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Contents

2 Letters to the Editor

5 K83: An Exercise with a Difference
   Major K. Wolfe, SO2 PR,
   Joint Exercise Planning Staff K83

9 Priorities in Aircraft Accident Survival
   Colonel B.M. Dwyer, AM, ED

12 The Parable of the Dangerous Cliff
   John A. Sinacore

13 Deterrence as a Determinant of Force Structure
   Lieutenant Colonel D.M. Hodda, Aust Int Corps

21 The Nature and Significance of Military History
   Major Warren Perry (Ret)

39 The DFRDB Scheme: The 3% Penalty Provisions
   Captain M.J. Knowles, RAEME

46 Reflections on Vietnam
   Major D.T. Read, RA Inf

49 The Naxalite Strategic Failure
   Dr Ed Duyker, Griffith University

58 Book Reviews

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

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The views expressed in the articles are the authors’ own and should not be construed as official opinion or policy.
LEADERSHIP TRAINING — A SYSTEMS APPROACH

Dear Sir,

In the September/October 1982 issue of “The Defence Force Journal”, LCDR Baker presents an excellent summary of the major issues to be faced in the course of future junior officer training development.

Shortcomings in SOTP 75 were clearly identified by early 1979, and quickly led to a number of measures to facilitate the proper application of the “systems approach” to initial officer training.

To date, the steps taken to apply the principles of objective training to the officer requirement include:

a. completion (during 1982) of the type of job analysis advocated by LCDR Baker,
b. DGNTE approval of a “Common Core” Duty Task Inventory similar to that advocated by LCDR Baker,
c. completion of all necessary “Common Core” task and training analysis,
d. a start on the development of a new Command and Leadership course along the lines discussed by LCDR Baker,
e. posting measures to achieve a pilot “Common Core” curriculum in January 1984, and
f. a start on the conduct of a new Seaman Branch Job Analysis to be planned as a joint enterprise with the RNZN.

LCDR J. M. HOGG, RAN

NEW MEDIA AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Dear Sir,

I am moved to write by the exchange in the May/June issue involving Lt Col Roylance’s reply to the article by Lt Col Fitzpatrick’s article in the January/February issue on the news media and military operations. I am sure Col Fitzpatrick will bear with me as I don’t have his original text in front of me. In fact, at the time I thought it was so naive and so shot full of errors that I passed it around some of my colleagues to test their reaction, and the issue didn’t make it back to my desk.

As I recall, one error was that Fitzpatrick didn’t give a guernsey, in his list of media owners, to the Melbourne Herald & Weekly Times, which is the biggest in Australia.

But the major objection was to the blimpish nature of his contribution, a quality which he actually manages to sustain in his reply to Roylance’s gentle effort to steer him back into the tracks of factuality.

In the last few months I have spent a lot of my time and my proprietor’s money to try to see defence questions from the point of view of the Services and from Servicemen in the field. This effort would not have been possible without the assistance of Roylance’s colleagues in the PR branch. As Roylance points out, he and his colleagues were recruited for a particular skill, and commissioned accordingly. I might add that this skill, along with others such as medical qualifications, dentistry, engineering, and port management, are generally seen in the Army as essential for the functioning of the Service in peace and war.

As to accreditation: this has to be a nonissue. In war, accreditation must be used to protect correspondents, to give them access and to confer some status, which is necessary if you have to work in the milieu of combat.

Rather than demonstrating affronted dignity, Fitzpatrick would have done better to eat his ill-researched words and try again.

JOHN STACKHOUSE
Deputy Editor
The Bulletin
PAY CORPS

Dear Sir,

It was with much pleasure that I read once again Paul Sindrey’s 1981 paper on pay systems, as updated and published in the May/June 83 issue of the DFJ.

His principal (to me) conclusion that the raising of a regular Pay Corps would bring benefits to the Army and its members, has my endorsement and support. It is my belief that such a development would be cost-effective in relation to already engaged personnel and the Defence dollar.

A regular RAAPC (perhaps retitled Corps of Finance), in addition to ensuring at unit level that members received in a timely manner their correct entitlements to pay and allowances, would contribute to the resolution/prevention of many of the Army’s financial management problems, including those involving non-public moneys such as mess funds, etc., etc. Such has been the experience over the past 2/3 years as a result of the splendid but necessarily part-time services provided by the ARES RAAPC.

J. DINGWALL
Colonel
Commandant RAAPC
Southport Qld.

CANADIANS IN VIETNAM

Dear Sir,

One of the least known aspects of the recent war in Vietnam was the number of Canadians who volunteered to fight there. As research for a book I am writing on the subject, I would appreciate hearing from anyone with knowledge of Canadians who served with Australian or American combat forces in ‘Nam.

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THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALIA

FIRST NATIONAL SEMINAR

‘Australia’s Defence and Security’

RUSI’s first national seminar is to be held at the University of New South Wales, Randwick, in the Sir John Clancy Auditorium, on Friday 14 October (3.30–9.30 p.m.) and Saturday 15 October (9.00 a.m.–4.00 p.m.).

The scope of the seminar is as follows: Strategic Environment, Force Structures, Technology and Defence Industry, Infrastructural Requirements for Defence, and The Way Ahead.

His Excellency, the Governor-General, is to open the seminar, and other speakers will include: General Sir John Hackett (author of the book ‘The Third World War — August 1985’, reviewed in this issue of the DFJ); Sir Peter Abeles, Chairman, TNT; Mr. Lou Mark, Chairman, ANR; Rear Admiral Guy Griffiths, Retd.; Air Vice Marshal Fred Barnes, Retd.; and Major General John Stevenson.

For registration details, phone Canberra (062) 48 7199 during working hours, or (062) 95 3878 after hours; or, write to RUSI Seminar secretariat, PO Box 1085, Canberra, ACT, 2600.

FRONTISPICE (over)

Tolstoy’s classic novel, ‘War and Peace’, is to be released together with ‘Anna Karenin’ as a Penguin Gift Set on 5 October 1983, price $16.95. — Ed.
"Don't tell me Peace has broken out" — BERTOLD BRECHT
The decision to hold Exercise KANGAROO 83 (K83) in the north-west of Australia during September and October 1983 was made in order to create new challenges for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Consequently, it will be the first time a KANGAROO exercise has been held outside the Shoalwater Bay Training Area, and the first time since World War II that a major Defence exercise has been held in Western Australia.

K83 is designed to test the ability of the ADF to react quickly to a low-level conflict and to operate in an environment that would be demanding of the men and equipment involved, and in an area distant from the main sources of supply and infrastructure support.

The aim of K83 is to exercise the ADF in joint land, sea and air operations in a low-level conflict, and to exercise Australian, New Zealand and United States forces in combined operations.

The Concept
The concept of K83 is new and presents some entirely new problems for the Joint Exercise Planning Staff (JEPS). Not only does the exercise involve the planning of Joint Service operations, which in itself can be complicated, but it has the added dimension of being a low-level conflict. Contrary to popular belief, this type of conflict can be more complex in planning than a conventional war.

A low-level conflict is defined as one in which the opponent engages in politically motivated hostile acts, ranging from non-violent infringements of, to small scale military action against, Australian sovereignty or interests. A low-level conflict, therefore, would not extend to operations that were designed to inflict a major defeat of the ADF, nor permanently contest control of part of Australia's territory.

In previous KANGAROO exercises, planners from the Combined Forces (BLUE Force) have had a fairly long lead time to prepare contingency plans to meet the threat portrayed by the intelligence scenario.

Whilst K83 contingency plans can be prepared in advance by BLUE Force, the intelligence scenario, purposely, has not indicated a clearly defined threat. Therefore, plans need to be capable of modification so that if the low-level conflict develops quickly, as low-level
conflicts are wont to do, BLUE Force can respond quickly.

In low-level contingencies, hostile actions against Australia may, in law, simply start with actions that breach Commonwealth or State laws. This could include breaches of customs or quarantine regulations, and unauthorized incursions into Australian sea and air space and coastal territory. It may even extend to apparently isolated acts of criminal violence (such as arson, sabotage or terrorism) before a distinct military threat is evident. This would be seen as formed bodies of armed men with distinguishing uniforms and under orders of foreign national authorities. Therefore, in the early stages of the K83 scenario, where the situation involves, or appears to involve, no more than isolated breaches of Australian law, Governments are unlikely to authorize dedicated military operations. It is more than likely that assistance from the ADF, initially, would be in the form of Aid to the Civil Power.

Even when military operations have been authorized, it cannot be taken for granted that a State of Emergency would be automatically declared; particularly if the Government of the day wished to preserve an atmosphere of 'business as usual'. Consequently, the role of the civil law enforcement agencies would not be diminished. This situation would require close co-operation and interaction between the ADF and the civil agencies, especially where the division of responsibilities was not clearly defined.

Such military/civilian interaction has not been substantially practised in the past. Earlier KANGAROO exercises envisaged a much higher level of conflict and were principally conducted in the strictly military environment of Defence exercise areas.

In endeavouring to move away from such settings, it is hoped to highlight the policy issues, and other questions of civil support and co-operation, that would be generated in actual hostilities in the defence of Australia. In these areas K83 will be breaking new ground.

The concept of K83 places emphasis on realistic planning by BLUE Force, in real time, rather than centralized planning by JEPS, particularly since it will be the first time that Operational Deployment Force contingency plans will be exercised in a KANGAROO exercise.

Planning

A team of Service men and women, headed by Exercise Director, Rear Admiral I. W. Knox; Deputy Exercise Director, Air Commodore G. W. Talbot; and the Head Planner, Colonel T. H. Holland; has been planning the exercise since September, 1982.

Since that time, many problems have emerged that have not been encountered in the planning of past KANGAROO exercises. In order for BLUE Force to plan and co-ordinate operations with civil agencies, in real time, considerable negotiations have been undertaken by JEPS to ensure that the necessary facilities are available.

Government departments (both State and Federal), transport agencies, and mining companies, that would feasibly be involved in a real conflict, have been approached. For many of these organizations it is the first time they have been involved in a Defence Force exercise. It is a brand new experience for them and a brand new experience for the ADF. For this reason, normal operating procedures on both sides need to be adaptable so that the interface can be achieved.

There are a number of other factors that JEPS has had to address for K83, not the least of which is the vast size of the exercise area; some 82,000 sq km are to be used, including a coastline equivalent to the distance from Melbourne to Brisbane. This has meant that clearances have had to be obtained for the ADF to use about 310 individual properties for the exercise. Also, the condition of some of the airstrips in the area is unknown, and have required extensive engineering surveys before use by the ADF.

New legal problems arise in the responsibilities of the ADF operating in public areas. What, for example, if any, is the authority of the local military commander to restrict the freedom of movement of the civil community in order to meet his military objectives? Similarly, what is the legal position if one of our own aircraft mistakes a group of innocent civilians for Kamarians (see subsequent paragraphs on Scenario) and attacks them? Questions such as these have not collectively been addressed in a major exercise in the past. The
ADF has been inclined to exercise in a clearly defined area and has assumed that, magically, it would be granted the authority to carry out operations, untroubled by political and humanitarian considerations. This might or might not be the case and, since the ADF will be operating on Australian soil, Defence planners will need to examine the validity of some of the assumptions that have underlined operations in the past.

Because of the vast distances involved in transporting men and equipment from eastern Australia, civil transport resources will be used to move a major part of the Force. Considerable assistance has been provided by the Departments of Aviation, Transport and Defence Support; as well as Qantas, Ansett, TAA, ANL and the various railway authorities; so that their facilities and organizations will be available to the ADF as though the exercise was a real operation. This should also allow existing procedures to be validated and new areas, previously limited to the realms of theory, explored.

Another new aspect of K83 will be the exercising of public relations procedures for operating with the media and the public at large. The implications of the release of information, censorship, and accreditation of media representatives will need to be addressed, and the effect on operations will need to be considered at all levels of the ADF. From lessons learned, operating procedures will be developed by the Public Information Branch for use in a real conflict.

Another problem to be highlighted is the use of Reserves in a situation where a State of Emergency has not been declared. Three Army Reserve units will take part in K83; NORFORCE will operate in its area of interest in the north-west, the 5th Independent Rifle Company will operate in the Pilbara and a Port Construction and Repair team in the Dampier area.

The Scenario

JEPS intelligence planners have put together a scenario that includes infiltration by illegal immigrants, small-scale political disruptive activities, threats to lines of communications, harassment of shipping, and limited military operations against targets on the mainland by small raiding parties, escalating to include some limited air strikes.

The villain in the piece is Kamaria, a mythical nation with a population of about two million people, mainly European, lying in the Indian Ocean some 1000 km west of Learmonth. Kamaria has been purposely placed in this position in order to meet the exercise objectives. Kamaria's position allows conventional aircraft, operating from its airfields, to reach all areas of interest in the Kimberley and Pilbara regions of Western Australia, but not so close that they would threaten Darwin or Perth.

Kamaria is portrayed as a predominantly western-oriented Third World country with a reasonably strong economy and a modest manufacturing base. The scenario alleges that Kamaria has a strained relationship with Australia, mainly because of a number of economic irritants. After considerable diplomatic discord, matters deteriorate to the point where Kamaria, frustrated at being unable to get its point across to the Australian Government, initiates a low-level military campaign against Australia.

Conclusion

K83 promises to be a refreshingly new exercise; it will break new ground in many areas, and in all parts of the ADF new and interesting challenges will be faced by all ranks.

In all, some 7000 Service personnel, plus many people from civilian organizations throughout Australia, will take part in the exercise.
The effect of an in-flight emergency is quite overwhelming on those who have not considered the possibility of an emergency situation occurring.

The immediate effect is one of almost total physical and mental paralysis — even to the extent of people persisting in pre-emergency behaviour, as if in an attempt to exclude from the mind the fact that a disaster is overtaking them.

The smart people — the survivors — intuitively fly as if expecting to be placed in a survival situation, and their mode of reaction tends to be purposeful, positive, and — above all — quick.

The born survivor will tend to:
- take up the best possible crash position,
- know where the exits are,
- not become disoriented, and
- know where the emergency equipment is stored.

Having survived the impact, and left the wreck, it becomes important for survival that the victims develop aggressive, rather than passive, reactions. Previous instruction can help. People must be instructed to accept a leadership role, and not wait hopefully for someone else to don the mantle. For a survivor to become a leader, all that is needed is a basic knowledge of priorities in survival. The priorities are usually:
1. Immediately move to safety.
2. Treat life-threatening wounds.
3. Treat other injuries.
4. Assemble all equipment of value.
5. Develop an appropriate shelter.
6. Organize the means of detection.

Move to Safety
The risk of fire from spilled fuel is normally sufficient to make a move mandatory. Although it seems obvious, remember that the shocked state of some survivors will preclude thought, so the leader must point out such things as:
- No smoking till well clear of the wreck, and only if clothing is uncontaminated with fuel.
- If going back into the wreck, avoid metal studded boots that could cause sparks.
- If in a non-perennial water course — move higher up.
- Preferably move close to a cleared area in case of later fire.

Life-Threatening Wounds
First aid in the post-disaster period is fundamentally simple, and is directed toward the following:
- Closure of a Sucking Chest Wound. If air is hissing in and out of a chest wound, it is an immediate danger to life. The immediate action must be to plug the wound with a rolled up clean handkerchief, for example, or a wad of tight cotton wool; then over this tape a sheet of plastic film firmly down around the edges. The patient is best laid on the injured side.
- Control of Bleeding. Most bleeding, even from arteries, can be stopped by firm, direct pressure on the bleeding point, after
pinching the wound edges together. Again, plug the wound with a tight ball of rolled up clean material, tightly bandaged over, with a second bandage applied over the first if oozing persists. Only if a limb has been amputated in the crash might a tourniquet be necessary.

- **Minimizing Shock.** Shock, whether from pain or bleeding, can be reduced by lying the patient down, elevating the legs to improve the return of blood to the heart, and reducing heat loss by wrapping in blankets or discarded clothing.

- **Care of the Unconscious.** An unconscious victim should be rolled on to one side, semi-prone. The top leg should be drawn up, with the top arm supporting the body, elbow on the ground, and hand tucked under the forehead, the head being extended to improve breathing. If breathing is satisfactory, the victim can be left long enough to quickly check the remaining survivors’ injuries.

- **Preservation of an Airway.** If a victim is not breathing normally:
  a. Tilt the face up, and swing the jaw forward by pushing forward with the fingers from behind the angle of the jaw on each side.
  b. If there is still an obstruction, feel down the back of the throat with the fingers for a possible foreign body such as a partial denture.
  c. It may be necessary to initiate mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.

- **Binding of Wounds.** Gaping wound edges should be brought together either by pinching together, and binding; or even by pinning with safety pins, and binding. The earlier the closure, the less the risk of infection.

- **Immobilization of Fractures.** Unstable fractures, whether closed or compound, cause bleeding (mostly internal), pain, and shock. The principle in stopping movement in a fracture is to fashion a splint that will immobilize the joint above and below the fracture.

- **Burns.** The first aid help is necessarily limited, but the principle is to reduce shock, to cover the burnt area with the cleanest material possible, and to delay the loss of body fluids by giving copious liquids by mouth. Large burns and lack of water may influence how much help can be given. Victims with burns to more than 50% of their body surface will need resuscitation within 24 hours in order to survive. If rescue is not expected in this time, treatment may be limited to making the victim as comfortable as possible.

- **Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation.** External heart massage and mouth-to-mouth breathing will be undertaken if circumstances permit. If one disaster victim is apparently dead, and two more are bleeding heavily, then the bleeding must be stopped before attending to the apparently dead.

- **Preservation of the Will to Survive.** As was stated at the outset, this is largely a function of leadership and of prior knowledge. Remember the priorities:
  1. Move to Safety.
  2. Treat Life-Threatening Wounds, and
  3. Other Injuries.
  5. Make a Shelter.
  6. Prepare a Signal.

**Other Injuries**
Lesser injuries need not be allotted such a high priority but, in order to minimize infection, abrasions and wounds should be cleansed and covered within the first two hours, if possible.

Sprains and strains respond well to cold packs, elevation, then firm supporting bandaging.

Remember that, with non-life threatening injuries, in many cases the sufferer simply needs direction to treat himself. This serves to give the sufferer a task, which helps overcome mental paralysis and leaves the leader free for the next task.

**Assembling Equipment**
The means of survival will group into categories:

- **Protection,** eg Clothing, Shelter, Weapons.
- **Food Gaining,** eg Rations, Weapons, Fishing Gear, Snares and Traps.
- **Water Gaining,** eg Water Stores, Utensils, Digging Tools, Solar Still Equipment.

By far the most important resource is
PRIORITIES IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT SURVIVAL

water. Never fly without a large water container, and the means to collect water (either from rain, water courses, or a solar still). Remember that active work at 40°C needs an intake of 15 l (ie. 15 litres) per day or more.

- **Signalling**, eg Reflectors, Lights, Smoke, Noise Emitters, Coloured Panels.

**Shelter**
The primary need, in sheltering from cold, is to be out of the wind, insulated from the ground, and with a fire at the down-wind end of the shelter. The shelter from heat involves being off the ground, with overhead cover, and exposed to a breeze if possible.

**Detection**
Signalling systems need to be organized as quickly as possible, bearing in mind the other priorities, but certainly before last light on day one.

**Conclusion**
Aviation history is studded with magnificent stories of survival, and sad stories of failure. In a landscape as harsh as Australia's, it is wise to seek knowledge before a disaster occurs.

Michael Dwyer joined the CMF as an undergraduate in 1949. His commissioned service was with various 2nd Division units. He served in South Vietnam from 1968-1969. He accompanied 2FDSVY SQN to Biak on Operation CENDRA WASH in 1977. He was posted as SMO Land Warfare Centre in October 1980, transferred to the Regular Army in December 1981, and is now posted as Colonel Environmental Health, Directorate of Army Health Services.

He holds a private pilot licence and is a guest lecturer to the SAR Co-ordinators' Courses run by the Department of Aviation.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**
The article, *The Application of Some Concepts of Deterrence to Australia's Maritime Strategy*, by LTCDR J.M. Leak, RAN, which appeared in issue No 41 of the Defence Force Journal, was first published in the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Volume 8, Number 1, of February 1982. The author was awarded the Australian Naval Institute Silver Medal for the essay, which was written whilst he was attending the RAN Staff College in 1981.

The editor wishes, albeit belatedly, to thank the Honorary Editor of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute for permission to reprint this distinguished article.

**AWARD: ISSUE NO 41 (July/August 1983)**

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the July/August issue (No 41) of the Defence Force Journal to Colonel J.P. Buckley, OBE, ED, (Ret), for his article on *Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee, KBE, CB, DSO*. 
The Parable of the Dangerous Cliff

'Twas a dangerous cliff, as they freely expressed,
Though to walk near its crest was so pleasant;
But over its terrible edge there had slipped a duke, and full many a peasant.
The people said something would have to be done,
But their projects did not all tally.
Some said, "Put a fence 'round the edge of the cliff;"
Some, "An ambulance down in the valley."

The lament of the crowd was profound and was loud,
as their hearts overflowed with their pity;
But the cry for the ambulance carried the day
As it spread through the neighbouring city.
A collection was made, to accumulate aid,
And the dwellers in highway and alley
Gave dollars or cents — not to furnish a fence —
But an ambulance down in the valley.

"For the cliff is all right if you're careful", they said;
"And if folks ever slip and are dropping,
It isn't the slipping that hurts them so much
As the rock down below — when they're stopping."

So for years (we have heard), as these mishaps occurred,
Quick forth would the rescuers sally,
To pick up the victims who fell from the cliff
With an ambulance down in the valley.

Said one, to his plea, "It's a marvel to me
That you'd give so much greater attention
To repairing results than to curing the cause;
You had much better aim at prevention.
For the mischief, of course, should be stopped at the source;
Come, neighbours and friends, let us rally.
It is far better sense to rely on a fence
Than an ambulance down in the valley."

"He is wrong in his head", the majority said;
"He would end all our earnest endeavour.
He's a man who would shirk this responsible work,
But we will support it for ever;
Aren't we picking up all, just as fast as they fall,
And giving them care liberally?
A superfluous fence is of no consequence,
If the ambulance works in the valley."

The story looks queer as we've written it here,
But things oft occur that are stranger.
More humane, we assert, than to succour the hurt,
Is the plan of removing the danger.
The best possible course is to safeguard the source,
Attend to things rationally.
Yes, build up the fence and let us dispense
With the ambulance down in the valley.

John A. Sinacore
By Lieutenant Colonel D. M. Hodda, Aust Int Corps

AUSTRALIA'S strategy is often described as being one of deterrence. This paper examines the meaning of deterrence as a strategic doctrine, and assesses its relevance to Australia's circumstances and its worth as a determinant of force structure. It concludes that the JSP (AS) Glossary definition of deterrence is not suitable for an Australian concept of controlling threats and that 'deterrent value' cannot be measured. Additionally, the paper concludes that force development is influenced more by financial guidance than military assessment and warns against the temptation for planners to hide behind a deterrent strategy in an attempt to stretch a meagre budget in times of uncertainty.

"From the military point of view, deterrence as a policy is at best relative and at worst sterile."

Although few nations have been prepared to renounce the use of military force as the ultimate expression of national will, preparations for war have always been difficult to justify in peace. This difficulty is even greater today when the notion of using force to resolve international differences is seen as an undesirable and inconclusive option for governments who must weigh the possible gains against the probable costs.

Australia is no different from others in this regard. Certainly, Australia has no strong military tradition demanding continual and substantial defence preparations. Despite a military history replete with examples of selflessness, courage and professionalism, it could be argued that Australians have never taken military matters very seriously. Australia's geographical isolation and the popular impression created during the 'war to end all wars', that Australians, 'after training for a month or two, (can become) equal to, if not superior to any other troops', contribute to this indifference. More significant perhaps is the fact that Australian shores have never been violated by an invader. Recent military involvements can only be regarded as token contributions of tactical forces in support of larger allies. Today, with the horrors of Vietnam and cries of 'no threat for fifteen years' fresh in people's minds, this attitude of optimistic apathy towards national security continues.

Of course there has always been some debate on defence matters, but the issue at stake is usually one of a specific equipment purchase. Moreover, it was not until 1972, when emphasis changed from 'Forward Defence' to 'Continental Defence', that Australian defence planners had to do their own strategic thinking. Since then a lot has been written about Australia's strategic context and the force structure needed to implement an appropriate national security policy. Central to many writings has been the theme of deterrence. It was natural to do so; deterrence is a much used word in the international vocabulary concerning strategy. Following the advent of nuclear weapons, supremacy of force lost its traditional meaning, and the problem of an excess of power in relation to objectives in dispute was foremost in the minds of strategists. War was seen as even more restricted in its application as an instrument of national policy, likely to be less conclusive than ever before, and, above all, potentially catastrophic to all civilization. Out of fear — not altruism — deterrence rather than defence became the basis of security policies of those nations that had to take nuclear weapons into account; budgets and forces were tailored accordingly.3
But Australia is not a major power, nor is it equipped with nuclear weapons. Its strategic circumstances are different from those that are. What, then, does the concept of deterrence mean for Australia? Can deterrence be used to determine Australia’s force structure? These are the major issues examined in this article.

DETERMINANTS OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Australia’s Strategic Context

‘A nation’s strategic environment is the prime determinant of its defence objective, strategies, and doctrines of the defence forces it maintains.’

A detailed assessment of Australia’s existing strategic environment, or an examination of the strategic assessment process, falls beyond the compass of this article. Nor is it informative to speculate on the distant future. Perhaps the only thing that we can be sure of about our world in the year 2000 is that it will be at least as different from what it is today, as today’s is different from that of 1960. Foreign affairs planners regard five years, at the outside, to be the most realistic basis on which to work. ‘Much beyond that becomes highly speculative and of doubtful utility to present policy.’ Nonetheless, there are some fundamental and less dynamic considerations which influence Australia’s security policies that deserve brief analysis.

Geography

Australia is an island, but it is also a continent with its vital areas located in the part of the continent that is furthest from any foreign country (except New Zealand). Clearly, a major invasion of Australia would be a formidable task for any power. Unless there is a fundamental change in the central strategic balance, even the superpowers would be constrained (by the need to provide for defence of their homelands) in the extent of force capability they could allocate for a major direct attack against Australia.

This geographical setting also means that Australia’s trade, which makes up more than 25 per cent of GDP, is vulnerable through interdiction of shipping. More importantly, perhaps, Australia’s territorial integrity is open to lower levels of harassment and intrusion along the enormous coastline and within the economic zone.

International Relationships

Australia’s place in the international system of order also affects its security policies. In this sense, Australia is in the unusual situation of being a Western nation located on the periphery of Asia. Geographically, therefore, there is an obvious and abiding strategic interest in the Asia/Pacific region, but Australia’s prosperity and culture are interwoven with the other industrialized democracies. Ideologically, Australia is allied to the United States and its partners. As a very minor power in this Western alliance, and one remote from most areas of struggle, it is difficult to judge how Australia should contribute towards deterrence of worldwide challenges by, or supported by, the Soviet Union. In relation to the Indian Ocean, the government has professed that, although socio-economic matters are important, ‘there is no substitute for a system of balances which will make resort to disruptive behaviour an irrational act. If this seems an old-fashioned solution, it is well to remember that in power terms we are still living in an old-fashioned world of nation states.’ Deterrence of this ‘threat’ is not considered further in this paper.

Australia has also acknowledged that its familiar role with the United States has changed following Nixon’s Guam Doctrine in 1969, which has been left substantially intact by succeeding American administrations. Consequently, greater initiative in world affairs and self-reliance in defence have been emphasized. In particular, Australia’s defence force must be capable of independently defending Australia’s interests against ‘lesser’ (than major invasion) threats.

Threats and Contingencies

Although the phrase ‘no threat for fifteen years’ has quickly disappeared from the vocabularies of defence officials, most officials and commentators are sanguine about Australia’s strategic circumstances. No consequential threat to Australia’s territorial integrity is foreseen. This lack of threat haunts defence planners, who need some criteria on which to base judgements about force capability. If there is no immediate discernible strategic threat, against what contingent threats should force structures be determined? The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence concluded that ‘it is not possible to assess the size and shape of the Australian Defence Force which would
be required to provide a successful defence against major attack until a potential aggressor is identified and the likely scale and nature of the attack is assessed. But the Defence Minister does not exclude from planning 'the contingency that in some calamitous situation we might again find, as was once our experience, territory to Australia's north occupied by a country with hostile intent towards us'. It would seem, therefore, that the requirement to meet major direct attack is one of those circumstances described by the White Paper 1976 as 'that could arise or are important enough to warrant policy attention'. So, too, are 'lesser' contingencies (short of invasion or major direct attack) used to determine force structure. This is a logical and prudent method, but there are problems. Obviously, priority has to be given to current and foreseeable tasks, and the necessity to meet a short-term goal may not coincide with longer-term desires. This dilemma, caused by the lack of identifiable threat of any substance and the need to insure against uncertainty, has led to a 'core force' concept; that is, 'a substantial force-in-being, which is also capable of timely expansion to deal with unfavourable developments'. Unfortunately, the implicit assumption in this 'core force' concept is that there will be sufficient warning time to undertake 'timely expansion'. If it is also judged that there is considerable uncertainty about the warning time available, then the 'core force' concept, as an objective for force structure planning, comes into question.

Assessment of warning times and preparation times is a fundamental and critical ingredient of a 'core force' philosophy — and one which deserves more attention by defence planners — but for this study the guidelines offered by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence are instructive. The committee concluded:

'The size of the force-in-being should be related to the base level required to enable the Defence Force to be expanded, within a period of not more than five years, to the size required to deter, to defeat, or to raise the cost and risk to an unacceptable level of an invasion of or major direct attack against Australia. Where it can be shown that the base level in certain elements would not be

large enough to provide an appropriate response to lesser contingencies, the size of these elements should be adjusted accordingly.'

It is not intended to debate the criteria for timely expansion, that is, within a period of not more than five years, but two aspects warrant comment. Firstly, the Committee appears to have ignored the probability that the force-in-being may be deployed on operations against lesser threats at the same time that it is undergoing 'timely expansion'. Secondly, and more importantly, the Committee fails to recognize that there can be a marked difference between a force which may deter and one which can defeat the same enemy.

Finance
Despite the proposition in the first sentence of the 1976 White Paper on Australian Defence, that 'the first responsibility of government is to provide the nation with security from armed attack and from the constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such attack', Australian governments have always been reluctant to spend more than about 2.6 per cent of GDP on defence. In a recent address, former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam pursued the theme that the public is better-educated and more sceptical than in the past, and needs to be persuaded of the usefulness of the things for which it pays. 'You won't get governments now feeling they're at risk in keeping financial commitments for the Services within modest limits,' he said. As if to endorse these remarks, a measure of Parliamentary interest was shown on 29 March 1979 when the bells had to be rung twice for lack of a quorum during a major statement by the Defence Minister. This does not mean that the politicians are to blame, but rather highlights the fact that Australia's defence tradition is one of pursuing its national security goals through foreign policy and the resources of others rather than through developing its own forces. This cozy strategem has enabled Australia to improve its living standards at a cost for defence generally one half that of the other industrialized democracies. Commentators may assert that this is insufficient to solve Australia's current defence problems and to carry out this 'first responsibility of government',
but few would anticipate a substantially greater allocation of the public purse to defence in the near future, no matter which political party is in power. History shows that strategic circumstance, rather than the level of real growth in GDP, is the dominant factor in the rate of growth in defence outlays. In the absence of any military situations comparable to Confrontation on Vietnam, it would seem that the last five years' average, 2.7 per cent of GDP, can be taken as a guide to future allocations. Provided the GDP grows at the last five years' average of 2.6 per cent, this will mean a potential real growth in defence outlay of somewhere between 2 and 3 per cent. Cynics may remark that this margin for growth will satisfy the apathetic Australian public who have been weaned on the belief that, in the event of a threat emerging, citizens can soon transfer civilian skills and qualities into the military context and 'rise to the occasion'. Certainly, force planners would be wise to plan on a defence budget of less than 3 per cent of GDP. Secondly, before substantial proportions of that defence vote are committed to any major equipment system, there must be reasonable certainty about that system's essentiality and ability to survive — especially if a deterrent strategy is proposed. Thirdly, there will always be a need for close examination of cost-effectiveness of proposed capabilities. It may be necessary to accept less effective, but cheaper, solutions to one problem, to accommodate demands for other capabilities which might otherwise be deferred.

Non-Defence' Tasks

Although the Australian Defence Force is structured primarily to defend the country's territorial integrity, the government requires it to carry out other tasks which do not necessarily contribute to the nation's 'defence'. Examples are military assistance to the civil community in times of disaster, UN and Commonwealth peace-keeping operations, assistance to neighbours, and counter-terrorist activities. These requirements add to the ever-present conflict between present capacity and potential expansion. This is not to suggest that such tasks are inappropriate, but simply recognizes that in a small defence force with a small defence budget, the effects of those 'non-defence' tasks are magnified. As governments are unlikely to forgo these options that the Services can provide, these requirements must be accommodated in forward planning as best they can.

THE USE OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

'We know from the hard experiences of the physical and social sciences that if the parts are not ordered in some prior way, are not held up to some based concept, all we can do is remain the prisoner of new data. A concept may be wrong or in error, but it must be formulated. . . . While strategy itself may not be a science, strategic judgement can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory and perceptive.'

Dissertations on strategy are invariably esoteric and difficult to summarize. The tendency is to provide your own definition to suit your particular theme. Contrary to the hopes of those in question of absolutes, strategic theory culminates neither in a simple lesson nor in a miraculous solution (although many armchair 'strategists' would lead you to believe otherwise). Nonetheless, any methodology used to determine force structure must embrace the theory of strategy. By the same token, strategic doctrine must not become something theoretical or dogmatic. As Henry Kissinger has noted: 'A wrong strategic doctrine can lead to disaster. An excessively rigid strategic doctrine can absorb great energy in the attempt to reconcile what happens with what is expected . . .

But if there is no doctrine at all and a society operates pragmatically, solving problems 'on their merits' as the saying goes, every event becomes a special case. More energy is spent deciding where one is than where one is going.'

Strategy is concerned essentially with control for a given effect. The essence of strategy is control. A strategic concept, therefore, is simply a verbal statement resulting from an analysis of what to control, the nature of the control, the degree of control necessary, when control is to be initiated, and the duration and method of control. Without clearly and precisely analyzing these elements, it is impossible to establish any rational kind of control which could reasonably succeed in bringing about the
desired effect.20 A strategic concept must pursue national goals, be able to adapt to changing circumstances, be realistic in its expectations and be based on effective military tactics. In determining force structure, the situations for which a capability is to be used must be known. Arguments based solely on tactical efficiency will provide a strategy replete with bias, emotion, and wishful thinking. Furthermore, a theory of strategy must be a theory of power in all its forms, not just a theory of military power.21

At the moment there does not appear to be any clear Australian strategy for the defence of the nation. National goals or contingencies to be used are uncertain; criticism, that the Services suffer from the 'replacement syndrome', is rampant. Nonetheless, the strategy most frequently mentioned is deterrence. 'Deter' is a verb continually used in Ministerial statements and other official publications. Unfortunately, the meaning of deterrence in the Australian context has several interpretations. If this strategy is the foundation of force structure development, the concept of deterrence and how it fits the Australian context should be quite clear. But is it?

AN ANATOMY OF DETERRENCE

Historical Origins

Deterrence as an element of national strategy or diplomacy is nothing new. The threat of war, open or implied, has always been a means by which one state deterred another from doing something that the former did not wish the latter to do. The advent of nuclear weapons, however, brought a new emphasis and a distinct connotation to the term. The new concept was formulated and implemented after World War II, when the Cold War was the centre-piece of global policies. The world was politically bipolar, and tension between the two blocs was so great that Western leaders thought that unless an opponent could be deterred, he would certainly attack. No defensive system in existence or envisaged, however, seemed capable of preventing damage incomparably more devastating than society had experienced. To offset the deficiencies of Western 'defences', the threat of nuclear retaliation was promoted as the only truly effective deterrent to attack, and as the means of securing the strategic balance.

Definition of Deterrence

Definitions of deterrence abound. For this article, the definition contained in JSP(AS) 101 Glossary is a good distillation of them all. It is:

'The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counter action.'

The Ingredients of Deterrence

Deterrence doctrines are usually framed in terms of 'expectation calculus' or 'disproportionate costs'; that is, a potential aggressor has to weigh the probability of his gains against the probability of the consequences. The latter can be expressed as the product of the punitive capability that can be brought to bear and the likelihood that it will be used. Thus, not only must the military be capable of inflicting damage unacceptable to the enemy, but political leaders must also be prepared to use that capability. For deterrence to be maintained both the elements of capability and credibility must exist in the minds of both parties. Moreover, there is a minimum level of both capability and credibility to be attained before the notion of deterrence becomes valid. These levels may vary with each set of circumstances considered, and it is possible to offset a decrease in one by an increase in the other provided the minimum level for each is not eroded.

The Uncertainty of Deterrence

Because deterrence is a psychological concept there is no certainty of success. Deterrence proves its mettle for as long as things do not happen. Unfortunately, it is not easy to show why something has not occurred. Was it deterrence that forced the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba? If mutually assured destruction (through a nuclear exchange) is the only certain deterrent, why have non-nuclear powers openly challenged the nuclear powers and had them back down? Given that Australia is unlikely to take up the nuclear deterrent option, to what extent would its conventional retaliatory capability deter a yet-to-be-identified opponent? It is worth emphasizing that the basis of nuclear deterrence is the certainty of the damage which would result, and that it is the threat of this dreadful
destruction which generates deterrence because of the levels of risk implied. At the conventional level, the risk which deters is less simple: it is more the fear of merely failing to achieve victory than fear of damage by counter-action. In this connection, the phrase ‘if deterrence fails’ rolls rather too trippingly off the tongues of many defence specialists — as if the possibility is acknowledged to accord the theory, but to be ignored in practice. There can be a marked difference between a force which may deter an enemy and one which can defeat him.

At this point, it is useful to recall Henry Kissinger's warning:

...Thus successful deterrence can furnish arguments to sustain obsolescent theories and designs, as it can encourage neutralism. It provides little incentive for the kind of innovation, political and strategic, consistent with a rapidly changing technology.22

Despite the uncertainties of a deterrent concept, there are several points in its favour. Exclusive reliance on a passive defensive strategy may suit some political needs, but ignores hard core military realities. Any responsive action which sought merely to fight on friendly soil could not withstand any offensive strategy by a well-prepared aggressor. Moreover, the mentality brought about by reliance on a passive defensive strategy would almost certainly lead to defeat. Indeed, one of the main lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was that the sooner one attacks, the better. Despite the immense difficulties for an aggressor contemplating major direct attack on the Australian mainland, the possession of a retaliatory or offensive capability can still be justified. If such an aggressor is certain that he will not be attacked on his own territory, he can devote all his military resources to offence. The possession of retaliatory forces by Australia, therefore, forces a potential aggressor to spend time, money, and manpower to counter that capability or to minimize the risks if it is used. By the same token, one must always bear in mind that if an aggressor can eliminate the retaliatory capability, say by surprise attack, the defender is then left with only his ability to absorb and recover from further offensive action. If this is insufficient, the ‘deterrent’ retaliatory capability has wasted the taxpayer’s money. Similarly, if political leaders are not prepared to show clearly that retaliatory, even pre-emptive, action will be used, a strategy of deterrence does not exist. The possession of a retaliatory or offensive capability does not mean that force structures are, or should be, founded on a deterrent strategy.

The ‘Disproportionate Response’ Interpretation

In their recent book Controlling Australia’s Threat Environment: A Methodology for Planning Force Development, Langtry and Ball have postulated that a policy of progressive introduction into the force structure of specific capabilities that will cause an aggressor to respond disproportionately would assist Australia to control her threat environment. In effect, this ‘disproportionate response’ approach rejects the JSP(AS) 101 Glossary definition, which predicates its view of deterrence solely on ‘counter-action’. This interpretation of ‘disproportionate response’ has its attractions, but, as Langtry and Ball note, there is no definitive mechanism which allows the translation of disproportionality into the force structure.

Using such an approach one could argue that Australia might be better served, in a deterrence sense, by a larger ground force than by a relatively small retaliatory force based on a handful of bombers. Until the framework of desired control is established, however, such provocative propositions remain as meaningless as those which ascribe ‘deterrent value’ to specific weapons or weapon systems. Without that framework, the force structure process is likely to remain based largely on mutual respect and, in lesser part, on an acceptance of a mutually tolerable lowest common denominator.24

CONCLUSIONS

What, then, is the utility of a deterrence doctrine for those responsible for planning Australia's force structure? Is it possible to find criteria that would provide some order for the present day uncertainty? Uncertainty may be a nuisance in planning, but it has to be coped with.25

Perhaps the starting point is to acknowledge that force development is influenced more by financial guidance than any military assessment. Hence, defence force planning must
proceed on the basis of a budget of slightly less than 3 per cent of GDP. Clearly, this is not enough to provide an impenetrable defence against all threats or contingencies; there will be pressures on individual Services to protect their interests. To overcome the problem of allocating limited resources among a variety of tasks expected of the armed forces, objectives and priorities need to be agreed by government. To ease the tension between short-term and longer-term goals, the degree of risk accepted by the government should be stated. For example, the government may require the Defence Force to locate, intercept, and arrest all intrusions onto the mainland, but will accept less effective control of fishing poachers to the extent that fishing losses do not exceed, say, $10 million per annum or irreparably destroy fishing grounds. From such a statement, the Defence Department can devise a means of implementing a strategy (force structure and tactics) to achieve that degree of control. By the same token, the Department must be prepared to advise the government on the degree of control that can be expected from a given cost.

It is the other end of the contingency scale, however, that is the main concern of this article. This is where most debate occurs and where greater uncertainty exists. But one thing is certain: strategies of deterrence are meaningless if your assessment of the enemy’s thought patterns and underlying assumptions does not match the way he is really thinking. Above all, deterrence is a psychological concept proven only when things go right (that is, do not happen). In nuclear deterrence, the essential feature of that strategy lies in the non-employment of weapons through judicious exploitation of the fact that they exist. In Australia’s case, potential enemies do not face the risk of a nuclear retaliation, which would suggest that aggression is suicidal folly. With no display of political will to use conventional strike forces in a pre-emptive or early attack, an enemy may calculate that the consequences of aggression are worthwhile. In this context, the Glossary definition of deterrence, which stems from a nuclear balance environment, is not suitable for an Australian concept of controlling threats. Unfortunately, many defence commentators choose to use this irrelevant definition to justify their predilection for a certain type of force. Hence, the description ‘deterrent value’ is wrongly used to suggest that some definitive mechanism for measuring deterrence exists. Those who talk about ‘deterrent cost-effectiveness’ usually confuse the cost-effectiveness of destruction with the cost-effectiveness of control. Rationalization of vested Service interests through half-baked strategic theories must not be allowed. What must be judged — and ultimately judgement is needed — is cost-effectiveness of control. Amidst all the present uncertainty, force planners should agree that so-called deterrent capabilities will be used, and that they are not vulnerable to counter- or pre-emptive action by a potential enemy.

With regard to a major attack upon Australia, the ‘disproportionate response’ interpretation of deterrence may provide better guidance to force planners trying to stretch a meagre budget in times of uncertainty. Notwithstanding such an approach, planners must not hide behind a deterrent strategy. There is a certain sanctity about things as they happen to be, and, for Australians, who traditionally lack interest in defence matters, a ‘deterrent strategy’ is a cheap and tempting illusion. The illusion occurs when military preparedness finds itself obstructed by dependence on a deterrent strategy. A defensive strategy is worthwhile for only as long as it plans for its failure! The problem for Australian planners, therefore, is not one of choice between ‘deterrent’ or ‘defensive’ capabilities, or between ‘retaliatory’ or ‘disproportionate response’ deterrents, but how retaliatory forces fit the entire defensive system.

The nation would be better served if the verb ‘deter’ was used less frequently, and, where possible, the word ‘defend’ used in its place.

NOTES
2. In the defence debates following World War I, many argued that the Australian did not need to begin his military training until war began. ‘If the war proved anything, it proved that young Australians, many of whom had not previously known one end of a rifle from another were, after training for a month or two, equal to if not superior to any other troops,’ said D. C. McGrath in Federal Parliament. Commonwealth Debates, Volume 93: p 4922.
8. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. p. 9.
13. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. p. 21. (My underlining added.)
17. Figures taken from a summary of factual historical analysis of defence expenditure and the economy in the last decade, undertaken by the Economic Analysis and Special Studies Section, Program and Budget Division, Department of Defence.

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THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY HISTORY
How to make its Study more useful in Military Training

By Major Warren Perry, (Ret)*

'The way that decisions are reached on questions of strategy, tactics, organization, etc. is lamentably unscientific. . . . There are no means for the comprehensive analysis of past experience, and thus no synthesis of adequately established data to serve as a guide in framing policy.'

Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War*, (p. 125)

Why Study Military History?

THE object of this article is to outline a plan for the systematic study of Military History as an integral part of military training. Although the task of studying Military History, if it is to be professionally productive, is a long and arduous one, it need not be a task of "blood and sweat and tears". It is of course only one of many tasks which an officer would have to fit into his personal programme for each day's work. But this is an instance where that well-worn proverb, "Where there is a will there is a way", is applicable. For the officer who perseveres with this study of Military History, its usefulness and its intellectual satisfaction should be reflected progressively in all aspects of his individual training as an officer. Military History is indeed a means of enabling him to extend his knowledge of the army beyond the scope of his own practical experience, which is always limited at all levels by time and by opportunities. The study of Military History also provides him with an intellectual basis for the comparison of current problems with past experience, in order to make deductions for present and future use. It is not true, as far as Military History is concerned, that history does not repeat itself.

During the War of 1939-45, crude andumbling solutions sometimes emerged to administrative problems which must have occurred and been solved in the War of 1914-18.¹

The term *Military History* encompasses the totality of the subject. Therefore, little real progress will be made in the study of the subject until it is grasped:

- that Military History is, scientifically speaking, a class which consists of many sub-classes; and
- that the purpose for which an officer studies Military History may differ in accordance with the requirements of duty, in accordance with his own personal tastes, and in accordance with his level in the chain of command.

Levels, it should be noted, are important not only in the study of Military History, but in all walks of military life.²

A published history of one's regiment, for example, which is based on adequate research and is written with skill and understanding, should interest all members of that regiment. But it will normally have less interest to members of another regiment, who will usually consider the history of their own regiment to be relatively more important for them to study.³ On the other hand, members of one regiment may be able to improve their knowledge of other arms and services by studying them through their unit histories.

One subject in Military History which should have a common interest to combatant officers at all levels is that of the methods of commanders in past wars. Commanders at all levels need theoretical training and practical experience in the exercising of powers of command, just as they need theoretical training and practical experience in, say, Administration, Military Law, and Tactics. Commanders at all levels have sometimes been left without guidance and so forced to devise their own methods of command. But history shows that they have not always acquired, in these circumstances of having to learn only by doing, the most efficient methods. In his illuminating book, *A Full Life*, Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks has said that Field Marshal Lord Montgomery "was one of the few commanders who

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tried to teach the people who worked under him." (p. 126.)

A study of Military History indicates that commanders at all levels should have two characteristics in common. First, they must make good and timely decisions; and second, they must produce good results through these decisions. These two characteristics are distinguishing marks of outstanding commanders.

The art of command may be studied in biographical literature on great commanders. Although this literature is quantitatively abundant, it is not all of equal value qualitatively for the student who is using it to study the art of command and to compare the methods of one particular commander with those of other commanders. All studies must have a starting point, and so one could begin by examining biographies of those great commanders of the past, General Sir John Monash, Field Marshal von Manstein, and General Douglas MacArthur.

Military History should not be likened to a large and homogeneous fruit cake, from which a student may cut a larger or a smaller slice. A more realistic figurative picture would be to regard the class, Military History, as one which is made up of a heterogeneous collection of many small cakes — a collection in which each cake is of a kind different from the others but collectively they make up that class described here as Military History. With such a concept in mind a student, before he cuts himself a slice from one or other of these cakes, would have to know which particular cake he wished to taste. If he were a divisional commander and he selected the cake marked "Command in the Field", he might benefit from studying Field Marshal Slim's *Defeat into Victory*. If the student were a battalion commander and he selected the cake marked "Morale", then he might find the study of Major John Baynes, *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage*, beneficial.

It is not suggested, however, in saying all this, that officers should go about their daily tasks with books on Military History in their hands. Military History is, for an officer, largely a matter of personal private study in peace-time. Wartime is a time when one can only apply what one already knows. It is not a time to study Military History.

The method of approach to the study of Military History is also important in order to get the best return for the time spent on it. Sir John Robert Seeley (1834-95), sometime Regius Professor of History in the University of Cambridge (1869-95), pointed out in his best-seller, *The Expansion of England*, another feature involved in the study of Military History, namely, scientific method, when he said: "It is a favourite maxim of mine that history, while it should be scientific in its method, should pursue a practical object. That is, it should not merely gratify the reader's curiosity about the past, but modify his view of the present and his forecast of the future." It should be noted, from Professor Seeley's reference to history being "scientific in its method", that this scientific method is simply ordinary thinking which is reflective, careful, methodical and systematic, and it can be applied to the study of Military History in two ways, namely:

1. it can be applied by the reader of Military History, which is published in the form of books, pamphlets and articles in periodicals; and
2. it can be applied by the research historian, who writes Military History, based on his own personal research work, for publication in books, pamphlets or periodicals.

A feature of this division is that an officer can belong either to one group or the other, and he can also belong to both groups.

Before proceeding further, however, it should be pointed out that Military History, as an integral part of an officer's military training, is a controversial subject. Not all officers are agreed that Military History is useful in the training of an officer. This dissenting view is against the experience of other professions, including Diplomacy, Engineering, Law, and Medicine. In each of these professions, members study its history for professional reasons as well as for intellectual satisfaction. Moreover, an officer who sees no professional usefulness in the study of Military History, is only qualified to make such a judgement if it is based on his own experience of a sustained and a systematic study of the subject. Those who reject the notion that Military History is a useful element of military training, do not always have this qualification of having studied the subject in a sustained and scientific way. Throughout this article it is assumed that Military History is a useful branch of study for an officer.
These introductory remarks can best be brought to a close by summarizing what has been said so far. The study of Military History is not a "thing in itself", as Kant might have said. Its study should be not only scientific in its method, it should also be related to other branches of an officer's training in ways which will be explained later. This method of study should normally modify one's view of the present and one's forecasting of the future. It is a mark of a person with a scientifically trained mind that he can see relationships between things; that in comparing two or more situations or things he can see similarities and differences; that he questions the meanings given to words such as Administration, Strategy, and Tactics; that he can define the terms he uses in discussions; and that he can re-adapt the experience gained in one situation and apply it in another situation. This is what, in his book, *We Live and Learn*, Sir Josiah Stamp called "applying distilled experience to fresh conditions."

More will be said about various features of scientific method later. In the meantime, attention will be given to the nature and scope of Military History.

### The Nature and Scope of Military History

It is an advantage to embark on a new subject of study with at least an approximate conception of its nature and its scope. In the case of Military History it is not possible to do more than prescribe its nature and its scope in a manner suitable for practical purposes, and this task begins by attempting to answer the question: "What is Military History?" The brevity of this question disguises the magnitude of the task of trying to answer it.

Sir John Fortescue (1859-1933), the distinguished historian of the British Army, said of this question: "I confess that I have found it very difficult to furnish a satisfactory answer." Nevertheless, he did attempt to answer the question in the first of four lectures which he delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge and which were published in book form later with the title *Military History*. Space will not permit here an examination of his very thorough analysis of the question: "What is Military History?" But it will become obvious, after reading his answer, that the common conception of the nature and scope of Military History, which has often been cultivated in the past, is much too restricted in scope to yield the optimum results for military training.

Indeed, the treatment of Military History in the past has led some to believe that it is concerned almost, if not entirely, with the study of the tactical features of military operations in past wars. This point of view has sometimes been described as the "General Staff approach to Military History". But Military History is much wider in scope. The treatment of the subject, for purposes of military training, should not be allowed to degenerate into slick and superficial descriptions of battles, actions, and engagements, which shed no light on how these operations were planned, the topographical features of the country in which they were conducted, how they were lost by one side, and why they were won by the other side. The victors, for example, may not have been better armed, trained and equipped than the losing side. But the losing side may have been badly served during the conduct of the operations by its supply and transport services — factors which may have caused a shortage of ammunition and delays in the arrival of reinforcements and rations and in the evacuation of casualties, with a consequent lowering of morale and fighting efficiency generally. But these and other factors, which contribute to victories and defeats in battle, are not always considered in much of the writing that is called Military History.

It is equally important to analyse the concept of Military History. It has already been pointed out that it encompasses the totality of the subject, and so it is something too gigantic for the mind to comprehend. Therefore, instead of trying to grasp its meaning as a whole at one bold stroke, it is more efficient to divide the whole concept into parts, and then study within these parts those aspects of the subject which are of interest. This division into parts or sub-classes is not fixed and unalterable; it is made to suit the convenience of the user. One such division or classification of Military History into sub-classes is shown in the following table, which is arranged alphabetically and is capable of considerable expansion in all its parts:

- **Administration:**
  1. Its definition.
  2. Its development, historically, from the unit level to the department of state level.
(3) Its nature and scope today in the Australian Army.

(4) Provisions since Federation for training officers of the Australian Army for administrative duties at all levels from units to departments of state.

- Armaments
- Army Co-operation with Naval, Air and Allied Forces
- Biographical Studies of Great Commanders and Staff Officers
- Campaigns
- Cartography Today and Yesterday
- Command and Staff Duties — their Development since Federation in the Australian and British Armies
- Demobilization Schemes
- Legal Services including Courts-Martial
- Martial Music
- Medical and Dental Services in the Field
- Military Engineering in the Field
- Military Intelligence
- Military Training Institutions:
  (1) Defence or War Colleges
  (2) Military Colleges for the Training of Cadets
  (3) Armoured Corps Schools
  (4) Schools of Artillery
  (5) Schools of Military Engineering
  (6) Schools of Infantry
  (7) Staff Colleges — Army and Joint Services
- Mobilization Schemes:
  (1) Partial Mobilization
  (2) General Mobilization
  (3) Mobilization of the land forces of the French Empire in July 1870
  (4) Mobilization of the land forces of the North German Confederation in July 1870
  (5) Mobilization of the British Army in August 1914
  (6) Mobilization of the German Army in August 1914
- Operations:
  (1) Amphibious Operations
  (2) Combined Operations
  (3) Military Operations
- Organization:
  Its study in past wars from unit levels to the higher direction of war at national and Allied levels.

- Relations in Peace and in War between the Soldier and the Statesman
- Strategy:
  (1) Sea
  (2) Land
  (3) Air
- Tactics:
  (1) Armoured
  (2) Artillery
  (3) Infantry
- Transport and Supply Services

This division of Military History into parts is a practical classification of the subject. Its sole purpose is to serve the convenience of the user and to make clear to him that all branches of current military training have their own separate histories. This classification is not a strictly scientific one, because it does not aim to cover the whole subject, and it does contain some cross-division. Nevertheless, despite these theoretical imperfections, it does illustrate, in perhaps a new way, the nature and scope of Military History. This view of Military History should also condition an officer to think less of studying Military History and more of studying particular aspects of Military History, such as the history of campaigns, the history of medical services in the field, the history of military law, the history of mobilization schemes, the history of strategy, the history of supply and transport, the history of tactics, and so on. Collectively, of course, all these sub-classes form a part of the whole or class known as Military History.

When Military History is looked at in this analytical way, a new conception of its nature and scope and of its possibilities arises readily. This new conception makes it clear that, in the past, the subject of Military History has often been drenched by tedious and oversimplified studies of major and minor campaigns. These studies have little if any training value, and they have tended to create the false view that 'this is what Military History is all about'.

It will have become obvious from what has already been said that, because Military History, as a class, is made up of a large number of sub-classes, the student will need to cultivate a familiarity with at least some of these various sub-classes, and with their relationships, if any. Nor should books on various aspects of the subject be looked upon as being like cookery books, full of recipes to apply to each
and every situation as it arises. An officer must adapt Military History, by interpretation, before it can be applied to current situations. This interpretation is an intellectual process, and so it needs also a theoretical knowledge of Military Science, combined with practical military experience. This dependence of interpretation on a combination of theoretical, practical and historical knowledge explains why the "cookery book" approach to Military History does not work.\textsuperscript{2} Alexander Smirnoff pointed out in his article, "Robert E. Lee and Napoleon", that without profound study one can achieve but little, and the career of arms is no exception to the rest. It is not too much to say that no one can become a great commander unless he has studied the campaigns of the great leaders of the past."\textsuperscript{24} Although the truth of this warning has long been asserted, it has also long been neglected. Profound study remains just intellectual ballast unless it changes performance by way of improvement. Nevertheless, this warning by Alexander Smirnoff raises the question of the uses of Military History, and so it will be profitable at this point to direct our attention to these uses.

**Uses of Military History**

There are, it has already been pointed out, two main schools of thought about the uses of Military History, and each school is of long standing. One school sees Military History as an integral part of military training. Sir Charles Oman, the author of *A History of the Peninsular War*, in seven volumes, and sometime Chichele Professor of History at the University of Oxford, said in an essay (well worth the time it takes to read) entitled "A Defence of Military History", that:

"The directing classes in any nation should have a certain general knowledge of the history of the Art of War, just as they ought also to be instructed in economic or constitutional history. 'What touches all is the business of all'."\textsuperscript{25}

When Captain Cyril Falls became the Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford, he said in his Inaugural Lecture, on 22 November 1946, entitled "The Place of War in History":

"There are in my view not many positive services which the historian can do for the state ... higher than that of tracing the causes of wars, describing the means by which they were fought, ascertaining the reasons which led to victory on one side or the other, describing the effects, and estimating the conditions likely to produce future wars and in which they could be fought."

The opposite school of thought sees no advantages for military training in the study of Military History. The distinguished naval historian, Sir John Laughton (1830-1915), delivered a lecture at the Royal United Service Institution, London on 22 June 1874, entitled "The Scientific Study of Naval History". In this lecture he pointed out that:

"I find that an idea that the history of the past contains no practical lessons for the future and is therefore merely a useless branch of scholarship, daily gathers strength, and is, indeed, put prominently forward by those whose opinions on purely technical questions have a just claim to our respect."\textsuperscript{27}

At the discussion period which followed this lecture, the President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, Vice Admiral Sir Cooper Key, said:

"There is no doubt that of late years there has been far less love for the study of naval history among young officers than there was when I first entered the Service. People are much in the habit of saying that everything has changed, and that the history of the past is therefore of little value."

These two opinions, although they were expressed 109 years ago and they relate to naval history, reflect views which resemble some which can be heard today about the value of Military History in military training. Advocates of the study of Military History for professional reasons have not always presented their case effectively, and they have therefore often failed to convince the unconvinced. The Army is an instrument of war, and it is only occasionally employed to perform the functions for which it is maintained. However, these functions, because of their scale and variety and the complexity of their relationships, do not usually enable an officer to visualize the relationships of his particular tasks or duties to the whole. This relationship between the parts and the whole can only be grasped effectively through a study of history. But the study of Military History, it has already been noted, is a long-term intellectual task of a strenuous character, if it is to be pursued
with the object of acquiring knowledge, reflecting on it and learning to apply it, with any necessary adaptations, in current work.

This application will not be easy, however, if the student depends exclusively on the passive act of reading. Reading should be combined with the more active task of conducting research, and then writing up the results of this research in the form of articles. Such articles can be submitted to the editor of one or other of the Service journals which are published nowadays in Australia. There are other means also of making this study of Military History an active task. One is by writing short lectures for delivery within the Regiment to members interested in the systematic study of Military History. Another means is by conducting discussion groups within the Regiment, at which participants can examine some particular topic from Military History. The success of this latter method depends on the direction and control of the discussion by a competent chairman.

The experience gained in this way can be applied in other branches of military training — it is not experience which is applicable only to the further study of Military History. Participation in war games is another form of training which can be based on battles, actions and engagements of past wars. Exercises of this kind, apart from demanding a sound knowledge of the history on which the exercise is based, give training in a variety of command and staff problems. These include: writing appreciations of situations, the drafting and issuing of orders, coping with problems of coordination and communication, and making prompt decisions on a variety of other matters which arise during the course of these exercises. Other things being equal, one may become highly skilled in conducting war games only after having undergone considerable practice in conducting them. One does not acquire this skill by attending a commanding officer’s lecture on the subject.

The sole object of studying Military History in these various ways is the practical one of acquiring knowledge and skill, and of being able to adapt this knowledge and skill for use generally in at least most other branches of an officer’s military training. The importance of acquiring knowledge, and the ability to apply it, was stressed by Marshal Foch when he said: “You must have knowledge; it is the foundation with which you cannot dispense. You must have the power of accomplishment, and to that end you must develop your faculties of thought, of judgment, of analysis, and of synthesis. But what is the use of all these things, if they function in a vacuum? You must make up your mind with determination, and work towards your object, without swerving. Most important of all is action, if you are to bring your theories to fruition, to produce results. Work; set stone upon stone; keep on building. You must do something, you must act, you must obtain results.”

But the application of knowledge does not mean learning by heart. It does not mean learning, parrot-fashion, ‘Principles of War’; it does not mean memorizing, as in the learning of drill procedures for application on the barrack square; it does not mean memorizing a part in a play to recite later at a regimental concert. It means the scientific application of knowledge, and the scientific application of knowledge is an intellectual task — a task which calls for the use of powers of reasoning.

In The Science of War, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson said: “I may remind you that if there was one quality more than another in which the great captains excelled, it was their power of reasoning. The despatches of Napoleon, of Wellington, and of Moltke prove that they depended for success on their hard thinking and careful calculation.” (p. 183.) Time has done nothing to diminish the importance of this observation by Colonel Henderson.

We are not endowed naturally, however, with an ability to think clearly and logically, to discover the essential elements of a problem by separating the relevant from the irrelevant, and to observe situations and describe systematically and adequately what we observe. The ability to do all these things is acquired by training in scientific method, by practice and, indeed, by more practice. The study of Military History provides a means of acquiring this practice, and the best time to perfect one’s skill in the application of scientific method is in peacetime training for, as Marshal Foch pointed out in his book, The Principles of War: “The truth is, no study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little, one has
already to know a great deal and to know it well." Military History, if it is studied scientifically and therefore systematically, can make a contribution to this need to "know a great deal", because it offers people an inexhaustible supply of vicarious experience — experience on which they may draw, instead of having, in ignorance, to repeat again this experience and sometimes its attendant sufferings.2

It will be profitable to digress at this point, therefore, to examine more closely this concept which we have already referred to as 'scientific method'.

Scientific Method and its Application to the Study of Military History

The ability to think clearly and logically is a minimum requirement of any officer, but this ability is not a natural endowment. It is skilled work, and this skill is acquired by a special intellectual training which is commonly described as Scientific Method. It should also be noted that a study is made scientific, not by the nature of the data with which it is concerned, but by the method by which it is studied.3 This explanation suffices to show that an officer does not have to be a chemist or a physicist before he can have a scientific approach to his studies, be they Military History, Tactics, or the analysis and evaluation of information to be used for Intelligence purposes.

Man has three dominant moods — the practical, the emotional, and the scientific. These moods correspond, symbolically, to hand, heart, and head; and they are all equally necessary. If any one mood becomes dominant and the validity of the other two is denied or ignored, then a want of balance in normal behaviour ensues. The presence or absence of this kind of balance is a feature to look for in the personalities of history’s great commanders and staff officers. This discussion is concerned, however, with the scientific mood only, and this mood expresses itself through scientific method, which has many distinguishing features.

Some of these features, which are applicable in the reading and in the writing of Military History, are as follows:

- its appeal to facts;
- its use of hypotheses;
- its freedom from emotional bias;
- its use of methods of analysis, classification, evaluation, interpretation, and summarization of data;
- its use of means of objective measurement;
- its observation of data; and
- its explanation of data.

These features of scientific method can only be described here briefly. The business of science is to discover, to gather data, and to classify facts. But what the facts are must be determined by investigation, and it is fruitless to collect facts unless they are related to a particular problem which has to be solved.

Analysis is the process of separating a whole into its parts, and synthesis is the process of combining a part into a whole. In the classification of data one assembles data of like characteristics. A pistol, a revolver and a rifle may all be thought of as Small Arms and therefore assigned to that class. They are also firearms, and so may also be classified as Weapons. The types of classes constructed in a classification of data will depend on the nature of the data under investigation and the purpose for which the investigation is being conducted.

Scientific thinking is aided when large volumes of information are reduced quantitatively by summarization.4 Information set out in narrative form may be summarized by abridgment, and information of a mathematical character may be summarized statistically. The interpretation of information is an important skill for an officer to have, and its application extends beyond the study of Military History. Scientific thinking is also essential in the analysis and evaluation of written appreciations of tactical situations and of intelligence reports. The study of a page of Military History, a written appreciation of a tactical situation or of an intelligence report, is not just a passive act of reading. The originator may not, for instance, write with the skill that he should; or he may not have a proper understanding of the things that he is writing about. The recipient of the report must therefore, whether it be a page of military history, an appreciation of a tactical situation, or an intelligence report, "read between the lines". That is, he must interpret what he is reading before he can take action on it. The process of interpreting is therefore one of stating what the findings of the investigation disclose. The recipient must ask himself questions about his findings. What
do they mean? What is their significance? What is the answer to the problem? The process of interpretation is not therefore a mechanical process; it is a critical process of reasoning. It demands a high standard of scientific thinking; it demands much practical experience; and it is a task in which errors can be made.

When the mind has before it a number of observed facts about some problem which has attracted its attention, there is a tendency to form some generalization about these facts in so far as they relate to the problem in hand. A generalization of this kind is called a hypothesis. When the hypothesis is fully established it may take the form of facts, principles or a theory.

Bias is prejudice, and it is a factor which should be guarded against. It is a leaning towards one side or the other in an argument or in the observation and recording of data. That person is rare who can record facts for and against his own views in an argument, without bias. Accuracy is the fundamental requirement in the collection of information for scientific purposes.

Apart from this factor of bias, which can influence trained as well as untrained persons, two observations may be made on the factor of accuracy. First, the untrained person is apt to rely on guesses, rough estimates, and subjective evaluations. On the other hand, the scientifically trained person, when conducting an investigation, weighs, measures, tests and determines quantities accurately. But this word investigation should not be associated exclusively with a scientist in a white coat in a laboratory. A reconnaissance is an investigation; a court-martial is an investigation; and a criticism of a field exercise is an investigation of the debits and credits of the training which the exercise has reflected. On the other hand, an investigation of some minor matter may be merely a quick mental process akin to that of a problem in mental arithmetic.

It is only by exact observation, as for example during a reconnaissance or by studying the relationships of a variety of factors in a page of military history about a battle, that an exact knowledge of facts can be obtained. But to differentiate observation from merely "looking around" to gain impressions, the following five distinguishing features of observation should be noted:

1. An observation is specific.
2. Scientific observation is systematic.
3. An observation should be quantitative, if possible.
4. An observation is made, or should be made, by one who is trained in the particular work involved.
5. Systematic observation claims to be scientific because results can be checked by another observer.

The verb to classify means to assign something to a particular class in a scheme of classification. In The Principles of Science, W. S. Jevons said: "Science . . . is the detection of identity, and classification is the placing together, either in thought or in . . . space, those objects between which identity has been detected"; and that "Whenever we form a class we reduce multiplicity to unity, and detect, as Plato said, the one in the many." This concept of Classification was illustrated earlier in this discussion when the term Military History was broken down into a number of sub-classes. In the same way it was illustrated that the term Tactics rested, in its totality, on a basis of sub-classes. These include the development of tactical theory, the nature of tactical principles and their application to practical problems. Then if Tactics is looked at from another angle it can be divided into Armoured Tactics, Artillery Tactics, Infantry Tactics, etc. But Classification merely describes and arranges. It gives no reasons why the resemblances and differences on which it is based are what they are. It is the function of Explanation to assign these reasons.

There are few words more commonly used in scientific discussions than the term Explanation, and so it is essential to know its precise meaning. To explain or to give an explanation is an act which should render a thing clearly comprehensible in all its aspects so that nothing is left outstanding or obscure. A purpose of studying Military History is to be able to explain it in this sense to others, either orally or in writing. One of Military History's great masters of explanation is General Sir John Monash (1865-1931). Another great expositor, whose name may be linked with that of Monash, was General Sir Charles "Tim" Harington (1872-1940) of the British Army. His outstanding powers of
explanation have been ably and picturesquely described by Sir Philip Gibbs in his *Realities of War* (1920) (pp.48-50).

An observance of the processes of scientific method, in so far as this method can be applied to the study of Military History, will help to eliminate the kinds of mistakes which Marshal Foch made in his own study of Military History and in his own application of its lessons in the earlier part of World War I. General Sir James Marshal-Cornwall said in his *Foch as Military Commander*:

"After many years' study of military history and of the art of war, he embarked on his career of active service in 1914 with a totally erroneous conception of the conduct of war under modern conditions."

General Marshal-Cornwall then went on to explain that:

"This fallacy was due partly to traditional obsessions and partly to his misreading the lessons of the past. Even his first experiences as a corps commander in the Lorraine battle failed to teach him the futility of a headlong offensive regardless of the circumstances. As an Army commander on the Marne a month later, he inflicted unnecessary casualties on his troops by his inveterate adherence to the assault doctrine. During the autumn battles in Flanders as an Army group commander, he at last began to appreciate the value of defensive tactics, while his experience of cooperating with his Belgian and British allies taught him lessons which proved of immense value in his later period of unified command. Here, too, he began to see the strategic development of trench warfare in truer focus." (p.244.)

General Monash's more scientific behaviour, as a corps commander in the same war, contrasted sharply with that of Foch, and Monash has left us the following description of it:

"I had formed the theory that the true role of the infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort, nor to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, nor to impale itself on hostile bayonets, nor to tear itself to pieces in hostile entanglements . . . but on the contrary to advance under the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine-guns, tanks, mortars and aeroplanes; to advance with as little impediment as possible; to be relieved as far as possible of the obligation to fight their way forward; to march, resolutely, regardless of the din and tumult of battle, to the appointed goal; and there to hold and defend the territory gained; and to gather in the form of prisoners, guns and stores, the fruits of victory." 37

The alternative to scientific method in the study of Military History is a combination of intuition and an untrained memory, whereby attempts are made unsystematically to apply to particular problems, as they arise, what experience one has acquired by practice or what one knows intuitively. Instances of this non-scientific approach may be seen in attempts by some to apply, by rule of thumb, principles of war to particular situations. Another instance may be seen in the non-scientific approach to the writing of appreciations of tactical situations.

The effective application of principles of war to particular tactical situations demands a great deal of practical experience based on a sound theoretical knowledge. It is essential to:

- know what a principle is;
- know the exact meaning of each of the principles of war that are being used;
- know the relationships, if any, between the various principles of war that are being used; and to
- have a knowledge of conditions which will affect or influence the application of a principle of war 38 to some particular situation.

These conditions are not fixed in number, and the following nine can be considered with advantage where appropriate:

1. Time
2. Space
3. Ground
4. Weather
5. Numbers
6. Morale
7. Communications
8. Supply
9. Armament

The writing of an appreciation of a tactical situation is a good example to illustrate a scientific approach to a military problem. An appreciation, however, needs to be set out in a logical sequence, which is familiar to, and in common use by, all concerned. The form and sequence used during my service, and it
may be different from that in use today, was as follows:
• State the object.
• Set out the considerations which affect the attainment of the object.
• State the courses open to each side.
• Outline a plan for the attainment of the object.

It will be obvious from the discussion so far that the study of Military History, through war games, can offer considerable practice to improve one's skill in the application of principles of war and in the writing of appreciations of tactical situations.40

The Training Value of Writing Military History

Earlier in this article it was mentioned that there were two methods of learning Military History for professional purposes. First, by reading published works on the subject. Second, by writing works on the subject, in the form of research papers, either for publication in journals or for delivery as lectures.

The article will now be restricted to the writing of history, mindful of Bacon's assertion long ago that: "Writing maketh an exact man". In looking at writing from another angle, Sir John Fortescue said in a small but useful book entitled The Writing of History that:

"The historian's apprenticeship must be long, laborious, even tedious; but this is no more than can be alleged of any serious work. . . . The historian, like other craftsmen, must learn his trade gradually, schooling his 'prentice hand by small essays, and learning from great masters, dead and alive." (p.46.)

The message in this quotation is clear. It is that the ability to write with skill is preceded by much and sustained practice in writing and rewriting during a long apprenticeship. One of the great masters of English prose in the 19th century, Cardinal Newman (1801-90), confessed in his old age — he died in his ninetieth year — that he never wrote anything but with the greatest difficulty.

However, the ability to write with skill presupposes an ability to conduct one's own research — research which involves the application of scientific method to the analysis, classification and evaluation of information for use in the writing of a book, an article for a journal, a report or whatever other form the writing may take. I read somewhere recently that Schreiben konnen heisst denken konnen (To be able to write means to be able to think). This statement expresses, in a nutshell, a great truth.

The naval historian, Brian Tunstall, drew attention to another aspect of writing in his book, The Realities of Naval History, when he said:

"Naval history cannot be written from books alone. It is essential to see for yourself at least a few examples of the letters, orders, instructions, despatches, minutes, lists, log books and signal books housed in the great depositories of the Public Record Office, the British Museum, the Admiralty Library and the National Maritime Museum." (p.9)

This advice, if translated into military terms relative to conditions in Australia, will also be helpful to army officers who aspire to become writers as well as readers of Military History.41

In this matter of acquiring skill in writing Military History, one of the advantages, which is often overlooked, is that this skill is an acquirement which an officer can use widely in the execution of other duties. These other duties include the writing of orders, signals, letters and memoranda of all kinds, as well as special reports and training manuals. The intellectual quality of all the writing, which arises out of the studying of Military History in the ways discussed in this article, should reach new and higher levels. Professor Gordon A. Craig in his book, The Germans, said: "Clausewitz demonstrated the ability to discuss the most complicated of strategical questions in graceful and readily intelligible prose" and "Helmuth von Moltke's letters from Turkey in the 1830s had literary qualities of the highest order". (pp320-1.)

Australian publishing has not yet produced any writers in the field of Military History who can compare as models with those outstanding English writers Captain Cyril Falls, Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington and Professor Henry Spenser Wilkinson. One could also mention in this context many more outstanding English writers on Military History, including General Sir Ian Hamilton, General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, and Major General Sir Frederick Barton Maurice. On the Australian scene, the
tradition that General officers do not publish persists even today. (Although, for reasons unconnected with this tradition, General Sir John Monash and Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey left published works which were quantitatively disappointing.)

The Old Royal Prussian Army, which disappeared from the German Army List soon after the collapse of the Hohenzollern Empire in 1918, had a good record for the production of outstanding writers on professional subjects. This may have been due largely to the training facilities which the Prussian Great General Staff, Berlin, provided for selected officers in its War History Section. The officers in this section conducted research and wrote history for training purposes within the German Army. Field Marshal Count von Moltke, as Chief of the Prussian Great General Staff of the Army, took a special interest in this War History Section and in the officers who served in it. He regarded the work of this Section as a means for the further training of the officers engaged in it. Many of these officers became not only distinguished writers on military subjects, but also distinguished officers in command and staff appointments in the field. Instances which may be mentioned were General von Bernhardi, General von Kuhl, and General von Freytag-Loringhoven. There were also many others.

This discussion on the writing of Military History has tried to stress the importance of using proper words in proper places and the need to avoid not only brevity at the expense of clarity, but also the use of slipshod language. An officer should never use a word to which he cannot attach a clear-cut meaning. If he writes slipshod history, then the probability is that he will also write slipshod orders, reports and signals, which recipients may at first sight either not understand, or misunderstand. Then time may have to be wasted by having to ask the originator for clarification. Therefore, to be obscure in writing is to be inefficient.

Military Historians you Should Become Acquainted With

Before a student of Military History can begin to reflect on it, or to specialize in it as a subject, he must first build up as quickly as possible, by wide general reading, a personal knowledge of Military History. Its study in depth should follow in due course. It is wholly inadequate to master merely the prescribed books on those campaigns, which are set for promotion examinations. That is not the way to acquire a sense of history, or to become an educated officer. It is the way to become what Thomas Huxley once warned against, when he spoke about allowing education (which ought to be directed to the making of cultivated men) to be diverted into a process of "manufacturing human tools, wonderfully adroit in the exercise of some particular technical skill, but good for nothing else." The importance of a wide knowledge of Military History may be illustrated in another way by quoting again, this time from Herbert N. Casson, a pioneer Efficiency expert. He said in his book, The Story of My Life, that: "No man can become a botanist by studying one geranium."

By systematic general reading, an officer should soon become acquainted with a reasonably wide range of published works on particular aspects of Military History, and with biographical details of their authors. This process will then enable him to take an intelligent part in discussions in the Regiment, at meetings at United Service Institutions, and elsewhere. These discussions themselves will also serve to increase his knowledge, not only of Military History, but also of current problems of military training.

An examination of a particular case will illustrate more vividly how knowledge can expand by way of oral discussions in the right circles. Consider the following three works which have been selected at random: Hamley's The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated, Cyril Falls' The Art of War, and Maurice's British Strategy: A Study of the Application of the Principles of War. If an officer were to hear these three particular works and the names of their authors mentioned in a discussion, it would be some satisfaction to him, although he may not have read the books, to have heard earlier something about one or other of their authors. It is by discussion in this way that knowledge is exchanged and expanded. Let us, therefore, examine more closely each of these three authors:

1. General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley (1824-93) was a distinguished British soldier and author of the 19th century, whose book, The Operations of War, was based on lectures he gave at the Staff College,
Camberley where he was at first Professor of Military History and later the Commandant. The first edition of this work was published in 1866 by William Blackwood and Sons. The book ran into several editions. Hamley died in 1893. The sixth revised edition of the book was published in 1907, and a reprint of this edition was issued in 1909.

When a cadet at Sandhurst, Sir Winston Churchill acquired a copy of *The Operations of War*. He used it throughout his later life, and as late as World War II, as a book of reference. This was a good advertisement for a book whose author had died in 1893.

When I visited the Staff College, Camberley in 1971, I saw an annotated copy of Hamley's *The Operations of War* in a glass case. It had belonged to Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (1864-1922), who had been one of Hamley's successors as Commandant of the Staff College.

2. Captain Cyril Falls (1888-1971) worked in the Military Branch of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, London under its Director, Brigadier General Sir James Edmonds (1861-1956), from 1923 to 1938. From 1939 to 1953 he was the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, and in this position his illustrious predecessors included Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington (1858-1925) and Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970). Then, from 1946 to 1953, Captain Cyril Falls was Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford.

3. Major General Sir Frederick (Barton) Maurice (1871-1951) belonged to a distinguished family of writers. He was, himself, the author of military works of substance, and in 1927 he became Professor of Military Studies at the University of London. His daughter, Professor Joan Robinson, is a distinguished Cambridge economist. His father, Major General Sir (John) Frederick Maurice (1841-1912), was a prolific writer on military subjects; he was sometime Professor of Military History at the Staff College, Camberley; he was the author of the British Official History of the South African War, 1899-1902; and his son-in-law, Christopher Thomas Atkinson (1874-1964), an Emeritus Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, at the time of his death, was also a distinguished military historian.

In this short discussion of only three works and their authors (General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, Captain Cyril Falls, and Major General Sir Frederick Barton Maurice), we have in addition met, so to speak, five other military historians, namely: Sir Winston Churchill; Brigadier General Sir James Edmonds; Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart (whose contribution to the study of Military History is still widely remembered); Major General Sir John Frederick Maurice; and Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington, an outstanding officer of the British Army who become a brilliant writer on military subjects.

Before closing this all too brief examination of military historians and their works, a few comments should be made about biographical and autobiographical works.

They can be rich sources of information on great commanders and great staff officers. Without biographies of Cromwell, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wellington and Robert E. Lee, large areas of history would remain obscure. Many obscure areas exist in Australia's published Military History because of the want of authoritatively comprehensive biographies of Blamey, Hutton, Lavarack, J. G. Legge, Senator Pearce, Frederick Shedden, Thomas Trumble and Brudenell White. These deficiencies prevent a proper understanding of this history.

Much nonsense has been written, from time to time, about the place of biography in historical studies, by some historians who have apparently felt the need to keep their names before the reading public by one means or another. Some of this nonsense reflects a want of more experience and a wider vision, and the need for a closer acquaintance with the teachings of logic and a better grounding in scientific method. The student of Military History should not therefore be deflected from his course by detractors of biography and hostile critics of its place in history. The *Harvard Guide to American History* has pointed out that:

"The relation of history to biography is inescapable. Despite the emphasis which present-day historians justly place on impersonal forces, history is, after all, a narrative of human beings. Man is necessarily the
agent through which impersonal forces act, and he may even modify or redirect them. In this sense, Emerson spoke truly in saying, 'There is properly no history, only biography. The increasing attention of biographers to men and women in non-political spheres has greatly enriched the historians' view of the past, and more of such work should be done'.' William O'Connor Morris, a military historian of distinction in the 19th century and a county court judge in Ireland, said in his book *Great Commanders of Modern Times*: "the careers of that small group ... commonly known as 'great generals', afford matter for consideration which can never tire, and which gains in interest the more it is analysed." Great commanders such as:

General Ulysses S. Grant
General Robert E. Lee
General Douglas MacArthur
Lieutenant General Sir Iven Mackay
Field Marshal Lord Montgomery
The Emperor Napoleon I
Major General Sir Charles Rosenthal
Field Marshal Lord Slim
Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington

are studied to acquire knowledge of the following factors:

- their personalities and physical appearance;
- their intellectual fitness for higher commands;
- their reading habits and the nature of their reading;
- their relations with their staffs, their colleagues, and with senior and subordinate commanders;
- their experience in command and staff appointments;
- their methods of preparing and conducting military operations;
- their methods for the training of their officers for higher appointments;
- their methods of administering discipline;
- their methods for promoting the welfare of their troops;
- their methods for maintaining efficient standards of administration within their commands;
- the effectiveness of their methods of decision-making;
- their ability to communicate, orally and in writing, with colleagues, subordinates and superiors;
- their effectiveness as chairmen of conferences; and
- the effectiveness of their influence on the performance and the morale of all ranks in their commands.

Commanders in history who are studied in this systematic way may serve not only as examples, but also as warnings. Moreover, an officer, who can make good judgments on commanders in history after this kind of systematic training, will be much better qualified to pass judgments on individual officers and other ranks under his own command.

The powers of command can be and are exercised in many different ways. "Every Great Captain", Ronald Lewin pointed out in his biography, *Slim*, "has his personal style". A study of biographical literature will illustrate the truth of this statement. But despite these personal peculiarities, commanders often have some characteristics in common. Admiral Sir William James said, in writing of his own service, that he believed the following three aces should be in the hand of the ideal commander: first, the ability to inspire loyal, wholehearted service, which was the transcendent gift; second, a fertile imagination and a creative brain, as in the ability to plan battles; and third, eagerness to make use of the ideas of others, and to take them into his confidence.

A commander does not succeed by education alone — although training and knowledge are indispensable, they are not enough. The successful commander will usually be found to have also the imagination to innovate, the capacity to make good judgments, the temperament to make timely decisions and then abide by them, and the willpower to persevere in adversity. Field Marshal Slim once said something to the effect that it is easy to be brave for five minutes, but not so easy to be brave for five weeks. A commander must think and reflect; he must discuss and listen and, if necessary, reconsider; and he must decide and he must act.

But after an officer has learnt all these lessons from his historical studies, they will remain ineffective unless he changes his own behavioural characteristics to conform with them.
Great staff officers are not so frequently the subjects of published works. But, where they are, then these works should be studied to ascertain and to evaluate:

- their personalities and physical appearance;
- their relations with their commanders and their own staffs;
- their methods of discharging their duties;
- their intellectual fitness for discharging their duties;
- their skill in drafting orders and reports, their promptitude in distributing them for action, and their effectiveness in supervising the execution of orders;
- their ability to describe, to analyse and to illustrate orally; and
- their effectiveness as chairmen of conferences.

The great staff officers of history include:

- Field Marshal Lord Alanbrook
- Marshal Berthier
- General Sir John Cowans
- General Sir Nevil Macready
- Field Marshal Sir William Robertson
- General Sir Brudenell White

During my service in the Australian Army, there was much evidence to indicate that the role of staff officers was imperfectly understood by some officers at the regimental level. Indeed, the attitudes of some of these regimental officers were grounded in sheer ignorance. In his biography By Command of the Emperor, Major S. J. Watson said: "If the study of Napoleon and Berthier does nothing else, it convincingly demonstrates that the strength of a successful partnership between a commander and his chief of staff is even greater than the sum of their strengths as separate individuals." Another instance of a partnership of this kind was that of Monash and Blamey in the Australian Corps on the Western Front in 1918. In a biographical sketch of the American commander, General Hunter Liggett, Sir Basil Liddell Hart looked at the importance of staff officers from a different angle and said: "It is a popular but utterly false idea that men in the fighting line are more valuable than men on the Staff, that a mass of uniformed men is synonymous with an army. Actually, the strength of any military force is in proportion to the strength of its foundations." He went on to reinforce this comment by saying: "The skyscrapers of New York are only possible because they are built on Manhattan rock, but Washington thought to build a skyscraper army in 1917 on sand, and in consequence a long and inevitable delay occurred while the fresh foundations of a Staff were being laid in France." Not all biographies of commanders and staff officers deal adequately with their subjects. Many features that have been mentioned in this discussion are either ignored or dealt with perfunctorily by authors of military biographies. In such cases, an author's treatment of his subject is incomplete and it does not, therefore, fully meet the requirements of an officer as a student of Military History. However, what a reader cannot find in one biography, say of Robert E. Lee, he may find in another biography of him. This kind of searching is aided by good indexes to the biographies concerned. But another defect in an otherwise good biography may be either the absence of an index, or the want of an efficient and comprehensive index.

Before closing this section of the discussion, three published papers on History should be mentioned, which are worth studying. The first is Sir John Fortescue's Presidential Address to the Royal Historical Society, London on 12 February 1925. The second is the paper entitled "The Study of Military History" by the late Colonel E.G. Keogh, who was the first editor of the Australian Army Journal and who did much in unobtrusive ways during his editorship to assist officers collectively and individually and to raise the average standard of training within the AMF. The third paper may be regarded as a contribution to the history of military training. It is Professor Spenser Wilkinson's "An Experiment in Military Education" which was published in The Army Quarterly in October 1921. Professor Wilkinson was then Chichele Professor of Military History at the University of Oxford. He was a highly skilled, interesting and analytical writer on military subjects, and this paper deals with the history of the Manchester Tactical Society. This Society was founded by a small body of Volunteer officers, including Wilkinson, on 21 March 1881. It seems from this paper that the Society was still in existence at the time of the paper's publication in 1921, although it was not then an active society as
it once had been. The paper shows what can be achieved by a systematic and sustained study of the Theory of Tactics combined with practical exercises in the field.

Final Comments on How to Teach Yourself Military History

A case has now been presented to show that Military History should be regarded as an integral part of the military training of every officer; and that its scope is much wider than its traditional concern has been with the tactical features of military operations in campaigns of the past.

In the presentation of this case it has also been shown that if Military History is studied systematically (and that means scientifically) by an officer, it should confer on him intellectual benefits that he may not otherwise enjoy; and that it will be found that the advantages of a training in Military History will be, in other branches of an officer's individual and collective training, co-extensive with the amount of time which he devotes to its study in the scientific manner that has been outlined in this discussion.

I wish to labour this scientific method approach to the study of Military History because, to be productive, this study must be a process of reasoning all the way, and not a process exclusively of memorizing. This need for the scientific method approach is not something to restrict to the study of Military History — it is an approach which should permeate every branch of military training. This need for reasoning is well illustrated in the understanding and application of Principles of War. These principles are not learnt as one learns by heart the multiplication tables. Their effective application is an intellectual process which is dependent on much intelligent practice.

Another matter which I wish to labour again in these final words is that Military History is not a study restricted exclusively to the tactical aspects of military operations in past wars. In saying this, there is no intention to diminish the importance of this study of military operations in past wars. But I do question the training value to officers of this branch of Military History because of the superficial way in which it has so often been taught and written about in the past. It is desired, therefore, to imprint indelibly on the reader's mind that, just as military training is not concerned exclusively with the tactical features of military operations, so is Military History much wider in its nature and scope than the study of the tactical features of military operations in past wars. The student of Military History should want to know a great deal more about other things connected with these tactical features of military operations. These other things include information on: time and space problems; the topographical features of the area in which the military operations were conducted; the arms and equipment and the supply and transport arrangements of the opposing forces; the morale and standards of training of the opposing forces; the availability of reinforcements to each of the opposing forces; and the strategic and tactical doctrines of each of the opposing forces. John Keegan, the author of that excellent book entitled The Face of Battle, said in effect that the student will need this kind of additional information to be able to generalize about anything with a confidence that some military historians display about everything.

Another matter which may be mentioned relates to organization and functions. As an officer advances higher in rank and finally goes permanently to extra-regimental employment, he needs to know more and more about the machinery for the direction and control of the Army in general, from the level of units to the level of the Department of Defence in Canberra. In this broadening of one's outlook, Military History can help considerably. There are no books of substance, as far as I know, on the history of Australia's Department of Defence. There are, however, several good books on the history of the now defunct War Office, London, which are still worth studying when nothing suitable is available locally.

Cicero has pointed out with great truth that "not to know what happened before one was born is to remain always a child." When reading books and articles on the nature and significance of Military History in its broadest sense, as an element of military training, one is impressed by a constant factor amidst the variety in this study. This constant factor is an expression of the value of Military History in the intellectual training of an officer. Indeed, the systematic study of Military History, by reading it and by writing papers about
it, should result in improved standards of individual training in an individual's:

• general knowledge of history;
• knowledge of administration, strategy and tactics;
• knowledge of cartography and skill in map reading;
• knowledge of Command and Staff Duties at various levels;
• knowledge of the duties of military police in the field;
• knowledge of military Intelligence in the field;
• knowledge of the machinery of government for the administration of Australia's Defence forces in peacetime and for their employment in the conduct of military operations in time of war;
• knowledge of the relations between the Soldier and the Statesman at all levels from the private soldier to the Chief of the Defence Force Staff in Canberra;
• skill in the writing of papers on Military History for unit lectures and for publication in journals: this writing can have the added benefits of improving:
  (1) skill in conducting personal research for the preparation of training exercises in peace and of military operations in war;
  (2) skill in report-writing generally;
  (3) skill in presenting unit lectures on current aspects of training not restricted exclusively to Military History (Here the scientifically trained mind comes into effect by being able to adapt knowledge and skills gained in one field of training for application in another.);
  (4) ability to apply Principles of War by reflecting on them, by writing about them in papers on Military History and by making oneself more familiar with them in all respects by talking about them in lectures. It should always be remembered that a knowledge of Principles of War is useless without the ability to apply them effectively in practice.

Indeed, the reading and writing of history, combined with historical research, can confer all these benefits, which I have just recited, and more, on the student. Let us take one final example from naval history — an example which is equally applicable to the Army. Captain Alfred Dewar, RN, said, in an article entitled "The Necessity for the Compilation of a Naval Staff History" that:

"Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton (1829-1912) has a very illuminative remark in the preface to his work Naval Administration. He said: 'For myself, I have learnt more of the interior workings of the Admiralty in the compilation of this volume than I did in five years at the Admiralty, where the work in one's own department is more than sufficient for the day.' This gives a clear conception of the value of history and of its direct relationship to (current) business."

In the last resort, each officer has to determine for himself, after a reasonable period of systematic study, the value he places on Military History in his own intellectual development. In a brilliantly written essay by R.H. Gretton on history generally, and merely entitled History, he said: "The true value of history... lies in its training of the mind to estimate evidence, balance assertions, and criticise mental attitudes in its creation of a capacity for judgement." If Military History did nothing more for an officer, that alone would be sufficient reward for his mental labour, and sufficient training to make him a better officer.

NOTES
2. The importance of looking at life and its problems from different levels is brilliantly illustrated in Sir George Mallaby's From my Level, published by Hutchinson of London in 1965. The author was an Under Secretary in the Cabinet Office of Sir Winston Churchill during World War II. For students of Military History it is an indispensable book to study on the higher direction of war.
3. In saying this, I have in mind regular regiments of the British Army, many of which have long and distinguished histories which have been recorded in published works. By way of contrast, it may be said that an active "industry" in Australia has been the frequent raising and disbanding and re-designating of units, with the result that most units have been kept, historically speaking, in a permanent state of "childhood".
THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY HISTORY

10. A research historian may regard, for the purposes of this discussion, as one who writes articles, based on his own personal research, which are accepted by editors for publication in their journals, etc.
12. A contrary view was expressed by Major B. A. Clayton, B.Sc. (Econ.), M.A., R.A.E.C. in his article "The Nature and Scope of War Studies" in which he said: "The term Military History is a confusing one since it can be used, and frequently is, to cover a multitude of courses concerned with war and strategy. However, for the purposes of this article, I am taking Military History to mean the study of those aspects of man's history in the past which were primarily concerned with battles, campaigns, states, and the minutiae of military action." See The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Jan., 1971, p.197.
20. In his article "An American Military History Foundation", Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Scammell has described them as Explanation by Parts or Factors, Explanation by Circumstances and Conditions, Explanation by Cause and Effect, and Explanation by Function.
24. The author of this anonymous article was Captain (later Major General) J. F. C. Fuller.
25. In some cases it may be desirable or necessary to submit an appreciation of a situation orally.
35. The author of this anonymous article was Captain (later Major General) J. F. C. Fuller.
36. In order not to complicate an elementary treatment of the subject, no consideration has been given in this article to the use of archival records. It is well enough if a start is made with books, journals and newspapers in order to gain experience and to save time. Archival records are not as readily available as secondary sources.
38. The author of this anonymous article was Captain (later Major General) J. F. C. Fuller.
39. In some cases it may be desirable or necessary to submit an appreciation of a situation orally.


49. For a good outline of C. T. Atkinson's academic career and a list of his published works see his obituary in *The Times*, London, 19 Feb., 1964, p.15.


51. Henceforth, the term biography will be used here to include the term autobiography.


56. Major Warren Perry has been a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society of Victoria since 1967, and his special fields of historical interests are Australian, British and German, Political, Military and Administrative History, with particular reference to training institutions for officers; and to the organizational and administrative aspects of the machinery of governments for the higher direction of war.


65. A commander is watched by his subordinates for two things in the realm of decision-making. First, snap decisions based on insufficient information. Second, for instability and confusion which arise from decisions made today and reversed tomorrow. The mark of a good commander is an ability to make reasoned and timely decisions based on all available and relevant information.


71. General Sir Brudenell White (1876-1940), sometime Chief of the Australian General Staff, has not yet had a biography.

72. General Sir Brudenell White (1876-1940), sometime Chief of the Australian General Staff, has not yet had a biography.
THE DFRDB SCHEME
THE 3°/o PENALTY PROVISIONS

by Captain M. J. Knowles, RAEME

THE DFRDB Scheme is a contributory superannuation scheme for members of the Defence Forces. To purchase benefits, which are paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, a flat rate of contribution of 5.5 per cent of fortnightly rate of pay for DFRDB purposes is paid to the Commonwealth by all members serving on continuous full-time service for a period of not less than one year (DFRDB Authority Ninth Annual Report, 1981, p3).

The current scheme came into force from the First of October, 1972 as a result of an Inquiry by the Joint Select Committee on Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Legislation.

This study was conducted with the purpose of investigating Section 23 (3)(b) of the Defence Forces Retirement and Death Benefits (DFRDB) Act 1973, which imposes a penalty of 3 per cent per year on Officers who, having completed 20 years service, retire before their notional retiring age.

The purpose of the penalty provision as determined by the Joint Select Committee is to prevent Officers retiring before their respective retirement ages.

A survey was conducted amongst 79 Army Officers stationed in South Australia to determine to what degree this penalty influences an Officer’s decision to retire before his notional retiring age.

DISCUSSION
The survey introduced a number of very important factors which require more detailed analysis. These factors include:

- the retirement process in relation to age, rank, and years served;
- employment prospects as a relationship to age;
- the penalty as an inducement to remain in the Services; and
- other means of retaining Officers.

Each of these factors was also addressed by the DFRDB Committee and, subsequently, Parliament. However, while these matters may have been given consideration, the full implication and resultant impact of these factors need greater examination. The 3 per cent penalty imposed on Officers who retire before their notional retiring age, as justified by the DFRDB Committee, does not fulfil its aim of inducing Officers to serve to their notional retiring age.

The Retirement Process
The current DFRDB Act in its entirety is not exactly as originally proposed by the DFRDB Committee in 1972. Nevertheless, the Committee was appointed by Parliament to investigate certain aspects of the then current scheme and make appropriate recommendations. Two of the areas for investigation were:

- any differences, as between members, in the benefits provided; and
- any anomalies and inequities that might exist.

(DFRDB Report, 1972, p6).

Knight (1979, p71), on this issue of differences in benefits provided and anomalies, states:

“A superannuation plan should be equitable — benefits should be related as far as possible to salary and service. Moreover, benefits should be properly designed to avoid unnecessary inequities and anomalies.”

The DFRDB Committee identified that the previous scheme did contain differences and anomalies in relation to Officers and Other Ranks. These included:

- That different methods of determining entitlement to retirement pension for Officers and Other Ranks adds to the complexity of the legislation.
That anomalies can arise where the level of pension available is related to age rather than length of service. A late entrant can sometimes achieve a higher pension after shorter periods of service than a man with longer service who is compulsorily retired at a younger age.

That retirement benefits for the Defence Force in comparable countries are based on a length of service principle which has been found to be more appropriate than a scheme based on age at retirement.


The DFRDB Committee proposed that the differences between Officers and Other Ranks should be removed; and that the anomalies related to a pension based on age would be eradicated by a scheme based on length of service:

- By placing all members of the Services on the same basis, it is considered that those anomalies resulting from the dual basis will be removed.
- The Committee considers that it is more equitable for the quantum of pension payable to be related to length of service rather than age at retirement, and this is reflected in the rate of increment being proposed.

(DFRDB Report, 1972, p26)

Knight (1979, pp30 and 32) supports this notion of equality between members and a pension related to years of service.

- "In most large companies, executives and salaried staff receive the same scale of benefits."
- "The most important reason for relating benefits to years of membership is that it is generally accepted that the total cost of superannuation in respect of each individual member should be commensurate with his period of membership, so that the cost for each year of service is more or less the same for all members. Also, it is essential that members consider their superannuation plan to be fair to all, and one way of achieving this is for benefits to be proportional to the length of membership (or service)."

The present scheme, instead of overcoming previous differences and anomalies between Other Ranks and Officers, has been resurrected in a different form. This about-face was based on a fear of attrition at the 20 year mark. The decision to use the DFRDB Scheme in this manner, that is a method of ensuring Officer retention, immediately loses its credibility.

Hyman (1973-81, pp1-04) addressed the matter of using superannuation schemes for other purposes than those originally proposed.

"It is important that a pension scheme should have as few complications as possible. Unfortunately, some employers lose sight of the proper objectives and ask for seemingly simple and logical features which are really quite complex. In consequence, their professional advisers frequently have to resort to strange and roundabout methods to achieve the employer's wishes. The hotch-potch which emerges is such that the employees have not a clue what the scheme is about and in consequence they regard it with a suspicion which may or may not be justified. If it is not justified, then the employer is not only paying substantially towards the cost of the scheme, but he is also buying lots of bad will — which is an exercise in futility."

Long service and seniority within an organization has on the whole been viewed as a desirable and necessary aspect of company life. Pension schemes are designed in recognition of these two important qualities of seniority and long service. McGill (1979, p20) states:

"Pensions represent a differential wage payment, similar in nature to a shift differential or other payment in recognition of the unusual or special character of the service. In the case of a pension, the differential payment goes only to those who remain in the service of the employer for a long period of time and is made in recognition of the special contributions, not reflected in wage payments, of a long-service employee to the firm. These contributions include the preservation of the folklore of the industry, fostering of loyalty to the firm and its traditions, and the transmission of technical skills from older to younger generations of workers."

The current penalty provisions penalize an Officer for long-service and seniority. The current scheme recognizes late-entry Officers by paying them a pension based on 15 years service in recognition of long-service, yet will
penalize an Officer who serves 20 years by virtue of the fact that enlistment occurred before the age of 22 (see Table 1).

Closer examination of the table shows that a person enlisting at age 15 years is required to serve 21 years as against a 32 year old enlistee who only needs to serve 15 years to receive similar pensions of 30 per cent. Six more years service has been provided, yet the pension is the same in percentage terms. The fact that the 15 year old enlistee is now only 36 years old will not go unnoticed by most. His chances of gaining employment will arguably be better than the now 47 year old. But it should also not go unnoticed that the now 47 year old had the equivalent of 17 years in civilian workforce before joining the Services.

The point being, that the difference between the two is that one made the choice of joining at a younger age. The 15 year old enlistee is being penalized because of this decision, yet the 32 year old enlistee has a comparable windfall — 6 years less service yet an equivalent pension.

Comparisons between those persons who have served 20 years shows that a 15 year old enlistee will receive a 7.4 per cent less pension than a 22 year old enlistee (35 - 27.6), yet equal service has been given. The 15 year old enlistee would be required to serve a further 3 years to receive the equivalent benefit of the 22 year old enlistee. Other anomalies and differences can be drawn from the table, such as a 21 year old enlistee who will receive a 1.1 per cent (35.0 - 33.9) less pension than a 22 year old enlistee where both have completed 20 years service.

This anomaly is further compounded when seniority is equal, that is, the Officers are of equal rank. The situation is such that an Officer of equal seniority and less service can receive a greater pension. The seniority anomaly is further perpetrated when compared to Other Ranks. The Army recognizes, by virtue of rank and salary, that an Officer is more senior than private, sergeant, warrant officer ranks, etc. Yet a warrant officer after 20 years service will receive a pension greater than a major who has served the same amount of time, and of the same age.

This is illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>% entitlement</th>
<th>Salary per annum</th>
<th>$ reduction</th>
<th>New retirement pay per fortnight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>$30,800</td>
<td>$2263</td>
<td>$8517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer Class I</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>$26,592 (salary circular March 82)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>$9307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2:**
COMPARATIVE PENSION ENTITLEMENTS BETWEEN A MAJOR AND WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE (WOI)
The WO1 is about $30 per fortnight better off than the major who is more senior, yet the same service has been provided. The major would need to continue service for one more year to receive an equivalent pension ($354). Similar comparisons can be made to other combinations of rank, which vary with respect to age and length of service commitments.

The previous analysis of seniority and years of service provides stark examples of differences and anomalies, not only between Officers and Other Ranks but also within the Officer structure. It is not possible to pass these examples off as exceptions to the rule. It is quite clear that there is an anomaly with regard to the 3 per cent penalty as applied by section 23(3)(b) of the DFRDB Act. This anomaly has been voiced widely throughout the Defence Forces, but the extent of the anomaly has not been measured previously.

Those who agree with the penalty, base their support primarily on:

- future civilian employment as a result of 'early retirement' will more than supplement the loss of pension due to the penalty, and
- the penalty is necessary to retain Officer expertise.

Employment Prospects

The DFRDB Committee also agreed with the concept of the retiree finding other employment. “The career of members of the Defence Force is generally much shorter than in other occupations and it is expected that for Servicemen who are required by the Defence Force to retire early that they will obtain other employment.” (DFRDB Report, 1972, p13)

However, having stated that retirees “will obtain other employment”, the Committee further stated that “luck must play a large part” (see below):

“Because retirement can occur for Officers at much earlier ages than is customary elsewhere in the community, different considerations apply. The benefit may provide a supplement to civilian earnings. But the extent to which it will be a sufficient supplement will depend on the kind of work the retired Officer can get. Very little information is available on the kind of work available or the experience of retired Officers in obtaining employment. It is clear that luck must play a large part. Some retirees may succeed in obtaining well-paid employment on retirement whilst others may either be forced into low-paid, unattractive work, or not be able to find employment at all. Much will depend on the general economic climate at the time the man retires. As retirement age is compulsory, the man can have little control in choosing an opportune time to retire.” (DFRDB Report, 1972, p17)

The Committee having accepted the fact that “very little information is available” on retired Officer employment prospects, could have been expected to investigate this aspect more closely. What was known at the time was that unemployment was 1.4 per cent in 1970, and 2.5 per cent in 1972 (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Cat 6204.0, p72). In 1982 the unemployment rate was 6.9 per cent (ABS Cat 6203.0, p12), a more than substantial increase. It is apparent that luck must play an ever increasing role in Officer civilian employment prospects.

Employment prospects for Officers do not appear to have improved since 1972, in fact the situation appears to have deteriorated quite considerably. The average duration of unemployment for the 35 to 54 year age group is currently 50.1 weeks (ABS Cat 6203.0, p23) as against 5.3 weeks (ABS Cat 6204.0, p78) in 1971. The employment situation has a very significant effect on Officer retention, with particular regard to notional and mandatory retirement ages. It has already been established that the older a person becomes, the less likely he is to gain meaningful career-related employment.

Officer Retention

The DFRDB Committee had addressed itself to the problem of retaining Officers, and as such was concerned that “there would be an inducement to retire after twenty years” (DFRDB Report, 1972, p28). The Committee further stated:

“It is of course most desirable that senior personnel be encouraged to stay in service, but it is considered that this is best effected by offering positive inducements . . .” (DFRDB Report, 1972, p28)
The "positive inducement" offered was a percentage reduction in retirement benefits if election occurred before an Officer's notional retiring age. Hardly a satisfactory method of positive inducement.

What extent therefore does the 3 per cent penalty provision play in retaining Officers? The survey indicates that 41 per cent believe the penalty would tend to be a major factor in their decision to retire, while 48.7 per cent indicated the penalty would only be a minor factor. Senior ranks rate the penalty provisions as not being as great a factor as do junior ranks. This could possibly be due to junior ranks not being as economically and financially as assured of their futures at their particular point in their careers. Age is also important, as 35 year olds and over also perceive the penalty as a lesser factor than do under 35s. Thirty-five and over is a much more crucial time in a person's life, due to family, etc commitments, and these factors are being rated ahead of the penalty provisions.

Age is a very crucial factor in the retirement process, especially in the Defence Force circumstances. As already shown, an Officer can become eligible for retirement benefits as early as age 35. The crucial decision-making time occurs once an Officer has served 20 years. This is because the decision must be made with regard to either serving on, or taking whatever retirement benefits are due and beginning a new career. This decision is further compounded when the Officer takes into consideration his likely promotion prospects and, with promotion, a change in mandatory and notional retirement ages.

For those ranks who have a notional retiring age of 42, there is a further five year period before mandatory retirement to find alternative employment, unless promotion is gained to Lieutenant Colonel. The Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) found that promotion chances of a Major to Lieutenant Colonel were declining sharply (RODC Report, 1978 pp3-21). The RODC further found that the chance of promotion to Lieutenant Colonel is "considerably lower than those achieved over the past 20 years" (RODC Report, 1978, pp3-32). The RODC also recommended that there would only be a 40 per cent chance of promotion to Lieutenant Colonel (RODC Report, 1978, pp3-32). With a Major's chance of promotion being one of uncertainty, a Major must make a decision relatively early with regards to a second career.

Levinson (1969, p51) sums up this period in one's life, which begins about 35, as follows:

"For most men, attainment of executive rank coincides with the onset of middle age, that vast gulf which begins about 35. It is the peak time of personal expansion, when a man lives most fully the combined multiple dimensions of his life. He has acquired the wisdom of experience and the perspective of maturity. His activity and productivity are in full flower; his career is well along toward its zenith. He is at the widest range of his travels and his contacts with others. He is firmly embedded in a context of family, society, career, and his own physical performance. His successes are models for emulation; his failures, the object lessons for others. He has become a link from the past to the future, from his family to the outside world, from those for whom he is organizationally responsible to those whom he owes responsibility."

This particular time in life has been termed the 'mid-career crisis'. This time corresponds to the period in life when an Officer faces his most crucial decision — to seek alternative employment or to continue serving.

The mid-career crisis in the Defence Force is further propagated by the relatively low mandatory retiring ages in the Services. Officers must make a decision between early retirement with its penalty and 'increased' chance of employment, or wait until notional retirement or mandatory retirement with the associated possibility of no employment.

The penalty provision no longer becomes a consideration. An Officer at age 38 with 20 years service, must decide what is best for him, not what is best for the Services. He realises his job chances will decline with age, his promotion prospects look dim. There can be no other choice; take the alternative job and leave, even though he would probably like to serve on. Removal of the penalty provision will of course not 'encourage' the Officer to continue service, but it is also apparent that the penalty's existence does not 'encourage' the Officer to continue service either.

The fear that there would be a mass exodus of Service personnel at the 20 year service
mark has not occurred. The Pacific Defence Reporter (May 1978, p3) indicates that:

"...job satisfaction will be increasingly sought in individual work situations. This was confirmed in our attitude survey which listed lack of job satisfaction as the major factor in early retirement."

The methods used in motivation and job satisfaction abound in the literature, and as such is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, the methods employed in increasing motivation and job satisfaction should not be underestimated, as substantial rewards can be made.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The 3 per cent penalty provisions proposed by the DFRDB Act and recommended by the DFRDB Committee as a method of Officer retention are viewed by many as unsatisfactory and unjust. This statement is based on the following findings:

- The 3 per cent penalty is not considered a deterrent in an Officer's decision to retire.
- Employment prospects from age 35 deteriorate greatly, and are likely in the foreseeable future to be difficult to attain.
- Early mandatory retirement age encourages an Officer to consider and seek out civilian employment, and hence early separation from the Services.
- The penalty provisions provide substantial differences and anomalies not only between Officers and Other Ranks, but also within the Officer structure.
- Poor promotion prospects increase the likelihood of early retirement.
- Job satisfaction and motivation aid in ensuring that Officers remain with the Services.

The aim of this article has been to show that the penalty, as originally recommended by the DFRDB Committee in 1972 and subsequently modified by Parliament, as a method of Officer retention is unsatisfactory. While it is acknowledged that the scheme should not be abused, in addition it should not be used as a method of reducing benefits to those who claim an equal right to these benefits. The report does indicate that the reason for Officer separation is not as a result of the benefits of the scheme, but due to career uncertainty from the mid 30s. The removal of the penalty would provide Officers with greater future financial stability.

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Captain Malcolm Knowles enlisted as an Army apprentice in 1972, and graduated from OCS in 1978. He holds a Bachelor of Business Degree with a major in personnel/industrial relations, and is currently posted as the Engineering Doctrine Officer at RAEME Training Centre. He intends to pursue 'the problems officers face after retirement in gaining meaningful career-related employment' as a further course of study.
Reflections on Vietnam

By Major D. T. Read, RA Inf

"History is assessing the damage to our nation and the responsibility therefor."

General William C. Westmoreland

Introduction

A recent review in this journal of an American book on Military Professionalism, observed that the Australian Army's contribution to the literature on the military sociology and history of the Vietnam conflict was sadly lacking. Perhaps the time has come to look at reflections which have had time to mature into more lasting comments. This article attempts to make some comment on the military sociological and historical influence of Australia's involvement in Vietnam during the summer of 1970. Perhaps this microcosm of time will point to a more general impression of those times. The words of a popular songwriter, "we were only nineteen", bring home the fact that some thirteen years have elapsed upon which one may draw some conclusions.

Historical Importance

Militarily, the Vietnam war would be considered by most to have been a prolonged operation. In the long line of military involvements since World War II, Korea, Borneo, Malaya and Confrontation with Indonesia, Vietnam was a low-level military operation which included some significant battles at Long Tan, Bien Hoa, Coral-Balmoral, Binh Ba, and Hat Dich. To the extent that since Vietnam there have been no military involvements, Vietnam's effect has been significant in terms of military strategy and planning for the foreseeable future. It will be shown that the political and military leadership has focused its attention on dealing with similar low-level conflicts in the future. In reality, a potentially higher level of conflict is unfolding in the world situation.

Training for War

If one could have enjoyed the sunshine at the Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka in early 1966, one would not have been concentrating on the task in hand. The sweat-stained bare shoulders of soldiers, both National Servicemen and regular, thrusting bayonets into sawdust-filled bags, pointed to more serious thoughts about the future. A warrant officer could be heard commenting on the sound of a platoon as it came to a halt on the parade ground: "Hear that — regulars not nashos!" This was not a reflection upon National Servicemen, but an expression of pride in the professionalism of seventeen year olds who were training for war regardless of their fate with a marble in the National Service lottery.

At the University of Adelaide, the Acting Minister for Defence, Dr Forbes, was explaining to students how, as National Servicemen, they would look back on their experience with satisfaction, in having served their country in a way which was unique. Those who were not called up would regret having missed the experience. At the same time, Dr Cairns was beginning to call for the opposition of National Servicemen going to Vietnam. The seeds of conflict had begun.
Vietnam

Vietnam, as a theatre of war, was unique in that one arrived by Pan Am jet or aircraft carrier into a more or less organized operation. Whether as an individual or a unit, one could not but be impressed by the presence of the United States forces and their organization for war. Tan Son Nhut airport may have been hot and sultry, but it was also bustling with the activity of fighter aircraft taking off and transports lined up for regular flights to all parts of the war zone. Those leaving to go home to the United States or Australia showed their experience in their comradeship, displayed without embarrassment. This war was businesslike on a huge scale, in more ways than one.

Away from the bright lights of Saigon and out in the Provinces, life went on as usual for the peasants who were only interested in scratching a living from the land, as long as the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army allowed them to. Programmes of land clearance, village resettlement and “Vietnamization” of the fighting were all designed to help combat the growing success of the North Vietnamese Army in their guerrilla and conventional war being fought in the border areas. South Vietnamese people appeared to be just as reluctant to embrace the influence of the United States as they were to submit to the North Vietnamese. And so a military conflict degenerated into a political struggle, not only within Vietnam, but in the lounge rooms of every western family who had some interest in the television news of this South East Asian war. This may be a simplification of the events, but it was no less the fundamental issue.

The War

Some days were declared non-war days, as indeed some places were designated non-war areas or special zones. There was no incongruity in the fact that a barber who cut Australian soldiers’ hair at Vung Tau, was later shot as a guerrilla outside that area. It was one of those wars. Possibly the biggest enemy was the waiting — the frustration. Lieutenant William Calley, U.S. Army, perhaps typified the result of frustration taken to its illogical conclusion. When he and his men shot innocent civilians after mine incidents, a military Court Martial found them guilty of military misconduct. Many Australians faced this pressure and did not give in to it. However, that made it no less real.

In terms of military experience, most of the battles took place at sub-unit level or below. Typically, they involved brief encounters with fierce fire fights, or were the result of endless ambushing of enemy resupply routes. The larger battles were exceptional, as generally they were not joined deliberately unless the North Vietnamese felt they had a tactical advantage, or wanted to achieve a political goal.

From a sociological viewpoint, the integration of National Servicemen with regular soldiers proved to be very successful. This does not mean that there weren’t any problems. On the whole, conscripts accepted their enforced service and, in typical Australian fashion, got on with the job. Due to their above-average intelligence, many found themselves in positions of responsibility. Quite a few were commissioned and later made the Army their career. Equally true, some questioned their role in this war and, if not actually becoming conscientious objectors, let it be known that for the duration of their military service they were only interested in staying alive.

The Trauma of Defeat

Eventually, the hopelessness of fighting a war popularly termed “unwinnable” resulted in the withdrawal of the United States and its allies from Vietnam. Not only had the war been lost militarily, but politically and psychologically a good deal more had been lost. The United States was left to wander in the wilderness for some years before it found the strength to put the memory aside. Within the United States, veterans pressed for, and got, a memorial in Washington D.C. The administration, under President Reagan, is taking increasingly stronger action against communist-supported wars in Central America despite parallels being drawn with the Vietnam lesson. Within Australia, veterans have been vocal in their search for the truth on the effects of the herbicide, Agent Orange, on Servicemen who came into contact with it. The Australian Government is taking more positive actions in its foreign policy dealings both with neighbouring countries and in Europe.

It is against this background that, despite eleven years of relative peace, the superpowers have been arming themselves with not only
numerous nuclear weapons but cruise missiles, and a substantial conventional warfare capability. It appears that Australia is still wandering in the wilderness. Not only does it not see a foreseeable threat, but is actually reducing its limited conventional capability.

**The Future**

Perhaps Australians should be forgiven for their apparent disinterest in defence matters. In a country where unemployment is high, and drought has been followed by bushfires and floods, is it any wonder that no one gets excited about overseas developments? Yet those developments will affect Australia just as surely as did Vietnam.

Precisely because Vietnam was our most recent military experience, however limited, its effect on political and military planning has been to divert our attention from more fundamental considerations in the defence of Australia. Historically, Australia has always fought someone else's war, somewhere else. The pain of Vietnam has helped to induce a conception that we will only ever have to fight a war on the Australian mainland in the future. As a result of this, the most likely enemy would only be capable of attaining low-level conflict, which our current defence force is capable of handling. Whilst we endeavour to develop a viable force structure for future expansion to higher levels of conflict, the more immediate problems of maintaining more expensive and sophisticated equipments and capabilities plague us.

Unfortunately, it is quite likely that unfolding world events will not take note of our limited vision. Soviet arms shipments to the Third World countries have recently reached significant levels. The level of military involvement by Vietnam in South East Asia has grown considerably in the past ten years. The increase of Soviet military equipment in a tense Middle East situation threatens to be exploited by various factions. The level of military operations in Central America grows daily, with increasing shipments of arms from both East and West.

It appears to be a legacy of Vietnam that we believe our defence force should only be prepared to defend Australia from an as yet unnamed aggressor. It is more likely that Australia will become involved in a world conflict of far greater intensity than anyone could imagine. Hopefully, the concerned Australian will not allow our Vietnam experience to colour present defence thinking for much longer.

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Australia’s first Vietnam War commemoration day, termed ‘Long Tan Day’, was observed in Hobart and Launceston on 18 August this year.

The battle for Long Tan, north of Nui Dat, on 18 August 1966, was the biggest battle and the biggest casualty list involving Australian troops since the Korean War. Seventeen died, and nineteen were wounded. More than 240 Viet Cong were wounded. — Ed.
THE NAXALITE
STRATEGIC FAILURE

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Introduction

A LTHOUGH political violence is not new to the people of West Bengal, its impact was markedly profound when leftist radicals known as “Naxalites” waged a five-year quasi-military campaign in their towns, villages, fields and jungles. The prelude to this revolutionary paroxysm was the emergence of a militant peasant movement in the Naxalbari region of Darjeeling district. The open advocacy of a protracted insurgency, and the call to the poor and landless throughout India to emulate the violent tactics of this movement, soon made Naxalbari, “Naxalism” and its supporters — “Naxalites” — household names. Moreover, as the Naxalites acknowledged the inspiration of the Chinese revolution and formed their own party — the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) — with Chinese approval, Naxalism became a synonym for Indian Maoism.

Upon the foundation of the C.P.I. (M-L) in 1969, the Naxalites began organizing guerilla warfare in the countryside. In the coastal districts of Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh, and Midnapore on the Bay of Bengal, they were able to foment rebellion among a large number of desperately impoverished tribal people such as the Jatapus, Savaras, Santals and Mundas. Although the uprisings in Srikakulam and Midnapore were crushed, the C.P.I. (M-L) turned to urban guerrilla tactics in Calcutta, and then in 1971 opened up a new rural front in the West Bengal district of Birbhum. By 1972, however, the back of the movement had been broken by concerted counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the Indian Army and various paramilitary units. This article is an attempt to analyse, in military terms, the major strategic failures of the Naxalite rural campaign between 1967 and 1972. The historical documents employed have been supplemented by field research in districts where whole communities of Santal tribals participated in guerrilla activities. Thus, particular reference is made to Jhargram subdivision of Midnapore district (which includes Gopibalanpur), Debra police station area in the same district, the Naxalbari region of Darjeeling, and the areas under the jurisdiction of Bolpur, Suri and Rampurhat thanas (police stations) in the Birbhum district of West Bengal. While various Naxalite factions still maintain strong followings in these regions, the only area particularly affected by low-level violence at the time of field study (Dec 1978; Jan-Feb, Oct-Dec 1979) was the area under the influence of the Binod Misra group on the Nepal-North Bengal border. Nevertheless, the Naxalites remain a force to be reckoned with in a number of other parts of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh.

Strategy and Tactics

Despite the profound influence of local social, cultural, economic and geographic factors, one can make some generalizations about guerrilla warfare; except for Castro’s success
in Cuba and the victory of the Sandinistas (F.S.L.N.) in Nicaragua, guerrilla warfare has only succeeded against foreign armies of occupation.\(^2\) If we are to analyse the Naxalite strategic failure by way of international comparisons, then it should be remembered that not all guerrilla movements have had strategic aims. The Soviet partisans, for example, were auxiliary guerrilla forces fighting in association with regular forces. Their operational and tactical tasks were to weaken and harass the enemy, while the Red Army made the strategic decisions.\(^3\)

Aside from the sporadic and localized Naga and Mizo insurgencies, the C.P.I. (M-L) faced the Indian military forces alone. Since they were not auxiliaries, their aim was to defeat the Indian military in the field of battle; they had strategic, together with purely tactical, objectives. Unlike, for example, the F.L.N. in Algeria, the I.R.A. in Ireland, E.O.K.A. in Cyprus, P.A.I.G.C. in Guinea-Bissau, and FRELIMO in Mozambique, the C.P.I. (M-L) would have had to develop regular warfare in order to win. Unlike the French, the British, and the Portuguese, the Indian Army could not have been expected to relinquish its military control of the subcontinent, by means of a strategic withdrawal. Similarly, for the Indian Government, the C.P.I. (M-L)'s insurgency did not represent the political and economic embarrassment of a rebellious satellite.

Although the Naxalites hoped for an equalization of military forces, they also fought for a complementary collapse of political power, since no revolution has succeeded without the breakdown of the State machinery. Robert Taber has summarized this process in the following terms:

"Social and political dissolution bleeds the military, and the protracted and futile campaign in the field contributes to the process of social and political dissolution . . . This is the grand strategic objective of the guerrilla: to create 'the climate of collapse'."\(^4\)

**Bases and Liberated Zones**

In order to create the climate of collapse and (according to the Maoist scenario) surround the cities, the C.P.I. (M-L) recognized the need to regroup, recuperate and train in sanctuaries beyond the Indian Army's reach. In its attempts to create such bases, however, the party revealed one of its worst ineptitudes. In the first instance, the Naxalites chose to attempt the establishment of self-sustaining guerrilla bases within India's own domestic political boundaries. Although they drew their inspiration primarily from the Chinese example, they were blind to many of the differences between China in the 30s and 40s, and India in the 60s and 70s.

The leaders of the C.P.I. (M-L) could not see that the Indian Army was not like the Japanese Army, bogged down throughout S.E. Asia, China, and the Pacific, and thinly deployed in occupation of major metropolitan centres. They also failed to consider the vastly superior communications infrastructure (of road and rail) bequeathed to India by the British, which (unlike Japanese-occupied China) enabled troops to be effectively deployed with relative speed and short lines of supply.

In their efforts to create internal bases, the Naxalites did not move their forces to strategically hospitable regions, but demonstrated a naive opportunism which located bases wherever large numbers of C.P.I. (M) cadres had defected to the C.P.I. (M-L). Thus, in Srikakulam, which Mazumdar hoped would be the Yenan of India,\(^6\) the guerrillas had no rear but the sea. In West Bengal, where they gained support in the plains, they made their own military rationalizations, with disastrous results. In December 1969, Mazumdar wrote, "it is possible to wage guerrilla warfare in the plains" and "wherever there are peasant masses."\(^7\) Two years later, the West Bengal-Bihar Border Region Committee of the C.P.I. (M-L) reaffirmed this thesis:

"It is one thing to dream petit bourgeois dreams about jungles and mountains . . . It is another thing to carry forward the painful revolutionary work of building a base area in reality. Our respected leader Charu Mazumdar has shown that this is not the era of the Chinkang of 1928, this is the decade of the 70s, the era of the downfall of the imperialists and reactionaries in one country after another. That is why it is possible today to build a base area in the vast plains. The proof of this is the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The proof of this is the vast plains of Cambodia."\(^8\)

Only Naxalbari, at the foot of the Himalayas, some ten miles from what was then the Pakistani salient of Titaliya (now part of Bangla-
desh), a mere five miles from the Nepalese frontier town of Bhadrapur and only sixty miles from China's Tibet, offered the Naxalites the prospect of a friendly border and hospitable terrain to the rear.

However, one can hardly make strategic comparisons between the plains of the Mekong and those of Bengal — especially in the absence of a Naxalite version of the Ho Chi Minh trail. The Naxalites appear also to have ignored Mao's own thesis on waging war on the plains. Because the Japanese were short of troops, Mao thought that guerrilla warfare was possible in the plains so long as the guerrillas had an extensive area in which to manoeuvre. Nevertheless, he insisted that:

"It is only in the plains that, when confronted by a heavy converging attack, the guerrilla commander should consider other measures in the light of the specific circumstances, namely, leaving many small units for scattered operations, while temporarily shifting large guerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can return and resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemy move away."

The Naxalites neither developed operations in extensive areas nor withdrew larger guerrilla formations to mountain sanctuaries. The field of operations for many guerrilla units and action squads was often no bigger than a thana, and commanders had immense difficulty aggregating and wielding large formations with any tactical mobility.

The party's inertia and its difficulty in flexibly dispersing, concentrating, and transferring its forces on the plains, led to its units being encircled and suppressed by an army with no shortage of troops. Guevara provides us with the essence of the guerrilla's dilemma in such situations:

"... the guerrilla fighter on the plains must be fundamentally a runner. Here the practice of hitting and running acquires its maximum use. The guerrilla bands on the plain suffer the enormous inconvenience of being subject to rapid encirclement and of not having sure places where they can set up a firm resistance."

The Naxalites neither established mountain base areas as, for example, the F.L.N. did in Algeria's Aurès mountains; as Tito did in Bosnia, Montenegro, Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia; as Mao did in Kiangsi-Hunan and Yenan; and as Castro did in the Sierra Maestra: nor did they establish rear bases in friendly neigh-
bouring states as the F.L.N. did in Tunisia and Morocco; as FRELIMO did in Tanzania; as Z.A.N.U. did in Mozambique; as POLISARIO did in Algeria; as the Sandinistas did in Costa Rica; and as the Nagas did in China’s Yunnan. It would also appear worth mentioning, at this point, that the guerrilla movements which emerged (and were crushed) in Latin America during the 60s, were distinguished by their lack of external bases. Hector Béjar (a commander in the ill-fated Peruvian E.L.N.) has written of internal bases:

"... no place is inaccessible for an army with some counter-guerrilla training. Only excessive naivete could have led to the belief that where the guerrillas can go, the army can’t. The concept of a security zone is not only absolutely contrary to guerrilla tactics, but is dangerous as well, because it gives the combatants false confidence in the protection they can derive from the terrain. In the first stage of the war, the guerrilla’s only security resides in himself, in his ability to move from one place to another, and in his knowledge of the terrain. To limit him to certain zones is equivalent to taking away his only defense: his mobility."

This is not to suggest that foreign bases and mountain sanctuaries ensure success. The Greek communists had (until Tito and Hoza withdrew support) bases in Yugoslavia and Albania, together with mountain sanctuaries in Grammos-Visti, and Oman’s P.F.I.O.A.G. had facilities in South Yemen’s Mahra province, as well as internal havens in the rugged “Jabal Qara” — yet both insurrections were crushed. The P.A.I.G.C., however, was able to wage a successful campaign against the Portuguese, in a flat country such as Guinea-Bissau, without any mountain bases, taking “full advantage of the jungles and swamps” in order to “create difficult conditions for the enemy.” Nevertheless, they also relied on bases in the Republic of Guinea and on the prospect of a Portuguese withdrawal.

To be fair, the Naxalites were faced with a conundrum; they were aware that they required both a dense mass-base and some degree of topographical security, yet if they withdrew to the mountains they knew they would have to rely even more on insular tribal populations such as the Santals. They also knew that they would thus become even more alienated from the mainstream of the Indian rural population. Although they compromised and concentrated on the borders of the Bengali hinterland, they were defeated. The Naxalite “liberated zones” in the plains were far from fluid or extensive; without fortifications, armour, and artillery, they could not have been defended.
Logistics and Ordnance

Intimately linked to the question of base areas is the organization of logistical support, and especially ordnance. One of the classical guerrilla maxims has been to capture weapons from the enemy, despite recent international experience which appears to suggest that contemporary insurgents have been forced to rely more and more on external infusions of arms.

Marcellino dos Santos has summarized FRELIMO's experience of this critical problem, in this respect:

"There is a Portuguese base where you know there are weapons — can you capture them with a group of 15 to 20 people? It is impossible; Portuguese troops who go from one point to another, travel in convoys. If you attack a convoy, the enemy does not run away — it reacts. When you see a convoy of 50 trucks with perhaps from 50 to 100 meters, or 200 meters, between each truck, how can you ambush it in order to get weapons? You might succeed in a lightning ambush of one truck, but the others will immediately take measures to counterattack the small unit. Right from the start we had to ensure our own supply. Naturally we did get materials from the enemy, but it was not the main source of supply. The main source of supply is from those countries who (sic) are helping us . . . This is still the position today, and particularly when it comes to getting sophisticated weapons."

The emphasis on sophisticated weapons would seem to be a significant point. One can hypothesize that, despite the awesome developments in counter-insurgency hardware, many guerrilla movements have attempted to achieve a critical parity or superiority in particular aspects of small-arms. Coupled with the tactical advantages of irregular warfare, the deployment of such weapons can become more effective. In the hands of the Boer Commandos, modern German Mausers proved very formidable weapons against the heavily armed British. In 1912, T. H. C. Frankland wrote:

"Rapidity of fire, accuracy, smokeless powder, and long range added to the irregular's power of harassing, while a few guerrillas could impose on large columns . . . In South Africa a few men with rifles could force a column to deploy at fourteen hundred yards, and could withdraw after doing considerable damage, while their opponents were still half a mile distant."

Similarly, T. E. Lawrence drew attention to the fact that, although Arab irregulars fighting the Turks aimed at simplicity of equipment, superiority of weaponry "in the critical department" was also aimed at. In the 14th edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica, he wrote:

"Quantities of light machine guns were obtained from Egypt for use not as machine guns, but as automatic rifles, snipers' tools, by men kept deliberately in ignorance of their mechanisms so that speed of action could not be hampered by attempts at repair. Another special feature was high explosives . . ."

Guevara's writings also emphasize the need for automatic weapons to maximize firepower at critical moments — together with long-range sniping weapons. Thus he writes:

"The arms preferable for this type of warfare are long-range weapons requiring small expenditure of bullets, supported by a group of automatic or semi-automatic arms . . . Medium heavy arms, such as tripod machine guns, can be used on favourable ground, affording a greater margin of security for the weapon and its personnel, but they ought always to be a means of repelling an enemy and not for attack. An ideal composition for a guerrilla band of 25 men would be 10 or 15 single-shot rifles and about 10 automatic arms between Garrands and hand machine guns including light and easily portable automatic arms, such as the Browning or more modern Belgian Fal and M-14 automatic rifles."

Charu Mazumdar, however, rejected Guevara's thesis outright; in July 1969, he wrote in Liberation that the C.P.I. (M-L)'s guerrilla war had "nothing in common with the kind advocated by Che Guevara". He added that the party's guerrilla war was not launched by "relying on arms and weapons — so characteristic of a Che-type war" but was launched "without arms and by relying on the cooperation of the masses."

The following year Mazumdar spelled out an even more primitive weapons policy for the Party:

"We should not use any kind of firearms at this stage. The guerrilla units must rely
wholly on choppers, spears, javelins and sickles. The tendency to lay stress on making or purchasing locally-made guns and capturing guns from the class enemies may arise. We must fight this tendency."  

Ultimately, however, the impatience of the C.P.I. (M-L)'s Birbhum cadres forced him to sanction the widespread gun-snatching campaign that had begun in that district. Suddenly, it was "the task of every revolutionary" to destroy the police force and to "seize their rifles" in order to "arm the squads of peasant guerrillas". In reality, most of the 280 rifles snatched in Birbhum were from private licensees. Although these breech-loading shotguns were far from being sophisticated weapons, the C.P.I. (M-L) never realized their full potential. In Cyprus, for example, Grivas had armed his E.O.K.A. reserves with some 800 shotguns stolen from villages in a similar manner to the Naxalites. The special shotgun units which were organized "were used to harry the British by night, attack army camps, create diversions . . . and execute traitors." Drawing upon the American Army's experience of using shotgun platoons against machine-gun nests, Guevara also pointed out that shotguns could be an ideal and effective guerilla weapon against open troop transports.  

In relying on their opponents for weaponry and ammunition, the Naxalites obviously wanted to emulate the Chinese example, which demonstrated the advantage of proper calibre ammunition readily available from the enemy's supply lines. The fact of the matter, however, was that the Indian Army and the paramilitary police forces used very different small-arms and ammunition. While the paramilitaries were largely equipped with obsolete .303 calibre, small magazine Lee Enfields and 9 mm. Stens, the army was equipped with 7.62 mm FN. "Fals" (in the L 1A1, British version), 9 mm Sterlings, and 7.62 mm FN. "Mag" machine guns.  

Even if the C.P.I. (M-L) had succeeded in accumulating a sizeable arsenal of captured paramilitary weapons, it could not have serviced these weapons once the army entered the field, for the simple reason that they could not be loaded with N.A.T.O. rounds. More importantly, they were at a decided disadvantage in the first place; without any automatic weapons their firepower was severely limited. As a result, they were unable to capture a single 7.62 mm automatic weapon from the army, once it was deployed.  

Although not impossible, mounting successful attacks and ambushes against a modern, well-equipped army with bolt-action World War II vintage rifles and sundry breech loaders was certainly a difficult task. The Naxalite failure was partially a result of a belief in the supposed invincibility conferred on its partisans by the use of guerrilla tactics, regardless of critical strategic issues. Mazumdar was not only an inept General, but a backward-looking one. Like the 19th century Polish Nationalists who harked back to Kosciuszko's scythe-laden peasant victory at Raclawice, Mazumdar guided his Midnapore cadres into regressive primitivism, which barred the development of an effective irregular military technology. In late 1970, for example, he put forward the ludicrous proposition that the ultimate counter-revolutionary weapons were nuclear weapons, but that guerrillas could survive their force by simply living in tunnels. For all his insistence on a self-reliant revolution, and conformity with the Chinese model, Mazumdar failed to realise that, even in China, the regularization of Mao's forces was finally made possible with external assistance. In the words of one Soviet writer:

"... in 1945, the Soviet Red Army, which had crushed the million-strong Japanese Kwanghung Army in Manchuria, turned over to the Chinese Red Army the Japanese military equipment that it had captured, amounting to over 3,700 artillery pieces, 600 tanks, 861 planes and many naval vessels. This was a significant factor in the final victorious offensives launched by the Chinese Red Army."  

One has only to contrast the significant military impact made by the Nagas (armed with Chinese mortars, and 7.62 mm-type 56 carbines, assault rifles, and light machine-guns) with that made by the ill-armed Naxalites, to realise that an infusion of foreign arms into Bengal could have generated a serious challenge to the Indian defence forces. Had the C.P.I. (M-L) acquired modern assault rifles, it would have gained simple, lightweight weapons, with a reasonably large magazine capacity, and capable of accurate automatic and semi-automatic fire to 400 metres:
in effect, a sniping weapon, a light fire support weapon and a sub-machine gun in a single, compact, and easily concealed small-arm. With some ancillary armour-piercing weapons and proper leadership, they may have become an effective irregular military force; only then could the Naxalites have stood some chance, however remote, of attempting to create the "climate of collapse" and the breakdown of the State machinery.

Final Observations

While the above scenario remains speculation, there is no doubt that the C.P.I. (M-L) would first have had to consolidate its mass base. If its popular roots had not been so shallow (between 1967 and 1971), it is unlikely that combing operations, "oil slick" pacification techniques, and fragmentation of the C.P.I. (M-L)’s logistic base would have been so successful. Ultimately, it was not weapons that robbed the Naxalites of their victory, but Mazumdar’s dogmatism and unrealistic assessment of the Indian political situation.

ABBREVIATIONS

C.P.I. (M) Communist Party of India (Marxist)
C.P.I. (M-L) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
E.L.N. Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional
E.O.K.A. Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston
I.R.A. Irish Republican Army
F.L.N. Frente de Liberation Nationale
FRELIMO Frente para Libertacao de Mocambique
F.S.I.N. Frente Sandinista de Liberation Nacional
P.A.I.G.C. Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde
P.F.L.O.A.G. Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro
Z.A.N.U. Zimbabwe African National Union

NOTES

1. For a general account of the course of the Naxalbari and Birbhum uprisings, and the policies and platform of the C.P.I. (M-L) see:
2. I have not included the experience of Zimbabwe among these exceptions because the black nationalist insurgency was stopped in its tracks by a political settlement and because the white “Rhodians” were (from the perspective of many African nationalists) an entrenched “foreign” presence.
5. Churu Mazumdar: Chairman of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).
10. Thana (Hindi, from Sanskrit sthanda: a place): a division of a district, a police station and the whole area subordinate to it.
27. Similarly, Carlos Marighella emphasized the use of shotguns for close range and night operations in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. Under the Geneva Convention, however, shotguns are proscribed because of the nature of the wounds they can inflict.
THE NAXALITE STRATEGIC FAILURE

29. See Yonuo, A., The Rising Nagas, (Delhi, 1974).
30. There were, however, some reports of such arms finding their way into Bengal. On January 12, 1969, four Naxalites from Uttar Pradesh and Srikakulam proceeding to Alipore in a car were captured and found to be in possession of Chinese-made small arms and ammunition. Another three Naxalites were also reported captured in the 24 Parganas while carrying Chinese weapons. See Amrita Bazar Patrika, March 7, 1970.

Dr Edward Duyker first visited India in 1975 during the ‘Emergency’. He received his Doctorate in 1981 from the University of Melbourne, for his thesis on Santal tribal participation in the Naxalite insurgency in West Bengal. Between February 1981 and June 1983 he was employed as a research officer with the Department of Defence. He is currently a teaching Fellow at Griffith University, Queensland.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

P 0587 WHOSE LAW OF WHOSE SEA?
Neutze, Dennis R. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan 83: 43-48
The US has rejected the Law of the Sea proposals but naval mobility will benefit if advantage is taken of new rules for transit of straits and archipelagos.

P 058 KEY U.S. BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Cottrell, Alvin J. National Defense, Dec 82: 31+(4P)
The US has vital interests in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, as shown by the large naval forces in those areas. The US has also high stakes in retaining key Philippines bases, and Subic Bay naval base is crucial in serving the US interests, with no suitable alternative base.

P 058 THE ASCENSION ISLAND BASE.
Defence, Nov 82: 70-71
Discusses how Ascension Island, being a small island, was turned into a military base to aid the British Military Forces in the Falklands Islands crisis.

P 05 THE LEBANESE WAR: AN AMAZING TESTING GROUND.
Gorce, Paul Marie de la Heracles, Nov/Dec 82: 8+(5p)
A detailed analysis of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon which began on 6th June 1982. The author draws principles from this analysis for all those involved in the employment of armed forces in current conditions of technical development within the framework of limited war.

P 0591 CLASH WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
Hyland, William G. Foreign Policy, Winter 82/83: 3-19
This article examines the history of US/Soviet relations in the last 30 years, in particular the future of the USSR in the post-Brezhnev age. The author believes that the superpowers have never been further from a nuclear war, as neither can realistically expect to achieve a position of dominance except at astronomical cost.

P 0592 STRUGGLE OVER WESTERN EUROPE.
Andelman, David A. Foreign Policy, Winter 82/83: 37-51
This article examines economic and political co-operation between Europe and the USSR and the phenomenon of Eurocommunism.

OPERATIONS

0 0593 SKYKNIGHT.
Williams, R. E. Naval Aviation News, Jan 83: 34-37
The F3D Douglas Skyknight retired in 1969 after a distinguished career in Korea and Vietnam.

0 059 HORNET: A NEW NAME FOR AIR SUPREMACY.
Eggman, Phil Naval Aviation News, Jan 83: 27-31
Describes Air Combat Manoeuvering (ACM) training at NAS Lemoore, using an adversary squadron and the Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System (TACTS).

Reviewed by Professor Theodore Ropp, Faculty of Military Studies, Royal Military College, Duntroon; Duke University, Durham, NC, USA.

This book was a bestseller in Britain and the United States and promises to be so in Australia. For a variety of reasons it is not likely to be made into a BBC television serial, though it would clearly have real audience potential. The usual quotes on the cover — "brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed," "serious and stimulating," "impressive detail," etc.— are all true. A Defence Force Journal reader can be sure that this reflects the best case views of the British school of strategy on the defence of Western Europe.

The work — as such works must be to be convincing — is packed with facts, arranged in a dramatic and convincing way. As fiction, it is a welcome change from the Doomsday and Star Wars schools of prognostication which have held the field since the 1950s. To the ordinary reader it is considerably more convincing and "realistic" than anything which deals with the insane logic of nuclear terror, or the equally far out predictions of electronic battlefields in space, or what will probably be a growing literature on terrorists making nuclear bombs in basements, as a variant to the spy hunt literature which is so perennially popular. More important to the Anglo-Saxon reader, this is the kind of thinking about the unthinkable which makes sense to the World War II buff, who feels that the next war might just possibly be related to the last great triumph of Anglo-American arms. As fiction, Hackett's scenario makes far more sense to old-fashioned war games than anything out of Herman Kahn, because it follows the rules of the old conventional strategy.

The war begins with the American hostage-covering force discovering major undercover and paratroop operations in its area. These are followed by a massive armoured assault, claimed by the Soviets to be purely defensive. Thirteen chapters then set the stage for the attacks which have just taken place. "The Storm Breaks on the Central Front" (Chapter 15) is followed by two chapters on sea power, two on air defence, one on the "Air War Over the Central Region," and on "The Centre Holds". Bits on the Home Front, and the Middle East and Africa, where the South Africans were helped "by plentiful volunteers from Australia and New Zealand", are followed by a trial nuclear bomb on Birmingham, the destruction of Minsk, and an internal revolution which begins in Central Asia.

The last part of the book is devoted to Reflections and Appendices. These in 1977 (when the book was written), justified the "best case" assumptions then being made by NATO planners. These are worth reading, not because of what seems to have gone wrong in Iran and Afghanistan since that time, but because they are basically those of the current NATO rearmament programme. One man's future is another's nostalgia. So long as those assumptions are explicitly stated, there is nothing wrong with them. And, though the work had to have a British theme to sell to a British audience, one should not stress too much that it has little to offer to an Australian reader, except to indicate the sense of how remote Britain's defence concerns are from those of Australia. Singapore is mentioned twice, as one of the few countries which has been helped to prosperity by Japanese and latterly Chinese economic progress, and as the terminus for an airliner hijacking. Australasia is mentioned as an undamaged part of that Sino-Japanese co-prosperity sphere which is bringing "human and sensible telecomputer era government to the troubled areas between them". This will be done by a kind of neo-gunboat diplomacy which will be the more effective because the Chinese and Japanese have few illusions about mind-altering and tranquilizing drugs. As for "Australia and the islands to its north," they will be "among the pleasantest places in which to live during the telecommuting age". Cost is not mentioned, but Freddie
Laker clearly has a future. This is a good book for the serious general military reader. It has nothing to say about Australia’s immediate military problems. It does suggest that deterrence may prevail, and that Australia’s military problems are those of local and regional defence under the aegis of a reviving Grand Alliance.

*General Sir John Hackett is currently in Australia to launch his latest book, “The Third World War — The Untold Story”, and will appear at the RUSI seminar in October. — Ed.*


Reviewed by: Jeff Popple, BA(Hons), Dept of Defence

Richard Hall provided the first, and only, study of Australia’s intelligence community with his controversial The Secret State; now R. H. Mathams has added to Hall’s work, with a discreet insider’s account of the development of Australia’s analytical intelligence organizations.

Intelligence analysis, as distinct from the clandestine activities of intelligence-collecting organizations or the workings of internal security agencies, involves the assessing of overseas trends and developments using information from a wide variety of sources, including clandestine ones. Mathams, with thirty years experience as an Australian intelligence analyst, is in an ideal position to comment on the evolution of intelligence analysis in Australia. He joined the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) (later the Joint Intelligence Organisation) at its inception in 1948, and worked there until his retirement in 1979 from the post of Director, Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation.

Mathams has drawn heavily from his own experiences, in tracing the establishment of JIB in Melbourne; its shift to Canberra and subsequent reorganization into the Joint Intelligence Organisation; the setting up of the Hope Commission (of whose conclusions he is somewhat critical); and the resultant establishment of the Office of National Assessments. He also sheds some interesting light on Australia’s changing role within the Western Intelligence Alliance, from its status in the 1950s as the China expert, to its present world-wide assessments.

Mathams argues that intelligence analysis should play a greater role, than it presently does, in the formulation of defence, foreign, and long-range economic, policies. He also argues for changes in the presentation of intelligence reports, quoting an incident when an important report went unread by those in power, because it was too detailed and technical.

Though conservative, Mathams’ account of the growth of Australia’s national intelligence organizations is reasonably objective and, in the areas where they overlap, it is much more informed and balanced than Hall’s The Secret State. Sub Rosa is probably too full of organizational charts for the casual reader, but for those interested in the history, or the current state, of Australia’s national intelligence organizations, it is a must.


Reviewed by Dr Hugh Smith, Department of Government, R.M.C., Duntroon.

This is a book with a message. For the last century and a half, strategy has been going down a blind alley. The aim in any conflict is to compel the enemy to do our will, but almost all strategists have made two fatal assumptions; (i) the centre of the enemy’s will to resist is to be found in his armed forces; and (ii) the purpose of strategy must therefore be to destroy those forces.

These errors have produced an obsession with abstractions such as victory, the decisive battle, speed of action, and concentration of power. Nuclear strategists have fallen into the same trap. The only difference in their case is that most regard the neutralization of enemy forces, rather than their destruction, as the chief purpose of strategy.

The proper or “free” view of strategy, according to the author, focuses on social and political order. Strategy is about creating,
maintaining, and changing, societies. True strategy must be directed against an opponent’s social order and towards replacing it with a new order. Traditional strategy, by contrast, subscribes to a precarious convention that governments do not attack one another’s “social resources” but accept as decisive the clash of armed forces in battle. In this way, war is severed from politics.

Two case studies feature in this work. There is a detailed study of revolutionary war as practised by the Chinese communists. This is held up as a prime example of strategy directed against a social order. Land revolution was the key to success despite those in the Chinese Communist Party who wanted to pursue traditional military strategies. The second study looks at Clausewitz, who emerges as a sort of tragic villain. It was his “original sin” to set modern strategy off in the wrong direction. Clausewitz glimpsed the truth in formulating his concept of war as a continuation of politics by other means. But the main thrust of his work was to represent military action as the chief determinant of political struggle. For the most part, Clausewitz failed to see the assumptions implicit in this approach to war.

This is not an enjoyable book to read. At times repetitive and inelegant, it is marked by a missionary zeal to hammer home the central thesis. Yet it cannot be dismissed lightly. There are conventions and assumptions which permeate — or, as Atkinson would say, infest, poison, haunt, rot and blind — modern strategy. Such intellectual blinkers have a potential for disaster if we are unable to cast them off, especially in the nuclear era. For the most part, Clausewitz failed to see the assumptions implicit in this approach to war.

Details of translation, editing and re-editing aside, Sun Tzu’s work is most certainly a work of genius. It is perhaps best compared with such erudite and thematically similar works as Clausewitz’ Von Kreig and Machiavelli’s Prince, and contains a host of timeless maxims. An accomplished General, who wrote his treatise after the loss of both his feet, Sun Tzu bequeaths to us the hard-learned lessons of bloody internecine conflict in the China of his day. His work is a systematic exposition of factors to be considered in formulating and implementing strategy, tactics, and manoeuvres, together with appreciating terrain and obtaining intelligence. The profound relevance of such considerations is best summarized in Sun Tzu’s own words:

“The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death. A road either to safety or ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.”
"ALL IN" — Australia During the Second World War, by Dr. Michael McKernan. Published by Thomas Nelson Australia. 286 pages. Price $27.50

Review for "Defence Force Journal" by J. P. Buckley, OBE

McKernan tells the story of the Australian people at home during World War II. It is a most interesting account of women at the work-force, the fear of invasion, the impact of the American Serviceman on Australian life, rationing, the multitude of problems besetting a nation at war, and the leadership and dedication of a great Prime Minister.

The descriptions of the above facets of life in Australia during the period are told with conviction and accuracy. The reviewer recalls the preparations against anticipated air attacks when he returned to Australia from the Middle East in March 1942. Slit trenches were being dug in backyards in Adelaide, while in Melbourne the Chief of the General Staff set the example by digging a slit trench in his garden at Evans Court, Toorak.

The impact of rationing made it almost impossible for this soldier to obtain a swimsuit or any other civilian clothing. McKernan covers in great detail the problems of obtaining goods and services. Whilst Dedman (Minister in charge of rationing) came in for much criticism for the severity of rationing, in fact he did an excellent job for his country. Later he was Minister for Defence, until the defeat of the Government in December 1949. Dedman did not get credit for his ability, but together with Chifley he must rate as an outstanding Minister during the period.

Australian women can be very proud of their wartime efforts, particularly their work in munition factories under very poor conditions, and often in places far removed from their homes; likewise, replacing men in many not so pleasant occupations. Their contribution whilst in the Services was invaluable to the war effort. During 1944/45 the reviewer was in the United Kingdom and North West Europe, and noted that the contribution by the Australian women to the war was not excelled by their British cousins.

The author could perhaps have made some mention of the outstanding work done by Essington Lewis (on loan from B.H.P.), Lawrence Hartnett (on loan from G.M.H.), and John Storey, to mention only a few, who converted Australian industry into a major war production exercise with excellent results.

It is very pleasing to read of the leadership qualities of John Curtin, who in December 1941:

"Suddenly appeared as a man of strength and determination, a real war leader. Although Prime Minister only for a few weeks, Curtin established himself immediately as a man who could lead Australia through the crisis".

McKernan has researched Curtin's contribution as a great Australian Prime Minister with accuracy and diligence. Curtin is depicted as a great leader who inspired the people by his example, dedication and patriotism. In fact, his early death was no doubt caused by his unflagging work for his country.

Few Australians are aware that a Memorial Service for John Curtin was held in Westminster Abbey on 18 July 1945. The historic building was overflowing with the top political and establishment figures paying homage to this humble and modest man, whose great service to the British Commonwealth was recognised in a far-off country. The reviewer was an usher at the Service.

This is a very interesting book about a most important period in Australian history — a time of great peril and anxiety. McKernan deserves great credit for his work. Hopefully it will be used in our secondary and tertiary institutions as a reference book on Australian history, particularly covering the period of World War II.

I commend the book to the Services and DFJ readers in general.

Congratulations to Dr. McKernan and to Thomas Nelson Australia for producing a first class book and a welcome contribution to Australian history.

Reviewed by Major M. P. J. O’Brien, RMC

Mr Manchester is a well-known author whose contribution to military historical writing has been significant. This book is quite different to his recent ‘American Caesar’, though it relates much about General Douglas MacArthur’s island campaigns. It does not pretend to be history: it is an emotional personal account.

William Manchester served in the United States Marine Corps in that unimaginably bloody conflict on Okinawa. He extends his experiences there to encompass the other campaigns of the Marines in the Pacific War. The narrative is paralleled by a visit he made to the area in 1978. The book is written, and well written, as if he were a participant throughout. He is most successful when writing about his own personal campaign, as may well be expected when his unit had suffered 81 per cent casualties. Could such slaughter be a prerequisite for writing as powerful as this — I hope not.

Manchester speaks for the foot-soldiers, that Shakespearian ‘band of brothers’, with an intensity rarely heard. Time has allowed his bluntness to tend towards libel: today’s fashions have permitted him to verge on the scatological. This book reveres the Marine but not often his commanders. I suspect it may say more about leadership of American soldiers than many a textbook.

No Australian is likely to write a similar book without changing the names of the participants — we may be still too close to our Generals. Yet some books (for example, Henry (Jo) Gullett’s ‘Not as a Duty Alone’) give a similar viewpoint. There is little as powerful as a literate foot-soldier’s account of that singular experience — an infantryman’s war.

I hope Manchester’s book is widely read; such books are a necessary complement to the study of military history. But read Gullett’s book for the parallel Australian experience as well!


Reviewed by Jeff Popple, B.A. (Hons.), Dept. of Defence.

When Auschwitz and the Allies went on sale in Israel it received extensive, often front-page, newspaper coverage and was the topic of numerous editorials. The book sold extremely well and was widely discussed. It has not received anywhere near the same coverage in Australia and its sales will probably be limited to a handful of historians and some libraries. This is a shame, as Auschwitz and the Allies is an important book, for it shows how bureaucratic ineptitude and apathy assisted the committal of one of the most hideous crimes of the century.

Martin Gilbert is a well-respected British historian and author of over thirty books, including atlases. His previous book, Final Journey, was a documentary study of the fate of the Jews in Nazi Europe, and obviously the research he undertook for it produced the idea, and the necessary documents, for Auschwitz and the Allies. Since 1968 Gilbert has been the official biographer of Sir Winston Churchill, and not surprisingly Churchill figures prominently in this latest book. Gilbert has combined his British and Jewish sources, along with some American documents, to produce this excellent study of how and when the Allies learned of Hitler’s Final Solution, and then how they responded.

Although the existence of Auschwitz itself was not known in the West until 1944, the awful reality of the Final Solution had been a known and confirmed fact in London and Washington as early as 1942. Reliable eyewitness evidence and other reports had been thrust at the Foreign Office by Jewish organizations in their desperate attempts to get Allied help in minimizing the effects of the holocaust. The wartime files of the British Foreign Office are filled with graphic accounts of the deportations, mass killings, gas chambers and perpetually burning crematoria.

Confronted with these reports, Whitehall was reluctant to do much more than tap its breast in sham sympathy. As the holocaust
gathered momentum, smug Foreign Office officials scribbled notes about “wailing Jews”, “Jewish sob stuff”, and about how the “Jews have spoilt their case by laying it on too thick for years past”. Gilbert details the dithering reaction of the Allies, and effectively juxtaposes it with the grim statistics of Auschwitz. “On April 3 a total of 2,800 Greek Jews reached the camp by train from Salonica, of whom 2,208 were gassed.”

The Allies claimed that their inaction was based on a fear that reprisals might be taken against the Allied prisoners of war, and that they were unable to do anything more than just win the war. But when they were presented with two practical ways of saving Jews from death, they did not react. The first involved the lifting of restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine, so that Jewish refugees could settle there. Any such initiatives were blocked by pro-Arab Cabinet Ministers, making escape from Nazi Europe even more difficult for Jews. Jewish immigration to Allied countries was hampered by low quotas, especially in England, where it was feared that a large influx of Jews “might easily fan the smouldering fires of anti-Semitism which exist here into flames”.

The other way involved physically destroying any of the key sections of the extermination conveyor belt in Auschwitz. Both Churchill and Eden gave their full support for an R.A.F. mission to bomb Auschwitz. This mission would clearly save rather than destroy lives, yet their orders were deliberately disobeyed by their own officials in the Foreign Office and Air Ministry. The diversion of bombers to Auschwitz was rejected on the grounds that it would needlessly endanger British lives and planes, even though Allied bombers accurately hit a nearby industrial complex and others actually overflew the camp to drop supplies to the insurgents in Warsaw.

In *Auschwitz and the Allies*, Gilbert shows how ineptitude, apathy, overwork, and a touch of anti-Semitism enabled the extermination of European Jews to proceed uninterrupted by the Allies. The book is meticulously researched and excellently produced with photos, plenty of maps and footnotes at the bottom of the page. It is a compelling book to read and one that will not be easily forgotten.

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**LET’S HOPE THEY’RE FRIENDLY**, by Quentin Fogarty. Available at good bookshops and from Angus and Robertson, P.O. Box 290, North Ryde N.S.W. 2113 for recommended price of $9.95. Reviewed by Robert Kendall Piper, RAAF Historical Officer

While travelling aboard an Argosy aircraft off the New Zealand coast in the early hours of 31 December 1978 a television crew, which included Fogarty, filmed Unidentified Flying Objects. Their sightings were confirmed by ground-based radar stations and the experienced crew aboard the freighter. At one stage the lights performed acrobatics, and were later calculated to be travelling at 16 kilometres per second.

When analysed by computer, the film was assessed as authentic, with the objects on it having definite shape, form, and varying levels of brightness. It created a sensation both here and in the United States.

The book is complemented with twenty dramatic colour stills from the film made in flight by the television cameraman, as well as black and white photos of the major participants in this remarkable story.

There is also a very interesting appendix on Frederick Valentich and his mysterious UFO-related disappearance when flying over Bass Strait in a Cessna 182 during an October night of 1978.

This is an honest and sincere story by a man who obviously suffered, both physically and mentally, by revealing what he encountered; it is recommended to both sceptics and believers as a book to acquire.
BRASSEY'S ARTILLERY OF THE WORLD

Reviewed by Richard Pelvin,
Directorate of Logistic Operations — Army.

THIS large-format, 270 page book provides an informative and well-illustrated catalogue of artillery and artillery-related equipment in current service with the world's armed forces.

The book is divided into eleven sections which encompass a general introduction to the characteristics of artillery weapons, ammunition, field guns and howitzers, SP field guns, mortars, artillery rockets, ancillary equipment for surface to surface artillery, anti-tank guns and guided weapons, anti-aircraft guns and SAMs, air defence ancillary equipment and, finally, coast artillery.

In addition, four appendices provide a list of obsolete weapons still in use, a glossary of artillery terms, a list of manufacturers of artillery equipment, and an index.

Each section is preceded by a general discussion of the characteristics of the weapons or equipment included in it. Each individual item of equipment is then described in turn, with tables outlining specifications and performance. The descriptions are enhanced by photographs (of quite good quality) and concluded with a list of user countries. A spot check of these lists has shown them to be generally accurate, although Australian gunners may be surprised to note they have been credited with operating the M109 SP155 mm Howitzer.

The book has been specially designed for use by military staffs and instructors. Certainly its recommended retail price of US$40.00/£Stg28.00 (the publishers provide no Australian price) is probably somewhat high for all but the most dedicated artillery buff. It should be noted however, when placed in the context of current book costs in Australia, the price is not excessive for a publication of this size and of such high production standards.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

The following books have been provided by publishers for review purposes. Qualified professionals are invited to contact the Managing Editor (see inside front cover) for further information.

Philip Towle, Arms Control and East-West Relations, Croom Helm, 1983.
Helena Tuomi & Raimo Vayrynen (ed), Militarization and Arms Production, Croom Helm, 1983.

Coral Bell, Crises and Policy-Makers, ANU, 1982.