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Illustrations by members of the Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick.

Printed and published for the Department of Defence, Canberra, by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne.

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed, double spacing, on one side of the paper and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:

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Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

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Fremantle Glass Patrol Boat

(Defence Public Relations)
THE Royal Australian Air Force has provided two Iroquois helicopters to assist with a census being conducted by the Papua New Guinea Government. The helicopters are from No. 9 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force Base Amberley, Queensland. They will operate from Mendi and Tari in the southern highlands. Their task will be to transport members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force engaged in carrying out the census in remote areas. During their stay in Papua New Guinea the helicopters will also be engaged in a training programme.

I would like to extend my personal thanks and best wishes to Mrs Gwen Lawless, who, after fifteen years as a Public Servant, has retired. Mrs Lawless was the Supervisor in charge of the Typing Pool in Building C at Russell. She has been extremely helpful during this, my first year as Editor of the Defence Force Journal. Gwen and her husband will be living in Molymook on the South Coast of New South Wales. On behalf of the ladies of the Typing Pool I wish them both a long and happy retirement.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome Betty Martin who replaces Gwen as Supervising Typist. Betty was previously Supervisor in charge of the Typing Pool in Building F Russell.

On the subject of typing, I have received a number of hand-written, and a few almost unreadable, photocopies of manuscripts. It would be greatly appreciated if all manuscripts could be typed, double space, leaving a 3 cm margin on each side of the page. Pages should be numbered. I do not have my own typist and the ladies of the typing pool are much too busy to undertake tasks such as retyping manuscripts.

The keel has been laid for the Royal Australian Navy’s new underway replenishment ship at the Vickers Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney Harbour. The ship will replace the present Fleet oiler, HMAS Supply and is scheduled for delivery in 1983. The Minister for Defence, Mr Killen announced that the new ship would be named HMAS Success.
THE EQUITY OF CONSCRIPTION

Dear Sir,

To briefly prolong what is becoming an academic argument on Captain Nicholson's article 'The Equity of Conscription' (DFJ No. 15 Mar/Apr 79) and to support Lieutenant Colonel Summers reply, I must comment on John's answer to the good Colonel in DFJ No. 21 Mar/Apr 80.

Colonel Summer's contention that equity of conscription depends on how and how long it is applied cannot be destroyed by argument that "it (conscription) imposes a regressive tax on a minority regardless of which system is being considered." "Indeed, universal conscription practised indefinitely, (the how and how long) as is the case in several countries of both East and West, automatically ensures that all sections of a society at some point in life share the same experience".

Neither can it be argued that "an all volunteer force, financed by those who pay taxes is equitable and efficient". That it is "equitable" might be the case if we all paid tax on a common scale, but that is not the case in this country. And anyway, why should those not taxed not share the common burden? We all live in the same life raft don't we? That an all volunteer force is necessarily more "efficient" because it is volunteer is not only irrelevant but could provide endless hours of quite unproductive debate.

Yours faithfully,
J. E. Dean
Major

AUTHORS REPLY

Dear Sir,

In reply I would ask Major Dean his own question, "... why should those not taxed not share the common burden?" The answer is simply that they should not. With an all volunteer Army the burden is shared, whereas with conscription it is isolated to a small minority.

In one form or another everybody pays taxes. The amount they pay will be closely correlated with their levels of wealth and income, and similarly the benefits they derive from the existence of the nation's defence force will also be correlated to their wealth and income. This is the case providing we assume that the individual’s income elasticity of demand for public goods is positive, i.e. As an individual’s income goes up, his demand for the good also goes up. There is considerable evidence to support this argument.

That conscription imposes a tax on those conscripted cannot be denied. That it also imposes costs on society as a whole equally cannot be denied. Whilst the latter may not be as tangible as the former, their existence is quite definable. (Refer to my original paper). Consideration of all alternative taxation methods in order to achieve a desired goal theoretically should be based on the relative efficiencies of the proposed policies (empirically it would appear that it’s more likely to be based on the political ramifications of such a policy — an unfortunate reflection on our society).

Even if "universal conscription" was a reality, (the existence of which has never been evident in Australia) it does not follow that it is the most efficient solution. If the resultant total costs to society are greater than the budgetary costs of an all volunteer force, (and there is considerable evidence that this is so) then conscription cannot be defended on economic grounds and proponents must rely on naive argument of what is “best” for society.

Finally I ask yet again. What is so inherently different about defence that we have to consider compulsion? Certainly our state of military preparedness is vital to our future security, but is not the level of crime in this country also cause for concern? What about the fact that many hospitals are severely understaffed? And prisons need more prison officers? What do we do? Conscript? I hope not.

Yours sincerely,
John Nicholson
Captain
"The Forgotten War in North Russia"

Dear Sir,

Thank you very much for the copies of the D.F. journal, Issue No. 22, that you forwarded to my son. They were greatly appreciated.

The article by Mr P. Burness on the above subject was both factual and interesting.

Of course, my connection with the campaign ceased when I was wounded in August 1919 and evacuated to England on the Naval Hospital Ship "Garth Castle", thence to Netley Military Hospital, near Southampton, from where I was discharged on the 16th March 1920.

Under instructions from A.I.F. Headquarters in Australia, I reported to Aust. H.Qtrs in Horseferry Rd, London, and on the same day was re-enlisted in the A.I.F., being completely reinstated as if I had never left it. This was owing to my parents objecting to my being discharged in England to join the Russian Relief Force when still a minor, being just over 18½ when I left Australia in August 1918. Therefore, I could have been the last man to join the 1st A.I.F.

After further hospital treatment in Caulfield Military Hospital in Melbourne, I was finally discharged on 1st October 1920.

Again thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
W. J. ROBINSON

MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA

Dear Sir,

The Military Historical Society of Australia will celebrate its silver jubilee in 1981. Created in 1956, the society retains its effective aims of fostering interest in Australia’s military past, providing assistance and support for historical research and acting as a focal point for military historians and militaria collectors throughout Australia.

At present, members include many representatives of the Defence community ranging from retired Generals to civil service typistes. The spectrum of members’ interests is just as broad and includes uniforms, weapons, badges, memorabilia and even restored military vehicles. The more dedicated historians in the society can advise you with eloquent authority on any number of military topics. Indeed, for the newcomer to the society, these people are an invaluable aid when it comes to research for an unusual acquisition to your collection.

Membership of the society permits enthusiasts, collectors and historians to meet others with similar interests at regular monthly meetings. Many of the meetings are addressed by guest speakers who are experts in their field and add to a member’s overall knowledge of military history. Of major benefit to the society members is the quarterly journal "Sabretache", a high quality publication which includes many authoritative articles on a wide range of subjects and updates members’ access to society news, trade discounts and members’ swap offers.

The society also has access to a wide range of military publications some of which are published by the society as a result of a member’s research activities, for example “Gallant and Distinguished Service – Vietnam” by Major Ian Barnes of the Geelong Branch.

B. M. ROGERS
Flight Lieutenant

P.S. If you wish to become a member of the society or would like further information about its activities please contact your nearest branch secretary:

ACT: B. Rogers, 14 Karney Street, Kambah, ACT 2902.
QLD: S. Wigzell, 17 Royal Street, Alexandra Hills, Qld 4170.
SA: K. Stanley, 40 Deborah Gve, Modbury, Nth SA, 5092.
WA: P. Shaw, 37 Coomeoora Road, Booragoon, WA 6154.
GEELOG: J. Maljers, 4 Stork Ave, Belmont, Vic. 3216.
ALBURY/WODONGA: R. Willshire, Creek St, Jindera, NSW 2640.
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS

COUNTER ARMOUR OPERATIONS

By
Major P. M. Coleman
Royal Australian Armoured Corps

I wish to preach the simple rules
We preach in anti-tank
Although they are not often taught
In rhyming verse or blank.

The first important rule to learn
If knowledge you desire,
Is always hit him in the flank —
And never frontal fire.
(For it is quite the usual thing
To face the way you run,
And if you shoot him in the flank
He will not see the gun.)

But shooting tankers in the flank
Is only one trap laid;
To solve the school solution you
Must find some defilade —
By which I mean that you must try
To site the b...g...gun
So that the tanks behind the one
You've hit, won't see the fun.

Now if you choose to site the gun
Upon a forward slope,
You'll never live to tell the tale;
There's not the slightest hope.
For all the OP's for miles around
Will spot you pretty quick —
A ranging round upon the ground
Then bags and bags of stick!

So if you'll take a tip from me
And live to fight again —
You'll bank your hopes on rear of slopes
And save the lives of men.

Lt-Col G. D. W. Court, MC
Royal Artillery
(Extract from “Hard Pounding” 1946)

INTRODUCTION

It began at first light on 15 September, 1916, with the advance of a solitary tank D1, under the command of Captain H. W. Mortimore, along the eastern outskirts of Delville Wood. Mortimore's advance was, in a way, prophetic of the tanks' progress in future battles — the balance of his success just outweighing failure. His tank reached its objective and took prisoner a number of German infantry, but it might have done more had not a shell hit the starboard sponson, killing two of the crew and breaking the track. The whole operation may well have met with greater success had Mortimores' superiors...
followed "Notes on the employment of tanks" issued by Swinton in February, 1916, which stressed the tank’s vulnerability to artillery fire and the need for his machines to co-operate with artillery and infantry.

WORLD WAR I

On 9 April, 1917, 26 tanks attacked the Hindenburg Line at Arras. Although not designed to be tank proof its deep belts of wire and ditches, closely co-ordinated machine-gun nests (firing armour piercing bullets) and skilfully located field-guns all combined to canalize, hamper and finally kill the slow moving tanks. Tanks were defeated again on 16 April at Chemin des Dames. The Germans, forewarned of the attack, let 180 French tanks enter a trap. A wilderness of shell holes and deep trenches, especially widened, was sufficient to defeat those early machines.

In April 1918, just 19 months after the historic action by D1, the Germans introduced the first anti-tank gun, the 13 mm Tankgewehr 18. The fight against the tank had begun in earnest.

WORLD WAR II AND THE 1973 ARAB/ISRAELI WAR

"In this year, 1929, I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance (sic). My historical studies, the exercises carried out in England and our own experiences with mock-ups had persuaded me that tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until the other weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and cross-country performance."  

Guderian, the architect of the blitzkrieg, studied the writings of Hart and Fuller and appreciated the need for co-operation between tanks, infantry and artillery. British experts, however, ignored the lessons of Cambrai and Amiens. They did not stress the need for all arms co-operation and as a result British theories of armoured warfare tended to swing in favour of the "all tank" concept. Britain entered the war ten years behind Germany in the development of tank, and consequently anti-tank, concepts.

Field Marshal Lord Wilson has described his efforts to train the 7 Armoured Division in Egypt in 1939-40 thus:

"In the training of the Armoured Division I stressed the need of full co-operation of all arms in battle. One had to check a pernicious doctrine which had grown up in recent years, aided by certain civilian writers, that tank units were capable of winning an action without the assistance of other arms... the chief agents in debunking this and many other fallacies of our pre-war pundits were the Germans."

So it was in the Western Desert, in late 1941, on the eve of CRUSADER that General Gott told his troops that the battle would be a "tank commanders' battle. No tank commander will go far wrong if he places his gun within hitting range of the enemy". Gott's commanders did as he wished, but by placing themselves within hitting range of the enemy they courted destruction by German anti-tank guns. In one action four 88 mm anti-tank guns decimated the attack of 7 Armoured Brigade; the other Brigades of 7 Armoured Division fared little better.

After the battle, in an analysis in which he attempted to draw lessons from CRUSADER, Gott wrote:

"The German will not commit himself to tank versus tank battle as such. In every phase of battle he co-ordinates the action of his anti-tank guns, field artillery and infantry with his tanks, and he will not be drawn from this policy."

It had become fundamental to the British method of fighting to virtually rely on tanks alone; they failed to make use of their field artillery and regarded the anti-tank gun as a defensive weapon.

A German panzer division, on the other hand, was a highly flexible formation of all arms which relied on artillery both in attack and in defence. Rommel's panzer groups were quite clear that whereas tanks dealt primarily with the enemy's infantry and soft vehicles, the destruction of the enemy armour was mainly the job of weapons designed for just that purpose, the anti-tank gun.

Although this theory was put into practice it was not at the expense of a further fundamental feature of German tactical doctrine — close and permanent integration of tank, gun and infantry teams. "... With our twelve anti-tank guns we leap-frogged from one vantage point to another, whilst our panzers, stationary and hull down if possible, provided protective fire. Then
we would establish ourselves to give them protective fire whilst they swept on again.”

So the British dashed themselves against the tank, gun and artillery of the Africa Corps, ultimately to learn, and finally to successfully apply themselves, the principles and techniques of combined arms operations. Principles that had been espoused by Hart and Fuller since the early 1920’s and so devastatingly employed by their German disciples.

In the Yom Kippur War, not 600 km to the east, Israelis charged with unsupported tanks into the missile defence of the Arabs, forgetting the lessons so bloodily learned by the British 29 years earlier. The Egyptians in their turn were also to rediscover another fundamental tactical truth; that a defence that is overly dependent on any one weapon, in this case the missile, will ultimately fail.

The Israelis quickly recast their tactics to integrate infantry into their tank formations, and to employ covering fire to suppress the Sagger and RPG7. Thereafter the tide of battle turned. “On the modern battlefield the tank has no independent, practical and effective answer to the long range anti-tank missile. On the other hand the anti-tank missile has no practical way to fight an artillery battery pouring fire on it. The artillery has only a very limited answer to the plane attacking its position . . . It is a vicious circle. We must get used to the fact that there is no longer any weapons system on the battlefield that has such a big advantage over other systems that it does not need to be employed with other weapons systems.” At longer ranges “the tank has lost its superiority as an anti-tank weapon to the long-range missile and in the future will lose it to the anti-tank artillery.”

Whether it be the Mark I Mother or the XM1, the Tankgewehr 18 or the TOW, the fundamental principles of the employment of, and the defence against, armour have not changed since Captain Mortimore’s advance at Delville Wood. Our challenge for the future is our ability to draw the lessons from the past and apply them to current tactics and technology.

AIM
The aim of this article is to postulate a concept of counter-armour operations for the Australian Army in a mid and high intensity conflict.

DISCUSSION
I have used the term “counter-armour” as opposed to “anti-tank” or “anti-armour”. I believe that the term anti-armour brings to mind pictures of a man in a foxhole with his bazooka, gritting his teeth and “carrying on”. Most seem to automatically adopt the defensive phase of war when considering anti-armour operations. This defensive attitude is likely due to a combination of factors:

a. historical conditioning,
b. uncertainty as to how to handle the situation, and
c. the term itself.

The first we can do nothing about, except draw from its lessons. The second is the topic of this article. The third can be easily rectified.

We do not refer to air-defence as anti-air, nor counter-bombardment as anti-artillery, yet it could be argued that both weapon systems present just as big a threat on the battlefield as tanks. Armoured-defence, like air-defence, is an all arms responsibility that, if we are to be successful, must be conducted in all phases of war. Anti-armour weapons are to “counter-armour” what anti-aircraft weapons are to “air-defence”: the tool required to execute the operation.

“Counter-armour” is a term better suited to all phases of war and is less likely to produce a defensive frame of mind.

I plan to discuss the subject of counter-armour operations under the following headings:

a. the threat,
b. current technology,
c. the tank,
d. missile versus gun and
e. a concept for Australia.

THE THREAT
“Some recent wars between small nations have developed intensities formerly considered to be only within the capabilities of large nations. It must, therefore, be assumed in planning to meet possible and more serious threats of the future, that enemy forces will be equipped with modern weapons . . . improved tactical mobility through developments in tanks, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery and rapid gap crossing facilities.”
Any power considering offensive operations in Australia will require an industrial infrastructure capable of mounting and sustaining operations over very long strategic and tactical distances. Such an operation could only be successfully undertaken by a nation with, or supported by, such an industrial capacity.

It is fatuous to suggest that such an invasion force would be predominantly infantry. Obviously the landed force by dint of its mission, the Australian environment and the sophistication of the industrial base required to mount and sustain such an undertaking, will be technically sophisticated and highly mobile.

A study of the divisional organizations of industrialized countries shows that the traditional "infantry" division has all but disappeared. With the exception of specialist formations (airborne, airmobile, commando) divisions structured for mobile operations are now mostly "armoured" or "mechanized". Both have large numbers of AFV; differences are more a matter of grouping dictated by mission.

**ARMOURED DIVISION**

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>WGER</th>
<th>BRIT.</th>
<th>FRA.</th>
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**MECHANIZED DIVISION**

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Combust and combat support arms are both mounted. The battlefield is awash with command vehicles, tanks, APC, self-propelled artillery, tank destroyers, tracked air-defence weapons and armoured bridgelayers; as well as various combat engineer and maintenance and recovery vehicles. (Indeed it is the fulfilment of Guderian's dream).

Firepower and manoeuvre are the basic elements of combat power. The ability to destroy AFV is now a major part of the combat power equation.

If we intend to take seriously our mission of defending the Australian mainland we must accept, and plan to meet, a realistic threat. “The army will require good tactical mobility to fight a fluid mobile battle in the extensive areas over which the battle could range.” If we are to be successful on the battlefield we will also need the ability to defeat large numbers of AFV. We should equip and organize accordingly.

**CURRENT TECHNOLOGY**

The last ten years has seen significant developments in the field of anti-armour weapons, both in their lethality and in their mode of delivery. Such weapons have the potential to substantially influence the techniques and effectiveness of counter armour operations.

A few of the more significant developments are:

a. **Artillery**

(1) **Cannon Launched Guided Projectile (CLGP)**

(a) The CLGP, or Copperhead, system consists of a 155 mm laser guided round and a laser designator operated by a Forward Observer (FO). The round weighs about 135 pounds and carries a HEAT warhead. A laser seeker is fitted in the nose.

(b) In operation the Copperhead flies ballistically to the target area where it detects the energy reflected by the laser designator. The round's guidance system then manoeuvres the round onto the target. (Diagram 1)

(c) The Copperhead can be fired from the standard 155 mm self-propelled or towed howitzer which means that every 155 mm within a range of 12-15 km will be able to concentrate its anti-tank fire on a given area.

(d) Like all high technology weapons, however, Copperhead has its limitations. Skillful use of ground by the tanks, combined with battlefield obfuscation, will limit the “designation” time available to the observer. Laser sensing devices will warn crew commanders who may well be able to take evasive action beyond the manoeuvre capabilities of the missile, or suppress the source of designation.
The high unit cost ($10,000) combined with the physical limitation of the observer to designate only one target at a time will limit the practical employment of the weapon to one gun firing per observer.

(c) However, sensibly and skilfully employed the Copperhead should take a heavy toll of key vehicles (command vehicles, bridge-layers etc) before the armour reaches the range of our direct fire weapons. It offers a new dimension to field artillery in that, for the first time since World War I, artillery is capable of destroying rather than just harassing or neutralising tanks. (Diagram 2)

(b) Despite the fact that the mines will be above ground, and will be unlikely to be large enough to “knock out” a tank, when mixed with smoke and VT they will certainly have the capacity to disable, and by doing to disrupt and slow the enemies momentum, thus presenting excellent targets for Copperhead and FGA.

b. Thermal Night Sights

(1) Thermal imaging, the third generation of night observation devices, or as it is sometimes known Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR), provides the ability to see, in real time, in total darkness.

(2) Thermal devices are currently being produced for the XM1 tank, the Leopard Two and the TOW missile system. Thermal imagery can penetrate smoke, haze, thin foliage and camouflage under most circumstances. It will give armour, and anti-armour, the ability to fight more effectively at night.
c. Attack Helicopter (AH)

Although not a new concept by any means the NATO countries and the Soviets are convinced that there is a place on the battlefield for helicopter borne anti-armour systems. The AH should not be expected to go forward and hunt tanks but should be integrated into the overall anti-armour plan. It is especially suited to counter unexpected penetration whilst ground forces manoeuvre and, as such, is a valuable asset in any counter-armour plan.

d. Fighter Ground Attack (FGA)

FGA play an important role in the combined arms battle as our first line of defence against the enemy armour. Counter-armour operations are liable to be hazardous and costly in aircraft. Aircraft, if they are to survive, will need to move in low and fast and deliver their weapons with pinpoint accuracy. There have been, and are continuing to be significant developments in the area of air delivered anti-armour weapons. Some of these are:

(1) First Echelon. Air attacks against the enemy first echelon armour will be most effective if conducted whilst the enemy is concentrated for an attack or whilst passing through defiles, minefields or gaps. FGA will not have the ability to seriously deplete the enemy first echelon without themselves suffering debilitating losses.

The Maverick missile is laser guided and is especially suited, in conjunction with FO's, for the destruction of those key vehicles in the enemy first echelon, the loss of which will cause the most disruption.

(2) Second Echelon. In order to deplete the second echelon armour as it concentrates prior to battle the USAF is currently developing a new family of Wide Area Anti-Armour Munitions (WAAM). WAAM's will be delivered from tactical aircraft flying at very low altitudes across or around the FEBA into the enemy second echelon area. Four weapons concepts are currently being considered. They will utilise a new generation of warheads to defeat advanced types of armour. They are:

(a) Anti-Armour Cluster Munitions,
(b) Dual Role Attack Weapons,
(c) Cyclops,
(d) Wide Area Special Projectile.

THE TANK

The characteristics of the tank are well known, however, recent technological improvements have markedly improved its fighting effectiveness and its ability to survive.

a. Mobility. The last few years have seen significant improvements in tank engines and suspensions. The horsepower to weight ratio has trebled when comparing XM1 to Centurion. This power when combined with automatic transmissions allows the tank to maintain a high speed over relatively rough terrain thus reducing its exposure time between bounds.

b. Protection. The successful development and imminent deployment of tanks fitted with special armour will have a profound effect on counter-armour operations. (XM1, Leopard Two, T80 and Shir Iran version of the Chieftan). Special armour is a composition of steel, ceramics, glass and glass contained explosives. The British Ministry of Defence claim that their Chobham armour, one of the first special armours to be developed, is proof against all known chemical energy munitions (HEP, HESH, HEAT) and also provides a high degree of protection against kinetic energy rounds. (APDS, APFSDS)

c. Firepower. Thermal night sights, laser range-finders, computers, automatic loaders and improved ammunition have all contributed to a significant increase in the firepower and the accuracy of the tank gun. Soviet T62 are reported to have been retrofitted with a combined laser
rangefinder and target illuminator, the latter to be used to designate targets for the seven km range laser aiming anti-tank missile; (AT6) tube launched from the HIND-D helicopter.\(^\text{17}\)

The main effect of these improvements will be an overall increase in tank effectiveness, its almost complete immunity to chemical energy warheads and its reduced vulnerability to kinetic energy rounds. The larger ATGW such as HOT, TOW and Swingfire should still be able to penetrate the sides and rear of the vehicle where the armour is thinner, but it is unlikely that smaller weapons such as M72, Carl Gustave, Dragon or Milan will have any effect.\(^\text{18}\)

The development of depleted uranium core APFSDS and improved chemical energy rounds will restore the balance, however, the short term (four to five years) loss of the ATGW and smaller HEAT weapons as an effective tank killer will, with the exception of the high velocity gun, leave us virtually defenceless against the latest, or retrofitted, tanks with special armour.

**MISSILE VERSUS GUN**

Improvements in tank armour and the subsequent increase in calibre, velocity and size of gun required to penetrate that armour has shifted the emphasis of infantry armour defecting weapons away from the battalion anti-tank gun to the lighter and more portable missile. The last 10-15 years have seen a significant increase in the number and type of anti-armour missile; missiles that vary from the individual light anti-armour weapon (LAW) to the long-range crew served long-range anti-armour weapon. (LRAW). I intend to restrict my remarks mainly to the gun and the medium and long-range missile.

**The Defence**

a. In defence the long-range anti-armour missile has a theoretically high hit probability. (For the TOW missile firing from a static position the detection to kill ratio is in the order of 98\%). However, studies have shown that the possibility of the crew detecting a target for the time necessary to track and engage successfully decreases, as with all direct fire weapons, dramatically with range. (Fig 1)

b. As can be seen in Fig 1 the missile has a high hit probability with targets that can be detected and tracked for the time required, but due to battlefield obscuration, ground and enemy tactics the detection rate is a good deal below the 98\% hit capability of the missile.

c. At shorter ranges the Leopard, with better optics, has a higher detection rate than the TOW but because of the gun characteristics the kill rate drops off over 1,500 metres. (Fig 2)

d. Both weapons when unsuppressed complement each other, the missile having greater accuracy over the longer ranges. (Fig 3)
TOW-DETECTION/KILL PROBABILITY
(DEFENDING UNSUPPRESSED)

Figure 1
(Note: The low kill rate in the first 600 meters of flight is the period when the crew is "gathering-in" the missile)

LEOPARD DETECTION/KILL PROBABILITY
(DEFENDING-UNSUPPRESSED)

Figure 2
When both are suppressed the tank, because of its armoured protection, maintains a higher detection to kill ratio than the TOW at the shorter ranges. The obvious solution is to maximize the characteristics of both weapons. That is, if possible, to have the Leopard engaging whilst suppressed, the TOW whilst unsuppressed. (Fig 4)

This theory is reinforced by the findings of a war game study conducted at the United States Naval College Centre for Advanced Research:19 "The TOW and tank were a particularly complementary and deadly defensive team ... Most often, commanders place TOW Platoons approximately 1,000 metres behind the tank Platoons. Depending on intervisibility, this allowed the TOW's and tanks to open fire simultaneously with the TOW's firing at 2,200 to 3,000 metres and the tanks firing at 1,500 to 2,200 metres. The tanks at the nearer range attracted most, if not all, of the Soviet direct fire while the TOW's received little or no fire and could track their missiles with little distraction ... Then as the Soviet battalion closed to within effective range of the T62's the M60 Platoons backed into total defilade and allowed the TOW's at greater ranges to complete the destruction of the Soviet Battalion."

At shorter ranges the superiority of the gun over the medium-range anti-armour missile is overwhelming and when suppressed in battle the effectiveness of the shorter range missiles is severely reduced. (Fig 5)

The U.S. Naval Research study also found that Dragon and tanks were complementary at the shorter ranges, but that the combined rate of fire of TOW and Dragon, without tank support, was not sufficient to prevent the enemy from over-running their position. Additionally the smaller infantry anti-armour weapons (M72, Dragon) could not be moved around the battlefield quickly enough to be employed against an armoured breakthrough.

The Attack. In the advance and attack the accuracy of the missile is further reduced. TOW has a very low hit probability whilst moving
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS

LEOPARD-SUPPRESSED DEFENDING
TOW-UNSUPPRESSED DEFENDING

Figure 4

LEOPARD COMPARISON
WITH SHORT RANGE ANTI ARMOUR WEAPONS
DEFENDING SUPPRESSED

Figure 5
and in its present configuration it is not capable of firing on the move whilst under suppressive fire. The smaller man-portable weapons have no ability to fire on the move and like infantry in the open are affected by suppressive fire.

In the advance, and certainly in the attack, it will not always be possible to pick the fire position that gives the missile protection whilst allowing it to engage at its most effective range. Detection and kill rates will, therefore, be lower than they would be in prepared defensive positions. (Fig 6)

The missile then, far from being the panacea for all our counter-armour problems also has many other practical limitations:

a. The relatively slow time of flight out to 3,000 metres (17 seconds for TOW) means that a vehicle moving at 40 kph will have travelled nearly 200 metres during the missiles flight. Wire guided missiles cannot be fired through falling artillery or trees, or over high fences and power lines. The skilful use of ground and obstacles by AFV, combined with rapid and erratic movement whilst exposed, all lessen the chances of a successful engagement.

b. The U.S. Centre for Advanced Research also found that many TOW weapons will expend their basic load, of ten rounds, before the battle against a first echelon tank regiment is complete. Compared to conventional munitions missiles are complex and expensive, (TOW $4,000 each), and even if available in unlimited numbers the weight of fire of missiles, without gun or counter-armour artillery support, is insufficient to halt an attack before the missiles' positions themselves are suppressed and overwhelmed.

c. Missiles with HEAT warheads, minimum ranges, back blast danger areas and wire guidance have severe limitations within built-up areas. In this situation there is a need for a rapid firing gun of high velocity with the ability to punch through walls and knock out tanks at close range.

d. Whereas the tactical employment of the medium-range missile (1,500 metres) is in harmony with the normal grouping and disposition of an infantry battalion, both the Soviet Union with the BMP/Sagger and the U.S. Army in Europe with the M113AI/TOW, are finding that the longer range weapons are not compatible with the role of the infantry. In the
defence the missile requires clear lines of fire and observation out to 3,000 metres so that it may, whilst in a reverse slope and defilade position, be used to engage the enemy at maximum range from the flank. In the advance and attack the missile carriers need to be constantly redeployed to apply their firepower against the main enemy armoured threat. Both actions should ideally take place at ranges in excess of 2,000 metres.

On the other hand, the anti-tank gun required for both FIBUA and close battlefield engagement of enemy armour, in order to be effective (at 1,000 metres) against tanks with improved armour, will need to be of very high velocity (5,000 fps) and at least 105 mm in diameter. It follows that such a large gun, if it is to be responsive to the battle and capable of surviving, will need to be self-propelled and armoured protected.

Summary. Before advancing my concept for counter-armour operations I will summarize my argument so far. It is:

a. that a hostile force landed in Australia will contain large numbers of AFV's,
b. that counter-armour operations will be conducted in all phases of war,
c. that the best counter-armour plan is one based on a comprehensive combined arms team,
d. that both guns and missiles are necessary and complementary,
e. that infantry units must have the ability to defend themselves against armour but are not anti-armour units, and
f. that we need to adapt our organizations and tactics to take cognisance of the changes in armoured vehicles and anti-armoured weapons.

CONCEPT FOR COUNTER-ARMOUR OPERATIONS

a. Concept. As a doctrinal base our infantry division must be organized and equipped so that it can defeat a mechanized brigade. Similarly a mechanized division should be able to defeat an armoured brigade..

b. The Counter-Armour Plan. The counter-armour plan must be based on a matrix of mutually supporting guns, missiles, mines and obstacles all dedicated to canalizing, disrupting, slowing and finally destroying the enemy armour. Diagramatically the plan will appear as follows:
This matrix is obviously far removed from the weapons which are currently held within, or available to, the infantry division.

The divisional commander is most likely to retain control of his tank regiment. Brigades, therefore, should not rely on tanks to form the basis of their counter-armour plan. Indeed, even if they were to be allocated for a specific task they should be superimposed so that their sudden withdrawal, for instance for redeployment or to the divisional counter attack, would not decimate the Brigade plan.

In view of the portrayed threat a similar situation applies in the case of a mechanized division. (Assuming at this point that an armoured division is beyond our resources). The tank regiments of the mechanized brigades may well be engaged on flanking, enveloping or reserve missions, most likely supported by one of the battalions, leaving the brigade base open to attack by armour. This will be particularly so in defence when the tank regiments form the basis of the counter penetration and counter-attack force.

Both mechanized and infantry divisions, therefore, must be structured so that their armoured units are free to manoeuvre without destroying the anti-armour credibility of the formation. Both divisions require a basic counter-armour capability independent of their tank elements.

A suggested scale of anti-armour resources within, and available to, the division is:

a. Brigade
   (1) Infantry battalion:
       (a) section: M72 per man,
       (b) platoon: 84 mm Carl Gustav,
       (c) company: two MRAW, and
       (d) battalion: 16 MRAW.
   (2) Counter-armour squadron:
       (a) Gun tp: eight 105 mm anti-tank guns, and
       (b) Missile tp: eight LRAW.

b. Division
   (1) Counter-armour squadron,
   (2) Attack helicopter squadron (as part of the divisional aviation regiment),
   (3) Four medium artillery regiments capable of delivering Copperhead and RDM,
   (4) One general support rocket regiment capable of delivery RDM, and
   (5) Engineers as presently allotted.

c. Armour Tanks and APC depending on the type of division.

d. Air Supporting FGA to deliver both PGM and WAAM weapons.

Counter-Armour Squadron

a. One of the main features of this concept is a manoeuvre unit at both brigade and divisional level specifically designed to destroy armour.

b. The counter-armour squadron is based on a combination of mutually supporting guns and missiles which, working in conjunction with other arms have the ability to locate enemy armour by day or night and to manoeuvre regardless of the air situation. The squadron has integral FO’s to provide anti-armour artillery support and a security troop to protect the guns from short range anti-armour weapons.

c. A suggested organization for such a unit is:
   (1) Organization (See page 19)
   (2) Role: to destroy enemy armour
   (3) Allocation: four per division

d. The squadron would be fought by the squadron commander and would deploy tactically in four troop/groups, each group consisting of:
   (1) two 105 mm anti-tank guns,
   (2) two LRAW,
   (3) one LLAD,
   (4) one RADAR, and
   (5) One Inf sect.

Counter-Armour Operations

a. The counter-armour operation begins with FGA delivering WAAM weapons deep into the enemy rear area to destroy his second echelon armour in hides and harbour areas before it can move to influence the battle.

b. If the ground is suitable and the opportunity presents itself the enemy first echelon armour should also be attacked by FGA. Such operations are liable to be costly in aircraft and would need to be carefully considered to ensure their cost effectiveness. These attacks should be directed against command and specialist vehicles when concentrated in FUP’s, assemble areas, defiles and gaps.
c. General Support Rocket Regiments (GSRS) acting on information received from screens, reconnaissance units and aircraft may fire RDM to seal gaps and block defiles. The RDM is the longest range weapon under the divisional commanders control with which he can significantly affect the enemy armour.

d. Artillery observers well forward with screens, covering troops and advance guards, armed with laser designators and supported by medium artillery firing Copperhead, will be well placed to commence the detailed destruction of command, headquarters and specialist vehicles and may operate as part of, or in co-ordination with, the brigade counter-armour squadron.

e. The brigade headquarters is the lowest practical level at which counter-armour operations can be executed. The speed of the modern AFV combined with sophisticated communications gives the armoured commander the ability to rapidly change the direction and emphasis of his thrust. A carefully co-ordinated and skilfully timed and executed plan is a fundamental prerequisite for success.

f. The primary task of the brigade counter-armour squadron is to destroy the enemy tanks and to separate them from their supporting infantry. The squadron should be manoeuvred by the brigade commander so that, like artillery, its entire weight may be switched to the point of decision. The FO’s of the squadron will move with each troop/group supplementing the guns and missiles of the squadron with anti-armour artillery fire. The enemy may be further disrupted if these fires are augmented with RDM, smoke and VT.

g. The infantry battalions perform a vital function in the counter-armour plan by forming the pivot around which the counter-armour battle is fought. The battalions must be able to withstand direct and sustained attack from tanks and mounted infantry whilst the armour battle is being decided. Once the enemy tanks are defeated it will be the task of the infantry to complete the detailed destruction of the enemy. For this role the battalions will need to be equipped with large numbers of short and medium range anti-armour weapons to destroy his remaining tanks and APC/MICV.

h. The divisional counter-armour squadron would, when grouped with the attack helicopter squadron, tanks and infantry form a powerful reserve or counter attack/penetration force.

Counter-Armour Operations In The Advance

a. With Tanks. Tanks when allotted, or even when organic to the brigade, are unlikely
(With the "step forward" technique the shorter range weapons advance under the protection of the long range missiles until they reach the limit of the supporting weapons effective range. The supporting weapon then "steps forward". The whole technique is supported by Anti-armour artillery. AH may secure the flanks and FGA attack the enemy in depth).

to be available in such numbers that they will, of their own volition, be able to destroy all the enemy armour. Brigades, therefore, must:

(1) advance with well balanced battle groups supported by a tank based reserve, and

(2) advance so that their anti-armour weapons are mutually supporting and each is engaging at its most effective range. This is best accomplished with the "step forward" technique. (See diagram 5)

b. **Without Tanks** When advancing without tanks the brigade commander must make an assessment of the most likely armoured threat and place his counter-armour squadron accordingly. Battalions when contacting armour must stand firm whilst the squadron manoeuvres. The squadron may either:

(1) reinforce the battalion and attempt to hold and destroy as much armour as possible pending divisional manoeuvre, or

(2) establish itself to the rear or flank of the battalion and, using
the technique so successfully employed by the Africa Corps, have the battalion draw the enemy into a prepared killing ground where, once halted, they may be attacked by the division.

Counter-Armour In The Attack
a. In the attack tanks and infantry should assault together with artillery FO's moving well forward in the assault echelon to engage defending armour with Copperhead.
b. FGA, if available, should be used to destroy depth echelons and to disrupt enemy counter penetration/attack forces.
c. The brigade counter-armour squadron, from a supporting position, may engage the defending armour with guns and missiles and interdict the counter penetration force. At the completion of the assault phase the squadron must move quickly into a position from which it can defeat, assisted by anti-armour artillery fire, the enemy counter attack force.
d. The divisional counter-armour and attack helicopter squadrons are an excellent combination to secure a flank. (See Diagram 6)

Counter-Armour In The Defence. It is in the defence that the full range of anti-armour weapons can be co-ordinated with devastating effect.
a. The divisional counter-armour squadron, supported by tanks, FGA, AH and anti-armour artillery should commence its operations as far forward as possible, even forward of the screen position if the ground is suitable.
b. As the screen withdraws the counter-armour battle should continue back by successive bounds until it passes over and through the main position. The divisional anti-armour units once through the position may then move to counter penetration/counter attack tasks.
c. The defence is a splendid opportunity to co-ordinate the obstacle plan with the counter-armour plan. Copperhead may

Diagram 6
be used to destroy vehicles which are especially vulnerable when slowing to negotiate obstacles.

d. Within the main position the brigade counter-armour squadrons must reconnoiter primary and secondary positions for the most likely armoured approaches. This may well mean that the squadron may not be in the position itself but could be a flank or even behind the position if, as at Tobruk, the best tank killing ground is actually on the position.

e. Infantry battalions must integrate their defences into the brigade plan and coordinate their artillery DF’s so that RDM fire may be brought down into likely armoured assembly areas and onto his assaulting formations.

f. The divisional counter-armour and AH squadrons are well suited to counter penetrate. Tanks at all levels should be reserved for the counter attack where their speed, firepower and armoured protection may be used to the best effect. (See Diagram 6)

Counter-Armour In The Withdrawal. In the withdrawal all available counter-armour resources must be grouped in the rear guard and step back systematically so that each weapon may disengage whilst under the cover
of a longer range weapon to the rear. (See Diagram 7)

CONCLUSION
The evidence is there for those who wish to see it. Whether it be Delville Wood, North Africa or the Sinai a consistent theme has been running through counter-armour operations. Sometimes our view has been distorted by an easy victory consequent to bad tactics or by a new weapon promising a quick victory. But the fact remains that in the end event ultimate success against armour can only be achieved with a well balanced and comprehensive combined arms team.

For this task our equipment is inadequate both in quantity and quality and our doctrine, and organizations supporting that doctrine, seems to be based on the proposition that if the enemy has armour it will somehow miraculously disappear or that he will never employ it imaginatively. We must develop a realistic doctrine that suits our situation.

As a doctrinal base our infantry division must be organized and equipped so that it can defeat a mechanized brigade. This doctrine must be supported by a long range and comprehensive plan for the raising of new units and the purchase of equipment.

Australia is a continent tailor made for mobile warfare, ninety per cent being suitable for armoured operations. The enemy will come equipped to fight in our conditions, we must be ready for that battle.
NOTES
7. Ibid.
8. ROTEM, Thoughts on Desert Warfare, P12.
10. Doughty, Copperhead P45.
19. A Dynamic Analysis of the Medium Tank Bt. PR-1.
20. LTC Zamir, Golani Bde, IDF. (Note: Although this study was conducted with M60AI, Dragon and TOW I believe that the lessons would be equally valid for other tanks and missiles with similar characteristics.)
22. Ibid. PR-3.
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DEFENCE SALES-PITH AND POTENTIAL

By Major Bruce Cameron
Royal Australian Armoured Corps

"England must expect everyman to do his duty, to sell arms to foreign countries!"

"This was the cynical comment used to describe the involvement of British servicemen in the promotion of military sales ("the squalid business of flogging arms to the Third World") at the 1979 Royal Naval Equipment Exhibition.

It is a growing opinion that the overseas sale of military equipment contributes to international instability, and is therefore morally wrong. Such political implications were recognized by President Carter who, soon after taking office, announced that United States participation in the arms market would be confined to that of "promoting its own security and the security of its close allies". In the new policy the United States would not, for example, ". . . be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed advanced weapons which would create a new or higher combat capacity".

Following the Cambodian catastrophe it would indeed be encouraging if such moral considerations were to be applied to the exercise of military influence and foreign policy. Should therefore, exhibitions such as that at Portsmouth be condemned (". . . a tragedy for anyone with pride in British naval traditions"), and public conscience be urged to vent its outrage?

It must be assumed that the moralist who agrees with such sentiment, also opposes Australia's purchase of HMAS Fremantle and HMAS Otama. Fortunately most people recognize that these purchases, as with others from overseas countries, are essential to the maintenance of Australia's national security. What might not be recognized, or even considered however, is how much support should be given to the reverse argument — that of the necessity of Australia's transition from the status of 'customer' to that of 'producer'. Should an Australian Defence Industries display be a part of the Asian Defence Expo to be held in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980?

Self Reliance and Defence Industries

Militarily there is no doubt that Australia's defence capability would be greatly enhanced if arms procurement was not dependent on overseas supply. Not only would the burden of protecting supply lines be removed, but also, and more importantly, the source would be guaranteed. The principle of national self sufficiency and self reliance has received much publicity recently.

Regrettably full achievement of this principle is not immediately possible. Australia does not have the technological expertise and industrial capacity to develop and manufacture, in the necessary time frame, many of the items the defence inventory is presently deficient — tactical fighters, guided missile frigates, and ship to ship missiles. In compensation however,
the defence capability of local industry is supported by such overseas orders through the present Australian Industrial Participation and Offset policies. Ideally for example, the aerospace industry should receive offset orders totalling $300m from the TFF purchase alone.

Despite obligatory overseas procurement, dependency is slowly being reduced and positive contributions to self reliance are being made. When capacity exists, greater responsibility is presently being granted to Australian manufacturers. This is seen in the construction of the specialist vessels HMAS Tobruk and HMAS Cook, and the local contract arrangements for the Fremantle Class patrol boats. In the 1978/9 defence budget, equipment contracts totalling $337m were directed to Australian industry, and it was stated that this amount would increase in the following year. Recently it has been reported that tax and financial incentives are likely to be developed to further attract industry support.

Development of Technological Base

It will be seen and understood that the increasing complexity of military equipments makes a high technological base (particularly in the fields of electronics and advanced construction techniques) essential to the achievement of the necessary industrial capability. This requirement has also been recognized by present policies. "In 1976/7 Defence spent $23m in the local electronics/telecommunications industry, out of a total of $54m on this type of equipment". The last budget announced that $19.1m had been allocated to phase 2 of DISCON (Defence Secure Communications Network), and a $15m contract had been awarded for HF communications terminals. It has been estimated that the total local expenditure on communications in the next 10-15 years will be approx $400m.

The importance of Research and Development (R&D) has not been overlooked either. $24m was allocated this year to the development of the "Jindalee" overhorizon radar. Such a project is in keeping with the policy of 'shared R&D' suggested by the United States as being necessary for the best utilization of funds available to NATO countries and their allies. This concept "assigns principal R&D task areas to those countries most concerned by a specific area of warfare. R&D in ocean control (for example) would be assumed by Japan, Australia, and New Zealand".

Cost Effective Solutions

In light of the foregoing it is regretful that the keel has not been completely laid for the future. Even with the necessary industrial and technological skills and capacity, defence contracts cannot be awarded to Australian industry if they are not 'cost-effective', i.e. if the production run is not sufficient in size to compensate for design, tooling, and manufacturing costs. "No subject so readily attracts oversimplified solutions as the dilemma as to how much added cost we should accept in order to divert money to Australian industry to help raise its production in high technology, as against importing it at lower prices because of the advantage of large scale production in major allied countries". Will there be sufficient demand for example, to make it feasible for Australian industry to manufacture aircraft to replace the Caribou and Macchi? The need for a market is obvious.

Marketing Techniques

One of the most outstanding examples of Australian development and manufacture is the "Ikara" anti-submarine system. It appears however, that it will only be through the marketing skills of Hawker Siddeley that orders from Brazil and other South American countries may be expected. Similarly one wonders if the British Defence Sales organization will be relied upon to recoup the development costs of the "Barra" Sonabuoy. It would be a disappointment if these projects, as with the "Jindivik" target aircraft, were not to realize their full potential through lack of marketing support.

One of the few successful ventures in defence sales would seem to be that of Dart Target Systems, manufactured by Australasian Training Aids Pty. Ltd. Having used drive and initiative to design and develop a first class product, this company employed the same qualities in its sales promotion to establish a world-wide market. With professional advertising, overseas sales offices, and customer 'servicing' policies, it is not surprising that success has followed. It is hard to imagine any other Australian company involved with defence industry, that might be eligible for both the Australian Design and Export Awards.
Whilst considering achievement rewards, might not an Annual Defence Industry Award provide additional incentive and be just recognition for such companies that contribute to Australia’s defence?

In the ruthless world of business, every individual and organization is considered a ‘suspect’. When a ‘suspect’ is identified as having both a need and the ability to pay, he is reclassified as a ‘prospect’. At this stage full sales resources are employed to ensure that custom is not lost. ‘Prospecting’ is considered to be the key to success. It is hard to understand why the sale of Australian defence equipment is not undertaken with the same enthusiasm and imagination found in the commercial market place. Is it because of a lack of ‘prospects’?

Potential Customers and Product Design

Unfortunately the answer appears to be that ‘prospects’ have indeed been identified, however they have not been actively sought. It is well recognized for example, that ASEAN nations constitute considerable market potential in the wake of diminishing United States involvement in the region. “As consumers of military equipment the ASEAN countries, Papua New Guinea, and New Zealand have substantial needs in the field of medium technology, high performance and tropicalized equipment, which need to be obtained from secure sources”9. In addition many countries in the near Pacific have recently proclaimed new sea boundaries and have a need for increased surveillance and patrol capabilities. To these countries, in addition to the advantage of avoiding the threat of political domination, it has been suggested that Australia is one of few feasible sources available. “With the exception of Japan to the north, Australia is the only regional nation with an industrial infrastructure capable of assisting its neighbours to improve their levels of self reliance”10.

If the techniques of professional marketing were to be applied, a survey would be conducted of these countries to determine their ‘need’. The first consideration after an equipment requirement had been identified, would be to evaluate the magnitude and strength of a likely order. If favourable, information that would then be examined would include: role in which equipment is to be employed, likely threat it is to encounter, anticipated operating conditions, and required capabilities. The result would be a rating of the customer requirement, coupled with a priority of design characteristics.

If the market potential was strong enough, independent manufacture may be considered. More likely however, the market survey results would be considered in relation to the known design and development requirements of Australian defence equipment. Quite probably many overseas design priorities will be met by the Australian requirement. Others may be readily achieved by an acceptable compromise or slightly modified production. Whatever the outcome, the possibilities of cost-effective Australian manufacture would have been fully assessed. Only in this way is the principle of self reliance able to be made a reality.

Conclusion and Commission

It would be easy to conclude in the words of the 1974 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, “... the export of Australian defence equipment should be considered whenever possible.”. As it has been shown however, despite real achievements in the development of defence industries, a further step must be taken. It is believed that it is essential that a specialist defence sales organization be established to assist industry in the marketing of Australian defence equipment. Australia’s self reliance must not be jeopardised because of unsought markets or unskilled salesmen.

NOTES
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ABORIGINES AND THE ARMY
THE SECOND WORLD WAR EXPERIENCE

Major R. A. Hall
Royal Australian Infantry

The relationship between the Army and the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders has been a long one beginning at least as early as the First World War. It was during the Second World War however that relatively large numbers of Aborigines and Islanders were enlisted or developed other forms of association with the Army, during a period when white relations with Aborigines and Islanders were largely characterised by racism and brutality.

The relationship which emerged from this association is of interest to the Army today in view of our continued interest in northern defence and surveillance, Australia's growing cultural diversity, and the unfortunate fact that racism continues to exist in today's Army.

During the Second World War, two documents laid down the criteria for enlistment into the Australian Army, the Defence Act and Australian Military Regulations and Orders. The Defence Act placed no limitations upon the racial origins of voluntary enlistees but required that all personnel take an oath of allegiance, thereby restricting enlistment to British subjects. Torres Strait Islanders and Aborigines were British subjects and therefore were not excluded from voluntary enlistment by the Act. Persons not substantially of European origin or descent were, however, exempted from call-up for war service under section 61(1)(h) of the Defence Act, and from compulsory training under section 138(1)(b).

Contrary to the Defence Act, Australian Military Regulations and Orders No. 177 stated that only persons who were "substantially of European origin or descent" were to be enlisted voluntarily. This did not affect the legal predominance of the Defence Act, however, and could be varied or waived to suit the requirements of Land Headquarters.

As the war progressed, the threat to the security of Australia increased, causing greater demands for Army manpower. As a result, the Army manipulated the discriminatory section of the Australian Military Regulations and Orders to allow the enlistment of some appropriately qualified Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.

As early as September 1939, and contrary to Australian Military Regulations and Orders, Aborigines were to be enlisted into the Army, though in small numbers. The then Minister for Defence, Mr. G. A. Street, had authorised the Commandant 7th Military District to begin enlistment of a limited number of selected part-Aborigines into units stationed in the Northern Territory. The Darwin Infantry Battalion, for example, had its own small contingent of Aboriginal servicemen.

Despite these and other isolated cases however, while hostilities remained centered in Europe, the Army showed little enthusiasm for Aboriginal volunteers.

In response to an increasing number of requests by part-Aborigines and full-bloods to enlist, and confusion created by the fact that some Aborigines were already serving contrary to the previous orders, Military commands sought clarification of the policy on enlistment of Aborigines and other non-Europeans. On 6 May 1940 a Military Board Memo was issued stating that the enlistment of persons of non-European origin or descent was "neither necessary nor desirable". As Aborigines began to be turned away from the recruiting offices throughout Australia, various agencies such as the Queensland Department of Native Affairs and the Aborigines Uplift Society took up the issue of Aboriginal enlistment. Their main grievances centered round the inconsistency of Army policy.

As a result of pressure applied by these agencies, the matter of Aboriginal enlistment was reconsidered by the Military Board and its decision, promulgated on 13 August 1940, was that:

Major Hall graduated from RMC in 1968. He served as a platoon commander in 8 RAR and then in a variety of appointments including I PIR, 2 PIR, HQ I Div. and DGAD (Army). His current posting is with Management Advisory Services Branch, Defence Central.

Article received Feb. 1980.
A squad of Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion training in their company lines, Thursday Island.
"...the provisions of Section 61(1)(h) and 138 (1)(b) of the Defence Act and AMR&O 177(1) must be adhered to.

This precludes the enlistment of full-blooded aborigines, but, in deciding whether or not a person with some aboriginal blood is or is not substantially of European origin or descent, medical officers will be guided by general suitability of the applicant and by the laws and practices of the State or Territory in which the enlistment takes place.

While the Army required a means of excluding unsuitable applicants from enlistment, the use of the applicant's race as a means of exclusion was bound to lead to the charge that the Army was practising racism. The Military Board decision however, did possess an important asset from the Army point of view; flexibility. The Army could adjust the acceptability of Aboriginal recruits to meet changes in the demand for manpower and in this regard the Military Board decision represented an improvement over the earlier complete exclusion of Aborigines.

Protest at the decision came however, on 4 January 1942, when a Sydney newspaper published an article concerning an Aborigine from Murwillumbah who attempted to join the AIF and was passed medically fit at the Murwillumbah recruiting centre. He and two other Aborigines from Grafton were sent to Sydney, but on arrival were immediately returned without explanation. Public reaction to the incident resulted in pressure being applied to the Army and the Commonwealth Government, to accept Aboriginal soldiers.

By early 1942 the Japanese advance and the dwindling availability of manpower were beginning to apply a more effective pressure to the Army. On 19 February 1942, Darwin was bombed and fear of a Japanese invasion reached a peak. By March, the demand for additional manpower to meet the threat of invasion had become so acute that the remaining classes of men; those of the most marginal military value, were called up. At this stage, the Army began to relax its attitude to the enlistment of Aborigines and although the wording of the orders did not change, Aborigines began to be enlisted in relatively large numbers. Despite the discriminatory nature of recruiting policy, those Aborigines who succeeded in becoming enlisted members of the Army, and who served in racially intergrated Army units, enjoyed an equality many of them seldom experienced in the pre-war civilian environment. Pay and conditions were identical with those enjoyed by white soldiers while opportunities for advancement existed for Aborigines possessing leadership qualities. Reg Saunders, for example, rose from the rank of private soldier to that of lieutenant during the course of the war though his was an exceptional case.

Though up to this time the Army had used the orders to restrict the entry of Aborigines and part-Aborigines into most parts of the Australian Army, it had simultaneously been raising racially segregated units manned almost entirely by persons of non-European origin or descent. The Torres Strait Defence Force and the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit were examples of this inconsistency.

The Torres Strait Defence Force was manned, below the rank of sergeant, by Torres Strait Islanders, mainland Aborigines and some Australian Malays. War Establishment authorised the raising of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
<th>Native Strength</th>
<th>White Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Artillery-Torres Strait</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ of a Water Transport Group (Small Craft)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>32 Australian Water Transport Maintenance Company (Small Craft) Royal Australian Engineers</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Australian Water Transport Operating Company (Small Craft) Royal Australian Engineers</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torres Strait Pioneer Company</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 12 1776 1355 421
These figures represented the ideal and were never actually achieved. Native strength of the total force fluctuated but never reached more than about 900.

While the Army was manipulating the recruiting regulations, similar manipulation was occurring with the regulations governing rates of pay. Pay scales for the Australian Army were governed by War Financial (Military Forces) Regulations and Military Financial Regulations. Neither regulation mentioned special rates of pay for Torres Strait Islanders or Aborigines. Though legally entitled to the same pay rates as white soldiers, the native members of the Torres Strait Force, again in breach of the relevant regulations, received considerably less pay. The War Establishment laid down the following pay scales for Islander and Aborigine servicemen:

- Private, 1st year of service: £3.10.0 per month
- 2nd year of service: £3.15.9 per month
- 3rd year of service: £4.0.0 per month
- Lance Corporal: £4.7.6 per month
- Corporal: £4.15.0 per month

By comparison, a private soldier in any integrated14 unit of the Australian Military Forces was paid at the rate of about £8.0.0 per month in his first year of service, regardless of his race.

This led to great dissatisfaction amongst the Islander and Aborigine troops and they eventually mutinied in January 1944.

On 1 February 1944, as a result of the mutiny, a conference was held in Melbourne to discuss the employment of natives in the Army. Representatives from the Department of the Army, External Territories, Interior, Navy, Repatriation and Treasury and from the Queensland Government attended, and the main question under discussion was the pay of the native troops.

The conference recognised that paying the native troops at a lower rate than white troops was illegal and estimated that the amount of under-payment, together with repatriation was £30,000,000. However, it was decided that payment of full rates of pay should not be made because the sum involved was too large, and

Army wages gave many Aborigines their first experience of a cash economy. Here an Aboriginal labourer purchases goods from an army canteen at Koolpinyah, 17 July 1943.
paying the natives their legal entitlement would put into their hands more money than they could have hoped to earn in civil life. It was felt that this would cause trouble when the soldiers were eventually discharged from the Army. It was inappropriate for the Army to countenance either of these arguments.

A payrise was given however, but to a level still short of the amount paid to white soldiers.

Another exception to the official recruiting policy was the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit. Like the Torres Strait Defence Force, this unit was raised to perform a particular task in a closely defined geographic area and its task was one that could not easily be performed by white units.

It had been recognised early in the war that Darwin would be particularly vulnerable to attack if Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies fell into Japanese hands. Because of the relatively small size of the military force which could be allocated to the defence of Darwin, it was imperative that the effectiveness of the force be maximised by providing early warning of any Japanese attack. The Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit was therefore raised in 1941:

a. To provide flank protection for Darwin by organising the natives of the coastline to form an efficient coastwatching organisation based on their own local organisation.

b. To organise the natives into a potential mobile force or patrol to carry out guerrilla warfare in the event of a landing by enemy forces...

c. To gather together a small unit of the aborigines who possess special prowess in hunting, in craftsmanship and bushcraft, and who are skilled in guerrilla warfare and ambush, and to use these natives for the instruction of members of the Independent Companies in tropical bushcraft.

Squadron Leader Donald Thomson was seconded to the Army from the RAAF for the purpose of raising and commanding the unit. He patrolled Arnhem Land and recruited about 50 full-blood Aborigines mainly from known fighting bands. Many were renowned warriors and some had already killed Japanese and had served gaol sentences as a result.

Recruits were given regimental numbers as a sign of their enlistment. "Pay" consisted of a weekly issue of three sticks of tobacco and equipment issued to the soldiers included tomahawks, knives, fishing lines and hooks. These items improved the efficiency of food gathering, thereby enabling the soldiers to spend more time training and fighting the Japanese.

The fifty Aborigines of the unit represented only the nucleus of the force, as each soldier's task, should the Japanese invade, was to organize and lead the other warriors of his clan in guerrilla attacks against the Japanese. To attack the Japanese they were to use only their traditional weapons — the spear and the spear thrower.

Thomson felt that the issue of firearms and indeed, any other type of military stores, would indicate to the Japanese that these Aborigines were in fact an organized military unit and that this would lead to severe Japanese retaliation against all Aborigines, whether fighting the Japanese or not.

This unusual unit was manned almost entirely by full-blood Aborigines at a time when official Army policy was that only people of substantial European origin or descent could be recruited. Officially the idea of recruiting full-bloods was not entertained.

The reason why both the Torres Strait Defence Force and the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit were treated as exceptions to the general Army policy can be seen in the nature of the organizations themselves. Both were restricted to closely defined remote localities. There was minimal chance of either organization fighting alongside predominantly white units and there was no possibility that the organizations would be deployed outside their defined area.

Despite this however, individuals from the Torres Strait Defence Force did venture outside the Torres Strait area to north Queensland and New Guinea but this was for training purposes or for brief visits involving the loading and unloading of ships and aeroplanes.

Individuals from the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit however may have been sent on "covert" missions to Timor and Malaya. Despite these cases, neither organization deployed formed bodies of troops outside its local area and both thus remained out of the public eye.

Both organizations were given tasks which the Army considered were essential, and for
which the natives were peculiarly suited. Thomson stated that no white soldiers "however well trained" could match his Aboriginal soldiers in guerrilla warfare and it would obviously have been impossible for white troops to mobilize the other Aborigines in Arnhem Land as Thomson's Aboriginal soldiers could. For the Torres Strait Defence Force, the situation was somewhat different. White soldiers could have performed the tasks of that force, but the defence of the Torres Strait Islands, though highly desirable, was not of such strategic importance as to warrant the deployment there of a force of white soldiers for the duration of the war, particularly as trained bodies of troops were always needed elsewhere. There was also the matter of cost to consider. It should be remembered that the figure of £30,000,000 in underpayment and repatriation liability left owing to Islander soldiers represented a significant saving to the Army which would have been forgone had white troops been employed.

The recruitment of Aborigines and Islanders into these organisations obviously suited the Army whereas the recruitment of full-blood or part-Aborigines into white units did not. The orders were therefore manipulated by the Army to cloak discrimination against Aboriginal and Islander recruits on one hand or their exploitation on the other.

This ambivalence in Army policy was also reflected in the Army's perception of Aborigines as a security threat. By early 1942, isolated white communities in north Australia began to feel threatened by Aborigines as a result of the guilt whites felt at their treatment of Aborigines, and the Japanese attempts throughout South East Asia to undermine the prestige of white colonial powers and to assert the interests of indigenous populations. Earlier however, wartime propaganda decrying the concept of a master-race had resulted in initial improvements in inter-racial relations. The Japanese advance brought these improvements to an end leaving Aborigines frustrated and disillusioned and whites threatened and defensive. While frustration induced many Aborigines to make public statements supporting a Japanese victory, whites accused Aborigines of actively assisting the Japanese and used the Aborigines' statements to justify their opinions.

The white perception of the security threat posed by Aborigines was endorsed by the Army, and became indiscriminately applied to all Aborigines. An intelligence report on Aboriginal stockmen in the gulf country, for example, claimed that Aborigines there were "largely" influenced by communist and anti-capitalist propaganda and were almost invariably swayed by agitators. Many Aborigines it claimed, would willingly help the Japanese.

The tendency of white security personnel to label all Aborigines with the sins of a few, as demonstrated by the above report, resulted in the worst excesses of the Army's relations with Aborigines throughout the war. In Western Australia, the Army imposed controls over the movements of Aborigines and compiled a register listing all Aborigines in the state. In August 1942, the Army issued orders controlling Aborigines between the mouth of the Murchison River and the northern boundary of the Perth metropolitan area. Employed Aborigines within this area were to reside on the property of their employers who were made responsible for their conduct and movements. Unemployed Aborigines were confined to the Moore River Aboriginal settlement or, if living north of the Dongara-Mingenew Line, were forced to camp permanently on Aboriginal reserves under the direction of the police. Despite the objections of the Western Australian Government, this scheme was put into effect, sometimes with the use of physical force to coerce the Aborigines involved. In January 1943 the Army sought to extend this scheme to other areas of Western Australia, but opposition from the State Government and police, and the diminishing threat of invasion by that time led to the abandonment of the idea but the Army continued to impose harsh controls more suited to the management of enemy aliens than Australian citizens, in isolated areas such as Port Hedland.

The poor estimation of the loyalty of Aborigines may also have influenced the willingness of the Army and Government to arm some Aborigines. The perception of Aborigines, doubtful loyalty and the possibility of renewed post-war inter-racial violence may have contributed, for example to the decision not to arm the Aboriginal soldiers of the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit. In addition, Biskup seems to suggest that doubtful security may have been the underlying motive for the Government's refusal to issue weapons to a group of Aborigines who underwent
military training in the Kimberleys in April 1942 but who were never recruited or formally raised as a unit. 

Yet another area in which the Army established a relationship with Aborigines, was that of civilian employment. From early as 1933 Aborigines had been employed by the Army in a civilian capacity, and although the Aboriginal civilians were employed throughout Australia, the Northern Territory from December 1941 onwards saw the highest level of Aboriginal employment achieved, and the most significant contribution to the war effort made by Aboriginal civilians.

After the entry of Japan into the war on 7-8 December 1941 the size of the defence force at Darwin grew rapidly. By late 1942 the combined strength of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Civil Construction Corps throughout the Northern Territory had reached over 100,000.

Most of this force was stationed near Darwin, though some units were stationed at various centres along the length of the Stuart Highway. By 1943, Army strength alone between Darwin and Mataranka was estimated at 50,000.

Most of the white civilian population however, had been evacuated after the first Japanese raid and would have numbered no more than about 1,000 in the Darwin-Mataranka area by early 1942.

As for the Aboriginal population, on 30 June that year the total Aboriginal and part-Aboriginal population for the Northern Territory has been 14,488. Though some part-Aboriginal children were evacuated, most of the Aboriginal and part-Aboriginal population remained in the Northern Territory.

The huge influx of white servicemen meant that thousands of men from the cities of south-east Australia came into contact with Aborigines for the first time. They brought with them a new attitude to Aborigines which was a mixture of the more liberal if disinterested approach to Aborigines common at that time in south-east Australia, a general

An Aboriginal orderly of 121 Australian General Hospital, bandaging the arm of a man wounded during an air raid on Katherine, 24 November 1942.
ignorance of pre-war racial attitudes and conditions in the north, and the egalitarian influences of the Army society. This peculiarly Army approach to Aborigines replaced the pre-war white attitudes in the Northern Territory because the Army, due to its size, became the dominant social organism in the north, while at the same time, white civilian influence declined due to evacuation. This huge influx of 100,000 servicemen required support in an area in which the industrial infrastructure had been designed for about 2,000 whites. Consequently many jobs were created to which Aborigines, representing the largest pool of available labour remaining in the Northern Territory, were inevitably attracted.

As a result of the threat of a Japanese attack on Darwin, Aborigines were evacuated from coastal settlements to settlements established further inland, just prior to the first bombing raid. Both the Army and the Native Affairs Branch believed the evacuation necessary so as to ensure the Aborigines' safety in the event of further bombings or a Japanese landing; to ease the rationing situation, since many Aborigines previously employed by white civilians now required rations; to prevent contact with the troops; and lastly, to prevent the "dissemination of contagious diseases".

An unforeseen result was that some of these settlements came to be located near Army Logistics units such as bakeries, hospitals, workshops, stores and depots and the like, which required local labour.

On 5 April 1942, officers of the Native Affairs Branch asked the Commanding Officer of an Army workshop located at Mataranka if employment could be given to some of the Aborigines. He agreed, so began large scale Army employment of Aborigines in the Northern Territory.

Work performed by the Aborigines at Mataranka was cement work, carting and shovelling sand and gravel, timber cutting, and cartage and stacking of ammunition. The Aborigines worked a ten hour day and the opinion of those in charge was that they worked harder than either soldiers or civilian labourers in the Middle East.
THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

Showing the North-South Line of Communications and the sites of principal Army labour camps.
This initial experiment was so successful from the Army's point of view that 20 more Aborigines and a part-Aborigine were sought for enlistment into the Army as supervisors of Aboriginal labour gangs which the Army anticipated would be formed. These additional labour organizations were requested on 26 July 1942 and resulted in the establishment of a new labour settlement at Springvale Station, about four miles from Katherine.

Shortly afterwards, similar labour settlements were also set up at Koolpinyah and Adelaide River in 1942 and at Cullen in early 1943. Aborigines from existing settlements at Barrow Creek, Banka Banka and Elliott were also employed.

By May 1943, the Army was employing 724 Aborigine men and women in the Darwin and Alice Springs areas. Aborigines remained in Army employment until after 1946 but by February that year the number employed had dropped to 396.

For each man or woman employed by the Army, food, housing, and clothing for his or her dependants were provided by the Army. Thus the number of Aborigines brought into direct contact with the Army as a result of Army employment was considerably higher than the above figures show.

As the war progressed, Aborigines employed by the Army were utilized in increasingly more diverse jobs. Semi-skilled work such as assembly and cleaning of carburettors and gear-boxes, driving, slaughtering, timber cutting, and sorting and reconditioning of tools and stores was performed by Aborigines as well as the general labouring tasks mentioned above. Female Aborigines performed gardening, hygiene, maintenance tasks around settlements, and were employed in hospitals as orderlies and personal maids to matrons as well as providing staff for washing, ironing, and other household duties. Similar work was performed in Australian Women's Army Service barracks, hostels and messes.

Both the scale and nature of Army employment of Aborigines was to have important consequences not only amongst the Aborigines, but also amongst other employers. Although many of the tasks performed by Aborigine labourers were mundane, some, such as driving and stripping and assembling of vehicle parts, represented a departure from the "traditional" style of Aboriginal employment in the north, which prior to the war, had almost exclusively been limited to stock work.

The conditions of employment which the Army offered its Aboriginal employees were generally better than those provided by the pastoral employers. The conditions of employment on Vestey's properties provide an interesting comparison. Wages there were 5/- per week of which 2/- was held in trust by the Department of Native Affairs. With the remaining 3/-, the stockman was expected to clothe himself and feed his dependants. Employers were exempted from paying these wages if they undertook to maintain the dependants of the stockmen, but this understanding was often ignored. Besides poor wages, Vestey's stations also provided the Aborigines with a poor diet consisting mainly of meat (mostly offal), flour, sugar and tea. This contributed to sterility, infant mortality, and a high rate of stillbirths, most of which could have been overcome by the addition of vegetables. In addition, Aboriginal stockmen worked no fixed hours and were given poor, if any, sanitary facilities.

By contrast, Aborigines employed by the Army were paid at the rate of 5/- per week and were provided with free clothing, medical treatment, and full rations for themselves and for two dependants each. Rations were similar to those of soldiers except that in the native ration there was more meat. The ration also included vegetables which were grown in Army gardens maintained by Aborigines. Army style messes and hygiene facilities including showers, were provided. At Tennant Creek the Army established an Aboriginal hospital which gave free hospitalization to Aboriginal patients whether employed by the Army or not, and to reduce unscheduled absenteeism, Aborigines were given a "walk-about" period on full pay and rations after each period of twelve months work.

Throughout its employment of the Aborigines, the Army had remained largely unconcerned about its own impact on the traditional culture of its employees. Though Army policy attempted to maintain the authority of tribal elders, encouraged cultural events such as corroborees and consented to the practice of traditional medicine, the act of establishing the labour settlements, and moving the Aborigines away from the coast to areas further inland, overwhelmed even the best attempts to protect
Soldiers of the Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion servicing a truck.
the cultural groups. Aborigines from different areas were thrown together in the settlements. Warramunga and Aranda from Central Australia for example were taken to Katherine, where, after an initial period of fright and wariness, they lived and worked successfully (from the Army’s point of view) with largely detribalized Wagait.

An even greater cultural shock was provided by the white servicemen. Though the labour settlements were sited so as to avoid contact with servicemen, were out of bounds and were policed by Aborigines and European supervisors, white servicemen came in search of women. Resultant inter-racial trouble was particularly prevalent at Koolpinyah which was located close to several Army units only 18 miles from Darwin.

Despite these problems, the establishment of labour settlements did have some positive effects for Aborigines. Many enjoyed better living conditions and higher wages than they may otherwise have had, but other less tangible benefits occurred also. With the exception of those Aborigine labourers from Central Australia, the majority of Aborigines in Army employ had already begun the process of adjustment to white society before recruitment by the Army. The experience of the Army labour camps assisted this process of adjustment. As a result, the Aborigines were more employable after the war, had an understanding of a cash economy, and had developed a higher self esteem.

Further improvements to the conditions of employment were proposed by the Army in November 1943. These were initiated by Brigadier Dollery, Commander of the Northern Territory Line of Communications Area, who was responsible for the recruitment and conditions of service for Aborigine labourers. He proposed the raising of an Aboriginal Employment Company and a Native Affairs section for the Headquarters of Northern Territory Force. This section was for the better administration of the various Aboriginal labour camps controlled by the headquarters.

The formation of the Aboriginal Employment Company was designed to provide an incentive to Aborigines to rise above the flat wage of 5/- per week, improve their labour skills, and improve their English. Enlistment into the company was to be restricted to those Aborigines who satisfied a suitable standard of intelligence, skill, conduct and knowledge of English. The 412 recruits were to receive the pay and conditions of white soldiers and specialized training which would suit them for employment after the war. Though first proposed on 18 November 1943, it languished in the Departments of Army and the Interior until 27 June 1945 when it was agreed that since the end of the war was approaching there would be no further need for a Native Labour Company.

The Native Affairs Section, which was adopted, consisted of European soldiers, male and female, who were located at each labour settlement. Their task was to conduct education and health training amongst the labourers and their dependants.

Both proposals indicate a changed perception of the Army's role in relation to the Aborigines employed. Since both proposals were formulated in late 1943 they can be attributed in part to the changing war situation. By that time the crisis of invasion was past and the end of the war in sight. These factors, plus the presence of individuals such as Brigadier Dollery, who had a sincere sympathy for the Aborigines, led to the consideration of post-war conditions for Aborigines. This concern was expressed in the proposal to establish the Native Affairs Section of Northern Territory Force. It stated that:

“It is not possible to over-stress the desirability of pursuing every possible means of raising the individual self esteem of the Aborigines as a contribution towards the raising of their racial morale. Nothing of lasting worth can ever be accomplished for these people...unless the Aborigines are led to believe in themselves and in our appreciation of them.”

Furthermore, the Army recognized that the future development of the natives of the Territory would demand native leaders and it intended the education programme, and the ill-fated Aboriginal Employment Company as a start in this direction.

Clearly, official Army policy towards Aboriginal and Islander soldiers and civilians was confused. In some cases, such as the decision to underpay the soldiers of the Torres Strait Defence Force, policy was strongly influenced by racism. In other cases, such as the treatment of Aboriginal soldiers enlisted into integrated units, or the pay and conditions pro-
vided for civilian labourers in the Northern Territory, policy was liberal and far-sighted.

Those policies which show most signs of racism can almost always be attributed to a headquarters located in a major city and thus subject to prevailing racist attitudes in the community at large. The relatively enlightened policies tended to have originated in headquarters having less exposure to white civilian ideals. For example, policy acquiescing in the underpayment of Torres Strait Defence Force soldiers originated in Land Headquarters Melbourne, whereas that governing the pay and conditions of civilian labourers in the Northern Territory was decided upon by Headquarters Northern Territory Force, which owing to the small white civilian influence remaining in the Northern Territory after early 1942, remained largely uninfluenced by civilian racist attitudes.

The best relations of all however, were those which developed on a personal level between black and white soldiers and civilians. These relationships were characteristically marked by a degree of friendship seldom found in the contemporary civilian environment. This was because the cohesive forces operating within the working group, for example a rifle section or gun crew, were stronger than the divisive influences of racism. The situation was different however in segregated units such as those of the Torres Straits Defence Force. While integrated units tended to promote group cohesion, segregated units tended to emphasise differences. Segregation also enabled Army policy to discriminate against the Islanders.

The Army now retains a tenuous connection with Aborigines and Islanders, mainly through those Aboriginal or Islander soldiers serving at present, occasional assistance to medical teams working amongst Aborigines, and through various exercises and other training activities conducted with Aborigines, such as recent visits to Port Keats Mission.

As interest is again focusing on the surveillance of northern Australia, Army interest in Aborigines may grow. Just as in the Second World War skills possessed by Aborigines living the traditional life in the north caused them to be regarded as a valuable military asset, so those same skills may be required in the future. Though contact with Europeans has eroded some of their traditional skills, Aborigines remain better suited to some tasks than most whites. If the Army were to enlist Aborigines for a surveillance or coastwatching unit in northern Australia, or contemplate operations in areas with a high Aboriginal population, it would do well to remember the lessons of its relationship with Aborigines in the Second World War.
NOTES


2. The author has evidence that a number of officers have unofficially proposed shooting as the best solution to the Aboriginal "problem".

3. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, item 628/1/1.


9. As above.

10. The Army War Effort: Australian Military Forces publication dated 31 August 1945. These were married men aged 35-45 and single men or widowers without children aged 45-60.

11. The term "native" was used to describe Torres Strait Islanders, mainland Aborigines and Australian Malays while the term "white" was used to describe people other than "natives".

12. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, item 628/1/1.


14. The term "integrated" has been used throughout this article to denote units other than "segregated" units.

15. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item 628/1/1. Minutes of a Meeting held to Discuss the Employment of Natives in the Army — Melbourne, 1 February 1944.


17. Donald Thompson was an anthropologist from Melbourne University. Before the war he had been engaged on extensive field work amongst the Aborigines of Cape York and Arnhem Land.

18. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item 741/5/9. The Japanese referred to were the crews of Japanese pearling luggers which visited the Arnhem land coast before the war. In 1933 most of the crews of two Japanese luggers, and a number of Europeans, including one policeman, were killed by these Aborigines.

19. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item 741/5/9. The only concession to technology was that the soldiers were taught how to make and use Molotov cocktails so that they could destroy aircraft on the ground and fuel and ammunition dumps.


23. Australian Archives, CRS A373, Item 5903. Japanese Activities Amongst Aborigines. It is interesting that this report found its way to the USA where it was apparently attributed to Western Australian Aborigines. See the National Times, 30 January — 4 February 1978.


25. Biskup. As above, p. 209. Total military strength in the Kimberleys at the time was less than 100 men. Aborigines and whites were trained by the Army as an unofficial "home guard".

26. Six Aborigines were employed by the Darwin Garrison on barracks maintenance duties.


29. Censuses conducted in 1933 and 1947 show Darwin's non-Aboriginal population to have been 1566 and 2538 respectively (Commonwealth Year Books No. 34 and 37). No figure is given for 1942 but it is reasonable to assume that had it not been for evacuation, it would have been somewhere between the 1933 and 1947 figures, or about 2,000. A reasonable estimate, taking evacuation into account, is about 1,000.


31. Australian Archives, Accession A431, Item 46/915. Report prepared by the Deputy Director of Native Affairs (V. J. White) for the Administrator for his attendance at a conference in Melbourne.


33. As above.

34. Australian Archives, Accession MP742, Item 275/1/123. Letter from the Adjutant General to the Secretary for Defence, dated 27 Feb. 1945.


36. Australian Archives, CRS A431, Item 46/915. Minutes of meeting held at the office of the Inspector General of Administration on 8 January 1943 to discuss the employment of Aboriginal labour.


40. As above.

41. Significantly, a number of today's Aboriginal leaders are ex-servicemen.
An Outline of the Australian Military Involvement in Vietnam

July 1962 - December 1972

By Major Ian G. McNeill
Royal Australian Infantry


INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to provide a framework of the Australian military involvement in Vietnam. Reference is made to some of the conceptual problems the commanders had to face.

At the height of the Vietnam war, more than one third of our available combat strength was deployed there. This consisted principally of a three battalion task force with combat and logistic support, an advisory team, an RAAF element of Iroquois helicopters, Canberra medium bombers, and Caribou transport aircraft, and a RAN element of one missile destroyer plus helicopter air crew and ground staff to operate with the U.S. Army. In the period of heaviest commitment, from 1969 to 1970, the total strength of the force within Vietnam, not including the destroyer, was maintained at approximately 8,000 personnel.

Army Posture Prior to Vietnam

In the early 1960s, the Regular Army had four battalions. Two of these were large battalions organized on the pentropic establishment, one was organized on conventional lines and in Malaysia as part of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, and the fourth, also organized on conventional lines, was the nominated replacement for Malaysia.

During this period, the situation in South East Asia was causing increasing alarm to Australia. There was armed activity in Laos, increasing insurgency in South Vietnam, and the Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia inspired by President Seokarno. In response to the deterioration of Australia's strategic position, it was decided to reorganize from the pentropic back to a conventional battalion organization. The new 'tropic' battalion, was regarded as more suitable for Cold War tasks. It was certainly more compatible with those of our allies.

The two pentropic battalions were reorganized in early 1965, forming a strong nucleus for two additional battalions, the Fifth and Sixth Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment. This reorganization was not as disruptive for the battalions as it was for the combat and logistic support organizations, but it did mean substantial changes to headquarters procedures. These had to be rethought, tried out, then practised as drills. It was within weeks of the reorganization of the First Battalion (Pentropic) that the Government announced,
on April 29, 1965, that this battalion together with a logistic support element was to be deployed to Vietnam the following month.

A second response by the Government to the strategic situation was the introduction of conscription to increase the strength of the Army which was unable to reach new manpower targets by voluntary recruiting. The National Service Act, which provided for the selection of 18 year olds by ballot, was passed in 1965. The first national service intake began that year. National service was subsequently to provide approximately one third of the force in Vietnam.

Political Mood

The commitment to Vietnam was made by the Liberal/Country Party coalition government, headed by Sir Robert Menzies, which had defeated the Australian Labor Party in 1949. Staunchly anti-communist, the Government was a strong supporter of SEATO and had only narrowly failed to secure the outlawing of the Communist Party of Australia in a country-wide referendum in 1951. The defence of Australia was based broadly on a concept of 'forward defence' which, in South East Asia, complimented the United States policy of containment of Communism. When announcing the deployment, the Prime Minister stated that it was at the request of the South Vietnamese Government, in consultation with the United States, and was in accordance with Australian obligations under SEATO. 'The takeover of South Vietnam', said the Prime Minister, would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Although the majority of Australians supported the Government stand (it continued in power until December, 1972) there was, even at this early stage, a measure of opposition led by the Australian Labor Party. Mr Arthur Calwell, Leader of the Opposition, in reply to the Prime Minister stated that the Labor Party 'firmly and completely' opposed the decision to send troops to Vietnam, arguing that it was based on three false assumptions:

- an erroneous view of the nature of the war in Vietnam; a failure to understand the nature of the Communist challenge; and a false notion as to the interests of America and her allies.

Although opposition to Australia's involvement in Vietnam grew more vociferous within and without Parliament as the war progressed, leaders of anti-war movements from the Opposition Party were careful never to impugn the general reputation of Australian troops fighting there.

Raising and Despatching of Australian Army Training Team to Vietnam

The despatch of a battalion to Vietnam, whilst creating most political attention, had, in fact, been preceded by the raising and deployment of a small training group of 30 officers, warrant officers and sergeants to Vietnam in August, 1962. Expertly trained in jungle warfare and with Malayan experience, the group was predominantly Infantry, with some Signallers and Engineers. They were commanded by a colonel. With recent experience in Burma, the scene of communist insurgency, and a former commandant of Australia's Jungle Warfare Training Centre, Canungra, in Queensland, the Commander, Colonel F. P. Serong, was seconded as 'special adviser in counter-insurgency' to General Paul D. Harkins, commanding U.S. forces in Vietnam.

The members of AATTV were deployed as part of the U.S. advisory system and located mainly in I Corps.

Training Team members, other than two with the Combined Studies Division, were under the operational control of United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, USMAAG later to be subsumed by United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, USMACV. The two in the Combined Studies Division operated under the control of the United States Mission. The superior Australian headquarters was Headquarters Australian Army Forces Far East Land Forces, based in Singapore. This was changed to Commander, Australian Army Force, Vietnam, when IRAR and its supporting elements arrived in the theatre.

The initial role of AATTV was strictly training. They were not to accompany Vietnamese forces on operations.

A capitation rate was paid to the United States who provided all needs, including
personal weapons and even uniforms — although in this latter case it was the desire of both the American and Australian Governments that the Australians be recognized as such by the wearing of their own uniforms, ‘Australia’ flashes and the flying of their flag above the Saigon headquarters. The capitation agreement was the first of its kind. It proved to be the first of a series of agreements under which Australia (and New Zealand), but no other Allies, arranged for logistic support on a repayment basis.

Deployment of AATTV provided Australia with the means of gaining additional intelligence of the war in Vietnam. Improved understanding of the war led to the recognition of the serious state of the campaign and, in consultation with the United States, AATTV was increased in June, 1964, to 80 personnel while their role was extended to operational advising in field units. The bulk of the Team continued to be deployed in I Corps, where movement began into the United States Special Forces and advisory teams with ARVN battalions. At the same time, six RAAF Caribou transport aircraft with crew and support facilities were based at Vung Tau.

First Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment Deployment to Vietnam

First Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, together with a cavalry troop, signals troop and Australian Logistic Support Company, began moving to Vietnam within 25 days of the Government announcement. It moved by charter aircraft and the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney, and was fully established in Vietnam by 10 June, 1965.

IRAR was placed under operational control of the U.S. 173 Airborne Brigade (Separate) as its third battalion. It was stationed at Bien Hoa airbase north of Saigon, and its initial role was to conduct operations in defence of the base. By December of that year, its role had been extended to include operations in the whole of III Corps area in conjunction with the Brigade. It was supported by a field battery provided by New Zealand.

The integration of an Australian unit with a U.S. Brigade was highly successful. There were differences in operating procedures, tactics, and some resupply problems but these were overcome. The Australians had to become accustomed to ‘skid briefs’, where the Brigade Commander stood by the skids under the whirling blades of a helicopter to give last minute coordinating instructions, ‘frag orders’, these being written supplementary, or fragmentary orders to the main operation order. There was also a need, in the initial stages, for the Australians to establish an ‘interpreter’ at the U.S. Brigade Headquarters while the Americans provided likewise at the Australian Battalion Headquarters.

Along the lines established with the Training Team, Australia paid a capitation rate to the United States for the personnel in the battalion and logistic support element. For this, the United States provided all combat, logistic and medical support except vehicles, weapons, clothing and equipment of Australian origin and integral to the battalion.

The battalion was increased by a battery of artillery, additional armoured personnel carriers, engineers, Army light aircraft and logistic support in September, 1965, thus forming a battalion group. The operational element consisted of some 1,300 men at Bien Hoa.

1st Australian Task Force Deployed to Phuoc Tuy Province

In July, 1965, only one month after the arrival of IRAR, the Chief of the General Staff began looking at ways to build up the force to task force strength, complete with combat and logistic support units, in case the Government should so direct. The governments of the United States, New Zealand and Australia and their military advisers had reached the conclusion at this time that only increased military effort in South Vietnam could save the situation. General William Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, always took the opportunity with Australian visitors to Vietnam to say ‘I’d really like to see an Australian task force up here!’

Military options for increasing Australian participation went to the Government, but it was not until 8th March, 1966, that the announcement was made that a task force of two battalions and support was to be deployed.

The Australian requirements for the area of deployment in Vietnam were:

a. an area of significant enemy activity;

b. the area should not be contiguous with the borders of Cambodia, Laos or the Demilitarized Zone;
c. the area should offer reasonably secure access to shipping and overseas aircraft; and
d. it should be a geographically distinct area which could be left largely to the task force and with which the Australian national effort could be readily identified.

An assessment of certain areas was made, including Phan Rang (rejected because of isolation and thought to be lacking, at that time, sufficient enemy) and the Mekong Delta (although COMUSMACV felt that the Delta had the greatest call on any force becoming available, he recognized Australia's national interests and had no hesitation in agreeing to Phuoc Tuy). Phuoc Tuy was chosen because:

a. although little was known of the Province, it not having been under Government control for several years, it was a fair assumption that it was, or would be, an area of significant military activity;
b. it was not associated with any border area;
c. it had good access by sea and air;
d. it was an area with which the Australian force could be readily identified.

e. it was an area where it seemed feasible to separate the enemy from the population; and

f. in terrain, it was not unlike that in which the Australian Army had trained and fought before.

1st Australian Logistic Support Group

The ease to Australia by which first AATTV, then IRAR Group was provided logistic support by the U.S. forces through the capitation arrangements had lulled the Australians to the realities of the logistic problem. The initial maintenance plan for the Task Force was that certain items of clothing, equipment, vehicles and weapons were to continue to be supplied from Australia, while the bulk of the requirements, in particular ammunition, defence stores and rations would be provided by United States authorities in the theatre again through the payment of a capitation rate. This simply did not work. First, many Australian units had not brought their first 30 days maintenance with them, either because they had not followed instructions, or because time was too short in Australia for their demands to be met. Second, the Australian build-up coincided with the massive American build-up in the theatre. This created enormous pressures on the U.S. system, and at times it was unable to satisfy even its own requirements. Of this period, the Army recorded:

Despite an almost embarrassing level of partisanship shown to Australia by the Americans, many of the requirements of the Australian force were just unable to be met.

The result was the sending back to Australia of an increasing number of priority maintenance demands. The logistic support force grew in size, and extra and unforeseen tonnages had to be sent to the theatre at short notice. Phase Two of the maintenance plan, which provided for the bulk of logistic and administrative support to be supplied from American sources after the initial 30 day period, was never fully implemented.

The Enemy in Phuoc Tuy

In mid 1966 the enemy forces in the Province were believed to be:

a. Headquarters 5 Division, currently located in the May Tao base area in the north east corner of the Province;
b. 274 Main Force Infantry Regiment (Dong Nai Regiment) of three battalions with a heavy weapons battalion; its strength was estimated at 2,000;
c. 275 Main Force Regiment of three battalions was based also in the May Tao area with an estimated strength of 1,850;
d. D445 Regional Battalion with a number of battalion and company bases throughout the Province; believed to be operating from the Long Hai area in the south of the Province, it had an estimated strength of 550;
e. local forces were believed to exist in each village and hamlet making up a small Viet Cong force and infrastructure; and
f. some additional logistic installations and units were known to be in the mountain areas to the north-west of Baria and in the Dat Do area.

The enemy had at this time the capacity to mount offensive operations within the Province with up to two main force regiments supported by a regional battalion and local forces. There were other regiments in neighbouring provinces to the north-west and north but it was considered unlikely that they would operate in Phuoc Tuy in the immediate future.
Despite the efforts of the experienced and determined Province Chief and the lone ARVN battalion in the Province, Government control in the Province was at an all-time low. The Viet Cong dominated the whole Province, except the Vung Tau Special Zone which was a joint South Vietnamese/Viet Cong holiday centre. Almost anyone, anywhere, was vulnerable to extortion or terrorism.

A high proportion of the population of 100,000 was either pro-Viet Cong or neutral, and in this circumstance the Government showed not the intent, nor had the means, to exercise more than a very loose control of the population. Any Malayan solution was considered by the Australian commanders to be bound to fail because of this lack of Government control and because of the apathy or opposition of the people.

Selection and Occupation of Nui Dat

The base at Nui Dat was selected well in advance of the arrival of the Task Force. It was selected by the Chief of the General Staff in concert with the Commander of Australian Army Force, Vietnam, who was to become the first Task Force Commander, and staff officers.

The first requirement of the base in Phuoc Tuy Province was that it be located between the enemy's main force bases and the areas of densest civilian population. It had to provide space for an airfield, for a maintenance area, and provide sufficient room to fight should the base come under heavy attack.

It had to be on ground which would be above water level during the wet season.

It needed to be on relatively open ground and not too near densely settled areas so that maximum use of firepower, rather than manpower, could be used for its defence.

It should be located close enough to the Vung Tau/Bara area to avoid diversion of forces for line of communication security duties or, alternatively, maintenance by air.

Nui Dat best answered these requirements.

On the arrival of the Task Force in the period April/June, 1966, units first lodged at Vung Tau then moved forward to occupy the base.

Initial Concept of Operations

The first step in the concept of operations was to establish quickly an area surrounding the base to a line designated as Line Alfa which was outside enemy mortar range.

The second step was to control an area out to artillery range.

The third step in this initial concept concerned force maintenance. This was to be by daily road convoy from Vung Tau, and forward by helicopter from the base.

It was anticipated that if these operations were successful to any appreciable extent, a situation would be created in which the enemy main force and regional units would become ineffectual. To a large degree they would be divorced from the local people.

In such a situation it was considered that the enemy would have only two choices: remain in their base areas or attack and attempt to destroy IATF. It was anticipated that the latter was more likely, even though it would mean fighting the Task Force on its own ground, exposed to the full weight of the extensive artillery and air support available. Great care was taken, therefore, to make sure that a balanced force was maintained in the Task Force base and that, except for the SAS long-range patrols, ground elements always operated within the range of adequate artillery support.

Initial security was based on continuous and aggressive patrolling. Fifty percent of Task Force infantry resources were out of the base on offensive patrolling every day and night. This rate was maintained for some two months, despite the onset of the monsoon within a week of occupying Nui Dat. It was an exhausting and nerve wracking experience for the infantry. On the other hand it established IATF presence quickly in the centre of the Province and also gave a measure of security to what then appeared a sizeable enemy threat. Commanders also noted that it had the effect of turning a green force, the majority of whom had never heard a shot fired in anger, into a much more battle worthy team with greatly improved command and control procedures.

In the process of establishing the security of the base, IATF did something which had not been done in Vietnam before and which drew some criticism at first. With the approval of the Province Chief, all Vietnamese were evacuated from within Line Alfa and re-settled east of Baria. This gave IATF a zone around its base in which firepower could be used freely and without endangering civilians. It provided a vacuum which Viet Cong patrols had to penetrate before approaching the base. It gave IATF patrols much greater freedom of exit.
from the base, being less likely to be located and watched by the Viet Cong.

On the other hand, it necessitated careful explanation to the civilians concerned and created resettlement problems which took some time to solve.

Command
From the outset IATF came under operational control of 2 Field Force Vietnam. An Australian major served as a liaison officer, and, where necessary, an interpreter, on the U.S. headquarters and worked very closely with the operations staff. The Task Force was permitted to operate very much according to its own methods.

Summary of Initial Operations
Prior to the forward deployment of IATF, 173 Airborne Brigade was given the task of ensuring that 5 Viet Cong Division was not waiting at Nui Dat. On 24th May, 1966, 5RAR, which had arrived from Australia, was moved by helicopter from Vung Tau to join 173 Brigade in its operations north of Baria.

It was operationally necessary to establish IATF forward as soon as possible and on 5th June, Headquarters IATF moved from Vung Tau to Nui Dat where 5RAR was operating.

By 14th June, 6RAR had arrived from Australia, completed its preliminary in-theatre training at Vung Tau and moved forward to complete the IATF concentration.

Both battalions carried out a settling down operation. 6RAR completed the job of clearing and destroying the partially cleared Viet Cong village of Long Phuc and 5RAR cleared the Nui Nghe area. The Task Force dug in at Nui Dat and established unit defended areas. Task Force operational procedures were finalised and rehearsed. The maintenance system was established.

Throughout this period, Viet Cong Regional Forces and elements of D445 Provincial Battalion maintained contact in the patrol battle, however no really serious resistance was offered. Small enemy patrols managed to take advantage of pouring rain and pitch darkness at night to probe the perimeter, especially the gun areas on the southern perimeter and the logistic company. Soon, however, IATF was able to put a stop to this.

From mid-July to mid-August, battalion group operations were conducted to expand the controlled area with accent on opening National Routes 2 and 15 and to take advantage of information from SAS patrolling. During this period of battalion group sized operations the Task Force influence was extended to Binh Ba to the north, to the Long Tan area in the east, to the Long Hai mountains in the southeast and to the Nui Thi Vai hills to the west. The operating battalion commander was given his complete battalion group as a manoeuvre force. His artillery fire support bases were given close protection by a company from the other battalion, which also had to provide a task force reaction force of a company group and another one or two companies to provide patrols within Line Alfa. Task Force patrol operations beyond Line Alfa were conducted by company groups. In this way the Nui Dat base was normally held by unit rear elements and by only one rifle company. On the other hand, the maximum effort was exerted outside the base and reasonable balance was maintained.

During the last week of this period there were growing indications, in particular from agent reports and communications intelligence, that 5 VC Division was in fact preparing to mount a sizeable operation on the Nui Dat base from the east. There had been similar indications before from other areas, however the precaution was taken of using company sized patrols and SAS patrols to check the area to the north and east of Long Tan. It was one of these patrols, D Company of 6RAR, which made contact with 275 VC Regiment at 1608 hours on 18 August 1966 in a rubber plantation near Long Tan. A savage and heroic battle ensued which lasted until 1910 hours with the arrival of the Commanding Officer, 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn, and A Coy 6RAR.

The results of the battle, fought mainly in pouring rain, were 245 enemy killed and an estimated 500 casualties evacuated, with the loss of 17 soldiers killed in action, one died of wounds and 21 wounded. The company won the U.S. Presidential Citation for its action.

It was believed that 275 Regiment had been preparing for an attack on the Nui Dat base. After the severe mauling it received, it was forced to abandon its mission. 274 Regiment, which was believed to have moved a reinforced battalion from the Hat Dich base south-east towards Nui Dat, took no active part in the operations, other than helping evacuate 275 Regiment wounded. It was a long time before
275 Regiment reappeared at any scene of action.

This fight was a drastic change from the pattern of previous operations and strongly confirmed the belief that a well fought rifle company, provided it had adequate air and artillery support, could, for a limited time, successfully fight a Viet Cong regimental force. It was with a much greater feeling of optimism and security that IATF turned again to battalion and Task Force sized operations designed to expand the controlled area.

In these early months there were many facilities lacking which prevented IATF from achieving even its tailored aims more quickly and with less exposure to the considerable risks it was obliged to take. A third battalion would have provided better balance and enabled more effective follow up of the enemy; an additional armoured element, particularly tanks, would have given the Task Force considerable advantages especially in the dry season; additional engineer construction resources would have enabled the efficient and early development of the base; an organic logistic company would have been better, for its own tactical defence as well as for efficiency, than the ad hoc arrangements which were made in the forward base. Additional staff were necessary at IATF Headquarters to cope with the continuous operational pressure. All these elements, and more, were eventually provided in succeeding years to enable IATF to achieve its peak in operational efficiency.

**IATF Operations 1966-1971**

Australian Army operations in Vietnam could be divided into the following phases:

- **Phase 1** — IRAR Group in the Bien Hoa area June 1965-June 1966.
- **Phase 2** — security and establishment and establishment of the Nui Dat base by IATF June 1966-June 1967.
- **Phase 3** — extension of the Nui Dat base and conduct of counter guerilla operations June 1967-January 1968.
- **Phase 4** — main force operations February 1968-June 1969.
- **Phase 5** — counter guerilla/pacification operations July 1969-November 1971.

Although these phases were in part reaction to enemy moves, in particular during the build up and action surrounding the Tet 1968 and Tet 1969 offensives, and a relative lull in main force activity in 1970 and 1971, they were also the result of what commanders found to be a certain ambiguity in the role of the force.

Right from the outset, IATF, in common with everyone else, faced the dilemma of simultaneous requirements to destroy or at least neutralize the enemy’s main and regional forces and at the same time remove the claws of the Viet Cong local forces and infrastructure from the towns and villages. The task therefore, was to fight conventional type operations and at the same time conduct uninterrupted pacification and reconstruction programmes. The first required concentration of force including heavy firepower, the second required continual small scale operations dispersed over a wide area in what could develop into a police type role.

In the event, the Task Force commanders were forced to attempt both roles, yet never at any time were the Australian forces given responsibility for the populated area of Phuoc Tuy. To carry such a responsibility, however, would have required a force with a complete advisory system to match the United States CORDS effort. This advisory system may have had to include civilian experts in fields in which the Army is neither trained nor equipped.

As it was the Task Force could best be employed in operations in depth against enemy base and logistic areas. Nevertheless, with the local forces ineffective in preventing enemy access to the population, some Task Force effort had to be diverted to that role. There were indeed many attempts to upgrade the ARVN and Regional Forces by retraining schemes and the leavening of Territorial units with Australian troops similar to the U.S. Marine Combined Action Programme. It was found, however, that such measures produced no lasting improvements or were only effective whilst Australians remained in the units. The basic reason appeared to be a lack of motivation by the personnel of Territorial Force units.1

A combination of both roles could only be achieved properly with a much larger force, capable of splitting into two properly organized independent groups with sufficient flexibility to react to a changing situation. This could really only be contemplated when the Government
considers that the threat to Australia's national interests vital enough to warrant the cost of such forces.

Operations in Phuoc Tuy became a series of search and destroy operations, cordon and search of villages, patrolling and ambushing, route clearance and civic action. After Long Tan, rarely was the enemy in Phuoc Tuy prepared to engage company or larger sized forces in protracted fighting. The war in Phuoc Tuy for the soldier meant long and painstaking searches in the jungle, suffering casualties from mines and booby traps, and with only occasional clashes with the enemy. There were notable successes, as when two companies of 5RAR supported by a squadron of tanks accounted for 43 enemy killed in a 24 hour operation in June, 1969, in the Binh Ba rubber plantation, but minor engagements were the rule.

Occasionally the Task Force was required for operations outside Phuoc Tuy. One such instance occurred as a result of the Tet offensive in 1968. The Task Force was deployed, in May, at a position north of Bien Hoa which was astride a main enemy infiltration route. Before IRAR had time to establish its position it was attacked on the night of its deployment by a reinforced NVA battalion. The attack overran the IRAR mortar platoon and penetrated the gun position before being repulsed. On subsequent nights attacks were repeated in greater strength but were unsuccessful. 3RAR established a second fire support base within gun range to the north and repulsed similar attacks. It has been intended that both fire support bases act as springboards for armoured/infantry patrols at company level, however the reaction of the North Vietnamese caused full battalion defensive
positions to be established for the only time of the war. There were 76 enemy killed on this operation while the Task Force lost 23.

Apart from assisting ARVN and Territorial Forces, the Task Force also carried out an extensive civic action programme. This was designed to improve the health, education, comfort, economy and morale of the villagers. It was always coordinated with security measures in the province. Civic action sprang not only from altruism but from a desire to provide the villagers with some resistance to Viet Cong claims and as a means of gaining the general acceptance and support for the Australian presence.

By 1970 and 1971, Viet Cong ability to mount operations by his main force units had been greatly diminished. Main routes had been opened and market activities and movement between centres was flourishing. Local government in the villages had become more effective. There was tangible evidence of the civic action activities of the force in improved schools, better roads and market places, improved irrigation systems, and increased medical and dental facilities.

The major role of the Task Force, that of destroying the main force units, had been partly accomplished. Certainly Viet Cong influence on the population had been largely reduced and Government control had been restored. Such success, however, was dependent on the continuing presence of the Task Force. The Viet Cong always had the capacity to retire into rest areas and reform, their recruits coming from within the Province or elsewhere. As well, the Viet Cong infrastructure in the villages, a Vietnamese responsibility, was never eradicated.

When the Task Force withdrew, the Training Team remained in Phuoc Tuy. Its members observed the gradual return of Viet Cong influence and the erosion of Government control. This process was continuing when the Training Team, too, departed from Vietnam.

Command and Control in Phuoc Tuy Province

There was a need for joint control of all operations and civil control measures in Phuoc Tuy. The whole of the Province lay within the Viet Cong Ba Long Province, and the Viet Cong moved freely between the populated areas which was the military responsibility of the Province, and their base areas, the military responsibility of the Task Force. When IATF operations were well clear of populated areas, commanders found it was possible to scrape by with a fairly low level of cooperation, and the Sector (the military arm of the Province) and IATF could plan their operations more or less independently. With the switch to pacification support and the upgrading of the Regional and Popular Forces a much greater IATF presence became necessary in and near the populated areas, and with it, a greater need for cooperation and control.

What commanders felt was necessary was the formation of an Area War Executive Committee (AWEC) along the lines of the Malayan situation. This was found not to be possible in Phuoc Tuy. As the Vietnamese controlled all civil and military functions in the Province, other than IATF, any initiative towards an AWEC would have to come from them. The Province Chief held official authority, but this was undermined by dissent, cross-currents of loyalties, distrust and competing ambitions in the Vietnamese camp. Even had an AWEC been formed, it would have been unlikely to work. Alternative measures were therefore instituted such as informal meetings between the Province Chief and Commander IATF, the allocation of districts to the battalions for pacification responsibilities, an extensive system of liaison officers and an attempt to form committees for particular functions. All, for varying reasons, were only of limited success.

One major result of this absence of a central coordinating authority was that while the Task Force was carrying out its operations in depth, the enemy was consolidating in the population.

Withdrawal

The growing dissent around the world concerning Western involvement in Vietnam was echoed in Australia. Where formerly it had been restricted mostly to university students, non-conformist groups, other minority groups as well as those with proven links to the Communist party, by 1970 the protest movement had expanded to embrace people in all walks of life. The movement reached its climax in the cities of Australia with the first and second moratorium rallies on 8 May and 18 September, 1970.
Added to this general feeling, President Nixon had announced a troop withdrawal of 115,000 Americans by mid-April, 1970. On 21 April, 1970, he announced a further withdrawal of 150,000 troops to be completed over the succeeding 12 months. On the day following this latter announcement, 22 April, the Prime Minister, Mr John Gorton, announced that a battalion of the Task Force would be withdrawn and not replaced at the end of its tour. The withdrawal was justified in terms of the success of Vietnamisation — the move progressively towards Vietnamese taking over complete responsibility for the conduct of the war.

Consequently 8RAR was withdrawn at the conclusion of its tour on 17 November, 1970, leaving a two battalion task force.

On 30 March, 1971, the new Prime Minister, Mr William McMahon, announced a further gradual withdrawal of 1,000 men spread over the three services, and to be effective during the following three months.

Finally on 18 August, 1971, the Prime Minister announced that the bulk of the Australian forces would be withdrawn by Christmas and the remainder, with the exception of the Training Team, shortly thereafter. The circumstances which permitted this withdrawal were explained as follows:

The main Australian effort has been in the general area surrounding Saigon and particular in Phuoc Tuy Province. There, the security situation has markedly improved. The enemy has lost the initiative. The Vietnamese territorial forces have been steadily developing their capacity, and in the last year have gradually expanded their own areas of operations. The enemy is still there of course, and some setbacks may yet occur. But it is our view, shared by the Government of the Republic, that the existing relative strengths are such that the territorial forces should be able to handle the likely contingencies.

In reply, the leader of the Opposition, Mr Gough Whitlam, stated:

The Prime Minister has announced the end of the Australian commitment. He gives reasons as specious for ending it as were given for making it so needlessly for more than six years. There is one reason why Australia is now withdrawing. We are getting out because the US is getting out.

The Task Force withdrew from Vietnam between October and early December, the last battalion, 4RAR, departing on 8th December, 1971. The last of the logistic support element left Vietnam on 5th March, 1972.

**Australian Army Training Team Vietnam**

In January and February, 1965, the Australian Army Training Team was built up to 100 men. It remained at this strength until late 1970 when it was increased to over 200 at the time of the withdrawal of the first battalion. It then gradually reduced in strength until final withdrawal in December, 1972.

Members of the Training Team were attached to all of the many types of military and para-military forces which the Vietnamese employed. They also served in Special Forces alongside the elite USSF teams in border outposts. Although the Team was concentrated in I Corps, its members were spread throughout the four Vietnamese corps.

In 1970, following the policy of the Australian Government, the Training Team began concentrating in Phuoc Tuy Province alongside the Australian Task Force. There they established a Jungle Warfare Training Centre to train Vietnamese junior leaders. Their role gradually reverted to training.

The Training Team remained in Phuoc Tuy Province on the withdrawal of the Task Force in December, 1971. There they stayed until, with the election of a Labor Government on 2 December 1972, they were ordered to withdraw on 18 December 1972.

**ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY**

Naval support for Vietnam began with the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney in May, 1965. Sydney transported the vehicles and equipment and one company of troops of First Battalion: The Royal Australian Regiment to Vung Tau. She made 23 voyages to Vung Tau, finishing on 12 March, 1972.

Other Naval support, in order of entering the war, comprised of:

**Clearance Diving Team**

A small team which remained in Vietnam from February, 1967 to September, 1967, the unit cleared underwater sabotage charges and limpet mines from the bottom of ships in Vung Tau harbour. It usually operated at night, and was highly successful. The unit also carried out
small boat reconnaissance in the Mekong Delta, ambushing, demolition of canal barricades and the location and demolition of tunnels and bunkers.

**Ships with the U.S. 7th Fleet**

The RAN provided one ship with the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea as follows:

- **Guided Missile Destroyers:**
  - *Hobart*  
    - March-September 1967  
    - March-October 1968  
    - March-October 1970  
  - *Perth*  
    - September 1967-April 1968  
    - September 1968-March 1969  
    - September 1970-March 1971  
  - *Brisbane*  
    - March-October 1969  
    - March-October 1971  
- **Daring Class Destroyer:**

Duties included the patrolling of the North Vietnamese coast to prevent seaborne supplies to South Vietnam, bombardment of enemy supply lines and installations and naval gunfire support to units operating in South Vietnam. On more than one occasion ships provided gunfire support to Australians in Phuoc Tuy.

**RAN Helicopter Flight**

From October 1967 to May 1968, the RAN supplied aircrew and groundstaff for an Iroquois helicopter flight in Vietnam operating with the U.S. Army 135 Aviation Company, later called 135 Assault Helicopter Company. Its main role was the airborne insertion of troops into battle. The RAN also provided pilots at intervals for the RAAF 9 Squadron of Iroquois from May 1968.

**Medical Officers**

The RAN provided a small number of medical officers for the 1st Australian Field Hospital at Vung Tau and U.S. hospitals.

**ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE**

Apart from the United States, Australia was the only outside nation to make a significant contribution to air operations in Vietnam. The magnitude of the total air effort, however, made the substantial and effective RAAF contribution small by comparison.

The following RAAF elements were deployed in Vietnam:

**35 Transport Squadron**

Six RAAF Caribou aircraft began operations in Vietnam on 14 August 1964 and were withdrawn February 1972. This was increased to seven aircraft and reduced by three with the partial withdrawal in June, 1971.

Initially called the RAAF Transport Flight, its name was later changed to 35 Transport Squadron. Most knew it, however, as the Wallaby Flight.

The Wallaby Flight was stationed at Vung Tau and was controlled by the United States 834th Air Division.

Operating from primitive airstrips in many cases, the Wallaby Flight delivered some 100,000 tons of cargo and 300,000 passengers.

**9 Squadron (Iroquois)**

9 Squadron consisting of eight Iroquois helicopters operated in Vietnam from 12 June, 1966 to 8 December, 1971.

Under the operational control of the Task Force, the squadron was stationed at Vung Tau and provided airlift, medical evacuation, and later gunship support, in company with U.S. Army helicopters, for the Australian Army units.

**2 Squadron (Canberra Bombers)**

No. 2 Squadron of Canberra bombers arrived in Vietnam from Malaysia on 19 April, 1967. They were withdrawn on 4 June, 1971.

Based at Phan Rang, 2 Squadron served under the control of the United States 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, itself part of 7th Air Force.

Canberras carried out missions throughout the four Vietnamese corps. They were particularly noted for their precision bombing at low altitude.

**Hercules Aircraft**

Hercules aircraft from 37 and 38 Transport Squadron, based in Australia, were used from the initial deployment of IRAR to the withdrawal of AATTV, to transport troops and supplies between Australia and Vietnam. Specially fitted and crewed Hercules aircraft were also used for the medical evacuation of wounded to Australia via the RAAF hospital at Butterworth, Malaysia.
CONCLUSION

The war in Vietnam placed the Australian soldier into longer periods of contact, or imminent contact, with the enemy than at any time in our history except the Gallipoli campaign. Towards the end, with the withdrawal of the third battalion, thirty days in the jungle followed by three or four days rest was the norm. Even when in the Nui Dat base the soldier had his share of sentry duty, perimeter clearing patrols and being a member of a standby force.

At home in Australia officers and men could expect great posting turbulence as Army planners tried to manipulate our manpower assets having regard to the force in Vietnam, the operational readiness of replacement forces, the two-year period of national service and regular soldiers in battalions, and the long period of standdown which returning soldiers had accrued. This was done within a peace-time atmosphere during which one third of the Army's combat strength was in Vietnam and a further battalion with support was in Malaysia.

Although the article refers to some of the problems faced by commanders in Vietnam, and to the necessary inconclusiveness of the effort, it was nevertheless found to be professionally satisfying. This was made so by the quality, expertise and professionalism of the men and the smooth running organization of which they were part.

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NOTES

1. The pentropic organization came about in 1960 with the onset of the nuclear age. It was a five sided system, with five battalions to a division and five rifle companies to a battalion — but with four platoons per company. A pentropic battalion was half again the size of a conventional battalion but with twice the fire power. The U.S. Army was at the time experimenting with a 'pentomic' concept.

2. This request may be interpreted as the acceptance of an offer by Australia. The letter, dated 29th April, 1965 was tabled in Parliament and reproduced in C.P.D. 19th August, 1971, p. 314.


7. The reasons for this may be more easily understood when it is realised that the Territorial Forces had been under the same Viet Cong pressures as the remainder of the population in Phuoc Tuy before the Task Force arrived, had witnessed and been victims of the same government ineptitude, and very often came from divided families where brothers and sisters may be on opposite sides (but nevertheless met amicably under the family roof). The Territorial Forces seemed to have some accommodation with the Viet Cong.


By Major G. G. Middleton,
Royal Australian Signals

RECENTLY Americans have pointed to a crisis of confidence in their country, its leadership and its seeming inability to maintain political and economic leadership in the modern world. They have exhibited a feeling of helplessness in their inability to deal with a handful of militant students holding Americans hostage in Tehran. That they are equally disturbed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their difficulty in formulating an effective response is also obvious.

Many of the factors which have made the USA a great power now limit its responses. In 1980 President Carter, unlike many of his predecessors, must tread warily in a politically aware and volatile world with its ever present dangers of crossing the nuclear threshold, threats to stability in the Middle East and the possible destruction of the existing world economic order which a Middle East conflagration could trigger. As a result many of the responses have been symbolic or carried out through surrogates. That the USSR also must play the game by more restrictive rules is often overlooked.

In their yearning for past glories and less fettered leadership Americans recall earlier periods of great presidential decision. More often than not this evokes memories of Theodore 'Teddy' Roosevelt, frontiersman, big game hunter, sportsman, rough rider, author, governor, president and international statesman. It is of interest to examine Roosevelt's presidency and take note of the actions which he was able to take at a time when the international limitations on US power were less restrictive than today.

For the greater part of the 19th century, the USA had maintained an isolationist stance in world affairs. The wars which had occurred with Great Britain and Mexico were primarily over issues or territory close to home and particularly following the Civil War the principal concerns of Americans were reconstruction, westward expansion, the American industrial revolution and economic matters generally. The army was a small one scattered across the frontier posts, while the navy remained small by the standards of the great European powers.

In 1895 an insurrection had broken out in Cuba and the succeeding events forced President McKinley, reluctantly to declare war
on Spain. Roosevelt, then Deputy Secretary of the Navy, had been instrumental in the despatch of Dewey's squadron to Manila Bay before resigning his post to become a self-appointed leader with the rough riders. The resultant publicity made him a national figure while his involvement with both naval and military matters fuelled a lifelong interest and throughout his public career he was to be an exponent of the need for a strong navy. He had been to the forefront in urging McKinley to intervene in Cuba, believing that intervention was inevitable if the USA was to retain its self respect as a nation. The war with Spain had resulted in the US gaining temporary control over Cuba and the Philippines and control over Puerto Rico; while it had furnished McKinley with the excuse he needed to incorporate Hawaii into the United States. All of these actions had been enthusiastically espoused by Roosevelt.

The popularity gained by Roosevelt's war time exploits, notably his dramatic charge up San Juan Hill in what he called a ‘bully fight’ had led to his nomination as Republican Governor of New York at a time when the party bosses believed that they could not have won an election with a less popular candidate. His too enthusiastic reform initiatives upset his powerful party backers and he was eased into the Vice Presidency, an office then considered to be of little account. When in September 1901 President McKinley was assassinated the nation found itself with the man party manager Senator Hanna described as 'that damned cowboy' in the White House.

Roosevelt brought a new style to the White House and in international affairs his vigour, impetuous enthusiasm and belief in America's international destiny caused him to make a greater impact on the world stage than any preceding and most succeeding presidents. Soon after becoming president he said:

'If we stand idly by' . . . 'if we seek merely swollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger will pass us by . . . Let us therefore boldly face the life of strife'.

I do not intend to give the details of all the international initiatives associated with Roosevelt's presidency however the principal events were:

a. The Panamanian rebellion against Columbia and the resultant agreement between Panama and the USA on the construction of the Isthmian Canal.
b. Re-intervention in Cuba in 1903 and 1906.
c. The Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and US intervention in Venezuela and Santa Domingo.
d. Mediation following the Japanese-Russian War.
e. Mediation in the Moroccan crisis of 1905-1906 in a dispute between France and Germany over conflicting territorial claims in Africa.
f. The doubling of the strength of the United States Navy and the world cruise of the 'Great White Fleet' in 1907-1909.
g. The resolution of the Alaska border dispute with Canada to the advantage of the United States.

On foreign policy matters he tended to act alone, choosing to work through his cabinet advisers only when it suited him and consulting Congress only when he was legally obliged to and, even then, often being accused of overstepping his executive powers. He was committed to what he described as the 'ultra-American spirit of patriotism' and in the 1900 campaign had told a Californian audience that 'I wish to see the United States the dominant power on the shores of the Pacific Ocean' while in his first presidential message to Congress in 1901 he remarked that no single work on the continent was more important to the American people than the building of an Isthmian Canal.

When the Columbian Government was proving intransigent in its negotiations with the USA over the terms for ceding a strip of territory for the Isthmian Canal a rebellion occurred in Panama City on 4th November 1903. Roosevelt ordered the US Navy to land marines which prevented Columbia from Rallying troops to the scene. Panamanian independence was recognized within a few days and the new government concluded a treaty with the US in December which was ratified by the US Senate on 23rd February 1904, a total period of less than three months. In response to critics Roosevelt said 'the canal would not have been built at all save for the action I took'.

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had denied European powers the right of military
intervention in the Americas, the Area which the United States saw as its sphere of influence. When in 1902 Venezuela's refusal to honour its debts led to threatened use of force by England and Germany, Roosevelt agreed to arbitrate the issue to prevent European intervention. Since European powers claimed that they were wronged by not being allowed to enforce the obligations of debtor nations this placed an obligation on the United States to act. Following this Roosevelt announced his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his 4th annual message to Congress in 1904. The critical passage was:

'...chronic wrongdoing, or an impatience which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power...'

He later used the corollary as justification for intervening in Santa Domingo to enforce a debt settlement and for re-intervening in Cuba to restore order in 1906. Had it not been for the caution of his advisers there is no doubt that he would have intervened elsewhere as well.

He had believed fervently in the need for naval strength from before his time as Deputy Secretary for the Navy. He believed that for a nation to be as rich as the USA but at the same time to be weak was to invite destruction. At his prompting the United States Navy doubled its strength during his presidency while the construction of the Panama Canal increased its potential still further by enabling it to concentrate in either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. Roosevelt, as usual without consulting Cabinet ordered the ‘Great White Fleet’ to make a voyage around the world at a time when it was generally believed that warships were not sufficiently reliable to undertake such lengthy voyages and in doing so Roosevelt believed that he ordered ‘the most important service that I rendered to peace’. Certainly he impressed both the American people and all international powers with American strength. He thus publicly demonstrated the belief he had expanded to Congress that:

'The strong arm of the government in enforcing respect for its just rights in international matters is the Navy of the United States... There is no more patriotic duty before us than to keep the Navy adequate to the needs of this country's position'.

Following the Russian-Japanese War in 1904 Roosevelt offered to mediate between them. As a consequence the Portsmouth Agreement of 1905 was reached and Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize however the longer term results were not particularly successful. Later, during the Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906 he again acted as a peace maker between France and Germany notwithstanding the advice of Secretary of State, Root. He actively directed the Algeciras Conference and afterwards boasted of having stood the Kaiser on his head 'with great decision'.

At all times he vigorously defended what he regarded as American interests. He acted strongly to protect the Alaskan border by stationing troops near it when gold strikes made it an issue and then through strong diplomacy arrived at a settlement which was favourable to the US while proceeding in a manner which saved Canadian face. The treaty with Cuba in 1903 as well as recognizing the right of the US to intervene allowed for US Naval Bases on the island. Similarly in the Philippines while establishing a measure of self government effective power was retained by US appointed governor and provision was made for US bases.

Overall his role in international affairs was an extremely active one. Only McKinley of his recent predecessors had been heavily involved and then only slowly and grudgingly. No other president had mediated disputes between other major powers and he was the first president to attempt to build the United States into a naval power ranking with the leading European powers. His decisiveness over Panama, Cuba, the Philippines and Santa Domingo established new forward limits of US power. While his critics harped at his impetuousness and the Democratic Party tried to make anti-imperialism the central plank of their campaign his great popularity with the American people gave him the easiest of victories in 1904 and this popularity within America enabled him to act with strength and decisiveness on the world stage. Notwithstanding that he was President during the pre-world war era of great
imperialistic rivalry between the major European powers he was able to establish himself as a prominent figure on the world stage and to establish the USA as a great power in the world. Perhaps the nicest description of him was written by a political enemy in the Louisville Courier Journal during the 1904 Presidential campaign:

'T. R. Roosevelt is as sweet a gentleman as ever scuttled a ship or cut a throat'.

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AWARD: ISSUE NO. 23 (JULY/AUGUST 1980)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the July/August 1980 Issue (No. 23) of the Defence Force Journal to Air Commodore R. G. Funnell, RAAF, M Pol Sc, Grad DIP ADMN for his article The Professional Military Officer in Australia.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

All books reviewed in this issue are available in various defence libraries.


THE theme of this book is that "through the proper application of a deterrent posture, Australia can effectively 'control' its 'threat' environment (pp. 7-8)." There is also a secondary theme, implied in the sub-title, that a deterrent posture policy has implications for this country's defence force development.

Now there is no dispute about the link between defence posture and procurement/manpower decisions and this aspect of the study is thoroughly covered. At the same time it may, or may not, be possible to control the "threat environment" by virtue of the posture we adopt. Whether such a strategy will prove effective depends, inter alia, on the correct perception of threats.

It seems to me that the authors have proceeded on the assumption that the assessments of the "threat environment" available to the defence planners is correct. However, this denies any impact of force structure, procurement programmes, etc. on the threat assessment process itself.

Two concepts underlie the defence posture proposed here: deterrence and disproportionate response. The former concept is a product of the nuclear rivalry between the two superpowers, the basic tenet of which is "to reduce the probability of enemy military attacks, by posing for the enemy a sufficient likely prospect that he will suffer a net loss as a result of the attack . . . (p. 11, citing Snyder)." A deterrent posture is thus most efficacious amongst nuclear powers, but becomes less so in the case of either a conventional or nuclear-conventional mix. Furthermore, other factors affect the application of the concept, as the authors point out (p. 12). These include the environment, troop deployment, force level and threat perceptions.

In this context, the official government assessment that there is "no foreseeable threat (to Australia) for 15 years" (White Paper, Nov. 1976) is significant, affecting as it does the climate for the development of an appropriate posture.

Disproportionate response, on the other hand, is a concept much more relevant to the Australian situation, bearing in mind the factors enumerated above, and especially perceptions of threat scenarios. Disproportionate response "is intended to progressively incorporate into the defence forces specific capabilities that will cause a potential aggressor to respond disproportionately in terms of . . . cost (p. 22)." The task of the defence planner is to decide, subject to budgetary and other constraints, what forces and weapon systems are necessary to oblige (all) potential enemies to make a disproportionate response and to plan correct strategies and tactics to meet (all) possible threats.

The implications for defence planning in the adoption of such a posture are obvious, particularly in relation to the level of forces demonstrably in being. However, fundamental to the whole policy making process is the assessment of threats to the country's security, for the necessary procurement, force structure and logistics decisions can only be effectively made after the potential requirements have been determined. The authors quote Dr. O'Neill's view that "the main defence problems currently in front of Australia are not those of limited finance but those of limited outlook (p. 58)." This is undoubtedly true, but the outlook is, I submit, deficient in the area of threat perception.
ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSITIONS: MANAGING COMPLEX CHANGE, by R. Beckhard and R. T. Harris, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1977
Reviewed by Major N. A. Jans

Although many service officers might argue that books about “management” are of little relevance to effective command and staff functioning in the military, there can be little dispute that “the management of change” is an area which is pertinent to all organizations, regardless of their goals and natures. Unfortunately, most books on this subject are rather thin, in the practical sense, containing too many homilies about the need to change and too few suggestions about how and when to actually do it. Consequently, a recent publication in the Addison-Wesley series on organizational development, called “Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change”, is a most welcome addition to the literature. It is written by two professors of management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who have had extensive practice as consultants in this field. The senior author was a pioneer writer in the area of “organizational development”, but in the preface to this book, it is conceded that it was rare for a practical “OD” project to proceed according to principles and without considerable difficulty. This, it is argued, was because early OD practitioners were lacking in two areas: firstly, in an awareness of the complexity of organizational behaviour: it was not appreciated how delicate a plant planned change is; and secondly, in a set of techniques for effecting change which would be both acceptable to managers and successful in practice. This book represents a solution to each of these deficiencies. It is structured in the form of a “how to” guide (which the reader must, of course, apply with commonsense based on local circumstances) of six steps of the change process in complex institutions:

1. diagnosing of the present condition, including the need for change;
2. setting goals and defining the new state or condition after the change;
3. defining the transition state between the present and the future;
4. developing strategies and action plans for managing this transition;
5. evaluating the change effort; and
6. stabilising the new condition and establishing a balance between flexibility and stability.

The most useful concepts in the book, to my mind, are associated with Steps 1-4. The writers’ advocacy of the need to describe the present and the desired future conditions, in all their ramifications, is an important reminder that such conditions comprise not only goals and technology, but also social groupings norms and values, and centres of intraorganization power. Since it is a rare change which does not have some effect on all of these, ignoring their possible influence risks failure of the programme or the project. It is neglect of this careful preliminary diagnosis which has, I am sure, caused problems with many planned changes in recent years, both inside and outside the services.

To handle the complex problems of the change itself, the writers call for a declaration of “the transition state” and the establishment of a special management system for it. This system, the task of which to nurse the organization through the change including dealing with the uncertainty and conflict which most change generates, is frequently deliberately quite different from those which are ideal for the old and final stable forms of management.

The book is directed not at academics nor even primarily at consultants but at managers in large complex organizations. Its size (it will take the average reader not much more than three hours to complete) is probably about right in terms of balancing the requirements of degree of explanation/illustration against propensity to be read. There are, in fact, many anecdotal illustrations of the application of the processes, covering varied organizations (businesses, hospitals and schools). Overall, it is very easy to read.

I daresay that the military manages change as well as most other institutions but this is no excuse for ignoring the chance to improve our ability in this area. Consideration of “Organizational Transitions” would, I feel, lead to such an improvement.

Reviewed by Captain P. A. Pedersen

In the first chapter of a masterly study of the historical method entitled What is History?, E.H. Carr enjoins his readers to "study the historian before you begin to study the facts". As Carr says, this is not very abstruse: "It is what is already done by the intelligent undergraduate, who, when recommended to read a work by that great scholar Jones of St Judes, goes round to a friend at St Judes to ask what sort of chap Jones is, and what bees he has in his bonnet".

This relationship between the historian and his point of view is particularly applicable to The Pacific War by Saburo Ienaga. The author was born in Nagoya in 1913 and from 1949 to 1977 taught at the Tokyo University of Education where he is now Professor Emeritus. Ienaga has written over fifty books and is as active in the academic field. He is deeply committed to the preservation of civil liberties in Japan and is an outspoken advocate of international disarmament. Hence it is hardly surprising that Ienaga opposes Japan's policy of sheltering under the US nuclear umbrella and bitterly condemned American involvement in Indochina.

The Pacific War is a mirror reflection of Ienaga's political philosophy and the principles that underlie it. He was concerned that as the war became a distant memory, future generations of Japanese would possibly repeat the errors that led to its outbreak. Thus the book is intended as a reminder to Japanese that their current peace and prosperity results from the destruction of the brutal and repressive system that prevailed until 14 August 1945.

Ienaga considers that the Pacific War did not begin with the attack on Pearl Harbor but rather, the explosion on the South Manchurian Railway Line near Mukden on 18 September 1931. That action by the Kwantung Army led to the seizure of Manchuria and presaged the outbreak of full-scale hostilities with China in 1937. Subsequent American and British economic sanctions threatened the successful prosecution of this conflict and so Japan crippled their military and naval power in the Pacific, thereby ensuring her access to the rich material resources of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Hence the war in China was 'the core of the Pacific War' and it remained the principal theatre even after the outbreak of hostilities with Britain and the United States.

The factors upon which Japanese policy was based were diverse. There were economic motives: the coal and iron of Manchukuo and Northern China and Dutch East Indies' oil. Then there was the urge to imperialism; the nationalist quest for an empire as great as any of those of the Western powers. Strategic considerations too, played a significant role. While admitting the importance of these factors, Ienaga says that the ultimate objective of Japanese policy was the destruction of communism, not only in China, but ultimately in Russia as well. The US and Britain did no more than issue futile protests at Japanese aggression because they tacitly supported this anti-communist crusade. Indeed Ienaga asserts that many members of government in both countries considered Japan "a bulwark against Communism in the Far East and felt a fraternal bond with her". Ienaga's contention is nothing if not controversial and resembles the view that the policy of appeasement in Europe also was aimed at turning German ambitions towards the East.

The Japanese military and the suppression of civil rights form the core of Ienaga's work and in his opinion constitute the two basic factors in accounting for Japan's slide to disaster. Under the principle of the independence of the supreme command, the military enjoyed direct access to the emperor, bypassing the government. Until the end of the Pacific War the service ministries remained the special preserve of professional military men, thereby crippling the effective exercise of power by cabinets formed from the majority party in the Diet. If the wishes of the military were not met, they could either topple the cabinet by having the army or navy minister resign or prevent its formation altogether by refusing to provide officers to serve as ministers. In 1912 Army Minister Uehara Yusaka resigned when the Cabinet refused to sanction an increase of two divisions. The Army Ministry announced that no successor was available and so the Cabinet itself had no choice but to resign. As Ienaga says, control over the appointment of service ministers gave the military the power of life or
death over any cabinet. Indeed by 1936 cabinets could only be formed subject to military approval of the proposed appointees. Furthermore, the refusal of the military to share information on service matters meant that governments were often ignorant of the true situation in China and then after 1941, in the Pacific theatre. Hence military control of foreign policy was tightened and the role of civilian members of government reduced to little more than uninformed spectators.

Why did the Japanese people accept this authoritarianism? asks Ienaga. The answer lies largely in the combination of the education system with a series of internal security laws which stifled intellectual freedom. After a brief flirtation with Western values and culture, Japanese education was constrained by strict government controls designed to inculcate national awareness and instil obedience to the Emperor. The Imperial Rescript on Education, issued in 1890, reflects these objectives. The uniformity produced by the education system was strengthened by the restrictions imposed on freedom of speech and thought by the internal security laws. The Press Law (1875 and revised in 1877) made newspaper editors culpable for all material they published and allowed the Home Minister to prohibit publication of any article he deemed offensive. The Peace Preservation Regulations (1887 and thereafter constantly revised) allowed police to exile those even suspected of scheming and plotting. The Public Order Police Law (1900) curtailed rights of assembly and association. These measures stifled the exchange of facts and ideas, removing the essential basis for informed judgement by Japanese on their nation’s foreign and defence policies. According to Ienaga, an intellectual vacuum resulted which was filled by official militarism and ‘the public, unaware of the truth or of alternatives, automatically came to support the government position’.

Ienaga’s detailed treatment of authoritarianism in pre-war Japan is part of his aforementioned concern to prevent any repetition of the events of this period by future Japanese generations. A similar motive underlies his lengthy account of what he calls ‘the horrors of war’. The grisly atrocities committed by Japanese troops in China and the Pacific are recounted in full, ranging from the Rape of Nanking to the vivisection experiments conducted on captured US airmen. The onset of the B29 raids brought the war to the Japanese homeland and inflicted further misery on a population already suffering acute food shortages. But despite the growing certainty of defeat the military did not waver in their determination to fight to the end, an attitude condemned by Ienaga as ‘an egregious act of cruelty against the Japanese people’.

In some respects The Pacific War is a useful addition to existing material on Imperial Japan. Its sources are almost wholly Japanese and it contains a wealth of contemporary accounts by a cross-section of the population who were directly affected by the events of those years — soldiers, refugees, housewives and even children. Ienaga’s examination of the Japanese military system is interesting, particularly the attitudes of the NCO and the emphasis on brutality as a leadership technique. He also draws parallels between the commitment of ever-increasing Japanese armies to China and the US involvement in Vietnam, a subject which has attracted several Western scholars of Japanese history such as Alvin Coox and Hilary Conroy.

However certain features of The Pacific War trouble this reviewer. Though admirable, Ienaga’s purpose in writing the book lends itself to polemicism and tendentiousness, both of which are particularly apparent in the concluding sections. He is extremely critical of the Japanese people for failing to revolt against military control. This is an extremely simplistic approach which confuses idealism with practicality, especially as Ienaga himself admits the almost insurmountable difficulties facing those with contrary views. He asserts that the behaviour of US occupation forces in Japan was comparable in every way to that of the Japanese Army in China and in fact, regards Japan as little more than as America’s vassal. Finally, Ienaga omits certain interpretations which conflict with his own. The work of Western historians such as Butow and, in particular, Crowley, should have merited consideration. Crowley’s Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, published in 1966, and the articles which preceded it, dispute the influence on policy-making exerted by political murders, extremist plots and military factionalism whose importance Ienaga stresses.

The eloquence of Ienaga’s plea to his countrymen to remember the past and avoid its errors, cannot be denied. Nonetheless its faults
detract considerably from the historical value of *The Pacific War* and preclude its unqualified recommendation to students of this turbulent period of Japanese history.


Reviewed by K.I. Taylor
Former Managing Editor, Defence Force Journal

A DICTIONARY is not an easy book to review. Perhaps the only way to test its worth is by using it over a period of time.

In six months, whilst Managing Editor of your Journal, I have found Mr de Sola's *Abbreviations Dictionary* truly international and extremely useful. I have been frustrated on occasion. For instance, I could not find my good friend Major General Dar's Pakistani "TBt" decoration, but then, neither does it show Commander Peter Shevlin's Australian "AM". Maybe both are too new to be included; perhaps the sixth edition will set matters right.

However, generally, Australia is well represented, though New South Wales people might object to the fact that, while the RACV — Royal Automobile Club of Victoria — is listed, the NRMA is given only as the "National Retail Merchants Association".

This useful book also includes sections on the Airlines of the World (for the jetsetter), the World's Capital Cities, Chemical Elements, the Richter Scale, Proofreader's Marks, the Beaufort Scale and many more, including Wedding Anniversaries. In this latter category, the author's sense of humour comes through. For the 80th Anniversary he writes — "Consult your nearest jeweler(sic); contact the media and the police if you have accumulated all the foregoing wedding anniversary gifts; treat yourself to whatever you want — this is the time-flies anniversary and may earn you a place in the *Guinness Book of World Records*."

A book no editor, writer or academic should be without, and a suitable present for that someone who has everything.


**PETER BURNESS'** article "The Forgotten War in North Russia" (DFJ No 22 May/June 1980) is a concise and objective account of Australian participation in allied activities in North Russia. The title is perhaps not totally correct, the war in North Russia is, to paraphrase Slim, not so much forgotten as unheard of.

Halliday dwells on this aspect in the opening chapter of his book even to the point of suggesting a degree of evasiveness on the part of the American Government in acknowledging that US troops were involved, thereby attempting to perpetuate the myth that the USSR is one major power with which the US has not been in direct conflict.

The book concentrates on the activities of American troops operating under British command from Archangel. It employs the tactic, fashionable in the 1960's, of denigrating some senior officers (although Ironside emerges as an able and popular commander) and investigates and reports on the political manoeuvring surrounding the Allied involvement, including the personal attitudes of Woodrow Wilson, Churchill and Clemenceau.

It is probably in this latter area that the chief interest in the book lies as the author reveals the shift of emphasis from ends to means and back again.

As the story unfolds of political indecision on the extent to which the conflict should be prosecuted; the underestimation of the enemy's equipment, morale and fighting ability; growing opposition at home and increasing disenchantment with the Government the Allies were supporting, one cannot but be struck by the similarity between these aspects of the wars in North Russia and South Vietnam. This comparison would obviously not have been possible when the book was written which makes it more telling than had the author deliberately attempted so to do.

The actions recounted are predominantly at sub-unit level and the way they are described reveals Halliday's experience as a war correspondent.
There are no photographs but the book does contain clear maps and, even though the area of operations is limited in area and oriented north/south, those maps help the reader follow the action through a maze of unfamiliar Russian names.

"The Ignorant Armies" is a readable book that not only demonstrates the repetitive nature of history but also serves to fill a gap that many may have in their knowledge of recent military history.

DUKW 2½ TON 6 x 6 AMPHIBIAN by Jeff Woods, published by ISO Publications LONDON, 1978, 72 pages. £1.25

Reviewer: MAJ A. C. G. Welburn, RACT OMOVt Log Br.

If anyone has ever wondered what DUKWs were and what they were capable of, Jeff Woods' book provides the answers. Produced by ISO Publications, this edition is one of three produced on World War II soft skinned vehicles — the others deal with the American Weasel and the British Landrover.

This book — DUKW — covers the Dukw from its inception, through acceptance into service and finally its demise in 1974 by way of brief narratives and photographs.

An introductory historical section outlines the initial requirement for the Dukw and gives the derivatives from which this vehicle was developed — the GMC CCKW 2½ 6 x 6 GS truck, the Ford Seep and Weasel. For the uninitiated the name Dukw is explained — from GMC terminology where D means 1942, U is for Utility (Amphibious), K for Front Wheel drive and W for two rear driving axles. This section also includes Dukw systems which covers methods of carrying heavy, unusual or indivisible loads — well illustrated with photographs of Dukws ferrying P-38 aircraft, M4 and M3 tanks, even Dukws rigged to fire fieldguns on the move and calliope type rocket tubes — in this case ten rows of twelve tubes of 4.5" rockets.

A technical description of the Dukw is included in the next outline narrative with mention being made of the difficulties encountered in modifying normal vehicle parts for use in an amphibious vehicle. In some cases the Dukw was quite advanced for its time, for example it was equipped with a centrally controlled inflation system for the tyres that worked through a permanent airline connected to a rotating gland in each wheel hub — a type of inflating system that is still under investigation in many of today's modern armies.

The final written section deals with the role played by the Dukw in operations throughout all the theatres of war. A word of warning is expressed in this section that is still current today: that care must be exercised in amphibious operations and such vehicles should never be used too far inland in a conventional truck role.

The book contains over one hundred and fifty black and white photographs with a central colour section on Dukw camouflage colours. The photographs cover Russian (one only) American and British Dukws carrying cargo, troops, and VIP's, in the Mediterranean, European and Pacific Theatres of war and even include a number of photographs of Dukws participating in amphibious beach and assault river crossings.

There are however a number of shortcomings which affect the value of this work — there is no table of contents, no index and no apparent order in presentation of photographs and line diagrams. In particular the photographs are mixed by date and theatre of operations which tends to become confusing. There is also a tendency, in places, to over-statement. The book, for example, begins with the following:

"In many ways the Dukw exemplifies all that is best of the American enterprise as seen from Europe. Brilliant ingenuity in conception allied with overwhelming competence in productive capability in cracking a near insolvable problem — the very essence of democracy's flexible response."

and closes with the comment that:

"no equally effective replacement is in service in the West today."

Whilst the first statement is "excessive", the second belies the fact that the LARC (Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo) V. XV and LX is in service with both the West German and American Forces stationed in Western Europe.

Primarily a book for those who have memories of the Dukw, it would also prove useful to anyone wishing to model this unique amphibious vehicle. Overall, a book with limited potential primarily due to its specialized and somewhat narrow topic.
I have long believed that there was a fund of material available to form the basis of histories of units of the Australian Cadet Corps. The wonder is that the impetus did not come from one of the units which was formed in the mid 1860s when the movement first began in Australia’s secondary schools. Though this was not to be, it was no less pleasing to read Brother K. G. Mortensen’s book about the post-war days of the Christian Brothers’ College, St Kilda, Cadet Unit. I hope his effort may encourage others to marshal the articles, reports, routine orders, which no doubt abound in school archives, into similarly acceptable form. Perhaps CBC was fortunate in having a chronicler as able as Brother Mortensen to present its story for, in twenty-one years in 3 Cadet Brigade he spent eighteen of them as Officer Commanding the CBC Unit.

In his preface, the author points out that he has not wished to limit himself to a mere historical summary of the activities of one unit or one Brigade. This comment has particular relevance to some of the later chapters where the Millar Committee’s report is discussed along with the political decisions of the Labor Government of 1975 and the Liberal Government of 1976 which respectively disbanded and reinstated the Australian Cadet Corps. The difficulties experienced since 1976 are also considered on a much wider scale than would be reflected at Brigade level.

Some aspects of cadet life are treated in more depth than others. The author discusses training in considerable detail, and from a number of different angles. There are separate chapters devoted to each of the specialist activities which were available to members of the unit. These are all drawn together to illustrate how they contributed to the common goal each year — the conduct of a successful camp. Most of the CBC camps were in that category despite the dwindling help which the Army was able to give because of its commitments to National Service Training and, later, to Vietnam.

In a survey which covers some tempestuous years of the Cadet Corps saga, it is impossible not to analyse the events which caused the tempest. Brother Mortensen is objective in his comments on the Millar report and he also deals fairly with the many detractors of the Cadet Corps as a school institution. He proves conclusively, for example, that boys do not have the desire to turn into killers when they have rifles in their hands. He also shows how safety-minded boys can become, not only when handling weapons but in other aspects of training and living in the field. However, weaknesses appear in his argument when he puts forward his thesis for the retention of cadet units in schools. Not all units remaining in existence are efficient units; the place of the Cadet Corps is lower on Army’s list of priorities than it has ever been; the demands on teachers’ time is such that few of them, especially in the state schools, are willing to put in the time to another activity such as Cadets.

An Australian Army Cadet Unit, apart from its obvious appeal to old boys and ex-members of staff of CBC St Kilda, is recommended as a more than useful guide to schools who still have Cadet units and should be read by all who care about Australia’s capability for its own defence and the place of the Australian Cadet Corps in that capability.