Defence Force Journal
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Iroquois helicopters of No 9 Squadron on exercise.

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Defacing the Rising Sun Badge
Dear Sir,

I am aware that much debate surrounds the origin of the 'Rising Sun' badge; but can anyone please inform me whence the star in the badge originated?

A crown only was present in the centre of the badges my father wore in 1914-19. There was no star in the badges I wore in 1943-46.

Of recent years I have been aware that for some devious reason a star has been placed underneath the crown in the centre of the badge; but the penultimate insult to this distinguished, honoured and respected badge is reached in the heading of "The Role of the Australian Army in New Guinea in 1944-45" by Robert Hyslop, DFJ No 54, Sept/Oct 85. In the diagram of the badge a star only occupies the centre.

Which republic now controls the Australian Army?

Lt Col J. D. MACANSH RFD (RL)

Curtin's Cowboys
Dear Sir,

Colonel J. P. Buckley's essay, in Issue 53 of Defence Force Journal, "A Soldier's Tribute to John Curtin," is of the highest quality and one will turn to it again and again.

I am delighted to read how strongly Buckley comes out to whether Australia was in real and grave danger at that time (1942). Indeed, he says on page 19,

"I can assure any of those who might wish to 're-write' the history of that time that, with very good reason, from Prime Minister Curtin down, there was genuine fear of the likelihood of an enemy attack on Australia."

It is plain, behind all the worries which Curtin had, the greatest one, which he could not escape, was that all the Northern Coast from the Kimberleys to the southern shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria was empty and defenceless (save only for Darwin, to which Herring was rushed).

One can look in vain in the military writings on that period for specific small portents of this great worry and of Curtin's actual concern for the people of the North. At last one of these is described in Richard and Helen Walker's new book, "Curtin's Cowboys — Australia's Secret Bush Commandos," (which publishes March 1986, by Allen and Unwin). Their book details the story of the North Australia Observer Unit.1,2,3

The Walkers describe (from the Archives) a minute4 written by Curtin on 10 August, 1942, to the Minister for the Army, Frank Forde:

My dear Minister,

I append copy of a telegram dated 7th August, addressed to me by the Secretary, Wyndham Road Board, concerning Defence Forces at Wyndham and should be glad if you would furnish me with advice on the matter in question.

"Western Command Garrison withdrawn from Wyndham four weeks ago. Understand Northern Command were to take over immediately but no garrison has yet been sent. We are entirely without protection."

Yours sincerely,

John Curtin
Prime Minister.

The reply by Forde is dated 27 August, 1942, and reads,5:

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to your letter of 10th August concerning the withdrawal of local forces from Wyndham, I am now able to inform you that the Commander of Northern Territory Force has arranged for elements of the North Australian Observer Unit to be stationed in the Wyndham area. This unit was raised recently and is now on its way to the Northern Territory.

Yours sincerely,

F. M. Forde.

The elements of the North Australian Observer Unit (NAOU) to be stationed at Wyndham consisted of one platoon, presently complete with horses (for the regiment was mounted), sub-machine guns, Bren guns, grenades and explosives. I was a member of that platoon, which arrived in Wyndham soon after the correspondence above. I can add my own
confirmation of that genuine fear, which Buc­
key describes, from Curtin down even to such as me, as we reached the deserted town with
the empty Kimberleys on our left (into which
another NAOU platoon would soon deploy) and an empty coast on our right stretching to an
NAOU outpost of four men, at the mouth
of the Victoria River.
Yours sincerely,

AMOURY VANE,
Captain, RCMF, retired.

1. Vane, Capt. A., “The surveillance of Northern Aus­
tralia — its history. The story of Stanner’s Bush Commando
2. Jeffery, Colonel PM., “Initial Thoughts on an Aus­
tralian Land Surveillance Force,” Defence Force Journal
No. 21, March/April 1980, pages 27, 28.
3. Vane, Capt. A., “Defence of Continental Australia

Australian Style of Command
Dear Sir,

I found major Warren Perry’s article “Is there an Australian Style of Command?” most
interesting and widely researched.

However, the passages describing Admiral Sir
John Kelly’s style create a general impression
that the Officer’s leadership style was an un­
qualified success.

This is generally accepted as having been true
during his two years of command of the British
Home Fleet following the Invergordon Mutiny.
Kelly was given a difficult but very narrow
objective — restoring morale and a sense of
duty. Kelly was ideally suited for both these
tasks.

However, it must be said that his style failed
badly earlier in his career when he was Vice­
Admiral First Battle Squadron in the Mediter­
ranean. During his command there occurred
the “Royal Oak Incident”. Kelly failed to per­
cieve early enough the serious personality dif­
fences between the Rear-Admiral First Battle
Squadron and the Rear-Admiral’s Flag Captain
and Executive Officer. The situation erupted
into precipitate reliefs of all three officers, courts
martial and a blaze of publicity.

Further, it is reliably reported that the stand­
ard of tactical training declined markedly dur­
ing Sir John’s command in chief of the Home
Fleet.

Turning to Sir John’s brother Howard, I have
difficulty in accepting that Sir Howard exercised
leadership at all. Certainly, his actions leading
to the wreck of the British sloop Petersfield
provide us with a lesson in the dangers of sug­
gestions from senior officers. Kelly, the Com­
mander-in-Chief, was on board Petersfield at
the time and, to use his own words, was “giving
the Captain a lesson in navigation” and sug­
gested a course which the Captain followed.
The ship ran aground and became a total loss.
At the subsequent court martial Kelly denied
responsibility and the Captain was found guilty.

Yours faithfully,

A. W. GRAZEBROOK
Commander RANR

1. The Royal Oak Incident by Leslie Gardiner, and The
Keyes Papers, 1919-38, p.245, the latter volume being pub­
lished by the Navy Records Society.
2. Fabulous Admirals by Commander Geoffrey Lowis,
and Very Special Admiral, the Life of Admiral J. H.
Godfrey who prosecuted at the court martial.
WORLD authority in counter-insurgency operations (1915- ) born Melbourne. Educated at St. Kevin's College, and Duntroon, where he graduated as a lieutenant in 1937. After various appointments in Australia he became a staff officer with 6th Division in New Guinea, 1942-45. After the war, when it became apparent that Australian forces could be involved in South-East Asia, he reopened and developed Canungra Jungle Training Centre, 1955-57. From 1960, when he became strategic adviser to Burmese Defence Forces, he specialised in counter-insurgency operations in tropical countries. He was Commander of Australian Forces in Vietnam from 1962-65, senior adviser to the Police Field Force for South Vietnam Government 1965-67 and adviser to US and South Vietnamese Governments on security, intelligence, and para-military operations 1967-75. He retired from the Australian Army in 1968. His honours include DSO, OBE, Officer of the Legion of Merit (USA), and (Vietnam) Medal of Honour, Cross of Gallantry (with palm) and Chevalier (Knight) of the National Order.

This article therefore seeks to come to terms, in an exploratory way, with the life and times of Brigadier Serong. It attempts to outline his career and assess his service as a professional army officer. The career profile of Brigadier "Ted" Serong suggests that he made a significant contribution to Australian military lore. It is fitting to enquire why this was so.

Much has been said and written about Serong's role in the Vietnam War but no worthwhile attempt has been made to recognise the totality of his service within the Staff Corps. In his case, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. His duty was not typical, as his record showed a long term association with jungle training, the command of special forces and secondment to foreign armies. Through his unique role as Australia's first Vietnam Commander he came to be regarded as an outspoken soldier in a controversial war. This article pays tribute to his professionalism in the military arts and examines why he remained one of the war's most enigmatic figures. Part of the mystery lay in the fact that very few people in Australia were said to have fully known the extent and nature of this officer's orders in his operational contribution to the war effort. Respected or denigrated he could never be ignored. Truly, he was a remarkable Australian soldier.

Staff Cadet Francis Serong (574) entered the Royal Military College, Duntroon Wing, Victoria Barracks Sydney by way of "service entry", on 11 February 1935. He had been a Lance-Corporal with the Militia 57/60 Battalion in Melbourne and gave his occupation as a student on entry. Serong was born on 11 November, 1915 in Melbourne. He shared a com-
From Left to Right: Cape, Gilbert, Jones (?), Thornton (NZ) and Serong.

— In Easter 1937 these staff cadets were given 'temporary commissions' as Lieutenants for a militia camp held in Seymour. (RMC archives Photo 719).

Lee’s book on ‘RMC Duntroon’ also refers, p. 115.

mon date with one of Australia’s more rebellious sons — Ned Kelly was hanged on the same day, some 35 years earlier.

‘He came from a unextraordinary background. For a former Citizens Military Forces member, it was not an easy road. ‘Service’ entrants began in the third class but, as might have been expected, care was taken to ensure that they were not deprived of the benefits of the usual fourth class training. Ted Serong turned out to be one of the College’s most remarkable products. He was an individualist of imagination, energy and resource, with a strong disinclination to accept no when he thought the answer should have been yes’. Life at RMC was endured and Lance-Corporal Serong rated a few achievements on the way. As expected, he also ran up the obligatory minor charges on his disciplinary sheet. A robust education at a Christian Brothers’ College had prepared him for the rigours of a service academy. Of slight build and average height he was not remembered as one of their better athletes. However, College records indicate that he took out the welterweight boxing championships in 1936. Some application was also shown in his academic scholarship. He tied with Corporal P.P. Jackson to share the military law prize in the graduation exam. Lieutenant Serong survived the various challenges to graduate into the Staff Corps on 14 December 1937. Whilst his father’s profession was in engineering Francis Serong’s allotted specialisation was in artillery although later arms service included armour and finally infantry.

The advent of World War II provided many opportunities for junior officers in all three regular services. Promotions to acting rank came quickly, allowing many relatively inexperienced officers to enjoy a wide ranging variety of duties and to gain useful experience at an early age. Serong served in the Armoured Corps, and was an acting Major from late 1942 until the War’s end in 1945. His substantive rank in the Staff Corps was, however, still only Lieutenant; on 15 December 1945 he was promoted Captain.

Major Serong’s wartime service was confined to the immediate Pacific area. He was a 6th Division veteran with considerable expertise in the island campaigns. Because of this recognised ability, much service was at GSO2 level with various Divisions and Brigade Headquarters. On occasion, he was seconded to Infantry Battalions for special duties. Although described as having served with the 2/11 Battalion, an AIF battalion of the 19th Brigade, he was never on its posted strength. His talents meant that he was rotated to where he was best needed at the time.

The young officer’s part in the war effort was considered significant enough to be included in the official war history. This was in recognition of his good service during the offensives in the Wewak area in the closing stages of the New Guinea campaign. “On 21 July, 1945 Major Serong, VX 59888, led out from the 35th Battalion, 8th Brigade, a force of three platoons and native police to destroy an enemy ammunition dump”. His patrol report in the unit’s official war diary noted that “the work of the native police was of the highest standard”. Such a comment was a prescient observation. Some 20 years later he would also employ police units in a more distant land against a different foe using not unfamiliar tactics.

At the war’s end a grateful Major Serong regarded himself as just another lucky survivor among thousands of other veterans who, after all, had only done their duty. Earlier in the war, in 1942, he had found time to undertake the first wartime staff course at Duntroon which was later recognised by the qualification ‘psc’. 
Later in 1944, he instructed at the Staff College at Cabarlah which proved a brief respite from active service before he returned to the Pacific battle-fronts in 1945.

The island campaigns provided some outstanding infantry leaders and Major Serong was said to be typical of them. One report suggested that "he was the best commander thrown up at the battalion level from the Australian Forces in the whole of the last war". Serong himself denies such an assessment of his craft. Serong holds that there were better combat commanders at battalion level that he could ever aspire to. He learned his staff work from such men as Pollard and Spry. He observed and studied some great leaders. His teachers in combat leadership, then and later, were superb craftsmen such as Bob McCarty (2/4 Pioneer Bn), Paul Cullen (2/1 Inf Bn), Ian Hutchison (2/3 Inf Bn), George Warfe (various) and Ben O'Dowd (3 RAR).

The pages of this journal on previous occasions have expressed some disquiet about the role of pro-consul given to General Macarthur in his dealings with subordinate allied Commanders and their troops; but for the young Serong there was no such feelings. He was, and remains, an unabashed fan:

"I am very much in favour of General Macarthur. I regard Macarthur as the greatest soldier that ever lived. It was his strategy, it was his thinking and because of the way he ran that (South West Pacific) operation I am here today". For Serong the war was truly over. The next decade saw him in a variety of senior appointments in the staffs of commands. It was a leavening experience in that he was able to demonstrate his considerable aptitude for organisational control. It was to put him in good stead for the remainder of his army career.

In the peacetime army Francis Serong's staff appointments included: AHQ, A Branch (organisation), HQ Eastern Command (GSO 1), AHQ G Branch (training), and AHQ A Branch (personnel). Promotion came on 30 January, 1947 in his confirmation as Major. On 18 October, 1948 he was similarly confirmed as Lieutenant-Colonel (he had acted previously since

First Class 'Graduation' photograph 1937. Serong is on extreme left of rear row. Others standing to his right are Williams (E.G.), Williams (E.W.S.), Oxley, Little, Gilbert, Jones. Seated (left to right) Coleman, Cape, Thornton, Jackson (D.R.) Cowper, Loughran, Jackson (P.P.). (RMC archives Photo 1245).

20 August, 1947). Given the acting rank of Colonel on 28 March, 1955, he received his last regular promotion on New Year’s Day 1958 when he was given this rank substantively.

As a staff officer, Colonel Serong had a recognisable flair for paper work. He had an ability to master operational orders and staff appreciations in the control of men on and out of the field in a mix of tactics and weaponry. Possibly because of his usefulness in his particular staff position, he was denied the chance to serve in Korea. Like many others he had heard rumours of war but in the peculiar ballot of officers of his rank and experience he was to stay in this staff grading through the duration of that war overseas. The Army had more call for him in Australia.

In March, 1955 Colonel Serong took command of the then Jungle Training Centre (JTC) at Canungra. He recalls: “Subsequently I started, re-started more accurately, the jungle training centre in Canungra which was oriented on developing a force that could handle counter-insurgency operations in the then turbulent area in South East Asia”. As commandant, it gave Colonel Serong a unique opportunity to put his own experience to practice. At the same time, it allowed him to redevelop a singularly Australian style of jungle warfare perfecting tactics which served Australian troops well in the ensuing campaigns of Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam.

The Commandant would also lead where necessary. He made his involvement as active as
possible. One recruit was daunted by a 15 foot leap into the unknown. On seeing this, the Colonel, in red-banded cap and pressed greens, calmly drew abreast of the young soldier on the same platform. After reassuring him, hand on shoulder (the soldier aided by a gentle push) they both stepped out together. The result was spectacular. The mud and slush spared neither rank. The soldier graduated — the camp laundry, or possibly a weary batman, had another task to complete.

Colonel Serong stayed for two years as Commandant of JTC, to complete his posting in May, 1957. By then the Army was re-adjusted to the fact that future combat would more than likely be in the jungles of Asia. Soldiers would come to wear the familiar jungle greens in preference to the old khakis. Weapons too would change. The standard Lee-Enfield would give way to the FN self-loading rifle.

By mid-1957 Australian troops in Malaya were well experienced with the incessant patrolling for which earlier training at Canungra had prepared them. Malayan service during the emergency was also to beckon Colonel Serong. He went to Malaya, stayed briefly, only to acquaint himself with the British jungle warfare school at Kota Tinggi. Working in its usual way, the Army had other plans for him.

In 1957 Colonel Serong was invited to become a guest instructor at a “pilot course” for the Burma National Defence College. “The Burmese Government played a very shrewd and farsighted stroke. They requested the Governments of many countries to send specialists to Burma as instructors in the Burmese National Defence Forces. The Burmese wanted an anti-insurgency guerilla expert. They asked for specialists by name. They obtained from Australia Colonel Serong.” He was attached to HQ FARELF for several months for this temporary duty. He gave his series of lectures in Burma from June to August, 1957. The period of service was all too short, for he was to return to staff duties again. From August, 1957 to February, 1960 he served on the general staff of HQ Southern Command.

Once again, he was to return to Burma. Because of his successful visit to Burma in 1957, the Burmese Government invited him to return as strategic adviser to the Burmese Defence Forces. “From March, 1960 to April, 1962, he was in Burma as an adviser, being attached to the Australian Embassy, Rangoon”.

Colonel Serong’s Burmese days were largely a happy time for him. It must have been professionally satisfying given the considerable amount of independence he was afforded. He was able to serve with the surviving members of Aung San’s 30 comrades. He formed friendships with many leaders which still endure. He witnessed the discontent of the Army which saw General Ne Win usurp power from President U Nu in the period. Later, in South Vietnam, he would observe the events which led to Ngo Dinh Diem’s removal by his officers in a bloody coup.

In early 1962 he left Burma for his next assignment. He was not replaced as his Burmese duty was a personal appointment. In assessing his contribution it was obviously some achievement. Technical efficiency was already increased. Serong observed that, shortly after he returned to Australia, General Ne Win re-organised the whole defence command structure to secure his political position and that the counter-insurgency operation lost its momentum. Colonel Serong could only speculate on his next orders. He commented that it came on April Fool’s Day that year, when he was informed that he should prepare himself for a reconnaissance trip to Vietnam.

It was during these preparations that his Army service was recognised by appointment as an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) in the Queen’s Birthday Honours of June, 1962. It was the first of many awards to come in the last years of his service. His award was “... In recognition of his outstanding service — especially in the training field.”

Before considering the circumstances of Colonel Serong’s appointment to Vietnam, it is necessary to describe the worsening military situation in Indo-China which made it so. During the period (the early 1960s) the situation in South-East Asia was causing increasing alarm to Australia. There was armed activity in Laos, and increasing insurgency in South Vietnam. The defence of Australia was based broadly on a concept of ‘forward defence’ which, in South-East Asia, complemented the United States policy of containment of communism. As in Korea, Australian troops were to fight alongside Americans, an involvement which by 1969, at
the height of the war, would require a third of
the Army's combat strength.
Against these deteriorating developments in
Vietnam, the Government decided that now was
the time for some good men to come to the aid
of the party. On the 24 May, 1962, the Minister
for Defence, Mr A. Townley, announced that
on the invitation of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment, Australia was to commit up to thirty
military instructors to Vietnam. Instruction was
to be in jungle warfare techniques, village def-
ence and related activities such as engineering
and signals. Their role would be to assist in the
training of the ground forces in South Vietnam.
The contingent was to be commanded by Colo-
nel Serong. Now that a political decision had
been made to commit a team he was also in-
structed to make a second reconnaissance visit
from 6-16 June, 1962. Thus, he was well placed
to assess the situation and take part in the
selection of a team from among the hundreds
of soldiers who had volunteered for service.
Approximately half of the thirty members se-
lected had served during the Malayan emer-
gency of the previous decade. The Commander-
Designate was fulsome in his praise for the non-
commissioned members of his team.
"In those days it took 9 years to get to be a
Sergeant in the Army, and a man who was a
Sergeant for another nine years, mostly combat
experience behind him, he knows his business,
and those fellows know their business." For
political purposes, the team was given the ad-
visory role with the expectation that they would
not be required to undertake combat opera-
tions. This came to be rarely honoured, and
soon there came to be reports of skirmishes and
larger battles. Sgt. W.F. Hacking was reported
as being accidentally killed on 1 June, 1963 —
not through enemy action. A year later on 6
July, 1964 Warrant Officer K.G. Conway was
killed in combat at Nam Dong. Canberra later
came to honour this soldier. In the suburb of
Gowrie, all (streets) are named after distin-
guished servicemen and women, and in par-
ticular, Conway Place. Colonel Serong (as
head of AATTV) was also designated as 'special
adviser in counter - insurgency' to General Paul
Colonel Serong with a South Vietnamese Army Officer, Doung Ngoc Lam, in Vietnam, C. 1964, (A.W.M.)

D. Harkins, Commanding US Forces in Vietnam (USMACV)\(^{20}\). Colonel Serong gained some access to the US political administration by virtue of the seven years experience he had received in the field of counter-insurgency prior to his arrival in South Vietnam. Even so, aides to senior US military officers would visibly wince when this Australian officer took the floor at various briefings. On one occasion he was reported to have personally bearded General Harkins to the horror of the General’s staff.

Serong’s protagonists soon came to understand the level of access he enjoyed and the support which he was able to draw from it. William Colby, whose own role in Vietnam is better reported in McNeill’s *The Team*, felt constrained to remark on the peculiar patronage that Colonel Serong enjoyed.

“When he (Serong) came back to Washington he would have a session with our President, this is not what a normal Colonel is going to be doing very often, and our President, President Nixon, was very interested in listening to him and his views . . . and he (Serong) was to bring that dimension that had to be brought to their attention and it resulted in a greater American effort in the pacification programme and not just a purely military effort”\(^{22}\). The situation predictably produced rows. Evan Whitton, in a perceptive article, recounts the sort of controversy the Colonel experienced with General Paul D. Harkins, the US Commander from 1962-64.

Serong knew, as would anybody in the field, Harkins’ reports to Washington were wildly optimistic. Serong went over Harkins to the US Ambassador, (the late) Henry Cabot Lodge, and laid it on him bluntly that Harkins was misrepresenting the position. Lodge, no pal of Harkins, called in the General and let him know what Serong had said. The upshot was predictable. Neither Canberra nor Washington wanted to hear any of that bad news. External Affairs told the Army to tell Serong to stay out of what they thought were politics, and what Serong thought was war?\(^{22}\). Serong himself discounts this belief. He admits that there was some turmoil in Canberra, but he never received the reprimand described above.

Colonel Serong relinquished command of the team in February, 1965. He was then seconded to the Australian Department of Defence for attachment to the US State Department. Later in 1965 Serong established the Vietnamese National Police Field Force raised under USAID auspices.

On 28 October, 1965 the Minister for the Army, Dr Jim Forbes, announced that four Australian advisers (including Peterson, Chinn and Simpson) had been decorated for gallantry in Vietnam. The gazetted list also included a Distinguished Service Order to Colonel Serong (CAG 4 No. 65 refers). A press report noted his citation as saying that “his outstanding courage and devotion to duty set an example which was an inspiration to all those who came in contact with him”\(^{23}\). Another contemporary report mentioned that “his citation said that his work had required him to visit out-stations and on many occasions he had become involved in clashes in which his courage and leadership had contributed significantly to the success of the operations”\(^{24}\). Later that year he and others were to be awarded the rare ‘South Vietnam’ clasp to the British General Service Medal 1962. “On 17 December, 1965, Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies said approval had been given for the award to troops serving in the area of a special (South) ‘Vietnam’ clasp”\(^{25}\). (Readers interested in the iconography of this award should consult Ken White’s article in a 1975 issue of the “Orders and Medals Research Society Journal” — Volume 14, Summer, Number 2 — 147).
With his experience in writing citations, Francis Serong was touched by an off-beat one composed for him. The best citation the Colonel treasured was one which arrived on his 50th birthday, in the form of a telegram from Australia. A glowing tribute (on his DSO) came from the Royal Australian Regiment’s W.O.'s and Sergeants mess at Ingleburn. “Congratulations on award of (the) DSO by Her Majesty to the best bloody soldier in the world. Should have happened years ago.” While he was warmly heartened by the sentiments, it was obvious to him that his old comrades had stood-to for far too long, as the message appeared to have been composed very late in the evening.

A British representative in Saigon, of the day, reading it and passing it on said, “... that is the difference between the Australian Army and other armies in the world. They are the only ones where a message like that could be sent and accepted. It is the highest expression of discipline and morale”. On receiving the message Serong felt that it was the underpinning of his military philosophy, which is the relationship between a leader and his men. It was not learned in any service training school. The undoubted fact that the NCO’s composed the message during a long night at the bar does not reduce the British representative’s point. It strengthens it.

The Colonel continued to serve in Vietnam in an unbroken period of Army service from 1962-68. The possibility of returning to Australia to eke out the twilight of his time in a quiet backwater, marking time for a pension, offered little cheer to this soldier.

“The US Government wanted me to stay there (in Vietnam), so there was some horse-trading went on between Canberra and Washington as a result of which I was then loaned to the State Department and I stayed there and in other capacities in the counter-insurgency operation until the last day of the war in 1975”26. As a serving officer on loan Colonel Serong was to act as a Senior Adviser with Allied Headquarters in Saigon until his resignation from the Army in 1968. After that, his service was in a civilian capacity as a consultant to the American-Vietnamese Command.

Thus Serong’s Vietnam experience can be seen in three phases. The first phase was as the Commander of the AATT from 1962-65. Secondly, in his attachment to the US Army from 1965-68, he was primarily involved in assisting with the formation and operation of the paramilitary programme in Vietnam. The third and final phase, from 1968-75, included employment as a Rand Consultant working in the field of strategy.

In his involvement with the Vietnamese Police Field Force Colonel Serong made an impressive contribution to the war effort. Due to the American build-up and the successive changes of Government the country was suffering from severe internal political instability. Such a situation would create a favourable climate for insurgency. It was thus necessary to stabilise the country by backing the administration with the continuity of a police force which would be more immune to the political crises which often distracted the leadership of the Vietnamese Army. “Every time the Government changed we had the most awful mess in operations because the forces that you had there for operational purposes inevitably became involved in political purposes”27. By December, 1965 the 15,000 strong Police Field Force under Colonel Serong was added to the pacification programme and it was then able to begin operations south of Saigon. Denis Warner, a veteran journalist, observed: Serong... saw that such success as was being achieved by the Vietnamese Army in clearing operations was nullified by the inability to secure the area after the battalions, with their associated regional force and popular force elements, had passed on to fresh operations in other areas28. Certainly, much of the British experience in Malaya was used by the Americans in this Vietnamese venture. Predictably, the scheme was not without its critics, although discussion of this deserves more detailed analysis than is possible here. The Government still had to extend its full authority to the rural provinces amid the confusion of an acute guerrilla warfare problem. Still, it was perhaps an honest and early attempt to recognise that a political input was required into the equation. In short, employment of the PFF was a tacit recognition that counter-insurgency required different solutions which could not be achieved by merely increasing the level of conventional ground forces which were, by their doctrine, often ill-fitted for the task.

In 1968, the watershed of the Vietnam era, Serong was approaching 53 and had become the most senior Colonel in the active list of the Australian Staff Corps. He decided to retire early, the Commonwealth Gazette of 5 Septem-
ber, 1968 announcing that he ceased to be seconded to the Department of Defence for special duties on 30 August, 1968 and was transferred to the Army’s retired list (Royal Australian Infantry Corps — Southern Command) with the honorary rank of Brigadier from 31 August, 1968. The Gazette also announced a posting to the reserve of a former stalwart of the first team, Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Mann, DSO. Another highly regarded officer with Indo-Chinese experience, Lieutenant-Colonel F.S.B. Peach, OBE, was transferred to the reserve supplement in the same list. It was thus the passing of an age.

The period 1968-75, the third and final phase of his work in Vietnam, saw Colonel Serong acting as a consultant in strategic matters. He took the opportunity to visit Australia in 1971 and to address the National Press Club in Canberra that February. Bruce Juddery, in an extensive article, reported the comment of one observer that “he’s certainly an Army personality, there’s no doubt about that — Serong’s certainly forceful”. Brigadier Serong then felt constrained to remark:

I’m not running for Sheriff anywhere, so it doesn’t matter what people think of me . . . I’m not going to ventilate my relationship with the Australian Army which, by and large, was a very happy one. I left it because I found a way of being more service to the country out of it than inside of it. During his visit he also took the opportunity to explain the derivation of his name for etymological purposes. His family name was originally Seron, but the ‘g’ was tacked on by a French ancestor frustrated by Australian mispronunciation. There is no ready explanation for the appellation “Ted”. He disarms some of his American critics who have invariably referred to him as “Surong” or “Sarong”. There is a “Sorong” near the tip of Irian Jaya. A “Sarong” of course was what Dorothy Lamour wore in those ‘road’ films with Bing Crosby when Serong was but an equally young subaltern.

Rank is said to have its privileges but for Francis Serong it also had its problems — at least for others in describing him. Recognising that the Americans had some semantic and cultural difficulties in handling the term “Brigadier” — Brigadier-General no longer being used in the British Army system from which Australia then took its lead — he was also described as a General on occasion.

In the closing days of the war the Americans could offer little comfort to a beleaguered President Thieu. The promised military aid had not reached Saigon’s Army which was fighting for its life. Against this backdrop President Thieu decided to abandon the Central Highlands and to fall back to a consolidated enclave. The subsequent withdrawal created a military rout which, armed with the loss of political will and lack of support, aided the defeat of the South. Hanoi’s troops entered Saigon on 30 April, 1975 and the rest, as they say, is history.

In the recriminations which followed a long silence, Brigadier Serong endured the obloquy of a succession of writers who were critical of his role in the war. In the search for scapegoats some critics considered it sufficient to target his strategy. For his part Brigadier Serong maintained that if he could strongly hold his own viewpoint other people were equally entitled to theirs. As far back as 1966 Serong maintained that “I can’t see us losing militarily if the citizens of the United States continue to back us.” In 1971 he offered that Hanoi had lost the initiative. One academic found this confidence misplaced. “He tends to under-estimate the North Vietnamese”, said Robert O’Neill (then) of the Australian National University, “and to over-estimate their troubles”. (Juddery commented correctly that ‘history will rule in the dispute’).

Serong’s last years in the Republic of Vietnam were spent as the Director of Studies of the Pacific Institute in Saigon. By this time he had produced numerous articles on counter-insurgency. Some of his more significant papers included: ‘The Australian View of Revolutionary War’ (1971), ‘Vietnam’s menacing cease-fire’ (1974), ‘The future of South Vietnam’ (1971) and ‘The Easter Offensive in Vietnam’ (1973).

As a civilian consultant he still managed to attract a certain amount of academic interest. Dr Peter King (now Professor) wrote a detailed article on Ted Serong in the winter of 1974 after an earlier visit to Vietnam. It was an attempt to come to terms with this soldier’s contribution to the literature. Dr King found Serong’s papers “brilliant and exasperating”. Furthermore, Dr King argued that:

It is a minor tragedy for the left and right that no one who can match Serong’s peculiar brand of ruthless realism had emerged on that side of the debate. For Serong is perhaps unique. A persistent and dedicated true believer, who
might nevertheless be taken to task for excessive disillusion about the cause he is serving. After the fall of Saigon, Francis Serong returned to Australia from where he continues to consult in the field of strategic planning. His account of reasons for the defeat were included in several articles written for the *Sydney Morning Herald*. (Lack of space prevents their proper interpretation in this paper.) Serong continues to travel to current trouble spots to assess and report on the threat and response to insurgency. He is presently pre-occupied with Central America. After a visit to the region in 1983 he produced a critical report which said "one of the chief difficulties is a shortage of ammunition and the supply by Washington of sub-standard weapons to the forces it is backing." (Such criticism also applied to the Vietnamese Army some twenty years beforehand.)

With a sense of *dejà vu*, one can only ask how will the future assess this Australian soldier. It cannot be denied that he was a colourful figure as his controversial record shows. Some ten years later after the war he still manages to excite concern for his utterances. In May 1985 he opined that:

"We are a people who send their soldiers to war, and spit on them when they come back." He remains unrepentant in the face of criticism. Perhaps he is not so large in life as he was twenty years ago but his voice is still heard. He remains a constant champion for stronger armed forces with an increased deterrence. He argues that the essential first step is to rebuild the nation's defences to a level at which they have maintained credibility... the level required can be measured on a rough but effective indicator — 4.5% of the G.N.P. However, for the Left to portray Francis Serong as a caricature from the Right is to ignore the evidence of his compassion for the Vietnamese people. He was observed (by Lansdale) to have a soldier's respect for the populace. "I found him exceptionally compassionate to the people he was dealing with in Vietnam, the Vietnamese people. This is a rare quality." Colby offered a similar perspective. "I know him well and I had great respect for him. The Americans were inclined to focus on the military power whereas people like Serong realised the importance of the political dimension of the problems so the Australian contribution was very important and quite unique." Similarly, Brigadier Serong argued that "we wanted to reabsorb the Vietcong within the population so that they could take part in the building of the nation when it finally came to peace." This article has attempted to describe the real Ted Serong. What forces and events created such an enigmatic figure? The media found good copy in him, which continued to fuel public interest. Those qualities he had earned him a place at Duntroon in 1935. He later developed the qualities of the true Australian soldier — quiet courage, perseverance, candour and loyalty. They are qualities which are still sought today in every station of life.

One of Serong's strengths appears to have come from his early schoolhood days. He had after all completed his secondary education at St. Kevin's, Melbourne, a school which rounded off students and it was run by the Christian Brothers. A former Roman Catholic Chaplain-General, Bishop Morgan, himself an alumni, recalls the influence of the Christian Brothers on his own life: "If I ever had to think back on the formation of character and the formation of my broad outlook on life, I always think of those Brothers... their impact on my life was great." In the formative days of Canungra (1955) Ted Serong was visited by the group of Chaplains-General, including Bishop Morgan — a good friend of his from many years back. Over lunch, and after a deal of preliminary talking, looking and listening, Bishop Morgan said he had been nominated to speak for the group and
that the Chaplains had come to persuade Serong to accept certain concepts for incorporation in the Centre's orthodoxy of training — that is, in matters of religious significance. The Chaplains thought that they might have some problems in convincing Serong of the need to inculcate such values in the training syllabus; but they had now seen for themselves that there was no problem because those concepts were in action already.

In summary, if more questions than answers have been raised by this article then it has partly achieved its purpose. A more thorough study of the man and his strategy is obviously deserving. Others may continue to debate the full extent of his role in the Vietnam war. Still, the facts of his life need to be distilled from much of the past fiction surrounding his name and his actions. If this attempt to unravel some of the mystery from this officer has come closer to the heart of understanding what processes have created it then the article has partly achieved its object as well.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to repeat that the younger Serong first entered Duntroon in 1935. A-half-a-century later the tide has turned full swing as 1985 witnessed the College's last graduating class march out with the inception of the Australian Defence Force Academy. The Royal Military College will end its present composite role. Hugh Smith, a Duntroon academic, offers that: "... the Services colleges served not only to maintain service traditions but also (served) as a focus for the expression of deeply held values in Australian society. It is a question whether the new academy (ADFA) will be held by the public in the same high regard as the older (service) colleges". The leadership qualities and career achievements exhibited by Brigadier Serong will though continue to provide an exemplar for successive generations of ADFA cadets. They may aim to achieve the same sort of qualities which characterised Francis Serong's career. In short, he was a good Australian soldier — "A soldier's soldier".

THE LONDON GAZETTE
Tuesday, 26th October 1965
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The Queen has been graciously pleased on the advice of Her Majesty's Australian Ministers to approve the undermentioned award in recognition of Gallant and Distinguished Service in Vietnam.

Distinguished Service Order

Colonel Francis Phillip SERONG, OBE (3102), Australian Staff Corps.

Colonel Serong graduated from the Royal Military College in December 1937, and has served continuously since that date.

In July 1962, in response to an invitation from the Government of South Vietnam an Australian Army Training Team was sent from Australia to assist in training Vietnamese in jungle warfare, village defence and related activities. Colonel Serong was chosen as the Commander of the Team.

Subsequently, when the role of the Team was widened to permit members to accompany the Vietnamese forces, by the very nature of the conflict our members became involved in operations which called for a high standard of courage, skill and leadership. Casualties have been sustained by our forces.

Colonel Serong's outstanding courage and devotion to duty has set an example which has been an inspiration to all those who come in contact with him. He has at all times maintained close personal touch with members serving on outstations and during these visits has, on occasions, become involved in clashes in which his courage and leadership have contributed significantly to the success of operations. In the 2½ years as Commander, he has maintained the high tradition of the Australian Army and has brought honour to his country as its representative. He is held in the highest regard by the United States and Vietnamese authorities. Colonel Serong is to relinquish the appointment in February 1965.

NOTES
15. Ibid, 43.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. SMH, 30 July, 1966.
36. SMH, 11 June, 1975.
37. The Australian, 14 October, 1983.
43. Canberra Times, 10 October, 1984.

Mike Fogarty is a public servant currently based in Canberra. He is a former member of the Defence Forces. In 1984 he graduated from the Canberra College of Advanced Education. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect official opinion or policy — past or present — given that his research was restricted to public sources. The generous cooperation given by the Royal Military College, Australian Archives, Australian National Library, Australian National University and the Australian War Memorial is gratefully acknowledged. However, he retains responsibility alone for any interpretation of the events described in this article. This is his first contribution to the ‘Defence Force Journal’.

Colonel F.P. Serong, DSO, OBE — photo taken during his service as CO, AATTW, C. 1964, (A.W.M.)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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COPIES WANTED
The Editor urgently requires back copies of Army Journal and Defence Force Journal.
My dear Colonel,

Incredible though it seems in retrospect, your 'Letter from the Dreamtime' almost convinced me you had finally fallen foul of desperate circumstances. Suitably provoked I offer this brief response.

Down the passage of time man has ignored, at terrible cost, the simple proposition that the price of peace is preparedness.

Throughout your great land, in a thousand places, are silent yet powerful symbols to your earlier neglect of this truth. Throughout your land there are those who remember, with an anguish which defies description, those whose promise was given up to this insatiable cause. There are those whose anger flames the remorse wrought by man's stupidity, those who have seen for themselves that war can have no other result than the destruction of the values without which there can be no hope.

There can be no more important national objective than the pursuit of freedom nor is it prudent to limit the treasure expended on its guarantee. Any shortfall in treasure will be paid for in blood. Regretably each generation seems destined to relearn this truth but with the march of time it becomes increasingly obvious your Great South Land will not escape the absolute penalties which flow from continued neglect and indifference.

What could be done? Simply put, your people must agree that the first duty of your Parliament is to safeguard the freedom of the Australian people. To do so the Parliament, and the people, would espouse vigilance and preparedness as the premium for survival in a dangerous world where there are no external guarantees of safety. They may well have to fend for themselves, without sufficient preparation time.

Such a proposition presupposes a National Will prepared to cut across the boundaries and barriers so restrictive of the execution of the common weal. It would require a recognition that national defence issues have taken a heavy toll of the social (and economic) infrastructure of your country. Time and again your community has agonised over the rights of individuals and minorities when a democracy commits itself to a proper defence or is committed to war. Certainly you could permit no restriction upon the legitimate expression of the alternative view but neither can you ignore the horrendous toll your people have paid in lives and misery.

By Lieutenant Colonel J. Wood, ARES
to support your national interests, no matter how imperfectly expressed. You must be therefore equally forthright in your opposition to those who would besmirch or smear or who would seek to distract you to lesser goals.

Surely freedom is the one ideal, above all others, which demands bipartisan commitment. Surely it should be possible for people of good will, of whatever political persuasion, to agree and then guarantee, the criteria necessary to fulfil fundamental defence objectives e.g., an agreed minimum capability, level of budget expenditure, degree of sophistication, size of force. It would follow that your Defence Force must be structured to meet any threat, whatever its level or method of attack. This can only mean a force in being, so equipped and at a level of operational efficiency as to make an Australian deterrent perceived and credible. Such a force structure would include specific provision for major, immediate and effective expansion and mobilisation should circumstances so require.

It will be argued, with some effect, that arming a nation is a fruitless and wasteful exercise. It will be also argued that the outbreak of war involving the use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be an unmitigated disaster for mankind. Why then even attempt to shield oneself from these horrors and would your forces be of any consequence anyhow?

There is merit in these arguments and they attract those who support a special interest or point of view. How comforting it would be if you could set aside the lessons and legacies of history or even ignore the everyday happening of your own times. Fortunately, many of you still believe in the future of your families, your friends and of your Great Land. You accept that there are still values and ideals worth striving for and this imposes a heavy cost.

No passivity, or the special cause, or the goodwill of man, are too fragile as reeds upon which to base your future and that of your children. Nevertheless you also hear from within the voices of indifference, and as this temporary lull in the business of war lengthens, so also the voices grow louder. You see, it is the perceived sharp end of threat which concentrates the mind and the resources. Without that goad, waste, inefficiency, convenience become commonplace and as they do so morale and professionalism are tarnished.

What could be done? One option would be to press for the immediate establishment of a Joint Force to cover the North-West approaches, presently the most obvious line of march to, and initial foothold on, your soil. This Force would require the appropriate early warning, surveillance, command-and-control, communications systems as well as the necessary infrastructure and logistic support. All these facilities would require a degree of protection normally only available in time of conflict. The composition and disposition of the Force would be a matter of specific and urgent study but the Government should be obliged to have the Force in place and operationally ready within two years.

During the same period planning for a second Joint Force, to cover the North and North-East approaches, should begin with work, on additional expansion facilities in the Joint Force Zones, commenced with a view to the routine deployment of forces, regular and reserve, earmarked to supplement the Joint Forces.

I expect you will not respond very readily to my proposal. Probably your most telling point will be that of cost. My proposal would require a major and ongoing expansion of the Defence Force and a concomitant funding program. Well, I have already flagged the need for new dimensions of thought and significant magnitude of expenditure if you are even to begin to tackle this whole subject with any impact. But the problem is not just money, it is attitude and especially the attitude of the professional. Maybe the years have taken a toll there also. Maybe too many people have just given up; the supremacy of economy may have become a way of life. Maybe.

You might also retort, correctly, that there are not even the resources to carry out the most basic of tasks now, let alone add major redeployments and commitments. This is a hard one to answer but there are avenues worth exploring—initially, special purchases or leasing arrangement could be introduced; the individual services could concentrate on the development of personnel and facilities using, where necessary, equipment not the latest in the state of the art. The arms dumps of the world are full of readily obtainable equipment and surely it is just as important to have more squadrons (of ships, of armoured vehicles, of aircraft) in being as it is to have the latest equipment in the inventory. In these days of no warning and high technology readiness is not just state of the art, essential though that is. It must also
be an in place capacity of trained personnel and suitable infrastructure around which a rapid expansion can take place.

I suggest that the traditional reliance upon small, albeit very professional forces, supplemented by reserves or special arrangements is no longer a credible concept. There has to be a marked increase in the size and readiness of the regular and reserve forces. These forces will have to be seen to be active, proficient and so deployed and equipped as to make any attempt to deny Australians their freedom one that would impose a totally unacceptable cost.

With best wishes,

Your old friend.

Lt. Col. Wood has contributed previously to the DFJ in a series of articles entitled 'A Letter to a Friend'. His civilian employment has included overseas postings to Jakarta, Hong Kong, and most recently, Tokyo. He is presently on the Unattached List HQ 3 Div. FF Gp.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The Journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

Terrorist Warfare: a Reassessment. Motley, James B. Military Review; Jun 85: 45-57. Article discusses terrorism from a US standpoint. It analyzes the nature of the threat, US anti-terrorist program and policy considerations, and National Security Decision Directive 138 which endorsed pre-emptive strikes and reprisal raids against terrorists abroad. Problems with leadership, support groups, media and access to weapons are discussed.

Canadians Backing away from Complete Unification. Young, Claire Pacific Defence Reporter; Aug 85: 27-28. An analysis of Canadian Defence Force structure with some comparisons to the Australian system. Problems have been experienced with increasing civilian participation in the military structure, breakdowns in communication between commands and National Defence Headquarters. Introduction of different service uniforms is indicative of the move away from complete defence force unification.

China's Naval Capabilities are Increasing, but Slowly. Bussert, Jim Defence Electronics; Mar 85: 129+(5p). Reviews the capabilities of the equipment, training and technological base of the PRC (People's Republic of China) Naval Forces. Includes a map of eastern PRC showing naval bases, shipyards, training facilities and electronics centres.

Principles of War and Low-Intensity Conflict. Summers, Harry G. Military Review; Mar 85: 43-49. The principles of war are the objective, the offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, security, surprise, unity of command, and simplicity. Discusses the application of these principles to low intensity conflict.

The Malaysian Army: An Update. Shuhud Saaid, Mohammed Asian Defence Journal; Mar 85: 10+(10p) Describes the Malaysian Army's operational commitments, organization, training and the redevelopment of its capability to fight conventional as well as COIN (COUNTERInsurgency) warfare. The formation of military doctrine by a process of decision making by consensus is gaining acceptance.
AN OVERVIEW OF MILITARY PSYCHIATRY

By Flt Lt B. White,
Senior Medical Officer, RAAF
East Sale

THIS article is a review of psychiatric issues in military medicine with special regard to the RAAF. It is aimed at the level of the general medical personnel and not at the specialist psychiatrist. Special note has been taken of the preventive approach in some sections, especially combat related conditions. From a medical point of view the best preventive measure is not to have to fight a war. If, however, war is necessary then an understanding of the basics of military psychiatry will preserve the armed forces to a better degree and will prevent much psychiatric morbidity. The information contained is based largely on a review of recent literature on the subject, plus some personal observations from work as a medical officer in the RAAF. The issues raised are relevant not only to medical personnel but to anyone involved in the command of military units at all levels in peace and war.

These are some specific problems of psychiatry in the military:
• Therapy resistant population;
• Comprised confidentiality;
• Expectation that the medical officer serves as an administrative triage officer for the military, an emphasis on administration rather than medicine;
• Ineffectiveness in situations where he experiences the same conflicts that created the patient’s symptoms;
• Pressure to conform with the organisation and such conformity may compromise medical treatment. In the past there have always been types of maladjustment to service life which have in fact led to improvements in service life and effectiveness but in their time earned general disapproval. Creativity and dissent are not admired in hierarchies whereas adaptation has a predisposition to be favoured;
• Problem of treatment of higher ranks; and
• Military officers have a more restrictive attitude to mental illness, and are less able to view it as an illness like any other.

General Psychiatric Morbidity

The incidence of psychiatric disorders in the general community is surprisingly high and averages about 25 per cent in many studies. Approximately 20 per cent of this number will have serious psychiatric illness. Consulting a psychiatrist or any doctor for psychiatric reasons remains unfashionable for most and carries a stigma. In spite of this the majority of the population could legitimately have recourse to psychiatric help at some stage in their lives for what are minor, non-disabling conditions.

Severely disturbed, psychotic patients are uncommon in the general military population. This seems to be related to the selection process at recruiting, and also such patients are medically discharged due to their unsuitability for continued service. Although a working knowledge of psychotic disorders is necessary, for the occasional case of manic depressive psychosis has
emerged in serving personnel, and many join the military at the age where schizophrenia may have its onset, such conditions are relatively uncommon for the general military physician. A review of the case workload indicates that the proportion of patients with psychiatric conditions presenting to the RAAF medical units is certainly no more and probably less than seen in the general population. There are several biases in this observation:

• Military doctors are often seen as part of the hierarchy, more so certainly than a civilian general practitioner and many patients are reluctant to present with mental or emotional problems;
• In small communities such as military units, confidentiality may be a problem and is certainly a concern to the patient;
• Doctors may be misled by the initial somatic presentations of many disorders and are often concerned not to miss significant organic disease. Doctors without particular interest in psychiatry may fail to detect a significant number of psychiatric problems, or incorrectly assess the diagnosis or severity of the disorder. Psychiatric disorders may co-exist or be related to organic illness;
• RAAF personnel may seek civilian medical treatment without notifying their base medical staff; and
• The Australian Defence Forces medical services do not routinely treat dependants.

One distinct advantage of the military medical officer is the greater knowledge and understanding that he has of his patients' social and especially work background, especially in the smaller units, and he usually can exert some influence on the conditions at work.

The armed forces are essentially highly structured and in many respects sheltered societies in which certain neurotic conditions may not only survive but may also thrive. This relates particularly to milder forms of personality disorders of paranoid, schizoid and obsessive types. The obsessive personality can cope and feel sheltered in a military situation where work is stable and predictable. He tends to work hard with an obsession for detail. He may be a difficult supervisor due to his insistence on minor detail and following instructions exactly. He is prone to decompensate under stress, such as wartime, and may become depressed, develop psychosomatic illness or obsessive compulsive neurosis or psychosis. In situations requiring rapid, flexible decisions his inflexibility and insistence on rules may become dangerous.

Conditions commonly seen include reactive depression, anxiety, insomnia, marital disruption, and alcohol abuse and dependency. Many other conditions are seen but account for only a small proportion of cases.

Reactive depression is often related to the service, either to conditions at work or to the location that the serviceman has been posted to. Depression is not usually severe and may react favourably to improvements in conditions at work, or posting to a preferred location. Active treatment may only need to be supportive therapy, or crisis intervention where the patients' feelings are confronted and expressed and the therapist and patient can attempt to find common sense solutions or reach acceptance of the problems. Anti-depressant medication may only sometimes be indicated. The side-effects of any drug treatments may have adverse effects; sedative side-effects are of special concern in aircrew or any personnel working in dangerous locations or on critical tasks.

Suicide and parasuicide are fortunately not common in my experience, but certainly occur. Australia has one of the highest suicide rates in the English speaking world at some 1,600 a year. Two-thirds are male, with shooting the most common method. In the USAF suicide is the third most common cause of death, as it is in young adults in general in our western culture. Most parasuicidal and suicidal patients are depressed and/or alcoholic or alcohol abusers, and some three-quarters of them are likely to be in touch with their general practitioner in the month prior to their death. Parasuicide is a non-fatal act of self injury and is much more common than suicide and is found more in the younger age groups and in females. Suicide itself tends to occur in older age groups and in males. Parasuicide may be associated with sociopathic personality disorder but a substantial proportion are not suffering from a diagnosable psychiatric illness at the time of the act. Among those who are, depression is the most common diagnosis. However, parasuicides are one hundred times as likely to suicide within a year than the general population.

The armed services are largely male in population where up to half of annual peacetime deaths are due to road accidents. A significant proportion of road accidents in young males may in fact be suicides and attempted suicides
Abuse of illegal drugs is not usually seen in the RAAF, since any service member who is proven to use marijuana or other illegal drug is quickly discharged. We are fortunate not to have the large scale drug problem that the US Armed Forces have. Nevertheless, significant numbers of service personnel do use marijuana and may easily escape detection if they are careful. Other drugs are used in rare cases and the first indication of this may be heroin withdrawal if the serviceman is cut off from his supply due to service commitments. Drug intoxication should therefore always be considered in the assessment of delirium or unconsciousness. Detection of illegal drug users is difficult, especially in service personnel who live off base. They are usually careful not to be under the influence of drugs while at work, and most supervisors and medical personnel are quite unfamiliar with illegal drugs. Chronic users may show non-specific behaviour changes which may be attributed to a variety of reasons: alcohol abuse, personality, dissatisfaction with the service or current posting. Abuse or overuse of legal drugs is also seen in small numbers and the benzodiazepines are often the drug group involved.

A difficult problem in this field is the issue of ineffective military personnel. Often in a highly technological and highly structured environment adolescents from disadvantaged backgrounds find themselves unable to compete for status with resulting frustration, and increasing alienation and lowered self-esteem followed by ineffective performance and antisocial behaviour. This can be reduced by encouraging them to develop their potential and advance out of jobs that sap their self-esteem. Problems arise here with lack of available jobs to remuster to and dissatisfied personnel tend to get poor supervisors’ reports and are therefore less likely to be permitted to remuster. The Air Force has continuing problems with ineffective military personnel; they usually have no definite psychiatric disturbance although they may have minor personality problems. They therefore get relegated to administrative management as being incompatible or unsuitable to air force life, or if significantly disruptive may be discharged under adverse circumstances. The Air Force has had a tendency to retain ineffective personnel, thereby increasing the workload for their supervisors and usually the medical personnel as well.

Another continuing and related problem is the issue of how disabled by psychiatric illness does a serviceman need to be before he becomes unfit for further service? Many cases are clear cut but many more are less definite. In such cases the member may perform his current work adequately but there may be doubt about his ability to perform under adverse conditions. There is no easy answer to this and I do no more here than mention it.

A large and essentially occult incidence of psychiatric disturbance may be found in dependants of military personnel. Unfortunately these dependants are not routinely treated by service doctors with the result that problems with the wives and children are largely unknown and in fact important facets of problems of the personnel themselves are not seen. From discussion with civilian doctors and histories given by service personnel there does seem to be a worrying incidence of depression and anxiety related disorders in the spouses. This is understandable when one considers that every two years or so the serviceman or woman is posted. The family must then move, the wife loses her job if she works, her friends, perhaps close family, the children change schools and usually change school systems, and they move to a new and strange house and community. By any standard life events questionnaire or inventory, such changes add up to significant levels of stress.

Although stressful to the serviceman to some extent, he is bolstered by a number of features: he may already know many of the people he will work with and his actual job is likely to remain largely the same. Usually for the spouse, most of her sense of worth is vicarious; she is moved due to the demands of her husband’s occupation, and her status relates directly to her husband and not to her own intrinsic value. Although it may not be as significant as found in many foreign military forces, her husband’s rank and occupation is a very large determinant of her status (I use the female form for the dependant since the armed forces are still largely male dominated and male oriented society and most dependants of service personnel are females). The overall effect is that many wives have a poor sense of self-worth and are lonely and isolated. A large number of marriage separations and divorces are seen in RAAF per-
sonnel, and the particular stresses described are likely to be a contributing factor to this.

I believe therefore that for a number of reasons the defence forces should routinely treat dependants of servicemen as is the case in the RAF and USAF. This would enable families to be treated as a unit, gain better surveillance of such problems in dependants, and in fact aid in the treatment of service personnel themselves since many psychiatric disturbances, of which alcohol abuse and dependency is a prime example, first have major manifestations in the family long before they are seen elsewhere. Other advantages would be the increased job satisfaction of service medical personnel with possibly better retention. This article is not a full discussion of such an issue but it would seem that with medicare, the universal health insurance scheme, it would not take an unacceptable disruption to gradually introduce treatment of dependants with payment by bulk billing medicare. The advantages would not be insignificant.

Alcohol

Alcohol abuse is the largest single drug abuse problem in the world as well as in the armed services. Alcohol has caused problems to the military from ancient times. Over recent centuries the incapacitation and loss of combat effectiveness due to drunkenness has become obvious to military authorities. US Navy research indicates that some 4.6 per cent of their survey were alcohol dependent while 9.6 per cent were alcohol abusers. There is no reason to consider that the percentage in Australian armed forces is any less. Like the US Navy, the incidence is probably similar to the demographically similar proportion of the general population.

The clinical problem is different from general medical practice where Korsakoff’s psychosis and severe alcohol-induced organ damage are more commonly seen. The emphasis in the RAAF is on early detection and treatment. Prevention is a hoped-for but currently unlikely goal. The young age of some alcoholics may surprise those who are unaware of the incidence of alcoholism in teenagers in the general community.

Presentation is variable, alcohol abusers or dependents may be seen after drink driving charges, disturbances due to drunken brawls, or work problems such as absenteeism. Unfortu-
up the senior officers and senior NCO’s. Such changes are probably not significant for routine tasks but may be quite serious under demanding and stressful conditions such as in wartime.

In rather heavier drinkers, a more severe form of minor dysfunction involves minor disorientation, loss of memory, difficulty in learning new material and subtle intellectual impairment, and is in fact seen at times in alcohol dependent personnel in the military.

Human Factors in Military Operations

The Air Force has rightly given consideration to the human factors elements of aircraft and aircrew performance. Much of this is really psychology, but some is of direct medical psychiatric consideration. These elements are well familiar to RAAF medical officers and so only a brief resume will be given here. These factors are also relevant to military operations since they degrade human performance, especially cognitive function, at times when it may be most needed.

A basic factor is the adverse effects of drugs, that is, legal medications and legal drugs, often obtained by prescription or over the counter from the chemist. In any type of operation where alertness is essential, many commonly used drugs cause drowsiness and will have a deleterious effect on performance. These drugs include antihistamines, most cough mixtures, antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications such as serapax and valium, amphetamines, and barbiturates. Many antibiotics and anti-malarials have side effects from gastric upset, lightheadedness to blurred vision and nausea. Any medication or drug, which includes caffeine and alcohol, has the potential to produce an unwanted, adverse effect.

Caffeine is a commonly used drug that is found in coffee, tea and cocoa. It commonly produces adverse effects which may be diffuse and difficult to diagnose for the unsuspecting. These effects include insomnia, anxiety, fatigue, headaches, lightheadedness, palpitations, dehydration, a reduced ability to think clearly even though wakefulness may be prolonged. These effects can occur with as little as six cups a day and certainly hypercaffeinism is common with 12 cups a day.

Caffeine is, in fact, a stimulant. There is a continuing search for medications that will allow personnel to sleep when needed, and to remain awake for prolonged periods, without serious adverse effects. RAF experience in The Falklands has proven that temazepam, a short-acting hypnotic, will give personnel a six-hour sleep without residual drowsiness. However, no stimulant has yet been proven to prolong wakefulness without serious side effects, especially of reduced cognitive function.

Acute and chronic fatigue are serious problems in military operations. Acute fatigue comes on rapidly if personnel have no sleep. After 36-48 hours there is serious degradation of performance and 72 hours is the limit of endurance without sleep. Chronic fatigue is an insidious problem that is produced by inadequate sleep in its timing or nature, chronic heavy workload and inadequate rest and recreation over a period of time. It produces an insidious onset of reduced alertness and mental resilience, increased irritability, apprehension and irrational behaviour with an increased potential for error, a reduced attention span, and greater concern for minor physical discomforts. Treatment consists simply of adequate exercise, rest, nutrition, and physical fitness.

Other significant problems in this field include circadian dysrhythmia which produces problems especially with cognitive function in personnel who are on changing shifts or who travel across more than three time zones.

It is worth briefly mentioning the hyperventilation syndrome since psychological causes such as fear, anger, extreme emotion anxiety, may cause a third or more of cases of hyperventilation. It produces a classic picture that can be alarming to the untrained that includes pins and needles (parasthesiae), dizziness, lightheadedness, tetany and muscular paralysis. Some atypical and therefore confusing symptoms include palpitations, non-specific chest pain, dry mouth, abdominal discomfort, muscle and joint aches, irritability and sleep disturbances. The acute symptoms improve dramatically with re-breathing expired air and slowing the rate of breathing. Hyperventilation and baratrauma are the two most common adverse conditions seen in the decompression chamber training.

Stress is a concept that has been approached at several points in this review, in particular combat and captivity stress. There are various definitions or concepts of stress. A working concept is that stress is the situation in which adjustment is difficult but there is strong motivation to overcome the situation. Stress produces biochemical changes in the body and in-
volves external factors acting on an individual who has an individual ability to cope. Under severe stress, performance is adversely affected, and prolonged exposure may induce ill health. Stress in low levels is beneficial, challenging the individual to perform, and this type of stress may be termed ‘arousal’. Exposure to high stress by individuals receiving adequate support does not increase the risk of physical and mental illness. In stressful situations, alcohol consumption may cause sustained levels of anxiety and therefore reduce ability to deal with stress. Stress may be seen in many segments of military forces. In general, peacetime stress is not as acute as in wartime, but may be more chronic and difficult to modify. This relates especially to the chronic frustrations of inadequate funding, bureaucracy and a general lethargy found in peacetime military organisations. Personnel without adequate support, often with family stresses as well, are more susceptible to stress at work and are likely to have difficulty coping with more complex cognitive tasks. Failure to cope with stress may produce decreased proficiency, inter-personal aggravations, family disruption, and psychological and physical distress and distension.

Stress may be managed in two major ways:

- Modify the stress itself, and this includes advice about alcohol and drugs (self medication); and
- Relaxation programmes such as progressive muscular relaxation which lowers the anxiety level and makes one less susceptible to stress.

Drug treatment is only recommended for severe anxiety neurosis. The side effects of anxiolytics such as serapax include drowsiness which is not acceptable for aircrew or other personnel involved in critical tasks.

Proper management of stress levels will mean that stresses may be better perceived as challenges which can eventually be overcome, and not as intolerable factors that eventually degrade performance and health.

Fatigue and circadian dysrythmia problems have been studied by major military forces. All these factors may play a significant part in the degradation of performance when such performance may be most critical and I would contend that most military officers have poor understanding of them and their effects. The Air Force does consider these factors in aircrew performance, but it does not give much consideration to them in non-aircrew performance and operations, due probably to its orientation towards aircraft and flying, and has done little to imbue non-aircrew with a sense of being part of a military defence force other than their role to service aircraft.

Psychiatric Illness in Military Aircrew

Few aircrew suffer from serious psychiatric illness, either psychosis or serious neurosis. However, due to the nature of their work, and the expense of training pilots, the effects of even moderate illness may be quite serious.

In civil pilots, significant problems include alcohol, anxiety state and depression. This is not seen as commonly in military pilots. Diagnosis and detection relies on time-consuming interviews by properly trained and psychologically oriented flight surgeons with input from peers and commanders. Minor problems may be present therefore but not detected, although such problems may make little or no difference to performance. Like similar situations in the military, it is important not to confuse the eccentric with some mild personality disorder although this may not always be easy.

Aircrew are certainly subject to stresses, but in military aircrew, these tend to be more challenging and arousing. Again there is debate as to what level of training should be used in preparation for war; the stresses of peacetime training are quite different from those found in modern, intensive warfare, but training at such levels would generate too many casualties. Systematic stress modification and management may be appropriate, in similar manner to what has been discussed in other sections.

Personality studies of aircrew indicate that they tend to be active, achievement orientated, tend to avoid and deny inner emotions, prefer the concrete to the abstract, tend to maintain emotional distance in interpersonal relationships and react to stress in a constructive, active way. Flying in itself satisfies many of the needs of such a personality by providing challenge, structure and casual family life. Problems may arise when they are confronted with ambiguous, uncertain situations and failure at perceived objectives.

One specific subject in regard to flying is worth covering briefly; fear of flying may be found in aircrew and in passengers. This may be composed of four separate fears: of crashing, of heights, of confinement and of stability. Treatment regimes may include desensitisation,
flooding, implosion, relaxation, hypnosis with problem restructuring and biofeedback. A combination of relaxation and desensitisation is often effective, especially where anxiety is the major component. A final note: airsickness may be associated with anxiety and fear of flying and may therefore be a symptom rather than a disorder.

**Bereavement, Accidents and Disaster Situations**

**Bereavement**

- Bereavement may be seen in the armed forces in different ways:
  - following death of family or friend from illness or accident;
  - special problems of an aircraft accident which is similar in many respect to deaths from other military activities in peacetime;
  - large-scale disasters with many casualties which has many parallels with battle shock;
  - civilians involved in wartime conflicts; and
  - death from military wartime operations.

A few principles are worth reiterating:

- Many people do not get over bereavement and fail to return to normal function. Such people have more frequent presentations to medical officers with minor complaints, vague aches and pains, insomnia and ‘nerves’.
- Common psychiatric disorders following bereavement include depression, phobias, obsessions, and conversion illness in which the symptoms of the deceased are mimicked.
- More common than these are minor behaviour changes with family disruption, a tendency to abuse drugs and alcohol, poor concentration, irritability and anger; and
- patients are more susceptible to poor outcome from bereavement if they have poor social support, concurrent stresses, if they have had a longer relationship and a pathological relationship characterised by excessive closeness and dependency, or by marked ambivalence; and if the death was sudden and unexpected with no time to prepare oneself for the loss.

**Management Principles**

The aim is to facilitate a normal bereavement by the expression and working through of one’s emotional feelings connected with a death, rather than the unhealthy, pathological bereavement where grief was suppressed or transformed into other emotions such as chronic rage at doctors for not having done enough to prevent the death. The doctor’s role is basically to give the bereaved an opportunity to open up the grief by simple, open-ended questions such as: ‘How are you coping yourself?’ or ‘How are you feeling?’ Bereavement should not be forced on the individual, since people handle loss in their own individual ways. Also, the doctor should only do this if he or she is prepared to face the emotions of the patient in spite of the doctor’s own feelings of helplessness since he cannot actively treat but rather should sit and listen. It is important that the patient does not feel that grief and tears are abnormal but is normal, although painful, and will not last forever.

When possible, the family should be warned of an impending death to allow them time to prepare. The doctor may need to assist members of the family in deciding whether to see the body and attend the funeral, since such actions make the loss more real, and although perhaps disturbing at the time, assist the long-term adjustment. Medications should be kept to a minimum with perhaps a hypnotic at night.

**Emotional Reactions to Military Aircraft Accidents**

Aircraft accidents are fortunately relatively uncommon in the Australian Military Forces. This is a function of the small size of the defence forces for the accident rate is generally similar to other major air forces. Fatal aircraft accidents involve special considerations of bereavement. Emotional reactions will vary with the individual and with the circumstances of the accident.

**Effect on Squadron Members**

After the death of a member, the squadron usually goes through a ritual response to its loss, including a memorial service and a wake. There is usually the normal emotions of grief and sorrow, there may in odd cases be survival guilt. This period tends to highlight features of the flyers that are present at all times.

Successful flyers are characterised by the mental defence mechanism of denial of the real dangers of flying. It is an unconscious mechanism to lower anxiety and emotion by denying something that consciously may be intolerable, and it should be regarded as a normal, healthy mechanism. It is found in everyone and a common example is the unconscious denial used
every time one gets into a motor vehicle. Such denial may become more apparent following the death of a squadron member when the accident is investigated and analysed, a cause found so that it should not happen again and therefore 'it couldn't happen to me'.

Magical thinking is usually involved, the commonest form is the belief that crashes come in threes. Curiously, this may be strongly believed and certainly crashes may occur in threes, such as in December 1983 when a Wessex, then a Porter crashed, then two Macchis collided, all within less than two weeks. Other magical concepts include lucky objects or rituals that must be done prior to take-offs. These were common in such formations as RAF Bomber Command in World War II, but far less common now since aircrew tend to be better educated, more intelligent and certainly do not face the horrifying casualty rates of Bomber Command and therefore feel in control of their lives.

Fear of flying may develop in survivors of accidents, or in personnel, aircrew and others who were close to or involved in an accident. It is a worse problem in non-aircrew since most senior squadron members are well aware of such problems, look for it and handle it quickly and pragmatically by returning the pilot to flying as soon as the initial nervous reaction settles. The commonest manifestation of this reaction is insomnia. Once such fear is established it may be difficult to treat, and will certainly cause continuing problems if it is not looked for. A desensitisation programme is often an effective treatment for milder cases.

**Effect on the Family**

The risk and fear of sudden, traumatic death of a pilot is always present with the family and is significantly worse in fighter aircraft and in higher risk operations. The death of a pilot affects not only that pilot’s family, but the families of other aircrew. The loss of a pilot in an aircraft accident will rouse fear and anxiety in the wives of the other pilots and in severe cases this can lead to major psychological disruption including neuroses and sleep disturbances and nightmares.

When a crash occurs, news and rumours spread rapidly to the wives. News services usually broadcast the crash within a couple of hours of the accident, sometimes giving more information than is known to many on the base. Every wife whose husband is unaccounted for is a potential widow until she hears differently, and such fears will also affect the children.

The effects of the pilot’s death on his wife are several. Often her entire life is centred around her husband, including her friends and her status. Suddenly she loses not only her husband but also her friends, home, her children must change school and her financial status is usually worsened. She may, in fact, become unwelcome in her old circle of friends since she is a constant reminder of the pilot’s risk of death. She may feel anger at the pilot for dying, for continuing in a career which is perceived as dangerous, and feel guilt and depression at her anger. Therefore, she will be subject to the normal bereavement plus the additional stresses of major, unexpected life changes.

**The Helpers**

Finally, the effect of the accident on the helper should not be forgotten. Even amongst medical staff many are young, inexperienced and little used to dealing with major trauma and death. There are also firemen, drivers, ordinary airmen with no more than basic first aid training who are involved in any aircraft accident. The effect on the helpers is generally related both to the severity of the accident and to their training and experience. These people who are unused to death in such a way may be suddenly exposed to death in a grisly and immediate manner and they will get a strong sense of their own mortality.

The effect will be short-term but many may suffer long-term sequelae.

The immediate psychological reactions of helpers include:
- shock and disbelief; and
- helpers who have purposeful tasks in fact feel reassured and positive, they may have a sense of heightened involvement, producing extraordinary levels of courage and work, an assertion of their own worth for they have trained for this and been called out on many pans and maydays and now they are called to help for real. Many feel that they are the only ones capable of carrying out their duties and continue working long after they have become severely fatigued.

Frustration, helplessness and a sense of failure are often seen when they find they can do nothing to help, the patient dies in spite of all their efforts. Some may have a sense of personal
inadequacy, believing themselves to be inade­quately trained, unprepared and poorly equipped. This may lead to prolonged recri­mination after the event and may even interfere with their capacity for normal work.

The end result for the helper is a sense of grief for the dead; for loss to the community, the base or unit, and for himself. Many helpers will feel a need for emotional release but may not feel such release appropriate. The emotion may be quite significant especially on the smaller unit where the dead is usually personally known to the helper. When an aircraft accident in­volves an aeromedical team the grief and shock may be especially relevant to the medical helpers.

Coping with the Experience

Many helpers will have problems with traumatic memories, insomnia and bad dreams. Usually this resolves but some are left with a traumatic neurosis where dreams and memories persist and other psychosomatic systems may develop.

 Helpers will cope better if they can discuss their experience with others through:

• Debriefing sessions which may include dis­cussion of the emotional effects of the crash. It is important that the younger helpers know that they are not the only ones affected, and there is nothing demeaning about shedding tears for a friend;
• Family, friends and co-workers will help if they are receptive to their need to talk; and
• Access to specialist professional help may be needed.

The helpers will cope better with the stress if they are given psychological understanding and support, and reassurance of the helpers’ worth and value. They may need reassurance that nothing further could humanly have been done, that death sometimes is inevitable and must be faced that way. The stress that helpers are susceptible to in the accident or casualty situation also will be minimised by adequate realistic training, adequate equipment and proper planning.

Disaster Situations

Military Forces may be involved in disasters in giving assistance to the civil community. Mil­itary aircraft accidents involving a large number of casualties will in themselves constitute a dis­aster. In addition the psychological principles involved are relevant in many wartime situa­tions. Warfare itself can accurately be consid­ered a disaster on a large scale.

In a disaster most people involved respond in an adaptive, responsible manner. A minority show grossly inappropriate responses such as panic and psychotic behaviour. Most people do have some emotional disturbance. This can in­clude anger, which may be misdirected towards innocent scapegoats such as the helpers who may be blamed for mishandling the rescue. This is such a common reaction that disaster planners should train to face this problem.

Many survivors may feel guilty for having survived, sometimes wondering if they could have done more to save family, or regretting a recent quarrel with someone who did not sur­vive.

Defence psychological reactions are common, humour is typical; more severe hysterical dis­sociative and conversion reactions such as blind­ness, deafness, paralysis and limping are also seen.

The emotional responses may be divided into stages:

• In the initial phase which lasts until the initial stresses of the disaster are no longer oper­ating, some 10-25 per cent of disaster victims remain calm, retain their awareness, assess the situation, plan and react constructively. Some 75 per cent are stunned and bewildered with reduced attention, reflexive, automatic manner and usually have a lack of emotion or feeling. The remaining group of 10-25 per cent have grossly inappropriate responses such as confusion, paralysing anxiety and hyster­ical crying and screaming. This range of re­sponses helps to explain the variation in re­liability of witnesses in disasters. During this phase many fear that they are losing their minds due to the simultaneous presence of intense feelings of fear, anger, guilt, loss, regret and anxiety. Abnormal behaviour may result from organic injury, and imbalance, adequate treatment of shock, hypothermia, carbon monoxide poisoning, dehydration, head injuries, etc., will dramatically improve the behaviour;
• The next stage is a period of recoil following the end of the initial stresses, with gradual return of awareness, recall and emotional expression; and
• In the post-traumatic period reactions com­monly seen include recurrent catastrophic
dreaming, anxiety, depression and psychosomatic reactions. In this period survivors usually come to a full realisation of the meaning of the disaster in terms of loss and bereavement.

The survivors of a disaster are prone to long-term physical and psychological problems including phobias, depression, psychosomatic disorders, drug and alcohol abuse. Disaster can also have a positive effect of drawing communities close together, and individuals learn about caring for each other and about a more altruistic, less material sense of values.

For the medical team involved in a disaster there are a few simple fundamentals of psychological first aid that will help to minimise the effect on such casualties:

• Adopt a sensitive, sympathetic and flexible attitude towards the wide variety of reactions that may be encountered;
• Ensure that injured and frightened survivors are not left alone, and in particular children are not separated from their parents;
• Encourage verbal expressions of feelings associated with the disaster experience;
• Offer reassurance that severe emotional reactions are in fact normal;
• Give accurate and responsible information to survivors, relatives and the media and dispel rumours as they emerge;
• Refer anyone showing grossly abnormal, violent or self-destructive behaviour to psychiatric personnel and transfer them to a special treatment centre;
• Give instructions in a confident, easy to follow manner; and
• Encourage survivors to participate in simple, useful tasks.

An adequate, flexible, functional plan that includes all relevant dimensions of a disaster including the psychological aspect will vastly improve the management of that disaster, and will lessen psychological casualties, improve their management and reduce the long-term sequelae.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence Libraries.


The Education of Nomadic Children

By Lieutenant-Commander Zakir Rahmani, RAN

Turbulence, a word used by educationists to describe the continual transfer of children from one school to another, suggests serious disturbance.

ZAKIR RAHMANI outlines research findings and suggests remedies to minimise the effects of turbulence.

WHAT happens to children who often move afar from one school to another or are deprived for varying periods of the guidance of a parent — usually the father — who has to reside elsewhere because of job transfer?

Turbulence, the word used by educationists to describe the continual transfer of children from school to school, suggests serious disturbance. How serious? What does research reveal?

These questions are of special importance to Australians because they constitute one of the most mobile population groups in the world. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1,808,500 non-institutionalised civilians aged 15 years and over changed their place of residence during the year ended 31 May 1981.

In addition, over 300,000 persons live in caravans and some 72,000 servicemen and their families are on the move. The 15 per cent of the Australian population that is estimated to be mobile includes school teachers, servicemen, geologists, construction and mine workers, doctors and bank employees.

For a school-going child, each change of residence also means a new neighbourhood and social changes. A change of residence may create domestic stress, if for example, it is associated with the temporary absence of father, change of accommodation (from a large country house to a cramped city flat), or a change from familiar places to unknown, unfriendly surroundings.

Change of neighbourhood involves leaving firm friends and seeking new ones. A change of school involves a transformation of at least some and perhaps most aspects of the learning situation: curricula, methods of instruction, teachers school buildings, examinations and progress assessment system, school mates and peer group.

Parents have expressed their concern about what they regard as being the detrimental effects of Turbulence on their children and many go to considerable lengths to minimise such effects. Some send their children to boarding schools. A large number of wives stay with their high-school-age children in one place while their husbands are either posted or are looking for a new job in another part of the country.

It is of course possible to conceive that some benefits do stem from geographical mobility. A mobile child may learn to adapt more readily to new environments. The mobile condition may encourage the child to be more tolerant of other modes of life. Unhappiness in one environment may be relieved by a change to a new community.
Differences between schools may enable a child to experience greater diversity of teaching styles and subjects. Improved performances may flow in subjects such as geography, history and social studies.

While it is easy enough to speculate about the beneficial and harmful effects of turbulence, we would do well to note that actual studies on this subject — and there are not enough of them — have produced contradictory conclusions.

**Achievement**

In 1981, I reviewed Post-1960 studies related to the effect of mobility on the academic achievements of school children. Of the 24 studies considered, 12 concluded that no relationship exists between mobility and achievement.

Nine concluded that there was a negative relationship and three a positive association. This review was disconcerting because it revealed the paucity of substantial research into the effect of turbulence while highlighting the complexity of the research problem.

Most of the information on mobile children has been collected from service families, perhaps because it was easy to locate these sources. Few studies have been done of mobile children in the civilian community.

In a follow-up study of Mackay and Spicer's *Educational Turbulence Among Australian Servicemen's Children* (ETASC) project, the data were re-analysed. The ETASC study found no evidence of a greater effect of turbulence on school performances.

‘While it is easy enough to speculate about the beneficial and harmful effects of turbulence, we would do well to note that actual studies on this subject have produced contradictory conclusions.’

This finding was so contrary to general belief that I considered it of interest to analyse data further in a way which was not possible within the limited time span of the ETASC project. The study extended the work done on Grade 3 children in the ETASC project by treating the data from the three services separately rather than in a collective fashion.

**Measures**

As geographical mobility and father's absence from the family are inherent and necessary features of service family life, three measures of turbulence, as in the ETASC project, were considered.

One was related to the mobility factor and the other two to father's absence from the family for long periods (continuous absence for 30 days or more) and for short periods (absence for less than 30 days). The combined effect of these three turbulence measures was considered in this study.

The other independent variables were general ability, sex of the child, father's rank as a measure of socioeconomic status, family size and personality of the child.

Academic achievement was measured by word knowledge and verbal comprehension test scores based on the ACER Primary Reading survey.

One of the important findings of the study was that the academic achievement of children from Navy families, as compared with those from Army and Air Force families, was not related to turbulence. Why this difference?

It was claimed that children from the three types of service families have different parental backgrounds, expectations and attitudes toward education. As the data indicated that children from the Navy families had a higher general ability and achieved higher scores in achievement tests than children from the other services, it was likely that children of Navy families were better equipped to counteract the possible adverse effects of school changes than their counterparts from the Army and Air Force families.

Another important finding of the study was that father's long-term absence was related to the academic achievement of groups of children from Navy and Air Force families alone. Father's longer-term absence is beneficial to certain groups of children (sailor's children and boys from Air Force families) but is harmful to other groups (naval officers' children and girls from Air Force families).

Father's short-term absence was related to the academic achievement of children from Navy and Army families. Its interaction with general ability was significant for children from Army and Navy families whereas its interaction with sex was significant for children of Navy families.

Girls whose fathers were absent infrequently achieved better results than those whose fathers were absent frequently. For boys, achievement was not related to father's short-term absence.
Although this study focused on children of Australian servicemen, children of doctors, bankers, public servants and migrant workers may experience similar types of turbulence and a similar relationship between turbulence and school achievement.

Clearly, the data indicated that the nature of turbulence is complex and has different effects on different groups of children. Furthermore, our capricious educational system helps to exacerbate the complexity.

**Diversity**

Australia's education system is comparable in some ways to the different gauges of Australian railway lines. It is difficult to justify the great variations that exist in the State school systems. Can it be claimed that the education system which is suited to the colder climate of Victoria is not so good for warm Queensland?

Because of the trend toward school-based curricula, teachers tend to develop courses around their pet areas.

It is true that courses are sometimes appraised by an expert accreditation team, but once this is done the responsibility for proper implementation of the courses lies with the school and hence the teacher. Furthermore, teacher mobility causes changes from one curriculum to another in the same school.

Diversity of education systems causes problems for those changing school. Geographical mobility requires adjustment to different school systems.

Parental responses to questions dealing with repeating or skipping grades, and changes to lower or higher academic stream in the same grade as a result of change of school, were analysed during the ETASC Project. The analysis indicated that:

Almost a third of the children who had changed school were reported to have had to repeat a grade, and almost a third were reported to have been placed in the same grade but in a lower academic stream at a new school.

However, almost twice as many children have reported to have been placed in a lower academic stream in the same grade as were reported to have been placed in a higher academic stream. More than four times as many children were reported to have repeated a grade as were reported to have skipped a grade (pp. 88-89).

Parents' reports during the ETASC project also highlighted the differences between schools in the areas of subject matter, subjects offered and stages at which the same material is taught, all of which were seen to have confused the majority of children who have changed school. Data based on parent's reports indicated that:

- **45 per cent** of the children who had changed school had been taught large amounts of material already covered at a previous school;
- **54 per cent** of the children who had changed school had been placed in a class which had already covered much material which was not covered in the previous school; and
- **68 per cent** of the children who had changed school had been confused by the difference in subject matter and level in the new school.

There is a need for communication between the various State systems in an attempt to find commonality. Ideally I would like to see a common system throughout Australia based on curricula appraised by an 'Australian Board of Accreditation', rather than State boards.

I believe in external assessment, supplemented by internal assessments, rather than in a system which is wholly based on internal assessment. At least there is a need to conduct State-based external examinations at the end of primary schooling and also at the end of secondary schooling. This would not only help our mobile children but would provide a stable education system rather than a turbulent one.

Differences in curricula between schools are bad enough, but the problems are magnified when a child moves between States.

Children's academic records (as well as their health records) are kept on a central computer and can be made available within 24 hours. When the communications satellite system becomes operational in Australia in 1985-86 it should be possible to make these records available within 24 hours, if stored centrally.
Recommendations
Whenever possible, parents should organise their move to occur during the December-January period, enabling their children to start new schools at the commencement of the school year. The following measures would help Defence personnel:

- Whenever possible, postings should occur during the December-January period to allow children to begin new schools at the beginning of the new school year;
- Six months notice of posting be given, where possible;
- The responsibilities of Base Education Officers be extended to include advice to service families on matters relating to schooling; and
- Where it is considered that turbulence has adversely affected school achievement, extra tuition be provided at departmental expense.

Turbulence may present many problems for teacher and students. The student must adjust to a new environment. The teacher must determine the academic level of each student, place the child in the best group for learning and teaching and help the child to adjust to the new situation.

Some of the many others educational reme­dies which might help to reduce some of the problems created by turbulence are:

- Better guidance programs at primary school;
- Schools should make a continuous study of their curricula so that required changes can be made to meet the changing needs of the student;
- Teachers must endeavour to begin instruction with new students at their level of skill and not where the school or teacher thinks they should be;
- A more flexible policy of transfer procedure should be developed to consider the needs of children and the needs of the family. The transfer procedures should be based on what is best for each child;
- Schools should develop means to expedite the transfer of student records between school systems, as well as programs of comprehensive evaluation, orientation, and remedial instruction for students entering from other school systems; and
- Schools should provide access to up-to-date syllabus materials and text books relevant to major curricula areas in other education systems to facilitate teacher understanding of the educational background of newcomers.

This article has also appeared in the March 1985 issue of the 'Education News' under the heading 'Smoothing Out the Turbulence'. Ed.

NOTES

Lieutenant-Commander Z. RAHMANI joined the RAN in August 1972. Since then he has served in HMAS CERBERUS, HMAS CRESWELL and Navy Office in the Directorate of Naval Manpower Planning and in the Directorate of Naval Training. From March 1986 he is appointed as an Honorary Visiting Fellow in the newly established Defence Study Centre at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Lieutenant-Commander Z. RAHMANI holds Masters degrees in Nuclear Physics, Atmospheric Physics and Educational Research. He has published a number of papers in well known Australian and overseas journals.
HAVING read this book, I am left with the impression that the author has written it from a particular viewpoint. In particular Dr McCormack believes that "the Northern aggression case is far from conclusive... and a good deal of mystery still surrounds the events of 25 June 1950" (page 68). I was in Korea at the outbreak of the war and I believe that some of the events referred to should be recorded as I understood them.

I do not doubt Dr McCormack's sincerity. Nonetheless, experience in several wars has demonstrated to me why I have so often heard the expression "fog of war". I expect that some sort of mystery has always been and will always be encountered and then further confused by a rapid passage of events. However, hindsight is usually a good guide to the general trend of what went on. Although the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) Report 1950 covers the situation well, I wish to make some additional observations from my own experience as a United Nations observer.

I will begin with a minor and yet significant matter. The maps of Korea (pages 22 and 86) show Kaesong as being north of the 38th parallel, whereas it is in fact just south of the parallel, and was within South Korean territory at the time. This is of significance because our first indication of the war was the attack on Kaesong by the North Koreans and they had to enter South Korea to do it.

Dr McCormack reports terrorist repression against candidates for the elections of 30 May, 1950 (page 60). I arrived in Korea just before these elections, and worked with an UNCOk team supervising in the Cholla Pukto area. My recollection was that there was a lot of interest, and a surprising number of Koreans turned out to vote. As far as I could see, the elections were carried out fairly although there were a lot of invalid votes due to the ignorance and inexperience of the voters. Teams working in other areas had similar views. A certain number of candidates were in gaol at the time, but the only terrorist activity in the area that we were aware of came from unfriendly guerillas who raided a police station and killed several police. North Korean guerilla raids were not uncommon in this area and roads had been cleared to 50 yards or so each side to make ambushes more difficult.

Dr McCormack refers at length to the UNCOk Military Observers' Report (pages 72-84), and in particular he is of the opinion that four points need clarification. What did they actually see? What were they told, and by whom? What inferences and conclusions did they draw from what they saw and were told, and were such inferences and conclusions warranted? How was their report used? He is further of the opinion (page 91) that "As the document which, more than any other, was used to commit the UN to war, the Peach-Rankin report is at best very inconclusive".

The report was written from our personal observations. The full text is included in the UNCOk Report of 1950, an extract from which is at the end of this article. It showed the itinerary followed by the team from 9-23 June, 1950. It also showed the result of our appreciation of the situation at that time. I think the
answers to the first three questions are clear enough in the report. We were allowed to go where we wished and to visit Headquarters, units and installations at various levels. Our appreciation was based on our observations and military experience, and we did not see any sign of preparation for an invasion or even a foray of any consequence across the parallel. It was not as if we were visiting Headquarters located in large complexes where we could be led through a maze of offices and only shown certain sections; the Headquarters we visited were housed in simple buildings where we had free access and, if the wool was pulled over our eyes as Dr McCormack suggests may have happened (page 83), it would have been a brilliant effort on the part of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army.

We had heard the talk in Seoul that some of the young officers wanted to push North. We had this in mind during our visits and were on the lookout for any indication of its possibility; we saw none. Another factor to be taken into consideration was that the Americans had never allowed the ROK Army to be sufficiently armed to make a move north a practical proposition.

The use to which the report was put by UNCOK was "in support of the conclusions they came to, from all the evidence available, that the South was under attack". I will return to this point in greater detail.

Comment is made (page 81) on the absence of intelligence information about the North encountered by the observers during the tour along the parallel and comparison made with the US Ambassador, Mr Muccio's comments later that "I think the several sources of intelligence available to us gave us a pretty good picture of what was going on in the North etc." UNCOK had been concerned for some time with developments in the North. They had made their own tours through the South and were briefed by the Government and the Americans on the information available on the North; this does not seem to have been too far off the mark. it was for this reason that they decided on 25 March 1950 to ask for military observers to be appointed. On 10 May, 1950 the Defence Minister made a statement that North Korean troops were moving in force toward the 38th parallel and on 12 May, 1950 UNCOK was briefed by the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff and the chief of intelligence of the Korean Army on the situation. Mr Muccio's comments were correct; they had a pretty good picture of the overall situation. (UNCOK Report 1950).

The observers had access to this intelligence; however, during the tour of the parallel it was difficult to find tangible information of what was going on at the other side of the parallel at the local level. In particular we encountered a number of agencies at Uijongbu who could tell us little or nothing about the North Koreans to their front. I should have thought it would have been to their advantage to let us know what the North might be doing if they had had the information. One explanation for this could be that the North Koreans had fairly recently cleared an area 4-8 kilometres deep along parts of the 38th parallel. (See copy of report at end of article.)

We did hear stories of farmers having to cross the parallel to ask the North Koreans to release water for their farms and who, on return, appeared to be thoroughly indoctrinated by the North.

Dr McCormack casts doubts on UNCOK's capability of assessing the extent of the outbreak of war (page 74). Fighting was reported as having broken out in the early hours of 25 June 1950 and it is not difficult to picture the ensuing confusion; Kaesong was under attack and tanks reported only about 35 miles to the north of Seoul. UNCOK met and sat continuously at the Duksoo Palace in their efforts to sort out what had happened and what they could do. They heard reports from the Korean Government, the Korean Army, the U.S. Ambassador, Mr Muccio, their own military observers and others. They were in as good a position as any one to realise what was occurring.

The military observers, myself and Squadron Leader Rankin, were well occupied in finding out what had happened and reported from time to time to the Commission. It was important to get as clear a picture as possible of the turn of events, it became apparent fairly quickly that more than a raid was going on, but it took a little longer to be sure enough of the widespread scale of the attacks; we could not afford to go off half-cocked with the Commission. We also assisted in the evacuation of civilians, dependants etc., from Seoul.

Our appreciation that the North had attacked was based on the following factors:
- Information from the ROK Army and signals shown to us;
• Information from the Americans;
• The fact that fighting had broken out, or the north had advanced on a wide front, simultaneously at Ongjin, Chongdan, Paekchon, Kaesong, Uijongbu, Chunchon, and Kangnung;
• The advance down the east coast was by a "coastwise operation";
• Visits in the Seoul area;
• The very genuine atmosphere of alarm in Seoul; and
• Our knowledge of the South Korean Army’s state of readiness from our tour.

As could be expected under those circumstances, exact information was hard to get quickly. For example, I saw one signal at the ROK Army HQ from Kangnung which said "Our gallant army is advancing southward", but we were soon aware that the North had started something on a big scale. The fact that the North had advanced on a wide front from coast-to-coast at the same time that fighting had broken out was convincing evidence that it was a planned full-scale operation. This was a very quick reaction to what the North claimed to be aggression by the South on the same morning. Similarly, the coastwise operation (which takes time to mount) on the east coast was launched about the same time they claimed the South had attacked. Dr McCormack seems to be aware of the implication of this (page 68).

UNCOK became convinced of the situation, and they were agreed on who started it all. In doing so, they placed credence on the observers’ report because of its nature, but I doubt they would have been as whole-hearted had they not been otherwise convinced. As far as I can recall, UNCOK reported to UN HQ that a full-scale war had broken out and I cannot understand McCormack’s reconstruction as to how and when the various communications were received. UNCOK had a better appreciation of the situation than indicated in the book (pages 73 and 74).

A feeling expressed by Squadron Leader Rankin, that on the Ongjin Peninsula some front line commanders knew that “there was something up” is recorded (pages 83 and 87). I assume, and Rankin agrees, that this refers to the information given to us by Colonel Paik in Yop, commanding the 17 Regimental Combat Team (RCT), the Twin Tiger Regimental Combat team, that the North had brought in reinforcements (about Company strength) in the vicinity of Chwiya. We noted it and included something to that effect in the report, but I recall that we did not read into it any immediate threat on a dangerous scale. Dr McCormack interprets this in the opposite sense (which is wrong), that Squadron Leader Rankin thought the South were up to something (page 87).

In hindsight it is interesting to note that the counter by the North, to what they claimed as an attack by the South, continued as a full-scale invasion for another 180-200 miles till it ran out of steam near Taegu. A counter-attack is normally mounted to regain lost ground and can be done quickly, but an invasion on a wide front and penetrating such a large area takes considerable planning and preparation. The author is aware of this aspect (pages 68 and 72), but still holds doubts. The advance by the North was initially against the ROK Army but they also took on American Army divisions sent from Japan.

Activity at Haeju is given prominence (pages 71 and 85-90). We heard of action in this area but did not believe that it was of great consequence, nor did it seem to last very long. Information was vague, but I can remember that my impression at the time was “that it was probably some form of counter-attack or South Korean troops from the Ongjin Peninsula endeavouring to make their way around the head of the gulf (Haeju Man I believe it is called), which cuts above the parallel near Haeju, to get back to the South”. There is no direct land route between Ongjin and South Korea below the Parallel.

Squadron Leader Rankin has reminded me that we asked Colonel Paik, commanding 17 RCT and brother of Major General Paik Sun Yup Commanding 1st ROK Division at Kaesong, how he would get his Regimental Combat Team out of the Ongjin Peninsula in the case of a heavy attack. His reply was that most of them, in the absence of adequate shipping would probably have to fight their way out round the head of the Haeju Man.

A look at the map of Korea will show that Haeju is probably the last place the South would use to start an attack on the North. The South only had a Regimental Combat Team in the Ongjin Peninsula. This would not have been a large enough force to start a war and it would have faced the South with an impossible line of communication problem. Equally it would have been difficult to attack from the direction
of Kaesong by 1 ROK Division as such an operation could only advance along a narrow frontage right across the front of Northern positions along the parallel. McCormack is aware that this could not have happened (page 90). Without any sort of naval strength, it would not be likely that a strong attack could have been made up the gulf to Haeju. Any activity in the Haeju area could not, I believe, have been of sufficient size to indicate that North Korea was under attack. We were only aware that there had been any sort of action near Haeju after the war had broken out. In later days I never met anyone from the South, Korean or American, who knew any details of this activity.

Dr McCormack quotes a Chinese source reporting that “June 25, At daybreak, South Korean Troops attacked North Korea from the West of Haeju and from Kimchon and Chorwon” (page 87). Chorwon is about 40 miles North East of Kaesong and is about 20 miles north of the 38th parallel. I do not know where Kimchon is but there is a town Kumchon about 15 miles above the parallel North of Kaesong. In any case I find it hard to credit that the south could have launched an attack on Haeju from Chorwon in North Korea.

The Haeju action is still a bit of a mystery (page 90), but I do not think it was of any great consequence in the war as a whole. Even if the North thought they were under attack at Haeju, they mounted a pretty large counter-attack across the whole width of the country, continuing on as a full invasion of South Korea to contain it.

Dr McCormack explores the possibility (pages 90 and 91) that the Haeju incident could have made sense as part of a deliberate ploy to provoke a counter-attack from the North, even suggesting that Mr John Foster Dulles could have a secret understanding with the ROK, since Mr Dulles had only recently visited Korea. Again, under the heading “Southern retreat: feint or collapse” (page 94), a hint seems to be given that the collapse could have been engineered with a view to getting UN/USA help. McCormack feels that there was a chance that General MacArthur and President Rhee could have been party to this. Dr McCormack is aware that this scenario may sound improbable, but feels that it is scarcely more so than the conventional explanation (page 91).

I can not subscribe to this theory. The only troops available quickly that could be used to take part with the the ROK were those from the Occupation Force in Japan. These were untrained for war, having been mainly recruited for occupation force duties and units were very much under strength. For example, on arrival in Korea, the US 24th Division consisted of only two regiments of two battalions each which were about half strength or less, and the 1st Cavalry Division battalions were all about half strength. It would appear most unlikely that America would be prepared to commit such units in a prearranged plan of campaign even if they had wanted to.

Furthermore, why would the Americans wish to be party to an invasion of North Korea, something they had been trying to prevent. If this had been part of their plan, surely they would have chosen the time and the place and armed the ROK Army. It must be remembered also that there had been no administrative build-up in the area, and this would have been essential.

The flood of civilian refugees moving south, the care for whom the military observers were given responsibility and which I estimated was something well over a million, and increasing rapidly, left little doubt that the Korean civilians knew what was happening. The question was “Why were they heading South and not North?” Should they not have joined their so-called liberators?.

Dr McCormack includes a photograph of refugees crossing the Naktong River and heading for Pusan (page 93) with a caption that the Americans had set a deadline. The problem here was that the North Korean Army were infiltrating their soldiers through our lines mixing with the refugees and this had to be stopped. The question which should be asked again was “why were they still heading South and not North?” Another photographer shows refugees fleeing Pyongyang, crossing the Taedong River Bridge (page 125). Once again the question arises “Why head South and not North?” Why did they choose to leave their own North Korea? The North had been building up their propaganda and it became clear that they expected the South to rise up and join them in their advance into the South. This just did not eventuate and it is a good indication of the attitude of the people of the South.
There is a reference to the dubious value of tanks (page 91). The observers referred to here were certainly not us. The Korean terrain was often said to be not suitable for tanks. I disagree; in a surprise onslaught tanks are a wonderful weapon, and they create havoc. They may lose their value slightly later on, but it takes time to gain the experience needed to stand up to advancing tanks.

In writing about Lord Casey's 1954 book *Friends and Neighbours*, Dr McCormack points out (page 107) that mention was made of regular inspections by UN Military Observers whereas Peach and Rankin were actually the first observers appointed. A number of military inspections were in fact conducted by members of UNCO and its secretariat before the appointment of military observers, and this is covered in the UNCO report of 1950.

On the question of atrocities (pages 129-130), my comment is that we saw two trucks of prisoners stopped by the roadside just north of Taejon but facing south. They were under guards who told us that they were prisoners from a gaol further up the road who were being taken south ahead of the advancing North Koreans. They were certainly being treated roughly by the guards if they as much as moved and a couple of prisoners were beaten brutally as we arrived. One of the trucks was photographed by a *Picture Post* reporter (page 130) who was travelling with us. This photograph received world-wide prominence at the time and I submitted a report on what I had seen and was told. We took the names of some of the escort, told them where to check-in in Taejon, and subsequently passed their names to the Korean Government. However, the events of the war overtook us and we heard no more.

The story I remember here was that the North Koreans retreating through Yanpyong called up local communist sympathisers and told them to make out lists of anyone anti-communist, pro-Japanese, pro-American, and so on. They took these out in three lots over three days down to the river for transport to Seoul for interrogation. Arriving at the river flats they sounded an air-raid siren and told the captives, tied together with signal wire, to get into the trenches already dug. They were then shot and lightly covered. I recall that there was one woman amongst those shot. We were told that the local informers were also shot later by the North Koreans.

Later, just south of Munsan near Tupo Ri (pages 141 and 142), we found another mass killing of approximately 150, all ages and sexes. We submitted a report with photographs of this massacre also to the UN. Once again we located a sole survivor who said it had been done as North Koreans retreated, and the state of the bodies supported this. Another massacre oc-
curred in the Cholla Pukto area, at Chonju I believe, where another group of approximately 1,000 were killed in a schoolyard. This was also investigated and reported on by an UNCOK team. Dr McCormack does not mention this, although I informed him of it.

Dr McCormack suggests the possibility that all these killings could have been meted out by the South against collaborators (page 142). This is unlikely on three counts: first, the bad state of decomposition of the bodies, which was a sure indication that they had been dead some time; second, the fact that at Yanpyong nearly all the males in the village had been exterminated and the North Korean soldiers had been obviously killed much later; and third, we were still meeting groups of police investigating collaborators. In my opinion they would not have had time to have killed these villagers, who had obviously been killed some time before.

I do not understand what the author meant in his comment that the mass killings we reported may have been recognised, even by the Pentagon, as isolated examples of atrocities committed by the North Koreans (page 146).

A further account of atrocities, not mentioned by the author although again I told him about it, is included in a book entitled *Pencilling Prisoner* written by an Australian priest of the Columban order, Father Philip W. Crosbie, of the experiences of prisoners in the North. Father Crosbie had been working out of Chun-chon and we narrowly missed him during our tour of the parallel; he was in fact taken prisoner at Chun-chon. I met Father Crosbie in 1968 when he was visiting South Vietnam, he told me that he was still working in Korea, and I have subsequently been in communication with Father Crosbie in January 1984. I find his account very convincing.

With regard to germ warfare, of which Dr McCormack makes much in Chapter II I cannot comment other than that there has never been any substantiation of the use of this type of warfare that I know of, and there has been widespread evidence of brainwashing and tricked confessions of prisoners-of-war; the morale of many prisoners was low. This has been made the subject of very thorough investigation by the Services. In travelling through North Korea later as far north as Anju and Sinanju, I saw no evidence of germ warfare having been introduced at that stage of the war.

A number of references have been made regarding the "State of Readiness" of the ROK Army. In the military observers' report, we said that we saw no sign of preparation for war. We were not in a position to gauge its efficiency. We knew they had only a few good officers; mostly their officer corps came from those who had been trained by the Chinese or Japanese armies, and were of doubtful capability.

However, when we heard at Taejon later that the UN were committed to support South Korea, I was required by Mr Muccio, with a KMAG captain, to locate and make contact with the ROK Army and encourage it to fight. We found them mostly in the Suwon area, some ninety miles to the north, and thereafter spent some time with them. They were in poor shape; I believe the troops would have stood and accepted great hardship but they were in general badly led. Under Japanese occupation, very few Koreans were allowed to practice leadership, and the poor quality of their officers was understandable. I had little difficulty in moving units, even divisions, as they were only too pleased to have someone make decisions and give orders. Eighteen years later, I saw the ROK Army in Vietnam; it was then a different story for they were well led and well trained.

Dr McCormack pursues the point that the South could have started the war. In his conclusion (page 160) he writes "... it is clear that evidence of aggression by either side, South or North, in June is circumstantial and inconclusive". As far as I am aware, the only evidence he produced to show that the South started the war was a minor action near Haeju on which comment has already been made above. There is plenty of evidence, together with hindsight, to show that the North came over in force on a wide front (pages 68-71) and penetrated deep into South Korea.

In conclusion, I am of the opinion that Dr McCormack is pushing it a bit in qualifying the title of his book as "An Australian Perspective on the Korean War".

1 **PENCILLING PRISONER**

By Father Philip W. Crosbie (Columban)
Melbourne
The Hawthorne Press, fifth edition, 1960
(First published October, 1954)
UNCOIK Military Observers Report Extract from the UNCOIK Report 1950

Annex 4

Report of field trips carried out by United Nations Commission on Korea field observers along the 38th parallel (A/AC.26/II/EMDOC 1.)

(Note by secretariat: This document was drafted in Seoul by the observation group on Saturday, 24 June 1950, the day following their return from Ongjin peninsula. It was not, however, possible to reproduce and circulate this document owing to the rapid march of events. The report was briefly explained to the Commission at its meeting in Seoul on Monday, 26 June 1950, and the decisions arrived at on the basis of this report were included in the cablegram dispatched by the Commission to the Secretary-General dated 26 June 1950 transmitting a report (reproduced as Security Council document S/1507 dated 26 June 1950) concerning the military situation. The report was further considered at a meeting of the Commission held in Camp Hakata on 29 June 1950 and a report was dispatched to the Security Council the same day (reproduced as Security Council document S/1518 dated 29 June 1950). The full report has now been reproduced for further consideration by the Commission.)

Team: Squadron Leader R.J. RANKIN, Observer
Major F.S.B. PEACH, Observer
Mr. C.L. COATES, Secretariat

I. Diary

9 June 1950
Seoul to Kaesong, visiting Headquarters First Division at Susak en route. Visit to Tower Hill on 38th parallel.

10 June 1950
Kaesong to Paekchon and Yonan, Visit to Regimental Headquarters. Return to Yohyon for visit to 38th parallel and to observe crossing of UNCOIK representative to meet emmissaries from North Korea at Yohyon Station. Return to Paekchon.

11 June 1950
Paekchon to Kaesong, Visit to refugee centre. Then to Seoul.

13 June 1950
Seoul to Uijongbu. Visit to Headquarters Seventh Division and thence to Tong Duk Choni Regimental Headquarters and 38th parallel. Return to Seoul.

14 June 1950
Seoul to Chunchon and Wonju. Visit to Headquarters Sixth Division.

15 June 1950
Wonju to Kangnung, Visit to Headquarters Eighth Division.

16 June 1950
Kangnung to Chumunjin and 38th parallel. Return to Kangnung.

17 June 1950
Kangnung to Seoul.

21 June 1950
Seoul to the Ongjin peninsula by sea. Disembarked at Bupo and then by jeep to Ongjin. Visit to Regimental Headquarters.

22 June 1950
Visits to 38th parallel at Mt. Kachisan (Opposite Chwiya in North Korea) and north-west of Ongjin.

23 June 1950
Return to Seoul by sea.

II. The General Situation along the 38th parallel

The principal impression left with the observers after the field tour along the parallel is that the South Korean Army is organized entirely for defence, and is in no condition to carry out an attack on a large scale against the forces of the North. This impression is based upon the following main observations:

1. The South Korean Army in all sectors is disposed in depth. The parallel is guarded on the southern side only by small bodies of troops located in scattered outposts together with roving patrols. There is no concentration of troops, and no massing for attack visible at any point.

2. At several points the North Korean forces are in effective possession of salients on the south side of the parallel, occupation in at least one case being of fairly recent date. There is no evidence that South Korean forces have taken any steps or are making any preparations to eject North Korean forces from any of these salients.
3. A proportion of the South Korean forces are actively engaged in rounding up guerrilla bands that have infiltrated into the mountains area in the eastern sections. It was ascertained that these bands are in possession of demolition equipment and are more heavily armed than on previous occasions.

4. So far as the equipment of the South Korean forces is concerned, in the absence of armour, air support and heavy artillery any action with the object of invasion would by any military standards be impossible.

5. The South Korean Army does not appear to be in possession of military or other supplies that would indicate preparation for a large-scale attack. In particular there is no sign of any dumping of supplies of ammunition or petrol-oil-lubricant, in forward areas. Roads generally are little used, and apart from a convoy of four trucks taking a company from Kangnung westwards to join in the rounding up of the guerrilla bands, no concentration of transport was anywhere encountered.

6. In general, the attitude of the South Korean commanders is one of vigilant defence. Their instructions do not go beyond retirement, in case of attack, upon previously prepared positions.

7. There is no indication of any extensive reconnaissance being carried out northwards by the South Korean Army, nor is any undue excitement or activity observed at the Divisional Headquarters or at regimental levels, to suggest preparation for offensive activity. The observers were freely admitted to all sections of the various headquarters including operations rooms.

8. The observers made a special point of inquiring what information was coming in regarding the situation north of the parallel. In some sectors, it had been reported that civilians had recently been removed from areas adjoining the parallel to the north to depths varying from 4 to 8 kilometres. Another report received during the night of Thursday 22 June at the regimental headquarters in Ongjin was to the effect that there was increased military activity in the vicinity of Chwiya, about 4 kilometres north of the parallel. No reports, however, had been received of any unusual activity on the part of the North Korean forces that would indicate any imminent change in the general situation on the parallel.

III. Administrative Matters

A. Provisional organisation of zones

In the unavoidable absence of the chief observer, it is not possible to make any but provisional arrangements for the organization of the observers already in Korea. Pending his arrival, however, it will be necessary to work according to a provisional plan which it is suggested should be as follows:

The length of the parallel should be divided into four zones, in each of which one team of two observers would normally operate. The boundaries of these zones will be fixed to comply with the requirements of communication and to provide the quickest way of obtaining information from Korean Army sources. The first zone will include Kaesong, the second Uijongbu, the third Chunhon and the fourth Kangnung. The four observers of zones one and two will be based on Seoul and will be expected to cover also the Ongjin peninsula. The observers covering the third zone will be based on Chunhon and those covering the fourth zone on Kangnung. The teams will be rotated in accordance with requirements subsequently to be determined, but in general an observer will be expected to spend not less than three weeks in each month out in the field.

B. Communications

Communication by telephone between the units of the Korean Army along the parallel are good but it is not easy to get messages quickly by telephone back to Seoul. Facilities for communicating with Seoul by telephone, however, do exist, and when liaison is properly established, communication by telephone with Seoul should not be unsatisfactory. From Kangnung, however, it will be necessary to send messages by radio, and provisional agreement has been obtained for the use of the KMAG (United States Korean Military Advisory Group) radio facilities, which are excellent.

For permanent arrangements, however, it will be necessary to establish an UNCOK radio net which will give facilities for each team to keep in direct contact with the Commission in Seoul. This will involve long-term planning and further examination of this problem will be necessary.

C. Transport

With the arrival of the four new jeeps it will be possible to make the teams independent of
Korean Army transport. Two jeeps might be placed permanently at the disposal of the teams in Kangnung and Chunchon, the other two remaining in Seoul. For the efficient running of the transport, good drivers must be recruited and it will be desirable to obtain the services of an expert mechanic who could also act as motor transport officer. It will be necessary to obtain permission from the Korean Army for the UNCOOK vehicles to obtain petrol and oil, and arrangements will also have to be made for the maintenance of the vehicles, possibly by the AMIK (American Mission in Korea) organization. As the observers themselves will on occasion drive the jeeps, they should be covered by proper insurance and should also be given such licences as may be necessary according to the Korean regulations. The jeeps, it is suggested, should be painted blue with suitable United Nations markings prominently displayed. In view of the condition of Korean roads, special attention should be paid to the seat padding and it will later be necessary to arrange for winterization. The trailers, when they arrive, should similarly be painted and marked.

D. Liaison

The officer deputed by the Korean Government accompanied the team throughout the trips and was of the greatest help. As the other teams arrive, extra liaison officers will have to be provided. Four interpreters, who will also be required to attend to executive matters for the observers, should also be recruited.

E. Equipment

For the efficient operation of the teams, the following equipment is necessary:

1. 4 pairs of binoculars;
2. 10 map cases;
3. 12 flashlights;
4. 12 camp cots;
5. 12 sleeping bags;
6. 24 blankets;
7. 12 first aid kits;
8. 4 compasses;
9. 12 duffle bags;
10. 12 mess kits;
11. 4 cooking stoves;
12. 6 water containers;
13. Insecticide.

It will later be necessary to provide winter equipment including parkas, gloves and snow boots.

F. Accommodation

If four observers are based on Seoul, it will be necessary to arrange accommodation for two observers at Chunchon and for two observers at Kangnung. The best arrangement from the point of view of living conditions will undoubtedly be to obtain permission from KMAG for the two observers to join the KMAG mess at Kangnung and Chunchon. It is understood that this would not be impossible if a request were made to KMAG Headquarters. If KMAG facilities are not used, the cost of providing alternative accommodation will be considerable.

G. Insurance

Apart from the motor insurance referred to above, it will be necessary to clarify the position as regards personal insurance of: (a) observers; (b) secretariat personnel working with the teams and (c) ancillary personnel.

(Signed) R.J. RANKIN, Observer
F.S.B. PEACH, Observer
C.L. COATES, Secretariat
INTRODUCTION

THE US Army recently completed a unique 18-month science project in the Federal Republic of Germany which resulted in the development of an exciting new long-term aircraft storage technique. This important study has proven that the most complex helicopters may be stored fully fuelled, under minimum preservation (Approximately six man hours) and in a controlled-humidity environment for up to 14 months and probably much longer (estimated to be up to 4 years) without any significant deterioration. Aircraft will remain fully mission capable (FMC) under the new storage technique and may be used for combat operations after 30 minutes' depreservation and arming.

A detailed description of this storage procedure is being incorporated as a new section in the Storage and Maintenance of Pre-positioned Material Configured to Unit sets (POMCUS) Technical manual 38-450. Changes incorporating the new storage procedure have also been proposed for the AH-1 helicopter, UH-1 helicopter and the OH-58 helicopter unit and intermediate maintenance manuals' storage section (Appendix E of each-23 manual). Other changes, adopting the new aircraft battery trickle charge procedures developed during the project, have been recommended for the Army nickel-cadmium battery maintenance manuals: TM 11-6140 - 203-14-1 and 2.

Accordingly, this new storage technique is available for use by the Army for the "strategic" pre-positioning of combat-ready helicopters belonging to deployable units. Strategic pre-positioning is the only immediately available and cost-effective way to reduce early U.S. Air force airlift of Army aircraft needed to rapidly reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-

Background

The U.S. Army has known for a number of years that the rapid reinforcement of NATO with Army aircraft posed a particularly difficult strategic task for planners. Military leaders have also recognized the need of a tactically cost-effective way to store aircraft in a ready-to-fight condition for use when a unit does not have the assets (maintenance, personnel, fuel) to fly the aircraft regularly. For these two rea-
SONS, the USATSARCOM began the Aviation Material Combat In-Country (AMCRIC) Study in 1978. Later, in December 1979, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe (CINCUUSAREUR), recognized a critical need to pre-position aviation assets in unit sets in Europe, to support deploying forces, and he suggested methods of storing such aviation assets.

This high-level recognition of the need for a new FMC aircraft storage technique was followed quickly with the Defense Guidance for fiscal year 1982 through 1986 requiring the Army to seek ways to minimize early strategic airlift support needed to rapidly reinforce NATO. These actions resulted in the Joint Aviation Storage Concept Validation Program and the development of the new long-term aircraft storage procedure.

Objectives

The overall purpose of the Joint Aviation Storage Validation Program was to confirm the findings of numerous other long-term humidity-controlled storage tests, all of which clearly maintained "... that storage of aircraft for a 6-month period (and probably much longer) does not constitute a technical problem" (2:3-2 para. 3-3). The specific objectives of this validation program were as follows:

1. To demonstrate the feasibility of pre-positioning AH-1S Modernized Cobra (MC) helicopters combat-ready in Europe;
2. To define the specific preservation, maintenance, and depreservation necessary to maintain FMC aircraft combat-ready while in pre-positioned storage;
3. To determine the support assets (personnel, monies, material, repair parts, and facilities) needed to store a base-line combat-ready aviation unit (one attack helicopter company) on a long-term basis; and
4. To examine potential aircraft storage sites in Europe.

Scope

The Joint Aviation Storage Validation Program Plan called for the placement of 14 AH-1S (MC) FMC helicopters in dehumidified storage in Herongen, Germany, for one year. USATSARCOM provided the 14 aircraft; a project officer, Major Wayne L. Dandridge, in Germany; and quality assurance, maintenance, engineering, and administrative support to the validation project. USAREUR provided the
storage shelter in Herongen and a project point of contact, Mr. Earl Erickson, the POMCUS Team Chief from USAREUR Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, War Reserves/Storage Division. The validation program was divided into these four major phases:
1. Initial storage and preservation;
2. The six-month depreservation and evaluation;
3. The 12-month depreservation and evaluation;
4. The six-month’s follow-up evaluation.

Preservation and Depreservation
The preservation method applied to the 14 helicopters used in the science project was held to a minimum in keeping with the primary objective of avoiding a need for extensive depreservation to return stored aircraft to a fully mission capable (FMC) status. As a result, the installation of charged batteries is all that is required when aircraft are removed from storage. The following minimum preservation steps were taken in Germany during the January 1982 validation project; the same techniques are available for future aircraft pre-positioning:
1. The 14 aircraft were cleaned and were determined to be FMC;
2. The aircraft were lubricated in accordance with (IAW) the 50-hour lubrication requirements using Wide Temperature Range Grease, National Stock Number (NSN) 9150-00-944-8953;
3. Exposed portions of each helicopter's hydraulic system were coated with Hydraulic Fluid, Fire Resistant, NSN 9150-00-149-7431;
4. Aircraft fuel controls were filled with 10-weight oil, Lube Oil Aircraft Engine Petroleum, NSN 9150-00-273-2388;
5. The helicopters were topped off with JP-4 fuel (this was the only type of fuel available for the project). Future storage programs will use JP-5 or JP-8, or, as an alternate, JP-4. JP-5 and JP-8 fuels are less hazardous and are more stable than JP-4;
6. Batteries were removed and placed in adjacent storage IAW the procedures in Technical Manuals 11-6140-203-14-1 and 2 under a diode-protected 28-volt 2-ampere trickle charge;
7. Each helicopter was electrically grounded.

A total of six unit-level maintenance man-hours were expended during the validation project to preserve each helicopter. Depreservation required a 10-minute operation which consisted of reinstalling a charged battery. The major challenge for any aircraft storage project is to ensure that each aircraft is in good condition and fully mission capable (FMC) prior to preservation.

COBRA BEING REMOVED FROM FMC LONG-TERM STORAGE
On 19 July 1982, seven of the 13 helicopters were removed from storage. No maintenance problems related to storage were experienced, and very few maintenance problems of any type were encountered.

Validation Project Procedures
The Joint TSARCOM/USAREUR Aviation Storage Validation Program erased all doubts the long-term FMC helicopter storage would present technical problems. The validation project team placed 14 AH-1S (MC) helicopters in long-term storage in Germany in January 1982. These aircraft were meticulously checked to ensure that they were FMC. The aircraft were placed in dehumidified (less than 50 per cent relative humidity) warehouse storage with minimum preservation.

After six months’ storage, with no maintenance being performed on the aircraft while in storage, seven of the helicopters were removed from the warehouse and underwent extensive testing to identify storage-related problems to confirm mission capabilities. The evaluation
process used on each of the first seven aircraft included the following:
1. Safety of flight technical inspection;
2. Careful preflight and daily inspections;
3. Maintenance operational check (MOC);
4. Visual technical inspection and pre-flight after MOC;
5. Limited test flight;
6. Careful preflight and ferry flight from Herongen to Ansbach;
7. 100 per cent technical inspection;
8. Armament systems checks and boresighting;
9. Careful daily inspection, pre-flight inspection and ferry flight from Ansbach, Germany, to the Wildflecken Range;
10. Careful daily inspection, pre-flight and firing of each aircraft at Wildflecken range;
11. Careful daily inspection, pre-flight and ferry flight from Wildflecken Range to Hanau, Germany;
12. Meticulous acceptance inspections by the 503rd Aviation Battalion (Combat).

The last seven validation aircraft remained in uninterrupted storage for eight more months until they were removed in March 1983. Then they underwent the same extensive inspections and testing that the first group of aircraft had been subjected to in July and August 1982. These remaining seven aircraft were issued to the 3rd AB(C) after the inspections and testing.

Six- and Thirteen-Month-Evaluations
The six- and 13-month-evaluations confirmed that the highly complex AH-1S (MC) helicopter could be pre-positioned for up to 14 months and probably much longer (estimated to be up to 4 years) and remain FMC with minimal preservation in a controlled-humidity (40 per cent to 50 per cent relative humidity) warehouse. The evaluations verified that preservation and depreservation of the Army’s most complex helicopters involve simple unit-level maintenance tasks. These tests confirmed that no depreservation steps are required when using this new storage technique other than reinstalling charged batteries.

The two evaluations also verified that aircraft fuel will remain stable and free of contamination during this type of storage. No maintenance problems related to storage were experienced, and very few maintenance problems of any type were encountered during the validation project.

Strategic Pre-Positioning Cost Estimate
A major part of the joint validation program included the development of a cost estimate to place one complete Attack Helicopter Company in long-term strategic pre-positioned storage within Germany. The approximate stock funded cost in 1983 dollars for placing one Attack Company in pre-positioned storage (POMCUS) and of developing an Aircraft Storage Preparation Maintenance Facility (SPMF) capable of supporting approximately two Aviation Battalions (270 helicopters) is as follows:
1. New site is $19,212,075; or
2. Co-located with an existing POMCUS site is $11,212,000.

The cost estimate above includes a SPMF capable of supporting the equipment of two combat aviation battalions in pre-positioned strategic storage and one controlled-humidity 40,000-square-foot (SF) warehouse capable of storing the helicopters of one Attack Company. To store one battalion, a storage facility would need approximately three of these warehouses for aircraft storage and one and one-half warehouses for related material storage. Using the Attack Company as a base line, the following estimates were derived:
Cost to store one company at a new site = $19,212,000
Cost to store one company at an existing POMCUS site = $11,212,000
Cost to store two companies at a new site = $25,048,000
Cost to store two companies at an existing POMCUS site = $15,339,000
Cost to store three companies at a new site = $30,834,000
Cost to store three companies at an existing POMCUS site = $19,411,000
Cost to store 18 companies at a new site = $144,429,000
Cost to store 18 companies at an existing POMCUS site = $94,779,000

A much more detailed explanation of the cost estimates is available in the “Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics Joint Aviation In Storage Concept Validation Program Final Report,” dated July 1983. A copy of this report can be obtained by writing to: Commander, USATSARCOM, Directorate for Plans and Systems Analysis DRSTS-BAR, Attention: Mr Valentin Berger, 4300 Goodfellow Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63120. It should be noted that these are
strategic pre-positioning cost estimates only (tactical storage would be much less expensive).

Technical Data
The large quantity of technical data collected by the Aviation Validation Team is scientific proof that aircraft strategic and tactical pre-positioning is technically simple. This technical data is now part of an official record in USAT-SARCOM, USAREUR, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, DCSLOG.

Humidity Control
The validation project proved that humidity control was the key to a successful long-term storage program. Although other past tests and this project support the premise that aircraft can be stored FMC successfully for up to one year under dry, free-ventilation, and minimum preservation circumstances, humidity controlled is undisputably the secret to true long-term FMC aircraft storage of more than one year. Humidity control of 40 to 50 per cent relative humidity inhibits corrosion, stabilizes fuel, and prevents the drying of elastic seals and hoses. Temperature has little effect on aircraft storage except for the expansion and contraction of fuel in the aircraft. The validation project confirmed that temperature control is not needed or desirable during long-term FMC storage.

Fuel Stability
The 14 helicopters in the validation project were topped off with JP-4 fuel prior to storage. Fuel samples were collected each month and were carefully analyzed by the USAREUR Oil Analysis Lab. Fuel samples were put through a full range of testing; including tests for volatility; freezing point; copper strip reactivity; existent gum; and presence of particulates of water, and of microbiological activity. A very small amount of water was found in the first month’s fuel samples from nine aircraft, but after that no water was found in the fuel cells, and all fuel remained stable.

Humidity control within the 40 to 50 per cent range prevents condensation of water in fuel tanks, and, without water, contamination and microbiological growth cannot occur. The filling of fuel tanks in turbine-driven vehicles is the most effective preservation technique available; it enables the vehicles to remain FMC throughout the storage period. (The British Armed Forces use the same fully fuelled procedure in their long-term helicopter storage program.) The Validation Project also established that there is no need for fuel sampling in aircraft in controlled humidity storage after the second month. Initial sampling is necessary, however, to remove settled water, and the second sampling is needed to establish a “base line” sample. Fuel sampling needs only to be done semi-annually thereafter.

Nickel Cadmium Batteries
All batteries must be removed from helicopters placed in pre-positioned storage. The 120-day service must be performed on the batteries, and the batteries may then be placed in adjacent storage IAW Technical Manuals 11-6140-203-14-1 and 2 under a diode-protected 28 volt/2 amp trickle charge. The trickle charge (although not currently listed in TM-6140-203-14-1 and 2) will increase readiness by continuously charging each battery until it is replaced in a helicopter.

Range Firing
The first seven Cobras were evaluated at Katterback Army Airfield, Ansbach, Germany, after removal from storage. The 501st Aviation Battalion (Combat) sponsored the aircraft weapons evaluation at the Range. Twelve thousand rounds of 20mm ammunition, 616 folding-fin 2.75 inch rockets, and 24 TOW missiles were fired during the six-months’ evaluation, with only one 20mm gun malfunction caused by a loose electrical cannon plug. No maintenance problems related to storage were encountered. Seven hundred rounds of 20mm ammunition and 187 2.75 inch rockets were fired at Wildflecken Range by the 3rd Aviation battalion (Combat) during the 13-months’ evaluation, with no malfunction attributable to storage.

Concept
Under the new long-term aircraft storage technique, helicopters will be pre-positioned in complete or partial unit sets in a fully mission capable (FMC) status. Twelve months’ storage with time extensions of six months will be used. Controlled 40 per cent to 50 per cent relative humidity conditions must be maintained within storage facilities. Controlled 40 per cent to 50 per cent relative humidity is preferred, but since European countries have naturally high humidity the year round, either “controlled-humid-
TEST FLIGHT

CW4 Pericle and Major Dandridge take off on a validation test flight in Herongen, Germany. The stress-tension-shelter in the background was used to store the aircraft during the storage project. These shelters provide dry, dark storage; but offer little security, a limited cover life of about five years, poor sealing and insulation, some limits to storage space due to the curved roof and lack the safety features required for storing aircraft.

Weapon systems will be boresighted and determined FMC. Explosive safety devices will be installed on all stored aircraft. Aircraft will be stored with sufficient ground-handling wheels to allow for maximum readiness and for rapid evacuation in the event of fire. The batteries will be kept nearby and will be trickle-charged during the entire storage period. All confidential classified mission-essential equipment will be installed in each helicopter.

The SPMF, designed for strategic pre-positioning support, will be operated with a maintenance capability approximately equal to that of a fixed base non-divisional Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) Company. All unscheduled maintenance, special inspections, or safety-of-flight modifications that come due during storage will be completed within the SPMF as soon as possible. The major objective of this type of storage is to keep helicopters FMC with sufficient acceptable "bank time" to ensure combat readiness.

The relative humidity control, sunlight protection, environmental stability, preservation, and security provided for the FMC aircraft storage program will allow for numerous scheduled maintenance tasks (listed on the DA Form
2408-18) to be waived and/or extended while a helicopter is in storage, and/or to be extended after removal of the aircraft from storage. Facilities used to store FMC helicopters must provide humidity control or dehumidifying devices, resistant floors, explosion-proof wiring and lighting, and high-capacity vapor-evacuation capabilities.

Summary
The Army has found the answer to the following two particularly difficult questions:
1. How will NATO be rapidly reinforced with Army aircraft without using U.S. Air Force strategic airlift capabilities needed for higher priority missions?
2. What is a cost effective way of dealing with the frequent mismatches of maintenance, personnel, and/or fuel assets with aircraft in Army aviation units?

The answer to both of these significant problems is the use of the exciting new long-term FMC aircraft “strategic” and “tactical” storage technique developed over the past 18 months. The most complex helicopters may now be stored fully fuelled, under minimum preservation and in a controlled-humidity environment for up to 14 months and probably much longer without any significant deterioration.

Conclusions
On the basis of the experience of the “Joint Aviation In Storage Concept Validation Program” and numerous other past storage tests, it is concluded that:
1. Helicopters can be stored using the minimum preservation technique for up to one year in a dry, free-ventilation storage area;
2. The most complex helicopters may be stored fully fuelled, under minimum preservation, and in a controlled-humidity environment for 14 months and probably much longer (estimated to be four years) without any significant deterioration;
3. JP-5 or JP-8, or, as an alternate, JP-4 is the best self-preservation for tactical or strategic long-term FMC controlled-humidity storage. Fuel will remain free of moisture and stable “indefinitely” in this type of storage;
4. NI-CAD batteries should be removed from stored helicopters, and be stored nearby IAW TM 11-6140-203-14-1 and 2 under a diode-protected 28-volt/2-ampere trickle charge;
5. FMC Helicopter Prepositioned Storage is currently the only feasible and cost-effective way to reduce early U.S. Air Force airlift of Army aircraft needed to rapidly reinforce NATO;
6. FMC Helicopter Storage is also a technique suitable for “tactical” use, to increase combat aviation readiness during peacetime, and to eliminate long-term disparities between the number of aircraft on hand and available crew, support personnel, repair parts and fuel;
7. The main drive shaft and tail rotor drive shaft flexible coupling grease repack and inspection in all AH-1, UH-1, and OH-58 aircraft should be extended by at least six months;
8. The storage technique demonstrated appropriate for the validation aircraft may be applicable to other types of complex military vehicles, systems, and sub-systems which must remain FMC during long periods of time (for example, the M-1 tank);
9. The preparation, preservation, storage, maintenance, and removal techniques de-
veloped during the Joint Validation Program should be published in TM 38-450; the AH-1, UH-1, and OH-58 Unit and Intermediate Maintenance Manuals; and the Nickel Cadmium Battery Manuals as soon as possible.

Recommendations

On the basis of the experience and conclusions of this Concept Validation Program, it is recommended that:

1. The conclusions above be accepted as a basis for “strategic” pre-positioning of helicopters for deploying units, and for “tactical” storage of active unit Army helicopters, as requirements necessitate; and that

2. Unit commanders consider the new storage technique as an at least partial answer to shortages of fuel, repair parts, support equipment, crew or maintenance personnel they may be facing.

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Major Dandridge is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. He is a Senior Army Aviator, a Maintenance Test Pilot, and Instructor Pilot, an Instrument Flight Examiner, and an Aircraft Maintenance Officer. A graduate of the U.S. Army Transportation Advanced Course, he holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Science from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and a Master of Science degree from Florida Institute of Technology. He is an ex-aviation warrant officer and enlisted man who has held positions as a combat armed helicopter pilot, an aviation advisor, an airfield commander, a maintenance company commander, a battalion operations officer, a division materiel officer, and an ammunition depot transportation officer. Major Dandridge was the Joint USATSARCOM/USAREUR Aviation in Storage Concept Validation Program Team Chief and the Assistant AH-1S Modernized Cobra Fielding Team Chief from November 1981 through June 1983. He is now a member of the Logistics Coordination Cell, Host Country Support Team, 14/7, U.S. European Command.
A great portion of this story is based on a record kept by my father as a prisoner of the Japanese in Changi jail, and later as a labourer on the infamous Burma/Thailand railway.

My father did not keep a diary in the true sense of the word, but rather a record of specific incidents, Military reports and personal notes on the members of his platoon.

Perhaps I am biased, but to read this record written at a time when life was measured in minutes, and that the discovery of any form of diary by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) meant instant death or severe beating, is a moving, and at times chilling experience.

Establishment of the 2/29th Battalion

The 2/29th was formed in Victoria under the command of Lt. Col. J. C. Robertson MC, VD on 17 October, 1940, and was initially concentrated at Bonegilla, however, the unit moved to Bathurst to undergo final training in open warfare. The original intention of course was for the 8th Division to be sent to the Middle East.

As the entry of Japan into the War grew closer, the Battalion as part of the 27th Brigade departed from Station Pier Melbourne aboard a Dutch Liner the "Mannix" (code named "Transport EE"), on 31 July, 1941 — but not for the Middle East.

First Impressions

My father graphically describes life aboard ship, and he summarised his feelings as "A great adventure and an intense pleasure". Like thousands of other young men at the time, (my father had just turned 21), this was his first sea journey, and the first to a foreign land.

As a sergeant, he was entitled to share a cabin and dine in a combined Officer/Sergeants Mess in the dining room of the ship. Apart from routine duties, time was spent lazing in the sun or reading and enjoying the sights and sounds aboard ship. Time passed easily, but as my father records "it did not take much observation as we approached our destination, to know what place it was".

The tropical sea and many small islands presented a welcome sight after months at sea, and this passage perhaps gives some insight into what my father felt at the time:

"What thoughts came to everyone’s mind? It would be hard to say easily. So far our Army life had been secure, even pleasant and well
ordered, so that it would be logical to assume that it would carry on the same, especially when we noted the welcome sight of our own fighters and bombers in the air to assist the grand Navy in its job of convoy work. Yes, I think many including myself thought that here the Forces are supreme against all comers”.

Following disembarkation, the Battalion camped in St. Patrick’s school Katong about 7 miles from Singapore on the East Coast Road. Their sister Battalions, the 2/26th and 2/30th were located at Changi in atapi roofed huts.

A confident report was noted by my father, “the camp was prepared for us and everything pointed to a good start in Malaya”.

It is interesting to note that a Sergeants Mess was quickly established and “specialised in cool drinks”.

Training of the Battalion was stepped up, and included many route marches designed to acclimatise all members to the tropical humidity, although these discomforts were soon forgotten following the Unit’s first Singapore leave.

My father notes rather cautiously, “many ideas were altered considerably when we actually got to know it (Singapore) better”. It was during this hectic period that my father late one night was summoned to appear before the CO. My father records that sinking feeling, (I’m sure we have all felt it at some time), as follows:

“I wondered what I had done wrong and as the time of night was 2200 hrs, it was hard to imagine what the cause of such a visit to the CO was. When I arrived outside his door believe me I was pretty nervous and swallowed hard before entering. Then came a most unexpected interview. The context was that I had been selected to attend an Officer Cadet Training Unit, together with 3 other members of the Battalion. I considered this an exceeding honour and felt rather dubious of my qualification to enter such a good school for Officers. It was no doubt an opportunity of a lifetime to attend a school which was manned by skilled Officers from Britain’s Army who had a reputable name for quality and estate in the annals of Army life.”

**Officer Training September 1941**

Officer training at this time consisted of 15 weeks and the instructional staff were a combination of AIF and British officers. The Commandant was a Major Denae of the Gordon Highlanders.

My father notes that “The training was hard and entailed plenty of study, but there were the compensations in the local cinema and sport available to balance the syllabus”.

As the completion of the Course drew near, my father and the other students alike began training for their passing out parade. It was at this juncture that fate took a hand, and my father notes: “but fate intervened with the declaration of war by Japan. All thought of ceremony disappeared from our minds, and we were told that we were now Commissioned Officers, ready to take a part in the struggle. What a start for a new officer.”

Virtually overnight all students were returned to their Units and those newly commissioned officers in the AIF were sent to a holding depot imaginatively called “G Base Depot”.

My father (left) with a fellow Officer Cadet, Malaya 28 Sept 41.
It was during my father's stay at G Base that the news of his Unit's first action filtered down the line. The Unit engaged the Japanese said to be only 200 strong in what is now known as The Muar Road Battle. I will cover this action in greater detail later, but as an indication of the ferocity of the fight, 13 Officers and 296 other Ranks, or 58 per cent of those who went into action were killed at Muar Road. Included in this figure was the CO, Lt Col Robertson and the 2IC Maj S. F. Olliff. One can imagine the crushing effect this must have had on those who were not involved in the action, to say nothing of the survivors of this first action for the Battalion.

The sense of helplessness and disbelief is recorded by my father in the following passage:

"Surely these Japs were no better than we were told, poor fighters, poor equipment, lacking air support and generally inferior troops".

Generally, the news of this action sent shock waves throughout Malaya, and as a result, General Bennett's plans for the defence of Johore had to be reassessed, as the danger had now increased and become more imminent. On a personal level, the battle had an enormous impact on my father as he records the death of his lifelong friend and the Battalion's Signals Officer, Lt Arthur Sheldon.

"He paid the supreme sacrifice but forever in my heart shall be his memory". (Extract from Lt. Sheldon's epitaph prepared by my father).

I have diverged somewhat, however I feel this passage is pertinent at this stage of my story.

And so ended my father's Officer Training and the beginning of a new phase in his life.

Lt Simmons — Signals Officer

Following the action at Muar Road, the Unit regrouped at G Base Depot and it was here that the task of reforming the Battalion was given to Maj S. A. F. Pond, who was promoted to Lt Col upon taking command.

My father was paraded to the new CO and given command of the Battalion's Signal Platoon, thus taking over from Lt Sheldon. "It was a hard blow to realise that I should have to take on the death of Arthur Sheldon and to know exactly the tremendous responsibility of trying to lead men in battle. However, we had a few original Sigs and they gave me great heart and courage. This then was the beginning of my Army life. The test of training, and on looking back, one realizes how far short I fell of my job."

My father now set about the task of reforming, retraining and restoring a viable signals network within the Battalion, (no mean feat even by today's standards).

Long nights were spent interviewing replacements, most of whom were Queenslanders, and had only been recruited into the AIF 3 weeks prior. Having now reinforced the signals platoon, my father then moved the platoon 2 miles from G Base and commenced training. The rest of the Battalion underwent retraining and conducted rifle practices on Bukit Timah range with the Japanese bombers operating overhead.

It was under these conditions that training, re-fitting and repair work was undertaken. As a measure of the urgency thrust upon the Battalion, my father was told by Lt Col Pond that he had 5 days to prepare the Signals Platoon for action. My father recalls: "What a huge task, remembering that our original battalion had 9-11 months to prepare for the same job."

Hampered by lack of equipment, inexperience and daily bombing raids by the Japanese the training and re-fitting went on.

Following the new orders my father's platoon was moved to Singapore Island and took up a position adjacent to Kranj oil wells, which also housed a wireless station. My father noted the new disposition of forces as follows,

"The new position on the island was adjacent to Kranj oil wells and wireless station, this being located on Bukit Timah road, south of Mandai cross roads. The 2/26th Bn at this stage was at Mandai, 2/30th at the Causeway and we were reserve Bn as they anticipated a drive over the Causeway and down Bukit Timah road towards Singapore. The disposition of our Bn was A & B forward right & left Coys, C & D right & left rear Coys, with Bn HQ at a position approx 55 yards from the oil wells."

Once on the ground my father's platoon received orders to "establish communications with all companies". My father noted, "rather a tall order for a few experienced men to do."

My father's platoon had not long been settled when virtually out of the jungle came small parties of survivors of the Muar Road action. Suffering from exhaustion, hunger and jungle sores, these small groups had eluded the Japanese, some for up to 9 days with no food or
shelter. After a quick check by the MO and a hearty meal these small groups rejoined their own Companies and prepared for the inevitable.

**Sounds of War**

By this stage of the campaign, the Japanese had made rapid gains and were now preparing for the assault on Singapore itself. The war was now on the doorstep of the 2/29th and my father recounts that first moment for him.

"Then began an uneasy feeling that the Japanese Army and Air Force were making more progress than we anticipated and it was borne out in the extra impetus of training the Battalion was then put to. It was a rush to reorganize as fast as possible and there seemed so many obstacles in lack of stores, kit and time — most essential of all elements. There had been more attention paid by enemy planes to the adjacent oil wells and surrounding areas to prove the fact that they were getting too close to be healthy. It was on one of these occasions that I got the biggest shock of my life. The time was about 1900 hrs and I was sitting outside a tent, talking to some of my platoon. It was a quiet evening with the possibility of being a very bright moonlit night. Shortly, in the distance the sound of a plane became audible and soon we realized that it was flying very low toward our camp, at a high speed. Suddenly, a questioning searchlight from the nearby SL Battery stabbed the air with a beam and caught the plane in its flight. At this time the plane was about 300 feet up and right over us. It swerved and banked very sharply and toward the oil wells some 300-400 yards from my tent. Then came a terrific flash and crashing report as it loosed the bombs over the oil wells. There was a rush for slit trenches fearing that he would turn again and machine gun us, but apparently it was a hit and run raid, as he flew away. We had been utterly deceived, as he appeared to us to be our own plane flying overhead with all landing lights on. The blast of the bomb lifted us off our feet. What a start for our new Bn."

Whilst this incident could be considered minor, the writing was now on the wall. The Japanese were at the Battalion’s doorstep and were about to “kick the door in”.

**The Battalion’s First Blood — Muar Road**

As mentioned previously, the speed by which Japanese Army advanced towards Singapore was not fully appreciated at that time. Exact numbers, dispositions and Armour support was only educated guess work by the Australian High Command, moreover, Major-General Bennett could not have known critical statistics of the Japanese to a degree where a full appreciation of the situation could have been made.

It was in this type of situation that the 2/29th were ordered to hold the Muar-Yong Road for 7 days to prevent Japanese movement towards Singapore. The intention of the Japanese was to clear the Muar-Yong Road, thus securing their advance South directly to Singapore.

As a prelude to this advance, the Japanese attacked Muar from the air on the 11th Jan., '42, and by the 15th were approaching Muar from Malacca to the North.

The Battalion, less D Coy (left to defend the Kahang Aerodrome) were now poised to repel the advancing Japanese who were reportedly only 200 strong and should be repulsed with little difficulty.

Forward elements of the Japanese advanced guard began probing the Battalion’s defensive position, and small exchanges of rifle fire and a certain amount of screaming and yelling took place, but no serious casualties were suffered. The Japanese then proceeded to lay down a heavy mortar barrage, which proved to be extremely accurate with most of the bombs falling in the Battalion’s perimeter. It was here that the Battalion learnt the value of fighting at night with the grenade and the bayonet. Of the 8 Australians wounded that first night, 6 were wounded by the .303, though not seriously.

The Battalion stood to at 5.30 the following morning. Shortly after in the distance could be heard a rumbling sound from the direction of Muar. The rumbling sound accompanied by the whistle of more mortar bombs preceded eleven light tanks coming down the road from Muar. The first wave of tanks were engaged by Anti-Tanks guns from the 2/4th Anti-Tank Regiment, however, it was observed with no small element of disbelief by members of the 2/29th that the Anti-Armour shells went right through the Japanese tanks. This enabled the tanks to penetrate the Battalion’s perimeter, however quick work by the Anti-Tank crews made short work of the tanks once the correct ammunition had been broken out. The picture now was that within the Battalion’s perimeter were numerous Japanese tanks burning fiercely, the Australians..."
picking off the Japanese using the Tommy Gun and hand grenade.

The intensity of the Japanese mortar barrage increased with the advance of their Infantry, moving forward under cover of this barrage. The Japanese were fearless in their advance and took suicidal risks to take up a better fire position from which they could bring down murderous automatic fire into each Company position.

By late afternoon, every Company was pinned down by the Japanese machine guns, mortars and cannon fire from their tanks. The situation became even more perilous by Japanese snipers who began systematically picking off members of the Battalion, and in particular, the officers. In order to report the present situation to Brigade Headquarters accurately, (all wireless communication had been lost to Brigade and runners were being ambushed by snipers), Lt Col Robertson decided to go himself. Riding pillion on a motorcycle, he and his despatch rider raced down the Muar Road, however, the Japanese had erected a road block across the road and as Lt Col Robertson and his rider approached, they were gunned down by the waiting enemy. The despatch rider, although badly wounded managed to turn the bike around and return to Bn HQ with Lt Col Robertson severely wounded clinging on to the back of the bike.

Lt Col Robertson died shortly after, the despatch rider, for his courage received an honourable mention, however, lost his arm from the wounds he received. He was one of the few that were evacuated by hospital ship back to Australia.

Command of the Battalion passed to the Second in Command, Maj S. F. Olliff, who was highly respected and idolised by his men. He had been given the nickname as “The Count” because of his fine qualities not only as a soldier, but as a man among men.

As night fell, the Battalion took stock, loading the wounded into trucks in preparation of running the Japanese road blocks, bringing up extra supplies of grenades and other ammunition. The Japanese then began probing for weak points in the perimeter by clashing their weapons together and shouting, this only served to aid the defenders in throwing grenades or bayoneting a likely target. Several Japanese bodies were recovered, and it was discovered that they were from the Imperial Guards, and as such, were well equipped and wore an olive green uniform. These were definitely not the untrained ill-equipped troops that members of the 2/29th were told they were up against.

The situation the following day now became worse, as the Japanese had brought up 5.9 inch howitzers and began shelling the Battalion’s position with a relentless barrage. The whole position was now becoming untenable, and positive action had to be taken to prevent the entire Battalion being wiped out.

Orders were then received that the 2/29th was to pull back to Bakri, some 5-6 miles south of Muar. As the Battalion straddled the Muar Road, Maj Olliff decided to marshal what forces he had left on one side of the road and move off, A Company leading, followed by BHQ then C Company, with B Company as rearguard. The Companies began to move, and as BHQ crossed the Muar Road, the Japanese raked the road with machine gun fire and killed Maj Olliff together with my father’s friend, Lt Sheldon.

It was now apparent that the enemy had virtually surrounded the Battalion, as the road blocks were now at either end of Muar Road. The Battalion could not go forward nor back to Bakri via the road. Meanwhile, sensing they had their quarry right where they wanted them, the Japanese increased the shelling on the entire area, killing those that were too wounded to be moved, and causing further casualties to those troops caught in the open.

The following, is a transcription taken down by father as told to him by one of the few survivors:

“Just as dawn was approaching, we reached open country, and there endeavoured to sort ourselves out. There were some Indians amongst us and several 2/19th members. All told we totalled approx 140. We formed into a Company and a Platoon and moved off. We travelled for 3 days with very little to eat, mainly rice obtained from the Chinese — and not much sleep. We had large numbers of wounded with us which made the pace slow, but the courage displayed by those men was magnificent — not a murmur. On the Thursday, we were only a few miles from Yong Peng, when suddenly the Malays informed our officer that it was occupied by the enemy. It was then decided (without checking the authenticity of the Malay’s statement) to split into small parties of 6-7 and get through the best way we could. We learned later that at that time, Yong Peng was not taken
— a very bad error on the part of the Organisation — but such is fate.”

The experience of these small groups who made their way to safety would fill a book in itself. Suffice to say, the suffering and torment experienced by these men would have been beyond belief. Some groups were never seen again, and it is presumed that they were caught and executed by members of the Imperial Guards, who were under orders that no prisoners were to be taken alive. This was in retaliation for the death of their Divisional Commander, who had been killed by an artillery barrage laid down by the Australian 65th Battery on the night on January 17.

In reviewing this action, and the heroic exploits of those small bands of soldiers, it is a tragedy, when one considers the lives that were lost due to poor intelligence, and of those that endured during the withdrawal to Base Areas and ultimately, to Singapore, were to die as a prisoner of war in Changi jail, and various stinking camps along the Burma/Thailand railway.

The Epic of Alexandra Hospital — Singapore

The philosophy of the Japanese army of treatment of prisoners and civilians has been well documented in numerous books and articles, and it is not my intention to labour this point, however, the following incident has been recorded by my father, which I feel should now be told.

By February 1942, the Japanese had all but conquered Singapore, and on 14th Feb., were in the outskirts of the city. Shelling of the Singapore garrison was now continuous and with murderous accuracy. The Japanese now approached the Alexandra Hospital, where hundreds of Allied casualties and civilian wounded were housed. This is an account of the Japanese occupation of the hospital:

14th Feb., 1942. During the early morning the water supply was cut off, shelling and air activity became intense, some shells bursting in and around the hospital. These appeared to be mainly mortar bombs with an occasional shot from our arty. The enemy were drawing nearer and approaching the rear of the hospital, from the Syar Rajah Road area. The number of incoming patients had lessened considerably, and there was little or no traffic in the wards. Japs were seen for the first time at 1340 hrs., attacking towards the Sister’s quarters. Jap fighting troops were about to enter the hospital from the rear. Lt Weston went out from the reception room with a white flag in order to indicate the surrender of the hospital. The Japs took no notice of him and Lt Weston was bayonetted to death by the first Jap to enter the hospital. These troops had entered the hospital and ran amok on the ground floor. They were very excitable and jumpy and no amount of either pointing to the Red Cross or shouting the word “hospital” had the slightest effect. The following events occurred at approx the same time.

- One party entered the theatre block, at this time operations were being prepared in the corridor between the Sisters block and the main theatre, this being the best lit and most sheltered place on the floor. The Japs climbed into the corridor and at the same time a shot was fired through the window wounding Pte Lewis in the arm. About 10 Japs came into the corridor and all medical personnel held up their hands. Capt Smiley produced the Red Cross Brassard, but the Japs appeared very excited and took no notice. The Japs then motioned to the staff to move along the corridor, which they did. Then for no apparent reason set about them with bayonets.

  - Lt Rogers was bayonetted to death (twice through the thorax), Capt Parkinson and Pte Lewis also bayonetted to death. A patient on the operating table was bayonetted but struck aside the bayonet, and it hit the cigarette case in his left breast pocket. He was again lunged at and wounded in the left arm. He then pretended to be dead and pushed Pte Sutton who was unarmed, to the ground, calling on the others to remain quiet. The Japs left the corridor after 15 to 20 minutes.

- Another party of Japs entered the wards and ordered the MOs and patients, who could walk, outside the hospital. In one ward, two patients were bayonetted. The Japs went upstairs and gave similar instruction as the other two. These two appeared to be more humane, for they mo-
tioned patients on stretchers to remain behind. Patients and personnel numbering 200 were taken outside, their hands tied behind their backs with slip knots, one length of string being used for groups of 4 or 5 men. Some of the patients could only just hobble, some had only one arm, some were in plaster, and others obviously ill. Many of the seriously ill patients showed signs of great distress, one or two collapsed and had to be revived. This party was walked by a circuitous route to the old quarters where they were herded into rooms 50 to 70 being placed in each room, the sizes of which varied from 9' by 9' to 10' by 12'. Here they were literally jammed, and it took minutes to raise one's hands above one's head. Sitting was impossible and people were forced to urinate against each other. During the night, many died and all suffered severely from thirst and suffocation. Water was promised but never arrived. When dawn came, the Japs were seen to have cases of tinned fruit which they kept to themselves. By the evening shelling was at its maximum and shells were bursting all round. One struck the roof of the building, injuring some of the prisoners and blowing open the doors and windows. When this happened 8 men tried to escape. Some were successful but some were hit by MG fire. Prior to this the Japs had been herding small parties out of sight and the ensuing yells and screams coupled on one occasion with the sight of a Jap soldier returning wiping blood from his bayonet, left little doubt as to their fate. Except for the party which escaped, none of these men were seen again. Capt Allerdyce who could speak a little Jap, Cpl McDonogl and Cpl Wilkins were taken away. Capt Allerdyce was under the impression that he was being taken away as a hostage or that the Japs wanted some wounded attended to. However, he was only seen again that night and for the last time the following morning at the servants quarters where the doomed 200 were imprisoned.

It must be assumed that he and Cpl Wilkins suffered the same fate as the others. The body of Cpl McDonogl was found outside the hospital and would appear to have been killed by shell fire.

A party of Jap soldiers entered the reception room shouting and shrieking at the patients and staff. Sgt Sherrif was bayonetted and died. Another party went into the wards causing injury to the patients. They entered the kitchen and killed Pte Bruce with a Tommy Gun. This party was also shown the Red Cross Brassard but replied by firing and throwing grenades. It is difficult to understand the reason for this barbaric attack on the hospital and investigations were carried out. Rumor has it that a party of Indian Sappers digging in a tunnel in the rear of the hospital had made a run for it when the Japs entered the hospital. At 1600 hrs 40 or 50 people were herded into the corridor and a guard placed over them. Later the guards went away, and investigations showed no signs of Jap troops. The party remained there until dawn. Shelling was heavy on Feb. 15 and a few direct hits were made on the buildings. Japs were using the ground floor and corridors for battle but this did not interfere with the duties of the hospital. At about 1800 hrs the Japs took a party away and led them to a drain where they remained all night. They were given cigarettes and raisins. At about 0800 hrs the Jap looters arrived. At 1000 hrs a Jap medical officer arrived and saluted all our dead. He complimented the staff on the way the patients were being looked after and provided a guard against looters. Feb 16. The Japanese GOC, called and expressed his regret at what had happened and assured the staff that they had nothing further to fear. He told the CO that he was the direct representative of the Emperor and that no higher tribute could be paid to the hospital.

Capitulation — POW Changi Jail

The “Unconditional Surrender” of the Allied Forces in Singapore took place between General Percival, Commander Allied Forces, and General Yamashita of the Imperial Japanese Army at 2200 hrs 15th Feb., 1942. Herein began 3 years 6 months and 6 days of torment, suffering and death for a great many members of the Allied Forces of which my father was one of those who endured those years. My father’s description of life at the hands of the Japanese...
would fill the pages of a good sized book, however, I would like to try and outline the
early days of capture, life on the Burma-Thailand railway and the final release on the sur-
render of the Japanese Army.

On February 17, after the fall of Singapore, my father’s battalion was marched 17 miles to
Selarang Barracks at Changi. Early days were spent establishing a daily routine and ensuring
that all men were aware that although prisoners of war, normal military discipline and orders
were to be followed and enforced. This was done not only to prevent wholesale disorder but
by maintaining a sense of discipline and morale the outlook of the troops was lifted and the
loss of life minimized.

The ensuing months saw my father involved in a variety of work parties. Work mainly con-
sisted of drilling bore holes for latrines, unloading stores and equipment from the wharves
and road repairs. In most cases transport was promised but never arrived, resulting in work
parties marching several miles with no water, little food and then toiling until nightfall in the
blazing sun. This never ending routine lasted for several months, until word spread that a
new camp was to be established to the North and that conditions were considerably better
than Changi.

As a result, about 640 members of the Battalion were nominated to go, my father being one of the 640. This group was known as F Force. On April 19 and 20 this Force left Changi
amid much waving and shouting and with a sense of relief to be away from the monotonous
toil of the work parties. The air of excitement was only tinged with a feeling of uncertainty
of what lay ahead for this group and many others that were to follow.

Transport was by truck and then by rail (steel rice trucks). After approximately a week F Force
reached Bampong in Thailand with most of the Force suffering from aches, bruises and hunger,
most of all, hunger. From now on the satisfaction of relentless hunger pains was to be the
priority.

It was this camp that the Japanese withdrew all transport and the rest of the journey was
made on foot. Some 160 miles later the Force reached Konkoita camp. This march had taken
only 16 days to complete. The Japanese theory was to march at night and rest during the heat
of the day. Fine in theory, however between trying to wash in the cholera infested water and
being called out for work details, the entire Force received very little rest.

The date of arrival at Konkoita was May 10, and the following day the Force was addressed
by the Japanese Commander, Capt Maruyama. This camp was not the site for establishment
of a rest and recreation centre as originally hoped by the Force, but in fact a camp for the
continuation of a railway line South to Thai-
land. The Burma-Thailand railway.

The Battalion members were now nothing but slaves at the hands of the Japanese guards, who
took great delight in prodding the members of my father’s Battalion with the point of the
bayonet or beating with sticks, and in some cases the sword.

A host of new diseases were now being experienced, such as dysentery, malaria, dengue
fever, beri beri and tropical ulcers. Despite these diseases, and the utter exhaustion of the work
parties, the toiling and death never ceased. Even the sick were hounded by the Japanese guards
to return to the rail line, and those that were too ill to even move were put on half rations,
and in some cases no rations. This ensured that death most certainly came in the end, despite
the desperate attempts by members of the Battalion to treat these helpless individuals with
the meagre medical supplies available. My father
recalls that some medicines were made from
roots and berries scrounged from the jungle,
and that many amputations were performed
using knives and jam tin lids as scalpels.

Needless to say, the death rate in these camps was frightening, and to reduce the spread of disease
bodies were burnt in huge funeral pyres. The
stench of the burning bodies only served to
heighten the appalling sub-human living con-
ditions experienced by my father and the other
members of his Battalion.

The job of transporting the huge logs for use
as sleepers and bridging timbers was supple-
mented by Burmese oxen and yaks, however,
even these poor beasts of burden soon fell by
the wayside from overwork and starvation. It
is here that the Australian soldier’s resource-
fulness came to the fore. Small bands of eman-
cipated men crawled into the jungle and slaugh-
tered these beasts and returned to the camp
kitchen with the prized meat. Unfortunately,
the Japanese decided to do a head count of the
yaks, and when it was discovered that several
were missing, the loads pulled by the yaks were
now pulled by my father and others like him.
Despite this additional burden many lives were saved by providing a morsel of meat to supplement their meagre diet of a cup of rice and half a cup of rice water twice daily. It is not surprising that so many died after toiling for 18 hours day-after-day, and then expecting to be capable of maintaining a high level of work on such a sub-standard diet.

The following is an extract of a detailed report prepared by my father as a record of the conditions and events that took place along the various work camps:

"As the health of the men grew worse, the demands of the engineers were more and more difficult to meet, and their treatment of our men while at work became more and more brutal. The work was often beyond what could reasonably be expected of fit men, and it was certainly beyond the strength of our weak men.

It became common for our men to be literally driven with wire whips and bamboo sticks throughout the whole day's work. Hitting with the fist and kicking also occurred frequently throughout the day. It was impossible that the beating was not for disciplinary purposes, but was intended to drive unfit men to efforts beyond their strength.

Many men never saw their camps in daylight for weeks on end, and never had a chance to wash themselves or their clothes. In some camps where the number of fit men fell below the Engineers demands, the Engineers themselves came into the camps and forced POWs out of hospital to work. Except in isolated cases officers were not made to work outside camp, but the Engineers often used the threat that officers would be taken for work if more men were not turned out from hospital.

At Sonkurai, where conditions were probably worse than anywhere else, the IJA Engineer Officer, Lt Abe, himself came into the officers quarters and asking to see six Officers who were most seriously ill (of whom 3 subsequently died) said, "Unless more men are produced for work tomorrow, I will send my soldiers to take these officers out to work". This Engineer Officer was conspicuous at all times in failing to stop brutal treatment of prisoners by his men even if it happened in his presence. Of the 1600 men who originally went to Sonkurai, in May, 1200 are already dead, and 200 more are still in hospital of whom many are not expected to recover.

By July more than half the Force were without boots and this caused a large number of poisoned feet and Trench Foot, from continual work in the wet. Blankets were not issued as promised, clothing issues were negligible and issues of medical supplies were totally inadequate. Bandages and dressings were seldom issued and only in very small quantities. For hundreds of hospital cases, (tropical ulcers), dressings were improvised from banana leaves and bandages from sleeves and legs cut from mens shirts and trousers. Consequently many limbs had to be amputated and many patients died.

It was during this period that several men, sometimes alone, sometimes in groups, disappeared into the jungle. Some probably had the idea of escaping, some undoubtedly left solely so that they may die in the jungle in freedom rather than in captivity of disease, illness and maltreatment. The men on the whole were in despair. The choice in front of them seemed to be death from disease, or never ending toil and brutal treatment at the hands of the Engineers. One party of Officers seeing their men dying and ill around them and in despair of being unable to help them, attempted to escape so as to let the world know what was happening to prisoners. This party failed, as was inevitable. Five perished in the jungle and the remaining four were captured.

From August onwards things improved at Sonkurai, but did not improve much at Kami-Sonkurai. As late as October, the Engineers there were blasting in a quarry just behind the prisoners' hospital in such a way that rocks and stones fell on the hospital huts at each blast. The huts were crammed full of patients many of whom were dying (about 8 a day).

In all camps accommodation was inadequate. Men slept touching each other and as a result, skin infection was 100 per cent throughout the Force. Except at Sonkurai, most of the Officers were as badly off as the men.

The move back to Kanburi took place in Nov. '43, but the men were in such a state 40 died on the train journey and 186 more in the first 3 weeks at Kanburi, in spite of better food and living conditions. It is certain that several hundred men will die in the next month or two from the result of their treatment in Thailand.
In accordance with the terms of the surrender of all Japanese forces signed by His Majesty the Emperor the war has now come to an end. These leaflets contain our instructions to Allied prisoners of war and internees whom we have told to remain quiet where they are. Japanese guards are to ensure that the prisoners get these leaflets and that they are treated with every care and attention. Guards should then withdraw to their own quarters.

Surrender notice dropped by Liberator Bomber over Changi Jail 28 Aug 1945.

It may be thought that some of this report is exaggerated. It is however only the barest outline of period of intense hardship suffered by a party of prisoners of war. If proof is wanted it is surely sufficient to point out the fact that of 7000 prisoners who left Changi in April, now in December 1943, about 3000 are dead, more are in hospital or convalescing of whom hundreds more will die within the next few months from the results of hardships they have undergone.

We know from letters received from England and Australia that it is believed there, that POWs are being well treated by the Jap. If the actual facts regarding Thailand were made known abroad, the news would be treated with indignation and amazement.”

This report that my father prepared is quite extensive and unfortunately I am obliged to only extract excerpts from the report in the cause of brevity. My father’s actual involvement in the construction of the Burma-Thailand rail-

way ended at Kanburi, where he contracted malaria and was hospitalised for some 3 months. I wonder as a person who has never experienced combat or the hardship my father endured, what would be worse. Lying in a stinking hospital with your body racked with malaria or toiling in the broiling sun and being constantly beaten. My father would not comment.

The nightmare of this ordeal was eased somewhat when all work parties were returned to Changi following completion of the railway.

In the early hours of 19 December 1943, the survivors of the Burma-Thailand railway arrived back at Changi after an absence of 9 months in the jungles of Burma and Thailand.

My father recalls that the early part of his return was spent in the hospital still suffering from malaria and a variety of other diseases and sores. However, it did not take long for the Japanese guards to begin forcing the sick and dying into work parties on the wharves and road work. Whilst this work was also tedious,
Home at last. My father (second from the left) with fellow Officers after pay parade in Melbourne 1945.

the conditions and standard of food were considerably improved from the months in the jungle.

By 1945, it became apparent from reports received via the BBC, (many home-made radios were now operating), that the tide of the War had now changed, and rumours were being spread that the War had in fact been won by the Allies.

On 28 August, 1945, a lone Liberator bomber flew over Changi and dropped leaflets announcing the end of hostilities and instructing the Japanese guards to withdraw to their own quarters.

My father described this moment as rather an anticlimax — months and years of suffering death and torment and the next — nothing, no shouting or sirens to mark the end, just stillness and for the first time a sense of relief — the end had come at last to this madness.

**Over — At Last**

My father returned to Australia in October 1945, after 4 years and 3 months absence. His body weight on arrival in Australia was 7 stone compared to 12 stone when he left. When I was younger, I often wondered why my father shunned Japanese people, would not buy anything made in Japan. And why during some nights my mother would cradle my father in her arms as he shivered and perspired and muttered meaningless words — I think I understand now.
A Poem
The following is a poem taken down by my father and is one of many contained in the record.

Malayan Debacle

They fought their way from Genios
They heard the crack from Mortars
The rat tat tat of light MGs
The Diggers from “Down Under”

The little yellow men came on
They infiltrated round us
But still our Aussies cut them down
The Diggers from “Down Under”

The Infantry they copped it hot
But still they battled bravely
And they in turn ambushed the Japs
The Diggers from “Down Under”

We hand it to the gunners
They shelled “Tojos” transport
And every shell that flew across
The Diggers from “Down Under”

Those who maintained supplies
Just how to dynamite a bridge
Those signallers who risked their lives
The Diggers from “Down Under”

That Company at “Muar”
They were told to hold their corner
And many sacrificed their lives
Brave Diggers from “Down Under”

And when the final battle’s fought
We hope the truth is published
And we’ll be welcomed home again
We’re proud to be those Diggers

right down to Singapore
the artilleries mighty roar
from stokers fiercely pour
tough and true

they hardly faltered once
a mighty fighting bunch
with deadly vim and punch
tough and true

right in among the trees
good fighting men are these
and beat them to their knees
tough and true

these lads who sweat and strain
and littered roads with slain
left chaos in its train
tough and true

those engineers who knew
to stop them coming through
no tighter spot they knew
tough and true

who were given up as lost
no matter what the cost
in that colossal frost
tough and true

and were released at last
and red tape days are past
around the family heart
tough and true

Lieutenant Simmons joined the ARES in 1968 in 6RVR and rose to the rank of Warrant Officer, Class 2, as an instructor at OCTU. He received his commission in 1981 and joined 1RVR as Training Officer, a posting which he has held to date.

In civilian life he is a Bank Manager with the National Australia Bank.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Pope

There are various popular myths about the characteristics of the Australian soldier. We all know of the mateship, initiative, disdain for authority and unsurpassed fighting abilities of the Australian soldier which began at Gallipoli and the Western Front, were nurtured and honed in the deserts of North Africa and Tobruk, through the jungles of New Guinea and on to Vietnam.

This myth, much of which is undoubtedly true, has developed a life of its own in that Australians know without doubt that their soldiers will have these qualities. But it is a myth that, like the Melbourne Cup, began naturally and has developed into a national characteristic. If this is the perception of the Australian soldier, what of his commanders? Do Australian commanders have such a clearly different style that it can be said that there is an Australian style of command? It is primarily this question that The Commanders seeks to answer.

But firstly, as a general comment on format and style; the book is well-produced and well laid out, with the greatly appreciated feature of wide margins for reader's notes. It is divided into a series of independent chapters, each concisely recounting the career of one senior commander. However, by so doing, and by electing to have several authors write the biographies, the book suffers from predictable continuity problems and some internal conflict. Thus, in one chapter: General Herring's 'assault on Lae was brilliantly planned and executed', whereas in the next chapter: General Vasey reported to his staff after the initial planning conference that 'they have got a dog's breakfast of a plan to capture Lae'. The planning concept was not changed though some aspects of its execution were altered. So, does General Herring deserve his praise, or should the accolades go to General Vasey for correcting the worst aspects of a faulty plan? Such matters are not resolved.

If the book was intended to be just a series of brief biographies, then no matter, as one could read it as a primer on Australian commanders. But the book seeks to answer questions on the Australian style of command; on how well officers were prepared for high command; and how political direction, organizational structures and entrenched defence policy affected commanders in the field. It is on its ability to answer these questions that The Commanders must be judged.

Unfortunately, the question on style of command is not answered, and indeed in many of the biographies it is not even addressed! Perhaps it is just as well, because as a group the Australian commanders appear to be little different from their allied and enemy contemporaries. Those selected do exhibit an unusually high degree of competence, but this must be expected in a book which has carefully selected its subjects. As for common characteristics among them, such as are expected of the soldiers, there appear to be none. Indeed, the variety of personal styles and characters of the commanders precludes the possibility of any unique Australian style of command arising. Any aberration in behaviour regarded as peculiarly Australian, such as General Vasey's use of 'colourful' language, only fits a preconceived notion of the Australian character. The case for a special style of command is therefore proved by default.

One feature did emerge which interested me. Over time there has been a change in the attitude to Australian defence by commanders. The WWI commanders were not yet 'acclimatized' to Australia as an independent country. They were 'Empire' men, more attuned to British and Empire defence than to that of Australia alone. But then, even during WWII, the Australian nation was under no threat, though our British mentor was.

The WWII section brought to the fore relatively junior officers from WWI — now more independent in outlook. However, I found it somewhat distressing to read once more of their
feuding and concern for position, carrying on personal feuds to the detriment of defence efforts — and that at a time when the nation was under threat. Indeed, the biographies of Generals Blamey and Bennett are particularly interesting in this regard, as they revealed much about the political forces driving the events of that time.

The post-WWII section is brief, describing only three officers, but it is significant because it is the period in which the political and defence machinery still evident today was forged. Not only are the effects evident today, but they are likely to be so for many more years to come.

Even though *The Commanders* fails in its stated purpose, it has many redeeming features which make it a worthwhile purchase. As a series of 'potted biographies', it can be used to gain a quick overview of important Australian commanders. It could be worth buying for this purpose alone.

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*Reviewed by Andre Kuczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.*

The historical foundations of the United States modern intelligence gathering establishment were firmly anchored during World War II, more precisely on 13 July, 1942 when president Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order that created the Office of Strategic Services. Although several clandestine fact finding mechanisms were already operating with varying degrees of success for a period considerably before America's formal entry into the global struggle against the Axis triumverate (such as the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Coordinator of Information); it was only with the formation of the OSS that the nation's contemporary spy network truly came of age.

Bradley F. Smith's very impressive study *The Shadow Warriors* is a critically favorable history of the agency's birth, its operations, and its gradual evolution into the central Intelligence Agency.

The OSS was essentially the eureka inspired idea of Colonel William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, a New York City lawyer, World War I hero and personal friend of FDR whose mercurial character and charismatic influence left "a significant mark on the defense and foreign policies of the United States." (p. 54).

In the years and months leading up to Pearl Harbor, American political and military authorities could not speak of possessing a genuine world wide intelligence network. Slightly more than six months after the spectacular Japanese assault on the pride of the US Pacific Fleet, however, they proudly boasted of conducting an effective campaign of sabotage, guerrilla attacks and other forms of non-traditional warfare that eventually spread to the four corners of the earth. "by the War's end," observes Smith, "no area of the globe, whether belligerent, neutral, or conquered, was immune to 'shadow warfare'." (p. xiii).

The Office of Strategic Services was, in many respects, a curious entity. For the duration of the war, Donovan presided over a large bureaucratic and technical staff swollen with 12,000 members from virtually every walk of life. The odd assortment of made-to-order specialists included Wall Street bankers, acrobats, college professors, movie stars and scientists. OSS agents were given carte blanche to operate anywhere in the world but strictly prohibited from involvement in Latin America — because of an agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation — and the Southwest Pacific where General Douglas MacArthur refused to allow it to operate there, supposedly on account of his profound distrust (and dislike) of the organization's clandestine nature.

The major responsibilities of the OSS fell into three categories: propaganda, to boost or break morale, research and analysis of information concerning all areas vital to American military and strategic interests; and secret intelligence gathering, pertaining to such subjects as spying, radio communications and para-military activities behind enemy lines. Although the first two units performed tasks deemed necessary for the war effort, it was the special intelligence group that unfairly but understandably acquired most of the glamor and drama associated with the OSS.

The accomplishments of the OSS were marginally significant. In Northern Burma, OSS led hit and run guerrillas and killed more than 15,000 enemy troops and turned the jungles
into a hell for the Japanese occupation forces." (p. 194). Beginning in late 1943, OSS teams parachuted into France and the Low Countries where they "rendered especially valuable services" for the Maquis and other local resistance groups (p. 225). Similar activities also regularly took place in other theatres of the European, African and Asian conflict.

Undoubtedly the greatest success story of the OSS occurred in "neutral" Switzerland where mission chief Allen Dulles (later destined to become the first director of the CIA) controlled one of the most fruitful espionage rings of the war, Dulles' agents scooped up German intelligence pearls by the bushel full and their feats were very considerable, especially in penetrating the highest echelons of the German Foreign Office and the Reich Security service while the master spy himself was able to negotiate a secret surrender of all German troops in Northern Italy a week before V-E Day.

Donovan remained at the helm of the OSS until the end of the war but was unable to convince President Harry S. Truman that it had a place in peacetime. On 1 October, 1945, the Office of Strategic Services was legally disbanded only to become re-organized less than two years later under a new name, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Smith ends his study with an assessment of the overall accomplishments made by the OSS. While the contributions of the Office of Strategic Services were noteworthy, the author contends that recent scholarship has grossly inflated the organization's achievements to unwarranted proportions. Although the OSS initiated daring and innovative tactics which strengthened the Allied war machine by weakening the powerful thrusts of the Axis Alliance, it nevertheless behoves the historian of America's World War II experience to recognize that "shadow warfare had only played a significant role as a supplementary instrument of military operations ... and both the story that Hitler won great battles by means of a fifth column and the tale that the OSS went it alone were fables." OSS agents merely "assisted the American armed forces in world War II" and notwithstanding their "best efforts ... no shadow warrior ever found a magic wand and the great power game was always too demanding to allow 'secret shenanigans' to do 'what armies are supposed to do'." (pp. 418, 419).

This new study by Bradley Smith displays the qualities that have distinguished his other important works: an enviable grasp of the relevant literature about the subject under consideration, an unrivalled familiarity with pertinent manuscript sources, an apt eye for the telling anecdote and quotation, a fluent prose, and, above all, sound judgement. The author did not intend to provide a history of the United States during World War II but the book nevertheless makes a significant contribution to that history. The Shadow Warriors constitutes a scholarly epiphany of the highest order.

**DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL AWARDS**

The Chief of the Defence Force has accepted a request from the Board of Management to cease the award for the best original article in each issue of the Defence Force Journal. It has become increasingly difficult to judge articles in order of merit due to the wide variety and high quality of material submitted for publication. Therefore, to be fair to all contributors, in future, no prize will be awarded.