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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Dear Sir,

Major Tony Holmes has identified (DFJ January/February 1983) one of the key elements of political stability in Papua New Guinea as the heterogeneous nature of the population and the resultant dispersal of political power away from the large, oligarchic tribal groupings which continue to bedevil politics in Africa. In so doing, he stands head and shoulders above the majority of commentators on the PNG experience who have all too readily accepted the African model for that country.

May I suggest however as a former district officer in PNG that he takes his view of the military's potential political role a little too far by ignoring two other factors at work. The first is the traditional rivalry between the army and the police, rivalry which in the past has led to quite serious outbreaks of violence. More importantly, the police have a much longer tradition as an elite force in the community while they are also much closer to the community at large. In my view, it would be necessary for that mutual hostility to be completely overcome before the military could act unilaterally and effectively.

The second factor I suspect is that with so many adopted institutions being based on the Australian model, the army's view of itself as well as the popular view of the army would tend to exclude political action as a legitimate activity. That is by no means a permanent factor of course but, as traditions are built, it is as likely to become permanent as otherwise.

Of course, while it is relatively easy to take over a country such as Papua New Guinea with its poor communications and its highly concentrated revenue base, such a move would also lead to a worse situation than the army wished to correct simply because the army would be unable to command the loyalty of a community which would quickly revert to its pre-colonial economic and political structure.

Lieutenant M. J. O'Connor
RANR

AUTHORS REPLY

Dear Sir,

Both points of concern raised by Lt O'Connor — the traditional rivalry between the Army and the Police, and the constraining perceptions influencing the legitimization of political activity — are pertinent.

The basis of my argument is the influence of the countervailing powers of the different elites. Their contribution to political stability derives from their relative cohesion and, as stated, it is within this framework of cohesion that the seeds of military intervention would usually lie.

Macgregor's role in 1890 of establishing an armed, native constabulary, and also the continuing influence of the police elite in PNG affairs, is implicitly recognized in the article. However, I consider that this elite has undergone much the same process of 'acculturation' as the military elite. Therefore it is arguable that both elites share a common perception of modernization based on similar values.

Finally, while I speculated on a potential political role for the military elite, it was no more than that. Indeed, I reiterate, the empirical evidence in PNG suggests any military intervention would be regarded as a usurpation of the authority of the present, stable political leadership.

Major Tony Holmes
RACT
Dear Sir,

It is unfortunate that in his article on the news media and military operations (DFJ Jan/Feb 83) Lt Col Fitzpatrick chooses to attack the professional ability and integrity of serving Public Relations Officers.

In the section of the article headed "Public Relations" he casts an unnecessary slur on brother officers in questioning their bona fides by writing: "PROs are regarded as lapsed journalists by the media and as pseudo officers by those in the Army."

I reject completely the "lapsed journalist" jibe. It is not true and is a poor argument of the type put up by those who develop a point through generalities which are, nevertheless, hurtful to those against whom they are made.

Many of us had a number of years (in some cases 20 or more) in journalism before entering the Army. We were in work when we applied for Direct Entry Commissions, would have stayed in work had we been rejected and were certainly not on the breadline because we could not make our way in our original profession. Those that have resigned for a variety of reasons have gone back into the journalistic community.

I do not know who "those" in the Army who regard us as "pseudo" officers are but the point should be made that none of us in the PR organisation regard ourselves as being other than what we are - specialist officers doing a job the Army WANTED us to do (I stress WANTED because obviously we could not have been commissioned without the Army's consent and without successfully negotiating the lengthy procedure of medicals, psych tests and selection boards). It therefore ill-behoves other officers to describe us as "pseudo" unless of course they are prepared to put that same tag on doctors, dentists, lawyers and psychologists.

I must say that Colonel Fitzpatrick is not original in his criticism, which was made some years ago in Pacific Defence Reporter. If he has picked up this idea from that journal he would have done well to examine the bona fides of the writer.

In backing up his opinion he says our military experience is limited and, while we serve in a domestic capacity on Military District Headquarters, is not likely to improve.

On the first point I would argue that our military experience in our field in the Army is equal to that of other officers in their particular speciality and we claim no more than that. On the second point I agree, as one who believes that PR officers should serve with the formations with which, if the need arises, they will go to war.

If the widening of our military experience beyond our speciality is required by the Army, I suggest we are given non-corps postings as are other officers. The fault, if any lies with the Army not PR officers who would welcome non-corps postings.

He talks about PR posts being filled by "regular career officers". The terminology is loose, PR officers are "regular" and have made the Army their career. If he means officers who have graduated from RMC or OCS, why not say so? I am not against such officers working with PR, particularly at junior officer level, because it would help their understanding of the media and of PR techniques and problems, and I suspect they get little of that at either of our Officer Training establishments. But why ask amateurs to do a job which has become technical and professional?

Col Fitzpatrick's article would appear to have been written around 1980 and the references used in many cases are out of date. It is a pity that the article was published in DFJ without updating because it does not reflect the "State of the Art" as it is today.

Col Fitzpatrick makes much use of the British example in Northern Ireland to push the "career officer" argument. It is out of date and in the Falkland Islands war the British PR system was to a degree found wanting. Defence is currently studying the recommendations of the "House of Commons First Report from the Defence Committee on the Handling of the Press and Public Information During the Falklands Conflict" so that we can benefit from the British experience. However, it has already been noted within the Department that "... some recommendations of the House of Commons First Report etc are similar to findings within the Seminar on Exercise Kangaroo 81".

These findings arose from a paper by myself and my predecessor as DDPR, Lt Col Murray Taylor. Recommendations made in that paper were approved by the seminar and will be incorporated in Exercise K83. Most significant of those recommendations in my view is that
PR not only attends major exercises to generate publicity from the neutral organisation, but is exercised in their wartime role. PR will be so exercised in K83.

Brief comments on other statements made in the article follow:

"Censorship in future wars should only be invoked to protect items of long term intelligence value" — comment: The Falklands War proved the short term value of censorship. For instance, had the Argentinians known their bomb fuses had been set wrongly, British losses would have been greater. The media cooperated in not revealing this.

"It is almost certain the media would resist accreditation ..." — wrong: The media would welcome it as controlling the rash of fringe writers, masquerading as media that bring the whole industry into disrepute ... as happened in Vietnam, where the Americans accredited all correspondents, even those visiting the Australian Forces.

Defence PR officers believe that any future Australian Force must have correspondents accredited by Australian authorities. Both Frank Cranston and Denis Warner, quoted in the article, appear to accept accreditation.

There is obviously a greater need for education about PR and the media within the Defence Force. Our SOMAC's are mentioned, and are valuable for senior officers, we also run UPROC's (Unit PR Officers' Courses) and I think there is a general awareness about PR in the Defence Force that was not there some years ago when, I suspect, we were still being very defensive following the Vietnam experience.

Defence PR policies are continuously under review and development. This process is partially responsible for an increased awareness of Defence in the media. There are today more correspondents taking a keen and informed view of defence than for many years in Australia. Regular briefings for these writers are held and the volume and quality of writing on Defence in Australian media is improving all the time.

Along with the media and its relationship with the Defence Force are always welcome but it would be helpful if they were not outdated at the time of publication and did not use denigration of PR officers as a group to help 'sell' a case.

Lt Col D. J. Roylance
Defence Central

AUTHOR'S REPLY
Dear Sir,

I would have been disappointed if my article had failed to elicit some response from the PR community, although I was surprised by the aggrieved tone of Lt Col Roylance's reply.

In his criticism of my article Lt Col Roylance has either inexplicably missed or studiously avoided the main thrust of my argument. I wrote the article at the time because I was particularly concerned that the Australian Army lacked a formal doctrine for public relations in war, and that it was doing little to train its officers and soldiers to cope with media pressures in either peace or war. I draw little comfort from Lt Col Roylance's reply because I saw nothing in it to indicate that these circumstances have changed in any way.

I am still concerned that the Australian Army stands to lose any future war, because it has not made the effort to prepare itself to fight in the presence of the modern media. Lt Col Roylance's reply when viewed in this light lacks relevance, however, to set the record straight I will respond to the peripheral matters that he has raised.

a. I have not read the Pacific Defence Reporter article that was cited and in view of the obscure reference to its author, I feel no compunction to make further comment.

b. As an exercise in pedantics, I would prefer to see GSO rather than SSO filling PR appointments.

c. The matter of PR officers filling non-corps appointments did not enter my calculations because I believe that PR appointments should be filled by GSO.

d. The Falkland Islands War was a major public relations success when compared with media coverage of the South Vietnam conflict. The major issue of the Falklands War as far as the British media was concerned, was the decision to officially release false and misleading information to the Press. Decisions of this nature were made either at Cabinet level or within the higher levels of the Ministry of Defence. It would be naïve to suggest that unilateral decisions were made by Army PR officers at the front, which was the fundamental area of concern that I addressed in my paper. Lt Col Roylance's statement that 'the British Army PR (continued on page 50)
THE ISRAELI INVASION
OF
LEBANON

By Captain D.E. Lewis, RA Inf

"In this article, the writer, Captain D. E. Lewis R.A. Inf, serving as an observer with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization during the invasion, has attempted to provide the reader with an account of the background, the conduct and the results of this invasion. It is early days after the invasion and the exact tabulation of force sizes and structure has not and may well not be released. With the passage of time further detail on other matters will no doubt come to hand. Many figures and accounts in this article are based on the experience and reports of the UN forces deployed in southern Lebanon and on Israeli controlled information releases. The writer's personal experiences have no doubt left their mark on these pages.

Captain Lewis was a witness to the Israeli mobilization in the eastern area of operations and the air battle of 9 June 1982. He was then transferred into southern Lebanon in July in the wake of the invasion and was subsequently the first Australian military observer to enter Beirut after the massacres in Sabra and Chatilla Camps. The writer assumes responsibility for any inaccuracies contained herein."

INTRODUCTION

At 1100 hours local time on 6 June 1982 Israeli forces launched an operation across their northern border invading Lebanon. This invasion, like other recent Israeli conflicts, was quick and decisive, and unlike other Israeli conflicts, the subsequent siege of Beirut and the occupation of Lebanon has drawn into the longest and most controversial campaign conducted by the Israeli Defence Forces (I.D.F.). The advance into Lebanon took the I.D.F. well past their published aims and saw the occupation of a foreign capital city. In terms of military achievement the campaign proved an overwhelming success. From a political point of view, however, it has left some nagging questions which will no doubt take Israel and its Arab neighbours into further years of turbulence and uncertainty.

Discussion on the moral and ethical aspects of the campaign are outside the scope of this article. Such discussion is heavily coloured by political, social and religious persuasion. The blow-by-blow descriptions of atrocities, alleged or otherwise, and the claims and counter-claims of unwarranted destruction were widely documented by the world press at the time. Revelation and conjecture on these issues will continue for many years to come.

BACKGROUND TO THE INVASION

Arrival of the PLO in Lebanon

Following the signing of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon in March 1949, the Israel-Lebanon border had been quiet and relatively secure by Israeli standards. Lebanon did not enter the Six Day War of 1967 and the Lebanese Government officially stayed out of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

In the early 1970's, however, a new element appeared on the scene in Lebanon. The PLO, expelled from Jordan, began to arrive in south Lebanon in large numbers. The Lebanese Government proved powerless to resist or control the establishment of the PLO stronghold in southern Lebanon. There developed what is often called a "state within a state". The Palestinian factions developed a complete social political and economic infrastructure. Palestinian refugee camps became towns and schools were established. The PLO and asso-
Associated factions provided local security, taxes and levies were imposed and a press and publicity machine established.

Because of the large number of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon (estimated at 300,000), it was not surprising to find a large support base for the PLO forming in the Lebanese capital, Beirut. Because of the central communications and control offered in a large capital city, Beirut was chosen by PLO Chairman, Mr Yasser Arafat, as the site for the PLO “Supreme Military Council”.

The Syrians in Lebanon

In April 1975, clashes between the PLO and Christian Phalange (right-wing Christian militias) around the port city of Sidon, spread through Lebanon and soon developed into a bloody civil war. Some reports place casualty figures at 50,000 dead. The Lebanese Army disintegrated and civil order collapsed. Into the vacuum came the Syrian “Arab Deterrent Force”. The Syrian 3rd Armoured Division entered Lebanon on 31 May 1976 and after bitter fighting against Moslem factions and surprisingly the PLO, the Syrians with their then allies, the Christian Militias, arrived in Beirut.

From the time of its initial deployment until the present, the Syrians have maintained this force of one division reinforced by two commando battalions and additional artillery in Lebanon.

During the years the Syrian relationship with the PLO had fluctuated from open hostility to complete support as so often happens in Middle East politics. The continued Syrian presence in Lebanon was a source of aggravation for Israel, and greatly complicated the issues of Israel’s subsequent invasion of Lebanon.

Operation Litani

Commencing soon after their arrival in Lebanon in the early 1970’s, the PLO stepped-up their attacks on towns in northern Israel concentrating particularly on those kibbutzim and towns in the Galilee “Pan Handle”. On 11 March 1978 the most serious raid to that time was executed by the PLO. A raiding party attacked a bus on the Tel-Aviv-Haifa highway reportedly killing 35 people and wounding double that number.

Military operations prior to the attack on the bus can be best described as “eye for eye” tactics. For each PLO raid there would be a reciprocal air-strike by the Israeli Air Force (I.A.F.). For each air-strike there would be an answering raid and so on.

Following the attack on the bus the Israelis launched “Operation Litani”. On the 14-15 March 1978, the IDF pushed north to the Litani River and cleared the PLO from this area (with the exception of concentrations around Tyre and the Rashidiya Refugee Camp). This campaign lasting seven days was followed by an Israeli withdrawal and the insertion on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) into the vacuum.

In addition to the insertion of some 6,000 UNIFIL troops, a second development to emerge following “Operation Litani” was the creation of a ‘Christian Enclave’. This narrow strip of land between the Israeli border and the UNIFIL area of operations acted as a buffer for Israel. The Enclave was, and at the time of writing, still is controlled by Major Saad Haddad, an officer who broke away from the central control of the Lebanese Army. He was provided with weapons, uniforms and money by the Israelis and established his De Facto Forces (DFF). Haddad provided protection for the Christian minorities in the Enclave, and allied with the IDF, he served to oppose the PLO.

Following “Operation Litani” through until April 1981 there were relatively few incidents across the border. With the outbreak of fighting between Lebanese factions and the arrival of the Syrians during the Civil War and aftermath, the PLO was fully occupied with local conflicts in Lebanon. After April 1981 the PLO again turned its attention towards targets in Israel and in the Enclave. In an attempt to halt this escalation, the United States Middle-East envoy Mr Habib negotiated a ceasefire between Syria, Israel and the PLO. This ceasefire was signed on 24 July 1981 but proved to be extremely fragile. Israeli reports claim the ceasefire was broken on 248 different occasions by the PLO. Breaches included laying mines, shelling and rocket attacks.

The PLO had by the middle of 1982, armed and equipped an estimated 20,000 ‘regular’ troops in Lebanon. Weapons mainly of Soviet origin and supplied through sources such as Syria and Libya ranged from T-34 and T-55 tanks, BTR-152 and BTR-60 APC’s, BM-40 and BM-11 rocket launches through anti-air-
craft guns and surface to air missiles, down to a comprehensive range of small-arms.

The Eye of the Invasion

By 4 June 1982, following the shooting of Mr Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to London, the Israeli Air Force launched a series of attacks on PLO targets in Beirut. Again, in the now all too familiar blow for blow escalation of events, IAF air raids were followed by PLO rocket and artillery bombardments of towns in northern Israel. All attempts to reinvoke the ceasefire of the previous July failed.

During the two days preceding the invasion UN forces and military observers reported a marked increase in IDF activity south of the border fence. It was difficult to establish if this was a serious mobilization or just a passing show of force. The IAF was extremely active and on 5 June observers from the UN reported 51 aircraft over-flying their positions as air attacks were launched into Lebanon.

THE LAUNCHING OF OPERATIONS

At first light on 6 June it became obvious that Israel was about to launch a ground offensive into Lebanon. At 1100 hours, Israeli forces, led by large concentrations of tanks, commenced to cross the start-line provided by the border fence. The invasion had begun.

Influence of Terrain

The terrain in southern Lebanon has a great bearing on military operations and dictates force composition and deployment routes open to an operation launched from the south. There is a narrow and relatively fertile coastal plain which quickly gives way to a range of coastal highlands called the Lebanon Mountains. South of the Litani River this range drops to a high plateau heavily dissected by deep wadis. Moving further east the ground falls away to the broad and fertile Beqoua Valley. This valley has provided a route for armies since the time of the Romans and before. Finally to the east is the imposing heights of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, the highest point being Mount Hermon (2814 m). All major features, therefore, run north-south and canalise operations into narrow defiles. With the exception of the coastal plain and some parts of the Beqoua Valley there is very little vegetation in the region.

It is interesting to note at this point that these terrain factors had the very same effect on the deployment of the IDF on 6 June 1982 as they had on the Australian 7th Division on 7 June 1941 when this Australian Division commenced its operation into Lebanon. The routes followed by the IDF are very nearly the same as those used forty-one years earlier by the Australians.

A final terrain feature, which must be stressed for the Australian reader, is the comparatively small distances invoked in military operations in the region. The distance from the Israeli border to Beirut is only 96 kilometers. This distance represents approximately the maximum limit of IDF exploitation during the invasion.

Concept and Course of Operations

The aim of “Operation Peace for Galilee”, as described by the Israeli Government Spokesman on 6 June, was “... to put all settlements in Galilee out of reach of terrorist artillery ... positioned in Lebanon.” In order to achieve this, Israeli plans provided for a rapid advance in depth, bypassing pockets of resistance and pushing forward to hold ground that would cut the PLO from Syria. It appears that those initial aims were changed, or at least given different emphasis as the IDF advanced rapidly north. It seemed as if even the Israelis were a little surprised with the speed and ease with which they arrived on the southern outskirts of Beirut. It was then that Israel seized the opportunity of bottling the PLO main-body in the city and by the application of measured force, open negotiations for a PLO unconditional withdrawal. The encirclement of Beirut and the cutting of the Beirut-Damascus highway prevented the majority of PLO forces from withdrawing to the north or to the east towards Syria, and it prevented the Syrian forces from resupplying or assisting the trapped PLO.

In accordance with the previously described dictates of terrain, the Israeli invasion forces were divided into three task forces. Task Force-West followed the axis of the coastal plain. Task Force-Centre advanced along the high ground of the coastal range and Task Force-East followed the route through the Beqoua
Valley and along the slopes of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains.

Task Force-West initially consisting of one armoured brigade moved along the coast, passing straight through the UNIFIL positions, and arrived in the early afternoon of 6 June at its immediate objective, Tyre. A second brigade then moved up to encircle the city. Further troops had made an amphibious landing near the mouth of the Litani River and moved south towards Tyre achieving a cut-off of PLO forces in the Tyre region.

Task Force-Centre consisting of an armoured brigade and comprising 150 tanks, 170 APC's and a supporting artillery regiment advanced on the regional centre of Nabitiya. This force was soon reinforced by an estimated 70 tanks and 120 APC's. Before a break-through was achieved on this axis, fierce fighting and repeated air attacks occurred around, and in, the PLO stronghold of Chateau Beaufort, an old Crusader castle.

Task Force-East, a further armoured brigade, advanced to Hasbaiya and the southern end of the Bequaa Valley, then pushed on to the lower slopes of Mount Hermon.

The exact size and composition of IDF formations is classified information and details are difficult to obtain. UN estimates, however, were that by Monday 7 June, the second day of the invasion, at least two divisions had deployed into Lebanon. At least three mechanized brigades, one tank regiment and an artillery regiment had gone into action along the coastal road. Two armoured brigades of more than 200 tanks, 300 APC's and two artillery regiments had deployed in the central sector, and an armoured brigade and an artillery regiment had deployed to the east.

Further seabourne landings to the north and south of Sidon on 7 June, caught many PLO units by surprise and assisted the IDF in maintaining pressure on the PLO by speed in the advance. By 8 June, IDF leading elements were on the outskirts of Damour, Sidon was besieged and mopping-up operations continued in Tyre. It was plain that the concept of operations was to encircle PLO strongholds, and then leaving a cordon around those centres, the IDF main-body continued the advance.

On the third day of the fighting in the central sector the task force on that axis became involved in heavy fighting with a Syrian armoured brigade in the Jezzine region.

Sound use of air and artillery support enabled the IDF to break through on this axis and be within striking distance of the Beirut-Damascus highway by the night 8 June.

Wednesday 9 June was probably the most critical day of the fighting for Israel. Increasing contact had been made with Syrian forces and the threat of Syrian surface to air missiles in the Bequaa Valley had to be met without bringing Syria into a full-scale war. This was the day of one of the largest air battles of recent years.

The period 8-9 June had seen the rapid deployment of more Syrian SAM-2, 3 and 6 units in the Bequaa Valley, bringing the total number deployed to 19 batteries. At 1400 hours on 9 June the IAF attacked and claimed complete destruction of 17 batteries and the rendering inoperable of the remaining 2 batteries. This was a remarkable feat since it is believed the IAF sustained no losses in these attacks. The Syrians launched MIG-21 and MIG-23 aircraft in an effort to break-up the Israeli attack. The IAF shot down 29 Syrian aircraft without loss. UN observation posts reported 99 IAF over-flights during that day (this figure includes remotely piloted vehicles, RPV's or drones).

The ability of the IAF to overcome the surface to air missile guidance and early warning systems was due to what has been described as "... undisclosed sophisticated electronic devices and types of ammunition, the exact use of which had been carefully rehearsed." Further details are covered in a later section, however, much of the information is a closely guarded secret.

During the period 9-11 June, IDF ground forces continued to press in and around Beirut. The southern and western areas of the city were subjected to naval, air and artillery bombardment. IDF units sat astride the Beirut-Damascus highway and leading elements of the advance were reported north of the Lebanese capital.

By 12 June the Syrians had withdrawn and consolidated around Zahti and Choura in the Bequaa Valley. Syrian strength at that time was reported at two divisions.

At 1200 hours on 11 June Israel and Syria agreed to a ceasefire arranged by Mr Habib. This ceasefire did not extend to the PLO, and Israeli 'mop-up' operations continued in the south while unrelenting pressure was main-
tained on the thousands of PLO trapped in Beirut. A ceasefire arranged for the 12 June with the PLO broke down and IDF operations continued.

After a long siege, and the pounding of West Beirut by the IDF, the PLO agreed to an unconditional withdrawal from Beirut under the cover of a multi-national force sponsored by the United States. The PLO commenced withdrawal on 21 August 1982.

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INVASION

Command and Control

In this fast moving operation where difficult terrain was covered at an alarming rate, and a good deal of fire support was called on, efficiency in the system of command and control was required. The effectiveness of IDF command and control was largely due to a sound and clear plan given in the initial stages of the invasion, and an excellent range of communications equipment held by the IDF. The IDF worked, as it has always done, with commanders forward, and this coupled with extensive use of air mobile command posts, kept commanders abreast of operations.

Control of fire support was well co-ordinated and response time was very short. Commanders at junior levels were able to call for air and indirect fire support using "open radio nets" on which they could call at any time. The detail of how this open net system worked has not been revealed.

The majority of engagements involved an all arms type approach and it appears that good co-operation and control was achieved between major units and supporting arms.

Mechanized Infantry

The emphasis placed by the IDF on mobility was plainly demonstrated by their use of mechanized infantry. The nature of the advance was such that infantry had to be mounted in tracked vehicles in order to keep up with the tanks.

PLO positions were generally subjected to air or artillery bombardment then attacked by a combined force of tanks and mechanized infantry. The momentum of the advance led to many assaults being carried out without the infantry dismounting. APC's either accompanied or followed tanks on to the objective, and only deployed the infantry if mop-up operations proved necessary.

The IDF used a combination of M113 and M-3 APC's to carry their infantry. Mechanized infantry combined with M-60 Patton tanks, the Ben Gurion (Centurion modification) tanks or the Israeli produced Merkava tank, to form battle groups in the advance.

Air Support

The ascendancy of the IAF in the area of operations during the invasion had a large impact on the course of events. It is reported that in all air operations over Lebanon the IAF destroyed more than 90 Syrian aircraft for the loss of two of their own. The maintainence of complete air superiority enabled the IDF to count on uninterrupted air reconnaissance forward of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). They had close air support at short notice, and the opportunity of using rotary wing aircraft to resupply ammunition well forward in the advance. Gun ammunition was flown in many instances directly to gun lines.

Air superiority also enabled the IDF to make extensive use of airborne command posts. Both rotary and fixed wing aircraft were used to carry commanders and communications equipment. A C-47 aircraft was kept aloft south of the border around the clock, and it is assumed this was an airborne command ship.

The use of armed helicopters, the Bell AH-1S Huey Cobra and the new Hughes 500 MD Defender anti-tank helicopter, in the eastern area of operations proved effective. Air superiority also enabled the Israelis to make extensive use of helicopters for medical evacuation.

A number of C-130 aircraft flying at great height were seen from time to time to be dropping chaff (shredded metallic particles). This tactic was part of the overall plan for electronic counter-measures taken by the Israelis.

The PLO

PLO forces opposing the IDF were in a difficult position. Firstly, with a standing ‘regular’ army of some 20,000 men and women, they were without the usually associated trappings of a government and national agencies that provide normal support. They relied entirely on external support. Secondly, the PLO was fighting on soil that was not theirs
and amongst a civilian population which was not of their own. For a force rooted in guerrilla principles these factors made operations difficult when hard pressed. This fact has been proved subsequently as PLO remnants have found it all but impossible to hide within the population of southern Lebanon after the invasion swept over them.

Many observers were surprised that given some prior knowledge of the likelihood of an Israeli invasion, the PLO seemed to be taken by surprise and offered less resistance than one might have expected. Certainly the speed of the IDF advance and the shock tactics caused a rapid collapse of PLO resistance in the south.

A further aspect is that the PLO weapons systems proved inadequate in the face of Israeli air and ground attacks. The IDF with state of the art technology supplied in the main by the United States, and with some of their own systems, was able to push over or past PLO positions with apparent ease. The sheer weight of numbers was of course decisive.

### Civilian Casualties

Much of the fighting during the invasion took place in built-up areas. The world press provided graphic accounts of the human tragedy and through the media, the question of civilian casualties was brought to the fore. Claims of total civilians killed range from less than 1,000 to 10,000 people. The truth probably lies somewhere in between these figures. Total casualties would run to many thousands.

The IDF accused the PLO of hiding behind the civilian population. The PLO because of the nature of their infrastructure, were found to have many positions in and around civilian population centres.

It followed, therefore, that the use of modern area type weapons such as air delivered ordinance, naval gunfire and artillery, exacted a heavy toll on civilians. The effect of these weapons in the confines of the city of Beirut was devastating.

In order that civilian casualties might be minimized, the IDF air-dropped leaflets and used loud-speakers to encourage civilians to flee. Their efforts were often in vain. The massacre of civilians by the Christian Phalangist forces in the Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps was a terrible climax to civilian suffering.

### Operational Testing of New Technology

As with previous Arab-Israeli wars, the invasion proved a valuable testing ground for new weapons systems developed by the superpowers. This invasion saw the first use of the F-16 aircraft in a large scale air battle. The performance of the F-15 fighter was proved beyond doubt. The Merkava tank and the Hughes 500 anti-tank helicopter were used for the first time on operations. The invasion also provided the West with its first assessment of the Soviet T-72 tank, at least nine of which were destroyed and captured by the IDF. The SAM-8 air defence system appeared for the first time in Lebanon, and three of these units were reported destroyed by the IAF along with one SAM-9 unit.

The destruction of the range of Soviet made SAM's was perhaps the proof of one of the major break-throughs of the invasion. The early warning and guidance systems of the SAM's was overcome by a combined air and ground effort. By using RPV's to provide immediate and continual information on the targets the IAF, in concert with ground launched missile attacks was able to destroy the SAM's. It is reported that while the IAF used a variation of the Shrike AGM-45 from the air, a new Zeev-type missile was used by ground forces. Both these missiles home on radiation emission from air defence radars. A combination of the missiles and simply 'out-flying' the air defence system defeated the SAM's.

The results of most of the technological frontiers tested during this operation are classified, and many of the findings are still under assessment.

### Use of Intelligence

Many observers were surprised at the extraordinary accuracy and scope of Israel's intelligence before and during the invasion. This intelligence was apparent at two levels. On the higher plane, their knowledge of strengths and dispositions of major Syrian and PLO units and headquarters was gained through extensive air reconaissance using modern photo-reconnaissance aircraft and RPV's which are used widely by the IDF. It is also believed that the IDF may have had access to U.S. satellite photography.

At lower levels, Israeli intelligence on PLO personalities and office-bearers was extremely
detailed. The selective destruction of the homes belonging to PLO members and sympathizers by leading units in the invasion force left observers in no doubt that such information was at hand.

For several weeks after the invasion intelligence sources led the IDF to PLO supporters or suspects, who were then arrested in their hundreds. A large prison camp was established at Ansar and numerous processing centres set up in PLO areas throughout the south. People held by the IDF were processed and screened through these centres and either sent to Ansar, or released. At the time of writing several thousand prisoners are still being held at Ansar. Detailed information on PLO members had been gathered by informers or Israeli agents planted in Lebanon before the invasion. Israeli penetration of PLO ranks seems quite certain.

Mobilization in Israel

The speed of mobilization for the invasion demonstrated to military observers the already acknowledged ability of the IDF to assume a war footing at short notice. While contingency planning for the invasion must have been completed long before 6 June, it was nonetheless a great achievement to materialize complete formations from the civilian population. The build-up in Lebanon took about 3-4 days and it is reported that by the end of the siege of Beirut, as many as six divisions may have been rotated in the area of operations.

The general call-out of the reserve was a massive operation. Civilian buses in their hundreds carried men and women who the day before had been office workers or kibbutzniks etc, to assembly points. At these points, generally located near Israel’s borders, units were formed and personnel linked with armoured vehicles. Stores were then distributed and units deployed forward into the area of operations.

Universal military service has of course been a long standing necessity in Israel. Current regulations require all Israeli men to serve for three years, and women for two years on attaining 18 years of age. Men then continue to serve for 30 days each year until they reach 55 years. These 30 day periods can be extended as required in time of war.

Because of the prolonged occupation of Lebanon while drawn out withdrawal settlements are discussed, the Israeli economy is under severe strain from a loss of manpower to the IDF. This strain can be ill-afforded by an economy which had about 120% inflation before the operation.

ISRAEL’S ACHIEVEMENTS

The invasion of Lebanon has brought about some fundamental changes and some new possibilities in the Middle East. It has in some way opened a door to negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbours. It has certainly got parties talking. The PLO and Israel may be negotiating, even if through intermediaries in the near future. PLO recognition of Israel will of course be central to any issues discussed.

On the other hand, however, there is a less optimistic aspect. The invasion has not changed certain fundamentals such as a homeland for the Palestinians, and heightened feelings following the invasion may well lead to further conflicts.

Some things cannot be disputed. The light has been extinguished on the PLO’s conventional military capacity for some years to come. Israel has achieved a resounding military victory. The bulk of the PLO’s heavy weapons have been captured, while the troops have been scattered through the Arab world. The PLO is now desperately searching for a host country where they can reorganize. In this matter, previous claims of Arab solidarity have proved to be exaggerated.

Israel has demonstrated her ability and willingness to strike at forces opposing her. Perhaps more distressing is the realization that Israel has an extremely large military capability which the U.S.A. either will not, or can not control when moderation seems called for. The relationship between Israel and the U.S. has been subjected to a temporary setback following the siege of Beirut, however, the umbilical cord with the United States will continue to carry more than three billion dollars of military aid to Israel in the coming year.

Syria’s reluctance to become engaged in a more widespread conflict with Israel was no doubt prompted by the realization that Israel has an extremely large military capability which the U.S.A. either will not, or can not control when moderation seems called for. The relationship between Israel and the U.S. has been subjected to a temporary setback following the siege of Beirut, however, the umbilical cord with the United States will continue to carry more than three billion dollars of military aid to Israel in the coming year.

Israel’s hope that by driving all foreign forces from Lebanon, a stable Lebanese government and society may emerge, seems far
from realization. Instability and factional fighting continues in Lebanon.

The immediate Israeli arms of “Peace for Galilee” have been achieved beyond expectations. The smashing blow delivered to the PLO has placed the towns of northern Israel out of harms way for the present.

Many reports have described the invasion as a military defeat for the PLO, and a political defeat for Israel. While this is a gross oversimplification, it does in part, describe the events following 6 June. Had Israel stopped at her initially stated aims and provided a security belt of some 40-50 kilometers north of her border, world opinion may not have been so harsh in its criticism. It can be argued equally that such a security belt would in the longer term have solved nothing.

From a military point of view, the invasion was a successful operation. The IDF launched a quick and ruthless campaign, defeating the opposing forces in detail. The IDF has proved again in the Middle East context to be a well armed and operationally capable force.

It must be emphasized again, however, that politically, some nagging and unresolved issues such as the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, together with Palestinian aspirations for an independent Palestinian state, must surely lead to an uncertain future in the Middle East.

Captain Lewis graduated from Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1975. He has held various appointments since then. This article was written when he was serving as an Observer with the United Nations Truce Organization in Lebanon. He is currently a Squadron Commander SASR.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries:


AWARD: ISSUE No. 39 (MARCH/APRIL, 1983)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the March/April issue (No. 39) of the Defence Force Journal to Major M. R. Roseblade, for his article The Rise of Soviet Naval Power and its Implications on Australia’s Maritime Communications.
PAY SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS OF A MOBILIZED ARMY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

By Mr P. J. Sindrey, APS, Dept. of Defence

This article examines the pay system requirements of a mobilized Army. It finds that current procedures would be inadequate and outlines a new system in which units have a greater responsibility for, and control over, their members' pay. In order to ensure that the proposal is ready for mobilization, the article describes how resources should be allocated for the development of the system during peace-time.

"In time of peace the general staff should plan for all possible contingencies of war." Jomini

INTRODUCTION

The last time that a detailed study was undertaken into the pay system requirements of a mobilized Army was in 1953. The conclusions resulting from that study were incorporated in a document issued by the Military Board, titled 'Standing Orders for Mobilization — 1953'. Since the pay system at that time had not substantially changed from the one used during World War II, it is understandable that the orders relating to pay consisted of only 12 paragraphs. The remaining detailed procedures were adequately covered in the current peace-time financial accounting instructions.

Since 1953 there have been extensive changes made to the peace-time pay system. Three decades ago pay procedures were decentralized, manually intensive and very slow to react to variations in entitlements. The system used now is highly centralized, relies heavily on computer support and is able to react promptly to changes in entitlement, both for individual soldiers and the Army as a whole. These characteristics have made the current system capable of efficiently supporting a stable force of 33,000.

What must be remembered, however, is that the present pay system has been designed to serve a relatively small peace-time Army. A mobilized force will have vastly different requirements which, for reasons presented later in this article, would render the current system inadequate. The aim of this article is to outline a pay system which will meet the requirements of a mobilized Army and to describe how such a system should be developed during peace-time.

The article is based on the assumption that, on mobilization, the size of the Army would increase to a strength in excess of 250,000. In addition, a series of financial conditions of service have been postulated as a basis for discussion of pay systems during mobilization.

FACTORS INFLUENCING A PAY SYSTEM FOR MOBILIZATION

Regardless of whether it serves a peace-time or mobilized force, an efficient pay system must be able to satisfy four basic requirements. These requirements are:

- to accurately assess entitlements in accordance with the prevailing conditions of service,
- to provide for dispersement of statutory and compulsory deductions which have been taken from members' gross entitlements,
- to provide a service to members, and
- to ensure accountability of public moneys.

It follows that the design of a pay system for mobilization must start by considering these four requirements. Factors such as financial entitlements and liabilities, the degree of service offered to the soldier and the extent of accountability required will all influence the final structure of the system.
Financial Conditions of Service

There are no official guidelines to indicate salary and allowance entitlements for members of a mobilized Army. Obviously a decision on this matter would have to be made by the Parliament of the day based on advice from the Department of Defence and the Department of Finance.

However, it is possible to postulate a series of financial conditions which would apply on mobilization. The conditions selected for the purpose of this article, and outlined in subsequent paragraphs, have been influenced by two assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that entitlements would be roughly the same as those applying in World War I and World War II. Secondly, it is assumed that many of the allowances paid during peace-time are a form of incentive for recruitment and retention and would no longer be payable.

Salary. One rate of salary would apply for each rank, regardless of specialization or years of service in rank. The rate would be all inclusive and would contain an element to compensate for those Service factors which currently justify the payment of Service Allowance.

Specialist’s Allowance. Certain categories of members are required to be highly qualified in order to carry out their duties. These members would receive a Specialist’s Allowance. The allowance would be payable at either the higher ‘A’ rate or the lower ‘B’ rate with differing amounts set for each rank. For instance, a Medical Officer would receive the ‘A’ rate for his rank while a member of the Special Air Service Regiment would receive the ‘B’ rate for his rank.

Force Allowance. A Force Allowance would be payable at either a higher ‘A’ rate or a lower ‘B’ rate with differing amounts set for each rank. This allowance would apply:

- at the ‘A’ rate for members serving in the combat zone (or equivalent); or
- at the ‘B’ rate for members serving in remote localities, overseas (except in a combat zone) or in the forward maintenance area of the communications zone.

Dependant’s Allowance. A Dependant’s Allowance would be paid to a member who has allotted a prescribed amount for the care of his or her family.

Other Allowances. There would, of course, have to be provision made to approve other allowances in special cases. However, allowances in addition to those listed above would only apply in unusual circumstances, such as a member travelling overseas accompanied by his family or a member not being able to obtain service accommodation.

Statutory and Compulsory Deductions

Statutory and compulsory deductions are a part of the overall financial conditions of service for a member. However, they are separated in this article because a pay system must also cater for the disbursement of these moneys to other individuals, organizations and authorities.

Taxation. Members would be exempt from taxation while serving in the combat zone. In other areas taxation zone concessions would apply in the same manner as at present. The pay system would have to transfer moneys collected to the Taxation Office and arrange the preparation of Group Certificates and other end of financial year data.

Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits (DFRDB). DFRDB contributions would be deducted and paid to the Australian Government Retirement Benefits Office. The rate would be 5.5 per cent of paid salary.

Married Quarter Rental. Married quarter rental would continue to be deducted but the rate would be set by the standard and size of the quarter.

Allotment to Dependant. An allotment, at a prescribed rate, would be deducted from the member’s pay as a prerequisite for the payment of Dependant’s Allowance. The allotment would be paid to the dependant by cheque or deposit to a bank, building society or credit union.

Service to the Soldier

The members of a mobilized Army will expect, and must be given, a pay system which offers certain basic services. No matter how many soldiers constitute the force, each is an individual with his or her own needs which must be met.

The first thing that the soldier needs is access to earnings. He will need to draw cash, at predictable intervals, in the currency of the area in which he serves, for his day-to-day expenses. This requirement will exist even
through he may be subjected to relocation at short notice either as an individual or as a member of a unit. There will be times when he does not want to receive his full entitlement and therefore the system must have a means by which he can accumulate his undrawn credit. On other, hopefully rare, occasions, he may incur an overpayment. The system must provide a means by which this can be recovered over a period of time.

Secondly, a pay system should be designed to react promptly when a soldier’s entitlement is varied. A loss of both morale and confidence in the system can easily result when a member has been promoted and has to wait months to receive his extra pay. Conversely, a large, retrospective reduction in entitlement can create financial problems for the soldier and administrative problems for his unit.

Thirdly, the system must offer the soldier some assistance in transferring a portion of his money to other individuals or to organizations. This is particularly important when a soldier is serving in an isolated area. Transferring money can be achieved by permitting regular allotments to individuals or organizations, although a restriction may have to be placed on the number of allotments allowed for each member. The other means of transferring money is to allow members to convert accumulated credits to a cheque which can be redirected through the postal system.

Finally, the pay system must be flexible enough to offer other facilities to the soldier as the need is recognized.

Accountability

The Audit Act and Finance Regulations contain strict guidelines to ensure the accountability of public moneys. These guidelines require that payments are lawful, accurate and have not been duplicated. The guidelines also permit the officer authorizing a payment to make any investigations he thinks necessary in order to satisfy himself that the payment is correct.

Since a pay system for mobilization will be subject to general guidelines set down by the Department of Finance, and expanded by Defence finance authorities, there will be certain minimum requirements to ensure accountability. These requirements include:

a. proof that entitlements have been correctly calculated;
b. some form of acknowledgement, by the member, for cash received;
c. proof that deductions made from gross entitlements have been dispersed to individuals and organizations correctly;
d. a certification by an acceptable authority that entitlements claimed by a soldier are legally payable in accordance with the prevailing conditions of service; and
e. an ability to retrieve details from individual pay accounts, to satisfy audit queries or questions raised by the member.

Any new pay system would have to be approved by the First Assistant Secretary, Financial Services and Internal Audit Division (Department of Defence). This approval would be based on recommendations by Departmental officers tasked with examining and testing the system. Subsequent examination of the system would, no doubt, be carried out by the Auditor-General’s Office.

LESSONS FROM WORLD WAR II

The design of any future pay system should take into account the attributes and failings of previous systems. In this respect it is particularly relevant to examine the World War II procedures to see if any lessons can be learned.

During World War II management of pay in the field was the responsibility of a regular Army Pay Corps. Most units in the Order of Battle held establishment positions for Pay Corps personnel and the Corps strength at its peak was over 5,000. Unit pay staff calculated entitlements and recorded details in a paybook which became the basic accounting document. Cash payments were made on the basis of credit shown in the paybook and the member signed an ‘Acquittance Roll’ as acknowledgement of the cash received.

Entries made in paybooks were all manually calculated. Although this was a potential weakness of the system, procedures worked well for two reasons. Firstly, the pay and allowance structure was simple and therefore calculations were uncomplicated. Secondly, the Pay Corps staff were well trained and quickly became experienced in a task for which they were specifically employed.

All entitlement changes and cash payments made by unit pay staff were advised to the
District Finance Office (DFO) in the state of the soldier’s enlistment. The DFO, which was also manned by Pay Corps staff, would then check the accuracy of any calculations and advise the unit of any discrepancies. In addition, the DFO would maintain records of tax deducted by the unit in order that Taxation Group Certificates could be issued.

In the case of allotments, the unit would deduct money from the soldier’s paybook and advise the DFO of the allotment required. The DFO would then authorize the fortnightly payment to the allottee by deposit to a bank account or cash payment at a Post Office.

The system for World War II did have its shortcomings. The first problem was that the Army had not paid sufficient attention to the pay system prior to the war. As a result, the system took some time to develop. In the early stages cash payments made at units could not always be identified against a particular member. This was mainly due to the incorrect transcription of the member’s regimental number or name on ‘Acquittance Rolls’, or the fact that some soldiers could not be issued with a paybook immediately on enlistment. This problem did continue throughout the war to a lesser extent. As a result, cash payments to the value of approximately £1,000,000 were ‘written-off’ as unidentifiable. The significance of this amount becomes apparent when, by means of retail price indices, the figure converts to approximately $25,000,000 at March 1983 prices. Alternatively, if a comparison is made on the basis of service salaries, the 1983 figure would be approximately $100,000,000.

Another problem which became apparent during the early stages of the war was the lack of experienced staff. The nucleus of the Pay Corps was formed from public servants skilled in financial procedures. These members had to develop the system and train new Pay Corps personnel while still providing a service to the rest of the Army.

The third problem related to the extent to which the pay system relied on manual calculations. Processing entitlement changes was a slow and tedious job and soldiers often had to wait for months before adjustments were actioned. Some payments were incorrectly calculated and had to be adjusted later, but the relatively small number of errors reflects credit on the efficiency of Pay Corps members.

To summarize, the pay system used in World War II offers a number of lessons. They are:

a. the need to develop and prepare a system before it is required,
b. the benefits of having a staff dedicated to the administration of pay,
c. the practicability of managing pay at unit level, and
d. the need for strict accountability of public moneys.

THE CURRENT PAY SYSTEM

The current pay system was designed to meet the requirements of a peace-time force. Major factors influencing the design were:

a. the expectation that the strength of the Army would remain relatively small;
b. the need to be able to pay each soldier any of the 31 allowances provided by the current conditions of service;
c. the need to be able to reduce each soldier’s net pay by any of the 13 deductions for which he may become liable;
d. the requirement to offer certain services expected by a peace-time force, including the provision of up to 14 allotments each payday; and
e. the recognition that units do not always have qualified personnel to manage pay.

In contrast to the World War II procedures the current system is controlled centrally, with the Director, Defence Force Pay being responsible for the authorization of entitlements.

Occurrences affecting pay usually originate from the member’s unit. Those relating directly to rank, pay level and increment are processed through the Army personnel system then passed to the pay system for adjustment of the member’s account. All other occurrences are sent to the Defence Pay Accounting Centre (DEFPAC) for verification prior to processing.

The processing of pay changes is co-ordinated by DEFPAC. Input is transmitted to a central processing computer located in Canberra where pay programmes examine the input and update the soldier’s pay account with the details advised. Where the occurrence has a direct financial effect all entitlements are reassessed and the adjustments are stored as a permanent record on the pay account.
At the end of each fortnight all pay accounts are reviewed by a series of programmes called ‘pay compute’. This process updates internal records, such as totals of taxation deducted during the year, and determines what output is required to advise units and various organizations of changes that have been applied during the fortnight. Output includes listings to organizations receiving allotments and advice to the DFRDB Authority of rank changes processed.

The most important output from ‘pay compute’ is an authorization for the unit to vary the amount of pay being received by the soldier. This authority shows the details of transactions which have been processed together with the monetary effect of those transactions.

Within the unit, the basic pay accounting document is the Salary Variation Authority (SVA). Pay staff can permit the soldier to receive cash each fortnight on the basis of the credit entitlement shown on the SVA. Transactions forwarded to DEFPAC will result in an authorization to change the fortnightly entitlement and units are not permitted to vary cash payments until this authority is received.

The Central Computer

In addition to the processing of transactions from units, the central computer is able to perform other activities. When changes to conditions of service are approved, the computer is able to calculate the effect of these changes and advise units of the adjustment necessary for each member. The processing of a National Wage Increase is carried out in this manner. The computer is also able to provide budgetary estimates based on predicted expenditure of salary and allowances.

Prior to 1982 the central system used Honeywell hardware equipment with ‘FACT’ programme language. The system was first introduced for Army in 1969 and performed reliably for nearly 13 years. In March 1982 the ageing equipment was replaced by a more advanced system using UNIVAC hardware with ‘COBOL’ language. The transfer to UNIVAC equipment coincided with a major redesign of procedures between DEFPAC and the central computer. These changes had little effect on unit pay administration until November 1982, when the paybook was replaced by a revised SVA which included a Pay Record on the reverse side. It is interesting to note that approximately 120 man-years were required to complete the task.

Using the Current System for Mobilization

Major modifications would have to be made to the current pay system if it was to be used by a mobilized Army. In the first place, conditions of service would change to such an extent that the majority of computer programmes would have to be rewritten. The UNIVAC pay system has about 396 programmes and many of them have been written to process input and assemble output related to the allowances and deductions applying to a peace-time force. With the new range of allowances and liabilities expected on mobilization, the requirement for some programmes would no longer exist, while others would need extensive amendment.

The other problem is that the total system has been structured to suit a small force. The central computer system could easily be modified to cope with a force of 250,000. This could be achieved by minor changes to the processing design and the addition of extra data storage areas. However, the peripheral equipment available would not be sufficient to cope with the additional transmission, processing and printing demands. Additional priority on existing resources could not be expected at a time of mobilization when other computer systems in Defence would also be operating under pressure. To overcome this problem a large increase in the allocation of peripheral equipment would be required.

Given that major additional resources could be allocated to the pay system, there are other reasons why the present system would be impractical on mobilization.

Firstly, the current system relies on a salary authorization being printed in Canberra 10 days before the payday. The authorization must then be forwarded to the member’s unit in sufficient time to allow pay staff to adjust the cash entitlement on payday. Although this procedure works well in peace, it would not suit a mobilized Army. The force could be constantly moving, with individual soldiers or whole units moving to new locations at very short notice. With authorizations at one locality and members at another, a state of constant confusion would exist. Members would not be receiving their correct entitlement and pay
accounts would not balance. The problem would be particularly prominent for members serving overseas or in remote localities in Australia.

The other problem with the current system is that it relies entirely on a computer complex in Canberra. Since mobilisation would be enacted in response to a national threat, a centralized pay system could constitute a strategic vulnerability.

In summary, the current pay system is not suitable for use by a mobilized Army. It was designed for a peace-time force and, even if major modifications were made, the system would be impractical and undesirable under mobilization.

### OUTLINE OF PROPOSED SYSTEM

The pay system outlined in this article attempts to combine the attributes of previous systems with the advantages offered by modern computer technology. The proposal advocates reintroduction of the paybook, in a modified form, and places more responsibility on units while still allowing central control by DEFPAC.

#### Unit Responsibilities

Each unit with an establishment strength of more than 200 would create and maintain a field pay cell. Those units with less than 200 members would be sponsored by another larger unit, or a number of small units serving in the same location could be grouped to form an area pay cell. A standard infantry division would form a total of 28 field pay cells and about six area pay cells.¹⁶

Units would continue to originate and approve documents which have a financial effect. These documents, along with the details already shown in the member’s paybook, would form the information from which the field pay cell would calculate the financial effect of the occurrence.

To assist the pay staff, each field pay cell would operate a mini-computer with hard copy print facilities. The mini-computer would contain a programme package written by Defence personnel and pay programmers. This package could contain details of pay and allowance rates together with sufficient information to calculate arrears adjustments for most pay transactions. Obviously the package could not contain the complicated checking facilities which currently exist in the central pay system; however, it would enable a skilled operator to carry out complex pay calculations to determine future entitlements.

Two groups of data would be fed into the mini-computer. The first would be the member’s current pay details as shown in the paybook. The second would be the revised details resulting from the transaction. The programme would calculate the effect of the transaction and print out the revised entitlement details together with the arrears adjustment. Pay staff would then transcribe this information into the paybook. Details of transactions processed would be stored by the mini-computer on cassette for later transfer to DEFPAC.

Allotments and other transactions which have a financial effect on individuals or organizations would be treated in the same manner. However, in addition, the cassette would accept all the extra information needed by DEFPAC to complete the transaction.

Once all entitlement changes had been processed, unit pay staff would determine cash payments available from the details shown in the paybook. Payment to the member would be made by cash, or cheque or a combination of both. Cheques would be made payable to any individual or organization at the member’s discretion. The member would acknowledge payment by signing a pay list and the details of all payments would then be transferred to the mini-computer cassette.

Each fortnight the unit would send the cassette containing transaction details and payment records to DEFPAC. Source documents which originated the entitlement changes and completed pay lists would also be sent to DEFPAC.

#### Central Office Responsibilities

On receipt of cassettes and supporting documentation, DEFPAC would institute a check of unit calculations and payments. This would be achieved by transmitting the cassette details to a central computer where a master pay account would be held for each soldier. The central computer would apply the transaction to the master pay account and then compare the results with that obtained by the unit. If the results were the same the master pay account would update internal records, such as group certificate accumulations, and no
further action would be necessary. In cases where a discrepancy was discovered, full details would be provided to DEFPAC for investigation. DEFPAC would have access to the source document and, by liaison with the unit, discrepancies would be adjusted.

Transactions related to other individuals and organizations would be treated the same as all other transaction types. However, in addition to applying these transactions to the master pay file, computer output would be produced to advise the payee of the effect of the applied transaction.

Defence personnel and pay programmers would be responsible for the initial programme package used by the mini-computers. This task would require a great deal of planning but the final system would be relatively uncomplicated for two reasons. Firstly, the conditions of service would be simple and therefore there would only be a small number of financial combinations which could apply. Secondly, the programme package would not be designed to check every possible error situation. Since input would be controlled by trained pay staff, the small number of errors which went undetected would quickly be isolated by the central computer system.

Programming of the central computer system is another task which would have to be undertaken by Defence programmers. However, for reasons detailed earlier in the article, this task would be required on mobilization even if the current pay system was continued in a modified form.

Once the pay system was operating, the mini-computer package would have to be updated each time a change in pay and allowance rates, or conditions of service, was approved. Amendments would be effected by means of a cassette incorporating the new rates and conditions. The cassette would also contain the information necessary to apply the new rate to each member’s account and calculate the arrears adjustment.

MANNING REQUIREMENTS

Most units in the peace-time Army have establishment positions for pay clerks. However, these positions are filled by members from the unit’s parent Corps. Training and retention of qualified pay clerks continues to be a problem and pay administration within units has suffered as a result. A recommendation to improve the pay service, by transferring pay clerks to Ordnance Corps, is being implemented by Army Office. However, this move will reduce rather than eliminate the wastage of trained pay staff to other clerical streams.

In February 1974 the Chief of Personnel, in consultation with the (then) Paymaster-in-Chief, appointed a Working Party to examine all aspects of the pay service in the field. The report was highly critical, stating "...the most striking impression was one of surprise that the system works as well as it does, not through any lack of diligence on the part of the hard working UPR’s (Unit Pay Representatives) but because of the systematic inadequacies in their establishment cover, manning and training".

The Graton/Pape report recommended the immediate reintroduction of a regular Army Pay Corps. This recommendation has not been adopted, although a Pay Corps still exists in the Army Reserve.

The proposed pay system outlined in this article relies on trained pay staff to man field pay cells and area pay cells. Since the responsibility placed on units is far greater under the proposed system, it is essential that a regular Army Pay Corps be reintroduced.

During mobilization, recruits for the Pay Corps would be readily obtainable from enlisted with an accounting or computer background. These members would need to be trained in pay duties before being posted to pay cells. DEFPAC and the central computer section would also need Pay Corps members to supplement civilian staff.

DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSAL DURING PEACE

The system outlined in this article could not be introduced overnight. Obviously, the time required to develop the proposal would depend on the financial and manpower resources allocated to the task.

This article has already presented reasons why the current pay system could not serve a mobilized force. Therefore it is essential to develop an alternative system during peace-time. Failure to do so would cause a recurrence of the problems experienced in the early part of World War II. The following paragraphs describe how the proposed system could be developed during peace-time.
Guidelines for Financial Conditions of Service

Before any system can be developed it will be necessary to establish the financial conditions of service for a mobilized Army. The Industrial Division (Department of Defence) should be requested to provide guidelines on the type of allowances and deductions they envisage would apply on mobilization and the circumstances in which they would apply.

The rates of salary and allowances could not be determined at this time but a system of setting amounts as a percentage of the Average Weekly Earnings could be considered. This would obviate the need for constant review.

Acquisition of Mini-Computers

The acquisition of mini-computers should be considered early in the development of the system. With the advance of modern technology both in Australia and overseas, it may be possible to purchase relatively inexpensive equipment which will meet the required standards.

Some units already have mini-computers which are used for operational tasks and many more will be supplied with this equipment in the near future. For this reason finance and computer staff must convince Army Office that future equipment proposals should recognize the needs of the pay system. Close liaison may result in huge savings in capital equipment.

Pay Corps Reintroduction

Reintroduction of a regular Army Pay Corps would provide many benefits to the existing Army, as well as ensuring that a mobilized force would have a nucleus of trained pay staff. The Corps could be manned initially by soldiers who are currently employed on pay duties.

In addition there would be a number of public servants in the finance area who would be enlisted on mobilization. Senior officers in this category should be shadow posted to key appointments and trained in the duties of their posting.

The role of the Reserve element of the Pay Corps should also be revised. Currently, members of the RAAPC study regular Army pay procedures for promotion examinations; however, normal training of these members concentrates on ARES (Army Reserve) pay procedures. This training is inappropriate for soldiers who would become pay staff on mobilization. Therefore training of the Reserve element of the Pay Corps should concentrate on the system members will man on mobilization.

Development of Pay Programmes

Development of the computer programmes outlined in the proposal would require significant manpower resources. Based on the calculation of resources used to develop the UNIVAC system, it is estimated that programmer time totalling 50 man-years would be required.

Approval should be sought for the establishment of a project team to carry out the necessary research and programming. The team should consist of experienced pay staff and programmers.

Development of Pay Documentation

Introduction of the proposal would require detailed accounting instructions to enable pay staff to understand and operate the system. The production of these accounting instructions should be undertaken in conjunction with the development of the system. Staff responsible for this task should therefore be included in the project team.

The other documentation required will be the various pay transaction forms and accounting records. These should be designed and sufficient stocks printed to guarantee that a mobilized Army has access to the developed system.

Trial of Developed System

After developing and testing the proposed system a trial of the procedures should be arranged. This would be best achieved by transferring a 200-man unit to the system for a period of six months.

On completion of the trial and evaluation of the results, any necessary changes should be incorporated and financial instructions revised accordingly.

Subsequent Annual Reviews. Once the proposal has been developed it should be reviewed annually to ensure that the system is still functional. When problems are identified, system amendments should be made immediately, and operating instructions updated to reflect the changes.

CONCLUSION

This article has analyzed the pay system requirements of a mobilized Army. By comparing these requirements with the facilities
available in the current pay system, it has demonstrated that peace-time procedures would be inadequate.

To overcome this problem a new pay system has been proposed which offers an efficient service to the soldier and still maintains a high degree of accounting control. However, the proposal is an outline only and will require considerable development if it is to be successfully introduced as a contingency plan for mobilization.

Development of the proposal will require the allocation of large financial and manpower resources. The article has suggested ways in which these resources should be utilized during peace-time to ensure that a mobilized force will have access to an efficient pay system.

The requirement has been identified and a solution propounded but the difficult task of development has yet to start.

NOTES

4. According to R. M. Bennett in his study titled "Expansion of the Australian Army During the Early Part of World War II — the Raising of the Second AIF" (Canberra, 1974), the Army reached its peak of 575,964 in February, 1944. Therefore, 250,000 is a modest assumption.
6. Details are contained in 'Standing Orders — Australian Imperial Force — 1940' Military Board, Melbourne, 1940. pp. 8-9 and pp. 133-145.
8. DF(S)R, Regulation 4 defines a 'dependant' for the purpose of this allowance.
9. The current pay system permits up to 14 allotments.
12. Turpin, A. M.
13. Kruck, E. T. Director Manpower Systems, Department of Defence. Unpublished letter to author dated 31 August 1981. A large amount of this resource was necessary because Army pay was the first financial system to transfer to UNIVAC. Later systems have been considerably easier to develop because they can use programs already written for Army.
16. MLW ONE, 6.2, Aide Memoire.
17. The Working Party consisted of Colonel (now Major General) P. C. Gration and Mr K. J. Pape. Its report, issued in 1974, had no official title and became known as the "Gration Pape" Report. It will be referred to by that name in this article.

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Mr Sindrey has been employed in the Department of Defence for over 17 years, mainly on tasks associated with service pay accounting. He is currently the Senior Executive Officer, Financial Research and Co-ordination, Financial Services and Internal Audit Division, Defence Central. This article was first written in 1981 at the Australian Staff College. It has recently been updated, mainly to reflect changes to the existing pay system.
IN the Northern Territory alone, there are twenty to fifty thousand brumbies and four thousand camels. They survive so successfully in the feral state that they have to be regularly culled. An average horse has the potential to carry 130 kg over 100 km per day for sustained periods. Camels show a capacity for carrying 190 kg over 200 km per day when operating individually and 100 km per day when operating in groups. The question examined in this article is whether or not the feral resource and its capacity is relevant to modern military operations.

In studying this subject two areas of concern became quickly apparent. First was the hint of apathy among some military thinkers in really coming to terms with the challenges of terrain, harsh climate and isolation which characterize the North West. Some point out that the problem of the monsoon, for example, is insurmountable but affects both sides in a modern conflict. Such thinking will serve only to deny the initiative to Australian forces. The second area of concern is the discovery of considerable bias among military thinkers against the use of horses and camels in modern military operations. There seems to be some consensus that to use such animals would be a retrograde step. Given the place of technology on the modern battlefield such a stance is understandable. The North West does, however, present some problems peculiar to this country which perhaps require a particularly Australian approach. Such an approach would need to recognize all resources available including animals. In short an open mind is necessary.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE HORSE AND CAMEL IN MODERN WAR

The use of animals in modern military operations is not an odd concept. What is strange is the fact that, with the problems presented to the military by the North West, Australia does not emulate a number of overseas forces which do use horses and camels. The Chinese Peoples Republic, for example, is reported to employ at least three divisions of horse mounted infantry for patrol work along her sensitive frontier with the Soviet Union. There is some evidence that the Russians employ a similar force in the same area. The Indian Army maintains one regiment of operational horse cavalry, which, together with a camel force proves useful for patrol work in the Rajasthan desert area bordering Pakistan. Similar factors of terrain, climate and isolation have caused the South Africans and, until recently, the Portuguese to raise horse mounted forces in Africa.

During the Second World War horses were used extensively. General Patton, after the 1943 campaign in Sicily made the wry comment:

‘If we’d had a brigade or a division of horse cavalry in Sicily and Italy the bag of Germans would certainly have been much bigger . . . as good as US armor was, the war could still have used some horses’.

The Russians and the Germans had no such shortfalls. The former employed over three million and the latter over two and a half million horses to complement mechanical means of mobility. Clearly the use of horses, particularly on the Russian Front, was due to the lack of industrial capacity to produce mechanical vehicles of all types. The corollary, however, that mechanical vehicles, if available, could have replaced the animal was proven false when vehicles froze and animals went on feeding on the thatch of ruined houses.
Perhaps the most compelling example from World War II was the story of the North Australia Observer Unit (NAOU). This was formed in 1942, "to watch for and report to HQ NT Force, by the quickest means, any landings of the enemy on the Australian coast between Normanton, Queensland, and Yampi Sound, West Australia and ... report any subsequent enemy movement including movement of his aircraft."

The founder of this unit was the anthropologist and former member of the personal staff to the Minister for the Army, the late Lieutenant Colonel W.E.H. Stanner. He wanted a highly mobile unit, horsed rather than wheeled, because, as he like to say 'horses can go where wheels cannot'. He deployed with 5 to 600 men, forty one vehicles, a number of coastal schooners and motor yachts, 1,500 purchased horses and nearly the same figure again from broken brumbies and donkeys. His operations concentrated on the coastal region and so camels were not involved. A report by Stanner's veterinary surgeon, Lieutenant D.C. Blood, released in July 1943, revealed that the quality of purchased horses was questionable and certainly below that of southern stock. The problem lay in station owners and drovers retaining the better animals for themselves. Capt. A. Vane, a former member of the NAOU, informed the author of this article that the brumby population was a solution. This was not because all brumbies were sound. It was because unsuitable brumbies could be easily replaced by other readily found stock.

Camels have shown their worth in the inland regions where water and forage are in short supply. They were first imported into Australia in the 1860's and, by the late 1880's, they were being used in considerable numbers in most parts of the country. The only objection to the use of camels was that explorers were able to cover the interior so hastily that they conducted insufficient survey and exploration.

Camels were extensively used on the telegraph line project between Adelaide and Darwin in the 1870's. They carried poles, supplies and stores for the construction of telegraph stations. They were similarly used during the barrier fence constructions in West Australia and the railway construction from Port Augusta to Alice Springs and Kalgoorlie. Perhaps the most universal use was evident in the police patrols of the outback which spread government control even beyond the road structures evident today. It is interesting to note that even under the most trying drought conditions feed was not carried for the camels. They were expected to supply themselves from the coarse scrub along the track and they appear to have managed quite successfully.

Perhaps the most epic comparison of the capacities of horse and camel in Australian conditions occurred in the 1890's. A horse and camel one day race was organised from Bourke to Wanaring over a distance of 110 miles. The horse won by a narrow margin but died the next day while the camel was ridden back by nightfall.

In sum the horse and camel have proven capacities which had a clear cut place before the advent of the internal combustion engine. This putting aside of horse and camel to history is particularly relevant to civil industry and NATO military spheres. The pace and conditions of a conflict in the North West may not however rule out the relative status of animals. They can refuel from the environment as did Stanner's horses and the camels of pioneer explorers. Vehicles cannot. They are natural by virtue of their feral state and develop no unusual signature for enemy surveillance. The vehicle stands out. The distances covered by camel and horse for each day of protracted operations sit quite well with the forecast rates of advance or withdrawal in current military doctrine. Rapid re-deployments or strategic moves can be easily achieved by air or motor transport.

It seems therefore, that historical orientation and known current military practice indicate a potential application of horses and camels in the North West. Before taking these conclusions further it is necessary to study an overview of the North West and the area of influence of the brumby and wild camel.

THE NORTH WEST AND THE FERAL RESOURCE

The North West in this article is defined as that area of Australia encompassed by the Northern Territory and the Kimberleys. The significance of the region is evident in a number of areas. Not the least of these are its potential resource wealth and its proximity to the land chain north of Australia. The land mass represents twenty three per cent of Australia's
total area. However, only one per cent of Australia's population lives in the region.

The terrain varies from mud flats to mountain ranges. The major part is open plain and sand dune. (See figure 1.)

Figure 1 illustrates the problem posed to mechanical forms of ground transport before the limitations of the monsoon are imposed. Generally speaking, the nature of the ridges and sand dunes severely restrict vehicle movement.

The most significant factor when planning military operations in the area is the weather. There are two seasons. The Wet occurs from November to March each year and affects the northern half of the area to the extent that all ground lines of communication are cut for weeks at a time. In addition, the plains become boggy and impassable to all types of vehicles. (See figure 2.)

The Dry does not provide a complete antithesis to the problems presented by the Wet. Areas unsuited to vehicle mobility remain as illustrated earlier in Figure 1. The lack of road and rail infrastructure is such that massive problems are evident for the deployment and maintenance of any force operating anywhere in the region.

The problem so far presented to man and his mechanical means of mobility have not prejudiced the success evident in the survival rate of the introduced species of horse and camel. Major concentrations of these animals in the feral state are distributed as shown in Figure 3.

The extent of the concentrations of animals has already been given. By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that prior to 1939 the establishment for an Australian Cavalry Brigade (horsed) was 2,329 horses. Thus in horse mounted infantry terms the feral horse resource in the Northern Territory may represent up to a 21 brigade lift.

As a general comment it seems that the brumbies survive in the plateau and range areas and the camels in the desert and sand dunes. The major concentrations reside in isolated and inaccessible regions. Clearly, they could survive just as well, if not better, in the areas populated by man.

The fodder and water requirements appear to be met naturally as suitable pasture exists over one third of the area and that lies in the region affected by the Wet (Figure 2). In addition, however, more than 140,000 hectares
of commercial fodder crops and sown pasture are established.

Whether or not the feral resource does provide a solution to the mobility problem caused by the terrain and climate depends on the capacity of these animals to meet military needs. This issue will now be examined.

**HORSE AND CAMEL — POTENTIAL AND LIMITATION**

The experience of the Boers, the Australian Light Horse and the Imperial Camel Corps when operating in hot arid conditions established that each animal had the potential capacities given earlier. The figures given are however applicable to fit, trained, watered, fed and properly maintained animals.

The maintenance aspects bear closer scrutiny. Working animals will normally require hard feed. In addition their daily intake will include about 46 litres of water. The bill thus created can, however, be offset by living off the land. This can be achieved if the numbers are limited in each group, lengthy rest periods are planned for, and about twelve hours in twenty four are allowed for grazing.

Endurance statistics in the Middle East reveal that the camel can be trained to operate without water for up to fifteen days if suitable (reasonably succulent) fodder is available. Fit horses can go without water for fifty to sixty hours at full work rate before producing appreciable casualty figures.

Because they are living creatures, camels and horses require proper handling in addition to good maintenance. They have their problems of temperament and special physical characteristics. For example:

- a. horses and camels do not readily mix and require training to do so;
- b. horses do not travel particularly well by sea;
- c. horses adapt to the feed in their own area of interest and require adjustment time if they are moved to alternate grazing situations;
- d. camels suffer from foot rot if their feet are continually wet;
- e. they both gravitate to herd behaviour especially during the mating or rutting season;
- f. they are prone to sickness or minor ailments and require sound husbandry and veterinary support; and
- g. they all require good, well fitting equipment to ensure that they can maintain their output.

Given this type of overview it may now be useful to examine some potential employments for these animals. The main ones have been identified as provision of conventional force mobility, porterage, SDS and reconnaissance. Each will now be discussed.

**Provision of Conventional Force Mobility.** The South African, Chinese, Russian, Indian and Thai armies are among the main users of animals for this purpose. It is stressed however, that the forces which use animals are normally located in the area of operations. In the Australian scenario the problems of terrain are similar and therefore the horse and camel option may be attractive. However, our conventional forces are not in the area and so, if a mounted force was deployed, it would mean moving beasts to foreign pasture and shipping concentrates and bulk from the state of origin. The costs of this could possibly outweigh the advantages.

**Porterage.** The Indian, Pakistani and Thai armies are among many who use mules for porterage. Stanner used horses and donkeys for this task. Animals have very definite potential here. It is just a question of breaking loads down to porterable loads or employing draught animals. The porterage role seems particularly useful to infantry formations moving on foot carrying heavy weapons and signals equipment.

**SDS.** The Wermacht used horse mounted SDS extensively. So did Stanner’s force. There is much lobbying in the Army to introduce motor-cycles for this task. While efficient, these machines are noisy, they cause the rider to concentrate on where he is going rather than observing normal individual tactical movement procedure, they make an identifiable signature for enemy surveillance, and they cannot go where a horse can. Many argue that the motor-cycle has replaced the horse in the outback. The fact is that motorcycles take stockmen to where their task is and then, if the terrain is at all rough the stockmen move on horseback.

**Reconnaissance and Surveillance.** Four wheel drive vehicles, armoured vehicles and motor-
cycles have been regarded as the best ground resources for this task. The camel and horse, however, are of particular use in this field given their capacities in terms of load weight and distance. The main advantage, however, lies in the possibility of living off the land and revealing no unusual signature to enemy surveillance. One can imagine the use of a horse mounted patrol network monitoring an enemy landing in the Wyndham and Ord River area. It could operate from the mountains all around and be completely elusive from the conventional enemy shackled to standard vehicles.

The North West Australia Option. The horse and camel of North West Australia could be used in all the above roles. The main problem appears to be to match manpower to the resource because to do this would mean creating forces in situ to maximise the return. The animate nature of the resource and the need to know the land support such a requirement. The question is; what is the return? The Australian Defence Force could gain a tremendous return if, like the Boers, General von Lettow Vorbeck in German East Africa, and now the Afghans fighting the Russians, it used its natural terrain and animate resources against the enemy. One could imagine the problem faced by an invader in the region of the Ord River if an Australian horse or camel mounted force constantly attacked it and then melted away into the surrounding ranges. It sounds a little old fashioned and perhaps romantic or naive. The fact is that the principles involved have worked well in the past. The Australian Army cannot afford to rely entirely on NATO oriented doctrine. The limited conventional resources and the environment underline this. There is a precedence in Stanner's force and now an infrastructure in North West Mobile Force to at least trial the concept in the surveillance role.

COST

Before making any final conclusions on return, a more clear definition of cost is required. This is a very difficult item to quantify. Stanner's force provides some data which make for a useful start point.

The NAOU report on horse transport dated 30 July 1943 concluded that every soldier required two horses for riding and one for equipment. There is therefore a ratio of three to one in the requirement. The camel ratio is not so clearly identified but given the information listed earlier it seems that a two to one ratio for protracted operations would be reasonable.

The cost of saddlery depends on the type required. Again the NAOU report is useful because it advocates the stock saddle and standard Army issue pack saddle with some modifications. The requirements for camels can be estimated based on the cost of the horse tack.

Stanner's horses would live on patrol without supplementary feeding for a month at a time. Beyond this supplementary rations of 3 kg of oats and 1 kg of bran was necessary. The problem here is that even at half rations it would take four horses in ten to carry the supplement for a three week patrol. This can be overcome by maximising the protein benefit in pasture feed through sound husbandry. A well maintained drenched horse will improve his digestive efficiency by fifteen per cent. Modern drenching techniques were not available in Stanner's day. Whatever is resolved in feed, the heat in the North West is such that a salt ration of five grams a day per horse is required.

Stanner's force also found that veterinary support was extremely important. There will therefore be a bill for veterinary aides and their training as well as veterinary surgeons.

The costing in broad terms for a squadron of one hundred men would be something like this:

a. Animals 300 horses or 200 camels or a mix of the two. If the feral animal is used there is no cost. If stock horses or domesticated camels are used the cost would be approximately $75,000.

b. Breakers. It takes two weeks for a breaker to train ten horses. Camels need hardly any breaking. The horse squadron requires 420 man days. Concurrent training is therefore essential and a breaker per ten man section is ideal especially in the brumby situation where the turnover of stock could be an ongoing concern.

c. Veterinary Support. One part time veterinary surgeon would be required. He would need to be assisted by one full time aide per platoon.
The squadron would require one full-time farrier for horses.

- **Veterinarian and Farrier Supplies.** An allowance of $20 per month per horse should be allowed. The squadron would need $6,000.

- **Tack.** One set of riding (stockman tack) and one set of pack horse tack per man bought off the shelf would cost the squadron $200,000 (approximately).

- **Feed.** When not on patrol, animals will need to be kept in yards unless it is intended to train another herd. This means that the number of animals to area ratio is such that they will need outside feeding. $20 per week per horse needs to be allowed for here. The monthly feed bill for the squadron would therefore be $24,000. The Alice Springs Camel farm feeds 34 camels for $1,200 per month. The squadron would therefore spend about $7,200 per month.

The cost factor is subject to many variables which only a trial can identify. Stanner’s logistic problems with horse feed would be different today because of the availability in the North West of alternate high protein feed in rice, sunflower and sorghum which can replace oats. Modern drugs and agricultural technique can combine to make the intake to output ratio of animals much more efficient than they ever were before.

In sum, without wages or capital works the all-up first-year costs of the squadron would be $560,000 if horses were used or $358,400 if camels were used. These figures assume every day feed (which should not be relevant during patrols) and the capture rather than purchase of animals. This sits well with the cost of establishing a vehicle mounted squadron.

**CONCLUSION**

Feral horses and camels thrive in large areas of North West Australia. Horses do particularly well in the areas affected by the Wet and were expolited successfully by the North Australia Observer Unit in 1942. Camels are of proven value in the arid interior and have potential in the Western Kimberleys.

The problems confronting conventional forces in the North West are not insurmountable but they are immense. The Wet season can severely curtail military initiative in the region. The brumby and wild camel are not the complete answer. They may only be a small percentage of the answer. Even on a low scale, however, they offer a capability not recognized in a conventional enemy inventory. The possibility of welding local forces (with detailed local knowledge) and the feral capabilities seems therefore quite attractive.

The cost of establishing such a capability is low. The main challenge lies in the training of riders, breakers, handlers, veterinary aides and farriers. There is also the need to recruit veterinary surgeons. The availability of such personnel from within the military or civil spheres is not known. It seems clear, however, that their availability in a time of crisis is not guaranteed and therefore this factor requires early examination.

The location, infrastructure and charter of the North West Mobile Force make that unit most suitable for the trial of the concept in the reconnaissance and surveillance role. If that unit is tasked with such a trial a number of changes to establishment would be required in specialist areas. Some direct enlistment of breakers for example may be necessary. The results of the trial could form the basis of modern doctrine on the employment of horses and camels in modern war. Such doctrine could provide the basis for an examination of the wider application of the resource in other tasks and other parts of Australia.

The key to the defence of North West Australia lies in a thorough appreciation of the environment of the area. This done, the lead time before a crisis can be used to overcome the problems which confront both sides and so gain and maintain the initiative for any confrontation. The exploitation of the brumby and wild camel is seen as one of many important steps in this process. The cost effectiveness and capabilities of the feral resource are such that these animals may be of considerable relative importance to the Australian defence capability in the region.

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These figures are based on Wilton's method described in "The Anzacs", Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1975.

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5. Ibid p. 151.
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Major Guy served in Vietnam with SASR in 1967. He graduated from OCS, Portsea in 1968. Overseas postings included Papua New Guinea, United Kingdom and Hong Kong. He attended Command and Staff College in 1982. He is currently as Instructor at the Land Warfare Centre on the Junior Staff Wing.
He cannot remember any of his friends actually being shot down. As transport pilots they were more frequently lost in adverse weather, colliding with obscured mountains on landing approach; or with engine failures at critical points during takeoff. In one unforgettable incident he watched in horror as an aircraft from his squadron cartwheeled in a ball of flame. An engine failed just as it became airborne, one wing tip struck the runway and instantly ignited the full fuel load. Each night before he dropped off to sleep he would muse to himself "perhaps tomorrow it will be my turn to die."

Moriya Saito, the youngest of a large rural family in Japan, was born much later than his brothers and sisters, some of whom were already married when he arrived to greet his perplexed middle aged parents. While still a young child his father and mother passed away with the result that his upbringing was accepted, in the traditional way, by the elder married sisters.

After completing Senior High School Moriya was hesitant in which direction to devote his future. The family’s sons for generations had been in the medical profession, though the thought of this long and difficult course held little interest for him. The year was 1936, money and worthwhile careers being in short supply he opted as an alternative for a cadetship in the then relatively new and exciting Army Air Corps.

At the age of eighteen Cadet Saito was posted to Sendai Flying School, some 300 kilometres north of Tokyo and still in use today, to commence his basic training. A unique and inexpensive system of introducing new students to the basic rules of flight existed at the centre. There were lightweight one man gliders to which were attached long stout ropes. These in turn were harnessed to lines of budding pilots. The students would run as fast as possible into the wind and tow each other aloft. Their first taste of flight, for a short time and at a very low but safe altitude. Its other benefit; plenty of healthy outdoor exercise for the cadets.

It was almost three months before the instructors permitted Moriya to become airborne in one of these basic gliders. Prior to his launch considerable time had to be spent in studying the theory of flight. There was to be no short-cut method before these young men flew for the Emperor and Empire.

The students, over the remaining nine months, gradually phased onto the YOKOSUKA radial engined biplane. Though slow and reliable the usual spate of training accidents occurred, especially on cross country exercises. When returning to their dromes the cadets often found them blanketed by low lying fogs which had quickly formed and drifted in, usually off the sea. With no radios and more often than not short of fuel an alternative had to be found with the inevitable results; forced landings.

Navigation was a strictly administered subject and before a practical solo exercise the
students periodically had to duplicate by hand and in colour their own maps. All essential aids such as roads, railway lines and even minor villages were included. On the reverse side a scale drawing of the drome at the intended destination with such minute details as parking and refueling arrangements. To top this a physical relief of the anticipated route from a side elevation showing mountains, peaks and low land. The Japanese Army was determined to lose as few pilots and aircraft, through poor navigation, as possible.

After twelve months the successful students graduated from initial training. Among them was newly promoted Lieutenant Saito with orders to proceed to Kyogahala Air Base, 250 kilometres east of Tokyo.

A specialised course in photo reconnaissance commenced at the new school. Practical exercises meant the pilots were assigned to a simulated target in their own country. It might be a city, railhead or shipping facility which had to be located and photographed in detail. These "missions" frequently offered the opportunity for a little private photography with students vieing to capture the best picture of Mt. Fuji or some other religious/historical site off their wing tip.

Bivoacs in the country and mountains were encouraged by the senior officers to foster comradeship and allow the young men a break from their often rigorous training. It is interesting to note also that spoken English was taught to all the pilots and a surprising amount of this language is still retained by those surviving today. One wonders how many Allied airmen were taught Japanese?

Departing these relatively carefree and happy days Moriya now proceeded to Matsudo Air Base, on the outskirts of Tokyo, where more serious studies were to ensue for a further year. These included endorsements on twin engine heavy aircraft, the principal of which was the NAKAJIMA K134. This aircraft was similar in style and performance to the American Douglas DC-2. (Technical data on the NAKAJIMA and other aircraft mentioned in this article is annotated at the end of the story.)

Another posting and Moriya was back where he started, Sendai. Now, instead of the green cadet he was the experienced flying instructor. Virtually the whole field of aviation instruction completed after two and a half years of relentless aviation schooling.

Japanese aviation technology was advancing rapidly and flying training was now in more modern all metal monoplanes, the TACHI-KAWA K155 with a 450 h.p. radial engine. A stable, easily handled and popular plane of which lightly armed versions had supported ground troops in China. Two years were to pass at Sendai as "Sensei" (teacher) with many of Lt. Saito's students being sent to the war in China on completion of their cadetship.

As an imminent escalation in war loomed over Japan Moriya was also directed to China for further experience and reconnaissance flights. One particular mission is well remem-
Training accident with overturned biplane after precautionary landing in small mountain valley. The pilot escaped unhurt.

From late 1942 the Japanese transport pilots were phased into the faster MITSUBISHI G3M and K121 aircraft. These were similar to their bomber counterparts except usually coloured silver or grey and having seating for up to eighteen passengers. They operated with extended range flights throughout South-East Asia and the South West Pacific. Non-stop journeys of three thousand kilometres were possible.

These transport flights were either direct ones across the sea or the safer island hopping “milk runs”. Both kinds were equally hazardous, the former if mechanical failure occurred over mid-ocean and the latter due to roving allied fighters. Auto pilots were frequently used with the Captain retiring to the rear for a warm meal, usually rice, as the unattended aircraft droned on.

Due to a shortage of pilots, especially near the end of the war, co-pilots were a luxury rarely known. The standard flying height was 3,300 metres with cloud banks being sought in the more active war zones. It was not uncommon for an engine to malfunction and the flight to be completed, with difficulty, on the remaining one. Maintenance and spare parts availability deteriorated progressively with Allied advances.

There were several precautions which Moriya always adhered to and believes saved his life on several occasions. One was to thoroughly “run up” and warm his engines before depar-
ture, even if it meant a fifteen minute delay. No half cold radials failed on him. He also always attempted to depart before dawn, the surprise attack time on airfields, even if it meant an unpopular 4 a.m. rise for his crew and passengers.

Where possible cloud banks, even if not on the most direct route, were used for concealment or handy escape routes as these unescorted transports were easy prey for Allied fighters. In mid 1944 near the Celebes, while “cloud hopping”, an American P-38 Lightning passed directly beneath his aircraft without the fighter pilot glancing upwards. Moriya was very lucky and well remembers when Admiral Yamamoto was shot down by these same aircraft at Bougainville.

When approaching airfields that were weathered in Lt. Saito would patiently circle slowly outside in clearer skies. With throttles back and mixture lean he would wait until a break appeared. Some of his more impetuous fellow pilots lost their lives while trying to grope through to the runway. Of the thirty-odd students in his original class only five or six were to survive the conflict.

In December 1944 Moriya had just alighted at Clark Airbase in the Philippines when the whole area erupted. Diving American Grumman fighters bombed and strafed everything in sight. Not a single Japanese aircraft escaped damage or destruction. Moriya fled the field on foot carrying a briefcase of important documents which had earlier been consigned to him. He watched helplessly from a thick clump of bamboo as his plane burned. He estimates that their forces lost two hundred planes in the raid. Replacements were later flown in from other areas, one of which was allotted to him to continue the homeward journey.

In latter day reflection Moriya feels that life as a pilot far surpassed that of the foot soldier. No thirty kilometre marches with a heavy rucksack in all kinds of weather. By contrast he travelled in comparative comfort, received preferential treatment as an officer and collected many superb souvenirs. These treasures from abroad made him very popular with the relatives back home. He would return with gifts of tobacco, sugar, butter, chocolate, material and even clothing. With everything being directed into the war effort little of these luxuries were available in Japan.

However, food obtained on his overseas travels was usually of poor quality with the rice unpalatable and the beef too tough to chew. As a result when departing abroad Moriya always tried to take sufficient foodstuffs for at least one appetising meal a day. By 1945 even this became difficult with little or no salt or the favourite miso flavouring; at this time also homeland food had become scarce and tasteless.

Captain Moriya Saito (top row third from left with his squadron and commanding officer — ‘‘Thora’’ transport in the background.
Captain Saito (seated) with his students and Tachikawa K136 Trainer. Some of these students were later "Kamikazes" out of Taiwan.

In the latter stages of the war many of Moriya's students became Kamikaze (Divine Wind) pilots departing on their last flight from Taiwan. It was the sad duty of now Captain Saito to be one of those officers detailed, on occasions, to bid them a final farewell. Towards the end of 1945, when it was anticipated that the war would soon terminate, he remembers seeing the signal that these suicide attacks were to cease. When asked why he himself had not become a Kamikaze he smiled and explained "as a veteran by that time with four thousand flying hours accumulated it was considered I already had contributed enough and taken sufficient risks for my country".

Two days before Japan's capitulation Captain Saito flew a high ranking Army officer, who seemed to have prior knowledge of the impending surrender, from Vietnam back home. When Moriya reported for duty a few days later he heard the war had ended. His luck had held, he had evaded internment and not suffered the long delays of repatriation that were the fate of others overseas. Able to return to his family and house almost immediately all he took with him, against the peace terms, was his sword which he still retains today.

In present days Moriya attends the regular squadron reunions where they reminisce over the adventures and heartaches of days gone by. One of their members is a Senior Check Pilot with Japan Airlines, another a captain on internal country routes while a third is satisfied to take the occasional joyflight in a light, single-engine Cessna.

Now settled in semi-retirement Captain Saito passes his twilight years in a large country home two hundred kilometres north of Tokyo. His clothing store is mostly managed by his energetic wife. Moriya's current means of transport is an immaculately maintained Honda Civic.
Like his aircraft of bygone days the car has to be carefully “pre-flighted” with engine warmed before he departs to the Bank, Rotary Meeting or local coffee shop. Indeed I believe I am the only other person permitted to operate the controls from the captain’s position; naturally only after the all important and carefully scrutinised pre-departure checks. I also often think that the only reason he permitted me to marry his only daughter was because I too am a pilot. Moriya never permits me to forget though who is the veteran and who the mere amateur with only two hundred hours in his log book!

**Addendum:** Unfortunately precise details and dates were not always possible in this story as it was relayed from memory alone, without the assistance of accurate records or diaries.

# Technical details of aircraft mentioned in this story are:

**NAKJIMA Ki44 Twin Engine Transport. ("Thora")**
First flew 1937  
Crew of 3 and 8 passengers  
2 x 780 h.p. nine cylinder  
Maximum speed 224 mph  
Cruise 193 mph  
Range 745 miles  
Service ceiling 23000’

**MITSUBISHI Ki21 Twin Engine Bomber/Transport. ("Sally")**
First flew 1936  
2 x 1500 h.p. fourteen cylinder  
Maximum speed 302 mph  
Cruise 236 mph  
Range 1680 miles

**MITSUBISHI G3M Twin Engine Bomber/Transport. ("Nell")**
First flew 1934  
2 x 1300 h.p. fourteen cylinder radials  
Maximum speed 258 mph  
Cruise 184 mph  
Range 3871 miles  
(Extremely long range aircraft which contributed to the sinking of HMS *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* off Singapore)

**TACHIKAWA Ki36 Monoplane Trainer.**  
(Codename "Ida")  
First flew 1938  
Two seater  
450 h.p. nine cylinder radial  
Maximum speed 216 mph  
Cruise 147 mph  
Range 767 miles

**YOKOSUKA K5Y Biplane Trainer.**  
(Codename "Willow" by the Allies)  
First flew 1934  
Two seater  
300 h.p. nine cylinder radial  
Maximum speed 132 mph  
Cruise 86 mph  
Range 633 statute miles

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**Oil painting by Peter Connor of Lt. Saito’s Mitsubishi G3M “Nell” over New Guinea.**

Bob Piper has been with Defence for ten years, the last four as RAAF Historical Officer. Prior to this he lived in Papua New Guinea, where his interest in writing and photography first commenced.

As a private pilot he has a natural interest in aviation and specialises in military history, of both sides, during World War II in the South West Pacific.

Many of his carefully researched articles are based on actual incidents and the reactions of those involved. The original participants have been located where possible and contributed to the stories.
THE EVOLUTION
OF AUSTRALIAN MILITARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

By Major J. R. Jauncey, RAA

While the advent of military unionism is a source of concern to the professional ranks of Australia’s Defence Forces, unions are but one element in a multi-faceted industrial relations system. This article focuses attention on Australia’s unique industrial relations which have evolved to regulate conflict in the employee-to-employer relationship. The nation’s compulsory arbitration process ensures that both parties enjoy legal equality. Servicemen have no rights in the determination of their employment contract; nor can they demonstrate their dissatisfaction collectively through industrial action or by appeals to a tribunal. Outwardly, there would appear to be little resemblance between the two systems with the singular exception of employee dissatisfaction. However, it is dissatisfaction that provides the conflict which causes industrial relations systems to evolve. Events of the last decade provide clear evidence that a military industrial relations system exists and that it is converging in its evolution towards the civil model. There are still a number of major obstacles that exist between the system in its present configuration and ultimate convergence (which will include the emergence of unions). Even if military unions are not likely to appear in the foreseeable future, military industrial relations are about to assume a new image which will have many of the characteristics of the civil system.

‘Industrial relations are, largely, relations of conflict. Strikes are only a symptom of conflict and only one among a number of symptoms. If industrial conflict is to be understood it is necessary to look at its causes rather than its symptoms. The causes are to be found in the larger structures and processes of economy and society. Many countries have responded to industrial warfare by building institutions which are meant to regulate and control it. The forms of institutional control influence the way in which conflict arises, the way in which it is expressed and the way in which it is resolved, or suppressed.’

Plowman (1980)

The development of Plowman’s observation could explain why many Australian military officers consider industrial relations as irrelevant to the Defence Forces. The military imperative of command, cemented in discipline and regimentation, should preclude any form of industrial conflict — conflict cannot occur because it is not allowed to occur. This is a fallacious argument because the proscription of strikes within the military merely eliminates a symptom of conflict and not its cause. Dissatisfaction is the real cause of conflict in the industrial relations’ context. Dissatisfaction over the perceived erosion in financial conditions of service cannot be eliminated by regulations and orders. Therefore the absence of strikes does not imply the absence of conflict in the form of dissatisfaction. Conversely, the right to strike does not mean that dissatisfaction will automatically develop.

Absence of the right to strike is not unique to the Australian military; state and federal public services, public safety organizations and most European military forces with lawful unions lack the right to strike. The Australian
Military differs from these bodies because it does not officially recognize the existence of industrial conflict within its ranks. However, there is little doubt that not all servicemen approve of the manner in which their remuneration is determined or with the actual amounts of pay they receive for their services. Last year a survey to determine Army Other Ranks’ attitudes indicated that pay was one of the main sources of grievance. Recently the media has commented on a high level of discontent amongst servicemen because of pay inequalities existing between the Defence Forces and civil industry. Although these symptoms lack the definition of strike action, there is still sufficient justification to support the view that a degree of conflict exists within the Australian Defence Forces.

If the Australian civil model of industrial relations is used as a guide, it will be seen that the recognition of industrial conflict is rapidly followed by a system for its regulation and diminishment. In a sense, the development of conflict is mirrored by the evolution of an industrial relations system in a continuous cycle of action and reaction. The existence of conflict in the Defence Forces is evidence of the existence of military industrial relations. The reasons why the system is obscure to most military officers is that it is administered outside the uniformed Services by Public Servants, and the pressures exerted by conflict to force the system to evolve are covert and well hidden within the Defence Forces’ administrative machinery. It is the aim of this article to reveal the existence and evolution of industrial relations within the military and to determine its most likely institutional form in the next decade. While unionism is but one element amongst many that comprise civil industrial relations, it is justifiably a subject of considerable concern to the military’s hierarchial rank structure and imperative of command. Therefore, the likelihood of military unionism in the 1980s, will also be determined.

The approach used will be the development of the convergence theme into a framework from which future military industrial relations can be extrapolated. The convergence theme, expressed in basic terms, is a hypothesis which states that the characteristics of the military have increasingly converged towards the properties typical of any large scale civil organization. Industrial relations is a specialist discipline so the article is prefaced with a short conceptual brief on the definition and composition of any industrial relations’ system and its regulatory processes. The discussion will include a description of how the system works and it will conclude with a summary of its characteristics for later comparison with the military model. The military model begins with a brief background on the procedures and organizations that have evolved to determine military remuneration. A comparison with the characteristics of the civil system is made to determine how close military industrial relations has converged. The likelihood of a system involving military unions is discussed and the next phase in the evolution of the military industrial relations’ system is outlined. The article will conclude with determinations on the convergence of the military towards the civil system, the future likelihood of military unions and the type of military industrial relations’ system that will most likely evolve in the next decade.

This article is based on the assumption that the Services will remain volunteer forces in their current peacetime roles.

**INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS — A BASIC UNDERSTANDING**

Industrial relations may be defined as all aspects of job regulation — the making and administering of rules which regulate employment relationships. The types of rules produced by the industrial relations system are procedural rules and substantive rules. Procedural rules govern the operation of the system and are derived to control conflict in a manner similar to a soldier’s rules of engagement. Substantive rules comprise such aspects as pay rates, pensions, hours of work, security and discipline which represent the tangible results of conflict.

An American writer developed a model of an industrial relations’ system that illustrates conceptually how a system works. He contends that any industrial relations’ system is comprised of certain actors, certain contexts, an ideology or ‘shared understanding’ between the actors which binds the system together, and a body of rules to govern actors on work related matters. The actors are the workers and their unions, managers and their organizations, and those government agencies concerned with work relations. The actors work
in an 'environmental context' which comprises the power relationships between parties, economic restraints, and the nation's legal framework.

The interaction between actors will determine the rules by which conflict is resolved and employment contracts negotiated. Unilateral rule determination was a feature of the United Kingdom in the early days of industrialization, when the employer determined wages and working conditions. Bilateral rule determination was a feature of Australia and America in the 19th Century when the employer was obliged to negotiate with workers collectivised into unions. Trilateral rule determination is a characteristic of most Western Democracies today, recognizing government as an equal participant along with unions and employers. Nevertheless, among these countries, two broadly different rule making processes are used; collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration.

Collective bargaining is the process of fixing the terms of employment and settling disputes arising from those terms, by direct negotiation between management and union. Both have the right to use economic coercion through strike or lockout. Collective bargaining does not prevent the Government from intervening, however, the onus is generally on the two adversaries to negotiate a settlement on issues outside the areas covered by government legislation.

Compulsory arbitration involves the establishment of a government body as a direct participant in the rule making process. The employer or union must submit their dispute to a government sponsored tribunal which has the power to hand down legally enforceable awards. Australia, in contrast to the United States and United Kingdom, uses the compulsory arbitration process. However, the process was not instituted to discourage collective bargaining.¹⁰

THE AUSTRALIAN CIVIL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS' SYSTEM

Compulsory arbitration in Australia is supported by government legislation which has established tribunals at state and federal levels. Each tribunal operates as a court-of-law, with legally defined powers and jurisdiction. The procedural rules which govern the tribunal's operation have evolved into industrial law as a separate and specialized discipline within the legal profession. The officials manning the tribunal have the status of Judges and Justices and the proceedings of the tribunal are similar to those of a civil court. The same legislation that establishes the tribunal also clearly defines the legal rights of the participants. The awards of the tribunal are legally enforceable employment contracts. Negotiated agreements achieved outside the tribunal through collective bargaining, can be certified by the tribunal and thereby become legally binding. The tribunal is the focal point of Australian industrial relations; the approaches of unions, employers and the government have evolved to service the tribunal. Each tribunal is supported by a specific law enacted to regulate industrial conflict and each of the nation's industrial laws stem from the Australian Constitution.

Section 51 of the Australian Constitution gave the Federal Government the power to regulate industrial relations: 'The Parliament shall subject to this Constitution, have powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth . . . (xxxv) . . . with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state.'¹¹ The legal instrument used to regulate industrial relations under the Constitution is the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904 plus sixty subsequent amendments. Some state governments had already enacted compulsory arbitration legislation at this time and the remainder followed with similar laws soon after. Commonwealth industrial law has the power to displace the awards of state tribunals or even state industrial legislation. Since the Armed Forces 'Industry' crosses state borders, only Commonwealth Law and tribunals will be discussed further in this article. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act was framed as the result of severe economic dislocation caused by industrial disputes, which confirms the thesis that conflict is the precursor to an industrial relations' system.

The Arbitration Act was introduced by a government led by Alfred Deakin, who described its purpose thus: 'We now substitute a new regime for the reign of terror by endowing the states with powers to impose . . . its deliberate will upon the parties to industrial disputes.'¹² This was a reference
The founders of compulsory arbitration in Australia realized that union participation in wage negotiations was essential if the system was to be viable. The second president of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Justice H. B. Higgins, emphasized the recognition of unions as a feature of the Australian arbitration system: ‘The system of arbitration adopted under the Act is based on unionism. Indeed, without unions, it is hard to conceive how arbitration could be worked.’

The Arbitration Act provides a number of benefits to unions registered under its jurisdiction. The ability of the federal tribunal to impose awards on employers (even concerning non-unionists) increased the power of unions in negotiating with employers. A small, financially-weak union can lodge a log of claims with the tribunal and thereby force the employer to negotiate, thus giving small unions not only the same industrial muscle as larger unions, but also legal equality with employers. Unions recognized under the Act also receive protection against the encroachments of other unrecognized unions. Not all unions are eligible for recognition and this is one of a number of serious jurisdictional limitations of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904.

The tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Act of 1904 is limited to industrial matters applicable to more than one state. Jurisdiction is also limited to those industries engaged in private commerce, thus precluding recognition of the public section as an ‘industry’ under the federal Act and unions representing school teachers and firemen have been denied registration for this reason. The federal legislation has a number of procedural limitations that diminish its effectiveness. A dispute must exist either as a strike or through a lengthy and costly procedure to serve a log of claims on employers. The awards of the tribunal are minimum wage levels, thus inviting unions to use industrial action to gain over-the-award payments. Accepting its limitations, the federal tribunal is still generally preferred, by both union and employers, to a system based solely on collective bargaining.

The tribunal established under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904 was the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which now exists as the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The Commission is charged with arbitration and conciliation. The Industrial Division of the Federal Court of Australia enforces the awards of the Commission. In addition to hearing award cases under its jurisdiction, the Commission determines the National Wage Case. The purpose of this case is to link all wages to a mobile economy. The Commission’s determinations become a benchmark for the remainder of the nation’s tribunals, thus ensuring that a degree of comparative wage justice exists throughout Australia. Over the years the Commission’s determinations have been a basic wage, minimum wage and cost-of-living wage adjustments. While the Commission has failed to devise a lasting national wage formula, it has succeeded in causing its determinations to ‘flow-on’ to all awards in Australia almost automatically. However, it is necessary for all industries to be linked with the Commission by law or through an intermediary tribunal for the flow-on to occur. There are three other federal tribunals subordinate to the Commission.

The severe economic dislocation caused by a dispute in the coal industry in 1949, resulted in the enactment of federal and N.S.W. state legislation to establish a Coal Industry Tribunal. Similarly, airline flight crew strikes in the mid 1960s crippled the nation’s air transport and led to legislation supporting a Flight Crew Officers Industrial Tribunal in 1966. The enactment legislation to regulate conflict in these two industries is evidence of the Government’s willingness to establish a special tribunal, if by so doing, conflict can be regulated. The establishment of an Australian Public Service (APS) Tribunal differed from the coal and airline examples, as conflict in the APS was potential and not actual.

The Federal Government became concerned in 1910 that delays in hearing APS grievances might erupt into a strike. The Government used its constitutional power to make laws on ‘matters relating to any Department of the Public Service . . . ’ to enact the Public Service Arbitration Act of 1911. The Tribunal formed under this legislation was the Public Service Arbitrator. The Tribunal is closely linked to
the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to the extent that it is considered that the APS Tribunal will eventually be absorbed into the Commission. Although not engaged in private commerce, the APS is recognized under the Arbitration Act of 1904 and APS unions enjoy the protection of the Federal Act because the Public Service Arbitration Act of 1911 provides the necessary recognition: ‘Employees in the Public Service...shall be deemed to be employees in an industry within the meaning of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904.’ The APS arbitration system is trilateral like the federal system, involving APS unions, the Public Service Board (as the Government management intermediary) and also indirect government participation as manager of the nation’s economy. The system operates under legislation and the Tribunal has judicial status. However, the APS Tribunal is dependent on the Commission for national wage determinations and it is also legally subordinate to the Commission. This leads to the conclusion that the APS system is a national industrial relations' sub-system.

The legislation supporting the APS sub-system lacks many of the procedural limitations found in the Arbitration Act of 1904. A union grievance can be heard by the Arbitrator as a dispute, without recourse to strikes or the lengthy process of serving a claim on the employer. The awards made by the Arbitrator are actual wages and not minimum wages, thereby eliminating the need for union militancy to achieve over-the-award payments. APS unions and the Public Service Board enjoy a reputation as skilled and sophisticated negotiators. However, the many advantages of the APS sub-system are mitigated by the high level of government control.

All tribunals are susceptible to government manipulation as they are obliged to work within an Act which can be altered by legislation. The political philosophy of the government will dictate its attitude towards the tribunal. While the awards of the Public Service Arbitrator are legally binding on the Public Service Board, Ministers of the Crown are entitled to appeal against awards to the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The awards and the results of appeals to awards must then be tabled before Parliament where they could be quashed. As one expert panel observed: ‘Whatever the extent of consultative and arbitral machinery, governments do finally determine, as their consciences dictate, the conditions under which their employees work.’ Generally, the operations of the system have circumscribed the actions of government and made direct involvement less likely and more politically unacceptable. However, government support for the maintenance of the APS industrial relations' sub-system (or any new equivalent sub-system) is still an essential requirement.

The medium for industrial regulation is the award. The industrial award defines both the work required of the employee and the remuneration required from the employer. It is in effect the employment contract. Usually one award covers the bulk of the employees engaged in a common industry. However, most industries require a range of occupations, many of which will be regulated by separate awards. Union organization parallels the award structure, with craft unions representing specific trades, associations representing specific professions, and industrial unions representing common occupation industries. The APS is represented by a wide range of unions reflecting the diversity in APS occupations. Unions are quick to seek the protection of their industry's tribunal if their awards are threatened by an employer or if another union attempts to encroach on their membership. Australian unions would be loath to forego the legal protection of a tribunal to allow a new industrial union to recruit from any workforce employed in skills which they believe come within their own awards.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CIVIL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM**

A list of eight characteristics can be derived from the preceding brief overview for later comparison with the military version of Australian industrial relations:

- Conflict must exist in either actual or potential terms before an industrial relations' system will evolve.
- A trilateral rule determination system using the compulsory arbitration process, with provisions for collective bargaining, has proved well suited to the Australian social and industrial environment.
- Any industrial relation's trilateral system or sub-system, conducted at national level, will require the roles and identities of
unions, employers and arbitrators to be mutually agreed and clearly defined by an Act of Parliament.

- A link must exist between any industry and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission either by an intermediate tribunal or through legislation.

- A government's position on the formation of a new industrial relations' sub-system would depend on its own political philosophy, the attitude of the civil union movement, and the degree of conflict existing in the new industry.

- The formation of a new sub-system in the federal public sector will be accompanied by a large number of government controls. However, governments have been reluctant to invoke powers detrimental to a tribunal's effectiveness.

- Unions could oppose the formation of new unions representing work force skills seen as relating to existing awards. Since most unions are protected by law, a new union(s) could face a lengthy court battle before its award was determined to be unique.

- The APS industrial relations' sub-system has demonstrated a capacity to rapidly translate a grievance into a disputed award before the tribunal, without recourse to strike action.

The overview has intentionally concentrated on the APS sub-system because it is currently used as the Defence Forces' link with the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and because the APS and the Defence Forces have a common employer. The similarity that exists between the APS and the military make it likely that any convergence that does occur, will be directed towards a type of APS model sub-system.

THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

The rules and regulations which govern all aspects of financial conditions of service, stem from the Defence Act which reserves the right of the Government alone to make determinations. In this sense the military's unilateral system differs considerably from the civil tri-lateral system. However, the procedures used by government in making determinations, have developed over the years to a point where comparison with the civil model now becomes possible.

Traditionally, military remuneration has been based on the paternalistic ideal of 'serve us well, do as you are told and we will look after you', and this is the basis for a contractual agreement between the serviceman and his government employer. It should be noted that, in common with the civil unilateral system of the 19th Century, it is the employer who decides what is expected of the employee and what constitutes his own obligation to that employee. The serviceman is in a position of 'virtual rightlessness', with the exception of his own decision to accept the informal contract by the act of enlistment. The soldier-scholar, General Sir John Hackett, emphasized the one-sided nature of the contract: 'The military contract demands the total and almost unconditional subordination of the interests of the individual should the group require it.' The Australian Army Law Manual Section 13 clearly confirms the soldier's unique legal position in the civil sense: 'By the common law no engagement between the Crown and any member of the Forces in respect of services past, present or future can be enforced in any court of law ....'

Various governments over the years have seen their obligation to 'look after you' in different ways. Traditionally they were based on the perceived needs of the serviceman. These needs have included clothing, housing, food, medical care and cash payments. Cash payments provide an example of the paternalism embodied in the system. It was not until after World War II that any attempt was made to relate military wages to the civil standard. Even then comparison with civil salaries and leave benefits was difficult as military pay was based on a daily rate (on the principle that servicemen are technically on
duty 365 days of the year). The daily pay rate included such features as Active Pay, Service Disability Allowance, Marriage Allowance, Uniform Maintenance Allowance and a hidden deduction for the cost of rations and quarters. This complex system often disguised relatively low levels of service income when compared with civil salaries. In this sense it may have prevented conflict as it was difficult for the dissatisfied serviceman to find the source of his dissatisfaction. However, a series of government sponsored inquiries over the past three decades have almost eliminated the ‘needs’ criteria, and comparison between military and civil remuneration is now possible.

The financial conditions of service, devised for the Australian Permanent Army (formed in 1947), were the result of a Parliamentary Working Group referred to as the Dedman Committee. The Dedman Committee adopted the Commonwealth Public Service annual basic wage as the base point for the determination of military remuneration. Government acceptance of the Dedman Committee Report committed subsequent governments to the policy that pay and conditions in the Armed Forces should reflect community standards. The Dedman Committee tied military pay determination to the decisions of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, using the APS Tribunal as the intermediary; as a result the Defence Forces have received the ‘Flow-on’ from national wage cases.

Low Service manning levels, caused by the military’s inability to attract sufficient recruits, led to the appointment of a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry in 1958 (the Allison Committee) and a Departmental Pay Review in 1964. While improved financial conditions of service resulted from these inquiries, their recommendations did not deviate from the principle of rigid wage relativities with the civil sector. Consequently, the system of military wage fixation became increasingly complex. The findings of an Interdepartmental Committee in 1968 confirmed the failure of inflexible civil wage relativities as a principle for determining military remuneration.

By the late 1960s servicemen were bewildered and dissatisfied with a military pay system that was too tightly aligned to civil standards to acknowledge the importance of military rank, and by frequent changes in wages, as the system chased the elusive civil equivalent. In late 1969, military officers lost their recently won (1964) equivalent salary status with the APS professional level and this demotion in status was bitterly resented. The Government had decreed that they should be aligned for pay purposes with the clerical and administrative division of the APS. A steady stream of comment began to appear in the press concerning the growing wave of Defence Force dissatisfaction. Questions were asked in Federal Parliament and the Government quickly responded to the conflict by the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry into the ‘Financial Terms and Conditions of Service for Male and Female Members of the Regular Armed Forces’ — the Kerr-Woodward Committee.

The Kerr-Woodward Committee differed from previous inquiries. Manpower attraction was included as a topic for consideration, but secondary to the main aim of developing a viable uniform system for determining financial conditions of service. The terms of reference challenged the basic principle of wage fixation relative to wages paid for civil skills: ‘To review ... the significance of rank and military skills and the implications of the concept of automatic application of civilian wage adjustments’. The Committee was unique in its wealth of industrial relations expertise. The first Chairman was Mr Justice K. R. Kerr, a Judge of the Industrial Court. Kerr left the Committee in 1972 to take up an appointment as Chief Justice of N.S.W. He was replaced by Mr Justice A. E. Woodward, also a Judge of the Industrial Court. The approach taken by the Committee was the norm for civil industrial relations’ inquiries, however, it set a precedent for military reviews. It was also the first time that the opinions of servicemen were actively solicited, although the Committee still refused to accept collective submissions from servicemen.

The Committee was appointed in October 1970 and submitted its final report in December 1972. The proceedings of the Committee were recorded in six reports and all recommendations were accepted by the Government. The results of the Kerr-Woodward Committee can be summarized into six areas of significant change:

- An annual salary along civil lines replaced the complex daily rate-of-pay package.
A clearly identifiable service allowance, to compensate for the disabilities of service life, was to be instituted.

Broad-banded six tier other rank pay levels were to replace the complex skill margins.

Service pay determination was to, wherever possible, reflect civilian wage fixing principles; at the same time recognizing that these principles may have to be adapted to the special circumstances of the services. Services were linked generally to the APS under the 'Common Employer' principle, while the Services' uniqueness was recognized by the 'Armed Forces Industry' principle.

Work study based on job evaluation was to preface any attempts to establish comparability either within the 'Armed Forces Industry' or with the APS.

An officer salary scale, recognizing the notion of a 'profession-of-arms', was to be linked to APS professional awards and not the administrative and clerical officer stream.

While the Committee's recommendations represented a major change to military wage determination, the results were predictable. The problem of establishing wage relativities, accurately reflecting the skills performed, had absorbed the attention of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission since the early 1960s. The solutions recommended by the Committee reflected the prevailing attitudes of the Commission in the early 1970s.

The Committee's recommendations removed much of the Defence Forces' discontent, but at the same time new areas of potential conflict were introduced. Moscos noted that the acceptance of salaries, in lieu of the complex pay package, has far reaching consequences: '... a salary system would set up an employer-employee relationship at variance with prevailing military norms'. A less conceptual observation was made on the British change to a salary structure in 1970: 'It provides the basis for the more rapid development of a sense of relative deprivation if service salaries are perceived to fall behind civil levels'. The area of potential conflict which is likely to have far-reaching consequences, is the contrast in the 'Common Employer' principle with the 'Armed Forces Industry' principle. At what point does a military pay matter extend past comparability with the APS to become unique to the 'Armed Forces Industry', and who decides? The Kerr-Woodward Committee represents the latest external inquiry to make significant changes to military remuneration policy.

Over the past decade a number of changes have taken place within the Defence Forces' structure to implement remuneration policies. Formerly it was the responsibility of a Treasury Finance Committee to advise on Service financial conditions. This Committee was abolished in the early 1970s and replaced by a Defence (Conditions of Service) Committee within the Department of Defence. The Committee became the main source of advice to the Minister of Defence who had acquired the legal powers over Service pay and conditions, formerly held by the Treasurer. The Committee is chaired by a public servant and two of its five members are public servants. The other three members are the Service Chief's of Personnel. New policy branches were established within Department of Defence (Central Office) with specific departmental responsibilities for service remuneration. One of these branches is titled the Defence Force Industrial Branch. There is a very noticeable role similarity between the defence industrial organization and the industrial relations' sections of most large Australian companies. An important internal initiative was an interdepartmental policy committee's recommendation in 1972 which led to the appointment of the Committee of Reference for Defence Force Pay (the Coldham Committee).

The Committee of Reference for Defence Force Pay is a neutral permanent body charged with advising the Government on matters relating to financial conditions of service. The Committee is chaired by a Deputy President of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (currently Mr Justice P. A. Coldham) with a Conciliation Commissioner and a retired senior service officer as members. The link between the military and civil systems was intentional; the Committee's membership was designed to 'bring . . . all the principles and practices employed within the (civil) conciliation and arbitration system. This in turn brings the same judgements and assessments within that system to bear on Defence Force issues'. The Committee's independent reviewal role makes it appear similar in function to an arbitration tribunal, however, there are a num-
ber of limitations placed on its operations that mitigate this view:

- It is a recommendatory body without the judicial powers of a civil tribunal.
- The Government is not legally bound to accept the Committee's recommendations but it is committed to stating its reasons for any rejection of the Committee's proposals.
- Representations made by individual servicemen on specific matters under investigation are invited. Collective representation is still prohibited.
- The Committee can only investigate those matters referred to it by the Minister of Defence or his delegate, the Secretary for Defence. A mechanism does exist for a Service Chief of Personnel to refer matters to the Committee on behalf of the Minister.

The Committee can be viewed as a compromise arrangement in lieu of a conventional civil tribunal. It provides for employer control to be maintained through its referral mechanism whilst avoiding a collective adversary relationship (unions vs government), and it also restrains the Armed Forces from becoming a precedent marker in employment conditions. At the same time the Services can rely on a source of rule making that is external to the departmental bureaucracy. As one anonymous observer has noted: 'The procedural rules that determine the Committee's operations, reflect a masterly piece of bureaucratic compromise'.

The combined effect of the Kerr-Woodward Committee and the Committee of Reference did not change the military's unilateral rule determination system because only the procedures were modified and not the system itself. The military's industrial relations' system had converged significantly towards the civil model in the early 1970s, but it had then stopped. The military's work value case in 1980 was the next indication that further convergence was still possible.

In 1980 the Army, Navy and Air Force circumvented established procedures by making a submission direct to the Committee of Reference. This act was unusual in that it did not go through the Defence Central Conditions of Service Committee or the Industrial Division who, under normal circumstances, form the liaison link with the Committee of Reference. The reasons for this deviation are not fully known and what little information that is available, cannot be substantiated.

The purpose of the submission was to present the Services' recommendations on the principles and concepts they saw as 'being the necessary basis from which an equitable and just remuneration package, appropriate to the Defence Force of the 1980s should be derived'. The submission argued that the unique nature of Defence Force employment (Armed Forces Industry principle) made comparison with the APS (Common Employer Principle) inappropriate. The submission recommended 'that the Defence Force be accorded a discrete and viable salary structure to complement its status as an independent, unique and cohesive "industry"'. The case put forward to justify breaking the APS relativity was based on the problems of attracting and retaining manpower, recognition of its uniqueness as an industry, and the inequalities caused to pay comparability with the APS. Cases prepared for the purpose of breaking the wage relativity of one group of workers from another are common occurrences in the civil system. The Association of Professional Engineers in 1964 and Journalists in 1967 used grounds similar to the Tri-Service submission; therefore in a civil context the submission is not unique in its objective or in its arguments.

Australia, like most Western Democracies, keeps the military under rigid civil control. The Secretary for Defence is responsible for the administration (including remuneration) of the Defence Forces. It has been his prerogative to advise the Minister and the Committee of Reference on financial conditions of service. The Tri-Service submission challenged this prerogative, not only by ignoring the Secretary's industrial organization, but also by pressing the Committee of Reference to accept an arbitral role between themselves and presumably the Secretary's organization. The Tri-Service submission is explicit in its intent: 'As the Defence Forces has no access to the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and its associated Conferences, the Services see the Committee of Reference carrying out, on behalf of the Defence Forces, the roles and functions that those bodies fulfil for the general industrial community'.

The appeal for a civil style arbitrator reveals conflict between the uniformed services and
their public servant administrators. Also revealed in the appeal was the Services' awareness of the Committee of Reference's favoured status with the Government. The Minister for Defence has declared his confidence in the Committee and he has acknowledged publicly that he views the Committee's role as analogous to that of the civil arbitration tribunals. The Committee could achieve a neutral arbitral position if the restraints in the rules for referral are lifted and if its determinations are given judicial status making it equivalent in status to the APS Arbitrator.

The Tri-Service submission was countered by a submission from the Secretary's industrial organization, thus confirming that conflict does exist. Predictably, this submission opposed any change to the 'Common Employer' principle: 'We believe the (Kerr-Woodward) Committee saw . . . (the) principle of comparability in salaries between the Defence Forces and the APS as a permanent feature of Defence remuneration'. The employment circumstances of the military were acknowledged to be unique, but not enough to warrant acceptance of the 'Defence Forces Industry' as the predominant principle. The need for an arbitrator was abruptly denied; the existing referral rules were considered satisfactory and any increase in the Committee powers could be viewed as an infringement on the Minister's prerogative. The opposition to the Tri-Service case is tantamount to that of an employer.

The role of the Service Chief's of Personnel illustrates the role-conflict which can occur if the identity and interests of employer and employee are not clearly defined. The Chiefs must have approved the Tri-Service submission because it was prepared by their own staff, yet the counter-submission was approved by the Defence (Conditions of Service) Committee to which they were members. Their role in the incident remains unclear. This begs the question of how feasible is it for the Services to act as the serviceman's representative? The main characteristic of a union is that it is constrained only by the interest of its members. The Services, in their self-appointed representative role, must also comply with government policy. Should policy become contrary to the serviceman's interests, the representative role will automatically cease. However, the Government may consider the maintenance of the Services' representative role as being in its own best interests, in which case it could support the independence of the Services.

The Tri-Service submission is unlikely to change the unilateral rule determination system; however, it does indicate the existence of conflict and it provides the faint outline of a trilateral system. The Services have indicated a willingness to serve as representatives of the workforce; the Defence industrial organization has acted (although not recognized in this role by the Services) the role of employer, similar to the Public Service Board; and it is possible for the Committee of Reference to achieve arbitral powers. Conceptually, the basis for a trilateral rule determination system employing an arbitration process, has now been introduced.

**CONVERGENCE OF MILITARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TOWARDS THE CIVIL SYSTEM**

The events of the last decade are significant, not because they changed the military's industrial relations system, but because they started a chain of events which could see the system changed in the future. The Government is still the sole authority for any change to financial conditions of service and the serviceman still has no legal rights in the employment contract. Change has occurred exclusively in the procedures used to decide financial conditions of service.

The appointment of the Kerr-Woodward Committee and the acceptance of its recommendations can be considered a convergent trend towards the civil model of industrial relations. The Committee was formed as a Government reaction to conflict (widespread dissatisfaction), thus following the evolutionary pattern of conflict and regulation evident in the development of the civil system. The Committee's expertise in civil industrial relations and their use of a methodology familiar to civil tribunals, ensured that the military problem would receive a civil solution. The abandonment of a complex remuneration package, in favour of a civil style salary, was clearly a convergent action. The recognition of the Armed Forces as an 'industry' follows a long-standing civil precedent of segregating related employment areas into discrete industries to facilitate their industrial management. The replacement of a single civil-wage-relativity principle with the 'Common Employer' and
'Defence Industry' principles was a convergent action because the civil system uses potentially conflicting principles as guidelines in wage determinations.

The establishment of an Industrial Division and a Defence (Conditions of Service) Committee is an action convergent on the civil model because it recognizes the importance of industrial relations and focuses the employer's contractual obligations into a dedicated area of management. The Committee of Reference could be considered a divergent action because it was accepted in lieu of a civil style arbitration tribunal. It could also be described as convergent because of its composition and its neutral function.

The Tri-Service submission is clearly a convergent action because it has identified the potential military participants in a civil trilateral rule determination system using an arbitration process. The arguments both for and against the submissions were very similar to those used in civil tribunals.

FUTURE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND UNIONISM

The ability of the military industrial relations system to regulate conflict will determine whether or not convergence towards the civil model will continue. The history of the civil system has shown that while the trilateral system using an arbitration process is stable, the procedures used by the system (such as wage formulas) change often. Economic fluctuations — workforce skill rearrangements caused by technology and variations in societal values, constantly produce new areas of conflict. There are very few dislocating pressures on the civil workforce that do not flow into the Defence Forces. It is reasonable to assume that the military system will be constantly tested and when it proves incapable of coping with conflict, it will evolve into a system capable of handling the new pressures.

Conflict exists between the uniformed Services and the Department of Defence Industrial Branch. The issues under dispute are known to all parties and the decisions required by the Committee of Reference and the Government are quite clear. In this respect, the argument on pay principles between two statutory bodies infers that the conflict is bureaucratic in nature. There is no way of knowing with certainty if the issues cited by the Services are the main sources of dissatisfaction within their ranks. If the Services have gauged the attitudes of their members correctly, then the resolution of the bureaucratic conflict should result in the elimination of dissatisfaction. Unions have a direct link to their members and therefore the identification of troublesome issues is relatively simple. The Services are insulated to a degree from their members by a rank system — the boss is also the union representative. Theoretically the military does have an advantage over the civil system in that the identification of morale problems is a function of command, therefore, it is conceivable that over a period of time, the sources of dissatisfaction may be accurately communicated to the Service Chiefs. Whether or not servicemen will accept the delay inherent in the military system, or even accept the Service Heads as their representatives, remains unknown.

Military industrial relations still has a long way to go before it resembles the civil system. The formation of military unions is but one of many issues that would have to be resolved before the military system assumes all of the characteristics of its civil counterpart.

The establishment of unions is only likely to occur if conflict becomes so great that no other alternative exists for its regulation. Unions become a last resort, not only because collectivism threatens the military imperative of command and government conservatism; but also because servicemen themselves have been reluctant in the past to accept unionism. While past performance does not preclude the acceptance of unionism in the future, it does suggest that an option other than unions would be more attractive. Even if conflict overcome conservative opposition, a number of problems would still exist.

A union would have to be devised which met the requirements of multi-faceted Defence Industry and a diverse workforce. A single 'industry' union would be hard pressed to resolve differences that exist between services and between potentially conflicting elements within a single service, eg. combat arms versus support services. The attitudes of senior officers and non-commissioned officers who accept the imperative of command may differ significantly from junior officers and soldiers whom have yet to come to terms with the imperative. A Defence Industry union would have to adopt arbitral powers to resolve divisive issues before
it could project a cohesive policy. The dissatisfaction caused by internal arbitration would diminish the union's effectiveness.

Another alternative would be to form craft unions based on the specific employment functions performed within the industry, eg. officer unions (foremen's unions, supervisor associations) and soldier skill unions (drivers, clerical and combat etc unions). This approach would be less divisive than the single industry union as it would allow each union to attend to its own interests. However, while an industry union would have minimal opposition from civil unions, military craft unions may not be acceptable. The employment structure of the RAAF and RAN are closely aligned to civil trades. The Army employs less than 15 per cent of its other ranks personnel in employments unique to the military, while the remainder work in areas with civil trade equivalents. It is possible that civil trade unions would refute the 'unique-to-the-military' notion and consider the formation of military unions, in trade areas common to their own, as an encroachment. Since the Conciliation and Arbitration Act provides existing unions with a degree of legal protection, it is reasonable to foresee a long period of litigation preempts the introduction of military craft unions. However, the union issue is overshadowed by the dimensions of the legal obstacles.

The establishment of a formal trilateral industrial relations' system could not occur without government support. The system requires a legal framework which recognizes the employment contract as legally binding between servicemen and presumably the Department of Defence (as the Government's management intermediary). The powers of the Committee of Reference or a similar body would have to be increased in law if it is to have the same judicial status as the APS Arbitrator. The military uniqueness from other industries is a strong argument for framing its own industrial relations' sub-system. However, the same arguments exclude it from the jurisdiction of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission because the military is not a commercial enterprise nor is it closely affiliated with a commercial organization. The only way that these problems can be overcome is by the enactment of a 'Defence Forces Conciliation and Arbitration Act' along similar lines as the Public Service Arbitration Act. As this type of an Act would recognize unions as an essential participant, it is axiomatic that regulations and orders made under the Defence Act, which prohibit collective representation, would be withdrawn. Since it is clear a trilateral system is within the Government's power, it begs the question of whether or not the Government would be prepared to sanction the required legislation.

The Defence Forces, like the APS, lack 'strategic position'. In peace there is very little the Defence Forces can do that will result in the Australian public bringing pressure to bear on the Government to the extent that a special Act of Parliament is raised. The coal strikes and airline stoppages, which led to legislation in support of separate trilateral sub-systems in each industry, were provoked by unions with considerable strategic position. It may be that a Defence Force known to be extremely dissatisfied has a reduced deterrent capability and therefore becomes a matter of strategic importance; although this argument loses a lot of its impact, from the community's point of view, in an era of no perceived threat to nation security, and by the fact that any increase in Defence spending must be at the expense of other government programs such as health, welfare and education, or by increased taxes. Failure to achieve recruiting targets and low rates of re-engagement usually result in a government reaction. Historically, in times of manning shortfalls, governments have increased wage and allowances (on a one-time basis) in a manner aimed at attracting entrants and also encouraging retentions. The use of this periodic 'safety valve' approach has usually been effective from the government's point of view, hence it must constitute a viable alternative to legislation. A Labor Government might be more sympathetic, however, it is doubtful they would support the required legislation should the trade union movement oppose it. Although the Government's reaction to an extremely dissatisfied Defence Force remains speculative, it is likely that dissatisfaction would have to reach critical proportions and all other alternatives exhausted before the required legislation was enacted.

In summary, while the civil model of industrial relations is notable for its evolutionary elimination of problems which have confronted its development, the number of obstacles which exist in the path of the military system suggest
that it will be some time before anything like the civil model develops, the military unions 
emerge. It is not possible to be more specific 
because the rate of convergence will be set by the 
level of conflict requiring regulation and since dissatisfaction cannot be quantified, the 
rate of convergence cannot be estimated. One 
method of slowing convergence is to identify an 
an alternative system that is capable of regu-
lating conflict without any severe modifications 
to the existing structure.

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
THE 1980s

The Tri-Service submission suggests a likely 
alternative to military industrial relations as it 
exists now and also to a legally constituted 
trilateral system with recognized unionism. The 
Government could condone the three Services 
acting on behalf of servicemen and allow their 
opposition to the Secretary of Defence's indus-
trial organization. The Government could 
increase the powers of the Committee of 
Reference by revoking the rules of referral. By 
accepting a policy to abide by the decisions of 
the Committee (which it is currently doing) and 
by using the Secretary of Defence to present the Government's case, as both employ-
er and in the public interest, the Government 
can achieve a degree of impartiality without the 
loss of any control over the Defence Forces. 
The system would be trilateral without union-
ism, regulated by a tribunal with a quasi-
judicial arbitral function. It could not be 
considered an industrial sub-system like the 
APS because it would not be legally empowered to enforce awards and it would lack a direct 
connection with the Commission. However, it 
has a number of unique advantages for all participants which makes its acceptance likely.

While Servicemen have accepted their right-
lessness in the employment contract (albeit unwillingly) they have also been conditioned to expect their leaders to act in their best interests wherever possible. Leaders have also been conscious of their responsibilities in respect to the needs of those under their command. The flaw in this rationale is that military leaders have lacked the influence required to effectively intercede on behalf of their subordinates. Prior to the Tri-Service submission mentioned previously recommenda-
dations made to the Committee of Reference represented the uniformed services' accom-
modation with the Secretary's industrial orga-
nization. The suggested trilateral variation 
allows the Service Heads to present the interests 
of their subordinates direct to the Committee 
of Reference regardless of the Industrial Branch's opposition. The effect of this new 
approach will be to reinforce the traditional 
military ethos without incurring any disadvan-
tage to the serviceman. Therefore, this new 
phase in military industrial relations is likely 
to receive the support of all ranks in the 
Defence Forces.

Governments have never been slow to rec-
ognize conflict or in introducing measures to regulate conflict. Therefore, it is not likely that a Government would oppose the establishment of the Committee of Reference as an arbitral body if such a move could stem Service dissatisfaction without any major change in existing legislation. The issue of unionism 
would be neatly sidestepped to the relief of a Conservative Government, whilst a Labor Gov-
ernment need not worry about an adverse reaction from the union movement.

The Services' role-conflict in the new system will be a significant limitation. The Services 
will have to relinquish their representative role when they are no longer able to pursue the interests of servicemen to the exclusion of other policy requirements. When this happens it is likely servicemen will look elsewhere for an organization to represent them and this organization could be a union. The path chosen by the Services will become increasingly diffi-
cult as defence costs arise. Therefore, while a modified trilateral system is a viable alternative to the civil system in the immediate future, the role-conflict limitation suggests that it is a temporary phase of unknown duration.

CONCLUSION

The basic structure of Australian military industrial relations has not changed. The mil-
itary's continued reliance on unilateral rule determination is in sharp contrast to the civil 
trilateral system. The serviceman is still unable to influence the terms of his employment contract which still remains a government prerogative. Since the basic system of military industrial relations has only one of the char-
acteristics of the civil system, it has not converged structurally towards a trilateral sys-
tem. However, the common characteristic is conflict which is the motive force for the
The system will be trilateral, using arbitration, concept and its practical inception is imminent. Industrial relations already exists as an accepted conflict which do not need either legislation or extent where a civil trilateral system is adopted arbitration. Should the military converge to the a trilateral system which relies on compulsory proportion of significant procedural changes that have evolution of industrial relations. The number variations still exist for the regulation of nature of the obstacles in the path for its evolutionary elimination of problems which have confronted its development, the number of nature of the obstacles in the path of convergence suggest that a military trilateral system with recognized military unions, will not occur in the foreseeable future. This view is supported by the observation that a number of options still exist for the regulation of conflict which do not need either legislation or unions.

The next phase in the evolution of military industrial relations already exists as an accepted concept and its practical inception is imminent. The system will be trilateral, using arbitration, with the Tri-Services acting on behalf of servicemen's interests (in lieu of a union); the Secretary of Defence Industrial Branch acting as the Government management intermediary (similar to the industrial role of the Public Service Board); and the Committee of Reference for Defence Force Pay moving into the role of neutral arbitrator (comparable with the APS tribunal). The system will not have the legal support of legislation, however, it will have the Government's commitment to abide by the determination of the Committee of Reference, thus giving awards quasi-judicial status. This variation to the civil system is dependent on the ability of the Tri-Services to maintain their self-appointed representative role and on continuous Government support. These uncertain qualifications suggest that this alternative is a temporary phase of unknown duration in the evolution and convergence of military industrial relations.

NOTES

2. Section 66 of the federal Public Service Act makes any officer 'directly fermenting or taking part in any strikes' liable to summary dismissal, such an act being considered 'an illegal action against the peace and good order of Australia'. Australian Industrial Relations, p 107. It is noted that Section 66 has not been applied in the last decade and public service strikes are on the increase.
3. Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and West Germany have legally recognized military unions. Only Swedish forces have a legal right to strike on matters other than selection, tenure or retirement. From A. J. R. 'Is There A Place for Unionism in the Australian Defence Force?' Australian Staff College, 28 September 1979. Annex A.
5. Soon after the Minister of Defence announced a work value pay increases in late August 1981, the Melbourne Age, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Canberra Times all contained comment alleging that the Defence Forces were 'grossly dissatisfied' over the result of the work value case. The Minister of Defence was obliged to make a public 'clarifying' statement in September 1981 for the purposes of correcting 'sometimes confusing reports in the civil media on the latest pay increase'.
6. Statistics were derived from CGS Exercise 1980, Personnel Branch Data Handbook, 'Manpower Problems through the 1980's.' Table 12.
9. Dunlop, J. T. Industrial Relations Systems. Holt, New York, 1958, p 7. Dunlop's conceptual model has been criticized within the academic community as being overly simplistic. However, most writers concede that the approach has provided many insights into the subject. Australian Industrial Relations, p 6.
10. One Australian authority on industrial relations noted that the founders in Australia of compulsory arbitration hoped that it would achieve the recognition of collective bargaining and a more complete organization of employers and employees together with the regulation of collective bargaining so as to protect the interests of the community. Walker, K. E. Australian Industrial Relations Systems. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1971, p 436.
11. Section 51 provides the framework for the regulation of industrial matters. However, the Government's authority to make arbitration compulsory derives from Section 98 xxxix, which allows Parliament to legislate on 'matters incidental to the execution of the powers (Section 51) assigned it under the Constitution.'


13. O'Dea, R. J. A Guide to Industrial Relations in Australia. West Publishing Company, Sydney, 1967, p 1. O'Dea notes that at the time of federation, industrial relations were controlled by state legislations in England Courts, and to this day a collective bargaining agreement is not legally enforceable and trade unions have their illegal status at Common Law only suspended by statute in the United Kingdom.


17. The Federal Tribunal has failed throughout its history to find a durable national-wage formula 'which will be industrially acceptable, economically viable and administratively feasible.' The latest attempt was wage indexation (1975-81) which was intended to adjust wages regularly in accord with movements in a price index. The system was abandoned by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in mid-1981 mainly because of the support of unions, employers and the Government was not forthcoming. Australian Industrial Relations, pp 249-271.

18. Australian Industrial Relations, p 117.

19. Australian Industrial Relations, p 110. If the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration are adopted, the APS Tribunal will be absorbed into the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission as a separate industry panel.


21. Caiden, G. E. Public Employment Compulsory Arbitration. University of Labour and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1971, pp 87-89. Caiden described the Federal Labor Party as believing the Government should be a model employer by leading the way in compensation, pension schemes and increased industrial democracy. 'It should offer liberal conditions of employment to force other employers to follow suit.' Caiden observed the Liberal-Country Coalition as having no formulated industrial policy other than its general disposition towards labour and unionism. The Coalition has been prepared 'to let the system regulate itself without much direction from above.' Its main concern has been government costs and inflationary pressures. Caiden's observations of 1971 have been substantiated by the actions of the Labor Government in 1972-1975 and the Coalition 1975.


23. The practical distinction between a 'trade union' and an 'association' is often blurred. In general, operational terms a trade union is regarded as an organization whose primary purpose is to protect the economic interests and employment rights of its members. An association is seen in a more general light, with less emphasis on industrial issues, and more on welfare and occupational interest matters. In the literature and official writings for many years were sometimes used in an interchangeable manner.

24. Defence Act Section 124(d), (da): The Governor-General is empowered to prescribe orders and regulations for the administration of the Defence Forces in relation to: 'the remuneration of members by way of salary, pay and allowances and otherwise'.


27. The quoted passage appears as a clarifying note to Section 13 in the Australian Law Manual. The current Director of Army Legal Services (BRIG ID Ewing) stated in 1978 that this note is supported by a number of judgements. However, it has no counterpart in civilian areas of employment.

28. Kerr-Woodward Committee Report 4, 1971, p 5: 'It is a method of expressing pay unique to the Services. It has no counterpart in civilian areas of employment.'


31. In 1964 Service Officers had been awarded substantial pay rises primarily because of an Arbitration Commission Decision to break the wage relativity that existed between professional engineers and clerical and administrative workers and engineers in the Professional Engineers' Case 1 and 2. By 1969 the relativity had been informally re-established because of pay rises received by the clerks and in this sense the Government decision recognized an existing situation: O'Dea, R. J. Principles of Wage Determination in Commonwealth Arbitration. West Publishing Corporation Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1969, pp 143-151.


33. Mr Justice Kerr was an acknowledged expert on work value as a wage principle and he was the author of 'Work Value.' Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1964. He was an advocate before the Commission on the much publicized Professional Engineers' Cases 1961-64.


37. Minister of Defence statement, 'Minister speaks on pay increase.' Army, No. 553, 22 September 1981, p 1.

38. Tri-Service Submission on Defence Force Remuneration to the Committee of Reference for Defence Pay relating to matters referred to the Committee by the Minister of Defence on 22 July 1980.

39. Tri-Service Submission, 'Forward'.

40. Tri-Service Submission, Part 6, Paragraph 6(e) (9.1).

41. Tri-Service Submission, Part 6, Paragraph 6(e) (43).

42. O'Dea, R. J. Principles of Wage Determination, p 137, 154.

43. Tri-Service Submission, Part 5, Paragraph 5.1.

44. Minister of Defence statement, 'Minister speaks on pay increase.' Army, No. 553, 24 September 1981, p 1. ... the Defence Force interest in this matter are dealt with by a completely independent tribunal...'. The interests of all members of the Defence Force will continue to be safeguarded by the Departmental review machinery and the Independent Committee of Reference.

45. Industrial Relations Submission to the Committee of Reference for Defence Force Pay, March 1981.

46. Industrial Division Submission, p 7.

47. Industrial Division Submission, p 10.
48. The issue of military unionism surfaced briefly in 1974 with an attempt by a retired Army officer to form a servicemen's association which was reported in the press — 'Armed Forces' trade-union plan', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 August 1977, p 9. The first Defence Minister in the Whitlam Labor Government, Mr Lance Barnard, indicated that he favoured a servicemen's association acting in a representative role: Barnard L. *The Military in the Modern World*, Towards a New Australia. Victorian Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1972, pp 20-38. However, the union issue never achieved much support and by 1977 the initiatives of the early 1970's had moved into obscurity.

49. Existing unions may object to the formation of a Defence Forces union because of its size. Based on existing Service strengths, a Defence Force Industry union would have an eligible membership that would make it Australia's eighth largest. There have been instances where smaller unions opposed the amalgamation of other unions on the grounds that the large union groups could dominate the national union forum (Martin, R. M., p 146). Since 74 per cent of Australia's unions (registered in 1977) have memberships fewer than 5,000, a large Defence Industry union could be viewed as a threat. Mr R. J. Hawke (then President of ACTU) indicated in a letter to MAJ B. Dugdale in 1974 that he did not see a place for an Armed Forces Union within the trade union movement.


51. The two Australian Military Orders that would prevent the formation of unions within the Defence Force's ranks are AMR&O 307 and 310. However, the enactment of a Defence Forces Conciliation and Arbitration Act (similar to the APS Arbitration Act) would provide for unions. Since an Act takes precedence over orders regulations and instructions, the deterrent value of AMR&O 307 and 310 would be automatically voided.

52. This approach was applied successfully in 1958, 1964, 1968 and in 1973.

53. Rawson, D. W. *A Handbook of Australian Unions and Employee's Associations* (3rd ed). Australian National University Press, Melbourne, 1977, p 13: 'Trade unionists tend to regard the Labor Party as being a creation of the unions and therefore subject to their control'. This view is reinforced by the authors of *Australian Industrial Relations*, p 207: '...the historical dominance of the trade unions is still reflected in the ALP's rules and policy making bodies'.

### LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (continued from page 4)

e. I will observe with interest the participation of PR in its wartime role on Exercise KANGAROO 83, particularly as there is no published doctrine on the subject. It is also worth noting that other exercise participants are unlikely to have received any form of media awareness training.

f. Lt Col Roylance's problem with my views on censorship is one of selective reading. The remaining sentences in the same paragraph describe how the problem of the Argentinian bomb fuses could have been handled.

g. I totally reject the claim that the media would welcome accreditation in war. When I was researching for the article I canvassed opinions from a number of working journalists and invariably they were strongly opposed to accreditation. They were concerned that the Services would select a group of media 'camp followers' in war, circumstances that they felt ran contrary to the fundamental freedom of the Press. The two journalists cited in my article were the exception, not the rule.

h. Lt Col Roylance claims that 'defence PR policies are continuously under review and development'. I take this as being an oblique way of admitting that we still lack any formal doctrine on the subject. In his criticism of my article Lt Col Roylance has concerned himself primarily with the credibility problems of his Corps and with largely irrelevant claims that the article is dated. His failure to provide a satisfactory answer to the major issues raised in the article should demonstrate quite admirably to your readers my reasons for writing it in the first place.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEFEAT OF THE SINGAPORE STRATEGY

By Captain J.G. Clark, RA Inf.

ALTHOUGH it is 41 years since Singapore fell, many of the lessons learnt still have relevance today. Cooperation between Australia and her allies is more important than ever, especially since history has an uncanny knack of repeating itself.

The Singapore strategy had its genesis with the acceptance of Article 19 of the Washington Treaty of Limitation of Naval Armaments on 6 February 1922. The terms of this agreement stipulated that Great Britain and the United States of America would have naval parity, whilst Japan was only allowed 60 per cent of their strength. Clearly this indicated a change of policy on Britain’s part as, not only did she have to accept a greatly weakened position in the Far East, she also appeared to welcome a one-power standard. The conference ended and it was generally felt that the Japanese had ‘greatly lost face’. Therefore, a suitable site had to be found for the positioning of a naval base to guard the Far East against a potential Japanese attack. Hong Kong had been the main naval base in the Far East prior to the First World War, but it was realised that its facilities were inadequate and so it was discounted.

Against this background, it was decided in 1921 to plan Far Eastern Imperial strategy on the basis of a battle-fleet operating from Singapore.

It was argued that such a fleet would deny the Japanese access to India and Australia and, in this way, they, and the South West Pacific area in general, would be secure against any remote possibility of a Japanese invasion. If such territorial integrity could be guaranteed to Australia, then her acquiescence in Imperial defence plans was logical.

The preliminary work on the Singapore naval base began in 1923 and the original plan called for its completion by 1933; however, as many historians have noted, the development of the base was beset by difficulties. In Britain, the Labour Government came to power and, in accordance with his party’s policy on defence, the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, announced that work on the base was to cease. He knew that the development of Singapore was important for strategic reasons but felt that the moral value of international conciliation outweighed this consideration. Besides, he also thought Singapore’s development would have a bad effect:

on general foreign policy and we should almost inevitably drift into suspicion and competition of armaments in the Far East ...

The Labour Government was defeated after its resignation in November 1924 and work on the naval base in Singapore re-commenced in 1925 with the announcement of the provision of £11,800,000 for new works. It was still hoped that the base would be ready by 1932 and thus secure a large degree of protection for the Far East. However, development was not going to be as smooth as planned, as Churchill announced in 1928 that there was not expected to be any war for ten years. This had the effect of relegating all Defence works to a very low priority and the situation was further exacerbated in 1929 when a Labour Government took office once again.

However, in 1931, there was another change of Government in Britain and it was announced that the Singapore base would be ready in 1935. The fact that it was not officially opened until 1938 is something that this article will further examine. It is interesting to note, however, that concurrent with the announcement of its (then expected) completion date of 1935, the British press declared that:

It was the determined attitude taken by the dominions, especially Australia, that finally defeated the plots to sabotage the work ...

Consider this statement, however, with that of McCarthy who says:
Australia had reinforced the habit of obliging the United Kingdom when it spoke of Singapore.  

Hardly a determined attitude on the part of Australia! This agreement on Australia's part with the British Government's plans, can be directly linked to the similarity of policy shared by the then Labour (Britain) and Labor (Australia) Governments of both countries as they had almost identical philosophical outlooks on the possibility of the outbreak of war with Japan. Sir Phillip Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer argued that 'all present indications seemed to show that we should have freedom from war on an extensive scale for a good many years' and that consequently work on the base should be slowed down. Scullin agreed with this and argued that 'the world might become more sane in the future'. But if it did not, Australia was still secure.  

Against this background, the Singapore naval base continued to be developed, albeit slowly, and, as Keogh has noted, the British Government's defence policy (in the Far East) rested on the propositions that:

1. The Singapore base would be built and that it would provide a secure and adequate base for a British battle fleet.  
2. The British assurances that a battle fleet could and would be sent to Singapore if Australia's security was jeopardised by the situation in the Pacific could be accepted.  

It was on this basis, and an understanding of British intention, that led to Australia's acceptance of Sir Maurice Hankey's report which restated to Australia the principles of Imperial defence and argued that:

attack on its territory could only be undertaken by Japan and this, in our opinion, is never a likely contingency if an adequately defended base is maintained at Singapore.  

The 'adequately defended' base was completed in 1938 at a cost of £60,000,000 and 'the hub on which the big wheel of British imperial Far Eastern strategy now revolved, however creakily, was of enormous size and impressive complexity'.  

However, this was only the development of the base itself and it should be remembered that the strategy called for the British battlefleet to steam to Singapore and base itself there to repulse any Japanese attack. There were serious defects in the strategy which ultimately led to the surrender of Singapore and it is these defects that need to be examined in order to ascertain why the defeat of the strategy was inevitable. There is wisdom in hindsight and many historians have adequately mentioned the signs which seem to have been ignored, especially by Britain. It should be said in her defence, however, that she was concerned with the worsening developments in Europe and her concentration of priorities were on those that more immediately affected her.  

That the naval base could: 'accommodate with ease a combined British and American naval force', there was little doubt. The security of the base was another question, and without that, there could be no fleet. A legend had grown regarding Singapore and it became fashionable to refer to it as an impregnable fortress. This was a myth which grew because:

The world wanted to be sold Singapore. It wanted to believe Singapore was an impregnable fortress, a bulwark against Japanese aggression in the Pacific.  

In fact, so much was the myth accepted that Sir Earle Page, who was the Australian delegate in London, said as late as November, 1941: Singapore, heart of the British Empire, and Malaya, and other parts of the Far East, are being defended by troops from the United Kingdom, India, Canada and Australia. Enormous advances have been made which have made Singapore not merely impregnable but able if necessary to be the spearhead of a great offensive.  

From this it can be seen that much reliance was being placed on Singapore as the one place where Britain could make a stand and halt Japanese aggression. There were extensive seaward armaments consisting of 'five 15 inch, six 9.2 inch and sixteen 6 inch guns in emplacements'. It was therefore reasonable to assume that Singapore could be defended from a seaward attack. What was not planned for, however, was the possibility of an invasion from the North through the Malayan jungle and across the Johore causeway. As Simson says:

no permanent or field defences were planned or built in time against a possible landward attack.  

The possibility of a landward attack had been discussed, and discarded, as early as 1928
Consider this attitude in relation to Singapore as a fortress. Like a chain that is only as strong as the weakest link, the basic consideration for defence is all round defence. Singapore was unprotected to the North because the jungle was thought to be impenetrable. Yet this weakness was well known as 'a Japanese attack on Singapore became a stock exercise for students in British Staff Colleges'. Their findings were that an attack from the North would result in the capture of Singapore. Japanese students were also coming to the same conclusion at the Tokyo War College and, as a result of these rehearsals as Leasor has noted: ‘Japan had learned from every one; Britain learned from none’. Australia, was concerned with the Singapore strategy for the same reasons that Britain was concerned with Europe. The areas to worry about were those nearer home yet:

the Lyons Government still based its expanded naval programme on a general plan of Imperial defence strategy ... This was at the expense of the Army and Air Force and they maintained that: nothing short of an absolute guarantee that a fleet would be despatched within a clearly specified time after the outbreak of war, would justify the Australian Government accepting the view that Australia was only liable to sporadic attacks ... The naval emphasis and line of reasoning could only be sound if the Royal Navy was strong enough to guarantee security both East and West of the Suez. But, ‘all through the thirties, there was sufficient evidence to show that it was not’. Australia’s defence policy was in accordance with the British plans, yet even when the warning signs became more evident, Australia clung to the notion that she would be safe because of the Singapore strategy. This can be related to the fact that the United Kingdom constantly urged Australia to support the concept of Empire defence yet attempted to make sure that no British interests would suffer. Even when Chamberlain said that England could not fight Germany and Japan at the same time, Australia mildly replied (through Menzies) that a greater interest should be taken in British policy in the Far East.

It was not only Australia that was being placated, however, as General Percival (the Chief of Staff in Singapore) had written in 1937 to the War Office expressing doubt that the naval force could go to Singapore if conditions in Europe worsened. Therefore, the defence of the naval base would be quite inadequate and defences should be built up to ensure the success of the Singapore strategy. As Strabolgi has also noted: ‘the weakness of the whole position lay in the defence of the Malay Peninsula’. However, these warnings were ignored until it was too late to effectively do anything constructive. It should be emphasised that, in planning the defence of Singapore, it was envisaged that any attack could only come from the sea; however the fortifications pointed to the South. Singapore was attacked from the North and thus the basic assumptions made by the planners proved to be totally false. This premise led to other assumptions which, in the final analysis, proved disastrous, not only for the defenders of Singapore, but for the whole of the British Empire.

When it was realised that Singapore was inadequately defended to the North, some attempts were made to rectify the situation but even then ‘our work consisted chiefly in developing the defences of Singapore in accordance with a War Office plan’. ‘Thus the cost of defending the British Empire’s greatest outpost in the East was, in the last analysis, decided by some anonymous civil servant in Whitehall’.

At the same time war had occurred in Europe and British policy constantly shifted according to the latest threat. When Singapore’s situation worsened in 1940, Britain was engaged on many fronts. The Battle of Britain was raging and there was the threat of invasion from Germany. The Far East was threatened, too, but war had not yet broken out. Therefore, it was natural for Britain to be concerned with her own well-being and only pay lip service to the Singapore strategy. It was agreed that reinforcements were necessary but there were none to send. Churchill told his Chief of Staff, General Ismay on September 10, 1940 that:

The prime defence of Singapore is the fleet.
The protective effect of the fleet is exercise to a large extent whether it is on the spot or not ... This was only adding to public complacency as a reliance was being placed on the supremacy of British sea power at the expense of providing adequate Army and Air power. But — and
this was the dilemma which was realised too late — the promise of naval defences depended entirely on Britain's successful actions against Italian naval forces.20

In September 1941, the Japanese leaders for the capture of Singapore were chosen and it was decided that the best troops would be used for the Malayan campaign because it was essential for the whole plan that Singapore should fall.49 There were two reasons for placing such significance on Singapore. First, the Japanese recognised the geographic position and through its capture, knew that they could strike East to India and South to Australia and the Dutch East Indies. Second, and this reason goes back to the 5:5:3 naval agreement of 1921, Japan knew that Singapore was the corner-stone of the British Empire in the East. They also wished to humiliate the British so: 'all the oppressed peoples of Asia would be emancipated'.42

The situation was such that there could, unfortunately, be only one outcome, yet despite the worst fears of many: 'Singapore, alone of cities in the Far East, gave its inhabitants the illusion of security'. The Prince of Wales and the Repulse arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941 and gave hope to the island's inhabitants that she may yet be saved. With their destruction on 9 December, the illusion of Singapore's impregnability was also sunk as the premises on which her defence rested no longer existed. Yet right up until the previous day (8 December) the myth of Singapore had persisted. The Order of the Day said: We are ready . . . . our defences are strong and our weapons efficient'.44

When Singapore surrendered on 15 February, 1942, over 70,000 troops were taken prisoner and it 'was the biggest military disaster that had overtaken British arms since the war started.45 Indeed, in the foreword of Simson's book Singapore, Too Little, Too Late, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton said:

It has always been a mystery to me that no Royal Commission was set up after the war to investigate . . . . the tragic loss of the Malayan Peninsula and Singapore . . . .46

The loss of Singapore meant more than the defeat of a strategy. That a strategy had developed was undeniable. That it had failed through a combination of propaganda, reliance on a battle-fleet that never arrived, and the war in Europe and in the Middle East is also true. Of even more significance, however, was the fact that:

Yamashita, by his victory in Singapore, had cut the arteries of an empire, of all the European empire. On that Sunday, centuries of white supremacy began to bleed away . . . .47

This single act of surrender meant that in the relationship between the East and the West, things would never be the same again.48

NOTES
2. This translated to a ratio of 5:5:3 for Britain, the United States and Japan respectively. See J. Leasor, Singapore, New York, Doubleday, 1968, p. 69.
3. Ibid, p. 69.
4. Ibid, p. 70.
7. For example, Leasor, Op Cit, p. 71 refers to 'an extraordinary background of political myopia in Britain'; also J. McCarthy, 'Singapore and Australian Defence 1921-1942, Australian Outlook, Vol. 25, 1971, p. 180 who says: 'It is suggested that since 1923 the proposal to send the fleet to Singapore was considered with the ambiguity which is often reserved for a policy which is fundamentally known to be unsound'.
10. Ibid, p. 102.
11. Known as the 'ten-year no war' rule. The scheme allowed for advancement from day to day of the rule. Therefore, it became truncated and was not to end at all. It was abandoned as a concept in 1931.
15. J. McCarthy says these attitudes are recorded in CAB 32-91, Committee on the Singapore Base, Minutes of First Meeting, 16 October, 1930. Quoted in Ibid, p. 174.
17. CAB 21-386, Report by Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Committee for Imperial Defence, 15 November, 1934. Quoted in J. McCarthy, 'Australia and Imperial Defence; Co-operation and Conflict 1918-1939', Op Cit, p. 27.
22. I. Simson, Op Cit, p. 5.
THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEFEAT OF THE SINGAPORE STRATEGY

Captain Clark served as a Section Commander on SVN with 3RAR in 1967/68 and subsequently with the Special Air Service Regiment. He graduated from OCS Portsea in June 1970 and served in various appointments with 24 RAR. He was the Army Careers lecturer for South Australia from January-June 1977 and then took up an appointment as the Senior Instructor, Officer Training Wing 4 Training Group. A Staff posting with HQ 1 Division Enoggera, where he was also the Qld Secretary of CESRF, was followed by an appointment to Mat Br, AO.

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Reinhard Meyers (Bonn): "International paradigms, concepts of peace, and the policy of appeasement."
Joan Beaumont (Deakin): "Prisoners of War and privilege."
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INTRODUCTION

Many authors on this subject commit a form of intellectual incest; quoting the words and enunciating the thoughts of others so-called notable authors, who in turn earned their reputation in a similar fashion. Rarely does one find an original thought. I should know, for since we talked I have read a large number of articles in this vein. You asked me to give my views on the desirability, or otherwise, of making military history studies a separate and compulsory element of the ‘All Corps Officer Development Programme’ for the period between commissioning and attendance at the Command and Staff College. Your terms of reference allow me considerable latitude and, as you are well aware, the subject has given rise to a large number of differing viewpoints.

I intend that this essay shall provide yet another perspective on this topical issue but, in doing so, it is my intention to avoid that essayist’s habit of which I am so critical.

Reduction ad Absurdum . . . or An Absurd Deduction

‘There was once a little old lady whose home was near a hospital. Like most hospitals, this one was equipped with an auxiliary power generator which would automatically start up the moment the mains power failed; which was frequently. One day, as she sat in her rocking chair on the verandah, the meter man arrived to read her electricity meter.

‘And how yer bin goin’?’, he said.

‘Oh not too badly, but I do have a complaint to make about that dreadful machine at the hospital,” she replied.

‘Every time it starts up the lights go out!”

I mention this small anecdote to illustrate a number of important aspects of human nature pertinent to the study of military history. Firstly human beings will always attempt to analyse their past experiences in an effort to avoid ‘making the same mistakes twice’. As human beings, we feel compelled to find a reason for every observed phenomenon regardless of the paucity of data to support our hypothesis. The agnostic and atheist would contend that superstition and religion are a direct product of this desire for explanation. It is a desire which is inculcated into us from infancy. The whole of the early learning experience is based upon conversations with our elders and the drawing of conclusions from our observations. With education and the acquisition of the ability to read, a natural extension of this is to delve into the vast experience available in books. Any record of past events is history. History which deals with military matters, whatever you conceive them to be, is military history. Obviously because of the scope of the subject some authors have found further sub-categorization necessary by using such qualifying adjectives as early, late, operational and social.

Because it is human nature to tap into the wealth of experience available in books, the study of military history by persons with an interest in military matters is unavoidable. To debate whether or not it should be studied and whether it is of any value is academic nonsense espoused by persons who have failed to appreciate that, regardless of their viewpoints, people will always seek to draw conclusions from the experiences of others. In any event the argument is circular for invariably it is based on
using historical example to prove that the study of military history is or is not worthwhile. Unfortunately, as illustrated, we do not always arrive at valid conclusions. The reasons are many. Not only does self interest, bias and social conditioning affect the author in his selective gathering and processing of the facts, it also influences the reader in that he will read and perceive only what he wants to. Despite this, it can be said that the chances of arriving at a valid deduction are directly related to the size of the data upon which the deduction is based and the skill and experience of the person processing the data. The data upon which the little old lady based her deduction was flimsy and her processing skills in that particular area were minimal. It is an example of how the study of past events by the inexpert in a cursory and haphazard fashion is full of peril. Given the fact that the study of military history is unavoidable and given also the fact that such study, poorly conducted, could be extremely prejudicial to the national survival in time of war, is it not our duty, as leaders in this organization, to ensure that the study of military history is conducted in a manner that will provide the highest probability of arriving at a correct conclusion? Such an environment can only be created by conducting these studies on a formalized basis; with students being guided by experienced and knowledgeable specialists in this discipline. In this manner, when the lights go out, we will at least not blame the auxiliary generator.

Application to the Australian Army

Both the Canadian and the American Army include formal training in military history as a necessary part of officer professional development. The Canadian system involves all officers participating in formal studies up until the time they become eligible for Command and Staff College. Whilst at the college students deal with the subject in far greater detail. The rationale for this appears to be on the basis that all officers should receive some training whilst those at Staff College possess the necessary academic ability and higher motivation level for coping with more detailed study. I agree with these sentiments and believe that there is considerable merit in this approach.

The American Army has included formal training in military history in its officer development programme since the early 1970s. Their experience has shown that classes have to be compulsory and that the course must be an integral part of the officer qualification system with formal exams being set in order to provide the necessary incentive for students. Liberal academics will no doubt find both these aspects distasteful. The findings are, however, the result of considerable practical experience in attempting to foster military history studies in a modern army where numerous demands are made on a young officer’s time.

The American Army also examined whether the study of military history should be separated from other subjects of a military nature or whether it should be integrated into such things as tactics and strategy. Adopting the latter course was found to involve considerably more effort and skill on the part of the course organizers. It also runs the risk of both lecturers and students adopting a simplistic approach to the subject; particularly in the area of the practical application of the lessons of military history. There are also many other facets of military history, such as political, strategic, social and economic considerations, which need to be taught as well as those dealing with the strictly operational aspects. Whilst the detailed study of past battles can be instrumental in providing a better understanding of tactical principles, the study of military history should also be viewed as being a means of providing an officer a balanced perspective on all matters applicable to his profession; not only for those of an operational nature. As a consequence, it is concluded that the optimum situation would be to teach military history as a separate entity and to use it as an adjunct to other studies as well.

Obviously our concern should be one of ensuring that such studies yield the maximum constructive effect, that students realize the limitations of their studies and that these studies are as thorough and accurate as we can possibly make them. A prerequisite to ensure this is that military history studies are conducted in a controlled and formal environment and not squeezed in as a part-time course taken in the officers’ own time; that is, out of normal working hours.

The next problem to be addressed is the actual course content. On this issue there is even debate on the name that such studies should be given. There is therefore no escaping
the fact that the architects of this course will not satisfy the wishes of all when determining what should and should not be taught as well as the manner in which the subject should be presented. In order to obtain at least some consensus of opinion, it is recommended that the course should be designed by a 'Board of Studies'. This board should consist of professional officers, who have displayed an active interest in this field, and academics involved in the teaching of history at university level.

The Nature of Military History Studies

General Wavell is often quoted as having stated that we should, 'Get at the flesh and blood of it, not the skeleton. To learn that Napoleon won the campaign of 1796 by manœuvre on internal lines, or some such phrase, is of little value. If you can discover how a young unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous, half starved army and made it fight ... then you will have learnt something.' In providing us with this guidance, Wavell has elegantly defined the philosophical ethos to which we should aspire when designing a military history course; though such sentiments obviously require further elaboration if we are to arrive at a curriculum. Michael Howard provides some assistance by suggesting that military history should be studied in width, depth and in context. Width equates to a study over a long period or timespan, depth equates to detail when zeroing in on a particular time period and context equates to relational analysis as events do not occur in a vacuum.

Comparing Wavell's statement with Howard's we find that they are in fact compatible. In starting the student along the path of military history it will be necessary for him to become familiar with the historical 'facts'. Possibly even to the extent of rote learning, but such learning should be viewed as merely the vehicle for transporting the student into the field of relational analysis. This is the 'flesh and blood of it'. Transplanted simply, it means that a successful military history course must provide for formal lectures and then informal discussion. The formal lectures should be structured so that they provide the student with detailed factual data on past events. The informal discussions should be aimed at developing the officer's deductive ability.

What campaigns should be studied? This should be decided by the board of studies. One suggestion made was that the American Civil War would make an excellent 'primer'; being one of the best documented wars in the history of mankind. The political situation, the size of the armies involved and the effects of modern weaponry can all be studied in considerable detail. I mention this only to give some indication of the factors that need to be considered when making this decision.

Of all the articles I have read, Colonel Keogh most probably comes closest to providing precise guidance on the shape that these studies should take. He states that the student should attempt to gain a clear understanding of the political aims of the war, the national strategy that was adopted by both sides and the aim of the campaign being studied. He then specifically lists those aspects of the campaign that should be concentrated on. These are terrain, weather, indigenous people, communications, local resources and the effect of the climate on the conduct of operations. This then provides a basis upon which the course can be constructed.

A further suggestion, which could have a significant effect on the nature of the course, is that it should be open to civilian students as well. This could have the benefit of providing fresh, original thought and achieve a certain amount of cross fertilization between civilian and military academic circles. It may also have a beneficial effect on public relations.

Conclusion

In this article I have purposely avoided becoming involved in great detail on any particular aspect. Detail examination must be on the role of the Board of Studies once it is constituted. It is also important that we do not become enmeshed in arguments regarding the worth or otherwise of studying military history. Regardless of opinions on this issue, people will always base their future actions, to some extent, on their past experiences and those of others. It is for us to ensure that such studies are conducted in an environment that is the most conducive to the correct conclusions be drawn.

The course of study, which is developed, must be capable of adjusting to changing circumstances. It must also provide for feedback on the course's effectiveness and incor-
porate a formalized mechanism for correcting faults or shortcomings. For this reason, the Board of Studies must convene regularly to review the course that is set. In this manner the course will remain responsive to the needs of the organization it serves. The course should be compulsory and a part of the officer promotion system with officers being provided time off from their normal duties to attend lectures and study. All studies should culminate in assessed exams and assignments in a similar manner to that which occurs in tertiary institutions. For officer development up to Staff College, the studies should be kept to a general nature whilst those studies conducted at Staff College should be in much greater detail. Whether the study of military history is integrated with other studies, remains separate or is a combination of the two will have to be determined once assets, aims and limitations are known. The optimum, in my opinion, would be to adopt the latter course of action.

The greater philosopher, Bertrand Russell, maintained that man is incapable of truly original thought. Instead he draws on his experiences of nature and his surroundings. However, man can extrapolate beyond his experiences and predict what will happen under different circumstances. Man has always done this and owes his very existence to this ability. As so often stated, a soldier may only have one chance to actually apply his skills in his lifetime. There is no room for error, no ‘second eleven’ tolerated. The results of that exam are final and the penalty for failure is unthinkable. The question is therefore not one of whether history should be studied but how we may, with best effect, use those 2000 years of experience to which Lawrence alludes.

NOTES

1. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (sixth edition), Oxford, 1976, p 509, defines history as a continuous methodical record of past events. As all events are past tense from the moment they occur, it could be argued that any accurate record covering events, no matter how recent, constitutes a history. It is a purely subjective judgement which determines those events that comprise military history. Gaston Bouthoul, eminent French Sociologist, maintained that, ‘Despite the reaction of a large number of authors, history continues to be essentially the history of wars.’

2. The reasons are many. A number of authors when arguing for or against military history studies recount the causes for inaccuracy. Two examples are given:

a. Howard, Michael. The Use and Abuse of Military History. A lecture delivered at the RUSI on 18 October, 1961. Howard states that the accuracy of historians is affected by such sentiments as nationalistic fervour or regimental spirit.

b. Blumenson, Lt Col Martin. Why Military History? US Army Journal Jan 75. Suggests that there exists a ‘Drum and Bugle’ mentality which tends to concentrate on the exciting and neglect the equally important mundane events.

3. Winton, Major Harold R. and Lau, Captain Harmut H. History and the Professional Soldier. Military Review Apr 74. The authors opine that not only do writers omit, lie or bend the truth so as to suit their personal circumstances (the regimental historical for example) but readers are also selective, tending to read only that which they find palatable.

4. Ransone, Colonel James F. Jr. The Future of Studying the Past — Informal Minutes of a Military History Workshop. Military Review Nov 76. This article deals with the experience gained in the formal teaching of military history in the US Army. It also gives an insight into the background events which caused military history to be introduced as a subject for study by all officers of the American Army.

5. Gatchel, Major T. L. The Study of Military History. Marine Corps Gazette Mar 76. Major Gatchel expresses the viewpoint that history is a valuable adjunct to tactical training and is best performed by actually visiting the battlefield.

6. Varma, Lt Col P. Defence Studies — A Suggested Replacement for and Complement to Existing Military History, Current Affairs and Higher Defence Courses. Australian Army Journal Apr 72. Varma expresses the opinion that the curriculum should be a balanced course of studies and not just military history. To this end he believes a name change is warranted to ensure that course architects are not channelled into one area of study.

7. As for note 2. Howard specifies the criteria for study as width, depth and context.


10. Hassler, Warren W. Jr. Military History: The Army’s Pivotal Study. Military Review Oct 76. Hassler put forward the view that opening courses in military history to civilians would serve to integrate the Army into the community as well as providing balance and improving the quality of the courses.

11. This sentence may at first appear to be an emotional overstatement of the case; but is it really? Forty years ago the Nazis postulated a thesis of sub-human races and commenced a programme aimed at genocide. Recently, the Cambodian and Lebanon experiences underline the extent of man’s inhumanity to man. Add to this the new threat of nuclear holocaust and one finds that defeat may not only mean subjugation but also extinction.

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**BOOK REVIEW**


**Reviewer:** Jeff Popple B.A. (Hons), Dept of Defence.

**Charles E. W. Bean** attached to all his diaries a caveat which begins with the sentence: "These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true." This is sound advice, but it should also be remembered that these diaries are as much a product of Bean's background, prejudices, biases and historical time, as they are a record of a historical event; and like most historical documents they reveal as much about the writer as they do about the subject. Herein lies the value of these extracts from his diaries, for not only do they provide a lucid, and largely, first hand account of the Gallipoli experience, but they also reveal much about C. E. W. Bean; Australia's first Official War Historian and the man primarily responsible for shaping the ANZAC legend.

Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean, official press correspondent with the Australian Imperial Force, landed at Gallipoli on that first, fateful morning of 25 April 1915. There he religiously maintained the diary which he had started five months before, on sailing from Melbourne with the first contingent of Australian and New Zealand troops. Over the months Bean compiled a detailed account of that tortuous and bloody campaign, from the beginning to the final evacuation. (Bean left the Gallipoli Peninsula only a day before the last troops were evacuated.)

Before leaving Australia Bean had discussed with the Government the possibility of his writing an official history of Australia's part in the war. He hoped that his diaries and notebooks would serve as the basis for that history. With this aim in mind, and unlike other correspondents, Bean lived with the troops gaining a first-hand impression of the campaign, and exposing himself to the same dangers (being wounded once), and hardships. He ranged across the battlefield during the day taking shorthand notes, which he would write up into his diary at night, often without the benefit of light.

**Gallipoli Correspondent** is made up of extracts from the twenty-five diaries Bean kept...
during the period October 1914 to December 1915. These extracts provide a clear and intimate account not only of the Gallipoli campaign, but also the sea trip from Australia, and the initial training period in Egypt. In recent years several diaries of soldier’s experiences have been published, but these extracts from Bean’s differ in one important respect: Bean was paid to write, not fight. It was his job to record the actions and the lulls, and he does so in a very readable and descriptive manner. His intimate account of the brutality, senseless bravery, and camaraderie of the campaign is graphic, and at times very moving. Bean was also fortunate, in that his position enabled him to move about the Australian lines gathering various frontline accounts of the campaign, as well as receiving high level briefings.

Although Bean’s diaries provide a feel for what it was like in Egypt, and on the Gallipoli Peninsula, they, like all diaries, have their limitations as historical documents. As Bean readily admits, they often contain immediate impressions based on limited knowledge and unsubstantiated secondhand accounts. This is most noticeable in Bean’s condemnation of Monash during the August assault on Lone Pine, implying that he was a “weak commander”. This assessment was based on a limited understanding of the terrain difficulties, and secondhand reports. Significantly, in the Official History, after he had the chance of viewing the area in 1919, Bean makes no criticism of Monash. Another shortcoming is Bean’s observations on Australian-Egyptian relations, which are coloured by a certain amount of racism and fail to give a balanced perspective to the relationship.

Kevin Fewster does well in his selection of extracts to bring out the character of Bean; his attitudes, concerns, biases, dedication to fair play and honesty in reporting. As well, many of the themes to be found in the Official Histories are evident here. In particular, Bean’s celebration of the Australian bush virtues of egalitarianism and initiative, and his growing disenchantment with the British, particularly the officers. As the situation in Gallipoli worsens, so does Bean’s opinion of the British. But in counterbalance his opinion of the colonial forces rise, with the colonies taking on the virtues of, and becoming the future for, the coloniser: “after 100 years of breeding in slums, the British race is not the same... [t]he only hope is that those puny narrow-chested little men may, if they come out to Australia or N.Z. or Canada, within 2 generations breed men again.”

Fewster allows these themes to develop, while presenting extracts on a wide range of topics. The extracts are very readable, well presented and attractively complemented by several of Bean’s own photos. Fewster’s informative introduction provides a good appreciation of Bean’s hardwork, and his footnotes helpfully clarify, and elaborate on, several points.

Gallipoli Correspondent, with its timely ANZAC Day release, is a fitting tribute to Bean’s dedication, and a moving reminder of the tragedy of Gallipoli.


Reviewed by Dr Ed Duyker, Department of Defence.

THE term “militarism” apparently first appeared in the Memoirs of Madame de Chastenay in 1816-18. Forty-five years later it was used again by Pierre Proudhon in his La Guerre et la Paix. In 1864 it came into use in the Deutsche Jahrbucher fur Politik und Literatur, and five years later it found its way into a French Encyclopaedia. As a European neologism it eventually spread to Britain. It is now a familiar English term for wherever and whenever military considerations exerted a “decisive influence on civilian government”.

As a term which is so commonly employed in the analysis and description of civil-military relations, it is indeed easy to forget that there is any controversy over militarism’s definition at all. There has, however, been considerable debate over its use and it is certainly time that the modes of application of such a key socio-historical concept should be reviewed. The significance of Volker Berghahn’s book is that it is probably the first serious history of the modern theories of the role and position of the soldier in society. Though it is by no means exhaustive, it is, for a pioneering work, remarkably comprehensive in certain areas. Berghahn’s treatment of German militarism is a
particularly good case in point. It is perhaps no surprise that the author is already widely known for his studies of the military in German society.

While the treatment of the theoretical debate on German militarism reveals Berghahn’s strength, his analysis of theories of Japanese militarism reveals something of his weakness. However, the pioneering significance of his study is not really diminished by this. Nevertheless, the author does include an interesting chapter on civil-military relations in the third world. His integration of the theories of the “Military-Industrial Complex” into the general international debate on militarism is also noteworthy.

What Berghahn’s book ultimately reveals is that the problem of defining militarism is by no means simple and is, in fact, becoming more and more complex. Thus he argues that the emergence of the high-technology societies of both the East and the West have rendered many of our earlier theories of militarism obsolete. This is particularly true of the Prusso-German models but also of basic Liberal and Marxist theories.

In summary, this book is an important review of a debate on a phenomenon with fundamental significance to all societies. For those without a grounding in German history or those who lack an understanding of basic Marxist theory, this book may be hard-going. While it will probably suit those with a strong political, sociological or historiographical bent, it is a study with obvious relevance to anyone who ponders on the role of the military in society.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel N. A. Jans, Directorate of Personnel Plans-Army.

THE genesis of this book was the 1980 U.S. Military Academy Senior Conference, which brings together each year a distinguished group of senior people from government, the services, business and academia for an informal two-day seminar on national security topics. The conferences are aimed at stimulating ideas and options rather than on producing specific proposals.

Some of the chapters are based on papers given at the conference, whilst others were subsequently written by participants to expand on major issues which emerged during discussions. The chapters include discussion on the problems of manpower quantity and quality, socio-economic biases in the forces (especially the army), costs, combat effectiveness and variants on the all-volunteer force. They are grouped into three parts: regular forces, reserve forces and alternatives.

Much of the book is concerned with specific issues arising from the All-Volunteer Force concept. (The sheer size of the AFV is, to an Australian, a little mind-boggling: the U.S. Army is about three-quarters of a million strong. To put it in perspective, that is one regular soldier for every 300 Americans: in comparison, there is one ARA soldier for every 400 Australians. For us to reach the same national manning levels as the Americans would require us to increase the ARA by around 15,000 or by just under half.) The AFV was born of the political problems associated with the draft. The draft was officially ended in 1973, after a virtually continuous existence under various Acts since 1940. There has been increasing criticism of the AFV in recent years, concerning its apparent failure to meet its manpower targets, both in overall terms and in its declining popularity as a career for soldiers with NCO potential or technical skills. This, say the critics, has critically reduced the military effectiveness of the U.S., particularly in its NATO commitment.

This kind of book is relevant to both scholars and policy makers. Both are interested in the overall issues, but whereas the policy maker sees answers, the scholar is as much concerned with the questions. What, then, are the issues in defence manpower planning which a book on this topic could address and how can we judge its usefulness?

The basic issues are liability and asset. Liability issues are about demand for manpower: how many people we want, how many we need and how many we are allowed to have. Asset issues embrace supply aspects: acquiring sufficient numbers and retaining as many as possible. And, within these broad issues, we
can devote separate consideration to quantitative and qualitative aspects. That is, we need some types of people more than we do others, and we thus make special efforts to get and keep them. These types include technicians, soldiers with NCO potential, soldiers willing and able to serve in combat units, and officers. All these areas can be viewed from a multidisciplinary perspective. For example, the problem of “setting the liability” requires answering questions such as: what are the force objectives, what general capabilities are thus needed, what is the cost-effectiveness of each force structure option, what is the most desirable “man-machine” combination, how are individuals to be employed and how well are they presently utilized? The questions have relevance for political scientists, economists, sociologists and psychologists, as well as military specialists. Therefore, a book on defence manpower planning can be judged by, firstly, the comprehensiveness of its treatment of “the issues”, secondly, whether it raises both questions and answers in such a treatment and, thirdly, by the extent to which it takes a multi-disciplinary approach to these issues.

On the first criterion, this book scores quite well. Many of the major issues are raised: conscription v. the AFV concept, increasing the attractiveness of the services as a career, the role of servicewomen, the priorities given to personnel and material in force options and reserve forces. There is, however, a bias towards the asset issues — procurement and retention. The liability problem is given little attention. This may be because this has been well covered elsewhere in the U.S. military establishment and, therefore, did not need coverage at this conference, but I was disappointed to note its absence.

The chapter on “the market model of military procurement”, by Robert Kelly, is particularly interesting with its simple illustration of how the supply and demand model from microeconomic theory can be used to show the major factors in personnel procurement and how they interact. For example, there is discussion on how and why supply and demand curves shift up and down in this specific context, including political, economic, technological and social pressures. Also of interest are the two chapters on personnel and material trade-offs. Former Defence Secretary Melvin Laird argues that the U.S. needs “both people and advanced technology, but in that order of priority”, and Bruce Arlinghaus presents evidence that because the improvement in soldier quality in the AFV has lagged behind that of advances in weapons technology, unit combat effectiveness has not been enhanced by the use of more sophisticated weapon systems ... “our soldiers are not too dumb; rather, our weapons have become too smart”. He believes that this is because technologists are failing to take account of what combat is actually like, in a psychological sense, and of what soldiers are presently willing and able to do in terms of manning and using their weapons systems. Although there is no counter-argument presented, this chapter is a valuable addition to the tiny literature on this subject: all western armies, it would seem, are paying insufficient attention to the manpower implications, both quantitative and qualitative, of proposed weapons systems. This, to me, is the defence manpower issue of the decade and could in fact have received more treatment in this book.

The second criterion is the treatment of both questions and answers. The book is, of course, deliberately oriented to the former, and those answers which are given naturally relate to the American context, which, socially, politically and technologically, is different to our own. Therefore, the book is unlikely to be particularly attractive to Australian defence policy makers (policy makers usually feel that they already know the questions and are thus more interested in the answers): a pity, because examination of one’s questions in someone else’s context often illuminates the local situation. Scholars will find the book useful because it contains some interesting theoretical discussion (for example, the chapter on servicewomen) as well as illustrating how important questions are tackled in another system.

One of the more relevant chapters is that in which Professor Charles Moskos discusses how the All-Volunteer Force can be manned, by improving attraction and retention. Moskos rejects the deliberate use of the military as a “welfare institution”, arguing that whatever success the army has had as a remedial organization for deprived youth, has been largely due to the armed forces being defined on other than welfare grounds, whether it be national defence, citizenship obligation, or even manly honour. He sees a solution to the retention problem as being one of providing certain
educational benefits exclusively for the service-man together with use of a “two-track” personnel system. The first track would be for short term enlistment into the less skilled jobs, especially in the combat arms and ships. This is for “citizen soldiers”. “Career soldiers”, on the other hand, enlist for “longer” terms (three or four years(!)) into fields where lengthy training is required. They get higher pay and special educational benefits (similar to the GI Bill scheme).

Finally, does the book adopt a multi-disciplinary approach? Here, again, the answer is a qualified “yes”, because the treatment is biased towards the political scientist, the economist, and to a lesser extent, the sociologist. Because the book tends to take a “macro” view of the issues, the psychologist misses out. This is unfortunate, because, if we reviewed the attempts to solve the manpower acquisition and retention in the ABCA nations, we would, I believe, see that (a) the solutions tend to concentrate on “conditions of service” policies, such as pay, education, family benefits etc, and (b) no matter what policy a particular service seems to be using at any particular time, its success in that service is about the same as it was in others. This suggests that future improvements in conditions of service policies are unlikely to make much impact on our manpower problems, and thus we must either look to other strategies or simply accept the situation. This book fails to address these points and fails to acknowledge the role which psychology — the study of the individual and his/her adjustment to an orientation to service life — could play. Some important issues such as the influence of unit leadership and morale on individual retention, and the question of whether most modern recruits are ever likely to be oriented towards a career which requires a commitment beyond two or three years — are ignored, and this leaves the book unbalanced.

In sum then: this book is a fairly comprehensive coverage of the main questions in defence manpower planning, concentrating on questions rather than on answers, and, of course, on a single nation’s perspective on both questions and answers, with a bias towards certain disciplines in its treatment. On balance, an interesting book, which will be more relevant to scholars than to policy makers.

A final point. This book says as much by its existence as by its content. It is illustrative of a keen public, political and academic interest in national security in America. Which comes first — the availability of such books, containing frank and critical discussion of the state of defence, or the demand for such discussion? The question is, of course, rhetorical: the point is that both the availability and the demand tend to be lacking in Australia. We can only hope that those few local academic and quasi-academic institutions interested in national security beyond the superficial level extend themselves to the treatment of manpower as well as strategic issues, and that this effort receives the attention of publishers. Without such publication, defence issues will continue to be debated in vacuo in the public forum.


Reviewed by Dr. E. A. J. Duyker, Dept. of Defence

Containing in excess of 6,000 indexed entries on books, articles, Government reports and publications, manuscripts and maps, this bibliography is an important guide for those seeking an understanding of a region upon which Australia is critically dependent. Compiled in support of the International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies (held in Perth in August 1979), it is the National Library’s first extensive area studies bibliography.

For more than two millenia the Indian Ocean has been a major trade and communication route as well as a means to influence and dominance. It is the third largest ocean in the world, encompassing over 73 million square kilometres, over 1,300 million people of diverse races and religions live in its littoral and island states under equally divergent political and economic orders. Given Australian’s dependence on the Indian Ocean for some many of her economic, political and cultural links, the publication of the first comprehensive bibliography of resources on the region, held in an Australian library, is indeed an important landmark.
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