Defence Force Journal

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

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Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

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The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and should not be construed as official opinion or policy.

Printed by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne
Armoured Personnel Carriers on exercise with Navy LCH.
Dear Sir,

I have read with interest Colonel Dunn's article, "The Next Step in Australia's Defence Evolution", and now write to question certain assumptions that are implicit not only in Colonel Dunn's article but also in other publications, reports and comments.

Firstly, there is the implicit assumption (present also in the 1973 Tange Report) that, whilst uniformed officers are given to incessant wrangling over funds for equipment, command structures, tactical control etc, civilian public servants are endowed with Solomon-like qualities enabling them to sit in impartial judgement and arbitrate with perfection between the three Services.

I suggest that civilian public servants are no more and no less human than uniformed officers and are subject to much the same fallibilities. To hand over further large segments of operating (as distinct from operational) parts of Defence to civilian control would simply result in an imbalance in the use of defence resources in favour of the segments handed over.

In support of my contention I point to what is now happening between the Department of Defence and the Department of Defence Support.

Secondly, there is the assumption that uniformed officers must (as distinct from do) move on too quickly to allow the continuity that produces better results in defence administration and policy development. I suggest the solution to this is not to replace the uniformed officers with civilians, but to plan postings of one and two star officers to ensure greater continuity.

Readers who watch such matters, or listen to the views of persons in Defence, will know that one two star post has been held by one officer for over five years, with very marked improvements in the results achieved by his Division.

On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that there has been continuity in the posts of, for example, DCNS (three holders in the past three years), CAFP (three holders in the past three years) and DCGS (four holders in the past three years).

It is no reflection on the individuals concerned in these and other rapidly revolving posts to suggest that it must be very hard to master their "portfolios" and argue their case in committee against a civilian who has been (say) three years in his post and ten years in his Division.

As an outside (hopefully close) observer of the Defence Department, I suggest that, in some instances, civilian views prevail in committee not because their case has substance but because of the superior debating skills and in-house tactical knowledge of the civilian protagonist.

Surely the time has come to recognize that the qualities required of an officer in Canberra differ in many ways from those required to command in the field. I suggest that the defence of the country would be the better for recognizing this by planning careers to provide not only the best field commanders but also the best uniformed protagonists in Canberra.

The time is surely past when the Defence Force can afford the luxury of trying to give each two star officer his turn at Fleet, Operational Command, Field Force or some other Command. By the time they reach one star rank officers should have gained enough experience and knowledge to provide user input to Canberra without going back to the field for a "refresher". I believe it should be possible, and most definitely is highly desirable, to plan careers of senior officers to provide individual officers most suited for specific posts and for those officers to serve in those posts for a minimum of 3 years.

I believe that this is the way to provide better decisions on major defence matters. For better decisions we clearly need. We have a situation in which large parts of Navy, large parts of Army and significant parts of the RAAF believe the ADF is getting the wrong balance of equipment. However, the equipment being procured is in accordance with the strategy developed by the current defence decision making system. Parts at least of that
strategy have been published (in the National Times). Many can and do argue that that strategy neglects important potential threats.

Clearly, something needs to be done about the way in which Australia’s defence policy and strategy are developed.

A. W. GRAZEBROOK
Commander RANR

Wartime Strategy in Support of Foreign Policy

Dear sir,

The current journal (No. 46 May/June ’84) contains a paper written by me whilst I was on staff course. I am astounded that it was published without my knowledge or permission.

It would seem to be a simple courtesy to inform the author that his work was under consideration for publication.

In this case the paper was written over five years ago whilst I was a member of RANSC 1/79 — a course then well known for its work overload.

As much as any author may aspire to timeless journalism — the article in question could well have done with some revision.

It would be appropriate for you to publish this letter in the next journal.

P. L. CLARK
Lieutenant Commander RAN

Small Arms Research

Dear Sir,

Information is sought from persons concerning small arms made during the period 1900-1984. If you fought with, repaired, helped to produce or captured military weapons, I would like to receive your comments. The writer is researching military use and suitability of all nations’ weapons and would particularly like to hear of experiences as to the reliability of machine guns, rifles, sub-machine guns, carbines and pistols in different battle conditions.

F. R. GIBBS
Ballistic Consultant
P. O. Box 25
PEAKHURST, N.S.W., 2210

The Australian Army in New Guinea

Dear Sir,

I regret I must take issue with Bernadette McAlary’s article (DFJ March/April, 1984) on the Australian Army in New Guinea 1944-45.

First, she does not specify which Australian Army of the two we sent to war. The AIF could be used north of the Equator in what might be termed the “real war”, but the other army, the militia, could not be used north of the Equator. If they were to be used, it had to be in New Guinea. Otherwise, they might as well have been discharged and Australia’s standing as a member of the United Nations would have looked a bit sick.

Of course, 6 Div was used in the Wewak-Aitape campaign mainly because it was available and MacArthur had no use for it in liberating an American colony.

But the underlying principle in the use of forces to mop up the Japanese was more basic. Ms McAlary hints at it and Norman Carlyon in his “I Knew Blamey” spells it out in more detail as the policy agreed by Blamey and Curtin, that Australian subjects and protected persons should be liberated as far as possible from the Japanese yoke. Indeed, much of Blamey’s policy, perhaps endorsing ANGAU and political pressures, had shown itself to be deeply concerned with the welfare of Papua New Guineans in occupied areas. There were many cases indeed where civil administration teams from ANGAU operated behind Japanese lines. I personally, as a patrol officer in New Guinea, remember the affection with which those teams were regarded for he limited protection and moral support they gave to the civil population. It was a policy that conferred subsequent benefits and will continue to do so for the future. It is one Australians can look back on with some pride.

More basically, the policy of mopping up to liberate the occupied areas and those peoples for whom Australia was legally and morally responsible, is one which ought never to be questioned, if only because to do so is to raise the possibility that some Australians are more worthy of protection than others. And that makes an interesting topic for discussion in the mess in relation to our recent condescending acceptance of the Cocos Islanders as full-fledged Australians.

M. J. O’CONNOR
Lieutenant, RANR
Reunion Notice
US AIR FORCE — ARMY AIR CORPS
Dear Sir,
Request the above listed REUNION NOTICE be published in your publication. We are trying to contact over 3000 men and their families we have lost touch with since our South Pacific service during World War II. 22nd BOMB GROUP (M/H), 5th AF (WWII) Hqs; 2nd; 19th; 33rd; 408th Bomb Sqdns. (29 Aug.-2 Sep., Westin Oaks Hotel, Houston TX).
35th Annual Reunion! Contact — Jack Clark, Box 4734, Patrick AFB, FL 32925. (305) 636 5004.

JOHN E. CLARK
22nd Bomb Group Assn.
P.O. Box 4734
Patrick AFB, FL 32925 U.S.A.
(305) 636 5004

The Moresby Wreck
Dear Sir,
I am very much loath to criticise any of the contributors to the Defence Force Journal, as it has provided over a number of years considerable variety in its subject matter ranging from military history to the complex and technical problems of the military in this present day.

My complaint is only a slight one, but as contributors are urged to ensure accuracy of information in their articles, this one needs a comment. It deals with a picture of a USAAF Mitchell bomber attacking a Japanese naval escort vessel in the article concerning the S.S. Pruth (DJF No. 44, Jan/Feb 84, p 19).

The photograph was captioned that 'A second after this snap was taken the vessel in the foreground (the Jap naval escort) was hit and destroyed'.

In a series of photographs on pages 192/193 of the Pictorial History of Australia at War 1939-1945, Volume 4, the action illustrated shows the destruction of a Japanese convoy off New Hanover on 16 February, 1944, by 38 B25's. One cargo ship, the Taisyo Maru of 4716 tons, was sunk and the naval escort was left aground after being hit, but not destroyed.

The series of photos themselves show how difficult it was for the attacking aircraft to sink the Taisyo Maru despite the fact that the ship seemed to be stationary in the water. The first photo shows 4 possibly 5 near misses, the second shows the ship already hit, but further near misses and a huge amount of machine guns fire spashes.

The naval escort which was under way, seems to have escaped relatively undamaged considering the number of aircraft involved in the attack. The last photo shows it lying stopped in the water and affected by only one major issuance of smoke from a hit or hits and this/these seems to have occurred abaft the funnel.

NOEL SELWAY,
Historian
Springwood RSL

Two Invasions of Lebanon
Dear Sir,
It is acknowledged errors of fact in articles submitted are not the responsibility of the Board of Management. Even so, one trusts this letter will be given due consideration because the aim to ensure information contained in contributions is correct, rests with both contributor and reader of DFJ.

The reference is to the article of Maj. McAllester R.L. in the No. 46 May/June 1984 issue.

Contentious points are:
Successful conclusion of the Abyssinian campaign also raised Allied morale. With the capture of Keren, the 4th Indian Division returned post-haste to the Libyan Desert, also in 1941.

The Irgun Zwei Leumi did respect the truce in World War II. The Stern Gang a splinter group would not co-operate.

Kfar Vitkin in 1944 comprised a German Jewish settlement, and a few hundred yards west of the latter was a Palestine Police Mobile Force (usual term PMF). The officer-in-charge was Superintendent Cunningham.

The convalescent depot was no doubt Natanya, which also served as a recreation base. South of this area were eucalyptus and orange groves.

Two British Army Sergeants, Paice and Martin, were executed by hanging, in a eucalyptus grove near Natanya, and the bodies booby trapped. This was Irgun retaliation for the execution of two terrorists.

The ruthlessness of the 1982 campaigns is clarified, if aware of previous incidents involving Menachem Begin, i.e. Explosion 1946, King David Hotel, Jerusalem. A minimum of eighty-eight people died, including fifteen Jews.
In 1947, Judge Ralph Wyndham was kidnapped in his own court, by ten Jewish terrorists.

The Arab village of Deir Yassin was the scene of massacre in 1948. Two hundred and fifty-four men, women and children were slaughtered.

To award Begin the Nobel Peace Prize was a travesty of justice.

H. F. Holder M.M.

A Story from the Dreamtime

Dear Sir,

LTCOL Wood’s article (DFJ No 46) and his excellent earlier series of ‘Letters from a Friend’ whilst highlighting the problems of Defence in general and defending Australia in particular, draws attention to our inability in real terms to defend Australia.

A Story from the Dreamtime creates an uneasiness deep down which I believe is shared by many in the ADF. Whilst outwardly we say, and hope, that 'she'll be rite' inwardly we know that it will not. Regardless of how much notice we (the Australian Public) receive of pending hostilities we will find it hard to believe, hard to accept and even harder to take the decisions necessary to ensure that the ADF is ready and able to repel, and not only contain, any invader of the Great South Land.

As LTCOL Wood indicates most steps taken to upgrade our defences are too little too late. Even if we have the manpower many specialists will not be trained and equipment will be in short supply.

I for one do not wish to see the Great South Land taken wholly or in part by an enemy, but I find it impossible to see how we could stop a determined enemy from annexing parts of Northern Australia at will.

It is time that we stopped deluding ourselves that we can resist an invasion on any scale including low-level incursions. The public must be made to realise that the ADF is only a token organisation and totally unable to defend our national interests. It should be acknowledged publicly by Government and Service officers and not only by retiring or retired senior officers.

I commend LTCOL Wood for the readable manner in which he has presented this problem and hope, but with little confidence, that should his scenario arise we will be ready.

S. P. DOSSETOR
Major

Queen’s Scarf of Honour
Dear Sir,

It came as a very pleasant surprise to see the subject of the Queen’s Scarf, a most unique British award indeed, presented once more and then by someone so distinguished as Sir Robert Hall.

In the original article in the Army Journal of September, 1976: I, for the sake of brevity, omitted on purpose some information, with the Editor’s kind permission, I would like to add the remaining information.

I pursued an enquiry into the award of the Queen’s Scarf, the matter arising during the course of my investigation into Regimental Colours and Battle Honours during 1972. An integral part of that investigation related to V.C. awards and then in particular to the South African War.

The National Army Museum were able to inform me that those awarded the Queen’s Scarf are listed in No 107 June 1965 of the Journal of the Orders and Medals Research Society and that the ranks given of the recipient are those when awarded the Scarf. Also mentioned was that the son of du Frayer was working on a book. That was in late November, 1973.

Half way through 1974, the Australian War Memorial was able to provide further information:

In General Order 141 of 10th October 1900, a brief citation was published for the award: “For bringing in a dismounted comrade under heavy fire . . . (on) 11 April 1900”.

The “Sydney Mail” of 22 September 1900 quotes captain M. A. Hilliard du Frayer’s Squadron Commander, as saying:

“In early April last, when the regiment was on outpost duty near Karee a reconnoitring patrol was sent out in the early morning in charge of Captain Legge. When approaching a farmhouse flying the white flag every precaution was taken, but seeing no one about, the men numbering about 12 rode within the stone fence enclosure when they were immediately fired upon from within the house and also by a party of Boers concealed in a donga on the veldt. The gateway was only 150 yards from the farmhouse but du Frayer dismounted, shook Private Clark into a semi-conscious state and, mounted again, got Clark up behind him and finally out of danger. Private du
Frayer was exposed to a heavy fire from both quarters previously mentioned.

Du Frayer received the Scarf from the Duke of York at a Royal Review in Centennial Park on 28 May 1901. Karee is to the North of Bloemfontein, along the railway line to Pretoria. The action described by Captain Hilliard in the "Sydney Mail", occurred after Bloemfontein's capture, but before the move on Pretoria, and the work of all the Australian and New Zealand Contingents as well as all other operational troops was to deal with the clearing up of the many strong points held by the resisting Boers who remained, to ensure escapes over the crossings of the Modder River from the mounted columns who moved up and down the River.

NOEL SELWAY

Rethinking ARES Retention

Dear Sir,

Paul Oates' article was very thought provoking and very timely in the light of the present climate of highs and lows, mainly lows currently prevailing in the morale of the Reserves.

The lows have been brought about by a) Introduction of Taxation, b) Loss of sense of purpose by reduction in mandays thus lowering the aspect of job satisfaction.

Late last year I undertook an informal tour of selected TAVRA's (Territorial Army Volunteer and Reserve Associations), in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and submitted reports as necessary but I would also welcome this opportunity to add to Paul Oates' notes as regards:-

United Kingdom Retention Initiatives. Wastage is certainly conceded as a paramount problem and in relativity the Territorial Soldier can be divided into 3 groups:-

a) Those discharging after completing up to 1 year’s service.
b) Those discharging above 1 year but under 3 years service.
c) Those staying on after 4 years are mainly in "for life".

According to one district secretary (a retired Colonel and a very practical and experienced person) those in a) were not regarded entirely as a wastage. QV "At least some training was absorbed and in any case I know the character of the people in this district and they will rally to the colours if it is necessary." Perhaps one

might even refer to this as a form of voluntary National Service.

The problem lies with b) and whilst the taxfree annual bounty has just been further increased, this is still not the answer. Discharges at this time of service are mainly for family and work reasons. It was agreed that a realistic incentive at this stage to encourage the member over the 3 year hurdle was the answer. Accordingly I sought their reaction to the introduction of a "Defence Force Housing Loan scheme for Reservists", an item still outstanding from the Miller Report list of recommendations and one which we in Tasmania are actively canvassing on the basis that the economic and intangible advantages justify its introduction; in fact we feel that with our economic assessments to date it would not prove a burden on the taxpayer.

(TAVRA wish to be kept informed of our progress, through the National Council of CMFA ie. this initiative as they also agree that introduction of such a scheme would be an extremely attractive aid to retention). Very briefly, qualifying criteria would be that a Reservist is required to complete 6 years efficient service without a break prior to lodging an application for a Housing Loan. The interest rate would be increased back up to ruling commercial rates should a Reservist be discharged (other than retired) during the term of the loan etc.

In my CMFA role and my role as a liaison officer with 6RAAPC, I am in contact with many Reservists particularly at the grass roots level and without exception they have all stated that they would "soldier on" in order to become eligible for consideration for a Housing Loan.

Overseas Attachment as an aid to Retention.

The high I mentioned at the beginning of this letter relates as a recently announced innovation by CISORF (Citizens in Support of the Reserve Forces); sponsorship has been obtained through Qantas, Ansett Industries and the Commonwealth Bank to assist promising Reservists to train with their counterparts overseas.

Such a scheme, promoted suitably, will be an aid in Retention Strategy and this scheme is at no additional cost to the taxpayer.

There would be no doubt that the early implementation of the Miller Report's Recommendation on the introduction of a
Defence Force Housing Loan Scheme for Reservists would be a very positive high which would assist somewhat in offsetting some of the lows of recent times morale wise.

Most other points of Paul Oates' article are very pertinent and it could be very worthwhile if his article together with the added comments on the Housing Loan Scheme could be reprinted in other like magazines etc, so as to stimulate further discussion on ways and means to aid Retention.

PETER BRUCE
State Secretary
Citizen Military Forces Association
Tasmanian Branch

What Indeed is a Warrant Officer?

Dear Sir,

This is a contribution towards the understanding of the confusing term Warrant Officer and, as a basis for the examination of this term, I will use Warrant Officer Cook's excellent article, "The Warrant Officer", published in D.F.J. No. 44.

The proposition will be examined here that the term Warrant Officer denotes not a rank but a class of officer who is appointed in accordance with the terms of a Royal Warrant — hence the term Warrant Officer. This term indicates that the authority and status of a Warrant Officer resides in a Royal Warrant just as the authority and status of a commissioned officer resides in a commission issued by the Sovereign.

Although A.M.R. and O, corrected to February 1940, lay down that the term Warrant Officer denotes a rank, official documents, that I have studied over many years, have left me with the impression that these documents often avoid being too explicit about the true meaning or meanings of the term Warrant Officer and they leave it to the reader to guess whether it is a rank or a class of officer or both.

W. O. Cook has pointed out that "The rank of Warrant Officer was introduced into the British Army in 1879" when a Royal Warrant, dated 11 January 1879, constituted a "class of Warrant Officers to assist in the discharge of the subordinate duties of the Commissariat and Transport, and the Ordnance Store Departments of the Army."

If this Royal Warrant marked the beginning of Warrant Officers in the British Army, the extension of the field of their employment to the various arms of the service would necessarily have followed at some later date.

The starting point of the present A.M.F. is 1 March 1901. On that date the control of the Naval and Military Forces of the various Australian States passed to the new Federal Government, the seat of which was then in Melbourne. Therefore, it can be said that from that date the A.M.F. has had three classes of officers as follows:

commissioned officers commonly referred to as officers; warrant officers; and non-commissioned officers. It will be obvious from this classification that the term "non-commissioned officers" is a technical term and so, while all warrant officers are non-commissioned officers, not all non-commissioned officers are warrant officers.

The members of these three groups constitute, logically, the officers of the A.M.F. But from this point onwards logical thought on the term Warrant Officer breaks down. Nobody would ever venture to address a person as say "Commissioned Officer Brown" or "Non-commissioned Officer Jones" because, by this mode of address, these persons would be addressed, not by their rank, but by their class, and I use this term class here in its strictly logical sense. If this reasoning be accepted, then it becomes obvious that, although it is logically incorrect to address a person as say "Warrant Officer Smith" it is, according to regulations, correct and proper to do so.

There seems to be a long standing uncertainty about how to address Warrant Officers. The Queen's Regulations and Orders for 1892 prescribes that: "Non-commissioned officers and men will address warrant officers in the same manner as they do officers but do not salute them." This particular Order was repeated as late as February 1940 in A.M.R. and O of the A.M.F. But because this Order is too vague and incomplete, it does not provide an adequate guide in practice. Nothing is more "off putting" than to hear a soldier say to an officer: "Good morning Captain" or "Good afternoon Lieutenant Smith"; or to hear a junior officer say to his C.O., "Good evening Colonel". Yet as far as I know it is only custom that forbids these forms of address.

An MBI was issued sometime in the 1930s (continued on page 24)
IT is a positive delight for this old American soldier to be with you on this auspicious occasion when we honour the first Anglican Bishop to the Forces in Australia. I bring you very special greetings from the Rt Rev. Charles L. Burgreen, Episcopal Bishop for the Armed Forces in the United States, who served previously as an Army chaplain under my command and with whom I have continued to enjoy a rewarding relationship. I bring you greetings also from the parish of St George in San Antonio and the Diocese of West Texas where my wife and I are currently domiciled. Our diocese has nine major military installations located within its borders, representing all of our military services. Because of our large military constituency, our Bishop has appointed a committee on Armed Forces within the diocese, which I have been privileged to chair for the past five years.

There is an intangible which draws those of us together who have laid our lives on the line in the defence of our countries or the Free World... often in distant lands. I will always remember the words a Marine scrawled across a bunker wall at embattled Khe Sahn in Vietnam. Those words read: “For the man who has fought for it, life has a flavour the protected will never know”. Those who wear or have worn the uniform of our countries are truly comrades-in-arms — who have fought side by side in World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. I had the privilege of close associations with Australian soldiers in two wars. Democratic societies are wont to expect a great deal of those who serve in the Armed Forces. They are not only subject to greater physical dangers and psychical stresses than their civilian counterparts — but are also submitted to a sterner discipline and code of conduct, endure greater privations and discomforts, and receive somewhat less in the way of financial remuneration as well. They are even reviled in some quarters as war-mongers — even though it is well known, under our respective forms of government, the military does not start wars. It responds solely to the direction of duly constituted civilian authority. Oft times, it must fight wars without precisely defined military objectives or under ground rules which preclude a military victory.

Service wives share many of the trials and hardships to which their husbands are subject. They are the ones who must keep the home fires burning and be both mother and father to their children during the frequent absences of their husbands. They are a very special breed and are a constant source of inspiration to us all. I can properly be accused of prejudice in this area — since I have been happily married to one of these gallant ladies for almost 46 years. She is fifth generation Army; her grandmother was born in a tent during one of the American Indian Campaigns.

At no time during my rather lengthy military career did I find any incompatibility or inconsistency between my duty as a soldier and my faith as a Christian. The military in our countries is an honourable and worthy vocation, which needs the services of men and women of God if it is to operate at maximum effectiveness. I am convinced that those on the active rolls of our armed forces — and those on the reserve rolls as well — are better soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines when they serve God well. That is true in combat as well as in garrison.

I entered the commissioned ranks of the U.S. Army almost 49 years ago as a Second Lieutenant in the cavalry. As the years passed and the armoured car, the tank, and finally the helicopter replaced the horse on the battlefield, I became something of a curiosity, something of a “Gee Whiz”. People couldn’t believe my initial period of service in the army. They’d look at me in utter disbelief and
exclaim, “Were you really an old Calvaryman?” With great patience and forebearance, I’d reply: “No, I wasn’t an old Calvaryman; I was an old cavalryman. Get your “Ls” and “Vs” sorted out and properly arranged. Our good Lord was crucified on Calvary; but an individual who rides a horse in the military is known as a cavalryman — and you crucify me everytime you call me a Calvaryman!”

I realise now that the incredulous comments addressed to me were in the nature of prophetic utterances. For I am, indeed, an old Calvaryman, who has committed his life to Jesus Christ and gone to the cross with him. At the same time, I remain an old cavalryman, steeped in the traditions of the mounted service, and thanking God, if we are to believe the Book of Revelation, that there will be horses in heaven. To signify a melding of the two roles of Calvaryman and Cavalryman, I wear a cross of horseshoe nails.

I hope and pray that the good Lord will keep my remarks on “Christian Leadership in the Armed Forces” focused and to the point. I’m aware of the adage that, “generally speaking, old soldiers are generally speaking”, usually telling war tales in which they are the obvious heroes. Somehow, in this college atmosphere, I’m reminded of the professor who dreamt that he was lecturing his class. He awoke — and found that he was. I hope that my words will be somewhat more inspiring than his must have been.

While the founding fathers of our two great countries guaranteed all citizens the right to worship as they please, they never intended that freedom of religion be interpreted as freedom from religion. The United States was clearly established by those who framed its constitution as a “Nation Under God”. We attest to this fact in the pledge of allegiance to our flag, recited by our school children from their earliest grades. For the price of one penny, you can read the national motto of my country: “In God We Trust”. It is inscribed on every coin of the realm. Your country, as a member of the Commonwealth family of nations, continues to acknowledge the Queen as “Defender of the Faith”. It seems patently clear to me that our two countries are not neutral about God.

It is, thus, incumbent on our Armed Forces to make provision for the free exercise of religious faith by their members. Our military chaplaincies are dedicated to that purpose. In my country, that chaplaincy is older than the nation itself. But the ultimate responsibility for the spiritual and moral well-being of a command rests not with the chaplain but the commander. U.S. Army regulations specifically charge him with “Responsibility for the religious life, morals and morale of his command, and for the activities of the chaplains under his command”. I would suppose that commanders in your military services are given a similar charge.

I recognise that there are those in the military here today who do not exercise command, in the classic sense of that term, and whose career patterns perhaps even exclude this possibility. But all of you who are officers, non-commissioned officers, or cadets will, on a continuing basis, have supervisory or leadership responsibilities delegated by command authority. So what I have to say should be of more than academic interest to all of you. While Christian leadership is not confined to commandership, proper commandership must, as a minimum, make full provision for the exercise of responsible Christian leadership.

I’d like to examine with you how a commander can and should discharge his responsibilities for his religious program; for it is, indeed, his program as much as his operations, training, maintenance, or recreational programs. I know of no way a commander can discharge his responsibilities in any area except by active interest and personal involvement. General George Patton used to tell his commanders, “You can’t push a wet noodle”. And he was so right. You must pull it from the front end if it is to go where you want it to. At Ft Benning, Georgia, the home of the U.S. Infantry Center, there is a heroic statue of a doughboy or a grunt (you would call him a digger), with a rifle in one hand, signalling to his comrades-in-arms with the orders to “Follow Me”. That motto of the infantry leader is not original. It is actually a steal from the words of our Lord to his disciples, recorded seventeen times in the four Gospel narratives. Jesus is the supreme example of the true leader. He sets the pattern for all of us who aspire to leadership in any area.

Commanders obviously cannot have much of an impact on the religious life of their commands unless they have a demonstrated personal faith in God. Public declarations of
The Rt Rev F. O. Hulme-Moir, AO, ED was the first Anglican Bishop to the Forces (1965/79) and also Anglican Chaplain General (1974/79). He died in March 1979. The lecture is a tribute to his memory.

their faith, while appropriate, should under no circumstances, serve to threaten those under them with differing church affiliations or religious convictions. On the other hand, such declarations should be a source of encouragement to those with a weak or non-existent faith.

If commanders are truly interested in giving their people balanced rather than truncated leadership, they should examine their own faith in God. Where that faith is lacking, they should seek actively to develop it through fellowship with believers, study of Holy Scripture, and opening up of communications channels to God. In the U.S. Military, we have, for many years, paid lip service to the values of the “Whole Man” or “Whole Person” concept, with its mandate on treating individuals as total human beings. Without spiritual sensitivity, I fail to see how a commander can deal effectively with his people, who are each body, soul, and spirit.

I believe that commanders should worship regularly at chapels where their people worship. But they should go well beyond mere Sunday chapel attendance in their involvement in the religious life of their commands. They should foster innovative and imaginative religious activities and spiritual outlets, designed to meet the needs of all of their people. Retreats, prayer breakfasts, bible study groups, Christian coffee houses, praise and healing services, folk masses, tent meetings, and various forms of outreach into local civilian communities come immediately to mind. Some of you may shudder at these suggestions. But you will have people who do not—who, in fact, are spiritually awakened or nurtured through these or similar means. The bottom line is, “Are you involving more and more of your people in your religious program?”

As a U.S. armoured division commander, I instituted the practice of holding periodic “Duty Days With God”, in which eight hours of religious instruction, discussion, singing, and worship were offered to all our people on a voluntary basis. Approximately two thirds of the command participated, and we found it an excellent way in which to pull up our spiritual pants. I followed the same practice later on as a corps commander.

Manifestly, commanders must establish close personal and pastoral relationships with assigned or supporting chaplains. I never allowed denominational differences to affect this relationship. My command chaplain and I prayed together frequently. He and my command sergeant major were perhaps the primary claimants for seats in my “jeep” or “chopper” when I visited troop units. It remains my conviction that chaplains are not used to their full potential in the military. They need to be brought into the main stream of unit or base activities. They are experts in man-man and man-God relationships. But, too often, they labour in a vacuum, with little command direction or support. Unless chaplains enjoy the full confidence of their commanders as well as unit or base personnel, their effectiveness is seriously impaired. Manifestly they must do their part to earn that confidence. They should identify very directly with their “parishes”, which may be largely of the outdoor variety, and be more than willing to share the dangers and discomforts of the people to whom they minister — to wear the same hair shirt, if you please. Chaplains should not habitually take on the role of grievance spokesmen for lower ranking enlisted personnel. At the same time, they should assist commanders in keeping their fingers on the pulses of their commands by making known any unhealthy situations which exist, with due regard for ministerial confidences.

I don’t want to leave the impression that I see religion as a tool of command — or simply a means of motivating, manipulating, or consoling the serviceman or woman. The things of God are clearly the things of God, and not
a means but an end in themselves. Nevertheless, when commanders and chaplains concert their efforts in providing morally and spiritually sensitive leadership to their bases, units, or activities, they can expect as an eventual byproduct a lowered incidence of absence without leave, alcoholism, drug abuse, racial tensions, domestic problems, crimes of all types, and even hospital admissions. I proved that rather conclusively in my U.S. Army commands.

Young men and women entering military service these days in many cases have no religious background or spiritual mooring. This is even true of some entering commissioned ranks. Others have been turned off by the organised church. In their search for meaning and purpose in their lives, they have found neither the answer nor any real dynamism in the faiths to which they have been exposed. Perhaps, in their vulnerability, they have even gone up a blind alley and become involved in one of the cults. All young people are particularly vulnerable to the stresses and temptations of service life, and to the pressures of their peers. Many of them are at the age where they have instant highs and instant lows — and sometimes go on drugs to put those moods on a schedule, to compensate for realised inadequacies, or to identify with a particular group or life-style.

Commanders, chaplains, and leaders at every level must find out where these young people hurt and help them to grow out of it. Once they have been met at their need with compassion and understanding (which, I hasten to add, I do not equate with permissiveness), they are more apt to be open to the reality of God. In order to be fully credible in the discharge of their responsibilities, officers and non-commissioned officers must live their faith. In the final analysis, the moral tone of any command will reflect that of the commander and leaders at all levels. You may have heard that old proverb, "Like master, like ox". In my view, officers and non-commissioned officers should do more than they have to police their own ranks. I don't think there should be a very high level of tolerance for habitual drunkenness, gross profanity, wife or child abuse, fiscal irresponsibility, adultery, or bending of the truth in any form. It's an unhappy fact that in the U.S. military we've tended to excuse or overlook many of these practices, and even to invest some of them with a false aura of masculinity. As a young officer, I developed a swearing habit, almost endemic to cavalrmen. We thought we had to swear at a balky horse for five minutes, without repeating ourselves, to get him over a jump. Midway in my army career, someone called my attention to General Orders issued by George Washington to the Continental Army on 3 Aug. 1776. These orders read: "The General is sorry to be informed that the foolish and wicked practice of profane cursing and swearing is growing into fashion; he hopes the officers will, by example as well as influence, endeavour to check it, and that both they and the men will reflect that we can have little hopes of the blessing of Heaven on our Arms, if we insult it by our impiety and folly; added to this, it is a vice so mean and low, without any temptation, that every man of sense and character detests and despises it". I regarded the words in these General Orders with bemused tolerance for some time. Finally, I had them reprinted and framed on my wall. I may have focused so much attention on swearing that I have obscured some of the greater vices. That certainly has not been my intent. I would suggest only that we damage our institutional integrity when we tolerate or even cover for, people involved in any of these practices or activities, rather than bringing them up against a moment of truth and we do them no favour over the long-term either.

I hope that I don't sound dour, judgmental, sanctimonious, or holier-than-thou when I make these remarks. I don't believe that my associates in the U.S. Army would ever have described me in that vein. I am mindful that our God is not a cosmic kill-joy. He has a great sense of humour. I realise that most every morning when I look at my face in the mirror. True joy is not just the absence of sorrow. It's the presence of God — the second fruit of the Holy Spirit, immediately behind love.

Perhaps you've heard the story of Charles Spurgeon, the famous Baptist preacher. He was speaking to a group of divinity students, trying to get across the idea that your face should reflect what you're saying. "When you talk about Heaven", he said, "Let your face light up with a heavenly glow. When you talk about Hell, your every day face will do". Such words are a sad commentary on the lack of real joy in the world when people are trying,
almost desperately, to sin more but are enjoying it less. Despite their masks, habitual, knowing sinners are neither happy nor fulfilled persons.

I am convinced that committed Christians can enjoy pleasant relationships with their peers or associates in the military, and with those over and under them. They are apt to be a little less concerned with self, and to base their relationships with others on something more than “What's in it for me?” God’s love should shine through all true Christians. Our Lord tells those of us who are his disciples that we are “The light of the world”. We are to cast that light on those around us, hopefully with the high beam — instead of merely sounding our own horns.

I do not mean to infer that individuals of any rank with a strong faith in God will achieve instant acclaim in the military. They will, almost certainly, take a good deal of kidding, and even some abuse, from those who have deliberately turned their backs upon the Lord. They must often travel a rocky or a lonely road — and, at times, take a stand which puts them at odds with their associates or even their superiors. These words of the Italian philosopher, Rossi, appear pertinent, and have long been a source of encouragement to me: “Never fear to walk in the loneliness of your own convictions; for, if you do, neither you nor they are worth very much”.

Christian officers and non-commissioned officers should not run cheap popularity contests by compromising moral standards. When they must make a stand, they should not, however, cloak themselves with self-righteousness or seek to cast themselves in a martyr’s role. Christian leaders, without tolerating sin, should still be willing to go more than half-way in their relationships with others — and to pray ardently for them. We’re told in Holy Scripture to pray for our enemies as well as our neighbours, perhaps, sadly enough, because they’re often the same people. I find the words of a contemporary song helpful: “You can talk about me all you please; I’ll talk about you on my knees”.

In his farewell address, George Washington had these words to say to his countrymen (and I hope you find them as pertinent to your country as mine). “Morality is a necessary spring of popular government . . . Reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle”. These words strike a responsive chord in this old soldier’s heart. National morality is but a reflection of the individual morality of our citizenry. I don’t think that we in the military can talk about integrity of morality in the abstract. We must season professional ethics with a deep and abiding faith in God and in obedience to his Holy Word. If we are guided solely by man-made rules of behaviour, our adherence to them will tend to collapse under stress as they did, in fact, among military personnel of all ranks in the U.S. Forces during the latter stages of the Vietnam conflict — when the malaise of the country as a whole finally caught up with the military.

There are continuing evidences of a stampede away from responsibility in our lands and an insatiable quest for self-gratification — although the trends appear less pronounced than in the 1960s and '70s. Most of the problems which beset our nations and our armed forces are problems of the spirit, and can be met only with answers of the spirit. Some of you are perhaps aware that I am involved in spiritual renewal within the Anglican Communion and the larger Body of Christ. This renewal, led and inspired by the Holy Spirit, continues to sweep across the world as a strong counter-force to materialism and secular humanism. It is a mainstream rather than a peripheral movement which has affected all our churches and had a profound impact on the lives on tens of millions of people. I believe with all my heart that God is pouring out his Spirit upon the world in a more insistent manner than he has in centuries. We may be moving into final fulfilment of God’s promise as spoken initially by the prophet Joel and repeated by St Peter on the day of Pentecost in these words: “And in the last days it shall be, God declares, that I will pour out My Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams; Yea, and on My menservants and My maidservants in those days I will pour out My Spirit; and they shall prophesy.” (Acts 2:17).

Christian commanders and leaders, at all levels, be they young or old, must be men and women who “see visions”, and project themselves into the future with zest and enthusiasm.
They can “dream dreams”, but then they must jump out of bed and make those dreams come true. They need to make plans but then to make tracks. They must be prepared to make mistakes on the side of action and involvement — and allow those under them to make similar mistakes in the learning process. We will always have problems in our armed forces as well as in our churches; were they bereft of problems, they’d really have problems. But I hope and pray that, in both instances, their problems will be problems of life and not of death.

We who are Christian servicemen and women certainly fill the bill of being “menservants” of our Lord. The words are essentially synonymous. We may, as suggested by a noted canon in the Episcopal Church, be the ones to lead our nations back to God. The aim is a worthy one — which, I would hope, would expand your horizons.

For the past five years, I have chaired a Greater San Antonio Military Breakfast, sponsored by local chapters of the Full Gospel Business Men’s Fellowship, International. I trust that my reference to this fellowship causes none of your problems. We have had a senior general or flag officer as our principal speaker, been supported by a military band playing religious music, and a joint service colour guard. This year, we had General John Vessey, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest ranking officer on the rolls of our armed services, as our speaker. Although our breakfast was attended by 39 generals and admirals plus a host of prominent civilian officials and church leaders, it was definitely not a protocol affair. The worship was very fulsome — a bit startling to some — and General Vessey gave an inspiring talk in which he professed his faith in God in unequivocal terms, like Joshua of old. I’d like to quote a few words from his talk: “You and I should march off courageously and confidently to do the work that God has laid out for us on this earth, whether it’s administering the Church, or spreading the word of God, or defending the nation and reducing the risk of war. You have important work to do, and I want you to know that I along with a great many members of the armed forces are praying for you as you do that work. I too have some important work to do; and I ask that you pray for me and my fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for all the men and women of our armed forces.

“Speaking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we meet often on knotty problems that affect the security of the nation. I want you to know, and it might be some comfort for you to know, that we meet periodically for breakfast, with nothing on the agenda but prayer, bible study, and Christian fellowship”.

I find those words of General Vessey very reassuring, as I trust each of you who is a comrade-in-arms from another continent does as well. I am gratified that those charged with national security responsibilities at the highest level in the Pentagon are men of God who regularly seek his will and study his word. Perhaps when you hear the Pentagon and the Kremlin bracketed in conversation, and equally vilified, you will recall these words.

I bring my remarks to a close by reemphasising my strong belief that commanders and leaders at all levels must accept, without equivocation of any sort, that their responsibilities for the men and women entrusted to their care extend into the moral and spiritual as well as the physical and mental areas. I cannot see how they can discharge these responsibilities in their own strength. They must be plugged into the power source of God’s love and grace, manifested in his son Jesus Christ, and made available to them through his Holy Spirit. It is from God that all authority on this earth, both temporal and spiritual derives, as we are told very specifically in St Paul’s Letter to the Christians in Rome (Romans 13:1). The role of the commander or leader in the military, following the example of our Lord, is essentially one of servanthood. I pray that God will give us the perception and courage to serve our countries well and faithfully, and to acknowledge our Lord with simple pride rather than with hesitant, reluctant shyness. God has more people than he can use in his secret service today. And now, as the little girl said to the bagpiper, “if you let go, he’ll stop screaming”. I’m going to do just that — Let go and stop screaming. I wish you all God’s richest blessings, as you continue to do his work within the military.
THE DEFENCE OF JAPAN: SHOULD THE RISING SUN RISE AGAIN?

Article reprinted from The Defense Monitor

- Japan is accused of shirking its military duties, but it ranks eighth worldwide in military spending, ahead of most NATO nations.
- The U.S. is urging Japan to increase its military capability to assist the U.S. in any war with the Soviet Union.
- Japan's naval and air forces would be expanded to detect and destroy Soviet ships and submarines before they can leave the Sea of Japan and to protect sea lines of communication in the Pacific.
- Additional air and naval capabilities may enable Japan to project military force throughout the Pacific region.
- Expanded Japanese military forces may not be responsive to U.S. influence, nor always support U.S. interests.
- The clear short-term advantages to the U.S. in Japan playing a larger military role in the Pacific should be weighed against potentially adverse long-term political and military consequences.

Japan is accused of shirking its military duties, but it ranks eighth worldwide in military spending, ahead of most NATO nations. This is a sizeable military effort by the first world power in history to formally renounce war. Article IX of its 1947 Constitution states that the “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of a nation... In order to accomplish [this] land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.”

After the Korean War began in 1950, American occupation authorities reconstituted the Japanese military as a national “police” force. In 1954, two years after the U.S. occupation ended, Japan formally established what it calls the “Self-Defense Forces.”

In the three decades since, the Self-Defense Forces have grown into a capable army, navy and air force. Its 15 submarines rank Japan eighth worldwide. Only four NATO nations have more submarines than Japan. With 52 destroyers and frigates, Japan ranks fifth worldwide. Only three NATO countries have greater total naval tonnage. With 470 combat aircraft in its air force and navy, Japan is fifteenth in airpower worldwide. Only four NATO nations exceed Japan’s more than 3,700 armored vehicles, tanks and artillery pieces.

Under a slow-but-steady buildup initiated in 1976, Japan is upgrading these already strong armed forces. The Japanese army is replacing out-moded T-61 tanks with a planned 850 modern T-74s and its Hawk surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with U.S. Improved-Hawks. Additional Hawks as well as the air force’s six Nike air defense squadrons are to be replaced with U.S. Patriot missiles beginning in 1986.

Japan’s air defence radar warning system is also being replaced. Japan has already purchased from the U.S. the first four of a planned eight E-2C Hawkeye early warning planes. Japan plans to build 155 F-15J jet fighters to replace its older F-104Js. The first two of an eventual six F-15J squadrons became operational in March 1984, the last is planned for 1987. Further, some 100 of Japan’s older fighters are being upgraded with new electronics.

The Japanese navy will be better able to detect and destroy submarines with the introduction of 12 new Hatsuyuki-class destroyers, two of which are already commissioned. Japan has deployed 22 of a planned 75 highly-sophisticated U.S. P-3C Orions as replacements for its aging P-2J ASW patrol aircraft.

A “Free Ride”?

Despite these steady improvements, American officials critical of Japan’s military effort argue that it has been getting a “free ride.” The Department of Defense’s annual “burden sharing” report this year was more than usually critical of Japan, stating that it “ranks last or close to last on all the ratio measures surveyed and, thus, quite clearly appears to be contributing far less than its fair share.”
In fact, Japan falls into the middle ranks of the 15 countries covered for all but two commonly applied measures of military effort: percent of population in uniform and percent of GNP spent on defense. It is not too surprising that Japan has only 0.22% of its citizens in uniform, since it has the second largest population of those nations surveyed. And, by Cabinet agreement, Japan's military spending has been kept below 1% of GNP since 1976. While it has no legal basis, this limit has become accepted policy in Japan.

Percentage of GNP is a poor yardstick by which to gauge what any nation should spend on military forces and especially poor for Japan. Japan's critics scornfully compare the 0.98% allocated in its current budget to the 6.6% the United States spent on defense in 1983 or the European allies' 3 to 5%.

Japan's GNP ballooned steadily over the last decade, resulting in an annual real growth in military spending of about 8%, tapering off to a planned 6.8% increase for 1984. If Japan included pensions and survivors benefits in its defense budget, as do the NATO nations, its military spending would actually rise above the politically-sensitive 1% of GNP watershed.

Moreover, Japan does help carry part of the U.S.'s regional military burden since the U.S. does not foot the entire bill for basing 48,000 military personnel in Japan. In 1982 the U.S. spent $2.2 Billion and Japan $1.05 Billion for this purpose. Japan spends more to offset U.S. basing costs than any other country hosting U.S. troops: $21,000 per U.S. soldier.

Compared to U.S. basing agreements elsewhere, it could be said the U.S. is getting a hefty discount in Japan. Under an agreement just signed with the Philippines, the U.S. must pay $900 million over the next five years just for use of bases there. If, for its own interests, the U.S. wants to maintain bases on the flank of the Soviet Union's most crucial military installations, those in Japan are a bargain.

U.S. forces clearly are in Japan to serve U.S. interests, as U.S. officials have attested: “Japan is the cornerstone of the U.S. forward defense strategy in the Asian-Pacific region,” Francis West, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense told Congress in 1982. “Japan is the key,” Vice Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, then-Commander of the Seventh Fleet has said. Japan's wartime survival “is as important to the United States as it is to Japan.”

Japan's Armed Forces

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Source: CDI

U.S.-Japanese Military Ties

Formal U.S.-Japanese military relations date back to the 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty committing the U.S. to respond to aggression against Japan. No reciprocal obligation was laid out for Japan, the 1947 Constitution having been interpreted as barring “collective defence” arrangements. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation strengthened the U.S. commitment while, again, accepting Japan's constitutional constraints. There remains great popular sensitivity to any formal acknowledgement of a U.S.-Japan military “alliance.” Japan's Foreign Minister had to resign in 1981 after using that word in a communique on U.S.-Japanese relations.

That Japan does, in fact, have a military alliance with the U.S. became all the harder to ignore after adoption in 1978 of the “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” which established a framework for joint planning not only for the defence of Japan but for the Far East as a whole.

U.S.-Japanese military ties have been strengthened by more than 80 joint naval exercises since 1955. Joint air exercises were initiated in 1978 and two years later the Japanese army began combined officer-level Command Post Exercises with the U.S. In 1982, for the first time, U.S. ground troops joined Japanese forces in manoeuvres in Japan and in 1983 similar exercises were conducted in the U.S. Every year units from the three Japanese services are dispatched to the U.S. for missile and naval training.
U.S. Forces-Japan

The 48,000 U.S. troops in Japan serve in 118 separate facilities. The headquarters of U.S. Forces-Japan are at Yokota, as are those of the Fifth Air Force and an airlift squadron. Yokosuka, headquarters of the U.S. Navy-Japan, is also the homeport of the U.S.'s only overseas-based aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Midway, with its 70 to 80 aircraft — including F-4, A-6 and A-7 fighter and attack planes — and six accompanying destroyers and frigates.

Three U.S. attack submarines are based at Sasebo, while Atsugi hosts a major Seventh Fleet naval air station. A P-3C anti-submarine patrol squadron is based at Misawa Air Force Base, as is the 6920th Electronic Security Group which eavesdrops on Soviet military activities. The U.S. Army-Japan headquarters at Camp Zama is a command and logistics skeleton, to be fleshed out with troops in wartime.

The majority of U.S. troops on Japanese territory are based on Okinawa. More than 24,000 troops of the Third Marine Division are based at Camp Courtney. A Fifth Air Force base at Kadena on Okinawa has more than 70 F-15 fighters, 18 RF-4C reconnaissance planes and 3 AWACS. Also at Kadena, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) maintains 22 KC-135 air-refueling tankers as well as RC-135 and high-flying SR-71 and U-2R reconnaissance planes. These bases give the U.S. a unique capability to monitor and — in time of war — engage Soviet Pacific naval and air forces.

Bases in Japan also support U.S. operations elsewhere in the Pacific region, as during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. The importance of these bases in Japan as staging areas for the defence of Korea has been much reduced since the early 1950s, but the primary mission of the 24,000 Marines on Okinawa remains rapid reinforcement in case of renewed Korean hostilities. If the U.S. wants to reduce reliance on its Japanese bases it could consider moving these Marines back to Hawaii or the western U.S. from where they could be airlifted during a crisis.

The 48 F-16 fighter-bombers destined for Misawa — one squadron in 1985 and another in 1986 — will bring in an additional 2,076 U.S. personnel and cost more than $1.6 Billion through 1989. The F-16s which will be outfitted to attack ground targets — not as air interceptors — will enhance the U.S. Air Force's ability to attack Soviet bases around Vladivostok and on Sakhalin Island. The F-16s have become an issue in Japan, both because Japan will pay $275 million of the $373 million initial basing costs, and because they are nuclear-capable.

Non-Nuclear Principles

The question of nuclear weapons is highly controversial in Japan. In 1981, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer remarked that American ships carrying nuclear weapons regularly entered Japanese ports. That this fact had been disclosed before did nothing to prevent a public furor over apparent violation of one of Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Those tenets — no manufacture, no introduction and no possession of nuclear weapons — are but the most obvious symptoms of Japan's "nuclear allergy." Still, official Japan tends to be myopic about the nature of its nuclear security relationship with the United States.

Japan hosts numerous nuclear support facilities. Four KC-135 tanker planes are kept on continuous ground alert at Kadena to refuel B-52 nuclear bombers en route to Soviet targets. Command-and-control centres for communication with SAC's bombers are located

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Japan's Contribution to Military Stability

"Japan’s deliberate policy of foregoing the development of offensive military capabilities ... has encouraged the development of mutually advantageous economic and political relations between Japan and other nearby nations, heightening a common stake in the stability of the status quo."

Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, June 1980
at Kadena and Yokota and a similar facility for control of U.S. ballistic missile submarines is at Yosami. Undeniably, these and other U.S. bases and ports in Japan are prime targets for nuclear strikes in the event of war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Japan’s exposure to Soviet nuclear weapons is nothing new, but deployment of 126 SS-20s in Siberia has heightened general awareness of the danger. After Prime Minister Nakasone remarked in January 1983 that Japan should be an “aircraft carrier” against Soviet Backfires, Tass retorted that “for such a densely populated, insular country as Japan, this could spell a national disaster more serious than the one that befell it 37 years ago,” a clear reference to the atomic bombings that ended World War II. With most of its 118 million people concentrated along the Tokyo/Osaka axis, Japan is indeed more vulnerable than most countries to total devastation from even a limited nuclear attack.

Few Japanese want Japan to acquire its own nuclear weapons, but occasionally, articles surface in Japanese journals arguing that it should. Japan’s six-year delay in ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been attributed by the Japanese press to a faction in the ruling party which held that, in an unpredictable world, Japan should not “abandon the freedom of option as to nuclear armament for a long time in the future.”

Although Japan is technologically able to produce nuclear weapons within a year of any political decision to do so, it is years away from the social and political climate that would permit it. In the currently unlikely event a pressured Japan should break off its relations with the U.S. and retreat into armed neutrality — as some factions in Japan feel it should — the nuclear option, however contentious, becomes all the more inviting.

Soviet-Japanese Relations

Technically, the Soviet Union and Japan remain at war. A 1956 agreement to reestablish formal ties and later negotiate a treaty broke down in 1960 when the United States and Japan signed a new Mutual Security Treaty. Persistent disputes over the years have revolved around fishing rights, Japan’s ties with China, Soviet incursions into Japanese airspace and waters and the deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in Siberia. Another longstanding irritant has been Soviet refusal to cede back the four Kurile islands seized when it declared war on Japan — at U.S. urging — in the closing days of World War II. The Soviets began reinforcing their bases on the islands after Japan and China signed a 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty containing an anti-Soviet “anti-hegemony” clause.

The downing September 1, 1983 by a Soviet interceptor of a Korean airliner, in which 28 Japanese, promised to temporarily strengthen the hand of the minority in Japan seeking to increase military spending. But it seems unlikely to prompt the major popular reassessment of military priorities the U.S. desires. For instance, the electoral setback suffered by Prime Minister Nakasone in December 1983 stemmed, at least in part, from a popular suspicion of his military programs.

The Japanese were not noticeably intimidated by Soviet air and naval movements following the Sino-Japanese treaty, nor by the Soviet missile-rattling that has followed Nakasone’s more aggressive military pronouncements. But, while they are not rushing into a buildup to match the recent growth in Soviet forces, neither are the Japanese in danger of being “Finlandized,” as American officials fear.

Masamichi Inoki, Director of Japan’s private Research Institute for Peace and Security and a strong supporter of a military buildup, reflects a widespread view when he says: “Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Reagan claim that the U.S. is behind the Soviet Union in terms of strength. That’s wrong . . . For me, the most dangerous enemies for the security of Japan are those who exaggerate the strength of the Soviet Union.”

U.S. & Soviet Pacific Forces

U.S. Navy Secretary John Lehman warned in 1982 that Japan’s military program “must now be implemented with greater speed and with increased funding” to counter the U.S.S.R.’s “tremendous new policy for a blue-water interdiction naval force.” As is so often the case with Reagan Administration assessments of Soviet power, Lehman overstates his case.

The Soviet Union began expanding its naval forces in the Pacific in the 1970s, after years of according that fleet lowest priority. The
Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan, is now the largest of the U.S.S.R.'s four fleets, with 92 destroyers and frigates, 225 smaller combat vessels, 96 attack and cruise missile submarines and 31 ballistic missile submarines.

The only base available to the Soviets outside of the Soviet Union is the American-built base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. While facilitating limited operations in the Indian Ocean, Soviet supply lines are tenuous and the base vulnerable to swift attack from U.S. forces in Japan and the Philippines. In general, no more than 10% of Soviet Pacific forces are deployed outside of home waters at one time.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet confronts severe climatic and geographical problems. Siberian winters hamper port operations, Soviet ships must traverse narrow straits to reach open waters. Extended supply lines — across the Eurasian continent for Vladivostok and only by sea for Petropavlovsk — and modest amphibious forces give the Soviets little capability to project military power in the Pacific. They also lack the air cover and supply ships needed for sustained operations far from their main land bases.

Although U.S planners want a strengthened Japanese Navy to help combat the Soviet Pacific Fleet, American forces in the Western Pacific are still formidable. Much attention has been focused on the decline in U.S. Pacific Fleet ship numbers since the Vietnam War peak, but too little has been paid to a tremendous increase in capability.

Large numbers of World War II-era vessels have been replaced by fewer — but much more powerful — Spruance-class destroyers, Perry-class frigates and Los Angeles-class attack submarines. The U.S. Western Pacific Seventh Fleet is the only force in the region with powerful carrier-based air defence and an ability to project that airpower ashore.

Add to this superior logistic forces and basing structure and the naval balance in the Pacific continues to favor the U.S. According to U.S. Pacific Commander, Admiral William Crowe, "I see every trend in my forces . . . going upward. We can match the Soviet increases in strength."

### Plans and Problems

Despite Admiral Crowe's optimistic assessment, the U.S. is urging Japan to increase its military capability to assist it in any war with the Soviet Union. Japan's naval and air forces would be expanded to detect and destroy Soviet ships and submarines before they can leave the Sea of Japan and to patrol sea lines of communication out to 1,000 miles from Tokyo.

The extent of U.S. plans for Japanese rearmament was outlined at the 1981 Japan-U.S. Security Conference, where American planners urged Japan to build up its forces far in excess of its current program.

Specifically, Japan was asked to acquire 350 jet fighters (mostly F-15s), giving it a fighter force roughly comparable to Britain's; 70 destroyers and frigates, giving it the third largest such force in the world; 25 attack submarines, moving it into fourth place worldwide in submarines; and 125 top-of-the-line P-3Cs, giving it the best anti-submarine capability in the region.

American officials avoid any suggestion that they want Japan to develop offensive military power in the region. But additional air and naval capabilities may enable Japan to project military force throughout the Pacific. The shift from a purely defensive capability to a potentially offensive one can be found in Japan's newest fighters. When Japan built its F-4 fighters, it took pains to leave off the bomb racks. But in building its new F-15s — which have an unrefueled range of more than 3,000 miles — Japan has not omitted bomb racks, permitting potential attack capability.

U.S. officials have stated that Japanese military spending would have to rise at least 10 percent annually to meet the combat capability planned by 1990. But Japan will have great difficulty meeting the financial requirements of even its current, more modest buildup. Japan also has a severe, service-wide shortage of ammunition, fuel and supplies. Japanese fighter pilots get only two-thirds of the flight time of U.S. pilots, for example, and can fire but one practice missile every two years.

According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Ickle, "Japan's [current forces], if they had the logistic stocks to provide sustainability, could represent very substantial combat capability." While Japan's growing warfighting capability is recognized in the Pentagon, the current emphasis on new weapons procurement will do nothing to ease Japan's serious supply problems.
Dire Straits
One of the new military tasks Japan is considering — after years of U.S. prodding — is a wartime mission to destroy Soviet naval forces as they pass through the three straits running between and around its islands. The goal would be to bottle up the Soviet Pacific Fleet and prevent re-supply of Petropavlovsk.

Tsugaru Strait, which runs between Honshu and Hokkaido, would be the easiest to close since it is narrow, shallow and flanked on both sides by Japanese territory. Tsushima Strait to the south between South Korea and Japan is wider and would require thousands of mines. Soya Strait to the north would be both the most crucial and the most difficult. The widest of the three straits, it is bound on the north by the Soviet Union’s Sakhalin Island and is within easy striking distance of Soviet aircraft.

In recent years the Soviet Union has bolstered its forces on the Kurile islands just to the east of the Soya Strait with a garrison of 14,000 troops, at least 20 advanced MIG-23s and a new attack submarine base. These forces seem to be part of a strategy to prevent any Japanese/U.S. effort to attack ships passing through the Soya Strait and to protect Soviet missile submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The Japanese, fearing that the Soviets might seize the northwest corner of Hokkaido to carry out this strategy, concentrate their frontline ground forces there. While a Soviet wartime land grab cannot be ruled out, it does not justify the extreme emphasis Japan places on its army, to the detriment of its air and sea forces. Japan could more profitably concentrate its limited resources on guarding its airspace and defending its home waters. This may be difficult to accomplish, since the Japanese Army has long been the dominant service.

Nervous Neighbours
Japanese worries about the consequences of the planned expansion of their military operations out to 1,000 miles are nothing compared to those of its neighbouring countries. Many Asian nations remember — seemingly better than Americans — the atrocities committed in the name of Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” its brutal wartime bid to take over the nations of the Pacific rim.

“We don’t discount the depth of the feeling” against the prospect of renewed Japanese militarism, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said in Indonesia in the fall of 1982. “Of course, nobody in the United States wants to see Japan become a military superpower.” But the Indonesian Vice President later told Japanese reporters, “We are scared. Japan must not be allowed to rearm. That is something all Asians fear.” According to the Philippine Foreign Minister, “The United States should be careful about making Japan its surrogate for the defence of the Pacific. We must be careful not to encourage any aggressive designs . . . or another Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

South Korea, 36 years a Japanese colony, is no less distrustful. Says one Korean official: “History has shown that Japan’s motives have always been completely self-serving. We agree to go along with its defence plans only because we see it as an integral part of the strategy for the American global military balance.” Even the Chinese, anti-Soviet to the core, are worried. In 1983 the Chinese Foreign Minister told a Japanese delegation, “I hope the Japanese [defence buildup] decision will in no way pose a threat to neighbouring countries.” Officials in Singapore and Thailand have expressed similar worries.

Some Asians fear that the 1,000 mile plan is only a first step; once Japan has the capacity to patrol that far, what’s to stop it from patrolling 1,500 or 3,000 miles? In March 1982 Rep. Paul Findley told a House subcommittee that “the 1,000 mile ‘limit’ should only be an intermediate goal for Japan” and that he would like to see Japan defend sea lanes all the way to the Persian Gulf.

A 1980 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) study concludes: “Japan’s deliberate policy of foregoing the development of offensive military capabilities . . . has encouraged the development of mutually advantageous economic and political relations between Japan and other near-by nations, heightening a common stake in the stability of the status quo.”

Widespread distrust of the 1,000-mile patrol — to say nothing of the 7,000-mile expanse envisioned by some — could undermine this status quo, sparking a regional arms competition. Some Asian nations have acquiesced to the 1,000-mile plan, with the proviso that the U.S. maintain its current — or even a larger — military presence in the region to offset
THE DEFENCE OF JAPAN: SHOULD THE RISING SUN RISE AGAIN?

WESTERN PACIFIC

SOVIET UNION

SEA OF OKHOTSK

PETROPAVLOVSK

MONGOLIA

VLADIVOSTOK

KURILE ISLANDS

TSUGARU STRAIT

JAPAN

TSUSHIMA STRAIT

OKINAWA

PROPOSED JAPANESE PATROL ZONE

GUAM (U.S.)

TAIWAN

PHILIPPINES

CAM RANH BAY

VIETNAM

LAOS

THAILAND

KAMPUCHEA

CHINA

SEA OF JAPAN

SAKHALIN ISLAND

GUAM (U.S.)
Japanese not Naive About the Russians

"[T]he Japanese are not naive about the Russians. They may not believe the Russians are ten feet tall as do some Americans... They may not believe that the Russians are planning an attack on Japan or any other country in the Asia-Pacific, now or in the future. They may not in fact believe that the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region has yet shifted adversely. But then, most American analysts do not either."

Prof. James W. Morley
Director, East Asia Institute of Columbia University before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 1982

Japanese naval strength. It is hard to see how an expanded Japanese military role in the Western Pacific will benefit the U.S. if we must bolster our presence to balance Japan's increase.

If the eventual goal is no more than 1,000 miles, it is just as hard to see how the patrol will contribute significantly to the security of Japan's vital sea lanes, which stretch a further 6,000 miles to the Persian Gulf oil fields. Even under its present ambitious mid-term defence program, Japan will not acquire sufficient forces to patrol 1,000 miles effectively. It would seem, then, that the U.S. is seeking to promote a show fleet. Where is the profit in creating a paper tiger that scares the United States' allies more than its rivals?

Arms or Toyotas?

Except for limited-run items such as the E-2C and domestic designs such as the T-74 tank, Japan co-produces its big-ticket arms under license with the U.S. This is not the cheapest way to go. An F-15 which costs Japan $48 million to co-produce, would cost only around $36 million if imported directly from the U.S. But co-production does, in the words of one Japanese official, "contribute to the enhancement of [Japan's] own technological base."

In the process Japan is acquiring expertise in producing sophisticated military hardware. Although it has the world's seventh largest defence industry, Japan banned foreign military sales in 1967. The only official exception is transfer of military technology to the U.S., a concession granted in January 1983. The Pentagon isn't eager at this time to import particular technologies, but has a strong interest in future Japanese advances in fibre optics, microchips, and robotics.

All three major Japanese defence contractors favor lifting the export ban entirely. If Japan undertakes a military buildup larger than the current plan, it will have powerful incentives to export, in order to realize the economies of scale other countries gain by exporting excess defence production.

It is very much in the American interest to keep these incentives to a minimum. Japan, after all, is the country which built 25,000 fighter planes a year during World War II. It would doubtless excel in the lightweight, electronics-packed arms now so popular on the world market. Japan could be a dangerous new force in a war-torn world already plagued by escalating arms transfers.

A Slowly Rising Sun

In 1946 General Douglas MacArthur described America's Japan policy, saying it should be the "Switzerland of the Far East." That is exactly what Japan has become. Without the military restraint that Japan — once the Prussia of the Far East — has thus far shown, the Pacific military balance that concerns U.S. officials could be far more precarious than it already is.

According to the 1980 ACDA study, if it had chosen "to develop offensive, or perhaps
even long-range defensive forces, Japan, by virtue of its location, could have significantly threatened both the Soviet Union and China, and certainly complicated or destabilized the military balance which exists today. Nothing has happened since then to alter that assessment.

Should the Japanese people decide that the time has come to play a more prominent military role in Asia, that is their business. But a radical change in the status quo should not come at the behest of an outside power. In the meantime, the Japanese military is being incrementally incorporated into a U.S. global strategy of "containment" of the Soviet Union. If U.S. forces are over-extended the Pentagon should reconsider that strategy, rather than attempt to create yet another major military power in the Pacific.

It makes sense for Japan to have a strong defensive capability, but not for it to develop large naval and air forces capable of projecting military power throughout the Pacific. Japan's military policy is already on a reasonable course. With the F-15s and improved air warning system it is now acquiring, Japan will be able to raise a realistic defence against air attack. If it adequately supports its destroyer, submarine and ASW aircraft fleet in Japanese home waters, Japan will be prepared for attack by sea. The ground forces now stationed on Hokkaido are already sufficient to fend off land attack.

Over the years Japanese military policy has remained relatively impervious to American exhortation. The most likely response, if U.S. pressure continues at its present pitch, is not a rapid buildup but increased Japanese resentment, which could well end up being channeled in directions contrary to U.S. interests. The clear short-term advantages to the U.S. of Japan playing a larger military role in the Pacific should, therefore, be weighed against potentially adverse long-term political and military consequences.

Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Holloway (ret.), warned the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of this in 1982: "I urge caution that in any approach to the Japanese to increase their defence commitments we should avoid the implication of an ultimatum ... It could lead to a rethinking on the part of the Japanese of their alternatives to a mutual defence pact with the United States and could even justify, in their judgment, a severance of these ties and the adoption of a neutralist position in the Western Pacific."

U.S. officials have become so obsessed with what they view as a military imbalance in this region, they seem blind to how much worse the situation could be. By pushing Japan to expand its military, the U.S. threatens to create a military force that may not be responsive to U.S. influence, nor always support U.S. interests.

The current shapers of U.S. military policy would do well to reflect on the prescient words of Imperial Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto the day Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor: "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."

CONCLUSIONS

Japan's current military program, coupled with improvements in its logistics stocks, will bolster its already sturdy self-defence capability.

**Rearmament Not a Viable Security Option**

"Given Japan's geographic location and economic vulnerability, rearmament is not a viable security option. Rather, the argument can be made that rearmament would only serve to destabilize the Asian-Pacific region and that, in such an environment, Japan would be correspondingly less secure."

Asian Security Environment: 1980
House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 1980
Increased Japanese self-defence capability will support U.S. military plans and strengthen overall defences against Soviet forces in the Northwestern Pacific.

Plans to generate a Japanese military projection capability create a potential for expansion that alarms many smaller nations in the Pacific.

An expanded Japanese military may not always support U.S. interests, so we should weigh carefully the long-term risks of promoting a reemergence of the Rising Sun.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (continued from page 8).

on how to address Warrant Officers, so that instances, similar to those given above in respect of officers, could be avoided as far as Warrant Officers were concerned. The only thing I can now recall about this MBI is that it laid down modes of addressing Warrant Officers of the P.M.F. and of the C.M.F. which were not identical. This difference was therefore a class distinction that was not however a logical one.

W.O. Cook said: "The elite of the Australian Army in its infancy, and in fact right up to the early days of World War II when it was disbanded, was the Australian Instructional Corps. Apart from the fact that this statement would displease those people who were members of the Australian Staff Corps before September 1939, when it was a differently constituted corps from the present day one, it should be noted that the Australian Instructional Corps was not created until 1921 and it existed officially until probably 14 August 1953.

The earlier A. and I. Staff was a different body. It was replaced after the war of 1914-18, by the Australian Staff Corps in 1920 and the Australian Instructional Corps in 1921. It should be noted too, that despite the name, Australian Instructional Corps, its members did relatively little instructional work in CMF units where the majority of its Warrant Officers were employed in permanent postings. This situation was due to the system which prevailed during the inter-war period and not to the members of the A.I.C. These Warrant Officers, when attached to CMF units, were borne down by "paper work" and by duties at PMF schools of instruction in the roles of either instructors or students. It was my experience, which was not of course Australia wide, that in practice they did relatively little instructional work officially within the CMF units to which they were attached. This was quite a different situation, I believe, from that which prevailed before August 1914 when the A. and I. Staff existed.

The Australian Army List, Part I, dated 1922 shows the A.I.C. in two separate lists. One list sets out the Warrant Officers who were classified in it as Warrant Officers, Class IA, Class IB and Class II. During the inter-war period these Class I Warrant Officers wore an officer's pattern of khaki tunic with a khaki coloured shirt and tie. By the time of the publication of the Australian Army List, Part I, in 1940 the Class IA and Class IB Warrant Officers had merged into one common classification of Warrant Officers, Class I. These Class distinctions, it should be noted, served the same purpose as rank distinctions would have done.

The commissioned officers of the A.I.C., with the substantive rank of Quartermaster, are shown in the other list. This term Quartermaster is one that is as confusing as the term Warrant Officer, because it is both a rank and an appointment, although I cannot recall ever having seen it specifically denoted in official records as a rank. Nevertheless, the manner in which the term has sometimes to be used in official records proves it to be a rank. If it were not a rank, as well as a position, how is the distinction to be explained, in terms of rank, between a Warrant Officer, Class I (Honorary Lieutenant) and a Quartermaster (Honorary Lieutenant)?

Warren Perry
Major R. L.
LEADERSHIP AT THE COALFACE

By Flight Lieutenant R. J. Matthews, RAAF

Perhaps one of the most often observed but least understood phenomena on earth is LEADERSHIP. Why is it least understood? Why is it shrouded in mystique? Why do some subscribe to the myth that 'Leaders are born, not made'? Why do others believe that leadership can be learnt but not taught? In this age the other old myth that 'you can take a horse to water but you can't make him drink' is also outdated. Try feeding the horse a salt lick before you take him to water — and then see if you can stop him from drinking!

A commonsense approach to leadership will show that there is no longer any mystique, it can not only be learnt, it can be taught, and it can be passed on from one leader to another, both up and down the chain of command. If the leader has some guidelines which allow him to recognize why leadership is important it becomes a simple task to show him how to use to his advantage some of the basic approaches to leadership.

Why Emphasise Leadership?

It is not only the military who have experienced a lowering of respect for authority in the 1970/80's. Civilian leaders also have to face the problems of rundown facilities, financial restraints, cutbacks in manpower and a reduction of training resources. These can have an adverse effect on morale of both the leader and the follower. The military leader is also faced with followers who have an attitude towards authority which at any given time has a direct relationship to the attitude of the public towards authority. If the public attitude becomes resentful towards authority this will in turn be carried into the defence force.

Our junior leaders, both commissioned and non-commissioned, of whom most are rather young in years and short of experience, are faced with a dilemma. They are indoctrinated in military subjects such as Discipline, Service Law, administrative procedures to enforce military authority and a number of service traditions and customs which need to be maintained. They are then let loose into a service system where an increasing number of their subordinates have little respect, or time, for military authority. But, regardless of this attitudinal problem which continues to increase in the military, such problems as undermanning, lack of resources and lack of respect, can be overcome by units whose members sense that their leaders have a genuine interest and commitment to their welfare.

Definitions

In any leadership discussions three words frequently cause confusion because their meanings are not understood. These three words are:

Management. Management is a process of establishing and attaining objectives to carry out responsibilities. Management consists of those continuing actions of planning, organising, co-ordinating, controlling and evaluating the use of men, money, materials and facilities to accomplish missions and tasks.

Command. Command is the lawful authority which an individual in the services exerts over subordinates by virtue of his rank and posting. The exercise of command is supported by the existence of a code of military law.

Leadership. Leadership is the art of consistently influencing and directing men in tasks in such ways as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect and loyal cooperation in the manner desired by the leader.

If we can accept that leadership is the process of attempting to influence the behaviour of
others the evidence from research clearly indicates there is no single, all purpose, 'best' leadership style. Successful leaders are those who can adapt their behaviour, their approach and their style to meet the demands of their own unique situation.

**Approaches to Leadership**

Some considerable time is required to research the thousands of books, articles and thoughts published on leadership. The following collection of thoughts has reduced the numerous approaches to leadership down to five main areas:

- **Machiavelli's approach**
- **Qualities approach**
- **Traditional situational approach**
- **Functional approach**
- **Modern situational approach**

The advantages of each of these approaches, and the best way to use them is explained in the following paragraphs.

**Machiavelli**

One of the earlier books on power and leadership was written in the 16th century by Machiavelli. He asked is it better to have a relationship based on love or fear. Machiavelli contends it is best to be both loved and feared — loved because the subordinates are fearful of the results if the leader finds out he is no longer loved. If you cannot have both, he suggests that a relationship based on love alone will not work for long. A love based relationship tends to be volatile, short lived, easily lost when the leader requires an unpopular task to be performed or easily terminated when there is no fear of retaliation.

On the other hand, a relationship based on fear tends to be longer lasting because the individual must be prepared to incur the sanctions — pay the price — before terminating the relationship or failing to comply. This relationship is a difficult relationship for many leaders to accept, particularly those leaders who want to be popular, because one of the most difficult roles for a leader is to discipline someone about whom they care.

To be effective, leaders sometimes have to sacrifice short term friendship and popularity for long term respect if they are really interested in the growth and development of the people with whom they work.

Machiavelli does warn, however, that we should be careful that fear does not develop into hatred. Hatred will often evoke overt behaviour in the terms of retaliation, dissention, undermining of authority and, perhaps in the extreme, even attempts to overthrow the authority.

To use Machiavelli's approach successfully the leader must be prepared to base his actions on the long term development of his subordinates and he must avoid the pressures of basing his actions on trying to stay at the top of the popularity poll.

**Qualities Approach**

This approach to leadership is probably the most widely followed of all the approaches to leadership. It is based on taking the good qualities of a successful leader and trying to adopt them for yourself.

Let's list some successful leaders:
- Churchill
- Stalin
- Hitler
- Barassi
- Fraser
- Hawke

These leaders could be credited with some of the qualities of knowledge, energy, courage, integrity, sympathy, tact, sense of humour or perhaps even adaptability as well as many other 'qualities'.

Already the knockers of the Qualities Approach are saying 'Who said Hitler was successful?' 'Fraser lost the election — he's no longer successful!' 'Barassi hasn't won a premiership for years!' They might also say 'Since when has Fraser had a sense of humour? When did Hitler show integrity? Barassi is volatile and not renowned for tact! Since when has a politician shown sympathy?'

The attitudes of the knockers are highlighting a lack of agreement as one of the shortcomings of the Qualities Approach. Napoleon listed 115 qualities he demanded of his officers. The RAF Cranwell College requires 7 qualities, the Canadian Defence Force 17, The US Marines 14 and the RMA Sandhurst lists only 4 essential qualities for a good leader: Courage, Willpower, Initiative and Knowledge. The Armed Forces of the world can't reach an agreement, and for that matter neither can the major civilian organizations reach an agreement about
which are the essential qualities (if any) and which are the desirable qualities.

The ‘knockers’ may also say that it is difficult to teach many of the qualities. How do you teach honesty? Can you be kept in a classroom for a few periods and taught how to display more confidence, more initiative, and improve your sense of humour? Probably not. Some leaders can’t tell a joke without messing it up, others can keep you rolling in the aisles. Does that make the joker a better leader than a person without a sense of humour? Not necessarily, but there is little doubt that the possession of certain qualities by one leader and the absence of those same qualities in another is what makes the former the more effective leader.

The Qualities Approach can be used successfully if the leader can look at any list of qualities, no matter how long, recognize that he may be lacking in some particular area, and then take action to improve that part of him image which he acknowledges as a problem area.

Traditional Situational Approach

The Traditional Situational Approach is based on the person most skilled for the job being the leader. Leadership changes as the task changes. An example that could be used for this approach is a shipwreck involving a doctor, a ship’s carpenter, a poacher and a deckhand. When the survivors reached the beach they had numerous lacerations, bruises and some broken bones. The doctor was expert in this field, and he took over and solved their medical problems. When they required shelter the ship’s carpenter took charge and organized the remainder as his labourers and he arranged the building of a hut. When they were hungry the poacher showed them how to set traps and snares and he led them in such a successful manner they were never short of food. When they wanted to leave the island the deckhand was the only one who could navigate by the sun and stars - he knew what sort of sail to set to make best use of the wind. He made an admirable leader onboard the lifeboat.

There are obviously many advantages to this style of leadership, but there is also a danger. The danger is a lack of direction. Who determines the aim? Who decides the priorities?

What happens if first aid, shelter, food and seamanship are all required simultaneously? Who then is the decision maker ... the leader?

This Traditional Situational Approach is not acceptable in the Defence Force. The breakdown in the chain of command would be chaotic. Notwithstanding this, we must recognize that in any military group there may be someone else who has more expertise for some particular task than the leader. We cannot expect the leader to be the professional and technical expert in every possible situation, but we can take advantage of the expertise of our subordinates and use their experience to help the leader solve the problem.

In advocating this approach the leader must be very careful that he maintains his position as the leader and the decision maker.

Functional Approach

Dr John Adair of the RMA Sandhurst developed an approach to leadership called the Functional Approach. His approach has been adopted, amongst other organizations, by the RAF, USAF and the RN. It recognizes that in any working situation the leader must look to satisfy three sets of basic needs:

Task Needs
Group Needs
Individual Needs

Task needs are the demands of the job, the timings, the resources, the Boss wants ... etc.

Group needs are what the leader must do to maintain group cohesion, team work, etc.

Individual needs are the physical and psychological motivation requirements of individuals.

Each set of needs — the Task, Group and Individual — are distinct but not isolated. They each overlap each other. Under varying circumstances the priority of needs may differ but all must be considered continuously.

Examples of the Task needs being the primary needs would be combat, meeting a time scale deadline, rescue from a crashed aircraft, etc. Examples of the Group needs taking priority would be the activities of a social club or recreational training instituted to raise the morale and group cohesion.

An example of the Individual needs taking priority would be providing motivation for a fireman, on standby, not sure if or when a fire alarm will sound. When we look at how we can motivate the individual we could con-
Consider Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs which establishes a set flow pattern of increasing motivators.

Maslow believes that the basic motivating factors are physiological, such as survival, food and shelter. When these needs are satisfied Maslow contends that the individual moves into motivators of safety and security such as the freedom of danger, freedom from threat of the sack. Then follows belonging and social factors — the grouping together of people because they need to associate, to admire and be admired. Esteem and status, fourth in Maslow’s hierarchy, is where the individual can satisfy his ego or enhance his reputation. In this area people need to feel competent and knowledgeable and need to be reminded of their value to the organization. The fifth and final area in the hierarchy is self realization and fulfillment. To reach this area the individual must be able to use all of his creative talents, without supervision and must believe that he has obtained all of his personal goals.

Once an individual has reached the peak of Maslow’s hierarchy, watch out!! He won’t be satisfied for long, he will be out looking for another challenge. When the new challenge is accepted the member then reverts down the hierarchy of needs to a lower level prior to working his way back up again to the top.

If the leader keeps supplying the challenge motivation is easy to find.

How does the leader use the Functional Approach? Simply by recognizing that the three needs of Task, Group and Individual must be satisfied. Whilst most times the job at hand makes the Task needs all important, there will be times when we can build up the Group and Individual needs in anticipation or in appreciation of the demands of the job. A credit balance in the bank of goodwill will produce favourable results from the Group and the Individual when the Task needs become demanding or overpowering.

Modern Situational Approach

Although each of the previous approaches to leadership may have given ideas to the leader none of them have told the leader how to get his subordinates to do the job.

The new or Modern Situation Approach to leadership, as devised by Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, is based on the relationship between leader and subordinate towards any particular task. This relationship will change as the task or situation changes. The approach is directly related to the subordinate’s potential to complete the task.

To use this approach the leader must first accept the task, then determine which group or individual is going to perform the work.

Hersey and Blanchard advocate that subordinates, either as an individual or as a group, fall into four separate ‘maturity’ areas. This ‘maturity’ is the subordinate’s performance potential which is influenced by a combination of the subordinate’s ability or skill, and his motivation or willingness to do the task. The levels they advocate are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATURITY LEVEL</th>
<th>BEHAVIOUR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1 (Low Potential)</td>
<td>Completely unwilling to do task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2 (Low Moderate)</td>
<td>Has some ability to do task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3 (High Moderate)</td>
<td>Can do job but lacks self confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4 (High)</td>
<td>Can complete task and is happy to take responsibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Completely unable to do task
Tasks frequently not done or not completed satisfactorily
Complains when given a task

Has some ability
Knows enough to ask intelligent questions but does not know enough to complete the job unaided
Has sufficient interest to ask questions
Wants to learn

Can do job but lacks self confidence
Looks for support
Unwilling to take responsibility
Completes task but likes it to be checked
Can explain job and carry it out

Totally reliable
Once the maturity level of the subordinate/s to perform a particular task is determined, Hersey and Blanchard advocate the following styles of leadership:

**Style 1** (For use with Maturity Level 1 subordinates). The leader should TELL the subordinates what is required, define the roles, tell them how, when and where to do the appropriate tasks — then exercise maximum supervision to ensure the task is completed satisfactorily.

**Style 2** (For use with Maturity Level 2 subordinates). The leader should SELL the subordinates on the importance of the task, the reasons why, the need for, and the implications of failure to perform.

**Style 3** (For use with Maturity Level 3 subordinates). The leader should PARTICIPATE in the decision making process. As M3 subordinates have the ability and knowledge to do the job their involvement can be used by the leader. Style 3 leadership is akin to advocated way of using the Traditional Situational leadership approach, but it must be remembered that the decision maker must remain the leader, not the subordinates.

**Style 4** (For use with Maturity Level 4 subordinates). The leader should DELEGATE the task to the subordinate. The M4 subordinate displays total reliability and is happy to accept responsibility. Minimum supervision is required.

Successful use of the new or Modern Situational Approach to leadership is dependant on the leader following a set sequence of events:

First, he must accept the task or job.
Second, he must allocate the task or job to his subordinates.
Third, he must assess the maturity/potential level of his subordinates to satisfactorily complete the task or job.
Finally, he must use the style of the leadership (TELL, SELL, PARTICIPATE or DELEGATE) appropriate to the maturity level of the subordinate.

**SUMMARY**

The best advice which can be given to the junior leader is that he must be flexible in his approach to leadership. He should make use of the advantages of all of the various approaches to leadership and avoid those areas he considers not suitable to his character. Within a short period of time the leader may well find his own qualities improving, he should be better able to make use of the expertise amongst his subordinates, his bank of goodwill developed from his interest in Group and Individual needs should be able to withstand heavy withdrawals caused by demanding Task Needs, and he will find that his subordinates will respond and perform better if he has chosen the correct style of leadership appropriate to their maturity or potential level.
Aircraft stream in and out of Papua New Guinea's main international airport at Port Moresby. Few of the passengers or crews realize its historical background and the air battles that raged around and above during WWII, when this place was called simply... Seven Mile Strip.

Remnants of that conflict exist today, mainly to the north and east of the field where rusting fuel drums, overgrown revetments and taxiways still remain as a stark reminder of those former desperate days.

Moresby's first landing ground had been at Ela Beach in the 1920's. This was satisfactory for the light planes of that era when the tide was out, wind blew from the right direction and was not too brisk. A successful landing or takeoff also depended whether the pilot could manage to stay on the narrow strip of firm sand along the water's edge.

With the introduction of faster and heavier aircraft in the thirties a dirt strip had been formed on flat land just out of town at Kila Kila. Because of the surrounding high hills on three sides and sea on the other, this small drome was naturally confined. Unfortunately it also faced thirty degrees off the prevailing south-east winds. Air mail contractors at the time had made numerous official complaints on the inefficiency and often dangers of operating at the Three Mile Drome.

On the scrub covered plain seven miles north of the town, along the Rouna Road, preparations had already begun by November 1939 for a new aerodrome. War had commenced in Europe some two months earlier and airfield construction for Australia was now deemed one of her top priorities. Seven Mile was to be an advanced operational base for the Royal Australian Air Force and the defence of New Guinea and North Australia, with civil flights then a secondary consideration.

Land was to be acquired, 246 acres in all, the sum of £600 being paid finally in settlement. Original construction costs were budgeted at a mere £13,000 but by July 1940 this figure had more than doubled to £29,500. For this outlay it was planned that the strip would be 150' wide by 3600' long and covered with 6" of fine gravel.

Trees were removed, stumps dug out and stones carted away. Construction was carried out by the PNG Department of Works. Natural springs were encountered in some areas and drainage for both these and the wet season, November-April, had to be well planned for. (It was important that this drome could be operated on in all weather conditions.) The Rouna Road was diverted by looping it around the north-west of the strip.

Mr. McDonald Richardson was obliged to operate his nearby quarries twenty-four hours a day to maintain the urgent schedule set by the Australian Government.

In conjunction with the centre gravel runway an adjacent dry weather strip was formed parallel on the town side. Sown with couch grass and rolled smooth "so that a car could be driven over it at 35 miles-per-hour without
January 1928 — DH-9 aircraft at Port Moresby’s first airport, Ela Beach.

discomfort to the passengers”. Completed first, in May 1941, it was a very large 900’ wide and also 3600’ long.

The following month Carpenter Airlines, in their then ultra-modern all-metal Lockheed 14, were the first to test (on 2/6/41) the completed main strip. Their pilots, D. G. Cameron and R. O. Cant, stated:— “We consider this aerodrome is entirely suitable for the operation of Lockheed 14 aircraft in all conditions.”

Closely following the civil crew were three RAAF Hudson bombers from 24 Squadron at Townsville, North Australia. Arriving on June 17 the captains reported that fine pebbles on the grass runway had been flung up and chipped their aluminium propellors on takeoff. Also the area would be difficult to obstruct, because of its vast open expanse, should an airborne invasion be imminent.

No facilities at this stage existed at the strip. The only building was a single shed for a tractor and tools with a 500 gallon water tank attached. A telephone was not installed, fuel had to be trucked from Moresby and was supplied by the Vacuum or Shell Companies via a hand pump.

American four engine B24 Liberators flew into the Seven Mile Strip in October 1941,
An American Airacobra makes a low pass over the fragments of an aircraft after a bombing raid at Seven Mile Strip.

whilst in transit, carrying a U.S. lend-lease mission to Moscow. Their pilots were to comment that although there was a good surface and ample width the length was inadequate for modern, heavy bombers. Night operations and training also were not possible. (Most military aircraft there were forced to depart at dawn and return before dusk.) On the advice of Mr. Pettus, Director of Works U.S. Army, arrangements were made for the main runway to be lengthened and strengthened. It was planned that the aerodrome would become a vital link in the American ferrying service to Manila. Within four weeks a further £28,000 was hastily approved to extend the length to 5,100'. Satellite dromes at four mile (Wards), Bomana (Berry), Laloki (Schwimmer), Waigani (Durand) and 35 mile (Rogers) were soon to follow, speeded along by the introduction of Japan into the war. (The latter names were later designated, being the surnames of U.S. fliers lost in the conflict.)

Air raids against Moresby and the surrounding area were to total 113 during World II. A large percentage of these were directed against the airbase at Seven Mile. First strike was on the night of 3 February, 1942, by six aircraft. The last was 17 June the following year with four 'Sally' bombers.

One of the heaviest was that of 17 August, 1942 (78th raid), when some 150 bombs were dropped with five allied aircraft being destroyed, eleven damaged as well as the control tower and operations room being completely demolished.

Attacks were to range from solo efforts to combinations of fifty or more fighters and
SEVEN MILE STRIP

bombers. Incursions varied from tree top level strafing by Zeros to high level precision drops by medium bombers. Tropical skies reverberated to gunfire and explosions as allied planes wrestled for supremacy of the surrounding air.

These intrusions had commenced cautiously at night, then boldly during the day, before returning once again to sporadic nuisance visits during the hours of darkness. The latter doing little more than ensure the defenders' sleep was disturbed. Over Seven Mile Strip the balance of power was to ebb and flow. Despite this, repairs, maintenance and improvements were to continue throughout the war.

First defender of Moresby's skies was No. 75 Squadron RAAF, led by Squadron Leader John Jackson DFC. "Old John", as he was affectionately called by his men (because he seemed so much older at 34 than the youngsters he commanded), was a former grazier of St. George, Queensland, and a veteran of No. 3 and 4 Squadrons in the Middle East campaign. His unit arrived with their P40 Kittyhawk fighters on 21 March, 1942.

During mid-morning on the 28th of the following month John led the last remaining serviceable fighters over Moresby at 22,000' to attack eight enemy bombers protected by a screen of fifteen Zeros. Vastly outnumbered two of the Australian aircraft plummeted to earth. One of the pilots killed was Squadron Leader Jackson whose P40 (A29-8) plunged into the side of nearby Mt. Lawes.

The memorable defence of Moresby for forty-four days by 75 Squadron is now history. Les Jackson, John's younger brother who was also in the squadron, was to lead the group on until they were whittled away to only one flyable aircraft. Americans in P39 Aeracobras eventually relieved the unit.

During the last week of December 1942, in accordance with Australian government policy, Seven Mile Strip was renamed Jackson's Field.

Numerous aircraft were to ditch during WWII in Bootless Bay off the south-east end of Jacksons. They either just failed to reach the drome on approach or encountering mechanical problems shortly after departure elected for a crash-landing in the sea. Wreckage of two United States bombers, a B17 Fortress and B24 Liberator, may still be seen in the shallow waters of the bay today.

One of the airfield's worst tragedies occurred at dawn on 7 September, 1943. A heavily laden U.S. Liberator struck trees on takeoff and dived, with a full bomb load, into an Australian assembly area at the south-east end of the runway. The entire B24 crew as well as fifty-nine men of the 2/33rd Infantry Battalion and 158th Transport Company were killed. In addition there were ninety-two injured in and around five trucks. Most of the soldiers had been waiting to emplane for Tsili Tsili and participate in the re-taking of Nadzab and Lae.

Squadron Leader John Francis Jackson, DFC. (RAAF).

Early type Flying Fortresses (B17's) at Seven Mile Strip, en route to the Philippines on 10 September 1941.
American Douglas A20A of the 89th Squadron after crash landing at Seven Mile Strip on 1 November 1942.

Jackson's became an important transit base in the latter years of the war as the battles moved further north. During the conflict it had been estimated that in excess of a quarter of a million takeoffs and landings were carried out by aircraft at this, by now, very famous aerodrome. At the cessation of hostilities the field reverted to the control of the former Department of Civil Aviation.

Post-war years saw the old main runway extended and repaired countless times, especially with the advent of heavy jet passenger aircraft. It was eventually to reach a stage where it was not a viable proposition to be further improved.

Shortly after Independence (Sept. 1975) the present main strip was completed on the northen side of the original. Sandwiched between these two is an unused WWII marsden matting runway of interlocking metal sheets. All three are parallel, running approximately south-east and north-west at an altitude of only 125' above sea level. The original runway is still used by light planes.

Now under the administration of the Civil Aviation Agency of Papua New Guinea Jackson's Field has grown to be one of the most prominent international airports in the South West Pacific. With some 4300 aircraft movements per month, of which approximately 160 are international, flights include destinations as far afield as Honiara, Singapore, Manila and Honolulu. Closer are Cairns, Brisbane and Sydney. Aircraft as large as the giant Boeing 747 may now operate day and night. It's a far cry from the original biplanes, fighters, transports and bombers that once trundled up to its edge and roared down the length into tropical Papuan skies a mere forty years ago.

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Squadron Leader John Francis Jackson (DFC, MID) now rests at nearby Bomana War Cemetery. The rudder pedal from his aircraft as well as photos and other information on him, 75 Squadron and the aerodrome named after this famous pilot may be seen at the Port Moresby Aviation, Maritime and War Museum.
GEOGRAPHICALLY MISPLACED ARCHIVES AND MANUSCRIPTS:

PROBLEMS AND ARGUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR RESTITUTION

by Carole M. Inkster, Australian Bureau of Statistics

Archives and manuscripts become geographically misplaced as a result of war, decolonisation, commercial activity and larceny. This article discusses, for each area, the effects of such misplacements and the attempts that are made for their replevin. Current practices and problems are described and, in conclusion, some parallels between these seemingly disparate areas, are drawn.

Introduction

The written word has always been a powerful source of societal development in both Eastern and Western civilisations, and the preservation and utilisation of the written record has, as a result, often demonstrated a unique, almost mystical power, for, or over, a particular society. The history of modern record preservation and methodology has its foundations in the days following the French revolution when, for the first time records which had previously been the province of a select few were suddenly made available to the general public. Realising the value of administrative records in their own country, the French Army, under the command of Napoleon, selected for transfer to Paris those administrative records of conquered lands relevant to the new French administrations of those countries. "The archives no longer followed the flag; the flag followed the archives." 1

Since then, written records have been variously dispersed, largely as a consequence of rapid political, economical, and social progress, of mass migrations from rural areas to cities and of industrialisation. The result has been not only the destruction of cultural heritages but often the disintegration of whole societies. "A nation robbed of its archives and historical manuscripts loses something more precious than paper — the silent witnesses of their individuality and their independence." 2 In discussing geographically misplaced archives and manuscripts, it is necessary first to define the terms of reference. Then, by drawing on examples extant in the literature, the causes, effects, and replevin of such misplacements are described, and finally current practices, problems, and situations are examined.

A misplaced document is one which, depending on the degree of precision of description, may be termed missing, estray, or fugitive. A missing document, the term used in Muller, Feith, and Fruin's classical treatise, may indicate a record which has been destroyed or has perished as a result of natural causes. An estray is "the legal term applied to a record or document not in the custody of the original records creator or its legal successor." 3 Fugitive material, which occurs in the title of an article by R. G. Adams, 4 "would expose us to the charge of having illegitimately inferred that certain classes of archives possess an inherent aptitude for running away," 5 and therefore cannot be suitably applied.

The term estray is preferred, and it is used principally to refer to a document which, having originally been part of an archival series or an organic link in a natural order binding all the components of that series, has become detached. As such it has lost whatever significance it possessed, having no more individuality "than a limb severed from the body of a living being." 6 Manuscripts, personal papers, or correspondence may therefore be termed pseudo-estrays since they may have similarly become misplaced but often did not form a legitimate part of a living record body. The causes of geographical misplacement are often interconnected, colonisation frequently resulting in commercial activity and vice versa, and larceny resulting from war. Thus the problems
each situation produces are often similar, but nonetheless complex.

Misplacement Resulting from War

Misplacement resulting from war can be traced back to the conquests of the Roman emperors who returned from their campaigns with treasures from the conquered. The spoliation and destruction of archives, libraries, monuments, and objects d'art were regarded as the natural rights of the invader. It was not until the 18th century and early 19th century that these cultural and artistic items became recognised as valuable treasure. Napoleon, as already mentioned, extended the Roman idea of the 'rape' of the subjugated countries to include archives, and despatched many to Paris from the Low Countries, Spain and Italy.

As the 19th century progressed, the effects of changes of sovereignty became more complex, and clauses began to figure in peace treaties as to ownership and custody of archives. Concurrently, the principles of the funds and of provenance became important factors in such clauses concerned with the extradition of records. These stated that the archive repositories of ceded territories were to remain with those territories as a normal consequence of annexation. However, only the records of the administration of the cession were to be delivered upon annexation leaving untouched the central records of the cessionary and the historical funds outside the post-annexation territory.

This became the fate of archives after war, but the dangers for archival holdings during warfare has presented far greater problems. The Hague regulations of the Rules of Land Warfare of 1907, Section III, article 56, may be interpreted to include, for protection under "property of municipalities", archival holdings, but only where they are preserved in "institutions dedicated to the sciences." State or government archives may thus fall outside the ruling of this clause, and evacuation seems to have served as the only reliable means of protecting them from destruction or seizure. The effects of artillery bombing are obvious consequences of warfare as we know it but instances have been frequently recorded of "individual destruction"; "American soldiers in Manila and German soldiers in Briey in Lorraine were certainly not the first to discover that records could serve as fuel," nor the Sinn Feiners in Dublin who barricaded windows and gates with them. Similarly, paper for munitions production has, at times, been supplied by repositories, as have bundles of records for road foundations.

Concerned about such threat of imminent destruction to art and archives in war areas during World War II, the US War Department issued directives stating that the billeting of troops in buildings containing archives should be avoided wherever possible. This was not only to protect the archives from being destroyed because of their physical attributes, but also to protect them from the boot-hunting soldiers of war. Similarly, the Germans had found it necessary to establish a system of records protection in countries they were occupying. Such measures, whilst attempting physical protection, did not imply the use of the archives was to be protected. German propaganda exploited the unlimited access to captured foreign archives for Germany's own aggrandisement, following a pattern set by many conquering nations before it.

World War II posed unprecedented problems for record protection, since, as the biggest military operations ever, no other war had involved "so many documents in so many locations during so long a period." At its close, the allied armies possessed authority to capture records under the Hague Convention of 1907, and also under the numerous laws and other directives of the Allied Control Commission relating to Nazi military and other documents of the German administration. The captured German records of that time were retained for their own safety because, for more than five years after the war, Germany possessed no effective, full-scale, central government. They were collected, administered, and used on site and in the United States and in Great Britain for a number of reasons: to assist the military in the prosecution of the ongoing war against the Japanese; to supply information for occupational demands; for war crimes trials; and for military history, particularly to provide accurate information regarding German order of battle. It has been stated that "well over 95% of the documents were left in Germany... the army established records depositories in Germany for those records that could not remain in German hands or be given back to German au-
authorities at that time, records of Nazi organisations, records taken by the Germans from Jewish, Masonic, labour, and other organizations, and individuals persecuted by the Nazi regime." The restitution of archival records and manuscripts displaced by war had precedents set in the early 19th century with the return of many of the archives seized by Napoleon. First the Papal archives went back to Rome in 1813, then the Belgian archives to Brussels in 1814, and the Spanish archives in 1816. Similarly, after World War II, the allies repatriated, where possible, the records of occupied countries that had been seized by the Germans, Italians, and Japanese, for example, the public and private archives of France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. These countries also retained those records which had been created during occupation. Problems arose, however, where no direct heirs existed such as with the records of Jewish organisations in Eastern Europe. In this case the solution was for the archives to go to organisations which were declared to be successors (in New York and Israel). Similarly, the archives removed by German authorities during World War II to Western Germany from repositories in Eastern Germany, where the cities and towns later became part of post-war Poland with substantially no Germans, remained in West Germany.

The return of captured German military records was not initiated until such problems as adequate central repositories had been resolved, and microfilming and declassification by the allies. By March 1968 the allies had returned 25,000 linear feet of captured records. Obviously, restitution can only be made for those records which have survived, since the invader, when the military situation changes for the worse, usually prepares to evacuate and destroys the records of the occupation. Such was the case in World War I when on October 11, 1918, the German authorities in Belgium started removing or burning their archives and when the Third Reich was collapsing in 1945, deliberate destruction of German Federal archives was carried out by German hands.

Civil wars produce similar problems with records being exploited, misplaced, carried off as booty, and continually in danger of destruction. Internal problems created by war exist when enemy-owned concerns within a country are seized, such as insurance companies, banks, shipping firms, and various industrial producers, importers, and exporters. In the United States, confiscation is possible through the 'enemy alien' legislation but return often prohibited by the War Claims Act of 1948. Such records have been called "a sort of archival platypus" since they link the characteristics of two distinct classes of records, private and public. They originate as private records but, once confiscated, have often been used, exploited and even treated as public records in that they have been destroyed according to public records disposal acts.

Archival documents displaced by war are actually at the mercy of the victor. The problems are simpler if the invader remains in control, since there is little that can be done to enforce even international law in such situations. This is the case with the Russian command of East Germany, for those records that were in the Russian zone of occupied Germany have remained there, and only a portion have been made available to Western researchers.

Effects of Decolonisation

The role of a colonising nation has analogies with that of the warring nation: both seek to dominate, to rule, and to lay title to lands and resources. The major differences exist in approach and, even though the motivation of both may be economic and political, the emphases and priorities differ. The approach of the colonising nation is generally a gradual one which seeks to develop and exploit both natural and human resources. The approach of the warring nation is more often very rapid, with the emphasis being on subjugation of the vanquished people and seizure of the resources that are immediately available. In both cases, that is whether through war or peaceful negotiations, where territory changes hands and new national entities emerge, archives will be transferred from one land to another.

Peaceful negotiations most commonly have involved, in the past, the demand from either a newly independent nation or from a different colonising power (such as German New Guinea) for those records which were produced in the process of administering that territory. Unfortunately the urgency of many societal pressures created in newly independent nations
It is a fact that in many cases the written record of developing nations is primarily a history of the colonial expansion of European powers. The attractions of tropical lands, foremost among them the spice trade and the slave trade, were the causes of much of their recorded history. It is also clear that to have a precise knowledge of what has gone before one of the primary requirements of administration, and archives can meet this requirement only when they have survived in an unmutilated state. The British have faced for some time a request to return the records of their administration in India which they retained after its independence. These documents were either gathered up and taken away from India or were created by government agencies based in Britain. For India this pursuit is not directed just to the British repositories and agencies but also to the French, the Dutch, and the Portuguese, which likewise have much archival material relevant to India.

Concern for the replevin of these estrays has caused heated debate within the Indian Government and press, so much so that the problem of these 'migrated archives' was brought to the attention of UNESCO for study and possible solution. The Indian argument does not lay claim to 'lawful emigrants', the documents which, though derived in the course of official functioning, cannot, because of their very nature, form part of their creator's archives, for example documents such as letters, despatches, or other communications which issue from one person or one office to another. The Indian argument, however, sees no justification in a government carrying with it the records created in connection with the domestic administration of a territory which it has relinquished to another government. The latter, as legitimate successor of the former, is considered to have the right to inherit these records, which if allowed to go with the ceding authority, would lose their archival quality and become estrays. It has been claimed that the place of origin of a document has no bearing on its legitimate custody; that 'it belongs only to the series of which it forms a natural part and travels with the creators or their legitimate successors'. This proposition seems to have been supported elsewhere in the past by clauses in a number of treaties which have demanded that the archives of a ceded territory remain for the successors. The present situation for India is no way unique to that country, having been the experience of many countries both in the Pacific basin and in Africa.

Here in Australia, this problem has arisen with the independence of Papua New Guinea. In the Editorial of Archives and Manuscripts, August 1975, it was noted that 'at times we have taken part in a rape of New Guinean resources, including bibliographical resources. In 1972 it seems that officers of the Australian Government were sent to Port Moresby to bring back to Australia anything in the governmental registries of Papua New Guinea which would reflect discredit on the colonizing power'. This situation was, however, brought to light, and the records were finally only photographed. It appears though, that it was not the first time Australia had endeavoured to tamper with these records. Kevin Green has suggested that the files of the Administrator's Office, which was transferred to Australia in 1942 when the civil administration was suspended and which are now held in the National Archives of Papua New Guinea, are far from complete and, to him, they appear to be a residue left after other files were removed for some purpose. He cites as examples of this the file on the Uncontrolled Areas Ordinance which is missing, and the lack of files on the subject of native labour. The transfer was originally made in order to safeguard the records, a valid reason in the face of Japanese invasion, but the records which have remained in Australia, combined with those returned to Papua New Guinea, may not represent all the surviving records of the administration. It might be supposed that the colonial power have ulterior motives in evacuating the records in 1942, using their safe-keeping as an excuse.
Again, similar situations occurred with the French withdrawal from Indo-China, when the most important colonial records were shipped to the safety of France. The stated justification does, in this instance, appear to be valid since, where local records fell into the hands of the Viet Minh, many were destroyed including, for example, the land registers seized in the cadastral offices of several Tonkinese provinces. Likewise, when the Dutch withdrew from Indonesia, they shipped the archives out to protect them. It may be difficult for the government of a newly independent country to see immediate benefit in preserving the records of a colonial past when it has to provide food for millions of hungry people. Moreover, the records are memories of a period of national disgrace and the nation is better served by negating the past. This view, however, needs to be overcome and, in the Archives Program which UNESCO initiated following World War II, it is clear that "no one country can possess more than a part of the total archival heritage of mankind... (and that) the loss of an important body of records in any country is a loss to all countries".

For Australia itself, as a collection of former British colonies, there are records of the Colonial Office in 1901 which relate directly to this country's history, as do parts of series from the Home Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury, Board of Trade, Audit Office, and Privy Council. Being components of British series, they are in legitimate custody. In order to provide Australian researchers with these sources of information, the Joint Copying Project was initiated just before World War II and has continued to date. The scope of the project has now been enlarged to cover records outside the Public Records Office. Even within Australia, problems of ownership arise, such as with the records of the Northern Territory when it was part of South Australia. These are not unnaturally in the custody of South Australia, but moves have begun by the Territory to obtain them.

Microfilming records seems to be the next best and a well supported alternative, when original documents, misplaced by colonisation, cannot be retrieved, though it is a palliative remedy and no justification for their non-return. It does, however, have the advantage of enabling researchers within a country to have access to records which may otherwise remain beyond their reach.

**Misplacement Resulting from Commercial Activity**

Documents misplaced geographically as a result of commercial activity are of two kinds: those that are the product or result of commercial activity within a country but do not remain there, such as the records of trusts, stock and export companies, and industrial enterprises; and, secondly, those which, through their own intrinsic value, have produced the very commercial activity that alters their custody. In regard to the first, commercial activity within a country is closely linked to colonisation, since economic concerns have given the impetus for colonies to be established. The companies so formed, having their head offices in the countries of origin, have also preserved the majority of their records there. Thus valuable source materials, containing information of importance not only for the history of the economy, but also for social and cultural issues, can be accessible through archives existing in a 'foreign' country. For instance, extensive records of the British East India company, which had its Eastern headquarters in Calcutta but whose field of enterprise stretched from Egypt and Aden to Hong Kong, are now in the Indian Archives. No doubt these records would be of value to several countries in the region.

More commonly, the records of commercial enterprises are to be found in Europe. This is certainly the case for those that have operated in the Pacific Basin area such as the German records of the New Guinea Company, but for Australia the bulk of business records are to be found in Britain. Some success has been made in obtaining a variety of these records as the result of the establishment, in Canberra, of a repository devoted to the preservation of business archives. This repository has obtained the London records of, for instance, Elder Smith & Co Ltd, (1886-1962), Australian Estates Co. (1899-1970), Australian Agriculture Co. (1824-1973), Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Co Ltd, (1863-1971), and the Peel River Land and Mineral Co. (1853-1960), to name but a few. Britain has also held many of the business records pertinent to economic developments in other countries such as those of the Hudson Bay Company in Canada. These company archives were recently transferred from Beaver House in London, to Winnipeg, resulting in a "phenomenal increase in their use and promoting some otherwise unprece-
dented hypotheses concerning the North American for trade".24

The second area of commercial activity is the result of the recognition that historical documents and records, are, like capital and the tourist trade, an exploitable resource, but, like land, labour and minerals, a limited resource. It is also clear that in this sphere of activity, institutions and scholars of the richer nations have the wherewithal to exploit those resources most effectively. Many motives are involved but whatever the case, a market exists and prices are set for so-called prestige items at least.

Demand in the 'archival market' comes from three sectors: first, from the private collector or institution that seeks out and purchases documents as investments, for the sake of investment, for prestige, or for personal gratification: second, from the semi-public realm, constituted by organisations which utilise both private funds and public subsidy; and third, from the public sector which per se consists of government financed and operated institutions. Governments, whilst intervening directly in the market sphere in this third sector, also intervene indirectly within the first two sectors to influence the direction of archival and manuscript activity. They do this essentially through legislation but also through the grants they make available to purchasing bodies. Such a role of government is justifiable "only if there is good reason to think that the private sector is subject to inherent limitations ... It is one thing for the state to keep its own records, but quite another for it to become the record keeper of society".25

In general the rationale for government intervention is based on the theory of public good and this applies to archives, not for the sake of their physical form, but for their content and their contribution to knowledge. The promotion of knowledge is, in many respects, a public good in that an original idea may be developed for the benefit of many people. "There is consequently an a priori case for support of archival activities as part of a larger public support of knowledge".26 Government intervention can successfully protect such a public good mainly through legislation. In appropriate cases it may: assert ownership; offer exemption from tax to private owners; accept manuscripts and documents for the nation in lieu of estate duty; provide funds to enable public institutions to purchase privately-owned papers that are offered for sale; and, under export licensing regulations, it may seek to prevent the export of documents of national importance. All these options have been utilised by the British Government in an attempt to stem the export of privately-owned documents. They are, for this reason, accepted not only as exemptions from estate duty but also from wealth tax and capital gains tax.

The British legislation controlling the export of archives and manuscripts has, since March 1979, applied to documents over 50 years old and requires the vendor to obtain a licence for the export of any such items being sold. Privately-owned manorial documents alone lie outside these rules and, through the Law of Property Act 1922, they may not be removed from Britain without the consent of the Master of the Rolls. Where the export of documents cannot be prevented, the export licensing regulations enable the government to demand photographic copies as substitutes, these to be made at the exporter's expense. Grants are also made available to assist in the acquisition of archival documents by public institutions. Such incentives and controls are not always successful and the international market continues to prosper. For instance, "in 1968 the Bertrand Russell papers were sold to McMaster University, Canada, for a reputed £250,000"27, "the sale to America ... of documents relating to Guy Fawkes; and the [sale of] important Tennyson manuscripts, part of which are in Cambridge and part in Toronto".28 The legislation aims to prevent such fragmentation of both individual record groups and the nation's records. Where this is impossible, recording their destination and obtaining copies of them is the best alternative available. Such legislation is not iniquitous to Great Britain but, since that country has such a wealth of materials available for the market, it provides one of the best examples of these regulations in action.

The last means by which government intervention can act to replevy misplaced documents, is in asserting ownership. This appears to be the least successful mode of action, evident from the number of reported bids for ownership that have failed to have been proven true. Theoretically, the principle, 'nullus tempus occurri regi', (time runneth not against the king) should allow a government to attempt
to recover a piece of property, such as archives, regardless of how long it has been in the hands of a private citizen. In practice, this dictum has not been upheld, as in the case of USA vs Sender, where the American government sought title to Spanish documents pertaining to New Mexico, but lost because the jurors felt it had no claim to documents after decades had passed. Here in Australia, a similar situation arose when Tasmania attempted, in October 1963 (Eldershaw vs MacGinnis), to retrieve some records held in the Port Arthur Museum relating to the colonial convict and police administration. The case was taken to court but, when the defence counsel objected that any pre-1855 records could not be shown to be public records of the State of Tasmania, the case was dismissed.

Effects of Criminal Activity

A direct consequence of any high demand market situation based on products of intrinsic value such as diamonds and gold, and similarly archives and manuscripts, is illicit trading, blackmarketing and theft. Thus larceny involving archival documents has, as the open market situation has expanded, been aggravated and accelerated in proportion to the upward trend of that market. Phillip Mason reported in 1975 that “theft from archives has now reached alarming proportions. During the past decade several hundred archives and libraries have been victimized”. Since item-by-item identification is precluded by the size of contemporary archival collections, difficulties exist in determining if items are missing, but even when they are known to be, it has often been the case that archivists have been most reluctant to report them.

Motives for theft are varied — ranging from singular personal possession, kleptomania, mental disorder (hostility or psychopathic aversions), to researchers ‘borrowing’ items, “the desire to purge written record of specific data”, or for monetary gain, whether it be in stamps, autographs or entire documents. It has been suggested that perhaps one of the biggest archival security problems is that of convincing archivists and their staff that there is in fact a problem. Preventative measures that can be taken include strict rules of access to certain storage areas by staff, thorough identification of users (at least to include a photograph), inspection and restriction of both apparel and carry-bags, listing of stolen goods, microfilming important documents to provide identification, two-way mirrors, strict supervision in the reading rooms, closed circuit television, marking material, and adequate locks.

The Society of American Archivists (SAA) has, in order to facilitate the recovery of stolen items and to publicise theft, established a Register of Stolen or Missing Archival Material. The list is revised annually, drawing on reports from the United States and Canada, and is sent to hundreds of dealers and archives across North America. The SAA also provides a security consultant service which advises archival institutions in the areas of security systems and internal archival procedures. Further, relating to these services, it issues a bi-monthly Archival Security Newsletter, which includes both accounts of recent thefts and prosecutions, and up-to-date technical data on security measures and systems. Finally, the SAA has sponsored a manual, Archives and Manuscripts: Security (Chicago 1977), which is a practical guide for all professional archivists and manuscript librarians.

Collection and repository protection, then, relies on planning a security programme, on implementing deterrents to theft (through security equipment and procedures), the identification of missing items, the insurance of valuable materials, and the legislation necessary not only to help protect the records and the staff, but also to aid in the detention and prosecution of those guilty.

This article has covered precedents, practices, and problems concerning misplaced documents, and throughout recurrent themes have emerged. Firstly, the causes of the misplacement of documents tend to be due to economic, political and/or social change; secondly, common factors in the prevention of further misplacement are seen in legislation, greater awareness, and greater care; and thirdly, there are common factors concerning their return, again through legislation, and through international co-operation at both national and personal levels.

NOTES

10. Wolfe, R. ed. Captured German and Related Records a National Archives Conference.
23. Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour. List of records relating to Companies and Firms held by the Archives, March 1979.
32. Ibid, p. 480.

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**CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS**

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

**BEWARE!** That’s Kendall McDonald’s advice after making this full investigation of the big row about diving on war graves. McDonald, Kendall Diver; Oct 83: 14-15. The ordinary diver should assume that all wrecks of warships are war graves unless there is clear evidence that all the crew escaped.

**REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF.** Allen, Robert C. Military Review; Dec 83: 2-11. Conditions in the Persian Gulf area are highly volatile and threaten the stability of that region which is of major importance to other parts of the world because of its natural resources. In an effort to counter the forces at work, the Gulf Co-operation Council was established. Its aim is to promote a common effort among the Persian Gulf states.


**DEFENDING THE MAPLE LEAF.** Fama, Joseph Defense and Foreign Affairs; Dec 83: 24- (3p). Canada’s defence spending is at the irreducible minimum; research and defence related industry is healthy.

**ARMY EQUIPMENT UPGRADE PROGRAM.** Malley, Robert J. National Defense; Oct 83: 30 (35p). Describes a new program to improve the capabilities of selected weapons systems held by the National Guard, the reserves and allies of the US.
LORD KITCHENER'S MEMORANDUM ON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA, 1910: the implications for Australia's military forces

KITCHENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE IMPERIAL CAUSE

By Major J. L. Mordike, RAOC

LORD Kitchener's visit to Australia from December 1909 to February 1910 to review local military forces and defences was not only of local interest. In England the British Secretary of War, Mr. R. B. Haldane, was quite excited by it. It was Haldane who, as architect of the Imperial General Staff, was working toward the creation of an army which would stand by the French against German aggression. Moving in a direction that was contrary to nationalist sentiment throughout the Empire, the British Secretary was progressing towards the development of an Imperial Army comprised of troops from the Dominions. On 13 August 1909, after the announcement of the Kitchener visit, Haldane made the following announcement in Bradford, England:

I am glad to be able to tell you that we are within sight — and, indeed, something more than within sight — of common plans, which will unify the forces of the Crown throughout the whole of the Empire. It is not for nothing that Lord Kitchener is going to represent the War Office in Australia and New Zealand, and then coming to the command in the Mediterranean with the duty of organising the troops through South Africa, and the still larger duty of working out the plans and necessary concentrations in case the Empire should be attacked. The Empire for defence is one and indivisible, and wherever the theatre of war may be — be it in Australia, be it Africa, be it India, be it our own islands — we should have the forces of the Empire so organised that they can be concentrated wherever the field may be, and that plans for our mutual defence may be worked out by one Empire, one whole. Lord Kitchener is going to Australia and New Zealand to work out the details with our children overseas.

To Deakin, the Australian Prime Minister, this statement would have been the source of worry and confirmed the suspicions he held for imperial intentions. The military policy of his Government was the defence of Australia and this explains the terms in which he couched the official invitation to Kitchener. The British Field Marshal was invited to inspect Australia's forces and fixed defences in order to advise this Government upon the best means of developing and perfecting the land defence of the country. The Prime Minister had earlier expressed limited satisfaction with Haldane's proposal of 1907 to standardize military procedures and organization throughout the Empire and under no circumstances would Deakin relinquish control of Australian troops or the right to determine independent defence policy for Australia. Deakin was not disloyal to the Empire — in fact he was committed to imperial unity — but he believed that Australia should contribute to the determination of imperial defence and foreign policy and this could not be achieved by blind subservience to Britain. In this regard Deakin held the popular political view for those who believed that Australia should accept Britain's foreign and defence policy without question were a minor political force from about 1907. Deakin and his supporters, and nationalists in general, were therefore a potential treat to Haldane's imperial plans. So why should the British Secretary of War contemplate Kitchener's impending visit with such eager anticipation?

Of the Memorandum on the Defence of Australia, which resulted from the Kitchener inspection, one of Kitchener's biographers commented that:

The Memorandum shows in every line that Australian military interests had been treated from the stand-point of Australian home defence, but deep in the writer's own mind there lay a much graver question, which had perhaps hardly occurred to his genial Australian hosts. He had long foreseen that the day would come when the whole strength of
the Empire must be concentrated against an aggressive foreign Power, and he was quite consciously preparing for the test. The conscious preparations Kitchener was making for the test went further than the biographer suggested. And they certainly did not occur to his genial Australian hosts. In the Memorandum the imperial warrior supported the proposal in the Defence Act, incorporated as amendments in 1904, to establish a Department of Inspector-General for the Australian Military Forces. The general duties of the Inspector were to include examination of the preparedness for war of the Citizen Force, the inspection of camps, cadet training, and the state of warlike stores and equipment. But in a departure from the original proposal, which was that he be '... the eyes and ears of the Minister and the Military Board' and that in special cases the Board might direct him to report on specific subjects, Kitchener recommended that the Inspector be responsible directly to the Minister of Defence. Where it had been originally proposed that the Inspector would be president of the Promotion Board, and have no administrative or executive functions, Kitchener added a further significant qualification that:

Under the conditions which exist in Australia it would appear to me advisable that the Inspector-General should be appointed President of the Board dealing with the promotion of officers above the rank of major, and should advise on the qualifications of field officers for appointment to the command of battalions, regiments, brigades, and districts. Based on the original proposal, Kitchener was writing the specifications for the most powerful military appointment in Australia. Being directly responsible to the Minister, the incumbent would be outside the control of the Military Board — the body charged with responsibility for administration of the military forces. The Military Board sat under the chairmanship of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and at that time, this position was held by Major-General Hoad, an Australian officer of known nationalist sympathies. Hoad was also held in low esteem by Hutton — since their meeting in the Boer War the British officer had considered Hoad to be of low intelligence and lacking the decorum and professional loyalty required of an officer.

As well as being directly responsible to the Minister, Kitchener recommended that the Inspector have virtually full control over the promotion of officers to senior rank — officers for whose performance the Military Board would carry ultimate responsibility and yet have no voice in their promotion. In addition there was to be a degree of control over which officers filled key command appointments through the Inspector's capacity to advise on what qualifications were required. In spite of these significant powers the recommendations for the Inspector-General almost entirely escaped attention in the general press debate which followed the tabling of Kitchener's Memorandum. The debate concentrated on Australia's defence preparedness, the Universal Training Scheme and the military college, and it appears that only the Sydney Daily Telegraph carried any comment at all. 'The powers of the future Inspector-General...', commented the newspaper in rather desultory fashion, '... and the question of making any appointment at all to this office for the next two years, are sure to be very anxiously considered before the Ministry takes action'. However, the article did not specifically draw attention to the extraordinary power such an Inspector would have. Instead it concentrated on the inspection function of the position and suggested that this function would not be properly fulfilled until the Universal Training Scheme was fully operational sometime in the future.

It could, therefore, only have taken Australia by surprise when the outgoing Fusion Government announced after its election defeat of 13 April, that an appointment was to be made. Under the heading of 'Last Act of Fusion—Military Scandal—Appointment of Inspector-General — Australian Officers Ignored', The Age, revealing its nationalist sympathies, announced on Saturday, 23 April 1910, that:

Saturated with the Conservative idea that everything that is good must come from abroad, Mr Joseph Cook's last act of defence administration has been to announce the appointment of Colonel Kirkpatrick, of the Imperial army, as Inspector-General of the Commonwealth military forces. The article reported that the announcement had been greeted with '... indignation...', '... astonishment...', and '... not a little chagrin...' from the '... whole Defence Department'. The reason for the consternation
expressed by *The Age* was that the appointment ‘... cast a great slur upon the senior officers of the forces ...’ and, as a result, it was an appointment ‘... which must be condemned by any true Australian’. Upset by the fact that the Fusion Government had not referred the appointment to the Military Board or any senior military staff for advice the newspaper continued its attack. Apparently the appointment had been offered to Kirkpatrick in January whilst that officer was in Australia with Kitchener. The newspaper was therefore concerned that Cook had veiled his intentions in secrecy and made an announcement only two days after he had submitted his Ministerial resignation to the Governor-General on 19 April. On this point the article clutched at the suggestion that the incoming Minister ‘... no doubt, will probe deeply into this matter, and, if possible, review his predecessor’s unpatriotic act’. The proposed duties of the Inspector-General, including the additional recommendation that he be president of the officer’s promotion board, were then listed, but, displaying implicit trust in Kitchener, the newspaper failed to make any further deductions. The sole, understandable reason for *The Age*’s anger was that a British officer and not an Australian officer had been appointed to the position by an ‘... anti-Australian Minister ...’, who, it was suggested, ‘... had intended to swamp the department with imported officers’.

The *Sydney Worker* was as upset as the Melbourne newspaper and announced that ‘... The amazing crookedness of the whole business is proved by the secrecy with which it has been engineered’. Nevertheless, this is where the *Worker* left its objection. It expressed no concern that it was a British officer and not an Australian who was to get the job. This newspaper reported that the appointment was offered to Kirkpatrick in February but not confirmed until the Fusion Government had been defeated at the polls. ‘Under the circumstances ...’, surmised the *Worker*, ‘... the appointment ought not to have been offered to Colonel Kirkpatrick without the consent of Parliament and he ought to have been distinctly told that Parliament must be consulted before it could be confirmed’.

By contrast the *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, in its normal conservative fashion, announced the appointment by using information supplied by Cook and decided that ‘... Australia was fortunate in being able to secure such an officer ... [as Kirkpatrick]’. The reason, continued the *Daily Telegraph*, was that the British officer was ‘... thoroughly au fait with Lord Kitchener’s scheme for the defence of Australia’. In another article on the same day the *Daily Telegraph* reported information supplied by Deakin in Ballarat. It seems that whilst Kitchener was in Australia he had been asked whether Kirkpatrick was a suitable man for the appointment. ‘... Yes ...’, was the instant reply from the Field Marshal, ‘... if you can get him. He was good enough for me to bring out as my principal officer ... [on the inspection tour]’. On this testimonial the Government, of course, could only offer the job to Kirkpatrick and Australia was, in Deakin’s words, ‘... indeed lucky to get him’.

In explaining why the Government had not referred the proposed appointment to the Military Board or to any military officer in fact, Deakin said that it was hardly likely that on a question of policy the military officers who would be subordinate to Kirkpatrick would be consulted. In listing the duties of the Inspector-General the *Daily Telegraph* specified only the inspection functions and glossed over the extraordinary powers as ‘... a number of other duties ... also suggested by Lord Kitchener’.

The *Sydney newspaper* put its final seal of approval on the appointment when it announced two days later that:

As Mr Deakin has stated categorically that the Government of which he was recently the leader received a reply from Colonel Kirkpatrick on March 9 accepting the appointment of Inspector-General of the Commonwealth Forces ... the disapproval of politicians becomes irrelevant, and the dissatisfaction of military officers becomes unmeaning.

In spite of such counselling the issue was not to quieten easily. While the *Daily Telegraph* was liberally dousing the issue with whitewash *The Age* continued to probe at the circumstances surrounding the appointment. The *Melbourne newspaper* was still concerned at the delay in the announcement of the appointment and therefore asked: ‘Did the Fusion Ministry for party political motives delay an announcement which it must have known would give sharp offence to the national sentiment?’

As Deakin had made his policy speech on 7 February, five days before Kitchener presented
the Memorandum, there can be little doubt that news of such a sensitive appointment would be kept from public knowledge until the elections had been completed on 13 April. And in seeking to explain the reason behind the appointment The Age, once again, almost certainly hit upon the truth: the Fusion Government was simply displaying its '... old Free-trade policy of self-distrust'.

When Deakin assumed leadership of the Fusion Government, an uneasy collection of the conservative elements in Australian politics, he wrote to his sister informing her that '... behind me sit the whole of my opponents since Federation'.

One element of the Fusion was the extremely conservative remnants of the Free-trade Party—these men did not share, and most probably did not understand, Deakin's vision for an independent Australia. For these men British ideals were universally valid and they generally tended to accept them in an uncritical fashion. A leading proponent of the Free-trade Party was the rather uninspiring Joseph Cook, Deakin's new Minister of Defence. Cook began his working life as a coalminer and had been in Federal politics since 1901; he was probably best characterized by Professor F. Alexander when he described him as '... a dull, heavy plodder'.

It was Cook who, in typical fashion, claimed credit for inviting Kitchener to Australia: 'For two years I sought on every suitable occasion to get the Government of the day to invite Lord Kitchener to Australia. And when I discussed the matter with the Prime Minister he at once fell in with the idea.'

After the Kirkpatrick appointment became public knowledge, Cook attempted to defend himself by expressing sympathy with the view that Australia had '... plenty of good material, both for officers and men ...' and he felt that there was '... no need to import officers from abroad, with one or two exceptions...'. Of course one of the exceptions was the Inspector-General and the others '... a couple of young directors ...' that Cook had intend to bring out from England, had he remained in office as Minister. These men had '... gained their knowledge at the Staff College, ... [and] ... would bring to us the latest word as to the best method of imparting the requisite instruction to our officers here'...

Between 1903 and 1911 only seven Canadian officers, four Australians, two New Zealanders, and two from Natal, had passed through British Staff Colleges. The large bulk of Staff College graduates were British officers. By recommending and advising that certain appointments in the Dominion armies be filled by Staff College graduates the War Office thereby deliberately ensured that their own officers could occupy positions of influence throughout the Empire. Obviously Kitchener intended that such advice would be offered to the Australian authorities by the Inspector-General.

The Age quite correctly wondered what had happened to Deakin's Napoleonic principle '... that each recruit may carry a marshal's baton in his knapsac ... [and that] ... promotion depends on individual capacity, energy and merit'. The newspaper was concerned that Deakin and Cook had violated '... this fine ideal ...' and, without enquiring whether a suitable Australian officer was available to be appointed as Inspector-General, '... they hastily thrust it upon a British visitor'.

On Wednesday, 27 April, the Fusion Government announced, in rather cowardly fashion, that it had decided to go out of office without confirming Kirkpatrick's appointment. It had decided to withhold the proposal from the Executive Council, so preventing its approval.

The new Fisher Labor Ministry assumed office on 29 April and the new Minister of Defence, Senator George Pearce, declared on 2 May that he had an absolute open mind with regard to Lord Kichener's Memorandum, and presumably, the Kirkpatrick appointment. Pearce was not entirely new to the portfolio as he had previously held it in the short-lived Fisher Ministry of November 1908 to June 1909. He had also held discussions with Kitchener during the inspection visit. The State Governor of Western Australia, Sir Gerald Strickland, had invited Pearce to Government House to have these discussions with Kitchener on 27 January. Strickland had '... heard such heartfelt praise of ... [Pearce's previous] ... good work as Minister of Defence that it ... [seemed] ... part of ... [his] ... duty to make this suggestion'.

On becoming Minister for the second time Pearce was quick to mention publicly that he had accepted the invitation and, although the discussions were mostly of a private nature,
Lord Kitchener had stated that he was indifferent as to which party in Parliament held office as long as Australia secured an adequate scheme of defence. In later life Pearce was to recall this meeting with Kitchener:

... I received a summons to attend at State Government House at 11 a.m. on a given date. At 10.55 a.m. I reported there and was shown into a room. Punctually at 11 a.m. the door opened and in strode Lord Kitchener, who shook hands with me and said, “Sit down please”. I saw those grey slits of his eyes looking keenly at me for a few minutes, and then he said: “I am not a politician, and I take no interest in politics; but they tell me you have been Minister for Defence, and that if there should be a change of government, you will be Minister for Defence again. There are some things that I am telling the Minister for Defence which I will not put in my report. I have the minister’s permission to tell them to you. Would you care to hear them?”

“Certainly I should”, I replied. Then for twenty minutes he outlined these things. They dealt mainly with the transition period of the change-over from the old militia system to the system of universal military training. They dealt also with the questions of the officers who would have responsibility for the new system. Mercilessly he analysed their capabilities or lack of them as he had summed them up. One officer of whom he had formed a high opinion was Major Throsby Bridges. He spoke well of some others. He adjured me to allow no tampering with the military college and urged the necessity of making the college the only gateway in the future for entrance to the A. and I. [Administration and Instruction] staff. When he finished he said abruptly, “Do you wish to ask me any questions?” There were several points which either had not been touched on or which I had not fully grasped, and I asked questions on these. To all these he had a reply ready, a reply that went straight to the heart of the problem. Then he rose abruptly, held out his hand, said good-bye and our interview was over.

Gavin Souter neatly summed up the Kitchener visit when he noted: ‘Kitchener was the perfect imperial warrior, and when he spoke Australia stood respectfully to attention’. And Pearce was no exception. Having left formal schooling at eleven years of age, trained as a carpenter and joiner, and being variously employed as an itinerant worker and prospector, the intellectually limited Pearce was ill-prepared for his role as Minister of Defence. Having no military experience there is little wonder that he, at first had difficulty understanding several of the points Kitchener told him in the interview. However, the Senator brought to his portfolio a characteristically straight-forward and simple approach to the demanding job. Lacking pretentiousness he was not above asking for and taking advice — and not only from the Lord Kitcheners of his experience. During the period of the second Fisher Labor Government the Minister, testifying to his humble approach unashamedly confessed that:

Among the military officers of the time, Colonel (afterwards Major-General) Bridges attracted me most of all. My predecessor in office had described him to me as “an impossible man”. He will never give you advice suitable to the political position, he went on to say, but only that which he regards as “sound” from the military point of view. So one day I sent for Bridges. I pointed out to him that I had no military experience and asked him for his advice in such circumstances as to my future actions. Pearce and Bridges were to develop quite a good working relationship over the next few years.

At the first Cabinet meeting of the Fisher Ministry on 3 May the matter of the Kirkpatrick appointment was discussed and Pearce subsequently made a statement that:

The late Government definitely completed the appointment, except for the passing of the Executive minute, and we do not propose to disturb it. At the next meeting of the Executive Council the formal appointment will be made.

Pearce continued by mentioning that, from his perusal of the relevant files, no enquiries were made to ascertain whether an Australian officer was suitable for the appointment. Nevertheless, Pearce thought Kirkpatrick “... a suitable man for the post.” Throughout the whole issue the extraordinary powers being ascribed to the Inspector-General virtually escaped any attention and received no apparent public debate. But why should they? In popular
opinion Kitchener was unimpeachable and his advice accepted with implicit trust. As one senior military officer commented:

Of course Colonel Kirkpatrick comes here with the mantle of Lord Kitchener around him and the fact that he does so is sufficient guarantee of his capacity. He will have the confidence of the public because of his association with Lord Kitchener... 

And the officer might also have added that he would enjoy the trust of politicians for the same reason.

Before the year was out Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Legge was to protest to Pearce that:

'Since the arrival of the present I.G. [Inspector-General], a series of events and Ministerial decisions have occurred, that bid fair to paralyse if not destroy the efficiency of the Military Board system'. Kirkpatrick, who had been promoted two steps in rank to Major-General for service in Australia, had wasted no time in using his new-found power since arriving in late May. Legge complained that it had been directed that Kirkpatrick be supplied with copies of all the papers, whether compiled for private information or not, and which were used at Military Board meetings. On several occasions Kirkpatrick had also sought and obtained an overruling of the Board's recommendations from the Minister. Among other things, the recommendations of the Promotion Board, which Kirkpatrick chaired, went directly to the Minister — the Military Board had '... no voice whatever in the selection of their most senior subordinates'. As Legge correctly pointed out, the Military Board had been reduced to a '... species of head clerks of the I.G. [Inspector-General] ... [who had] ... all the powers and none of the responsibilities of a General Officer Commanding'.

In July the Military Board also recorded its dissatisfaction, although in a more restrained fashion, when discussing the issue of agenda papers and decisions by the Board:

The Secretary, Military Board, having stated that acting on Instructions a copy of each agenda paper and memoranda of Board's Decisions has been issued to the I.G. [Inspector-General], the Board pointed out that the Agenda are confidential papers prepared to assist the Board in dealing with matters brought forward by members for consideration and discussion and that the issue of such papers including Draft Regulations, Estimates &c. should be confined solely to members of Board. The Board considered that copies of the memoranda of its decisions should continue to be (sic) forwarded for the information of the Inspector-General.

What is of special significance is the concluding remarks Legge made in his complaint to the Minister:

I attribute no wrong motives to the Inspector-General; he is quite right in trying to gather as much power as he can — from the Imperial point of view. Truly did General Nicholson, CGS at the War Office, say in his memorandum of 7-12-08 that the oversea Dominions were thinking seriously of defence, and that 'The real problem before the various Governments concerned is to guide this feeling into correct channels from the outset' I had hoped that the "channels" referred to were going to be Australian made, and that Australian aspirations would have done the guiding.

All this apparently failed to impress Pearce. In the Minister's opinion Legge was not allowed to '... criticize and reflect upon the administration and policy of the Minister'. He therefore directed that the officer withdraw his objections and this Legge did on 6 December.

Apart from condoning the Kirkpatrick appointment, Pearce's subsequent actions, as referred to by Legge and the Military Board, show the Minister to be an absolute tyro, at least as far as overseeing the proper administration of the Army was concerned. His actions show that he was also prepared to trust Kirkpatrick in the same way as he had trusted Kitchener. This is especially difficult to understand in view of the fact that whilst Minister on the previous brief occasion, Pearce had displayed a suspicion of British intentions in relation to the establishment of the Imperial General Staff. In May 1909 he had advised Prime Minister Fisher that:

... you will see that I propose to keep the position of the Chief of the Commonwealth Section of the General Staff separate and distinct from the position on the Military Board. I think this is wise because if we were to connect that position with the Military Board we would be connecting up Imperial control with our local administration.
Part of the explanation is that Pearce stood in such awe of Kitchener, as most Australians appeared to have done, that he simply did as the Imperial Field Marshal had suggested. For a deeper understanding we must return to that earlier disciple of imperial military policy, Major-General Sir E. T. H. Hutton. In the year of his departure from Australia in 1904 Hutton had reported to the Government that the "inspector-general" system could not work under Australian circumstances. Hutton, in characteristically blunt fashion, and unlike Kitchener, pointed out that the peculiar Australian circumstances were the lack of experienced, knowledgable officers. Hutton reported that he was "... strongly of the opinion that Australian officers, unaided by assistance from the imperial Army... would find it most difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the requisite discipline in face of local political pressure and personal influence". The Australian forces, therefore, required a leader and instructor more than an inspector. An inspector "... must necessarily have matured experience, ripe judgement, and a very high degree of technical and scientific knowledge". And as there was no such officer in Australia, Hutton advised that an inspector to the Commonwealth Forces, if appointed, "... must necessarily be an Imperial Officer of high standing and long service". In the Memorandum, Kitchener had recommended that the proposed appointment of Inspector-General be ascribed extraordinary powers "... under the conditions which exist in Australia...". He failed to elucidate what these conditions might have been in the Memorandum but it is almost certain that they accorded with Hutton's original opinion. It is also certain that Kitchener orally expressed this opinion to Cook and Pearce and that the two Australian politicians believed him. Prepared by the advice from Bridges before the inspection commenced, as well as his own first-hand experience, Kitchener would have well realized that the Memorandum was to be received by either a pliable lightweight in Joseph Cook or an awe-struck novice in George Pearce. Against a backdrop of a fawning Australian public, Kitchener thereby ensured that the Memorandum advanced the imperial cause to the hilt.

In the Memorandum, Kitchener recommended that a Staff Corps of officers be formed to provide supervisors for all military areas and districts in the Training Scheme, as well as staff for headquarters for permanent troops; these men would be the instructors, administrators, and advisors for the Army as well as Australia's representatives on the Imperial General Staff. All members of the proposed Staff Corps were to come from graduates of the military college but Kitchener took a rather unusual step and recommended that none of the officers now serving should be transferred to the Staff Corps. As an interim measure instructors could be drawn from the existing force until graduates were available for the military college. Obviously the military college was to be the nerve centre for the Australian Army and the sole source of the officers who would guide and advise from the most senior and influential military positions. The British Field Marshal also recommended that officers for the New Zealand Army be trained at the Australian military college. Because discipline and efficiency would be paramount in an institution which [was] so essential to the defence of Australia... any political interference with its management... should be strictly avoided. Kitchener emphasised that: 'It will be evident that the Director of such a College must be a man of exceptional qualifications, well educated, and accustomed to do his duty fearlessly and thoroughly'. While still in Australia the then Minister of Defence, Joseph Cook, had invited Kitchener to recommend who such a man might be. And taking advantage of the invitation the imperial warrior nominated William Throsby Bridges.

There can be little doubt that once Kitchener had named Bridges the matter was settled and that the Minister did not seek the advice of his senior Australian officers. Of course, one might ask on what basis Kitchener knew Bridges so well that he felt he could recommend him to fulfil the requirements of the appointment.

The Field Marshal was obviously at great pains to promote Bridges and took care to mention his high opinion of the Australian officer to Pearce during their Perth interview. In this instance, unlike the Kirkpatrick appointment, Cook was quick to inform Australians in early February 1910 that he was very glad that it had been possible to elect an Australian to such a high and responsible position — an action the Minister took before
the Memorandum had been tabled. It is certain that Kirkpatrick and Bridges, and presumably Kitchener, felt secure in their cause — one was the most powerful military officer in Australia and the other had control over the future education of the only officers to be admitted to the Staff Corps.

As a result of the Kitchener visit and Memorandum the imperial interest gained further influence over the Australian Army's officer corps. Such a result was entirely within the designs of the War Office and Haldane in their attempt to seek to influence the military affairs in the Dominions. It accords with similarly inspired attempts, although by different methods, to directly influence military policy in Canada. In attaining this result Kitchener had been aided by the high esteem in which he was held by the Australian public and press. More specifically his aims were assisted by the more conservative elements in Australia as represented by the pliable Cook and the ingratiating Daily Telegraph. As for Pearce, it was his naivety and lack of perception which laid him open to manipulation by Kitchener — in this regard Pearce was not alone but he was the responsible Minister.

It is a sad irony that the Kitchener visit should coincide with the finale of Alfred Deakin's political career. What started as an astute political move resulted in the achievement of something Deakin had been opposed to throughout the most productive years of his political career: imperial designs to influence or control the Australian military forces. After Kitchener's ship had departed Australian shores at the completion of his visit Alfred Deakin drafted a wireless message thanking Kitchener for the services he had so generously rendered to Australia. This message concluded:

I trust that . . . your Australian visit will rank in your memory in some degree as pleasantly as it does in ours to whom it promises so much towards the establishment of the future self-dependence of this continent.

Alfred Deakin.

As it transpired, Kitchener did not receive the message as wireless contact could not be made between shore and ship; Kitchener's visit and Memorandum were aimed at achieving anything but self-dependence for Australia.

NOTES

4. Ibid., p.149.
5. Cablegram from the Prime Minister (Mr. Alfred Deakin) to Viscount Kitchener (Commander-in-Chief in India), 9 July 1909, in G. Greenwood & C. Grimshaw (eds.), Documents on Australian International Affairs 1901-18, Melbourne, 1977, p.246.
6. Extracts from a speech by the Prime minister of Australia (Mr. Alfred Deakin) 20 April 1907, Ibid., pp.242-245.
18. The Age, Melbourne, 23 April 1910.
19. Ibid.
20. Worker, Sydney, 28 April 1910.
24. Ibid.
26. Professor F. Alexander, quoted by Ward, in Ibid.
30. J. Gooch, The Plans of War, London, 1974, pp.136-137. The specific situation described by Gooch applied to the Canadian Army but there can be no doubt that the same ploy was used in relation to the Australian Army.
31. The Age, Melbourne, 28 April 1910.
32. Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 28 April 1910.
33. The Age, Melbourne, 3 May 1910.
34. Strickland to Pearce, 19 January 1910, in Pearce Papers, Australian War Memorial, File 419/80/2, Bundle 3, Item 20.
35. The Age, Melbourne, 3 May 1910.
36. G. F. Pearce, Carpenter to Cabinet, London, 1951, pp.71-72. Note: The author refers to ' . . . Major Throsby Bridges . . . ' but, in fact Bridges held the rank of Colonel at the time of Kitchener's visit. It was probably presumptuous of Pearce to assume he would necessarily be the next Labor Minister of
Defence. By Pearce’s own admission this was subject to election to the ministry by caucus before the Prime Minister could allocate portfolios (see p.77, Ibid.).

39. Pearce, op.cit., p.77. **Note**: The author refers to Bridges as a Colonel in this passage. Bridges was promoted to Brigadier-General on 29 May 1910 — the day he arrived in Melbourne from U.K. and the first time Pearce would have seen him during the second Fisher Labor Government.
40. Pearce, quoted in the The Age, Melbourne, 4 May 1910.
41. Ibid.
42. A military officer, quoted in Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 25 April 1910.
43. Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Legge to The Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 12 November 1910, para. 18, p.8, Australian Archives, Melbourne Accession B197, Item 1804/1/7.
44. The Argus, Melbourne, 31 May 1910.
45. Legge to Secretary, Department of Defence, op.cit., para. 18e, p.11.
46. Ibid., para. 18f, p.11.
48. Legge to Secretary, Department of Defence, op.cit., para. 20, p.9.
49. Legge to Secretary, Department of Defence, 22 November 1910, Australian Archives, Melbourne Accession B197, Item 1804/1/7.
50. Ibid.
51. Legge to Secretary, Department of Defence, 6 December 1910, Australian Archives, Melbourne Accession B197, Item 1804/1/7.
52. Pearce to Fisher, 14 May 1909, Pearce Papers, Australian War Memorial, File 419/80/2, Bundle 4, Item 2.
54. Ibid., para. 25, p.11.
55. Ibid., para. 26, p.11.
56. Ibid., para. 27, p.11.
57. Memorandum by Kitchener, op.cit., para. 94, p.18.
59. Ibid., para. 41, p.12.
60. Ibid., para. 111, p.22.
61. Ibid., para. 111, p.22.
64. Ibid., para. 55, p.14.
65. Coulthard-Clark, op.cit., p.91.
66. Pearce, op.cit., p.72.
69. Draft message Deakin to Kitchener, CP 12/945 and CP 12/1939, Australian Archives, Canberra.

**EDITOR’S NOTE:**
This is a two part article. Part one dealt with Kitchener’s Visit and Recommendations for a Military College (Issue No. 46, May/June 1984).

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**BOOKS IN REVIEW**

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence Libraries:

Ball, Desmond and J. O. Langtry, eds, Civil Defence and Australia’s Security in the Nuclear Age, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1983.


Pura, Colin, The Black Berets, Melbourne, 9th Division Cavalry Regiment Association, 1983.
By Lieutenant A. J. Hinge, RAN

'. . . the whole art of war consists of a well reasoned and circumspect defence followed by rapid and audacious attack.'

Napoleon Bonaparte

Introduction

The specific role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is to maintain and develop a sufficiently powerful armed force to deter external assault or make such an assault, if it came, as costly as possible. This leads to the responsibility of the ADF to provide a potent variety of forces capable of inflicting maximum casualty upon an aggressor. This article endeavours to outline a national defence strategy capable of meeting the requirements of the ADF in the 1990s and into the third millennium.

An effective national defence strategy is primarily determined by the perceived threats which the ADF may be called upon to deter, counter or eliminate. Consequently, the first consideration is a brief analysis of the possible threat environment followed by a clear statement of the national defence strategy designed to control the environment. The next stage will involve consideration of a range of specific forces capable of satisfying the requirements of the selected strategy. Finally, this article will examine the basic Command/Control/Communications (C3) principles which must be tailored to meet the operational demands of the force.

THE THREAT

In 1981 a strategic assessment submitted to Parliament by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, outlined an array of threat situations which Australia may be confronted with. Threats included sporadic attacks against vital points; harassment of shipping, fishing and oil production; in addition to intrusions into Australian airspace and the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). It was also considered that military support for the exploitation of our off-shore resources and the use of military pressure against neighbours, whose security is important to us, could also eventuate. In addition to these possible threats, others involving operations by international terrorists, encouragement of dissident groups to take terrorist action, introduction of illegal immigrants and exotic diseases all contributed to a wide spectrum of low and intermediate level conflicts which might arise.

All threats have a massive potential for escalation which could lead to limited lodgement, a major punitive attack or even invasion. It must also be remembered that we are living in a world growing more nationalistic, militaristic and protectionist; populated by many new sovereign states which are growing increasingly adept in the use of sophisticated weapons and efficient Command/Control/Communications facilities. By 2000 AD it is likely that resource wars will flare up between the 'have and have not' nations as key oil fields, fishing grounds and mineral deposits near depletion. Antarctica and Western Australia for example will become increasingly valuable, vulnerable and attractive targets for lodgement and exploitation by developing nations, who may see themselves as challengers of our moral rights to sit on so much untapped and undefended wealth. These challenges can only be allayed by regional cooperation or by force of arms. We must encourage the former but when all other political means have failed we must be prepared to resolutely use the latter.

In summary, Australia presently faces no specific threat. However, a broad spectrum of possibilities exist, ranging from low to high level threats, none of which can be ignored and all of which can escalate.
The National Defence Strategy

The Military Strategy

Good strategy; in a non-clearly defined threat situation, is based on the maxim: ‘Prepare for the worst and you won’t be disappointed’. Preparing for the worst involves preparing to ward off a determined major regional assault unassisted by allied powers. This can be done.

To deal with a broad threat spectrum, forces must be structured to deal with crises in the major threat band. A sufficiently flexible range of capabilities must then be developed to deal with major threats. The versatility of the force structure would be such that lower level threats could be dealt with by judicious selection of force elements, which could be dispatched to inflict a measured response in proportion to the seriousness of the threat. The existence of such a force satisfies the two main requirements of a defence force; that is, to act as a deterrent and provide a potent, ‘in-being’ war fighting machine.

Any major assault is best dealt with by a strategy of Active Defence in Depth (ADD). ADD gives its user a ‘tough nut to crack’ identity and is ideally suited to maximizing enemy attrition and flexible enough to deal with all manner of low level and intermediate threats (in addition to the thwarting of a major assault). ADD incorporates thinking offensively by effectively employing surveillance, secrecy, speed, deception and consequent surprise to maximise enemy losses far from our shores. It is the ultimate deterrent war fighting strategy, in that it offers on identifiable foe sudden encounters at places and times of our choosing. The effective use of the sea around us is a vital principle of ADD and intrinsically gives us an initial level of defence in depth by virtue of geography. The active component of ADD comes to the fore when we realize that the sea is a defensive moat providing us with a three dimensional battle field which includes regional enemy staging ports. Maritime forces must use as much of the sea as possible as a hunting-killing ground causing maximum attrition to the aggressor’s logistics, manpower and morale. The ability to effect sea denial deprives the adversary of the initiative with which to choose when, where, how and in what concentration he will attack.

The strong force projection capability implicit in an ADD strategy, most importantly, allows enormous scope for the use of the two basic principles of general combat. Firstly, Balance: put the enemy off balance; usually by speed and surprise. This can pay huge dividends as will be outlined. Secondly, apply maximum force to the weakest points of the opponent’s machine even if they be in his homeland. This will of course require good C3 and intelligence co-ordination.

The first three phases of ADD: 1: Seagoing Guerilla Warfare. 2: Mine-Submarine Warfare. 3: Carrier Warfare would be directed by the Forward Defence Command (FDC) which is the first of the three ADD commands. The FDC (see Section 5) is responsible for force projection and sea denial operations beyond the EEZ. The fourth ADD phase involves the Coastal Defence Command (CDC) which would be responsible for long-range surveillance together with EEZ combat operations and surveillance. The final ADD level involves the Land Defence Command (LDC) dealing with opposed landings and continental combat operations. The roles and structures of all three commands will be elaborated on in Section 5. Suffice it to say that an enemy will be faced with a powerful Defence in Depth, capable of making any conventional attack by regional forces prohibitively costly.

The Economic Strategy

It has rightly been said that ‘Money is the sinews of war’. The basic economic problem is that defence expenditure has remained singularly unattractive to governments, especially
in times of tight economic circumstances. This 
is mainly because national defence planning 
and national development planning have re-
mained mutually exclusive. A solution to the 
basic problem is to make defence expenditure 
attractive to governments by tying in defence 
policy with national development so that they 
proceed hand-in-hand, scratching each other’s 
back as it were. Plans can be formulated to 
destroy the isolation of defence and national 
planning from one another. Defence policy 
and planning can contribute to sustain national 
development by generating ADD programmes 
which create, directly and indirectly, jobs based 
on a substantial Australian Industrial Participa-
tion even at the expense of high initial cost. 
The bulk of proposed ADD forces (Sections 4 
A,B,C,D and E refer) employ middle of the 
road technology available in Australia now 
and a certain amount of high technology which 
is generally available to the nation. The shells 
and propulsion systems of container carriers, 
submarines, airships, mines, pocket subma-
rones, submersibles and submarine logistic 
barges can be manufactured here together with 
considerable amounts of electronic and other 
equipment. Many stand-off weapons, sensor 
systems and VSTOL aircraft will have to be 
fully imported for several years. However, 
after this period the Australian electronics and 
general engineering industry could be built-up 
to a considerable state of independence. Aus-
tralian Industrial Participation must be maxi-
mized and supervised using careful planning 
to produce a formidable Total Defence 
Resource (TDR).

Another vital component of the TDR is the 
use of current and future civil infrastructure. 
Civil sector pilots, aircraft, boats and even 
firearms can provide a massive boost to the 
TDR. Non-duplication of resources could save 
the standing defence forces hundreds of mil-
ions of dollars annually. For example, the 
basic operations of the expensive and inade-
quate Fremantle class patrol boat could be 
undertaken by civil craft allowing money and 
personnel to be invested in units with more 
‘teeth’.

In summary, our Total Defence Resource 
can be greatly magnified by planning to in-
corporate substantially more Australian Indus-
trial Participation together with the assets of 
the civil sector in the national defence strategy.

Active Defence in Depth requires a substantial 
Total Defence Resource. This cannot be 
attained if the current non-integrated policies 
persist; where defence planning is isolated from 
national development planning in neglect of a 
serious use of the civil infrastructure.

The Force

The ADD force should be composed of a 
large number of cheap, reliable and combat 
proven items offering maximum deterrent and 
warfighting value. All forces are chosen to 
demand a disproportionate response from the 
enemy (see Note 3) and provide sufficient 
flexibility to deal with a wide spectrum of threat.

Seagoing Guerilla Warfare

Seagoing guerilla warfare is the first combat 
phase of ADD. It is also the most flexible, 
cost-effective and neglected option of major 
powers and middle powers such as Australia. 
The tenets of guerilla warfare have been 
adopted and proven time and time again. A 
guerilla avoids presenting a target to the op-
ponent until he is ready to kill. Heavoids set 
piece, head on battles which assaulting enemies 
try to force and employs mobility, conceal-
ment, secrecy and surprise to hit at the weak 
points. The guerillas’ aim is to achieve LOCAL 
SUPERIORITY over the opposition even in 
the enemies’ heartland by the use of surprise 
and temporary concentration of forces. In the 
first line of ADD attack this adds up to 
wide spread use of the submarine as a mobile 
base for naval sabotage and offensive mine 
warfare. The vital principle of force concen-
tration was graphically illustrated by Lieuten-
ant Colonel Masonabou Fsuji, the architect of 
the Japanese plan to take fortress Singapore 
in WWII ‘... with surprise and with our 
strength concentrated ... , the first blow is 
always the vital one ... ‘ in outlining some 
of his basis principles of combat success. 
Fsuji’s plan involved achievement of local 
superiority which led to the defeat of allied 
units one by one. The German commando 
Skorzny, also attributed his numerous striking 
successes to rapid and unexpected concentra-
tion of force arguing that once real disorder 
is created, almost anyone can get away with 
anything. Fsuji was obviously not alone in his 
thoughts or successes.
Irregular forces can fight hit and run, small and medium scale action as independent units or co-ordinated bands. They harass and destroy enemy forces, drain manpower and draw an overall disproportionate cost and response from the foe. At extremely low relative cost they can be used as ultimate political scalpels in punishing any, regional enemy to potentially any degree for low to medium threat situations and may be used en mass in major scenarios.

There is a vital role for pocket submarines and two-man submersibles in the years to come. As an example, in 1941 an Italian submarine dropped three pocket submarines a few miles off the entrance to Alexandria harbour. These mini-sub proceeded to sink the British battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth together with a large fleet oiler. This single act shifted the Mediterranean naval balance, gun for gun, from the British to the Italian favour.

Similarly, the exploits of our own Krait, an ex-Japanese fish carrier during Operation Jaywick should also be remembered where six men equipped with canoes and some limpet mines sank 41,000 tonnes of Japanese shipping in Singapore harbour, more tonnage than sunk by the entire RAN during WWII.

Today we can build at low cost, Goliath killing Davids — two-man submersibles which deployed by a mother submarine and being equipped with modern explosive devices could wreak havoc in any port that acts as a regional assault base or is occupied by a power threatening us or our regional friends in any way. We can draw practically any price from an aggressor in stores and life lost by the sinking of ship tonnage. Besides this, the sheer cost of harbour protection against submersibles little larger than big fish would be high, causing him to make an unattractive, disproportionate response. Only imagination limits the use of these simple, effective weapons and how they can be brought within strike range. Boldness and originality in this sphere of tactical endeavour can and will offer massive dividends for minimal outlay. History has proven this.

**Mines and Submarines**

Mine warfare forms an integral component of a war winning ADD program. The mine has a profound psychological and political impact, as an all weather launch and leave weapon operating 24 hours a day with a long shelf life. In all major twentieth century conflicts the mine has proven itself a demonstrated and relatively cheap success. They act as an ultimate standoff weapon requiring no support and demand a disproportionate response from the enemy owing to the extreme difficulty in countering them in terms of time, money and human life. Mines are proven destroyers of massive quantities of ship tonnage and can give the user the enormous advantage of permitting his force to effectively decide the geography of the theatre of operations. For example, the mining of choke points and vital transit routes would seriously inconvenience an enemy by increasing his vulnerability to detection and attack; in addition to seriously decreasing his time on station. The enemy can effectively be isolated and his tactics limited by intelligent use of mine warfare. The mine has always been conservative both in terms of the military budget and the user's life, moreover it is a very acceptable form of warfare to the public as was illustrated by the U.S. mining of Haiphong harbour in 1972.

The mining of three North Vietnamese harbours proved particularly effective in that 50 ships were trapped in port for 300 days and even with the massive burden placed on the overland route from China, imports were still reduced by thirty per cent. Supplies reaching combat areas were reduced by an estimated 800-1500 tons per day. Also, with increased enemy traffic on the overland route the North Vietnamese experienced greater vulnerability to air interdiction and suffered significantly higher casualties. The cost U.S. forces was basically a shot down A7E together with the mines themselves. In short, a few mines laid in the right quantity, at the right place had a vital impact on the result of the last U.S. offensive against North Vietnam and acted as a potent lever by which to make the communists more amenable at the conference table.

The Indonesian Archipelago, through which any major lodgement attack by a regional federation could come, offers an excellent area for the effective deployment of mines which could be laid by submarines, P-3 aircraft and various surface units. During World War II three ageing U.S. minelayers, the Preable, Gamble and Breese laid mines in the Blackett Strait of the Solomons and soon sank three Japanese destroyers, the Kagero, Kuroshio and Oyashio. The cost was nothing but the mines themselves. Minelaying, particularly by sub-
marines outside ports must become an Australian military art whilst the mining of choke points and patrol routes must become a practised art of ALL Australian surface ships including merchantmen. The mine also offers important possibilities for Australian Industrial Participation (AIP) which has been discussed as a major component of ADD structure.

The mine remains an ideal weapon for the present and projected political climate. It can be used strategically and tactically as a weapon with considerable political clout and is flexible enough to use in most situations in the threat spectrum — from sealing off various transit straits used by enemy shipping, to ‘bottling up’ enemy supply units in major ports. It must however be realized that for maximum effectiveness mines must be laid early in the conflict and in large numbers in order to remain a vital sea denial weapon. It can be employed in warfare without bloodshed in order to stabilize a deteriorating situation and a variety of delivery platforms must exist for deployment. In particular, the diesel submarine must act as a mobile minefield by which to harass the adversary in his waters, to rupture supply lines by bottling up ports with mines for as long as possible and taking out opportunity targets with torpedoes and missiles. Special undersea mine barges will need to be delivered to submarines by surface vessels when getting close to enemy seas in addition to secret stockpiles being positioned at submerged points in the region. The role of the submarine in the first stage of ADD cannot be overemphasised as it is an ideal maritime guerilla unit, in that secrecy, surprise and concealment are its vital assets. Such assets are essential while operating in enemy seas without the benefit of a massive surface fleet. Until the time is right the submarine, its mines, missiles and torpedoes offers the foe no targets, only headaches. Consequently, as a result of the submarine being the cornerstone of the first combat stage of ADD three submarine squadrons of 5 units each based at Darwin, Perth and Sydney are required. In addition to these squadrons powered submersible barges stocking mines, torpedoes, fuel, missiles and spares need to be constructed.

**Container Carriers**

Considerable research has been undertaken on these units which provide a practical alternative to the prohibitive costs of the dedicated seagoing airpower necessary for sea denial. Their capability to ensure the security of SLOC’s is most desirable in a nation reliant on maritime trade. The major uses of these units would be close-in ASW protection, long range delivery of stand-off weapons (including mines), resupply of irregular and submarine forces and opportunity assault against enemy logistics and maritime forces. Each ship would be capable of supporting four to six VSTOL fighters and four helicopters (which may be civilian helicopters adapted to military use during time of national emergency).

Organic maritime air support is an invaluable asset in maritime combat, especially with the advent of long-range stand-off missiles of the calibre of Harpoon. The greater the intensity of air support, the greater the chance of destroying major enemy units and destroying logistic continuity. The advantage of providing close-in ASW protection is obvious especially when considering that for maximum self-defence these carriers will usually be operating in squadrons of three. Operations involving more than one squadron will give the nation a potent regional strike capability with a destroyer squadron acting as major sensor units.

Australia is a maritime nation and nowhere near self sufficient. Convoys must get through and must be armed, which leads to the re-introduction of the ‘Woolworth’s’ carrier concept. What is required is a re-inforced container ship hull which can be used to good effect in peacetime as a 15,000 ton container carrier and in wartime optionally as an armed merchantman or a complete carrier. This would entail the use of VSTOL aircraft and helos supported by standard size containers known as TEEMS (Transportable Engineered Environment Modules) housing all necessary support facilities together with weapons and sensor units. Extensive use would be made of ‘bolt-on’ packages such as Phalanx CIWS together with prefabricated ‘clip-on’ flight decks which could be attached when required. Two carriers would remain in operational use in peacetime with the rest making a welcome contribution to Australian flag shipping under the management of Australian shipping companies. The non-activated carriers would act as a strategic reserve in which two or three weeks training would occur in a strictly military role where TEEMS and decks would be installed. Civilian...
personnel would be responsible for damage control, propulsion and general maintenance while military personnel attached to TEEMS would maintain sensors, weapons systems and aircraft. The carriers would be under the command of a naval officer for one month per year. Ten such carriers would be a boon for Australian flag shipping and a bonanza for AIP. The carrier force forms the second combat phase of ADD by which our SLOC’s are kept open, organic maritime airpower projection, in concentration, is attained and a formidable standoff capability is generated. It should be noted that AIP and ADD must go hand in hand in the generation and use of multipurpose basic designs with specialized, modularized components involving systems of greater flexibility, reliability and overall simplicity. This must be made true of our submarines, carriers, mines, TEEMS, Submarine Logistic Barges (SLB’s) and Coastal Surveillance Vehicles (CSV’s).

Coastal Surveillance Force (CSF)

The CDC as previously noted would be responsible for the defence and surveillance of the EEZ. By the year 1990 it would basically be composed of 75 F-18, 24 F-111, 20 P-3 LRMP aircraft. This represents a formidable strike capacity considering that the P-3 can be Harpoon equipped, giving it a strong strike capability in addition to its long range patrol capability. The workload of the increasingly valuable P-3 aircraft must be reduced by a specialized Coastal Surveillance Vehicle (CSV) capable of comprehensively patrolling the EEZ.

The CSV must give a bird’s eye view of the EEZ. Basically the EEZ takes in about 1,300,000 square miles of ocean which is difficult to effectively or cheaply patrol with either patrol boats or LRMP aircraft in any time frame. Total surveillance at minimal cost can be achieved by the construction of AD 600 Sentinel Airships each of which can daily search through an area of 100,000 square miles or effectively cover 500 miles of coastline daily out to the 200 mile limit. Thirteen such airships would be required to cover the entire EEZ daily. The airships would each cost approximately two million dollars and operating costs would be five per cent of that required for an Orion. The Sentinel has a high endurance in going for seventy two hours at forty knots using extremely reliable engines (1200 hours between overhaul periods) and has a vectored thrust facility. Important features are also its high volume to payload capacity, it’s payload of 3 tonnes and facility for a high degree of crew comfort. It is helium filled with shore support facilities being simply a cleared area, anchoring pylon and a vehicle for stores and crew transfer. The airships can perform all the duties of helicopters, including submarine detection at a fraction of the P-3 cost. Patrots could depart Sydney, circumnavigate the continent in a fortnight and have a week’s leave prior to commencing another patrol. Each ship would be equipped with basic radar systems, magnetic anomaly gear, communications equipment and a defensive rocket system in addition too small arms for possible boarding parties. Twenty airships would suffice to cover our EEZ including seven in reserve. Thus, for a hardware cost of approximately forty million dollars effective surveillance is achieved. This is equivalent to the cost of a few Fremantle patrol boats which have far less capability to cover seaspace, much greater initial cost and through-life cost in terms of both personnel and equipment, especially when one considers that an airship will be manned by a crew of three. The airship of today is a far cry from the hydrogen filled Zeppelins of yesteryear. It can be used as the ultimate long range maritime patrol aircraft to maintain one hundred per cent surveillance at a small fraction of the current cost of present ineffective methods. The possible uses of airships are numerous. They could be employed as Airborne Early Warning (AEW) stations, ASW platforms or minesweepers. In fact, the United States Navy has hired an AD 500 for trials involving the towing of sonar arrays for submarine detection. The advantages of an airship over a helicopter for minesweeping purposes, in terms of superior endurance and much cheaper cost are also considerable. An AD 600 could tow a minesweeping sled at 15 knots for a full week continuously before requiring resupply.

The airship may even prove to be a substitute for fixed wing aircraft in an anti-aircraft role. The AD 5000 is a scaled up version of the 500 and 600. It is planned to be approximately 100 metres long, 40 metres high and 32 metres in diameter with a disposable lift of about 60 tonnes. Like the other airships it is difficult to
detect using various sensors (besides the eye) due to its very low radar and infra red signatures when operating in a passive mode, that is, without its own radar operating. An airship such as the AD 5000 equipped with two dozen long range air-air missiles (100km +) would thus become a formidable air superiority unit.16

An airship's potential in terms of economy and effectiveness could be harnessed for the national defence. Experimentation in airship applications could prove well worthwhile.

**Operational Deployment Force (ODF)**

The current ODF is structured to cope with low-level threats. An ODF must be capable of at least dealing with a limited enemy lodgement which could be considered an intermediate level threat.

Contingency plans must be made for the rapid deployment of two full Infantry Brigades to any scene of lodgement. One of these Brigades should be parachute trained and both Brigades must be expert in the use of Fuel Air Explosives17 (FAE) for the destruction of enemy formations, hardened point targets, bunkers, command centres and general area destruction. The ODF must be backed up by at least two squadrons of ground attack aircraft (30 A-4/A-7 type) of proven cost effectiveness for delivery of FAE devices and conventional bombs and missiles.18 If a major enemy breakthrough and lodgement occurs the ODF must be able to fight a rearward action; in conjunction with civil reserve forces, in order to maximize the available time for organisation of the rest of the LDF. The rearward action would involve a scorched earth policy using FAE devices to destroy all features of value to the enemy (bridges, roads, railways, water sources, etc.).

The parachute trained Brigade should be capable of rapid deployment in Papua/New Guinea and various other areas affecting the security of our northern friends. The heavy use of civil infrastructure in the deployment of the full ODF in any scenario would be necessary. The national defence resource is certainly capable of sustaining and deploying such a relatively large ODF if sufficiently logical and detailed plans are prepared and promulgated. The advantages of tackling the enemy in his early consolidation stage warrants this investment in a strong ODF.

**Command, Control and Communications (C³)**

A C³ system supports defence decision makers in effectively managing their resources and provides a basis on which to determine a response which best suits the need. It must however be strongly emphasised from the onset that crises almost invariably require the establishment of ‘ad hoc’ C³ systems. This was found in 1970 by the Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Defence Panel on the workings of the U.S. Department of Defense.19 It was established that standard military layered echelons and communications do not satisfactorily do the job in a crisis. Consequently a C³ system must be established by which to provide a flexible, survivable structure with which to backup and apply ADD operational hardware.

The basic C³ process is outlined in the following diagram:

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1. **C³ INTELLIGENCE INPUTS**
   - Enemy existence
   - Enemy strength
   - Enemy capability
   - Enemy position
   - Enemy intent

2. **C³ COMMAND PROCESS**
   - Assembly of information
   - Display of information
   - Analysis of information
   - Evaluation of information
   - Consideration of options
   - Selection of an option

3. **C³ IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS**
   - Issue of orders
   - Execution of orders
   - COMMS
Command-and-Control must necessarily come from the seat of government which will require accurate and timely intelligence inputs. A suitable response can only then be decided upon by major military and political decision makers. The centrality of command exercises from a hardened, secure position has been the conclusion of Soviet and U.S. forces after much time consuming and costly experience. This situation is unavoidable in order to ensure rapid and efficient communications. However, backup command centres may be set up at HQFDC, HQCDC and HQLDC. This would involve shared data bases which directly relay information and, of course, the use of a sophisticated, secret communications system. Secrecy is a major part of the communications network of the ADD C^1 system. Great pains must be taken to organise communications networks and codes invulnerable to enemy tapping, jamming and deception so as to ensure reliability and survivability.

Time is often the most important consideration when dealing with a crisis. A highest to lowest communications system must exist whereby the use of the classic layered command/control system can be bypassed. A direct link between Central Command and actual fighting units such as submarines, container carriers, naval saboteurs etc. must be available for rapid response to any crisis. Only a sophisticated and reliable communications network can ensure the flexible framework of an effective C^1 organisation during a crisis. Data processing techniques must be used in as many stages of the process as possible in order to enhance reaction time and provide ultimate decision makers with information at their fingertips.

Ease of communication and counsel at the highest level is instrumental in co-ordinating rapid, effective action. To ensure a maximum degree of command co-ordination FDC, CDC and LDC commanders (Four star level) must be based at Central Command with their three star seconds occupying the respective command Headquarters around Australia. The FDC will be commanded by a Naval Officer assuming responsibility for all operations outside the EEZ. Strike forces from the CDC would be at his disposal and under his command whenever available and operating outside of the EEZ. He is responsible only to the Minister of Defence for his operations and area of responsibility. The Minister will act as co-ordinator of the three commanders and the four persons will comprise the Defence Command Team (DCT). The CDC commander (RAAF) is responsible for all operations in the EEZ and all FDC forces which may be operating in the EEZ. The LDC commander (ARMY) is responsible for all land operations. Decisions of the respective commanders in their areas of responsibility are to be final unless countermanded by the Minister in consultation with the Prime Minister. Commanders will thus have responsibility for absolute geographical areas. Their authority can only be overridden by the Minister in cases of extreme doubt and the Minister must implement a routine of stating the policy requirement and then considering the relevant commanders viewpoint on military options. A ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ will then be conveyed to the respective command headquarters or perhaps given directly to various units involved in emergency situations. It goes without saying that the considerable powers invested in the three commanders takes for granted a sense of ripe judgement and realization of political implications. Obviously each commander must be provided with a carefully selected beaurecrat/uniformed advisory staff.

The importance of the Central Command Centre and personnel within demands that security be of the highest standard. It must be a hardened site capable of resisting all manner of sabotage or direct attack. If however, Central Command is knocked out of action HQFDC, HQCDC and HQLDC must take over the war from their hardened sites. Each command must have sufficient cross-training, expertise and communications systems to temporarily manage the conflict in the event of another post being rendered unserviceable. Built-in C^1 duplication and absolute clarification of areas of responsibility and power are basic features of a coherent C^1 system.

In summary, the C^1 system envisaged involves rapid reception of data by a commander of clearly defined authority and jurisdiction. Orders are then relayed to the respective command HQ for implementation however a capacity for highest to communicate with lowest as indicated in the Holloway Report must be established in order to maximize flexibility and when necessary short circuit the system. This entire procedure must be crucially linked
together by a sophisticated, reliable and above all secret communications system made as invulnerable as possible. This is a tall order indeed but a vital one as C becomes a decisive element of modern warfare.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made with a view to increasing the Australian Defence Forces capability to fulfil its role and deals with modifications to force structure and Command/Control arrangements.

- The ADF should be structured to counter a major conventional assault. This is due to the fact that while no threat is currently evident, a broad threat spectrum does exist. To allow for most contingencies a force must be developed having the capability to eliminate or deter threats at the major end of the threat spectrum. Smaller scale crises may then be dealt with by selected elements of the force.

- A military strategy of Active Defence in Depth (ADD) should be adopted in order to maximize the deterrent and ‘in-being’ warfighting capability of the ADF. Active Defence in Depth involves tactics and hardware designed to draw a disproportionate response from any aggressor (see note 3). ADD also involves the full use of our geographical advantages which yield full scope for the vital advantages of defence in depth, sea denial, surprise and the prerogative of taking the initiative.

- An economic strategy involving a coupling between national development planning and national defence planning must be instituted on a broad scale. This policy is capable of generating the substantial Total Defence Resource required to support the ADD strategy. More account will have to be taken of the civil sectors resources which may be incorporated in the TDR. Planning must involve a minimization of equipment duplication between the military and civil sector. ADD equipment (Section 4) must have a substantial content of Australian Industrial Participation even at the price of high initial expense.

- Command/Control of the ADF must be simplified by organizing a flexible system of command echelon reduction in order to maximize speed of response and interpretation of orders. This must be taken to the extreme of highest to lowest communications which can ultimately reduce the number of echelons to two; that is, the one that ultimately decides to give the order and the one that pulls the trigger. This calls for more sophisticated, secret and longer range communications hardware and methods than those in use at the moment.

- Command/Control response time and effectiveness will be enhanced by a system of annular area operational commands with each commander having full responsibility for operations in his geographic zone of responsibility. The Forward Defence Command (FDC) will be responsible for force projection, sea-denial, and Special Action Force (SAF) operations beyond the EEZ. The Coastal Defence Command (CDC) is responsible for operations and surveillance by aircraft inside the EEZ. The third command would be the Land Defence Command (LDC) dealing with opposed landing operations, continental conventional and guerrilla warfare together with surveillance.

- Major Command-and-Control must necessarily be centralized in a hardened command post at the seat of government. A Defence Command Team (DCT) should exist consisting three zone commanders and the Minister for Defence. The Minister would act as chairman and have the ultimate right of vetoing any zone commanders decision. The ministers main role would be to provide the political direction and constraints within which the zone commanders could operate.

- Command/Control effectiveness would be enhanced by improving the political awareness of commanders at all levels. Officer training should involve a greater understanding of Australian policies and their ramifications, together with the principles of the limited adjective and dangers of escalation. This training should make officers, even at the junior level, more competent in independently deciding for the national interest in a high-tempo crisis situation, at any level of threat.

- Command-and-Control of the ADF must be exercised by competent and innovative senior officers. The military promotion and advancement system must be looked at so as to ensure; as far as possible, the promotion of vigorous, forceful, decisive and above all intelligent people who must be relied upon
to combat threats. The current ADF is based upon orthodoxy in operation and management. Orthodoxy thrives on its fear of setting precedents because the practitioners of orthodoxy advance in the system, while the innovators are frustrated in an environment where the pressures remain administrative rather than competitive. ADD requires leaders at all levels prepared to adopt novel ideas and tactics. The present system of advancement appears to promote the people most practised in, and least able to depart from, the edicts of orthodoxy. Many of these people may lack that elusive but critically important quality in war called military leadership. It is recommended that a study be made of the current officer training and advancement system. This system may paradoxically be promoting the men least able to successfully and imaginatively manage a modern crisis situation.

NOTES
1. Sydney Morning Herald (p. 33 Saturday April 23rd 1983). Russel Bradden in his article: Lost We Be Sold Another Singapore describes the effectiveness of Fusuji's methods.
3. Pacific Defence Reporter (pp. 7-15 September 1979 Issue). D. Ball and J. O. Langtry of the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre suggest that defence capabilities be selected which cause the would be aggressor to place a disproportionate amount of resources into the counteracting of our selected capabilities. This is so as to make it more difficult for him to gain the confidence of overall military superiority, so often preliminary to determined attack. From an article entitled Development of Australia's Defence Structure: An Alternative Approach.
5. The Navy: The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia (p. 29 October 1983 Issue) gives a very good account of the success of the operation.
6. The strike advantages of submarines are numerous, their major assets being 'invisibility' and smallness of size. During WWII the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) employed the following types of submarines: (a) MSC. (Motorised Submersible Conoes or 'Sleeping Beauties'). These giant killers; no bigger than a middle-size shark, carried sufficient explosive devices to destroy 40,000 tonnes of shipping. (b) Welman Midget - A battery operated submarine five metres long with a one metre beam. It carried 250kg (560lb) of explosive in a false bow which could be dropped after the setting of a time fuse. (3) WELL FREIGHTER - Four-man submarine which could be used for inserting sabotage teams and equipment. Modern battery and electronics technology would greatly increase the endurance, efficiency and strike power of these cheap and long underemployed weapons.
7. Rear Admiral Roy Hoffman in his article cited in note 8 gives impressive statistics throughout of the astounding cost effectiveness of mine warfare, for example (p. 147) he gives the case of the U.S. Army Air Forces planting of 12,000 mines in Japanese waters in five months causing the sinking or damaging of 670 ships. The cost was only 15 bombers.
11. U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS (pp. 103-106 January 1983 Issue) J. J. Mulquin outlines the successful operations of an ARAPAHO prototype undertaken at Chesapeake Bay in the United States in his article Arapaho Update. J. J. Mulquin of USN PROCEEDINGS for Captain Gerald O'Rourke's contribution entitled What's In Store For Arapaho? (pp. 117-119).
12. A 'Woolworths Carrier' is the term used to describe merchantmen modified to act as escort carriers for convoy protection during World War II.
13. Pacific Defence Reporter (p. 89. June 1979 Issue) Desmond Wetter in his article Arapaho describes how TEEMS are being employed in the Egyptian and British Navies in various applications. The USN has also made considerable progress in this area. (See note 14).
14. Pacific Defence Reporter (p. 48-51 April 1979 Issue) P. Reynolds outlines this highly effective option in his article; The Airship in an E2Z Situation. Particular note should be taken of the full specifications of the AD 600 Sentinel on page 49.
15. Op Cit. PDR April 1979. page 48-49. Access to the extensive Mediterranean by German submarines was denied by two airships with magnetic anomaly equipment stationed above the Straits of Gibraltar. It should also be noted that in World War II U.S Navy Airships maintained eighty-seven per cent availability in all weather conditions.
17. Pacific Defence Reporter (pp. 80-84 February 1978 Issue), D. Ball in his article entitled New Military Technologies For The Defence of Australia outlines the devastating effects and real potential of FAE'S. Certain limitations on its application exist but the explosive power of the devices is a major asset in anti-shipping and anti-folegement applications.
18. The ODF will require substantial air support until adequate artillery and armour backup are deployed. High technology and expensive F-18 aircraft would be reserved mainly for maritime strike role. A cheap, battle proven ground strike aircraft such as the A-4 or A-7 would be ideal for the job. F-18 units could be used by the ODF to maintain air superiority as a fighter so that the 'Bomb-carriers' could get on with the job. Secondhand A-7 and A-4 aircraft could do the job well. These aircraft would be piloted by army personnel on a basis similar to the US Marine Air squadrons.
19. U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS (pp. 24 August 1974 Issue) Hugh Ware in his prize winning article...
entitled New Tools For Crisis Management analyzes several military crises and some of the findings of the Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Defence Panel relating to Department of Defence handling of them. (pp. 19-24).

20. U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS (pp. 23-31 October 1974 Issue) Rear Admiral Donald T. Poe, USN in his article entitled Command and Control Changeless — Yet Changing describes the philosophy of the US World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) which was established at Washington in 1977 as an effort to simplify decision making and execution. This is a basic conformation to the centralist policy of the USSR with its Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) bunkers in Moscow and Odessa. The SOSS system in turn is in fact a direct descendent of the German (World War II). The fundamental lesson learned is that questions relating to the higher conduct of war can only be answered at a national level. Centrality in C is unavoidable.

21. The Holloway Report was prepared for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff by an ex-CNO, Admiral James Holloway III, ISN (ret’d) and five other active and retired senior military officers. The 78-page report released on 23rd August 1980 is considered by the US Department of Defence as the definitive analysis of Operation BlueLight; the codename for the abortive Iran hostage rescue mission. The report outlines the problems encountered when conventional commands in multiple layers attempt to control a special mission. Basically the report tells of an overmanaged effort depending on conventional sequential checks and orders which did not work.

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**BOOK REVIEW**

**THE BLACK BERETS, The History and Battles of the 9th Division Cavalry Regiment, by Colin Pura. Published by: 9th Division Cavalry Regiment Association, GPO Box 5308 BB, Melbourne, 3001.**

Reviewed by Col J. P. Buckley, OBE, ED, (Ret)

This is the story of a regiment which for a brief time belonged to 7th and 8th Aust. Divisions before finally joining 9th Aust. Division. Before being concentrated in Victoria, the Regiment was scattered across four States. It made the transition from Light Horse to Tracked Vehicles without major difficulty.

I first visited the Regiment when it was 8th Aust. Division Cavalry at Balcombe, Victoria in December 1940. At that time I was serving on H.Q. 8th Aust. Division. Having seen most of the other units, I was very impressed with the C.O. Lieutenant Colonel Hector Bastin. The discipline, morale and espirit de corps of the unit were first class, likewise the care and maintenance of the obsolete tracked vehicles was very good.

Later in Syria, whilst serving on H.Q. 1 Aust. Corps, I visited the Regiment whilst it was in action — its performance was highly regarded, as it was to be later at Alamein, Labuan, Tarakan and battlegrounds in between. Not only was it a good cavalry regiment, but it finished the war as good Commando Squadrons.

Colin Pura has produced a regimental history which includes a mass of information, including a nominal roll of all members who served. The story is well illustrated by 110 excellent photographs and several illustrations, but lacks maps of the Middle East which would have been helpful to the reader who was not there.

The unit was lucky to be thrust into the Syrian Campaign so soon after it reached the Middle East where it was able to carry out its role in a mobile operation. Furthermore, 6th Aust. Division Cavalry Regiment, already experienced in battle, was used in the Syrian Campaign.

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Lieutenant Hinge graduated from the Australian National University in 1977 and joined the RAN in 1979. He is currently posted to the Weapons Electrical Engineering School HMAS Nirimba and will take up the post of Training Officer HMAS Waterhen later this year.
The problems of unsatisfactory tracked vehicles bedevilled both regiments, also the acute shortage of spare parts made life difficult for the two commanding officers. However, Denzil MacArthur-Onslow of the 6th Cavalry and Hector Bastin of the 9th were extremely good commanders, and their drive and initiative overcame many of their problems.

After changing from horses to tracked vehicles at the outbreak of war, it was perhaps a greater change to become commando squadrons later in the war. The unit came through these transitions with flying colours. Perhaps Pura could have highlighted the difficulties experienced by the Regiment in making these changes.

It would have helped the general reader if a broad general picture of the tactical employment of the Regiment in operations could have been given. Likewise, a good index at the end of the book is missing, and the chronology on pages 111 and 112 has gaps and is out of sequence (the next entry after 14th June 1941 is 24th January 1943).

The foreword is written by one of the outstanding fighting Brigadiers of World War II, David Whitehead, CBE, DSO & Bar, MC, ED, CdeG. He comments 'members of the Regiment have much to be proud of, and this is reflected in the strength of its Association.'

Colin Pura has written a very good history of a very good Regiment; he and the Association deserve congratulations on their fine effort — as also do the printers, Hedges & Bell of Maryborough, Victoria — who always seem to produce high quality results.

Good Luck to the 9th Division Cavalry Association, it has a very good tradition to safeguard.


Reviewed by D. R. Jender, Department of Communications.

This book is a collection of articles dealing with various aspects of civil defence in Australia and a number of foreign countries. Four of the book's sixteen chapters cover civil defence in Sweden, China, the Soviet Union and Britain, with a fifth chapter reviewing the international examples. The remaining eleven chapters deal with civil defence in Australia, but no continuing theme is evident, a reflection no doubt of the fact that each chapter has a different author. A final short chapter by Dr Robert O'Neill, now director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, summarises the contributions of the various authors. The book contains a useful and reasonably up-to-date bibliography of government publications, books and articles on civil defence issues. There is however no index to the book's contents, an unfortunate omission.

Civil defence is most commonly thought of relevant when there exists a threat from nuclear weapons. This aspect is given detailed treatment in chapters on nuclear attack, fallout shelter design, and a technical appendix on radiation shielding. These chapters are useful reference material on these subjects, particularly as they relate to the Australian situation. This latter aspect has not been widely available in a convenient public form.

Chapters on the politics of civil defence and the role of the States serve to emphasise that civil defence in Australia is as much a political problem as a technical or military one. There are complex problems of Commonwealth-State relations in this field, as in so many others, and these chapters make constructive suggestions in this area.

A chapter on the role of the construction industry advocates closer relations between that industry and civil defence planners. It is not obvious why this industry should merit special consideration, since presumably a number of others (eg. transport, food) have considerable relevance to the subject. This leads to a more general examination of war and the economy, but the position of civil defence in relation to economic activities is not well developed in the book.

Some of the staff at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University have struggled valiantly for some years to raise Australian consciousness about the need for greater civil defence efforts. This book, containing contributions from a number of writers at that university, continues this campaign. Dr O'Neill makes probably the
most telling comment on civil defence in Australia when he writes that a major civil defence program would imply a substantial revision of our defence priorities. Given uncertainty about what Australian civil defence might be defending against, and limited resources for defence, it seems inevitable that civil defence will remain a low priority item in Australian defence planning.

For that small and select group in Australia interested in the subject of civil defence, this book is a useful collection of the ideas of a number of writers. This does however mean that the book lacks a general theme which would give coherence to the whole presentation.

MARINES DON’T HOLD THEIR HORSES

Reviewed by Jeff Popple, Dept of Defence

In Marines Don’t Hold Their Horses the author cannot seem to make up his mind whether he is writing a serious biography or an exciting narrative. Unfortunately he fails at both.

The subject of Skidmore’s biography is Colonel Alan Warren CBE, DSC. Warren organised a series of Special Operation missions into occupied France immediately after Dunkirk and later in Malaya. Following the fall of Singapore he was taken prisoner by the Japanese and sent to the labour camps along the River Kwai. Skidmore has tried to liven up his biography of Warren by interspersing passages of description or comment with conversations that supposedly took place or with Warren’s thoughts on the events that were occurring. The accuracy of these conversations and thoughts is questionable, as Skidmore relies solely on Warren’s memory. Skidmore recounts Warren’s exploits in a dramatic style which is reminiscent of that found in a ‘Boy’s Own Annual’ or a ‘Biggles’ book. This style tries to generate excitement where none exists, but is too forced to be truly exciting. Skidmore further reduces the value of his book by not providing any notes on sources, we are to assume that all his information was garnered from interviews with Warren, and by not attempting to collaborate any of the statements made in the book.

The dust-cover of the book claims that it is a “tribute to a courageous man and a valuable addition to military history”. Both of these claims are very dubious. The military historian will learn nothing new from this account, although he might be surprised by the claim that thousands of Allied soldiers escaped via Sumatra following the fall of Singapore. The book’s only strength lies in its account of life in the labour camps, and this has been told before with more understanding and to greater effect.

The book is too sketchy to be a good biography, only vague references are made to Warren’s exploits in Norway in 1940 or to his posting at the China station before the War and we never learn what happened to his first wife. The book fails to be a tribute. Although Skidmore writes dramatically of the raids Warren organised into France and the ones against the Japanese in Malaya he cannot disguise the fact that they achieved very little. The French missions were incredibly inept and achieved nothing while one of the missions in Malaya was halted for a whole night because of distant lights which turned out to be fire-flies! (p57) Certainly Warren displayed great fortitude and endurance whilst a POW, however he is overshadowed by the dedication and bravery of the Australian army surgeon, Colonel Albert Coates.

Possibly Skidmore’s overly dramatic style of writing draws more criticism to the book than is deserved. Marine’s Don’t contains several interesting incidents, such as the evacuation of Penang (pp48-52), however, since they are presented without any supportive evidence and in too little detail they are of minimal value to the historian. The book is easy to read and most readers will complete it in one or two sittings, but whether it is worth the effort is another matter.