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Contents

3 Editor's Comment

4 Letters to the Editor

6 Australia: The Undefended Source of Energy
   Colonel J.M. Hutcheson, University of NSW

12 Guarding White Australia
   Major R.A. Hall, RAINF

19 The New Guard and the Defence Department
   Squadron Leader L.J. Egan, RAAF

31 Escape from Shangri-La
   Robert Kendall Piper, Defence Central

37 An Alternative to Anzus
   Squadron Leader P.J. Harradine, RAAF

51 The Factors which led Japan to War with the USA
   in 1941
   WO2 T. Bradley RA Sigs

54 Review Article: Marlborough as a Military
   Commander
   Captain P. A. Pederson, Dept. of History, RMC, Duntroon

59 Book Review

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.
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The Annual British-Australian Exchange Exercise Southern Cross — North Star 81.
Editor's Comment

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

Distribution of the Defence Force Journal has been a problem since its inception. Recent complaints indicate that not enough copies are available and that copies are not reaching the readership. During the past few months I have been unable to honour all new requests but I hope to rectify this problem next issue.

Distribution of the journal has been designed so that all members of the Defence Force have a chance to read a copy. About 17,000 copies are printed for circulation. The Navy gets 2,700, Army 10,000 and Air Force 3,300. The remaining 1,000 are distributed to Defence Central and overseas missions.

If you are not receiving enough copies or indeed if too many copies are arriving at your unit, please let me know in writing and I will try to solve the problem.

A second article appears on the subject of Aborigines in the Army by Major Hall entitled Guarding White Australia: Aborigines' Contribution to Northern Surveillance During the Second World War appears on page 12 of this issue. At the end of this article I have added a Defence press release which I hope will be of interest to readers concerned with this topic.

A military funeral was held in Canberra on May 13 for General Sir John Wilton, KBE, CB, DSO.

General Wilton, born in Sydney in 1911, graduated from Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1930. His initial service was with the British Army in the United Kingdom and later in India and Burma. He returned to Australia before World War II and served with distinction in the AIF.

He began his war service as a battery commander in the Middle East and was a temporary colonel at advanced land headquarters, Morotai, when the war ended. During this time he was awarded the DSO, and was mentioned in Despatches. In 1946 he was awarded the OBE.

His post-war appointments included Director of Military Operations and Plans at Army Headquarters; Commander of the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade in Korea; Brigadier in charge of Administration Eastern Command; Commandant of the Royal Military College, Duntroon; and Chief of the Military Planning Office, South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in Bangkok.

In 1962 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. His last appointment was Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff committee in 1966. He was promoted to general in 1968 and eventually retired from active service in 1970. In the 1964 New Year Honours List he was appointed Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire.

A truly distinguished military career.

Even in retirement General Wilton retained an active military interest. Soon before his death he was taking a particular interest in the role of Aborigines in the Army.

His passing is a profound loss and will be mourned by all whose privilege it was to have known him.

An agreement has been reached in Canberra under which the University of New South Wales accepts responsibility for the academic integrity of the Australian Defence Academy.

It was signed by Minister for Defence, Mr D. J. Killen, and the vice-chancellor of the University of New South Wales, Professor Rupert H. Myers.

Under this arrangement a college of the university will be established as an essential unit of the academy. This is similar to the old contract where the university is responsible for academic teaching at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. All going well, the academy should be open for intake in July 1986.
THE INSTRUCTIONAL NEEDS OF CMF RECRUITS
Dear Sir,

I would like to comment on an article by Trevor Cook entitled 'The Instructional Needs of CMF Recruits', issue number 27. The only weakness Mr Cook’s article established was the fact that there are bad instructors within the military system, as there are anywhere.

The military system of teaching has a proven track record. It is simple, sound, effective and is capable of being used to teach any level of student. There is a logical sequence of progression that is aimed at letting the majority maintain pace. But, let us be totally honest, there is no known teaching method that can enlighten everyone, especially in the time frame allotted in an Army Reserve course.

What Mr Cook’s article did highlight is the almost fanatical zest both he and his fellow educators have for ‘Obfuscating’. This need for making simple meanings sound ultra-sophisticated is needless. It brings to mind an old saying that could be changed, KISS; Keep it Simple Stupid. Now it should be changed to KLONE, or Keep Language Obfuscated Never Educated.

I have no doubt that in the near future everything we do will have to conform and sound impressive. I expect we shall soon be required to attend our Regulatory Aerobic and Diagnostic Intrasturctural Investigative Analysis (Annual Medical Board). This is obviously taking the issue to ridiculous lengths, but there are many such terms already part of our normal daily reading, as this article shows.

In these instances, I am completely against this introduction of ‘Big’ terms where there is absolutely no need to use them. What makes it worse, in many of these articles is the glaring examples where people like Mr Cook not only obfuscate, but assume that once they have done so, many of the readers will not know what they are talking about, so they commit a blatant miscalculation and practice tautology. I could finish by saying there was a great deal of thought behind the articles Directive Re-assessment Systematized Module, or Proposed New Training Plan, but that would be taking things too far!

R. PAYNE
Sergeant

It is Defence Force Journal policy to give the author of an article the right to reply to letters of a critical nature. In this case, however, I have not received a reply from Trevor Cook the author of The Instructional Needs of CMF Recruits. I have therefore decided to publish Sergeant Payne’s letter without the author’s reply.

MARKSMANSHIP IN AUSTRALIA
Dear Sir

The late Peter Sellers is generally attributed as the author of the slogan: Join the Army. Travel Overseas. Meet interesting people — and kill them. It is refreshing to find that Major Burkhill (Marksmanship in Australia DFJ No 27) advocates doing away with the formality of joining the Army and the expense of overseas travel to achieve the ultimate result. By pooling resources the Army and the civilian members of rifle clubs we are led to believe can provide sufficient deterrent to keep Australia safe, and if all else fails, kill anyone we don’t want.

As the Staff Officer in the Department of Defence closely associated with the task of looking after the Minister’s interests where Rifle Clubs are concerned I must point out that there is no obligation on the Minister to involve himself in the administration of the Rifle Club movement in Australia. He has certain responsibilities for the safety of rifle ranges. Rifle shooting is a sport which requires rigorous controls in the public interest. This is provided through liaison between Inspectors of Rifle Ranges and the Captains of civilian Rifle Clubs. It has been the policy of successive Australian Governments since 1965 that the rifle club movement should be self supporting and autonomous.

Australian Rifle Clubs do not make a unique contribution to the defence capability of the country. Other sporting activities, such as yachting, underwater diving, gliding, and orienteering also encourage the development of skills in the individual which could perhaps be useful were that person could be called on for military service in a Defence capacity.

If the Australian Army needs a reserve of sharpshooters it is to be hoped that they will be
found where they belong: in the Army Reserve, not in the National Rifle Association of Australia.

W. G. WRIGHT

AUTHOR'S REPLY

Dear Sir,

With regard to my article "Marksmanship in Australia", DFJ No. 27 and Mr W. G. Wright's letter, dated May 18, 1981. Whether Mr Wright likes it or not, we are in the Defence Forces, and part of the job of the Defence Force is to fight in defence of our country.

As my article pointed out, history has recorded that the members of the National Rifle Association have provided a pool of trained marksmen who have played a vital role in the training of soldiers in marksmanship skills in time of emergency. They have provided this assistance not only because they have wanted to do so but also because they saw that they had an obligation under the Defence Act 1903-1975 (as amended) and the Statutory Regulations made under that act. This legislation is still current and applicable today.

The Rifle Club movement still has important input into the Services in the form of advice, the provision of specialised training from time to time, and have been called on to give demonstrations, particularly in the use and evaluation of our more recently introduced sniper weapon system.

Mr Wright quite correctly points out that there are other sporting activities and skills which have a defence force application and cites orienteering and underwater diving as just two examples. However, none of these activities have the defence connotations or affiliations that the Rifle Shooting movement does.

Countries such as Switzerland engage in programmes of marksmanship training for defence purposes which involves nearly all male persons and some females of military service age. As the Staff Officer involved in the administration of Defence aspects of Rifle Club matters, Mr Wright would know that Australia provides, in a more palatable way through sporting activities, a reserve of people familiarised in one of the soldiers most basic and essential skills, marksmanship.

I think Mr Wright would be surprised if he took the time to investigate just how many servicemen and servicewomen, both regular and reserve, who already take advantage of the facilities that the National Rifle Association of Australia offer to advance and improve their marksmanship skills.

A. R. Burkhill

Major

SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE

Dear Sir,

This letter is to thank you for your kindness in keeping me on your list of subscribers to the Defence Force Journal. I can't imagine how many Canadians do read it, but let me add my praise to theirs. It is a fine publication, and I am most impressed with its fine quality.

I am interested in knowing what sort of response you might have received vis-a-vis my request for data on Australian professional soldiers of fortune. I've identified several in fiction, one being "Breaker Morant", of the recent film, whose name fits into my sphere of reference given that he was involved in an armed conflict that did not directly involve Australia, but rather indirectly because of the Empire association. I'd be most interested in corresponding with anyone whom you know that is interested, as I am, in the "byways" of military biography and history. It also occurs to me that you might wish to have a contribution or two on the subject, but except for a three-week trip to New South Wales, Victoria, and the Brisbane area in 1976, and limited reading, my knowledge of Australian militaria is rather limited at this time, admittedly. (It may be of marginal interest that I've found two "Kiwi" connections: Lowell Yerex, a one-eyed ex-RFC type who was a "s of f" in Central America in the '30s and an aviation entrepreneur who founded TACA, a local airline in those parts; also one Von Tempsky, a Prussian with filibustering experience under Walker in Central America, who died in battle against the Maoris in the 1860's.) Any scrap of data on Australians of a similar adventuring bent, is most welcome.

Many thanks for your consideration. I look forward to hearing from you.

Allan Levine, MLS

Librarian

Perhaps one of our readers can help. Allan Levine's address is 11909 Frieon, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H3N 2S1.
INTRODUCTION

The Aim

The aim of this article is to confirm that Australia's energy resources are of great value to the world's users and then examine the feasibility of Australia defending those resources.

Background

Australia is an energy-rich continent, one of the best endowed in relation to its population. A population which is at zero growth and which is no more than 0.3% of the world's population. Australia has the good fortune to contain about 25% of the world's known reserves of uranium. Our energy wealth exists not in dreams of undiscovered oil wells but in coal, natural gas, shale and uranium, complemented by energy sources that we have barely touched, such as industrial and domestic waste, liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and various forms of solar power.

There is a school of thought among strategists that sees the central area of superpower conflict as moving from central Europe to the Middle East and the adjacent Indian Ocean waters. The Indian Ocean provides a ready access to the virtually unpopulated western coast of Australia. Economics and politics of Australia are being changed as Australia's layers of isolationism are peeled away. Few would confidently describe Australia as "The Lucky Country".

There is complacent solemnity surrounding pronouncements about the state of our national alliances. However, there are signs that Australia's foreign policy is becoming
increasingly flighty in nature — that Australia is in danger of becoming an international flibbertigibbet. Until about ten years ago Australia's conception of a coherent policy on foreign affairs and defence was dominated by the idea that powerful friends and relations would provide the broad umbrella of our security. While Australia is still obsessed with the desire to please great and powerful friends, we are becoming less selective about whom we proposition. Some authorities consider that our policies toward South East Asia leave much to be desired. Probably, Australia's relations with the region are at a lower ebb than they have been for a long time.

THE PROBLEM
Exogenous Shocks

Energy and inflation are the major issues of the 1980s and beyond. “Exogenous Shocks” is a new economic term. OPEC, Iran and the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan were exogenous shocks. There is every indication that the frequency and negative impact of these shocks will increase.

In August 1980 the Australian Government saw the Russian threat to be real and growing. They saw the Soviet arms build up, its naval expansion and its activities in Afghanistan as presenting a growing threat to world security. The Vietnamese were seen to be adopting threatening postures with 250,000 troops outside their borders.

Perceived Threat

Public opinion polls from 1971 to 1980 have been shown a growth from 42 to 64 per cent of Australians fearing that this country will be threatened with invasion by 1995. In a post-mortem of the Federal Elections of 18 October 1980 Guy Harriett (commentator) in the Sydney Morning Herald on 21 October 1980 said that Australia was a country faced with serious economic and social problems. He considers Australia to be in a dangerous and unstable part of the world. This perceived external threat should be seen against a strong and growing undercurrent of internal discontent and disillusion among the Australian people. So that great issues such as unemployment, inflation, foreign policy, defences, health and social services are fermenting to such an extent that internal pressures may create the necessary apathy to assist external military threats.

Consequent upon the Defeat of the Allies in Vietnam, economic stagnation and impending exhaustion of natural resources there has been a pessimistic mood in the higher political and social circles of the Western Powers, as people lose faith in their leaders. Europe is witnessing the growing strength of the communist parties, fascist revival and a wave of terrorism which tends to indicate the weakness of established regimes and the exhaustion of established tradition. There is a cultural crisis which devalues the past. This denial of the past, superficially progressive and optimistic shows on closer analysis that Western Society despairs so much that it cannot face the future. The despair of Australia may provide the matrix for this country's invasion by covert or overt means.

ENERGY
Tensions

A basic cause of tension between the Soviet Union and the Western World is the shortage of energy. As there is really no alternative source, the Soviets must soon turn to the Middle East for oil. Hence an unstable and difficult environment is about to be superimposed on local conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran War. Most industrial countries have to some extent been caught in a double squeeze by the OPEC oil price rises and political instability in the Middle East. There have been strains imposed on their external accounts and, in addition, there is always the spectre of disruption to oil supplies causing chaos to their generation of electricity as well as to their transport industries. The solution to Soviet pressures should be for most of the Western World, including the United States, and in particular Australia, to rebuild their defence capacities which have deteriorated greatly since the Vietnam War.

Alternative Energy

According to Dr. Chauncey Starr who is a distinguished United States scientist and Vice Chairman of the Electric Power Research Institute, by the year 2000, twenty five per cent of the Western World's energy requirements will have to come via the aggressive technological development of nuclear sources. Hydro power has been virtually fully developed to produce eleven per cent of power requirements. Assuming appropriate technical breakthroughs, six per cent of our power can be solar. After allowing for two per cent from
esoteric fuel sources, coal will be the remaining major source of energy.

Demand for Energy

People tend to take for granted the use of energy as part of their standard of living. In the developed countries the dependence on available energy sources is almost total. People rely on electricity for radios, television, cooking, lighting, transport, airconditioning, heating, elevators, telephones, typewriters, manufacturing, computers and so on. Therefore, our standard of living is highly dependent on readily available, cheap energy. If energy is not available there will be a radical lowering of living standards. Hence, those countries such as Australia which are rich in energy resources will become prime economic and military targets.

Despite attempts to retard world population growth, it will continue to rise for a considerable period. However, there are hopes that rate of growth will reduce over a period so that a curve of sigmoid form will result and world population will approach a stable limit. Even the most optimistic forecaster believes that the limit will be three times the present population.

The underdeveloped, developing and developed world all compete for energy resources at a rapidly increasing rate as nations become industrialised, as transport systems expand and as the population demands improved standards of living. Titterton considered that in 1979 that 4% of world’s electricity consumption came from fission power stations and that by the year 2000, cetera paribus that 30% would be derived from fission power. The general trend will be for coal (fossil) and uranium (fission) to share the load with thorium (fission) to be added later. If and when fission becomes technically proven and economically practicable it should take up the burden of energy supply. However, until this big “if” is overcome (if ever) Australia, with energy resources far exceeding its likely needs, will be a prime economic and possible military target.

In a universe with “infinite” tonnes of radioactive material and on a unique planet where oxygen is an essential part of our life support system, the scientific logic and the ethical justification of limiting chemical combustion and replacing it almost exclusively with nuclear fission will gradually dawn upon all thinkers. Australia’s nuclear resources will become even more valuable. Hence, Australia’s diplomatic and military defences will become much more vital to its survival as an independent nation.

THE TARGET

Minerals

The soaring oil prices decreed by OPEC have had fewer adverse effects on Australia than on any other industrialized nation. Australia has an extraordinary endowment of energy resources. Coal and uranium provide a surplus of electricity — generating fuels with the bulk of oil requirements being satisfied from current sources. In addition proven supplies of natural gas are bountiful. Most other industrial countries have been caught in a double squeeze by the OPEC oil price rises and political instability in the Middle East. Strains have been imposed on their external accounts. However even more critical is the spectre which has arisen of disruption to oil supplies and consequent chaos to transport and electricity-generating industries.

The Attractive Target

Australia, the “Lucky Country” has many of the critical energy resource materials. However, as has been said before, consequent upon its possession of these resources Australia is and will continue to be a prime target for both economic and military covert if not overt military aggression. Australia has the good fortune to contain about twenty five per cent of the known world uranium reserves. In addition, Australia has very significant reserves of coal, together with support minerals such as bauxite and iron ore. However, with only 0.3 per cent of the world’s population in a very large country, Australia’s current defence seems to lie in selling its energy resources to those major military powers which are certain to assist in Australian defence. The identification of those powers, in a changing world is difficult. In the past, similar alliances have not been reliable. Indeed, consequent upon becoming reliant upon Australian export of its resources friendly nations may themselves become militarily aggressive towards the “hand that feeds them”. Thinkers, such as Hermann — Kahn and Tofler continue to stress that the rapid changes which are currently hindering world economic and military stability will accelerate into the
foreseeable future. Australia is too attractive a target to be left unhindered by these accelerations.

Capitalism, Socialism or Barberism

Australian capitalism twists and turns as it tries to accommodate itself to the gyrations of world capitalism. So that Australian capitalism is in such a crisis that it is unlikely to adopt a form of independent socialism which might extricate this country from its predicament. In addition, there may emerge an Australian variety of neo-fascism with its danger of barbarism. These dynamic pressures may process Australia towards disintegration, in the vortex between the imperialists, America and Japan.

The operation of internal and external pressures will thrust Australia even more into the world economy. So that there will be the removal of many protective structures which Australian capitalism created to prevent its people and their economy suffering too much from unbridled market forces.

Protective structures and devices have included marketing boards for agricultural products, regulation of the capital market to provide the necessary social capital for public works and housing at low interest rates. In addition, there are traditional tariffs and import controls as well as control of overseas borrowings and public ownership of communication and transport systems. Probably the most critical control is the export of minerals, in particular uranium and coal and the ownership of these two critical resources. Wheelwright considers that the great contemporary catch cry for de-regulation and letting market forces operate is caused, in part, by forces external to Australia. These forces seem to be dominated by the giant corporation, especially the multi-national. So that Australia is already under economic aggression. At the same time, dynamic internal forces seem to be confusing the direction of Australia's Government(s). So that Australia's internal economic as well as military defences are rapidly deteriorating. Hence, a firm base from which to repel military aggressive may not exist for Australia.

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE

Political-Economic Defence

There are clear indications that Australia has embarked on an increased defence expenditure to the exclusion of a rational trade policy, manufacturing policy and foreign policy. Thereby, placing Australia in a very dangerous position for its region and for the future balance of government. All the guns in the world will not remove Australia from its present precarious position. Economic and politico-diplomatic defence must complement if not precede military defence. Australia has antagonised every member of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) by adopting cynical protectionist trade policies, and crude protective international civil aviation policies.

A crisis, may in due course, if not now engulf the Middle East and spread to the Indian Ocean which washes about twenty per cent of Australia's coastline. This crisis may call for a unified Western response. However, Australia should avoid a situation which calls for Australia, well in advance, to tie itself irrevocably and blindfolded to one of the chief protagonists. Cautious, skilful and self-interested diplomacy must be pursued now and with deliberate vigor.

The current Australian Government maintains that it has the credibility and capacity to attract overseas development capital. Hence, it is unlikely to interfere with the negotiability of Australian assets. Already a substantial part of Australia's land and mineral resources are possessed by overseas owners. There is every likelihood that the pattern of overseas holdings in Australian energy and resource projects in five or ten years from now will show that the country's economic defences have been stormed to pass real financial control of Australia to nationals outside of Australia. The aggregation of this wealth in the hands of a few international corporations which already have tremendous influence over the markets for competing commodities could significantly influence the size, shape and rate of Australia's future development, if not Australia's future in all of its aspects. Australia will probably fail to optimise its opportunities in the future, just as it has failed to do so in the past. Therefore, independent of military overt aggression, Australia may well pass covertly to the control of others.

Physical Australia

Although it has an area of over eight-million square kilometres and a coastline of about
thirty six thousand and eight hundred kilometres, Australia has a population of just less than fourteen million people. Sixty four and a half per cent of the population is concentrated in about ten major cities. Towns with less than one hundred thousand people have a total of twenty one point one per cent of Australia’s population. The rural sector has about fourteen point three per cent. So that only about one tenth of one per cent is migratory. The majority of Australia’s urban population is concentrated in cities and towns, in particular along the eastern seaboard. Most Australians live hundreds if not thousands of kilometres from the country’s mineral resources. Hence, the capacity of the local population to report the activities of overt aggression against Australia’s mineral resources would be very slow, if not zero.

The Defence Forces

The permanent armed forces of Australia is about 70,000, including about 16,000 in the Navy and 21,500 in the Air Force. Currently, there are about 1,000; 500 and 24,000 in the Navy, Air Force and Army reserve forces respectively. However, the Army reserve is being increased to 30,000 overall. Military manpower is being increased at approximately 1000 men per year. The defence services are all voluntary. There is an appropriate proportion of civilians in the base support areas of all three services. The 1980 Budget increases the Australian Government spending on defence. Pressure groups want defence spending to be 3.5 or even 3.8 per cent of the Gross National Product which is high per head of population by world standards.

Traditionally, Australian Defence Forces have proved themselves to be competent in war and well trained in peace for war. Historically, Australia has relied on the enactment of call-up legislation to provide rapid expansion in time of war. So far, those wars have been a long way from Australia. Therefore, the six to twelve months training and expansion required has not been a hindrance to Australia’s Defence. Even with some warning, a strong aggressive invasion of Australia, in particular into the energy resource rich areas of Northern and North West Australia would probably be successful. Sudden attacks by strong enemy forces into most of the mining areas which are not close to the major cities where the defence forces are located. Indeed, simultaneous attacks on several widely dispersed but important mining centres might present a difficult task for Australia’s meagre defence forces. Although all three services are highly regarded throughout the world, numerically the Australian Defence Services are far too small to cope with a total enemy force in excess of about one division. Even with call up legislation there will probably be too few soldiers, too late.

The Military Threat

The current Australian Government has been well forward in its support of the United States’ firm military response to Soviet involvement in the Indian Ocean. There is a prospect of a U.S. Naval facility in Western Australia as well as U.S. staging facilities for B52 bombers on Indian Ocean deployment. The emergence of these and other visible signs of Australia’s upfront role in the new arena of superpower conflict has been quoted in a recent Tass article which revealed the Soviet’s sensitivity to such a role. The surveillance of Australia’s vast coastline has been and probably can only be nominal due to the high cost necessary to achieve a significant effect. There are no rail links on which to move the military, in particular tanks, from South to North Australia or indeed to many likely energy resource targets. Some authorities maintain that Australia will not be attacked by Asians. However one should not discount unforeseen pressures by, or independent of the Soviet, motivating such an attack. Likewise, while the current threat may appear to be the Soviet, similar unforeseen pressures may cause a multiplicity of independent or co-ordinated overt or covert invasions or action by others outside of Asia.

CONCLUSIONS

Energy Resources

This article has shown the valuable current and future potential of Australia’s energy resources to the rest of the world. Exogenous shocks will be more frequent and of greater intensity than the advent of OPEC or the Soviet inclusion in to Afghanistan. A basic cause of tension between the Soviet and the West is the shortage of energy. Hence, Australian energy resources have become a prime economic and military target.
Australia’s Defence

There is growing internal conflict as Australian capitalism wrestles with world capitalism and resultant forces. Economical and political defence by Australia are in need of major overhauls. The future security of Australia is already at risk. A major war in the regions of the Indian Ocean of ASEAN would involve the United States with Australian base facilities and military support. Modern long-range missiles have negated Australia’s past security due to our geographical isolation. After examining the evidence in the article, it is apparent that Australia is undefended, in the first instance to economic aggression but ultimately to military aggression. Australia’s luck has run out!  

REFERENCES

ABORIGINES' CONTRIBUTION TO NORTHERN SURVEILLANCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

BY MAJOR R. A. HALL, RAINF

SEVERAL articles have recently appeared in this journal concerning the creation of a surveillance force in northern Australia. Some of these have mentioned the possible employment of Aborigines and we would therefore do well to examine in detail the contribution made by Aborigines to the surveillance of northern Australia during the Second World War. Some lessons applicable to the employment of Aborigines in similar roles today emerge.

Long before the war, Japan had been identified as a potential enemy and the problems of the defence of Darwin and surveillance of the northern coast were being considered by defence planners. Darwin was isolated, its only lines of communication to south east Australia were the sea route — vulnerable to attack by a sea power such as Japan — and the even more tenuous Stuart Highway; for most of its length between Alice Springs and Darwin, a one lane dirt road subject to flooding, washouts and drifting sand. In order to maximise the effectiveness of any force employed in the defence of Darwin, a surveillance screen to provide early warning of enemy approach was required on both flanks. Although the Army had already organized a system of nominated officers reporting shipping and air movements in their areas, this makeshift system did not cover the virtually uninhabited coastline on the flanks of Darwin.

Before the war, and while the conflict remained centred in Europe, numerous proposals suggesting surveillance forces to cover the unprotected north coast had been submitted to the Government by concerned citizens. One such proposal, received by the Government early in 1940 made specific reference to the possibility of a Japanese landing on the east flank of Darwin going unnoticed for some time. The proposal mentioned the attempts by Japanese pearling and bech-de-mer lugger crews to ingratiate themselves with the Aborigines of Arnhem Land before the war, as well as Japanese intelligence gathering activities. It is interesting in the modern context that this proposal suggested that the object of the Japanese attentions was Australian mineral resources, in particular, iron ore deposits on Elcho Island. The proposal went on to suggest that an Aboriginal coast watching service should be established on Elcho Island and the Arnhem Land coast and that a police post, equipped with radio be established on Elcho Island to provide early warning to Darwin.

The Directorate of Military Intelligence had been aware that Japanese intelligence gathering, particularly in the form of surveys for naval purposes, had been underway in north Australia as early as 1908. The proposal was therefore supported and a police post duly established. The Aborigines of the area were by nature keen observers of local events and nothing escaped their notice. They were induced to report to the police post any shipping or air movements they had seen. Thus began the

Major Hall graduated from RMC in 1968. He served as a platoon commander in 8 RAR and then in a variety of appointments including 1 PIR, 2 PIR, HQ 1 Div. and DGAD (Army). His current posting is with Management Advisory Services Branch, Defence Central. He has previously contributed to the Defence Force Journal.

Article received January, 1981.
first localised and informal northern surveillance service employing Aborigines.

A more formally organized involvement of Aborigines had its origins in Melbourne in June 1941. There Flight Lieutenant Donald Thomson delivered a lecture on “Arnhem Land and the Native Tribes who inhabit that area” to a small audience which included the members of the Military Board.

Before the war Thomson had been an anthropologist at Melbourne University and had done extensive fieldwork in Cape York and Arnhem Land, spending a total of 26 months amongst the Aborigines of Arnhem Land and winning their trust and friendship. On joining the RAAF, Thomson was employed in the British Solomons Islands Protectorate organizing a coast-watching service among the local Solomon Islanders. He was therefore familiar with Aborigines, Arnhem Land and the problems and possibilities of employing native personnel in surveillance work, and occupied a unique and authoritative position from which he could advise the Army upon possible roles for Aborigines in northern surveillance.

In his lecture, Thomson suggested that the Arnhem Land Aborigines were of importance to the Army in several ways. First, unlike the Army at that time, they knew Arnhem Land intimately. Second, there was the matter of Japanese influence among the Arnhem Land Aborigines and whether or not they would uniformly support the Japanese. Third, the fact that Arnhem Land Aborigines had a long standing and friendly relationship with the people of the Malay archipelago. Thomson suggested that these factors, combined with the Aborigines’ highly aggressive nature and skill at guerilla warfare, meant that after first ascertaining the degree of Japanese influence amongst the Aborigines, they could be usefully employed either in passive defence, such as coastwatching or the training of white troops in bushcraft, or in active defence, such as reconnaissance and fighting patrols. Their friendly relations with Malays would possibly suit them for patrols in the Malay archipelago.

In August 1941, Thomson accompanied Lieutenant Colonel Scott, the Director of Special Operations, to the Northern Territory to discuss the disposition and employment of an Independent Company in a surveillance role, and to assist in the preparation of an appreciation. The object of the appreciation was twofold — to carry out a reconnaissance of the coast and hinterland on both flanks of Darwin and to establish and maintain a coastwatching organization and fighting patrols in Arnhem Land and north-west Australia. Their appreciation concluded that it was unlikely that the Japanese would land in strength on the coast of Arnhem Land. It was thought possible however, that the Japanese would attempt to seize the aerodromes at Milingimbi and Groote Eylandt by landing small parties by aircraft, parachute or from small ships. Other vulnerable points were, to the west, the 1000 miles of deserted coastline and the Daly River, and to the east and north, the Alligator Rivers, the Roper and the McArthur Rivers. From any of these points, small enemy parties could move inland to threaten Darwin’s line of communications — the Stuart Highway.

The appreciation also examined the problem of the extent of Japanese influence among the Aborigines. Though the Aborigines of western Arnhem Land had been amenable to the Japanese advances, the more aggressive Aborigines of east Arnhem Land had remained intractably hostile to all foreigners, Japanese or white. It was decided that the extent of influence among western Arnhem Land Aborigines would have to be investigated and countered where necessary.

As a result of the appreciation, Thomson was seconded to the Army, promoted Squadron Leader and appointed to command a unit having the following tasks:

a. Reconnaissance

(1) To carry out a thorough reconnaissance of the area including islands off the coast, Borrooloola on the McArthur River, Gulf of Carpentaria, to Wyndham in the North West of W.A.

(2) To re-establish friendly relations with the natives of this area . . . to assess the kind and degree of influence exerted upon the natives especially in Arnhem Land, by the Japanese . . . to take active steps to dispell any Japanese influence and to undermine their prestige.

b. Flank Protection for Darwin

(1) To provide flank protection for Darwin by organizing the natives of this coastline to form an efficient coastwatching organization based on
their own local organization, and reporting, in each district through posts equipped with (radio).

(2) To organize the natives into a potential mobile force or patrol, retaining for the most part their local grouping, so that the natives can be readily gathered into efficient units to carry out guerilla warfare in the event of a landing by enemy forces, and led by the reconnaissance party.

c. Instruction in Bush Craft

(1) To gather together a small unit of the aborigines who possess special prowess in hunting, craftmanship and bushcraft, and who are skilled in guerilla warfare and ambush, and to use these natives for the instruction of members of the Independent Companies in tropical bushcraft and in living on the resources of the country."

To achieve these daunting tasks, Thomson’s unit, the Northern Territory Coastal Reconnaissance Unit, RAE (later renamed the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit), initially consisted of a mere twelve men; four whites including himself, six Solomon Islanders as crewmen for the seagoing ketch “Aroetta”, a Torres Strait Islander as bosun and an enlisted central Arnhem Land Aborigine. Thomson had carefully decided upon the criteria for the selection of his crew members. All were to have had experience with small craft, be temperamentally suited to long periods of isolation and cramped conditions and, most important, the whites in his unit were to have had experience with natives.

Later, Thomson’s tasks were broadened to include a land reconnaissance, and an additional party of just three men was selected to perform this role on the western flank of Darwin while Thomson conducted land and sea reconnaissance on the eastern flank. The land reconnaissance party consisted of a lieutenant and two sergeants chosen for their pre-war experience in the operations of the mining industry on this flank of Darwin.

Though the west flank land patrol was to remain under Thomson’s command it was to operate independently of Thomson and he could have exercised very little control over it. Its tasks were to reconnoitre from Darwin, west along the coast to Wyndham keeping likely enemy approaches on that coast under surveillance and undermining any Japanese influence amongst the Aborigines the patrol members encountered. Thomson established a patrol base for this group on the Victoria River in early November 1941 so that the party was established was with sufficient stores to outlast the wet season due to begin in January the following year. Thus the first deployment of the Northern Territory Coastal Reconnaissance Unit occurred in November 1941, nine months before the deployment of the North Australia Observer Unit.

After mentioning the establishment of the land patrol, Thomson’s report on his unit’s operations fails to mention the land patrol again. This is perhaps a reflection of the folly of attempting to retain under Thomson’s command a small group engaged on tasks quite different and quite remote from his own.

Later that month Thomson departed from Townsville on board “Aroetta”, bound for the Arnhem Land coast via Darwin. On his voyage to Darwin, Thomson turned his thoughts to the tasks before him. He decided that the most vulnerable points in his area of responsibility were Milingimbi and Groote Eylandt aerodromes, the Groote Eylandt flying boat base and the Roper River. Both aerodromes were well prepared strips and the flying boat base possessed fuelling facilities, barges and other land based support facilities. All these installations were virtually undefended with only two or three people nominated as “aerodrome guards”. The Roper River was likely to be of interest to the Japanese since it offered line of approach to Mataranka on Darwin’s line of communications. It was navigable for 80 miles by shallow draught vessels and was completely unprotected and unobserved for the first 60 miles. The only opposition the Japanese were likely to meet on this approach was the police station at Roper Bar!

After leaving Darwin, Thomson decided to put ashore regularly along the Arnhem Land coast to assess the degree of Japanese influence and to conduct anti-Japanese propaganda sessions. Raiwalla, the Arnhem Land Aborigine soldier in Thomson’s crew conducted anti-Japanese propaganda in the local languages and Thomson administered medical aid to those Aborigines who required it. These sessions were concluded with fire power demonstrations using “Aroetta’s” machine guns. Thomson found that these demonstra-
tions left an indelible impression upon the minds of the Aborigines, especially when conducted at night using tracer ammunition. By these means, Thomson not only established friendly relations with the Aborigines and ensured that a future visits they would report sightings of shipping and aircraft movements, but also convinced them that "Aroetta" was a far more powerful vessel than the Japanese lug­gers which had visited before the war.

To organise his guerilla force, Thomson recruited mainly in east Arnhem Land. Inte­tribal warfare had been practised by the Aborigines of this area for centuries and the techniques of scouting, patrolling, recon­naissance, night movement, infiltration and camouflage were all well established, and many warriors had developed a very high level of individual skill in these techniques. These Aborigines were also hostile to the Japanese and Thomson was therefore able to recruit and train a highly skilled and motivated force in the minimum of time.

Recruitment was limited to fifty warriors drawn from two main clans. In the event of a Japanese landing, these warriors were to return to their clans, mobilize the remaining warriors and lead attacks against the Japanese.

Thomson was constantly aware of the necessity to organize his guerilla force as far as possible within the framework of the existing Aborigine culture. Consequently, in the early stages of recruiting, he was faced with the delicate problem of uniting the warriors of two feuding clans. To weld his force into a single unit it was necessary to expiate the grievances one clan had against the other and this had to be done in accordance with traditional Aboriginal law. The "squaring up" process consisted of selected scapegoats from one clan "running the gauntlet" while the members of the other clan attempted to spear them! To escape that ordeal unscathed meant that the original grievance remained unexpiated and in that case the scapegoat was speared through the thigh. Though two men were temporarily crippled, Thomson's willingness to observe tradi­tionnal Aboriginal law facilitated the unification of his force and reinforced the Aborigines faith in him as their leader.

Thomson made no attempt to turn these Aborigine guerillas into orthodox soldiers. A little drill was taught to foster discipline and some instruction in minor tactics was given but Thomson reasoned that too much orthodox training would indicate to the Japanese that the Aborigines were trained soldiers led by whites and this would probably lead the Japanese to retaliate against any Aborigines they came upon, whether they were Thomson's guerillas or not. Furthermore, emphasis on drill and formalised tactical formations which, after all, were aimed at the speedy training of mass European armies, were inappropriate to the type of force Thomson had in mind and may even have eroded those traditional skills the Aborigines already possessed. In any case, Thomson was confident that with training in the effects of small arms fire, the Aborigines and their tradi­tional mode of warfare would be equal to the task. For the same reasons, the Aborigines were to be armed only with their traditional weapons: spears and spear throwers, with which they were highly skilled. At night, they could silently kill sentries, scouts and small par­ties using these weapons. The Aborigines had been highly successful with these weapons in the early 1930's when they attacked parties of Japanese and whites who had entered their ter­ritory. Though these intruders were expecting trouble and were armed with firearms, they in­flicted no casualties on the Aborigines while the Aborigines killed a number of trespassers. Thomson's only concession to technology was that his guerillas were taught the use of Molotov Cocktails for the destruction of parked aircraft, vehicles and stores. The Darwin hotels had been raided by "Aroetta's" crewman in search of clear glass bottle for the manufacture of the "cocktails".

Each Aborigine soldier equipped himself with a spear thrower, three fighting spears and a wire fish spear. Thomson provided tomahawks, knives, fishing lines and hooks so that the force, having relatively efficient food gathering equipment, could spend more time training and fighting. Other outlays in provi­sioning the force were two pieces of calico and a blanket per man, and a brass identity disc bearing the soldier's regimental number. "Pay" consisted of a weekly issue of three sticks of tobacco per man. Surely no other force has been raised and maintained so cheaply! Items likely to indicate that the Aborigines were receiving white support, such as the brass discs and calico, were to be discarded if the Japanese invaded.
Exercises conducted by Thomson practised the force in infiltration, night approaches to objectives, exfiltration and re-grouping at selected rendezvous. One such exercise involved a long night swim through a mangrove-fringed river to reach the objective. Despite the tangle of mangroves the Aborigines managed to approach, attack, disperse and rendezvous silently and unerringly. Thomson assessed his guerillas to be far superior in these skills than even the best trained white troops.

During this period of training and patrolling Thomson adopted the practice of going barefoot. He reasoned that bootprints left behind during raids would indicate to the Japanese the presence of a white leader. It is possible however that his reasons may have been more complex than that. It was his belief that to successfully lead his Aborigine soldiers, he would not only have to speak their language and observe their law, but also live as they did in almost every detail. This was what leadership of tribal Aborigines demanded, and in return, the Aborigines gave unswerving loyalty.

To familiarise his force with approaches to Milingimbi, Groote Eylandt and the Roper and McArthur Rivers, Thomson thoroughly patrolled these areas and detailed sketch maps of each area were also drawn up. An observation post at Gulnare Bluff, overlooking the mouth of the Roper River was also established and manned by his guerillas. A constant patrol programme was maintained from this post for two months until responsibility for the post was handled to 4 Independent Company. Another Observation post established at Trial Bay also functioned as the unit's patrol base. Trial Bay was chosen because it was central to Milingimbi, Groote Eylandt and Roper River, was unlikely to be chosen by the Japanese as a landing site, and because it was situated in the midst of a friendly Aborigine population.

After sixteen months of constant patrol, Thomson’s tasks were completed. A thorough reconnaissance of his area of responsibility had been carried out, Japanese influence amongst the Aborigines had been countered, a coastwatching service relying upon local Aborigines had been established, instruction in bushcraft had been given to members of the Independent Company and a guerilla force had been organized. By March and April 1943 it was apparent that the threat of a Japanese invasion had receded. The North Australia Observer Unit had deployed seven months previously and in co-operation with 4 Independent Company, adequate surveillance coverage of northern Australia was now assured. Thomson’s unit was therefore disbanded and “Aroetta” returned to Townsville where her log ended on 12 April 1943. Though its history was brief, the unit remains one of the most remarkable in the Australian Army.

While the Northern Territory Coastal Reconnaissance Unit was providing its temporary surveillance screen, other surveillance units including the North Australia Observer Unit (NAOU) were being formed. The NAOU needs little further elaboration, its history having been described in Vane’s article — The Surveillance of the Northern Territory — Its History: The Story of Stanner’s Bush Commando 1942. One point not made in that article however, was the extensive use of Aborigines by the NAOU. Despite the excellent bushcraft displayed by that unit’s white soldiers, Aborigine guides were essential to the unit’s operations. One patrol commander exhorted his peers in his patrol report to “take black guides (on patrol), they are very necessary and worth six white men in scrub country.” Aborigines were also employed by the NAOU as stockmen and trackers and NAOU patrols were often given the task of contacting the Aborigines in their areas of responsibility in order to question them on Japanese shipping or air movements.

Other surveillance units raised in 1942 in response to the fear of invasion included a Navy Unit based on Melville and Bathurst Islands. Little is known of this unit but the duties performed by its Aborigine members appear to have included labouring, patrolling and message delivery by swimming the Apsley Straits. Patrolling duties included searching for downed enemy and allied aircrew, locating mines, reporting enemy air and shipping movements and providing surveillance over the exposed northern coast of Melville Island. For this work the Aborigines received no pay; only rations and accommodation. This fact became public as late as 1962 causing embarrassment to the Navy.

In north Queensland, following several unsuccessful attempts by security services to apprehend people believed to have been landed covertly by boat or parachute, the formation of a small force of Aborigine trackers was proposed. These trackers were to be commanded by
a white NCO who "was familiar with Aborigines". The Army evidently recognised, as in the case of the Northern Territory Coastal Reconnaissance Unit, that the command of a group of Aborigines was a specialists job. Further information on this proposal is also scarce and it is unknown if it was implemented.

Despite the scarcity of information relating to some proposals to employ Aborigines in a surveillance role, some interesting lessons can be derived. These lessons may be relevant to modern proposals to employ Aborigines in a surveillance role in future.

First, Aborigines possessed skills of military value, namely tracking and other aspects of bushcraft, detailed local knowledge of remote areas both inland and in coastal waters, knowledge of local Aborigine languages and customs, and an ability to exist for extended periods in remote areas. In addition, some Aborigines possessed a well established system of warfare which was able to be employed against our enemy. To the extent that these skills still exist amongst Aborigines, they remain of value to defence today.

Second, the command of Aborigines leading a traditional or semi-traditional life-style is the province of specialists. The command of totally tribal Aborigines should be given to trained anthropologists or to individuals who have long experience and empathy with Aborigines. Today the Army ought to be able to produce some Aborigine commanders. The long history of police punitive raids on Aborigines as well as recent events in the north of Western Australia seem to suggest that some policemen may not enjoy the trust and confidence of some Aborigines. Suggestions that policemen should command patrols which include aborigines may therefore meet with difficulties unless the policemen are thoroughly screened to identify and reject those found to be unsuitable.

Third, the social division between black and white Australians will be exploited by future enemies just as it was exploited by the Japanese. We can expect Aborigines to utilize our enemy’s propaganda as a lever with which to achieve their own advancement within Australian society. The Army’s reaction to this should be controlled and liberal. The employment of Aborigines in a surveillance unit would help to familiarise the Army with the problems and aspirations of Aborigines, Assist Aborigines in the acquisition of status, leadership skills, training and financial security, and would allow the Army the tactful option of employing Aborigine servicemen in the control of Aborigine civilians if that ever became necessary. These social benefits to Aborigines should not be lightly dismissed. Defence implies more than an ability to wage war, and the erosion of social divisions within Australia through Army employment of Aborigines would bring rewards in the form of reduced vulnerability to propaganda attack and reduced internal tension.

Fourth, conditions of employment for Aborigines should be fair and just. Failure to provide totally fair and just remuneration will inevitably be revealed and will be recognised as exploitation. This will cause embarrassment to the Army and will lend credibility to our enemies attempts to exploit our social divisions. Care must also be taken to protect Aborigine culture within Army employment. Failure to do this would be self defeating. Not only would Aborigines in Army employment be discontented, but since the militarily valuable skills possessed by Aborigines exist as a result of Aborigine culture, the erosion of culture means ultimately to erode the skills.

In recruiting Aborigines for a modern surveillance force, there would probably be benefit in publicising the valuable role played by Aborigines in the Northern Territory Coastal Reconnaissance Unit. Aborigines in north Australia are generally well disposed towards the Army as a result of their relationship with the Army in the Second World War. Some of the younger generation would probably welcome the opportunity to use their skills in the Army as their fathers had done. Their fathers exploits in the Northern Territory Coastal Reconnaissance Unit would form a sound basis for the establishment of an Aborigine unit tradition and Espirit de Corps. A modern Aborigine surveillance force could take great pride in the fact that their fathers, using little but traditional weapons, had formed the first line of defence in northern Australia at a period when the threat of invasion was at its highest.

**FOOTNOTES**


5. Army Training Memorandum No 48, April/May 1947. In 1914 the government was so incensed at Japanese naval intelligence gathering along the north coast that a clause was inserted in the Crimes Act allowing the prosecution of unauthorised persons taking depth soundings.

6. Australian War Memorial CRS A2663 Item 741-5-9 Report on the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit by Squadron Leader D.I. Thomson, RAAF 1941-43. All other references to Thomson and his unit throughout this article are derived from this report unless otherwise stated.

7. This appreciation, being written before Japan entered the war, did not recognise the Japanese preference for the indirect approach. It also assumed that parts of Arnhem Land were "impassable".

8. Vane, Captain Amoury. As above P20.

9. Dr N. Peterson, ANU, is preparing a publication on Thomson's work amongst the Aborigines in Arnhem Land including his work for the Army. This publication will feature a number of previously unpublished photographs taken by Thomson.

10. As above. Note however that the title is misleading. There is more to the history of northern surveillance than the North Australia Observer Unit.


12. Willey, K. Money wasn't mentioned. The Bulletin. The fact that the Army also employed Aborigines without payment was revealed in Willey, K. The Army Pay Us Nothing. The Bulletin 24 Nov 62.


15. Langtry, Lieutenant Colonel J.L. and East, Lieutenant Colonel C.H.A., As above. Langtry and East make particularly strong reference to this aspect of Army employment of Aborigines.

16. Hall, Major R.A. As above. A more detailed account is available in the Army and Aborigines During World War II available in The Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, or from the author.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Department of Defence issued the following 'Press Release' on Friday, May 1st, 1981.

New Army Unit for Surveillance of North-West

A new and unique Army Reserve unit is to be raised with the special role of surveillance and reconnaissances of the Northern Territory and Kimberley region.

Announcing this today, the Minister for Defence, Mr. D.J. Killen, said the unit is to be known as North-West Mobile Force, or NORFORCE.

"It will be formed from the existing 7th Independent Rifle Company and have its headquarters in Darwin", Mr. Killen said.

"In developing the NORFORCE proposal special consideration will be given to making the best use of the knowledge and cooperation of all elements of the population in the region.

"In particular, NORFORCE will seek to take advantage of the unique skills and talents of aborigines and long-term residents who have special knowledge of local conditions.

"Because of the specialised nature of the unit, the Regular Army element will be larger than normal for a Reserve unit and is expected to comprise a lieutenant colonel as commanding officer, and up to 40 other Regular Army personnel when the unit reaches its planned strength of 320."
EVENTS in Australia during the early 1930s affected the population so much that society (particularly in New South Wales) became politically, economically and socially polarized. Arguably, the world-wide economic Depression which had spread to Australia by 1930, had the most profound effect on the national domestic situation. Loss of work and incomes disrupted the lives of so many people that it shook the very foundations upon which Australian society had been built. Social polarization had occurred earlier in Australia’s history. World War I had had such a polarizing effect, particularly over the ‘Referendum Issues’ in 1916 and again in 1917. Thereafter, however, the people’s aspirations for the good life, “a life of plenty”, seemed attainable.

The Great Depression shattered the dreams and aspirations of many people. During the uncertain Depression years, Australian society, instead of fortifying itself in the face of adversity, degenerated into a society split by bitter conflict over a remedy for the nation’s ills.

In 1930, J. T. Lang and his Labor Party had won election to both the Premiershipt and the State House of New South Wales. Lang’s policies, particularly the ‘Lang Plan’, called for ‘equality of sacrifice’ by all for the general good. Consequently, Lang’s election engendered hope out of the despair of the thousands of unemployed, homeless, and others whose incomes were threatened by the Depression. But to the wealthy businessman, landlords, and professional people, Lang’s winning the Premiership represented the ascendency of the militant left and socialization of society; a state of affairs which they believed would if left unopposed, impinge on their interests and destroy the Australian society that they aspired to maintain. This situation also raised within conservative circles, the spectre of Communism. Physical conflict between the Right and Left had already begun at rallies and demonstrations, and many people assessed these developments as a threat to national loyalty as well as to Britain and the Monarchy. To thousands of people this loyalty which had been defended at great national and individual cost during World War I, appeared to be in jeopardy once again. This time the would-be perpetrators of the impending crisis were seen to be Lang and the Left who, most importantly, were in a power position to implement constitutional change.

There evolved from these domestic conditions in New South Wales (as elsewhere in...
Australia), secret and semi-secret right-wing organizations. Some groups had had their genesis in the 1920s, but no single organization appeared to have gained the large following that the New Guard did in New South Wales during its main period of activity between 1931-1932. Its founder saw Lang and the Left as a threat to economic recovery and social order, and therefore set about organizing the demise of 'Langism' and all it portended for the Australian society. This included the alleged development of plans to stage a coup to depose the Lang Government if constitutional means failed.

Initially, the New Guard was a covert organization but its leader, Eric Campbell, soon openly challenged the State Government. By 1932, militant activity and political events in New South Wales had reached a critical stage and rumours and allegations of a conspiracy to overthrow the Lang government by force, with Defence Department complicity, were commonplace.

While historical research has been conducted into the activities of the New Guard on a number of occasions and by various researchers, this article will attempt to analyse the available evidence, in order to determine the validity of the alleged New Guard coup conspiracy. Simultaneously, particular investigation will be made of the allegation of collusion between the New Guard and the Defence Department to determine whether there was Federal complicity in New Guard activities.

To help establish whether or not the New Guard had the capability to forcibly overthrow the State Government in New South Wales, some details of the Movement's organization and aims preceding the alleged conspiracy are necessary.

II

In his book The Rallying Point, Eric Campbell describes how he and a number of his friends and acquaintances were seriously concerned about the consequences of Lang's election. With no other contrary evidence available, apparently an ex-Australian Imperial Force Major (John Scott an old compatriot of Campbells), visited Campbell in his law office a few days after Lang's election on 25 October 1930. Campbell asserts that both he and Scott had similar notions about what they considered as imperative to stem the inevitable deterioration of the social order. In their view they considered that:

- if Lang stands up to the militant unions, there will be serious strikes and with the crowd in their present mood and many near the breadline, who knows what will happen? And if Lang bows down to the unions and goes all out for socialization there will be a bigger bust-up... and if there is civil strife who is to maintain order — the police?  

Following this meeting the two men began to covertly organize a force of 'around one thousand sound, reliable, service types preferably of the officer and N.C.O. class who thought exactly as they did. During this period, as Robert Darroch has established, Scott was already involved with the Gillespie-Goldfinch organization (known as the Old Guard or The Movement), which was a secret committee of 'concerned upper class' citizens. When it was established that the Old Guard was recruiting for the same purpose as Campbell's group, the two forces decided to join ranks. The evidence which Darroch has uncovered suggests that the Old Guard's leaders were not as disorganized as Campbell states in his book and, through Scott, almost established a front organization for their own secret group. That Scott remained in the Gillespie-Goldfinch Old Guard to complete the recruitment drive (most probably at Goldfinch's request) and at a later stage refused an invitation from Campbell to join the New Guard, lends credence to this theory.

Nevertheless, Campbell continued to organize the New Guard — ostensibly at the request of some of the initial founding members along strict military lines.

Following on from an organizing meeting held at the Imperial Services Club on 16 February 1931, a larger and more representative meeting was arranged to be held in April. At this gathering of about 100-150 supporters, Campbell declared the aims of the New Guard and asked those present to join the Organization. He wrote that 'with the precision of a drill movement a representative from each table rose to his feet with signed attestation papers, thus effectively beginning a new drive for membership and organizing Locality (area) committees.

No undisputed membership figure is available as New Guard policy was not to divulge this information 'to the enemy...
tactical reasons. However, a broad assessment of the New Guard's strength can be made. Campbell alleges that in March 1931, he told Scott he had 5000 members. When the New South Wales police enquired into the New Guard's activity in September 1931, its membership was found to be 32,000; although, since recruitment began in earnest, 87,000 had applied to join. Applications were reported to average between 2000 and 3000 per week during this period. While New Guard strength was mainly centred on the metropolitan area of Sydney, country centres also had some branches with total of about 3000 members. Although in April 1932, the New Guard was reported to have 100,000 members, Campbell was confident he had 50,000 'dependable' men, but assessed he had 20,000 hard-core 'Iron-sides'. Whatever the actual membership may have been, it certainly was substantial and outnumbered the manpower strength of the metropolitan police. As a comparison, the police could only muster about 12,000 men to parade through Sydney streets in a show of force in April 1932.

Utilizing the military knowledge acquired from his years in the AIF, Campbell began organizing the structure and system of command of the New Guard. During its initial phase, the Guard force was divided into four zones in the metropolitan area, each of which had numerous subordinate divisions. These divisions comprised Guardsmen from a number of Localities, with area of responsibility generally coinciding with a suburban boundary. In command of this structure, there was a general headquarters (GHQ), headed by Campbell, with individual military sections including finance, intelligence, vigilance, publicity, ordnance, transport, supply, engineers, signals and aviation. Representatives from each of these sections as well as zone and divisional commanders formed the General Council, the supreme policy and command body within the Organization.

On 5 April 1932, the GHQ issued new regulations, superseding all previous instructions and organizational requirements. The Metropolitan Command was extended southward to the Victorian border, northward to Hawkesbury River and westward to the Nepean River. It included one mobile brigade and six zones; each zone retaining command over subordinate divisions and localities. The Country Command covered the remainder of New South Wales and was divided into four zones under the supreme command of zone commanders but under control of the chief commander Eric Campbell. In addition to this ground force structure, an Air New Guard was authorized, as well as a Harbour Guard. The latter was organized around a marine unit whose territory of operation was defined as Port Jackson and its waterways. A Sea New Guard was also to be instituted, but was to be subordinate to the Harbour Guard. Each of these departments of the Guard was authorized to have representation on the Council of Action, the new name for the old policy-making body the General Council. In addition to this efficient military organization, Guardsmen were divided into three specific categories. 'A' class men were the physically vigorous, to be employed as 'Shock Troops', whose duty it [was] to oppose by armed force any attempt to overthrow constituted authority by force'. 'B' class members were those 'with technical experience, who [would] be mobilized for the defence of essential services (water, gas, electric light and power, trains, trams, buses, bridges etc.) irrespective of age'. Those men unfit for either category A or B due to age, disability or lack of skill, were categorized as 'C' class members and were assigned to local defence as New Guard local constabulary. Within these categories Guardsmen had military-style rank as well as coloured armbands to distinguish officers from other ranks within the mobile brigades (Class A and B personnel) and Civil territorial constabulary (C class personnel). Each member of the New Guard was required to sign an affirmation paper upon enlistment which required him to:

'solemnly and sincerely affirm that . . . by every means . . . and without regard for consequence do [his] utmost to establish in New South Wales the high principles for which the New Guard stands'.

The declaration continued that the Guardsman's oath would not be 'fulfilled until Communism has been completely crushed and until sane and honourable Government has been established'. All members had to subscribe to the principles, objectives and policy of the New Guard. To most Guardsmen, these aims must have seemed 'responsible', although they were most likely interpreted with a bias engendered by the schism in the society at the time.
However, a close scrutiny of these aims raises some questions concerning the objectives of the New Guard and how they were to be attained.

Firstly, the New Guard stood for the 'suppression of any disloyal and immoral elements' in the society. These individuals or groups were to be classified by the New Guard which had effectively established itself as the arbiter of who was 'disloyal' or 'immoral' by its own standards. At the same time, another principle declaring 'maintenance of the full liberty of the subject' clearly supported the 'rights' of those same individuals or groups just as it did those of the members of the New Guard. Secondly, the objective of the Organization was supposedly to 'unite all loyal citizens, irrespective of creed, [or] party' but from the affirmation oath, the New Guard plan was to crush the legal Communist party. Thirdly, while 'all proper and necessary steps' were to be taken to 'effect any or all [New Guard] principles', it was not clear whether these 'steps' were to have been implemented within a lawful or constitutional context. Campbell's personal interpretation of the objectives of the New Guard as he explained in later years were twofold:

'first, to preserve law and order and maintain services in case of civil strife breaking out as a direct result of the economic crisis, and second, to foil any attempt, constitutional or unconstitutional, by the government to foist socialization on the people. This of course would include the preservation of law, order and services. My assumption was that in the first we would be working with the police and government, whilst in the second we might well have both to contend with'.

Campbell’s plan was to ‘politely detain the police outnumbered at least sixty to one’, in their own lockups if they were ‘so unwise as to be unpleasant’. He did not clarify how he would determine whether the Government was acting constitutionally or unconstitutionally, although suggestions of likely activity were provided in 1931.

One of the most significant New Guard policy statements was made public at the Organization’s second ‘Town Hall’ rally on 16 September. In his speech, Campbell included several general references to the political state of New South Wales which were considered justification for the New Guard to take the law into its own hands. As far as the Guard leadership was concerned, ‘Politicians had been lulled into the belief... by reason of the lethargy of the people that their brief authority entitles them to perpetrate any injustice in the name of law’. Explaining further, Campbell said the politicians seemed to have forgotten that ‘they are still in a British community, and that the manhood of the State is at last awake... [and that these] men are now pulsing with the spirit of the AIF... and are prepared to face the facts and solve the difficulties as truly did... [AIF]... troops face the opposition of a first-class European army and overcome it’. Campbell directly challenged any opposition to New Guard aspirations when he defined ‘any one (for we are not yet quite sovietised), particularly the Socialist Government of this State to interfere in any way with the New Guard’ and added that ‘Other than the AIF, the New Guard is the strongest moral and physical force New South Wales has ever had’. Campbell explicitly explained that the New Guard was ‘not a political party’ and would ‘neither become one’ nor ‘identify [the] organization with parliamentary politics’. If this was to be the New Guard’s policy, arguably the only way to fulfil their stated aims were other than by political means, and would thus include illegal acts. If the New Guard considered them necessary, arguably, these acts included insurrection. Campbell once said:

‘There can be no doubt that the continued development of Communist ideals must inevitably lead to civil war,... and we must bear in mind that were we forced, by a condition of chaos, wherein law and order ceased to function, to temporarily assume control of the State, the re-establishment of law and order could only be regarded as the first step... It would be our duty to secure the lawful appointment during this period of a limited number of men of sincerity, strength, skill, and courage, and invest them with the administration of the country’.

From the evidence, the New Guard saw itself as a righteous and moral force, militarily organized and trained to uphold the beliefs of an Australian patriotic ideology closely aligned with the traditions of ‘God, King and Country’. But it is clear that the New Guard itself would be the arbiters in determining how these beliefs and traditions would be upheld, irrespective of the constitutional processes of the country.
Although illegal acts with the aim of ridding New South Wales of the “forces of evil” were seen by the New Guard as legitimate, their strategy also provided for legal activity. On 23 November, the New Guard delivered a petition urging the Governor (Sir Philip Game), to dissolve the New South Wales ‘legislative assembly and allow the question of dealing with disloyalists to be submitted to the electors’.

The Governor, while obliged to receive this type of deposition, considered the New Guard’s ‘formation and existence’ as causing ‘as many headaches as ... the Lang government’. Sir Philip Game had already given consideration to dismiss Lang and although petitions to have the Premier dismissed were becoming commonplace, he retained his opinion ‘that I should be entirely wrong if I were to ask ... [Lang] ... to surrender ... [his] ... commission’.

New Guard activity increased in the following months, with Guardsmen disrupting political meetings (particularly Communist gatherings), not only in the Sydney metropolitan area, but also in country localities. The New Guard insisted that its raison d'être was to assist the police — should the need arise. At the same time the New Guard was using intimidating tactics against any group that opposed its ideals. Its activity caused the Governor much anguish, as he ‘did not condone, nor wanted the New Guard’s assistance in the political affairs of N.S.W.’

From published private letters, the ‘Governor found the New Guard a perfect nuisance: and Mr Campbell felt much the same about the Governor’. Game felt that ‘Lang has a great deal of right on his side ... and that extremists on the other side are a greater danger than extreme Labor’.

In this politically tense period, Campbell announced that Lang would not be allowed to open the Sydney Harbour Bridge. He argued that ‘someone of quality, if possible a Prince of the Royal blood’, should open it ‘for the people of New South Wales’. In the same speech, Campbell announced the raising of another petition to the King to “rid the State of a nasty tyrant”. Game felt that ‘Lang has a great deal of right on his side ... and that extremists on the other side are a greater danger than extreme Labor.

IV

Allegations of a plot to overthrow the Lang Government became public in May 1932, following an abortive assault on Alderman ‘Jock’ Garden by eight members of the New Guard. Immediately following the assailants’ arrests, the police raided their homes and the headquarters of the New Guard. The police claimed they seized documents which revealed a scheme to kidnap the N.S.W. Government on 18 March, one day before the Sydney Harbour Bridge opening, and to imprison them in the Berrima gaol. Those purported by the media to have been included on the kidnap list were Premier Lang, Chief Secretary Gosling and other prominent Labor Party representatives, Trades and Labour Council leaders and police officers. These documents revealed that New Guard personnel had been engaged over a number of months in watching these individuals, and recording their movements, routines and habits. Some documents were said to reveal detailed plans of Berrima gaol and assessments of its value for defence against attack. Other documents seized reportedly contained aerial views of Liverpool military camp, secret codes similar to those used by the military, and locations where secret drilling was conducted in the Sydney metropolitan area.

As well as ‘arresting’ these public figures, the New Guard plan was to mobilize its forces to secure Sydney to prevent chaos and to maintain ‘law and order’. The Harbour New Guard at a prearranged signal, was to disembark Guardsmen who were then to secure strategic metropolitan points. The mobile brigade was to
overpower the military tank corps and then use the tanks to quell riots. Private planes and cars were also to be used in the "coup" as necessary.

Subsequent police investigation also revealed that the Guardsmen involved in the attack on Alderman Garden belonged to a special group of 52 members who formed what became known as the 'Facist Legion of the New Guard' modelled on the Ku-Klux-Klan of the United States. This group was to conduct secret activity for the intelligence branch of the New Guard and the identity of its members was closely held. Although Eric Campbell piously disclaimed any responsibility concerning these allegations, the New Guard began losing members and support. An official CIB document advised that while the 'disclosures are not outside the oft-boasted schemes of the New Guard, it must be held responsible for the state of mischief which it has deliberately brought about'. Rank and file Guardsmen must also have been displeased over the alleged measures to overthrow the Constitutional Government and the assault issue, which were 'met with a general condemnation and . . . lost the New Guard a good deal more of its membership'. The whole affair was regarded by the N.S.W. police as 'the death-knell of the New Guard'.

During the public court hearings that followed the assault on Alderman Garden, supportive evidence of a plot was revealed. Under oath, a police investigator made the following statement:

'On 3 March, it was decided by the Council of the New Guard to take action to throw armed battalions of New Guardsmen across the lines of approach to Sydney and isolate the city. They were then going to cut off the electric light from Bunnerong and throw the city into darkness. Then, under the cover of darkness, they intended to form up other armed forces in the city, overthrow Parliament and the Constitutional Government, take possession of all Government Departments and set up a dictatorship. That is what Mr Campbell meant when he referred to the five months plan of the New Guard. It was not carried into effect for this reason, certain members of the New Guard became aware of the objectives of the Council and said definitely they would have nothing to do with it. It was only when it was realized that certain members would not fall in with this mad scheme that it was abandoned'.

Amos' interview with a former commanding officer of the New Guard's 1st mobile brigade and a member of the Council of Action, revealed that preparations for a revolt had been made; but whether or not to put the plan into action had been 'touch and go at that particular moment of stress'.

Further evidence of a seditious conspiracy was delivered in the Commonwealth Parliament on 19 May 1932 when Senator Dunn read parts of three statutory declarations sworn by a former New Guard intelligence branch member. In these statements detailed references were made concerning New Guard preparations 'to fan the workers into revolution' . . . and to seize 'tanks for revolutionary purposes'. These sworn statements also included allegations that the New Guard had planned 'to kidnap the most influential members of the Labor Party and members of the Legislative Council'. The statement continued that the positions for the defence of the Berrima gaol was 'ascertained for machine guns, riflemen, numbers of men it could accommodate, water supply and every military detail'. A former New Guard intelligence member on oath, wrote that Campbell selected him as one of the men to guard Premier Lang and other 'prisoners including, he remembered, J. Garden, Graves, Chapman, Martin, D. Grant, E. Voight, Gosling, Cavanagh and Kilminister'; that is, officials of the N.S.W. Government and Trades Hall.

If the person who swore these declarations had been in the New Guard intelligence branch, he would have had access to many of the organization's planning documents. As he was able to supply to the Senate, a list of the names and zones to which New Guard locality and division commanders were assigned, it is reasonable to assume that he actually did have access to the documents. These names compare favourably with those commanders listed in Amos' work and mentioned throughout The Rallying Point, both books written many years after the event.

In the months preceding the Harbour Bridge opening, New Guard activity peaked in a public attempt to have Premier Lang dismissed as a result of an elaborate New Guard inspired petition. But, from evidence contained in official
documents, and hinted at by Campbell, Amos argues\(^6\) that this constitutional measure was the New Guard's last peaceful attempt to unseat Lang before implementing a coup. Campbell is alleged to have urged all Guardsmen to be 'prepared to come out if called upon... There is a very dirty job to be carried out... [and] if we fail we are in a mess\(^66\).

Even Premier Lang was convinced that the New Guard was planning to kidnap him\(^6\). Lang believed that the New Guard became obsessed with the idea of removing him from government, thereby permitting the New Guard to influence the political scene in its own favour. This may have even included the establishment of a dictatorship led by the New Guard as suggested in Campbell's September 1931 speech\(^68\). In considering such a plot, the tense socio-political atmosphere created by the continuing economic crisis should not be forgotten. Lang was adamant in his refusal not to pay New South Wales' overseas debts to British bond holders, and the Federal Government was about to garnishee the revenue of the State\(^69\).

The Criminal Investigation Branch documents cited earlier as well as the documentary evidence gathered during the NSW Police raids on the New Guard\(^70\), support the allegation that the Council of Action had made contingency plans to forcibly overthrow the New South Wales Government. In early June, even after Lang's dismissal by Governor Game, the NSW Police raised a charge of sedition against seven New Guard leaders; a charge that was not acted upon by the caretaker government\(^71\). Given the evidence supporting the allegation of a planned coup, did the New Guard have the capability to conduct an armed takeover? From the first public report on the New Guard, the police claim:

'that the New Guard is a highly organized body, and from a perusal of the various occupations of its members they appear to certainly be in a position to carry out what they say in running, protecting and maintaining essential services, including the taking over of the Bunnerong Power House, the Gas Works, Water Supply and Sewer, should the occasion ever arise for them to do so'\(^72\).

In addition, the New Guard was organized along military lines with centralized command. Its strength was substantial and had even been quoted by a police witness in the 'Garden Case' as 'actually superior in strength to the combined military, naval and police forces of New South Wales'\(^73\).

The New Guard also had an active training programme and 'hard-core' members were probably armed. Initially, the Organization's leadership strongly denied rumours that their members were conducting training and the NSW Police failed in their attempts to apprehend contingents of Guardsmen drilling. In mid February, however, following police investigations, media reports strongly suggested drilling was taking place\(^74\). One month later, Prime Minister Lyons announced that his 'government cannot, and will not, countenance or permit unauthorized military formations in any part of Australia'\(^75\) and most newspaper assessments held that Lyons was specifically referring to the New Guard. Campbell replied that he did not believe Lyons was referring to the New Guard but that the 'only way to stop the New Guard from drilling was to stop Communism'\(^76\). True to his words Campbell reissued orders to the New Guard to continue training\(^77\); this action was reported to Canberra CIB in a Secret and Personal letter on 14 April 1932 which read:

'Further evidence has been collected which shows clearly that military training is actually being carried out in certain Localities of the New Guard.'\(^78\)

Confirmation that the New Guard was armed or to what extent, cannot be made. However, a late 1931 report on the Organization indicates that it had a project to assemble (from locally manufactured parts), a three pounder gun. This project was assessed to be practicable but not likely to go unnoticed by the responsible authorities\(^79\). Weapons were alleged to be available to Guardsmen and ammunition was to be obtained from a defence ordinance store for £2/7/6 per thousand rounds\(^80\). The Assistant Minister for Defence released information on the sales of munitions which included 105,000 rounds during the twelve months ending 30 April 1932. In all cases but one the reason for purchase had not been stated but the sales had been recommended by the district base commandant and their end use was considered to be legitimate. That the New Guard bulk purchased similar ammunition seems unlikely as less than a few thousand rounds ap-
pear to be unaccounted for in the report. Nevertheless, Guardsmen did possess some knowledge of the accessibility of weapons and many were also members of rifle clubs. Campbell noted that there was 'no attempt to arm' the New Guard but Localities had begun to independently arm themselves. He also recalls noting 'with amusement many a bulge on the hip at town hall meetings'. Campbell himself had a number of weapons at his home as did many people in New South Wales; pistol licences rose from 9,000 in 1928 to 16,500 in 1932. The New Guard was probably not armed in an organized way; however, Guardsmen in some Localities were armed and individual members of the Organization probably had weapons; either licensed pistols or sporting rifles.

Documentary evidence shows that the New Guard had the intention of using arms if necessary. In a confidential questionnaire, New Guard headquarters requested individual members to specify 'to what length [they were] prepared to go' to achieve the Organization's objectives, and whether members 'have had any use of firearms'. The inquiry concluded:

'Do you realize that an armed clash is apparently inevitable and are you prepared in such an event to take an active part in it as an A class man?'

Even with the New Guard's substantial military organization and training, its potential capabilities in an armed insurrection against the Government of New South Wales would have been immeasurably improved if its plans and operations had been aided by Federal military forces. Such a possible connection soon became public, but results of subsequent investigations into the allegations appear to have been poorly handled by the Lyons Government leaving the impression of a 'cover-up'.

VII

Following the NSW Police raids on New Guard establishments in early May 1932, seized documents were reported to show a definite connection between the New Guard and the 'military, naval and air forces' of the Commonwealth. The Labor Member for West Sydney, Mr Beasley, brought to the notice of the Federal Parliament similar allegations. Beasley recounted that New Guard members made much use of military titles and encouraged the view that the Defence Department was in sympathy with their aims and objectives. He said that there was conclusive proof that secret information regarding the transfer of arms and ammunition from Victoria Barracks to Garden Island was made available to the New Guard by an 'inner circle' of the Department. The Guard, he said, also possessed the code of names which is used by the Commonwealth Defence Department in connection with rifles, Lewis machine guns and other firearms. He continued that there were Guard documents dealing with the 'wireless system under the control of the Government', ... with the disposition of rifle bolts; plans of Victoria military barracks, Leichhardt ammunition depot and Liverpool camp, and of military activity and dispositions. Beasley argued that since this information was obtained by the New Guard, it indicates that it must have been made available by 'somebody inside the [Defence] Department — obviously a person occupying a high and confidential post, who is also in the councils of the New Guard'.

Prime Minister Lyons refuted allegations of any association with organizations of an illegal or unlawful character, but then added that the determination of whether or not the New Guard belonged in that category still had not been made. Nevertheless, for the record, he said:

'This Government and the Defence Department have been most careful indeed to take every precaution to see no information of the nature referred to is made available to any individual or to any organization which is not entitled to it'.

Lyons then tabled a telegram from the Secretary of the Defence Department which read:

'I can definitely assure you that the Defence Department is in no way associated with the New Guard, and has no communications official or otherwise with that organization. I might add that all officers of the permanent military forces were instructed some time ago that they were not to become or remain members of such organizations, and they were required to sign a statement to the effect that they did not so belong'.

However, in the case of citizen forces which mainly comprised the Commonwealth Defence Forces, no such bar to membership of any organization existed, but members were not permitted to divulge information. Lyons seemed adamant when he agreed to conduct 'a close
and exhaustive investigation’... assuring... ‘that a royal commission will be appointed which will inquire into [the allegations] as well as into other matters in connexion with New South Wales’91. On the same day, Premier Lang announced that the NSW government would appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into allegations made by the Opposition in the NSW Legislative Assembly. These included changes implicating State Labor Government ministers in conspiring with a paid agent (a former New Guardsman), involved in the Jock Garden assault and the ‘Fascist Legion’92.

With two Royal Commissions being promised by politicians, it is not surprising that neither was conducted. Firstly, Lang was dismissed by the NSW Governor on the day following his announced intention to appoint a Royal Commission. By 5 October 1932, the elected New South Wales Premier (Stevens) announced that ‘no action should be taken in regard to the New Guard’ following searching police inquiries93.

Secondly, the Lyons Government failed to undertake the convening of a Royal Commission ostensibly because appeals had been lodged against the convictions of the Guardsmen involved in the Garden assault case. The Government determined that there should be no Federal investigation into that aspect of the inquiry until those appeals had been dealt with. However, the investigation into Beasley’s allegations of Defence Department collusion would be conducted. This inquiry was to be independently made by the Defence Department94, the very organization implicated in the allegations. Given the politically tense situation at the time, one could be forgiven for thinking that this issue was ineptly handled by the Federal Government. The reasons for not holding a Commission into the assault question may be legally justified and even accepted, but to direct the Defence Force to investigate its own organization for collusion with the New Guard cannot be accepted as legitimate. Subsequent events also suggest a cover-up.

Senator Dunn asked the minister representing the Attorney-General if he knew that the Government would not be conducting a Royal Commission even though that type of investigation had been promised. In reply, Senator McLachlan said that, while this had been promised, the expense of both a Federal and a State Royal Commission — ‘given the need for economy’ — would not ‘serve any good purpose’! Under the circumstances, the Government was arranging an inquiry by a senior officer of the Defence Forces95.

Later in the year, during House debates, Prime Minister Lyons skilfully denied promising a Royal Commission to ‘inquire into the activities of the New Guard’ and finally, after further legalistic discussion Lyons tabled the long-awaited report into the alleged association of Defence Force officers with the New Guard96. It is interesting to note that this report (known as the Bruche Report), did not appear in the CPD of the day’s proceedings97.

The general findings of the Bruche report were made public before August however. In a short article in the Sydney Morning Herald, Lyons was reported to have announced that: ‘definitely and conclusively... the general charges of collusion made by Mr Beasley and other members of the Lang group were completely without foundation... ’... [and] they had been found to be grossly inaccurate and misleading98.

The full statement by Lyons was published in The New Guard, a monthly magazine99. The report refuted the allegation that the Defence Forces were in sympathy with the objectives and aims of the New Guard. As early as March 1931, the Department realized that ‘certain difficulties might arise’ therefore warnings were ‘issued to Permanent and Citizen Forces in New South Wales’ by Army Headquarters ‘forbidding’ association in any way with such organizations. Another measure adopted to ensure the integrity of the Defence Force was an interview, especially arranged between the Base Commandant Victoria Barracks, and Eric Campbell, in May 1931.100 The purpose of the meeting was to inform Campbell to cease forthwith his untrue claims that the New Guard was acting under the aegis of the Defence Department. Later, Campbell appears to have adopted a superior manner about this meeting but conceded ‘that [the New Guard was] not over popular’ with the Army101.

The Bruche report also stated that in no case was the New Guard shown to have had access to any secret or confidential information and there was nothing in the seized documents to support Beasley’s allegations. Examples of some of the allegations and the Department’s replies are published in The New Guard 102. Generally, the Bruche report only indicates in-
formal social contact between Army personnel and Guardsmen. The plans referred to are appended to the report. They are no more than very rough sketches. The tone of the report can be assessed as ‘defensive’ and it was careful to note that officers’ activities when not on duty were their individual concern; inquiries were restricted to ‘office hours only’.

In support of the contention that the Commandant of Victoria Barracks and his fellow officers were not in collusion with Campbell’s organization, an informative comment was made by Sydney CIB inspector Longfellow-Lloyd from information he must have received on 9 or 10 May 1932, one month before the publication of the Bruche report:

‘A newspaper reference to collusion with the Military Forces has caused much annoyance at 2nd District Base and the Commandant has requested the Commissioner of Police to demonstrate the proofs, if any, to him. The Commissioner showed hesitancy and is being now requested in writing to meet such request.’

As further evidence that official complicity between the military and the New Guard was unlikely, a ‘secret’ and ‘personal’ intelligence letter is informative. Reporting on the continued drilling of Guardsmen, a major attached to General Staff, 2nd Military District (Victoria Barracks) suggested:

‘that the time has arrived for the Commonwealth Government to have drastic action taken in this matter. I am satisfied and the Naval intelligence agrees that the best procedure would be to carry out a raid at the Headquarters of the New Guard and impound all the documents found there, we are sure that this would result in obtaining a large number of documents which would confirm the views expressed above.’

He continued that he was of the opinion that ‘such action would result in a very big percentage of the members leaving the organization’ as ‘they are very tired of the false position in which they are placed by the speeches and actions of Campbell and that any sign of official disapproval would be quite sufficient to induce them to resign.’

It is worthwhile to recall that one month later, the NSW Police raided the New Guard headquarters, and as a result the New Guard organization declined in popularity and soon became defunct.

VIII

Given the military background of the people who joined the New Guard and the ideology of that organization, there would have been some meeting of the minds between the military and Guardsmen. Issues such as the defeat of ‘Langism’ and the hatred of Communism were certain unifiers. Nevertheless, much of this ‘support’ for the New Guard seems to have dissipated once it began adopting such blatantly dictatorship tactics as the serious contemplation of the armed overthrow of a constitutionally elected Government. To support this assessment, many Guardsmen left the organization at this time and the Guard continued to decline in numbers.

While the ‘collusion’ allegation was ineptly handled publicly, the Federal Government took much of the political heat out of the very tense situation by diffusing the responsibility for the inquiry promised by Lyons. The New South Wales part of the investigations was, in fact, the responsibility of the NSW Police Department. What remains is that the investigations and denial of collusion was made by an organization which had a vested interest in absolving itself of complicity. From the available evidence, however, there is no conclusive proof that there was officially — even at an elite level within the military — collusion as alleged by Mr Beasley.

NOTES

3. Campbell, op. cit., p. 27.
4. ibid., p. 28.
5. ibid.
7. Godfinch was the general manager of CSR and Gillespie was the Director of the Bank of NSW. Other committee members included Colonel Summerville (Secretary of the Royal Agricultural Society), Colonel Bertram (Secretary of the Royal Sydney Golf Club), five other commerce personalities. Two Victorian Barracks Army Officers observed the meetings. See Campbell, op. cit., p. 32.
8. ibid.
9. ibid., p. 38 and p. 50.
10. ibid., pp. 39-41.
11. ibid., p. 1.
12. ibid., pp. 46-49.
13. ibid., p. 47.
14. See Appendix 1.
17. NSWPP., p. 1057.
20. SMH., 30 April 1932, p. 13.
21. NSWPP., 1058-1059.
23. NSWPP., p. 1066. See also Campbell, op. cit., p. 52.
24. CRS A 367, pp. 3-5.
25. ibid., p. 7.
26. See Appendix I for details.
27. NSWPP, p. 1062.
29. ibid., p. 73.
30. NSWPP, pp. 1068-1069. Also reported in SMH, 17 September 1931, p. 9.
31. ibid., p. 1069.
32. ibid.
33. SMH., 24 November 1931, p. 9.
35. ibid., pp. 67, 79 and 86.
36. SMH, various from November through April.
38. ibid., p. 223.
39. SMH., 12 January 1932, p. 11.
40. SMH., 15 February 1932, p. 9, 17 February, p. 11.
41. CRS A 367, letter from CIB Sydney to Director CIB Canberra, dated 14 March 1932.
42. ibid.
43. ibid.
44. CRS A 367, letter from CIB Sydney to Director CIB Canberra, dated 16 March 1932.
46. Interpretations of this incident can be found in ibid., pp. 86-87 in Moore A., 'Who Bashed "Jock" Garden', undated paper as well as any Sydney newspapers immediately following the attack on 6 May 1932.
47. SMH., 9 May 1932, p. 10 and 11 May 1932, p. 11.
49. SMH., 11 May 1932, p. 11.
52. SMH., 9 May 1932, p. 10.
53. SMH, 10 May 1932, p. 9.
54. SMH., 11 May 1932, p. 11.
55. CRS A 367, Letter from CIB Sydney to Director CIB Canberra, dated 11 May 1932.
56. SMH., 11 May 1932, p. 11.
58. Amos K., op. cit., p. 77.
60. ibid., p. 1082.
61. ibid., p. 1083.
63. Campbell, op. cit.
64. This petition was said to contain more than 400,000 signatures. SMH., 12 March 1932, p. 13, Daily Telegraph, 12 March 1932, p. 1, SMH., 22 February 1932, p. 10.
65. Amos, op. cit., p. 73.
66. ibid.
ABBREVIATIONS
CIB — Criminal Investigation Branch
CPD — Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
CRS A 367 — Commonwealth Investigation Service Correspondence Files item C 94121
NSWPP — New South Wales Parliamentary Papers
SMH — Sydney Morning Herald

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Century — held in original form National Library
Daily Telegraph — held on microfilm National Library
New Guard — one copy held on CRS A 367 file in Australian Archives Office, Canberra A.C.T.
Sydney Morning Herald — held on microfilm ANU Chifley Library

Books, Articles and Unpublished Works

AWARD: ISSUE NO 28 (MAY/JUNE 1981)
The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the May/June 1981 issue (No 28) of the Defence Force Journal to Wing Commander Peter Rusbridge for his article A Military View on the Future of the Australian Aircraft Industry: Giving it a Go.
CONCEALED within the towering mountains of Dutch New Guinea (now West Irian) lies a rich and pleasant valley, whose official name is Baliem, and through which meanders a large river of the same name. A place of mystery and legend among airmen, cooled by altitude and protected by 13,000' peaks on all sides, which permits narrow access by the 9,500' Pas (Pass) Valley on its northern edge.

In mid 1945 this area was to create world headlines with the unique rescue of two men and a woman, the sole survivors of an aircraft crash, by a glider and tug plane. The news media of the time were quick to dub this place “Shangri-La”, after the mythical hidden valley of Tibet in James Hilton’s famous novel LOST HORIZON. Later, Hollywood was to produce movies on both the novel and the New Guinea rescue story.

By May of 1945 the war against Japan had reached her very doorstep and Hollandia (now Djaypura) was a large sleepy base in the backwaters of New Guinea. On Sunday, the thirteenth of that month, a joyflight and navigation exercise was organised by Colonel Peter J. Prossen, of the Far East Air Service Command (FEASC) who was to accompany eight service women and fifteen men (including crew) on planned overfly of “Hidden Valley”.

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The artwork for this story was prepared by Peter Connor, Directorate of Air Force Safety.

Article received March, 1981.
BALIEM VALLEY CRASH SITE

Dutch New Guinea

Hollandia

AUSTRALIA
As the intensity of the fire increased (it was to continue spasmodically until the afternoon of the following day) the party retreated to a ledge some 25 yards away with McCollom carrying PFC Hanna. The regular afternoon rain then began falling, adding to their misery. John now began repeated trips back to the crash site, recovering tins of water, hard sweets, yellow tarpaulins and a signal kit from emergency lifecrafts. Not once did he make mention that his twin brother, also on the flight, was somewhere back inside the smouldering fuselage; or that his chest, which had a cracked rib, was causing intense pain.

As night approached the four swathed themselves and Eleanor Hanna in tarpaulins to endure the uncomfortable, long, cold night. With the dawn it was found that Eleanor had died and she was carefully wrapped in one of the canvas squares and laid beside a nearby tree.

That morning the first search plane flew over (there were 24 in all sent out) and although the group signalled with a mirror they were not seen. Ken Decker was to comment that the previous day had been his 36th birthday and he wasn’t the least bit impressed with what he had received! All felt greatly relieved, though, that they were missed and a search had begun. That afternoon Laura Besley died and was placed with Eleanor Hanna.

At daylight on Tuesday fifteenth the remaining three began a slow trek down the mountain, hoping to find more open ground. Following swift mountain streams, traversing waterfalls and wading in icy cold water, they reached a clearing on an embankment at midday on the Wednesday. During the descent Margaret’s long hair repeatedly became entangled in bushes until at last, in desperation, she asked John to cut it short with his penknife. Ken, who back in Hollandia had been refused a date by Margaret, never lost an opportunity to remind her in the days that followed.

Lying in a sunlit grass patch to warm up, the group soon heard the engines of a large plane in the distance. Yellow tarpaulins were hurriedly laid out and they were quickly spotted, the pilot overhead cutting his engines momentarily and rocking the plane’s wings as a signal. That afternoon a large group of timid natives visited the small grassy knoll, talked in their own language to the white strangers and smoked mountain tobacco. Their obvious friendliness and humour was a welcome relief to the previous days of ordeal.

Thursday the seventeenth, a radio was dropped by parachute that morning. It was quickly set up by the men and contact clearly established with the circling aircraft overhead. Survivors’ names were relayed and brief details of the tragedy stated. Food, jungle kits, medicine, bandages and jungle knives were located with other chutes nearby. The three found that now only small portions of food could be consumed at one time. (Their stomachs had shrunk considerably over the previous days; unnoticed by them until then.)

The following day the army plane once again returned and this time dropped two medical paratroopers further down the valley, in more hospitable country. One, Corporal Rammy Ramirez, injured his ankle but despite this both he and S/Sgt. Ben Bulatao (both Filipinos) soon arrived at the camp and set to work. Some of the survivors’ wounds were now turning septic and required modern medicines as soon as possible. Ken Decker’s right elbow was found to be broken and back burnt; in addition to his deeply gashed scalp. Margaret’s right foot was badly cut, legs were burnt and left side of her face blistered. All had suffered stoically. Fires were now lit by the medics, hot food and drinks soon performing wonders for morale.

On Sunday, May 20, a transport aircraft dropped Captain David Walters and ten paratroopers in the main Baliem Valley, some 45 miles to the south. Two of these men remained behind to set up camp and build a glider strip, while the rest set out to reach the survivors, arriving five days later on the afternoon of Friday, May 25.

Captain Walters and a burial party then proceeded further up the mountain to the crash site with 20 crosses and a Star of David. After these were erected and the identifying tags draped on each, for the seven girls and fourteen men, an aircraft circled overhead with moving funeral services being read over its radio by a Catholic, Protestant and Jewish representative. The survivors below at the grass knoll listened in with heads bowed.

By June 15 the three were pronounced fit enough to accompany the army party to the main valley and glider strip. A long, slow and painful journey. They arrived to be greeted by surprisingly comfortable accommodation consisting of large partitioned tents and even a
makeshift bath! Assorted shells, especially flown in, were used to barter with the local natives and to purchase pigs for food.

Their return to civilisation occurred on Thursday, June 28, and was heralded by a C46 Curtiss Commando releasing a Waco CG4A glider overhead, piloted by Lieutenant Henry E. Paver. Within a short time it had silently swooped down to a perfect landing on the 300 strip. Meanwhile a Douglas C47 affectionately named LEAKING LOUISE, having followed the C46 in, droned in slow circles overhead. Patiently she awaited her turn to snatch up the towline immediately preparations below were completed.

The first load consisted of Lt. Paver the pilot, the three survivors and two Filipino paratroopers. Preparations were speedily completed and on a radio signal the lightly laden transport, with Major Samuels at the controls, swept down low in a shallow dive. On his first attempt he caught the snatch line between the two posts and roared down the valley. Tragedy nearly overtook the party again. As the glider slithered down the strip it snagged an old supply parachute on its skid, which luckily didn’t reopen, but created some drag as it trailed behind. The C47 clawed for altitude in the thin atmosphere, speed dropped to 105 m.p.h., and some trees were skimmed, before it finally climbed clear.

Continuing to circle for some time, sufficient height was eventually gained and the glider swung north, obediently following the mother-ship home. The return trip was not without its problems as the dragging chute continually slapped the thin wooden floor of the glider. A two foot wide hole was torn in the ply which then permitted the wary passengers an uninterrupted view of the jungle passing below.

After a 1½ hour flight the glider was released over the coast and settled gently down for a welcome landing at Hollandia. As the waiting media snapped photos and bombarded Margaret, John and Ken with questions, the three remained understandably quiet. Although a tremendous relief to finally be back after 47 days, their thoughts continually flashed back to their 21 friends left on the mountain, now
marked by the 20 white crosses and a Star of David.

In late October, 1958, Dutch officials, exploring in the area of the Pas Valley for the wreckage of a Short Sea Land Missionary plane that crashed in 1954, re-discovered the wreckage of the United States C47. An American Search and Recovery team from Hawaii made necessary arrangements and arrived in Hollandia on 18 November, 1958. A week later at the Netherlands Government Station in the Baliem Valley Dutch officers briefed the team on the terrain and climatic conditions. Especially noteworthy was the temperature variations which dropped from 80° F. during the day to 45° as night approached. High winds and heavy rains usually accompanied this sudden change in temperature.

Meanwhile members of a Dutch patrol returning from Pas Valley reported being attacked by previously friendly natives. Despite this, a party of 31 men, armed for protection against attack, departed for the crash site on December 4. The team successfully accomplished their mission and the remains of those left behind 13 years earlier were recovered and returned to the United States.

**PROLOGUE**

Unbeknown or forgotten to the U.S. Army and world media in 1946 was the fact that the Baliem Valley area had in fact been visited in 1938. The whole area was subject to the intensive Archbold Expedition of more than 100 outsiders. A combined organisation of Dutch and Americans with Dyak carriers. This group, with soldiers and scientists in their ranks, operated with the then new Catalina amphibian. Superbly equipped, this aircraft, named *Guba 2*, landed on both the Baliem
River and nearby Lake Habbema, the latter at an amazing 10,500’ altitude.

In excess of 100,000 specimens were collected by the scientists over a period of a little more than a year, the whole expedition having been expertly served by an aircraft that was to feature so prominently within a few years in World War II.

The Baliem Valley area is still an extremely dangerous place to fly, even in modern aircraft. As recently as 29 July, 1977, a RAAF Iroquois helicopter (No. A2-379), whilst negotiating the Pass Valley in poor weather conditions, crashed. Amongst cloud and mist, terrain was encountered which rose faster than A2-379 could climb in the thin atmosphere. There was loss of translational lift and the Iroquois stalled through the tree tops. The captain was killed and four of the other five on board were seriously injured. At the time Indonesian authorities were being assisted with the mapping of Irian Jaya. An accompanying Iroquois witnessed the whole incident and quickly re-located the site with the signals received from an activated survival beacon.
AN ALTERNATIVE TO ANZUS

By Squadron Leader P. J. Harradine, RAAF

'Vefore covenants, without the sword, are but words'
— Thomas Hobbes

INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Australians celebrated the bicentenary of Captain Cook’s discovery of their nation; 1970, however, was not an auspicious year for it ushered in the first decade of Australia’s history in which the country was forced to accept responsibility for its own defence. In the two centuries following Cook’s landing at Botany Bay, Australia’s security was threatened from time to time, but it never had to be defended by dint of Australia’s own efforts. That period ended under rather dramatic circumstances when the U.S. decided to withdraw its land forces from the Asian mainland and away from Australia’s area of strategic interests. Somewhat analogous was the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942 thus ending an era in which Australia was protected by the UK’s defence ‘umbrella’.

In November 1973, as Leader of the Opposition, Mr Fraser rejected the Labour Government’s assessment that East-West detente and a new era of peace in South-East Asia were likely to protect Australia from threats for the next 15 years. He continued ‘I believe that the world around us is a dangerous and uneasy one. We therefore need strongly based defence forces. We are more alone than we ever have been’. The widespread disorder of the ‘sixties has extended into the ‘seventies to such an extent that few countries have not been affected by external aggression, internal subversion, anarchy, disorder or other forms of violence. Australia is one of the exceptions, but ‘it faces a dangerous quarter of a century if it fails to safeguard its independence and contribute to world peace and security’.

Australia cannot remain isolated from the general crisis involving the security of most of mankind merely by concentrating on the rectification of its domestic problems. The UK’s influence has practically disappeared from South-East Asia, and with the U.S. decision to reduce the size and nature of its military commitment in that area, as well as in the South-West Pacific, the efficacy of the ANZUS Treaty — Since there are no other great powers to whom Australia can look for protection, it should have recourse to initiative and enterprise in its research for self-reliance in defence.

The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS), originally termed the Pacific Security Pact, was negotiated in 1951 and took effect in April 1952. At the time it came into force, the Treaty was seen in Australia as providing an insurance against a re-armed Japan as well as against Asian Communism. The wording of the Treaty is ‘similar to that of the NATO Treaty, but commitments are less precise and ANZUS does not specify assignment of national forces’. Briefly, ANZUS provides for: ‘regular consultations between the parties in the event of any danger

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During his tour in Malaysia as adjutant 75SQN, he was attached to 36 and 37SQN detachments in Vietnam for admin and movements tasks in support of C-130 relief and evacuation operations in April 1975.

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to the security of the signatories, and recognition that an attack on one of the parties would be considered dangerous to the peace of others and would lead to appropriate retaliation in accordance with each signatory's constitutional procedures.16

Article IV is the operative clause of the Treaty and is the most flexible,7 it emphasises the requirement to accord with the member-nations constitutional processes before acting to meet a common danger; consequently there is no guarantee of any specific response by other signatories in the event of an armed attack on one of the parties. During the 27 years of its existence, ANZUS has been neither tested nor repudiated in part nor modified in any way; yet, in that time, there have been major conflicts affecting the security of Australia's area of strategic interests. Even so, successive Australian Governments have considered that ANZUS maintains its relevance despite continual changes in the global balance of power.

On the other hand, the U.S. has been reassessing its global interests and security commitments — particularly since the late 'sixties; this process of review has led the U.S. to a 'more restrictive attitude of interests' without abnegating its Treaty commitments.8 Perhaps the most significant reassessment of the U.S. position was expressed in President Nixon's 'Guam Doctrine' of July 1969 which was summarised by an eminent political scientist as follows:

The U.S. will keep all its Treaty commitments. The U.S. will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied to it, or of a nation whose survival the U.S. considers vital to its security or the security of the region as a whole. In cases involving other types of aggression, the U.S. will furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. It will, however, look to the threatened nation to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.9

In other words, as long as Australia does not face a direct, nuclear attack from the USSR or from the PRC ('scenarios which nearly everyone would agree appear extremely remote') the degree of support from the U.S. could be very limited indeed.10 Any assistance Australia would receive in any other given threat would be for the U.S. Government to decide in the light of its perceived interests at the time; after all, the U.S. is not bound by ANZUS or any other treaty to give military assistance to Australia. In that context, therefore, this article aims to assess a proposal as an alternative to ANZUS — the establishment of a community of regional nations for their mutual security.

ANZUS—ITS RELEVANCE TO AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE

Despite the uncertain benefits to be derived from ANZUS, the Treaty remains a cornerstone in Australia's defence policy. The 1976 Defence White Paper stated 'Our alliance with the U.S. gives substantial grounds for confidence that in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia's security, U.S. military assistance could be forthcoming'.11 Thus, ANZUS is still Australia's most important defence agreement; it purports to ensure the nation's defence by its most powerful friend. However, whether it would guarantee U.S. support in some future conflict directly involving Australia is open to conjecture. In such event, Australia may have to defend itself without the support of its major ally. Yet, the U.S. may have a requirement to defend its installations at North-West Cape, Pine Gap and Woomera just to maintain its global strategy and not necessarily because Australia, as a nation, is the U.S. area of strategic interest.

Generally speaking, alliances are formed in particular circumstances to promote the common, though not necessarily identical, interests of the countries involved. Also, pacts and alliances usually have a prescribed term, but even where there is no time or other limit (as with ANZUS) attitudes and interests of the parties can be affected by changing world developments. Few Australians have read the rather limited commitments contained in the text of the ANZUS Treaty; as a result, most are inclined to believe what they have been told — that the Treaty is the basis of their country's defence and that it pledges far more than it prescribes.

The Vietnam Lesson

Australia would do well to heed a lesson from the Vietnam War on the value of alliances. In 1964, speaking on the necessity of winning the conflict, Richard Nixon said:
What America must do is to instil in herself and her allies a determination to win this crucial war — and win it decisively. She must recognise far beyond Vietnam, and the victory is essential to freedom... On the fate of South Vietnam depends the fate of all Asia. For South Vietnam is the dam in the river. A Communist victory there would mean, inevitably and soon, that the flood would begin: next would come the loss of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia which is only 45 miles from the Philippines and next door to Australia. Can anyone seriously suggest that in such circumstances the U.S. would not engage in a major war to save the Philippines from the same fate as Vietnam? And what of Japan?

Just three years later, speaking about the same war, the same man stated:

Weary with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crisis, many Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism. And they are not alone: there is a tendency in the whole Western world to turn inward, to become parochial and isolationist — dangerously so.

So, despite the earlier, unqualified statement of American resolution, the U.S. Public's support for the nation's involvement in the Vietnam War weakened and eventually the President was influenced accordingly. The about-face in U.S. policy was a disaster for the South Vietnamese: if that could happen to them, it could happen to any ally of the U.S.

The U.S. is a great democracy — a democracy in which public opinion can be very assertive and influential. Consider the Tet Offensive, for example; it was a military defeat for North Vietnam but a political victory for U.S. opponents of the Vietnam War. It swayed American public opinion, forced President Johnson to reverse his policies on military aid to Vietnam, and destroyed the President's political future. The moral is quite evident: no relatively weak nation should base its security on the temperamental or unstable public opinion of a greater power.

No matter what treaties or undertakings are made by leaders of nations, they should be regarded only as statements of intent which will always be subject to revocation if public opinion so dictates. In the case of ANZUS, the Treaty's value rests not in the commitments and affirmations made already, but in results when the Treaty has to be honoured. Such results would depend on the disposition of the U.S. — something that cannot be predicted: as Lord Canning has aptly stated 'A nation has neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, only permanent interest.'

Is Australia in the U.S. Area of Strategic Interest?

Since the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. has adopted a more circumspect approach in determining its defence and foreign policies. Its selective withdrawal of forces from the Asian and Pacific regions may be an indication of Australia's minor place in the U.S. areas of strategic importance. However, during his visit to Australia in May 1978, Vice-President Mondale asserted 'We have major political, economic and security interests in the region'.

Such a statement may be very comforting to those who believe that the U.S. is the bulwark in Australia's defence system; under scrutiny, however, it begs the question of what is the precise nature of U.S. interests in Australia and in 'this region'.

Only four months later, Vice-President Mondale himself provided a partial answer to that question when addressing the crew of the USS MIDWAY. He said that U.S. military strength in the Pacific region would be sustained. 'Let there be no mistake' he continued 'the U.S. will remain a Pacific power. The freedom of Pacific sea lanes is vital to (U.S.) security and we are protecting them'.

To paraphrase: the U.S. has stationed elements of its Services in the Pacific region to protect its own interests but not necessarily those of Australia.

The strategic posture of the U.S. in the Pacific is defensive — a posture that has no special regard for Australia. About 25 per cent of U.S. trade is carried on the Pacific Ocean's routes; most of that trade is with Japan. In the interests of keeping Japan's industrial strength on side with the Western world, the U.S. must be expected, in its own strategic interests, to give Japan precedence over Australia. Another scenario of U.S. power in the Pacific excludes Australia also. Perhaps the line between the Marianas and the Caroline Islands is simply a forward position for the defence of Pearl Harbor which, in turn, is a forward position for the defence of the U.S. West Coast. U.S. forces
in the Philippines and Okinawa are substantially involved in the present U.S. strategic links with Japan, but using the hypothesis that Japan eventually moves out of the ‘Western orbit’, those forces could be withdrawn summarily, just as other elements have been, or will be, removed from Taiwan and South Korea.

The strategic focus of the U.S. in the Indian ocean is concentrated in the north-western section which encompasses vital oil routes. Yet, the U.S. is only a marginal influence in that region, whilst the USSR’s influence in that area is increasing as a result of the growth of USSR naval and air power in recent years.

According to the 1976 White Paper on Australian Defence, ‘areas of Australia’s primary strategic concern’ include: adjacent maritime areas, the South-West Pacific region and the South-East Asian region. The White Paper concedes that, whilst unfavourable developments in those areas would not necessarily mean that a threat of attack on Australia was developing ‘they could introduce uncertainties into our strategic prospects’. The comfortable belief, espoused in the previous Governments’ White Paper, that there was no strategic threat within the foreseeable future, was not repeated in the 1976 White Paper; regrettably, however, the current White Paper, whilst acknowledging that long and vulnerable lines of trade and communication are the basic and inescapable facts of Australia’s strategic position, is based on the assumption that ANZUS is still the linchpin in the nation’s defence.

The ANZUS Treaty does not guarantee an automatic response in the event of aggression; axiomatically, it is of doubtful value to Australia. Some may argue that such installations as Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North-West Cape contribute to U.S. strategic, retaliatory and deterrent capabilities thereby bringing Australia automatically within the areas of strategic importance for the U.S. On the other hand, Professor Mediansky, when assessing those are vis-a-vis Australia’s areas of strategic interests, opined that Australia is no more than marginally important to the U.S. — not even considered strategically as ‘valuable real estate’. ‘It may indeed be true’ he wrote ‘that the communications bases on Australian territory are a convenience to the U.S. It is, however, at least equally likely that the Americans would not regard their defence as worth the effort involved in assuming the responsibility for the security of the whole Australian continent’. Irrespective of either arguments merits, indications are that changes in U.S. strategic perceptions have downgraded Australia’s strategic value to the U.S., and that the selective concentration of U.S. forces in the North-West Pacific — many from South-East Asia — and in the northern area of the Indian Ocean has removed Australia from the U.S. defence ‘umbrella’. In addition, Australia’s new strategic attitude, from forward defence to ‘Fortress Australia’, has contributed even more to the divergence of the strategic preoccupations of both nations. Consequently, to maintain that some sort of a tradition still exists between them that their interests in Australia’s region are identical or parallel, is unrealistic. To assume, as the White Paper appears to, that a Treaty signed on the basis of identical interests can still be relevant after 27 years is even more absurd.

The U.S. has given Australia ample warning of its intentions to move its military influence away from Australia’s strategically important regions and revert to a more ‘traditional posture’. As early as December 1968 Dr Henry Kissinger, then President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, made a significant statement prescriptive to the Guam Doctrine:

Regional groupings supported by the U.S. will have to take over major responsibilities for their immediate areas, with the U.S. being more concerned with the overall framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise. If the U.S. remains the trustee of every non-Communist area, it will exhaust its psychological resources. No country can act wisely in every part of the globe at every moment of time.

B. A. Santamaria summarizes the ‘Kissinger Doctrine’ thus: ‘If you do something, we (the U.S.) will help, but help is not likely to include the sending of U.S. forces. If you do nothing, we can’t be expected to help at all’. Notwithstanding the reality of Australia’s relative isolation from the strategic areas of a major ally which has clearly signalled its intentions, there remains a widespread tendency in Australia to assume that there is a special bond between the two countries. The only affinity that exists involves similar historical develop-
ment, comradeship under arms and, to a certain extent, common cultural origins; but the special relationships that tend to ensure one country's importance to another — strong historical, strategic, ethnic and economic bonds — do not exist between Australia and the U.S. As if to jolt Australia's Officialdom from reliance on the 'special relationship' with the U.S., a former Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt recently gave his version of the Guam Doctrine. Whilst in Canberra, he warned that changes in U.S. foreign and defence policies, together with the withdrawal of U.S. military influence from South-East Asia and Western Pacific regions, and a more active participation with NATO, indicated that Australia does not figure prominently in U.S. strategic thinking. Specifically, he told the 'Canberra Times' Defence Correspondent:

For a long time you have relied on ANZUS. At the time we signed it, we meant every bit of it and we had the power to back it up. We still mean it, but we don't have that sort of power any more. (In the event of a major confrontation in South-East Asia or with the Warsaw Powers) we would be fully engaged trying to look after our own interests. Australia would be very unwise to continue to count on the U.S. for its security. In conditions under which Soviet strength is so overwhelming, the U.S. will be forced to let its allies defend themselves.

Unpalatable as it may be to Australian Governments and their strategists, the evidence is clear — the U.S. has embarked irrevocably on a process of cutting down its commitments to bring them into line with its resources and capabilities; it has reduced its forces committed to the defence of other countries, and it seems to be determined to avoid any future military obligations in Australia's area of strategic importance. The Pacific Defence Reporter's Naval Editor likens Australia 'current position with the U.S. to its dependence on the U.K. during 1941-2 when, no matter how much the U.K. may have wished to do so, it did not have the forces to send an effective deterrent to Singapore and thus protect Australia. 'In a future war' he wrote 'the U.S. would have prior commitments to Europe and NATO, just as the British had in Western Europe in 1941-2. For Australia and regional countries, there virtual isolation from the U.S. area of strategic importance, and the corollary that the U.S. is less disposed to intervene again in the affairs of South-East Asian nations because they are not identified with U.S. national interests, should be a matter of grave concern.

Australia's Reliance on the U.S. for Defence Logistic Support

Article II of ANZUS imposes an obligation on the signatories to develop the capacity to resist armed attack by effective self-help and mutual aid. In Australia's case, 'aid' has been very much a one-way flow since the Treaty was signed; the nation's Defence Force continues to rely very heavily on U.S. technology, expertise and supply of weapons systems and spares with scant regard for self reliance in these matters. So far, the arrangements involving the purchase of defence equipment from the U.S. have been very convenient for Australia, but they are not compatible with the spirit of ANZUS, for, low-order threats excepted, Australia is still incapable of assuming primary responsibility for its own defence.

In his Ministerial Statement on Defence in March 1979, Mr Killen observed that 55 per cent of defence expenditure on equipment, spares and maintenance is spent in Australia. He did not seem particularly concerned by such a disturbing and indefensible admission on the nation's reliance on overseas defence supplies, indeed, when speaking about purchases from the U.S. he said '... these arrangements provide our Services with the great advantage of direct access to the large stocks of the U.S. Services without the necessity to re-negotiate with manufacturers'. Superficially, there seems to be some merit in such a system of logistic support; on examination, however, it ignores the existence of an agreement, made with the U.S. in 1965, in which the U.S. undertook to provide Australia with logistics support only 'to peacetime levels'.

During the 28th meeting of the ANZUS Council in Canberra 1979, Council members discussed Australia's combat capability and its reliance on U.S. supply and support. Reflecting some anxiety over possible future levels of support and the current availability of spares, members agreed that there should be more definitive understandings regarding the provision of supply and support 'in contingent circumstances'. As Mr Killen explained later
"It's a matter of determining, having regard to the dependence Australia has on American technology in so many military fields, as to how we can ensure better supply and spare parts for the maintenance and repair of the weapons systems we have".28

The only encouraging conclusion to be drawn from the Council's deliberations and the Defence Minister's comments on the overseas logistics 'pipeline' is that there is at least an awareness, perhaps an admission, that Australia lacks the industrial capability for self-reliance in its defence. Unfortunately, the rationale for this continuing dependence on overseas procurement of defence material has not been addressed by the Government - at least not publicly. The Chairman of Hawker-de-Havilland, Mr. R. Kingsford-Smith, speaking to the Australian Defence Association's 1978 Defence Seminar said that Australia was defying the lessons of history by relying on the U.S. alliance and on the lack of visible threats. He concluded 'There is an argument for maintaining a defence industry. Despite present government policy that Australia should have increased defence reliance and greater defence capacity, we are not making the best use of Australia's defence capability. We still have too much dependence on the overseas supply line, with the inevitable weakening of our capacity and all the risks inherent in the importation of defence equipment from foreign suppliers'.

No matter how Australia's reliance on U.S. logistics support is viewed, it is an expedient at best; at worst, it could commit Australia to subservience or isolation. Further dependence on current arrangements can do nothing to either develop the nation's self-sufficiency in defence or establish a strong defence industry.

AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONSHIPS IN ITS AREAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

For its defence, Australia evidently depends on ANZUS — a conditional Treaty that has never been put to the test — despite all the indications that the nation is strategically isolated from its greatest ally in an area of potential instability. A logical step in the search for a realistic and practicable alternative to ANZUS is an examination of the action Australia can take, on its own initiative, towards achieving regional security. Firstly, however, the areas of strategic importance to Australia should be reviewed for contextual purposes.

ASEAN Nations

Australia appreciates the responsibilities facing ASEAN leaders at this time in South-East Asia's history, with the opportunities now available to lay the foundations for a lasting era of peace. Australia recognises ASEAN's great success as a regional organization and applauds the spirit of cooperation which has emerged among its members.

That message from the Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, to the Chairman of ASEAN's 1976 Summit Meeting summarizes Australia's recognition of ASEAN's achievements and objectives.

ASEAN countries are of great importance to Australia because of their geographical proximity and the implications that events there can have for Australia's security. Consequently, Australian foreign policy gives ASEAN nations high priority by recognizing that security in the region depends on the integrity, political stability and economic strength of South-East Asian countries. Similarly, ASEAN's leaders, mindful of the 'domino theory', believe that their bloc cannot be a significant influence in the area until member-nations have stable, economic self-sufficiency.

To give the Association more substance, ASEAN economic ministers met in March 1976 and agreed on preferential trading and tariff arrangements. In other words, tentative steps were taken to form an ASEAN 'common market' to facilitate trade expansion between ASEAN states and thus increase the export earnings of ASEAN commodities on the world's market. To date, this economic community has succeeded in attracting foreign investment (as opposed to direct aid) and appears to be containing subversive, internal revolutionary movements without undue recourse to overt military methods. Australia has a fair record of participation in ASEAN cooperative regional arrangements, but its current involvement seems to be concerned more with pecuniary gain rather than with the future security of the region.

According to the recently-published 'ASEAN Report', Australia cannot afford to ignore the tremendous possibilities for mutual advantage in close ties with ASEAN nations. It commented further that if Australian industry
and Government seized the opportunity, Australia could provide much needed management, organizational and marketing expertise. Moreover, whilst ASEAN’s gross domestic product in 1976 exceeded Australia’s by US$5m, ASEAN still needs investment and expertise from Australia, Japan and NZ to bolster its industrial programmes. Yet despite the Australian Government’s pledges of support, it seems to have little real interest in ASEAN. That concern is shared by Mr Hayden; in a recent interview, the Leader of the Opposition said ‘I have very strong suspicions that the area which will be most important for Australia — South-East Asia — will start to lose interest in us as a trading partner if we’re not a mutually beneficial trading partner for them. There are markets available, provided we’re prepared to innovate and take the necessary risks to get moving.’

New Zealand

Compared with Australia, NZ has a less diverse agricultural output and fewer useful mineral deposits. Its secondary industry is small, and the country relies on the scale of primary produce to import those goods it cannot manufacture. Since the loss of its traditional markets with the UK, NZ like Australia has had to find other trade outlets; new areas of trade now include Japan and South America, but NZ still has not recovered from the reduction of its exports to the UK — gross exports were reduced by 13 per cent when the UK joined the European Economic Community.

Despite its close ties with NZ in historical, political, strategic and foreign policy matters, Australia has been more of a rival in trade; this has soured relationships between the two countries from time to time. However, under the NZ-Australia Free Trade Agreement, the balance of trade between them is becoming less unfavourable to NZ.

In terms of defence capability, NZ is very much the junior partner in the ANZUS Treaty, but unlike Australia, it seems to be acutely aware of its weaknesses and vulnerability. The NZ Government has just completed an assessment of the country’s strategic position and has stressed the need for realism in defence policy. Whilst accepting that ANZUS provides a framework for the contribution of a small country to the interests it shares with the major partners, the NZ Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, drew attention to the ‘shifting strategic scene’ since the end of U.S. involvement in South-East Asia and the West Pacific regions. Emphasising his country’s isolation, he said ‘No one could suggest that, as we enter the ‘eighties . . . (the region) is a sheltered place immune from international strains and tensions. This demands that NZ look to its broad strategic interests in the part of the world in which we live’. An earlier report by the NZ Government ‘New Zealand at the Turning Point’ stated the situation even more candidly:

Our size and isolation, our dependence and vulnerability, particularly in economic terms, and the fact that in world terms we belong to a minority, all . . . point to the simple fact that we are expendable as far as the power centres of the world are concerned. It is clear that our preoccupations do not weigh heavily on other countries.

So, as far as relative weaknesses are concerned, strategic vulnerability and dependence on trade for economic strength, NZ’s position can be likened to that of the ASEAN nations; Australia appears to be the only country to whom NZ can turn for a lead in meeting its problems.

The Indian Ocean

In its 1971 Report on the Indian Ocean Region, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs observed that, in so far as, international politics, economic interdependence and military strategy are concerned, ‘the Indian Ocean is as important to the world today as were the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans during World War II’. The region’s importance to Australia’s industry and population is situated in the eastern sector, about 12,000 ships carrying 175m odd tonnes of Australia’s exports and imports (including about 80 per cent of oil imports) transit the Indian Ocean each year.

Until the later sixties, apart from some periods during World War II, Australia’s security interests in the Indian Ocean were protected by the states regularly, fostering support and protecting trade routes. When the UK withdrew its naval influence, the resultant power vacuum highlighted Australia’s vulnerability in the region. Later, the USSR deployed naval forces to a militarily significant extent; to counter that, the U.S. developed its
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Naval support facilities at Diego Garcia, midpoint in the Indian Ocean. Australia welcomed the U.S. presence, but, supported by ASEAN, expressed concern over the potentially dangerous build-up of the super powers' forces, and stated that the Indian Ocean should be declared as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.

Apart from the USSR Navy's activity in the north-western section the Indian Ocean is now devoid of a controlling naval power. Unless history fails to repeat itself, this situation may not last for long because: no littoral is presently capable of exercising exclusive political or military influence over the entire region; the Ocean is essential to the world's commerce, transport and communications; raw materials and energy resources particularly mineral deposits in Western Australia and petroleum in the Middle East, are accessible from the Indian Ocean, and the area is almost encompassed by 'emerging' nations — many of them unstable politically, and most non-aligned and susceptible in varying degrees to political and economic influence by the major powers.

In contrast, Australia has a relatively stable government and a sound economy. Also, it is not beset with internecine strife, insurgency and racial tensions that are so common to most of the other countries in the Indian Ocean's region. Therefore, in the event of conflict in the area, Australia has more to lose than other littoral states. Under present circumstances, the likelihood of conflict cannot be overlooked; Australia's remoteness and, more importantly, its non-involvement in the present power-play between the USSR and the PRC to dominate non-aligned states, do not guarantee its immunity from some future wars. No doubt the U.S. would respond if its interests were threatened directly by an escalation of USSR forces. However, the USSR would be reluctant to invite U.S. retaliation, thus leaving Australia enmeshed in a contest between the USSR and the PRC for supremacy in the Indian Ocean region.

**Japan**

Japan is in a peculiar position as a major power. Since World War II, the Japanese Government has given priority to economic policy over strategic and political considerations. Although a conscientious member of the UN, Japan has declined to participate in any active peace-keeping role and so far, has rejected any idea that it should join any regional defence organization. This accords with a clause in its post-war Constitution which renounces war and states that land, sea and air forces (apart from the Self-defence Force) as well as other war potential will never be maintained.

In a newspaper article in October 1978, Dr. T. B. Millar wrote that Japan devoted less than one per cent of GNP (to defence). According to Dr. Millar, many Japanese regard defence as a waste of time and money — either a return to the ignoble past or an indication of inefficient diplomacy; yet, 'a recent poll reported 53 per cent believing that the USSR is the primary threat to Japan'. That belief was reflected in this year's White Paper issues by the Japanese Ministry of Defence. The White Paper stated that Japan must quickly increase its defence forces and equipment to cope with the USSR's massive military build-up in the Pacific and the Far East, and that the USSR now 'rivalled' the U.S. militarily in the region.

The Japanese Government is clearly troubled by the qualitative improvement in the USSR's Pacific Fleet and facilities and airpower in North-East Asia. Moreover, it is concerned over the possibility of reduced U.S. concern for the defence of 'Western' interests in Japan's area of strategic importance. For the sake of argument, once the U.S. withdrawal of its forces from South Korea has been completed, would the U.S. be able, or wish, to defend South Korea in the event of another attack from the north? Also, having left 'Taiwan to its fate, might it not do the same to Japan?' Already, the U.S. has requested Japan to take a more active role in the defence of the region; to date, Japan has agreed to contribute towards the cost of U.S. bases and facilities in the country, but it is being urged to do more to strengthen its Self-defence Force which, at present, 'could not cope with a Soviet conventional attack ... nor with essential surveillance of coastal waters.'

Japan's uncertain strategic position in the global balance directly affects Australia's. In his statement on the World Situation in 1976, the Prime Minister Mr Fraser stressed the 'fundamental importance' of Japan to Australia's long term political, economic and security interests. Australia and Japan, he said, '... share an interest in a stable power balance...
in which no potentially-hostile power dominates a region of critical concern to either of us’. Speaking to Australia’s importance to Japan’s security, he pointed out the need for Australia to uphold its guarantee of Japanese access to critical sources, and supply, of raw materials.’

The fact that Australian-Japanese trade is the world’s seventh largest bilateral trade flow is an indication of the considerable regional significance of both nations. Some statistics support the view that Australia is fundamental to Japan’s economic and strategic vitality; in 1977, Australia is fundamental to Japan’s economic and strategic vitality; in 1977, Japan imported 47 per cent of its iron ore requirements from Australia, 43 per cent of its coal, 64 per cent of its bauxite, and 100 per cent of its alumina needs. Understandably, both countries have a common interest in the security of sea lanes, not only between Australia and Japan, but also between the two nations and the Middle-East oil producers. A logical extension of such economic interdependence should be the development of escort potential to protect the trade routes; regrettably, however, neither country has the naval and air power to assure the security of merchant vessels.

To try to forecast what would happen if Japan’s economy suffers because of restricted access to oil and raw materials, by denial of supply or interdiction of shipping (which is within the USSR’s power) is a problem for expert strategists, but one possibility that should not be disregarded is the emergence of a militant Japan aided by the PRC. That prospect, with all of its concomitant problems, should weigh heavily on the minds of Australian, NZ and ASEAN leaders. With Japan being pressed by the U.S. to take a more active defence role and by the PRC the closer economic cooperation, and concerned over the USSR’s growing long-range maritime interdiction capabilities, perhaps the time is opportune now for Australia to think more seriously of sharing discussions with Japan on those defence issues common to both countries.

DEVELOPMENT OF A SOUTH-EAST ASIAN/PACIFIC ECONOMIC AND DEFENCE COMMUNITY

At a National Strategy Information Centre’s 1978 conference held at Brighton UK, a delegate from the UK, commenting on the security of the non-communist world, said that the U.S. cannot defend all its allies. Referring specifically to the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, he asked ‘When are we going to see (South) Korea, Japan, the ASEAN nations and Australia taking a forward step toward creating a new defence (sic) structure in the ‘Pacific Basin’? In reply, an Australian delegate said there is a growing opinion in favour of Australia’s greater economic and military support for ASEAN and that Australia should seek closer economic and military co-operation with other countries such as Japan. Otherwise, he observed, Japan may be forced, to engage ‘in some sort of neo-greater co-prosperity plan which would not be wholeheartedly welcome in the area’.

In his recent book ‘The Last Quarter’, Malcolm Booker supports the general theme that Australia’s future security is dependent on Australia’s sound relationships with its Asian and Pacific neighbours. In particular, he states that, individually, Australia and South-East Asian and Pacific nations are too weak to survive any deliberate economic or military offensive either by the USSR or the PRC. The longer they take to join together in developing the collective strength necessary to resist the pressures of those Great Powers, the greater their chances of falling into the orbit of either and eventually becoming inextricably involved in the Great Powers’ rivalry for domination of the area. Using that assumption, Booker develops the proposition that, ‘if Australia is to contribute to the development of a regional security system its first and urgent task is to seek good relations with its neighbours’. ‘Good relations’ can be interpreted as Australia’s support for, and participation in, the formal establishment of a community of South-East Asian and Pacific nations to determine common policies for the region’s trade, economy and defence.

A Regional Economic Community

Many European countries had the foresight in the ‘fifties to realize that without economic unification their future security would be endangered. So they resolutely set about the task of turning a ‘common market’ concept into reality by overcoming antipathy, discord and vested self-interests. Since the UK’s entry into the EEC, the economic advantages to
Australia, as a member of the Commonwealth, has been greatly reduced; even so, Australia still continues to strive for greater trade concessions with the EEC countries to little avail. Not only that, it pursues other countries as prospective trading partners — countries with which trade may not be in Australia's long-term strategic interests; for example, subsidized meat and wheat deals, and joint fishing ventures, with the USSR could involve inherent risks for Australia's security.

Had previous Australian Governments the prescience to sponsor an Asian Pacific Economic Community — an organic relationship based on economic unification — with ASEAN, NZ and Japan, instead of bemoaning the loss of markets with 'traditional' trading partners whilst maintaining tariff barriers against the products of Asian countries, Australia might now be in a position of considerable power and influence. Instead, it has isolated itself both politically and militarily; it has been virtually excluded from European interests, it could well be ignored by the U.S., it is only one of Japan's many suitors and, until very recently, it has been indifferent to the opinions and needs of its close neighbours on whom its security may well depend.

The opportunity for Australia to take an active part in a regional economic and trading bloc has not yet passed. As recently as March 1979, Mr Rajaratnam, Singapore's Foreign Minister, said that Australia, Japan and other non-Communist industrialized countries in the area could fight communist in South-East Asia by helping ASEAN to meet its economic and political objectives. In a keynote speech to a symposium on problems between rich and poor countries, he said 'In helping ASEAN to help itself, (regional) non-communist industrial nations would be helping themselves for a fraction of the cost expended in fighting unsuccessful and largely disastrous anti-communist wars'.

Australia should accept that suggestion — indeed an invitation — to join economic forces with ASEAN. It would be so easy for Australia to continue to delude itself that there is no need for (and little profit in) anything more than occasional token gestures towards its poorer neighbours, just because it seems to be under the impression that it belongs to the rich nations' 'exclusive club' in an era of resources diplomacy. Whilst Australia's future security may well depend on cooperation with South-East Asian and Pacific countries, its protective trade policies have made impossible the development of mutually beneficial trade relations with them. As Malcolm Booker says: "In trade we are a bad neighbour and this has engendered resentment in the region — from NZ to Thailand. We try to soften this resentment with gobbets of aid, but these are too small to make any significant difference to countries whose pressing need is access to overseas markets."

An article of this size gives no opportunity to detail the steps Australia should take to seek the best possible form of economic and political association, firstly with ASEAN and NZ and then, acting collectively with them, with Japan. Generally, however, the options for assistance and influence that are open to Australia in the region include political and diplomatic activity, trading relationships and economic assistance in various forms. For example, as a country with modern engineering industries and facilities for technological research and development, Australia could perform a very useful function in regional relationships. Instead of competing with the economies of regional countries, it could provide the advanced technology they need. (Its) role would then be seen as a trusted partner in promoting the security and welfare of the region.

A Regional Defence Community

In his Ministerial Statement on Defence in March 1979, the Minister for Defence stated that the characteristics of Australia's Defence Force should be examined against Australia's own geo-political environment. 'Like every country' he said Australia must sustain its military standing in its geographical neighbourhood through which attacks upon its territory could be launched. . . . It is in respect of armed threats within our own geographical environment that our (AN/US) allies could be expected to look to Australia to be reasonably self-reliant and to make a maximum effort to look after its own security.' If such a statement is taken at face value, one could be forgiven for thinking that the 'Fortress Australia' notion has given way to the 'Forward Defence' policy, but that is not so. Continental defence is still the basis of
Australia's defence planning and it is a potentially dangerous one. "(It nourishes) the strains of isolationism, ethnocentrism and self-delusion in Australia from which we need to liberate ourselves if this country is ever to find a role on the international stage appropriate to its circumstances, national image and sense of self respect." 

Stronger political and economic links with regional countries may not, in themselves, be sufficient safeguards for Australia's security; some responsibility for mutual defence needs to be accepted as well. Although the old concept of Forward Defence may be no longer relevant, or accepted in the Free World of the 'eighties, Australia's complete military isolation from its areas of strategic importance could be as damaging to national interests as the withdrawal of all economic forms of aid. The nation's defence, as well as its economic security, could best be served by a modified Forward Defence policy based on defence aid and cooperation with regional countries, and which could be developed into a collective defence system. After all, Australia's security hinges on military cooperation with regional countries, and its Defence Force should be designed for that purpose.

As discussed already, the combat effectiveness of most of Australia's defence equipment is too dependent on logistic support from overseas; in addition, much of the Defence Force's inventory is not compatible with the weapons systems of regional countries. Theoretically, there are no reasons to prevent the production of conventional military equipment, in Australia, for an Asian/Pacific military bloc. Industries for the manufacture of ships, aircraft and armaments already exist. Ideally, Australia could play a leading part in developing a defence industry for the region — it has a well-educated work-force that is capable of research, development and production of a wide range of conventional weapons systems for sale to allied forces. Using economies of scale, there is no need for Australia to continue to import modern technology.

Regional developing countries have a high regard for Australian military and technical expertise. The ASEAN nations, including the two 'industrially sophisticated' countries — Singapore and Malaysia — do not have the industrial defence capacity to sustain them militarily in the event of a prolonged conflict, although they are able to satisfy most requirements to meet the needs of internal security. Australia can strengthen ASEAN's defences by diverting available technology and resources into defence-based and heavy industries for ASEAN's benefit. In turn, the labour and capital component of Australia's light industries, which are presently an obstacle for ASEAN's exports, could be reduced. Consequently, ASEAN nations would have a market in Australia for some of their light industries, and Australia would contribute to the defence and heavy industrial needs of the region. Eventually, Japan — which is probably the only country in Australia's area of strategic importance with the engineering and technological capacity to engage in large-scale armaments manufacture — should be approached to join its South-East Asian and South-West Pacific neighbours in a defence community.

Malcolm Booker considers that a regional defence arrangement of South-East Asian and West Pacific nations would have a realistic chance of establishing a neutral zone which the USSR and the PRC 'might find easier to respect than destroy'. Such a bloc would: establish a more stable balance of power in the area; prevent the closing of the Russian pincers around China (China would then, have the chance to develop its full potential, but since it could not get control of South-East Asia it would not become a global threat); and, reduce Japan's fear of economic strangulation because its access to the resources of South-East Asia and Australia would be assured. 

CONCLUSION

Whilst the ANZUS Treaty's importance to Australia cannot be denied its value cannot be measured or defined simply because it is a conventional treaty that has never been tested in the 27 years of its existence. However, for Australia to withdraw from the Treaty, just because its Articles do not make provision for guaranteed responses, would be just as foolish as assuming that ANZUS is the absolute guarantor of Australia's security.

ANZUS is an enigma: its strengths are its weaknesses and vice versa. In the event of aggression, '(Australia) cannot be sure that the U.S. would react, but any ... would-be aggressor cannot be sure, either'. Yet,
Australia is most unwise to rely on such a Treaty as the backbone of its defence arrangements. Repeatedly the U.S. has urged its allies to assume primary responsibility for their own defence. Since 1969 the message from Washington has been that the U.S. helps those who help themselves. (In the event of an attack on Australia) the U.S. response would depend on Washington's hard-nosed appreciation of its national interest and, in these days, a highly unpredictable Congress.

Since the early 'seventies in particular, the changing strategic outlooks of Australia and the U.S. have been significant factors in the divergence of both nations' national interests and preoccupations. Australia has adopted an almost isolationist attitude militarily, and has retreated from a forward defence concept to a continental defence policy. The U.S., on the other hand, has withdrawn forces from the South-East Asian mainland and selectively concentrated forces in the North-West Pacific and in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean to protect U.S. economic and security interests. The net result is that Australia's strategic value to the U.S. is far less than it was when the ANZUS Treaty was signed. There is no longer any point, then, in maintaining the pretence that, in Australia's area of strategic importance, U.S. and Australian interests are identical or even similar. To pretend, as does the 1976 White Paper, that a defence policy, developed on the basis of common interests, can endure, is fatuous.

If for reasons of expediency, isolationism or sheer disinterest the ANZUS Treaty's major power fails Australia in an hour of need, Australia will have to rely on its own resources to defend its security. Now is the time to prepare for that eventuality; such preparation would achieve far more than the continual, excrescent diplomatic efforts to strengthen the ANZUS relationship — after all, only Australia can preordain its own destiny. No nation should base its defence and its future on an uncertainty if, by its own efforts, it can reduce the dimensions of uncertainty. Whilst ANZUS can still be regarded as Australia's second line of defence, it should not be the first.

Using the premise that the security of Australia depends on keeping the South-East Asian and West Pacific regions free from the domination of hostile powers, the first, and logical, priority should be given to cooperation for the defence of the countries within those areas, i.e. the ASEAN nations, NZ and Japan. The stability and security of those countries are essential to Australia's survival, and, as an important trading nation, Australia should be vitally concerned with the protection of trade routes to regional markets. Those routes, particularly to Japan and ASEAN nations, are extremely vulnerable to attack or blockade by unfriendly powers; therefore there is a requirement for Australia to establish and maintain stronger economic and military relationships with ASEAN, Japan and NZ. To meet the requirement, a programme for the development of a South-East Asian/Pacific Economic and Defence Community can be defined, and ought to be evolved in three stages.

Firstly, Australia, NZ and Japan should give the ASEAN nations every possible encouragement to complete their integration into a 'common market'. Australia should set an example: the ASEAN region constitutes a large, potential outlet for Australian primary producers; for the manufacturers, ASEAN is a potential buyer of industrial and defence equipment. It is a region with which Australia can have a concomitant, not a rival, economy that should be based on the principle of free trade.

Secondly, Australia and NZ should then seek 'associate' status with ASEAN, and, on the basis of closer commercial interests, build stronger political and military relationships even if ASEAN insists that the latter remain unofficial.

In the final stage — after consolidation of the Australian-NZ-ASEAN links — Japan should be asked to join the new community; if it agreed to do so, a very powerful political, economic and military regional alliance would then join the major pro-Western nations of the North-West Pacific to those of the South-West, and extend its influence, through the strategically-important straits to Australia's north, to the Indian Ocean.

Far from weakening ANZUS, a South-East Asian/Pacific Economic and Defence Community would establish a zone of armed neutrality in the region thereby strengthening the Treaty, for it would probably attract U.S. support. The U.S. does not want to exercise global strategic control and has encouraged, indeed pleaded with, its allies to accept
responsibility for regional security. For Australia, the lesson is clear:

We must bring our commitments into line with our capacities and resources; never again indulge in the folly of giving gratuitous offence and advice to . . . powers whose politics we disapprove of, while clinging to the coat-tails of our Great Power protector. Henceforth, we must make our own judgments hard-headedly in the light of realistic assessments of our national circumstances, our interests and our capacities.  

NOTES
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8. ibid, p144.
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13. Santamaria, op cit, p90.
14. ibid, p91.
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18. ibid, op cit, p6, para 25.
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27. ibid.
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32. ibid, vol. 2, p118.
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36. Booker, op cit, p100.
38. ibid.
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42. Millar, op cit.
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52. 'Aid to ASEAN’s Fighting Role', *The Canberra Times*, 6 March 1979.
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55. ibid, p216.
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THE FACTORS WHICH LED JAPAN TO WAR WITH THE USA IN 1941

By WO2 T. Bradley, RA Sigs.

The war between Japan and the United States in 1941 was inevitable. The expansionist policy which Japan was developing indicated that she was on a collision course with one or other of the super-powers. There were a number of areas which showed this development. This article will discuss what are considered the major areas which led to the conflict: the economic pressures arising from rapid modernisation, the militarist character of the Japanese people and, to a lesser extent, the attitude of the United States to Japanese immigrants.

At the completion of the Meiji restoration in 1868 the oligarchy in power could see that the only way in which they could avoid the western interference in Japan, as had occurred in China, was to be accepted as a modern state. From their view of the West they interpreted modernisation as primarily industrialisation and decided "to construct an economy sufficiently industrialised to enable Japan to hold her own in the modern world." This meant directing most of their energies to industrialising as rapidly as possible.

It shouldn't be concluded that this industrialisation occurred overnight; the processes had been commenced during the Tokugawa period but received a much greater impetus after the Meiji restoration. During the Tokugawa period and the early Meiji period the industries of Japan used mainly the resources that were available in Japan, but as industry grew the lower quality and quantity of the home resources became inadequate. With this growth Japan started to rely more and more on the import of her raw materials. This trend is shown to some extent in the type of imports during the latter part of the 19th century; before 1895 imports were mainly fully manufactured items, after this date they tended to be more and more raw materials and partly finished goods.

Besides rapid industrialisation the Meiji restoration brought with it changes to the ruling system of Japan. Since the beginning of Japan's history she has had the Emperor as the divine ruler, although for most of the time this had been only in appearance and not in practice. During the period up until the early 1600's Japan was ruled under the regency system, controlled at times by the Fujiwara family. After this time the military family of Tokugawa Ieyasu gained control and ruled until the Meiji restoration under a shogun system. Both of these systems nominally recognised the Emperor as the divine ruler but in practice he was all but ignored.

The Meiji restoration, which was led by leading samurai from the four great western hans (Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa), came about using the call for restoring "ruling" power back into the hands of the Emperor. This "restoration of the Emperor" call was the driving force behind the movement, but the real control remained in the hands of a ruling oligarchy made up of the restoration leaders.

Constitutional government was also viewed as a prerequisite for acceptance as a modern state, but the oligarchy in power felt that it was too early to relinquish the reins of control to a democratic system of rule. In 1868 the first con-

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stitution was granted but it was nothing more than an outline of what the oligarchy wanted to achieve. The constitution of 1889 was the first real attempt at forming a system of constitutional government: this document made provision for a bi-cameral system of government. Although the 1889 constitution provided for a representative system of government, it still left the power of decision making as the divine power of the Emperor, who exercised this power through his cabinet.

The cabinet ran into many difficulties in governing, as their appointments were granted or withdrawn by the emperor, who was still greatly influenced by a group known as the "Genro" (or elder statesmen) which comprised to a large degree the old ruling oligarchy. The cabinet's difficulties further increased when, early in the 20th century, Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo secured an imperial ordinance decreeing that the Ministers for War and Navy were to be generals and admirals still serving on the active list. This gave the military the power to make or break a cabinet by invoking their power to withhold providing their minister.

Japan's initial moves of an expansionist nature appear to have been a result of economic needs rather than solely for the sake of obtaining colonies, although some sections felt that owning colonies was part of being accepted as a modern state. Their first endeavour in this field was Korea (1894-95) where they fought and defeated China mainly to expand their markets there. They gained more than just greater freedom in Korea from this conflict, they also gained from China; control of Formosa and the Pescadores, Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula (later given up under pressure from Russia, France and Germany in the "Triple Intervention"), and a large indemnity payment. This conquest heightened the nationalistic feeling of the Japanese and increased the esteem of the military at home.

Their second endeavour was against Russia in 1904. This conflict occurred due to Japan's growing need for export markets and access to raw materials, both of which were available in Manchuria; but Russia held that she had the exclusive economic right in Manchuria and refused to let Japanese interests in. War with Russia was popular in Japan as many people still remembered her actions in the "Triple Intervention" earlier. Japan fought Russia to a stalemate and at the treaty of Portsmouth won from her: recognition of Japan's "paramount political, military, and economic interests" in Korea, the transfer to Japan of Russia's lease of the Liaotung peninsula and the railway connecting Port Arthur and Mukden.

From these two conflicts Japan gained international recognition of her exclusive interests in Korea and southern Manchuria.

These military victories and the ensuing world recognition tended to further raise the strong nationalistic feeling of the Japanese. The Army and some extreme nationalists felt that it was Japan's right to replace the fallen China as the dominant power in East Asia; the Government also held this view but to a much lesser extent. They differed greatly on the means of achieving this dominance; the Government felt that it would be more beneficial to control the indigenous governments by economic dominance; the Army, especially the Kwan Tung Army in Manchuria, felt that it would be quicker and more effective to gain control by military subjugation.

The Kwan Tung Army represented the more extreme elements of the Army and being isolated from the homeland, tended to act without regard to the home government. This can be seen by their actions in the "Manchurian Incident" in 1931 when under the pretence of protecting Japanese railway concessions they occupied Mukden and other cities in Manchuria. The civil Government had not been consulted prior to this incident and had in fact tried to prevent the Kwan Tung Army from carrying out any actions of this kind. The Government, though, was presented with a 'fait accompli' which it had to try to explain away to an apprehensive world. In the following week the Kwan Tung army occupied almost all of Manchuria and drove the Chinese forces of Chang Hsieh-liang south of the Great wall.

The civil Government was forced to come out in support of the actions of the Kwan Tung Army in Manchuria, as the surge of nationalism generated by the victories made it dangerous for anyone to oppose them.

Six years after the Manchurian incident another "Incident" provoked Japan's further expansion into East Asia. This incident, known as the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident", appears to have occurred over an accidental clash between Japanese legation guards and troops of a local warlord. This incident was grasped by the
extremists to support their call for a quick military conquest of China; the Government was forced to accede to this call when the Minister for War threatened to resign. The heavily reinforced guards at Peking and Shanghai moved out to attack and occupy the major population centres and their lines of communications. The western powers voiced their disapproval of this invasion of China, but none were prepared to risk a conflict over the action. It was in 1941, when Japan moved into French Indo-China and posed a threat to Siam Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, that the western powers were moved to direct action. Their action took the form of an economic embargo, on Japan, by the United States, Great Britain and Holland. These three nations were economically essential to Japan as they supplied, either directly or through their colonies, most of the essential raw materials (in particular oil and scrap iron). The United States acted as the negotiator and stipulated, as a condition of lifting the embargo, that Japan was to withdraw completely from China and Indo-China. This was totally unacceptable to the Japanese people and the Government did not dare accede to it. Japan at the beginning of the embargo had stockpiles of raw materials sufficient to sustain her industries for two years, but with the primary sources cut off it was obvious she would have to find a solution quickly. The Government considered that they had three options open to them: one, to capitulate to the United States’ demands, which taking into account the national feeling at the time no government dared to accept; two, economic strangulation, which would reduce her to a second or third rate nation also as unacceptable as the first option; three, military conflict, which the Army claimed would be successful and would re-open the sources of raw materials. The civil Government did not share the confidence of the Army in their ability to be victorious over the United States, and tried desperately to talk the United States into reducing her demands. The United States were not prepared to give way to a reduction and the Prime Minister (Konoye) was forced to resign allowing General Tojo, a war advocate to be appointed in his place.

The national feeling of the Japanese about the United States also helped to provide public support for a military solution. With the modernisation of Japan there had been a sharp increase in the population pressure on the home islands and emigration was encouraged as a partial solution. Many of these emigrants went to the west coast of the United States, where they encountered discriminatory laws against orientals. These laws, which were state laws, had been legislated earlier to control the surplus cheap Chinese labour which was left idle after the earlier gold rushes. The states were now using these laws to discriminate against the Japanese. The Japanese Government had complained to the United States Government about this discrimination, but the United States Central Government had been unable to help as they had no control over their states legislatures. This discrimination gave rise to a strong anti-American feeling in Japan, which was made worse by the total exclusion of Japanese in 1924.

In conclusion, it can be seen that in 1941 Japan had backed itself into such a position where it had to go to war or lose face by relinquishing all it had won over the previous five years. The national feeling at the time would not tolerate what the Japanese people and military would consider surrender, so the nation elected to go to war. To recap the factors which placed Japan in this position we must look at: firstly, the fact that Japan’s industries relied almost totally on the availability of overseas raw materials and markets (also applicable today) and when they are cut off, as in 1941, Japan has to take some remedial action; secondly, Japan’s acquiescence to the military’s control over the Government, and the Government’s lack of control of its Armies away from the homeland, produced uneven Government direction; thirdly, the strong nationalist feeling of the Japanese people allowed the nationalist extremists to lead them to war.

REFERENCES
2. Ibid., p. 267.
4. Ibid., p. 126.
5. Ibid., p. 142.
6. Ibid., pp. 186-189.
9. Ibid., p. 213.
JOHN Churchill, the first Duke of Marlborough, was unquestionably the greatest British military commander of modern times and, in the opinion of this reviewer, the greatest military commander in history. Marlborough's formidable reputation rests on his performance in ten successive campaigns throughout which, as one early biographer wrote: "He never fought a battle he did not win, nor besiege a town he did not take". Yet Marlborough was 50 before the first real opportunity of demonstrating his martial prowess materialised and, unlike Napoleon, his skill did not decline as the years passed. Indeed, his final campaign in 1711 is regarded by many historians as the most brilliant of his career. But Marlborough's achievements transcend the battlefield for he was constantly hampered by the enervating vacillation of the United Provinces and Austria, England's principal allies in the Second Grand Alliance, and the insidious intrigues of his enemies in Parliament and the Court of St. James. Overcoming these pressures required diplomatic and political manoeuvring as adroit as that displayed in any campaign.

Marlborough has been generally well served by historian and biographer, outstanding amongst whom was his illustrious descendant Sir Winston Churchill. His epic Marlborough, His Life and Times and Professor G. M. Trevelyan's equally famous England in the Reign of Queen Anne, are regarded as the definitive works on the subject and the period. In 1973 David Chandler's Marlborough as Military Commander appeared and deservedly gained acceptance as the standard reference on Marlborough the soldier. Chandler is a leading authority on 18th and 19th century warfare, particularly the Marlburian era. He is Deputy Head of the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and since 1970 has held a Visiting Professorship in the United States. He is also President of the British Commission for Military History and in 1975 was elected Vice-President of the International Commission for Military History.

Marlborough's early life and formative influences are examined briefly. His father had fought for the King against Cromwell and his royalist loyalties were punished by the imposition of heavy fines which reduced him to near penury. From an early age then, Marlborough learnt the importance of concealing his political views and the need for tact in all situations. He inherited his father's respect for the monarchy and the established religion while his financial astuteness was legendary. However, he was also driven by a ruthless, and at times unscrupulous, ambition for wealth, power and social standing, evidenced by his infamous desertion of James II in 1688. Their long friendship of 22 years had been of considerable benefit to Marlborough but after the abortive Monmouth rebellion in 1685, the first obvious signs of disillusionment appeared. Marlborough's strong Protestant beliefs were affronted as James packed an enlarged Army with Catholic officers, attempted to control the Anglican clergy and strove for Catholic paramountcy.
Finally, he abandoned his old patron in favour of William of Orange and openly encouraged the desertion of senior officers before leading 400 troops to join the Prince’s march on London at Axminster. The patriotic, moral and religious motives by which Marlborough subsequently explained his action have been seized upon by partisan historians but Chandler stresses the ambition and self-interest which underlay his determination to be on the winning side. Notwithstanding the long-term advantages to the nation, he condemns Churchill’s “ruthlessness, ingratitude, intrigue and treachery against a man to whom he owed virtually everything in his life and career to date”.

Underhand methods also characterised his quest for the command of all English troops in Flanders in 1692. Marlborough tried to force the King’s hand by spreading disaffection amongst his officers, prompting Chandler’s apt comment: “Here was an overmighty subject indeed, who clearly felt that services were indispensable”.

Perhaps the most important single influence on Marlborough was Sarah, his wife of 44 years whom Chandler describes as both the blessing and bane of his life. Her close friendship with James’s daughter by Mary of Modena, the future Queen Anne, greatly assisted Marlborough’s rise to prominence. But Sarah was a volatile termagant whose irascibility and Whig partialities increased as she rose in station. Eventually the bullied Anne could stand her no longer and turned to another confidente, Mrs. Masham. Thereafter, Marlborough’s influence declined rapidly. In more ways than one, Sarah was responsible for the zenith and nadir of her husband’s career.

Meanwhile Marlborough’s military experience was steadily increasing. He had gained a commission in the Foot Guards in September 1667 and the following year, served with the Tangier garrison in skirmishes against the Moors. In 1670 it is believed that he participated in naval operations against the pirate den of Algiers. Promoted to Captain in June 1672, he fought in Flanders during the Third Dutch War, distinguishing himself by his personal bravery at the siege of Maastricht. In 1674 Marlborough served under the great Turenne in his advance into the Palatinate and was present at the battles of Sinzheim and Entzheim, where he saw a convincing demonstration of how surprise could compensate for numerical inferiority. Marlborough’s growing reputation was enhanced by his performance against Monmouth’s rebel army with its climax at Sedgemoor on 6 July 1685 and, in 1689, his leadership of the 8000 strong English contingent at Walcourt, the opening campaign of the Nine Year’s War. The Allied commander, Prince Waldeck, subsequently wrote to William that the 39-year-old Marlborough had displayed greater military aptitude in this single campaign than many generals achieved in a lifetime.

After Walcourt Marlborough served with distinction in Ireland, conducting successful sieges against the Jacobite forces at Cork and Kinsale in 1691. Chandler emphasises the importance of these operations which represent Churchill’s first attempts at independent command. The bold concept of seizing the southern Irish ports was the product of sound strategic thinking while its execution required administrative skills of the first order. A large part of the Army consisted of Dutch, Huguenot and Danish contingents under the Duke of Wurttemberg and from the outset he challenged Marlborough’s right of overall command. Churchill successfully defused the issue by offering to share the command on an alternate daily basis and chose ‘Wurttemberg’ as the password for the next day. The crisis presaged the difficult problems Marlborough would encounter with Allied commanders and the Dutch Field Deputies during the War of the Spanish Succession and they were all, invariably handled with the same masterly tact. This was the background of the Captain-General who took the field against France in Flanders in 1702; as Chandler says, the product of half a century of military experience rather than a brilliant amateur.

Chandler’s detailed examination of 18th century warfare shows how Marlborough’s approach differed from most of his contemporaries in Western Europe. For a number of reasons the impact and scale of war was limited. There was a widespread feeling of revulsion at the excesses of the interminable religious wars of previous generations while the harshness of winter necessarily restricted the campaigning seasons to spring and summer. But the critical factor was economic. The financial strain of supporting large armies in the field caused governments to remind their generals constantly of the virtues of moderation. The
result was military mediocrity and a preference for siege warfare or elaborate chess-board manoeuvring as generals strove to avoid battles which might shatter the national investment under their command. Improvements in weaponry, in the form of the flintlock musket and socket bayonet, reinforced this trend because casualties were inevitably increased by their use. Marlborough, however, consistently sought situations favouring a major engagement — or what Clausewitz would later term "the bloody solution of the crisis". As a strategist, he preferred battle as the sole means of achieving long-term advantages; as a tactician, his object in battle was the destruction of the enemy.

Marlborough's tactical innovations and modifications to existing doctrine played no small part in deciding the issue once battle was joined. Unlike the French who regarded cavalry as an instrument of mobile firepower, Marlborough insisted on shock action as its raison d'être and the cold steel of the massed cavalry charge completed three of his four greatest victories. The few rounds of ammunition carried by his cavalry were used to protect their horses at grass and not in battle. In any cavalry attack infantry played a major role, compensating for the former's lack of firepower and covering their regrouping in the event of a reverse. At Blenheim, the 27th Battalion of Foot in the centre followed close behind the Horse and their heavy supporting fire enabled the Allied cavalry to reform after an initial repulse. Marlborough also took a great interest in artillery, personally siting many of his batteries and often moving them to new positions after an engagement had begun. Certain Swedish practices were modified and adopted: the platoon firing system which vastly increased the output of effective fire from massed infantry and the addition of two light guns to each battalion for close fire support. At all stages of a battle, Marlborough emphasised the close cooperation of infantry, cavalry and cannon. As Chandler says, he was "from first to last the proponent of combined action, whether offensive or defensive".

Marlborough constantly used deceptive measures to gain surprise: deployment in fog or mist, long night marches to appear before a shocked enemy next day and duplication of stores depots to conceal his true line of advance. He was extremely judicious in his choice of staff; Cadogan the Quartermaster-General, Cardonnel, Davenant and Armstrong served with him throughout his campaigns and Chandler asserts that without them, few if any of his projects would have come to fruition. Another secret of Marlborough's success was the use of carefully selected aides-de-camp as his battlefield eyes, a vital function in an age when distance and dense clouds of blackpowder smoke made it impossible for one man to control every sector. Herein lies the explanation of Marlborough's knack of appearing at points of greatest crisis and danger.

The long Continental campaigns and the bloody encounters which punctuated them — the battles of Donaunworth, Hochstadt, Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenaarde and Malplaquet and the sieges of Lille, Douai, Tournai and Bouchain — are examined in detail. There were certain elements common to all Marlborough's encounter battles. The first concern was to seize the initiative, usually achieved by employing surprise to commit his opponent whether he desired it or not. Then came a meticulous personal reconnaissance of the enemy position and the likely battlefield, Marlborough looking for suitable dead ground to conceal the movement of troops for flank assaults. Once battle was joined the pressure on his opponent was relentless. Probing attacks were made against the flanks and likely weak points, drawing the enemy's reserves into action. At Oudenaarde these were launched before his own forces had completed their assembly into battlelines — a good example of Marlborough's flexibility. Heavy assaults on selected points followed — often on the flanks — to commitment the remainder of the enemy's reserve before a superior force massed in the centre for a devastating breakthrough. This was the basic grand tactical pattern of Blenheim, Ramillies and Malplaquet and a radical departure from the accepted French technique of trying to turn the flanks of their opponent with cavalry.

However each of these battles had its own singular characteristics. At Ramillies, Marlborough used the dead ground behind the Plateau of Jandrenouille to transfer Orkney's battalions from the right to the centre, leaving a skeleton force in the old position to convince Villeroi that Orkney had not moved. At Oudenaarde, a potentially disastrous situation was averted by his brilliant reinforcement at the height of the battle of the endangered right
At Malplaquet, Marlborough's cool handling of his forces and personal intervention at critical junctures carried the day against a French defence which he later described as the best he had seen. The famous forcing of the Ne Plus Ultra line without a single casualty in 1711 was a masterpiece of deception. After feinting in front of Villers Brulin, Marlborough completely fooled Villars, the ablest of the French generals, by a forced night march to Arleux, 39 miles distant. Leaving their camp fires burning and preserving every semblance of normalcy, Marlborough's Army was on the march for five hours before Villars realised what was afoot. Seven years earlier, Churchill had demonstrated even greater administrative and deceptive skills in the precursor to Blenheim, the epic 250 mile march in five weeks to the Danube theatre which was equally as deserving of applause as the battle itself. In the case of his sieges, Marlborough was more bound by the rigid practices of his time but nonetheless, the skill with which he covered the sieges of Lille and Bouchain were outstanding examples of the art.

Chandler considers that Marlborough was successful at every level of warfare from Grand Strategy to Minor Tactics. None worked harder to preserve the integrity of the Grand Alliance, a difficult task in view of British ire at the continuation of Dutch trade with France. Marlborough's constant visits to the Hague smoothed these problems while his amicable relations with the German Electors loyal to the Allied cause, the Swedes and the Danes, averted head-on clashes of interest. His conception of the war extended to its farthest reaches and thus he could leave Flanders for the Danube in 1704, recognising it as the vital theatre unlike his lightweight colleagues who charged him with "stealing the army". Marlborough's apprecia-
tion of the role of seapower in Continental warfare was almost unique in this period. He felt that the Allies' command of the sea conferred inestimable advantages on the Alliance and his plans for a strike at the French heartland through Toulon in 1707 and, after Oudenarde, an advance along the coast to the mouth of the Somme, would have forced France to surrender. The former failed because of Allied vacillation while the latter was hardly considered, so bold was the concept. Marlborough also differed from his colleagues in his belief in immediate pursuit after a decisive victory because of the strategic benefits that would accrue. Unfortunately, the opportunities for strategic exploitation were extremely rare but the outstanding example followed Ramillies when Marlborough overran the whole of the Spanish Netherlands. For all this, the Duke remained to the end a soldier's general who could pick up in his own coach those who had dropped through fatigue on long and rapid marches. The rank and file dubbed him 'the old Corporal' because of his constant concern for their welfare. Nor did he shrink from the dangers they faced. At Ramillies his horse was shot from under him as he led two cavalry charges at a crucial stage of the battle. Their esteem enabled Marlborough to make demands on his men that few other generals would have contemplated.

When considered against the onerous burdens under which he laboured throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, the scale of Marlborough's achievements is simply remarkable. His allies, the Dutch and to a lesser extent the Austrians, were dubious assets. The former, anxious to minimize their casualties and expenditure, urged caution on their generals and appointed five Field Deputies, veritable political commissars, who accompanied Marlborough with the power of veto over proposed operations involving Dutch troops. The result was the squandering of numerous potentially decisive opportunities, the most notable of which followed the breaching of the Lines of Brabant in July 1705. Marlborough had forced Villeroi to accept battle behind the River Yssche but the delays occasioned by Dutch indecision allowed the French to improve their positions, ultimately forcing Churchill to abandon the operation without a shot fired. In view of his vast numerical superiority which included concealed battalions and squadrons on the French flank and rear, there is little doubt that Marlborough would have scored what many authorities regard as probably his greatest victory. Chandler concludes that it could have ended the war. The favourable situations created by Marlborough's generalship at the end of 1708 were similarly frittered away.

Marlborough had managed to weather the vicissitudes of domestic politics until 1707 but thereafter, his stocks declined rapidly. Sarah's growing estrangement from Anne, the fall of his great friend, the Lord Treasurer Sidney
Godolphin, and the emerging prominence of his Tory enemies, Harley and St. John, proved disastrous for Marlborough's standing at St. James and with Parliament. He began his final campaign in 1711 in the knowledge that his political foes at home had won the day and that even the most brilliant successes in the field would not silence them. It is Marlborough's consistently superior performance in the face of these adverse circumstances, national and international, that lifts him above the ranks of the Great Captains.

Despite his obvious admiration for the Duke, Chandler's approach is totally dispassionate. He is as critical of Marlborough's intrigues and his abject pleading before the Queen in 1710, as he is laudatory of the Duke's courage and concern for his men's lives. There were occasions when Marlborough was too tactful and should have made his feelings known, particularly his grave fears about the situation in Spain where the continued dissipation of resources weakened the Allied cause. After the fiasco at Almanza, further involvement was tantamount to the reinforcement of failure but Marlborough rarely expressed these doubts to his Allies or his master. He was fortunate in the majority of generals who served alongside him, pre-eminent amongst whom stands the redoubtable figure of Prince Eugene. His dedication to the profession of arms and unselfish co-operation with Marlborough made him the perfect colleague and an important factor in accounting for the Duke's success.

David Chandler's *Marlborough* is a superb work which demonstrates yet again the truth of Lawrence's aphorism: "With two thousand years of examples behind us, we have no excuse when fighting for not fighting well". His lucid text is complemented by clearly drawn and easily understood maps. However there are several spelling errors and omissions and in some chapters the number of footnotes does not correspond with the number listed in the references. These minor irritants should have been corrected before publication.

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**BOOKS IN REVIEW**

The following books reviewed in this issue of the *Defence Force Journal* are available in various defence libraries:


Reviewed by Dr. F. M. Cain, School of History, University of New South Wales.

AUSTRALIAN historians are looking again at Australia’s involvement in World War I and much of the research is directed at examining the composition of the first A.I.F. This was a remarkable all volunteer army which rapidly expanded with a flood of eager recruits early in the struggle and then shrank by the middle of the war as Australians lost enthusiasm in what they began to see as a bloody and unwinnable war.

Dr. Bean, the official war historian, painted the first A.I.F. in an heroic form. He described its members as expressing the real values of Australian egalitarianism, tinged with the bushman’s practicability, and it being led by self-effacing officers and generals who were equal, in their own way, to the slick Sandhurst graduates. Dr. Robson’s books and articles have suggested that Bean’s descriptions require some qualification and Dr. Brugger has looked at the impact of the first A.I.F. on the Egyptian community in an effort to give us a better understanding of how our Aussie diggers saw and were seen by members of what would now be called a third world country.

Dr. Brugger partly uses the research technique of drawing on the letters and diaries, mainly of officers and some men, lodged in the Australian War Memorial. This is the method used by Dr. Gammage in his book which describes the attitude of the diggers in the war and while, in his case, the material overwhels the subject matter, Dr. Brugger chooses more selectively thus preventing the story being swamped by the letters.

Chance and coincidence surrounded the arrival of the A.I.F. in Egypt. When the first Division of 30,000 men had been assembled in ships at Albany ready to sail in convoy to Europe, the British Cabinet decided on 25 October 1914 that they should travel via the Cape of Good Hope where (with shades of the Boer War ever present) they would land to help put down a revolt by the Dutch in South Africa. There was a delay and when the fleet did sail on 30 October the British Cabinet withdrew its request because by then General Botha had defeated the rebels with his own forces. The fleet thereupon left for Europe via the Suez Canal.

When the troop ships were in the middle of the Indian Ocean the Australian High Commissioner in London, Sir George Reid, sent a cablegram to the Australian Government on 17 November 1914 saying that Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, had asked him to request the Australian Government to approve the landing of the Australian troops at Egypt for a short training period before they sailed on to Europe to join the Western Front. This would allow the Australians to aid in the defence of Egypt because Britain had declared war on Turkey on 5 November 1914 although, as Kitchener remarked, there was no shortage of British troops there for this task. Reid supported the proposal because he was aware that the tent and hut accommodation at Salisbury Plain, where the Australians were to be housed, was inadequate for the Australians at that time of the year. George Pearce, the Labor Senator and Minister for Defence, submitted the matter to Cabinet on the following day and approval for this stop-over was given by the Government. Reid must have been concerned that the Australian Government would not approve of this proposal because on 18 November he sent another cablegram explaining that there was no alternative sites to Salisbury and that the Canadian soldiers already camped there were showing signs of a lack of discipline.

This was a highly significant decision because it led to the Australian troops being involved in those unfortunate events on the Gallipoli Peninsula. It also gives the start to Dr. Brugger’s interesting book and it is regretted that she does not explore the reason for stop-over more fully. The Salisbury Plain was good enough for the British and later for the Australian troops — why not in 1914? If Kitchener believed that the British Army in Egypt could handle any Turkish offensive, and he, after all, was a very knowledgeable old Egyptian hand, why did he have the A.I.F. lodged temporarily there where no facilities existed to accommodate them?
Egypt had been a problem area for Britain ever since she became involved, along with the French, in its government early in the nineteenth century. It had potentiality for agricultural prosperity, but a constant series of religious and fratricidal wars and a succession of corrupt and incompetent leaders robbed the country of any chance of stability. The British occupation, which was termed a Protectorate, provided settled government for a short time before the war, and it also provided the conditions for new nationalist leaders to emerge. The 70,000 troops who arrived from Australia, India and Britain by the end of 1914 placed strains on the local economy which naturally led to price inflation in local goods and services and a resentment by the ordinary Egyptians.

Until the two Australian Divisions left for the Gaba Tepe tragedy on 25 April 1915 the Australian troops were engaged in establishing their camps, using tents and equipment borrowed or bought locally. It was not an easy matter because Cairo did not have the economic structure to help outfit the armies of men. The leather harnesses and canvas goods made locally were far inferior to the products of the Australian Government factories and the carts that were damaged in transit were poorly repaired by local industry. The A.I.F. soon began repairing its own material with supplies from Australia, even preferring to bring tyres for the Corp's motor transport from Australia rather than purchase locally.

Keeping all these lusty Australians camped about Cairo occupied and active for fourteen hours a day taxed the resources of the Australian Army and it was not until early in 1915 that dining huts with tables and seats and lights were erected in the camps to give the men some focus for their off-duty hours. Drunkenness and whoring filled the leisure times of many diggers and Major-General Bridges reported on 15 January 1915 to the Australian Government that 470 cases of venereal disease were being treated in the isolation compound. Bridges met these problems by stricter control of the issuing of leave passes and establishing a detention centre under an Australian officer with sixteen Australian and nine New Zealand soldiers. He stopped the pay of those suffering from venereal disease, which would have caused resentment among the troops, and established courts martial which convicted men mostly for insubordination, drunkenness, breaking arrest and absent without leave.

The tougher conditions must have had some effect because by late in February Bridges was reporting that 'all ranks are acquiring the habit of obedience and more fully recognize the exact compliance with orders. This is evidence that the training is improving the discipline'. The stories about the exploits of the diggers in Cairo were flowing back to Australia, however, and the Censor's Office in Australia had to forbid newspapers publishing such stories. Bridges tried to stem newspaper reports issuing from Egypt and told the two newspaper correspondents who had travelled from Australia with the convoy that they were brought on the understanding that they would disembark in England not Egypt and that they should therefore find a ship in order to complete their journey. 'Banjo' Paterson who was the correspondent for the Sydney Morning Herald and the Melbourne Argus took the hint and headed for London, but his counterpart for the Melbourne Age and the Daily Telegraph remained to report the Cairo scene.

With 70,000 troops based in Egypt, it was not surprising that little interaction with the small European population in Egypt took place. Dr. Brugger devotes some space to explaining why the haughty English civilians and the aloof continentals had nothing to do with the Aussie diggers. The Australian officers had a little more contact, but this was very slight even though Bridges employed two French language teachers to instruct the officers. The author also devotes much space to describing the anti-social activity of the diggers in and around Cairo. The stories are legion and range from diggers overthrowing orange-sellers' street stalls to them tossing the crews off the trams and driving them pell-mell back to the terminus at the camp site. We have no explanation of this larrikin behaviour and one has difficulty in placing it alongside Dr. Bean's descriptions of the diggers as being carefully selected (with numerous rejects) from the responsible and aware members of the Australian male community.

The raids by the diggers on the Cairo brothels at Ezbekieh are described, but again little analysis is provided. The damage done must have been extensive. In the first raid early in 1915, it cost £1,700 in compensation and the payment was shared between the Australian
and New Zealand Governments. Another in July 1915, conducted entirely by the Aussies, cost more although on this occasion the Australian staff hired a local barrister because the brothel owners were retaining counsel to sue for exaggerated amounts. Explanations by other historians were that the diggers, on the first raid, learned that they were off to battle and wanted to make a final impact on the area and that when the military police were sent in firing revolvers the boys got their dandy up and began misbehaving even more. The second riot has gone unexplained. Was it that the diggers were trying to show the pimps and brothel owners that they resented seeing them exploit the ladies who actually earned the money? Was it an expression of men being unable to properly adjust to a society with more relaxed sexual morals to those they grew up with in Australia dominated as it was by wowsers and bible bashers? Does the age distribution of the A.I.F. help give a clue in this direction? Dr. Brugger unfortunately side-steps these more interesting historical questions.

The last third of the book deals with the Australians' involvement in helping to suppress an Egyptian nationalist rising early in 1919. Those Australian troops in Egypt not returned to Australia were joined with British and Gurkha troops and with aircraft to engage in a rural pacification programme. Again we are given little context for these interesting events. We are not informed whether they were demonstrations against landlordism or against the British and their system of Protectorate or whether they were inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution or were simply expressions of rural dissatisfaction which swept the Nile delta periodically. This is to be regretted because Dr. Brugger is a student of Arabic and of social anthropology and she could well have given an interesting historical context to the events.

Little has been known about Australia's involvement in this pacification programme and the author has delved in A.I.F. and War Office files to reconstruct the events. The diggers were engaged in putting down riots, restoring disrupted communications, searching for arms in the villages and distributing literature which reassured the Egyptians that British rule was best. Political speakers were watched and pamphlets containing political material were seized. This particular work was not dissimilar to what Military Intelligence had been doing back in Australia to local radicals and pacifists.

Six or seven Aussies were killed or wounded in all these operations and on one occasion a company of diggers decided on a pay-back. They collected all the men in Saft-el Molouk, which was the village nearest to where two diggers had been fired upon, but before matters went too far the local commanding General and his Political Officer appeared on the scene and to head-off a potentially nasty situation decided to hold a summary court under the existing martial law. Most of the 128 local men were judged guilty of 'withholding evidence' by the court and given twenty lashes each by the diggers. Not the best way, perhaps, of winning the local hearts and minds.

The years of World War I are acknowledged by Australian historians as being more of a social watershed than has earlier been believed. Deeper research is proceeding along various lines about the social effects of this war based on a variety of documentary sources that have become available in Australian Archives and the novel approach of Dr. Brugger in examining one small aspect of the diggers in A.I.F. is an example of these new developments. Other books, hopefully being undertaken by Australian publishers, will help us to understand better how the basic values and political attitudes of this country were formed against those significant years of World War I.

A GUIDE TO THE STUDY AND USE OF MILITARY HISTORY by John E. Jessup Jr., and Robert W. Coakley (Eds) published by the Center of Military History U. S. Army (SU. S.11 (cloth) SU. S.6.50 (paper)). 507 pp Reviewed by Brigadier M. Austin (RL) D.S.O., O.B.E., A.A.S.A.

THE overall approach of this most comprehensive work (not it should be noted dealing with historical research and writing) is along four general lines.

After dealing with the nature of military history as a discipline, its use and suggested methods of study, the essays proceed to examine the great military historians and philosophers, subsequently reviewing World and American military history from 1607 to 1945, concluding with the U.S. and World military scene since that date. The historical programmes, activities and resources of the
U.S. Army are then considered in some detail — the Military History Institute; Army art programmes; museums; unit history; the use of military history in the Army school system, and in staffwork; Army records, and finally writing for official and unofficial publication. The final part briefly scrutinizes military history outside the Army — in the Department of Defence and in other World powers — Germany, France, United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, Russia, China and Japan, and concludes by discussing the important relationship between military history and the Academies. In this regard Dr. Spector reaches a conclusion which, with exceptions is far from being reached in Australia, viz

"Military history as an academic field has experienced an impressive degree of growth and development during the past two decades. Although it has still far to go to match the more established historical specialities, one might argue that it is at least moving in the right direction and has already contributed much to our understanding of American history".

A selective bibliography accompanies each part.

From this broad description it will be seen that Part One is perhaps the most important for the Australian reader, although those who wish to study specific periods or campaigns in which the U.S. Army participated will find much to interest them in Part Two.

In Part One Maurice Matloff, the Chief Historian of the U. S. Army Center of Military History describes the nature of the historical discipline of which military history is just one part, objectively detailing how military history is just one part, objectively detailing how military history is written, its use and the changing fashions in historical interpretation. Colonel Griess, Head of the Department of History at the U.S.M.A. follows with a discussion on the scope and value of military history, from its narrow application to military doctrine (operations, administration, technical), to the broader theme of national policy and strategy, involving the relationship of the Services with social, economic, political and psychological elements. Finally Lieutenant Colonel Votaw, considers the mechanics of a study programme, instancing the development of the U. S. M. A. programme (where he was previously an instructor), of the 'thread of continuity' concept which forms a broader base of study than merely seeking out applications or otherwise of the principles of War. These 'threads' cover a wide range of enquiries from military theory and doctrine, through tactics and logistics to political, economic and social factors, and while not definitive, provide a useful tool for organizing study.

This is not a book to be read and lightly tossed aside. It is the cooperative work of many eminent military and academic scholars, and calls for close and detailed study, particularly by those embarking on a military career. It also has a clear message for those who consider the past quite irrelevant, believing the expansion of technical knowledge has consigned all past military experience in peace and war to some bureaucratic shed; those who would concentrate on the solecism that the immediate past and present only matter, and even in that minute historical framework would pay attention only to the incomprehensible shibboleth of matters of decision and policy making.

"We ignore our past and other peoples' past at our peril."


Reviewed by E. A. J. Duyker, Central Studies Establishment.

A SGHAR Khan's book is an important contribution to the existing body of work on the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. From the pen of a retired Air Marshal and a former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, it is the first retrospective appraisal of the conflict to come from a senior Pakistani military officer. Although he makes no attempt to conceal his personal patriotism, his account is refreshingly free from the Koranic hyperbole which has invariably marked similar narratives.

The foreword also merits mention since it is written by Altaf Gauhar, a former Secretary of the Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Not only does Gauhar place "The First Round" in historical context, but he contributes his own valuable analysis of the events under consideration. We are informed, for example, that the Pakistan Armed Forces never even undertook an "in camera" profes-
sional analysis of either the 1948 or 1965 conflicts and were thus doomed to repeat many of their mistakes in 1971.

Asghar Khan’s book, however, is not one for the reader seeking a blow by blow account of a major sub-continental war. It is, rather, the personal record of a man deeply anguished by lack of direct command (he had retired two weeks before the commencement of hostilities!) and of a man who sought immediately to advise, plan and negotiate on his nation’s behalf. Nevertheless, his analysis of Pakistan’s initial air-strikes against India, clearly mirrors his own role in advising President Ayub Khan and the part played in originating and planning his country’s air strategy.

One of the more startling revelations of the book is the author’s disclosure that he was kept in ignorance of “Operation Gibraltar” — Ayub Khan’s secret plan to send several thousand infiltrators, trained in guerrilla tactics, to foment an uprising in Indian occupied Kashmir. Indeed, it was precisely this operation which catalysed the war in the first place; India quickly responded by crossing the 1948 Cease Fire Line in order to seal infiltration routes. We also learn that despite the successful Pakistani attack on Chhamb — which threatened to trap the 100,000 strong Indian garrison in Kashmir — Ayub Khan, with Bhutto’s Machiavellian assurance, did not believe that India would decide the issue in the Punjab as she had consistently warned.

The total misjudgment of the Kashmir situation and the abysmal failure of attempts to spark a Kashmiri rebellion, certainly cast serious doubts on Pakistan’s planning abilities. Asghar Khan, however, hints that Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto had a much more sinister objective in backing such an aggressive move. What Bhutto did not achieve as a result of the military mistakes of 1965 he achieved as a result of the debacle of 1971, i.e., personal power.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the work is the light it sheds upon the frantic diplomatic missions the author undertook once Indian armour did, in fact, begin to roar towards the Punjabi city of Lahore. As the author roves from China to Turkey, from Turkey to Iran and then to Indonesia — in search of planes, munitions and spare parts — we gain fascinating insights into the geo-politics of the region and the personalities of its leaders. What particularly surprises an Australian reader, however, is the author’s account of (the Indonesian Naval Commander-in-Chief) Martadinata’s offer “to take over the Andaman islands” from India. Asghar Khan quotes him as saying: “... the Andaman and Nicobar islands are an extension of Sumatra and are in any case between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there?” Significantly, while Indonesia contemplated taking advantage of India’s strategic dilemma at the time, so too, Afghanistan mobilized her armed forces and menaced the disputed Pathan tribal lands of Pakistan’s North West Frontier.

When the focus of the narrative shifts from diplomacy to the conduct of the war, the author issues a number of harsh criticisms of his country’s leadership and their defensive strategy. Their restraint and lack of dynamic leadership, he argues, “caused a general paralysis in the field, made the timid commanders more timid and the bold more cautious”. Whatever the subjective parameters of Pakistan’s military strategy, Asghar Khan’s book is a notable first attempt to seriously evaluate the performance of his country at war.

While the long-standing antagonism between India and Pakistan eventually led to another war in 1971, this book is unique in the sense of pathos it achieves. Through his personal account of the (post-cease-fire) Tashkent negotiations, we learn that the author not only met India’s Lal Bahadur Shastri upon the reaching of the agreement, but literally within hours of the Indian Prime Minister’s sudden death. As Khan witnessed India and Pakistan enter a less turbulent era in their relations, however temporary, he was obviously moved by its haunting circumstances. Perhaps the course of recent Pak history (and his own detention as a political prisoner in 1977) has since led him to write that the war “appears now to have been fought for no purpose”.


Reviewed by Sub-Lieutenant J. V. P. Goldrick RAN

IT is not often that one opens a book with such pleasure and is able to come away fully satisfied. “A Century of Ships” is a
valuable addition to the published works of Australian maritime history and it is all the better for being so obviously a labour of love.

The photographs are well chosen, with literally "something for everyone". Naval, merchant and even architectural enthusiasts will all find sufficient to maintain their interest and make the book well worth the purchase. The entire work is in black and white, a wise decision in view of the cost of colour printing and one which has ensured that the book has been kept to a reasonable price.

Although the authors have not ignored old favourites of the harbour, so many photographs are completely new to the previously jaded and world weary enthusiast that the success of the book can stand on this count alone. Particular gems among the selection of warships include a beautiful shot of the battle cruiser Australia after World War I and a remarkable photograph of the harbour and eastern suburbs in the 1920s.

The development of the foreshores of Port Jackson is incidentally (though nonetheless fascinatingly) traced in the succession of photographs. One cannot help but be struck by the extent of built up areas in the present day as compared with fifty or even twenty-five years ago. Perhaps the public at large should be reminded that it has been the presence of the Services on the harbour that has done so much to preserve what remnants of the foreshores which remain in their native state.

The captions are, in general, informative and witty. The major complaint which may be made concerns the frequent lack of specific dates to photographs — certainly difficult to research, but essential nonetheless. There are errors — to name two, the battle cruiser Renown was not broken up in 1947 but after being sold in 1948, and the carrier Indefatigable was launched in 1942 not 1944 — but these are, on the whole, very minor.

Despite its recent publication, the book is already becoming increasingly difficult to find in the shops — surely a tribute to its popularity. Unless Rigby's indulge in a second and successive runs, "A Century of Ships" will become a much sought-after collector's piece.

Highly recommended for anyone with even the slightest interest in ships or the history of Sydney.


THE Second Boer War provided many of the earliest glimpses of the combination of many characteristics of twentieth century wars: the effects of machine guns, magazine rifles, and smokeless powder, the power of guerrillas with popular support and the modification of military plans because of the influence of public opinion. Would the lessons that could have been gained from this campaign have prepared the British Army better for 1914? This book provides some of the answers to this question. As Private Smith of the Black Watch wrote in 1899:

Why weren't we told of the trenches?
Why weren't we told of the wire?
Why were we marched up in column?
May Tommy Atkins inquire . . .

Mr Pakenham has produced the first one volume history of the Boer War based on manuscript and oral sources for seventy years. Though pleasantly written, this book is not simply just the narrative that Kruger's 'Goodbye Dolly Grey' is, nor is it as ponderous as the 'Times History of the War in South Africa'. The book is meticulously sourced, in part at least due to the author's command of Dutch and Afrikaans — languages he learnt to write this book. His thoroughness has unearthed significant new sources, in particular a secret journal of War Office Intelligence Department and the papers of Sir Redvers Buller hidden under a billiard table.

If the Boer War is often considered as a war of British blunders, General Sir Redvers Buller is seen as the man primarily responsible. The author has made an effort to exonerate Buller by placing his mistakes in the context of the differences between the 'Roberts Ring' and the 'Wolseley Ring' and comparing his errors with those made by Kitchener. Whilst a balanced view is provided, I feel that this will not be the final word.

It is as a humanist that Mr Pakenham excels. Here is the first account of the war that considers the role of the black population and its atrocious treatment by those of both sides who considered it a 'Gentlemen's War'. The book provides a strident criticism of Kitchener's role in ignoring the conditions in concentration camps when they were first set up.