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HMAS Jervis Bay at sea
GUARDING WHITE AUSTRALIA

Dear Sir,

May I add a little to Major Hall's "Guarding White Australia"? (in DFJ issue 29). Yes, I made a serious omission when I failed to describe the role the Aborigines played when I described the operation of the North Australia Observer Unit (in DFJ issue 14). It was a neglect which was pointed out to me almost at once in 1979, when the article was published, because the long range patrols depended on Stanner's old Aboriginal friends being able to help the unit. In one of the earlier drafts of the article (which were much longer than the published article) I had written an extra half-page on the War Establishment and in it I discussed how the WE included an anthropologist with the rank of Captain and another anthropologist with the rank of Lieutenant; that is, two anthropologists as well as Stanner, who was one, just as Donald Thomson was, in his NT Coastal Reconnaissance Unit. There were to effect the Aboriginal liaison by NAOU throughout the deep bush after the Japanese landed and the NAOU took on its intimate reconnaissance role as distinct from its coastal surveillance duties. I went on to discuss the attached personnel (as distinct from attested enlisted personnel) who were shown in the NAOU WE as being 15 Sergeant-guides seconded from the NT Police. These were white officers, of course, and were attached on the basis of one to each platoon with the dual role of guide and advisor/director of the NAOU's Aborigines. The actual strength of the Aborigines with the NAOU varied from district to district and from season to season. In the WE they were included as "Native personnel may be employed as necessary".

The platoon in which I served (that is No. 6 Platoon of B Company) in the NAOU, the Aborigine whom I best remember was 'Lightning'. He taught me most of my bushcraft and I did not forget him and I did mention him in the article (see "A Bush Scout's Diary" on page 25 of DFJ No. 14) when I was out on a patrol of hundreds of miles from Timber Creek to Blunder Bay and back with Lightning as our tracker. I should well have mentioned on page 23 that the wet-season patrol from the Forrest River to Drysdale was successful because of the help of the aborigines from the Forrest River Mission for half the way, and of those from Drysdale Mission for the rest. I, personally, can never forget the aid of the Aborigines and so I am very glad Major Hall has now shown for all of us how important the role of the Aborigines was in the instant-danger days of 1942.

On the subject of omissions in my article on NAOU in DFJ issue 14, it has been pointed out why did I not list the sixty or so patrol areas and watching-posts which the NAOU used in 1942. The reason was that I believed that the actual map references of these still had some surveillance integrity today. No doubt Lt. Col. J. George, Commanding Officer NORFORCE ARES, has all the information on these he requires and hence the details were well left out of a general article.

Major Hall mentions that little is known of the Naval Unit based on Melville and Bathurst Islands. The best reference to this is in Chapter XI of "Darwin Drama", which was written by Owen Griffiths at the end of his tour of duty at Darwin in 1941-42. The book does turn up in some service libraries but is otherwise unavailable.

There is a story of Donald Thomson and his unit and his ketch, the AROETTA, which I hope Major Hall will not mind me telling. Thomson and Stanner (of NAOU) were old friends and both were anthropologists. One night in the Gulf of Carpentaria, Thomson in the AROETTA, sailed in and headed up the Roper River. HE AND HIS MEN considered they owned the sea and the rivers in the Gulf. But Stanner said this was nonsense because HE AND NAOU owned the land AND the sea AND the rivers. The NAOU outpost ordered the AROETTA to stop. Thomson refused to respond to the NAOU signals and sailed on. "It MIGHT be Japs," said the NAOU, and opened up with their Bren and at least one bullet hit the AROETTA. Thomson stopped the AROETTA so fast there were skid marks on the water for days after. Thomson complained so eloquently later to General Stevens (who was the GOC NT Force at the time) that Stanner was carpeted. There was no formal reprimand but Stevens told Stanner...
there was such a thing as too much zeal, from which Stanner's men deduced that they had been in the right.

Of interest in the WE of NAOU, there is also the fact that the NAOU had, as well as all the horses which I wrote about, no less than twenty-one motor-bikes and bicycles. I served about two years in the NAOU in those days and it painted such a picture of North Australia, and in such colours, upon my heart, that it has never been forgotten.

In the epilogue to my article (page 30, DFJ issue 14), I commented upon an article in the Australian Army newspaper ARMY, describing Stanner, the NAOU and today's SASR. That was in 1979. Today, the tradition goes on in the new Army Reserve unit, "NORFORCE".

AMOURY VANE, Captain

JAPAN AND USA — 1941

Dear Sir,

The article by WO2 T. Bradley (DFJ No. 29, July/August 1981), "The Factors Which Led Japan to War with the U.S. in 1941", is an over-simplification of the situation. I would like to highlight both his failure to consider some important factors and the relative importance attached to some aspects.

His opening paragraph reveals a glaring, but relatively common, error. He suggests that a major factor was "the militarist character of the Japanese people". While it was fashionable in the 1930 and 1940s to label Fascism or, for that matter, any extreme expression of "national feeling", as the logical outcome of the innate aggression of some races, this theory has been completely discredited since. Not only has it been shown to be untenable in any situation, but it has also been revealed as a completely inadequate explanation for what happened in Japan.

A great deal of responsibility for Japan's military adventures in the 1930s and 1940s lay with the very origins of its industrial revolution. The early industrialists were invariably members of the old Samurai families, who found that the business world required many of the personal qualities demanded of a warrior in former times.

By the 1920s they had been so successful that many had achieved considerable political influence. Japan did not, as the article suggests, "acquiesce to the military's control over the Government". In fact, the two were one and the same thing. Their interests, sympathies and loyalties were so completely in harmony, that matters of foreign policy, military policy and economic policy were invariably seen as interdependent.

The writer is correct in seeing the Emperor as a mere puppet. The fact that he was retained as such, however, is an indication of his value to the Government as a focus for public loyalty and devotion. When the Japanese people so willingly supported the war it was the Emperor they were supporting. It was not, as the writer suggests, an expression of their "militarist character". Had the Japanese been essentially militarist the Government's continued use of the Emperor as a focus for national unity would have been unnecessary.

The economic questions raised in the article are limited in their scope. A vital factor in Japan's foreign policy in the 1930s was the interdependence referred to above. Whatever the ethics of the situation, neither industry nor the military could afford to see the other decline. By 1930 they were utterly committed to each other's continued success.

It is important to remember, too, that trade embargoes affected much more than the supply of raw materials. In the early stages of industrialisation a nation requires ready and continuing supplies of capital for investment. There is a limit to the amount of capital which can be generated by an essentially agrarian, subsistence economy, as attempts to finance industrial development in the late 19th century by bleeding the agricultural sector dry, had shown. The revenue from cheap, mass-produced exports, which was so critical to the economy, virtually dried up with the trade bans in the 1930s. By that time Japan's future survival depended on continued overseas trade. Her reaction to the embargoes was inevitable.

A final, and perhaps the most important, factor was the international political climate, which certainly favoured the expansionist. All of the world's major powers had either gone to war in recent years to protect or advance their own territorial interests, or had participated in the systematic carving up of the defeated powers at Versailles. Japan could be excused for thinking that such behaviour was expected of a great power, or of an aspirant to the title.
They must also have received a great deal of encouragement from the acquiescence of others — by the Allies towards Germany and Italy, and by the U.S. towards Japan, the latter of course referring to the failure of the U.S. to act on information about Japanese war plans.

The treatment of Japanese immigrants to the U.S., while of some nuisance value, can hardly be considered a major factor, as this article suggests. It pales into insignificance beside the economic and political factors at work in Japan.

All the ingredients for war existed in Japan in the 1930s — the means, the motive and, what is more important, a reasonable chance of success. Faced with the alternatives — ignominious retreat and economic collapse — the decision to attack the U.S. was inevitable.

JOHN R. LEONARD
FLTLT

MARKSMANSHIP IN AUSTRALIA

Dear Sir,

I was most intrigued by W. G. Wright’s letter (DFJ29) in reply to Major Burkhill’s article on ‘Marksmanship In Australia’.

Especially so were his remarks that Major Burkhill “advocates doing away with the formality of joining the army” and “if all else fails, kill anyone we don’t want”. I re-read the original, but must have missed them as they couldn’t be found.

I have never thought of the members of the rifle clubs being a deterrent, but with the paucity of defence spending and continual cutbacks, perhaps it is a thought.

As the Staff Officer in the Department of Defence looking after the Ministers interests, what efforts are being made to make the rifle club movement provide a more useful contribution?

We are all aware that many rifle club members are of an age where no contribution could be made. We are also aware that with the introduction of the SLR the clubs and Army tended to go separate ways. A move to bring them together again is through the Tri-Services competition. The Tri-Service is a worthy effort to introduce a day’s service rifle shooting into each of the Eastern States Rifle Association’s Queen’s Medal competition and is becoming a widely recognized competition for Army shooters.

One of the originators, of course, was Major Burkhill, not Mr Wright, and the organization is being fostered by Lt. Col. Brian Hodge, Shooting Rep. 2MD.

When the Australian Army finally recognized the need for a sniper rifle, the rifle selected was a civilian type match rifle which had developed to a high state of efficiency through years of club match experience. A telescopic sight was added and we had a first class sniper rifle.

If Mr Wright cares to peruse Army Staff Instruction 5/79 on “Rifle Shooting, Training Competitions”, he will surely note in practices and training progression laid down a marked influence of the tried methods of club use of the classification range which have stood the test of time. These methods of range management were never abandoned by the clubs as the Army did with trying to use technology rather than proven procedures of training.

Any student of military history will tell Mr Wright that effectiveness of armies has always depended on the disciplined weapon skill of its individual soldiers. Major Burkhill referred to this. Let me only say that the vast numbers of rifle ranges built all over Australia, in many remote country towns, are all attributable to the hurt the Brits received at the hands of the Boer riflemen, hunters and shooters from childhood. It seemed a lesson had been learned, but time has a way of dimming history.

One statement was correct. The rifle clubs are self-supporting and autonomous. They therefore provide a solid base of experience and source of training the Army can well utilize.

As an example, two Army Queen’s Medal winners I know personally, are regular club shooters as are a high percentage of the selected top 20 participators.

In 1980, some 4 members of Newcastle Army Reserve Units (3 from 1 unit alone) fired qualifying scores for selection (this is 20% of the magic 20). Only 2 shot because of paper work lost and work commitments, but all showed they had the skill. All 4 were members of rifle clubs and had developed their skills in their own time and at their own expense. They could not have done this without a rifle club being there. Thank you, Mr Wright, for not closing it down (yet!).
Mr Wright says a reserve of sharpshooters should be developed in the Army Reserve. With one range practice a year, this will be difficult, as few reserve soldiers would live that long.

Mr Wright says other sports provide useful skills. Perhaps so. Perhaps he should transfer to the Ministry for Yachting with an office in Alice Springs so he wouldn't have to get too involved and let the people who are trying to foster service rifle shooting skills get some support and encouragement. Skill with his personal weapon is skill the soldier's basic skill and the rifle clubs can assist in a positive manner by providing extra opportunities that would not normally be available in the service.

ATHOL PARKER
Maj. (RL) (Formerly 2RNSWR)
S.E.E. for Newcastle Army Reserve Rifle Association
Member BHP Rifle Club, Newcastle

Dear Sir,

I believe Mr Wright, "Marksmanship in Australia" DFJ Jul/Aug 81, has missed the point of Alan Burkhill's article on this subject. This would not be a matter of much concern if he were not "the Staff Officer in the Department of Defence... associated with the task of looking after the Minister's interests where Rifle Clubs are concerned".

Rifle Clubs contribute both directly and indirectly to the quality of marksmanship in the services.

Firstly, a number of servicemen are members of the clubs, and the benefit they derive from this is apparent in the proportion of such shooters heading up the prize lists in service rifle competitions and awards.

Secondly, Rifle Clubs represent a pool of knowledge and expertise which is available to those who wish to consult it. It is not available in the Department of Defence to any similar extent.

Thirdly, Rifle Clubs keep rifle ranges open and working. Rifle ranges suitable for military training are becoming a scarce resource.

The wisdom of fostering the tie between the Department of Defence and Rifle clubs by every possible means, including those appropriately noted by Alan Burkhill, is apparent, but only if a basic assumption is accepted. This is that marksmanship is a critical skill to the serviceman. Does Mr Wright accept this? If not, is his a personal view or an expression of Departmental policy?

B. J. HODGE
LTCOL
Army Office/2MD Rifle Shooting Representative

Dear Sir,

In coming to the support of a Service colleague, your two correspondents Wing Commander M. J. Burke and Major G. L. Mincham (DFJ No. 31) have preferred the traditional method of concluding an Officer's Mess argument, namely resort to personal denigration rather than the exercise of logic.

The essence of Major A. R. Burkhill's argument is that Defence should do more for the rifle shooting movement in Australia than it does. Drawing attention to the existence of the Australian Rifle Club Regulations as they are presently written ignores the fact that for some time a process has been in operation to change these Regulations at the request of the body governing Rifle Clubs so that they will reflect the situation which presently exists between Defence and the NRAA.

The purpose of my rejoinder to Major Burkhill was to express what I understand to be the Minister's view of the relationship between Defence and the NRAA, a relationship which the NRAA accepts even if some members of civilian rifle clubs do not. The degree to which the Department assists the NRAA in representations to Government about a multiplicity of matters is clearly not appreciated by your other correspondents.

I am well aware of the desire of sportsmen with ability to shine in the company of their peers, and have noted in recent years the generous support given by successive Chiefs of Staff to the participation by Service personnel in international sporting events. While these activities are great morale boosters, it would be stretching the bounds of credibility to suggest that they have an impact on Australia's defence preparedness which requires among other things special military training independent of external activities.

If I am blissfully ignorant of the contribution that Australian Rifle Clubs make towards improving marksmanship skills of Australian servicemen and servicewomen, I suggest that
I have been in good company with the top echelons of the Australian Army since 1959 when the decisions were first taken that the Rifle Clubs in their relationships with the Government should have the same status as other sporting bodies.

It is time that the activities of the Australian Rifle Club movement and other small arms clubs are recognised for what they are: sporting recreations, no more and no less.

W. G. WRIGHT

Dear Sir,

The article “An Alternative to ANZUS” (DFJ No 29) by SQNLDR P. Harradine bases its recommendations for Australia’s future defence strategy on two assumptions:

a. that Australia could establish a significant politico-economic relationship with the ASEAN group, and

b. that, were such a relationship possible, it would constitute a reasonable alternative to ANZUS.

I would contend that either assumption is valid.

Australia’s Relations with ASEAN

It is too easy to see our present differences of opinion with ASEAN as simply the products of specific, and therefore temporary, issues or personality clashes. In fact, we share little, if anything, with ASEAN, apart from location and even there we are very much on the fringe of its sphere of influence.

We cannot comprehend, however, good our intentions, the vast differences between individual members of ASEAN, let alone between ourselves and ASEAN. While it is convenient to speak glibly of South-East Asia as though it really exists as an identifiable unit, in fact the reverse is true. In terms of language, religion, cultural and political history and economic development, there are so few similarities, and its own unity so fragile, that it could hardly constitute a serious relief of Australian anxieties in the region.

We have recently been made aware of the difficulty that Japanese businessmen have in understanding the Australian “work” ethic, and we are regularly treated to documentaries which marvel at the peculiarly Japanese traits which have fostered its economic revival. If Japan, the Asian country which has come closest to embracing Western values and lifestyles, is so incomprehensible to us, how can we hope to come to terms with the intricacies of other more traditional Asian cultures.

Our economic relations, of course, are yet another matter. We find it difficult to export to Asian countries because they can ill-afford the prices that our higher standard of living demands. We find it equally difficult to import relatively cheaper goods from Asia because they threaten the survival of our own manufacturers. While the extent of Australian trade with Asia would suggest a degree of mutual economic interest, in reality the relationship is rather fragile.

ASEAN as an Alternative to ANZUS

Let us assume, however, that it is possible, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, for Australia to develop close ties with SE Asia. The critical question then becomes — to what extent will these ties protect us from the threats that ANZUS seems unable or unwilling to meet?

It is a cruel, hard fact of life that governments are motivated principally by self-interest. Indeed, why shouldn’t they be when their primary duty is to strive to achieve the national goals of their citizens? A nation can only be expected to support its neighbours if doing so will protect or further its own interests. To expect a group of countries whose individual interests often conflict with those of others in the group, to collectively support another whose interests put it at least on the fringe of, and probably outside, the group is rather optimistic to say the least.

Mention is made of the EEC, as though it might serve as some sort of model for ASEAN. The comparison, however, is rather superficial since it ignores the fact that the EEC developed in a region where cultural, linguistic, economic and political ties enabled it to happen, and where close proximity and a century of terrible conflict forced it to happen. Those pre-requisites do not exist in SE Asia.

By all means let us foster harmony and prosperity in our region, for to do so is to further our own interests. Let us not, however, expect that an alliance, however fragile, with one of the super-powers can be replaced by a tentative liaison with a loose collection of individual countries so pre-occupied with their own survival that they would find little reason to fight for ours.

J. R. LEONARD,
FTLT
INSTRUCTIONAL NEEDS OF CMF RECRUITS IN THEIR INITIAL TRAINING PERIOD

Dear Sir,

It is indeed with interest that I have read the original article on this subject presented by Mr Trevor Cook (Issue No 27) and the reply made by SGT Graeme Withers (Issue 31).

I do not know what instructional experience Mr Cook and SGT Withers have had, but to a reader who has been in the field for much of my service, it would appear that neither author has addressed themselves to the problems which confront the instructor in the environment depicted.

Mr Cook has sought to prove to readers that it is necessary to possess a certain education standard, acquired at a tertiary training institution preferably, before instructional duties can be undertaken whereas SGT Withers has defended the present system without explaining how the standards of training are a reflection on the instructors ability.

The fact that the training standards of Army Reserve recruits is directly proportional to the standards displayed by the instructors has not gone unnoticed. The Army has instituted a series of Instructor Development courses to correct this anomaly, beause the standard of some Army Reserve recruit training instructors is scarcely better than that of the recruits under instruction.

The Army way of life and hierarchical structure do not interfere with competent instructional techniques as is argued by Mr Cook. Indeed, we have developed our expertise to such high standards that the Army Instructional Teams are in constant demand in civil and government enterprises to impart this knowledge. The Systems Approach to Training is the result of this expertise.

Instructing is an art and not an exact science. The methods which are employed of course will vary according to the type and standard of class. The key to the success of any period of instruction is, primarily, a clear definition of the training objective. It must be concise, limited and simple and related to the time available to the individuals to be taught. The instructor will be cognizant of this prior to commencing his task.

I certainly do not subscribe to the philosophy of using fear, or fear of punishment as a teaching medium because the assimilation of instruction by some recruits is below an acceptable standard in the eyes of the instructor. Trevor Cook should know better, being in the NSW Dept of Education, which is teacher-oriented.

Frequently an officer or NCO is faced with teaching individuals who may not be particularly interested in learning. The onus is then firmly on the instructor to arouse their interest and make them want to learn. No person can be forced to learn; discipline will ensure he listens and takes part in the instruction, but learning and remembering is a voluntry process.

The purpose of training is to increase a soldier's knowledge and skill. If the training is to meet that purpose, certain conditions must apply and the soldier must:

a. realize that he needs training,
b. understand what he is expected to learn,
c. have an opportunity to practise what he has learned,
d. get reinforcement that he, in fact, is learning,
e. progress through training presented in a logical sequence, and
f. be willing to learn.

The Army system of training is performance-oriented, which in turn is characterized by training objectives which state precisely what the soldier must do upon completion of training. A properly structured training objective has three elements:

a. performance,
b. conditions, and
c. standards.

From these the soldier, in this case the Army Reserve recruit, knows what he must learn to achieve the required standards. Thus the first two conditions of learning are established through the use of training objectives. Additionally the training manager and instructor readily understand the purpose of training by the explicit nature of training objectives. Perhaps this is what Mr Cook is trying to allude to in his article.

Training is student, or soldier, oriented rather than instructor-oriented and in performance-oriented training, soldiers perform job or duty related performances under the conditions specified until they demonstrate a level of

Letters continued on p. 46
THE NEED TO END RAMPANT WEAPONS DUPLICATION

By Dr. G. L. Williams, Dept. of Social Sciences, W.A. Institute of Technology

The North Atlantic Alliance will face a great challenge to its integrity during the 1980s. The increased strength of the Warsaw Pact constitutes a greater capability than at any time over the last thirty years or so. Meanwhile, NATO members have sought to pursue their economic interests and security interests in the expectation that increases in expenditures for defence would not be sustained.

The pursuit of national economic and technological interests has resulted in massive military-industrial duplication within the Alliance, with consequent rampant proliferation of equipment and loss of military effectiveness. Thus, there is now great cause for concern that independent members of the Alliance may not be able to act swiftly and effectively in their common interest.

Even if the Warsaw Pact capabilities were not growing, a more effective and sensible allocation of the defence resources of the Alliance would be relevant in terms of increasing military effectiveness. There is a manifest need to reduce divisive competition among the Allies for arms sales, and a growing need to strengthen political and economic relations between the United States, Canada and Western Europe. The Alliance’s purpose, after all, is to enhance the capability of the NATO forces to contain a Warsaw Pact attack, and thus seek to deter such an attack within the realistic resources available for defence.

Dr. Williams is the Head of School of Social Sciences and Chairman of the WAIT Strategic and Defence Studies Unit, Department of Social Sciences. He has published six books on defence and is a former NATO Defence Fellow 1974/75.

Article received January 1981

Standardization has a common and special meaning throughout NATO and relates to the adoption of common military concepts and doctrines. A common infrastructure linking national systems has come into existence over the years which has led to sustained interaction and interpretation with and between member states. The process has assured that the various national forces are able to operate together effectively and support one another. In short, NATO has sought the adoption of common standards to promote interoperability of its forces and equipment — with hoped for benefits to military force effectiveness. However, a more comprehensive use of the term involves a more sustained process. This would relate to common items of equipment, components and parts for systems, and maintenance and training systems in a way that assures the most economical and efficient use of research, development, production and logistic resources of the Alliance.

It is clear that significant military and economic benefits would be available to the Alliance through the relentless implementation in standardization. Standardization, in its broadest sense, as well as in its more narrow sense as interoperability has thus provided a basis for a more ambitious approach. This more ambitious approach has involved frequent attempts to achieve economic cooperation in the development, production and procurement of military equipment — economic cooperation which embodies military trade as a major component.

In order to gain results, efforts have been made to get the heads of member Governments to place a top priority on achieving standardization. But so far real progress has been sporadic and disappointing.

The Europeans must in the 1980s move towards rationalization of their arms production and procurement, in a framework of cooperation with the United States and
Canada. Continued participation of France in the European Program Group should be encouraged.

It is now widely recognized that Alliance strength does not mean just military forces, but is based upon sustained economic growth within all the member nations.

Military leaders and organizations within the Alliance must play their part in the pursuit of common doctrine, tactics and weapon requirements.

Industrial leaders and organizations from all member nations must be urged in the 1980s to reach understandings and develop practices which reduce the technical obstacles to cooperation.

There is a widespread belief that the NATO forces in quantitative size and defence expenditures are inadequate to face the Warsaw Pact. Also the excellence of equipment, readiness of forces, and ability to operate together are all on the curve of diminishing returns.

The challenge to the Alliance will therefore grow over the next 10 years. The opportunities for Alliance renewal are also pressing but this renewal, within relative expenditure ceilings, will require sustained political leadership at the highest possible level.

Over this decade interoperability and standardization of arms and equipment must be relentlessly pursued in order to gain the military effectiveness from forces which can operate and support one another. The economic burden of maintaining the necessary conventional strength should be shared by NATO members.

Standardization, a macroeconomic problem involving the jobs, industrial base and technological futures of the member countries, must be solved through economic means such as military trade and shared production.

In the interest of the Alliance as a whole Western Europe must maintain a technically advanced, industrially productive, and economically viable European defense industry. Western Europe must avoid being forced to fall back on the production of less sophisticated types of equipment or merely purchasing licenses or being a subcontractor for the equipment it requires for the members' forces. Inevitably, this must mean increased emphasis on cost-effectiveness within the research and development programs of the European members of the Alliance.

Powerful mechanisms need to be created within the Alliance to determine and implement common military requirements. International industrial cooperation ought to be promoted by making the selection and contract award process compatible among Alliance members.

Top priority must be given to defence and economic policy as key areas of cooperation, with the period ahead offering opportunities and challenges akin to those in the period after World War II.

ANNUAL PRIZES 1981

The Board of Management of the Defence Force Journal has awarded the prizes for the best original articles of the year (issues No. 26 to 31) to:

1st Prize ($200) — Australia's Strategic Environment:
    A Wider Perspective
    By Lieutenant Colonel J. Wood
    (Issue No. 31)

2nd Prize ($75) — A Military View on the Future of the Australian Aircraft Industry:
    Giving It a Go
    By Wing Commander P. J. Rusbridge
    (Issue No. 28)
INTRODUCTION

The RAAF inventory of technical equipment includes aircraft and their multiplicity of systems, mechanical transport, communications equipment, computers, weapons, radars and other equipment too diverse in nature to detail. The inventory ranges from the simplest technology to the most advanced, and the vast majority of engineering and maintenance activities required are peculiar to and performed within the Service. For this reason the RAAF must have a dedicated training programme flexible enough to cater for the extremely wide range of technical activities. Most RAAF technical activities are directed towards getting aircraft and associated weapons and support systems ready for operations. This article discusses technical training undertaken within the RAAF to satisfy this prime role.

The functions of the engineer officer and technical airman are markedly different; the officer is concerned generally with engineering management and the airman with the performance of maintenance activities. There is, therefore, a requirement to consider officer and airman training separately, and a section of the article is devoted to each. Both officer and airman training systems do have one similarity in that there are three distinct levels of training. Basic Training is a term used for ab-initio training undertaken at a formal training establishment before a RAAF member takes up a productive appointment. Field Training refers to specialist training conducted at RAAF units and is generally training on specific technical equipments. Post-Graduate Training involves further formal training in either the technical or

ABSTRACT: The RAAF employs a considerable number of engineer officers and technical airmen on a wide range of technical equipment, from the simplest to the most advanced technology. Functions undertaken include engineering, maintenance and project and resource management. A three tiered training system, involving basic, field and post graduate training is used to provide the technical and managerial skills necessary to support a technologically intensive force. A systems approach to training is applied at all levels to ensure that appropriate training is given when it is most needed.

SUMMARY: For engineers and technical airmen, the RAAF has a system of training which involves basic, field and post graduate courses. The three tiers of training, which are designed to provide both the technical and managerial skills required to support a technologically intensive force, are described. A systems approach to training is applied at all levels and mention is made of its application.

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management fields. Each of these levels of training is an essential part of the complete RAAF training system and will be considered separately.

THE ENGINEER OFFICER TRAINING SYSTEM
RAAF engineer officers are employed in several different fields, broadly categorized as engineering, maintenance and project and resource management. Throughout his career an engineer almost certainly will be required to undertake duties in several of these fields. Obviously this wide range of employment demands personnel of various technical disciplines. Officers commissioned from the ranks and who bring a wealth of practical experience are ideally suited for the management of maintenance workshops and bring practical experience to other areas. Tertiary qualified officers are essential for areas of design work and they bring a theoretical application to other areas. The RAAF has found that a mix of about 60% tertiary qualified and 40% commissioned airmen meets the RAAF engineering and maintenance requirements.

Basic Training
The engineer branch of the RAAF is divided into five categories, armament, aeronautical, electrical, instrument and radio, and there are approximately 890 engineer posts of which 700 are currently filled. With a turnover of approximately 8% of officers per year, the RAAF has a requirement for a considerable number of new graduates each year. This requirement is met primarily from the Engineering Cadet Squadron (ECS) at RAAF Base Fyshwick, Melbourne. Cadets recruited into ECS undergo a four year degree course at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology in mechanical, aeronautical or communications/electronics engineering. Other avenues for engineering degree training under RAAF sponsorship are the undergraduate scheme, whereby students who have completed part of their training are recruited and sponsored to completion of their course, the civil schooling scheme, whereby airmen are sponsored for tertiary training prior to being commissioned and the RAAF Academy, which provides limited opportunities for cadets to complete aeronautical engineering training at Sydney University. The RAAF also recruits directly at graduate level but the numbers are small.

Thus basic training in the broad engineering sense is catered for by the use of civilian training institutions. The advent of the Australian Defence Force Academy could well bring at least some basic engineering training into the Defence Force, but it is my opinion that the requirement for direct-entry graduates and some sponsored training will still exist. Formal engineering training is the foundation stone of engineer officer basic training but is not the complete structure. Both graduates and officers commissioned from the ranks require technical induction training in the procedures applicable specifically to the RAAF.

This induction training is catered for by a seven week Engineer Officers’ Basic Course conducted at the RAAF School of Technical Training (RAAFSTT) situated at RAAF Base Wagga, NSW. The course is aimed at providing the new engineer officer with sufficient information to enable him to assume his first post in the RAAF. Subjects included in this course are the RAAF Publication System, Technical Documentation (an area of prime importance in providing for maintenance standards and accountability), Supply Management and Procedures, Production Management, Aircraft and Workshop Safety and Basic Metallurgy and Corrosion. Emphasis is given to specific RAAF procedures and requirements in these areas. Further courses, the Familiarization Courses, of approximately 14 weeks duration, are conducted for Aeronautical, Radio and Armament officers. These courses are designed to present theoretical knowledge to the engineer commissioned from the ranks and some practical experience to the new graduate. Again the course emphasizes RAAF peculiar requirements.

As a firm proponent of the systems approach to training, in which training courses are developed to meet user requirements and the course product validated against the requirement, the RAAF is particularly concerned that all and only those requirements to be met by the student are covered in the courses. At present a review of all engineer officer basic training courses is being conducted to ensure that the courses are applicable to user requirements.
Field Training

With a broad range of specialized equipment, and having a policy of flexibility of employment of its engineer officers, the RAAF must have a training system whereby personnel can be rapidly and effectively trained in specialist areas. Such a system is provided in the Field Training system. RAAF operational and support bases have nominated units established and manned for the task of conducting training courses aimed at providing the specialist knowledge required for members to undertake particular duties. Although the Field Training system is primarily designed for airmen, engineer officers attend selected specialist and management courses to better prepare them for their engineering duties.

Typical courses available are the Chinook Technical Familiarization Course conducted by the Chinook Operating Squadron (12 SQN), the Non Destructive Inspection (NDI) Familiarization Course conducted by the RAAF NDI Standards Laboratory, the Fuel Quality Control Course to be conducted at the newly established Petroleum Engineering Centre, and the Officers’ Instructional Technique Course conducted at RAAFSTT. There are many such courses, generally of one or two weeks duration. Instruction on these, and in fact all RAAF courses is to a published syllabus prepared by specialists to meet graduation standards approved by the Air Force Office of the Department of Defence.

Exchange positions, in which RAAF engineer officers are exchanged with officers of other services (such as the USAF and the RAF) provide a type of Field Training in that RAAF officers gain knowledge of procedures and philosophies followed elsewhere. This programme has considerable benefits in a dynamic situation such as exists in the rapidly developing RAAF.

Post-Graduate Training

A RAAF engineer officer can expect to undertake duties in a wide range of fields during a career in which he receives promotion to senior management level. He may be required to perform deep engineering tasks such as fatigue analysis of in-service aircraft structure or may be involved in the introduction of computer-based management systems. In virtually all cases the officer, at middle and senior management level, is required to possess significant staff skills and a broad knowledge of the world’s defence organizations and their policies. These technical and staff skills can only be developed through an effective training system.

On the technical side, engineers are encouraged to advise personnel managers of their employment area preferences, and well reported officers are selected to undergo formal post-graduate training courses. In particular the RAAF has found that the two-year MSc courses in aircraft structure and propulsion systems offered by the Cranfield Institute of Technology (UK) are ideally suited to the needs of fatigue analysis and aircraft and engine engineering sections of the RAAF. Two RAAF engineer officers are selected for the course each year. A course conducted by the RAF at RAF College Cranwell and entitled the Aerosystems Course, of one year’s duration, allows two RAAF engineer officers each year the opportunity to specialize in aircraft systems and their management. The course can (with an additional six months study) lead to a MSc degree from Loughborough University. RAAF graduates of these courses are invariably employed in the pure engineering areas of the RAAF.

Logistics and Project Management is another specialized field vital to RAAF operations. Selected engineer officers (one per year) undertake MSc training at the United States Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, US. Graduates of this course are employed in the more detailed logistics management areas of the RAAF.

The RAAF also grants flying training courses, followed by a consolidating flying tour of duty, to selected RAAF engineers. This post-graduate training allows for greater expertise in the engineering, airworthiness and mission capability management of new and in-service aircraft. Similarly, a limited number of engineer officers are selected for the Test Project Engineers Course conducted at the United States Navy Air Test Centre, NAS Patuxent River, USA, or the Empire Test Pilot Course conducted at Boscombe Down, UK. These courses provide for engineer specialist requirements in research and development posts.

To provide for effective staff training, virtually all middle management engineer officers showing potential for further advance-
ment undergo staff training at the RAAF Staff College. A one year course is conducted for officers of all branches of the RAAF with the aim of consolidating staff skills required in the majority of RAAF management positions. Staff training generally is currently under review and the one year course at middle management level will shortly be replaced with structured residential and correspondence courses at junior and middle levels. The RAAF also participates in exchange programmes with the RAN and Army and with the RAF and USAF so that RAAF engineers receive training in management systems applied in other armed forces. Advanced staff training is also available to RAAF engineers at the Joint Services Staff College, a six month residential course conducted in Canberra, and a senior management course of one year’s duration conducted at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London.

THE TECHNICAL AIRMAN TRAINING SYSTEM

Airmen in the RAAF are employed in approximately 20 different technical musterings ranging from Motor Transport Fitter and General Fitter through Metal and Wood Machinist to Airframe Fitter and Radio Technician. With few exceptions, where qualified tradesmen are recruited, the RAAF conducts all training required to bring the raw recruit from secondary school standard to tradesman or technician standard. The majority of members of technical musterings are employed at the lower ranks directly on productive tasks such as aircraft servicing but as they rise in rank they are required more in the supervisory role. A number of airmen are employed in training, maintenance planning and spares assessing duties. The three levels of training are essential to provide capable airmen at all rank levels.

Basic Training

The RAAF has two formal basic training institutions, the RAAF School of Technical Training at RAAF Base Wagga and the RAAF School of Radio (RADS) at RAAF Base Laverton. Both schools conduct a series of technical courses. An apprenticeship scheme exists to train 15 to 17 year old high school leavers in one of several two-and-a-half-year trade courses which equips the member to graduate as a basic tradesman capable of taking his place in the RAAF work force. Adult trainee courses similar to the apprentice courses but lacking slightly in depth are conducted for recruits over 17 years old. These adult courses are of approximately 15 months duration and also equip the graduate to take productive posts in the RAAF.

RADS has the responsibility for conducting courses for, as the name implies, the radio trades, a term which in RAAF parlance includes ground and air communications, radar and aircraft approach and landing aids. RAAFSTT conducts training in all other disciplines. Both the apprentice and adult trainee schemes at both schools provide general service training, airmanship training, general engineering training and special-to-trade training.

Field Training

Once the graduate of the basic training course is moved to his first productive post, and thereafter as he moves in response to RAAF requirements, he must be provided with training peculiar to the equipment on which he is required to work. The field training system, mentioned in the section on officer training, although important to officer training, is designed primarily to ensure that adequate training is provided for technical airmen. There is a vast range of courses which cater for this peculiar-to-type training. In view of the serious consequences of error in maintaining aircraft, the Field Training courses are invariably a prerequisite for employment on particular types of equipment.

Typically, Field Training courses range from one week to several months in duration and are conducted by full and part-time instructors, themselves specifically trained in instructional duties as well as the subject matter of the courses. Examples of Field Training courses are the Mirage Simulator Technician Course of nine months (part-time), the F111C Airframe Familiarization Course of eight days and the Macchi Ground Training Course of four weeks duration.

Post-Graduate Training

Post-Graduate Training requirements for technical airmen are not as complex as those described for engineer officers but there is still a firm requirement. Again a post-graduate
training is aimed at both increasing an airman’s technical skill and knowledge and improving his supervisory and management abilities. On the technical side of post-graduate training, there is a considerable number of courses which fall into this category. Many are conducted at Field Training centres, as these are geographically located such that a large proportion of the RAAF can be trained without considerable travel expense.

Other courses, of a more specialist nature, are conducted at one or both of the two training schools and some civilian organizations are used. Some courses are specifically designed to meet the new technology needs that come with new aircraft acquisition.

Typical examples of post-graduate training courses are the Explosives Demolition Training Course, an eight day course aimed at graduating Armament Fitters capable of performing explosive demolition, the basic Electronics Course of 14 weeks duration, aimed at providing electronic training to mustering not previously trained in this theory and the Non-Destructive Inspection Technician Course of 13 weeks duration, graduating NDI Technicians who perform inspections on all types of RAAF equipment. Personnel are selected for such courses, to meet RAAF requirements, on the basis of reported performance and ability.

Post-Graduate Training courses in the management and supervisory area are not extensive in range and this is realized as requiring review. Formal management training for the majority of airmen is conducted at RAF FSTT in the form of a Sergeant Supervision and Management course, of approximately five weeks duration. Airmen receive this training prior to or on promotion to Sergeant rank.

Future Training Requirements

The present airmen training schemes have to date provided well for the RAAF’s requirements, but the demands of future high technology aircraft will demand more highly trained airmen. Recognizing this need, the RAAF is about to introduce an Apprentice Technologist scheme in addition to the other basic training schemes. The Apprentice Technologist will undergo a three-year apprenticeship which will culminate with the apprentice receiving trade training to a similar standard at present, but more broadly based. In addition the apprentice will receive a Certificate of Technology qualification from a recognized tertiary institute. Numbers of graduates will be controlled to provide sufficient numbers of (after four years experience) SNCO Systems Technicians qualified to fault diagnose on the RAAF’s higher technology equipment.

In recent years, the quality of training has been reviewed using the results of Occupational Analysis surveys, and this continuing task has indicated the requirement for further review of the RAAF trade structure and training requirements. The Apprentice Technologist training scheme is the foundation stone of a structured training system which has the aim of training technical airmen to the various standards needed in the RAAF engineering and maintenance fields.

CONCLUSION

The RAAF has a wide range of equipment from the simplest to the forefront of technology. The majority of engineering and maintenance activities are performed within the service and many of the skills are peculiar to the RAAF. There is therefore a requirement for the RAAF to maintain a structured training system for engineer officers and technical airmen. Three levels of training are employed for both officers and airmen. These are Basic, Field and Post-Graduate Training. These levels allow training to be undertaken commensurate with employment requirements for the lowest and highest ranks.

In using a systems approach to training, and with access to Occupational Analysis Surveys, the RAAF aims to provide the correct standard of training when and where required. This aim is achieved with the training systems described in this article.

COPIES OF BACK ISSUES

Copies of back issues of the Defence Force Journal are available for distribution on request to the Editor.
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While the Communist Party of India had experienced acute ideological fissures in the early sixties, the more Leftist Communist Party of India (Marxist), (which emerged from the split of 1964), was itself to experience factional dissent from a variety of groups within its fold. This dissent was particularly noticeable from those with more acute adherence to the thought of Mao Tse-Tung. In West Bengal, the Darjeeling unit of the C.P.I. (M) was a unit almost completely dominated by one such faction angered by the party's electoral participation. By 1967, Kanu Sanyal, a respected thirty-five year-old member of the District Council of the C.P.I. (M) and other like-minded members of this Darjeeling faction had gained control of local peasant organizations.

Under the influence of his ideological mentor Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal started to exploit tactical advantages that the newly elected United Front* Government of West Bengal had provided. Confident that they could act with relative impunity (since the United Front had undertaken not to deploy police in the settlement of land disputes), Sanyal initiated a movement which featured the forcible occupation of land and the expropriation of hoarded rice and paddy.¹

Between March and May 1967, nearly one hundred incidents involving tribals, armed with bows and arrows, occupying land and symbolically establishing their "ownership" by ploughing small parcels, were reported to the district police.²

Nowhere was Sanyal's success as an organiser so obvious as in the villages of Naxalbari, Kharibari and Phansidewa police stations, where he enlisted the help of a dedicated local C.P.I. (M) tribal leader, Jangal Santhal.

Part of Siliguri sub-division of Darjeeling, Naxalbari is situated in the strategic fifteen mile wide corridor which links the north-eastern Indian states of Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Arunchalpradesh and Meghalaya, with the rest of the Republic of India. The sensitive character of its location is exemplified by its proximity to international borders. What was the Pakistan salient of Titaliya (now part of Bangla Desh) is some ten miles away. The Nepalese frontier town of Bhadrapur is a mere five miles off, while China's Tibet looms only sixty miles to the north.³

Although the local authorities had kept a low profile since the election of the United Front Government, they did attempt to preserve order in the area, given its strategic sensitivity. Inevitably, there were incidents as the movement progressed, when jotedars† attempted to resist the seizure of their lands and property. Not surprisingly, violence ensued on a number of these occasions and the police

*The United Front was a coalition of leftist and Marxist parties which won power in the West Bengal state elections in 1967. The most senior member of the "Front" was the C.P.I. (M).

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¹JO TEDAR: (Hindi, jot/tenure, Persian, dar/holder), a wealthy peasant, a middle landholder and an employer of agricultural labour.
began to take action. From May 20 or so, "about 50 persons, a majority of them Santals",** against whom complaints had been lodged, were arrested. It was only when Police Inspector Sonam Wangdi and three other police officers began to seek out "the most militant of the local C.P.I. (M) leaders" that outright rebellion appears to have been catalysed. Whether Wangdi was merely attempting to exercise his influence in the area, in order to diffuse the explosive character of a dissident C.P.I. (M) movement, or not, is still unclear. Wangdi was ambushed and killed "by a group of Santals armed with bows and arrows", while travelling in a jeep on the morning of May 24. From then on, "the Santals", who had "reacted sharply to the recent arrests", were said to have remained "poised for attacks on police parties".4

On the very next day, when a police party was sent to Prasajote to investigate Wangdi's ambush, they "resorted to firing when about 600 Santals attacked the S.D.O. and S.D.P.O. with bows and arrows".5 The twenty-three rounds fired killed nine persons, among whom were "six Santal women and two children, including an eight month baby in arms".6 In relation to the nature of these casualties, The Times of India reported:

Santal women are taking a prominent part in the 'peasant movement' in the area. With children slung on their backs and bows in hand, they are generally in the forefront of armed bands roaming in the area.7

By May 27, "over 100 Santals" had been arrested at Naxalbari in connection with these disturbances and police were already combing the area in search of "tribal leaders wanted in connection with specific cases".8

In early June, the United Front Government ordered a judicial enquiry into "incidents of unauthorised occupation of lands, looting of paddy belonging to big landlords and assaults by Santals and other tribals".9 Despite the call for an enquiry into the outbreak of violence in Naxalbari, the Government had no definite policy to deal with the situation in the region. In order to prevent further clashes, however, the police were asked not to take any further action, even though defiant rhetoric on the part of the rebels and sporadic looting and violence continued to take place.10 On the morning of June 11, for example, the headless corpse of Nagen Roy Choudhury, a jotedar, was discovered some time after his house had been raided by "200 Santals armed with bows and arrows", and grain and valuables carried away.11

By mid-June, however, the authorities were no longer appraising the Naxalbari situation as

**The Santals are one of India's largest "scheduled tribes" numbering 3,633,459 according to the 1971 Census.
one of mere agrarian unrest, but as a nascent insurgency. According to the Darjeeling S.P., "the armed gangs" which "ruled disturbed areas" were actively seeking "armed encounter". The Commissioner of Jalpaiguri division, Ivan Surita, went even further and stated that "armed guerrillas" were in fact operating in the area. It was also obvious from reports of theft of firearms, that the rebels were consciously building up armed units. Kanu Sanyal in his retrospective account of the Naxalbari movement, commented:

Realising that their struggle against the jotedars, the landlords and the money-lenders would be subjected to armed repression by the state apparatus, they armed themselves with the traditional weapons like bows and arrows and spears as well as with guns forcibly taken away from the jotedars and organized their own armed grous. That these armed groups had been organised to achieve specific political ends, was becoming abundantly clear. Again Sanyal tells us:

In every area they created regional and central revolutionary committees and established the peasant's political power. . . . They declared the existing bourgeois law and law courts null and void in the villages. The decisions of the regional and central revolutionary committees were declared to be the law.

In effect, Sanyal's armed units succeeded in creating a temporary parallel administration. The shadow rule of these committees resulted in the redistribution of land, paddy and property of the jotedars, destruction of legal documents and deeds, rescission of debts and mortgages, and the punishment of oppressive jotedars and their retainers. The newly constituted "People's Courts" began handing down sentences ranging from death to humiliation.

Whilst the Naxalbari rebels consolidated their position, the United Front Government began moves to deal with the revolt as quietly as possible. A six member ministerial team toured the area in order to examine the problems of the region more closely, while authorised to take whatever measures they thought proper. The C.P.I. (M) itself, naturally enough, attempted to bring its problem children into line. The Land Revenue Minister, Hare Krishna Konar, had earlier met with Sanyal and for a time appeared to have succeeded in settling the rebel grievances politically. While Konar had agreed to "take immediate steps to solve the complicated land problem", Sanyal and his lieutenants had agreed to surrender. Inspector Wangdi's death, however, appears to have dissolved any hope of such a compromise.

Throughout the second half of June the violence in the region continued to grow. On June 15, three persons were killed and a number injured when a landholder fired on a mob of 500 which had raided his house. On June 19, 300 armed men looted a house at Nehalujote village under Naxalbari police station, while on the same day two tea garden workers were killed and fifty armed men snatched another firearm from a house which had already been relieved of some 128 cartridges.

The disturbances in the Siliguri sub-division soon began to attract international attention, and most specifically from Peking. On June 28, Radio Peking commented:

A phase of peasant's armed struggle led by the revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party has been set up in the countryside in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal State of India. This is the front paw of the revolutionary armed struggle launched by the Indian people under the guidance of Mao Tse-Tung's teachings.

The Chief Minister, Ajoy Mukherjee, reacted predictably and declared, in the West Bengal Council, that the United Front Government would not tolerate the creation of any "free zone" or Chinese "enclave" in the Naxalbari region. By this stage nearly 150 cases of looting, arson, intimidation and murder had been reported from the area, while nearly 400 cases had been recorded and 700 warrants had been issued.
As a State Government ultimatum to the rebels to surrender began to expire, attempts were made to dislocate communications in the area. A deep ditch cut off the road link with the Buragunj police camp and a wooden bridge near Hatidoba was destroyed, in order to isolate a section of Kharibari P.S. with the onset of the monsoon. Two rebels were also killed and another two seriously wounded in a gun-battle with a “resistance” party, in the village of Banglagach in Phansidewa, on July 3.

It was not surprising that the West Bengal Cabinet, on July 5, because of the recalcitrant behaviour of the rebels, should unanimously decide in favour of police action. On the same day, however, the United Front's most senior partner, the C.P.I. (M), received its most severe slap in the face, so far, from Peking. The People's Daily declared:

A peal of spring thunder has crashed over the land of India. Revolutionary peasants in Darjeeling area have risen in rebellion. Under the leadership of a revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party, a red area of rural revolutionary armed struggle has been established in India. This is a development of tremendous significance for the Indian people's revolutionary struggle... The revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party has done the absolutely correct thing and they have done it well.

Going ahead with its decision, the West Bengal Cabinet “issued instructions to the Darjeeling district administration and the police, to open as many police camps as necessary and intensify patrolling of the disturbed Naxalbari areas”, to restore normality.

The first police actions, after the Government decision was made, were hardly concerted attempts at counter-insurgency but rather shows of strength. Some 500 armed policemen (contingents from the para-military Eastern Frontier Rifles and the State Armed Police's 2nd Battalion), carried out a number of route marches in the three affected areas. Though the police responded to reports of a group of “nearly 800 adivasis” raiding and setting fire to the house of Polous Kugru, in Bhatajote, under Kharibari P.S., they were too late. It was only on July 12, when about 1500 armed policemen besides two companies of E.F.R. had been mobilized", that the authorities began strictly to enforce Section 144, Cr P.C., thereby forbidding the movement of more than four persons together and the carrying of bows, arrows and spears without licence, in the Siliguri subdivision of Darjeeling district. As a result, police arrested 75 rebels, “mostly tribals”, in surprise early morning raids on the Hatighisa group of villages. In this first major action against rebels, 245 arrows, 98 bows, 17 spears and 20 kukuris, together with expropriated rice, were seized after police searched 10 villages with little resistance. This operation, however, yielded none of the rebel leadership.

Within two days, the rebel counter-attack was massive yet nonetheless desperate and unsuccessful. On July 14, Kanu Sanyal with about 2500 followers, armed with bows, arrows, spears and guns, carried out a daylight assault on the Raimotijote police camp. During the “battle” a rebel who attacked a constable with a kukuri was bayoneted to death, while 54 others, including two policemen, were injured. Reinforced from surrounding camps, the 600 police, though outnumbered, were better armed and organized and thus were able to capture 294 of their assailants.

On subsequent days, arrests (including Jangal Shantal’s brothers) mounted as police conducted “patrol raids” in the villages of Birisingjote, Hatighisa, Buragunge, Raikhatijote, Rangalijote and Tarabai.

The focus of continuing police raids soon shifted from the villages which had been rebel strongholds, to the forests of the area. Within eight days of the earnest commencement of police operations, 562 people had been placed under arrest on specific charges. These police efforts resulted in the groupings of at least 300 wanted men, who had fled their villages and sought refuge in the Tukuria forest. On the run from the police, yet under some form of cohesive leadership, they began to behave as independent and mobile guerrilla groups rather than armed village bands. For example, on the night of July 19, one group about a hundred strong, emerged from cover, encountered a police patrol, immediately took firing positions, peppered the police, then retreated and scattered within the forest.

The police responded to such forays by laying a “dragnet” in the Tukuria forest.
(covering about 25 square miles of Naxalbari and Kharibari police stations) but only succeeded in capturing six wanted persons. In an apparent attempt to cut off the guerrillas' lines of retreat and thus reduce the parameters of their mobility, the authorities intensified surveillance of the Nepalese border. This was done by adding six new patrol posts (to the already existing three, along the 25 mile long Naxalbari belt) and carrying out operations right up to the river Mechi.

By the third week of July, the insurgent forces stood as the 200 strong group of Kanu Sanyal's, the 100 strong group of Jangal Santhal's and an unknown number of men under the leadership of Mujibur Rahaman.33 These groups, however, were probably unable to establish contact with each other since they neither exhibited any co-ordinated activity nor reinforced and balanced the other's fighting strength. Posed against Sanyal's, Santhal's and Rahaman's hastily formed, ill-armed, and inexperienced guerrilla units was a massive police force able to launch highly mobile and co-ordinated raids by well-armed and experienced para-military units.††

As the number of arrests mounted in late July, the rebels were clearly on the run. While they had made an attempt, in early June, to maintain something of an offensive strategy, they were now only able to deploy weapons defensively to cover their retreats. Hard-pressed by police closing in on him and his followers, Mujibur Rahaman, for example, fought a rearguard action on the night of July 23, before escaping into the dense Surajgarh forest on THE Indo-Nepalese border.34

Rahaman, however, was only to be captured some four days later in Kishangunge subdivision of Bihar, about 32 miles from Siliguri.35

Despite torrential rain and flooding, the police maintained their offensive against the demoralized fugitives holding out in the forests. By the end of the first week of August, wholesale surrenders began to take place.36 The continuing police patrols and raids yielded further arrests. Significantly, Jangal Santhal, his group of guerrillas obviously fragmented, was captured with a loaded gun, on one such surprise raid, on August 10. The day before, twenty-four persons were arrested and four of the rebels' firearms were seized.37

Although Kanu Sanyal eluded capture for some time, by mid-August the uprising had been well and truly smashed, and the authorities had further secured the area with another six police camps. At the time, however, few could have predicted that the short-lived Naxalbari uprising would soon produce such a series of violent repercussions in the wake of its collapse.

Towards a Revolutionary Party

Despite the C.P.I. (M) leadership's denunciation of the Naxalbari revolt as ultraleftist and adventurist,38 the Naxalites (as they soon became known), continued to organize within the C.P.I. (M), by attempting to unite its other dissident Maoist cadres. Many of these dissident C.P.I. (M) groups had become prominent in their support of the Naxalbari movement, when they formed a "Committee to Support Naxalbari and Peasant Struggles". At the same time, the C.P.I. (M)'s Bengali weekly Desh Hitaishi was also under the control of a number of Naxalbari supporters. So concerned was the C.P.I. (M) with this defiant trend that the State Committee expelled nineteen "Naxalites" including Sushital Ray Chaudhuri, a member of Desh Hitaishi's editorial board, on June 19, 1967. Although those expelled attempted to maintain control of the weekly, they failed when they were physically ejected from its offices by party loyalists on June 28. Undaunted, the rebellious Maoists started publishing their own weekly, Deshabrati, within a week. Similarly, as various Trade Unions, Student Federations and front groups began to voice support for the Naxalbari revolt, they were promptly disaffiliated by the state leadership of the C.P.I. (M).39 By November 1967, the rebels had started another journal, the English language monthly, Liberation. In its first issues Charu Mazumdar enjoined the C.P.I. (M)'s dissident revolutionary cadres to denounce the party's revisionist leadership and help forge the party into a truly revolutionary force.

We call upon the revolutionary comrades still within the Communist Party of India (Marxist) to repudiate openly the neo-revisionist leading cliques and its politics and openly to join hands with us who are striving to build a genuine Communist Party in our country.40

††Note: The police were based in camps situated in Moniramjote, Birganj, Raimati and Laharsing.
However, it was not until after the Madurai plenum of the C.P.I. (M), (which differentiated the C.P.I. (M)'s position from the C.P.C.'s), that Maoist groups from other states began openly attacking the party's leadership.

Still attempting to change the party from within, the West Bengal Maoists formed a co-ordination committee which then convened a meeting of inter-state dissidents in Calcutta, on November 13, 1967. This meeting then announced a decision to:

... form an All India Co-ordination Committee... to develop and co-ordinate militant and revolutionary struggles at all levels, especially peasants' struggles of the Naxalbari type under the leadership of the working class...

The All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (A.I.C.C.C.R., as it became known), soon realized, with the advent of the Burdwan plenum of the C.P.I. (M), that no revolt against the party leadership was imminent. On April 23, 1968, the A.I.C.C.C.R. broke with the C.P.I. (M). Similarly, the Andhra dissidents, who had formed their own State Co-ordination Committee in September, 1967, and had not affiliated with the A.I.C.C.C.R., also broke with the party after the Burdwan plenum. Thus, together with the expulsion (for anti-party activities) of about 400 members of the party, including Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Parimal Das Gupta and Asit Sen, these defections represented a major upheaval in the C.P.I. (M). The A.I.C.C.C.R. continued to call upon the other Maoist groups to disband themselves and "join the All India Co-ordination Committee", but disunity persisted despite some consolidation. The A.I.C.C.C.R. was unable to coax the Andhra group, under the leadership of Tarimela Naggi Reddy, into its fold.

Although the Andhra group of Naggi Reddy eventually attended the A.I.C.C.C.R. meeting of October 1968, its Srikakulam district committee was in agreement with Mazumdar's call for the immediate development and intensification of Naxalbari-type kishan struggles. When the tribal movement in Srikakulam intensified (with the active encouragement of Mazumdar) into armed struggle, relations between the Reddy and Mazumdar factions were seriously strained. While Naggi Reddy continued to emphasize the need to develop a secure mass base prior to launching a protracted guerrilla war, Charu Mazumdar argued that:

A stage has now been reached when the formation of the Communist Party brooks no delay. The Party should immediately be formed with those revolutionaries as the core who are building up and conducting revolutionary class struggle.

In February, therefore, the A.I.C.C.C.R. denounced the Naggi Reddy group and went on to form India's third Communist Party in April 1969. The formation of this new revolutionary party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) was announced at the May Day rally in Calcutta by Kanu Sanyal. Over 10,000 people heard Sanyal declare:

The task before the A.I.C.C.C.R. was to lay the basis for building a genuine Communist Party. That task has been successfully completed. With great pride and boundless joy I wish to announce today that we have formed a genuine Communist Party — the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

T. Naggi Reddy
The C.P.I. (M-L) eventually gained the support of the State committee of the U.P. and Bihar A.I.C.C.C.R., together with those in Assam, Tripura and Jammu and Kashmir. The Nagi Reddy group in Andhra, however, was joined by the K.P.R. Gopalan faction in the nascent “Naxalite movement” would prominently in the thick of the struggle. At the guerrilla campaign in West Bengal. This time Srikakulam, it was not long before the new intensifying armed struggle in the villages of Andhra and the West Bengal A.I.C.C.C.R. surfaced on a number of occasions, while considerable juggling for leadership positions could not agree on the structure of the proposed third Communist Party. Personality differences between Tarimela Nagireddy in Kerala, but it did not gain the support of the Srikakulam district committee, which maintained its allegiance to Charu Mazumdar and the C.P.I. (M-L). According to Marcus Franda, “the leadership of the A.I.C.C.C.R. could not agree on the structure of the newly formed C.P.I. (M-L) quickly proposed third Communist Party. Personality differences between Tarimela Nagireddy in...
A Framework for Education & Training

By Major B. D. Copeland, BA BEdSt RAAEC.

INTRODUCTION
There has long been a gap between 'Education' and 'Training'. 'Education' had been generally seen as the vehicle for the promotion of culture, human values and the general skills needed for living. 'Training' had been associated with the process by which dogs are taught to salivate at the ringing of a bell and human beings to perform given tasks with maximal effectiveness and minimal intellectual effort. 'Training' had been regarded as being vastly inferior to 'Education'.

In recent years, both areas have come to be viewed in a different light. 'Education' has come to imply both a broad awareness and the ability to perform basic skills in given contexts. There is seen to be a 'Training' component to 'Education'. On the other hand, 'Training' has come to mean the pursuit of excellence in giving the individual or group the necessary skills to carry out given tasks. The difficulty of operation will vary in terms of the categories of systems involved\(^1\).

A RATIONALE FOR EDUCATION
The terms of reference of the Education Officer are wider than those of the Training Officer. The Education Officer has the mandate to support the service member both within the Defence Force and the wider community. The service member has an assigned role within the Defence Force. At the same time, this person is also an individual, a citizen, a voter and a consumer. The service member may also be a spouse and a parent. Through 'Education', this person is assisted to be more aware of the many duties that he/she may have to carry out, both in the service and the community, and to become more effective in these roles.

A RATIONALE FOR TRAINING
Both Training Officers and Instructors are involved in promoting particular skills in student individuals and groups. Service personnel are trained to make decisions in given contexts. To do so effectively, they must know certain facts and techniques and hold certain attitudes. These they must apply to the completion of given tasks. The Report of the Regular Officer Development Committee

The member has had two articles printed in the Defence Force Journal. The article 'A Programme in Problem Solving' appeared in DFJ No 14 Jan/Feb 79. The article 'Network Analysis and the Training Officer' was printed in DFJ No 25 Nov/Dec 80. Cartoons for this article were prepared by David Clark, Admin. Services Branch, Dept of Defence. Article received May 1981
(Australian Army) states that 'inclusion of the terms attitude/knowledge/skill specifies that training is concerned with all domains of human performance ie the affective, the cognitive and the psychomotor'.

**COST EFFECTIVENESS**

How might 'Education' and 'Training' be organized for most effective use of time and resources. It is important to recognize the relative values of the two components of 'Education'. There is the general component involving the personal enrichment of the individual through exposure to literature, history, government and the sciences. The value of such 'Education' is immeasurable.

The second component involves the promotion of skills which may be applied to the work place. Cost effectiveness may be achieved if a degree of rationalization is undertaken between 'Education' and 'Training'. In both areas, the skills are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, there is considerable overlap. The Training and Educational personnel will improve the cost effectiveness of courses if they apply a framework of skills and develop progression and reinforcement across a range of related courses. Part of the work of the Education Officer may involve the broader task of developing techniques of Decision Making and of promoting in the student 'the ability to apply insight from the solution of one problem to the solution of a similar problem in a different context'.

**NETWORK ANALYSIS**

A course will be less than effective if, at the conclusion, the student is unable to perceive the flow of processes within the sub-systems and systems under a study. The student should be able to identify the roles and tasks of individuals within the working systems.

**A Course in Business Principles** will focus upon:
- The cash flow system
- The accounting system
- The process of audit.

**A Course in Social Studies** will trace the operation of:
- The voting system
- Voting procedure
- Passage of a bill
- The Parliamentary system
- The Bureaucratic system.

**A Course in Science** will focus upon:
- Technical processes
- Related problems
- Processes of tabulation
- Process of empirical research
- Process of fault finding.

**A Course in Computer Operation** will develop the systems of:
- Data processing
- Information retrieval
- Computer networks.
A Course in Consumer Protection will focus upon processes of:
• Checking claims of vendors
• Purchase of consumer items
• After sales service
• Redress of grievance.

A Course in Car Mechanics will trace the operation of:
• The systems of a car
• Maintenance and repair of systems
• The process of fault finding.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ‘EDUCATION’ AND ‘TRAINING’

Having perceived the extent of the skills of Decision Making, the Training Officer and Education Officer are in the position to ‘subdivide the operations’, to produce an effective division of labour.

Summarized is a taxonomy of skills that could be developed through ‘Education’ and ‘Training’. Part A is the particular concern of the Education Officers, providing the basic enabling skills for the process of Decision Making. It would be expected that Training Officers would acquaint themselves with the skills involved in Part A. The Education Officers would need to apply the skills of Part B to ‘problems’ derived from the course areas for which they are responsible.

The intention of Part A is to promote in student personnel a broad basis of practical skills to frame a logical, sequential approach to Decision Making. Personnel will be required to recognize the importance of drawing accurate conclusions and of developing the ‘whole to part’ approach necessary for implementation of the basic skills of Network Analysis.

TAXONOMY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TASKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Task Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Identify a statement of fact</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>Establish the characteristics of a statement of fact</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>Identify statements of fact</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>Identify a statement of opinion</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>Establish the characteristics of a statement of opinion</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>Establish the types of statements of opinion</td>
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<td>2.30</td>
<td>Identify statements of opinion</td>
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<td>3.00</td>
<td>Identify a valid argument</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Establish the techniques of valid argument</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>Establish the validity of a given argument</td>
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<td>3.30</td>
<td>Prepare an argument</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>Arrange a series of items</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>Arrange a series of items in ‘whole to part’ order</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>Arrange a series of items in ‘part to whole’ order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>Arrange a series of items in ‘part to part’ order</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>Describe a given subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>Describe a given item</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>Describe a given process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>Illustrate a given description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>Prepare a map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>Prepare an organization chart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>Prepare a tabular chart</td>
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<td>6.40</td>
<td>Prepare a graph</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>Prepare a flow chart</td>
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<td>6.60</td>
<td>Prepare a flow diagram</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>Prepare a Gantt Chart</td>
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<td>6.80</td>
<td>Prepare a PERT Chart</td>
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<td>6.90</td>
<td>Prepare a Critical Path Chart</td>
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<td>6.100</td>
<td>Prepare a FAST Chart</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>Establish an accurate conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>Establish a conclusion from given evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>Establish the evidence necessary to establish a given conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>Establish the range of possible causes of a given situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>Establish the possible causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>Establish the ‘most likely’ to ‘least likely’ causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>Categorize a given series of causes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.00 Establish the range of possible effects of a given action
9.10 Establish the possible effects
9.20 Establish the ‘most likely’ to ‘least likely’ effects
9.30 Categorize a given series of effects.

10.00 Establish the accuracy of a given process
10.10 Check a given process
10.20 Establish the techniques of double-checking
10.30 Double-check a given arithmetic computation
10.40 Double-check a given administrative process
10.50 Double-check a given technical process
10.60 Build a double-check into a given process.

11.00 Establish the networks involved in a given work situation
11.10 Establish the system
11.20 Establish the sub-systems
11.30 Establish the processes.

12.00 Establish the problems related to a given network
12.10 Document a given problem
12.20 Categorize a given problem.

Part B.

13.00 Establish the aim necessary to the solution of a given problem
13.10 Establish the enabling aims
13.20 Establish the terminal aim.

14.00 Establish the factors/criteria that apply to the solution of a given problem
14.10 Establish the factors/criteria that apply in the design of a given item
14.20 Establish the factors/criteria that apply in the development of a given process.

15.00 Establish the range of possible courses of action
15.10 Establish the ‘most likely’ to ‘least likely’ courses.

16.00 Select a course of action
16.10 Select a course of action that requires confirmation of evidence.

17.00 Establish the order of steps
17.10 Establish the techniques of preparing written check-lists

17.20 Establish a check-list of steps
17.30 Construct an organization chart
17.40 Construct a flow chart
17.50 Construct a flow diagram
17.60 Construct a Gantt Chart
17.70 Construct a PERT Chart
17.80 Construct a Critical Path Chart
17.90 Construct a FAST Chart.

18.00 Assess the effectiveness of a given subject
18.10 Establish the techniques of assessment
18.20 Establish the criteria needed for assessment
18.30 Assess a given item
18.40 Assess a given process
18.50 Assess a given person.

19.00 Locate an error/a fault
19.10 Establish the techniques of location
19.20 Locate an error/fault in all processes in this taxonomy.

BASIC ENABLING SKILLS

Members involved in ‘Education’ and ‘Training’ cannot assume that student personnel have the ability and desire to apply skills from one context to another. There is a tendency for all people to ‘pigeon hole’ knowledge and skills and to fail to recognize that there is a finite range of skills for Decision Making in all contexts.

Some members may fail to give maximal support to student personnel by assuming a certain base level of ‘common sense’ skills. There is a widely held yet untested belief that ‘common sense’ cannot be taught. Thus certain student personnel fail their courses as they are seen to lack this magical and undefined quality. Perhaps such people lack the basic enabling skills pre-requisite to effective Decision Making. Perhaps they fail to draw accurate conclusions from evidence. Perhaps they do not apply effective techniques of checking and double-checking.

Part of the answer lies in our promoting a range of skills across all related courses with a built-in remedial component at least in the basic courses.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ‘APPRÉCIATION’

Many Training Officers rely on the Service Appreciation as the basic framework for Decision Making. They do so because there is no other framework available to suit their particular needs. Indeed, the Service Appreciation does provide the framework acceptable for a particular type of Decision Making. However, little support is given to the Training Officer should he decide to develop the following skills:

- Fault finding
- Planning by time
- Checking and double-checking
- Preparation of Flow Charts
- Evaluation of processes.

Decision Making in technical and administrative areas can be based only in part on the Service Appreciation. A wide range of techniques is available to support such Decision Making. Unfortunately, these skills have not been categorized up to this point, for effective application to ‘Education’ and ‘Training’.

SKILLS OF THE TRAINING OFFICER

A mandate has been given to the Training Officer to implement the ‘training loop’. At the same time he must perform the role of a leader and must not neglect the tasks, individuals and groups with which he is involved. A Training Officer may well give breadth and depth to his work if he applies a range of related technical skills. These include:

- Systems Approach to Training
- Methods of Instructional Training
- Decision Making and Problem Solving
- Creative Thinking as part of Decision Making
- Value Analysis
- Work Study
- Network Analysis
- Basic Computer operation.

THE PROBLEM APPROACH

The Education Officer and Training Officer have two primary tasks in preparing courses. Where possible they should:

- Establish the system, sub systems and processes involved in the area of operation.
- Establish the range of related ‘problems’.

There are three groupings of ‘problems’ categorized in terms of the source from which these are derived. Any one situation may involve one or more of the following categories derived from:

- Man to Man Interface These involve situations both formal and informal in which individuals may operate — the self-organizing and probabilistic systems.
- Man to Machine Interface The machines in a system are operated by people. The effectiveness of operation of the machine depends upon usage by a person in dealing with a given situation — probabilistic systems.
- The Machine Given the correct design, maintenance, repair and usage by people, the operation of the machine is completely predictable — determined systems.
FRAMING OF 'PROBLEMS'

'Problems' are framed and categorized to enable student personnel to practise by 'mastery learning'\(^\text{16}\), the widest range of tasks with which they may be confronted in the work situation. Problems may be framed in two ways as follows:

- **Task Completion** A basic situation is given and the student is required to solve the problem by establishing the aim, factors, courses and steps.
- **Fault Finding** An error situation is outlined. The student is required to determine the nature of the error and establish the correct process\(^\text{17}\).

UNITY OF COURSES

Greatest effectiveness may be achieved if the Training Officer and Education Officer strive to develop a framework of skills common to a number of courses. In developing courses the following points may be considered:

- How do adjacent training courses mesh in relation to the progression of skills?
- What skills provide the foundation for the course under consideration?
- Is the widest range of practical skills developed?
- What techniques exist for the development of practical courses?

TECHNIQUES OF COLLATION

Thus the effective Training Officer and Education Officer should be alert at all times to identifying 'problems'. Once identified, a problem could be recorded initially in the member’s pocket diary and then transferred to the catalogue of 'problems' at the office eg. Some stores have not arrived late at the unit because the NCO assumed that the indent was comprehensive and did not cross-check with other records and with staff. The Training Officer could note the following:

- Summary of incident
- Weakness in the system
- Nature of the error
- Number of 'problems' involved
- Types of systems involved.

SOURCES OF 'PROBLEMS'

There are a number of sources that may be used by the effective Training Officer and Education Officer. There is the formal approach which involves study of the systems, sub systems and processes involved in given operations. Informal sources of problems are:

- Service Manuals
- Service investigations
- Civil trials and service courts martial
- Media reports
- Interviews with personnel
- Observation in the work place
A FRAMEWORK FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING

• Professional journals
• War histories
• Accounts of world history.

INTER RELATIONSHIPS
There are skills that apply to any context of Decision Making in either Education or Training. Conversely, there are no new situations ‘under under the sun’ which involve specifically unique skills. The following situations are of determined system type and involve the same basic skills:

Checking and Double-Checking of
• an arithmetic computation
• a mess bill
• a ration return
• a stock take
• an electrical circuit
• a rumour
• a claim of a vendor
• a computer program.

Fault Finding in
• a bank statement
• a cash balance
• a water reticulation system
• a car fuel system
• an administrative procedure
• unit security
• an arithmetic computation
• an argument
• a flow chart or time chart.

PROBLEMS AS CORE ACTIVITIES
The Problem Approach to Decision Making may be used to considerable effect by the Education Officer. A particular problem will present a situation for the student to address. From the situation, a number of activities may be derived. These include:
• arithmetic computation
• problem solving
• clear thinking
• letter writing
• report writing
• counselling by role playing
• lecture notes
• instruction
• location of references
• interpretation of regulations
• planning.

FAULT FINDING
The skill of ‘fault finding’ may be omitted from Training and Educational programmes because of a misunderstanding that has seldom been questioned. It is generally believed that the student should never be exposed to an incorrect procedure as he may, under pressure, be tempted to use this method. To some degree, this is true. Yet, the student member is thus not supported in a number of basic tasks that he must carry out in the work place:
• Basic fault finding in the processes with which he is involved. Faults do happen.
• Awareness of possible fault points. He is then in a better position to anticipate problems and often eliminate the difficulties before these arise.
• Preparation of procedures for use by other personnel.
• Counselling of a subordinate who has made an error of judgment.
• Instruction of personnel in a training situation.

CONCLUSION
There is much value in our developing a framework to link ‘Education’ and ‘Training’. Compartmental thinking will become the primary casualty. ‘Cost effectiveness’ will be the major benefit and this will increase as the links between the two areas are consolidated and increased.

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11. Defence Regional Office Vic Problem Solving and Creative Thinking Course.
12. Defence Regional Office Vic Value Analysis Practitioners’ Course.
13. Department of Defence (Army) School of Ordnance Work Study Course.
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THE OFFICER CADET SCHOOL,
PORTSEA:

AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE

M.A.C.E.

INTRODUCTION

IN a letter dated 22nd February, 1980, the
Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Sir
Donald Dunstan, KBE, CB, gave the writer
his permission "to carry out a historical and
ethnographical study of Officer Cadet training
at the Officer Cadet School, Portsea". The
ensuing study carried out at OCS led to the
presentation of an interim report to the Direc­
tor-General of Army Training, Department of
Defence, Canberra, A.C.T., in March, 1981.
The objective of this article is to introduce the
scope of the research project to the public in
general and to the military profession in par­
ticular.

The Officer Cadet School is located in the
Point Nepean Defence Reserve on the Mor­
ington Peninsula, 96 kilometres south of
Melbourne, and overlooking the entrance to
Port Phillip Bay. OCS was established at
Portsea in 1951 when, with the Army's rapid
growth more officers were required than the
Royal Military College, Duntroon and other
sources could provide. The Officer Cadet
School is situated in the grounds of the old
Commonwealth Department of Health Quar­
tantine Station.

The School opened on the 5th January,
1952, with a class of 71 Cadets. Initial courses
ran for twenty-two weeks. In 1955 this was
extended to the present forty-four week sylla­
bus.

OCS trains officers primarily for the Aus­
tralian Regular Army, but in addition officers
have been trained for the Armies of Papua
New Guinea, New Zealand, Malaysia, Philip­
pines, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Thailand,
South Vietnam, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria and
Fiji.

The Charter of the Officer Cadet School is
to train Cadets for service as officers in the
Australian Regular Army. Its aim is to give
them the knowledge necessary to fit them for
this service, and to foster the moral and mental
qualities on which leadership depends. The
course of instruction is designed to:

Promote a sense of honour and loyalty, duty
and responsibility; inculcate habits of disci­
pline and soldierly conduct; and give a
correct understanding of the Armed Services
in the Australian Nation;

develop a capacity for clear and logical
thought and expression;
give a sound military education in the science
and art of war; and

instruct in the military skills and techniques
of modern warfare required of the junior
officer.

The objectives of training at OCS are encap­
sulated in the School Motto: 'Loyalty and
Service'.

Australian candidates are selected twice
yearly by Selection Boards which endeavour to
select a sufficient number of cadets for entry
in January and July each year. Maximum cadet
strength at OCS is 174. Generally an intake
will consist of between 80 and 100 cadets.

There are three types of entry to OCS. Fully
described in OCS Handbooks and Syllabi for
the purpose of this article it will suffice to note that the three types of entry to OCS comprise:

(a) Normal Entry,
(b) Special Entry, and
(c) Military Survey Cadetship Entry.

The above three categories effectively allow for entry of a wide range of applicants who possess academic qualifications up to the level of recognised degrees or diplomas from a tertiary institution and including former Royal Military College Staff Cadets certified by the Commandant RMC as having successfully completed the first two years of a degree course at RMC. These selection conditions and criteria being applicable to Australian applicants, the selection of overseas cadets is the responsibility of their respective governments. Some New Zealand entrants complete a six to twelve months 'pre-OCS course' in New Zealand before coming to OCS. Age, military service, and educational level on entry of other overseas cadets may vary.

Background to the Research

The programme of fieldwork research at OCS was based on planned occasional series of visits to the School. The duration of these visits was related to the kind of activities being observed. The events studied at OCS were selected to represent as much as possible the general objectives of the course. Being 44 weeks in length and divided into two terms each of 22 weeks, the junior term is designed to raise each Officer Cadet to trained soldier level. In the senior term cadets receive more advanced training to prepare them for their role as junior officers. The Officer Cadet School course is infantry oriented. The following subjects are studied and cadets are expected to gain a satisfactory pass in all subjects in order to graduate:

- Character Development and the Psychology of Leadership
- Communication Skills
- Tactics
- Staff Duties
- Peace Administration
- Government
- Military History
- Methods of Instruction
- Military Law
- All Arms Training
- Linguistics
- Battlecraft
- Navigation
- Drill
- Radio Telephone Procedure
- Physical Training
- Weapon Training
- Army Health and First Aid
- Chemical and Biological Defence

The above in effect constituting an outline of curriculum objectives at OCS, the full range and scope of Officer Cadet training is described and minutely detailed in the Officer Cadet School Block and Detailed Syllabus.

For organisational purposes, and in view of commitments at the University of New England it was impractical to observe all of the items in the syllabus; and it was equally impractical to follow the day-to-day progress of The Company of Officer Cadets. Consequently, it was decided to observe a representative sample of administrative, classroom, demonstration and field training exercises. The sequences and instances of these observations were planned in conjunction with advice from staff at the Officer Cadet School. A major organisational decision was to focus on the progress of the junior class of Officer Cadets who marched in on 10th July, 1980, with the objective of following that class throughout its training until conclusion in June, 1981. Concentrating on Officer Cadets in Junior 'A' Company, 3 Platoon, 7, 8, 9 Sections, these Cadets provided initial personal contacts but should not be thought to have provided a "statistical" sample of the Cadets at OCS. In final analysis, the social anthropological study of OCS includes Instructors and Staff, military and civilians, even occasional visitors to the institution which comprise the population of the research situation.

From the point of view of the social anthropologist OCS is ideally located. Situated near the fashionable seaside holiday resort of Portsea at the very tip of the Mornington Peninsula, OCS is physically secluded. Inside the Main Gate a person entering OCS literally finds a different kind of world. By means of dress, mannerisms, habits, customs, and in many different and distinctive respects characteristic to the military way of life, the population of OCS may be said to have a common way of life, a culture distinct from that of civilian society outside.
The term 'culture', used in connection with OCS, is strictly speaking not quite correct. All but a few Overseas Entrants are members of the general Australian culture. As such they share with it the Australian way of life. Within that broad framework it is more correct to speak of the military way of life at OCS as a sub-culture, a 'cultural variant' of a segment of the population (Yinger, 1960:615, n.l). Even so, sub-cultures like that of OCS constitute "relatively cohesive cultural systems. They are worlds within the larger world of our national culture" (Komarovsky and Sargent, 1949:143). It was to study, and attempt to understand the nature of OCS and the character of its distinctive culture which constitutes one objective of the research of Officer Cadet training at that institution.

The link between anthropology and education (or training) lies in the notion of culture being learned and shared behaviour. Implicit in that idea is that any form of learned behaviour must be taught; or passed on from one generation to the next. Using the same reasoning it can be said then, that the 'culture' of OCS — the learned and shared behaviour, valued and judged to be appropriate behaviour in the Australian Army Officer — must be equally passed on from 'generation' to 'generation' of Officer Cadets. Encompassing both the written and unwritten standards and expectations and rules of conduct, these norms which regulate the culture and life of OCS are jealously guarded and carefully passed on from generation upon generation of staff (but especially by the Senior Cadets) to the succeeding class of junior Officer Cadets. It was to study and attempt to understand the scope and character of training at OCS which constitutes another objective of the study of that School.

The writer's interest in the subject of military training is based on several main considerations. Training for war has historically encompassed inculcating a vast array of customs, interests, actions, and thoughts in men. Summed up in terms of "soldierly behaviour" or as "the military way", militarism is part and parcel of the military ethos and constitutes the most potent, persistent, and valued characteristic of the military person. The nature of military training — which constitutes the vehicle for the inculcation of the military ethos in individuals — is the primary subject of the study at OCS.

### Academic Framework of the Research

Until recent times military training as a subject in its own right appears to have been a hitherto neglected field of academic research. True, a wealth of scholarly and popular publications on a wide range of 'military' subjects exists. On analysis, however, most of that literature is essentially historical in nature. A notable change in direction which has occurred in recent times are sociological studies of the military undertaken by prominent researchers like Morris Janowitz, Sam C. Sarksian and Samuel A. Stouffer, to name a few.

With few exceptions, the work of the above nature is American in origin. Basically, the sociological analysis of the military has stemmed from a concern with an individual's adjustment to occupational membership of the military. As Morris Janowitz (1971) has put it that approach reflects a concern with "considering a person's intelligence, skills, and aptitudes in assigning him to a military occupation". In essence, questions of this kind come within the scope of problem-solving. In taking that perspective such studies attempt to perceive the world of the military organisation from the point of view of individuals recruited into it. For example, questions which a sociological study may well pursue are, "why should we do one thing rather than another; what is the best way of doing things; how are we to decide what is best?"

An anthropology of military training differs from the above described sociological mode of enquiry. Rather than concerning itself with a biographical analysis of individuals' entry into occupational membership of the military, it wishes to question the fundamental structures in which the social experiences of individuals take place, not taking them for granted as "seemingly natural and self evident conditions of life" (Berger and Berger, 1976:28). To put a point to it, rather than being concerned with describing and evaluating "networks of recurring patterns in which people behave in routine situations" (Berger and Berger, 1976:17), this study attempts to examine the nature and context of what is taken for granted about the social experience of Officer Cadet training as a familiar routine at OCS. Rather, therefore, than examining the narrow question of individual training careers, a social anthropological analysis of the training at OCS examines
"Shepherd Hut" now the RSM's Office OCS
general principles of the social organisation of war and training for war.

Modern day thinking on what constitutes appropriate military training appears to be premised upon the notion that the content of military goals has undergone tremendous changes under the impact of new technology. Where in the past the training for war may be said to have been essentially aimed, as Janowitz puts it (1971:45), at "heroic traditionalism concerned with glory", the present objective of military training (as Professor P. H. Partridge (1969), for instance, writes) is concerned with "changes in the character of warfare and in the conditions under which contemporary states prepare for possible warfare". The emphasis on a vastly changed technology Partridge believes has led many countries to a reappraisal of the kind of education and training necessary to produce a body of officers qualified to carry out the evolving and more complex functions of the profession. He notes:

The prime object of military policy broadly conceived is not the ultimate prosecution of major war but its prevention; in other words, . . . deterrence has become the controlling purpose . . . (1969:3).

Given that there is an essential difference between traditional and modern warfare, the focus of the writer's research into military training at OCS deals with questions concerning the evolution of war and warfare. Essentially the study of evolutionary developments in training for warfare in Australia (if such developments in fact exist) may be indicated by analysing changes in modes of military training. The reason for choosing training as an indicator of change lies with the idea of culture. Social anthropological theory proceeds from the assumption that underlying the formation of any group of people with a distinctive way of thinking and mode of acting is a common culture. In many respects such as dress, speech, mannerisms and other typically military characteristics, members of any army are markedly different from members of the wider society. Employing education or training as an indicator of changing patterns of a given culture is based on the notion that a culture constitutes "the learned and shared behaviour, thoughts, acts and feelings of a certain people . . . learned in a sense that this behaviour is transmitted socially rather than genetically . . ." (Tylor, 1871). It is exactly this quality of the social transmission of behaviour from generation to generation which provides at the same time the analytical focus and framework for the study of possible changes in the training for warfare in Australia — occasioned by the demands of evolutionary developments in the nature of war itself.

In the above discussion two substantive issues relating to an anthropological study of military training are evident. These are, why the evolution of warfare and the imminence of consequent considerations and re-evaluations concerning new modes of training for possible warfare can be thought to be of interest. And, secondly, what the value of anthropology is as an analytical tool for the above purpose and why any conclusion drawn from such a study are of academic interest and, in particular, how it can be thought to be of any practical interest to the Army.

Turning to Professor Partridge's observation about the need for a re-appraisal of the kind of education and training of army officers due to changes in the character of warfare and in the conditions under which contemporary states prepare for possible war suggestions which have so far been made cover some obvious points: one being that the armed services of contemporary states must possess officers who command extremely advanced and highly specialised weapons of warfare. Next, Partridge suggests that there is no need "to labour the obvious point" that the application of very advanced science and technology to warfare requires radical changes in older ideas concerning the education of officers in the armed forces.

CONCLUSION

In Australia the point can be raised whether or not elaborate formal and academic Army education — as opposed to training — of the kind required for the operation of highly specialised technological weaponry in nation states such as, for instance, the United States, in our case is really desirable or necessary. Writing in the Australian Financial Review, Monday, March 16, 1981, Defence journalist Peter Robinson argued, for instance, that rather than lacking in punch, Australia's present defences in a regional context in fact "are quite formidable". There can be little doubt that under the circumstances there is an ongoing debate concerning the shape of future...
Defense preparedness in Australia. A number of basic elements which affect Australia's security and its security policy and posture (R. Babbage et al., 1978:1) are involved. Whichever rubric these considerations may come under — political, economic, scientific, technological, social, and so on — all can be said to be characterised by attempts to formulate, and, where possible, to solve a perceived problem or series of problems.

The underlying cause of a concern with social and technological problem-solving in matters of Australian Defence considerations lies with the concept itself of what constitutes war, and the preparation for warfare. Essentially all, including the most sophisticated discussions of war and warfare, have revolved around some very few and basic principles which, as the anthropologist H. H. Turney-High (1971:25) writes: "have been applicable in war from time immemorial and . . . will continue to be so in future wars. These truths are known as technical principles or principles of war".

The principles are entitled:
1. The Principle of the Offensive.
2. The Principle of Combined Employment of All Forces.
3. The Principle of Concerted Effort.
4. The Principle of Concentration of Force at the Critical Point.
5. The Principal of Integrity of Tactical Units.
6. The Principle of Fire and Movement.
8. The Principle of Surprise.
11. The Principle of Correct Formations.
12. The Principle of Intelligence.
13. The Principle of Mobility.

There can be no doubt that the above enumerated principles are important in themselves, and important with respect to each other in any military dogma concerning what may be called forms of traditional warfare. The question arises, however, to what extent these principles of war may be affected by "new" forms of warfare.

Answers to questions such as have been raised above lie outside the scope and objectives of the this article. However, by posing the question as such, foundations for future consideration and debate can be said to have been laid. As such, new directions for possible future academic comment are suggested by the present — evolutionary — focus on the phenomenon of war and the preparation for warfare. In the past, as Turney-High has observed, when academics have written about military matters they have become "obsessed" with the weapons employed, ignoring the soldier's axiom that military science is fundamentally a social one:

"Successful warfare is a matter of social organization, not of superior weapons . . . To regard the superiority of weapons as the crucial consideration is a civilian attitude easily controverted".

Academic objectives in relation to anthropological studies of society in general, and of the anthropological study of education and training in particular, are well established in the literature. Thus, where it is the aim of the anthropologist to collect, classify and analyse knowledge about human beings in general, the study of OCS aims to do so specifically in relation to the nature and scope of military training in Australia. The basic contribution which that study makes is that it provides a hitherto untapped academic view of military training. That there appears to be a growing need for academic comment seems suggested by noting, for instance, the views of persons such as Professor P. H. Partridge, Defence journalist Peter Robinson, and academics like Ross Babbage et al. who observed that their Glas paper does not address either specific Army capability requirements or the details of officer education and training . . . It is believed that a background discussion of . . . trends in the general strategic environment is essential for a consideration of [general Army capability requirements], but that other areas of expertise must be involved in the determination of the appropriate details of officer training and education" (1978:3).

Suggesting that: " . . . to go further than we have would be to risk infringing the limits of our competence" (i.e.) the point of departure for the study of OCS training and the analysis and description thereof seemed indicated.

As suggested in previous discussion the practical value of an anthropological study of military training lies with the notion that it illustrates that which otherwise may be taken
Technology. Furthermore, as Janowitz (1971:41) points out, military training constitutes "a system of manpower training which is the reverse of civilian industrial enterprise. A task is found for each person rather than a person for each task". As a result, military training is target oriented, specific in its objectives and deterministic in its methods. These characteristics of training engender high degrees of effectiveness. As C. M. A. Hartman (1971) puts it, the nature of military training is akin to indoctrination. Indeed the military themselves refer to 'dogma'. As such, military training can be said to differ from civilian training in the essential aspect which Hartman (1971:41) crystallises in the observation that:

Indoctrination teaches the student to think in exclamation marks. Scientific schooling teaches the student to think in question marks. Military education is supposed to succeed in both.

Until recent times the demands made on army training have been largely successful, and perhaps therefore, mostly taken for granted. This taken-for-granted quality of life, however (in the light of world-wide social change on a scale hitherto not experienced), has been aptly questioned by Professor Partridge's observations on the different nature of military training in (what here may be termed) "post-industrial" society. The implications for education in general in societies involved in what some anthropologists have called "catastrophic social change" (Wilson and Wilson, 1968) may well specifically also not have been fully recognised in the area of military training. Yet these implications would seem self-evident. If, as Partridge believes, future military training will reflect a concern with the role of the military in the deterrence of warfare, then clearly that objective differs in essential aspect with traditional objectives of military training which, as Morris Janowitz (1971:44) puts it, concerns "a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objects of power with utmost efficiency". If, as recent writers have suggested, education in the widest sense for new modes of social living must be explored and adopted and if as a phenomenon of social living, military training can be thought to be equally subject to such re-evaluations, then perhaps the research at OCS can be said to be some kind of a milestone.

In having supplied an ethnographical — 'historical' — record of present practice in military training and in comparatively drawing attention to current practices and possible future worldwide trends the anthropological study of education at OCS serves as the basis from which to draw practical inferences about social situations in which we as a people find ourselves at this point of time. Like the tip of an iceberg, this social anthropological study of military training reveals a mass of underlying, stored capacities.

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AN ALTERNATIVE RESERVE FORCE

By Lieutenant Colonel J.P.F. Dixon (RL)

I FIRST came to this subject when, like most of us, I thought about the defence of continental Australia. All the usual imponderables were there: Three million square miles, fourteen million people; climatic variations, vast distances, and emptiness. Against this landscape was our small Regular Army. Australia, an enclave of western civilisation is set uncomfortably close to populous neighbours to the north who may have little reason to love us but much to envy in our natural wealth. This scenario has haunted generations of Australian politicians and pundits and it has evoked some fairly craven/pragmatic/dependent reactions (choose your own adjective). "Australia is indefensible!" "We look to our great and powerful friends". Well, it is wise policy making to foster like-minded allies, but history and even recent Australian history provides examples of allies being uncomfortably absent when needed.

In this matter I believe there is one unthinkable thought: that Australia cannot be defended by Australians. There is only one question that can be asked: How can Australia be best defended by Australians? If the Israelis, surrounded by hostile populations across common land borders had been in any doubt about the proper question what would their fate have been now? Further, it erodes our moral claim to this continent and threatens the security of future generations to be anything less than whole-hearted in marshalling what resources we have to make sure we stay here, as an independent nation.

Having said that I hasten to add that what I propose is not a sweeping cure-all... the total defence picture is too complex for that... but a supplement to the reserve ground forces which may be quite valuable in several ways in an emergency.

THE REGULAR ARMY AND THE ARMY RESERVE

I wonder how many Australians know just how good a Regular Army we have. I see little sign of any such understanding in the press. For an illustration of its efficiency we need only go back to the sixties when, for the Vietnam War, it was asked to quickly expand itself to three times its former size. How many other regular armies could have delivered first class troops to the battlefield in so relatively short a time? There is no doubt we are fortunate in having such groups of officers and NCO's who have been trained to such exacting standards and can be relied upon to be the basis of another expansion should circumstances require it. It should be noted that to field such an efficient force again we would need to have advance warning from the potential aggressor of at least eighteen months. Secondly, we would need the war stores ready at hand to equip the force to modern equipment tables... not to mention logistical backup. But note also; as modern equipment becomes more sophisticated and expensive the numerical strengths of armies tend to decline. I leave it to the experts to do the sums, but I would have thought it unlikely that we could field more divisions that the Ist AIF.

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Perhaps the new Army Reserve is a more accurate description of what was once the CMF. I do remember in the early days of the post-war CMF the feeling, if not the clear statement, that we were to be the ready assembled bones and muscle upon which a new AIF was to be fleshed out if ever the need arose. Korea, a few brushfire wars and Vietnam put paid to that notion if it ever existed, as it became perfectly clear that there was no intention of using the volunteer force. For twenty years we must admit that the CMF was in a slow but graceful decline. The reasons were many but not the least the long memories of many regular officers who had served in subordinate positions in the 2nd AIF. This need not concern this article, sufficient to note that it existed. The ARA thought little of the CMF and, to be fair, many of their strictures were accurate, particularly in those deplorable days when we bore the brunt of the ill-conceived 1st National Service. You will have your examples as I have mine; and we must face the facts that some units approached the standards of the mythical Portuguese irregulars. A senior regular officer recently suggested in conversation that the decline dated from the retirement of the 2nd AIF officers. Maybe. I think it was something deeper. However, I should point out there were good units, good commanders and individual soldiers, good platoons and troops. I have witnessed various regular officers who, once they got over the culture shock of going from a professional organization to a civilian volunteer one were heard to mutter. "I don't know how you do it, but you seem to get things done". Patronising faint praise indeed; but the only ones I ever heard in my service. There is, on analysis, a gleam of hope in such a statement; it implied that the observer could faintly apprehend that there might be more than one way of "getting things done".

As I mentioned earlier the new name Army Reserve seems descriptive, for it is obvious that the force is firmly locked in as an auxiliary of the ARA. I do not say this is a bad thing but rather it limits the options available to experiment with other ways of utilising volunteer manpower. In regard to armour, artillery, engineers and service units it obviously has great benefits for defence. For example, it is possible to train ARES armoured soldier up to a standard where only a short polishing up course will make him fit for a first line unit. The reason for this is that he trains in a 'hands on way'; he uses the equipment, he learns to maintain it, but more importantly if he and his crew can march for several hours, maintain communications and arrive at the right spot on time, then they can see their progress in practical terms. They can feel themselves achieving the standards and objectives laid out for them. Similar things can be said of the other technical arms. I wonder if this is true of ARES infantry? I would think the most difficult task a volunteer organization faces is to train a first rate infantry. He is the generalist of the battlefield and the skills he needs are too numerous to list. But many of those skills depend in turn on physical fitness and hardihood; qualities that are not easy to develop in home training. Could it be we ask too much of the infantry volunteer? Could this in turn account for the dramatic falling off in numbers in that corps over the years?

Something drastic has happened whichever way you look at it, to reduce, in Victoria, six Infantry battalions down to the numerical strength of one. I know it is said that modern youth has so many outlets and distractions etc. etc. and that in the post-Vietnam climate services suffered from the anti-war feelings. However, speaking quite subjectively, when I come across young people in my work, they seem much the same as those described by Dr. Bean in Vol I of the Official History of WW I, 1914; with two exceptions; they are less naive and more sophisticated. Given that I see no reason why a greater proportion could not be induced to take an interest in the defence of their country . . . provided we set them realistic aims which can be achieved and we don't insult their native intelligence.

THE OLD LIGHT HORSE

There was a time before World War I when you could find Light Horse units and sub-units from Kalgoorlie to Cairns. They were formed, mainly in country districts; not as regiments concentrated in major towns but as troops and squadrons scattered among the settled areas of the Australian countryside. Conditions of enlistment weren't easy in that the aspiring trooper had to provide his own horse and that the quadruped had to be up to army standards. Nevertheless volunteers were not scarce and rural hearts were known to swell with pride.
when 'their' 'Yankalilla Troop' was smartly turned out and drilled. The British Empire had much reason to be grateful for this organization in Palestine between 1915-18. What is interesting is that much of this was achieved without the expensive infrastructure in depots and cadres that seem to be essential nowadays. Maybe the Edwardians could teach us something about administration. The other things to note in passing is that these Light Horsemen were trained as mounted infantry, not cavalry. The horse was a means of mobility to get the rifleman onto the ground in the right place.

THE RANGERS

What sort of organization could we think of today which would excite the imagination of the more adventurous youth, challenge him to develop skills which are attractive to him while giving us an overall increase in the ground force numbers?

My answer: A force to be raised at local and regional levels consisting of mobile sections of soldiers organized around a four wheel drive vehicle. An organization which is cellular rather than pyramidal. Small groups ranging given areas which can be brigaded or dispersed wherever necessary. This force to be based around available accommodation from mechanics institute or a hired factory rather than expensive depots. Sections to be raised in any locality which can produce six or eight men. a central command and cadre group based on each region.

The Inducement: Learn four wheel driving the real way. Learn desert navigation and long-range radio. Open spaces and adventure training while doing a real job.

Primary Objective: To train a light recce force and guerrilla groups with intimate knowledge of particular areas of Australia.

Secondary Aim: To provide partly trained manpower in emergency which can be quickly absorbed into any combat unit.

Tertiary: To spot and foster junior leadership talent which can be fed either back into the Rangers or posted to formal units.

THE PRIMARY

What I propose is the building of regional forces which are capable, in the worst foreseeable circumstances, of becoming a guerrilla force. It may be argued with much weight that no such extension of our formal military organization can be, or even needs to be foreseen. In reply I would say it takes Nostradamus to look even five years ahead in world events and secondly why shouldn't those skills start to be developed as a deterrent against future misfortune. 'He who desires peace must prepare for war' etc. And thirdly if the force only identifies junior leaders who might not have joined the more traditional arms of the ARES then Australia is still ahead.

THE BASIC ORGANIZATION

At rock bottom this would consist of a section of six to eight men. It would be based around an Australian designed four wheel drive vehicle, in most cases. Two sections in turn make up a patrol. The patrol would be the fundamental recruiting unit.

Put another way any locality which could raise 12 to 16 recruits would form a patrol. The organization would specifically seek to localize not centralize. The more patrols there were spaced across the map, the more detailed local knowledge would be there to be drawn upon. Anyone who has commanded a country ARES unit knows what long distances many soldiers have to travel to attend parade at central depots. The Ranger concept on the other hand would make a virtue out of the tyranny of distances by seeking to raise patrols in as many local communities as possible. In practice these would need to be in the medium and smaller country towns rather than in the one-pub hamlet.

I have concentrated on the country in my description of the Rangers so far for two reasons: firstly to show that it would be possible to achieve something that the ARES has been unable to do for 15 years: draw upon the high quality practical manpower in rural Australia. Secondly, city manpower can more readily supply the volunteers for the technical arms and service units of the ARES. However, recruiting need not be confined to rural areas. City patrols should also be raised, particularly in the outer suburbs.

Where two patrols are raised in reasonable proximity a troop would be formed under the command of a subaltern.

HIGHER ORGANIZATION

Command and control would be exercised by a Regimental Headquarters. But note that the RHQ would not be merely an apex of a
pyramid on an organizational chart but more importantly a regional command. It would coordinate training, supply specialist cadre and command all patrols in the region. It would rarely if ever manoeuvre squadrons in the field. It could control anything from two to five squadrons.

Likewise there would be a sub-regional command based on the squadron. Its tasks would be to train in multi-troop operations, administration of the troops and information collection. Like its superior it should remain flexible in terms of the number of sub units it controls. These could range from two to six.

TASKS
Generally to consider the ways in which an enemy force entering a region could be most effectively identified, delayed, harassed and sabotaged. To consider, if a guerrilla force had to operate in an occupied region, the best way to do it.

SPECIFIC TASKS
To recce and record every track, road, defile, hide, dump, cover in the region.
To recce and record all facilities in the region which may have value in time of war.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES
To become proficient in patrolling techniques and all that implies.
To train in ambushing and hit and run tactics.
To train in long range navigation.
To become proficient in communications and simple codes.
To train with light weapons up to the medium MG.
To train to use explosives in a defensive and aggressive role.

SHADOW ROLE
Most (but not all) of the aims can be realized in home training. For instance, if the right sort of recruits are attracted they will bring with them an invaluable fund of local knowledge. Further it will be seen that however good this organization becomes it is confined to the more populous regions of Australia. The question arises what is to be done about the wide open areas in the north and north west of the country where people are thin on the ground and where an enemy might conceive an easy lodgement?

The answer is to give to each regiment a shadow role in the north. Every annual camp could be held in a specific area of the Kimberleys, Arnhem Land, The Gulf Country etc, e.g. The South Queensland group becomes familiar with the Barkly Tablelands. The Mal-lee Group is assigned the recce of the southern Kimberleys and so on until over the years a considerable familiarity is developed with a second region of defence interests. I need hardly add that such training periods would be a great fillip to recruiting. Whatever the means of mobility required for this role could be stored or maintained in the north for the incoming units.

THE BOTTOM LINE: ADMINISTRATION
The aim of this organization is to provide a supplement to defence on a cheaper per head basis than formal units. And the best way to do that is to dispense with an expensive infrastructure. The idea of the ‘‘Drill Hall’’ should be done away with except for RHQ. Let’s take a theoretical example. In the town Bercharip two young men responded to the early recruiting team from RHQ in the regional capital and came back from the Ranger Centre trained as junior NCO’s. They succeeded in recruiting 10 others and in the fullness of time acquired two equipped FWD’s. Previously, aided by the SO (accommodation) they secured a lease on the now unused Mechanics Institute for class rooms etc. Through their own efforts and some small budgetary help from RHQ they converted it into quite comfortable office, classroom and mess. The two vehicles for a small weekly sum are garaged in a compound at the local GMH dealer’s cavernous workshop. Servicing of the vehicles is done by the patrol but repairs are carried out by the local dealership since all the parts on the vehicle are standard domestic items available almost everywhere in the country. Fuel is purchased locally and so are rations unless combat packs are required, then they are indented from RHQ.

With this system the administrative load on RHQ is reduced to a minimum. There is no heavy administrative tail stretching back to LAD’s workshops or Transport Corps. RHQ with fewer people, can get down to its job to
administer personnel and supervise training standards. The Rangers are designed to operate within Australia therefore they should be supported within it. The extra business brought to local contractors will help the image of the unit in the district.

**UNIFORMS**

The scale of issue for the Rangers need only be a fraction of that issued to the ARES. There would be only one basic uniform: a camouflage set of coveralls with a distinctive cut, a cap which keeps the sun and rain off the face, foul weather jacket, boots and sweater. There is no reason why both servicability and smartness can’t be designed into these outfits.

**VEHICLES**

The standard vehicle would be designed and built in Australia. There is a wealth of experience in this country on what constitutes a good FWD. There is also unused plant capacity. The design contract would insist on absolute simplicity and standardization of components. For instance the engine should be a Holden or Ford six. (ADE carried out tests on the first of these in a FWD back in the late fifties. I wonder what became of the idea?) All spare parts would be available at your local dealer. A good production run would reduce unit costs well below what the Army currently pays for its FWD’s and provide a fillip for the car industry. (NOTE: in a few regions of Australia it may be useful to look at the horse as a means of mobility).

**WEAPONS**

In the old days of your CMF soldiers were trusted to take their personal weapons home with them. The system worked well and reduced the number of stores and storemen needed. We should return to it. Most country people are brought up with guns and have a sensible attitude to them.

Machine guns and side arms are another matter. These would be stored securely at Squadron or Regiment and be issued from there. In some areas arrangements could be made with the state police to store certain items with them.

**COMMUNICATIONS**

I would see this tackled in two stages:
1. The basic set. The rapid growth of CB technology has seen the introduction of small, well made transceivers. This technology should be used to build the Ranger set; the only real differences being that they be waterproof and shock mounted. As I write this I have with me a Victorian Forestry Commission radio which measures 8" by 10" and gives surprisingly good comms through the Alpine regions. Communications at this level could be both efficient and cheap.
2. At a later stage more sophisticated long range radios could be issued to selected units.

**PRIMING THE PUMP**

There is no question that the hardest part of the Ranger organization would be making a start. It could take as long as five years to bring it into full operation. At the beginning a Ranger Centre would be established. This would evolve doctrines, standard operating procedures and train cadre personnel both ARA and ARES. It would need to be staffed by flexible minds from both groups. Inputs from ARA on irregular warfare techniques would be invaluable, but, just as essential, would be the inputs from ARES on the leading, fostering and encouraging part-time volunteers. The very best brains from any part of the Australian Army should be sought for this stage.

The graduates from this centre would form the bare bones of the organization. NCO’s aided by the Regiment would have the task of gathering the volunteers in their home districts. In addition there would be higher approaches made to foster the force through municipal, shire and business organizations. Starting at the centre the word would spread to every part of the region.

Standards would have to be laid down from day one which were practical and capable of achievement. These should be thoroughly tested and once worked by adhered to closely. A pessimist might say at this point that the only thing he could see coming out of this is a bunch of cowboys whooping it up through farmers paddocks at Government expense. An optimist might say on the other hand the quality that has distinguished the Australian
citizen soldier in both world wars is his capacity for self discipline and initiative when he can see the object of the exercise. He has not changed. To this day the worst military sin that can be perpetrated upon the Australian soldier is to by mucked about by experts or amateurs. This would have to rank No. 1 on the ranger tablet of commandments.

The force should be highly visible in the local community and not locked away behind compound walls. It would be mobilized immediately in bush fires, floods or any other natural disasters. But having said that, it is a military unit with all the discipline that that implies. The Rangers would have to do without bands, brass buttons and parade grounds. Some would say that these are the essential aids in producing a disciplined unit; on the other hand others would argue that being well led, having a real job to do, one which is capable of achievement, are the foundations of a real discipline; that of the individual working as an intelligent part of the group.

Lastly, is practical. There are examples in more than one state where sub units scattered over miles of country at the ‘far end of the military establishment’ operated with high morale and efficiency on very little in the way of help from parent HQ’s in the city. It was from observing this that the idea came.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (see also pp. 3-8)

competence specified by the standards. Those soldiers who quickly master a particular training objective can be shifted to help slower learners (a form of peer instruction) or continue their own skill development in other areas. The training focus is toward soldier performance rather than on an instructor’s ability to present instruction.

The Army is constantly improving its instructional image. We have the expertise and training publications to prove it. However I believe that the instructional system proposed by Mr Cook would not satisfy a competent instructor. A class room technique, used in a tertiary education, student teaching institution may be suitable for teaching practical or manual subjects, but to adapt it for use in a Service environment is fraught with danger.

Performance-oriented training does not reduce the importance of the instructor because he has the responsibility of making his instruction work. That is making it do what it is designed to do: to get soldiers to achieve the training objectives in the most efficient manner possible. This responsibility increases rather than decreases the importance of the instructor.

Training objectives describe in precise terms what it is that constitutes success. The instructor no longer has to guess what is important, and has maximum flexibility in deciding how best to organize the lesson so that the maximum number of students can achieve the objectives in the shortest possible time.

The ultimate aim of all instruction and training is fitness for battle which is essential if success is to be achieved. With this aim in view the instructor is to do all in his power to ensure that the soldier becomes a master of his weapons, his tools and the technique of fighting. After all the objective of all weapon training is to teach soldiers the most efficient way to use their weapons in order to inflict maximum casualties upon the enemy.

To achieve this the instructor must spare no effort and he must constantly be viewing the task through the eyes of his recruits to find out:

How will they learn best?

Because the instructor has only succeeded in his task when the soldiers being taught have absorbed the knowledge and can put it to practical use. Would you not agree, Mr Cook?

ROSS BURNS
WO1
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Fifth Task Force

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INTRODUCTION

THE recent revolution in the system of training Seaman Officers in the RAN has occurred almost without notice. I refer of course to the system of Warfare training which has produced the Advanced Warfare Officers (AWO), Principal Warfare Officers (PWO) and Assistant PWO's who are presently manning our fleet units.

If the initials AWO, PWO and APWO are new to you, then you may recognise some of the following expressions used by the Long Course Specialists (LCS) to describe their successors; 'Programmed Parrots', 'Zippo Kids', 'Jack of all trades', 'Bright Sparks' etc. All these terms of endearment contain some elements of truth, and so they should because the LCS were after all instrumental in the creation of the Warfare Officer.

Requirement for Warfare Officers.

The need for Warfare Officers really originated during World War II with the introduction of radar to naval ships and the resultant effect of increasing the war at sea to a 24 hour affair. The undaunting prospect of maintaining ships in constant readiness for action throughout day and night was not really implemented until recent years. Previously, ships in War operations maintained constant surveillance by manning electronic sensors to gain warning of a developing threat and then fought off attacks by sending the ships company to Action Stations to man weapon systems. This principle was certainly adequate to counter the World War II type threats of slow high-level bombers, diesel powered submarines and gun armed surface ships. The command would always have time to be available to direct his ships operations as advised by his Seamen Sub-Specialists. These officers were well trained in their particular field of warfare after completing a LONG Course (approx 12 months) at the Royal Navy's sub-specialist schools.

The post World War II development of the Soviet Navy changed the nature of war at sea by concentrating on the introduction of the guided and homing missile into its forces. The Soviets replaced the bomb with the missile, the gun with the missile and the torpedo with the missile. Launch platforms were developed to deliver missiles from the air, sea surface and sub-surface; platforms which were designed to be employed in massed co-ordinated attacks supported by Electronic Counter Measures such as chaff, radar and communications jamming and spoofing. Consequently the gap between detection and attack was reduced from hours to a few minutes. Reaction times against Anti-ship missiles in service today vary from a maximum of 7 minutes for Air launched missiles from approximately 100nm to 1½ minutes for horizon range missiles launched from Surface ships and submarines.

The presence of this type of missile threat at sea today dictates the requirement for ships to have a capability to react immediately to counter-attacks. This capability is a combination of good sensors, effective weapons systems and personnel trained to employ their equipment in the optimum manner.
Technology has provided some answers to assist in this field e.g. suites of radars and electronic sensors to detect launch platforms and missiles, tactical data systems with quick reaction modes, and more accurate and reliable weapon systems. The effective use of a ship's sensors and weapons is achieved by a Command and Control Organisation designed to warn all fleet units of a developing threat and ensure that all units react immediately to this threat. At present this requirement is covered by a system of pre-planned responses to particular threats implemented in ships by Warfare Officers trained in the employment of ships weapons and sensors in all tactical situations.

**The PWO System**

The PWO System revolves around the requirement for each ship to be capable of defending itself against all threats on a 24 hour a day basis. This is achieved by manning the ships weapons and sensors in a Two Watch system with a Principal Warfare Officer in charge of each watch. The Command delegates authority to the PWO to react to pre-planned responses and take necessary measures to defend the ship and initiate offensive actions as a counter-attack. The PWO is assisted by Directors and Controllers, who are Officers/Sailors employed in the use of a particular weapon or sensor.

**Warfare Training**

In the RAN Warfare training commences at the Junior Lieutenant level with the Assistant PWO course. This 10 week course is designed to train junior officers to act as Directors and assist the PWO in the Operations room. APWOs normally undertake a short Pre-joining course in one of the warfare sub-specialties — Gunnery, ASW or Communications prior to joining their ships. Some officers are selected to qualify in aircraft control and fill billets as Fighter Controllers in HMAS MELBOURNE and the DDGs. The APWO course is conducted in Australia at HMAS WATSON with some training at the Gunnery and Communications Schools at HMAS CERBERUS.

The second stage of Warfare training is the PWO course at the Royal Navy's School of Maritime Operations (SMOPS), HMS DRYAD. During this 29 week course the embryonic PWO undertakes theoretical and practical training in Gunnery, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Communications, Radar, Operations room management and General tactical subjects. The course includes two weeks sea training; one week devoted to live gunnery firings and the other to ASW operations. Before graduating to practise his art at sea the Student PWO must pass two 3 hour exams on all subjects covered and also perform satisfactorily as a PWO in

A typical Defence Watch Organisation in a Destroyer Escort would be:-
the Tactical training Models at SMOPS during a week of Operational Tactical Training (OTT). During OTT the students carry out the duties of PWO in the models of ships operations rooms. Staff Captains are appointed to observe their performance and 'real' sailors are provided from fleet units to man the sensors and weapons. Students are required to regurgitate all the skills ingested during the PWO course — they plan and brief tactical games, direct the ships operations from the Operations room and implement pre-planned responses to counter-simulated missile attacks.

**PWO Employment**

The newly qualified PWO is considered to be capable of:

- using his ship's weapons and sensors to counter the current missile threat, and
- administering the day by day affairs of the Ships Warfare sub-departments.

Therefore, on joining his first ship the PWO is normally allocated the duties of either Gunnery Officer or ASW Officer. The Senior PWO will also be designated the ship's Operations Officer. A small percentage of PWOs qualify as Navigation Officers on completion of their PWO course and fill the traditional role of Navigation Officer in Fleet units.

The Royal Navy's policy is that the PWO should serve at least 18 months to 2 years at sea before being considered for Advanced Warfare training or other employment. In the RAN the practice has been for PWOs to spend a mere 12 months in a ship before proceeding to their next appointment.

**Advanced Warfare Training**

Some PWOs are selected to complete the Advanced Warfare Officers Course at SMOPS DRYAD. The AWO course is designed to equip TWOs to fill senior sea billets and specialist staff positions. Therefore the course is divided into 'Stream' training in the sub-specialist fields of naval warfare namely, Above Water Warfare (A), Under Water Warfare (U), and Communications (C) with common training in Maritime tactics at the Maritime Tactical School (MTS) which is co-located with SMOPS.

Upon return to Australia RAN Officers who have passed the AWO course are designated as PWO (sub-specialty) — graduates of the 'A' stream are either G or D if they have previously qualified as Fighter Controller; 'U' stream graduates are known as T and Communicators have the suffix CEW. The latter allocation of EW to the Comms branch is an RAN anomaly. The RN trains the AWO(A) as its EW Specialist and as a result achieves better tactical utilization of this important weapon and sensor system.

**Advantages and Disadvantages of Warfare Officers**

The greatest advantage of the Warfare system is that it provides Officers who are well trained in maritime tactics and capable of using ships weapons and sensors to counter today's missile threat. As a result RAN ships are now manned adequately to participate in prolonged periods of operation when a three dimensional missile threat exists. A peacetime advantage is that now all seamen officers filling Warfare billets have a common training base and there is a greater tendency for a teamwork approach to exercises and practices.

The major disadvantage of the Warfare system is that the PWO does not have the detailed knowledge of equipment which his predecessor the Long Course Officer exhibited. Thus the vital role of knowledgeable user is lacking in ships the PWO has time to concentrate on learning about the more detailed aspects of his equipment. Initially the PWO has a general knowledge of capabilities and limitations of his weapons and sensors which is sufficient to enable him to employ them in a tactical environment. This is normally not a sufficient level of knowledge for the PWO to discuss problems with maintainers and provide a valuable operator input. Also PWOs do not appear to have the confidence that was expected of the LC Officers and therefore they are loath to proceed beyond the basic weapon practices and exercises that they practised during the PWO course. Both of the above shortcomings tend to disappear as the PWO gains experience in his ship.

In fact most of the criticism that is levelled at the PWO could be reduced by some changes in policy. The first aspect worthy of change is the duration of sea service after qualifying as a PWO. In the RAN this is currently a mere 11-12 months which is insufficient time for the PWO to develop expertise in a particular sub-specialty. The RN consider the first 12 months...
as a consolidation period after the PWO course and look at the second 12 months as the period when the PWO starts earning his keep. The RAN should adopt a similar policy and ensure that PWOs stay at sea longer and have a staggered changeover system so that there is always one PWO with at least 12 months experience in each ship.

The second aspect is the fact that RAN PWOs are trained by the RN to operate British weapons and sensors. This is ideal for those RAN Officers fortunate enough to complete 2 years exchange periods with RN. However, the officers who return directly to Australia require a 6 week familiarisation course to acquaint them with RAN equipment before they join their ships.

Presently there is some commonality between RN and RAN ships however, this is rapidly disappearing with the DE half-life refits and purchase of the FFGs. The gap will be even greater when the Follow-on Destroyer replaces the DEs. The writing is therefore on the wall for the RAN to take a big step forward and start training Warfare Officers in Australia. My plan would be to start Australianisation at the Advanced Warfare level. The AWO Course has a relatively small annual turnover and a course could be designed to meet current RAN requirements. Because of the large numbers involved, PWO training would need a more gradual introduction. One possibility would be for only those Officers selected for Exchange to do the RN PWO Course while the remainder stayed in Australia for a local course. Another alternative would be to negotiate a new style course with the RN where RAN Officers did their equipment training in Australia and joined up with their RN counterparts for tactical training.

The Australianisation of Warfare training is a subject worthy of some study. Action is needed in the near future to prevent our Officers becoming redundant before they complete their warfare training.

**Warfare Training for Sailors**

The RN has complemented the PWO system with the formation of the Operations Branch which provides sailors trained to fill the positions of Directors, Controllers and Operators. These positions are related to rank and also indicate a seaman's level of warfare skill i.e. Directors — CPO/PO, Controllers — PO/LS, Operators — AB/SMN. This differs from the RAN system of more general professional training which is not directly related to rank or billet. There is certainly a case for examining the present RAN Seaman sub-branch structure with a view to bringing it into line with the requirements of modern maritime warfare.

**CONCLUSION**

Warfare training was introduced into the RAN over 7 years ago in response to a requirement to provide our ships with a personnel capability to recognise developing missile threats and implement the rapid reactions to counter this threat. The present PWO and AWO courses conducted at SMOPS DRYAD provide the necessary tactical training to meet this requirement. However, the increasing equipment commonality gap between the RN and RAN will eventually result in the RAN being full of Warfare Officers trained only to fight in RN ships. This problem could be overcome by the Australianisation of Warfare training. Another essential part of the Warfare system is the training of sailors to fill supporting billets. The current method of general professional training for sailors does not provide personnel with the required background to fill the positions of Director/Controller which are so important in the Warfare system.
The Chinese Military Strategist, Sun Tzu, who lived about 500 B.C. said “War is a matter of vital importance to the State and the province of life or death. It should not be embarked upon without due reflection”. He placed reflection well above weaponry as a tool of war and of the five fundamental factors of importance in producing victory he placed first what he called “moral influence”. By this he meant that which causes people to be in harmony with their leaders so that they will accompany them in life and unto death. In those days armies were collected when necessary but the sophistication of modern weapons and the training necessary for their use has changed that and armed forces need to remain continuously in existence. However, their function is unchanged and their fitness is determined in the relatively brief period when they go to war. Among other things, the alcohol or other drug abuse which may have been given limited attention gets an abrupt exposure.

In some armies there has been a refusal even to admit the possibility of alcohol problems and the removal of a tentative guess at a prevalence of alcoholism of 4% in another army from a document, meant for internal publication only, because even to raise the matter was intolerable, comes to mind. It may have been because in a profession at risk those who are most likely to be affected are the longest in it — Generals are the most likely soldier alcoholics and the least likely to tolerate the facts. The estimate of 4% was almost certainly a low one and the Australian Army would probably have made no better showing. The U.S. Army accepts a figure of 4% for problem drinkers and as many as 30% of their soldiers get drunk at least weekly.

Alcoholism has been called an occupational disease of soldiers but the description is misleading. The Army is merely one of the occupations in which factors conducive to drug abuse are more prevalent than in others. The prevalence of alcoholism or drug abuse in the armed services of any country correlates with the prevalences in the civilian population from which it draws its recruits. If we assume 10% of adult Australian males and 2% of adult Australian females having problems with alcohol and an exactly proportional recruitment we start with something approaching 1,000 problem drinking soldiers in Victoria alone.

An attempt to control the factor of civilian prevalence must obviously depend on some kind of recruit selection. Most armies devote a deal of attention to selection procedures and tend to overvalue the success which they can achieve. Negative selection, the exclusion of the unsuitable, is relatively efficient with people who are physically diseased or inadequate but much less so for those who are psychologically disturbed or vulnerable to disorders of behaviour such as drug or alcohol abuse. Positive selection is of less significance in this situation.

When the U.S. Army became wholly voluntary the pattern of recruits changed and a higher proportion was found to show a series of personal characteristics and to show behaviour which included drug abuse. They showed more intellectual and emotional deprivation and tended to have a low expectation of achievement. In some, lack of the development of internal controls or self discipline had been evident since the ages of about 10 to 12. This group is particularly liable to seek external
discipline to compensate for their own deficiencies and to gravitate to disciplined organisations like the Army or, for the less fortunate, prison. Unfortunately, their reactions to external discipline are often not good and their hostility and resistance seems to increase their vulnerability when exposed to forbidden pleasures, including drugs. Other features noted have been big city upbringing, poverty, dropping out of school, criminality, previous multiple drug abuse, and heavy drinking for personal rather than social reasons by the members or their parents or both.

A study of the behaviour of opiate abusers in the U.S. Army in Europe included the following features:

- Smoked tobacco: 100%
- Single: 95%
- White: 91%
- Previous illegal drug use: 84%
- School drop-outs: 51%
- Parents divorced or separated: 36%
- 20 alcoholic drinks or more weekly: 11%

The significance of age as shown in the U.S. Army in Vietnam indicates that the greatest rate of illegal drug use was in 20 year olds and the least in 24 year olds. Perhaps the struggle for identity, adolescent protest and a thirst for adventure and excitement were still persisting and causing the 20 year olds to be the most inclined to respond to challenge — illegality of the drug would add to its attractions.

The Duke of Wellington willingly took a drunken rabble and used them as cannon fodder in the winning of his wars and others since have believed in maintaining cheap and plentiful liquor. The N.A.T.O. Forces in Germany have tax-free alcohol, which may be seen by the troops as an opportunity to save money on their drinking but in practice is often only an opportunity to drink more for the same cost. Soldiers go to foreign lands where the laws seem less serious, money is not so real and the drinks are weaker. There is a widely believed myth in Australia that our beer is the strongest in the world. The same myth is heard in Germany and, strangely, the strongest beer in the world is brewed in Scotland. Americans in England have been known to get into difficulties because American proof and English proof in liquor are different and they thought the 70% proof English spirits were weaker than the identical U.S. product labelled 80% proof.

Drugs may also be more readily available abroad, particularly to well-paid troops, because prostitutes and drug peddlers gather round large military camps. On the other hand abuse of one kind of drug may be reduced because of the local attitudes and regulations. American troops had much trouble in Vietnam with cheap pure opiates and they also have a lot of trouble in Germany whereas they have almost no trouble in Italy and Turkey and little in the U.K. and Belgium.

American troops on return to the continental United States, at least from Vietnam, tended to revert to former practices on return to their previous environments. In a large study, use of illegal drugs before Vietnam was admitted in 47% but it was mostly casual use. In Vietnam 92% used alcohol, 69% used cannabis and 43% used narcotics. The use of illegal drugs tended to occur in the first week, to lead to addiction in 20% of cases and to show no correlation with danger, assignments or deaths of friends. The reasons given by the users were euphoria, intolerance of regulations, homesickness, boredom and fear. After Vietnam 95% showed remission of addiction and people changed back from opiate to alcohol or barbiturates. However, while the pattern of drug use itself reverted, those who had used illegal drugs in Vietnam showed a continuing greater amount of crime, unemployment, divorce and depression. It is important to remember that American Service tours in Vietnam were short and rarely more than a year.

The attitudes of the military hierarchy are of great importance because when drug use of any kind is accepted its incidence is likely to increase. Certainly we accept that this is the case with tobacco and alcohol and experience with the British Army in Germany supports the belief for opiates and alcohol. The British were neighbours of the Americans and were near drug distribution centres. They had some trouble with experimental cannabis use but next to no opiate abuse. Alcohol was a big problem but varied from unit to unit and there was a suspicion that those units with most alcoholism had the hardest drinking commanding officers.

There are a number of military factors which are not specially confined to armies, like boredom, excessively light work, hard work, hot conditions and above all a largely male
profession in which there is a degree of sexual isolation.

The stresses of war, though increasingly severe, are not necessarily as significant as they might seem. In war there may be no opportunity to escape into drugs and such opportunities as there are may be refused because impairment of consciousness can be lethal. Also, but for the same reason, the military attitude, at least to new and unaccepted drugs, tends to harden. The attitudes of military leaders become highly realistic when confronted with the facts of modern war as exemplified by the Egyptian General who declared after the 6 Day War, that the best way to avoid psychological casualties of battle is to remain at peace and the second best way is to win. All are subjected to enormous stresses and the results may begin to appear only after the main event. We should not be deceived by philosophical discussions of the morality of biological or nuclear warfare; what happens at the time will depend almost entirely on what is believed to be effective. The modern commander, at least in a war between major industrial nations, could have and could face nuclear weapons, nerve gases and biological weapons and would have a pressing need to cover large distances at very high speeds, remaining exposed to the threat of annihilation of himself and his troops until he reaches his aim of total victory. He would want weapons which would eliminate all resistance but would leave food, fuel and transport routes untouched. Such weapons are available and exemplified by nerve gases. The poor bloody infantryman would be confronted with the unheralded arrival of a substance which is odourless, tasteless, invisible and, in some cases, inevitably fatal long before he has detected its presence. Treatments are available but cause disabling toxicity if taken, whether necessary or not. Prophylactic treatment is, therefore, denied. When in danger, which means anywhere in reach of aircraft or rocket, the soldier must protect himself with an outfit which does not admit air or moisture and he must wear it until the danger of attack has passed and chemical tests demonstrate that it has not already occurred. During those weeks he cannot eat, drink, micturate or defaecate without sophisticated equipment not readily placed in the outback. He cannot recognise his friends nor be confident of the supportive hierarchy, he cannot speak readily and he cannot even be sure that any man he meets is not his enemy. He is thus simultaneously isolated, deprived and terrified.

These stresses can lead to the classical war neurosis with acute or chronic anxiety, frightening dreams, insomnia, irritability, agitation and somatic symptoms and preoccupation, a syndrome commonly thought to be responsive to alcohol, barbiturates or tranquillizers. Alcohol for certain, and probably all the others, is likely to suppress inhibition more than it produces tranquillity and therefore does more harm than good. In any case, even if effective these are drugs of dependency with withdrawal syndromes which approximate to the original illness. Withdrawal therefore may lead to apparent relapse, reinstitution of treatment and an end result of both chronic illness and drug addiction.

A military organization is even more at risk of damage than a civilian organization as a result of drug abuse. We are all now aware of the dangers of drinking and driving but a Leopard tank is more dangerous than a small family car and firing its gun even more so. We have it on good authority that no American B52 ever did take off with all the crew stoned but it is a frightening idea. Drugs can also be a problem in relation to security and most armies have complex systems to exclude drug users from security posts while attempting to safeguard their rights.

Naturally there are favourable influences as well. One of the advantages held by a military force is strong control over its internal environment. An army can try to select troops so as to exclude those with high risks, it can educate and it is to the credit of senior officers, in Australia at least, that they are willing to accept information and advice on the real dangers. There are opportunities to control availability of drugs to individuals both by simple restrictions and by freeing the availability of one drug or group of drugs relative to others. Discipline is within military control, even to some extent with regard to the civilian population. This extends to detection of the drug abuse and requires consideration of amnesty programmes which foster self-reporting at the small cost of tolerance and treatment for those exposed on the grounds that a punitive approach drives the problem underground.
To summarise, soldiers are people, they have educational cultures and personal backgrounds which affect their vulnerability to drug abuse, they enter an abnormal environment either voluntarily or by compulsion and are then liable to exposure to an extremely abnormal and stressful set of circumstances. In these ways they may have an above average liability to abuse drugs and their community has an above average liability to damage as a result. There are some protective influences which can be used as civilian and military authorities become more aware of the problems.

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ASEAN: A NEW DIMENSION?

By Wing Commander N. P. May, RAAF

ABSTRACT

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has always been resolute in seeking regional neutrality and has repeatedly reaffirmed that ASEAN will not become a military alliance. Throughout the war in Vietnam and even after the ceasefire in 1973 when communist forces seized South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, ASEAN continued to invite those countries to join the organization in the hope that Vietnamese nationalism would eventually weaken Soviet influence and allow an even stronger grouping of independent Asian countries. This idealism was shaken with Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and was put under further strain by the ensuing refugee problem and border clashes between Vietnamese and Thai forces. Despite official insistence that ASEAN will remain a non-military organization some observers see a move towards the militarization of ASEAN as inevitable. Just what are the prospects for a collective security arrangement being added to ASEAN?

"To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region . . ." (Purpose of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - 1967)

VIETNAMESE aggression in Southeast Asia has prodded a political reaction from the hitherto introverted and somewhat languid ASEAN organization. The five non-communist Southeast Asian countries demonstrated effective political cohesion in denouncing Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia and for its treatment of refugees. This concerted effort by the ASEAN countries has added a new political dimension to their original 1967 statement of purpose.

The political element was formally added in 1976 at the ASEAN Bali summit conference where a Declaration of Concord was signed which sought expanded cooperation in political, as well as, economic, social and cultural fields. Although ASEAN officials stressed that the Bali Declaration did not indicate a shift from its professed strict neutrality, there was an obvious change from the idealist 'Zone of Peace and Neutrality' (ZOPAN) notion which had previously reflected ASEAN's only acknowledged security policy. Some observers see the new political dimension to ASEAN as a logical step towards the militarization of the Pact. Just what are the prospects for a collective security arrangement being added to ASEAN?

In considering this prospect it is worthwhile reflecting on the origin and development of ASEAN and to examine some of the relationships between the five member-countries and other regional powers.

In the wake of World War II, when the Western World first perceived the threat of communist expansion, and when Southeast Asia was emerging from its colonial past, the United States and some of its European and Asian allies formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This alliance did not achieve lasting cohesion among the Southeast
Asian countries, and considerable turbulence occurred during the 1950s and early 1960s. There was a continuing effort during the 1960s to create an indigenous organization to foster regional stability among the non-communist states. Early efforts along those lines included the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established in 1961 by Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand; and an ineffective attempt by Philippine President Macapagal to form an association with Malaysia and Indonesia called MAPHILINDO.

ASA failed because it did not include Indonesia, the most populous regional state which, under President Sukarno, fell under the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party. Sukarno opposed the formation of an independent Federation of Malaysia, comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah. His aggressive policy of ‘Confrontation’ and guerrilla attacks against Malaysia continued to separate the countries until his fall in 1967. ASA was also weakened by a dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over the sovereignty of Sabah.

The change of Government in Indonesia in 1966 opened the way for Thailand to successfully bring together the five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) with a political formula which emphasized economic and cultural co-operation but carefully avoided politics and military issues. At the outset and Communist powers-viewed ASEAN with suspicion; both the Soviet Union and PRC denounced the arrangements as a front for the “Western imperialist powers”. The Communists were, however, preoccupied with the fighting in Vietnam and later with events in Laos and Cambodia, so apart from some indigenous communist insurgency the ASEAN countries were generally free from external interference and made economic progress during the 1970s.

ASEAN’s response to the ceasefire in Vietnam in 1973 was to emphasize the ZOPAN concept and to offer membership to Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam and Burma. This offer was ignored. Burma wished to remain in self imposed isolation and in quick succession the communists seized Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos. Even then diplomatic approaches to the communist countries continued to make clear that the offer of membership to ASEAN remained open. Soon after the fall of Saigon Malaysia recognized the new Provisional Revolutionary Government in Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) and all five members recognized the Pol Pot regime in Phnom Penh. At this same time Thailand and the Philippines established diplomatic relations with China. Hopes for an Asian detente seemed justified, particularly when Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien visited the ASEAN countries and assured them of Hanoi’s friendly intentions.

The apparent North Vietnamese victory did not bring peace to the communist regime. Internal resistance to the new Government was brutally suppressed. Neighboring Cambodia and Laos turned against Vietnam. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese fugitives created serious problems for the ASEAN countries. Finally the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 destroyed the image of detente and created an awareness in ASEAN that political and economic solidarity was not enough to guarantee peace and security.

ASEAN has survived despite internal racial, language and religious differences and despite other internal difficulties such as the friction between the Philippines and Indonesia over Muslim revolutionaries in the southern Philippines and between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. ASEAN’s ability to overcome these difficulties and to co-operate for their common good has earned much international respect. Japan, Australia and New Zealand readily send representatives to ASEAN conferences, and even the communist countries have come to accept ASEAN as a significant regional organization. A conference held in Manila in June 1981 to exchange views on regional and international issues attracted the attendance of the President of the European Economic Council Christopher Van der Klaauw and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig.

ASEAN solidarity has withstood the test of recent political turbulence: the fall of Saigon, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, altered U.S. China relationships, Cambodian atrocities, the Chinese “punishment” of Vietnam, the refugee problem and, most of all, the apprehension about Vietnamese aggression. The current challenge by the Vietnamese Army, backed by the Soviets and already dominating Laos and Cambodia, is particularly vexing because of the differing opinions within
ASEAN as to the nature of the threat posed by Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union.

Although Indonesia generally shares the concern of the other ASEAN members over Vietnam's takeover of Laos and Cambodia, they are likely to regard the Chinese attack on Vietnam with greater apprehension. Except for a short time, when Sukarno led Indonesia to side with China in a bid for leadership of the Third World, Indonesians have generally regarded China as the most dangerous regional power. Indonesian leaders remember that China supported the PKI attempt to take over their Government in 1965 and they are still aware of the four million ethnic Chinese in Indonesia that could be subverted by China. Indonesia can also empathize with Vietnam's struggle for independence having fought for their own freedom from colonial rule. The present Indonesian leadership seems to believe that Vietnamese nationalism will eventually lead the country away from Soviet influence and from its strong communist expansionist character. Like Indonesia, Malaysia's attitude is influenced by the fear that the PRC is still seeking domination of the region. The presence of a large Chinese minority within Malaysia and the PRC supported guerrilla warfare which has been a constant problem for the Federation since its independence are both reasons for Malaysia's cautious attitude when dealing with China. Both Indonesia and Malaysia seem to expect Hanoi to slacken its ties with the Soviet Union and become a buffer against Chinese expansion. They do not wish a confrontation with Vietnam which they believe would lead to increased Chinese influence in the region.

The possibility of an ASEAN rapprochement with Vietnam (allowing Vietnam to consolidate its position in Laos and Cambodia) is not viewed in the same way in Bangkok. The recent Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, the shelling across the border and particularly the Cambodian refugee problem long suffered by Thailand are good reasons for Thai apprehension regarding future moves by Vietnam. No doubt the Thais were quite happy to see the Chinese 'punish' the Vietnamese in 1979 and are pleased by China's warning of a further 'lesson' should Vietnam dare attack Thailand. Direct Vietnamese aggression is not, however, the only issue here. Thailand is particularly susceptible to Communist insurgency in its northeast provinces where the population is largely Laotian. The Laotian population in this area is in fact larger than the population of Laos itself and could be seen by an expansionist Vietnam as part of a greater Indo-China. The potential for a Vietnamese supported rebellion in this region must be a major concern in Bangkok and further reason for Thailand to be wary of Vietnam. Furthermore, Thai attitudes are likely to be influenced by their long association with the United States and are likely to reflect the American anti-Vietnamese (anti Soviet) attitude whilst accommodating China's position.

Singapore, with its predominantly Chinese population, also sees Hanoi rather than Peking as the more dangerous communist power. The apparent contradiction in a relationship between a business oriented, free enterprise society, like Singapore, and Communist China is not difficult to accept when Hong Kong is used for comparison.

The ASEAN countries will probably be unable to reconcile their different perceptions of the politics of the region. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that any, let alone all, of the members would be prepared to make a firm commitment to an ASEAN military alliance. There are, however, other ways short of an alliance by which co-operation and rationalization in matters of defence can contribute to their collective security. There are already many examples of such co-operation within ASEAN, in fact only Indonesia lacks experience in regional military co-operation; Thailand and the Philippines, as members of SEATO, have had experience in joint planning and exercises, Malaysia and Singapore inherit a common background of British training and Thailand and Malaysia have co-operated since 1965 against the communists on their common border. Bilateral military co-operation has already become fairly common. Malaysian and Indonesian joint exercises have been particularly active and the first Indonesian-Singapore and Indonesian-Thai war games were held in 1980.

Another area where ASEAN is laying the basis for multilateral military co-operation is in logistics. Greater standardization of equipment, particularly sophisticated weaponry such as combat aircraft and field armaments, will enable reinforcement and supply support to be effected more efficiently. For example, in the recent expansion of their air forces, two aircraft
types, both American, the Northrop F5E fighter and the McDonnell-Douglas A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft were selected by all the ASEAN countries. Thus, in the air, ASEAN has reached a degree of standardization that would foster any future attempt to create a combined air defence command. This type of logistic coordination is in contrast to that which previously existed whereby the five countries were variously supplied by the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands.

There are limits to what can be achieved by the rationalization of defence planning. The present military balance in Southeast Asia does not favor ASEAN. There is no combination of ASEAN forces which could match Vietnam's military might. In 1980 the combined ASEAN armed forces totalled 693,000 compared with Vietnam's army of more than one million (10:76). The contrast between Vietnam's battle-hardened soldiers and the ASEAN armies that have never fought a conventional war and are mainly prepared for counter-insurgency is also significant when comparing their capabilities. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine any way by which all of the far flung ASEAN armies could be quickly and effectively concentrated in any likely battle area. Conflicting requirements for troops at home and difficulties in mobilization and transportation of men and equipment would reduce the size of the force that each country could actually put into action on a foreign battlefield. Language differences would compound the operational problems of a combined ASEAN force and put it at a further disadvantage to the Vietnamese.

Although ASEAN has publicly reaffirmed its non-military intentions, there have been suggestions from various lobbies and public figures, such as Singapore's Foreign Minister Suppiah Dhanabalan, that ASEAN could be "forced into some sort of military alliance" (4:33). The ASEAN leaders are willing to use the threat of a military pact as a diplomatic tool, however any such pact would be a "paper tight" without the backing of an outside power such as China, Japan or the United States.

An ASEAN military alliance now would be of little more than diplomatic value because their individual armed forces are not strong enough or prepared to counter the Vietnamese Army in open conflict. The strengthening of each ASEAN country's armed forces is therefore a higher priority defence issue than the consideration of a regional alliance. Large increases in military spending have occurred in recent years. In 1980, the ASEAN countries' military expenditures totalled U.S. $5.5 billion, a 45% increase over 1979, and nearly double that of 1975 (4:32). Military spending has also been redirected from the traditional counter-insurgency operations towards items that are of strategic significance such as modern weapon systems and new air bases. Of the ASEAN countries Thailand is the most threatened and the Thai Government has shown its concern by spending more than a quarter of the 1980 budget on defence. Next year's proposed budget further increases defence spending by US $400 million to a total of U.S. $1.25 billion (4:35). Malaysia has also shown concern about its external defence after years of dealing with only internal counter-insurgency problems. Malaysian defence spending increased by over 140% in 1980 to US $888 million, and a defence budget of U.S. $1.4 billion is proposed for 1981 (4:35). Indonesia is furthest away from Indochina and has less reason to fear for its external security, however it is the largest nation in Southeast Asia and has ASEAN's largest armed forces (300,000 men in the Army, 70,000 in the Navy and 40,000 in the Air Force) (4:36). Indonesia's military credibility is, however, compromised by the lack of modern equipment. Much of the Soviet supplied equipment is obsolete or is immobilized due to a shortage of spare parts. Indonesia is currently trying to rearm but, being the poorest member of ASEAN (GNP US $360 per capita compared to the 1978 ASEAN average GNP of U.S. ($1140) (1:278), it needs substantial help from the West. The Philippines is faced with serious insurgency problems and their military priorities are clearly on counter-insurgency rather than conventional warfare. They are not unduly concerned about external defence because they have the security afforded by U.S. military bases. Any Filipino contribution to an external, ASEAN force would probably be only a token gesture. Although Singapore has spent more per capita on defence than any other ASEAN member and has, in relation to its size, a large active armed force of 42,000 men, (4:34) its most significant role in regional defence is probably that of an arms supplies and technical servicing centre for much
Despite increases in military spending, ASEAN will not be military strong enough to affect the balance of power in Asia significantly within the foreseeable future. That balance is still in the hands of a few great powers, and the United States remains the strongest guarantor of ASEAN security. The United States commitment in the region is confirmed in a recent Defence Department report (8) which emphasizes that the United States will continue to seek "Close ties" with the ASEAN countries, and asserts that their cohesion helps to counterbalance Vietnamese pressures and discourage Soviet ambitions in the area. The report also reaffirms the defence arrangements the United States has with the Philippines and its commitment to Thailand under the Manila Treaty. China is a formidable political and military force and has also emphasized its full support for ASEAN. China's capacity to strike against Vietnam has already been demonstrated, and the Chinese leaders have specifically stated that they will take action if Vietnam attacks Thailand. Japan is another regional power that must be considered, although Japan is dedicated to peace and has emphasized that it will not co-operate in a military way with any other country, it does have a significant economic influence on the situation that exists between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries. An example of the economic pressure that Japan can bring to bear is the withholding of aid to Vietnam pending the resolution of the situation in Cambodia.

The prospects for a military alliance within ASEAN appears doubtful for several reasons. One is that the members do not agree on whether Vietnam or China is their biggest long-term threat. Thailand and Singapore believe that Vietnam will remain a Soviet puppet and will constitute the greater danger. But Malaysia and Indonesia fear that Chinese expansion is a greater threat, and they can see advantage in an independent Indo-Chinese state comprising Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam under Vietnamese leadership. Other divergent influences such as the nagging territorial disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia and language and cultural differences will not improve the chances for a successful military partnership.

Even with parochial issues put aside, there would be little gained by a formal military commitment because ASEAN's combined armed forces are no match against Vietnam's and, in any case, the balance of power and the best guarantee for ASEAN security lie in the hands of outside powers.

The best strategy for the five ASEAN members for the 1980s would seem to call for the maintenance of the strength of their political unity, the strengthening of their individual armed forces and the continuation of coordinated military planning and bilateral training and defence arrangements short of an ASEAN wide military alliance.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**BOOKS IN REVIEW**

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries.


McKernan, Michael, The Australian People and the Great War, Melbourne, Thomas Nelson, 1980. (2 Reviews)

Reviewed by Dr. Frank Cain, School of History, University of New South Wales.

BOOKS about the World War I have sold readily of recent years, showing that Australians have developed a revived interest in the history of that important war. This book by Dr. McKernan discusses the social history of the war years and covers some areas which have been omitted from the large and ponderous Official History by Professor Ernest Scott which took over a decade to write and is regarded as the authoritative text about war on the home front.

Dr. McKernan is well suited to write about the social history of the war. His Ph.D. thesis on Australian Churches at War was jointly published last year by the Catholic Theological Faculty of St. Patrick’s College at Manly and the Australian War Memorial, and in 1979 his article on sport in Australia during the World War I appeared in a book of articles about aspects of sport titled Sport in History. These two topics of sport and religion during the war are repeated in this book and the author adds to them chapters discussing the manner in which the war affected school children, women, country residents and German migrants and their descendents, as well as the experiences of the Australian soldiers in Britain and events in Australia after the end of the war.

The author discusses and illustrates how the years of devotion to ideas about British Imperialism carried Australia unthinkingly through the war years and produced the most remarkable of responses, particularly among school children, women and clergymen. He shows how the education of generations of school children on stories and poems about “Deeds That Won the Empire” led to the mobilization of vast human resources in Australia and how the Australian Army was cheerfully sent off to defend “Mother England” whose security during the war was never in danger.

Tens of thousands of school children pumped full with emotions of Anglophilia — the love of all things English — busily set about collecting money (Victorian State school children raised over $48,000) and knitting millions of socks, gloves and other items for the personal use of the diggers. Women rallied too, driven by similar emotions, but they could be offered little more than cake-baking and the rolling of bandages. The author does well exploring the Anglophilic myths that fired the enthusiasm of millions of Australians in these years, but regrettably he does not explore why little genuine Australian nationalism was allowed to emerge in this period.

What was the reaction of the Australian diggers to “Mother England” whose interests they had joined the Australian Army to defend? The brief answer was disappointment. They found it a cramped, dirty, class-ridden and above all an abnormally cold island. The diggers were excluded from many clubs and restaurants because they were open to officers only, but they still boosted the English economy with their spending money when on leave from France. There was evidence that the rate of venereal disease was higher in England among the Australian troops than the New Zealanders, which the British Army Council solemnly ascribed to high rates of pay and the innocence of the Aussie troops unfamiliar with big cities. The Australian diggers, as much as they disliked the war, had to return to France and the front-line after their leave had expired. The diggers claimed that if there was a direct road leading back home to Australia from France most of them would have walked all the way.

Back home the political and moral battle was fought between the middle class who firmly supported the war and the defence of British Empire and the working class who opposed the war and began calling for some type of peace settlement. Dr. McKernan describes how the clergy firmly supported the war and enlistment, seeing it as a morally correct thing to do. A more obvious reason for the clergy’s stance was that they were
echoing the mood of their middle class congregation upon whom most of them were financially dependent in the long run. The Catholic Church was different, argues the author. It was led by Irish priests and it was predominantly working class and it promoted stronger feelings of Australian nationalism in its schools than did the Protestant of State schools, who were fixated on British jingoism. When the conscription referendums were conducted in 1916 and 1917 the social classes and the two religious sects of Protestants and Catholics were set at each other's throats, thanks greatly to the political opportunism of Billy Hughes. He arranged for the holding of the referendums and then took the "yes" side and condemned, vilified, censored and even had imprisoned many of those who argued the "no" case.

Dr. McKernan looks again at the role of the Irish prelate, Archbishop Daniel Mannix, of Melbourne, in these significant times. Mannix remained fairly quiet in the 1916 referendum, but actively urged a "no" vote against conscription in the second referendum, saying that Australia had contributed enough men to the war and that trade interests were one of the reasons for the war. Historians have argued that Mannix took this stance out of loyalty to his Mother Ireland and in support of the anti-British Irish nationalist movement. Dr. McKernan argues that Mannix was more reflecting the attitude of his working class flock and that he drew such wide lay-Catholic support that the Catholic press and other prelates and priests switched sides to support the "no" side in the second referendum in order to not lose credibility with their congregations.

It is an interesting re-assessment of the role of Mannix, but it tends to overlook the fact that the trade unions and radical groups such as the socialists, the I.W.W. and radical women's groups were successfully mobilizing working class support, both Catholic and Protestant, for the "no" case from the early days of the 1916 referendum. It was probably more the publicity and arguments of these people that influenced the Catholic congregations rather than those of their Archbishop. Perhaps the Archbishop himself may have been influenced by the arguments of the Australian left as well.

The chapter which discusses the treatment of German immigrants and their descendents is the saddest of all chapters. It shows how the mood of British patriotism was whipped up into a near frenzy against people of German descent who were carted off to internment camps and after the war shipped off to Germany, leaving behind their property and sometimes their Australian-born families behind. The photographs of the living conditions in the internment camps tells more about the hard life of the internees than anything the author can say.

The "grey years", the title of the final chapter, shows how the excitement of the war years was replaced by the drabness and unemployment of the 1920's predicted during the war by the anti-conscriptionists and others. The women returned to the kitchen sinks, the children put away their knitting needles and to keep the image of British Imperialism alive the R.S.L. took over the conduct of Anzac Day. Mannix continued to ride the crest of the wave and on St. Patrick's Day celebrations he would lead a procession down the Melbourne streets surrounded by fourteen Catholic Victoria Cross winners mounted on white chargers. The various institutions and powers that could have helped Australia develop an economic dynamism were closed down or abandoned as the State Governments scrambled to reassert the petty autonomies they had lost during the war years. We can see it now as an era of great opportunities lost.

This book is a worthwhile contribution to the history of the war years. It casts a searching light into many areas of Australian life and shows how bigotry, sectarianism, false patriotism and Anglophilia have all been used to great effect by some leaders in order to clutch on to political power and, in addition, hold back the development of a genuine Australian nationalism.


Reviewed by Jeff Popple, Dept. of Defence.

MICHAEL McKERNAN has produced an excellent study on the impact of war upon society. It is a compassionate examination
of life in Australia during the Great War. Apart from one chapter, McKernan concentrates on the experiences of those who did not rush off to fight in the war in Europe. He examines the ways in which the people who stayed in Australia supported, or opposed, the Empire’s cause. He has tried to uncover how the vast majority of Australians reacted to the war and what they thought of it. To do this he has delved into a wide range of largely ignored sources to produce a highly readable yet thought-provoking account of life in wartime Australia.

McKernan’s sources are not parliamentary debates or large city newspaper editorials or political memoirs, but rather they are the letters and diaries written by the soldiers, local newspapers or the sports and letter pages of the larger papers, and school magazines. The considerable reliance on school magazines for one chapter is questionable, as it is a dubious contention that they reflect the views of the majority of students. It is possible that the views expressed by students in school magazines were written mainly with the aim of appeasing teachers rather than reflecting the views of their peers. This is but a small point and should not detract from a study that has been produced after extensive research into a wide range of primary sources.

At the outbreak of war Australian society appeared to be united behind the Empire’s cause. McKernan argues that this unity was only on the surface and that the seeds of division to come lay germinating. The experience of war was to quickly breathe life into the latent class tensions which existed and provoke religious and racial hatred. The middle classes had the time and money to engage in patriotic acts and decried the working class as being “slackers” because they were not visibly patriotic. In fact, most workers, particularly women, who did not enjoy the assistance of part-time domestic help as many of their middle-class sisters did, were unable to engage in copious acts of public patriotism. The class criticised the pomposity of the middle-class patriots while bemoaning the unequal sacrifice imposed upon them by the rising cost of living and the increase in unemployment. The religious tensions between Protestants and Catholics were transposed upon these class conflicts, adding extra venom to them. McKernan further argues that the war “confirmed the male dominance of society and produced massive displays of confrontation” (p. 13).

While each chapter deals with a separate aspect of life in wartime Australia, they all contribute to McKernan’s underlying theme of increasing tension and conflict. He traces the attempts of the super-patriots, “the parsons, politicians and newspaper proprietors” (p. 113) to raise the reluctant populace to the desired level of patriotic fervour. The chapters cover such things as the reaction in rural Australia to the war, the vigorous persecution of German-Australians (many of whom had lived most of their lives in Australia and some even had relations serving in the A.I.F.), the reaction of the churches to the war and the attempts to suppress sport in Australia because it was seen as being frivolous and diversionary.

The chapter on schools records the enthusiasm school children had for the war and their efforts, girls knitting socks and boys training for future enlistment, to contribute to Australia’s war effort. This chapter also records the terrible waste of lives, as it traces the careers of brilliant scholars who went and fought and died in the war (p. 59). In the chapter on women, McKernan outlines the tremendous efforts of women, by knitting and raising money, to try and alleviate the discomfort at the front. These two chapters also emphasise the concern and efforts of the organisations to quantify their patriotism. For instance, the Australian Comforts Fund proudly proclaimed that it had sent 1,354,328 pairs of socks to Australian servicemen.

Arguably the best chapter in the book is the one on the A.I.F. in England. It records how the A.I.F., very much like the American G.I.’s in Australia in 1942-45, went from being viewed as heroes by the British public to being viewed as criminals and trouble-makers. This chapter relies heavily on letters written by the soldiers and provides a fascinating account of an often neglected aspect of the war. McKernan concludes his book with a sober chapter on the difficulty the soldiers had on their return to Australia to settle back into society and forget the war.

McKernan has provided an interesting account of Australia at war. The only criticism is that it is possible that McKernan has over-stressed the tensions that were present at the outbreak of war. Certainly the almost unanimous enthusiasm exhibited for the war would
suggest that only minor dissent existed in July 1914. McKernan has written a thought-provoking study on wartime Australia which is also very readable and entertaining and is aided by numerous photographs and cartoons.


Reviewed by Major D. M. Horner, RAINF

Ronald Lewin is one of Britain's foremost military historians. He brings together not only careful research, balanced analysis, wide knowledge and acute judgement, but he writes with engaging style, and through analogy and quotation illuminates effectively the finer nuances of command and generalship. Wavell's complex character requires all of Lewin's skill. How can one explain why Wavell rose to one of the Empire's most vital commands and retained such a command through four years of war, after the field marshal himself acknowledged that, 'my trouble is I am not really interested in war'? It is a measure of Lewin's ability that he is able to resolve this apparent ambiguity.

This fine book is not strictly a biography. Rather it could be viewed as one in the same series as Rommel as Military Commander, to which the author has made a number of notable contributions. The Chief is an analysis of the conduct of Wavell's 14 campaigns during the World War II and of his three-and-a-half years as Viceroy of India. As Wavell observed of his campaigns, 'some have been successful, others have failed'.

At the outbreak of the World War II General Sir Archibald Wavell was Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, and thus when Italy joined the war in June 1940 he was faced by what appeared to be overwhelming numbers of Italian troops in Libya and East Africa. Yet in a number of brilliant actions culminating in the smashing victory at Beda Fomm, Wavell's forces defeated the Italians in Libya; at the same time his forces advanced on two fronts into Ethiopia, and on 19 May 1941 the Duke of Aosta surrendered as Viceroy.

But in the midst of these victories things had started to fall apart for the general, whom Rommel had said was the only British commander to show 'a touch of genius'. First came defeat in Greece, then the collapse of Cyrenaica Command before Rommel's daring thrusts, the seizure of Crete and the failure of Operations BREVITY and BATTLEAXE in the Western Desert. The only glimmers of success were in Syria, Iraq and Tobruk.

What burdens of disaster were placed upon Wavell? As Supreme Commander of the ill-fated ABDA Command he presided over the surrender of Singapore and Rangoon, and later as Commander-in-Chief India he directed the disastrous and ill-prepared advance into Arakan in early 1943. Then as Viceroy of India he struggled manfully to bring peaceful and sensible independence to the sub-continent, only to find himself replaced prematurely in early 1947 by Lord Louis Mountbatten who, within the year, was to oversee the celebrations of independence.

What manner of commander, then, was this taciturn Scot, who wrote like an angel but was so reticent that he found it impossible to develop a rapport with Churchill? (And it was not just Wavell's silence in conversation that irritated Churchill. For example, after Churchill criticised the light casualties sustained during the Somaliland Campaign Wavell replied bluntly by cable: 'a big butcher's bill was not necessarily evidence of good tactics'). Was Rommel right about Wavell being a genius? Did Wavell contribute to the disasters which befell his forces or was he the victim of circumstances over which he had no control? The answers, of course, are the same for all three questions, and Lewin skilfully analyses Wavell's performance to show that he had most if not all of those attributes thought to be required of a great commander. Ironically Lewin's criteria are the attributes described in Wavell's Generals and Generalship.

It is now 12 years since the publication of the second volume of John Connel's admirable biography of Wavell, and since then there has been much important scholarship, beginning with the revelations in The Ultra Secret and the further expositions in the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War and Lewin's Ultra Goes to War. It is therefore appropriate to reassess Wavell's campaigns, particularly those in North Africa, Greece and Crete, in the light of this new information.
Greece was perhaps the most contentious campaign for Wavell, for it was clear, as General Blamey, the Australian commander, put it, that the campaign 'hadn't a dog's chance from the start'. Various accounts have criticised Churchill for insisting upon the campaign, Anthony Eden for committing the British to Greece without reference to his Government, Generals Dill, Blamey and Freyberg for acquiescing in the campaign, and Wavell for advising the British Government that there was a chance of success. After analysing the facts with balance, perspicacity and sympathy Lewin concludes that Wavell believed that the campaign was viable, that he erred in his judgement on this fact, and thus failed to provide the Cabinet with satisfactory military advice. Furthermore, Lewin shows that Churchill did not pressure Wavell into conducting a campaign which the general opposed, but rather, gave Wavell every opportunity to state whether it was feasible. In fairness to Wavell, Lewin shows that Ultra intelligence was not particularly helpful to Wavell in the planning for Greece, despite the fact that British Intelligence had indeed estimated that the Germans would invade in force.

Wavell's performance in India when he ordered and pressed the offensive in Arakan is criticised even more severely. Whereas over Greece Lewin spends considerable time cataloguing the extenuating circumstances as to why Wavell erred, over Arakan the author is quite blunt: 'Every serious student of the campaign agrees that Wavell deserves no admiration... Most commanders sail into the doldrums sooner or later. This time Wavell stayed there too long'. Yet at the same time as Wavell was directing this 'old-fashioned and unimaginative battle down in Arakan', his unorthodox and imaginative mind was seized by Wingate's plan to penetrate the Japanese line with his Chindits, and he was giving it every encouragement.

In the light of the Australian Government's recent announcement of the review of the organization of the Department of Defence, including aspects pertaining to the command and control of the Defence forces in time of war, it is interesting to analyse Wavell's role as Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East and India, and his relationship with the Chiefs of Staff, the Government and his subordinate commanders. He had wide ranging powers and responsibilities, a degree of independence of action, and at times vast resources. Command was exercised from London by directives rather than by day-to-day orders. Although, of course Churchill interfered with the system, one might argue that that was the prerogative of a Prime Minister. On the other hand Wavell had his own subordinate field army commanders: O'Connor and Wilson in Libya, Wilson again in Greece and Syria, Platt and Cunningham in Ethiopia, Percival in Malaya and Alexander in Burma. Thus the Commander-in-Chief did not generally exercise day-to-day command over his campaigns, although he visited the front frequently. Wavell was, however, the link between the Chiefs of Staff, who operated at the political-military interface, and the commanders in the field responsible for day-to-day operations. It was the Commander-in-Chief who protected his subordinates from the vagaries of political interference and enabled them to concentrate on the battle.

At times Wavell had political worries, at other times detailed operational concerns. It was in orchestrating these many influences and resources in simultaneous campaigns in different geographic areas that Wavell showed his ability as a high commander, retaining the confidence of his military subordinates and superiors, if not the confidence of Churchill. By always fighting well forward he invariably had fall-back positions which prevented complete disaster. Even if he lost the three great cities of Athens, Rangoon and Singapore, another two, Calcutta and Cairo, remained secure. The magnitude of these responsibilities perhaps explains why Wavell was promoted to field marshal, but not before, as Lewin reveals, he had sought it by writing to the Prime Minister.

The Chief is no mere chronology of Wavell's achievements and failures, but is a skilfully wrought analysis drawing upon an extensive background of military history. Lewin writes that Wavell digested and absorbed all that he read; By a kind of osmosis the books he encountered became part of himself and he kept their contents, as the gunners say, like ammunition stacked 'ready for use'. The same can be said for the author. After reading Lewin's account one is almost, but not quite, convinced that the field marshal was indeed 'The brilliant chief, irregularly great'. One suspects that this is the impression Lewin had hoped to achieve.