Defence Force Journal
Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

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The views expressed in the articles are the authors’ own and should not be construed as official opinion or policy.
Gunship Training
Ted Serong's Army Career

Dear Sir,

I refer to my article on Brigadier Serong which appeared in the Defence Force Journal recently (no. 56, January/February). A minor change is required to the first sentence of the last paragraph, second column, on page 12.

The quote should be properly sourced as follows:

"It is a minor tragedy for the Left that . . ." The two words 'and right' originally shown in the text (after left) should be deleted to properly acknowledge the reference shown as a footnote.

Michael Fogarty
AUSTRALIAN STUDY GROUP
ON ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

CONFERENCE: 26-27 JUNE 1986

The tenth annual conference of the Study Group will be held on Thursday / Friday 26-27 June 1986 at the Australian Defence Force Academy. The theme of the conference will be:

PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE IN AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY

Speakers will represent the variety of perspectives on issues of war and peace to be found in Australian society today. Those who have agreed to speak include:

Sir William Keys - RSL
Andrew Mack - Peace Research Centre
Peter Edwards - Official History, Vietnam War
Michael McKernan - Australian War Memorial
Professor Francis West - Deakin University
Lt Col David Horner - Military history
Ron Walker - Department of Foreign Affairs
Derek Woolner - Legislative Research Service
Des Ball - Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Frank Hutchinson - Peace Education
Magnus Clarke - Nuclear War and Young People
Hugh Smith - Australian Defence Force Academy

For further information and registration forms please contact:

Dr Hugh Smith, Department of Politics, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, Campbell, ACT 2600

Telephone 062-688862 or 062-688845
The Department of Defence is not only the largest of Commonwealth Government agencies, employing 71,000 men and women in the services and more than 37,000 civilians but also the most complex.

"It combines the command, control and financial functions of the department itself with the duties and organisation of the three services, the extensive research and development work of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and the activities of the Natural Disasters Organisation, which co-ordinates physical assistance from the government in the wake of natural disasters at home and abroad. Since late last year it has also included defence production facilities.

"Administering an organization with such wide and varied roles which together fulfil the vital task of maintaining a secure Australia is made even more difficult by the fact that so much of its activity is long term."

K. Beazley
Minister for Defence, June 1985

Introduction

It remains a disturbing paradox that an organization aiming at effective operation in the confused and disordered environment of war and crisis has evolved into 'the most complex' of government agencies. Consequently, it is appropriate to discuss whether the current Australian national security machinery is capable of yielding a timely and firm response in time of crisis. After all, let us not lose sight of the essential roles of the Department of Defence (DoD) which embodies most of what we know as the national security machinery. This role should be to manage human and material resources so as to optimize the combat effectiveness and combat sustainability of the DoD operational arm which is the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Though the DoD has taken on extensive responsibilities in other areas, the primacy of the fundamental role must be maintained so as to provide the Australian Government with a reliable and enduring tool of policy.

For many years Defence Ministers have been aware of the 'difficulty' of running their department. This situation seems to have been exacerbated in recent years and should give reasons for concern, since, if such difficulty exists in peacetime it is naive to think that all things will fall into place in war. Indeed, the difficulties in managing defence resources will almost certainly be multiplied in what Clausewitz described as the 'fog' and 'friction' of war.

This article is a critique. It will necessarily concentrate on things which the DoD is, in the author's opinion, seen to be deficient in or simply appears to be doing wrong. The article will not often mention the many tasks which the DoD accomplishes in a timely and competent manner. Therefore, the reader is warned against interpreting parts of the writing as all too fashionable 'DoD bashing'.

By Lieutenant Alan Hinge, RAN
The Fundamental Problem—'Overcentralization'

Defence departments around the world share the basic problem of striking the right balance between centralization and decentralization of authority and processes. Indeed, this a common issue in many other organizational types but it is a particularly critical aspect when dealing with crisis or war management. An appropriate level of central control is undoubtedly essential in maintaining a coherent link between military operations and policy. Central control is also valuable in countering some of the less cost effective tendencies of the services, especially in such areas as acquisition policy. However, overly centralized management and even command can also cause unacceptable operational inflexibility at lower levels and seriously impede ADF performance in a crisis. Therefore, the great dilemma of DoD central management rests on how to assert strong central control while delegating sufficient responsibility and authority to its operational arm. Once a correct balance of control is struck, this should do much to ensure rapid and efficient military operations in a crisis.

Attaining the correct level of ‘balanced centralization’ in the DoD is made even more difficult by the fundamental uncertainty of all war planning in time of peace. Other large departments and corporations have fairly clear and precise reasons for existence. They can set tangible objectives and arrange appropriate feedback lines so as to assess whether their objectives are being met. The DoD has no profit to make, it is not embarrassed by inflation or unemployment figures and its competence is not shown up by a rise in the rate of industrial disputes or illiterate people in the community. In short, DoD is really only shown accountable in that stern ‘court of last resort’, which is war. Unfortunately, in war and crisis, second chances are seldom given and revision of policy and practice are luxuries which often cannot be afforded. The Australian DoD must look at getting things right during peacetime. A first step in increasing the department’s ability to manage a crisis and prepare for war is arresting a trend towards overcentralization of control and authority. This trend has resulted from an ‘overimplementation’ of the Tange Report on defence reorganisation.

During a crisis, the greatest virtue of any organisation is procedural simplicity. The more centralized a system becomes, the higher the number of management and command thresholds which must be crossed and the more complex is the system. Each decision level increases the chance of delay and ‘breakdown’ of the chain. Thus, the administration of even highly technical forces and operations should be made as simple as possible. The Australian DoD has moved towards an extremely centralized system in order to cope with its ill-defined tasks and the uncertainty which is inherent in the planning for war.

Overcentralization of the DoD has led to the imposition of maximum as opposed to adequate levels of control from ‘The Top’ (The Canberra Central Defence Organisation) and a correlated failure to simplify the defence task. DoD is not delegating decision making authority to lower (regional) levels and generating initiative at the ‘lower rungs of the ladder’ where, in operations, it will be needed most.

Overcentralization of any organization is indicated by two main symptoms.

**Symptom 1—Procedural Complexity**

Firstly, the generation of a greatly increased procedural complexity in the decision making process. Overcentralization gives rise to excessive layering of authority levels which impedes performance with delays, duplication of effort and inordinately numerous review levels. Excessive layering of decision levels has generated a cumbersome DoD Committee system which involves a level of ‘consensus’ based on the lowest common denominator of assent from the numerous parties involved. These parties include the services, defence bureaucracy, and several other outside departments such as Foreign Affairs and Finance. Increased procedural complexity has complicated defence purchases to the extent that over 100 major steps are often required to make a decision to acquire a major piece of equipment. For example, the main bodies associated with the acquisition of major naval equipments are:

Directorate of Naval Project Co-ordination  
Naval Staff Requirements Committee  
Defence Operational Requirements Committee  
Chief of Naval Staff’s Advisory Committee  
Project Director Staff  
Defence Industrial and Manufacturing Policy Committee  
Naval Materiel Committee
Defence Source Definition Committee
Defence Force Structure Committee
Defence Force Development Committee
Minister for Defence
Directorate of Naval Production
Department of Administrative Services
Directorate General of Naval Design
Potential Equipment Suppliers
Supply Branches
The Parliament
Defence Production Group
Treasury
Department of Finance

It should also be noted that the Minister of Defence was required to give approval at six stages of the over 100 stage process and these approvals were in addition to approvals given during ministerial participation in some of the above listed committees.

There is no doubt that major equipment purchases require a high degree of consideration and scrutiny. Also, no one can realistically argue with the need in this day and age for long lead times and adequate administrative and technical advice in the military acquisition process. But the DoD has taken the process to overcautious extremes and, in the matter of equipment acquisition, one wonders whether the whole process could not be substituted for a system of Australian Operational Adequacy Assessments (AOAA). Such a system would merely involve a team of Australian experts going overseas to put proposed equipments under rigorous operational examinations to see whether the equipment was appropriate to Australian needs. If Australian production were desired, prototypes could be produced by private enterprise management groups who could be contracted to co-ordinate production between Australian and foreign facilities. The prototype would be tested in accordance with AOAA's and, if successful, full production would follow.

This way, the DoD will be simplifying its acquisition program, saving money, reducing lead time and allowing private enterprise to take many of the risks.

A certain degree of initial confusion and waste must be accepted in the undertaking, described above. But these can be accepted since they are, in the long run, less burdensome than the current acquisition process and can lead to more appropriate and better tested units being acquired more quickly and in larger quantities.

The extremes of bureaucratic procedure to which the DoD has turned is understandable. Australian defence decision makers have negligible experience in planning for the higher conduct of war. A policy of self-reliance has only been in place for a decade or so and during this period little more than lip service has been paid to the principles of self-reliance. Throughout this century, up until the post Vietnam-era, Australian defence planners had the relatively easy job of supplementing the forces of 'great and powerful friends'. When a policy of self-reliance was acknowledged to be the way ahead in Australian defence circles, planners had very little experience of mobilization, strategic analysis or management of any forces greater than Task Force or Brigade level. Lack of high level defence management experience is thus a major reason for the overcautious DoD approach to many issues.

Another reason for the move toward over-centralization and bureaucratic 'overkill' is that the services exhibit strong tendencies to maintain their historical independence and these tendencies are justifiably regarded in many areas of the DoD as things that must be checked if cost effectiveness and a suitable Joint approach to defence problems is to be achieved. The pursuit of separate service functions and roles is not surprising. The services have always been and are currently trained that way. Thus, in the absence of any really serious approach to Joint operations and Joint co-operation a certain degree of bureaucratic impartiality, particularly in terms of equipment acquisitions, is desirable. However, one could argue that DoD has used the Committee system to counter service tendencies to a level which has become counter productive. In using the Committee system to maximise cost effectiveness and unify service purposes the DoD has ironically acquired one of the least cost-effective defence systems in the world. This claim will be supported in the next section, which examines the second major symptom of an overcentralized organization.

Symptom 2: Loss of Output Orientation

An overcentralized organization becomes so inundated with the details of functional management that it begins to lose sight of the purpose for which it was designed. In becoming preoccupied with the enormous amount of data
which must be processed in its central offices such an organisation begins to lose perspective relating to what is important and what is not. The central offices then tend to overmanage or 'micromanage' when their function should really be policy declaration and allocation of decision making authority to regional or out-station middle managers. Micromanagement involves succumbing to the bureaucratic temptation to exercise control over all matters and not delegate authority to those sub units which are perfectly able to do the job with basic policy guidance. The micromanagement which exists in an overcentralized system causes the system to expend energies which could otherwise be devoted to output maximisation and output control. Such an organisation necessarily becomes increasingly involved in Function Oriented Activities (FOA) of a general support nature and less involved in Operations Oriented Activities (OOA) which are concerned with direct support to the main objective achieving machinery of the organisation. This syndrome causes the organisation affected to lose control over output, fail to achieve objectives and lose responsiveness generally.

An obvious manifestation of this organisational sickness in defence organisations is a dramatic decrease in the 'Teeth-to-Tail' ratio (COA/FOA) of the DoD generally. In the case of Australia's DoD, a disproportionate increase in the 'Tail' organisation has taken place since the mid-1970s when the major Defence Reorganisation took place. In terms of available operational units teeth-to-tail ratio has fallen in the services but this generally seems to be in line with trends elsewhere in developed western countries. However, where a major change in the overall ratio has taken place is in the civil support area. The Defence Reorganisation generated a long term rise in DoD civil employment of nearly 40%. This represents a numerical increase from 27,000 to over 37,000 in one decade. The latter figure of 37,000 personnel has reached the stage where it is equal to the effective manpower of the combined Australian Navy and Air Force and is larger than the Australian Army by a factor of approximately 20%. Meanwhile, the numerical strength of the Australian services remained quite constant throughout the period (totalling about 70,000 personnel).

In view of the massive increase in civil personnel support functions which has occurred since the Defence Reorganisation of 1973-76, it is almost impossible to believe the gross miscalculation at the time which estimated that, in the long term, a civilian manpower reduction of 1,500 would be a major benefit of centralization. The Minister of Defence at the time, Lance Barnard, stated '... Thus the new organisation not only promises greater effectiveness in the management of Defence. It presents us with an opportunity to achieve this increased effectiveness at a reduced cost in the form of civilian wages and salaries. It is an opportunity to divert funds from overhead to military equipment. We will seize that opportunity, I have decided that the total reduction civil manpower should not be less that 1,500'. These were brave and confident words indeed since by 1981-82 only 10% of the DoD budget was spent on capital equipment and by 1983-84 over half ($A2.815 billion) of the defence budget was dedicated to manpower related costs involving service salaries and allowances, civil salaries and 'Administrative expenses and other services' (which are directly related to civil allowances and other manpower expenses).

During the last five years $A25 billion has been spent on Australian defence. This enormous sum has yielded a surprisingly low output in terms of capability. To gain an insight into what this sum can buy if handled efficiently we must compare Australian performance to that of another country during the same period. A period of five years (1980-85) is selected for convenience as it is an adequate time for gauging defence continuity and serves our purposes better than simply analyzing the most recent single years trends. A country selected for comparison should have roughly the same population, manpower cost (per individual) and technological capacity in addition to a basic proportionality of defence expenditure. Like Australia, it should also buy most of its major weapons platforms and equipments from overseas.

Comparative Output Study

Canada serves the purpose of comparison for the following reasons:

i) Its population is comparable to that of Australia (25 million as opposed to 15.6 million). This is reflected in a basic proportionality in the size of the defence forces (85,000 as opposed to 70,000).
ii) Total manpower costs per man in each country are roughly equivalent ($100,000 per individual);  
iii) Defence expenditure ($US) of Canada has averaged out at an only one fifth (22%) higher level than Australia during the five year period 1980-85; and  
iv) Canada purchases most of its equipment from overseas and has very similar equipment to Australia in terms of type and capability. In fact, much of it is identical, eg., Leopard tank, M113 APC FA-18 aircraft and Oberon submarines. Missile weapons are also identical in many cases such as the Harpoon ASM and Sidewinder AAM.

From these characteristics it would be fair to assume that Canada should not be able to field a significantly more powerful field force than could Australia. But this is not the case as is generally indicated by the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational forces*</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unmech)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mech)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Air</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Fixed Wing (MR)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Rotary wing (ASW)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong>**</td>
<td>75(F18)</td>
<td>138(F18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/FGA/AD</td>
<td>24(F111)</td>
<td>74(F5A/D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Military Balance 1985-86

* The difficulties in comparing forces of different countries is considerable and arguments concerning differences of interpretation are inevitable. However, distinguishing operational value from paper strength is a necessary task. For example, although Australia has one division (3 infantry brigades on paper, the six infantry battalions which form its core are at varying strengths. The infantry component of the ODF consists of two battalions fairly close to full strength. The four other regular battalions are down to as low as half strength (ie, 60 men in each rifle company of nominal strength 123 is not unusual. This leads to infantry sections on patrol consisting of from 3-5 troops when nominal section strength is 9-10 troops). Consequently, it may be that Australia could put a fully mechanized and supported infantry brigade into the field at relatively short notice but little more than this. Of course, this brigade includes the entire ODF and surge capacity would be very limited.

** Each of the two mechanized infantry brigades deployed by Canada would be of more combat value than a hastily 'thrown together' Australian land defence force. For example, the Mechanized Brigade Group deployed by Canada to Europe is equipped on heavy scales and has a strength of 5,256 personnel. It consists of one armoured regiment, 2 infantry battalions, one artillery regiment, an engineer regt and a helicopter squadron. It is supported by an Air Group of three fighter squadrons consisting of 54 F18 aircraft. This Canadian Nato deployment alone, which is always kept at a high state of readiness, would therefore certainly be no less effective than a combined, concentrated Australian Army/Air deployment under optimum conditions.

Also, note that the Canadian Special Service Force is also considered the equivalent of a mechanized brigade (strength 4,000. It contains an armoured regiment, infantry battalion, artillery and engineer regiment).  

*** Australian Air Force units involved in Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) are included in this total, ie. 12 RAAF P-3C in service.

**** Both the RAAF and RCAF are presently in a state of flux owing to the transition from older fighters to newer fighters. Totals are given for aircraft inventories anticipated to be largely in place by 1988. This approach assumes the phasing out of all RCAF F104 aircraft and most RAAF Mirage II0 aircraft by
that year. The RCAF also has a much more comprehensive infrastructure than the RAAF in terms of ECM and other training and support functions.

Major Australian DoD ‘Output’

Deficiencies

In 1984, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence noted ‘... that in spite of an annual defence budget of over $5 billion and combined forces totalling some 72,000 service personnel, Australia can only quickly field in an emergency:

- a small number of tactical aircraft;
- a smaller number of naval combat vessels;
- a counter terrorist force based on two squadrons of the Special Air Services Regiment; and
- up to a brigade—approximately 3000 soldiers—mainly from the Operational Deployment Force (ODF) located at Townsville, supported by other units.

Other ‘principal weaknesses’ determined by the committee included:

- the lack of long range integrated surveillance and early warning capability.
- the absence of a national air defence system; and an inadequate strategic command and control system.

In addition, further ‘important deficiencies’ in the force structure were listed as:

- Australia’s Area of Principal Defence Interest is inadequately mapped and charted;
- the information on Australia’s national infrastructure is incomplete;
- Australia’s Maritime Defence Forces are thinly spread and they have inadequate protection against air and submarine attack;
- the Operational Deployment Force is inadequately manned and equipped and has insufficient air transport to meet all its deployment response times;
- Australia’s land forces lack a close air support or aerial fire support capability, and have inadequate battlefield surveillance facilities. As a general rule, they are thinly spread, undermanned and underequipped;
- Army’s reserve stocks of ammunition, weapons and spare parts are inadequate, and, apart from elements of the Special Air Service Regiment and the Operational Deployment force, its operational readiness is very low; and
- Australia’s preparations or civil defence and civilian support of our defence posture are ill defined.

On balance, the Committee considered that there existed ‘fundamental weaknesses (which) detract from the credibility of Australia’s Defence Capacity, in particular our ability to deter intermediate and high level threats’. These weaknesses were that ‘Australia’s current approach to defence is inadequate in terms of its limited short term operational deployment capacity and combat sustainability, its limited expansion potential and its inadequately defined command structure. The Committee is not satisfied that the Australian Defence Force can quickly deploy sufficient men and material to meet low level threats, not can it sustain them for long enough in operations. Its capacity to deal with higher level threats crucially depends on receiving sufficient warning of the threat and being able to expand in time to meet it, this conclusion is effectively an indictment of DoD management of the Defence Force and seems to be justified.

The DoD cannot accept the extraordinarily small, teeth-to-tail ratio it has achieved as ‘... a necessary price for updating and modernizing Australia’s overall defence capacity in line with recent developments in our strategic environment’. Nor should the department be permitted to explain away Australia’s defence unpreparedness and critical operational limitations as being ‘... further justified in terms of the high costs and long lead times associated with major defence equipments and the likely extensive warning times for intermediate and high level threats’. Such vacuous rationalizations do not stand up to analysis and belong more to the realm of wishful thinking.

It appears therefore that current national security planning and general DoD decision-making processes are not ‘delivering the goods’. This situation will become further entrenched unless modifications are made to the system. If changes are not made, Parliament will continue to get a much lower level of DoD effectiveness than it expects and ought to receive. This will remain the case despite the Government continuing to dedicate 10% of its annual budget spending on defence and ultimately investing defence funds of the order of $A60 billion.
during the 1980-1990 period\textsuperscript{27}. The confidence with which this statement is made rests on the belief that the inefficiencies of DoD management and implementation processes are a direct result of a basic failure to develop any specific form of national security policy by which to set objectives and provide a means for assessing departmental outputs. This fundamental lack of direction makes the design of appropriate command systems and operational concepts all but impossible.

\section{II The Determination, Management and Implementation of National Security Policies}

Management and implementation of organisational objectives will not be cost effective unless objectives are clearly identified. The DoD tends to make its strategic objectives so general as to be meaningless\textsuperscript{28}. This is no better exemplified than in the compilation and interpretation of the \textit{Strategic Basis Paper} which should act as a firm tool for the guidance of defence decision making.

A former service Chief of Staff stated that '... In their contribution to the preparation of the Strategic Guidance, the individual chiefs deliberately make it vague and woolly so they can use it to justify the selection of any piece of equipment they want'\textsuperscript{29}. The extreme generality and lack of quality of the document was also widely acknowledged by many defence-interested elements of the public and elements of the responsible press. In 1983, the current and endorsed \textit{Strategic Basis Paper} was ‘leaked’ by the \textit{National Times}. An editorial in the \textit{Financial Review} stated '... The publication of extracts from a highly confidential cabinet document, the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, is a matter that should give serious pause to all concerned with policy making in this sensitive area ... The Strategic Basis material now published gives ample support to the belief that there is something wrong in the government’s policy making and the theory of the reasons for confidentiality. The truly shocking thing about the Strategic Basis material is what it tells about the inadequacy, indeed the incompetence, of our foreign affairs and defence establishment. The assessment is trivial, superficial and tendentious. If this is what millions of dollars are spent on, the money is clearly wasted\textsuperscript{30}. Judging from the material actually published in the \textit{National Times} such harsh judgements seem to be largely justified. Unfortunately, the Australian Strategic Basis Paper gives every appearance of a document which is sentence by sentence edited by numerous authors with the short-sighted objective of gaining the lowest common denominator of assent within the DoD and other departments. Such a document only leads to extreme generality and an increase in uncertainty. This unnecessarily high level of uncertainty merely leads to increased ‘infighting’ among the services and a tendency to overcentralize so as to maintain maximum control over resources and decision making authority. The micromanagement which ensues chokes ‘output’ and the DoD becomes more preoccupied with maintaining its corporate integrity by concentrating on Function Oriented Activities.

Evidence exists that the DoD has accepted that the basic guidance is very limited and ‘... did not provide us with the facility we felt we needed to integrate the capabilities of the Defence force as a whole ... We are approaching the next version in a somewhat different way ... we will, rather than take it as one omnibus document, set up what we are terming a guidelines paper ... and that will take strategic guidance and turn it into something we think is more precisely aimed at defence capability. We then aim to go ahead with a series of specific studies or reviews of particular issues in the military or defence area ... In this way the Defence Force Development Committee will get, over a time, a series of separate studies, all hopefully fitting into an integrated pattern’\textsuperscript{31}. This all very well but it appears quite vague, however, it can be argued that no sound basis for defence capability judgement will ever be arrived at unless those in the DoD charged with the planning of the higher conduct of crisis management and war can settle upon a fundamental strategy for Australian defence. Capability judgement must be based on firm decisions regarding fundamental choices between:

(i) Concepts of Operation—
- Coastal defence or defence in depth?

(ii) Operational Orientation—
- Direct strike or strategic penetration?
- Joint or single service command/control?
- Primarily Maritime, Air or Ground operation?
(iii) Command System—
Mission Oriented or Function Oriented?
Maximum unit ‘self containment’ and initiative or central control down to the tactical level?
Without firm choices being made in these and several other areas, guidance will not be clear and proper selection of capabilities and setting of priority between capabilities cannot be accurately achieved. All the new ‘studies or reviews of particular issues’ will be of no value as long as these choices are not made and promulgated. Output will continue to be low given such lack of direction.

III The Suitability of the Existing Central Defence Organisation for War
The DoD bias towards centralization seems to have made it ‘uncompetitive’ in terms of peacetime capability output. It should therefore come as no surprise to note that DoD planning for war mobilization and ultimate provision of fuel and ammunition reserves is negligible. But serious as these problems are, two critical factors must be addressed which, even in crisis management situations short of war, can seriously inhibit DoD speed of reaction and the quality of forces available for deployment. These factors are (a) DoD failure to take Joint Operations seriously; and (b) DoD failure to design and implement an Operations (output) Oriented Command System.

(a) JOINT OPERATIONS
A major area of DoD mismanagement in terms of preparation for crisis and war deals with the Department not giving Combined Arms (Joint) operations the priority, indeed the primacy, they deserve. Joint operations embody ‘Teamwork’ force multipliers which our lean ADF cannot afford to neglect. There is an obvious requirement for efficient Joint Service Operations involving firm unified command of forces and Joint advice rising above individual service interests. Much lip service has been paid to the Joint or ‘Purple suited’ philosophy by uniformed and civilian members of the DoD, however, the following observations suggest that no substantial Joint operational infrastructure exists and no determined effort is being made to institute a serious approach to Joint operations:

- No comprehensive and independent form of Joint Operational Readiness Assessment seems to exist. Consequently, DoD has no effective gauge of Joint performance ‘output’ other than post-exercise debriefs which are frequently unreliable as they depend on a high level of honest self-criticism to be of any value.
- The Exercise Planning section of the Directorate of Joint Planning (DJP) consists of only two officers. This section is responsible for the planning of Joint exercises and production of a Joint Programme of Service activities. It also produces a Joint Training Report and the CDF Joint Training Directive among other things. Assistance would probably be gained from the other section in DJP (Contingency Planning Section) but this section only consists of six officers.
- The ADF lacks any form of permanent Joint Operations forces which are capable of engaging in practised operations at relatively short notice. The Joint Service Units and Organisations responsible direct to ADF Headquarters (where all positions are not always manned) are purely ‘tail’ entities, ie. Joint Services Staff College, Australian Defence Force Academy, and the Australian Joint Warfare Establishment.
- A strong spirit of service independence exists even in areas which could be cost effectively centralized with minimal detriment to ADF operational performance, eg. Manpower planning, service police, legal, healthcare, personnel administration and in many training commitments. For example, consider healthcare in the services. Each service has its own Health Office at Russell Hill, Canberra, with offices being manned as detailed below:

The cost of maintaining the four Flag and General Rank Officers in these three organisations is over one quarter of a million dollars. Total annual personnel costs for the three health offices would be approximately $A3.25 million. The necessity to have three controlling bodies for services, which have the same health standards, is questionable. Similarly, in the other areas mentioned amalgamation could be achieved with beneficial results in terms of monetary savings and the development of a ‘unified approach’ to problems which would eliminate much waste and redundancy.
Failure to amalgamate many basic, already centralized administrative structures common to each service is largely due to a tendency to preserve traditional service autonomy. If these tendencies cannot be overcome in basic administrative and training functions there is little likelihood of them being overcome by the present ‘lightweight’ Joint Operations infrastructure.

The current Joint policy seems to be based on the wishful thinking that the three services are flexible enough to be brought together, unpractised, on a modern battlefield and do the job. This seems a recipe for disaster as the Holloway Report would suggest. This authoritative US DoD report dealt with the abortive military mission to save US hostages in Iran during 1980. It found many problems with the Joint organisation which was developed to perform the mission. Problems existed throughout the command process despite the huge amounts of resource dedicated to the task. The mission’s ground force commander said before the US Senate Armed Forces Committee that:

“In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and then asked them to perform a highly complex mission. The parts all performed, but they didn’t necessarily perform as a team. Nor did they have the same motivation.

“... My recommendation is to put together an organisation which contains everything it will ever need, an organisation which would include Delta, The Rangers, Navy SEALS, Air Force pilots, its own staff, its own support people, its own aircraft and helicopters. Make this organisation a permanent military unit. Give it a place to call home. Allocate sufficient funds to run it. And give it sufficient time to recruit, assess and train its people.”

This hard learned experience is to a somewhat lesser extent reflected in the ADF’s very limited experience of Joint enterprises. In June 1984, the then Director General of Joint Operations and Plans said of the Kangaroo ’83 Exercise:

“We took personnel from all three services . . . from all round Australia, and quite obviously that is a major problem if you look at it in the larger context of handling or coping with any sort of emergency that arises with the level of manpower we have at the moment.”

If joint service disasters of the magnitude of the US rescue attempt can happen at the tactical level, problems are almost certain to multiply at the strategic level of national defence if a strong Joint framework has not been put in place. It has been argued that the current single service setup is flexible and that the formation of a Joint Command and Operations establishment is “... precipitative and unwarranted”. This attitude would seem to lack a sound appreciation of modern battlefield conditions and tends to illustrate what might well be an unrealistic confidence in the concept of warning time.

The pace of modern war requires speedy response and the use of well co-ordinated, mutually supportive combined arms operations. Unity of purpose, thorough team training and familiarity with other service idiosyncracies are prerequisites for the generation of the cohesion so essential to Joint operational success and any other form of military success for that matter. These prerequisites are not satisfied overnight when throwing together individuals and formations many of which are as strange to each other as the enemy might be.

(b) COMMAND SYSTEM

It has been said that an army of stags led by lions is far more effective than army of lions led by stags. This seems to be a fairly valid representation of the point that competent command is fundamental to the competent operation of a defence force. A Command system must co-ordinate the activities and support of its forces so as to carry out necessary Defence missions. Thus, the critical importance of an efficient command system is hard to exaggerate.

The chief of the Defence Force (CDF) is the Joint military adviser to the Defence Minister and the rest of Cabinet. CDF is therefore the critical interface between military and political decision makers. His advice to the ultimate authorizing authority; that is, Cabinet, must be well conceived and of the highest quality. In major crises he must in turn have the top quality advice of the Joint planning and command team within his headquarters (HQADF). This Joint planning and command team, headed by the Assistant CDF (Operations), must make the command process as uncomplicated as possible for the CDF, the Minister and Cabinet. Simplification of the command process involves minimizing the amount of data needed to be
assessed by Cabinet by distinguishing the truly relevant from the non-relevant and developing realistic options for the decision making body which we will call the National Defence Executive (NDE = Cabinet, Minister of Defence, CDF and an absolute minimum of other officials since it serves a command, not an administrative function). In short, the HQADF Joint Planning Team must quickly be able to provide Cabinet, through CDF, with the following:

1. A clear and concise statement of the problem;
2. Short term and long term implications of the problem;
3. Practical options for the solution of the problem; and
4. A recommended option for the solution of the problem.

These four elements are essential to facilitating sound Cabinet judgement in terms of the higher conduct of war and crisis management. Mission allocation and prosecution can then proceed once a plan has been determined by the prominent national decisionmaking body and clear objectives and rules of engagement have been specified at the highest level.

The expertise required to provide the CDF with the highest quality of Joint military advice goes far beyond mere operational virtuosity. Skills in formulating such comprehensive advice include:

(a) A well developed ability to contribute to the formation of coherent Joint operational strategies for the higher conduct of war. This involves a sound knowledge of, and training in, strategic analysis and political crisis management principles and procedures. This ability takes for granted the possession of genuine Joint perspective rising above the institutionalized interests of the service;

(b) A well developed ability to articulate concepts and produce excellent Staff work. Such communications skills do much to maximise the prospect of intelligent cooperation in contingency planning and produces an homogeneity of thought based upon logical argument. Unity of purpose will be a major benefit arising from the proper exercise of these attributes;

(c) The ability to design processes of decision making by which members throughout the ADF can judge events and make appreciations in accordance with one definite and unified system. By making sub-unit commanders thoroughly familiar with Joint decision making principles the delegation of tasks and responsibilities is made easier and more effective. This gives a bias towards decentralization in the organisation and guards against the HQADF being inundated with details and 'micromanagement' decisions. The role of the HQADF Joint Staff should therefore be command in its broadest sense; that is, setting objectives and educating sub-units in the basic guidelines by which to achieve the objectives. This leads to enhanced initiative being displayed in the operational echelons which need it most; and

(d) The ability to initiate and maintain a Joint Operational Readiness feedback mechanism which will not rely on data being provided by the headquarters being assessed. Such a system must provide an independent, reliable gauge of ADF output while concurrently not being perceived as a 'threat' to the Joint commands undergoing test procedures.

The application of the skills listed will assure correct guidance to ADF formations from above and competent advice to strategic decision making authorities. Australia's current Joint planning body tends to lack these skills and the requisite manpower to apply them.

U. Alexis Johnson, a very senior US diplomat who figured prominently in many of the world's post-war crises and negotiations, concluded that it was imperative that the ultimate political decision making authority be provided with a corps of genuine 'purple suited officers' qualified to look at 'the whole gamut of national political and military issues without being encumbered by the baggage of service loyalty and promotion channels. While the parent services would be run by senior officers highly competent in the requirements of their services and specializations, this group would be separate from their parent services for promotion purposes'. Johnson's call for a broader and more balanced survey of military matters and truly Joint advice to decision makers is a fundamental conclusion after over forty years of first hand crisis management experience at the highest level.

It seems quite clear that a system of truly Joint command and control should be implemented so as to guarantee the 'teamwork' mul-
tiplier for actual Joint operations. Two steps must be taken to do this. These steps are to, (a) Firmly institutionalize Joint operations and (b) Form permanent Unified Commands which can act in a semi-independent, self-contained manner during mission execution.

(a) Institutionalization of Joint Operations

The cursory treatment given so far by DoD to a Joint concept of operations can be changed by providing HQADF Joint planning staff with personnel in sufficient number and of sufficient calibre. This group must be empowered to check elements of the services and support bureaucracy which pursue conflicts of interest to such extremes as to be detrimental to the national defence interest. HQADF must evolve into the 'last word' in the allocation of decision making authority to the services and Joint Commands. It should also become the prominent authority in deciding on force development and structure so as to replace the current inefficient Committee system.

The services should ultimately be seen as 'Feeder entities' or simply reservoirs of strength for the Joint Operational Formations (JOFs) commanded by CDF through his HQADF staff. Service Chiefs, as professional heads of their service, would ensure the correct training of service units and ensure a requisite replacement system for service units deployed with JOF's. JOF commanders, selected by HQADF (which would also provide a JOF Chief of Staff to the formation) would be in absolute command of his force which would operate according to general objectives given by CDF. Component service commanders of each JOF would be directly responsible to the JOF commander and not to their service chief. Such a system would thus institutionalise Joint operations, mitigate autonomous tendencies between the services and increase ADF fighting power by focussing attention on overall national defence objectives as detailed by CDF in consultation with his HQ staff and Cabinet.

(b) Permenant Joint Commands

Overcentralization of command and control proved disastrous in Vietnam during the years of US involvement. The US command structure was overcomplicated and despite the availability of massive technological resources, the time taken to organise and plan operations was longer than at any other time in the history of the United States. The lesson is clear. Centralized command and centralized control of forces does not work in terms of economy or efficiency. But centralized command and decentralized control can and does work. The prerequisite for decentralized control is the existence of a number of JOF’s which are as 'self-contained' as possible, particularly in terms of logistic support.

Centralized command of JOF’s would emanate directly from HQADF. HQADF would adopt a policy of setting guidelines such as rules of engagement and setting the objective for each JOF commander. The JOF commander would then be at liberty to decide how he, and his now semi-independent command would realize the objective. Obviously, absolute clarity of directive to the JOF commander would be essential. Also, an independent feedback system would have to be designed by HQADF in order to maintain an accurate surveillance on the operational situation. This feedback system is essential so as to ensure that HQADF does not 'get told what it wants to be told' through the normal command chain. At the same time, the independent feedback system must be designed so as not to seem to threaten operational formations.

This form of decentralized control, in which the field commander is given considerable latitude of decision making authority, is a major attribute of any modern force requiring the characteristics of mobility, cohesion, rapidity of response, concentration and combat sustainibility. A high level of logistical and command independence should also filter down to the lowest possible levels in order to ensure that response to crisis situations is rapid and commensurate with objectives set by the NCE through HQADF.

Besides having the services of a HQADF experienced Chief of Staff, the JOF Commander must be highly trained in a unified system of command, analysis and action designed by Joint Planning Staff. This is essential to produce the homogeneity of approach which HQADF must be able to rely on in order to allocate a high level of decision making authority to JOF commanders. Indeed, JOF command would probably follow a long posting to HQADF for the system to be most effective. It can of course be argued that this process is simply a means of inducing 'group think' into the ADF and it would be counterproductive in terms of initia-
But this need not be the case. Homogeneity of approach towards operations ensures intelligent co-operation in the higher conduct of war and does not rule out the use of initiative at all. Intimate collaboration at higher levels of command is probably the most vital ingredient of military success and effective crisis management. A JOF commander, on receiving the parameters of the problem and objectives from HQADF, should be trained to assess the operational situation according to a certain common framework of analysis. But equally important would be his freedom to create a solution based on the merits of the particular operational case. Consequently, JOF commanders would have to be selected that could prosecute operations with 'elastic' tenacity and never lose sight of the strategic and political whole of which their objectives are part.

Many reservations would doubtlessly be voiced concerning the institution of an Operations Oriented System as discussed above. The lack of civil control over the military would certainly be an objection. But the NCE would set objectives and this would be a predominately civilian political group exercising absolute and final control over general objectives. The important judgement to be made is therefore between two approaches which are:

(a) Maintaining comprehensive central control over the DoD operational arm and accepting a low DoD 'output' in terms of capability. (Function Oriented Command System); and

(b) Accepting a lesser degree of assured comprehensive control over the operational arm in an effort to maximise the quantity and quality of DoD 'output'. (Operations Oriented Command System).

A happy balance must exist between these extremes, which are effectively, those of centralization and decentralization of control. It is suggested that a system of centralized command coupled with decentralized control as discussed in this section is the optimum approach given the speed and quality of response required in modern crisis control.

IV The Interaction of Civilian and Military Agencies

The issue of what constitutes an appropriate level of civilian control over the military is a prominent factor when considering interaction between bureaucratic and military agencies of the DoD. The Australian DoD is essentially a functional diarchy based upon civilian-military accountability at all levels of the decision making and management process. The Department arose in its present form from the Defence Reorganisation Act of 1975 which set about implementing 'central functional control' of defence resources in exactly the same way as it was approached during the US DoD reorganisation of the early 1960s by Defense Secretary McNamara. The fundamental aim of the Australian reorganisation as stated by Lance Barnard in 1973 was that:

"The Defence of this country is too important a matter to be administered by a demonstrably inefficient grouping of organisations whose objectives are not always the same, whose very existence as separate bureaucracies bedevils great affairs with unnecessary conflicts ..."

Similarly, a predominant motive for creating the US functional reorganisation was, in Bernard Brodie's words, "... rationalizing procurement for the armed services, by insisting on budgeting by functions rather than services, and all the rest—including above all marked enhancement of the meaningfulness of civilian control ..."

Functional reorganisation of the Australian DoD involved the formation of seven major functional groups within the Department, all headed by civilians. Each group is to provide policy advice to the minister and issue directives on behalf of the minister relating to its functional area. Strong civilian control of the DoD was also ensured by establishment of 12 major management and policy making committees of which only two were to be chaired by service officers. Such a system can tend not to take basic military aspects into proper account as was found in a major 1981-82 review of the higher defence management. Two major problems noted by the Defence Review Committee (Utz Committee) were that "... insufficient attention is given to military advice in the formulation of defence policy and the shortcomings of some senior defence committees."

Senior defence committees are undoubtedly under firm civilian control, especially given the considerable power which may be exercised by the Chairmen of respective committees. For example, if we consider the very important process of long term force development, there
are three higher committees which are intimately concerned with the details of this issue. These committees are:

- The Consultative Group
  (Civilian Chairman/7 Civilians, 3 Servicemen)
- Force Structure Committee
  (Civilian Chairman/7 Civilians, 3-4 Servicemen)
- Defence Force Development Committee
  (Civilian Chairman/2 Civilians, 4 Servicemen)

The Force Structure Committee and Consultative Group do most of the force development ground work and advise the Defence Force Development Committee. The Consultative Group and Force Structure Committee also have the same person as Chairman (Deputy Secretary B) which places extraordinary decision influencing power in his hands. This is a situation which is sure to provide much scope for conflict with the services and low 'productivity' in the force development area. A past Deputy Secretary B was recently interviewed by the media which reported that:

"As a Deputy Secretary in the Defence Department, his job was to play devil’s advocate to proposals from the Armed Services, and his fearless and disciplined approach to the task earned him the undying enmity of many defence chiefs. When a thick and densely argued submission for a 'New Destroyer Project' arrived on his desk, the story goes in the Department that Mr . . . . . . crossed out the word 'destroyer' and wrote in 'corvette'."

Such attitudes and stories, whether truths or half-truths, indicate that all is not well in the higher management areas of defence in terms of higher civil-military working relations. The military cannot be blamed for believing that civilians, rather than performing a supportive role, are in reality exerting such a high level of control as to equate to command. Civilian dominance of the DoD is represented at most levels of the diarchy. At the highest level the Secretary, or Permanent Head of the Department is given very wide terms of reference. According to the Public Service Act, he ‘shall be responsible for its (the Department’s) general working, and for all the business thereof, and shall advise the Minister in all matters relating to the Department’. The Secretary is also accountable and therefore in control of all DoD expenditure under the Audit Act of 1901 and other regulations. Compared to those wide and highly tangible powers the CDF is not in such a clear cut position. CDF is, ‘the principal military adviser to the Minister for Defence and, subject to the control of the Minister,... (is) to command the Defence Force’.

But, in a peacetime diarchical system which has closed the gap between functional and operations oriented activities, the line between command and administration is unclearly delineated. If we consider the issue of wartime command as defined in the Australian Field Service Regulations, we observe that:

"A command in war is an appointment which involves complete responsibility for the training and leadership of fighting troops and for the efficiency and maintenance of these troops."

One must ask the question of how viable this concept of command in war is in a diarchical system and how working relationships under this type of system will 'marry' in time of war.

If we look at the origins and performance of the US DoD functional management system, on which the Australian reorganisation was conceptually based, we are offered little scope for confidence in our current system. During the US functional reorganisation of the early sixties, McNamara set about implanting the tools of financial and public management throughout the US defence complex. Tight civilian control was emplaced within two years of McNamara’s entry into the Kennedy Administration. Civilian dominance of the military aspects of the US DoD was so great that civilian methods of management were naturally used to cope with the new Defense Department’s first big test, which happened to be the Vietnam War. A systems approach to warfare became a central aspect of warplanning. Data based statistical methods were widely employed up until McNamara’s resignation in 1968.

The Planning Programme Budgeting System (PPBS) was also used in conjunction with systems analysis to, as Brodie puts it, ‘get the most tactical and strategic effectiveness for one’s money’. Ironically, this streamlining of the US DoD, which was aimed at maximising cost effectiveness, produced the least cost effective war in US history.

But the real guilt for the Vietnam failure can be found on the military side of the US DoD diarchy. The US military allowed themselves
and their civilian counterparts to be taken in by the gnostic presumptions of civilian or academic strategists who sought throughout the post war era to reduce war to an academic model and thus make it amenable to systematic quantitative analysis. Indeed, many of the academic strategists were systems analysts or efficiency experts by training and Brodie says that ‘they were mostly in the United States and usually were associated with institutions like the RAND Corporation . . . ’59 The US military abrogated its responsibility to give strategic advice and left it to another group which substituted technical, administrative, historical and general academic knowledge for ‘the art of the general’60. Gradualism and over-elaborate concepts of limited war were thus applied with minimal success. In short, the US military were not sufficiently concerned with true strategy and failed to develop and give advice which was of sufficient quality to influence government against the arguments of civilian DoD staffers and academic strategists. The US military effectively lost command in Vietnam and, by default, the war became administered by the civilian side of the diarchy61.

Henry Eccles aptly sums up the US experience of the diarchial defence structure during the Vietnam war when noting the failure of military to take their rightful role, ‘This was the surrender of military intellectual leadership to the civilian scholars and systems analysts. It stemmed from three primary causes; the military leaders’ preoccupation with their struggles over service unification, the creation and shaping of the Department of Defense . . . their preoccupation with nuclear weaponry . . . their growing contempt for the study of military theory . . . In this process first the military lost control of their language, then of their organisation and finally of their operations . . . ’62.

This sad epitaph of a diarchy where the military ultimately lost control of their operations might well be said of the ADF after a future crisis. The ADF must seek to establish its rightful military intellectual prominence within the DoD so that the ‘horse can once again be put before the cart’. The civil arm of the DoD diarchy cannot be blamed for endeavouring to remedy obvious deficiencies in military intellectual guidance of policy. Low civil arm confidence in the unity of the services and their potential to make well-reasoned strategy decisions for the collective good of the defence effort is quite justified. Consequently, it is to be expected that in a diarchical system the bureaucratic arm will move to maximize its decision making power. The military see this process as an effort at civil intrusion into their areas of responsibility and tension is the end product of this sad imbalance.

It is suggested that much of this tension would dissipate if a strong and genuine Joint service command organisation is formed which would produce a high quality of military analysis and decision for the collective good of the Australian defence effort. This organisation, under CDF, would have its legitimacy recognised by those elements of the services and bureaucracy which are dedicated to maximising the effectiveness of the defence effort and not advancing their own positions.

Summary.

The role of the Department of Defence (DoD) is to satisfactorily provide for the defence and security of Australian interests. The essential element of this role is organizing and sustaining a capable Australian Defence Force. DoD ‘output’ in terms of ADF operational capability and sustainability has, with justification, come under consistent adverse comment in recent years. Such criticism reflects poorly on the DoD management of the overall defence effort. This paper examined the following three major reasons for generally unsatisfactory DoD performance:

a. Overcentralized control of functions;

b. Failure to firmly institutionalize Joint doctrine; and

c. Inefficiency of the Higher Committee Force Development system.

It is also argued that these deficiencies could be substantially remedied by implementing the following measures which are aimed at developing a DoD capable of wielding strong central command while exerting decentralized operational and administrative control.

I. Incorporate a Decentralization Bias within the DoD.

The central administrative machinery of the DoD should make every effort to limit its involvement to only the broadest aspects of management. These aspects are:

a. The design of decision making processes for the ADF and DoD civilian arm. This would provide all DoD personnel with analytic tools
by which to judge events and make apprecia-

tions in accordance with one definite and uni-

ified System. Such a policy would help to ensure homogeneity of approach to administration and operations which would in turn make the proc-

cess of delegating authority safer and easier. In designing such processes the DoD must be wary of settling for a ‘systems approach’ based on quantitative analysis. Processes should combine logic, intuition and common sense. They should make full use of the creativity, initiative and motivation of the individual;

b. The allocation of the widest possible de-
cision making authority to Defence Regional offices and ADF commands which are quite capable of performing relevant tasks under general directives. This policy should then be extrapolated to the lowest possible levels, whether they be administrative or operational; and

c. Development of an independent feedback system between the Central defence organiza-
tion and the ‘coalface’ commands and offices. The aim being to ensure an independent means of assessing and maintaining DoD ‘output’ quality.

Implementation of these broad management policies will simplify the defence task by:

1. Eliminating the need for central defence agencies to ‘micromanage’ by greatly reducing the amount of minor decision making input data to be assessed. This leads to increased concentration on essentials, flexibility and speed of response;

2. Rationalizing the existing system of exces-
sive layering of authority and review levels. This leads to a reduction of duplication, paperwork and delays;

3. Encouraging initiative and developing an improved ability to cope at the ‘coalface’ where such attributes are most needed; and

4. Maximizing independence of Joint Oper-
tional Formations (JOFs) by providing them with the highest degree of self-containment in terms of force structure, command authority and logistics support.

II. Firmly Institutionalize Joint Doctrine and Command.

Achieving this goal establishes doctrinal unity and a ‘teamwork multiplier’ which can substantially increase ADF operational output. This will occur when HQADF evolves into an organization capable of effectively controlling divisive elements within the services and bu-

reaucracy which pursue their own vested inter-

ests to extremes harmful to the national defence effort. HQADF staff must be of sufficient calibre and in sufficient number to exercise firm control over the services. The services must eventually accept a less independent status and become reservoirs of personnel and equipment for permanent JOFs. JOFs must eventually become cohesive fighting formations to which ‘troops’ will give a degree of loyalty exceeding that which is given their parent or trainer service.

HQADF staff numbers must be built up to a sufficient level to ensure:

(a) Cabinet is given genuine Joint service advice of the highest quality;

(b) JOFs remain as ‘self contained’ as possible and are capable of a quick and apt response to HQADF directives. This necessarily involves the development of an appropriate Joint Readiness Evaluation System;

(c) The efficient and maximized allocation of decision making authority to JOF and sub-

unit commanders; and

(d) Unity of purpose within the Australian Defence Force.

Conclusion.

Defence is an issue of vital importance to any nation. The Australian DoD can ill afford to remain satisfied with the mediocrity of performance which it has exhibited to date. Unsatisfactory DoD performance can basically be attributed to over-centralization and overcau-
tion which are symptoms of an organization lacking direction and experience in planning for the higher conduct of war.

My recommendations for improving DoD performance are aimed purely at maximizing the quality and quantity of operational output and incorporate the essential elements of an operations or missions oriented command sys-

tem. Given Australia’s limited resources, I cannot see a better method of providing for national defence despite certain risks which are inherent in such a system. But risks are nec-

essary if change is to be effected; and change is needed if Australians are to get the defence value for money which they have a right to expect. After all; in the long run, the conse-

quences of continued DoD inefficiencies will probably weigh more heavily upon Australians than do errors in the choice of defence means.
NOTES

1. The Australian, 10 June, 1985, Special Report, p.2.

2. K. Von Clausewitz, 'On War', See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the 'fiction' involved in war. Modern technology and a 'systems approach' to war management has not eliminated this factor. See note 42.

3. See the 'Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments' which was presented to the Minister of Defence in November, 1973. It is widely known as the Tange Report.


5. Ibid

6. Comprehensive testing procedures under simulated operational conditions is probably the best way to guarantee value for money. Overseas suppliers should welcome such procedures if sufficient numbers of equipments are likely to be ordered. However, domestic production of equipments is a more difficult question. Private enterprise should be utilized to produce management packages for DoD use, since DoD has project management expertise of far less calibre. The most recent of a sustained number of criticisms of DoD project management was levelled by the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts which accused the DoD of misleading it over a number of issues relating to the Government Aircraft Factories (GAF). In its response to an earlier report (No.198) which, specified GAF management problems, the Committee said 'gross inefficiencies and mismanagement continued'. See Canberra Times, 'Defence Gets a Serve'; 7 December 1985, p.14.

7. Deployment and provision of an Australian Task Force of approximately Brigade strength was Australia's main contribution to the Vietnam allied war effort. Management and support of this force was a major defence force effort and, even then, the Task Force fell under the effective operational control of the US. It did not act as a truly independent command at any stage of the involvement.

8. The teeth-to-tail ratio tends to decrease as modernization pervades defence forces. This is mainly due to high costs of sophisticated platforms, weapons and other equipment. The higher capability such equipments give is a difficult factor to take into account in the consideration of teeth-to-tail ratios.

9. The following Australian service strengths were listed in THE MILITARY BALANCE 1985-86 (International Institute for Strategic Studies); Navy: 16,025, Air Force: 22,677 (Total RAN complement is therefore 42,702), Army: 32,029.

10. In 1975, there were 69,154 service personnel in the ADF. In 1985, there were 70,731 regular service personnel serving in the ADF.


15. P. Young, 'Putting Bang Bang in the Military Buck', The Australian, 2 February 1985, p.9. This figure takes into account individual training and general support costs in addition to salaries, and is, on average, a very general figure.

16. See the Military Balance Series, 1980-81/81-82/82-83/83-84/84-85 for details of annual Canadian defence expenditure. Expenditure has been increasing at a faster rate than Australia's. At the beginning of the decade it was under ten percent more than Australian expenditure. Currently, it is running above Australian expenditure by over one third.

17. Military Balance 1985-86,

18. P. Young, 'Sorry, Mr Beazley, but our forces are run down'. The Australian, 24 July 1985. The skeletal strength of the infantry battalions is matched by a large shortfall in Armoured Personnel Carriers to transport them. Mr Beazley has acknowledged in Parliament that the Army currently has a shortfall of 311 of these vehicles which are fundamental to the mobility of our army. See The Australian, 'Army would 'walk' to war'; 17 December 1985, p.3.

19. The Canadian Special Service Force should not be confused with the Special Air Services. Australia's SAS Regiment numbers only a few hundred personnel equipped for lightly scaled reconnaissance and counter-terrorist work. The Canadian Special Service Force is a major combat formation of high capability.

20. See Military Balance 1985-86, p.44.


22. Ibid, section 6.112, p.114

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid, section 5.26, p.77


26. Ibid.

27. Given that $A25 Billion was spent on defence in the first half of the decade, it is reasonable to assume that even given minimal real growth in budget allocations this figure will more than double in the next half decade. The spiralling costs of weapons, systems, manpower and platforms will almost certainly cause defence expenditure to average at about $A7 Billion over the remaining years of the decade.

28. The extreme generality of DoD strategic objectives is a fundamental reason for its low 'output' in terms of capability and sustainability. Lack of direction and the syndrome of 'no likely threat' for a certain number of years is symptomatic of an 'immature', overcautious defence organisation which is extremely unsure of itself. See C. Carr and F. Mitchell, 'Bureaucratic Triumphalism and the Defence Structure', Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1979, p.69-70, for a discussion on the apparent aimlessness of the Defence bureaucracy.


31. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, op cit, section 8.33, p.150.

32. Ibid p.115.


34. Ibid p.12.

35. Pacific Defence Reporter, August 1985, p.3. Service pay increases granted in late 1985 have increased the figures noted in the article concerned.


38. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, op cit, section 7.58, p 132.


40. CDF (then CDFS) was described as '... the principal military adviser to the Minister for Defence ...' in the Ministerial Directive to CDFS dated 9 February 1975.


43. Van Crevald's book (op cit) provides a strong argument for this theme.

44. Ibid p 237

45. Barnard, p 1


52. See Ball p 300.


55. Van Crevald, p 237.

56. By 1968, the US had lost hope in the possibility of a clear cut military victory (see Van Crevald, p 232). At this point, the US concentrated more on getting out of Vietnam than adopting a 'systems approach' to winning the war.

57. Brodie, p 461.

58. See Van Crevald, Chapter 7, pp 232-260 for an analysis of the US command (?) structure in Vietnam. The author concludes this startling chapter with the apt statement: 'To study command as it operated in Vietnam is, indeed, almost enough to make one despair of human reason; we have seen the future and it does not work.' (p 260)


60. The word strategy has traditionally meant the art of the general or Commander-in-chief.

61. The stage was reached during the war at which the President and Defence Secretary exercise direct control over air strike frequency and target selection. The civilian stranglehold of the DoD grew to the point where the resulting friction led to the relief of the US CNO (Admiral Anderson) in 1963. After this, the military arm was brought firmly under control. See Defence Force Journal No. 36, Sept-Oct 1982, p 3-4.


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Introduction

It would be a bold individual who entered the maze of committee reports, distorted journalism and confusing political rhetoric that girdles defence in search of logic, and a still bolder one that chose to ignore it all together. Defence is important, especially to those of us who make a living at it. We all have our own areas of expertise but if you’re anything like yours truly, you sometimes find the basics rather illusive and contradictory. Is it possible that the foundations of Australian defence, those assumptions and (dare I say) prejudices upon which it is built, are shaky?

Australia’s defence thinking has not changed fundamentally since WWII yet the world is very different, not least due to the spread of nuclear weapons. Sound defence policy has the confidence of the majority of citizens yet doubt seems to be growing. Perhaps past policy-makers have been wrong and we should not be too eager to follow the route so well mapped out for us.

Defence: First Principles

There are two things fundamental to nationhood; assets (people and property) and sovereignty (the ability of the people to decide their own fate). If the people and their property are destroyed there is obviously no nation. If the people cannot decide their own fate they are slaves, colonials or the victims of conquest. The loss of either assets or sovereignty is most undesirable for any nation.

Defence and nationhood are closely related. Broadly, defence means the protection of a nation from undesirable foreign influences and therefore covers aspects of foreign and economic policies as well as the armed services. In a democracy defence is the product of a collective will to prevent what is believed to be detrimental to the people as a whole. In Australia’s case defence was a major reason for the federation of states into a nation.

Australians elect a Federal Government to express their will as a nation. The Government has created several departments to preserve and facilitate its sovereignty, of which the Department of Defence is one. Information about defence is freely available to the public. A look at the basics which under-lying current defence dogma can be very enlightening.
The Nuclear Threat: Assets V Sovereignty

In October 1984 the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Defence had this to say about Australia’s strategic environment;

- “The most dangerous threat to Australia’s national security and well-being would arise from war between the United States and the Soviet Union;”

and

- “Australia can provide no direct defence against nuclear war, nor can it directly change or influence the global balance of power;”

In other words the primary threat to Australia is global nuclear war, however nothing can be done about it. It seems reasonable then, to say that Australia’s entire defence structure exists to meet a secondary threat.

This is hard to swallow.

Perhaps nuclear war is not the most dangerous threat. It makes little difference. Nobody could argue there is no threat at all, or that the resulting damage to the people and property of Australia would be anything less than catastrophic. At very best Australia’s defence ignores a substantial threat.

What then, is the threat that our defence structure is supposed to answer?

First of all the level of threat to this country is perceived to be very low indeed. This has naturally led to the somewhat academic treatment of defence problems; it is after all hard to take a hypothetical situation seriously. The kind of threats envisaged are described as ‘low’ or ‘intermediate level contingencies’ i.e. terrorist type activities or a dispute with a neighbouring country over, say, fishing rights.

An actual invasion of Australia is considered unlikely due to the massive logistic problems any attempt would have to overcome. In any case it’s assumed that Australia will have ample warning and plenty of time to prepare with the assistance of allies, in particular the USA.

All threats, whether of high or low order, are considered to be threats to the Sovereignty of Australia rather than the people and property. Should these threats materialize the assets of Australia would certainly suffer, but they would not be annihilated. Australia would be undefeated and retain its nationhood until the government surrendered.

This kind of thinking was more appropriate in WWII than it is today. Unfortunately conventional attack is not the only threat we face.

The possible outcome of ignoring the nuclear threat, a shaken Australian government emerging from shelters to ‘govern’ a nation of incinerated ruins and a few distraught citizens, is patently absurd and far from any common sense idea of defence.

To the author’s knowledge not a razoo has been spent on the nuclear threat since the sixties.

Arms Control

The report goes on to say;

- “Australia should emphasise the common interests in achieving disarmament and arms control;”

It’s difficult for Australia to be entirely convincing as a disarmament crusader while claiming to be firmly established in the western camp. Not only is the ANZUS alliance the cornerstone of our defence, but we permit the joint defence facilities on our soil, one of which is a major link in the US submarine launched missile forces. Australia has neither the international clout nor the reputation for impartiality (as does Sweden for instance) to effectively promote arms control. Besides, the major powers already profess support for arms limitation; there is no point preaching to the converted.

The Conventional Threat

- “While Australia’s own region of interest is relatively stable, there are developments which could undermine the prospects for continuing stability in the longer term;”

True. Things change and we could face a growing threat (conventional presumably) from our own region at some time in the future.

Australia’s answer to this possibility is the ANZUS alliance. The alliance, it’s reasoned, deters aggression and should this fail will provide the required assistance. Meanwhile Australia need only keep the military capacity to deal with minor contingencies. There will be plenty of time, should things turn sour, to expand the forces from the existing nucleus of expertise.

A very nice theory and cheap to implement too! It does however, have a few minor weaknesses that we should be aware of.

Firstly, the threat must be assessed as such and mobilization begun early if Australia is to have any hope of being ready in time. This means that the government, politicians, must make a decision of huge consequences quickly.
Politicians have a remarkable capacity for not seeing unpleasant developments and a gift for telling people what they want to hear. The Prime Minister of pre-war Britain, Neville Chamberlain, with his delusions of “peace in our time” was an excellent example. Nobody wants to hear about war.

Secondly, assuming that the decision to expand Australia’s defences had been taken early it is not certain the time available would be enough. The enemy would have several years head-start, numerical superiority and a very sound plan for getting his men to Australian shores. Nobody would undertake such a risky venture without being reasonably sure of success.

Thirdly, we cannot rely on the US to come to our aid. The ANZUS alliance does not commit them to assisting Australia in any way, and even if it did prudence dictates that we should not rely on foreigners to rescue us. Treaties made in peacetime tend to be forgotten or reinterpreted in times of conflict. Self interest will always be paramount.

History

History has patiently tried to teach a rather slow Australia about the dangers of relying on a foreign power. Before WWII it was widely believed that the Royal Navy and an impregnable Singapore would provide adequate defen­ce for Australia. This complacency and reduced government expenditure during the depression led to a disastrous decline in Australia’s defence forces.

When war broke out in Europe Australia rapidly trained its young men and sent them away to fight the Germans and Italians. The Japanese however, on entering the war swiftly destroyed HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, and soon overran Singapore. With Australia almost defenceless Churchill tried to have the AIF, at that stage returning from the Middle East, diverted to Burma with the aim of protecting India!

When the US entered the war Australian troops came under the command of MacArthur and once again subject to the interests of another country, albeit interests very close to our own.

Most wars we have fought had very little to do with the defence of this country. Australia has never entered a war entirely on its own behalf.

The Enemy

The final sub-paragraph on Australia’s strategic environment says;

- “In seeking to ensure regional security Australia should be aware of the different perceptions and perspectives of our neighbours.”

This points to the extremely important and often forgotten fact that whether or not we think our defence is adequate is irrelevant. What counts is what the enemy thinks.

Any potential aggressor will look most of all for a strong national will to defend. He could be forgiven for believing that it does not exist in Australia.

Australia has not developed a defence industry preferring instead to rely on imported hardware and expected assistance from abroad. We no longer keep adequate reserves of ammunition or spares, again relying on last minute assistance. Nor does Australia have up to date topographical maps for much of its territory thereby reducing the effectiveness of what little sophisticated hardware it does possess.

The enemy will also look at Australia’s existing potential to enforce national will when planning aggression. He may, for instance, decide to test our resolve by invading or harassing a friendly neighbour confident that we do not have the wherewithal to prevent it unaided. Being a local conflict we could not really expect the US to commit troops (it may not be in their interest to do so), nor could we defeat the enemy without a massive increase in defence effort. It’s not certain that the Australian people would agree to the required sacrifices unless Australia itself was in danger. The alternative would be a humiliating back-down costing us whatever hopes of regional leadership we may have entertained.

Australia First

We would do well perhaps, to be a little concerned. The question of minimizing risk from nuclear attack has been ignored. The question of how Australia would cope with a radically different post-war world has received similar treatment. To proceed with attitudes like ‘it’s too awful to ever happen’ or ‘we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it’ puts nuclear war in the same league as an invasion from Mars. It makes nonsense of the very idea of defence.
Even if there were no risk from nuclear war our defence is still inadequate because we have failed to put our own interests unreservedly and unconditionally first. Australia still chooses, 40 years after WWII, to base her defence on an alliance with the USA. Our interests are not, and never have been, identical to those of America. Any gain this compromise seems to bring is illusory. Sooner or later we will have to take full responsibility for our own defence and the longer we delay the harder it becomes.

Does Australia Need ANZUS?
The arguments for keeping the alliance are briefly:

- ANZUS provides Australia with a measure of deterrence against aggressors;
- ANZUS facilitates a strategic dialogue with the US;
- ANZUS enhances our diplomatic and military status;
- ANZUS gives us access to a wide range of defence resources including advanced technology, supply and support for weapons systems and other equipment, and sophisticated intelligence; and
- The Australian defence force derives considerable training benefit from ANZUS.

One wonders if it's ANZUS that deters aggression or simply the fact that Australia has close ties with the USA and other western nations. The measure of deterrence depends upon the willingness of the USA to provide assistance which, in turn, depends upon their available resources and popular support for foreign involvement. With the resurgence of isolationist feeling in America we may find ourselves rather forlorn in the years ahead.

It is misleading to say that Australia's diplomatic and military status are enhanced by ANZUS. There is a certain prestige in having powerful friends but only when a significant contribution can be made to the common good. Australia will ultimately be judged on its own merits and not on a one sided alliance.

ANZUS no doubt facilitates "strategic dialogue" with the US (whatever that means), though surely a formal treaty is not needed for meaningful communication between two basically friendly nations. Foreign defence technology and training are nice but cannot be relied on. Depending on foreign intelligence, whatever the source, is fraught with danger. ANZUS guarantees Australia nothing. Rather it formalizes a relationship that would exist anyway.

In this light it's interesting to look at some of the drawbacks.

Liabilities of ANZUS
Most damaging in the long term is the false sense of security the alliance fosters in the community at large. It's too easy for individuals to sweep defence problems under the carpet believing that ANZUS is the panacea. While this may be politically expedient from time to time in the long run it will be detrimental because democracy relies on an informed citizenry to succeed. Eventually it will be up to individual voters, not politicians or defence officials, to make important decisions about defence. It is, after all, average citizens who fight wars.

ANZUS is bad for Australia's international credibility because it shows we're prepared to rely on the US for defence while trying to promote an image of ourselves as independent members of the international community. We must practice what we preach. Australia cannot moralize to the world about disarmament while allowing US facilities on its soil, and expect to be taken seriously.

The presence of US facilities in Australia is a military hazard. There is little doubt that these, and US warships in our ports, would be targets in a nuclear exchange.

Is ANZUS worth it? The author believes not.

The Future
Australia must develop a credible and truly independent defence capability that answers both conventional and nuclear threats.

The author believes the changes needed to achieve this are significant and must involve the community as a whole. It means the introduction of civil defence and national service programs. It means support for defence industry in Australia. All Australians and their property face a direct threat therefore all should participate in defence. This country can no longer afford the luxury of an elite professional military equipped with expensive imported equipment.

Australia should not forget New Zealand. We have more in common with them that we will ever have with the USA. Our future will certainly
be closely linked with theirs and if we must have an ally they are the logical choice.

The author, however, is not holding his breath. Defence will continue to be thought of in terms of grand alliances and global strategies for quite a few years yet. Meanwhile a depressed economy and weak dollar will gradually whittle away our capabilities and opportunities for greater independence will be passed up. Alas, in our committee based and rather paternalistic democracy the winds of change blow very slowly.

NOTES

2. Ibid., pp 13-20.
3. Ibid., pp 34-40.
4. Ibid., p 35.
5. J. P. Buckley, A Soldier’s Tribute to John Curtin Defence Force Journal No. 53. This excellent work reveals some disturbing similarities between current attitudes to defence and those prevalent prior to WW2.
7. Ibid., p 35.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The Journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

The Power of Sea Power. Grazebrook A. W. United States Naval Institute Proceedings; Mar 85: 108-113 NATO Defence strategy presumes there will be a mass Soviet land and air attack on the central and southern European fronts. This article outlines the weaknesses in NATO strategy and Navies, should the USSR begin an extended trade war both inside and outside the NATO geographic area.

China: Emerging Sea Power. Hahn, Bradley United States Naval Institute Proceedings; Mar 85: 102-107 Fear of a rapidly growing Soviet Navy has caused China to modernize its Navy with the aim of making it a dominant force by the end of this century. The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Navy has considerable influence in the Chinese leadership. The article outlines China’s perception of Soviet actions in Asia and increasing co-operation between China and the US.

Singapore, The Poison Shrimp. Richardson, Michael Pacific Defence Reporter; Jun 85: 19-21 Reviews the development of Singapore’s Armed Forces since independence and problems it may face in the future such as the ability to sustain a heavy defence commitment. Also discusses Australia’s defence links with Singapore. The ‘poison shrimp’ policy was aimed at deferring potential aggressors by building the defence industry and military capability.

Vietnam, The Double-Edged Sword in South-East Asia. Warner, Denis Pacific Defence Reporter; Jun 85: 15-18 The Soviet Union has turned the Cam Ranh Bay into its biggest base outside the USSR, sustaining growth of its naval and air forces in the South China Sea, and has financed Vietnam with much military aid creating a potential threat to the United States in the Pacific and to ASEAN.

China’s Big Leap into the Arms Trade. Hollingworth, Clare Pacific Defence Reporter; May 85: 11+(3p) China sold defence equipment worth $1.7 billion (US) in 1984. The author reports on the defence industries including armaments, communications and aircraft, also the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) and its attitude to the Soviet Union.
By Major Dennis Burke, RAAC

May 6 1984

NAYRA tensed at the sound of gunfire as she walked with her young daughter Suda along the seaside Corniche in West Beirut. It was a warm and sunny Saturday and some families were paddling in the blue Mediterranean that lapped the beach. She felt more cheerful about her future as a new Government had been formed in Beirut to stop the fighting with Rashid Karami, a Sunni like Nayra, as Prime Minister. He would do something. He knew how heartily sick of the war the people were. Tomorrow a peace march was planned. Christian and Moslem women from both sides of the divided city would march to the GREEN LINE to join hands together and pray for peace. There was hope.

She was buying her daughter a glass of freshly squeezed orange juice from a seaside vendor when the four 105 mm shells hit the beach and the Corniche, blowing Nayra, Suda, the juice man and ten others to oblivion. There was no peace march the next day, for the occasional shelling kept most people indoors. By Monday 24 more people were dead and 84 wounded.

June 11 1984

The three Katushka rockets that hit the hospital and car park at ZARIF, a Beirut suburb had caused no injuries, but cars were on fire and residents rushed to rescue what little they could. Adnan Karaki, who was a seasoned photographer for the Beirut Daily Star moved amongst them to gain the best shots. He knew the dangers, but like the residents, reasoned that the the gunners in the mist-shrouded mountains would move onto new targets as they spread their terror.

Today they didn't and Adnan died in the second salvo. Someone rescued his film. Along with a photo of Adnan himself lying dead in the car park, these made page 3 the next day, under a caption entitled ‘BLOODY MONDAY’. It was the same day that Perez De Cueller, Secretary General of the United Nations, left Beirut after brief peace talks with the President. On this day 106 died and 250 were wounded!

Any day in Beirut is dangerous, some more than others. Sadly, the people of the city play a form of Russian roulette in order to exist. A
mother sends her child to school wondering if he will come home or be caught in some skirmish between rival factions or the victim of crazy shelling. A market gardener near the GREEN LINE tends his small crop and hopes he will not be a sniper's target that day. Christians who have to work in West Beirut and Moslems who have to work in the Christian East trudge doggedly across the few crossing points in the city each day. Maybe today some will be kidnapped and murdered as a form of religious reprisal on either side, or cut down by a hashish smoking sniper perched on a building.

On May 6, the day Nayra died, I watched the shelling of the beach from the ruins of Baabda hospital on a hill overlooking the city. On June 11, I was acting as LO to Perez De Cueller, ferrying messages by car from his hotel high up the mountain at Beit Meri in East Beirut to our UN headquarters in a villa at Hazmieh in the city. By June 11, I had been a UN observer in Beirut for 3 months, monitoring the situation, or more accurately, watching helplessly the death throes of a once great city. I, along with her people, hoped this nightmare would soon end.

Towards the end of March, I first entered Lebanon by way of Jordan and Syria. We (there were three of us), travelled north from Damascus, then west to enter Lebanon to the north of Tripoli. There had been a hijacking of one of our convoys on the normal route through Zahle the previous week, so it was decided to try this approach. It was with a sense of increasing vulnerability that I first entered Lebanon and commenced the coast drive to Beirut. Major areas of Tripoli were devastated at the time because of fierce fighting between rival Palestinian factions. Tripoli gave me my first glimpse of the devastation I was soon to become familiar with in Beirut.

Through the Syrian controlled areas of North Lebanon, we were stopped at various checkpoints manned by Moslem militia allied with Syria, whilst our papers were checked, and 'donations' were collected from travelling merchants. All this was by Syrian soldiers lazing nearby.

The militia, mostly teenagers, wore a variety of dress — camouflage trousers, boots or sandals, T-shirts emblazoned with popular western slogans, helmets or cowboy hats. All however, carried Kalishnikovs, and with these they gained my instant respect!

Later we entered the Christian controlled area north of Beirut. Here the checkpoints were manned by Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or Lebanese Forces (LF) militia who were better equipped than their Moslem brothers and went about their business in a more professional and unfriendly way.

We arrived at last at our headquarters, a small villa in the suburb of Beirut. I was soon to discover that it was sited very close to the Lebanese Army Headquarters and the Presidential Palace, areas which were the targets of frequent inaccurate shelling from the West. After a quick briefing, I was taken to a villa in the mountain suburb of Brummana which was to be my home for the next six months. The UN observers in Beirut had mostly moved to the east following the Chouf war in Feb 84, and the taking of West Beirut by Moslem forces. Since then the west part of the city had spawned many "uncontrolled elements" which made living there more hazardous for foreigners.

The villa at Brummana was well appointed including being sand bagged around the windows and doors. Electricity was rationed to a few hours each day and the water was undrinkable. It was called ANZIC house by the observers for it housed members from Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and Canada. This old Commonwealth brigade had banded together for what little we had in common. My first beer in this new home coincided with the WHOOSH and CRACK of Syrian Katuska rockets fired into Brummana. As we sipped our beers from the safety of the stairwell, I pondered on the Lebanese situation. After a few days work in Beirut, I realized that one could never hope to understand the complexity of the problem nor attempt to find a solution without examining the reasons which led to this present chaos...

The observations of an Englishwoman, Freya Stark, who lived in the same mountain suburb as I back in 1928, gave me my first clue:

"The people are charming to me. They are not really Eastern or anything, just a poor fringe of a people between Islam and the sea; doomed to be pawns in whatever politics are played here... I haven't yet come across one spark of national feeling, it is all sects and hatreds and religions.""
time, this small country has seen 100,000 of its people killed, 500,000 made refugee and another 350,000 leave to find a safer land in which to live. For a country with a total population of 3 million this is a particular agony.

Lebanon seems to invite attack. Besides numerous invasions last century, it has been overrun three times in the last nine years: by Syria in June 1976, by Israel in March 1978 and again by Israel in June 1982. Syrian troops have occupied large areas of Lebanon since 1976, and as Syria and Lebanon were as recently as 1940, the one country, many Lebanese understandably identify with Syrian interests and policy in the region.

What makes Lebanon different from other countries of the Middle East is its mountains, abundance of water and access to the Mediterranean. This combination has made it over the centuries a refuge for dissidents who were determined to maintain their separate identities.

Less than 220 km long and 70 km wide Lebanon is enclosed by two mountain ranges, the LEBANON descending to the Mediterranean coast, and the ANTI-LEBANON, which forms the Eastern border with Syria. Between these ranges lies the BEKAA VALLEY, a narrow fertile strip about 10 km wide. Leading back from the coastal plain north of Beirut is a series of mountain valleys running west-east. They lead to the heart of Mt Lebanon (referred to simply as ‘THE MOUNTAIN’ by locals) which is the historic centre of the Maronites. . . (MAP 1)

“The origin of the Maronites is vague, however they were the only Christian sect to emerge after the Moslem conquest. They appear to have had no serious problems with Islam until they collaborated with the Crusaders and this cast suspicion on their loyalty. The Maronites provided forces to the Crusaders and thus began their long relationship with the West. To this day many major northern families claim descent from the Crusaders.” The Maronites see Lebanon as a Mediterranean country, not on the Western edge of the Arab and Moslem world, but on the Eastern edge of Christendom.

The Maronites are the dominant Christian sect today but others include Greek Orthodox and Catholic, Armenian Orthodox and Catholic, and Syrian Orthodox and Catholic. The different sects have a long record of often bloody disagreement because the geography of the country spawned isolated fiefdoms and family dynasties. The constant jockeying for power often resulted in murderous exchanges within and between sects, a situation, which still persists today. The long running feud between the FRANJIEHS and the GEMAYELS, two Maronite dynasties, is one example. When confronted by the Moslem enemy however, Christians unite under the militant Maronite wing of the Lebanese Forces (LF) most notably ‘THE KATAEB’ . . . more about them later.

The Moslem sects are also numerous in Lebanon, but three are dominant: the orthodox SUNNI, the SHIA who disagree about the descent of authority from Mohammed, and the DRAZA whose brand of Islam is a closely guarded secret and who are the most cohesive force. The history of the Moslem sects, like that of the Christians, is one of betrayal and disagreement, which inevitably led to the formation of militias.

For instance, the most significant militant arm of the Sunni is the MORABITOUN (VIGILANTS). Born out of the Nasserist Pan Arab nationalist movement of the fifties, (he was also a Sunni Moslem) the Morabitoun was the first armed militia in Lebanon. As the majority of Palestinians is also Sunni, the Morabitoun has developed close ties with them. There are approximately 7,000 armed Morabitoun in Beirut.

The Shia are represented by the AMAL (HOPE), formed in 1975 by the Imam Mus el Sadr who disappeared, presumed murdered, during a visit to LIBYA in 1976. The Shia are the oppressed, generally uneducated Moslems who form the majority of Moslems in many countries of the Middle East. Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution are Shia Moslem. The South of Lebanon is predominantly Shia and refugees from here have poured into Beirut following the Israeli invasions of 78 and 82, thus swelling recruits to the AMAL. Today they are the dominant Moslem militia in Beirut and as they blame the Palestinians for many of their problems, they often clash with the Morabitoun. The Druze are represented by the militia of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), with Walid Jumblatt as their leader. The PSP are unpredictable but are generally pro-Syrian. They joined forces with the AMAL in Sep 83 to oust the Christians from the Chouf Mountains and West Beirut. From the Chouf their guns dominate Beirut and control the coastal road to South Lebanon.
1. TRIPOLI. Sunni Muslim Syrian control.
   Centre dominated by pro-Arafat fundamentalist.
2. CHRISTIAN. Franjieh country.
3. THE MOUNTAIN. Christian pro-Israeli Phalange.
4. WEST BEIRUT. Muslim, Syrian, Shia and Druze control.
5. CHRISTIAN. Army Headquarters and Presidential Palace.
6. CHOUFF MOUNTAINS. Druze and Syrian control.
7. SIDON. Muslim pro-Syrian PLO. Some Shia influence.
8. SOUTH LEBANON. Muslim Shia AMAL control.
9. BEKAA VALLEY. Syrian control.
Besides these main militias, on both sides there are small extremist groups such as the Maronite GUARDIANS OF THE CEDARS, the ISLAMIC JIHAD (Holy War) and HEZBOLLAH (PARTY OF GOD), each seeking to promote its particular point of view by any means. In Lebanon today there are in fact 135 combatant groups operating, many of whose loyalties shift daily!

Lebanon’s 20th century problems began immediately after WWI. By delegation from the League of Nations France became the governing power over the region known today as Syria and Lebanon. The present state of Lebanon was formed by the French in an effort to thwart Syrian nationalists who were agitating for the whole area to become a single state, and to appease their wealthy friends the Maronites, who dominated the North. The formation of this new state of Lebanon gave power to two major communities: Christian and Sunni.

Paris maintained its hold over the country through the Maronites. Lebanon became independent of Syria in 1941, and in 1943 a National Covenant was decided upon. This was confessional and stipulated the following:

- The President of the Republic and Chief of the Army must be Maronites;
- The President of the Parliament must be a Shiite; and
- Each confession is represented in Parliament

But ultimate power stays with the Christians who have a 6 to 5 majority.

In theory the Covenant was to have provided a balance between the factions, but things started to go wrong following the great influx of Palestinians after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Ten years later, with the Nasserist resurgence of Arab nationalism, violence erupted between Moslem dissidents and the Christian dominated Army which warned that the Covenant was breaking down. America sent troops in to prop up the Government. Perhaps if the warning signs were acted upon and a redistribution of power made then, the magnitude of the troubles to follow may have been avoided.

The Christians had never made the effort to establish, train and equip a strong national army, so that it could be used effectively by the Government if required. They never saw the need for one, particularly as they neither wanted to antagonize Israel nor meet the enormous costs involved. They were to regret this mistake.

In September of 1970, commonly called ‘BLACK SEPTEMBER’, the Jordanian Army crushed the increasingly militant Palestinian immigrants. Thousands of Palestinian commandos and refugees fled before the army of King Hussein and established themselves in Lebanon. This swelled the numbers already living in the shanty town areas of Beirut and created further imbalance in Lebanon. Nevertheless power remained with the Christians.

A showdown was not far off, for the Christians grew increasingly nervous of the Palestinian presence and the strength of the militant PLO operating as a state within a state. The clash occurred in May 1973 in Beirut, however the Lebanese Army failed to suppress the Palestinians. Instead the conflict had the effect of polarizing Christians and Moslems. The Christians now considered all Moslem Lebanese to be pro-Palestinian. As the Army was confessional consisting of Christians and Moslems, it could not be relied upon. So the raising of Christian militias was accelerated, the most notable being the ‘KATAEB’. The Palestinians too allied themselves with the Moslem Lebanese to counter what they claimed was the Christian dominated Government.

In the face of increasing provocation from the Palestinians and Moslem Lebanese the Christians began talking about partitioning Lebanon. As the attention of the world remained focused on Vietnam and the Sinai agreements, Lebanon moved closer to the abyss. Civil war erupted in 1975, which eventually introduced the Syrians, who invaded supposedly to restore order. They have remained since.

Now with the sanction of the Syrians, the Palestinian commandos operated freely against Israeli targets. Eventually the Israelis too entered Lebanon in force — first in 1978 then again in 1982. Operation ‘PEACE FOR GALILEE’ in 1982 put Lebanon on centre stage. This operation was aimed at the liquidation of the PLO and partly accomplished its purpose but at a terrible price. “19,000 people died during the operation, almost 7,000 of them in Beirut. Throughout the country about 30,000 were wounded again with the majority of them in Beirut. Of the total dead and injured only about 16% were fighters a statistic illustrating the blanket nature of the offensive”. Those displaced were almost all civilians, mainly from...
refugee camps of the South. The UN estimated some 60,000 had their homes destroyed and were forced to move.

The invasion did succeed in ousting the majority of the PLO from Lebanon and there was a brief period towards the end of 1982 when the Christian and Moslems appeared willing to settle their differences. The President-elect Bashir Gemayel was wooing the people, especially the Moslems, with talk of reunification and reconciliation. But he was assassinated in September 1982 and the massacre of Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra — Chatila by Christian forces occurred days later. Following the massacre, which added to the world criticism of the Israelis for the invasion, siege of Beirut and for allowing the massacre to occur, the Israelis decided to pull back to a more defensible position on the Awali River. The vacuum created by this move resulted in the Chouf War in September 1983 and uprising in West Beirut in February 1984, events which culminated in the disintegration of the Army. They were not defeated; Moslems in the ranks simply refused to use their weapons against their fellow Moslems and along with the Army went Lebanon's hopes. The war which began in 1975 has, apart from occasional lulls, never stopped. There is no effective Government in Lebanon and the forces for anarchy have never looked back.

Now the communities are very geographically concentrated (MAP 2). The Christian heartland is East Beirut and the mountains to the North. The Sunnis retain importance around Tripoli. The South, part of which remains under Israeli control, has long had a large Shia community. Poor refugee Palestinians and Shia occupy the 'belt of misery' in West Beirut. This includes the ramshackle areas of Sabra — Chatila, Chiyyah and Burj-El-Barajineh. The Chouf mountains above Beirut belong to the Druze.

"Even the evidence that guns have been used like aerosol cans in Beirut streets these past nine years will not attune the visitor to face what has been done to the city's heart . . . The scale and extent of the destruction beggars belief."

For Beirut the suffering has been harshest. This dynamic and beautiful city, once called the 'Paris of the Middle East' has been the focal point of the conflict. Beirut has been ripped apart by the civil war, then besieged and bombarded by the Israelis. There is a giant ferris wheel in a crumbling amusement park on the coastal Avenue Du General De Gaulle in West Beirut. To me, it became symbolic of the past and present of Beirut. It's skeleton steel stands definitely reminiscent of the gaiety of Parisien Beirut, now only a memory, for the old Beirut is gone forever. The city is dying, for it can endure no more.

Beirut is split into two main areas, Christian (East) and Moslem (West) since the fighting which began in 1976 and again in February 1984. The dividing line is known as the 'Green Line' and is the 'Front Line' between Christian and Moslem forces in the city. (MAP 3).

The atmosphere in Beirut can change like a chameleon, and just as quickly, but between outbreaks of violence life assumes a hurried normality. The Lebanese merchants are excellent businessmen, and many like to remind you they are descendants of the early Phoenician traders who plied the Mediterranean coast. Anything can be bought in Beirut. The shops in the main shopping areas of Hamra, Burj Hammoud, Ashrafiyah and Dora offer the gamut of international merchandise. Japanese electronics, Swiss watches, European cars, Italian shoes, French clothes, jewellery, confectionery and jams from Maxims can all be purchased at astoundingly low prices.

In the East particularly, the European look is fashionable and the people speak a Beirut slang which is a mixture of Arabic, French and English. Amongst the Christians it was 'chic' to speak French and this only served to emphasise their perception of themselves compared to the Moslems. On the coast to the North at Jounieh multi-million dollar yachts lie anchored, bikini-clad beach girls and private clubs abound. The now shabby Casino De Liban opens its doors when it can and ironically a large statue of Christ atop a hill surveys the scene.

Jounieh is to the wealthy Christians as Surfers Paradise is to the nouveau riche Australian. Here damage is minimal in comparison with the city and here the Maronite values are strongest, values guarded by the Lebanese Forces.

The Lebanese Forces are a coalition of Christian militias fashioned by Bashir Gemayel after the end of the civil war in 1976. The strongest militia in the Lebanese Forces is the 'Kataeb' which was founded by Bashir's father, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, following a visit to the 1936 Olympics where Hitler's Brown Shirts had
impressed him. The KATAEB has the same
ultra-nationalist ideals. From humble begin­
nings, aided by the civil war, and the deep
schism which has developed between Christian
and Moslem, the KATAEB now totally domi­
nates Christian thinking and actions. They, not
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), represent
security to most Christian Lebanese.

In East Beirut, despite the presence of the
outward signs of authority such as the Army
and Police, the LF superimpose forces every­
where to guard their own interests. They do not
tolerate interference. The militia, on mobiliza­
tion, numbers upwards of 20,000. They are
extremely well equipped with Israeli and Amer­
ican weapons and mostly Western equipment.
Their 105 mm and 155 mm artillery batteries
wait ready for action in the Christian hillsides
above Beirut. The LF are ‘Cocky’, tough and
the law in East Beirut. They do however ensure
a type of normality, if that is possible, com­
pared with the rest of the city.

West Beirut is chaos! By day it is teaming
with people who vie with the traffic for move­
m ent. Electricity is less reliable here than in the
East, and in many places water and raw sewage
flow from pipes shattered by shelling. Piles of
uncollected garbage fill the streets which are
alive with rats big enough to bluff even the
artful Lebanese cats! Drains are clogged with
debris and when it rains large areas become a
quagmire. Wretched children in rags beg in the
streets with a strained look of exhaustion and
sadness that belies their tender years. The con­
ditions in the refugee areas of the 'belt of mis­
er' are shocking. The smells are foul. Gunmen
of all ages are everywhere. Throughout West
Beirut one learns very quickly to read the pos­
ters and slogans which proliferate the walls of
buildings to determine which group is in control
in which area. By night the streets empty of all
but the foolhardy, the killers prowl and the
night sky lights up with each new clash.

The AMAL claim they control West Beirut
and militarily they do, but for the ordinary
person this provides little protection from the
wildcat skirmishes which occur suddenly be­
tween trigger happy groups and gangs. In West
Beirut there are so many totally uncontrolled
elements operating, that for civilians who risk
the streets death becomes an 'odds on favour­
lite'.

The UN's unthreatening presence assisted us
to develop a special relationship with groups
on all sides. In the course of a patrol we could
meet with AMAL, PSP, HEZBOLIAH and
KATAEB. We also made friends with many
merchants, ordinary peaceful people both Mos­
lem and Christian caught up in the war. With
them all we engaged in the Lebanese pastime
of drinking coffee, talking about the war and
looking for a solution.

The helicopter that took me out of Beirut
lifted off from the LZ in West Beirut on the
20 September 1984, approximately the same
time as a suicide car bomber crashed through
the barricades of the new American Embassy
in East Beirut on his mission of death. Lebanon
then was no closer to a solution to its problems
and I was as confused as my Beirut friends.
Since then, despite various initiatives, there has
been a resurgence of heavy fighting and now
the LF are fighting amongst themselves.

"The Arabs have no half-tones in their reg­
ister of vision. They exclude compromise and
pursue the logic of their ideas to its absurd
ends without seeing the incongruity of their
opposed conclusions. Their convictions are
by instinct, their activities intuitive."

T.E. LAWRENCE

The war in Lebanon is between Christian and
Moslem, Christian and Christian, Moslem and
Moslem, Rich and Poor, Family and Family.
If Lebanon is to take its first positive steps
forward towards self-respect, there are clearly
basic structural changes required. The authority
of the state must be restored. This calls for a
new Covenant to rectify the imbalance of power
so that Christian, Sunni, Shia and Druze are
equally represented. Essential also is the com­
plete reorganization of the Army by abolishing
confessionalism, so that it is able to implement
the authority of the state.

On the negative side however, the upsurge in
confessional thinking caused by the war and
the countless massacres has created such a deep
distrust that is is difficult to see how a Gov­
ernment and Army strong enough to implement
these changes could ever be established. Also
worth noting, is that the uneducated fighters
on the streets in Beirut, most still in their teens,
have known nothing but war and the power of
the gun. As judge, jury and executioner they
are all powerful and the prospect of laying aside
their weapons is not an attractive proposition.
Still Lebanon has many dedicated leaders, who, if given the “tools” (in Churchill’s words) to get Lebanon back on its feet, could achieve a lasting peace. But there are external dimensions to the war over which few Lebanese have any control.

There is Syria, that wants a puppet Lebanese government to counter the Israeli’s ambitions for the country and to shore up its vulnerable Western flank.

The Israelis for their part will never accept any Syrian proxy which would increase the threat to its Northern border. Israel has its own Christian-Lebanese force in South Lebanon. This provides an acceptable buffer, and allows Israel to enter Lebanon at will either to chase Palestinians or threaten Damascus. As well, the strategic considerations and global deals of Russia and America are relevant, for each have some influence on Syria and Israel respectively.

Lastly there are the Palestinians. The issue of the Palestinians is inter-woven throughout the sad history of the Lebanon war for this war is yet another symptom of the Palestinian plight. There can be no lasting peace for Lebanon nor the Middle East until this issue is addressed squarely.

So in Beirut they drink their coffee, argue politics and can find no answer. After a decade of war their fear of each other is reality, acceptance of which is parodied in the popular Lebanese joke about the rooster and psychiatric patient. The patient is convinced that he is a grain of wheat in the barnyard and will be eaten by the rooster. The psychiatrist works with the man for a year and finally says, “Now Sir, you realise you are not a grain of wheat.”

“Yes Doctor, but . . .”

“But what?”

“But does the rooster know?”

NOTES
4. Tony Fransiyeh, heir apparent to the Fransiyeh dynasty was murdered along with his wife, three year old daughter, maid and chauffeur by Gemayel gunmen in June 1978.
5. UNTSO (OGB) Information Bulletin.
8. Son of Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, and now succeeded by his brother Amin, the present president of Lebanon.
10. The Kataeb (Phalanges Libanaises) was the name of the para-military organization founded in 1936 which was transformed in 1949 into the Social Democratic Party. The party however continued to be known, popularly and officially as the Kataeb Party and its members Phalangists.
11. Attributed to T.E. Lawrence by Leon Uris in his novel The Haj. My spelling of Lebanese names throughout the article is for ease of pronunciation.

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IN SUPPORT OF MORE EFFECTIVE TEXTS FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEAN SERVICE STUDENTS IN AUSTRALIA

... But what about Australian Service Students?

By Major Bruce Copeland BA BEdSt RAAEC

Introduction

In the Defence Force, student personnel of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) continue to attend courses on technical subjects conducted by the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force.

If we are to give maximum support to these students, we must bring a high level of expertise to bear to produce training material appropriate to students from another culture who speak English as a second language.

It will be suggested that an appropriate strategy does exist for the production of effective student texts for technical training courses. An effective mechanism needs to be put in place in all Service schools.

It is not good enough when some personnel involved in Training, state that the numbers of foreign students do not warrant a greatly increased input of resources.

Aim

The aim of this article is to:
- establish possible weaknesses in present training strategies and texts for the students of the PNGDF;
- suggest appropriate strategies that may be used in the preparation of training texts; and
- summarize aspects of the Pidgin Familiarization Course for Instructors conducted at the RAAF School of Languages, Point Cook for Australian instructors training PNG personnel in Australia.

Definition

The term "texts" has been taken to mean any instructional material that may be collated and bound into a booklet or any reference booklet prepared by the School as part of the requirement for a given course.

Background

This article has been written in conjunction with three (3) articles that have appeared in the Defence Force Journal. These are:
- "A Systems Approach to Mastery Learning" DFJ No 44 Jan/Feb 84;
- "In Support of our Friends, the Foreign Instructor and Student" DFJ No 50 Jan/Feb 85; and
- "In Support of the Papua New Guinea Student in Australia" DFJ No 54 Sep/Oct 85.
All of these articles have been written in support of effective Training. These are not cited as references but as supplementary texts for the reader who may wish to pursue the topic further.

Training Texts
Students from the PNGDF may gain limited support from texts written by Australian personnel in Australia.

It may well be that most texts used on courses will have been written with Australian students in mind. Perhaps those who write the texts are unaware of how to give help to students with another language and cultural background.

As a result, no attention has been paid to the needs of the PNGDF student.

Texts may be poorly prepared in the following ways:
- Emphasis will have been placed on setting down the "theory" with little regard for practical activities;
- There will have been limited/unskilled use of diagrams;
- Minimal support will have been given to the instructor on how to carry out the practical aspects of lessons, to develop appropriate concepts and consolidate skills and knowledge;
- No attempt will have been made to develop a language teaching component; and
- Assumptions will have been made about the starting points in knowledge and skills based on the Australian rather than the PNG student.

The task of preparing texts for PNGDF students may well be beyond the present level of expertise of many of those involved in Training in the Defence Force.

It is hoped that the present series of articles will focus attention on a number of appropriate aspects.

Preparatory Training
At present, support in preparatory training for the Air Element of the PNGDF is carried out at the Field Training Centre in Lae. This is a sub-unit of the PNGDF Air Transport Squadron.

Support for members of the Maritime Element is carried out at the Goldie River Training Depot, near Port Moresby. Personnel of the Land and Marine element may have the benefit of the trade courses of the Technical Training Unit (TTU) at Murray Barracks.

Personnel due to be posted to RAAF courses in Australia will attend a six-month course to give them basic skills in:
- technical drawing;
- technical English;
- reading for comprehension;
- use of basic equipment;
- study techniques;
- mathematics;
- physics; and
- introduction to aviation.

Some students will have attended the Pre-Employment Technical Training (PETT) Courses at a number of technical colleges in Papua New Guinea.

The preparatory support given to the student personnel of the Land Element of the PNGDF by the Australian Army, prior to their attendance of courses in Australia, illustrates again the under-utilization of Army Education Officers in the management of technical training.

Language Development
A basic weakness in the preparation of training texts lies in the standard of expression. Technical concepts can be made more complex yet by use of long and poorly constructed sentences.

It is important that a standard formula exists for preparation of texts. The following are suggested:
- All description should, where possible, be supported by a labelled diagram and/or flow chart;
- The working of the apparatus should be explained in a logical and sequential way. The sequences of inter-locking "cause-effect" should be supported by a flow chart and be traced through the processes involved; and
- Any technical concepts should be explained including definitions, physical laws, formulae and forms of words.

In short, an effective text will be written in simple sentences and should develop logically and sequentially. There should be a minimum of abstract terms that will cause a break-down of understanding by the student.

Texts should be progressively validated and modified as difficulties are identified in student
comprehension. Student difficulties may occur as the result of:
- poor expression;
- gaps in explanation; and
- use of examples unfamiliar to the student.

Student Difficulties

Those who write student texts should be aware that it takes only one or two unfamiliar words to destroy comprehension by the foreign student.

The Australian instructor may care to imagine his/her own difficulties with the following text:
A series circuit consists of two or more rediponstiv units that are so wilats that the current has only one path to funbst.

Unfamiliar words can prevent understanding in a lesson as well as reduce the ability of the student to respond appropriately in a written examination. Testing of theoretical knowledge of foreign students should never depend solely on a written examination when technical language comprehension is involved.

Students can find unnecessary difficulty in comprehending the usage of different forms of the same word. Confusion may occur with such words as capacity, capacitance, capable and capacitor.

A student may have learned the techniques for “maintaining an engine”. He may be blissfully unaware that to “maintain an engine at a constant speed” is an entirely different matter.

An instructor may state that a component “regulates” the oil “flow” through the system under study.

In the examination the question may require the student to describe the “regulatory” function of the component in “facilitating” the “circulation” of oil. Such questions may cause the student to fail the examination.

Students need to be familiar with the forms of words:
accelerate, acceleration, accelerator, decelerate, deceleration.
compress, compression, compressor, compressed.
move, movable, movement, mobile, mobility, immobile, immobility, motion, motive, motionless.
diffuse, diffused, diffusion, diffusive.
suspend, suspension, suspended.

At the RAAF School of Technical Training at Wagga Wagga, a PNGDF student who fails a written examination, may be given a formal oral examination by the instructors. Such an approach is both humane and highly professional.

Reading Levels

Foreign students attend familiarization courses at the Defence Co-operation Language School (DCLS) at Laverton. At this time, their reading levels are assessed to determine ability to read and comprehend texts which they will encounter on their respective courses in Australia.

If foreign students are tested on their ability to read to particular levels, then it would be reasonable to expect that Australian Training personnel be able to prepare texts to designated levels appropriate to given groups of foreign students. Perhaps it would be easier for Australian Training personnel to make all texts as simple as possible.

Standards

It is of crucial importance that there be a high degree of support to the PNGDF student in the usage of language. This should be carried out only by specialist personnel.

It is not acceptable for the Australian instructor to limit the usage of words so strictly that the PNGDF student would understand what had been written only if expressed in a certain way.

It is equally not good enough for the instructor to ignore the problem completely.

Response 1  “We don’t have time for that sort of thing.”
Response 2  “We’ve been doing that for years.”
Make It Difficult
One effect of poor design of student texts is that too much onus is placed on the student to succeed. The text should have been set up in support of the student. On the contrary, it becomes a mute obstacle.

A text should act as an extension of the instructor. Each student takes away from the lesson, the instructor in written form.

In the preface to a text book of Science for Secondary Schools, the authors make the following points:

"The authors feel that a text should not only be readable, but should be developed enough to be self-explanatory...

"It should then be a ready source of information and procedure when the student is away from the classroom or laboratory...

"It is hoped that the 'Questions to Answer' will be useful to both teacher and student...(1).

Sadly, many students can remember their own school days and recall teachers who were far from helpful. Neither teacher nor text gave adequate support to the students who were struggling to succeed.

They were forced to endure the following process, day after day:

- The teacher stood and talked;
- Questions were directed around the class and answered by the more able students;
- The class was required to read the chapter and complete a set of problems at the end of the chapter. These problems increased rapidly in difficulty so that only the class genius could complete the last three problems;
- The weaker students sat hunched around their work waiting for the teacher to fill the blackboard with the solution. The students would then transcribe the solution into their notebooks;
- They hoped that after summarizing the process of each problem, they would eventually be able to solve problems for themselves; and
- The teacher had the class complete the remaining, more difficult exercises for homework.

The strategy reflected a lack of sympathy for the average student, a lack of awareness of the techniques of mastery learning, and a lack of support for students in the consolidation and revision of skills. Australian Service students may suffer from the same deficiencies.

A Model Textbook
During his years as a secondary student, the writer made use of a textbook in matriculation physics (2).

Chapter by chapter, the textbook set out the areas of physics. It differed from other textbooks available at the time, in that the author had provided up to 100 small problems at the end of each chapter.

Each problem was arranged to guide the student through the progression of component concepts, technical processes, physical phenomena and calculations.

Each problem high-lighted a particular "cause-effect" situation. We may read "why does a balloon expand as it rises to increased altitude?"

This problem would then be followed by "what happens to the volume of the balloon if pulled down to sea level?"

A further question could be "If the temperature of the air in the balloon increases, what would happen to the volume of the balloon?"

Interpersed among these questions would be a series of related calculations, arranged with such precision, that the average student could be guided to the correct solution.

By the time the student had successfully solved the 100 small problems, he/she had been led, step by step, through the range of concepts inter-relationships, experiments and calculations appropriate to the aims of the course.

This would have been a most effective strategy for the following reasons:

- All students proceeded through mastery;
- The actual exercises framed an effective strategy as well as the range of skills and insights;
- Students no longer suffered the indignity of not being able to complete the work; and
- The inexperienced teacher would be guided through an effective strategy as well as the range of skills and insights.

Heat, Friction and Expansion
1. Why does a piece of thick wire become quite hot, when it is rapidly bent to and fro?
2. Explain why a person's hands might be burnt by a rope.
3. After a motor car has been driven for some time its tyres feel warm. Explain.
4. A glass stopper has become stuck in a bottle. It may be loosened by gently heating the neck while keeping the stopper cool. Explain.
5. A kettle is completely filled with water and placed on the stove. Water over-flows as the kettle becomes warmer. Explain.

6. Explain why a dinner plate may break if held in a flame but not, if heated in an oven.

7. A hole is cut in a sheet of metal. The sheet of metal is then heated. Does the hole become larger or smaller? Explain.

8. What is the name given to each of the following changes of state: solid to liquid, liquid to gas, gas to liquid, liquid to solid.

9. A few chips of ice are heated in a test tube until steam is formed. What changes of state have occurred?

10. A thick glass bottle is more likely to crack when boiling water is poured into it than a thin-walled test tube. Explain.

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**Examples That Confuse**

Textbooks written outside of Papua New Guinea may provide many problems for PNG students because of the students' lack of familiarity with the technical culture in which the text was produced.

The writer holds a physics textbook that provides extended sets of problems at the end of each chapter (4). Yet for PNG students, the scenarios within the problems would not have been within their experience.

What the author of the book had done was to present theory in each chapter, explained in terms of technical processes appropriate to the technical culture in Australia at the time. The author could assume that Australian secondary students would have already encountered most, if not all the processes cited.

Yet, for PNG students, this was not to be. The teacher would have been obliged to teach the processes in the problems so that the PNG student would even be able to conceive what the problem was. The following references are taken from the problem exercises at the end of the chapter:

- Determine the acceleration of an engine block down a roller chute.
- A smooth slippery dip at an amusement park is inclined at 45° to the horizontal.
- A planing machine table requires a force of 200N.
- A V-2 rocket rises to a height of 36km.
- A mine cage is attached by a cable to a winding drum.
- A pile-driver monkey accelerates vertically for 3 seconds.

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**Examples From The PNG Context**

Effort could be made by training personnel in Australia to balance technical examples applicable to western culture with those specific to PNG. The following provides only a limited selection:

- Gradients could be explained in terms of mountain walking tracks.
- Suspension bridges demonstrate aspects of stress and wave motion.
- Elevation, range and velocity of projectiles may be demonstrated by the bow and arrow, spear, rifle and shotgun.
- A wide range of tools in agriculture, construction and vehicle maintenance may be used to demonstrate leverage.
- Battery operated devices are common in PNG.
- Generators and outboard engines are to be found in many villages.
- Some people own and operate small boats and public motor vehicles and private cars.
- All traditional and modern houses, bridges and jetties involve techniques of construction and application of geometrical principles.
- Water reticulation systems and pumps are available in some villages.
- Construction of river and sea going canoes involves aspects of stream-lining, friction and balance.
- Insulation and vaporization may be demonstrated by the operation of the traditional in-ground cooking process, the mumu.
- The process of tempering steel is similar to that of tempering the wood of a spear.
- A cooking fire may be used to demonstrate aspects of combustion.
- Elasticity may be demonstrated by the action of the skins of various PNG drums.
- Resonance and vibration are shown in the use of the guitar, Pans pipes and the Jews harp, musical instruments used in Papua New Guinea;
- The use of cement is common throughout the country;
- Foot driven sewing machines used in PNG demonstrate a drive mechanism, the operation of a cam and a worm gear;
- The coffee industry in the Highlands involves the usage of a range of machines available to villagers;
- PNG village children play with a number of handmade toys involving hand eye coordination including a tyre driven by two hand held poles;
- The wool spinning and weaving industries in the Highlands would involve villagers in a range of technical processes; and

We may add to these, a wide range of insights held by some students from previous experience in the PNGDF and other organizations and attendance on the PETT courses at the technical colleges. There are those who would have attended courses in technical subjects at tertiary level.

The Need For Specialist Skill

What is important is that the Australian instructor is able to appreciate the diverse aspects appropriate to training of PNG students. The instructor should have at his/her disposal the widest possible range of insights to maximize effectiveness in explaining a concept to a PNG student. The preparation of student texts should be designed for this express purpose. All aspects should be laid out in the text and should include:

- Explanation of theory;
- Application to theory to examples that the student will be able to relate to;
- Student activities at the end of each chapter;
- Solutions to student activities at the end of the textbook;
- Sets of revision activities at the end of the textbook together with solutions;
- A glossary of terms; and
- A spelling list of terms to be found in the text.

The writer holds a textbook in matriculation mathematics (5), in which the author provided a series of exercises of given type, each supported by an explanatory worked problem followed by a set of related problems. The real value of the textbook lay in the 12 sets of revision exercises and solutions, each set comprising 30 problems.

In other words, the textbook was simply an extended list of approximately 1000 mathematical problems arranged according to type, in simple to complex order.

The instructor was thus given maximum support in presentation and consolidation of student skill. *Any student text is not worth the paper it is written on if there is no evidence of categorized student activities.*

The problem is made worse if many of those involved in managing the Training Systems have neither awareness of the need nor the competence to do anything about it.

The Importance of Toys

We must always be aware that all people vary in experiences within the cultures to which they belong.

In western culture, the growth of children is often influenced by a wide range of skills developed from early age. Many parents in western culture deliberately and systematically expose their children to many and varied experiences. They are aware the effects of such experiences are cumulative towards development of adult skills.

Toys are selected on the basis of the skills that the child user may acquire. A brief selection of experiences is suggested.

- Use of plasticine modelling will help the child to perceive in three dimensions;
- A jigsaw puzzle may promote recognition of shape and colour matching of shapes and classifying of items;
- A toy car or semi-trailer may give the child an appreciation of things mechanical, concepts of motion and manoeuvring an articulated vehicle;
- A toy aircraft will give insights, as copied from movies, into take-off, landing and banking an aircraft;
- A tricycle/bicycle will lay the traces for steering motion and balance;
- Play with electrified toys will involve replacement of batteries and the discipline of making it work again;
- Construction with 'leggo/meccano pieces will promote skills of manipulation, use of tools, understanding of shape, space, design and touch;
• Assembly of kit aircraft will promote planning, comprehension of instructions, relating the text to the diagram, the diagram to the components, spacial awareness and touch; and
• Television offers enormous input of background knowledge.

All activities involve touch, the ability to use appropriate force in relation to manipulating a particular component. Some items need to be picked up with tweezers. Some require pliers. Experience tells us to apply appropriate touch. Some knobs are turned with the thumb and forefingers and the pressure is applied from the wrist. Other knobs may need to be turned with a grip of the hand and pressure applied from the forearm and shoulder.

PNG students may not have developed the sense of touch that an Australian child would have done, having not had an extensive background in manipulation of toys.

One has only to observe Australian children constructing 'leggo' devices, operating a remote controlled toy car, shunting a toy train into a siding, playing a star wars computer game and tightening plastic nuts on plastic bolts.

The point becomes obvious that so many skills are ingrained in the Australian child. Courses must be designed to bring the PNG student some of the way towards absorbing a wide range of technical skills that they miss out on in early childhood, and consolidating those many skills that they already possess.

The PNG Child

From our viewpoint, the education of the PNG male child may be more casual than that of his Australian counterpart. Most PNG children live in a rural setting.

From early childhood, they have a high degree of freedom in and around the village. Few responsibilities are placed on them.

Apart from attending school and helping his father, the boy may spend his time climbing trees, running around, catching animals and paddling canoes.

As the child becomes an adolescent, he begins to work more with his father and the other men. His advice is not sought. He is not expected to show initiative except to do what was expected of him.

On the other hand, he may leave the village and join the clan members who have moved to the urban areas.

Other such young men may attend a provincial high school if they are fortunate enough to pass the competitive grade six examination and if their parents and clan can afford to pay the costs.

Some may be able to graduate to the National High Schools to complete grades 11 and 12.

Those who graduate from secondary school may be selected for a number of advanced study areas. Selection for the Papuan New Guinea Defence Force may well find the young man on course in Australia.

Assertiveness

A number of years ago, the writer was involved in training a group of young men from a Pacific country. They had come to train at an Australian Service institution. Already they had spent some time at this institution and had been assessed as "lacking in assertiveness".

In discussion on this point, they stated that they had found great difficulty in achieving the degree of assertiveness required of fellow Australian students.

They explained that, in their country, they had been expected from early childhood to know their place in the clan. As adults, they were required to value consensus within village matters, together with the formality of listening courteously to others and being listened to at the appropriate time.

Village discussion was not limited to a 45-minute lesson period but continued for as long as it took, until every person had given his view and a consensus was reached.

The leader of the village was the one regarded as being able to listen carefully, draw the views together and help the group to reach a common view.

Such an approach may have been a little too culture specific for the training staff at this Institution. Such an Institution may unwittingly place considerable pressure on foreign students by having them conform to what Australians consider to be healthy aggressive behaviour.

Technical Decision Making

Support needs to be given to PNG students on all aspects of technical decision-making involving:

• cause and effect;
• conclusions derived from evidence;
• checking and double-checking;
• fault-finding; and
• problem-solving.
Such areas need to be promoted as separate chapters of any textbook for PNG students. For any technical system under study a range of items can be established along the lines as those summarized below:

**Causes.** Establish the possible causes of the following:
- The vehicle battery is flat;
- The clock in the vehicle has stopped;
- The gauge indicates temperature increase;
- The tyre is deflated;
- The engine cuts out at high speed;
- The engine cuts out at idling speed;
- The radiator is boiling; and
- Static occurs on the car radio.

**Effects.** Establish the possible effects of the following:
- The vehicle is driven with a loose fan belt;
- The battery leads are removed while the engine is running;
- The spark plug gap is too wide;
- The distributor points are corroded; and
- The high tension leads are defective.

**Conclusions from Evidence.** Establish the possible conclusions from the following:
- The battery is flat. It is recharged. Within a day, it is flat again;
- The leads of the battery are removed. The engine was running. Now the alternator is defective; and
- The petrol tank was just filled. Now there is a continuous knocking in the engine.

**Check and Double-Check.** Establish the appropriate techniques for the following:
- that the battery is charged;
- that the petrol tank is full;
- that the radiator cap is defective;
- that the petrol pump is working; and
- that the cylinder head is cracked.

**Qualified Personnel**

It is important that the training of PNGDF students and the preparation of student texts be supported by training policy in the three Services and by specialists in Education and Training.

The RAAF point some of the way in the training manual by specific reference to the characteristics of student work sheets which are "used to give the student practice in applying the theory presented in a block of instruction or to outline specific work to be done". Normally, it will be presented as a means of:
- setting problems; or
- briefing the student on a practical exercise "(6)"

Professional awareness and effort in relation to training PNGDF students is very much apparent in a number of Service schools.

Support in the preparation of student texts for PNGDF students could be given through the professional advice of the Australian Technical Training Support Unit (ATTSU) employed in PNG to advise the PNGDF on aspects of training.

It is appropriate that Defence Force Education Officers be also employed within ATTSU.

**Course Managers**

It is appropriate that Service instructors acquire a range of skills for effective and efficient training of PNGDF personnel in Australia. However, certain aspects of Training are beyond the control of the instructor. These include:
- organization of lessons with regard to the most effective strategies;
- preparation of examination material; and
- preparation of texts.

It is, therefore, important that Course Managers attend the Familiarization course at Point Cook.

**Conclusion**

A high level of expertise is necessary if we are to produce training material appropriate to PNG students.

Such expertise does not appear to exist within the Training Systems of the Australian Defence Force.

Present student texts will have been written by Australian personnel for Australian students as they know of no other way.

Needs of PNGDF students will differ from those of Australian students in areas of language and technical culture.

Support to Training of PNG students in Australia requires the continued input of skilled and experienced training personnel posted to PNG from Service Education Branches.

Instructors and Course Managers need to be aware of the many aspects relevant to training PNG students.
Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- Resources be made available to all Service schools to facilitate preparation of texts appropriate to PNG students;
- Training personnel gain the expertise necessary to prepare appropriate texts;
- Education Officers of the Defence Force be regarded as integral to the commitment of ATTSU to the PNGDF; and
- Training institutions provide the necessary skills to not only the instructors but also the course managers.

NOTES

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Major Copeland has contributed several articles to the Defence Force Journal on aspects of Training. He is presently posted to the RAAF School of Languages. Over a six year period, he has conducted 35 courses to prepare government personnel for posting to PNG. Courses involve language, culture, living conditions and aspects of Training appropriate to Papua New Guinea. Australian Service Personnel involved in training PNG students in Australia have also attended the course.

COPIES WANTED

The Editor urgently requires back copies of Army Journal and Defence Force Journal.
Introduction

The importance of Parliament in the provision of an effective national security policy and Defence Force needs no argument in this forum. The purpose of this article is to give readers unfamiliar with the internal operations of Parliament some insight into the way in which Parliament and Parliamentarians keep themselves informed and advised on defence matters, and specifically to explain the role of the Parliamentary Library’s Research Service in helping Parliament deal with defence.

The Executive and Parliament

In a defence context, the Executive Government usually means the Minister for Defence, any Ministers Assisting, the Prime Minister and (frequently) the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Finance plays a different but critical role. These Ministers have at their disposal the resources of their own Departments and, given a co-operative relationship, those of their Ministerial colleagues as well.

What of the majority of Parliamentarians, Senators and Members of the House, who are not Ministers? These include the entire body of non-Government Parliamentarians (presently the Liberal, National, Australian Democrat and Independent MPs)*, and the Government backbench. Not for these people the resources of large and well-staffed bureaucratic machines existing (at least in theory) to satisfy the Minister's every need: the ordinary MP in fact has only a modest and indifferently paid personal staff at his or her immediate disposal.

The Parliamentary Departments

Parliament runs a small bureaucracy of its own, consisting of five “Parliamentary Departments”. These Departments are legally Departments in the same way as are Defence, Finance or Foreign Affairs, but differ both in size and especially in role. Unlike the Executive Government Departments, the Parliamentary Departments are not responsible to a Minister of the Crown: this role is filled by the Presiding Officers of Parliament — the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The Parliamentary Departments are: Department of the Senate (responsible to the President of the Senate), Department of the House of Representatives (responsible to the Speaker of the House), Department of the Parliamentary Reporting Staff (more usually called “Hansard”), Joint House Department and the Department of the Parliamentary Library. These last three Departments are responsible to the President and the Speaker, jointly.

Each of the Departments has its own functions in support of the Parliament. For example, they provide staffing for Parliamentary Committees, expedite the business of either House, produce Hansard and so on. But the Department most directly concerned with the information and research requirements of Parliamentarians is the Parliamentary Library.

* Throughout this paper, the abbreviations “MP” — Member of Parliament — refers to both Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.
Research for Parliament

The Library in fact carries out two distinct but interrelated functions. It provides all the services one expects of a Library, plus several specialised services designed to meet the unusual nature of its clientele. A staff of experienced professional Librarians is employed to these ends. Additionally, however, the Library provides specialised research services to its clients and employs people qualified in a wide range of disciplines, but rarely in Librarianship as well, to provide a body of “expert” opinion and analysis available to all Parliamentarians on demand.

These people work for the Legislative Research Service (LRS) of the Parliamentary Library. The LRS consists of seven specialist Groups, dealing with:

- Defence;
- Economics and Commerce;
- Foreign Affairs;
- Health, Education and Welfare;
- Law and Government;
- Science, Technology and Environment; and
- Statistics.

About 35 permanent professional staff are employed by these Groups, which range in size from six or seven people (Economics) to three (Defence; Science, Technology and Environment). Staff allocation between Groups corresponds more or less with the level of demand experienced in each Group’s area of responsibility.

Effective co-ordination and co-operation between the Research Service and the Library side of the Department is greatly enhanced by the latter’s appointment of “Subject Specialist Librarians”. These Librarians belong to the Department’s Reference Service, but are expected to have some expertise in a specific field, e.g., defence, and to work closely with the relevant LRS Group. This arrangement has had the effect of giving the Groups access to highly capable reference services in their various areas of interest. In addition, the Subject Specialist Librarians themselves deal with a large number of questions directed to them by MPs, usually questions requiring Specialist Librarian skills as well as some subject expertise to handle effectively. There is in fact a continuous interchange of information and work between the Research Groups and the appropriate Subject Specialist Librarians.

Parliament and Defence

Under our system of government, control of policy and funding for defence, like any other portfolio, rests firmly with the Government, supported by a majority of the House of Representatives. What then can the Opposition, or the Government backbencher, hope to achieve when defence-related topics come up for discussion in Parliament? What resources are available, and to what types of Parliamentarian?

a. Parliamentary Committees

Parliament operates an extensive system of committees, including several with some coverage of defence. The so-called “Cross Report”, for instance, is the work of Sub-Committee “C” (Defence Matters) of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.* (The custom has arisen of naming committee reports, or even committees, after the Chairperson: thus the “Cross Committee” now chaired by the Labor Member for Brisbane, Manfred Cross, is the same committee as that called the “Katter Committee”, chaired while the Coalition was in power by the National Party Member for Kennedy, Bob Katter.) Committees have extensive powers to gather evidence and, in the last resort, to protect witnesses against harassment or intimidation from Departments with something to hide. As noted earlier, they are staffed by the Department of the Senate or of the House, as appropriate; nevertheless, they frequently require specialist advice when dealing with difficult and complex issues, and on occasion seek it from the Library’s LRS. (Other options open are to hire external consultants or staff, or to seek suitable staff on secondment from the Library or elsewhere.)

b. Government Backbenchers

As members of the Government party or parties, these backbenchers have some access through Ministers to advice or information from the Public Service. However, such advice is necessarily in terms of the policy of the Government of the day. A backbencher who is unhappy with some aspect of Government defence policy cannot expect a great deal of assistance from the Minister or the Department.

He or she must go elsewhere; one of the primary sources of assistance is the Parliamentary Library.

c. The Opposition and Independents

Members of the Opposition, whose goal is to displace the Government on the Treasury benches, can hardly expect massive assistance from the Government in gathering ideas and information. Of course, in our democratic system, certain information is routinely made available or will be provided on demand, but much is harder to come by without extensive study of the literature, something the average MP simply has not the time to do. Independents (who are usually Senators) face perhaps greater problems, in that they lack the national organisation and machines of the political parties.

For these Parliamentarians, the resources of the Library and its Research Service are often the most readily available sources of information and policy analysis.

Research Staff for MPs and Political Parties

All Senators and Members have an entitlement to certain personal staff, some of whom are based in the electorate, others in Parliament House and occasionally some who commute between these locations as Parliament meets and adjourns. The purpose of these staff is, of course, to remove the burden of routine work from the Parliamentarian and to provide him or her with a degree of intellectual and research support. Nevertheless, the three staff to which the “normal” (that is, backbench without any other office) Australian MP is entitled pale into nothingness when compared with the dozens allocated to Members of the US Congress.

That such staff can reduce burdens on MPs is beyond dispute: however, their effects elsewhere have been largely unforeseen, and this is particularly the case with the Parliamentary Library. Some people have claimed that allocating extra staff to MPs for research should reduce the demands placed on the Library's own research services. However, experience has tended to support the contrary view: an MP, having extra staff, has in effect extra avenues for placing demands on the Library because each new staff member can develop and suggest areas of research for the Parliamentarian which were simply unavailable before the new staffer arrived. Such demands, moreover, are frequently of a depth which forces recourse to specialist Library research staff, even if preliminary work is done by the MP's own staff. No doubt the occasional research assistant employed by an MP would have the knowledge and capacity (though none would have the resources) to provide to his member what an officer of the LRS might provide in relation to aspects of defence policy. But if the client requires assistance making the complex strategic, operational and financial judgements involved in e.g., the merit or otherwise of acquiring nuclear-powered attack submarines, it is not surprising that the areas of the LRS with the relevant competence will be required to apply their expertise to these questions. It is in the nature of things that a service which can provide a wide range of expertise will be heavily tapped by individual research assistants who do not themselves have such a range. In addition, where research assistants, by their education and background, have the capacity to make more sophisticated demands on the LRS but are themselves not equipped to undertake the inquiries, it will inevitably happen that work demands increase.

An option followed up in some democracies, e.g., New Zealand and the UK, is the provision of research units dedicated to the requirements of each of the major political parties in preference to the Australian system of a single research service available to all MPs regardless of status or party. This course has some attractive features, notably the elimination of the issue of political bias in research staff: nobody working for, say, the National Party research unit in Wellington is likely to harbour secret sympathies for the Lange Government.

Against this, there are a number of difficulties associated with this approach not shared by the Australian model. Party-oriented research units tend to fall under the de facto control of the Party hierarchy, and to peddle “the party line” whatever they are asked to do. Thus, a New Zealand National Party backbencher out of sympathy with the dominant faction in his party would probably receive cold comfort approaching the Party research unit for work designed to show that some aspects of party policy is deficient or wrong. Moreover, the staff of such organisations, being political animals, frequently work there more to gain contacts and influence to further their future political careers than to do research work for the sake of it; they tend also to become closely
involved in the internal politics of the party concerned. Thus, the Australian model on balance seems superior, combining as it does party-oriented people employed by the MP with access to an impartially available research service as well. The fact that the MP's own staff tend to generate more work for the Library's researchers should be seen as a positive development, so long as the Library has resources adequate to cope with the extra demand.

**Defence Research for Parliament**

With so diverse a body of potential clients, it is not surprising that range of demands placed on the Defence Research Group is very wide indeed. Requests made of the Group by clients can be for readily available facts and figures (e.g., the strength of the Defence Force), for two or three articles which will give a quick and accurate picture of developments on a particular topic (e.g., on the US Strategic Defense Initiative, or on the mooted move of the RAN Fleet Base to Jervis Bay), or for an in-depth study and analysis of a particular issue (e.g., manpower, equipment, logistic and financial requirements for a credible defence posture in our exposed north-west region).

But the role of the Defence Group is not wholly passive and responsive to demands from individuals. For one thing, politics tend to throw up issues which reach prominence for a few days or weeks and then fade away either temporarily or for good. When an issue is prominent, many MPs will seek information or analysis of some aspect. So the Group will try to anticipate issues and make available to all comers a prepared paper (a "Basic Paper") setting out the state of play, the major considerations involved and — where appropriate — the main "pros and cons".

Perhaps the most important role of the Group is its advisory and educational role. Politicians cannot be experts on everything, even if the electorate thinks they ought to be, and frequently have to take a position on something with which they are not fully conversant. Often an MP in this position will seek information and advice from the Group before deciding what position to take. Much of the time, an MP will seek this kind of advice to equip himself or herself better for debate behind the closed doors of the party room, rather than for debates in the parliament itself. Consideration of policy issues by party (as opposed to Parliamentary) committees — e.g., the Government Members' Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, which plays a role in the Labor Party's decision-making processes — will also generate demands on the Group.

Carrying out the role it is expected to play necessarily requires the Defence Group to be able to undertake wide-ranging tasks in areas such as strategic analysis (national and international). The Group is expected by clients to be able to comment intelligently and often at short notice on such things as the implications (if any) of the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting, the various arms control kites flown by each superpower and their real proposals as well, the consequences for the continued stability of the central strategic balance of the US Strategic Defense Initiative, Australia's attitude to SDI and so on. In short, the Group is required to be up-to-date and articulate over the whole spectrum of its responsibilities, and particularly in areas of constant or predictable high demand such as "the bases" (Pine Gap, Nurrungar, North West Cape, etc.) or Australia's declaratory and real policies on arms control issues. Expertise is maintained through reading the literature, but equally important are establishment and maintenance of contacts with relevant individuals and institutions in the "defence community" and the personal development of Group staff through attendance at seminars, conferences, field visits and, in two of the last three years, by sending people on the Joint Services Staff College Course.

**Style of Work and Output**

Providing as they do a service to all MPs, the primary constraint on Group staff is political objectivity and impartiality at work. Whatever one's private opinions, it is necessary almost every day to sit down with an MP whose political views are the opposite of one's own. If the MP discerns a lack of enthusiasm or an unwillingness to assist and concludes that this is attributable to political bias in the staff of the Group, the Group's reputation and effectiveness will suffer. In fact, no such charge has been made.

Politics being a frenetic occupation, it is far from unusual for a client to appear and announce that he or she is due to speak on a particular matter in the Parliament in the next couple of hours, and to seek notes or material to assist. There is a rule that the Research
Service does not write speeches, only papers, but if a client chooses to read a paper out as a speech, that is the client’s affair. Nevertheless, we do not provide clients with political rhetoric, only with the products of research.

Requests made by clients for more detailed analysis and research will be for one of two types of work: for a paper arguing a particular line (e.g., a paper arguing that Australia needs an aircraft carrier and should acquire such a platform); or for a paper outlining the situation and giving the pros and cons without reaching any recommended course of action. The former type can be more difficult to write, especially if the desired “line” is one the author thinks is wrong, and is a real test of the ability of LRS staff to work impartially and objectively. Such requests will be refused only if the “line” sought cannot be argued in any reasonable sense (e.g., a request that we write a paper advocating the acquisition of 50 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs from the US): however, requests of that type are extremely rare.

The Group’s output consists of:

a. oral briefings and consultations;

b. provision of material (journal articles, newspaper items, references to useful books, etc.);

c. basic factual information;

d. purpose-written papers requested by a client, whether advocating a line or not; and

e. papers written for general distribution to MPs: either short summaries (Current Issue Briefs) or extended discussions (Basic Papers) of subjects of wide interest to clients.

In addition, Discussion Papers are occasionally commissioned from academics, ex-Defence Force officers and so on, who have a particular expertise; Group staff can also write Discussion Papers, which differ from Basic Papers in that they can advocate a particular solution or course of action. They always carry the usual disclaimer dissociating the Library from the opinions expressed.

The Library has a rule that its output must be based on material which is either published or publishable. Thus, classified material is not used by the Defence Group. It has no access to such, and does not seek it. It might be thought that this would impose crippling limitations on the Group’s capabilities; experience has shown, however, that this is not so.

There are in fact extensive public sources on defence around the Western world, and the Group has access to many of them. By a close scrutiny of such sources, it is possible to assemble over a period a massive data base from which almost anything likely to be needed by clients can eventually be extracted. The Group consumes a disproportionate percentage of the Department’s vote for journals and research tools such as Jane’s, principally because unlike (say) the Economics and Commerce Group, so much of the data held by the relevant Executive Government Departments is classified. We are continually involved in assembling pieces of jigsaws, and have grown reasonably proficient at it.

**Importance of the Work**

Parliament is the highest authority in the land, ultimately responsible for our national security. It votes the resources used by the Defence Force, and the Government answerable to it determines policy and a great deal of practice as well. It is therefore critically important that Members of Parliament interested in defence and national security have access to a source of reliable and unbiased research and analysis if they are to have a proper chance of understanding the issues of the day and playing a useful part in decision-making. As everywhere, knowledge is power, and it is the task of the Defence Group to make knowledge and ideas available to those Parliamentarians who seek it. Others are perhaps better placed to assess the success with which the Group has discharged this responsibility, but the importance of the work itself can hardly be overstated.

The author is a Senior Legislative Research Specialist in the Defence Group of the Parliamentary Library’s Legislative Research Service. He has an Honours Degree in History from the University of Newcastle, NSW, and is a graduate of JSSC Course 31/85. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and should not be attributed to the Department of Parliamentary Library.
At a recent annual camp of an A Res infantry battalion the majors outnumbered the subalterns two to one. Which wasn’t difficult as there were only two subalterns.

As a result the subalterns declared themselves an endangered species and in the irreverent manner common to subalterns, began to demand special treatment as befitting their status. Of course, they were soon straightened out.

This in turn led to the production of the accompanying cartoon. It does highlight a pertinent point. The subaltern is endangered. They are becoming increasingly rare and the problem of producing officers for the A Res is becoming serious.

Probably the greatest single course is the requirement, that all potential officers must have the Higher School Certificate before consideration for selection for training for a commission. While the A Res certainly needs the academics for promotion to the more senior ranks, the officers who make the A Res work give years of their lives to the system and retire as captains and majors. The working regimental officer.

In these days the economic situation is such that unless there is a specific career in mind most young men leave school as soon as a job opportunity presents itself and while establishing themselves in the world, may take up the Reserve as a hobby. After a few years they have established themselves in the workforce and have developed maturity and perhaps, as well, enough military knowledge, leadership and experience to enable them to be potential leaders. But many of these suitable people are stopped dead by lack of the dreaded HSC, and the Reserve suffers.

Recently I attended a conference where, amongst other things, the recruiting of potential officers was discussed. A number of experienced officers put forward many sound proposals, but as I listened to the discussion I couldn’t help thinking of the current in saying ‘been there, done that and got the T-shirt’. It had all been said before.

There has been much written in the war histories, both World War I and II, about the officering of Australian Forces. These days it may not be fashionable for recommended military reading to include these histories as military technology has advanced so much, but the human factors of character, personality and leadership have not changed that much that perhaps there may be some worthwhile lessons we can still learn. After all, in this century we certainly have had a fair amount of experience in raising and training forces for war that surely the war histories must offer some wisdom for the future.

C. E. W. Bean, our WWI Historian was not only an excellent historian, he was intensely interested in the nature of the men who made up WWI Vol. 1 the First AIF and not a little proud of what he found. In writing of PA6 the recruitment and training of the force, he said,
‘The training of the men was never the main difficulty in the Australian Imperial Force. The bush still sets the standards of personal efficiency, even in the Australian cities. The bushman is the hero of the Australian boy; the arts of bush life are his ambition; his most cherished holidays are those spent with country relatives or in camping out. He learns something of half the arts of a soldier by the time he is ten years old — to sleep comfortably in any shelter, to cook meat or bake flour, to catch a horse, to find his way across country by day or night, to ride, or, at the worst, to stick on.’

P.A. 8 ‘Such men could not easily be controlled by the traditional methods of the British Army. But they were seriously intent upon learning and were readily controlled by anyone really competent to teach them. They were hero-worshippers to the backbone.’

‘Early in the history of the AIF it became clear that the right selection and training of officers was the problem vital beyond any other in the creation of an Australian Army. Given officers and non-commissioned officers of the right type and of sufficient training, the rank and file of an Australian force could be trained in a few months.’

Vast numbers of new officers were required. ‘The method of providing officers for the AIF was at this time becoming settled, it having been laid down in Australia that, with a few recognized exceptions (Duntroon graduates), no candidate was to be commissioned unless he had enlisted and qualified in the way open to all others. All commissions must henceforth be obtained from the ranks. Battalion commanders searched their companies for men of outstanding character and sufficient education; these, whether sent away as “cadets” to an officers’ school (as was shortly to become the usual practice) or promoted in the field, did not as a rule change their battalion, but became officers over their old comrades — a practice entirely opposed to the practice in the British Army. As a rule the newly appointed officer
Note: In July '84 2RNSWR had only 2 Lieutenants on strength

gave a dinner in the nearest town — a "last night" — to his old mates, and from that time their relations were formed. A few men on promotion found it difficult to maintain this attitude, or failed through lack of character, but their proportion was small.

'The officers of the AIF were a strong and determined set, and were never separated from their men by any marked distinction in comfort and mess luxuries. The result, deliberately aimed at, was in all well commanded units, a really close friendship between them and their men. Command was difficult, but it brought many advantages.'

WWI Vol. 3 P22. Thus the 5 divisions of the AIF set out for the next 3 years of gruelling
warfare on the Western Front. ‘Men given their commissions, especially, went into battle with the feeling that their former comrades were watching them, and the proportion of second-lieutenants who were killed in their first fight after promotion was so high as to give rise to the proverb, “One star, one stunt”.'

The system produced an officer corps who were respected and the soldiers knew their leaders were put there through ability, which gave a firm morale to the units. One of Bean’s favourite stories was that of a soldier who had been a member of the legal profession before enlistment as a private. Later, in France, he received a signal offering him the position of judge in Australia, and if he accepted, his release from the army would be arranged. His verbatim reply said it all — ‘No bloomin’ fear. I’ve just been made a second-lieutenant in the AIF.’

Between the Wars

WWII Vol. 1. The modest post-war defence plans formulated in 1920-21 included the re-forming of the Militia which was bitterly opposed by the Labor Party describing the Government as ‘militarists’ and ‘warmongers’. The wartime organization of 5 Infantry and 2 Cavalry divisions was retained, but with a ceiling of 31,000 or 25% of their war establishment, with a permanent Staff Corps of 1,600. Equipment was WWI leftovers.

The biggest blow, however, was that training was restricted to a six day camp and four days depot training annually. The annual camps were often held over Easter to make it easier for members to attend. The defence assumption was that war was remote, Britain would defend Australia with the British Navy and Singapore fortress no one could get near us anyway. Home defence preparations consisted mainly of renovating our coastal forts at major population centres. And no regular fighting units.

WWII Vol. 1 P27. ‘It was too late, however, to achieve before war broke out what was more important than parades (through cities) and promises (the build up of defence preparedness), namely of adequate equipment. Machines and weapons which the Australian Army, like the Air Force, had ordered years before, had not been delivered from the British factories which were fully employed in a last minute effort to equip the British Army.’ Little or no thought had been given to preparing industry for war.

Our factories, in the weapons field, could only produce rifles and Vickers MMGs. Brens were planned, but training was being carried out with worn-out Lewis guns from WWI stocks.

‘Thus the Militia was never able to achieve its aim of providing an adequate defence force as it needed 6 months additional training with full equipment to reach an adequate standard. While it could not make efficient private soldiers it did produce a nucleus of capable leaders, trained by World War I officers, who had learnt their trade effectively in 1914-18.’ Militia officers and trainee officers usually did much more additional training in their own time in their enthusiasm to master their hobby job, inspired and encouraged by their veteran leaders.

After the Munich Crises 1935

The Munich crises brought the realization of how inadequate our defences were and our vulnerability. In 1938, Blamey organized a massive recruiting campaign which raised Militia numbers to 70,000 and more importantly raised the training days to a 16 day camp, with an extra 16 days ‘home’ training for Officers and NCOs, but still with WWI equipment and horse transport.

The private initiative of Essington-Lewis in gearing industry for future defence needs is another story, but one worth reading.

By 1939 many Militia units were up to strength and with a waiting list. Militia units were being called up for 1 month and later 3 months full-time duty.

Formation of the Second AIF

On war being declared the Government immediately offered a force, to be known as the Second AIF The first division to be formed was numbered 6th, following the numbers given to the 5 divisions of the First AIF Commanders were appointed who then chose their subordinate commanders. Brigadiers were usually WWI battalion commanders who had continued to serve in the Militia. Unit COs were also WWI officers who then interviewed and chose junior officers from the Militia units of their area. Many COs, after their initial selections, opted to wait and select additional officers from the ranks after the first few months of training.
Historians, with the wisdom of hindsight, have strongly suggested that a better plan would have been to enlist whole Militia battalions intact, as many had volunteered to a man, but politically this was not to be as the Militia was restricted to 'Home Defence' only.

It was found that we could easily raise a division, but not equip it and many essential items not available from WWI stocks had to wait until the 6th Division arrived in the Middle East. Here, for example, they saw their first Brens.

Training in Australia, too, was handicapped by the builders and plumbers putting the fine touches to camps such as Ingleburn and Puckapunyal. However, by Feb 1940, the 6th Division was on its way and the 7th was being recruited.

'Snarlers'

The traditional army habit of making words from initials of titles sometimes gives a humorist his big chance. Educational qualifications again paid a big part in selection of people for OC-TUs. If, after training in Australia or in the Middle East and posting to a unit, a CO decided he was unsuitable, he was served with a notice (Form???) 'Services No Longer Required'. This immediately became a 'snarler' and the recipient had the option of transfer to another unit as a private or return to Australia. The history records troopships returning from the Middle East carried numbers of these men who didn't make the grade.

One man took it seriously and subsequently won a posthumous Victoria Cross at El Alamein.

Thus by a ruthless process of trial and error the quality of officers in the AIF were improved and many of the WWI leaders, who had raised and trained the units were being replaced by younger men with battle experience coming through.

WWII Vol. 3 P557. 'Commanding officers considered that as a general rule the reinforcement officers, selected and trained in Australia, had less military ability and less military knowledge than many of their own NCOs. The high standard of NCO directly promoted or trained by the Officer Cadet Training Unit (in Egypt) threw the weakness of the average reinforcement officer into relief; he proposed that all new officers should come from the ranks of the unit. In one battalion eighteen lieutenants joined as reinforcement officers in 1941 and nine NCOs were commissioned from the ranks. Of the nine all were capable officers, some outstanding; between them they had won or would later win six decorations. Of the eighteen reinforcement officers, fewer than one-third succeeded as regimental officer.'

'Events were to show that there were enough potential officers in the divisions enlisted in 1939 and 1940 to provide good leaders for a force five times as large.'

'... proposed that all new officers should come from the ranks of the unit.'

The Japanese Threat

With the entry of Japan into the war in Dec 41, the full concept of Australia's vulnerability was realized and there was large scale mobilization of Militia battalions for home defence.

WWII Vol. VI Chap. 1. By early 1943 one division, the 8th, had been lost in Malaya or the islands to the north of Australia, but we had assembled 3 AIF divisions and 18 brigades (each 3 battalion) of Militia organized loosely into 7 Divisions and 2 armoured Divisions consisting of an armoured and a motor brigade. At the time of Japan's entry into the war we had only 12 Matilda tanks at the training school at Singleton, but foresight had led to tooling up to produce Bren gun carriers and the initial organization and training of the armoured regiments had been successfully carried out on these vehicles and the Militia Light Horse Regiments provided the leadership framework. Later these units received American tanks and White scout cars and were regarded as efficient units, but were never employed except as small infantry support groups.

This period saw large scale transfer and promotion of battle experienced AIF veterans to reinforce the Militia formations, many of whom had been raised and trained by WWI veterans who were now gradually being phased out by these younger men. By 1945 all 6 Divisional Commanders were WWI veterans but only 4 of the 21 Brigade Commanders were, and all but one had served in the Middle East and 13 had sailed with the 6th Division.

The Final Campaigns

WWII Vol. VII Chap. 4. 'The army which now entered on its final campaigns (3 AIF, 3 Militia Infantry and 2 Armoured Divisions),
and whose leadership and equipment were the subject of such keen debate at home, was at this time, in many respects, at the peak of its efficiency. More than two years earlier it had established a tactical superiority over the Japanese and since then it had gained in skill and confidence, and, in particular, in the art of living healthily and cheerfully in tropical bush.'

P76. 'Observation of the relations between regular and citizen officers in both the British and Australian Armies suggests that those relations might have been greatly improved if the regulars, from the beginning of their training, had been taught two axioms: first that in a total war citizen officers are bound to comprise the great majority, and one of the tasks of the regular is to ensure that this expansion of the officer corps is accomplished smoothly and efficiently; secondly, that the keen and intelligent citizen officer often brings to his military job valuable civilian experience and after a few years may equal the regular in military knowledge and ability.'

For the veteran divisions of 1945, the expansion of the army 'had entailed the loss of most of their junior leaders of 1941 and 1942, but in each there was still a cadre of specially durable “originals”, among the officers and in the ranks. For example, in a battalion of the 6th Division in action east of Aitape, of the 36 officers who had helped form the battalion in 1939, one was now commanding a division, 3 were commanding brigades, 3 commanding battalions and 7 were first grade or second grade staff officers'.

And the new junior officers? — ‘the tendency was to promote to commissioned rank tried sergeants aged about 25 or more: in four classes graduating from OCTUs in the last half of 1944, 40% were aged 28 or over’. Average service prior to OCTU was 2½ years.

The great objections from all COs was the policy of not sending OCTU graduates back to their own units, a distinct reversal of WWI policy. However, during the final campaigns of 1945 this was partly overcome by commissioning numbers of senior NCOs in the field, as was done from early in WWI.

And so, for better or worse, the final campaigns were waged until the war ended with an army similar in size to that with which we finished the first world war.

What had we learnt?

Today we have an efficient officer training system for our regular army and if mobilization was required tomorrow we would be far better prepared leader-wise than in the dark days of confusion of 1940 and 1941. We would, too, have a good pool of potential leaders in the former members of our regular Army. But would it be enough?

Experience of two world wars has shown that the citizen soldier volunteers would still provide a substantial part of our army and it is essential that as many potential leaders as possible be given the opportunity to develop now, so perhaps if we recall a few lessons of that experience as a guide for selection and training future leaders in the Reserve, the A Res subaltern may be able to be taken off the endangered species list.

A final thought. Of the officers in those 6 fighting divisions in 1945, I wonder how many had their leaving certificate (or equivalent)? And if we suddenly had to raise a force of 10 Infantry and 2 Armoured divisions, the size of our army at the end of WWII, how would we stand for equipment?
LEADERSHIP is taking the point position when your unit is expecting contact with the enemy and assuring that you are the last person to abandon ship. Leadership is flying a crippled bomber to the ground when one of your wounded crew members cannot bail out. Leadership is keeping your young soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors alive and never leaving your wounded behind. Leadership is writing a dead trooper's family a personal letter immediately after the battle.

Leadership is not glorifying war. Leadership is not doing "anything" to get promoted. Leadership is not winning the battle at all costs, nor is it losing a war to avoid casualties. Leadership is not found in the security of a well-fortified command bunker, nor is it found in a plush officer's field mess.

Leadership is rewarding a soldier, sailor, airman, marine, or civilian with the appropriate motivational device immediately after an exceptional deed or service. Leadership is commanding and managing. Leadership is establishing and using specific, prioritized objectives. Leadership is managing by exception, using job enlargement, and seeking job enrichment. Leadership is humanistic. Leadership is believing in God, family, and country in that order. Leadership is treating men and women equally without regard to race, color, creed, religion, age, or custom. Leadership is visiting your wounded and sick frequently. Leadership is knowing and living by the Constitution, the Code of Conduct, the Geneva Convention, and the basic human rights of all mankind. Leadership is being assertive, but not aggressive.

Leadership is not ruthless or mindless discipline, but it is the ability to do the right thing at the right time by putting the whole before the part. Leadership is not a good efficiency report, nor is it paper readiness. Leadership is not a court-martial for every offense or punishment for every mistake. Leadership is fair, predictable, and consistent.

Giving a superior sound professional advice when you know he or she does not want to hear it is leadership. Leading when you can; following when you should; and getting the hell out of the way, when you have nothing to offer, is leadership. Learning the language and customs of a host country is leadership. Staying in top physical condition is leadership.

Leadership is not forgetting that the past is our heritage, the present is our challenge, and the future is our responsibility. Leadership is not being overweight, not smoking, and not drinking alcohol. Leadership is not being right all the time and is certainly not being wrong most of the time.

Leadership is a general who knows the friendly and enemy situation, the immediate action for the M-16 rifle, his driver's first name and family, and the Lord's Prayer. Leadership is a private who knows he or she is in the chain of command and may have to take over when senior in rank. Leadership is knowing why there are air, land, and sea forces; why there are cavalry, infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, and logistical forces; and why combined arms and concentration of combat power are important. Leadership knows about defense in-depth and how to use it.

No compromise of the integrity of one's word, deed, or signature is leadership. Setting high standards and seeing that they are met is
leadership. Intelligence, dedication, creativity, and selflessness is leadership. Stamina, vigor, and commitment is leadership. Spontaneous, contagious enthusiasm is leadership. Initiative, self-improvement, and professionalism is leadership.

Leadership is adaptability, appearance, cooperation, and decisiveness. Ingenuity, sociability, tact, and tenacity is leadership. Leadership displays knowledge, manages resources efficiently, and plans beyond the immediate requirements of assigned duties. Delegating authority, commanding confidence and respect, and accepting full responsibility for your actions is leadership.

Leadership is Martin Luther King, Robert E. Lee, Pope John Paul II, Abraham Lincoln, Irwin Rommel, Jesus, Mohammad, Joan of Arc, John Paul Jones, Sister Teresa, Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher, and many other well known figures. Leadership is also Robert Lightle, Herman Perez, Bill Waters, Sandy Dandridge, and thousands of other unknowns. It is found at the squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, corps, theater, Army, national and international level.

Leadership can be good or bad, centralized or decentralized, warm or cold, offensive or defensive, macro or micro, or expensive or free. Leadership can be Protestant or Catholic, Jewish or Moslem, Hindu or Morman, or atheist or agnostic.

Leadership is guiding. Leadership is legendary. Leadership is foresight. Leadership is absorbent, abstinent, and unfortunately, at times abominable. Leadership is baccalaureate, balanced, basic and too frequently backward and barbaric. Leadership saved lives, killed, stopped wars, started wars, voted and dictated. Leadership has walked softly and carried a big stick, but it has also been loud and non-violent.

Leadership is honesty, enthusiasm, loyalty, courage and wisdom. Taking care of your soldier’s, civilian’s, sailor’s, airmen’s and marines’ dependents is leadership. Leadership includes being a good boss and friend, father or mother, son or daughter, sister or brother, and husband or wife. Knowing that the profession of arms is much more than just a job is leadership.

Leadership is helping, training, encouraging, understanding, motivating, disciplining, crying, laughing, standing firm, giving way, counselling, correcting, giving a second chance, and trying again and again. Leadership is optimizing, minimizing, memorizing, and mesmerizing. Leadership is tall, short, thin, heavy, male, female, black, brown, white, yellow, old, young, naturalized, and un-naturalized. Leadership is from the city and the country. Leadership is from the north, south, east, and west. Leadership looks you in eye, kicks you in the ass, covers your flank, and takes your place on the most dangerous mission.

Leadership comes from experience, but experience comes from mistakes. Leadership changes the odds and knows the risks. Leadership develops team work. The tides, the channels, the seasons, the winds, the weather, and the best forecast are all known by leadership. Leadership often makes good grades in school and has numerous years of formal education with many important degrees; but it also has been known to fail maths, English, and other equally important subjects.

Leadership comes from family, friends, teachers, coaches, and pastors. Simple, easy-to-understand orders come from leadership. Complex tasks are changed into short and accurate plans by leadership. Leadership can be learned and taught, but not forgotten or bought. Leadership can be seen, tasted, smelled, felt, and heard, but it can come from a blind person with no hands who cannot hear or walk.

Finally, leadership is so in love with life that it is willing to die to insure that others lives will go on.

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Reviewed by John R. Shield.

In a short period of time, I had the most tremendous experiences of all of life: of fear, of jubilation, of misery, of hope, of comradeship, and of endless excitement. (rifleman, p.16)

If you walk into any public library and go to the 1940s you will find shelves of books which are personal narratives of an author’s experience in World War II. There are literally thousands of such accounts, they range from the semi-tragic contemporary The Last Enemy, by Richard Hillary — a fighter pilot who was killed later on in the war; to the anarchic, nostalgic reminiscences of Spike Milligan. All have in common one thing — to attempt to share with the reader a personal experience of World War II.

Studs Terkel’s "The Good War" is in a sense, an attempt to supersede those shelves of books. It is a collage of personal experience — it is as close as he can make it to being the representative personal experience. By bringing together a group of some eighty people with vastly different backgrounds and involvement and letting them talk, Terkel has attempted to provide a definitive oral account of the war.

This is by no means an easy task, even if the book is limited to the American experience. World War II must easily be the most complex event in human history. How can one possibly choose the right eighty people that will provide a total picture? Compare for instance, the survivors of a Nazi slave labour camp with a sixteen year old girl in California whose war consisted of bringing home sailors from the U.S.O. to have dinner with her parents. Her final statement is only that:

After Pearl Harbor, I never played with dolls again. (p.247)

Yet we have learnt that she has been through three broken marriages, and ever since the war, has been quite unable to cope with relationships, because her adolescence was destroyed by the advent of war.

To her, the war represents a personal tragedy — it has in effect destroyed her emotional life. But what of our camp survivors? Their story is one of the most harrowing in the book. They conclude:

We are just happy. The other thing is almost behind us. But I tell you we still carry deep scars . . . You just live to survive.

We can’t dwell and live backwards. (p. 431)

Such personal tragedies are quite incomparable, yet each is total for those involved. This example in a sense reveals the central dilemma of "The Good War". Terkel, in attempting to put together the definitive oral account, has been unable to find representative people, because no two experiences of the war can ever be the same.

So, perhaps the book is a failure in that respect. But if it is, it is a glorious failure. For Terkel presents us with an infinite variety of experience. His narrators range from middle ranking I.B.M. executives who look back upon their G.I. days through a nostalgic haze, to one of the Andrews Sisters; from the French director of "The Sorrow and the Pity", to the chief American prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials. Such different wars exist in their memories!

Yet Terkel doesn’t simply let the leaders and the famous dominate the book. We have accounts from less obvious groups. Negroes are represented in force, and one senses a deep resentment for the discrimination that pervaded their war. Those at home are well represented — even teenagers are given twenty or so pages to attempt to communicate how it felt to be fully aware of the world at war around them, but to be unable to participate. Women are also represented in numbers coming close to their very real effort.

The problem always remains however; is it a representative sample? To an extent, this will depend on the individual’s perceptions about the nature of war and its implications. Total war, one can argue, affects entire populations. Yet is it worthwhile to devote space to a teenager’s experience, if we miss out, because of that, on a person whose involvement would tell us much ‘more’ about the war? I would argue that it is. For World War II was not simply about fighting the Japanese and the Germans.
It was, for want of a better term, a social event of an enormous magnitude.

Even if one didn't engage in blood and guts heroics, if one's sole effort was to stick flags in a map on the kitchen wall, one was still at war. Terkel's book is an attempt to find how that war affected everyone; not only those who 'fought', but all those involved — in effect, America.

Having reduced America to eighty people, the reader then faces the problems of any oral history, which are exacerbated by the emotive nature of the war about which they are talking. For oral history is always slightly dangerous. The war, for nearly all those featured in the book, was by far the most momentous event in their lives. Consider our rifleman:

I honestly feel grateful for having been witness to an event as monumental as anything in history and, in a very small way, a participant. (p.16)

For better or worse, oral history will always depend on the memory of those discussing the past. Memory is a particularly selective thing. When an event is so crucial to a person's consciousness, as the war seems to those in "The Good War", memory is apt to be more selective than usual. An I.B.M. executive tells Terkel:

I never discuss what I did in the service with my children. I told them some of the funnier stories. They do not know all the things that happened during the World War. I prefer that they don't. (p.146)

Yet how much has this man simply deleted from what he tells Terkel? The war, for many, and obviously our executive above, was a tremendously traumatic experience. The human mind simply protects itself against that turmoil which such an event tends to evoke.

One finds throughout "The Good War" people discussing bodies stacked 'like cordwood'. It is, by any standards, an horrific image. Yet the constant reference to it may point us to a deeper problem; that it may be the one image of horror which has become acceptable. How much have these participants otherwise purged from their consciences?

It is impossible to be critical of this process, for it is an instinctive or reflex action on the part of those involved. Yet it is a problem for the reader. One is not, by any means, getting a full account of the personal experiences of those featured. It is an edited version, and it is not necessarily Terkel doing the editing. It is the human mind, protecting its owner from images and experiences of war that are too painful or too inexplicable to be reconciled with their understanding of "the good war".

This in fact leads us to Terkel's main conundrum in the book, which is reflected in the quotation marks used around the title phrase. How can any war be a "good war"? Was it simply that the enemy was so bad, and that we were so good? Was it because the war, in one admiral's words, was "a noble adventure"? (p.191)

Or is it because in post-Vietnam America, the second World War is nostalgically remembered as the last time Americans seemed totally committed to, and unified in an unquestionable cause? Consider the journalist who tells us:

As I look back, it was a war that had to be fought. It's probably the last one. I don't think there ever will be another war that has to be fought. All war is evil. What is unthinkable is fighting a war that is unnecessary. (p.185)

All war is evil, but are some wars more evil than others? Or has Terkel in fact exposed the nostalgic haze to be just that, a haze covering the reality? Can any war really be a "good war"?

At time throughout "The Good War" it becomes hard to cope with this happy evocation of the most apocalyptic event in human history. The present it seems, is disillusioning. Vietnam was different. One couldn't recognise an enemy. Nobody collected aluminium foil or rolled bandages for the boys in Vietnam.

This seems to be the central point for Terkel and many of his interviewees. Somehow the paraphernalia of World War II has helped to cover or hide the horror of war. The war was a noble adventure, it was excitement, it was a time of national unity and maturity that can only be looked back at with fondness and regret for its passing.

As one reads the interviews and accounts, one can't help but comprehend a process of falsification taking place within the minds of those who lived through World War II. Sure, the war had its horror, its shame, its waste and all the rest. But all wars have that. World War II was different. It was a "good war". Everything made up for that. The unity, the sense of purpose, was and is unforgettable for a nation that has since undergone the traumas of Korea and Vietnam.
As we move into the '80s and '90s we should perhaps look upon "The Good War" as a warning to us. For it shows how easily we can forget our past, or relive it within our consciences in a way that is pleasing and supportive within an unsure world. "The Good War" was a time of unity and purpose, that is for certain. Yet it was also a time of prolonged misery and loss for humans everywhere. That should never be forgotten.

A journalist gives us his account of the war about halfway through the book. In it he describes some hair-raising times, the people he met, the excitement of those times, he certainly had a "good war". Yet he concludes, as perhaps we all should:

But, I could have done without this experience. No matter how just a war it was, it was war. It never was a solution to anything... (p.366)

'LANDSHIPS: BRITISH TANKS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR' AND 'VANGUARD OF VICTORY: THE 79TH ARMOURED DIVISION' by David Fletcher. Published by HM Stationery Office, London Approximately $15.00 each.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Pope.

It is appropriate to review these two well presented books together, not only because they are by the same author but because they are part of a series of five books dedicated to examining specialised equipment and their employment. For the record the others are 'The Churchill Tank: Vehicle History and Specification', 'The Cromwell Tank: Vehicle History and Specification' and the 'Data Book of Wheeled Vehicles: Army Transport 1939-1945'.

Landships I found to be an excellent book on the development of the first tanks. It is easy, interesting reading and illustrated with a large number of well selected photographs. The author has developed a commendable style of lightly and entertainingly covering the general history of tank development until some interesting or significant event occurs. The occurrence is then described in great detail in the same easy readable style yet managing to include a wealth of facts. Also included are the lateral effects the event has had on other projects, plans and future developments. One therefore ends up with both a general knowledge of the Landships/Tanks development and yet knowing enough detail of the significant events and actions to add life to the first five years of tank development. It is well known that the tank was conceived long before the First World War but unfortunately none of the bureaucrats, military or civilian had the foresight to envisage the slaughter and stalemate which would occur in trench warfare, a form of war brought about by the introduction of machine guns and mass armies using outmoded tactics. It required a new weapon (or tactic) to break this deadlock, which began in 1915, though infantry and artillery continued to try with decreasing success throughout 1915-17. The weapon which finally succeeded in resolving the impasse was the tank and this history of its development from a primitive caterpillar to a sophisticated weapon system is good reading, informative and carries the important lesson that we can never afford to stop thinking about the military art and developing our profession for the next war. Traditions and attachments to past glories, as the horsed cavalry demonstrated can be a fatal delusion.

Having had the pleasure of reading Landships I was confident that David Fletcher's book on the 79th Armoured Division would be written to the same high standard. The 79th Armoured Division has not been given its due as a formation in history because it never fought as a division but was always 'penny packeted' in support of other formations, both armoured and infantry. This is not surprising as the 79th drove and fought in the special purpose tanks and armoured vehicles known as the 'Funnies'. Yet the men and machines of 79th Armoured Division were in the forefront of every major land action from D-Day to the end of the war in NW Europe as it was their role to provide crossings over natural obstacles (such as rivers and ditches, many of which were contested) breach man made obstacles (such as minefields and wire) and provide specialised tanks to support attacks (such as flame throwing tanks, amphibious tanks etc).

The disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1943 had revealed only too well that normal tanks could not just be landed on a contested beach and unleashed on the enemy. Yet without tanks an infantry assault on fortified positions would be severely handicapped. The answer adopted was

Reviewed by Don Jender, Department of Defence.

The subject of a north-south railway across central Australia has been under discussion for more than a hundred years. This book continues the debate, with its advocacy of such a line linking Alice Springs and Darwin.

The book provides a detailed description of the proposed rail link, with maps and a summary of rail capacity and costs. There is also an examination of the history of the issue, including the two major recent examinations — the joint Commonwealth-Northern Territory review of the project (1980), and the Independent Economic Inquiry conducted by Mr Hill (1984). The latter has been much criticised by those favouring the project for taking an unduly short term and restricted economic approach to the subject.

The principal issues in the debate about the rail link proposal are its immediate and long term economic implications, its defence value, and its usefulness as a component of general infrastructure development in northern Australia. The reader is given a brief statement of the perceived economic advantages of the project, with a two page rebuttal of the Hill Inquiry. There is some discussion of northern infrastructure needs, mainly related to defence requirements. This book concentrates on the defence significance of the project, an understandable emphasis in view of the background of the authors. Consequently the book is of most value to those interested in the relevance to northern defence of a rail link between Alice Springs and Darwin.

Some thirty pages are devoted to considering the composition and logistic needs of representative forces which might be used to react to low, medium and high level contingencies. The analysis of force numbers, tonnages and methods of movement into northern Australia provides a simple, understandable discussion of northern defence in various situations, and provides data which enable assessments to be made of the logistic support required for forces operating in various situations. The main strength of the book is in this area.

The authors assert the need for the Alice Springs-Darwin railway, but focus on the defence implications of the project. Justification for the project would necessarily depend on a complex of economic, defence and strategic factors. The authors have chosen to concentrate on the defence aspect, and give a comparatively cursory treatment of the other considerations. They conclude that the project’s “extremely high” defence value and the “substantial social and developmental benefits” more than offset any lack of financial viability, but this is little more than their assertion. The book is consequently not in itself a complete or convincing demonstration of the need to build the railway. It is a valuable contribution to the debate on the more limited subject of what defence value there would be in the Alice Springs-Darwin rail link.

Reviewed by André Kuczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

"Tokyo Rose," Mrs. Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino, was an American citizen of Japanese parentage (nisei) whose broadcasts on Tokyo radio were designed to weaken the morale of American troops through supposedly upsetting references to life back home. Her seductive voice was employed to undermine the GIs’ fighting spirit by inferring that their wives and girlfriends were being unfaithful to them, and urging the soldiers to return to the United States.

The nickname “Tokyo Rose” came from American servicemen in the South Pacific, who in fact enjoyed her programs, which featured nostalgia and good dance music. After the war D’Aquino was returned to her native soil where she was tried and convicted of treason, fined $10,000 and sentenced to ten years in prison. She was eventually released after having served six years of her maximum term. Some three decades later D’Aquino sought a Presidential pardon, on the grounds that she had been trapped in Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor and had been forced to broadcast for the Japanese propaganda service and that she was only one of various persons dubbed “Tokyo Rose.” On his last full day in the White House — January 19, 1977 — President Gerald R. Ford granted the pardon.

But even with the American President’s pardon granting remission for D’Aquino’s conviction, Masayo Duus does not believe that justice was done. “[T]he word ‘pardon’ does not go down well,” she writes in the Epilogue, “especially in light of the evidence from official files of government abuse of power. The presidential pardon was a decent act, and a proper one, but it does not erase the stain of injustice . . . I wondered then, and I wonder still: Who should have asked for a pardon?” (p. 233).

Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific is a horrifying glimpse into the seamy realm of human tragedy. One thing emerges clearly from this book. The United States’ motives in prosecuting “Tokyo Rose” were based on wilful ignorance and virulent racism. Reading this splendid piece of historical scholarship brings back to mind the poignant statement made by the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the August 1963 issue of Atlantic Monthly, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” There can be no doubt that the world is a poorer place for having witnessed the sad case of “Tokyo Rose.”

FALKLANDS — WITNESS OF BATTLES, by Jesus Romero Briasco and Salvador Mafe Huertas. Published 1985. US $15.95

Reviewed by Wing Commander A. W. Litheridge

BRIASCO and Huertas have produced a book about The Falklands war that concentrates on the air battle — including sea-air and land-air engagements. The book comprises a series of (mostly) short chapters each describing a particular aspect of this more specialised scenario. There are chapters relating to the aircraft of each side — predominantly fighter and attack aircraft of course, but also aircraft that played relatively minor roles such as transports, bombers, helicopters and light ground attack types. Related equipment such as missiles — surface-to-air and air-to-air — and the Argentinian TPS43 radar based on The Falklands are also described. Finally, there are chapters related to specific high profile events such as the attack on the Invincible, operations on 21 May 1982 and the attacks on the British ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristam on 8 June 1982.

The authors have included in their work a comprehensive range of statistics on aircraft and ship losses, registration numbers, pilots names, positions of events and equipment/weapon involved. These statistics are organised into a series of tables to provide a clearer picture of who did what to whom, how they did it, and what they used. As with other similar books, there is a comprehensive journal of the war whereby the reader can at least follow the sequence of events, on a daily basis, from 18 March through to 14 June. Throughout the
book there is also an excellent collection of photographs about the air war and the aircraft and ships involved.

Notwithstanding the above, *Falklands, Witness of Battles* is a difficult book to read. The authors have had some difficulty in expressing on paper the English 'vernacular' and consequently the reader has to work hard in places to overcome some cumbersome phraseology. Nevertheless, the information is there, and in most instances is worth the effort if one is interested in another point of view on the war.

One interesting aspect of *Falklands, Witness of Battles*; is the preoccupation with the Argentinian story. The authors claim in the Foreword that their book is an impartial account of The Falklands War; I am not sure that this is the case. Of the 25 chapters, 18 were devoted predominantly to the description of Argentinian operations while only four concentrated on the British forces. Moreover, many of the Argentinian descriptions were based on very 'emotional' personal accounts and were in direct contrast to the more clinical British approach. I suspect that the authors reacted purely to what and how the different experiences were imparted to them by the military personnel they interviewed, and that the British felt no need to resort to colourful language. Certainly, there has been little attempt to critically analyse the various events, particularly those based on personally related experiences.

If you are after comprehensive statistics and good photographs then this book is recommended. However, if your preference is for a detailed informative and readable book on the war, *Falklands, Witness of Battles* may not be for you; there are better books around.

Salvador Mafe Huertas is a Spanish Military historian and aviation and defence journalist who, although not a pilot, has flown in many Spanish military aircraft. Jesus Romero Briasco is a Major in the Spanish Air Force and has flown several aircraft types including the Mirage III; he has co-authored several features prior to attempting this work.


Reviewed by CAPT C. W. Orme

WHAT does *War and Peace* have to offer the modern reader one hundred and eighteen years after its initial publication? The novel which is more frequently used to give substance to a bookshelf rather than a mind, has as much to offer in 1986 as it did when it was first published in 1868. For the reader, prepared to do battle with the fifteen books and fourteen hundred pages which make up one of the true great epics of literature, the reward is enormous.

*War and Peace* offers what most studies of an historical and military nature fail dismally to provide — the heart and soul of a period. Whilst texts on early nineteenth century Europe arm protagonists with facts, this classic novel provides a rare insight at all levels of society, in all human conditions. Be it Napoleon’s projected feelings at the Battle of Borodino or the character of the Bogoucharovo peasantry, the insight is incisive. Tolstoy is masterful in portraying all aspects of both the individual and his society at war.

As the novel progresses the reader is drawn into high and low society, growing with the characters and enduring their emotional and physical hardships. Whilst Tolstoy may have used poetic licence to enter the minds of great historical figures it is nonetheless a highly credible projection. *War and Peace* is not a novel for the faint hearted. It requires a commitment to start however this is quickly replaced by the overwhelming satisfaction and exhilaration gained from reading it. For the militarist, historian or escapist, *War and Peace* is as truly great a novel in 1986 as it was in 1868.

Rarely have both education and insight been provided in such a pleasurable and satisfying way.