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An Australian Iroquois helicopter, painted in the colours of the MFO, flies over the Force's Headquarters at Eilat in Northern Sinai.
Dear Sir,

It may seem presumptuous of me to write on the Falklands conflict, having retired from the Royal Marines over 10 years ago. Living in Japan, I have had to rely on reports in U.S. and Japanese newspapers and periodicals, and a nightly diet of terse BBC reports. I can therefore say I am untainted with propaganda.

Since I retired, I have been able to keep in touch with the latest developments in naval warfare, first as Managing Editor of the DFJ in the first three years of its existence, and lately, through regular reading of its many excellent articles, as well as of those in the USNI Proceedings and the Naval Review.

While admiring the obvious professionalism of the British forces on land, at sea and in the air, one must be shocked at the appalling losses in both men and ships suffered by the Royal Navy. Lessons can obviously be drawn from the campaign, for Australia as well as for the rest of the Western Alliance.

First of all, was it worth it? I must unequivocally answer, "Yes, it was!" Once a dictatorship, whether of the right or left, is allowed to get away with an infamous act to cover its own inadequacies, then the World is lost. That, at least, the British Government has learned from history.

Why did so many Argentine aircraft get through? The blame must primarily lie with British government policy in the years since the Wilson Administration started to withdraw from east of Suez. Did we learn nothing from Crete and Kuantan? It was criminal lunacy to scrap the carrier and denude the Fleet of its air cover and long range surveillance. We must have suitable aircraft to bring down the missile-carriers long before they can become a danger to the ships of the landing force. An Australian government would neglect this lesson at its peril.

Once engaged, we must wonder why our anti-aircraft weapons were so inadequate. It seems that courageous pilots can still press home their attacks against modern missiles and guns. Perhaps we should thicken up both missile and gun armament to deal with such kamikaze tactics. We must also remember in these days of international arms sales to find an antidote for not only the weapons of our likely enemies, but for those of our allies as well. The French-made surface-skimming Exocet came as an unpleasant shock in its deadly effectiveness.

The Harriers performed superbly, both because they are excellent aircraft and because they were expertly flown. In their limited way, so did the two "harrier-carriers," but it is alarming to think that, in a few months, both ships would have been unavailable, due to proposed government cutbacks.

The nuclear attack submarines performed to their potential and kept the Argentine Navy bottled up effectively. With the addition of cruise missiles, they would present a formidable deterrent to any future Argentine, or other, adventurism.

The older ships' steel superstructures were able to withstand more punishment than the aluminium of the newer ones. This is an area, together with new damage control and firefighting techniques, including the use of fire-resistant paints, which will obviously be studied closely and must be remedied, both in current ships and in future design.

One can only admire the logistics miracles achieved in collecting, transporting, delivering and maintaining such a huge quantity of men, weapons and equipment over such vast distances, a problem very relevant to Australia. Again, this would have been made more difficult without the two LPD's, Fearless and Intrepid, which were also due for the defence cutback.

Once ashore, the quality of marine and soldier, the standard of leadership, training and morale was dramatically illustrated, fitness, even after weeks at sea, seems to have been maintained. The age of technological warfare still calls for a superbly fit infantry soldier.

Lastly, one should examine the way in which the war was reported. In Argentine, absurd claims were made, a totally false picture was painted and, when the truth came out, there
was much bitterness and the regime began to totter. As I write, no one knows how far it will fall.

In Britain, while there was some absurd jingoism among the popular press, the BBC, to its lasting credit, gave an objective, balanced picture, the Prime Minister showed Churchillian resolve and was backed by the Parliament (after some cold-Footism) and the vast majority of the people.

Will it happen again? Clearly Britain cannot entertain any Argentine claim in the foreseeable future. They have, to use a popular expression, “blown it.” A country which treated the Falklanders as it did, particularly in the latter stages, and has murdered its own citizens with such gay abandon, is clearly unacceptable to any British administration or to the Kelpers themselves.

This means an expensive and prolonged defence of the archipelago, which might be turned to advantage. One hopes that the Kelpers will prosper. Clearly, they will never recapture the peace they once knew, but maybe substantial quantities of oil and other minerals will be found and western defence will have rediscovered a vital link in its world network. If the lessons are learned and acted upon, then Britons will not have died in vain.

Ian Taylor
Okinawa, Japan.

*On 10 December 1941, the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battlecruiser *Repulse* were caught by Japanese land-based aircraft off the east coast of Malaya, while on a sortie, unprotected by air cover, to intercept a Japanese landing force, and sunk.

A LEGAL STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

Dear Sir,

Your interested readers will wish to note the outcome of **GROVES v THE COMMONWEALTH** which was discussed at some length in my survey of the soldiers right to sue the Commonwealth for negligence (DFJ No 33, March/April 1982).

On 4 May, 1982 in a unanimous decision, the Full Bench of the High Court ruled that a serviceman can get damages for injuries negligently caused in **peacetime** by other servicemen.

The judges were careful to limit the liability to the facts of the instant case and left open the question of what happens if the injuries occur during activities of a military nature, such as weapons training or tactical exercises. The joint judgement said, “There is, in this case, no question of war or war-like activities; not even of training activities” and Mr Justice Murphy said “Leaving aside warlike operations (including training and manoeuvres) ...”

While the case is not a complete breakthrough for servicemen I expect the Commonwealth to legislate to define the position and of course any such legislation will come under the scrutiny of Parliament. With Australia awash with Administrative reform I can amend my remark in the ultimate paragraph of my article and now say, “Reform is in the air and likely to be on the Statute Book”.

STAN MILLER
Colonel
AALC

NORTH AUSTRALIA OBSERVER UNIT
1942-1945

Dear Sir,

I am currently researching a television documentary concerning the formation and operation of the North Australia Observer Unit 1942-1945.

My initial interest in this remarkable story was aroused by an article, written by Captain Amoury Vane and published in the Defence Force Journal (January-February, 1979).

Preliminary research has revealed that few official records of the N.A.O.U. exist and my primary source of information will be ex-members of this unit. Their anecdotes, diaries and photographs will be essential to my research.

To date, I have been able to contact quite a number of men from the N.A.O.U. However, I’m sure that there are still many others who do not know of my research.

I would be most grateful if your readers could be informed of my need to contact ex-members of the N.A.O.U.

Any information concerning the North Australia Observer Unit, should be addressed to:-

RICHARD WALKER,
Television Features Department,
ABC,
G.P.O. Box 487,
Sydney 2001, N.S.W.
THE WORLD TODAY CRIES OUT FOR LEADERSHIP.

In a period of international uncertainty and instability, worldwide inflation, economic stagnation, and moral and social turbulence, the cries go out for leaders and leadership. It seems that the various peoples of the world believe that if through prayer and supplication a new Churchill or de Gaulle or Roosevelt or Adenauer or Nehru, or preferably all of them, should arrive, the problems of the world could be solved. Meanwhile, in the world as it is, actual political leaders enjoy little public support and, where such democratic practices are allowed, they are frequently voted out of office and new leaders tried.

At lower levels in society, the cries are as frequent and as urgent. From kindergartens to the great institutions of societies, the search for men and women with the ability to lead others and achieve desired results is conducted with great assiduity. The underlying assumption is that if the leader can be found, the results will be achieved: if the right man is chosen as captain, England's cricket team will again be supreme; if the right man is hired as executive manager, he will lead the company away from the abyss of liquidation; if the man appointed to command the battalion is a true leader, it will achieve outstanding results. However, as leaders find to their cost, the reverse is also the case.

ABSTRACT

Arguing that no general theory of leadership has yet been developed, the author nevertheless surveys the available literature on leadership theory to construct a less ambitious viewpoint, namely, a theoretical framework, from which leadership may be examined.

Leadership is seen as being more complex and multi-varied than early researchers and most modern-day practitioners have imagined. Particular stress is placed on interaction between the leader and his followers and the necessity for the leader to engage his followers' values and motivations in the quest for organizational goals. Also stressed is the major role played by followership in producing good leadership.

The section on leadership practice emphasizes the need for well-developed and articulated goals, for consideration in dealing with followers' values and needs, for using conflict positively and that the practice of followership can be an effective way of learning to be a leader.

Air Commodore R. G. Funnell, RAAF

Introduction

The world today cries out for leadership. In a period of international uncertainty and instability, worldwide inflation, economic stagnation, and moral and social turbulence the cries go out for leaders and leadership. It seems that the various peoples of the world believe that if through prayer and supplication a new Churchill or de Gaulle or Roosevelt or Adenauer or Nehru, or preferably all of them, should arrive, the problems of the world could be solved. Meanwhile, in the world as it is, actual political leaders enjoy little public support and, where such democratic practices are allowed, they are frequently voted out of office and new leaders tried.

At lower levels in society, the cries are as frequent and as urgent. From kindergartens to the great institutions of societies, the search for men and women with the ability to lead others and achieve desired results is conducted with great assiduity. The underlying assumption is that if the leader can be found, the results will be achieved: if the right man is chosen as captain, England's cricket team will again be supreme; if the right man is hired as executive manager, he will lead the company away from the abyss of liquidation; if the man appointed to command the battalion is a true leader, it will achieve outstanding results. However, as leaders find to their cost, the reverse is also the case.

Air Commodore Funnell has contributed to the journal on previous occasions. He is currently Director General Military Staff SIP, D IV. Canberra.

Article received March 1982
assumed to be true: if England loses, the
captaincy is suspected; if the company fails,
the executive manager is expected to assume
the blame; and if the battalion performs poor­
ly, its commander has figuratively to answer
a *prima facie* charge of poor leadership.

One might expect in circumstances where the
concept of leadership is used so frequently as
both solution and explanation that a well-
developed and well-articulated theory would
have been developed, but that is not the case.
In fact, there is not so much as a widely
accepted view or opinion of what leadership
is or what it is not, or of how to recognize it
or its best practitioners, or of how to develop
if it is suspected of being present. Conversely
— perhaps even perversely — there is a
plethora of adages and bits of folk wisdom
about leadership. 'Leaders are born not made.'
'You can't teach leadership.' 'You can teach
leadership.' 'Management and leadership are
fundamentally different.' 'Leadership is just a
part of management.' 'Management is just a
part of leadership.' 'To be a leader you have
to be tough, mentally and physically.' 'If you
want to know what leadership is really about
read Slim / Wavell / Montgomery / Eisen­
hower / Patton / Churchill / Roosevelt / Mao
Tse-tung (delete as required).'

To seek assistance from the social sciences
is to enter an intellectual morass. Although the
literature abounds with studies of leadership,
little of direct usefulness to practitioners is
available. Ralph Stogdill in 1974 compiled a
'Handbook of Leadership' which summarised
research to that time. To that extent, namely,
as a summary of past efforts, it was useful,
but that could hardly be said of many of its
conclusions. To define leadership as 'the ini­
tiation and maintenance of structure in expec­
tation and interaction'2 may be theoretically
rigorous and academically useful but it is of
little value to the foreman on the factory floor
or even the managing director behind his
executive desk. Of equally limited usefulness
is the conclusion that 'Studies of leader behav­
ior indicate that leaders described high in
both initiating structure (letting followers know
what to expect) and consideration (looking out
for the welfare of followers) tend to promote
high degrees of follower satisfaction and, in
some cases, group performance'.3 A good deal
of interpretation is needed to bring conclusions
like that to the workplace.

The American historian and political scien­
tist, James MacGregor Burns, won the Pulitzer
Prize for his monumental work, 'Leadership'.

The book is excellent and worthy of serious
study, but it is pitched ultimately at political
leadership at the highest level. Considerable
interpretation is needed of Burns' work to
glean ideas and observations which are of
practical value at other levels and in other than
political circumstances. It is at those other
levels and in those other circumstances that
this article seeks to operate.

So much of leadership study, research and
writing is of limited use to those who conduct
most of the leadership tasks in the world's
various societies. There is no great value to
the non-commissioned officer or junior officer
in today's armed services of an historical
analysis of the leadership of Marlborough,
Wellington or even Montgomery, for that
analysis does not relate to the job he or she is
doing today or might do tomorrow. Academic
research is necessary and in due course may
well be of great value but for the leaders of
today what is required is that which is relevant
to today and tomorrow. The aim of this article
is to seek out that which is relevant and
translate it into a form which is useful in
today's circumstances. The need is for some
frame of reference against which people who
need to practise or assess leadership can view
the subject in a useful way. To be valuable
such a frame of reference must have a strong
theoretical foundation, and this will be given;
however, it cannot be based on a total and
coherent theory of leadership because such a
theory does not exist. Instead the great harvest
of material on leadership will be winnowed
and the wheat examined. From this will be
extracted that which is of most use to practi­
tioners of today.

Let it be said at the outset that what will be
extracted will not be a set of rules or maxims
to use as either standards by which to judge
leadership or actions by which to apply it. The
subject defies such simplistic treatment. Instead
the frame of reference provided in this article
will develop a notion of what leadership is and
what it is not; it will offer ways in which
people in leadership positions can view their
circumstances and ways in which they can seek
to improve their performance; and it will offer
a vantage point from which all can view leaders
and assess their performance.
Power

In an article such as this the strong temptation is first to define the subject and then to set about describing it. The temptation is resisted. As we shall see, leadership is not so much an entity as a process and as such one must look into it to see the forces which are at play before attempting too specific a definition. However, without defining leadership precisely, two notions concerning it are put forward as a starting point. In fact, they are nothing more than truisms: leadership is a process involving people, and to carry that further, leadership is concerned with getting people to do things. The second notion introduces the concept which is at the core of the leadership process, power.

Forty years ago Bertrand Russell remarked that ‘... the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in Physics’. The analogy is an excellent one, as it places power at the very core of social processes. Russell went on to define power as the ability to produce intended effects. The ways in which power can be exercised occupy a whole spectrum from the subtle, almost invisible, approach of emulation through increasingly more evident ways such as suggestion and persuasion to the blatant, perhaps ultimately brutal, technique of coercion.

One of the best known and most useful typologies of power is that of French and Raven. They give the following as the possible bases or sources of power a person may possess:

a. legitimate power: the potential for influence that derives from being the incumbent of some position or office;
b. reward power: the potential for influence that derives from being able to bestow or withhold valued objects;
c. coercive power: the potential for influence that derives from being able to impose or withhold punitive actions;
d. expert power: the potential for influence that derives from possessing information or skills that are valued in the organization; and
e. referent power: the potential for influence that derives from being personally liked or respected.

There are numerous other typologies of power but that of French and Raven is simple, persuasive and has considerable explanatory force. However, useful as it is, it treats power merely as a resource and as Burns has pointed out quite compellingly, power has two essentials, resource and motive. He is worth quoting at length:

'We all have power to do acts we lack the motive to do — to buy a gun and slaughter people, to crush the feelings of loved ones who cannot defend themselves, to drive a car down a crowded city sidewalk, to torture an animal.

We all have the motives to do things we do not have the resources to do — to be President or senator, to buy a luxurious yacht, to give away millions to charity, to travel for months on end, to right injustice, to tell off the boss.

The two essentials of power are motive and resource. The two are interrelated. Lacking motive resource diminishes; lacking resource, motive lies idle. Lacking either one, power collapses.'

Further, a feature of power which has been much ignored but which is essential to the concept of power within the context of a study of leadership is the role of purpose. Purpose brings in the notion that power is a relationship not just an entity and as such it involves people other than the power holder. Of what use is an abundance of power if that power has no salience for the person or persons on whom it is exercised? Burns remarks that ‘Even the most fearsome of power devices, such as imprisonment or torture or denial of food or water, may not affect the behaviour of a masochist or a martyr’. Conversely, if the purposes of the power recipient are in accord with or even merely compatible with those of the power holder, the behaviour of the power recipient may be greatly influenced even though the amount of power available to the power holder is small.

It is important to grasp the point that purpose has a role in the power relationship; it is equally important to grasp that the flow of purpose is from power holder to power recipient and that the purposes of the power holder are of primary importance. Also it is important to grasp that the motivations or purposes of the recipient do not need to match those of the holder; relevance not coincidence is the criterion. To put it in other words: if the purposes of a power holder are relevant to the
motivations of a power receiver the power resources of the power holder can be used to influence the behaviour of the power receiver to achieve a desired result.

Before moving on to a discussion of the development of leadership theory a summary of the concept of power as developed herein will be useful. Power is a central concept in the analysis and description of social processes. It has two essential elements, resource and motive, and may be defined as the potential to influence the behaviour of others to produce desired results. As a resource it is useful to categorize power as legitimate, reward, coercive, expert and referent. The element of motive highlights the fact that to possess the resource is not enough; you must want to use it. This in turn connects with the notion of purpose, not only the purpose of the power holder but also that of the power recipient.

A leader is a power holder and a power user. He possesses certain resources which are relevant to the recipients and he uses the potential which that gives him to influence their behaviour to produce results which he seeks. The process through which this takes place is leadership and at this stage that will serve as a rough-cut definition supplanting the notion given earlier that leadership was concerned with getting people to do things. It is a definition to keep in mind as the discussion now shifts to a description of the development of leadership theory.

The Development of Leadership Theory

A description of how leadership theory has developed is not just of historical interest. In fact, the historical treatment given to it here will of necessity be cursory. For practitioners, the major interest resides in the fact that so much from the older theories is still encountered today. There are still many organizations and individuals who seem to believe that the essence of leadership is the possession of certain personal characteristics; there are others who assert that leadership consists of using a certain approach or style in dealing with other people; still others believe that not only the leader but also the followers must be studied and included in the theory; others include not just leaders and followers but also the task and the environment; and there are others who believe that the variables which must be included in the theory are even more numerous. Suffice it to agree with Charles B. Handy that the search for a definitive theory of leadership '... has proved to be another endless quest for the Holy Grail in organization theory' but yet assert that there is value in reviewing the theories and how they have developed.

Trait Theories

Trait theories postulated that a good leader was one who possessed certain personal characteristics or traits. Consequently, analysis of the concept, leadership, focused on the personality and values of successful leaders. This revealed a bewilderingly large list of characteristics. The list could go on for pages but typically it would include physical appearance, intelligence, energy, power of expression (written and spoken), emotional stability, sense of responsibility, reliability, integrity, enthusiasm, technical expertise, determination, endurance and courage. Unfortunately there was little agreement among researchers as to which traits should be included and which excluded. Additionally, there was little agreement on the rank order of importance of those traits which were included. Of even more significance given the theoretical starting point of the research, few great leaders possessed many of the traits. Apparently all that can be stated with certainty is that good leaders can possess a wide variety of traits and that, while trait theories have some descriptive advantages, for analytical and explanatory purposes they are quite inadequate.

But is there not something to be gleaned from trait theories? After all, do not many personal appraisal and selection schemes use a trait approach? And are there not some traits which are relatively common to good leaders? The answer to all questions is yes. The three traits which most studies single out as characteristics of good leaders are intelligence, initiative and self-assurance. Handy seems to favour the inclusion of a fourth, the so-called helicopter factor, which he defines as 'the ability to rise above the particulars of a situation and perceive it in its relations to the overall environment'. These are, however, at best necessary but not sufficient conditions for a good leader. A good leader will probably possess them, or put in the reverse sense, without them it would be difficult to be a good leader, but possession of them will not make one a good leader.
Stogdill found from his survey of the research that leaders scored high in such characteristics as intelligence, ability, personality, task motivation, performance and social competence. However, the characteristics are so broadly and often poorly defined that they are useless in practice. Stogdill admits that ‘... despite the great ingenuity displayed in the development of tests to measure these characteristics, such instruments have not proved reliably useful for selection of leaders’. He goes on later to make a most telling point: ‘Traits do not act singly but in combination. A pattern of traits effective in one situation may not work in another’. One might well ask of those who still rely so heavily on the assessment and measurement of traits for their theoretical justification for so doing.

Style Theories

Dissatisfaction with trait theories led researchers away from concentrating attention on the leader. Instead of studying what the leader is, research turned to studying what he does and, more particularly, how he does it. In other words, the style of leadership was scrutinized. This school of thought will be familiar to all who have attended staff colleges, administrative colleges or business management courses during the last 30 years. The names of Chester Barnard, Chris Argyris, Douglas McGregor, Rensis Likert, Blake and Mouton, Lewin, Lippitt and White will be familiar. The assumption underlying their studies and theories is that workers will perform more effectively for leaders who adopt certain styles of leadership than they will for those who adopt other styles.

Without being too general, the style theorists can be seen as viewing leadership styles along a spectrum which ranges from authoritarian through democratic to laissez-faire. These were precisely the terms used by Lewin, Lippitt and White for their pioneering studies in the late 1930s. However, the same spectrum, or parts of it, was also used in McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y, Likert’s Systems 1 to 4, Blake and Mouton’s Managerial Grid and other studies. Laissez-faire was shown early to be of little use and all the later researches concentrated on the authoritarian and democratic styles, although at times different terms would be used. Authoritarian, restrictive, task-oriented, socially distant, directive and structured would be considered as a cluster of identical behaviours to be contrasted with democratic, permissive, person-oriented, participative and considerate behaviours. The underlying assumptions were that person-oriented behaviours foster group productivity, cohesiveness and satisfaction and that task-oriented behaviours inhibit them. Unfortunately for the style theorists their assumptions were not supported by research findings. As Stogdill has pointed out:

‘The relationship of democratic, permissive, follower-oriented, participative, and considerate patterns of behaviour to productivity is zero or negative as often as it is positive. These patterns of behaviour are not consistently related to group effectiveness in task performance. Autocratic, restrictive, and task-oriented behaviours show as many zero and negative relationships as positive relationships to productivity. On the other hand, socially distant, directive, and structured leader behaviours tend to be related positively to productivity’. Human relations may require a considerate approach but productivity will be at best uncertain. The conclusion is plain: style alone will not produce the results which leaders seek. Although style theory broadened leadership theory to include the follower and his interactions with the leader, it was still not broad enough. Other variables associated with the work group, the work environment and the task itself must also be included.

Contingency Theories

Contingency theories are based on the idea that leadership is contingent on not only the leader but also other factors such as followers, the task, environment et al. Their history has been one of increasing complexity in theoretical design as each new theory has been shown to be inadequate. To illustrate the increase in complexity, Figure 1 is an early and relatively simple model devised by Hollander and Julian. The model is simple and yet persuasive. It accords with the impressions of many practitioners of leadership. It also expresses graphically that leadership is a process of influence...
involving interactions among the leader, the group and the environment. Another early model and probably the most influential was that of Fiedler and his associates.\textsuperscript{22} The basis of their approach was that group performance was contingent on the need structure of the leader and the situational favourableness for him. It has been depicted in the manner given in Figure 2:

However, as stated above, these models could not contain all the variables identified by contingency theories as needed in the theoretical design. Even more complex models were needed. By their own admission that of Ivancevich, Szilagyi and Wallace\textsuperscript{24} captures only '... some of the more important'\textsuperscript{25} in their quite complex model shown in Figure 3.

Whatever its effectiveness as a theoretical model the value of it to the practising leader at whatever level is at best debatable.
Handy has a similar but simpler model in what he terms his 'best fit' approach. He considers:

- **a. the leader**: his personal characteristics, his preferred style of operating;
- **b. the subordinates**: their preferred style of leadership; and
- **c. the task**: the job, its objectives, its technology;

all of which depend to some extent on:
- **d. the environment**: the organizational setting, the nature of the group, the importance of the task.

The 'best fit' approach contends that there is no best style of leadership but that leadership will be most effective when the requirements of the leader, the subordinates and the task fit together.
The measurement tool for 'best fit' is a scale which runs from tight to flexible. It is not a precise measure but merely, as Handy puts it, a low-definition subjective tool. His suggestion is that in a given situation the three factors can be placed roughly along his scale. For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tight</th>
<th>flexible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>leader</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>subordinates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>task</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The example is one where the leader by personality and preference uses a fairly structured style of leadership in a work environment in which his subordinates prefer a more flexible style giving them more control of their work and in which the task itself is loosely defined with no tight constraints on time. Because of the mis-match, tensions are set up which need to be alleviated. The most obvious move is that of the leader towards the flexible end of the scale, but this may not be possible; the task and the subordinates may have to move instead. If a modus vivendi is to be achieved all three may have to move to some degree.

The example shows the way in which Handy's model can be used. It has contemporary appeal particularly as the idea of 'fit' is enjoying a vogue. Where once the belief was that the task, the group, the environment and the leader were factors to which the subordinate had to adapt or depart, the modern belief is that none of these factors is set, all are capable of adaptation. However, despite its initial appeal and some explanatory force, it fails as an operational tool. As a summary in an operationally useful form of the work done on contingency theories Handy's description of the four major interacting elements is excellent, but once he introduces his measurement scale his model collapses. It depends too much on the place of the task on his scale. Although the ability to redesign a task to make it 'tighter' or 'more flexible' is greater than is often imagined, there are still definite limits to how far a task can be moved, and to achieve a 'best fit' the leader and the subordinates will have to move to accord with the position established by the task. Research findings give no support to that.

What then has resulted from the considerable theoretical efforts undertaken over the last 30 years? Rather more than might at first appear even if so much of it is of more use negatively than positively. Trait theories have been shown to be inadequate; and yet some findings of value have been obtained. Style theories have been shown to encompass only some of the factors involved in leadership; and yet leadership style is important though contingent on other factors in the environment. Contingency theories of increasing complexity have been developed without yet developing one which can be verified; and yet there is much that is soundly based in the conclusion that the leadership process is one in which the leader, his subordinates and the task interact within the work environment. To go beyond this the recent work of James MacGregor Burns which was referred to earlier will be brought into the discussion.

The Work of Burns

Burns takes the process of leadership beyond the holding and the use of power. For him leadership shares with power the central function of achieving purpose but a leader is a particular kind of power holder. A leader does more than use his power resources to produce desired effects; he actively engages the motivations and values of his subordinates in a conjoint effort to produce results which are important to both. He puts it well:

'Some define leadership as leaders making followers do what followers would not otherwise do, or as leaders making followers do what the leaders want them to do: I define leadership as leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations — the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations — of both leaders and followers. And the genius of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers' values and motivations. Leadership, unlike naked power-wielding, is thus inseparable from followers' needs and goals.'
In developing his theoretical stance Burns casts his net widely, embracing the work of historians, psychologists, sociologists and political scientists. He places heavy emphasis on the work of humanistic psychologists such as Adler, Erikson, Fromm, Piaget and Maslow and contrasts their work with those who through ‘... drawing on studies of animal behaviour, have tended to misconceive leadership as simply control or rulership’. He asserts instead that leadership is a process which continuously engages the needs, values, aspirations and motivations of both leaders and followers. If the follower is used as simply the instrument through which power is applied, the process is tyranny, not leadership.

Some might argue that Burns’ position is not value-free, and they would be right; but he contends, and one can but agree, that values are important and if they are made explicit they will help not hinder the development of theory. Without the introduction of values the concept of leadership would be anchored in the concept of power and Attila, Hitler and Idi Amin would be seen as practising the same craft as Jeanne D’Arc, Churchill and Pope John Paul II.

In leadership the place and role of followers are of critical importance. Their needs, values and motivations must be taken into account for they as well as the leader may be seeking to realize their potentialities. What must also be acknowledged is that most leaders in the hierarchical structure of organizations are both leaders and followers, acting as leaders in one direction and as followers in another. If their full potentialities are to be realised their motivations will need to be satisfied in both directions, a point which will be pursued at greater length in later discussion.

At this stage a brief review of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is necessary. Although his work is widely known, universal knowledge cannot be assumed and without a basic understanding of his hierarchy of needs much of what Burns postulates may be misunderstood.

Maslow presents an ‘holistic’ concept of personality, contending that an individual attitude or act cannot be considered without reference to the total personality. Put another way, he suggests that a person is motivated by one or more psychic needs and that the importance of these predominant needs affects all his attitudes and behaviour. Thus each person has an integrated (but perhaps not explicit) view of the world which is based on his individual needs. His theory of motivation encompasses five basic areas of need: physiological, safety or security, affection and belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization. The first four are deficiency needs the gratification of which is essential for mental health; the fifth, self-actualization, is the process of the unfolding of the human personality to its fullest extent, allowing the particular person to realize his full human potentialities. The key to Maslow’s theory of motivation is that motivation is dominated by unsatiated needs and that consequently one does not move up the hierarchy until the needs at the present level are substantially satisfied. For example, until one’s physiological and security needs are satisfied they will dominate one’s attitudes and behaviour, leaving little or no psychic room for the development of affection, belongingness, esteem and self-actualization.

The needs with which Burns is most concerned are the higher needs, esteem and self-actualization. In the context of political motivation he considers that unfulfilled esteem needs (both self-esteem and esteem by others) are the key elements of political ambition and there can be little doubt that the need for esteem is a powerful force in all social processes including that of leadership. The need for esteem engages both the leader and his followers in interactions from which both seek benefits and, if the process allows their gratification, the desire for self-actualization will become influential.

Self-actualization is a complex set of higher needs, less imperative than the lower needs, related more to the mind than the body, associated with creativity and including not only the self but others as well. Jeanne Knutson takes the point further by adding that a self-actualizing person possesses the flexibility of mind that allows him or her to assess the needs of others and an open-mindedness which is likely to make for successful leadership. Burns continues it by making self-actualizing persons potential leaders at all points because of their capacity to grow, their competence, their flexibility and their ability to perceive the needs of their followers in relation to their own. However, at this point Burns departs from Maslow for he considers that Maslow over-
emphasizes self-actualization to the detriment of mutual actualization with others.

'I suggest that the most marked characteristic of self-actualizers as potential leaders goes beyond Maslow's self-actualization; it is their capacity to learn from others and from the environment — the capacity to be taught. That capacity calls for an ability to listen and be guided by others without being threatened by them, to be dependent on others but not overly dependent, to judge other persons with both affection and discrimination, to possess enough autonomy to be creative without rejecting the external influences that make for growth and relevance. Self-actualization ultimately means the ability to lead by being led.'

The point is well made. It also emphasized that the study of leadership has been concentrated too heavily on the leader and insufficiently on the led. Leadership is an interactive process and as such it is one which benefits from a view from the other direction; followership is as important to Burns' theoretical construction as leadership. Moreover, as stated earlier, nearly every leader is required to follow at the same time as he leads. Leadership can be enhanced by good followership; it can be negated by poor followership. Any theory of leadership which does not highlight the role of and the factors involved in followership is deficient. The full process of leadership embraces in most circumstances a grand series of levels in which leaders at one level are followers at the next. An excellent way of viewing leadership in a hierarchy, which almost all organizations are, is a set of concentric rings around a central person. On each ring are people who must at the same time follow a person (or sometimes persons) positioned on their inner ring and lead others positioned on their outer ring. Leaders must therefore develop the skills not only of leaders but also of followers. More importantly their role as leader is even more powerful and productive if they help to make their followers into leaders. As Burns puts it: 'The role of the "great man" is all the more legitimate and powerful if top leaders help make their followers into leaders. Only by standing on their shoulders can true greatness in leadership be achieved.'

The theoretical vantage point from which leadership can be viewed has now been erected. Leadership can be viewed as a social process in which the motivations, values and goals of the leader interact with those of followers and in which the power resources of the leader are used to influence followers to achieve goals which are set by the leader and relevant to the followers. Within the definition the leader, the followers, the task and the environment are all shown to be important as is the influence which each has on the others. Although it is only a 'two-level' definition which does not capture the dynamic idea of leadership/followership spreading out as concentric rings through an organization, to have expanded it would have produced an overly complicated and thereby less useful definition. Much that is accepted as leadership is excluded by this definition. Leadership is not mere power holding or power wielding; it is not just oratory or the giving of orders; nor is it being liked or not being liked, or of being admired or not being admired. Burns describes it well in an evocative passage:

'Much of what commonly passes as leadership — conspicuous position-taking without followers or follow-through, posturing on various public stages, manipulation without general purpose, authoritarianism — is no more leadership than the behaviour of small boys marching in front of a parade, who continue to strut along Main Street after the procession has turned down a side street toward the fairgrounds.'

The Practice of Leadership

The practice of good leadership is derived from its theoretical base. Primarily and probably most importantly leadership is about achieving results; it is goal-oriented. Those who have been placed in positions of leadership must clarify the goals of that part of the organization they lead so that all may know to where they are going. Too little attention is paid to the clarification of goals, particularly in large bureaucracies. Broad goals are essential as a starting point but they need to be narrowed and made increasingly specific to be operationally useful. If organizations required as much effort to be put into the specification of goals as they often do into the task of developing long-winded and frequently meaningless job descriptions, all would benefit. With well-developed and specific goals the leader, the led
and the organization know where they are heading and are able to recognize the fact when they get there. Moreover, all are well-placed for determining the costs involved and the relative efforts expended. This helps considerably in both allocating rewards and refining procedures.

The notion of goal-setting connects with that of ‘structuring expectations’ which was seen by Stogdill as being of central importance in leadership. The idea of letting people know what to expect is a broad one which includes many parts of the leadership process but it stems from the idea that a primary task for a leader is to clarify goals for all to see. Further, it requires leaders to establish and maintain structures (using that work in a broad sense) which allows all to know what is expected of all. The point is a critical one because research into productivity, worker satisfaction and group cohesiveness has shown that structuring expectations is the single pattern which contributes positively to all those factors. In Stogdill’s words: ‘Philosophies of leadership...that undermine this factor destroy the very foundation of leadership.’

To proceed beyond goals and expectations, that is, beyond the questions of ‘to where are we heading’ and ‘how are we heading’, the next question on which one must concentrate is that of ‘with whom’. For leadership to be exercised the leader must know his followers, their values, their goals, their motivations. This is not to know followers in the sense of knowing their Christian names or their favourite pastimes or the ages of their children, but rather in the sense of knowing where their values lie, what will motivate them in heading towards organizational goals and how leader and followers might engage in a symbiotic relationship which is mutually advantageous and achieves the leader’s goals. Anyone who has ever engaged in such a process will vouch for the deep satisfaction and sheer human joy which accompanies it as all involved raise themselves and each other to higher levels of performance than any of them had foreseen.

Valued leaders are those who are considerate of their followers, who are aware of the needs and values of their followers and who are both considerate of and effective in working for their welfare and comfort. An associated point is that followers value the leader who has influence within the organization and particularly with his superiors. This ambassadorial role of the leader is important not just in a vertical direction but even more importantly in a horizontal direction. The leader’s ability to represent his group effectively and obtain due consideration, fair and equitable treatment and prestige is valued highly by his followers. No one who has ever worked for any length in a large bureaucracy would contest the point.

However, despite the leader’s best efforts in answering the questions of ‘how’, ‘to where’ and ‘with whom’ he is going, major obstacles will still be encountered. Many of these will arise from the fact that goals, aspirations, values and motivations of the many people involved in the process will seldom if ever coincide. Moreover, they may be incapable of being made to coincide and, with some, even compatibility will be difficult to achieve. Conflict is the inevitable result. Now conflict is opposed to much that is central to the western liberal tradition; consensus and harmony are considered to be the preferred operating modes for social processes. Nevertheless, scholars such as Simmel, Coser and Dahrendorf have shown that, although conflict is inevitable, if used wisely by the leader it can ultimately be constructive. The test of leadership is not to remove conflict but to curb it; leaders do not shun conflict but accept it, confront it, exploit it, ultimately embody it. However, as well as expressing and mediating conflict they must shape it.

Using the power resources at their disposal leaders influence the scope, intensity and direction of conflict. They use it to sharpen people’s consciousness, engage their attention and destroy the lassitude and apathy which are so often the accompaniments to consensus and harmony. As probably the primary actor within a conflict situation the leader must accept that he will not be universally liked. He may well make enemies. In complex social situations in which many different values and goals are competing it cannot be otherwise if those values and goals are maintained. If the leader places modal values such as harmony, achieving consensus and being liked and admired above the end values of the goals he has set for himself and his team he has ceased to lead; he has become merely an office-holder.

To accept that conflict is inevitable and should be used in a productive way is not to deny that it can also be destructive and debi-
litating. It is part of the leader’s task to control and direct it. For this he must be given the appropriate tools. In the interactions which are taking place continuously between the leader, his followers, the task and the environment leaders should, if possible, have the power to change the environment, the task and the people. Too often it seems that leaders at the higher levels fail to appreciate the difficulties which leaders at lower levels encounter through not having the tools at their disposal to conduct properly their leadership tasks. There is much more scope than is commonly imagined to give these leaders greater control over the people, the task and the environment with which they work.

Leaders must also be given the time to establish the structures and develop the processes they need to achieve their goals. Frequent changes of task, environment and people imposed on leaders from above introduce often unnecessary complications which may frustrate leaders and ultimately undermine their best efforts while they themselves may be moved on just as they are, or are about to become, fully effective. This last point bedevils military organizations in which frequent changes have become endemic. For example, the senior officers of the Australian Defence Force can expect to spend a minimum of two years in a post no matter how poorly they are performing, but can expect no more than three years in a post no matter how well they are performing. This is an excellent example of the way in which modal values, such as in the first case the desire to reduce posting turbulence and in the second the need for career development, can supplant end values such as task performance. This type of rigidity is difficult to justify. A person placed in a leadership position should be given the resources, including the time, to establish himself. However, if he is unable to produce the required results he should be moved to a position better suited to his array of talents irrespective of the period he has served in the post. On the other hand, if he is achieving results of the highest order he should be left in the position for as long as possible.

The discussion above has focused considerable attention on goals, that is, on producing intended results, and to a large extent the test of leadership is the degree to which it produces the results it intended. However, a factor which must be brought into any test of leadership is fate, externally controlled effects which may well nullify the efforts of the best leaders and deny them the results they seek. Any assessment of leaders and the groups which they lead must take into account the effects of factors over which they have little or no control.

As stated above in the theoretical discussion of leadership, too little attention has been paid to the concomitant and important subject of followership. Perhaps the best advice which can be given to any prospective leader seeking to understand the subject and develop his skills as a leader is to encourage the practice of being a good follower. This is not to say that a good follower is necessarily a good leader; far from it. It is to say that thinking about and practising followership within a sound theoretical framework of leadership is an excellent means, perhaps the very best, of learning about leadership.

But how does one practise followership? As stated, the first requirement is a sound theoretical framework of leadership. The other requirements revolve around the idea of helping the leader perform his leadership tasks. If the follower does not have a clear idea of where he is going he should seek the answer, and he should do so in such a way that the leader is encouraged by the interchange. Nothing but conflict of the destructive type will result from a leader/follower interchange in which the follower accuses the leader of not knowing where he is going or of not informing his team of the goal. However, sometimes because of personality even non-accusative interchange between follower and leader is difficult. In this circumstance the follower will need to use considerable skill in human relations and communication, skills which will serve him well as both follower and leader.

Once goals have been established and developed as far as is possible the good follower will ensure that the procedures for achieving them are well-developed and well-known. Then he will seek to know and understand the people with whom he works and engage their interest and motivations in achieving the common task; and throughout all this he will be developing and refining both his knowledge of leadership and the crafts required to practise it.

Whether as follower or leader, as analyst or practitioner, a good practical way of viewing organizations is to look at first their structure,
both formal and informal, and then their process, both formal and informal. ‘Structure and process’ is an excellent practical platform for viewing organizations. True, it does not include much of what is essential to leadership. It does not consider explicitly the leader or the led; only in an obtuse way does it consider the environment; but it does provide an excellent view of that which often baffles analysis and practitioners, the task. In many large organizations the task is so complex, involves so many people, so many strata, so much diversity that understanding it seems an impossible task. So, first look for its formal structure; now for its informal structure. Why are they different? (They always will be.) Now look at its formal processes; now its informal ones. Why are they different? (They almost always will be.) Knowledge of an organization’s formal and informal structures and processes is of great practical importance to leaders.

The Training of Leaders — Can Leadership be taught?
The short answer to the question posed in the heading is ‘probably not’. Despite the enormous sums of money which private and public enterprises have expended on leadership training over the last 40 years there has yet to be developed an effective method of training leaders. Some training schemes, for example, sensitivity training and T-Group training, have enjoyed considerable vogue but evaluation of their effects leads to the general conclusion that little of the learning is transferable to the work-place. As a general statement Handy notes that:

‘So much of formal learning takes place in a “cultural island”, unrelated to the particular physical or psychological frames of reference of the individual. Much of that hard-earned learning is not shipped out from the cultural island to the world of work. Thus, evaluation studies have found high scores on content learning at the end of the programme but little evidence of any application.’

As a particular statement on sensitivity training Stogdill concludes that:

‘The few studies investigating the relationship of training to group performance suggest that follower satisfaction and group cohesiveness tend to increase while productivity tends to decrease, in response to sensitivity training of the leader.’

The key to the acquisition of leadership skills is to look at it from the other direction: leadership is not the result of training but of learning. The focus shifts from the organization and its attempts to implant leadership to the individual and his attempts to learn it. The role of the organization becomes that of facilitating the learning of leadership. Structures and processes which facilitate the effective interaction of leaders and followers are established and maintained (which requires effective leadership at the highest levels); leaders are given a task and held responsible for the results they achieve; effective leaders and the teams they lead are rewarded, ineffective leaders are replaced; leaders are given the resources to do the job and the authority which is commensurate with their responsibilities.

To assist learning and hence development, the organization should provide leaders at all levels with the theoretical framework against which the organization views leadership. The old adage that there is nothing quite so practical as good theory is a truism which contains real substance in the context of leadership. If leaders at all levels share a view of leadership this will facilitate both the acquisition of leadership skills and the development of that symbiotic leader/follower relationship which is so productive for all.

Leaders then are people who are always open to learning. They are people who are open-minded, receptive to ideas, and willing to change their thinking if better ideas are available; they are people who interact with and are willing to learn from others. Leaders are also good mentors. Working with their followers, they encourage them in their efforts to develop their own leadership skills. The best leaders are those who serve as both model and mentor to their followers.

The Selection of Leaders
An issue which is associated with the training of leaders is that of their selection. Traditionally organizations have relied heavily on trait theory for selecting leaders. However, more recently the emphasis has changed to selecting those who have had prior success as leaders, but even then the results may be less than expected. Research confirms the complex nature of
the leadership model with which we have been working. Leaders, followers, task and environment interact continuously and often unpredictably. Perhaps the most which can be said is that success is the best known predictor of future success and, to take it a little further, if the group, task and environment are similar, success in one such set of circumstances is probably transferable to another.

Leadership in the Military

If leadership in civilian organization is of the utmost importance, it is more so in the military. A failure of leadership in civilian enterprises may have drastic consequences. It may mean loss of jobs, loss of profits, even company failure, but such events pale in comparison with those associated in the ultimate with the failure of military leadership. It is small wonder that so much importance is attached in the military profession to leadership. Leadership is the subject of study, comment, writing and research, but despite this no common theory of leadership or set of practices has emerged.

Too much attention in the military has been concentrated on heroes, not enough on leaders. Too much has been made of military leadership in battle or in wartime, too little on leadership outside the battleplace or in peacetime. Who can name a famous military leader who did not achieve his fame in battle or in wartime? Too much has been made of leadership at the highest levels in trying to develop leadership. The thoughts and actions of Marlborough, Wellington, Wavell and Slim are often interesting and always important, but unless they are placed in an appropriate theoretical framework, they have little relevance to today's military workplace. The anecdotes and reflections of great military leaders require considerable interpretation to become germane for the junior officers and NCOs who occupy the great bulk of leadership positions in today's military. Too often are these people referred to the great men of military history and enjoined to be leaders rather than being shown and coached in how to be.

Some valuable attempts have been made to improve the situation in the military. Dr. John Adair, working at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst has used a similar theoretical framework to that used in this article to provide theoretical and practical guidance to the military on the subject. Although his commitment to formal leadership training has not been supported by research as reported by Stogdill and others his work has offered military forces an excellent starting point. It has been accepted by some. Admiral Sir Richard Clayton, Commander-in-Chief, Naval Home Command, is reported as having used Adair's approach to develop a doctrine of leadership and management which he hopes that the Royal Navy will endorse. However, the central point remains true; despite a great interest in and considerable writing on the topic of leadership, the military has yet to develop a common theoretical viewpoint from which to view leadership and a set of practices which support that theoretical viewpoint. While one can hope that one's own efforts will help to change this, all the probabilities are against it.

Conclusion

"If we know all too much about our leaders, we know far too little about leadership. We fail to grasp the essence of leadership that is relevant to the modern age and hence we cannot agree even on the standards by which to measure, recruit, and reject it. Is leadership simply innovation — cultural or political? Is it essentially inspiration? Mobilization of followers? Goal setting? Goal fulfillment? Is a leader the definer of values? Satisfier of needs? If leaders require followers, who leads whom from where to where, and why? How do leaders lead followers without being wholly led by followers? Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth."

The quotation is from James MacGregor Burns and forms part of his Prologue entitled 'The Crisis of Leadership'. The topic is important, its crisis affects us all. The aim of his article was to help to overcome this crisis by presenting in a relatively small package a soundly-based theoretical framework against which to view the topic and a set of practical precepts to help practitioners.

Early theoretical work concentrated on the personal characteristics of leaders but produced little of lasting significance. Although some characteristics have emerged as probably being necessary conditions for leadership success, no characteristic or set of characteristics has
emerged as being sufficient for success. The shift in emphasis from the leader to his style of leading proved to be equally unproductive even though it did acknowledge the importance of followers in the equations of leadership theory. Contingency theories further broadened the scope of study without ever seeming able to capture all the variables involved. Leadership models became more and more complex and less and less useful. All that can be usefully gleaned from the mainstream of leadership theory is that leadership is a complex social process of influence in which the leader, his follower, the task and the environment interact as the leader seeks to use his power resources to achieve intended results.

The work of Burns was used to go beyond this. His theoretical view is founded in the study of power and humanistic psychology. For Burns the leader is a particular kind of power holder who uses the power resources at his disposal to engage the aspirations of his followers and direct the whole enterprise towards achieving specific goals. Leadership is defined as a social process in which the motivations, values and goals of the leader interact with those of followers and in which the power resources of the leader are used to influence followers to achieve goals which have been set by the leader and which are relevant to his followers.

The practice of leadership is taken from its theory. Goal setting is important as a first step, and it is not just broad goals which must be set; sub-goals and sub-sub-goals must be derived in a hierarchy which allows everyone within the enterprise to know what is expected of him or her. The needs and values of followers are most important if they are to be motivated towards achieving the leader's ends. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is of significance here for, once the basic physiological, safety and social needs of followers have been met, they will seek to satisfy the higher needs of esteem and self-actualization. Burns, in fact, emphasizes mutual actualization rather than self-actualization as he seeks to put leaders and followers into a symbiotic relationship which satisfies profound human needs.

The leader/follower relationship is of great importance in the practice of leadership. Most leaders are required to be followers as well. This Janus-like position has elements of ambiguity and confusion to it but it also offers an excellent opportunity for developing leadership skills. If in the followership role one considers the total leadership/followership process from the theoretical standpoint presented in this article one can also see the way in which followers can assist leaders while enhancing their own knowledge of both the theory and practice of leadership. The conscious interaction of leaders and followers and the conscious engagement of the values and motivations of leaders and followers will allow each successive level of leaders to 'stand on the shoulders' of their followers while at the same time offering shoulders for their leaders to use.

Many obstacles will be placed in the path of leaders but the test of leadership is that of overcoming obstacles. Social processes generate conflict but leaders do not avoid conflict. They control it, mediate it, shape it and use it. Destructive conflict is removed; constructive conflict is used. In doing this and in exercising his other leadership skills the leader will be opposed, he will make enemies, he will not be universally liked or admired, but through it all he will maintain his direction, eschewing the pursuit of modal values such as consensus, harmony and admiration as ends in themselves as he heads for and leads his team to their end values of task performance and goal achievement.

Leaders must be given the tools with which to do their job. This probably means giving leaders at all levels a greater control over the task, the environment and the composition of the group than has traditionally been the case. It also means giving them sufficient time in which to establish structures, develop procedures and achieve goals. However, if he or she has been given this and has not produced the results, replacement of the leader should be considered. Provided failure has not been the result of factors over which the leader has had little or no control he or she should be moved to a position better suited to his or her particular array of talents and replaced by someone who might be better suited to the task, group and environment.

On the subject of the training of leaders little can be said other than that no proven method of training leaders has been developed. Leadership is a process of continuous learning in which good theory combined with a receptive mind offers the best chance for the develop-
ment of leadership skills. This is assisted greatly if the developing leader has the guidance and counsel of a mentor who, working from the same theoretical viewpoint, can steer and coach him or her.

The image of mentor and prospective leader is a good one with which to conclude this article. Leadership is above all else a human activity, and one can always find some author whose preconceptions and prejudices match one’s own.

The bibliography given is therefore not an attempt to catalogue all that is readily available on the subject of leadership nor is it even a catalogue of all the works the author consulted. Rather it is a catalogue of those works which the author found most useful and which he believes others will find most useful as references or as works to be studied further.

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A Note on Sources
The literature on leadership and associated subjects is seemingly endless. Although there is much of value in the literature there is even more that is merely repetitive or derivative. Sorting one’s way through the thicket of publications can be a difficult task. In the end the serious student will need to read a large number of original works. For those whose interests are more practical than studious there are some useful summaries. Stogdill’s ‘Handbook of Leadership’ has a comprehensive bibliography which documents almost all research works on leadership published to 1974. Burns is diligent in noting the sources of his material in ‘Leadership’. However, his presentation of sources as afternotes without either numbered notes or bibliography makes the task of reference more difficult. Good general texts on organization theory and organization behaviour such as Handy, Kast and Rosenzweig, Ivancevich, Szilagyi and Wallace, and Luthans all give excellent summaries of the material and references to the original documents from which it was obtained.

Although the author read many books by military men and many articles in military journals, little of direct benefit was gained. This was because the approach which has been used in this article of developing a sound theoretical framework upon which practice can be based runs counter to the military main-stream on the subject which is to offer practical advice and not be concerned with the development of theory. Unfortunately the result is that wide reading in military journals and books produces confusion rather than clarity and one can always find some author whose preconceptions and prejudices match one’s own.

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NOTES

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5. Russell, Bertrand. Power: A New Social Analysis. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1938. p. 10. Although written some years ago, Russell's book is an excellent treatise on the subject. To be privy to a great mind grappling with an important and complex subject is enlightening. The book is also pleasantly free of the sociological jargon so frequently used in more recent works, demonstrating that clarity in thought and expression accompany each other closely.
6. Ibid, p. 35.
13. Most appraisal schemes use what I term the 'Humpty Dumpty' approach in which the underlying assumption is that, by breaking Humpty and then describing the 12 or 26 or 38 varied and scattered pieces, one succeeds in describing the whole. Who indeed can put Humpty together again? This particularist fallacy is often compounded by assigning numerical values to the pieces.
14. Handy, op cit, p. 89.
17. Ibid, p. 413.
22. Stogdill, op cit, p. 418.
27. Ibid, p. 302.
31. Ibid, p. 49.
33. Burns, op cit, p. 113.
35. Burns, op cit, pp. 116-117.
36. Ibid.
37. The point about the need for followership was made strongly in Time Magazine in an issue devoted mainly to leadership. In a special section entitled 'In Quest of Leadership' the statement is made that '... the problem is not just a lack of leadership but a lack of followership.' Time, 15 July 1974, p. 30.
38. Burns, op cit, p. 443.
40. Stogdill, op cit, p. 419.
41. Ibid, p. 412.
42. Handy, op cit, p. 105.
43. Burns, op cit, pp. 35-41.
44. Handy, op cit, p. 109.
45. Burns, op cit, pp. 43-46, discusses the disruption often caused by conflict between modal values and end values. He believes that the leader's commitment must be to overriding general values and that the leader should not become entangled in the pursuit of a host of lesser values. His or her behaviour must be related '... to a set of reasoned, relatively explicit, conscious values'.
46. The idea of using 'structure and process' as a tool for the analysis of organizations or, more practically, for the establishment or refurbishment of organizations was imprinted in the author's brain during a graduate course at the Canberra College. This work was undertaken in 1978 with a veritable academic dynamo, Alex Kouzmin. It has proved most useful in a variety of circumstances.
47. Handy, op cit, p. 266.
48. Stogdill, op cit, pp. 412-413.
49. Ibid, p. 412.
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PICK YOUR SHIPS — CHOOSE YOUR WEAPONS. Watson, Phillip; Stothard, W. M. Navy International, April 82: 986-989. Armed forces are instruments of government policy and threat analysis must therefore start from a political assessment, identifying potential enemies and their possible hostile aspirations.


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ENERGY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR DEFENSE. Klick, Arnold F. National Defense, Nov 81: 33+(3p). Discusses the need for contingency planning against energy supply emergencies not only by the U.S. defence community, but also by industry in general.
Interest Groups And Australian Defence Decision-Making

By Dr. G. L. Cheeseman, Dept. of Defence.

The recent proposal by the Royal Australian Navy to purchase the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible has attracted much media speculation over the Navy's motives for such a decision. Faced with the facts that the Navy had earlier considered the Invincible to be unsuitable and that its change of mind followed rather closely the announcement by the Australian Labor Party that it would specifically exclude a sea-launched air capability from any future maritime defence posture, it was widely concluded that the Navy's decision stemmed more from a desire to retain an aircraft carrier than from any objective assessment of Australia's defence needs.

The idea that Australia's major defence equipments may be purchased to satisfy the ego-investments of the Services is at odds with the official view that major defence capabilities are chosen on the basis of how well they satisfy broad national objectives, that policy outcomes reflect the measured and professional judgments of uniformed and civilian officers and that the interests of the wider community are protected by bureaucratic and parliamentary oversight of the defence policy-formulation machinery. The case of the aircraft carrier may also cast doubt on the assertion that the defence decision-making process is dominated by civilians. Which of these views prevails?

Certainly the belief that public policies reflect the interests of the whole community is an ideal that is not easy to sustain in our modern, industrialised society. In order to influence public policies, groups must know how, where and when policies are made, they must be able to gain access to key politicians and public officials, they must have the economic and personal resources to prepare detailed and often highly complex submissions and they must be able to mobilise community or political support for their proposals. These requirements are beyond the grasp of the ordinary citizen or backbench politician. As a result, public policies are increasingly reflecting the exclusive requirements of large corporations, producer organisations and unions.

The idea that public policy-making can be a fully rational process is also open to doubt. The rational model assumes the existence of a neutral government which aggregates a multiplicity of external demands into a universally acceptable statement of intent or policy. In recent years, as societies have become more complex and the state more involved in all aspects of private life, the earlier notion of governments as neutral, unitary decision-makers has begun to be questioned. Governments are now seen to compromise multiple competing power centres which are motivated by different norms and perceptions based on not-so-neutral assessments of the national interest.

An important part of this change is the realisation that the bureaucracy plays an effective, and increasingly autonomous role in formulating public policy. By virtue of their specialised expertise and their location within the policy-making process itself, government departments or organisational interests within departments are able to use their knowledge and skills to powerfully influence the shape of official decisions. Public policy then reflects not only a system of external group pressures but an array of institutional interest group pressures as well.

The existence of interest groups within government institutions has important consequences for the analysis of how public policy is formulated. Students can no longer assume that policies emerge simply as a national choice.

Dr. Graham Cheeseman has contributed to the journal on previous occasions.

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between rational alternatives. Policy-making must now be viewed in terms of the nature of the decision-making process, the various organisations that are involved in the process and the key individual and interests who inhabit these organisations.\(^6\) Nowhere is this more apparent than in Defence where a complex mixture of government and non-government organisations and actors are involved in pursuing the deceptively simple policy objective of ensuring national security.\(^7\)

This article uses an interest group perspective to examine defence policy-making in Australia. It begins by considering the formal policy process and its actors and then looks at the roles and influence of those interest groups that lie outside the government and the bureaucracy. It is argued that unlike the United States, outside interest groups in Australia have very little direct influence on defence policy. This is due partly to the closed nature of the policy process but also to the existence within the Department of Defence of very strong institutional interest groups who are motivated by different objectives and role perceptions and who compete for power on the basis of their organisational resources and ability to mobilise support among other groups. Of these institutional interest groups, the Services presently enjoy most influence by virtue of their expertise, their strategic location within the policy process, their ability to exploit changes in Australia's defence environment and the failure of their civilian competitors to fully utilise the policy control mechanisms that are contained within the decision-making process.

**External Constraints on Defence Policy**

The last decade has been marked by significant changes in Australia's environment which have had a major impact on our defence planning. The shift in the global balance of power and the failure of the United States in Vietnam have led the US to reformulate its foreign policy such that Australia is no longer guaranteed US military support under ANZUS particularly under circumstances of regional conflict. Over the same period, there has been a continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and capabilities as well as unprecedented developments in conventional military technologies which have revolutionised military weapons, tactics and doctrine.\(^8\) The broad strategic changes that have taken place mean that Australia must adopt a more independent and self-reliant defence posture which moves away from the earlier notion of forward defence towards the defence of the Australian mainland and its immediate interests. While the need for a new defence posture is clear, it is not obvious how such an objective should be achieved. A number of commentators for example have argued that the existing structures of the armed forces should be changed.\(^9\) Some have pointed to the weaknesses in Australia's industrial infrastructure\(^10\) while others believe that we should simply increase current defence spending and capabilities.\(^11\)

The 1970s then have witnessed an increasing level of debate on defence in Australia which has been marked by an absence of clear solutions on the one hand and zealous advocacy of often incompatible alternatives on the other. The recent emergence of defence as an issue is reflected in the increasing interest that is being shown in the subject by the media, political parties and the public at large.\(^12\) As we shall see, the uncertainty associated with how best to structure our defence forces has important consequences for the defence decision-making process as well. The new capabilities that are required to satisfy self-reliance together with the obfuscation of traditional Service roles caused by changes in technology, provides each Service with an opportunity to expand its area of responsibility at the expense of the others.\(^13\) The climate of uncertainty has also weakened the Defence policy control mechanism by reducing the ability of Defence Central to measure competing Service demands against broadly accepted defence objectives. Under these circumstances, the defence decision-making machinery becomes a framework for increased bureaucratic politics where opposing interests compete for resources on the basis of their organisational power rather than the cogency of their arguments.

**The Defence Policy-Making Framework and Institutional Interest Groups**

The need for greater independence and self-reliance in defence has been recognised by the Government\(^14\) and is reflected most clearly in the recent reorganisation combined under a single department the whole of the activities of the previous Departments of Navy, Army,
Air and Defence as well as some of the research and production activities of the old Department of Supply. The new Department reflects Australia's changing circumstances in at least four important respects. The first is that the Department is organised along functional lines where different organisational groupings are responsible for specific segments of the overall policy domain. For the purposes of this article, the important groupings within Defence are the Strategic and International Policy Division which is responsible for developing strategic assessments and for providing strategic guidance for the development and Analysis Division which provides guidance on force structure and Defence Force capabilities; The Programmes and Budgets Division which co-ordinates the Departments Five Year Defence Programme and its annual budgetary appropriations; the Defence Industry and Material Policy Division which is responsible for policies relating to the involvement of Australian industry in Defence; the Defence Science and Technology Organisation which provides scientific and technical advice and maintains a technology base to support the Defence Department and Defence industry; the individual Services and a number of intelligence organisations which provide specialist advice on intelligence and security aspects of Defence policy. A second, related feature is the integration of servicemen and civilians through the provision of joint establishments, military 'cells' within predominantly civilian organisations and a system of "two-hatted" appointments where individuals are given executive responsibilities over both civilian and service branches.

Despite these measures, it is significant that the number of servicemen located within civilian organisations and the number of civilians working in the various Service offices remains small. Rather than bringing to "bear on defence objectives the best balance of professional and administrative judgment" therefore, the reorganisation has simply imposed a predominantly civilian superstructure onto the existing single Service Departments. In so doing, it has done little to disrupt the established patterns of role socialisation and information processing that are practised by the Services. More importantly, it has also served to institutionalise intra-departmental interests.

As the organisational groups within Defence have particular responsibilities and are concerned with achieving specific policy objectives, they can be considered as institutional interest groups who can be expected to view the overall national interest in terms of their own specific organisational interests and capabilities. The Services are particularly important in this respect because of their highly specialised corporate structures, distinctive traditions and varied combat experiences. Each has a clear notion of what the fundamental role of its organisation is and its leaders will only accept policy — or budgetary — changes which do not threaten the organisation's "essence" or undermine its morale.

The potential importance of the existence of institutional interest groups within Defence becomes clear when we consider the third feature of the departmental reorganisation: the Defence Committee System. In all, there are well over 100 committees involved in Defence policy-making. These include Cabinet committees, inter-departmental committees, senior Defence committees, various single Service and Defence Central committees and a number of statutory and advisory committees and councils. The majority of committees are made up of members of the various internal interest groups just described. Almost all the important policy decisions that are made in Defence are made or recommended by committees.

The final important feature of the reorganised department is the use of a Planning — Programming — Budgeting System (PPBS) for resource planning and budgeting. Introduced in 1976, the program broadly involves establishing a set of defence objectives and desired capabilities from available strategic guidance; programming, over a rolling five year period, those force structures and major equipments that are required to satisfy these objectives and finally seeking funds in the annual budget for the first year of the Five Year Defence Program (FYDP).

The FYDP then establishes in quantitative terms a statement of defence requirements over the ensuing five years. Its primary advantage is that it integrates strategic planning and defence budgeting such that annual budgets flow from decisions about strategy and military needs rather than the other way around. The use of PPBS also provides the administration with a mechanism with which it can manage...
and shape the substance of defence policy. The effective use of PPBS as an instrument of policy control however is largely dependent on the existence of well defined and broadly accepted defence objectives. As we have noted, one consequence of Australia’s altered strategic environment has been the increased uncertainty over how Australia’s defence should be structured with the result that defence objectives are now couched in such general terms that they can be used to justify almost any new military capability or major equipment item.

A second characteristic of the Department’s resource planning and programming system is that it is extraordinarily complex. In line with the PPBS philosophy, the acquisition of any major equipment item involves first the selection of a generic type of equipment for inclusion in the FYDP, followed by the selection and procurement of a specific item of hardware. Each stage can involve consideration, and often re-consideration, by a number of committees over periods of five years or more. Such a complicated and involved process not only contributes to the long lead times associated with major equipment procurement, but it also provides considerable scope for opposing interests to overturn or re-negotiate earlier decisions.

An analysis of the defence decision-making process, at least with respect to the formulation of strategic guidance and the selection and procurement of major equipment items, shows that the formal process is centralised in Canberra, occurs within a climate of excessive secrecy and is essentially closed to direct participation by groups that lie outside government and bureaucracy. The Defence Department itself comprises a number of institutional interest groups who are concerned with specific areas of policy and who play an integral part in the policy-making. The major groups are the intelligence community, the Strategic and International Policy Division, the Defence Industry and Material Policy Division, the Force Development and Analysis Division, the Programs and Budgets Division, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and the three Service Offices. The decision-making process itself is highly complex and makes extensive use of committees that are made up of representatives of the various interest groups just described. While designed as a rational model of decision-making which allows for the participation of different interests, the committee system actually provides an ideal arena for bureaucratic politics in which opposing groups attempt to mobilise support for their programs and seek to transform their recommendations into policy by utilising the various channels of influence that are open to them.

OUTSIDE INTEREST GROUPS

The expectation that only institutional interest groups play a primary role in decision-making can be tested by examining the roles and actions of the major actors and interest groups that lie outside the formal defence establishment.

These outside bodies can be usefully divided into sectional and promotional interest groups. Sectional interest groups have a relatively narrowly defined membership, they seek to advance specific interests and they tend to direct their efforts more at the different organs of government than at the public at large. Promotional groups have a broader based membership, are generally concerned with a wider range of issues and seek to establish climates of interest which are beneficial to their clientele rather than engage in direct lobbying of the defence establishment.

The most obvious sectional interests are the various defence industries and industry groups but they also include the Returned Servicemen’s League, the defence group of unions and staff associations and a number of smaller organisations like the Defence Welfare Association and the Vietnam Veterans Association. Promotional groups include the media, academia and a number of professional associations like the United Services Institutes, the Australian Defence Association, the Navy League, the Australian Naval Institute and the Air Force Association. These last three examples are also interesting in that they are composed almost exclusively of members of institutional interest groups which operate inside Defence.

There seems to be reasonable agreement among Defence officials and academics that both academic institutions and the media have little direct influence on overall defence policy formulation. This lack of influence is primarily due to the closed nature of the defence decision-making process and the relatively small number of academics and journalists who specialise in defence studies. It is probably reasonable to assume however that both the
media and academics perform an increasingly important indirect role by raising defence-related issues, by providing insights into how Defence operates and by publishing detailed technical information on military weapons and equipment.

The direct influence of the various ex-service and professional associations is also seen to be limited. Apart from the RSL, which enjoys some formal status in the eyes of the Repatriation Department (now Veterans Affairs) in particular, none of the associations are directly involved in the defence decision-making process. Most groups tend more to fulfil a social and professional role by providing a forum for members to meet and discuss their views. To this end, most groups conduct regular meetings, publish a journal or magazine and occasionally sponsor a conference or seminar. Most groups do not actively lobby on defence matters, the notable exception being the recently-formed, Australia Defence Association which seeks to achieve its objectives by mobilising public support through a public education program and using this support to lobby individual politicians and ministers.

Organisations such as the Navy League and the United Services Institutes however can be expected to have some indirect influence over defence policy as a result of their close relationship with various institutional interest groups. The single and combined Service associations in particular are important because they serve as a further vehicle for reinforcing the unique traditions and role perceptions that characterise each Service and so help to sustain within the Defence community itself a climate of opinion which preserves the interests of their respective client groups.

While defence industry in Australia does not enjoy the same relationship with the Defence Department that it does in the US, it nonetheless plays a fairly significant, and increasing, role in defence procurement. The Australian defence industry lobby can be divided into two groups: those Australian companies with local manufacturing and support capabilities, and the representatives of overseas equipment suppliers. The overseas companies tend to supply the high-cost, high-technology equipments that are beyond the capacity of Australian firms to produce, while local industry is generally more interested in the replacement, repair and support of major equipment items used by the Australian Defence Force. Overseas suppliers require the support of local companies in order to satisfy the government’s policy on Australian Industry Participation (AIP) which requires that a minimum of 30 percent local content be provided in all major equipment contracts. While defence expenditure on local industry is small compared with the total manufacturing turnover in Australia, Defence orders can have a major impact on specific areas like munitions, aircraft, naval shipbuilding and electronics.

The differences in the respective capabilities and perceived roles of local and overseas industry groups are generally reflected in the way they attempt to influence defence policy. Local industry uses a network of channels to attempt to maintain a position of favoured status in the defence industrial policy framework whereas overseas companies tend to rely on the glamour, and vote catching appeal, of the products they are offering.

Industry concerns are conveyed to the government in a number of ways. The major formal means of communications is through the Defence Industry Committee (DIC) which is a joint industry — Department of Defence committee tasked with advising Defence on the capacity of Australia’s defence and providing guidelines on how industry would support the Defence Forces during an emergency. The Committee is currently headed by the Chairman of Directors of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation and it contains a number of other industry representatives. While the DIC performs an essentially advisory role, it has been the source of a number of government policy initiatives, most notably the offsets program which was initiated in 1970 by former DIC chairman and head of BHP, Sir Ian McLennan. The offsets policy requires overseas contractors to provide work for Australian industry to the value of up to 30 percent of the value of the contract. It is overseen by a second advisory body, the Industrial Committee for the Development of Offset on Overseas Procurement (ICDOOP) which was also established in 1970.

While the DIC continues to press for greater involvement of industry in the defence procurement system, its arguments remain reasonably muted because both the DIC and the ICDOOP are dominated by firms which enjoy
the benefits of existing Defence contracts. As Anne Summers has argued:—

"The government does not seek the advice of people who are not in business of either selling to defence or of administering the procurement programs. The voices of independent advisors, particularly economists, might well add a discordant note to what is a well orchestrated regulation of conflict."  

The dominance of the formal channels of influence by firms that have a major stake in defence procurement, may be partly responsible for the recent formation of a number of defence industry lobby groups. These include the Defence Manufacturers Association of Australia (DMFAA) which was formed under the aegis of the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturing, represents an increasing cross-section of Australian industry and has recently established an office in Canberra. The objectives of the DMFAA are to encourage greater participation by Australian manufacturers in the manufacturing, supply, modification and maintenance of defence material and to seek to be consulted at an early stage in all defence requirements plans. Other defence industry groups include the Association of Defence Contractors, which is based in South Australia, the Defence Manufacturers Council of the Metal Industries Association, which is particularly concerned with representing business interests in New South Wales, and the United States — Australia Industry Development Association which was established in 1978 to assist Australian firms develop defence markets in the United States. The general approach of these associations is to make submissions to various official committees of enquiry, to serve as intermediaries between their members and the different departments involved in Defence procurement and to sponsor conferences and seminars involving members from both industry and Defence.

The lobbying of individual politicians and bureaucrats, which is arguably the most important lobbying activity of defence industry, usually takes place on an individual industry basis and involves a wide range of activities including telephone and personal contacts, correspondence, presentations and luncheons. The contact is usually with politicians and senior bureaucrats although much of the exchange of detailed information occurs at working level meetings between industry representatives and either DIMP or Service project officers. The network of contacts is generally encouraged by Defence and is used by industry to display its wares, to remain informed of the latest defence initiatives and, in the last resort, to lobby against unfavourable procurement decisions. Its importance is reflected in the increasing number of firms that are opening offices in Canberra or hiring Canberra — based professional lobbyists. Overseas equipment suppliers in particular seek to establish personal contacts with the Defence establishment by employing retired Service officers and public servants.

This array of contacts and pressures enables defence industry to exert some influence over certain areas of policy in particular those concerned with Australian Industry Participation. The strength of industry influence in this area is reflected by the fact that AIP represents a highly visible political component of the defence policy process, that there exists within Defence an institutional interest group specifically charged with AIP oversight and that each Service generally recognises that projects containing high levels of Australian content stand a better chance of being approved. With respect to other areas of policy, the general consensus within Defence is that industry has very little impact. The Australian industry's approach is seen to lack cohesion and is constrained by both the limited defence market and the system of open tendering. As a rule, questions of technical merit and risk (provided AIP levels are not at issue) are seen to be more important than political influence in the choice of preferred equipments. There is a general preference within the Services in particular for equipments that are manufactured overseas, and in times of financial stringency, the Services will often have equipment items designed or developed within Defence-owned establishments. Nonetheless, industry does provide an important source of technical information and its ability to exert political influence over defence decisions may be expected to increase in view of the trend towards the Defence Department acquiring more complex and expensive systems which require increased involvement of Cabinet and its sub-committees in the decision-making process.
CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing we can see that an understanding of defence policy-making involves two different, but complementary, cognitive maps: one which describes the mechanics of the decision-making process and one which deals with the distribution of power. The first map is a description of the policy-making process. It sets out the procedures to be followed in developing policy, details who are involved, shows where decisions are made and provides a basis for determining the distribution of power by defining organisational boundaries, formal access points and the division of responsibilities. Such a picture however provides only a static view of defence policy-making and does not account for the competition between sub-cultures within organisations or the relationships between competing groups and how these relationships alter with changing circumstances.

In order to address these factors, a centripetal 'power map' can be conceptualised in which the various interest groups are arranged about a central decision-making arena comprising the higher-level Defence Committees. The inner shell of the 'power map' is occupied by the various institutional interest groups (or sub-groups) which operate within the Department of Defence. Aligned behind these groups are the technical institutions and various sectional interest groups such as the single service professional associations and aircraft or maritime industries. Beyond these are the broader-based sectional and promotional groups and finally the public. The location of the sectional and promotional groups within the 'power map' can vary with respect to the location of institutional interest groups as circumstances, issues and leaders change. The potential degree of influence that is open to a particular group is dependent on its proximity to the centre of power (direct involvement in the policy-process), the number of groups that are aligned with it (ability to mobilise support and utilise available channels of access) and the linkages which exist between groups within the same shells (bargaining, alliances, agreements and coalitions).

Using these two models, it can be argued that under present circumstances, the Services have the greatest influence over defence policy. The services control the equipment and capability entries into the policy process and they are represented on all higher Defence committees. Within the committee system itself the military usually acts in collusion where each Service declines to question or oppose other Service proposals unless external circumstances have undermined the accepted division of responsibilities between Services or a Service perceives that its fundamental role is under threat. The Services also generally ensure the support of DIMP Division by providing for AIP within projects and they often tailor requirements to meet known budgetary constraints. The Services are supported by a number of professional associations and industries who share common interests and finally they operate within an overall climate of opinion which favours current Service roles and force structures. In direct contrast, while the various civilian institutional interests may have some influence over certain areas of policy, their overall influence is limited by their inability to mobilise wide support, their suspicion of each others roles, their lack of expertise, their failure to fully exploit the policy control mechanisms that exist within the decision-making process and the entrenched bureaucratic and ideological positions of their opponents.

A clear illustration of how the Services can use their potential power to influence defence policy is provided by the Navy's continuing campaign to retain an aircraft carrier capability. The change from forward defence to increased self-reliance highlighted the crucial role of maritime defence in Australia's revised defence outlook. In the early 1970s, both the Navy and Air Force had forces-in-being which could provide such a capability. The Air Force had its F-111s and a proposed tactical fighter force replacement whereas the Navy's capability was based on its literal and ideological flagship, the HMAS Melbourne.

Aware of the likely prohibitive cost of providing both capabilities, Defence Central conducted a detailed Naval Air Power and Tactical Air Warfare Study (NAPTAWS) which concluded in 1975 that carrier-based air power was less cost-effective than land-based air-power. While the study was based on a scenario approach, which has since lost favour as a valid method of developing force structures, its specific conclusions are still favoured within Defence Central. The Navy, perceiving the threat to its fundamental role as
a "bluewater" navy, embarked on a campaign to lock the government into committing itself to replacing the Melbourne. The campaign was marked by the effective use of available resources and skillful manipulation of political opportunities as they arose. It culminated in the government's decision in 1980 to replace the Melbourne with one of two contenders. Some of the notable features of the campaign was Navy's ability to present the government with a ready list of capital equipment which would satisfy the altered strategic requirements of the 1980s and beyond. It was also able to adapt the carriers perceived roles to suit changing political and bureaucratic requirements.

Keeping in mind the recent developments in Australia's foreign policy, for example, the Navy has argued that "the possession of seaborne air adds significantly to our ability to support foreign policy by providing a naval presence". It also convinced the government that a relatively low-priced, light aircraft carrier is required which could deploy both helicopters and short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) fixed wing aircraft. Such a capability would complement rather than directly compete with the likely replacement for the RAAF's Mirage fighter aircraft. It could also be deployed from ground stations in northern Australia and could be used to provide close air support for ground forces (a role which is not actively pursued by the Air Force).

Over the period of the debate, the proponents of a carrier-based maritime air capability have used the existing network of defence association journals and conferences to forcefully argue their case. This propaganda exercise has been augmented by official Navy representations to various committees, by extensive advertising by ship-building and maritime industries and by personal lobbying such as inviting politicians and senior bureaucrats to sail on the Melbourne during exercises. The Navy's case has also been aided by some favourable organisational changes and appointments. The most significant of these was the appointment in April 1979 of Admiral Synott, who is in favour of retaining a carrier-based capability, as Chief of the Defence Force Staff. A second important change was the establishment in May 1979 of a Defence Directorate of Public Information which was initially headed by another proponent of the carrier. But the Navy's time may have run out. As might be expected from our conceptual model of the policy-making process, the ability of an individual service to always get its way can never be assured. With time and changing circumstances, the original arguments for a proposal can become outdated or unacceptable, bureaucratic alliances can falter and opposing forces can gain strength. All these factors have been in operation in the aircraft carrier debate. At the time of writing, while the acquisition of an aircraft carrier still seems likely, the Navy's case has been made more difficult by the continuing economic problems faced by Australia on the one hand and the erosion of community support for a carrier on the other. The carrier debate, which had previously taken place primarily within the Defence community, has now widened to include the general media which is almost universally opposed to such an acquisition. The debate has also begun to assume a political dimension with the Australian Labor Party's rejection of the need for an aircraft carrier at this time. Government backbenches too have begun to express concern about the electoral consequences of such a major item of expenditure occurring in a period of reduced government spending. Finally the other two Services are becoming increasingly concerned that the committal of funds on the carrier could threaten their own equipment programs and objectives. It remains to be seen whether the Navy can overcome these obstacles and maintain its past record of skillful bureaucratic and political manipulation.

NOTES
INTEREST GROUPS AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DECISION MAKING


21. At present, the only committees which have members other than politicians and public servants include Committee of Reference for Defence Force Pay, Defence Industry Committee, Australian Defence Force Academy Development Council, Technical Works Committee, Australian Services Council for Canteens, ASCO Board of Management, Services Committees Trust Fund, Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority, Committee for Employer Support of Reserve Forces (CESRF) & JSSC Advisory Council. Of these only the Defence Industry Council has any real access to strategic guidance and procurement policy formulation.


25. See T. P. Muggleton, An Evaluation of the Analytical Infrastructure for Force Decision-Making in Australian Defence: A Budgetary Perspective, Department of Economics, faculty of Military Studies, University of NSW, 1976, p. 36. The policy-control mechanism is further weakened by the fact that, unlike the US case where the executive lays down force capability objectives, the Services are directly involved in formulating (and vetoing) Australian force capability guidance.


27. Report of Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Defence Procurement, November 1979, p. 103.


29. This scheme has been proposed by Desmond Ball in The Politics of Australian Defence Decision-Making, p. 17 although he does not apply it to business interests.

30. The regular membership of the Australian Naval Institute for example, whose objective is to encourage and promote the understanding of the Navy and the maritime profession, is open only to members of the naval forces of Australia although members of other Services and others "having an interest in maritime affairs" are eligible for lower categories of membership.


33. To help achieve this aim, the Victorian Branch of the ADA publishes a member's manual which includes guidelines on how to conduct meetings, a study program, an action program, information on who and how to lobby, a professional education program and how to raise resources. See Australian Defence Association, Members Manual, 8 May 1980.


43. Ibid, p. 7.
48. The Defence Industry and Material Policy Division Drafts the AIP provisions of each tender and evaluation AIP aspects of tender responses. It is represented on a number of higher-level Defence committees, DIMP maintains offices in each state, issues development contracts to Australian companies and has some say over who should receive open tenders. The Division also sponsors a Dept. of Defence Directory of Australian Defence Oriented Industry which lists a representative range of Australian firms who supply, or have the potential to supply, the Dept. with Australian made goods. The directory is made available to other government departments, selected foreign governments or overseas companies seeking to place AIP in Australia.
50. A recent example of direct -political influence in the defence decision-making process was the tendering of the Defence Integrated Secure Communications Network (DISCON) project after extensive lobbying by one of the unsuccessful tenders.
54. Tri-Service Submission to the Katter Committee, Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1980, p. 54.

AWARD: ISSUE NO 34 (MAY/JUNE, 1982)
The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the May/June issue (No 34) of the Defence Force Journal to J.P. Buckley, OBE, for his article Great Soldier — Great Christian.
The sound of the side drum echoed through the narrow cobbled streets of the village. The sergeant, dressed in a brilliant scarlet tunic halted, filled his lungs with a mighty intake of air an bellowed:

"Who will accept the King’s shilling and serve His Majesty? Come on lads, a shilling for rum and new lands to see."

The poor, the hungry, the no-hopers and the drunkards, all flocked to the banner and marched away to fight upon some seventeenth century battlefield.

Now it’s 1915, and a young officer stands upon a dais in London. The band plays a patriotic tune and the banners proclaim “Just returned from the front — hear his brave story.” The young officer recounts to a hushed audience how they are punishing the Hun in France, but the lads need help over there so they can finish the job so, step forward come and lend a hand.

Reminders of the call to arms are to be seen throughout the country as a stern, bearded senior officer points an accusing finger and proclaims “Your Country Needs You.”

1940 and the posters appear again, the bands play on the dais and the young officers recount their experiences while the politicians thunder about King, Country, the cowardly Hun, our women and children and the protection of home. The volunteers rush forward, many to escape the depression and its soup kitchens, many for the promised five shillings a week and some, bored with their existence chase the “Great Adventure”.

Recruiting in time of war, or an emergency, is an easier task than that faced in peace. Between the wars there is no patriotic fever to grip the young men, no exotic battlefields to sail, or fly, off to you and your mates aren’t joining up and going away, so why care? The values, the decisions reached are weighed far more carefully in time of peace, as the potential recruit takes a long, hard look before committing himself to an Army career.

The problem of recruiting suitable young men into The Army Reserve is even more complicated because of the many distractions offered today such as discos, girl friends, the go anywhere freedom of the off-road vehicle, overseas trips and a good take home pay.

In the past Western Australia, like most other States, went along with the old tried and tested format of unit recruiting because there was no alternative.

Unit members were asked to “join-up-a-mate” and once a year an “open day” was held at their barracks to parade the men and display their equipment.

Unfortunately most of the people attending were relatives, or friends, who had no intention of joining the Citizen Military Forces.

Lack of funds for publicity and the difficulty in locating the display area, within an unfamiliar Army establishment, ensured a lack of support from the general public and in particular the recruiting target market.
Troops and friends had a great day, but the true aim of the exercise was not achieved, that of recruiting a large number of young men. Units continued to do their own thing and unit strengths flowed up and down upon the individual efforts of unit members, level of activity and motivation of its officers and N.C.O’s.

It was time for a change.

In 1965 the writer, was attached to the United States Army Pacific (USAPAC) in Hawaii and studied their public relations organisation concentrating mainly on internal and external PR as it effected the soldier.

**INTERNAL:** Here the soldier is motivated by a multi-mix of print and electronic media, to feel pride in his country, his uniform and the job he was doing.

He was constantly reminded that he was doing a job which was of national importance, a job that he had been selected to do.

**EXTERNAL:** This was aimed at the American public and highlighted the readiness of The Army to come to the aid of the civilian population, NOT only in time of war, or an emergency, but during the normal course of a year with community assistance programmes.

It was during this period that I noted how the regular Army co-operated with the Reserve (National Guard) to take advantage of private enterprise to boost Guard recruiting.

For example during the period of one week elements, representing all sectors of the Army, went on display at the Ala Moana Shopping Centre in downtown Honolulu. Both regular and reserve soldiers manned equipment that ranged from heavy tanks to missiles and answered questions put to them by interested shoppers.

The shopping centre expended funds on local television, radio and press to promote the massive display and invited the public to come and see their Army.

To coincide with the display the National Guard called on all their men and did a road verge clean-up of the Nimitz Highway, trucking tons of refuse away for disposal.

This was widely reported by all local media and highlighted the efforts of the National Guard.

Some people may maintain that the Army shouldn’t appear to be garbage men.

They miss two main points.

1. It does promote self pride in the soldier as he gains recognition from the general public.

2. The public applaud something which is being done by the Army, whereas they normally associate them with taxpayers’ costs in relation to equipment and training.

   However the report the writer submitted on his return was carefully lost and time past until the mid seventies and the introduction of the Functional Command.

   Colonel Robert D. Mercer was appointed Assistant Commander 5th Military District and as such became the senior Army Reserve Officer in Western Australia.

   He appointed Major Clem Richards, another Reserve soldier, as his recruiting officer with the task of establishing a new and aggressive unit within the Army Reserve Recruiting Liaison Staff (ARRLS) structure. The unit was to recruit and process eligible young men and women into Reserve units at a higher level than in the past.

   Apart from the National advertising and limited special-to-unit funds, there was no money available for the task. Brought back into the Army reserve as Public Relations Officer I was directed to give ARRLS and recruiting every assistance.

   My experience gained while with the Americans combined with the knowledge of the local shopping centre scene, plus the tireless enthusiasm of Major Richards, all helped to put together a new format for recruiting.

   The Perth metropolitan area was divided into zones and within each zone the largest shopping centre was targeted for a display.

   The dates selected for each display coincided with a recruit camp to be held within weeks of the activity and large country centres were also included in the plan.

   After an initial phone contact with the Centre Managers Major Richards, myself and the regular Warrant Officer from ARRLS visited the centre.

   This visit would sell the whole idea of a display to Centre Management and detail units and their involvement.

   It was confirmed that there would be no charge to the centre for a Thursday to Saturday continuous display. However, we did expect the centre to support us with advertising to a level of some $3000.

   This was to consist of full pages in the local supplements of the West Australian, using photos supplied by Army Public Relations and one, or two, radio stations. Country centres
were scaled down to approximately $1000. A second visit to the centre was made to determine where unit displays could be placed in the mallways and the area of car park to be roped off for the action displays.

These were motor transport ambush drills, employing troops in a section attack on an enemy position with reinforcements being rappelled in by RAAF helicopter. Using smoke cannisters and blank ammunition, the action displays were to be carried out on the Saturday morning in the secured area.

Inside the centre as well as static displays there was to be demonstrations of unarmed combat, combat ration cooking and sampling of special dishes prepared on the spot by the Catering Wing.

A conference was then called, prior to the display, at the centre one evening. This was attended by all unit recruiting officers, who were briefed and then conducted around the centre having their areas pointed out, plus other relevant features identified eg. power sources, rest rooms, loading bays etc.

Previously a written instruction had been distributed to all participating units detailing dress requirements, security, hours of attendance, set-up and breakdown procedures, sequence of events etc.

The centre manager was also provided with a programme with a rundown on units. This would form the basis of his advertising which would be prepared by his advertising agent. Final artwork and scripts were required to be submitted to Army Reserve PR for checking and approval.

A final co-ordinating conference would then be held one week prior to the display to ensure everything was ready, as planned, for a professional presentation to the public.

The full display was then set up, by units, on the Wednesday night prior to the opening on Thursday. This was achieved by arrangement with the Centre Manager who opened and secured the centre after hours while the displays were being prepared.

The directing staff checked the displays during the night.

In the main Australian Regular Army staff manned the displays during the day on the Thursday and Saturday with Reserve personnel taking over on the Thursday night and Saturday morning.

The method of recruitment was simple. If a person of suitable age and appearance showed interest in a display, they were approached and engaged in conversation by one of the attendants. After qualifying the person as interested in joining The Reserve, the staff member conducted them to the ARRL's recruiting centre, set up in the Mall, where they were introduced to a counsellor. Normal procedures then applied culminating on a medical and psychological test and interview. If successful the applicant was then assigned to the next recruit camp.

Results were dramatic and applications were into the eighties at each shopping centre.

Awareness of The Army Reserve also increased through the centre's advertising, Army PR efforts with media during the activity and word of mouth by thousands of shoppers who saw and enjoyed the display.

The advantage to the shopping centre was that it brought new shoppers to them from outside their normal catchment area and therefore increased centre traffic.

This in turn increased sales through retail outlets and made the merchants happy. Consequently centres of all sizes began requesting a display. However, the original aims and requirements of Recruiting were maintained:

1. To select centres in the areas we knew contained young people of enlistment age.
2. Select centres that were totally enclosed and airconditioned, which made them independent of the weather.
3. Selection of a centre with a merchants' association advertising budget that could afford to effectively promote the display.
4. Select a centre that had wide malls and room to accommodate the total display.
5. Selected centres were not revisited under two years.

Obviously the last point was established to prevent a situation whereby frequent visits to the same centre would negate the result as we culled over the same young people. We found that this worked and 15 year olds who saw our display, took positive steps to join when we returned two years later.

An important key to success is imagination in forming a display.

As an example, the artillery placed a 105 mm gun in a sandbagged position with an overhead
cam net. Using a dummy round, orders were given and the drill carried out. This was repeated every 15 to 30 minutes during heavy shopping traffic times. To the rear of the gun emplacement were display boards featuring large photographic blow-ups of various aspects of their training, including Royal Salutes.

The photos, taken by Army Public Relations, were correctly mounted, bordered and then attached to the stands. Consequently, more interest was shown in this display than many others. Advice on how to correctly present a display and maintain it was given at an annual seminar for unit Recruiting Officers conducted by Major Richards. The programme for the forthcoming year was also detailed and Guest Speakers and film highlighted new approaches to councilling and selling. The workshop also outlined material available to units, supplied the machinery for units to cut from letters to a standard shape and size and generally assisted to prepare professional and uniform displays.

At a later stage an additional seminar was held annually to maintain and refurbish existing display material.

The results of Reserve recruiting in Western Australia have proved to be excellent.

The main advantage of using shopping centres are:

1. The guaranteed availability of large numbers of people to view your display.
2. The financial support of the centre, which makes recruiting independent of Government monetary fluctuations.
3. A controlled climate.
4. The large number of centres available for selection.
5. Local advertising that sells the reserve locally.

A constant effort should be made to add to displays, in order to maintain interest, especially during the second or third visits to centres. Here are a few that could be used:

1. Free fall into a secure car park by Army parachutists using either service or civilian air. If civilian, the Centre pays for the aircraft.
2. An endurance march where units submit teams, who on the Saturday morning, attempt a forced march from a point 20 kms away to conclude, before 12 noon, at the centre where the display is being held. Participating troops wear webbing, field pack and carry weapons.

The winning team (judged on time) is presented with a trophy by the shopping centre.

3. Roping down from a high point at the centre.
4. A drill team displaying in the main mall, or car park.
5. Armoured personnel carrier driving display. This can be carried out where a suitable section of land is available adjacent to the centre.

Times have indeed changed and with them must change the methods by which we recruit young men and women into the Army Reserve.

Let us take a lesson from the past, from that red jacketed Sergeant who marched his drummers into the village square and told the townsfolk, who were busy bartering, that they could join his Majesty’s Service and win the Royal Shilling.

We should go out to where people gather in numbers and sell the benefits of being a member of today’s Army Reserve.

I cannot think of a better place at a cheaper price than a major shopping centre.

**COPIES OF BACK ISSUES**

Copies of back issues of the *Defence Force Journal* are available for distribution on request to the Editor.

By Dr. Edward A. J. Duyker, BA (Hons), Ph.D., Dept. of Defence.

INTRODUCTION

KNOWN colloquially as “Naxalites” after Maoist insurgents who participated in an uprising in the Naxalbari region of West Bengal in 1967, the guerrillas of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) profoundly influenced the political climate of eastern India between 1967 and 1972, and even today remain a force to reckon with. Founded in 1969, the C.P.I. (M-L) openly advocated a protracted insurgency along classical Maoist lines, and disparaged all other leftist parties who placed faith in the electoral process. In the wake of the fragmentation of the Indian Communist movement and the increasing polarization of the nation’s rural community, the C.P.I. (M-L) drew its main support from impoverished and landless tribals and scheduled castes.

Although the Naxalite movement never reached the stage of a developed insurgency, the 60,000 man state police force (assisted by about a dozen battalions of para-military Central Reserve Police, and eventually three army divisions), were hard pressed to restore order in a host of rebel villages. One indication of the size of the movement is that, at its height, some 700 action squads were known to be operating in West Bengal alone, a state which by 1973 had accumulated 17,782 Naxalite prisoners in its jails.

The uprisings which the party organized in Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh, in Midnapore district of West Bengal and eventually in the sprawling metropolis of Calcutta, were nevertheless crushed. By 1970 C.P.I. (M-L)’s campaign appeared to have been blunted. Before peace could return to the troubled plains of Bengal, however, the C.P.I. (M-L) opened up a new rural front in the district of Birbhum — in the north-west of the state.

THE BIRBHUM UPRISING: 1971

Although the C.P.I. (M-L) attempted to assassinate a jotedar* of Khoshnagar village in Dubrajpur thana,† in January 1970, its presence was not really felt in Birbhum until the middle of 1970. At that time, the party’s slogans began to appear on the walls of Suri and Rampurhat townships. Later in 1970, a campaign which emulated aspects of China’s “cultural revolution” commenced in the urban centres and featured the firing of government offices and schools. The campaign of arson in the schools, however, appears to have had a two-fold objective, since the Naxalites were able to disrupt both the educational and the electoral process in the district at the same time. It was reported, for example, that three polling stations located in schools in Bolpur were set on fire.

*Jotedar: (Hindi, jot/tenure, Persian, dar/holder), a wealthy peasant, a middle landholder and an employer of labour.
†Thana: (Hindi, from Sanskrit, sthana/a place), a division of a district, a police station and the whole area subordinate to it.
fire in one night.\textsuperscript{4} By about the middle of March 1971, the pattern of Naxalite activities changed with the first seizure of rifles in the Rampurhat area.\textsuperscript{5} By early April, this indispensable adjunct to any serious uprising, i.e. the collection of arms, was occurring regularly in the villages. Although the Naxalites at first had to ambush police personnel and snatch their weapons, they soon found it easier to relieve private licensees of their firearms. The police responded predictably by enforcing the placement of private arms with the authorities.\textsuperscript{6} This policy left many landholders and money-lenders even more vulnerable. As the gun-snatching efforts of the Naxalites increased, so too the sporadic killings carried out by the party began to develop into a concerted campaign of annihilation. Again the authorities responded with attempts to capture activists and thus stem the tide of the movement. On April 25 the army, which had been extensively deployed in the district since the elections of March 1971, undertook combing operations in the village of Surul. They arrested sixteen people and captured knives, bombs and blood-stained clothing. A night curfew was subsequently imposed on the town of Bolpur and further combing operations were also undertaken.\textsuperscript{7} However, only seventeen people had been detained in the district under the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act by April 30, 1971.\textsuperscript{8} By this time, another two schools and a post office had been set on fire, another jotedar had been killed at Illambazar, an attempt had been made on the life of a police inspector at Suri,\textsuperscript{9} and a former Congress member of the State Assembly had been hacked to death with a bhojali.\textsuperscript{10} Fear of the civil authorities, among large numbers of villagers, appears to have been in evidence from reports of combing operations at the time. In one such operation, a 15 year old boy was shot dead when police opened fire as "all young boys of that place (Akhhira) began to flee".\textsuperscript{11} The nature of police violence during these raids tended to alienate a large section of the population from the administration, such that many sided with the Naxalities and provided them with aid and comfort.

Naxalite activities, therefore, tended to multiply rather than decrease in the face of these initial combing operations. Similarly the number of participants in certain actions appears to have markedly increased. A forest beat office at Chandrapur, for example, was raided by 60 young men who, although under fire from the Beat Officer, managed to capture "a rifle and three guns".\textsuperscript{12} In fact, the C.P.I. (M-L) felt confident enough of the increasing size of its units and armoury, to declare that, from May 8, 1971, its "People's Army" had been in existence. The party claimed that in Rampurhat area some guerrilla squads, \ldots joined their forces and began marching through one village after another day and night.\textsuperscript{13}

In Bolpur thana, the party's Surul unit, \ldots staged a march of its 'red army' along an eight-mile track from Sriniketan to Jadabpur.\textsuperscript{14} This march featured large numbers of "Santals* and others carrying rifles and muskets". It was noted at the time, that the economic demands of the tribals had been emphasized "rather than the ideology and programme of the party".\textsuperscript{15} By July 1971, the movement had claimed about 175 lives in the district, yet despite the capture of over 200 guns\textsuperscript{16} by the C.P.I. (M-L) and its "army", traditional weapons such as bhojali, tangi, and knife, figured largely in these deaths. On June 19, for example, a party of more than 200 men composed mainly of Santals although armed with a large number of firearms, ultimately used their knives in a raid on a landholder in the Bolpur village of Itanda. In some instances, the preference for traditional weapons indicated an apparent lack of requisite technical skills. There were a number of reports of Santals misfiring their arms in the context of Naxalite violence, in Birbhum.\textsuperscript{17}

As the annihilation campaign progressed, the Naxalites began to hold "people's courts" in which money-lenders and landowners were tried by their fellow villagers and raiding guerrillas. The sentences passed on them ranged from exile to death. In lieu of the political vacuum existent in a number of villages, the Naxalites formed "revolutionary peasant committees". These committees determined wage rates for landless labourers, distributed confiscated land, rescinded debts and organized village defence groups. In some cases communal land use took place for a time.\textsuperscript{18}

Two weeks after the Munsif's court at Bolpur and the sub-post office at Sriniketan had been

\*The Santals are one of India's largest "scheduled tribes", numbering 3,633,459 according to the 1971 Census.
set ablaze, the Chief Minister of the United Front Government, J. Ajoy Mukherjee, reported to the press that he had received written representation from “some of the local people of Birbhum seeking permission of the Government to raise resistance groups to fight the acts of violence in the district (and) . . . to permit them to deposit their licensed guns in some central places to be guarded by volunteers of the resistance party”. It was also reported at this time that the situation at Santiniketan was “explosive” and that special police pickets had been posted inside the campus (Visva Bharati) at the Vice Chancellor’s insistence. Soon after, a student was shot at and wounded while returning to his hostel. In the adjoining town of Bolpur, two armed police were stabbed and the office of the Higher Secondary school was set on fire in the same week.

With the collapse of the United Front Government, the resumption of President’s rule, and the inability of the civil authorities to maintain order in Birbhum, Siddhartha Sankar Ray (Union Minister without portfolio) ordered the deployment of army personnel in every police station of the district to deal “immediately and effectively” with lawlessness. At the same time it was announced by the State’s Inspector-General of Police, P. K. Bose, that resistance groups would be formed within two weeks. It appears that the deterioration of law and order in the district was also compounded by the activities of “gangs of anti-social elements such as dacoits” who employed C.P.I. (M-L) slogans to divert attention from themselves.

Together with reports of the ineffectiveness of the local police in dealing with Naxalite attacks came accusations on the part of certain sections of the press, that there had been a degree of collusion between police and Naxalites in murders and firearms snatching. On July 5, The Statesman reported that,

... in Birbhum, a section of the police became so panicky that they came to an agreement with the extremist elements.

This was followed on July 11 and 13 by more comprehensive evidence from the Bengali daily Jugantar and the C.P.I.(M)'s newspaper, People’s Democracy, respectively.

Naxalites are supplied with all the information from the police station. They come to know at least twenty-four hours beforehand when curfew will be imposed and when police searches will take place . . . Police stations possess lists of those who own licensed guns or revolvers. Naxalites of Birbhum have received this list from each and every police station.

These articles also recounted evidence to suggest that the police supplied Naxalites with information which enabled the execution of an Intelligence Branch constable and a police informant. It appears that the Naxalites were also aware of which licensed gun-holders had actually handed their guns to the police and which had not. Since informers and other policemen continued to be killed, the evidence seems to implicate only a section of the Birbhum force. This was in fact affirmed by the Naxalites themselves:

During their attack on the Ahmedpur outpost the guerrillas shouted ‘hands up’, but the policeman on guard duty sought to aim his rifle at them. The policeman was shot dead at once. As the other policemen of the outpost surrendered they were let free after the party’s politics had been explained to them. At Ilambazar also, all the four policemen on duty at the outpost surrendered as soon as they were surrounded. They were let free after their guns had been seized. All this had an impact on a section of the police force. As a result, this section of the police supplied secret information regarding the police force to the party in some cases. At least in one case an ordinary constable turned his rifle against a police officer.

One of the most potent summaries of the reasons for police ineffectiveness came from the Patna Searchlight.

... the lack of public support and cooperation has led to an almost total absence of police intelligence, the backbone of preventative and investigative work. The peasants are so militant that unless they are armed and in large numbers the police are afraid to go into the villages to investigate a case or arrest a villager. They often face attacks by armed villagers aided by their militant mentors.
Faced with these reports of the worsening situation in the district, the government ordered the immediate transfer of all officers in charge of Bribhum’s police stations on July 14. Through July, however, despite the government’s repressive measures, Naxalite activities continued to take place. A government employee of the treasury office at Suri, a landowner of Tantipara village and a small businessman of Rampurhat were all “savagely killed” early in the month. It was about this time that the pattern of Naxalite attacks altered. Those killed in the villages of Lohagoria and Ruppur, in Bolpur thana, were not done to death with traditional weapons but were found bullet-ridden. A jotedar in the village of Nachansaha was also shot dead by seven armed men and another violent death occurred in the same village the next day. Although sporadic killings continued to take place in the Illambazar and Bolpur area, Naxalite annihilations appear to have tapered dramatically from the middle of July onwards.

The firing upon a search party and the bomb attack upon a C.R.P.§ picket at Suri’s Vidayasarcollege, at this time, suggest a change of emphasis in the Naxalite offensive. Having to face the full wrath of state power, the C.P.I.(M-L) became more concerned about tackling the military rather than with attacking the landholders they had terrorised for months. From reports of the army’s operations, however, it seems that the Naxalite partisans had little opportunity to do much more than avoid capture.

Counter-Insurgency

When the army was deployed in Bribhum, it was initially posted at Rampurhat and Suri and thence to the other thanas of the district. In addition to the army, two companies of police were also dispatched to assist the district authorities. Based in “Anti-dacoity camps”, this combined force immediately undertook combing operations. By July 7, 1971, 65 people had been arrested, 50 from Suri and 15 from Rampurhat. The Bribhum S.P., P.K. Bhattacharyya reported that in these initial operations a “huge quantity of live ammunition was also recovered”. Despite these early Government successes, official sources expected only limited results because of the lack of information about the identity and activities of the extremists... of the 200 people detained in Bribhum, so far, not more than 15% is likely to have any connection with extremists. Possibly because of these problems, army authorities decided to reorient the pattern of combing operations “in order to conduct effective screening and searching”. Concurrent with the first phase of combined army and police operations in Bribhum, operations in the adjoining district of the Santal Parganas were carried out. In thirty different localities 62 persons were arrested in Ranishwar, Masalia and Kundahit thanas. These raids subsequently produced a storm of protests. Eleven M.L.A.’s submitted a memorandum to the Chief Minister complaining of a “reign of terror” prevailing in a large number of villages in the name of curbing Naxalite activities. The severity of the military response appears to have been indicative of an appreciation of the district’s strategic value to the Bribhum Naxalites. The ability to retire into the hilly forested tracts of the Santal Parganas was for some time a significant factor in the C.P.I.(M-L)’s survival in Bribhum.

Although the army did not face much resistance, it found combing operations in the villages far more difficult than in the towns. There were numerous reports of individuals dodging cordon and several resultant deaths. A top Naxalite leader in Lalpahari, under Rampurhat thana, was, for example, shot dead in this manner, in a jungle tract. Reports of these army combing operations reveal a definite and concerted pattern.

A combing operation is basically aimed at destroying the effectiveness of the enemy, by capturing or killing insurgents and/or their weapons and ammunition. Standard texts on the subject also emphasise the need for an intentional measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. In Bribhum, the counter-insurgency forces were largely successful in capturing or killing Naxalite guerrillas and uncovering arms caches. The vast majority of weapons snatched by the Naxalites were ultimately recovered. Intentional inconvenience to the population, whether controlled or uncontrolled, was certainly achieved since hardly 10% to 20% of those rounded up were finally placed under arrest.

§C.R.P.: Central Reserve Police.
Some parliamentarians saw the round-ups in Birbhum, however, as violent acts of retribution carried out under the auspices of the central authorities. One Lok Sabha# member declared at the time, 
... even old women and children are not spared. Beatings and arrests and falsification and shooting ... go on ... In Birbham, in Cossipore, they looted and burnt many houses. The tribals are affected very much and in one village five guns were recovered. This is the punishment they have given (sic). But in the neighbouring villages, where 10 guns were found, because these people joined the Congress, they were spared. That village was not touched. The name of the village was Thalia.41

Another member reported that:
Kasipur, a tribal hamlet in the jurisdiction of Elambasar (sic) Police Station has of late been the target of an attack by the C.R.P. and congress storm-troopers. At dead of night they entered the village, locked the houses from outside and then one after another set fire to them. In a grim battle for survival the villagers could save their own lives ... The villager's stock of food-grains, simple furniture, utensils, cattle, clothings, and all the rest of the belongings were either gutted or looted. All trees and plants were uprooted. And the only tubewell catering drinking water to the villagers was broken into pieces ... In the combing operations by the army, men and women were indiscriminately tortured ... The men were being hung heads down from branches of trees and then beaten for hours.42

Normally combing operations involve secrecy in order to achieve surprise, but in Birbhum this was not always possible. The special relationship between the C.P.I.(M-L) and certain sections of the police force in the district meant that the Naxalites had a developed intelligence network, which posed special problems for the recently posted army units. There were, for example, numerous cases of Naxalite squads or cadre being forewarned of army raids under circumstances which implicated the police. These forewarnings even extended to the actual behaviour of police accompanying the military on operations. S. K. Datta-Ray in his report on “Operation Steeplechase”, commented, 
... 23 constables lagged far behind, tottering off the bunds, splashing in the fields petulantly complaining of damp and fatigue. Long before the straggling line became visible, ... we could hear their voices raised in chattering talk ... the more effervescent burst into song. If any Naxalites sheltered in the squalid huts ... they could have wished for no more effective early warning system.43

Tactically a search involving a battalion or more is best controlled by the military commander with the police in support. However, in smaller operations, international experience suggests a reversal of this approach. Given that the entire military presence in Birbhum stood at battalion strength, supported by two companies of dispatched police, officially detailed to “assist” an indigenous force of 500, and that the size of combing parties in Birbhum ranged from at least 80 men to at most 600, one would have expected the police to have played a fairly dominant role. However, this appears not to have been the case:

Theoretically, troops are supposed only to seal points of exit during a combing operation and provide fire cover for policemen who plan and execute the job. In practice, the army has built up its own network of informants who are often paid. Acting on the basis of this private intelligence, it draws up plans and gives orders to a somewhat slatternly police.45

Once the army had gained some sort of orientation in the district and managed to exercise a dominant cohesive role among the other counter-insurgency forces, the authorities began to achieve some success in stemming the Naxalite tide. Demonstrating flexibility in its organization of the encirclement of villages, establishment of roadblocks, and evetion of external interference, the army soon had the C.P.I. (M-L) on the run. Depending on available approaches, exits and topography, units would enter in motorized convoys or disembark at a distance and approach on foot. Like the Naxalites themselves, the army appears to have made regular use of night sorties, in order to achieve surprise. Although emphasizing small-unit operations, its

#Lok Sabha: lower house of the Indian parliament.
commanders effectively wielded larger formations and still managed to keep C.P.I. (M-L) cadres and sympathizers unaware of the targets of impending raids. For example, a raid on the village of Chhatra involved 600 men "pushing forward in a three pronged attack". The fact that a pathetic group of three Naxalites was driven to fire upon such a vastly superior force of military and para-military personnel, testifies to the effectiveness of the plan. All three were shot down, and their weapons, six guncotton slabs, and 40 yards of fuse were captured.

By August 4, of 280 rifles snatched by the Naxalites in Birbhum, the police and army had managed to recover some 150 during their operations. Some weapons were extremely well concealed. In one Santal home it took, . . . three N.V.F. youths toiling away with spade and shovel for over an hour, in the course of which was unearthed a cunningly concealed oubliette of bamboo and mud.

In most of their raids, it appears that aside from searching for weapons and particular C.P.I. (M-L) members, the army also arrested "anyone, in fact, who was young and able bodied, irrespective of his credentials". During operation "Steeplechase", interrogation was apparently centralized, although in the hands of the police. Of 400 known C.P.I. (M-L) cadres in Birbhum, less than 100 had been apprehended by August 25, despite 1,300 arrests in Rampurhat thana alone and a claim by one army Major that he, . . . recovered all weapons and finished all Naxalite leaders in villages surrounded by nullahs and forests along the Brahmini river.

These arrests, however, certainly disrupted the Naxalite chain of logistical support, communications, and command. On July 22, it was reported that a number of "front-ranking" C.P.I. (M-L) leaders including Aloke Ghosh and his brother Biren were arrested. This was a severe blow to the party's leadership in the Bolpur area. Similarly early November saw the arrest of Kishan Chatterjee, the party's most prominent leader in Suri thana and Ram Goyen, a party leader in Rajnagar thana. The party also suffered casualties in gun battles with the police and the military. On these occasions the insurgents were forced into firing on Government forces as a result of being cornered in combing operations or because of tactical ineptitude.

As a result of a battle in Ilambazar's Chowpahari forest and in the village of Ikshudhara in Bolpur thana, the party not only suffered casualties but also loss of weapons. Similarly a unit of young Naxalites which ambushed a police van passing through the village of Indragacha suffered casualties in the return police fire. The psychological impact of these setbacks appears to have been significant, since, in early November, many Naxalite youths appear to have begun to surrender, or at least those that had no specific charges to face.

It soon became apparent that the party did not have a mature mass organization to fall back on. At the same time the lack of military experience among party cadres made the C.P.I. (M-L) organization extremely vulnerable when the leadership was decimated by casualties and captures. The lower ranks were unable to command and lead successfully. Coordinated resistance to the police and army became more and more difficult as the numbers of fighters steadily declined, as their contacts in other squads failed to surface after successive military operations and as their supporters began to reconsider the consequences of the assistance they rendered individual insurgents. A letter to party cadres in Birbhum written by Charu Mazumdar in September 1971, appears to suggest that Mazumdar was not aware of the imminent collapse of the insurrection. Quite to the contrary, he believed that the army's initial attempts at "encirclement and suppression" had failed and that with proper initiative the struggle in Birbhum was about to advance to a level of serious challenge to the army. According to Mazumdar, Birbhum had "become an object of terror to the ruling classes". The very next issue of Liberation, however, made no mention of events in Birbhum. By November, it was obvious that the uprising had completely collapsed, and that the movement, as a whole, had been smashed.

* Charu Mazumdar: Chairman of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

† N.V.F.: National Volunteer Force.
NOTES

15. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. The Sunday Searchlight, July 4, 1971. When these village resistance groups were finally set up by the police, from gangs of toughs, they evoked (according to journalists) even more terror amongst the populace because they enjoyed official patronage.
40. "They should be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage guerrillas and their sympathizers from remaining in their locale, but not to such an extent that they will be driven to collaborate with them as a result of the search," Green, T. N. ed., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him (New York, 1964) (Since reprinted by Army Publishers, Delhi).
41. Lok Sabha Debates, November 17, 1971 (240).
42. People's Democracy, November 28, 1971.
44. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
52. Ibid.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries.


PERCEPTION, CONCEPTION AND
THE IDENTITY CARD

By CPODENH Leslie J. LAUB, RAN

O n July 18th 1944, two German agents “Gregor” and “Igor” were parachuted into the Vitebsk Sector of Russia. They wore authentic Russian Officer’s Uniforms and carried sealed orders for General Koslov from Marshal Vassilevsky. The spies were received in grand style, a banquet, house and servants were granted them. They attended conferences and remained with the unit for several weeks then were flown back to Germany.¹

Around December 10th 1976, a similar incident occurred in Australia. A reporter drove his motor car up to the gate of HMAS ALBATROSS, presented a credit card to the sentry and was admitted to the Naval Air Station. He drove around the Establishment and was eventually wined and dined in the Senior Sailors’ Mess. all this happened during a security “Blitz” which followed the destruction of a substantial part of the Fleet Air Arm by an arsonist a week earlier.

Both incidents and many more like them, illustrate that the positive identification of personnel from their documents is something less than an exact science. The number of sentries (and their supervisors) who have appeared before their Commanding Officers charged with negligence or dereliction of duty creates the illusion of a preoccupation with security and people act as if spies lurked everywhere.

The problem of security is a very real one, however it is often misconstrued to be prevention of espionage rather than little reason to suspect that an “unfriendly” country would chance taking photographs in a Dockyard when it is clearly visible from every tall building in the city. Nevertheless, a potentially disastrous situation could arise if a group of terrorists stole a patrol boat and threatened to shell a city. The task would not be difficult for the dedicated and organised guerrilla group as on weekends, ships are largely unmanned and sentries are seldom armed.

The Identity Card

The Identity Card is seen as a solution to the problem of unauthorised entry, a complex card with a photograph of the bearer and his particulars separates the “friendlies” from the “unfriendlies”. This is an excellent theory but like many theories, fails in practice.

Everyone in the forces has a favourite ID Card story, perhaps how the members of a car pool exchanged ID cards to see if the sentry would notice and it was six months before one person discovered he got the wrong card back. Another popular story tells of a Sailor who used a pack of cigarettes held up to the windscreen of his car. My personal choice is about a wife who drove into a Dockyard without a pass. She claimed that her Bankcard was always welcome. On the surface it would seem that sentries are not up to the task of checking ID cards. A fairly obvious forgery has served the author very well over Australia. It was made using a copy machine, coloured paper and an acetate sheet. The colour, size and shape were accurately reproduced but the photograph bore little resemblance to the holder.

The fact that sentries cannot or will not detect such a card or the many other objects which are accepted in lieu, illustrates that something is amiss. This “something” can be explained through the principles of perception.

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Perception

Perception is the gathering of sensory information. Perception is seeing, hearing and so on. Conception is the interpretation of this information. The presentation of an ID card to a sentry normally involves visual perception but a number of mental operations are also carried out. For example,

a. is the card an ID card? colour, size, photograph normal?
b. is the card current?
c. salute or not to salute?
and so on. Each task requires a visual scan of the card and the interpretation of data concentration on each operation. This ability to concentrate is important, as any person can only concentrate on one operation at a time.

Selectivity

At any moment, all five senses are operating. We are not bombarded by many sensations at once because we select and focus on each as they move into our field of attention.

To illustrate the nature of Selectivity we can imagine standing on a parade ground at attention. We become aware that our back aches and this becomes more annoying as time goes by. Then a fly begins to crawl up our nose. The backache recedes and the fly comes into focus. Attention therefore is Selective. There are a number of factors which govern this attention shift and these may be used to explain why the sentry fails to "spot the phoney".

1. Intensity and Size

The louder the noise, the bigger the object or the more garish a particular item, the more likely it is to attract attention. For example, the sentry who collects women for his panel van would find it very hard to concentrate on the ID card of the driver of a $100,000 custom build job. The sentry is distracted by more intense stimuli than he sees in an ID card. Intensity can also be governed by the time the performer spends on the job. While the task is novel and exciting the sentry is apt to be efficient and well motivated but as the watch drags on, the novelty and intensity of his attention diminishes.

2. Contrast

We can best illustrate contrast through visualising a small, hot room full of smokers, all puffing away. When someone opens two windows in that room we have contrast. Everyone in the room would be aware that something has changed. Contrast can also be seen when one man in a Platoon is out of step. In both cases attention becomes fixed to the contrasting object.

The sentry often relies on contrast to discern between the steady stream of those who have an ID card and hold it up and the odd person who has no card and sits still.

3. Repetition

A stimulus has a better chance of being observed if it is repeated. One back-to-front ID card might go unnoticed but a second, then a third followed in the same way, the sentries attention would be drawn to the situation.

Repetition without variety has the opposite effect, attention wanes and the sentry becomes bored.

4. Movement

Something which moves in an unusual or unexpected way within a field of vision is attention getting. If a car draws up to a sentry post and a Sailor leaps out of the boot and runs toward the bushes, the sentry's attention would be fully on the moving object. the three others in the car without identification would pass unnoticed. Movement in an unusual way is a form of contrast.

5. Motives

It is difficult to act excited about checking ID cards when your boots are full of water, your hands are frozen, it is 4 a.m. and you're tired. However, if a genuine report of a sweet, young nymphomaniac who seduces sentries came in, then attention would again concentrate on the job. the sentry will diligently search every car from then on. Unfortunately few people have exciting or rewarding experiences on sentry duty and the job is not particularly prestigious. There is no doubt that if the sentry is well motivated toward the job then he will do it to the best of his ability.

6. Set and Expectancy

A person sees only what he is "set" to see. A sentry checking the expiry date on an ID card would not see that card did not belong to the bearer if he was not set for that task. The sentry looks for, and "sees" what he is
told he will see and he expects to see. Since only those people who have ID cards, hold them up for inspection (expectancy), the sentry will “see” any item held up as an ID card. While he is set for ID cards he will ignore other stimuli.

The chances of a sentry detecting an anomaly in identification papers is therefore relatively remote. The RAN ID card as it is almost devoid of any device which aids in perception. The photograph, printing and colours are usually on uninteresting grey/blue/green and the data itself is difficult to read at arms length. Since the critical, close-up examination of each ID card is impractical because of the time factor involved, the current card fails its primary purpose.

...identification of members requiring access to their place of employment... The cost factor of each card ($10) is not warranted as a simpler, less expensive card is no less difficult to copy.

Conclusion
The human element in the perception/conception process and the ease with which cards can be reproduced gives a strong case for electronic identity checking devices.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

This listing is provided to bring recent publications to the attention of readers. For information about Book Reviews readers are requested to contact the Editor. The following books are available for review.


NATO’s Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense, Edited by David S. Yost, New York, Pergamon Press, 1981.


By Brigadier M. Austin (R.L.)

VICTORIA

By 1838 the continued development of the Port Phillip district had led, as in Western Australia, to increasing friction between the Aborigines and the settlers. In June of that year it was suggested to Gipps that he 'either...levy war against the Blacks, or sanction the enrolment of a militia, and allow them to be supplied with arms and munitions of war from Her Majesty's stores'. He declined to do either.

In April, 1842 a party of bushrangers was captured near Plenty Falls by a party of 'volunteers' who had taken the precaution, however, to be sworn in as special constables. Arising from this incident the notorious Police Magistrate, Major Frederick Berkely St. John, submitted a plan for the formation of a Yeomanry, based on Edward Macarthur's proposals of 1825. Two public meetings were subsequently held in late May and early June to foster such an association 'for the protection of the settlers against bushrangers, and the aggressions of the Blacks,' although this was later amended 'for the protection of families and property, which protection the limited police of the country is unable sufficiently to afford'. After some discussion Major William Firebrace, against whom 'not one dissenter voice could possibly be raised', was nominated as Colonel Commandant of 'The Port Phillip Volunteers', who were to provide their own arms — 'carbine, rifle or double barreled gun, having a sling attached to it, a pair of pistols, and a sword; patent black leather pouch, belt and cartouche box'.

La Trobe, as requested, forwarded the resolutions of the meeting to Gipps in Sydney, remarking that he was convinced of the utility of the proposals. He believed that 'no practicable measure of precaution can be devised of equal value to the inhabitants', although he did sound a note of warning about its possible dangerous use against the Aborigines.

It was perhaps this latter point which made Gipps wary. He informed La Trobe that he thought the efforts of the gentlemen concerned highly credible and worthy of Government attention. He did not want to put obstacles in the way of the plan, but before proceeding further he would like the following points to be maturely considered.

1. No armed force can be raised in any part of the British Empire except under the express sanction of the Crown.
2. No officers can legally exercise a command over any armed force except they hold commissions from Her Majesty.
3. For any armed body to elect, or to recommend the appointment of their own officers would be, (he) believed, contrary to the principles of the constitution, and to universal practice as well in the mother country as in the colonies.

This is a five part article dealing with the Australian Army Reserves from 1788 to 1854. Part four will appear in the next issue of the journal (No 36 Sept./Oct. 1982).

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4. An Act of Council will, (he was) disposed to think, be necessary to regulate the constitution, and to provide for the good order and government of any force that may be raised.

A subsequent meeting of the promotors in August hastened to assure His Excellency that they had no wish to violate the Constitution, and that they had every confidence that he would introduce a Bill for the formation of the Volunteers, the appointment of officers, and ‘form such rules for its guidance as he may think fit’, should he deem such action appropriate. At the same time they thought Gipps might be in error respecting the exclusive rights of the Crown, since Militia officers in England received their commissions from the Lord Lieutenant. Nevertheless, they did not wish to dispute his opinion, although they hoped and trusted that these recommendations would be considered. And so for the moment the matter ended.

In October 1851 the Geelong Advertiser reported that thought was being given to the formation of Yeomanry in the towns, and eight months later the Portland Herald stated that ‘some gentlemen in the district have serious intentions of organizing such a force’. Neither enterprise bore fruit until some time later.

In spite of the obviously dangerous international situation the Argus during 1852 and early 1853 continued to regard the uneasiness in Sydney in the nature of a panic, still believing that even if there was a French invasion it was preposterous to believe that any resistance could be offered by the Victorian Government, which could not make a road or keep a police constable to his duty. In May 1853 its Geelong correspondent foresaw the need to fortify Port Phillip Heads although he considered that a call to form a Volunteer Corps was doomed to failure, even if 10,000 frog-eaters arrived, since ‘people will not neglect their means of making money just now’. The Argus steadfastly maintained its attitude that resistance was useless although its stance was being steadily undermined.

By October the Argus had modified its attitude considerably. Victoria was no longer in a state of political serfdom, but with the changed situation in which she now found herself, the imported ill-paid troops, who had no interest in the country, ‘whose presence could only serve to oppress and demoralize the people’, could well be dispensed with and replaced by a National Guard composed of better materials. In the face of the gathering European storm the time had arrived for Victorian property and interests to be voluntarily protected by her own citizens, using their own resources.

By December 1853 Edward Wilson, the Editor and part Proprietor, in the words of his biographer Geoffrey Serle, ‘began to have doubts about his policy; the Argus was toned down and veered and wavered as the democratic movement it had helped to create gathered strength’. By now the Argus advocated the immediate organization of a Militia, an action which should have taken place long before. It also proposed that the Colonies join in maintaining ‘a squadron of war steamers’. The defence of the Colony should never be entrusted to regular troops since they were insufficient for the task and dangerous to civil liberties. Inter-Colonial action was suggested although this idea was not taken up in the other colonies.

...we should act in concert with the other colonies. They are all interested in the matter; and what none of them could easily accomplish single handed we may affect by combination. What would be impracticable as a premature attempt to carry out a speculative proposition, may work successfully when the cui bono is not only seen but felt!

Earl Grey could well be excused a cynical smile.

**TASMANIA**

In 1848 the strength of the regular troops in Tasmania was close to 1,500 and as a consequence there was not the same pressure to raise local forces as in other Colonies. In September Denison, when considering the size of the military force required for the Colony, concluded that ‘nothing more than attempts of a predatory nature are at all likely’. However,
his suggestion that two companies of local artillery be organized at a cost of about £1,100 ($2,200) a year to be paid from the Land Fund went unanswered.  

**SOUTH AUSTRALIA**

It was in South Australia where the internal and external threats to Colonial security were least, that the most determined effort was made to establish local forces. In 1831 proposals for settlement envisaged ‘that the defence of the Colony should be provided for by a militia to be composed of the whole male population of the Colony above the age of sixteen and under sixty’. The following years saw some modifications to the details, but the basic principle of ‘self-support’ was maintained. By 1836, for example, the back page of the application form for free passage to the Province was endorsed — ‘In consideration of being allowed a free passage,...Thereby engage to act, as a militia man or special constable when called upon...’.  

The South Australian Commissioners for reasons of principle, and the Colonial Office for reasons of economy, hung tenaciously to the doctrine of ‘selfsupport’, and when Captain (Sir) John Hindmarsh RN departed in July 1838, he left behind him less than twenty policemen, who were fully occupied looking after eighteen felons and other prisoners in the insecure building used as a gaol. With the departure of the Royal Marines with Hindmarsh all that was left behind was a somewhat tarnished reputation, but no organized military force.  

Hindmarsh’s successor Lieutenant Colonel George Gawler, faced with the attitudes of the Colonial Office and the Commissioners, had little alternative but to test the self-supporting principle. He accordingly embodied early in 1840, without either enactment or expense, the Royal South Australian Volunteer Militia, consisting of two troops of cavalry and a company of infantry. The grant of the title Royal was no doubt ‘a very cheap way of securing the military services of the colonists’, and while it authorised the use of ‘gold laced ornaments and blue (the Royal) facings’ on the uniform, Her Majesty felt constrained to state that she hoped that in making a choice of uniform, the officers would avoid needless expense. In fact, however, Captain (Sir) George Grey lurking in the background, had pointed out to the Colonial Office that if care was not taken there could soon be a move, one way or another, to provide the uniform at public expense. Even without the somewhat contradictory title, the unit appears to have been regarded as a joke in the Paradise of Dissent, and by June had ceased to be mustered ‘as the rainy season was fast approaching’, although Grey, who was soon to replace Gawler, commented that ‘the parade of military uniforms was one of the singular features’ of Adelaide.  

Grey, anticipating trouble on his arrival to supplant Gawler, made overtures to the Colonial Office for troops before he left England. He believed that finance clearly precluded the ability of the Province to rely on its own resources to maintain both the Police and a Military Force. Nevertheless he was advised to turn to Gipps in an emergency, and to consider the formation of a Militia. Meanwhile Gawler, not knowing his days were numbered, was pointing out to the Secretary of State that the Commissioners’ insistence on holding to the self-supporting principle was endangering the prosperity, and reasonable safety of the Province. The ‘volunteer militia’ had been formed to support the Police, and if the strength of the Police was not maintained, or local forces substituted for them, every settler would soon take the law into his own hands, with consequent danger to the Aborigines — ‘Even in the present state of things, with a well commanded efficient police, it requires incessant care and decision to prevent such evils.’  

Grey, regarding the Volunteers acting in a Police role as unconstitutional, later elaborated this point. Unless they were ‘acting as special constables enrolled by direction of a magistrate as prescribed by Statutes 1 and 2, William IV C41, they would not be permitted to constitute themselves into a military force proceeding against an enemy, because the natives were Her Majesty’s subjects’.  

Troops could only be called out to support the civil power in cases of extreme urgency, on the written instructions of a magistrate, who had to accompany the detachment in the execution of its duty.  

Pike records that at its first review the Volunteer Militia could only muster two non-commissioned officers and one private on parade, so it is not surprising that Grey did not follow up Gawler’s lead. By 1845 it was admitted that the unit existed in name only,
although it was not until 1851 that Australia's first 'Royal' regiment was unobtrusively buried. 72

In October, 1844 a 'massacre' of an overland party occurred at the junction of the Darling and Murray Rivers, and Inspector Tolmer, and a party of fourteen mounted policemen proceeded to the area. As several weeks' rations had been ordered for thirty men it was presumed that the number would be made up by 'mounted volunteers' or an 'auxiliary force', and it appears that these extra men were sworn in as special constables. 73

Major (later Major General) Frederick Holt Robe became Lieutenant Governor of South Australia in October, 1845 and twelve months later was writing to London on Gawler's Royal South Australian Volunteer Militia. He was about to undertake the task of regularising that nominal body, when he had become aware of the New Zealand Militia ordinance, which was based on the Acts of Jamaica (9 VIC 35) and Barbadoes (3 VIC 6). Since the preparation of a Militia Bill in a new colony should be as perfect as possible he asked for copies of these and similar Acts. In addition he suggested the desirability of drawing up a model Bill, and it 'being communicated to the regular army [which] would tend very much to promote uniformity in the relations between the regulars and the militia in whatever part of Her Majesty's dominion they might be called upon to serve together.

The Colonial Office forwarded these Acts, together with that for St Helena in May 1847, together with the instruction that he was to be guided by his own judgement and military experience. 74

The following month when acknowledging the arrival of arms, ammunition, accoutrements and ordnance, Robe informed Grey that no horse harness had been sent for the guns, howitzers and ammunition wagons. He explained that South Australia mainly cavalry country with open plains. Moreover it was essential to be able to move the guns to protect any part of the coast where landings were threatened. Most men were used to the saddle and he had no doubt, in Adelaide alone, a field battery could be respectably horsed in twenty-four hours. 75

Robe was undaunted by Grey's refusal to provide the harness unless South Australia paid for it, and in June 1848 published for general information an abstract of a proposed Ordinance to organize and establish a Militia. The South Australian Register considered this action as a chimerical attempt to resuscitate Gawler's defunct Volunteer Militia, laying the initiative for its introduction on the Major-Commandant of that Unit, and members of the Legislative Council, Major O'Halloran, so that Council members might have the benefit of Robe's military experience. The Register suggested that the proposed measure be shelved for another twenty-five years. Gross violations of the liberty of the subject could only be justified by an urgent necessity affecting the subjects, as well as the rulers of a country. in no way did this apply in South Australia. If there was to be any fighting, people should fight, not for political privileges, for they had none; not for property, since that would not be jeopardised unless they did fight, but solely for the name of a union with England, and for the reality of being ruled by the absolute will of an English Secretary of State — a weaker cause could not be found. The only risk arose from the English connection, and if England exposed the colonists to danger, it was up to her to protect them. To which 'an Englishman' pointed out that the next war with France would be ruthless and rancorous, and would involve more than the demolition of a few pig sty's and the plunder of half a dozen hen roosts. 76

All of which somewhat begged the question since the matter was never discussed by the Legislative Council. A month later Robe was succeeded by Sir Henry Edward Fox Young.

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

. . . . . And we do give and grant unto you the said James Stirling by yourself or by your captains or commanders by you to be authorised full power and authority to levy arm muster command and employ all persons whatsoever residing within our said Territory and its Dependencies under your Government and as occasion shall serve to march
them from one place to another or to embark them for the assisting and withstanding all Enemies Pirates and Rebels both at sea and land and such Enemies Pirates and Rebels if there shall be occasion to pursue and prosecute in or out of the limits of our said Territory and its Dependencies and if it shall so please God them to vanquish apprehend and take and to execute Martial Law in time of Invasion or at other times when by law it may be executed and to do and execute all and every other thing or things which to our Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief doth or ought of right to belong . . .

So ran the Commission of the Governor, Sir James Stirling RN, in 1830. Not long afterwards he was informed by the newly appointed Secretary of State, Viscount Goderich that it was impossible to provide troops to guard every part of the Colony, and the settlers were 'expected to defend themselves against petty assaults of a predatory nature, to which they may be exposed'. In his view they should concentrate as much as possible in towns and villages, instead of scattering themselves all over the countryside — a suggestion, the practicability of which did not appeal to the settlers. Nevertheless 'the pertinacious endeavours of these savages to commit depredations on property having called for the determined resistance of the settlers', Stirling informed Goderich that he had been able to restore confidence 'by the formation of a Yeomanry Force, and by proper arrangements for mutual assistance and co-operation among the settlers'.

By a proclamation in October 1831 Stirling had nominated magistrates in each district as leaders of groups of six men. Those volunteers were to be given a musket and ammunition; 5/-d (50c) per day on active duty; 15/-d ($1.50) for each horse if they were mounted, although no compensation was allowed for injury to the horse unless it was killed wounded by 'enemy' action. The attempt was marked by complete lack of success.

In May 1833 the Aborigines were involved in two murders at Bull Creek. Discussion of the event by the Executive Council disclosed the difficulties of raising a Yeomanry. With the large capital costs of establishing their farms, together with the high cost of labour and provisions, the settlers could not afford to release men from their work more than was absolutely necessary. During the day the labour force was dispersed away from homesteads and was not available to deal with any sudden attack. In essence, individually the settlers were prepared to defend their lives and property, but not collectively as an organized body. In any case the existing military force was dispersed in too many outstations, and too many soldiers were employed on non-military duties. The Executive Council was well aware of the barb in this latter plaint. In the English Sun of the previous November one settler had complained of the troublesome natives. What were the soldiers doing? Trading! The Sergeant-Major had a dairy; the Corporal had the dearest store in Perth — both were adding house after house to their property. Both men had been financed by an officer who had built a large house with soldier labour which he leased to the Government £150 ($300) per year. This was bad enough, but what really hurt was that whilst the military, which ought to protect us, are enriching themselves at our expense, we are not allowed to defend ourselves. If a native is shot while driving away our sheep, we are threatened by hanging; and when we have taken natives in the act of robbery, they have, after a night's detention, been sent about their business, with a present of a loaf and a blanket! Lord Goderich tells us that we must protect ourselves by congregating in towns, and never going out without being well guarded, but how we are to cultivate our farms whilst residing miles from them in a sea port, he has not told us any more than how we are to employ men to guard us when we can scarcely feed ourselves!

At this time Stirling was in London. He informed Goderich that these charges were not new, but there was little he could do as the trading was being carried on by the soldier's wives who were not subject to military law. It was quite true that Major Irwin, in conjunction with Mr McMackie had constructed a large house in Perth and that this had been offered, accepted and hired for the reception of members of the Store Department on their arrival in Perth, while Irwin was absent in England early in 1831. All the information required was contained in the remarks of the Executive Council. The person who had made the earlier complaints, and who probably had also written
to the Sun was a public-house keeper not noted either for sobriety or responsibility. He had been invited to make charges against Irwin but had failed to do so. Nevertheless later that year the detachment of the 63rd was retained in Perth, on the advice of the Executive Council, awaiting orders for the discharge of married men who had, ‘acquired considerable property, which if sold would defeat their praiseworthy efforts. 80

In Perth, Surveyor-General Roe summed up the situation neatly for the Executive Council — a partial or complete success would be achieved with the yeomanry scheme if the settlers could be satisfied that the troops were distributed and employed in as judicious and efficient a manner as their numbers allowed.

Call to rectify Aboriginal injustice

SIR — We wish to draw public attention to a grave injustice to the Aboriginal people which needs to be rectified.

It relates to the killing in 1833 of Yagan of the Bibbulmun tribe by the early settlers in Perth (then the Swan River Colony). The killing itself was bad enough but what followed and the situation which continues today add to that shame.

After Yagan was killed he was decapitated, his head was smoke dried and sent to the British Museum, where it remains today.

Yagan was a tall, athletic and dignified figure who commanded respect in all that he did.

When Governor Stirling and his party arrived in 1827 Yagan was one of the first Aborigines to befriend them and in the years that followed he greatly assisted the white settlers. He became a close friend of many of them.

However the murder of some of his fellow tribesmen by the white settlers demanded, under his tribal law, that an equal number of white settlers’ lives should be taken before full friendship could be restored. It fell Yagan’s lot to be involved in those reprisals.

What was necessary under tribal law was considered a crime under British law and thus Yagan was branded as an outlaw with a price on his head.

Yagan could now be friendly again with the white settlers and for quite some time kept up sporadic visits to his close friends.

It was one of these close friends who shot Yagan in the back during a friendly visit. Apparently he valued Yagan’s life and friendship at less than the reward money of £30 (or, if you like 30 pieces of silver).

We cannot restore Yagan’s life but we can remedy the injustice of having his head preserved in the British Museum.

Action should be taken to have it returned to the original Bibbulmun tribal grounds and to be buried with honor and dignity.

RALPH D. NICHOLLS
and REX HARCOURT
Melbourne

In the case of Bull Creek £30 ($60) reward was offered for Yagan, and £20 ($40) for each of Midgegooroo and Munday, ‘dead or alive’, which pecuniary stimulus Major Irwin, the acting Governor, informed Goderich had brought forward some efficient volunteers among the settlers, whose habits and occupations have necessarily given them a more intimate knowledge of the haunts of the natives’. These ‘volunteers’ had not been given permission to act except under the orders of a magistrate or constable.

There was nothing really new in this procedure, as settlers had been attached as guides to military parties on several occasions, and had been paid for the loss of their time and labour. Nevertheless such action was open to serious objection. In seeking the reward a settler’s judgement could become clouded and not over scrupulous at how many he shot to ensure the capture of one of the culprits ‘dead or alive’, and this was likely to happen whether or not he received his orders from a magistrate or policeman. Stanley, the new Secretary of State, apart from the size of the reward, disagreed in principle, and directed that such action not be taken again. In New South Wales and Tasmania it has been proved time and again that the settlers were usually the aggressors. It was satisfactory to learn that this was not the case in the present instance, but if the Mounted Police and the soldiers were not adequate in numbers for the task, it was up to the settlers to give their services gratuitously.
for the protection of their own lives and property.\footnote{55}

However, no matter what the past or present views of the Government the settlers believed that they were entitled to be protected, and to remain secure in the quiet enjoyment of the lands assigned to them, or which they had purchased. Such security, however, was not to be at their expense. In 1835, twelve months after the 'Battle of Pinjarra' the settlers believed that the military force 'ordered for the service of this colony renders the maintenance of a police corps unnecessary and burdensome on the resources of the colony, which are required for and ought to be applied to more beneficial objects' — a view which was not shared by Stirling. Glenelg, now Secretary of State, readily bowed to superior local knowledge, but emphasized to Stirling that the settlers could not rely on military force alone for internal security — Government policy was to encourage the various colonies to provide as much as possible for their own defence by encouraging the formation of local corps.\footnote{55, 56}

\section*{NOTES}

\begin{itemize}
\item 59. 21-7-38 Gipps/Glenelg HRA 19-509; 21-12-38 Glenelg/Gipps \textit{ibid.}, p.706
\item 60. 6-6-42 \textit{Port Phillip Patriot} (PPP).
\item 61. 4-5-42 Victorian Archives Letters Out (VALO) 416 (42/571), D419 (42/573); 14-6-42 VALO D473; (42/783)30-8-42 VALO D588 (42/1155); 2-5-42 Victorian Archives Letters In (VALI) 42/1366; 4, 14-6-42, 7-9-42 SH; 2, 6-6-42, 25-8-42 PPP; 12, 13, 18-8-42 Victorian Archives Manuscripts (VAMSS) 7092-4 (143-5)
\item 62. 30-10-51, 4-6-52 A
\item 63. 6-4-53, 24-5-53 A
\item 64. 28-9-53, 19-10-53 SMH; 4, 21-10-53 A
\item 65. ADB 6-412; 28-12-53A; 4-1-54 SMH
\item 66. 29-9-48 Denison/Grey CO 280/231 R567 F453
\item 67. Quoted by Zwischenberg, \textit{op. cit.}
\item 68. 14-7-38 Hindmarsh/Glenelg CO 13/11 R578 F180.
\item 69. 10-4-40 Gawler/Russell CO 13/16 R582 F17; 22-4-44 Military Secretary (MS)/CO, War Office (WO) 1/432 R895 F395, minute: Zwischenberg \textit{op. cit.}, p22 et/seq.
\item 70. 18-1-41 Gawler/Russell CO 13/20 R584 F63.
\item 71. Chief Secretary of South Australia, out correspondence, 399, 402/1841 and 763/1842 (Quoted by Zwischenberg \textit{op. cit.}).
\item 74. 22-10-46 Robe/Gladstone WO 1/435 R897 F53; 28-5-47 Grey/Robe \textit{ibid.}, F61.
\item 75. 7-6-47 Robe/Grey \textit{ibid.}, F73.
\item 76. 9-2-48 Grey/Officer Administering South Australia \textit{ibid.}, F89; 10, 28-6-48, 12-7-48 \textit{South Australia Register} (SAR).
\item 77. CO 380/116 R848 F13
\item 78. 30-5-31 Goderich/Stirling CO/397/2 R304 F181; 30-11-32 Goderich/Stirling \textit{ibid.}, F249; 30-11-31 Stirling/Goderich CO 18/9 R297 F100; 16-8-32 Goderich/Stirling CO 397/2 R304 F234.
\item 79. 6, 10-5-33 Minutes Executive Council CO 20/1 R1118 F207; the soldiers were from the 63rd; 30-11-32 Goderich/Stirling CO 397/2 R304 F249.
\item 80. 7-1-33 Stirling/Goderich CO 18/12 R298 F8; 28-9-33 Danell/Goderich CO 18/12 R299 F330.
\item 81. 1-6-33 Irwin/Goderich \textit{ibid.}, F262; 19-11-33 Stanley/Stirling CO 397/2 R304 F426.
\item 82. 15-10-35 Stirling/Aberdeen CO 18/15 R301 F378; 7-3-37 Glenelg/Stirling \textit{ibid.}, F371. Hasluck in \textit{Black Australia}, MUP 1970, states that Yagan was executed by a firing party in the centre of Perth. A letter to the \textit{Australian} of 9 July 1980 states that after death 'he was decapitated, his head was smoked dried and sent to the British Museum, where it remains today'.
\end{itemize}

\section*{APPEAL FOR PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN}

Two Central Office public servants, entrants in the Queen of Canberra Quest, are hoping to raise more than $60,000 for Canberra's Hartley House and Hartley Street Centre. These are non-profit organisations established to provide for the care and welfare of physically handicapped children in the ACT.

Lyn Fairlie and Genelle Mills entered the Quest to help raise money for the centres, whose running costs exceeded $100,000 in 1981.

The Hartley Street Centre, located at an ACT primary school, provides educational and paramedical facilities for physically handicapped children of the ACT and surrounding areas. Hartley House provides accommodation for physically handicapped children. Plans for a second hostel are well advanced.

Donations can be sent to:
Queen of Canberra Entrants,
C-4-32
RUSSELL OFFICES ACT 2600
Cheques should be made payable to "Hartley House".
VICTORY IN BANGLADESH by Maj Gen Lachhman Singh, pp 320, Maps and Illustrations, (Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun, India, 1981.)

Reviewed by Dr. E. A. J. Duyker, Defence Central.

In the December elections of 1970, the East Pakistan based “Awami League” emerged as the largest single party in the Republic of Pakistan; thus for the first time the long standing domination of the Bengalis (of East Pakistan) by the Punjabi-Sindhi elite (of West Pakistan) was seriously challenged. General Yahya Khan, however, who had announced the legal framework for the elections, refused to accept the Awami League’s mandate for changes in the nation’s constitution. As Yahya Khan’s attempts to undermine the resolve of the Awami League’s leader, Mujibur Rahman, to form a government failed, he decided to crush the Bengali resistance with a brutal military crackdown. It was this attempt by West Pakistan to emasculate the Bengali intellectual and political leadership which sparked off civil war and ultimately precipitated India’s intervention on the side of the Bengalis.

In the ten years since India’s invasion and the establishment of the independent state of Bangladesh, a number of books have been published which have described the course of the war with Pakistan on both the eastern and western fronts. Maj Gen D. K. Palit’s “Lightning Campaign” is perhaps the most familiar to Australian readers. While Lachhman Singh’s work may not become the classic study of the 1971 subcontinental war, it is, I believe, destined to become the classic contemporary account of the campaign in East Bengal.

A highly decorated veteran of operations in Burma, Kashmir, Goa and Bangladesh (where he commanded a division), the author infuses into the narrative the obvious mark of an incisive tactician and of a mature military analyst. “Victory in Bangladesh”, therefore, is not a glossy martial litany, but a serious evaluation of India at war. After India resoundingly defeated Pakistan, it was all too easy for her leaders to ignore serious mistakes and failings in the euphoria of their victory. The importance of Singh’s book lies not only in his meticulous historical chronicle, but in his objective assessment of India’s major shortcomings in both the planning and operational phases of the conflict. Having been passed-over for promotion (in favour of less battle-proven commanders) may lead some to accuse him of vindictive bitterness, but one cannot disregard Singh’s own plea that, “... it is a disservice to future generations of soldiers to ignore the lessons of the 1971 campaign just because we won a decisive victory there which to some, especially non-participants, may appear to have been won easily”. In this respect one is reminded of another remarkably capable victim of India’s vague criteria for senior staff promotions — Brig J. P. Dalvi who’s brilliant personal critique of India’s performance against China in 1962, “Himalayan Blunder”, was so profoundly influential.

Among the most salient points made by Singh are that; (1) the lack of any clear directive that the capital was the ultimate objective, during the fighting, made it “difficult for subordinate commanders to select the intermediate objectives along which they could direct their full energies to capturing Dacca with the least delay”; (2) that in the difficult deltaic terrain of East Bengal, the tactical benefits of helicopters were vastly underemployed; (3) that limited use of strategic air reconnaissance was made; (4) that in joint operations the three services could not overcome the “practical flaws” resulting from the “lack of an integrated command in Delhi and Calcutta”.

Although Singh also provides an account of the various phases of the partisan campaign waged by Bengali irregulars such as the Mukti Bahini and emphasizes their positive achievements, he argues that it was a mistake to arm such “large bodies of half-trained, ill motivated and leaderless volunteers, especially as they created law and order problems after the war”. It is surprising that in this evaluation Singh makes little mention of the differing ideological orientations of these guerrilla groups which
was of particular concern to the Indian Government. There is certainly evidence to suggest the existence of a potentially explosive combination of Bengali nationalism and political extremism at the time — especially since the Indian state of West Bengal was itself suffering from a near complete breakdown of its administration as a result of the Naxalite insurgency. There can be little doubt that fear of the economic and political repercussions of the influx of millions of refugees (into an area convulsed by revolutionary strife) influenced India’s decision to invade, as did the growing extremism of the Mukti Bahini. Singh remarks, however, that the Pakistani Commander in East Bengal, Gen Niazi, denuded his defences in south-western sector because he felt that Naxalite activities around Calcutta would hinder an Indian offensive in the area. Nevertheless, he is most frank when he states that India saw the possibility of a friendly government in Dacca as an asset to New Delhi in “solving the counter-insurgency problems in the eastern region without the insurgents getting aid from and in East Pakistan”.

Yet “Victory in Bangladesh” is not an attempt to explain the causes of the war, rather it is an attempt to explain its course in the eastern theatre. While the specialist will gain very valuable insights into many aspects of the conflict, the general reader will most certainly be satisfied by the author’s description of the conduct of the campaign (along with the occasional Napoleonic maxim) and especially by the graphic details of the decisive crossing of the Meghna, the fall of Dacca, the Pakistani surrender and the birth of Bangladesh. Perhaps the only frustration for the uninitiated will be the lack of a consolidated list of abbreviations and a glossary of relevant terms.


Reviewed by Wing Commander Peter Rusbridge.

MORE than thirty years have passed since the outbreak of the Korean War. This is long enough for memories to dim, but perhaps not long enough for passions to cool, partisanship to subside and objectivity to surface. It seems to me that the student of modern history (whatever that may be) treads a most uncertain path through obvious minefields, particularly when some of the major participants in the period he is studying are still around to challenge his conclusions.

The author is not in any way daunted by these unwelcome hazards. Indeed, he has taken every opportunity to interview prominent officials in Australia and overseas over their recollection of events in which they participated. Human beings have a tendency to attribute past successes to good judgement rather than luck and to rationalise past failures as being due to events beyond their control. I do not know how the author coped with these tendencies. However, there is no doubt in my mind that the task he accepted in writing this book was a very challenging one.

Because man is not a machine, total objectivity is impossible. One’s interpretation of events is inevitably coloured by personal inclinations. Kept within bounds, such colouration can add life to an historical work and give it a sense of direction which it might otherwise lack. Any indications of the author’s attitudes to his subject were thus of interest to me. Some of his comments in his preface intrigued me from this point of view in a way which is worthwhile explaining in detail.

An important theme of many of Tolstoi’s historical works is the inability of individuals in any role, capacity or situation to influence major trends or events in history. In ‘War and Peace’, for example, Pierre Bezukhov arrives at the battlefield of Borodino anticipating an organized clash of wills, purposes, strategy and tactics. He expects to find evidence of organization and endeavour directed towards specific ends in a way which is traceable to the two major participants, Napoleon and Kutuzov. In this he is disappointed.

Instead, he finds confusion, disorganization, ignorance, and blunder combined into a pointless and formless collision between two amorphous masses, the outcome of which is unpredictable by rationale means and which is certainly beyond the control of either of the two nominal commanders.

History, says Tolstoi, is pure drift, uncontrollable by any human agency, and undirectable towards a positive end. If there ever was an end, the means certainly do not exist.
Lively debate is possible on this issue. Is Tolstoi right, wrong, or somewhere in between?

It was with this question in mind that I read the following:

'I began this work with the belief that the personalities of politicians, their advisers and the chief external actors have a major impact on the formation of national policy and I had hoped to give some treatment to these matters in this volume. Although I still hold this belief, I have not been able to carry that intention into effect, chiefly because at some twenty-five years’ distance from the events covered the evidence available on these aspects is poor.'

Tolstoi, I suspect, would not be surprised at the author’s failure to justify his belief.

The author goes on to anticipate that better understanding of issues concerning the Korean War will develop as more is written by participants in the war. I do not think that by this he means to go so far as saying that it is too soon to write this book. After all, presumably, he would never have written it if he felt that way. However, as I have already implied, I suspect that it is indeed too soon.

To that extent there is a difference between us. Presumably, therefore, this review is coloured by my prejudice in this regard.

The author has decided to divide the complete history of Australia’s participation in the Korean War into two volumes. This is the first, and it deals with strategy and diplomacy. The second volume yet to be published, will deal with Australia’s contribution on the battle-field. The author’s reasons for dividing up the work in this way are basically sound. Yet alternative arguments could be equally well devised to support a decision to link policy with operations in the one work.

For example, the author of a recently published volume of the history of the Canadian Air Force faced much the same situation as Dr. O’Neill in deciding how to organise his work. He reached the opposite conclusion, and yet I would hesitate to say that one was more successful than the other.

The different approaches, if applied to the same subject, would most probably result in different perceptions of the subject for the reader. One strong impression I derived from this book, probably aided by the layout, was of the artificiality, superficiality and indeed callousness of safe, warm, well-fed politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats point-scoring in complicated, subtle and ultimately pointless manoeuvrings, while in war-torn Korea, cold, hungry and diseased people of many nations were being killed in causes of which they were basically ignorant.

However, I doubt that this was the author’s intention. This is not a polemical anti-war book. Nor is it pro-war either. It is too dispassionate to be anything more than a sober record of the facts known to the author.

Turning to the first of the author’s main themes, I was struck by how little strategy as such was an issue during the war. None of the Allies seemed to have had a true strategic reason for fighting the Korean War. They fought for political reasons to prevent the unification of Korea from taking place under terms unacceptable to the West. It was more of a moral or political crusade rather than an act of strategy as such.

At least, that is what the Allies said in public. I should have thought that the USSR would have felt the existence of a free world toe-hold, thousands of miles in their rear, to be an unacceptable strategic risk. Similarly, I should have expected the West to be interested in maintaining that toe-hold at all costs in order to tie up sufficient Soviet Forces in the Far East to relieve pressure in Europe.

I cannot imagine any strategic or quasi-strategic issue concerning Korea to be more important than that. Yet, only a certain Senator Vincent of the Liberal Party, speaking in an otherwise unusually fatuous debate, even by Parliamentary standards, seems to have raised the issue.

On the other hand, perhaps the issue is too recent to have surfaced yet. Perhaps in one hundred years from now when the strategic issues of the Korean War are viewed from the perspective of that future time, the ‘Asian Second Front’ will have been recognized as dominant.

Of course, other strategic influences outside Korea had their part to play — particularly communist insurgency in South-East Asia. There is some evidence that the USSR, faced with the inevitability of a continued United Nations presence on the peninsula, deliberately extended the truce talks in Panmunjom in order to tie down Western military resources which were badly needed elsewhere, in French Indo-China.
The West, in its attitude of moral rectitude, prolonged the war much longer than would otherwise have been the case over the single issue of voluntary repatriation of prisoners. Apparently this issue was more important than supporting the struggling French in the Red River Delta.

From the author’s account, Australia seems to have taken only marginal interest in these strategic issues. This is understandable in view of the fact that neither of them directly affected Australia’s vital interests.

Exactly what Australia’s vital interest was seems to have been a matter of some debate between the Anglophile Menzies, seeking to maintain ties with Britain and, on the other hand, Percy Spender, whose whole post-war career was dedicated with singular concentration towards achieving a strategic alliance with the United States.

It is over this aspect that strategy becomes inextricably bound up with the author’s other theme of diplomacy. Indeed, one can argue that the bulk of the text describes progress towards the ANZUS treaty, with Australia reluctantly paying the political price of intervention in Korea in return for the United States reluctantly entering into the smallest possible commitment to come to Australia’s aid in times of danger. ANZUS and not Korea dominates the diplomatic aspects of this book.

As for the rest of the diplomatic aspects discussed — and there is a great deal of such discussion — I was irresistibly reminded of Frederick the Great’s aphorism, ‘Diplomacy without armaments is like music without instruments’. Most of Australian diplomatic activity during the period of the War took place amongst the Allies. In this context, the actual influence Australia wielded at any particular moment corresponded directly with how much Australia was able to satisfy the needs of others. The paramount need seems to have been military commitment by Australia to Korea, South-East Asia and the Middle East.

Unfortunately, Australia’s Defence Forces had become so run down following the end of the Second World War that she was unable to satisfy all the military requirements demanded of her. Australian diplomacy was therefore reduced in effectiveness.

The author takes a more optimistic view of Australian diplomacy than this, arguing that individual Australian Government officials were sometimes highly successful in helping to resolve diplomatic issues between the allies. There is no doubt that Australia sometimes articulated a particular line or policy which was subsequently adopted by some other more powerful ally. However, to assume that such adoption resulted from Australian diplomacy is too bold a step for me.

In general, the author has written a book which probably includes too much detail. Sometimes the detail is necessary. There were occasions, for example, when even small delays in the transmission of diplomatic telegrams had a considerable effect on Australia’s public position on issues at critical points in the War. Therefore, a description of how the telegram was handled is relevant. On other occasions, the purpose behind a wealth of apparent trivia is not so clear.

The author’s style is very pleasant and readable. His organization is good. I particularly welcomed his habit of summarising a long and involved chapter with a couple of brief paragraphs at the end, highlighting the main issues discussed. He has researched his subject most painstakingly and his reference and bibliography are excellent.

His judgements are soundly based on the evidence before him, although that does not mean one has to agree with the judgements made. In all, the book is a significant contribution to our current understanding of events surrounding the Korean War.


Reviewed by Jeff Popple, Dept. of Defence.

In his book Sexton has attempted to lay bare the facts behind Australia’s entry into the Vietnam War. His thesis is that Australia entered the war not at the request of the South Vietnamese, nor even really at America’s request, but that it entered the war on its own initiative. Sexton also claims that Australia pressured America into increasing its commitment in Vietnam because an American presence in South-East Asia was seen as being crucial for Australia’s defence. To many readers the claims presented in Sexton’s book will seem outrageous and unbelievable, but in fact they are based upon a governmental report into
Australia’s involvement in Vietnam which was tabled in Parliament in 1975. Sexton appears to have relied substantially upon the report but he has presented the material in a more dramatic and outraged tone and has argued for more drastic conclusions. He has set out the texts of the cables and documents which were only paraphrased in the report. The contents of Sexton’s documents coincide with the paraphrased versions in the report, however, if he had footnoted them and alluded to the report more clearly he might have headed off some of the criticism he received over the validity of his sources. Sexton also uses other documents not appearing in the report, American sources and information gleaned from private correspondence with William Bundy the then US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Sexton argues that Australia’s decision, on 29 April 1965, to send an infantry battalion to fight in Vietnam was not in response to American pressure but that it was an Australian initiative. The Australian Government was totally indifferent to the aims and expectations of the South Vietnamese Government. “Not only was a South Vietnamese ‘invitation’ not sought until the last minute — and then only for cosmetic reasons — but the Australian Government was determined that troops should go even if the South Vietnamese did not want them”. (p1). He also claims that a study of the available documents reveals that certain parts of the Australian Government desired an increased American involvement in the Vietnam conflict at every level, and a significant Australian participation with the Americans. This policy had been formulated before America had any combat troops in Vietnam. Australia wanted American intervention in Vietnam in order to lock them into the South-East Asia region and because the Americans could be put in “a position by Australian assistance in Vietnam where they felt obligated to Australia should it be threatened from any source in or out of the South-East Asian region”. (p2). In order to achieve these aims Australia vigorously pressed for both increased American involvement in Vietnam and for the Americans to request that Australia supply troops.

What Sexton fails to stress is that from 1962 to late 1964 it was America that was pressuring Australia for assistance in Vietnam, although it stopped short of requesting combat troops. Australia only started pressuring America over Vietnam when in late 1964 America appeared to go luke-warm over Vietnam and the Australian Government suddenly realised the benefits that could be gained from US involvement in Vietnam. Sexton also fails to give due prominence to the confrontation with Indonesia. This had become particularly worrying for the Australian Government in late 1964 following Barwick’s blundered attempt to get a guarantee from the Americans that ANZUS would cover a conflict with Indonesia. Also the situation was worsening in Indonesia and the Australian Government feared that it might find itself unsupported in a conflict with Indonesia. In many ways Australia’s involvement in Vietnam could be solely viewed as being a means to gain American assistance over Indonesia. In the final analysis however, it is doubtful that Australian pressure had any influence upon the American decision to send troops to Vietnam.

In addition to setting out his argument Mr Sexton provides several interesting background chapters. Two of which, the one on the domestic political situation and the surprising lack of public debate prior to the decision to send troops, are excellent analyses. On the whole Sexton’s study is a lively and interesting study of the events leading up to Australia’s entry into Vietnam.


In the last decades of the 19th century the Royal Navy struggled to absorb and apply technological advances in ship construction, propulsion and armament which threatened to overturn established ideas of maritime warfare. These advances (the iron hull, steam engine and breech-loading rifled gun) between them altered war at sea in an unparalleled way.

Accounts of the manner in which these inexorable technical changes affected the Royal Navy make fascinating reading whether they trace change through equipment development or personal biography. In the latter category, John Winton’s book traces the life and naval career of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, an officer in the foreground of change in the Royal Navy! Also one holding unprecedented responsibility in wartime.
Jellicoe’s early training and postings as an officer selected for high rank are described in varying detail, but in each posting something of the state of the changing navy can be seen. A valuable feature of the book for readers without background knowledge of the period is the inclusion of explanations sufficiently detailed to enlighten but not distract. Naturally more space is devoted to his activities in China during the Boxer Rebellion when Jellicoe was severely wounded. During a multi-national naval expedition in China this future Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet became friendly with officers from many nations, particularly those from Germany. He valued these friendships and visited Germany until their navies opposed each other in the First World War and Jellicoe’s career reached its climax.

The largest single part of the book is devoted to Jellicoe’s wartime career when he held the two most responsible positions in the Royal Navy. Positions which were very much in the public eye anyway and were made more so by controversy during and after the war. Jellicoe became Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, containing the majority of British naval strength, at the outbreak of the war and largely bore the public reaction when the Grand Fleet did not meet the German High Seas Fleet in a historic and decisive battle early in the war. The apparently inconclusive result of this battle, when it did take place at Jutland in May 1916, led to the post-war Jutland Controversy over whether the Royal Navy, and particularly Jellicoe, could have done better.

Winton clearly and impartially describes the Battle of Jutland and the Admiralty’s contribution to public confusion over who won. Despite unpalatable losses of British ships and German claims to victory, there can be no doubt that, judged by possession of the battlefield and willingness to continue fighting, the Royal Navy defeated the High Seas Fleet which sneaked away under cover of darkness and dared not leave its base again. Jellicoe’s remarkable tactical sense at Jutland is rightly extolled but his equally important failing in not training his captains to report the enemy is fully described but not equally emphasised. Poor enemy contact reporting was a major failing in the Grand Fleet at Jutland and one for which the Commander-in-Chief must bear responsibility.

Jutland ended the primacy of the battleship in this war since the High Seas Fleet defeat in that battle prompted the German Navy to concentrate on submarine warfare. Jellicoe had become First Sea Lord by the time this anti-commerce warfare was seriously affecting the British war effort. His opposition to the introduction of convoy, his pessimism and deep fatigue after moving from the strenuous Grand Fleet posting to an arduous Admiralty appointment, are well portrayed. Deep-seated reluctance to delegate responsibility increased the strain of his service as First Sea Lord which ended abruptly in a cunning replacement while the war continued.

Jellicoe’s last official naval service was his post-war Empire Mission which took him around the world advising Empire members on their naval defences. Changing economic and political factors combined with a lack of clear Admiralty strategic policy to render much of Jellicoe’s work on this mission ineffective but this did not reduce the strain. He was treated as a very important visitor and feted wherever he went; this treatment he found very tiring and he looked forward to the end.

He returned to England early in 1920 but almost immediately returned to New Zealand as Governor-General for four years before retiring to the Isle of Wight. In retirement he continued an active life of public service until his death in 1935.

This impartial biography is not an academic work replete with copious footnotes (although sources are listed for each chapter) but it does realistically portray a man who was part of the changing Royal Navy. More importantly, this man carried unprecedented wartime responsibility for British naval power. The picture Winton portrays of him is a clear one which I invite readers to see for themselves.


Reviewed by Major D. T. Read, 3 RAR

THIS book represents a milestone in Australia’s Military development. As one of the contributors, Dr Robert O’Neill, points out, it would have been unthinkable ten years ago that a group of service officers should have been permitted to join with academics in
publicly expressing views on the military as a profession in Australia.

It sets a fine example of scholarly research, opinions and recommendations which, hopefully, will serve as a basis for future works by serving officers and a source of inspiration for students in the profession of arms.

It is divided into two parts. The first part looks at the formulation of defence policy, in particular at the roles played by military officers in making policy decisions. The second part deals with education and training of military officers.

As Dr Hugh Smith states in the first chapter that public debate is important if alternative views and options are to see the light of day. It is a means of remaining in communication with the society which we serve and in being healthy as a profession.

The serving officers who have contributed to this book are Lieutenant Colonels P. A. Mench and N. A. Jans, and Majors G. L. Cheeseman and K. R. Sydney. Their contributions to this book confirm many of their previous submissions to, and references by the Regular Officer Development Committee in its reports.

The contribution of officers to defence policy is becoming increasingly important — if not as important as operational experience. This greater involvement in bureaucratic decision making requires a more adequate understanding of the political, social, and scientific framework within which serving officers are required to work. Drs Smith and Mediansky highlight this area of expertise effectively, and it is to be hoped that future career development, addressed in later chapters, will take account of this.

Desmond Ball, a Senior Research Fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, makes some highly pertinent observations in the areas of Defence Hardware procurement and Mobilisation. He cites the fact that there is still no official study of specific defence requirements and actual force structure for defending Continental Australia against foreign attack. He indicates the need for a joint operations room to be activated and continually manned, the lack of preparations for mobilisation and the "grey area" of political/military interaction between the Secretary and the CDFS.

Part two of the book is of direct concern to all officers as it covers the options upon which the future education and career development of officers will be based, not only for the Army but to some extent the Navy and Air Force also.

Lieutenant Colonel Mench describes the approach of the three services to Officer education which has ended up by improvisation in a less than adequate posture. The emergence of ADFA is a step towards providing a firm footing upon which to build a rational education system.

He stresses the need for an approach which looks to a continuing program of education throughout an officer’s career, and the opportunity for post graduate research in Strategic and Defence Studies.

Lieutenant Colonel Jans and Majors Cheeseman and Sydney have argued the case for specialization in career planning and development. It is interesting to note that Lieutenant Colonel Jans is currently employed in the Personnel Branch at Army Office, dealing with Officer training development. Who says the system doesn’t work?

Their recommendations really confirm the need for career development which takes account of the expertise required in the earlier chapters of the book. By a process of gradual internal reform the changes proposed appear to offer an effective solution to the problem.

Perhaps the most readable and pertinent comments in the book are made in the last chapter. Dr Robert O’Neill gives an excellent summary of the development of the Australian Military Forces since colonisation to the present day. He makes the point that, as individuals, Service Officers must learn to acquire competence and confidence by engaging in intellectually challenging activities with their seniors, their peers, their juniors, and with a wide range of the civil community. To those who would agree with these sentiments, this book recommends itself.

FRED: AN AUSTRALIAN HERO by Peter Sekuless, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1981, pp. x + 174, illustrations, cloth $12.95.

Reviewed by Peter Dennis, Senior Lecturer in History, UNSW at Duntroon.

THE “Australian hero” of this book is Fred March, who was born at Gundaroo, a few miles from Yass, in 1881. As a young
man he escaped the stifling boredom of a country life by working his passage to the United States, where for a few years he worked in the Cadillac division of General Motors. Returning to Australia he drove for a hire car firm in New South Wales, and then ran a travelling silent film show. He later claimed that he served with the Australians at Gallipoli, although official records — admittedly not always as reliable as historians would wish them to be — do not bear this out. After the war he decided to stay on in the Middle East rather than return to a humdrum life in Australia. His experience with cars got him a job in a hire car firm in Cairo, where it was his fortune to be driver of the car in which the Governor General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, Major General Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated by nationalists. March’s courage under fire earned him the Empire Gallantry Medal (which later became the George Cross) and a reward, which he used to buy his own Cairo garage. For the next few years he enjoyed the good life, but by the mid-thirties the money had run out and his business had collapsed. According to his own story he enlisted with the Australian Army in the Middle East in the Second World War, but again neither Australian nor British records have any trace of him. After the war he stayed on in the Sudan building water storage ponds. By 1956 he was ready to retire to Italy, there to settle down with the woman to whom he had been sending money for some years to establish a nest-egg. He settled in Khartoum, married an Italo-Ethiopian woman, and eked out a precarious existence until the Australian Government, acting after pressure from the RSL and other interested groups, granted him a pension for his war services. He died in 1977, leaving behind a string of medals, including the Croix de Guerre and the Serbian Eagle, most of which cannot be verified as having been awarded to him.

As the subject of an article in a magazine or newspaper there might have been enough in this bare outline to make something worth writing. But as a book, even a short one such as this, it makes very thin reading. March seems to have been neither very interesting, except in his willingness to embroider the facts, nor outstandingly courageous in a way that would justify calling him an Australian “hero” without running the risk of hopelessly devaluing the term. However, he can hardly be blamed for this book, having studiously avoided publicity in the latter part of his life to the point of utterly refusing to approach the Australian Government for a pension.

The fault lies squarely with the author, who has used a mildly interesting side-note to foist upon the unsuspecting reader a monstrously overblown story in which it seems that the hero is not so much the unfortunate March but the author himself. First we are saddled with a mainly fictitious account of March’s life up to his moment of glory in 1924: that together with Bernard Freyberg he fought in the Mexican Civil War on the side of Pancho Villa; that they subsequently joined the Royal Naval Division and participated in the raid on Antwerp; that they helped bury the poet Rupert Brooke on the island of Skyros; that at Gallipoli March helped Freyberg in a raid on the Turkish beach defences; and that after being wounded there he joined Lawrence of Arabia, and at the end of the war found himself in Egypt. For all of this, the author cheekily admits, there is not a shred of evidence, and much of it — for example the Pancho Villa and Rupert Brooke episodes — he cheerfully confesses he has himself made up.

The object of this ripping tale, it seems, is to set the stage for the author’s own exploits in uncovering the real Fred March. Hence the chapters are portentously titled: “An Australian Legend” (in which the hapless reader is sucked into the mystery), “The Unmasking of an Australian Legend” (in which all is exposed — or is it?), “The Death of an Australian Legend” (where the author’s hopes are shattered), and “In Search of an Australian Hero” (in which one hero discovers another, albeit posthumously). We are subjected to a blow-by-blow account of the author’s struggle to uncover the “truth” and to secure justice for Fred’s widow. He battles with unfeeling bureaucracy, with the “turgid sludge” that was the open drain outside Khartoum’s Sudan Club, and with the food of Air Egypt. His spirit undaunted, however, our contemporary hero follows the trail wherever it leads. The travelogue sections of the book have a peculiar nastiness: they must rank as some of the most gauche, if not boorish, that I have ever read.
Consider this description, which likens Khartoum Airport to a fishing vessel:

The net in this case was an Alitalia jet; the catch an assortment of European, American and other white businessmen, officials, diplomats; the deck a collection of ramshackle buildings euphemistically called Khartoum Airport, staffed by rude, non-English-speaking Arabs and Africans. The mores of polite society were forgotten as terrified white men jostled one another and shouted at uncomprehending Sudanese in a vain attempt to get to the Khartoum Hilton or some other oasis as quickly as possible.

Or this on his arrival in Turkey:

I had asked the travel agent to book me into a first-class hotel, so I had only myself to blame for the Istanbul Hilton, where the staff were incomparably unhelpful. A taxi-driver was more helpful in directing me, and I was soon on a bus faced with six hours cooped up with fifty Turks chain smoking their foul cigarettes.

What a dreadful experience it must have been; how brave the author was to venture among the natives. Had the question of an Australian passport for Fred’s widow not been one of the issues at stake the author might well have done the Australian image a great service and stayed at home.

Not the least irritating feature of this book is the author’s suggestion that Fred deserves to be ranked with such Australian “heroes” as Breaker Morant. Notwithstanding the romantic gloss of the film, Morant was a liar and a drunk, and was imbued with a streak of savage cruelty. Fred March may not have ridden with Lawrence of Arabia or been at Gallipoli, and his last year’s were increasingly given over to drink, but he doesn’t deserve that.


Reviewed by Richard Pelvin, DLO-A.

Few aircraft have attracted as much public attention and indeed notoriety as the B-52 Stratofortress. Over the quarter century it has been in USAF service it has become despised or respected as a symbol of U.S. military strength.

In this book Mr. Boyne has set out to tell the story of the B-52 and succeeded admirably. He is well qualified to write such a book, being a much-respected air historian, a former B-52 pilot and Assistant Director of the U.S. National Air and Space Museum.

He commences his account by providing a concise overview of American heavy bomber development from the end of the First World War until the B-50. He devotes a chapter to the B-47 and its unsuccessful rivals and then comes to the B-52, covering well its initial design, development and entry into service. Each model of the bomber is described with the much later and quite different G and H models filling a separate chapter.

The B-52’s service career is outlined from the early days of creating new records to the operations over Vietnam and the final culmination of the devastating Linebacker II operations of December 1972. SAC went to extraordinary lengths to obtain the maximum effort over Hanoi and Mr. Boyne vividly tells of aircraft continuing their mission with two engines out and of maintenance crews continuing their tasks in the aircraft as it proceeded to Hanoi.

Mr. Boyne contends that after the success of Linebacker II in forcing the North Vietnamese to return to the conference table, continued bombing would have forced their surrender. This conclusion is perhaps taking conclusions drawn from the success of Linebacker a bit too far. The North Vietnamese had shown themselves over thirty years of warfare to be extremely tough and there is some doubt whether the USAF could have kept up the exceptional effort required to maintain just eleven days of bombing. It is also doubtful whether “surrender” would have much meaning to the Hanoi government after the U.S. forces had departed.

The book has an interesting chapter on the weapons used by the B-52, covering its guns, iron bombs and various decoy and stand-off missiles, including the highly controversial Skybolt.

Mr. Boyne’s style of writing is highly readable and seasoned with a light touch of humour. The book itself is beautifully illustrated with many clear, interesting photographs complementing the text superbly. There are also many excellent diagrams.