DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

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A former Royal Australian Air Force Walrus amphibian aircraft which was wrecked in Antarctica 32 years ago, is now back in Australia. The wreckage was brought home by ship from Heard Island. It will be held in storage at the Royal Australian Air Force Base, Pearce, Western Australia, from there it will be sent to the Royal Australian Air Force Museum at Point Cook, Victoria, for restoration. It is believed that the Walrus is one of only two in the world. The other, another Royal Australian Air Force aircraft, is in the Royal Air Force Museum at Hendon, England.

The Walrus, serial number A2-4D874, entered the Royal Australian Air Force on September 19, 1943, and served for the remainder of World War II. On October 2, 1947, it was leased to the Department of External Affairs for work in the Antarctic. Three months later, on January 5, 1948, it was wrecked in a gale at Heard Island and had remained there ever since. The Department of National Development, Division of National Mapping agreed to the request by the Royal Australian Air Force to bring the aircraft home.

Also known as the “Seagull V”, the Walrus was designed by R. V. Mitchell who was later responsible for the famous ‘Spitfire’ fighter. Delivery of 24 Walrus aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force began in 1935 for operations from Royal Australian Navy cruisers. A further 37 were delivered during World War II. The Walrus was a three-seat biplane with a ‘pusher’ engine. It had a top speed of 120 knots and was originally designed to be operated from warships.

The Army is commencing a long range project to replace light armoured vehicles by the mid-1990s. Exploratory studies, within the Department of Defence have already started to determine the characteristics of light armoured vehicles, both tracked and wheeled, required by the Army in the future. Subject to the successful outcome of these studies and to Government approvals in due course, further studies to pursue the requirements in greater depth would be initiated as the project develops.

The project named ‘Waler’ after an Australian breed of horse which achieved a fine reputation as a brave and dependable mount for the British and Indian Cavalry. It was later used by some Australian Light Horse Regiments, forerunners to today’s Royal Australian Armoured Corps.

Approximately 200 men and women Navy Reservists will take part in a Navy Control and Protection of Shipping exercise, starting on May 7, 1980. The Reservists will participate in exercise “Roll Call 80”, a biennial exercise involving Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Reservists will simulate the movement, coordination and control of merchant shipping in a wartime situation. Unlike other naval exercises, “Roll Call 80” will not involve the actual movement of ships. The participants will man naval control of shipping organisation in Australian capital cities, and command headquarters in Canberra and Sydney. They will join about 100 permanent members of the Navy for the conduct of the exercise, which will highlight the importance of maritime lines of communication. Roll Call exercises have been conducted since the late 1950s.
THE BANTAMS
Dear Sir —

Because of your interest and help while I was researching a book during the past two years, I would like to share with you a splendid bit of news.

My manuscript, “The Bantams”, has found a publisher. Howard Baker Press of Wimbledon, London, will be bringing out the book this autumn.

I want you to know how much I appreciated your contribution in assisting me to gather information for this book. I sincerely consider that you played an important part in helping me research it.

With thanks and best wishes,

Sidney Allinson
Ontario
Canada

P.S. Your publishing my appeal for information resulted in 3 most helpful replies from readers.

Thanks again
S.A.

FUNCTIONS OF A DESIGN AUTHORITY
Dear Sir,

Reading the article by R. E. Christensen (DFJ Jan/Feb/80) took me back some eight years and lead me to conclude that nothing changes very much except perhaps an E for an A and some other new organisational abbreviations.

While always being an ardent supporter of EDE, or ADE as I knew it, and while agreeing that many of the points which have been made, I was surprised to see that Design Authority is still being defined, discussed and, in the hands of the Author, further delineated.

Unless this matter is resolved, once and for all, the present misunderstanding and disagreement will be perpetuated into a period when important new projects will make a clear understanding of procedures and responsibilities between industry and Defence mandatory.

The Author refers to a number of recorded and ad hoc functions of a Design Authority. These are —

- The performance of and the supervision of study, design and in-service defect modification of military equipment
- The in-house (intra-mural) execution of a technical task as well as the control of the assumption of the responsibility for and the acceptance of the outcome of a task sub-contracted to a Design Agency
- Responsibility for the design of the product incorporating the preparation of design drawings and other related data
- The functional organisation responsible for the overall control of the technical aspects of a development project
- The conduct of Project Definition studies and Feasibility studies if conducted by other than the Design Authority.

I receive the impression that under any of these definitions EDE sees itself in the role of the Design Authority.

While this may be so in some cases, it must be far from the general rule.

It is not uncommon for industry to be asked to submit bids for the project definition stage of a major project. Surely, in such cases, the successful tenderers will become the design authorities. They are being asked to provide product specifications for the system, the components, equipments and ancillaries, together with the contract plans for the remainder of the project, detailed technical descriptions, development models and a tender for the development/pre-production phase.

The tenderer will not be Design Agencies working under a supervising EDE Design Authority. The tenderers may have various Design Agencies sub-contracting to them.

Where EDE is not the Design Authority, it nevertheless has an important role to play. From an industry point of view, it is the organisation to which the contracting Design Authority can refer for technical explanation and information. From the Service point of view, it provides technical advice and recommendations on the control and monitoring of the project.

No organisation should have the exclusive right to monitor and control its own performance. It was on that point that I argued some eight years ago and it still appears far from resolution.

J. D. Honeysett
Brigadier (RL) OBE
AUTHOR'S REPLY

Dear Sir,

Thank you for the opportunity to reply to Brigadier Honeysett's letter. I thank him for his kind comments on EDE. Whilst he expressed surprise about the current day delineation of a subject that has, for Army, been fairly firmly established for a long time, he may not be aware or have appreciated that:

a. a practitioner's (of the Design Authority for Army) side of the story has not been recorded before, and
b. the article was prepared in order to publicise the nature of the Army Design Authority function at a time when there is still no commonly agreed set of Design Authority functions within the three services and DSTO.

As a result of this lack of standardisation industry is confused (as we painfully know).

It was not stated in the article, but the draft was cleared for publication with the Materiel Branch, Army. I have re-read Reference 5 to my article, which reference was published in 1975, and found that what I have written parallels very closely official Army writings on the subject, being further delineated only by giving the practitioner's side of the story.

EDE is not the Design Authority for all of Army's projects, just for most of those formally accorded an EDL project number where we preform the "recorded and ad hoc functions" he refers to.

Note that any contracted industries output must be subject to inspection by a Government Agency. During production (and for some pre-production activities) such inspection (for Army) is by the Army's Quality Assurance Agency. During the preceeding study and development phases such inspection and technical direction as necessary is carried out, as arranged, by Army itself, EDE or any other Design Authority appointed by Army. I do not particularly care (except for sentimental reasons and established usage on Army projects) if the term Design Authority is changed. The "Design Authority" function, retitled, would still be much the same.

The final paragraph of this letter is not understood in that there has never been any question of any industry or Design Authority or Materiel Branch, etc. activity (to go up the technical management hierarchy) which is impervious to scrutiny, review and comment by the next more senior level in the management chain on any project.

(R. E. Christensen)
Chief Electrical Engineer,
Engineering Development Establishment

MAN — THE MEASURE OF MOST THINGS

Dear Sir,

Your 'Editor's Comment' on page 2 of Defence Force Journal No 20 (Jan/Feb 1980), in its second sentence, suggested that the accompanying article 'Man — The Measure of Most Things' (pages 6-16) should raise some interesting debate in the Letters to the Editor Section.

Brigadier W. B. James (The Director of Medical Services — Army) and his co-author, Lieutenant Colonel R. J. G. Hall, ask us . . . 'to face up to the perfectly reasonable question of how man should be prepared for and utilized in the modern battlefield'. To offer some answer to that question is the challenge they successfully take up in their article.

Whether lengthy debate will ensue is up to other readers to decide, but I support the author's contentions dealing with Counters to Stress, under the headings 'Counter at the Individual and Group Levels' and 'The Nature of Care'.

In early 1968 Chaplain J. R. (Roy) Bedford wrote to me from South Vietnam, giving advice on training my unit might provide to soldiers preparing for service overseas. As I read 'Man — The Measure of Most Things', memory of Roy Bedford's letter stirred. When I 'dug it out', his words seem timeless and worth sharing.

He wrote ‘... It is important that men coming over here (to South Vietnam) have a real understanding of themselves. They need to realise they are responsible people. They do not have to be victims of the environment here or controlled by animal instinct. Too many men take themselves too cheaply and too many leaders of men talk as if man is incapable of
personal disciplined behaviour ... I have a lot of sympathy for soldiers in their struggle to maintain standards. It is not easy. Temptation comes to them. They do not have to go looking for it. They miss the stabilizing influence of home and ordinary female companionship. A man needs to have his standards sorted out in his own mind, and he needs strong motives, if he is not to fall by the wayside up here ... ."

There was more sage advice in Chaplain Bedford's letter than space will permit, in this rejoinder to the Jan/Feb 1980 article 'Man — The Measure of Most Things'. Perhaps Roy Bedford's postscript in 1968 will suffice "... I wrote as I thought of the situation and the reaction of soldiers to it. I thought of scrapping the letter and starting again but decided to let it go as it is and hope it suggests some ideas". Certainly it did suggest ideas in 1968 and subsequently — for example in 1976-77 at the Australian Staff College, Queenscliff; and I think Chaplain Bedford's words remain applicable today — and for our tomorrows in training, educating and leading men and women for service in and beyond Australia.

Alan Howes
Lieutenant Colonel

P.S. Rev. J. R. Bedford, MBE has seen the above and concurs with my use of his letter. Many readers, from the Army in particular, would recall that Roy Bedford served as a Regular Army Chaplain for over 20 years until 1978; he is now a Chaplain at Westmead Hospital in Parramatta, NSW. Both of us agree with the authors of 'Man — The Measure of Most Things' and General Hackett (footnote 28) that the effectiveness of any method of combating the effects of stress must be a matter of subjective judgement.

(Monthly Publication)

Dear Sir,

I believe an unsatisfactory trend is developing with the Journal. Articles take too long to be printed. I submitted an article in August 1979. I understand from yourself that the article will appear in the May-June 1980 edition. A perusal of the November/December 1979 edition shows articles received in March, April and January of that year. Surely that is too long.

If articles are not printed quickly, surely their value must be decreased. I am sure a lot of articles are motivated by and/or written about contemporary issues. The articles can be dated by the time it is printed. Alternatively, decisions on the issues the author wishes to influence may have already been made. This would hardly serve to encourage the submission of articles to the Journal. The potential may choose not to write at all or submit his article to some other defence oriented magazine. Neither option would advance the cause of the Defence Force Journal.

To me the two obvious solutions are to either increase the size of the Journal or to publish more often, say monthly. Both would cost money. However, if this publication is to be the main professional journal of the services, it is money which must be spent. Alternatively, advertising may provide the necessary income.

Your faithfully
D. J. Reid
Major

Limited by a set number of pages and the need to balance content, many articles have to be held back for quite some time. A monthly issue would certainly eliminate these problems.

Editor
April the 25th. Anzac Day!
The gates of memory open and down the years is seen the youth of a nation going to war. It is 1914.
With light hearts and eager steps they went, volunteers all, embarking on an adventure which, although they knew it not, would mean a rebirth of the nation's spirit and the creation of a tradition for generations of Australian youth.
Over the seas they went to the cradle of civilization and there, on the sands of Egypt, their bodies were toughened and their minds prepared for the ordeal that lay ahead.
In the fullness of time they rendezvoused, in a great armada of ships, on the quiet waters of the Aegean Sea off the shore of Gallipoli.

Then, in the early morn of that memorable day, the 25th of April 1915, the quiet of the Aegean was shattered by the blasts of naval gunfire and the battle for Gallipoli was joined.
The first wave of the Anzacs clamoured over the sides of their transports into small ships, barges and little boats on the sea below. Piloted by young naval middies, the Anzacs made their way to a beach forever to be known as Anzac Cove and in the early morning light they glimpsed the hills that were to test them so.
They landed. And then, not metaphorically but literally, they stormed the heights in a feat rarely equalled in military history. And of them it was truly said "Their's was a guerdon of highest endeavor".
Overcoming the difficulties of terrain, tremendous odds and the stubborness of worthy foes they exhibited remarkable heroism. Struggling ever upwards — fearful hearts found strength in the company of men born to be leaders to such an extent that within hours they shared the Gallipoli hilltops with the men who defended them.
So close were the combatants on the ridges that, in places, a mere thirty yards separated them. In such a situation individual battles were fought, when only, the sounds of human anger and the clash of steel on steel were heard. But on occasions the fury of war in concentrated attack and counter-attack the sounds reached a crescendo — described as a 'devil's orchestra' and always with the result that men were wounded and dying.
The dead were many and an armistice was called to bury them. And in the almost unreal silence the song of a bird was heard!
Time was condensed and life's experiences contracted to a span said to be like the rapidity of thoughts flowing through the minds of drowning men.
So it was sometimes in unreal silence, or amid the fury of conflict in the ebb and flow of months of battle there came a stirring in the hearts and minds of the fighting men.
A something!! An almost indescribable something. A kind of sense — hard to explain but easily understood by those who experienced it. A mateship — a comradeship in service came amongst them.
So was born THE SPIRIT OF ANZAC.
And although the initial flush of success at the Landing was later dulled by the need for

Captain Perry served as a Sergeant in World War I with the 14th Battalion, 1st AIF including service in Gallipoli, France and Russia. During World War II he served as Command Instructor, Wimmera District, Victoria.
evacuation and when, in the nights, the Anzacs came away from the hills of Gallipoli — the Spirit of Anzac came with them.

It went with them wherever they went, over the sea, in the air or on the land.

It went with them as they rode the desert in Palestine.

It went with them into the mud and the misery of the battlefields of France and the poppy-bedecked fields of Flanders.

They left their dead in every land.

And little white crosses — thousands of little white crosses give evidence of the price men were prepared to pay that generations to come might be free to choose the way of life they preferred to live.

Some were mutilated in body, broken in health or tortured in mind.

But through it all moved the Spirit of Anzac.

Until — came that wonderful day when bells peeled out the joyful tidings — the war was over. Peace had come at last!!

And the men of the 1st AIF came home to life in peace.

It is 1918.

The years go by, 1919, 1929, 1939. But these are the years of uneasy peace and soon, incredibly soon it seems to those who have experienced it, war came again. And another generation was called upon to serve their country and again the youth of the nation goes to war.

Over the seas they go in the footsteps of their fathers.

And the Spirit of Anzac goes with them.

It goes with them into the foxholes of Tobruk, into the Gallipoli-like ravines of Greece and into the hell known as Crete. They feel the exultation of victory at El Alamein — where the tide of barbarism let loose by that tyrant of Europe, Hitler, is stemmed.

But there homeland is in danger and they are recalled. Recalled to plumb the deeps of bitterness in the surrender at Singapore and to suffer the bestialities and sadistic treatment of the Changi prison camp and the indignities of the Burma railroad.

Some flush the jungles of Borneo. Others wearily, yet fearlessly tread the Kokoda Trail. And through it all lives the Spirit of Anzac.

It is good to think that this Spirit of comradeship in service helped those poor emaciated bodies in the Changi prison and on the Burma railroad. It is good to know that a touch of that Spirit gave solace to all the bereaved, the mothers, the fathers, the relatives and mates of all the fallen — in the knowledge that they served their country well and preserved for its people the freedom to choose the way of life they preferred to live.

What is this Spirit of Anzac — so clearly understood by those who felt it?

It may be hard to define yet can be explained by the words — service and sacrifice. Two qualities — one bound up within the other. Qualities which emerged from the baptism of blood and fire endured by the men at Gallipoli, matured on the battlefields of Europe in the two Great Wars and continued in all the conflicts which the sons of the Anzacs have engaged in since.

Their bravery was an example second to none. Their valor was shown in deeds that were done. These acts we do not belittle nor do we lower the standard that they set. But the open gates of memory reveal a spirit born:

War deeds forgotten
And valor passed by
In Gallipoli hills
Their bones do lie.

But a Spirit was born
To assurance give
These do not die
Dear God — they live!
RAPIER

Should it be reserved for the Field Army?

By Major D. J. Reid, Royal Australian Artillery

RAPIER is presently being introduced into service in the Australian Army. At last the services have a really effective land based low level air defence weapon. The cost of Rapier makes it unlikely that we could ever afford enough to defend all the targets we would like. Therefore only some of the targets will be defended by Rapier; some will miss out. Which targets should Rapier defend?

When this argument is raised, the two sides usually taken are:

a. As an Army asset it should defend the field army.
b. It should defend airfields as they are critical to the whole defence effort.

Which of the two arguments is correct? There is no correct answer for all situations. Air defence weapons should be deployed in accordance with a priority for defence, not according to any standard allocation. Seeing that the priority is determined by the appropriate commander, what is defended is a matter for his judgement. However, he should only allocate his priorities after considering all the relevant factors.

If Rapier is used to defend airfields, there can be no suggestion that the Army is doing a task which rightfully belongs to the RAAF. The responsibilities for air defence, as agreed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1970, mean that the Army is responsible for the provision of all land based low level systems, irrespective of where they are deployed. What has to be decided in this case is the priority for the employment of army weapons on tasks for which the Army is responsible. This article will assess the relative priority which should be accorded to airfields and combat troops for defence by Rapier.

ASSESSING PRIORITIES FOR AIR DEFENCE

The basic considerations in determining the priority for defence by low level surface to air weapons are:

a. What targets is the enemy likely to attack?
b. What priority of effort is he likely to apply to each target?
c. Does he have the capability to damage or destroy the target?
d. How important is the target to us?
e. Can the target be defended in any other way?

LIKELY ENEMY TARGETS AND PRIORITIES

The assessment of enemy intentions is the hardest assessment to make. The problem is perhaps made a little easier if an analysis of the method of conduct of air warfare is made. The aims of the air war for either side can be summarized under the following headings:

a. to gain and retain air superiority;
b. to intercept the movement of men and material into and within the combat area (interdiction);
c. to disrupt the means of command and control;

Major Reid joined the Army in 1960 and was commissioned in 1964. He has served in Malaysia, Vietnam, United Kingdom, Germany, United States and various units in Australia. He is at present with SIAD Wg School of Artillery. This same article in a slightly changed version, won the RAA Association Competition in 1979. Editor Article received Nov. 1979.
d. to demoralize civilian and service personnel; and
e. to give close support to combat troops.

It will not always be easy to determine which of these aims is being pursued by the enemy air force at any one time. Apart from an overall estimate of broad enemy intentions, the only method available is to try to recognize any pattern which might exist in recent enemy air activity. One well known example of clearly recognizable aims was in the 1967 Middle East War. Here, the Israeli Air Force pursued the aim of air superiority in its pre-emptive strike. Then it changed to close air support interdiction. In Greece in 1941, the pattern followed by the Luftwaffe was:

a. the destruction of ports and quays and the interception of sea communications;
b. the gaining of air superiority;
c. the destruction of transport, petrol and supply and ordnance depots, and
d. finally, the machine gunning and bombing of roads and communications.\(^{(1)}\)

It is quite likely that the enemy air force would be pursuing more than one aim at a time, with each being accorded a differing proportion of available air effort. It is likely too that the enemy would always apply some effort towards gaining or maintaining air superiority. This would be so irrespective of which other aims are being pursued at the time. There will, of course, be several occasions when other enemy aims are given a higher priority. This would be particularly so when the enemy enjoyed a degree of air superiority.

Given that an enemy air force would always apply some air effort towards gaining or maintaining air superiority, it follows that our aircraft, airfields and supporting facilities, surface to air weapons and the control and reporting organization could always be subjected to enemy air attack. The strength and frequency of attacks would depend upon the priority that the enemy is applying at that time to gaining or maintaining air superiority. Later in the article I will advance further reasons for enemy attacks on our airfields.

I have attempted to demonstrate that airfields are likely to be subjected to air attack at any stage during operations. This does not necessarily mean that airfields must be defended by weapons like Rapier. So far I have applied only the first two steps in determining the priority for air defence. The next step is to determine whether the enemy has the capability to destroy or damage the target.

**VULNERABILITY OF AIRFIELDS**

The ability of an enemy to destroy or damage airfields cannot be assessed accurately without specific information on the airfields and the attacking aircraft. However, a few general statements can be made.

Airfields are usually fairly easy to find and they would probably be within range of enemy aircraft. It is possible to harden airfields by erecting aircraft shelters, providing a rapid runway repair capability and burying and/or duplicating essential services. Whilst these actions lessen the vulnerability to damage, they by no means make airfields invulnerable to the effects of air attack. It is, for example, very difficult to harden maintenance hangars. Maintenance can be conducted in the hardened aircraft shelters, but this precludes the economies of scale possible in hangars. Thus, any destruction of hangars would probably have a long-term effect on aircraft availability.

Implied in the term 'airfields' are the various radars sited in their vicinities. The radars may be used for either air defence or air traffic control purposes. Because of the visual and electronic signatures of radars, it is very difficult to conceal them or to protect them from damage. The radars are an essential part of the air control system and their loss would probably mean a significant decrease in our ability to conduct the air war.

In summary, it seems likely that an enemy could inflict enough damage on our airfields to interfere significantly with our use of air power.

**IMPORTANCE OF THE TARGET**

The next question to be considered is how important is the target to us. May I be so bold as to state that airfields are vital to the successful prosecution of the war. Why is this so?

**Importance of Air Superiority**

The major reason for the favoured position which I give to airfields is the importance I, and many others, attach to air superiority. In any conflict, the side which enjoys air superiority is given a very significant advantage. That side has the initiative and the enemy air force is compelled to resort to defensive operations to survive. Montgomery was an advocate for the
inclusion of air superiority as a principle of war because he believed its attainment was a prerequisite to success in the land battle.

With the enemy air force under pressure, our air force should then be able to apply effort to other tasks of more direct relevance to the land battle. Such tasks could be interdiction and close air support. These actions would ease the pressure on our ground forces.

Life for all our forces would be more comfortable under conditions of air superiority. Whilst enemy air attacks could not be ruled out, they would occur less often. We would be able to move more freely during daylight without the same likelihood of attack or detection by enemy aircraft. We could make more use of transport aircraft without too much fear of interference. Most importantly, our forces should have a greater opportunity to take the initiative because they should be able to concentrate greater forces with better security.

To emphasize further the importance of air superiority, it may be instructive to consider the situation if the enemy held air superiority. Our air force would probably be unable to provide much offensive support to the Army. The air force would be unwilling to use transport aircraft in the forward areas. The Army could expect harassment and deliberate air attack at virtually every turn. The enemy reconnaissance aircraft could provide detailed information on our dispositions.

It is my assessment that the attainment and retention of air superiority should be accorded a very high priority.

Achieving and Retaining Air Superiority

Air superiority is achieved by a combination of offensive counter-air and air defence operations. Both operations should be planned and conducted in unison. It is likely to be a continuous battle throughout the war, not a single battle which is fought and won or lost only once.

The aim of offensive counter-air operations is to seek out and destroy all elements of enemy air power, both on the ground and in the air. The operations are conducted by friendly aircraft striking at enemy air installations. It is highly likely that the enemy will be directing at least some effort against our strike bases in an attempt to inhibit our counter-air operations. Air defence of our bases is therefore necessary if we are to safeguard our strike force aircraft and their supporting facilities. To not defend our bases would put the attainment or retention of air superiority in jeopardy.

Air defence operations are conducted to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air action. These operations contribute to the achievement of air superiority by:

a. increasing the attrition rate of enemy aircraft,

b. helping to create areas where enemy aircraft are not free to operate, and

c. protecting the resources used for offensive and defensive counter air operations.

An essential element in any air defence system is a force of interceptor fighters. Fighters are the most flexible weapons of the defence. They have a long range which enables relatively few aircraft to provide protection to quite a large area. As outlined earlier, aircraft and airfields are vulnerable to air attack. Given the importance of fighters to air defence, their air defence should be given a high priority.

Once air superiority has been achieved, more resources can be directed to other air tasks. However, some resources would probably still be needed to retain air superiority lest the enemy wrest the initiative from us. Therefore, airfields would still merit a high priority for air defence because of their importance to air superiority, even after we enjoy some measure of air superiority.

Importance of Other Air Tasks

As stated earlier, the proportion of effort allocated to other air tasks would probably increase once a measure of air superiority had been achieved. The tasks would probably include interdiction and close air support. Both of these would ease the difficulty of the task confronting the ground forces. This would be particularly helpful when our forces were moving such as in an advance and unable to concentrate all their firepower. Air power used in this way would be a significant source of combat power for our forces.

Safe airfields are essential if our forces wish to benefit from an interdiction programme and from close air support. The enemy, in seeking to counter such activities, would surely consider attacks against our airfields. Thus, if we want our air force to be able to provide support, we must consider allocating a high priority to the air defence of the airfields.
THE MEANS OF AIR DEFENCE

In the present state of technology, no air defence system can give any guarantee of immunity against damage from air attack. An air defence system can only make attacks costly and less accurate. In time the attrition rate may become too high for the enemy to sustain and then he may decide against ordering further attacks on that target. Each defence therefore aims to impose an attrition rate whilst at the same time causing a lowering in the accuracy of weapon delivery.

In the absence of a specific threat, it is difficult to state if a target can be defended adequately by weapons other than low level surface to air weapons. It would be necessary to have details of the enemy aircraft and tactics. In the absence of such data, only generalizations can be made.

Enemy aircraft are likely to try to penetrate to the target at low level to avoid detection by the long range ground control intercept radars. The aircraft may not be detected until they climb to locate and identify the target before diving to release their weapons. This detection may occur as little as 30 seconds or less before weapon release. What options are there to counter this threat?

Fighters could not react quickly enough to intercept before weapon release. They perform best against targets detected at long range. The inability to engage targets detected close in is more a limitation of the radar cover than the fighter. This shortfall in radar cover may be overcome to some degree in the future by using airborne early warning aircraft. It remains to be seen just how effective the airborne early warning aircraft/fighter combination would be in countering low level attacks.

High and medium level SAM also need quite a degree of early warning to be effective. They require good low level radar cover and this is hard to achieve. Therefore, low level attacks are unlikely to be countered effectively by these weapon systems.

Apart from low level weapons, the only remaining option for defence of airfields is the use of passive measures. The effects of some of these measures were canvassed when considering the vulnerability of airfields to attack. It is virtually impossible to do much with passive measures except lessen the effects of air attack. It would be very hard to conceal an airfield or move it, for example.

Whilst low level weapons cannot guarantee protection of a target, they are designed to engage a target within seconds of detecting it. This makes them ideal for defending against low level attacks. However, such weapons can become ineffective if used in isolation as enemy aircraft could attack above the engagement envelope of the weapons. They must therefore form part of an integrated defence with other weapons and passive measures.

In summary, airfields, and any other targets likely to be attacked at low level, seem unlikely to be able to be defended properly except by low level weapons. These weapons need to be integrated with other weapon systems.

PRIORITY TO BE ALLOCATED TO AIRFIELDS

So far I have argued strongly for allocating a high priority to the air defence of airfields. I acknowledge that many other important targets will exist on the battlefield and further to the rear. Why then do I not consider them as important as airfields? Whilst I have discussed some of the reasons earlier, I will state them here again briefly.

Weapons like Rapier can protect only a very small area. The areas selected for defence must therefore be those which are the most critical. Aircraft and longer range SAM can protect quite a large area and their precise location is therefore less critical. However, because of their wide coverage, their loss would have a profound effect on the air defence of this large area.

Low level systems would be of minimal value in the absence of complementary systems like fighters. The converse is also true. Therefore, Rapier defending forward troops would be more effective if fighters were also available. However, if Rapier were provided to the forward troops at the expense of the fighter airfield, the fighters may soon be destroyed by an enemy low level attack. Then, fighter cover for a very large area would be lost. The area of low level cover lost by moving Rapier to the airfields would be miniscule by comparison.

In the final analysis, the priority allocated to the defence of a target will depend upon the views of the commander, and to a lesser extent, his staff. They will each have their opinions on the relative worth of the targets vying for air defence protection. However, I submit that any
target would have to be extremely important if it is to attract a higher priority than airfields.

THE REMEDY

In times of limited resources, it would appear that combat troops would receive minimal protection from low level weapons and I have argued that this allocation of priorities is correct. Nevertheless, I would certainly agree that this would make it very difficult for the ground forces to achieve their full potential.

It appears to me that the only way in which Rapier would be available for combat troops would be for there to be an increase in the quantity of Rapier available. There needs to be an assessment of the quantity required for all tasks. This could be translated into a scaled allocation which is realistic. The present allocation of air defence regiments is misleading and inadequate. There is no allocation of units for the defence of targets behind the corps rear boundary and this is where many very important targets are located. A corps receives an allocation of one regiment per division, but, these have to defend targets in the corps rear area as well as in the divisional areas. Having a stated scaling for the combat and communications zones, the lines of communications and the support areas would serve as a constant reminder that air defence is required in these areas too.

Once the allocation for all areas is recorded, we would be in a better position to point out our paucity of resources and the lack of equipment and a viable expansion base for the total Rapier force needed in war. Once one Rapier battery is in service, some are sure to argue that we have one third of our needs for one division. However, when a more realistic allocation is recorded, we could show more easily that those people are fooling themselves. They are ignoring the requirement for air defence of assets which are needed to support a division from behind the corps rear boundary. There is also the question of whether one third of the requirement is enough when we have two thirds of the infantry and field artillery and all of our tanks in the division.

There is a marked reluctance by the Army to accept its wider responsibilities for air defence. As an example, Chapter 5, entitled, Air Defence, in the Manual of Land Warfare Part One, Volume 1, Pamphlet No. 5, Fire Support (Provisional) 1977, deals only with air defence of the field army. Paragraph 502 states, 'As part of the overall air defence plan, air defence artillery detects and engages aerial targets threatening the field army'. A further example of the attitude is the purchase of only a one third Blindfire capability for Rapier. Such an option is acceptable in the combat zone but is inadequate for the defence of targets likely to be subjected to concerted night attack. It is apparent that many people in the Army believe that the Army is responsible for the defence of just the field army.

There is also a reluctance on the part of the other services to accept the Army's responsibilities. There is an understandable resistance to admitting to the need for Rapier to defend their assets. To do so could mean that the costs for additional Rapier would be added to the project cost of the Tactical Fighter Force, for example. However, other associated costs such as essential new facilities are included in project costs. Is air defence any less important?

CONCLUSIONS

I believe that the defence of airfields would, in most circumstances, merit a higher priority than defence of combat troops. It would then seem highly likely that Rapier will not be available to defend combat troops unless there is a significant increase in the total Rapier resources likely to be available.

The scaling for the provision of Rapier is unrealistically low. This stems in no small way from the reluctance on the part of all three services to accept the Army's responsibilities for air defence. Until this attitude is changed, there is little chance of the situation improving.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army should review its proposed scaling of Rapier and produce a realistic scaling for targets behind the corps rear boundary. The Army should then take every opportunity to remind the other services of the likely need for Rapier to defend their assets. This should be the first step in a programme to build a viable expansion base for the total number of Rapier units needed in a war. If a good expansion base exists, the combat soldier is far more likely to enjoy adequate low level defence, and medium and high level defence too.

Until the fruits of the preceding recommendation have been realised, the Army should develop tactics and procedures which permit it to continue operating in spite of the lack of low level air protection.
Acknowledgement


NOTES

I SUPPOSE I first became interested in Military History, if not at my father's knee then certainly sitting next to him on one of the benches at the deal tables under the ivied apple trees outside the Reformation at Gallowstree Common.

When the last ha'penny had been shoved and the last dominoed, conversations would start and range over many topics. With inhibitions and tongues liberated by Brakespeare's best bitter, bucolic philosophers aired their views and attempted to maintain a train of thought under a barrage of derisive comment, equally uninhibited.

Deprived of my elders' advantages, both in experience and in the fact that my glass contained only lemonade, and allowing that much of the import of the discussions went over my head (both literally and figuratively — as many arguments still tend to), I sat quietly and absorbed as much as I could, even if for no other reason than it was usually way past my bed-time.

In those days a few new names had been carved on the village war memorial and many of the young men still strutted in their shiny 'demob suits'. Given the opportunity those same young men interjected casual references to 'The Desert', 'Normandy' or 'The Rhine' while the greybeards, including my father (Royal Berkshire Regiment, France 1915 aged 16) ignored them to a man.

Even my pre-pubescent sensibilities perceived some antipathy between the protagonists of 'The Great' and 'Hitler's' Wars.

Sometimes, when the young men became particularly persistent and all parties had achieved a suitably fractious condition, unkind comparisons would be made and vehement debate would ensue, silenced temporarily only by the transitory presence of a stranger from Kidmore End or the vicar.

The altercation would often continue at the pub gate after closing time and even following the village bobby's dispersal of the rabble it would be carried on along country lanes for miles around with the most well reasoned and cogent argument emanating from those wending their way home alone.

On only one aspect were the young and not so young unanimous and that was in their expression of outrage when Errol Flynn was depicted as 'avin' won back Bermer'. This only added to my confusion because, as a devotee of the pictures shown each Monday night in the Peppard Memorial Hall, I thought he had! It must be confessed, however, that my attention

Major Pound was commissioned into the RAA in 1964 after service with the British Army. He has had various regimental appointments including service in SVN with 105 Fd Bty in 1965 and with 4 Fd Regt in 1970/71. His non corps appointments have included service in Pers Br at Army Office, 1 RTB and HQ 7 MD. He is presently posted as SO2 Force Structure in DPLANS.

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was often distracted from the screen by one Nellie Glossup, a calf dealer’s daughter from Stoke Row. A well travelled girl by virtue of the fact that she had lights on her bicycle.

But I digress.

Thus it was that I learned my first lesson on Military History; that being that even with a subject so definitive there is room for argument and differences of opinion.

I describe Military History as definitive because it has a clear outcome. Wars are won and lost. Where the discussion ensues is how and sometimes who.

Obviously an appreciation of how earlier battles were won or lost is of absorbing interest to those who might be involved in any future fracas, or it should be. The Australian Army assumes that this is not always the case and employs a gentle coercion in the form of requiring its officers to pass a written examination on the subject.

This requirement plus an interest in Military History and a perception of the differences of opinion has led me to read several accounts of the same action. Inevitably disparate views appear. This is because authors emerge from amongst the leaders and the led, participants and scholars, friends and allies (the terms are not necessarily synonymous), egotists and modest men and those who won and those who came second.

Histories written while hostilities persist are little short of propaganda, while those written when passions have cooled and allegiances changed reflect totally different views. Furthermore, many seek only to reinforce preconceived notions.

The above prompted the title of this article which was conceived while I was perusing a list of the prescribed references for the Military History examination.

To me the subject, as officers are encouraged to study it, should not be a separate entity but be included as part of the study of tactics. It is advocated that tactics courses should encourage the application of historical lessons to contemporary military problems rather than, as is the present case, leaving it to argumentative students to individually inject precedents into syndicate discussions.

Should this suggestion be accepted as valid would it be sufficient to merely drop the Military History requirement or should it be replaced?

I have to recommend a replacement subject drawing upon the history of why wars were fought, not how, why they were won or lost and the effect of a war on subsequent events. Such a subject should inculcate, even amongst the unwilling, an awareness of the factors that lead to war and to defeat or victory. They may not be able to influence matters as individuals except through the ballot box, or until they reach positions where they have some say in the formation of national policy but a degree of awareness would go a long way toward achieving a suitable stage of preparedness individually and as an army.

Even if examinations are abolished in favour of an attendance or correspondence course, the basic tenet still holds good.

From my reading of the history of warfare this century I have attempted to identify some of the factors that have emerged as significant in victory or defeat. They are offered as an illustration of the theme of this article. Readers may dispute some or all of them, some are supportive, others, arising from different situations, are contradictory but they are considered of greater significance in defence planning than, for example, operations on the Kokoda Trail or in North Africa.

Factor 1
The greatest single contribution to the winning of wars this century has been the economic and industrial power of the United States of America.

It tipped the scales in World War I, sustained Britain and the Commonwealth in World War II until it was unleashed in full against the Axis powers and brought about their defeat. It has maintained Israel and allowed a reasonably dignified military withdrawal from Vietnam.

Conclusion
Either develop a sound economic and industrial infrastructure or stay good friends with those that have one.

Factor 2
There is now a tendency to mount an operation that has limited objectives and once those objectives are achieved or the operation loses momentum to call for a cease-fire and UN intervention, thus effectively preventing ejection by force of arms. A withdrawal may be negotiated after a period but left behind may be
new settlers or ground bereft of uranium, oil, iron ore or whatever.

Conclusion
Plans for the defence of Australia should include identification of those areas on which no invading force is to be allowed to gain any foothold whatsoever and the denial of those areas made a first priority.

Factor 3
Active disputation of government decisions is becoming more manifest. Where those decisions affect the Defence Force that force may find itself not only in conflict with an external enemy but also with internal factions.

Conclusion
The Defence Force should not assume that its internal lines of communication will be secure and should be constantly aware of the problems of sabotage, security and disaffection.

Factor 4
Democratic armies always lose, in the first instance anyway and that might be enough to lose permanently.

To allay some of the protests I refer to Mons, Dunkirk, Singapore, the Philippines, Kokoda, Kasserine Pass, Hungnam, etc, etc.

Conclusion
There must be something wrong with the preparations for war of democratic defence forces. Surprise is no mitigation.

Is it perhaps the fact that peace-time armies are run on bureaucratic principles that are the very antithesis of those required to train an army (or a navy or air force) effectively?

Factor 5
With modern communications there is a tendency to by-pass intermediate commanders. Section commanders in Vietnam, endeavouring to ferret out a lone sniper, pensively fingered their triggers as they received a barrage of instructions from their battalion commander circling just overhead in his helicopter while Commander AFV held telephone talks with the Prime Minister direct.

Carrying this to its logical conclusion one can visualise A Coy advancing to contact in the Gulf Country near Bourketown, a place fit only for war. Above in an orbit stationary relative to the earth’s surface, hangs a satellite, its instruments capable of discerning detail on the ground through darkness, cloud and the dust of reliability trials. The company’s manoeuvres are displayed on a screen in a bunker deep under Capital Hill. The Prime Minister watches, discusses the action with the War Cabinet then thoughtfully presses a transmission switch.

‘One one this is Omega Zero Alpha. Keep up on the left of number two platoon.’

Readers are left to draw their own conclusions.

AWARD: ISSUE NO 21 (March/April 1980)
The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the March/April 1980 issue (No. 21) of the Defence Force Journal to Major H.J. Clarsen for his article Aviation Support for the Australian Army.
service
dedication
in peace

By Major M. P. S. Shaw
Headquarters British Army on The Rhine

"Give me French officers, British NCOs and Prussian soldiers and I will rule the world"

Napoleon

INTRODUCTION

In recent years much thought and discussion has taken place regarding the purpose and place of military forces in democratic societies. A major preoccupation has centred upon how dedication of those forces can be maintained during periods of peace and how they can be motivated into maintaining high standards of readiness in the absence of obvious aggression. Amongst the contributors to these activities have been serving officers and those with previous service experience. Regrettably much of the debate has been pessimistic and prone to generalizations.

Though a conceptual approach is clearly necessary in order to determine the direction in which the Armed Forces should move, generalizations as to how motivation can be improved do little to clarify these issues as each of the Western democracies has different defence needs, demographic distributions of population and wealth and long-standing military ethics. It is therefore intended to approach this article in the particular — the subject of the inquiry being the British Army. It is hoped however that certain of the recommendations made will be applicable to all Armed Services organized on broadly similar lines.

To do so it is intended firstly to set the scene by surveying important developments that have contributed to the Army’s present position in society; secondly to examine significant changes of public attitude in contemporary society and thirdly to consider the Army’s self-image. Thereafter suggestions will be made as to how motivation can be maintained and if necessary enhanced given the constraints adduced.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY IN SOCIETY

In tracing the development of the Army Correlli Barnett(1) makes the point that public apathy to a standing army is not a new phenomenon among the British people. In certain quarters the antagonism resulting from the rule of the Cromwellian Major-Generals still survives today. In the intervening three centuries since the re-establishment of a constitutional monarchy, the advent of continental wars has invariably found the nation ill-prepared and despite hastily contrived and essentially wasteful expedients such as the embodiment of the ill-trained militia or the hiring of foreign mercenaries, the British failed to learn their lesson.

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(1) See Correlli Barnett, Britain and her Army, pp. 203-204.
The conclusion of all wars prior to the twentieth century have been marked by a disbandment of the majority of forces then in being and a reversal to the old disproven methods. Only with the formalizing of Britain’s trading empire in the last century and the need to police it did there come about public acceptance of the need for a standing Army and this only provided that the Army was comfortably removed from the centre of power. Accordingly three basic myths were born; the essentially amateur nature of soldiering, the efficacy of the militia and within the Army itself the desirability of isolation from the community at large in order to foster and preserve the martial spirit.

As Dixon points out, these myths survived until they were rudely exploded, firstly by the South African War which proved the limitations of the militia and the gentlemanly school of soldiering and then more significantly by the Great War. During the latter, and only for a transient period did the Army, though not the General Staff, come to mirror the composition of society. When the war ended popular disaffection with the management of the war effort and the part the Army had played interacted with the Army’s own wish to revert to its previous role of imperial policeman. This led to the re-establishment of its self-imposed isolation which was accompanied by a general sterility of thought. Greater catalysts were to prove to be firstly World War II and secondly the ideological/power confrontation resulting directly from it. Thus more by accident than design, 1945 saw the Army inextricably linked to its parent society through the medium of National Service.

The ensuing years finally ended the Imperial preoccupation and thus strengthened our dependence upon and hence commitment to Europe. They also ensured that the Army became essentially home-based for the first time in its history. Whilst National Service existed public interest remained. However the maintenance of large standing armies is not part of the British tradition and hence a small professional army came back into being — the essential difference with its predecessor being a definitive commitment to provide four divisions in Europe until the end of the century, the balance being stationed predominantly in Britain itself. Thus whilst public interest in the Army has inevitably been eroded, surveys carried out in 1968 suggested that the British people were far from apathetic about Defence matters. Indeed it might be claimed that involvement in Northern Ireland and expansion of Soviet forces in Europe have since regenerated interest.

There is, however, a paradox in the British attitude: Defence is considered an important if irksome necessity and soldiers as individuals are generally held in relatively high regard. It is the institution that is viewed with some suspicion and as such the ordinary citizen is reluctant to commit himself to its service. This attitude is often misinterpreted by serving soldiers as reflected in a recent survey conducted by the writer.

If Britain is to continue to be prepared to defend itself and honour its defence commitments elsewhere, and there is every indication that this is accepted by all major political parties, albeit with different degrees of emphasis, then the relationship between the British people and their army is crucial to the issue of maintaining dedication and motivation in the latter. To see how this can be achieved it is necessary to examine significant changes in public attitude — failure to do so being tantamount to attempting to diagnose a medical complaint without reference to the symptoms.

**CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES**

Recent changes in public attitudes can be conveniently grouped into three categories, political, economic and social:

**Political**

The advent of thermonuclear weapons, in giving those who own them the ability to destroy any opponent (and suffer reciprocal treatment) has given birth to the theory of deterrence; broadly speaking the maintenance of national security through a position of strength. Moreover increased sophistication of delivery means has necessitated that a permanent guard be maintained, as unlike the past a nation can no longer rely on a lengthy mobilization of forces to ensure its security. This has conditioned the British to an acceptance of standing nuclear forces provided by the Royal Navy and the RAF. As deterrence theory has been modified by the imperatives of nuclear parity into a policy of flexible response
within NATO, the public have also accepted the existence of a well-equipped standing army. Accordingly the Army has become inextricably identified as part of the establishment, concerned primarily with the security of the nation state and hence the concomitant preoccupation with the employment of power in international relations.

Nowadays there is widespread questioning of the efficacy of the use of force in international affairs amongst the liberal intelligensia who enjoy substantial influence in the communications media and consequently have some say in formulating public attitudes. Force has sometimes been portrayed and proven to be too blunt an instrument — as in Vietnam. Moreover force smacks of neo-colonialism, something for which there is little public support. Essentially then the Armed Forces by virtue of their incorporation in the power base are to an extent pursuing a different philosophy than that of the commercial sectors of society, who see the future more in terms of transnationalism and international cooperation.

At first sight these distinctions may seem of somewhat peripheral importance to any debate on the relationship of Armed Forces and society however it is as well to remember that it has an important by-product on recruiting patterns. The intelligent young are now educated in the desirability of international cooperation and commerce. The emotional appeal of the Armed Services is out of step with these attitudes.

Some countries, notably Canada and the Scandinavian nations have capitalized on this trend by investing their Armed Forces with what Janowitz(5) calls the 'Constabulary ethic'. Accordingly these forces are available for deployment under United Nations auspices to likely trouble-spots between nation states and as such may be said to contribute to international stability. Though mention was made of this in the last Defence White Paper and the Foreign Secretary has recently offered an infantry battalion group for deployment in Southern Africa, it is unlikely to become a major preoccupation of the British Army so long as it continues to play an important role in NATO. No fundamental change of image is therefore likely to evolve in the foreseeable future.

Economic

Armed Forces that are ready, equipped and available for instantaneous use are apt to be expensive. Within the major European democracies their cost has now stabilized at a figure between 3.6% and 5.0%(6) of GNP although there are extremes in both directions. Until recently the trend in Britain, as in other European nations, has been downwards and although this has generally been criticized by the Defence establishment sometimes for patently sectional interests, when viewed in the wider context and seen in terms of national 'life assurance', the figure is not unreasonable. Clearly one can never have enough insurance cover but what can be achieved in practice is severely limited by the pocket — be it individual or corporate. Thus although governments of differing political complexion are all prone to examine defence expenditure critically there appears to be a consensus that the present level will be maintained and possibly be increased in real terms by 3% per annum in the future. 3% however does not make Defence an expanding industry and accordingly the Armed Services and by corollary the Army must learn to live within its budget.

This then raises issues of priority of expenditure between the Services and disposal within each Service. The former is now apparently well regulated as a result of unifying and streamlining of the Ministry of Defence. Disposal within each Service bears greater examination.

The Army element of the Defence votes divides approximately as follows; manpower costs (including pensions) 50%, capital equipment programmes (including R and D) 40% and running costs the balance. Running costs do not lend themselves to any significant adjustment and accordingly the trade-off reduces to one between manpower costs and equipment.

Presently there is substantial pressure to increase service pay. Whilst this is clearly desirable in order to re-establish the principle of parity enunciated in the introduction of the military salary, it can only be done at the expense of cutting or deferring equipment programmes and here lies the essential conundrum. Whilst Janowitz is probably right in suggesting that there are moral implications in paying one's Services too well, there is clearly...
a fine balance to be struck between excessive and acceptable standards of remuneration. The former would in any case be unacceptable to the productive elements in our society. However failure to meet acceptable minimum levels would no longer attract men of adequate talents. This interrelates with the second point; that of equipment expenditure. If soldiers themselves perceive that they are ill-equipped to do the job, then there is a consequential loss of self-confidence and questioning of the national will. For the soldier there is therefore a personal dilemma between acceptable personal remuneration and adequacy of his equipment. Given the forementioned financial constraints it is one that does not readily lend itself to solution.

What can be said, however, is that in our society material reward is seen as important for two reasons, firstly as a measure of personal success and secondly as a proof of public esteem in one's vocation. The Army must either ensure that its rewards are sufficiently high to attract men of adequate quality to man its existing establishments or alternatively make a thorough reappraisal of those same establishments in order to see where economies in quality or in scale can be achieved.

Social Changes

All Western Democracies are to some extent adjusting to their post-colonial place in the order of affairs and nowhere are the problems more evident than in Britain and more especially her Army. In the mind of the public at large there is now general acceptance that our future is bound to that of Western Europe although successive Governments have dragged their heels on the issue to the obvious frustration of our EEC partners. The Army has been instrumental in the post-colonial withdrawal and to a small extent is still committed to some garrison duties. It is therefore associated with and to an extent preoccupied with what Correlli Barnett describes as the now discredited 'blue water school' of British foreign policy. Whilst this might not be a bad recruiting gimmick for the minority, it is nevertheless an irrelevance for society at large.

Fundamental changes in society centre about the emancipation of youth. Youth now commands substantial spending power and this has given it an ability to exercise its liberty and broaden its horizons as never before. Greater horizons have brought about a questioning of the effectiveness of large organizations and their ability to respond to individual needs. This has initiated a response from the many organizations who are employers and therefore recruiters themselves. The advertising literature of some of the established professions and indeed many of the new now abound with emphasis on opportunities for individual development, the importance of personal initiative and the general friendliness of working conditions. Because many of these concerns have no long-standing public image their literature retains credibility however far-fetched are the claims. The Army was slow to meet this challenge and until recently ineffective in its response. Moreover it is still impeded by its apparently rigid internal stratification which is so regularly lampooned by the entertainment industry.

Whilst there may be no more than a grain (or two) of truth in these imputations the fact remains that much deep-rooted suspicion has yet to be overcome. The current emphasis on the 'self-reliant, ready for anything' image in both officer and soldier recruiting is clearly a step in the right direction. It does however breed instant association with 'dirty jobs' and hence requires skilful and persistent monitoring.

There is also a tendency on the part of youth to challenge the concept of authority and to reject repressive discipline and in this the Army's public image is hampered by memories of wasteful and sometimes unproductive periods of National Service. This is not to suggest that youth is looking for the soft option. Indeed it requires personal experience to conceive the sterility and mental debilitation of the lifestyle of a semi-skilled or unskilled worker in large manufacturing industry to realise the attractiveness which the Army still has in those areas, provided the requisite elements of authority and discipline are augmented by challenging training and improved living conditions.

In summary then we see a parent society that does accept the need for an effective Army; however whilst it sees the Army as useful in NATO and in domestic issues it sees no merit in neo-colonial recidivism. Interlacing this attitude we also see the interaction of material preoccupation and greater individual awareness.

The ingredients that constitute motivation are multifarious and likely to vary according to the level of awareness, educational and social
background of the individual. However they will possibly include the perceived usefulness of the organization one works for, its ability to carry out its task and the levels of reward, both financial and in terms of self-fulfilment accorded to those who serve in it.

HOW THE ARMY SEES ITSELF

What then of the Army's view of itself. The traditional self-image of an officer being a gentleman retained to fight and that of a soldier coming from the dross of society has clearly been modified by time. Now the officer regards himself as a leader/manager with marketable skills and accepts that by virtue of technology the soldier is a more able creature capable of formulating his own opinions and aspirations.

But does he?

To state that this change in attitude is universal is to be guilty of a measure of self-deception. In the more progressive Arms the second attitude is indeed well established, partly because educational imperatives changed officer recruiting patterns well before World War II and the technological imperatives of manning and maintaining complex equipment have completed the process in more recent years.

There are however powerful and traditionalist enclaves in the Army where attitudes are changing only reluctantly. Within these the opinions of more progressive officers accord well with the modern self-image. However, whilst only a minority of those remaining cling tenaciously to the traditional ethic, the majority have only reached a half-way house in their attitudes. The Regimental system upon which the teeth Arms of the Army is founded may have much to commend it, however it does ossify the trappings of its squirearchical origins. Accordingly officers still like to regard themselves as gentlemen albeit of somewhat diminished means. They accept the need for professionalism provided there are still sufficient outlets for enjoyable social pastimes, yet they are curiously selective in their professionalism. Interest in the manipulative and organizational skills is generally high, however the unglamorous process of acquiring the best equipment is generally eschewed — as demonstrated in the wide disparity of popularity between the 'Weapons' (material acquisition) staff and the 'Straight' (employment) staff. Moreover, whilst he sees himself as the protector of society (and is inherently suspicious of the rough and tumble of politics), philosophical debate regarding the role of the Army and its place in society has to be force-fed through the expedient of promotion examinations.

Of their soldiers the same officers are curiously ambivalent. Recruiting and training organizations stress the trouble and expense involved in recruiting and hence imply the intrinsically high value of the soldier. Most young officers actually like soldiers when they make their acquaintance, yet the relationship is curiously detached in all but the best commanders and paternal despite an equivalence of age. Strenuous efforts for the care and well-being of ordinary soldiers and their families are encouraged, yet the treatment is generally effected in the same vein as one might to a favoured pet. Yet young officers rely, and indeed are encouraged to rely, heavily upon their Senior NCOs and Warrant Officers, invariably establishing warm, friendly and effective working relationships with them.

Whilst the reader may have some reservations on the foregoing, there must be general acceptance that officers and Senior NCOs share closer interests and aspirations than do Senior NCOs and short service soldiers. Presently however the Army is divided into two estates; officers and other ranks and recruiting and career planning is organized accordingly. This system certainly does not accord with the functional realities of the job. Indeed if formalization of these divisions is required then clearly three estates would now be more appropriate.

COMPARISON

Any survey of attitudes cannot hope to be comprehensive and whilst the writer is himself aware that he is open to perfectly valid criticisms of generality, several points of significance do emerge, the first being one of perspective:

On the one hand there is reliable evidence to suggest that the British do value their Armed Services, without necessarily enlushing about the function they perform, and are prepared to meet concomitant costs within reason. The majority do however eschew service themselves. On the other hand the Army is suspicious of society, partially because the apparent anarchy of consensous politics conflicts with its own
image of Utopian order and partially because criticism (so essential to open politics) hurts when it cannot be contradicted. This constitutes a possible cause for lack of motivation — lack of perceived public esteem.

The second point concerns the effect of the apparent mobility of society. This conflicts with the hierarchical requirements of any large organization — the Army not least of all. It matters not that this mobility is more apparent than real and heavily underwritten by ability. What is of importance is that the Army’s historical image makes it appear more elitist and less responsive to individual needs than comparable employers.

Thirdly resources available for Defence are considered adequate by the general public, whereas the soldier is apt to consider that he is given second-rate treatment not only in terms of personal financial reward and equipment expenditure but also in the inducements he can offer would-be recruits. The labour market is now highly competitive from the employers’ point of view — youth employment notwithstanding — for all who need men with high skill potentials. These same men are obviously ambitious and aspire to good working conditions and social mobility. In competing, the Army is to an extent impeded by its earlier image. Its now meritocratic self-image is only partially accepted as valid by society at large. It must be sold aggressively and above all be proven by results.

Fourthly there is presently heavy reliance upon traditional officer recruiting patterns. Despite a certain comfortable predictability regarding the known ethos of the aspirant, there are now doubts about the quality of boys coming from these sources — the brightest favouring university education instead. This bias is hardly likely to broaden the base of the officer corps and thus risks increased isolation from society. This phenomenon is highly undesirable and our own and other nations’ histories bears proof. Moreover lesser quality boys are likely to prove less well motivated officers.

As regards soldier recruiting, the competing material rewards of commerce and industry will inevitably reduce the quality of recruits. Eventually the Army may only be able to attract the educationally under-privileged unless more strenuous efforts are made to advertise its advantages in those sectors of society where it still retains a sometimes justified image of social immobility.

In functional terms the rank structure is justified, however one should speculate if its rigid formalization between officers and other ranks is really appropriate in the current social climate. In many respects the Army, despite some remaining inequalities, is as much if not more of a meritocracy than large industrial and commercial enterprises operating on equivalent hierarchical systems. However, its rigid stratification might be responsible for selling it short in the eyes of potential recruits of intellectual if not educational ability.

To continue the examination of how dedication and motivation can be improved, it seems sensible to examine how the horizons and career opportunities of the three functional divisions within the Army can be improved, examining trends common to all at the end. In doing so three pre-conditions will be assumed: Firstly that the Army’s present commitments will stand for some time to come, secondly that Defence expenditure will stay at approximately present day levels and thirdly that there will be no easing of training constraints.

**CAREER EXPECTATIONS OF THE OFFICER**

In any large organization there are bound to be a small number of men who have the talent, ambition and educational abilities to succeed to the top. Ambition engenders its own motivation and dedication, albeit sometimes for selfish reasons, but because it is ever present the individual concerned is likely to have only secondary concern for his working conditions and financial reward. Accordingly he must be excluded from any discussion on the majority. What then of the average officer, what induces him to join the Army and once joined why does he remain committed? What makes him work hard and what does he expect as his ultimate reward?

The following have been suggested as the most popular reasons for obtaining a commission:

- Patriotism and altruism — the Victorian public school ethos of service to the state.
- The appeal of a graduated career in an ordered community.
- The opportunity to acquire or improve educational or professional skills.
The pursuit of specialist or boyhood interests.
Achievement of a rise in social status.
An occupation well-paid in comparison with those demanding similar qualifications.
Parental influence (particularly in families with established military connections).

These reasons are clearly comprehensive as they circumscribe the ambitions of the three types of officer in the Army; the long serving regular officer, the short service officer, and those promoted from the ranks on Special Regular or Quartermaster commissions. It is present Army policy to officer on a ratio of 60% regular officers and 40% short service, the former incorporating officers commissioned from the ranks.

Whatever the motives of the short service officer he is clearly a bird in passage ultimately destined for a career in civil life and hence to an extent unconcerned with promotional prospects. Provided the Army offers him an interesting and satisfying period — and there is statistical evidence to suggest that it does — he is quite happy to see out his commitment and withdraw with an adequate gratuity. Equally the officer promoted from the ranks whether into a Quartermaster or combatant appointment, tends to be in the middle or towards the end of his service. He is sufficiently aware of and presumably satisfied with conditions of service and therefore unlikely to be disaffected. Indeed in the case of the majority of these officers the commission coupled with social recognition is culminating reward of their ambition frequently engendered during the early days in the Sergeants' Mess.

It is to the regular long service officer that we should really address ourselves, not only because he represents the major part of the officer corps and therefore his personal motivation is instrumental in engendering it in subordinates, but also because he is prone to be most vulnerable to changes in defence expenditure and career planning. His reasons for joining the Army in the first place are likely to be very similar to those of the young entry short service officer. For the majority these will form a somewhat clouded mixture of motives encompassing the desire to serve the community in defending the State, the appeal of Regimental life, travel, sport and adventure — all within a generally well-ordered framework. As he progresses through his twenties and becomes more aware of his parent society the officer's attitudes will shift but they are unlikely to clarify overmuch particularly if he takes the trouble to consider the conflicting pressures previously alluded to.

Though a proportion of his fellows will leave, either disgruntled by the system or in pursuit of greater rewards, most will remain committed to a somewhat intangible ethic, possibly constrained by domestic pressure or satisfied in finding a particular niche. The majority are likely to aspire to promotion which is nowadays symbolized by attendance at Staff College — the major hurdle for the middle-piece officer.

Acceptance of the 60/40 ratio in officer establishment has had a number of implications when linked with the progressive reduction in the size of the Army. It has tended to create over-lavish establishments in order to preserve officer posts and thus an acceptable hierarchical/promotional structure. Resultantly jobs have been created or retained which by absolute standards barely justify continued existence. Moreover as the substance of more jobs decline, the requisite qualifications appear to increase so much so that much of what used to be regarded as the fun of soldiering — that is command of soldiers — now occurs only once each during the tenure of the ranks of Major and Lieutenant-Colonel for the majority of officers and only for the selected minority thereafter. Inevitably the realization of this is bound to be painful for people who, even if their primary motive for joining the Army was not command of their fellow men, ultimately found that they enjoyed and felt themselves to be good at it.

It is not entirely accidental that the Staff College course or long special-to-arm training takes place at about this critical period. Having spent 12 to 14 years in his chosen career by this stage, the regular officer has by this time achieved a broad understanding of his profession, clearly enjoys it and is potentially useful in its higher management structure. Accordingly he must be formally prepared. With this rationale there can be no dispute, however one must question the logic of processing unaltered numbers through Staff College despite reductions in the Army's establishment. The argument that fewer resources available for Defence require better and more detailed management is valid to a point, however to the
individual the deliberately cultivated image of Staff College being the ‘Open Sesame’ to an interesting, successful and stimulating subsequent career can sometimes prove to be illusory.

Therefore there seems to be a very good case for reappraising the structure of the officer corps. A reduction in the regular component would create better career opportunities beyond the rank of Major — the current bulge in the promotional pyramid. Equally Staff College could be retained with its present capacity and hence become an accepted ‘catch-all’ or alternatively the same or a more severe degree of selection could take place in the secure knowledge that all graduating would find gainful employment for their skills. Moreover the elite thereby generated would be likely to be more highly motivated than at present because of the demanding nature of their employments. Furthermore it would be small and thus would not enjoy the almost total hegemony over the higher ranks that the current Staff College output does. This would give scope and worthwhile outlets for those not selected by virtue of the whole regular element being smaller in size.\(^{10}\)

How then could the revised officer structure be recruited? One solution is simply to make selection for a regular commission more difficult and then make good the increased requirement for short service officers from those failing to measure up to the more severe selection criteria. This has disadvantages not the least being the valid complaint that regular officers are provisionally selected for 35 year guaranteed employment on the strength of a 3 day selection course. A better approach might be to recruit all officers on the basis of a short service commission. Thereafter personal inclination, previous assessed performance on a standard military course at Sandhurst, educational qualifications and the needs of the Army could determine what proportion were offered regular commissions. This system would have the advantage of inculcating a competitive edge at a stage where it would be of the greatest benefit to the Army — that of testing the effectiveness of a young officer’s handling of soldiers. Critics might argue that competition would obviously be involved in achieving a regular commission thus simply reducing the age of the ‘rat race’. This is not necessarily the case. It would be better to assess an officer’s ability to lead soldiers under a system which offers little scope for falsification or complaints of disadvantaged treatment than to defer the issue until the officer is well advanced in his career as happens at present.

Refining the selection system for Regular officers would have a number of beneficial effects. Firstly it would induce the need to work hard from the outset — something not always evident in the more complacent Sandhurst product. Secondly it would create a situation where lesser but better selected numbers competed for worthwhile jobs which by their very nature would challenge the individual more. Thirdly smaller overall numbers of middle-piece officers could substantially alter the level of reward and status achievable. Finally Staff College would assume its correct function in differentiating between those with exclusively practical leanings and those who combined practical and intellectual abilities suitable for the achievement of high rank.

A further by-product of this system would be an increase in the turnover of short service officers. Initially this might place a strain on the recruiting system but in the longer term it could prove beneficial. Short service officers returning to civilian life with moderately generous gratuities and happy memories of a rewarding and maturing period of service would be sufficiently young to act as a source of indirect recruiters in addition to disseminating the Army’s role to society at large. This fact was not overlooked when consideration was given several years ago to reducing the initial commitment of a short service commission\(^{11}\).

To suggest that the entire combatant element of the officer corps should be recruited exclusively from direct commissions from Sandhurst is to deny another source of potential and one significant in broadening the base of the officer corps — that of promotion from the ranks.

**CAREER EXPECTATIONS OF THE WARRANT OFFICER/SENIOR NCO**

Huntingdon\(^{12}\) points out that ‘the education and training necessary for officership are normally incompatible with prolonged service as an enlisted man’. This premise is accepted by the Army in that promotion from the Sergeants’ Mess is almost exclusively designed to fill Quartermasters’ appointments, albeit sometimes through the artefact of an interim period as a combatant officer on a short
Attempts to recruit combatant officers from the junior ranks have met with mixed success partly because young men are required and they therefore lack formal educational qualifications being too young or too junior to partake in soldiers' educational schemes and particularly because they lack what are deemed to be the necessary intellectual ability or maturity for officer training. By the time would-be officers are suitable material they are already either in or a good way towards the Sergeants' Mess. Under the present commissioning system whereby Senior NCOs are generally offered Special Regular commissions and therefore no guarantee of a full career, it serves them well to progress through the Sergeants' Mess to ultimate commissioning as Quartermasters and thus a career to 55.

All these restrictions are probably correct when one remembers that a Special Regular commissioned officer could aspire to command a sub-unit. It nevertheless wastes talent. The young aspiring Sergeant must under present conditions serve in a subordinate or advisory position throughout his remaining service until eventually he attains a commission through 'dead men's shoes'; that is unless he is fortunate to belong to an enlightened regiment or one desperately short of young officers. In this event he may enjoy temporary command of a platoon. It seems generally accepted that Senior NCOs make good platoon commanders and this in turn suggests that the present career pattern is sterile and likely to blunt the edge of ambition which could be usefully employed by the Army. The promotion to and subsequent employment of Senior NCOs is therefore a subject merit one consideration and we would do well to consider the German model — born in their case of expedient in not having sufficient officers in time of war.

THE MIDDLE GROUND

Under the German system command of a platoon is considered suitable for a Senior NCO and is also an extension of a young officer's training. The first real command of a regular officer is considered to be the company. Because he aspires to this earlier than his British equivalent the German regular officer has a greater incentive to learn and as a result is more conscientious. Moreover because he represents a smaller proportion of the overall management structure, the incentives for continued application through Staff College and hence on to the General Staff are greater. Equally the NCO, with greater employment horizons is also better motivated and the result is beneficial to all concerned including junior ranks.

Critics of this system may argue that it would be impractical if applied to the British Army because:

- It cuts against the established rank structure. German NCOs are inherently of higher quality than their British counterparts.
- A relatively lavish rank structure such as our own gives the opportunity for supplementary activities not required in a conscript army with a predictable training cycle and a single well-defined role.

There is a certain validity to each of these criticisms. However, it has already been suggested that the officer corps of the Army should become broader based if it is to retain and indeed enhance the confidence of its parent society and to give substance to its meritocratic claims. There are dangers in reducing the selection criteria for regular officers either in accepting more but of lesser quality from traditional recruiting sources or broadening the catchment for its own sake. Equally recruitment of regular officers from the ranks seems fraught with difficulties if they are to be selected partially for their educational potential for commanding sub-units. There therefore seems sense in tapping the one available reservoir of proven ability — the senior ranks, and in refuting the second criticism it must be stated that there is no available evidence to suggest that long serving German NCOs are markedly more competent than their British counterparts. Even if they were it is likely to be as a result of practice in their job rather than inate gifts. The third criticism has only peripheral bearing on the issue. Existing establishments could be maintained in terms of overall executive posts, only the distribution between officer and Senior NCO posts being altered.

A FUTURE STRUCTURE

Synthesizing the two proposals made on the management strata of the Army, a possible outline organization could be as follows:

All officers would in future be commissioned on a short service basis. At some time in their
first three years of service those who had expressed an interest in a full career would be offered a regular commission dependent upon their potential for reaching field rank, their educational qualifications and the foreseeable needs of the Army.

Those not offered regular careers would leave as at present with a gratuity, the gratuity structure being designed to make service until the late twenties financially attractive.

The basic composition of the regular element would be reduced to as little as 30% of those initially recruited (this being dependent upon recruiting levels remaining broadly similar to those currently achieved).

The balance of platoon commands and indeed selective appointments such as second-in-command posts of sub-units would be made available to selected Senior NCOs.

The benefits of such a system would be:

To grant guaranteed long-term employment only officers who have proved their worth under conditions of extended assessment and not as at present the somewhat cursory and culture-biased conditions of the Regular Commissions Board and the Sandhurst Standard Military Course.

The system would reduce numbers available for staff training and as these officers could have already have been subject to some degree of intellectual assessment on a competitive Regular Careers Course, a 'catch-all' system of staff training could operate with no reduction in present standards or subsequent quality of employment. Alternatively were selection to Staff College based on the current criterion of one in three, then those selected by examination would automatically be identified as the future elite and could be stretched more significantly than at present. There would still be room for the employment of non-staff trained officers in jobs that did not merit detailed additional training.

By reducing the initial pool of officers by healthy competition at a stage where this competition would be beneficial to the soldiers they commanded and subsequently offering sufficient scope for these reduced numbers to fill really worthwhile jobs, officer motivation could be sustained even at the middle ability level through their service. Moreover, demand would determine the overall number of jobs that needed doing and not as at present supply.

At regimental level the shortfall of regular officers could be filled as at present with short service officers and as they gradually wasted out these same appointments could be used for the employment of Senior NCOs. The cumulative effects would be a broader cross-section of management at regimental level and a probable increase in the motivation of all managerial ranks.

Huntingdon's comment still bears examination. The implicit suggestion is that a long serving subordinate does not necessarily have the qualities of a leader. This is probably true. The qualities of good NCOs are loyalty and diligence and those of officers also demand some originality.

To suggest that junior officers need an excess of originality is to overstate their value. During their initial tours of duty they are unlikely to understand the mechanics of the Army sufficiently well to enact any of their own ideas except on a fairly local basis. At platoon level the Senior NCO is likely to be just as capable. In addition there is much to be said in favour of Senior NCO platoon commanders in that they provide stability and continuity for their subordinates, something that the average tour of a junior officer does not contain because of the increased emphasis on short courses and the like. Thus whilst it must be generally accepted that the training of Senior NCOs does not equip them for appointments of equivalent responsibility and freedom of action as middle-piece officers, there is everything to suggest that employment within sub-units is well within their competence.

Baynes suggests a more flexible approach for promotion to the Sergeants' Mess. His system envisages well qualified young men reaching the Sergeants' Mess within one or two years. It is a system practised in the technical Corps to provide financial remuneration for skilled technicians and it is fraught with difficulties if employed on a large scale. There may well be a place for a small number of Sergeants promoted well ahead of their contemporaries, but it is writer's experience that a surfeit of this type of promotional product tends to detract from the overall quality of the Senior NCOs in that they lack the experience so essential to a unit. Accordingly it would seem sensible to retain the present minimum service criteria for men reaching the Sergeants' Mess, but during this time to earmark the more talented for possible
command. Having been promoted to Sergeant by a given age, top quality Sergeants could then be sent on a command course more comprehensive than existing Senior NCO training and upon return be employed as commanders. This type of system would be unlikely to prove divisive as later arrivals in the Sergeants' Mess would probably not aspire to platoon command.

Formalizing a command system for Senior NCOs gives direction to a promotional system that otherwise lacks obvious purpose. Were command of a platoon-sized unit set at Colour Sergeant or equivalent level and tours set at either three or four years duration, the brightest candidates selected by perhaps their 25th birthdays could complete a total of 5 tours before being eligible for pension. An example of their service pattern could be as follows:

A tour as platoon commander with the rank of Colour Sergeant
A period as a Company Sergeant Major or specialist platoon commander as a Warrant Officer 2nd Class.
A appointment as an instructor.
A tour as company Second-in-Command possibly as a Warrant Officer 1st Class.
A final tour Regimental Sergeant Major.
Pensionable retirement or commissioning as a Quartermaster.

THE SHORT SERVICE SOLDIER
What then of the short service soldier, how can his motivation be improved within current financial constraints? To answer this we must examine his motives for joining the Army. Amongst the most popular are:

- The adventurous aspects of military life.
- The ability to learn a trade.
- Job security and guaranteed pay.
- The prospect of promotion.

Although recruiting has fluctuated quite dramatically since the inception of an all-regular Army, it would be true to say that the Army does make an attempt to satisfy the majority of these aspirations. Opportunities for foreign travel have obviously diminished with the reduction of overseas bases, however, energetic Directors of Army Training have compensated for this by providing overseas training. Adventure training has also filled part of the gap and is arguably more useful in its character building applications than some aspects of service in overseas stations.

Moreover, it is encouraging to see that the young officer is now expected to achieve some measure of competence in at least one adventure training pursuit.

Acquisition of a marketable skill is clearly dependent upon which arm the soldier joins. Those Arms and Services that offer trades with civilian recognition have no trouble in recruiting or maintaining motivation provided that skill once acquired is exercised and developed. The problem really arises where levels of competence or manipulative skills are required that have no immediately recognizable civilian counterpart as in the combat arms. It is to the credit of both the Armoured Corps and Infantry that they have succeeded in evolving a promotional structure geared to the acquisition of a variety of skills. Whilst this maintains motivation in the soldier who is committed to serve for some years in the future, the problem of eventually equipping him for civilian life is still unanswered and requires further examination.

In the aspects of job security and promotion the Army serves its junior ranks well and career planning particularly when organized on a large Corps basis, is generally good until the hiatus of senior NCO employment previously discussed.

This leaves pay as the fundamental source of dissatisfaction. Whilst the pay structure depends on skill levels, length of service commitment and promotion and is comprehensive and subject to only minor anomalies, poor rewards in terms of comparability with civilian earnings is proving the greatest single issue in determining the motivation of the junior rank. If there is no speedy and permanent correction of the present situation, the Army is likely to fail to find recruits of the quality it requires. There have been suggestions that more educationally disadvantaged men could be recruited using the inducement of remedial education. There are dangers to this. Lack of academic attainment suggests lack of self-motivation and intakes containing large numbers of these recruits could not be tolerated whilst establishments remained pared down to essential posts.

FACTORS AFFECTING ALL RANKS
Up to now we have examined methods of motivating men to join the Army and how that motivation can be sustained throughout their
service. Where the Army falls down is in its reluctance to accept that all soldiers except the most successful of officers are likely to return to civilian life before their reasonable expectation of a working lifetime is over. 28-day courses on completion of pensionable engagements are hardly adequate preparation for a complete change of life style and indeed are considerably less useful than EEC financed retraining schemes. The financial advice given to soldiers during their service in preparation for retirement sometimes borders on economic lunacy.

Considering re-education firstly, there is much that could be done to improve coverage of the facilities available from the Open University. For those of lesser academic ability employed in trades of no civilian equivalent, skills could be taught on a garrison basis. The Army has technical workshops in most major units and trained personnel who could be organized to provide out-of-hours training schemes under the auspices of the Department of Employment.

Retirement to civilian life also implies acquisition of a house. Though there is a scheme for advantageous emplacement on Local Authority housing lists, in the past the terminal grant was regarded by many as a mechanism by which a soldier purchased his first house. The property price rise of the early 70's coupled with that now taking place, places even the smallest house beyond the realization of any soldier who has not made personal provisions. It is time the Army ended its ambivalent attitude to soldiers acquiring their own homes, either by declaring general acceptance of the principle and thus instituting a system of low interest loans, as employed in the Royal Navy, or alternatively by instituting a system of its own based on an omnibus mortgage. A system could operate under which soldiers paid realistic quartering charges which in fact represented a mortgage repayment. Part of that not absorbed in running costs could be deemed to be the man's stake in his quarter and tied to the average value of quarters upon his entering the scheme. On final retirement, the soldier would either be returned a lump sum equating to the rise in quarter values since joining the scheme or alternatively be offered advantageous purchase of a surplus quarter near his intended place of retirement.

A final aspect that merits attention is the Army's management of its families. This may not be significant in recruiting a young officer or soldier but as he is likely to get married during his service, the care afforded to his dependants is critical to his well-being and often instrumental in young soldiers in particular leaving the Army. Present welfare services rely heavily on the voluntary help of officers' and Senior NCOs' wives. Progressively more of these are having to seek employment when free of children, accordingly the good neighbourliness that has previously sustained the system is not breaking down and the soldier as a tax payer whose tax is not abated when he goes abroad, has a right to expect social services of a quality equivalent to those available when stationed in Britain.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The British Army has some right to the claim that it is well motivated and dedicated to the service of the nation. Recent years have proved this point and have demonstrated its flexibility in responding to various calls to such an extent that the public have come to see it as a reliable element in a progressively self-seeking and anarchic world. Because of this there is a body of opinion that believes that it should stand firm in its principles and remain impervious to the changes in society. This can be a seductive argument but it is essentially dangerous. If armies get violently out of step with the values of their parent societies, far-ranging and generally destructive consequences ensue. It therefore behoves the Army not to become complacent in broadening its recruiting base and management structure, whilst retaining established virtues. Only by periodically challenging these virtues can their relevance be tested. Much has been done in recent years and though the criticisms levelled in the paper are wide-ranging they do not challenge the basic fabric of the Service. They do however challenge some cherished and out-moded beliefs. In an age in which beliefs are likely to be questioned by a critical public it behoves any organization to test its own.

**NOTES**

(1) Correlli Barnett: Britain and Her Army.
(2) Norman F. Dixon: On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.
(4) Attitude Survey conducted on 13 Army Staff Course November 1978. Of the 132 officers asked what status the Army enjoyed in society 109 considered it undervalued and 23 considered it enjoyed a reasonable status.

(5) M. Janowitz: The Professional Soldier.


(7) Results of the EEC Referendum on the Renegotiated Terms of Entry June 1975.

(8) Executive Committee of the Army Board Draft Paper: The Short Service Commission — 2 Year Option.

(9) Attitude Survey 13 Army Staff Course November 1978.

(10) Informal conversation with officers visiting German Staff College May 1978.


(12) S. P. Huntingdon: The Soldier and the State.

(13) J. C. M. Baynes: The Soldier in Modern Society


BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue are available in various defence libraries:


ARmed FORCES and SOCIETY in AUSTRALIA

A limited number of copies of “A Bibliography of Armed Forces and Society in Australia” by Hugh Smith and Sue Broome are available free of charge. Requests should be sent to: Dr Hugh Smith, Department of Government, R.M.C. Duntroon, ACT, 2600.
The Forgotten War in North Russia

By Peter Burness

DURING 1979 the Australian War Memorial in Canberra mounted a special exhibition entitled “The Forgotten War — North Russia 1919” to mark the 60th Anniversary of the Australian involvement in the Russian Civil War. The exhibition featured a number of photographs and relics from this little known campaign and attracted considerable interest.

The Australian involvement in North Russia commenced on 17 June 1918 when three A.I.F. officers and six sergeants embarked on the troopship “City of Newcastle” bound for Russia. These men had been specially chosen and had recently completed training with other Commonwealth volunteers at the Tower of London. Throughout their training their destination and mission had been kept secret. The following year these A.I.F. volunteers were joined in North Russia by over one hundred Australians serving with the British Army.

Following revolutions during 1917, Russia had signed an armistice with Germany withdrawing from the European War and at the same time embarking on a bitter civil war within her own borders. The Allies were greatly alarmed that Russia’s collapse would allow Germany to transfer large numbers of troops from the East over to the Western Front. At the same time there was also concern that military stores held in Russia would fall into German hands.

In early 1918 a small Allied detachment was landed at Murmansk in North Russia. This was followed in August by larger landings at Archangel of British, Canadian, and U.S. Battalions supported by French, Poles, Serbs and Italian troops.¹ The Australian volunteers were formed into part of a force known as “Elope Force” which was first landed at Murmansk. One of the Australians, Sergeant A. Van Duve MM, later wrote: “On arrival at Murmansk in June 1918 five of us were sent inland on patrol . . . it was six weeks before we arrived back at Murmansk, then we sailed for Archangel. There was another Australian (Sgt. B. Perry MM) in that patrol.”

Following the Archangel landings the Allies advanced in August and September westward to Onega, and south along the Vologda railway and the Dvina River to Bereznik. Behind these advances were the friendly White Russian forces. By October 1918 it is estimated that there were 15,000 Allied troops around Archangel.

It was inevitable that the landings in North Russia would bring the Allies into conflict with the local Bolshevik forces. The Bolsheviks, however, realised that this theatre of operations was relatively unimportant because of its climate, remoteness, poor communications, and difficult terrain. As a result the Reds maintained a constant pressure, but did not launch any major offensive to try to dislodge the Allied troops.²

On 11 November 1918 Germany signed the Armistice and the guns fell quiet on the Western Front. This event added a new dimension to the activities of the North Russia Force. There was no longer any German threat to be considered. However, while the war had ended, troops in North Russia still found themselves in action supporting White forces against the Bolsheviks. Furthermore the Allies were now committed to this strange campaign by the onset of the Arctic winter which froze the harbours and made evacuation impossible. Throughout the Winter the Allied forces resisted Red Army attacks, developed defences and trained White Army troops. The small band of Australians were by this time widely scattered. Most were serving amongst White units in an advisory capacity. This role was not

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unlike that of the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam 50 years later in a somewhat similar conflict.

The Allied governments had agreed that their forces should be evacuated at the earliest opportunity. War against the Bolsheviks was not one of the objects of the original landings. Furthermore, any escalation of the present fighting would be politically unwise at home where the population was preparing for the long awaited peace.

In the early spring news was received in Archangel of important White Russian Army successes in the East and in Southern Russia. It was therefore decided that the Allied force in North Russia should be strengthened to allow a local offensive to drive south and link up with the Siberian Army. Such an offensive would allow an evacuation while the Reds were still recovering. As a result, plans were commenced in England to raise a special volunteer force for North Russia.

The North Russia Relief Force was to consist of two Brigades. The first would be commanded by Brig.-General Grogan VC., and the second by Brig.-General L. W. de V. Sadlier-Jackson. Sadlier-Jackson’s Brigade would consist of the 45th and 46th Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, and the 201st Battalion M.G. Corps, with the 55th Bty R.F.A., 250 Signal Coy. R.E., and the 385 Field Coy. R.E., attached. Volunteers for these units were required to be trained, single, fit and over 19 years of age. They would be enlisted for 12 months service.

Among the early volunteers for the Relief Force was Major H. G. Harcourt DSO., MC. Harcourt was a regular British Army officer with considerable war experience and valuable machine gun training. He was appointed to raise and command a company of the 201st M.G. Battalion. Harcourt was aware that there were many well trained Australian servicemen still in England awaiting repatriation to Australia, so he went down to A.I.F. Headquarters at Horseferry Road, London to seek volunteers.

Among the Australians was Warrant Officer Charles Oliver who had settled in Australia in 1910 after an extensive career in the British Army. Before the war he had been appointed to the new Duntroon Military College as an instructor. In 1917 he joined the A.I.F. and in April 1918 joined the 21st Battalion in France. In June he was wounded and invalided back to England where he was when the war ended. He obtained leave to study orcharding at West Brighton. However, finding this too dull he put his name down for North Russia. Oliver was responsible for enlisting a great many fellow members of the A.I.F. into the Relief Force.

The Australians recruited by Harcourt and Oliver, and others who responded to separate appeals, were posted to the 45th Battalion Royal Fusiliers and the 201st M.G. Battalion in Sadlier-Jackson’s Brigade. Unlike the earlier A.I.F. Volunteers already in Russia these men, numbering possibly 150, had to be discharged from the A.I.F. and enlisted into the British Army. However, Charles Oliver was able to get permission for the Australians to be enlisted as special companies. They were also allowed to retain A.I.F. uniform and received an assurance that they would be repatriated to Australia after the campaign.

Among the Australians to offer their services was Captain H. W. Murray, VC., the A.I.F.’s most decorated officer. However, Murray withdrew his name when advised that he would not be able to retain his rank in the British Army. Another officer, Lieutenant H. Gipps of the 5th Australian Division Artillery enlisted and served in North Russia as a Corporal. Some of the others who enlisted were General Service Reinforcements who had arrived too late to serve in France. These men were determined to see some action before returning home. However, there were also many Australians who had already seen considerable active service who were prepared to join up. Sergeant Robinson and Private Francis were both Anzacs and carried wounds received in 1915. Corporal Pearce wore the ribbon of his Military Medal won at Ypres in 1917. Private H. Spies also had an M.M., and Warrant Officer Jenkyn wore the Distinguished Conduct Medal awarded for his repeated acts of bravery in France during 1918.

Most of Sadlier-Jackson’s Brigade was formed in London before being sent up to Sandling Camp in Kent where General Rawlinson presented Colours to the Royal Fusiliers on 22 May. During the next few weeks the Brigade assembled at Leith, Newcastle, Tilbury and Southampton prior to embarkation. Most of the Australians finally sailed on the former German ship “Steigerwald” from Leith on 9 June and on the
“Czar” from Southampton on 3 July. “The Times” newspaper report of the departure of the “Steigerwald” says that the ship sailed flying the flag of the League of Nations.

Sadlier-Jackson’s Brigade disembarked in North Russia over a period of about four weeks during June-July 1919. General Ironsides, commanding the North Russia forces observed: “As I watched them disembark I felt that they could walk through anything in Russia”.

Following the arrival of the Relief Force it was possible for most of the original 1918 Expeditionary Force to be evacuated. Most of the A.I.F. volunteers were amongst the first to leave. By July only two of the original nine Australians were still in North Russia. General Grogan’s Brigade was the first to land and was sent up the Pinega River. When the first companies of Sadlier-Jackson’s Brigade arrived at Archangel they were sent down the Dvina River. This force made its way down the river by barge to the forward base at Bereznik where they relieved troops who had held the village throughout the Winter. The front line was now at Triotsa and Topsa a few miles away.

The Relief Force on the Dvina River joined up with a White Russian force called “Dyer’s Battalion”. This battalion was composed of Russians of doubtful loyalty welded together by strict discipline. General Ironside’s faith in Dyer’s Battalion was shattered on 7 July when a company rose up in mutiny murdering their British officers and crossing over to the Reds. The mutiny of Dyer’s Battalion had considerable effect on General Ironside’s plans. He wrote: “I now felt a distinct urge to extricate myself and troops as quickly as possible”. The mutiny also fell heavily on Sadlier-Jackson who conceived “an immense disgust and mistrust of everything Russian”.

While the main part of the Brigade was moving into positions down the river there were further troops of the Royal Fusiliers and the 201st M.G. Battalion landing from Britain. These companies were held for a while at Archangel since the river was dropping too low for them to proceed down the Dvina. There was a high proportion of Australians in these companies including Major Harcourt’s machine-gunners and some infantry under Major May. Like Harcourt, May was a British officer who identified himself closely with his Australians. Private W. J. Robinson later wrote: “Our O.C., to identify himself with us, obtained an Australian hat and wore it during our service. He was Major May of the Royal Fusiliers, and wore his Aussie hat until he was wounded in the attack on Emptsa in August 1919”.

On 16 July Harcourt was ordered to take his men and some of the Royal Fusiliers down the railway to the other main front to strengthen the positions there. On 20 July General Ironsides flew up to Archangel from the Dvina following reports of possible mutinies on the railway front. Ironsides took a train down to Obozerskaya where he collected Harcourt’s force. The British had obtained information that the Bolsheviks would attack along the railway to support mutinies among the local Russians and those on the Onega front. Anticipating this attack, the British quietly withdrew possible pro-Bolshevik troops from the line and had Harcourt’s men disarm them. Their positions were then occupied by British, Australian and loyal Russian troops.

Private Robinson recalled this period in a recent letter to the Australian War Memorial. “Our role in this area was mainly to patrol the slashings in the huge pine forests and to attack the Bolsheviks wherever they attempted to establish positions. One such position, a large machine gun post, was attacked by us and a number of the enemy killed. The Bolsheviks did not bother to bury their dead but left them to rot where they lay. There were no casualties on our side”.

On the Onega River the Russians staged their mutiny prematurely on the 20th. Among the few British troops in that area was Captain A. Brown, one of the original A.I.F. officers in North Russia. The Australian was taken by surprise, although he managed to shoot two mutineers with his revolver before he himself was shot and bayoneted to death.

On 22 July the Bolsheviks attacked on the railway. They advanced with considerable commotion. “Obviously they were calling to the men they expected to come over to them. They got a rude awakening when the Australian machine-gunners opened on them” wrote General Ironsides. The Bolsheviks were able to capture six blockhouses which they occupied. During the night they made further attacks on Harcourt’s positions which were repelled without loss.

Next morning the British counter-attacked and recovered all their former positions. Dur-
ing the day patrols located about 300 Bolsheviks regrouping in preparation for another attack. A company of men, mostly Australians, caught them by surprise killing about thirty and routing the rest. General Ironsides was returning to the Dvina when he received a message of the successful raid. “The Australians . . . killed thirty with the bayonet and wounded a good many more. They then set fire to four blockhouses and left them burning briskly. With this heartening information in my pocket I flew off” he later wrote.10

A week later the Australians were again in action along the railway. A force from the 45th Battalion Royal Fusiliers commanded by Major May, and Harcourt’s mixed force, with two Russian companies in support launched an attack on the Bolshevik’s flank. Part of the Australian detachment was to seize a large gun located on a railway siding. This attack got off to a bad start when the guides got lost. However, the Australians performed well in the following action capturing some artillery, machine guns and over 200 prisoners. The railway gun was damaged but withdrew to safety. The British were unable to follow-up this attack and advance on to Empsia because the Russians in reserve were too slow coming forward.

With the situation now well in hand on the railway, General Ironsides turned his attention to the forces along the Dvina. Here he hoped to deliver his main blow against the Bolsheviks before carrying out his final evacuation. Sadlier-Jackson had already been ordered to plan this attack and now selected 10 August as the date. The purpose of this offensive was described by Sadlier-Jackson:

1. To strike a strong blow at the enemy and lower his morale.
2. To push his river fleet back to allow mining for the evacuation.
3. To raise the morale of the White Russians.

The Bolsheviks’ defences on the Dvina lay astride the river for about 6 miles with a depth of 10 miles. This took in the villages of Nijni Seltso, Sludka, and Chudinova on the left bank, and Selmenga, Gorodok, and Borok on the other side. About 6000 Reds held this line, many in well constructed log blockhouses behind wire entanglements. To launch his attack Sadlier-Jackson had two battalions of Royal Fusiliers (less those companies serving on the railway front), two M.G. companies, a company of Royal Engineers and a brigade of White Russians. Artillery support was available from over 20 field guns and howitzers and two 60-pounders from the Royal Navy.

The attack commenced on time after a heavy artillery bombardment which included smoke and mustard gas. Kochimaka was in British hands only 10 minutes after zero hour, and Chudinova an hour later. Sludka was entered at 1350 hours. Private Brooke, an Australian in the 45th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, distinguished himself in these early actions. “Under heavy fire (he) came back with reliable information, enabling his platoon to advance without casualties”. Brooke was later awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

At Seltso the attack ran into trouble and was held up. However, on the right bank of the river things went according to plan. Borok fell first, then at 1458 hours Gorodok, considered to be the key to the right bank positions, was entered. Later in the day the Bolsheviks counter-attacked but were driven off with heavy losses. On the difficult left bank a 20-minute barrage was ordered on Nijni Seltso. This was followed by a successful attack in which many prisoners were taken. By midnight the battle had been won. However at this time there were grave fears held for a column which had earlier captured Sludka. Taking their wounded and prisoners with them this column had tried to link up with the main force but had been repeatedly attacked. Finally the weary survivors staggered into the British lines at 0720 hours next morning.

Corporal A. P. Sullivan, an Australian, won the Victoria Cross for his bravery on the 10th August. Existing records do not provide many details of his actions. However, it appears that he may have been part of the column which had been cut off. His citation says: “The platoon to which he belonged, after fighting a rearguard covering action, had to cross the river by means of a narrow plank, and during the passage an officer and three men fell into a deep swamp. Without hesitation, under intense fire, Corporal Sullivan jumped into the river and rescued all four, bringing them out singly. But for this gallant action his comrades would undoubtedly have drowned. It was a splendid example of heroism, as all ranks were on the point of exhaustion and the enemy less than 100 yards distant.”11
Corporal Arthur Sullivan VC., one of the two Australians awarded the Victoria Cross for actions fought in North Russia in 1919. The white star on his sleeve is the insignia of the North Russian Relief Force.
On 11 August General Rawlinson arrived at Archangel to take over from Ironsides as Commander-in-Chief and arrange the evacuation from North Russia. Commenting on the report of Sadlier-Jackson's victory the previous day, Rawlinson wrote: 'This success is just what I wanted. It will greatly hearten the White Russians, and keep the Bolshies from interfering with our withdrawal.'

Before the British evacuated North Russia there was one final offensive action in which the Australians played a very important part. This action took place at Emptsa along the railway in late August. The attack was designed to allow the White forces to consolidate their positions before the final British withdrawal. Because of the inadequacy of the maps available, this attack was preceded by extensive patrolling. This attack went in on 29 August. The Australians spearheaded the assault which was supported by White forces. On this occasion the White Russians performed well. The Bolsheviks were taken completely by surprise, but some of their blockhouses defended bravely. During this action Sergeant Samuel Pearce a Victorian, cut his way through the enemy barbed wire under heavy fire. He then, single-handed, attacked a blockhouse and knocked it out with handgrenades. A few minutes later Pearce was cut down by an enemy machine gun. He was later awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.

In the same attack with Pearce, Sergeant Hill, another Australian, was badly wounded attacking a blockhouse. Hill's leg was so badly shattered that it had to be amputated. Private Ben Parry-Williams, Hill's mate, then silenced an enemy post with his Lewis Gun. Private Robinson was also wounded in this action and his life was only saved by the Bible he carried in his top pocket deflecting a bullet. Finally at the end of the day the Bolsheviks fell back across the Emptsa River, demolishing the steel railway bridge behind them. In the action over 1000 prisoners were taken.

During the next four weeks the British handed over their positions to the White Russian Army and made their way back up the rivers, and the railway to Archangel. This withdrawal required that an enormous quantity of military stores and equipment be destroyed. By 23 September the British force had withdrawn...
Australians of the 201st M.G. Battalion outside a captured blockhouse. This is in the vicinity of the blockhouse attacked by Sgt. Sam Pearce when he won the V.C.

Bolshevik prisoners taken by the Australians during the attack on Emptsa on 29 August 1919.
Within the next four days all the troops were aboard ships returning to Britain. The evacuation was completed by 27 September 1919.

The Australians in the North Russia Relief Force returned to England to take their leave and obtain their discharges from the British Army. They then joined over 8000 other troops still awaiting repatriation to Australia. They also managed to get two captured machine guns sent home for display in the proposed "Australian War Museum". One of these (a Maxim) is still held at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, and was placed on display in the special anniversary exhibition.

In Australia itself the North Russia "diggers" attracted little attention. Newspaper reports of their activities went little beyond reporting the award of the two Victoria Crosses. However, there was one article published in the Melbourne "Truth" on 24 May 1919 which had a lot to say about the political implications of the campaign. It concluded by saying: "The Commonwealth Parliament ought to be called together at once to condemn the sending of Australian troops (to North Russia) from London or anywhere else". Senator Pearce, Australian Minister for Defence, tried to avoid any criticism of the Government by stating that he was not receiving any information on the activities of these Australians. "The men are entirely under War Office conditions. Their discharge has relieved the Commonwealth of responsibility in regard to them".

In early 1920, only a few months after the evacuation of the Relief Force, Archangel was in Bolshevik hands. The British seem to have determined that the campaign should be quickly forgotten. No Official History of the Campaign was ever written nor did the troops involved ever receive a special medal (eligibility for the British War Medal was later extended to cover North Russia). The Communists, however, did not forget. Many years later Mr Krushchev said: "We remember the grim days..."
Privates W. Robinson and E. Gaffey, two Australians wounded in North Russia, pose in the ground of Netley Hospital, England, shortly after the conclusion of the campaign.
Private Joe Purdee receiving the Distinguished Conduct Medal in the grounds of Netley Hospital. Purdee received the award for his actions on 10 August 1919 while serving in North Russia with the 45th Battalion Royal Fusiliers.
when... all the capitalist countries of Europe and America marched on our country to strangle the new revolution".

The Australians in Sadlier-Jackson’s Brigade served only about 10 weeks in Russia. They did not have to experience an Arctic Winter so conditions were not too uncomfortable. There were certainly very few of the horrors which had been experienced on the Western Front and casualties had only been light. Only two Australians were killed in North Russia (Captain Brown and Sergeant Pearce VC). However, there were several men wounded including Sergeant Hill and Privates Kevin, Purdue, Robinson, Lutherborrow and Gaffey. During the brief campaign the Australians maintained the high reputation achieved by the A.I.F. during the war. The Victoria Crosses of Sergeant Pearce and Corporal Sullivan were the only two awarded for service in North Russia. In addition other decorations were awarded including Distinguished Conduct Medals to Sergeant Gascoigne-Roy, Lance-Corporal Lutherborrow, and Privates Brooke, Purdue and Quarrell. Privates Hodson and Sutton received the Military Medal, and Captain-Brown was Mentioned-in-Despatches.

No doubt Australian veterans of North Russia had cause in later years to remember the names of some of those they had served under, and alongside, in 1919. Arthur Sullivan "the quiet VC", returned to civilian employment in Australia. In 1937 he visited England as a member of the Australian Coronation Con-


tingent for King George VI, and on 9 April was tragically killed in a fall in a London street. General Ironsides received his Field Marshal’s baton in 1940. He was C.I.G.S., and later C-in-C Home Forces during the early years of World War Two. Lt.-General Arthur Percival, in command of forces in Singapore at the time of the surrender in 1942 had been awarded a bar to his D.S.O. for service in Sadlier-Jackson’s Brigade. Major Harcourt also received a bar for his D.S.O. for North Russia. Harcourt, who was closely identified with the Australians in North Russia, visited Australia in 1929 on leave from the British Army and decided to stay. He later served with distinction during the 1939-45 War, commanding the 2/6th Independent Company on the Kokoda Trail in 1942.

NOTES

2. Ibid.
6. Ibid. p. 160.
7. Australian War Memorial, DRL. 7086.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid. p. 165.
MAY 1975 saw the successful conclusion of the Vietnam People’s Army’s (VPA) general offensive against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Since this time a number of articles have appeared in Vietnamese publications analysing various aspects of this operation. One of these, written by Colonel Dao Van Xuan, is titled “In the Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising — Tank-Armored Troops in Strategic Group Offensives”. In it the author discusses the strategic and tactical employment of the VPA’s armoured forces, highlighting specific points, and outlining the lessons to be drawn from the offensive. Colonel Xuan’s article provides an opportunity to compare the VPA’s experience of armoured operations in the 1975 Offensive and the 1972 Spring Offensive, when armoured fighting vehicles (AFV’s) first appeared on the battlefield in large numbers. In 1972 VPA armoured forces had been employed with only mixed success. Building on this experience VPA commanders involved in the 1975 Offensive were careful to use their AFV resources to maximum advantage. In doing so they greatly aided the VPA’s chances of victory.

BACKGROUND TO THE 1972 SPRING OFFENSIVE

In response to the RVN’s relatively successful “Pacification” and “Vietnamization” programmes, and, the consolidation of President Thieu’s leadership, the Lao Dong (Workers’) Party decided to revert to large unit warfare in December 1970. According to Porter, “the Lao Dong Party’s strategy for ending the war had always assumed that a military and diplomatic stalemate could be broken by a decisive victory”, and, what was of greatest importance was the timing and targets for such a main force offensive. Throughout 1971 increased Soviet and Chinese military aid flowed into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). This build-up of aid was the result of agreements signed between the DRV and the Soviet Union in August and December of 1971. Negotiations with China, in February, 1971, concerning supplementary military aid, were reflected in a doubling of Chinese shipments into Haiphong. Significant also was the nature of this assistance. As well as small scale items, such as ammunition and rifles which had been provided previously, large numbers of heavy mortars and artillery, armoured vehicles, and trucks also began arriving. During this period VPA divisions, which had been operating in the RVN, were withdrawn from combat to undergo training and re-equipment with the newly arrived aid.

The reasons for mounting the offensive in 1972 were that United States ground forces had largely been withdrawn from the RVN, and hence, the VPA could concentrate their efforts on destroying ARVN* main force units. Also, with President Nixon committed to extricating the United States from Vietnam, a successful attack on the RVN would apply further pressure for a negotiated settlement if he wanted to be re-elected in 1972. At this time the anti-war movement still remained as a significant lobby group in American domestic politics. The “Pacification” and “Vietnam-
IZATION” programmes were designed to show that the RVN regime could administer and defend its sovereign territory. If the VPA could achieve success on the battlefield then the effectiveness of these programmes would be shown as limited, and the credibility of the RVN regime would be further undermined. If the offensive resulted in the capture of territory, Communist prestige would be enhanced, and the basis laid for the establishment of an alternative Government to the one in Saigon. On the eve of the 1972 Offensive the VPA had thirteen divisions, equipped with approximately twelve hundred AFV’s, poised to strike against the ARVN forces.

**LESSONS OF THE 1972 OFFENSIVE**

General Giap, the VPA’s Commander-in-Chief, opened the offensive on three fronts, with the main initial thrust across the northern Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The VPA advance in this area began on March 30, spearheaded by one hundred AFV’s. Inaccurate intelligence assessments meant that ARVN anti-armour defences were inadequate in trying to stem the progress of the VPA armoured columns. The surprise appearance of AFV’s on the battlefield clearly demonstrated the devastating psychological effect they can have on an unprepared enemy, and, was a decisive factor leading to the ARVN’s 3rd Division disorganized withdrawal. Once the ARVN forces overcame this initial shock, they were able to employ successfully anti-armour weapons, and, their own armoured forces, against the VPA. The ARVN’s subsequent achievements in destroying enemy AFV’s was also assisted by the VPA inept handling of its vehicles.

VPA forces operating on the other two fronts, in the RVN province of Kontum and Binh Long, also employed AFV’s to spearhead their advance. The VPA’s use of armoured forces in attempting to capture the provincial capital of An Loc clearly illustrated weaknesses in tactical co-ordination and co-operation. Lack of effective artillery support, combined with an absence of accompanying infantry, meant armoured vehicles became easy prey to the anti-armour weapons of the ARVN forces. Although recently returned from training in the Soviet Union, VPA tank
crews fared badly in tank versus tank engagements, and, also, in general battlefield deployment. According to observers, VPA armoured units persisted in advancing along roads when cross-country movement would have been safer, and, proceeding slowly and indecisively when speed and initiative were called for.\(16\)

Initially the VPA offensive had been favoured by rain and low cloud cover which restricted the use of allied air power. When the bad weather lifted RVNAF* and USAF† planes were able to fly missions in support of defending ARVN forces. Ground-attack aircraft, bombers like the B-52, and helicopter gunships were responsible for destroying many enemy AFV’s on all three fronts. This situation emphasized the essential requirement for active, and passive, air defence measures if AFV’s were to operate on a battlefield where their forces did not have the benefit of air cover.

For the VPA, the conventional, mid-intensity warfare they were being called on to conduct was a new experience. Commanders lacked the background to organize large-scale, combined-arm operations, and this deficiency was reflected in high vehicle and manpower casualties. The fact that the three fronts on which the VPA forces were fighting did not directly support each other aided ARVN attempts to contain the VPA drives. On the northern front the VPA advance lost its initial momentum due to an inability of the logistic system to maintain supplies.\(17\) As far as the individual VPA soldiers involved in armour operations were concerned, one commentator described the situation in the following terms — "hesitant unco-ordinated fumbling with some well maintained Soviet vehicles showed once again that successful armour employment is totally dependent on aggressive spirit and technical skill on the part of the tank crews".\(18\)

By the middle of May the tide had turned against the VPA offensive, and many of the units on the three fronts were being withdrawn for refurbishment. By the end of July the VPA had, in combined operations, sustained some 60,000 troop casualties and lost 250 AFV’s. Balanced against three losses was the, what later proved to be invaluable, experience gained at all levels in planning and conducting operations involving large numbers of troops from different arms. Also, the VPA had succeeded in forcing the RVN to commit all of its main force units to stemming the Communist advance. This allowed Communist guerilla groups freedom to operate in the countryside, and establish control over a further 1400 villages in the RVN.\(19\) The first large scale use of AFV’s by the VPA graphically illustrated to commanders the possible pitfalls associated with their employment. The lightning success of the 1975 Spring Offensive in many ways demonstrated how well the VPA had applied the lessons learnt three years previously.

**LEAD UP TO THE 1975 SPRING OFFENSIVE**

At the 21st plenum of the Lao Dong Party’s Central Committee, held in October 1973, it had been decided that the DRV must “maintain a course of strategic offensive and give active guidance to advance the revolution in the South”.\(20\) This decision led to a reorganization of the VPA order of battle along the lines of four independent army corps, with associated mobile commands.\(21\) A re-equipment programme was also started, and, according to the VPA field commander, General Van Tien Dung, “large numbers of tanks, armoured cars, rockets, long-range artillery and anti-aircraft guns were sent South”.\(22\) Such an effort was possible because, by 1974, the old “Ho Chi Minh Trail” through Laos and Cambodia had largely been superseded by a new network of paved roads extending from the DMZ between the Vietnams down through the Central Highlands.\(23\) In conjunction with this, General Dung describes the construction of “a 5000 kilometer-long oil pipeline which ran from Quang Tri through the Central Highlands on to Loc Ninh”.\(24\) In this way vehicles using the new road system could be conveniently refuelled.

The effectiveness of the VPA’s reorganization and planning was demonstrated in December 1974, when main force units joined with regional forces in opening a campaign to gain control of Phuoc Long Province. The combined infantry and armour assault on the provincial capital, Phuoc Binh, quickly led to its capture by the VPA. One observer stated that, “militarily, the attack revealed the reforms that had been instituted”\(25\) in the

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* Republic of Vietnam Air Force  
† United States Air Force
VPA, and, emphasized that the VPA “now placed greater (importance) on the shock value of armour and artillery closely supported by infantry”. The improved co-ordination evident in the attack resulted from the integration of armour and sapper groups into the VPA divisional formations. Encouraged by this success, DRV leaders resolved to conduct an all-out strategic offensive to liberate the RVN in 1975-1976.

LESSONS OF THE 1975 SPRING OFFENSIVE

In planning the use of armoured forces in the campaigns of 1975, VPA commanders gave much thought to the lessons learnt in 1972. They approached the problem of maximizing benefit from limited resources by concentrating armoured forces, as described by Colonel Xuan, “in the most appropriate and rational way”. This meant deciding on what were to be the most decisive battles and those which would have the greatest influence on the prevailing strategic situation. By amassing armoured forces for these critical engagements, and, as Xuan says, “dealing thundering blows in the important strategic directions”, great benefit was to be gained. Consistent with this, AFV’s were not used in the diversionary actions of the “Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands) Campaign” but concentrated for the major assault on Ban Me Thout. Similarly, in the “Ho Chi Minh Campaign”, AFV’s were allocated specifically to spearhead the advance on Saigon.

The VPA identified two key methods of successfully employing armoured forces — “sudden assault” and “deep advance”. The notion of “sudden assault” implied overwhelming of enemy resistance by a quick attack. In this way the shock effect created by AFV’s was utilized to throw the enemy off balance. This technique was used against population centres such as Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Hoc Mon, and ultimately Saigon. A successful “sudden assault” opened the way for an effective “deep advance”, or pursuit. The vulnerability of a withdrawing enemy meant pursuing VPA forces were able to inflict heavy casualties on ARVN units. Also, the “deep advance” movement referred to the actions carried out in the use of the “blooming lotus” tactic. The employment of armoured forces facilitated the rapid capture of key objectives, such as command and control centres, inside a town or city’s defensive perimeter. The VPA used this tactic to great effect, and, according to Colonel Xuan, “the role of deep advance attack was considered the decisive blow responsible for the lightning victory of the campaign”.

The VPA commanders also recognized how their armour had suffered when they became detached from infantry troops in several of the 1972 battles. Consequently they were determined to maintain tight attack formations with each component mutually supporting the other. Also these formations needed to be strong enough so that enemy infantry and tanks could not stop their advance or divide them. In working closely with infantry units, armoured forces provided support by destroying enemy fortifications and obstacle systems. In deciding on the employment and tactics of a combined-arms group though, VPA commanders also considered how the characteristics of AFV’s could best be utilized. Points in their consideration, as Colonel Xuan recounts, were “the need to attack hard and quickly, to have extremely bold offensive action, and importantly not to stop in front of enemy troops during an attack”.

In order to maintain the momentum of their advance VPA commanders used the technique of “leap-frogging” units. When enemy resistance was encountered the leading units deployed for a quick attack, while following units bypassed the enemy location to continue the advance. This was the case in the attack on the Thu Due Officers School outside of Saigon. While it was in progress, other VPA units pressed on to attack and seized the Saigon Bridge.

The speed at which the VPA were able to maintain their advance, combined with a lack of planning on the part of the ARVN forces, denied the latter any opportunity for regroupment and consolidation. The ability of the VPA to sustain its progress came from a disciplined and well organized logistics system based on more than 10,000 vehicles. To fully capitalize on the opportunities created by successful infantry and armour attacks, VPA troops needed the ability to move at the same speed as the leading armoured vehicles. Where previously VPA divisions had moved on foot, in this offensive the available resources made it possible to mount them in trucks for rapid
redeployment. Captured enemy vehicles, and even touring cars, were used when VPA transport was not readily available. The VPA also made greater use of armoured personnel carriers for both transporting troops, and, close accompaniment of tanks during assaults. By these various means VPA advance units were able to cover an average of 50 to 60 kilometres in a 24 hour period.

During the 1972 Offensive the VPA were forced to restrict their operations because of logistic backup problems. In the “Tay Nguyen” and “Ho Chi Minh” campaigns of 1975, armoured vehicle mobility, and combat efficiency, were maintained by a complex, yet effective resupply system. The construction of the oil pipeline to Loc Ninh must have greatly increased the ability of AFV’s to operate for protracted periods in southern RVN provinces. To facilitate the distribution of fuel each advance column had attached to it “units in charge of transporting fuel” “to assure timely supplies”. Similar units were also responsible for ammunition resupply and vehicle servicing. As well, VPA forces made use of captured fuel stocks. The speed of their advance meant that on many occasions withdrawing ARVN troops did not have time to destroy depots, or immobilize vehicles. In the case of the latter, VPA troops used enemy AFV’s to boost the strength of their own forces.

The level of competence displayed by VPA commanders during the 1975 Spring Offensive was a great improvement on the situation that had existed in 1972. The VPA established within combined-arms groups a command situation whereby the senior infantry officer was in charge, except, where AFV’s were fulfilling the major attack task and then the armour officer was in command. According to Xuan, in both cases, “the infantry commander and the tank-armoured force commander had to maintain a close relationship”. Training also stressed that to carry out an effective tactical appreciation commanders needed to be in a position where they could observe changes on the battlefield. While the implementation of any plan required commanders to have firm control over all forces under their command. Leadership training conducted by Communist armed forces has often been criticised for its stifling of individual initiative, which has led to an inability of commanders to cope with unexpected situations. The impression gained from Colonel Xuan’s article is that the VPA approach to the carrying out of command tasks was to encourage flexibility and creativity in all combat situations. This was to apply particularly to officers in command of “deep advance” columns. The successful by-passing of ARVN defensive locations to strike at centres of command and control depended on the personal initiative of individual commanders.

In commenting on the 1972 Offensive General Dung mentions the significant role of United States support in limiting VPA operational successes. With six hundred fighter-bombers based on four aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, and, one hundred B-52’s based in Thailand, as well as approximately one hundred and eighty RVNAF aircraft operating against them, any weaknesses in the VPA anti-aircraft defences were reflected in troop and vehicle losses. By 1975 the factors prevailing on both sides had altered significantly. While the RVNAF had been strengthened to some sixteen hundred aircraft of all types, the ARVN could no longer count on United States air support. For their part the VPA had been supplied with more advanced anti-aircraft weaponry by the Soviet Union. Also the integration of anti-aircraft regiments into advance columns, and, an emphasis on mobile defensive measures, meant the VPA were able to establish a protective umbrella over most troop concentrations. This greatly reduced the incidence of AFV casualties from either tactical bombing, or, close air support missions.

In 1972 the lack of inter-arm co-ordination by the VPA, particularly in assaults, had cost them dearly. In overcoming this deficiency VPA planners stressed the requirement for preparation prior to combat. Flowing from this was the establishment of standard operating procedures designed to facilitate quick understanding between co-operating units. As a further aid to commanders, advance columns had attached to them reconnaissance troops composed of infantry, artillery, and engineer elements. These troops served a liaison function between the advance column commander and their own branch commander. In organizing communications it was considered important, according to Xuan, to properly combine “the signal networks among all units and services”...
“particularly to fully use the solid signal network of tanks and armoured vehicles to assure uninterrupted signal and liaison contacts”. To aid co-operation and co-ordination advance columns “also organized a unit of liaison officers equipped with mobile vans which (were) constantly dispatched to the advance line to directly assess the situation”. To these sources of information was added the intelligence which became available from units operating behind the ARVN’s lines of resistance. The effectiveness of all these measures was demonstrated in the speed with which the VPA offensive was brought to a conclusion.

CONCLUSION

Colonel Xuan’s article indicates that the VPA had learned, as a result of their experiences in 1972, that if they ignored the basic considerations of AFV employment, high casualties would result. In regarding the full experience of VPA armoured operations no startling new techniques or innovations appear. What does come out though are many valuable and pertinent lessons demonstrating how armoured forces can be successfully employed. The reasons for the VPA’s effective use of armoured vehicles bear close resemblance to the major principles stressed in the training doctrines of most Western armies. What the VPA achieved was to adapt these tenets to the unique conditions of the Vietnamese situation. Outside of the Arab-Israeli conflicts the present day student of armoured warfare has had very little opportunity to observe AFV’s in actual combat situations. Examination of the VPA’s armoured operations provides a chance to broaden this experience. Throughout the course of the war in Indochina many questioned the viability and effectiveness of armoured vehicles in the region. As one author comments, “But everyone knows you can’t use armour in a place like Vietnam!” This cry was heard so often through the mid-sixties that it came to be accepted almost as an article of faith. The VPA clearly demonstrated that armoured forces did have an important part to play in deciding the final outcome of the conflict. It would be hoped that these lessons are not lost on future planners of combat operations in the South-East Asian region.

NOTES


3. Reports as to when AFV’s were first used by the VPA on the battlefield vary. One source describes the night assault by PT-76 light tanks at Ben Het, in the Central Highlands, on March 3-4, 1969, as being the first employment of AFV’s by the enemy (K. Macksey, The Guinness Book of Tank Facts and Feats, Guinness Superlatives Ltd; Enfield; 1972: p. 178). Another source cites the successful infantry-armour attack on the U.S. Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, in the first week of February, 1968, as being the first use of AFV’s by the VPA (B.E. Halloran, “Soviet Armor Comes to Vietnam”, in Army, August 1972: p. 18).


9. According to the author there was not a single Communist main force division in South Vietnam by the end of 1971, Porter, op. cit., p. 104.


12. The complete failure to give warning of a possible tank threat stands as a telling indictment of allied intelligence work at this time”. Ward, op. cit., p. 1.

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15. “Prisoner interrogations have established that at least 3000 North Vietnamese tank crewmen participating in the offensive had only four to five months earlier graduated from the Russian armoured school at Odessa”. Ward op. cit., p. 5.
17. Ward op. cit., p. 4.
18. Ulmer op. cit., p. 15.
22. loc. cit.
26. loc. cit.
29. Xuan op. cit., p. 58.
30. Ibid., p. 59.
31. loc. cit.
32. The image of the 'blooming lotus' describes the way the style of attack began in the center of the town, then gradually opened out into the outlying areas like a flowering bud slowly opening its petals”. Dung op. cit., pp. 31-32.
33. Xuan op. cit., p. 59.
34. Ibid., p. 61.
35. loc. cit.
36. Ibid., p. 62.
38. Ibid., p. 227.
39. Xuan op. cit., p. 62.
41. Xuan op. cit., p. 66.
42. General Dung makes mention of the fact that in the advance column American M113 APC’s, as well as M-48 and M-41 tanks began to make their appearance. Dung op. cit., p. 142, c.f. Xuan op. cit., p. 66.
43. Xuan op. cit., p. 63.
44. Dung op. cit., p. 90.
46. The Soviet Union had supplied the VPA with the ZSU-23-4 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun. This AFV is equipped with four, radar controlled, heavy machine-guns, and is considered by Western Authorities to be highly effective in its designated role.
47. Xuan op. cit., p. 64.
48. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
49. Ibid., p. 65.

Declassification of the Army Journal
The Army Journal bore a caveat restricting its access to unauthorised persons. I have now authorised the removal of the caveat and the security classification.
All issues of the Army Journal are now publicly available. — Editor.

COPIES OF BACK ISSUES
Copies of back issues of the Defence Force Journal are available for distribution on request from the Editor.
THE PRACTICALITIES OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES

By Commodore A. H. Cooper, RAN (Rtd)
International Hydrographic Bureau (Monaco)

This article examines some of the practical difficulties which will remain even though agreement be reached on how the seas should be divided amongst nations.

It is not enough to declare or proclaim areas of the earth's surface. In order to control, police and respect areas, their limits or boundaries must be defined and promulgated in such a manner that men can relate their own position to them. The inherent difficulties of doing this in the sea need to be understood and taken into consideration by the lawyers and legislators concerned with the Law of the Sea.

The core of the problem is that the sea surface is featureless, mobile and hostile to man. To know where he is man must have recourse to technical aids. This simple and obvious fact cannot be overstated.

On land, boundaries can be related to natural features or man-made marks and, where appropriate barriers such as fences, can be erected. The proprietor or caretaker and the potential trespasser are then left in no doubt as to which side of the fence they belong.

At sea there are no marks. Fixed structures and floating buoys can be placed but their use is limited by practical considerations including water, depth and cost. Positions are described by numbers which, normally, are meaningless until they are plotted on a chart. Hence charts are an essential link in the process of relating positions at sea.

Therefore we must have charts which are suitable, that depict the boundaries of areas accurately and enable the mariner to plot his position with equal accuracy.

Positions at sea have to be described by relationship with known positions, either the equator and the meridian of Greenwich (by latitude and longitude) or fixed points on land (by bearings and/or distances). Since both methods are likely to be used in conjunction the relationship between the two must be known.

It is well understood that the curved surface of the earth cannot be simply represented on the flat surface of a chart. Cartographers use projections which are conventions designed to retain on the chart certain natural relationships by sacrificing others. Briefly, if the distances between three points on the earth's surface are drawn to scale on a chart the bearings or angles between them will be distorted and vice versa. The navigator, for practical reasons, wishes to preserve his compass courses as straight lines, which is the reason that the navigational chart is generally produced using the Mercator Projection. However, the price is the distortion of scale. In effect, a line bisected on a Mercator Chart gives a mid-point which, on the earth's surface, is not midway between the two terminal points of the line.

The transformation from the earth's surface to a flat chart by means of a projection necessitates the input of numbers representing the shape and size of the earth. These parameters are collectively known as a "figure of the earth" and several are in use today, some having been devised over a century ago. Thanks to data obtained by satellites the size and shape of the earth is now known with considerable accuracy, however no one figure of the earth has yet been accepted internationally (1979).
Although the differences between the various figures of the earth in use are small they can have a significant effect on distances plotted on charts which are based on different figures.

The horizontal relationship of features on the earth's surface and hence their relationship on the chart are described by co-ordinates based upon a point of origin or horizontal datum. Such datums are usually regional or national and their relationship one to another can only be determined through common points and taking into account the different figures of the earth and projections.

Boundaries or limits at sea are likely to be related by distance, to base lines, which, by one formula or another, represent the inshore limit of the area or the seaward limit of the coastal state.

These base lines must be derived from a knowledge of the sea level which governs the seaward limit of the land. This presents little or no problem where the land emerges abruptly from the water but there are many places where gently shelving shorelines cause the water line to vary horizontally by many kilometres.

The level of the sea, which controls this waterline, rises and falls due to the tide, seasonal and long term influences and unpredictable causes such as meteorological effects. Indeed, it is a mistake to consider the surface of the sea as level.

Low water line, which is used as a basis for drawing base lines, can mean many things. Hydrographic surveyors, in order to eliminate the temporary effect of tide and bring their soundings into relative agreement, reduce them by the height of the tide above a vertical datum and it is this datum which establishes the position of the low water line shown on charts. But what is low water? Besides long term and unpredictable variations the tide falls to quite different levels in the short term. The best known example of this is the difference between Spring and Neap Tides. Hence the hydrographer has adopted numerous low water levels to be his datum which, with safe navigation in mind, he defines as a level below which the tide will seldom, if ever, fall. Commonly used are Mean Low Water, Mean Low Water Springs, Indian Springs Low Water and more modernly Lowest Astronomical Tide. The differences between any two of these levels could in some areas, move the low water line horizontally by significant distances.

Thus the very basis upon which our sea limits are likely to be defined is open to variations of interpretation. If to this is added lack of adequate tidal data on very many coasts of the world we face the fundamental problem of defining base lines and therefore derived seaward limits.

R. D. Hodgson, the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, in his paper “The Technical Delimitations of a Modern Equidistant Boundary” explains clearly and in detail, these problems of getting boundaries onto the chart. The subject is also extensively covered by A. L. Shalowitz in his two volumes ‘Shore and Sea Boundaries’.

It is clear therefore, that the charting of our proclaimed boundaries is no easy matter. Even after definitive base lines have been agreed the description of the boundaries based upon them will present problems arising from differing horizontal datums, projections and figures of the earth. This will be particularly so for a limit 200 miles offshore.

Once an international reference system is agreed there will be the stupendous task of compiling the necessary charts in conformity and there will still remain the problem of the differences between these and the existing national charts and maps.

Once a boundary has been accurately plotted on the navigator’s chart the questions arise: where does it lie on the surface of the sea and how does the navigator find his position accurately in relation to it?

Technology has developed “positioning systems” of which those giving high accuracy are expensive, sophisticated and in many cases have range limitations of less than 200 miles. The needs of navigation offshore are for reliable and simple equipment which will enable the mariner to determine his position well enough to give a prudent berth to dangers and to make a landfall. Accuracies of one mile are normally sufficient for these purposes.

Positions at sea are obtained by measuring distances or directions (bearings) to known fixed positions. Near the coast these can be visual or by radar. Lines of bearing or range can be simply plotted on the chart and their intersection gives the position. The accuracy of such a position depends, of course, on the accuracy of the chart and the instruments used, the skill of the observer and the correct identification of the “target”. However, it is
possible by these means to ascertain a position within a few tens of metres.

Beyond the horizon use must be made of those objects which can be seen such as stars and artificial satellites or of electronic devices which are capable of measuring over the curvature of the earth. Astronomical observations require skill, a clear sky and horizon and, the necessary calculations take time. The accuracy which can be expected under average conditions is about one mile. This can be improved to perhaps, one tenth of a mile, by repeated observations, at a fixed platform.

Positions can be derived from artificial satellites only by the use of expensive and sophisticated equipment. Accuracies as good as 10 metres are possible by repeated observations, from a fixed platform. However, any movement of a vessel had a considerable effect upon observations and unless it can be ascertained with great accuracy large errors result. At best a moving vessel can obtain an accuracy of 100 metres. An error of 1 knot in speed can introduce an error in position of 1500 metres or more.

The only means currently available for ascertaining ships speed and course with the accuracy necessary for satellite positioning require the use of still more equipment which is expensive and sophisticated. The information can be derived from a second positioning system of the electronic type referred to below or from the most sophisticated Ships Inertial Navigation Systems or sonar doppler which is limited to use in depths less than 200 metres and fairly calm sea conditions.

Positions from satellite can only be obtained when suitably placed satellites are “in sight” which occurs on average a dozen times a day with the existing U.S. N.N.S.S. (Navy Navigational Satellite System). Breaks as long as 6 hours do occur when no suitable satellite is available.

There are numerous systems which electronically measure long distances. All make use of radio waves and depend for accuracy on knowledge of the propagation of those waves along the path traversed. As a general statement it is true to say that the longer the range the lower the accuracy available. All require costly shore stations and expertise to maintain the stations. Onboard equipment varies greatly in cost but there are systems economically in reach of fishing craft. Except for those systems especially designed for high accuracy, which inevitably are expensive, the accuracies normally obtained are those necessary for ordinary navigation, about 1 mile.

At the present time only a very small percentage of the potential Exclusive Economic Zones of the world are covered by any method of position finding other than Astronomical sights and satellites. Omega, a very long-range system, will provide world-wide coverage when installation of land stations is complete. It is still (1980) regarded as experimental and can be expected to provide positions accurate to no better than one or two miles.

All long-range systems depend upon widely spaced shore stations which will often have to be placed in different countries, which may have different geodetic datums and use different figures for the earth. In consequence positions derived from such systems may not be in agreement with positions derived from local geodetic control, which includes baselines and therefore sea limits.

All electronic positioning systems are subject to failure due to radio interference and require expert maintenance and calibration. They must be operated with intelligence and experience. It cannot be expected that, in the foreseeable future, positions far out to sea which are accurate to even the nearest mile, will be available in all vessels in all parts of the world.

The situation can be summarized as follows:

1. It is not a simple matter to draw limits on charts and the difficulty is exaggerated at long distances offshore such as 200 miles.
2. Baselines can only be defined after extensive tidal study and/or specialized coastal photography.
3. Geodetic control has yet to be brought into international agreement by use of common datums and an agreed figure of the earth.
4. Charts must then be provided which are accurate for horizontal control and in agreement with horizontal and vertical datums which have been accepted internationally.
5. It must be expected that vessels will normally not be able to position themselves accurately to better than one mile and that such accuracy will by no means be attainable always or everywhere. Fortunately fixed
platforms can be positioned with adequate accuracy from satellites and repeated readings.

6. States wishing to control vast tracts of sea will have to accept the expense of installing positioning systems which reach to the boundary and of providing patrol vessels, at least, with costly and sophisticated positioning equipment.

7. Confrontation situations will arise at or near boundaries which will be brought about or aggravated simply by the inability of either party to say with certainty where they are in relation to boundaries the position of which, in turn, may be open to doubt.

EXERCISE BULLSEYE

Australia will be the host country for a “mini-Olympics” for military transport aircraft (May, 1980).

C130 Hercules crews from Australia, New Zealand and Canada will compete to test their skills in navigation, tactical flying and air dropping of cargo.

Each country is entering one aircraft and two crews in the competition, named Exercise Bullseye, to be flown from RAAF Base Richmond, NSW. The exercise is designed to train crews in the re-supply of troops in the field.

C130H model aircraft from No. 40 Squadron, RNZAF and No. 435 Squadron, Canadian Armed Forces, will arrive at RAAF Richmond on Monday, May 5, 1980. The RAAF aircraft taking part will be a C130H of No. 36 Squadron, Richmond.

The RAAF’s No. 36 Squadron has taken out first and second placings in the competition in the two years Australia has participated — in New Zealand in 1978 and in Canada in 1979.

The name of Neville Reginald Howse is recorded for all time in the history of Australian medicine, among the archives of the Australian Military Forces, in the annals of Australian federal politics, and in the story of local government in New South Wales.

My personal association with Neville Howse was limited to two brief occasions, on both of which I was a bystander. The earlier was in Egypt during World War I, when he was a Colonel and I but a trooper in the First Light Horse Field Ambulance; the later after the war, when he was Major-General Sir Neville Howse, Director-General of Medical Services to the Australian Army. I remember clearly his questioning, humorous blue eyes, his face round like an apple from his native Somerset, his enigmatical rather cynical smile, his sense of assurance, his quiet voice and his close attention while others spoke.

And so, for my portrait of Neville Howse the soldier, I turned to Mr J. McGrath and to Mr W. R. Lancaster of the Defence Library in Canberra, to Colonel Joynt, VC, to Mr Warren Perry, the Editor of the Historical Magazine of the Royal Historical Society of Victoria, to official war histories and to books. To all of those I am truly grateful. Only because of their kindness could I have gathered together any military mosaic of this great man.

Neville Howse was born just over a hundred years ago in the charming Somerset village of Stogursey, a few miles inland from the shingly shores of Bridgewater Bay in the Bristol Channel. His father, a medical practitioner, had served in the Crimean War, and it is not difficult to imagine this young lad growing up entranced by stirring accounts of that extraordinary campaign.

Following his schooling in Taunton, young Howse became a medical student at the London Hospital, that grim, grey block of buildings in Mile End Road. On the staff was another medical man later to imprint his name on civilian and military surgery and on literature — Sir Frederick Treves. After graduation, Howse demonstrated anatomy at the University at Durham.

But within a year he was threatened with "a weak lung" (whatever that may mean) and, in 1889, Howse migrated to Australia. What the British Empire owed to these weak lungs is written in history. Ten years before Howse came to Australia, Cecil Rhodes, with the same sword of Damocles dangling above him, migrated to South Africa.

With no sponsorship and little money, Howse began practice in Newcastle. Later he moved to Taree, where he soon realized the opportunities for a qualified surgeon in a country area and, after a few years, in 1895, he returned
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR NEVILLE HOWSE, V.C.

to England for post-graduate study. Attached to his old medical school, the London Hospital, Howse gained his Fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, served on the staff under Treves, and then returned to New South Wales early in 1899.

On 17 January 1900, at the age of 35, Howse was appointed to the New South Wales Army Medical Corps, with the rank of Lieutenant, his army pay being less than that of a private soldier’s in peace time today. Attached to a unit of engineers he sailed from Sydney and arrived in Cape Town just before the defeat and capture of Cronje’s army at Paardeberg.

The relief of Kimberley and the battle of Paardeberg were the only glimmers of light in the gloom of the disasters during the closing weeks of the nineteenth century. Buller’s tragic and futile fighting along the Tugela in Natal had been overshadowed by Gatacre’s defeats and Mathuen’s black days on the banks of the Modder River; and at Magersfontein, which finally stirred the British Empire to a realization of the magnitude of the challenge.

Field Marshal Lord Roberts was roused from his grief at the loss of his only son in the battle of Colenso and, with that famous younger soldier Lord Kitchener of Khartoum as his Chief of Staff, was appointed to the supreme command in South Africa. Roberts arrived at Cape Town on 10 January 1900, and drove rapidly North over the scenes of Methuen’s previous disasters.

The battle of Paardeberg on 27 February, the anniversary of the British disaster at Majuba Hill nineteen years before, ended all prospects of a Boer victory in the war. Although Paardeberg was the decisive battle of the campaign, the conflict dragged on over two more years because of the elusiveness of that will-o’-the-wisp, De Wet, and the astuteness and persistent ability of two Boer generals, Smuts and Botha.

On arrival in South Africa, all AAMC personnel came under the command of the British Principal Medical Officer, and Howse was posted as RMO to a NSW mounted unit attached to French’s cavalry division. French was probably the only senior British officer who, from the beginning, had appreciated the type of campaign ahead. Fortunately, he had managed to escape from Ladysmith by the last train that left before the town was invested by the Boers.

After the defeat and capture of Cronje and his army, there began the weary, frustrating two years’ pursuit of the wily De Wet and his raiding guerrillas. French’s mounted troops were here, there and everywhere — chasing, fighting and frequently cornering small bands of Boers. At one of these engagements near Widefort on the rising ground above the Rhinoster River, a detachment of French’s force, including the New South Wales mounted troops, rode into a strong Boer position commanded by De Wet himself. It was during this engagement that Neville Howse won his Victoria Cross.

In a publication by the authorities of the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, “They Dared Mightily”, there is a more vivid account of this incident.

“De Wet opened a withering fire... At the height of the fight, Howse saw a trumpeter fall, wounded, in the front line. Fire was extremely heavy but Howse galloped out to rescue the man. His horse was shot dead and Howse continued on foot, reached the casualty, dressed his wounds, then carried him out of the action.”

This was the first award of the Victoria Cross to an Australian soldier. Actually, the first Australian VC winner was Lieutenant Mark Bell, who was born in Sydney in 1843 but left Australia at an early age to serve with the British Army. Howse’s award remains the only VC ever made to medical personnel of the Australian Forces. During World War I, a direction from the British High Command concerning recommendations for the Victoria Cross was interpreted by the Australian authorities as an order that “the award was restricted to acts of conspicuous gallantry which were materially conducive to gaining a victory”. Gallantry in saving life was not considered eligible.

Within a few weeks, Howse was promoted to the rank of Captain and continued with his mounted unit.

Later, during one of the many minor engagements, after having successfully operated on a Queensland officer on a kopje under fire, Howse volunteered to remain with his patient; he was taken prisoner and detained by the enemy for six weeks.

Soon after being released as a non-combatant, he was down with typhoid fever. Throughout the war typhoid fever was responsible for seven times the number of casualties
resulting from Boer bullets. In Conan Doyle's diary there is a vivid account of this epidemic in his hospital at Bloemfontein. When convalescent, Howse was invalided to England.

On 22 February 1901 he returned to Australia, and when his train arrived at Orange, what a welcome awaited! The Mayor in his chain of robes of office, surrounded by his councillors; the city band with their blaring brass and thudding drums were almost drowned by the cheering crowd on and around the station.

He resumed his practice as though he had never left it.

The Sydney Daily Telegraph of 5 December 1901 reporting the "beautiful and historical ceremony at Victoria Barracks, Paddington", records: "Yesterday was a red-letter day in the military annals of New South Wales. In the midst of a brilliant assemblage, Captain Howse of the New South Wales Army Corps had pinned upon him by the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Frederick Darley, the coveted Bronze Cross for Valour."

After the war, Howse received his campaign medals. Queen Victoria had authorized a Silver Campaign Medal for the war in South Africa — "The Queen's Medal" with a ribbon of red, blue and orange — to bear clasps embossed with the names of each major battle in which the soldiers served. As Queen Victoria died during the war, King Edward VII authorized a similar medal with a ribbon of green, white and yellow — "The King's Medal". Howse received both, with six clasps on his "Queen's" and two on his "King's".

Battle was in his blood. He became restless while the war dragged on and, after a year in Australia, was off again, this time as a Major commanding a Bearer Company of a Field Ambulance, and landed at Durban in March 1902. The force advanced by rail through Natal to Newcastle and then marched across the border for operations in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. In the meantime, peace negotiations had commenced and on 31 May 1903, hostilities ceased.

Again Howse became ill and was invalided to England for the second time, but returned to Australia later in the year. He resumed his practice with his brother Jack, and Dr Arthur Colvin, who was to play such a notable role in the public life of New South Wales, and who served on the staff of the Medical Directorate in World War II.

In 1905, Howse married Miss Evelyn Northcote, eldest daughter of G. de Val Pilcher of Orange.

A surgeon of Howse's ability and personality attracted patients from wide areas and he was looked upon by all his colleagues as their leader. In those days there were few motor cars and Howse drove around in a sulky. It was not a question of when a doctor was on duty: he was always on duty to attend the medical and surgical needs of his patients with whom he had a deep and enduring personal relationship. A busy practice such as he commanded would have satisfied most men, but not so Neville Howse. He was twice Mayor of Orange, and there was probably no field of community service throughout the district that did not have his inspiration and personal guidance.

When war clouds were gathering in Europe during 1914, Howse again became restless. His feet were itching, pawing the ground like those of an old war horse at the sound of the trumpet. On the day war was declared, Howse left by train to offer his services to Major-General Williams, the Director of Army Medical Services.

War plans had been prepared for the urgent occupation of German New Guinea. Howse was appointed as Principal Medical Officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to command the small army medical detachment in support of the first Australian operation in World War I.

Howse's command consisted of Captain Maguire as his second-in-command, two young medical graduates, Captains Donaldson and Pockley, one Warrant Officer and thirty-five other ranks, all of whom had some training in first aid and nursing but none in tropical medicine and hygiene. The official equipment of this unit consisted of two medical and two surgical panniers, designed and equipped for the Boer War and retained in store since that campaign. All the uniforms for this tropical venture were of thick and heavy wool.

Time was the important factor in this expedition and there Howse demonstrated his qualities of command and organizing ability. On his own initiative he added supplies of quinine and emetine, he provided a microscope, slides and stains for simple investigations, and he obtained mosquito nets, dressings, medical
comforts and other essentials from the local Red Cross. He arranged for smallpox and typhoid protection of the troops and, disturbed by the dental condition of his men, he enlisted a fourth-year dental student and provided a small kit of essential instruments.

Within two weeks of the declaration of war, this force sailed from Sydney in the P. & O. liner Berrima, which had been rapidly converted into an auxiliary cruiser. Escorting by HMAS Sydney, the expedition assembled about the north of New Britain.

Landings were made on the beaches of Blanche Bay and, as the advanced troops moved inland, the first Australian casualty in World War I was one of Howse’s young medical officers, Captain Pockley, who died of wounds received while gallantly attending an exposed casualty during the fighting to clear a road block. Within a few days all resistance had been overcome, but Howse’s task remained — the maintenance of the health of his garrison troops in an isolated, tropical, malarious area.

He issued orders covering hygiene discipline and personally saw that these were carried out. As a result of his energies, the administration later reported “nearly two thousand men have been landed on a shore in a tropical country and, up to the present, not one single case of serious illness has occurred”. Howse improvised adequate hospital accommodation and laid the foundation for a healthy garrison in Rabaul. Then, handing over his command to Major Maguire and with the captured German flag in his kitbag, he returned to Australia in an endeavour to join the Australian Imperial Force, which was just about to depart for overseas.

On 1 November, in the clear sunlight of that early Sunday morning, this vast convoy of 38 ships, carrying 30,000 men and 10,000 horses, steamed slowly out from Albany Harbour to take up their stations. It was an unforgettably majestic sight as the ships formed into three long lines, half a mile apart with a similar interval between each transport — “the greatest effort of sea transportation of troops to a distant seat of war that the world has seen”.

Lieutenant-General Bridges held the anomalous dual commands of the AIF and also of the First Division. Surgeon General Williams was appointed Director of Medical Services to Bridges as the Force Commander, and Colonel Ryan ADMS to Bridges as Divisional Com-
Africa and HMAS Melbourne took station at the head of the convoy. Two days later, on 9 November, while we were at early morning stables, mucking out our horse stalls, I watched a scurry among the escort. Melbourne suddenly dashed off to the west, but soon turned back to the convoy while Sydney sped away in a curling cloud of smoke, and both Melbourne and Ibuki took station on our port bow.

Later that morning, when we were exercising our horses on the matting strips laid on the iron decks, the man leading the horse in front of me said he could hear gun-fire. I listened, but could hear nothing — but this was almost certainly the beginning of the Sydney-Emden duel leading to the destruction of the raider on Cocos Island.

Later, when our convoy reached Colombo, the Emden survivors, who included the Commander, Captain von Muller, were taken on board the Orvieto and placed in charge of Lieutenant Casey, who could speak fluent German. Von Muller was asked what would have happened if he had sighted our convoy. When he looked at our chart, he said: "I was fifty-two miles from you that night. If I had got up to you I would have run alongside the cruiser on the port bow of the convoy and fired a torpedo. Then, in the confusion, I would have got in amongst the transports, and I think I would have sunk half of them before your escort came up to me. I would have been sunk in the end — I always expected that."

As we sailed on to the Canal, our escort was provided by an odd-looking Russian cruiser with five tall, thin, erect funnels — "the packet of Woodbines". The Askold had survived the Japanese attacks on Port Arthur eleven years before, but was sunk later by a torpedo off Gallipoli. The entry of Turkey into the war had presented many problems in the Middle East and, while in the Red Sea, General Bridges received a signal from the War Office to disembark and train his troops in Egypt. Howse had been appointed for the voyage only and, when this was completed at Alexandria where the troops disembarked, he was left in the air with no duties.

The AIF had been designed as a field force and no medical units other than field ambulances had been included. Confusion had arisen as to who was to provide the lines of communication medical units, the general hospitals, the stationary hospitals, the casualty clearing stations, the depots of medical stores and the convalescent depots. Only after Bridges' force had been organized was it decided that Australia should provide these, but none were available when the AIF left Australia. Until they arrived in the Middle East, which would not be for some months, medical arrangements as a matter of urgency had to be made with the British authorities, as well as for the landing of 30,000 troops and their training around Cairo.

Bridges appointed Howse as Disembarkation Medical Officer to meet this immediate need, including provisions for a number of serious and contagious sick discharging from the transports alongside the docks of Alexandria.

Howse, cutting out or ignorant of the established staff routine, called immediately upon Sir John Maxwell, the General Officer Commanding the British Forces in Egypt, who at once made available all that Howse needed. This was a typical outcome of Howse's approach to senior combatant officers, however senior. It didn't concern him that he had no confirmed appointment; where there was a task to be done he personally saw that it was carried out. Again he was at a loose end. When all the troops were tented in the various training areas, medical personnel from the field ambulances took over the Mena Hospital and Howse was given this command. There I first met him when, from our Light Horse Camp at Maadi on New Year's Day, 1915, I was admitted with an acute appendix.

When, early in the New Year, No. 2 Australian General Hospital arrived in Cairo to take over Mena Hospital, and the other various Australian L. of C. medical units began to arrive towards the end of January, Howse was again "floating", but not for long. Bridges' concern was directed to the training of his First Division and he appointed Howse his ADMS while Ryan assumed a clinical role as Consultant Surgeon, AIF.

The Medical Services of the AIF came under the higher command of the British Director of Medical Services in Egypt. It requires three weary years of World War I and the advent of General Monash as Corps Commander to bring home to the War Office that Australians were capable of managing their own military affairs with outstanding efficiency and complete loyalty to the overall command.
Urgent planning was begun by the British staff in Cairo for what was to be the Gallipoli campaign. The evacuation and care of Australian casualties came under the direction of the British authorities and, when Howse ultimately had access to these plans in which the medical services had been allotted an unfortunately subordinate role, he firmly but constructively criticized them as inadequate—which later they proved to be. That the ultimate medical plans for the campaign did not prove more inadequate, that more hospitals were available for Australian casualties and that more, less crowded and better equipped medical transports were available, were due to Howse's courageous and not always popular insistence in the face of opposition.

When General Birdwood arrived in Egypt to command the Australian and New Zealand troops, the famous ANZAC Corps, there was no provision on his establishment for a senior staff medical officer. This anomaly was pointed out by Howse, but it was announced that the Corps would be administered medically from Cairo—an impossible situation!

Howse landed at Gallipoli with the Divisional Headquarters on the first morning and was soon faced with a tremendous problem—the rapidly mounting casualties wandering or being carried down to the over-crowded beach, cluttered with men, animals, munitions and other stores for 20,000 troops. The medical plan of high authority in Cairo had been to keep the beach clear of casualties by retaining them inland, on the assumption that sufficient ground would be gained to establish a field hospital in some sheltered inland site. This assumption proved false and, in any case, no provision had been made to carry out this plan which was a violation of the generally accepted medical principle that casualties, if unable to return to their unit after first aid, should be evacuated to the rear as soon as possible. This was the challenge when Howse landed under fire.

Sir Brudenell White, General Birdwood's Chief of Staff, recalling that stirring day, wrote: "At the landing at Gallipoli, Howse was invaluable and indispensable. Human power of seeing into the future is at very best limited and the medical provision for the great landing displayed much of human frailty. The medical orders were not in Howse's possession long before the event, but with characteristic vigour, he represented the palpable defects and insufficiencies. That some remedy was applied is entirely due to him. But, alas, for a time the beach at Anzac looked like a holocaust. Then it was that Howse became a giant. He took the whole matter into his own hands, giving and disregarding orders in a manner quite shocking but strangely and rapidly productive of results. Shells and bullets he completely disregarded. To the wounded, he was gentleness itself; his capable hands eased many a patient while his cheery voice and bearing brought comfort and consolation. 25 April, 1915 was a black day on the beach, but it produced many heroes. Could they now be asked to name the greatest, the palm would go to Neville Howse.'" Truly, a wonderful tribute from the highest and one of the most able officers on Birdwood's staff.

Beside the entrance to the RSL Hall in Croydon, Victoria, is framed the following unsigned memory of Anzac:

"I crouched in a shallow trench on that hell of exposed beaches, with steeply rising hills, bare of cover, a landscape pock-marked with war's inevitable litter, piles of stores, equipment, ammunition and the weird contortions of death, sculptured in Australian flesh. I saw the going down of the sun on that first Anzac day, the chaotic maelstrom of Australia's bleeding."

An ADMS has no responsibility or authority for evacuation of casualties to the rear of his Divisional area, but Howse, on his own initiative, somehow arranged for a special pier to be built for all arriving craft—boats, barges and tows—which, after they had landed their troops, animals and stores, were made available for back-loading of casualties. He personally supervised this evacuation which went on throughout that first night and, by dawn next morning, 1700 casualties including many stretcher cases, were on board the one hospital ship, the Gascon, and two empty transports for which Howse provided medical personnel. The beach had been cleared.

Over those exacting months of May, June, July and August, Howse, tired and worn, sharing as did everyone on Gallipoli, the dangers, the diseases, the discomforts and the privations, continued to be harassed by impractical instructions from the Army HQ in Cairo. At the end of August, with the prospect of winter coming soon with its added hardships, special provision for health of the troops was
necessary, and Howse was appointed as temporary DDMS on Birdwood’s staff until a regular medical officer arrived from India. This was a momentous advance. The medical service at Anzac was no longer to be represented on Corps HQ solely by a combatant officer. The impact of Howse’s appointment was felt immediately. Everyone on the peninsula suffered at some time from intestinal disorders. He rigorously tackled this tremendous problem; he improved the rations, he made provision for the retention of light casualties and for their return to units, he instituted the Anzac Medical Society where more than fifty medical officers met whenever operational needs permitted, promoting professional keenness with clinical and administrative discussions. The medical service of Anzac in the operational area had been adjusted, but in Egypt confusion persisted. The British Director of Medical Services was still responsible for all base medical administration and, owing to a gross underestimate of casualties, the base hospital and convalescent accommodation proved quite inadequate.

When, in response to the many disturbing signals, Major-General Fetherston, the acting DGMS in Australia, arrived in the Middle East, he realized at once that the Australian medical arrangements in Egypt should be directly under Australian control, and that Australia should be represented at the War Office where arrangements were controlled covering Australian casualties arriving in England. This recommendation was accepted by the Australian Government in spite of the objections in Egypt and at the War Office. Fetherston also recommended that Howse should be promoted to Surgeon General, Director of Medical Services to the AIF. Before he left Cairo, Fetherston sent for Howse and explained the situation to him, but two days later Howse had an urgent signal to return to Gallipoli.

It had been decided to evacuate the peninsula, and Howse, whose ability and resource had been proved, was needed to handle the medical aspect of this hazardous venture. For once the expected casualties were overestimated and his plans completely covered the needs of this remarkably successful operation.

When he returned to Cairo after the evacuation, Howse found his position most anomalous. His appointment as DMS, AIF, had not yet been confirmed by the Australian Government. On Gallipoli, with his temporary rank and posting, Howse was able to exercise his authority and did so most ably. But all the Australian troops in Egypt still came under the British Medical Staff in Cairo. The AIF forces were mounting: those from Gallipoli had been added a steady flow of reinforcements from Australia. Howse was offered an appointment on the British Staff “to assist the Senior British Army Medical Officers in administering the Australian Medical Services”, but he had the wisdom and vision to realize that this would mean the absorption of the AAMC into the RAMC and, with his usual charm and tact, Howse hesitated to accept the position until his rank and responsibilities in the AIF were determined.

Howse gradually assumed control of the Australian base medical units in Egypt, including those concerned with an increasing number of Australian Troops assembled along the Canal. He was everywhere where his services were needed, his guiding principle being “go ahead and do what you believe should be done until someone stops you”.

While the Turkish threat to Egypt remained, the Australian troops were to be integrated into the British Middle East Force. However, the Russian victory over the Turks at Ezerum and the German attack on the Verdun area completely altered the military situation. Egypt had a breathing space and all available troops were needed to meet the crisis in Europe.

General Birdwood was ordered to gather his Australian Divisions into an AIF Corps and, leaving his Light Horse in the Middle East, sailed with his troops to Europe. Early in 1916, Surgeon General Howse’s position as Director of Medical Services of the AIF was confirmed. This involved the medical direction of all Australian troops, General Birdwood’s Corps of the infantry and supporting arms in France, and the Light Horse in the Middle East. Distance and sea hazards made it impossible for Howse personally to administer the extensive AIF medical commitments in these two widely distanced areas and Colonel Rupert Downes was appointed to represent him in Egypt and did so nobly. The confusion and frustrations which ensued, brought about by the Egyptian High Command’s reluctance to recognize Howse’s authority in that area, considerably added to the problems of the DMS, AIF and to
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR NEVILLE HOWSE, V.C.

Downes' difficulties. Howse considered all the medical resources of the AIF, including hospitals and other establishments, as one AIF pool — to be drawn upon as he considered necessary.

With his rise to the highest medical posting in the AIF, Howse left behind his military life of the past — a life of intimate association with the fighting soldier in battle — the life that he loved. He arrived in London in 1916, almost exactly a year after he had landed at Anzac, and established his staff in the Westminster Methodist Training College, Horseferry Road, which had been taken over as AIFHQ Abroad.

Howse's first duty was to confer with Sir Alfred Keogh, Director-General of Army Medical Services at the War Office. As a result of his impressive approach to high authority, an excellent relationship was established between these two men. These visits and personal contacts were to prove invaluable in smoothing out the many difficulties that arose between the two army medical services. Howse demanded the highest standard of medical care for his troops and his standard did not necessarily coincide with the standards acceptable to others. A less resolute and tactful DMS would have flared into an administrative explosion or have given way before the frustrations. Howse did neither, as he had won the respect and confidence of General Keogh. The official war history records, "with unsurpassed diplomacy he dominated the AIF medical service and, in spite of frustrations, he tightened his control and advanced the efficiency of his service until it became unsurpassed in any theatre of war".

Howse formed new medical units not laid down in the good book. Realizing the ability of Australian medical personnel to face arduous work in their civilian practices, he considered the establishment of certain units, as laid down, excessive and reduced them accordingly, thus increasing their numbers. At that time, AIF Corps, Divisional and Brigade Staffs included a number of British officers; the DDMS on Birdwood's staff, his senior medical officer, was a British Regular. Only after three years of war did Howse's insistence, supported by Sir Brudenell White, succeed in achieving Australian medical officers in all the AIF medical postings. He broke down interstate rivalry by mixing his men and, considering his medical resources as a common pool, he did not hesitate to post personnel and equipment from one unit to another more heavily engaged. Contrary to tradition, he pushed surgical teams as far forward as it was possible to operate. Twenty years later, in World War II and in Korea in the fifties, we were to realize that Howse had laid down the principles for an efficient army medical service under all conditions in the desert, the jungle, the mountains, the snow or in the open country.

Howse returned to Australia at the end of 1918 but, early in the next year, he was in London again, supervising the medical aspects of the Repatriation program.

When Major-General Sir Neville Howse, VC, KCB, KCMG, finally returned to Australia after the war, his was the obvious appointment as Director-General of the Australian Army Medical Services.

In 1925, Howse was invited to stand for the Federal Parliament. He resigned from the army, stood for election, and was returned as Federal Member of Calare.

It was impossible for Howse to remain long in the ranks and, within a year, he was Temporary Chairman of Committees and a member of the Australian Delegation to the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva. In 1925, he became Minister for Defence and Health, and he could then talk down to the Adjutant-General and his comrades on the Military Board. In his book, Qantas, Sir Hudson Fysh records an interesting interview with Howse as Minister for Defence. Fysh was seeking Federal Government aid for the establishment of his airline. "What have you come to me for?" demanded Howse. "You know I consider expenditure on aviation subsidies a complete waste of money. No future."

"But", Fysh asked, "what about defence?"

"Defence!" Howse replied. "It's a waste of money also. Bombing is a waste of time. What did it ever accomplish?"

This seemed so at variance with Howse's forward-looking in the past that I wrote to Sir Hudson who replied:

"In regard to the attitude towards aviation that I quote Sir Newville Howse took up way back in the 1920s when he was Minister for Defence.

"It was perfectly true and well known at the time that he had little time for either civil or military aviation. However, it can be said in
mitigation that in those days very few people, even people of keen perception, had much faith in the new art, and indeed none of us in the business predicted what air transport amounts to today.

"Sir Neville was much beloved and was a perfect gentleman if there ever was one. I believe he hated war; he loved his medicine, he loved people, and I believe that being Minister for Defence as he was for a while, was just not quite his line of country."

His was a most demanding appointment and, as his health was suffering, Howse asked to be relieved and was appointed Minister for Home and Territories, which portfolio has so often proved the graveyard of Ministers. Finally, in 1928, he held the Ministries of Health and Repatriation. But, at the general elections a year later, he lost his seat.

Howse was far from well. In 1930, he went to England and consulted Lord Moynihan, who operated upon him for gallstones, but the trouble was far more serious. Shortly after a second operation that year, Neville Howse died of malignant disease of the pancreas at the age of sixty-six. "Cowards die many times before their death; the valiant never taste of death but once".

Lord Casey, who served with Howse on Gallipoli and later on General Birdwood's staff, wrote, "You asked me about Neville Howse... I first met him in late 1914... He was a most friendly and attractive man who treated junior people like human beings and I rapidly became very fond of him. I saw a good deal of him on Gallipoli and in France. I saw him not long before he died, which was in London in 1930. He knew he was grievously ill and told me so, saying, 'Isn't it a damned nuisance?' Both he and General Sir John Gellibrand were in Federal Parliament together. They were both outstanding men in character and personality, but were never comfortable or felt at home in politics... I have the most lively and happy memories of him. He was the sort of man who did you good to meet and talk to.'"
was hardly a reservist in the ranks of those bronzed, mature men. They were the finest body of infantry ever to have left [England], and the next three weeks were to prove it".

Artillery practice was rudimentary; early in 1915 the author joined No. 7 Mountain Battery of 12 pounders loaded on to pack mules. The guns were almost divided into pairs under the direction of infantrymen ignorant of gunnery. By 1943 in Tunisia he was Commander, Corps Royal Artillery in IX Corps, and in the final breakthrough battle was put in direct command of seven divisional artilleries, and two army groups of medium artillery. In the decisive battle of 6 May 1943, he switched the fire of some 500 guns on to a single target.

There are some very telling comments. For instance: "If Winston won the war, without General Sir Alan Brooke we would have lost it." He describes the Americans at their worst at Fondouk, but later generously records their improvement. From this praise he excludes some of their errant navigators with whom he flew.

For those unswayed by the modern bias against imperialism this is good autobiography, and modestly records a life of endeavour and leadership, and a surprising appreciation of beauty.


Reviewed by CPO DENH L. J. Laub, RAN (CPO Laub is a third-year Arts student majoring in History at Deakin University)

SERIOUS thinkers have often questioned the existence of a cohesive and realistic foreign policy in Australia. This is partly due to the absence of urgent external problems and the continuing reassurance that there is no military threat in the foreseeable future. As a consequence, the Australian government finds it easy to maintain cordial relations with the rest of the world.

Dr. Millar's book shows how Australia's membership in the British Commonwealth and our cultural and economic ties to Great Britain meant that we had no real "Australian" foreign policy, and it was accepted as a matter of fact that Australia would declare war, send troops and toe the party line whenever Great Britain wished it. As a consequence, the colony of NSW sent volunteers to the Sudan, Victoria a naval contingent to China in 1900 and a combined force of "colonials" went to Africa to become the "Australian Regiment" at the outbreak of the Boer War. Australian participation in the First and Second World wars was never in doubt.

The apron strings which tied us to British foreign policies were strained to breaking point during World War II when the return of two divisions caused a distinct souring of relations with the Churchill government. As the war continued, it became clear that the future security of Australia was in the hands of the USA rather than the United Kingdom so the post-war military and economic treaties consolidated the USA as our protector.

The zenith of our identification with the policies of the USA was reached by Prime Minister Holt in the 1960's when he repeated the American election slogan, (Australia is) . . . "All the way with LBJ".

Vietnam and the Whitlam era chilled our relationship with the USA and Australia tended toward a more independent "Australian Stance" in international affairs.

Dr. Millar traces these somewhat jumbled threads of foreign policy from their colonial beginnings to 1978, a difficult task by any measure. To make it easier to follow he divides the book into six parts. Parts one to four (165 pages) dealing with the period from 1788 to 1945, and parts five and six (278 pages) cover the last thirty-four years and form the bulk of the book.

If any readers shy away from this book simply because it sounds like an uninteresting academic dissertation on a dull subject, they are misleading themselves. A recent letter to the Editor of this journal complained that the articles were "so scholarly — but so dull". I could only suggest that he read Australia in Peace and War. I agree that the book is scholarly, but it is never dull. It is entertaining, very readable and full of those biting criticisms which makes it a pleasure to read.

The book is controversial and often unkind to the memory of past Australian and Commonwealth leaders but is very, very well written and presented. Australia in Peace and War is a highly commended work which will no doubt become a handbook for serious students of Australian History while retaining an attraction for the casual reader with an open mind.

Reviewed by K. I. Taylor
Formerly Managing Editor, Defence Force Journal

THE Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), which includes sea and air wings, so could more properly be called the People's Defence Forces, returned to world attention during the short and, from the Chinese point of view, beautifully stage-managed Sino-Vietnam conflict. That they did not have it all their own way against the smaller Vietnamese forces can be attributed to two main factors: firstly, the PLA still shows a paucity of equipment and tactical expertise; and secondly, the Vietnamese forces, inspite of their presumable war-weariness, can obviously yet pack a punch. There is a third factor. The Chinese action was a restrained exercise, with a wary backward glance at the long border with the Soviet Union and Mongolia.

Professor Nelson's book covers a fascinating period of the history of the PLA — the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) and its aftermath. He has gathered information from a variety of sources, including statements by Chinese leaders, reports from Western and Taiwanese agencies, blended them with his own considerable experience, and produced a balanced and well-written view of China and her armed forces today. By excluding personalities where possible in his survey of the organisations involved, he has made sure his book remains in date as a textbook for "China watchers" for years to come. His text is complemented by clear charts by Harlan Jencks which appear as an Appendix, and the book is sprinkled with uncluttered maps of great credit to the artist and publishers.

The sheer numbers quoted (3 million ground forces, 300,000 Air and 200,000 Naval forces) seem enormous, yet, as Professor Nelson points out, per capita they are only about half the international average.

Chapters deal with the regular forces, their political, administrative and command structure, the para military forces, and an overview of China's defence posture. The author thinks that the PLA is wrongly orientated towards a conventional invasion; something which, he believes, a potential aggressor would be loath to tackle, since it would involve being bogged down in "the quagmire of the people", to use Mao's words.

His comment on the role of the Commissar is interesting, in that he sees little friction between the Political and the Military Commander. Indeed the former is likely to take over many irksome tasks, such as the men's welfare and education, political correspondence, and some administrative duties, leaving the latter free to get on with the fighting. His remarks on military elitism, the role of the PLA in the GPCR and the officer selection process are also worth reading, and give a clear background to recent events.

The book is available through Methuen of Australia, 301 Kent Street, Sydney.