Board of Management
Commodore H. J. P. Adams, RAN (Chairman)
Captain H. J. Donohue, RAN
Colonel G. D. W. Irvine
Group Captain R. R. Tayles, AFC RAAF
Dr V. J. Kronenberg

Managing Editor
Mr M. P. Tracey

Illustrations
Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick, ACT

Defence Force Journal
Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:
The Managing Editor
Defence Force Journal
Building C, Room 4-25
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600
(062) 65 2682 or if unanswered 65 2999

Published by the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, for the Department of Defence.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1984
ISSN 0314-1039
R 82/1097(5) Cat. No. 83 1043 9

Printed by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne
Contents

2 Letters to the Editor

5 Morale on the Battlefield
   Major-General H. J. Coates, MBE

17 Rethinking ARES Retention
   Paul Oates, Department of Defence

29 A Most Extraordinary Wartime Coincidence
   Air Marshall Sir Edward Chilton, KBE, CB, RAF (Ret)

33 The Laws of War and the Civilian Population
   Major J. G. Rolfe, New Zealand Army

37 The Circle
   Lieutenant Colonel A. Pope, RAAOC

40 Review Article
   André G. Kuczewski

43 The Role of the Australian Army in New Guinea in 1944-45
   Bernadette McAlary, SA Health Commission

52 Japan's Reluctant Return to Military Power
   Major A. Weaver, RA Inf (Ret)

62 Book Review

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readily given by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Any reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.

The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and should not be construed as official opinion or policy.
Transport and Australia's Security

Dear Sir,

I am completing a Defence Fellowship at the Australian National University on 'Transport and Australia's Security', and seek anecdotes and experiences related to the use and organization of civil transport for defence purposes, and national emergencies and major disasters, in wartime and peace.

My subject covers road, rail, sea and air transport of people and goods: accounts of servicemen and women travelling by rail and road from the eastern States to Darwin during World War II, for example, illustrate one type of wartime account sought.

Written contributions should be sent to me at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, Canberra, 2600. A copy of my Study Outline is available on request.

ALAN HOWES
Lieutenant-Colonel

DFRDB Scheme

Dear Sir,

It is with much apprehension that I become involved in the DFRDB debate (again). I refer to the article on the DFRDB submitted by Captain Knowles (September/October 1983). I submitted letters through Navy channels to the anomalies of the DFRDB Scheme in November 1978. The replies to all these letters pointed out my narrow viewpoint including one from the then Minister of Defence, Mr Killen. I am enclosing a copy of the letter as it may be of interest to the readers of Captain Knowles' article.

I would also like to point out that I am a prime example of table 2 of the article. I have just completed 20 years service at the age of 35 at the rank of Lieutenant (RAN) (11 years service as a non-commissioned officer). If I had decided to resign I would have received a lower pension than the Major (in the example) whereas some of my original recruit contemporaries are Warrant Officers and therefore entitled to a larger pension. A point that was not shown in the example is that I have contributed more to the scheme than the Warrant Officers.

It was this anomaly, the so called 'loss of ability to retire after 20 years service without penalty' on promotion to an officer from the ranks that I based my submission.

I wish Captain Knowles lots of luck with his article but not to hold his breath waiting for favourable action.

LIEUT. JAMES MARRS, RAN

Copy of Minister's Letter

The Hon. J. D. Dobie, M.P.,
347 Port Hacking Road,
Caringbah, NSW 2229

Dear Mr Dobie,

I refer to your personal representations on behalf of Lieutenant J. C. Marrs of 3 Nyrang Place, Kirrawee, on what he sees as an anomaly in the early retirement provisions of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits (DFRDB) Act. He indicates that the DFRDB conditions which he describes may be a disincentive to officer candidature.

Pension, and many other considerations are undoubtedly taken into account by sailors seeking promotion to officer. These are of course matters which must be weighed by the individuals themselves and decided accordingly. The attraction of officer rank should not simply be the availability of a higher pension — whether this is after 20, 25, 30 or more years — but rather the assurance of continued employment for a long period as well as increased salary, status and responsibility.

By way of background, perhaps I should explain that prior to 1 October 1972 when members of the superseded DFRB scheme were transferred to the new DFRDB scheme, an officer was required as a general rule, to serve to his prescribed retiring age for rank (47 years for a Lieutenant) to qualify for pension benefits. The benefit payable on voluntary retirement before that age was a refund of contributions only.

This all changed with the advent of the DFRDB scheme when a basic entitlement to
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

pension arose at the twenty year service point, but with a penalty of three per cent of retirement pay for each year short of notional retiring age (42 years for a Lieutenant) for premature retirements at own request. This penalty had its origin in the report of the Joint Select Committee on DFRDB Legislation (The Jess Committee), which was tabled in the Parliament on 19 May 1972.

The Committee took the view that although retirement before retiring age (with pension) should not be prevented, it should not be actively encouraged. So it recommended a pension reduction of five per cent for each year short of completion of a current engagement for other ranks.

The Government of the day decided, however, on a significantly reduced scale of penalties for officers; and no penalties at all for other rank members because of their different terms and conditions of employment.

Officers have, of course, an assurance of continued employment up to an age which is their prescribed retiring age for rank. On the other hand, other rank members are employed on a term engagement basis and re-engagement is not a right. It seems to me therefore that the decision not to impose penalties on other rank members was a perfectly reasonable one in the circumstances.

It is true that isolated or narrow comparisons of the type made by Lieutenant Marrs can sometimes identify seeming anomalies or discrepancies as between individuals. However, to ascribe disadvantages on this basis ignores a proper comparison, which can be made only on the totality of the provisions of the DFRDB scheme. For instance, the progressive advantages accruing in the officer’s favour over periods of service beyond the twenty year point have not been addressed by your constituent.

It must be clearly understood that an officer who retires before attaining his notional retiring age for rank and incurs the pension penalty does so entirely of his own volition. He does not have to retire; and if he does, it is not unreasonable to expect that he must be fully aware of the consequences in the context of the DFRDB scheme.

Moreover, there is no relationship whatsoever between the amounts of contributions payable during service and the benefits payable following retirement. It would be extremely difficult, I believe, to find any two cases where members paid the same amount of contributions and received, in retirement, the same benefits.

Against that background, and having regard to the substance of the advice conveyed by Rear Admiral Griffiths and Rear Admiral Willis, I find I am unable to agree with Lieutenant Marrs that the benefits arrangements currently in force are in any way anomalous or unfair.

Yours sincerely,
D. J. KILLEN

Sniper Rifles

Dear Sir,

Like Warrant Officer A. H. Bowden Sniper Rifles — Defence Force Journal No 43 I know very little about sniping. What I do know I have gleaned from reading “With British Snipers to the Reich”, written by Captain C. Shore, formerly officer sniping instructor at the British Army of the Rhine Training Centre.

Without seeking to re-arouse the passions of those who would wish for greater recognition of the National Rifle Association of Australia by the Department of Defence, I would question Bert Bowden’s assertion that “our expertise in long-range rifle performance left us when the Defence Forces and the Rifle Associations parted some 25 years ago”. Moreover, if Captain Shore is to be taken at face value, a sniper, unless faced with a collective target, should not need to use a number of cartridges — “the first for the individual target should have been the last and only one!”

From this it can be seen that the 900 yard argument and the 10 shot capability of the L42A1 is irrelevant for sniping.

Shore’s ideal sniper rifle would be .276 calibre, light (without impairment of basic accuracy) and portable, using a high velocity cartridge, and fitted with a simple, light telescope sight of 4 to 5 power.

The flatter the trajectory the less error. If the sniper cannot guarantee getting in a killing shot at 500 to 400 yards then he must use his stalking ability to get closer.
Perhaps we have a confusion of thought. The incidence of terrorists in recent years has called for the development of a long-range executioner. This is somewhat different from the role of the sniper, which is to dominate No Man's Land and the enemy's forward defended localities. The sniper's task is to ensure that the enemy's movements are restricted as much as possible. In killing he should prefer Officers and NCOs so as to undermine the enemy's morale to the greatest extent. Naturally if the terrain is unsuitable for the sniper he is not likely to be effective, nor should he in fact be employed.

It is this similarity of roles I suggest which has given rise to the notion that long-range target shooting and sniping are somewhat synonymous. It would be interesting to know what Lee Harvey Oswald and the Jackal would have to say on this subject.

W. G. WRIGHT
Department of Defence

---

Dear Sir,

I am presently undertaking research for a book on the history of Mauritians in Australia. I hope also to emphasize some of the broader links between Australians and Mauritians in this book. I would therefore be grateful to hear from anyone who served with, or met, Mauritian "Pioneers" in the 8th Army in Tobruk or any other theatre.

I would also like to make contact with anyone with ideas or suggestions on the Mauritian contribution to Australia including the Defence Force. I have been told, for example, that there were a number of pilots of Mauritian origin who flew Hercules transports to Vietnam and Zimbabwe.

Any help that your readers may be able to offer would be very much appreciated.

Dr Edward Duyker,
"Glenn Robin",
167 Princes Hwy,
Sylvania, N.S.W., 2224

---

QUEEN'S SCARF OF HONOUR

Dear Sir,

Particulars of the New Zealand Award recently came to my notice and I wrote to enquire from the United Kingdom National Army Museum, whether particulars of this award were available. In reply, a copy of page 28 of the Army Journal for September, 1976 was sent, being a contribution by Sgt. N. C. Selway. I am able to add a little, from a Boer War Roll of Honour, 1903, in the library of the Gisborne Museum. This work was edited by the then Governor, Lord Ranfurly.

The number of a despatch by Field-Marshall Roberts, reporting the award to the New Zealand recipient, and presumably others, was given, being No. 27443 of 17.6.1902. Sergeant Selway was furnished with a subsequent rank of the New Zealand Man, who was Private Henry Donald Coutts of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles. My own enquiry arose from reading of H. D. Coutts in the unpublished autobiography of a friend of his, and from having been told many years ago, in the then Tanganyika Territory, about this unusual award, by the son of a recipient. This was in fact, the du Frayer mentioned in Sergeant Selway's note.

The U.K. National Army Museum also sent a copy of a typescript of a proposed preface to a work about the award, together with a table of contents. One of the sections was titled 'The New Zealand story and biography built up in 1956'. If this work, or perhaps an unpublished typescript, should be on record, I am sure that a copy of the section would be appreciated by the Queen Elizabeth II Memorial Museum, New Zealand Army, Waiouru, to which I am sending the papers received.

And if you should chance to have the address of the writer, A. G. H. du Frayer, I should be very grateful if you would pass my greetings to him, with congratulations on completion of a quest which seemed unattainable at the time when I knew him.

SIR ROBERT de Z. HALL
1 Lewis Street
Gisborne
New Zealand
MORALE ON THE BATTLEFIELD

By Major-General H. J. Coates, MBE

'I produced the article at the request of GOC Training Command, Major-General David Butler, DSO, originally as an address to his officers at a Seminar at Ingleburn on Sunday, 30 October 1983. I have left it in that form. I recognise that it relates to one part only of the Australian Defence Force — the land element. I wish to thank Lieutenant-Colonel Mick Eley, AA Psych Corps, RMC Duntroon, and Lieutenant-Colonel Des Mueller, RAA, CO/UI, School of Artillery, for their assistance in its preparation. Naturally, I am responsible for the thoughts expressed in it.'

Major-General John Coates

GENTLEMEN, the subject is Morale on the Battlefield. When Major-General David Butler asked me to speak on it, he, being the Commander that he is, told me what it was that he was looking for — not how to do it — on the basis that I would amaze you with my ingenuity. You will have to be the judge of whether or not this is so. If we achieve nothing else I hope we will all be prepared to air our views and share our experiences.

Gentlemen, we are rapidly eroding our professional experience base. There are very few of us here who fought in the Australian Army's last experience of mid-intensity conflict — Korea; and even within the Army itself those with Vietnam ribbons are declining rapidly, particularly among the NCOs. Moreover, morale can be a very personal subject, and there is something about our crusty Australian resolve which makes it sometimes difficult for us to expose our innermost thoughts. That should not be so for, as the nineteenth century French military philosopher Colonel Arland du Picq said —

"The human heart . . . is then the starting point for all matters pertaining to war . . . Let us then study man in battle, for it is he who really fights."

You will quickly be aware that much of this presentation is historically based. Yet we need to be careful, because some evidence can be misleading. It is quite common in modern war to find troops astonished by an order to withdraw, and of others who emerge from a victory under the impression that they have suffered a disaster. Some eyewitness accounts also may be unreliable. "... The only thing my grenadiers saw of Russia," said Napoleon, "was the pack of the man in front."

Nor do the popularly accepted ingredients of morale necessarily remain constant. One casualty has been patriotism, and one writer has contended that even as early as World War I, it had lost its value as a motivator. In our case, I believe that patriotism, which I interpret for my own purpose as pride in being an Australian, is not only important — it deserves to be fashionable. Moreover, in every part of the Army that I have been in, there have always been some highly committed men — however anachronistic their motivations may have seemed to others — who have had an effect quite disproportionate to their numbers. And, situations could yet arise for Australia in which influences that to some people are seen as irrelevant may yet come to have a powerful effect.
To a degree, Morale defies description. And, certainly, like Motivation — its close cousin — it is not easy to quantify. Yet you know when it is lacking. For then, even the simplest things go wrong. A unit without morale is soulless; its absence can be felt, almost tasted.

But while accepting that it is hard to quantify, we have also given it dimensions. We regard morale along with firepower and manoeuvre, as an essential element of combat power. Firepower and manoeuvre are the physical elements of manpower, weapons and equipment; morale is developed from the psychological state of man. In searching to dissect its make-up, I want to present three examples—which, in different ways, highlight its importance as an element of combat power.

In the last year of the Pacific War, the Australian Army became involved in a series of controversial campaigns; Gavin Long referred to them as 'The Final Campaigns'; a recent book has termed them 'The Unnecessary War'. In many respects, they were backyard operations, because the main thrust of the war against Japan had by then moved much further north to Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific. The operations were Aitape-Wewak, New Britain and Bougainville and, in what was then Borneo, three assault landings at Balikpapan, Brunei and Tarakan.

Many of the troops who took part in them were already veterans of several campaigns—the Western Desert, Greece, Crete, Syria and the earlier operations against the Japanese at places like Kokoda, Milne Bay and Buna. There were both Militia and AIF Divisions and, in the twelve months that these operations ran their course, although losses from enemy action were modest, losses from tropical diseases like malaria were exceptionally high. Moreover, the operations themselves were conducted in some of the worst terrain in the world.

In terms of public vituperation, active opposition to the campaigns never assumed the dimensions that were reached during the Vietnam War. Yet many people were strongly opposed and considered the campaigns a grievous waste of effort and lives.

This disquiet was felt by many of the troops, yet they soldiered on, generally uncomplainingly. Why? Some felt there was a real job to be done, some wanted to settle old scores with the Japanese, some were bored with training on the Atherton Tableland. Yet, for most of them, they went because their units went, and their mates were there.

One of them who was killed on Tarakan was Lieutenant Thomas Currie Derrick, VC, DCM, better known as "Diver" Derrick. There were many who thought that Derrick had done enough fighting. His original platoon commander thought so; so did the battalion medical officer. His adjutant was certain that Derrick's CO had written to the Military Secretary to urge that Derrick be retained to train troops in Australia. But the 2/48th Battalion was ordered overseas, and Derrick would have been nowhere else. He took a burst of machine fire while defending a knoll overlooking Tarakan airfield and died after two operations to save his life had failed.

The spirit of such men was epitomised by the observation that Brigadier "Tack" Hammer made of his own Brigade's morale that it—

"Could not have been better if it had been fighting the Alamein battle or capturing Tokyo. Yet every man knew as well as I knew that the operations were mopping-up and that they were not vital to the winning of the war. So they ignored the Australian papers, their relatives' letters advising caution, and got on with the job in hand, fighting and dying as if it was the battle for final victory."

Again, in Burma during the British second Arakan offensive the Japanese launched a counterstroke which infiltrated undetected between Messervy's 7th Indian Division and the 81st West African in the Kaladan Valley. The Japanese objectives were broadly: to overrun the 15th Corps Administrative Box and its supplies, cut the Ngakyedauk Pass which linked the two divisions (5th and 7th Indian), isolate both divisions from support from India and destroy them in detail. The battle of Ngakyedauk which followed was regarded by the then General Slim, commanding 14th Army, as the turning point in the campaign. Initially, the Japanese succeeded well enough; they took Taung Bazaar, cut the road south of Goppe Bazaar and, while Doi Force fixed the attention of the British from the front, they concentrated on the encirclement of 7th division and the capture of the Administrative Box. During this action they overran the 7th Divisional Headquarters.
Then ensued a severe dogfight among the camouflaged tents and dugouts of the headquarters and along the jungle paths through it. Clerks, orderlies, signallers and staff officers threw back yelling rush after rush, but when the Japanese mortars made the area untenable, Messervy gave the order for the whole headquarters to fight its way through the Japanese to the Administrative Box. After destroying equipment, ciphers and documents, they broke out in several groups, one led by the General himself. Casualties were numerous, but the bulk reached the Box and Messervy had a reduced headquarters working by evening. The enemy swarmed around the Box and to strengthen it Messervy called inside its perimeter two additional infantry battalions from an outlying position to act as counter-penetration troops.

In relation to the fighting for the Box itself, let me use General Slim's description:

"As their reinforcements arrived they (the Japanese) flung them into the attack . . . The fighting was everywhere hand-to-hand and desperate. The Administrative Box was our weak spot. Commanded from the surrounding hills at short range, crowded with dumps of petrol and ammunition, with mules by the hundred and parked lorries by the dozen, with administrative troops and Indian labour, life in it under the rain of shells and mortar bombs was a nightmare. Yet the flimsy defences held, held because no soldier — British, Indian or Gurkha — would yield; they fought or they died where they stood. How some of them died will be for ever a black blot on the so often stained honour of the Japanese Army. In the moonless dark, a few hundred yelling Japanese broke into the Box and overran the main dressing station, crowded with wounded, the surgeons still operating. The helpless men on their stretchers were slaughtered in cold blood, the doctors lined up and shot, the Indian orderlies made to carry the Japanese wounded back, and then murdered too. A counterattack next morning exacted retribution, but found the hospital a shambles, the only survivors a few wounded men who had rolled into the jungle and shammed dead. Such an outrage only steeled the resolve of our men. Typical was the spirit of a battery of medium artillery pent up in the Box. An air pilot reported he had seen their 5.5m guns firing at a range of four hundred yards as the enemy pressed home an attack. He thought their situation desperate. A wireless signal was sent to the gunners asking how things were with them. "Fine," was the answer, "but drop us a hundred bayonets!" The bayonets were dropped — and used."

Ultimately, the attacks lost momentum and the Japanese forces were destroyed. Of the 7,000 Japanese who penetrated the area around Ngakyedauk Pass, over five thousand bodies were found and counted, and many more lay undiscovered in the jungle. In Slim's words: "The March on Delhi via Arakan was definitely off."

Many elements of that action have importance for us even at this distance: in any defence of Australia, we are likely either to fight in the jungle, or in wide grasslands and scrub where the probability of enemy infiltration and penetration will be equally high, so we had better get used to the idea and its consequences for leadership and morale. It demonstrates that the "indirect approach", so beloved of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, can be nullified if those troops caught remain unshaken and are prepared to stand and fight while leaving manoeuvre and counter-penetration to other forces from outside; and it also demonstrates, with what tenacity, administrative and logistic troops can defend and hold.

These were the same units that had been kicked ignominiously out of Burma less than eighteen months before, and even ten months before had been worsted by the Japanese in the First Arakan offensive.

The degree of surprise by Egypt and Syria during the Yom Kippur War on the Israeli northern front was such that the brunt of the fighting in the first 24 hours was borne by the regular troops of the IDF while the reservists trickled in.

In the north of the Golan Heights, the basic concept was to rely on only 17 small fortified positions manned by about 15 soldiers, surrounded by mines and wire and backed up in each case by a platoon of tanks.

The Area of Operations included the TAP-LINE (the longest oil pipeline in the world).

On Friday, 5th October, the day before Yom Kippur, the Israeli force on the Golan was
equivalent to two Brigades (—), a total of 177 tanks and 11 batteries of guns against 5 Divisions, 900 tanks and 140 batteries of guns.

The edge of the Golan escarpment is in some places less than five miles and from the lip of the escarpment the various kibbutzim and other settlements can be reached by tank fire let alone by artillery fire.

Five principal routes lead down from the escarpment to the Sea of Galilee and Jordan Valley below. On the escarpment itself, a number of routes connected positions behind the Israeli battlefront; one of these, a very obvious route follows the TAPLINE, which starts at Bahrein and traverses the 1200 miles to the Mediterranean in Lebanon.

Soon after the Syrians attacked, while Israeli shooting was very accurate, it was quickly apparent that the two Brigades (—) would be very hard pressed.

A young officer from a kibbutz in the Brigade Area named Lieutenant Greengold (nicknamed Zwicka), hitchhiked to the Barak Brigade HQ at Nafekh and asked if he could help. He was told that four tanks of which three were damaged were about to arrive. They would be repaired and he would be given command. He helped remove two dead bodies from one of them, and was then told to get moving along the TAPLINE route to make contact with the Brigade Commander who had gone forward. He was also told that he and his four tanks would be known as 'Force Zwicka'.

As he drove south-east down the TAPLINE, he came into contact with a Syrian force moving in the opposite direction. This surprised him because he thought he would be meeting his Brigade Commander. But he advised the Brigade Commander that he was opening fire and entering the battle. He had set out at 9.00 p.m.

From then on, non-stop for the next twenty hours, sometimes with an accompanying tank or two, but mostly on his own, he waged an incredible battle with Syrian tanks and APC odds of 50:1. At 9.20 he destroyed the lead tank in a Syrian column. Half an hour later, he observed a column of 30 Syrian tanks accompanied by trucks driving along in perfect formation "as if on a parade ground". Allowing them to close, he hit the first tank at 20 yards range. He then proceeded to play a lethal game of hide and seek with the remaining tanks up the TAPLINE route and, in the process, he destroyed ten of them. The Syrian contact reports indicated that they thought they were up against a sizeable force. That Syrian force withdrew.

Throughout the night and next day he was forced by damage to change tanks several times. He was blown out of his tank once with fairly severe burns but got into another and carried on. In the process, he witnessed the destruction of several accompanying tanks, including a Tank Battalion Commander, whom he had joined for a short time. By accurate fire, he saved the lives of many other people in a number of engagements. During this time, the Brigade Commander whom he set out initially to join had also been killed.

By this time the Israeli forces in the southern Golan were down to 12 or 14 tanks against 600 Syrian. Zwicak had accounted for between 20 or 30 on his own. After 20 hours, not surprisingly, he ran out of steam. His firing became indiscriminate and wild, and he was evacuated medically.

It seems almost unnecessary to say that what he did in that 20 hours was of the greatest heroism. But, in many respects, his actions were a microcosm of the total IDF effort: there were many Zwicks in the first 48 hours of that war. Indeed, while I have highlighted his actions, I could equally well have highlighted the actions of the defenders of the seventeen small posts who held their ground, reported, and inflicted what damage they could on the enemy. It also illustrates two other things: incentive and stress. By his actions, incentive, in the sense of defence of his homeland (almost his own kibbutz) was obvious; but remember the French had similar incentive in May 1940, but their crisis was not answered in the same way. Stress is now a greater factor than ever before because fighting is and will be round the clock. It was more aggravated for the Israelis because their equipment for night fighting was rudimentary; in contrast, the Soviet-supplied equipment of the Syrians was very good.

In each of the examples I have just related an almost indefinable quality has existed which has sustained and inspired the men involved, and lifted them to incredible efforts. The circumstances were different in each case yet each time there existed a high degree of courage, determination and commitment to the
task. I believe that much of the success of each of those groups was accounted for by morale, and through it motivation to fight. But in each case morale probably existed because of emphasis on different things. In the case of the Australians in those final campaigns from Bougainville to Borneo, I am sure that the recognition of "We're all in it together" contributed to a high level of group cohesion, involving mutual trust and confidence, and based on experience, training and discipline. In the second example, in Burma, there was no doubt that it was leadership which contributed to victory in the battle of Ngakyedauk, and it was leadership based on the realisation of the importance of morale. In the third vignette, where the Israelis were repelling an attack in their own front yard, it is the contribution of commitment and belief in a cause which stands out as the basis for the high level of morale and motivation of Zwicka and his group, and all the groups like them who fought so effectively in that war.

So morale can be based on a number of things. The factors I have just touched on in my three examples keep recurring in writings on morale on the battlefield, whether they be military or academic accounts. With this in mind, I now want to look more closely at morale on the battlefield.

What makes up morale? For our purposes, it is principally a group phenomenon, and I think Field Marshal Montgomery summed up what it is all about by relating morale to two fundamental characteristics of the group — cohesion and esprit de corps. It is worth examining each of these components in turn.

In 1946, in his book Morale in Battle, Montgomery made this distinction:

Cohesion, he said, involves feelings of belonging and solidarity, gained from common experiences, and shared goals and values. It is a bond which holds a group together, and it exists at the small group level. [The level which the psychologists call the primary group.]

Esprit, on the other hand, binds small, primary groups together, and generally involves larger and more formal groups or, in Army terms, regimental or unit-sized groups. Esprit involves feelings of pride, unity of purpose, and adherence to an ideal which the unit-sized group usually represents.

So it is cohesion which binds individuals together, and esprit which merges them into a unit with common goals and values. Together, these make up what we call morale. If we are to operate effectively in war we, as leaders and trainers, must understand both what morale is all about, and how morale can effectively be generated, then sustained on the battlefield.

As I have just implied, cohesion and esprit don’t start on the battlefield. If they are to exist they must, in most cases anyway, be generated and fostered well before then. I intend to discuss the place of training in the establishment of morale but I should also point out that there are other factors which can assist in the fostering of morale. Organisational factors can play an important part, and I will dwell on these for a moment.

It is well known to most commanders, and reinforced by studies in the behavioural science area, that cohesion can be enhanced by attention to organisational factors. Anthony Kellett, in a publication sponsored by the Canadian Department of National Defence, has isolated some of these factors. One of these is compatibility. It is perhaps trite to say that a group will not be cohesive unless its members are compatible. But unless a unit is organised so as to minimize the opportunity for interpersonal clashes, and to position side-by-side those who work best together, the job of fostering cohesion will be well-nigh impossible. Compatibility is one organisational factor which cannot be ignored. Turbulence is another.

The turbulence in a unit caused by the inevitable continuous rotation of personnel is a factor which must be controlled. It has been Australian Army policy in peacetime, and sometimes also in war, to rotate personnel individually, rather than in unit or sub-unit blocks. Group cohesion is bound to be affected by this practice. I am not suggesting that this policy is wrong, but I am firm in my conviction that unless unit commanders and, through them, unit officers and NCOs, are constantly reminded of the disruptive effect turbulence can have on group cohesion, we cannot hope to sustain positive morale. Many of you would be aware that the US Army, for example, is so sensitive to the effects of personnel turbulence on unit cohesion and morale that a peacetime manning policy based on cohort replacement has recently been introduced.
While I am not in a position to comment on the success of the American New Manning System, I am quite confident that in Australia, problems of personnel turbulence can be overcome in other ways so long as sensitivity and awareness is incorporated into our leadership and training practices.

A third organisational factor which can affect group cohesion is that of competition. Peter Watson, in his book "War on the Mind", draws attention to competition between groups of American and Australian soldiers in Vietnam, concluding that controlled emphasis on competition, stressing different military practices and customs, was a great help to cohesion on both sides, and that it is possible for this to have a positive effect on fighting efficiency. Conversely, of course, excessive emphasis on competition, at any level, can lead to internal friction and stress and negative effects.

A fourth organisational effect on group cohesion is the size of the group. The smaller the group the easier it is to establish and maintain cohesion. Some American researchers have claimed that a company-sized group is the smallest group with which soldiers will readily identify. However, more recent research by US and British psychiatrists, looking at World War II experience, has established what I find to be a much more realistic conclusion. Soldiers will identify more readily with a platoon or even a section-sized group than they will with a company or battalion. It is quite clear from the research I am quoting that in time of combat, when stress is greater, identification and cohesion becomes strongest within smaller groups. The importance of junior NCOs, namely section commanders, cannot be underestimated therefore, in any consideration of battlefield cohesion and morale. To a private soldier the most immediate source of leadership and support is the Corporal and it is easier to understand, when this is considered, why both Napoleon and Marlborough were nicknamed "Corporal" by their troops. We might flatter ourselves as Commander Officers, Adjutants or even RSMs, in thinking we are central in the minds of our soldiers, but when the pressure is on we are distant, vague figures compared to the section commander.

If we accept cohesion an esprit as fundamental to morale, we must recognise that cohesion is most effectively fostered at the section or platoon level. However, esprit being the cement which binds cohesive groups together, becomes more directly the domain of the commander, adjutant, RSM and senior officers.

The British Army has applied these two principles in its regimental system for many years. The heavy emphasis on tradition as a unifying force has made easier the tasks of building cohesion and maintaining esprit de corps, and has lent the British regimental system something of a magical aura in this regard. Baynes, in his book Morale: A Study of Men and Courage, looked at a British battalion in World War I. It was characterised by what he described as "monastic" officers for whom the Regiment was the most important thing in their lives, and NCOs who spent their entire careers in the same regiment. This contributed to such cohesion within the ranks and such strong esprit de corps that men characteristically would put the good of the Regiment ahead of their own lives.

One advantage of the emphasis on tradition is that association and identification with past glories can maintain some measure of self-respect and pride within a unit, even while it is going through a period of relatively undistinguished achievement.

Looked at from this point of view, it could be said that we are fortunate in Australia to have inherited many of the aspects of the British regimental tradition. And, focus on our own traditions, if wisely fostered, can go a long way towards building and maintaining in our units those necessary characteristics of cohesion, esprit, and morale.

Of course, tradition can take us only part of the way. Morale, particularly on the battlefield, sooner or later depends on performance, and in order to perform well in the final analysis we need to be well-disciplined, well-trained, and well-led. It is the morale aspects of those three things: discipline, training and leadership, that I want to address in turn. Without these three elements, morale on the battlefield will not exist.

First, discipline. As well as being important to any fighting force for more obvious reasons, discipline is critical to the building of mutual trust and confidence. In the early part of a soldier's training in particular, this is epitomised by a proper emphasis on drill. Lord Gort, who commanded the British Expeditionary
Force in World War II, and who had won a Victoria Cross in World War I, saw drill as providing a feeling of unison and of moving together, characteristics which are necessary to help overcome fear in battle. Prior to World War I, training in the British Army revolved around drill and discipline. This was typified by what was called "pokey drill", which was the repeated practice — handling of weapons in barracks. The constant loading and unloading of drill rounds, week after week for several years, was undoubtedly taken to an extreme, but it has been suggested that it was this practice which was a major contributor to the superb weapon handling of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914, where British soldiers carried out the correct actions automatically, however frightened they may have been in battle. Captain Robert Graves, who instructed reinforcement drafts at Harfleur in 1916 refers in his memoirs (Goodbye to All That, 1973) to the emphasis on arms drill during training. It was an accepted fact then, he says, that courage by itself did not make a good soldier; neither did skill at drill. But consistently the best soldiers and those who contributed most to morale and reliability were those who combined courage with skill at drill. I am referring not just to formal foot and arms drill, but weapon training drills, action or contact drills, and battle drills. Drill not only promotes high morale: it also reflects it.

Drill for its own sake can be over-emphasised. But drill as a means of building individual confidence, and with it mutual confidence and trust, is an essential basis for morale.

I can relate to you one example from within the Royal Military College of the way in which drill can serve to develop cohesion, confidence and morale. Many of you would be familiar with the practice at RMC of separating junior cadets from the rest of the Corps during their first five weeks, while they are instructed in basic military skills and procedures. During that time Fourth Class (i.e. First Year) cadets are regarded by the rest of the Corps of Staff Cadets as novices. At the end of this five-week induction period, Fourth Class cadets parade by themselves and are ceremonially awarded the Corps lanyard. As they march off the parade it has become traditional for the senior classes to applaud Fourth Class. The feeling of pride within the junior class at that moment is most obvious — they are fairly bursting with it.

At that point, several things have been achieved. The drill itself contributes confidence and mutual trust in their own abilities. This is formally recognised by the award of the lanyard which is a symbol, for the first time, of belonging. And all this is cemented, irrevocably, by the public recognition and acceptance by the rest of the Corps of Staff Cadets. The contribution of that parade to morale and esprit within RMC, and within Fourth Class in particular, is very significant.

The Royal Military College, while I am on the subject, is the source of another illustration which draws attention to the Army attitude to discipline in a changing society. Discipline, as I have said, is essential within any military force. It introduces certainty, trust, and confidence, and is essential if soldiers are to perform effectively in periods of great stress. But society outside the Army does not automatically accept such a requirement for discipline as it may have in the past. At RMC, as you would know, cadets train in a military environment and study in an academic environment. The link between Athens and Sparta is a contradictory one in many ways, and nowhere more clearly than in the minds of RMC cadets. On the one hand, they are quite rightly encouraged to question everything in the pursuit of academic knowledge. On the other hand, of course, the military ethic demands immediate obedience and conformity. This conflict is not exclusive to RMC, however. It exists everywhere where our officers and soldiers wish to be part of a wider and more liberal society outside the Army. But, however much there may seem to be an irrevocable conflict between the two value systems, I believe they can exist side by side. It does mean subordination to some extent of questioning and liberal values. But only where necessary, and I believe it is our role to continually remind not only our soldiers, but also our officers and NCOs of what military discipline is all about, and where its limits lie.

A quotation which sums up what is required applies just as well today as it did in 1871 when it appeared in British Army Regulations: "Every order given by a supervisor must be obeyed at once, and without hesitation. Its propriety must not be disputed, or questioned at the moment. If any individual feels himself
Discipline should be a source of pride, and not a basis for antagonism. If handled positively, discipline serves to foster cohesion, uniformity and personal pride. It should serve to emphasise in a positive way the differences between the military and civilian ethic, as well as serving as a basis for unit efficiency and effective unit performance.

Moreover, my own experience in the Army is that it is not possible to have partial discipline. You cannot be selective about discipline. Either you have it or you do not. If people are slack about saluting, bearing and movement around the area, you can bet the same unit is slack about care and cleanliness of weapons, maintenance of vehicles, health and hygiene, and other facets of its life. Moreover, it is a fact that soldiers prefer to work in an organisation where standards are high and where discipline is firm but understanding.

At the basis of discipline, of course, is self-discipline, and it was General Wavell in 1953 who said: “At its best, discipline is instilled and maintained by pride in oneself, in one’s unit, in one’s profession, and only at worst by a fear of punishment.” Discipline should be an integral part of the development of morale, and never a means of destroying it.

In addition to discipline, a second characteristic which is essential to performance, and therefore related to morale, is of course training. I don’t intend to discuss training at any great length because this is being addressed in detail elsewhere. But I will say a couple of things about training as it relates specifically to morale.

The first point has to a large extent already been covered, and that is thorough training in essential skills. The Army Training System I know recognises that those skills both at an individual and a group level which require error-free performance under stress need to be thoroughly learned to the point where they are performed automatically. Weapon handling and contact drill are two cases in point. Practice and automatic performance leads to confidence, and in general I believe we train effectively at this level, and always have.

The second part relates to confidence itself. If a unit knows it is good, morale and esprit will tend to flow naturally from there. Two clear indicators of how sharp a unit is in the minds of its soldiers are its standard of discipline and drill, which I have just mentioned, and its level of physical fitness.

Moreover, physical fitness, as well as being an important aid to confidence-building, also has other advantages. It can be of indirect benefit by allowing people to sustain a high level of performance longer, thereby combating the effects of stress, or it can be of direct benefit. Some time ago, when I was researching the performance of various national units during the Malayan Emergency, I was struck by the fact that in terms of the number of enemy kills-per-contact the Fijian Battalions outperformed everybody else. I asked a previous commander of 63 Gurkha Brigade, in which the Fijians had served, why this was so. His answer was devastatingly simple. He said that “A Fijian with a Bren gun could run faster than a Chinaman for his life.” (You will recall that during the Emergency most of the CTs or Communist Terrorists, i.e. the enemy, were of the Chinese race.)

Furthermore, a well-trained unit which knows it is well-trained is bound to perform better on the battlefield than one which doubts its own ability. For this reason I believe we must not lose sight of the value of praise and other methods of positively reinforcing good performance. It is easy to find fault and criticise during training but we all, I think, would recognise that recognition of good performance is one of the most effective means of motivating soldiers and building esprit and morale at all levels.

My third point in relation to training relates to the second, and it has to do with motivation in training. In a war situation, when we are training for imminent battle, there is no problem with motivation, although emphasis on positive, confidence-building motivation is still important. But in peacetime, it is not surprising that many soldiers lose motivation, switch off, and consequently become ineffective. I suspect that this problem of motivation, particularly in peacetime, has been given less emphasis at Army level than it deserves, and consequently it is a temptation for the commander or the trainer to gloss over “poor attitude” as someone else’s problem when, in fact, it should be conscientiously attacked at all levels. Fluctuating motivation, I might add, is no less a
problem at the Royal Military College than it is in the units with which you might be associated. In peacetime, this is a widespread potential problem which must, I believe, be faced on a wide front and, as I have said, at all levels.

This leads me to my third fundamental characteristic of morale on the battlefield. The first two I have discussed, these being discipline and training. The third is leadership.

In a controversial book published in 1978, entitled *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*, the US authors Gabriel and Savage maintained that the United States Army's commitment in South Vietnam was marked by a massive failure of leadership on the part of the officer corps. While I cannot agree with everything they put forward, their argument deserves attention, not least because it draws attention to the fact that this very failure of leadership on the battlefield coincided with the most intense academic focus on leadership in the US since World War II. If one accepts the basic assumption made by Gabriel and Savage that there was a failure of leadership in the US forces in Vietnam, then the obvious question arises. Why, particularly when so much time and energy was being spent studying leadership in the US.

It has been suggested that there was the lack of a cause and a consequent lack of commitment to the task amongst US forces. The war was increasingly unpopular at home; troops, largely conscript, knew they had only limited tours of duty and officers in particular in many cases saw their tour of duty primarily as a means of having their ticket punched before they returned home to pursue their military careers again. While, if true, all of these factors would undoubtedly have contributed to poor cohesion and low morale, there was possibly a much more fundamental reason, identified not only by Gabriel and Savage, but others, and that was a lack of commitment by officers to their soldiers, and a lack of personal commitment to the tasks soldiers were being asked to perform. Personal commitment of this sort is not an academic concept. It is recognised by any soldier of any rank who has experienced it. In fact, well over two thousand years ago the Greek Xenophon is quoted as saying: “...An officer will not be regarded with contempt by those he leads if whatever he may have to preach he shows himself best to perform.”

Gabriel and Savage take this further by accusing senior US officers of avoiding combat risks, and taking advantage of the sophisticated communication and transportation devices available on the increasingly automated battlefield to distance themselves physically from their troops. In sociological terms, they said:

“In Vietnam the record is absolutely clear: the officer corps simply did not die in sufficient numbers or in the presence of their men often enough to provide the kind of martyrs that all primary sociological units, especially those under stress, require if cohesion is to be maintained.”

By way of comparison with Vietnam, of the 781 Israeli casualties in the Six-Day War in 1967, almost half were officers. We sometimes observe that Israeli commanders expose themselves too much, the implication being that we would be more prudent, but this may be exactly why they are so successful as an Army.

While casualty rates certainly are not known by soldiers, and bearing in mind that the statistics used by Gabriel and Savage have been disputed, it is clear that the impression soldiers gain of the preparedness of their officers to expose themselves to the same or greater risks is of great importance. Apart from this, there are two other reasons why officers in particular must identify themselves with their troops. Meyer Teichmann, an Israeli psychologist with the Army during the Yom Kippur War, noted that while the leader's control over communications and tactics make him recognised by his troops, when they have been under sustained operational pressure for some time, if he is not capable of providing them with close emotional support, his position will be usurped by the emergence of closer, informal leaders in the group. And second, Correlli Barnett points out that leadership in combat does not need to be imposed like authority — it is actually welcomed and wanted by the led. Everybody wants someone to look up to when he's scared. If the formal leader is not there, or cannot meet those expectations, he will lose whatever real authority he may have had.

I think the point which emerges when we look at leadership and its effects on morale on the battlefield is a simple one which is very basic, though it seems it can be easily over-
looked. If the leader identifies with his men, and is committed to them as well as to the task, and if he leads by example, he will find his men beside him, fighting with him, and for him.

But it was Field Marshal Slim, I think, who pointed out that it is not just the men who fire the weapons who deserve the leader's personal commitment and identification. Of no less importance are the cooks, the clerks, and the telephonists, who must feel that their efforts are contributing positively to the success of the battle. And more importantly it is those soldiers who need to know that their importance is recognised — particularly by the leaders at the top. To be effective, morale must be contributed to and shared by all; there must be no rotten apples in the barrel, and it is one of the responsibilities of the leader to demonstrate that each of the apples in the barrel is of equal importance.

When I started on leadership, a moment ago, I mentioned in passing that there was probably a lack of a cause and commitment amongst US forces in Vietnam. It is difficult to measure the influence of any one factor on morale, but most writers seem to agree that belief in a cause is, up to a point, a powerful motivating and unifying factor. Conversely, and perhaps even more importantly, if there is no cause it will be very hard to develop commitment to the task, as the US experience in Vietnam may have shown.

You will recognise of course that the dimensions of leadership and also the principal factors that contribute to it can be, and indeed frequently are, interpreted and expressed differently by different leaders. Slim, for example, identified a number of foundations of morale, foremost of which was belief in a cause, or to use his words, "a great and noble object", whose achievement must be vital and to which each soldier must feel he is contributing. As well as this basis for morale, which Slim saw as a spiritual foundation, he identified an intellectual foundation, involving knowledge or belief by the soldier that the "great and noble object" is attainable, knowledge that his unit is efficient, and confidence in his leaders. The third foundation of morale, according to Slim, is a material one, which can be summarised by the statement, "Look after your men." If weapons and equipment, and living and working conditions, are as good as they can be, and the soldiers know this, then the third, or material foundation is satisfied.

There is some doubt about just how significant a cause is once the battle starts. Montgomery believed that men don't advance over fire-swept ground in the conscious pursuit of an ideology. The American writer Dollar put it in a similar way when he said:

"... The soldier in battle is not forever whispering, 'My cause, my cause.' He is too busy for that. Ideology functions before battle, to get the man in, and after battle by blocking thoughts of escape."

Wavell was also quoted as saying: "A man does not flee because he is fighting in an unrighteous cause; he does not attack because his cause is just." Wavell believed that good leadership was the most important factor in maintaining cohesion and morale during the battle.

Yet I am inclined to believe that Slim's emphasis on commitment to a cause is important in any sustained build-up to a battle, or in any situation where action is prolonged. The unbelievable doggedness with which Germany's SS Panzer troops fought on and on in Russia must be at least partly explained by their commitment.

Their cause may not have been "great and noble", to use Slim's words, but it was undoubtedly something they believed in, and a basis for their sustained commitment. But, for them to keep going as they did, there had to be exceptional leadership and cohesion at all levels within that force, as well as the customary discipline of the German race.

So I think that attainment of that extra inspirational component of leadership is possible if attention is paid to both leading by example, and committing oneself and one's soldiers to a cause.

Before I attempt to pull all this together and relate it to the Australian experience and the future, I think I should make a point about the nature and significance of stress on the modern battlefield, and its relationship to morale. Much has been written on this subject, and I think I only need to point out that with the quantum changes in technology and weaponry, even in the last decade, it is obvious that battlefield stress will be an increasing problem. Much more terrifying firepower, round the clock fighting, and the availability of quicker,
more comprehensive, but more confusing information on the battlefield together creates the potential for much more devastating effects on individual and group morale than we have experienced before. We need to concentrate, in my view, in three areas if we are to maintain battlefield morale.

First, we must work hard to build up high levels of morale and confidence before the battle. Second, by attention to good leadership and effective training, we must produce units capable of withstanding, as far as possible, the negative influences on morale which the modern battlefield will surely involve. And, third, we should pay some attention to post-battle procedures which work to alleviate the after-effects of stress and help units to continue effectively in the field. While I won’t go into this now, I believe the Israeli experience of having battlefield support elements of medical and psychological specialists at the battle front is worth further examination.

Looking as objectively as I guess an Australian can at our record, and at our current state of training, I am optimistic that we have the basis for effective performance in the type of war we might expect between now and the end of the 1990s. And I mean by that effective performance both in military and human terms. But, we are going to have to work at it. Since World War II our structure and operational involvement has focussed on limited, small-scale, low-intensity warfare, to brigade level. Now we’re going to have to think on an army basis. We have had the advantage in one sense of having to make the most of a small force. And I suppose that advantage, for want of a better word, will be with us for a long time. The advantage is, of course, that we have to get the most from our resources, including our manpower, and we don’t, in most cases, suffer from the disadvantages associated with planning, operating and training on a massive scale. I think we are closer to our soldiers than many countries can afford to be, and this coupled with our inheritance of much of the British-type tradition and regimental esprit, puts us in a much more favourable position when it comes to the development of cohesion, esprit, and morale. One danger, however, is that we will lose sight of the basic elements so essential to maintaining morale in a future battlefield. We must not get so sophisticated in communications, transport, and weaponry that we forget the importance of the groups of men and women who man this equipment and fight with it. Although there is much we can still learn from scientific advances in the areas of human behaviour, leadership, and morale, and we certainly should not ignore those, we should continue to work from the basis we have established, and established soundly, in the Australian Army. And I return to the three fundamentals of discipline, training and leadership.

Although my remarks have largely been directed towards morale on the battlefield, I think it is evident that the principles which apply there apply equally to morale in peacetime. In some ways, in fact, we may have to work harder to sustain morale when there is no obvious cause, or battle in sight, but the principles of discipline, sound training and leadership apply just as much in peace as they do in war.

Our force is founded on discipline. We must be sensitive to the fact that all ranks must also take their place as members of a changing society, but we must work to incorporate sound and positive discipline into a force which exists within that society. Drill is fundamental to discipline; not merely square-bashing drill but also effective battle drills and deployment drills in the skills that most matter on the battlefield. And our training itself must consciously take into account the development and maintenance of motivation, as well as cohesion. One integral part of this, both in training and later, is the place of positive reinforcement and encouragement. Without that we cannot hope to foster self-esteem and confidence, so important to morale.

And finally leadership at all levels must be oriented towards personal involvement and group cohesion. If a leader cannot lead from the front, and demonstrate both in training and in battle that he is first amongst his men, he will not be effective and his effect on morale and esprit in that group will be counterproductive. With this in mind we must be very careful not to allow technological advances and sophisticated equipment to come between a leader at any level and his men.

I believe the Australian Army is fortunate to be able to draw on its history, its traditions, its size, and the quality of its men when it enters any future conflict. But whether we stay
effective in the 1990s and beyond will depend not on fortune but on how we prepare ourselves, now.

REFERENCES


CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

AIR FORCE GROWTH PACED TO CAPABILITIES. Aviation Week and Space Technology; 23 May 83: 61+(4p) Planning by the Saudi Air Force to upgrade its aerial capabilities has been predicated on establishing a solid training base and on limited skilled manpower that dominates weapons acquisition.

THE POST-NUCLEAR ERA. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE ARMS MUST CHANGE. Edwards, John: Arms, Tom: Wilson, Andrew Bulletin; 11 Oct 83: 107+(6p) Three related articles. “The unthinkable has happened” — the superpowers have put aside a defence posture based solely on nuclear weapons. The first article describes changing policies and what they mean to Australia. The second article — “Hi-tech horror to supplant N-weapons” — describes research into “smart” non-nuclear weaponry. The third article — “the powerful case for true GRIT” — recalls the old acronym for Graduated Reciprocation in Tension — Reduction.

SOVIET ARMS TRANSFER POLICY AND THE DECISION TO UPGRADE SYRIAN AIR DEFENCES. Roberts, Cynthia A. Survival; Jul/Aug 83: 154-164 Suggests Soviet policy in the move to equip Syria, a non-Warsaw Pact country, with two Soviet manned, long range, high altitude SA-5 missile batteries never before deployed with Soviet forces outside the Warsaw Pact.

U.S. OPTIONS — AND ILLUSIONS — IN CENTRAL AMERICA. Jordan, David C. Strategic Review; Spring 82: 53-62 Although it has mustered a much more realistic understanding, than its predecessor, of the basic forces and stakes in the accelerating battle for the Caribbean-Central American region, the Reagan administration appears caught in a mire of regional developments, competing options and domestic attitudes, including those of potent special issues.

Major General Henry John Coates graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1955 and was commissioned in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps. Following regimental duty with the 1st Armoured Regiment at Puckapunyal, he served as Adjutant 10 Light Horse in 1958-60, followed by a further tour of duty with 1st Armoured Regiment.

He was a Company Commander and Instructor in Military History at RMC Duntroon from 1963 to 1965 and then served for two years on exchange with the British Army in Germany as a Tank Squadron Commander in the Royal Scots Greys.

He attended the Royal Military College, Queenscliff in 1968 and served in South Vietnam in 1970-71 as Officer Commanding B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment and as GSO II (operations) of the 1st Australian Task Force. For his service in Vietnam, he was made a Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE).

He commanded the Corps of Staff Cadets at RMC Duntroon in 1971-74 and then attended the Australian Joint Services Staff College.

He served on exchange with the US Army at Fort Hood Texas in 1975-76 and on return to Australia was promoted Colonel and appointed Colonel (Operations) HQ Field Force Command. He was promoted to Brigadier in 1979 and has since served as Director General Operations and Plans at Department of Defence (Army Office) and as Deputy Chief of Operations until February 1983 when he took the appointment as Commandant of the Royal Military College with the rank of Major General. He attended the Royal College of Defence Studies, UK in 1981.

Major General Coates holds a BA Degree in History and Economics from the University of WA, a BA (Hons) Degree in Oriental and Russian History from ANU, and an MA (Military History) from ANU.

He is currently Head of Australian Defence Staff, Washington, USA.
By Paul Oates, Department of Defence

Introduction

During the last decade, a substantial amount of investigation and research has been conducted by independent committees, the Department of Defence and some elements of the Australian Army, into the role, functions and problems of our volunteer citizen Army. These initiatives have often been mirrored in other Western countries who wish to enhance their defence potential by the provision of citizen soldier reserves, and yet have difficulty in maintaining these forces.

Problems with Retention of Reserve Personnel

The establishment of any efficient and effective Army Reserve, is usually frustrated by the problems encountered with the recruitment, training and retention of volunteer personnel. Even the effects of providing sufficient resources, to achieve recruiting targets and to partially train those recruited, will largely be eroded away by the disinterest, non-attendance and resignation (ie 'wastage') of members of the Army Reserve (ARES). The effect of wastage, or the lack of retention of trained and effective personnel, may be seen to be a very, if not the decisive factor in maintaining a credible force.

Reasons for Wastage

In every community group of volunteers, the same basic essentials will dictate whether that group either expands, remains constant or declines. Some of these basic essentials are community involvement, recognition by others, pride in one’s own ability and a sense of achievement and purpose.

Do these factors relate to the known problem of wastage in the ARES however? This article will discuss some, but by no means all the possibilities, of how the general public (who provides the volunteers), and the volunteers themselves, could consider the ARES in a different light to that of the regular soldier (ARA).

This article is not intended to provide anything drastically new or significantly different. It merely seeks to highlight some commonly accepted principles of human nature.

Wastage Effects

It is an undeniable fact that the Army Reserve has over the last ten years experienced an average resignation or discharge rate of 35.8% of the overall force. It has also been suggested by investigating bodies (1974 Millar Report) that even the monthly statistics on ARES numbers may in fact include a percentage of ‘non effective’ or those who have not maintained their efficiency.

The Traditional Role and Character of Citizen Forces in Australia

‘Part-time soldiering in Australia goes back almost to the beginning of European settlement.’

Prior to the 1850s, groups of civilian volunteers were occasionally formed to counter various internal threats such as bushrangers, aborigines or the possibility of an Irish convict revolt. In 1854 the outbreak of the Crimean War saw the withdrawal of part of the imperial garrison and led to the creation of Volunteer Forces in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. Part-time forces have been in continuous existence since then.
A Tradition of Volunteer Service

A history of volunteer forces being raised in Australia for overseas service had beginnings with contingents of Australians serving in the Maori Wars of New Zealand in 1863.

In 1890, the last of the British troops were withdrawn and a steady but increasing acceptance was seen for a small, regular, caretaker, specialist, instructional force, backed by unpaid volunteers (provided only with arms) for the passive defence of local areas and a paid militia assigned for active operations.

Further examples of Australia’s history of military involvement overseas were the New South Wales contingent to the Sudan in 1885 and the relatively substantial forces committed by all the Australian Colonies to the Boer War 1899-1901.

Federation of the six Australian Colonies saw the amalgamation of the existing regular (mainly garrison artillery) and citizen forces under a single defence system and under a Federal Government.

The First World War (1914-18) and its prodigious requirement for uniformed men, first raised the spectre of conscription. It was the case then, as there is now, a latent mistrust and dislike in the Australian community for the use of conscription to flesh out Australia’s armed forces in time of war. This factor will be discussed later in this article.

During the two World Wars, there was little change to the main concept of reliance on citizen forces to provide for the defence of Australia. Regular forces were merely to provide an immediate deterrent while the main army was mobilizing. It was not until 1949 that the Defence Act provided for regular infantry.

The Role of the Army Reserve

The role of the Australian Army Reserve (ARES) is:

a. as part of the defence of Australia and its interests in time of war and defence emergency, and

b. with the Regular Army, to provide the basis for expansion of the Australian Army.

It has been observed that:
"The object of a reserve military force is primarily, with minimum disruption to the country’s economic and social life, to provide a force capable of being committed to operations more quickly than if it were untrained, even though it will still require a period of training to bring it to operational efficiency."

Contention may be found however, when trying to reach agreement on what sort of reserve military force the ARES should be and how capable it must be, when required. Recent experience, has shown that the ARES ‘wastage’ (approximately 30%) seriously affects the degree of operational readiness. Suggestions will now be developed on how retention rates might be improved and if reconsideration of the role of the ARES could provide an enhanced potential for the development of Australia’s Army in time of war.

Firstly, other countries have had to consider reserve forces wastage problems and in the main, have decided to ‘buy’ retention.

OVERSEAS CONCEPTS ON THE PROBLEMS OF RESERVE FORCES RETENTION

It is significant that many western countries maintain reserve forces. In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, these reserve forces are much larger than Australia’s. Both the US and the UK reserve forces however, suffer from the same problem of how to retain their trained volunteer members.

United States Reserve Forces Retention Schemes

In a statement on the 10th March 1982, Lieutenant General La Vern E. Weber, Chief, National Guard Bureau, commented on the retention initiatives currently employed by that force:

‘The ARNG (Army National Guard) continued the selected Reserve Incentive Program
(SRIP), which consists of an enlistment bonus, re-enlistment bonus and educational assistance. Efforts will be increased to maximise this valuable recruiting and retention tool by the introduction of a $2,000 enlistment bonus."

Further on in his statement, Lieutenant General Weber said:

'A formal Air National Guard Retention program utilizing Base Career Advisors, was implemented in May 1981. Both first term and overall retention improved as a result of increased emphasis on this program. The retention rate increased from 61.4 per cent in F/Y 80 to 63.1 per cent in F/Y 81."

These incentives, the General said, 'have a direct effect on both recruiting and retention.'

Interestingly enough, the Australian Army Reserve's average wastage over the last ten years (1970-1980) is only 35.8% giving a retention rate of 64.2%

A paper submitted by Major General William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve (US) describes further incentive schemes currently used to promote retention:

'Monetary incentives were first initiated for higher priority units of the Army Reserve in December 1978. These incentives have a twofold effect:

a. an increase in Army Reserve enlisted paid drill strength, each year since initiation in F/Y 79, and

b. the channeling of new members into high priority units."

'The incentives include an enlistment bonus of $1,500 or educational assistance of up to $4,000 for qualified high school graduates who enlist in high priority units for six years. In F/Y 81, this program resulted in 5,590 soldiers enlisting for the $1,500 cash bonus.'

Continuing his report, General Berkman says:

'We (US Army Reserve) also have an affiliation bonus that provides for accession of individuals who have completed their active duty obligation ... The bonus pays the equivalent of $25 for each month of affiliation.'

Will the concept of cash bonus incentives be successful however? Current indications are that monetary incentives do provide a significant improvement in the retention rate of volunteer military forces.

United Kingdom Retention Initiatives

Similar problems in the retention of trained reserve personnel are also being experienced in the UK. In a precis prepared by the Directorate of Territorial Army and Cadets, the following observations are made:

'Whilst the intake of new recruits into the Territorial Army continues at a satisfactory level, the rate of outflow; for all the many reasons connected with a civilian volunteer force (changing personnel, circumstances, jobs, family commitments and so on) mitigates against a build up of trained soldiers."

Two types of incentives are being used to curb these wastage levels. Firstly:

'An Annual Tax Free Bounty is paid on completion of the Annual Training Commitment at an increasing scale for the first three years and then at the third year rate thereafter. (£300).''

and in addition,

'Overseas training is extremely popular and is probably the biggest single factor which influences Territorial Army recruiting and morale."

Summary of Some Overseas Retention Incentives

Several conclusions can be drawn from the retention schemes of both the US and the UK. It could be important, when considering the payment of initial enlistment bounties, to reflect that those incentives only raised the retention of US National Guard Units from 61.4% to 63.1% (ie less than 2%). The effects of a gradually increased bonus for effective service, such as that of the UK Territorials, may have more effect with ensuring partial retention. Unfortunately, there is not much opportunity to employ or train anything more than a select few ARES members overseas.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the ARES

Current Strength of the ARES

Subsequent to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Prime Minister directed that the strength of the Army Reserve be increased to 30,000. On paper, this strength was achieved just after June 1981. In order to achieve the target of 30,000 however, a considerable recruiting campaign was undertaken at significant cost. A committee (Army Reserve Expansion Advisory Committee — AREAC)
was formed to plan and oversee the expansion initiatives. A concentrated effort from all members of the AREAC including Defence Public Relations, advertising from Defence Force Recruiting and a vastly increased effort from ARA and ARES personnel involved, was able to achieve the goal of 30,000 in July 1981. This meant that in one year alone, over 14,000 enlistees had to be recruited to allow for wastage as well as expansion.

Will the whole effort be negated however, by the perennial problem of wastage? Will the millions of dollars worth of resources spent on achieving the aim, provide any lasting significance and what did the exercise prove?

**Lessons Learnt from ARES Expansion**

The 1981 expansion of the ARES did provide proof that large numbers of young Australians could be interested in volunteering for part-time military service in the ARES.

It also proved that the Australian population does have a basic interest in finding out more about their Defence Force, if motivated by:

a. exciting advertising, depicting traditional links between those who served in the past and those serving now,

b. increased public awareness of defence matters by good Public Relations in line with political direction and world events, and

c. a high profile, readily apparent ARES force taking part in public displays, presentations and mock battles.

**Retention**

The expansion campaign is over, but the battle to retain those gains in manpower achieved is already underway. The results of this battle against wastage will become evident soon. Unless the wastage factor is reduced to around 10-15%, no appreciable return will be provided to balance the efforts expanded.

To capitalize on the lessons learnt from the ARES expansion campaign, the value of distinctive, high profile, regional units will now be examined.

**Passive Recruiting and Public Relations**

‘There is no doubt that the Military Tattoo is a stimulus to recruitment, and within reason, the use of that sort of display, event at unit level, should be encouraged.’

‘All the world loves a parade’ someone once remarked. The popularity of military spectacles is well known and the Edinburgh Tattoo is a prime example of this. Local units such as the New South Wales Lancers (Parramatta Lancers) have, in the past, on civic and ceremonial occasions, appeared on horseback dressed in traditional uniforms. This is not just a colourful display. The public of that region as a community, can identify with their own local, distinctive unit and reflect on their own traditional and regional involvement. Similar units have been the mainstay of our citizen army traditions. Public recognition, acceptance and involvement must provide a tangible and demonstrable incentive for recruiting and more importantly, retention of ARES members.

In 1974, the Millar Committee investigating the Citizen Military Forces said:

‘We believe that tradition as such, does count with members of Units, and selectively improves recruiting.’

**ARES Unit Titles and the ‘Strength’ of Belonging**

The names and titles of units are also important to their members and the immediate area where the unit is traditionally based. The amount of appeal created by a unit number as opposed to the identity of a regional title or identifying regimental name, is also significant.

To belong to a simple numbered battalion or unit does not convey or promote any meaningful association with the public or the peer group of a member. While belonging to the 1st Battalion ARA may mean something to the Regular Army, this is not the same to the civilian or for that matter, to the citizen military. The inclusion of a regional and/or identifiable title such as the ‘Bushman’s Rifles’ or the ‘New South Wales Scottish Regiment’ immediately creates recognition and esteem by the act of joining and belonging. Titles such as ‘The 164th Cavalry Regiment’ cannot compare with say ‘The Prince of Wales Light Horse’ or perhaps ‘The Prime Minister’s Own Light Horse’.

In the last issue of *Triad* (APR 82) an article on the ARES highlights the wartime role played by the Australian citizen soldier:

‘... it was mainly citizen soldiers in both World Wars who pulled us through and if it should happen again, we will need more citizen soldiers.’

The fact remains however, that the citizen soldiers available before and between the two World Wars, joined and stayed with a different style of citizen army to that now offered.
The Weakness of the Concept for a Total Force

In 1974, the Millar Committee stated: "there is no escaping the fundamental differences of service on a part-time and full-time basis. We believe a better term than 'one army' is 'total force', whereby the assets of the Army Reserve and the Regular Army are welded into a single, total effort."

There is contention on just how the Australian Regular Army (ARA) and the ARES could be welded together, when in the same Report, the Millar Committee observed of the ARES, that they (the Committee) are:

"inclined to believe that a percentage of listed strengths are not fully effective."

Available non-effective figures (30 JUNE 80 to 31 MAR 82) for the ARES then stood at a national total of 1,417. Further, with an average wastage of 35.8% over the last ten years, at least one ARES soldier in every three must be an enlistee or at very best, a recruit.

The practical realities of integration must now be addressed by the Army as a whole. Suggestions made by the 1974 Millar Committee, namely improved training, assimilation with regular units and a sense of achievement as an efficient soldier, are still being repeated today. Have these suggested remedies provided the panacea for the ARES retention problem therefore? The answer must be no.

Inherent Weakness in ARES Training Concepts

A fundamental weakness in the concept of current ARES training ought now to be recognised. A part-time citizen soldier is highly unlikely to be able to achieve the degree of training available to his counter-part in the ARA. Yet it is a lynch pin of the present ARES rationale that more and more emphasis on training to get closer and closer towards the ARA ideal. This is not providing an effective answer to the wastage problem. In fact this situation is probably having the opposite effect to that desired. ARES member's morale must suffer when they are asked to achieve the impossible and are regarded, quite rightly, by their ARA equivalents as inferior in skill at arms.

Evaluation

A comparison of the traditional strength of the citizen military forces and their current apparent weakness in numbers and therefore effectiveness, should be made. The reason for the current weaknesses could be that the ARES is not allowed to fully utilize its traditional strength.

ARES Integration with the ARA

An attempt has been made to integrate the ARES with the ARA, based on the concept proposed in the Millar Report of 1974. This states that: "Our proposed organisation draws the components closer together and integrates them, where we deem this to be possible. Where commanders are provided by one component, assistant commanders are drawn from the other."

Partly, the basis for this concept appears to have been generated by some of the authors of the Millar Report having been: "much impressed by the dedication and enthusiasm of regular officers in the United States who were applying themselves, for the first time, to be Army Reserve and the National Guard."

Integration of the ARA and the ARES has not been found an overwhelmingly total success even though some concerted efforts have been made in this direction. A recent Army paper on the state of the ARES states some examples of integration as the '6 Signal Regiment and the 135 Signal Squadron. Reserve elements are also integrated with the Army Survey Regiment and ARES instructors are employed with the SASR. A few service units are integrated at sub-unit level into ARA structures, for example, the Terminal Regiments. The newly formed HQ 7 Brigade has also been integrated as part of the 1st Division.

Problems associated with Integration

Since the inception of efforts to integrate units of the ARA and the ARES, a number of inherent difficulties have been revealed.

Geographical Factors

Firstly, the traditional strength of ARES units is in their regional and area associations. The need to have ARES units located within the normal travel range of members, does not lend itself to the ARA requirement for large, unpopulated training areas and the desirability to be located at strategically important regions.
Financial Factors

The original concepts of the Millar Report suggested a capacity for a continual system of support from the ARA units to the ARES units and vice versa. The allocation of travel funds for this requirement, the Report says: "would be well spent." Present financial restrictions, which could also occur at any time, would effectively emasculate a force using the system however.

As an example of the cost of integration, a recent proposal for the integration of an ARES tank squadron into 1 Armoured Regiment has been deferred because of the cost, ($12.3m to $14.6m over nine years). "cost is a major limiting factor in integration".

Training

Although the concepts for integration were developed in the Millar Committee's Report of 1974, the committee obviously had significant misgivings about the viability of a totally integrated force. For example:

"The Regular soldier has to be ready for war at relatively short notice. This requires an expert which can come only from constant repetition in the handling of weapons and other skills to the point where his actions will be instinctive in situations of extreme stress. The Reserve soldier, in circumstances where a period of further training on full time service can be expected, need not acquire and maintain in peace that some instinctive proficiency."

The requirement of the Reserve soldier to undergo further time-training after mobilisation is also discussed by Dr Millar in a previous publication.

"It currently takes about nine months to get a Regular or National Service Infantryman fully trained for combat. With their very limited experience — useful though it may be — CMF members would probably need a minimum of six months full duty before they were ready." The latent potential of integrating a dichotomy of separate units with different amounts of training, skill and experience, must be suspect.

Diversification of Units

To provide a complete spectrum of opportunity in all Army disciplines, a variety of ARES units must be available, in each State. This may not be either economical or logistically feasible. Regular Army units are not bound by this constriction and are located using a different rationale. The practicability of integrating units or arranging joint training must therefore be queried.

Uniformity and Conformity

Integration has been promoted as a way of improving the state of the ARES. Since the concept calls for the virtual submergence of any distinctive traditional characteristics of the ARES units, within a uniform ARA requirement to perform and conform in an ARA manner, the main strength of ARES units has virtually been denied them. This main strength is, namely, the regional, and identifiable community presence of a citizen volunteer force rather than that of a junior brother in the ARA. Lack of identification is a serious problem if a member needs to be contacted quickly and his unit is not readily identified by either the Army or a worried wife.

Family and Friends

Integration has also destroyed most of the traditional camaraderie of those now serving. The old values of help and assistance to fellow member's families have gone. In the past, regimental activities involving families and friends helped the soldier gain esteem and respect and very importantly, provided his family with some form of participation in "his" regiment.

ARES EFFECTIVENESS IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO THE NATION

In the CGS Exercise of 1981, the factors influencing the structure of an expanded Reserve were studied. The times taken to expand the Reserve were divided into three phases:

a. National Threat Phase — 12 months,
b. Perceived Threat Phase — 22 weeks, and
c. Specific Threat Phase — 14 weeks.

"This suggests that the time available for Army expansion may be far less than the nominal warning time available to the government." "Ultimately, a large scale expansion without some form of conscription does not seem to be practicable."
... shortened defence preparations time highlights the problem of retention of trained officers and NCO’s in the Reserve.

Dr Millar has stated, in his Committee of Inquiry into the CMF, that;
‘CMF members would probably need a minimum of six-month’s full time duty before they were ready.’

There is a considerable section of informed opinion that would suggest an extra period of three months combat training before an ARES soldier was ready for war. The reality therefore, is that composite ARA-ARES units could not be used together in any but the National Threat Phase of 12 months.

Reserve Call-Out
‘Under current legislation, the Governor General may call out the Reserve, only in time of war or declared defence emergency. — The recent raising of NORFORCE emphasises the need to review call up legislation.’

Further problems with the call-out of the Reserves, as opposed to using the immediately available Regular Forces, is highlighted under the heading of ‘Warning Time /Defence Preparation Time’, in the CGS Exercise 1981 Report;
‘a requirement for an overseas commitment could arise with little or no timing and a range of low-level contingencies could also arise at short notice.’

and further,
‘Government decision — making on Defence resource allocation, would be assisted by an awareness of the public’s opinion of the level of defence preparations being made.’

This public awareness would of course take time to effectively promote.

ARES Potential
The conclusion should therefore be made, that the present thrust of integrating ARES units into those of the ARA, at any level, is not either practical or feasible under the present circumstances. Only a future, strong and fully established ARES could successfully be mobilized separately, as has been the case in Australia’s past history.

Public Opinion of the Defence Force
In a report about community attitudes to the Defence Force as an employer, the Australian National Opinion Polls (ANOP) observes that:
‘The community does however believe that a Defence Force is a very necessary part of the Australian society.’

This gives a decided clue to how the community regards the Defence Force as a whole. The report goes on to say:
‘Doubts is the operative word in most Defence Force image considerations — to the extent that it would not be overstating the case to say the Defence Force has no real image in peacetime.’

Again, the report continues:
‘Whether too young or old, the peacetime role of the Defence Force is cloudy, obscure, almost blank.’

There is understandably, a lack of public knowledge and opinion about Australia’s Defence Force and for that matter, the ARES. This is due to an almost complete decline in the visibility of the Armed forces. In addition, any direct contribution made to communities is made by the regular forces, during natural disasters for example. This contribution is made by servicemen who are part of an anonymous, similarly uniformed group, who are recognised but who do not belong, by and large, to that community. How can the public relate to such a ‘low profile’ as the reserve forces have today, when even the community assistance given by regular forces, is denied the citizen military.

Image and Public Relations
An example of how visibility can affect community attitudes and public opinion, is the gradual demise of the image of the local policeman. The days are long gone when the local policeman had a rapport with his local area, in which he served and usually lived. He is now no longer seen ‘on the beat’ and these days, is usually associated (with help from the media), as a repressive element in today’s society.

The lack of association and social integration within the community they serve, has led to the now perceived but passive antipathy for the police and their punitive role in today’s public arena. It is an unfortunate reality, that because of their usually onesided relations with
the public, the police force is regarded by many as just a necessary evil. This is to the public’s, as well as to the members of the police forces, detriment.

Unless the ARES can present an identifiable association with the community they are a part of and volunteer to serve, there is a real danger of their being misunderstood. It is always the unknown or the mysterious that is the first to be maligned. Good public relations depend on a high profile within the peer group.

The Community’s Image of the Army

It has been noted that the image of Australia’s Army still remains in the public’s mind. ‘A useful plus for the Army is its slightly higher standing among young people who appear to have an almost historical respect for it.’

Steps should now be taken to provide more interface between ARES units and the general public. The perception of acceptable and desirable standards by members of the public, may be utilized to enhance the image of service in the ARES. To belong to a select section of any community generates commitment and peer group prestige. This situation may be capitalized on, but only if sufficient thought is given to what would enhance the ARES image in the community.

‘The Army’s image, what there is of it, emphasises lack of glamour, peacetime irrelevance and doubts as to its modern nuclear war contributions.’

While the role of the Army in nuclear war might be difficult to illustrate, the introduction of some glamour and peacetime relevance is not. More will be said later, on how the ‘image’ of the ARES might be enhanced, but there appears to be no relevant, contemporary reason why the ARES could not perform some community activities.

The Identity of the Army Reserve

In a paper prepared by a Reserve Staff Group in August 1980, the following was noted:

‘It is generally accepted that identity is an important element in the motivation of any soldier — ARES or ARA. The effect on recruitment and retention . . . does not seem to be appreciated.’

Our Glorious Traditions

‘We believe that tradition as such, does count with members of units, and selectively improves recruiting.’

It is historically significant that Australia’s volunteer citizen forces have been in existence since the 1850s. These forces have provided the backbone of our country’s military defence until quite recent times, and as such, have considerable association with, and deep seated roots in Australia’s history. These honourable traditions are a recognisable and demonstrable plus with the community and should be recognised and used to enhance ARES recruiting and retention. The problem is how to capitalize on this fact.

The Effects of integration on ARES Traditions

The effects of integration with the ARA have virtually proved to be the ‘death knell’ of any traditional regimental activities that do not equate with an ARA ‘equivalent’. Traditional ways of creating and holding a unit’s interest with regimental guards, functions, by teaching regimental history and unit affiliations have had, by necessity, to be dispensed with.

In their Report on the Army Reserve, the Reserve Staff Group observed under a heading of ‘Desire to Serve/Cameraderie’;

‘These fundamental emotions are believed to have contributed greatly to ARES participation. The Colour Party, Regimental Drummer Boy and the Queen’s Colours may be out-of-date, but the emotions to which they appeal, fortunately still exist.’

Do these emotions, so fundamental to the ARES, have any place in today’s citizen forces? If they still exist and are as stated ‘fundamental’, how can they possibly be out-of-date? It is quite clear that contemporary Army opinion does not prefer to place much value on ARES traditional activities, with their separate style of training and involvement. It is also clear that there has been no improvement in the wastage factor of ARES units who previously enjoyed a more ‘traditional’ regimental life.

Reforming the Old Traditional ARES Units

In a recent Army report, a comment, illustrating how the ARA feels about any proposal to reform some traditional citizen units, stated:

‘such pressures (are) from unit associations rather than from the body of the Army Reserve.’
This statement provides a clue as to why some very important factors, associated with the gradual decline in the strength of traditional requirements of our citizen Army, have possibly been overlooked.

Firstly, recognition must be made of the very significant civilian community involvement essential to any ARES unit. Further, since the present force was established in 1948, the ARES (or the Citizen Military Forces [CMF] as it was then known), has always provided a tacit threat to the ARA. Australia's military potential, since the 1850s, and until the formation of the ARA after World War II, traditionally rested with our citizen forces. It was not until 1949 that the Defence Act provided for regular infantry. For example: ‘The geographical locations of units has allowed the militia to develop an impressive set of traditions based on direct links with the accomplishments of militiamen in combat dating back to the Maori Wars. ARA units are unable to match these links with any similar claim to continuity. These traditions have become the most jealously guarded feature of our militia.’

The ARA Posture on ARES Traditions

The ARA’s answer to counter the ARES traditional role, since the early 1960s, has been gradually but effectively to absorb all future ARES potential. In 1959-60, the Army’s field force structure was then re-organised into what was called the ‘pentropic’ system. In effect, as part of the re-organisation, many old militia units were reformed or combined, with a subsequent diminishment of unit traditions and images. This led to a lack of interest of many volunteers who then resigned and provided a weaker structure which had to be propped up with the National Service selective conscription scheme.

In 1972, National Service was abolished and in 1974, the Millar Report recommended a gradual coalescence of the ARES with the ARA. Considering that the strength of the ARES rests with part-time volunteers, the ARA must always therefore be the dominant partner in this dichotomy, of what should be a complimentary not integrated association.

Further, the position of the ARA to effectively ‘lobby’ for ARA type initiatives has now effectively culminated in a vicious circle in which the ARA proposes ARA type training for ARES units who, because of their part-time nature, fall short of the mark. This leads to ARES disinterest and discharge with the resultant recommendations by all subsequent Army investigations, that what will improve the ARES, and the retention problems, is more and better ARA type training. The time has come to break this nexus.

In a statement on the matter by Major General Cullen in 1974 he said: ‘the basic problem is lack of manpower, and no re-organisation will solve that’.

Requests for a Return to Traditional ARES Regiments

To return to those pressures, purported to come from only outside the ARES, on the desire to reform some traditional militia units. The ARA reaction to this natural and traditional expression of community interest in their citizen forces is quite understandable, when viewed in the above context. The problem is that those who have either participated or would like to participate in the distinctive regimental traditions of their area cannot do so in today’s ARES. They are now therefore, not usually members of the ARES. Since the regiments have been disbanded and their cadre of ‘loyalists’ scattered or discharged, who is there to extol the virtues of the ‘old brigade’. Those joining and resigning every year in today’s ARES of course, are not aware of the lost opportunity in joining and participating in the citizen military’s distinctive traditions.

The role of the ARES must, by the very nature of the original spirit of spontaneity to serve, within the community, provide distinctive and identifiable units. How many commandoes for example, would part with their green beret or the SAS with their special insignia. No part-time soldier wishes to disappear in an amorphous green or khaki, low profile, group of men with no appreciable public role or image. Where is his pride and bearing when he looks like every other man in the Army?

‘Right up to the first World War, soldiers insisted on wearing full dress into battle and many a man frankly joined the Army so he could wear a busby or a nice red uniform with brass buttons. Even today, a general had seriously claimed that the reason so many men joined the Marines is that Corps still retains it’s ornate full dress . . . ’
The Citizen Requirement

A gradual return to the historically proven concept of traditional and distinctive citizen requirements must provide one of the answers to ARES retention. Is the traditional regimental parade, with all its dash and glamour, such a bitter pill to improve the retention rates? The provision of regimental uniforms, when the price of retention is compared, is surely not very contentious. The true answer rests with what might happen, if ARES units were to regain their independence by returning to the inherently strong and viable concerns they once were.

Colonels-in-Chief

To promote a balance to the normal channels of communication, the historic appointment of Colonel-in-Chief was created. Regrettably, it has lapsed and it would appear timely to seek its resurrection.

Regimental Commanders would have an opportunity for discussions or suggestions about community involvement and regimental activities with someone of local standing. Civilian soldiers could have an authorised channel to communicate their own ideas or frustrations outside of the normal communication channels.

Potential Colonels-in-Chief abound with suitably qualified Senior Defence Force officers retiring each year or from the equally well qualified public figures. Such people could be appointed for a period of one or two years and would provide a healthy influence especially if there was a requirement to submit reports to the Chief of Army Reserve on his regiment.

Bi-Centennial Functions — Political Appeal

Australia is currently in the process of planning for our 200th Anniversary. What could be more nationally appealing than to be able to parade the old Light Horse or Field artillery units in traditional Australian uniforms as part of the citizen military's contribution to the occasion.

In many countries, the focus of the nation at ceremonial occasions or of visits of state is always a parade of troops in traditionally national uniforms. This provides an enormous stimulus and political appeal by capitalising on the national spirit.

Units Must Have Dedicated Leaders

It is at this point that a note of caution must be sounded. To consider the recreation of a unit with distinctive traditions and dress, the ideals and aspirations of those who are to provide the executive function of the unit must be sympathetic to that unit's rationale and existence. The provision of officers and NCO's from other units with other traditions and ties will no doubt have a deleterious effect. There will still be a multitude of units, for those who favour a simple, more ARA existence, to join.

Suggestions on How to Reform Old ARES Regiments

As a beginning, the reformation of traditional units could be phased in along the following lines. In NSW and VIC, one infantry, one artillery and one cavalry regiment each with an emphasis on proving the system. Sufficient advertising and recruiting resources must be devoted to ensure an effective effort. Public Relations support must also be marshalled and interested regional and community bodies contacted and consulted. The co-ordination of research, resources and facilities may be carried out by a committee of Army, Defence Department and interested bodies and groups in the first stage (say three months). Secondly, the practical aspects of the committee's recommendations could then be planned, (roughly six months). Finally, the planned raising of each unit could begin gradually over a two-year interval until effective strength was achieved. At each stage, financial planning would be allowed for in the appropriate FYDP and the whole exercise being allowed to expand to other areas as the initial benefits were assessed.

Conclusions

A major conclusion, when all the factors are held in the balance, is that the main thrust of current initiatives about the ARES problem of retention must be reviewed. The review however must be made with a different concept in mind, than that currently being used. Unless the retention factor of the ARES is reduced to around 10-15% pa, the ARES would not be of much use if required to perform its role. The interesting fact is that the available and historically proven methods of recruiting and retaining Australia's citizen military forces...
is still available. The reasons for not using them, is unfortunately proving self defeating to the nation's defence.

Unless the ARA has an effective and vital back up force to mobilise in the event of war or emergency, the Regular force will itself be vulnerable. The existence of a readily available and motivated manpower, while the main bulk of civilian volunteers/conscriptees is being drafted and put together, is an essential factor in providing a credible deterrence.

The fundamental efforts of maintaining and expanding the Australian Army Reserve should be channeled towards a highly interested and motivated force of civilian volunteers, with a close association with the community they live in. That force must have identity, an historical base and provide some essence of glamour. All these attributes are not necessarily associated with the Regular Forces, in the eyes of the public.

In addition, those initiatives used by overseas reserves forces may also be contemplated, including the use of adventure to equate to overseas service and the introduction of a scaled bonus system of cash grants for effective completion of each year of service.

This ultimately means the contemplation of a slightly changed role for the ARES. Instead of providing a basis for expansion of the ARA, the ARES must maintain its traditional strength as a complementary force, with it's own identity and integrity. Only then will the latent strength of our citizen forces be fully realized. This report is meant in no way to denigrate the hard work and initiatives of many ARA officers, it is to put forward the view that another way might be better.

Recommendations

The gradual re-introduction of separate and distinctively identifiable Reserve units in their traditional areas and with the help of those communities. The public relations and political capital of this initiative will be considerable in both the short and long term.

The introduction of adventure and a greater possibility for travel. Perhaps, the creation of an 'Outward Bound' course with an approved insignia to be worn on completion.

The re-introduction of colourful and traditional CMF uniforms, such as Light Horse, Lancet type uniforms for cavalry units and armoured regiments and the re-introduction of infantry regiments such as the Victorian and New South Wales Scottish. This will provide the glamour at present absent and is by no means exhaustive in application. A separate study must be made of this.

The introduction of a scaled bonus system for each year of effective service. For example:

1st year = $1,000
2nd year = $2,000
3rd year = $3,000 and each year thereafter.

This system, if it reduced wastage levels by only 5% would be cost effective in the long run.

The ARES can and should contribute to some form of community assistance. Legislation now covering the regular forces must be extended to cover reserve personnel. The value of performing community assistance in their local area, would provide an enormous fillip in morale, public relations and a sense of purpose for ARES members.

The membership of each ARES unit should initially be allowed to expand, according to the number of volunteers who wish to join that unit. Once ARES membership is put on a healthy footing, extra financial incentives could be used to divert excess manpower to those specialist units currently in short supply, (logistics units for example).

That a more traditional ARES be promoted as an effective counter to the underlying mistrust of the Australian community towards conscription in time of need. By providing an ever present pool of community understanding on defence matters, the ARES may assist the national well to remain free and democratic.

NOTES

1. The Report by the Millar Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces — March 1974
2. The Army Reserve — transcript of Army to Army Talks DEC 1980
3. Report by the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces — (Millar Committee) March 1974 para 6.3
4. ‘Statement on the posture of the National Guard and the National Guard Budget Estimates for 1982’ by Lieutenant General La Vern E. Weber, Chief National Guard Bureau, 10 MAR 82
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. "The Reserves" a precis prepared by the Directorate of Territorial Army and Cadets and AG (Mob) — (UK) in MAR 82.
Paul Oates was born in Parramatta in 1948 and was educated at The Kings School, Parramatta. He served in A Coy (Scottish) 17 Bn RNSW R before going to Papua New Guinea as a Patrol Officer from 1969-75. In 1976, he joined the Department of Defence and is now the Executive Officer of the Defence Force Recruiting Branch. He attended RAAF Staff College in 1982.

AWARD: ISSUE No 44
(January/February 1984)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the January/February issue (No 44) of the Defence Force Journal to Dr M.G. King, Professor G.V. Stanley and Professor G.D. Burrows for their article Stress, Combat and Tactical Decisions.
By Air Marshal Sir Edward Chilton, KBE, CB, RAF (Ret)

'We who dwell in the British Isles must celebrate with joy and thankfulness our deliverance from the mortal U-boat perils, which deliverance lighteth the year which has ended. When I look back upon the fifty-five months of this hard and obstinate war, which makes ever more exacting demands upon our life's springs of energy and contrivance, I still rate highest among the dangers we have to overcome the U-boat attack on our shipping, without which we cannot live or even receive the help which our Dominions and our grand and generous American ally have sent us.'

(Quotation from a BBC World Broadcast by Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 26 March 1944)

TODAY there is much discussion about the Russian naval build-up; in fact, Russia is second only to the United States as a naval power and already possesses the most powerful submarine fleet the world has ever seen. Bearing in mind the fact that the modern submarine bears no relation to its World War 2 counterpart — in terms of modern weapons, detection systems and its underwater characteristics — this represents a major threat. Also, nuclear propulsion and the ballistic missile have enabled the submarine to develop from a 'naval weapon' to a self-contained strategic weapon system.

Whilst pondering over the above recently, my mind went back to some of the events which took place at sea during the protracted and bitter struggles of the last war. One event which in my view can only be described as a remarkable coincidence is well worth describing in some detail. It took place during a period when the Admiralty and RAF Coastal Command brought about a brilliant exploitation of the U-boats' tactical errors when attempting to cross the Bay of Biscay in mid-1943. The losses and damage they suffered in the Bay were for a time on such a scale that they added greatly to the German U-boat Command's discomfiture.

The German U-boat Command had decided upon a new tactic — namely 'Group Transits' — which required U-boats on outward journeys across the Bay of Biscay to keep together. At first sight, this appeared to have great advantages for the U-boats in that one small group was more likely to escape detection by aircraft with their new search receiver than three or four individual boats scattered over the Bay of Biscay. Also, there was the promise of German Air Force fighter cover from bases in France (mostly Ju 88c's) and, furthermore, the U-boats themselves could give each other mutual fire cover from their recently-installed more powerful anti-aircraft guns. The plan was that, on being sighted, the U-boats would zigzag and open fire which would provide more determined and accurate fire than that from single boats. It is against this background that I direct your attention to the battle which took place in the Southern part of the Bay of Biscay on 30 July 1943.
Sunderland ‘U’ of No 461 Sqn (Royal Australian Air Force) was based at Pembroke Dock and for the Captain — Flt-Lt Marrows — and his crew of eight, the 30 July 1943 was a day never to forget. It started out as a normal midsummer’s day — a very early take off, in fact at 0248hrs. The take off was unusually normal for a heavily loaded Sunderland as there was the right amount of wind, an ideal visibility and the sea was slight. As the operational area was approached, the crew settled down to their allotted tasks, either flying the aircraft, watching vital instruments especially the radar screen, navigating the aircraft, scanning the sky for enemy fighters, sweeping the sea for submarine or periscope wakes, etc. All the weapon systems and the guns had been tested as soon as the aircraft had cleared the land, so all was ready — the crew were merely waiting for that opportunity to show how their long training and practice would pay off.

As it happened, the crew’s patience was to be rewarded, as shortly after 1000hrs when they had finished their designated patrol and were on their way home, a patrolling aircraft (Liberator ‘O’ of No 53 Sqn) under the control of their own HQ — No 19GP at Plymouth, sent a sighting report of enemy U-boats which was intercepted by their wireless operator and, more fortunately, by several other patrolling aircraft in the Bay of Biscay. Thus, excitement started to mount in Sunderland ‘U’ of No 461 Sqn as it was directed by Control to alter course for the report area in the south of the Bay — approximately some 180nm NNW of Cape Finisterre. The crew had to be even more alert now because of the greatly increased possibility of interception by enemy fighters. In less than half an hour, the crew’s keenness and hopes were further sharpened by another intercepted report which told them that another Sunderland (‘O’ of No 228 Sqn) was already on the scene circling no fewer than three surfaced U-boats which were reported to be steering a south-westerly course in ‘V’ formation. The crew’s apprehension about the possibility of enemy fighters was well founded because they heard that an enemy fighter had already made a pass at the Sunderland on the spot — so much so that it had to beat a hasty retreat for cloud cover, jettisoning its depth charges in the process. The captain of Sunderland U-461 mentally congratulated the captain of the Sunderland on the spot upon his successful evasion as it was clearly better for him to remain safely in the area to keep a watch on the U-boats — even though he had now lost his killing power. Contact was successfully maintained and a Catalina flying boat now joined the party but was shortly directed to contact some naval sloops (HMS Kite, Woodpecker, Wren and Wild Goose) who were known to be a few miles from the area — and to home them to the area.

By 1100hrs, the efficient Group HQ at Plymouth had organised a reasonable force of aircraft to converge upon the U-boats; these were two Halifax from No 502 Sqn (‘B’ and ‘S’), a further Liberator ‘A’ of No 19 Squadron (US Army) and ‘U’ of No 461 (RAAF—Sunderland) the main object of this story.

The forces thus gathered, the attack was opened by Halifax ‘BV502 Sqn from a height of 1600ft attacking the starboard wing U-boat with 600lb Anti-Submarine (AS) bombs but they just missed their target chiefly because the pilot ran into the concentrated anti-aircraft fire from the three U-boats which damaged the aircraft in several areas.

The second Halifax — ‘SV502 — now decided to attack the same U-boat but with different tactics by changing the height to 3,000ft and by dropping the bombs separately even though this involved three bombing runs and increasing the time exposed to the enemy’s flak. The first attack was made from dead astern in dense flak and the bomb fell very close to the stern of the target. Although it appeared to be well within the known lethal range of the bomb, the submarine continued for a while upon its course so two more attacks were made but these were less successful. Soon the crew were delighted to see that its target was slowing down, and after a quarter of an hour the U-boat lost way, stopped and began to settle slowly on an even keel with smoke pouring from its conning tower — followed by some 40 crew abandoning ship — the end of U-462!

Now came the moment for Sunderland ‘U’/461, and great excitement reigned within the flying boat because this was the moment everyone had been waiting for and their teamwork and training would succeed or fail. Above all else, it was to be the captain’s first attack upon a U-boat and, in a way, the honour of Australia was at stake — the RAF had just
sank a U-boat before their very eyes and clearly what they could do, so could the RAAF — and so it was to be.

The Sunderland and Liberator ‘O’/53 Sqn decided to attack the port wing U-boat while the US Liberator ‘A’ flew over the already sinking U-462. Both the former aircraft met intense flak from the remaining two submarines but the enemy tended to concentrate upon Liberator ‘O’, thinking it to be the most dangerous opponent. They did succeed in damaging it so much that it was unable to return to the UK but later made a successful landing in Portugal. This was lucky for the Sunderland as it gave it its chance as the captain was able to come in on the port quarter at only 50ft to drop his load of seven depth charges, spaced at 60ft apart. The stick straddled U-461 and the bows immediately gave off quantities of orange-coloured froth. Even before both aircraft could come round again for a second attack the submarine had started to sink, leaving some 30 men in the water so that a dinghy had to be dropped for them, and some shell splashes started to straddle the U-boat from the fast approaching sloops. Thus, by one of the most extraordinary coincidences of the war, the U-boat U-461 was sunk by ‘U’/461 Squadron. It was, in fact, the 300th U-boat kill of the war. One wonders at the odds of this happening.

On leaving the Escort Group, Marrows set course for base — Pembroke Dock. However, it soon became apparent to the crew that they had used up a great deal of their fuel during the diversion and the U-boat engagement so that it would be a close run thing. The navigator and engineer were confident that they would make the Scilly Isles, where there were flying boat base emergency landings. No sooner had the crew settled down for their routine return flight than the nose gunner suddenly reported yet another U-boat on the starboard quarter. Marrows just could not believe that here was a fourth U-boat — all in one patrol after a year of no sightings of any sort. They went straight into the attack through heavy flak and it would most probably have resulted in yet another kill except for the failure of the depth charge release mechanism due to AA damage. By this time the fuel situation was really critical, and they just made it back to the Scilly Isles; in fact the fuel tanks were empty on arrival!

To complete this story, one must return to the remaining U-boat — U-504. Seeing his two colleagues thus disposed of, despite heavy defensive fire and some fighter cover, the captain of the third U-boat decided that his salvation could only be beneath the waves and he decided to dive. This did indeed save him from further air attack but not, as he so dearly
wished, from destruction. The sloops had, by now, been successfully homed on to the scene by the Catalina and soon contact was made with the hidden enemy. Depth charge attacks were carried out and shortly U-504 joined the others on the sea bed.

The morning of 30 July 1943 proved to be an emphatic answer to the U-boat Command’s new U-boat tactics. Apart from losing three U-boats in a few hours, two of them were the much-needed supply boats (U-461 and U-462), a grave loss to the U-boat fleet. A fine piece of co-operation by the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force and of all the most unlikely units to be found over the oceans — a Liberator of the US Army.

Postscript

I am indebted to Chaz Bowyer — the author of *Coastal Command at War* — for the following additional information about Flt-Lt Dudley Marrows, RAAF. Little more than two weeks after the coincidence of the sinking of U-461 by Sunderland ‘U’ of No 461 Squadron, Flt-Lt Marrows was involved in another odd coincidence. On 16 September Marrows and his crew were patrolling in their Sunderland off the Spanish coast at the bottom of the Bay of Biscay — a favourite entry point of the U-boats returning from their Atlantic patrols, hoping to avoid the Sunderland’s radar coverage. Marrows knew the risk from German fighters and it was unfortunate that on his very last operational flight before returning to Australia he was suddenly attacked by no less than six Junkers Ju88’s. The ensuing battle was intense, with the Sunderland damaging all six of his attackers, but eventually Marrows could not keep his aircraft in the air. The Sunderland was cut to pieces with several of the crew wounded, so he had no alternative other than to land in the sea. The Sunderland only stayed afloat just long enough for the crew to launch their dinghies and gather their survival equipment. As they had already made their ‘ditching report’ to HQ’s No 19 Group at Plymouth, they pinned their hopes upon an early rescue. They were found by a Catalina flying boat early the next morning, and by mid-morning they were rescued by a destroyer hunting group. By yet another odd coincidence, it was the same hunting group (2nd Destroyer Group) commanded by the legendary Captain F. J. Walker, CB, DSO, whose destroyers had finished off the action on 30 July. On the way home, Captain Walker presented Dudley Marrows with the life-jacket and escape gear worn by Kapitanleutnant Stiebler, the commander of U-461.

A few weeks later, Flt-Lt Dudley Marrows, DSO, DFC, RAAF, returned to Australia to join No 40 Squadron, RAAF, and fortunately survived the war. But to complete this remarkable story of coincidence, Coastal Command’s historical file discloses yet one more. In May 1943 Wing Commander W. E. Oulton (later Air Vice-Marshall, CB, CBE, DSO, DFC) accomplished the unique feat of sinking three U-boats in the Bay of Biscay. The numbers of all three ended in ‘63’ — U-663, 463, and 563.

*The RAF Career of Air Marshal Sir Edward Chilton KBE, CB, FRIN, focussed largely on coastal and maritime, but he also saw much service in the Far East and Mediterranean. He retired as Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command. His service interests coloured much of his career in his retirement, particularly his specialist qualifications in navigation. He also over recent years has established a notable reputation as a writer, historian, lecturer and raconteur, travelling widely and being in much demand by public and private bodies in these capacities. He has also maintained close contact with the RAF through his sporting interests of swimming, sailing and rowing.*
THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

By Major J. G. Rolfe, New Zealand Army Intelligence Centre

'War is cruelty and you cannot refine it.'
(General W. T. Sherman 1846)

'Since the aim of war is the destruction of the enemy state, it is legitimate to kill its defenders so long as they carry arms, but the minute they lay them down... They once again become mere human beings and one no longer has any right over their lives. These principles derive from natural laws and are based on reason.'
(J. J. Rousseau, ‘Le Contrat Social’ 1762)

Introduction

The opening quotations reflect two opposing views of the position of non-combatants in warfare and each attitude has been practised at various times in man's history. The history of warfare is littered with examples of non-combatants being involved as victims of the military either because of accident or atrocity, reprisal or act of policy. In 1099 the First Crusade arrived at Jerusalem, '... they indulged themselves three days in a promiscuous massacre... After seventy thousand Moslems had been put to the sword and the harmless Jews had been burnt in their synagogue.' And again in 1365 as Alexandria was captured.

'Making no distinction between Coptic Christians, Jews or Moslems they put the whole city to the sword, looting, ransacking, raping and murdering.' In more recent days General Sherman earned the title 'Attila of the West' as his army systematically destroyed a 250 mile corridor through the southern states during the American Civil War. Later still in the First and Second World Wars complete villages were destroyed and all inhabitants killed in reprisal for actions against the military. The term 'Schrecklichkeit', or frightfulness, was coined during the First World War to describe this kind of action. The Second World War saw the blunt weapon of indiscriminate mass bombing used in an effort to break civilian morale and since then the small wars since 1945 have routinely affected civilians as in the mass defoliation of large tracts of arable land in South Vietnam, the forcible re-location of large segments of the non-combatant population in most small wars and most recently the reported use of chemical weapons in Indo-China and in Afghanistan. At the strategic level peace is now maintained between the super powers by the policies of nuclear deterrence which includes civilians as targets.

But history has not been full of unrelieved nastiness against the civilian population. As early as the Middle Ages local rules were often established which had the effect of protecting the population in return, perhaps, for services. From the time of the late eighteenth century a more positive belief has established itself which requires wars to be conducted only between soldiers of the warring nations. Now most countries, at least publicly, have espoused the twin philosophies of liberalism and humanism. War is considered to be at least undesirable and if war occurs attempts must be made to limit its effects to those whose profession it is. The limitations on military action are found in the body of International Law known as the rules of war, the most commonly cited of which are the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

Theories of International Law

International jurists identify two major theories of international law, consensual and
pragmatic. The argument for the consensual theory was put in an opinion given by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927:

‘International law governs relations between independent states. The rules of law binding on states therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law ... with a view to the achievement of common aims’.4

This view relies on formal words, or practices long accepted to give the law validity. Law once made is seen as being above the control of an individual state’s whim.

The pragmatic view of international law, put simply states that the law is what the policies of the states make it. Law is imposed upon the world depending upon the power of each state.

Governments have taken either view indiscriminately depending upon their concern of the moment. The consensual approach can be seen in international treaties regulating the conduct of the signatories, for instance in that provision of the 1907 Hague Convention which bans weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering. The pragmatic theory comes to the fore as each state then puts its own formal interpretation as to what may be considered unnecessary suffering.

The Evolution of The Laws of War

From the earliest days of warfare the only limitations on the actions of the military in their relations with the civilian world were those designed to facilitate the conduct of military operations. Thus to keep local order conscripted soldiers of the Caesars swore an oath:

‘In the army ... and for ten miles around it you will not with malice aforethought steal alone, or with others, anything worth more than a sestertius.’

Later, in the thirteenth century, the Mongols anticipated Jomini’s theory that the key to victory is the progressive domination of the enemy’s territory. But even they could, at times, spare non-combatants in the interests of expediency. ‘... the indiscriminate slaughter began to be reduced, if for no other reason than because it was a waste of time and because there was always a use for able bodied prisoners’.6

It was not until 1625 that any attempt was made to formulate a body of law in which the practices of warfare were to be codified in other than practical terms. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch statesman, was able to write an exposition of the laws of war which were applicable internationally. The principle meat of his book ‘De Jure Belli ac Pacis’, ‘The Laws of War and Peace’, lies in the fact that it synthesises the ideas of earlier writers and introduces the concept of a natural law independent of God and based on man’s nature. The ideas were forerunners of the humanitarian ideals which inspire many modern jurists in the field of the laws of war.

After Grotius the concept of civilian rights began to grow as a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants was made. Pillaging of towns diminished as citizens took less part in their defence. As military authorities took a greater interest in the welfare of their troops they exchanged agreements with local authorities to guarantee supplies in return for the protection of the civilians. But these were local arrangements made according to the inclination of the commander and the attitude of the local population. It was not until 1868 in the Declaration of St Petersburg that states could formally agree that: ‘... the only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy’.

By the early twentieth century it had become apparent that the scale of modern warfare and the increasing deadly nature of modern weapons required more extensive formal treaties to limit the potential effects of war. In 1899 and 1907 the Hague Conventions were signed. These conventions related primarily to the actual conduct of operations while the early Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929 which were replaced by the 1949 Geneva Conventions aimed at protecting the victims of war; the sick, the wounded, prisoners of war and civilians.

The aim of all of these treaties was to attempt to apply the principles of the humanity, solidarity and universality of the human race to warfare. If the nations could not be persuaded to renounce warfare as a means of settling their differences then perhaps they could be persuaded to draw limits which would not only limit the methods of waging war but would also protect non-combatants.
The Laws of War as they Relate to Civilians

The modern laws of war are based primarily on the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Conventions. By the early 1960s the laws were codified for military purposes in a number of pamphlets such as an American pamphlet which gives the text of specific conventions and any interpretations or guides considered necessary. The laws define those persons eligible for protection as civilians of an enemy nation as those persons "not protected by the provisions relating to prisoners of war, the sick and wounded and the shipwrecked". Specific protections are available for civilians, for instance, they may not be coerced, taken hostage, nor have reprisals taken against them for the actions of others. A civilian is not however entitled to engage in activities directly hostile to an enemy force or else he forfeits his protection under the rules of war.

It was soon realised that the 1949 Conventions might well prohibit formal actions against civilians but that they did not protect them fully from the indirect effects of war. In 1965 at the twentieth conference of the International Red Cross (ICRC) a series of principles were adopted which may be summarised:

'... that it is prohibited to launch an attack against the civilian population as such... (and that civilians) be spared as much as possible.'

With these principles in mind the ICRC began drafting a new set of rules confirming the tradition of humanitarianism which was embodied in the 1949 Conventions. By 1977 the additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions had been drafted. The protection of civilians is defined in Part IV of Protocol I and the requirements are quite specific. The civilian population and civilian objects must always be distinguished from military objectives and combatants and thus:

'... The civilian population as such as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack.'

Also prohibited in the same Article of the Protocol is any attack not directed or able to be directed at a specific military target. Indiscriminate, and thus prohibited, attacks include target area attacks which cause loss of life or damage to civilians in excess of the direct military advantage expected.

Later in the Protocol attacks to cause damage to the natural environment or to prejudice the health or survival of the population are prohibited. Another Article of the Protocol prohibits attacks against installations such as dams, dykes, and nuclear reactors (even if military objectives) which contain dangerous forces, if such attacks could cause severe loss of life to civilians. Finally, so far as civilians are concerned, the planners of any attack are required to do all that is feasible to identify objectives, choose methods to minimise the loss of civilian life and to cancel the operation if loss of life, injury or damage to non-military objectives is likely to exceed the immediate military advantage.

Most countries in the world are signatories to and have ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions and by mid-1981 sixty-three nations had signed the new Protocols I and II to the Conventions, but only 17 states had ratified or acceded to them. The ratifying states do not include Australia, New Zealand, the UK or the USA. A number of states also indicated that they had reservations on their own understanding of the text of the Protocols. With this number of signatories it would seem that the provisions of the Protocols are consensual statute law for most countries but as so few countries have in fact ratified the Protocols it would seem difficult to consider them as binding unless, under the pragmatic theory of law, states are forced to so consider them.

Effectiveness of the Laws

The laws of war would appear to act at two levels and any discussion as to their effectiveness needs to examine each level. At the lower level the laws are designed to protect individual civilians from acts done in the heat of the moment and military teaching reflect this:

'The pillage of a town or place even when taken by assault is forbidden.'

The higher level of operation of the laws protects the civilian from decisions made at a national or strategic level and it is at this level that the new Protocols to the Geneva conventions have been introduced.

A commander may claim that military necessity forced him into an act otherwise prohibited and the Protocols do reflect the concept of relative military advantage. Military necessity however tends to depend upon the point of view of the observer. This defence was gener-
ally rejected by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg and the rejection is reinforced by FM 27-10.

'The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimised by military necessity.'

During the war in Vietnam a number of American servicemen were prosecuted for violations of the laws of war, the first time that any significant action has been taken by a combatant against its own personnel.

The moral would seem to be quite clear that at the tactical level the laws of war regarding the treatment of civilians are valid and are likely to be enforced either by the victor nation after the conflict or by a nation against its own during the conflict.

The situation at the higher level is less clear. During World War Two both sides engaged in an unrestricted bombing campaign against major cities. The bombing was clearly illegal under the 1907 Hague Convention relating to the bombardment of undefended areas but no action was taken against the Germans because in effect both sides had altered statute law in favour of a new customary law.

The principle of reciprocity is not the only one which may alter the effect that war has on civilians. Both the United States of America and the United Kingdom have specifically stated that in their understanding of the 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Conventions nuclear weapons are not specifically regulated or prohibited. However it would seem, according to the letter of the Conventions, that any strategic planning which targets cities as cities rather than as military objectives is prohibited. The American Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) of 1976 includes as its aim the destruction of 70% of Soviet industry. At the least it is estimated that Soviet civilian casualties would range from 3.7 million to 27.7 million in an attack on military objectives alone. At this level national interest presumably takes precedence over the laws to protect civilians.

Conclusion

The effectiveness of the laws as they relate to civilians would seem to be dependent upon the time, place, scope and level of warfare. Unless directed specifically at enemy armed forces military actions are prohibited, however the civilian is only likely to be protected if he is confronted by a regular soldier in a conventional war. When national policy matters are considered or when the position of the civilian population is a major factor in winning the war then their concerns are less likely to be considered.

‘Laws were like cobwebs; Where the small flies were caught and the great break through.’

Frances Bacon
‘Apothegems’ c1600

NOTES

4. Ibid, p. 266.
15. Ibid, p. 4.

Major J.G. Rolfe graduated from Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1970. Since then he has served in a variety of regimental and staff appointments and has completed a BA Degree at Auckland University. He is currently the Officer Commanding New Zealand Army Intelligence Centre.
My tale is not a happy one, concerned as it is with the invasion and defeat of Australia. It seems incredible in retrospect that we could have been so unready, so unprepared to defend our country; but it’s true and the surprise of the invasion was complete. Yet the evidence we gathered over the years of the preparations was overwhelming. We deluded ourselves that the increasing frequency with which foreign warships entered our waters was no more than survey operations, poor navigation or fitted a new jargon term we coined, ‘political incident seeking infringement’. The incursions were, of course intelligence gathering operations seeking suitable landing places.

No, this is not a story enlightened by a happy ending but the truth of how Australia was conquered because she allowed her defences to become obsolete, inadequate and of low priority to the society which considered them an unnecessary expense. But I am being wise with hindsight; the trap into which so many military and political writers fall. Therefore, let me remind you of the major facts so that you may see for yourself why none of us should have been surprised at the ease with which we were conquered.

The signs of possible invasion were there for twenty years, but over time we began to ignore them, perhaps because of our increasing familiarity with them. Foreign ships often entered our waters and landing parties were seen on many lonely and isolated coasts. As we did not have the resources to counter these incursions we conveniently misinterpreted these sights as harmless cases of water collection or the seeking of shelter. Not once can I remember a reported sighting being interpreted as an intelligence gathering landing despite high ranking officers in uniform being identified among those in the landing party!

The reason for our self delusion is not uncommon. Our policy makers had determined that we had no enemies in the foreseeable future therefore defence spending could be minimised. Minimising defence spending resulted in our losing our ‘blue water’ navy and being reduced to a few coastal patrol craft totally unsuited for battle with more sophisticated ships possessed by our ‘visitors’. As we were incapable of preventing the landings and were unwilling to increase our defence spending to achieve the capability necessary to prevent them, the solution adopted was to degrade the reliability of the reported sightings. This was achieved by requiring corroboration of every sighting by an independent witness from a different vantage point. In the sparsely populated areas around our coasts this soon reduced ‘reliable’ evidence to negligible proportions. But even if this was for public consumption one would have expected a better understanding from our defence chiefs.

Unfortunately, such is not the case. They too accepted the ‘no threat for fifteen years’ policy and did not dissent when, with each passing year it was extended so that the fifteen year horizon was never reduced. Perhaps to remain in line with our own defence capability our defence and political masters looked for a potential aggressor only among the littoral states of the oceans surrounding Australia. By doing so they failed to understand that improvements in transportation meant that an invasion could be successfully launched from much further afield.

Around us our less sophisticated neighbours squabbled and fought their petty wars but we were unaffected. Our great land mass defied occupation by all but a huge force with massive logistic support. Our retaliatory powers we
thought would keep our neighbours’ ambitions in check. With blissful self delusion our defence forces lapsed into a second rate organization equipped and trained for administering itself in peace, not for fighting a hard war against a ruthless, determined and well equipped enemy.

None of our strategic plans called for objectives beyond our shores so we limited our defence technology and weaponry to that which we considered most suitable for use in the Australian environment. As a result our military technology became introverted to Australian conditions as we saw them, not as they may appear to an invader.

The short-range missiles we developed at our research and development establishments carried only a light projectile and were limited by what could be produced by native Australian industry and technology. This severance of foreign expertise helped Australia both economically and technologically but, as with any nationalization the protection thus afforded led to sloth and caused us to fall behind the rest of the world in many areas of arms development. Our emphasis was economically quite right, that weapons should be Australian made, that technology should be Australian and the design and capability of our arms should suit Australian conditions but it did not assist us in remaining up to date in a rapidly changing world. All our efforts were very good in theory but from a defence point of view, in an era of ‘no threat’, who do you design the weapons for use against? We chose to design them for use against an Army such as we ourselves had developed. Therein lay the flaw in our defence strategy for the invader was not like us culturally or technologically. But to return to the theme; as I have said, our forces had been neglected, dissected and relegated to a low priority in the national scheme. Our technology, starved of resources and foreign expertise, was unable to keep pace with developments and our weapons systems became obsolete and inadequate in world terms. Thus, when the battle came, the weapons on which we placed our defence hopes, the short range missiles “Woomera” and “Boomerang”, proved to be inadequate against the longer range weapons of the invaders equipped as they were with better rangefinders and weapons of far greater lethality and power. We had no weapon comparable to their heavy artillery and we had no answer to the mobility capability of their forces. This combination of mobility and firepower gave them a tactical and strategic advantage we were never able to counter.

I suppose that most of all it was in strategy that we proved to be most deficient. The main elements of our defence forces were stretched along the eastern seaboard from north Queensland to western Victoria. This lack of concentration and the geographical separation of our forces gave the invader a basis on which to plan his attack and he did so brilliantly. The plan of attack was bold in concept and meticulous in execution and deserves to be repeated here though I am sure you know it well. The enemy fleet sailed through the undefended Sydney Heads and landed a large force of tough, ruthless men in the centre of Sydney at Circular Quay. Quickly they seized the business and Rocks area of Sydney before advancing as far as Richmond, Parramatta and Holdsworthy/Cambelltown, thus completely disrupting our communications and main defensive areas.

Shortly afterwards, other forces stormed ashore in Tasmania and Moreton Bay causing a complete breakdown of our limited control systems and a loss of cohesion among our forces. Our best troops in north Queensland stood by helplessly as cyclone and storm immobilized them and kept them from the decisive area. Our forces in Sydney and Brisbane were caught totally by surprise. They were psychologically unprepared and as soon as they were assembled they were committed piecemeal to battle. The inevitable result was disaster and they were soon dispersed.

Once the enemy had secured his bridgeheads in the vital areas around Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane he was able to despatch lightly armed but highly mobile reconnaissance and occupation forces far into the interior to bring these areas under control or to pursue any Australians still resisting the invasion. Other parties swiftly penetrated along the coastal routes to link up the bridgeheads. Some of these parties were successfully attacked or ambushed and destroyed but always this resulted in the committal of overwhelming forces against us wherever we had recorded a victory. Our lack of mobility and the paucity of our forces meant that we were never able to concentrate our forces against the mounting threats and anyway the deep reconnaissance
parties continually deceived us. We never did ascertain where the invader would strike next so a paralysis of indecision permeated our defence effort.

Yes, it was a sadly lopsided affair and the world powers, for reasons best known only to themselves, raised no objection to our being invaded. I suppose the speed of the invasion, its obvious success from the outset and our apparent lack of resistance may have cowed many into silence. Sadly it must be admitted that some nations even appeared happy at our demise while others were plainly jealous that they had not exploited our weakness first!

All in all our performance as a society was poor, our technology and tactics outmoded and unable to resist more modern weapons and equipment. Our lack of co-ordination, our inability to consolidate caused by the geographical separation of our forces, the lack of mobility of our forces and the breakdown in communications due to the audacity of the invasion gained for the enemy an overwhelming initiative which we were never able to wrest from them. It is obvious now that we simply never placed enough emphasis on defence. We were never willing to pay the costs of defence as we could not see past the ‘no threat’ era to the day when we would need a strong ‘blue water’ navy to prevent a force reaching us. We could never see the need for a strong, modern, well equipped Army to fight those who do manage to invade. Such a deterrent value was never appreciated so instead we paid the price another way, we lost Australia to the invader.

Perhaps next time, if there is a next time, the new Australians will do better than we did, but all indications are that they are following the same pattern we did. It seems the lessons of 1788 have not been learnt at all.

Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope graduated from OTU, Scheyville in 1967 and was allotted to RAASC. In 1971 he was transferred to RAAOC. He has served in a variety of regimental and staff appointments including overseas postings in Vietnam, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. He attended the Australian Staff College in 1981. He is currently a staff officer in H.Q. Log Command.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries:


WHAT HAPPENED AT PEARL HARBOR?


Reviewed by André G. Kuczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

On 7 December 1941 the United States suffered the greatest military defeat in its history. In a daring and superbly executed "blitzkrieg-style" raid, 360 Japanese fighter planes and torpedo bombers attacked the American Pacific Fleet moored in Pearl Harbor and the surrounding military airfields on the island of Oahu. Of eight battleships, three were sunk, another capsized and the remainder seriously damaged. Three light cruisers, three destroyers and several auxiliary combat and support vessels were also decimated or debilitated. On land, of 231 Army planes arrayed in neat rows on two principal airfields, only 166 managed to survive the devastating aerial assault; of Navy and Marine Corps planes, only 54 out of 250 remained. More than 3,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel were killed and wounded. In the space of one hour and fifty minutes, the combined armed forces comprising the backbone of the United States' Pacific arsenal were annihilated in one of the most successful and spectacular undertakings ever attempted in the annals of military strategy. Thus in less than two hours, the United States was ignominiously stripped of any claim to naval superiority in the waters of the Pacific Ocean. "America's War in the Pacific," reminisced General Robert L. Eichelberger in his memoirs some time later, "began in defeat and humiliation."

Ever since 7 December 1941 the question of blame for the United States' unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor has hovered like a dark spectre over the national conscience. Shortly after the attack, an investigating committee headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts concluded that the two commanders in Hawaii at the time of the Japanese raid, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short, were responsible for the loss of the Pacific Fleet and almost 3,000 lives. Eight other investigations took place, the last ending in 1946. But somehow, amidst all the questioning and testimony, details continued to be left out; contradictions in testimony were not resolved; pieces of evidence were still missing. In his latest engrossing study Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, John Toland, the dean of World War II historians, delved into recently unveiled documentary evidence to conduct "the tenth investigation". His conclusions are truly startling. Admiral Kimmel and General Short, among the most able commanders in the service, were made the scapegoats of one of the most widespread "cover-ups" ever conducted in the United States and the conspiracy originated at the top, with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt himself.

In the attempt to cover-up the responsibility, two distinguished and competent career officers were retired from service in disgrace. To compound the tragedy, they were smeared and humiliated for years, the innocent victims of hate-mail from an outraged American public convinced that they had negligently sacrificed the honour and prestige of the United States by allowing the Japanese to make a total mockery of the nation's defences on Hawaii. Thus, in the eyes of citizens of the republic, without a thorough investigation and with no opportunity to defend themselves, Kimmel and Short were found guilty in absentia of dereliction of duty for the debacle at Pearl Harbor. Curiously enough, Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox cleared both Kimmel and Short of any wrongdoing when he returned to Washington on 15 December following his informal fact finding mission to Oahu a week earlier only to have President Roosevelt suppress his report. The moral depravity exhibited by those
who sought to obscure the responsibility in Washington was as extreme as that shown by those who plotted and executed the false and notorious charges against Captain Alfred Dreyfus in France at the turn of the century. While many were involved in the scandalous plot to whitewash the Roosevelt Administration, the leading figures below the President were Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson and Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall.

Due to the fact that American cryptanalysts had broken many Japanese codes long before Pearl Harbor — even the most important of all, the top secret diplomatic or “Purple Code”, by August 1940, nearly seventeen months before Pearl Harbor — American experts in the Army Signal Corps and Naval Communications had been reading the Japanese messages sent all over the world. Hence they were able to get a clear idea of the Japanese plans for peace or war, and the most probable time and place of the latter. By late November 1941, a great mass of information had been accumulated at Washington indicating that Japan would make war on the United States somewhere if diplomatic negotiations failed. Many intercepted Japanese messages, the first of which was picked up on 24 September 1941 and decoded on 9 October, actually pinpointed the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In any case, after the collapse of the third Konoye Cabinet the issue of war with Japan became one of “when” and “under what conditions”. Marshall and Naval Operations Chief, Admiral Harold R. Stark, wanted to play for time needed to bolster American military power; they told Roosevelt that the United States was not ready with the physical means to back up any ultimatum or quasi-ultimatum to the Japanese. The Pacific Fleet had already been severely unbalanced to provide urgent convoy patrol and scouting duties in the Atlantic, and manufacturing for Lend-Lease had effectively precluded adequate preparation for the defence of the Philippines, Guam, Wake and Hawaii. In Hawaii particularly, there were insufficient anti-aircraft batteries required to successfully ward off any incoming Japanese aerial invasion, and the Navy at Pearl Harbor lacked the requisite number of long-range reconnaissance bombers to provide a 360 degree watch. Knowing this, Roosevelt and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull insisted on sending the 26 November note that Japan took for an ultimatum. In Hawaii Admiral Kimmel and General Short were obliquely warned that trouble might be brewing, but the whole emphasis of the dispatches was that an attack was to be expected on the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines or Guam. General Short was advised to take precautions, but not to disturb the civilian population; it was desirable, said Marshall, that Japan commit the first overt act. Short informed Washington on two separate occasions that he had ordered “Alert No. 1”, the alert against sabotage. When Washington failed to ask for “Alert No. 3”, which would have ordered full combat readiness, General Short took it as evidence that no danger was to be expected from the sea.

After 27 November, Roosevelt, Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and Stark (the so-called war cabinet) knew that war was likely to arrive at any moment. The intercepted Japanese code messages heralded a break in diplomatic negotiations with the United States; Japanese consulates and embassies were destroying their confidential material; in the Far East the Japanese forces were mobilizing for the seizure of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. By 3 and 4 December it was certain that war would come in a matter of days, and on 4 December that it would be against the United States. By the afternoon of the 6th it looked as though it might come the next day, and on the morning of the 7th it was apparent that it would take place about 1 p.m. Washington time — about 7.30 at Pearl Harbor. Yet no warning of any probability of an attack on the Hawaiian naval base was sent by either Stimson (who, as Secretary of War, was entrusted with this ultimate responsibility) or Marshall. Just why Kimmel and Short were not told of the Japanese intentions continues to remain an unsolved historical problem. In fact, borrowing Winston Churchill’s famous phrase to describe Soviet foreign policy, this aspect of the Pearl Harbor puzzle is “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”. By use of the “scrambler” phone Marshall could have reached Kimmel and Short well before the sun was up in Hawaii on the morning of the 7th. Instead, he elected to send a code message by the relatively slow-moving commercial radio. Unfortunately, by the time the message had arrived at Kimmel’s and Short’s headquarters it was already 12 noon Hawaiian time and Japanese war planes were
safely back on their carriers. Why, then, did General Marshall send the warning message by slow Western Union and not by telephone? Toland thinks it might have something to do with the fact that Marshall was fearful "that the Japanese would discover that the United States had solved their Purple code; the natural tendency of intelligence officers to guard new information almost obsessively; or interservice and interdepartmental rivalries". (p. 316).

Whether Kimmel and Short should have sensed the danger to Hawaii without premonitory advice from Washington is a fascinating conjecture. Admiral Kimmel, for example, knew from his intelligence officers that certain Japanese carrier task forces had blacked out their radios and disappeared into the vast ocean space. He did nothing about it, for he lacked the planes for 360 degree patrol, and the general tenor of his instructions from Washington had emphasized the probability that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor. For his part, General Short learned of a mysterious spy message from Hawaii to Japan on the night before the attack; he did nothing about it, because he could not decode it. The failure of Washington to let Kimmel and Short in on certain vital secrets made it inevitable that this should be so.

In the course of his analysis, Toland never suggests that Roosevelt deliberately withheld valuable information from Kimmel and Short in order to bring the United States into war by doing nothing to prevent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This interpretation, which was forcefully pronounced by a number of well known American revisionist historians in the post-World War II era, further maintained that Roosevelt secretly invited the Japanese attack and thus gave himself the necessary rallying cry to galvanize a reluctant nation and Congress for an all out crusade against the Axis Powers. Whether there is any truth in this view will, in the present reviewer's opinion, probably never be fully known. But one thing is certain, the United States' highest elected civilian officials were involved in an inexcusable campaign to make scapegoats of two innocent men. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to read Toland's statement on the last page of his study that "[d]espite shortcomings, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a remarkable leader. Following the maxim of world leaders, he was convinced that the ends justified the means and so truth was suppressed." (p. 324). This conclusion obviously takes away much of the thrust of Toland's opening comments that two innocent human beings were offered as sacrificial lambs for no other reason than to shield the Roosevelt Administration from mounting public anger arising from the Pearl Harbor fiasco. All this begs the question: did Roosevelt's ends justify ruining the lives of two noble commanders who were guilty of nothing more than being at the wrong place at the wrong time. Roosevelt, no doubt, may have very well rationalized his decision to remove Kimmel and Short on the grounds that he was far more important to the well being of the nation than either of the two Hawaiian commanders. But it was hardly rational for Roosevelt to destroy the careers of two men simply to protect and further his own. In this lies the crux of the matter.

NOTES


2. In addition to the investigation by the Roberts Commission, the following Pearl Harbor investigations were made: a preliminary investigation by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox prior to the investigation by the Roberts Commission; an examination of witnesses by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S.N., under a precept dated 12 February 1944; a naval court of inquiry headed by Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U.S.N.; an investigation by Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945; an investigation by the Army Pearl Harbor Board headed by General George Grunert, U.S. Army; and the investigation by the Joint Congressional Committee in 1945.

3. There is considerable controversy surrounding the meaning of the 26 November message. For a succinct discussion of the historical problem see Norman Hill, "Was There an Ultimatum before Pearl Harbor?" American Journal of International Law 42 (April 1948), 355-367.

André G. Kuczewski is a professional historian in the Department of Administration and Policy Studies at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. The author's primary field of interest is the diplomatic origins of the Second World War in the Far East between Japan and the United States. His book reviews and articles have appeared in Etudes Internationales, Asian Profile and well over a dozen other popular and academic periodicals on three continents. Mr. Kuczewski is currently writing a major study on the origins and legacy of General Douglas MacArthur's occupational policy in post 1945 Japan.
THE ROLE OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN NEW GUINEA IN 1944-45

By Bernadette McAlary, South Australian Health Commission

Introduction:

THE mopping-up campaigns in New Guinea 1944-1945 throw the worst possible light on Australian politics and military logistics. Australia went head-long into the New Guinea campaigns exactly the same way the country had initially entered World War II — automatically as a matter of principle with no thought to stipulating her own war aims or objectives.

In panic, the country's leaders subjugated the Parliament's autonomy and power to direct its own affairs in war. The Government blindly conceded to McArthur's demands and passively accepted changes to war policy decided solely by General Blarney. The government simply let the offensives proceed without questioning their political or strategic purpose. Theirs was a prime example of the substituting words for thought, of allowing a military cliche to take the place of reasoned argument. The Government really let generalisations influence the decision in the particular situation without subjecting the offensives to a rigorous examination in relation to the considerations pertaining to the particular situation.

The Government was so naive, it is folly for anyone to suggest it was sufficiently sophisticated to manipulate Australia's commitment in the mopping-up campaigns with the view to enhancing its international standing in post-war settlements.

For its part, the Government seems in the first instance to have taken no active stand either for or against the offensives. Then it found itself in the position of having to defend in Parliament and in public the actions of its military commander's actions. One line of defence was that military operations were purely the concern of the military commander and that the Government should not interfere with them. It is the function of the Government to determine the political aims of military action, to define clearly the task assigned to the military commander and then to provide him with the means of carrying it out.

As for the military necessity for these campaigns, history itself refutes this supposition.

By mid-1944, the Japanese were all but defeated — it was only a matter of time. The Japanese in New Guinea were cut off from supplies, diseased and in rags — they were strategically impotent. Any offensive the Japanese might have undertaken would have been purely local, and no matter how successful, would have been halted by the sea. The Australian offensives could have been achieved the same ultimate result by doing what the Americans had done, by remaining on the defensive.

Leaders of the Japanese forces able to fight either aimed to hold down Allied troops who might otherwise have been employed elsewhere or, dismissed entertaining counter-offensives because it was reasoned without naval and air support, no useful strategic purpose could be achieved.

Military intelligence was so poor it negatively influenced Australian military stratagems. It was not until after capitulation, Japanese numbers in New Guinea were closely established and even a fortress of 69,000 enemy troops was discovered on the Gazelle Peninsula.

Many contemporary Australians, at that time, contended that the New Guinea War was
unnecessary both on political and military grounds. These people included prominent public figures, the general public and the troops, themselves. I concur with their view.

Japanese invasion of the Pacific Islands was viewed by Australians as threat of possible Japanese invasion of Australia. Fear was generalised. The Government was not exempt.

The Americans made no effort to rout out the Japanese after they had fought successful offensives in New Guinea. However, when the American armies reached the Philippines, they sought complete destruction of the Japanese forces. These activities were never subjected to criticism on the ground that they were unnecessary. This change of policy was based on political rather than military grounds. It was of personal political expediency to MacArthur who was ambitious for acclaim back in America. Similar action in New Guinea would not have bought him the same recognition. This resulted in MacArthur’s disinterest in the New Guinea campaigns after the withdrawal of American troops.

Australia’s formal entry into the war had been virtually automatic. Without defined war aims and objectives it so no wonder the Ministers were disappointed to find that they had little say in the higher direction when it came to the war against Japan. Despite this, they not only accepted that decision but supported General MacArthur with undeviating loyalty. It is evident that this policy was adopted as a matter of principle.

The threat from Japan produced a change of mood in Australia — fear. In fear, the Government panicked and decided to mobilise the full strength of the nation to wage the mopping-up campaigns in New Guinea. Australian leaders were concerned about the implications of allowing large numbers of Japanese, an estimated 90,000, to become embedded in New Guinea and did not accept MacArthur’s view that the by-passed Japanese forces could be ignored because they were “strategically impotent”.

Paul Hasluck contends that by June 1944 the Government “favoured the civil side of the war effort”.9 This is not altogether true. The fact was in civil, as well as military planning, the Government was taking post-war needs into account. Additional responsibilities had been placed on Australia for the supply of food and other materials to the Allies. “As the additional manpower required for the production of these materials could be obtained only by a reduction of the armed forces, the Allies agreed that henceforth Australia should maintain six infantry divisions and two armored brigades in action or ready for action in the South-West Pacific Area”.10 The review of service programs was made in regard to present, as well as, future rates of production. The Government certainly had some reasonable grounds for relating it to the post-war aspect of maintenance of productive capacity. Hasluck goes on to argue, Government bias reduced the available manpower of the Australian Army which mitigated towards a secondary role of the Australian troops in the war.

That Curtin had to actually write to MacArthur on 22nd November 1943 to specify, ‘Australia had a special interest in the employment of her own forces in driving the Japanese from her territories”, that, as late as, March 1944 Blamey was asking General Morshead for America to request the Australians take over all areas in New Guinea and, finally, that Australia waited until 12th July for MacArthur to ‘inform Blamey that he wished Australian troops to assume responsibility for the continued neutralisation of the Japanese in Australian and British territory and mandates’, removes every last shread of doubt that Australia lacked decisiveness and was already very secondary in the role she was to play in this war.

Not only did the Australian Government not accept the responsibility for its own decision-making but mutely accepted specific prescriptions via MacArthur, ‘northern Solomons-Green Sialnds-Emirau Islands by 1st October; Australian New Guinea and New Britain by 1st November”. Australia’s indecisiveness had long since relegated Australia to a secondary role throughout the period she was at war.

In “May 1944, most of the Australian formations which had participated in the Huon Peninsula-Ramu Valley operations had been withdrawn for rest and refit”.11 When MacArthur did indicate his intention to employ Australian troops, of the three A.I.F. divisions, the 6th was the only one ready for action. Not a state of preparedness in anyone’s thinking. The 9th would be ready next and the 7th because it had suffered heavy sickness casualties would be last ready for action. The initial
formations, however, comprised the 6th and 9th divisions, with the 7th in reserve.

A further directive issued by McArthur on 2 August specified the minimum forces to be employed in New Guinea. To fulfill these requirements 'Blamey had to employ on these duties one more division than he had anticipated and considered necessary'.

This disposition 'would require practically all the fighting troops now in Australia . . . air strength in the Northern Territory virtually precluded an enemy landing'. A trebulous position for Australia when it is understood the country's only means of mounting an attack on any enemy would be by air.

Apparently, Blamey had foreseen this development which prompted him to advise the Government to reduce and reorganise the army. However, his advice had to be subjugated by the Government to MacArthur's directive. This left General Blamey with two immediate commitments in New Guinea:

- (a) to neutralise with four divisions the bypassed Japanese in the islands,
- (b) to provide two A.I.F. divisions for operations in the Philippines.'

Blamey's instructions, issued 11 August allotted the following tasks:

'Solomons Area —
Relieve the U.S. forces defending the Torkina perimeter on Bougainville, and Emirau, Green, Treasury and Munda islands, and defend the air and naval installations thereon.
On Bougainville, destroy enemy resistance as opportunity offers.

New Britain —
Relieve U.S. forces in New Britain, maintain contact with the Japanese by patrol activity, and without committing major forces, endeavor to advance for a line Open Bay — Wide Bay.

New Guinea —
Relieve the U.S. forces at Aitape, defend the airstrip and base area, and by patrol activity maintain contact with the enemy in the Wewak area. The commitment of major forces is to be avoided.
Maintain one infantry brigade based on the Madang-Hansa Bay area'.

MacArthur left the task of neutralising the enemy in by-passed areas to General Blamey's discretion. However, it was believed that in MacArthur's opinion nothing more than effective containment was required.

Although Curtin busied himself in discussion with Air Vice-Marshal Bostock and 'stated the principles that the first requirements was adequate air support for Australian land forces by the Allied Air Forces; that RAAF air support should be available to Australian land forces to the greatest extent practicable wherever they were in contact with the enemy'.

Curtin also stated the further contradictory principle 'that mopping-up and air garrison duties in re-occupied territories would be undertaken by the RAAF only after provision had been made to meet the other commitments'. This indicates how easily the Government could overlook its perception and its appreciation as to what may be required as necessary back-up for Australian troops at the front in the New Guinea campaigns.

At a War Council Meeting toward the end of September, Blamey reassured members 'that large-scale active operations were not contemplated at present. Enemy strength and positions would be probed and the extent of further operations would then be determined'.

However, in his own instructions, while General Blamey specified that major forces were not be committed on New Britain or Aitape but 'in respect of Bougainville, his expression destroy enemy resistance as opportunity offers did not restrict his subordinate formations to any particular line of action provided that they arranged for the security of the air and naval installations. The only restriction was the size of the forces placed at their disposal'.

At this point, public controversy accelerated. Proposed release of men from the Army led to criticism of Australia for failure to continue doing her proper share. In fact, some questioned whether the Australian Army was pulling right out of the war.

The situation was not helped by no news of the Australian operations in New Guinea appearing in MacArthur's communiques with a consequence correspondents' report of Australian operations could not be released by the censor. Of course, this gave MacArthur increased kudos in America which could be reckoned good politics for him.
It was not until, Spender, who was visiting New York, complained to a newspaper that MacArthur’s communiques were placing Australia and her war effort in a false light, Blamey and Forde wrote to MacArthur about the desirability of mentioning the Australians. MacArthur then admitted, “Australian Forces have relieved United States Army elements along the Solomons Axis, in New Britain and British New Guinea. Continuous actions of attrition at all points of contact have been in progress. 372 Japanese have been killed, twenty captured, and ten friendly nationals have been recovered”.

In Australia, this led to the much awaited publication of news about the operations which had been held up by the censor. However, one Australian newspaper maintained and reported the view, “American public opinion, which is inclined to write off Australia as a fighting force for the remainder of the Pacific war, now sees the Digger in the humblest of secondary roles — mopping-up behind the real fighting, slogging Yank... If the latest information means that the Australian campaign is to eradicate ‘backyard Japs’, the question of necessity arises. From this distance, the Solomons, New Britain and New Guinea garrisons seem well under the control, and there is no military need to waste Australian lives routing out the beleagured enemy”.

In answer to the criticism, Curtin reiterated that the Government had decided that all Australian ground troops were to be assigned to the command of General MacArthur in the South-West Pacific Area — Australia had a major political issue nearer home: ‘to clear out the enemy still in occupation of territories for which the Australian Government was politically responsible’.

Public criticism was not confined to public figures, criticism had also arisen from the troops themselves. Many of the troops considered they were first rate troops being used on a second-rate job. Morale was not heightened when they compared the inactivity of the U.S.A. fighting troops when in these areas while in possession of every conceivable type of equipment, and the lack of supply to support the Australian troops. The troops were further disgruntled because they also believed the Government was not willing to accept the financial obligations involved under lend-lease if American equipment was made available.

When General Blarney expressed the view that the Japanese should be mopped-up Senator Manner complained that the Army in New Guinea was not adequately equipped and that the Commander-in-Chief should be “a young and experienced man who has seen service in this war and is game enough to go to the front and see himself what is taking place”. It was Mr. Archie Cameron who also “said that he did not believe that the Parliament, the people or the Army had complete confidence in the man entrusted with the command of the Army”. Holt went as far to advocate immediate cessation of offensive operations. This debate was never pursued officially.

Curtin accepted full responsibility for the operations. He had also accepted the intelligence he received as true and therefore right and did not seem to beg the question. “Blamey had informed him that the operations had been discussed fully with MacArthur, who had given no specific instructions: MacArthur had stated that in such situations a local commander had considerable freedom of action as to methods, and that the local missions had been carried out with skill and energy and the equipment of the troops was sufficient... in the Philippines the Americans were clearing the Japanese from the whole of the islands to free the native peoples”. They displayed belief that without unconditional surrender of the Japanese in the Pacific, the only alternative was to smash the Japanese into submission. Australia was following precisely the same principle. Difficulties encountered in provision of supplies and amenities were directly attributable to shortage of shipping and this problem was world-wide.

As it turned out, with news of the landing of Australian troops at Tarakan, it appeared that the Australian infantry was again in the forefront of the battle and, thereafter, little was heard in public criticism of the divisions’ role in the New Guinea territories.

On the 22 May 1944, the War Cabinet examined an appreciation by Blamey of the
“Operations of Australian Military Forces in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands”. His operations were slanted with a view to:

- Destroying the enemy where this can be done with relatively light casualties, so as to free out territory and liberate the native population and thereby progressively reduce our commitments and free personnel from the Army;
- Where conditions are not favourable for the destruction of the enemy, to contain him in a restricted area by the use of a much smaller force, thus following the principle of economy.”

He noted the Americans change of policy after they reached the Philippines to free the islands completely of the enemy and further stated it was also necessary to destroy them in Australian territories. He had decided against passive defence because this course would destroy the Australian troops' morale, create discontent and impair their resistance to disease. This is only a statement of general principle, it should have and still remains open to challenge. He went on to say a passive defence would only serve to lower Australian prestige throughout the world and lower the prestige of the Government to an extent that it might not recover after the fighting had ceased. His policy was apparently based on political rather than military grounds.

Blamey’s aim was clear — to bring about the enemy’s total destruction. By aggressive patrolling he anticipated gaining information of enemy strengths and dispositions and by systematically driving him from his garden areas and supply bases to force him into
starvation and destroy him where he was found. Little was known of the enemy strengths and dispositions even by the American formations. It can be rightly argued that precise intelligence input is the crux of any military campaign. With a void of precise intelligence when mounting the mopping-up campaign, for Japanese numbers were repeatedly under-estimated, it is clearly understood there was no firm military rationale. It was rather an effective political motivation. Blarney's policy was a matter for Government not a matter of military strategy. Blarney stood firm in his conviction to disagree with MacArthur. He firmly believed the Japanese forces were not strategically impotent because for him, they were organised, adequately supplied and required large Australian forces to contain them. Given the time history refuted this belief. Blarney had argued that MacArthur, by implication, had approved the operations and the Council agreed to the objectives set out in Blarney’s appreciation. Practically all the combat strength of the Australian Army was put into action or otherwise, was in immediate reserve to the troops in action. This continued until the cease fire. At no time since 1918 had Australia maintained so many men in contact with the enemy and this was merely a secondary movement, merely mopping-up action. Without clear directives from Blarney, complicated considerations ensued that effected the employment of the Australian forces. After his defeat at Aitape, the Japanese General Adachi established his headquarters at Wewak. “Allied Intelligence estimated Adachi’s total strength to be from 24,000 to 30,000; actually it was nearer to 35,000”. Adachi’s army was in bad shape. It had suffered heavy casualties fighting in the Huon Peninsula. Apart from small cargoes brought by submarine at infrequent and irregular intervals, no supplies were reaching it. Adachi had to live off the country. He was short of ammunition and had no medical supplies. After suffering a long series of defeats and enduring great hardships, his troops were in rags, under-nourished, diseased, and had no immediate prospect of succour. In an Operation Instruction issued on 18 October, General Sturdee defined one of the roles of 6 Division as:— “to prevent movement westward of Japanese forces in the area and seize every opportunity for the destruction of these forces”. It is contended, there was a vital difference between this instruction and the instruction issued by Blarney on 11 August. Blarney had made no mention of attempting to destroy enemy forces and specifically directed that major Australian forces were not to be committed. Sturdee’s use of the expression “seize every opportunity for the destruction of these forces” did not seem to coincide as a correct interpretation of Blarney’s instructions. The expression gave a vigorous commander, like Stevens, plenty of scope to read into it an invitation, if not an actual direction, to employ his division in an all-out effort to destroy the enemy. Since Blarney must have had a copy of Sturdee’s instruction to Stevens soon after it was issued, Blarney’s silence may be taken as tacit approval. In spite of Blarney's directives to his subordinates, I can see no point in querying Sturdee’s or Stevens’ actions. There is little evidence of misinterpretation of orders. Blarney had previously stated clearly his intention to carry out offensive action. Some confusion did occur when, towards the end of January, “Stevens sought permission to engage in a more vigorous offensive to destroy the enemy in the Wewak area. In reply Sturdee told him to continue his coastal advance but not to become involved in a major engagement since no reinforcements or additional administrative resources were available”. None the less, Stevens issued an operation instruction stating his intention to be the captor of But, Dagua and Wewak. 16 Brigade started on 20 February, and advancing against only minor opposition, crossed the Anumb River three days later. On 17 March the leading battalion occupied But and on the 21st cleared the enemy from the Dagua area. 17 Brigade advanced towards Maprik through Balif and Asankor. Although the advance had not led to a general action, there had been much hard and costly fighting in a minor key. Australian casualties were quite heavy in relation to the size of each one of the numerous small actions the Japanese compelled them to fight. The troops were not able to take adequate preventive measures and the sickness rate mounted alarmingly. It is not surprising that the troops of 6 Division viewed the
operations without any marked degree of enthusiasm. They knew well enough that they were merely mopping up and they were convinced that no important issue hung upon the result of their labors. "In brief, they considered that the enterprise was not worth the exertions they had to make and the price they had to pay".

On 19 March, General Blamey decided to advance to Wewak. When Wewak was captured on 10 May it was found that many Japanese had escaped by tracks leading inland. 16 Brigade immediately took up the pursuit with the object of driving the fugitives against 17 Brigade advancing eastward through Maprik. These operations dragged on until 11 August. It was on this date Sturdee advised Stevens that the Japanese Government had opened surrender negotiations and ordered him to stand fast on the position he then occupied. At this stage the remains of the Japanese 18 Army was compressed in the triangle Haripmor - Tonumbu - Numoikum. After the capitulation, Adachi said that his object had been to hold down Allied troops who might otherwise have been employed elsewhere. The truth is, after his costly attempt to destroy the Americans at Aitape, he was in no position to do much more than keep his troops alive. He was definitely incapable of undertaking offensive action. Simply nothing that he did or attempted to do necessitated an Allied offensive.

Allied estimates placed the Japanese total strength on New Britain at 38,000, a long way short of the true figure. The role given by General Blamey to the Australian force - 5 Division - detailed to relieve the American forces on New Britain was:

"To maintain contact with the Japanese forces by patrol activity, and without committing major forces, to endeavor to advance to a line Open Bay - Wide Bay".

On 27 December 5 Division began its advance towards Wide Bay with the immediate object of establishing an advanced base at Milim. On the 15th a Japanese detachment was driven from Kamandran and patrols established the fact that the enemy was holding a strong position at Waitavalo. Logistic difficulties held up preparations for attacking this position until 5 March. The attack went in two days later and captured the position after some sharp fighting.

Following the capture of Waitavalo, patrols moved along the coast to Jammer Bay and along the inland tracks. Only scattered opposition was encountered. 5 Division had now secured its objective Wide Bay - Open Bay. From then until the close of hostilities the division followed a policy of vigorous patrolling.

It was not until after capitulation that it was found that the Japanese force were holding a fortress at the tip of the Gazelle Peninsula comprising "16,200 naval troops and 53,000 army troops, a total of 69,000. This force was well provisioned, well equipped and had ample stocks of ammunition". The only reason General Imamura did not employ this formidable force in a counter-offensive was the fact he considered that without naval and air support he could achieve no useful strategic purpose. Until success in the north enabled the Japanese fleet and air force to return to Rabaul there was no point in recapturing ground in New Britain. To attempt so would merely fritter away his strength without winning any worthwhile objectives. At the close of hostilities the Australians were still a long way from the fortress.

This last mentioned fact reveals the incompetence of Australian military intelligence and the total uselessness of these campaigns fought so wide of a rational basis.

On Bougainville, the main Japanese force was concentrated around Buin. The Japanese commander on Bougainville, Lieutenant-General Hyakutake, unable to penetrate the defences, weakened by severe casualties and impeded by long lines of communication, withdrew his forces and followed Imamura's New Britain policy of "live and let live."

"At the end of October, 1944, Allied Intelligence correctly estimated that the main Japanese army force was in the Buin area and that detachments of 17 Division were at Numa Numa and the northern end of the island. Again, although it was known that there were naval forces on the island, their strength was underestimated. Actually a naval garrison force about 4,000 strong was in the Buka area, and in the Buin area there were some 3,500 marines. Towards the end of 1944 Hyakutake had 35 per cent of his troops engaged on gardening and fishing, 15 per cent on transport duty, 30 per cent sick, and about 20 per cent available for fighting".
Lieutenant-General S. G. Savige arrived between 13 and 20 November and took over command in the Solomons on the 22nd. On Bougainville, Savige defined the primary task as the defence of the Torokina perimeter, and the secondary task "to gain information which would assist the preparation of a plan for the total reduction of the Japanese troops on the island".

From the very beginning, General Savige made it plain that he intended to engage in a major offensive in pursuance of the clause in Blamey's instruction: "Destroy enemy resistance as opportunity offers." Since both Sturdee and Blamey must have had a copy of Savige's operation instruction soon after it was issued and they took no restraining action, it can only be assumed that they approved of the proposal.

Landing at several points southward of Motupena Point, patrols moved by the coastal track and found that the enemy was withdrawing across the Puriata River. On 4 March an Australian column crossed the Puriata on the Buin Road and immediately encountered strong opposition. "After several days of heavy fighting, during which a number of bayonet attacks were delivered by the Australians, the Japanese position astride the road was captured, but attempts to reduce a position just off the track were not successful. While this fighting was going on, Japanese detachments raided the line of communication behind the forward troops. Another column moving by a parallel route a few miles inland from the Buin road, was also brought to a halt by strongly entrenched Japanese soon after crossing the Puriata".

On 29 March the Japanese launched a general counter-offensive against the Australian positions in the Puriata River area and succeeded in isolating several localities. Very close and fierce fighting went on until 6 April.
and only after the Japanese commander, had suffered crippling losses, did he give up his attempt to drive the Australians across the river.

After reorganisation, the advance was resumed on 17 April. When the Mivo River was reached towards the end of June the Japanese mounted some particularly heavy counter-attacks, all of which were beaten off with heavy loss. “During July rain fell on 26 days and a total of 2,193 points was registered”. These abnormal weather conditions brought active operations except patrolling to a standstill. But before the advance could be resumed information was received on 15 August that Japan had capitulated. Three days later an envoy from General Hyakutake crossed the Mivo under a flag of truce to arrange for the surrender of all Japanese forces.

The campaign on Bougainville cost the Australian Army 2,088 battle casualties, of which 516 were killed in action or died of wounds. Although the Japanese losses were much heavier, their strength in the Buin area at the close of hostilities was still so formidable that an attempt to destroy them would have undoubtedly involved the Australians in longer and costlier operations than those they had already undertaken.

The Australian troops engaged on Bougainville, like those engaged in the Aitape - Wewak area, knew well enough that the offensive was contributing nothing to the winning of the war. One unit history expressed the general opinion in the paragraph:

“At Salamaua men went after the Jap because every inch of ground won meant so much less distance to Tokyo. But what did an inch of ground — or a mile — mean on Bougainville? Nothing! Whether Bougainville could be taken in a week or a year would make no difference to the war in general. Every man knew this”.

Politically or strategically, the offensives on Bougainville and at Aitape - Wewak served no useful purpose. They achieved nothing that could not have been achieved at far less cost. Fortunately for the good name of the Australian Army, the Japanese capitulated before this chicken came home to roost.

NOTES
5. Hasluck, ibid, p. 566.
6. Hasluck, op cit, p. 566.
8. Keogh, ibid, p. 397.
11. Keogh, ibid, p. 397.
17. Hasluck, ibid., p. 571.
22. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 574.
32. Keogh, op. cit., p. 419.
34. Keogh, op. cit., p. 422.

Bernadette McAlary has previously contributed to the Defence Force Journal. She is a registered general and midwifery nurse with a Diploma of Teaching, Bachelor of Education and is currently a student in a Masters Degree, Business Administration. She is employed with the South Australian Health Commission in Health Services Administration.
JAPAN'S RELUCTANT RETURN TO MILITARY POWER

Major A. Weaver, RL, Royal Australian Infantry, (RET)

"The true warrior picks his teeth on an empty stomach".

Samurai philosophy.

Background

Japan's defeat which ended World War II was complete. Even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki were obliterated by atom bombs, the cities of the Japanese home islands were destroyed by countless air raids. The industrial empire of Japan lay in ruins, her naval and merchant ships had been sunk and her foreign trade was non-existent. Her seven-million strong army had returned from the farflung battlefields of Asia and the Pacific, despondent and morally crushed and her once mighty airforce was smashed.

Thirty-eight years later, and after a thorough programme of demilitarization, Japan has again emerged as a significant power. The technical skills, sheer dedication and diligence of her people, and their complete participation in the fulfilment of national aims, have, in no small measure, contributed to this phenomenon.

Significantly, all this was achieved under a democratic system of government. The remarkable buoyancy and vitality of Japan today has impressed the world and her sphere of influence is being widened in a most spectacular way, whilst her prosperity and economic power continue to grow at an unprecedented rate.

Some Vital Considerations

Japan's continued prosperity depends to a great extent on the maintenance of her trade relations with other countries. The escalating tempo of this trade, if in any way curtailed, will inevitably upset the country's economy, and, consequently any instability which could adversely affect her trading partners will have a direct impact on her own economic balance.

Japan is thus faced with the problem of having to protect her increasing wealth, and, although not threatened by any apparent hostile designs on her homeland, her trade could be endangered as a result of unrest, confrontation and limited conflict in places such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Indo-China, Malaysia, South Korea, Burma, India, Pakistan and the Middle East.

Japan is vitally concerned that the maintenance of peace and security in such regions is continued, and that the security of the high seas and accessibility of safe ports for her vast merchant fleets are guaranteed.

A case in point is the important fact that Japan imports daily over half a million tonnes of petroleum, iron ore and coking coal via the often contentious straits of Malacca.

Constitutional Factors

Against this background, the Japanese have been forced, reluctantly, to take positive steps to prepare themselves militarily within the framework of their national constitution, the restrictive article of which states:

"Renunciation of War.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Despite the war-renouncing clause, Japan, as early as 1950, spurred by the United Nations requirements for the execution of the Korean war, and encouraged by the occupying powers, embarked upon a programme of rearmament and military training. This was necessary to meet the fundamental needs for defence of her homeland.

Initially this requirement was met by the formation of a National Police Force of 750,000 men and an 18,000 men strong coastal navy, both of which became the embryo of the expanding ‘self-defence forces’ of Japan. Since then considerable developments have taken place, highlighted by the Supreme Court ruling in 1961 which interpreted the “no-war clause” to imply that it was not to limit Japan’s inherent right for self-defence in face of aggression. Thus expenditure on defence is not in any way limited by the constitution.

The Japanese Defence Structure

The Japanese defence structure is designed to fulfill the requirements of self-defence, strictly within the framework of the constitution. The euphemism “Self-Defence Forces” (Jieitai) has been selected advisedly to designate the country’s military services.

Defence spending for the fiscal year 1982 was 3.2% of the General Account Budget and totalled over 2500 billion Yen (approx Y220 to $A1.00 in October 1983) representing a 7.8% increase over that of the previous fiscal year; and the ratio of defence spending to GNP fluctuated from 0.91% to 0.93%.

As the fastest growing economic power in the world, she will only have to maintain this level of expenditure on defence, to attain fourth place as a military power well before the end of the eighties.

The Japanese Self-Defence Forces

The Japanese Self-Defence Forces, presently numbering 300,000 men, are grouped under a unified command and comprise the Ministry of Self Defence, the Ground Self-Defence Force, the Maritime Self Defence Force and the Air Self-Defence Force. All three services are entirely manned by volunteers and have a high proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers to provide the nucleus for a much larger force. Each service has its own training establishments, staff colleges and hospitals.

The Ground Self-Defence Force (Army)

Japan’s ground defence capability is to act as a deterrent to aggression against Japan by impressing upon would-be airborne and seaborne aggressors that they will have to project sufficient ground forces to destroy Japan’s ground defence, thereby deterring them to attempt any incursions against the Japanese homeland.

Should actual aggression occur Japanese forces would try to interdict and repel landing forces at sea or on the beaches so as to minimize the possibility of inland battles.

However should any invading force evade interdiction at sea or on the beaches, the ground forces would be the major force to deal with them by taking advantage of the terrain.

The Ground Self-Defence Force comprises twelve divisions and two combined brigades for peacetime deployment. The divisions are positioned as basic operational forces capable of independent combat operations over certain periods.

The current tendency is to move toward an emphasis on mobile striking power, mobility, firepower and air defence capabilities with at least one tactical formation of each kind capable of mobile operations in support of divisions.

Currently such tactical formations comprise one armoured division, one artillery brigade, one airborne brigade, one training brigade and one helicopter brigade.

— The armoured division is organized mainly as a tank formation, chiefly responsible for mobile firepower and mobility.
— The artillery brigade is equipped with various types of field artillery guns and provides over-all fire support.
— The airborne brigade performs various airborne operations such as surprise assaults on vital fronts and destruction of enemy positions as well as the security of areas independently, or in co-operation with ground forces.
— The training brigade is responsible for the training of personnel and for the provision of support for research work at the Combined Arms School. The various functions of the brigade are well balanced and it maintains a satisfactory level of training as a back-up for ground combat.

— The helicopter brigade is equipped with transport helicopters and provides air-transportation of combat units and supplies.

The Ground Self-Defence Force is also designed to provide surface-to-air missile units capable of performing low altitude air defence over vital areas. In line with this concept, the force has eight anti-aircraft artillery groups equipped with surface-to-air HAWK missiles which are gradually being converted from the basic model to an improved version in order to be able to cope with more sophisticated aircraft.

The Ground Self-Defence Force maintains a strength of 180,000 personnel which is considered to be adequate for its function.

The combat units often operate under near arctic conditions, ostensibly with a weather-eye on likely Soviet aggressive intentions.

The training of the officers, and men and the equipment they use are superior or at least on a par to those of their neighbours. They are well paid, highly disciplined, well trained and enjoy a high morale. Unlike the fanaticism of the men of the old Imperial Forces who marched through Asia, conscripted and poorly paid, the modern soldier is a volunteer who may resign at any time. He enjoys the most modern conditions any army can offer. The height and physical strength of the soldiers are greatly increased as a result of improved nutritional standards enjoyed by the Japanese people in recent years. Only ten per cent of applicants for commissioned rank are accepted for training, in keeping with the policy of attaining the highest professionalism possible. On the lower levels, the forces must compete strongly with industry for their recruits — a formidable problem in the highly competitive society of modern Japan.

Although strong emphasis is placed on technical skills, all ranks are given exhaustive and strictest training in unarmed combat. The martial arts of Kendo, Judo, Karate and physical fitness programmes are of primary consideration at all times.

Some of the hardware with which the force is currently equipped includes about 850 Type-74 tanks (38 tons, 105mm gun), 540 APCs, 770 rockets, 330 anti-aircraft machine guns, 1860 mortars, 1470 recoilless rifles, 890 field guns and howitzers (155mm self-propelled, Type 75).

The Type-74 tanks have 105mm guns with anti-vibration devices and computerized trajectory calculators, weighing about 38 tons and capable of a maximum speed of about 53 km/h. The height of the tanks is adjustable and they can be fitted with a snorkel. An airtight compartment is installed for protection of its four-man crew against NBC attack.

The field guns and howitzers of the force consist of Type-75, 155mm self-propelled howitzers weighing about 25.3 tons and capable of a speed of about 47 km/h.

The Air Self-Defence Force (Air Force)

Japan’s air defence is provided by continuous surveillance over almost the entire air space surrounding Japan, by aircraft warning and control systems and air defence operations at low and high altitudes and the maintenance of aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.

The force also provides the capabilities for interdiction of hostile airborne and seaborne forces and for supporting ground battles. It is designed to take immediate and appropriate action against violations of territorial air space and aggression in the air, at all times.

For this purpose the Air Self-Defence Force is equipped with aircraft control and warning wings, fighter wings and surface-to-air missile groups maintaining twenty-four hour alert in peacetime and performing missions to deal with violations of territorial air space.

In keeping with the improved performance of aircraft in recent years, modernisation of these units has become necessary in order to maintain a state of effective readiness and an adequate defence posture.

Accordingly the force is currently modernising its fighter intercepter aircraft by replacing the F-104J by the F-15. The Air Self-Defence Force is also responsible for the interdiction of hostile sea and airborne landings and ground support when required. It has been given three squadrons of F-1 ground support aircraft, however, it is anticipated that the F-1s will have to be replaced by more modern aircraft as they will end their useful life by 1985.
For their air reconnaissance and air transportation roles the force maintains the air reconnaissance squadron consisting of RF-4Fs and three air transport squadrons of C-1s which in view of their inadequacies for support of mobile and airborne operations will soon be replaced by C-130Hs.

Overall, the combat aircraft of the Air Self-Defence Forces include about 260 fighters, ten reconnaissance aircraft and forty transport planes. In addition the force has six groups of ground-to-air guided missiles (NIKE) units on its order of battle.

In the not so distant future the Japanese may well consider developing their own fighting aircraft. The current emphasis on true auton­omy dictates such a course which is well within the scope of the highly efficient Japanese industry. The competent Japanese electronics industry is busily developing air defence installations and surveillance satellites, and, undoubtedly Japan will eventually develop her own missiles.

The Maritime Self-Defence Force (Navy)

Japan's Maritime Self-Defence Force manned by 40,000 officers and men is responsible for defending the country against invasion from the sea and for protecting maritime transportation in the waters surrounding Japan.

Since any potential aggressor must approach Japan by sea or air the Maritime Self-Defence Force is responsible for interdicting the invaders at sea in joint operations with the Ground Self-Defence Force and the Air Self-Defence Force.

The severance or blockage of Japan's sea transportation is considered one of the most effective means by which a would-be aggressor could defeat a country such as Japan, which is so heavily dependent on overseas supply of resources, energy, food and other vital commodities.

Accordingly, the Maritime Self-Defence Force is also charged with the protection of maritime transportation. The force provides one fleet escort force which maintains at least one escort flotilla on operational alert for immediate operations against hostile elements at sea. In line with this concept, the Fleet Escort Force maintains four escort flotillas, each of which is a basic unit for mobile operations providing well balanced anti-submarine, surface strike and air defence functions.

The Maritime Self-Defence Force is accelerating the modernisation of its escort flotilla and plans to modernize two-thirds of its total number of twenty-one vessels by 1986.

The force is also designed to provide anti-submarine units capable of maintaining at least one operational division in each designated area on constant alert as a surface vessel unit for the purpose of guarding and defending coastal waters.

For the defence of coastal waters the waters are divided into five districts each of which has two divisions allocated to it, with anti-submarine, surface strike and airborne functions. Accordingly the deployment of vessels equipped with anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare equipment etc. is in progress.

The force is also designed to maintain submarines, ASW helicopters and minesweepers in order to guard the coasts and perform minesweeping operations in vital ports, harbours and major straits as required.

In 1982, the total number of submarines in service was fourteen. Their functions are to conduct anti-submarine warfare and to assault hostile vessels. The installation of anti-ship missiles on submarines is gradually being contemplated in order to strengthen their attack capability and to improve their chances for survival.

Land based helicopters for anti-submarine warfare are designed for coastal defence of major straits, vital ports and harbours, and are also designed to act on information received from submarines for effective anti-submarine action in co-operation with surface vessels. For such purposes they are also being equipped with magnetic detection devices in addition to sound detection devices.

Minesweepers are organized into minesweeping divisions and minesweeper helicopter units as part of the minesweeper flotillas in each district, and are designed to remove and dispose of mines. The force is also equipped with fixed wing aircraft for anti-submarine warfare, capable of performing surveillance and patrol missions in surrounding waters and for escorting surface vessels.

The Maritime Self-Defence Force is presently in the process of acquiring P-3Cs to replace the P-3Js and other aircraft that are gradually being decommissioned to improve capability.
to deal with high performance nuclear submarines.

Approximately ten fixed wing aircraft units for anti-submarine operations are to be raised in the near future.

The Maritime Self-Defence Forces includes some of the following:

- Capital ships such as the 5200 ton 'SHIRANE MARU' which is capable of a speed of 32 knots and is equipped with a short range SAM system (Seasparrow), two 5-inch single-mounted rapid fire guns, two triple mounted short range torpedo tubes, one ASROC launcher, and three anti-submarine helicopters.

- Approximately 370 operational aircraft (including 60 anti-submarine patrol helicopters and 120 anti-submarine fixed wing patrol aircraft, as well as:
  - forty-eight destroyers
  - fourteen submarines
  - eighteen frigates
  - forty mine warfare vessels
  - twenty-one patrol vessels
  - ten motor torpedo boats
  - twenty-seven motor launches
  - eight landing vessels
  - three depot ships
  - two oil tankers
  - three tugs
  - and, thirty-one auxiliary vessels.)

 Reserve Forces (Yobitai)

In addition to the country's regular Self-Defence Forces, the Ground Self-Defence Force has a 41,000 men strong citizens force of part-time officers and other ranks whilst the Maritime Self-Defence Force maintains six hundred reservists.

It is interesting to note that the effective strength of the citizens forces falls less than one percent short of its authorized order of battle.

Maritime Safety Agency (Coast Guard)

Independent of the country's defence structure is the Maritime Safety Agency (Coast Guard) which comprises 12,000 men with eight large patrol vessels, twenty-two medium patrol vessels, fifty-seven small patrol vessels, 197 patrol craft, and twenty-five navigational supply vessels. These vessels are being constantly modernized in conformity with increasing commitments brought about by the adjustments made to internationally recognized territorial waters.

In essence the Maritime Safety Agency is responsible for enforcement of law and order at sea, rescue of life, cargo and vessels in distress and providing necessary assistance in case of natural calamity, accidents or other events when relief is required as well as matters concerning port regulations, suppression of riots and disturbances at sea and search and arrest of criminals at sea.

Nuclear Consideration

Japan's nuclear capabilities although by no means as developed as those of the major powers has considerable potential. She has established several nuclear reactors capable of generating high yields of power which will give her adequate capabilities of producing great quantities of bomb-usable plutonium.

Currently Japan has twenty-four operational nuclear power plants with a further eleven units under construction and another eight in the planning stage. By the time the forty-three units are operational they are expected to generate 35,244 mW of power.

Nevertheless it is most unlikely that Japan will be able to develop her nuclear capabilities for defence purposes for some time as she is bound by the law of "three anti-nuclear principles", of non-possession, non-manufacture and non-importation of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore Japan ratified the nuclear arms non-proliferation agreement in June 1976 which obligates her to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear arms.

It is widely agreed that the nuclear deterrent poses an enigma which forces powerful nations to withhold their strength in the face of massive retaliation, which, at its best, would end in pyrrhic victory, and, Japanese defense philosophy is most certainly coloured with such considerations.

Furthermore, the Japanese government has long been most reluctant to embark upon an extensive nuclear weapons programme as she reportedly fears that such action could well result in a nuclear arms race between China and herself. On the other hand, Japan is quietly preparing the way for rapid expansion in the nuclear field should the situation demand such action.

Envisaged Role of the Self-Defence Forces

The Japanese government insists, that her forces will only be employed for defence, and, in the more specific sense, for self-defence. But in practical terms the training of the individual serviceman and of the combat teams to which he belongs is both defensive and offensive. There is no other alternative.

The Japanese are acutely aware of the fact that instability in the world, particularly in Asia, is caused by economic inequalities. Japan is therefore determined to play a larger role in the assistance of underdeveloped nations to offset such anomalies. Reluctantly, however, Japan may have to do so from a position of military power, particularly in the light of eventual United States military withdrawals from the region.

Should the ability of any of Japan’s trading partners be threatened by revolutions or foreign intervention, she may well be forced to provide some form of military presence abroad, may this be in the form of military aid, or in extreme cases, by direct military involvement, however far-fetched such scenario may appear at present.

Alternatively she may have to accept the most unsavoury situation of becoming a highly geared workshop without an equitable consumer demand and without adequate raw materials. Such a situation could set off a chain reaction of economic chaos, not only in Japan, but also in countries intimately involved in trade practices with her.

In view of these considerations, the eventual role of the Self-Defence Forces, presently forbidden by the Japanese constitution to operate on foreign soil, will most certainly be determined by developments on the international scene. Consequent legislative adjustments to the “no-war” clause of the National constitution will further decide this issue.

In the face of likely threats against Japan’s interests at home and abroad, such constitutional amendments could well involve the Japanese Navy in extensive escort duties for merchant convoys and on protective tasks over home and foreign ports. The highly trained naval landing parties may be deployed, whenever necessary, to afford ground protection and security on invitation by friendly trading nations experiencing armed threats against their trading installation.

The Japanese Air Force may establish bases protected by Japanese soldiers (in agreement with friendly powers) as a further stabilizing factor in the security of the regions.

It is most unlikely that Japan would ever again embark upon military adventures abroad. Her abortive experiences in China confirmed by the American experience in Vietnam will most certainly influence her against taking such a course no matter what the provocations may be. Consequently it is most unlikely that her army of the future will ever be increased beyond fifty divisions in time of war.

The rebirth of the Japanese Imperial Marine Corps is a strong probability. The nucleus of such formation is currently being provided by the naval landing parties of the Maritime Self-Defence Force. The role of the Marines aptly caters for the type of operations Japanese forces may be faced with, under circumstances already mentioned.

Japanese Public Opinion

The majority of Japanese are still opposed to militarism of any kind. They remember their disastrous defeat in World War II and the swashbuckling tyrannical power exercised by her military clique (Gunbatsu). It will, however, be a relatively simple matter to convince the masses that the necessity exists for some rearmament, particularly in the field of passive defence. Being the only victims, so
far, of nuclear attacks, the Japanese are aware of the requirements for such preparations.

To further support any argument for rear­mament, the government of Japan may well exploit the latent national paranoia which has manifested itself in the ranks of the older or middle-aged groups of the population who vividly recall the punishment they sustained from hostile aircraft in World War II when their defences were utterly inadequate to repel or sustain such attacks.

Certainly there are strong leftist socialist factions militant in Japan. Irrespective of their political alignments, however, the homogeneous Japanese people still retain their traditional patriotism and awareness of the importance of national unity and solidarity. They particularly tend to rally in the face of political economic and military crises.

There is also ample evidence that a new­style nationalism is making itself felt in Japan; mostly emanating from a just pride in post-war achievements. The proud, resourceful and ambitious Japanese are increasingly aware of the fact, that they will progressively play a greater part in the shaping of world history. But the likelihood of such national consciousness bringing about a return to the old style militarism is most remote in the light of the strong leftist influences permeating the Japanese political scene. Nor would the rightist factions countenance the progress-inhibiting revival of the Bushido creed. (Way of the warrior.)

It is however certain that a nation of the size and importance of Japan will hardly continue to exist without adequate military forces. The realistic Japanese are aware that the execution of foreign policy and political intervention abroad carry no credibility unless pursued from a position of power.

**Power Alignments**

Japan will not consider joining an Asian Regional Security plan as her existing treaty with the United States does not make it feasible to enter into a similar treaty with other countries, nor does the ‘no war’ clause of her constitution make such alliances workable. The United States Security Treaty with Japan continues to play a most significant role in preventing aggression against Japan. But as has long been predicted the United States is beginning to exert pressure on Japan to increase her defence spending. In addition to the security afforded Japan by the very presence of United States Naval and Air Force installations and personnel in Japan and South Korea, US equipment and technology have often been made available to Japan in the past in line with the Japan-US security arrangement. Over the last two years exchanges of equipment and technical information, licensing releases (permits from the US government for Japanese production) more frequent information exchanges etc. have been discussed between the two countries’ defence officials.

Significant also is the growing determination for self reliance by the Japanese. Although still relying to a large extent on American strategical or tactical equipment they are determined to achieve complete autonomy by replacing obsolete weapons with those developed and manufactured in Japan.

The USSR’s intransigent posture of refusing to sign a peace treaty with Japan unless the Japanese desist from pressing demands for the return of their “Northern Territories” is a continuing problem.

The Soviet Union has been consistently strengthening its military power, both qualitatively and quantitatively in the Far East as epitomised by the deployment of an estimated division of ground forces on the islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and the Habomai group situated immediately north-east of Japan’s northern-most island of Hokkaido. (Referred to as Japan’s Northern Territories.) This together with a substantial Soviet naval and air force presence in that area is seen as a constant and increasing threat to the security of Japan. Since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in October 1956 when the two countries signed a Joint Declaration, the matter of the reversion to Japan of the Northern Territories has remained the sole unsettled issue left for Japan resulting from World War II since the United States returned the Ogasawara and Okinawa islands to Japanese sovereignty.

During the early seventies, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently referred to Japan’s “militarized economy” and “revival of militarism concurrent with economic encroachment”. However since the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship on 12 August 1978 Chinese attitudes toward Japan have changed
considerably and it is interesting to note that
the PRC government has repeatedly urged the
Japanese to press their demands for the return
of the Northern Territories with increased
vigour.
Smaller nations such as the Philippines,
South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore
continue to be somewhat apprehensive of a
Japanese military come-back and traditionally,
the position of Taiwan is a singularly vital one
in Japanese security considerations.
Japan's trade with the prosperous Chinese
Nationalist Republic flourishes — a matter
which had often caused the PRC government
to threaten cancelling trade practices with
Japan. Furthermore the withdrawal of the
United States Seventh Fleet which acted as an
effective wedge set between the two Chinas
for more than a quarter of a century, continues
to be a problem seriously affecting Japanese
strategic concepts.

The Australian Attitude Toward Japan's
Military Role
When the Australian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr Bill Hayden, M.P., released a
press statement in Tokyo on 26 July 1983 he
made it clear that Australia and Japan share
a basic commitment to the strategic interests
of the West by emphasizing the fact that both
Australia and Japan are allies of the United
States and share similar views on a range of
international issues and common views as
regional neighbours working for peace.
He made the point that Australia has a
strong interest in the establishment and main-
tenance of harmonious defence relationships
between Japan and the United States; stating
that this is of great importance to the stability
of the Asia/Pacific region as a whole and to
the ability of the United States to carry out
its global role.
Mr Hayden further asserted that Japan is
making an effective contribution to Western
strategic interests through its self-defence
forces and its provision of bases and other
facilities for the United States in Japan, within
the framework of the Japan-United States
Treaty of mutual security and co-operation.
Significantly, however, Mr Hayden ex-
pressed Australian reservations as follows:
"Australia would be concerned if either as
a result of external pressure or internal
decision there were a shift in Japan's basic
defence posture, or a dramatic acceleration
of defence spending or if Japan were to
attempt to develop a regional security role.
This would have a destabilizing effect on
the Asia-Pacific region. Australia notes that
there are strong constitutional and domestic
political constraints as well as regional sen-
sitivities which operate against Japan's al-
tering its basic policies."

Japan's Future in Power Politics
The area around Japan is one of geograph-
ical complexity.
Situated adjacent to the Asian continent
with its peninsulas, islands and straits Japan
represents a force for stability backed by
economic power, second only to the United
States among Western countries, whilst geo-
graphically occupying a strategically important
position. The various political and military
interests of the USA, China and the USSR
overlap in this area as seen in the light of the
Sino-Soviet confrontations, the Sino-American rapprochements as well as in the major military confrontations on the Korean peninsula.

It is also worth mentioning here that, in Japan there has been a substantial growth in nationwide public opinion concerning the issue as seen in the designation of “Northern Territories Day” on 7th February each year.

The Japanese are obsessed with their aim to convince the world that they are at least equal industrially, economically and technically with the West. Indeed some eminent economists believe that, well before the end of the century, Japan will surpass the United States economically and in her living standards, and it has long been predicted that Japan would assume first place in the field of car manufacture.

To illustrate Japan’s enormous potential it is worthy of note that her military power today is only a fraction of that of her pre-war strength when her forces could boast a might consisting of eight million men in uniform, 1,400 aircraft, 1½ million tons of warships, 10,000 artillery pieces and 10,000 tanks.

Modern Japan, with her increased technological and industrial capabilities, could greatly improve on such achievements should the need arise.

It could be argued that Japan's low defence spending when compared with the enormous defence budget of her neighbours, may, together with her constitutional restrictions, render her a militarily impotent economic superpower without super-weapons. Nevertheless, even without increasing her defence spending — with her ever-increasing gross national product and her industrial potential — Japan has the capability of becoming the most significant military force in Asia. And, should Japan decide to increase her defence spending by merely one per cent of her GNP, a truly significant growth of her defence potential would ensue. It is to be reasonably assumed that the contentious political developments in the regions surrounding Japan's economic sphere will inevitably force her into amending the war-renouncing clause of her democratic constitution.

Consequently Japan will, however reluctantly, be induced to re-enter the military scene to meet any threats against the security of her trade practices.

In the light of the requirements for survival as a nation dependent on the import of vitally needed raw materials and continued and ever-increasing overseas trade in a turbulent world, Japan cannot shirk her involvement in military preparedness and, perhaps likely military involvement in the future.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


The “Europa” Statesman’s Year Book.

“Facts about Japan” by Public Information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

“The Asia Magazine” Japan editions.

ABC-TV program, “Four Corners” — 1970 “Japan’s Defence Forces”.

Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs — 1980, “Japan’s Northern Territories”.


---

Major Weaver retired from the Australian Regular Army in 1976. He enlisted in the AIF early in 1942, and served with the 29/46 Infantry Battalion in SWPA during World War II and later with 67 Infantry Battalion in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. A Japanese and German linguist he was subsequently posted to the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre and British Intelligence Detailed Interrogation Unit in Japan. During the Korean conflict he was a platoon commander with 3 BAR and was then again posted to Japan with HQ British Commonwealth Force, Korea. In 1962 he was appointed GSO 2 to HQ Northern Territory Command, Darwin and later served as the Second-in-Command of the First Australian Civil Affairs Unit in Vietnam.
BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel B. J. Avery, RA Inf, SO1 (PERS) HQ 1 MD.

ANDREW Hiller is a barrister and the Senior Lecturer in criminal law at the University of Queensland; his experience is not confined to academia and includes service with the Australian Army Reserve dating back to his enlistment into the Royal Australian Signals in 1953. His appointments have included SO2(OPS)(ARES) at HQ 1 MD; although currently on the Inactive Reserve, he is frequently called upon to lecture on this topic in which he has become so expert. Major Hiller's interest in the subject of public order and the law dates back to 1973 when, as an Army Reserve Officer of the Australian Army Legal Corps, he was requested to lecture on the subject of aid to the civil power to courses at the Jungle Training Centre Canungra (now Land Warfare Centre) and to units at Enoggera. His interest in the subject led him to undertake extensive research, and the final product is his book 'Public Order and The Law' which is the only publication which deals exclusively with this subject as affected by the laws of Australia and New Zealand.

The great British liberal economist and philosopher of the last century, John Stuart Mill, addressed the problem of the relationship between the rights of the individual and the needs of society, when he noted when writing 'On Liberty' that the questions to be answered included what is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual and where does the authority of society begin? The dilemma of democracy is that the individual's rights should only be curtailed when they adversely affect the rights of others. When an individual's actions offend without violating the constituted rights of others, he may be punished by opinion though not by law.

It is over the hundred and twenty years since Mill wrote 'On Liberty'; the dilemma has been intensified by the pressures of population and the advances of technology, so that one of the greatest problems facing democracy is to guarantee individual liberty without prejudicing either the collective security of society or the liberty of other individuals.

Mr Hiller's book, while in essence a textbook for law students and a reference book for practitioners of the wiliest profession, is of interest to the professional soldier and to students of the problems of civil rights. He examines in great detail the law, its application and interpretations in the Commonwealth, in the several states and territories, and in New Zealand. The areas covered in the book include many which are the subject of much controversy, but all are relevant to the problems which confront our society. Frustration with sometimes archaic laws and mindless violence alike lead to a situation in which the forces of law and order are forced to police the fine line which separates dissent and violent protest.

These controversial areas are treated in an even-handed manner, analyzing the effects of the law on the public, the individual and the law enforcement agencies, and making recommendations where the author considers the law to be either anachronistic or deficient, thereby restricting unnecessarily the rights of the individual or hampering the operation of the police and the courts. He covers public processions and assemblies, unlawful assemblies and riots, police offences, legislation covering threats of violence, firearms and dangerous weapons and those modern areas of concern, hijacking, crimes involving aircraft, and terrorism against such persons as diplomats and foreign dignitaries.

Of particular interest to the profession of arms, is his coverage of Aid to the Civil Power, in which his case study examines the call out following the Hilton bombing. In this section of direct military involvement is a discussion on the defence of superior orders, in which he cites Sir Charles Napier's famous quotation "The principle that unlawful superior orders could never provide a defence to a soldier would dissolve the Army at once. It reduces the soldier to a choice between the hanging awarded to him by the local law for obeying his officer and the shooting awarded to him by the military law for disobeying his officer."
Such discussion must be a deep and abiding interest to any who may be placed in the invidious position of being able to choose the court in which they may be tried, as a result of actions taken in the course of their duties.

The book is written for members of the legal profession, and is written according to the conventions of that calling. In spite of the esoteric language and style, I found the book immensely readable, and of interest to students of other disciplines. Being the only book on the subject specific to Australian conditions, it should be available as a ready reference to any formation commander or his staff, and as a source book for students attending the various Service colleges.


Reviewed by Dr Hugh Smith, Royal Military College.

These two books show that problems of strategy can be viewed in very different ways. The collection edited by David S. Yost is concerned with prescribing policies for NATO's future effectiveness against what most contributors see as a growing Soviet threat. NATO as a whole is criticised for being too complacent, the European allies for failing to consult with the US, and the US for its lack of clear policies and lack of leadership — Jimmy Carter is a frequent target here.

The contributors focus on various aspects of NATO strategy. Some criticise NATO's exaggerated concern with conventional defence ("raising the nuclear threshold") and on the too easy assumption that the Soviet Union will be deterred from using nuclear weapons by fear of all-out war. The Russians, various writers point out, are well prepared for nuclear war at all levels, including enhanced radiation weapons, and for chemical warfare. NATO's greatest problem at present, it seems, is the widespread desire in Europe for arms control and disarmament. This can undermine the efforts that NATO must undertake to transform itself from a collection of disparate national forces into a united collective force.

The collection entitled Contemporary Strategy by four British writers is broader in focus and more analytical. First published in 1975, it has become a widely-used text-book and is now reprinted. Part One looks at the nature and development of strategic thinking and at the role of military power in the contemporary world. Part Two examines various strategic concepts, including deterrence, arms control, limited war and alliances. The final part outlines the defence policies of the five nuclear weapon states. For the most part the collection is readable, containing numerous examples and making use of a wide range of references. For the person seeking an introduction to strategy in the nuclear era — especially someone with a broad knowledge of world history since 1945 — it would be hard to find a better book.


Reviewed by Dr Ed Duyker.

Ali begins with a radical, but not startlingly original, analysis of the birth of Muslim nationalism in south Asia and the road to partition of the Raj. Although he owes a substantial debt to the classic studies of scholars such as Mujeeb, Sayeed and Habib, he provides a refreshingly comprehensible synthesis — of value to anyone who seeks an introduction to pre-independence Muslim politics in India.

All who ponder on the role of the military in south Asia will find Ali's analysis of Pakistan's military-bureaucratic dictatorship (from the late '50s to the late '60s) of particular interest. The author places a heavy emphasis on the legacy of British training. Aside from an analysis of the class roots of Pakistan's officer corps, he examines the extent to which they have failed as agents of modernisation. Unlike the radical nationalist intellectuals in the Egyptian Army (who were inspired by the writings of Voltaire, Garibaldi, Ataturk, Napoleon and Clausewitz) Ali describes Pakistani generals as products of a "transmuted Sand-
hurst Jingoism’ which, in its indigenous Pakistani form, left them ‘bland and insipid figures, whose view of the world came from the Reader’s Digest, Time and the Royal United Service Journal’.

Although Ali’s treatment of the Kashmir conflict is superficial, readers will profit from his analysis of the profound repercussions of the emergence of Bangladesh (from the eastern wing of the pre-1971 bifurcated state). In his treatment of Bhutto’s brief six-year populist experiment, Ali displays the mark of an impassioned observer. For Ali, Bhutto’s fall from power can be traced directly to his repression of the Baluchi’s and to his party’s ‘refusal to tolerate a meaningful regional autonomy or accept the principle of power-sharing within a federal framework’ . According to Ali, Bhutto’s war in Baluchistan was ‘A disaster on every count. It poisoned the political atmosphere of Pakistan, and the country is still suffering from the pollution. It thus laid the basis for the military coup of July 1977 . . . The offensive against Baluchistan permitted a discredited, enfeebled high command to recoup what it had lost with the debacle in East Bengal, and re-enter the political stage . . . (Bhutto’s) chief military commander, General Zia-Ul-Haq, had been promoted because Bhutto was convinced — by his servility and lack of intelligence — that he represented no danger. However . . . (Bhutto) fatally underestimated the autonomous power of the army as a political institution in Pakistani politics . . . What he failed to grasp . . . was that the army was utilising Baluchistan as a political laboratory, and that sooner or later its experiments, culled from counter-insurgency manuals in Fort Bragg, would be tried out on the population of Pakistan as whole.”

Ali certainly has no trouble convincing the reader of Pakistan’s chronic instability. In places he pronounces that the state’s ‘make-shift political and social composition indicated that its interior was diseased from birth’ ; that it is an ‘experiment doomed to failure . . . a state . . . built on foundations of sand’. Despite his earlier prognosis that Pakistan will ultimately prove to be a still-born nation, he eventually warns ‘fatalists’ that —

“ . . . this is not an epoch in which new states are born and old ones disappear at regular intervals. Modern States, even the most dilapidated of banana republics, are far more powerful than their predecessors, and are characterised by a marriage of new technology to coercive structures and ideological manipulation that has had unhappy consequences for the majority of the third world’s inhabitants. No spontaneous collapse of Pakistan will take place: however irrational the process of its birth, a Pakistani state now exists; albeit in a gnarled and deformed shape. Though its foundations may have crumbled, it is held together by uninformed scaleholders, who are in a desperate mood.”

In this book, Ali has few kind words for the United States, China or the Soviet Union. Some may find the author a sanctimonious Trotskyist, but they will find it difficult to dismiss many of his arguments out of hand. Even conservative readers will be impressed with his treatment of recent political change in Afghanistan and Iran. While serious scholars of the region would be unwise to ignore this book (regardless of their biases), the non-specialist will profit from Ali’s engaging pose and his impressive control over historical detail.


Reviewed by Major A. A. Pope, RAAOC.

PROFESSOR van Creveld’s ‘Fighting Power’ is first and foremost a thoroughly enjoyable book to read. Probably more importantly though it is also instructive with many valuable insights, hints and glimpses into the inner workings of two mighty armies. The starkly different approaches taken by these armies to the business of war make the comparisons even more enlightening as the results of each approach can be related to quantifiable results in battle. As Professor van Creveld emphasises, one point that must be clearly understood is that victory or defeat is not the measure of any army; it is the army’s intrinsic fighting qualities — its mental, intellectual, moral, material and organisational foundations, its toughness, cohesion, courage and willingness to fight and, if necessary, die which defines its quality and is its true measure. It
is the sum of these qualities which he terms 'fighting power'. Therefore, according to Professor van Creveld this means that although the methods and weapons of war may have changed the basic qualities required of soldiers have not.

In 'Fighting Power' Professor van Creveld seeks to explain the apparent 'fact' of German military superiority in all circumstances, a fact alluded to (but not explained) by Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy in his two books 'Numbers, Predictions and War' and 'A Genius for War'. Professor van Creveld tries to answer why, on a man for man basis, the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 per cent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when the Germans were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost. 'Fighting Power' therefore begins from a premise and seeks to analyse why the results uncovered by Colonel Dupuy should be as they are. Colonel Dupuy states the fact, that on results the German Army was better than its US counterpart, Professor van Creveld seeks to answer why.

Initially, it is difficult to grasp the book as a whole as Professor van Creveld has, like a chemist, reduced it to twelve elements. Each element (chapter) makes perfect sense in its own right but it is not necessarily related to either the chapter which comes before or that which follows. The result is that the book never develops the rhythm of a good novel and, were it not for the way it engrosses the reader with a desire for more knowledge it could be comfortably put down at the end of each chapter. This lack of rhythm is in no way a criticism of 'Fighting Power', indeed there is probably no better way to achieve the author's aim, it is merely an observation on the effects on writing style of the methodology used to examine various aspects of the two armies. In fact, because of the central theme to which all of the essays/elements/chapters are related the book could be considered to be in the shape of a leaf. It begins with the stem of the 'Problem' diverges widely through ten segments of individual parts related to the theme finally returning to the point in the 'Conclusions' of the last chapter.

Professor van Creveld's comparative methodology is based on objective statistical data. He has studiously avoided using personal reminiscences and such curious opinions as 'the German Army contained more tough peasants' (supposedly better infantry) or that 'US troops were better with machines' as they are subjective and cannot be substantiated. The written record may not be any more accurate than opinion or memories but it does not alter with the passage of time. Having defined his method Professor van Creveld then compares point by point the same practices and functions in the German and US Army. The functions and practices he has chosen to examine are national character and the social status of the military, doctrine and the image of war, command principles, Army organization, personnel administration. Under the heading of maintenance of combat efficiency he dissects such factors as troop indoctrination, rotation of units and men and the treatment of medical and psychiatric casualties, rewards (pay, leave and decorations), justice policies and finally the training, selection, promotion and performance of the NCO and officer corps.

Having stated the facts Professor van Creveld seeks to extract such conclusions as can be drawn from them. To do this he asks three questions: what are the distinct characteristics of military as opposed to civilian organization that make for fighting power? How can fighting power be maintained in technological warfare; and what is the role of fighting power among the other factors governing modern war? In his conclusions he gives as a series of five reflections on the German Army, the US Army, the nature of military organization, the impact of technology and on fighting power itself. The reader is equally free to draw his own conclusions from the same data. My own view, like that of Professor van Creveld is that despite the immense destructiveness of modern war there is nothing to indicate that fighting power is now any less decisive a factor in the end.

'Fighting Power' is a valuable and instructive source of useful data. It only needs some young officer to gather similar data on the Australian Army today for comparison with the proven German Army for this book to become either indispensable — or banned.