Board of Management
Commodore H. J. P. Adams, RAN (Chairman)
Captain H. J. Donohue, RAN.
Colonel F. P. Scott DSO
Group Captain R. R. Tayles AFC RAAF
Dr. V. J. Kronenberg

Managing Editor
Mr M. P. Tracey

Illustrations
Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick ACT

Printer
Printed for the Department of Defence, by
Ruskin Press, North Melbourne.

Defence Force Journal
Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spacing, on one side of the paper and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:
The Managing Editor
Defence Force Journal
Building C Room 4-25
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600
(062) 65 2682 or if unanswered 65 2999
Contents

3 Letters to the Editor

5 Flight Instruction in the RAAF: Two Perspectives
   Dr Ross Telfer.

11 The Impact of Technology on Maritime Warfare in
   the 1980s.
   Commander C. J. Skinner, RAN.

26 Leadership Training in the Navy of the 1980s: A
   Systems Approach
   Lieutenant Commander C. V. Baker, RAN.

35 Day One at OCS
   F. J. Brockhall.

42 Fate of the Flying Dutchman
   Robert Kendall Piper.

47 Review Article: Australia in the Korea War 1950-
   1953, Vol 1.
   Captain G. Pemberton, RAAC.

53 The Foundation of Australia's Army Reserves:
   1788-1854. (PART 4)
   Brigadier M. Austin (R.L.)

61 Book Review.

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information
contained in their articles: the Board of Management accepts
no responsibility for errors of fact.
Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be
readily given by the Managing Editor after consultation with the
author. Any reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement
of source.
The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and
should not be construed as official opinion or policy.
Graduation Parade OCS, Portsea
(Photographer SGT Barry Buckley, Defence Public Relations, Army)
SOME ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL MANagements

Dear Sir,

In quoting Section 93 (1) of the Financial Regulation, under the Audit Act, that: “All officers who incur or authorise expenditure shall exercise due economy” as a lead to the topic of accountability for resource usage, Mr O’Neill (“Some Aspects of Financial Management”) has put his finger on a serious, though common, misunderstanding of the meaning (and therefore the application) of what is referred to as the economic use of resources.

Let me illustrate the point. In 1979/80 the Defence fuel bill was say, $x million. In 1980/81 the bill for almost the same quantity of fuel was $2x million. Defence “accounted” for the increased expenditure on the grounds of inflation, import parity pricing, and increased fuel holdings.

These reasons of course do not imply any improper or even inefficient expenditure. However if Mr O’Neill is saying that, thereby, Defence is fulfilling its obligation under Section 93 (1) and is exercising “economy in resource usage”, I believe he is mistaken.

The application of simple economic principles (as against the fulfilment of accounting and legal obligations) will lead a ‘manager’ to realise that, if the price of a commodity increases, he has at least three options:

a. reduced consumption;

b. compete with other sectors for additional funds;

c. reduce the frequency or quality (or both) of his services.

It is in making these decisions and living with the consequences of them that he is exercising his economic managerial skills.

This I believe is what is required by the “economical, efficient and effective use of resources”. It encompasses more than the legal accountability for the spending of public funds, important though that function is for both civilian and service members of Defence.

W. J. HOFF

AUTHOR’S REPLY

Dear Sir,

I agree with the thrust of Mr Hoff’s letter. I am not, however, saying what Mr Hoff suggests I might be in his third paragraph.

The various questions concerning overall resource allocation including reconsideration when, eg, total resources, or price relativities change, are canvassed by a number of senior committees which bring together the various specialist interests to consult (DRB 4 sets out the composition and functions of these committees). It is in this process that the resource usage criteria inherent in Finance Regulation 93 (1) is observed both in setting the original Budget Estimates and then reviewing any proposals to change them either for price or other reasons.

The actions in the preceding paragraph meet the requirement in the macro economic sense. What I was trying to point out was that in day to day administration, FR 93 (1) puts the onus on Ministerial delegates, financial clearance and concurrence authorities, and prescribed officers to apply the same tests to submissions put to them, whether they deal with decisions to repair/replace or, at another level, propose numbers which might be sent to an interstate conference, and/or what travel arrangements might apply etc.

J. S. O’NEILL
Assistant Secretary
Budgets and Estimates
(General and Co-ordination)

STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS

Dear Sir,

The anti-carrier campaign of the past few months which has been conducted apparently by some retired high ranking RAAF personnel is unfortunate in the devisiveness being created between the Navy and the Air Force and it must not be condoned. It is reminiscent of the carrier/ B-36 Bomber and TFX debates in the USA in the 1960’s. The contribution which those debates made to the compromise of military intellectual thought is well illustrated in a recent letter to the US Naval War College Review, March-April 1982 from Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, US Navy (Retired) who has been a consultant for some years to the US Naval War College and has written extensively. 

W. J. HOFF
on strategy and logistics. For the benefit of
readers I repeat his letter in full:

'Sir,

Almost immediately after their stunning successes in World War II our country’s military leaders began a process which in twenty years was to play a big part in drawing down upon the United States the disaster and humiliation of the Vietnamese War.

This was the surrender of military intellectual leadership to the civilian scholars and systems analysts. It stemmed from three primary causes: the military leaders' preoccupation with their struggles over service unification, the creation and shaping of the Department of Defense, and the controversy centering on the B-36 Bomber; their preoccupation with nuclear weaponry; and their growing contempt for the study of military theory, particularly of logistics. The process of the resulting civilian domination was made clear by the relief of Admiral George Anderson from the office of CNO in 1963 and the TFX decisions of the same period.

In this process first the military lost control of their language, then of their organization, and finally, of their operations. Intellectual honesty and rigor were smothered under an avalanche of esoteric jargon and meaningless calculations, while the critical calculations and relationships were largely ignored by civilians and military alike.

One observer, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., recently put it this way:

"Instead of concentrating attention on military strategy which had become unfashionable after World War II (and to many, irrelevant in the nuclear era), there was an increased emphasis on technical, managerial, and bureaucratic concerns."

One result of all this was that, when Vietnam became an issue that required major decisions, at no time did anyone in authority make a rigorous estimate of the situation — an estimate that would have started with an analysis of the objectives. In consequence, as Colonel Summers says, "the confusion over objectives . . . had had a devastating effect on our ability to conduct the war."

Summers points out while the United States, violating the precepts of Clausewitz, Mahan, and such like, what it takes is deep thought plus the ability to appreciate the influences of the physical aspects of warfare-geography, time, distance, and capabilities — to attain an intuitive understanding of the whole problem.

The essence of strategy lies in an authoritative combination of: the objective, i.e., the effect desired; the means, i.e., power derived from resources; and the scheme or plan to use the means to achieve the effect desired.

But, if a man cannot make an intuitive evaluation of the relationship of key objectives, tactical and logistical resources, and time, he is still not a strategist. What he is is a mere speculator.

While Clausewitz should be studied, no one should think that he is the final authority. What he did was to provide us with a splendid base from which to develop our own ideas.

REAR ADMIRAL HENRY E. ECCLES,
U.S. Navy (Retired)


2. Ibid., p 66.

The military in Australia have not been famous for strategic intellectual thought either so the perpetuation of unnecessary interservice rivalries which would hinder such development is not in the best interests of the Services or Australia and should be resisted.

C.A. BARRIE
Commander, RAN

QUALITY CONTROL FOR THE ARMY RESERVE

Dear Sir,

I am writing a short note to thank you for publishing my article on "Quality Control for the Army Reserve" in the March/April edition of "The Defence Force Journal".

Unfortunately my name is slightly incorrect, my surname being Bushell Guthrie. Also I am a serving member in the Army Reserve with the rank of major. The mix up is largely my fault as the covering letter with my military details and curriculum vitae was posted separately to the letter and obviously gone astray.

PHILLIP BUSHELL GUTHRIE
IN August, 1981, a questionnaire was distributed to samples of flying instructors and trainee pilots at two R.A.A.F. bases. The results indicate both agreement and conflict over aspects of flight instruction.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
This research depended upon the co-operation of Commanding Officers, flight instructors, and trainee pilots from the two R.A.A.F. bases. Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

BACKGROUND
In 1980-81 surveys were undertaken of instructors and student pilots in general aviation in several Australian States (Telfer, 1981, 1982). These surveys indicated areas of both agreement and disagreement, the latter mainly in terms of perceived difficulties. Conflicts emerged in perceptions of flying hours required to solo and various licensing stages and in the perceived effectiveness with which aspects of instruction and instructor training were carried out.

To ascertain the extent to which these results could be isolated within general aviation, cooperation was sought and gained for an adapted questionnaire to be applied to flying instructors and student pilots in two RAAF bases.

THE SAMPLE
From two R.A.A.F. bases involved in student pilot and flight instructor training, a sample of 21 instructors and 17 students was gained.

Most of the instructors (13, or 76%) were currently instructing from one to five students. One was instructing between eleven and fifteen students, and four were currently instructing over twenty students. (Three did not provide details).

THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The basic aim of the questionnaire was to gather data about the process of flight instruction. Thus items covered estimates of flying time to solo; difficult units of instruction and learning; perceived additional training needs; an evaluation of present instructional standards; and suggestions for change.

The five item (student) or seven item (instructor) questionnaire was mailed to respondents with a reply-paid envelope to ensure confidentiality and anonymity.

THE RESULTS
Both groups of respondents were asked to indicate estimates of average flying time required by students before they flew solo for the first time. The results are shown in Figure 1. There was general agreement that about 10 flying hours would be required. It is interesting to note the "tail" of the distribution of instructors' responses, however. Three instructors but no students estimated that more than ten hours would be required. The optimism or inexperience of students, and the realism or pessimism of instructors was a more marked result of the general aviation survey. In that survey, the differences in viewpoint became more marked as the licensing stage ascended to the commercial pilot level.
The general agreement shown by the R.A.A.F. groups is similar (but the hours are lower) to that found in the "hours to solo" item of the general aviation survey. This point is taken up in the concluding marks.

Next, both groups were asked what each had found to be the most difficult units or phases in each of the following stages:

- Pre-Solo stage;
- Post-Solo G.F. stage;
- Instrument flying stage;
- Navigation stage;

The results for each will be discussed in turn. (In all cases, more than one respondent had to report a difficulty before it was recognised).

![ESTIMATES OF HOURS TO SOLO](image)

**FIGURE 1**

**ESTIMATES OF HOURS TO SOLO**

![Number of Responses vs. Flying Hours](image)

**PRE-SOLO STAGE**

Both students and instructors agreed that there were five problem areas in pre-solo training:

- **Landing** (listed by 24% students and 29% instructors);
- **Circuits** (24% students; 29% instructors);
- **Flying with specified attitudes** (24% students; 14% instructors);
- **Stalling** (18% students; 14% instructors);

Students and instructors each isolated some particular areas of concern, not perceived as a problem by the other. For example, learning and remembering checks was reported as a problem by 41% students, but only 1% instructors. Similarly the flare or round-out on landing was seen as a problem by 35% students but not by any instructors. Procedures were listed as a problem by 29% students, and by no instructors. Others reported only by students (usually about 3 (18%) each) were: base turn and landing; base turn; and lack of confidence.

Instructors perceived problems with:

- **air adaption or student pilot awareness in the air** (29% instructors, 1 student);
- **base and finals** (19% instructors, no students);
- **wingovers** (14% instructors, no students).

Others reported by instructors (14%) and not students, were: **allowance for wind and cross wind**.

**POST-SOLO**

Identification of problems in the post-solo phase showed a greater degree of agreement. The Forced Landings exercise was named by 65% of the students and 33% of the instructors. (It was also seen as an instructional problem by general aviation respondents). Aerobatics (35% students; 33% instructors); circuits (18% students; 19% instructors); judgement/accuracy (18% students; 19% instructors); attitude flying (12% students; 14% instructors); action after an emergency (12% students; 10% instructors) and solo practice after dual exercises (12% students; 10% instructors) were other areas of agreement as instructional problems.

Students identified only one problem not mentioned by instructors — learning checklist procedures. Instructors, however, named four aspects not listed by students — slow rolls; effects of wind (sic.); flexibility and quick thinking; and formation flying.

**INSTRUMENT FLYING**

Again there were areas identified by both groups of respondents as problems:

- **orientation** in instrument flight (59% students; 58% instructors);
- **cross reference** (29% students; 24% instructors);
- **instrument approaches, learning symbols and procedures, multiple and simultaneous tasks** (12% students; 10% instructors).

A major difference was in the emphasis given Scan related problems by instructors.
Some 60% of instructors reported radical scan, selective scanning, slow or fast scans as instructional problems. 24% of the students reported such difficulties. Similar instructor-only responses were tacan approaches, priorities, and trimming.

The only problem reported by more students (students 24%; instructors .05%) was that of accuracy in instrument attitude flying.

**NAVIGATION**

Problems recognised by both groups of respondents were:
- Map reading and relating real life to the map (students 18%; instructors 40%);
- Simultaneously flying and navigating (18% students; 19% instructors);
- Preflight planning (12% students; 10% instructors);
- "not jumping to conclusions" (i.e. unnecessarily worrying about being lost) (12% students; 5% instructors).

Students (35%) reported a general navigation problem of "procedures" which was not mentioned by instructors. They also reported two other problems which were not listed by instructors — holding an accurate heading (18%) and preparation (18%).

Instructors drew attention to the problems of low-level navigation (instructors 33%, students 6%), either overworking or inability to relax/work in the cockpit (instructors 33%, students 12%), and wind assessment when airborne (instructors 19%, students 6%).

Both instructors and students were asked to specify types of additional training R.A.A.F. instructors needed to overcome such problems as those listed.

The most common answer was NIL (47% students, 38% instructors). A further 29% students and 14% instructors elaborated further by stating that experience alone would provide solutions to instructional problems.

There was a high degree of student/instructor agreement in responses to this item. Apart from the two groups of responses already given the pattern was for a small number in each group to suggest one or two of the following training needs:
- more time in training for instruction, especially on low navigation, formation and advanced areas;
- more discussions and lectures in training on the learning process and psychology;
- fault analysis (solving student problems by finding them);
- remedial inflight action;
- regular standardization flights (every six months) with experience instructors.

Also, there were requests for:
- a prerequisite for flight instructors to have a minimum of five years' operational experience;
- tested instructional ability;
- inclusion of civil aviation requirements (A.N.O.'s; A.N.R.'s, etc);
- more emphasis on student problems in flight instructor course.

Both groups were asked to indicate from a given list which aspects of flight instruction were currently being undertaken at an effective level.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>% Reporting Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass Briefing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Flight Briefing</td>
<td>82% 95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflight Demonstration</td>
<td>94% 95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflight Evaluation</td>
<td>82% 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflight Remediation</td>
<td>71% 86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debrief</td>
<td>94% 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation and Use of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Aids</td>
<td>65% 66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this item, respondents were given an opportunity to add comments. The most common student comment was related to simulators. 24% noted that they regarded a Machi simulator as potentially of "great value to students". Another student added that procedures could be advantageously taught on the simulator. Two similar comments were made regarding instrument flight and speeding cross reference.

Other comments were:
- there was a lack of standardization in instructor approach;
- the advice of other students was especially helpful;
- social mixing of instructors and students would "relax relationships".

Instructors commented about the lack of time available for pre-flight briefs, debriefs, and the preparation and use of teaching aids. One added that a more remedial approach was required with debriefs, and that more emphasis should be placed on inflight remediation. The
preparation and use of teaching aids was seen to be limited due to lack of funds.

Other comments included the need to retain students' self-confidence and motivation; experience as a solution for problems; shortage of experienced instructors; the redundancy of mass-briefs when only small numbers of students are involved; the need for regular discussions about students' future roles, motivation and prospects; and the need for social exchanges between instructors and students.

Respondents were asked if additional flight instructor training were required, what means was seen as most appropriate. The results are given in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
<th>Preferences for Means of Additional Instructor Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student Ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminars, Conferences, Workshops</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Job Training</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence Courses</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Time Study</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Time Study</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the results indicate, there was complete agreement on the use of on the job training, then in-service courses, workshops, seminars, or conferences as the most appropriate means of additional flight instructor training.

Additional comments included the desirability of providing additional flying within the existing instructors' course to "enhance pure flying skills", and the need for an annual "revaluation" of instructors.

The final section of the questionnaire was open-ended, enabling an elaboration of previous responses or additional comment on any aspect not covered by the questions.

Despite one reminder that "there are no problems of flight instruction in the R.A.A.F.", most respondents chose to comment further. One valid point was that the questionnaire approach to such a topic as the problems of flight instruction is inadequate.

"Some critical factors are involved in the selection of flight instructors", the respondent added, after suggesting that a discussion of the whole subject would be valuable exercise.

The range of comments provided some interesting overlaps in students/instructor viewpoint, and some clear examples of polarization. On the subject of student confidence an instructor wrote:

... meaningful friendly criticism coupled with praise is the golden rule. Once the student knows you are on his side, you can kick his butt till it's black and blue, if necessary ...

A student commented: "There seems to be a lack of encouragement and praise — this tends to reduce, not build confidence."

For one instructor, "the singular problem is the calibre of the trainee". For a student, "a lot is left to the student to learn without assistance. There's a difference between spoon-feeding and not teaching at all.

Other instructors pointed to staff/student ratios which needed to decrease for standards of instruction to increase; the claim that flying courses are often under heavy pressure of time constraints; and the diversified backgrounds from which instructors are drawn. It was suggested the C.F.S. courses should be more flexible to cater for varying participant backgrounds. In terms of motivation, one instructor suggested that only those personally committed ("actually enjoying the job") should be flight instructors.

Both groups recognised the importance of experience as a determinant of the quality of flight instruction. Students wrote: "... an experienced instructor gives you a definite advantage. The standard of instruction varies considerably." "... the best instructors are those who have had most experience with students."

Instructors saw most of their learning coming "... from exposure to both students and senior instructors". An interesting implication follows: "... as instructors learn their techniques in the first year of instructing, tours of duty should be two years or more".

For students, a major area for additional comment was the lack of feedback for evaluation of performance. "Not knowing your marks makes self-appraisal difficult. More general debriefs would help." Others commented:

"... Not knowing about your flight assessment takes your incentive away ..."

"... more information on progress is needed ..."
"not knowing my results, it's difficult for me to evaluate the effectiveness of instruction".

"Most problems diminish with practice — if they don't, the student is generally scrubbed."

There were two other major areas of comment: student/instructor relations and the role of simulators. Students commented on a desire for social and informal contact with instructors. One felt that social contact would enhance the working relationship and "maximise the opportunity for feedback". Another commented: "It's amazing how performance improves if one is flying with an instructor who one can respect both as a pilot ... and a person with regard for a student's problems". Another said: "... a friendly relationship encourages the students to work hard to avoid letting the instructor down".

One pointed out that "personality clashes do occur and really affect performance". Another added that instructor training in psychology could prevent the student without confidence, "... a real hazard in the air".

An instructor agreed — "perhaps a mini-course in psychology would help". Another felt that "a need exists for a more personal approach — we need to be more aware of the problems and pressures encountered by the student".

On the subject of simulators, one student printed in large block letters, "A Machi simulator is a must". One instructor warned that "simulators should not be used to replace air experience for the ab initio student. Sound airmanship can only be developed from actual experience".

**CONCLUSIONS**

There was a high degree of agreement by instructors and students on the hours of flying needed before solo. This estimate (of ten hours) was lower than that estimated by students and instructors in general aviation. There, students' estimates were eleven hours and instructors' estimates were sixteen hours average. This variation could be explained in terms of R.A.A.F. selection procedures which maintain a quality of student intake unattainable in general aviation. The homogeneity of trainee quality could enable greater consensus in estimating hours to solo.

The most difficult phases of aspects of flight common to R.A.A.F. and general aviation were those of circuits and landing. It is interesting that this is a feature of flight training in both civil and air force systems. It is predictable in that both are cumulative exercises in which a series of previously acquired skills are synthesised and coordinated.

The complexity of landing, especially in cross-wind or traffic circumstances may be minimised for the trainee by a task analysis. One hypothesis is that students' information-processing ability could be strained to the point of overload in the early stages of landing practice. A solution for such a situation would be for instructors to ensure that the short-term memory is available for maximum information processing. This means that procedures and checks should be so familiar that they are reliably stored in the long-term memory of students.

As in general aviation, the flying exercise of forced landings appears to be a problem for most students and many instructors.

Perhaps those instructors (66%) who do not find it a problem could disseminate details of their methods and approaches. Next to circuits/landings this appears to be a major problem for the trainee pilot. Another major problem for both groups was the difficulty with orientation when flying by instruments. In instruction training, this aspect may need special emphasis.

While the general feeling was that no special instructor training was needed to overcome such problems, about a quarter of the respondents chose to make suggestions which appeared both reasonable and relevant. Most could be implemented by the individual instructor, but they could easily be covered within an instructor training program.

The least successful aspects of flight instruction were reported as being inflight remediation and the preparation and use of teaching aids. The former is no doubt seen as being the more important. Tradition and occupational socialisation play roles in determining expectations of appropriateness in flight instruction. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that the benefits of the skill of variability in teaching can enhance the instructional process (Turney, 1973). Use of variation in the media and
materials of instruction are the major means of varying teaching approaches. Videotapes, projected transparencies, models, and overheads can provide a valuable input to flight instruction, even though the learner may be alone and not in a mass briefing.

The relative roles of praise and criticism depend largely upon the style and philosophy of the instructor. A repeated student comment was virtually a request for feedback concerning progress and attainment to accompany instructor comments, especially in the debrief. If comments can ensure that instructor comments provide the most information about student performance and minimise personal criticism. If feedback of results could be formalised by either allowing student access to records or in the provision of condensed reports, the process would be further enhanced.

Simultaneously, student objections of impersonality or lack of informal instructor/student relations may be removed if such feedback were given in scheduled informal discussions of progress. Perhaps some barbecue or instructor/student social gatherings could help the informal link to develop.

The process of learning is most complex, and the process of learning to fly in the armed forces is an extremely specialised variant. A written survey, conducted by one outside the service, is an extremely crude and limited approach. It is, however, an indication of area worthy of further exploration.

The major problems of flight instruction exist in flight instruction, not only in the R.A.A.F. or in general aviation. Two fields of enquiry: the psychology of the process of learning to fly, and the teaching skills involved, seem to be the key areas for future research. Change involves altering expectations, roles, and tradition. It appears justified, however, in at least some aspects of some instructional practices.

References

AWARD: ISSUE No 35 (JULY/AUGUST, 1982)
The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the July/August issue (No 35) of the Defence Force Journal to Air Commodore R.G. Funnell, RAAF for his article Leadership: Theory and Practice.

APPEAL FOR PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
Two Central Office public servants, entrants in the Queen of Canberra Quest, are hoping to raise more than $60,000 for Canberra’s Hartley House and Hartley Street Centre. These are non-profit organisations established to provide for the care and welfare of physically handicapped children in the ACT.

Lyn Fairlie and Genelle Mills entered the Quest to help raise money for the centres, whose running costs exceeded $100,000 in 1981.

The Hartley Street Centre, located at an ACT primary school, provides educational and paramedical facilities for physically handicapped children of the ACT and surrounding areas.

Hartley House provides accommodation for physically handicapped children. Plans for a second hostel are well advanced.

Donations can be sent to:
Queen of Canberra Entrants,
C-4-32
RUSSELL OFFICES ACT 2600
Cheques should be made payable to “Hartley House”.
By Commander Chris J. Skinner RAN

'Technology — the Scientific Study of Industrial and Mechanical Arts'

INTRODUCTION

Technology

The term 'Technology' after many years of overuse now conjures an image of a creeping societal threat like 'Terrorism' or 'Big Brother'. Nevertheless Technology is a useful term to describe a major influence on all of life, and no less so on warfare — land, air, space and maritime. This influence has been increasing since such early inventions as the bow or spear. The rate of increase is growing itself; thus developments over a few decades now are of equal significance to those spanning centuries in earlier times. This acceleration results in new problems for ordinary people who find it increasingly difficult to comprehend the changing world now that several changes can occur within their lifetime.

Driving the acceleration of technological change is massive investment, the greater part of it defence related, which has resulted in a world-wide quasi arms-race that transcends national boundaries and even alliances. The investment is huge for several reasons:

a. maintenance of the super power thermonuclear balance, requiring huge military budgets;
b. greater reliance on the weapons themselves rather than the warrior and the organised military grouping; this has resulted in more being spent on each weapon;
c. increasing lethality and fire power, both of which imply increased costs of modern weapons; plus

d. the increasing difficulty in predicting the outcome of sophisticated technological warfare.

Overall, following an age-old precept of warfare, technological development in opposing, advanced countries must proceed to counter the possible as well as the actual. This alone is a powerful multiplier in R and D budgeting.

Geopolitical

In maritime affairs, a number of concurrent developments have occurred that produce further technological impact. Of these the most pervasive are geopolitical — the creation of many new countries that were formerly coastal or island colonies of the great powers; the awakening of China; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution; and the influence of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in controlling the availability and the steeply-rising price of oil. All these have contributed to the level of instability perceived by most countries, and have produced the desire to arm to a sufficient level. High-technology weaponry is irresistibly attractive to many countries with ample dollars or credit to spend; although often there is not the national educational wherewithal to provide technical maintenance and support (which must be 'bought' in also). Nevertheless such weapons create a potential threat, and neighbouring
opposing countries must follow suit, or be disadvantaged.

Equally influential has been the rapid realisation of the worth of the sea, the food in it and the resources under it. As technological advances have permitted exploitation of the seabed to greater water depths, so countries have become increasing acquisitive regarding ocean areas previously considered high seas. The Law of the Sea Conferences are closer to final agreement, but many coastal countries have declared territorial limits of 12 nautical miles (nm) and Exclusive Economic Zones of 200 nm unilaterally. The latter brings with it the opportunity for exploitation to be conducted under licence by those countries with advanced technology, thereby producing further potential competition for resources, particularly oil. While this is not necessarily sinister, it does add a new medium for potential conflict — disagreements over offshore seabed resources.

Finally there is the super-power confrontation between USA and USSR; both countries have striven to maintain at least an equal position (and better still, a little ahead) in the strategic balance, and have increasingly confronted each other at sea. The inexorable expansion of Soviet maritime fleet assets — civilian and military — and of the roles and influence they project, has been a most influential change in the maritime strategic situation. The United States Navy (USN), previously unchallenged in many of its capabilities, is increasingly beset by Soviet tactical counters, and by budgetary pressures at home. In earlier years in land, air and undersea warfare, USA has claimed a technological superiority that compensated for more-numerous Soviet forces; although probably still the case temporarily in some areas, the reverse is also true as exemplified in Soviet development of anti-satellite satellites where the United States has not yet an equivalent capability.

The impact of technology is occurring through these various avenues and mechanisms; the results will follow several broad treads:

- exploitation of maritime areas will become more intensive, leading inevitably to greater rivalry, friction and even conflict;
- advanced surveillance systems will produce overwhelming data requiring extensive reduction and analysis before use;
- weapons of increasing sophistication will continue to be developed; and will become available to a large number of countries able to purchase both the weapons and the needed maintenance effort, as a relatively cheap way of creating a formidable threat. The other two major areas of technology in navies — mobility and communications — will continue their developmental trends but will probably not change dramatically.
- Finally and of most significance, the western advanced world will increasingly depend on 'Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC)' to carry raw materials and energy sources to feed the technology advances. Compared with Communist bloc countries in Europe/Asia for whom the equivalent transport is mostly on land (excepting eastern Siberia), this implies an increasing vulnerability of western powers to the severing of the SLOC's by maritime forces. This vulnerability will be the most profound resultant impact of technology on maritime warfare; it may also precipitate all the other impacts discussed in this article.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Early Maritime Warfare

In early history, fleets of warships determined international events on many occasions; even at that time the warships were 'purpose-built', with a ramming bow. They were propelled by oars, sometimes with an 'auxilliary' sail, a method of propulsion that continued on for centuries. Large numbers of oar-propelled vessels were to be used as late as the Russo-Swedish War (1788-90). The use of sail for propulsion increased gradually such that 'during the later Middle Ages, the sailing ship had gradually developed into a truly ocean-going vessel', however 'oar-power' was more reliable in close-quarter battles.

Cannon were used in ships following their use ashore, and naval guns similarly reflected the improvements in design and performance made to land-based artillery. The Spanish Armada (1588) 'was the first sea-battle to be decided by artillery alone, for the superior handling characteristics of their ships had enabled the English to avoid close combat with their larger adversaries'. Developments occurred in many areas. By 1783 'in the Royal Navy, several technical improvements had by now proved their worth; copper plating on
The Industrial Revolution

The Industrial Revolution brought mechanisation to all spheres of human activity, not least maritime warfare, where developments continued in propulsion and in firepower, now grown so lethal that armouring for ships became a necessity. It had been pioneered as early as the sixteenth century by the Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin in the Japanese/Korean War (1592-98). Yi's armoured 'turtle ships' defeated the Japanese fleet ten times larger than his own. The Crimean War was another landmark in naval development; for the first time steam power proved its superiority over sail propulsion. In addition the new explosive shells demonstrated their great penetrative power, and resulted in the third change — the increasing use of armour to protect ships from increasingly effective artillery. The American Civil War was a further milestone. 'With the national economies on both sides fully integrated into their respective war efforts, the American Civil War was truly the first modern war, and the first "total" war in the modern sense'.

By 1864, 'the technological revolution had proceeded a step further. Monitors and smaller armoured ships had fought, the armour had shown itself superior to artillery, the torpedo had made its first kill and experiments with submarines were under way'.

'Steam power became a major consideration in strategic planning, and was the primary stimulus to Alfred Thayer Mahan in his writings on Sea Power which were so influential on maritime nations'. The location of coaling stations for steam-powered ships assumed critical importance.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) marked another milestone... 'quickfiring, heavy artillery; ammunition of great explosive power and proper fire control systems functioning... made possible concentrated gunnery of tremendous effect, at ranges of 4000 and 8000 yards. On the larger scale the voyage of the (Russian) squadron halfway round the world demonstrated the considerable supply problems involved in supplying a modern fleet far from its bases. The war also saw the first use of wireless, which kept Togo well informed about the movements of his opponents'.

This Century

For the remainder of this century the pace of technological innovation quickened, and gave forth a spate of new inventions. In the period until the start of the Second World War (1939-45) came the machine gun, the aeroplane as an effective weapon, bigger and bigger battleships, the establishment of the submarine as a deadly weapon, reliable radio communications, more efficient steam propulsion, and more accurate artillery of longer range.

The Second World War (1939-45) saw some significant changes and developments; the vulnerability of surface units to aircraft attack; the profound effects that the German U-boat submarine offensive had on logistic supply to Britain across the Atlantic, and later US submarines had on Japanese supply lines; rapid exploitation of radar, and the German invention of rockets for strategic land warfare. Perhaps the two most important of all were, firstly, the influence of aircraft carriers; and secondly the atomic bomb. 'The Battle of the Coral Sea was... a battle of some significance in the development of naval warfare: for the first time fleets had fought one another without direct visual contact'; together they provided the Attack Carrier Battle Group which today is providing a formidable means of potential intervention and tactical strike, as evidenced by their flexible employment as part of United States international policy. Russia is taking steps to acquire a similar capability. The original role for such carrier forces of strategic nuclear deterrence is now better handled by ballistic-missile armed submarines (SSBN's).

1945

The atomic bomb exploding over Hiroshima in 1945 marked the start of a new era. All diplomatic, strategic and maritime concepts and philosophies have changed irrevocably since entering the nuclear age. That does not mean that all older proven or classical concepts are outdated; in many respects only the scale
has changed, albeit by a staggering increment. The world has not yet indulged in the Pyrrhic excess of waging two-sided nuclear war. The superpowers have maintained a semblance of parity or 'balance' in their nuclear stockpiles, however the number of nuclear countries has increased and may be expected to continue to grow.

A rash of wars of all sorts have occurred throughout the world, all constrained uneasily at times within the milieu of so-called 'conventional' warfare. None of them has involved the major powers in major maritime conflict, although the USA, and more so recently the USSR rely on their maritime capability to exert powerful pressure adjacent to the coastal zone. The USSR has come a long way since 1945; this transformation has affected world-wide political attitudes extensively.

And the nuclear balance itself, until recently a two way east-west confrontation increasingly must take China into account, at least in East Asia. When China completes the development of an SSBN, the present semi-stable situation may be expected to destabilise. Chinese antipathy for Russia plus cordial relations with the West, has had some influence on Russian-American relations; however the eventual long-term effects are not at all clear. Certainly the role of Japan in providing much-needed technological expertise in return for raw materials, will be an important determinant in such changes.

Historians have identified eight major patterns in the period since 1945:

a. 'confrontation of the Superpowers — USA and Russia;
b. the Technological Revolution;
c. the Political and Economic Revolutions;
d. the Conspiracy and Challenge of International Communism;
e. the Growing Importance of International and Regional Organisations;
f. the Trend towards Polycentrism, primarily due to the rise of China as a power;
g. the Start of Arms Control and Disarmament; and
h. new Elements in Military Strategy'.

All of these can be seen as themes through the following discussion of what I have called Current Issues, that is: 'Where are we now in 1980'.

**CURRENT ISSUES**

'Nukes' — Big and Small

The number of countries with nuclear weapons is growing. The number of weapons held by these countries is growing. The accuracy of delivery of the weapons is improving; the ability to pack them into more and smaller heads is improving; and the countries who feel most at risk are working harder to obtain the capability. At the same time the earlier abhorrence of such warfare has decreased almost in inverse proportion to their spread, such that nuclear war is no longer unthinkable, only horrifying.

This in turn has evoked a multitude of studies, theories and principles of control of this highly dangerous situation. There is no general agreement that control is possible — that the level can be held short of an all-out nuclear exchange. Some, noting the increasing vulnerability of land-based fixed missile sites propose that their launch must be inevitable if they are hazarded, if only to 'protect' their capability. At that stage it becomes a little unreal. What is real though is none of the commentators have any difficulty in accepting nuclear exchanges at sea. Remote from major population centres of either side, the navies are supposed to battle it out in scenes reminiscent of mediaeval knights fighting for their kings. The only problem is the navies, at least the Western navies, are not really awake to what is being expected of them.

Finally there is the contribution to raw power that derives from the opponents' perception of our will to use the nuclear weapons, whether tactical or strategic. 'The nature of international politics has not decisively been altered by the onset of the nuclear era, nor have the perceptions of most world political leaders concerning the importance of military power undergone substantial change. Leaders of nations large and small continue to evaluate their own positions on the power scale relative to that of others; whether their estimates are right or wrong, technically correct or based on ignorance and misinformation, such estimates seemingly continue to influence their conduct.' Now that the 'unthinkable' stage is past, it is inevitable that sooner or later a leader possessing nuclear arms will decide to use them.
Military Intelligence and Technology

The 'imperative of basing military decisions on sound information about the capabilities of enemy forces and their potential movements is just as great as ever'. Over the last few decades technology has contributed a large part of the present capability for gathering military intelligence — whether 'spy' satellite, high-flying reconnaissance aircraft, capable 'electromagnetic intelligence' (ELINT) receiver, or under-ocean acoustic surveillance system. Consequently the intelligence requirements should have been met; they have been, but 'the danger today is less with the paucity of information than it is with the difficulty of comprehending all of the information' available in overwhelming quantities.

Even so, some areas of military development are suitable to be kept secret, such that the actual creation of a new capability cannot be discerned readily, for example, the addition of a longer range motor/fuel tank in a cruise missile. There is no assurance that such a capability that appears feasible, is not actually being pursued by the opposition, and consequently our side must seek it too: 'Countries at similar levels in an area of technology can expect to make a particular advance in that technology at about the same time... Two such countries aiming at full security must not only counter the actual moves of the other, but because of the long timescale of military R & D, offset any other possible moves which the other could make from its initial technical position'. This is the major cause of the high level of defence-related technological R & D. A final impetus derives from the anticipated warning time from perception of crisis to onset of conflict, an interval disturbingly short and reducing; certainly they are less than R & D times for new capabilities. Although this 'lead-time' disparity is increasingly recognised, the resulting influence is less rapidly employed, and is not always effective in periods of cost reduction.

International Factors and Technology

In an increasingly crowded world the disparity of living standards between countries is as wide as ever and increasing. The efforts of international non-profit groups and bodies, both United Nations (UN), and privately sponsored, has done much to publicise the problem, but has not, nor can be expected to make great inroads in solving the problems rapidly. Meanwhile, other international entities such as the multinational corporations have significant influence, often running counter to the aid-groups; similarly countries that have a great need of imported energy-source raw materials, cannot afford to be altruistic while maintaining their own standard of living (a credo of advanced countries).

Technology has undoubtedly contributed to much greater levels of travel and other communication, particularly television, however there has not been any lessening of misunderstanding. This indicates that there is some much longer term factor at work in determining the conditions for friendly understanding between countries and ethnic groups. Furthermore telecommunication systems are so pervasive that they provide an ideal means for misinformation and propaganda in unenlightened hands.

In advance of these innovations in communication and technological developments, has been the military introduction of vast, complex communication systems, often automated, world-wide and with redundant links, secure from compromise and designed to survive significant levels of warfare. This has spawned terms like C3I (command and control, communications and intelligence) and WWMCCS.

The Electromagnetic Spectrum

The usage of the entire EM spectrum is growing all the time — the fringes are being developed; lasers and fibre optics for communication; extra-low frequency (ELF) for communicating with deep-submerged submarines; and the density across the spectrum is increasing. There are still less-dense areas such as between the millimetric waves (20-200+GHz), and far infrared (2000 GHz = 2THz); nevertheless they are being encroached upon. The applications in warfare include frequency diversity in communications and radars, more effective ECM, particularly jamming, and very much more effort going into counter counter-measures (CCM).

Even more so, this applies to the upper frequency end — electro-optics; increasingly involved in guidance, homing and target designation for guided weapons. The increasing popularity of precision guided weapons and their demonstrated effectiveness is causing
planners and analysts to go back to their history books in an attempt to find means for degrading the deadly hail of fire expected... with more and more precision guided missiles (PGM’s) surfacing. Many of the systems appear to have few... weaknesses that can be exploited by conventional (ECM) techniques’. An urgent revival of smoke screens and camouflage is occurring, and more effective armour is being fitted — reminiscent of the artillery/armeur development in the latter nineteenth century.

And there are ‘ray weapons’. Large sums are being spent on developing the laser or a large particle generator to produce desired military effects in space, and terrestrially. Progress reportedly has been slow and may not attain practical effectiveness for many years. However, a sudden ‘breakthrough’ change to this status should not be ruled out.

Space

Satellites litter the inner space around earth, either in rotational orbits at lower altitude (eg 100-400 nm) or synchronous orbits at higher altitude (21,000 nm approx). Used extensively for surveillance, navigation and communications of all kinds, they have become a commonplace. However, they can be interfered with — either by jamming or by physical attack. Russia has been flight-testing anti-satellite (ASAT) satellites for more than two years; the USAF has recently been authorised to conduct tests of the US equivalent.

The surveillance capabilities of satellites are good but not perfect — they suffer problems of resolution and limited time over the area of interest. Nevertheless their ability to detect EM emissions, and even eavesdrop on uncovered circuits, has radically changed the traditional dimensions of maritime warfare; gone is the ability for surface forces to disappear for days in the broad ocean.

Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons

B and C weapons (so called) are often put together due to their similarity in handling; nevertheless there is at least one important distinction — chemical weapons and agents have been used — most recently reported being used by Russia in Afghanistan. There has been sufficient evidence amassed on the infrequent use of chemical warfare to indicate that control of the outcome is difficult but not impossible. Some authoritative individuals argue that B-weapons can equally be controlled and are equally likely to be used, however defence for B-weapons is acknowledged as much more difficult, and likely to be difficult for the attacker also. ‘(It) seems right to regard both B and C weapons as bringing to war only a new kind of lethality’.

Lethality

Lethality, otherwise ‘killing power’, has been increasing steadily over the years, at the same time that ‘nukes’ have become smaller and smaller... ‘killing power naturally remains a chief ingredient of military success’. ‘Engineering development, coupled with operational analysis of battlefield conditions, can steadily raise the kill or casualty-inflicting capacity of a military force, nor has any definite limit to this trend yet revealed itself... ‘Conventional warfare might one day be made to approach nuclear warfare in its lethality and therefore its “unsuitability”’.

This latter proposition will probably never come to final equality, since one imagines it will normally be preferable to avoid problems of radiation and fallout. However the line between conventional and nuclear will become less distinct.

Electronics and Computer Science

Very little of the other technological ‘revolutionary’ developments would have been possible without the computer and its pervasive ‘software’ programs, together the subject of a new academic field — computer science. The computer, in common with very many modern machines, has increasingly relied on the breathtaking rate of development of microminiature electronic devices of all kinds; each new generation providing a quantum increase in performance, usually in a smaller package, with less input power required. These devices lend themselves readily to use in portable military equipment, and even more so inside weapons and ordnance, leading to the apt term ‘smart weapons’.

‘Software’, as distinct from the tangible ‘hardware’, is a new form of matter that is often difficult to grapple — at the same time it is ‘knowledge’; a ‘specification’, and the ‘resulting mechanisation’. Brand new approaches, techniques, management, evaluation and methods of support have been nec-
necessary; the process isn't complete either; perhaps in a (human) generation, when there are people who have grown up with computers and couldn't imagine life without them, they will be universally treated as the powerful tools they are. Meanwhile the military puts them to good use. In particular, to conduct simulations of military, economic and political situations and operations, without the cost in lives or money of actual combat; thus in theory avoiding the costly mistakes of earlier times.  

A new problem of modern systems often heavily dependent on 'embedded' software, is the difficulty of testing to even a small percentage of all the options and environmental conditions for which the systems are designed. It is now considered normal for infrequent design problems to exist in operational computer programs long after their acceptance into service, requiring life-cycle support to 'maintain' the program after these problems are discovered. At the same time the upgrading of software is relatively easy although the cost of the necessary testing is often more expensive than hardware. Thus 'in the military field, as in the civil, we must expect a constant struggle to ensure that the computer remains firmly the servant of its users'.

What Technology Demands of People

As the pace of technological change and innovation quickens, so it requires an acceleration of responses in the people involved; and the latter group is growing — now including most of the population of western countries. For individuals the demands are increasingly heavy especially on older people; they may already have been asked to relearn whole sections of knowledge twice over in their lives, for future generations it will be more often. The reason for this is that technology feeds on itself. Technology makes more technology possible . . . Technological innovation consists of three stages, linked together into a self-reinforcing cycle. First, there is the creative, feasible idea. Second, its practical application. Third, its diffusion through society, (which) in turn helps generate new creative ideas . . . There is evidence that the time between each of these steps has shortened'. There is the temptation to consider arbitrarily slowing the pace of technological change in order to reduce stress, and enable better adaptation and survival. For after all, while the technical frontier moves ever on, not everything it leaves behind becomes obsolete or redundant'.

Educational levels of military personnel are important to the changing level of technology. 'Continued refinement of equipment and methods might show diminishing returns on the battlefield as the technical demands on the individual, perhaps at low levels in the military hierarchy, begin to approach the limits of his abilities'. Furthermore 'as regards military personnel . . . until recent years, their professional appreciation has generally lagged behind technical development substantially'.

Liquid Fuels

The lie to this comfortable wish to slow the pace, is the stark truth that the world has a finite limit on fossil-fuel energy sources; particularly oil, which in addition to being a valuable chemical feedstock is increasingly sought after to feed the engines of the millions of vehicles for which an alternative power source has not been developed. Although oil consumption is not expected by one projection to grow absolutely by very much (1.1% annual rate 1978-90), the growth for other fossil fuels suitable for vehicles is not growing rapidly either (natural gas 2.7%, coal 3.7% annual growth) and these require extensive modification for ships presently burning oil fuels; aircraft have no such option. The supply of 'synthetic' liquid fuels is increasing (25.7% annual growth rate); these fuels manufactured from a variety of sources — tar sands and oil shale, coal, natural gas and alcohol — are expected to provide necessary fuel but at greater cost, reflecting the large technological investment required for their production. Even so in the projection for 1990 synthetic fuels will provide only two percent of world total energy supply, while oil will have dropped by nine percent (to 45%).

Clearly the economics of liquid fuels are affecting warfare more than ever before — conventional land, sea and air warfare all depend on vehicular mobility, almost all of it reliant on liquid fuel; the only exception is the growing naval use of nuclear power by the major navies. However even the world nuclear energy supply is growing at a steady annual rate of only 11.3 percent. For the USA, the greatest western user of nuclear energy for vehicular propulsion, the growth rate for total nuclear energy supply is only ten percent".
Thus a change from conventional liquid fuels is a daunting undertaking; there are a number of issues of specialised application to maritime warfare and the impact of technology.

CURRENT MARITIME ISSUES

Introduction
Primary amongst them is the introduction of controlled nuclear propulsion, enabling the equipping of major navies with large numbers of SSN’s and SSBN’s that are truly submarines — able to stay underwater indefinitely. Other propulsion developments have been the complete change to oil fuel enabling fuelling at sea underway, and the perfection of marine gas — turbine plant for ships, resulting in rapid starting and streamlined maintenance giving more days available at sea.

In the firepower area, the most dramatic change has been the introduction of guided missiles to be used for all forms of lethal delivery; increasingly impervious to jamming and/or other countermeasures, the to and fro of Anti-Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) goes on.

Meanwhile ‘armour protection’, having been dropped since 1945 in the interests of economy, is starting to make something of a comeback, if only to protect vulnerable vital areas against shrapnel and blast. As performance levels have climbed for electronic equipment so also has the fragility and general vulnerability to even small violent disturbance. This in turn has sparked a massive interest in ‘survivability’, often including armour now of light-weight, complex plastics formulation.

International Issues
‘Today, the centuries-old concepts concerning the freedom of the seas are increasingly being questioned, and nations are laying claim to sovereignty over waters up to 200 miles (325 km) from their shores’. The fish and mineral resources in these sea zones, and particularly the oil under it, are already leading to competition and low-level international jostling as the level of exploitation increases rapidly.

Although many countries were reasonably happy with the provisions of the UN sponsored ‘Law of the Sea’ the continuing difficulties in obtaining agreement, particularly by the major powers, on such issues as the rights of ‘archipelagic’ countries has led to a large number of unilateral declarations of 320 km EEZ, and in many cases bilateral agreements on the boundaries between contiguous zones.

Whatever the developments in nuclear propulsion for military ships and submarines, there is no end in sight for the continuing dependence on oil - derived fuel in most other vehicles. In spite of active search and research for other means, notably stored electricity, the capital costs, size and efficiencies mitigate against it. The result of this is that large rates of petroleum oil and gas production are needed even to maintain the status quo as already discussed. Drastic reduction in the rates will inevitably lead to major crises around the world as the many countries which are wholly or mostly dependent on imports, suffer massive dislocation of normal societal functions. The several occasions of world and local shortages of petroleum have always been traumatic in the countries affected, and further occurrences are probable. For some countries like Japan, the effects would be so great that it is inevitable, yes inevitable, that they would have to take retaliatory action to prevent a domestic disaster; history records this has happened before, as Japan’s entry into the Second World War (1939-45) in 1941 followed the final United States embargo on oil exports to Japan. Most countries of Western Europe are in a similar although less severe situation. Even the USA, still a major oil producer, is increasingly affected. And all of these countries receive a large part of their oil by sea from the Persian Gulf area, as highlighted by the recent Iran-Iraqi conflict.

Carried in huge tankers over what used to be called trade routes, but now are Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), the oil is a lifeline of normalcy — once cut all present bases of consideration start to topple. And the SLOC’s are essentially vulnerable due to their vast extent and the diminishing western maritime assets with which to defend them. ‘The United States depends on overseas sources for vital natural resources, particularly oil...The American capacity to escort merchant shipping across the Atlantic or around the Horn of Africa with surfaceborne escort vessels is clearly limited... it is no longer clear that the US, even when its forces are supplemented by those of its allies, possesses sufficient naval strength to bottle-up successfully the numerically superior Soviet navy’. The vast expanses of the Indian Ocean and the recent concentration in
the North-West corner further strain the resources for anti-submarine protection elsewhere.

Submarine Warfare

'True submarine warfare had to await the development of nuclear engines' (sic). Clearly the stealth of the SSN is the best match for the SSN or SSBN; 'set a thief to catch a thief'. And indeed it works so well that underwater battles, reminiscent of science fiction, can easily be imagined that only become clear to the general world at the conclusion or even much later. The battle is between opposing technologies as much as anything else — how quiet can one submarine be made; how sensitive can its detection equipment be made. This is truly at the very edge of technological development, and budgets and priorities are accordingly high.

A major ASW capability has been the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) — fixed or rotary-wing — which have been able to use their superior mobility and good sensors to counter the submarine making its way to attack a force or convoy. Finding the SSBN is more difficult; deliberately hiding away while remaining ready, it is not an easy proposition; and now able to be thousands of miles from targets since the deployment of missiles such as the SS-N-8. It was the missile that changed all that. Firstly, the capabilities of submarine-launched anti-ship tactical missiles have increased many-fold, with the Soviet capability much ahead of the West again, especially with the submarine tactical ballistic missile (SS-NX-13). The targeting information for Soviet submarines is available from a number of surveillance sources, even as simple as a trailing AGM, via a world-wide C1 system similar to the United States equivalent, except that it provides detailed information to individual platforms as well as force commanders.

Secondly, the time is near when submarines will carry an effective AAW missile thus giving the MPA pause. The whole tenor of submarine warfare has changed anyway. The areas involved have become huge, and are now too large for effective comprehensive ASW search by aircraft. Thus the detection of submarines in the deep field will have to depend on a combination of systems such as SOSUS and TACTAS, as well as the MPA's in Distant Support/Independent Operations.

Air and Surface Warfare

The above water warfare areas have become truly three-dimensional. The forceful capabilities of the USN large attack-carrier (CVA) battle groups are largely undiminished, and although their prime mission is no longer long-range nuclear strike they still carry a very powerful air strike force that has great flexibility, and yields great influence on events onshore.

The AAW battle is still a viable one against manned aircraft even when armed with anti-ship missiles, however the increased performance of the Soviet 'Backfire' is a more difficult challenge. The anti-ship missile defence (ASMD) of forces afloat is being pursued in many ways, all of them offering effective defence against one or more incoming anti-ship missile (ASM) provided it is detected in good time, and with varying probabilities of success against a multiple ASM attack. The difficulties of combating submarine launched ASM's are greater, but counters have been built. Electronic warfare is used extensively in the battle, however live or simulated evaluations stop short of full realism, and hence 'we are clearly likely to witness a continuing electronic battle between offensive and defensive systems with respect to land, sea and air fighting, and at any future state a major war between technically advanced powers, excluding the use of A.B.C. weapons, could only be... a "truly enormous experiment"'.

A very great number of the smaller maritime countries have acquired patrol boats/corvettes with very good ASM capabilities — Harpoon, Exocet, Penguin, Otomat, Gabriel, SS-N-2A and the like. They have only been used effectively in two regional wars; the SS-N-2A used by Egypt in the Yom Kippur war were all unsuccessful, almost all defeated by Israeli ECM. Later missiles would not be so defeated. However 'hard-kill' of the missiles is difficult due to small cross-section, and trajectory (either skimming, or high angle dive). And of course the Soviet tactical ballistic SS-NX-13 will have no counter at all initially.

The point of all this is that like submarine warfare, the battle is one essentially of technology — what capability can be afforded by one side, and what counter then becomes essential for the other — and so it goes on. There are a number of similar trends, both general and specific to the maritime domain,
that can be perceived now, and can be expected to continue their influence through the 1980s.

**GENERAL AND MARITIME TRENDS**

**Great Powers — USA, USSR, and now China**

The USA has always been a country with a short memory and a predilection to think as far as the next presidential election. Thus US foreign policy moves in a series of spurts. Most recently have been the SALT II talks, the reaction to Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the creation of the rapid-deployment force, and the change in US targeting policy from cities to military targets. Meanwhile the United States armed forces are at a very low level.

Conversely the USSR has built up total defence forces which are now widely regarded as being excessive if intended only for the defence of the motherland and satellite countries. In the strategic nuclear balance, the Soviets have achieved parity and a bit more. In conventional forces however, the Warsaw Pact forces greatly outnumber NATO forces. There is no serious opponent on the southern borders, except the Chinese army which outnumbers the Soviet Eastern Armies, but is less well equipped and poorly supported in high-technology arms such as close air support, tactical nuclear weapons etc. Finally at sea, although the USN is still pre-eminent, this situation is changing as the USSR continues the classic build-up of maritime forces with high technology naval support.

The situation was complex enough when the nuclear balance was Russia versus USA; more recently, with China having proven its ICBM and with its own nuclear warheads, the balance is more difficult. China is a two-edged sword. The most populous country by hundreds of millions, not very long removed from European and Japanese domination, is now fervently anti-Russia in its stand against revisionism of its communist principles, courting the West and Japan as a means to balance the threat from Russia. And with a rapidly growing navy that is larger and more capable than any other in the Asian Pacific area after the USA and Russia.

**Energy and Islam**

A widespread resurgence of fundamentalism is occurring in Islamic countries. Such calls to return to the true faith inevitably talk of a ‘Jihad’ — a holy war — against the infidel. Unfortunately the larger part of the world’s oil reserves lie in Islamic countries notably those surrounding the Persian Gulf; and the users are infidel.

The usage rate of energy generally continues to rise overall at rather more than the population increase rate. The stocks of fossil fuel are finite and the downward kink in the Western oil consumption in 1973 resulted from manipulation of supplies following the Yom Kippur War. Such manipulation may be expected again, indeed is anticipated in the foreign policy of most Western countries, and certainly is in the foreign policy of Japan. Western Societies are thus increasingly vulnerable to general, intentional dislocation; should it start to occur the reaction in those countries will probably be entirely self interest, thereby for example negating NATO — which of course makes it all the more likely to happen. In final full recognition of American dependence on Middle East oil both for USA and Western Europe (to fuel American subsidiaries in Europe, and keep the large US Army contingent mobile), the USA sent initially two carrier battle groups to be in the Indian Ocean; other areas (Med. and North Pacific) have been depleted. Meanwhile if the Russian naval build-up keeps on, then ‘the US will lose its ability to protect its vital interest abroad’.

Japan is gradually rearming, but slowly — for political reasons, mainly unpopularity. Meanwhile Japan is totally dependent on Middle East oil at least until the deal to buy China’s coal in return for Japanese technology. Should the oil supply dwindle Japan would have no choice but to take unilateral action.

**Technological Capabilities**

The USA has always been ahead of the USSR in technological development, but this lead is decreasing. In solid-state electronic devices the lead is now only 2-3 years, and rapidly decreasing. In space technology USA is probably more sophisticated in its exploitation of space. However Russia has ASAT’s flying, whereas USA is probably some years behind and will find it difficult to catch up.

The USSR appears to be well ahead in a C3 system that provides target data down to the smallest effective unit such as a submarine. Both powers have increasingly mechanised
intelligence-gathering capabilities with USA perhaps still retaining the ‘edge’. The volume of data is overwhelming and probably susceptible to ‘dis’-information; predicting or even determining the ‘outcomes’ of events in a war zone will be even more difficult than ever before. All this is destabilising and dangerous; reactions are more aggressive in the presence of incomplete knowledge of the enemy. The greater extent of CI will lead to more dispersed launch platforms, thereby enhancing defence, and to more concentrated attacks by co-ordinated targeting of missiles, thereby enhancing attack. In this the Soviet Navy is already well versed and well fitted.

The acceptance of tactical nuclear warfare will grow, and, alas, become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Likewise the lethality of conventional weapons will rise steadily until it approaches that of small nuclear devices. At this point a very great destabilising influence may arise due to the lack of an obvious division between conventional and nuclear weapon lethality; perhaps ‘fallout’ or the lack of it will then be the criterion. ‘Vulnerability’ and its alter ego ‘survivability’ will become of greater and greater importance as lethality grows.

The challenges of communications will increase; the demands will increase also, and, due to extensive (and increasing) efforts to disrupt communications, we may have to cope with less and less capability remaining. Eventually tactical discretion will be delegated back down to the commander on the scene, where it probably should always have been. The people at home will be subjected to greater misinformation and propaganda by governments of both sides, who themselves will lack the intelligence capability or the strategic control they would have liked, but have never been likely to afford. Increasing public polarisation of attitudes will result in greater destabilisation. Meanwhile the increasingly rapid rate of technological change will cause greater cultural trauma in a society finding it difficult to adapt to so much change.

**Technological Products**

Vehicles will change — particularly at sea — where we will see more rather odd vessels like huge catamarans and hydrofoils, hovercraft and surface effect ships (SES). Their roles will change even more so — escort aviation platforms, multipurpose logistic ships and amphibious ships will no longer fit into neat categorisations. Convoy protection, particularly of tankers, will again be a vital part of future conflict. The traditional submarine menace has now been joined by long-range aircraft and submarine-launched tactical missiles, and within the next ten years, the missiles increasingly will be ballistic. It has been, is now and will continue to be extremely important that the surface convoys have 3-dimensional protection — submarines in direct support — and AAW and ASW aircraft ready in the force. Almost every ship will have an air capability.

Aircraft will change too. The long-range MPA will need AAW and ASW as well as SW. The STOVL fixed-wing and rotary-wing organic aircraft will need multirrole capabilities.

Software costs for big and mini-computers are rising steeply with performance, such that a true economic cost can be placed on its utility. This is supporting the growing trend to the use of microprocessors — now ubiquitous, and almost commonplace, yet when combined in sufficient numbers in a distributed processing system, results in powerful computer capability.

Munitions accuracy is increasing still further — resulting from the rapid and accelerating rate of innovation in solid-state electronic devices. The electromagnetic spectrum is continuing to saturate with new methods of transmission, greater power levels, and intensified countermeasures. The ‘soft’ weapon of EW will be rapidly expanded in that it can be used without killing, hence less risk of escalation.

Military units and formations are increasing their establishment of sophisticated hardware — sensors, weapons, communications. This in turn will increase the logistic support needed, with resultant ‘strain on the train’. The role of logistics in the success of campaigns on land and sea will be of greater importance than ever before, in that greater technological capability is less forgiving of adverse environments and will require more support. Adding even more to the heavy costs of all this is redundancy... ‘a chief characteristic of the impact of ‘science’ on ‘warfare’ has in fact been the phenomenon of technical obsolescence before operational use’.

Finally the ultimate in technological products is the growth in the use of energy. The convenience and abundance of fossil-fuel
A Summary of Technological Dynamics

The technology cycle can be described starting at any point. Assume an expansion of technological state of the art in a particular area, due to the right combination of several factors, namely; a determined R & D effort; necessary resources already existing; the geopolitical situation stable and the level of popular education high, thus their ability to absorb new methods and capabilities also high. Technological advances are made.

The result is the ability to combat the present threat better, or meet other current commitments better. However, the opposition will have begun a similar upgrade, such that in the longer term the opposition increases in capability also and the threat becomes greater. This in turn provides pressure on us to develop new technological methods to combat the more capable threat. Other factors may change the threat also, particularly the USA/USSR/PRC relations, ‘time’, and the availability of petroleum fuel. The new methods will be pursued in a way that employs maximum effort to produce earliest results; hence ‘the process of procuring military systems has come to be the most important single pressure for technological development’.

Finally, slowly but surely the R & D efforts come closer to producing the needed capability. When it is produced there is a huge flare of interest and before long, wide international proliferation, after which we return to the start of the cycle.

Epilogue

‘Political changes produced in the world as a direct or indirect result of science and technology may in the end prove far more crucial determinants of military requirements than narrower developments in military or associated technology’.
more than the warning time. So therefore the formation of defence and maritime forces must be based on better estimates of possible needs, rather than actual perceived threats.

**Technological Forecasts**

a. The ubiquity of computers will be so complete that software will be a matter of economics rather than technology.
b. Space use will increase rapidly, and will almost certainly include weapons to counter opposition space vehicles.
c. The exploitation of the RF spectrum will continue unabated.
d. Operational effectiveness, and the long-term conduct of war, will increasingly be determined by logistics; for international operations this will require an increasing capability for defence of civilian shipping, which will provide the logistic train.
e. The lethality of conventional weapons will grow, and that of small nuclear weapons decrease until they are similar. Concurrently the acceptance of tactical use of such weapons will increase and eventually lead to their use.

Increasingly capable and extensive C'I systems will enable greater control of warfare. However, a much increased level of data will now be available 'up the line', resulting in the possibility of information overload and/or decision-making paralysis — the solution for which is delegation. Hence the forecast is for a compromise to be reached in the level of tactical delegation.

**Human Forecasts**

The ability of man to accept accelerated changes is not increasing as the rate of change itself, which will lead to psychological stress, and the tendency to look back, or maintain the status quo.

Greater communication capacity will produce information overload, resulting in human sub-optimum performance as part of the defence against change. The communication systems will be readily vulnerable to 'dis' information, which will produce further human stress because of the higher levels of ambiguity and confusion.

Popular polarisation of international viewpoints will increase due to the higher ambiguity, the probable increase in 'dis' information, and the perceived increase in super-power instability. This will result in increasingly threatening behaviour, to the extent of supporting a rapid belligerent response, without thought of ethical or other limitations which may have been conceived at another time in a period of relative order and stability. This will even extend to the possible use of NBC weapons.

The greatest challenge for military commanders will be to retain the ability to control the combat situation, and to control the behaviour of humans involved in it.

**Maritime Forecasts — Warfare**

The aircraft will continue its pre-eminence in above water warfare (AWW), even though it is at greater risk from opposing surface, and even subsurface units. For weapon delivery this will be offset by stand-off weapons. However, this will not solve the problems of classification, identification and damage-assessments, which will exercise both sides greatly. Surface units will almost all acquire an aircraft capability.

The submarine will continue its tactical advantage over surface and air platforms due to its counter-detectability advantage, its ability to hide in the vast oceans, and the much improved weapons with which they will be armed. The use, particularly by USSR, of coordinated C'I systems for surveillance classification and targeting, will increase; and for some Western navies will provide a much-needed up-grade in capability which could be used for ‘Harpoon’ missile. Submarine operations will frequently be conducted remote from target forces and areas, thereby incurring much higher complexity in ASW and anti-ship operations. Nuclear propulsion will enable truly ‘submarine’ operation. Pure submarine warfare will be a new dimension in war.

The increasing cost of fossil fuels, particularly petroleum will greatly influence maritime military operations. Nuclear power plants will be fitted widely in new construction ships of sufficient size. Active R & D will be progressed to produce alternative fuels for ships and aircraft.

A belated but intensive interest in ‘survivability’ in all forms, will signal the response to the rising lethality of weaponry. However, there is a danger in concentrating on Soviet threats; increasingly Western weapons are being sold widely, and may be expected in unfriendly forces in years to come.
Maritime Forecasts — Geopolitical

The USA will continue to fall behind the rate of Russian increased forces in the flag­showing exercise of forceful gestures in Africa. This role will expand as Russian confidence grows in its ability to exercise sea power. The behaviour of lesser maritime powers, particularly energy import-dependent countries, like Japan, will increasingly reflect this.

The growing use of the sea will result in more and more incidents of international maritime friction; which will, in turn, require greater surveillance and action. Further agreement on the ‘Law of the Sea’ is likely, however the results are not likely to be firm and final in the shorter term. Increasing Western reliance on SLOC’s across the Indian Ocean for the transport of petroleum, is unequal compared with Russia, and becoming more so; and therefore it is vulnerable to Persian Gulf interference. The increased USN involvement in I/O will continue, and basing units in the area is feasible. In other areas NATO forces and the US troops in South Korea require colossal levels of logistic support, most of which will travel by sea in time of conflict.

The disparity in quantitative assets in maritime warfare between USSR and USA will grow, placing the USA in danger of losing the ability to protect its own interests fully overseas. The United States strategic posture has changed recently from targeting cities to targeting military installations; the ramifications will take a long time to explore fully and implement.

As the world becomes more unstable, there will be an increasing risk that tactical nuclear warfare will take place between middle-rank powers, leading to the involvement by the super-powers; the latter would attempt to limit warfare to ‘conventional’ weapons, however if this failed then would limit warfare to tactical nuclear warfare at sea, based on the much reduced dangers of maritime nuclear warfare to civilian populations.

CONCLUSION

The resulting impact of technology on maritime warfare will be extensive, but more so as a reflection of the impact of technology on society generally, and of the impact on all forms of warfare. The peculiar features of the maritime environment will produce some new challenges requiring early assessment of technological impact, in order not to ‘miss the boat’. Of these, the technology-led exploitation of the oceans will be greatest. However, this exploitation will not necessarily produce fundamental changes in maritime warfare; this will require careful assessment and rapid reaction to emerging new requirements.

The major technological determinant of change in maritime warfare will be the Western dependance on the sea to transport oil and gas energy sources to keep Western society alive. The communist and third-world blocs do not have the same reliance on sea-transported fuel. Inevitably they will realise this provides a powerful means of political leverage; classical interdiction warfare could easily result; expected Western retaliation would probably not be totally effective due to inadequate force levels, resulting in very great pressure to use (tactical) nuclear weapons; at sea first, of course.

After that no-one quite knows whether the theories of control of escalation will work when it is the West that is escalating to protect a crumbling society bereft of oil.

NOTES

7. Ibid. p. 40.
8. Ibid. p. 43.
9. Ibid. p. 74.
15. China already has effective land-based missiles of right capability and accuracy to give pause to a potential enemy. The development of submarines to carry strategic nuclear missiles to sea is continuing but is a lengthy process.
21. Ibid.
THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON MARITIME WARFARE IN THE 1980s


24. World Wide Military Command and Control System (USA).


28. Ibid. p. 168

29. Ibid. p. 169.

30. Ibid. p. 77.

31. However the result of the Vietnam War warns against too heavy a reliance on a simulation as predicting actual outcomes; extensively 'modelled' by the USA, the results stubbornly eluded prediction.


35. Ibid. p. 169.

36. Ibid. p. 158.


38. From Donald W. Barnett. 'The End of the Oil Age in the Pacific: The Eastern Pacific'. Ibid.


40. UK is a notable exception having recently become much closer to self-sufficiency, based on North Sea oil.


45. Intelligence Gatherer — usually, a converted trawler.


47. Sound Surveillance System — a fixed underwater array, Tactical Towed Array Sonar — a line array of hydrophones towed by a surface or sub-surface unit.


52. Ibid.


56. Not the same; the SES has side walls that are wetted.

57. ASUW — anti surface warfare.

58. STOVL — short take-off, vertical landing.


60. Ibid. p. 175.

61. Ibid. p. 59.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


INTRODUCTION

In recent years there have been many willing to offer advice on officer development, most of them external to our naval culture. An impression that naval officers, senior sailors and sailors are not interested in their own professional development can be assumed all too quickly from this apparent apathy. From my observation, however, they are acutely concerned.

I make no apology for where I may appear critical of present leadership trends. In the naval profession, as in any other profession, self-analysis and self-evaluation are essential prerequisites in effecting change and growth. I trust, therefore, that these deliberations may in some measure contribute to the improvement of leadership training in the navy of the future.

THE 1980s ENVIRONMENT

Important Industrial Trends

‘Necessity is the mother of invention’; likewise innovation in organizations usually derives from role-set changes brought about by society at large. Some of these tendencies towards change, discernible in Australian industrial society at present, are listed in Table 1.

The manager of the 1980s will have the same two resources to manage as he has always had — his material resources and his human resources. The former are likely to become easier to manage due to the onslaught of mechanisation, computers, and other technological advances. His human resources, however, are bound to become more difficult to manage for a number of reasons:

a. Rising generations of youth are the products of a permissive society which has provided them with few static values by which to judge normality from abnormality, or custom from taboo.

b. Scientific progress is outstripping social progress with the inevitable result of urbanised stress, the manifestations of which are all around us: universal drunkenness and drug dependence; increased divorce and suicide rates; the breakdown in the relevance of religion to daily living.
Anticipated Change in the Navy

The navy is not an island unto itself and, like any other organization, must be profoundly affected by demographic, political, social, economic and technological change. Neither can it be immune to the difficulties of managing a youthful complement of men.

The following prognoses seem reliable for the navy of the 1980s:

a. Technological advances will alter the whole mix of naval job-types and the skills currently performed within them. Some trade categories will become obsolescent; others will emerge. (The restructuring of the MT Category to accommodate entry into service of the new FFGs is a case in point.)

b. The navy’s ‘ship’s company’ will, I surmise, be the best-educated and most informed and enlightened it has ever had the privilege to recruit. I predict, however, that that company will be a permissive crew. Ill-discipline prevails in the civilian industrial workforce and it is unrealistic to expect that the same ill-discipline will not permeate our own work environment. (Patrol Boat, the excellent ABC television series, demonstrated the tightrope our naval leaders must walk between effective management and bureaucratic order.)

c. The structure of our naval force will become far more heterogeneous and androgynous. Projected shortages in the number of young men available for enlistment in the mid-1980s will necessitate increased recruitment of ethnic minority groups and women. The navy’s ‘statutory women’ will be found in greater numbers and in more managerial positions than at present.

d. The importance of rank will become obscured and official channels of communication will become less-rigid as the complexities of decision-making increase.

The greatest demand on leadership will be the need for a thorough understanding of human behaviour. Tomorrow’s leaders will be obliged to integrate the personal needs of individual members with the requirements of the navy far more than is the case at the moment.

How well the navy achieves its future goals focuses on the critical role training will play in their achievement. It is the predictive-cum-adjustment role of naval training that will accommodate these changes. Vice Admiral Synnot in 1977 wrote:

‘I believe I can say with confidence that we achieve high professional standards in a range of comprehensive capabilities, using relatively modern technologies.’

Although he was speaking explicitly as CNS of the operational efficiency of the navy’s fighting ships, he was also indirectly complimenting the excellent endeavours of trainers, for without effective training, efficient ships and high professional standards cannot be sustained.

LEADERSHIP

In order to understand leadership, it is necessary also to understand the nature of groups. Leadership forms in groups whose members satisfy individual needs through interaction with others. Followers may be considered the creators of leadership in two distinct senses:

a. there can be no leaders without followers; and

b. leaders are group facilitators, for unless they are perceived by their respective groups to be helping them achieve group goals, they will be ineffective as leaders of those groups.

Leadership is thus what Professor K. Davis describes as ‘the human factor which binds a group together, and energises and motivates it towards the achievement of group goals’. I therefore draw little distinction between a manager, a leader, a supervisor, an instructor, an officer or an other rank in position of responsibility. All are group facilitators; all have leadership responsibilities that are situation-specific or group-specific.

TOWARDS BETTER LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Almost all current research highlights the behavioural aspects of leadership. The complexities of the naval environment of the 1980s dictate that the navy’s leaders (be they generalists or specialists) be sensitive to the human needs, capacities and aspirations of their men. The importance of understanding human relationships demands radical changes in current leadership training orientation, placing far less emphasis on knowledge and information about leadership and far more on the acquisition of those skills deemed essential for effective lead-
ership. It is this aspect I would now like to examine critically, proposing an alternative strategy for improving leadership effectiveness in the navy.

A Systems Approach

RANTS, the Royal Australian Navy Training System, was adopted by the RAN in 1971 as its *modus operandi* for approaching training issues. RANTS, like all systems training, focuses on the relevance of the job performance *per se*; that is, all training ought to be both job-oriented and job-derived.

However, if we return to the grassroots philosophy of systems training, outlined by its founding father in the United Kingdom, Brigadier Mellor in his report (1966), we find mention of its application only to trade training and practical skills training. Few trainers since have thought systems training relevant, let alone feasible, to the training of more abstruse managerial performances. I am not of that opinion and will now demonstrate how such an approach could transform existing practices.

I propose:

a. to highlight some of the inadequacies in leadership training (as exemplified in the Seaman Officers' Training Plan);
b. to concentrate on the *job performances* of officers; and
c. to use these *job performances* as a reference point to develop an alternative strategy for leadership training.

Seaman Officers' Training Plan (SOTP)*

All Seaman Officers in Stage 3 of their development undergo a course of training, covering managerial and divisional officer duties. Table 2 cites a few of the terminal objectives of that training.

I suggest that it is wrong to assume training in knowledge of this kind will turn out good leaders for the future. It is based on improper derivation, and is no guarantee that our young officers will perform effectively as leaders of men. There is ample evidence that the navy perceives the nature of the problem — the June 1979 occupational analysis survey of officer performances, for example, demonstrates the felt need. Experienced officers attending Training Administration Courses at the RAN School of Training Technology in HMAS CERBERUS also articulate their chagrin about the inadequacies of such leadership training practices.

Job Analysis

The RAN Training System model demands that curriculum development commences with a thorough analysis of the job requirement in order to define the principal duties and tasks and the degree of involvement that incumbents have in carrying out those performances. As a general statement, managerial performances (stated in behavioural terms) centre on three overlapping sets of organizational needs and Table 3 portrays typical performances relating
TABLE 2

SEAMAN OFFICERS' TRAINING PLAN — TRAINING OBJECTIVES
(PERFORMANCE STATEMENTS ONLY)

With respect to...

MANAGEMENT DUTIES

Trainees will:

- **Appreciate** the development of management principles in the RAN.
- **Recall** in outline the historical development of management thought.
- **Explain** the concept of functional leadership.

DIVISIONAL OFFICER DUTIES

- State the rationale for having a Divisional System.
- State the responsibilities of the Divisional Officer.
- List the training establishments in the RAN.

TABLE 3

SAMPLE MANAGERIAL/SUPERVISORY PERFORMANCES RELATING TO GENERAL NAVAL FUNCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Maintenance Needs</th>
<th>Task Needs</th>
<th>Individual Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give status to group</td>
<td>Make plans</td>
<td>Attend to personal problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set standards</td>
<td>Allocate resources</td>
<td>Support individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain discipline</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Recognise/Use individual talents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build morale</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praise/motivate group</td>
<td>Supervise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Make plans
Allocate resources
Control
Direct
Supervise
progress etc.
to each function. Annex A provides an additional sample excerpt of tasks likely to be performed by many officers. Both sets of performances are, of course, provided for illustrative purposes only.

Training Analysis

From Table 3 and Annex A, officer-type performances (on the surface at least) may appear to be just as commonplace as those describing trade-related performances. The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERBS DESCRIBING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning Skills</th>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>High-level Performances</th>
<th>Supervisory Performances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For example, officers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze</td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Allocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascertain</td>
<td>Assist</td>
<td>Administer</td>
<td>Assign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarify</td>
<td>Argue</td>
<td>Advise</td>
<td>Authorise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define</td>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Assess</td>
<td>Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Communicate</td>
<td>Caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnose</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>Criticise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify</td>
<td>Deny</td>
<td>Instruct</td>
<td>Delegate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrate</td>
<td>Discuss</td>
<td>Inspect</td>
<td>Determine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Encourage</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>Inform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Manage</td>
<td>Organise</td>
<td>Investigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specify</td>
<td>Motivate</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Muster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantiate</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>Solve</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MILITARY REVIEW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE EMPHASIS ON LEADERSHIP DIMENSIONS BY LEVEL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>FIRST-LINE</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>MIDDLE</th>
<th>TOP</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. COMMUNICATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HUMAN RELATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. COUNSELING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SUPERVISION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TECHNICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. DECISIONMAKING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PLANNING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ETHICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
knowledge component (stressed in the SOTP) becomes embodied in NPIs, BRs, DI(N)s, etc., whilst the degree of accountability involved comes from the verbs describing the actions being performed. Table 4 provides examples of verbs frequently found to recur at the Duty/Task level of an officer’s job scalar. These sample verbs describe the types of performances that supervisors actually do which are publicly observable. It is then up to the training development officer to take these various tasks and, either singly or in clusters, analyse the enabling skills and attitudes associated with their performance.

### Enabling Skills

The matrix at Table 5 attempts to quantify skills’ usage, according to rank responsibility, is the end result of a recent study of leadership skills found common to all US Army officers from lieutenant to general. It embraces such important dimensions as communicative skills, human relations skills, counselling and interviewing skills, *inter alia* and represents, in my opinion, a significant step forward in identifying and quantifying leadership skills in the military.

From Table 5, it is easy to identify some of the skills that need to be acquired by officers;
they include: communications skills, human relations skills, counselling skills and supervisory skills. I stress human relations skills. Empathy, for example, can be singled out as possibly the most potent factor in being effective as a leader. Catharsis is another, for we witness almost daily the need for officers to intervene at the feelings level in the human problems of subordinates.

Skills in More Depth

What therefore are the skills required of a leader in the navy? The answer must come from the tasks he performs in his job and a thorough analysis will doubtless reveal skills such as those in Table 6 as essential to his effective performance.

These skills are not unique to divisional officers or seaman officers. They apply to all our personnel in supervisory positions within the organization — personnel such as chaplains, social workers, psychologists, careers advisers, resettlement officers, education officers, instructors, training advisers, officers-in-charge and heads of departments, to mention but a few.

Attitudes

Types of attitudes and values deemed desirable in naval leaders must, like the skills, be derived from the tasks leaders perform. Task analysis is most likely to reveal attitudes and values such as those cited in Table 8 as worthy of our leaders in the future.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUDES</th>
<th>VALUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good manner and bearing.</td>
<td>Openness and trust in communications with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for naval customs/traditions</td>
<td>An ability to confront and manage conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourable attitudes specific to particular tasks</td>
<td>A desire for genuine collaboration with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourable attitudes to Service involvement generally</td>
<td>Responsible participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive approach to Service discipline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-discipline: co-operative/harmonious at all times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>safety/security conscious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One futuristic value the navy may be able to adopt to a far greater extent than at present is that of a blame-free work environment. At present, the navy is very much a blame-laden work environment, where human mistakes are usually reflected in disciplinary action or judgemental statements in confidential reports. Much more scope, however, should be permitted for personnel to make errors of a human kind without recrimination for those mistakes. Only where life is at stake or health and safety are at risk should blame be focused on the incumbent as much as it often is at present.

Training Objectives

Most difficulty in applying systems training to abstruse supervisory performances centres on the writing of their related Training Objectives. Training Objectives, by definition, are statements of human performance which measure exactly the terminal expectations of the training. As such, they comprise three parts:

(a) Performance: what the trainee must demonstrate he can do at the end of training;

(b) Conditions: the training conditions under which he must carry out the performance; and

(c) Standard: relating to the qualitative aspects of the performance.

Identifying Conditions and Standards for higher-level performances is straightforward enough and Table 8 cites some useful examples:

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITIONS</th>
<th>STANDARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In discussion groups</td>
<td>Using Assessment Checklists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In diads; triads</td>
<td>Using Performance Evaluation Rating Scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In syndicates</td>
<td>Using Attitude Inventories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In aspect rooms</td>
<td>Using Staff Models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In attitudinal workshops</td>
<td>Using Staff Answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In dialectical peer counselling exercises</td>
<td>Using Paper and Pencil Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using prescribed problem-solving techniques</td>
<td>Using Situational Measures (as are used in the British Forces to select officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using CCTV</td>
<td>Using Procedural standards (for example, in accordance with ABR 27, Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via case studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is difficult is to quantify standards of acceptable performance; that is, to be able to measure precisely when the trainee has executed a certain behaviour satisfactorily. This may, however, be far less important than the fact that he has displayed positive indicators of the desirable performance. For example, if the trainee indicates such favourable attributes as applied intelligence, sociability, etc in the execution of the task, identifying these indicators may be just as acceptable as trying to measure the attributes themselves. Rating scales certainly assist in the scoring process, if this is deemed to be necessary.

Course Design

This article has concentrated in large measure on the need to make training in the acquisition of leadership skills less knowledge-oriented and more performance-oriented. In so doing, it has highlighted explicitly the importance of systems training and implicitly the need for careful selection of training development officers in this specialist field of training due to the heavy behavioural bias involved.

There are, of course, a number of dysfunctional organizational outcomes in my proposal which would need to be accommodated:

(a) The time to design such courses will be longer; the time to run them will also be longer than if conventional lecture methods are used.

(b) Specialist staff, trained to cope with more sophisticated learning methods, will be required.

(c) The fidelity of the learning and assessment environments will have to approximate more closely the naturalness of the real life situation. CCTV and other media will have to be used extensively to provide non-judgemental feedback to trainees on their performance. Classrooms will have to be converted into aspect rooms, with facilities, such as an Office Management Simulator, being installed.

CONCLUSION

McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y assumptions (Likert’s System 4 alternatives) are at work in my proposal: namely actively substituting Theory Y strategies for inappropriate Theory X assumptions. Through Theory Y alternatives, opportunities will be created for trainee supervisors to self-develop a keen interest in their training, by putting them in the forefront of the learning process. Such alternatives will also foster a healthier social climate in the organization, where attitudes and values will be given equal or greater stress than facts or mere adherence to detail.

Whatever else, the navy of the 1980s will demand effectiveness from its leaders. It is up to trainers to determine the best means of fulfilling that aim. It will not be the cost of adopting better methods; it will be the cost of not doing so that will determine how well that aim is achieved. A systems approach is most likely to resolve the problem and point the way to the future.

NOTES

1. ‘Statutory’ in the sense of fulfilling the requirements of the provisions of Sex Discrimination and Equal Opportunity Legislation.
2. Chief of Naval Staff (Vice Admiral Synnot), 1977.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


---

(DUITY/TASK INVENTORY
FOR JOB: DIVISIONAL OFFICER
BRANCH: MAYBE ANY BRANCH (ADMINISTRATION DUTIES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DUTY/TASK DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>INVOLVEMENT</th>
<th>NO TRAINING</th>
<th>COURSE TRAINING</th>
<th>ON-JOB TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DIVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Maintain sailors' personal records.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Dispatch and receive sailors' records upon posting.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Recommend requests for leave, conforming leave to law regulations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Present complaints to higher authority with relevant supporting documentary evidence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Raise requests for tailor training, ensuring supply of appropriate travel and joining instructions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Raise Movement Requisitions (M 1701).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Delegate Divisional Administration tasks to Divisional staff, and ensure successful completion.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Supervise dispatch and receipt of mail through RAN mailing system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Direct the drafting of the Watch and Station Bills for Division.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>Organise the daily routine of Division, liaising with other departments as necessary.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL ASSESSMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Assess performance of Divisional personnel using:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Complete forms as per Task 2.1 and render to CO for forwarding.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Draft letters for signature of higher authority:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Reporting outstanding and inadequate performances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Recommending awards and positive corrective measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Conduct Divisional disciplinary investigations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Administer disciplinary measures within Division.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Counsel Senior Sailors in the Division on disciplinary matters.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Advise personnel when charged with an offence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Assist sailors undergoing disciplinary investigations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Ensure dress and conduct of Divisional personnel is in accordance with Naval standards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Take charge of Divisional personnel on ceremonial parades.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY: I = INVOLVEMENT
1. Do under supervision
2. Do
3. Do and supervise
4. Supervise
N = NO TRAINING REQUIRED
C = COURSE TRAINING REQUIRED
O = ON-JOB TRAINING REQUIRED
INTRODUCTION

This article was preceded by an article in Vol. 32 of Defence Force Journal which served as a general introduction to a social anthropological study of military training at the Officer Cadet School, Portsea during July 1980-81. That article essentially set out the parameters and purposes of the research. This one aims to outline some aspects of the research proper. As such, it will deal with some phenomena and particulars of life at OCS. The information obtained from the study of these imponderabilia of actual life and of typical behaviour (as the anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski (1960:20) called it) constitutes the ethnographer’s primary aim in his fieldwork; and observing and recording them is the basis upon which any future analytical and interpretative statements regarding the subject of research must be based.

In a sense any written piece of work to some extent resembles a piece of legislation. Based partially on tradition and precedent and partially on the writer’s powers of observation and understanding the contours of the issue of a published work are potentially far-reaching. For this reason alone, it is incumbent on an author to justify the logic of his plan of work to readers.

Fieldwork Methodology.

Malinowski (1961:24-5) described the essential outline of any ethnographical record in terms of three lines of approach:

1. The method of concrete, statistical documentation;
2. The compilation through minute, detailed observations of some sort of ethnographic diary; and
3. A collection of ethnographic statements, items of folklore, etc., or, as he termed it, a corpus inscriptionum.

The goal, as Malinowski said, “is, briefly, to grasp the . . . subject’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world”.

Any methodology of field research is concerned with two basic issues. These are, choosing an appropriate field for enquiring into, and determining appropriate methods to study it. The term “field” referring to a circumscribed, and abstract area of study is distinguished from the other meaning, a field, which refers to the actual location of one’s study. In the sense in which the term is used in the first instance it refers to the research interest, the theoretical orientation of the study.

In devising an appropriate fieldwork methodology for the social anthropological study of military training at OCS the selection of its theoretical framework was governed by the particular interests and expertise of the researcher. Consequently, the conceptual context within which this article is written follows directly from the writer’s orientation in social science methodology.

All methodological considerations fall essentially into two categories — “naturalistic”, and “mechanistic” research (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973); — approaches which W. J. Filstead (1970), for instance, identifies as belonging respectively to the qualitative and
quantitative research methods. The debate between social scientists about which fieldwork method is preferable in sociological research is complicated and persistent. Suffice it to say that the methodology of the research at OCS falls into the category of qualitative research.

The centrally significant property of the qualitative research orientation as expressed by Filstead (1970:vii) is, that it “does not make the mistake” to force the research problem into *a priori* schemes of technical paraphernalia rather than observing it in the context of the empirical world being investigated. The danger in carrying out “mechanistic” research based on the natural scientific model Filstead (1970:6) believes that it tends to “Entrap” the research in paradigms in which the prevailing disposition and practice is “to allow the theory, the model, the concept, the technique and the scientific protocol to coerce the research”. These, Filstead argues, are artificial devices which “measure everything and understand nothing”. The above propositions concerning the validity of empirical research have guided the investigations at OCS and have given both shape and direction to the research method.

Traditional anthropological practice is to begin an ethnography by describing some of the things which the observer has learned about the society under investigation. While an ethnography is generally expected to give an overall view of the way of life — the culture — of a people it is not a passive social survey type of research and, instead it reflects some hypothesis or circumscribed theoretical concerns.

In a sense, an ethnography tends to proceed autobiographically, outlining what happened and when, so that a piecemeal picture of the society in question emerges. In an important sense ethnographic research is the foundation for and the pathway to the classification and correlation to explicit observations of events in the culture of a society. Implicit in the idea of collecting data which lead to valid and justifiable statements is the need, however, in any good ethnographic research not merely to ask questions but to ask the *right* questions.

Social science methodology has often been accused of theoryless fact-collecting. Extensively discussed in the literature — e.g. in W. J. Filstead (1970) — a reply to that position is that no observations and no recording of what has been observed can take place without underlying assumptions. Insofar as any ethnography consists of a selective collection of data out of limitless minutiae of everyday life the results from any investigation in social science inevitably reflect biases in training, preferences, prejudices, etc., which attach to the investigator. As Howard Becker (1970:25) warns:

“We take sides as our personal and political commitments dictate, use our theoretical and technical resources to avoid distortions that might introduce in to our work, limit our conclusions carefully . . . and field as best we can the accusations and doubts that will surely be our fate.”

From the point of view of research design the above discussion is thought to have provided valid grounds for now turning to the field of enquiry itself: to an examination of the actual practices, the basic patterns and configurations of military training at OCS.

THE MAKING OF OFFICERS AND GENTLEMEN

Outline Of OCS Organisation
The Officer Cadet School is an Australian Army School and is responsible directly to Headquarters Training Command for matters of policy, organisation, training and standards*. OCS is comprised of the following organisational divisions: Headquarters, Support Wing, Field Wing, Military Arts Wing, Education Wing, and The Company of Officer Cadets. Principal appointments within OCS are the Commandant, Deputy Commandant, Chief Instructor, Staff Officer (COORD), Staff Officer (PERS), Student Counsellor, Senior Instructors Field, Military Arts, and Education Wing, Adjutant, Quartermaster, Officer Commanding A Company, Officer Commanding B Company, and Regimental Sergeant-Major. The School is provided with regional administrative support by 3rd Military District. The Commandant is the Commander of all ranks serving in the establishment of, attached to, or under instruction at the Officer Cadet School. The Chief Instructor is the Commanding Officer for The COC. Command appoint-

* The basis for information concerning the organisational outline of OCS was provided in documentary material, e.g. OCS Standing Orders, Cadet Handbook and Brief On The Officer Cadet School (mimeographs, unpublished, courtesy of the Commandant, OCS).
ments within The COC are provided. Under-
officer (UO) and Non-commissioned Officer
(NCO) appointments are filled by Senior Class
Cadets appointed by the Commanding Officer,
The COC. Cadets appointed to positions within
The COC are entitled to wear rank and they
are specifically appointed in order to:
• Conduct the day to day internal admin­
istration of The COC;
• Enforce OCS Standing Orders; and
• Carry out the duties and responsibilities
of their position within The COC as
outlined in Standing Orders.
Forming the basis upon which the profes­
sional development and advancement of Offi­
cer Cadets is built the organisational structure
of the Officer Cadet School at the same time
is the organising pattern for, and determinant
in the quality of, the day-to-day life of mem­
bers within that institution.

Day 1 At OCS
Institutional life at OCS waxes and wanes,
punctuated by events* in between the two
major occasions of Marching In, and Passing
Out at Graduation. In the Cadets’ Mess there
is a “Days to Graduation” Board. It is changed
daily. It has become tradition that the board
is changed, by the Colour Sergeants, from 1
to 0 as part of the “pinning on the pips”
ceremony at midnight during the Graduation
Ball. The sequence of events between the first,
and last day at OCS in effect marks the passage
of stages in the professional development of
an Officer Cadet into an Officer in the Regular
Australian Army. On Day 1, for many Junior
Cadets that goal may well seem desperately far
away.

If life at OCS begins very early in the
morning by most civilian standards, then
Day 1 — always on the Thursday prior to the
first instructional day — when a new junior
class of cadets marches in is certainly no
exception. The Senior Class having returned
from leave on the previous day and having as
it were re-started what to them has become a
familiar routine has commenced its prepara­
tions for the reception of the Junior Class; a
state of progress in their own affairs which
only six months ago may well have seemed
near-unattainable to some of those who are
now seniors. Capped by an inspection of
Quarters by the CO, The COC between 1025
and 1230 hours the senior cadets settle into a
waiting routine, awaiting the arrival of “their”
juniors at the Main Gate to OCS between 1230
and 1400 hours.

At 0700 hours on Day 1 a reception party
of three non-commissioned instructorial staff
led by a senior NCO have left OCS for Spencer
Street Railway Station in Melbourne, the
assembly point for all new cadets whether they
travelled by public or private transport. Prior
to departure from their respective places of
residence entrants into OCS have been issued
with a set of comprehensive instructions —
OCS Joining Instructions. Giving details of the
course, conditions of life, work and facilities
at OCS in general the information is aimed at
acquainting cadets with immediately useful
particulars concerning their new life and envi­
ronment. Instructed to, “Please report to
Spencer Street Station Melbourne, at
9.30 a.m.” and to be, “preferably dressed in
civilian clothes” cadets are advised that they,
“will be met by OCS Staff”. Those not
travelling by their own transport are further
advised that, “Buses will be provided to move
you to the School”, while those with their own
transport, “After reporting . . . will be directed
to travel independently to an assembly at the
School’s front gate”.

To outsiders the OCS reception party can
look nothing less than imposing. By the nature
of their profession members of the Army
compared with the average civilian look almost
alarmingly physically fit. Complementing their
appearance with regulation pressed and
starched clothing OCS Instructional Staff’s
presentation of self to the outside world is
literally “capped” with a red-banded peaked
cap. In the case of the leader of the reception
party — a Wing Sergeant-Major — a pace­
stick carried underarm completes what to any
outsider and to most bewildered (if not fright­
ened) new cadets is a convincingly impressive
display of authority and potential power.

The arrival of the OCS reception party at
Spencer Street Station in an army staff vehicle
sometime before 0900 hours is invariably watched by some early arrivals among the party of cadets. During the trip by car from OCS to Melbourne the conversation among the OCS party has only occasionally concerned itself with the target of their journey, i.e., the new cadets. Ranging from an occasional joke to a lengthy discussion of some sporting event the odd remark like: “Have we brought the . . . (cadet documentation on joining)”, or: “Geez, my trousers will be creased like hell the way we’re squeezed up; the cadets will never believe we’re Army” reminds one that, to this party the event is a matter of ordinary business. The purpose of the journey for them is to conduct the affairs of the Army in what it considers to be a proper and appropriate manner. That manner, Army-like, and generally briskly efficient constitutes the first contact which many new cadets have with army organisation, and with their chosen new way of life; with “the simple fact of . . . knowing that a man is a soldier rather than civilian” (Janowitz, 1965:11). That “simple fact” may not have been fully consciously apparent to some of the new cadets at Spencer Street Station until they literally came face-to-face with its reality one early morning in Melbourne and perhaps wondering “what the hell” the person was doing there.

The convoy of private cars having been instructed how to reach the OCS Main Gate and having left Spencer Street Station upon completion of all cadets’ initial joining formalities, buses containing the rest of the party also leave. Inside, strangers exchange their first words as members of a group tentatively feeling out others’ reactions to the events of the morning, and, perhaps more particularly, towards oneself. Subconsciously one knows that from now on we’re somehow different — its “them” and “us” — and who really knows what that may mean? The only reasonable and apparently accessible solution to the problem of having been cast adrift from old associations lies with others in your group; kindred souls who, like yourself are in transformation between private and professional life which, as yet unbeknown to you, for the military person means, “more than an occupation; it is a complete style of life” (Janowitz, 1964:175).

On arrival at the Main Gate at OCS word of the arrival of the party of junior cadets is delayed until their whole body is present and accounted for. When this has been achieved OCS administration is notified. OCS Joining Instructions states:

“When you arrive at the School, you will be met by the Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) and the members of the Senior Class. The RSM will allot you to a position in The Company of Officer Cadets, and detail a Senior Class Cadet to foster you into the routine of the School”.

These briskly efficient instructions hardly do justice to the actual procedure of the reception of the junior cadets. From their own point of view as well as that of the Staff, but especially that of the senior cadets, the Marching In of the Junior Class is a significant event; a crisis in the habitual interaction of individuals (Chapple and Coon, 1942:484) at the Officer Cadet School.

Any disturbance which involves marked changes in the interactions between members of a group, Chapple and Coon (1942) observe, requires the restoration of equilibrium by ritual or ceremony. The function of rituals and ceremonies, they state is that through the agency of the conditioning process they serve as mechanisms of transition, to ease the individuals concerned in passing from one state of equilibrium to another. There can be no doubt that the reception of the junior class from the point of view of the new cadet is the first step in the conditioning process which he will experience at OCS.

As he stands facing what his Joining Instructions have described as a welcoming party the newly Marched In Junior Cadet is due to find out the true meaning of that bald announcement in all its intricate detail and significance.

The force with which the transition from civilian to cadet status (even for ex-serving Army members) takes place on Day 1 is visibly discernible upon many a young face. If the talk on the bus en route to OCS has been desultory at best, the nearer the vehicle gets to OCS, the quieter the party grows. As the bus enters OCS territory apprehension can be near-palpably felt. Other than the hum of engine and tyres the only other sound — one would almost swear — is the click back-and-forth of nervous eyes darting from one new object to another; the cannon at the Gate and the legend, “Officer Cadet School Portsea”; along the
short winding road from the Gate the sign on
neat Army blue and red background reading,
“Wilson’s Folly” (what does it mean?); the
menacing tank at Tank Junction (it, at least,
looks slightly familiar); and finally, the road
descending gently from Tank Junction and the
bus easing its passengers into their destination,
a complex of buildings: Is this it?"

Confirmation that they have actually reached
the end of the journey from home — far, far
away — comes from the order to disembark
given by the duty instructor accompanying
each bus from Spencer Street Station. Quickly
and efficiently the party is gathered into some
semblance of order, and on command they
march a short distance from the point of
disembarkation around the corner of a two-
storey building and onto what they will very
soon learn is the Battalion Sergeant-Major’s
(BSM) parade ground. Turning the corner,
shockingly abruptly the junior cadets literally
confront their future. It is the first time that
they meet face-to-face with the Regimental
Senior Sergeant-Major and the members of the Senior
Class drawn up at attention in stark military
ranks, looking thoroughly and almost accus­
ingly professional before the line of what now
looks a bedraggled lot of civilians.

The Joining Instructions state that the pur-
pose of the meeting of the Junior Class with
the RSM and Senior Class is to allot individ­
uals, “to a position in The Company of Officer
Cadets, and detail a Senior Class Cadet to
foster you into the routine of the School”. To
the anthropologist the ceremony of the BSM’s
parade ground is much more than that. Assem­
bled before their seniors in spectacular cere­
monial fashion Junior Class members are
instructed to, “fall out one pace” upon an
individual’s name being called out, to acknowl­
dge his presence, and, upon introduction to
a designated member of the senior class by the
RSM, to follow that senior class cadet who,
as the Joining Instructions state, “will ensure
that all cadets quickly learn to adopt habits of
personal organisation which meet the high
standards set by the School”. Thoughtfully
adding the observation that “the first six
months at OCS is a demanding time and new
cadets usually find it very tiring and confus­
ing”, the real meaning of what the anthropol­
ist would call a cadet’s initiation into mem­
bership of the (military) society, however, can
only be experienced; it cannot adequately be
described in words, no matter how eloquently
expressed; it is felt, more than it can be stated.
The process of the induction of junior cadets
at OCS begins when, at a maximum in numbers
of five they are allocated to a Ranking Senior
Cadet following the latter with their luggage
to their rooms and then to lunch. Thus begins
the long process of learning to become a
professional soldier on a road to profession­
alism which is steeped in the practices and lore
of the military way of life. At the end of Day 1
at OCS the emphasis upon having to “quickly”
learn the myriad intricacies of their new life,
so seemingly innocuously foreshadowed in the
Joining Instructions will take on a very special
meaning for each and every cadet at least some
of whom may well wonder why they should
not have given greater thought to the warning
in those Instructions that:

“If you have serious doubts about the ability
to withstand pressure, given suitable guid­
ce, then it might be to your advantage to
adopt an entirely different career and not
proceed with your plans to enter OCS.”

The new cadets are about to learn their first
major lesson in the process of the education
of professional army officers, namely that the
Army makes no secret of the fact that it wants
only the best, “Inevitably . . . in the terms set
by the . . . system”, (Berger and Berger,
1976:195), and that it makes no concessions to
that ideal. The price for any compromise to
what the Army considers are minimum stand­
ards in the development of a professional
soldier they consider is too high; it can be
literally a matter of life and death. If Day 1
at OCS may well be tiring and confusing to
the new cadets, and if the subsequent year of
training is one which is frought with many
trials then, Army-like, little if anything is done
without a particular and practical purpose.
The principle at stake as Peter and Brigitte
Berger (1976:195) point out is that the individ­
ual, “is supposed to achieve, to want to achieve
. . . “Progress” is not just something that all
are supposed to believe in; they are all supposed
to contribute to it.” The failure of any indi­
vidual to grasp, and act upon the basic principle
which underlies Army training is a matter
which is not tolerated in the making of Officers
and Gentlemen at OCS; and, it believes, in an
individual’s own best interest given the nature
and the consequences of the training.
CONCLUSION

If it is an object of any social scientific study to discover "more" about our human existence in order, it is assumed, to not only better understand others but also ourselves, then the study at OCS may be characterised as a theme of humanistic inquiry, capable of encouraging speculation about the nature, meaning, and future of Man. While it can be justifiably argued that to confront and attempt to comprehend the nature of any aspect of human behaviour is intrinsically important a study of war and the preparation of warfare is — arguably — of special interest.

In attempting to find grounds for common understandings for the phenomenon of war, social scientists "disagree among themselves" (Koch, 1974:52-3) in their explanations. In spite of voluminous treatises on the subject very few explanations have in fact emerged from these studies. Theories of war and warfare show a range of "explanations" ranging from the level of the technical proficiency of a people and the operational state of their tools of war to others, focused on the attitudes and commitment of individuals to material or symbolic rewards obtained through participation in warfare. Most theories Koch (1974:52-3, 4) points out each essentially derive from one particular field of study: (1) biological evolution, (2) psychology, (3) cultural evolution, (4) ecology, and (5) social-structural analysis. Few, if any studies of war, however, have attempted to examine that phenomenon from the perspective of the generic evolutionary necessity of training for war: of the proposition in social science that in order for subjects of human knowledge (including war) to survive and "improve" they have to be passed on from generation to generation; they have to be both taught and learned, not haphazardly and left to chance, but purposefully and deliberately.

The social anthropological study of military training at OCS is specifically focused on the nature of what is taught and learned about war: not in the sense that is intended to discover matters of precise detail of the curriculum of training but rather, in the sense that it intends to discover what generalised principles of education and training used in the passing on of forms of knowledge in general are equally applicable here, in the training for war and warfare.

The challenge of the methodology of discovery employed in this study of military training is that it aims to explore what may be termed both an inner and outer perspective on the problem; it is as it were, two-dimensional, avoiding explanations which essentially come from the perspective of the investigator, however capably trained and equipped. It establishes instead, a basis for what Pierre Bourdieu (1977:3) describes as, "an inquiry into the conditions of possibility and thereby, into the limits of the... standpoints which grasps practices from the outside, as a fait accompli, instead of constructing their generative principle within the very movement of their accomplishment"; offering a fundamentally different approach to the reconstruction of social phenomena in which the social sciences appear to have been entrapped. Putting that proposition simply is to say that, for instance, military training may be seen from two perspectives; the objective truth of discrete acts of training, and the subjectively felt "truth" of such training experienced by teachers and "taught" alike. It is to say that the whole truth of a practice lies on two levels: as Bourdieu argues, it is, "the co-existence of two opposing truths".

It is at this point that we may ask what "truths" may have been discovered in the course of the fieldwork at OCS. In a sense that question cannot be answered. On the one hand, being able to precisely and accurately answer it would have had to make basic assumptions about the competence of the researcher's expert knowledge of military training. Such an assumption of course, is both inaccurate and untenable. On the other hand, it would have been equally absurd for the writer to have assumed that he could literally place himself in the shoes of those whom he studied; staff and cadets at OCS. Notwithstanding the above, not being in that position cannot be thought to "therefore" disqualify him from observing and commenting upon objective aspects of training or on the social experience of this training by individuals at OCS. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that "society" is a living breathing thing, and that its reality, "exists only in the empirical world and not in the methods sociologists use to measure it". (Filstead, 1970:3); but that in order to understand the world we cannot avoid having to study it by what in
final analysis is a more or less workable method and methodology.

The reality of OCS cannot be summarised on the evidence of one day in its life. It is even doubtful that it can be approached in the course and the passage of any period of time. Even if it were practically possible for an investigator to, "wait around indefinitely . . . (an) inferential jump from verbal behaviour to overt behaviour appears to be tenuous under some conditions" (Deutscher, 1970:28).

In other words, at OCS as indeed anywhere, what people say they see, hear, or feel, or what an observer thinks they see, hear or feel may all be quite different things from what is "actually", "objectively" seen, heard, or felt. Even so, to refuse to tap into the complex network of social interaction that constitutes human behaviour on the basis that it is no simple task to do so is to avoid the real and growing problem to become involved in the needs of society; and in the case of phenomenon of war and warfare to achieve insights and social explanations other than such essentially psychological ones as suggested, for instance, by Arendt (1969:5), who recognised that:

"the chief reason warfare is still with us is . . . a secret death wish of the human species, . . . an irrepressible instinct of aggression . . ."; or a behavioural explanation which posits that:

"A very profound motive for going to war is to resolve life's tensions, to escape from unhappiness . . ." (Turney-High, 1971:141).

The immense heuristic value which lies in qualitative research lies in the proposition that, "insight may be regarded as the core of social knowledge" (Filstead, 1970). Arrived at by being on the inside of the phenomenon to be observed; by participation in activities which generates interest, purpose, point of view, value, meaning, and intelligibility, as well as bias (i.e.:4) has been the chief consideration in the planning and conduct of the research at OCS. Providing a body of information such as has been described in this article concerning Day 1 at the School, the accumulation of this, and further knowledge about how we, in Australia go about the business of making of professional soldiers may eventually build up into a clearer picture of the complexities of human behaviour. Such a greater understanding of the passing on of knowledge concerning war and warfare to succeeding generations of what some people regard as their nation's best young men may eventually lead to better explanations why we still engage in war, "this final arbiter in international affairs . . ." (Arendt, 1969).

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Filstead, William J. (Ed.), *passim*.


ON information supplied by Privates Thomas and Butler, an American and two Australian Army officers, with native guides and carriers, attempted to backtrack over the trail in order to rescue the remaining members at the crash site. After seven days the relief party found a pair of U.S. Army leggings dropped by one of the survivors. At this point their provisions were now desperately low and they were forced, reluctantly, to return to base. Later, to their bitter disappointment, when they questioned the survivors concerning the leggings, they learnt that they had been dropped only 30 minutes walk from the plane!!

American C47 affectionately nicknamed FLYING DUTCHMAN departed from Wards Strip near Port Moresby in New Guinea for Pongani to the north east with U.S. troops of the 126th Infantry Combat Team, Thirty Second Division. Their purpose was to join other U.S. and Australian troops for a co-ordinated advance against the Japanese in the Buna Campaign. There was a total of 23 on board consisting of the three crew and the remainder a chaplain and soldiers. Takeoff time was 1 p.m. November 10, 1942.

Approximately 25 minutes after becoming airborne the aircraft was caught in a strong downdraught, dropped on top of the trees, clipped the branches of some and then careered on into the side of the mountain. There was very little surplus power in the thin air at that altitude (9000') in which to overcome the sudden drop, especially with the freighter fully loaded.

The pilot, one of the crew and four of the troops were killed on impact, with another man dying that evening of injuries incurred in the crash. Most of the food and supplies were destroyed in the accident and when a fire consumed the front portion of the plane. The surrounding vegetation was so thick that if any person wandered very far from the site, without marking the trees, there was every possibility that they would become lost!! Two parties of four decided to set out for assistance. Eight injured men remained behind with the fittest of those, Private Patton, tending them and carrying water.

PARTY ONE: Departed on November 12 in an easterly direction and on the fifth day of their journey came to a narrow gorge on the Moni River scattered with boulders. The sides of this ravine were too steep to traverse on foot, so each man secured a log and attempted to ride the rapids down the fast flowing river. The first two men disappeared out of sight downstream and presumably drowned where
a small waterfall in the river dropped approximately eight feet. Privates Thomas and Butler, the remaining two, searched for the others along the banks for two days without success.

They then proceeded towards Abau through the rugged mountains via Safia where they stayed to recuperate for a week. Until they reached this valley the only natives they met at the villages were old men, women and children whose food supply was limited. These people, however, directed them towards Abau on the coast where Australian forces could render assistance.

After 32 days the two men eventually arrived at Abau. Here they were met by Australian Warrant Officer David Marsh to whom they related their story. Marsh was later to be one of the officers to participate in the unsuccessful rescue attempt to the FLYING DUTCHMAN.

Thomas and Butler were then moved to Port Moresby where they were hospitalised on December 16 for burns and exposure.

**PARTY TWO:** Departed on November 16 in a southerly direction and consisted of Sgts. Kershner and Holleman as well as PFC's August and Mobley. For the first ten days they scarcely saw the sun, except on one occasion when they passed through a moss field. Direction was maintained with the retrieved aircraft's compass. They remembered the plane's approximate heading and applied the reverse as best as possible, which was a south-westerly bearing.

On the tenth day the four struck a defined trail and although in a weakened condition continued slowly onwards. Eventually they arrived at Kokobagu plantation near Rigo and were met by Australian Warrant Officer Edward Hicks and medical orderly Ron Davies. The survivors were fed, showered, given fresh clothes and their injuries treated. By an amazing coincidence Hicks and Holleman had been on patrol a month earlier together in the same area. A scribbled note sent forward with natives by Sgt. Holleman while on the walk out had been received by Ed Hicks at Rigo who had recognised the name and moved up to Kokobagu to assist the men. Six days later the U.S. soldiers were also returned to Port Moresby and taken to the 10th Evacuation Hospital for burns and malnutrition.

In August 1943 reports were received that the Moikordia natives had found the plane, however, there was no official investigation at
that time. Aerial reconnaissance of the area commenced May 29, 1944 to locate the crash site and continued for several weeks without success. On or about July 15, an aircraft discovered the wreckage on a small ridge at the headwaters of the Awara River on Mt. Obree at 9,000'.

A special team from the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) led by Warrant Officer White re-located the C.47 after some arduous walking. The remains, as well as notes left by the passengers, were recovered and returned to the United States that same year.

In 1961 the crash site was once more in the news when it was re-discovered by light planes searching for a latter day missing aircraft, a civil Piaggio, which was subsequently never found. Cadet Patrol Officer J. Absolom with U.S. Army men Lt. W. Wheeler and Sgt. J.

Paolillo once more returned to the site which was located with extreme difficulty. The last three days required cutting a path through the dense jungle. During this visit Sgt. Paolillo noted the legible diary pencilled on the aircraft's tailcone door. The diary/door was subsequently retrieved and brought back to Port Moresby. It remained a curio in their cultural museum until quite recently when it was transferred to the Army Museum.

The diary text is as follows: (with errors)

Crashed 1:30 Tues 10 of Nov 1942.
Tue 10 — 17 men alive.
Wed 11 — 16 men alive.
Thur 12 — 4 men started for help.
Fri 13
Sat 14 — Tried to put up balloon.
Sun 15 — Cracker and cheese.
Mon 16 — 4 men started for help — due south — Leaves 8 men left.
Tues 17 — Small piece of cheese.
Wed 18 — Chocolate bar.
Thur 19 — Found one chocolate bar.
Fri 20 — 1/3 can tomato juice.
Sat 21 — 1/3 can tomato juice.
Sun 22 — Drank last 1/3 can of tomato juice.
Mon 23 — Last cigarette — even butts.
Tues 24 — First day — no rain.
Wed 25 — 2nd day — no rain.
Thanksgiving Thur 26. Rain today also clear in morning.
Fri 27 — Buckets full water this morn — still got our chin up.
Sat 28 — Clearest day we have had.
Sun 29 — Nice clear day. Boy we’re getting weak, still have our hope.
Mon 30 — Still going strong on imaginary meals.

December Tues 1 — My! my! Summer is here — went to Spring today.
Wed 2 — Just slid by but Boy it rained.
Thur 3 — Kinda cold and cloudy today — still plenty hungry. Boy a cig would do good.
Fri 4 — Same old thing — clear this morn.
Sat 4 — Boy nothing happened just waiting.
Sun 6 — Had service today. Still lots of hope.
Mon 7 — Year ago today the war started — Boy, we didn’t think of this then.
Wed 9 — Cloudy. God is looking out for our water supply.
Thur 10 — Just thirty days ago. We can take it but would be nice if someone came.
Fri 11 — Cold rainy today. We would like to start out before Christmas.
Sat 12 — Fairly nice day — still plenty of water.
Sun 13 — Beautiful morning everyone has high hopes.
Mon 14 — Waiting.
Tues 15 — Waiting.
Wed 16 — New water place today.
Thur 17 — Running out of imaginary meals. Boys shouldn't be long in coming now, 6 more shopping days.
Fri 18 — Nice and warm this morning. Rained in the afternoon.
Sat 19 — Pretty cold last night. Cold this morning too. Water pretty low. Five more days to Xmas.

Sun 20
Mon 21 — Plenty of water.
Tues 22 — Rained all three days.
Thur 24 — Tonite is Christmas eve. God make them happy at home.
Fri 25 — Christmas Day.
Sat 26
Sun 27
Mon 28 — Rain every day.
Tues 29
Wed 30 — Johnnie died today.
Thur 31
Fri 1 — New Year’s Day.

Pat
Mart
Ted (on lower left door)

Two of the survivors, one from each party, were in recent years traced by myself to their home addresses in the United States. One of them, ex Sgt. Ed Holleman of Hudsonville in Michigan, advised that he was most anxious to contact the Australians who assisted and treated them on their arrival near Rigo. The medical orderly Ron Davies, and Lt. Edward Hicks were located living in retirement close to Melbourne and Sydney respectively.

The tragedy however was not yet complete. A letter sent to the United States by Mr. Davies was returned four weeks later by the family, advising that Ed Holleman only recently, and without warning, had passed away peacefully in his sleep at the age of 63. This had occurred on 21 September, 1978. A reunion after 36 years was not to be.

I was proud to be the instigator, through the U.S. Embassy in Australia, of the return of the diary/door to the American people. It arrived there in mid-1980 at the Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. The USAF subsequently returned a perfect facsimile to the fledgling Aviation, Maritime and War Museum in Port Moresby, New Guinea.

An appropriate display is now in both countries as an epic reminder of tragedy and survival in the jungles of New Guinea during WWII.
By Captain Greg Pemberton, RAAC.


THE publication of Volume One of Australia in the Korean War 1950-1953 by Robert O’Neill represents a major contribution to the understanding of Australia’s post-war foreign policy. A contribution which is a little surprising in that earlier Australian official war histories have concentrated more on military actions and left the rocky shoals of policy to the private research workers. In view of the more controversial and at times political nature of the analysis of foreign policy, one can be excused for being a little wary about a book that is offered as the “official” version of the politics, strategy and diplomacy behind Australia’s involvement in the Korean War.

On reviewing an official history one is mindful of E. H. Carr’s words in What is History? written in criticism of those historical schools under the influence of nineteenth century liberalism. He said: “When we take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it” [p. 22]. This is unquestionably a sound piece of advice. However, in so far as Carr only asked himself about the nation and period to which any particular historian belongs and ignored their position in society, then he too could be accused of writing in that same complacent philosophical tradition.

Historical writing is not an independent phenomenon. It is an integral aspect of all social activity. As such it performs a social role. Some would even say a class role. For not only does every age write its own history, so too do the different parts of society write their history in their own image and interests. The pursuit of academic objectivity has always been a wild goose chase. Carr acknowledged that society was not homogeneous, but he overlooked the consequences that must follow if the different interests in a society are reflected in its historical writing. This consideration is of the utmost importance in any historical evaluation. Therefore it must be remembered that a history dubbed “official” is no guarantee of its definitiveness or impartiality.

Happily, Australia has been well served by its official war historians. This volume is a worthy addition to that fine tradition. O’Neill himself has this to say:

My predecessors as Australian official war historians have been proud to claim that their works have been official only in the sense that the Australian Government opened its records for their examination and provided the essential financial support... In the present case the claim can be no different. I have been subject to no censorship and have been given full access to all relevant materials. [p xix]

Indeed, one of the major advantages of official histories is that certain information which might never have been available to private scholars is brought to light earlier than otherwise would have been possible. O’Neill’s book cuts well into the normally sacrosanct thirty year statutory period for archives release.

Turning to the volume itself, the first thing to note is just how well presented it is. Much more so than the rather austere World War Two series and the C. E. W. Bean compilation.
which graces the shelves of many a rare book shop. The inclusion of high quality photographs, illustrations and maps enhance considerably both the appearance and value of this work. The extensive biographical sketches and chronology of events are also very useful for quick reference. The Government Publishers and Australian War Memorial are to be congratulated.

There are only to be two volumes in this series. Korea, after all, was only a small war for Australia. Volume One, reviewed here, is subtitled “Strategy and Diplomacy”, the second volume will deal with “Combat Operations”. Giving the politics and diplomacy equal time along with their more sanguinary “continuation by other means” is a further break from the established pattern of the official histories. To an extent this may be a reflection of the growing sophistication of our time when war is increasingly stressed in its political context. More particularly it is a tacit acknowledgment that — in contrast to the absolutes of “total war” and “unconditional surrender” of the 1939-1945 conflict — the Korean War was marked by the reality and visibility of the limits placed on combat operations by political considerations. But lastly and perhaps most importantly, this balance is due to the more prosaic reason O’Neill himself offers: “Australia’s involvement in the war was much more significant at the level of policy formulation than that of combat operations” [p. xv]. With implicit respect to Clausewitz, O’Neill adds that this division of the subject matter between the two volumes is neither arbitrary nor completely artificial. It was just that there was little ongoing interaction between the two spheres.

The main body of this volume is a meticulous and seemingly exhaustive compendium of the official documentary record. Cabinet and committee minutes, departmental working papers and external and internal official correspondence are all included. It is difficult to imagine that any major aspect of the decision making process behind the Australian involvement has been left out. Moreover, O’Neill systematically illuminates each major step in the drama by appropriate excerpts from parliamentary debates and press reports. Published memoirs of some of the principal actors are also used. Having assembled, surveyed and sifted through this vast array of material, O’Neill reduces it to a digestible size and form by a neat reconciliation of thematic intelligibility with the dictates of chronology. He identifies and emphasises a number of distinct themes: the course of the war and subsequent peace negotiations, the policies and objectives of the major antagonists, Australia’s global strategic outlook and relations with the United States and the Commonwealth and allows them to leapfrog each other chronologically through the years. The result is a remarkably well balanced analysis of the period which goes beyond the Armistice to the Geneva Conference of 1954 and the final withdrawal of Australian forces in 1957. Consequently the book throws light on many aspects of Australia’s defence and foreign policy apart from just Korea. Australian policies to the Middle East, Malaya and Indo-China are dealt with extensively, while the negotiations behind ANZUS are given a central position.

The information brought to public notice by this volume will cause some reassessment to be made to earlier evaluations of the direction of Australian foreign policy in this period. For example, it has often been assumed that Curtin’s ‘New Year’ message of 27 December 1941 marked the displacement of Britain by the United States as the principal guarantor of Australian security. The involvement in Korea was therefore the almost automatic consummation of this new relationship. In fact O’Neill’s book makes it quite clear that for Menzies and it seems, the bulk of the cabinet, the Commonwealth relationship remained the first priority at least until well into the 1950’s. Indeed, the first reaction of the Australian Government to the news of the North Korean invasion was for cabinet to act on an earlier British request to send a Lincoln bomber squadron to Malaya. When the Americans made their first overture for Australian support, the Government made it quite clear that no steps would be taken without consultation with the British Government. The early decision of 28 June 1950 to place HMA Ships Bataan and Shoalhaven under American operational command was made only after news had reached Australia that Attlee had done likewise with those British ships which were also in Japanese waters.

For Percy Spender and some senior members of the Department of External Affairs the realities of the international scene demanded
a different set of priorities. Spender was already convinced that Australia must involve itself in a Pacific pact which included the United States as the main defender of Australian interests. Apparently he shared none of his cabinet colleagues confidence as to the security afforded to Australia by Britain's far flung Empire. The Americans were anxious to legitimise their intervention in Korea as an international police action. Spender shrewdly calculated that this American desire to involve United Nation forces presented a rare opportunity for Australia. On 17 July 1950 he advised Menzies that:

"... from Australia's long-term point of view any additional aid we can give to the United States now, small though it may be, will repay us in the future one hundredfold... Such offers [of Australian support] as these might have little effect from the military point of view, but considerable political effect as a gesture".

He concluded by offering his "purely personal view" that:

"... time in Korea is rapidly running out and if we refrain from giving any further aid we may lose an opportunity of cementing friends with the United States which may not easily present itself again". (p. 65)

Spender went so far as to recommend that the Lincoln bombers be diverted from Malaya to Korea and it was with his insistence that the United States request for the use of the Mustangs of 77 Squadron, then stationed in Japan, was considered favourably by cabinet. Menzies however, remained reluctant to commit Australia any further to the Korean War. Following a meeting with the British Cabinet he concurred with Sir William Slim's view that "in a major war it was in the Middle East that Australia could make her best contribution towards Commonwealth defence". The British Government had counselled Menzies that there was no need for Australian ground troops in Korea. Menzies seemed content with that.

Spender had other ideas. In urging Menzies to deal directly with the United States and not through London he was seeking to break from traditional policy. It is not certain which way Menzies would have turned, but an unusual sequence of events took matters out of his hands and placed them squarely in the lap of Spender. Late on 25 July 1950 a request from General MacArthur calling for the commitment of 3 RAR, then in Japan, to Korea, was relayed to the Chiefs of Staff in Melbourne. Menzies was on board the Queen Mary en route from England to the United States. The Chief considered the request and on 26 July recommended, with some reservations, that the request should be met.

Meanwhile, unaware of all this, Alan Watt, the First Secretary of the External Affairs Department was informed that same day by an official of the British High Commission in Canberra that Attlee had decided to send British troops to Korea in support of the United States. Watt immediately grasped the significance of this news. He telephoned it to Spender who was at Moss Vale and soon after set out from Canberra in his car. The effect on Spender was electric. He believed that if Australia now reversed its previous stance in order to fall in line with the shift in British policy then Washington would not recognise Australia as a fully independent nation worthy of a treaty of alliance. Thus he thought it was imperative that Australia pre-empt Attlee's announcement which was to be made in the House of Commons later that day. With Menzies out of contact by secure communications, Spender had to act boldly. He telephoned Fadden in Queensland and wrung from a reluctant and hesitant Acting-Prime Minister concurrence to the statement that was released to the ABC at 7 p.m. on 26 July: "In response to the appeal of the United Nations, the Australian Government had decided to provide ground troops for use in Korea". (p. 76)

Incredibly, this announcement was made without the knowledge of the Chiefs' recommendation and without the Prime Minister's consent: it could hardly be called a decision by responsible government. Menzies was presented with the news of this fait accompli by an Australian official as his ship docked in New York harbour; his initial chagrin was mollified by the resulting warmth of Truman's gratitude which facilitated Menzies securing United States support for $250 million loan from the World Bank to alleviate the dollar shortage at home. International affairs was never Menzies' forte but he was always quick to recognise a "good thing" when he saw it. The "in principle" decision stood.

Official statements indicated that the Australian decision had been made in response to a request for support by the Secretary General
of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, but neither Menzies nor the Joint Planning Committee had seemed to be moving towards a favourable response to Lie's request. As O'Neill drily observes:

"Ostensibly the prime reason for their commitment... was to support the cause of collective security through the United Nations... in reality, their commitment had been made primarily in the interests of Australian-American diplomacy." (p. 76)

The culmination of this diplomacy was the ANZUS Treaty. Menzies believed that an alliance with the United States was neither necessary nor possible, but Spender pursued his goal relentlessly. Indeed this volume bears testimony to the energy, ability and single-mindedness of Spender. By adroit exploitation of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Korean contribution and Australia's other commitments to Commonwealth defence, he secured the alliance. Despite the deliberate uncertainty imposed on the key clauses by the Americans, ANZUS would become and remain the central plank of Australian security for many years to come.

Nevertheless it would be incorrect to assume that the Australian Government as a whole now saw the United States as Australia's major ally. Menzies declined to co-sponsor without British concurrence the United States resolution in the United Nations to condemn Chinese aggression. In May 1951 the Cabinet decided to refuse American requests for further Australian troops despite the lobbying of Spender in Washington and Casey, who had succeeded him in External Affairs. Diplomatically Korea had been important, but with American gratitude won, involvement in Korea emerged as a rival to Australia's more vital strategic interests. In December 1952, the first priority of Australian strategic planners was the Middle East with the Suez Canal and British oil interests. Thus, Australian strategic thinking remained predicated on Commonwealth defence assumptions. Though the events in Korea would help to shift Australian concern from a broader global canvas to the narrower stage of the local Asian area, it would remain British oriented. In October 1953 when Australia's military commitment to the Middle East ended, support of the British in Malaya became the first priority. In view of the Australian refusal to support Dulles' proposal of American intervention in Indo-China in 1954 and the decision in 1955 to provide forces for the Malayan Emergency, there is some support for the contention that the United States did not succeed Britain as Australia's number one "great and powerful friend" until the news of the British decision to negotiate entrance into the Common Market broke against the Laos crisis in 1961. After that, the path led unerringly "down the road" to Vietnam.

Arguably this dedication to Commonwealth defence interests was a little misguided. The debacle of Singapore in 1942 which brutally exposed the hollowness of the proclaimed mutual reciprocity of Imperial defence should have left no illusions as to where Whitehall placed Australian interests in relation to its own. Nevertheless the British connection remained close in the post-war years, partly through ideological links, as embodied so gushingly in Anglophiles like Menzies, but more so because Britain continued as the main source of foreign investment and as a market for Australia's primary exports. Yet one of the real revelations of this book is London's shabby treatment of Australia. As we have seen, Attlee failed to inform Menzies at the Prime Ministers' Commonwealth Conference of the impending reversal of British policy on ground troops in Korea. Moreover, not only did Britain lobby against Australian involvement in Korea because it was feared it might hinder British interests in the Middle East but it even opposed Australia securing an alliance with the United States. O'Neill quotes from Sir Alan Watt's Australian Diplomat:

... this seemed to me ungenerous treatment of a Commonwealth country whose citizens had volunteered in their hundreds of thousands during two World Wars. (p. 188)

O’Neill does not pull many punches throughout the book. Of course it is not surprising that as an official history the treatment of the potentially more controversial aspects is cautious. Nonetheless they are there, however understated. O’Neill is too competent an analyst to do otherwise. The discrepancy of the real and stated motives for Australian involvement is pointed out to us: as is also the importance of the $250 million loan as one motive for involvement. O’Neill also points out the failure of the Government to build up Australia’s defence forces in proportion to the intensity of its Cold War rhetoric. The book
is certainly no whitewash and in this respect
it is a far more critical and thereby valuable
work than that equivalent volumes by Sir Paul
Hasluck in the World War Two Series. Quite
reasonably O'Neil considered it outside his
terms of reference to explore the Korean
involvement's place in the Australian domestic
political scene. There is much here that awaits
the research worker. Both the Korean war and
the Petrov affair were important steps in the
generation of a Cold War hysteria that served
effectively to discredit Labor, undermine the
legitimacy of dissent and eventually pave the
way for the massive influx of American capital
by placating the Australian public into quies­
cent acceptance.

There is far more of value in this volume
than there is room to comment on in this
review. Not only does it make good reading
but it will serve as the prime reference text for
this period for many years to come for those
who wish to burrow even deeper. Indeed, as
the only writer with access to the documents
it is unlikely that many of his conclusions will
face any serious challenge for some time and
even then it is unlikely that his broad evalua­
tions of Australian policy will undergo any
major modification. But it must be emphasised
that this volume is far from the final word.
After all it is only a documentary history and
as such it offers only one dimension of histor­
cal explanation. O'Neill says that the person­
alities of the individual decision makers are
major factors in the formation of national
policy. Perhaps so; but it must not be forgotten
how far men, as Althusser has pointed out,
are unconscious social agents of vast, supra-
individual forces. For an historian to attempt
to explain the occurrence of complex historical
phenomena — be it the Renaissance, the Great
Depression or the First World War — it is not
enough to examine the motives of the principal
actors, individually or in the aggregate. There
is much more to it than this. The Australian
involvement in the Korean War must be por­
trayed against a wider background than that
offered by this book.

Of course O'Neill did not see it as his task
to address himself to such questions. He does,
however, venture into the broader questions of
the Cold War and origins of the Korean War
and this invites comment. Disappointingly,
despite his obvious pains to present an even-
handed weighing of the issues, what emerges
is very much the "official line". Of the two
Koreas he says:
The rights and wrongs of this situation are
difficult to assess but the weight of evidence
suggests that the Communists were much
more ruthless and intolerant of any oppo-
sition or independence of thinking than were
Syngman Rhee's group. (p. 7)

He cites the economic progress of the South
in comparison to the North and concludes that
any "free election" would have resulted in
many more votes for the South. However, such
an assessment is not without dispute and one
wonders on what basis it can be assumed that
Rhee would have won a free election. One
should be mindful of Eisenhower’s comment
about Vietnam that any elections would have
resulted in an overwhelming victory for Ho
Chi Minh. O'Neill’s assessment also neglects
to mention the widespread repression practised
by Rhee to suppress opposition to his rule,
which Truman noted in his memoirs, or that
the economic chaos in the country became so
great that Acheson proposed in late 1949 giving
$150 million in aid otherwise "the whole
situation in Korea will collapse".

The American insistence on "free elections"
was to a great extent inappropriate to what
was going on in Asia after World War Two.
The crucial issue was land. Anti-colonialist
nationalism was only a means to social reform.
Liberal democratic forms of government, much
beloved in the West where they shore up the
interests of the propertied classes, were seen
by the United States as a panacea for the
"instability" of the region. The harder heads
on the left of Asian nationalist movements
rejected them out of hand as a sham. As
Graham Greene pointed out in 1955, the idea
of individual freedoms or voting for self-gov­
ernment was as unintelligible as it was valueless
to the average Asian peasant. This misunder­
standing was the basis of the failure of the
United States to win over the "hearts and
minds" of many of the Asian peoples.

When it comes to examining the outbreak
of the war O'Neill accepts at face value the
aggression of North Korea and goes on to
speculate as to the Soviet Union’s motives for
sponsoring it. There is no mention of the
continual threats by Rhee to re-unify the
country by force. This so concerned the Amer­
icans that they refused to provide him with
heavy military equipment. The Chinese objec-
tive, says O'Neill, was "the protection of a system of friendly neighbouring client states"; [p. 1] but his own discussion of MacArthur’s actions gives considerable weight to the interpretation that the Chinese reaction was due to a real and understandable fear that MacArthur would not stop at the Yalu.

Of the American motive, O'Neill says that it was to "maintain the system of collective security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations ..." [p. 1]. This ascription of such selfless motives to Washington is surely a case of confusing the rhetoric for the substance. "Collective security against aggression" was a fond euphemism which gave an air of legality and even morality, to a vested political interest, that is, "the containment of Communism". It was not just that anti-communism was founded on repugnance to an alien political philosophy or system, it was a policy and ideology generated by the United States which served to facilitate its economic expansion around the globe. America emerged from pre-war economic and political isolationism with an economy geared by wartime production far beyond the capacity of its pre-war domestic markets. Vast new overseas markets for export and investment had to be found if the economy was not to be wound down to face another Great Depression. It was by virtue of the Marshall Plan, the sale of military equipment and overseas investment that this was achieved. Anti-Communism was important not only as a means to quiet overseas opinion in the face of American economic penetration, but also because the growth of a Communist system of states would inhibit American economic expansion as did the sterling bloc. Korea, strategically important to the defence of Japan, especially with China gone, was thus an important cog in the maintenance of a world system of free trade.

None of this has been said in order to cavil at what is in the final analysis a very good book. Indeed it is fortunate that O'Neill’s comprehensive treatment of Australian policy is not extended to the broader questions that remain. If it were otherwise there would be little left for the private scholars and historians to explore.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence Libraries:

Parnell, Neville, Whispering Death, Sydney, A. H. and W. Reed, 1981.

COPIES OF BACK ISSUES

Copies of back issues of the Defence Force Journal are available for distribution on request to the Editor.
By Brigadier M. Austin (R.L.)

Fitzroy reported the New South Wales defence situation to the Colonial Office in the middle of November 1853, and by February 1854 the views of the Master General of the Ordnance were being sought. War was now imminent and it could hardly be expected that Fitzroy's request for hardware could be completely filled. Gunners, and Sappers and Miners were not available, and it was suggested that Barney should organize a small local corps of Sappers and Miners. Newcastle however, misplaced the papers and his reply to Fitzroy was consequently delayed until June.56

Meanwhile at the end of January Edward Macarthur, now a Lieutenant Colonel and Deputy Adjutant General of the Australia Command, submitted further ideas on the establishment of a Militia or Fencible Force in New South Wales to his Commander, Major General Sir Robert Nickle.

Macarthur saw two major problems — the inconvenience attendant on withdrawing large numbers for military service, and the expense borne by the public purse. He proposed these difficulties be overcome by the formation of some 500 sections, in localities 'where the inhabitants [were] not too few', each of at least twenty men, loosely organized on a regimental basis, serviced by a Staff Officer and an appropriate number of non-commissioned officer instructors and armourers. Clothing, arms and accoutrements would be at the expense of individuals, with an arrangement for returning the arms and accoutrements at a valuation.

Meanwhile the Executive, having been rebuffed in raising local forces in 1852, perhaps felt that it was better to give the public concern time to gain momentum, and thus force the Council to take the initiative. If this was the real aim the Executive was ably assisted by the Sydney Morning Herald. In a leader in January 1854 it was suggested that a large force of Militia be enrolled as the basis of a future colonial army. There was no immediate danger, but as Great Britain had handed over control of the colonial revenue she should be entitled to call on the Colony for a fair share towards the defence of the Empire. The Government should not look forward to more Imperial troops — a corps of Volunteers was 'the best, safest and readiest mode of providing for security and peace'. The whole community was imbued with strong feelings of loyalty. There were no bitter internal differences of political opinion, and discussion on such an important question could proceed without prejudice and passion. With all of which Thomas Smith agreed — 'We have the means of being ... prepared. Let then the ardent, loyal and patriotic portion of our community find the time to meet and organize themselves in military discipline and subordination'.

Wentworth was again rebuked for his opposition to the previous Bill, it being claimed that he expressed regret when he perused the long list of 'anxious aspirants for the green and silver furnished by an old member of the Artillery Company to the Governor-General and Colonial Secretary'. Yet another correspondent advocated a public meeting to form an Artillery Company. 'Non-Combatant' however pointed out that many young men lived in lodgings, owned neither homes nor property, with families in the United Kingdom, and
earned barely sufficient to keep them alive. Unless they liked that sort of fun for its own sake, there was little to attract them to the Volunteers. There was ‘little worth fighting for’ — let the landlords and other scheming exactors pay for the fighting men, or buy the foe off."

Those with much to lose viewed matters differently. The Chamber of Commerce considered there was alarm in the minds of a large number of the most intelligent and most influential members of the community. There were sufficient arms to equip 3,000 men, but particular types of tomahawks and other weapons were not available to outfit boarding parties. His Excellency was asked to call the Legislative Council together to form a Volunteer Corps. The Herald, happy that the subject of Defence seemed to have gripped the public at last, supported the move. It blamed the Council for the lack of defence preparations, although at the same time it castigated Fitzroy for gallivanting around the Darling Downs. His absence at such an important time was a public calamity.

Further correspondence followed. ‘Very Defenceless’ suggested that as any marauder was after gold rather than land, those with gold should be prepared to pay for its defence. The Chamber of Commerce should give a lead by buying their own pikes and drilling daily. Naval and military Volunteers should be raised, and paid by an assessed income tax. ‘The Old Rifleman’ believed there were many who had a free Saturday afternoon (the public offices having been recently closed at that time). What was there to do in Sydney on a Saturday afternoon? He was satisfied that the 200 stand of arms sent out by Grey in 1852 would not be enough to fill the demand, in spite of the followers of Lang, Campbell and Darvell. ‘Seramait’ suggested the youth of Sydney be trained as boarding parties to overcome a hostile fleet by sheer weight of numbers — 5,000 men could be so used in less than half an hour. ‘JM xyz’ asked why there was worry about the French at New Caledonia — they were probably on our side, and drew attention to the disparate pay rates for troops in New South Wales and Victoria.

Having raised a public clamour the Herald was anxious that action be taken. If the Executive was examining the defence question it should say so and allay public anxiety. Special constables as well as Volunteers could be required and the Executive would be fully justified incurring the expense of equipping both bodies. The magistrates should take the lead and call a public meeting."

Noting that abrupt change from complete apathy to wild excitement which had taken place in Sydney, the Argus correspondent remarked on the recently issued regulations for granting regular commissions using a Board of Examinations. If this system was applied to Volunteers dissatisfaction was certain to arise. He remembered Lieutenant General Sir Maurice O’Connell stating some years previously that ‘where the service was purely voluntary, and the expense of clothing etc., borne by the corps itself, the right of choice [of officers] should be absolute, and the mere notice of the election should be sufficient to render imperative the issue of a commission’. The Herald approached the new system from quite a different angle. After examining the syllabus it concluded that if any youth of seventeen or eighteen could not compass the course he had ‘grossly neglected himself’. The superficial theories of the Radicals that the officers were too aristocratic a class could now be left safely in the good sense of the public, which would no longer:

consent to run the risk of having the QUEEN’s troops commanded, and the national character sustained or degraded, as the case may be, by persons from whom scarcely any pledge whatever has been taken, beyond that of their original status, — that they are as individual men qualified for the important work, and willing to throw their best energies into the execution of it. It may be that some future PLUTARCH, in chronicling in his annals the glories of Australian-born heroes, will revert to his act on the part of the British Government as the germ of a healthier system of intelligence and morality among military men [and] as another fixing of the links which bind us to our Fatherland, and also, we trust, as the cause and forerunner of trophies destined to colonial arms.”

The Argus correspondent was unconvinced by the Herald’s laudatory remarks. Practical experience was required, not a knowledge of Latin and German. Despite the Herald’s disclaimer, Volunteer officers must be in a position to acquire, both personally and by prac-
tical skill, the confidence of their men. If the new commissioning system was to apply to Volunteers there would be a great deal of dissatisfaction.

Fitzroy returned to Sydney on 10 May and a week later prorogued the Council until 6 June, at the same time taking the opportunity to quieten the public fears. He was satisfied, he told the Council, on the most authentic information available that there was no immediate cause for alarm. The only Russian vessels known to be in the Pacific were one fifty-gun frigate, accompanied by a small corvette and a steam sloop, which were to have accompanied the United States naval forces to Japan from Hong Kong the previous January. His Executive would 'cause the works of defence already commenced to be prosecuted with vigour'.

Opening the Legislative Council on 6 June, Fitzroy abstained from proposing a Militia, 'confident that the loyal and manly spirit which animates the people of this country, in common with their fellow-countrymen in the United Kingdom will induce more than a sufficient number to tender their services for the protection of their country and their homes'. His Volunteer and Yeomanry Corps Bill was submitted to the Council two days later and by 11 July, a fortnight after the official declaration of war had been announced, had been reported on by a Select Committee.

The Select Committee canvassed a number of suggestions, including that submitted by Edward Macarthur to Nickle. Bloomfield, commanding the 11th, because of the French alliance saw no great danger to Sydney from the Russians. He preferred a small nucleus of permanently embodied and paid Volunteers around which unpaid Volunteers could gather as necessary. Service in the latter could be regarded as some form of pastime in which drill was kept to a minimum and the men induced to become good shots. In principle he disagreed with the idea that the Volunteers choose their own officers. Macarthur believed his ideas would work well if supported by a system of prizes. He proposed silver medals for the best shot in each section, with the winners competing for a gold medal. '...on one side the Queen's head and the motto pro aris et focis* and on the other side the Arms of Australia with the motto sic fortis Etruria crevit.** That gold medal should be given to the winner by the Governor General, on the anniversary of the founding of this Colony, with a great deal of circumstance, so as to render the individual who received it a marked man'. Like Bloomfield he believed it undesirable for Volunteers to nominate their own officers, but considered the English system should be followed — first nominate the officers, and then it was up to individuals whether they joined the Volunteers under a particular officer or not.

Nickle, who of all the witnesses had the greatest Volunteer experience was firm in his belief that artillery should be the first unit raised. There were many men in the 11th (and the 40th) who were competent artillery instructors, and he did not want to see that regiment frittered away in small detachments manning batteries. He supported the raising of a troop of Cavalry, and agreed in case of necessity that it could be formed from mounted policemen. Officers should be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Commanding Officer.

There was nothing startling in the report of the Select Committee, other than a recommendation that provision be made for Naval and Artillery Volunteers. During the ensuing debate the Council mainly covered the appointment of officers, service beyond the boundaries of the Colony, and the provision of pensions in the case of wounding or death on service. The Act (18 Vic 8) was passed on 27 July and assented on 4 August, on which day was also assented complementary legislation (18 Vic 10) 'to authorise the resumption or occupation and use of any lands required for the purposes of military defence, and to make compensation to the owners thereof'.

In August 1851 Fitzroy had informed Grey of the offer of the Sydney Rifle Club to form itself into a Volunteer Rifle Company. To infer from this that members were foremost among the Volunteers in 1854 would not be correct. When the Select Committee held its hearings it was informed that Club members were not keen to join the Volunteers because of the clauses relating to the Mutiny Act, Articles of War, and trial by Courts Martial, even when on Active Service. In their view there was too much danger of transportation inherent in these clauses. Moreover while they had no objection to the commanding officer being appointed by Fitzroy they preferred to elect

* for our altars and fireides
** thus Etruria grew strong
their own officers and non-commissioned officers. 2

There were other rifle enthusiasts. In late June the Herald stated that a number of persons had formed themselves into a club and practised on certain days. In this there was little danger provided the public was not endangered. However the Commissioner for Crown Lands (Barney) had been struck on the chest by a stray bullet while riding along the Botany Road from the direction of the new cemetery — 'the had a very narrow escape for doing mischief, and we hope that for their own sake they will improve upon their present arrangements'.

Having passed such an important piece of legislation, and perhaps to rebut criticism that there had been too much delay dealing with defence matters generally, the Council agreed on 11 August to a motion proposed by James Macarthur that an Address be presented to the Governor-General for early implementation of the Act, at the same time pledging the Council's financial support.

On 15 August the Gazette announced the appointment of Captain Augustus Fredericks Jenner, 11th Regiment, as Inspecting Officer, and Captain William Browne as Adjutant of the Corps. Recruiting started six days later with the opening of the Muster Rolls at Jenner's private residence in Bent Street, intending members being asked to indicate their preference for infantry, artillery or naval service.

On 4 September two to three hundred of the Corps gathered in the pouring rain at Government House to have their selection of officers announced by Fitzroy, who was graciously to accept the Colonency of the Regiment a few days later.

On 7 September Major Thomas Wingate, who had sold his commission as a captain in the 2nd in 1846, was appointed commander of the Yeomanry and Volunteer Corps in New South Wales (later the Sydney Volunteer Rifles, and finally 1st Regiment of New South Wales Rifles), and the following day called a meeting for 12 September 'to provide for the regulation of the Corps'.

The remaining officers, also appointed on 7 September, formed a star-studded cast, mainly from the Civil Establishment of the Government, with a few ex-regular officers, and others from the learned professions.

The Sydney Morning Herald listed the non-commissioned officers in December with the comment that

The undermentioned gentlemen . . . have been selected — as well for the regularity of their parade attendance as for their efficiency and proficiency or drill . . . and it is only fair to presume that from these will be made the selections for the future promotions as vacancies may occur.

Recruiting started slowly and only about seventy enlisted the first day. The Sydney correspondent of the Argus contrasted the inauspicious beginning with events two years before when a quiet recruiting campaign started among Government employees, and some two to three hundred were candidates for martial honours. Somewhat harshly he suggested that now that War had been declared the possibility of doing more than playing soldiers had somewhat dampened ardour, although he looked forward to the movement getting under way when members were seen 'sporting their uniforms about the streets . . . There is a great deal in the uniform whatever Mr Parkes may say; and indeed I know no man more likely to be led by vanity . . . than "the first commoner in the land" [Mr Parkes] himself. We are a vain race, and an appeal to this our most prominent failing is the best way of winning us'.

Efforts were not wanting to speed up recruiting. Attention was drawn to the possibility of the withdrawal of British regiments, and the necessity for the Volunteers to take their place. 'Bertha Smith' suggested that the Sydney bachelors should be compulsorily enlisted, and in any case girls should not dance with such who had not joined the Regiment. 'An Artillery Man' agreed, and hoped the young men would heed 'Bertha's' advice, otherwise the Government might have to resort to a Militia. Surely the expense of a uniform (£8 to £10 — $16 to $20), or the labour of drill was not enough to hold them back — if it was, then they should 'economise on the number of cigars, nobblers and balls (billiards)'. Nor did 'Bertha' like the suggestion that the uniform be grey, associating that colour with the enclosed compulsory celibates of Cockatoo Island — all her brothers had joined the Volunteers because the jackets were red! 'Emily' suggested a more substantial token of esteem for each company such as a large embroidered silk flag 'worked (as the gentleman say) by our own fair hands', and
supported 'Bertha' in 'not having anything to do with those who will not fight for us'.

By the end of August some 200 of the 'class called gentlemen in the conventional sense of the term' had joined, but 'at present the lower classers certainly seem disposed to hang back, but without them the Corps will never be made efficient'. The 'gentlemen' included 'not only...the heads of departments, but also barristers, and individuals of the highest respectability'. Having such exclusive membership the unit could expect some in-built problems.

All cannot be officers, and if all the men are not submitted to the same strict system of drill, there will be no content or good feeling in the corps; whilst if the drill not be pretty strict, the corps will never be effectual for good.

As in all recruiting drives there were a variety of opinions, reasons and excuses for the low rate of enlistment. Early in September in a debate for the supply of arms, accoutrements and gunpowder from England as reserve stocks, John Dunmore Lang characterised the volunteers as a failure, a statement rebutted 'in energetic terms' by Flood and Parkes, the latter pointing out that the Corps 'had not had a sufficient trial'. 'A Citizen' objected to paying for his uniform. One wasn't required anyway as a belt or forage cap was all that was needed to distinguish friend from foe. Why a 14 lb (6.35 kg) rifle and a 4 lb (1.81 kg) sword? A Russian could be just as effectively killed by a 8 lb (3.62 kg) rifle and a 1 oz (28 g) bullet. Why imitate 'pipe clay' soldiers who were paid to do their duty. Unpaid Volunteers should not be expected to pay for their uniforms as well as give up their time. Another correspondent stated that if the Colony was worth fighting for then surely service should be compulsory, but whether Volunteer or Militia service was required people's patriotism should not be taxed beyond that of time, and they should not be put to any financial expense for doing something which was clearly everyone's duty. Gideon Lang (with proper respect to the officers) was more pointed in the middle of October. From all experience of British communities, the Government was justified to raising Volunteers rather than Militia. The British people were faced not only with interruptions to trade, but also with additional heavy taxation. The Colonists were the same people, with the same interest, but had the meanness to throw the burden of colonial defence on to those whose resources were fully committed, when they were capable of defending themselves. The Volunteers 'have barely 350 out of a population of 63 000'. Selfishness pervaded the community.

Much of the indifference is to be attributed to the want of encouragement given by our leading men...they should enrol themselves for the sake of example...a few more carriages waiting for volunteers to finish drill would have a great effect. But I doubt it is useless to talk, for what can you expect from the British zeal of a community when the people among them who can pay a guinea [$2.10] for a concert ticket look upon "Good Save the Queen" merely as a signal to put on their hats, and turn their backs to crush (sic) out. Many more would enrol except for the expense, and he suggested those who were too weak, stout or old equip a rifleman in their stead. It was easy for those with an instant-soldier syndrome to make such criticisms, but it is difficult to see how the initial situation could have been markedly improved considering the composition of the population and the buoyant gold economy. As the Solicitor General mildly remarked there was a 'material tone of thought and feeling in the Colony'.

In spite of its early problems the unit slowly grew in members, and even with high non-attendance, gradually became more efficient but above all he considered the prime excuse was that 'the Russians were never likely to come'.

On the question of expense one correspondent suggested that if some young gents wanted to form an exclusive Corps it was up to the Government to make service compulsory by raising a Militia. Probably this would not be necessary if the cost of uniforms was partly off-set by a Government subsidy as an encouragement to merchants and tradesmen to volunteer. Gideon Lang ('with proper respect to the officers') was more pointed in the middle of October. From all experience of British communities, the Government was justified to raising Volunteers rather than Militia. The British people were faced not only with interruptions to trade, but also with additional heavy taxation. The Colonists were the same people, with the same interest, but had the meanness to throw the burden of colonial defence on to those whose resources were fully committed, when they were capable of defending themselves. The Volunteers 'have barely 350 out of a population of 63 000'. Selfishness pervaded the community.
under the watchful eyes of the drill sergeants. It was considered that the latter's remuneration should have been increased, even though the Legislative Council, when considering the Estimates, had reduced that of the Inspecting Officer, an action which was seen as a 'parsimonious spirit and narrow-minded policy [which] actuated and influenced certain members of our legislative body, whenever the Volunteer's pay and allowances have been considered in the Estimates'.

Bloomfield, commanding the 11th, subsequently appointed Inspecting Field Officer in mid-December, inspected the unit at drill in the Domain on 23 September, and expressed 'astonishment at the great proficiency [it] had obtained'. Fitzroy was also to have inspected about a month later but the unit was not yet properly outfitted. Nevertheless 115 assembled in their new uniforms consisting of an invisible [sic] green frockcoat braided, with velvet collar and cuffs, drill trousers; around the waist a patent leather belt to which is attached cartouch-box, shot-pouch and sword bayonet. The headdress — a cap, and above the peak a bugle in bronze, with the figure 1 beneath'. The 500 spectators were surprised with their exercises, and even the Argus correspondent could scarce forebear to note that the unit had made greater progress than had been anticipated.

A month later the Regiment carried out its first official engagement, providing a Guard of Honour when Fitzroy opened the New South Wales branch of the Paris Exhibition. The Guard was 'accompanied by the drums of the 11th Regiment, the band of that Corps being stationed in the gallery, where they laboured hard "in their vocation"'.

Later in November the Regiment had the opportunity of drilling with the 11th in the Outer Domain 'much to the delight of the spectators who gave them a hearty cheer', and the satisfaction of Bloomfield. The only pity was that so many riflemen were among the spectators instead of being on parade with their more energetic comrades. Fitzroy finally inspected the infantry and artillery Volunteers on 16 December. As 'an old soldier [he was] highly gratified with the proficiency which the corps had arrived at in their drill'.

The practical side of soldiering was not overlooked with ball practice at the rear of Victoria Barracks and 'skirmishing' in the Inner Domain with blank cartridges. However, 'the poor fellows got their faces sadly damaged by the kicking of the heavy rifles, a fault arising chiefly from the very coarse powder distributed by the Government. The Volunteers will be compelled therefore for comfort's sake to find their own gunpowder as well as their own uniforms ...'. As Gideon Lang had pointed out there certainly was a requirement for some form of fatigue dress.

It will be recalled when the question of establishing Volunteer units had been raised in 1851 that arms and equipment for 250 riflemen and 250 yeomanry had been forwarded free of cost. In March 1854 the Colonial Office became curious why these weapons had been issued to the Police. Fitzroy replied that the Colonial Storekeeper had no arms to issue to the Police in 1853; the need was urgent and there was no possibility of raising Volunteers at that time. It had been suggested that the arms be supplied on repayment from Ordnance stocks, which in turn could be resupplied from England. The Deputy Ordnance Storekeeper had been requested to render accounts in the usual way, but had been unable to cost the items. The Colonial Office directed the Board of Ordnance to provide the prices but chided Fitzroy — he was not to divert military stores without prior approval.

In mid-September 'Rifleman' was surprised that there had been no mention of the formation of a band for the 1st Regiment. As matters developed the question became contentious as the band was hired at what 'and old rifleman' considered a wanton yearly outlay of £1000 to £1200 ($2000 to $2400) raised by an annual levy on all members of £10 ($20). Although no doubt done in good faith the decision was not happily received. The approach was tactless as the Volunteers did not want to be treated as regular regiments; as the band would be under the control of the officers let them pay for it, as was done in regular regiments, and if there was to be any extra expenditure it should not be wasted on a band, but should be used for a testimonial to the drill sergeants.

Meanwhile the other arms had also been progressing.

On 19 August an 'Ex-Trooper' called for the establishment of Yeomanry, asking for either pay not clothing (which should be plain, but handsome), but merely for the regiment to be
enrolled, armed and given the minimum of drill. In support the *Sydney Morning Herald* suggested four troops, each fifty strong, noting that

*Our readers will have observed in our latest news from England that notice has already been given to the Anglo-American Colonies that, from the present demand laid upon our military force at home, the British troops stationed here will be forthwith withdrawn, and the colonies will be called upon to protect themselves. And what reason, we will ask, have we to flatter ourselves with the idea that this colony will form an exception to this rule, or that we shall continue to depend upon troops of the line for our defence?*

While a month later *Bell’s Live* was glad to notice an advertisement calling a meeting to consider steps necessary for establishing a Cavalry Corps. New South Wales has been long celebrated for its horses and horsemen, that it will be strange indeed if a crack troop cannot be formed. If the tug-of-war do actually come and an enemy landed, all military experience tends to show that cavalry are a *sine qua non*, for the street fighting that must ensure. *Bertha Smith* could not see the use of Yeomanry. Everyone considered the enemy would arrive in ships. Were Horse Marines being formed? One good thing, however, would be to teach people to ride gracefully, which she implied the officers of the 11th could do.  

*An inaugural meeting to consider the formation of a Yeomanry Corps was held on 11 September with proposals which differed somewhat to the Rifles. Objections were raised to Fitzroy’s method of appointing officers, and it was proposed the Corps elect its own officers in accordance with the number of votes received, although under ‘Government Regulations’, rather than those established by the Corps. The *Argus* correspondent feared the officers would be a ‘dozy lot’, and considered the proposed uniform ‘showy’ — ‘scarlet, white and gold lace, with papier-mache helmet, and such like foolery — bad enough with regulars but worse with Yeomanry’. The question of expense was also raised with the correspondent ‘Cavalry’ considering that if the Yeomanry were to provide their own uniforms then the Government should consider providing a ration for the horse or an equivalent allowance.*

On 28 September Captain Malcolm Melvill Macdonald was appointed Adjutant of the New South Wales Yeomanry Cavalry and by mid-October the troop was being drilled ‘at the Carter’s Barracks, adjoining the old Protestant burial ground’. A month later the Corps was said to be progressing rapidly and ‘before long...they will be able to parade with rifles’.

The Yeomanry turned out in their new uniforms at the end of November, the horses splendidly caparisoned with the headgear and breast plates similar to those of the XI Hussars; the saddles and holster pipe similar to those worn by our Mounted Police; the saddle cloths are made of thick blue cloth, trimmed with white, bearing on their corners in gold letters the initials of the Corps with a golden scroll beneath. The uniform of the Corps is a blue cap with a gold band, a scarlet jacket braided with gold, with dark-blue trousers set off with a gold cord. The Corps is armed with heavy cavalry sabres until an assortment of sabres from the celebrated house of Wilkinson and Company arrive.

Prior to this event Captain Macdonald, a popular officer, had resigned, as a consequence the *Argus* correspondent believed ‘from some scandal’, although this comment is not borne out by any other reports, or by his subsequent military career. He was replaced early in December by Captain John McLerie, the Superintendent of the Sydney Police.

Gother Kerr Mann was appointed Captain and Commandent of the Volunteer Artillery Force on 7 September and ‘An old Subscriber and Colonist’ was complaining a fortnight later that no one could tell his son when drill would commence. However, by the end of September a ‘tolerably strong muster’ at Fort Macquarie had gone ‘through their marching exercise in a very creditable manner, considering that they had been organized but so very recently’. Like the Yeomanry it would not be long before the gunners would be able to parade with rifles. A comment which must have been galling particularly when an artillery range, behind Victoria Barracks towards the Lacklan Swamp,
had been proclaimed a week before Mann's appointment.118

The commencement of Australia's first sustained effort to raise a local force was not without its critics, but by the end of 1854 the results were not altogether insignificant, although within twelve months it was obvious that enthusiasm, in the Rifles at least, was waning, as the following comparison shows.119

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>31 December 1854</th>
<th>31 December 1855</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Inspecting Officer, Adjutant, Clerk</td>
<td>Inspecting Officer, Adjutant, Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeomanry</td>
<td>1 officer 44 other Ranks</td>
<td>3 officers 43 other Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1 officer 46 other Ranks</td>
<td>2 officers 83 other Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>21 officers 368 other Ranks</td>
<td>15 officers 286 other Ranks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a country where horses and horsemen loom large in colonial mythology and history it may seem strange, apart for pure military reasons, that the numbers of mounted troops, be they Yeomanry or Mounted Rifles, should be so small. In part this no doubt can be attributed to the dying embers of the 'exclusive' and 'emancipist' philosophy, squattocracy or other divisions in the social fabric. Be that as it may, Denholm in _The Colonial Australians_ highlights the practical difficulties of forming large mounted units at this time — 'apart from those of travelling mobs of cattle and flocks of sheep — most of the travelling feet on colonial streets and roads were human feet'. He goes on to show for example that in New South Wales in 1861 there were 350 000 people and 230 000 horses, but what is concealed by these figures is 'that a small majority of the people, or perhaps a minority of the people, owned all the horses, and that an even smaller number actually rode horses'. Of the 230 000 horses only 80 000 were available as saddle stock belonging to about 2 000 owners. Approaching from another angle be points out that of the 350 000 people, 120 000 were concentrated in the County of Cumberland, but between them they owned 17 000 horses of all kinds, and concludes that in spite of their cheapness great numbers of people chose to walk rather than ride. Whatever the underlying reasons the tottering steps towards the ultimate formation of the Australian Military Forces were taken largely by urban infantry feet.120

**NOTES**

83. 19-11-53 Fitzroy/Newcastle WO 1/524 R901 F107
84. 12; 16-1-54, 31-3-54 SMH
85. 7-4-54 SMH
86. 6-8, 11-4-54 SMH; the principal public offices in Sydney were closed Saturday afternoons — HTC 10-3-54
87. 17-4-54 SMH
88. 18-4-54 A; 11-3-54 SMH; 18-5-54 A
89. 18-5-54 A
90. 6-6-54 VPLCNSW; 7-6-54 SMH; 10-6-54 SMH
91. VPLCNSW 54-1-59. 15, 17, 28-6-54 SMH; 12, 14, 20, 21, 28-7-54 SMH; the Argus correspondent was not sanguine that the Select Committee would deal with the matter expeditiously, 'Our committees are by no means celebrated for speedy action, and there is little reason to hope for greater celerity of movement in this than any other' — 29-6-54 A.
92. VPLCNSW 54-1-59
93. 28-6-54 SMH
94. 26-7-65 A (criticism by Sydney correspondent); 12, 22-8-54 SMH .
95. 22-8-54 A — the Argus correspondent described Jenner as 'well and favourably known as an older member of the staff' [and Brown as] a decent sort of fellow who has served here and retired on half-pay'. However, 'An old Subscriber and Colonist' was more critical stating that the two officers who constituted the Brigade executive fell far short of the requirements for their appointments — 22-9-54 SMH. Jenner resigned in November apparently as a result of remarks made in the Legislative Council which he considered reflected on him (MacCallum _op cit._ Part 2 page 16, Reference 18, Chapter 4.)
96. 5, 13-9-54 SMH; 11-9-54 A
97. NSW _Gazette_ 1854, pp 1853, 1958
98. 11-12-54 SMH
99. 22-5-54 SMH, A
100. 26, 29-8-54, 4-9-54 SMH
101. 26-8-54 SMH; 31-8-54 A
102. 5, 6, 8, 16-9-54 SMH
103. 27-9-54, 16-10-54 SMH
104. 14, 15-10-54 SMH
105. No 736 Sergeant Major Thomas BAYNES of the Staff
106. 25-9-54, 14-10-54 SMH; 28-10-54 A — the Sydney correspondent described Jenner as 'well and favourably known as an older member of the staff' [and Brown as] a decent sort of fellow who has served here and retired on half-pay'. However, 'An old Subscriber and Colonist' was more critical stating that the two officers who constituted the Brigade executive fell far short of the requirements for their appointments — 22-9-54 SMH. Jenner resigned in November apparently as a result of remarks made in the Legislative Council which he considered reflected on him (MacCallum _op cit._ Part 2 page 16, Reference 18, Chapter 4.)
107. 2-10-54 A.
108. 11-12-54 SMH
109. 16-10-54, 23, 24, 27-11-54 SMH
110. 18-3-54 Newcastle/Fitzroy WO 1/524 R900 F45; 7-9-54 SMH
111. 13-9-54, 5, 6-12-54 SMH
112. 21-8-54 SMH
113. 14-54 A
114. 4-9-54 SMH
115. 12, 16-9-54, SMH; 9-10-54, 7-11-54 A
116. 16-10-54. 11-11-54 SMH
117. CO 206/96, 97 Rl 179, 1180
118. NSW _Gazette_ 1854 p 1993; 22-9-54, 2-10-54, 11-11-54 SMH.
119. CO 206/96, 97 Rl 179, 1180
120. The _Colonial Australians_ David Denholm, Penguin 1979 pp 103, 104. These figures support MacCallum's belief that the Yeomanry were mainly mounted policemen (op.cit. Part 2; p 2, reference 28)

Reviewed by Captain Greg Pemberton, RAAC.

When Bob Connell and Terry Irving proclaimed in the forward to their Class Structure in Australian History: “Our intention is political . . . and it may therefore seem curious to some readers that a history-book is the result”, they were taking up the banner of the New Left from Humphrey McQueen’s New Britannia in calling for a unity of theory and practice. Michael Sexton’s War for the Asking has been written with the same manifesto in mind.

Scorning any pretense to the Olympian disinterest of professional historians of a Rankean inclination, or any affectation of the niceties and polite discretion of Whig story-telling, Sexton’s purpose is also political. A former staff member of the Whitlam government, he seeks ruthlessly to expose and indict. Furthermore, as Sexton himself says, the issues he raises are not merely of “historical importance”, but concern vital questions of relevance to all Australians in the 1980’s.

That master of Parliamentary rhetoric, Gough Whitlam, once referred to the Vietnam conflict as “the war of the great lie”. There are few now, outside of the Reagan camp, who would seriously quibble with such an epitaph. For just as with the American administrations of the 60s, the Australian Government of that period had its yawning “credibility gap” prised open by an unusual succession of disclosures. First there were those extracted by an active and inquisitive Opposition and media at the time. Then in 1971 there was the embarrassment of the Pentagon Papers. And eventually, the confirmation of all previous suspicions by the parliamentary paper prepared by R. G. Neale under the aegis of the Whitlam government. With the publication of Sexton’s work it seemed as though the last major revelations had been made before the official history and the release of government archives.

It was perhaps by virtue of his political affiliations Sexton was able to get hold of a swag of Government documents. Most of which are cablegrams telexed between the Department of External Affairs and the Australian Embassies in Saigon and Washington. The cabinet records, internal working papers of Defence and External Affairs are still lacking. The motives of the Australian policymakers are thus only sketchily revealed. Menzies is almost absent from the drama.

Nevertheless this is an important book. The Menzies government always maintained that it sent its troops to Vietnam primarily to help the people of South Vietnam who had requested our aid against aggression. The “left” retorted that we had been pushed in by the Americans. No one ever took the first myth seriously. Sexton has effectively demolished the second. What is made patent is that extraordinary episode in Australian diplomatic history in late 1964 to early 1965 when the Government presumptiously sought “to bring certainty to American policy and planning”. As part of this policy the Government urged the Americans to take a tougher line in Vietnam — to employ air strikes against North Vietnam and hold staff talks for the introduction of ground troops, Australian as well as American, into South Vietnam — all before the Americans had themselves finally resolved on such a course of action. If Bundy, McNamara and Rusk were the hawks, it was Hasluck, Waller and Menzies who were trying to teach them to fly.

Although all Australians should be thankful to Michael Sexton for bringing this information to public notice, it is a great pity that for legal reasons he chose not to include copies of all the documents that he used. This is what so enhanced the value of the Pentagon study. Consequently we have to take his word for what most of the documents contain. But a careful cross-reference with the public record and in particular with the Neale study, supports everything he reveals. Indeed, at the risk of being churlish it should be pointed out that most of what he “reveals” may be news, but it is not new. It was all contained in the Neale study in 1975, albeit in less detail. Sexton appears to have used precisely the same doc-
It has been said above that this is an important book. But it is by no means a great one. Unfortunately, Sexton — a senior lecturer in Law at the University of New South Wales — is not an historian, at least of this period. These important documents are set against a thinly drawn historical background based on the sketchy use of a few secondary sources. This is not a comprehensive study of Australia's foreign policy, or even Vietnam policy, in this period. It is, as it claims, merely an expose of some of "Australia's Vietnam secrets". And if we really want to answer the crucial question of why Australia got involved in the Vietnam war, we need to work on a much broader canvas than Sexton paints for himself. Having read his book, it is clear that Australia invited itself to the war, but one is left with the lingering question of "why?"

To an extent the answer lies in the economic relationship of Australia with the United States in the post-war period. Between 1946-47 and 1963-64 £2,000 million of new foreign capital poured into Australia of which one-third came from the United States. By 1964 American investment constituted just under half of new foreign capital formation in the Australian economy. It was only $3.4 million less than British capital and concentrated in the key manufacturing, mining and chemical industries. It was largely this massive injection of American capital that went a long way to underwriting the long boom in Australia and hence the continued electoral success of the conservative parties. Without suggesting too simplistic a base/superstructure formula, it cannot be denied that Australia's economic dependence on the United States gave the Government little room to manoeuvre in foreign policy, especially with the British moves to join the Common Market. It would have been terribly hard for the Australian Government not to have responded favourably to American wishes over Vietnam. At the same time, the Australian Government could also have seen Australia's foreign policy as an economic lever. Australia's Korean commitment facilitated Menzies' efforts to secure a $250 million loan from the United States. And there is some evidence to support such a conclusion with regards Vietnam.

In March 1965, Menzies became so concerned about the drying up of the influx of American capital into Australia that he wrote Johnson a personal letter expressing his concern. The decision to send "Diggers" to Vietnam was made the very next month. However, it would be unwise to accept too simple a picture of Australia as a passive client state of US capitalism. The conservative government had not supported the proposed American intervention in Indo-China in 1954. While, as Sexton shows, the decision to ask ourselves into Vietnam was made long before Menzies' letter. Australia was far from an unwilling partner. And our decision-makers had their own very special reasons for seeing Australian troops in South Vietnam in 1965. This is precisely what Sexton's book overlooks.

Sexton seems to assume that Australia had a consistent and unambiguous policy to the Vietnam War for the period 1961-1965. A policy based on the long term need to keep the United States in South East Asia. In concentrating on the flurry of diplomatic activity between November 1964 and April 1965, he misses the fundamental change of direction in Australian policy around mid to late 1964 when the Government moved from a restrained policy of token support for the American effort to the anxious urging of deeper involvement. (Sexton covers the November 1964-April 1965 period in 102 pages and the previous fourteen years in 19 pages.) The reason for this change in policy is locked in the minds of the leaders of that time. And in view of the eyebrows raised even by Robert O'Neill's cautious treatment of the Korean involvement it is unlikely that the official history of Vietnam will be very revealing. Nevertheless there are already enough signposts to point the way.

In part the answer lies with the appointment of Hasluck to the External Affairs portfolio in April 1964. Neither a lawyer or "British bootstrapper", Hasluck's 'realpolitik' approach to international relations immediately injected a harsher and more urgent note into the rhetoric, if not the substance of Australian foreign policy. He wanted the American alliance to be based on more than a scrap of paper. And he had real and immediate reasons for his concern. The source of that concern lay with Indonesia.

Former ambassador to the United States, Sir Howard Beale wrote of Australian foreign
policy in his memoirs: "Indonesia was our first concern. In the Government we did not say much publicly about the extent of our interest in the new nation and our concern for what might happen there, but these things were never far below the surface of our thinking and policy-making". Declassified documents from the United States have now revealed a crisis of relations between Indonesia and the Australians and British in August/September 1964 which was never really intimated in public. When HMS Victorious and its escorts sailed through the Sunda Straits in September 1964 with aircraft at combat ready, the Australian Government was involved with British plans for military action against Indonesia. It was against this background that Hasluck cabled all Australian Embassies that it was a vital national interest to retain an active American presence in South Vietnam.

Faced by the real prospect of war with Indonesia and mindful of the American Government's refusal to back Australia in the West New Guinea dispute or commit itself to ANZUS in the way Barwick had sought, the Government acted to ensure that this time the Americans had no way out. They were merely seeking to put into effect Renouf's now famous advice to achieve such a "sense of mutual alliance that in our time of need... the United States would have little option but to respond as we would want."

This aspect of the Vietnam issue has yet to be fully explored. It was hidden underneath the compost heap of lies about that period. Regrettably, however, truth was just the first, not the only casualty of that war.


Reviewed by Dr L. H. Barber, History Department, University of Waikato, New Zealand.

Noel "Wig" Gardiner has, in his Freyberg's Circus, made a useful contribution to the history of the North African campaign of World War II. After an unwelcome tour of duty as Divisional Sports Officer (made bearable by New Zealand's 8-0 win against South Africa in the 'Desert Test'), Gardiner was reposted to 27 Battalion in time for the Muwasib attack and for Operations Lightfoot and Supercharge.

Don Davin warns us in his foreword that 'Wig' Gardiner's style is racy and straightforward. Davin recalls Gardiner's reaction to a British officer during a TEWT:

But look here, sir, that staff solution of yours is all balls. It may seem all very well on paper, but you'd never get real soldiers to let themselves be stuck out on that forward slope... they'd tell any officer who tried to put such a bloody silly idea as that across to go and get stuffed.

It is to the credit of his publishers that Noel Gardiner has been allowed to tell his tale in his own words.

Freyberg's Circus' strength is its worm's-eye-view of the training, fighting and morale of 2NZEF. Gardiner's chapter on 'Desert Tactics' is his best — with frank admissions of insufficient operational planning and the early problem of insufficient early liaison with tank brigades. His most exciting incident is the 'Affair at Bianchi' when Freyberg's staff car suddenly appeared beside him and the General rapped out "They've got two of our brigadiers, Gentry and Weir. We want them back. Get cracking and make contact. I'll send up reinforcements as soon as I can". The Brigadiers were rescued. The final chapters are marked, perhaps marred, by too many reflections on the ills of the contemporary world.

Noel Gardiner's book is a fascinating reminiscence of the North African campaign. It is well illustrated and the text is well reinforced by six maps.


Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant (AIRTC) H. S. Brennan, NSWAIRTC. Formerly 2/11th Australian Armoured Car Regiment 1st Armoured Division AIF 1941-1944.

In this obviously well researched book Kenneth Macksey sets out to trace the history and development of the AFV from the early days of experimentation to the what was then reasonably sophisticated vehicles at the close of the 1939-45 War.

The early chapters of the book deal with the efforts of Ernest Swinton, and others, to overcome the outdated and bureaucratic attitudes of both Service Chiefs (Army) and
civilian members of Defence Boards toward any radical change in the make-up of the army, and indeed, throughout the book these factors control the development, employment and efficiency of AFV's in general and tanks in particular.

It is interesting to note that "Boney" Fuller presented a paper, called "The 1919 Plan", wherein he set the pattern for what was to become the much feared "Blitzkrieg" operation used with so much success by the German Armoured units during 1940 under the direction of Guderian, who improved on Fuller's original plan and co-opted all arms in offensive warfare, which took most of the European countries so affected by complete surprise.

The book is written in non-technical language, however the experience gained by Major Macksey during his 27 years service with the Royal Armoured Corps, and his obvious interest in AFV development shows through in every chapter, as he manages to convey the trials and tribulations and also successes as if he had been there personally.

Reading this book gave me great pleasure, as it is now 38 years since I left the 2/11th Armoured Cars, I was pleased to note mention quite frequently of "Armoured Cars", and I have no hesitation in recommending the book to any ex "Tankie" or "Turret Head" as I understand the expression is now.


Reviewed by Dr. L. H. Barber, History Department, University of Waikato, New Zealand.

FRANK E. Huggett belongs to that splendid combination — historian and journalist — who bring to life that rare commodity, readable history.

In Cartoonists at War Mr Huggett moves in time from "the Grand Old Duke of York", the militarily incompetent son of George III, to the Suez Crisis. His narrative is built around his cartoons, in the case of "the Grand Old Duke" Gillray's caricature of 1793 showing the Duke with a weighty Flemish courtesan on his knee with hungry guardsmen in the background. Suez is reflected by the Illingworth cartoon in Punch wherein Eden is shown marching a company over the crest of a hill.

The caption redeployed the lampoon directed at "The Grand Old Duke of York":

The grand old Anthony Eden
Recalled thirty thousand men
He marched them up to the top of the hill
And he'll march them down again.

Huggett's selection of cartoons is representative and balances satire of the services with propaganda against enemies of the realm. As might be expected his twentieth century cartoons are superior with Rowlandson's Boer War "stealthy infantry patrol" marking a movement to a less cluttered and more effective presentation. Bruce Bairnsfather's World War I "Old Bill" probably wins first prize for mock heroics, while Sidney Strube's "Britain stands", showing a helmeted infantryman on sentry duty atop of a lion-shaped Dover cliff, is one of the strongest rallying pieces.

Frank Huggett's Cartoonists at War is supported by a succinct narrative. All-in-all, this is a well-organised work that portrays the impact of war on soldier and civilian with graphic and narrative impact.

WHISPERING DEATH — by Neville Parnell, (Published by A. H. & W. Reed, PO Box 126, Terry Hills, NSW 2084. Rec. price $17.95).

Reviewed by Jack Docherty, RAAF News.

A LOT of blood, sweat and tears must have gone into the preparation of Whispering Death.

For it tells comprehensively for the first time the story of the RAAF Beaufighter squadrons in the South-West Pacific area, a task that has taken years to research.

There are combat reports, lists of aircrew and awards won by them and many rare and hitherto unseen photos of the men and their aircraft.

The photos have been reproduced as well as possible in the circumstances, considering the age and in many cases the lack of quality of the originals.

The author writes expertly, throwing in countless little details that help to make the book very interesting, rather than just a record of events.

Essential for the library of the dyed-in-the-wool enthusiastic and good entertainment for those who simply like reading about aircraft and the men who flew them.