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Loading armoured personnel carriers on HMAS Labuan
MILITARY UNIONISM -ITS POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE 1980s

By Major I. J. Ballantyne, RA Inf

Unionism has penetrated all major sectors of the community except the military. This article examines this phenomenon to determine whether there is potential for unions to develop in the Australian Armed Services during the 1980s. The Australian industrial relations environment suggests that while the military is unlikely to receive 'outside' union assistance, the mechanisms of arbitration would support the development of a neutral, professional union. European military unions have developed largely as a reflection of social and political attitudes and while those attitudes are not duplicated in Australia, there is scope for political support of service industrial representation. Trends in the United States can be identified in this country, indicating that military unionism is likely to be an issue of no less significance in the Australian Armed Forces. The Australian Armed Forces are characterised by an increasing awareness of industrial 'rights' and a greater willingness to demand those rights. These attitudes are offset by conservatism and legal barriers to active group representation. The article concludes that while military unionism is likely to be an issue in the eighties, it has the potential to develop, it is not inevitable in this decade.

'Theirs not to make reply, 
Their not to reason why, 
Theirs but to do and die.'

Alfred, Lord Tennyson 1854

LIKE Tennyson, many Australians see the military as an almost feudal, authoritarian organisation, with characteristics which isolate it from the community at large. The unique nature of military goals and the specialised skills required of servicemen as managers of violence appear to confirm that a fundamental divergence must exist, and be maintained, between military and civilian organisations.

It may be true that armed forces do not mirror society, however they are influenced by, and responsive to, change within their social environment. The soldier is recruited from, lives within, and is subject to the demands of the community. Social trends do have an impact on the military and usually lead to adoption, or at least adaptation of new found societal norms.

Recognition of the military's obligation to avoid isolationism and to keep abreast of social development is confirmed within Australian Army doctrine.

'Organisations must ensure that their structure, leadership styles, objectives and general mode of operation remain dynamic and tuned in to changing society attitudes, values and needs.'

Janowitz confirms that this ideal is put into practice.

'There has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in a military, a shift from authoritarian domination to a greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus. The organisational revolution which pervades Society, ... is also to be found in the military.'

One of the most dominant trends in the western world in recent history has been in the direction of increased equality, political democracy and protection of basic human rights. This trend has been characterised most by the association of individuals into organisations for the protection and promotion of group interests. The scale and diversity of representation and the degree of political and social influence of these organisations has become an accepted facet of today's society.

As social evolution occurs, aspects of the conditions under which individuals live and are employed often become unsatisfactory to those individuals. In industry, once group dissatisfaction is perceived, it is normal for action to be taken by way of representation, negotiation or even confrontation through the industrial relations channel of the union; in the Austra-
lian Armed Forces there is no mechanism for direct industrial representation. It is in the area of unionism that the military is almost totally at variance with the societal norm.

Although the idea of labour organisations may appear inimical to the armed forces, the existence of military unions in a number of European countries and a recent upsurge in union interests in the United States would indicate that it is not a totally alien concept. There is a growing awareness of industrial relations issues in the civilian community, and an increasing level of identification and alignment with the civilian community by the military. These facts infer that military unionism may have some potential for development in Australia. This military aberration from the social norm could well have a short future.

This article will determine whether military unionism has potential for development within the Australian Armed Forces during the 1980s.

TERMINOLOGY

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a trade union as an

'organised association of workmen of a trade or group of allied trades formed for protection and promotion of their common interests.'

The term 'union' will be applied in this broad sense, without attempting to differentiate between a 'trade' and a 'profession', nor between the titles 'association' and 'union'. It should be remembered that

'The character of a union is influenced by many factors: the composition of its membership, the calibre of its leadership, the social, economic and legal environment in which it develops.'

The term 'military' will be used to incorporate all services within the armed forces. 'Conditions of Service' will be used to include matters relating to pay, allowances, working hours, retirement, working environment, accommodation and discipline.

APPROACH

Discussion of military unionism has largely centred on issues which relate to its potential impact on military effectiveness and the probability and consequences of industrial action. Additionally, there has been considerable attention paid to the possible organisational forms of, and alternatives to, military unions. These areas of discussion have, by necessity, tended to generate subjective and often highly emotive conclusions.

This article will examine the potential for development of military unionism in accord with social evolution. It will look at the industrial relations influences which are likely to be conducive to the development of unionism. It will not attempt to predict consequences.

Firstly, the Australian industrial relations environment will be discussed to determine whether the existing framework would stimulate or hinder the development of a military labour organisation. Knowledge of this sphere of social and political development is also necessary to place overseas experience with military unions in the correct context. Overseas developments will be examined to determine whether analogies can be drawn to Australia.

Determination of the need for, and the responsibility for development of military representation would ultimately lie with servicemen. While no survey has ever been undertaken to seek servicemen's attitudes, an effort will be made to ascertain whether conditions which favour the development of unionism are present within the military environment.

Discussion of political or ideological motivation for the development of military unionism is beyond the scope of this article.

AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Labour and government began organising in the 1850s, however the present industrial relations structure has been influenced primarily by the Federal Constitution, which gave the Australian Government authority of 'Conciliation and Arbitration for the preservation and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the bounds of one state.'

Unions

The union movement began to organise on a national basis soon after Federation to match the constitutional breadth of influence enjoyed by the government. In 1913 the forerunner to today's Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) was formed. The Australian Commonwealth Public Servants Association (ACPSA) was functioning by 1922, some forty years prior to its counterparts in the United States.
Australia is characterised by a large number of small unions linked primarily through the ACTU and, by the extent of their penetration into the workforce. There are almost three hundred unions which in 1975 represented over sixty per cent of the workforce. Of significance in recent years is the increase in the number of 'white collar' unionists and the movement of professional associations, such as police, bank officers and teachers, toward a more militant stance in the industrial arena.

The role of unions is, essentially, to seek improved economic conditions, improved environmental conditions (especially at the place of employment), and security of employment. Pursuit of ideological objectives often ensures that the activities of some unions are placed in the public eye. It should be remembered that these activities are secondary to the role of unions.

Structure
The industrial relations system in Australia is unique. Since Federation it has been based on compulsory arbitration, legal sanctioning of awards and conditions and a system of permanent tribunals and arbiters. The system is designed to remove the government from the decision making role, providing for employer and employee to take any dispute before a 'judicial' authority. In practice, however, the government as a major employer and interested party is often involved in industrial conflict.

Political Environment
The political environment has been characterised by a long period of conservative government. The Labor Party has held office for only seven years since the end of the Second World War. The result has been that 'social' legislation has been slower coming than has been the case in Europe. Unions have tended to be in conflict, rather than partnership, with government. 'Consultation' is not a characteristic of Australian industrial relations.

The European model is paralleled to the extent that the labour movement is closely associated with the socialist political party.

Influence on Development of Military Unionism
Support from the existing trade union movement and an industrial relations system conducive to the successful operation of a military union would be major influences contributing to the development of an armed forces labour organisation. Does the existing environment provide either?

The facts that the union movement is supportive of small unions and that there is a movement towards a greater degree of unionisation of the 'professional' sectors of the community, are both favourable indicators that an Armed Forces organisation would not be a move against current trends. It is, however, unlikely that the union movement would initiate moves to 'organise' service manpower. The armed forces are traditionally viewed as being an extension of government. The union movement is likely to view the development of a services union with some distrust as servicemen are traditionally conservative voters, subservient to the government of the day and in competition with social service programmes for government funds. Prime Minister Hawke, when President of the ACTU, indicated in a letter to Major G. Dugdale in 1974, that he did not see a place for an armed forces union within the trade union movement.

The conciliation and arbitration process could be considered supportive of direct representation by a service organisation. The adjudication of claims on equitable grounds, judged against community and industry standards, does appear to provide scope for the operation of an organisation not likely to be disposed to withholding labour.

Summary
The development of military unionism is likely to be influenced by its potential for successful operation in the current industrial environment. The present Australian System is likely to favour a small and 'neutral' organisation, but it is unlikely that the military would receive active support of the existing trade union movement.

OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE
Europe
Unions have functioned within the Armed Forces of Western Europe for up to three quarters of a century. Six countries, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, West Germany and Belgium, have between them more than sixty labour organisations representing servicemen. The rate of membership of regular forces varies between one hundred per cent in Nor-
way, to about seventy per cent in West Germany. Several factors of commonality in the development of these unions can be identified. Each country has experienced a long period of social democratic government during the evolution of their military unions and each has an active conscription programme. Governments in each of the six countries have come to power largely on the strength marshalled by the civilian trade union movements. Military representation has grown as part of the social norm and with the active support and promotion of government.

Norway and West Germany have developed active military unions within the past twenty-five years and are reflective of the social trends within those countries. Major aspects of their development will be mentioned in broad detail.

**Norway.** The BELFALETS FELLES ORGANISATION (BFO) has represented all regular officers since 1958. The Social Democratic Government (1935-65) gave approval for unionisation in 1946 but it took some ten years before unionism became an accepted part of Service life; much of the resistance coming from within the forces. Unionism became mandatory for all Norwegian employees, including the military, in 1958 and is now the only avenue for initiating changes to conditions of service. The BFO has the same bargaining and consultative rights as other unions, except for the right to strike.

**West Germany.** The re-introduction of defence forces in 1954 saw positive efforts to ensure that there would be no recreation of a military elite. The Social Democratic Government since then have pursued a policy of civilianisation of the military to create ‘citizens in uniform’. Emphasis in German society was placed on individual rights and in accord with this, a defence ombudsman was appointed in 1956 and union organisation approved in 1958. High Command resistance limited union growth until 1966, when government legislation permitted active union recruitment and activities to proceed within the barracks. The union has legislated consultative rights on most matters of service conditions but does not have the right to strike.

**Relevance of the European Experience to Australia**

The right to organise service labour in Europe has not been won by internal service activism, but primarily by government initiated legislation which guarantees certain inalienable rights to individuals, irrespective of their employment. The presence of a large proportion of conscripts in each force did no more than accelerate the process of democratising the military.

At first glance there appear to be few analogies between Europe and Australia. Australia has had a predominantly conservative style of government, civilian unions have tended to be adversaries rather than allies of these governments, and union rights have been fought for and not achieved by means of consultation. The socialist ideals, present in many European countries, are unlikely to provide an impetus for military unionism in Australia in its present environment.

Closer examination of the Australian situation does, however, provide some insight into the attitudes of labour oriented governments. During the 1972-75 Labor Governments, a services ombudsman was appointed and the Minister for Defence, Mr Barnard, indicated his support for a labour organisation within the Armed Forces. Mr Barnard considered that the ‘military elite’ should be replaced by a citizen army closely integrated into society. He suggested adoption of an Armed Forces Association, similar to that of West Germany, to provide servicemen with an effective voice in working for better conditions.

The European experience has proved that military unions can develop and function effectively, but that their evolution is reflective of social attitudes. It has shown that service conservatism can be overcome as servicemen become more aligned with the concept of citizenship. Australia has not paralleled European social and political development and even if community aspirations were to alter in the near future, there could be a significant time gap before any government initiated moves toward military unionism became effective.

**United States**

There are no military unions in the United States, but in recent years there has been one major attempt to ‘organise’ the military. Military unionism has been the subject of a considerable volume of debate in recent years. The union movement in the United States is not as developed to the extent that it is in Australia. Membership is low, with unions
being viewed with distrust by employee and employer alike. The single area of growth in the labour movement has been in the public sector where some thirty per cent of federal employees are union members. 'Organisation' of government workers was not permitted until 1962.

Efforts to introduce unions to the military came from the public sector in 1976, when the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) voted to recruit uniformed personnel. The move was not supported by the military and, predictably, it was actively opposed by government. The Defence Manpower Committee took the following view:

'The question is no longer moot; the possibility of a military union must be faced squarely and appropriate actions to deal with the possibility must be undertaken now.'

This advice was heeded by the Senate in 1977 and it voted to deny the armed forces the right to unionise. This decision may be challenged in the Supreme Court.

Apart from the move by the AFGE, the most dominant theme for discussion of the potential for military unions is that relating to the transition to an all volunteer force in 1972. Opinion is that the necessity to compete for manpower on the open market will produce servicemen more willing to make comparisons of functions common to both civilian and military communities. Charles Moskos, a noted sociologist, believes that the military is becoming identified as an occupation, rather than as a calling and that as a consequence, servicemen are increasingly pragmatic about basic conditions of employment. Additionally, a significant real decrease in benefits to servicemen has occurred. The opinion of many commentators is that thoughts of direct representation cannot be remote given this situation.

Relevance of the United States Experience to Australia

It is considered that the American situation has relevance to the Australian military. The Australian Armed Forces are an all volunteer organisation with many servicemen aligning themselves with civilian counterparts, and it could be argued that there is a belief among most servicemen that their service is more an occupation than a calling. The subject of erosion of benefits will be dealt with later, however it is appropriate to mention at this stage that there is strong feeling within the services that conditions have deteriorated significantly in recent years.

As has been mentioned, it is unlikely that moves towards unionism would be instigated by the ACTU affiliates. However, the power of the union movement is such, that if a union sponsored move in this direction was initiated, it is doubtful whether it could be brushed aside as easily as it was in the United States.

This country has a history of adopting many social trends from North America. With the greater level of union acceptance in Australia, development of military unionism must have a higher degree of probability here than in the United States.

FORCED INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION

Improvements to conditions of service in the Australian Armed Forces have not occurred through active agitation on the part of the servicemen. Major reviews have occurred as a result of a rather inconsistent procedure of government sponsored enquiries.

The last decade has seen significant evolution in the industrial machinery of the Defence Forces. In 1970 the Defence Conditions of Service Committee was established and, for the first time, serving officers comprised a major part of a committee which specifically dealt with service conditions. The Kerr/Woodward Committee recommendations resulted in expansion of the service conditions directorates in each of the three services and in the formation of two branches in Defence Central dealing with wages policy and service conditions. An independent Committee of Reference has also been established and is chaired by a Deputy Commissioner of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. This committee, as with all Defence service conditions mechanisms, does not have arbitral powers.

A services ombudsman was appointed in 1973 but his powers were limited to making recommendations on the application of existing conditions, and then only for individuals. This position has been vacant since 1977.

The Australian Armed Forces have been the subject of considerable industrial reform. An indication that this reform is being maintained is exemplified by the Committee of Reference
currently examining defence pay. The committee has advertised widely that it is seeking submissions from interested parties, including servicemen and outside organisations.

While conditions of service mechanisms have improved, servicemen are not direct participants in the decision making process. Recommendations are forwarded to the government which has no compulsion to act upon them. In effect, the employer is the sole authority in the determination of employee’s claims. While this approach is traditional, in today’s society it would be considered ‘benevolent paternalism’, and out of step with accepted community standards.

THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

The factor most essential to determining the potential for unionism in the military is the attitude of servicemen and their perception as to its necessity. Two prominent commentators, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and S. E. Finer, have identified a number of pre-requisites which must be present within the military environment before union development is feasible.

The following should be present:

- The motive to unionise.
- The mood to unionise.
- The opportunity to unionise.

Changes of attitudes and expectations within the Australian Armed Forces could indicate that these pre-conditions exist, at least to some degree.

The Motive to Unionise

A move towards unionism is likely if servicemen perceive that the existing system is failing to protect and promote their interests. There must be a reason to unionise.

Australian servicemen join under an unwritten contract with expectations that their interests will be protected by government. Many servicemen believe that in recent years the government has violated that ‘contract’ by permitting progressive erosion of service conditions. Examples often cited are: loss of pay relativity with civilian industry, mandatory waiting period for Defence Home Loans and changes to the system and cost of service accommodation.

There is an underlying feeling that this erosion of benefits will not be redressed willingly by the government. Policy indicators support this contention. This feeling of deprivation is exacerbated as servicemen observe civilian unions pressing for increased benefits to members.

These factors are only valid motives to unionise if the servicemen believes his position is not likely to improve, or indeed, to deteriorate. The current examination of pay structure by the Committee of Reference does not hope for improvement in the near future. Additionally, the recent upsurge in interest in defence may place the services in the public eye, forcing the government to maintain its implicit ‘contract’ with servicemen.

The Mood to Unionise

While a sound reason to unionise is essential, it requires a desire, or willingness, to depart from tradition before the concept can be converted into an active movement. Harries-Jenkins sees this mood developing when individual feelings of deprivation become collective. It is recognised by a willingness to take positive action.

As volunteers, servicemen are attracted to the military because they see it either as a calling or as a beneficial occupation. It is becoming more apparent that the latter feeling is dominant and this is supported by regular forces recruitment appeals which embrace material gain, training opportunities and civilian style living conditions. As noted in discussion of the United States, this results in a pragmatic approach towards conditions of service and is likely to increase ‘demands’ for maintenance of, and improvements to, entitlements.

The Australian serviceman has demonstrated willingness to be vocal in support of conditions of service. The Kerr/Woodward Committee noted that:

Some 3300 letters were received from serving personnel and their families and we have been advised that a voluntary response of this size is usually high.

This ‘mood’ to voice discontent is also exemplified by an increase in communication to the press by serving personnel, and in support given to the RAAF wives groups currently agitating for improved pay and conditions for their husbands.

While there is a tendency for servicemen to ‘demand’ entitlements, the willingness to unionise is still likely to be hesitant. Servicemen are conservative with little knowledge of unions
except that gained through the media, and even if the motive exists most other avenues are likely to be pursued to draw attention to the 'plight' of servicemen. Lack of 'mood' to unionise produced the initial resistance of European Armed Forces to unionisation, even after the opportunity had been presented. Similarly the Australian Armed Services Association formed in 1974 failed because of lack of support.

The Opportunity to Unionise

The reason and 'state of mind' to support unionism may be quite explicit, however it is only where opportunity exists that unionism has the potential to develop effectively. This opportunity relates not only to the legality of such a move, but also to the likelihood of acceptance within the political and social environment.

No Australian Service Law Manual actually states that the formation of unions for the protection and promotion of common interest is forbidden. However, each service has instructions which infer as much, as the following extracts from the Army Law Manual illustrate.

Australian Military Order 307:

(1) The use of outside influence to support complaints or applications for personal advantage . . . is contrary to discipline . . .

Australian Military Order 310:

'An officer or soldier when subject to military law, is forbidden:

b. to initiate or take part in any public discussion relating to or instructions issued by any military authority.'

It should also be mentioned at this stage that there is nothing in either the Australian Constitution or the Defence Act prohibiting members from joining unions.

Political attitude towards military unionism has been discussed earlier in this article. In summary, conservative government is likely to resist moves in this direction and legislation similar to that in the United States would be a possible reaction. Socialist government is likely to be more supportive, but only if the social environment indicates acceptance of this departure from the traditional subservience of armed forces. Community acceptance is unlikely while unionism is associated with political and industrial activism. The armed forces are still seen as having a traditional low profile position in the community, however it has been noted that there is tending to be a greater acceptance of unionism within traditionally apolitical bodies such as police and teachers.

While there is no legal impediment to the formation of a military union, the opportunity for that union to be active is restricted by military law. Political and social acceptance of unionism is not likely at the present time, however movement towards liberalisation of individuals rights could herald a change to this stance.

SUMMARY

The Australian Armed Forces are normally responsive to community trends. In recent history, unions have become an accepted part of the civilian community, penetrating all major sectors of society except the military.

The industrial relations environment is characterised by a system of compulsory arbitration and by conflict between conservative government and a well organised union movement. While it is unlikely that the union movement would initiate moves to 'organise' the military, the trend towards "professional" and apolitical unions and the arbitration mechanism could be considered supportive of union development in the services.

Military unionism in Europe has developed from 'liberal' social attitudes which recognise servicemen firstly as citizens, and from positive supportive action from the governments. Introduction of unions was initially resisted in the military. Australia has not had the same accent on social 'rights' nor the degree of 'social' legislation but there have been indications that a Labor Government would be more positive in its approach to unionism within the military.

Trends in the United States indicate that servicemen's conditions of service expectations and aspirations are increasing, a situation considered conducive to industrial activism. Australian servicemen are displaying similar, if not more positive trends in this direction.

The motive and mood to unionism are present to some degree in the Australian Armed Forces. There is a feeling that the reason exists and that the willingness is increasing, however improvements in service mechanisms in recent years and tradition conservatism will act as significant restraints. The opportunity to unionise is not, for practical purposes, available. Legislation could alter this.
CONCLUSION

It is doubtful if the issue of independent industrial representation for members of the Australian Armed Forces can be avoided during this decade.

Trends which support the growth of unionism within the community, an industrial relations framework which would be conducive to the development of a military union, changing attitudes and expectations of servicemen, and the probability of impetus from a future labour oriented social and political environment, are indicative that military unionism has potential for development.

This article does not suggest that unionism is inevitable in the next ten years. A government responsive to servicemen's industrial expectations and the traditional conservatism of the military will both act to resist 'organisation' within the armed forces. Legal barriers also remain.

The military has come considerably further that the several leagues foreseen by Tennyson. The prospect of servicemen never again asking why; or refraining from reply in industrial matters is remote. Military hierarchy and government should be aware of the potential for development of unionism to ensure that decisions which will ultimately affect important aspects of the military function, are not left until the eleventh hour.

NOTES

9. In Norway the term 'officer' is used for commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. 'Officers' provide the bulk of the regular membership in a predominantly conscripted Defence Force.
13. The Department of Defence is the most highly unionised with over sixty per cent of all civilian employees having union membership.
17. The three major enquiries since the Second World War have been: Sidman Committee, 1949; Alison Committee, 1958; and Kerr/Woodward Committee, 1972.
18. Harries-Jenkins is a noted sociologist and author of numerous works on military sociology and lately, military unionism. Finer is the author of the authoritative book on soldiers and society, The Man on Horseback.
19. The current Defence White Paper, 1976 has one of its objectives as the reduction of manpower costs as a proportion of the Defence Budget.

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THE MORALLY LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY POWER

By Wing Commander B. L. Hughes MIE (Aus) psc

"Physical force . . . is thus the means of war, to impose our will on the enemy is its object."

Clausewitz

"Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel just"

Shakespeare

INTRODUCTION

EVERYONE is behind them. They're fighting in a just cause.' Claimed Britain's Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, of her fighting men at the Falkland Islands. Mrs Thatcher's comment is interesting for it implies that fighting in a just cause is morally acceptable, and that the nation fully supports the soldiers because the war is just. Her accent on the moral justice of Britain's position reflects the general tendency of governments to portray their warlike activities in terms acceptable to their people, and, increasingly, to world opinion. There is an implied belief that national and international consciousness recognises moral principle and, thus, will support or accept morally justifiable wars.

This proposition is supported by a consideration of the effects of education, both formal and informal, on peoples' attitudes. Widespread formal education, in producing a more literate and thinking population, has encouraged the questioning of the validity of government policies, including those on war.

Informal education has created a realisation at large of the gruesome bloodiness of war. The process started, perhaps, with W. H. Russell's telegraphed accounts of the conduct of the Crimean War published in The Times and which, incidentally, moved Florence Nightingale to take up her mission. Shortly after that war, over 150 correspondents covered events in the American Civil War. The process of informal education continues today with every graphic television report of any current war.

With an informed, aware and questioning population, the national will in war to persevere through adversity and win against the tenacity of the enemy may dissipate, unless the war has sound moral justification. The questioning of the moral propriety of America's involvement in Vietnam was a major factor in that country's loss of will and confidence, leading to its defeat. Although, in this case, skilful propaganda may have played a part in forming public opinion, nevertheless, the claim has been made that: 'Vietnam differed from other wars in that so many citizens posed their objection in moral terms. In their eyes it was the United States that was the aggressor, raining death on a far-off people with no rational justification.'

This short discussion prompts the thought that a government should not expect to retain its people's support for a war where that war is morally questionable. In reverse, the people can rightly expect their government to apply moral principle when contemplating war.

A professional soldier manages the application of violence in war. For that soldier to retain honour and dignity, it is incumbent upon him or her to employ violence only in a morally legitimate cause. Thus, as for governments, so for soldiers is the obligation to understand the moral limits to the use of violence. But, what are those limits? Under what conditions if any, can war be morally justified? This article will answer that question by developing a conceptual framework of moral justification wherein armed force may properly be employed.

This article is restricted to consideration of the direct application of force; it does not address economic or physiological power struggles which fall short of actual warfare. Questions of justice in war also fall outside its scope. If, in this discussion, a definition of
moral is necessary, then it would be that which is humane, civilised and based on Christian ethics. Further, the point of departure for the argument is from an affirmative answer to the question of whether any war can be justified. This is not avoidance of the thorny issue, but, rather, acceptance of the facts of international life; world pacifism is a dream, a noble dream but a dream nonetheless.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Roman society generally held that the civilised world was encompassed by the frontiers of the Empire, an Empire which brought peace and prosperity to its citizens. During the Fourth and Fifth Centuries AD, the Western Roman Empire, weakened by internal stagnation, collapsed under the invading weight of many barbarian tribes. While a rump Eastern Roman empire managed to survive into the Fifteenth Century, the greater portion of the old Empire fell under the divided authority of many barbarian kings and petty chieftains. Open hostility between the various tribes and clans was the norm; Pax Romana had given away to endemic warfare and anarchy.

Christianity, which had been well established in much of the Roman world by the time of its collapse, found many converts amongst the barbarian tribes. The very early Fathers of the Church, men like Tertullian and Origen, had taken a distinctly pacifist approach to warfare, possibly because of the Roman Army's official practice of offering sacrifice to the Emperor. St Augustine (354-430), on the other hand, pragmatically tried to reconcile Christian ethics with the propensity of petty princes to engage in warfare. He invoked the concept of just and unjust wars, a concept which can be traced to Greek philosophy. He condemned wars of conquest, permitted wars to restore justice and punish wrong, and declared that the true aim of warfare was to create conditions for a lasting peace.

Augustine's rather vague principles were refined by medieval theologians, particularly St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) who endeavoured to be quite specific on the question of determining the justice of individual wars. He taught that three criteria must be satisfied: first, the war must be declared by a prince, not a private individual; second, the prince must have honourable intentions; and, third, those attacked must be at fault. Satisfaction of the first criterion would be easy to establish. Satisfaction of the second would be known only to God, but, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, could be assumed. Satisfaction of the third criterion clearly is open to interpretation and for that reason requires further comment.

Aquinas wrote at a time when the kingdoms and principalities of Europe were organised within the single polity of Christendom, supervised by a theocracy headed by the Pope. In the conciliation and, if necessary, arbitration of disputes, the Pope operated as a supranational authority whose rulings supposedly were widely respected and accepted. Theoretically all disputes between princes could be resolved by appeal to the Pope. A prince who rejected a papal decision was at fault and could justly be attacked by the aggrieved prince acting with proper intention. In principle, therefore, the problem of judging the moral standing of a war was solved.

In the succeeding centuries, however, the rise of nationalism, the revival of serious trade and the Reformation profoundly altered the political climate in Europe. The stirrings of nationalism and the lure of trading profit induced new competitive pressures between states, while the Reformation destroyed the religious unity of Christendom. Universal acceptance of the Pope's supranational authority, the fulcrum of Aquinas' argument, was lost. For practical purposes sufficient justification for war existed in the mere fact of national and religious differences, particularly the latter.

While the Christian (now Catholic) tradition survived in Spain, where the theologians of the stature of Suarez (1548-1617) wrestled with the problem of the Spanish conquests in the Americas, the mainstream of European thought on the matter became decidedly secular and rather pragmatic. The school of thought which was pre-eminent from the 18th to the early 20th century could be characterised as 'elite pragmatism'. It was pragmatic because it recognised nations as entities having sovereign rights, including the oft-practised rights to self-defence and to the pursuit of the national interest, even by resort to deliberate war. It was elite because the issues of state were for the ruling classes to decide, the common man having no voice in these matters. Arguably, the school's most effective exponent was von Clausewitz (1780-
1831) and most effective practitioner Metternich (1773-1859).

Elite pragmatism was an acceptable approach to the issue while wars were fought by small professional armies far from home and with little effect on the lives and activities of the general mass of influential citizens. Napoleon's raising of the French national levies and the concomitant reaction of the opposing powers caused a ripple in this complacent approach, but somnolence returned with demobilisation. Although the American Civil War gave a foretaste of the devastation wrought by modern war, the theory of the sovereign right to initiate war was only finally discredited by the enormous casualties of World War I. Such grand carnage could only be justified by elevating the war to a crusade, a war to end all wars.

MODERN EXPERIENCES WITH SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITIES

The cataclysmic shock of World War I utterly discredited the idea of the sovereign right of nations to wage war in the national interest. As a result, the victorious allies established the League of Nations, whose covenant embodied the principles of collective security, arbitration of international disputes, reduction of armaments and open diplomacy. Its formation was an endeavour to establish an effective supranational authority which would render obsolete the unilateral resort to arms to obtain justice. An effective League would have given modern validity to Aquinas' philosophy on the justice of war.

Initially, the League achieved some success in forestalling or stopping small wars, for example: wars between Albania and Yugoslavia in 1921 and Bolivia and Paraguay in 1928. 'But, when great powers made demands for political change, the League faced the dilemma of peace of justice and failed to solve it.' The failure of the League resulted in neither peace nor justice, and, during World War II, the League ceased to function.

World War II saw the creation of the United Nations Organisation to act as a new supranational authority. The UNO embraces essentially the same principles of international cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes as espoused by the defunct League. Since the creation of the UNO in 1945, codification of international law has progressed and a judicial system has been developed, but not an effective law-enforcement mechanism. Notwithstanding some enforcement successes, for example the removal of Soviet forces from northern Iran in 1946 and the containment of North Korea, the UNO has been conspicuously unsuccessful in preventing war.

The comment that the UN peace keeping force in the Lebanon in 1982 'turned out to be as futile and meaningless as the United Nations' resolutions that brought (the force) into existence' perhaps is indicative of the level of UN prestige in matters of justice, war, and settlement. The Falklands Island War in 1982 showed that nations are unwilling to place their trust in the international judicial system. Quite clearly there is no present supranational authority in the sense of Aquinas' philosophy; the modern experiments have, so far, failed. In these circumstances, the nations of the world once again must apply their own moral philosophy in deciding on the use of military force.

SELECTION OF A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

This article seeks to develop a framework of moral justification for the proper employment of military force, a framework which will be of practical value as a guide to behaviour and thought. Thus, the philosophy should be capable of clear expression and easy understanding; it should be capable of adoption by nations as a practical policy; and it should be acceptable to people in general, by being both reasonable and moral.

The literature contains a diversity of philosophical positions on the issue of the moral rightness of war. These positions range from total pacifism in the face of any provocation to total rejection of any constraints to war. As an aid to rational analysis, these various positions can be reduced, without too much distortion, to four percepts: complete pacifism; strict self-defence; self-defence and assistance to those unjustly attacked; and, finally, nihilistic warfare. Each of these will be examined briefly against the criteria of acceptability established above.

Strict pacifism, while a laudable ideal, is too extreme and requires too heroic an attitude to be generally accepted by a people or government. Certainly, strict pacifism is a policy not wholly supported by any nation. Japan,
espousing pacifism in its Constitution, comes closest, but still finds necessary the maintenance of a formidable self-defence force. One could advance more esoteric reasons for the rejection of strict pacifism, but its general unacceptability is sufficient for this article.

Nihilistic warfare is also too extreme a position to be accepted, or even honourably argued. A cursory examination of international agreements, the growing body of international law and even the Nuremberg Tribunal pronouncements supports this conclusion.

A policy of strict self-defence is attractive and can be rationally implemented, as evidenced by the examples of Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. It is second only to pacifism as the most laudable and proper approach to the issue in a perfect world. In an imperfect world, however, strict self-defence is amoral since it fails to account for the humane requirement, even obligation, to assist those in need. This obligation applies equally to the national and municipal communities. One may paraphrase, in international phraseology, Section 1, Article 29 of the International Declaration of Human Rights: 'every nation has duties to the international community in which alone the free and full development of nationhood is possible.' The obligation is embodied in the United Nations Charter which, notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of the organisation, does reflect the more noble sentiments of mankind. The UNO specifically recognises the need to assist those states subject to aggression.

On a more mundane plane, a policy of strict self-defence allows the possibility, perhaps even probability, of an evil government enslaving much of the world through the inaction of other governments, each 'secure' in their cocoon of self-content. Ultimately, 'this policy leads to a society based not on the defence of rights but adjustment to power.' For these reasons, strict self-defence cannot be proposed as an acceptable moral policy in an imperfect world.

Rejection of approaches based on the precepts of complete pacifism, nihilistic warfare and strict self-defence leaves only the fourth precept, that of self-defence coupled with assistance to those in need. A philosophy based on this precept holds promise of being both morally acceptable and capable of adoption. Moreover, while it is likely to be more complicated because of the need for greater specification, such a philosophy does not suffer from the obvious defects inherent in the other approaches. For these reasons, the fourth precept will be used as the basis for development of a set of moral principles to govern the legitimate use of military force.

THE USE OF FORCE: PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DEFENCE AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS

The conceptual framework defining limits to the legitimate use of arms propounded in this article is based upon two assertions, firstly, that nations have a right to self-defence and, secondly, that nations have an obligation to assist other nations unjustly attacked. The first assertion is clearly axiomatic, the second less so. However, the argument demonstrating the correctness of the second assertion would merely restate in reciprocal form the argument used above to show that a policy of strict self-defence is amoral, and therefore does not need repetition.

Defensive action can be either in defence of a nation's own territory and culture or in defence of another nation's territory and culture. Wars in defence of another nation can be dissected further into those where intervention occurs in support of a faction in a previously single nation. Thus, three types of defensive war can be identified, being wars of self-defence, wars of assistance and wars of intervention. These three types will be considered separately to determine the moral factors justifying a resort to arms.

Wars of Self-Defence

The right of self-defence allows a nation to employ its military power in defence against an attack by another nation. Authorities are divided, however, in defining the apparently simple term 'an attack'. Walzer holds that the term can validly be interpreted to include direct attack on a nation and the serious threat of direct attack. To these should be added an attack against a nation's truly vital interests.

A nation can morally employ its armed forces to repel the direct attack of another nation, and history offers many examples illustrating the legitimate employment of force in these circumstances. Straightforward examples from this century are Poland's resistance to Germany and Finland's resistance to the USSR in 1939.
A strong argument can be made that an enemy’s preparations for imminent attack are an integral part of that attack. A pre-emptive first strike to destroy the enemy’s ability to launch the attack would therefore be justified on the grounds that the enemy has actually started his attack; in a logical sense, it is not a pre-emptive first strike at all. Further, “if the intended victim has to wait until the enemy’s war machine has attained full momentum before responding with force, his right of self-defence is gravely diminished.” Fine judgement is necessary, of course. The legitimacy of the act lies in the fact of being gravely threatened, not merely in the fear of being threatened. The best contemporary example of justifiable use of force in this way was Israel’s pre-emptive strike against Egypt in 1967.

The third interpretation of attack is when one nation takes action against another nation’s vital interests so as to destroy or seriously harm that nation. Military action in self-defence could properly be taken if other measures fail to deter the offending nation. Naturally, to morally justify armed retaliation, the consequences of successful attack against the nation’s vital interests must be sufficiently serious. Good historical examples are comparatively rare, but the American reaction to the USSR’s attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 could be cited as an arguable illustration. Another was President Carter’s declaration that any USSR attempt to interfere with Middle East oil exports would be considered to be an attack against America’s vital interests that deserved an armed response.

Wars of Assistance

Developing international law looks to the maintenance of peace and justice through collective security. In support of this development, membership of the international community of nations generates obligations to assist other nations in need. If the international community lacks the collective will to act, then the responsibility falls to nations individually, and these may quite legitimately offer military assistance to a nation unjustly attacked.

For the use of force by an assisting nation to be differentiated from warmongering and a mere lust for aggrandizement, the assistance must be in response to a request for help. The assisting army must be invited to enter the fray, otherwise it also may be assigned the status of aggressor. Consideration of recent events will show the truth of this statement. The USA and its allies waited upon a request from the South Vietnamese Government before providing active military support. Similarly, the USSR usually gives armed support to fraternal Marxist governments, for example in Afghanistan and Hungary, only after it is formally sought.

Occasionally, elements of justice may reside with both parties to an armed dispute and determination of that nation having the balance of justice may not be possible. When this occurs, third nations should refrain from assisting either side. However, if one side should gain a decisive advantage over the other and sought not a firm, just peace but a grossly unjust and disproportionate settlement, then a third nation could morally assist the defeated nation. This is because the victorious nation, through vindictiveness, has placed itself in an immoral position, inviting censure and resistance. Moreover, imposing a grossly unjust settlement generates conditions conducive to failure of the peace in the future. As has been written of the treaty of Versailles, 1919: ‘The seeds of trouble for the next 20 years were sown in those articles of the treaty Germany had the most obvious grounds for resenting, whether as offensive to its national honour or as unduly onerous, oppressive and vindictive.”

Wars of Intervention

The moral justification for wars of intervention, like wars of assistance, rests on the humane obligation to assist those in need. A crucial difference exists, however, in that the nations of the world intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, possibly without the invitation of the constitutional government. Because intervention without invitation is regarded as outright aggression, the need to intervene must be compellingly serious, and the burden of proof rests on the intervening nation. Such grounds exist, perhaps only exist, where a segment of the population of a country is being gravely abused through the application of a policy of enslavement or genocide.

Hitler’s sustained pogrom of the Jews and the Pol Pot regime’s decimation of the Kampuchean intellectuals are recent examples of instances where the international community had an obligation to assist a persecuted people. Thus, Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea may
have been justified as a humane action on behalf of mankind; however, Vietnam remaining in Kampuchea as an occupying power cannot be condoned and clearly impugns Vietnam's motive for invasion.

SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS

The Question of Proportionality

The discussion so far has established certain principles governing the morally legitimate use of military force in the international arena. The application of these principles, however, can conflict with other, equally valid principles and the pragmatic realities of the world, requiring nations to balance one against the other. A question of proportionality in initiating or prosecuting a just war arises.

The concept of proportionality requires that no greater force be used than is necessary and that the application of force should not produce greater evil than its non-application. The reaction to aggression must be in keeping with the level of that aggression; massive retaliation against a relatively minor provocation would be inexcusable. The British reaction to the 1982 Argentine takeover of the Falkland Islands provides an excellent example of proportionality at work. In contrast, some observers believe the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon in the same year was a disproportionate reaction to the threat of the substantial Palestine Liberation Organisation elements in that country.

A corollary of the concept of proportionality is that the unconditional surrender of an enemy can rarely be pursued as a justified policy. The use of military force is only legitimate up to the point when the enemy is ready to concede reasonable terms of surrender. These reasonable terms may include the seemingly onerous occupation of the enemy's country and dismantling of his war-making capacity where this is demonstrably necessary for the creation of a lasting peace. Enforcement of unconditional surrender may induce the enemy to fight on past the point where he would have surrendered in response to less stringent but reasonable demands. Use of force past this point is morally indefensible since it needlessly causes death of one's own soldiers, those of the enemy and non-combatants.

Careful consideration of proportionality is necessary when making decisions regarding the moral legitimacy of a war of intervention. Foreign intervention to assist a people suffering previously under an inhumane regime may itself cause greater suffering than the regime inflicts. Further, proportionality may be lost if other nations misinterpret the motives of the intervening power and intervene on behalf of the inhumane government.

The Question of Neutrality

For some wars there may be genuine difficulty in determining the side on which the balance of justice lies, as with the Iraq/Iran war. Third parties have a right, even obligation to remain neutral in these wars. As will be explained below, third parties should also remain neutral in respect to civil wars. The more convinced we are, however, that one of the belligerents is an aggressor or that the outcome is going to be disastrous, the more likely we are to deny the very possibility of non-involvement.

The argument supporting the moral legitimacy of wars of assistance and wars of intervention is one of obligation to collective security and enforcement of humane government. By definition, the argument of obligation seemingly can admit no possibility of an election to accept the obligation, it simply exists. But other factors, other obligations, relating mainly to the concept of proportionality do bear upon the question. A Finnish declaration of war upon either Germany or Russia in 1939 over the invasion of Poland plainly could have been suicidal. There would be little point in Liechtenstein declaring war on Vietnam for its invasion of Laos. These examples show that practical matters of survival and influence must be considered in decisions concerning the morality of neutrality. In this wider realm, neutrality can be an acceptable course for a nation.

The Question of Civil War

Civil war may be defined as the state of affairs which exists when a section of the population of a country rebels against the government of that country. Two broad types of civil war may be identified, one where the rebels wish to replace the existing government, and the other where the rebels wish to create a new sovereign state from a part of the old. In considering the moral correctness of inter-
THE MORALLY LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY POWER

In civil wars concerned with the overthrow of a government, the moral legitimacy of intervention hinges on the causes giving rise to the rebellion. In a civil war initiated to defeat a government or faction intent on the imposition of grossly inhumane policies, the case for intervention equates to that for a war of intervention justified by the obligation to assist those in need. The people have risen against their tormentors and cry for help; it should be given. Alternatively, this type of civil war may be initiated merely for the political purpose of changing the colour of a government, and is thus an exercise in the free expression of the political will of the people. Political civil wars should not attract foreign intervention.

In the type of civil war entailing the partition of a country, intervention on behalf of the separatist movement would be correct only after the movement has shown that it truly represents the aspirations of the people it claims to represent. It does this through a successful act of political will by its supporters, and foreign powers have no right to intervene in the process, on either side. When the separatist movement has proved its standing and right to recognition as a sovereign state then the war ceases to be civil and becomes an international war. Then the case for foreign intervention becomes a variant of the case for a war of assistance discussed above.

Walzer raises the issue of the improper intervention of a foreign power in a civil war. He suggests that a second power would be morally justified in assisting the other side so as to redress the balance of power in the war, thereby allowing the free expression of political will to occur. Superficially, it is a powerful argument, but difficulties abound with this approach. To be correct only sufficient assistance should be provided to balance the other power’s influence, not overcome it. Confrontation between the two assisting powers is likely, leading to escalation of the conflict and its possible spread into wider spheres. With foreign powers assisting each side the war probably would be longer and more violent and disruptive than if no assistance at all was provided. Improper as the first foreign power’s action is, the concept of proportionality argues against the moral justification of action by the second power.

The Question of Treaties

A treaty, being a formal promise between nations, does create a moral obligation on the partners to fulfil its terms. However, obligations created by a treaty in relation to war cannot transcend the normal obligations of a state to the community of nations. A treaty cannot morally justify any nation supporting another nation in an immoral, aggressive war, in contravention of its higher obligation to resist such activity. Inversely, resort to war to assist a nation in self-defence against attack does not require justification by appeal to a treaty; the aggressive act of the attacker is sufficient justification.

Although the mere existence of a treaty is of no consequence in determining the moral justice of a decision to go to war on behalf of another nation, treaties do fulfill a useful function. They serve notice to a potential aggressor that allies intend to exercise their legitimate right and humane obligation to assist the threatened state, and thereby help to preserve peace in the world.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT: THE CONSTABULARY FORCE

Wars of assistance and intervention are akin to municipal police functions performed within a country. International enforcement of law or respected custom by nations acting in the name of collective security or humane principle thus may be called an international police action. Occasionally, that label has been explicitly used, as with the United Nations response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Police-like activity is also undertaken when international forces assist in the maintenance of peace between hostile but fundamentally orderly nations, as occurs on Cyprus and elsewhere. Participation in these peace-keeping operations is a nationally responsible use of military force because the operations endeavour, not always successfully, to stabilize the world, impose justice and reduce suffering.

Since the Korean War, the world has increasingly accepted the use of national military forces for international police activity. This interesting development was identified by Janowitz in 1960 and termed “the constabulary concept.” The development is interesting and important as, hopefully, it may lead to the actual establishment of an international con-
stabulary force acting for the United Nations, or, more likely, its successor. The community of nations, as a legislative body, supported by a judiciary and an effective enforcement agency, then would be a true supranational authority.

CONCLUSION

A national resort to arms is often justified on moral grounds. There appears to be a recognition that a modern nation will only unstintingly support a war where the people can see that it is morally correct and necessary. There is a long tradition of Western thought concerning the moral validity of war, a tradition finding its roots in Greek philosophy and the work of early Christian theologians. St Thomas Aquinas firmly established the concept of a supranational authority to settle disputes, however, modern experiments with supranational authorities have, so far, failed. In the context of the absence of an effective supranational authority, this article has attempted to explore and define the moral principles governing the proper use of national military force.

The Moral Use of Force

The literature contains a diversity of moral positions on the use of military force. This diversity can be reduced to four general arguments, based on the precepts of complete pacifism, strict self-defence, self-defence coupled with assistance to those in need, and the nihilism of war. But which of these approaches promises a moral, widely acceptable, and practical set of principles to determine the legitimacy of the international use of force?

The philosophies represented by both pacifism and nihilism represent extreme positions unacceptable to the people and nations of the world. This does not deny the nobility of pacifism but merely expresses its present unattractiveness as a national policy. Strict self-defence is a plausible national policy and, indeed, several states do espouse it. However, such a policy is amoral as it fails to take account of the humane obligation of a state to assist other states in need and to rally to the collective defence of nations unjustly attacked. This process of rejection leaves only the precept of self-defence coupled with assistance to those in need as a moral basis for further development. It has none of the obvious defects giving cause for rejection of the other three. Furthermore, the principles derived from this precept are based on the axiomatic right of nations to self-defence and on the obligation, embodied in the United Nations Charter, to assist other nations in peril. The principles will now be expounded.

A nation may morally employ its armed forces in self-defence against the attack of another nation. An attack may be defined as an overt direct attack, as the imminent preparations for an attack, and as serious interference with a nation’s true vital interests. Preemptive attack against an enemy is justified as an inherent aspect of self-defence, provided always that the threat is clear and immediate.

A nation may morally employ its armed forces in providing assistance to another nation unjustly attacked. Ideally, this assistance should be in concert with other nations acting under the charter of the United Nations, but if the UN fails to act, individual assistance may be offered. The legitimacy of assistance depends on the beleaguered nation asking for help; unilateral philanthropy is not valid. Assistance is not morally legitimate where the side of justice cannot clearly be identified.

A nation may morally employ its armed forces to intervene in the internal affairs of another sovereign state where this is necessary to prevent gross inhumanity, for example genocide or enslavement of a people. The onus of proof falls on the intervening nations, and it must be compelling.

Supplementary Comments

Although a legitimate case may exist for a resort to arms according to the principles just described, the argument cannot be divorced from other considerations. A nation must ensure that the use of force is commensurate with the issue, and does not inflict suffering out of proportion to the injustice being opposed. The level of force applied must be no greater than necessary and for no longer than necessary. A sense of proportion must bear on military decisions.

The concept of proportionality also provides the moral basis for neutrality. A government’s obligation to resist aggression and injustice must be weighed against its obligation to look to the well-being of its people. Where involvement in a war would have little effect on the
outcome or puts the nation at undue risk, then neutrality would be proper and acceptable.

In general terms, nations should not interfere in civil wars, principally on the grounds that a civil war is an internal act of national decision making, albeit a violent act. The internal affairs of a nation are normally not the legitimate concern of other nations. Exceptions occur when a separatist movement succeeds in establishing its independence, and when a regime is so inhumane as to require its extinction, if necessary by foreign forces.

The Future

Wars of assistance and of intervention are essentially police-like actions carried out by military forces in the international sphere. Janowitz described the development of this constabulary concept in 1960 and since then acceptance of the concept has been growing. Because police actions contribute to the peace and well-being of the world, participation in international peace-keeping operations is a morally legitimate use of a nation's armed forces.

The growing acceptance of the constabulary concept portends, one may hope, the emergence of a modern supranational authority. If this occurs, wars between 'sovereign' states will become outmoded, as war between the vassals of a king became outmoded with the development of nation states. At that future time, the principles governing the morally legitimate use of national military force put forth in this essay will cease to have validity, or even meaning.

NOTES
2. Shakespeare, King Henry VI, Part II.
4. A moment's reflection will show that this statement is a truism requiring little authoritative backing for this article. The question of public opinion concerning war is discussed frequently in Wright Q. A Study of War, Abridged, 1st Phoenix Edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1965, passim.
9. ibid., p. 247.
10. ibid., p. 248.
16. Wright, op. cit. p. 65 et seq. and p. 198 (by implication).
18. Wright, op. cit. p. 193. One feels obliged to comment that the logic behind the elevation is, at best, faulty. Organization of the League of Nations to contain future wars was not dependent on the capitulation of Germany and its allies; a mutual ceasefire would have been more conducive to a unified world. One could conclude that the pious aim was merely a slogan for encouragement of the people.
23. Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars, Penguin, London, 1977, p. 72. Walzer was actually referring to the policy of appeasement when he penned these words, but they apply equally well to the case of strict self-defence, which can, in any case, be linked with appeasement.
24. Constraints of size prevent full developments of arguments in this essay but very full arguments in support of most of the propositions may be found in Walzer, op. cit.
26. Walzer, op. cit. p. 54 et seq. and p. 70 et seq.
27. Although nations have a right to resist, they do not necessarily have an obligation to resist. Under some circumstances, accommodation or surrender may be the more valid moral response; Denmark's decision not to physically resist the German invasion in 1940 is a good illustration.
29. Wright, op. cit. p. 208 et seq.
30. 'World Wars' in Encyclopaedia Britannica, ibid., Vol. 19, p. 967.
31. Walzer, op. cit., p. 86 et seq.
32. Walzer, op. cit., p. 119.
34. Walzer, op. cit. p. 233. On neutrality, Walzer concludes that the right of neutrality outweigh the obligation in the community of nations. His argument, however, is unconvincing. He appears at pains to produce an argument supporting preconceived conclusions and commitments.
35. Walzer, op. cit., p. 97.
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Wing Commander Hughes is currently CERCOM in the Directorate of Communications — Electronics Air Force. He has previously served in HQSC, Defence Central and on exchange with the RAF. He is a graduate of the RAAF Staff College.

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THE RISE OF SOVIET NAVAL POWER
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON
AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

By Maj M. R. Roseblade, RACT.

"Today we have a fully modern Navy, equipped with everything necessary for the successful performance of all missions on the expanses of the world’s oceans. Naval forces can be used — in peacetime — to put pressure on their enemies, as a type of military demonstration, as a threat to interrupting sea communications and as a hindrance to ocean commerce. The flag of the Soviet Navy now flies over the oceans of the World."

Admiral Gorshkov

INTRODUCTION

The dramatic expansion of Soviet maritime power since the Second World War has been the subject of scrutiny and comment by Western analysts for a number of years. Much argument has centered on whether this expansion in size was in the nature of a defensive reaction to an imagined U.S./NATO military threat to the Soviet Union; or whether it represented a policy of aggressive expansion and a realisation, following the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, of the potential of naval forces for propagating communist power and influence throughout the world.

AIM

The aim of the this article is to illustrate how the growing Soviet Navy, particularly the Soviet Pacific Fleet, poses a very real threat to Australia’s trade and defence, having regard to the size and make up of the Royal Australian Navy and the falling strength of the United States Navy in the region.

DISCUSSION

Australia’s Trade Routes

Australia, being an island-continent depends to a very great extent on overseas trade. We have always done so and we will continue to do so. By far, the greater proportion of Australian overseas trade depends upon the sea.

Australia has a number of principal trade routes, including:

a. Coastal routes, including such vitally important movements as that of iron from the minor parts of the north-west, north about to South East Australia and oil form the Bass Strait oil fields.

b. The trade routes to Europe, via the Cape of Good Hope are markedly more vulnerable than they were now, that we must assume that satellite surveillance will increase the ability of a hostile power to divert diesel electric or nuclear powered submarines to intercept merchantmen on the high seas.

c. Exports and imports routed through the Indonesian Archipelago could, if Indonesia resumed diplomatic relations with the USSR, be closed off by mines, surface-to-surface guided weapon armed fast attack craft, submarines and short-ranged shore-based aircraft.

d. Exports and imports routed to our north-eastwards, perhaps to avoid the Indonesian Archipelago, cannot avoid passing through other islands to reach Japan. Those islands belong to newly independant and increasingly diverse small national states, often with harbours and airfields, for the use of which Russia may be prepared to pay valuable contributions, to help the unhealthy balance of trade of an island state.

e. Even trade routes to North America cannot avoid passing through island studded areas.

In these circumstances, in which Australia’s maritime trade can be threatened, not only on the High Seas, but in restricted waters far from Australia, the Russian Navy would not have to restrict herself to actions in the approaches to our principal ports.

THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET

Can the Soviet Navy now apply sufficient force against Australia to inflict a defeat upon us and if Russia has insufficient force to do this now when will she be able to do so?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider several major aspects of the Soviet Navy:

a. The margin of strength the Russians would have after they have met commitments in other parts of the world — those parts outside the Indian Ocean and Pacific Regions.

b. The capabilities — the number of ships, submarines and aircraft and their armaments — of that margin of strength.

c. The ability of those marginal forces to operate at distances from Russia — the bases and afloat support capability available to Russia in the region.

d. The potential growth in capability of Russia’s maritime forces over the next two decades — the lifetime of the ships, submarines and aircraft for which Australia is making equipment decisions in 1981.

Russia’s Margin of Maritime Strength

Russia has commitments to meet outside the Indian Ocean and Pacific Region, including:

a. SSBNs (Ballistic-missile submarine, nuclear) and SSBs (Ballistic-missile submarine, conventional) for use against targets in Western Europe and North America.

b. Anti-submarine operations against British, French and United States SSBNs.

c. Strike Operations against U.S. reinforcements moving across the Atlantic in the early phases of a European War.

d. Strike against NATO maritime forces, such as the Sixth and Second Fleets.

e. Defence of Russia’s own coastal shipping and that small portion of her overseas trade that is important to Russia’s prosecution of a war.

Whether or not Russia would actually have to fight a major Atlantic/European War in the event of a regional conflagration in the Indian Ocean-Western Pacific Region, it can be argued that, in deploying her forces on a world wide basis, Russia would not feel safe in neglecting the Atlantic and adjoining waters.

Thus, if Russia became involved in a war with (say) China, she could not accept the risk of deploying her Arctic and Atlantic maritime forces to the Indian or Pacific Oceans.

Therefore, it can be assumed that Russia’s margin of strength for a war in the Indian Ocean and/or Pacific Region would be drawn from at least those maritime forces normally deployed in the Soviet Pacific Fleet — from which Russia’s Indian Ocean Battle Groups are normally drawn.

Annexes A and B list the ships, submarines and aircraft which comprise the Soviet Pacific Fleet. These Maritime Forces can be subgrouped by role:

a. The Ballistic Missile Strike Force, comprised of SSBNs and SSBs, for use against China or the United States. Normally, these forces are committed and are not available for redeployment.

b. A Long Range Submarine Strike Force, capable of use against hostile surface war and merchant ships, anywhere in the Pacific or Indian Oceans.

c. Escort Forces, for that small portion of Russia’s merchant marine that is vital to her prosecution of a war. (Destroyers and Frigates).

d. Short-Ranged Forces — fast attack craft, missile corvettes etc. and some types of aircraft — for use in a defensive or offensive role in waters adjacent to Eastern Russia.

e. Defensive Forces — Mine Counter-Measures units for clearing Russian waters of mines.

f. Amphibious Forces, for amphibious operations over short distances (LCTs) and LSTs, capable of operations over both short and ocean distances.

g. Surface Strike Forces, of an aircraft carrier, guided missile cruisers and destroyers and long range aircraft, such as Backfire.

h. Support Forces.

Of these, the forces that could be both uncommitted and capable of operating south into the Indonesian Archipelago, the South Pacific and Indian Ocean, are the submarines, oceangoing amphibious forces and surface and airstrike forces.

We have recently seen forces of all these types within photographic range of the RAAF’s long-range maritime patrol aircraft. Photographs have been taken of the aircraft carrier Minsk, the LPD Ivan Rogov, the 8200 ton guided missile armed cruiser Petropavlovsk and a Zulu class submarine operating off North West Australia.
Obviously, the extent to which ships of these types would be available for operations against Australia would depend upon Russia's commitments elsewhere in the region. However, the very nature of marginal strength in heavy oceangoing units of these types, suggests their availability for operations in our region.

Therefore, their use becomes a matter of the priority of Russian targeting, or much more likely, the benefits Russia might seek as a return on the investment she would make in deploying her marginal strength against Australia.

Possible motives for a Soviet attack upon Australian interests are frequently 'glossed over' in the general media. Some are far from unconceivable, particularly where Australia could simply be held for ransom.

It would be quite practicable for Russia to attack Australia's coastal shipping until a ransom was paid, in the form of fishing concessions, supplies of wheat to beat an international ban, or refused to replenish U.S. Naval Forces.

To assess the maximum ability of Soviet Maritime forces to threaten Australia, it is necessary to examine each aspect of Russia's marginal maritime strength.

**Amphibious Forces**

Russia's amphibious warfare capability has increased significantly in recent times. However, this has been primarily a qualitative increase — the sophistication of operations.

However, it is considered, that even with the LPD, Russia is still ten years away from an ability to mount an opposed over-the-beach landing and maintain the offensive capability of that force, once it is ashore.

Therefore, whilst Russia's oceangoing amphibious forces are efficient, their limited numbers would confine them to small lodgments of short duration in Australia.

Looking well ahead, a major invasion is a possibility but, to achieve the required major numerical build up would take some years and would be easily detectable — Australia would have plenty of warning time.

**Submarines**

As shown at Annex A, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has a general purpose submarine force of some eighty boats. The deployment of even ten percent of these in Australian waters would very quickly tax Australia's surface and Mine Counter Measures forces.

Soviet submarines alone, could quickly prohibit Australian coastal and maritime trade.

**Surface Forces**

Early in 1980, the Soviet carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean included the aircraft carrier *Minsk* and the cruiser *Petropavlovsk*. Between them, these ships were equipped with fixed wing VSTOL aircraft for air defence and strike against surface targets, anti-submarine helicopters, helicopters for over-the-horizon guidance of long-range surface to surface guided missiles, anti-submarine missiles, long-range surface to air missiles, point defence missile systems and anti-cruise missile missiles.

Accompanied by a Fleet Replenishment Ship, it is considered that this force could operate with relative impunity, in Australian waters (within range of our shore-based aircraft).

With further Soviet VSTOL aircraft carriers becoming rapidly available, a class of nuclear powered CTOL aircraft carriers under construction, Kara Class cruisers in series production and the first of the gigantic Orsvietsk Soyces class battle cruisers (*Kirov*) launched earlier this year, Australia has a long way to go before it can match even half of Russia's Pacific Fleet marginal ocean going strength.

**Mine Warfare**

Although the newer Soviet heavy surface units have sacrificed their minelaying capability in favour of helicopter platform, many of the Pacific Fleets' older units are equipped for minelaying. The Sverdlov Class cruisers are each equipped with 150 mines, whilst the Koutlins and Skorys can each lay 80 mines. Most Soviet submarines are equipped to lay mines, as are aircraft.

Australia is overly vulnerable to the mine and the availability of a modern MCM force is many years away.

**Naval Aircraft**

Even when operating from their bases in Vietnam, Soviet shore based aircraft would be out of minelaying range of Australian waters, unless they ran the risk of air to air refuelling. Backfire (TU-22m) variable geometry bombers, operating from Vietnam, could probably threaten Australia's trade in the northern approaches — in the Timor Sea, or the
approaches to the Sunda or Tombok Straits. With in-flight refuelling, Backfires could range further south and over some parts of Australia's more vital coastal shipping routes. Nevertheless, even Russia's Vietnamese bases are a long way from Australia and her home bases are much further still.

**Naval Bases**

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is well supported by bases. However, their distance from both Australia and the Indian Ocean, leave Russia with the options of depending upon afloat support or acquiring more forward operating facilities. Russia is apparently adopting both courses, as the recent increase in the Pacific Fleets' afloat support strength and base developments in Vietnam, Cambodia and elsewhere demonstrate. Apart from her own bases, there are numerous Soviet technicians at India's major naval base at Visakpatnam.

The Soviet Fleets make excellent use of their merchant ships, as a means of providing fuel, ammunition and stores. Thus, the strength of the Soviet merchant Navy, which is the largest in the world, must be taken into consideration when assessing the ability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet to operate away from its home bases.

**AUSTRALIA'S REPLY TO THE GROWING SOVIET NAVAL THREAT**

In February 1980, the Prime Minister announced, that as a consequence of the events in Afghanistan, the Government had decided to increase operations in the Indian Ocean, including extra surveillance flights and naval patrolling, ship visits to littoral states and naval exercises with friendly forces in the region.

In a statement to the House of Representatives on 25 March 1980, the Minister for Defence laid to rest the idea that there would be no threat to Australia for many years.

As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mr Killen said that Australia must rely on its principal ally, to carry the main responsibilities in the Indian Ocean by Australian air and naval units. Australia has offered the United States the use of defence facilities in Australia, that might support the U.S. operations in the region. Mr Killen emphasized the need for Australia to recognize that it was only in, on and over the sea, that a hostile military power could be projected towards Australia. He said “Our interest, therefore, is to do what we can to ensure that our maritime approaches are not dominated by unfriendly or potentially unfriendly countries”.

**Deterrent Capability**

Effective deterrence is undoubtly the most desirable form of defence. What deterrent force is available now to counter the growing threat of the Soviet navy?

- **a. The Full Strike Force.** Consists of twenty-four F111C fighter bombers located at Amberley, Queensland. These aircraft will eventually be equipped with the Harpoon missile.

- **b. The Submarine Force.** The six Oberon Class submarines, carrying Mark 48 torpedoes give the RAN a limited capability for long-range interception of enemy submarines and surface ships. The Oberons are to be equipped with new U.S. fire control systems and the Harpoon anti-ship missile system. There are no plans to increase the number of submarines.

- **c. The Naval Air Arm.** This consists of one squadron of five A5-G Skyhawk strike fighter aircraft, two squadrons of anti-submarine aircraft with 19 Grumman Trackers and one ASW helicopter squadron with six Sea King and two Wessex helicopters.

- **d. Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance and Strike.** This force consists of twenty Lockheed Orions, based at Edinburgh, near Adelaide. One of the squadrons is equipped with ten of the new P3C aircraft and the other is equipped with the older P3B. The Government has embarked on a programme to improve the intelligence gathering, anti-submarine and anti-shipping capabilities and survivability of the Orions as follows:
  1. installation of the Australian developed Barra Sonobuoy;
  2. modification to carry the Harpoon air-to-surface missile (range 80 km); and
  3. updating the ECM equipment.

- **e. Naval Surface Force.** This force consists of:
  1. 6 Oberon Class patrol submarines;
  2. 1 Majestic Class Medium aircraft carrier; (In exercise)
THE RISE OF SOVIET NAVAL POWER

(3) 3 Charles F Adams Class guided missile destroyers;
(4) 2 FFG 'Oliver Hazard Perry' guided missile frigates;
(5) 2 Daring Class destroyers;
(6) 6 River Class frigates;
(7) 3 Ton class MCM ships;
(8) 12 Attack class patrol craft;
(9) 4 Oceanographic survey ships;
(10) 1 Fleet tanker;
(11) 1 Destroyer tender;
(12) 1 Training ship;
(13) 6 Landing craft (Heavy);
(14) 1 Amphibious Heavy Lift Ship; and
(15) 42 Miscellaneous craft.

f. In addition the following craft are being procured overseas or are being built in Australia:
(1) 2 FFG 7 'Oliver Hazard Perry' guided missile frigates, from the United States;
(2) 15 Brooke marine PC F420 patrol craft;
(3) 1 new Underway replenishment ship, to replace HMAS 'Supply'.

The RAN Order of Battle and ship's characteristics are shown at Annex C.

The writer considers that the deterrent force available to counter the Soviet Navy is inadequate, for the following reasons:

a. The Age of Naval Force Craft. As can be seen from Annex C, the majority of the craft are more than ten years old. Indeed, HMAS Melbourne was launched in England in 1944 and commissioned into the RAN in 1955. It is now twenty-six years old. Inspite of a series of extraordinarily expensive modernisations and refits, HMAS Melbourne has reached the end of its useful life. The last Charles F. Adams Class guided missile destroyer to join the RAN, HMAS Perth, was launched in 1963 and commissioned in 1965. In addition, the last of the three 'Ton' class MCM ships, HMAS Snipe, was launched and commissioned in 1953. (The average age of ships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is four years, two months.)

b. Weaponry. When compared with the weaponry installed in Soviet ships, the weapons systems with which the RAN is equipped are inadequate. A prime example, again, is HMAS Melbourne. Although the carrier would operate with a protective destroyer and frigate screen, United States Navy doctrine admits that the Soviets would be capable of saturating a large area of ocean with anti-ship cruise missiles. Most, it would be hoped, would be shot down by the screen but some would penetrate to the carrier. (The current AA/cruise missile defence of HMAS Melbourne consists of twelve (four twin, four single) 40 mm Bofors guns of 1953 vintage and 1940 design).

Only two RAN vessels will be equipped with a close support defence system such as the U.S. Phalanx gatling gun system, which can fire 3000 rounds per minute at incoming cruise missiles. Although the Mk 48 torpedo (the most advanced in the world) and the Harpoon surface to surface and air to surface missile are being gradually purchased (in limited numbers) and will provide a limited capability, the majority of weapons systems of RAN surface ships and submarines are far older than their Soviet counterparts.

c. Numbers of Craft available. With only six submarines, one aircraft carrier, five destroyers and six frigates, the task of protecting the two hundred mile EEZ surrounding the 2500 miles of Australia's coast line seems awesome, particularly when one remembers that this entails 2.5 million square miles of ocean! One must also take into account that of the eighteen major warships, one-third would be in the process of refitting or replenishment, at any given time.

As discussed earlier, if only ten percent of the submarines available to the Soviet Pacific Fleet were deployed in Australian waters, the RAN would be hopelessly overstretched to counter this threat with only one underway replenishment ship available (this craft would obviously operate with HMAS Melbourne and her protective destroyer screen). Thus the RAN can 'field' only one battle group. If Soviet submarines commenced an operation off the east coast against merchant shipping and the Battle Group was patrolling off N.W. Australia, it
would be at least five days, travelling at full speed (HMAS Melbourne — 23 knots), before it arrived.

CONCLUSION

It has been assumed that a unit of the United States Navy would be available to aid the RAN, if any of the scenarios discussed earlier, eventuated. However, with commitments worldwide, particularly the Atlantic and a rapidly expanding Soviet Navy to contend with, it is considered that the USN would be capable of rendering little assistance. Australia must therefore be prepared to operate alone.

With a large EEZ and coastline to protect, reliance on maritime communications and a small Navy, Australia is desperately vulnerable to the massive Soviet Navy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made:

a. Develop the industrial base to produce our own ships and aircraft. It is considered a mistake to acquire sophisticated weaponry from overseas. Example is the acquisition of the four FFG 7 'Oliver Hazard Perry' guided missile frigates from the United States. Although Australia has the capability for overhauling and maintaining such craft, the loss of one or all of these ships in combat could not be replaced.

The Harpoon missile and Mk 48 Torpedo are also purchased from the United States, in limited numbers. Each one used must be purchased from the United States. In a wartime situation with air and sea routes to the United States, in all probability, severed, replacement ships, spare parts and ammunition could not be replaced.

The replacement for HMAS Melbourne will also be acquired from either the United States or Spain. Australia must therefore, be capable of producing its own weaponry — and quickly.

b. Small, Missile craft, it has been shown, can carry an extraordinarily large amount of offensive weaponry in relation to their size. In 1967, an Egyptian 'Osa' patrol boat sank the Israeli destroyer Eliaji with a Styx anti-ship missile. Small missile armed craft are far less expensive than frigates and destroyers and many can be purchased for the cost of one destroyer. Australia should build a large fleet of Harpoon equipped missile patrol craft, rather than relying on small numbers of larger, more sophisticated ships.

c. Increase the number of submarines from six to at least twenty. These should also be designed and built in Australia.

d. Small VTOL carriers should be built, rather than reliance being placed in one large and expensive aircraft carrier. Equipped with 'Harrier' type aircraft and ASW helicopters, three VTOL carriers would significantly improve the RANs' offensive capability.

e. Utilization of merchant shipping to carry ammunition and stores for the fleet would reduce the need for dedicated RAN support ships to be built. Provision should also be made for the fitting of defensive armament to merchant shipping in time of crisis, particularly with AA and ASW missiles.

f. Upgrade an MCM capability in the form of large numbers of mine warfare vessels. Having regard to the large Soviet minewarfare capability and Australia's vulnerability to mines, the mine hunting catamaran, currently under development, should be proceeded with as quickly as possible.

RUSSIAN PACIFIC FLEET — ESTIMATED COMPOSITION JUL 80

(From Jane's Fighting Ships 1980/81)

1. Submarines
   a. SSBN — 23 (10 Deltas, 11 Yankees, 2 Hotels)
   b. SS  —  5 (Golfs)
   c. SSGN — 17 (3 Echo Is, 14 Echo Is)
   d. SSG — 6 (4 Juliet, 2 Whiskey 'Long Bin')
   e. SSN — 14 (incl at least 4 November and 6 Victor)
   f. SS — 45 (incl at least 16 Foxtrot, 1 Bravo, 17 Whiskey, 6 Zulu)

2. Heavy Ships
   a. Aircraft Carrier (cv) — 1 (Minsk)
   b. Guided Missile Cruisers — 7 (Incl 1 Kara, 2 Kyndas, 3 Kresta)
   c. Light Cruiser (CL) — 2 (Sverdlovs)
   d. Command Cruiser (CC) — (Admiral Senyavin)

3. Escorts
   a. DDG — 11 (Incl at least 5 Kashins, 1 Kildin, 2 Kanin)
   b. FFG — 6 (Incl at least 3 Krivals)
   c. DD — 15 (8 Keitins, 7 Skoryis)
   d. FF — 30 (Incl 2 Kola, 9 Riga, 10 Petya, 4 Mirlsa)
   e. PSK — 19
4. Amphibious Warfare Ships and Craft
   a. PSK — 1 (Ivan Rogov)
   b. LPD — 10 (Aligators and Repuchkas)
   c. LSD — 46 (Incl at least 15 Polnouys)
   d. LCT — 48
   e. Hovercraft — 18

5. Light Craft
   a. Fast attack craft (missile) — 55
   b. Other fast light craft — 155
   c. Ocean and Coastal MCM craft — 93

6. Support Ships
   a. Depot ships — 20
   b. Fleet Support ships — 35
   c. AOR — 24
   d. AOE — 1
   e. Auxiliaries — 130
   f. Merchant ships as required

7. Manpower
   130,000 Officers and sailors, of whom at least 50 percent serving at sea at any time.

8. Soviet Naval Infantry
   Two Soviet Naval Infantry Regiments, each of 3 Infantry Battalions, 1 tank battalion (equipped with T54, 55 medium and PT 76 light tanks), APCs, 122 guns and SA09 anti-aircraft missiles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Role and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IL38 (May)</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>Long range maritime patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>TU95d (Bear)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Long range maritime strike. Fitted with ASM. At least ten normally operate from Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TU16 (Badger)</td>
<td>85-100</td>
<td>Maritime strike — fitted with ASM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TUP16 (Badger)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Tankers, ECM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>TU22 (Blinder)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Maritime reconnaissance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>TU22M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Strategic bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yak 36 (Forger A)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>VTOL attack aircraft for CV Minsk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>BC12 (Mail)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maritime patrol flying boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>KA25 (Hormone)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Seaborne ASW helicopters, armed with ASW torpedoes or nuclear depth charges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>KA25 (Hormone B)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Special electronics duties, nil, OTH missile guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>M14 (Hound)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Utility and transport helicopter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personnel: Over 12,000 men, including ground crew, but excluding ship's companies.

The Russian research ship Chumikan (about 7,000 tonnes)
## ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERI TYPE</th>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>NO. RANGE (NM)</th>
<th>SPEED (KM)</th>
<th>ARMAMENT</th>
<th>DATE COMMISSIONED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Aircraft Carrier</td>
<td>Modified 'Majestic'</td>
<td>1 12,000 at 14 kts, 6,200 at 23 kts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12-40 mm (4 twin, 4 single) 4 A4G Skyhawk fighters, S5G Trackers, A/S aircraft and Sea King Mk 50 A/S helicopters</td>
<td>28 Oct. 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Submarine 'Oxley' (British Oberon)</td>
<td>6 9,000</td>
<td>16 surfaced 17 submerged</td>
<td>8 x 21 in tubes (Mk 48 torpedo)</td>
<td>1967-69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Destroyers 'Perth' (DDG)</td>
<td>3 45,000 at 15 2000 at 30</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>Tartar SAM 2 x 3&quot; Iroq 6 x Mk 32 A/S torpedoes</td>
<td>1965-67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Destroyer Daring (DD)</td>
<td>1 3,700 at 20 30-5</td>
<td>6 x 4-5</td>
<td>6 x 40 60 mm 1 x 2 barrelled Limbo mortars</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Frigate Oliver Hazard Perry</td>
<td>4 4,500 at 20 29</td>
<td>6 x 21 in tubes</td>
<td>Standard SAM Harpoon SAM 1 x 76 mm 6 x Mk 32 torpedo tubes</td>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Frigate 'River'</td>
<td>6 3,400 at 12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Seaco SAM 2 x 115 mm</td>
<td>1958-71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mine warfare ships 'Ton' (modified)</td>
<td>3 23,000 at 15 3,500 at 8 kts</td>
<td>2 x 40 mm</td>
<td>1953-56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Large Patrol Craft 'Freemantle'</td>
<td>15 1,450 at 30</td>
<td>4,800 cruising</td>
<td>1 x 40 mm</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Large Patrol Craft 'Attack'</td>
<td>12 1,220 at 13</td>
<td>1 x 40 mm</td>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Destroyer Tender</td>
<td>1 12,000 at 12 20+</td>
<td>4 x 40 mm</td>
<td>12 twin</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Fleet Tanker 'Tide'</td>
<td>1 8,500 at 13 17</td>
<td>2 x 40 mm</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Roseblade graduated from Dunroon in December 1971. He has served in a number of Field Force road transport units and staff appointments. Between 1977 and 1979 he was a Troop Commander, 176 Air Dispatch Squadron, and since 1980 has served as a Staff Officer on the Headquarters of Field Force Command, Victoria Barracks. He is presently serving as Staff Officer Grade 2 (Personnel and Logistics), Field Force Movements and Transport.

## CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT, Cable, James. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Sep 82: 71-76. Examines what happened, and what might have happened, and concludes that deterrence and defence are much preferable to counterattack.


WHY BEGIN SHOULD INVITE ARAFAT TO JERUSALEM, Foreign Affairs, Summer 82: 1110-1123. Proposes three reasons why Israel should recognize the P.L.O. and invite Yassir Arafat to talks in Jerusalem. Namely that recognizing the P.L.O. will enhance Israel’s image at home and abroad, secondly that the P.L.O. is the only organisation representing the Palestinians and finally because such a move would improve Israel's position in the Arab world.

MARITIME STRATEGY VS COALITION DEFENSE, Komer, Robert W. Foreign Affairs, Summer 82: 1124-1144. Analysis of future options in American national defence strategy to replace the primary reliance on nuclear deterrence. The two major options discussed are maritime dominance and increased defence of Europe and Asia resulting from a higher level of conventional defence with a more equal contribution being made by the allies.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A DIFFICULT DECADE, Rogers, Bernard W. Foreign Affairs, Summer 82: 1145-1156. Describes the needs of NATO during the 1980’s, if it is to maintain its credibility as a defensive alliance able to oppose the Warsaw Pact nations.

MANEUVER WARFARE AT SEA, Kelsey, Robert J. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Sep 82: 30-36. Naval doctrine must accommodate both manoeuvre warfare, to paralyze the enemy, and attrition-warfare, to destroy him by emphasising flexibility of equipment, tactics and strategy.
DRILL IN A
MODERN AUSTRALIAN ARMY

By Staff Sergeant R. R. Chant, Army Survey Regiment

A n Englishman named Lawrence once wrote: "We of the 20th Century have 2,000 years of recorded experience, and if we still must fight, we have no excuse for not fighting well".

In the past few years the British have added significantly to that record of experience. They have the ongoing experience of Northern Ireland, have had the Iranian Embassy Incident in London and lately the re-occupation of the Falkland Islands. Yet it is not for these actions alone that the British soldier has become the soldier of the hour. In fact, he has been the soldier of the hour for the last couple of hundred years. The proof of this is not so much in his victories, but in his defeats.

He has been defeated in a variety of theatres for a variety of reasons. Some of these defeats have been The Charge of the Light Brigade, Isandhlwana, Khartoum, Singapore, Crete and Arnhem, to name a few. Some of the reasons for these defeats have been: poor generalship, lack of political will to prosecute, conflict between military and political interest or simple, overwhelming odds. No recent defeat can be solely attributed to lack of discipline, teamwork or fitness on the part of the private soldier. This is born out by the horrific cost that goes with defeating the British soldier. Nobody ever beats him cheaply. This is what makes him the soldier of the hour. He achieves this by attention to basic principles of soldiering. The most important basic principle of soldiering is drill. However, the British soldier has not always been so fine. During the American Revolution, plain bad soldiering can be added to lack of political will and poor generalship on the part of the British, giving the Americans a cheaper victory than they might have had.

Robert Jackson joined the British Army in New York just after the outbreak of the American Revolution. He was an army doctor of wide experience by the time he wrote "A View of the Formation, Discipline and Economy of Armies". Quoting from Jackson: "The exercise with the firelock, or common drilling of the European Infantry, are not of a nature to interest the simple soldier. The purpose of them, as connected with utility, is not fully comprehended by him. He goes to the field as an automaton, to act and be acted upon by mechanical powers, ignorant of the principle on which he acts, and the purpose for which he is constrained to act." I find this statement too close to the mark in the Australian Army today. Not so much with weapon training, but almost word perfect if applied to drill training.

At a time when we should be, at the very least, maintaining drill standards and content, both standard and content, particularly in post recruit training is diminishing. This is happening because, as Jackson said: "Drill does not have the nature to interest soldiers and most soldiers do not understand its purpose." The reason that soldiers show little interest in or do not understand drill, is lack of education.

Recruits are often shown the film "Zulu". Why? "Zulu" is a good leadership film and an example of firepower of European armies in the late 1800s. Unless the elements of drill are explained in detail prior to seeing the film, then seeing the film simply becomes a pleasant break from the daily routine of training. Even the introduction in our drill manual leaves a bit to be desired. Four paragraphs is hardly enough to even basically cover the aim and purpose of Drill. To speak vaguely about instilling a sense of instinctive obedience is not good enough.

If you study the implications of instinctive action you could come to the conclusion that there should be nothing instinctive about obedience. Obedience should come from an alert, conscious and precise frame of mind and never from the half-haze of Pavlovian instinct.

The young men who join our Army today are the educated products of a technology-based society. Yet, with regard to drill, they are falling into the category described by Robert Jackson. That description is over 200 years old. We must avoid this lack of understanding and raise the level of interest in drill
procedures. This can be easily achieved. Toward the end of every recruit’s training he should be given a formal lesson on the elements of drill and their relevance to modern soldiering. I believe that the following precis would form a solid base for such a lecture. This deeper understanding of drill should be confirmed on Subject 1 promotion courses at all levels. We have been historically fortunate in inheriting a drill system from the British. We should properly recognise it for what it is and concentrate it; not dilute it.

The A.B.C. of Military Drill

Introduction

When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of it’s prey, it is because of timing. Sun Tzu. There are three principles underlying the performance of Military Drill. The order in which this precis presents them implies no degree of importance to any of these elements. They are the floor, the walls and the roof of a bunker. Without any one of these elements, you do not have a secure structure from which you can fight.

Aim

The aim of this precis is to define and explain in detail, the three elements of Military Drill.

The Three Elements of Military Drill

a. **Element A.** Drill is taught so that a degree of instant obedience is instilled into the individual soldier; eg, a properly trained soldier will instantly respond to a sharp verbal command.

b. **Element B.** Each drill movement is taught according to its own individual aim; ie, Turns and Inclines at the Halt are taught so that the direction of a body of troops can be changed in an orderly and efficient manner. The statement of aims during drill periods establishes in the recruit’s mind that military orders have specific aims. This justifies instant obedience.

c. **Element C.** Drill is taught to instill precision, aggression and fitness into the individual soldier; eg, a properly trained soldier will be able to precisely co-ordinate a sequence of actions in a fit and aggressive manner. Precise co-ordination is another term for teamwork.

These three elements are the backbone of military training.

Analysis of Elements. Let us examine a hypothetical squad. An instructor is carrying out confirmation after teaching Turns and Inclines at the Halt.

Refer only to “Element A”. Given the command: “Right Turn!” the members of the squad will individually, and instantly, turn to their right. This will become a standard response for the rest of their military careers; and so they should instantly react to all properly executed orders for the following reason:

Refer only to “Element B”. Given the command: “Right Turn!” the squad is aware that there is a reason behind the order. Having been given an “Aim” for all lessons throughout their training, they will have established a “Habit of Knowing” that they are always acting for a specific military reason. A person in any walk of life performs a function better if he knows why he has to perform it. Even if a person only has a “Habit of Knowing”, he will out-perform a person who can suspect no reason at all for a given command. So, as well as individually turning to the right, they will do so with the confidence of knowledge.

Refer only to “Element C”. Given the command: “Right Turn!” the squad will move with individual precision and aggression, through two physically demanding stages. It is the individual’s skill at performing precisely timed movements that gives a group of individuals the key element of teamwork. The two movements carried out by the soldier are performed with controlled speed and physical exaggeration. There is an implied aggression in moving with rapid physical control and noise; eg, Karate. Although drill noises are not vocal, the noise is sharp, loud and clear in a good aggressive squad. Exaggerated physical movement is sometimes called “exercise”. The fitness benefits of drill movements can only be achieved if they are repeated like any other exercise. Performing selected or modified drill movements as exercise, has the added advantage of reinforcing Elements A and B.

Any drill period or drill style can be analysed in terms of these three elements.

Relevance of Drill in Modern Warfare. History shows that well-drilled, and, consequently, highly disciplined armies, when properly led, have most often carried the victories. The
OCS Cadets on Parade
A.B.C. of drill played its part in the past. Due to the ever-increasing complexity of military operations, it will play an increasing part in future victories.

Anti-terrorist, or strike action, along with the staccato nature of bushfire or guerrilla warfare, has seen a great change in the basic forms of military operations in the past thirty years. In general terms, orthodox armies now train for a series of short-term tactical objectives that can blend into extremely long-term strategies. The Soviet Union is a good example of a short-term tactical operator who is tied to a long-term strategy of indefinite duration.

Terrorist Example: Iran’s London Embassy. In this example, soldiers with the highest levels of skill were called upon to separate armed fanatics from a group of hostages. They achieved this objective by employing a precise series of rapid, aggressive actions. Soldiers at this level succeed on precise action and instant reaction based on ingrained sense of timing, controlled aggression, a high state of mental and physical preparedness, as well as many other attributes. However, remember that they were recruits once. On what foundation is their skill built? Military Drill!

Orthodox Warfare Example. In general terms there will be no more “fronts” along which armies can test their strength and endurance for extended periods of time. The orthodox soldier will act against his enemy in a highly technical and likely, very mobile environment. He will be part of a team carrying out co-ordinated actions to search and destroy, effect security of an area, interdict supply routes, cordon hostile areas, be they towns or villages, along with many other orthodox military functions. These tactics will demand precise actions aimed at specific objectives. A modern operation may have elements of Infantry, Artillery, Armour, Engineers, Strike Aircraft and Airborne Troops all combining in a complex tactical plan. Everyone involved will need an inherent sense of timing, an aggressive desire to achieve the objective and a high level of fitness. Where does the soldier begin to build these skills? On the drill square.

True enough, armies no longer fight in squares where a complex series of close-order drills have to be carried out to position troops prior to and during a battle. Armies now change position or direction and engage in battle largely by mechanical means. The action is swifter, more intense. The tolerance for error is contracting. Therefore the A.B.C. is becoming more important as a foundation for advanced military training.

Conclusion
An army that performs a relaxed style of drill is attempting a contradiction of principles. Relaxed Discipline? Relaxed Precision? How can they proceed to higher levels of military skill and achieve the required success rates?
The drill element of training in the Australian Army gives one of the best training foundations in the world. Understand these elements and build upon them to the best of your ability. Do this and you will be able to demonstrate these principles to your enemies at their expense.

If we teach our soldiers something along these lines, concentrating on interest and understanding, we will produce an even better soldier.

Sergeant Chant joined the Army as an Apprentice Fitter and Turner in 1967. He graduated from Army Apprentices School, Balcombe as a member of the 22nd intake in 1969. In 1971 he was transferred from RAEME to RA Svy. Since joining the Royal Australian Army Survey Corps he has worked in many areas of the map production process and is currently employed in the Photographic Troop at Army Survey Regiment.
THE FIRST AND THE FINEST

By Jeff Popple BA (Hons), Dept. of Defence

Peter Charlton's The Thirty-niners is a joyous celebration of those original volunteers for the second Australian Imperial Force, the men that General Blamey called 'the first and the finest'. Traditionally portrayed as reckless, flamboyant adventurers, these men who enlisted in the last month's of 1939 were to form the famous 6th Division.

The 6th Division was raised in a period of indecisiveness and complacency. The Government was reluctant to send the Division overseas, because of the threat posed at home by Japan, and did not put a lot of effort into recruiting for the AIF. The Government was undecided how to approach the War and its' motto of 'business as usual' permeated the community, and was partially responsible for the complacency and apathy shown by the bulk of the public. Men were unenthusiastic about enlisting in the 6th Division, and this in turn fueled antagonism between the volunteers and the rest of the public, and particularly between the AIF and the militia. Not surprisingly, these original volunteers developed a strong esprit de Corps, that separated them from later recruits and from the rest of the public.

The bitterness felt by some of the 'thirty-niners' is reflected in this extract from a diary written after the battle at Bardia, in January 1941:

"In those early times of October-December 1939 the AIF were subjected to humiliating jeers and sneers by Sydney citizens of the sort who had the conviction that khaki was very drab and unattractive suiting and that the patriotic motives which impelled us to enlist were outdated and unfashionable emotions. [It is] these people who are [now] no doubt cheering loudest in the general acclamation of the Bardia Battle."

Obviously, the origins of this sort of attitude can be traced back to the disastrous recruiting campaign of 1939. For in 1939, unlike in 1914, there was no overwhelming rush of eager recruits, and few displays of mass public enthusiasm for the war. Those who did enlist were in the minority, and were considered to be either 'economic conscripts' or just plain foolhardy and reckless.

Recruiting for the 6th Division commenced in early October, with the Government and the press confidently predicting that the 18,500 men needed would be easily raised in under a week. The Sydney Morning Herald proclaimed that the only difficulty would be in 'selecting the necessary men from the very much larger number offering.' Despite these optimistic visions of a deluge of recruits, it soon became apparent that there was not going to be a rush, and after a week of recruiting, only in Queensland was there a good response. [See Table 1]

In New South Wales [See Table 2] recruiting got off to a slow start. On the first day, set aside for men with previous military experience, only 1,369 men enlisted, including 906 militiamen. This response was considered disappointing as there was about 10,000 current members of the militia in New South Wales. On the second day a further 1,010 men were passed as fit, bringing the total to 2,392. This forced the authorities to revise their earlier decision of only leaving the recruiting depots open for two days, and to continue recruiting at all centres. These centres were to stay open for nearly a month before the quota was reached. This response is typical of that experienced throughout Australia, although it was not as bad as the situation in Victoria where
TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>AUSTRALIAN RECRUITING FIGURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCTOBER 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>2504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>1431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>18564</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Non-Militia recruits only.
2. Recruiting figures unavailable.
3. Recruiting commenced 2 October 1939.

it took well over a month to reach the 6,000 man quota.

The most striking feature of the slow enlistment rate was the reluctance of militiamen to transfer to the Second AIF. Half of the vacancies in the 6th Division were set aside for members of the militia, while the rest of the vacancies were to be divided equally between men with previous military experience and those with no military or militia experience. In New South Wales it had become very apparent by 12 October that the militia was not going to fill its' allotted 3,250 positions, and it was decided to discontinue the quota system and to concentrate on recruiting non-militia personages. In Victoria enlisting from militia personnel commenced on 3 November, following the fulfillment of the non-militia quota of 3,000. It took nearly a fortnight to attract 1,000 militia recruits, and with enlistment stagnating it was decided to reopen "general recruiting because militamen had failed to enlist".

This pattern was repeated throughout Australia, and instead of providing the envisaged fifty percent, the militia only provided between twenty to twenty-five percent of the 6th Division, fewer than 5,000 men.

The response to enlistment was very poor compared to 1914, when officials were overwhelmed by the rush of recruits. Sir Henry Gullett, the Minister for Information, described the enlistment rate as "not overwhelming" and went on to say "frankly there was not a big surplus and there has been a very disappointing response from the militia." The new members of the Second AIF echoed these sentiments and many were disappointed that the general public was "not yet awake to [the] national danger." The AIF was particularly angered by the poor response from the militia, and there was a prevalent feeling among the AIF "that the militia had let it down" by not enlisting in larger numbers and filling the "shortage of good officers and NCOs". The AIF claimed that the militiamen were 'Toy Soldiers' more interested in parades than fighting, and thus coined the term; "'choco" — the chocolate soldier who would not fight.'

Those who enlisted were in the minority and this caused a certain amount of tension between the early recruits and the general public. This situation was further strained by the general attitude of the public towards the war, and consequently towards the AIF. There was no mass enthusiasm for the war and most people avidly followed the Governments slogan of 'business as usual'. The public tended not to treat the new recruits with deference, but rather referred to them as 'economic conscripts', 'Menzies' Tourists', and even 'five-bob-a-day murderers'. Members of the 2/10th battalion recalled that "they were in many cases, considered foolishly impulsive, and some [civilians] looked upon the Diggers in uniform with a smirk." While one recruit remorsefully commented that there had been no "tremendous surge of admiration and respect for those who are ready to defend us".

The conditions under which the 6th Division was formed; the slow enlistment rate, the poor response from the militia, and the general apathy of the public; were responsible for the thirty-niners forging on exclusive and very special esprit de Corps. The sense of being an original 'thirty-niner' was very strong, and manifested itself in; their suspicious and caustic treatment of later recruits; their air of confident superiority; and in their treatment of the 'Chocos'. This special esprit de Corps was
forged during their recruitment and was tempered in the battle fields of North Africa, Greece and Crete. It was still with the men when they finally returned to Australia in 1942, and it was reflected in their attitudes which were "resentful of civilians, yanks, chocos, and anyone else who was not in the bloody A.I.F." 16

In The Thirty-niners, Peter Charlton very clearly establishes the character of the esprit de Corps of the 6th Division, but he does not delve for enough into its’ origins. His early chapters set in Australia are the weakest in the book, as he relies far too much on Gavin Long’s To Benghazi 17 for his information and quotes. Once the book is under sail for Egypt it improves greatly, with plenty of original research and it proves to be an excellent examination of the character of those original volunteers for the Second AIF.

Charlton follows the AIF to the Middle East and the successes at Bardia and Tobruk, and from there to the disasters of Greece and Crete. These last two campaigns are particularly well handled and the reader gets a good feel of what it was like to fight in these mishandled and bloody campaigns. As a result of Greece and Crete, over 5,000 Australians were taken prisoner and forced to spend four long monotonous years behind barbed wire as POWs. Charlton also provides an interesting chapter on the AIF’s role in seizing Syria from the Vichy French. After Crete the original 6th Division virtually ceased to exist, and it returned to Australia in 1942 with only a third of the men who had joined up in those doubtful, unreal months of 1939. Charlton only gives scant attention to the battles in Papua, New Guinea, because by that time the influx of reinforcements had changed the character and composition of the battalions, and only a few ‘thirty-niners’ were left.

Charlton has relied heavily upon the diaries and letters of members of the 6th Division; and also upon the answers he received to questionaries, that he sent out to 200 surviving ‘thirty-niners’. His sources provide for some entertaining reading, although Charlton should have dealt more critically, and cautiously, with them. It is also a shame that Charlton has not been more thorough with his footnoting, as he makes it very difficult to follow up, or evaluate, some statements that appear in his text. On the whole The Thirty-niners is a fair book, although perhaps Charlton has been too harsh, or bias, in his appraisal of the performance of the militia units in New Guinea. It is a very readable account, if at times a bit journalistic in style.

The Thirty-niners is an entertaining and thought-provoking study, and it provides a window through which the not too distant past, with its’ now quaint attitudes toward duty and war, can be safely viewed.
NOTES

2. ibid; pp117-8.
3. Originally it had been decided to set aside only two days for recruiting; the first for members of the militia and for those with previous military service; and the second for men with no previous military service.
4. These are official military figures published in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 October—22 November 1939; Commonwealth Debates, 21 November 1939, Vol. 162, p1398.
5. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 September 1939.
6. Age, 15 November 1939.
7. Figures from *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 October — 5 November 1939. The figures used are the official ones released by the military authorities. These had to be sorted out from the more enthusiastic estimations which the *Sydney Morning Herald* often published as being accurate. In some cases the exact figures for each category such as militia recruits were not available but it was possible to calculate them by drawing from the other figures published. Although the New South Wales quota was passed by 3 November, recruiting continued for specialist positions and to replace those determined as being unfit by the comprehensive medical examinations conducted at the training camps.
8. For a analysis of the reasons advanced by the militia to account for their reluctance to enlist see; Jeff Popple, *A Very Temperate Reaction: A study of the first nine months of the Second World War in Australia*, with particular emphasis on enlistment in the 2nd A.I.F., unpublished Honours Thesis, University of New South Wales, pp25, 26, 70.
10. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 January 1940.
12. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 January 1940.
15. The Bulletin, 8 November 1939.

Jeff Popple graduated from the University of New South Wales in 1980 (BA Hons) Military History. He joined the Department of Defence in 1981. Jeff is a keen Military Historian and has contributed to the *Defence Force Journal* on several occasions.

AWARD: ISSUE No. 38 (JANUARY/FEBRUARY, 1983)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the January/February issue (No. 38) of the Defence Force Journal to Dr Edward Duyker, Department of Defence, for his article *The Evolution of Israel’s Defence Industries.*
INTRODUCTION

The argument for tracked Rapier has been strengthened as recent events in South East Asia, the Middle East and the South Atlantic have vividly illustrated the effect that air strikes can have on unprotected ground troops and surface vessels. Unopposed air attacks can only succeed and the destruction in the Falklands of HMS Sir Gallahad along with many of her crew and troops is a clear example of this. The troops being landed were almost entirely at the mercy of the high speed, low-flying enemy aircraft.

The British Aerospace Rapier Surface-to-Air Guided Weapon System has been proven to be an extremely effective air defence weapon. Sales alone demonstrate the confidence many other nations have placed upon Rapier; Abu Dabi, Australia, Brunei, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, USA and Zambia being some of the countries outside the United Kingdom which have made significant purchases of Rapier systems. However, the British Task Force which landed on the Falklands had Rapier — so what went wrong?

Shortfalls

The operational requirement upon which Rapier has been based called for the following principal system characteristics:

a. short reaction and ‘into and out-of action’ times;

b. low weight and compactness to ensure maximum ground mobility and air portability and ease of handling without mechanical aids;

c. ability to operate from ground level up to at least 3000 m;

d. high rate of fire and kill potential; and

e. good coverage and maximum/minimum range performance.

In the case of Optical and Blindfire Rapier, most of these performance criteria have been met except, perhaps, the requirement for short ‘into and out-of action’ times. A highly-trained Rapier section can deploy and be ready to fire in approximately ten minutes in ideal conditions. A more realistic deployment time is around the twenty minute mark. This means that the troops to be protected by Rapier may not be so for a considerable time after an operation commences.

Therefore, Rapier cannot provide immediate air defence for beach landings. Designed as an area defence weapon, Rapier, in its wheeled form, is not ideally suited to supporting mobile operations. The relatively long ‘into and out-of action’ times mean that the system would have to be rapidly moved ahead of an advancing column, deployed and moved again in a leap-frog fashion. This leap-frogging process would required a larger number of fire units than would be necessary if Rapier was more mobile.

In addition, the wheeled version of Rapier is not as mobile as are tracked armoured vehicles and therefore cross-country deployment would, in most cases, require air-lifting facilities to position sufficient fire units, support vehicles and crews.

Additionally, Rapier’s ability to withstand the battering inherent with rapid and frequent redeployment is significantly poor. The equipment in its wheeled configuration is simply not able to cope with this battering and serious degradation of performance is known to occur. Combined with rapid movement, this degradation of performance may mean that the technical support of the system would be seriously stretched, probably beyond the limit, further reducing Rapier’s capability to provide the protection which is clearly required by ground troops operating in a hostile air environment.

These shortfalls would be overcome by a highly mobile, single-vehicle weapon system having the same basic characteristics as Rapier with the following improvements:

a. negligible ‘into and out-of action’ times, and

b. greater reliability.

Why is Rapier Unreliable?

The main reason for the poor ability of Rapier to withstand constant movement is occasioned by the handling required to bring the weapon ‘into and out-of action’. Fourteen cables have to be connected, reconnected, rolled and unrolled; complex electronic assemblies have to be fitted and removed; highly
sensitive electro-optical items have to be manhandled; and a complicated procedure has to be followed for each deployment. Coupled with the handling problems are:

a. inherent unreliability of the dated Rapier technology,
b. long repair times due to the slow manual and automatic testing procedures, and
c. the long logistic ‘tail’ inherent in the repair philosophy of Rapier.

What is the Answer?
The problems which have been identified are:

a. ‘into and out-of action’ times are too long,
b. mobility is restricted,
c. reliability is poor under mobile conditions, and
d. repair times are long.

The procurement of Tracked Rapier would eliminate ‘into and out-of action’ delays, provide improved mobility and reliability, and significantly reduce repair times.

Tracked Rapier
Tracked Rapier is highly mobile and can accompany tanks and other armoured vehicles over rough terrain. It can cross inland waterways and can be landed simultaneously with amphibious operations. The crew and most of the weapon are protected to the same standards as armoured personnel carriers and nuclear, biological and chemical protection are also provided. Further physical data and characteristics are included in the accompanying Table. The characteristics of Tracked Rapier, which significantly reduce most of Rapier’s inherent limitations, are demonstrated in the following summary.

Into and out-of Action Times.
Instead of many minutes to bring the weapon into action in the case of Optical Rapier, only 30 seconds will elapse from halt until an engagement can commence. Out of action time is negligible. All deployment sequences are performed by the crew from within the cabin, precise levelling of the launch vehicle is not required and by having the optical Tracker and power supply mounted on the same vehicle as the launcher, time-consuming recabling and handling procedures are eliminated.

Mobility.
The obvious mobility advantages of lightweight, tracked vehicles over the wheeled combination of prime movers and trailers need no further amplification. The launch vehicle is airlifted in C130 MRT aircraft and can be airlifted by CH-53E helicopters.

Reliability.
Without the constant handling that the current Rapier system receives, an immediate improvement in reliability can be expected. In addition, the redesign that much of the system has undergone means that inherent reliability has also been improved.

Repair Times.
The refinement required to fit Rapier on to tracks was not extensive; however, some redesign was necessary. This redesign gave the manufacturer an opportunity to introduce much in the way of additional built-in test equipment (BITE), further improving the crew’s confidence in the weapon. The additional BITE also assists the maintenance teams in fault-finding, thus reducing repair times.

The Answer.
The introduction of Tracked Rapier to the British Army is yet another example of how well the proven and highly flexible Rapier system can be adapted to effectively protect ground installations and troops. In a hostile air environment, Australia would need Tracked Rapier to support:

a. mobile operations,
b. beach landings, and
c. armoured operations.

Tracked Rapier combines the highly successful Rapier system with the ever-reliable and universally-utilized M113 family of tracked vehicles. Had the British forces landing on the Falklands been equipped with Tracked Rapier, perhaps far fewer human and material casualties would have occurred.

NOTES
1. Tracked Rapier — British Aerospace Dynamics Group Stevenage
3. The Introduction of Rapier into the Royal Air Force — Air Vice Marshal D.A. Pocock — 1974
FIG 1 — RCM 748 VEHICLE

TRACKED RAPIER

PHYSICAL DATA AND CHARACTERISTICS

1. Mobility
   a. Low Ground Pressure
   b. Low Centre of Gravity
   c. High Power to Weight Ratio
   d. High Speed across Country
   e. Amphibious
   f. Cruising Range 480 km plus
   g. Helicopter Lift by CH-53E
   h. Airportable in C130

2. Armour Protection
3. Inconspicuousness
   a. Low Silhouette (under 2.8 m height)
   b. Covered Surveillance Radar
   c. Easily Disguised
   d. 360° Coverage by Weapon

4. All Round Surveillance and Coverage
5. Firepower
   a. Eight Missiles Ready to Fire
   b. Machine gun for Self-Defence
   c. Night Driving Aids for Driver and Commander
6. Night Operations
   a. Blindfire Radar Available on Separate Tracked Vehicle
   b. Thirty Seconds from Coming to a Halt

7. Fast Into and Out-of Action
   a. Out of Action in under 30 seconds
5. Crew
   a. Launcher Vehicle (3)
   b. Blindfire Vehicle (2)
   c. Comfortable Sitting Position
   d. Cab Comforts
   e. Ergonomically Designed and Positioned Controls
   f. Built-in Test Equipment
   g. NBC Protection
Captain Heron joined the Army in 1966 as an Apprentice Radio Mechanic. He qualified as a Radar Mechanic in 1969. In 1971-75 he was involved in the UK/Woomera Rapier Trials. He was commissioned in 1978 as an Administrative and Technical Officer. From 1979 to 1981 he was SO3 Rapier, Maintenance Engineering Agency. He is currently EME Rapier Base Repair Facility, Adelaide Workshop Coy.
THE EFFECT OF SATELLITES ON AUSTRALIAN MARITIME STRATEGY DURING THE 1980S

By LCDR G. A. SPENCE, RAN

INTRODUCTION

Strategy can be defined as ‘the art and science of applying the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force’. Strategic theory can be broken down to encompass four classic schools: continental, aerospace, maritime and revolutionary strategy.

In view of technological developments in the last 50 years, the delineation between the strategic schools has become more and more vague so that military vehicles must not only be capable of operating in their traditional environment but also in those which are contiguous.

In spite of this interrelationship with other strategic schools, the broad principles of maritime strategy are still relevant and will help define the scope of this article. The fundamental principle of maritime strategy is sea control; this is achieved by either preventing the enemy from using the sea for his purposes or ensuring that you are able to use the sea for your own purpose. If sea control is achieved, then a country is in a position to exercise influence ashore against an enemy. This sea control does not, however, imply occupation of the seas by a military presence; this may be necessary at times but the deterrent aspect can also be employed. This means that a country possesses a demonstrable capability to conduct certain forms of maritime warfare with forces which might have to be expended if that became necessary. The possession of appropriate combat technologies in peace is then a signal to any potential aggressor that it may not be worth attacking you or your interests in that fashion.

Having outlined maritime strategy’s basic principles, the scope of this article will be to identify the components which make up maritime strategy, ascertain the contributions which satellites could make to that strategy and examine the implications of employing satellites in the Australian scene.

MARITIME STRATEGY OF AUSTRALIA TODAY

Sir Anthony Synnot has acknowledged that ‘Australia could become involved in a variety of possible conflicts which might range from global conflict or disruption of our trade at the higher and to raids on our coastal areas or disputes in our off-shore resources zone at the lower end’. Few countries of the world could have a greater interest in controlling the sea. First, Australia is totally surrounded by sea; apart from internal terrorist attack, any threats to Australian national security must have one thing in common, they must all approach Australia by either sailing on, sailing under or flying above the surrounding oceans. Second, Australia’s isolated position and dependence on sea lanes for the majority of her trade and economic survival further reinforces the necessity for sea control in her area of interest.

A suitable maritime strategy is therefore of paramount importance to Australia, however, when considering the relevance and effects of satellites, a consideration of maritime strategy in its simplest form, control of the sea, is sufficient.

Australia’s main problem in defence of the nation is the lack of funds, or rather lack of willingness to provide funds, available for the protection of an enormous continent and coastline surrounded by vast amounts of ocean.

Australians would believe that help will be forthcoming from the USA via the ANZUS treaty in the event of conflict, however, should this theoretical conflict not affect the interests of the USA, assistance in the large, anticipated quantities might not materialise. ‘It would thus
appear that under current US policy, unless Australia is threatened directly by the Soviet Union or China, the Australian government cannot expect to receive unqualified support'. Sir Anthony Synnot has supported this statement: 'I suggest it would be reasonable to expect the US to come to our assistance if there were a fundamental threat to our existence; but there could be many other occasions when we might be expected to, or might have to, deal with lesser but nevertheless very demanding situations on our own'.

This somewhat tenuous link with the USA can be treated in two ways: the link could perhaps be reinforced by increasing the value of Australia to the USA thereby rendering more probable the chance of support in times of conflict or, Australia could develop her own capabilities in order to become a more viable and autonomous defence force.

Whether she is assisted or not, the basic components of the maritime strategy of Australia, or indeed any other country have to be ascertained in order to determine if satellites can make a contribution to that strategy.

Sea control, the fundamental principle of maritime strategy, requires information about antagonists operating in, on or above the sea; having gained the information, force may have to be brought to bear on the antagonist and communications are needed to co-ordinate the action. To achieve sea control then, requires the following capabilities:

a. surveillance and reconnaissance,
b. intelligence gathering,
c. weapon delivery, and
d. communications.

Surveillance and reconnaissance in maritime strategy is provided primarily by aircraft and ships; the RAAF regularly flies surveillance sorties using its fleet of 20 Orion, P3 aircraft and the RAN conducts coastal surveillance duties with Tracker S2 aircraft. At sea, the Fleet can no longer avail itself of the Tracker since the withdrawal from service of HMAS MELBOURNE. Ships will now have to rely on their own radar or on the Seaking helicopters which will eventually embark on HMAS AUSTRALIA for information; ships not operating with AUSTRALIA will have to make do with RAAF support although some will eventually be fitted with helicopters of their own partly capable of fulfilling this role. Submarines, being covert vessels, rely largely on passive acoustic sensors augmented perhaps by information from other units for surveillance and target identification. Australia's capability in surveillance will increase significantly should Project Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Backscatter radar realise its full potential but its main weakness will be the vulnerability of its large, fixed antenna arrays.

The limited resources of Australia's Defence Force are already over-stretched meeting commitments to patrol the Indian Ocean and the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) in spite of reinforcement by civil Nomad aircraft in the seas to the north of the country. Moreover, this is a peacetime commitment; in a war situation, these assets would not be available to concentrate on surface surveillance — anti-submarine patrols would be required thereby reducing considerably the units available for surface surveillance.

None of the surveillance systems being used by maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), surface ships or submarines are capable of detecting missiles; in addition, MPA cannot detect aircraft with their radar.

Intelligence gathering in Maritime strategy is primarily conducted by means of Electronic Support Measures (ESM) operations conducted by aircraft, ships and submarines, the vehicles conducting the surveillance operations. Alternatively, intelligence can be obtained from other countries such as the USA in second hand form.

The next phase, attack or defence using weapons from a platform is well understood. The range, accuracy and technical sophistication of modern weapons such as cruise missiles make them hard to counter. Present tactical thought relies heavily upon avoiding the antagonist or destroying him before his weapon is released. Defensive measures after weapon release largely depend on electronic or physical seduction of the weapon or a last ditch point defence.

Co-ordination of military effort relies upon effective communications; in the maritime scenario, this is done by using an assortment of radio links ranging from Very Low to Ultra High frequencies. Various forms of transmission type are used including automated data links, secure voice nets and covered radio automatic teletype systems. Australia is already entering the satellite field in military communication; the RAN is purchasing the American
THE EFFECT OF SATELLITES ON AUSTRALIAN MARITIME STRATEGY DURING THE 1980s

AN/WSC-3 (RAN VI) UHF transceiver system which operates through the US Navy's Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM). Another Australian connection is through the American satellite communication receive-only/relay ground station at North-West Cape.

Summary
Australia satisfies the needs of maritime strategy with limited assets. Her surveillance effort relies on RAAF P3 aircraft, civilian aircraft and surface units’ radar. The country’s intelligence information either comes from these surveillance platforms or from the USA in second hand form. The USA also contributes to Australia’s communications now that she has bought into the US FLTSATCOM system.

SATELLITE APPLICATIONS AND CAPABILITIES
The surge of technological advances in the last two decades is nowhere more obvious than in the field of satellite and space technology. Apart from developments in the satellite vehicle itself, innovations in surveillance, communications and weapon systems fitted to satellites have also been proceeding rapidly. The satellite is now one of the most capable of military platforms and has very significant relevance to future maritime strategy.

Satellites can follow one of two types of orbit: the geostationary orbit, sometimes called geosynchronous, at an altitude of 32,000 km above the Earth where satellites are stationary relative to the Earth’s surface and the other orbits either higher or lower where the satellites follow elliptical paths in which their positions change relative to the Earth.

Positions in the geostationary orbit are in great demand since this is the belt in which most telecommunications satellites are placed. At present, some 3,000 satellites are jostling for position amongst miscellaneous bits of rocket and space debris, the most crowded area is directly above the Atlantic Ocean.

Surveillance and Reconnaissance
The band of space closest to the Earth’s atmosphere is where many surveillance satellites operate. They usually follow elliptical orbits passing very close to the Earth; at perigee they sometimes brush through the atmosphere. These orbits decay fairly rapidly, the duration of the orbit depending mainly on its initial altitude, the higher the orbit, the longer is the life of the satellite. Obviously, such satellites have to be replaced frequently to provide continuous surveillance effort.

Satellites currently carry a variety of optical photographic, infra-red, radar and electronic intercept sensors for the detection, location, identification and tracking of objects of military significance on or flying above the Earth’s surface. Their capabilities are highly classified but the USA, one of the leaders in satellite technology, possesses optical photographic equipments capable of a resolution of at least 35cm. (Claims of 15cm resolution have been made.)

Although reconnaissance and surveillance still relies heavily upon low altitude, short lived optical photographic satellite methods, technological developments have produced a digital image system as embodied in the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) KH-11 spacecraft. Although at present giving poorer resolution than optical photography, further development should soon correct this deficiency. The satellite can however relay its information to Earth almost immediately thereby overcoming the delays inherent in optical photographic methods. The life of the digital image type satellite is around two years, another great improvement on its predecessors’ performance.

The limitations imposed on optical systems by cloud cover, camouflage and darkness are significantly reduced by the installation of infra-red (IR) photographic and radar system. ‘In the late 1980s American armed forces will concentrate on radar rather than cameras for space surveillance’. IR systems are at present employed extensively for general surveillance tasks and in the more specialised missile early warning role. In the latter role the systems comprising 2,000 sensors are placed in geosynchronous orbit ‘staring’ at (as opposed to sweeping over) the Earth’s surface to enable rapidly moving missile IR signatures to be detected. Already, an improved 150,000 sensor system is planned for launch in 1984; this system will be capable of detecting aircraft as well as missiles.

Intelligence Gathering
In addition to the surveillance methods already discussed, satellites have other means of contributing to the intelligence gathering effort.
Satellites are ideally suited to Electronic Support Measure (ESM) operations; in addition to intercepting, analysing and monitoring EM emissions, satellite ESM techniques have been developed to provide position information. The US Navy employs sets of three satellites which orbit in clusters on parallel paths. Interferometry techniques allow fixing of positions of origin of radar and radio signals. Nuclear test monitoring facilities are also within satellites’ capabilities.

Although not an active partner in these intelligence gathering activities, Australia is connected to these US operations by way of the CIA Pine Gap base near Alice Springs which monitors Soviet missile tests, radars and microwave telephone conversations via the RHYOLITE satellite system.

Weapon Delivery
Anti-missile defensive weapon systems are partly developed and much effort is currently being directed by the USA towards further development. The systems are based on laser and particle beam technology.

The TRW company in the USA is working on a Hydrogen Fluoride blue-green laser, the best colour for good atmosphere penetration. These weapons are also eminently suited for deployment in satellites since the inevitable scattering and absorption by the atmosphere is minimised; only during the last part of the journey to Earth does the satellite laser encounter the dense atmosphere which afflicts all earth-bound systems.

Particle beams, similar to those used in atom-smashing linear accelerators, also gain benefits from being space based. Since the beams are crossing the Earth’s magnetic field direction of force perpendicularly, they do not suffer the deflection experienced if the beam is fired on Earth when it is invariably almost parallel to the surface.

These ‘death rays’ should prove to be very effective missile destroyers; the high speed of the beams (the speed of light in the case of the laser and only slightly less than that in the case of the particle beam) means that no ‘lead’ is required when targeting; thus multiple opportunities exist to effect a hit.

Again, although not a partner in these operations, Australia is involved through the Nurrinjar ground station, a command and control facility for these satellites. The positioning of the ground facility in Australia reflects the suitability of Australian longitudes for Soviet missile field surveillance by geosynchronous satellites.

Communications
Communications is the field which is most strongly supported by the satellite. Most of the satellites in geosynchronous orbit are either dedicated to or partly used for communications. The majority of these space vehicles are innocently employed in civilian telecommunications, Australia has a share in this field, participating in such ventures as the International Maritime Satellite Organisation (INMARSAT), which started operations in February 1982, and her own Domestic satellite (DOMSAT) communications system which will appear in the near future. As previously mentioned, other connections exist through military satellite communications with the RAN becoming involved in the FLTSATCOM system and the US placement of a satellite station at North-West Cape.

The USA has been operating satellite communications systems for many years and at present has a continuous development, updating and replacement program. The Defence Satellite Communication System (DSCS) III is the most advanced of these communications satellites and is scheduled for launch in 1982; the vehicle is nuclear hardened (shielded to withstand radiation) and employs anti-jam circuitry.

Position Fixing
An additional role to the four main roles already discussed is position fixing by satellite. This capability has been available since the mid-1960s; however, the present system will be replaced in the mid-1980s by the Global Positioning Systems (GPS) using the NAVSTAR satellites. This fixing method can supply positional information accurate to 16m to even small portable backpack receivers. The system also provides added accuracy for submarine launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. Yet again an Australian connection exists; Australian government approval was given to position portable testing equipment at the Tranet satellite tracking station at Smithfield, SA. This equipment is expected to remain there for a number of years.
Satellite Weaknesses

Because of their remoteness from earth-bound surveillance and weapon systems, satellites are very vulnerable to attack. Those in low orbits can be monitored by ground-based radar systems but those in geostationary orbit, perhaps the most important of the satellites, are beyond the range of most radars and are thus difficult to cover with defensive ground based systems.

An experiment to evaluate a satellite mounted IR attack early warning system will be one of the first Space Shuttle payloads. Other steps are being taken to improve surveillance of high flying satellites; some radars' high altitude coverage is being improved, new radar sites are being established and increased optical surveillance of geosynchronous orbits is being implemented.

There are two methods of attacking a satellite — by missile, or killer satellite. Missile ranges restrict this method of attack to the low flying surveillance type satellites. This vulnerability is not particularly serious since these vehicles are short-lived and regarded as expendable. A more serious threat is that of killer satellite attack on higher orbit spacecraft. The USSR have been practising interception and destruction techniques for some years now; the USA is addressing the problems of counter-measures and is examining variable thermal signature, evasive manoeuvring, decoy deployment and hardening techniques.13

A major problem with satellite radio links is the limited amount of information which they can transmit. Also, due to the large distances involved in satellite-to-Earth transmissions, even directional antennae create a large 'footprint' on the Earth; this increases the risk of interception and reduces received signal strength. These problems are being addressed by experiments with laser communication systems capable of transmitting an equivalent amount of information as is contained in the Encyclopaedia Britannica every second. The 'footprint' size would be in the order of a few hundred meters making the signal almost impossible to intercept and also jam-proof. Such a system should be ready for space in 1984.14

In addition to the vulnerability of the satellite itself, another great system weakness is the vulnerability of the associated ground stations. Counter measures being considered are the use of mobile ground stations, airborne terminals and multiple ground stations. Increased attention is also being given to sabotage prevention measures.15

Summary. Satellites provide very effective platforms for surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, defensive weapon delivery and communications roles. The systems have disadvantages such as vulnerability and performance limitations in some roles due to cloud cover; these shortcomings are being addressed by rapidly advancing US technology. Australia has already bought into US military satellite communication systems and other connections between Australia and the US satellite program exist by virtue of land bases already established.

SHOULD AUSTRALIA USE SATELLITES?

Satellites have been shown to be a very capable means of conducting many of the roles required of Australian maritime strategy. They are vulnerable at the present time but so, too, are most other military platforms.

In times of limited conflict, the scenario which many believe is the only one relevant to Australian defence policy, the absence of the superpowers in the conflict would leave Australian satellites secure. In this setting, it is in the roles of surveillance, intelligence gathering and communications that they could provide most benefit. Continuous surveillance over surrounding oceans could be effected to provide accurate and timely information on which to base decisions concerning deployment of Australian’s meagre maritime forces.

Employment of satellites will also release Australia’s overtasked surveillance forces to concentrate on other roles such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrols. Due to relatively short detection ranges, ASW patrols require many units to cover significant areas. Although satellites are as yet unable to conduct ASW operations, they could usefully undertake the surveillance tasks.

In the nuclear or global scenario, the space-borne system would be subject to attack. Presumably satellite losses due to attack would affect both sides and so the balance of capability would be maintained. Conventional methods of carrying out the roles should be retained for this eventuality. In any case, a conventional force would be required to cover
the occasions when factors such as adverse weather conditions reduced the efficiency of the satellite systems.

ACQUISITION OF SATELLITE SYSTEMS

The field of satellites can be entered by means of three methods: a country can develop and launch its own satellite, it can launch a satellite in a co-operative venture with other countries or it can attempt to co-operate with a country already operating its own systems.

Although no cost figures are available, Australia would probably be unable to fund the development or implementation of its own self-sufficient satellite program. The option whereby launch facilities are purchased is commonplace today and this could be a cost effective option, particularly now that the Space Shuttle is operational. This option is attractive but, again Australia would probably be unable to afford precautionary redundancy measures, that is, duplicated systems, either in terms of spacecraft or ground stations. The low orbit limited life satellite systems would also be an excessively expensive venture for Australia. Sharing facilities would therefore seem to be the most suitable option.

The USA would be the most suitable country to approach. Australia already participates in and benefits from the US intelligence network and satellite communications systems on a small scale. Participation with the USA also exists in defence procurement and the acceptance of US satellite bases in Australia. The Australian area of interest is already covered by US satellites and is considered strategically important; no additional coverage would be required to cater for Australian needs. In addition, by participating in the US program, Australia would have precautionary system redundancy and would not have ‘all her eggs in one basket’.

BENEFITS OF SATELLITE USAGE

Effective sea control in the oceans surrounding Australia depends greatly on maintaining surveillance over the area. Although still subject to some limitations, satellites could now be the most effective way of covering areas as large as those which interest Australia.

Much improved warning of impending hostilities in a limited war scenario would be provided by satellites; none of the nations likely to be involved in this setting has the capability to destroy these space platforms nor would they want to, for to do so would be to invite retribution from our partner, the USA.

Surveillance by satellite would release our present surveillance forces for other tasks such as ASW and surface attack in ‘hot spots’. Australia’s surveillance forces are already stretched in their peacetime role and could be expected to be further extended in wartime. The purchase of an additional 10 Orion aircraft will not alleviate this state of affairs but will merely replace obsolescent equipment.

Satellite communications provide world wide highly capable links over various frequency bands. The RAN has acknowledged this fact by purchasing equipment for this role but expansion of this role to other maritime forces would greatly improve command, control and communication capabilities.

IMPLICATIONS OF CO-OPERATIVE SATELLITE PROGRAM

The difficult part of implementing such a co-operative venture would be the detailed negotiations which would be necessary to guarantee the required access to surveillance, intelligence and communications networks. The USA is extremely reticent whenever intelligence information is requested. Much persuasion would be required to break down this barrier and this might have to take the form of reciprocal benefits. A probable request from the USA would be clearance to expand their bases and facilities in Australia.

Much hue and cry has resulted from the American bases already established in the country; arguments against having the bases here have centred on the resultant threat of targeting in the event of a superpower confrontation. This outcry may have been exacerbated by the underhand way in which the Government allowed the true function of these bases to become known to the Australian public on some occasions.

If Australia decided to participate in a co-operative satellite program which resulted in an agreement extending US facilities in the country, the Australian public should be made fully aware of the benefits to the effectiveness of the Defence Force in both limited and global war scenarios balanced against the likelihood of targeting because of US bases.

Possibility of nuclear attack does exist but such an attack would not occur in isolation
since such an action would be high on the escalatory scale particularly if the USA had significant interests in the country. In the global scenario Australia would become involved whether or not US bases are positioned here.

Looking at this situation ideologically, western nations should not expect the USA to provide the nuclear deterrent umbrella for them without the individual nations, Australia included, contributing in some way. By entering a co-operative satellite program, ties between the USA and Australia would be strengthened and might provide the basis for the negotiation of a stronger ANZUS treaty; an isolationist policy could only result in abandonment by allies in times of need.18

CONCLUSIONS

The extent to which satellites will affect Australian maritime strategy in the 1980s is dependent on Australian policy.

By opting out of satellite employment, Australia could continue to carry out her maritime operations as she does today. She will thereby be employing her meagre forces inefficiently and will soon fall behind most of the western nations in her knowledge of and ability to use high technology satellite facilities.

Should Australia opt to make use of these facilities, the most efficient and cost effective way would be by co-operation in the US program; this would greatly improve Australia’s surveillance, intelligence gathering and communications capabilities and reduce the workload on the maritime units at present employed in those roles.

Greater American involvement in Australia is necessary to achieve the co-operation program and much effort would be required to convince the Australian public that those bases would not significantly increase the risk of attack.

Australia must be prepared to contribute to the nuclear deterrent effort. Not only would satellite program participation achieve this but the tenuous ANZUS treaty links would also be reinforced to provide greater security for Australia.

NOTES

18. See Institute of Public Affairs (NSW) analysis of the Hon. Bill Hayden M.P.’s address to the Australian Institute of International Affairs (NSW) on 9 November 1981, entitled ‘Self-Reliance and National Defence’.

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Lieutenant Commander Spence joined the Royal Navy in 1970, Supplementary List (Aircrew). He underwent basic Observer training at RNAS Lossiemouth and then Operational Flying Training in Sea-King helicopters at RNAS Portland. Numerous postings followed. He transferred to the RAN in 1978 and served as a Senior Observer HC723 Squadron. He also underwent the RAN Staff Course at HMAS PENGUIN, and is currently Staff Officer to Director General Naval Training and Education. This article first appeared in the Balmoral Papers.
Continental Defence

Defence of the Australian continent is not a burning issue. As with the rumours of French, Russian or San Franciscan invasion fleets, so with the modern chimera. Who is to annex our resources? Where is the historical evidence to substantiate the likelihood of any nation undertaking such a foreign policy? The German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine after the war of 1870 is no example because it followed the utter defeat of France and was in the nature of spoils for the victor; it had not been an original war aim. Similarly, the Sudetenland is no pointer either. The desire of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination was exploited by Germany to provide some legitimacy for the conquest of Czechoslovakia as a whole.

Indonesia’s invasion of Timor or desire for West Irian do not provide verification either because of the underlying irredentism. Acquisition of another country’s natural resources might be a feasible war aim if the target country had a common border or was at least more accessible to the invader. But what country is going to spend the vast amount of money needed to gain such annexation of Australian resources at the cost of becoming a rebel in the eyes of the rest of the world. There are easier ways of achieving the same result and at less cost. Resources are acquired daily, painlessly, by diplomatic and financial means. If resource annexation was considered a viable foreign policy it would have been exercised by now to eliminate the middle-east oil problem.

Resource annexation is therefore a preposterous reason for risking high level involvement in war. So, if we are not to have our resources annexed, what about guerilla activity? What about widespread incursions by small, platoon-sized bands living off the land and forcing a disproportionate response from Australia’s small standing defence force? This idea is almost equally as silly. Where is the historical evidence to suggest this is a viable foreign policy Irian Jaya and Confrontation perhaps North Korean guerillas operating south of the 38th parallel, or Vietnamese infiltrating into Cambodia and Laos? Perhaps this is evidence, but surely there were compelling nationalist reasons in these cases? The use of such tactics against Australia would be far less likely since it is hard to see what benefits could be gained. Embarrassment? ‘Look at Australia folks. Nation, highly developed, western nation struggling ineffectually against the pinpricks of a less fortunate country!’ Hardly a mature political aim — and anyway, where is the profit? Embarrassment will only last so long; so-unless the protagonist is prepared to persist — the whole exercise is ultimately rather pointless.

But, what if guerilla activity were the precursor to full-scale invasion? It is much more logical that Australia could face full-scale invasion sometime in the future. There are at least half a dozen nations that have, or could develop, the capability for invasion. But, such an act is not likely in the foreseeable future. The need for occupation or ownership of Australia by a foreign power is not apparent now. Whatever is required of Australia (apart perhaps from Lebensraum) can be acquired by other means — diplomatic or financial. There
is no cost-benefit in invasion this year. So, defence of the Australian continent is not an issue — yet!

**Expeditionary Wars**

Australia has a long tradition as an exporter. Australia is a trading nation; not only in goods, but also in goodwill. ‘Australian support for foreign benevolence — special status in exchange for support in hard times’. This might be the slogan of successive Australian governments who have committed the nation to a string of expeditionary wars from the Sudan to South Vietnam.

What a venal foreign policy — blood for benevolence. But in fact it makes good sense. Far better to defend Australia on another’s soil than see her own despoiled. And defence it is, for it ensures the maintenance of a system within which Australia can continue to prosper. After all it is the continuing prosperity of our great and powerful friends which guarantees our way of life. And that is what defence is all about.

As with the past, so with the future. The likelihood of external conflict is great. It is confirmed every day; in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in Arabia. All these conflicts damage Australia and it is inevitable that such conflict will have the potential to fundamentally affect us. So much so, that we must again consider the likelihood of an expeditionary war to protect our vital interests. And that is what defence is all about.

Forward defence, coupled with the possibility of defending the homeland, sit easily within a military planning framework which plans for the worst case (full scale invasion) and prepares for more immediate contingencies (expeditionary wars). Continental defence, as the ultimate threat, can then be assumed to require total defence commitment — full mobilization. Forward defence will therefore require something less than total commitment — a balanced force tailored to the contingency.

**Defence Policy**

Present Australian defence policy is muddled. It fails to heed the lessons of the past and it ignores present events. While Australia waits for invasion she will see all about her crumble as she sits within her borders unable to influence events occurring all around. An Australian army — regional forces conducting surveillance as the main body concentrates on the vital ground and key terrain of Sydney/Newcastle/Wollongong and Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth etc. — will be useless. Only if it is strategically deployable will it earn its keep.

So, what should Australia’s defence policy be? It should be two-tiered to achieve our war aim: ‘to maintain Australia’s way of life’. The defence policy should be planned in two phases (as it was in the immediate past):

a. **Phase 1** — forward defence.

b. **Phase 2** — defence against invasion and occupation.

Once this policy is accepted the need for a strong defence force becomes self-evident. There will be no more agonizing over the manufacture of credible threats on which to hang our defence development hats. If the aim is to maintain our way of life then it is obvious that external events can have an adverse effect on us. Some events — such as the overthrow of the ASEAN nations — are clearly recognisable as being of that type. And we can — and should — plan for them.

Forward defence, coupled with the possibility of defending the homeland, sit easily within a military planning framework which plans for the worst case (full scale invasion) and prepares for more immediate contingencies (expeditionary wars). Continental defence, as the ultimate threat, can then be assumed to require total defence commitment — full mobilization. Forward defence will therefore require something less than total commitment — a balanced force tailored to the contingency.

**Force Structure**

Having decided that full-scale invasion is the worst case situation for Australian defence, force structure is easy to describe. It is the largest balanced force a fully-mobilized nation can sustain. It may initially require emphasis on the RAN and RAAF with a later swing to the Army and RAAF with a lessening of support for the RAN. It must also however provide a comprehensive industrial base; in other words a fully integrated defence effort. This force structure must have the need as its first criteria. Financial cost will be secondary because national extinction will be the ultimate cost.

Once financial cost is eliminated as the prime criterion of force structure military judgement (backed by operational analysis) can develop a force best suited for the task. This process will start with an objective analysis of Australia’s capacity to mobilise and will take account of all the obvious factors of manpow-
er, natural resources, developed industry, loss of lines of communication etc. It will ultimately point to a finite size for the defence force. The CGS, given his share of resources (including of course a financial limit since finance cannot be ignored), will then shape the Army for its military task. His appreciation might lead him to an army consisting of, say:

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With planning complete for Phase 2, planning for Phase 1 can be undertaken. Full mobilization is not a requirement of forward defence (necessarily) and — because national survival will not be immediately at stake — the financial cost of military effort will again become a major factor. Nevertheless, the military need should still drive the force structure, based on the range of contingencies, and planners must regard a balanced force as the prime criterion. If finance dictates that only a certain quantity of resources will be allocated to the Army then the force must be tailored to within that limit. But it must be balanced. If we take a balanced enemy as a starting point we must logically arrive at an equivalent Australian response. A different solution will demonstrate military amateurism or criminal irresponsibility. Therefore, there is no room for the plan which ignores the lessons of military history and produces an unbalanced force deficient in firepower or lacking mobility. A smaller threat does not reduce the need for balance; it reduces the scale of the response. Similarly, an unbalanced threat does not eliminate the need for a balanced response; it simply eases the task.

The overall force structure, say three armies of six corps, will allow progressive planning at lower contingency levels and will lead to a logical size for a standing army. If the end is known, the beginning can be derived and the successive stages planned for. The only military debate that remains is 'what constitutes balance within:

a. the various contingencies of forward defence, and
b. a fully-mobilized defence force?' This is the point at which professional military judgement must make its contribution.

Conclusion

Australian defence is based on an incorrect appreciation. The error is compounded by military planners who have failed in their responsibility to offer advice based on sound military grounds rather than solutions based on what they perceive as the most acceptable financially. To rectify the situation, government must revise its defence policy and military officers must revive the need for military balance rather than a balanced budget.

Major Prickett joined the Army in 1965 and served in 1 Armd Regt before attending OCS in 1967. He served as a tank troop leader in South Vietnam with A Squadron 1 Armd Regt in 1970. Various staff and regimental postings followed, he attended RMC of S in 1978 and in 1979 Staff College at Queenscliff. He has since served in DARMD and commanded A Squadron 1 Armd Regt. He is presently Regt 21C of 1 Armd Regt.
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY

A CASE STUDY OF DEFENCE DECISION MAKING

By LCDR D. A. Francis RAN

INTRODUCTION

THERE are a number of different approaches to the study of public policy, in general terms they are:

a. Institutional studies examine the operation of individual government institutions on a range of policy issues.
b. Process or case studies concentrate on particular issues and examine how they are handled by various institutions.
c. Output studies attempt to quantify government activity and resource allocation by examining funds spent, applications approved etc.
d. Economic studies attempt to match government activity to a variety of economic models.

This article is a case study on the development of proposals to construct the Australian Defence Force Academy, an institution to teach university level courses to officer cadets of all three services. All of the approaches to public policy listed above have merits and deficiencies, which should be borne in mind when considering the evidence in this article. Case studies are valuable in that, by following an issue from inception to maturity (or obscurity) the connections between and interactions of the various institutions which handle the case are highlighted, for no government institutions operate alone. But case studies do have a shortcoming. Case studies are intended to explicate some larger phenomenon, in this case something of the nature of the defence policy process. However with a sample of only one case being examined, the sample is too small and too specific to enable one to draw many valid generalizations.

The study of the ADFA project aims to illustrate something of the formulation of policy concerning the tertiary education of service officers. ADFA is an example of defence policy making involving the executive, the legislature and Australia’s academic community. The ADFA project is worthy of examination as being one of the earliest attempts by an Australian government to approach a defence problem on a wholly tri-service basis. Additionally this project has survived two changes of government, one rejection from cabinet, rejection by the Public Works Committee of Parliament, and spirited opposition from some segments of the services and the academic community. This study attempts to identify why ADFA has survived.

PROPOSALS TO AMALGAMATE SERVICE COLLEGES

The two oldest military colleges in Australia were established in the early days of federation, for RMC Duntroon was formed in 1911 and RANC Jervis Bay was founded in 1913 (the RAAF College started in 1947). But after only a decade of existence the first of many proposals to amalgamate the service colleges had been put forward and rejected. Such proposals have been voiced and rejected at irregular intervals up until the late ‘sixties, when the proposal to form what is now ADFA was raised and finally adopted in the early ‘seventies. ADFA is the only proposal for a tri-service academy to be actually adopted.

In 1922 the general military run-down and financial pressure reduced student numbers and, amongst other cost-cutting options, amalgamation of the defence colleges was discussed. RAN insistence on complete commonality with the RN training patterns precluded the successful amalgamation of the RAN training of 13-year-old entrants and Army training of 17 year olds. A cabinet appointed committee examined ways of reducing costs in 1923 but failed to agree on any viable scheme and recommended the separate colleges be maintained.

By 1929 the approaching depression forced the services to look closer at amalgamation of the Colleges. The Naval Board proposed sending naval cadets to Duntroon temporarily until
financial conditions should improve, and RANC be reformed. The Military Board proposed that costs of the Defence College be evenly shared between the services, but the RAN insisted it should only pay the extra costs of educating naval cadets at Duntroon. This fact, combined with continuing antipathy to losing single-service traditions, and the incompatibility of the training schemes in force was responsible for amalgamation not proceeding.

However, financial conditions worsened, and economies had to be made. Both services decided that the only viable course was to incorporate their colleges in larger single-service establishments. Accordingly, RANC moved to Flinders Naval Depot (now HMAS Cerberus) at Westernport, Victoria in mid 1930, and RMC moved to Victoria Barracks, Sydney in 1931. The colleges returned to their original sites at Duntroon in 1937 and Jervis Bay in 1958.

Amalgamation of the colleges does not seem to have arisen again until 1959 when a fresh proposal was dropped, or in the words of a Director of Naval Education “successfully repulsed.” Little is known of the cause, origin or form of this amalgamation proposal, but it probably arose from proposals for tertiary education amongst all three colleges. Rationalisation of the varied training schemes in force is a necessary pre-requisite for the successful operation of a combined college. The Martin Report suggests that this proposal failed because the RAN objected to Duntroon as a site because it was remote from the sea, and the RAAF needed an airfield site for introductory flying training.

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

RMC was modelled on West Point, the US Army Academy, and entered 16-19 year olds in a four-year course. RANC in contrast entered 13 year olds for a four-year course identical to that employed by the RN. The RAAF made intermittent use of Duntroon during the twenties and thirties. The RAN began entering 18-20 year olds during and after WWII and this evolved into the present Senior Entry comprising HSC matriculants. The 13-year-old entry continued until superceded by a 15-16 year old entry which was only abandoned in 1981! The RAAF College entered 17-year-old school leavers.

The first steps towards university level education at service colleges arose from the Army's Rowell Report of 1946 which recommended that university education be made available at RMC. However this did not eventuate until over twenty years had passed. RAAFA in fact achieved the first real step towards university education when it entered into an agreement with Melbourne University to teach the University's curriculum at Point Cook in 1961. In 1968 RMC started undergraduate training under an agreement with UNSW. 1969 saw RANC start teaching first year UNSW subjects under a radically different agreement. RANC students spend their second and later years on campus at UNSW.

The three services have continued to educate officers through non-degree training for short service commissions. The RAN and RAAF both utilise RMIT originally for Diploma and later for degree studies (the degrees differ from university degrees in being less theoretical and far more practical, or 'vocational'). Other tertiary institutions are used by all services on a small scale and RANC also commenced the non-degree ‘Creswell Course' in 1968. These institutions (and the Creswell Course) are usually vocational courses tailored to meet particular vocational needs of the services.

THE RISE OF ADFA

The different agreements with the universities are worth noting. RANC uses a mixture of Defence Department civilian academics and RAN Instructor Officers of lecturing. RAAFA uses a mixture of Defence Department civilian academics and Melbourne University employees, whilst Duntroon has only UNSW employees as lecturers. By the late sixties the Defence Department saw “... a multiplicity of Service College-University associations with no overall co-ordination...” From this view there arose, in mid 1967, a ministerial decision by Mr Fairhall that there will be established:

“an armed forces academy which will operate with separate wings at Duntroon and Point Cook, but with its headquarters at Duntroon”.

Subsequently the Tertiary Education (Services Cadet Colleges) Committee headed by Sir Leslie Martin was appointed and presented “the Martin Report” in January 1970. This committee recommended that an autonomous, degree conferring institution be established
within the existing Duntroon facilities to provide a "balanced and liberal" education. This was put to Cabinet as Submission No. 299 in 1970, but a decision was deferred. Cabinet commented:

"a. a single academy would go against all previous rationale of separate colleges.
   b. costs were questioned, and more detail required."

Subsequently the Chiefs of Staff Committee stated its unanimous support for the proposed academy. In 1973 the Steering Committee to the Defence (Administration) Committee recommended that the academy be established at a new site adjacent to Duntroon, with Duntroon becoming a centralised Army officer training school. Cabinet Decision 2138 of 18 March 1974 approved in principle the establishment of ADFA along the lines proposed, and the Minister for Defence, Mr Barnard, appointed ADFA Development Council in April 1975. This Council included a full-time Executive Officer (Rear-Admiral W.A.G. Dovers RAN, retired) to deal with day-to-day affairs.

After the events of November 1975 a LCP government returned to office, and on 20 October 1976 the Minister for Defence announced in parliament that the government had approved in principle the establishment of ADFA. This decision received bipartisan support. On 11 April 1978 Mr Killen announced that ADFA would bear the title "Casey University". The bill was presented to parliament one day later.

In March 1978 the House of Representatives referred the ADFA question to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works. This was a most crucial decision, for, after one year's investigation, the PWC recommended against the proposal. The Committee identified flaws in the various arguments for the Academy, identified opposition from academic groups and found a division of opinion amongst serving and retired service officers.

The PWC hearings offered an arena where interested persons could present their views. However, the presentation of the PWC report attracted little public interest until the government, in controversial circumstances, announced on 7 December 1974 a decision to overrule the PWC advice and proceed with ADFA that major public debate erupted. A lengthy Senate debate occurred on 5 March 1980, and numerous articles appeared in the press both on ADFA itself, and on the propriety of the government's decision to ignore the PWC. The government responded to the widespread criticism by announcing in parliament on 15 May 1980 that ADFA would go ahead, but with modified academic status and management arrangements. Construction commenced in 1981.

THE MAIN ACTORS

The main known actors are:

a. the three Services.
b. Defence Central (including its appointed committees).
c. the successive Ministers of Defence, and the Prime Minister (Mr Fraser).
d. the academic staff at RMC Duntroon.
e. the academic community at large, and
f. the Public Works Committee.

THE THREE SERVICES

As outlined in the first sections of this article the services had a sixty-year history of fostering their own exclusive identities, and consequently of strongly resisting moves to amalgamate their separate colleges. How is it then that ADFA is now proceeding?

The scene was set in the late sixties when all three colleges organised their separate agreements to teach civilian tertiary courses. Once this occurred, the services became vulnerable to fresh amalgamation proposals from 'outside', meaning in this case, Defence Central (at that time, 1967 known as the Department of Defence, the services then being separate departments).

The views taken by the Chiefs of Staff in 1967 are not known, but they subsequently, on several occasions, indicated support for the academy concept. Whether this was their own view, or simply reflected Ministerial wishes is not known. However one must assume that if there were any substantial disagreements it would have been made known.

Expressions of opinion by middle and lower ranking officers on ADFA were absent until the late seventies, some ten years after the project commenced, and well after the project had developed a great deal of momentum. In fact servicemen did not join the debate on ADFA until it was too late to stop the proposal.

ADFA had of course been a topic of bar talk for years, but no servicemen publically joined the debate until 1978 when the first
article by a serviceman appeared. Lethargy cannot be discounted as a cause of this silence, but there are other factors. The services are hierarchically organised, decision-making is highly centralised in Canberra, and dissemination of policy alternatives within the services is strictly limited. The majority of decisions are initially announced via the responsible Minister, and not through the normal chain of command. The lower levels have virtually no input to policy formulation (except on areas of each units own specific operations) because they are not usually permitted an opportunity to participate.

A number of service working parties have been established to advise on the implementation of various aspects of ADFA, and they have planned ADFA well. However this efficient work does not imply service support for ADFA. It is important to realise that they (like the Martin Committee) are only to advise on the implementation of the ADFA policy, not to examine the basic arguments for or against ADFA. Possible dissent is masked by tight terms of reference, and strong service discipline.

Service officers tend to be measured by their seniors according to their enthusiastic and efficient implementation of given tasks, not for their critical outspokenness. This fact was recognised by the PW'C which had found it necessary to reassure military personnel who gave evidence before it that they would not be penalised for speaking freely.

The lower levels of the services in fact have a wide divergence of views about the necessity for tertiary education of officers. The Army RODC articulates some widespread areas of debate on educational needs but the RODC itself did support the need for a wide liberal tertiary education. The RODC observed that:

"... developments towards a tri-service academy were based upon a Ministerial decision rather than upon a detailed analysis of the options available. ..."

and also

"The ADFA concept is regarded by many officers in the Services with considerable suspicion."

In general terms it can be seen that the Service Chiefs and Defence Central supported ADFA, whilst at lower levels there is divergence of opinion on the value of tertiary education, and a general lack of support for ADFA.

DEFENCE CENTRAL

Defence Central, for the purposes of this study, consists of the Minister for Defence, CDFS, the three Chiefs of Staff, The Permanent Head and a supporting staff predominantly staffed by public servants. The Martin Committee, and the ADFA Development Council are responsible to Defence Central.

The crucial decision in the history of ADFA was the decision by Mr Fairhall in 1967 to appoint the Martin Committee with terms of reference that precluded any investigation on the need for a tri-service academy. This necessary first step was simply not taken. Where within Defence Central this proposal originated is not known nor is the input of the Permanent Head, or the Service Chiefs known.

The absence of clearly argued supporting evidence on the need for ADFA lead to later criticism of the proposal, and indeed heavily influenced the PW'C to recommend against proceeding with ADFA. The PW'C found:

"...the development of the logic for the creation of a Tri-Service Academy suffered from a process of reasoning-in-a-circle wherein the proposition to be tested had as a basic assumption the proposition itself."

Whether the Minister or his departmental advisers are responsible for this situation cannot be ascertained. The Chiefs of Staff subsequently expressed support for ADFA on several occasions. Much of this support was genuine, although there is some oblique evidence that, on at least one occasion the Service Chiefs support was subject to higher direction from either CDFS or the Minister.

The attitudes of Defence Central participants should be viewed against the background prevailing in 1967. The three services had arrived at three separate solutions to the tertiary education problem. This was seen as "untidy", although each solution suited the services' different needs. The amalgamation of the Armed Services was then, following the Canadian example, a fashionable proposal in some quarters outside the services themselves. Additionally, there was an aversion to the use of civilian universities on the grounds that they lacked a military environment; were viewed as "hotbeds" of opposition to Vietnam involvement, and harboured such social evils as radicalism, protest, drugs and even long hair. These general considerations, together with cost factors, probably persuaded Defence Cen-
centre to favour the idea of a single military university in 1967. Although these considerations changed over the succeeding years, and ADFA appeared less appropriate to current needs, the 'higher' direction of the Chiefs of Staff Committee referred to in the preceding paragraph has preserved a Defence Central corporate image of support for ADFA.

THE MINISTERS

The ADFA proposal originated with Mr Fairhall, was put to Cabinet by Mr Fraser, was resurrected by Mr Barnard, and continued by Mr Killen (with support from Mr Fraser as Prime Minister). A perusal of parliamentary debates indicates consistent bipartisan support for the proposal up until the PWC presented its report in 1970. The government's decision to continue with ADFA despite the PWC's views provoked a storm of criticism from both major parties. The main thrust of this criticism was on the government's decision to ignore the carefully considered views of one of its parliamentary committees.

Until Mr Fraser put the proposal to Cabinet in 1970 the matter had not been subjected to any form of scrutiny. The Martin Committee was not invited to discuss the arguments for and against ADFA, and there is no evidence of debate or scrutiny of the case by parliament or any community interests. It is therefore very significant that when the proposal went to Cabinet in 1970 it was the first real test of whether the ADFA idea had executive support. In fact Cabinet rejected the idea on the grounds of poor supporting arguments and inadequate cost estimates. There may have been one other factor. Cabinet at the time was under some strain. The Gorton government was in decline, and indeed Mr Fraser resigned from Cabinet later in 1970, and Mr Gorton himself subsequently lost his office. Mr Fraser's personal position in Cabinet may have contributed to the rejection of ADFA.
In 1973 Mr Barnard, recommenced work on ADFA, but not for the original reasons alone. By 1973 University fees had been abolished and therefore the universities' resources were being stretched beyond their capacities.

In short, servicemen's places in civilian institutions (i.e. RMIT, UNSW, University of Sydney and Melbourne University) could not be guaranteed. However, by 1980 the ALP, reflecting over-capacity in universities generally, prevailing austerity, and accepting the conclusions of the PWC report no longer supported ADFA.

Parliamentary debates indicate that both Mr Killen and Mr Fraser supported the ADFA project. However the strength of their support was not apparent until they persisted with the project in the face of strong criticism of the government's decision to ignore the PWC report. Several commentators maintain that ADFA is Mr Fraser's 'pet project'. The most pertinent comments occurred on 18 March 1978 in the Canberra Times when a journalist reported the parliamentary decision to refer the ADFA proposal to the PWC. In a generally anti-ADFA article the author implied that the PWC hearings would be inconsequential as the proposal is "one of the Prime Minister's pet projects". One year later this prophecy came true. Mr Fraser's personal interest in this project may be responsible for the strong 'corporate body' of support amongst the Chiefs of Staff and top Defence Department levels. It is clear that for ADFA to be proceeded with in the presence of strong press, parliamentary and academic criticism, strong Prime Ministerial support was essential.

THE ACADEMIC STAFF AT RMC DUNTROON

We have seen that the Ministers and the top echelons of the Defence Department can be described as supporting the ADFA proposal. The academic staff at RMC Duntroon are significant in being the only other identifiable group that is in support of ADFA. Some members of the staff (relative to other actors in this study) have been quite active in publishing articles and letters to the editor in an endeavour to influence the decision making process. In contrast, the staffs of RAAFA and RANC have not published at all. RMC staff have also put their own individual and group submissions to the PWC. Only one academic from RAAFA made a submission to the PWC (and he spoke against ADFA) and RANC staff have maintained their unblemished record of silence. RMC staff have also exercised influence through the Interim Council of RMC.

RMC staff have argued that academic freedom should be preserved at ADFA, that ADFA should be either an independent university or better still, a college of UNSW. This latter arrangement is well known to the staff at RMC. In its most basic form the RMC arguments constitute an unsubtle power struggle for more academic votes on ADFA's governing council.

The reasons for the RMC staff's strong support for ADFA can be readily identified. Under the terms of the existing RMC/UNSW agreement RMC academic staff have automatic transfer rights to ADFA, whereas RANC and RAAFA staff do not. RMC staff are on-site in Canberra, and no shift of home is necessary to transfer to ADFA. RMC staff number about 80, and are generally more senior than their RANC or RAAFA contemporaries who may transfer to ADFA. RMC staff therefore stand to gain the more senior positions in a much larger ADFA, and by seniority and numbers will clearly dominate the academic departments at ADFA. In short, RMC staff stand to gain new facilities, larger departments and new hopes of greater prestige and influence of the new institution. They have used several known means of influencing the decision-making process and one can only speculate as to the extent of private lobbying amongst other academic institutions (especially UNSW) and academic staff associations.

THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY AT LARGE

The academic community has generally been against the ADFA proposal, the principal arguments being:

a. ADFA was seen as a duplication of tertiary facilities at a time of general over-supply of university places.

b. There was concern at the closed or elitist nature of a military academy.

c. There was concern that ADFA would not be recognized as a university because of its small size, lack of autonomy and a perceived lack of academic freedom.

d. The capital cost of ADFA, and its high cost per student were criticized.
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY

The principal critics were the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, the Federation of College Academic (both threatened to boycott ADFA), the Adelaide University Council, Professor Low, Vice-Chancellor of ANU. A number of other senior academics made public statements or made submissions to the PWC arguing against ADFA. Naturally, some academics were advocates of ADFA, the most influential being Dr O'Neill and Dr Millar of ANU and Professor Myer representing the UNSW Council, all of whom have past or present links with RMC.

The anti-ADFA academics were quick to voice public criticism of ADFA and they probably claim success in forcing the government to drop the concept of Casey University as an independent institution. The government has instead reached agreement with UNSW that it will supervise the academic quality of ADFA under similar conditions to those now governing RMC. ADFA students will be awarded UNSW degrees, and ADFA staff will be employees of the University. These points are the only significant concessions the government has made to any pressure groups concerned with ADFA. In other respects the ADFA proposal is unchanged and the views of the middle and lower-ranking service officers have been disregarded.

The academic community has been remarkably effective in influencing the government, when one considers that they entered the debate only at a very late stage, and most anti-ADFA speakers have no direct involvement with military cadets. Whereas one would have expected serving officers within the Defence Department to have had greater influence because they are on the ‘inside’, and are more closely involved with ADFA’s intended end product. One must conclude that, in this instance, Australia’s academic community has exercised access to and some influence with the current LCP government.

The academic community as a pressure group was greatly aided by the readiness of the press to publicize their views. Presumably the media regard the academic’s standing in the community and their academic ‘detachment’ added credence to their articles.

THE PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE

The PWC, after one year’s investigation, firmly recommended against the ADFA proposal. The government provoked substantial press and parliamentary criticism by rejecting the PWC report. The PWC had acted as a focal point for the protagonists in the ADFA debate and had done much to facilitate opposition to ADFA from with the Defence Department, especially by its deliberate encouragement to service officers and public servants when it pointed out that, by law, witnesses cannot be penalised for giving contentious evidence to the Committee. This action was provocative to a government which had maintained a corporate image of support for ADFA amongst the successive Ministers, the top levels of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff. The PWC recommendation must have been especially irksome to a Prime Minister who has had a ten-year ‘special interest’ in the project. The PWC report was also responsible for destroying the ten years of bipartisan support the project had enjoyed from the Labor and Liberal-Country Parties.

Once the PWC report had been rejected and much public support for the PWC became apparent, the ADFA debate assumed a new form. First, parliament divided along party lines, and LCP backbenchers had little choice but to support the government’s decision or face defeat in the House, an obviously unacceptable option. Secondly, the PWC report became a component in the ongoing Executive versus Legislature power struggle. The notions of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ (as embodied in the role of the PWC as a scrutineer of government business) and of ‘effective government’ have long been in conflict. It is not in the government’s perceived electoral interest to encourage what may be an embarrassing scrutiny of its business by a parliamentary committee. The government’s decision to reject the PWC report and continue the ADFA project received backbench support because of political considerations, rather than the strength of the rational arguments supporting ADFA.

CONCLUSION

This case study into Defence decision-making illustrates the dominance of decision makers at the centre of government, especially where effective public debate can be avoided until after a project has gathered a momentum of its own. The hierarchical, centralized and well-disciplined nature of the Defence Department is illustrated by the continuous public corporate
image of support for ADFA amongst the top Defence Department officials and the Chiefs of Staff. It is also illustrated by the reluctance of serving officers to publish contentious articles, and especially by their reluctance to give frank evidence to the PWC.

The ADFA project has survived a period of fifteen years (1967-82) because of a chain of unrelated, but fortuitous circumstances. These are:

a. the arbitrary nature of the 1967 decision which effectively precluded discussion of the justification for a tri-service academy.
b. the perceived scarcity of university places in 1973 that encouraged the Labor government to support ADFA.
c. the personal interest of the Prime Minister, the bipartisan political support, and the 'corporate' Defence support for the project in 1976-80, and finally
d. the existence of traditional party discipline which aided the executive in reducing the impact of parliamentary scrutiny of government business.

The arguments for ADFA, as articulated by various Ministers and their departmental subordinates did not stand up to PWC scrutiny, and the rational arguments against ADFA have been made subordinate to the political wishes of the executive.

This study has also demonstrated the effectiveness of the RMC staff and the academic community at large as pressure groups. Their high standing in the community as learned and impartial authorities facilitates their access to the media and to parliamentary committees. Where the academics have seen their self-interest at stake, they have proved to be active and articulate. The success of the academic community in this case study has demonstrated that civilian pressure groups can influence Defence policy, an area that is considered to be normally resistant to pressures from outside the executive. In contrast to the academic community, serving officers of middle and low ranks, have proved to be unable to articulate their arguments and to effectively influence decision making in the top echelons of the Defence Department.

Prior to the PWC hearings the ADFA proposal had been largely unknown outside the services. The PWC therefore served as an effective forum for the debating and advertis-
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. 'A Tri-Service Academy by Any Name', Canberra Times, 18 March 1978.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. ADFA = Australian Defence Force Academy.
2. CDFS = Chief of Defence Force Staff.
4. RAFA = RAAF Academy.
5. RANC = Ran College.
6. RMC = Royal Military College, Duntroon.
7. RMC = Royal Military College, Duntroon.

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Lieutenant Commander David Francis entered the Naval College in 1969 and subsequently graduated from the Creswell Course. After the Sub-Lieutenants' Operations and Weapons Course in the United Kingdom significant postings have included HMAS Melbourne, HMAS Lonsdale and HCS Harold E. Holt. He is currently the Supply Officer at the Royal Australian Naval College, HMAS Creswell, Jervis Bay.

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(The Citadel): "Nuclear arms control — an American dilemma."
SAM C. SARKESSIAN: BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD: THE NEW MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Reviewed by Lt Col N. A. Jans

The last two decades have not been particularly happy ones for the American military institution, after the major traumatic experience in Vietnam, the end of the draft and a number of minor fiascos such as the failure of the military operation mounted to rescue "the hostages". Within the American military profession itself, according to this book, there have been two reactions to all this. The first is a tendency to see Vietnam as an aberration: a once-only bad dream. The catharsis is to advocate a traditional mode of professionalism and to concentrate on Europe in thoughts about future operations. Those who adopt this view can thus not only believe that the military, being the total servant of the state, was blamelessly placed in an invidious tactical situation in Vietnam, but also that the lack of a victory there was not really reflective of America's true military capacity.

The second reaction has been to argue that the Vietnam experience revealed a number of fundamental flaws in American military professionalism. These include an ignorance of, and an unjustified reluctance to take account of, political factors in strategic and tactical problems; and an inflexibility within the command system which impeded the effective conduct of operations in Indo-China. Advocates of this line are convinced that it would be wrong to not learn from the Vietnam experience, and most propose institutional changes which they hope will better prepare the military for whatever the future holds, whether this is in Europe or in some less conventional theatre of operations.

Sam Sarkesian, ex-paratrooper and now a professor of political science, embraces the second of these philosophies. Sarkesian believes that American military professionalism, as it is presently conceived and practised, is inadequate to meet the challenges of the coming decade. In support of this, he argues from both empirical and conceptual grounds: he presents findings from others' studies which suggest that the US Army failed to learn from its demoralising experience in Vietnam; and he maintains that the traditional model of professionalism, which he believes contributed to this experience, is unlikely to be adequate in the light of probable political-military situations in the future.

Traditionally, the military profession is politically reactive, in that it accepts that the armed forces will do only what the government tells them to do. If war is an extension of politics, then, in the traditional model, the military has an insignificant role in the political process until the government decides that war is necessary. (This is, of course, a fundamental norm of Western military institutions, including our own.)

Sarkesian argues that this norm is obsolescent. The essence of his thesis is the proposition that the greater the diversity in the threat environment, the greater the strains on the traditional model of professionalism. Sarkesian begins by showing what most of us would readily accept: that there is a bewilderingly large and complex range of threats to any Western nation in the 1980s, especially to the US: everything from mutually armed destruction to incidents like the occupation of the US Embassy in Iran. However, strategies for limited military operations "remain elusive" and this poses dilemmas for the military profession. It is not simply that commanders and policy makers need to include political factors in their appreciations of the best course of action (although Sarkesian sees this as being extremely important, in terms of avoiding many of Vietnam-type errors in the future), but that the traditional principles of military professionalism — "Duty, Honour, Country", and the demand for institutional loyalty and obedience — preclude the flexibility and adaptability in individuals and institutions which is needed to prepare and direct the military machine effectively.

The professional model which is needed, Sarkesian concludes, is one in which military men are seen as more than "unconditional servants or paid employees of the state". They
need political understanding and expertise, a sense of realistic and enlightened self-interest, and professional perspectives transcending boundaries which have been traditionally associated with duty, honour and country. The military profession must take on a political dimension (not party politics) so it is capable of dealing with environments that are not purely "military", and — controversial point here! — recognise the professional military institution's right to engage in politics within a domestic system, as long as it adheres to "the rules of the game". The basic aim of this is to enhance the profession's ability to reach the civilian leadership and the public to develop and explain its case for the adoption of certain objectives — not so much in the competition for resources but in terms of the choice of options in global strategy.

Of course, such a stance has its dangers, and Sarkesian acknowledges these: "To take on this critical political dimension is only a short step away from assuming a self-righteous stance as the ultimate arbiter of society's political disputes." (p 132). (One thinks of the French Army in Algeria.) Sarkesian's formula is based on an officer corps which (1) sees itself as having a role beyond the traditional "management of violence"; (2) is highly educated and, indeed, places as much professional value on political and intellectual sophistication as on "battlefield competence" in military technology; and (3) has a changed and more complex relationship with the American political system. Sarkesian argues the key to this formula is to educate military professionals in the meaning of democracy and in the proper role of the military in a liberal society, most desirably at the graduate school level, ie, as post-commissioning tertiary education. He stresses that this will not come about just by simply adding courses to senior service schools or by increasing the proportion of officers on long term schooling; rather it requires a different concept of professional socialisation and education and an integration of political factors and methods of analysis into tactical and strategic thinking. Although battlefield competence and the skills and attitudes that contribute to it are not irrelevant in Sarkesian's model, they are not mentioned much in this book, except as a barrier to the adoption of the thinking which he advocates. And herein lies the major weakness in his model.

For, whilst few would surely disagree with his assertion that, "While conventional military forces remain essential ingredients in strategic deterrence, the utility of such forces for purposes of intervention has declined" (p 112), the political basis of "armed diplomacy" (nice phrase, that!) for a nation is the latent strength of that nation's forces. And, since Western armies (and, indeed, most others) are based on a hierarchical, authorative, disciplined character if it is to maintain latent strength, the military institution must continue to have that character. This institutional character tends to produce a particular kind of person. It is not denigrating that kind of person to suggest that, especially in peacetime when the maintenance of this institutional character is difficult and internal efforts to so maintain it are thus intensified, the kind of person Sarkesian would like to see in the military institution, would not be particularly comfortable there. Indeed, the military institution, as a socialising environment, could find it rather difficult to produce significant numbers of officers of each type who also appreciated the views of the other. Fortunately, Sarkesian brushes over this. Perhaps he feels that, as a political scientist, he should give direction and that the sociologists could then tackle the practical problems in the social system; but it is disappointing that there is not more on these problems.

Sarkesian also gives very little space to the question of how the civilian leadership and the community would react to this new professionalism. I am inclined to think that the community would be somewhat apprehensive of a move in this direction. In essence, he says it is up to the military to demonstrate, by example, how this new style would be of more use to the state than would alternative models of professionalism.

My final criticism of this book is that I found it a little difficult to read, perhaps because of the small typeface, but also because it was somewhat repetitive. It started life as a series of essays, and could have done with some rigorous editing to trim these into inter-related chapters. Nonetheless, this is a thought—provoking book and deserves to be widely read. One of its strengths is the evidence of considerable background reading, and anyone interested in studying this issue will benefit
from the many reference notes and bibliographical items.

It is intriguing, of course, to speculate on whether the issues addressed in this book are of relevance to the Australian military profession. Despite our size, we do have a distinct threat environment, and there is no reason to think that political sophistication — in its application to problems of military strategy and tactics — is no less needed by Australia than by America.

But for me, the most important lesson in this book is that it points up a fundamental difference between the Australian and American military establishments. This difference is one of scholarly reflectiveness: the propensity to study the past and the present as guides to the future, and to discuss the alternative courses of action in deciding how a desired future is to be sought.

Australian servicemen do not have a good record in reflectiveness, even in terms of the conventional area of "military history". Quantitatively at least, our collective contribution to the literature on military sociology and history is almost as nothing compared to that of the American services. Vietnam alone has stimulated all sorts of writings from Americans; some arguing that they went wrong, others arguing that they didn't and many proposing lessons to be learned from the experience. Contrast this mountain of print with the Australian equivalent: a few novels and a handful of articles, largely about CRW techniques, in periodicals such as this. Locally, moreover, there is almost no debate about professional dilemmas such as those Sarkesian discusses.

Someone once remarked, at an "Australian Armed Forces and Society" conference, that Australia had yet to produce a Janowitz. It's worse than that, I'm afraid: we haven't even got to the stage of producing a Sarkesian.


Reviewed by Dr Ed Duyker, Dept of Defence.

HINDSIGHT may be cheap but it sometimes makes fascinating reading. Philip Towle's anthology is an impressive compilation of cases of historical hindsight applied to strategic intelligence over the past hundred years. The first part of Towle's collection is devoted to the analysis of Russian and Soviet military power. Part two deals with British and Australian perceptions of emerging Japanese military capability; British views of the naval balance between the wars; threat perception in South Asia between 1962 and 1980; and assessment of Arab and Israeli military strength.

The third part of this book is a thought provoking essay on the need to examine the social dimensions of strategy alongside the implications of technological change. However, of particular significance is Towle's own introduction, since it raises so many of the methodological problems involved with estimating foreign military capabilities. As Towle so cogently demonstrates, "precision is unattainable... the most despised power may prove stronger than expected, while even the greatest power may have its weaknesses". In this context Towle reminds us of Rebecca West's suggestion that before a war military power appears as exact as "astronomy" yet after a conflict it seems more like "astrology".

For all those who seek to approximate the military power of other countries, this collection provides a wealth of historical examples and implicit guidelines for the sober judgement of present and future cases. Significantly, three of the contributors are Australians (David Horner, Ron Huiskens and Geoffrey Jukes); other contributors include Chris Bellamy, N.E. Howard, Ravi Rikhye, K.R. Singh, Geoffrey Till and, of course, the editor himself.


Reviewed by John McCarthy, Senior Lecturer in History, RMC, Duntroon.

THIS book, written by an ex-Pathfinder navigator, is a valuable addition to the massive literature which is concerned with the strategic use of air power in the Second World War. From 24 July to 3 August 1943, the German city of Hamburg was subjected to four major raids by aircraft from Bomber Command and to two daylight attacks by
American aircraft. In Hamburg, the result is still referred to as ‘die Katastrophe’. With considerable skill and feel for atmosphere, Musgrave takes his reader through from the early morning far-ranging reconnaissance flights, to the briefing and the raid itself and then on to the touchdown, interrogation and final exhaustion. The narrative is switched from bomber to night-fighter and from bomb-aimer to those mansing the search-lights and guns or waiting in shelters for either relief or extinction. The author’s deep understanding of the aircrew experience tinges his account with an authenticity denied to some rather more scholarly commentators; his view of the debriefing procedure is a gem. For those who wish to probe deeper into the techniques of area attack, the appendices on the use of Window, the operation of Gee and H2S, the methods of marking and pathfinder crew duties are clearly written, well illustrated and most informative. There is also a most interesting chapter on the firestorm phenomenon itself.

The Hamburg attacks were the first to be carried out with the aid of Window. In human terms the effects on the city were devastating. One third of Hamburg’s houses were destroyed, but as with most European cities the majority of people lived in flats. Some fifty-six per cent of such homes disappeared. Roughly 22,500 women, 17,100 men and 5,400 children were killed. The port facilities, however, quickly returned to normal operation though there was a fall-off in submarine production. Although, for some unexplained reason, Musgrave feels that the post-war bombing surveys were biased, both the American and British studies showed that industrial output returned to eighty per cent of normal within five months. The fact is that the R.A.F. bombing had not been directed at those areas in the city which housed industry of military value. The industrial centre lay on the south of the Elbe and as Musgrave’s bombing map clearly shows, the main attacks fell on the residential districts a good five to six miles away. In a local comparison, attacks on the suburb of Farrar could only affect Fyshwick in a most indirect way. Largely, however, this was the method of area attack. It was designed to break morale, yet the population of Hamburg remained just as firm as London’s did under its ordeal of the Blitz.

The strategic bombing offensive against Germany holds a strange, grim fascination for many. Debate surrounds both its morality and its military effectiveness. It can be argued that even the partial application of Douhet’s theories executed by Bomber Command marked the beginning of a return to barbarism in warfare which has now been developed to the concept of the Neutron bomb. It is likely that before the advent of strategic air power, any officer who advocated that hospitals, cradles, the aged, young girls with dolls or boys kicking footballs constituted a legitimate target system would have been regarded as insane and unfit to hold command. Such attitudes, however, became commonplace in the Second World War. Nobody can doubt the courage of the aircrews, but this is not the point at issue. The photographs alone in this book, and many of these are from German sources and not seen before by this reviewer, are enough to show the horror inflicted upon the innocent of Hamburg. To some it will be heresy, and for one bombed by the Luftwaffe difficult to say, but one can only regard with the partisanship of a common humanity the efforts of the German defences to protect their people. The forces unleashed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris were darkly evil and an affront to the decency of mankind.


Reviewed by Ronald Haycock, RMC, Dunroon.

Larry Stewart’s volume on the evolution of Canadian Defence policy since 1964 is the thirty first title on security matters put out by the Canadian Queen’s University Centre for International Relations. And it is the first one which tries to cover that policy transition over the long haul. The collection is divided into four sections; Canada and Nato, Continental Defence, Peacekeeping, Arms Control and Disarmament. Each section is introduced with some editorial comment explaining the course of events surrounding the subject and ended
by an extended bibliography, the latter covering documents, articles and books beyond those titles mentioned in the text. There are also useful appendices, including suggestions for further reading in the areas of Defence Organization and Military-Industrial policy. In all the compilation is impressive.

Yet this reader has some reservations. The first is that nearly all of the speeches and documents presented represent the arguments in support of government policy rather than provide a larger view of the debate surrounding it. In the forward Nils Orvik, the Director of the centre, points to the “old proverb which says that in order to know where you are going, you must know where you have been”. If it’s true for defence policy, surely it must be true for the criticism of that policy. Moreover, by not seeing a selection of documents on the debate, the reader, especially when he is an outsider, has no idea of what it was like or what influence it had on government policy. In part the editor has recognized the importance of the criticism because he prints extensive bibliographic lists, portions of which could be used to illuminate the other side. In doing this, he helps redress the omission but his presentation is still not balanced.

The second criticism is of the omission of sections on defence organization (integration and unification — of which the Canadian experiment is still in the forefront of the world’s military forces) and military-industrial policy for the sake of space. While one understands that these two subjects are yet very controversial politically, as well as militarily — and hence tend to be down played by governments — they are just as important a measure of military capability and performance as any of the other subjects in the volume. Are they not reflections of defence policy, do they not affect it? How can the book’s stated purpose (“to document the central themes and events of Canadian Defence policy . . . ”) be complete without documentary evidence of the two pillars on which all other defence policies depend. Yet they are not entirely ignored. Again the editor has appended (Appendices D and E) good bibliographies dealing with Defence Organization and Military/Industrial policy. While providing a useful service, their inclusion only begs the question about a selection of “Documents and Speeches” in these areas.

There are a few other minor flaws in the work. For instance, why does the cover read “Canadian Defence Policy: Selected Documents . . . ” when the title page proclaims it to be “Canadian Defence Policy: Selected Speeches and Documents”, and what goes on pages 114 and 207. Finally there is no price mentioned.

In spite of these qualifications this work is of substantial value as a reference tool for both the beginning student of Canadian defence policies and those who wish to explore the subject in more depth. For any Australian interested in Canadian defence it is indeed a very neat package.

**CONTEMPORARY ALLIANCES**, by T. B. Millar, Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1981. 164 pp paperback. No price given.

Reviewed by Donald R. Jender, Department of Defence.

**T**his book is the second in the series *Canberra Studies in World Affairs*. Pages 53 to 163 contain the texts of 30 post-1920 treaties, some familiar (NATO, ANZUS, SEATO, Warsaw Pact), many not. Pages 1 to 51 reprint a paper “Contemporary Alliances” presented by T. B. Millar to a conference at the Australian National University. This discusses the general nature of treaties and alliances, and considers in greater detail some of the more significant ones: the Treaty of Rio (now a topical subject), ANZUS, the US/Japan treaty, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There is a short treatment of other treaties involving the USSR. The author concludes that alliances are likely to continue as a significant factor in world affairs.

The book provides a convenient compilation of some important treaties. It would be a useful reference for the serious student of international politics and those who work in the field. As the Falklands dispute has demonstrated, one never knows when a treaty might spring to prominence. The opening paper of the book could be helpful to someone seeking a brief introduction to the subject of treaties and alliances, particularly those of some relevance to Australia.