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Contents

2 Letters to the Editor

4 Growing up with Japan
   Lieutenant Michael O'Connor, RANR

9 Perspectives on the New Discipline Legislation.
   Commander G. L. Purcell, RAN

15 Williamson, Stanton, Wadsworth and Orr
   R. Leiston

31 Commanding above the Stress of Battle
   Major D. A. Benge, RAE
   Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Robertson, AA Psych
   Major G. J. Stone, RA Inf

43 Power and Authority in a Military Organization—
   Application of some Theoretical Concepts to the
   RAAF
   Squadron Leader W. J. Freeman, RAAF

48 Integration of the Australian Regular Army and
   the Army Reserve
   Lieutenant Colonel P. W. White, RACT

53 Understanding Morale
   Kevin R. Smith

62 Book Review

Board of Management
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Managing Editor
Mr M. P. Tracey

Printed by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne
Sir Frederick Shedden
Dear Sir,

Reference my story of Sir Frederick Shedden in Issue No. 50, Jan/Feb. 1985, I should like to amend page 45 as follows:

(a) At the beginning of the second paragraph delete ‘John Wilton’ and insert ‘Tom Daly’.

(b) In line 11 of the second paragraph after ‘Later’ insert ‘Brigadier John Wilton’.

The end of the second paragraph on page 43 should read ‘commanded in turn by Brigadiers Tom Daly and John Wilton’.

I regret transposing the names of Brigadiers Wilton and Daly in the original story.

COL J. P. BUCKLEY (RL). OBE, ED

High Command
Dear Sir,

It is interesting to compare the views of the younger officer of today (represented by Major Horner) and the more traditional outlook of Major Perry. There is nothing that more clearly demonstrates the evolutionary nature of military thought than examining the approaches by these two officers.

I do not have the same problem that Major Perry has in accepting the term High Command. Regardless of its origin, it has come into common use today. Indeed, I have done some research on the origin of the term as stated by Major Perry and find the stated association questionable. The term ‘groses hauptquarter’ literally means ‘major or ‘grand headquarters’ while ‘oberste Heeresleitung’ means ‘highest command staff’. The similarity between these terms and ‘high command’ is therefore, at the least, tentative. I must therefore conclude, if we are to pursue Major Perry’s argument, that the term was indeed coined in Britain rather than Germany — by the British propaganda machine.

On the other hand, if we were to attribute the origin of ‘High Command’ to foreign source after 1914-18, say the Second World War, I could see a stronger argument emerging. Germany did use Oberkommando der Wermacht (OKW), which means ‘Higher Armed Forces Command’, and the equivalent army OKH. But then again so did the Soviets — Glavense Komandovassie (GK), which is literally translated as ‘High Command’. The question now arises who did coin the term High Command — the British propaganda machine, the Germans or the Soviets?

Perhaps I may be permitted to pursue this line a little further. Major Perry implies that the terms ‘Commander-in-Chief’ or ‘Supreme Commander’ are more acceptable in the Australian context, presumably because of their British origin. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme (Allied) Commander for the invasion of Europe. But at that time Hitler was already Supreme Commander of the Armed Force (Oberster Befehlogaser der Wermacht) and had subordinate Commanders-in-Chief. Similarly, Stalin was the Supreme Commander heading the STAVKS, and had a number of Commanders-in-Chief responsible for Fronts and Fleets.

Thus there is evidence to suggest that similar terminology develops in various armies more or less concurrently. I therefore could not object to the changing terminology, because that is the way we progress.

I might add here, that I myself obviously contributed to the acceptance of the term ‘High Command’ in the Australian Army many years ago now, when I renamed the ‘Rear Link’ to the ‘High Command Link’ in communications, when writing the joint service publication on communications. I can even attribute it to Field Marshal Montgomery, who used the term when describing the function in relation to senior officers.

I also have no problem with Major Horner’s use of the terms ‘National’ and ‘Military’ strategy. These two concepts have been used from the time of Sun Tzu. (see Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War), and I believe are so widely accepted today that, more often than not, a definition is not considered necessary.

On the other hand, I do have some difficulty with Major Perry’s differentiation between ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’. Although I am all for
simplification of concepts, over-simplifications bears with it the sin of omission. If I was forced to define, which I would rather not, I would favour Clausewitz's classification:

'tactics teaches the use of the armed forces in engagements, and strategy the use of engagements to attain the object of the war'.

When I say I would rather not, I do so advisedly. Firstly, it is in deference to the many eminent strategists (such as Liddell Hart, Sokoloskiy, Beaufre and Mahan) who have written extensive treatises on the subject. Secondly, the more advanced military thinking now accepts three, rather than two, levels of war. The third is the operational level, which exists between the tactical and the strategic.

I might note that operational level is nothing new. I can trace it back to the XVIIth century, when it was ascribed to Guibert and was known as 'Grande Tactique'. Napoleon became its greatest exponent. The German Baron Hugo von Freytagloringhoven defined the three levels of war in 1920, and the term 'operational' came into common use in the German Army thereafter. The Soviet General Triandafilov defined it as the term 'Operational Art', and the three levels of war are now well-established in Soviet military thinking. The United States adopted the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war in 1982, through their definition in FY 100-5 in that year.

I am surprised that Major Perry needs to have recourse to grammar in drawing a distinction between the CDFS and Chief-of-Staff. Apart from the fact that the two appointments are well-known to all officers, Major Horner had earlier clearly stated the difference between the two appointments (p. 17). This is perhaps a clear illustration in quoting out of context. The Utz Committee extract is clear and concise; the revision by Major Perry is not. Indeed, by removing the appointment of Chief-of-Staff from the description of command functions, it becomes incomplete.

I might add that now that the title of CDFS has changed to Chief of Defence Force, the description of high command has become even more apt.

I think, to use today's jargon, the bottom line is that we cannot be overly tradition-bound; otherwise, the world will leave us behind. We will then become like Sir William Napier, who strenuously opposed equipping the British Army with a new rifle as, in his opinion, it would destroy the infantry spirit and reduce them to what he called 'long-range assassins'. I encourage more Young Turks like Major Horner to test and try ingrained traditional ideas, in order to determine whether they are still relevant.

Col. J. VIKSNE
Russell Offices, Canberra

AWARD: ISSUE No. 51
(March/April 1985)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $50 for the best original article in the March/April issue (No. 51) of the Defence Force Journal to Captain H. S. Donohue, RAN for his article Maritime Mining: An Australian Perspective.
By Lieutenant Michael O'Connor, RANR

Introduction

Recent articles in Defence Force Journal have focussed on the impending re-emergence of Japan as a Pacific military power. This is as it should be. Japan is the third largest economic power in the world and shares interests in the Pacific with the two larger economic powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. If those interests clash, the smaller Pacific powers such as Australia will be embroiled whether they like it or not.

Australia shares a close military and political as well as economic relationship with the United States. Indeed, it would not be overstating the case to assert that Australia still depends for protection in most conceivable circumstances on the United States, whether that dependence is realistic or not. Japan has a close economic and security relationship with the United States, and a very close economic relationship with Australia.

All three nations regard themselves as part of the Western bloc, bound by ties which are economic and philosophical. All are democracies and all reject the concept of totalitarian rule and the professed determination to reshape the world in the Marxist image. All three are therefore in potential conflict with the Soviet Union, a conflict the philosophy of which is manifested occasionally in military confrontation.

Australia's relationship with Japan is essentially economic. Japan is our largest trading partner. Australia is one of the most important sources of raw materials, especially wool, iron ore, coal, bauxite, and food for the Japanese processing economy. Yet the very size and importance of that economic relationship has implications for the security relationship between the two countries.

The Defence of Japan

Unfortunately, too many commentaries on Japan's approach to defence adopt the simplistic view that the Japanese constitution rejects the option of resort to war as a solution to international disputes, and also eschews the development of armed forces. The same argument is used in Japan by those elements who for whatever reason do not want to see a return to the militarism of the 1930s and early 1940s. There is no doubt that there are strong elements in the Japanese body politic that adopt this view, some for legitimately pacifist reasons, others because of their allegiance, however tenuous, to the Soviet Union or China.

What these attitudes ignore is that there are a wide range of other views in Japan, many of them respectable and all with a substantial following. They also ignore the ultimate reality that Japan has very strong armed forces, organized under the euphemism that they are self-defence forces with little more than a police role. The defenders of the current Japanese defence posture also point out that Japan spends less than one per cent of Gross Domestic Product on defence. If that were
true, one per cent of Japan's GDP nevertheless can buy a lot of defence, even if it is not enough. It certainly buys more than Australia's three per cent.

It is well known now that Japan in fact spends more than one per cent of GDP on defence because a number of items which are called defence items in Australia, such as Service pensions, are not counted in the Japanese defence budget. What the relative levels of spending are is beyond the scope of this article. If the Japanese Government wishes, for political reasons, to conceal items of defence spending, to stay below what is seen as an acceptable figure of one per cent of GDP, that is its business. What is important for Australians is to determine what is being done with that money and how Australia might be affected.

Clearly, quite a lot is being done with the money. The Japanese Self Defence Forces are substantial and well-equipped. They have a moderately high profile and community status, certainly not lower than ours in Australia. There is a widespread defence debate in Japan of a sophistication much greater than in many countries, and with many more participants than we enjoy. The Japanese Defence White Paper, published usually annually, is a large and sophisticated document which canvases in depth a wide range of issues including strategic issues which are often buried in a mountain of secrecy in this country. Defence is a political issue in Japan.

This is as it should be. There is no reason why the Japanese should be expected to depend on others for their defence. Japan has a very long military tradition, by no means all as dishonourable as was some — but not all — during World War II. It follows that a powerful nation with such a tradition, and now largely populated by a generation with only a tenuous connection with events forty years ago, is unlikely to feel bound by a constitution imposed on it by the victors — and now the allies — of that era. Indeed, any attempt on the part of those victors to insist on the maintenance of the peace provisions of the Japanese constitution is likely to be counter-productive. At the moment, it suits the Japanese Government to ignore rather than change those provisions, just as it suits the bulk of the Japanese population to do likewise. It is largely only the Left — and generally the extreme Left — in Japan which would make an issue of the peace constitution in an attempt to enforce its provisions.

The other reasons for the Japanese official circumvention of the constitution and the growth of concern for Japan's security is that the country does feel threatened. The Soviet Union still occupies what was, until 1945, Japanese territory in South Sakhalin and the Kuril islands. The Soviet Union has so far refused to conclude a peace treaty with Japan, and Soviet forces maintain sophisticated installations at a high degree of readiness not only in the occupied territories but on the nearby Soviet mainland. These forces have resorted to penetration of Japanese airspace on frequent occasions and have threatened to do so in standard Soviet fashion on many more. The destruction of the Korean airliner in 1983 by Soviet forces sent a shiver of apprehension through the Japanese which was still apparent during my visit to the country a few weeks later. It was pointed out to me that the Soviet Union had forces at a high degree of readiness much closer to the Soya Strait area between Hokkaido and South Sakhalin than did the Japanese SDF.

The point of all this is that Japan is an independent, wealthy and proud nation which does feel threatened. Japan's defence policy is not one which will be made by an outsider, but will be made by Japanese, and will be designed to maintain that independence and wealth. That is as it should be. It is quite improper for outsiders to try to dictate that policy; they must learn to live with it.

**Living with a Rearmed Japan**

To a considerable degree, Japanese defence policy will impinge on Australia only to the extent that Japan develops a Defence Force which has the capacity to project power beyond its immediate neighbourhood. The Japanese SDF, powerful though it is now, has a very restricted reach. However, interest is being generated in the region because of what is perceived as a Japanese intention to extend the reach of that force, nominally to protect Japanese merchant ships and cargoes.

As usual, the Americans are being blamed for the change. As *Defence Force Journal* readers will have seen in an earlier issue, the pro-Soviet U.S. Center for Defense Information rebroadcasted the invitation by US Defence
Secretary Weinberger for Japan to take responsibility for the defence of sea lanes out to 1000 miles from Tokyo Bay. The Weinberger request, however, ought to be seen in the same light as the euphemistic “requests” by the South Vietnamese Government of the 1960s for Australia to commit forces to the defence of that country. All they do is provide a legal and political justification for a move already decided.

What the Japanese have decided is that their sea lanes are threatened. Over a period of years, they have noted not only their dependence on sea-borne trade but also a growing threat to its security and a decline in the American capacity to defend it. They point to qualitative changes in the Soviet navy with the development of large aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, attack submarines and large surface warships. They have noted the inclusion of anti-merchant ships serials in the world-wide OKEAN exercises conducted by the Soviet Navy, and especially the conduct of such exercises north of the Philippines where they are pointedly directed at Japanese trade. The development of Soviet facilities and forces in Vietnam on the flank of that trade has also generated concern.

On the other hand, the Japanese are aware of the decline in US ability to defend everybody’s sea lanes. They are conscious of the oft-quoted statement by a former CINCPAC, that the US Navy does not have the capacity to defend America’s sea lanes west of Hawaii. And they are nervous of the possible expulsion of US forces from the Philippines in the post-Marcos period.

There ought therefore to be no surprise if the Japanese begin to develop long-range maritime forces designed to defend this trade both eastbound and southbound in the Western Pacific. Australia’s interest is — or should be — involved by the fact that so much of that trade is with this country, and that if we are not as dependent on that trade as is Japan, we are certainly very dependent for our existing standard of living on its continuance.

It ought to be recognized that the decision to develop these maritime forces has been taken, and planning is well advanced. At the Tokyo Conference on the security of sea lanes of communication held in 1983, the attendance of a large number of senior and middle-level staff officers from the Self Defence Force Headquarters emphasized the point. And the wry comment by one that “if we could find an aircraft carrier which did not look like an aircraft carrier in a newspaper photograph, we would have half-a-dozen” came as no surprise. It was clear from discussions that the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) is well advanced in the theoretical teaching of carrier operational doctrine, and that the development of a carrier-based long-range trade protection force has already commenced, at least on paper.

Regional Responses

There is no doubt that this development is welcomed by the Americans. Not only have the series of conferences on sea lane protection been sponsored unofficially by the Americans, but they clearly welcome the possibility that the Japanese will now contribute to easing the burden so blithely placed on the Americans by the world’s trading nations. The Americans in common with many Japanese planners have reservations about the current Japanese strategy of closing the straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya against the Soviet forces based around Vladivostok. Other Japanese, including many from the JCSS (regarded as a leading force in the “rational” section of the Japanese defence community), still believe in the relevance of the “strait” strategy. They point out that, with the straits closed, the Soviets cannot supply their bases at Petropavlovsk or in Vietnam. Others respond that, on the contrary, this will compel the USSR to take more extreme action to keep the straits open. In any case, they argue, closing the straits would escalate a conflict which might begin with relatively low-level harassment or semi-piratical attacks on Japan-bound shipping as far away as the Indonesian straits or the South China Sea.

The Japanese concern for the security of shipping in South-East Asian waters, and their apparent determination to do something about it, is causing concern in the ASEAN countries, all of which suffered badly during the Japanese occupation of 1942-45. Indonesia and the Philippines paticularly are extremely hostile to any expansion of Japanese military power into the region. Under present circumstances, the Japanese MSDF could not expect to acquire any base facilities in the region.

There is an essentially political flavour about the ASEAN reaction. There is no suggestion that the Japanese intend to send ground forces
into the region. That is certainly not their need. Any forces which were deployed would be sea-based forces, and the numbers of personnel involved would be small. Nevertheless, there would be a political backlash in the ASEAN countries, one which they are determined to avoid.

The weakness of the ASEAN position is that they offer nothing. All the ASEAN countries have an interest in an economically stable Japan, an interest which is growing rather than diminishing as their own economies develop. Yet while accepting the reality of the threat, they reject any regional Japanese response and offer no contribution themselves. It is an issue that the ASEAN nations, singly or jointly, will have to address in the near future.

From an Australian perspective, the situation is even more depressing. The defence debate that does exist in Australia has only the most limited maritime perspective, and that part of the debate which concerns itself with the security of merchant shipping tends to attract varied responses which, together, argue that there is no threat.

These responses include the view that because so little of the shipping involved is Australian flag shipping, none of that Australia-bound will be attacked for fear of involving other nations. That the basis of the argument is false has been demonstrated by the attacks on non-involved merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, demonstrating once again that it is cargoes which are important in a “guerre de course”, not the ships themselves. In any case, the argument ignores the fact that Australian flag shipping now accounts for almost 5 per cent of the total (up 50 per cent in five years) while Japanese flag shipping accounts for almost 30 per cent of the total.8

If the conflict is between Japan and a third country, Australia’s position as a major trading partner of Japan’s will then automatically involve us if the war becomes a war at sea.

Other responses have suggested that, in respect of the USSR at any rate, there is no capacity to attack the shipping. That view may have been valid in 1977, the date for the force structures quoted, but, as suggested above, it is certainly not valid today. Since 1977, the Soviet Navy has increased substantially, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with a substantially increased capacity for a shipping war in the Western Pacific. The development of maritime forces in Vietnam, and the manifest ability to deploy larger forces in that region very quickly, certainly invalidates the argument that the Soviet Union lacks an anti-shipping capacity.9

All these developments which have taken place in recent years if not months, suggest the need for an urgent re-evaluation of Australia’s strategy for maintaining the freedom of the sea. There are powerful arguments for the proposition that a potential threat does realistically exist at this time. Australia is so dependent on sea-borne trade for the maintenance of a politically acceptable standard of living, that it is clearly an important strategic interest to maintain its security. And, given that the bulk of that trade in the threatened area is with Japan, we have a substantial interest in Japanese perceptions and responses.

Clearly, Australia can do little about the problem on its own. Just as clearly, it is not enough simply to secure the approaches to the Australian mainland and our ports when the strategic context behind our current posture is to deny the use of those approaches to a hostile invader. Our challenge is to secure those approaches for free and peaceful passage, to ensure that they can be used, not they they cannot be used. It is matter of sea control rather than sea denial.

Another aspect of the problem is that of deciding the extent of these approaches, of the extent of our focal areas. There is a case for the proposition that the geography of our northern approaches determines that our area of strategic concern extends as far as the Philippines. Whatever the truth, it is a question which ought to be debated, and debated publicly, if only because it is the public whose quality of life would be affected by a campaign against merchant shipping, and it is the public which ultimately pays for its security.

An oft-repeated truism is that we alone cannot secure these trade routes. The assertion gets us nowhere. What is important, is to develop regional defence relationships which enable all interested parties to maximise their effectiveness. There is a need to pool forces, to engage in co-operative force development with the wealthier nations concentrating on the high cost force elements. There is a need to develop common doctrines and communications procedures.
And finally, there is a need to develop command arrangements which will assign responsibility for particular areas to individual countries. In this context, Australia’s role cannot be underestimated. It is almost pivotal. As an important trading partner of Japan’s, Australia anchors one end of the Western Pacific sea links which are of increasing importance to ourselves and the ASEAN nations. As a member of ANZUS, we link the United States to the southern end of those communications; and as a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement and the Manila Pact, we link all the nations of ASEAN, except Indonesia, with ANZUS. Indonesia’s membership of ASEAN links that country with what ought to be an informal maritime security system, but those links can be strengthened because of the long-term good relations that have existed between Australia and Indonesia ever since the foundation of the republic.

Conclusion
One of the more questionable assumptions of the defence debate in Australia is that we as a nation are free to make decisions about our defence posture regardless of any other country except an enemy. On the contrary, our links with the rest of the world, and particularly with the region, are so substantial and growing to such a degree that we may become involved in any conflict, be it intra-regional or between a regional country and an outsider. And with the growing importance of sea-borne trade coupled with its vulnerability, the possibility of being involved in a conflict at sea is more, rather than less, likely. It will be prevented only by a manifest ability to neutralise any large-scale attacks on shipping. That ability will only derive from a joint effort by all the countries dependent on the free movement of that shipping.

Australia ought to be welcoming the Japanese commitment to sea lane protection, and should be seeking to assuage the real fears of the ASEAN nations by playing a more prominent role in the South-East Asian area, by ensuring that the Japanese can be confident that in our part of the world their cargoes can move freely.

NOTES
3. The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime SDF and the Air SDF are no more than politically clumsy euphemisms for Army, Navy and Air Force. Not to be ignored is the para-military Maritime Safety Agency, similar to the US Coast Guard and having a wartime reserve function.
4. Apart from P3 LRMP, there are no long-range aircraft. The MSDF has no tanker support and only a very limited and elderly amphibious capability. Only the newer submarine class will have a range anywhere near comparable with the Australian OBERONS.
7. From discussions and proceedings of the 1983 Tokyo conference on the security of sea lanes of communication.
9. There are innumerable sources for this view but particular reliance is placed on intelligence sources at CINCPAC HQ, Hawaii.

NOTE:
The Australian Defence Association is a private, self-funded body of Australians concerned about national security and committed to public education, research and commentary on aspects of national security. It publishes a quarterly journal DEFENDER and information is available from the Association through the Executive Director, Box 329, North Melbourne, 3051, Victoria.
Introduction

In July 1985, the three separate systems of legislation which currently govern discipline in the three Services will be replaced by the single system that is created by the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFD Act). The introduction of the system will constitute a land-mark reform and a significant turning point in the history of the Australian Defence Force.

Reform of the legislation was recommended in 1946 by Mr Justice Reed as a result of an inquiry into the trial and punishment of military offenders. Through a series of delays, reviews and pigeon-holing, the much needed reforms embodied in the DFD Act have taken 39 years to emerge.

Some members of the Defence Force may question the wisdom or appropriateness of these changes; others may even resent them. Once members have survived the cold-water shock of transition from the old to the new, however, I expect that most will readily come to appreciate the advantages of the new. Nevertheless, despite any feelings of confidence about the long-term utility of the new legislation, it is likely that there will be teething problems associated with its implementation. Thus the purpose of this article is to provide some perspectives on the DFD Act for consideration by members of the Defence Force who will have duties or powers under this new legislation, in the hope that it may put to rest some commonly-held misgivings.

Some of the matters which will be considered are: the objectives of the DFD Act, the need for legislation relating to discipline and the need for the DFD Act, the ambit of disciplinary law and its relationship with the ordinary civil law, the background to and operation of the DFD Act, and some of the more important duties which members will have under the Act.

Objectives of the DFD Act

The DFD Act seeks that difficult-to-achieve balance between two competing objectives:

- The unimpeded maintenance of good order and the traditional requirements of command and discipline; and
- The protection of the reasonable rights of Service personnel.

The Act does not interfere with the continued exercise of command power or the hierarchical structure of the Defence Force, although it does provide special mechanisms to safeguard the rights (and the dignity) of the individuals who belong to the Defence Force. In effect, the Act seeks to overcome the stigma which has hitherto been attached to military law because of its tendency to be applied arbitrarily and because it has had the appearance, if not the reality, of being susceptible to "command influence". In the 18th century the eminent English jurist, Blackstone, described the military system of justice as being: "built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions and is something indulged rather than allowed as law". Early this century Clemenceau said: "Military justice is to justice what military music is to music." In 1982, in the House of Representatives, Mr Gordon Scholes, who was then the Shadow Minister for Defence, described the existing laws relating to discipline in the Defence Force as having
remained in operation "for a period which would not have been tolerated in the civil law of any State or in any comparable country".

From a military point of view these criticisms might be regarded as exaggerated and non-specific — tending merely to emphasize the rights of the individual without regard for the need to maintain discipline. Nevertheless, they do contain more than a grain of truth and, in a democracy such as ours, it is not possible to maintain a system of discipline in the Defence Force which is too widely at odds with community norms in relation to human rights.

The DFD Act has regard to internationally accepted standards of human rights, but seeks to balance these against the high standards of personal conduct which must be maintained in the Defence Force if it is not to disintegrate into an ineffective or dangerous rabble. In trying to achieve this balance the DFD Act, in the course of its operation, will no doubt be criticized — by both hardliners and civil libertarians. The important thing for Servicemen to remember is that the control of discipline in the Defence Force is still in their hands. Without the new legislation and a concerted effort to make it work in the manner intended by Parliament, the gradual transfer to the civil authorities of the present powers of Service authorities is more than just a possibility.

Why does the Defence Force need Discipline Legislation?

In view of the wide executive powers of the Chiefs of Staff of each Service with respect to any matter relating to the organization of the Service, it is appropriate to ask why special disciplinary legislation is needed at all. Why, for instance, can't the Chief of the General Staff issue a set of instructions covering all aspects of discipline in the Army?

Whatever might be the merits of such an approach, it is not practicable because of the limitations imposed by law on the powers of a chief of staff. For example, a chief of staff has no residual power to commit a person to detention. Should he purport, therefore, to impose a punishment of detention, the punishment would be unlawful and the detainee could be released from custody on a writ of 'habeas corpus'. Similarly, a chief of staff could not lawfully impose a fine on any member of the Service because the chief of staff would have no power to compel the member to pay the fine.

Because of these limitations on the power of Service chiefs to make rules relating to discipline, coupled with the obvious requirement to have rules which do provide for discipline in the Defence Force, a legislative basis for discipline is essential.

What's wrong with the present Legislation?

The problem with the present UK-based legislation is that it is outmoded, is not specifically intended for Australian Servicemen, and it is impenetrably complex. In his second reading speech of the Defence Force Discipline Act in the Parliament, the then Minister for Defence, Mr Killen, described the present law as a "Serbonian bog of archaisms". He went on to describe some of the oddities contained in this law which created offences such as "duelling", "behaving in a scandalous manner unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman", "by beating drums, negligently occasioning false alarms on the march" and "conniving at the exaction of any exorbitant price for a house or stall let to a sutler".

However amusing this "Serbonian bog" might appear, the reality is that failure to update and rationalize this law means that it continues to place excessive reliance on the dragnet offence of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. Thus, one or other of the existing codes fails to make specific provision for offences such as failure to comply with standing orders, absence from place of duty, or minor assaults and disturbances; while none of the codes makes provision for driving offences and drug offences. Also missing from the existing law are any detailed provisions on the conduct of investigations by Service police or any comprehensive provisions for review of convictions and punishments imposed by Service tribunals.

As to complexity, the legislation governing discipline in the Defence Force is contained in the following: three United Kingdom Acts, two of which have ceased to operate in the UK; four sets of United Kingdom rules or regulations, all of which have ceased to operate in the UK; three Australian Acts; and nine sets of regulations under the Australian Acts. In some instances, finding the law in this maze of legislation has become practically impossible.
Outline of the Defence Force Discipline Act

The DFD Act creates Service tribunals with power to try members of the Defence Force on charges of Service offences against the Act. The Act also provides these tribunals with power to try civilians who have given consent in writing to be subject to Defence Force discipline, and who are accompanying the Defence Force outside Australia or on operations against the enemy, for some of these offences in certain circumstances. Civilians are not otherwise liable to be tried by Service tribunals, nor are any offences created by the Act triable by civil courts.

The Act creates a system of internal appeals against and review of convictions and punishments, complementary to the system of external appeal against, and review of, convictions provided by the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act.

The DFD Act also provides for related matters such as investigation of offences, suspension from duty, powers of arrest and search, power to order restitution of stolen property or payment of reparation for damage or loss caused, conviction without punishment, approval for certain punishments by higher authority, suspension and remission of punishments, execution and enforcement of punishments and parole.

Review of Operation of the DFD Act

Two separate mechanisms for review of the operation of the DFD Act have been created by the Act. These are:

- the requirement for an annual report on the operation of the DFD Act by the Judge Advocate General (JAG); and
- the requirement for an independent review, within three years of commencement of the new discipline system, by a special Board of Review to be established by the Minister.

The reports by the JAG and the Board of Review will be tabled in Parliament. The review by the Board of Review should provide opportunity for members of the Defence Force, members of the public, and any persons or groups having a specialist interest in aspects of Defence Force disciplinary law, to have their views seriously considered in the review of the legislation.

Service Tribunals and Civil Criminal Courts

The DFD Act creates a special category of criminal offences, known as Service offences, and confers power on Service tribunals to deal with and to try such offences. In this respect the DFD Act supplements the ordinary criminal law of Australia. However, because the acts which give rise to charges of Service offences may also ground charges under ordinary law, they may sometimes be dealt with by the civil authorities instead of by the Services. Offences such as murder, manslaughter, rape, or treason, when committed in Australia, will normally be tried by the civil courts. When these offences are committed overseas, they may be tried by a Service tribunal provided, usually, that this course of action is acceptable to the country in which the offence occurred.

Where less serious offences, eg. assaults, driving offences, creating a disturbance or behaving in an obscene manner, are committed in the public domain in Australia, it will usually be appropriate for them to be tried in the civil courts. However the choice of forum for these offences will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. Where there is a strong nexus between the alleged offence and Service discipline, eg. a brawl by Servicemen in a public bar, to where the delays inherent in a civil trial of a Serviceman are likely to aggravate an existing disciplinary problem, it may be appropriate for the offence to be tried by a Service Tribunal. This is a matter to be resolved in each case by consultation between service and civil authorities.

In the context of this question of concurrent jurisdiction of Service tribunals and civil courts, it is noteworthy that Service tribunals are the only disciplinary tribunals in Australia which have the power to try offences and to act "judicially". Other tribunals, such as Police Disciplinary Tribunals, may hear evidence and impose certain penalties but they do not have the power to determine whether or not a person is guilty of a criminal offence. For example, if a policeman is charged with assault, the charge must be tried in the civil courts. Separately, but usually dependent on the outcome of the criminal trial, a Police Disciplinary Tribunal may impose a penalty such as reduction in rank as an administrative consequence of a conviction of assault.
Procedure at Trials by Service Tribunals
Consistent with these unique powers of Service tribunals to try certain offences against defence members and defence civilians, the DFD Act sets out in some detail the procedure to be followed in such trials. This procedure is further amplified in the Rules of Procedure, which have been made by the Judge Advocate General (appointed by the Governor-General under the DFD Act) and in the Discipline Law Manual (JSP-AS-201). The procedure at trials before all kinds of Service tribunals is basically the same as the procedure which is followed in trials in civil courts but is adapted to meet Service requirements. Similarly, the nature of evidence which is receivable by Service tribunals, and the substantive rules of law which these tribunals must apply, are basically the same as in the civil courts.

Although some members may view this increased “legalism” with dismay, it is important that it be seen in perspective. Most hearings by Service tribunals will be by summary authorities and will continue to be simple affairs consisting of one or two charges in respect of which the evidence will also tend to be relatively simple. Fine points of law will generally not arise nor will there be a need for lengthy cross-examination or impassioned addresses by would-be Rumpoles. In addition, because of the documentation which should be prepared by the prosecutor and defending officer prior to the case, the procedural, evidentiary and recording processes should be relatively simple. Should this opinion be doubted, then a visit to a Court of Petty Sessions in any large Australian city will confirm that justice according to law is administered by most magistrates with a minimum of pettifogging and with very great despatch.

Courts Martial and Defence Force Magistrates
In the case of courts martial, the new Act makes some significant changes from existing law such as: providing an accused with a statutory right to legal representation, making provision for a preliminary hearing by the judge advocate to deal with an application or objection by the accused, and abolition of the Army and Air Force requirements for the conviction to be confirmed by higher authority. In practice, members with experience of courts martial will find the procedures to be generally familiar and courts martial are not dealt with further in this article.

Defence Force magistrates are a new form of Service tribunal with jurisdiction similar to that of a restricted court martial. The procedure at a trial before a Defence Force magistrate is similar to that before a magistrate at a court of petty sessions. As the Defence Force magistrate is required to be an experienced legal officer selected from the judge advocates’ panel, and the prosecutor and defending officer will generally be legal officers, there is no need to deal further with Defence Force magistrates in this article.

Summary Authorities
Perhaps the most important aspect of the DFD Act is the role which it creates for summary authorities. The phrase “summary authorities” includes subordinate summary authorities, commanding officers, and superior summary authorities. All of these authorities have powers to deal with and to try certain offences against specified persons.

A summary authority must duly administer justice according to law without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, and in particular:
- must ensure that any hearing of a charge before the authority is conducted in accordance with the DFD Act and the Rules of Procedure and in a manner befitting a court of justice;
- must ensure that, at any hearing of a charge before the authority, the accused person does not suffer any undue disadvantage in consequence of the person’s position as such or of the person’s ignorance or the person’s incapacity to adequately examine or cross-examine witnesses or to make the person’s own evidence clear and intelligible, or otherwise;
- at the trial of a charge by the authority, must well and truly try the accused person according to the evidence; and
- must ensure that an adequate record of the proceedings before the authority is made.

Officers appointed as summary authorities have a legal duty to act according to law in relation to charges brought before them. To some people this may seem an onerous task to impose on Service officers who for the most part will have had little formal legal training.
and who will often be busy in the performance of other military duties.

Initially, summary authorities may encounter some difficulties with legal or administrative aspects of the new system. To overcome these difficulties, authorities will need to study the relevant parts of the Discipline Law Manual and may also need to obtain advice from legal officers from time to time. In due course, however, when training in the new system is an established part of the syllabus at the Australian Defence Force Academy and other officer cadet training establishments, the administration of justice under the DFD Act should be of a uniformly high standard.

It is possible that in order to avoid some of the irksome aspects of the DFD Act some officers will be tempted to deal administratively with offenders rather than charging them with a Service offence. While this approach may be appropriate in relation to certain kinds of minor offences (e.g. absence from place of duty) it has the potential to imperil discipline, and should be adopted with caution.

By way of example; an officer some years ago allowed junior members who had committed minor offences, the choice of being dealt with by him or appearing formally on a charge. Being ‘dealt with’ by him meant receiving corporal punishment administered by him with a gym shoe. The existence of this alternative and unlawful system was relieved of his duties and discharged administratively from the Service. Whilst the example is an extreme case, it serves to illustrate the dangers inherent in any ‘ad hoc’ system of punishment which operates without sanction.

**Defending Officers and Prosecutors**

When the DFD Act is introduced, many officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs will be required to act as defending officers or prosecutors at summary trials. Advice in relation to both of these functions is contained in the Discipline Law Manual, and it is not necessary to discuss the specific duties in any detail here.

However, it is worth pointing out that non-lawyers have been acting as “counsel” in summary trials in the Navy for some years, and their duties in this regard have come to be accepted as an ordinary incident of Service life. Under the DFD Act, the roles of prosecutor and defending officer are probably more extensive and formalized than they are under the Naval Discipline Act, but for practical purposes the differences are minimal.

In simple terms, a prosecutor is required at all summary hearings to present evidence in support of the charge. At a trial, the prosecutor “leads” prosecution witnesses through their evidence; for example:

- “What is your full name and rank?”
- “Are you currently serving at RAAF Base Edinburgh?”
- “Were you in the sergeants mess at RAAF Edinburgh at about 1600 on 5 May 1984?”
- “Can you remember anything unusual occurring in the mess that afternoon?”
- “Please tell the commanding officer in your own words what you observed . . .”

The witness will then proceed to give his account of the incident giving rise to the charge, being prompted by the prosecutor, by non-leading questions. (Leading questions may be asked where the particular fact is not likely to be disputed.) The prosecutor may also make a short opening and closing address.

An accused may conduct his own case or request a specified member of the Defence Force to defend him. Any reasonable request for a specified member should normally be complied with, but where the member is not reasonably available the summary authority may, with the consent of the accused, direct another member to act as defending officer. In most simple trials the defending officer will be required to do little more than to clarify or weaken prosecution evidence by cross-examination, and in some cases he may choose to call opposing witnesses of fact. He will also usually prepare a simple pre-sentence report in accordance with a format provided for the purpose for use if the accused is convicted, and in the event of conviction may call witnesses to give evidence as to the good character of the accused.

The duties of prosecutors and defending officers in most simple cases can be performed adequately by most Service personnel after they have had a modicum of training. Provided they receive this training, their role in the presentation of all relevant evidence to a summary authority should become a useful and important aspect of the conduct of summary trials.
Concluson

The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 is a significant and long-overdue reform of disciplinary law relating to Australian Service personnel. The new Act represents that blend of tradition, realism and progress which must always be an ideal in a disciplined Defence Force in a liberal democracy.

Whilst some legal and administrative difficulties may be encountered in the course of its implementation, the new Act will soon underpin discipline in a unified way in each of the Services, and will provide protection for the reasonable rights of Service personnel.

Although the DFD Act may appear to be 'lawyers law', its successful operation will depend largely on the efforts of non-lawyers because most charges will be dealt with by summary authorities who will be assisted generally by laymen. How successful these efforts have been will probably be revealed in four years time, when the Board of Review makes its report.

NOTES

2. These offences will only be triable by Service tribunals with the consent of the Attorney-General.
3. This power to act "judicially" is based on the power of the Parliament to make laws for the defence of the Commonwealth and the control of forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth. It is not based on the judicial power of the Commonwealth, as this can be exercised only by the courts. The King v Bevan Ex Parte Elias and Gordon 1942, 66 C.L.R. 452.
4. A "defence civilian" is a person who accompanies a part of the Defence Force outside Australia or on operations against the enemy (eg. war correspondent) and who consents in writing to subject himself to Defence Force discipline.
5. These requirements are imposed by Rule 22 of the DFD Rules.

Commander Gerald Purcell joined the RAN in 1962 as a cadet midshipman. His early postings included being Navigator of HMAS Swan, Commanding Officer of HMAS Bombard, and exchange service at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis. He qualified as a Principal Warfare Officer (Navigation) in 1976 and later served as Navigator of HMAS Brisbane and HMAS Stalwart, and as an instructor at the RAN Navigation School. After five years of part-time law studies, he was admitted as a Barrister of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1982. He is currently serving in the Legislation Section of the Department of Defence in connection with implementation of the Defence Force Discipline Act.

No. 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron
50th Anniversary

To coincide with the 50th Anniversary of No. 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron, the Squadron Medical Officer, Squadron Leader Wilfred Brook, is currently writing the Squadron history. This book will be published in time for the celebrations next April, and any former member of the Squadron who feels he has some interesting anecdote or photographs, is invited to contact SQNLDR Brook on 03 2323875, or the Public Relations Officer, Flight Lieutenant Michael Garnett on 03 2684824.
At Moascar, Egypt in early January, 1916 two sergeants who had just come out of Gallipoli with their battalion were quietly appraising the new reinforcement officers.

"How long do you think they'll last when we go in again?" asked one sergeant. With the experience of Anzac behind him, the other answered, "About three weeks."

Introduction

THERE comes a time when a good unit reaches a peak in efficiency, dash and spirit, maintains this high point for a period and then falls away. It still remains a good and reliable unit but it has lost that extra, hard-to-define something that makes a good unit an outstanding one. This falling away may be due to a single factor or a number of circumstances; for example the loss of the commanding officer, an ill-starred action, a change from mobile to static warfare, or a move from one command to another.

In the European spring of 1917, an Australian battalion attained a standard that it was not to reach again. This unit was 14 Battalion, 4 Brigade AIF and its excellence then came mainly from the calibre of its four company commanders — Williamson, Stanton, Wadsworth and Orr.

When these four officers commanded their companies, 14 Battalion had been on the Order of Battle for almost two-and-a-half years. Much had happened in this short space of time.

Raising 14 Battalion

On the outbreak of the Great War, Australia offered the War Office 20 000 men — an infantry division of three brigades, each of four battalions and a brigade of light horse. There being more than 20 000 volunteers, another brigade was raised. This formation — 4 Brigade, commanded by Colonel John Monash — was unusual in that it consisted of men from all States whereas other brigades were recruited wholly from one State or had battalions from perhaps four States. Monash's battalions were 13 Battalion from NSW, 14 from Victoria, 15 from Queensland and Tasmania and 16 from West Australia and South Australia.

14 Battalion's first headquarters was at 178 Collins Street, Melbourne, close to the Town Hall. Here the CO selected his officers and formed the framework of his battalion. Two weeks later, on 1 October 1914, the Headquarters moved to the less comfortable surrounds of Broadmeadows Camp, ten miles to the north, and organized its 1070 recruits into eight companies.

The proportion of recruits who had been trainees under the 1909 Defence Act, which came into effect in 1911, was small. This was because most of the recruits' ages were beyond those specified in the Act, their average age being 26. They were mainly single (89 per cent). Minimum height was 5 feet six inches (168 cms) and minimum chest 34 inches (86 cms). On enlistment, each man "... swore that he would well and truly serve his sovereign lord the King in the Australian Imperial Force and that he would resist His Majesty's enemies and cause His Majesty's peace to be kept and maintained and would with God's help faithfully discharge his duty according to the law."

The 32 officers held commissions either in the old pre-1911 militia or under the compulsory training scheme. The RSM and RQMS were former British Army regulars who had joined the Australian Instructional Staff.

Until they were issued with uniforms, the recruits wore blue dungarees and white hats,
the precursors of the 2nd AIF’s “giggle suits”. Training was hard, and very quickly the Battalion gained a sense of corporate identity. Colours were presented by the Governor General at the St Kilda Cricket Ground, there were route marches and field exercises, marches through Melbourne and NCO courses. In November the three battalions from the other States joined the Brigade, and formation exercises were undertaken. Then on 17 December, led by their Commander, the Brigade marched past the Governor General and the State Governor outside Parliament House, Spring Street. 14 Battalion marched to their band which played their regimental march, Stephen Foster’s “Swannee River”. Five days later, the Brigade sailed for Egypt.

The men who as company commanders were to have such a profound effect in 14 Battalion were not in this convoy to Egypt, but already the fates were drawing on the threads that would bring them and the Battalion together.

Wadsworth

When the ships of the second convoy sailed down Port Phillip Bay, William Robert Wadsworth was a second lieutenant in 66 Infantry (Mount Alexander) Battalion, a compulsory training battalion, which on the outbreak of war had been called up for garrison duties and its officers and men therefore debarred from enlisting in the AIF. The Battalion was stationed at Sorrento, a small village near the entrance to Port Phillip.

Wadsworth was born in the gold mining town of Castlemaine, Victoria on 17 July 1892. He was educated at the local State and Grammar schools. From an early age he was keen to be an engineer but until that opportunity arose he delivered telegrams. He then obtained a clerical position at Thompson’s Foundry at Castlemaine in 1909. This led on to apprentice draftsman at a guinea ($2.10) a week. His local compulsory training unit was 66 Infantry Battalion and he received his commission on 14 May 1914 at the age of almost 22.

The garrison duties at Sorrento lasted about three months for Wadsworth and then he qualified at an AIF Officers’ School at Broadmeadows for eight weeks and then sailed with them from Melbourne in HMAS Horata on 27 September 1915 and disembarked at Suez, one month later, on 27 October.

Stanton

Stanton, like Wadsworth, grew up in a country town in the Colony of Victoria. He was born on 9 September 1893 at home in Hunter Street, Stawell, a prosperous town founded on gold and later a centre for grazing and wheat. His father was an ironmonger in Stawell and was a captain in the Victoria Volunteers. Young Stanton attended schools in Stawell and was a member of the cadet corps there for about five years. On leaving school he joined the Victoria State Savings Bank in Stawell and was later transferred to the Head Office of the bank in Melbourne, where he was well reported upon. He played A Grade tennis for St Kilda, where his opponents noted that his second service was faster than his first. Like a number of his contemporaries he had a motor bike and a girl friend. She was from one of Melbourne’s leading families of jewellers.

Stanton enlisted in Melbourne on 8 February 1915 soon after his 21st birthday and after completing an officers’ training school at Broadmeadows he was appointed second lieutenant on 1 June 1915. He was a good-looking man, of fair complexion and blue eyes, and stood six feet tall.

Stanton was posted to the 8th Reinforcements, 14 Battalion and left Melbourne in HMAS Makarina on 10 September 1915. After some training near Cairo he embarked for Gallipoli in mid-November 1915.

Orr

Robert Wells Orr was a little older than his fellow company commanders, having been born on 5 February 1890 in Footscray, an
Williamson

Williamson was the fifth child of Reuben, a labourer, and Annie Williamson, and was born on 6 September 1893 at Cowwarr, a small settlement in the Latrobe Valley, about 110 miles (180 kilometres) east of Melbourne. He attended the local elementary school and then Melbourne High School where he was in the cadet corps and completed the entrance course for school teachers 1909-10. Next year he entered the Manual Arts Course at the Melbourne Continuation School and finished this on 31 December 1913. In early 1914 Williamson took up an appointment as a temporary assistant in the Sloyd (i.e. simple carpentry) Centre at Melbourne High. The District inspector reported that he had "... a good presence and style before a class ... appears to have a reserve of latent power ..." He ceased duty with the Victorian Education Department when at the age of 21-9/12, he enlisted in the AIF at Melbourne on 19 June 1915 as a private with the regimental number of 2555 and posted to the 8th Reinforcements 14 Battalion commanded by Second Lt Stan-
ton. Williamson had a fine physique — he was over 6 feet tall — of fair complexion with bluish grey eyes and black hair and answered to the nickname "Lofty".

Williamson's ability was soon recognized and promotion came rapidly. When he embarked at Melbourne in HMAS Makarina with the 8th Reinforcements, 14 Battalion on 10 September he was a temporary warrant officer, with the understanding that he would revert to the rank of private when he reached Egypt. This reversion to the ranks was a general rule in the AIF from March 1915. Commanding officers, fairly naturally, wished to promote men with ability and experience from their own units and not have ready-made NCOs (and officers) thrust upon them from Australia. Williamson and other reinforcements for the AIF on Gallipoli were trained mainly by British Army instructors in training camps near Cairo, because the AIF had not yet reached the stage of taking responsibility for its own self-government behind the front lines. Commanding officers on Gallipoli were no different to their predecessors in earlier wars or their successors in the Second and subsequent wars — invariably they deplored the standard of training of their reinforcements, no matter how eager they were to receive them.

The main force that impelled Williamson and the hundreds of other young men training near the Pyramids, was the anxiety to join their battalions at Anzac. After about five weeks, the 8 Reinforcements embarked at Alexandria for the Peninsula.

Anzac

While Williamson, Stanton, Wadsworth and Orr were training in Australia, the battalion in which they were to serve had gone into action at Gallipoli. 14 Battalion landed on 26 April — their 2nd Reinforcements had gone ashore the previous day as a Beach Party — and in the first few confusing days, sub-units were committed piecemeal. After the reorganization, the Battalion occupied Courtney's Post7 continuously, and in August 1915 they were in the dreadful night march and the attempt to capture Hill 971.

For the remainder of its service on the Peninsula, the Battalion held Durrant's Post, about 3,000 yards north-east of Anzac Cove. It was here that Second Lieutenant Orr and the 7th Reinforcements joined them to bring the field strength up to 7 officers and 384 other ranks. A month later Second Lieutenant Stanton and Private Williamson came from Egypt in the 8th Reinforcements. All had little time to serve at Anzac because plans were well under way for an evacuation. In later years Williamson's service at Durrant's Post was remembered. Because of his previous rank and ability, he was given acting appointments and his personality was such that he inspired confidence. At night his silent approach and his, "Is everything all right, sentry?" was a comfort to the new reinforcements as they peered out into the dark.

14 Battalion were withdrawn during the night 18/19 December to Lemnos Island, and after a week there they sailed for Egypt. It was here, at Moascar, that Second Lieutenant Wadsworth and the 9th Reinforcements were taken on strength, and where the sergeants just out of Anzac commented upon the probable active service "life expectancy" of a subaltern.

Egypt

In Egypt the sixteen Australian battalions from Anzac reformed and training began. Williamson was promoted corporal on 6 January 1916, sergeant 20 days later and then field commissioned second lieutenant on 1 February and remained in D Company. Orr put up his second star on 20 January and Stanton and Wadsworth theirs on 1 February. Between mid-February and early March the Anzac battalions underwent a profound change — each battalion had to transfer about half its officers, NCOs and men to form the nucleus of the battalions and other units of the 4th and 5th Divisions, very much in the same way as the original battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment were to be split 50 years later. Four hundred from 14 Battalion were transferred to 46 Battalion of 12 Brigade, and others went to 4 Pioneer Battalion, 4 MG Company and 4 Division Signalling Company. At the same time, 4 Brigade joined 12 and 13 Brigades to form 4 Division. March-outs in 14 Battalion were redressed by drafts of the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th Reinforcements.

Training in Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula continued and instruction was given on new weapons such as the Mills bomb (the 36M grenade that lasted until the Korean War), Lewis gun, and mortars. There was also a
period of duty on the Suez Canal defences. During this period of expansion, Wadsworth and Orr were promoted captain on 12 March (to be seconds-in-command of B and A Companies respectively), and Stanton on 10 April to be second-in-command D Company. Williamson was one of his platoon commanders.

On 25 April 1916, 14 Battalion paraded with other units of 4 Brigade to commemorate the first Anzac Day. Williamson, Stanton and Orr wore a blue ribbon on the right breast of their tunics which showed that they had served on the Peninsula. Those men who were at the Landing wore, in addition, a plain red ribbon. These embellishments were not to last long. They were replaced by a brass ‘‘A’’ which was worn on the colour patch.

During brigade exercises and when off duty, officers of 4 Brigade got to know each other. Many had made their names at Anzac — Jacka, now second lieutenant; Murray and Black who were in the same machine gun detachment in 16 Battalion were now commissioned, Black still with 16 Battalion, Murray transferred to 13 Battalion.

Western Front

By now all knew they were to leave Egypt soon for the Western Front, and in late May 1916 Captain Wadsworth took a small advance party to Marseilles to make arrangements for 14 Battalion’s disembarkation there. The Battalion arrived on 7 June and entrained for Bailleul in northern France. Here steel helmets and respirators were issued and training in gas warfare begun.

Stanton took part in 14 Battalion’s first action in France. This was a night trench raid which was planned in great detail by their brigade commander, now Brigadier-General John Monash. Amongst other things, so as to maintain formation security, the raiding party wore British Army Uniforms. While the raid was said to be successful, casualties were heavy because the raiders were caught in the uncut wire and by artillery. Of the 60 who were in the assault party, five were killed, three died of wounds and 38 were wounded.

In July 1916, 4th Division moved south to the Somme and participated in the terrible fighting on Pozieres Ridge and at Mouquet Farm. As with all other units that fought there, 14 Battalion suffered severely, and again the survivors could see little gain as compensation for their hardships and losses. In these actions, Williamson (now a captain), Stanton and Wadsworth were company seconds-in-command and Orr commanded D Company.

The duties of a company second-in-command in the Great War were similar to those of today — training, administration and commanding the company when the OC was absent. However, he was generally more often in the line than his counterpart in the Second World War and subsequent campaigns. In company actions the OC would often lead two of the rifle platoons, the second-in-command the other half of the company.

From the Somme, the shattered Australian divisions were sent north about 60 miles to Flanders to recover, and six weeks later they returned to the Somme to suffer the appalling winter of 1916/17.

In early February 1917, in the capture of Stormy Trench (where Captain H. Murray, 13 Battalion, won his VC), C Company, 14 Battalion was ordered to support 13 Battalion. Williamson commanded half the Company, his company commander the other. The trench was taken and held though losses were heavy. Of C Company’s 120 men, 95 became casualties. Williamson was commended for his leadership throughout the night action. The OC, C Company was killed in this action and Williamson was appointed OC. On the same day, Stanton became OC, B Company.

Soon after this line duty, 14 Battalion marched into the village of Ribemont, on the
Ancre, about six miles south-west of Albert and some 16 miles behind the front. Here they were built up once more and intensive training began.

Morale and Efficiency
The Battalion was now approaching its peak of efficiency. It had behind it great wealth of experience. It was well known throughout the AIF, and the men were proud to be in “Jacka’s Mob.” Its four company commanders had been through the severest of tests and an excellent officer had been appointed to command. The Battalion now also had an outstanding chaplain.

Hard training was interspersed with sport — the new CO was a keen footballer; athletics, where Captains Stanton and Williamson were judges; and leave. In the evenings the Padre ran a series of concerts, lectures and debates which were of such a standard as to attract visitors from other battalions of the Brigade. Examples of the subjects covered were “Australia’s Problems: The Rainless Area”, “Was Australia Justified in Refusing Conscription”, “Napoleon’s Campaigns”. In addition, the CO began education courses, as he was looking ahead to the day when his men would return to civilian life. The first Battalion messes in France for officers and sergeants were opened, for up to now front-line service and billets had prevented their establishment.

Thus two months of concentrated and intense activity culminated in 14 Battalion reaching its highest level of esprit-de-corps and confidence, and ready for the offensive they knew would come with the approaching spring.

But for the Allies, who had been measuring “success” in yards gained at huge cost, a momentous event now occurred. Without any immediate pressure being applied, the Germans began to retire.

This withdrawal was in accord with a wide-ranging strategic plan, and on the Western Front it involved moving out of the bulges south of Arras and Peronne to a straighter line 10 to 30 miles to the east. The Allies called this new German front the “Hindenburg Line.”

Battle of Arras
On 9 April 1917, the British 3rd Army (General Allenby) began its attack at Arras. Initially, it was partly successful, and Haig, the BEF Commander-in-Chief, hoped to get the cavalry corps through any breach that might result. After two-and-a-half years of barbed wire, machine guns and accurate artillery, British generals were still obsessed with the notion of horsemen dashing through a gap. To support 3rd Army, 5th Army (General Gough) to the south-east on 3rd Army’s right was to seize the village of Bullecourt in the Hindenburg Line, and through this gap Gough would pass a cavalry division to operate in the enemy’s rear and thus further assist 3rd Army.

Bullecourt was to be attacked by a British division on the left and an Australian on the right. On 8 April, the Australian commanders told Gough that the thick wire around Bullecourt had not been sufficiently cut by the artillery and that their supporting attack could not go in for at least four days. However, at this time 5th Army was short of artillery and there seemed no solution to the problem.

Tanks and a Plan
It was then that the company commander of the twelve tanks attached to Gough’s 5th Army suggested that, to overcome this deficiency in artillery, his tanks could break into the Hindenburg Line by destroying the wire with their fire and tracks, and then they would signal the infantry forward under the protection of what artillery there was available. Gough accepted this plan and on the afternoon of 9 April he motored to HQ Anzac Corps and pressed this action upon the Corps Commander (Lieutenant-General Birdwood) and his Chief of Staff (Brigadier-General White). Both these officers had grave misgivings about the plan because they believed the tanks were not capable of doing what was so confidently predicted. But Anzac Corps were basing their objections on hearsay because the AIF had had no firsthand experience with armour.

Anzac Corps accepted the following plan:
- Night patrols would determine if the Hindenburg Line around Bullecourt was still occupied. 5th Army believed that the Germans would probably continue their withdrawal to the east.
- If the Line was unoccupied, the Australians would take it over and advance to Riencourt on the morning of 10 April.
- If the Line was still occupied, 5th Army might order a dawn attack on 10 April at 0430 hours with tanks.
Even though it was decided that 5th Army might order the attack, it was necessary, of course, for planning and movement to go ahead and very little time remained. Anzac Corps passed verbal orders to GOC 4 Australian Division (Major-General Holmes) at 1600 hours, and in turn Division telephoned their orders to 4 and 12 Brigades which were to carry out the assault. Written orders followed at 1900 and 2130 hours. 4 Brigade order No. 74 began: “On a date to be notified hereunder, the enemy will be driven from the Hindenburg Line.” Because of the time factor, the two brigades could now only follow the general outline of plans for an attack which had been drawn up a few days earlier, and which they believed had been postponed until such time as the wire in front of the German lines had been cut properly.

The Tank Company received their orders at 1830 hours and, because they had about six miles of night driving before reaching their assault positions, the tanks started forward at 2000 hours.

In outline the plan of attack was:

- All tanks in front of assaulting brigades. Their approach noise was to be covered by machine gun fire.
- Tanks to break down the wire and signal the infantry forward.
- The Hindenburg Line was to be taken by (on the left) 12 Brigade, (centre) four tanks and (on the right), 4 Brigade.

- On the Hindenburg Line being seized, four tanks would wheel left and, followed by an Australian battalion, would “subdue” Bullecourt.
- On signals from the Australians in Bullecourt, the British 62 Division would advance, occupy Bullecourt and with assistance of four tanks, capture parts of the Line west of Bullecourt.

By the afternoon of 9 April, 4 Brigade had elements of 14 and 16 Battalions forward on a sunken road about 800 yards from the German line. These battalions would occupy the Hindenburg Line and then 15 and 13 Battalions would pass through them and take Riencourt, another 1000 yards further on. The two follow-up battalions left their reserve areas, seven miles behind the front, at 2200 hours.

By this time some of the patrols that had been sent out to see if the Hindenburg Line was still held, were back. Their reports were alarming. The Line was still strongly held, and patrol leaders said that unless the wire was cut and there was heavy artillery support, the proposed attack had no hope of success. One patrol, for example, reported that the wire near Bullecourt was in three belts, each eight feet wide, then there was a space of 50 yards and then a further belt ten feet wide.

![Battle of Bullecourt](image-url)
Anzac Corps Protests

Anzac Corps at 2300 hours put these reports to 5th Army and urged that the planned attack be postponed at least for 24 hours, when it would be better known whether the situation on 3rd Army's front would justify the attempt. Clearly there was little to be gained in a hazardous enterprise which had the aim of supporting another attack when that attack at Arras even now appeared to be faltering. However, 5th Army replied that the attack on Bullecourt must go ahead as the Commander-in-Chief BEF wished it.

At 2345 hours, only five hours before Zero hour (today's 'H Hour'), Anzac Corps again stressed that the patrol reports and information from 3rd Army divisions which had been repulsed, all indicated that the Australian attack could not be justified. In addition, Anzac Corps pointed out their lack of confidence in the tanks and their anxiety arising from the hasty planning. The Australian protests were brushed aside.

5th Army orders confirming that the attack would go ahead had been issued at 2130 hours. These followed the more detailed but provisional orders issued earlier at 1750 hours. At 0045 hours, 4 Division received their confirmatory orders and these were sent to the brigades. 4 Brigade's startline had already been taped just forward of the sunken road by 14 Battalion's Intelligence Officer (Captain Jacka) who earlier had taken a reconnaissance patrol to the enemy wire.

Preparations for the Attack

At 0100 hours Bullecourt was drenched with gas by the Royal Engineers who used a new weapon, a battery of electrically fired mortars, to project the bombs across no man's land. This surprised the Germans because gas was usually discharged from cylinders in the Allied lines, and they reacted with rifle and machine gunfire for 15 minutes or so. After that it was quiet except for the occasional artillery and machine guns.

At 0230 hours, led by their scouts and under cover of patrols out front, 14 Battalion began forming up on the tapes. Each company had a frontage of one platoon in extended line and the other three platoons in the same formation behind. From left to right there was Captain Orr's D Company, Williamson's C Company, Stanton's B Company and Wadsworth's A Company.

There was a gap of 300 yards between Captain Orr's D Company and 46 Battalion, 12 Brigade on their left. This gap was a gentle re-entrant, and four tanks were to advance down it. The boundary between 14 Battalion and 16 Battalion on their right was a dirt road. The headquarters of both Battalions were co-located on the railway embankment. The supporting battalions — 15 and 13 Battalions — were in position behind the embankment after their long approach march from Favreuil. HQ 4 Brigade was in Noreuil, about 2000 yards to the rear.

When the men of 14 Battalion reached their places on the tapes they lay down on the thin snow. They were in fighting order — steel helmet, respirator on the chest, haversack on the back, entrenching tool on the left hip, water bottle on the right hip, bayonets fixed. Each man carried two hand grenades.

Officers and senior NCOs carried 1:10,000 maps which showed the enemy trenches, corrected from information received up to 1 April 1917, in red. All other detail, including contours and roads, was in black. The road which included their sunken portion was marked, "bad road narrow and unmetalled". Although the night was piercingly cold, greatcoats were not worn because of their bulky awkwardness.

It was now a matter of simply waiting and hoping that the covering patrols out in the darkness in front of them would ward off any inquisitive enemy. The Australians listened hard for the sound of approaching tanks. They had not worked with tanks and were very curious and keen to see them in action.

Time passed slowly. The wind continued to blow strongly and there were occasional snow showers. The hushed whispers between men ceased as the agony of the cold gradually took hold. Suddenly there was a burst from a Lewis gun, and those near feared that they had been discovered. It turned out that one of the returning patrols had been fired on. The patrol leader, who had only recently been commissioned, and two of his men were badly wounded.

Tanks Late

There was no sound of approaching tanks and the Commander and staff of 4 Brigade in Noreuil, which was on the route the tanks had to use, became increasingly worried. It would take the tanks one-and-a-half hours to get from Noreuil to their start lines and there was
still no sign of them. The anxious Brigade Commander at 0410 hours persuaded Division to delay Zero hour 30 minutes to 0500 hours. He dared not ask for a greater extension because first light was a little before 0500, and sunrise would be at 0607.

**Attack Cancelled**

Soon after this, the leader of tanks called his company commander, Major Watson, who was at HQ, 4 Division, on the telephone from a signals office in Noreuil Valley. He reported that the tanks had not yet reached Noreuil and that it would take another 90 minutes before they would get to the front. Their progress had been slowed by the snow storms and the crews were exhausted. 4 Division's situation was now very critical. Daylight was rapidly approaching and there were almost two brigades of men lying out in the open. Very soon they would be visible in the snow to the enemy.

It was 0500 when the GOC, 4 Division looked at his watch and murmured, "I think there is just time to get the boys back." His staff telephoned his decision to the Brigades. Brigadier-General Brand's message to his four battalions on the railway embankment was short and to the point. It said, "The stunt is off. Disposition as yesterday. Move."

The Brigade signalmen sent this message by key over the buried, laddered lines to the battalions. 14 Battalion's signal office — a dugout in the railway embankment near the co-located headquarters — received it and passed it to the adjutant. After hurried consultation with the CO, the adjutant and an orderly climbed over the embankment and ran forward as fast as the ground and the faint streaks of dawn allowed. The young adjutant passed the hasty withdrawal orders to each company commander.

The battalions moved with only moments to spare. An eye witness with a good turn of phrase described 14 and 16 Battalions' retirement as being "like a crowd coming away from a football match." The men were stiff and cold and were sure that the Germans could see them, and that soon they would be raked by machine-gun fire and be shelled. It was now 0520 and features were quite visible. Then luck favoured the Australians. A snow shower swept across them and they were screened just as the enemy artillery opened up. Captain Orr took his company back only as far as the sunken road for he had to hold this forward position. The other company commanders took their men back to Noreuil.

The artillery fire caused some casualties in 12 Brigade as they withdrew though, in fact, it was not directed primarily at them but at the British troops of 62 Division on their left. Strong fighting patrols from this division had raided the Hindenburg Line on the other side of Bullecourt so as to divert some attention away from the Australian attack. 4 Division and its brigades did not know of this support, and it can only be supposed that in the extreme haste in which the whole operation was mounted there was a terrible lack of co-ordination at Corps and Army. 62 Division was understandably bitter about the needless loss of 162 men, and blamed 4 Division for not letting them know until 0455 hours — 25 minutes after the original Zero hour — that the attack had been postponed.

The three companies of 14 Battalion, trudging their way back to their former bivouacs at Noreuil, knew nothing of this tragic muddle. But they were aware that there had been a bungle somewhere, and that they or someone else would suffer for it because surprise had been lost. Some of the men noted that the tanks had finally reached Noreuil and that they were now covered with tarpaulins. After a meal, 14 Battalion settled down in the mud to get what rest they could. The cancelled attack entered Brigade lore as the "Buckshee
Battle” or the “Buckshee Bullecourt”, Buckshee being Hindustani for “free or anything come by with unexpected ease.”

Army Plans

While the tired battalions rested, a conference was held at HQ, 5th Army. It was run by General Gough and was attended by the commanders and chiefs of staff of 1 Anzac, V Corps, the cavalry division, the tank battalion and the RFC. Gough told the conference that 3rd Army was to renew its attempt to break the enemy line at Arras, and that 5th Army would attack Bullecourt next morning. The attack was to follow the same plan as was set down for the previous day. Again, the tanks were to break the German wire.

As they had done before, Commander, 1 Anzac (Birdwood) and his Chief of Staff (White) argued strongly against the plan. They did not believe that the tanks could do all that was expected of them. However, they both failed to convince Gough and once more orders for the attack went out from Army and down the chain of command where they reached 14 Battalion at about 1600 hours on 10 April. Inevitably, there were amendments and revisions to the initial plans and these were to reach battalions until midnight.

The eleven tanks (the twelfth was unserviceable) were allocated four in front of 12 Brigade, three in the gap between the brigades and four in front of 4 Brigade. They were to be in position, 150 yards in front of the infantry, by 0300 hours. Infantry guides would lead them to their positions. Each tank commander was given detailed orders. The two right-hand tanks in front of 4 Brigade, for example, were to turn right when they reached the German lines, crush the wire along those trenches and secure the flank, proceed towards Queant and then return to Noreuil.

Artillery support was on a timed programme, 0100 hours — gas Bullecourt, 0445 hours — barrages on both flanks, 0515 hours — barrage lifted from Reincourt so as to allow 13 and 15 Battalions to enter that village. Zero hour for the tanks would be 0430, and for the battalions 0445 hours. The plan of the previous day whereby the tanks would signal the infantry forward was discarded, because it was felt that such an arrangement could too easily break down. The two main enemy lines were called “OG 1” (Old German 1 — the line nearer the Australians) and “OG 2”, although some soldiers, particularly gunners, to this day say that OG meant “Objective Gained.”

14 Battalion’s Preparations and Plans

Meanwhile, it had not been a restful day for the rifle companies in Noreuil Valley. Enemy artillery caused casualties, and there were the preparations to be made when the units are on standby. From 1600 hours onwards there were orders and movement of reconnaissance groups and fatigue parties and liaison conferences.

At 2300 hours A, B and C Companies of 14 Battalion left their miserable trenches in Noreuil Valley and started their approach march to the assembly areas. The snow was thicker on the ground, the wind was still cold and there were occasional rain showers.

One of the ‘left-out-of-battle’ sergeants who brought a ration party up to the railway embankment recognized, in the darkness, the tall figure of his OC. Williamson was standing alone on the parapet of a trench, gazing across to the German lines. Even in the darkness, the sergeant sensed his OC’s unease.

In A Company earlier that afternoon one of Wadsworth’s platoon commanders, an Englishman who had seen service in the South African War, who was an original member of 14 Battalion and who received his commission in the field at Anzac, asked his OC to look after his things and gave him his personal papers. The platoon commander knew that he would not come through.

The CO attended a final conference at Brigade HQ in Noreuil at midnight, and then held his final orders group in the small command dug-out in the railway embankment about two hours later. To his four young company commanders, who he knew so well now he adopted a light and flippant manner, a common enough approach when all know that they are facing a very hazardous action. But later he was to be bitterly critical of himself for his remarks.

Battalion scouts led the companies from the assembly areas out to the tapes near the sunken road. The companies were in the same formation as the night before — from left to right D, C, B and A Companies, each company with one platoon frontage. Each platoon was in extended line. Thus there were four waves.
There was about six feet between men and about 60 yards between waves. Wadsworth with his company corporal and batman positioned himself just to the rear of his first wave. The Battalion's Lewis guns, the Bren gun of the Great War, were in the second wave. Three-inch mortars of 4 Light Trench Mortar Battery were positioned on the right and left of the Battalion. They were to advance with the Battalion and provide defensive fire from the objective.

All told, 19 officers and a little more than 650 men of 14 Battalion were lying in the snow awaiting Zero hour. At this stage of the war, between one-quarter and one-third of a battalion was 'left-out-of-battle'. This LOB group was the nucleus on which smashed battalions were rebuilt.

The first two waves of 14 Battalion were to capture OG 1; the following two waves, OG 2; and then 15 Battalion, which was behind them, would pass through and assault Riencourt. 16 Battalion, on Wadsworth's right, were to do the same as 14 Battalion and the battalion behind them — 13 Battalion — would also assault Riencourt. It was to be 4 Brigade's first full-scale brigade action since their ill-fated attempt on Hill 971 at Gallipoli in August 1915. Battalion Headquarters was co-located with 16 Battalion's in a dug-out in the railway embankment. A dressing station was next door. Brigade HQ remained in Noreuil.

Tanks Late Again

14 Battalion began moving on to the tapes at 0215 hours and were in position at 0245 but again the tanks, which should have been 150 yards in front of the forward wave by 0300 hours, were late. The first of the four that were to support 4 Brigade was guided into its position by the 14 Battalion Intelligence Officer (Captain Jacka) at 0320 hours. Jacka asked the tank commander if from that position the tank could reach the Hindenburg Line in 15 minutes, the timing upon which the plan of attack rested. The young subaltern replied that it was impossible. This meant that the infantry would reach the wire before the tanks. When Jacka put this information to the COs of 14 and 16 Battalions, they asked that the tanks begin their advance 15 minutes earlier, at 0415 hours. This request was refused by 4 Division because it was too late to make any more amendments and CO, 14 Battalion logged, "3.40 Decision — stick to the programme".

Two more tanks arrived and were guided into position by Jacka. The fourth failed to make its rendezvous. All the tank commanders were worried that the enemy might have heard their approach. Machine-gun fire to blanket the noise of the tanks had, because of imprecise orders, been sporadic and uncoordinated.

Throughout the night a rough log of events was kept by the CO, 14 Battalion. At 0417 he noted that tanks were in position, at 0423 "enemy shoot at tanks" and at 0430 "Stanton reports that tanks appear to be running late".

The three tanks in front of 4 Brigade started forward at 0430 — the appointed time — and received some scattered artillery. This shelling caused some casualties to the waiting infantry — 14 Battalion Intelligence Officer was killed and a large shell exploded in the 4 Light Trench Mortar Battery area, Completely destroying three mortar detachments and also killing and wounding some 14 and 16 Battalion men. Then a tank behind the infantry opened fire and killed three men who were carrying mortar bombs.

The Attack

Soon after this the word was passed down the lines of the waiting troops — "one minute to go" — and precisely at 0445, in falling snow, the men of 14 and 16 Battalions rose to their feet and began their advance. It took
a little time for this information to reach Battalion HQ but at 0448 the CO wrote in his strong, flourishing hand, “First wave reported started followed by second”. At 0449½ he noted, perhaps unconsciously lapsing to his artillery days, simply, “All gone”.

It was now within minutes of nautical twilight and visibility, because of the snow on the ground, was fairly good. The increasing number of enemy flares and the shell bursts lit up the flat, bare plain, and survivors to this day recall the straight four lines of men advancing. Williamson was heard urging his men to keep their dressing.

About half-way to the wire the advancing troops overtook two of the three tanks and a great number of flares were sent up from the Hindenburg Line. It was then that the enemy realized that they were about to be attacked, and they reacted quickly and fiercely with small-arms fire and artillery from both Bullecourt and Queant. Casualties began to increase, particularly in D Company on the left flank which was now exposed. In the gap between 4 Brigade and 12 Brigade there should have been three tanks, but none were there. Furthermore, there was a muddle in 12 Brigade and, on the understanding that they were not to advance until the tanks were in position, the attacking battalion did not move at Zero hour but delayed 30 minutes. These two factors caused D Company to come under both flanking and frontal fire. Captain Orr was wounded when about halfway to the wire, and he was carried to a shell hole where he was later killed by an artillery shell. On the extreme right the platoon commander who gave Wadsworth his personal effects to look after was killed by machine-gun fire just before reaching the wire.

The condition of the wire met by the leading waves varied. It was practically intact in front of D Company; on the right, where A Company was, it was destroyed in places. The Battalion was now under intense fire, and casualties were high as the men crawled under the wire where shells had torn up the ground, or stepped over damaged wire, or tried to get through the enemy zig-zag gaps or run through a break. They then had another dash of 50 yards to OG 1. 16 Platoon of D Company was now down to about 12 men of the 36 who started. Both C and D Companies lost two platoon commanders here. However, against all odds, OG 1 was taken and the advance on OG 2 was under way before the follow-up 15 Battalion came in.

On the right, OG 2 was reached by elements of 14 and 15 Battalion by Communication trenches or over the top. In the centre and on the left the wire was uncut, and the only gaps were those left by the enemy for their patrols. Captain Stanton left his Second-in-Command in charge of B Company troops in OG 1 and led the rest of his men in a rush towards OG 2. It was here that he was killed. Further to the left, men tried to climb over the thick, taut wire but were caught by enemy machine-gun and rifle fire, and three more platoon commanders were lost. Very few men remained in this sector after several repulses, and then Captain Williamson tried to get forward again and was mortally wounded. D Company’s sole remaining officer and a few men finally reached OG 2, mainly by crawling under the wire, and they were joined by some of 15 Battalion. Further down on the right in 16 Battalion’s objective, Major Black, one of AIF’s best known officers, was killed at a gap in the wire in front of OG 2. As a result of the determined efforts of small groups of men under the direction of the few remaining officers, OG 2 was secured by 4 Brigade at about 0600 hours. Although they started late, 12 Brigade, on the left, had also secured their objectives, but again casualties were high.

Despite the failure of the tanks, a portion of the Hindenburg Line had been seized, and thus the first phase of the attack was successful. However, when the remaining officers of 13 and 15 Battalions reached OG 2 they soon realised that with their losses, depleted ammunition, and with no tank and close artillery support, the second phase — the capture of Riencourt — was quite beyond them. All they could now hope to do was consolidate what they had gained, and ask for more ammunition and artillery support. In OG 1 and OG 2, companies of the battalions and battalions of 4 Brigade were intermixed, but a number of the surviving officers, including Wadsworth and mainly Captain Murray VC directed the local defence. However, for the Australians, the situation was rapidly getting worse.

**Enemy Resistance**

Firstly, the German resistance to the link-up of 14 Battalion and 12 Brigade along OG 1 was heroic. They had a tank to their front,
a battalion of 12 brigade to their rear had practically cut them off, and there were Australians on both flanks. The vital north-south road on 14 Battalion’s left where it met OG 1 remained in enemy hands throughout the action.

Wrong Intelligence

Secondly, and worse, at Brigade and Division messages were being received from the artillery observers and the Royal Flying Corps contact patrols, that tanks leading Australian infantry were well over the Hindenburg Line and that the Australians were in Bullecourt. At 0715 hours the 4 Brigade commander told his COs on the railway embankment that he had “orders to be ready to move forward as an advanced guard”. But grimmer, more realistic messages were being logged at 14 Battalion HQ — “0717 Brigade asked to get counter-battery on 5.9 battery firing bearing 64T from C 5 G 50:60” and “0721 To Brigade from Jacka. Tanks a failure”.

Despite repeated requests by signal flares for SOS fire on Riencourt from the now beleagured troops in OG 1 and OG 2, no artillery support came because it was believed that this area was in our hands. It took 90 minutes for a runner to get to the railway embankment from the Hindenburg Line. Enemy machine-gun and artillery fire by 0800 hours now made it impossible to reinforce the Australians across the broad, open plain in daylight. Resupply must await darkness.

Reports

At 1012 a message arrived from Wadsworth who wrote it at 0917 on a German message pad. It read:

To: CO FAD (codename for 14 Battalion)
From: OC AIM (codename for A Company)

Have got both objectives but no further. Ammunition is wanted extremely badly also men. Please arrange early.

Wadsworth Capt.

Despite messages such as this, and others, it was not until 1100 hours that reports from the battalions were believed rather than those aircraft and artillery observers. By then it was too late to take remedial action. The Germans began a series of well-conducted counter-attacks, against which the few Australians, with low ammunition, could do little. As if to underscore the critical situation that 4 Division and Anzac Corps had only just recognized, 14 Battalion logged (but not in the CO’s hand or in the elegant hand of the adjutant), “1120 — Lt Aarons (a 16 Battalion platoon commander) crawled back. Reported things serious. 25 per cent left. Proposed to fall back on line of shell holes out of bomb range and hold on till night”. It had taken Aarons over one hour to get through, by dodging from shell hole to shell hole and crawling beside a nine-inch bank.

Soon after Lt Aarons’ report, another came with the CSM of B Company. Wadsworth had ordered the CSM to get runners back to the embankment to acquaint his CO with the latest information and his resupply requirements. Three runners were killed in the attempt and then the CSM finally got through. In the log reporting the CSM’s message is the entry, “Stanton out”.

Australians Withdraw

Wadsworth’s report via his CSM was written before the decision was made to withdraw from first, OG 2, then OG 1. There were no more Mills bombs and the machine-guns were out of ammunition. Enemy fire prevented the few Australians forming another line in the shell holes in the southern side of OG 1, and so the withdrawal was continued back to the sunken road. By 1145 hours the Germans had regained all that 4 Brigade had won, and had taken prisoner men sheltering in around the trenches. It was only then that our artillery opened fire on the Hindenburg Line and forward of it, and in so doing killed a number of 4 Brigade who were prisoners or wounded lying out in the snow. On the left, 12 Brigade completed their withdrawal about an hour later.

Casualties

Wadsworth narrowly escaped being taken prisoner. When moving down the wire he saw fourteen men taken while he was in a shell hole. Luckily for him the Germans took the prisoners back to a trench and then artillery came down. It took Wadsworth five hours to get back. Of the 19 officers of 14 Battalion who went over the top that morning, seven were killed, two wounded, two died of wounds, three were wounded and taken prisoner, and
two were taken prisoner. Only three came back unscathed — the company second-in-command whom Stanton left in charge in OG 1, one of Stanton's platoon commanders, and Wadsworth. 14 Battalion's total casualties were 19 officers and 582 other ranks. Of about 3000 4 Brigade all ranks who went over the top at First Bullecourt, there were 2399 casualties — 80 per cent of the force.

During the afternoon, the third brigade of 4 Division took over the front line and 14 Battalion survivors marched back to Noreuil. The Noreuil Valley was under shell fire and there were more casualties. Late in the afternoon just after the CO, 14 Battalion and his staff and the three surviving officers left, the command dugout was completely demolished. On reaching Noreuil, the remnants had to march another five miles to the south-west in snow showers and sleet, in the darkness, to a new bivouac area. Next day, on 12 April, they marched two miles to Bapaume, had a three-hour rail journey to Albert and then marched two hours when, at 2000 hours, they arrived at a camp on the old Somme battlefield for a week's training and re-building. At a parade during this period, Padre Rolland when speaking of the loss of the company commanders, remarked, "Such boys to be such men."

AFTERWARDS

The Tanks

A trite and superficial report on Bullecourt was issued by 4 Division, but a joint report by the COs of 14 and 16 Battalions was robust and to the point. It opened up with, "The Tank Co-operation in the attack made on the Hindenburg Line on the night 10/11 April 1917 was useless or worse than useless . . . ."

It took years to sort out what happened to the tanks. Of the eleven tanks, only four reached the German wire. None were there before the infantry. All were destroyed by 0630 hours. In all, six of the tanks were destroyed and two disabled. One that was recovered was destroyed by shell fire at the rear of Noreuil. Of the 103, all ranks of the Tank Company who went into action that morning, 52 were killed, wounded, or missing. In September 1933, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, who during Bullecourt was a major on the HQ Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps, argued that two of the tanks entered Riencourt and another village about 1200 yards further north. However, it is difficult to accept this view. For example, the Germans make no mention of tanks being behind their lines.

Newspaper Reports

The Melbourne "Argus" (price one penny) first reported the action near the bottom of page 7 on 17 April 1917, under the heading, "Breaking the Line" (from Mr C. E. W. Bean official reporter with the AIF). Bean's account was bland. No casualties or units were given, and Bullecourt was not mentioned. He reported that Riencourt had been captured and that troops had entered Hendecourt, the village where Fuller was later to argue that two tanks had reached. Bean must have written his despatch early in the morning when the higher HQ were influenced by the erroneous reports of artillery and air observers. An adjoining column on the same page of "The Argus" gave news from Russia about the disposal of Rasputin's body. "The Argus" printed casualty lists, which by the date of occurrences could only be Bullecourt, for about two months.

Second Bullecourt

Bullecourt and parts of the Hindenburg Line near it were captured after very severe fighting from 3 to 17 May 1917 involving the 2nd Australian Division, then the 1st and finally the 5th and three British divisions. This time the Australians had adequate artillery support but did not use tanks. Second Bullecourt cost the Australians 7000 casualties. The whole area was lost less than a year later during Ludendorff's great offensive, "Michael", of March 1918.

14 Battalion

14 Battalion and the other battalions of 4 Brigade were rebuilt and retrained and took part in all the AIF's major engagements over the next eighteen months. The Battalion's total casualties on the Western Front including wounded, gassed and prisoners of war were 104 officers and 2586 other ranks, just a shade higher than the average for the sixty AIF battalions that served there.

After the war, the Battalion lived on in its Association and in 14 Battalion (The Prahran Regiment) CMF. In the Second World War, the Association provided many of the amenities
and other tangibles such as colours for the 2/14 Battalion. The Association was also responsible for having 2/14 Battalion wearing their yellow over dark blue oblong colour patch. Initially, with little regard to tradition, the authorities have decreed that the patch should be a diamond black over blue. At Puckapunyal the company officers and senior NCOs were given instruction on the Battalion's history by the young Regular adjutant whose uncle had been killed at Pozieres when serving in 14 Battalion.

Stanton's is one of the 24 Great War dead whose names are displayed in the lounge of the Lawn Tennis Association of Victoria club rooms, in Glenferrie Road, Kooyong, a long, long way from a gap in the barbed wire in Picardy. The State Bank Head Office in Melbourne has his photograph on a memorial board.

After the war, a relative of Stanton who was rowing on the Yarra met a stranger, and after names were exchanged and being asked was he related to Captain Stanton, he was told that the OC, B Company was "... the finest man he had met in France".

The Company Commanders

Captain Williamson (who was initially reported missing), Stanton and Orr have no known graves. They are commemorated on the panels of the Villers-Bretonneaux Australian National Memorial, only 30 miles to the southwest of where they fell. Their names are on no local outdoor memorials in Australia, and one looks in vain among the fading plates on the trees that flank the Geelong road at Footscray, for one with Orr's name on it.

However, his name is one of the many on the handsome honour roll in the Footscray Town Hall. During Anzac week 1983 this Town Hall displayed his photograph and those of others, including a number of 14 Battalion who fell at Bullecourt.

Wadsworth continued serving in 14 Battalion, was wounded, and at the end of the war was a major with the DSO, MC and a mention-in-despatches. The Military Secretary in Australia took scant notice of what was happening overseas — on 1 October 1918, Wadsworth is listed as "lieutenant 2 Battalion 7 Infantry Regiment" of the Citizen Forces. In the 1920 Regimental List he is shown as "lieutenant (honorary major) C Company 2/7 Inf Regt", just two places above the Australian Flying Corps' leading fighter pilot, "A. H. Cobby DSO, DFC lieutenant 5/24 Infantry 1 October 1918".

After the war the sergeant, now commissioned, who estimated so long ago at Moascar that the new officers would last three weeks, told Wadsworth of the occasion and apologized for it.

Wadsworth returned to Thompsons' Foundry at Castlemaine as an engineer and continued his Citizen Forces service. He commanded 7 Battalion (Mount Alexander Regiment) 1927-29.

Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, he commanded 9 Australian Garrison Battalion at Portsea only a few miles from where he was stationed at the beginning of his other war. Later he was transferred to the Australian Army Ordnance Corps and served in the Base Workshops at Bandiana. When the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers were raised he joined them and commanded HQ Australian Base Workshops, later 2/4 Australian Base Workshops.

The Base Workshops was greatly expanded during the war, and Wadsworth was promoted colonel with a command of 1 150 men. He was transferred to the Reserve of Officers in November 1944.

He again returned to Thompsons', where he became works manager and a director. He retired after 50 years' service with them and moved to Melbourne. He called his new home "Le Verguier", after the last village captured in France by 4 Brigade in September 1918. This village, like his home, is on a hillside. By chance, the house is in a street that bears the name of the senior complacent and shallow commander on the Western Front.

Wadsworth is alert and active and still carries fragments of German metal in his body. His incredibly neat garden reflects one of his long-time passions.

Bullecourt Today

The Bullecourt area is on the Cambrai Carte Topographique 1:50 000 (1978 Edition) and shows very little difference from the detail in the 1917 maps. The smashed villages of No-reuil, Bullecourt, Riencourt and Queant were rebuilt exactly upon their old layouts. Today's roads follow faithfully those of 65 years ago, and the tracks which were 14 Battalion's left
and right boundaries are easily identified; as is the sunken road where they formed up for the attack.

It is not difficult to imagine the battalions lying out in the snow in the dark waiting for the minutes to pass and, at the appointed time, rising and then advancing in four waves along the gentle slopes which are now sown with sugar beet.

The railway has gone but the embankment where the headquarters were is still there, and it is now covered with bushes and saplings.

The gap between the two brigades — a gentle re-entrant running down towards Riencourt, and down which three tanks were to advance — is under regular cultivation and is called "Vallee des Fourches" (Valley of the Forks).

In May 1981, most of Bullecourt’s population of 250 gathered outside their village church to witness the unveiling of a memorial to Australian soldiers. Earlier that morning, they and the citizens of Riencourt saw the president of the Souvenir Francais (the French RSL) place a wooden cross in the muddy field which was once part of the Hindenburg Line.

Except for rare events such as these, the peace and quiet of rural France, and the regular rhythm of the seasons, dominate all.

NOTES

1. The Victorian Naval and Military Club was on the second floor, the United Service Institute on the third. The CO was a member of both. In Collins Street, just outside this building, is now the Anzac Day marshalling area for the post-World War II campaigns marches.

2. So as to be in line with a recent British Army change, the sixteen AIF battalions adopted the four company, each of four platoons, organization in Egypt in January 1915. Most of these battalions titled their companies A, B etc although some in the early days at Anzac used Number 1 Company and so on.

3. Except for the four RMC graduates, all from the second entry. The chaplain (Chaplain A. Gillison) is not included in the officer strength. Gillison was to die at Anzac. His son was to write one of the RAAF World War II, Official Histories.

4. Wadsworth's grandfather was a close friend of the

5. An infantry Reinforcement was 2 officers and 150 men — 15 per cent of a battalion’s establishment. The officer figure was kept low as their high wastage was made up by promotion from within the battalion e.g. from 1915 to 1918, 68 officers were promoted from the ranks of 16 Battalion, a figure typical of other 4 Brigade battalions. The planned flow was one Reinforcement per battalion, per month and it remains as one of the grim statistics of the Great War. Because an AIF soldier's regimental number was a battalion number, it was possible to work out his Reinforcement. Officers had no regimental numbers.

6. AIF enlistment forms did not specify date of birth, but "age of enlistment". Frequently these details do not agree with birth certificates.

7. When the 1st VC was won by a member of the AIF — L/Cpl A. Jacka, D Company, 14 Battalion on 19 May 1915. Initially within the battalions of 4 Brigade, there were some hard feelings against 14 Battalion because it was believed that they were being favoured by Monash. This was because Courtney's, in the early days, was regarded as being relatively "cosy" whereas the other 4 Brigade posts at Quinn's and Pope's which were garrisoned in rotation by the other battalions, were dangerous, even by Anzac standards.

8. During this time the AIF learnt of the Battle of Jutland, and of the death of Lord Kitchener.

9. Which displaced "Bacon Stealers", given to them at Anzac because their ration was generous when compared with that received by the rest of 4 Brigade.

10. Lt Col J. H. Peck CMG, DSO, DSC, born 22 July 1886 at Grenfell, NSW. A permanent soldier, RAN and A & I Staff. Adjutant 11 wounded 25 April 1915, BM 4 Inf Bde, CO 14 Bn, GSO 1 5 Aust Div, Repatriation HQ London 1919, died 2 September 1928 in Brisbane. 14 Battalion was disadvantaged by having no less than eight commanders in four years.


12. Major H. W. L. Watson, DSO, DCM, OC, 11 Coy D Bn, Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps. His tanks were Mark 1. The male tanks, designed to engage artillery, had two 6-pounds and two Vickers machine guns. Female tanks had Vickers only, for their role was against infantry. Male and female tanks worked together in pairs. Each tank had eight crew members. Tanks were first used on the Somme on 15 September in penny packets and on unsuitable ground. They were an unproved weapon. 11 Coy had been raised only a few weeks and their training had been curtailed due to equipment shortages. They had not been in action and had done no training with infantry. Except for seeing disabled tanks on the Somme battlefields, Australian troops had no experience with them whatsoever.

13. Thus adding weight to the sardonic "one star, one stunt."

14. Coincidentally, Poet, Second Lieutenant Wilfred Owen, 2 Manchester’s, only four days later and 30 miles to the south-east, was to use a very similar phrase to describe his company in an attack.

15. One of these, a platoon commander in Williamson's company, when wounded was dragged by Stanton to a shell hole. The wounded officer survived captivity. His son was to serve in RA Signals 1944-78.

16. This includes three officers who were killed or wounded at Battalion HQ.

17. One immediate effect these casualties and those from the earlier battle had was that, in order to build-up the wasted battalions, 6 Australian Division (61-70 Battalions) then forming in the UK, was disbanded.

18. Also commemorated is A. H. O'Hara Wood, the 1908 State champion. Medical practitioner. Fighter pilot RFC, attached 4 Squadron AFC, died of wounds when serving with the RAF 6 October 1918.

19. This was not as odd as it may appear. The AIF was specially raised and had its own seniority. Back home the Army, in the form of the Citizen Forces, continued its day-to-day activities.

20. The story goes that the first CO was appointed because of his wide experience in electricity. Then it was discovered that this extended only to meter reading.
COMMANDING ABOVE THE STRESS
OF BATTLE

By Major D. A. Benge, RAE
Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Robertson, AA Psych and
Major G. J. Stone, RA INF

In a situation where the consequences of wrong decisions are so awesome, where a single bit of irrationality can set a whole train of traumatic events in motion, I do not think we can be satisfied with the assurance that “most people behave rationally most of the time”.

C. E. Osgood(1)

Today’s military commander will face enormous stress on the battlefield which, unless countered, will deprecate his decision-making ability and may eventually lead to illness. Recent stress research shows that training can be conducted to raise stress tolerance and develop individual stress management strategies. It is in the vital interests of the Army that a comprehensive approach to stress management be developed.

Introduction
Irrationality, uncertainty, depression, indecision and paranoia are scarcely the qualities that are desirable in a battlefield commander; but history shows that these characteristics have been displayed at times by many battlefield commanders, who otherwise were very knowledgeable and highly regarded men.

In his book, ‘On the Psychology of Military Incompetence’, Dr Norman Dixon provides ample historical evidence of erroneous decision-making by ‘distinguished’ commanders, where disaster resulted. Among a complex list of causes for this he states, ‘Under stress, men are more likely to act irrationally, to strike out boldly, or even to freeze into stupid immobility’(2). Dr Hugh L’Etang, in addressing the RUSI in May 1979, cited many dramatic cases of stress-induced performance degradation. To quote but one:

General Rabin, Israeli Chief of Staff in 1967, was notified of the Egyptian alert on 14 May. He began working a 20 hour day, making all decisions himself. (At any rate, he thought all decisions were being passed to him.) By 21 May he was stammering, incoherent, and smoking 70 cigarettes a day. By 23 May, his behaviour was like that of a speechless man in a trance. Finally he collapsed and wanted to resign.”(3)

Montgomery, Macarthur, Rommel, and in fact most, if not all, the great commanders had their lapses. The likelihood of stress-related problems (especially as the pace and the intensity of warfare escalates) is such that there must be an increasing obligation on any responsible military organization to ensure that its higher commanders are able to cope with the pressures of such conflict. To meet such an obligation, a comprehensive approach to stress management must be developed.

Investigation of this subject necessarily requires consideration of the following questions:
a. What is the nature of stress? How does it affect the military commander?
b. Can training be conducted to improve stress tolerance?
c. What strategies can be employed by the commander in battle, to minimize stress?
This article will address all of these questions.
It must be emphasized that the aim of this article is to examine the implications of stress on battlefield command. The related issue of the ‘combat exhaustion’ of the soldier in the forward trenches will not be dealt with here.

Knowledge of the psychology and physiology of stress can help in the identification and minimization of stressors, and in the improvement of stress tolerance. Accordingly, the nature of stress on the commander will now be examined.

The Nature Of Stress

General

Stress refers to a very broad class of human problems. It deals with any demands which tax the body system, as well as the response of that system(4).

Factors which are potentially stress-inducing (stressors) are either external or internal to the individual. External factors such as heat, cold, noise and vibration have been the subject of much research but are not the major focus of this article. Internal factors can be either physiological or psychological. In the context of the battlefield, a considerable research effort has been aimed at evaluating the effects of physiologically induced stress, covering such factors as fatigue, sleep deprivation, disruption to circadian rhythm, and hunger.

Psychological factors such as lack of confidence in subordinates on the other hand, have not received the same attention, particularly in relation to the functioning of the commander.

The Stressors of Command

Today’s commander faces a host of stress-inducing factors, both physiological and psychological, as he attempts to command on the battlefield. Recognition of these stressors is vital for subsequent stress management.

Decision-making will become more complex with greater volume of information but it is still likely to be conflicting and inadequate. The span of command and the number of direct command units is likely to increase. There are numerous activities which compete for the commander’s time but which must be managed to allow time for considered and detached planning. He may have concerns over the competence of staff and subordinates. Any problems in relation to superiors through lack of direction, ambivalence or political constraints will further distract the commander from his tasks at hand.

There are other pressures which can interact with the personality of the commander, such as loneliness, consequence of failure and, as General Ridgeway puts it, ‘the agony of dealing in death’. The commander may also be subject to pressure from other groups such as family, peers, political organizations and, increasingly in future wars, the media.

Physical factors such as disruption of normal duties, lack of sleep and fatigue are likely to increase susceptibility to minor illness. The noise, heat, dust, and uncomfortable travel of the battlefield, place further demands on the body.

Individually, these stressors are not uncommon problems, but where they are concentrated, such as during a campaign, they can become a recipe for degraded performance and eventual collapse of the commander.

The Stress Response

Reaction to stressors, whether internally or externally induced, has the same effects. These have been described by Selye(5) as of three stages, comprising:

a. Alarm Reaction. This is the initial shock phase, during which resistance to stress is lowered. It is rapidly followed by counter-shock, during which the body’s defence mechanisms react with large quantities of adrenaline, cortizone and other hormones being released. At the same time, co-ordinated changes occur in the central nervous system to prepare the body to respond.

b. Resistance. The stage of maximum adaptation and, hopefully, a return to equilibrium if the body has coped successfully with a short-term stress situation. (Figure 1).

c. Exhaustion. This is a chronic stress reaction (Figure 2) where the body has failed to cope successfully with a stress situation (or a series of such situations). In chronic stress reaction, the body cannot return to equilibrium. Subsequent stress onsets gradually wear down the defence mechanism until the stress response becomes inadequate and one of the organs involved in the general stress response begins to malfunction. The ex-
Normal level of Resistance

Immediate alarm reaction

Return to equilibrium

Recovery Phase

Onset of Stress

Figure 1: Acute Stress Reaction

Note: 1. Resistance to stress may be increased.

haustion phase can lead to disease in any part of the body.

Although Figure 2 depicts a dramatic deterioration in performance, that is a stylized representation. Individuals manage to survive a wide range of pressure from various stressors as part of everyday life. There are in fact three types of stress reaction. Firstly, there is healthy functioning; secondly, reasonable and treatable fatigue; and finally, as suggested in Figure 2, progressive deterioration. This latter stage is the result when the stressors are so numerous and/or intense that the body is unable to adapt.

While Selye adequately describes the body's response at an organic level, he does not adequately cover psychological responses to stress. Individuals who become anxious under stress also become suspect in the adequacy of their decision-making. Being a cognitive process, decision-making is susceptible to a variety of psychological influences such as denial, attitudes to risk-taking, pontification, and cognitive dissonance. At the cognitive level, research has shown that under prolonged stress, mistakes increase and this has awesome consequences for the military.

The consequences of stress-induced deterioration may be physical or mental. The body

Normal level of Resistance

Immediate alarm reaction

Eventual stress symptom or illness

Recovery stage incomplete

Onset of Stress

Figure 2: Chronic Stress Reaction

Note: 1. Resistance to stress lowered as individual fails to adapt to each stress situation.
reacts to high arousal and exhaustion by an outflow of hormones and chemicals which increase not only blood levels of cholesterol, fat, uric acid and blood-clotting tendencies but also heart rate and blood pressure, increasing susceptibility to cardiac illness. The psychological consequences of prolonged stress are well illustrated by studies of concentration camp survivors and include deterioration in memory, concentration and intellect as well as anxiety, depression and more serious mental illness.

As mentioned above however, not all the phases of stress reaction produce negative or even permanent results. In the first phase of stress reaction, healthy functioning, the outcome can be beneficial in that the body is aroused and adapts to the stressor, which may well increase overall effectiveness. In the second phase, although performance and adjustment may suffer initially, if the pressure is alleviated in time the effects of stress can be treated without residual effect. It is the third stage which produces long-term problems.

To summarize, there appears to be an inverted ‘U’ relationship between stress and productivity (Figure 3). When stress is low, productivity is also low. As the level of stress increases, the level of productivity climbs until a point is reached where an increase in stress causes a decrease in productivity.

**Individual vulnerability**

A further point on the nature of stress is that it is essentially individually defined, and must be examined with reference to character-
istics of both the focal individual and his environment. Thus, not only must the nature of the stressor be examined, but also the context of it for the individual and the susceptibility of the particular individual at a particular time.

Individual vulnerability to specific stressors vary widely according to personality characteristics and behavioural differences. Genetic and developmental differences are unique for each individual, and determine vulnerability. Age, day-to-day events, mood and a variety of other transient influences can affect vulnerability to stress. The expectations, roles, and perceived abilities of an individual are important factors in understanding how specific stressors are interpreted, and what reaction or coping mechanisms are evoked (McLean, p38).

Research by Friedman and Rosenman has shown that personality is also related to individual stress vulnerability. ‘Type A’ personalities are stress-prone, and are characterized by high degree and intensity, high levels of ambition, competitiveness, aggressiveness and need for achievement and recognition. Typically, they display a compulsion to overwork, are constantly struggling against time and often neglect family life, social pursuits, leisure and recreational activities. These behavioural characteristics were present in 90% of heart attack victims under the age of 65 studied by Friedman and Rosenman, and contrasted sharply with the easy-going behavioural pattern of the ‘Type B’ personality.

Preparing The Commander

From an organizational viewpoint there are a number of ways in which the commander could be prepared to deal most efficiently and effectively with the stresses of command. This section will cover the scope for formal training.

Training

From a training viewpoint, there are two important points which come out of the stress literature. Given the unique nature of individual vulnerabilities, it can be seen that, as a part of normal development, individuals determine their own requirement for coping mechanisms, evaluate a range of strategies, and retain those which are found most useful. Therefore, any training programme should encourage development and self-evaluation.

The second point is that exposure to stress, up to the point where it is still having a positive effect on productivity, not only maximizes productivity, but can also improve the individual’s tolerance for stress. For the development of stress management training, these facts have implications which will be discussed in this section.

The selection techniques for soldier and officer avenues into the Services ensure that, at a gross level, those entering have developed reasonably sound personal stress coping strategies. However, experience of stress prior to service is likely to be limited and, in most cases, low-level, thus coping strategies are likely to be relatively untested. Furthermore, since these strategies will have been developed by self discovery and limited stress experiences, they are not likely to be as comprehensive or efficient as is possible. It is therefore appropriate to provide training which aims at broadening the base of stress experience and increasing the range of options available as possible coping strategies.

Development of a Programme

Stress is an inevitable part of military life and all may eventually face situations in which their traditional coping methods prove inadequate. For these reasons, it is argued that a programme of systematic exposure to information would widen the range of stress-coping strategies available to officers. Officers should also be encouraged to experiment with a wider range of options. By using lecture, discussion and case study methods during induction courses (which are perceived by many as stressful) officer cadets could develop more widely based, and therefore more effective, strategies. Even if immediate change was not produced during these courses, individuals would have a comprehensive body of knowledge from which they could later draw.

An important aspect of any learning situation is knowledge of results. Necessarily, this involves evaluation. While it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of an individual’s coping strategies (and indeed comment on trainees’ reactions under stress are made at various establishments) the process of evaluation may have counter-productive effects. Depending on the form of evaluation and the consequences for the trainee, the process could well inhibit the trainees’ openness to new
information. Where the purpose of evaluation is institution-centred rather than trainee-centred, trainees would revert to stress-coping strategies they have found useful in the past. Thus, the effectiveness of any programme, aimed at development of new strategies, would be negated. For these reasons, it is argued that evaluation should be aimed at providing feedback to students and encouraging self-evaluation.

A further principle from educational theory is also applicable in that instruction should build on knowledge already available, in a way that progressively challenges the student. From the point of view of developing stress tolerance, this suggests that where individuals learn to cope successfully with progressively more difficult situations, their stress tolerance is likely to increase. Support for this view comes from Dollard and Horton who found that during World War II, soldiers reported that they experienced progressively less stress with increased exposure to combat. This is consistent with Miller, who found that realism in training reduced fear in battle, and the evidence of Shaffer, who proposed that knowledge of enemy weapons and tactics as well as confidence and knowledge of their own combat skills and procedures assist soldiers to control fear.

### Individual Stress Management

Regardless of the actual point at which evaluation is made, the process is similar. A series of standardized stress situations could be developed to provide the individual with information on the adequacy of stress tolerances, as well as giving career managers a stress tolerance profile for individuals. It should be recognized at this point that there is a different information requirement for the individual who has leader responsibilities. Whereas the recently inducted individual needs to be exposed to a range of coping strategies that he may not have previously considered, leaders must evaluate not only their own reaction but also be able to evaluate those of their subordinates. Officer training at this level should include mutual observation, discussion, self-evaluation and further stress-related knowledge, such as the way that life events can combine in such a way as to place individuals at higher, but measurable, levels of risk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Life Event</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Death of spouse</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Marital separation</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Gaol term</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Death of close family member</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Personal injury or illness</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Loss of job</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Marital reconciliation</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Change in health of family member</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Pregnancy</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Sex difficulties</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Gain of new family member</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Business readjustment</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Change in personal finances</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Death of close friend</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Change to different type of work</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Change in number of arguments with spouse</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Mortgage over 7 000</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Foreclosure of mortgage or loan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Change in responsibilities at work</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Son or daughter leaving home</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Trouble with in-laws</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Outstanding personal achievement</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Wife begins or stops work</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Begin or end school</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Change in living conditions</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Revision of personal habits</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Trouble with employer</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Change in work hours or conditions</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Change in residence</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Change in schools</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>Change in recreation</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Change in church activities</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Change in social activities</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Mortgage or loan less than 7 000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Change in sleeping habits</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Change in number of family gatherings</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Change in eating habits</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1: Holmes and Rahe Social Readjustment Rating Scale

In studying the cumulative effects of life events, Holmes and Rahe have identified critical changes in life and assigned numerical values to them (see Table 1). This work has been followed up in an Australian context by Tennant and Andrews. It has been found
that life events can be quantified on a scale of stressfulness to identify those individuals who are at greater risk because of the number of crises they have experienced in a period. Where the events score is low, risk of stress-related problems is also low. Conversely, where the total is high, the individual is at risk. Breakdown does not necessarily follow and indeed can be avoided by appropriate action. Provided one is aware of what to look for in himself and his subordinates, he is better able to intervene constructively. Not only does this preserve the individual’s productivity, but it is also likely to raise the individual’s stress tolerance if the situation can be successfully resolved.

The notion of timely crisis intervention appears to be at the basis of the Israeli model of employment of military psychologists. They have found that stress-related battle casualties are more effectively dealt with in situ than following removal from the combat zone. The traditional notion of Western armies has been that to establish mechanisms to deal with psychiatric casualties in proximity to the battlefield will increase those casualties. The Israeli Defence Force rejects this notion which is again consistent with the literature on stress research.

Individual Stress Management Strategies

Once an individual has a sound understanding of the physiological and psychological nature of stress, he is well placed to develop a personal stress management strategy.

There are two basic categories of stress management strategy which can be employed. Firstly, the stressors on the commander must be identified, and then either removed, or their influence minimized. Secondly, the commander’s tolerance threshold can be raised by suitable attitudinal adjustment and experiences.

In practice, most successful commanders have employed both types of strategy, as a basic component of their philosophy of command. However only a few, notably Slim, Patton and Montgomery record their stress management strategies specifically, and some techniques they used will be commented on in this section.

The principal strategies will now be discussed.

Dealing with Stressors
Make Decision-Making Easier

A commander must make difficult decisions, and so he should be as confident as possible in his decision-making technique. Both Montgomery and Slim praise the wisdom of taking (and getting) undisturbed time to think out the vital aspects of a complex problem. Montgomery called it ‘penetrating the heart of matters and then defining it (the problem and solution) in crisp brief and simple terms’.

Montgomery and Slim both emphasize the need to think out problems in relaxed and comfortable settings. This invariably requires some detachment from the main headquarters, and indeed Montgomery always maintained a detached ‘tactical headquarters’ from which to work, even when battle was not joined.

Clear thinking also requires timely and accurate information, simply presented. Both Patton and Montgomery found that their information requirements demanded a network of liaison officers at critical areas of the battle, to supplement the normal chain of command. In any case, staff must develop skill in reducing information to brief and simple terms. ‘Pray give me the facts on one sheet of paper’, was Churchill’s oft heard cry.

Manage Time Well

There will always appear to be an enormous amount of work needing to be done. The commander must have a fine sense of priorities, and a high priority will normally be adequate sleep and relaxation. Slim and Montgomery both demanded their sleep and then resolved to get the most efficient use out of the remaining hours of the day. Invariably this meant significant delegation and detachment from all detail. Staff must be left to manage the routine control of operations while the commander uses his time to deal with the vital issues appropriate to his level of command. Montgomery quoted an appropriate epitaph for an overworked commander:

‘Here lies a man who died of exhaustion brought about by pre-occupation with detail. He never had time to think because he was always reading papers. He saw every tree but never the whole wood.’

Minimize the Span of Command

Commanders can be easily overloaded by a large allocation of units, too many subordi-
nates reporting directly to them, and wide-ranging or ill-defined responsibilities. The wise commander will group units under intermediate commanders and not have too many individuals requiring personal direction. Information processing theory suggests that individuals are capable of handling up to seven major inputs. NATO doctrine limits the recommended number of combat sub-units to five.

Commanders should seek and receive specific directives (and limits if appropriate) for assigned tasks. Increasingly, sociopolitical guidance should reasonably be demanded for independent tasks as political intervention in the conduct of operations may be more likely in the future. Without such limits and a clear understanding of requirements, the commander's mind may be continually stretched beyond the focus needed for vital decision-making.

Demand Competent Subordinates

Lack of confidence in subordinate commanders can both deter delegation and cause undue pressure on the commander's decision-making process. A commander cannot afford to tolerate or 'carry' incompetent subordinates. Key subordinates, including staff, must be the best available in the force to do the job. Rommel was well known for his ruthless removal of officers who could not meet his standards. Montgomery commented how he spent one third of his working time, considering and selecting command appointments. As 8th Army commander he kept appointments down to battalion level in his head. He also kept his competent and successful staff team with him during his subsequent appointments through World War II. Within reason, the Army's personnel management system should afford the battle commander the opportunity and priority to select the men for his key appointments.

Have the Courage of Convictions

(set aside career concerns!)

Relationships with superiors have been the bane of every commander at some stage. Ideally, commanders along the chain of command will attempt to foster supportive relationships amongst themselves. However, situations will arise where moral courage is needed to present unpleasant truths and argue unfavourable issues with superiors. Concern about one's career is a most patent stressor, and the officer who lives in fear of disapproval or critical assessment may find himself an early stress casualty. Worrying about one's career is an improper element in decision-making in any case, aside from the stress potential it can create to further deprecate the quality of decision-making.

Patton, Rommel, and Montgomery are excellent examples of men who displayed such moral courage. Rommel frequently protested and argued with Hitler without concern for recrimination. Montgomery invariably did what he thought to be best, unconcerned with higher disapproval. While this should be the exception rather than the rule, the man who is not prepared to set career concerns aside, will more likely be replaced through illness, rather than disapproval.

Demand Appropriate Rest and Sleep

Insufficient rest and sleep is a common stressor on commanders. There must be no misconception about one's ability to go without sleep. The hormones released involuntarily to cope with other stressors are only reproduced during sleep periods. If the hormones are not replaced, the body's adaptive capacity is quickly exhausted and vital organs, including the brain, lack the energy to meet the demands placed upon them.

Whilst individuals differ slightly in the amount of sleep they need to 're-build', tests on soldiers in the US and UK show that, on average, a minimum of five hours sleep (per 24 hours) is necessary to maintain reasonable performance levels. Anything less than five hours incurs a cumulative 'debt' which must be repaid. For optimum performance over the longer term, an average of seven hours is recognised. 

Slim and Montgomery both demanded restful unbroken sleep. Slim routinely went to bed at 2200 hours and arose at 0630 hours. Anyone disturbing him for less than a real crisis did so at their peril. He quotes 'I have seen too many of my colleagues crack under the immense strain of command in the field. I must have ample leisure in which to think, and unbroken sleep. The wisdom of the learned man comes by opportunity of leisure'.

Be Comfortable

Extremes of noise, temperature, movement and uncomfortable living conditions all initiate reflex adaptive responses. The commander
bouncing around in an armoured vehicle, with radios barking in his ears, dust blowing in his eyes and throat, beneath a scorching sun, may quickly find his adaptive defences exhausted. The commander is wise to afford himself discreet comfort and quiet, when appropriate, as a suitable climate for sound decision-making (20).

Develop Relaxation Techniques

The majority of the above techniques focus on minimization of the influence of stressors. However, some stress reaction is always inevitable, and the body will prepare itself for ‘fight or flight’ with outward signs of tenseness which should be diffused. A wide variety of techniques have been recommended to release such tension before it becomes a further stressor in itself. A number of medical practitioners suggest techniques of progressive relaxation and meditation designed to dissipate muscle tension (21). Alternatively, Dr Greenberg recommends a technique called Large Muscle Activity (22). His rationale is that while the body under stress tenses and prepares itself for crisis, the exercise of large muscles will help to use up the excess fuel in the blood, bring down blood pressure, and eliminate the stress hormones that are causing muscles to tense. His techniques essentially involve activity in the form of walking, stretching and isometrics.

Greenberg also emphasises the need to ‘diversify one’s emotions’. The commander should have some hobby or special interest project, to which he can temporarily escape. Senses of achievement in hobby areas tend, psychologically, to improve self-image and strengthen self-confidence.

Slim’s ability for detached relaxation is reported by Evans, where during heavy fighting at one stage on the Chindwin, the General was found writing an article for the Birmingham Post. He is reported to have said ‘There is nothing more I can do. I must sit back and let them (the divisions) do their part’ (23). More recently, Falklands campaign victor, General Jeremy Moore, admitted to carrying a Bible and a copy of Shakespeare’s sonnets in his pocket. ‘They give you ease of mind, you know’ he replied (24).

Here again, the individual is wise to identify techniques that will suit him.

Raising Stress Tolerance

Earlier, comment was made of the different vulnerabilities that individuals have to stress situations. Research shows that not only can these be measured but that an individual’s tolerance can fluctuate considerably and can be significantly raised or lowered by both mental and physical attitudes and experiences.

Changing Perceptions

Perhaps the major influence towards raising stress tolerance is the changing of the perceptions that an individual has, towards real or perceived stressors. Tanner points to the interesting paradox where anticipation of an event can be more stressful than the event itself. He notes how controlled tests on parachutists (both trainee and experienced) show that they experience their greater stress response, not while falling through the air, but before they even leave the ground (25). The simple message here is that any preparation that can be done to remove fear and give confidence to an individual about a potentially stressful event, will enhance his capacity to cope with the demand.

The most insidious aspect of fear is uncertainty of future events. Accordingly, a high quality information service to advise of the real capacity of the enemy and the scope of a situation will vitally assist the commander. At the same time, whatever he can do to positively develop his confidence in his own abilities will enhance his tolerance of subsequent difficulties. Gaining experience and familiarity are important here.

Both aspects can be concurrently developed by the well-established training progression of learning, practising, and the testing performance under realistic conditions. The value of prior exposure to a stressor was mentioned earlier. What must be recognized is that developmental exposure to stress must be supportive. Exaggerated and excessive exposure to stressors can have negative effects. Individuals should not be exposed to stress beyond their tolerance thresholds.

This perception-changing strategy is most important, and worth re-emphasis. Whatever can be done to change an individual’s perceptions of stressors for the better (ie to see them as less stressful) will increase his tolerance of that stressor.
Having a Religious Faith

The perceptions and confidence of a number of commanders have been influenced significantly by their faith in God. No doubt any commander who perceives he has a 'supernatural' support and guidance should have good reason to be confident, and relatively unafraid in time of testing. Of course, such faith must stand the test of experience, and so it is interesting that many senior commanders continue to extol the virtue of their religious faith. MajGen James comments: 'The universal experience of generals, from Xenophon to Montgomery, who claim that a man's faith is important to him . . . cannot be denied. Indeed experience has led us to believe there is an inner strength in all men connected with this belief in God, and the leader who disregards it is no better than a fool'.

Montgomery's emphasis on this is interesting. 'The outstanding influence in my life has been a deep sense of religious truth'. His order for the battle at El Alamein concluded with the prayer 'Let us all pray that "the Lord mighty in battle" will give us the victory'.

Having offered such a prayer during the day of 23 October 1942, it should not be surprising to find that at 2140 hours, when the Eighth Army went into the attack—Montgomery was already sleeping soundly in his caravan. Ronald Lewin further comments on this strength in Montgomery's life. 'Throughout his life he preserved this unshakeable faith . . . He fervently believed that God was supporting him'.

Rationalizing One's Problems

Various techniques have been put forward to help individuals 'rationalize' their worries. Dale Carnegie's "How to Stop Worrying and Start Living" contains many simple techniques in this area. Essentially, 'rationalization' aims at discarding those problems that are either of minimal consequence, properly belong to someone else, or for which nothing can be done. There are untold numbers of problems that may be occurring in a commander's formation. The wise commander determines the vital matters deserving his attention and blocks or passes other worries pressing on him, for others to attend to.

Stay Healthy

Anything less than the best of health will drain the body's defensive hormones and divert their capacity to cope with other stressors. At the outset, a commander must recognize that any illness automatically lowers his stress tolerance.

If sick, the commander must get well quickly, and this is often best achieved by complete rest and a break from command for a period. To diligently 'struggle on' is counter-productive and invites breakdown. Conversely, the commander must take steps to maintain good health. Regular exercise and a good diet are two priority concerns here.

To quote Montgomery, 'You can't win battles unless you are feeling well and full of energy'.

Maintain a Harmonious Life Routine

The body performs most efficiently when it maintains a harmonious cycle of rest, eating, and activity. Dr Narain emphasizes this need for maintenance of 'circardian periodicity'. Essentially the body has its own biological clock which comes to expect sleeping, eating, and exercise on a regular basis. Narain indicates that where the cycle is disrupted, the body becomes confused and sends out alarm signals, using up precious hormones, and activating stress. The experience of 'jet lag' is a classic example of a life cycle disorientation. Maintenance of a consistent pattern of daily routine will avoid unnecessary hormonal secretion, thus leaving more capacity to cope with other stressors.

Conclusions

Commanders on today's battlefields will be barraged by stressors, both physical and mental. They must realize that the body will react automatically to these, evoking involuntary (or reflex) hormonal and nervous responses. Initially, and in short exposures, the body prepares itself for high performance, and positive effects are felt.

However, in the long term, with an accumulation of stress demands, the body's adaptive capacity becomes exhausted. Starved of adaptive hormones, the body's physical and mental functions begin to depreciate. In the very long term, or under concentrated stress assault, illness, and physical and mental collapse can occur. However, more insidiously, before this, vital decision-making ability is affected. Unknowingly, the commander can become irrational and indecisive. Such a situation is unacceptable, and accordingly com-
manders must have developed individual stress management strategies.

Most successful commanders have used some sort of stress-coping techniques, but it is only in the last ten years that the full physiological and psychological nature of stress has begun to be understood by medical science. Stress research now shows that quite specific training can be conducted to assist individuals raise their tolerance threshold and develop individual stress management strategies. It would seem to be advantageous for the Australian Defence Force to address this subject formally in the education, training, and development of its officers.

The skills of the commander can be the most decisive factor on the battlefield. But the consequences of his error can be catastrophic. Today’s commanders must have developed comprehensive stress-management strategies. Nothing less is acceptable, for as Ginsberg observes in his ‘Lost Divisions’:

‘... no soldier ever becomes acclimatized to war. No matter how brave he is, no matter how deeply he believes in the right­eoussness of his country’s aims, the passage of each day wears thinner his protective armour, so that the time may come when he can no longer face the morrow’[32].

This article is drawn from research originally done by MAJ G. J. Stone, MAJ D. A. Benge RAE, and MAJ J. M. Robertson AA Psych, at the Command and Staff College in 1983.

NOTES

17. Geier, R. P. ‘Sleep Loss’ in Armor, Jan 79.
20. The wise leader would be mindful, though, that excessive comforts are not good for troop morale!
26. James, W. B. and Hall, R. J. G. ‘Man, the Measure of Most Things’ in Defence Force Journal, Jan/Feb 80, p13.

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POWER AND AUTHORITY IN A MILITARY ORGANIZATION - APPLICATION OF SOME THEORETICAL CONCEPTS TO THE RAAF

By Squadron Leader W. J. Freeman, RAAF

Introduction

The concepts of authority and power are of fundamental importance in understanding how leaders may influence followers. Yukl defines power as the 'potential to influence unilaterally the attitudes and behaviour of certain persons in the desired direction'. Authority is a narrower concept and is sometimes referred to as 'legitimate power'. Yukl defines authority as 'the right of a person to influence others in specified ways'.

In any large organization, some specialization of roles is necessary. If the organization is to be effective, some members must be given authority over others so that each member conforms in accordance with role expectations. The RAAF is a large military organization of over 22,000 people. The RAAF performs many different roles, and RAAF personnel have a large range of specialized trades and skills. The system of authority which is used in the RAAF is based on traditional values common to military organizations. This article will examine the applicability to the RAAF of the theoretical concepts of power and authority.

RAAF Organization and Rank Structure

Military organizations are formally structured at all levels. Under the Department of Defence (Air Force Office), the RAAF is divided into two commands; Headquarters Operational Command, and Headquarters Support Command. The commands control formations or units, consisting of squadrons. Each squadron or unit is under the control of a commanding officer. Units and squadrons in turn are divided into flights and sections for administrative and functional purposes. Personnel are allocated to each unit on the basis of formal organization tables held at Air Force Office.

Each person in the RAAF is given formal rank, which indicates the level of authority that person has in the organization. The formal rank structure ensures that each member of the RAAF can identify his or her relative status in the organization. The working relationships in the RAAF represent an organizational structure for providing legitimate authority. Acceptance of the organization's procedures includes acceptance of the authority of superiors. Members of an organization accept the system even though it restricts individuality and personal freedom. They are willing to accept this because membership of the organization, even with its restrictions, is preferable to other alternatives. In the case of non-commissioned members of the RAAF, acceptance of the organization involves a legally binding contract to serve for a specified period called an 'engagement period'. It also involves agreement to comply with certain requirements of the organization designed to reinforce the rank structure and maintain tradition.

Reinforcement of Rank Structure

Members of the RAAF are required to wear uniforms with rank displayed, to reinforce the status of the wearer. Rank is also reinforced by the existence of separate messes for airmen (Aircraftman to Corporal), sergeants (Sergeant to Warrant Officer) and officers (Pilot Officer and above). Messes are the clubs of members concerned, and members may only attend messes not applicable to their rank on special occasions. Officers have widely varying views...
on the subject of social interaction with non-commissioned ranks. This attitude tends to change as officers become more senior in rank. That is more junior officers than senior officers consider that interaction off duty is acceptable. Stouffer, Suchman et al (1949) found that US officers disagreed on the subject of officers maintaining social distance from enlisted personnel:

‘While 82 per cent of enlisted personnel agreed that “an officer will have the respect of his men if he pals around with them off duty,” only 27 per cent of captains, 39 per cent of first lieutenants and 54 per cent of second lieutenants agreed’.

Scott (1956) found that enlisted personnel had a better perception of the organization structure if officers maintained social distance.  

Non-commissioned ranks are required to salute commissioned ranks and commissioned ranks are required to salute senior members. Although the senior person in each case must return the salute, the junior person must always initiate the interaction by saluting first. This traditional ‘paying of compliments’ is aimed at maintaining the superior status of senior members of the organization.

Terms of address also reinforce the formal rank structure. Non-commissioned ranks are required to address commissioned ranks by their rank or as ‘Sir’. Similarly, officers are required to address their subordinates by their rank. However, in practice, most officers address subordinates by christian names, except in situations which require greater formality.

Parades are another activity based on tradition, whereby the commanding officer reviews the standards of dress and drill of his subordinates. The members of the unit are also reminded of the rank structure because all rank levels have a particular role to play on the parade. The commanding officer commands the unit, and the other officers on parade take executive appointments, command flights or fill supernumery positions. The members of flights on the parade react to the commands of the commanding officer, squadron commanders, flight commanders and other executive appointments.

**Sources Of Power in the RAAF**

The most widely recognized categorization of the bases of power is that of French and Raven (1959). French and Raven identified five bases of power: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power and expert power. These bases, or sources, of power may be examined in terms of leaders’ power over followers, and followers’ power over leaders.

**Power Of Leaders Over Followers**

The reinforcement of the formal rank structure in the RAAF is a source of legitimate power for the leaders in the RAAF. Legitimate power is exercised through the command system. In general terms, a senior member in the rank structure has a right to make legitimate requests of junior members. This power is backed up by a system of legal commands supported by the Air Force Act. In essence, a legal command by a superior officer must be obeyed. The Air Force Act provides statutory support for such commands. All members of the RAAF are subject to the Air Force Act. Under the terms of the Act, officers are appointed ‘subordinate commanders’ and may hear charges at a summary hearing. These officers may award punishments for such offences as insubordination, stealing, drunkenness, absence without leave or ‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline’. Thus, the coercive powers of the leader are quite wide and are even wider in times of active service. Punishments include reprimands, confinement to camp, and fines. Commanding officers have wider powers of punishment than subordinate commanders, including power to sentence members to time in a military prison. Courts martial have wider powers again, and may demote or dismiss members for more serious offences.

But the RAAF leader also has other powers based on his or her ability to administer rewards. All members of the RAAF are given annual performance assessments which determine suitability for promotion and posting to particular jobs. A poor assessment could result in a horizontal move to an unpopular location, while a good assessment could result in promotion and posting to a popular area or overseas. Personnel are assessed in a number of different categories depending on rank. Categories for assessment of airmen include ‘appearance’, ‘service attitude’ and ‘suitability for representational posts’. Officers are assessed in ‘representation’, ‘appearance’ and ‘integrity and loyalty’. Thus, conformity with
RAAF norms and values is a significant consideration in assessment. Merton and Kitt (1950) found that US army personnel were promoted more rapidly if they 'expressed attitudes which conformed to the army norm':

'If they accepted the status structure of the army as legitimate, they were more rapidly identified with others at their own or next highest status level'.

Leaders also determine who is sent on training courses and what jobs are assigned. These courses and experience may affect promotion prospects and represent a significant power. Leaders can also modify work organization and job design. These powers can have a significant effect on followers' motivation and job satisfaction.

Another important aspect of position is control over information. Within the RAAF, much information is disseminated from the department, through the commands to formations and units. Thus, there is a certain amount of filtering of information through the communication system. Within units commanding officers and their advisors decide what information is disseminated in the form of routine orders. Leaders have access to information from outside the organization and from other parts within the organization which their followers do not have. This leads to a general acceptance of the leader's word on matters regarded by followers as being within the scope of the leader's knowledge.

RAAF leaders also possess personal power, but this depends on the leader rather than the organization. Leaders who have appropriate qualifications or who have demonstrated skills in the performance of their jobs may be regarded as 'experts' by their followers. The leader's expert power will also be reinforced if he has been a reliable source of information. Within the RAAF, there is a great emphasis on years of service as an indicator of expert power. In essence, if you have been with the organization for a long period you are more likely to be regarded as an expert or knowledgeable leader. There is a growing emphasis on tertiary qualifications and other training to keep officers abreast of technology and aware of developments in administration and management. This training will help leaders to retain expert power.

Referent power, that is power based on a follower's personal identification with the leader, depends greatly on the personality of the leader. The formal rank of the leader, and the perceived power that goes with it, is also a source of referent power. Because of the emphasis on rank and achievement of promotion in a military organization, there is a certain admiration and respect for rank per se.

Power through Tradition

The rank structure of the RAAF and the customs of saluting, parades, etc are based on traditional requirements of military organization. Originally, drill was devised as a demonstration of a commander's control of his men. The method of warfare demanded close formation columns of rifle men whose strength lay in their cohesiveness and combined power. The group was only effective while there was complete control of all members through unquestioning obedience of the leader. Whilst the days of unquestioning obedience have all but gone, there are many traditions which still survive. Traditions remain in military organizations and are cherished because they help to motivate organization members through a feeling of security and affiliation:

'In the United States Marines, it (responding to traditional authority) draws on the follower's internalized sense of responsibility to all who fought at Montezuma, Tripoli, Tarawa or Vietnam; the young private is part of them, and he would feel guilty if he did not do his duty'.

Similar traditions based on World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War perform a similar function in the RAAF. Members are inspired through the knowledge that they are part of an organization which has arguably achieved great success in performing its roles in the past.

In the traditional military organization, the follower responds to the leader's position as indicated by his uniform. Thus, orders are obeyed no matter what the characteristics of the officer concerned. In fact, members of the RAAF are often reminded that the salute is not given to the person but to the 'Queen's Commission' which every commissioned officer holds. This impersonality means that there is greater predictability in behaviour because of values based on tradition.
Power of Followers over Leaders

In considering power in the leadership process, the power of followers over leaders must also be considered. This power is a restraint on leaders' exercise of power and is based on the leader's dependence on followers. McMurry takes followers' power into account in his definition of power:

'I define power as the capacity to modify the conduct of other employees in a desired manner, together with the capacity to avoid having one's own behaviour modified in undesired ways by other employees'.

Leaders are dependent on followers for performance of work functions. If followers perform well, the leader tends to be regarded as an effective manager. Poor performance by followers can damage the leader's reputation.

Subordinates may gain power through the control of information. Because of the volume of information passing through an organization, the leader may be unable to examine every document received or despatched. Thus, the leader may be dependent on followers to inform him when important information is received or despatched.

The ability to perform functions which the leader cannot perform gives followers expert power over leaders. When a leader does not have the expertise to perform the tasks of his followers, he cannot explain how the task should be done or supervise his followers in the performance of the task. He must rely on referent power or reward power. The leader's lack of expertise in subordinates' tasks will limit the leader's use of legitimate power.

There is a wide range of specialized trades and skills in the RAAF. The typical engineering officer or supply officer cannot know all aspects of his subordinates' functions. The leader in this situation has to rely on his relationship with his followers. Members of a group involved in an operation all have a specific role to play. If one member cannot perform effectively and in accordance with expected behaviour patterns, all members of the group are at risk. Thus, all members of the group are dependent on each other for effectiveness, and the leader is dependent on the group, for the success of the operation.

Power and Leadership Effectiveness in a Military Organization

RAAF leaders should be aware of the implications of using the various types of power. Backman, Bowers and Marcus (1968) studied the bases of power identified by French and Raven in five organizations, and drew the following conclusions on their effects on satisfaction and performance:

- **Expert power** was most strongly and consistently related with satisfaction and performance.
- **Legitimate power** along with expert power was rated as the most important basis of complying with a supervisor's wishes but was an inconsistent factor in organizational effectiveness.
- **Referent power** was given intermediate importance as a reason for complying and in most cases was positively correlated with organizational effectiveness.
- **Reward power** was given intermediate importance for complying but had inconsistent correlations with performance.
- **Coercive power** was by far the least prominent reason for complying and was actually negatively related to organizational effectiveness.

Military organizations such as the RAAF tend to emphasize and reinforce legitimate power. If we consider the conclusions above, there are obvious dangers in relying too much on legitimate power. To achieve greater satisfaction and performance, the leader should be aware of the importance of expert and referent power. Users of reward power will tend to be more highly regarded than users of coercive power, but the conformity of followers to coercive power increases with the strength of the potential punishment.

The bases of power are inter-related, and the results of the use of each type of power should be considered. While leaders may achieve desired results in the short term with legitimate and coercive power, there is evidence that these bases of power are not the most important in achieving organizational effectiveness. Bowers (1975) found that more democratic leadership will be more likely to result in members of the US Navy intending to re-enlist. Johnson (1969) found that USAF ROTC units which had more democratic leadership had higher performance levels. Expert and referent power appear to have the most favourable impact on organizational effectiveness. RAAF leaders should be aware of the limitations of formal authority and the use of coercive measures in improving performance.
Any power the leader has, depends to a large extent on followers’ acceptance and willingness to comply.

Conclusion

The formal rank structure and traditions of the RAAF tend to emphasize the use of legitimate power backed up by coercive power. However, other forms of power are just as important, particularly in the normal peacetime leadership situation. The RAAF system of legitimate power and the coercive measures available keep the leadership process more formal in the RAAF than in other types of organizations, and provide support for the system of strict discipline which may be required in a wartime or operational situation. Discipline and the need for coercive measures are generally accepted within the RAAF because they fit in with the traditional rank structure and formal leadership processes which exist in a military organization.

The five types of leadership identified by French and Raven exist in a military organization. However, there is an emphasis on legitimate power and formality in interaction between leaders and subordinates. The rank structure is formal and reinforced by behaviour and display of rank on uniforms. If RAAF leaders are to be effective, they need to be aware of the importance of various types of power and the implications of using each type.

NOTES

2. ibid, loc cit.
4. ibid, loc cit.
8. ibid, pl01.
10. ibid, p461.
12. ibid, p307.

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INTEGRATION OF
THE
AUSTRALIAN REGULAR ARMY AND
THE ARMY RESERVE

By Lieutenant Colonel P. W. White, RACT

Introduction

RESERVES have been a part of the Australian Defence Forces since Federation. In that time, in which they have been subjected to many reorganizations and have actively contributed in two world wars, their relevance to Australian defence has never been seriously questioned. The contention that reserve forces are generally cheaper to maintain, at least in the broadest sense, is commonly accepted. As recently as 1974 the Committee of Inquiry into The Citizen Military Forces (the Millar Report) stated that ‘the main justification for having men in the reserve rather than the regular forces is economic’. There are many other reasons why Australia should have an effective reserve force. This article accepts in principle that the economic, environmental and population constraints of Australia dictate the need for competent reserve forces. What is not accepted is that Australia is making the best use of its reserve forces.

At the moment the Army Reserve (A Res) is engaged in an expansion within its existing structure of some 30 per cent over 12 months. To date the planned targets have been all but met, and consequent equipment purchases have been made to cater for the personnel increases. Yet despite this large increase in manpower, equipment and, consequently, expenditure, the structure of the Army Reserve remains substantially as it did prior to the Millar Report which castigated it for its inefficiency. If the Army is not careful, the problems which contributed to the prevalent inefficiency of the Reserve ten years ago could reappear.

Aim

The aim of this article is to examine integration of regular and reserve Army units as a means of developing the efficiency of the Army Reserve.

Integration

Integration is specifically defined as the combining of parts into a whole. In this article the word integration will be used to describe the combining of regular and reserve elements in one unit. The degree to which integration can be effected will vary greatly, and therefore the word integration may be qualified to show degree.

The expressions affiliation and sponsor unit will also be used. Affiliation refers to formal co-operation between a regular and reserve unit without any change to the command status of either unit. In such instances, the regular unit is referred to as a sponsor unit, and is responsible for the provision of all possible assistance to the affiliated reserve unit. The expression sponsor unit has also been used to refer to the regular unit with which a reserve unit is to integrate.

Current Situation

Despite the recommendation of the Millar Report that there should be a ‘One Army’ concept, little has been done to examine the relevance of integration to the Australian Army. From 1978 to 1979 the concept of affiliated units was trialled in North Queensland to gauge its relevance and suitability for further implementation. As the regular units
in North Queensland were generally operating on restricted establishments, and the local reserve units were, restricted to sub-unit size the circumstances were favourable for limited integration to occur. Sponsor units provided instructors to the reserve when required, assisted with reserve exercises, and encouraged individual and group reserve participation on regular exercises. The concept was successful.

Further steps towards integration have been taken by Royal Australian Corps of Transport units in NSW, where no less than three regular regiments now command reserve units of squadron size. Once again, the concept has been proven viable. Despite this, there is no move towards integration on a wider scale, even on a trial basis. There are a number of reasons for this.

Problems of Integration
Possibly the largest single problem facing integration is acceptance of the concept itself. Regular Army personnel may see integration as a reduction of their unit capabilities, as the Army Reserve is not generally considered by regular soldiers to be efficient. The Army Reserve, in turn, may see integration as involving a loss of their unit traditions and independent command status. In both instances these misgivings would be justified, as that is just what would happen. However, the concept of integration is based on the assumption that the total effectiveness of the Australian Army is what is important. Therefore, any individual loss is justified if it promotes a better total system. Other problems would also need to be resolved if integration were to take place.

Administration
Army Reserve administration is different in many respects from the systems employed in the Australian Regular Army (ARA). Pay rates and systems are different, for example, and reserve units are responsible for their own recruiting, while ARA recruiting is done centrally. There is an inherent risk in establishing an integrated unit; that reserve problems will detract from the efficiency of the regular unit with which they integrate.

The solution to this problem is to rationalise both administrative systems so that only one exists. Where this is not possible, (and recruiting would be one instance) the regular unit should be supplemented with personnel for the purpose of carrying out the additional administration. No increase in overall personnel numbers would occur, as cadre staff currently posted to reserve units would provide any additional staff. In fact, manpower reductions would probably occur.

Discipline
Reserve personnel cannot always be subjected to the same type of discipline as regular personnel. To commit a regular soldier to detention (a gaol) is a normal punishment, but to do the same to a reserve soldier would normally interfere with his principal employment. This problem can only be overcome if the difference is acknowledged by allowing the introduction of a system of equivalent justice. By this I mean the existence of different penalties for the same offence. Where the regular punishment may be a physical form such as detention, the reserve punishment is more likely to be in the form of a fine. Such a system assumes that both punishments are, and are seen to be, equal. Allowing that it is unlikely that two people will ever completely agree as to what constitutes equal punishment, the Army system currently has the flexibility to apply such a system. Indeed, it already works to a degree, as commanding officers have always been responsible to authorize a suitable punishment, regardless of the offence. The principal disadvantage of the existing system is that commanding officers’ powers to fine soldiers would be inadequate for more serious offences.

Training Timings
The nature of the two organizations is that one will work by day during the week, and the other at night and on weekends. This will limit the degree to which co-operation and teamwork can be established. In an integrated unit, these timings could result in headquarters staff being required to work seven days per week. This is unlikely if units are properly staffed and if the unit is correctly managed. Consideration should be given to the establishment of reserve deputy appointments in those areas (such as operations) where a week-long workload may exist.

If properly organized, the variance in training timings can be used to advantage. Duplication of equipment and facilities can be avoided. By arranging five day exercises to run
from, say, Friday to Wednesday instead of from Monday to Friday, both groups can be involved. Regular personnel could then take a four-day break instead of two separate weekends. Most regular soldiers would consider this to be an advantage.

Command Appointments for the Army Reserve
Integration would reduce the number of command appointments available to reserve officers. Opportunities for promotion beyond the rank of major would be limited. This is not to suggest that all command positions would be restricted to regular officers. Where appropriate, integrated units could be commanded by a reserve officer. This might occur when the greater proportion of the unit organization consists of reserves. Other units would be completely reserve.

Extent of Integration
Integration can only take place effectively when an ARA sponsor unit is located in the same area on a relatively permanent basis. This is the result of reserve units being fixed to a geographical area. Integration could not, for instance, occur in Tasmania, which has a significant reserve strength but virtually no ARA. Where a regular unit is required to move, it would be possible to change the command status of any integrated reserve unit. However, it would not be desirable that such a situation occur frequently.

To balance this, personnel in remote areas who wish to join the A Res would have greater opportunities in an integrated system, as they could complete their training obligation at any time during the year. Such personnel are currently enlisted in a ‘Bushman’s Rifles’ type of unit, which has a restrictive annual training requirement.

Animosity
Some animosity may arise between regular and reserve personnel due to perceived differences in conditions and standards of training. Education and good management should prevent this, although to some extent rivalry will always exist and, within limits, is to be encouraged.

Summary
There are a number of problems associated with integration, but these are not insurmountable. They can be overcome by an effective and continuing education programme as to why an integrated defence force is important for Australia. The organization and administration of the Army must be adjusted to suit the requirements of an integrated system.

Advantages of Integration
I have already stated that the intention of integration is to increase the efficiency of the total Army. There are a number of advantages resulting from integration which will achieve this objective.

Efficiency of Command
While some reserve units currently have good commanders, others suffer from the appointment to command of officers who are not suited for the position by virtue of their ability, training, or experience. In the existing system, with limited scope to select commanders, this is inevitable. Integration will either place the responsibilities of command on a professional soldier, or will place the reserve commander in a position where he has excellent support from which to draw advice. This should improve the standard of command and therefore increase efficiency. The resulting improved standard of training will also act as an important recruiting and retention incentive.

Centralization of Officer and NCO Control
Associated with integration would be centralized control of postings and promotion for officers and NCOs. The mechanism to achieve this already exists. Implementation would only require expansion of the existing system to include the Army Reserve. Currently these reserve functions are performed at a local level, albeit subject to higher approval in some instances. Although this makes the best use of local knowledge, it also allows parochial attitudes to intervene, with the result that the best man for the job is not always the one chosen. Centralized control would not prevent local input, but would avoid favouritism. It would also assist when personnel move from one area to another, and when personnel information is required for contingency and other planning.

Realistic Training
Reserve units are limited in the training that they can carry out. This could result from a
lack of equipment, expertise, time, or unit size. Perhaps of all these factors, time alone is likely to cause problems in an integrated unit. By conducting unit exercises over weekends, reserve soldiers will be able to participate in exercises of a size and scope greater than they are currently able to achieve, except perhaps in annual camps. Access to a greater variety and quantity of equipment will be automatic, permitting better training.

As the complete manpower of the sponsor unit is available to assist in training, standards should be high. At the lower rank levels, regular and reserve soldiers will work side-by-side, developing a good understanding of each other and allowing experience to be passed on informally.

Perhaps the most important result would be that the reserves could directly identify their role in war. This they currently cannot do. Such identification should compensate for any loss of unit identity.

Economies of Scale
A side benefit of integration would be a reduction in the number, and an increase in the average size, of units. This would lead to economies of scale. To illustrate simply, the quantity of clothing used by the Army would remain the same, but the number of unit indents would be reduced. Units would also conduct major exercises at full strength, which many currently cannot do.

Summary
There are significant advantages in integrating units where possible. Although these must be balanced against the disadvantages, the net result is likely to be a more efficient base from which the Army could mobilize.

Exceptions to Integration
Regardless of how many changes are made to the system, integration will pose some problems which, although not necessarily insoluble, are better avoided. Some units will not be suited to integration by virtue of their operational obligations or their geographic location. The nature of some reserve training will also prevent integration.

Operations
Certain regular units have operational obligations which cannot be met by reserve soldiers. The Operational Deployment Force (ODF) is the obvious instance. Regardless of their level of training, reserve soldiers could not meet the notice to move expected of the force. Such forces must therefore be excluded from integration. However, there is no reason why a close affiliation cannot be established between reserve units and regular units with an operational obligation, provided that the affiliation in no way detracts from the regular unit’s primary role.

Geographic
The problem of the isolation of some reserve units from a suitable sponsoring unit has already been discussed. Integration is not appropriate in such instances, although some affiliation may be possible. Regardless of location, a sponsoring unit could still assist with annual camps, and by training individual reserve soldiers who were available for detachment to that unit.

Reserve Training
A number of training activities are common to all reserve personnel. Recruit training and some promotion training are examples. As such activities are beyond the role and capability of regular units, they are best conducted separately. This can be achieved by retaining the reserve training groups currently existing in each area of reserve concentration. These training groups would be able to call in regular units for assistance with instructors, or any other assistance which regular units are suited to provide. Liaison between the two groups will need to be conducted through the relevant regular formation headquarters. Therefore an Army Reserve cell should be located within the headquarters in peacetime, and the training groups should be placed under command of that headquarters.

A Proposed Concept for Integration
Integration is a radical change of concept for the Army, and it is not something which can be hastened. The concept should be tested in one area, and its results carefully studied, before the concept is spread throughout the Army. In particular, integration should be preceded by a careful public relations programme among those involved to ensure that participants support the concept or are at least prepared to give it a fair go.
Three aspects of integration are particularly important:

a. A reserve Deputy Commander should be established at all major headquarters, formations and major units which will be involved in integration. The appointment will be responsible to understudy the Commander, to advise the Commander on reserve matters, and to supervise any cells or groups established in the headquarters/unit specifically for reserve purposes. The appointments will be dropped in war, where they are not appropriate, as the peacetime training function of the headquarters/unit will no longer be relevant.

b. Those units which are to be integrated must be carefully selected. Suitability will depend on:
   (1) location;
   (2) proximity of a control sponsor unit; and
   (3) the requirements of the Army ORBAT (Order of Battle).

The senior member in each unit will command the unit.

c. All major Army manning activities and, where possible, unit training activities, should be integrated.

Integration should be introduced in three phases:

a. **Phase One.** All administrative procedures must be rationalized to ensure that no distinction exists between regular and reserve systems. The one exception to this will be procedures which are peculiar to the reserve.

b. **Phase Two.** Organizations and procedures suitable for an integrated Army are to be established. These will include:
   (1) centralization of the control of officers and NCOs, including posting and promotion; and
   (2) the establishment of Deputy Commander positions and reserve cells on appropriate unit and formation headquarters.

During phase two, the decision must be made as to which units will be integrated.

c. **Phase Three.** Implementation.

**Conclusion**

Having a small population, Australia is unable to maintain a large standing Army. The only way a defence force of sufficient size can be developed is through the astute use of reserve forces. Such forces are less expensive in peacetime, and therefore a larger force can be maintained. Balanced against this is the poorer level of training existing in the reserve force. **Australia must have an Army Reserve which is considered to be efficient within the constraints of reserve training. Integration offers the best means of attaining this goal.**

Integration in itself is no panacea. As a concept, it is unlikely to be readily accepted, because of the vested interests and misconceptions which exist in both the regular and reserve forces. Before it could be acceptable, major changes to existing administrative systems would have to take place. To enable command expertise to be retained in the reserve, some regular units may be commanded by reserve officers. Training programmers would need to accept a different approach, as would each commander, in his attitude to discipline. Nevertheless, all these difficulties can be overcome and compensated for by the advantages accruing from an integrated system.

The principal advantage of integration is that the efficiency of reserve units will improve. This will result from better command and organization, as well as more realistic training and better utilization of resources.

Not all units will be suitable for integration, but where integration is practical it offers an improvement over the existing system. Implementation must be carefully planned, with a relevant public relations programme preceding its acceptance. Once an atmosphere of credibility has been created, integration should take place, probably using a trial in a selective area as a prelude to integration on a wider level.

The result would be an Army whose total capabilities would be increased by virtue of the increased efficiency of the Army Reserve. This must be in Australia’s interest.

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Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces.

**Editor’s Note**

This article first appeared in the Fort Queenscliff Papers.
UNDERSTANDING MORALE:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE MORALE OF THE
AUSTRALIAN INFANTRYMAN
IN VIETNAM

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MORALE may be defined as a forward-looking and confident state of mind relevant to a shared and vital purpose.

Confidence and sense of purpose are essential factors in morale. For the infantryman that sense of purpose is found in the shared determination to fight and to win, not only to fight but to die if necessary. It is a grim and noble purpose that cannot be sustained for long without confidence in mates, confidence in commanders, confidence in weapons, and confidence in one’s own skills. Yet that confidence itself can only be fostered if there is a firm resolve, a strong sense of purpose.

High morale in industry, in sporting teams and in the military is characterised by faith and pride in the group and its leadership, commitment to the job in hand, enthusiasm and persistence, confidence and cohesiveness. Morale is something more than complacent job satisfaction.

Low morale is indicated by apathy, indecision or insecurity in the majority of group members. Objectives are neither perceived as being of vital importance, nor felt to be shared by members of the group. There may be little faith or pride in the group, the individual may feel to be of little significance in the total situation, and leadership is ineffective.

Research in the seventies by Bonnett and Smith identified a useful approach to the consideration of morale. At that time Bonnett was Director of Naval Training Research, RAN, while Smith was directing a morale research project at the University of New England. The Bonnett and Smith approach was based upon work carried out in the 1950s for the U.S. Office of Naval Research.

Morale can be considered as having three aspects:
1. COHESIVE PRIDE reflecting a sense of co-operation in working together to achieve objectives. Comradeship and unit spirit are features of this aspect of morale.
2. LEADERSHIP SYNERGY which is group energy generated by appropriate leadership, claimed by some to be the most basic and important factor in morale.
3. PERSONAL CHALLENGE which in turn can have three aspects:
   (i) Tenacity and fortitude;
   (ii) Adventurous Striving; and
   (iii) Personal Reward.

Good performance in difficult situations, ability to absorb stress, enthusiasm and confidence, and high motivation are indicative of this aspect of morale.

There has been considerable documented comment about the morale of American servicemen during the Vietnam conflict. For example Savage and Gabriel write tellingly of an accelerating disintegration of the U.S. Army during the decade 1961-1971. They draw attention to the decline in officer quality, desertion and mutiny, “fragging”, and widespread use of drugs. The Savage and Gabriel article created spirited debate in American military circles. Some viewed the article as a gratuitous libel upon the officer corps. Some accepted the article as fully representative of the truth. Virtually all acknowledged tensions and influences attributable to a general breakdown in traditional features of American society and to the growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War among civilians.

Since Australia was subject to the same social forces in that decade, it is particularly interesting to discuss the morale of the Digger who served in Vietnam. Very little apparently
has been systematically documented regarding Australian morale in Vietnam, yet as veterans of combat duty in Vietnam retire from the army their experiences and attitudes can too easily be lost. There is a need to document carefully some indications of their morale, both as a record in its own right and as an inspirational guide to the future. It is possible to consider aspects of morale in Vietnam, based on the three aspects of morale noted earlier.

A series of interviews with Vietnam veterans was conducted in 1983 by the writer of this article. Some of those interviewed were by now civilians. Others were serving soldiers attached to the Infantry Centre, Singleton. Vietnam was twelve years or more behind them.

The sampling of those interviewed was small and random. The interviews were very much open-ended, based upon leading questions along the following lines:

1. Prior to departure from Australia:
   - Personal reluctance
   - Re-postings
   - Sick-parades
   - A.W.L.

2. Confidence
   - (including lack of confidence) —
     - from own skills
     - from mates
     - from officer and N.C.O.'s
     - from Australia.

3. Cohesiveness — from mates and same outlooks
   - from pride in Unit
   - from job to be done.

4. Examples of: panic, jack-ups, fragging
   - tenacity
   - enthusiasm

5. Personal reactions (then and now) to:
   - mines, being shot at etc.
   - village destruction and resettlement
   - searching tunnels, graves etc.
   - dead bodies and wounds.

These quotations from these interviews are in italics.

Cohesive Pride

"Your own section or platoon or company was always the best. You had no time for 7 RAR if you were in 2 RAR. Yet even though your own company was better than any other you had respect for each other as members of the same battalion".

"Soldiers take pride in the knowledge that their own company or unit is good at something, and identified as such by others".

"We thought we were pretty good. I was in the Recce. Platoon of Support Company, and we went further in small groups than anyone but SAS. Our nashos were first up to Vietnam and they felt pretty good about it. We spent longer outside the wire than any other platoons and we smelt more than anyone else when we came back. We took fewer stupid casualties than other platoons".

"We felt pretty good when the whole battalion went out in waves of choppers — blokes and guns everywhere. We were a fighting unit with a fighting job to do".

"Our jungle greens, giggle hat and sweat rags were more functional than the Americans’ uniforms — and then on parade we wore our Digger hats and silver RAR’s. We needed our own distinctive way of doing things, our own outward signs of a special identity".

The unit pride evoked when the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment paraded, with families present, in full battle dress, camouflage details, with operational equipment, arms and ammunition prior to its departure for Vietnam has also been commented upon. These comments by veterans clearly identify one important part of cohesive pride: the appearance and the reality of being just a little bit special. The attraction of being a member of a unit that is good at its job and looking the part is a powerful contributor to cohesive pride.

There is a valid viewpoint that elite forces cannot do anything that thoroughly trained infantry should not be able to do. However, since there may not always be the time for infantry to become thoroughly trained, unit attraction seems particularly apparent in the case of forces such as the SAS. Many comments on the SAS are equally applicable to regimental infantry units:

"To win acceptance among a group who have found the same road to self-respect is to join a community and achieve an identity not attainable in the fragmented isolation of urban life . . ." (Garaghty T. Who Dares Wins Fontana-Collins, Glasgow, 1981, p. 260).

This sort of identification with a group promotes cohesiveness and, further, Kellett tells us in his recent excellent book:

"... the deliberate recollection (in celebration, dress or colours) of past events unique to each regiment — glorious last stands or
battle-winning charges — restores a measure of self-respect and pride to the members of a unit that cannot compete in many of the tests of unit quality that characterise garrison soldiering" (Kellett A. Combat Motivation Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston, 1982).

Thus, the U.S. Presidential Citations of 3 RAR and 6 RAR go a long way in creating cohesive pride. Unit mottoes such as "Nulli secondus" of 2/2nd AIF or the colourful colloquial analogy for a unit colour patch such as that of the 2nd Armoured Brigade: "Through mud, shit and blood to the green fields beyond" are valuable in supporting morale. Pride can be evident simply in being "The poor bloody infantry". Even the special nature of recruitment, such as that for the Sudan Contingent or for Korea Force, creates cohesion, as do unique ways of going into battle as exemplified by mounted infantry or a parachute regiment. While this cohesive pride will often grow of its own accord, it should also be consciously fostered. The outward signs of being distinctive can range from pride in a commando's beret to the stink of a sweat rag — both are reasonable evidence of soldierly performance.

Working together for years prior to going into action is well-exemplified as the basis for the morale of the 2nd Scottish Rifles at Neuve Chapelle in 1915. (Baynes, J. Morale: A Study of Men and Courage, Cassell, London, 1967). The same factor emerges in these interviews with Vietnam veterans:

"Most Australian battalions trained as a unit for twelve months before going to Vietnam. We knew a twelve-month tour of duty lay ahead":

"We trained for many months together, we went overseas together, and out in the bush together we were able to put our training into action".

"Whereas the Americans replaced individuals, feeding them through nominal units, the Australian units rotated as real entities".

Regimental spirit reflects confidence, pride and duty, developed by constant emphasis on training for war, such as unusual and tough training that other units may initially deride, then envy and finally emulate, such as a company's 100-mile route march concluding with the regimental band marching the company back into its barracks.

In working together in the field soldiers come to know each other remarkably well. In combat this, in turn, fosters a rare closeness that a man remembers all his life. Let these Australian veterans tell it their way:

"We soon came to know the weak links in action, sleeping on sentry or the bloke who didn't pull his weight filling sandbags".

"The big mouths of the platoon were often weak as piss in a firefight".

"The bullets are too fast for the liking of the bloke who's quick with his fists or too ready, with his mouth".

"We took some time to get below an overlay of bravado. This was mainly during a six week period of acclimatization in Vietnam — minor patrols with contact and losses — prior to joining the battalion. It took some time to overcome the trigger happiness by a few loud mouth clowns. I kept well away from those blokes — they never change — the hotshots who did things without thinking, those who lacked caution and common sense. They didn't help our confidence in the platoon, but ultimately we sorted things out and confidence grew. I was at ease outside the wire with the quiet blokes — no bravado in the bush. Mates reacted quickly and correctly when needed and that gave us a lot of confidence in each other. Morale for me was just the platoon I was with".

"When cold, wet and miserable, and the food hasn't arrived, every unit has a character. We would cultivate and encourage him. He's a big factor for lifting morale, making a humorous comment that breaks the down-hill slide".

An American we interviewed puts clearly another side of the knowing of one's comrades in arms:

"Confidence is fostered by the presence of experienced soldiers with a reputation for skill in battle. The fear factor is ever-present, and so the experienced and stronger men are encouraged to support and sustain the others, thus working as a team. Trust and faith in each other's ability is essential".

By contrast a well-known problem faced by the Americans is mentioned by an Australian:

"The U.S. army is huge, amorphous, no one even knows anyone else's name half the time".

One cannot but be greatly impressed by the depth of soldierly comradeship which was constantly mentioned during interviews.

"Men in a section are closer together over there than back here. One in, all in, whether
on leave or in action. We relied on each other. We shared everything. There was just so much honesty'.

"There was a certain affection for each other, a trust and confidence, from going through some sticky situations together".

"You become part of your mates and they become part of you. There was mutual trust—an affection and emotion for each other, yet you could still see your mate die without shedding a tear over him. You knew about life and death".

"Mates looked after the bloke who had any traumatic effects, whether on R & R or when the battalion returned to Australia".

"Relying on each other for your very lives promoted cohesiveness".

These remarks bring to mind the very well known comments of Gullett on his service during the Second World War:

"An effective battalion is being, ready to fight, implies a state of mind—I am not sure it is not a state of grace. It implies a giving and a taking, a sharing of almost everything—possessions, comfort, affection, trust, confidence, interest. It implies a certain restriction, and at the same time a certain enriching and widening of the human spirit. It implies doing a hundred things together—marching to the band, marching all night long, being hungry, thirsty, exhausted, filthy; being near but never quite mutinous. It involves not the weakening but the deferment of other bonds and interests; the acceptance that life and home are now with the battalion".

"This then, was our platoon. We had come half way round the world together. We knew and liked each other and worked together in all matters. We were in no doubt that we were the finest infantry platoon in the AIF". (Gullett H. Not As a Duty Only, Melbourne University Press. 1976 pp. 1 and 8).

Ion Idriess recalls similar manly sentiments from his service during the First World War:

"But the dearest memory, the memory that will linger until I die, is the comradeship of my mates, these thousands of men who laugh so harshly at their own hardships and sufferings, but whose smile is so tenderly sympathetic to others in pain". (Idriess I.L. The Desert Column Angus and Robertson Australian Classics, 1982 p. 145).

From the Israelis comes a similar tale:

"Soldiers during the Six Day War, asked what sustained them in moments of dire peril and drove them on, indicated the need to fulfill their obligation to fellow soldiers—the affiliative motive".

"In interviews with wounded soldiers in hospitals heard on the Israeli radio, the word ha-herrah (my buddies) is mentioned with monotonous frequency". (Rolbant S., The Israeli Soldier, Cranbury New Jersey, 1970).

Ellis writing of this loving comradeship and mutual respect puts it quite concisely at several places in his book:

"The soldier became increasingly bound up with his tiny fraternity of comrades who shared his suffering and they alone came to represent the real world. In the last analysis, the soldier fought for them and them alone, because he defined himself only in the light of their respect and needs". (p. 315).

"All men who have known this experience must hunger for it, a vision as unattainable as the Holy Grail . . ."

". . . the very toughest soldiers, those whose job is to kill, maim and destroy, it is just those men who are the most gently considerate and moved by feelings of sympathy for others. . . who indeed would trade these comrades of the battlefield for friends made in time of peace?" (p. 351).

"The fighting soldiers were sustained by a regard for others in which self-respect and mutual esteem were so inextricably intertwined that courage was a commonplace, self-sacrifice the norm. Without this bedrock of genuine human love there would have been no combat divisions, and not a billion cheery exhortations, a million sergeant majors or a thousand scaffolds could have made a jot of difference" (p. 357). (Ellis J. The Sharp End of War Corgi Books London, 1982).

Gammage tells us of this basis for a cohesive pride that has lasted through the years, highlighted every Anzac Day, since 1915:

"Mates strengthened a man's attachment to his unit, shared and eased the oppressions of battle and hardship and multiplied the diversions of leave. . . they became the AIF's greatest cohesive influence, discouraging-shirking, and lifting men above and beyond the call of duty". (Gammage G. The Broken Years Penguin, Ringwood, 1975, p. 247).
Leadership Energy

Synergy is group energy. Leadership synergy is the commitment, effort and confidence that is aroused by effective leadership. While the leader should never expect more from a soldier than that soldier is capable of achieving, there can often be a valid expectation for more than that soldier at first believes he can accomplish. Men are more efficient when they understand clearly what results are expected of them. They are more willing when their leaders take an obvious interest in the welfare and achievements of the troops. Their sense of purpose is reinforced by the initiative and the competence of their leaders.

The best indication of the quality of a fighting unit is held by many to be seen in the quality of its corporals. The creation and release of energy begins with the smallest groups in the army as the following quotations from interviews indicate. Confidence in the section leader was important in Vietnam:

“He made me feel safe. He was decisive and knew what he was doing. He told me, ‘We’re going to live, boy.’”

“Corporals were men identified as natural leaders — men who would say let’s get started, and others would follow. The regular battalions do not find such men easily, but national service can provide them without them making a lifelong career of the army. National servicemen were on average better soldiers than the regulars in Vietnam, but the regulars were our very best and our very worst. Corporals were our major casualties.”

“There were a few NCO’s who’d see the enemy when he’s not there and start firing. Some who were new didn’t seem to know the score. Others — real professionals outside the wire — knew clearly what to do. They focussed on essentials — ensured that our gear was functional. We’d go perhaps two hours in the bush without saying a word. Bush-bashing with fleeting shots were what it was all about. Some of these NCO’s were agreeable to put it on the knuckle if provoked. Perhaps they were wild inside the wire, but they were controlled and competent outside. They had good map reading skills and were physically tough.”

Three aspects of the officers’ role emerge in the following extracts from records of interview:

i) acknowledging experience and expertise
ii) showing solidarity with his soldiers
iii) keeping the troops well-informed.

“Officers who won’t listen are destructive of morale. You need to listen to soldiers’ advice or suggestions, even though decision remains the officer’s responsibility. I gained respect by allowing my experienced platoon sergeant to take the lead with advice until I gained experience.” (Former lieutenant U.S. 4th Inf. Div.).

“Our Colonel made us feel a special group in ‘Tiger’ battalion. He always welcomed us back when we came in from an action or from long operations.”

“Once national servicemen were told why we were in Vietnam we had the most able, toughest, most dedicated soldiers we could want. It is important to tell the reason why.”

The comments cited here, and other comment during interviews, seem especially to recognise military competence, physical toughness, sharing of information and earning the respect of the fighting soldier as paramount leadership qualities. It is these leadership qualities which remain uppermost in the recollection of Vietnamese veterans. These are qualities which energised the morale of troops in Vietnam.

Personal Challenge

Tenacity and Fortitude

Good, steady performance in difficult and shock situations, a solid reliable persistence in getting on with the job, an ability to handle stress or frustration, physical endurance — these are the characteristics of tenacity and fortitude. Perhaps in the fighting soldier these qualities are the most important of all in preventing low morale. Looked at from another perspective, a unit with good morale should reveal these sterling qualities. Napoleon has already said it, of course:

“The first quality of the soldier is fortitude in enduring fatigue and privations.”

Bidwell (Bidwell S. Modern Warfare Allen Lane, London, 1973, p. 127) considers morale to be found essentially in the ability to stand up to prolonged operations, fear, fatigue and ill-health.

The infantryman is a special sort of soldier — willing to endure hardship. He feels fear and a readiness to panic. He has the capacity for uncontrollable shivering or bowel action, as much as any man — but he is trained to
control it, determined to control it, and usually able to control it.

There is a development of the inner will in this sort of morale: a mental toughness. Mental and emotional determination, self-disciplined, enables its possessor to resist stress and frightening distractions. It enables the soldier to make and implement correct decisions in situations of real danger.

During interview there were relatively few explicit comments to illustrate this dimension of morale. However, Australian soldiers do have a tradition of fortitude, such as at Gallipoli, Pozieres, Tobruk or Shaggy Ridge. Yet there is a limit to endurance. Courage and fortitude are an expendable store. Even the best and bravest will break down under unrelenting stress. Gallipoli was no exception:

"Disease, constant danger, poor rations and a depressing existence among cemeteries containing the remains of their friends were responsible perhaps even more than the enemy for driving to despair a handful of the courageous men who had stormed and held the beaches." (Moore W. The Thin Yellow Line Leo Cooper, London, 1974, p. 73).

Auchinleck was obliged to write of the 9th Division at Tobruk:

"The health and morale of Tobruk garrison is very good but the power of endurance of the troops is noticeably reduced and this is likely to be further reduced as time goes on and I detect signs of tiredness in those in responsible positions." (Maughan B. Tobruk and El Alamein: Australia in the War of 1939-45 Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1966, p. 350).

The very great majority of our soldiers in Vietnam handled the sights and sounds of the battlefield adequately. Modern man is less accustomed to raw injury, sudden death and the rigours of living in the field than were previous generations. He is in many ways a more sensitive person, but in combat he coped.

"Body parts were meat. So-and-so was dead. No trauma, but some dreams and nightmares. When your number's up, your number's up". "The day the boss got his M.C. there was shit everywhere. We had walked straight past them. They had tunnels all over the place. We lost Norm and almost half-a-dozen others. Our 'medic' received an M.M. for his attempts to save Norm. One of the Captains got hit in the chest. We brought in the choppers then to shoot up the area. It was a battalion operation. About twenty of us came back several weeks later. It was a stressful time — felt it physically — tension in the heart — we were crawling and had quick reactions. A job had to be done and our tempers were a bit short. There was a controlled fear as we watched where each of us walked."

The isolation of the point man or forward scout on patrol was recognised — the stress of uncertainty, continual straining of the eyes and ears, controlling the noise of his own movements, aware of the hazards of mines underfoot and booby trapped foliage.

At the Infantry Centre, Singleton, it has been explained that there was less combat fatigue among Australians in Vietnam than in previous wars. The matter of combat fatigue warrants some little attention here for its bearing on morale. It is impossible to predict endurance and staying power, but inadequate sleep seems to be very often the starting point for a more serious fatigue. This author believes firmly in the importance of sleep. The human body has certain "circadian rhythms" which call for a normal 7½-8 hours sleep daily. Under combat conditions a backlog of lost sleep can quickly develop, for the human body is not equipped to handle shortened sleep cycles. There is ample evidence to show how work performance decreases after 18 hours without sleep. Sleep loss causes errors of omission rather than commission. Eyes fail to pick up details, senses become dulled, dreamlike thoughts emerge, false visual impressions are created. Sleep descends in gentle irresistible waves and one shudders into wakefulness time after time.

It is well known that during World War II Montgomery retired early to bed as often as possible — most famously on the eve of D-day — and insisted on not being disturbed. During the Six-Day War in 1967, General Rabin worked a 15-20 hour day for nine days by which time he was in a trancelike condition and incoherent. After an injection to induce sleep for 24 hours he was once more alert and able to assume responsible command.

Drug use among Americans in Vietnam seems to have been a problem of personal and military discipline rather than a result of combat stress. A point to be made in this article is that during open and frank interviews
with a wide range of Australian veterans of Vietnam no evidence emerged of Australian discipline and morale disintegrating in the way that occurred with U.S. forces.

An aspect of training designated aptly by the Russians as "psychological tempering" involves step-by-step preparation for situations that can lead to combat fatigue. The Soviets believe that for combat training to be effective it must recreate the psychological pattern found on the battlefield. This pattern requires a close simulation of actual physiological and psychological conditions to evoke feelings and thought similar to those occurring under the strain of battle. (Gothreau A.F. Morale: Political/Psychological Preparation of the Soviet Soldier. Student research report, U.S. Army Institution for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, Garmisch, Germany, 1973).

Clausewitz has long ago noted that an army imbued with true military spirit is one inured to privations and fatigue by exercise, by training just as happens with the muscles of athletes. The Australian Army has a saying, "Train hard, Fight easy". While no fighting is easy, the meaning is clear enough. Psychological tempering will contribute to the development of morale: confidence and the tenacity to endure.

Psychological tempering requires the development of personal skills in recognising fatigue and stress. It involves discussion of natural reactions to fatigue and stress, and of the normal consequences of failing to master one's own fatigue and stress reactions.

The training aspect of psychological tempering begins with simple, though often new, experiences such as sleeping out of doors. There is need to develop the capacity to perform routine procedures under sudden, unexpected sustained or severe stress —

- clear a weapon stoppage
- call down artillery fire accurately
- apply basic defensive tactics

Technical mastery of a weapon is of little value unless there is also a confident ability to use it in an array of difficult circumstances. In the Sinai an Israeli motor brigade's far strung out dust cloud towering for thirty miles back, gave the Egyptians the impression that a mighty host was advancing upon them. Panic and demoralisation ensued. Confidence could have been built and morale sustained if the Egyptian troops had been given previous training experience of such sights in the desert.

Training that achieves competence, good judgement, cheerfulness, steadfastness and persistence under normally stressful and fatiguing circumstances is training that enhances morale. Therefore, the following are examples of contexts, with the physiological and psychological aspects carefully monitored, which without strain on budgets are important in peacetime training:

- in all weathers
- limitations of sleep
- periods without food or water
- unaccustomed heat and cold
- continuing after physical exertion to the point of exhaustion
- extension of the time anticipated for a field exercise
- confusing sensory impressions
- restraint in one place for a long time
- in difficult or unusual terrain
- unaccustomed sea and air turbulence
- unaccustomed noise
- enduring continual loneliness
- enduring continual close company
- enduring silence and other sensory deprivation
- sudden loss of leadership
- tasks where every soldier's competence is limited
- limitations on time that is available to complete a mission
- confused orders (e.g. strong radio interference making communication difficult)
- multiple tasks in unanticipated situations (e.g. "Enemy" counter-attack from several unexpected directions with difficult access — contrary to official briefing for the exercise)

These comments touch upon matters of military competence. They also are vitally relevant to a "... confident state of mind" that contributes to soldierly pride and the capacity for endurance in battle, and that is morale.

**Adventurous Striving**

"They went with songs to the battle". (Laurence Binyon)

A morale of energetic, confident enthusiasm with zestful, zealous striving to attain goals is related to a young man's sense of adventure. War does provide an outlet for high spirits and a love of danger. The confronting of
violent challenge is a way to test oneself and one's courage against a great unknown. A chance to see the world and the opportunity to participate in great events have appeal to our sense of adventure. This is all related to the development of a fighting spirit.

"It is confidence, casual courage, a high threshold to fear, elan, enjoyment and excitement. Once seen in others it can never be forgotten; once it has taken hold of a man, however briefly, it remains a lifelong and treasured memory." (L'Etang H. "The Fighting Spirit" Brassey's Annual: 1969 p. 298).

Australians in Vietnam had this spirit:

"We were rearing to go, ready for the big adventure. In Vietnam we would be putting our trade into practice. Training for war creates a strong sense of expectation."

"Those with a strong unit identification had no problems prior to departure for overseas, but from reinforcement wings and in non-combat support units there was a degree of gangplank fever."

"The soldiers were eager to go, and national servicemen had swung readily into this attitude."

"We were young, enthusiastic troops. Prior to departure some individuals did extra training to get themselves extra fit. I didn't notice any increase in sick parades. AWL was less than when we were in basic. Just before leaving for Vietnam some of the less able might have been re-posted."

Those who undertook extra training were by no means unique. It was happening with some of the Americans, and it had happened in Gullett's platoon of the 2/6th Bn. in the Middle East. When the U.S. 25th Division based in Hawaii in 1965 received orders to move to Vietnam most troops 

"... sensibly began preparing themselves. Some took courses in Vietnamese, or read books on tropical diseases, insects and reptiles. Others bought hunting knives, special water-repellant clothing and enormous amounts of soap — rumours had already got to them that there was a shortage. Exercising became fashionable." (Watson P. War on the Mind Pelican Books, London, 1980 p. 161).

"Our working days were long but such was our keenness that even when they were over we practised throwing grenades, bayonet fighting, stripping and aiming our weapons." (Gullett H. Not As a Duty Only Melbourne Uni. Press, 1976 p. 66).

This zestful enthusiasm is reflected in research findings by the U.S. Navy:

"Of all variables included in the analyses, items that assessed an enjoyment of physical activities, a need to excel, and identification with being a Marine had the strongest association with graduation from recruit training." (Hoiberg A. & Berry N.H. Fifteen Years of Research on the Attitudes and Performance of Marines Report 77-6 Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California).

It is reflected also in the well-known fighter-factor research in Korea, based upon investigation of 310 soldiers who underwent 86 separate psychological tests. Five main personality factors emerged as characteristic of the good fighter, and at school they took part in sport more often than non-fighters:

- Masculinity, including outdoor adventurousness
- Emotional stability
- Sense of humour, preferring a sharp wit and biting sarcasm
- Intelligence
- Leadership; including poise, spontaneity, extraversion, independence and freedom from anxiety

Underlying the morale of adventurous striving is a set of factors similar to those which make for the good fighter and similar to those which motivate young men to volunteer for the army.

**Personal Reward**

"And gentlemen in England now a-bed, Shall think themselves accursed they were not here, And hold their manhoods cheap, while any speaks That fought with us upon St. Crispin's Day."

Personal gain in the moral sense of intangible rewards is more relevant here than are tangible rewards such as pay. This aspect of morale is related to a striving which arises from incentives of personal satisfaction. Recognition and respect, esteem and prestige, being of good soldierly repute and sharing in military success are the real features of morale of personal reward. Pay, promotion and awards are of the
The reward of self-respect grows out of pride in doing a soldierly job, and out of confidence in individual military skills.

"Confidence in ourselves in Vietnam was built by continuous training, not just depending on experience in action or in the bush."

"The Australian soldier has considerable cross-training with a wide range of military skills. We were more confident than the Americans who tended to be more specialised, less apt in teamwork and less possessed of natural cunning in the field."

"Automatic responses when action begins do a lot to prevent insecurity and trauma."

"Confidence in action arose from toughness in training. When under fire for the first time your response was automatic because of your thorough training."

"Those not in a combat unit have a sense of slight inferiority."

These latter remarks are echoed again and again in the words of those who were there, and in the minds of those who were never there.

"I was in daily contact with the people who were at the very heart of the war ... There are things that they know that I don’t know. Things that they felt that I will never feel, I hope. There are places that they’ve been that I never want to go. It’s odd though. Sometimes when I think about them, I experience a guilt that is akin to the guy who didn’t go at all." (Baker M. Nam Abacus, London 1983).

"They hear and watch us with the envy rear-echelon troops often feel for the infantrymen" (Caputo P. A Rumour of War Ballantine, New York, 1978, p. 100).

To be a Digger on active service is a matter of proud reputation back home. Even in the decade of the pacifists, the digger tradition stood unassailable as it had since the years of the original Anzacs:

"... they valued the reputation they had won ... their prestige affirmed their proficiency as soldiers, encouraged their belief that they could contribute to victory, and protected the good name of their units. Perhaps above all, because the world still honoured martial capacity as it had before 1914, the ability of the Australians gave them some common ground with civilians, and earned them the respect of other soldiers. Since the landing the stirring deeds of men from a land so slight and distant had caught the romantic enthusiasm of the English press; ‘Anzac’ conveyed impressions of almost legendary fighters, dashing and gallant, far from their homes and almost invariably triumphant in war.” (Gammage B. The Broken Years Penguin, Ringwood, 1975, pp. 225-226).

Reputation among family, friends and community is real reward. Even when that wider community comes to question the moral and political rightness of a war, in that potentially demoralising phase of the final years in Vietnam, the Australians’ self-respect was un tarnished:

"A military tradition of serving as a Digger is widespread in Australian families. Morale requires a sense of well-being in the family and support at home."

"Demonstrations back home were a non-event as far as the Australian troops were concerned."

"The contempt of soldiers — even temporary soldiers — for civilians prevented any of the dissent in Australia affecting our troops in Vietnam."

Success, according to Sir William Slim, is one sure basis for building morale. Its importance is attested by Australians who served in Vietnam:

"Confidence came from your own ability developed during training, from group support and the mates you know, and from winning a nice little stoush now and then."

"Having success in action gave us confidence. Even just a reasonably average first contact soon after we arrived gave us confidence, because we were able to confirm our knowledge. Our training was thorough."

On the matter of personal reward as a morale factor, let us offer the final word to our sole American interviewee:

"We got out — wounded a little — and the morale of the entire LRRP company was boosted by this success. You cannot maintain morale with losses. You need to pat successful soldiers on the back. Recognition for accomplishments is important. Tell everyone in the unit when a man does a good job and tell other units when a unit does a good job."
Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be seen that the three aspects of morale used as a framework for this article represent a useful approach for thinking about combat morale. The framework conveniently accommodates the relatively unstructured comments of infantrymen interviewed on aspects of morale. It is suggested that this framework of understanding can lend itself for use in training.

Beyond exploratory interviews such as those forming the basis for this article, it would be enlightening and no doubt useful to conduct more systematic analyses of morale in an array of army units both regular and reserve.

The morale of the Australian soldier in Vietnam, as reflected in the interviews, was high. To reiterate, morale is a forward-looking, confident state of mind relevant to a shared and vital purpose. Morale of cohesive pride, leadership synergy and personal challenge in pursuit of that military purpose were in the tradition of earlier generations of Diggers.

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BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by Andre Kusczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

In his literary classic The Crime of Sylvestre Bonard, the great nineteenth century man of letters Anatole France is heard as saying that "[a]ll the historical books which contain no lies are extremely tedious." Had France gone through the unrewarding (if not entirely unfortunate) experience of reading Empires in the Balance he would have most adamantly agreed that his observation was in need of some partial revision. One suspects that the legendary French writer could not help but come away with the impression that H. P. Willmott's "extremely tedious" study, far from containing no lies, is, to a very large extent, chock-full of distortions, omissions, half-truths, over simplifications and a wide array of other historical inaccuracies.

The present reviewer began exploring this book with a heightened sense of interest and optimism. These positive initial observations were founded on Willmott's promise that he would approach his subject matter "from the Japanese point of view" (p. xvi). This methodological framework, in the author's opinion, involved discovering "precisely why and for what objectives Japan went to war in 1941, and on what basis she could possibly envisage fighting a defensive war against the most powerful industrialized state in the world, the United States; the greatest of the imperial powers, Britain; and the most populous state on earth, China, in what was the largest ocean of the world, the Pacific, whose size is greater than the total land surface of the planet" (p. xvi).

Willmott further justifies his intellectual position by defending the basic premise upon which the monograph was written.

"It appeared that there was no well-written single-volume of the campaign that did justice to the subject, and I could not help
but note what seemed to be two quite distinct features of most accounts. The first was the seemingly perfunctory manner in which Japan was handled in most works. The second was the way in which both American and British accounts tended to look at events in a rather narrow and nationalistic manner . . .” (p. xv).

Willmott's preliminary comments to his readers in the preface set the stage for what appeared to be a scholarly treatise, that offered a fresh examination of the topic uncontaminated by the foul-smelling cesspools of patriotic history which have traditionally stressed (into our own day as well) the picture of a "peace-loving" United States and Great Britain suddenly finding itself at war in 1941 with a sly, deceitful and murderous Japanese "enemy." All hopes for a profound and mature historiography which departed from this childishly simple image of David and Goliath were rudely dashed. What followed proved a monumental betrayal.

In Chapters 1 and 2, Willmott focuses his sights on an in depth analysis of the factors that determined Japan's entrance into the exclusive and prestigious club of great power politics in the early years of the twentieth century. The story of Tokyo's diplomatic and military ascendancy in the Far East, beginning with the Imperial Navy's annihilation of Czarist Russia at Port Arthur during the Battle of Tsushima, and culminating with her equally spectacular and impressive victories against the English-speaking powers in the opening months of the Pacific War, have been diagnosed ad nauseam, and it really serves no useful purpose to recall these basic facts once again. What deserves maximum exposure, however, is Willmott's treatment of Japan's decision to acquire a colonial empire in the regions of South and Southeast Asia since this, in the final analysis, was the pivotal factor that initiated Tokyo's controversial struggle with the United States and Great Britain. Willmott makes no attempt to conceal his intense dislike for Japanese imperialism prior to the outbreak of the war. In fact, he can scarcely contain his sense of outrage, and refers to it as a barbarous record of "mass murder, torture, rape and pillage" (p. 53).

All this, of course, is perfectly true and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to locate any serious historian who would question or challenge the legitimacy of these facts. These observations notwithstanding, a number of perverted ideas mysteriously creep into the discussion. Unlike Japanese imperialism, the ruthless and exploitative character of British, Dutch and American colonial rule in Asia touch no such wellsprings of emotion. The United States' "Open Door" policy, for example, is not seen as a euphemism for colonialism. Instead of admitting the morally indefensible nature of the United States' involvement in Peking's affairs, Willmott makes the abominable statement that the "Open Door" reflected "a conscious American moral commitment to China . . ." (p. 9)

British and Dutch imperialism in Asia are likewise seen as noble and altruistic attempts "to improve the lot of the masses and to create a new native elite that had assimilated Western culture and technique" (p. 14). Although the French receive failing grades for their "rapacious" regime in Indo-China (p. 15), Willmott concentrates his heaviest artillery on Japanese colonialism, which he sees as nothing more than exercises in military conquest and territorial expansion. These arguments beg one fundamental question: considering the long-standing historical record of United States involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean (not to mention the Philippines and China) and British designs in Africa and India, how different were Japan's motives for pushing her way into Asia from the overseas adventures of other nations? The answer, quite obviously, is that there is absolutely no difference. Colonialism, in any form, is ethically contemptible, irrespective of the power which forcefully imposes its will against the expressed wishes of another nation. Does Willmott have no shame in suggesting anything to the contrary? By applying double-standards to the historical participants which he is studying, Willmott has forfeited his rights as a professional historian. He has thrown off the mantle of serious scholarship and donned the attire of a stage-performing ventriloquist ingeniously speaking from both sides of his mouth.

When it comes down to understanding the origins of the Second World War in the Far East, Willmott adopts a curiously ambivalent posture. He contends, in one section of the book, that "Japan genuinely sought good stable relations with the Western powers and was anxious to secure peace throughout the
Far East in order to expand her industries” (p. 39). Shortly after pronouncing this view, Willmott pulls the carpet from under his own feet with the claim, unsubstantiated by the evidence incidentally, that “from June 1940 onwards, there was a powerful inducement for Japan to go to war” (p. 61). The author’s oscillating stance on the course of Japan’s foreign policy objectives do little to explain the chain of events during the two-decade period ending with Tokyo’s declaration of war against the Anglo-Saxon powers. In fairness to the author, it should be pointed out that he does provide an accurate description of the central event leading up to the outbreak of armed hostilities: the American embargo of July 1941. This action on the part of Washington, Willmott insists, “had the effect of placing the American thumb firmly on the Japanese windpipe. The gentleness with which the hand was applied could not disguise the firmness of the grip.” This state of affairs “left the Japanese with no option other than to fight, unless they were prepared to see their empire reduced to an Asiatic irrelevance at the beck and call of the Americans” (pp. 62, 67).

Although Willmott is correct in his assertion that the embargo was the “act that firmly placed the Americans on a collision course with Japan,” he mistakenly believes the reasons surrounding Washington’s freezing of all Japanese assets in the United States when he maintains that “[t]he pressure that the Americans applied was positive inducement for Japan to go to war — the very opposite reaction to what was intended.” In other words, “[t]he deterrence policy proved a failure because the very instruments that the Americans applied proved self-defeating” (pp. 123, 107). Willmott’s interpretation (to which many historians still subscribe) bears no relationship to the thinking that went on inside the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt where it was assumed, in numerous cabinet meetings and military conversations dating back to at least the mid-1930s, that Japan would actively resort to armed intervention rather than succumb to a progressively tightening belligerent noose.

From here Willmott goes on to discuss the phenomenal list of Japanese military successes against the Western powers in the first five months of the Pacific war; the lightening attack on Pearl Harbor; the daring raid on the Repulse and Prince of Wales; the fall of Northern and Central Malaya; and the tragic surrender of Bataan. The decisiveness of these resounding Japanese victories, among the most accomplished in the annals of military history, were the results of a vastly superior strategic thinking. In terms of direction, tactics, command, good equipment and morale, the Japanese had outclassed and outscored their Anglo-American rivals. For this paramount reason, writes Willmott, it would be a grave injustice “to deny the Japanese proper recognition and acclaim . . .” (p. 334)

In passing judgment on this book, it must be emphatically stated that the overall results are less than acceptable. The chief reason for this lacklustre effort rests with Willmott’s choice of a bibliography. The list of research materials is largely made up of official and semi-official histories commissioned by the victorious nations after the war to justify their positions. As sources of new evidence and non-partisan analyses, they leave a great deal to be desired. What is particularly disturbing is the author’s failure to consult, let alone cite, a single British, American or Japanese archival source. Neither has Willmott examined the diaries, memoirs, autobiographies, letters or diplomatic correspondence of Japanese statesmen who would have provided him with a veritable cornucopia of invaluable evidence. Taking into consideration the author’s own frank acknowledgement that he wished to record the story “from the Japanese point of view,” his inexcusable omission of Japanese archival material and other important primary sources is nothing less than a felonious breach of the rules to which all law-abiding historians should scrupulously adhere. Cicero once wrote in De Oratore:

“The first law for the historian is that he shall never dare utter an untruth. The second is that he shall suppress nothing that is true. Moreover, there shall be no suspicion of partiality in his writing, or of malice.”

Based on the number of infractions and violations Willmott has committed, an indictment from the bar of Clio is appropriate; the verdict; guilty of short-sighted and extremely poor research. The sentence (a most lenient one when compared to the enormity of the charges): merely a pledge that he conduct any future research in a more thoughtful and diligent manner.
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