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RAAF apprentices graduating parade
Fault Points

Dear Sir,

Major Copeland's article, 'Fault Points In The Training Systems', contains several flaws. From the outset, the author's writing style obscures his intent and defies clear understanding by the reader.

The aim of the article expressed an intention to establish fault points in the training system. The body of the article centres on a singular 'contended weak link', mastery learning.

The concepts which appear to underpin mastery learning are already practised by applying the steps of the ATS model. A soldier reaches job standard by achieving various training objectives. Lessons are based on having a student learn by moving from known to unknown; easy to difficult; and concrete to abstract concepts. Explanation, demonstration, practice and testing, complete the learning cycle. Mastery learning is little more than 'new wine in old bottles'.

The author then digresses to advise that computers be left in their boxes if not geared to training programmes which promote decision-making skills. There is a plethora of research to show that CBT is an efficient means by which to gain a wide range of skills (and attitudes). Lessons which include drill, practice, tutorial, simulation, gaming and modelling, are all suitable for CBT application and do not necessarily include decision-making skills.

Clever words which purport to embrace new training concepts that are already practised are not required. Major Copeland's article fails to offer anything which would enhance the systems approach to efficient and effecting training.

P. R. HUDSON
Lieutenant Colonel

Authors Reply

Dear Sir,

On being informed that a letter of criticism had been received at your office, I was jubilant. At last, after many years, a response to an article of mine had been made to the Defence Force Journal.

Even criticism is better than no response at all. At least, such input would provide the basis for further discussion.

However, I find it difficult to hide my disappointment at the standard of comment by LtCol P. Hudson. This is not the sort of letter that I had hoped to receive.

His argument falls short in so many ways. The officer did not produce a credible argument because he:

- commented on this article without indicating awareness of background concepts in previous articles;
- assumed that the Defence Force Journal caters only to the needs of the Australian Army;
- failed to recognize that the Army Training System is only one among many;
- argued that the present article offers no worthwhile insights whatsoever;
- did not address the recommendations made in the article;
- did not indicate other professional articles in the DFJ that make similar points on Mastery Learning and the needs of the Instructor;
- appeared to assume that the Army Training System has been developed to the extent that no further input is necessary;
- argued from the "we're doing that already" position;
- did not indicate understanding of the intricacies involved in the implementation of Mastery Learning;
- did not recognize the importance of the application of component skills of Decision Making to the preparation of the range of "tutorial, simulation, gaming and modelling" activities;
- did not appear to benefit from any of the articles that referred to categorizing of skills according to system types;
- misread the basic point of the article and failed to understand that the "contended weak link" may be traced to a number of fault points within the Training System leading to the inability of personnel to
maximize support for the Instructor (who was not even mentioned in the letter of LtCol Hudson).

- failed to understand the basic criticism in the article as explained in terms of "new wine in old bottles".
- did not even address the issue of the appropriateness of the present Army Training System to Training in an age of New Technology;
- did not acknowledge his own professional standpoint — psychology; and
- did not indicate recognition of the professional experience of the writer in the field of Education.

I am always willing to discuss any shortcomings of this work. In many ways, I am my own worst critic.

LtCol P. Hudson is entitled to his view. Yet, the view expressed is contrary to the wider body of knowledge within the field of Education. He is unaware of the interest that these articles have generated from time to time both within and without the Defence Force.

The present article, like those before it, is not the work of an "ivory tower practitioner" but that of a person who has spent much of his professional life not far removed from the classroom. I hope that LTCOL P. Hudson can make the same claim.

BRUCE COPELAND
Mayor

The Next Step

Dear Sir,

I would like to take this opportunity to compliment Lieutenant Colonel Peter Dunn on his article titled "The Next Step in Australia's Defence Evolution" (DFJ No. 46). As an ex-Service officer I have often been critical of the three single Services allowing their anachronistic parochialisms to inhibit their development as a cohesive and efficient Defence Force. I have also pondered on the question of how the CDF would command any joint force without a properly formed joint headquarters. It seems to me that Peter Dunn's article outlines a logical and efficient solution to both problems.

I would however like to take issue with one aspect, namely the inclusion of the Natural Disasters Organisation (NDO) in such a structure.

NDO was established in 1974 as a part of a range of initiatives taken by the Federal Government to improve Australia's capability to cope with both man-made and natural disasters. Its primary "operational" role is the coordination of total national Government efforts in major disasters with those of State and local voluntary organisations (Cabinet Minute No. 4 of 26 Feb 74). This, along with its other roles of counter disaster planning, public education and the oversight of the Australian Counter Disaster College, necessitate patterns and types of day-to-day working relationships that are critical to its primary operational role and that could not be effectively accomplished within the framework suggested by the article. It is for this reason that Cabinet decided that "the Director-General will be removed from the normal chain of military command and will have direct access to the Minister through the Secretary (Press release by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence — 18 Feb 74). As long as the NDO is to remain in the Defence Department, and there are a number of sound reasons why it should be elsewhere, e.g. PM and C or environment, then it must remain an outrider organisation to effectively fulfil its function.

As the Deputy Prime Minister said when introducing the new NDO concept to a meeting of State Ministers in June 1974, "I would not want to destroy a system that has operated so very well indeed ... I hope that we can convince people that merely because it (NDO) is associated with the Department of Defence, ... will not mean that it is going to be directed by the Service Chiefs ... not at all ... they would not want to do so and I would not permit it."

I do agree however that the performance of the organisation would probably be enhanced if the Director-General position was filled by a civilian as opposed to a serviceman. This is not meant to be derogatory to current or past Directors-General, for all of them have made their own personal contributions to the NDO. However, I sincerely believe that there is little doubt that a civilian with a longer tenure of appointment and appropriate knowledge of the political nuances of Commonwealth/State relationships would be better suited to the task.

NOEL ALLWRIGHT
Senior Training Officer
Australian Counter Disaster College
(continued on page 10)
BUT WHEN CAN THE ARMY RESERVES BE USED ???

By Major M. G. Smith, Royal Australian Infantry

Introduction

In 1974 the Millar Report recommended to Government that the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) — now the Australian Army Reserve (ARES) — be reorganised and developed as part of the 'total force'. Since 1974 the development of Army force structures and capabilities has occurred with this in mind. The Permanent Military Forces (PMF) and the ARES are now mutually supporting elements of a total force — an Army whose declared functions and roles apply equally to both the PMF and the ARES.

In line with the concept of total force, the Army's capabilities have been endorsed by (among other things) a significant expansion in ARES numbers, by the integration of certain PMF/ARES units, and by the raising of predominantly ARES regional force units for national surveillance purposes. In addition, the need for the Army to have a viable expansion base, well structured and capable of effecting rapid force expansion, is now recognised as an important function of the ARES component of the total force.

This enhancement of Army's capabilities has, within some sections of Army, been accompanied by increasing concern as to the availability and employability of the ARES in operational situations short of defence emergency or war.

This article does not concern itself with the use of the ARES in situations of domestic violence (or 'aid to the civil power'). Such situations are covered adequately in Sections 61 and 119 of the Constitution and Section 51 of the Defence Act. This issue has been addressed adequately in other forums. The failure to distinguish between using the ARES in situations of domestic violence (e.g. Bowral 1978) and other operational contingencies, has long clouded the debate about the use of the ARES.

Legislative Issues

An assessment of the effect of current legislation on the operational use of the ARES cannot be made without, first, understanding the legal composition of the Army, and second, understanding the legal situations and processes by which the ARES can be made available for operational purposes.

Composition of the Army

The defence power of the Commonwealth flows from the Constitution, but it is the Defence Act which provides the legislative authority for the operational use of the various elements of the Army. Under the authority of the Statute Law Revision Act 1981, proclaimed by Parliament in 1983, the Army consists of the PMF and the ARES each of which is constituted as follows:

**PMF**
- the Australian Regular Army (ARA);
- the Regular Army Supplement (RAS); and
- the Regular Army Emergency Reserve (RAER).

**ARES**
- the Active ARES, and
- the Inactive ARES.
ARES Availability

In discussing the availability of the ARES for operational employment, two terms need to be clarified. These are:

- **Time of War.** Time of war means any time during which a state of war actually exists. This includes the time between the issue of a proclamation of the existence of war, or of danger thereof, and the issue of a proclamation declaring that the war or the danger thereof, declared in the first proclamation, no longer exists.

- **Time of Defence Emergency.** Time of defence emergency means the period between the proclamation declaring that a state of defence emergency exists in relation to Australia, and the publication of a proclamation that a state of defence emergency no longer exists.

Under the Defence Act, currently only the PMF can be mobilized in situations short of defence emergency. The ARA and RAS may be operationally used as required. The RAER may be called-out quickly by the Government promulgating a notice in the Gazette—a simple method which makes the RAER readily available in situations short of defence emergency (or war).

Unlike the PMF, the ARES does not become available for operational employment unless and until a time of war or time of defence emergency is proclaimed. Once proclaimed, all or part of the ARES may be called out for service by a proclamation which states the reason for calling-out those forces. In situations short of defence emergency (or war), ARES members may volunteer, and may be accepted, for full-time duty. However, it would be impossible to predict the numbers of ARES personnel who would volunteer for operational service, and it could not be guaranteed that complete ARES units, or even the ARES component of composite units, would be available. The reliance on ARES volunteers in situations short of defence emergency (or war) is, therefore, an unacceptable basis for planning manpower availability and for determining force structure.

Under current legislation, AMR 486 allows the CGS to increase the training obligation of the ARES even though a time of defence emergency (or war) has not been proclaimed. This is useful legislation for preparing the ARES for operational employment, but it does not make them available: only the proclamation of defence emergency (or war) can currently do this. Should unforeseen situations arise where ARES elements, as part of the total force, are required quickly, the application of AMR 486 will be of little practical use.

A question often raised in relation to the use of the ARES is whether or not the ARES might be used in situations short of defence emergency, but in anticipation of such a declaration? In a most comprehensive paper titled 'Some Legal Aspects of Defence Force Planning' by Anthony Bergin (Lecturer in Politics at the Royal Australian Naval College, Jervis Bay), the author points out that 'according to case law . . . the power to pass legislation under the defence power will only come into existence when the threat materialises'. Bergin goes on to explain how this presents a problem, particularly for low level conflicts which may arise at short notice, and for which it will be difficult to prove the need for defence emergency until after the situation has developed fully. It would therefore be quite wrong for force development to occur on the assumption, or even the hope, that ARES units or assets could be made available in situations short of defence emergency in anticipation of such a declaration being made.

The current procedures governing the call-out of the ARES are part of a legal process whereby the nation could, if necessary, be mobilized progressively by stages. These stages would not have to be implemented consecutively, nor would they preclude the introduction of some form of national service either instead of, or as well as, these stages.

- **Stage 1.** Introduced when the Government calls-out the RAER for continuous, full-time military service by notice in the Gazette.
- **Stage 2.** Introduced by a proclamation declaring that a time of defence emergency or war exists and during which all or part of the ARES may be called-out for continuous, full-time military service.
- **Stage 3.** Introduced by a proclamation declaring the existence of war or the danger thereof, or by the actual outbreak of war. In such situations all male persons (except those who are exempt) who have resided in Australia for six months, are subjects, and are between 18 and 60 years of age, become liable for progressive call-up in accordance with Section 60 of the Defence Act.
The appropriateness of this system of progressive call-out is dependent largely on two factors. First, that the PMF (including the RAER) is capable of handling to conclusion those situations which fall short of defence emergency. And, second, that the nature of modern conflict will allow government time to recognise those situations which the PMF cannot handle to conclusion, and to quickly proclaim a time of defence emergency (or war) to make the ARES available.

In relation to the first factor it would be unlikely that the PMF could currently handle to conclusion all situations which are likely to fall short of a defence emergency. Experience in Korea, Malaya and Vietnam indicate that situations short of defence emergency (or war) can arise which are beyond the capability of the existing PMF. Furthermore, although the RAER may be made available quickly to support the ARA (and/or RAS), this response is nullified by the current low strength and capability of the RAER which makes that force (RAER) an almost ineffective asset. Under current legislation, therefore, if additional forces are required in situations short of defence emergency (or war), these can only be raised through increased voluntary enlistment and/or some form of national service. The ARES element of the total force, even though in existence, could not be used in such situations because defence emergency would not have been proclaimed by Government.

The second factor, which relates to the nature of modern conflict, brings into question the viability of the total force concept: a concept which has guided Army force structure development into the 1980s and beyond.

THE ARES AND THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

Modern Conflict and the ARES

National survival and well-being can no longer be characterised by the single contrasting conditions of 'peace' or 'war'. National independence, sovereignty and defence now rely upon a complex and indeterminate number of interdependent variables. In such a climate, the notion of total war has given way to a kaleidoscope of conflict situations, all different, and for which modern armies must now be prepared.

In Australia the need for a total force concept has arisen because of the proliferation in Army's assigned tasks. The diverse nature of modern conflict has meant that Army's operational responsibilities are no longer applicable solely to conventional warfare. In addition to the essential maintenance of conventional war capabilities — the evolution of which is accelerating rapidly — the Army has also been assigned other responsibilities. These include the development and maintenance of capabilities in such areas as counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, nuclear deterrence, peacekeeping and military assistance to the civil community in disaster relief operations. This proliferation in Army tasks has meant that the nation no longer can afford the luxury of a part-time militia-type force whose sole purpose is to await the onset of total war and general mobilisation. These tasks (including conventional war) must be undertaken by a total force, whose elements must be readily available to Government for employment when and where required.

Since the Millar Report of 1974, Army force structures have been developed, and are continuing to be developed, using the concept of the total force. However, despite this development it could be argued that, just as Government will be reluctant to proclaim war until all other options are denied it, so too will Government only proclaim a defence emergency when the situation becomes so grave as to necessitate that course of action. The very act of proclaiming war or defence emergency is reactive in nature: it is a response to an unsatisfactory situation rather than a prevention of it. Situations could arise where the Government would be reluctant to declare a defence emergency. Such action might be interpreted as aggressive by neighbouring countries, as over-reaction by some allies or regional countries, or as alarmist militarism by sections of the Australian community. The very term 'defence emergency' connotes that something is unacceptably wrong and that extreme measures are required to rectify an unfavourable situation.

The ARES currently possesses operational capabilities required by the total force in a variety of situations which may fall short of defence emergency. Regional Forces (such as the North West Mobile Force) and Special Action Forces (such as 1 and 2 Commando Company) may be required to be operationally employed at an early stage so as to achieve
containment, provide intelligence and prevent conflict escalation. In addition, ARES (or composite PMF/ARES) combat and combat service support units may be required to assist PMF units in a variety of conflict situations. Yet the Government may be reluctant to proclaim a defence emergency in all these situations, particularly if such a proclamation would serve to promote and popularise the political aims of an adversary, or if such military commitments were abroad and did not represent a defence emergency in terms of Australian territorial sovereignty. Australia’s involvement in Vietnam is the most recent example of this latter type of situation and one that cannot be excluded as a strategic option for the Government in the future. In such situations, and under current legislation, the ARES could not be employed: a fact which renders the total force concept impotent and irrational.

Thus, on the one hand, a situation exists where the operational use of the ARES as part of the total force has been recognised, and where force structures have been developed accordingly. While, on the other, the availability of the ARES depends on the formal proclamation by Government of a time of defence emergency (or war) — a proclamation which, for a variety of reasons, may not be politically expedient, or may not become politically expedient until the situation has escalated beyond acceptable limits. In essence, therefore, current legislation works against the concept of total force because it differentiates between the circumstances and procedures under which the PMF and ARES components of the Army may be operationally employed. Further, since it is impossible to predict those situations (or the precise moment within those situations) in which the Government will declare a defence emergency, it is also impossible to guarantee that the total force (or necessary elements of it) will be available when and where required.

ARES Morale and Employer Support

The current inability to use the ARES for operational purposes in situations short of proclaimed defence emergency serves only to impede the attainment and maintenance of high morale within the ARES. In addition, the development of close and trustworthy relations between the PMF and the ARES is similarly impeded because the PMF has no guarantee that the ARES will be made available to assist in operations short of defence emergency. The ability to operationally employ the ARES in situations short of defence emergency would strengthen the total force concept and enhance the image of the ARES by ascribing to it a more positive role. Within the ARES, sense of purpose and morale would benefit, and the feeling of separateness from the PMF would be minimised.

It has been argued that any change to present legislation may adversely influence employer support for the ARES. This is an important consideration, but one that is not supported on the evidence of a preliminary analysis conducted during 1981 by the National Committee for Employer Support. To the contrary, the Committee's preliminary analysis suggested that, as far as most employers were concerned, they gave their support on the understanding that Reservists could be called-out in peacetime.

Writing in late 1983 (almost a decade after the recommendations of his Committee were submitted to Government) Dr Millar stated that '. . . if the Regular Army is committed at home or overseas, the Army Reserve should be activated as the force next to be employed. This has never been the case but any other policy is absurd and expensive. An implication of this . . . is that there must be legal provision for calling out the Reserves or part of them in situations other than war or defence emergency, if the Government feels the need'.11

It is difficult to contest the logic inherent in Dr Millar’s statement. As an extension of the same logic, it would seem that ARES morale is impeded, and the relationship between the ARES and the PMF is constrained, by applying to the ARES a discrete legal arrangement which prevents it in actuality from being part of the total force unless and until defence emergency (or war) is proclaimed.

The Options

There are four options available. The first is to retain the status quo and change nothing. This option is the one most favoured by successive Governments over the past decade since the release of the Millar Report. It is also the option least favourable to the defence of Australia, although obviously the easiest option to follow.
The second option is to retain current legal call-out provisions for the ARES, but to cease with the policy of total force development. Since it is easier to change 'policy' than it is 'legislation', this option has some merit. However, it would require an increase in PMF capability in order to offset the loss of the ARES, an economic impossibility in time of increasing resource constraint. The adoption of this course would also put paid to the 'one army' concept, and set in concrete a 'two army' establishment which would be economically absurd and inappropriate to the nation's defence needs.

The third option is to retain current legislation but to transfer much of the existing ARES to the RAER. This option has the attraction of creating a reserve force which is readily available for use in situations short of defence emergency. However, such an option also neglects the institutional and social forces that would resist such a change. It has taken a decade to change from a 'Citizen Military Force' to an 'Army Reserve'. The latter title and organisation is now well established in the community. To weaken that organisation by improving the capability of the RAER (which is in effect moribund) would have a disruptive and confusing effect on the Australian population.

The fourth, and last, option is to change legislation to make the ARES available in situations short of defence emergency (or war). What is required is legislative procedures that enable the Government to operationally use the ARES on a selective and progressive basis as part of the total force, depending on the situation at the time, and without recourse to the proclamation of defence emergency (or war). However, to bring this about, legislative amendment would be required: but the extent of such amendment should be minimised, should be kept as simple as possible and should be introduced as soon as practicable.

Probably the simplest way to effect such amendment would be to annul existing legislation concerning the call-out of the ARES, and then apply to the ARES the existing legislation concerning the call-out of the RAER. Such amendment would permit the Government to retain discretionary powers in the use of the ARES, but any decision by Government to use that force could be implemented quickly and without recourse to the proclamation of defence emergency. Such amendment would help to make viable the concept of total force in situations short of defence emergency (or war), and would assist significantly in force structure planning.

Conclusion

The ARES is a key element of the total force and represents almost half the current force-in-being. The ARES possesses capabilities essential for the operational effectiveness of the Army, and it provides the base necessary for the future expansion of the Army if and when required. Situations short of defence emergency could arise which may require the timely response of all or part of the total force-in-being, or for which force expansion may be required. Under existing legislation the use of the ARES, other than on an individual volunteer basis, would be denied to Government unless and until a time of defence emergency (or war) was proclaimed. This situation is inconsistent with the concept of total force: it reduces the flexibility of strategic policies and limits the options available to Government.

Legislative amendment to the Defence Act is required to ensure that the ARES will be available for operational use in situations short of defence emergency (or war). Amendment which prescribed to the ARES the existing call-out procedures applicable to the RAER, would ensure the operational availability of the ARES in situations short of defence emergency (or war). Such amendment would retain Government control over the right to use the ARES, and would give the Government the flexibility to selectively and progressively call-out those ARES units (or elements) considered necessary to deal with the situation at hand.

NOTES
2. Refer JSP (AS) I (A), Ch. 2.
4. Defence powers are stated in other acts also, the most important of which are: the Naval Defence Act, the Air Force Act, the Control of Naval Waters Act, the
Approved Defence Projects Protection Act, and the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act.

5. Under the Statute Law Revision Act 1981, members of the Regular Army Reserve (RAR), which was formerly part of the PMF, were transferred to the Inactive ARES, and the RAR ceased to exist.

6. In a strict legal sense it is the Governor General who has the sole power to promulgate this notice in the Gazette and thereby mobilize the RAER. However, in practice, and by convention, this would be done by the Governor General in Council: i.e. on the recommendation of the elected Government.


8. During Vietnam, for example, these stages were not applied. Instead, a selective national service scheme was implemented under the provisions of the National Service Act 1951-1973. This Act remains on the statute books and could be re-activated and amended if necessary.

9. As of 31 January 1982 the posted strength of the RAER was nil officers and 96 other ranks.

10. Three levels of conflict applicable to Australia (low, medium and high) are defined in JSP (AS) 1 (A). For an unclassified and comprehensive description of these levels of conflict see Brigadier J. N. Stein, 'The Administrative Support Concepts for Land Operations in Defence of Australia', Presentation to the Conference on The Civil Infrastructure in the Defence of Australia: Assets and Vulnerabilities, ANU, Canberra, 28 November-2 December 1983, p. 8.


12. CARO Strength State for January 1983 showed ARES strength at 32,029 (30,335 in Active ARES, 1,694 in Inactive ARES) compared with an ARA strength for the same period of 32,850.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (continued from page 4)

From Eureka to Gallipoli

Dear Sir,

The article "From Eureka to Gallipoli" in the Defence Force Journal No. 44 Jan-Feb., 1984 was most interesting. I have some small interest because in the early 1920s I knew Doctor Peter Lalor who was a member of the Medical Staff of the Sunbury Mental Asylum. Visiting him one day I noticed a sword in his Study and he told me that an Englishman who had been with his grandfather at the Eureka Stockade, came to him with the sword which he said was his grandfather's and that he had picked it up after the fight at the Stockade, and had cherished ever since. He was now a very old man and was going back to England to end his days there and wished that the grandson of his old comrade should have the sword. His grandfather's initials were on the sword.

I was most interested and told Dr. Lalor that I had just been given a sword exactly the same with PDL under the hilt. By the way, the original Peter Lalor's initials were just PL. I think PDL must have something to do with the Maker.

I was given my sword from the Sir John Franklin Hotel which was built by the second Constable of early Melbourne who had succeeded John Batman in this office. I presume he was an emancipist from Van Dieman's Land. There used to be three swords in the Bar and as it had lost its Licence I asked where they were and was told there was only one left and I could have it. The picture of the sword in the article is the same as mine.

I wonder how this account tallies with the history of the Lalor family's sword? It would be quite a good thing if I could find out more about my sword. The best explanation I have had so far is that it was a sword used by the police troopers of the Eureka period.

Rev. W. F. GILMOUR
HIGH COMMAND
—THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE

By Major D. M. Horner, Royal Australian Infantry.

In the many analyses of recent wars in newspapers or magazines the authors usually refer to the decisions of the opposing high commands. During The Falklands War we read, or even heard on radio or TV, that various decisions had been made by the Argentine or British high commands. But who are the high commanders, and what is high command?

A British Army pamphlet produced in 1961 and titled High Command fails to provide a satisfactory definition of high command. Written specifically for NATO, the booklet concentrates on the command of a theatre encompassing several corps, both land and air forces, and troops from different nations. In a similar vein, a British Army manual published in 1950 titled Conduct of War states: “High Command of the land forces will be exercised by a supreme commander, commander-in-chief, army group commanders, and army commanders.” But these definitions fail to explain why high command is different from ordinary command.

The Australian Manual of Land Warfare (1977) does not even mention high command, but it does state: “The principal task of higher commanders is to bring about a winning concentration of combat power at the point of combat, whether the operation is defensive or offensive.” The manual continues: “After the necessary concentration of combat power has been set in motion the divisional and brigade commanders become responsible for the immediate conduct and direction of the battle.”

While these quotations indicate that a higher commander is concerned with strategic, rather than tactical matters, they also imply that the big step is from divisional to corps command. These views appear to mirror those of the current British manual on Land Operations published in 1968, although the British are more precise. Significantly the British begin with strategy:

Military Strategy. This has two aspects. First it is the function of organizing and distributing military means to fulfil the aim of the grand strategy or foreign policy. This is the task of the high command, and involves producing the conditions under which tactical operations can take place to the advantage of our own side and to the enemy’s disadvantage.

The British manual then adds that the “day-to-day conduct of operations is the province of divisions and brigades. Corps and higher headquarters will be planning ahead...”

In my view these definitions, if you can call them that, are quite inadequate, and in my book, High Command, I defined it as that level of command which determines and executes military strategy and allocates military resources. Thus the vital issue is not whether the commander is responsible for a division, a corps, an army or a theatre of war, but whether he is concerned with day-to-day combat on the battlefield, or is concerned with the strategy to be employed in the campaign. The difference between battlefield command and high command therefore equates to the difference between tactics and strategy. And just as there is a blurring of the distinction between tactics and strategy — recognized by the introduction of terms such as grand tactics, operational concepts, operation strategy, operational level of war and campaign strategy — so too there can be a difficulty in deciding...
whether a commander has reached the level of high command.

The difference between strategy and tactics was examined by that deep thinking US Rear Admiral, Henry Eccles, who wrote:

"Tactics deals with the immediate, strategy with the comprehensive. Tactical flexibility coupled with logistic excellence makes for the strategic flexibility that lays the foundation for the strategic exploitation of a tactical success. Thus it sometimes happens that a man who has distinguished himself in command of tactical operations may fail to perform as well when promoted to a command position where he must deal with strategic affairs."

Field Marshal Montgomery observed:

A good battalion commander does not necessarily make a good brigadier, nor a good divisional general a good corps commander. The judging of a man's ceiling in the higher ranks is one of the great problems which a commander must solve, and it occupied much of my time.

The impression should not be created that high command is merely a very elevated form of operational or battlefield command — that it is merely the difference between tactics and strategy. In a modern democracy military strategy is not a matter for military men alone. Military strategy is part of a nation's grand or national strategy which is determined by political leaders. Thus the commander who determines and executes military strategy is at the politico-military interface. He advises the government on matters affecting national strategy, he shapes his military strategy to complement the national strategy, he argues for the appropriate resources and he ensures that his plans are administratively feasible. He then allocates resources to subordinate commanders each of whom receive specific combat missions. The high command is therefore the link between the government and the battlefield. Probably Clausewitz's most often quoted dictum is that "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means." The high command translates governments policy into action on the battlefield.

Australian military leaders have had only limited experience of high command. In eight wars Australia has provided expeditionary forces but has had little influence over the strategy employed during those wars. However, rather than concentrate on Australia's influence over allied strategy during those wars, this article concentrates on the Australian commanders who have occupied high command positions.

Only four Australians might be considered to have filled high command appointments in the First World War. These were Vice-Admiral Sir William Creswell, First Naval Member of the Australian Naval Board, General Sir John Monash, Commander of the Australian Corps, General Sir Harry Chauvel, Commander of the Desert Mounted Corps, and Major General Sir William Bridges, Commander of the 1st Australian Division.

Creswell warrants consideration by virtue of his command of the Australia Station under the general control of the British Admiralty. Under his direction the RAN mounted the successful expedition to capture German New Guinea during September 1914. Sir James Killen, Minister for Defence from 1975 to 1982, observed in 1982 that the expedition was "the First Australian joint military operation conceived, planned, organized, and executed by Australia with overall political direction leading back to the Government of Australia." Unfortunately this statement is an exaggeration. In fact, the expedition was undertaken at the urging of the British Government and against Creswell's advice. In his view, the British and Australian naval forces in the Pacific would have been better used to seek out and destroy the powerful German units operating in the western Pacific.

As Stephen Webster has written, "to the end of his days Creswell remained convinced that had [Admiral] Patey [Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Australian Fleet] been set free to chase von Spee across the Pacific the tragedy of Coronel might not have happened." Similarly, Creswell resisted Admiralty instructions to allow the Japanese to occupy the Marshall Islands, forecasting that they would eventually threaten Australia. Creswell demonstrated a grasp of naval strategy and provided sound advice to the Australian Government, but with the small forces at his disposal, and his ultimate responsibility to the Admiralty, he could hardly be described confidently as occupying a position of high command.

Major General, Sir William Bridges commanded the 1st Australian Division in action for barely three weeks after the Gallipoli landing before he was mortally wounded by a
sniper’s bullet. His claim to recognition as a higher commander rests on his appointment as GOC of the AIF. Yet as his biographer, C. D. Coulthard-Clark, noted, while Bridges was the officer best equipped to maintain the AIF’s national identity and administrative independence from the larger British formations with it was expected to operate, he was probably the officer with least inclination to place Australian national interest above those of the imperial authorities. In Bridges’ view, there was no distinction to be drawn in 1914-18 between Australia’s national interests and Britain’s, and he wanted the AIF to fit neatly into British formations. Furthermore, he was so anxious to command the 1st Division in battle that he hived off his administrative authority as far as he could, especially in the medical field, to the detriment of the AIF. He did not seek to carve out an independent authority of his own and should not be included in the ranks of Australians who reached high command.

After Bridges’ death Major General Gordon Legge commanded the AIF for a few months until General Birdwood took over and held the appointment until the end of the war. Birdwood was not an Australian, but his Chief of Staff, Brudenell White, who was an Australian, had an immense impact on the command and administration of both the AIF and the 1st Anzac Corps. In the opinion of C. E. W. Bean he was the tactical and administrative commander under Birdwood in “all but name” White displayed many of the qualities needed for high command. He had a fine grasp of strategy and tactics, and he understood politics. Loyal, patriotic, courageous, highly professional and a superb organizer, it was no surprise that White became Chief of the General Staff after the First World War. But he was never the actual commander of the AIF. He never had to bear the final responsibility. Thus while White was perhaps, as Menzies said, “the most scholarly and technically talented soldier in Australian history”, as a commander he remains one of Australia’s great “might have beens.”

As a contender for command of the Australian Corps White was overlooked in favour of General Sir John Monash, who not only was more senior, but had command experience at brigade and divisional level, compared with White’s complete lack of command experience. It is doubtful whether even the great Monash reached the level of high command. He certainly understood the difference between battlefield command and high command and he saw his role as one of organization and the marshalling of resources. But he also revelled in the hour-by-hour control of the battle. The best example is, of course, Mont St Quentin, and his planning was of a kind that would have killed him had the war lasted into 1919. Clearly Monash was capable of thinking in terms of grand tactics, claiming after the war that the opening of the British offensive with the assault by the Australian Corps on 8 August 1918 was his idea. But careful research shows that the operation was decided at well above Monash’s level of command. Furthermore, he did not command the AIF until after the end of the war and he was not required to proffer political advice or to formulate military strategy. He was just one of many successful corps commanders on the Western Front.

Why then have many writers described him as perhaps the best man in France? Liddell Hart wrote that Monash “had probably the greatest capacity for command in modern war among all who held command.... If that war had lasted another year, he would almost certainly have risen from commander of the Australian Corps to commander of an Army; he might even have risen to be Commander-in-Chief.” Others, such as Lloyd George, A. J. P. Taylor, Anthony Eden and Field Marshal Montgomery agree.

Although Monash did not reach a position of high command he demonstrated many of the qualities necessary for such a level of command. He was a great organizer, he was decisive and quick in thought. He had a mind which ranged far beyond the battlefield. Ruthless, and yet sensitive, perhaps his greatest quality was his meticulous planning. Anyone who has studied Monash’s life can be in no doubt that he would have handled a high command appointment well — he certainly had the brains which, as Clausewitz insists, is the great prerequisite. His work as Chairman of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria shows his mastery of the political field. But the fact of the matter was that he was not required to exercise high command in war.

Nor was Australia’s other First World War corps commander, Harry Chauvel. Chauvel had greater opportunity to demonstrate a grasp
of military strategy than Monash. Under Allenby, his forces cut deeply into the Turkish Line, heading for strategic, rather than tactical objectives. And he had a tricky politico-military problem to resolve at Damascus, where his political adviser, Colonel T. E. Lawrence, was less than reliable. But his role in the 1918 offensive was planned by Allenby, who also had ultimate responsibility. Chauvel's responsibility to the Australian Government for the Australians under his command was similarly limited. As GOC of the AIF in the Middle East his approach of co-operation with the British rather than confrontation "was not good enough for some of his more aggressively nationalistic subordinates, but Chauvel had assessed his situation and never forgot that this first line of responsibility was to Birdwood in France." As A. J. Hill wrote, Chauvel's "success was based on the timeless military virtues — courage, coolness under fire, knowledge, the capacity for decision." Thus Australians had only limited experience of high command during the First World War, but the experience of this level of command increased dramatically during the Second World War for a number of reasons. First, Australia had grown in maturity as a nation. Australians expected to exercise greater control over the employment of their armed forces and they were less inclined to accept British direction. As part of this growth, Australian military leaders, with the experience of the First World War, were better prepared to make decisions on strategy from an Australian rather than a British perspective. Second, the higher level of threat to national security forced Australian political leaders to take a greater role in the formulation of strategy. Third, since Australia deployed larger forces in the Second World War, many of them operating directly from Australia, there were increased opportunities for Australians to exercise high command.

The most outstanding example was Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey. As GOC of the AIF in the Middle East from the time of his arrival there in June 1940 until his return to Australia in March 1942, his responsibilities were wide-ranging and of great importance to the Australian war effort. He had been issued with a charter setting out the terms of agreement between the British and Australian Governments over the employment of Australian troops. On many occasions during 1940 Blamey had to fight to maintain the integrity of his force against Generals Wavell and Wilson who wished to split up his force.

Undoubtedly, Blamey failed in his role as GOC of the AIF when he hesitated to advise the Australian Government that in his view the campaign in Greece would end in withdrawal. In his defence, it might be observed that Wavell had given him the impression that the campaign had been approved by the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies. Blamey learned his lesson well, and never again failed to keep the Australian Government informed.

Blamey's ability to safeguard Australian interests was increased with his appointment as Deputy Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East in April 1941. At one stage during the Syrian Campaign he intervened directly to persuade General Wilson to change his strategy. His most important decision was to recommend to the Australian Government that the 9th Division be withdrawn from Tobruk. He clearly saw the political and military aspects of the argument and pressed the British Commander-in-Chief, General Auchinleck, relentlessly. Supported by the Australian Government Blamey won, but it was a trying experience. John Hetherington recorded that at one conference Auchinleck began by stating that Tobruk could not be relieved.

"Gentlemen", [said Blamey]. "I think you don't understand the position. If I were a French or an American commander making this demand what would you say about it."

"But you're not." [replied Auchinleck].

"That is where you are wrong" . [said Blamey]. "Australia is an independent nation. She came into the War under certain definite agreements. Now, gentlemen, in the name of my Government, I demand the relief of these troops." It is hard to imagine Chauvel, Bridges or even Monash making a similar demand in the First World War.

Despite his meritorious work in the Middle East and his problems with Wavell and Auchinleck, when Blamey returned to Australia as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces in March 1942 he was to face his biggest test in high command. By March 1942 the Army, and indeed the whole nation was in deep crisis. In the four months from the outbreak of war in the Far East Japanese
forces had overrun South East Asia, had defeated and captured the Australian Forces in Singapore, Java, Ambon, New Ireland and New Britain, and had landed on Timor and New Guinea. Darwin and Broome had been bombed and an assault against the mainland was expected any day. The Government and some sections of the population seemed close to panic.

Although the country stood largely defenceless, military and political authorities had not stood idle while the Japanese had come steadily closer. The 7th Division and one brigade of the 6th Division were returning from the Middle East. Militia divisions were mobilizing and undergoing training and a number of senior commanders had been recalled from the Middle East. Then, a few days before Blarney's appointment, General Douglas MacArthur had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area. Australia no longer stood alone, but seemed assured of American help. Until this help materialized, however, and until the troops could be trained and equipped the Japanese threat would continue to grow.

In these circumstances Blarney was faced with an immense and complicated task — a task which over-shadowed in its complexity and importance to Australia that presented to any leader in Australian history, including Monash. As Commander of the Allied Land Forces, under MacArthur, Blarney was responsible for the land defence of Australia and for offensive operations planned by MacArthur. As Commander-in-Chief of the AMF he was responsible for training, development and administration of an Army soon to exceed 12 divisions, plus a multitude of training and base establishments. As the Government's chief military adviser he was responsible to advise the Prime Minister on high level defence policy. And he undertook a further, self-imposed task of ensuring that Australian interests were safeguarded against the wider interests of her more powerful allies, particularly the United States.

There is not space here to detail Blarney's achievements and failures during the last three and a half years of the war. His record contains no outstanding peak; rather, it is marked by year upon year of wise decisions, stubborn determination to further the interests of Australia, and a deep concern for the well-being of his soldiers. He had many weaknesses but greater strengths. He was Australia's senior soldier for the full period of the Second World War during which time the army fought with skill and bravery in a score of campaigns. His appointment as Field Marshal in 1950 was justified recognition of his achievements.

Blamey was not the only Australian to reach a position of high command during the Second World War. The crisis of early 1942 when Australia was under threat of invasion placed the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sturdee, in the curious position of also being, in effect, commander-in-chief for the defence of Australia in the period from December 1941 until Blarney's return in March 1942. Sturdee and the other two Chiefs of Staff, both British officers on loan, were required constantly to produce strategic appreciations for a worried government. Sturdee deployed his meagre resources to the islands to the north and then watched helplessly while each garrison was crushed by the advancing Japanese. Faced by these mounting crises Sturdee never lost his sense of balance and proportion.

Sturdee had an important impact on allied strategy when he recommended to the Prime Minister that the convoys of the 1st Australian Corps returning from the Middle East should be diverted from Burma to Australia. The other Chiefs of Staff were afraid that their advice could be biased and told Sturdee that they would unreservedly support him whatever his decision. Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell thought that this was "the most fateful recommendation [Sturdee] had to make in his service."

When the Chiefs of Staff met the War Cabinet on 18 February 1942 to discuss their recommendations, Sturdee informed the ministers that he would tender his resignation if the AIF were not returned to Australia. As we know, it was.

It was Sturdee's lot to prepare and deploy the army for its first battles, when troops, equipment and training were in short supply and the AIF was overseas. These battles cannot be half as successful or as easy to command as the latter avenging battles when equipment and training is more plentiful and heavier weapons can be brought to bear. It is a measure of Sturdee's determination, clear-sightedness, and professionalism that he survived to join in the final battles of the war. More than that, he was the rock on which the army, and indeed
the government rested during the weeks of panic in early 1942.

Other generals also had their moments in high command. In his dual positions as Commander of the 9th Division and as GOC of the AIF in the Middle East after Blarney’s return to Australia, Sir Leslie Morshead was required to demonstrate many of the qualities necessary for high command. Certainly Auchinleck thought so when he commented after one disagreement: “So you’re being like Tom Blarney, eh! You’re being sticky! The mantle of Tom Blarney has fallen on you!”

Undoubtedly Morshead could have commanded a corps at Alamein if it had not been for British prejudice against dominion soldiers, Plus Montgomery’s natural reluctance (having just arrived in the desert) to accept someone he did not know.

In a similar vein Gordon Bennett in Malaya was required to exercise many of the prerogatives of high command and while he had many achievements, on balance he cannot be regarded as a great success.

Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring exercised high command in a different fashion. As commander of the 1st Australian Corps in New Guinea from October 1942 to October 1943 and for many months GOC of New Guinea Force he was responsible for executing the strategy that drove the Japanese for Papua and captured Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen. Critics might argue that Herring was merely following the scheme devised by MacArthur and more particularly Blarney, but Blarney gave Herring considerable freedom of action. The deciding factor, however, is the breadth of responsibility shouldered by Herring, for he had to co-ordinate the land, sea and air forces of two nations and bring them together for the joint allied attack on Lae. In addition, he had to organize the logistic support in a hostile terrain, while also he was concerned with the civil administration of the liberated areas of New Guinea. It is true that most of the battles fought during this period were conducted by brigade and battalion commanders, but the marshalling of resources for success on the battlefield required all the skills of a competent high commander.

No naval officers reached the level of high command. The RAN was the only allied navy to be smaller at the end of the war than the beginning. The Empire Air Training Scheme was so manipulated by the British that few Australian air force officers had an opportunity to reach a high command position. As Chief of the Air Staff for the last three and a half years of the war Air Marshal Sir George Jones had an opportunity to make his mark as an air commander of note. Unable to resolve his feud with the Commander of RAAF Command, Air Vice-Marshel Bostock, he lost credibility, had little influence over strategy and became merely an administrator.

Since the Second World War Australians have had little opportunity to exercise high command. As Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan from 1946 until 1951 and of the British Commonwealth Force in Korea in 1950 and 1951 Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson had to deal with many high command problems, but was never closely involved in strategy.

As Chief of the General Staff from 1963 to 1966 and as Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1966 to 1970 General Sir John Wilton played a major part in formulating Australia’s strategy for the Vietnam War. There is not yet sufficient material available to analyse Wilton’s performance. He was highly respected by military, political and public service contemporaries. Ironically, as Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, he had no legal authority to exercise command. It was, however, his private representation directly to the opposition spokesman on defence, Lance Barnard, which led directly to the establishment of the position of Chief of Defence Force Staff after the election of the Whitlam Government.

The various Commanders of the Australian Force, Vietnam, Generals Mackay, Vincent, MacDonald, Hay, Fraser and Dunstan should possibly be considered as high commanders; after all, they were the link between government policy and action on the battlefield. They were faced with problems similar in fashion, if not in magnitude to those mentioned earlier in this article. Sufficient information is not yet available to examine their performance, but at least MacDonald and Dunstan, the former later to become CDFS and the latter to become CGS should be considered carefully by future historians.

This survey has touched briefly on the Australian commanders who might be considered to have reached positions of high com-
mand in war. There has been no attempt to examine the peace-time Navy, Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. Certainly, in a period of cold war a Chief of Staff advises on strategy perhaps as much as in a hot war. But except in special circumstances, a Chief of Staff is more an administrator than a commander. Formulating strategic appreciations in peace is a far cry from executing strategy in war.

Earlier in this article high command was defined as that level of command which determines and executes military strategy and allocates military resources. The discussion then moved away from that definition to examine a number of commanders, perhaps creating the impression that high command is embodied in one particular man at any time. It is true that the Commander-in-Chief in the field exercises high command in relative isolation. But in modern times high command has become a collective responsibility.

Improvements in communications in the last one hundred years, coupled with the conduct of war by single nations or by coalitions across the globe, has meant that military strategy thousands of miles abroad can be controlled from the home capital. Politicians have become more deeply involved in strategic decision-making and strategy has been expanded to include the marshalling of all of a nation's resources.

Thus, while it is valid to point to a number of commanders who reached high command levels, it might be more appropriate to focus attention on the strategic decision-making machinery. For most of the Second World War, for example, Australia's strategic direction was provided by the War Cabinet advised by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. For the first two years of the war the organization worked tolerably well, but the fundamental weakness was the lack of a system for the high level joint operational command of the forces. The Chiefs of Staff exercised no joint and little single service command function.

When war came to Australia in December 1941 a new organization had to be developed. As mentioned, Blamey became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and although the War Cabinet remained the official strategic decision-making body, real responsibility was given to the Prime Minister's War Conference attended by the Prime Minister, Curtin, General MacArthur, and the Secretary of the War Cabinet, Sir Frederick Shedden. With his many roles Blamey was also important, but the Australian Chiefs of Staff lost much of their influence during this period. Generally, the Australian Government accepted MacArthur's advice even when it went beyond the limits of military strategy. Fortunately for Australia, during the first eighteen months of the Pacific war MacArthur's interpretation of American strategy in the south-west Pacific was almost the same as the Australian government's grand strategy. But the Australian Government's reliance upon MacArthur had a stultifying effect on its ability to develop its own strategic policy. Australia's experience of coalition warfare therefore revealed severe limitations in the national strategic decision-making process and in the organization for high command.

This is an appropriate place to return to the current situation in Australia. In the Joint Service Publication JSP (AS)l(A), the chapter titled "Higher Command Relationships" is devoted solely to a discussion of the roles of the Chief of Defence Force Staff and the three single service Chiefs of Staff operating as the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The CDFS has three functions: commander, administrator and adviser. In time of war his role as the government's principal adviser on military matters and on requirements for, and allocation of, national resources to the Australian Defence Force, would absorb most of his time and energy. The Chiefs of Staff would be similarly engaged. This heavy responsibility would limit their ability to be involved in the detailed control of operations by the armed forces in war, and there is adequate evidence in Australian history to show that this would be so. In their submission to the Utz Committee in 1981 the Chief of the General Staff's Advisory Committee decided to use the term high command to define the command responsibilities of the CDFS and the Chiefs. They concluded:

High command is exercised by the CDFS and Chief of Staff. It involves the formulation of military strategy as part of national strategy, the allocation and co-ordination of resources and the issuing of directives to achieve the aims of military strategy. It does not involve the day-to-day control of operations.20

It should be noted that there are two aspects to command: an upward process involving preparation of appreciations and plans; and a
downward process involving the issuing of orders and directives. A commander relies heavily on his staff in the development of plans and appreciations and this reliance is even more obvious in the area high command.

While few officers will have to exercise high command, many will at some stage work on a high commander's staff. Clearly then, it is important that officers understand the role and responsibilities of the high command. While these responsibilities are wide-ranging, high commanders, either individually or collectively are concerned primarily with the formulation and execution of military strategy. And it is in this realm that wars are won and lost. As the great naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan put it:

"If the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valour of the soldier, the brilliance of the victory, however otherwise decisive, fail in their effect." 21

NOTES
15. Ibid, p.82.
17. MacArthur's original title was Supreme Commander, but soon changed it to Commander-in-Chief.
20. CGS Advisory Committee Staff paper, Review of the Organization of the Department of Defence, p.5-3.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries:

Hayes, Grace Person, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan, Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1982.


McNicholl, R. R., the Royal Australian Engineers, Vols 1, 2 and 3, Corps Committee of the RAE, 1982.

McNicholl, R. R., the Royal Australian Engineers 1919 to 1945, Vol 3, Corps Committee of the RAE, 1982.

ALMOST fifty years after the publication of Toto Ishimaru's book *Japan Must Fight Britain*, it is necessary to think seriously again about the future directions of Japanese defence policies and their implications for Australia.

By way of catalyst to further thought, it is appropriate to caution that such consideration take place within the long view of Japanese history. The same nation that struck down the Russian fleet in the early years of this century was later to engulf China, Manchuria, South East Asia and surge well into the Pacific in a series of military successes which set in train irrevocable political changes. These military successes were soon overshadowed by the subsequent grind of the allied counter-offensive and finally repaid in kind. In a mirror image of the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States, without warning and without quarter, struck the terrifying blows that forced Japan to total and unconditional surrender. It would be foolish to think that these legacies have been forgotten.

It could be argued that Japan, faced with the totality of United States power at the time and since, has brilliantly manipulated its conqueror. As early as 1947, the Americans were discussing the importance of Japan as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and ever since United States activities in Asia have, in some way or the other, added strength to that bulwark. That the present-day Japanese Prime Minister should refer to Japan, either deliberately or by misrepresentation, as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" is finally only a semantic escapade. More to the point, he was signalling the commissioning of a structure carefully put together over the last 35 years. Not only has the carrier been launched, it is substantially equipped and now free to work up to a thousand nautical miles from its home baseline, presently Tokyo-Osaka, but possibly one day Okinawa or Iwo Jima. Ironically, the public American pressures to bring forward the launching date could well be the very decoy the Japanese will later use to deflect criticisms of their actions.

The Japanese, having avoided the wider ramifications of the enormously expensive Cold War, have sheltered with a much-vaunted and almost paranoic timidity, behind the United States-imposed so-called Peace Constitution. Thus protected, they have been free to develop an economic infrastructure of such significance and magnitude as to be the envy of the post-war world. They have also constructed, almost as a corollary, a military infrastructure, the significance and potential of which is imperfectly understood. Even a perfunctory examination, however, would highlight the ease with which the Japanese space programme could be put to military purpose; how the broadly-based, sophisticated and under-utilised defence industry could make good essential shortfalls of equipment; how the defensive weapons of strategic significance, i.e., the F15s, the P3Cs, the submarines, the guided missile destroyers, could become, if the political will or strategic necessity so determined, the offensive weapons of war. Japanese prohibitions on the use of nuclear weapons could be eventually circumscribed by the new option available to non-nuclear powers, the advent of the cruise generation of missiles, armed at least during times of peace, with non-nuclear warheads. Muted proposals to put Japan's underutilised defence industry to making good the shortfall in exports or the eventual breaching of the 1% of GNP proscription on defence spending promise further erosion of the traditional solidarity on such matters. By any measurement, Japan has a significant military capacity and potential.

Much of this progress can be attributed to the protective shield and the earnest and practical encouragement of the United States. Nevertheless, specific factors warrant more detailed consideration. The first is the single-
mindedness of the Japanese commitment to the Japanese way; the relentless pursuit of the national interest. It must be the Japanese who claim the credit for, and enjoy the fruits of, their economic miracle. Just as readily, this pride, if bruised, or frustrated, or antagonised, could turn to petulance or to arrogance.

Secondly, it has been assumed, perhaps unwisely, that almost forty years of peace and co-operation have created, between the United States and Japan, bonds not easily unravelled. Yet this assumption must be discounted by the realities that major differences of opinion exist between the two as well as a surprising lack of practical military co-operation. There seems little doubt that, in the event of military conflict between the United States and the USSR, the Japanese will be assumed to be an ally of the United States and U.S. forces based on Japanese soil remain a trip wire which could well entangle Japan should, say, a mishap occur on the Korean Peninsula or should U.S. forces in Korea be withdrawn. But it cannot be assumed that Japan will continue as a tame handmaiden of the United States. Indeed, one must wonder why it is the Japanese have accepted for so long a relationship others would regard as demeaning.

The third factor, and clearly the most important, is that of the Japanese political will. It has been comforting for the West to rely upon the conventional measurements of assessment of the Japanese scene and to record the repeated reassurances of Japan's adherence to the Peace Constitution. With an apparent openness on matters of national security that embarrasses most other democracies, the Japanese have carefully sketched in the outline and the detail of their military infrastructure, and such matters are readily quantified. They appear to have gone to inordinate lengths to disarm suspicion domestically and regionally. Finally, however, our assessments only reflect "The Tatemae" — the official Japanese line. What is the "Honne" — the actual situation? Behind the facade, what are the Japanese actually up to? The important questions as to Japanese motive and ambition remain unanswered. Where is all this headed?

It would be convenient to interpose here the likely scenarios open to Japan. Such studies should be undertaken and from them conclusions drawn as to the possible fall-out for Australia. Sufficient to note that Japan's geography merits special emphasis, in that the Northern Territories issue alone could be likened to an inert incendiary of such potential lethality which, once triggered, either deliberately or accidentally, would be extremely difficult to defuse. More alarmingly, it could spread quickly and engulf the local firemen. For the Japanese, the possible detonators for the device are multi-primed: the affront to national sovereignty, the arrogance of the Soviet refusal to even admit a Japanese claim, the cowardice and self-aggrandisement of the original Soviet action in August 1945, the strategic importance of the territories to the defence of Japan.

On the other hand, Soviet actions in the post-war era have confirmed strength of purpose and capacity in pursuit of objectives. One wonders why this issue has not long ago joined the list of Soviet territorial infringements or interventions, although until recently such an action would only have given an unnecessary profile to something dormant.

However, other factors may well overtake whatever it was that has kept the Soviet policies in check. In a brief and brutal rejoinder to Prime Minister Nakasone's early forays on defence matters, the Soviet Union claimed it was possible to sink his aircraft carrier "in twenty minutes", and raised once again the spectre of Japanese cities reduced to nuclear ash. By way of reinforcement to such blatant threats, the Soviet Union continues to strengthen its nuclear and conventional military deployments in the Far East and, as has been forcefully demonstrated in Swedish waters, is prepared to eschew lesser constraint. Increasingly, the Soviet military and especially its naval presence in this part of the world, is confronting a like-minded escalation of United States' military strength. Increasingly, this contest of will and strength impinges upon Japan and predestines less flexibility in Japanese policies.

Of course, one can quickly marshal the arguments in support of Japan not becoming involved militarily in this contest — self interest; constitutional constraints; deep-seated memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; some form of Finlandisation proposal; Japan's lack of nuclear weapons; the vulnerability of Japan to nuclear and economic blackmail or at worst, attack. These arguments cannot be ignored but each is also argued from the Japanese per-
spective. Equally important, and finally imponderable, are the Soviet assessments of the significance of Japan. For reasons touched upon briefly, the time has probably passed for Japan to remain a passive bystander, the realities are that Japan represents to the Soviets a physical obstacle astride the key egress of Soviet military power in North Asia and into the Pacific. Upon and around this obstacle are also based powerful elements of the Soviet Union's principal opponent.

Is this then the point of Japan's post-war military development? Have the Japanese correctly forecast that, in the final scheme of things history has bound them to the United States camp in any contest with the global USSR, and to this end Japan must prepare. Or have the Japanese, for different historical reasons, and those of national pride, forecast that finally they must have the national military power to protect what they have built. Or is there some other purpose?

It has probably surprised students that Australia, having suffered so cruelly by way of losses to Japanese military action, should develop such a wide-ranging and substantial power-war relationship with Japan. There are some obvious explanations for this. Both countries have benefited from the relationship to date. The relationship has been remarkably free of public recrimination, and the deliberately low profile of the Japanese defence buildup surprisingly has not caught the attention of the racists and jingoists in Australia. On those occasions when defence has become a national issue in Australia in the post-war period, the threats have had labels other than Japan and, over the last decade, there has been a sense in which Australia, Japan and others have shared the Soviet Union as the most likely threat.

Even though the economic downturn has caused a re-examination of respective advantages vis-a-vis even long-established friends, the readjustment of economic ties is unlikely to cause any substantial change in course. We share many common interests with Japan, and it would be a sorry state of affairs if we could only assess our options as "Japan, Friend or Foe?"

Central to respective national interests is the fundamental relationship with the United States. It is this common relationship which has indirectly and directly fostered the strong ties between the three countries and which, on the military side, has made practical defence co-operation a reality. Under present treaty arrangements it seems inconceivable that any major military activity affecting directly the security of either Japan or Australia could occur without the involvement of the United States. It could be argued further that a significant military action against either Japan or Australia would involve the other major trading partner.

While it seems unlikely that Japan could be seen as other than a staunch ally of the United States, in the longer term we should expect to hear an increasingly independent voice on matters previously regarded as being outside Japan's immediate security consideration. Nakasone's statements on defence have, in effect, merely foreshadowed the fundamental position he supported, within the context of Williamsburg, on the INF issue. The direct implications for Japan of a reshuffling of Soviet nuclear resources is obviously a matter to which the Japanese Government, and public, have to pay attention and, having done so, make their position clear. The new elements in the equation are the Japanese Prime Minister's willingness not only to publicly state his position, on a security matter, but to also identify that position with international negotiations. In the longer term, the end result of present Japanese policies and programs will be a much more politically adventurous and independent Japan, backed by a very significant industrial capacity and a substantial defence force. It is this proposition we should be addressing now.

For the moment it is convenient for Australia to sympathize with this strengthening of Japanese purposes as a proper response to a bullying Soviet Union. It has also been reassuring to note the actions taken by Japan to lay to rest, especially within ASEAN, suspicions of a revival of Japanese militarism and, as a consequence, rearmament. However, one wonders as to our response, and that of our other friends, should Japan's political and defence spokesmen shift the focus of their concern about Soviet intentions from North Asia to the Soviet presence at Gam Ranh Bay. Given the significance of Japanese oil and trade routes that pass Indochina, it is possible to hear an echo of the Japanese cry when the United States moved its Pacific fleet to Hawaii in 1940: "A knife pointed at our throat". Or as Admiral Gorshkov has since written: "Naval
forces can be used — in peacetime — to put pressure on their enemies, as a type of military demonstration, as a threat to interrupting sea communications and as a hindrance to ocean commerce”. As has been demonstrated historically the weakest link in Japan’s defence is its vulnerability to economic pressure.

Turning to bilateral considerations, inasmuch as they concern Japan’s defence policies, it is appropriate to note that Australia and Japan have an established special relationship. Our early and important contribution to BC3F led naturally to a regular program of ship visits which, especially since 1977, have developed to a degree of complexity in joint exercises, second only to that which Japan conducts with the United States.

It has fallen to the Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF), as the guardians of the best traditions of the Imperial Navy and which sees itself as untarnished by the military excesses of World War II, to be the cutting edge of Japanese initiatives to break out of the post-war cocoon. Recently Japanese horizons have been expanded by 1,000 nautical miles, and it will be the MSDF that has the primary carriage of this major development. The execution of the mechanics of such a comprehensive task will provide a necessary filip to the previously neglected joint warfare operations between the MSDF and Air Self Defence Force (ASDF), and should ensure new levels of sophistication in combined activities with the United States.

As the designated sea lanes are coincident with Australia’s principal sea routes to Japan, this development is of special significance to Australia. One could foresee a time when the existing practical co-operation between the RAN and the MSDF will focus specifically on the protection of the sea routes between Japan and Australia. Like Nakasone’s move at Williamsburg, such a development would represent yet another significant lift in the threshold of Japan’s re-emergence as a military power in this region.

Whatever the final judgement made as to Japanese motives and capacities, Australia must assess is position with regard to the future directions of Japanese defence policies. The motive for this assessment, whether it be a subconscious response to some silent cry from grimmer days or prompted by a cold-blooded look at the bottom line of Japan’s defence account, matters little. This is a subject about which we are poorly apprised.

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The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $50 for the best original article in the July/August issue (No. 47) of the Defence Force Journal to Robert Kendall Piper, Department of Defence, for his article Seven Mile Strip.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE
INDONESIAN ARMY
TO INDONESIA'S
THREE OVERSEAS
CAMPAIGNS

By Major T. J. Properjohn, RA Inf

The article analyses the attitude of the Indonesian Army to Indonesia's three overseas campaigns: West Irian, Malaysia and East Timor. It describes the influences that determined the Army's attitude in each case. The position of the Army in Indonesian Government and society is also discussed. The conclusion is that the army became more aggressive as its position in Government and society became stronger.

'Anyone who thinks he understands the situation here simply does not know the facts.'
Anon. Attributed to a British Ambassador in South-East Asia.

In the past twenty years, Indonesia has been involved in three overseas campaigns. Two of these were instigated by President Sukarno and the third by President Soeharto.* Each of the campaigns was launched for a different reason, but there are common aspects. Of particular importance was the attitude of the Indonesian Army to the Government's intention to conduct military operations in each case.

The Indonesian Army was formed in the aftermath of World War II, in the midst of the Indonesian Revolution. It was in the forefront of the Indonesian struggle for independence and it emerged highly nationalistic and with a belief in its role as a people's Army. Following the suppression of an attempted communist coup in 1948, it also became intensely suspicious of communists. There is no indication that these traits have not remained with the Indonesian Army today.

The Indonesian Armed Forces consist of four Services: Army, Navy, Air Force and Police. Of these, the Army emerged from the Revolution as the largest and most powerful. While there have been several attempts to limit the Army's power, and expand that of the other Services, none has been successful. In this article the role of the Police is not discussed, as it played no apparent part in any of the campaigns.

The Indonesian Army is possibly unique in its relationship with the Indonesian Government and with Indonesian society. Its 'dual function' concept means that it permeates all levels of civil administration, commerce and agriculture. But it is in Government where the Indonesian Army is seen to be most important. Here its power lies in its control of the Government's 'Association of Functional Groups' (GOLKAR), the major power group in the Indonesian Parliament. It is through this power base that the Army is able to influence Indonesian foreign policy.

The aim of this article is to analyse the attitude of the Indonesian Army to the three overseas campaigns conducted by the Indonesian Army: West Irian, Malaysia and East Timor.

The basis of Indonesian Foreign Policy

Indonesian foreign policy is based on the premise that, as the largest state in South-east Asia, it should play the leading role in the region. In this regard, little has changed with the transition of power from Sukarno to Soeharto. However, the bellicosity of the former has been replaced with a pragmatic realization that abrasive conduct in foreign affairs must be minimized.

Current Indonesian foreign policy can be described as non-aligned. Officially it is termed 'independent and active', and is dedicated to the national interest, to co-operation in the South-east Asian and South-west Pacific regions, and to the strengthening of solidarity, unity and co-operation among other developing nations.

Indonesia has strong ties with the West, particularly the United States of America. However, these ties have been modified to some extent by an uncertainty over US long-
term interests in the region, particularly since the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. Indonesia is a strong supporter of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although not a military treaty, Indonesia is attempting to improve military co-operation with her ASEAN neighbours. Several defence co-operation agreements with other ASEAN countries have been signed by Indonesia, and a number of joint exercises have been conducted.

Indonesian foreign policy is also characterized by a hostility to communism. Despite this, diplomatic ties with the USSR have remained intact, notwithstanding previous Soviet support for the PKI. Diplomatic ties with China were broken in 1967, following the attempted coup in 1965, which was officially blamed on the Chinese. Since then, Jakarta has adopted an 'off-again on-again' stance towards the question of resuming a normal relationship with China.

The present pragmatic foreign policy replaced a flamboyance that both concerned and aggravated Indonesia's neighbours. Under President Sukarno in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Indonesia aspired to lead an international anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist front. Sukarno consistently attacked a world in which the 'old established forces' (OLDEFOS — primarily the Western nations) dominated the 'new emerging forces' (NEFOS — primarily Third World countries). His strident denunciation of reliance on foreign aid was based on a belief that aid was simply an OLDEFOS tool to keep NEFOS nations in subjugation. Worse, he saw foreign aid as a means of boosting the economies of OLDEFOS countries, thus enriching those countries at the expense of those emerging.

Of importance is what one observer termed 'a ceaseless search for foreign aid'. It is probable that the current Government's desire for foreign aid reflects a belief in the importance of such aid in maintaining economic stability. The importance accorded foreign aid is a fundamental difference in the foreign policies of Indonesia's two presidents.

Sukarno's foreign policy was characterized by a belligerent anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stance. This was manifested in two campaigns: the liberation of West Irian, and the campaign to 'Crush Malaysia'. In both campaigns the attitude of the Army was, at times, quite distinct from that of the Government, and showed a developing political awareness and a realization of its latent power.

In the latter part of his presidency, Sukarno in turn lashed out against the Dutch, the British and the United States. As these campaigns mounted in intensity in 1964 and 1965, it was recognized by many observers that Sukarno's objective was more than a display of presidential pique for a few Western countries. Sukarno had embarked on a deliberate alignment with the left, particularly China. Into his speeches during this period crept references to 'turning the steering wheel' of his country, and 'turning the helm over'.

West Irian

The Indonesian Army in the early 1950s was gradually increasing both its political base and its integration into many aspects of Indonesian society. The Army Chief-of-Staff, General Abdul Haris Nasution, defined the role of the Armed Forces at that time as safeguarding the concept of Pantja Sila and the ideals of the Revolution.

The progressive integration of the Army into Indonesian society was described by Nasution in a speech in 1964:

'For the sake of the State, the Armed Forces takes a role as a security (military) apparatus, and for the sake of society the Armed Forces becomes one of the social forces, who joined forces with other groups ... in implementing economic programs (distribution, production, co-operative movement, agriculture, industry), for the sake of the people's welfare. As a social force, the Armed Forces co-operates side-by-side with political and functional groups in (Parliament), the Supreme Advisory Council ... Cabinet and other State and Society institutions in outlining the State's policy'.

This integration had at times been impeded by divisions of opinion between the Army leaders and some of the regional or territorial commanders, particularly in the Outer Islands. Many of these commanders had, due to their isolation, formed what were virtually regional armies. By 1953, according to one source, real power in the Army lay with the territorial commanders.

An attempt to resolve this situation was made in 1955 at a meeting of senior officers.
INDONESIAN ATTITUDE TO INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGNS

in Jogjakarta. Although the primary reason for the meeting was to devise a strategy to prevent what was seen as increasing political interference in military affairs, it also served as a forum to resolve differences between territorial commanders and the Army leadership. It was clearly in the Army's interest to present a united front. The value of such a united front was shown when the Cabinet of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo appointed General Bambang Utojo as the Army Chief-of-Staff. Senior officers objected to the appointment on the grounds that it was clearly political, and the Utojo was too junior for such a position. Faced with this resolve, the Cabinet was forced to resign, and Nasution, sacked in 1953, was reappointed. From this time on, the Army became assertive in the civilian sphere.

During the 1950s there were a series of internal disturbances, particularly in the Outer Islands, which led to the declaration of martial law in 1957. The 'Three Souths' rebellion (South Sulawesi, South Sumatra and South Kalimantan), which commenced in February 1958 and lasted three years, had two important consequences for the Army. First, Army leaders were able to remove from the Outer Islands most of the more radical officers, particularly those who had identified with the rebels. Secondly, the suppression of the rebellion emphasized the importance of the Army and gave it more prominence in political affairs, in addition to justifying the continuation of martial law.

The Army's strategy in the suppression of the rebellions was a further indication of growing political awareness. Led by a more secure and confident Nasution, the Army at all times sought a policy of negotiation with the rebels, and armed clashes were few and minor. Throughout the rebellion, the Army's conduct was such that the whole campaign was termed by a British journalist as 'the most civil Civil War in history'.

From this position of growing political awareness and increasing social importance, the Army now analysed its position in relation to the PKI. Despite the authority conferred on it through martial law, the Army was concerned to note that the strength of the PKI was increasing. The rise of the PKI was actively supported by President Sukarno who saw it as a means of maintaining a balance between an increasingly powerful Army and the Presidency. This expansion of the PKI was viewed with concern by the Army who saw the communists as their main rivals in both the political and social fields. The Army saw that it was in its own interest to limit the PKI's potential for growth.

An early attempt to limit this expansion occurred in July 1960 when the PKI issued a critical evaluation of the achievements of the Cabinet. The Army was also criticized in the evaluation which was published in the Party's official newspaper. Acting under their martial law authority, Army leaders responded quickly. Several PKI leaders, including the Chairman D. N. Aidit, were interrogated by Army intelligence officers, and some were imprisoned. The Party was also 'denied permission to operate' in several of the Outer Islands, at the instigation of local Army Commander.

The President intervened. Reluctantly, the Army ceased its interference, at least overtly, in PKI affairs. Sukarno's relationship with the PKI at this time was illustrated in an address he gave on the eve of the PKI's July, 1960 attack.

'I do not fear the communists. I have no leftist phobia... I and the PKI have many differences, but we also have similar views with regard to anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, the fate of workers and peasants, the West Irian issue'.

Sukarno now pressed this philosophy on the Army. He was concerned that the Army also should not entertain any 'leftist phobias' that might be dangerous to his delicate balance of power. In order to achieve clearer recognition of his sympathy with the PKI, Sukarno at this time intensified his campaign of NASAKOM, a blending of nationalism, religion and communism into one basic philosophy. NASAKOM was a direct descendent of Pancasila, embodying the elements of the Indonesian Revolution. In this manner, Sukarno was able to attack what he termed anti-NASAKOMism, identifying this as anti-Pancasila, and thus counter-revolutionary. The effect of this was to manoeuvre the Army into a more vigorous pursuit of the 'anti-colonialist' and 'anti-imperialist' West Irian campaign.

Anti-imperialism, with special emphasis on the recovery of West Irian, had been one of the three basic goals of the 'Kerdja' (Work) Cabinet, laid down in July, 1959. The other
two objectives were the provision of adequate food and clothing for the people and the restoration of internal security.

The West Irian issue had preoccupied Sukarno from the time of Indonesia's independence. To him, and to many other Indonesians, it was the last bastion of the Dutch empire in South-east Asia, and he saw its continuing rule by the Dutch as an insult to the Indonesian people. A policy of increased pressure on Dutch nationals, including the seizure of Dutch estates and businesses was implemented together with a planned deterioration of diplomatic relations. This culminated with Indonesia breaking diplomatic ties with the Netherlands in August, 1960.

Thus, in the latter half of 1960, the Army was in an awkward position. The removal of many of the more radical commanders after the 'Three Souths' had left it with a more moderate leadership, under less pressure to adopt or support radical policies. From its handling of the rebellion, the Army had gained a measure of prestige, and while not overly popular, it was at least recognized as a moderating influence. Indeed, its restraint in suppressing the rebellion may well have gained the Army more sympathy from the general populace. To counter this new-found prestige was the rising influence of the PKI which, although lacking arms, enjoyed the benign protection of the President, as evidenced in his intervention in the July 1960 incident. The PKI had enthusiastically embraced NASAKOM, to the suspicion of the Army, and was echoing Sukarno's anti-imperialist rhetoric. Clearly, the Army had to be seen to support NASAKOM, but there were practical difficulties.

The Army, with its role as the protector of the Ideals of the Revolution, was concerned with the restoration of security within Indonesia as stated by the 'Kerdja' Cabinet. This selection of a different priority to that of the President was most likely influenced by a realization of the capabilities of the Armed Forces, rather than a simple matter of security. The limitations to the Army's operational effectiveness, resulting from a paucity of equipment and a lack of suitable training, were well known by Army leaders. Nevertheless, the experience of the Outer Islands must have been fresh in the minds of the Army, and it must have been concerned about any eventuality which might lead to a weakening of its ability to counter an insurrection.

An Indonesian Army assessment of the invasion of West Irian was less than enthusiastic about the chances of success. The assessment stated that, to be successful, the Army would have to rely on the boldness of its plan and the high morale of the troops, as well as the weakness of the Dutch. Against potential success, the analyst noted problems with the lack of time to obtain sea or air superiority, the length of the line of communication, the slow speed of unprotected convoys, and the lack of joint training, particularly amphibious exercises.

The Army leaders were well aware that the lack of sea or air power could be overcome, particularly if the requirements for the liberation of West Irian were used as a rationale for an arms purchase. Thus, from the Army's point of view, West Irian became the 'poisoned chalice'. Nasution, well aware that effective military operations depended upon adequate sea and air power, also knew that the issue of West Irian could be used for raising finance for the purchase of the necessary equipment. The irony of such a purchase was that the arms supplied would be overwhelmingly for use by the Navy and the Air Force, which would thus be strengthened at the expense of the Army.

Another difficulty concerning the arms was the source of supply. The only possible suppliers of the quantity and types required, given the nature of the long-term financing required for such purchases, were the USA or USSR. Apparently most officers, including Nasution, preferred US equipment either because of perceived superiority or because US equipment was already in-service in the Indonesian Armed Forces. However, suspicion of Russia's involvement in the communist rebellion at Madjim in 1948 may also have been a factor. Nasution, in particular, had made strong overtures to the US for the supply of arms. Increasingly concerned by Sukarno's statements concerning West Irian, and aware of the use to which such weapons would be put, all requests were refused by the US. Nasution was eventually instructed by Cabinet to negotiate an arms purchase with the Soviet Union.

In 1961 Sukarno issued orders to the Army to prepare a plan for the military liberation of West Irian, although the heavy equipment
necessary for such an operation had not yet arrived from the USSR. In a speech to the nation on 17 August 1961, the anniversary of the gaining of independence, Sukarno emphasized the importance of the military build-up. Later, on 19 December 1961, he announced the formation of TRIKORA (The People's Triple Command — established to command forces involved in operations in West Irian). TRIKORA was tasked with ensuring that planning for the operation was accelerated, in concert with a program of increased domestic agitation against the Dutch presence in West Irian.

Despite the bellicosity of Sukarno, there were still signs of Army reluctance to undertake the campaign. During 1960 and 1961, General Nasution visited Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, repeatedly giving assurances that Indonesia would not resort to force. Moreover, during a closed lecture given to students at the Indonesian Army Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in August 1961, Nasution told officers that while the 'Kerdja' Cabinet had stated that the struggle for West Irian would continue, this did not mean that the Army should be tied to a specific time-frame. He continued:

'It would be too arrogant of us to decide to regain West Irian within three years. The West Irian problem has not yet become a basic problem. An example is the approach taken by the military commander near there. Recognizing that West Irian is not a basic problem, he does not provide special security for this single matter . . . from now until the end of 1962 the restoration of security will be the number one problem'.

A final example of the Army's apparent reluctance to become decisively involved in the West Irian campaign is the TRIKORA announcement of 19 December 1961. Several days before, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, had stated that 'the President . . . will announce on 19 December his final command for the inclusion of West Irian into the Indonesian Republic'. Despite this somewhat pugnacious attitude, the TRIKORA made no such statement. It was, in the words of one observer, not an improbable speculation that the Army leadership (which controlled TRIKORA) acted as a moderating influence over the 'final command'.

Although the Army did not want a decisive engagement, it had been a front runner in the Revolution and remained intensely nationalistic. As one of the objectives of the Revolution had been the liberation of all territories governed by the Dutch, it is likely that the Army felt a sense of humiliation over the continued Dutch occupation of West Irian. Certainly the Army's task in the Revolution would not be complete without the liberation of the territory.

This may account for the ambiguous statements that Army leaders, including Nasution, made at this time. As early as February 1960, Nasution stated that Indonesia should be prepared to face all circumstances, including 'territorial war' in the liberation of West Irian. In August 1960, he also stated that 'the West Irian claims should be settled within West Irian itself'. Yet, at the same time, he was repeatedly stated that West Irian had no intention of invasion. Other indications of a more moderate approach included a request from General Nasution to the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, that he mediate behind the scenes between Indonesia and Holland.

Despite the apparent reluctance of the Army to be drawn into a full-scale conflict, in 1962 it began preparation for military action. In January an Area Command for West Irian (MANDALA) was formed, headed by Major General Soeharto. The Command was given the tasks of planning and implementing military operations against West Irian.

The military planners devised a three-phase operation: in the first phase ten companies of infantry were to be infiltrated; then during an exploitation phase, armed forces would attack designated targets in the territory; and finally Indonesian authority would be consolidated in those centres of population capture in the second phase.

Throughout the campaign, the Indonesian Army seemed content to rely on psychological, rather than physical, warfare to achieve a result. The preferred tactic was to apply pressure, diplomatic as well as military, each time the Dutch showed signs of giving ground. On 26 March 1962, for example, just as secret talks in the US between Indonesia and Holland concluded, an Army supplementary order called for intensification of infiltration. Later, despite Subandrio's acceptance 'in principle' of a proposed cease-fire put forward by
United Nations Secretary General, U Thant and US negotiator Ellsworth Bunker, and its acceptance by the Dutch, Sukarno stated that Indonesia was stepping up military activities 'because of the build-up of Dutch forces there'.

The Indonesian West Irian campaign relied initially on 'volunteers', who were apparently used to demonstrate the intensity of feeling for the liberation of West Irian within Indonesia. Such 'volunteers' were constantly referred to by Sukarno and Subandrio as part of their 'rally the people' approach. Appeals for volunteers were made in Malaysia and Singapore, as well as within Indonesia, and were quite successful, particularly among the communists and the labour movement.

As soldiers, the 'volunteers' were singularly unsuccessful. Although given some training and military equipment, and often bolstered by regular soldiers, their military contribution was indeed slight. An account of the activities of one group is perhaps representative:

'On 10 November 1960, twenty-three heavily armed Indonesians landed not far from Etna Bay. All wore Army uniforms, and claimed to have been addressed by General Nasution prior to departure. A number had belonged to an earlier group of infiltrators who had been captured in West Irian in 1954, and had been sent home after a four-year prison term. At least one of the leaders of the November 1960 group declared that he made the trip under duress . . . The group as a whole complained of poor organization, great hardships and the utter futility of their efforts. All had been killed or captured by March'.

Nevertheless, despite their military ineffectiveness, it is possible that the 'volunteers', supported by regular troops, were of benefit to the Indonesian campaign. Faced with increasing psychological pressure caused by real or imagined Indonesian infiltrators, and increasing US diplomatic pressure, the Dutch signed an agreement on 15 August 1962 transferring authority for West Irian to Indonesia on 1 May 1963.

The approach used by the Army was that of low-key infiltration tactics. By limiting the number of people involved in the campaign, less logistic support was required. The Army's success came with the use of psychological warfare on an enemy increasingly reluctant to fight.

It is apparent that throughout the period, the Army leadership did not want to become decisively engaged. The deficiencies in sea and air support were only too readily apparent, and would only be rectified at the expense of the Army. The Army's recent experience with the 'Three Souths' rebellion left it with a concern for the maintenance of internal security. Internal security was one of the three objectives laid down by the 'Kerdja' Cabinet, and was considered by the Army to be of greater importance than the West Irian problem. On the other hand, the Army could not afford to be seen to be reluctant to fight; to do so would be contrary to the 'Spirit of 45' and the Army's pre-eminent place in the Revolution.

Crush Malaysia

As the West Irian campaign drew to a close, the Army's main concerns were the problems of maintaining a non-military role in the aftermath of martial law, the country's critical economic decline and the rising power of the PKI.

Martial law had been instituted in Indonesia as a direct result of the Outer Islands rebellions, and it gave the Army an entree into the administrative life of the country. Using emergency regulations, it banned strikes, broke up demonstrations, controlled the use of slogans and ran the former Dutch estates. Under martial law, the Army began to develop as a duplicate administration. In some areas, particularly in the supervision of the import-export trade, the control of rice and of all forms of transport, it replaced the Government. An Army signature was needed for many transactions and the citizens began to complain.

With the liberation of West Irian, martial law was revoked despite the protests of the Army. In an effort to check the erosion of its administrative base, and also as a means of preventing the social discontent that would invariably result with the demobilization of the West Irian 'volunteers' and other members of the Army with no apparent function, the Army now turned to a programme of civic action.

As long as the West Irian campaign lasted, the Army had argued the case for a large infantry force. It undertook a recruitment program that increased its size to in excess of
350,000, including thousands of hastily trained 'volunteers' and short term draftees. After the Dutch agreed to leave West Irian peacefully, the rationale for such a large army suddenly evaporated. It was realized however, that the demobilization of scores of thousands of soldiers was out of the question; unemployed and discontented, they would undoubtedly be the cause of much civil unrest. The answer was seen in a vast civic action programme which was agreed to be General Nasution.

Operasi Bhakti, the civic action program, was not universally popular with Army officers. Younger officers, in particular, saw little glamour in such tasks as road construction and bridge building. Yet the Army leadership saw the political significance of the program as an opportunity to maintain grass-roots contact with the population. In particular Operasi Bhakti was seen as a way of competing with the PKI for the support of the population.

At the same time as implementing its civic action program, the Army leadership now saw the opportunity to examine the economic situation within the country, particularly with regard to economic management. The Deputy Commandant of SESKOAD (the late Lieutenant General Suwarto) had pioneered the broadening of officer training into political, social and economic fields, and frequently called on the services of lecturers from the University of Indonesia. This contact had led to the drafting, in the early 1960s, of the Army's 'Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management'.

The Army leadership saw the possibilities of its territorial management programme, in concert with Operasi Bhakti, being supported by a generous US aid program which was then under negotiation. The aid programme was seen by the Army as crucial to economic stabilization, and it viewed with alarm any attempt to disrupt the negotiations. The PKI's 'Crush Malaysia' campaign was seen by the Army to be such a disruption, and was viewed by Army leaders with suspicion.

Probably the most important political factor in the period between the liberation of West Irian and the 'Crush Malaysia' campaign was the rivalry between the Army and the PKI. During the West Irian campaign, the Army and the PKI had both received popular support, which, aligned with the sense of national purpose inspired by Sukarno's rhetoric, was enough to keep the opponents in uneasy harmony. The cessation of hostilities introduced a strong sense of uncertainty among all groups. The President was concerned that the delicate balance of power shared during the campaign might be weighted in the Army's favour as the Armed Forces turned their attention to domestic matters. The Army in turn was concerned that its administrative base would be weakened following the lifting of martial law.

An opportunity for Sukarno to weaken the Army's leadership was presented to him, ironically, by General Nasution. Nasution, keen to consolidate his power as Minister of Defence and Security, had proposed that he be elevated from his position of Army Chief-of-Staff to a new position as Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff, with full authority over all Services. Nasution proposed one of his deputies, General Yani, to be appointed Army Chief-of-Staff.

Thus Sukarno was provided with an opportunity to divide the Army leadership. Nasution was widely considered to be the Army's outstanding general, but his popularity was not unanimous among his fellow officers. In particular his suppression of corrupt practices among some senior officers had caused some resentment. On the other hand, General Yani, although an anti-communist, was seen as less likely to be critical of Sukarno's policies. A Javanese, he tended to regard Sukarno as bapak — a father who might be wrong but could not be openly contradicted. His military reputation was sound, and he was widely regarded as a 'moderate' who would be more malleable than the aesthetic Nasution.

Sukarno's master stroke came after Yani had been appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Army and Nasution installed in the top position in the Armed Services. Led by Air Force Chief-of-Staff Omar Dhani, each of the other Service Chiefs-of-Staff complained to Sukarno (possibly at Sukarno's instigation) that they could not possibly serve under someone with no experience in their service. Sukarno's answer was to appoint each of the Chiefs-of-Staff as Commanders of their respective Services, answerable to Sukarno as Commander-in-Chief. Nasution, while remaining Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff, had his function changed from operational control of the Services to mere administrative co-ordination and civil defence. Nasution was, in effect, 'kicked upstairs'.
As well as causing division among the ranks of the Army’s leadership, where the ‘Nasution group’ and the ‘Yani group’ provided the basis of a divided command, Sukarno actively sought to promote inter-service rivalry. As already stated, the arms purchases prior to the West Irian campaign had greatly increased the prestige of the Navy and the Air Force. Both services were considered much more radical than the Army and contained a significant number of officers sympathetic to the aims of the PKI. It was really only the Army that displayed the ‘leftist phobia’ that was anathema to Sukarno.

Opposition to the Federation of Malaysia, as previously mentioned, was first raised by the PKI after federation was proposed by Tuku Abdul Rahman on 27 May 1961. The Party’s Central Committee formally condemned the planned federation as a form of ‘neo-colonialism’ and an ‘attempt to suppress the democratic and patriotic movements’ of the inhabitants of the Malaysian area.

From the Malaysian point of view, the Prime Minister considered that the communists were the driving force behind the confrontation. In an article written in 1965, he stated:

‘The Communists consider us an obstacle to be reckoned with in their grand design to subject all Asia to their influence. Obviously Malaysia from this point of view had to be “crushed”. The Communists were quick to seize the opportunity to implement their crushing vicariously through Indonesia, a country with which we had always felt close fraternity . . .’

The Tunku went on to state that unfortunately neither Sukarno nor the Army did anything to stop the PKI, and that he felt that the Communists were supported by Sukarno.

The preparations for the ‘Crush Malaysia’ campaign were continuing. In May 1964 President Sukarno announced the formation of DWIKORA (the ‘People’s Two Commands’ and the successor to TRIKORA). The DWIKORA was given the twofold aim of ‘tearing Malaysia apart’ and ‘intensifying the revolution’. Significantly for the Army, Sukarno chose the Air Force Commander, Air Vice Marshall Dhani, described as ‘young, inexperienced but impressionable and highly ambitious’, to lead the Command. The deputy position went to the Navy, while the Army, the senior Service in the Armed Forces, was relegated to the second deputy’s post. The President’s justification for selecting the Air Force and the Navy in front of the Army lay in the new found capability of these Services following the Soviet arms influx. However, the decision also recognized the lack of genuine enthusiasm among Army leaders for confrontation, compared with that of the Air Force and Navy, and Sukarno’s influence within these Services.

The ‘Crush Malaysia’ campaign began with an ineffective revolt in Brunei by the North Kalimantan National Army (TKNU) in November 1962. Despite Sukarno’s support of the revolt with a series of violent denunciations of the new Federation, it had been put down by May 1963. During this period, training camps for irregular ‘volunteers’ were set up along the Brunei—Indonesian Kalimantan Border. Border raids commenced during April/May 1963, again using ‘volunteers’ as had been the strategy in the West Irian campaign. However, there is some evidence that these volunteers were led by former or recently discharged Indonesian Army officers. In Borneo the ‘volunteers’ operated until March 1964 when, in the words of one observer, ‘all pretence was abandoned and normal operations were resumed at full scale’. The control of operations had passed to the Indonesian Army, and regular soldiers were beginning to fight as units, rather than as advisers to bands of ‘volunteers’.

In Peninsula Malaya and Singapore, a program of recruiting dissident Malay nationals and Chinese by the Indonesian Army had commenced in the late 1950s. Although considerable activity was undertaken in gathering information, and some training was conducted in subversion and espionage, the program appears to have been an abject failure. At no time did the dissidents look like achieving their avowed aim of overthrowing the Malaysian Government.

Even though the Army was now in control of operations against Malaysia, there was little sign of widening the conflict. There was good reason for this; it lay in the Army’s awareness of the vulnerability to Indonesia to sea or air attack. For instance, widening the conflict might lead to Britain’s use of her over-whelming naval or air power — a fear which Britain skilfully played on by a rapid build-up of these forces after the initial Indonesian landings.
By the latter half of 1964, the Army had found another reason to avoid the commitment of more troops to Confrontation; in mid-1964 the intelligence section of the Army’s Strategic Command (KOSTRAD) identified a threat to internal security brought about by a continuous rise in the strength of the PKI. According to KOSTRAD’s assessment, while the Army had over 600 battalions, most were under-strength and only about twenty-five were regarded as really good units. To have one-third of these twenty-five battalions involved in confrontation — as was thought to be necessary — would have left the Army vulnerable to a Sukarno — organized ‘putsch’. That this threat was considered serious was borne out by the Army’s sluggish action in preparing ‘invasion’ plans and organizing troop movements.

A final indication of the Army’s reluctance to widen operations was shown by the activities of KOSTRAD’s Special Operations Branch (OPSUS). The major task of OPSUS during this period was the establishment of informal liaison with the Malaysian Government, a liaison, of course, which remained unknown to President Sukarno. This led to the establishment, in early 1965, of a permanent liaison office in Bangkok between the Malaysian Department of Foreign Affairs and OPSUS personnel. The secret talks had made little real headway, but, by the time of the coup, the Army had established some contacts, and a measure of goodwill.

With the post-coup transfer of authority from Sukarno to Soeharto on 11 March 1966, the reason for confrontation vanished. Less than three months later, a delegation led by Foreign Minister Adam Malik met in Bangkok to discuss a ‘normalization’ of relations between the two countries. Despite the Army’s lack of enthusiasm during the campaign, there was now some embarrassment over the terms on which Malik reached agreement with the Malaysians. Army participants at the conference were said to be ‘amazed’ that Malik had agreed to the recognition of Malaysia. According to one general who had been a member of the delegation at Bangkok, it was ‘essential to prove, for the sake of history, that Confrontation had been launched for good reason — that it was not all just a mistake, something done for no reason’.

Throughout the ‘Crush Malaysia’ campaign, the Army leaders behaved with characteristic moderation. Despite the replacement of Nastution with the more malleable Yani, the Army was never thoroughly committed to the campaign. It was far more concerned with its position in Indonesian society, the state of the economy, and the rise of the PKI which it saw as a threat to internal security. Despite these problems, the Army was quite willing to take control of operations after the ‘volunteers’ fiasco. It should be remembered that thereafter operations were conducted almost exclusively in Borneo. The Army leaders were well aware of British air and sea superiority, and had no desire for a wider conflict.

**East Timor**

The GESTAPU (30 September) movement effectively changed Indonesia’s political stance. Regardless of who planned or executed the coup, the results were clear. It was the end for Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’. The ensuing power struggle eventually led to the destruction of the PKI, the replacement of Sukarno by Soeharto, and the emergence of the Army as the dominant force in Indonesia.

Beginning in October 1965, the Army leaders were able to tighten their grip on the Government of Indonesia. The elimination of the PKI removed the only serious opposition to the Army’s political and social base. Of the twenty-seven members appointed to Cabinet in 1966, twelve were from the Armed forces, and six of the most important were from the Army. Further, a large proportion of senior public servants were recruited from the Armed Forces. In virtually all departments where the minister was not a military man, at least one of his senior public servants was.

The Army further consolidated its position in the 1971 elections. Prior to polling day, all regional and local government officials were required to join the Government association GOLKAR (Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups). In the election GOLKAR won sixty-three per cent of the votes, two hundred and thirty-six of the three hundred and sixty elected seats and was the leading party in all provinces. In the new Parliament, the GOLKAR candidates were joined by one hundred members (seventy-five from the Armed Forces) appointed by the Government, giving GOLKAR control of seventy-three per cent of the Parliament.
From this authoritative position, the Government and the Army were now faced with a potentially disruptive situation in East Timor. Following a coup in Lisbon and the downfall of the Caetano regime, the left-wing sympathies of the new Portuguese Government were faced with increased political activity throughout Portugal and its colonies.

In East Timor three political parties were created in April 1974. The three parties, two major and one minor in terms of supporters, were soon to be instigators in a series of political disturbances that were viewed with concern by neighbouring Indonesia.

The Democratic Union of Timor (UDT), was initially formed with the objective of retention of constitutional links with Portugal. In August 1975, following a coup that ended in fiasco, the party changed its course and advocated integration with Indonesia. The second party, the Popular Democratic Association of Timor (Apodeti), from the outset had favoured integration with Indonesia and had received encouragement and possibly financial assistance from Indonesian officials.

The third party was the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin), probably the largest of the parties, and at that time the only one with a clear social and economic program. Fretilin stated its aims as land reforms, the modernization of agriculture and the combat of illiteracy, among other social and economic reforms. As the name of the Party implies, it sought independence for East Timor. The membership of Fretilin was considered by observers to be more radical than that of the other parties and included a number of left-wing students recently returned from Portugal.

A coalition between UDT and Fretilin was formed in January, 1975. The coalition policy included some reversals from UDT's previous policies: independence within several years, and the formation of a transitional government. Integration with Indonesia was firmly rejected. Perhaps due to these reversals, the coalition did not last. A rift was apparent in April, and in May the coalition was dissolved. Animosity between the two parties continued to grow, with armed clashes occurring in various parts of the island.

The clashes led to an attempted coup by UDT. According to one observer, the coup was apparently supported by the police, and it was claimed by Fretilin that it was also supported by Japanese and Australian business interests. The coup was unsuccessful and was countered by Fretilin. In the fighting that followed, UDT was virtually over-run and, by the end of August, 1975, had been forced to withdraw to a few strongholds along the Indonesian border.

Throughout the coup and counter-coup, there was little comment from the Indonesian Government, although it must have viewed the left-oriented Fretilin successes with concern. Indonesia had no desire to have an independent, unstable state sharing a common border, particularly in view of the possible alignment that Fretilin might have with the Chinese.

The Army's position on the Timor issue was generally regarded as 'hawkish'; in favour of a quick 'surgical strike' against Fretilin. This was the position of the Minister of Defence and Security, Lieutenant General Maradan Panggabean, and his position strengthened as the left increased its grip on the country during the civil war.

Indonesian Government statements of the time show the concern which Indonesian felt. On 18 August 1975 President Soeharto declared that Indonesia had 'no territorial ambitions' over East Timor, but the process of decolonization must be 'truly in conformity with the wishes of the people'. A few days later, General Panggabean stated that whether or not Indonesia sent troops to East Timor depended on events, and that Indonesians would 'abide by the wishes of the people, like the world did to us over the West Irian issue'.

A factor in the Army's proposal for a 'surgical strike' was its opposition to the use of 'volunteers' in East Timor, in the same manner as the two previous campaigns. Objection to the use of volunteers stemmed from two main areas: members of the Army would not be seen to be taking part in what was perceived to be a major operation, and the command staff of the Defence and Security Command (HANKAM), technically responsible for operations of this nature, were denied their role. It could also be supposed that the Army, having analysed the effect of the 'volunteers' in the previous campaigns, was reluctant to be associated with this potentially unsuccessful strategy.

It is evident that President Soeharto was reluctant to employ regular troops from the
beginning, as advised by the Army. To have done so would certainly have drawn criticism of his carefully managed "independent and active" foreign policy, and probably drawn unfavourable comparisons from Sukarnoism. Thus the President, against the wishes of the Army, embarked on a campaign of protection of the Indonesian border, using 'volunteer' soldiers rather than formed units.

While these 'volunteers' were involved in clashes with Freljilin troops, most activity was small-scale. However, the situation changed completely when Freljilin announced a 'declaration of independence' on 28 November 1975. Indonesia now had what she feared; and independent, unstable state sharing a common border.

The invasion of East Timor commenced at dawn on 7 December 1975. An invasion force, numbered by various observers at between two and ten thousand, landed at Dili by sea and air. Despite the references by the Government to 'volunteers', there was no doubt that the incursion into East Timor was a full-scale military operation, controlled by the Indonesian Army.

It is noteworthy that the Indonesian Army was much more willing to become involved in large-scale military operations in East Timor from the outset, than had been the case with the previous two campaigns. In 1975 the Army was operating from a base of undenied strength. Its permeation throughout all levels of society, and the elimination of the PKI, meant that internal security would not be the problem that it had been in the previous campaigns. The Army was better equipped, better trained and with unquestionably better support from the other services than it had been in the past. It may also have been of significance that this time no other major power appeared interested in the actions of Indonesia towards East Timor.

Conclusion

The degree of involvement of the Indonesian Army in each of the three campaigns has depended in each instance on how the Army viewed its position in Indonesian society, particularly in relation to the balance of power.

At the commencement of the West Irian campaign, the Army had only recently suppressed a rebellion in the Outer Islands. It had gained some popular approval for the tactics it had used, particularly its willingness no negotiate. Despite the suppression of the rebels, and the consolidation of the Army leadership's power following the removal of certain disdident officer, Army leaders remained concerned about the internal security situation.

At the same time, Army leaders were aware of Indonesia's paucity of sea and air power. With the necessity for a long line of communication, this was an obvious disadvantage to a large-scale campaign. Although equipment could be obtained, it meant dealing with the Russians who had been objects of suspicion since Madiun. Worse still, the supply of new equipment would benefit the Air Force and the Navy, at the expense of the Army.

Thus for the Army, West Irian was the 'poisoned chalice'. To the intensely nationalist Army leaders, the continuing occupation of the Territory by the Dutch was humiliation. The Army would fail in its commitment to the Revolution if it failed to act. Yet in the opinion of the Army leaders, the time was not right, and the Army was not ready.

The Indonesians gained West Irian almost by default and, although the Army obtained increased prestige in the Government and among the population, the accolades were not necessarily deserved. The more pragmatic among the Army leaders must have been aware of the realities of the 'glorious victory', for they were certainly not stampeded into the next campaign, 'Crush Malaysia'.

Here the crucial issue, from the Army's point of view, was the rise of the PKI. The balance of power was all-important in the early 1960s; a fact only too well understood by the President, the PKI and the Army. Sukarno sought to protect the PKI and limit the power of the Army; in turn, the PKI sought to increase its prestige by initiating the 'Crush Malaysia' campaign to promote its 'anti-imperialist', 'anti-colonialist' stance. The Army, even suspicious of the PKI, sought to increase its 'people's army' character by undertaking a massive civic action project and by concentrating on economic recovery, particularly 'territorial management'.

Under increasing pressure, the Army finally participated in the Campaign, taking control after the fiasco of 'volunteers' landing on the Malayan Peninsula. Despite control of the campaign, the Army still showed caution; operations were limited to the Kaliman-
The invasion of East Timor was undoubtedly regular military force. With the elimination of the PKI, the Army assumed a position of undisputed authority. The transfer of authority from Sukarno to Soeharto meant that the Army had now reached the presidency. A new moderation now characterized the conduct of foreign affairs.

The advent of civil war in East Timor was viewed with concern by the Army. There were no doubts about the political stance of Fretelin, and the Army saw its old adversary, the communists, gaining a toehold on the Indonesian archipelago. This was anathema to the Army; internal security could be threatened, and there was a possibility of strong ties between China and an independent left-oriented East Timor. It was no accident that Jakarta had still not reopened diplomatic ties with Peking.

The influence of the Army on the Government’s East Timor policy was a reversal of its stance in the two previous Campaigns. In fact, all positions were altered. Instead of a bellicose President prodding a reluctant Army, the situation now was hawkish advice being given to a President determined to avoid precipitous action, and the charge of ‘Sukarnoism’. Eventually, as a result of Fretelin’s declaration of independence and the lack of interest by other nations in the affairs of East Timor, Soeharto invoked the Army.

Finally, a word on the use of ‘volunteers’. The role of these has been obviously political. While ‘volunteers’ may have been of some use in West Irian for their psychological value against an enemy increasingly unwilling to fight, their military value in Malaysia was certainly questionable. It was their lamentable results in the Malayan peninsula that led to the Army’s involvement in Confrontation.

The ‘volunteers’ in East Timor prior to the December invasion were undoubtedly regular soldiers. Their small-scale actions seemed to be aimed by keeping the military situation reasonably stable, while providing a measure of security for Indonesia along the common border. After the invasion, despite the Government’s references to ‘volunteers’, there were certainly regular soldiers operating as part of a regular military force.

NOTES

3. There has been much discussion as to whether GOLKAR is a political party or not. It originated as part of an Army attempt to mobilize various interest groups in opposition to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Its present function is to provide a common emblem for elected and appointed members of Parliament associated with the Government. It has no deep roots in Indonesian society, as, for example, parties with a common religious basis, and probably would not survive without Government support. GOLKAR is, by nature and membership, pro-Army.
5. For the most recent reference, see The Bulletin, 6 Oct 81.
8. Weinstein, p 220.
12. The Panji Sila, or five principles belief in God, nationalism, humanism, democracy and social justice is the underlying principle of the Indonesian Constitution. Sukarno’s revolution was described by Nasution as a continuous revolution against its permanent enemies: contra-revolutionaries and colonialists/imperialists.
13. Speech to the West Irian People’s Consultation, Jayapura, 30 Apr 64. Note that although Nasution uses the term ‘Armed Forces’, the Army was by far the largest of the four Services that comprise the Indonesian Armed Forces.
INDONESIAN ATTITUDE TO INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGNS

1. This view is only partially shared by Drummond (p 428) who states that the Army was to some extent mainly as a consequence of the 'glorious victory' in West Irian. However he concedes that the 'more cautious' were aware of how little had been achieved in the Arafura Sea, and how much more dangerous confrontation with British air and naval power would be. Nasution, in the author's opinion, shared the views of the more cautious. Sundhaussen, Ulf. The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics. Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Australian Political Studies Association, Monash University, Aug 71. Sundhaussen believes that Prime Minister Djijananda could count on the firm support of Nasution for his planned austerity program, 'an attitude consistent with the Army's view that is own strength is dependent on Indonesia's economic strength.'


3. Polomka, Confrontation, pp 34-35; Drummond, p 427. Drummond considers that the supply of weapons had little effect on the West Irian campaign. The major effect of the arms purchase was the increased political importance gained by the Navy and Air Force.


5. Polomka, Confrontation, pp 32-33. The aims of TRIKORA were:
   * prevent the establishment of an independent State in West Irian;
   * hoist the Red and White (Indonesian) Flag in West Irian; and
   * prepare for general mobilization.

6. Polomka, Confrontation, pp 33-34.


13. Polomka, Confrontation, p 42.


20. van der Kroef, Indonesian Communism, pp 364-365. van der Kroef also stresses that demobilization would weaken the strength of the Army vis-a-vis the PKI.

21. Polomka, Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp 87-88.


25. Crouch, p 52.


28. Crouch, p 52.


31. van der Kroef, Indonesian Communism, p 360.

32. Rahman, Tunku Abdul. 'Malaysia: Key Area in Southeast Asia.' Foreign Affairs, Vol 43 No 4, Jul 65. p 666.

33. Polomka, Confrontation, pp 159-160.

34. Polomka, Confrontation, pp 160-161.


37. Polomka, Confrontation, pp 171-172.

38. Polomka, Confrontation, p 173.


40. Polomka, Indonesia Foreign Policy, p 103.

41. Weinstein, p 339.

42. Crouch, p 213.

43. See note 3.

44. Crouch, p 216.

45. van Dijk, Cees. East Timor. RIMA, Vol 10 No 1, Jan-Jun 76. pp 5-7. It should be noted that van Kijk's article is primarily from Indonesian newspaper sources.

46. van Kijk, pp 7-8.

47. van Dijk, pp 13-14.


49. The Bulletin, 30 Sep 75.


51. Asia Yearbook 1977 states 2,000; various other left-wing publications give much higher figures. The actual number is irrelevant due to the rapid build-up of troops in the days subsequent to 7 Dec 75.


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By Brigadier M. H. MacKenzie-Orr OBE GM

As long ago as the 17th Century the French recognised the necessity for appropriate training to provide "technically proficient officers for the artillery and engineers". They founded an artillery school at Douai in 1679 and an engineering school at Mézières in 1749. Prussia's engineering school was founded in 1706 and Britain's Royal Military Academy at Woolwich was founded in 1741 to "provide a gentlemanly and technical education for both engineers and artillery". Interesting that engineers and artillery should require "gentlemanly" as well as "technical" education!

Of course, the education provided was limited, and the bulk of commissions in the British Army continued to be purchased. Between 1860 and 1867 of 4,003 first appointments in the Army 3,167 were by purchase and only 863 without. In the debate which preceded the Cardwell reforms which abolished purchase of commissions in 1871, Lord Cardwell found it necessary to say "... if there is one lesson which we have learned from the history of the late campaign (the Franco-German War), it is this — that the secret of Prussian success has been more owing to the professional education of the officers than to any other cause to which it can be ascribed. Neither gallantry nor heroism will avail without professional training!"

The Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, known colloquially as "The Shop", presumably to identify its graduates with the trade and distinguish them from the practitioners of the higher military arts who had to purchase their right to direct the wars of the 19th Century, developed significantly from the middle of the century following the introduction of competitive entrance examinations in 1863.

By the onset of the Second World War when the Royal Military Academy was moved to Stoke-on-Trent to preserve its staff and students from the Blitz it had a solid pedigree and reputation for producing officers with professional skill and the capacity for technical innovation. A few serving officers became Fellows of the Royal Society.

During the Second World War a number of distinguished officers of the Australian Army attended "war" courses at the Royal Military Academy. They included the Honorary Patron of the Institute of Service Technical Staff Officers, Colonel R. T. Elvish Ed (RL), who attended an inspecting ordnance officers course in 1942. Following the cessation of hostilities the Royal Military Academy was given a permanent home at a wartime Artillery Barracks constructed in the grounds of a lovely old Victorian estate Beckett Hall — now the library. The College became the Royal Military College of Science and its ever widening circle of graduates formed in the early 1950s, what has become a considerable force in college life, the Shrivenham Club.

In 1954, Colonel R. T. Elvish commenced a correspondence with a famous member of the college staff LtCol C. F. Tumber TD RA, with a view to starting an Australian Chapter of the Shrivenham Club. Among the 'names' associated with these beginnings were General McNicholl, General Caust, Brigadier Forest, Brigadier Nurse, Colonel Dean*, Colonel Tonkin, Major Wells*, Major Hill, Colonel Slee, Major Lockett and the first RAAF member WGC DR Northey. (Brigadier Dean, RL, Colonel Wells RL and Colonel Elvish RL are still active members 30 years on.) The first Newsletter recorded inaugural dinners of the Australian Chapter in 1959 attended by:
a. provide the facility, in Australia, for presentation of ideas and opinions related to services materiel and munitions of war;

b. establish and represent the professional status of Services Technical Staff Officers both within and external to the services; and

c. offer advice on education schemes for future technical staff requirements.

The aims of the Institute shall be supported by appropriate social activity amongst the members.

Membership.
The Institute shall consist of:

a. Members — A serving or retired member of the British Commonwealth Services who, being a Technical Staff or Special Equipment graduate of the Royal Military College of Science or equivalent service College, or who, possessing academic/technical qualifications acceptable to the Council, is or was engaged in military technical staff work, shall be eligible to be a Member.

b. Associate Members — An officer not possessing academic/technical qualifications acceptable to the Council, but who is or was engaged in military technical staff work, shall be eligible to be an Associate Member.

c. Honorary Members — An officer, not qualified for other grades of membership who by virtue of signal service to the Institute or by virtue of holding a specific appointment within the Services as determined by the Council, may at the Council's discretion be invited to become an Honorary Member.

d. Patrons — A patron should be a person whose patronage would lend dignity to the Institute. There should be, at any time, one Patron and a number of Service Patrons as determined by the Council.

Patrons of the Institute are:

Professor P. T. Fink CB CBE, Chief Defence Scientist; Rear Admiral R. R. Calder AM RAN, Chief of Naval Technical Services; Major General K. J. Taylor, Chief of Materiel Army; Air Vice Marshal J. A. Dietz, Chief of Air Force Technical Services; Colonel R. T. Elvish ED RL, Honorary Patron.

The Council of the Institute is:

President, Brigadier M. H. MacKenzie-Orr OBE GM; Vice President, Vacant; Secretary, Wing Commander N. Alexander; Treasurer,
At a time when the scientific and technological training of Service officers is constantly under review to enable the services to keep abreast of and direct the service applications of science and technology, the ISTSO could play an important and useful role in the development of Australian Defence capabilities. In 1982, 19 officers graduated from Shrivenham Courses, in 1983 the number was 24 predominantly from Army. These middle ranking officers will face the daunting problems of the military application of science and technology into the 21st Century. Perhaps active membership of the ISTSO will enable them to better exploit the opportunities and prepare their successors for their inheritance.

Further information about the ISTSO can be obtained from:

The Secretary
ISTSO
Campbell Park Offices CP2-3-30
CANBERRA, ACT, 2601

NOTES:

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Per Ardua — Ad Astra

The core of the argument,
The heart of the matter, he said,
Is this — is it a monument
To the proud living, or the dead?
In conjunction with government
The sculptress has turned her back
On outworn modes, — Torment
The curious crowds with lack
Of instant appeal; I'll grant
The texture's smooth and chill,
She said. — Cold blades are meant
For death, but life I feel,
He said. Lectern or wings
At the centre? These lance-like bars —
Do they symbolise our strivings
To yet undetermined stars?

(RAAF Commemorative Sculpture)

MARIAN D. CLINGAN
CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION (CPR) DURING HELICOPTER AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION FROM A FORWARD AREA

By
Flight Lieutenant J. A. Williamson, BSc, MB, BS, DA(Melb), FFARACS,
Flight Lieutenant C. J. LeRoy, B Econ,
Sergeant R. W. Cooper,
Sergeant L. P. Henson, and
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Introduction
The use of helicopters for providing medical aid is established practice in both military and civilian life. However, extensive experience worldwide has shown that patients requiring resuscitation tolerate movement very poorly.

Thus the urgent evacuation from a battle zone of a military casualty in need of resuscitation presents a conflict between the patient’s medical situation and the safety of the rescue and aircraft team. Clearly in this situation the safety of the team and an aircraft takes priority over a single casualty. However, once the decision to perform the aeromedical evacuation (aeromedivac) is made, there is a need to carry it out as quickly as possible while at the same time sustaining effective resuscitation throughout.

This study examined resuscitation capabilities during aeromedivac, using an RAAF UH-1H Iroquois with standard equipment, carried out under “worst possible” conditions — namely, simulated battle conditions, no ground assistance, no special medical equipment, and on a casualty with no effective circulation (circulatory arrest).

Some international agreement now exists regarding resuscitation terminology. This study uses such terms, which are currently endorsed by The Australian Resuscitation Council, viz: Expired Air Resuscitation (EAR), External Cardiac Compression (EEC), Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR).

Personnel and Site
The entire study was conducted at RAAF Base Townsville and involved personnel and equipment from all three squadrons on the formation No. 35 squadron, Base Squadron and No. 27 (City of Townsville) Squadron (RAAF Active Reserve).

A team was selected (Figure 1) on a volunteer basis by the team leader who is an anaesthetist. None of the members other than the leader had had medical training, and their only previous instruction in resuscitation was a standard 2 hour session consisting of a lecture and manikin practice, as part of their normal Air Force training.

Materials and Methods
During this study, internationally agreed upon resuscitation timings were used (2 EAR’s to 15 ECC’s for a single resuscitator and 1 EAR to 5 ECC’s for two resuscitators; a carotid pulse check was performed every 2 minutes). For the objective evaluation of resuscitation efforts the study used a recording manikin* (Figures 1 and 2) which recorded performance quantitatively (volume and time) onto a paper trace for subsequent assessment. In addition one of the team members (AC A. West) is an Air Force Reserve photographer. Full precautions were taken against crossinfection from the use of the manikin. These consisted of:

(a) selection of team members with no recent or current medical history of infections, or medical treatment;
(b) the use of personalised silicone overlay face pieces\(^6\) (Figure 2); and
(c) cleansing of the manikin after each practice session.\(^6\)

The resuscitation techniques employed (EAR, ECC, CPR) did not involve the use of any medical or ancillary resuscitation equipment other than the manikin itself. No additional medical equipment was carried on the aircraft, which was equipped in the standard RAAF manner for forward area duty.

The helicopter and flight crew were provided from No. 35 Squadron, Townsville, and were available during the last 2 days of the study.

The exercise extended over 7 days and was conducted in 3 Phases. The first Phase took 5 days and consisted of preliminary revision of basic anatomical, physiological and technical principles of resuscitation, followed by intensive drill practice of the simulated aeromedivac sequence.\(^1\) This was achieved by preparing a dimensional mock-up of the interior of an UH-IH Iroquois, using a “Ferno Washington” basket stretcher with straps. This stretcher closely resembles the standard Stoke's litter carried in a cradle under the cabin of all RAAF Iroquois helicopters (Figure 3). The entire sequence was well performed using a standard folding RAAF medical stretcher.

Once adequate performance standards in Phase 1 were achieved (Figure 4), Phase 2 applied these skills to an actual aircraft situation under static (non-flight) conditions.
This permitted the superimposing of additional problems associated with aircraft equipment (helmets, harnesses, Stokes litter, seating adjustments), aircraft environment (engine noise, communication limitations, movement restrictions) and aircraft safety (exit and entry, aircrew requirements).

The final third Phase was integration with the flight crew and in-flight performance of the entire aeromedivac exercise under simulated “worst possible” conditions, while the manikin recorded timing and performance continuously.

The study was terminated at the moment when effective CPR on the patient had been re-established on the ground by a waiting “medical” team at the “safe” landing site.

**Results**

**Phase 1:** After 5 days, satisfactory standards of CPR were achieved using the manikin in the mock-up situation (Figure 4).

During this Phase the team members became familiar with the basic problems of airway clearance, airway maintenance, initiation of appropriate resuscitation, and patient transport under unfavourable conditions. Specific problems identified and overcome with the aid of the manikin were difficulty with airway maintenance during EAR in the “basket” stretcher, overinflation of the lungs in “the heat of the moment” producing interference with effective ECC (Figure 6), and a failure to fully relax pressure of the hands on the chest during the “release” phase of ECC.

**Phase 2:** The preparations carried out in Phase 1 resulted in the sequence from landing to the establishment of effective CPR in the static aircraft with rotors turning being quickly mastered (Figure 5 (a) to (i)). Figure 6 shows that adequate CPR was attained under these conditions (in fact on the first attempt).

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**Figure 3** — The Stokes litter in place on a UH-IH Iroquois helicopter

**Figure 4** — Manikin Recording showing adequate resuscitation achieved at the end of Phase 1. The change over from 1-man to 2-man CPR is shown (arrow)
During this Phase several problems encountered in Phase 1 were solved "on the spot" by the loadmaster (FSgt John Porter). The first problem related to the securing of the safety harness worn by the rescuers. During the run to and from the aircraft, the harness had to be secured in such a way that it would not trip the rescuer, but would at the same time be easily freed for quick buckling to the aircraft floor prior to take off. Considerable time was spent developing a technique in Phase 1 (Figure 7) which was only partially successful. The loadmaster solved the problem at a glance (Figure 8).

A second problem concerned the location of the Stoke’s litter during the flight to the casualty site. Rehearsals had been conducted with the litter carried in the cabin in front of the rescue team (Figure 9). It was quickly verified that the extraction of the litter from its normal cradle position on the aircraft by the second rescuer on landing (Figure 10) did not significantly prolong the rescue.

Finally, as pointed out by the loadmaster, it was unnecessary to spend time securing the patient to the litter, nor the litter to the floor of the aircraft for flight conditions — even rough flight. This was verified in Phase 3.
Figure 5 (a) to (i) — The complete rescue sequence performed during static (non-flight) conditions

Figure 6 — Manikin recording of life sustaining CPR being performed under static conditions. Note the transient interference with cardiac compression resulting from relative overinflation of the lungs (arrows)
Phase 3: Happily, and somewhat to the team’s surprise, the application of the technique to the real situation of in-flight CPR, even during “rough flight” conditions — produced no difficulties (Figure 11). The maintenance of effective, life-sustaining CPR during rough flight is illustrated by Figure 12. Even a change over in resuscitation roles in flight by members of a two-man resuscitation team was achieved, in less than 20 seconds (Figure 12).

A typical aeromedivac took about 50 seconds from touchdown until the commencement of resuscitation on the casualty, and a further 60 seconds for the re-establishment of CPR in the aircraft.

At the end of Phase 3, the resuscitation was taken over by a waiting ground team who removed the patient in the litter immediately on touchdown, and recommenced CPR when at a safe distance from the aircraft. The time interval for this temporary interruption of CPR (including observance of all approach and exit safety precautions) averaged about 16 seconds (Figure 13).

Discussion
This study has shown that all necessary steps for the effective performance of life sustaining resuscitation techniques in the complete absence of resuscitation equipment are possible during an aeromedivac under battle conditions, in an RAAF UH-IH Iroquois helicopter.

The results suggest that such an undertaking is unlikely to be either safe or successful unless
Figure 9 — The Stokes litter was initially carried on the aircraft in front of the rescue team.

Figure 10 — The normal stowage of the Stokes litter (see figure 3) permitted speedy retrieval on landing, by the second rescuer.
the rescue team is well trained; also close liaison with the flight crew is essential throughout, although aircraft "inter-com" with the resuscitation team during the return flight, when resuscitation is in progress in the aircraft, do not seem to be necessary. In fact for the rescuer performing EAR in flight, it can prove a positive distraction as he concentrates on airway maintenance and inflation timing. He is unable to operate the voice button during resuscitation, in any case, and the second rescuer has only a seven second opportunity every 2 minutes during carotid pulse checks.

Contrary to popular belief, aircraft vibration produced no problems whatever during this study either for the rescuers, or the recording apparatus on the manikin! It would be interesting to evaluate other aircraft types in this regard.

The standard service flight crew helmets offered no impedance to the performance of resuscitation by the rescuers (Figure 5(h) ) but of course had to be removed immediately from the patient, when present (Figure 5(b) ).

Of the two basic methods of elevating the jaw of an unconscious patient (jaw support and jaw thrust) jaw thrust was found to be superior (Figure 5(i) ). Not only did it maintain an unobstructed airway more readily in the litter under aeromedevac conditions but it also provided increased stability for the rescuer performing EAR in flight. However padded elbows are recommended for protection against discomfort from the wire mesh of the litter.

There is now firmly documented evidence\textsuperscript{4,8,9} to show that the shorter the time interval between the onset of the need for resuscitation
in a patient and its effective commencement, the more likely a successful outcome for the patient. Therefore it is important for the first rescuer to proceed with all speed directly to the casualty immediately on landing. He must not delay to become involved in the extraction or transport of the litter, nor the negotiation of other holdups in the aircraft at that stage. His task is to initiate resuscitation at the earliest possible moment, and to continue it until the second rescuer arrives with the litter (Figure 5 (d)). It is emphasised however that the observance of normal safety precautions around the aircraft is essential, and does not significantly prolong the aeromedivac.

Conclusions
1. The RAAF UH-IH Iroquois permits effective cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in flight without special equipment.
2. At rained resuscitation team is necessary, but no additional flight crew training is required.
3. The technique of evaluation reported here is readily applicable to other small aircraft and could be used to determine their aeromedivac limitations. Such knowledge is essential for military aircraft, especially any new acquisitions.

Acknowledgements
We acknowledge the co-operation and assistance of Squadron Leader L. R. Ward (Rotary Wing Flight Commander 35 SQN), and of the flight crew (Flight Lieutenant Jim Walley, Pilot Officer Steve Cook and FSgt John Porter). In particular, we wish to thank Squadron Leader Bob Peck (Headquarters Operational Command, Glenbrook N.S.W.) and Ms Edith Harrison of Drager Ltd, Townsville, who not only provided the manikin and accessories respectively, but also took a close interest in the study. It is a pleasure to record the advice and encouragement, during all phases of this study and its documentation, of Squadron Leader H. K. Hildebrandt (CO 27 SQN). We are also grateful to Margaret Caulfield for her typing and editing skills.

The permission of Group Captain S. Clark AFC, OC RAAF Base, Townsville, to report this study is gratefully acknowledged.
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AC Tony West served in the RAAF from 1970 to 1976 spending 2 years at Laverton and 4 years at Frognav as a Telecom Tech. He joined the RAAFAR in 1981 and is at present the photographer for 27 SQN Townsville. He is a First Class Prison Officer at Stuart Prison, Townsville, in civilian life.
THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN EDUCATION ASSISTANT CATEGORY IN THE RAN

By Lieutenant Commander Allan Burrows,
RAN

Introduction

EVIEW findings indicated the different priorities that Service Units placed on the training and staffing of libraries of similar sizes. Where the RAAF establishment occupied their library with trained personnel with dedicated duties, Army and Navy establishments in the main relied on the dedication of a single employee who often worked extra unpaid hours to achieve objectives. The risk exposure of this situation is that one branch of the Department appears to have recognised the benefits to its members by maintaining a well trained, well staffed service where the other branches continue to place a low priority and as such, general service suffers.

1 A 1982 All Ship/All Shore message stated: 'due to current shortages of TOWs in all technical categories, qualified sailors are not always available to meet manpower requirements' and went on to call for ships and establishments to actively recruit volunteers from sailors borne to nominate for the next TOW course. The whole concept of TOW has been under review in the RAN for some considerable time without resolution.

Aim

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the requirement for an Education Assistant category in the RAN.

Postulation — The Existing Navy Situation

Information Services

The Defence Information Services Branch (DISB) was formed in March 1977 by the amalgamation of the Scientific and Technical Information Branch and the Defence Library and Information Service. Its responsibilities and functions are laid down in DI (G) ADMIN 18-1, but, briefly, it can be said that DIS is an information service network of libraries designed to meet the information needs of Defence personnel at all levels. When it was created the avowed intent (which has been well implemented) was to provide a massive pool of information which could be accessed by all Defence personnel. That this concept has not been fully recognised, embraced and wholeheartedly adopted by the RAN is unfortunate and unenlightened. With resolution this shortcoming can and must be overcome.

An information service is more than just books sitting on a shelf awaiting the occasional browser or the isolated borrower. What Defence has available is an information service which provides, inter alia, loans, interlibrary loans, current awareness services such as Current Defence Readings (CDR) and various Reports announcements, reference services both manual and on-line, periodicals services, collection development and advice and assistance on information management matters. The Honourable Barry O. Jones, MHR, Minister for Science and Technology in the current government believes that 'at present Australian society is divided between the “information rich” and the “information poor” and moves must be made to close the gap.' He also proposes a ten point information policy which stresses free access to information, establishment of information resource centres and public access to data banks.

On this basis Defence would seem to lodge quite comfortably within the 'information rich' sector of society. However, despite the provision of this extensive resource a recent Defence Internal Audit Review of NSW libraries found 'many librarians are only employed for library duties on a part-time basis' and 'within the ranks of unit management it appears that the knowledge of what services can be provided (even the existence of the local DIS library) is poor.' Like its Victorian counterpart it too
pointed out the disparity between RAAF libraries employing ‘Education Assistants who specialise in library operations’ and ‘the untrained staff of the remaining libraries’ which ‘even when trained, there is no assurance that the librarian will remain within the library area’.

What these Audit Reports are attempting to portray is the under-utilisation of this huge resource by Navy; the lack of dedicated personnel, adequately trained and of long tenure, who can provide a responsible service; and the poor control of DIS material in those ships and establishments where there are no professionally trained or committed librarians or library oriented personnel. Indeed it should be noted that every DIS library is a special library, with functions quite distinct from the general reference and recreational functions of a public library and, very likely, quite distinct from those of the nearest DIS library to it.

Technical Officers Writers

That the whole concept to TOW has been under review for some time without resolution is a recognised fact within the RAN. A Navy Office approved Duty Task Inventory (DTI) does exist, however all course documentation is in the old format for the old course. There has been no re-development utilising the systems approach to training as yet. These courses are of approximately seven weeks in length for AB level but they are not popular with the young ABs because to perform TOW duties they are taken out of the main stream of their category.

At a TOW Policy meeting held at HMAS NIRIMBA on 13 April 1981 the staff of DNMP agreed that the administration load of the technical branches should be reviewed in conjunction with the proposed introduction of Maintenance Upkeep Management Systems (MUMS), that the term TOW should be abolished and the billet re-designated Maintenance Administration Assistant. This latter recommendation was not supported by DFM. The problem is still not resolved.

Instructor Branch

In a comparatively recent review of the Instructor Branch one of the CNS approved roles of the branch was stated as:

to provide expertise in the fields of training and education, including the management and development thereof, to meet the Navy’s needs.7

Precisely what is encompassed by ‘training and education’ has not been identified to date, but from observation and experience the Instructor Branch is reluctant to become involved with library matters, therefore the role defined above will not incorporate this aspect without sufficient influence being brought to bear. This is difficult to understand in a Branch which springs from an academic environment in which one learns the value of information services. As the disseminators of information within the fields of training and education it is therefore surprising that the Branch has not grasped the significance of this vast field of information services and ensured that such responsibility be placed solely within its ambit.

By way of contrast a Royal Australian Air Force Education Officer8 has no problem in identifying where his areas of concern lie. He is advised quite succinctly that:

The Unit Education Officer advises the Commanding Officer on all educational matters, arranges facilities for Service Education classes; examinations, trade tests; manages the library and the audio-visual aids provided for the base; assists with the supervision of the technical publication offices.

That is, his role in educational matters is defined to include libraries and this embraces technical publications.

By including information services within his management role the RAAF Education Officer ensures that RAAF administrators and members of the ‘profession of arms’ are encouraged to exploit the same information retrieval techniques that benefit scientists and technologists. In contrast the RAN Instructor Officer perceives a hiatus between information services and the roles or pursuits his branch is currently following or is being encouraged to pursue in the foreseeable future. The import of this for Navy is that this management discontinuity is also not being pursued or addressed by any other branch or category, with the result inevitably being that Navy will remain within the ‘information poor’ sector of Defence.

Miscellany

Currently there exists many areas of concern involving the responsible management and utilisation of DIS resources as identified by Inter-
nal Audit Inspections. These include: ‘no usage records (such as library loan cards or book location cards); the numbers of active registered borrowers are low in relation to unit strengths; no follow-up of books on loan; poor control over periodicals and non-acquittance of documents for stock received from DISB’.10

These and many other deficiencies are also constantly being observed by DIS staff during visits and apply to both ships and establishments. Corrective action is a continuous, labour-intensive requirement and is compounded by the frequent posting of barely/recently trained, but out-of-category, personnel just when they are developing an interest and feel for the work and are becoming cost-effective. A similar and allied problem exists for non-dedicated, or out-of-category, personnel employed in video training and production of TTU2. It is further compounded by the near extinction of the Academic Instructor which ‘it has been decided ... should remain open but not used for the present’.11

Similarly there are the problems associated with Navy technical and other Navy and Defence publications which are distributed by NSO (PUBS) to each ship and establishment via the ‘supply system’. Once such publications reach a unit they are distributed to relevant user sections who are then responsible for the management, control and updating of these publications — with the supply system distributing the amendments and changes. Experience demonstrates a poor track record in such management, control and updating throughout the Navy,12 on average, when compared with the system in force and enforced by the Air Force.13

One area of the especial concern to the RAAF in that of equipment damage/malfunction and hazards to personnel as it relates to immediately implementing changes in publications — they can promptly produce cases and statistics demonstrating such relationships. Unfortunately the Director of Naval Safety is unable to supply comparable examples and statistics which might demonstrate a causal relationship between not amending a publication and any subsequent effect on equipment failure or personal injury. This is not to say that such cases have not occurred. Safety ought to be a prime consideration, especially as the Navy moves to finer tolerances and computerised control of gas turbines and similar technological innovations.

With the ever increasing and costly requirements for training within the RAN and the application of the systems approach to such training, increased professionalism from instructional staff has been engendered and encouraged. This has further increased the demand for Instructional Technique courses and in turn has led to greater and improved utilisation of audio-visual training aids. The production of these aids traditionally belongs to an Instructional Production Centre (IPC), where such exist, which are usually manned by civilian personnel and are therefore subject to fluctuating manpower ceilings within Commands. Additionally this augmented demand on IPC resources has resulted in more instructors attempting to produce their own such aids. This leaves less time for lesson preparation, test marking and professional updating; results in non-standardisation of aids for standard lessons; and, of course, generates a natural desire on the part of an instructor to retain as his own those aids which he has personally produced.

These then are some of the current problems within the Navy situation and perhaps others too might be identified. How the RAAF handles similar areas of concern and how the RAN might adapt such a solution to its problems is expounded in the remainder of this paper.

Illumination — The RAAF Educational Assistant Mustering

History

For many years there was no specific provision for assistance to Education Officers in the RAAF. However, the growth of technical libraries and the rapid development of visual aids in training during WW II led to the creation of two musterings initially for airmen and later for airwomen — Clerk Librarian and Cinema Operator. It became evident that the educational needs of squadrons could be met by one person who could combine the functions of Clerk Librarian and Cinema Operator. It became evident that the educational needs of squadrons could be met by one person who could combine the functions of Clerk Librarian and Cinema Operator and also assist with tutorial courses, aptitude testing and general educational activities. Accordingly and mustering of Education Assistant (EDASST) was introduced in 1944.14 It suffered a decline at the end of WW II but was
REQUIREMENT FOR EDUCATION ASSISTANT IN RAN

reinstated during the Korean War and has become firmly established since.

During the 1970’s various RAAF bases conducted EDASST courses, such courses being developed by the individual base. Following a 1979/80 Occupational Analysis done on the mustering using the CODAP format, rationalisation of the training requirements has resulted in the development of a standard RAAF course for Basic Educational Assistant. However this course has yet to receive Air Office approval and, in the interim, on-the-job training (OJT) is conducted by individual bases using a job standard issued by HQ Support Command.

Structure and Duties

The Education Assistant trade group offers a full career plan for both male and female members, from AC (ACW) through all ranks to WOFF.15 As defined, members of the Education Assistant Mustering may be employed on duties which deal with:

a. the general administration of Service education, operation of audio-visual aids, and conduct of RAAF libraries and Technical Publication Offices; and

b. senior members may also be employed on duties involving supervision and administration of trade tests, instructional duties, RAAF internal examinations, and counselling members on remuster, promotion examinations and resettlement.16

Entry requirements include having the ability to absorb further training; to be assessed as suitable on the basis of psychological tests; and to possess an educational standard of Year 11 level with pass in English and three other subjects.

Occupational Survey 17

A considerable amount of information can be gleaned and discussion generated from the findings of the Occupational Survey. For example, 71 percent of the respondents in the mustering have 12 or more years schooling, and this grouping is higher for females than for males. A grouping analysis of the five different identifiable job types shows that there are two distinct and unique job groups. It shows that 54 percent are clustered together to form a general library duties job group comprising 9 percent concerned with the administration, operation and maintenance of audio-visual aids; 32 percent with the administration, issue and return of books general and periodicals, and 13 percent (mainly SNCOs) with the provision of personnel administration and educational services together with trade test administration.

Of the remainder, 36 percent form a distinct Technical Publications job group with most of their time spent performing tasks concerned with the administration and amendment of technical publications. The remaining 10 percent is made up of 4 percent in staff appointments (SNCOs in staff positions who perform tasks associated with DISB, examinations and liaison work) and 6 percent performing isolated functions. Of further interest is the analysis of job satisfaction data by job type/group, and it is not surprising that the Technical Publications job group gave the lowest rating for job interest and average utilisation of talents. The cross movement of personnel within the mustering between the various job types means that perceived stagnation in such a low interest job type as Technical Publications does not become an unendurable proposition.

Implications derived from the Survey as they affect training were quite clear and were discussed in paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Report. The principal one was that ‘there are sufficient numbers of tasks performed in common by a large percentage of the lower ranks in the Education Assistant Mustering to support a formal training course for new members’.18 This has since resulted in a Graduation Requirement for a five week course to be conducted at RAAF Base Fairbairn, of which one week is the equivalent of the DISB Library Skills I course. This has yet to receive Air Office approval as stated earlier and the interim OJT is to be closely monitored by a Task Book to be issued by Director of Training — Air Force.

Resolution — The Way Ahead For The RAN

Introduction of an Educational Assistant category within the RAN could be much to alleviate the well deserved criticism being accorded to some of the Navy DIS libraries through Internal Audit Reports. It would provide a better utilisation of scarce DIS resources together with a constancy of procedures plus close observation of such procedures. The net result for both libraries and Technical Publi-
cations centres would be amalgamation, uniformity and continuity throughout the Navy—replication of a system (the RAAF one) which provides complete documentation, responsibility and follow-up at all times whatever the size of the unit and wherever it is located.

By providing a category which would be allied to the Instructor Branch, and thus in support of the role endorsed by CNS, a full branch structure could be offered comparable so that within the RAAF. Such a move would overcome any objections that:

Navy Office would not support the introduction of any new category which would not be self supportable from a promotions and sea-shore roster ratio aspect.¹⁹

A full rank structure catering for both male and female members could be offered which would overcome the demise of the Academic Instructor, substitute for the depleted and unpopular TOW, adequately service a sea-shore roster and permit a useful re-categorisation of some medically affected personnel who would otherwise have to undergo discharge.

On a similar note there would be provision for re-categorisation of those who are academically suited and who fail trade training courses through lack of practical skills and could otherwise be discharged. Having at least started a technical course such personnel are already motivated towards the Service, would better understand the requirements of technical publications and would have already made useful commitments and contacts within the technical fields. In addition is the consideration of all the money already invested in that member which would be otherwise written off.

Such a category could be easily tailored to suit the needs of the RAN. For example, instead of having a member of this category serving in the smaller ships (patrol boats, submarines, MHIs) a unit or cell could be located at Garden Island, Waterhen, Stirling, Cairns and many other centres ready to go onboard whenever a ship is alongside for a few days. The purpose would be to take onboard new publications, muster, acquit documentation, amend technical publications, interview, advise and counsel ship’s company on education, training and resettlement matters and generally carry out the category’s functions. A further example consistent with this reasoning would be to include segments of the 28 week Army Illustrator Reprographic course done at the School of Military Survey, Bonegilla. Having an Education Assistant with this additional training would overcome the problems often experienced through the lack of staff or civilian ceiling-induced manpower shortages in Instructional Production Centres.

Additionally the loss from TTU2 of trained and experienced personnel in video production through posting back to their usual fields of employment would be overcome and thus be more cost-effective in terms of utilisation of training. Add to this the safety considerations and a more responsible attitude towards technical publications than the existing inefficient, expensive and poorly managed arrangements, combine this with the efficient utilisation of information services and a branch structure is more than justified.

**Manpower**

Identifiable and quantifiable manpower figures for such a new category would best be derived following input from the various directorates and divisions. As a guide the RAAF figures for the EDASST Mustering are as shown on Figure 1.

Using the Establishment figure of 206 and manpower figures for RAAF and RAN of 22,500 and 17,000 respectively then the RAN could support a category of 156 members with a rank structure comparable to that of the RAAF. Whether any quantifiable savings in manpower can be identified when the effects on AIs, TOW’s and miscellaneously employed are considered remains to be seen. The net effect on manpower may be nil but certainly the overall effect will be increased efficiency.

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**Figure 1**
Implementation

The implementation of such a category could be phased in over a period of several years which would allow a time period for rank scaling to be achieved. It could be aided by using re-categorisation (voluntarily) of those personnel already in possession of some of the necessary skills and training e.g. Instructor training, video training, library training, technical publications experience and TOW experience. The few remaining members of the AI category, assisted perhaps by some exchanges involving RAAF (and RN) Educational Assistants, could form the core of the new category and be used to develop syllabuses, training objectives and role for the category under guidance from members of the Instructor Branch.

Conclusion

RAAF sponsored DIS libraries are manned by Education Assistants who also have a responsibility for the handling and distribution of Technical Publications. These two tasks fit neatly together because of the relationship in practice between Technical Publications and other reference material. By employing dedicated and specially trained staff in their libraries RAAF obtain a more effective service than that enjoyed by most Navy units with DIS libraries.

Navy libraries are frequently manned by staff 'part-loaned' from another establishment position or made available because of a temporary physical disability. Under this system there is little continuity, small chance of developing library staff who are contributors rather than just incumbents and no career prospects for those who may find themselves suited and satisfied by this type of employment. Overall, Navy user units suffer because they do not receive the support which is available to other users of the DIS network.

The unpopularity of the TOW sub-specialisation within the technical branches, its slow demise without a substantive replacement and the ever-increasing administrative workload being imposed upon the heads of technical sections suggest a viable alternative be proposed without delay.

That the Instructor Branch, and the Navy at large, has failed to grasp the importance of ‘Information Services’ in this expanding era of the information explosion is axiomatic; that this deficiency can, with resolution, be overcome and the role of the Instructor Branch widened to embrace responsibility for this area is paramount.

The introduction into Navy of an employment category pertinent to the library and information services functions would be a major step in improving the standard of service available to Navy. The net effect from the introduction of this category may or may not result in any savings of manpower but efficiency of performance in many areas justifies its establishment. Because of the related education type functions of such positions it would appear that appropriate branch sponsorship for this employment category should be vested in the Instructor Branch.

To provide an improved standard of performance within the field to information services, increased awareness within the ‘profession of arms’ of information retrieval techniques and the more efficient utilisation of manpower and resources within separate areas of concern, the RAN should:

a. establish a category of Education Assistant (or Training Assistant or Training Technician) similar to that of the comparable RAAF mustering;
b. tailor such a category to suit the Navy's disparate needs; and
c. align such a category to the role-enhance Instructor Branch for sponsorship, guidance and tasking.

NOTES

2. DEFNAV CANBERRA MHA 270641Z AUG 82 (325 All Ship 328 All Shore). TOW is the acronym for Technical Officers Writer.
5. Note: This use of the term ‘librarian’ is in the non-professional sense, and refers to the person manning the library.
8. Who equates to an RAN Instructor Officer, Not the narrower sense in which this term is generally used within the Navy.
12. This is compounded by the attitude of the Navy Supply System which considers any publication distributed by NSO (PUBS) to be a Navy publication and therefore belonging to the Supply system, even if that publication is sponsored by some other authority within Defence. For example DIS Manuals with amendments or Australian Standards are not being directed towards the libraries for which they are intended.

13. That the RAAF expertise is recognised is clearly demonstrated at joint establishments such as AJASS where RAAF Education Assistants are invariably supplied to man the DIS and Technical Libraries.

15. DI (AF) AAP 2391.101-IM Ch 1.
16. DI (AF) AAP 2003.100. Ch 2 Para 201.
19. As advised to the TOW Policy meeting held at HMAS Nirimba, 13 April 1981.
20. A recent study by the RN on the amalgamation of two existing WREN categories has, I believe, resulted in the two, viz. Training Support Assistants and Education. Being combined with the new category being coordinated by RNSTT.

Lieutenant Commander Allan Burrows served in the Defence Information Services Branch at Campbell Park as the Navy's liaison officer (DISLO-N). This position has provided the opportunity to observe DIS, RAAF and RAN procedures, compare and contrast results and draw inferences and conclusions within the fields of information services, education and training. He is currently Command Resettlement Officer at Naval Support Command.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

IMPLICATIONS OF A SELF-RELIANT POLICY FOR AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME POLICY. Willis, R. J. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute; Feb 84: 36+(8p) Proposes a maritime strategy for Australia based on a Government policy of self reliance.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE PERSIAN GULF. Olson, William J. Military Review; Mar 84: 19-29 None of the prospects are particularly comforting — permanent stability is non consistent with the fundamental attitudes of the two countries.

THE JAPANESE NAVY AND SEA LANCES DEFENSE. Bouchard, Joseph F.; Hess, Douglas J. United States Naval Institute Proceedings; Mar 84: 88-97 Japan is beginning to recognise the need to defend its sea-lanes, but only if there is a direct threat to Japan.

SEARCH FOR A NEW CONSENSUS. Lehrrack, Otto United States Naval Institute Proceedings; Mar 84: 96-99 The growing feeling of insecurity in Japan may lead to radical changes in defence policy. Once consensus for change emerges, the direction can be worked out.

IF TERRORISM HITS HOME, WILL THE ARMY BE READY? Motley, James B. Army; Apr 84: 18+(6p) Suggests that co-ordinated terrorist activity is now a possibility in the US and that the US Army is the only organization capable of combating such an activity, but the US Army is not trained for this task.

SPACE: AIR FORCE AND NAVY OUTLOOK. Signal; Jan 84: 22+(6p) Comments on the importance of space and space systems to US Signal interviews Vice Admiral Gordon R. Nagler, USN, and General James V. Hartinger, USAF.

THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY. Ustinov, Dmitri Defence Science 2001+; Apr 83: 46-47 The Marshal of the USSR suggests that President Reagan's assertion (Speech 22 November 1982), that the USSR has a clear margin in military superiority is untrue, and merely calculated to deceive the American public into justifying military programs.

MILITARY ART: PREDICTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000. Zumwalt, Elmo R. Defense Science 2001+; Apr 83: 49+(7p) Suggests that future conflict will be long term and peak quickly to violent levels, that a political world view that does not support instantaneous defence readiness will be an invitation to aggressors.


THE NUCLEAR DEFENSE OF EUROPE. Kerr, Donald M.; Maaranen, Steven A. Washington Quarterly; Autumn 83: 93-110 Shifts in the "correlation of world forces" threaten the effectiveness of NATO's defense strategy, prompting a comprehensive review of the Alliance's dangerously vulnerable flexible response doctrine.

THE KEY WEST KEY. Halperin, Morton H.; Halperin, David Foreign Policy: Winter 83/84: 114-180 If the US is to continue to defend its interests effectively without wasting vast sums of money, serious revisions of the responsibilities and missions of the armed forces will be needed.

Reviewed by: J. P. Buckley, O.B.E.

This excellent book edited by David Horner fills a need to tell the achievements of some of Australia's outstanding commanders. I say some, because of various reasons there are a few notable omissions; for example — Berryman, Northcott, Mackay and Hassett. One or two are lucky to be included.

Horner's own personal writings on Blarney, Sturdee, Rowell and Vasey are balanced and mostly accurate. I think that in the first three he has captured the personality and performance of each. In the case of Sturdee, who was a very good looking man, the photograph on page 144 is a "shocker" and bears no resemblance to him. However, Horner redeems himself by his final comment: — "More than that he (Sturdee) was the rock on which the army, and indeed the Government, rested during the weeks of panic in early 1942."

In regard to Blarney, Horner has rightly not mentioned some of the doubtful gossip which was included in "High Command". Horner is a very good historian and there is no need for him to include comments which were disputed most strongly by those who were close to Blamey.

Whilst on Blamey, there are comments by Lodge in writing about Lavarack (page 142) being kept on the shelf, as were Robertson, and Bennett. The three officers were determined to displace Blamey as Commander-In-Chief. In addition they each had some characteristics not required in a C.-In-C. I don't think Blamey kept them on the shelf — at various times I served under each, and I feel they put themselves there by their own actions and ambitions. Did they give their Commander-In-Chief complete loyalty?

Menzies and Curtin both stated that Blamey had no rival for the job of C.-In-C. He was the only Allied General to start the war as his country's top commander, and to finish the war in the same high appointment.

Stuart Sayers has written a masterly appreciation of Herring — I think it's the best chapter in a series of good chapters. One can feel that Sayers has researched his subject with great skill, dedication and experience. His biography of "Ned Herring" must rank as one of the best of the biographies written about special people since the war. He knew Herring very well and this comes out in the story.

Ronald Hopkins has played down Robertson's ambition, his boring ego and his lack of tact. However, having served under him I admired his ability and his outstanding loyalty to his subordinate staff. Several Duntroon graduates were accepted and helped by "Red Robbie" when they had been discarded by unsympathetic commanders.

The chapters on Blamey, Monash, Chauvel, White, Herring, Sturdee and Morshead give great pride to the reader in learning of the number of brilliant commanders Australia has produced this century. Yet, it can be said that successive Australian Governments have not seen fit to acknowledge their appreciation of these men in any tangible way. Blamey is the prime example. A "clapped out" Buick staff car was his only reward when he left the Army.

As was to be expected, Harry Rayner has produced an excellent appreciation of Scherger as also has Petersen on the versatile and brilliant Monash.

All of the authors have done a splendid job and I do not think it would be appropriate to challenge one or two minor statements or opinions in such a good story. Perhaps Lodge could have found a few nice things to say about Gordon Bennett?

Mr. first reaction was to wonder why the R.A.N. and the R.A.A.F. were limited to one chapter in each case. Perhaps a case could have been made to include Air Marshal Williams and Vice Admiral Collins. In due course, Horner may give consideration to writing an-
other volume which could include Northcott, Mackay, Berryman, Hassett, Collins, Williams and others.

Whilst Horner may dispute my choice to include Shedden, it is arguable whether Shedden was not the most powerful defence adviser, organiser and administrator in the period covered by "The Commanders".

In any case, Horner would be eminently qualified and experienced to write a biography of Shedden. The absence of such a biography is a great gap in our military history.

I commend "The Commanders" — it is an excellent book and should be on the bookshelf of anyone interested in Australian history. Horner can feel very proud of "The Commanders". He is now well established as one of our very good contemporary military historians.


Reviewed by André G. Kuczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

"[W]orld-historical individuals . . . must be called 'heroes' insofar as they have derived their purpose and vocation not from the calm, regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order but from a secret source whose content is still hidden."
— G. W. F. Hegel, Reason in History (1837)

HISTORIANS have long been fascinated in unravelling the many faceted intricacies of individual character development which combine, often in sphinx-like silence, to produce men and women of fame or notoriety. In 1943, Sidney Hook, a philosopher much interested in the nature and problems involved in historical investigation and interpretation, opened the debate further by unveiling the "great man" theory in his book, The Hero in History. An outstanding historical personality, asserted the author, was one whose influence affected the lives of millions of his contemporaries and also the ideals, hopes, values, faiths, thoughts and actions of many generations thereafter. Moreover, affirmed Hook, "[t]he hero in history is an individual to whom we can justifiably attribute preponderant influence in determining an issue or event whose consequences would have been profoundly different if he had not acted as he did.

Measured by this standard, Douglas MacArthur must clearly rank as one of the most dynamic personalities to have left a unique imprint on the history of the twentieth century. Almost twenty-five years after his death, the contours of MacArthur's life and times continue to attract the attention of those seeking a better knowledge of his immensely controversial personality. From journalistic accounts to scholarly analyses, there has been a profusion of information on the man and his milieu, much of it, regrettably, tedious and superficial in overall scope. This is precisely why Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years is such a refreshing and welcome change.

Petillo's principal purpose is to contribute to a psycho-historical post-mortem of Douglas MacArthur and to gain some insight into his behavioural patterns through an intensive examination of the indelible influences pronounced on him by the geography and people of the Philippines. "For forty years," insists the author, "the Philippine Islands provided both safe haven and appropriate centre stage for Douglas MacArthur. The development of this complex relationship between the man and the country is the focus of this study." (p. vii).

Petillo goes on to point out that "the Philippine Islands were of special importance" in moulding MacArthur's character.

Their beauty and the friendship nurtured there sustained Douglas MacArthur as no place had ever done. If their hopes sometimes encouraged his capacity for vast misjudgment, their sacrifice inspired his greatest successes. For Douglas MacArthur, the Philippines were home. For this reason, their influence on the man deserve consideration. (p. xvii).

The debut of MacArthur's experiences in the Philippines (which, by a curious twist of historical fate, almost coincided with the origins of American involvement in that nation's affairs) began with his first assignment as a second lieutenant shortly after graduating from West Point in 1903. It was to end more than four decades later when, as Commander,

in-Chief of United States Forces and Field Marshall of the Philippine Army (an honour bestowed upon him by President Manuel Quezon), he liberated a war-ravaged Manila. Altogether MacArthur spent five distinct periods of varying lengths in the Philippines, the longest between 1935 and 1942 when, on official orders from the White House, he reluctantly left the islands to escape the fierce Japanese onslaught on Bataan and Corregidor.

Petillo contends that the crucial watersheds in MacArthur’s intellectual development and professional career paralleled his residence in the Philippines. The author suggests the islands provided MacArthur with an atmosphere for personal growth and self-examination. It also offered him with the point of reference from which he successfully came to grips with a number of failures and traumatic episodes. This, combined with the abiding friendship and profound respect he received from the Filipino populace, led him to form a particularly intimate bond with the country and its people that never wavered throughout his entire adult life. According to Petillo, Douglas MacArthur’s “understanding of the Philippines as a place of safe success combined with the frequent opportunities his career provided for him to return there.”

As a result, the Islands eventually became the one place which offered the security of a home, in the truest sense, while also providing a convenient staging ground for his next attempts at success in the outside world . . . On both private and public levels, the Philippine Islands provided an environment and experience that Douglas MacArthur incorporated into other arenas of his long life. And when, in 1944 and 1945, the Philippines no longer provided that haven and support, he left it willingly, indeed abandoned it quickly as possible, ready now to stride on to the larger stage for which history better remembers him. (pp. 247-248).

There are a number of perplexing questions which, although not explicitly stated, subtly permeate the parameters of this study. For example, would MacArthur’s so-called “rendezvous with history” (to quote the title of a book on him by his friend and military colleague Courtney Whitney) have unfolded had he taken a proverbially different fork in the road from the one which he actually travelled on in the Philippines? And what about the future of the Philippines? Would that nation have taken another historical path had MacArthur not been there? For that matter, would the record of Asia’s past have been the same without him? To these hypothetical speculations there are no firm answers. Some will even say that the “ifs of history” have no place in the study of man’s past. Nevertheless, they serve to underline the seemingly inseparable link that united MacArthur with the Philippines.

Carol Morris Petillo’s Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years is a masterpiece of historical scholarship, written in an informal and genial manner. It is an original, stimulating and absolutely fascinating journey of one country’s impact on one man’s life. Anything written about Douglas MacArthur’s legacy, most of which, incidentally, was left in Asia, henceforth must start where Petillo leaves off.


Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, O.B.E.

THESE three volumes detail the most comprehensive and interesting history of any Corps which the reviewer has read. In the period 1835 to 1945 every battle, skirmish or activity in which the Corps has participated is covered in detail with extremely good photographs and illustrations.

The research involved in producing this excellent story must have been a mammoth task. Only Ron McNicoll could have devoted the time, the dedication and the effort in writing the story of the ‘Sappers’ at work with such success. The stories of the early R.E. officers in Australia makes fascinating reading. Some of the junior R.A.E. officers in World Wars 1 and 2 became leaders in the Engineering profession in peacetime. Many of them would readily agree that they owed much to the experience they gained in qualities of leadership, determination and improvisation under Brigadier-General C. H. Foott and Major-General Sir Clive Steele. Sir Vernon Sturdee, for example, always acknowledged that Foott had inspired and guided him during their
association before, during and after World War 1.

After World War 2 many officers of the Corps made rapid strides in the business world and in the Public Service. Names like Green, Risson, Overall, Holland, Meyer, Wilson, Jackson and Bell are only a few who immediately spring to mind. It is hoped that Volume IV will include reference to the peacetime achievement of the many brilliant ex-members of the Corps.

I have only one or two small observations covering this excellent work, more cover could have been given to Sir Vernon Sturdee and to Sir Mervyn Brogan, who both held the Chief of the General Staff appointment with distinction. Surely something for the Corps to be proud about!

Brogan only gets one mention as a Lieutenant (Vol. III page 330). This note should have been expanded to show his subsequent appointment to C.G.S. Perhaps Volume IV will tell of Brogan's brilliant handling of coal production for Emergency Services during the strike in 1949 when the Army was called in to man the coal fields.

The references to Sturdee in Vol. II page 206 and in Vol. III page 396 miss out some appointments including G.S.O. in Field Marshal Haig's H.Q. B.E.F. in 1918 (First A.I.F. officer to be appointed); G.O.C. 8th Australian Division and after General Blamey retired, Acting Commander-in-Chief A.M.F. from 1st December 1945 to March 1946. Sturdee always regarded himself as a 'sapper' and he was always proud of the Corps. It was no accident that another distinguished member of the Corps, Brigadier A. T. J. Bell was “Insignia bearer” at the military funeral service for General Sturdee.

McNicoll's history of the Corps makes most interesting reading — in places it is gripping — it will be of great value to the Corps and to the Army. The books will also appeal to the general reader who is looking for entertainment, knowledge and satisfaction.

The author should be very proud of his work. Perhaps he could be persuaded to write Volume IV. McNicoll is eminently and uniquely qualified to complete the task.

Congratulations to the Corps Committee of the Royal Australian Engineers for their vision and achievement in publishing this excellent work.


Reviewed by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Dept. of Defence.

The six years of the Second World War called forth a military effort on a scale which exceeded Australia's national experience during even the War of 1914-1918. The very substantial contribution of military engineers to that effort is reflected in the size of this third volume in a four-part history of the R.A.E. to 1975, which equals in page length the combined total of the first two volumes covering 84 years.*

As one would expect, wherever Australian ground forces were operationally engaged there elements of the R.A.E. were to be found too. Accordingly, readers are presented with a narrative which portrays engineers in action at Bardia, clearing gaps in minefields and crossings of anti-tank ditches, building railway lines in the Lebanon, repairing cratered roads or cratering them anew in Greece, unloading ships in port under air attack in Crete, demolishing bridges to deny routes to the advancing Japanese in Malaya, conquering impossible terrain in New Guinea with the construction of roads, and clearing bombs, mines and booby-traps in front of our own infantry at Balikpapan. Some less well-known aspects of the engineers effort are also given their due, however, with the inclusion of details concerning the forestry units that milled timber in England and Scotland as well as the Pacific, the work of Engineer Services Branch in meeting the demand at home for camos to accommodate a rapidly-expanding Army and in maintaining land communications in northern Australia, the establishment of a Transportation Service, the development of Australia's coastal defences, and measures undertaken to provide for camouflage both for formations abroad and within Australia. It is this aspect regarding the diversity of engineer roles that the author, himself an engineer and retired...
Major-General, brings out in his conclusion by referring to sappers having made essential contributions during the war not only to the Army’s teeth but to its tail as well.

It is a story of impressive achievement under all the pressures that war is capable of generating. And the demand on the R.A.E. did not slacken with the end of hostilities; roads and bridges still had to be kept open against the ravages of climate and terrain for purposes of resupply and, as the Army’s fighting elements moved out of the jungle, new camps and facilities had to be built to hold the troops prior to returning to Australia. The account provided by the author, of challenging situations and the means used to resolve them, will undoubtedly interest past and serving members of the R.A.E. For non-sapper types (like this reviewer) for whom these aspects are not the main interest and who find the novelty of more road-building beginning to pall after a few chapters, there is greater understanding to be had regarding the contribution of engineers in maintaining the fluidity of operations.

Some of the military problems that this book highlights are of more than simply passing professional concern to serving members of the Australian Defence Force. Observations about the difference in quality until 1942 between A.I.F. units and the militia, especially once the “eyes” in the latter had been picked out for the A.I.F. and other good men had been withdrawn because their civil occupations were in the reserved category, point up the difficulty that could still possibly confront the regular army in undertaking expansion using the resources of the Army Reserve. The instance of the infantry commander on Bougainville who set the sappers of the field company allocated his brigade to digging latrines while important work on the main communication road lagged also points up an obvious lesson. The over-bombing of Japanese targets on Tarakan before the Australian landings pointed out the penalties accruing from a lack of strategic foresight; the unnecessary obliteration of existing installations and facilities, when all that was required was that they be kept out of operation by the Japanese until they could be captured, created the need for a much heavier engineer effort than would otherwise have been required.

A more difficult area on which this book comments is touched on mainly in the author’s assessment of the Engineer-in-Chief, Major-General Clive Steele. He was, we are told, impatient of delay and obstruction, and nursed a well-known aversion to finance officers, business advisers and civilian public servants. There is in this, of course, plenty to fuel the prejudices of present-day servicemen, but whether the situation was as clear-cut in favour of the poor, exasperated military officers is less clear on the evidence presented. Could it be that their protagonists were also charged with faithfully doing a job requiring the implementation of the Government’s desire for domestic recovery once the direct danger to Anshun, Australia had passed? Of Steele’s antipathies, McNicoll says nothing more censorious than that these ‘tended to be aped by the less discerning of his staff and subordinates, though the more responsible were often able to ease the tension. Some would say that these attributes did the Corps a disservice, and it is probable that after the middle of 1943 a more accommodating stance would have been of benefit.’

Of fortitude and courage, both in and out of battle, this book has many stories to tell. The one which stuck the deepest chord with this reviewer was the construction of the Bulldog-Wau road. After the conquest of the Owen Stanley Ranges was complete, entailing heights of 9,500 feet, dense forests, numerous obstacles, and eight months unremitting labour in nightmarish conditions, the military utility of the road was reduced even before the first trucks traversed its length by the capture of Lae and the opening of the Nadzab airfields. Consequently it was kept open only a few months. Against this less-than-funny example, the book has many humorous sidelights which even the non-sapper will appreciate. Like the case of the C.R.E. who lost his job because a demolition prepared in the canteen at Milne Bay was fired by mistake during the Japanese attack — ‘Blowing up beer is serious’, notes the author — or the reported involvement of the Milne Bay fortress camouflage officer, a keen musician, during salvage operations to right the capsized M.V. Anshun laying stuck in the silt of the bay — he allegedly ensured cables were equally stressed by striking their pitch with an iron bar! A classic illustration of the Australian Army’s ability to make do with next to nothing comes in the form of the words of a U.S. officer, whose engineer regi-
ment of the 41st Division was taking over from the 7th Divisional Engineers in Papua in January 1943; having heard out the C.R.E. he remarked, 'I just can't work with what you've got. I'm not going to try' and ordered a signal sent off to Port Moresby for extra equipment.

Also given is the account of how the Army supposedly came to be at Kapooka, near Wagga Wagga, a site which still retains its army associations today. In choosing a site near General Blamey's birthplace General Steele was making sure he would have quick approval from the Commander-in-Chief in locating a new R.A.E. Training Centre. The author tells us too that the Australian Army was simply conforming to British practice in transferring responsibility for coast and anti-aircraft searchlights from the engineers to the artillery. Frankly, this reviewer preferred the alternative version as to why this strange change came about, reportedly as a result of an incident in Port Moresby which was being visited by a very senior officer at the time that a searchlight location was being abandoned:

Some of its equipment remained, including its field telephone, and was being guarded by the sapper who could best be spared from other unit duties. The sapper rang his corporal and said 'There's a fat old bloke in Bombay bloomers outside wanting to come in. I told him no one was allowed in but he won't take no for an answer. He says he's General Something. What'll I do?'


Reviewed by André G. Kuczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

EARLY in 1942 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt authorized the appointment of a committee of military staff commanders to co-ordinate operational plans for waging total war against Japan. For the next four years an inner coterie of America's highest ranking officers — General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations; General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to F.D.R. — were entrusted with developing a wide array of strategic, tactical and logistical plans aimed at bringing about the emasculation of Japanese military power.

In The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Grace Person Hayes peers into a powerful historical microscope that reveals both the molecular composition and nuclear structure of the JCS and how that body significantly contributed to the successful outcome of Washington's armed struggle with Japan. Although the book is primarily a scholarly autopsy of an organization which exerted a profoundly indelible influence on world developments in the 1941-1945 era, it also delves to a lesser extent into the modus operandi of Japan's armed forces utilizing heretofore undisclosed classified documents.

Confronted with a modern Japanese navy, whose professionally dedicated and patriotic crews celebrated a string of spectacular victories over the Anglo-American rivals, the first priority of business on the agenda for the JCS was to contain further Japanese encroachments. Shortly after the declaration of hostilities in Asia and the Pacific, military supplies were rushed to those areas still controlled by the United States as a means of establishing a line of defence from which future offensive raids could be launched. Once American forces had firmly entrenched themselves in these fortifications, the JCS unveiled plans that called for the most meticulous co-operation between the navy, air force and army to ensure maximum striking potential. Such a storehouse of organized firepower, they reasoned, would then enable American forces to gain the upper hand by breaking out of their restrictive defensive perimeter.

From July 1942 onward the United States seized the initiative, starting with the bloody but victorious engagement at Guadalcanal. As American factories continued to turn out an ever-increasing flow of war material, Japan began to experience the full consequences of mercilessly unremitting military pressure. In 1944, when ultimate American triumph over Japan was no longer in doubt, the JCS approved more ambitious offensive operations (such as saturation bombing of industrial targets and large civilian concentrations) which, it was argued, would break the backbone and
morale of the Japanese nation. As time would later prove, the JCS were correct in their grisly prediction. In the last six months of the war, American war planes dropping incendiary explosives were rapidly incinerating large sections of the Japanese mainland. It was to be the last chapter that sealed Japan’s fate.

In her conclusion, Hayes credits the JCS for the major decisions that led ultimately to Japan’s surrender. “Responsibility for the strategy by which Japan was defeated,” she writes, “lay with the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . It was the Joint Chiefs of Staff who approved strategic plans, decided between alternate courses of action when their staffs were unable to reach agreement, and issued directives to the theatre commanders.” (p. 725).

Hayes’ study also reveals that the JCS were preoccupied with trying to steer the United States through another conflict, albeit less serious and costly. Shortly after Japan had soundly humiliated England’s Far Eastern defences at Malaya and Singapore, the Combined Chiefs of Staff of Great Britain established close relations with the JCS to prepare and implement general Allied strategy. But while the United States directed an overwhelming share of its time and resources toward destroying the Japanese war machine, their British counterparts made it clearly known from the very outset that, insofar as they were concerned, routing Nazi Germany came first on the list of objectives. Amicable relations between the American and British Chiefs of Staff were, at best, tenuous throughout the entire length of the war and, despite public images of harmony, constantly beset by serious friction and disagreement. “The U.S. Chiefs’ insistence that more effort should go to the war against Japan and that pressure should be maintained in the Pacific did not impress their British colleagues favourably. They held to the idea of establishing a line in the Pacific and defending it against any Japanese attempt to break through it . . . It was apparent that the British looked upon the war against Japan as a secondary matter and that they were reluctant to agree to devoting more than a minimum of resources to fighting the Japanese . . .” (p. 281).

The only visible fault in this book (and it is a glaring problem indeed) comes with Hayes’ probe into the origins of the war between Japan and the United States in Chapter I. The author finds nothing objectionable, or even remotely questionable, about the motives surrounding America’s diplomacy toward Tokyo in the last decade of peace. Not surprisingly, she evidently feels that Washington’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan was ethically correct and politically enlightened. What naturally follows from this dubious premise is a melodious propaganda recital, complete with rhyme and verse, of the official American explanation for the immediate and underlying causes that strained relations to the breaking point in 1941.

The sheer magnitude of this fraudulent interpretation of the events that culminated at Pearl Harbor is so immense that it would take several generations of full time study and at least a one volume book length analysis to successfully offer a point by point refutation. Of course, an indepth and thorough intellectual exorcism of this blatant charlatanry disguised as learned scholarship cannot be attempted in its entirety here. Suffice it to say that a few notable examples will provide a convincing illustration of these incongruities.

First and foremost, Hayes suffers from a dreadfully severe case of double vision which leads her to see false mirage-like images where none really exist. According to the author, a peace-minded United States “took steps” to avoid a confrontation with Japan. Unfortunately for the welfare of the planet, Tokyo was intoxicated with “expansion” and “aggression” (pp. 3, 5). This leads Hayes to conclude that Japan’s international posture was “irreconcilable with the policies of the United States” which, in turn, precipitated “an impasse with little prospect of resolution” (pp. 22, 23).

Records in American, British and Japanese archives, however (not to mention the mountain of diaries, private papers, journals and other personal memorabilia of innumerable important personages associated with the diplomatic conflict on both sides of the Pacific), present a dramatically different scenario.

Thousands of cubic feet of primary sources testify to the fact that Hayes’ verdict does not hold any water. In a word, the author’s inference that Japan actively sought a quarrel with the United States is nonsensical, pure and simple. The mass of evidence pointing to Japan’s desire for a negotiated settlement with Washington is staggering, if not humanly overwhelming. Rather than postulating misleading
and inaccurate statements about Japan's alleged insensitivity toward the demands of world peace, Hayes would have done far better if she had asked herself why Tokyo was unable to fulfill this objective. In doing so, Hayes would have found something infinitely more complex than the fairytale image of a well mannered and innocent America suddenly attacked, without probable cause, by a diabolically clever Japan committed to a course of world domination.

Hayes' fictional understanding of Japanese-American relations during the period leading up to the explosion of war in the Far East extends to other arguments. She is particularly incensed, for example, by Japan's invasion of China. This is cited as concrete proof that Tokyo had knowingly flaunted "the Paris Peace Pact of 1928 and the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 which had guaranteed the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of China." (p. 5). What is at issue here is not whether Japan's military policies were imperialistic for it is abundantly clear that they were. What Hayes fails to mention is that Japan was not alone among the company of voracious great powers which coveted colonial ambitions in China. In reality, both the United States and Japan shared largely identical goals in that part of the world. Tokyo and Washington alike were attracted with magnetic intensity to the Asiatic mainland as a sphere to further the national interest. Moreover, it is not only dishonest but hypocritical as well for Hayes to condemn Japan's expeditions inside China while simultaneously letting America off the hook for the very same action.

It is perfectly true, as Hayes observes, that Japan's China policy was undertaken with an eye toward the future when Tokyo would eventually exercise full administrative and military control of that country. The author contends that this was a clear violation of the spirit and letter of the so-called "Open Door". Hayes refuses to acknowledge (either through ignorance or omission) the fact that the seemingly innocuous term "Open Door" was, in brutal historical reality, an ingenious euphemism that concealed the true meaning of an agreement decided upon the great powers (including the United States) that provided them with provisions for the "equal" penetration and exploitation of China. It is the pinnacle of moral and intellectual bankruptcy for Hayes to offer a two faced explanation that chides Japanese involvement in China's internal affairs while simultaneously letting America off the hook for the very same action.

Seen from another perspective, Japan's decision to place China under its protective "custody" was not at variance with the foreign policy of the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean. There is an interesting book to be written some day explaining precisely how American diplomats and statesmen expected to convince their Japanese counterparts, on legal and moral grounds, to relinquish something which they themselves took for granted, namely a geopolitical sphere of influence comparable to the American Monroe Doctrine. Unless one is prepared to believe, as Hayes obviously does, that the United States has had the singularly distinguishing good fortune of accepting a religiously annointed mission bestowed upon it by some divine and wise master who granted America the permission to act in ways strictly denied to other less privileged nations, then it stands to reason that the interpretation blaming the Asian origins of the Second World War on the assiduous work of some "bad men" in Tokyo, who ardently wished to disturb the tranquility of the globe, is nothing more than a phony sham clothed in scholarly garb.

In short, Hayes' interpretation of Japanese-American relations in the 1931-1941 period is no more worthy to a historical appreciation of the era than witchcraft and voodoo lend themselves to the techniques of modern medicine. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan is, on the whole, a book which deserves our attention, but Chapter I reveals an intolerable gap in the historical methodology and philosophical justice of one of this century's most tragic and misunderstood periods.
Defence Force Journal

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