DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL
Defence Force Journal
Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

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Illustrations
Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick, ACT

Photography
D.P.R. Stills Photo Section

Published by the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, for the Department of Defence.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1985
ISSN 0314-1039
RM 82/1097(15) Cat. No. 85 1453 1
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Printed by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne
Physical Distribution Management and Customer Satisfaction Service Levels

Dear Sir,

Physical Distribution Management. A Concept For The Army, by LTCOL D.H. Castle, RACT (DFJ Mar/Apr 1985) demands comment as the proposals, are probably not the most appropriate for Army. My reasons follow:

The term Physical Distribution Management as pointed out by the author is well recognized in commerce; indeed Army representatives attend regular physical distribution discussion groups in the Melbourne area with representatives from industry. What is discussed is as suggested by the author how “to bridge the gap between the producer and the consumer”. It is here that we need to highlight two aspects:

a. “producer” in the military sense is often a non-profit organization such as a government factory or the Army repair service; and

b. the key to customer satisfaction (ie the availability of an item of supply to the consumer) is the probability of an “Item of Supply” being available for operations. (Administration in the Area of Operations — MLW Vol 1, Pam 6, para 913).

Succinctly one cannot draw absolute parallels between Army and commerce as has been attempted by the author, without considering their ultimate objectives; commerce, the probability of creating and maintaining wealth, the military, the probability of having items of supply to successfully conduct military operations. Regrettably the author fails to distinguish this feature in his concept which, it is agreed, would be suitable for a civilian enterprise.

The author identifies from a text book, eight elements of physical distribution — procurement, packaging, unitization, materials handling, storage and warehousing, inventory control, transportation, and documentation and order processing. In discussing these elements a number of comments are necessary:

a. Firstly the author fails to acknowledge the Federal Government policy that the procurement — contracting agency is responsible for all transport costs to the delivery point. This incidentally is most reasonable in that it will ensure maximum customer satisfaction to where the Items of Supply are needed, at a high transport priority and also low transport priority to cater for inter-depot stocking nationally. The Government procurement — contract system which gives such flexibility ought not to be destroyed by transport corps officers suggestions, particularly if such suggestions are not in the customers interest as recent statistical evidence from Scuba (Stock Control Usage Based Army) shows. Furthermore the Government policy is enshrined in the express terms of such contracts, and computer systems can be designed to capture costs if such a management requirement exists for the Army Transport Service.

b. Secondly, packaging and unitization are functions that the Army may wish to pay for in order to reduce defence manpower costs. Again this is a contractual decision not based solely on transportation requirements. The purpose is to satisfy a customer; it is an operational requirement rather than a cost driven requirement.

c. Thirdly the author’s comments on inventory control, particularly SCUBA, contain a number of statements that are not correct. SCUBA is reactive when it operates in its historical automated mode, however SCUBA can be predictive and stock can be earmarked for Capability, Mobilization and Future Requirements if management so direct and provide the necessary financial resources. Additionally by reacting to demand, stock levels can be automatically adjusted, at low transport priority, in time and place in accordance with customer demands.

The majority of the eight elements of Physical Distribution described are not, as suggested in the Article the joint responsibility of the RACT (Royal Australian Corps of Transport) and RAAOC (Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps). Clearly the RAAOC has a much greater responsibility than acknowledged by the author.
Additionally the author fails to consider the RAEME (Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers) which is a major "producer", particularly during operations in the Army concept. The author’s preoccupation with transportation costs, an inadequate consideration of customer satisfaction (or in commerce — customer service level), and the fact that commerce is based on a totally different corporate objective (which incidentally is often influenced by taxation incentives), has led the author down the wrong route. In short, costs are necessarily of a secondary consideration to the operational requirements of the military customer; the probability of availability of the item is and must remain the primary consideration for military operations.

The author explains in little detail his concept of a logistics staff and demonstrates concern with "status" and "conflict of interest". The "tribalism" in the Army will remain unless we remember the one team concept is to support a customer for operations. It is time to develop modern cost-effective complexes under the control of one logistic corps or do away with logistic corps and have career specialists. The West German Army acknowledge the benefits of allocating transportation resources to units and our model of centralizing most transportation resources may not be in the best interests for operations for our authorized capability.

The author uses two quotes:

"One lesson that does emerge is the need to develop in peace, systems and procedures and organizations appropriate to war"  
Paul Hasluck

"A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with these factors, and battles and wars are won only on taking risks”  
Field Marshal Lord Wavell

Clearly the Secretary’s responsibilities in the management of financial resources in the Department do not involve risk taking for operations, or the creation and maintenance of wealth which is a legitimate realistic commercial organizational pursuit. Decisions made by Secretary’s officers are normally based on precedent as distinct from military officers who ought to decide normally on principles. The logistic systems and procedures developed in peacetime for military operations decisions do require careful and urgent research and development as submitted by the author. However, ultimately it remains whether an item of supply is available for operations with a reasonable probability. If policy is to purchase only the bare minimum for Army Activity Requirements and very little for Capability, Mobilization and Future Requirements for operations, it is necessary that military planners and taxpayers are made aware of such action and their potential consequences. Finally, any physical distribution concept that will require massive change at short notice for operations needs to be developed now. It follows that supply systems redeveloped project (SSRP) or logistics systems redeveloped project is the key in providing the automated information which Operations or Logistic staff will need in the future to make risk judgements as suggested by Lord Wavell.

M. BROMET
LtCol
IS THERE AN AUSTRALIAN STYLE OF COMMAND?

By Major Warren Perry, R.L.

In a recently published book, *The Commanders*, the question was asked: "How far can it be said that there is an Australian style of command?". It is not probable that any research papers have been published on this subject hitherto and so the question enjoys at least the appearance of originality. It is not therefore, which can be glibly answered "off the cuff", or in some platitudinous way at question time to an audience of senior officers, after a lecture on say the subject of Training in the Art of Command.

A search for an answer to this question demands a strict observance of that well-worn proverb "Look before you leap", because one cannot venture on the giving of an answer before devoting some mental labour to the antecedent tasks of defining terms and prescribing the nature and scope of the examination. The question can refer to two main areas of Australian activity, namely, style of command in the Civil sector and style of command in the Defence sector. This second division of the subject, which alone concerns us here, divides itself into styles of command in the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force. This division may also be extended to include the ministerial head or heads of these three fighting services. But for convenience this examination will restrict itself, with exceptions in Section iv, to styles of command in the Army. It will therefore exclude a consideration of styles of command at the level of a supreme commander in the field, who may be a Sailor, such as Admiral Lord Mountbatten in SEAC, a Soldier such as General Douglas MacArthur in the SWPA, or Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham in Malaya. The commands of supreme commanders usually consist of Sea, Land and Air forces.

In the Army, command can be viewed from different levels — at the regimental level, at the level of subordinate formation etc., commanders, and at the level of a Commander-in-Chief. These three groups of commanders can be looked at again from two other levels and classified into subordinate commanders and the relatively smaller group of independent commanders. A Commander-in-Chief is usually, but not always, an independent commander, who is responsible direct to his Government. Just as a good minister of state does not always make a good prime minister, so a good subordinate commander does not always make a good independent commander.

The attainment of precision in the use of language, in this examination, can be aided by defining the terms used. The definition of a term is simply a declaration of its meaning and by this act a fruitful source of confusion and misunderstanding is avoided.
The term *commander* has sometimes been invested with a great deal of black magic and it has often been confused with the term *leadership* because some commanders drive and others lead. In reality, however, most commanders are obliged to drive and to lead in proportions which vary according to circumstances. It will serve the purpose of this article therefore to regard commanding and leading as synonymous terms. A commander in civil language is nothing more nor less than a Manager, a Lieutenant-Colonel L.F. Urwick has defined the term "managing" as getting things done with and through people. The commander of an infantry battalion is the manager of the Battalion and he is normally responsible to the commander of an infantry brigade. Likewise, the commander of an infantry brigade is the manager of his brigade. A Commander-in-Chief is the general manager at head office of the land forces which he commands and, like any other general manager, he exercises his powers of command through his subordinate managers, down the chain of command, to the first upwards link in that chain, the section commander of an infantry battalion. By custom, commanders above the regimental level are normally referred to as higher commanders. When analysing this term commander attention should never be deflected from the fact that a commander, and especially at the higher levels, is a man of many parts, and it is as such that he is judged in history. His responsibilities are not therefore restricted exclusively to the conduct of military operations in the field on the day of battle, although this is the picture portrayed by some writers of military history. A commander at any level, apart from his administrative and training responsibilities before battle and his tactical responsibilities during military operations, should be skilled in communicating his objectives and his plans for their attainment to subordinates, to colleagues, and to superiors; he should be able to arouse their interest in them; and he must gain their support for them if he is to produce good results. His success or failure in doing all these things, other things being equal, will be greatly influenced by his style of command which means no more and no less than the manner in which he discharges his duties and the manner in which he conducts himself in his relations with other people up and down the chain of command. Two features of the style of Field-Marshal Count von Moltke were: first, he refrained from issuing any but essential orders; and second, he did not interfere with the tactical arrangements of subordinate commanders who had to execute orders. Marshal Foch's style of command in 1914, to take a later example, was permeated with the doctrine of the "offensive spirit". It was the doctrine of the French Army at that time and it blinded Foch and others to the fact that French troops, imbued with a strong offensive spirit and armed with rifles and bayonets, were no match for the Germans' artillery and machine guns. So Foch's style of command in 1914 led to excessive French losses in men and material. But experience gradually taught him that frontal attacks, regardless of the material forces of the enemy, were futile and too costly.

Differences in the styles of command of two commanders at the level of a Scottish battalion, is well illustrated in James Kennaway's novel, *Tunes of Glory*. One was an acting C.O. of the Battalion and an ex-ranker. His replacement as the C.O. had come up the "pukka" way from Sandhurst and staff appointments at the War Office in Whitehall. Their scales of values were different; their methods of doing things were different; and their respective tastes and interests culturally touched at few if any points.

Style in command has many features and one is that which draws the line between the outstanding commander and the ordinary "run of the mill" commander of the profession of arms whose only qualifications are those which ordinary observation, routine training and experience, and average intelligence confer. A commander with style is outstanding because he does not concern himself with irrelevancies and so he does not multiply activities, which have little or no connection with the solution of the problems which arise out of his daily tasks. He does not, to use a cliche, use a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

The term *Style* is not a scientific concept. It is not a substance which can be weighed on scales or measured with a ruler. Nor can it be proved to be correct in a particular instance, as one can prove the correctness of a mathematical problem. Nevertheless, Style can be observed to express itself in a variety of situations. Ben Jonson said: "A strict and succinct style is that, where you can take away nothing without loss, and that loss will be manifest". *The Australian* dated 19 November 1969 referred to "the Gorton style of Government"; Samuel
Butler said: “A man’s style in any art should be like his dress — it should attract as little attention as possible”. The Style Manual, published by the Australian Government Publishing service, has pointed out in a striking way that: “Although different styles are current, and none need be said to be wrong — December 25th is no less Christmas Day than 25 December — different styles in the one publication produce incongruities which irritate the observant reader”. In his Foreword to John Hetherington’s Blarney, Sir Robert Menzies said: “The power of command is a faculty hard to define but impossible to mistake when you meet it.”

Style may be spoken of in the same terms. It is hard to analyse or define, but it is, too, impossible to mistake when you see it.

The styles practised by various commanders may be studied by observation or in the evidence of history in respect of deceased commanders. The results of such study may be compared and contrasted; deductions may be made from these comparisons and contrasts; and the results of these deductions can be adopted for training purposes. Moreover, the validity of these comparisons and contrasts in style will depend on a precise and fixed meaning being attached to the term style and all its uses as a quality in the art of command. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives as one of its many definitions of Style the following one: “The manner of executing a task or of performing an action or an operation”. Because of its simplicity and its clarity this definition is a suitable one to adopt for the purposes of this article.

Two outstanding commanders in history, but with widely different styles, are Washington of American War of Independence fame and Grant who gained fame in the later American Civil War.

They provide a good starting point for a study of styles of command. Washington, an impressive officer in manner and appearance and with a magnetic personality, was a predominantly emotional commander. It has been said that: “All the state papers which are traceable directly to his hand are expressions of emotion.” He combined lofty sentiments with deep feelings for the welfare of his troops. He was not a master of the European style of warfare, but in the course of his operational experience, he showed a capacity to learn from mistakes and so, unlike Frederick the Great’s mules, to benefit from experience.

General Ulysses S. Grant was a distinguished commander of a later epoch in the history of his country who, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller has pointed out, was one of those inscrutably simple men, of a kind who appear from time to time in history, and who are unaware of their own greatness; he sought no fame, yet “he set fire to an epoch” although “he remains uncanonical” in the Pantheon of War. Grant’s style of command differed widely from that of Washington; he was a strict disciplinarian and although he was not popular with troops, they respected him; and although, like Washington, he made mistakes, he seems rarely to have repeated them. His manner was less polished and his appearance less immaculate than was the case with Washington; and unlike Washington he rarely, if ever, displayed any emotion in his behaviour. It has been said that during the ebb and flow of a battle his pulse rate, however great the issues at stake were, neither rose nor fell. In an analysis of the art of command a distinction should be made between the meaning of style and the meaning of skill. A commander may have skill without style but he cannot have style without skill. Skill means having the knowledge of how to do something and also the ability to do it. There are of course varying gradations of skill. In William Hazlitt’s brilliant essay on art and skill entitled “The Indian Jugglers” he described the style and skill of the famous fives-player, John Cavanagh, by saying:

His style of play was as remarkable as his power of execution, he had no affectation, no trifling. He did not throw away the game to show off an attitude, or try an experiment. He was a fine, sensible, manly player, who did what he could, but that was more than anyone else could even affect to do.

Style, it was said earlier, manifests itself in many ways. In retail shopping, before the use of plastic bags and “sticky tape”, I have observed the varying styles of shop assistants in wrapping up parcels and tying them up with string. Differences in style, in even this simple operation, were often conspicuous. One assistant could wrap up parcels quicker and more neatly than another, other things being equal, because of a difference in style.

The term Style may be looked at more closely, at this point, by examining the views of some of its specialists in order to get a firmer and
clearer impression of its distinguishing features. A good starting point for this task is Professor Walter Raleigh’s book entitled Style which he opened by saying:

Style, the Latin name for an iron pen, has come to designate the art that handles, with ever fresh vitality and wary alacrity, the fluid elements of speech.

Here the author’s own style is questionable for the sentence is a mixture of a literary flourish and an attempt to convey a piece of information. It can be interpreted to mean, however, that the author regards Style as an expression of the art of doing something. Elsewhere, he pointed out too that style is an element of “the whole range of the activities of man” and that these activities included “architecture and sculpture, painting and music, dancing, playing and cricket.” But Professor Raleigh did not refer, as he might well have done in this context, to style in the art of command in the profession of arms. Towards the end of his book, Professor Raleigh commented on the teaching of style and he said, dogmatically, that “style cannot be taught.” But as he progressed with his explanation he relented somewhat and said: “Imitation of the masters, or of some one chosen master . . . have their uses, not to be belittled.” But he then paused to issue a warning order to the effect that these uses also “have their dangers”, because “The greater part of what is called the teaching of style must always be negative, bad habits may be broken down, old malpractices prohibited.” Elsewhere he mentioned that: “The formal attempt to impart good style is like the melancholy task of the chosen master . . . have their uses, not to be belittled.” But he then paused to issue a warning order to the effect that these uses also “have their dangers”, because “The greater part of what is called the teaching of style must always be negative, bad habits may be broken down, old malpractices prohibited.” Elsewhere he mentioned that: “The formal attempt to impart good style is like the melancholy task of the teacher of gesture and oratory: some palpable faults are soon corrected; and, for the rest, a few conspicuous mannerisms, a few theatrical postures not truly expressive, and a high tragical strut, are all that can be imparted.” Professor Raleigh agreed with the Roman teachers of Rhetoric that “to be a good orator, it is first of all necessary to be a good man” because “Good style is the greatest of revealers, — it lays bare the soul” and later, as if to give emphasis to this last remark he added that “All style is gesture, the gesture of the mind and of the soul.”

Later, in 1955, Mr F.L. Lucas had a book published also entitled Style. It consisted of a course of largely re-written lectures on Style which he had delivered earlier in the University of Cambridge. In its first chapter, entitled “The Value of Style”, he examined the relationship between Style and Criticism. Although we are not concerned here with Criticism, officers are in fact concerned with it, in the course of duty, in a variety of forms. It may be useful therefore to digress for a few moments to look at this term. Lucas said “Criticism is not a science whose elements can be mass-taught to adolescents — it is a difficult art, at which even adults are seldom a notable success.” Most readers will be able to recall “Criticalisms” they have attended, after having spent a day or more in the field on training exercises of one kind or another, where the styles of the directing staff handing out the criticism, varied widely perhaps from constructive to destructive. But to return to Mr Lucas’ book on Style. After pointing out that it is harder to create . . . than to criticise he illustrated this difference by referring to the following example in military history:

We can all criticise Napoleon’s folly in lingering so late into the autumn at Moscow; but how many of us would ever have got there? I conclude not that we should fear to criticise frankly, but that it might often be done with rather more modesty by those who have created nothing themselves. (p.25)

In another chapter of this book, headed “The Foundation of Style — Character”, Lucas confirmed, in effect, what Professor Raleigh had said earlier, when he said “the problems of style . . . are really problems of personality” and that “Style . . . is a means by which a human being gains contact with others; it is personality clothed in words, character embodied in speech”. All this, in a nutshell, means that Style, in the exercising of command, is an expression of the personality of the commander. Although personality is a difficult word to describe and to define it is one that is bound up with any consideration of Style which forms the subject matter of this article. It is worth noting therefore what the Earl of Birkenhead said of it in his essay “Lord Esher and Lord Kitchener”; “Personality, that mysterious complex of qualities whose citadel is never stormed by industry alone, and without whose gates brilliancy has so often clamoured in vain.”

In the last paragraph of this chapter on “The Foundation of Style — Character”, the author asked the pertinent question: “But if character is important for style, what characteristics are most important?” He said in his answer that he believed that there were “several human
qualities” that “men have generally agreed to value” and, in naming some of these qualities, he included those of good manners and courtesy, good humour and gaiety, and good sense and sincerity. Although these qualities are not scientific concepts, their presence or absence in the style of a commander can be readily observed, for all practical purposes, by his colleagues, his subordinates, and his superiors. A high-handed commander, whose style is characterised by bad manners, abruptness and want of courtesy towards others, is easily recognised.

Most readers of this article will probably agree that those features of style, to which Professor Raleigh and Mr Lucas have drawn attention, are valid characteristics of style to adopt in practising the art of command. It may surprise some readers to learn, however, that these two authors were concerned in their books not with practising the art of command, but with practising the arts of writing and speaking. Nevertheless, these observations on Style by Professor Raleigh and Mr Lucas may serve as useful guides to present-day officers when developing their own styles of command. A third writer, who may now be introduced, is Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933). She looked at Style from the point of view of an Administrator, for she was herself a distinguished American scholar and teacher of Administration. In a discussion of Business Management 17 as a profession, Miss Follett said:

There is a word that means a great deal to me; I wonder if it does to you. That is “Style”. Whatever a man does, whether he is a statesman or an artisan, whether he is a poet or a tennis player, we like his activity to have the distinction of something we call style.

But Miss Follett added that style was “a difficult thing to define” and, in her attempt to explain and to define the term, she said:

I have seen it defined variously as adapting form to material. As calculation of means to end, as restraint, as that which is opposed to all that is sloppy and bungling, the performance of an act without waste. Others speak of style as broad design, noble proportion. A manager’s job performed with style would have all these characteristics.

It will be readily noted that Miss Follett brings the concept of Style in these two quotations closer still to the requirements of military training in the art of command. She refers here to style in adapting design, quantitatively speaking presumably, to the material available, of style involved in adapting means to ends, and of a style which attains its object while eliminating waste. Miss Follett then mentioned instances of her searches for style and then, in the specific instance of playing polo, she said:

I have looked for style in literature and art, games and statesmanship. It is interesting to watch polo from this point of view. In all games of polo I have seen, the best players have usually had style: no waste of muscle, calculation of means to end, yes, and proportion and design, too. Again, watch a good actor when his acting has the distinction of style 18. There is restraint, calculation of means to end, no waste of energy.

This third explanation of Style by Miss Follett pays strict regard militarily speaking, to the requirements of that principle of war known as Economy of Force.

Professor A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947), a Mathematician and Philosopher and sometime Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University, has also examined this subject of Style in his book, The Aims of Education and other Essays, (pp.19-21). There he said “the most austere of all mental qualities” is “the sense for style”. He then elaborated on this “sense for style” by saying:

It is an aesthetic sense, based on admiration for the direct attainment of a foreseen end, simply and without waste. Style in art, style in literature, style in science, style in logic, style in practical execution have fundamentally the same aesthetic qualities, namely, attainment and restraint.

In referring to “the utility of education” he said “Style in its finest sense, is the last acquirement of the educated mind; it is also the most useful”. He believed of style that:

It pervades the whole being. The administrator with a sense for style hates waste; the engineer with a sense for style economises his material; the artisan with a sense for style prefers good work.”

Professor Whitehead pointed out too that “Style is the fashioning of power” and “the restraining of power”. He then answered the question, “Where, then, does style help?”, by saying:

With style the end is attained without side issues, without raising undesirable inflam­mations. With style you attain your end and
nothing but your end. With style the effect of your activity is calculable. . . . With style your power is increased, for your mind is not distracted with irrelevancies and you are more likely to attain your object.

Although Professor Whitehead does not identify Style in these quotations with a neat definition, he does point out clearly what style can do. He provides in this way therefore useful everyday texts for officers intent on improving their style in the art of command.

However, improvements in style involves more than the passive act or reading studies on Style. This reading must be followed by changes for the better in behavioural characteristics. There is a style in drill, which one can observe by watching various regiments at say Guard-mounting ceremonies or at demonstrations of Gun Drill by detachments of various batteries of artillery regiments; there are styles to be observed at battery positions in the shooting of batteries; and there are styles to be observed in conducting administration in its various aspects at the headquarters of say battalions and at the headquarters of field formations at various levels.

In that best-seller of an earlier era entitled The Nation in Arms by Field-Marshal Baron von der Goltz, there is a chapter, useful to study even today on “The Command of Armies”. In it the author examines what he describes as “the courage to take responsibility” which originates, he said, in a “nobility of mind”. His discussion on this matter can be linked with Mr F.L. Lucas’ statement that: “Character . . . is the first thing to think about in style” (Style, p.67). The Field-Marshal said of this “nobility of mind” that: “It gives that calm tranquility upon which excitement breaks as a ship against a rock at sea; it provides an even balance of mind, diffusing a comforting effect, like an electric current, over the whole army” (pp. 32-3) and “it inspires confidence throughout the whole army from the private soldier to the general commanding” (p.33). These features in a commander distinguish his style of command from that of other commanders who lack them.

I once witnessed an Australian corps commander “tick off” a Brigadier on a roadway in an operational area. It was a most devastating scene for the Brigadier. But in doing it the corps commander stood on slightly higher ground than the Brigadier; he remained in perfect control of himself emotionally; and he did not raise his voice above normal conversational level. This was the corps commander’s style. His effectiveness on this occasion would have been greatly reduced if he had bellowed, raved and ranted at the Brigadier.

The point has now been reached, in this examination of style in exercising the art of command, where it may be useful to take a look at the styles of command of a flag officer of the Royal Navy, a general officer of the Royal Prussian Army, and an Australian War Minister.

In Commander Geoffrey L. Lowis’ book, Fabulous Admirals and some Naval Fragments, there is a brilliant personality sketch of Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Donald Kelly (1871-1936) and it illustrates well his style of command. When the Mutiny at Invergordon occurred in 1931 “Joe” Kelly — neither he nor any one else used his baptismal name — was about to retire he was unexpectedly appointed to command the Home Fleet to restore its morale. “He was”, Commander Lowis said, “the perfect choice, for Joe was the rugged sailor, much liked by the men and the officers too.” He was always willing “to indulge in a bit of window dressing” to help along a good cause and “he was genuinely interested in the welfare of his men.” Just as other officers specialised in Gunnery, Signals or Torpedoes, he specialised in Personnel. His interest extended to officers also. When the half-yearly promotions to Captain and Commander were published he sent out “sheaves of letters and signals” to those who were promoted. On the other hand this born leader of men “insisted on taut discipline, smart boats, clean ships, and well-dressed sailors — things that the men appreciated too” and he believed “that a joke a day kept the willies away”.

When “Joe” Kelly reached Invergordon to deal with the mutiny, his personality and style of command solved the problem. He visited every ship in the Fleet; he addressed the company of each ship; and “he spoke to the sailors in a language they understood.” There was nothing about “Joe” Kelly that was either profound or subtle. He drove his wit home with a bludgeon, “but is was just the right medicine.” He made the sailors laugh; he made them feel ashamed; and he made them understand that “there was to be no more nonsense.”
He took the sailors into his confidence by saying:

You know, when this trouble blew up, the Admiralty looked round for an Admiral with a good record. They had none. So they said they’d have one with a bloody awful record, and that’s why I’m here. Now take a look at me — I know I’m no oil painting — but take a good look, so that when we see each other ashore you won’t say “Who’s that funny old bugger over there?” (p.240).

The top operational post in the Royal Navy in Joe Kelly’s time was that of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty but he never held it. The post with “perhaps the most honour” however was that of C-in-C, Portsmouth, and he occupied that post for the last two years of his service. On the last day of his service he was promoted to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet. It gave him “the enormous satisfaction of seeing his Union Flag flying at Admiralty House.” Those who had known him as a young Sub-Lieutenant, “always near the bottom of the class”, would never have believed that he had the brains to attain the highest rank in the Royal Navy. He did have, however, “what was wanted at a critical time — personality” with which he could reach a man’s heart”. This is how he did it:

Joe Kelly tried to model himself on the great Lord St Vincent with whom he had some physical resemblance, being well over six foot, with a great black jowl jutting out till it almost met the huge hooked nose. He was three years older than his brother, Howard, and quite different in temperament. While Howard was reading his books, Joe was boxing his way to a heavy-weight championship. While Howard’s sarcasm was alienating his shipmates, Joe bubbled over with good fellowship, a trait that he took with him to the very top of the tree. While Howard dressed immaculately, Joe chucked on anything handy. He had none of Howard’s aura, but Howard had none of his bonhomie. What both the brothers did have was personality.

The second example to examine for style in the art of command is Field-Marshal Count von Schlieffen (1833-1913). Strictly speaking his main work was done not as a commander but as a staff officer. When he became Chief of the General Staff of the Royal Prussian Army in 1891, he was no stranger to the Great General staff in Berlin for he had served there in other appointments in earlier times. The American historian, H.A. De Weerd, said that, when Count von Schlieffen succeeded Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee (1832-1904) as Chief of the General Staff of the Royal Prussian Army, in 1891:

He was now at the summit of his power. Self-possessed, aristocratic, and soldierly, he appeared to combine the qualities of a Guards’ officer and philosopher. No one on the staff was left in doubt about the standard of work he required. Woe to the “stuffed shirt” or dilettante, who tried to “get by” Schlieffen with a superficial knowledge of the work at hand. Officers left his room breathless from his reprimands. “Colonel, you made the same mistake two years ago”, he might say. Playing with a paper knife, he would listen to a report with half-closed eyes. At the slightest inaccuracy, he would rasp out a correction and prove the officer wrong on the spot. The range of his precise knowledge was disconcerting.

Count von Schlieffen could speak authoritatively on a wide range of subjects — on the characteristics of the French mountain artillery, on the organisation of a Russian infantry division, on the training of the Italian Alpine troops and many other subjects. He was present at an inter-departmental conference in Berlin, during the Moroccan Crisis of 1905, at which an official of the German Foreign Office spoke. De Weerd said of this official that:

He mentioned the distance between two rather unimportant towns in Morocco as being 150 kilometres. Instantly, but courteously, Schlieffen corrected him. The distance was 130 kilometres. Irritated, the Foreign Office expert called for large scale maps — which only proved Schlieffen right. A matter of 20 kilometres might seem little to a diplomat, but to Schlieffen it meant a day’s march with all its problems of transport and supply.

Schlieffen’s professional life had been restricted to the study and practice of the strictly military problems of the German Army. He differed in this respect from his predecessor, Field-Marshal Count von Moltke (1800-91) who was an officer with a wider outlook and a higher vision. Moltke, while in no sense a “political
general”, had a profound knowledge of the problems of politics in so far as they affected the Army and he understood clearly the need and the purpose of co-operation between the Soldier and the Statesman, despite his conflicts with Bismarck. Schlieffen, on the other hand, held the belief that as a soldier the discussion of political issues lay beyond his province; and he regarded war as a matter of military operations, if not exclusively then almost exclusively.

Another factor in the life of Schlieffen is that his place in history rests on his work in the German Army in peacetime, after the close of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Sir Basil Liddell Hart said Schlieffen’s “grasp of strategy was broad but shallow, more mathematical than psychological” and “his lack of understanding of the wider political, economic and moral factors which are inseparable from military factors on the higher plane of strategy that is aptly termed grand strategy”. These deficiencies in Schlieffen’s general education and in his military training were not uncommon in his time, nor were they peculiar to the German Army. But they are not relevant to the task here which is to study the style of Schlieffen in the execution of his official duties.

The features of his style and personality were many and varied. His memory was said to have been unfailing; his lectures and his criticisms and field exercises were delivered without notes; and his style, in both oral and in written communications, were characterised by brilliance and clarity. He wrote the Introduction, dated 2 January 1905, to the fifth edition of Clausewitz’ *Von Kriege*.

Field-Marshal Count von Schlieffen relinquished the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Royal Prussian Army on the last day of December 1905 and he was succeeded the following day by General von Moltke, a nephew of Field-Marshal Count von Moltke. In retirement Schlieffen’s interest in his profession did not wane. He died at his residence in Berlin, the city in which he was born, on Saturday 4 January 1913. His funeral took place in Berlin on Wednesday afternoon 8 January 1913. His death occurred, like that of Scharnhorst (1755-1813) a hundred years earlier, on the eve of grave decisions and momentous events.

The third example to illustrate style in command is Senator Sir George Foster Pearce (1870-1952) who belongs in history to the ranks of Australia’s War Ministers. Australians, although attracted by martial music and drawn to demonstrations of military pageantry, as much as the people of other countries, seldom even pretend to take an intelligent interest in either their armed forces or in their war ministers who play a responsible and indispensable part in the operating of the nation’s machinery of war.

During the 83 years that have passed since Federation in 1901, Australia’s War Ministers have been designated officially, for most of that time, Minister for Defence. Most of these Ministers during that time have come and gone largely unnoticed, for relatively few have left any mark on their Department. Some of these ministers, it seems, had no genuine interest in Defence matters, either politically or administratively, and they regarded the Defence portfolio as merely a stepping stone to something different and better in the Ministry to which they belonged. This attitude has been unfortunate not only for the Department of Defence but also, for Australia.

Senator Pearce began his parliamentary career before Federation in the Parliament of the Colony of Western Australia. But after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 he entered the first Federal Parliament as a Senator for the State of Western Australia. He was to remain in the Senate until he retired from it in 1938. Today he ranks as the longest serving and the most outstanding Minister for Defence in Australia’s history.

What made this self-educated man, with little, if any, formal education, become an outstanding Minister of Defence? By his tenacity and his personal industry and by grasping his opportunities, he became a well-informed and sagacious Minister of the “no nonsense” type who insisted on decisions once made, except in very special instances, being executed. He gave direction to his Department; he controlled it firmly and justly; and he re-organised it to convert it from a peacetime organisation into a wartime one to enable it to cope more effectively with its wartime tasks. His place in history shows him to have been associated, as Minister of Defence, with many of the nation’s major defence developments and reforms of his time. These included the introduction of the General Staff System in 1909, the opening of the Royal Military College at Duntroon in 1911 and of the Small Arms Factory at Lithgow in 1912.
The introduction of a Universal Training Scheme in Australia in 1911 at the Cadet level and in 1912 at the CMF level.

When the War of 1914-18 began in August 1914, Pearce was sitting on the Opposition Benches in the Federal Parliament. But about six weeks later, on 17 September 1914 at the age of 44 years, he became again Minister for Defence in the Third Fisher Ministry. He was to retain this portfolio until 21 December 1921. It was during this period, which included for all practical purposes the whole of the War of 1914-18 and the immediate post-war era with its problems of demobilisation and the reconstruction of the post-war Defence forces, that he reached the zenith of his parliamentary career.

Pearce, as Minister of Defence, had two different and sometimes conflicting roles. He represented the Government in Parliament as the spokesman and advocate and defender of its Defence policy. In addition he was the executive head of the Department of Defence and in this way he exercised his powers of command as an Administrator. Not all Australian Ministers of State have seen themselves clearly in this second role. They have considered themselves rather as occasional visitors to their Departments where often their executive powers were gradually usurped by their permanent heads. Ministers sometimes perform badly as Departmental heads and some made little, if any, attempt to shine in this role. Neither Disraeli nor Gladstone added anything to his stature as a statesman by his work as a Departmental administrator. Senator Pearce, on the other hand, applied himself diligently from the outset to the task of mastering these two aspects of his role as a Minister.

Senator Pearce was a tall man, he spoke quietly, but with clarity and brevity, and his manner was courteous. There was nothing flamboyant in his appearance or histrionic in his behaviour. He was not an orator in the sense that Holman, Hughes or Menzies was. He based his arguments on facts; he presented a case to his audience logically and with a strict regard for probity and economy of words. It was not his style to disguise the absence of substance in a case by resorting to emotional appeals. Nor did he evade responsibility by resorting to ambiguous language. His decisions on Departmental files will be found to be brief, crystal clear in meaning, and free from the slightest traces of any deliberate ambiguity. These decisions moreover were usually legibly written in his own handwriting. When reading them I sometimes wondered, if he had written them late at night, after Parliament had closed down for the day and when most people were asleep.

Senator Pearce's record, as a Minister of Defence, is now a matter of history. His status in public life rested on the firm foundations of devotion to duty, integrity and sincerity — all qualities which cannot be counterfeited. His style, that is his manner of discharging his duties, can be seen in the following words by Brigadier Geoffrey Drake Brockman: "Sir George Pearce was in harness right to the end of World War II. In Melbourne he presided with distinction over the Business Board of Administration. This Board advised the Government with regard to finance on all major service expenditure. As Director of Fortifications and Works, I frequently stated the Army case for large construction undertakings to this Board. Sir George, a man of charm, introduced a friendly atmosphere to the Board Room. Our last meeting was just prior to my return to civil life, for the second time, in 1944. I attended a Board Meeting by special invitation. Sir George, in a very gracious speech, thanked me for my co-operation."" Pearce led the Australian component of the British Empire Delegation to the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference which was held in Washington from November 1921 to February 1922. There he earned high praise for his work at this Conference from the veteran British statesman, Mr A.J. Balfour, who led the British Empire Delegation. Viscount Bruce of Melbourne said: "The late Lord Balfour once said to me that he regarded George Pearce as the greatest natural statesman he had ever met." Viscount Bruce agreed with this opinion of Lord Balfour and to which he also added his own testimony by saying in 1951: "For very nearly thirty years I have been associated with great affairs. During this time I have met a great number of the foremost political figures on the national and international stage. With many of them I have been privileged to work. I regard George Pearce as the wisest and most courageous counsellor of them all."

In this article on Style in the Art of Command it is appropriate that its last words on Senator Pearce should be about his administrative style as a Minister of State. This style was, in a nutshell, characterised by "animated modera-
tion”. Walter Bagehot described this style as “a certain combination of energy of mind and balance of mind” and this combination, he said, “was hard to attain and harder to keep”. But today, in looking back over the arduous tasks with which Senator Pearce had to cope in his public life, especially as Minister of Defence during the War of 1914-18 and as Chairman of the Business Board of Administration in the Department of Defence during the War of 1939-45, it can be seen that he attained and maintained this “balance” and if any one thing can be pointed to as the key to his success it is this “balance”.

The object of this exploratory article has been to open up the subject of Style in the Art of Command for further discussion and development. More research work will need to be published on the subject before the question, “How far can it be said that there is an Australian style of command?”, can be answered in any intellectually satisfying way.

Historically speaking, it may be that it is somewhat early to attempt to answer this question, except in a provisional way. It may be possible to discern trends which in the course of time may become more distinct. On the other hand, styles of command in the Army are a reflection of the social conditions of the nation and these conditions are in a continuous state of change. It is in this respect that a non-regular officer, such as Monash, may be better qualified to gauge these social conditions than a regular officer, who usually lives, relatively speaking, a more monastic-like life within a strictly military society. The British regular officer during the War of 1914-18 probably never adapted himself to the fact that the Other Ranks of the new armies were different in most cases, intellectually and socially, from the Other Ranks of the pre-war British Regular Army and therefore they needed a different kind of discipline and a different style of command to get the best out of them. The failure to recognise these factors may explain also why some British officers had troubles when trying to handle troops, individually, of the 1st AIF.

Nevertheless, however one may judge the present situation in this matter of style in command, two things can be said with assurance. First, any Australian style of command, which may emerge now or in the future, will be something over and above the total product of the personalities of each of its individual commanders. Second, each individual personality will be fashioned, modified, and developed by a combination of three strong and persistent forces — those of general education, military training and the examples set by all officers of the Army and especially those set by its higher commanders.

NOTES
3. This Defence sector should include Civil officers but for reasons of space they are not discussed here. The roles of Civil officers in preparations for war and in the conduct of war are usually ignored by Australian historians. An outstanding instance of importance is that “grey eminence”, Sir Frederick Shedden, KCMG, OBE, idc (1893-1971), who was the Secretary of the Department of Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia from 1937 to 1956.
4. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham’s command in Malaya was just before the advent of the supreme commander and so he did not bear that title and he commanded land and air forces but not naval forces.
5. For an analysis of Leadership see L.F. Urwick’s Leadership in the Twentieth Century. Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, London, 1957. Its study will show that good commanders and good leaders have common qualities and qualifications.
6. Although the terms Commander and Leader, and Command and Leadership, are regarded in this paper as synonymous terms see also Roger Falk, The Business of Management. Penguin Books, 1961, p.27, where Field-Marshal Lord Slim makes a distinction between Leadership and Management.
15. Ibid, p.127.
16. The terms “character” and “personality” are used in this paper as synonymous terms.
18. For a comment on how stars of the stage attain this style by systematic attention to trifles, see Herbert Casson, How to get things done, Angus and Robertson Ltd, Sydney, 1939, p.119. This system would be useful in training detachments in Gun Drill in the Artillery.


23. The Hohenzollern German Empire (1871-1919) did not have an Imperial General Staff of the German Army. The functions of such a staff were performed by the General Staff of the Royal Prussian Army in addition to its own duties in the Royal Prussian Army.


DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL AWARDS

The Chief of the Defence Force has accepted a request from the Board of Management to cease the award for the best original article in each issue of the Defence Force Journal. It has become increasingly difficult to judge articles in order of merit due to the wide variety and high quality of material submitted for publication. Therefore, to be fair to all contributors, in future, no prize will be awarded.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

The Iran-Iraq war. Sterner, Michael Foreign Affairs; Fall 84: 128-143 Discusses the developments in the Gulf war over the past four years, including Soviet and American intervention.

The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R. Yankelovich, Daniel: Doble, John Foreign Affairs; Fall 84: 33-46 The American people are now psychologically prepared to take a giant step toward real arms reductions, between the US and the Soviet Union. Credibility Restored. Air Force Magazine; Nov 84: 98 + (1lp) This article is based on a policy paper titled “Force Modernisation and R&D” adapted by the AFA’s Annual National convention. Topics covered include: Economics and Efficiencies, total Force, Nuclear Forces, Strategic Defence, Force Projection and Space.


Challenging the Atlantic Alliance: The Development of a Resource Strategy. Abshire, David M. Signal; Oct 84: 23 + (6p) There are several obstacles to Allied arms co-operation—the sheer size of the US defense effort, concern over the technology leaks, different relations between government and industry, and different perceptions of the threat.

The Ultimate Defense. Valley, Bruce L. United States Naval Institute Proceedings; Feb 85: 30 + (7p) Discusses the origins of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Lt Gen James Abrahamson’s (the SDI Program Manager’s) “Racehorse” contracting approach, the ABM Treaty and Soviet disregard of it, and the “challenge” of an “Effective strategic defense” program.

Tailoring Deterrent to Threat. Otis, Glenn K.; Browder, Dewey A. Army; Oct 84: 132 + (7p) The Commander of US Army Europe, assesses the forces available to NATO and the Warsaw Pact Forces, and discusses planning for transition from peacetime to wartime organizations.

Soviet Military Policy in Transition. Roberts, Cynthia A. Current History; Oct 84: 331 + (6p) Soviet military leadership in promoting major revisions in doctrine, reorganization of the armed forces, and use of conventional rather than nuclear operations.

The Biggest Challenge. Collins, D.A. Military Logistics Forum; Sep/Oct 84: 53 + (3p) NATO’s combat readiness is impeded by barriers to rationalised logistic support.
THE ANZUS alliance had its roots in the dark days of late 1941 and early 1942 when Australia appeared to stand alone before the onslaught of the rapidly advancing Japanese armed forces. Up till this time Australia had depended upon its ties with the Empire to protect it. Great Britain, our Mother Country, with her capacities already stretched to breaking point by the war in Europe, was unable to provide an umbrella of protection over this distant part of the Empire.

This was most forcibly brought home to the Australian people with two events. The first, the sinking of the capital ships HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, on 10th December 1941, showed that the Royal Navy was unable to exert its influence any further in the Far East. This event coupled with reversals in Malaya, prompted the Prime Minister John Curtin to make his now famous speech in which Australia, "looked to America free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom," in the hope that America would aid us in our hour of need. The fall of Singapore, bastion of the British Empire in the east, on 15 February 1942, brought the lesson home even more strongly to the Australian people. It seemed not long before Australia itself would fall before the lightning advance of the Japanese. However, help was in the offing when large quantities of American aid and personnel poured into Australia, in the nick of time, or so it seemed.

The Creation of ANZUS

When first floated by the Lyons Government of 1937 the idea of a Pacific Pact between Australia and America, had fallen on deaf ears in Washington. Revived in 1943, by Dr. H.V. Evatt, Australia's Foreign Minister under John Curtin, the idea again was not taken up by the United States, as they, the U.S., felt no requirement to underwrite Australia's security. When the idea was revived yet again by another Australian Foreign Minister, Percy Spender in the Menzies Government of 1950, it received new attention in Washington because of the changing world situation.

Washington, in its efforts to put its 'containment' policy into effect, began to realise that a 'soft peace' would be required with Japan to help prevent the spread of communism. No other country, particularly Australia or New Zealand, wanted a re-armed and possibly re-surgent Japan on their hands again. Washington began to believe that some form of security pact was going to be required to buy Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to a 'soft peace' with Japan.

When John Foster Dulles, 'Ambassador at Large' for President Truman, arrived in Australia in February 1951, he discovered that both Australia and New Zealand were more afraid of a new militant Japan than of an Imperialist Russia. Dulles dominated proceedings and forcefully expounded the American conception of what the proposed tri-partite agreement would entail. When he left Canberra with a draft of the pact and it was formally initialled in June and signed in San Fransico in September. Only one month before the settlement of the Japanese peace treaty. (As one American observer later noted, 'There wasn't too much give and take there. I don't know whether you'd call it negotiation or not'). After its formal ratification ANZUS entered into force on 29th April 1952.

The two main signatories, Australia and the United States, differed dramatically in their conceptions and interpretations of what this alliance was to mean. Australia saw it as directed primarily against the possibility of a re-
armed Japan. The United States, on the other hand, presented it as not a guarantee of American support in time of trouble, but rather, as a measure enlisting Australian support in the effort to contain communism. This meant from the U.S. point of view, ANZUS was simply part of a complete Pacific strategy, which included a bilateral U.S.-Japan agreement providing for the continued presence of American forces there, a bilateral U.S.-Phillippines security agreement. To the Australians, however, it became Australia’s chief security guarantee and rapidly became the cornerstone of the nation’s defence and foreign policies.

Through ANZUS, the Menzies Government hoped to guarantee Australia’s security and gain access to the higher echelons of American defence planning. Instead it only succeeded in identifying Australia with U.S. policies, without being able to either influence them or stand apart.

The Treaty

There is nothing in the ANZUS treaty that actually requires any of the signatories to come to the others aid in case of need. Where Spender sought, but failed to achieve, the incorporation of a NATO-like provision, in which an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all members. Dulles on the other hand did not wish to make it appear that he, or to Administration at home, was attempting to remove the power of Congress to declare war.

The result was, as most critics will point out, a treaty under which the United States is not obliged to do anything about Australian security in time of threat, except discuss it. The important articles, concerned with this in the treaty read:

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any one of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes . . .

While it appeared at the time as a landmark for Australian diplomacy, the ANZUS treaty proved to be an extraordinary fragile foundation for the nation’s defence policy, not to mention its foreign policy. Australia sought and achieved, an ambiguous American security guarantee because Canberra feared the threat of the re-emergence of Japanese militarism. The fear was quite misplaced, although that was far from obvious at the time. Australia’s hope of gaining access to high level American military planning was also thwarted. What it did achieve, though, was an illusion of security and an opportunity for Australia to devote its resources to its economic development, while gambling that the U.S. would step in if a threat developed. Fortunately, no such threat has yet emerged.

Australia’s Current Defence Policy

Since 1970, with the beginning of the ‘Nixon Doctrine’, Australian defence planning and policy making have undergone a radical change. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South-East Asia, Australia has had to abandon its time honoured policy of ‘forward defence’. In Australia, most defence planners have come to accept two main precepts for their doctrines and theories; — that the Defence forces must now concentrate on the defence of Australia, its island territories, its air and maritime approaches and its vital interests. Moreover it must now take prime responsibility and greater self reliance on its own ability to undertake this without aid.

This transformation of Australia’s defence policy with the incorporation of these two new vital elements, has, from the position of our planners, forced them to move from relying upon relative certitudes to grave uncertainties. Under the policy of Forward Defence the certainties of where and who the threat to Australian security were well known. It was generally conceived to be Communist Insurgents in South-East Asia, and they were to be defeated on their home ground. This was to be achieved through the use of COIN (Counter Insurgency) operations that were to be conducted in close co-operation with our allies, and in particular America — while in turn ANZUS was to provide a guarantee of Australia’s own defence.

With the decline of the United States as a hegemonic power, particularly after Vietnam, it began to become increasingly clear to Australian defence planners that Australia could no longer rely upon the U.S. to intervene on our behalf if it became necessary, particularly after
it was realised that there was no actual requirement under ANZUS to make them. It seemed then that the security of the 1950s and 1960s had largely been a self delusion on the part of the Australian Government.  

Future military operations are now seemingly confined to the continental landmass, the 200 mile E.E.Z. (Exclusive Economic Zone), its maritime and sea approaches, and in some cases Papua New Guinea and Antarctica as well. Coupled with this is also a much clearer requirement for greater self reliance.

Australia's defence planners have been unable to commit themselves to the concept of a clear and concise policy. The basis of any good defence policy is a determination of the possible threat and of a force structure from which future developments can be planned. The Australian Defence establishment is unwilling and reluctant to commit itself to any particular force structure for two reasons. The first, is due to the lack of any foreseeable or perceivable threat anywhere in the region at the moment that might threaten Australia's security. The second is that, until the nature and implications of the current 'revolution' in conventional military technologies is better understood, expensive and extensive procurement programmes are avoided.

As with most middle-sized powers, Australia has in the past procured new equipment largely on the basis of a replacement syndrome, accepting the dictates of the 'follow-on imperative'. However, a change procurement approach is now necessary. For one thing, the new strategic environment means that procurement to simply replace obsolescent systems is likely to lack strategic relevance. Secondly, the escalating costs of new systems, together with the widening range of technological options, means that middle powers must be selective. With the implications of the new emphasis on self-reliance, the concepts of the past where many weapons systems have been procured to operate jointly with American systems, now result in commonality still being a criteria, while at the same time the capability for independent operations has now become paramount.

Designing an appropriate force structure for the defence of Australia in the light of these immense and unprecedented uncertainties is an especially difficult exercise. The response of the Department of Defence has been to decide the capabilities of the Australian Defence Forces on the basis of two general concepts, that of a 'core force' and that of maintaining the 'state of the art'. These concepts have been adopted principally because of the difficulties of identifying any imminent or particular threat in the foreseeable future, to Australia. The argument is that until any notional threat begins to materialise, it would be waste of resources to build up a force structure capable of dealing with any particular contingency. Moreover, such a built-up structure could only prove to be an unnecessarily inflexible one incapable of dealing with what will eventually happen because of the likelihood of something arising that is unpredictable. Rather the Defence Forces should consist of a wide range of incipient capabilities or 'core blocks', and 'force expansion models' which should be developed to indicate the rates at which, and paths along which these core forces would be expanded in the event of hostilities. Maintaining the 'state of the art' allows the Defence Forces to include in the range of extant core capabilities a familiarity with modern, high technology equipment which would be valuable should events want the terminal force structure in the direction of that equipment.

Unfortunately, as the critics of this policy point out, the core force concept suffers from a number of quite debilitating inadequacies. There is a theoretical problem, in that the development of force expansion models cannot proceed very far because it is not possible to delineate the elements of the core force unless it is known what it is to be the core of. A choice has to be made, whether consciously or not, in the selection of core capabilities, yet the lack of consideration of the terminal capabilities required allows no rational criteria for this choice.

Many other problems become manifest in the implementation on the concept. The existence within the defence establishment of many disparate Service and civilian groups with vested interest and quasi-autonomous sources of power means that the types of forces in the 'core' are likely to include more than that warranted by the theory. There is an inevitable tendency, as exemplified perfectly in the current force structure, to buy 'little bits of lots' of equipment. The inefficiency of this, in sheer cost effectiveness term; should by itself tend towards a movement away from the core force approach. Moreover, the 'follow-on' or replacement equipment, rather than equipment decided on
a more objective requirement basis, also figures more prominently in a force structure 'decided' on the basis of this approach. In fact, the core force concept in practice becomes little more than a rationalisation for the extant capabilities and force structure17.

More fundamentally, the current force posture has an inability to expand sufficiently to meet any relatively serious contingency within the expected warning time. This becomes particularly clear when warning times are superimposed on lead times for procurement and expansion of equipment and forces. Such long lead times for strategic warning cannot be relied upon today.

This is particularly evident when it is realised that these warning times are likely to be much less than the time required to expand the core force to a viable level. A study of lead times quoted by Desmond Ball in his article, 'Development of the Australian Defence Force'18, gave the average length of warning times preceding all conflicts, since 1939, as 14.3 months, while for smaller scale conflicts, which is the more likely of the types that Australia might be involved in, the time from the first perception of a threat to actual hostilities, has averaged only 10.6 months. Moreover, on the basis of this data on past conflicts, there is a 50 percent probability that conflict could occur in less than four months19. It follows then that in any but minor contingencies then, the core Regular Army would be incapable of expanding sufficiently within the expected time available.

So it would seem that in summary, the core force is one of the most reactive planning mechanisms imaginable. It depends for its efficiency on superior knowledge of threats and threat lead times, yet it is precisely because of the current methodological inability to deal with the perceived threat environment that this concept has prevailed within the Australian Defence Establishment20.

Possibilities for the Future

As already pointed out in this article, there is a growing realisation within the Australian Defence Establishment that we are going to be unable to rely upon America in case of need. This has been brought about by various analysts having a fresh look at the ANZUS treaty and then equating it with America's situation today. With her inability to intervene successfully in Vietnam and Angola, the American empire is seen to be on the decline. The reasons as to why this is occurring lie outside the scope of this article and will not be covered. What is important, though, is that Australia's defence policy has been thrown into confusion. Also it raises the question of whether or not ANZUS should be continued with or not?

From the viewpoint of the Defence policy makers this re-evaluation of ANZUS has provided them with the difficulty of attempting to defend a very large country with little in the way of forces. The result has been a very poorly thought out policy that, as its critics have pointed out, simply is a means of justifying the continuation of the current force structure, but what alternatives have been provided? Most theorists agree that 'deterrence' is required in the Australian Defence Forces so as to prevent the creation of a future threat that might endanger Australia's peace. While the general concept of 'deterrence' is what most nations' defence policies aim at, as a means by which war can be prevented, it can however take different forms. The defence theorists define 'deterrence' in two main forms, the first, is an ability to inflict damage on your adversary's homeland, in time of war, to the point that he is unwilling to continue attacking, due to adverse morale and damage to his ability to continue with the war. The second, is to ensure that your nation has the ability to inflict sufficient casualties on an invading force, that is out of proportion to the advantages gained by that invading force21.

The proponents of these schools of thought can be further broken down into smaller groups yet again. Those who believe in the value of being able to inflict damage on your adversary's homeland, range in their opinions of how this should be done. Some extremists consider that Australia should develop its own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to their targets. The power and influence of this group reached its zenith when its leading exponent, John Gorton was appointed Prime Minister in 1968, however he was prevented from being able to achieve his aim by being deposed before the purchase of a nuclear reactor, capable of producing weapons grade Plutonium, could be approved, in 1970. However, as his successor committed Australia to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, this form of deterrence would appear not only repugnant to most Australians, but also to the Government as well22. Most other
exponents of this form of deterrence, 'the ability to inflict damage upon your opponent's homeland', point to lesser, but still effective forms of deterrence, in the creation of either a strong, long-range navy or airforce. As their critics point out, though, the creation of such a force could just have the opposite effect on our neighbours in the region, and prompt them to build up their own forces, in response to our build-up and then a threat has been created, which is the opposite of what 'deterrence' is meant to achieve.

This leaves us with the latter type of deterrence, in which it becomes too costly for an invader to actually invade Australia, out of proportion for the advantages gained. Referred to as disproportionate response by some of its exponents, they point to the success of such nations as Sweden and Switzerland where this doctrine is in use today. The Swedish concept of a total defence posture has been developed to the point that it is calculated that some 70 divisions would be required to successfully invade the country. This is totally out of proportion with the benefits that would be gained.

To develop this argument further, as its proponents point out, the essence of deterrence is the costs and benefits to Australia's defence planning, especially in the absence of perceivable threats, should be orientated towards deterrence in terms of maximising the cost of, and risk of aggression against us. This process requires the identification of an imminently aggressive act and possible operations involved in responding in ascending order of cost and risk to the enemy. It requires us to plan national resource organisation and military operations which allow the least prospect of the enemy impeding our contingent force expansion, and which would raise the enemy's costs and risks to the highest possible level. The vehicle for ensuring this is inherent in the concept of disproportionate response.

It is intended under this doctrine that the defence force will progressively incorporate into itself specific capabilities that will cause a potential aggressor to respond disproportionately in terms of the cost (in money, time, material and/or manpower) in order to gain the advantage.

As Australia, for the foreseeable future, will restrict itself to relatively small standing forces backed by also a relatively small reserve force, in a military crisis it will depend on the large scale mobilisation of untrained manpower. This makes time available for defence preparation critical. A posture of progressive deterrence, based on this concept, would assist Australia to control her threat environment, particularly in forcing upon a potential aggressor lengthy lead times for the acquisition and development of essential capabilities. To illustrate this, it is conceivable that by the purchase of a further ten relatively cheap submarines, a potential adversary might be forced to buy an anti-submarine capability that is ten times as expensive. In addition to this purchase of the capability to combat our submarines he will require further expenditure to purchase the necessary logistic, training and theoretical back-up that is needed to operate these weapon systems. This extension of our submarine force might well also have the result that it will cause our potential adversary to give pause to the thought of attempting a large scale sea-borne assault on Australia. If he were not deterred, then Australia would then have the ability to, when it was noticed that he was continuing in his build-up, to raise our level of deterrence further, using the type of weapons that have been proven by their cost effectiveness, to force an enemy to make a disproportionate response.

While it is true that deterrence might well fail because of a number of factors, including irrationality, miscalculation of the costs, acceptance of the military costs for non-military strategic objectives. Care must be taken to ensure that the concept is not only applied in the context of deterrence but also to the military requirements for the actual defence of Australia. To be cost-effective, preparations should be suitable for both deterrence and for actual defence. This of course means that the force structure of the defence forces must be reflective of what their ultimate ability will be in wartime, rather than at present of simply being an amorphous mass which can be expanded in any direction thought to be required. For the value of deterrence is largely a psychological one in the mind of the enemy. In other words, he must see what he is being deterred by, to be deterred by it.

Having explored the alternatives to the current defence policy it would perhaps also be suitable at this point to explore what other areas of Australian Government policy would be affected by a non-continuation of the ANZUS treaty.
Of these, foreign relations, would perhaps be the most important. Australia's relations with our neighbours have been affected severely since the inception and signing of the ANZUS treaty. In return for the illusion of security, Australia paid a high price. ANZUS formally drew Australia into a US-dominated anti-communist front in Asia. It effectively promoted the idea that Australia should go to war along with the United States whenever the Americans felt the use of force was necessary in the Pacific region. ANZUS was, after all, only the beginning. It was followed by the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO) of 1954 and numerous subsidiary defence agreements that further integrated Australia into the American strategic network. ANZUS also made military calculations and an 'all white' alliance the dominant features of Australia's foreign policy at a time when the country was striving to improve relations with its Asian neighbours.

Perhaps worst of all ANZUS has reinforced Australia's historic inclination toward subservience and stymied the possibility of a creative and independent approach to foreign policy problems. Many thoughtful and influential Australians still believe that ANZUS constitutes the most successful initiative taken by an Australian Government in the field of foreign affairs in the post-war period. This is precisely the problem, for defining a successful initiative in these terms harkens back to the Menzies argument that Australia could best prove her independence by deciding upon whom she chose to become dependent.

While most Australian politicians must realise that the American connection of the ANZUS treaty is not ironclad. It is their response to that awareness that is fascinating. A minority would cast off the alliance completely and develop a self-reliant defence and foreign policy. The Labor Party would maintain the alliance but seek a more independent position within it. The Liberal-National Country Parties wishes to strengthen the alliance. Their undeclared policy appears to be to try to give the U.S. such a large stake in Australia that it will have no choice but to come to the rescue if a threat emerges. Of these only, the two first policies seem to be more responsible, and the new Labor Party Government under Mr. Hawke is pursuing this type of policy with hopefully better, and more certain results than the one pursued by the Liberal-National Country Parties under Mr. Fraser and now Mr. Peacock.

The most visible evidence of American involvement in Australia's defence and foreign policy would most certainly be the numerous Intelligence gathering, Defence, scientific and communications installations that are located on Australian soil. However, as they are governed by agreements other than ANZUS they lie to a large extent outside the scope of this article. The aspect of them that is important to this article, though, is the influence that they have on our defence and foreign policies. These installations have made it difficult for our Government to pursue policies which are devoted towards greater regional co-operation and regional arms control with again the result that it is again questionable as to whether or not it is worthwhile to continue with this rather one sided alliance?

Conclusion

In conclusion then, the liabilities of ANZUS would seem to outweigh the benefits, as far as Australia is concerned. There is no concrete requirement that the U.S. is required to provide any military aid to Australia in a time of need, as the only requirement is consultation, and even if either party would wish to aid the other, they must follow their constitutional process before doing so. In view of the nearly forced withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from the Lebanon, by Congress in September, under the War Powers Act of 1976, constitutional process might take quite a long time and might not decide in Australia's favour. The main effect of this treaty has been the domination of our defence and foreign policy decision making systems by the fear of not following the U.S. lead, in case that they might end their side of the agreement.

It should be pointed out, though, that this treaty is not entirely one-sided in the favour of the Americans. For the American connection provides benefits to us in other ways. The U.S.A. is apparently quite generous in the flow of intelligence data which it shares with Australia. It also provides access to 'defence science and technology', military staff contacts regarding tactical doctrine and operational procedures, while joint exercises provide our forces opportunities to exercise with forces using high technology that would not be normally avail-
able. However, this is also a two-edged weapon, for with the discretion which the U.S. has in deciding what material can be passed on to Australia, it obviously has great influence on both Australia's defence and foreign policy making processes. Dependence upon this source of intelligence gathering must be treated with circumspection at best.

So it would seem questionable as to whether Australia should continue with the ANZUS treaty. If we negated the treaty what would the difference in our present defence policy be? As we are committed to greater self-reliance anyway in the area of defence we would simply be forced now to spend creditable amounts upon defence instead of the pittance spent now. It would also allow us to show to the other members of the region that we are more willing to stand apart from the many morally questionable practices of the United States in its efforts to 'contain world communism'. Therefore it would seem that the withdrawal of Australia from the ANZUS treaty would make little difference to Australia's Defence Policy, it would however have a far greater effect on public opinion within Australia and it would be a very brave government that did so. It should be noted that in reference to the latest ANZUS conference and statements made since then by our Foreign Minister, our present government is perhaps more willing to take this course of action, as the criticism of the U.S. over the invasion of Grenada might have shown.

NOTES
2. P.27, Ibid.
3. Idem.
4. Idem.
5. P.28, Ibid.
7. P.29, Ibid.
8. Idem.
10. Idem.
11. P264, Ibid.
15. Idem.
16. P.267, Ibid.
17. Idem.
22. Idem.
26. P.271, Ibid.
27. Idem.
29. Idem.
30. P.30, Ibid.
31. It is suggested for further information on the agreements governing the location of these installations that the reader see the Appendices (P.160-174) of Desmond Bell, C., (ed), 1982, Academic Studies and International Politics, Dept. Of International Relations, A.N.U., Canberra.

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COMBAT STRESS REACTIONS

By Flight Lieutenant B. White, RAAF.

A understanding of the causes and effects of combat stress on the individual in armed forces at war have important implications for the viability of military units. A basic understanding is important not only to medical officers and all medical personnel, but also to commanders at all levels from section leader up for they themselves are important in treatment and prevention, and is important to all military personnel who may be able to provide 'buddy aid' when needed.

It is relevant to a modern air force since their medical facilities will often treat combat casualties, they are involved in aeromedical evacuation, they are usually sited on bases that are concentrated and highly attractive targets, and modern warfare will involve long-range weapons more than ever before.

A major problem is that the importance of combat psychiatry, while remembered in principle, tends to be forgotten in the practical business of warfare. Psychiatric casualties are unavoidable but can be minimised; and they constitute a significant proportion of non-fatal casualties. In The Falklands, the British reported no serious psychiatric problems due probably to a number of reasons including their high morale and the troops involved in the majority of the engagements were elite troops and in no way representative of an average soldier. Battle shock did occur but soon resolved with rest, food, warmth and reassurance.

In the Israel forces in the Yom Kippur War, psychiatric casualties accounted for 23% of all non-fatal casualties, and this figures does not include many cases of battle shock that resolved after a few hours of rest. This review of battle stress reactions is based largely on the Israeli experience in the Yom Kippur War and in Lebanon in 1982.

The range of battle stress reactions includes battle shock, battle fatigue which develops after weeks or months of moderate intensity combat, refusal to fight which usually develops as time progresses and manifests often by desertion or being absent without leave, self-inflicted injuries or non-battle injuries that could have been prevented, passive participation in battle with no contribution to firepower or aggressive activity, and minor psychiatric disturbances presenting with non-disabling fear or mild anxiety, with minor organic complaints, or with poor coping with minor illness or injury. Battle shock is the most dramatic and most common in high intensity conflict and is the main subject of this section.

**Battle Shock**

Battle shock is the simple emotional reaction to the stress of battle. The basic psychological process is the breakdown of narcissistic defenses against mainly the fear of death, but also of wounds and disability, fear of failure and losing
face, resulting in an overwhelming fear of helplessness. It may develop after days or even only hours of intense combat and was the major type of psychiatric casualty suffered by the Israelis in 1973 and 1982. It is characterised by anxiety, depression, sleep disturbance and fear. At the front line its main feature is usually an inability to perform, and at the divisional medical unit is usually characterised by difficulties with thoughts and feelings. The shorter, more intense, more fluid conflicts of modern warfare rapidly generate psychiatric casualties which may sometimes appear within hours of the start of hostilities. These same conditions make prevention and treatment more difficult.

The symptoms reported by the Israelis in Lebanon include in descending order of frequency: anxiety, depressive effect, sleep disturbance, fear, social detachment, conversion reactions, crying, decreased appetite, headache, exhaustion, fatigue, psychomotor disturbances, disturbing dreams and memories, tremors, confusion, concentration disturbances, speech impairment, dissociative stages, irritability, aggressive behaviour, memory impairment and noise sensitivity startle.

**Stages of Battle Shock**

Battle shock can be roughly divided into three stages, plus delayed battle shock:

- Immediate stage lasts for the first hours to days and is characterised by anxiety, depression and fear. Properly managed, the majority of soldiers with battle shock recover during this stage;

- Acute stage, lasts for days to weeks, and is characterised by the emergence of neurotic symptoms consistent with the soldier's pre-war personality, and recovery is still likely;

- Chronic stage develops if treatment in the acute stage fails. This is characterised by personality impoverishment and chronic psychiatric disability and is of extended duration. Recovery is slow and often incomplete; and

- Delayed battle shock is seen in soldiers who have performed well in intense fighting but break down on their first home leave or on receiving a telephone call from home. It may also be seen in initial battle shock casualties who are evacuated to the rear after they had in fact recovered and consequently often suffered a second, more serious decompensation.

**Predisposing Factors**

Battle shock can be related to a number of predisposing factors, both combat and pre-combat. The combat factors that battle shock incidence is related to include:

- Intensity of fighting; at extremes of intensity, onset may occur before the onset of significant fatigue or sleep deprivation. Casualty rates and battlefield stress are closely related and when the stress is greater, the fraction of casualties which are psychiatric is larger.

- Lack of sleep and similar physiological stresses such as circadian dysrhythmia and dehydration. Sleep deprivation itself produces rapid fatigue and performance degradation which initially affects cognitive and perceptual skills especially.

- Combat role: In Israel, battle shock was most commonly seen in armoured units, intermediately in artillery units, least in infantry units which was probably related to the armoured units being engaged in the most intense combat. Support troops were more vulnerable which was expressed by having a higher percentage of their casualties as psychiatric. Troops playing a passive role and unable to retaliate are more prone to battle stress casualties.

- Physical injury, especially in more seriously wounded soldiers.

- Battle shock is more frequently seen after tactical errors such as being caught in an ambush, and after seeing one's friends or own commander killed or wounded, or indeed after one's own close encounter with death. It is seen more after units have been surprised, when they are facing defeat, facing superior enemy numbers, and when they are in retreat.

Predisposing factors, pre-combat:

- Prior on-going civil stresses were found in the majority of battle shock cases. Typical family stresses include pregnancy, recent baby or death.

- Low self-esteem regarding their military performance.

- Low morale characterised by minimal group cohesion and unit identification, no trust in their leadership and a high incidence of interpersonal difficulties with members of their unit.

- Personality type was not a predictor of becoming a psychiatric casualty but did cor-
relate significantly with likelihood of recovery. In this regard one can consider three personality types:

- **Stable personality**, well adjusted, in untroubled life circumstances, and generally recovered in the acute stage;
- **Transitional**, in men facing developmental crises such as in late teens or late 30s and early 40s and have an intermediate prognosis for recovery; and
- **Repressed personality**; men who deal with anger and anxiety with repression and have the poorest prognosis for recovery.

— Battle shock casualties tend to be worse in those with poor education, low motivation, low intelligence, reservists and in lower ranks.

**Treatment**

The principle of treatment is immediate attention near the battle front with rapid return to the unit. Improper treatment by evacuating to the rear and not returning recovered casualties to combat duties may mean slow recovery and prolonged disability. In an Israeli experience, more than 60% returned to their units within 72 hours if treated forward, while only 40% returned to duty if treated in rear areas. Management is directed at reassuring the soldier that he is neither sick nor a coward, just tired and will recover when rested, and he is needed by his unit and will soon return to it.

**Immediate Stage**

Appropriate treatment is rest and supportive psychotherapy entailing a brief recounting of events by the patient, coupled with reassurance by the therapist, with rapid return to combat duty, is effective in a large number of casualties. For mild cases initial treatment may only need to be a couple of hours rest at the battalion R.A.P. and then return to the unit. The Israelis system was developed in the Lebanon conflict whereby if further treatment was needed they were evacuated to their Advanced Medical Battalion, in support of a division, which would have a forward mental health team of a psychiatrist, a psychologist and three other mental health officers, either psychologists or social workers. Here treatment includes physical replenishment, (sleep, water, food) and supportive individual and group psychotherapy. Psychiatric casualties are treated as soldiers, responsible for their own maintenance and retaining their own personal weapons. Here they are held for 48-72 hours and then either returned to unit or if unimproved evacuated to the rear. If evacuation of combat shock casualties is needed, it should be by ground ambulance and not air, to maintain psychological proximity to the front.

The management by the team consists of initial interview detailing objective details of where the soldier had been. Describing what has happened clarifies events and reduces the emotional turmoil, and thoughts and feelings inevitably follow the objective description. They are then given 6-8 hours of physical replenishment. Then the soldiers are given useful tasks to perform and invited to join in individual and group psychotherapy. Next the team arranges for comrades from the soldier’s unit and for the unit commander to visit the soldier if possible. Then the soldier may be taken back to visit his unit. This helped to restore mutual confidence between the soldier and his unit and maintained links with the unit. When the soldier recovers enough to return to his unit, the team would arrange for comrades from his unit to pick him up.

There can be problems with the medical team itself. The close proximity to the front makes them susceptible to fear and in fact to attack and battle shock themselves. They may have a tendency to over-identify with patients and to want to protect their patients. The medical team members will cope best if they establish personal friendships to whom they can verbalise their emotions. They need to be given adequate rest and leave themselves in the longer terms situations. They will need to develop adaptive defensive mechanisms by acceptance of the inevitable and of that which they have no control, by developing a sense of humour, and by suppression and denial of the intolerable. They must be wary of the use of drugs and alcohol to buffer anxiety and feelings of inadequacy.

**Treatment of Acute Stage**

If the treatment of the immediate stage fails and the patient passes into the acute stage, he should be evacuated to the rear and abreaction treatment would be indicated. This entails releasing tension and suppressed emotions through extensive conscious examination and by relieving the combat trauma in imagination, words and action. If evacuated, the chance of eventual
recovery is maximal if they are sent to convalescent camps where military discipline is maintained.

Prognosis for treatment at any stage is better if the patient takes the initiative in his own care, helps others and helps run the treatment team's area; and is better in the relatively younger, patient who considers himself to be healthy. Prognosis is not related to severity of initial symptoms.

Treatment of Chronic Stage

In Israel, the chronic battle shock cases were referred to a central unit where treatment consisted of abreactive individual and group psychotherapy, individual and group sports, and combat orientated military training. Only a small percentage required medication, which were tricyclic antidepressants. The outcome of this treatment was that some returned to duty, and none needed further institutional care.

Long-Term Outcome

In general, if a soldier is fit for combat duty by normal military criteria, a history of previous battle shock does not place him at increased risk for future combat related psychiatric breakdown.

Prevention

Basic precepts of prevention of combat shock are good leadership and good morale. High morale correlates well with combat effectiveness and appears to protect against battle shock even during intense fighting. It is characterised by positive social support, group identification, stability of assignment and a high regard for one's work. Company morale correlates closely with personal morale whose major components are trust in the company commander (primarily, trust in his professional competence), confidence in one's own skills as a soldier, one's feelings about the legitimacy of the war, trust in one's weapons, trust in one's self, confidence in one's comrades, readiness to fight, unit cohesiveness and the quality of one's relationship with one's commander. Therefore, anything that improves these individual components will aid in preventing combat shock.

Unit commanders should be taught to expect battle shock casualties and to expect these casualties to return to the unit after brief treatment so that such casualties will be handled effectively.

Other important preventive measures include good physical fitness which reduces susceptibility to both physical and psychiatric illness in combat. Exercise may in fact be relaxing in itself and men involved in purely physical tasks seem to be less stressed than those involved in cognitive functions. A risk here is that the physical activity will distract from primary duties.

Overlearning of basic combat skills is important. Under the stress of battle, cognitive function deteriorates while overlearned physical tasks are maintained. The accent should be on overlearning of appropriate drills such as weapons handling and contact drills. An emphasis on inappropriate drills may be dangerous since under the stress of combat regression to simpler drills may produce maladaptive behaviour.

Repeated exposure tends to reduce the impact of a stressful situation upon most individuals as long as the stress level is not intolerable. However, chronic exposure to unacceptable levels of stresses induces ill health. It should still be practicable to induce stress habituation by exposing soldiers to graduated levels of stress which should always be kept within a tolerable level, so that it produces enough stress for arousal, to be challenging, and not so much as to be acutely intolerable, or chronically inducing ill health. Such stress habituation is best done in conjunction with realistic training that emphasises the sights and sounds of the battlefield. Part of the training could include a stress management programme with simple positive statements and relaxation counselling.

An important and obvious aspect of prevention is to minimise physiological stresses such as fatigue, cold and dehydration. This applies especially to leaders who in some respects are more stress prone due to the demands for them to carry out more cognitive than physical tasks.

Strong discipline is an important preventive measure. Such discipline must be an individual discipline for modern warfare requires that units fight more dispersed than in the past. The elements of such a discipline and how to produce it are in fact a complex issue and beyond the scope of this review. An important element of such discipline is education and knowledge appropriate to the situation. It seems appropriate here to make passing mention of heroism. Heroes do not seem to be unique personalities, rather certain situations call forth heroism and good leadership and strong unit cohesions are strong factors here. In Israeli experience, heroes
were not the most obedient soldiers, they displayed a tendency for minor infringements and in fact some resistance to military authorities appeared to foster heroic behaviour.

Delayed battle shock seems less likely if the soldiers remain with their units and are not given sudden home leave or rapid demobilisation since this weakens supportive ties with their units and may precipitate delayed battle shock. It should not be forgotten that a soldier’s unit is effectively his family and he is often closer to his unit comrades than his civilian relationships.

Combat fatigue or exhaustion is a type of chronic fatigue and at less intense levels of combat; 100 days of intermittent exposure is the average length of tolerance before non-effective behaviour becomes frequent, and this can be prevented by adequate rest and rotation of units out of combat.

**Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder**

This syndrome has been reported in Vietnam veterans and is proportional to combat stress. These veterans report insomnia and nightmares, emotional deprivation with an inability to get on with people.

They may have co-existing syndromes of alcoholism, drug dependence, antisocial personality disorder, somatisation disorder, and depression. Essential treatment consists of debriefing, however belated, from military experiences. The Vietnam veterans were suddenly discharged and returned to normal civilian life without debriefing or deprogramming and this has certainly exacerbated the syndrome. Initial reports in Australian Vietnam veterans also suggest that exposure to herbicides has not increased the incidence of birth defects in their children and that chronic psychiatric disorders are comparable to that found in veterans of other wars and should be considered psychiatric and not a result of exposure to herbicides. Such disorders of course are still war induced.

**Prisoners of War**

Prisoners of war are subject to severe psychological stress and the effects of this can be both immediate and long term. A basic understanding of this will be useful for the treatment and rehabilitation of returned prisoners and for the training and preparation of personnel so that they may better withstand captivity. Captivity stress, like other forms of stress, is proportional to duration and severity, and to training and preparation. Since we are most likely to be involved in an Asian war, our captors are likely to have significantly different values from ours with less a ‘civilised’ approach to prisoners.

Longer term prisoners tend to display greater suspicion and distrust and to use repression and denial as defence mechanisms, and they have more difficulty in adjusting to normal life after repatriation. Such long term prisoners under severe conditions can physically be expected to age more rapidly and may be more susceptible to physical illness. Many may become heavy chain smokers or develop other deleterious western habits, quite possibly as a result of their captivity and their method of rehabilitation. During their imprisonment the range of psychological problems seen include malingering, self-inflicted or exacerbated injuries, behaviour problems, hysterical reactions and homosexuality. The long term problems are worse if the prisoners are rapidly returned to the normal world on repatriation. Development of psychiatric illness in P.O.Ws does not seem related to precaptivity personality or psychiatric disorder.

Prisoners may be seen to pass through stages of adaptation to captivity which may be seen in P.O.Ws and also in hostages taken prisoner:

- **Startle** or panic stage lasting for the first seconds to minutes; usually an abrupt transition from normal function to that of a prisoner, often of captors who may be ambivalent about letting their prisoners live; captives may feel fear, panic and defencelessness, and will be worse if the captivity is unexpected. Emotional control should be gained as quickly as possible and is best managed by focused activity such as counting the guards, and by relaxation techniques.

- **Disbelief** stage lasting for the first minutes to hours, this may be worsened by dehumanising actions such as stripping, beating, and blindfolding. This stage may be best managed by meditating and psychological dissociation, focusing on thoughts of home or other inwards looking concepts.

- **Hypervigilant** stage lasting from the first hours to days; coping is assisted by keeping orientated to the passage of time, studying the details of the surroundings so that they become reassuringly familiar.
— Resistance/compliance stages lasting the first days to weeks in response to the captors attempts to gain co-operation and confessions. Anyone can be forced to co-operate if sufficient physical or psychological torture is applied. Isolation is often the most effective means of such coercion. Captive behaviour varies from ready compliance to prolonged resistance. Coping is greatly improved by maintaining physical fitness by exercising even in cramped confinement, and by communicating with fellow captives. Religious faith and thoughts of loved ones may also be supportive.

— Depressive stage lasting from the first weeks to months, in which classical depressive signs and symptoms are seen and coping is aided by a strong support group and by using one's intellect to fight boredom.

— Gradual acceptance stage lasting from the first months to years in which captives begin to accept that their captivity may be for a long time and basically live day-to-day without much thought for the future and become preoccupied with immediate concerns such as food and sleep. Group activities such as games and church services and intellectual pursuits such as reading, writing, learning a new language are beneficial.

In a similar way, captives may pass through stages of recovery when they are released:

— Brief euphoria, lasting for the first seconds to minutes but is short lived. Released captives are initially very wary lest this be a false hope and will display emotional restraint and careful evaluation of events. Wild celebrations are quite inappropriate at this stage and the captives need to be protected from exposure to overzealous media, politicians and well-wishers.

— Hyperarousal stage lasts for the first minutes to hours, where the released prisoners are over-stimulated and mentally slowed and may be confused and exhausted. They need adequate sleep and may be best kept in a hospital where the necessary debriefings are carried out. Such debriefings are useful to the prisoners for ventilating their emotions.

— Compliance/resistance stage, lasting from the first hours to days, where they initially comply with most requests, and too much may be asked of them. Then they resist such requests as they regain feelings of individual power. If held in hospital they should be encouraged to wear casual clothes rather than pyjamas and have time to set aside for their own independent activities. They should not be overburdened with visitors, but should have a gradual exposure to visitors. They should have good access to other returned prisoners with whom they feel most affinity.

— Denial stage, lasting from the first days to weeks where the ex-prisoners may deny significant physical or psychological difficulties. This denial should not be taken at face value nor should it be challenged severely but given gentle persuasion to continue with periodic follow up.

— Restitution stage, lasting from the first weeks to months where they have difficulty denying themselves food and other comforts, they discover difficulties in returning to family customs that are different from prior to captivity and are greatly different from those they developed during captivity. They may need to return to work or a refresher course rather than be given prolonged leave. It appears beneficial for them to talk or write about their experiences.

— Stage of gradual readjustment lasting from the first months to years where the returned prisoners gradually return to a normal lifestyle. They may still be susceptible to an increased incidence of physical illness, and to a certain extent, many can never fully recover from the psychological stresses of the more severe captivities. They are best managed by periodical examinations and informal counselling.

In general self-reliance characterises captivity while reliance on others is central to the recovery, and this may be a difficult transition. Military survival courses appear to have a beneficial effect on morbidity and mortality of prisoners of war. Like any stress it can be modified by training and preparation. One final comment: While the prisoners undergo severe stresses, their families will also be subject to increased stress and may need appropriate support.

The Future Battlefield and the Enemy

Warfare must be considered to be one of the most demanding human occupations and the price of poor performance is high and is often exacted with an immediacy that will greatly increase the psychological stress. If war is a
necessity for the defence of the country, then one should prepare for it so that performance and efficiency are maximised. This preparation should be for the war in the future; unfortunately, the practicality is that not only are weapons, systems and training largely based on previous wars, but also the psychological approach to military life and war itself are based on times and styles of warfare long past and one should question whether they remain appropriate.

What conflicts, if any, Australia will be involved with in the near future is impossible to predict. Modern continental warfare is expected to be more intense and probably of shorter duration. It will involve an unprecedented lethality of modern weapons, sustained combat due to night vision ability, NBC threat (where even the rumour or threat of such warfare may be psychologically devastating), and will require the use of a wide range of new technologies. It will demand dispersal of forces thereby requiring more junior commanders to take the initiative and have independence in action. The effects of electronic warfare and ECM by a sophisticated enemy may severely reduce communications. The rear area casualty threat will be much higher due to air, missile, long-range artillery attack, air mobile assaults and commando attacks. Physical and psychiatric casualties will be much higher in rear units that in previous wars had been relatively safe. Medical units will not only be inadequate for dealing with the large number of battle shock casualties generated they will themselves be subjected to battlefield stress.

An air force unit is usually based on an air base or airstrip which is both a concentrated and attractive target. In a highly mobile and fluid battlefield, it may well be quickly overrun. Certainly under such conditions of warfare, air force units will be subject to physical and psychiatric casualties at a rate for which they are quite unprepared.

A final point about future warfare. The aim of combat is to break the opponents will to fight.

A thorough understanding of this is one of the features that differentiates the better leaders from the ordinary. Victory can come far more efficiently by destruction of the enemy's command, his essential supplies such as fuel, and especially his will to fight, than by the creation of large numbers of casualties. Even if our forces understand this poorly, a sophisticated enemy such as the USSR has a different approach based on inducing battle shock rather than physical casualties.

While we may be trying to prevent, treat and minimise psychiatric casualties, the enemy will be looking to induce surprise, fear, fatigue, uncertainty and confusion in our own troops thereby precipitating battle shock. The enemy will emphasise continued pressure on the defender to rapidly induce extreme fatigue. Artillery fire plans will be designed to induce shock rather than physical casualties or damage.

The enemy will have trained his own troops to be resilient to combat stress. He will be thoroughly trained in combat drills. The enemy leaders will be trained to make decisions as to which preplanned alternative to select, rather than to formulate a complete plan under conditions of stress. He will try to ensure that his men are given adequate sleep and are protected from surprise attack. He will attempt to maintain morale by achieving early success and by reliance on moral conditioning that their cause is right. This is not new, but a sophisticated enemy will take strong measures to recognise the problems of battle stress, will seek to protect his troops from it, and at the same time induce and exploit it in the opposition.

Leadership and Psychiatry

In the efficient functioning of a military force in peace and war, the performance of its leaders is one of the most critical factors. Besides the usual problem of military defeats, poor leadership contributes to poor morale and both are significant predisposing factors for combat shock. Much of the assessment of the performance of leadership properly belongs to military psychology and therefore a lengthy discussion is not warranted here.

Command can produce stress even in peace-time, and more so in wartime. Leaders at all levels are more susceptible to stress in wartime than are their troops who perform overlearned, simple, mechanical tasks since they must think, plan and make rapid decisions. They are likely to have conflicts with superiors and subordinates and will be subject to ambiguous and uncertain situations. The response to stress of course is not necessarily to induce a non-coping response and there are great individual differences. Combat stress will reduce cognitive function, and mental fatigue from attention demanding tasks adds to the stress. As already
COMBAT STRESS REACTIONS

mentioned, the Soviets simplify the decision making process for their leaders, reducing flexibility but thereby reducing also susceptibility to stress and hopefully increasing reliability. This touches on a complex debate but the consequent loss of flexibility does not seem to be the optimum approach.

The problem is that the more flexible leader needs to process more information and make more complex decisions. If this is unaffected by combat stress, it will result in a higher quality leadership with optimal use of restricted resources. Certainly the most successful leaders have been those who are flexible, yet determined and decisive. The best leaders are quite rare and there is a significant doubt that current Australian Defence Force selection and training processes are suitable for the development of such leaders. The optimum personality for a pilot is not that for a leader, and training for junior command is not always appropriate for senior independent command. Leadership in barracks and leadership in combat is substantially different. There have been many cases of leaders who have made good, or excellent junior leaders, but failed disastrously on a higher scale. This is a complex issue which relates more to psychology than psychiatry.

Thomas Dixon's book makes a good introduction but the issue deserves more extensive debate. The practical upshot is that numerically most of our leaders are at section, platoon and company level and we are likely overall to have average leaders as the norm at all levels and for their optimal functioning, they should be protected against battle stress and this is best done in a similar way to prevention of combat shock. That is by gradual stress habituation, thorough learning of appropriate tasks, discarding inappropriate tasks, physical fitness, maintaining morale, relaxation counselling, and realistic and effective training.

Such training should include an emphasis on leadership, rather than command and administration exercised by virtue of office, for good leadership has positive benefits which include high morale and resilience against combat stress. Junior leaders need formal education in the realities of war, including the physiological and psychological stresses and their sequela.

Finally, the fact of stress must be confronted in the open. Discussion with peers may be useful in putting the stress into perspective and in affirming support.

Conclusion

This article is not definitive nor comprehensive, but has briefly summarised major concerns of military psychiatry in an attempt to cover adequately a subject poorly understood at most levels of military medical units. Much of what has been covered has important consequences for the viability of military forces in wartime. Some subjects have not been extensively covered since they are beyond the scope of this review. The effects of nuclear warfare have not been discussed since, if conventional intensive warfare will swamp medical facilities, full scale nuclear warfare will generate physical and psychiatric casualties of an inconceivable magnitude. That, combined with the residual radiation, may make the earth uninhabitable for man and in such a case, attempts at psychiatric first aid become academic and of no significant effect.

The article has touched on a number of topics which are deserving of, and I hope will generate, further discussion and debate. What are the advantages and the practicalities of defence force medical services treating dependants? What is the cut-off level for military ineffectiveness? Many mild personality disorders will survive in the regulated, peacetime military but will be unsuited to the demands of war. Indeed should military forces continue to select, train and promote on the basis of suitability for peace yet military rather than for war? Alcohol will continue to be a major concern, especially for prevention and early treatment and education, although severe alcohol dependency and physical damage is very rare. How significant is the effect of relatively low levels of alcohol in producing subclinical levels of cerebral damage? Does it make any practical difference or does it represent a degradation of performance that will take away an important fine edge of capability?

Certainly military forces need to train and prepare for combat shock casualties. Exactly how this is done is a subject for further, extensive debate.

Leadership is a subject more suited to mainly psychological assessment. However, leaders at all levels are certainly subject to higher levels of stress in combat. Effective leaders in peacetime barracks are not necessarily effective in war. Whatever discussion and theoretical concepts are raised, our approach must be based on what is pragmatic and practical. Change is
necessary but it needs to be effective and well planned.

Properly utilised, military medicine will have an important effect on the development and maintenance of combat effectiveness. Under certain circumstances, military medical personnel have the ability to directly affect the organisation and community with which they are concerned in a way that is unprecedented in the civilian community. I hope that this review has served to both educate and stimulate further debate on these subjects.

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General Reference
By Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Lowry, Assistant Defence and Military Attache

The Western States had two centuries or more for their 'age of absolutism', a century and a half for their 'age of democratization' and a century for their 'age of welfare'. The new nations must somehow telescope all three into one single age

INDONESIA was born on the rising tide of nationalism and great expectations following the defeat of the Dutch colonial masters by the Japanese and the subsequent surrender of the Japanese occupiers to the allied powers. The Declaration of Independence, proclaimed in 1945, was not recognized by Holland and four years of intermittent fighting and conferences were to follow before the independent state of Indonesia was finally recognized.

The new country consisted of more than 13,000 islands with a land area of one fourth that of Australia and a total land sea area as large as continental Australia. It was populated by several ethnic, cultural and religious groups without a strong bond of national unity. Communications and transport infrastructure were sparse and located mainly to serve the plantation, oil and forestry industries. A modern, mass-education scheme was non-existent and educated or skilled manpower was very scarce. The Public Service was under-educated, under-trained and inexperienced in the middle and higher levels of administration; and a large and rapidly increasing population was clamouring for the fruits of independence.

The numerous political parties which emerged generally represented ideological or religious interests. At Independence the 1945 Constitution, which called for a strong presidential system of government, was replaced by the 1950 Constitution which provided for a parliamentary form of government. However, the formation of strong parliamentary democracy quickly foundered in the absence of strong, nationally-based political parties. Coalitions fell in quick succession until President Sukarno proclaimed 'Guided Democracy', re-introduced the 1945 Constitution and re-established a presidential form of Government in 1959.

During the 1950s successive governments had to cope with rebellion and subversive movements which wanted regional autonomy, to separate from the Republic or the creation of an Islamic state. Some of these movements were founded on ideological differences but most were a reaction to the inability of the Government to grapple with the causes of discontent.

During the period of 'Guided Democracy', Sukarno tried to apply the Javanese concept of harmonizing and synthesizing all political groupings into a government of national unity led by Sukarno himself as 'the great teacher'. This endeavour to harmonize the religious, nationalist (including the Armed Forces) and communist political groupings ended abruptly on 30 September 1965. Fearing that 'the great teacher' was ailing and that the Armed Forces were threatening the political balance, a group of officers, sympathetic to the President and his concepts, launched an abortive coup d'etat with the support of the Communist PKI. The coup failed but Sukarno was never able to re-
gain his position of authority and the Armed Forces became the dominant political power in the ‘New Order’. The ‘New Order’ resolved to put a stop to the divisive politics of previous governments and build its own version of democracy, called Pancasila democracy, based on the 1945 Constitution.

The ‘New Order’ would avoid the tumultuous, charismatic, mass mobilization form of politics followed by the ‘Old Order’ and try to channel all political activity through controlled government, political and community channels under ABRI tutelage. The turbulence of the previous twenty years convinced the ‘New Order’ that national development could only occur in a secure social environment and that security depended on appropriate national development. Security and development were seen as interdependent and indivisible objectives.

AIM

It is, therefore, the aim of this article to describe the ideology, organization, and doctrine — the internal defence measures — introduced by the ‘New Order’ to attain the security objective.

SCOPE

Internal defence is not just a matter of physical force but rather a comprehensive and balanced set of measures covering the primary areas of human physical, intellectual and spiritual concern. The article will endeavour to describe what ideological, political, religious and physical measures are taken to ensure the longevity of the ‘New Order’ and what the prospects are for the future. The article is not concerned with judging the fairness or justice of the current Government or the measures applied.

IDEOLOGY

The debate on which ideology was to be adopted at Independence was the central problem to be resolved in drafting the 1945 Constitution. For although Indonesia is 90% Muslim, less than 30% are considered devout. Naturally, the devout wanted a theistic state. The nominal Muslims and minority groups wanted a secular state. A compromise was reached in which the state recognized the existence of ‘God’ but embraced no particular religion. Nevertheless, the debate has continued at varying intensity.

Sukarno’s attempt to meld all the streams of ideology found in Indonesian society was rejected by the Suharto Government in favour of the Pancasila ideology but the concept of guided democracy was retained. Accordingly, a range of control measures have been introduced to guide the development and activities of political and social organizations and repress those who venture beyond the boundaries determined by the ‘New Order’.

The Pancasila ideology is said to be based on the intrinsic values of Indonesian society, as formulated by Sukarno, and included in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. This Constitution was in force when the ‘New Order’ assumed power with the promise of governing according to the true intent of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. This theme gave a sense of continuity with the Sukarno era and avoided traumatic change at a time of great uncertainty.

The five principles of the Pancasila ideology are readily acceptable but very general. To give practical effect to the ideology, a guide for understanding and practicing the Pancasila was formulated. The guide specifies that Pancasila, the Indonesian people and the state are inseparable and that it is the responsibility of every citizen to ensure the survival of the Pancasila state. The rules of acceptable individual and social behaviour are outlined and every citizen is obliged to understand and practice them. The five principles of the Pancasila ideology and the rules are quoted verbatim in the following paragraphs.

First Principle — Belief in God Almighty

In accordance with this principle, Indonesians are obliged to believe in ‘God’ and fulfill the obligations of their particular religion. They must show tolerance and respect for the other authorized religions. They must co-operate with the other religions to create religious harmony and attempts to convert people and other religions is forbidden.

Second Principle — Social Equity for all Mankind

According to this principle, all men must be acknowledged and treated with equal dignity as befits ‘God’s’ subjects. All citizens have the same rights and responsibilities without differentiation according to tribe, ancestry, religion, faith, sex, social position, race etc. In fulfilling this principle humanitarian values must be held high and truth and justice defended. Conscious that all men are born equal, Indo-
nesians should strive to develop mutual respect and co-operation with other nations.

Third Principle — The Unity of Indonesia
Under this principle, Indonesians place national unity, solidarity and the safety of the nation and the people above personal and sectional interests. Because of their pride and love of the nation, Indonesians are prepared to sacrifice personal and sectional interests for the benefit of the nation within the context of fostering global order based on the principles of freedom, eternal peace and social justice.

Fourth Principle — Representative Democracy
As a consequence of this principle, Indonesian citizens possess equal rights and responsibilities. In exercising individual rights, priority must be given to national and social interests. Before taking decisions which affect others a meeting should be held with those concerned to produce a consensus on what needs to be done. The meeting should be held in an intimate family atmosphere (debate or argument is not encouraged). All parties are obliged to accept, respect and actively support the consensus achieved and execute the decisions taken, responsibly and in good faith. The decisions should not violate 'God's' law or moral code and must uphold the dignity of man, truth and justice and give priority to national unity and solidarity for the common good. Execution of the consensus will be entrusted to reliable representatives of the people.

Fifth Principle — Social Justice for all Citizens
Indonesians are conscious of their responsibility to bring about social justice in society. This must be developed by co-operative effort and within an intimate family environment. They should be careful to keep a balance between rights and responsibilities and respect the rights of others. People must be assisted to become self-sufficient. However, they should not use their property and position to oppress others, live extravagantly or act against the public interest. Hard work should be encouraged and the results and achievements in the public interest should be valued and appreciated.

In summary, the ideology is designed to strengthen national unity and communal solidarity by setting out the fundamental objectives and the ground rules for social interaction in Indonesia. Fulfilling these broad objectives and complying with the ground rules is the responsibility of the whole nation under the leadership of their state institutions.

STATE INSTITUTIONS

The 1945 Constitution designates Indonesia as a unitary republic. The highest institution of state is the Peoples' Representative Council (MPR). The MPR must meet at least once every five years. It elects the President and Vice President, sets the broad objectives to be accomplished by the President during his term of office and authorizes amendment or change of the Constitution.

Under the MPR are four bodies of equal status, the Presidency, Parliament (DPR), the Supreme Court and the National Audit Board (BPK). There is also an advisory body (council of elders) called the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) which is appointed by the President and provides advice to the President.

The Presidency
The Presidency gains its power from its constitutional authority over the armed forces and the authority to appoint and dismiss senior officials in the armed forces and the executive, and must approve appointments to the BPK and judiciary. The Presidency also derives authority from its leadership of the majority political grouping, authority to appoint 100 of the 460 members of parliament and its constitutional right to issue decrees etc. for the execution of Government business. The President exercises his authority through the Cabinet, the Provincial Executive and Armed Forces.

Cabinet
The presidency is supported by a Cabinet, currently consisting of 37 ministers and 4 senior officials. The key ministries and agencies for internal defence are shown in the following paragraphs.

Department of Home Affairs
The Department of Home Affairs is the primary channel of Government administration. It is responsible for the passage and maintenance of law and order, co-ordination of the services of the other Government departments and through its social political section, the guidance and control of political activity.

The Attorney-General Department
The Attorney-General Department works closely with the police and the armed forces in the investigation and prosecution of subversives.
**Department of Information** The Department of Information is responsible for issuing licences to all media, for guiding and counselling editorial staff on security matters and for ensuring the flow of information on all aspects of development and Government policy and programmes to the population at large.

**Department of Manpower** The Department of Manpower is responsible for stimulating the demand for manpower, encouraging skills development and maintaining harmonious labour relations.

**Department of Education** The Department of Education is responsible for curriculum development and purity, for developing national spirit and teaching the Pancasila ideology throughout the school system. It is also responsible for guiding and channelling student energies through approved organizations and activities. Guidance and regulation of mystical cults is also a responsibility of this Department.

**Department of Religion** The Department of Religion is responsible for the administration of religious courts, for encouraging religious observance, promoting religious harmony and promoting active support from religious leaders for Government development efforts.

**State Ministry of Youth and Sport** The Ministry of Youth and Sport is responsible for encouraging the development of non-political outlets to absorb the energies of youth and for guiding, counselling and regulating youth groups. Developing national pride and performance through national and international competition is also an integral part of the responsibilities of this Ministry.

**Bulog — National Logistics Agency** Bulog is responsible for ensuring the flow of essential products (e.g. rice, salt, kerosene etc.) to the four corners of Indonesia and price control of those products, usually through market operations.

**BP7 — Agency for the Education and Implementation of the Pancasila Ideology** BP7 is responsible for national ideological education.

**Bakin — The National Intelligence Co-ordination Agency** Bakin is responsible for coordinating the monitoring and detection of all subversive activity affecting Indonesia at home and abroad. Bakin does deploy some agents but preventive or repressive measures are usually left to the police or the military.

**The Armed Forces** The Armed Forces, primarily the Army, are the ‘backbone’ and ‘central nervous system’ of the ‘New Order’. It has legislative authority to detect, prevent and repress any subversive activity. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces work in close co-operation with the civil administration in exercising this authority.

**Police** The police come under the command of the Armed Forces but the Chief of Police has authority to conduct routine police operations. At provincial and lower levels, the police work in co-operation with the civil administration in the maintenance of law and order. However, the Army territorial commanders are responsible for command and co-ordination of internal defence activities and operations.

**Provincial Executive**
Administratively, Indonesia is divided into 27 provinces which are again divided into regions, districts and villages. Government is a hierarchy based on these subdivisions and the senior official at each level answers through the chain of administration to the Minister for Home Affairs. Area offices of other Government departments are usually found down to district level and are primarily responsible to their own department but the senior Home Affairs official at each level (e.g. governor, regent) has limited authority to co-ordinate the work of the various departmental area offices.

**The Armed Forces Internal Defence Structure**
Paralleling the civil administration is the Army territorial command structure, ‘backbone’ of the internal defence system. If the Army territorial command structure is the ‘backbone’ of the internal defence structure, then armed forces personnel seconded to key positions in the executive, legislative, judiciary and business can be described as the ‘central nervous system’: the means used to tie the various institutions together. These seconded personnel, called Karyawan, are expected to perform the duties assigned to them by the receiving organization, motivate and stimulate development efforts and ensure affairs are conducted in accordance with Government policy and the Pancasila. The pyramid of Government can be depicted as shown in figure.
INTERNAL DEFENCE IN INDONESIA

PYRAMID OF GOVERNMENT

President

Other Ministers

Minister of Home Affairs

Commander Armed Forces

National Level

Provincial Office

Governor

Military Territorial Commander

Province

Regional Office

Regent

(2)

Region

(1)

District Chief

(2)

District

(1)

Village Chief

Village Non-Commissioned Officer

(3)

Village

NOTES:
1. Matters at district and village level are handled directly by officials from the region office, by the district or village chiefs or heads of executive units e.g. headmasters, public works project supervisors and policemen etc.
2. Not all districts have a dedicated military commander. Some commanders encompass two or more regions or districts in remote areas of provinces like Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.
3. Similarly the village NCO normally covers a cluster of villages.

Policy Formulation and Co-Ordination

Policy formulation stems from the Constitution and the objectives (GBHN) given to the President by the MPR. In practice the GBHN are drafted under Presidential guidance by the Cabinet and the National Defence and Security Board (WANHANKAMNAS). Although details may be changed by the MPR, the philosophy and strategy underlying the objectives are rarely altered.

The executive then produces a national five year plan embracing all aspects of development. Next, departments and statutory bodies produce their own five year and annual plans which form the basis of budget submissions.

Many bodies contribute to policy formulation, among others the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, tertiary institutions, the National Defence Institute, the service command and staff colleges, the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) and the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency (BAKIN). Naturally, there is also a great deal of informal input to policy formulation and co-ordination but the agencies primarily responsible for internal defence policy formulation are BAIS, the social political staff of Armed Forces Headquarters and the Army territorial staff.

Co-ordination is achieved through a hierarchy of conferences designed to bring together all departments and officials who contribute to the maintenance of security.

Political Security Ministerial Meetings

Within the Cabinet there are three ministers responsible for co-ordinating the activities of ministries concerned with political and security affairs (POLKAM); economic, financial and industrial affairs as well as supervision of economic development (EKUIN); and, social welfare, education, health, youth affairs etc. (KESRA).

The POLKAM Ministers meet monthly to review the situation, discuss policy initiatives and co-ordinate activities with the Ministers involved. The meeting is chaired by the co-ordinating Minister and consists of Ministers' of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, Justice, Information, the Armed Forces Commander, Attorney General, the Head of BAKIN and others as required.

Provincial Leadership Conference

At Province, Region and District level there is a Leadership Conference (MUSPIDA) usually chaired by the local military commander, and attended by governor, regent or district chief, the Police chief, the Public Prosecutor and other members as required. The MUSPIDA meets regularly to discuss the political and security situation, discuss policy initiatives and co-ordinate activities. The Conference has no executive authority but relies on the members to use their executive authority to initiate action in accordance with the letter and spirit of the consensus reached.

At village level there is a Village Welfare Institute (LKMD) led by the village chief. It has a number of subsections which deal with such aspects of village life as health, education, ideology and security. Officials of the LKMD are volunteers; unpaid villagers selected by the village chief. The LKMD receives support and advice from district and regency authorities and from the village NCO and the police.
Policy and Doctrine

Having described the ideology, state institutions and policy formulation and co-ordinating mechanisms, it remains to describe the policy and doctrine derived to meet the aspirations expressed in the ideology. The Indonesian authorities have always been conscious that internal defence cannot be established and maintained by force alone. They are aware that without the active support of opinion makers no Government can endure for long. To use a phrase common in Indonesian doctrine, 'a conceptual and comprehensive approach' has been adopted to develop the institutions of state, to inculcate the rules of individual and social interaction with the state and to create a security apparatus capable of maintaining security.

Indonesia is conceived as being on a continuum between a suppressed and exploited colony and a great power where prosperity, justice and security has been achieved. To reach that goal, it is believed the development strategy has to be followed relentlessly until the people, the social institutions and the economic resources are developed to fulfill the worldly aspirations of the population. Having experienced the failure of the 'Old Order', the 'New Order' is determined to provide the unity of purpose, continuity and direction needed to get the nation moving.

Ideological Doctrine

In ideological terms the need for unity means there can be no debate about political ideology. A Bill currently before Parliament will compel all political, religious and community organizations to accept the Pancasila as the only legal ideology. Another four Bills before Parliament are designed firstly, to make it more difficult for either of the other political parties to gain power and secondly, make it more difficult to change or amend the Constitution. One of the Bills mentioned will increase the size of Parliament from 460 representatives, including 75 Armed Forces appointees, to 500 including 100 Armed Forces appointees. This increases the proportion of Armed Forces appointees from 16 to 20 per cent thus making it more difficult for either of the other parties to gain a majority.

Another Bill will change the requirements for amending the Constitution from a quorum of 2/3 of the MPR and a simple majority to a referendum which requires 90 per cent approval from the eligible votes to change the Constitution. Naturally, for any change to be accepted, all five factions of the MPR would have to support the change.

The Pancasila ideology is inculcated in the population from kindergarten. Tertiary students undertake 100 hours of ideological instructions before commencing their course. Most organizations are required to have a number of qualified and authorized instructors and to conduct Pancasila courses. Censorship is applied and university students can only study other ideologies under supervision and in such a way that the strengths of the Pancasila ideology are highlighted. The print, radio and television media and all public occasions are used to espouse and reinforce the message. The aim is to ensure that there is no ideological vacuum in Indonesia.

Political Policy

The traditional, big, happy and harmonious Javanese family is taken as the desirable model of political behaviour in Indonesia. Matters of significance should be discussed in a friendly family environment with due respect paid to elders, equals and younger members. After discussion, a consensus is formulated by father and all are obliged to support the consensus and measures taken to implement it. Open, emotional debate is regarded as vulgar, coarse and uncivilized. An even greater sin is to disclaim support for the consensus, and to publicly and volubly criticize implementation of the consensus is a violation of social harmony. This model gives a different emphasis to basic human rights (by Western standards). In liberal democratic societies, the state is seen as an aggregation of individuals who surrender some freedoms in return for the protection and support afforded by society and the state. In Indonesia, and many other counties, society and the state are seen as entities in their own right, without which the individual would find life very difficult. Therefore, the obligations and responsibilities of the individual to society and the state take precedence over individual rights.

The numerous political parties of the 'Old Order' have been reduced to three. The former nationalist and socialist parties were compressed into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the devout Islamic parties into the United Development Party (PPP). The Government party (called GOLKAR) represents the civil
service, professional and veterans' organizations and part of the less devout Islamic population. All political expression has to be channelled through these three parties.

Nevertheless, many other mediums of political expression are recognized. They range from professional groups and student associations to sporting and recreation clubs. In an effort to guide and control this form of political expression, umbrella organizations have been built or amalgamation encouraged. Large and widespread organizations such as labour, youth and sports have been brought under "umbrella" organizations financed by the Government. Good examples of umbrella organizations are the National Youth Committee (KNPI), the Indonesian Labour Federation (FBSI) and the National Sports Committee (KONI). The organizations regulate the political affairs of their affiliates and provide a conduit for political expression, communication and education.

For smaller, more specialized associations, efforts are made to have fragmented groups form one organization; for example, doctors, lawyers and ham radio operators are encouraged to form one association to represent their interests. This makes political control, guidance and counselling easier and provides a channel for political expression and education according to the pancasila model. One of the Bills mentioned earlier will regulate the formation, disbandment and conduct of all these organizations.

The organization of Parliament is also based on the Pancasila (family) model. The majority party, GOLKAR, commands the house but each faction is represented in the house leadership and committees. For example, the Chairman of Parliament is from GOLKAR but he has a deputy from each of the other factions. Thus all factions are involved in most house business and deliberations and are bound by the 'consensus'. As the leaders are fond of saying: 'There are no winners and no losers under the Pancasila model'.

According to the Constitution, both the Parliament and the President can initiate legislation, but in practice all legislation is initiated by the Executive and put to Parliament for approval. As the Pancasila model does not allow a 'loyal opposition' and as all draft legislation is intended to fulfill the objectives (GBHN) given to the President by the MPR, discussion is generally limited to perfecting the draft legislation, rather than debating the substance or philosophical basis of the legislation.

The Pancasila model does not permit judicial appeal against legislation and a court of administrative appeal, though considered acceptable, has not yet been established. However attempts are being made to draft an acceptable Bill. Consequently, the main channel of appeal against abuse of regulatory authority is via the Executive or the regional and national Parliaments.

Community political activity is also minimized in the interests of social stability. A 1975 law prohibits the formation of party branches below regional level and limits campaigning to short periods before elections. The legislation also prescribes the type and form of campaigning. The intent of the law is to limit 'political rabble rousing' between and during elections. However, in the interest of 'political education', the Government party, GOLKAR has recently launched a campaign to recruit and educate a cadre of 8 million members at village and district level.

Regulation, development, guidance and counselling of political and mass organizations is the prime responsibility of the social political section of the Department of Home Affairs. However, other departments play a role within their sphere of interest. For example, the Ministers of Sport and Youth Affairs, Manpower, Religion and Education are involved in shaping the political process via youth and sporting movements, unions, religious movements and student associations respectively. Every care is taken to ensure the selection of leaders who will abide by the Pancasila model. Public rallies have to be authorized and demonstrations are forbidden.

Detection and control of overt or clandestine political subversion within or outside the authorized political structures is the prime responsibility of the armed forces (through its intelligence and territorial organizations) and BAKIN (the National Intelligence Co-ordina-
tion Body). If transgressions are of a minor nature or the deviant person or organisation is only potentially troublesome, remedial action is usually handed over to authorized organizations or to the Civil Authorities, such as the Social Political Section of the Department of Home Affairs or the police. Every effort is made to educate offenders, channel their energies, and thus avoid alienating members of society. In serious cases, where blatant subversion is intended or rapid reaction is needed, the special powers of the Command for the Restoration of Peace and Security (KOPKAMTIB) may be invoked. However, these powers are normally held in reserve for use in cases where the conventional institutions cannot cope with the problems confronted.

Thus, an attempt is being made to create and strengthen self-regulating political structures and channels for political activity. Education of the people in political practice according to a code of behaviour distilled from the Pancasila is also a cornerstone of Government policy. The security apparatus prefers to remain in the shadows, prompting the civil administration and other institutions to control political expression. However, they are prepared to react quickly if required.

Religion

Religion has been both a radical and a conservative force in Indonesia. Religious fervour was an asset in the struggle for independence but also an obstacle in creating the independent state. Nevertheless, the Government has always acknowledged that religion plays an important role both as a hedge against communism, a social control and a restraint against rising material aspirations and the negative impact of western culture. It is also seen as a channel to motivate support for the Government and its policies.

In the early 1970s, the Government thought the nationalist PDI would divide the minority electoral vote with the Islamic PPP, but successive elections proved the impotence of the PDI to perform this function. Consequently, the Government sought, discreetly, to weaken the PPP, by breaking its affiliation with the Major religious organization, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and to muster religious support for GOLKAR. The first part was achieved when the December 1984 National Congress of the NU decided to break its affiliation with the PPP and concentrate on spiritual and welfare matters leaving members to decide their political affiliations.

President Suharto put religion in perspective when he said at the opening of the NU Congress:

"For us, Pancasila, as the basis of the nation (ideology), is no longer a matter of contention in the Pancasila state every citizen obtains motivation and inspiration from their respective religions and faiths in the co-operative effort to develop society, the people and the state."

Internal Security Policy

Internal security policy is predicated on two principles. Firstly, that the state is under constant threat from internally and externally motivated forces trying to fragment the nation, change its ideology or betray its independence; and secondly, the security forces should never allow themselves to be alienated from the people. Consequently, policy calls for a comprehensive intelligence organization to monitor and assist in overcoming the threat and a positive programme, a "social weapon system", capable of warding off the threat without recourse to repressive measures.

Monitoring the security situation is the prime responsibility of BAKIN, BAIS (Strategic Intelligence Body) and the Army territorial apparatus. However, all arms of Government have specialized intelligence agencies (which are coordinated by BAKIN). As a 1964 publication stated:

"Our intelligence activities must encompass all sectors of society including the political sector (political organizations, youth, labour, farmers etc); the economic sector (import and export trade, industry, farming, transport etc.); the social sector (international co-operative bodies, scientific, religious, cultural, etc.); and all elements of Government and administration."

Political subversion is broadly defined as any act of omission which undermines or could undermine the ideology, Government, economy, or religious and social harmony. This could include a wide spectrum of activities from normal criminal acts designed to undermine the authority of the Government, to armed revolt.
The Armed Forces have extraordinary standing powers to deal with subversive activity wherever it occurs, but again, where conditions permit, the appropriate institutional channels are used, so that the hand of repression does not become too visible and the institutions of state are stimulated to perform their proper functions.

The social weapon system consists of the national ideology (Pancasila); a viable political system capable of absorbing the channelling aspirations of the population, or at least the influential elements of the population; an economic system which guarantees the supply of basic human needs; and a situation which allows social and religious life to continue in harmony with prevailing policy. The Government has developed these systems and implemented a security system responsible for monitoring the situation, assisting in propagating and convincing the people of the efficacy of Government policies and systems and taking corrective action where the policies and systems are not being implemented correctly.

Measures taken to prevent the alienation of the Armed Forces and the people include imbuing the security forces and the people with the historical role of the security forces as revolutionary fighters, saviours of the state and upholders of the constitution. Great emphasis is also placed on maintaining the values of the revolutionary generation of 1945 when the security forces and the people fought as one for the independence and welfare of the nation. That era and ethos now provides the doctrinal basis for Armed Forces involvement in Government, known as ‘Dwi Fungsi’.

The security forces also have a strict code of discipline designed to make members aware of their role in society and encourage exemplary behaviour. Karyawan wear civilian clothes and are not usually addressed by rank and everyone is encouraged to live frugally and devoutly.

Direct communication between the Armed Forces and influential organizations and individuals is encouraged at all levels, both to keep track of the situation and to develop and maintain social cohesion. Civic action projects are also undertaken to strengthen the bond between the Armed Forces and the people and great pains are also taken to disassociate deviants from the general population. Thus Muslim extremists are accused of using communist tactics or of being criminals who have strayed from the true teachings of Allah.

If all else fails, as it will from time to time, the Government can employ considerable physical coercion to protect the Pancasila state. Indonesian doctrine stresses that the entire nation is obliged to secure the nation and that the Armed Forces are only the nucleus of the national security effort.

The intelligence apparatus has specialist executive units for special operations to detect, arrest or neutralize dangerous subversives or to counter terrorist acts. For larger scale operations, the territorial structure, regular troops and para military forces can be employed. When the use of force is required the military commander has full authority to mobilize and employ all the resources, civil and military, available to restore law and order and civil administration.

**Future Prospects**

Transforming a large, developing, physically and socially fragmented, agrarian nation with little previous national identity into a modern nation state cannot be achieved rapidly or without suffering. Whether current methods and means are appropriate is a matter of judgement beyond the scope of this article.

However, the current regime has stabilized the nation and commenced wide ranging development in all fields. Nevertheless, the security situation could be disturbed by sluggish economic development, rising political aspirations, or a power struggle within the ruling elite. Islamic fundamentalism does not have widespread support, in its own right, but could be a factor in combination with other causes.

Beyond arguments about the desirable ways and means to achieve balanced economic development, Indonesian economic development is hindered by an ineffective and inefficient Public Service, poor quality education and training (and a consequent lack of skilled manpower), poor financial administration and misuse of authority. Efforts are being made to overcome these deficiencies but progress may not be quick enough to meet the needs and expectations of a rapidly increasing and more aware population.

Indonesian society is traditionally hierarchical and paternalistic and that characteristic continues to be a great asset in maintaining security. However, continued development, increased travel and the penetration of foreign media,
although controlled and censored, will enevitably force some changes in traditional patterns of behaviour. Great efforts are made to promote traditional values, generate pride in all things Indonesian, promote religion, and denigrate foreign values but it is proving difficult to innoculate the middle and upper classes against what are seen as the less desirable foreign concepts and values which make social control more difficult and complex.

The very success of Government development in creating a growing educated upper and middle class could create material aspirations and a desire for political and economic power beyond the point where ideological indoctrination, patronage and more subtle control measures would be effective. At that point the Government could allow a gradual increase in the authority of national institutions, which are now under Government tutelage, and institute political and economic reforms to allow wider participation. Alternatively, the Government could confuse national and corporate interests and maintain or tighten bureaucratic control. This would be done ostensibly to protect the nation from unrest, but would also secure the interests of the elite in the short term.

In the longer term, if development is too slow or misguided, dissatisfaction and unrest could force an increase in the use of repressive measures. This could, potentially, break or weaken the bond between the security forces and the people, thus prompting the emergence of an educated revolutionary cadre of the left, right or centre which could shake confidence in the Government and destabilize the nation.

Institutionally, the major source of instability is likely to be connected with the succession of the President. Constitutionally the President is elected by the MPR. In practice he will be selected by the ruling elite and put to the MPR for election. If there is no obvious successor or the successor is incompetent, a struggle for power could break out and stimulate widespread unrest. Naturally, the Armed Forces will try to avoid this eventuality by selecting a capable man through consensus with the other factions. In summary, the future holds many challenges for the Government generally and the Armed Forces in particular, but the system they have created has the potential to meet them.

Conclusion
The aim of the article was to provide a descriptive overview of the internal defence measures applied in Indonesia. The measures are based on a sound understanding of the fundamental problems. A home-grown ideology has been created and propagated and despite widespread apathy has been generally accepted. The Government has created the institutions and channels for political expression, albeit under tutelage. The distribution and price of basic human needs is regulated and there is a genuine desire to develop the nation and improve the lot of the people.

The Armed Forces are well integrated with Government and provide comprehensive coverage of potential trouble areas. They are thoroughly imbued with the need to maintain close links with the people in general and opinion makers in particular. It is not a military dictatorship on the South American model, but the Government is dominated by the Armed Forces, which constitute the major political force in the nation.

The internal defence system is comprehensive, strong and capable of maintaining law and order in the short term. However, the causes of discontent are ever present and, unless economic development is sufficient, appropriate and equitable, the long term future will seriously test the system. Although institution-building is occurring, Indonesian society is still hierarchical and paternalistic. Responsibilities which would normally be shared by the institutions of state in other societies, still rest with the Executive. Consequently, at this early stage of institution building, James Mackie's 1978 observation that "The structure of Government is extremely brittle . . ." still contains a grain of truth.
NOTES
2. This was a concession to the Dutch and the Federal States who hoped the move would protect the conservative elements of society and Dutch economic interests.
3. Indonesian doctrine gives more emphasis to communist involvement in the Coup. See Nugrono Notoasunto, The National Struggle and the Armed Forces In Indonesia, Department of Defence and Security Centre for Armed Forces History, 1975, page 125. However, it is generally accepted that it was not simply a communist coup even though communist influence was a factor, for example see Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, 1978, page 97.
4. JSP (AS) 101, Edition 3, Feb 84, defines internal defence as, 'The full range of measures taken by the Government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency'.
5. Decision Number II/MPR/1978, 'Guide to Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila'.
6. The authorized religions are Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism.
7. 75 of the 100 appointed members are appointed from the Armed Forces; the remainder are from functional groups like the Public Service. In mid-1985, all 100 will become Armed Forces appointees. See paragraph 50.
8. Regulation of mystical cults, which have a strong following among nominal Muslims, was given to this Department to emphasize that mysticism was not considered, officially, to be a religion. Mysticism is the pursuit of oneness with 'God' through set but uncodified individual behaviour. This behaviour is usually learned from a Guru (teacher).
9. State Ministers have a small, personal executive staff but do not administer a department.
10. The Department of Defence is not included here because it is primarily concerned with administration of the Defence Forces. Its role beyond that is limited, because the Commander of the Armed Forces is one of the four senior officials in the Cabinet and answers directly to the President.
11. The others usually include some or all of those mentioned in paragraphs 25-35.
12. The five draft Bills will be passed into law in mid 1985. They are: a Bill to regulate community organizations; a Bill on political parties and designation of the State ideology; a Bill on the composition of the MPR/DPR, provincial and regional parliaments; a Bill on the procedure for amending the 1945 Constitution (Referendum); and a Bill on the regulation of general elections.
13. In the May 1982 elections GOLKAR obtained 64.07 per cent, PPP 27.99 per cent and the PDI 7.94 per cent of the vote.
15. P. Napitupulu, Intelligence (Fungsi dan Perannya), Bhratara, Jakarta, 1966, page 158.
16. Presidential Decree 47/1978 authorizes the Special Executive to use all elements of Government and take whatever measures are necessary within the law and without ignoring the rights of citizens in accordance with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

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MAXIMIZING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEFENCE RESOURCE

By K.P. Dreitkopf, Director Accounting Policy and Systems.

Introduction

The concept of a 'Resource' means different things to different people, depending usually on the degree of descriptive terminology attached to the word 'resource'. However, when stripping the veneer and layers of both emotive and descriptive ideas and arguments resource in its Defence context reverts to the basic meaning that it is a given amount of Government funding allocation to perform certain tasks.

This article introduces the reader to an awareness that Defence Resources in whatever form attract some form of cost. Consequently, the usage of one resource will have a direct influence on the availability of other resources. In other words, even though usage of a given resource might seem to indicate that the resource is 'free' (i.e. does not attract any costs whether readily identified or not) the simple truth is that 'Free Resources' in the Defence environment do not exist.

Resources Concept

In examining the concept of resources consideration must relate to economic definitions, the Government Budget strategy and allocation of the Defence dollar.

In the economic sense 'Resources' are popularly described as items or services used to produce goods to satisfy human wants. Much is then said about the traditional categorization of resources into land, labour and capital, including the composition of the resources by elements such as natural resources (e.g. air, water, soil), physical and mental effort, equipment inventories, buildings and plant.

Western democracies are traditionally made up of the people's elected representative and government strategies are said to be tested by the ballot box. Thus, in satisfying human wants on the national scale governments will consider the ballot box power and voter reaction when deciding its resources 'sharing' policy. It implements such decisions by formulating a Budget Strategy.

The flexible 'Budget Strategy' is the medium by which a government's expected national income over a given financial year is apportioned to provide expenditure authority for government policies. The Defence dollar resource is that portion of the national income which the government of the day decides it is prepared to forgo for the defence of the nation within the total 'sharing' policy over the particular Budget period.

It can thus be said that in the Defence context 'resource' denotes the quantity of defence dollars available to provide adequate national Defence security within government agreed guidelines.

Resource Influences

The Defence dollar resource is influenced by both external and internal factors. Subject to the degree and direction of such influence direct effects will be felt not only in the quantity of the Defence resource available but also the manner and programmes to which it is applied.

Direct external influences derive from such areas as government policy regarding national economics, government Budget allocations, natural disasters and overseas events.
National economics may require diversion of public sector expenditure into non-public programmes. For example, if policies are inflationary-inducing then the diversion of resources might be to promote restoration of commercial confidence. Likewise, if a period of economic growth has developed and particular programmes are satisfied to the extent a surplus may arise then the basis of formulating the national economic policy will change.

National economic policy will thus form a substantial part of government criteria in formulating Budget strategies. This is not to say it is the only basis as obviously other factors such as natural disasters and voter reactions will also be reckoned with. Overseas influences will affect government resource decisions in either a conscious or indirect way. The oil crisis and sharp increase in related product costs are indirect effects as is continuing global inflation and exchange fluctuations. Overseas natural disasters and emergencies (e.g. Vietnam) generally require a cautious government decision to divert national resources.

Internal influences are normally those generated within the Defence organisation, e.g. the policy of funding allocations for specific projects and purposes on a priority basis, reassessment of priorities, wastage factors such as direct waste, indirect waste, reduced efficiency and direct losses.

**Resource Applications**

The actions of people involved with the Defence organisation will generate certain effects which can be identified and quantified in terms of Defence dollar resource applications. As in any organisation subject to regulatory controls it is necessary to have an orderly approach to resource applications. In the broad sense Defence accomplishes this by having users bid for specific programmes and projects, with provision for variations. These bids are then generated into a consolidation of the estimating process, converted into the appropriation structure and ultimately resources are allocated for application to the tasks previously proposed.

The application of resources is thus identified in the broad stream of the government appropriation structure, formulated and effected through the Appropriation bills. A cursory glance at these Bills will show that the Parliament 'appropriates' dollar values to each Department of State under specific appropriation 'Divisions'. For example some Defence appropriations for financial year 78/79 are detailed in Appropriation Bill No 1, then detailed into Divisions 230 through to 253.

The appropriation Divisions are then further detailed into sub-divisions, the total concept being to identify how the resources are applied. Division 230-1-01 identifies the resource application Permanent Naval Forces (01) Salaries and payments of a salary nature (1), for the Australian Defence Force (230). Likewise, Division 232 is the 'Manpower' resource application for Defence civil personnel.

The reader will note a trend in this appropriation structure to identify resource application on a limited functional basis. This is useful for accountability purposes however it does not presently enable a ready identification of costs associated with a particular function. For example, to identify the total cost of running an Air Base would necessitate the gathering of information as extracted from the various Appropriation Divisions encompassing salary equipment and so on. The need to have such a cost identification facility has been long recognised and development work has been continuing for some time to assess alternative means of presenting resource application data. In the meantime the present Appropriation structure will continue pending changes enacted by Parliament.

The concept of resource application as identified in the Parliamentary Appropriations is thus developed into a practical application within the Defence organisation. It can be seen how the Defence resource is applied into broad streams such as Manpower, Equipment, Plant, Research and Development, and Administration. Each of these categories may then be further developed to identify further resource applications within that stream. Manpower entails the Defence Force, civilian personnel, administrative staff, technical staff. Equipment includes maintenance of existing stores, weaponry, consumables. Plant includes the major capital replacement and acquisition programmes, static facilities such as bases and the like. Research and Development is generally related to all those items concerning Science and Technology. Administration includes all those 'house keeping' type of applications.

By once again drawing on the Appropriation Bill No 1 for 1978/79 the Defence Resource allocated in that Bill is seen to be $2.3 billion.
The relative identification of how this resource is applied within the Defence organisation is simplified by this percentage table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Force</th>
<th>$2.3 billion</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>$0.903 billion</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian salaries</td>
<td>$0.27</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Salaries and Admin Expenses</td>
<td>$0.16</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/Stores (non Capital)</td>
<td>$0.601</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs and O/Hauls (incl. Works)</td>
<td>$0.091</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services (incl. NDO, Defence Co-op)</td>
<td>$0.084</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Services</td>
<td>$0.191</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table may be further simplified into these three categories:

- **Manpower—Salaries and associated expenses**
  - $1.237 billion, 53.1%
- **Admin—Administrative expenses**
  - $0.272 billion, 11.7%
- **Equipment—other services (including equipment)**
  - $0.820 billion, 35.2%

**Resource Management**

The appropriation structure and the Defence allocations through the Budgetary Process have already been discussed and in the context of resources management is the government means of effecting its economic oversight. There are however a number of other managerial devices employed with which to manage the Defence resource. These are external and internal processes.

External Defence resource management is affected by such events occurring from the Appropriation structure, the Senate Estimates Committee hearings, Treasurer's statements of receipts and expenditure, Auditor-General's reviews and examinations by the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. Internally, Defence manages its resources through the Appropriation structure, the Resources and Vote Coordinators and the Five Year Defence Program. All these methods provide resource management with the means to monitor and control resources; balance allocations with usage (or draw comparisons); review resource application achievements; and provide for resources growth factors.

After the Treasurer presents the Budget and tables the Appropriation Bills, Senate Estimates Committees are formed which are tasked with examining the Bills and questioning the Departmental Estimates. A formal Senate hearing is constituted at which Departmental Officers
providing evidence. Space does not permit detailed discussion here as to types of questions and examinations pursued, however, the readily available Hansard transcripts of proceedings provide a valuable insight into this type of resources monitoring.

Within the Department, resource management is effected through set procedures under the control of the Departmental Budget Control Authority. He is responsible to the Secretary for co-ordination and control of the Defence resources programme. This management is achieved through a hierarchical system and delegations along both functional and appropriation structured lines. A system of inputs is thus provided whereby initial estimates are produced, ‘Vote Co-ordinators’ control and manage specific portions of the resource allocation and ‘Resource Co-ordinators’ will oversight and initiate resources policies along Departmental functional lines.

Effective control is achieved within this aspect of resources management by the monitors watching expenditure and commitment trends, recognising potential distortions to the programme, taking cognizance of revised allocation priorities and re-aligning resource applications within the managerial framework when the necessity arises. Closely aligned with this method of control is the system of balancing and comparing resources estimates with allocations and expenditure (or commitment) achievements, within the Department.

On the national scale the Minister for Finance prepares a statement of Receipts and Expenditure for each financial year. This details the dollar value of each resource allocation made under the appropriations and also the achieved expenditure in respect of the allocation. The statement is subject to scrutiny by the Auditor-General who will prepare an annual report to the Parliament. In this report he certifies as to the correctness of the Departmental accounts. Resources management is thus aided by setting specific budgets, based on expected resource applications and ‘balanced’ against actual resource expenditure achievements.

A further extension of the Resource Management so far described is the method of reviewing achievements in applying the resource. Monitoring and control provides a continuing review process within the Defence Organization. However, further critical reviews emanate from external sources, principally the Auditor-General’s Office and the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts (PAC).

The Auditor-General is vested with the very wide-reaching power to make enquiries and observations and call for accounts, vouchers, statements, documents and explanations as he thinks necessary. His findings which can be very critical of Departmental resources usage, are tabled annually in the Parliament, in conjunction with statements of receipts and expenditure discussed. The PAC is the Parliamentary agency which will select items from the Auditor-General’s Report and elsewhere and conduct Public Enquiries. Departmental explanations are required and Departmental Officers provide evidence under oath.

Finally, a system of Resource Management should also provide for future planning, with regard both to the effects of current resource utilization and expected growths or decline as expected future resource allocations. The Defence Organization is serviced for these purposes by the Five Year Defence Programme (FYDP).

The FYDP is basically a planning strategy extending over five years but which is continually reviewed and subjected to revised resources, policy implications. Planning is thus assisted and regulated in the context of likely implications for future years where particular resource decisions are effected in the current (or ‘Budget’) year.

Resource Costs

The term ‘cost’ generally creates the automatic response of focusing on dollar value concepts. Popular terms such as ‘Life Cycle Cost, Life of Type Cost, Sunk Cost, Opportunity Cost, Full Cost, and Additional Cost’ are bandied about at random, often by people that ‘know’ they have a good grasp of what the term ‘cost’ means but who are unable to practically explain their notion of cost. This is not to imply that there are a lot of ill-informed people about or that ‘cost’ is an esoteric truth revealed only to a select initiated few. Rather, it is necessary that the concept of applying limited resources be recognized as not necessarily meaning that cost effectiveness (or value for money) has been achieved. The fact that a particular appropriation is available and the resource is applied does not mean that the true cost of the application and its effect on other resources has been considered.
In making resource decisions it is vital that the effects on other resources are recognized. To achieve this the decision maker should consider relevant cost factors such as Resource Influences, Idle Time, Idle Capacity, Idle Capital and Established (or 'sunk') costs.

In applying resources to manpower elements there is a need to strike at a balance between the various elements of cost to obtain the maximum Defence dollar benefit. The measurement for cost effectiveness may be the degree of troop availability and readiness to deal with situations or the capacity of a fighting unit. Costs associated with this role will include initial acquisition and training (capital), establishment and administration (Labour), and exercising or actual combat (production). If a higher proportion of the resource is applied to capital and labour then the cost effectiveness in terms of production will diminish.

For example, once being established as a prepared manpower element any resources applied to that manpower and not related to production will diminish the benefits per Defence dollar for that unit. Thus, a typical Defence Force Officer attached to a Defence Headquarters will enhance production by applying his resource to staff duties. (Resource being his time and cost being identified by converting time into salary and other benefit terms). Any time used which is cost connected with this aim in mind, to fit him for his primary role as a fighting unit, will reduce the cost effectiveness achieved.

There are thus many implications in respect of resource 'costs' which may not be initially considered when applying resource decisions in the Defence environment. There are inherent dangers in drawing the suspect conclusion that particular resource applications which appear not to attract specific costs are 'free' resources. The costs may not be immediately evident and could well have drastic consequences for other resources which are not initially recognised (either by accident or design).

Summary

This article has shown that Defence resources are finite and that the application of resources should be based on sound planning and judgement with a consciousness of the effects on other limited resources.

Resource utilization in the Defence environment begins with estimating how resources are to be applied with a view to achieving maximum effectiveness per Defence dollar in implementing the Defence primary role. However, such applications will be subject to varying pressures and influences, both of an external and internal nature.

The Defence Resource is public property and therefore subject to Government allocation priorities within the framework of government economic policies. A consequential direct effect is to place resource applications under close public scrutiny. Press articles and Parliamentary questions often refer to alleged wastage of the public resource.

To maximize the effective use of Defence resources, planning should be based on the primary Defence objective as the focal point. This critical requirement is further amplified when recognizing that the resource decisions often (if not always) need to be justified in the context of maximum effectiveness achievements. Therefore, as resource applications must relate to the Defence primary role and public accountability (not necessarily in that order) it is imperative that resource decision-makers adopt the habit of considering the implications for other resources when applying particular allocations.

In conclusion, achieving the maximum effectiveness of limited Defence resources will depend largely on these factors:

- retaining the Defence primary objective as the focal point for resource decisions;
- making resource decisions which are based on good estimates planning;
- recognizing that resource income is finite and that usage will attract costs which may not immediately be identified but which will contribute to diminishing the balance of resources available for other purposes;
- resource decisions unrelated to the primary defence role will decrease the cost effectiveness attained per defence dollar;
- wastage and inefficiency, whether accidental or by design, will use resources to the detriment of primary objective achievements; and
- because they use public funds in the final analysis defence resource applications are subject to ever-increasing critical appraisals by the public at large and its agencies (Parliament and the Press) requiring justification by Defence personnel for their resources decisions.
AUSTRALIA'S USE OF THE SEAMINE IN THE 1990s

By Lieutenant A. J. Hinge, RAN

Today, as in the past, many people consider the mine an old fashioned, ineffective, unglamorous and even immoral weapon. It has been argued that such a simple weapon has no significant role in the allegedly high-price, high-pace, high-technology confrontations and wars of the future. The aim of this article is to show that the mine has a brighter future than ever as an increasingly cost effective and flexible weapon capable of strongly supporting the defence of Australian national interests. In particular it will be argued that the mines utility as a sea-denial weapon will be instrumental in the defence of Australia's territorial integrity against possible challenges for resource wealth towards the end of the century.

Problems for Australia in the 1990s

In 1995 it is almost certain that less than 0.3% of the world's population will be living on the Australian continent. It is also certain that the continent and Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) will still hold at least one quarter of the world's known Uranium reserves in addition to enormous mineral, oil and fishery reserves. Australia's Antarctic territory also represents a large area with as yet unknown resource reserves open to the challenge.

To our north is a rapidly developing region composed of nations with increasing populations and growing demand for energy and other resources by which to sustain economic and social progress. The region is populated by many relatively new sovereign states following an apparent world-wide trend of becoming more nationalistic, protectionistic and militaristic. As essential oil fields, fishing grounds, mineral deposits and other available reserves deplete, the small Australian population's right to such a disproportionate share of the planet's wealth may be challenged in various ways. Areas of Western Australia, the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) and Antarctica may become increasingly vulnerable and attractive targets for lodgement and exploitation by developing and even developed nations. Limited warfare tactics could well be used against Australia ranging from sporadic attacks against vital points; harassment of shipping, fishing and oil production to regular intrusions into Australian waters and introduction of illegal immigrants. A limited or even major lodgement in an isolated area of
the continent is also a possible avenue for establishing a political precedent for subsequent ‘immigration’.

Australia is unlikely to have sufficient sea assertion and surveillance forces to both defend the EEZ and maintain sea lines of communication against harassment. The development of a solid and diversified protective, defensive and offensive Australian mining capability will provide the nation with an enhanced defence in depth and supply a useful supplement to the activities of a small Navy and Air Force charged with the formidable job of defending a massive continent with an equally massive EEZ. In addition to these important considerations the mines utility as a weapon of limited war will give political decision makers vital options not provided by other weapons systems in future conflicts.

The Mines use in Future Conflict

The mine has consistently proven itself effective in all major twentieth century conflicts and has established itself as a valuable instrument in limited warfare. During the Vietnam War in 1972 the mine was the only politically practical means of cutting off North Vietnamese sea traffic and resupply. The mining of three North Vietnamese harbours achieved the vital strategic objective of imposing a highly effective, cheap and non-escalatory naval blockade. Fifty foreign vessels were bottled up in port for 300 days. As a direct result supplies reaching communist combat units was reduced by an estimated 300-1500 tons per day. The increased traffic required on the overland resupply route made the communists more vulnerable to air interdiction and their casualties increased significantly. It has been argued that the laying of mines had a vital impact on the result of the last co-ordinated US offensive against North Vietnam and acted as a potent political lever by which to make the communists more amenable at the Paris conference table. Sir Robert Thompson, highly respected strategist of the Malayan Emergency and outspoken critic of the conduct of the U.S. campaign in Vietnam highlights the value of the mining in the following quote:

‘The mining was aimed at reducing Hanoi’s future capability to continue the war at the pace Hanoi itself had set . . . A far more important purpose was the message which it conveyed to the Russians: “If you arm your allies with superior offensive weapons to invade my allies, you must expect an appropriate American response which may involve you”. The Russians got the message at once’. The mine thus re-established itself as a potent tool of limited war in that it was quite openly used in a period of national reversion to warlike actions. It was acceptable to the American people as a form of warfare because it was used effectively, without directly killing people or devastating property. The enemy had to make a conscious decision to challenge the field and run the gauntlet. The level of violence was minimized as well as the potential for escalation involved in imposing a normal naval blockade against the predominantly Eastern bloc supply ships.

The successful mining of North Vietnam to achieve limited objectives graphically demonstrates the unique psychological effect of mine warfare. The psychological warhead of the mine can be exploited by efficient and imaginative Australian planners. The mine has a different psychological effect when compared with directly aimed or active weapons. The mine is a passive, unaimed weapon which the German submariners of both world wars feared above all other weapons. They felt that these automated, impartial and implacable enemies were patiently waiting for them to make a mistake and kill them mercilessly. No questions asked and no quarter given. The success of the North Sea Barrage in WWI even though it offered less than 10% kill probability is testimony to the deterrent effect of mining against submariners. The hidden, lurking nature of the mine had sinister, even evil connotations for these intrepid U-boat men. The effect on morale was such that few skippers would knowingly go up against a field. In history there have been many blockade runners but precious few minefield runners. The mines psychological warhead will continue to breed apprehension, shock, surprise and fear as men continue to feel naked before it. It will also continue to inject a persistent amount of caution and uncertainty into the planning and implementation of hostile naval operations against Australia.

The mine satisfies the present and future requirements to possess a less destructive means by which to achieve the limited objectives of
regional confrontations involving Australian national interests. In stating this it must not be inferred that the mine is in itself less destructive, on the contrary, mine fields sank more vessels in WWII than any other weapon. The point is that the mine, in eliminating escalatory eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between forces can stabilize crisis situations, buy precious political bargaining time and deliver a measured military response to a hostile act. Let us take the hypothetical 1995 example of foreign vessels continually entering the northern Australian EEZ effectively challenging Australian rights to the oil, gas, fishery and mineral resources contained within. Given that the foreign vessels had the support of their home government the Australian Government might react by dispatching a suitable ambassador such as an F-18 or FFG. Ultimately these active Australian defence units, given continued foreign infiltration, would either have to pull the trigger or back down. The former action being highly escalatory and the latter being an effective denial of sovereignty and serious blow to national prestige. In such a rape environment the mine offers itself as a valuable option when dealing with such challengers. Against the resource burglars of the future the mine can act as a ‘robot policeman’. The mining of the disputed area would send a clear ‘keep out’ signal to the challenger and would be indicative of an Australian national determination to hold on to its territory. The challenger would enter the EEZ at his own risk against a rapidly deployed, extensive field of two thousand pound mines. The planting of such fields would be a low risk, politically attractive means of naval blockade and a convincing declaration of an exclusion zone.

In the future, at least at the onset of many limited crises, traditional forms of warfare may be too provocative or escalatory. Mining can buy time; maintain ground and provide decision makers with an effective, decisive and low risk military response. The mine, as Australia’s ‘robot policeman’, supporting a thinly spread Navy and Air Force in the resource hungry world of 2000 AD could maintain an all-weather, 24-hour per day vigilance confirming our national claim to an extensive EEZ. In the final analysis it would be considered a form of ‘Surveillance by Fire’ when other surveillance forces are committed elsewhere.

It can be argued that the mine not only denies the challenger use of the disputed area but also the alleged legitimate owner is denied access. This is basically true, however the mine will have achieved some critical objectives. First, it will deprive the challenger of the victory which would have been won if no direct military action was taken against him. Secondly, it buys time for the Australian political and military leadership to crisis manage without making costly and possibly humiliating concessions. Time would also be available for ‘third parties’ to intervene before a military fait accompli was claimed by either of the disputing parties. Finally, the use of mines would be perceived by the challenger, the world and the Australian electorate as an effective and decisive action since the mine, once deployed, issues no communiques and will not surrender. Besides these important considerations the minefield remains ours. The mine sterilization time, ship count number, actuation characteristics, location, concentration and other programmable mission parameters are known by the user, in this case the Australian Government. Modern technology can even supply mines capable of being switched ON/OFF by various remote means providing temporary transit paths for friendly units on an ‘as required’ basis.

It could also be argued that the Australian EEZ has too large an area to mine in the case of non-specific area infiltrations. An option could be the offensive mining of the challengers home waters or shipping lanes to cause him proportionate inconvenience. In an extreme case submarines covertly laying Hi-mix mines could cause the closure of the challengers ports. Surprise Rapid Aerial Minelays (RAM’s) conducted by F111, P3 and C130 Aircraft could also achieve this aim at the beginning of a serious confrontation when the challengers’ air defence guard is down. In fact, Australia currently has a formidable Ram capability in that each P3 Orion is capable of carrying seven 2000 lb mines and a number of smaller mines. Also, under the Cargo Aircraft Minelaying (CAML) scheme the C130 is capable of rapid conversion to a minelayer able to deploy sixteen 2000 lb mines. The outstanding success of RAAF Catalinas in the RAM role during WWII is sufficient testimony to the utility of aerial minelaying in the waters of South East Asia.

The tactical use by Australian Naval and Merchant vessels of Convert Surface Minelays (CSM) is yet another area where the use of the mine can deliver large dividends during a con-
Conflict. Australia’s region of interest to the north, through which any long term incursion or lodgement force would probably come abounds with narrow straits, numerous islands and other such choke points and ambush sites. Minefields could significantly assist in the dislocation of an enemy war effort by the destruction or threat of destruction of his naval forces and logistics supply. During one night in WWII three ageing U.S. minelayers, the *Breese*, *Preble* and *Gamble* laid mines in the Blackett Strait of the Solomons and on the same night three Japanese destroyers, the *Kagero*, *Oyashio* and *Kuroshio* were sunk. The cost was nothing but the mines themselves. Only imagination limits the use of these unique and versatile weapons in the future defence of Australia against all manner of threat.

### The Mine as Protector

Australian harbours, ports and coastal routes are vulnerable to convert mining by unfriendly forces. The best mine countermeasure is the use of our own mines. Mines can be effectively employed around important harbours, oil rigs and coastal routes in a protective capacity in order to prevent the close approach of hostile surface vessels and submarines.

The effectiveness of the mine in a protective capacity was probably exemplified by the failure of the 250 ship UN Amphibious Force to take the Korean coastal town of Wonsan during the Korean War. This supposedly simple amphibious operation was held up for eight days by three thousand simple Soviet mines quickly deployed from sampans by inexperienced North Korean troops under the supervision of three Soviet advisors. The town was eventually taken from the rear by an ROK unit. At the end of the war Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East said

"The main lesson of the Wonsan operation is that no so called subsidiary branch of the Naval service, such as minewarfare, should be relegated to a minor role in the future. Wonsan also taught us that we can be denied freedom of movement to an enemy objective through the intelligent use of mines by an alert foe".

The main use of protective fields in Australian waters during the next decade will probably be against submarines. In future a number of anti-submarine fields could be laid in Australian waters to protect ports, harbours, oil rigs and coastal shipping routes. Also, a number of random fields could be shown to act as a powerful deterrent to unauthorised submarine activity within the EEZ. The existence of these fields would be declared but not their nature, location or extent. This would prove a significant form of anti-submarine surveillance (by fire!) and would indicate that the Australian Government meant business. These fields would be few and far between during peacetime but could be rapidly stocked up at the onset of conflict. Initially they would generally be composed of a basic galvanic antenna anti-submarine mine and locations would be known to Australian submariners and ‘need to know’ authorities. More sophisticated ASW mines could be laid as the situation warranted. Such mines as the Encapsulated Torpedo (Captor US Mk 60 mine) with a kill radius of one kilometre could be used to effectively protect high priority targets. Captors have been laid by submarines with 21 inch torpedo tubes and P3C aircraft during testing in the United States. It can also be laid by a wide variety of surface vessels.

### Australian Mine Production and Deployment

A mine is basically a metal casing packed with explosive, batteries, safety and arming devices together with some form of target detection device which determines just how ‘smart’ the mine is. The target detection device incorporates the influence sensor(s) (magnetic/ acoustic/pressure/combination) together with a processing unit which can range in complexity from a basic mechanical or electrical relay to a microprocessor. In the case of buoyant or moored mines a mooring cable and sinker unit is also required.

Australia has the material and technological resources by which to manufacture all but the most complicated mines. Australia could certainly manufacture all mines required for protective and defensive purposes. Sensor and target detection devices of good quality (as opposed to best quality) could be constructed using current resources. Most protective mines would be elementary in nature requiring few, if any, anti-sweeping properties as they are laid in territorial waters. Defensive minefields involving the laying of mines in international waters in order to
protect sea lines of communication would need certain basic anti-sweeping characteristics which could easily be provided by Australian industry. It is well known among mine countermeasures (MCM) personnel that mine sweeping is severely complicated by relatively simple mines which incorporate ship counts with the addition of intermittent arming and delayed arming. More problems can be thrown in by including a fixed intercount dead period and a facility whereby a mine fully arms if it does not detect any ship activity within a fixed period of days. Such mines as these could also be effectively used in many offensive mining applications.

Special Hi-mix offensive mines covertly laid by submarines for such purposes as harbour blockade would need moderately more sophisticated anti-sweep facilities, high target discrimination and have flexible, programmable mission parameters so as to remain appropriate to a changing tactical situation. Such mines might be operated remotely in terms of activation, deactivation and sterilization. Some modern mines even have the capability to vibrate into a sandy bottom almost completely burying themselves once deployed. MCM units would truly find this an ‘offensive’ mine!

The operational value of simple mining material in the protective and defensive role is enormous. Its clever offensive application against opponents with little MCM expertise and equipment makes such material extremely devastating and very difficult to deal with\(^9\). The deployment of such mines in a protective role offers a good opportunity to involve the resources of the civil infrastructure. Portable minelaying rails can be quickly fitted and dismantled on board just about any ship of reasonable size\(^10\). Bottom mines have even been laid from speed boats and rubber dinghies in the past.

Many civil vessels would also be useful in an MCM role as makeshift hunters and sweepers during times of difficulty. A number of converted trawlers were employed by the Royal Navy in a minesweeping role during The Falklands campaign\(^12\). At present a Vessels of Opportunity Programme (VOOP) is being conducted by the Royal Australian Navy to further explore the possibilities of calling upon assets of the civil sector to substantially enhance Australia’s MCM resources.

By involving the civil sector in mine-countermeasures, together with protective and defensive mining the public would be better informed on an important defence matter. Perhaps a more cohesive and supportive population may develop once permanent forces get the community actively involved in defence? Even the most extreme ‘peacenik’ could have only few objections to the boosting of his country’s MCM, protective and defensive mining capability by members of the civilian population. Involvement of the civil sector in MCM and mine deployment may become not only politically acceptable but politically attractive since the mine will naturally draw public support. The Australian public can identify with the mine as a weapon defending the nation from external aggression and the use of the mine is in full harmony with the strategy of Continental Defence. Minewarfare also harmonizes with the historically and geographically derived insular, even defensive disposition of the Australian people. Even using the mine in an offensive capacity can be well within the constraints of world opinion in many scenarios when the use of more provocative weapons will be unacceptable. World opinion will always be a constraining factor in Australian politics and military decision making. This further enhances the use of the mine and its value to political decisionmakers and the civil population in future crises.

**Conclusion**

The mine is not the panacea of Australian defence problems. It is however, a valuable tool in dealing with a large range of crisis situations which may be faced by our nation towards the end of the century. Also, as a potent sea-denial weapon it will grow in value in the support of our relatively small dedicated sea assertion and surveillance forces.

The bold and imaginative use of the mine offers more promise than ever before in the management and limitation of tomorrow’s conflicts. The mine will take its place in the mainstream of Australian defence planning as a relatively cheap, solid and diversified mining capability is developed. The net result being a significant and cost-effective increase in Australian deterrent credibility and warfighting capability. Ultimately it is believed that the mine will be instrumental, as a sturdy and reliable ally, in maintaining Australian territorial integrity against the challenges which are likely to come.
NOTES


2. These scenarios are adopted from a Strategic Assessment submitted to Parliament by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in 1981.


6. Commander A. Lott. Most Dangerous Sea. Naval Institute Press. 1959. p. 215. (Lott points out that from July 1943 to July 1945 RAAF Catalinas laid 2,498 mines in 1,128 sorties with negligible losses. Their main target was Surabaya, Headquarters of the Japanese Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet. The harbour was closed 47 times with a total of 375 mines. These mines sank seven ships and damaged eleven more. Balikpapan, another major RAAF target, which produced 67,000 barrels of petroleum products for Japan per day (90% of total Japanese requirements), was also often paralysed by mines. The total number of vessels sunk by RAAF deployed mines was 90, totalling 39,384 tons.


11. Lieutenant Commander J. M. Steussey, USN. Comments on Admiral C. Horne's article New Role for Mine warfare which appeared in the Nov. 82 issue of Proceedings pp. 34-40. Steussey (Proceedings July 83 p. 86) describes the rapid and efficient laying of 2000 lb Mk-55 bottom mines using simple, inexpensive and portable mineries which were packed up immediately on completion of the lay.


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TRUTH REVEALED ABOUT CHURCHILL FELLOWSHIPS

The Churchill Trust in Australia is part of an international organisation which was set up to provide opportunity for people with high academic qualifications to study overseas at Universities?

Wrong! The Churchill Trust of Australia is a wholly Australian organisation set up to give opportunity for overseas study to all Australians regardless of academic qualifications.

Well, even so, The Churchill Trust is an elitist organisation which deals mainly with people who are leaders in their field?

Wrong! The Churchill Trust offers Fellowships to all Australians who have demonstrated ability and show determination to strive for excellence by study or observation overseas.

Maybe, but only a few people can afford to go on a Fellowship?

Wrong again! The average Churchill Fellow goes overseas for about three months — fares and tuition fees are paid, an adequate living allowance is provided and family allowances are available in some circumstances. Most employers are so pleased with the honour and opportunity given to their employee that wages are continued in full or in part.

Well, anyway, I'd never get one.

Right this time — if you do not apply. But if you write to the address shown in the advertisement on page 41 asking for an Information Brochure on the Fellowships available in 1987, you could learn about the opportunity of a lifetime.
"If we could First know where we are, and whither we are Tending, we could better Judge what to do and how to do it".

Abraham Lincoln

To many of its supporters of 1945 the United Nations (UN) has failed in its primary task of ameliorating conflict. Those who saw it as a precursor to world government have been similarly disappointed. It must be acknowledged that the UN has failed to prevent those upheavals it was charged to eliminate, but it has nevertheless evolved to be a major participant in the pursuit of international peace and harmony.

The UN's evolution has been accompanied by fundamental development and change, and despite its disappointments, shows no sign of collapse. Inis Claude observes that the UN has a character of "changeability" and "changingness," and can be expected to continue to adapt to future challenges. Nevertheless, the UN has evolved to be "government by the Great Powers" and is capable of doing no more than the major powers permit. While changes to its authority, structure and operation can be formulated to improve its capabilities as a "peacekeeper" in the future, such efforts are largely unrealistic and impractical in the absence of broader international moral and political consensus. To appreciate this dilemma we must understand its threats of continuity and its "changingness".

The UN was the logical successor to the League of Nations, and lacked many of the latter's weaknesses. It was established primarily to prevent the recurrence of war, with its guiding principles enshrined in the Charter. The Charter detailed the peacekeeping machinery to be used in times of conflict. It provided (Articles 39-50) that members must attempt to resolve conflict between themselves by traditional diplomacy, conciliation and arbitration or through regional organisations. Should resolution remain elusive, the Security Council may recommend a solution to the parties in dispute. Furthermore, if the Security Council decides that peace is threatened or violated, it may require the belligerents to desist, invoke non-military sanctions or create an international police force to end hostilities. The General Assembly may additionally recommend a solution and/or military sanctions (Articles 11-14 and the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 1950). The Secretary-General may also activate the Security Council at any stage (Article 99). Primary responsibility for peace-keeping was thus entrusted to the Security Council, with the General Assembly in a supportive role. The Charter also acknowledged that conflict prevention goes hand-in-hand with international law, improved international harmony, standards of living, employment and social and economic progress and development.

The Charter reflected the priorities and aspirations of the Major Powers in 1945. It was concerned largely with conflict resolution (41 articles) rather than prevention (10 articles) and permitted wars of self-determination and self-defense. It provided for "world government" by the Great Powers in the composition of the Security Council, the right of veto by the permanent members and the restriction on the General Assembly from making political decisions. This distribution of functions thus contradicted the Charter's "sovereign equality". National sovereignty was further limited
because the UN could decide when members were to employ armed force and commit forces against another sovereign state. Above all, the Charter was predicated on continued unity among the Great Powers. This was not to be the case.

Despite the Charter's prescriptions, the UN "peace-keeping" function has evolved largely in response to three phenomena. The first was the Cold War which split the UN into opposing East-West blocs, undermined its principle of unanimity, deadlocked the Security Council and politicised the UN generally. The organisation subsequently acted to keep the major Powers peacefully apart or to limit any conflict between them ("preventative diplomacy").

Secondly, the thermonuclear revolution and its attendant risks of global annihilation altered the nature of war, the nature of politics and thus the nature of the UN. This was manifested in the rise of disarmament and pacifist issues ("prudential pacifism") and the demise of collective security.

Thirdly, the decolonisation process saw the UN functioning to confer and revoke legitimacy. After 1955 the number of former colonies swelled UN membership. These new arrivals were united in ideological consensus, and increasingly represented a formidable neutralist-non-aligned voting bloc in the General Assembly. Their priorities were the end of colonialism and racism, the New International Economic Order and freedom from political interference. The US was henceforth no longer guaranteed parliamentary victory in the General Assembly, and the USSR no longer the guar­anteed subject of General Assembly criticism. However, the General Assembly was soon para­lysed by the delinquency of these new states and, in turn, witnessed the rise of the Secretary-General and reemergence of the Security Coun­cil as the UN's major "peace-keepers".

Despite the above, and the deadlocked Se­curity Council, the peace-keeping potential of the General Assembly is not bankrupt. Increas­ingly it has reflected public opinion and checked the actions of predatory states who wished to avoid Assembly censure. Furthermore, its "recommendations" are increasingly heeded — "obedience (to recommendations) is a growing tradition which makes disobedience increasingly difficult". It is impossible to determine how much conflict the UN has prevented and how much security it has provided. It has certainly proven useful in the application of third party techniques which have prevented or shortened conflicts. It was particularly successful in as­isting with the peaceful decolonisation process. It also provides a unique speech-making forum which is increasingly viewed as a substitute for armed conflict. Yet the UN's successes are clouded by its failures. In recent years it has failed to resolve Middle East conflicts despite a UN presence and the focus of world attention, and conflict in the sub-continent, South Atlantic, Cambodia, Africa and South America. It has failed to achieve the reduction of arms called for in the Charter. What then are the shortfalls of the UN as a "peace-keeper"?

As already noted, the Charters provides the UN with its structure, boundaries and framework. It recognises the reality that not all dis­putes will be settled. Yet it does not fit in well with the contemporary environment. It fails to define what is meant by "threat to peace", "act of aggression" (Article 39) or "self def­ence" (Article 51). The requirement for mem­bers to provide forces for disposal by the Se­curity Council and obligatory military sanctions (Articles 42 and 43) are today dead letters. The Military Staff Committee is as far as the UN has gone in implementing military enforcement provisions. Furthermore, the Charter failed to provide for the shifting emphasis on security matters between the Secretary-General, the Se­curity Council and the General Assembly.

The major functional weakness of the UN is the lack of commitment to its ideals and prin­ciples by its members, particularly the Major Powers. The UN can do only what its members will it to do. It is today a political organisation in which members are locked in continual power and legitimacy struggles. Increasingly members are using the UN as a foreign policy tool, and increasingly they seek to avoid compromise. Efforts to adequately define "aggression" and wars of "self determination" have foundered on this political confrontation. Voting patterns change as selfish interests change. Furthermore, members are increasingly working outside the UN (as required by the Charter) to resolve their differences. Thus, only when compromise is doomed do members turn to the UN, rendering it virtually impotent at resolving conflicts before they reach crisis stage. Without the members confidence in the UN as a "peace-keeper", and without their responsible conduct as members of the global community, the UN is doomed
to the role of peripheral crisis manager, of limited effect.

Those who saw the UN as a collective security organisation have been disappointed at its total failure in this regard. The General Assembly United for Peace Resolution (1950) and the participation of sixteen members in Korea is the closest the organisation has moved towards collective security. The Security Council deadlock, the continuing adherence to balance of power and status quo politics by the Major Powers, the lack of definition in contentious areas (such as "aggression"), the requirement for states to participate in action which may be injurious to their interests and the UN's slow enforcement reactions have frustrated all collective security efforts. This failure prompted the development of "preventative diplomacy" as a third party technique which today is a major component in the UN peacekeeping inventory. This is the interposition of UN forces between belligerents after an armed conflict with a view to preventing surprise attacks and keeping the Major Powers apart. Forces for these duties are routinely drawn from neutral small-middle-range powers but cannot be stationed on territory without the states continued consent. This form of peace-keeping is rendered unpredictable because, despite the Charter provisions, there is no assurance that nations will contribute the necessary forces or finance the operation(s) — both aspects reflecting the ongoing power political contest within the UN.

How then can the UN be fashioned into a more effective "peace-keeper"? Fundamentally the members, and the Major Powers in particular, must wish the organisation to play a more effective peace-keeping role. They must work for broader political and moral consensus and agree to seek to avoid war. Dr. Evatt observed in 1948 that there could be "no substantial improvement in the work of the organisation so long as there is suspicion and lack of good will and understanding among members". Claude observed that the UN has "uses, not purposes". Its members have purposes which are often not conducive to peace and order.

Such a turn-about in the attitudes of the Major Powers is improbable. It is unrealistic to expect that Marxists will embrace Capitalists or that Major Powers will consign their interests into the care of the majority vote in the UN, or renounce the use of force. Furthermore, it is a "great delusion" to expect to transform the UN into a "synthetic artificially created great Power, powerful in its own right presiding over enforcing world peace and orderly conduct". Yet the UN can still act as a prime mover for peace. It needs to develop embryonic perceptions of common interest in the economic, scientific and disarmament spheres. The Major Powers need to agree on rules of peaceful coexistence and arms control. Such cooperation will reduce global insecurity and promote a sense of common interest which may spill-over into the political arena.

Despite its weaknesses, the Charter is not the decisive determinant of UN behaviour. It is the "runway" from which the UN "takes off". It has proven sufficiently flexible to permit the UN's "changeability" and will continue to do so. As its flexibility ensures that it reflects the fluctuating contradictions and realities of the international environment, it is doubtful if amendment would be beneficial. If it was amended, it should define more clearly the concepts of "aggression" and "self-defence", increase emphasis on conflict prevention and provide for earlier referral of potential conflict to the organisation. Nevertheless, as already noted, amendment would require unprecedented political consensus such that amendment would no longer be necessary.

Membership of the UN must be open to all. Should it be possible to agree on the necessary Charter amendment, Security Council membership should be extended to more accurately reflect contemporary power relationships. There is justification to add Japan as a permanent member, drop Britain and France from permanent status and introduce more middle-ranking powers without right to veto. The veto should be retained as a "safety valve" (should it be abolished it is quite unrealistic to expect that the Powers will not vote or act in any way inimical to their interests).

The General Assembly needs to be increasingly linked to the Security Council's security function. Its membership should be broadened, or a Security Committee established to perform its security function. It should not be given authority other than to recommend because of disparities of power and influence (2/3 of the Assembly vote could represent a mere 10% of mankind). A weighted voting system could make its resolutions more representative, but it is
unlikely that the principle upon which weighting could be based would be agreed upon.

The Secretary-General and Secretariat must play a more active third party role in "peace-keeping". The Military Planning Staff and Field Service Organisation needs reinforcement so that military planning and field support capabilities are in place at all times. It is unrealistic, however, to expect a UN standing police force, as envisaged in the Charter, to be established. Such a concept is tantamount to that of world government. It is unwise to expect nations to relinquish operational control of their contingents under UN authority for possible use against a major power (or smaller power backed by a major power).

The UN has evolved since 1945 as a major actor in international peace-keeping. It has, however, failed in its primary task of eliminating war and the promotion of order and security. It has failed because its membership, and Great Powers in particular, have not wished it to succeed. Yet the UN has produced some successes. It has provided an array of third party functions, an arena in which nations develop relationships, a forum bestowing political legitimacy and fostering non-political common interests and in which the Great Powers increasingly demonstrate restraint, circumspection and communication. Rather than criticize the UN for failure in a turbulent political climate we should explore and develop its successes. It should continue to seek peace through justice, redistribution and international law, together with its third party and neutralist functions, reinforcing traditional diplomacy and continuing the trends towards universality and procedural adjustment. It is the best equipped international organisation to perform this role.

Although not a panacea for peace, the UN is "a set of rules and a set of tools". These tools need to be fashioned and adapted to meet each challenge.

NOTES
2. 15 members since 1965 — 5 permanent and the remainder on a two year term.
4. Signalling increasing US disinterest towards the UN.
6. The belligerents must also respect their roles and limitations.
7. Most powerfully demonstrated in the mounting of the Congo operation.
10. Ibid, page 121.
11. Ibid, page 120.

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Illustrations
Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick, ACT

Photography
D.P.R. Stills Photo Section

Published by the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, for the Department of Defence.

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ISSN 0314-1039
RM 82/1097(15) Cat. No. 85 1453 1