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New Wine in an Old Bottle
Dear Sir,
I refer to DFJ 49 (Nov/Dec 84) and the article of page 44 ‘New Wine in an Old Bottle’ which is attributed to me.
I am afraid that a terrible mistake has occurred because this article was never intended to be published in the DFJ. The reasons are as follows:
a. a similar article has previously been published under the title ‘Bruno and His Guns’ in DFJ No 16.
b. the introduction makes reference to ‘The Journal’ and ‘Gunner’ which are not Australian publications but refer to the ‘Journal of the Royal Artillery’ and the ‘Gunner’ which is published by the Royal Artillery Association. As a consequence, references to various articles relating to HMG ‘Boche Buster’ and in particular the Kings Shot fired from that gun and the ‘1979 edition of the Journal’ are misleading and confusing to Australian readers.
You may recall that in June 1982, I wrote to you seeking permission to quote from ‘Bruno and His Guns’ for this new article. At the same time I also wrote to the Australian War Memorial and Mr C. F. Coady seeking permission to quote from the earlier article by him in the April 1975 edition of the Australian Army Journal. On all these occasions a copy of ‘New Wine in an Old Bottle’ accompanied the request. I can only conclude that with the passage of time my original motive has been overlooked and now misunderstood.
I would therefore be grateful if you would point out to readers in the first available edition of the DFJ that this mistake in publication was not of my making.
D. N. BROOK
Lieutenant Colonel

Course Design & Development
Dear Sir,
I would like to congratulate Major Bruce Copeland on the articles he has written on aspects of Course Design and Development. He has worked over the years to develop a number of useful techniques.
I was interested in the article ‘A Systems Approach to Mastery Learning’ (Defence Force Journal No. 44 Jan/Feb 84). Recently I completed a project on ‘Mastery Learning’ for a masters degree in Education, and Major Copeland has added a number of practical aspects to my own perspective.
The value of his work lies in his explanation and integration of three areas—systems, decision-making and mastery learning.
J. BUDIMAN
Lecturer
RAAF School of Languages

The Australian Army in New Guinea
Dear Sir,
What a great pity the part the 7th Infantry Brigade, who were part of the successful defence force at Milne Bay, or the 30th Infantry Brigade who fought over the Kokoda Trail and, later supported by the 14th Infantry Brigade, were part of a force attacking Gona and Sanananda, fought at all! What a great pity that the fighting performance of the chocks dispelled the impression that there was any real difference between men of the A.I.F. and the Militia! Why was it that in April 1943 the Army included nine A.I.F. Brigades and eighteen Militia Brigades, and that of these there was only one A.I.F. and Four Militia Brigades were in New Guinea, and later in July some of the Battalions of the Militia which had fought in New Guinea, were broken up to reinforce the 6th A.I.F. Division? Now why was that, Lt. M. J. O’Connor, RANR?
That “mopping up” you mention, that was carried out; when the U.S. troops went off to campaign in the Central Pacific, or more precisely, the Philippines; by a very large part of the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force—all were involved. How come the three Militia Divisions, the 3rd, 5th and 11th were able to claim 19 Battle Honours and two Victoria Crosses (6th Division had 14 plus two, respec-
tively in the Wewak campaign!). Total Japanese strength in the First Army Area at the Cease Fire was 151,677, the majority of which were in New Britain where the 5th Division were fighting. The fighting was strenuous and long, and its value doubted, but one could hardly call it "mopping up", more like what might be termed the "real war"!

Without a doubt A.N.G.A.U. played a very vital administrative role, but there again so did the Ministry of War Production. As to the Cocos Islands—what condescension? A read of the Act is enough to dispel the idea.

It is a great pity that in 1984, one has to read disparagement of a fighting force which to this day bears the Honours of War, of its predecessors of the 1st A.I.F. and the 2nd A.I.F. From my own experience I know that to this day there is "the Real Army" and the "weekend warriors". I suspect it will be hard to tell which is which when the chips are down, the Vietnam campaign proved that—the real army and the National Service; following in the wake of the A.I.F. and the chokos. Experience hasn't taught anyone much on that score.

Perhaps Lt. M. J. O'Connor RANR, ought to read his Official Histories a little more, as well as the Cocos and Keeling Islands Self Determination Bill, 1984; he suffers from failing to appreciate the Militia's effort, which has never received the attention it deserves, and finds excuses for his own.

J. C. McALLESTER
Major R.L.

Operation Zipper
Dear Sir,

I am writing to seek the assistance of readers of the Journal in locating a publication on the planned reconquest of the Malay peninsula in 1945. This of course did not eventuate but it seems that much planning and strategic movement of Allied forces took place in 1945 under the code name "Operation Zipper".

A friend of mine Mr. Gordon Evans is writing a book on events of the period and recalls that as a member of Fleet Air Arm he was issued with a publication in 1946 whilst returning to UK on board H.M.S. Bulolo for demobilization. This publication described how and why Operation Zipper was planned. Some years ago, Mr Evans made enquiries of Earl Mountbatten of Burma who was most helpful but even he was unable to locate any publication on Operation Zipper through his contacts in the Services.

If any reader of the Journal can advise where this publication could perhaps be available for loan or inspection it would help Mr. Evans greatly in his researches.

J. C. McALLESTER
Major R.L.

High Command — Australian Experience
Dear Sir,

Major Horner's article "High Command — Australian Experience" in D.F.J. No. 48 of 1984 focusses attention on an aspect of history which has been much neglected in the past in Australia in preference to experience at the regimental level as recorded in unit histories.

One message which the article transmits loudly and clearly, if one reads at times "between the lines", is the need to define terms. This need is so important in the military training of the modern officer, that it should be an offence for any officer to use terms, in speech or in writing, which he does not or cannot define.

As far as the English language is concerned the term High Command, like so many other military terms that we use, has a foreign origin. It probably dates from the time of the War of 1914-18 when the British propaganda machine used to vilify the "German High Command". This nebulous term, as then used, referred presumably to the grosses Hauptquartier which was the headquarters in the field of the Em-

SWOCs, SMOPs & PWOs
Dear Sir,

The new RAN SWOC (DFJ No. 49) sounds AOK for PWOs at RANSWARS. I guess SMOPS will miss the RAN PWOs, but the USN ATT for AIO training, plus the NCDS training at CSDC (with some time on HMASs at GID) sounds much more interesting!

I think I'll POQ now, AVAGOODWEEKEND. Got the message?

A. K. WYLIE
Squadron Leader
peror in his capacity as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the German Empire. However, propaganda does not have to be accurate. It only has to be effective. So this British propaganda might at times have also referred to the Oberste Heeresleitung as the German High Command. This O.H.L. was the Army component of the Grosses Hauptquartier and it was there, after July 1916, that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were located. The nearest British equivalent, at that time, to the O.H.L. was the War Office, London. But it was never described, officially or unofficially, as the British High Command. Even in the War of 1939-45 any reference to the ‘British High Command’ would have been a journalistic and not an official designation.

The supreme command organisation of a nation, as distinct from its supreme governing body, is fashioned, organisationally and therefore functionally, by the nation’s system of government which is determined by its constitution.

The term “High Command” is used in Major Horner’s article also in another sense — not to mean the seat of the highest military command but to mean the exercise of powers of command by an individual at the highest military level. Major Horner referred to a quotation in the Utz Committee Report of 1981 from a General Staff Advisory Committee Report and in this quotation the term “High Command” was used in defining the duties of the C.D.F.S. and it said:

“High command is exercised by the C.D.F.S. and Chief of Staff. It involves the formulation of military strategy as part of national strategy”, (p. 17)

The term “High command” fits into this first sentence of the quotation uncomfortably and the title “Chief of Staff” creates an ambiguity. It is not clear, grammatically, if C.D.F.S. and Chief of Staff are one and the same person or two different persons. On the assumption that these titles refer to one and the same person, this sentence would perhaps be simpler and clearer if it read:

The C.D.F.S. exercises command and staff functions (or duties) in respect of his direction and control of the Naval, Military and Air Forces of the nation (or Commonwealth of Australia).

In this revised sentence the need to use the inflated term “High command” disappears.

In the second sentence of this quotation which reads —

“It involves the formulation of military strategy as part of national strategy”.

It is presumed that “military strategy” means Naval, Military and Air Force Strategy and that the National Strategic Plan consists of two parts — the military strategical plan and the civil strategical plan. It is not clear, however, who would do at the level of the National Strategic Plan, what the C.D.F.S. does at the level of the Military Strategic Plan, in the matters of co-ordinating the various parts of the Civil half and then integrating the Civil and Military halves into one harmonious whole. When looked at in this way Australia has only one strategical plan — the National Strategic Plan of which the Military Strategic Plan is a part.

The term “High Command” in Australian Defence literature is a confusing, imprecise and unnecessary term and it should be abandoned. The Australian command organisation in the field, from the level of the Battalion to that of the C-in-C or the Supreme Commander, can be thought of as regimental commanders and higher commanders. Above these higher field commanders the command machinery becomes a complex and integrated body of Ministers of State, service Chiefs of Staffs, and Civil servants; and it is located, in British practice, at the seat of Government.

We should cease to argue romantically about whether General X was a battlefield commander or a Schreibtischgeneral and think of command machinery, up and down the chain of command, scientifically in terms of division of labour and assume that each man in this network is, or should be, placed where he can serve best.

The practice of creating jargon and lacing it together into a loosely and sometimes meaningless patter for the benefit of radio listeners and newspaper readers, is one which members of the profession of arms should avoid in the interests of clarity and comprehension. The expression “... at the politico-military interface” (p. 12), is an example of jargon and it robs a narrative of meaning and vigour. Another example, outside Major Horner’s article, which has already acquired a status in Australian military literature, is the adjective military used as a noun to mean “The Army” or, as a collective noun, to mean officers as a body.
I have so far been spared the pain of seeing the term “Honor Guard” moved from journalism and the radio into Australian military literature.

Then there are related offences of style. The term *Strategy* is nowadays one of the most used, misused and abused words in our vocabulary. Rear-Admiral Eccles’ definitions of Strategy and Tactics, as quoted (p. 12), fill me with despair and confusion. The distinction which General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley made, in *The Operations of War*, between Strategy and Tactics is probably still the clearest and simplest for field commanders — “The theatre of war is the province of strategy — the field of battle is the province of tactics”.

The author’s comments about Blamey reminding Auchinleck that “Australia is an independent nation” and that “It is hard to imagine Chauvel, Bridges, or even Monash making a similar demand in the First World War” (p. 14), illustrates the need to make judgments in accordance with the circumstances of the times in which events occur. The Statute of Westminster, enacted by the British Parliament in Westminster during the inter-war period was one of the causes which changed the political, diplomatic and military “climates” of Australia and Great Britain. Bridges, Chauvel and Monash, for example, were legally officers of the British Army during WWI. — Blamey, during WW II, was not. The designation A.I.F. was an appropriate one in 1914 — in 1939 it was an anachronism.

Elsewhere, Major Horner said with truth, that “formulating strategical appreciations in peace is a far cry from executing strategy in war” (p. 17). Nevertheless, this peacetime experience in formulating strategical appreciations can provide useful preliminary training for the execution of strategic and tactical plans in war. Field-Marshall Montgomery, not a strategist, gained useful experience during the inter-war period by writing original tactical exercises and then executing them with the troops he commanded. Later, when war came again, he was able to apply this intellectual and practical training, which he had given himself earlier, with a success which gave him an advantage over other officers, above and below him, who had not trained themselves in this way. In this respect Monty illustrated the truth of General von Willisen’s warning in *Die Theorie des grossen Krieges* that *Vom Wissen zum Können ist immer ein Sprung*, and he underlined it by adding *der Sprung ist aber vom Wissen und nicht vom Nichtwissen*.

One could continue discussing other aspects of Major Horner’s thought provoking article but space does not permit.

WARREN PERRY,
Major, R.L.

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**AWARD : ISSUE NO 49**
(November/December, 1984)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $50 for the best original article in the November/December issue (No 49) of the *Defence Force Journal* to Major M. G. Smith, RA Inf for his article *Australian Military Aid: Appraisal and Verdict*. 
The Need

“If the main motivation for learning is the need of the knower and the learner to belong, and if one of the main threats to learning is nonbelonging, then an essential first condition of learning is that a sense of belonging emerge for both knower and nonknower.”

Overview of the Interactive Process

For a number of years I have noticed in classroom situations, involving adult learners, two forms of “teacher” behaviour which seem common and have become the norm in the adult learning process:

Little, if any, effort is made to focus on the “hidden” aspects of teaching adults, and by this I mean the “real” interpersonal factors; and

The whole teaching process seems to evolve around the formal giving of “information and facts”, rather than involve the adult learner in facilitative action to achieve their own learning goals.

Interaction between adult learners is not seen as a supportive element in the learning process. The value of feedback as opposed to answers, to confirm that learning and understanding has taken place would seem to occupy a low
priority, be misunderstood, not used or valued at all in the teacher-learner relationship.

The process of teaching is seen as the formal giving of information and facts (an effective tool some time ago), one's ability to effectively interact in the teaching and learning process to ensure understanding, clarify meaning and couple these with deep interpersonal behaviours is often neglected.

The covert behaviours of both teachers and learners, or as Curran puts it, knowers and nonknowers is not fully valued as a highly supportive tool to the learning situation.

These behaviours would include:
• Linking feelings and beliefs with the learning process
• Clearing of blockages to learning (processing)
• Appreciating the learner as a prime contributor to the teaching function
• The values of the learner and teacher as "humans".

Some will strongly argue that in most strands of learning, the teaching process is of necessity a one way path, particularly where skills are involved or when procedures have to be digested and understood. Such beliefs have many flaws.

The blockages to establishing understanding are not confronted, processing of the learner is not understood lot less carried out, and the "worth" of the learner and teacher in combination, is not utilized to support the whole teaching interaction.

In this article an attempt will be made to examine this knower-nonknower interaction, by appreciation of the needs of both teacher and learner individually and collectively. The facilitative method of teaching as opposed to the formal approach, what it attempts to achieve, is this effective, and a brief examination of how better communication both inside and outside the learning environment can assist in this interactive relationship, thus supporting the learning situation.

The Teacher as a Person

Rogers and Goombridge, in "Right to Learn: The Case for Adult Equality" have written: "In order to meet the mixed needs of students the teacher must become much less the main provider of information and much more an expert in learning methods and the resources needed to carry them out."

I have interpreted the "learning methods" to which they refer as those strategies which are employed by learners in the acquiring of knowledge and skills. The reference to resources has been taken to include those interpersonal teaching skills necessary to carry the facilitative process in helping adults learn. Both these expressions call for an examination of factors relative to the "person" who leads the learning process. They are:
(a) The need to be accepted.
   (i) as a human: The need to be accepted for what you are. To be valued by the group. A person with value systems, beliefs and desires. As a person who, like the learners has encountered successes and failures, joys and sorrows, being wanted and not wanted.
   (ii) as a helper: A person with confirmed openness, fairness and truth. A person who understands the learner's difficulties. A person with strong empathetic behaviours.
   (iii) as a teacher: A person with knowledge, and skills. A person with past experiences harnessed to reinforce the teaching process. A discriminator of values and a researcher.
(b) The need to satisfy one's own person.
   (i) Achievement of your own personal life's goals and desires.
   (ii) The maintenance of your own identity in an open, secure, non-threatening environment.
(c) The need to facilitate the learning process (to teach).
   (i) To be seen and act as an objective thinker — without bias, prejudice or indifference — but still remain human.
   (ii) A person with current, accurate, relevant data to support the learning process.
   (iii) To be seen as a competent, professional educator of adults.
   (iv) To be seen as a motivator in the learning situation, where promotion and maintenance of the desire to learn are principal elements.

Brundage and Mackeracher (1980) also see three important characteristics for adults who work with adults. The points they raise are:
• positive self concept and self esteem coping with situations in teaching without anxiety or defensiveness. The appreciation of the
self as a co-learner and freedom to express your feelings and values in the facilitative process.

- Good interpersonal relations.
  The valuing and respect for others and their experiences, and refraining from judgement or evaluation. The ability to utilize an empathetic, caring approach to teaching. The insight to allow others to discover themselves yet at the same time take on the responsibility for their learning styles and direction. To harness and apply the values arising out of the feedback loop.

- Necessary knowledge and skills relevant to your roles and responsibilities. The orientation of yourself towards knowledge and skills and the approaches necessary to facilitate adult learning. The easy adaptation of different models of teaching and learning.

The Adult Learner and his Needs

Lowe (1975) suggests that there will often be no age gap between the participants and the educator and frequently the learners have had more experience relevant to the problem than has the adult educator.

The need of the learner to have this recognized and valued is one of significance. The societal status of mature age students in Australian learning institutions is such that teachers should utilize the value of work experience and become sensitive to the institutional pressures placed on these learners. Hore and West (1980) suggest that there is a likelihood of drop outs if they (the learners) fail to adjust to these pressures and those demanded by their societal environment.

The changing and unpredictable behaviour of adults as a result of pursuing their life's goals through the learning process is another need that requires attention. The difficulties of coping with paradox and having these dilemmas clarified in a supportive style will substantially facilitate this behaviour change with minimal damage to self concept.

The immediacy of adult learning is one with which teachers may have difficulty in coping. The adaptation of appropriate curricula and the removal of irrelevant information so as to allow for this need is one of great importance. An underlying relationship of adult life is the measure of years before death whereas with children this measure is years since birth. These measures place considerable demands and stress on both learners and teachers. Teachers are required to refine syllabi and streamline instruction so as to ensure maintenance of interest and a desire to learn. Learners are in need of skills to utilize tomorrow. Knowles (1970) suggests that adults engage in learning largely in response to pressures they feel from their current life situation. To adults, education is a process of improving their ability to deal with life problems they face now. They tend therefore, to enter an educational activity in a problem-centred frame of mind.

If immediacy is to be facilitated in the adult education process then self-direction has to be a central criteria. The right to assess, choose, evaluate, and use the learning situation is a heavy demand on institutions, particularly those of a more conservative nature where little latitude in student choice of subjects is permissible, lot less the content of these subjects. The exploring of experiences and values in group situations is a valuable contributor to the self-directed process. James E. Russell, Dean Emeritus, Teachers College, Columbia University, points out that teachers may help to define procedure, collect equipment, indicate the most propitious routes, but the climber must use his own head and legs if he would reach the mountain top. The best method of teaching adults yet hit upon, is undoubtedly group discussion. Comparing syndicate studies and plenary discussion followed by an overview of the process is a most valuable aid to satisfying the need of self direction. Learners can learn from learners.

The significance of self concept in the learning process is one of great value. Maslow tells us:

"Satisfaction of the self esteem needs leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, capability and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world. But thwarting of these needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness, and of helplessness. These feelings in turn give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends. An appreciation of the necessity of basic self-confidence and an understanding of how helpless people are without it can be easily gained from a study of severe traumatic neurosis."

The need for teachers of adults to guard against "pygmalion effect" in the facilitation of learning, to be objective and open to all
are important elements if the self concept of each learner is to be maintained, protected and built upon. The unfortunate tendency of people engaged in interaction in groups is to evaluate the worth of one person over another. This is as a result of our value and selective systems. Subjective thinking denotes in many cases, sound objective reasoning and judgement. Thus terminating in a loss of respect and credibility for the teacher and a lowering of self concept and esteem for the learner.

Explaining his awareness model The Johari window, Luft, 1969 refers to interpersonal learning and self concept in this way "perhaps the idea of love in a learning group is still not precisely focussed. But the idea helps explain why there is wide-scale if not universal, need for interpersonal learning. There are other terms for love, if this term still seems misleading, people need people to confirm each other, to help in the constant rebuilding of the self-concept, and to grow in competence in interpersonal relations."

I have only attempted to explore five major needs of adults as learners, many others remain. The reader is encouraged to pursue these.

If the needs we have discussed are to be valued and "used" by both teacher and learner an approach centred on an unstructured model with focus on sharing and comparing with evaluation without judgement is necessary.

The Facilitative Process

By way of definition I have turned to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary. This publication tells us:

FACILITATION:
"To make easy or easier. Ease in performance or action: fluency: easiness to be persuaded: pliancy: affability."

The seven conditions of learning given by Knowles in his book 'The Modern Practice of Adult Education' and the corresponding principles in facilitating, each is worthy of re-print here. Knowles continues:

It is becoming increasingly clear from the growing body of knowledge about the processes of adult learning that there are certain conditions of learning that are more conducive to growth and development than others. These superior conditions seem to be produced by practices in the learning-teaching transaction that adhere to certain superior principles of teaching as identified below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITIONS OF LEARNING</th>
<th>PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The learners feel a need to learn.</td>
<td>1. The teacher exposes students to new possibilities for self-fulfilment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learning environment is characterized by physical comfort, mutual trust and respect, mutual helpfulness, freedom of expression, and acceptance of differences.</td>
<td>2. The teacher helps each student clarify his own aspirations for improved behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners perceive the goals of a learning experience to be their goals.</td>
<td>3. The teacher helps each student diagnose the gap between his aspiration and his present level of performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners accept a share of the responsibility for planning and operating a learning experience, and therefore have a feeling of commitment toward it.</td>
<td>4. The teacher helps the students identify the life problems they experience because of the gaps in their personal equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners perceive the goals of a learning experience to be their goals.</td>
<td>5. The teacher provides physical conditions that are comfortable (as to seating, smoking, temperature, ventilation, lighting, decoration) and conducive to interaction (preferably, no person sitting behind another person).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners accept a share of the responsibility for planning and operating a learning experience, and therefore have a feeling of commitment toward it.</td>
<td>6. The teacher accepts each student as a person of worth and respects his feelings and ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners perceive the goals of a learning experience to be their goals.</td>
<td>7. The teacher seeks to build relationships of mutual trust and helpfulness among the students by encouraging cooperative activities and refraining from inducing competitiveness and judgmentality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners accept a share of the responsibility for planning and operating a learning experience, and therefore have a feeling of commitment toward it.</td>
<td>8. The teacher exposes his own feelings and contributes his resources as a colearner in the spirit of mutual inquiry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners accept a share of the responsibility for planning and operating a learning experience, and therefore have a feeling of commitment toward it.</td>
<td>9. The teacher involves the students in a mutual process of formulating learning objectives in which the needs of the students, of the institution, of the teacher, of the subject matter, and of the society are taken into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners accept a share of the responsibility for planning and operating a learning experience, and therefore have a feeling of commitment toward it.</td>
<td>10. The teacher shares his thinking about options available in the designing of learning experiences and the selection of materials and methods and involves the students in deciding among these options jointly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The learning process is related to and makes use of the experience of the learners.

11. The teacher helps the students to organize themselves (project groups, learning-teaching teams, independent study, etc.) to share responsibility in the process of mutual inquiry.

12. The teacher helps the students exploit their own experiences as resources for learning through the use of such techniques as discussion, role playing, case method, etc.

13. The teacher helps the students develop and apply procedures for self-evaluation according to these criteria.

14. The teacher helps the students to apply new learnings to their experience, and thus to make the learnings more meaningful and integrated.

The learners have a sense of progress toward their goals.

15. The teacher involves the students in developing mutually acceptable criteria and methods for measuring progress toward the learning objectives.

16. The teacher helps the students develop and apply procedures for self-evaluation according to these criteria.

Carl Rogers is strong in presenting his view of "Teaching" as opposed to the facilitative method.

"Teaching, in my estimation, is a vastly over-rated function. Having made such a statement, I scurry to the dictionary to see if I really mean what I say. Teaching means 'to instruct'. Personally I am not much interested in instructing another in what he should know or think. 'To impart knowledge or skill.' My reaction is, why not be more efficient, using a book or programmed learning? 'To make me know.' Here my hackles rise. I have no wish to make anyone know something. 'To show, guide, direct.' As I see it, too many people have been shown, guided, directed. So I come to the conclusion that I do mean what I said. Teaching is, for me, a relatively unimportant and vastly overvalued activity." [Rogers, 1969, p. 103].

The requirement to facilitate the needs of both learners and teachers as outlined earlier in this article and to utilize the interpersonal aspects of teaching call for an approach free from the strictures of a classroom environment. The anxieties of threat of failure and observance of "class norms" are inhibiting characteristics of this style of approach.

For the teacher the freedom to explore experiences, and to value the learners as people rather than students are stepping off points in the facilitative process. A willingness to share with a group structure, feelings, attitudes and beliefs aimed at bringing about a developmental outcome are features of facilitation. For the learner, the ease of fitting into this learning environment without fear of threat or anxiety and openness to share in a supportive learning group are important in the adult learning process.

Hore and West draw our attention to the state of infancy in which research has indicated we find ourselves. They contend:

"The resultant strains on the staff and the students in general, and the interpersonal relationship between the two in particular, may therefore be considerable. Although the problem is itself important in that it affects the teaching standards of the staff and the performances of the students, the solution to this problem calls forth a more complex set of research questions than those which were addressed by the present study. It is therefore essential to regard the study described in this chapter a preliminary one which proposes nothing more than to examine academic staff's attitudes towards mature age students in relation to entry methods for these students, the students' subsequent academic performance and contribution, and some observations about the problems they raise."

Communication

For communication to be an effective, valuable aid in the learning process it must be direct, in its application, objective in its evaluation and free from warped perceptions of learners.

Communication involves verbal and non-verbal language the former being subdivided into time, space and things. We communicate direct meaning in terms of time by keeping people waiting — a supervisor communicates superiority by keeping his subordinate waiting, rarely the other way around. We communicate
space by that which we have around us. The Chief Executive has a larger office than does the Section Head. We communicate by things in a similar manner; having two cars and two houses is better than one car and one house, a big house is better than a small house, and so on.

The application of good verbal communication to the learning process is important if it is to be valued, and effective. The adult teacher who keeps the group waiting without explanation is communicating a second-best attitude to the group. The teacher who facilitates the learning in a room too small or too big, communicates a similar attitude of "This is all I could get". The teacher whose room is deficient of fresh air, dirty, and full of distractions communicates a similar attitude and places little value on the subject matter he or she expects the learners to assimilate.

The teacher who ignores the aging process of adults by neglecting a decline in visual, auditory or kinetic acuity of the learners is communicating a striking inexpert approach to the teaching function. Such neglect results in embarrassment, and anxiety for adult learners. Deficiencies as these are blockages to learning and fail to acknowledge the significance of communication in the interpersonal process.

Joseph Luft in his book of human interaction p. 122 provides a useful table as an illustration of how a defensive communication climate can be reduced to a supportive one in interaction within groups. The table could be most useful for adult educators where sometimes fixed opinions and "way of expression" will cloud central learning issues with emotion, rather than openness and objective thinking. Luft's table is illustrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Behaviour Characteristic of Supportive and Defensive Climates in Small Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Climates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Superiority</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Certainty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By way of explanation Luft supports his theory by suggesting:

"Speech or other behaviour which appears evaluative increases defensiveness. If by expression, manner of speech, tone of voice, or verbal content the sender seems to be evaluating or judging the listener, then the receiver goes on guard. Of course, other factors may inhibit the reaction. If the listener thought that the speaker regarded him as an equal and was being open and spontaneous, for example, the evaluativeness in a message would be neutralized and perhaps not even perceived. This same principle applies equally to the other five categories of potentially defense-producing climates. The six sets are interactive. Because our attitudes toward other persons are frequently, and often necessarily, evaluative, expressions which the defensive person will regard as non-judgmental are hard to frame. Even the simplest question usually conveys the answer that the sender wishes or implies the response that would fit into his value system."

No discussion on interpersonal relationship and communication would be complete without due attention being given to "perception" as a message carrier. Earlier in this article I spoke of "Pygmalion effect" or the self-fulfilling prophecy. The self-fulfilling prophecy idea was introduced by Merton (1948). A self-fulfilling prophecy is an expectation or prediction, initially false, which initiates a series of events that cause the original expectation or prediction to become true. Brophy and Good (1974) further explain that the self-fulfilling prophecy effects or teacher's expectations are most likely when the teacher's expectations are inaccurate and inflexible. Such expectations cause a teacher to perceive mostly those student characteristics that do not confirm expectations. Also, they cause the teacher to persistently treat the student in inappropriate ways (treating him as if he were someone else, as it were). If continued indefinitely, such treatment constitutes a pressure on the student to begin to conform to the teacher's expectations by behaving in the ways that the teacher expects the student to behave. This, in turn, reinforces the teacher's expectations all the more, and a self-regenerating vicious circle is established. If the situation persists a true expectation effect is likely to occur.

To reinforce this discussion the writer recalls many instances where pygmalion effect has
had strikingly disastrous consequences on organizational and classroom behaviour. The immediate judgement process is often incorrect either as a result of an unprofessional approach to teaching or a strong bias. Downey (1977) sums the situation up this way. Judgements of behaviour can clearly be misleading because we infer something about other people’s intentions without having any idea whether these inferences are correct. To talk to a person and to learn more about him by listening to what he says about his feelings, aspirations or intentions, or about his opinions of others enables us to discover more about him and thus to refine our first impressions and modify any erroneous judgements we may have made.

**Conclusion**

This article has, of necessity, been a resume of some interactive aspects of adult teaching and learning. Amongst others, it has addressed the questions of facilitation, communication and perception. These areas, it is contended, have, in my experience, been the downfall of good teaching. The highly selective process of choosing facilitators and subject matter, experts conscious of the need to preserve a sound and conducive learning atmosphere, is one of great significance. All too often they fall short of the mark. Hopefully this article has focussed on these shortcomings and given the reader a deeper insight into the traps that await those ill-equipped to be part of the teaching function.

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**ANNUAL AWARDS 1984 (ISSUES NO 44 TO 49)**

The Board of Management of the Defence Force Journal has awarded the prizes for the best original articles of the year to:


*2ND Prize* ($75) *Australian Military Aid: Appraisal and Verdict* by Major M. G. Smith, RA Inf (Issue No 49, Nov/Dec).
SOLDIERS and SOWERS

By Midshipman Tom Frame, RAN

Introduction

IN Australia we have no conception of socialist organisation either in civil production or in acquiring military requisitions. For most Western nations, military requisitions constitute a constant burden on the national resources with a very limited perception of the benefits. This problem has been tackled by the Chinese. However, their solution lies within the ideological framework of "Maoism" and as such is not easily translated to the Western world. Yet some insights can be gained from considering the attitude of the Chinese to their military and the relationship the army shares with the national economy. Whereas in the Western experience a close relationship of the Chinese type has not been facilitated by a relatively weak economy, the Chinese model has numerous valuable features which are appealing to Third World nations whose national security is in danger, though whose economy may be unable to support a sufficiently capable defence force to counter external threats. This study, a portion of a much larger work, will examine the historical development of the Maoist model of military organisation until the 1970s. This analysis is by no means exhaustive. Rather it is an attempt to give a basic overview of Chinese military activity where it has endeavoured to reduce the burden of military spending on the civil sectors of the national economy. In the midst of defence budget reductions, Australians may be interested to see how the Chinese have fared with the Maoist model.

Origins of the "Maoist" Strategy

In the history of most Western nations, a clear division of national organisation separating the military from the civil sectors has been emphasised. The primary function of the military has continued to be the providing of military force. However this Western division of organisation has not prevailed in Communist China. This is a consequence of the "Maoist Model of Army Building" which has provided ideological guidelines for the interaction of the military with the national economy since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.

It is this interaction that will be closely examined in an attempt to assess the value of the Maoist model in both a military and economic sense. Even with the death of Chairman Mao and the political deaths of the Gang of Four, the Maoist model continues to direct and guide the Chinese leadership on military affairs though most other aspects of Maoism have been rejected, and thus a consideration of it today is very relevant.

The Maoist strategy of army-building and the contemporary function of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) evolved during the years of the Yenan Decade (1935-45). The product of this strategy was the Red Army which later became the more refined PLA. In formulating a military policy for China, Mao's basic theoretical supposition was grounded in his belief that the communist military in China was capable of functioning as a productive workforce while also being able to carry out its traditional task as a fighting force. The result of Mao's thought was an original model of military organisation. Mao's military model was characterised by its multifunctionality, structural diffuseness and politicisation of the individual. Because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had very limited resources, both in opposition and as government, it was apparent that a full-time army was a luxury it could not afford. Historically, communist soldiers were required to fight and assist in production so the CCP could survive economically and militarily. Thus Mao's policy was one born out of necessity. The initial engagement of the PLA as a component of the labour force occurred during the period of civil war in China (1946-9). This period of transition, when the communists needed to perform some of the basic functions of government, generated the necessity to convert a large proportion of the military manpower to the execution of non-military tasks that were traditionally car-
ried out by the civilian population in the newly occupied areas. Mao consequently called on the army to transform itself more into a “working force”. Thus crash programmes were initiated to broaden the role of the army. Simultaneously, many cadres were transferred to civil sectors to carry out non-military production tasks. By the end of 1949, the ability of the PLA to function as a “working force” had been demonstrated. The result of this activity was a relatively smooth transition of government.

The early economy of the People’s Republic (1949-53) was burdened considerably by the cost of maintaining a large military. To immediately reduce this burden, a great number of soldiers were demobilised and transferred to the civil sector to perform tasks in production or administration. The role of the PLA in China was accordingly set out in the 1949 Common Programme and the 1956 Party Constitution.

The 1949 Common Programme claimed the PLA was especially suited to undertake production work because the majority of soldiers in the army were derived from the proletariat, possessed a high degree of political consciousness, and were expert in many types of productive skills. It was emphasised that the PLA’s participation in production to revive the economy should not be regarded as a short-term measure, but seen as lying within the framework of long-term planning for national reconstruction. As a consequence, the Party made ambitious plans for nationwide army participation in assisting the civil production units and initiating new production units to meet the needs of the developing economy. Only those troops assigned to “combat duty” were excluded.

Agriculture, handicrafts, construction and repair of factories, restoration of communications, irrigation works and reclamation of barren land were among the fields in which they army took part. In the north of China for instance, fifty percent of the PLA troops were organised to take part in water conservancy projects; while in Jiangxi province, it was scheduled that each soldier would devote two months a year exclusively to production work. To requisition itself, military production carried out by the army itself, was made possible by the many skilled labour and technical experts who had been drafted into the army during the civil war.

From the initial use of the PLA as a labourforce, the nature and degree of production work varied from region to region according to local needs. In North China the emphasis was on water conservancy, while in the North East (Manchuria), the scene of intense Japanese destruction and Russian looting, the PLA was used mainly to re-open mines, to repair buildings, bridges, roads and railways. In the barren northwest, it was agrarian production that dominated. PLA production and assistance activity was predominant in the hinterland, while in the East China seaboard, there was little evidence of PLA production or assistance to the civil economy.

During the first ten years of communist rule in Xinjiang, a north western province, the PLA Production Corps (officially constituted in 1954 when it contained 140,000 men) set up for example, 147 large and modern state farms that encompassed about 1.7 million acres of virgin land. The Corps developed 23 large scale ranches with 1.3 million cattle, establishing 100 irrigation projects, 343 industrial mining enterprises. The troops also built housing in excess of 800,000 square metres in floor space. During the 1970s these Production Corps, divided into three sections; agriculture, industry and mines, had been established and were active in at least four military regions and eight provincial military districts according to CCP reports. However the Korean War practically brought a halt to the CCP’s plan to use the PLA for non-military production tasks.

Institutionalising the PLA’s Non-Military Role

The Army’s first major involvement in production as an organised and routinised activity came in 1956 as a result of the “socialist high tide” in that year. Following Mao’s call for a rapid advance to collectivised agriculture contained in the treatise “On Agricultural Co-operation” of July 1955, the PLA’s political department drew up the “Programme for Participation and Support by Army Units in Agricultural Co-operation and Agricultural Production,” in which twenty directives were proposed to utilise the army to “support with practical actions” the Draft Programme. The army was ordered to join the Chinese population in an effort to perform each of the tasks outlined in the “National Programme for Agricultural Development”. Fourteen of the
twenty directives set out in the PLA's implementation plan are relevant to our examination of the PLA's role as a workforce. These also provide insight into the types of practical activities conducted by the PLA.

The PLA's Non-Military Directives

1. In areas where cadres were required to participate in the work of building and reorganising co-operatives, work teams of officers and men were subject to the leadership of the local party committee to aid agricultural work. Officers were appointed to the work teams to support the transition to socialism. 2. In the years between 1956-8, the army was able to raise funds internally to provide thirty tractor stations in addition to various technicians chosen from the demobilised servicemen to support agricultural production. On completion, the tractor stations were handed over to the Ministry of Agriculture. 3. A system of compulsory labour for socialist construction was initiated. On the average, five to seven days were expected as a contribution. In the rural areas, troops helped the Agricultural Producers Co-operatives (APCs) in carrying out a variety of farm tasks including water conservancy projects, the construction of dikes, roads, and land reclamation. 4. The entire army was mobilised and organised to participate on holiday periods and in spare time, in the drive to eliminate the "four pests" (rats, flies, mosquitoes and sparrows- later changed to bedbugs for ecological reasons). 5. Troops took part in an active campaign to plant trees and build forests. Garrisoned troops were to provide manpower to help local people plant trees and develop forests in accordance with the local plans. 6. Natural fertilizer was also collected by the PLA troops. 7. Troops were to co-operate with the local population in garbage disposal. Additionally in this area, the military hygiene service personnel instructed in peasantry on public health and the prevention of serious diseases. 8. The PLA participated in the protection and breeding of livestock, observing and enforcing the laws of prohibition against the slaughter of calves and draught animals. Veterinarians under the auspices of the PLA aimed at devoting part of their time to assist the local co-operatives in curbing and preventing animal disease, in addition to providing animal training. 9. In the event of a natural disaster or an emergency, the locally garrisoned PLA troops were to assist the local party committee in fighting the disaster and in the instrumentation of relief. 10. The army systematically aided the co-operatives and production units in setting up primary and evening schools in an attempt to reduce illiteracy. The PLA was ideally meant to be used as a training resource for teachers and bookkeeping personnel. 11. Army non-combat assigned signal units were to set up broadcasting and telephone networks in rural areas providing superior national communications. Again in the field of training resources, the PLA was to instruct civilian operators. 12. Army repair shops were to assist the APCs as much as possible. 13. Army power generation stations were to take into account the needs and demands of the local APCs. 14. Demobilised soldiers were ordered to prepare themselves for active participation in socialist construction. Technical personnel to be demobilised were deployed in areas with greatest needs. In sum, these guidelines for PLA participation in civil economic programmes can be divided into two distinct categories. Those designed to make a specific military contribution to production, and those which aimed at improving relations with the local populace.

The results of this assistance plan had a significant effect on the Chinese economy. A tremendous allocation of labour resource took place in the allocation of PLA troops to lagging areas of production. This was imperative if China was to succeed in advancing to a higher level of socialist organisation in the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). In reality, China was far from ready to progress into this more complex stage of the revolution. Though the Great Leap was a devastating failure, the army had aided the economy and allowed it to consolidate with military labour assistance and repaired or upgraded technology. The economic burden of maintaining the military was lightened, allowing for increased capital investment to establish industrial plants.

The PLA's Contribution to the Civil Economy and Some Statistical Anomalies

The standard calculating method for the PLA's direct contribution to "socialist reconstruction" since 1956, has been the compilation of the number of man days per annum devoted by the PLA to production work. Article 5 of the Draft Programme stated that the ideal
proportion was a contribution of between five and seven workdays per person. From calculations based on this figure, the two and a half million strong PLA should have contributed between 12.5 and 17.5 million man days of labour for 1956. In contrast, the published figure only amounted to just over 4 million man days, suggesting considerable resistance to the programme of production. 20 million man days was the published figure for 1957, which rose to 59 million in 1958. This figure for the number of completed man days and also the reported figure for 1959 must be severely questioned. Over the reliability of these statistics have two eminent scholars held conflicting views. Michael Y. M. Kau makes reference to the figures for 1958 in an exhortation of praise for the success of the PLA's programme. He does not question these crucial figures rather he uses them to highlight the escalation of PLA involvement in non-military production. Another scholar, John Gittings, believes the statistics for 1958 and 1959 are inflated along with most other reported figures presented during the Great Leap when the Party attempted to hide the gross failure of the campaign. Gittings' argument is a very plausible one and should be accepted. His criticism of the reported figures for 1959 add weight to his argument. Forty-four million man days of labour assistance were recorded by the PLA in 1959. Gittings believes the actual planned figure for 1959 was more in the order of 30 million man days. For the PLA to have achieved this figure, every PLA soldier and officer would have had to contribute almost one month's "free" labour. He asserts this is inconceivable at this point in national planning. From a broader perspective of the figures for the army's production participation between 1956 and 1964, a curve is obtained roughly following the rise and fall of the Great Leap Forward.

| PLA 'Uncompensated' Participation In Production Work |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1956            | 4 050 000       | (man days of labour) |
| 1957            | 20 000 000      | (projected)       |
| 1958 (completed)| 30 000 000      | 59 000 000        |
| 1959            | 44 000 000      |                 |
| 1960            | 46 000 000      |                 |
| 1961            | 22 780 000      |                 |
| 1962            |                 |                 |
| 1963            | 8 500 000       |                 |
| 1964            | 5 410 000       |                 |
|                 |                 | X agricultural production only |

Source: J. Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army

Army participation in production before the Great Leap was concentrated primarily in providing manpower and technical assistance to the agricultural co-operatives. In 1958 the Party claimed that the PLA had built over 20 000 water conservancy projects, contributed nearly 16 000 million catties of natural fertilizer to local agriculture and loaned 8 800 trucks to assist in the production of steel. During 1958-59 industrial construction was the focus of PLA civil assistance. However, this focus was altered by the natural disasters of floods and droughts 1960-1 when PLA labour was concentrated mainly on relief work and agriculture. So desperate was the situation, particularly in terms of food shortages caused by the Great Leap and the natural disasters, military training for much of the PLA was suspended in an effort to help the peasantry sow or reap the harvest in time. By 1963 this emergency and relief work was terminated. Subsequently, and in the absence of other pressing local needs, civil production assistance was relegated to periods that did not interfere with military training.

The PLA and the Civil Economy After 1960

In 1960 the Military Affairs Commission and the Central Committee approved the release of a report that envisaged the entire army energetically developing a campaign to increase production and practice economy within its own ranks. This represents a major junction in the development of PLA non-military activity. The initial aim of the programme was to reduce the burden of military expenditure on the economy. Seven points were raised as a consequence of this report which outlined areas in which the army could reduce its allocation from the national budget and its dependency on civil production units by bringing these components of production within its own operational parameters. I will list the seven points in an explanatory paraphrase: 1. Economising on Grain: The army was encouraged to save on grain and produce suitable nutritional substitutes. Vegetables had to be grown and stored. 2. Economising on Cotton Cloth: Cotton ration tickets were reduced in number and greater care was ordered on current issue uniforms. 3. Economising on Construction Materials: Less building material had to be used in barracks construction. 4. Economising on Oil and Fuel: Fuel-saving devices were promoted.
for general use, coal was rationed and more careful use of fuel required. 5. Economising on Expenditures: All administration and miscellaneous expenses were to be avoided if practicable. Misappropriation was severely condemned. 6. Promotion of Sideline Production: Subsidiary agricultural production was to consolidate and further develop the aim of the lower level troops to become totally self-sufficient in meat and vegetables, partially self-sufficient in cooking oils. The production target set for 1961 was to have each person, on the average, provide himself with about 25 catties of meat and 500 to 700 catties of vegetables. In the course of this sideline production, it was not permissible for the PLA to hire local labour that was already providing agricultural output. The twin policies of spare time production and running small-scale farms were contained in the implementation of sideline agricultural production in the army. The aim of the spare time production was to plant vegetables for daily use and to raise hogs. Many vegetables had to be planted to provide animal feed to raise the number of hogs. On the average, 3 to 5 persons would raise one hog. 7. Manage well army-run industry: Army run iron and steel and cement production were restricted to native methods, initially with a provision for expansion, going from small to big, from native to foreign techniques, with the objective of having production provide surplus for reinvestment. The estimates for the production in 1961 were 180,000 tons of pigs iron, about 30,000 tons of steel and about 300,000 tons of cement. In a similar vain, tool and machinery repair shops were to aim at repairing and producing new parts at the same time. The military aimed in 1961 to make for themselves, 50 to 70 per cent of all vehicle parts and over 60 per cent of weapon parts. Military related production units were to raise the quality of production while organising more efficiently their advanced experience and labour resources. As a result, labour intensive production was to rise by 5 per cent with an overall reduction of 1 per cent in production costs.

The policies embodied in the 1960 report were significant in many respects. The PLA was intended ultimately to make itself independent of the economy. The necessity for central government funds would be removed since the PLA would provision itself with arms, food, equipment, fuel and housing etc. Had the PLA been organised along Western lines it would have been totally dependent on the tightly regulated and developing Chinese economy. An obvious question which arises at this juncture concerns the value of non-military activity when it must invariably affect combat training and the overall state of military preparedness. Does non-military production so restrict the military that its fighting ability is seriously curtailed? Historical experience can provide an answer to this question. A military conflict of a reasonable size, such as the Korean War (1950-3), would require most of the PLA troops many of whom would be called from participating in non-military production tasks. A vacuum was created in their absence, in addition to the soldiers being in a low state of combat readiness. This problem however was not addressed in either the “Programme for PLA Participation...” in 1956 or in the seven points that arose out of the 1960 report. In the process of the Korean War and to a more limited extent the recent Sino-Vietnamese border conflict in 1979, non-military production in which the PLA had been operating was severely disrupted in addition to the problem of combining production units with combat prepared units. The Chinese have been faced with the problem of achieving a balanced relationship between military and non-military activity, so as to make both viable, since the inception of the Maoist military model.

The PLA in Agricultural Production After 1964. Building on the groundwork of non-military production activity programmed after 1960. In early 1964, the Chinese were called upon by the Party to “Learn from the Experience of the PLA in Political Education and Ideological Work”. The achievements of the PLA’s political work supposedly made it a model for the whole nation to “learn from, study and compare with”. By late 1964, this slogan had been largely replaced by the theme “ Depend on the Poor and Lower Middle Peasants”. Three years later, in early 1967, criticisms from within the PLA and especially the heavy purge of senior military officers, indicated the discontinuity within the military regarding the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the economic value of “grasping revolution” which was tied in with the propagation of Mao’s thought in communes and factories. There is a strong indication that
the majority of military leaders supported the 'promote production' theme of the 'grasp revolution and promote production' slogan, yet differing over the wisdom of supporting revolution. Subsequently in the spring of 1967, very large numbers of PLA personnel were sent into local communes and farming brigades, most of them on a temporary basis. During the early part of the campaign the armed forces were reported to have combined propaganda and labour. However by April of 1968, the PLA effort was clearly concentrated on the promotion of propaganda, emphasis being placed on the political and policing activities of the PLA in the countryside. During the summer of 1968, a need arose for the PLA to protect the harvests from the farmers who preferred to eat or sell their produce instead of having it taken by someone on behalf of the Party. After the spring of 1968 and the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, calls for the PLA to support agriculture were reduced, declining further the role of the PLA in the countryside.

A brief overall assessment of the PLA's input into agriculture during 1964-9 can be made at this point. Even with the great numbers of PLA soldiers sent into the countryside to assist agriculture, PLA personnel formed a very small percentage of the vast productive force engaged in agriculture. The principal form of military assistance to non-military production, has been in the area of flood control and other activities where their organisation, discipline and heavy equipment have been particularly valuable. But what of the peasant response to these intrusions by the army? Strangely, when the peasants have been called on to "learn from the PLA", they have been expected to learn of their fighting spirit and political work rather than their farming techniques. The peasantry at large have represented the presence of the PLA who have come as tax collectors as well as production assistants. PLA interference into the affairs of the peasantry has met with hostility from most of the population, affording the "support agriculture" task a thankless status. Within the upper group of PLA officers, movements have arisen opposing PLA participation in agricultural production. The major criticism has centred on a belief that it is a hindrance to combat training and overall military effectiveness.

The PLA in Industry After 1964

The military was directed by the Central Committee in March 1967 to aid civilians and support industrial production in factories and mines. This came one month after the military were sent into the rural villages. Some troops had entered and were participating in industry before the March directive to support production and continue with political work. The main task of the PLA in industry was to restore order in factories with minimal material incentive, a result of the rise of the "Gang of Four" and the victory of "politics over pragmatism". Though the PLA had great experience in the fields of engineering and communications, they did not have the capacity to plan or manage complex industrial systems. By 1971, a vast number of PLA personnel continued to be involved in industry. However, it must be stressed that most of the PLA effort in industrial enterprises during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath was devoted to propaganda campaigns. In the early 1970s, the emphasis shifted again. This shift was toward production, economising and self-reliance.

Some Problems with the "Maoist" Military Model

A discerning reader of Maoist literature can perceive the stress that the basic mission of the PLA in the modern economy has been to stimulate production. Connected with this mission have been exaggerated claims of industrial and mining success since late 1967, to demonstrate the practical profitability of this application of Maoist thought. The PLA was portrayed as an integrated, though discernably self-contained, workforce that lived, ate and studied with the civilian workers. However a great deal of evidence suggests that this has never been the experience of most Chinese. It was not normal for the PLA troops to work among the labourers. In the instances where the PLA troops did work side-by-side with civilians, the army usually tried to set an example rather than to assist in raising the efficiency or output of civil producing units. The Maoist Model of Army-Building has created two major problems which have influenced the performance of the PLA as a labour force. These problems have decreased, in my opinion, the viability of the model. Briefly the problems are these; 1. There has been a noted trend towards institutionalisation and profes-
sionalism. This has promoted a desire for professional autonomy within the military. To exacerbate the problem, the military has sought priority for the development of military technology and a desire to increase the emphasis on the primacy of the regular army and its military objectives. 2. The continual expansion of the non-military role has led to the military dominating and intervening in virtually every area of Chinese society. 20 The first problem clearly involves a contradiction to Mao’s thinking, whilst the second, which is more applicable to this discussion, stems from an overly enthusiastic application of Mao’s doctrine pertaining to the utilisation of the military as a “working force” and a “production force”. PLA influence over a wide variety of policies has come by virtue of its organisational strength and its involvement in a leading role in non-military activities. The involvement of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution is a manifestation of this problem. In August of 1971, Mao stated his objection to the prevalent situation where “the Party controlling the gun” theme had been reversed and undermined by the PLA leadership and Lin Biao. 21 During the latter part of the Cultural Revolution, military factions and military supported factions had virtually taken control of the Party.

Efforts to direct the military into non-military production activity have created significant risks and trends undesirable in a socialist state. The result of these trends has been an imbalance in the Party-army relationship which has been an imbalance in the Party-army relationship which has done nothing to promote internal stability. When the army has been used for its organisational skills and technical expertise, there usually results a tendency toward “professionalism” and “elitism”. But it would seem very difficult for this to be avoided when the PLA, as a skilled and organised group, has been directed to work amongst illiterate or poorly organised peasants. While the PLA has had some notable success in provisioning itself, the results of the PLA’s assistance to civil enterprise do little to commend the Maoist model to nations seeking to reduce the burden of military expenditure on the national economy. In principle, the Maoist strategy and its emphasis on practising economy within the military, has several attractions for the Third World in particular. Many of these can be perceived from the Chinese experience. For us in the Western world, the Maoist model has few attractions. The initial investment involved in establishing military production complexes would make its use uneconomical. Similarly, military assistance to the civil sectors of the economy would probably prove more disruptive than productive. Noteworthy also is the fact that Australia’s military is not manpower intensive, so programmes requiring military labour would leave our nation susceptible to external threats with an insufficient number of prepared and organised units. However, I shall leave the last word on this matter to the eminent scholars of whom I have already made mention, John Gittings and Michael Y. M. Kau. In so far as their conclusions of the value of the Maoist model in a broad sense are concerned, they are of one mind. They believe the Maoist model can be used effectively to regulate the participation of the PLA as a labourforce in the economy if the deviations from the model are dealt with rapidly and soundly with a commitment to self criticism. A judgement on the value of the Maoist model and strategy is now up to us.

NOTES
2. David B. Ralston, Soldiers and States (Boston, Heath, 1966) page 55.
5. Article 24 of the Common Programme of the People’s Political Consultative Conference.
11. ibid., p 181.
13. ibid., page 141.
15. ibid., p 748.
16. ibid., page 751.
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21. ibid., page 325.
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SIR Frederick Shedden, originally a country lad from Kyneton in Victoria, became Australia’s foremost expert on defence policy and administration of the higher defence machinery. His reputation was such that with Sir Robert Garran, architect of the Australian Constitution, he was rated by some senior officials as one of the two most outstanding officers ever to serve in the Australian Public Service.

As permanent head of the Department of Defence from 1937 until his retirement in 1956, he exercised a most powerful influence on defence policy and administration before, during and after World War II. The extent of that influence may surprise even some of those who served in the Australian Defence Forces and the Public Service in that period.

Knowing that I had served with Sir Frederick as an Assistant Secretary and later as First Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defence for more than seven years and subsequently enjoyed a close association with him from 1956 to 1971, when he was writing his book at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, several historians and retired senior officers have suggested that I should write my impressions of Shedden the man.

I was privileged to spend long hours in private conversation with Sir Frederick during his fifteen post-retirement years by which time he had mellowed considerably and no longer exhibiting the “need to know” tenet which for so long had been an important part of his life, he seemed eager to reminisce about his experiences and recollections of events and personalities. Therefore, I have long felt disinclined to place on record some of the confidences that Sir Frederick shared with me.

But in accepting the challenge now, I do so with the intention of providing material that might assist an author who may wish at some future time, to produce the biography of this remarkable Australian. Until such a biography is written, there will remain a serious gap in Australian military history.

Field-Marshal Blamey and Lieutenant-Generals Sturdee, Herring, Northcott and Rowell all regarded Shedden’s exceptional service to the nation in wartime and peace as outstanding and superbly dedicated. “The right man in the right place at the right time” was how Sturdee once described him. In 1942, Prime Minister Curtin stated that with all the wartime problems facing him, he did not know how he could carry on without Shedden. Many others endorsed these opinions.

To understand how Frederick Shedden, from a humble family living in a state of near poverty, with minimal schooling in a small country town, attained his position of eminence as Australia’s chief defence adviser, a role he performed so splendidly through the most critical and dangerous phase of the nation’s history as to earn even international recognition and esteem particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States, it is fitting to trace his life from the beginning.

Family Background

Fred Shedden’s grandfather George Shedden senior, was born at Millar Hall near Edinburgh. His connections with Ayrshire were to account for his family’s great pride and affection for the poet Robbie Burns, an interest that passed down to his descendants, most of whom were keen to collect Burns’s work and quote him
at the slightest encouragement. Sir Frederick was to carry on this tradition.

The Shedden family roots were of strong peasant stock with fierce pride in their Presbyterian heritage. They were God fearing Christians, hard working, honest and constant in their adherence to the strict precepts of their Church. Discipline, responsibility and sound common sense characterised their approach to life. Loyalty to family and superiors was all important.

Fred Shedden inherited these qualities to a marked degree, hence his total loyalty in later years to Prime Ministers Curtin, Chifley and Menzies. There were to be times when this same loyalty could prove detrimental to some of his associates and friends, but more about that later.

His grandfather George Shedden senior, as a young man dearly loved his native Scotland but on hearing glowing reports about the prospects in Australia where land and property could be owned by anyone willing to work hard, his interest in that distant continent was stimulated. He began to wonder what it might have to offer an earnest Scots peasant. Then when news of the early gold rushes reached him, he was attracted by tales of wealth and the adventure of settling in a new country where apparently, success could be achieved by a man's own endeavours. Deciding finally to emigrate, he sailed aboard the "Chatham" for Tasmania and arrived there in 1855.

In 1870 by which time he had a family, he moved again to seek better prospects on the mainland and headed for Kyneton, a small town in the colony of Victoria. There he worked as a mill hand and subsequently as a gardener. For some years he was the gardener for Prospect Home Academy, a church Grammar School where as a popular employee, he was respected and regarded with affection by the pupils. He exercised a good influence on the boys at that school. A devoted member of the local church, he lived at Kyneton until his death at age 89.

His son George Shedden junior, served an apprenticeship with an engineering firm in Kyneton to become a wheelwright and a fitter and turner. Like his father, he too was a devout member of his church.

Frederick George Shedden, son of George Shedden junior, was born at Kyneton in central Victoria on 8 August 1893.

In passing, it is of interest to note that the central Victoria district also produced some of Australia's distinguished Service commanders such as:

- Lieutenant-General Sir James McCay, born in Ireland (1864) and raised in Castlemaine
- Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead born at Ballarat (1889)
- Lieutenant-General Sir John Northcott born at Creswick (1890)
- Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Herring born at Maryborough (1892)
- Lieutenant-General Sir William Bridgeford born at Smeaton (1894)
- Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman born at Ballarat (1894)
- Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Walls born at Kyneton (1898)
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger born at Ararat (1904)
- Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Daly born at Ballarat (1913).

At Kyneton from an early age, Fred Shedden was encouraged by his family to participate actively in the Sunday School and throughout his life he gained much strength and satisfaction from his association with the church. In 1907 at the age of 13, he won a prize for biblical knowledge. More than 70 years later, that same prize was discovered in a secondhand book shop by well known historian Warren Perry who purchased it as a souvenir.

Young Fred attended the local Kyneton State School and later the Prospect Home Academy. As the family had very little money, possible his entry to the Academy was facilitated by his grandfather's connection as an employee. Needless to say, the lad made the most of his opportunity as an ambitious, hard working student. He was very determined to succeed. Aware that his family could not afford a tertiary education for him, he set about achieving the best possible scholastic results by which he hoped to earn that on his merits. His goal was Melbourne but he had to make his own way.

While still at Kyneton, Fred Shedden became keenly interested in the Army Cadets. At a camp at Maryborough, Victoria, he met Captain Thomas A. Blamey, A & I (Administrative and Instructional) Staff and was impressed immediately by the strong personality, clarity of instruction and firm leadership qualities displayed by Blamey who was nine years older
than Shedden. That meeting was the start of a long and significant acquaintance that would benefit Blarney in the years that lay ahead. These two men were destined to play a vital role in Australian history in World War II.

The Headmaster of Prospect Home Academy, the Reverend G. J. Richmond, took a special interest in Fred Shedden’s future. He advised him to apply to join the Commonwealth Public Service in which he considered there could be scope for Shedden’s qualities of character and scholarship. Also he recommended that Fred should endeavour to study part-time at Melbourne University to improve his academic qualifications.

The Public Service

On 10 March 1910 at the age of 16, Shedden reported for duty as junior clerk with the Department of Defence in Melbourne. The permanent head at that time was the renowned Samuel Pethebridge (later Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Pethebridge) who headed the Department from 1910 to 1918. The chief clerk was Thomas Trumble who became permanent head from 1918 to 1927. Another well known officer then serving in the Department was Malcolm F. Shepherd who later was Secretary of the Department from 1927 until 1937.

Shedden was extremely fortunate that the three officers mentioned above took an interest in him and his further education in the Department. Obviously his talents and potential for advancement were recognised early in his career. Every effort was to be made to prepare him for senior departmental appointments. Just how comprehensive and thorough this training and grooming proved to be will become evident in succeeding paragraphs.

It was quite a wrench for Shedden to leave his family home in Kyneton to settle in Melbourne. For a time he boarded with friends in Northcote but later his parents decided to move to Melbourne where his father George Shedden worked at Newport Railway Workshops. At this time the family lived in a pleasant tree lined street near the beach at 88 Victoria Street, Williamstown where Fred joined them and commuted daily to work at Victoria Barracks.

The family formed a strong attachment to the Congregational Church in North Williamstown. When the Shedden parents died they were buried in Kyneton and their Minister went there from Williamstown by train to conduct both services. Records of these services are still held by Mr George Bremner, an enthusiastic historian and prominent member of Legacy and the Kyneton Sub Branch of the RSL. Early records of the Shedden family also are held by the Misses G. and M. Shedden and Mr Jack Collins, late of Kyneton.

Fred Shedden began studying Accountancy and by 1917 he was appointed to the Australian Army Pay Corps, AIF with the rank of Lieutenant. At the same time he was made an Honorary Lieutenant in the AMF. He embarked for overseas service on 22 March 1917 and served in London and in France as a Divisional Paymaster. He returned to Melbourne on 10 December 1919 and was placed on the Reserve of Officers First on 1 October 1920. Arising from his wartime experience, Shedden was instrumental in developing the Australian Army Paybook system.

Thereafter, his progress in the Department of Defence was rapid. He completed a Bachelor of Commerce degree part-time at Melbourne University under the tutelage of the legendary Professor Sir Douglas Copland who considered Shedden as his most promising student and proposed that he be sent to the London School of Economics for further advanced study.

The Minister for Defence, Sir William Glasgow also was so impressed by Shedden that he recommended to Cabinet that he be sent abroad for special training in defence administration, financial administration and higher defence policy. No other Defence Department officer has ever had such training and experience. Indeed, except for Sir Edwin Hicks, later permanent heads of the Department have had no previous defence training at all.

Training in the United Kingdom

By the time Shedden set off for London at the age of 35, he had married Anne Edwards in December 1927 (they met in the Defence Department) and his confidence and personality had matured greatly. He was of slight build and average height with a noticeably straight back and piercing hazel coloured eyes which could really smoulder with annoyance. He was always neatly dressed.

He had a keen sensitivity to “atmosphere” especially if he could detect any signs of patronising, lack of attention or slight on the part of uniformed officers. This apparently
stemmed from an incident when as a senior public servant, he had been challenged by a middle-ranking officer who asked “What could you know about the Army?” and told him he was “only a clerk!”

In 1928 he attended the Imperial Defence College in London, now the Royal College of Defence Studies, the top Defence College in the British Commonwealth. On the same course were Lieutenant-Colonel E. K. Squires, Royal Engineers (later Lieutenant-General E. K. Squires, Inspector-General and Chief of the General Staff, Australian Military Forces) and an Australian officer Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Lavarack (later Lieutenant-General Sir John Lavarack).

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond the Commander of the Imperial Defence College, was quick to recognise Shedden's knowledge of finance administration and his keen interest in strategy and Commonwealth Defence planning on which Richmond was acknowledged as a world expert.

Shedden graduated as the star student of his IDC course. The fact that as a public servant he had proved himself so convincingly in this highly competitive forum, elevated his professional standing in the eyes of his contemporaries and brought his name to notice in the wider defence sphere. Now he had to live up to that reputation and he had no doubts about his ability to do so.

Admiral Richmond was to have an important influence on Shedden's future thinking on defence subjects. After the IDC course they began to exchange correspondence and this personal contact continued long after the Admiral retired from the Royal Navy to become Professor of Naval History at Cambridge and until his death. Shedden's thirst for knowledge on Commonwealth Defence matters was satisfied in part by Richmond whose opinions he valued.

In 1929, Fred Shedden was attached to the War Office, especially to study financial administration. There he met Sir Maurice Hankey who also was to help shape Shedden's future career. Sir Maurice was Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, a most powerful adviser to a succession of British Prime Ministers and later he became Lord Hankey and a member of Chamberlain's Cabinet. Chamberlain had described him as “not an officer but an institution.”

Sir Maurice, astutely perceiving Shedden's abilities and his potential, did what he could to train and guide him in Imperial Defence planning and policy. This policy emanated from the 1923 Imperial Conference and was based on British sea power. Shedden served for two years with Hankey in the office of the British Cabinet and Committee of Imperial Defence. In that position, he had direct contact with very senior British Service officers and diplomats. With Hankey's guidance and influence, Shedden befriended a number of these officers who were later to become wartime leaders. Likewise, he learned under Hankey's patronage how to handle Cabinet Ministers, a skill he used to good effect later in Australia.

Shedden now possessed the qualifications and confidence needed to entitle him to become the "Australian Hankey" a title which at that stage of his career would satisfy his earlier ambitions. A few misguided lightweights of the time nicknamed him “Pocket Hankey.” He obviously idolised his mentor as the most powerful man in the UK Defence Machinery so he set out to emulate that great man's methods of working and his technique of retaining in his own hands, power and the ability to use it to influence others. In some of these practices, Shedden later would excel the skills of his tutor.

In the final years of his life, Sir Frederick often talked to me about his great admiration for Hankey's achievements, his strengths and talents, many of which were to become a pattern for Shedden's own accomplishments.

Fred Shedden, son of a wheelwright and the grandson of a Kyneton gardener, had come a long way. By the early 1930s he was a soundly trained, highly qualified defence expert, recognised for his ability at home and in the United Kingdom. He enjoyed the status of being the protege of the most eminent defence authority in London and as his professional competence developed, so too did his social attainments.

While in England, he also was able to do some research at London University on public finance, political science and administrative law thus adding to his already impressive knowledge to equip himself for higher responsibilities.

Before returning to Australia, he was attached to the Australian High Commission in London to serve under High Commissioner Mr Stanley Bruce (later Lord Bruce) who had
been Prime Minister in Australia before assuming the London post. This gave Shedden some experience in diplomatic work and his service with Bruce led to a lifelong friendship.

**Return to Australia**

Back in Melbourne in 1932 Shedden was selected for appointment as head of secretariat of the Australian Delegation to the Disarmament Conference being held in Geneva. Up to this time, he had some confidence that continuing world peace could be achieved, but his experience at the conference persuaded him that there was little hope of ever attaining that ideal. He realised then how important it was for Australia to build up her defence capability, with Imperial Defence policy as an essential keystone for development in that direction.

However, neither his seniors in the Department of Defence nor the Government were very interested in making positive financial provision for defence at that time. Australia was still in the middle of the great depression and money for defence was scarce. Britain still ruled the waves, the Singapore Naval Base was considered to be impregnable and Australia could rely on Great Britain for her protection. Furthermore there was the League of Nations which continued to inspire optimism for many people.

In common with some of the senior Army officers, Shedden had some reservations about the Singapore policy although he hoped that if ever put to the test, it would work in an emergency. Meantime, he believed strongly that Australia should do everything possible to play her part in Imperial Defence and at every opportunity he did all he could to ensure that the importance of Imperial Defence planning and strategy was brought to the notice of his superiors.

Sir Maurice Hankey visited Australia late in 1934 to advise on Defence policy. Shedden accompanied him around Australia on that visit. Hankey recommended that Australia should place full reliance on the Singapore Base and the Royal Navy’s ability to use it for the protection of Commonwealth and British interests in the Far East. Shedden appeared to accept this reassurance in preference to sceptical opinions then being expressed notably by Lavarack, Sturdee and Wynter.

During this visit to Australia, Hankey suggested in the appropriate quarters that Shedden be considered for appointment as the next Secretary, Department of Defence.

Following Shedden’s trip to Geneva in 1932, he was given other overseas assignments. These were as a member of a delegation to attend the World Economic Conference in Ottawa in 1933, then in 1934 he was sent as an Australian representative to attend the Wellington Defence Conference.

From 1935 to 1937 he was Assistant Secretary of the reconstituted Council for Defence and by 1937 he was appointed First Assistant Secretary, Department of Defence.

On the retirement of the Mr Malcolm Shepherd later in 1937, Frederick Shedden became Secretary of the Department of Defence and Civil Member of the Defence Committee. There was no better trained, qualified and experienced public servant or Service officer to perform the duties of his new appointment. It was fortunate for Australia to have a man of his calibre and knowledge in this prime Defence posting at a time when the clouds of war were gathering over Europe.

**Secretary, Department of Defence**

Thomas Trumble and Malcolm Shepherd had presided over a rather minute staff at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. The tempo was calm and unhurried. No one suffered from stress. These two permanent heads had strolled around the Barracks offices at seemingly leisurely pace and everyone knew everybody else in those days. Malcolm Shepherd was a friendly man who was well liked by all.

But with the appointment of Fred Shedden, all of this changed both in the Department and within the Barracks. He kept very much to his own office and studiously avoided any form of personal exposure. To many junior members of the staff he was known only by name. Few of them could have identified him by his appearance.

When he took over the appointment as Secretary, he still supported the Imperial Defence doctrine of dependence on the Royal Navy and its Singapore Base to shield Australia from any likely threat that Japan might pose in the Western Pacific. He was prepared to argue this case with Lavarack and his colleagues who continued to voice their concern
about the validity of the "Singapore Policy" should Britain ever become embroiled in any European conflict of arms.

No doubt Shedden's faith in Admiral Richmond and more importantly Lord Hankey, influenced his views. He firmly believed that Australian defence must be geared to powerful allies and he thought in terms of Great Britain only. In the opinion of some senior officers at that time, instead of clinging so rigidly to that policy, he should have been devoting more of his attention to support for building up local defence capabilities although this was unpopular with both the Government and the opposition then. Later however, the reverses suffered by Britain between 1939 and 1941 were to compel him to start questioning the wisdom of the Imperial Defence policies which for so long he had been an ardent advocate.

Between 1937 and the outbreak of the war, Shedden's tasks were by no means easy. The Government had lost its confidence in Lavarack and had arranged for Lieutenant-General E. K. Squires, who had attended IDC at the same time as Shedden, to be seconded from the British Army for appointment as Inspector-General of the AMF and to report on the Australian Army organisation. No doubt Shedden had some influence in this choice of Squires. The Inspector-General's recommendations were implemented just before hostilities commenced in 1939. The Command system was introduced and Squires then was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Lavarack was made GOC of Southern Command (Victoria and Tasmania) and Sturdee GOC Eastern Command (NSW).

In the other Services before World War II, the upper echelons of the RAAF were affected adversely by disagreements between Air Vice-Marshal Williams and Goble which caused the Government and Shedden some concern. Finally, Air Chief Marshal Burnett was appointed from the RAF as Chief of Air Staff in Australia. The RAN on the other hand gave little concern because it looked to the Royal Navy to provide the Chief of the Naval Staff and Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Fleet. It was thought at the time that Collins and Farncomb were too young for the top RAN appointment — yet Mountbatten was younger than both when he was made Supreme Commander of South East Asia Command later in the war.

Preparations for War

Following the September 1938 events in Munich, the Government took stock of the situation in Australia and was forced to weigh up much of the conflicting advice it had been receiving. The nation still was suffering from the depression and the Army had been grossly neglected. It was in no condition to mobilize. Its equipment was obsolete; for example its horse drawn field artillery guns brought back from the 1914-1918 war were equipped with steel rimmed wooden wheels!

It had suited the Government to place its trust in Britain's Singapore policy which to a large extent excused Australia from having to spend much money on home defence in the depression years. By mid-1938 however, feelings of concern started to develop. There were no permanent Army field troops of any significance apart from the Darwin Mobile Force and a few Royal Australian Artillery units mostly based in fixed coastal defence installations. The Militia had been allowed to run down. Action had to be taken quickly to strengthen the Army for home defence as a contingency measure.

As mentioned earlier, Shedden thought highly of Blamey and resolved to get him into the Defence system to assist with the urgent tasks ahead but realised that such a move would have to be handled tactfully. While Shedden was convinced that Blamey would be the man to lead the Australian Army in war, the Prime Minister Mr J. A. Lyons with his rather puritanical attitudes, did not readily accept Blamey's nomination for a senior appointment. However, after considering strong representations made by Ministers Casey and Gullett, he agreed to a personal meeting with Blamey. Following that, Lyons consented to Blamey being appointed Controller-General of Recruiting in which capacity he would serve under Shedden's direction. This was another fortunate decision for Australia at that time.

Long after Sir Frederick Shedden's retirement, he told me that he had been quite determined to get Blamey into an important post in which he could demonstrate his ability. Then he would be well placed to become Commander of an Australian Expeditionary Force in the event of war. Shedden had great confidence in Blamey having studied his performance in World War I and subsequently and needlessly to say, Blamey lived up to
Shedden's expectations. He proved to be remarkably successful in increasing the strength of the Militia in a short time. By so doing he re-established his reputation in the eyes of the Government and publicly exhibited his worth as a highly competent leader, organiser and administrator.

At the same time Shedden initiated work on the "War Book" a Top Secret master document to specify in precise detail, all the important steps and sequence of actions to be taken in an emergency to facilitate swift and efficient transition of the nation into a state of war. This vital project took many months of research and endeavour to perfect. The final result was a masterpiece of clarity in defining relevant procedures and responsibilities.

One of Shedden's main problems on becoming Secretary was the inadequate and antiquated filing "system" he inherited. Files were haphazard and his small Department was having tremendous difficulty in coping with the rapidly mounting records of policy decisions, various committee documents, correspondence and other data. Workable and effective methods of filing had to be devised as a matter of urgency and Shedden was just the person to organise this — which he did with despatch. His Department's new system worked so well that soon it was adopted also by the Cabinet, War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council.

Shedden's insistence on complete accuracy of the agenda and minutes of Cabinet submissions and decisions, made a favourable impression on Ministers. Prime Minister Menzies once was quoted as saying "Documentation, thy name is Shedden!"

He was a tireless worker. Seven days a week was his norm. His whole life revolved around his work and his home. Had he not been childless, his working habits might have been different but as it was, he spent most of his time in his office. In middle age he developed chronic insomnia thus needing only a few hours sleep at a time so most nights he would do more office work at home. His only other interest was his church. As a devout Presbyterian, invariably on Sunday evenings he could be seen in his pew at the Frank Paton Memorial Church at Deepdene, a Melbourne suburb.

By mid-1939 he had achieved a great deal in his first two years as Secretary to prepare the Department with its higher defence machinery for the wartime role it soon would be required to perform. He had introduced many of Lord Hankey's ideas in designing departmental procedures and Hankey's methods and standards were apparent in practically every aspect of the Department's operations.

### Outbreak of War

Shedden was the architect of a radical reorganisation of the Defence structure during 1939. His Department was to be limited to the functions of policy formulation and implementation. This involved the removal of defence industrial production to a newly formed Department of Supply and Development in April 1939 followed by the setting up of the three Service departments each with its own Minister. At the same time, the Department of Defence Coordination was established to give higher policy direction to the Defence group of departments, and the Prime Minister became also Minister of Defence Coordination.

In addition to his responsibilities as Secretary, Department of Defence, Shedden was appointed Secretary to the War Cabinet and later, Secretary of the Advisory War Council. It was during this period that he became the most powerful and influential adviser on defence matters to the Prime Minister and the Government, a vital and most responsible role he performed with distinction throughout and after World War II.

As Sir Paul Hasluck wrote in "The Government and The People" Volume I, page 362:

"The War Cabinet Secretariat which developed under Mr Shedden became one of the most efficient instrumentalities in the whole of the Commonwealth Public Service and its system of supporting Ministers with agenda and documents proved a notable aid to administration at the heart of the Government. The efficiency of the Secretariat may be counted among the many reasons for the rapid growth of the importance of War Cabinet".

In the same volume, Hasluck described Shedden as "A highly capable public servant and one of the few outstanding men on the civil side of the Australian war effort."

Whilst Shedden remained Secretary of Defence, he firmly maintained higher defence machinery should concentrate solely on the formulation and implementation of policy. No change to this concept took place until after his retirement in 1956.
Fortunately for Australia, the early war years of 1939 and 1940 gave its defence staffs and indeed the whole initial war effort, time to settle down and make considerable progress in reorganising to prepare for the nation's defence.

Higher Organisation for War

Shedden lost no time in developing plans to expand the wartime organisation into areas which at first sight appeared to have little to do with defence. In June 1940 he submitted a proposal that a Minister and Department of Economic Coordination be created to serve an Economic Cabinet in a manner similar to that in which the Minister and Department of Defence Coordination served the War Cabinet. Also he proposed that a Joint Economic and Industrial Staff be established to assist the Minister for Defence Coordination. These recommendations were based on Shedden's knowledge and experience in economics and financial administration. His training at Melbourne and London Universities had been followed by extensive experience in these fields in Government circles in Australia and Great Britain.

Shortly afterwards, he proposed forming a Production Executive of the Economic and Industrial Committee, but no action was taken by the Menzies Government as this recommendation was overtaken by political events, namely a change of Government. Later, the new Curtin Government adopted the proposal.

These activities are mentioned to show the extent to which Shedden, now reaching the peak of his career, had become involved in the higher direction of war organisation. In many cases, he was the initiator.

As Hasluck wrote “... a close examination ... leaves no doubt on the influential role of the Defence Department both as an initiator and moulder of decisions”. Even Manpower policy was very much influenced by Shedden. Again quoting Hasluck's book (page 444): “Discretion, orderly arrangement and careful ground work were so large a part of Shedden’s training that his achievement was often hidden.”

In order to improve the quality of the work of the Defence Department, Shedden did not hesitate to recruit bright intellectuals from civil life. Typical of this recruitment were Douglas Menzies (later Mr Justice Sir Douglas Menzies) and Alistair Adam (later Mr Justice Sir Alistair Adam). Douglas Menzies became Secretary of the Defence Committee and Adam was his assistant and subsequently head of the Defence Department office at GHQ.

Overseas Visit with Menzies

In 1941 Shedden accompanied Prime Minister Robert Menzies on his visit to the Middle East and the United Kingdom. Another member of the Prime Minister's touring party was John Storey (later Sir John Storey) a leading industrialist who made a very significant contribution to the national war effort by developing the aircraft production industry in Australia. Menzies, Storey and Shedden were a formidable team. Shedden's talents were known in UK by Hankey and other senior defence authorities. Few doors were closed to him. Likewise, Storey's ability and aggressive tenacity made an impact on Lord Beaverbrook and a number of aircraft production executives which yielded good results for Australia.

Mr Menzies who was well known and respected in London, remained there for several months basking in the attention and the VIP treatment he was given. Shedden played a critical role in briefing him on important matters to be resolved with the British Government and defence chiefs. The deployment of the expeditionary force into Greece was one topic discussed at length by Menzies with the British War Cabinet. Shedden was opposed to the use of Australian troops for this excursion,

Shedden with Prime Minister Menzies and General Blamey, Middle East 1941. (AWM).
but his advice was ignored. He became very upset when Britain revoked her undertaking to contribute more to the Order of Battle for the Greek campaign.

**New Government Goes To War**

The collapse of the Menzies Government late in 1941 is now history. This presented Shedden with a huge challenge. He had been thoroughly trained and prepared to handle the top job in Defence but the disasters which followed the entry of Japan into the war were to test his ability and endurance to the limit.

He had a new Prime Minister (Mr John Curtin) and Government who had little knowledge and of course no experience in running the country in a perilous war situation. A great deal of his time had to be devoted to educating the Prime Minister and the Ministry on priorities to be given to major war decisions and other pressing tasks confronting them. Bearing in mind the Australian Labour Party’s lack of interest in defence planning in the 1930s, Shedden faced a daunting and most difficult task. Subsequently, Curtin’s conversion from peacetime pacifism to become a dedicated great wartime Prime Minister was to be likened to Saint Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus.

Within a matter of weeks the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Malaya, the East Indies and the island chain to the north-west of Australia. Confidence that Singapore would hold out against any land or sea attack was still high. Every effort had been made by the Australian authorities to have Singapore reinforced. The redeployment of the AIF from the Middle East to South East Asia was demanded.

Shedden bore great responsibility and was a key figure in advising Prime Minister Curtin on action to be taken to meet these and other war crises as they arose. It was indeed fortunate that the recommendations of the Chief of the General Staff (Vernon Sturdee) for the return of the AIF from the Middle East were supported so vigorously by Shedden. Sturdee felt so strongly about the recall of the AIF to Australia after the fall of Singapore, that he threatened to resign if the War Cabinet rejected his advice. In the event, Cabinet adopted the course of action advocated by Sturdee.

The collapse of Singapore dazed the Australian public. Such a catastrophe was unbelievable. Besides, the vast majority of the nation’s best trained soldiers, sailors and airmen were serving in overseas theatres of war leaving Australia’s defence to a sparse, inexperienced and poorly equipped Militia. In this alarming predicament, Shedden staunchly supported the strong, calm actions of Sturdee. David Horner wrote in “*The Commanders*” (page 158) that at this time, Sturdee “... was the rock on which the Army and indeed the Government rested during the weeks of panic in early 1942”. Sturdee was very grateful for the support he was given by Shedden in this crisis.

Curtin decided to recall Blarney to appoint him Commander-in-Chief of the AMF. Shed-
den was involved in that decision. By early 1942 Curtin had considerable confidence in Shedden's ability and judgement and relied heavily on his counsel.

**MacArthur's Arrival**

After the disasters in the Philippines, Malaya, the East Indies and Rabaul, General Douglas MacArthur, United States Army, was appointed Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific Area and he established his headquarters in Melbourne. Blarney then was appointed Land Forces Commander as well as C-in-C, AMF.

Thenceforth as far as Curtin was concerned, the old Imperial Defence policy was no longer relevant to Australia's security. His appeal to the United States for help was supported wholeheartedly by the Australian people, many of whom felt sadly betrayed by the United Kingdom, even allowing for the difficulties it was facing at that time. Reassurances about the impregnability of the Royal Navy and Singapore, repeated so convincingly for so many years previously, now were revealed as meaningless. The tragic loss of Singapore and the sacrifice of Australian troops were the gravest of calamities.

Shedden in particular was dismayed by the turn of events. Sturdee, Lavarack and Wynter had been proved correct in their assessment of the long standing "Singapore Policy". Shedden now had no alternative but to accept the situation as it was; as did John Curtin.

Explaining Australia's appeal to the USA and MacArthur’s appointment, Prime Minister Curtin was reported in the Melbourne "Herald" on 26 December 1941 as having stated: "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom".

On his arrival in Australia, MacArthur stipulated quite positively his requirements for coordination of his activities with the Australian Government. He would deal personally with Curtin in all major proposals. Matters of important detail would be handled through normal Government channels; existing policies and procedures for supply and personnel matters should continue; and essentially, unified control would apply in combat. (Further details are given in Hasluck's "The Government and The People" Volume II, page 114).

Shedden's role as Secretary of the War Cabinet was to arrange and facilitate all discussions between the Prime Minister and MacArthur. In effecting liaison between the two leaders, he became the intermediary and carried out that task so skilfully that he received their high praise. Correspondingly, Shedden's own influence and stature were enhanced enormously by this unique responsibility. MacArthur came to regard Shedden as Curtin's principal adviser and confidant on all major defence matters. MacArthur and Shedden worked well together. They had confidence and great respect for each other. But Blarney's relationship with MacArthur was different in that he was subordinate to the American C-in-C. MacArthur tended to emphasize this fact by his practice of ignoring or by-passing Blarney to discuss major defence policy direct with the Prime Minister, in the process of which Shedden, rather than Blarney, invariably was involved.

In later years some observers, including Sir Alfred Kemsley, considered that Shedden should have given Blarney greater support in his differences with MacArthur. I agree with that opinion. However, Shedden fully realised that MacArthur had to be kept satisfied to ensure his continuing concern and support in the Australian war effort. In the early stages, the safety of the nation was at stake.

Shedden understood very clearly that Australia's defence now was inextricably linked with the United States, therefore he considered it imperative to keep MacArthur contented by not contesting his major recommendations. Mostly, Curtin and Blarney adopted a similar attitude. It was only on a very few occasions that Shedden raised questions with the Prime Minister about MacArthur's propositions.

It would be of interest now to speculate what might have happened had Shedden sided with his old friend Blarney over some of the issues that arose, such as the deployment of the AIF after 1943 and MacArthur's treatment of Blarney as Commander of the Allied Land Forces in the latter part of the war.

When MacArthur moved his headquarters to Brisbane in July 1942, Shedden was quick to establish a Liaison Office of his own at MacArthur's GHQ. Alistair Adam, the bright young barrister who had been recruited by Shedden, was posted as head of that Liaison Office.
Whilst Shedden was held in awe by his permanent staff because of his high standards and strict demands for absolute accuracy, quality performance and long working hours — for which he set the example — he did have a sense of humour if any of his staff felt courageous enough to try him out. As Shedden isolated himself and rarely was seen outside his office, it took Adam several months to actually meet him. The encounter took place at a War Cabinet meeting in Sydney when Adam confronted Shedden greeting him with "Dr Livingstone I presume?" Sheddon saw the joke.

Later at GHQ in Brisbane, Adam addressed the following memo to Shedden:

**VERY PERSONAL**

To The Secretary

Your comment that the guards at GHQ appeared to be witless creatures — a comment in which I had concurred — has made me hesitate to report the following incident.

2. I am not in the habit of forwarding reports which are officially graded as Z99, but I feel I should make an exception in this case as it might possibly induce you to revise your opinion of the guards in question, and in any event should do nothing to impair the friendly relations subsisting between this country and the United States.

3. **REPORT**

As I was proceeding to the lift from my office I was challenged by the guard at 1600 hours on Sat. 24/10/42 with the following uncalled for remark: "THAT MR SHEDDEN OF YOURS LOOKS LIKE A HELLUVA NICE GUY TO ME."

4. Your advice as to the value to be placed on statements made by the guards at GHQ would be appreciated.

(Signed) A. D. G. Adam  
Officer in Charge  
Brisbane Secretariat  
25/10/42

In reply, Shedden penned the following footnote to the memo:

Their judgement is even worse than their lack of wit. They obviously are not descendants of lawyers.

(Initialled) F.G.S. 26/10 1941 Middle East, Shedden with Prime Minister Menzies and General Blamey. (AWM).

I believe that Douglas Menzies, Alistair Adam and other able officers who were brought into the Department, made significant contributions during the war years. They were not in any way intimidated by Fred Shedden. Their humour helped to relieve the tension in times of stress. They assisted in the smooth running of the Department and to some degree, managed to prevent Shedden from becoming too difficult with his peers and his staff.

The permanent officers of the Defence Department at that time were efficient (they had to be!), conscientious and dedicated and were specialists in their own fields. Officers such as Archie Wilson, P. E. (Johnny) Coleman, Vincent Quealy, Bertie Port, Sam Landau and many others contributed greatly to the war effort, never sparing themselves in handling the masses of high priority work that had to be done. Several of the wartime officers of the Department were still serving with Shedden when he retired.

**Shedden's Influence with Curtin**

Permanent heads and high officials of other Departments grew envious of the power and influence exerted by Shedden on Prime Minister Curtin. Some found it difficult to conceal their feelings of jealousy. But few if any, had the ability to match Shedden's monopoly of
wartime bureaucratic power. Even the Service Chiefs of Staff had to report to the War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council through him. He was responsible not only for preparing or examining submissions (agenda) but also for drafting the minutes of meetings and monitoring follow up action.

In relation to the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff, Shedden had the ability to present a differing view to the Prime Minister if he did not concur in the Chiefs' conclusions. This applied particularly in cases when any of the Chiefs of Staff had conflicting ideas. Curtin welcomed Shedden's recommendations and seldom departed from them, thereby encouraging Shedden to use opportunities to offer strategic advice whenever he deemed it necessary.

From an overall defence point of view it is no exaggeration to say that the Prime Minister unhesitatingly looked to Shedden for strategic, organisational and financial advice for the national war effort. Perhaps Curtin harboured some reservations about seeking and accepting advice from his Service Chiefs because of his personal lack of knowledge and experience of matters military. Nevertheless, he usually did accept without question, military advice given to him by MacArthur. Thus the two most influential advisers to the Prime Minister were MacArthur and Shedden. This state of affairs continued until the end of the war, although MacArthur's influence waned progressively as his campaigns advanced further away from Australia.

Command Appointments

Shedden knew from his contacts at his IDC course and his service with the Committee of Imperial Defence in London, that the best of the Australian Service officers compared very favourably with their British counterparts. He therefore tried very earnestly to convince the UK High Command to recognise and accept the qualifications and experience of Australian officers whenever senior command appointments were being considered for the Middle East. Blamey and Morshead were typical cases.

Shedden made strong representations to Prime Minister Menzies that Blamey should be Commander-in-Chief in Greece rather than “Jumbo” Wilson (later Field-Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson).

Then from May 1944 onwards, he was alert to the question of who the Commander should be if any combined British and Australian Force were formed to take part in the thrust northwards against the Japanese.

I find it difficult to understand why Shedden did not support Blamey more at this time when it was patently clear that MacArthur was choosing to ignore Blamey's role as Commander, Allied Land Forces.

Priority for Prosecution of the War

The tacit agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill to defeat Germany first was still the policy of the US and UK Governments in early 1942. This posed enormous problems for Curtin and MacArthur in their efforts to obtain forces and equipment for the Pacific. Finally in May 1942, Evatt was able to convince Churchill of the necessity to wage war with determination in the South West Pacific Area. When this became known there was great jubilation in Australia. MacArthur and Shedden were directed to prepare a statement for release by the Prime Minister ("John Curtin" by Lloyd Ross, page 286). The release stated:

“... he was now much more satisfied that public opinion had been directed to a realisation that the war was really global — not European . . .”

Whilst Curtin was a gifted orator and expressed himself well on paper, it was nearly always Shedden who was asked to draft important cables and Prime Ministerial statements on defence topics. At times it was almost impossible to detect who the author or the initiator had been. Files do not always reveal the true story!

From this time on, things began to move forward in the Pacific.
The Militia Bill, December 1942 — February 1943

The Australian Army was organised on the basis of two distinctly separate forces; the AIF which was voluntary and could be sent to serve anywhere outside Australia; and the AMF including conscripts, which was restricted to Australian home defence.

This organisation was cumbersome and awkward to manage, especially when the policy was changed to permit individuals and units of the AMF to volunteer for service overseas. This meant that AIF and AMF (Volunteer) units then could serve side-by-side in a combat zone under different rates of pay and service conditions.

Shedden and MacArthur diplomatically pressed Curtin to solve this ridiculous dilemma. In particular, the Amerians were puzzled as to why they had been sent to help defend Australia while the AMF could not be used to defend Australia's own territories. Curtin accepted the force of the arguments put to him.

Having decided to rectify the situation, the Prime Minister had to proceed cautiously. There were elements in his Labour Party who were prepared to go to any lengths to prevent the introduction of conscription for overseas service. But once his mind was made up and he had determined the course to be followed, Curtin was prepared to face the consequences. He called a special Federal conference of the ALP in Melbourne on 16 November 1942. After much acrimonious debate and bickering, the conscription issue was referred to the various State executives of the party for further consideration. In January 1943 the party reassembled in conference and this time the Prime Minister won endorsement for his proposed amendments to the existing legislation. Following that, approval was given by Cabinet and the new Act was sent to the House of Representatives.

This Act defined the South West Pacific Zone as the area bounded on the west by the 110th meridian of east longitude, on the north by the Equator and on the east by the 159th meridian of east longitude.

In his book "John Curtin" (page 306) author Lloyd Ross mentions that Shedden wrote to MacArthur enclosing notes for the second reading speech on the Militia Bill which was to be delivered by the Prime Minister. Ross thought that the letter accompanying the speech notes revealed the closeness that existed between Shedden and MacArthur and also with Curtin, a relationship that enabled Shedden's direct access to the Prime Minister. This confirms what most senior officials believed at the time.

The Bill became law in February 1943 and its enactment was a personal triumph for Curtin. In spite of strong resistance from some members of his Cabinet and party, he had redeemed a situation that simply could not be justified, especially to allied forces. Again the Prime Minister had leaned heavily on his Secretary, Defence Department for strong, loyal support and sound advice.
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, London 1944, Shedden is in the rear row 4th from left next to Blamey. (AWM).

Soon afterwards, Shedden was created a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George. This award was made on Curtin's recommendation despite some fierce Labour Party opposition, illustrating how highly the Prime Minister valued Shedden and all he had done for the war effort. More about this later.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference 1944

The Prime Minister accompanied by Sir Frederick Shedden and Sir Thomas Blarney, attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in May 1944. The main items for discussion were in two categories:

a. Conduct of the war, so that the Governments represented could review their respective war efforts in relation to strategic planning; and

b. Post-war problems, British Commonwealth and International.

Curtin's primary interest and contribution to the conference concerned the war in the Pacific region and in particular, his proposal for consultation and coordination in Commonwealth Defence planning and organisation. The Australian representatives were disappointed by the other delegates' lack of interest in the latter subject. Smuts from South Africa, was not enthusiastic about Curtin's proposals.

This result was not surprising because Churchill obviously did not want any consultation to be too formal. It suited him better to be able to issue orders without first having to subject them to any type of prior consultative challenge. There is no doubt that much of the initiative of Curtin's approach in this discussion was attributable to Shedden although Curtin was well aware of the problems that had been caused by Churchill's lack of consultation with the Australian Government in the past, especially in late 1941 and early 1942. However, the seeds were sown and better results were to be achieved on this question in 1946 when Chifley and Shedden attended another similar conference in London when Clement Attlee was the British Prime Minister.

I had my first meeting with Sir Frederick Shedden in London when he attended the 1944 Prime Ministers' conference with Mr Curtin. I was impressed immediately by his determination and ability and became aware of his devotion to Curtin. I had heard about the strength of Shedden's influence on others and was able to see some evidence of this during that visit. We Australians who then were serving in London, were very proud of our Prime Minister's performance whether in Whitehall, at Lord's cricket ground or when he went off to RAF stations before dawn so that he could meet RAAF men and watch them take off on their bombing missions over Europe. Although he was a sick man, his speech on accepting the Freedom of the City of London was brilliant. Shedden was a great help to Curtin during this period in the UK and always was to be seen at his side giving strong support to the Prime Minister wherever he had to go to keep up with his busy rounds of official duties.

It was at this time that General Jacob, British War Cabinet Assistant Military Secretary threatened to withhold from Australia, some highly classified material unless an inter-service staff organisation were established in Australia to handle such matters. Jacob went
further by suggesting that Shedden should appoint to his Department a senior Service officer of equal status to himself. (This information was given to me in May 1944 by Colonel H. G. Rourke the Australian representative in the British War Cabinet Secretariat; and Sir Frederick confirmed it in discussion in the 1960s).

Apparently these moves were intended as a means of questioning to some extent the civilian control of the Australian Department of Defence. But the Prime Minister and Shedden (who resented what he regarded as Jacob's gratuitous impertinence and was not about to share his authority and the prestige of his position with anyone) were quick to dismiss these proposals.

Final Stages of the War in the Pacific

As the war in Europe progressed in the allies' favour, plans for the deployment of British forces in South East Asia and the Pacific received increasing attention. This demanded some important decisions to be taken by the Australian Government. Curtin wanted the Australian forces to continue their close association with the Americans, but there was another school of thought that this association should be switched to the British. There was a suggestion that Blamey be appointed to command a combined British and Australian force but that idea was not pursued to finality.

There is little doubt that MacArthur had decided not to use the AIF to assist in the later stages of the war to drive the Japanese out of the Philippines despite the protestations of Curtin and Blamey. They firmly believed that the Australians should participate in the last stages of the war against Japan and considered that the AIF deserved the right to share in the foreseeable victory.

A decision made to provide the Royal Navy with bases in Australia, presented the Government with considerable difficulties. These were aggravated by the C-in-C, British Pacific Fleet, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, RN who demanded that Australia provide almost every facility and support that would be required. The British Government already had been informed of the limited resources that were available then and also that what facilities did exist, had been stretched to the maximum possible extent by Australia's unstinted war effort. Fraser's unfortunate dogmatism and his public statements on this debate certainly were not welcomed by the Australian Government nor by Shedden. In his opinion, Fraser like Jacob, was too inclined to tell Australia what to do in terms more suited to some form of colonial relationship. Any hint of a challenge to recognition of Australian sovereignty was like "a red rag to a bull" with Curtin and Shedden! This battle of the bases went on until Japan's early surrender closed the matter.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, London 1946. Chifley didn't like dinner suits so for the first time ever the official dinner was a mufti affair. Shedden is in the second row 3 from left. (AWM).
Prime Minister Curtin’s death on 5 July 1945 was a blow to his nation. His premature death no doubt was due, at least in part, to the awful strain he had been under for so long through the turbulent war years, in which he completely dedicated all of his energies and talents to the defence of Australia. A memorial service was held for him at Westminster Abbey which was attended by many of the leading figures in London. The Abbey was packed to overflowing with mourners — a magnificent tribute to a great Australian in a far away land.

Curtin had earned his place in history and he had been held in the very highest respect by Shedden and so many others who knew so well what he had done for his country. Many years later, Shedden told me that Curtin had made certain that Australia’s sovereignty was acknowledged without reservation by the major powers. Proudly he asked Shedden to ensure that he (Curtin) would be remembered for this achievement.

The tragedy for Curtin was that he did not live to see Japan defeated.

Prime Minister J. B. Chifley

The new Labour Prime Minister Ben Chifley quickly took over the reins of government. From Shedden’s viewpoint, this did not cause any major changes of policy or approach in Australia’s contribution to the war. Chifley knew Shedden’s loyalty and experience and he was prepared to let the Defence machine continue to function without interference. He looked to Shedden for strategic and military advice which was given readily and positively. Shedden’s situation remained unchanged.

Blamey’s position on the other hand, was less secure following Curtin’s death. Chifley had not been one of his admirers and there were some members of the Curtin Cabinet who had been anti-Blamey, waiting for an opportunity to depose him. It had been due to the staunch support of Curtin and Shedden that Sir Thomas Blamey’s services continued until 1 December 1945. But on relinquishing his high appointment, it is a sad commentary to note that he received no sign of the Government’s gratitude, not even a letter of thanks, although he was allowed to retain his well used Buick staff car worth only a few hundred pounds. After World War I, Sir Harry Chauvel the great cavalry commander, was given the use of a horse on his retirement and Monash received nothing at all. Thus did Australian politicians show their appreciation to these wartime leaders!

Towards the end of World War II, Shedden was not at all pleased by Churchill’s proposals for a Commonwealth force in the Pacific, to be formed as a “testimony of British Commonwealth unity”. One of Shedden’s main objections was an intention for the Army component of this force to be commanded by a British General who had no experience of operations against the Japanese.

Shedden interpreted this as another example of Australia’s top field commanders continuing to be unacceptable to Churchill and his colleagues. To Shedden, it indicated a British colonial attitude again. Nothing seemed to have changed since World War I when Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig steadfastly refused to have Australian officers on the staff of the British Expeditionary Force in France until as a result of repeated representations by Prime Minister Billy Hughes, Lieutenant-Colonel Vernon Sturdee (nephew of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Doveton Sturdee Bt, Royal Navy, victor of The Falkland Islands battle) became the first of a small number of AIF officers to be accepted for junior appointments on HQ, BEF.

Due to the early surrender of the Japanese, nothing came of these British proposals for a Pacific theatre Commonwealth Force but Chifley, like Curtin before him, had made it clear to MacArthur that Australia wanted at least one of its divisions included in any plans for the invasion of Japan. Perhaps it was fortuitous that the conclusion of the war terminated any further bickering between the British and Australian Governments over these matters.

Following Curtin’s lead, Chifley, Shedden and Blamey had signalled clearly that they were quite determined that Australia would not be pushed around by Churchill and later by Attlee. For these debates, Shedden was making most of the bullets which Chifley, helped by Evatt and Beasley (Minister for Defence), was more than willing to fire.

Japanese Surrender and BCOF

After General MacArthur had decided that the formal surrender ceremony would be held in Tokyo Bay, the British authorities suggested that the Commonwealth countries each should nominate a senior officer to accompany Ad-
miraL Sir Bruce Fraser who was to represent and sign for Great Britain. As this proposition was not acceptable to the Australian Government, Shedden recommended that General Blamey be appointed as Australia's own representative. This was approved and the British Government was advised accordingly ("The Government and The People" by Hasluck, Volume II, page 597).

The next controversial issue to arise was the United Kingdom's proposal for a British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, to be structured in a manner to place Australia in an inferior role. This aroused Sheddon's ire and the Australian Government contested the proposition forcefully. Eventually agreement was won and Lieutenant-General Sir John Northcott was appointed C-in-C, BCOF. He was empowered to discuss direct with MacArthur, the final details of the Occupation Force, its composition, location, responsibilities and chain of command. The MacArthur-Northcott Agreement was signed in Tokyo on 18 December 1945.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia (JCOSA) was an organisation set up as an advisory body to include representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the four Governments concerned, namely Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand and India. The Australian Acting Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Sir Vernon Sturdee was the first Chairman of JCOSA. He was also Chairman of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Shedden always considered that the newly formed JCOSA structure provided immediate and lasting advantage for Australia. For the first time, the British Government had consented to allow its armed forces to operate under another British Commonwealth country's Government and serve under that country's appointed commander. Furthermore, it gave the Australian Government defence responsibilities as a sovereign power in the Pacific. The pre-war Singapore policy had been well and truly laid to rest. British and American authorities now began to recognise Australia as an independent nation, ready and able to stand up for her rights against all others, large or small.

All of these were matters for which Shedden had suffered and struggled at various times throughout his service in the Department of Defence. By the end of the war with Japan, many gains had been achieved by Australia, not the least of which was the unquestioned status and entitlement to be listened to attentively on defence matters by the major allied powers.

Shedden had played a most important role in reaching this plateau although consistent with his nature, he had done so very much in the background. It was to Australia's great advantage throughout this time to have had Prime Ministers Menzies, Curtin and Chifley and who did not hesitate to express strongly their reaction to any overbearing posturing or lack of consultation by Churchill, Roosevelt or Attlee. The process of attaining this position had been a long and tedious struggle. The fact that the control and operation of the British Commonwealth Force in Japan now had been vested in Australia, proved that the Australian Joint Service machinery was capable of handling any contingency, even though there were to be occasions when the UK would attempt to revert to earlier attitudes. Furthermore, the Australian Government and its defence authorities had gained the confidence to press their firm national views on Commonwealth Defence coordination and planning in the post-war years.

British Commonwealth Defence Planning After 1945

It will be recalled that Prime Minister Curtin had raised the need for British Commonwealth Defence planning and coordination during the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in May 1944. That probably was the most important matter put forward by Curtin at the meeting. He had been well briefed by an excellent paper prepared by Shedden. A key principle of Curtin's submission was that each nation had its own sovereign status which gave it the right to be consulted on all matters concerning its own defence interests. If this principle were observed, then Commonwealth planning and coordination could be of great benefit to all partners.

Leading up to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in 1946, Shedden spent much time and effort in preparing relevant position papers for Prime Minister Chifley. Characteristically, Shedden and his Defence Department staff had done a very thorough job, consequently the Prime Minister was very well briefed, as Curtin had been at the previous
meeting. Chifley was determined to demonstrate his independence and was not prepared to be overawed by anyone else in the gathering. When told that “Black tie” would be the dress for the official dinner, he stated flatly that he did not have one, and that was that. For the first time for such an occasion, the guests wore lounge suits to the function!

Amongst the decisions reached at that meeting, there was agreement to coordinate Defence planning. Australia already was doing this in discharging her responsibilities for BCOF and was keen to accept other functions in the Pacific area where Australian expertise could assist the UK and other Commonwealth nations. Also at the meeting, some progress was made in coordinating and sharing intelligence matters but these were to be organised on a more formal basis. Concurrent with Commonwealth planning, each member nation was expected to achieve a standard of self-defence to its maximum capacity within its own resources.

Chifley’s Government had authorised the establishment of a post-war Regular Army to meet the needs of Australia’s international commitment in BCOF and to maintain key units to be available for any emergency. Sturdee, supported by Shedden, had fought strongly for a Regular Army. Later, the Labour Government authorised the raising of CMF units.

Chifley deserves much credit for his interest in the Army while he was Prime Minister. Shedden and Sturdee (CGS) both spoke highly of his cooperation and understanding. The Prime Minister’s straightforward, down to earth approach pleased them both. Up to the time his Government was defeated in the 1949 election, the post-war Australian Army had much for which to thank Chifley.

To play its part effectively in Commonwealth Defence planning, the Australian Department of Defence had to be reorganised and new staff recruited to cover new commitments. As evidenced earlier, Shedden was by no means averse to recruiting experienced and qualified staff members from the Services and the private sector despite some criticism levelled at him for this by the Public Service. Amongst those recruited for civilian appointments in the Department at this time were:

- Brigadier F. O. Chilton (later Sir Frederick Chilton) initially a Controller of Joint Intelligence, then appointed to Defence Policy (Deputy Secretary).
- Colonel A. P. Fleming, Controller Joint Intelligence.
- Captain A. Storey, RAN, Joint Intelligence.
- Major-General W. Cawthorn (later Sir William Cawthorn) Joint Intelligence.
- Captain A. E. Buchanan, RAN, War Book Officer.
- Mr R. Thompson, Defence Signals
- Mr E. L. D. White, Research and Development
- Colonel J. P. Buckley, Production, Supply and Logistics.

All of the above officers were employed at Assistant Secretary level or above.

In some instances, major committee structures had to be set up to service the Joint Service machinery. For example, the Australian Joint War Production Committee (now Defence Industrial Committee) was formed in 1949 to parallel a similar organisation in the United Kingdom. This Committee functioned under a part-time Honorary Chairman, the late Sir John Storey, a well known industrialist who had accompanied Prime Minister Menzies to London in 1941 to advise on aircraft production and supply matters. He was succeeded by Sir Ian McLennan who held the position for more than 20 years. The JWPC was served by a Planning Staff, a Strategic Materials Subcommittee and a Key Industries Sub-Committee. Other high level Committees were formed for other functions of the reorganised Defence Department.

At this time, Shedden was in his element. He gave every possible encouragement to his staff to further Inter-Service and US as well as British Defence cooperation and planning. Prior to my change from the Australian Regular Army to the Defence Department, I had heard most unflattering remarks about Sir Frederick and his methods of working. It was said that he was unapproachable, kept to himself, was unreasonable, lacked compassion and ruled his staff by fear. He was alleged to have few (if any) graces and lived only for his work.

I well remember Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, then GOC Eastern Command, telling me that I was crazy to consider working for Shedden. Berryman said he would arrange with Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell that I be granted six months’ leave
without pay, so that if dissatisfied with my new position in the Defence Department, I could return to the Regular Army without loss of seniority. General Rowell confirmed this when I reported for duty in Melbourne.

Subsequently, I found that the rumoured descriptions of Shedden's characteristics had been largely exaggerated. True, he did not mix with his staff, nor did he invite any of them to his home and he did tend to intimidate those staff members who allowed themselves to be so treated. There was no doubt that his life revolved around his work, his home and the church. Little else seemed to interest him although on very rare occasions he visited the Melbourne Cricket Ground to watch some cricket or football. Archdeacon Randal Deasey, who served as Secretary of the Defence Committee when Shedden was Chairman, recalls that often when Shedden travelled overseas, he wanted to know the VFL results. He had one or two close friends but his total dedication to duty did not allow much time for social contacts. He was a member of the Athenaeum Club in Melbourne and the Peninsula Country Golf Club at Frankston but seldom played golf. He kept himself physically fit by gardening at home. His needs were modest and he never learnt to drive a motor car, although he owned one which his wife drove.

It did not take me too long to realise that Fred Shedden was a gifted, very intelligent man whose outstanding talents had been nurtured by education and wide experience. He could identify the weakness in any proposal like a flash, likewise his written defence papers were the very acme of clarity. He expected his staff to meet his demanding standards even though this was not always possible. At times, he could be devastating in his criticism. But overall, his aim which he pursued relentlessly, was for maximum efficiency and performance in his Department. I was very impressed with his knowledge of logistics and equipment policy.

From 1946 to 1949, the Honourable J. J. Dedman was Minister for Defence. He was a capable, efficient Minister but like Shedden, he had a retiring nature and never sought the limelight. Nevertheless Dedman contributed significantly to the build up of Australia's post-war forces. In fact, Chifley and his Government had good reason to be proud of the
Menzies and Shedden had worked well together during the former’s first term as Prime Minister, so they were able to start off on the best possible basis for Menzies' second term. Also the Prime Minister had a keen interest in defence matters, particularly where bilateral and multilateral planning was involved. Shedden considered that Menzies had done very well in establishing an Australian defence capability in the time that was available to him between the outbreak of the war till his Government lost office in 1941.

Following the war and by 1949, all Australian defence commitments in Japan and at home were operating very satisfactorily. BCOF was functioning well; the Long-Range Weapons Establishment was progressing impressively in conjunction with UK as a partner; the Joint Intelligence Organisation was working smoothly and Australia had become an important cog in the machine, similarly with Defence Signals; cooperation with UK in defence science was meshing closely and Australia had an important role in this sphere. These were only some of the many defence related matters which were receiving a great deal of attention, much of the initiative and formulation of policy for which bore the mark of Shedden. Under his general direction, policy, organisation, levels of communication and responsibilities were crystal clear.

While overseas in 1950, Prime Minister Menzies became convinced that there was every possibility of another world war breaking out and that Australia had no more than two years in which to prepare for such an eventuality. Consequently the Defence Preparations Act of 1951 was passed by Parliament.

This brought immediate action within the Department of Defence. Shedden directed that the War Book be revised forthwith and this kept Departments and the Services very busy until it was completed. Also, the CMF had to be strengthened greatly and a Director-General of Recruiting had to be selected. Shedden’s skill in proposing the right man for the job again came to the fore. He nominated Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Herring, Chief Justice and Lieutenant-Governor of Victoria, who was duly appointed. The Victorian State Government agreed to release Herring from his judicial duties and granted him leave of absence to perform his new role.

Some of those serving in the Defence Department at the time recalled that Blamey had been chosen for an identical appointment just before World War II. Had another international conflict arisen, perhaps Herring would have followed in Blamey’s footsteps by becoming the commander of another AIF. Shedden’s ability to plan a long way ahead was very well known to senior members of his staff.

In the event, Sir Edmund Herring rendered most distinguished service as Director-General of Recruiting.

Mobilization Requirements

Following the Menzies Government’s approval of a new Basis of Strategic Planning, the Joint War Production Committee decided to undertake a full-scale feasibility study into materiel requirements of the Services for mobilization. This involved the Services in providing statements of their respective requirements in detail, from miscellaneous items to tanks, ships and aircraft for the Order of Battle that had been designed by the Defence Committee. This proved to be a lengthy and painstaking task but the Services tackled their assignment assiduously. After review by the JWPC, the statements were forwarded to the Department of Supply and other appropriate Departments for analysis to determine those requirements which:

a. Could be provided from local production;
b. Could be met by an increase in production capacity, or by creating new capacity; and
c. Could not be met by a. or b. above and therefore would have to be obtained from overseas sources.

Manpower needed to meet the rate of production desired was calculated and the quantities of raw materials required for the programme were assessed. Based on 1951 costs, the total programme was estimated to cost more than £1,900 million. It was decided that the Material Requirements for Mobilization would be submitted to Cabinet for consideration.

Shedden decided to take me to Canberra to assist him to prepare the Cabinet submission. It was my first experience of travelling with him. I had nothing about which to complain. We stayed at the Canberra Hotel for five days and worked in the Defence Minister’s office at Parliament House.
I found Shedden to be a pleasant companion and whether in the dining room or lounge after work, he took the trouble to ensure that I met senior members of Cabinet and other VIPs. I gathered that he was popular with leading members of both the Coalition and Labour Parties because of their attitude towards him. In particular, Sir Arthur Fadden, Sir Philip McBride, Mr Arthur Calwell and Dr H. Evatt went out of their way to seek Shedden out for a friendly chat.

Normally we worked in the office until midnight and then walked back to our hotel together. Shedden's prodigious capacity for work amazed me as also did his ability to sift through numerous papers and unerringly select the most salient points. His Cabinet submissions and notes were classic examples of brevity and clarity.

He had forecast that Cabinet would not accept the Statement of Requirements without some further examination. He thought that the Government probably would appoint a leading businessman as Chairman of a Committee to review the Statement. His notes for the Defence Minister suggested that Cabinet decide to set up a Committee with Mr Frank Richardson (later Sir Frank) as Chairman to review the programme. Then when Shedden had to brief the Prime Minister, I accompanied him. When the inaugural meeting of the Committee was held, at which the Prime Minister was present, I was greatly impressed by the substance and clarity of his address and directives to the Committee. He had absorbed Shedden's prior briefing to perfection which indicated how well they teamed together.

Shedden always seemed to know which business people would be acceptable to the Government regardless of which political party was in office. Mostly, the best qualified person was nominated for the task in hand; but sometimes a friend or associate of the Prime Minister could be proposed. However, in my time in the Department, some brilliant men were given part-time honorary appointments as Chairmen of special Committees; eg. Sir John Storey, Sir Ian McLennan, Sir Edmund Herring, Sir Leslie Morshhead, Sir John Allison, Sir Alfred Kemsley and Sir Charles McGrath to mention only a few of those nominated by Sir Frederick Shedden at different times. Rarely did the Government alter Shedden's recommendations.

I doubt if any person who worked with Shedden did not gain from the experience. On the other hand he could be very difficult with some people. I know of one Major-General (a friend of mine) who worked for Shedden. Their personalities were quite incompatible, so much so that this officer kept in the drawer of his desk, a typed and signed, but undated, letter of resignation. Fortunately, the officer was selected for appointment to a senior diplomatic post by the then Minister for External Affairs, Mr R. G. Casey (later Lord Casey) so a showdown was averted.

**Chairman of the Defence Committee**

After the end of World War II, some difficulties arose for the Australian Chiefs of Staff in their relationship with Shedden, causing them to take the extraordinary step of recommending to the Government that he be appointed as Chairman of the Defence Committee. The Chiefs considered it necessary to make this move as a means of ensuring that their views once endorsed by Shedden as the Chairman, then would be presented to the Minister in the form intended by the Committee as a whole. By being thus committed to collective decisions of the Defence Committee, Shedden no longer would be in a position to inject any of his own different views which at times, he had done in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Defence.

The late Sir Vernon Sturdee, the instigator of this unusual proposal, was my source for this information.

Indisputably Shedden possessed the knowledge and experience to qualify him to perform the role of Chairman in a most effective manner. As a public servant, he was unique in this regard.

The late Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell wrote his opinion of Shedden in his book "Full Circle" (page 194) published in 1974, as follows:

"The Defence Machine"

The mechanics of the Defence Department call for some special notice since the day-to-day work of any Chief of Staff is closely connected with the department, more particularly in my own case than in that of my colleagues. The scene was dominated by a great Australian public servant, Sir Frederick Shedden, who had grown up with the defence
organisation from the end of World War I and who came to be the close adviser, and indeed the 'confidant of, a succession of Prime Ministers from Lyons through to Menzies, Fadden, Curtin and Chifley and again to Menzies. He had an unrivalled knowledge of matters associated with Commonwealth defence and he was a tireless and meticulously accurate worker. It could be said that he had a fault it was in his complete absorption in the work he was doing, leaving little time for outside activities. He had critics both at home and abroad; in the main these were Service people who couldn't match his intellect or who were jealous of his power and influence. The common criticism, and I met this more than once in London, was that he was the civilian Commander-in-Chief, but I always met this with the comment that our organisation was our own business and not theirs. I had the happiest personal relationship with Shedden and I accepted the organisation as it was laid down and was able to work with it. If that organisation, which was undoubtedly devised by Shedden, was wrong in any respect the fault was not his but was that of successive governments who approved it. And it is this aspect that deserves closer attention.

In fairness to Shedden it should be stated that his appointment as the Chairman of the Defence Committee, with the three Service Chiefs as members was made on the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff themselves and their recommendation was made ostensibly in the light of Shedden's exceptional experience. When this matter became a live issue in my time as the senior Chief of Staff we always felt that the organisation should be reviewed in the light of the experience and capability of his successor. This obviously has not been done, although for the past decade there has been a Service Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee divorced from his own Service. It may well have been that the motive of the Chiefs of Staff was to ensure Shedden's agreement to any particular proposal in the Defence Committee itself, rather than to leave him free to put his own interpretation on it to his Minister. But this is purely a matter of conjecture.

What all this comes down to is for the Government to say what kind of advice it wants. Does it want pure military advice, or does it want a proposal that has been gone over with a fine tooth comb by other civil departments? In my view, the only proper course is to leave strategy to those who are trained for it, namely the Chiefs of Staff; and then, but not before, to bring into consultation all the other authorities concerned, diplomatic, economic and financial to see to what extent, if any, the Chiefs of Staff proposals need modification. Too often an attempt was made to deal with the matter in one move by having "representatives of the civil departments concerned attend the Defence Committee meetings which resulted in the blurring of the outlines of basic strategy.

I am unaware of the procedure today, but I would guess that it is much the same as it was twenty years ago. There is certainly an independent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and I would hope that nothing has been done which would allow the Secretary of the Department of Defence to come between the Minister and the Service head on purely military matters. I do not believe for one moment that on such matters, there is any link between the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the United Kingdom and their appropriate political heads. If there remains a need for a clear definition of responsibility between the Service and Civilian heads of the three Service departments, then there is just as pressing a need for the dividing line between the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Secretary for Defence to be plainly marked. We are not likely again to have someone of the calibre and background of Sir Frederick Shedden in the latter post."

Since Rowell's prediction was recorded, vide the last sentence of the above quotation, time has proved him right. Whether there ever will be another Secretary of the Department of a quality to match Shedden's, remains to be seen. Also I endorse Sir Sydney Rowell's judgement of Shedden's critics. From personal experience, I found that such critics generally based their opinions on ignorance or they had "their own axe to grind."

Higher Appointments in the Services

The appointment of Chiefs of Staff and other senior officers in the Services are subject to approval by the Minister for Defence and in some cases by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. As all such recommendations had to be processed through the Department of Def-
ence, this gave Shedden the opportunity if he so wished, to present to the Minister his own views on the suitability of the officers nominated for various appointments.

Shedden had a long association with most of the senior uniformed officers which enabled him to appraise their ability to fit in with Joint Service staffs and the political-military interface. When he considered it necessary, he was quite prepared to exercise his influence with the Minister or even the Prime Minister if he disagreed with any recommendation submitted for approval.

I am aware of at least two instances in which he was responsible for changes being made in the selection of officers for promotion to two star rank, despite several attempts by the relevant Services to persist with their nominations. In both of these cases, Shedden’s nominees were promoted and they were successful in their later postings.

Whilst it may not have been obvious to many young officers, Shedden took a keen interest in their performance and potential for higher rank. He observed closely the work of officers serving on Joint Planning Committees and Staffs and those appointed as Secretaries of these organisations. Amongst many whose progress he followed with considerable interest in my time were Colonel J. G. N. Wilton (later General Sir John Wilton), Colonel T. J. Daly (later Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Daly), Colonel M. F. Brogan (later Lieutenant-General Sir Mervyn Brogan), Group Captain A. M. Murdoch (later Air Marshal Sir Alister Murdoch) and Captain H. Harrington (later Vice-Admiral Sir Hastings Harrington).

Sir Frederick Shedden also made a point of discussing whenever possible with anyone qualified to offer a knowledgeable opinion, the merits of middle-ranking officers. Any information he gleaned would be stored in his memory or recorded in his comprehensive filing system occupied several strong rooms in A Block, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne.

International Conflicts and Treaties

The early 1950s brought armed conflict to Korea, Malaya and Indo China in the Pacific region and there were problems also in the Middle East. Any one of these could have escalated into a major war. Two did.

Shedden always seemed to be at his best in periods of emergency and stress. From 1937 when he was first appointed Secretary of the Defence Department until his retirement in 1956, there were never any genuinely slack periods. He thrived under pressure and luckily he enjoyed good health, apart from one serious bout of pneumonia during World War II and his persistent insomnia — which he overcome by working through his wakeful nights. His ability to sustain such a high level of performance throughout so many years of worry and urgent decision making, indicated enormous resources of mental and physical strength, fortitude and stamina.

In June 1950 the Korean War erupted with the North Korean invasion of South Korea. The Australian Government decided to provide troops to serve with a United Nations force. This basically was to be an infantry brigade which was commanded in turn by Brigadiers John Wilton and Tom Daly, two of Australia’s great soldiers.

During this conflict the Secretary, his Department of Defence and the Services were functioning again under wartime conditions. Shedden as Chairman of the Defence Committee and adviser to the Government was working under tremendous pressure. JCOSA seemed to be the ideal organisation to control the British Commonwealth efforts in this action, but once again Churchill wanted to set up his own channel of control direct to Japan. Shedden and Rowell combined well to counter this although Churchill still insisted on having a personal representative in the theatre. This arrangement complicated things at times for Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Robertson, Commander-in-Chief, BCOF.

At the same time, there were four other areas of major defence interest to Australia. These were:

a. The defence of the Middle East;
b. The defence of Malaya;
c. The ANZUS Pact; and
d. The SEATO Pact.

The Middle East

Defence of the Middle East in the 1950s again became a focus for serious British concern. In 1951 a meeting was called in London to discuss defence arrangements for the zone. The Australian delegation was led by the Minister for Defence, the highly trusted and able Sir Philip McBride who was accompanied
by Sir Frederick Shedden and Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell, Chief of the General Staff. Other member nations of the British Commonwealth also were represented at a high level.

Progress was made in designing a strategy for the defence of the area. Agreement was reached on the scale of forces the various Governments would be prepared to contribute if necessary and logistic arrangements were discussed, including contingency plans for equipment stockpiling in the region. Although McBride was a most competent Minister, it was Shedden's experience and knowledge that were used to the fullest extent in these deliberations.

This Commonwealth planning proved to be a valuable exercise but the plans were never implemented. The Middle East situation was to change dramatically, culminating in President Nasser seizing the Suez Canal and expelling the British from Egypt in 1956.

Malaya

The need to protect Malaya against external aggression gave rise to the formation in 1949 of the ANZAM Treaty which was designed to link the defence capabilities of Australia, New Zealand and Britain with Malaya's in the event that any such combined force may be required to operate in that area.

Defence planning under the terms of this treaty attained advanced stages of agreement on the likely threat, member nations' force contributions and the logistic support needed for various contingency situations. Shedden's personal involvement in all of this planning was considerable.

However, when Malaya gained independence and Britain reduced her forces east of Suez to token strengths only, these developments virtually cancelled out the effectiveness of ANZAM as a result of which strenuous efforts were made to provide alternative defence measures to replace it.

ANZUS

The ANZUS Pact was signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. There is no necessity to itemise the terms of this pact as they are widely known in the Australian defence arena. Furthermore, the provisions and interpretations of Articles of the Pact have been a contentious source of debate for political parties and others in this country almost since the pact was signed.

Suffice it to say that the ANZUS Pact became the cornerstone of Australian defence and foreign policy from the time it came into existence. It remains so today.

Shedden regarded this pact as the most important development in Australian defence in the post-war years. He devoted himself to seeking full acceptance of ANZUS and used every means at his disposal to ensure that the United States understood very clearly the extent to which Australia had placed her trust and reliance on the formally agreed terms and application of the ANZUS Pact. He stressed the need to remind USA continually of this fact.

Meetings of the ANZUS Council have been held regularly, the venues for which usually have rotated between the partners' capital cities. Australia has played her part in meeting the conditions of the Pact, as has been demonstrated unequivocally many times. Examples of this have been the establishment of American communication bases, overflight of B52 aircraft, use of naval facilities and joint exercises.

SEATO

The South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed on 8 September 1954 by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States of America. It was ratified by the Australian Government on 18 November 1954.

Article IV of the Treaty states:
1. Each party recognises that aggression by armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. It is understood that no action on the territory of any state designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or
with the consent of the government concerned.

The formulation of the SEATO Treaty was the last major international defence planning project to occupy Shedden's expertise and his wealth of experience. Australia's role in the formation and the continued work of the organisation was a very significant one. Many, including Shedden regarded SEATO as the Far East equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. At least, that was the hope.

Brigadier John Wilton, Director of Military Operations and Plans at Army Headquarters, Melbourne, in which appointment he coordinated all Army intelligence, operations and planning, was to play an important part in SEATO planning. As the senior Australian planner, he attended most of the meetings in that capacity and Council meetings as principal adviser to the Australian Minister and his Military Adviser (the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee). Later Wilton was promoted to the rank of Major-General and appointed Chief of the Military Planning Office SEATO in Bangkok which was an acknowledgement in SEATO circles of his great ability. Shedden was delighted about Wilton's selection for the top SEATO planning appointment as he thought highly of Wilton's balance and his capability.

The frequency of ANZUS and SEATO meetings in addition to the normal day-to-day work of the Defence Department kept Shedden extremely busy, but this was to his liking. He was feeling a sense of reward for all of his long-range planning and the effort he had invested over a long period of time to achieve these goals.

Concurrently major activities were under way in South Australia at Woomera and Salisbury. These came under the general policy orbit of the Defence Research and Development Policy Committee and through that to the Defence Committee, thus they also demanded much of Shedden's attention.

Final Years as Secretary, Department of Defence

From the end of 1953, the threat of another global war began to recede. Although the alarms of 1951 had been proved wrong, they served a useful purpose in the two years that had been regarded as a time of warning. Much valuable defence planning and preparation to meet possible emergencies had been achieved in that period.

Whilst British military strength east of Suez was now negligible, Australia had powerful friends and allies in the region, notably USA. Shedden's advocacy for high priority to be accorded to the ANZUS Pact had received strong support, especially by Sir Sydney Rowell.

However, from late 1953 Shedden's influence with Prime Minister Menzies began to show signs of decline. His wartime dominance had aroused jealousies and some ill feeling among certain of his peers. Besides, some of the younger astute, ambitious and in most cases able civilian officers were beginning to stake their claims for appointment to the upper echelons of the Public Service. There were a few in some departments who set about this aim in rather ruthless fashion. These trends did not auger well for older permanent heads at that time such as Sir Frederick Shedden.

It was an established fact that Menzies did not always relish being served by any subordinate who possessed greater knowledge than he did on particular matters. Also, perhaps he reasoned that the time had arrived for some changes to be made in the Defence organisation leadership.

The Prime Minister decided first to retire the Secretary of the Department of the Army, Mr Frank R. Sinclair, on the grounds of ill health. Sinclair did not agree with this, nevertheless he had to go, because Menzies "did not want him to die at the desk". (Mr Sinclair died in 1965).

Then Menzies informed Shedden that the Government wanted the history of Australian defence policy to be researched and recorded comprehensively for posterity. Recognising Sir Frederick's depth of knowledge of so many aspects of this complex subject and his personal involvement in most significant events, the Government wished him to compile this official history. Every assistance was offered including office accommodation at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, clerical assistance, staff car and driver and any other support he might require. In addition, he would continue on full salary and allowances until his 65th birthday, while Shedden was placed in a position of being unable to refuse these inducements, he did have a keen and genuine interest in undertaking the assignment.
Rumours of Shedden’s pending retirement which had been circulating for a while, inevitably stimulated speculation in his Department about who would succeed him. The popular favourite was Deputy Secretary, Brigadier F. O. Chilton (later Sir Frederick Chilton, head of Repatriation Department) who was known to be held in high regard by Shedden and other senior officers in the Public Service and the Armed Forces. He had a brilliant war record having been awarded a DSO and bar (Berryman rated him as one of the best fighting Brigadiers of the 2nd AIF; and many believed he deserved another bar to his DSO for his service in Greece). He was a very capable administrator, loyal, well liked and always a perfect gentleman. Some years earlier, Shedden had sent him to attend the Imperial Defence College but part way through his course, Shedden recalled him from London to replace Mr P. E. Coleman the senior Assistant Secretary of the Department who had died. Chilton’s sudden recall to Australia and his subsequent promotion to Deputy Secretary rank, together with all of his other qualities, clearly placed him as front runner in the minds of those speculators who were interested in who the new Secretary might be.

It was Mr E. W. Hicks (later Sir Edwin Hicks) who was appointed as Secretary, Department of Defence to follow Shedden. He had been a very successful permanent head of the Department of Air from 1951 to 1956 and he was favoured by Menzies. Hicks brought to the Department something it had lacked during the Shedden years. Although initially not a defence specialist of the Shedden mould, he was a superb organiser and manager of people. In his first few weeks, he took the trouble to introduce himself to every member of his staff in their own offices and thereafter made a habit of dropping in unannounced from time to time. His interest in the staff and his personal contact were like a breath of fresh air. For the first time ever, a staff Christmas party was held in the Department and one of the bars was set up in the Secretary’s office.

Ted Hicks was also accepted well by the Services. He got on splendidly with Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wells and Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger both of whom served at different times as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He had advanced ideas on integration of the Services and together with Sir Leslie Morshead, he proposed a first class scheme to implement the concept but he received no encouragement for this from the Menzies Government. Many years later when an almost similar scheme was adopted, Hicks should have been given some credit for his pioneering foresight. Although when he took over the Department of Defence, he did not have the extensive background knowledge of defence history, planning, strategy and higher organisation that has been possessed by Shedden (no one else ever did!) he proved to be a very effective and efficient Secretary in his term from 1956 to 1968.

The thoroughness of Shedden’s preparation and grooming for the top Public Service appointment in Defence in Australia, has never been repeated for any of his successors. Many retired senior officers both military and civil, cannot understand why successive Governments have not taken steps to ensure that contenders for this important post are given appropriate career management such as attendance at the Royal College of Defence Studies (previously the Imperial Defence College) or an equivalent institution and experience of serving with the higher defence machinery, to prepare them properly for the most senior level defence responsibilities.

As has been shown, Sir Frederick Shedden, the most outstanding Secretary ever of the Defence Department, had been exceptionally well equipped for the role he was called on to perform and which he did so admirably through the war years and post-war.

During his tenure as permanent head of the Department of Defence, Shedden served under the following Ministers:

- Prime Minister J. A. Lyons
- Prime Minister R. G. Menzies (twice)
- Prime Minister Sir Arthur Fadden
- Prime Minister J. Curtin
- Prime Minister J. B. Chifley
- Rt Hon J. A. Beasley
- Rt Hon F. M. Forde
- Hon. J. J. Dedman
- Hon. E. J. Harrison
- Hon. Sir Philip McBride
- Hon. G. A. Street
- Hon. H. V. C. Thorby

No other departmental permanent head gave his superiors greater loyalty or better service
than Shedden. In most cases he was the "power behind the throne" and the Ministers knew it.

The History of Australian Defence Policy

As promised by the Prime Minister, Sir Frederick Shedden did receive every possible assistance for his project of compiling the history of defence policy in Australia. He was joined at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne by Mr F. A. McLaughlin and Mr H. L. (Bertie) Port who served as his research assistants. Both had been Assistant Secretaries in the Defence Department before their retirement. It was a measure of their loyalty and absolute devotion to Shedden that they worked on for several years, helping him without any payment except for a pittance to cover fares and luncheon expenses. Fred McLaughlin was the most discreet officer I ever met. He had been Private Secretary to Prime Ministers Bruce, Curtin and Chifley and he was known as "The Prince of Private Secretaries". Bert Port had been a finance expert for at least two decades during which it was his responsibility to draft and present the Defence Programme annually. These two dedicated gentlemen worked with Shedden until his death. Like him, they worked from 10 am to 6 pm five days every week.

Sir Frederick began to write up the history in early 1957. His intention was to produce it in four volumes:

- Volume I 1901-1939
- Volume II 1939-1941
- Volume III 1941-1945
- Volume IV 1945-1955

In 1958 he travelled to the United States and the United Kingdom to research historical material concerning Australian defence. He was made most welcome in both countries and in the course of his research he received cooperation and advice far beyond his expectations. On one occasion he mentioned to me that in an interview with Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, he was told that in Montgomery's opinion the essential ingredient for any good author to include in a book he hoped the public might read was "a number of cats amongst the pigeons!"

Shedden was pleased to discover that his name and deeds were still remembered in London and in Washington. As Sir Sydney Rowell wrote, he had become known in some London circles in World War II as the "Civilian Commander-in-Chief" and while that was remembered by some, succeeding personalities in British higher defence appointments had great respect for him being well aware of his record of service and the reputation he had earned.

Sir Frederick seemed to enjoy working on the history at Victoria Barracks in the environment that was so familiar to him. He had worked there from 1910 until 1971 except for a few years in London, and he loved the Barracks atmosphere.

In contrast to his self imposed isolation in the years he was Secretary, he was delighted in his retirement, to receive visits by some of his friends and former colleagues including Ministers, his successors Sir Edwin Hicks and Sir Henry Bland and other senior officers who called on him in his office. Whenever he could, he liked to yarn with other old-timers he had known at the Barracks. One of these was Mr George Cobbin the barber who allocated extra time for Sir Frederick's hairdressing appointments, just so they could chat more leisurely.

In those years, only on one occasion did I see Sir Frederick become upset when he had a visitor. That was when a later Secretary of his old Department insensitively informed him that before the history was published, the draft may have to be scrutinised to ensure that it contained no security breaches or diplomatically delicate matters. Shedden, the master of discretion, security and integrity was not at all amused. Neither were ex-members of the Shedden team when they heard of the episode.

Progress on the compilation of the history was painfully slow. It dragged on year after year and occasionally became something of a joke. Some people thought it never would be published. Questions were asked in Parliament about the progress being made and when the work would be completed, but this made little impression on the author. He carried on at his own pace.

Hoping that the Australian National University Press would publish the book, Shedden sent some drafts to the Director but after a protracted period of discussions, ANUP and Sir Frederick could not agree on the form and content of the intended publication. Later a private publisher was consulted but this approach also was unfruitful.

By early 1971 Volumes I, II and III virtually had been completed but not much work had
been done on Volume IV covering the years 1945 to 1955. By this time, Shedden already had decided that if he could not persuade a publishing firm to produce the book, he would finance the publication himself.

In his words "the story simply had to be hold."

That same year it became evident that Sir Frederick was beginning to fail in health. When suffering from what proved to be his final illness, he ensured that news of this was kept secret from all except his family and his old friend McLaughlin. Eventually when his condition became known to members of his former staff, many offers of help were extended but as always, Shedden’s private life continued to be totally segregated from the official sphere of the Department.

He died on 8 July 1971.

As I was then the senior Department of Defence officer serving in Melbourne, the death was reported to me by Mr Fred McLaughlin. On Lady Shedden’s behalf he informed me that no press statement would be necessary, that the funeral would be private only and by request, no flowers were to be sent. When I expressed regret that these arrangements provided no opportunity for the Government, the Minister or the Department to pay their last respects publicly, McLaughlin told me that this was what Sir Frederick wanted and his widow had asked that those wishes be observed.

Both in life and in death therefore, Sir Frederick Shedden’s personal life was kept strictly apart from his Public Service duties and connections. It was his own firm decision to deny any type of official tribute for his long and meritorious service. All throughout his working life he had never been one to seek any form of what he considered to be self aggrandisement. But if ever a man deserved recognition, he did.

Soon after the funeral the Secretary did arrange for a statement to be issued by the Prime Minister. It referred to Shedden’s recent death and praised the very distinguished service this great Australian had given for this country, particularly at the time of the nation’s survival in its period of gravest danger in World War II.

Very typically, Sir Frederick had let it be known that following his death, like the “old soldier” his final wish was simply to fade away.

The “Parish Messenger” published by the Frank Paton Memorial Church in Deepdene, recorded in the August 1971 issue:

"By the death of Frederick George Shedden on 8th July, the congregation has lost a member who had been associated with us for about 15 years. A retiring man, Sir Frederick was regularly in his pew at evening worship . . . his faith was very dear to him. He was a gracious man. With his strength he had a gentleness. He had the abiding virtues of kindliness, integrity, generosity of mind and heart and steadfast loyalty to the highest values. We remember him with thanksgiving — a good servant of his country and greatest in his humility and Christian discipleship."

Other Tributes

The following extracts describe clearly the value which some prominent leaders placed on Sir Frederick Shedden’s contribution to Australia’s defence in his lifetime:

Sir Paul Hasluck, author of “Diplomatic Witness” and an outstanding historian of World War II:

“...I have considerable admiration for Shedden as one of the great Australian public servants . . . there is no doubt that on the civilian side, he was one of the most influential men in the development of Australian defence policy . . . efficiency in method and the depth of experience on subject matter made Shedden a major figure on the conduct of the war, especially after Curtin became Prime Minister and even more so when the appointment of MacArthur as Supreme Commander in the South West Pacific was followed in the Australian sphere by a close personal relationship between MacArthur and Curtin, with Shedden as the arranger and facilitator and sometimes the prompter, of their collaboration”.

Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell, author of “Full Circle”:

"... a great Australian public servant, Sir Frederick Shedden . . . had an unrivalled knowledge of matters associated with Commonwealth defence . . . We are not likely again to have someone of the calibre and background of Sir Frederick . . .”

Brigadier Sir Frederick Chilton, one time Deputy Secretary, Department of Defence and Chairman of the Repatriation Commission 1958-1970, in a letter to Colonel J. P. Buckley:
“Sir Robert Garran and Sir Frederick Shedden must surely rank as Australia’s most outstanding public servants, the first as the architect and interpreter of the constitution, the other for his unique role and contribution during Australia’s darkest hour . . . I know that Menzies respected and trusted him . . .”

Prime Minister Mr John Curtin. In “High Command” (page 223) the author David Horner quoted Curtin’s words as follows:

“. . . Curtin told Shedden that ‘but for the assistance secured (from him) personally he could not have carried on’ . . .”

Later Sir Frederick (with some modesty and slight emotion) told me of this statement made by Curtin in December 1942.

General Douglas MacArthur wrote the following letter to Prime Minister Curtin on 5 February 1943 (extracted from page 251 of Horner’s book “High Command”):

“As the first great phase of our campaign to protect Australia from invasion draws to a close, I cannot abstain from expressing my appreciation of the splendid contribution to our success by the Secretary of the Defence Council, Mr Shedden.

While not in any sense serving under my command, his duties have been so identified therewith that I feel that I owe him a deep obligation for the superior manner in which he has beneficially influenced many momentous problems and materially contributed to their successful conclusion.

Unfortunately I have not the power to decorate civilians or I would unhesitatingly cite him for an appropriate reward. I hope you will not regard me as presumptuous, although I realise I go beyond normal limitations, if I recommend him to your consideration for such recognition.

But he belongs to that great class of civil servants who work in comparative obscurity but whose value cannot be overestimated . . .”

Note: On Curtin’s recommendation in 1943, Shedden was created a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG).

Lieutenant-General Sir Vernon Sturdee who had known and worked closely with Shedden from 1934 until 1950, described him as:

“. . . the right man, in the right place at the right time!”

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Kyneton “Guardian” — Newspaper files.


Sir Sydney Rowell — “Full Circle”.

John Hetherington — “Blamey Controversial Soldier”.

John Robertson — “Australia at War 1939-1945”.

Lloyd Ross — “John Curtin”.

Norman Lee — “John Curtin, Saviour of Australia”.

David Horner — “High Command”, “Crisis of Command” and “The Commanders”.

Air Marshal Sir George Jones — Interview.

Colonel Sir Alfred Kemsley — Advice and discussions.

Sir Frederick Chilton — Correspondence, advice and encouragement.

Hon Sir Alistair Adam — Correspondence and advice.

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The author served in the Australian Regular Army until 1949 when he became an Assistant Secretary and served later as First Assistant Secretary, Department of Defence until he retired in 1974.

His previous contributions to the Defence Force Journal have included articles on Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Herring and Lieutenant-General Sir Vernon Sturdee. He has written book reviews for this Journal and other publications such as the RSL “Mufti”.
In support of our friends, the foreign instructor and student

The Training System must enable us to bridge any cultural gaps.

By: Major Bruce Copeland BA BEdSt RAAEC

Introduction

Training of foreign personnel has long been a part of Australian foreign policy, particularly those from the Asian and Pacific region.

This Training has been carried out both in Australia and overseas. For many years now Australian personnel have played a continuing role in Papua New Guinea.

This effort has been supported within the Australian Army by the Army Training System. In this article, it will be contended that Australian Training personnel must leave nothing to chance in implementation of Training of/by foreign personnel. The probability of long term success of a course package will be enhanced if thorough development of Programmed/Mastery Learning is made integral to Course Development.

Aim

The aim of this article is to identify a range of difficulties that may be faced by foreign students and Instructors involved in Training programmes prepared by Australian personnel.

Background

This article has been prepared in conjunction with seven (7) articles that have appeared in the Defence Force Journal. These are:

- A Programme in Problem Solving’ DFJ No 14 Jan/Feb 79;
- ‘Network Analysis and the Training Officer’ DFJ No 24 Nov/Dec 80;
- ‘A Framework for Education and Training’ DFJ No 32 Jan/Feb 82;
- ‘A Module in Fault Finding within Technical and Administrative Systems’, DFJ No 34 May/Jun 82;
- ‘Think Systems’ DFJ No 41 Jul/Aug 83;
- ‘A Systems Approach to Mastery Learning’ DFJ No 44 Jan/Feb 84; and
- ‘Fault Points in the Training Systems’ DFJ No 46 May/June 84.

Each of these articles has been written in support of Training Systems in general and the Army Training System in particular.

Each has been written to promote the importance of Mastery Learning within the Training System.

The point may need to be made that Mastery Learning exercises do not necessarily imply a set instructional approach. Using Mastery exercises, an Instructor may promote single student mastery, role playing, group discussion and the lecturette.

The important feature of Master Learning is that lessons become problem/activity oriented.

Such exercises would than give maximal support to Australian Instructors and those from client Third World nations.

A Programme in Problem Solving

The first article in the series above was written to summarize a Programme in Problem Solving (PIPS), prepared at the Joint Services College of Papua New Guinea in 1976-77.

The article was written in 1978 to summarize what the writer considered to be a unique experience in Course Design and Development.

The Programme was prepared in the form of sequences of problem exercises and suggested solutions to promote basic problem solving among student personnel.
The view was taken that all activity on all courses would involve Decision Making and Problem Solving.

It was recognized that too many Australian Instructors were involved in giving lectures and testing recall of knowledge by objective questions rather than addressing the necessity to promote skills by student mastery.

A number of factors were taken into account in the preparation of PIPS. These were:
- Activities were based on the component skills in Decision Making.
- Knowledge was tested only in its application to the solution of problems.
- Exercises were categorized into sequences in terms of the component skills involved.
- Student activity was maximized.
- Instructor explanation was minimized.
- Emphasis was placed on the students’ ability to make decisions in practical routine situations.
- A revision/reinforcement component was built into the sequences of exercises.
- Exercises and solutions were documented carefully to support the effectiveness of future national Instructors.

Cultural Gap

Australian Training personnel work well in foreign countries if they are prepared to accept that they are living within another culture and have to make allowances for differences in outlook.

It is important for Australian personnel to recognize that differences in outlook and experience will exist between them and national students and Instructors.

All people are products of their cultures and their outlooks are influenced by the range of factors which include:
- levels of technology within the nation;
- skills developed within the national education system;
- cultural practices as influenced by religion and custom;
- availability of information through the national media; and
- day-to-day experience.

Language

All Australian personnel speak English as a primary working language. Many service members in client nations also have a high level of skill in English.

As spoken by Australians, the language consists of a wide range of idioms and modes of organization of ideas.

In our language, there is the luxury of abstract terms to give subtle differences in meaning to words and concepts.

Often, idioms presuppose an understanding of particular concepts and processes shortened to a single cue word.

There is the story of the Asian domestic servant who was told to “pluck a fowl and put it in the refrigerator”. He was not to know that the term “pluck” did not mean simply to remove the feathers, and to place a live fowl in the refrigerator.

Obviously, the domestic servant did not normally prepare a chicken in this way. Instead he had probably suspended judgement and done as he was instructed.

Many cross-cultural error situations undoubtedly originate in vague instructions and suspended judgement.

In an instructional situation, such misunderstandings may be common and cumulative. The word “transistor”, for example, may mean a small component or a type of radio.

Technical jargon spoken in English, gives the foreign student a double difficulty.

He/she must understand both the technical concept and the explanation.

Choice of Words

Many foreign students will find difficulty in comprehension of abstract words both written or oral. This will again depend on the degree of exposure of the student to the English language and Australian idiom.

Yet, it is possible for Australian personnel to control their choice of words to maximize understanding by foreign students.

In the description of a technical process, there is a finite range of concrete words that may be used.

A ship’s hydraulic system may be explained using the following words:
- lift, lower, neutral,
- cylinder, piston, control box, pump, pipes, tank,
- handle, turn, left, right,
- starts, stops, directs,
- oil, along, inside, into,
- push, go, forward, back,
- down, up, return, and
- arm, filter, rust.
Thus the basic concept of the Hydraulic System may be explained in 30-50 simple words. It is not necessary for the Instructor to use words such as "apparatus", "elevate", "circulate" and "eject", in developing student understanding of the basic concept.

Foreign students will vary in their understanding of technical terms. On those courses where skill in the use of technical terms is mandatory, it may be necessary for the Training personnel to develop a language module to be produced separately and given to foreign students prior to and concurrently with the course to be undertaken.

Memorization
For a foreign student faced with an extensive list of technical terms, his/her major effort on course may be directed towards memorizing names of components.

With prior preparation, Australian Training personnel could produce teaching material with appropriate annotations in the target language of the students. Such small courtesies would give support, in a number of ways, to foreign students for whom English is a second language.

A Mixture of Students
Foreign students may face many problems if placed in a class with Australian students.

The Instructor must choose between the interests of the Australian students and foreign students in terms of:
• the level of language used,
• choice of common skills and knowledge,
• pace of the course, and
• speed of delivery in oral presentation.

Politeness
A sense of politeness of many people in South East Asia will prevent them from gaining maximum benefit from an Australian course for the following reasons:
• To ask questions may be seen to imply criticism; and
• As representatives of their country, students may be loath to offer suggestions.

Thus, even a course critique may not reveal problems that foreign students experienced on an Australian course.

The Training System
The Training System provides the framework for Course Design and Development. Often, the Instructor is left the task of translating objectives into instructional practice.

This can be seen to be a critical weakness in the Training System. Yet, the problem is increased when Training involves foreign students and instructors.

At present, the Army Training System places little emphasis on the practical skills involved in the management of Mastery Learning.

This provides problems when the students are Australian. The problem is increased when foreign students are involved, and a cultural gap intervenes between the Instructor and student.

The Training System will give maximal support to foreign Instructors if Mastery Learning is developed.

Further support will be provided if Australian Training personnel are selected in terms of:
• practical expertise;
• knowledge of cultural factors relevant to implementation of Training;
• innate respect for people of other races; and
• skill in the target language.

Foreign Instructors
If Australian personnel are involved in support of foreign Instructors, then there needs to be 'give and take' in the conduct of Training.

If foreign Instructors have received their training in Australia, then any imperfections in Training may well be passed on.

Shortcomings in presentation of Training may be "muddled through" by Australian personnel with varying degrees of success.
However, in terms of a foreign aid commitment, Australian personnel need to promote the highest possible standards in Training technology appropriate to client Third World nations.

The Pidgin Course
For personnel on posting to Papua New Guinea, attendance on the Melanesian Pidgin course is most worthwhile. The course is conducted at the RAAF School of Languages at Point Cook.

Students learn the Pidgin language within everyday and job related contexts. In doing so, they practise the skills of speaking in logical, concrete and sequential language patterns. Skills of language are promoted through extensive sequences of Mastery Learning exercise.

The course is designed to incorporate aspects of course design and development that are appropriate to Training in Australia and Papua New Guinea.

Students experience learning a language thoroughly and with a minimum of both tension and fear of failure.

In course critiques, there is often the constructive comment that the course uses a strategy that students have not experienced before in the Defence Force.

Towards the end of the course, the students receive a hand-out as follows:

"On this course, you have been given the opportunity to make the same error 10-20 times before you got it right. Please give the PNG students the same opportunity to master skills."

Conclusion
It must not be denied that the Training System is the only framework that can be used to promote effective Training. Given that the framework is sound, then we must bring our expertise to bear to close any gaps and enrich the strategy already used.

There is much that we can do to support Training in nations to which Australia give foreign aid.

Our professional effort must be directed in such a way to involve foreign Instructors to support them in making use of course packages that are produced.

Course packages that are not usable, will end up in waste paper baskets or unit archives, after we depart.

Recommendations
The following recommendations are made in support of the foreign student and Instructor.

• that appropriately qualified and experienced Training Officers be tasked to prepare comprehensive sequences in Mastery Learning to support the Training Objectives;

• that support to foreign Instructors be extended to gaining expertise in Management of Mastery Learning; and

• that all Australian Training their personnel attend a language/familiarization course appropriate to a given client nation.

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Major Copeland has made several contributions to the Defence Force Journal. His present interest lies in promoting the Training System and techniques in support of the Training Systems.

As Lecturer in Charge of the Neo Melanesian Pidgin Department of the RAAF School of Languages, he has been involved for a number of years in supporting the Training role of Australian personnel on posting to Papua New Guinea.
'Whether we like it or not, the army today lives, moves and has its being in a scientific environment, and one which is becoming more so every year. I believe that an officer today, whatever his arm, cannot but increase his efficiency — and that means his ability to lead men in battle as well as to equip and prepare them for battle — if he makes a real effort to try to understand what is going on in the world around him.'


'The higher we soar on the wings of science, the worse our feet seem to get entangled in the wires.'

New Yorker Magazine, 7 February 1931

Introduction

Every new item of defence equipment entering service today is more efficient, more expensive and more complex than that which it replaces. We in the armed services should be extremely grateful for the improved efficiency and very conscious of the astronomic costs involved but most of all we should be deeply concerned about the increased complexity for we, the servicemen, must operate and maintain these new equipments. Advanced electronics and all the other benefits of space age technology are the products of inventive scientists, skilled technicians and well-equipped laboratories. When the new equipment and systems are safely installed by the manufacturers in our ships, aircraft and vehicles, will we be able to keep them functioning efficiently? Where will the operators and technicians come from?

It is true that there are many bright young men in the services today who, with the necessary training, could take on these new duties but these are also the same men earmarked by their ability for promotion to the next generation of senior ranks. There are also officers capable of understanding the new technologies but, if they are taken away from general duties to be given specialized training and then given technical posts, it might cause a shortage of leadership at unit and headquarters levels. There must also be a limit to the quantity of high quality manpower that can be attracted into the services. The future requirement for high calibre men to be engineers, technicians and operators would appear therefore to reduce the number and quality of men available to become commanders and leaders.

The future for the services looks fraught with problems caused by the new technology. Leadership standards may have to fall. Officers and servicemen may have to undergo obligatory technical training. Recruits without technical aptitude may have to be rejected and even experienced officers and servicemen who cannot adapt may have to be discharged. The requirement for these men to be replaced could lead to a greater reliance on women. The technical branches may have to be greatly expanded and, with technical equipment becoming the battle winning factor, command decisions may be dictated by the technical
SERVICEMEN OF THE FUTURE

services. The Staff College may become a nursery for technocrats.

This article discusses whether the armed forces might have a shortage of educated and responsible personnel to fill the technical posts and to be the leaders of the future. It also looks at what manpower measures could be taken to overcome such a shortage.

The Revolution in Defence Technology

The most significant military development of the last two decades has undoubtedly been the miniaturization of electronics. The same technology that reduced a 1950s' computer, costing thousands of pounds and filling a large room, to the familiar pocket calculator of today costing mere pounds has had a similar impact on weaponry and defence systems. An early model of the Vought A-7 attack aircraft had in it, in the mid-sixties, a black box, the size of a shoe-box, weighing several pounds which produced the pilot's head-up display. It could hold 48,000 bits of information. Today one standard memory chip such as the Intel 4008, which is smaller than a postage stamp, carries 64,000 bits. The consequence of this miniaturization is that an aircraft or any other weapon system can now carry hundreds of sub-systems incorporating a host of sensors, control and displays. And the micro-electronic revolution is far from being over. Micro-chips with electron paths of about one micron are now being made by Marconi Avionics in an effort to produce a micro-processor that can carry out 500 million individual electronic operations in one second.

As well as digital information and control systems, the micro-chip has made possible rapid advances in related fields. Compact signal processing has allowed the development of precision guided munitions, frequency hopping radios and planner array radars. Even equipment as commonplace as the internal combustion engine can now have its every cycle monitored and optimally controlled by a micro-processor.

Materials technology has also developed rapidly during the course of the micro-electronic revolution. New materials have been discovered and new technology has been developed for old materials. Carbon fibres and plastics have reduced aircraft weights, ceramics have increased engine running temperatures and titanium alloys have increased the strength of helicopter blades permitting faster aircraft speeds. New photo- and thermo-electric sensing materials have been developed making night vision equipment practical for military use. New steel composites such as Chobham armour have provided a quantum leap in ballistic protection. Other earlier inventions, previously considered too fragile or intricate for military use, have now entered service in large numbers and in many roles. Lasers are now integral parts of many weapons and the gas turbine is becoming a practical alternative power plant in ships and even land vehicles, as in the American Abrams tank. Mechanical handling and automation are being introduced throughout the services to reduce manpower and speed up operations. Simple examples are auto-loaders for tank guns and the completely unmanned gun turrets on warships.

All of these improvements incorporate advanced technology which must be treated with respect and understanding. A willing amateur repairman is often no longer an asset as he can cause extensive damage to an equipment by simply not appreciating the technical implications of his actions. Something as seemingly indestructible as aluminium armour can be rendered ineffective by an untrained welder attempting an apparently simple repair.

The Need for Technical Training

The advances in technology have made the internal workings of new weapons systems and equipment very complex and beyond the comprehension of most people. On the other hand these modern devices invariably incorporate great strides forward in automation and the new equipment is often easier and simpler to operate than the old. At first glance a battlefield artillery computer appears to be a formidable complicated machine requiring a highly trained specialist for its operation. In fact its operation is simple and easily learnt. The computer itself guides the operator through the various stages and of course relieves him of all the lengthy calculations. What was a ‘gunner black art’ needing mathematical skill and experience is now a relatively simple task requiring only a limited ability with numbers and an short familiarization course. The computer has relieved gunners of the need for long technical training in the use of formulae and tables for gun prediction. Similarly the introduction of solid state Clans-
man radios considerably reduced the training time for a basic signaller compared to the time required for training on the old valve technology Larkspur sets.

Not only has operation become a simpler affair but paradoxically so has repair. The majority of modern electronic equipment has been designed for ease of repair and testing. The Clansman range of radios has built-in test equipment (BITE) for the operator and automatic test equipment (ATE) for the repair technician. A comprehensive knowledge of the functioning of the set is unnecessary. The operator knows that the radio is malfunctioning by pressing a button and obtaining a 'no go' indication from the BITE. The repair technician connects the set to the ATE and by following a simple test programme is informed where the fault lies. Repair is then usually an easy matter of replacing the faulty electronic module. Repair of the individual boards is, however, often very difficult and requires a high degree of technical training. To minimize this problem the services usually send such components back to the manufacturers for repair or backload them to service base workshops for repair by civilian employees.

Another example of the attempt to relieve the load on service technicians is the current effort to design 'maintainability' into new equipment. The McDonnell Douglas Phantom F-4 needs 49 maintenance man-hours per flight-hour. The new McDonnell Douglas/Northrop F-18, by careful design, needs only 18. This was achieved by simplifying the aircraft technician's tasks. For example, all equipment is located only one-deep under the skin of the aircraft; all the skin panels use the same fasteners; one single panel in the wheel-well houses all the gauges for the various fluids and all auxiliary equipment is built into the airframe. Training time as well as maintenance time is much reduced by this modern design concept.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that new technology always simplifies an operator's task. The great improvement produced in one field often demands that extra equipment must be added to a system to take maximum advantage and in this way the complete system grows ever more complex. The Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) fitted to Chieftain tanks makes a first round hit relatively easy for even the newest and least technically minded recruit. The long training and months of range practice necessary to become an expert tank gunner are no longer required. IFCS is, however, only a calculating and display system. To be effective it needs input from both the operator and from other electronic systems within the tank. The tank crewman must understand the functions and interrelationship of all the systems in the tank. He must be able to monitor and up-date information, spot malfunctions and take any necessary action. It is not the individual components that require technical expertise, any one of which is comparatively simple to operate, it is the fact that a modern weapon system is a multiplicity of sub-systems which combine in an often complex and confusing manner. Any soldier can use a Clansman radio after a few minutes instruction but to install it and its ancillaries in a vehicle requires an intelligent man with technical training and expertise.

Repair is also not necessarily as simple as pressing a button and then changing an electronic module. The hardware is now often but a small, cheap part of many systems. The most vital and expensive part is frequently becoming the software and it is for the 'repair' and modification of the software that an engineer or technician needs to be of the highest calibre. As military equipment becomes more and more specialized and complex it is becoming more usual that the equipment is trialled developed and modified after entering service. So few and specialized are some of these systems that it is essential that the expertise for design, repair and maintenance be held within the services. In both these circumstances highly competent, technical, military staff are necessary.

Even from before the First World War the armed services have had their technical specialists. The technical knowledge and ability of those men has in general kept pace with advances in technology and even today, because of automation and modular replacement, the arms and services which have traditionally operated technical equipment have had little problem in recruiting and training men of sufficient calibre to operate and maintain them. One result of the micro-electronic revolution, however, is that those arms and services which were always very non-technical now find that they have more and more complex equipment.
The biggest problem is undoubtedly faced by the Army which in the past has equipped the soldier only with the simplest equipment necessary to live and fight. Sailors and airmen have always had a close association with large, expensive and complicated machinery. The most complicated equipment with which the average soldier would come into contact was his rifle. The demands of modern warfare and the advances in defence systems now mean that every soldier is dependent on complex equipment to perform his task. In BAOR there is nearly one radio set for every three soldiers. Every soldier rides to war in a vehicle. Even the infantryman has a vehicle and in the near future with the introduction of the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) will have an equipment of great complexity costing hundreds of thousands of pounds. The advent of the guided missile to the battlefield now brings the problems of optics and electronics to the antitank and air defence gunners who in the recent past had only iron sights with which to contend.

Despite the obvious proliferation of electronic and other advanced systems it does not necessarily follow that the new operators, and a large proportion of servicemen will become operators of some sort, will require technical training above and beyond that given to their predecessors. Most of the new equipment will be easy to operate but, more importantly, the new generation of servicemen has grown up in a world of video games, home computers and Citizens' Band (CB) radio. They are not afraid of electronics and have often already developed the necessary skills to operate advanced equipment with speed and accuracy. The operation of technical equipment is often considered an art, demanding aptitude but not necessarily technical ability. Radar and sonar operators can develop incredible powers of detection and identification which are unrelated to their technical knowledge of the equipment that they operate. But such skills are wasted unless the operator can react to his observations. The safety of a warship or airfield can depend on just one such operator. He must have the intelligence to understand the implications of his finding and the initiative to react quickly.

The Need for Leadership

With computers and other electronic systems relieving men of the need to use their brains for calculations and routine thinking there is a temptation to believe that there is no longer a requirement for human decisions and the leaders to make those decisions. In fact the need for high quality leaders becomes more important. John Laffin has written 'Despite scientific and technological improvements, by a curious paradoxical reaction machine warfare has reached the stage where leadership in the real sense is paramount. Speed has reached such a climactic pitch that leaders of all ranks will have to make decisions and implement them in minutes or seconds'. Wellington and Napoleon could stamp their leadership on an army by being visible to all on the battlefield and by moving in person to any section of the battle requiring their personal attention. A century later when whole populations were mobilized and battlefields were many miles wide the importance of leadership appeared to decline. Generals, commanding from rear positions, never saw their frontline troops and had little opportunity to influence the battle after written orders had been sent. In the retreat to Dunkirk, with generals of the calibre of Gort, Brooke, Alexander and Montgomery, there was no shortage of leadership among the allies. It was the inability of the Allied commanders to communicate and see the battle that rendered their leadership useless in the final outcome. The advent of helicopters and good electronic communications in recent years however has given back to commanders the ability to be seen and to meet their subordinates face to face. Leadership has again resumed its overriding importance.

Not only is leadership now important at high command level, but at levels. Future weapon systems and equipment will be high value targets. They will have to be able to operate independently and in physical isolation if they are to survive on the battlefield. The new Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the next generation of self-propelled guns will have the ability to fire independently from individual positions as opposed to centralized battery positions. Although radio communications will be available (but possibly ineffective in an electronic warfare environment), on the spot leadership and initiative of the highest order will be required of the NCOs in such isolated commands.
If leadership is still essential to make the most effective use of advanced systems on the battlefield it will also be vital in the procurement and support organizations. The latest technology must be brought into service in the requisite numbers and in quick time if the combat troops are to hope to defeat an opponent equipped the latest weaponry. Equipment must be rapidly brought back into service after breakdown or damage. This puts very real demands of leadership onto the procurers, suppliers and maintainers.

The complexity and cost of modern equipment causes the involvement of many interested parties throughout an equipment’s service life. The development and management of service equipment therefore is inevitably done by committee. If future equipment is ever to leave the drawing board, the armed services must provide the necessary leadership in the system. The problems of leadership in the forces are often greatly eased by the rank structure and the uniformity of purpose of their members. Equipment committees will often consist of servicemen, civil servants and civilian industrialists who may well be at cross purposes. The successful control and direction of such a committee requires high level leadership ability and the importance of this leadership to the success of the Services grows with the cost and complexity of succeeding systems.

The gap in knowledge between the technically qualified and the average decision-maker widens everyday as ever more arcane technologies are developed. This raises the question of whether, in a technical environment such as the armed services, any person without a technical understanding can effectively lead. A 1947 study of leadership concluded that, ‘... leaders in a particular field need and tend to possess ... superior general or technical competence in the area. General intelligence does not seem to be the answer.’ If the military are to retain control of the direction of future defence systems’ development, it is essential that the officers in the defence ministry understand the capabilities and limitations of the technologies being pursued in the defence research and development fields. It is also no longer appropriate that any officer should reach high rank without a good knowledge of the functioning of the equipment with which future wars will be won or lost.

Present Selection and Training in the Armed Forces

It would appear from the requirements for officers and NCOs outlined above that the armed forces do not need leaders and technicians as separate categories but rather that they require men who individually have both leadership and technical ability, the balance of these qualities in an individual depending on his precise employment. At this point it is pertinent to consider how the armed forces currently recruit and select manpower.

The three services, with few exceptions, select their officers on the basis of leadership. The selection methods are in essence those developed by the War Office Selection Boards in 1942 and, although modern equipment has progressed beyond all recognition of that used in the Second World War, that technical revolution is not reflected in the present selection requirements. A minimum education standard is demanded but in the science field this is seldom more than O level elementary mathematics. Soldiers, sailors and airmen are, on the contrary, usually selected for their aptitude, especially for technical trades. Leadership is not specifically tested at the recruitment stage although intelligence and initiative are deemed desirable qualities. By these selection methods the services do not, however, presuppose that leadership and technical ability are totally innate. Officers during their basic training and NCOs at a later stage on cadre courses undergo leadership training. Similarly both officers and other ranks in non-technical branches may receive technical training. There is somewhere in the selection procedure, however, an assumption that some people are better able to become leaders and others to be technically trained, while admitting that leadership can be taught and even the non-technical can be given a grounding in technical subjects.

The total lack of any requirement for an officer to be technically apt is most surprising. Since 1980/81 more defence funds have been spent on equipment than on personnel and in 1982/83 46.4% of the total budget, or 6,545 million pounds, was expended on equipment. With the proportion of money going to equipment increasing every year it would appear that fewer and fewer men will be controlling more and more equipment and officers will have less likelihood of leading men than of managing machines.
The final result of the present selection procedure is that officers are good leaders but not necessarily technically well versed and NCOs can be technically very competent but lacking in leadership. The selection and training systems of the services have been adequate up to now because enough officers with technical ability have emerged naturally from the basically leader oriented officer corps and sufficient technician NCOs have become good leaders. This was inevitable as a proportion of men are bound to be capable of performing well in both roles. Such people are of course of high quality and very desirable to both the military and civil communities.

There will be an ever increasing demand for people with leadership and technical knowledge at the design, management and command levels within the services. Some specialist equipment will also require such ability at the lower repair and maintenance levels. Although not requiring great technical expertise or leadership at the operating level, many modern and future defence systems will be so crucial to winning the battle that the operators need to be extremely responsible and capable of understanding the significance of their equipment’s role in the larger defence machine. In short the operators must be well educated and technically aware.

With such stringent demands for future manpower at officer, NCO and even operator level, the armed services may have increasing problems recruiting and selecting enough men. They will have to examine possible new sources, new ways of attracting recruits, more appropriate selection methods and improve training.

**Attracting the High Quality Recruit**

Since the end of national service, the British armed forces have had to compete with the civilian sector for manpower. Recruitment has traditionally been good during times of high unemployment and, as it is now considered unlikely that unemployment will ever return to the relatively low figures of the 1970s, the armed forces will obviously benefit in the future from having a large pool of men from which they can select the best. At present the unemployed comprises a large proportion of well educated people, including university graduates. The problem for the armed forces is whether they can attract enough educated persons and whether these people will be suitable for jobs demanding technical ability and leadership.

In the past most well-educated, responsible people have only entered the forces with commissions. Entering the ranks has not been considered suitable for someone with good educational qualifications. Enlistment in the forces has also failed to give as rewarding financial benefits as employment in other fields. The prospect of long term unemployment may well change this attitude as might the continued existence of the good image of the forces at present held by the public. If the services are also to obtain their share of qualified and potential engineers and technicians, however, it will ultimately be pay and conditions of service that will attract them because it is in these employments that competition from industry is most fierce. In recent years the British Government, schools and universities have all become aware of the necessity to encourage science and engineering at all levels. In fifteen years time, when the first generation of pupils to grow up with Mrs Thatcher’s micro-computers in all primary schools enter the job market, there should be a healthy pool of technically trained young people. But dynamic, responsible engineers and technicians are highly valued in an ever more technological society and they will be able to obtain lucrative employment in almost any walk of life.

It appears inevitable that more attractive pay will have to be offered by the services if they wish to compete for high calibre men and this immediately takes the problem out of the hands of the service chiefs and puts it into those of their paymasters, the government. A devious way around the problem is for the higher pay to be disguised by rapidly promoting the high quality servicemen into higher pay brackets. This is done at present by all three services but only to a modest degree. The drawback of this system is that it produces a top heavy rank structure with men holding higher rank than that for which their experience and leadership would normally qualify them. This has proved bad for the morale of normally promoted servicemen and detrimental to the efficiency of the services when operations or emergencies have imposed great demands on the leadership of junior and senior NCOs.

Another solution to the problem is the creation of a specialist technical branch with
a completely separate pay and promotion system. Such specialists have existed in the services at officer level for many years. They include doctors, chaplains, lawyers and other professional men who have obtained their qualifications as civilians and had practical experience before joining the forces. They are given a minimum of military and leadership training lasting only a few weeks. Their pay scales are subject to separate negotiation and they compete for promotion only with their brother officers in the same profession. With such a branch for technically qualified officers, and even NCOs, it would be possible to attract recruits from civilian life in sufficient quantity to fill all the technical posts of the future with the added advantage of being able to select those with specific skills or experience in industry. This technical branch would also be able to recruit manpower over a large age bracket giving recruits direct entry into the rank for which their qualifications and experience fit them. The problem posed by this technical branch compared to the established specialist branches is of course one of the scale and importance. The technical branch would be very large and would grow larger and of more importance in the future. Increased pay for such a branch would be a significant slice of the total defence spending. The technical branch officers would have limited military experience which would prevent their employment in all-arms posts. This would mean that they would be unable to hold command posts and therefore their vital knowledge would be lost at the levels at which it is important that a commander should have a good understanding of technical matters. The division of the services along these lines would also engender damaging rivalries and inhibit the cross-fertilization of ideas between the users and the technical personnel.

One largely untapped source of potentially skilled and educated personnel for the services is women. Females are not generally technically oriented but they are usually conscientious and capable of operating sophisticated machinery. The American armed forces now employ many women in technical and responsible positions. They fill posts in all units other than front line combat units being among other things pilots, aircraft mechanics, signallers and computer operators. In the British army, women with engineering degrees have now been commissioned into both the Royal Engineers and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

As technology makes war less a close contact struggle between combatants and more of a contest between equipment operators, the employment of women in all but potentially very dangerous positions becomes very much more feasible.

There are many arguments against the use of women in the forces which need not be discussed here. One advantage in the past was that they provided cheaper labour than men. This is no longer so and if they are employed to do exactly the same job done by a man the present social climate in Britain would insist that they were paid the same wage. The employment of women opens up a large source of responsible recruits although there is no financial advantage in their employment.

Finally there is a source of potential technically able leaders who are at present passed over by the selection system. Because during officer selection leadership is the prime requirement, many applicants with good education and, more importantly, with technical ability, are rejected because of inadequate leadership ability. Rather than teach technology to those who are selected on leadership ability, it might be easier to teach leadership to those who already have technical knowledge. At the serviceman level there also seems to be potential for more aptitude assessment to identify those young men who could learn to be leaders, technicians and operators.

Whatever the background and ability of the service recruit it is apparent that most, if not all, will require training in leadership, technical subjects or both if they are to take a useful part in the armed forces.

### Technical Training in the Armed Forces

Technical training is very costly. It invariably requires expensive laboratories and equipment. The staffing requirement is also formidable. For example, at the Royal Military College of Science the student to staff ratio was 1:1.16 in the year 1981/82. It is inevitable therefore that the services will try and economize where possible on technical training. Despite this, any officer with the ability is encouraged to obtain a scientific or engineering degree. Such graduates obviously tend to come from the technical branches and the percentage of graduates is often very high, for example, in the
Royal Engineers over 70% of captains have degrees while in the engineering branches of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force non-graduates are rare. Those officers in the non-technical branches of the forces are also encouraged to obtain degrees but inevitably few are in technical disciplines. While it must be allowed that the forces need some officers qualified in such subjects as languages it cannot be denied that many degree subjects are of no direct benefit to the forces and only of marginal benefit to the officer.

The technical education available to officers, other than that gained on degree studies, is small. Technical training in specific areas is given to a proportion of officers who can expect to work closely with certain equipment or material, for example, the long armour and the long petroleum courses. But the only education that an officer can expect to receive on the broad subject of military technology is from the small module given on the Regular Commission Course at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and from the period spent at the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS) on the Army Staff Course (ASC). About one-third of army officers go on the ASC and of these about one-third again do the 10 month course, the remainder doing only 10 weeks. Therefore only about one-ninth of regular majors and above have anything more than a passing acquaintance with military technology and most of these officers already have a background of technical training. The 1982 Army List shows that no full generals had received technical staff training, only one of 12 lieutenant generals had and only 5 out of 65 major generals. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force do not have the equivalent of RMCS. Being in general more closely involved in day to day contact with major equipment they rely on the more technical nature of their initial training and their experience to give them an overall knowledge of military technology. At the weapons staff level the expertise is provided by close liaison between the user and the technical branches.

In the United States armed forces each of the services has an academy for training its officer cadets. At West Point the course is 4 years long and the cadet graduates with a general engineering degree suitably tailored for the military. Further technical training is received at the various arms schools and then any further studies, for example for a master’s degree, are carried out at civilian universities. This system is good for giving all officers a basic technical education and permitting those from the technical branches to go on and receive more extensive education in narrower fields. It does, however, constitute a long time taken out of the early stages of an officer’s career and is costly.

A more ruthless insistence that all officers must receive instruction in military technology may be necessary in the future when so much of an officer’s time will be spent intimately with defence equipment. A degree in military technology might be deemed a prerequisite for promotion. For the non-technical a composite degree made up of military studies and some elements of more liberal studies could be devised. For the technical officers, a common first year on general military technology would be followed by 2 or 3 years reading engineering with a specialization. The Army already has its own university in the RMCS. While there might be problems getting the courses recognized by civilian authorities, the services should resist any demands that they should necessarily provide civilian qualifications. If the services provide the education they should be able to expect that the results will be of direct benefit to them. Curbs on defence spending mean that the services can no longer spend money on providing trained manpower for industry and the unemployment situation should attract officer recruits without the inducement of offering in-service degrees in the subject of the officer’s choice.

An experiment in the British Army to increase the number of technically oriented officers entering the Army was the establishment of Welbeck College. Welbeck is a sixth form college where boys study for A levels in science subjects. The experiment was successful and, while at present its boys usually go into the technical branches, there is scope to expand the systems to provide a source of officers for the non-technical branches: officers who would have at least a science background on which an understanding of military technology could be built.

In contrast to officers, other ranks are only trained in trades that are of direct use to the forces. There is however a tendency to mould the trade training to the equivalent civilian
training and to even give civilian qualifications. This overtraining is costly and wasteful of manpower and results in unnecessarily highly trained technicians. Economies in this field would permit a short basic introductory course to be given to all servicemen on the subject of military equipment and technology. This course could also be used as an aptitude assessment period to find those men who would be good at operating and possibly maintaining technical equipment.

As military equipment becomes more specialized and more divorced from that used in civilian life, servicemen, as well as officers, can no longer expect to leave the forces with trade qualifications that will immediately give them a civilian job. The services will have to try to retain all their technically trained personnel up to the normal retiring age if they are to continue to operate and maintain the increasingly complex defence equipment. To this end premature voluntary retirement will have to be strongly discouraged. Fortunately again the unemployment situation will assist in this necessary retention of experienced personnel. In 1978-9 a total of 7,869 personnel trained in mechanical, electrical or civil engineering skills left the services. In 1981-2 the figure was 4,855. For those with training in communications the figure dropped steadily from 2,537 to 1,296 over the same period.

In order to obtain the number of technicians that they need, the services have for a long time run apprentice training schools and these will have to continue into the future with increased numbers of students, more concentration on military requirements and less emphasis on providing civilian qualifications. At present junior leader regiments provide the Army with young soldiers who have been given a taste of leadership and responsibility. All three services in the future will need a source of such young men who are not only responsible but have a fair education and a grounding in science and simple engineering. To this end another stream of training is required. It could attach itself to the apprentice colleges or to the junior leader system but would produce a result half way between the two. A separate school would add to training costs and give an unnecessary mystique to the training. In reality all servicemen should be capable of the background knowledge to operate any equipment given to combat troops.

In summary, the services must continue to give high level specialist technical training to those officers and men who are intimately concerned with the management and maintenance of equipment but, more importantly, they should ensure that all officers are given a basic education in military technology and that a growing number of servicemen are given the background training to make them competent and responsible operators of military equipment with an understanding of the role that the equipment plays in the military organization.

Conclusions

The technological revolution has produced a plethora of electronic systems and complex equipment which are going to affect the work of all servicemen, with even the most junior man having close everyday contact with advanced technology. The very specialized technical aspects will undoubtedly continue to be looked after by the highly trained experts, both officers and men, in the technical branches. The extra burden caused by quantity and sophistication will be backloaded to civilian industry, this being made possible by the advances in modular design and replacement.

At the operator level there will be an increasing demand for educated, responsible and technically aware servicemen but at the same time there will be no diminution in the need for leadership at junior NCO level. All officers will need to have a much greater understanding of technology if they are to employ the new systems effectively, to understand their potential and limitations and to plan economically for their future replacements.

Even with the growing emphasis on technical training in schools and the continued large numbers of unemployed, it is unlikely that the armed forces will be able to recruit enough men with the education, responsible attitude and technical background to operate future equipment unless they take positive steps to ensure their availability in the future. Similarly, enough technical officers will not be forthcoming unless the services can become more attractive to suitable candidates or can provide the necessary in-service education.

The solution cannot be found in higher pay even if this is disguised by the creation of technical specialists on separate pay scales. A possible solution is a change in selection pro-
at the serviceman level the acceptable standard of intelligence and education will have to be raised to reflect the higher levels of knowledge and responsibility needed in an advanced technological environment. There will no longer be a place for the unintelligent servicemen in any branch of the services and the general employment situation in Britain should make this policy workable for the foreseeable future.

There is scope for the increased use of women who have for a long time filled responsible jobs in all three services operating sophisticated equipment, often more efficiently than men. The physical limitations of women and the element of danger working with combat units must, however, restrict the number of women that the services can employ.

However the potential pool of responsible and technically aware recruits is increased, the services will need to expand their present leadership and technical training programmes. Specifically, all officers should be given at least one year’s education in military technology, possibly as part of a military degree course. Young servicemen who are not potentially high grade technicians or suitable for rapid promotion but who have a good basic education should be given special training in the rudiments of science, engineering and leadership so that they can become the educated and responsible operators of tomorrow’s military equipment.

Advanced technology defence systems can be two-edged weapons. They have to be working efficiently and controlled correctly if they are to be an improvement on simpler systems. Unless those who are managing them understand the underlying technology, they may well be misapplied, liable to failure at the critical time and a terrible waste of scarce defence funds. Unless the operators are familiar with their equipment and responsible enough to understand all the implications of their operation, the armed forces will have an open flank laid bare by the advances in technology that they had sought to harness for the better defence of the country.

Editor’s Note: This article was awarded third prize in the Peter Stuckey Mitchell Commonwealth Armies Competition, 1983.

NOTES
4. Ibid. Table 6.9.
5. Ibid. Table 4.14.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries.


THE PATHS I'VE TROD' by Elizabeth Burchill, Spectrum Publications Pty Ltd and obtainable from the author, 5 Lithgow Ave, Blackburn, Vic 3130 $10 (autographed).

Review by Lt Col D.J. Roylance (RL)

Elizabeth Burchill was a nurse of some distinction and an author of note, this book being her fifth. But whereas her earlier books dealt with particular experiences in her nursing career, "The Paths I've Trod" is an autobiographical work which spans the whole spectrum of a very busy life.

For the paths trod by Elizabeth Burchill are many and interesting from the time she entered the nursing profession in Melbourne until she left to enter the academic world and become an accomplished author and broadcaster.

She showed herself to be an adventurous soul. The confines of nursing in a capital city were not long for her. She was soon in the Australian interior with the Inland Mission and her story of this time is told with a fascination which leaves the reader unable to put the volume down.

After more training in Melbourne Miss Burchill heads for London, from there she finds herself in Spain towards the end of the Civil War and her experiences there among the most touching of her story.

She is next found as a summer relief nurse as part of Grenfell's Medical Mission on the Labrador coast.

Returning to Melbourne in 1939 she enlists in the 1st unit of the 2nd Australian General Hospital, 2nd AIF, and it is this next section of the story that is of most interest to military readers. She travels to the Middle East in the troopship Y4 which, under its original name of the SS Stratheden, and returned her to Australia from her world travels. She works in military hospitals in the Middle East. She finishes the war in Army Hospitals in Victoria. After discharge she takes up work as a radio announcer in Shepparton and starts her writing. But her nursing career is not over and her path wanders north again through Darwin, Thursday Island and New Guinea. Later she travels to Africa, and the United States.

All-in-all an absorbing read.

CHANGI PHOTOGRAPHER — GEORGE ASPINALL'S RECORD OF CAPTIVITY, by Tim Bowden, Published jointly by A.B.C. Enterprises and William Collins Pty Ltd. Price $16.95.

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, O.B.E., E.D.

This is one of the most moving books I have read for some considerable time. It tells the story about an extremely courageous young soldier who joined the A.I.F. at age 17 years and was captured in Singapore in 1941.

During his period as a prisoner of war this fearless teenaged soldier kept a photographic record of many historical incidents in Singapore, the Selarang Barracks incident, the infamous Burma railway, Cholera Hill and many places in between.

If his camera had been detected by the Japanese it would have meant instant death. Towards the end of the war it became too dangerous to keep the camera; but Aspinall was able to hide the photographs and many of them are published in this excellent book.

I don't intend to elaborate on the inhuman treatment of the prisoners — much has been written about this aspect in the past; but it does no harm to reflect on what happened in South East Asia in 1941-45.

I must mention the magnificent work of the Medical Officers, who without drugs or proper instruments and under the most impossible hygienic conditions were able to give some relief to the soldiers. Amputation had to be done on rough benches without anaesthesia.

The book does not indicate whether NX37745 H. G. Aspinall was ever granted an award for his meritorious and extremely courageous service. If not, why not?

Aspinall and Bowden and the publishers have produced a first class book on the war in South East Asia and the appalling and inhuman conditions under which the A.I.F. fought and experienced as prisoners in Asia.

Hopefully, this book will be most successful — it's a story which had to be told — how Aspinall was able to get film, chemicals to develop the films and more importantly safe places to develop his work reads like a first class spy thriller.
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