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AIR Marshal Sir Richard Williams, KBE, CB, DSO, affectionately known as 'the father of the Royal Australian Air Force' died at St. George's Hospital, Kew, Melbourne, on Thursday, February 7, 1980, after a brief illness.

Sir Richard Williams was born at Moonta, South Australia, on August 3, 1890. He joined the Army at the age of 19 and on the formation of the Army Aviation Corps he was accepted as a member of the first pilot's course at Point Cook, Victoria. He had the honour of being the first pilot to gain his 'wings' on November 12, 1914.

As a Lieutenant, Richard Williams went overseas with the Australian Flying Corps and commanded No 1 Squadron, AFC, winning the DSO for gallantry. Later in the war, with the rank of Major, he commanded No 40 Wing, Royal Air Force.

On his return to Australia after the war, he was appointed Director of Air Services to Army Headquarters in Melbourne. He was unswerving in his agitation for an autonomous Air Force, and on March 31, 1921, had his reward with the formation of the Royal Australian Air Force. He was appointed to be the first Chief of the Air Staff and promoted to the rank of Wing Commander. He was then aged 30.

Sir Richard guided the infant Air Force through its formative years and up to February, 1939, when he was sent to England as Air Officer in Chief (Administration), Coastal Command, Royal Air Force, for two years. He held the rank of Air Vice Marshal.

Returning to Australia he was appointed Air Board Member for Supply and Equipment until September, 1941. He was then an Air Marshal, having been promoted in January 1940.

In December, 1941 he returned to England as Air Officer Commanding Royal Australian Air Force Overseas Headquarters, London. He was appointed Royal Australian Air Force representative on the Joint Staff Committee, Washington, from July, 1942 to June, 1946.

Sir Richard Williams retired from the Royal Australian Air Force on August 28, 1946 at the age of 56 years. He then accepted the post of Director General of the Department of Civil Aviation and remained in that position for nine years.

He was knighted in 1954.

Sir Richard maintained an intense interest in his beloved Air Force right up to the time of his death. He regularly attended Air Force functions and was always in demand as a speaker whenever airmen got together.

The Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal N. P. McNamara, AO, CBE, AFC, paid the following tribute:

"Sir Richard Williams is truly the father of the Royal Australian Air Force, having fought and won the battle for its formation as an independent service. He remained in close contact with the Royal Australian Air Force and was unfailingly interested in its modern development."

"His passing is a profound loss and will be mourned by all whose privilege it is to have served in the Royal Australian Air Force."
CIVILIAN MODELS

Dear Sir,

In Major Graco's article “Civilian Models” (DFJ No 18 Sep/Oct 1979) the comment that, the Services should not adopt carte blanche civilian model solutions to their problems, is readily accepted. However, I find it difficult to agree that many of the dangers Graco would have us fear are in fact “dangers”. Rather the incorporation of civilian solutions/practices represents a challenge to the traditional view of the military. In fact it is not inconceivable, accepting Janowitz’s determinants of civilianization, (as outlined by Graco), that even more radical shifts from the traditional model will emerge.

In analysing the determinants of any military system one must bear in mind three factors: Firstly, military systems do not operate in social vacuums. Problems such as meddling politicians and uncertain budget are not specific to this era. Did not the Roman generals wage their wars while the Senate debated their worth and significance? Were not questions raised in the House of Commons regarding British involvement in the campaigns of World War II? One cannot divorce the military from the political, economic and social ideologies of the time.

Secondly, the essence of a military leader does not change. Be he Hannibal, Eisenhower or a contemporary platoon commander, the successful military leader must know both his strike power and his men. Present day weapons demand that the military leader have (or have ready access to) greater technological sophistication. However, this does not “supplant his role as a commander of armed men”. What good is all his technical knowledge if he cannot direct his men in its use.

Thirdly, human attitudes and behaviour are adaptable. As Janowitz has suggested, society will gladly (and rightly) hand over to the military professionals specific roles when the need arises. Recent natural disasters are evidence of this. However, as the business of war becomes more complex is there a “danger” in having “whiz kids” who are not in uniform? Given they are under the direction of military leaders, in times of threat, surely their role becomes advisory, not dictatorial.

I would suggest that contemporary problems with personnel, organization and operations are not the result of “civilianization” per se. Rather such problems most likely stem from conflict between those with new ideas, imagination and awareness and others who are reticent to move out of the mentality of a previous era. Agreed the traditional view has served us well but times have changed. It is now imperative that our military leaders be attuned to the society they are defending and that they are more aware of the means and manpower at their disposal to implement this defence. If this requires more civilian participation then let us hope we have the foresight to accept this reality.

Peter J. Oswald
Lieutenant RANR
Naval Psychologist

AUTHOR’S REPLY

Dear Sir,

Lieutenant Oswald’s letter indicates that “conservatism” rather than “civilianization” is the cause of contemporary problems in the Armed Services. I would suggest that both conservatism and civilianization are problems — not one or the other. As I explained in my previous reply, I have tried to address some of the not so obvious but more serious consequences of civilianization.

Warwick Graco
Major

FOOTNOTE


THE EQUITY OF CONSCRIPTION

Dear Sir,

I crave your indulgence to comment again on Captain Nicholson’s article “The Equity of Conscription” (DFJ No 15 March/April 1979) and his response to my letter (DFJ No 18 September/October 1979).
The author’s dismissal of my statement that conscription is sometimes necessary to meet manpower requirements is hardly valid in historical terms as conscription was introduced by Australia during both World Wars for just that reason, and our commitment in Vietnam could not have been sustained except at a much lower level without conscription. Conscription as we understand it was first introduced in Republican France in 1799. It was approved by the Council of Five Hundred on the application of General Jourdan because of, would you believe, the lack of interest of the population in military service. As I stated in my previous letter, the article is really concerned with the economics of manpower production in peace, as is virtually admitted in the opening gambit, and manpower for the Regular Military forces at that.

Further, any author who selectively quotes examples to support his hypothesis to the exclusion of others more representative should reasonably expect to be picked up on it. While not commenting on the success or otherwise of the scheme, the Australian National Service Scheme 1951-59 was aimed at producing basically trained manpower for the CMF or Reserve forces and not for the Regular Military forces. The article does not mention manpower production for the Reserve forces.

I would like to restate my fundamental contention that the equitability of otherwise of conscription depends on how and for how long it is applied. The optimum would be universal conscription of the selected age group continued indefinitely. Space prevents me from developing this argument further.

In conclusion, while I do not dismiss the notion that market forces have an impact on the supply of "labour" to the military forces, I do contend that there are other factors to be considered such as the social and political acceptance of high pay levels in the military forces and the inescapable fact that the majority of the population just do not like military service. While I am certainly not an advocate of artificially low pay levels in the military forces (perish the thought!), the high cost of full time manpower and its relationship to total Defence expenditure cannot be ignored.

yours,
L. R. Summers
Major

AUTHOR’S REPLY

Dear Sir,

In an attempt not to bore your readers I shall keep my answer to Maj. Summers’ letter fairly brief.

A public good is a good enjoyed by all regardless of their ability to pay. Clearly defence is such a good. On grounds of equity, economics, or plain common sense it is not unreasonable to suggest that the good in question should be paid for by those who receive most benefit from its existence. Equally as clearly, conscription does not fulfill this criterion. It imposes a very high, regressive tax on a minority (regardless of which system is being considered, even Maj. Summers’ utopian, universal system, those required to serve still form a minority). Conversely an all volunteer force, financed by all who pay taxes, is equitable and efficient.

Without wishing to dwell on the point too much, I must add that it is not necessarily true that the provision of an all volunteer force can only be obtained with excessively high budgetary outlays in part it is reasonable to assume that in an Australian context the additional budgetary costs may in fact be rather minimal for an increase in the defence force likely to be considered necessary by the government. The actual increase in wages necessary for any given force strength is largely dependent on the elasticity of supply, a subject which I do not have the space to develop but was discussed in my original paper to some extent.

Finally, I must once again pose the question. What is inherently different about military labour? Why can’t the market system be allowed to operate freely as it is meant to do in a free enterprise system? Surely the principle of ‘user pays’ is sound in this instance.

Yours Sincerely
John Nicholson
Captain
Aviation Support for the Australian Army

Major H. J. Clarsen
Royal Australian Infantry*

INTRODUCTION

Aviation support for the Australian Army is currently provided by both the Army Aviation Corps and the RAAF. The roles of the Aviation Corps, and therefore the types of aircraft which it may operate, are governed by the CGS/CAS agreement of 10 April 1967 (as amended in 1972). The terms of this agreement, and in particular the fact that the Army is restricted to operating unarmed aircraft with a maximum all-up weight limitation of 4,000 pounds, have often been challenged. Indeed, the all-up weight limitation has already been waived on two occasions, with the purchase of the Porter and the Nomad aircraft, and the Army is at this moment considering a proposal which, if implemented, would have the effect of expanding considerably the size and scope of the Aviation Corps at the expense of the RAAF.¹

It is an appropriate time, therefore, to challenge the continued existence of an Army aviation capability. Has the Aviation Corps outlived its purpose? Is there a less expensive way to achieve equal or better aviation support? Has the introduction of centralized command over the three Services, with the consequent emphasis on joint rather than single service operations, eliminated the necessity for maintaining a separate Army aviation capability? How have the increases in the RAAF helicopter capability and the trend towards high technology helicopters affected the operations of the Corps? Is the retention of an Army aviation capability in the Australian Army still appropriate?

AIM

The aim of this article is to develop the thesis that all aviation support for the Australian Army should in future be provided by the RAAF.

The thesis will be argued along the following lines:

• The creation of an Army aviation capability in the post World War II period was justifiable in view of the Defence Force structure of the day, the battlefield conditions at that time, and the type of aviation support then required.
• Since that time, however, the Army has expanded the roles and tasks of the Aviation Corps out of all proportion to those initially envisaged. Some of those tasks, and others which the Corps is now seeking to have included amongst its responsibilities, conflict with the basic rationale for the establishment of an Army aviation capability in the first place. At the same time, the RAAF has developed its own helicopter capability, albeit reluctantly at first. This has caused a duplication of facilities and capabilities which, under the current policy of creating a self-reliant Defence Force, operating jointly rather than separately, is expensive and unsatisfactory. In order to simplify, control, and to achieve maximum economy, all light aircraft which are dedicated to the support of the Army should be grouped together in a single Service.

¹This article first appeared in the Queenscliff Papers.
• In considering which Service should own this fleet of aircraft, it first appears logical that they be given to the Army. It will be argued in this article, however, that, from a total Defence Force point of view, it would be preferable for such ownership to be given to the RAAF. Central to this discussion will be the command and control relationship both in peace and war. It will be shown that, with the integration of the three Services into one Defence Force commanded by the CDFS, it is now possible, and desirable, to devise a command structure which removes the necessity for a separate Army aviation capability.

ORIGINS OF ARMY AVIATION

Historical Background
The history of the development of an aviation capability in the Australian Army is closely allied with the history of the British Army Air Corps.

During World War I both the Royal Flying Corps and the Australian Flying Corps functioned almost exclusively as tactical air forces dedicated to providing operational support for the land forces. In both cases the corps eventually became the nuclei of their respective air forces: the RAF being established in 1918 as an amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, and the RAAF (established in 1921) being a reconstituted Australian Flying Corps.

In Britain, the RAF, under the leadership of Lord Trenchard, quickly set about establishing itself as a totally independent service beholden in no way to either of the senior services from which it had developed. Its obsession with the bomber and its emphasis on the development of an elite 'airforce caste' had disastrous results for both the Royal Navy and the British Army at the outbreak of World War II. Not only were aircraft which were suitable for Army and Navy support simply not available, but techniques that had reached a high degree of perfection during World War I were either forgotten or had remained undeveloped.²

Throughout World War II, and later in Korea, the Air Observation Post organisation proved that it could provide quick response and skilled control of fire with the use of standard Royal Artillery procedures, and that it could operate effectively in an adverse air situation. In Malaya, whilst the RAF still owned the aircraft involved, it was found that light unarmed aircraft, operating in close contact with the Army, could exercise an effect on counter-insurgency operations entirely disproportionate to the effort involved. The advent of the helicopter introduced a new dimension more readily appreciated by the Army than the RAF.³

In the Australian Defence Force the situation was almost identical. Throughout World War II the Army had the support of RAAF Auster aircraft manned by RAAF pilots and Artillery observers. In 1950 it was agreed that Artillery pilots should fly aircraft on Air Observation Post duties, and in 1960 the first Army-owned unit, 16 Army Light Aircraft Squadron, was raised. But as the RAAF and the Army normally operated as separate parts of an allied force rather than as a joint Australian force, the inability of the RAAF to provide adequate support for the Army went largely unnoticed. As in Britain the air force displayed a distinct lack of interest in the potentialities of the helicopter.

Rationale for the Development of an Army Aviation Capability
The development of an aviation capability in both the British and Australian armies can be attributed mainly to the fact that the air and land forces were administered as separate Government Departments, with little central control over force structure and budgeting commitments. This lack of central control coupled with the reluctance of the air force to allocate its resources to what it considered to be only a minor role, created the conditions under which Army could gradually develop its own aviation capability.

Another factor which affected the air force attitude was that the aircraft needed to perform the tasks demanded by Army were, by air force standards, extremely simple to operate and maintain. In all cases tasks could be performed by a pilot alone and it was more cost effective to train an army officer to fly the simple aircraft involved, than to give an already highly trained air force pilot the additional training required to perform artillery fire direction and other army-related tasks. Further, the tasks which the Army demanded were unrelated to other air force tasks, and they necessitated a
radical change in attitude, particularly because the pilot was required to live and operate from field airstrips rather than from established bases.

The Army based its proposal for an integral aviation capability on two fundamental arguments: firstly on its need for operational control over the aviation asset, so that it could properly apply its own priorities when tasking its supporting aircraft; and secondly on the fact that it could gain better support from armymanned pilots than from those temporarily seconded from the air force. These arguments, amongst others, are described by Brigadier Chatterton in his book, *The Wings of Pegasus*, when outlining the reasons for the development of the British Army Air Corps:

"... The Army aircraft is in no way intended to be an offensive weapon requiring the highly skilled operation of a pilot trained to deliver a costly or highly lethal bomb or missile. To the Army, the light aircraft or helicopter is primarily a means of conveyance which provides the soldier with a further means of mobility or a platform from which to improve his observation ... The Air OP organisation of the Royal Artillery proved from its early inception that the most efficient direction of the guns by aerial observation came, not unnaturally, from a gunner ... It is essential that (the pilot) remains at all times primarily a soldier and secondly an aviator ... Unlike modern air forces, the essence of Army aviation must be simplicity of equipment and operating techniques ... There can be no reliance on black boxes, navigational devices and ground operated aids."

Comment on the CGS/CAS Agreement

The terms of the CGS/CAS agreement of 10 April 1967 were largely influenced by the type of aircraft already in service within the Army, by the division of responsibility then existing between the British Army and the RAF, and by the limited capacity of the Army to accept responsibility for air support at that time. The agreement merely formalized an already existing force structure in which the responsibility for the acquisition, manning, maintenance, training, operation, command and control of aviation elements was divided between the RAAF and the Army. It would appear that the agreement was essentially a compromise resulting from the evolutionary development of an Army aviation capability, rather than being the result of an objective study of the future requirements of the Australian Defence Force, and of the costs involved in developing two similar but separate aviation capabilities.

**ARMY AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE FUTURE**

**General**

Prior to examining the inadequacies of the current force structure it is appropriate to discuss the requirements for air support in the land battle of the future. Broadly stated, there will be a continued requirement for support from the following types of aircraft:

- strike aircraft (for both interdiction and close support tasks);
- reconnaissance aircraft (capable of long-range surveillance, short-range reconnaissance over enemy held territory, and target acquisition and analysis);
- long and medium-range transport aircraft; and
- battlefield aircraft.

**Battlefield Aircraft**

Provision of the first three types of aircraft clearly fits within the present and future roles of the RAAF. The fourth category, however, is not one which is formally used within the Australian Defence Force, although it is used, with varying definitions, in Army aviation circles in Australia and other Western Countries. In this article it is defined as including those aircraft which, on operations, are based within the Area of Operations, are dedicated to providing support for the land battle, and play a tactical role in conjunction with Army units and formations.

Battlefield aircraft tasks include command and control, observation of indirect fire, liaison and communications duties, battlefield surveillance and photography, as well as tactical air transport operations such as airborne assault, support for SASR operations, aeromedical evacuation (both forward and intermediate), and short-range logistic transport tasks. Other tasks, which are not currently performed by either Army or RAAF aircraft but which could in the future be introduced as Army requirements, are:
• aerial deployment of land mines;
• airborne mine detection;
• anti-armour operations;
• target acquisition/designation;
• electronic support measures; and
• electronic counter measures.

An examination of these tasks indicates that the types of aircraft which should be included in the category of battlefield aircraft are the LOH, UH, MLH,* and short-range fixed wing aircraft such as the Porter, Nomad and Caribou.

The advantages of considering battlefield aircraft as a ‘single family’ of aircraft become apparent when the environment in which they will operate is considered. They will all operate in the midst of an Army organisation in battle, and must conform to its methods of movement, deployment and concealment. The aircraft will all use the same air space, the same strips or helicopter areas, and will be supported by the same logistic system. They will all operate at low levels and will consequently all have the same problems of avoiding the fire of their own troops as well as that of the enemy. They will be controlled in the air by the same air traffic control organisation and will all be responsive to the same formation or joint force commander. Not only will different types of aircraft often have to perform similar tasks but they will frequently need to work together on the same task. For instance in anti-armour operations it may be necessary for an LOH and a UH to work as a team, the LOH acting as the scout, and the UH as the tank killer.

It is of interest to note that the definition of battlefield aircraft which appears to be favoured by those seeking to expand the roles of Army aviation is similar to that used in this article except that it includes only those aircraft normally based in the forward battle area, ie. the combat zone. In this way the MLH and the Caribou are excluded from the battlefield aircraft ‘family’ on the basis of a possible difference in base location, rather than being included because of commonality of purpose, task, and method of operating. It is reasonable to assume that in most operations the MLH will be used well forward in the combat zone: indeed, because of range and load capacities, this is exactly where the aircraft will be most valuable. The Caribou, too, is a tactical rather than a strategic aircraft which will operate from forward airfields in conjunction with Army rather than RAAF units. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that both these aircraft should be included in the battlefield aircraft ‘family’.

It would appear then, that there would be considerable operational advantage in grouping all battlefield aircraft together in one Service; obviously that Service should be either the Army or the RAAF. Prior to examining this matter further, however, it will be useful to examine the major problem areas which are evident in the current force structure, as these lend additional weight to the concept of a single-service grouping of all types of battlefield aircraft.

Army Aviation Corps Manning

Probably the most fundamental problem facing the Army Aviation Corps now and in the future is that of adhering to the axiom described by Brigadier Chatterton that “it is essential that (the pilot) remains at all times primarily a soldier and secondly an aviator”.

In the early days of Army aviation this was an easy objective since it was a relatively simple matter for an Artillery or Infantry officer to learn to fly an Auster or Cessna aircraft and then to provide the support required. The pilot training course was short, and normal Corps training provided the officer with the expertise required to perform the task.

The introduction of the helicopter, and the subsequent raising of a separate Army Aviation Corps changed these conditions considerably. Training time increased, and the Corps quickly encountered the type of manning problems normally found in a small specialist Corps. The limited size of the Corps, particularly at the major/lieutenant colonel level, restricted the number of career officers which the Corps could attract and sustain, and it was therefore forced to rely on short-service commissioned officers from the National Service source. These National Service officers, because of their short time in service and their relatively long and expensive training commitment, could not be given the benefits of experience in the other

* Light Observation Helicopter, Utility Helicopter and Medium Lift Helicopter respectively.
Arms, and they therefore became ‘aviation specialists’ with limited practical understanding of the procedures and requirements of the arms which they were required to support.

When the National Service scheme ceased, the Corps was faced with a new but similar problem. An Army Office study of 1975 predicted that the Corps would encounter serious problems in the provision of junior pilots and flying instructors unless a new system of providing short-service commissioned officers could be instigated. The cessation of the six-month OTU course, and the inability of other Army schools to economically run such a course, have meant that the Corps has no option but to train its cadet officers on the normal full year’s course at OCS. (Thirteen such cadets, specifically recruited for the Army Aviation Corps, commenced their training at OCS in June 1977). In order to solve the specific Aviation Corps problem of a deficiency in junior officer ranks only, these cadets will on graduation be given the unusual option of accepting either a permanent or a short service commission. Obviously, if all, or a majority, accept permanent commissions, the Corps will eventually find that it cannot provide adequate career prospects for all its senior officers.

In the meantime the Corps has been forced to discontinue its original policy of providing its newly graduated RMC and OCS officers with regimental experience in one of the combat arms prior to commencing flying training. Thus the trend towards producing ‘aviation specialists’ continues, despite the fact that the need for light aircraft pilots experienced in the requirements and procedures of the combat arms was one of the prime reasons for the original development of an Army aviation capability.

**Anti-Aircraft Weapons**

The second major problem facing the Aviation Corps concerns the change in flying techniques required over the modern battlefield because of the rapid improvement in anti-aircraft weapon technology.

Major General R.L.C. Dixon, former Director of the British Army Air Corps, described this problem when, in the *Army Air Corps Journal* of 1976, he explained the requirement for a trained observer to accompany the pilot on any mission over the modern battlefield:

> “An anti-tank helicopter obviously has to have a missile aimer. The pilot will not be able to perform this function even when we have a semi-automatic system. In observation and reconnaissance helicopters the requirement stems from the fact that modern heat-seeking and radar-directed air defence weapons in the forward area have increased the need to use stealth and flight at ultra-low level, when operating near the FEBA, to reduce the danger of presenting a line of sight to enemy weapons. Although at ultra-low level a pilot can memorize a direct route of reasonable length from A to B, he cannot be expected to know where he is after several changes of track to take advantage of cover to avoid hazards, or after adopting a number of different observation positions, at a height when it is too hazardous to direct his attention to the map. Because of the enemy’s air defence he cannot climb for safety or to orientate himself. He needs a navigation aid, but that will still not enable him to pinpoint something he observes, since at ultra-low level he cannot safely consult his map and work out a grid reference. Even if he could somehow overcome his navigation and orientation difficulties on his own, a pilot at almost ground level cannot observe effectively with the naked eye out to some 3,000 metres, the sort of distance within which he is particularly vulnerable to air defence weapons. He needs some optical aid, either stabilized binoculars or something better, but he cannot use it himself because in a helicopter, especially at ultra-low level, he cannot take a hand off the controls. He therefore needs an observer . . . . At night, particularly if the pilot is using passive night goggles, an observer is essential to read the map or to use his own hand-held passive night goggles to identify a particular field or target and direct the pilot to it.”

The conclusion which can logically be drawn from this, although General Dixon did not do so, is that under these conditions the pilot will be concerned with nothing other than the immediate problem of flying his aircraft. It is the observer who will need to have an intimate knowledge of Army procedures, requirements and tactical dispositions, as it is he who will actually guide the pilot in order to carry out the mission. Thus it is logical that the observers be
trained by, and belong to the Army; but as long as the command and control arrangements are satisfactory (from the Army's point of view), the pilots and aircraft need not belong to the Army at all.

'Sophistication versus Simplicity'

General Dixon illustrated a third problem when, later in the same article, he addressed the issue of sophistication versus simplicity of aircraft. Dixon explained that in his opinion there are three sources of complexity in battlefield aircraft. Firstly, the desire for better performance, coupled with more safety. Secondly, the need to adjust to changes in the battlefield environment. And thirdly the fitting of equipment which is desirable to enhance existing capability or to improve serviceability.

In the first category, he included the twin-engines of the Lynx utility helicopter — “some increase in sophistication in this area is more or less unavoidable”. In the second he included identification friend or foe (IFF) equipment, without which “we would not be able to operate at all without every chance of being shot down by our own side, unless severe restrictions are imposed on our air defence, as well as a combination of optical assistance (eg. passive night goggles), a navigation system, and radio altimeter to allow aircraft to fly at very low level, at night, and in marginal weather”. In the third category he included the hostile fire indicator, radar warning systems, armour, thermal shielding, HF radio, infra-red landing lights and duplicated systems.

General Dixon considered that, in order to perform its roles in an increasingly sophisticated environment, the Army Air Corps has no alternative but to adopt the type of equipments included in the first two categories. In the third category he considered that it was a matter of judgement whether the advantage outweighs the penalties in payload, cost and complication.

General Dixon concluded that section of his article with the following words:

“We would all prefer our equipment to be cheap and simple if it would do the job, but most of the 'complexity' we are introducing makes it easier or safer for the pilot to perform his operational task, or is essential to enable us to operate effectively under existing battle-conditions”.

The conclusion which General Dixon did not draw is that, with every increase in the complexity of Army aviation equipment and operations, the Corps moves further away from the reasons for its existence. Pilots must spend more of their time learning and practising technical skills instead of developing their knowledge of the procedures and requirements of the Army in operations. The breed of 'specialist aviators' thus produced is little different from its Air Force counterpart, and the advantages of retaining an Army aviation capability are diminished.

Cost Factors

If the requirement for a separate Army aviation capability is accepted, then there is no doubt that the Army and the RAAF, through single-service management arrangements, have gone a long way towards minimising the costs of a duplicated capability. If that basic requirement is challenged however, it quickly becomes apparent that there would be considerable savings in manpower, training, accommodation, airfield facilities and running costs, if all aviation support for the Army were instead provided by the RAAF. There appears to be little justification other than Army ownership, for example, for separate Army aviation establishments at Holsworthy, Townsville, and Oakey, as each is within a few minutes flying time of an existing RAAF base, ie., RAAF Richmond, RAAF Garbutt, and RAAF Amberley. The provision of separate bases with organic firefighting services, air traffic control services, air field maintenance services, and, in the case of Oakey, transport, quartering, messing and headquarters staff, simply cannot be justified in terms of cost effectiveness. As long as the Army retained control over the use of these aircraft, they could provide support for the Army just as effectively and with fewer overheads from within the corresponding RAAF base.

Similarly, there is no justification, other than separate ownership, for the current duplication of facilities and staff for the technical training of pilots and aircraft mechanics. The training requirement in both services is relatively so small, and the skills to be taught so similar, that combined training at one location must perform, be more cost-effective. The current situation is a product of separate ownership of
the personnel involved, rather than an objective study of the job specifications of pilots and aircraft mechanics in both Services, and the economies of scale which would be achieved by conducting all training at the same training centres.

**Insularity**

The other major deficiency in the current force structure is the inherent insularity of the two separate elements of the battlefield aircraft fleet. Tactics, procedures and organisations tend to develop in isolation rather than in unison. Consequently the tactical doctrine and SOP of the two elements differ markedly, and the raising of a composite squadron consisting of, say, utility helicopters and light observation helicopters is impossible, even though this may be desirable for either operational, or administrative reasons. Furthermore, the two elements are tasked by separate headquarters, thus encouraging inefficiency through inappropriate tasking of each type of aircraft. Finally, collective training is rarely carried out on a joint basis, so that the problems which are common to both elements tend to be resolved independently.

**Summary of Current Weaknesses**

The current force structure has the following weaknesses:

- The Army Aviation Corps is suffering from many of the normal manning problems of a small specialist corps. One solution which has been adopted is to recruit ‘specialist aviators’ on short service commissions. While this solution may solve the ‘numbers’ problem, it is in direct conflict with the *raison d’etre* of the Corps.
- Continued improvement in anti-aircraft weapon technology will mean that, in battle, the pilot will be forced to concentrate completely on flying his aircraft, while a trained observer carries out the task. The pilot will of necessity become less of a generalist Army officer and more a ‘specialist aviator’. Once again this conflicts with the *raison d’etre* of the Corps.
- The proliferation in Army Aviation tasks, and the consequent trend towards more sophisticated helicopters, increases the quantity of technical training required by the pilot. Again, the Corps is being forced into producing ‘specialist aviators’.
- Although the cost of maintaining separate capabilities has been reduced as far as is possible within the constraints of the current force structure, there is little doubt that considerable economies of scale would accrue through an amalgamation of the two elements of the battlefield aircraft fleet.
- The current insularity of the two elements causes diverse tactical doctrine, and inefficient organisation, training and tasking. Conversely, a great deal of additional staff work is necessitated to ensure that these inherent inefficiencies are minimized.

**THE PROPOSAL**

The weaknesses inherent in the current force structure would be eliminated by the permanent establishment within the RAAF of a Tactical Air Group (TAG) consisting of all types of battlefield aircraft, ie. LOH, UH, MLH, Caribou, Nomad and Porter. This formation should be placed under operational control (or functional command) of the Army’s Field Force Command, but remain under administrative command of Operational Command, RAAF.

Further details of the proposal are:

- There would be a requirement for the allocation in both peace and war of an operations cell from HQ TAG to HQ Field Force Command. The function of this operations cell would be to coordinate Army operational and training requirements with RAAF administrative and technical requirements.
- The organisation and tactics of the TAG would be established jointly by RAAF and Army. These would obviously need to be dictated by Army operational requirements and RAAF administrative and technical requirements.
- In war, elements of the TAG would be included in the Tactical Air Support Force, but these elements would remain under operational control of the Land Component Commander. An alternative would be to allocate to the TAG those other RAAF aircraft (eg. FGA, MRT,
etc.) which are, for a specified period, dedicated to providing support within the Area of Operations. In this case, these aircraft would be tasked by the Land Component Commander on the advice of the commander of the TAG, and a TASF would not be raised.

- Those battlefield aircraft required for purely RAAF or Navy support tasks (e.g., search and rescue, air base defence, etc.) should not be placed under operational control of the Army, but should remain under full command of the RAAF. Obviously these aircraft could still be based with elements of the TAG, depending on the suitability of the location of the TAG bases. The number of battlefield aircraft so excluded from the TAG should be agreed jointly by Army and RAAF, through the office of the CDFS.

- Technical training of pilots and groundcrew would be a normal RAAF responsibility. Collective training within the TAG, however, would be a joint Army/RAAF responsibility. All RAAF personnel posted to the TAG would need to attend an Army familiarization course on joining, or rejoining, the TAG.

- Army observers would be given their specialist training by their own corps and posted or attached to the TAG as appropriate. Alternatively they could remain with their normal corps units and be provided for specialist tasks whenever their particular units are to be supported by the TAG. Because of the high degree of teamwork required of the pilot and observer, it would appear that actual posting of the observer to the TAG would be preferable.

DISCUSSION

Advantages of the Proposed Force Structure

The proposed force structure has the following advantages:

- The Army will gain continuous operational control over all battlefield aircraft during peace and war (less those dedicated to purely RAAF and Navy support). This will remove the current anomaly where Army has little control over the operational tasking of aircraft such as the UH, MLH, and Caribou, despite the fact that the principal role of these aircraft is to provide operational support for the Army. At the same time, Army will not lose its operational control over the LOH and light fixed-wing aircraft fleet.

- The proposed organisation has the marked advantage of developing and operating in peace-time the same organisation as that which will be used in a joint force in war. Joint service procedures will be well established and familiar before operations commence, and the level of co-operation and understanding between the two services should improve accordingly.

- The proposed structure permits maximum economy of scale in all aspects of procuring, maintaining and operating a battlefield aircraft fleet. These economies are likely to become increasingly significant as aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons increase in complexity. Maximum use of economies such as these is already vital to the effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force; it is likely to become even more so in the future.

- The proposal removes the 'small corps' manning problems of the Army Aviation Corps.

- The pooling of all similar aircraft into one operational grouping permits optimum use of aircraft, manpower, and maintenance facilities.

- Tactics and procedures will no longer be developed in isolation.

- The proposal provides for the most efficient training system possible because individual training will be carried out by the parent (specialist) Service, or Corps, and collective training will be controlled jointly.

- RAAF support for the Army will be based on a more complete and up to date understanding of Army requirements and procedures.

Likely Objections to the Proposal

There are likely to be two major objections raised in opposition to the proposed
organisation. The first is that the Army will have insufficient control over the structure of the battlefield aircraft fleet; that the proposed organisation gives Army no control over RAAF allocation of resources to battlefield aircraft; and that for these reasons Army should ideally have complete ownership of all battlefield aircraft, and personnel, on which it relies for its day-to-day operation.

The answer to that objection includes a number of different aspects. Firstly, it is a fact of life that close co-operation between the RAAF and the Army, at all levels and in many different areas, will always be vital to successful Army operations, in peace and war. This has been achieved in the past, and, with the emphasis on a self-reliant Australian Defence Force, the requirement will be even greater in the future. Secondly, it is surely nonsense to suggest that the Army can rely on the RAAF in some areas of air support but not in others. Thirdly, if it can be shown that it is more cost-effective from a total Defence Force point of view for all battlefield aircraft to be grouped together in the RAAF, then the retention of all or some of the battlefield aircraft fleet in the Army should surely be justified in more positive terms than ‘possible lack of Army control over RAAF priorities’. Fourthly, it can be seen that the proposed organisation is consistent with one of the broad aims of the recent reorganisation of the Department of Defence, ie. the development of an integrated defence force operating jointly under the CDFS. It is precisely because of the reorganisation that this proposal is feasible; the CDFS and Defence Central now have sufficient control over force structure, and the allocation of resources, to make the proposed organisation practicable.

The second major objection will be that professional jealousy will preclude full acceptance by the RAAF of any organisation in which RAAF units are placed under Army operational control. It will be suggested that this will prevent the efficient functioning of the proposed organisation, especially during peacetime. The answer to this objection is that under existing policy many RAAF battlefield aircraft units are likely to be placed under Army operational control in war in any case. It makes sense, therefore, that they be placed under Army operational control in peace. (Amongst other things this would eliminate the apparent weakness in the current policy of not raising a Tactical Air Support Force until it is actually required for operations). Any reluctance on the part of RAAF personnel to accept a situation of Army operational control should obviously be eliminated during peace rather than in war.

Those in favour of a continued Army aviation capability may also see this proposal as an attempt to simplistically allocate roles and tasks (and therefore vehicles) to the three services on the basis of environment, ie. land, sea and air. They will argue that, taken to its logical conclusion, such a policy would mean not only that Navy would own and operate all watercraft, and Air Force all aircraft, but that Army should then own and operate all land vehicles. Clearly such a situation would be impractical and unworkable. What is forgotten in that argument is the critical requirement for precision in the operation and maintenance of aircraft, as opposed to the relatively simple matter of operating and maintaining most land vehicles. In addition, the number of aircraft involved is much smaller than the number of vehicles, and the aircraft can be concentrated in far fewer locations, so that the economies of scale achieved by centralizing all aircraft are more pronounced than would be the case if all vehicles were centralized in the Army. Clearly, as long as suitable command and control relationships can be devised, it is preferable, particularly in a small force, for similar types of complex equipment to be centralized in one service wherever possible.

The Canadian Experience

The Canadian Defence Force has experimented with both extremes of this issue and has found that the advantages of unilateral ownership of military aircraft by one specialist ‘air’ force (or command) far outweigh the advantages of separate ownership of air assets by the services (or commands) being supported. In 1967 the Royal Canadian Air Force was divided into four quite separate elements. These were a Tactical Air Group owned and commanded by Mobile Command, a Maritime Air Group owned and commanded by Maritime Command, an Air Defence Command, and an Air Transport Command. By 1975 it was found that this division of air assets was impractical and expensive and the four air elements were
therefore regrouped into one Air Command. The Canadian Defence Force now consists of three combat commands, i.e. Mobile, Maritime and Air Commands, with Air Command consisting of a Tactical Air Group (placed under permanent operational control of Mobile Command), a Maritime Air Group (under operational control of Maritime Command), an Air Defence Group, and an Air Transport Group. Organisational charts which describe the 1967-74, and the current organisations, are shown below.

The Canadian Defence Force is relevant to the Australian force, not only because of its comparable size and operating budget, but also because of the unmistakeable bias within the

**CANADIAN DEFENCE FORCE ORGANISATIONS**

1. 1967 to 1974

![Organisation Chart 1967-1974]

2. 1975 (continuing)

![Organisation Chart 1975-continuing]
Australian force towards the integration of the three single services into one force operating jointly rather than separately. Whilst this integration falls short of the complete unification of the Canadian force, it is probable that the Australian Services will continue the process of integration in order to achieve optimum use of the limited resources allocated to Defence.

Recognition of the requirement for integration, and for the centralization of air assets, is illustrated in a letter written to the author of this article by Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger on 8 July 1977. Sir Frederick, who, as Chief of the Air Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in the 1960s was more than a little involved in the development of Army aviation in Australia, wrote: "... I have always believed that the whole problem of interservice duplication springs from our organisation of separate sovereign services ... We have taken the first step towards unification — one Minister for all services. What we need now is an Australian Defence Force with three fighting arms — Navy, Army and Air.

... In the meantime Army will cling grimly to their aeroplanes — as will the Navy. And so the taxpayer will continue to get less defence for his defence dollar than he could — and should be getting. Perhaps a lot of problems will be solved when oil becomes a memory, and no longer will all VIPs have their own aeroplane!

... I recall Army's main argument that an Air Observation Post pilot must be an Army man because a non-Army man would not know what he was looking at on the ground. RAAF of course, argued that this supported a case for an Army observer but NOT a pilot. Army eventually laughed at their own argument by recruiting their pilots direct from civilian ranks!"

CONCLUSION

The development of an aviation capability in the Australian Army was essentially the result of RAAF indifference to the Army's needs, and the inability of Army, through the higher defence organisation, to influence the RAAF to fulfill those needs.

The RAAF eventually agreed to the development of a separate Army aviation capability, subject to severe limitations being imposed on the size and type of aircraft which Army could operate. The formal agreement between the CGS and CAS was essentially a compromise, resulting from the evolutionary development of Army aviation rather than from an objective study of the future requirements of the Australian Defence Force.

Despite this, the development of an Army aviation capability was justifiable in view of the Defence Force structure of the day, the battlefield conditions at that time, and the type of aviation support then required. The relative simplicity of the tasks envisaged and the absence of an effective enemy air defence capability, meant that the aviation capability required was well within the capacity of the Army to meet. Tasks could be performed by the pilot alone, and it was considered more cost-effective to train an experienced Army officer to fly the simple aircraft involved, than to give an already highly trained air force pilot the additional training required to perform specialized Army tasks.

Since then the RAAF has considerably increased the size and scope of its own battlefield aircraft fleet. This development of two similar but separate capabilities has a number of fundamental weaknesses. Principal among these is the cost of providing separate logistic and training systems as well as separate base facilities and services. Also the two elements tend to develop their organisation and tactics in isolation, and the existence of separate tasking agencies leads to inefficient tasking. Conversely, a great deal of additional staff work is necessary to ensure that these inherent inefficiencies do not occur.

In considering the likely battlefield conditions of the future it is evident that the number of battlefield aircraft tasks will continue to grow and that the aircraft required to carry out these tasks will continue to become more complex. Added to this is the rapid improvement in anti-aircraft weapon capabilities. Under these conditions pilots will need to be highly skilled specialist aviators, and they will often need to be supported by trained observers. Already the Army has been forced to forgo its original policy of attracting its pilots from within the supported arms, and giving its junior pilots a period of practical experience in one of the combat arms. The requirement for specialist aviators is in direct conflict with one of the two fundamental reasons for the original
development of an Army aviation capability, viz: the cost-effectiveness of using army officer pilots experienced in the procedures of the combat arms, as opposed to using pilots from the RAAF.

The other fundamental reason for the development of Army aviation was the Army requirement for operational control over its supporting aircraft. Now that the Australian Defence Force is centrally commanded by the CDFS, it is possible to institute a command relationship for the battlefield aircraft fleet which has all the advantages of RAAF ownership and Army operational control.

The retention of an aviation capability within the Australian Army is therefore no longer necessary or appropriate. All aviation support for the Army should in future be provided by the RAAF.

NOTES

1. Newspaper article in the Brisbane Telegraph dated 18 Feb '77. The article reported Army Office study of a proposal that the utility helicopter (UH) be transferred from the RAAF to the Army.
7. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
8. The Yolla (Vol. 1, No. 4). Further comments on Wing Commander Watson’s Views by Commander T.R. Duchesne.
9. A Canadian Defence Force press release of 25 August 1975 stated: ‘... The new organisation will consolidate aviation functions currently being performed by three separate commands of the Forces. It will unify all air resources, regular and reserve, to coordinate their employment and deployment more effectively and economically...’

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THE CONGESTED "IN" TRAY

Do you suffer from congestion of the 'IN' tray? If the answer is 'YES', Read on...

Administrative Ability

Almost all officers can expect to spend some time during their Service career at a desk job performing an administrative function. Although the primary reason for their being in such an administrative position may be their expertise, qualifications, and experience in a particular field, their superior’s assessment of how well they perform their role cannot fail to be influenced by their administrative ability — as distinct from their specialist ability.

Signs of All-Is-Not-Well

The usual, and more obvious, indications that all-is-not-well with an officer’s administrative performance is the visible accumulation of an excessive amount of material in the ‘IN’ tray. Indeed, this congestion of the ‘IN’ tray can, at times, be so marked that material awaiting action fills more than one ‘IN’ tray, overflows on to the desk, piles up on the floor and — in more cases than one might suspect — may be hidden away in store rooms, book shelves and filing cabinets.

Common Reasons for Congested ‘IN’ Trays

The reasons for the development of the congested ‘IN’ tray are many, and all should be understood and considered by the officer seeking to overcome the problem. They also need to be understood by the officer’s superior, when assessing that officer’s performance.

A few of the main or common reasons for the development of overloaded ‘IN’ trays are:
- A gross overloading of responsibilities.
- A seasonal or otherwise unusual and excessive input of material.
- A desire on the part of the officer always to look ‘busy’ (even when he is not).
- A lack of administrative expertise.

The answers to the problems associated with the first three reasons listed are well outside the scope of this article.

Where the reader is concerned — as the officer with the ‘IN’ tray problem or as the supervisor looking to help at what is, apparently, a case of a lack of administrative expertise this article should be of some value.

As stated earlier — and it is worth mentioning again — many, if not the majority, of officers employed in staff positions, and therefore employed in an administrative role, occupy those positions because of their expertise, qualifications and experience in fields other than administration. It is not surprising, or unreal, therefore to suggest that the lack of administrative experience must dampen administrative performance, and nowhere would this dampening effect be more likely to show itself than in congestion of the ‘IN’ tray.
Judging and Allocating Priorities

The non-professional administrator occupying an administrative (staff) post knows, instinctively, that he is at a disadvantage — and will often, in the early days, confess to this disadvantage: “It will take me months to learn this job”; “I hate paper work”; “Why me?”; “I don’t know what to do — and I don’t think I ever will know”.

Exaggerated? No doubt. But few, if any, realize why they feel at such a disadvantage. And yet most — in time — manage to attain reasonable levels of efficiency.

The clue to understanding why some excel where others falter, may be seen in the oft heard remark by superiors: “I’m losing so-and-so, just as he is becoming good value. He knows what’s got to be done around here. It will take months before the new man learns the ropes”.

The man who has been in the job the longest, usually knows — from hard experience — what needs to be done. In other words, he becomes proficient in judging priorities.

Now there is no way one can lay down a magic formula, for general use, on shortening the time required for developing experience at judging priorities (although a good hand-over take-over can be a big help in this direction).

What I would like to suggest is that a change from the usual system of allocating priorities to an alternative system of allocating priorities can be of immense value to the non-professional administrator — particularly when settling in at a new staff post.

The Usual Priority Allocation System

One might say, “My boss decides my priorities for me”. This may be true, but only partly true, since even the most domineering supervisor cannot afford the time to scrutinize everything that comes into the subordinate’s ‘IN’ tray.

The usual system for allocating priorities to material in hand, is to consider the value of each piece of material by judging the importance likely to be placed on that material by the supervisor (immediate supervisor, or other high level supervisor).

For ease of reference the ‘usual’ system may be referred to as the PAVE (Priority Allocation by Value Estimation) system.

The inherent difficulty with the PAVE system is that having determined the major item, or items, of high priority, attention is often devoted to these high priority items to the exclusion of all others.

The supervisor is fed a continual stream of material of interest and importance to him. The impression is formed in the mind of the superior (as is doubtless intended) that the subordinate is doing a good job — whilst under pressure (the supervisor notes the growing congestion in the ‘IN’ tray).

The superior may or may not notice that so called ‘routine’ items — minutes, memos, and letters on matters not rating as ‘priority’, and miscellaneous matter such as trade magazines and reports — take an inordinate period of time to pass through the hands of this otherwise efficient officer, to the disadvantage, annoyance and inconvenience of other officers further along the distribution chain.

The Alternative Priority Allocation System

The alternative system for the allocation of priorities to material in hand is based on the estimated time needed to complete the action required, rather than the value of the material itself. Minor items taking a few minutes each to read and sign off, perhaps 15 to 20 minutes in all, will be actioned ahead of the topmost priority material. Time required to complete action then, becomes the normal method of allocating priorities. Once the time system of priority allocation is in full use, the need to divert from this principle, and allocate priority according to value (perhaps at the direction of a superior), would be rare indeed, since the minor items requiring little time to complete will have been disposed of as they were received — there should be little or no minor items in hand to obstruct work on the priority task.

This alternative system may be referred to, for ease of reference, as the PATE (Priority Allocation by Time Estimation) system.

The PATE system has the following advantages over the usual, or PAVE, system:

- Allocation of priority by time estimation means rapid clearance of minor (1 to 10 minutes for action) items.
- Rapid clearance of minor items enhances working relations with others having an interest in those items.
- Rapid clearance of minor items reduces quantity of material awaiting action and reduces or ends, ‘IN’ tray congestion.
• Reducing ‘IN’ tray congestion leaving less material ‘in hand’ for the day.
• Less material ‘in hand’ make priority allocation easier.
• Easier priority allocation means better control and improved morale.
• Improved morale leads to an improved output.
• Improved output means a greater capacity for work and more time to consider material ‘in hand’.
• More time to consider material ‘in hand’ improves quality of material output.
• Improved quantity and quality of output has its own rewards.

Adoption of the allocation of priority by time (PATE) system is a natural progression from the normal value estimate (PAVE) system. It is a progression effected by staff officers as they become familiar, and get ‘on top’ of their staff duties. It is a progression they accomplish without becoming aware of the change — all they know is that where they once struggled, they now have control.

I believe an understanding of the PATE system of time allocation of administrative priorities will make it easier for the non-professional administrator to see the advantages for himself, and enable him to make that progression sooner in his staff post than would otherwise have been the case, to the benefit of himself, his superior and his Service.

Staff officers who wish to benefit from the foregoing advice should immediately resist the temptation to put aside minor items while they concentrate on the priority task of the day.

Even with the top most priority task in hand a five to ten minute break every hour to clear those minor items, should be possible, and will provide a welcome relief from the tension prolonged concentration can bring.

The real beauty of the PATE system is that it can be introduced slowly, in stages.

Try it for yourself.

Every time something new arrives on your desk, seize that opportunity to gain a break from the priority task you are engaged in.

Enjoy the break in tension. Examine the new material. If it will take less than 10 minutes to action and clear — do it now. Stop that ‘IN’ tray congestion from growing. Feel the benefit of being in control of the situation.

Resolve now to extract minor items from the ‘IN’ tray congestion and action them and do this two or three times a day until the congestion is eliminated.

Once the ‘IN’ tray congestion has been eliminated, you need never suffer from that problem again. Indeed, you may — like me — never feel the need for an ‘IN’ tray at all.

Declassification of the Army Journal

The Army Journal bore a caveat restricting its access to unauthorised persons. I have now authorised the removal of the caveat and the security classification.

All issues of the Army Journal are now publicly available. — Editor.
During the 70s, the Defence Forces struggled to maintain their equipment, attempted to devise methods of defending the vast 'North', bought equipment that was designed to be used both strategically and tactically by large forces in well developed areas, and chose to minimise the logistic implications caused by Australia's renowned 'tyranny of distance'.

The early 80s saw the Third World fail to halt the mounting birth rate; Australia, however, became a leader in population decline. Government buys of capital equipment for the defence forces were deferred and shelved. As it was to be proved later, their acquisition would not have changed the course of the war for there would have been too few guns and tanks on too big a battlefield. Some description of the training of the period could be described, loosely, as low intensity warfare. No training in urban guerilla tactics, street fighting or rural guerilla warfare was undertaken. It appeared that Australia considered it could fling its paltry force into an area of operations 2500 miles from its supply bases and defeat the enemy like Hitler's blitzkrieg of Poland or France.
The East Coast of Australia was ignored; no training to meet a possible attack was undertaken. The plans to meet a Heartland threat were well disguised; so well disguised that the players never recognised them or used them. Details of how the Armies of Hitler were slowly but inexorably destroyed by the Russians, lay unopened in libraries: laymen used General Von Manstein's writings for table wargames and were amazed how vast tracts of open ground could swallow up Armies. Wargamers won the battles of the German 6th Army at Kharkov by falling back quickly to defendable and less easily encircled positions. Comparison studies of Russia and Australia were ignored, after all Russia was cold and Australia hot, so what could they have in common? Sadly rain and snow have largely the same effect on tracks and off-road conditions; thirst; heat stroke and frost bite all achieve the same end — death for the exposed man and equipment. The Partisan sighed deeply, "Enough of this parade of defence delusions of the past decades. Let us now look at what happened."

The War

"Much discussion had taken place about allowing overflow populations into less populated countries; however, as usual, the nations could not agree on any common policy. Australia came under severe pressure from the Nations, whose population control measures had failed, to take people into our vast under-populated island. Parliament procrastinated and finally said 'NO'. The Third World bloc in the UN condemned us for our selfishness. The overpopulated islands to the North gained confidence from solidarity and threatened dire consequence if we did not accept many millions of their problem peoples. The military training emphasis had been on defence of the North, the most empty region. Therefore the urgency was to move troops there. This was done, but where to draw defence lines, and what to defend, became immense problems for the soldier on the ground. The force carried out reconnaissance on likely landing sites. The Enemy was given active and powerful help from one super power and words, mild words, of restraint from another. The Country felt alone, but boisterous confidence existed in our 'Anzac Spirit' to defeat any comer. The enemy struck in mid November, seized Broome and Derby airfields, then landed at various points along the coast from Port Hedland to Darwin. The invasion appeared to be aimless. The North Force was quickly expanded to 200,000 men splintered to perform like a fire brigade against the many Enemy outbreaks. Then the rains came and bogged everything down. The thunderous monsoon brought with it the realisation of Scorpion's strategy against Hannibal — isolate the Army, capture the city!"
used off unmade airfields, and enough vehicles to move all the men off main roads — in essence, to ignore the need for well structured and equipped defence force.

"Two — a defence concept that defied strategic sense and an almost insane impulse to defend nothing, at the cost of everything. The need to admit privately, if not publicly, that the Eastern triangle with its formed roads for rapid deployment and concentration, short supply lines, the support from the firm base, and rapid access to casualty care was the only thing to defend. This was denied for an overall defence plan; no! not plan because no one really grasped that nettle, it was an idea; a grandiose idea — Defend Australia!

"Three — the failure to identify the need for a large Defence Force Reserve, which could have been trained to defend and operate in their own territory. A force mustered by conscripted service was necessary, such as that of the Swiss, who insist that their young serve as part of their National debt. This was a ‘too difficult’ decision for the Parliament, for it would disturb the Lotus Eater at his play.

"Four — the thought of defeat was never entertained. When the Fall came we were left with little to fight with, no structure to fall back upon, and to plan for a national guerilla fight. The very idea of a Defence Force training in guerilla tactics, both urban and rural, was considered to be non-Australian, akin to an ocker drinking lemonade. We failed badly and we may never recover our land because of our failure to recognise that the Fall might come."

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR  
(see also pages 4 and 5)

CREATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Dear Sir,

Colonel J. M. Hutcheson’s article “Creative Organizational Leadership” (DFJ No 19 November/December 1979) raised many issues vital to leadership effectiveness in the military environment, not the least of which he cites as the “need for flexibility, innovation and creativity” in leadership training. In highlighting the behavioural aspects of military leadership there can be little doubt that he is pointing the Services in the right direction.

In late 1979, I attended the USI of the ACT seminar on "Australia’s Force Structure Options to the End of the Century" and was personally disappointed to observe that, in two days of brainstorming, not one mention was made of “The Man” — the 100,000 of them that comprise the Defence Organization. Have we become so task-oriented and equipment-oriented in our thinking that our human resource and its structural needs have become almost forgotten?

I do not know whether all readers are aware that the Navy’s Peter Mitchell Trust Essay Competition topic for 1979 is titled “The Demands on Leadership in the Navy of the 1980s”. The DFJ would be a commendable forum to publish the prizewinning essay when results are known. It is only to be hoped that some of the ideas that come out of that essay are as refreshing in their approach and as solidly based on psychological research as those proposed by Colonel Hutcheson.

C. V. Baker
Lieutenant-Commander, RAN
INITIAL THOUGHTS ON
AN AUSTRALIAN
LAND SURVEILLANCE FORCE

Colonel P. M. Jeffery, MC, JSSC, psc.

INTRODUCTION

DURING July-August 1977, the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) was tested in its surveillance, long-range-reconnaissance and harassing roles in support of a Corps deployed in the defence of the Northern Territory. Exercise LONG VIGIL encompassed some 66,000 sq km of the Northern Territory and extended from the Victoria River to the Cobourg Peninsula in the North to a line running Bullo River — Katherine — Maningrida in the South. The SASR mission was to provide information to a Corps Headquarters located at Tindal on enemy amphibious and air lodgements expected along the coast, to continue reporting the enemy build-up and breakout after lodgement and to impose maximum delay.

The main enemy force (represented only in outline) of a Task Force (-) with Landing Craft Heavy (LCH), patrol boat, commando company, army aviation and air transport support landed in the Cox Peninsula and East Alligator River areas, where for several days they built up their operational forces and logistic support. They then broke out of the lodgement areas in an attempt to capture the uranium fields of Rum Jungle, Oenpelli and Jabiru with their final objective being the strategic airfield at Tindal. (See map page 25).

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery is serving with the Directorate of Special Action Forces in Operations Branch, Army Office. He is a former commanding officer of the SASR (1976/77) and prior to that was CO 2 PIR. He has served in Malaysia, Borneo, PNG and Vietnam and is a Camberley and Joint Services Staff College graduate.

Article received June 1979

It is not claimed that the SASR detected every enemy intrusion, nor were all the surveillance techniques used by the Regiment uniformly successful. However, from the commencement of the enemy's reconnaissance activities prior to lodgement, until the final two pronged advance on Katherine, his amphibious, parachute dropped and air landed forces were under constant surveillance by some twenty-two SASR patrols, which constantly reported the movement of ships, armoured vehicles, trucks, aircraft and artillery to Corps. Successful harassing operations using F111 aircraft, which were guided to their targets by SAS patrols using beacon transponders, were carried out where the circumstances warranted. In mounting his ultimate counter-stroke, the Corps commander would have had little difficulty in deciding the best location to do battle, the precise timing to commit his force and the correct balance of forces to ensure success. Without such information he would have been fighting comparatively blindly and would have had great difficulty in planning the correct course of action.

The success of this embryonic land based surveillance system was due to a simple ground/air appreciation in deciding the initial location of surveillance patrols, a high standard of individual and patrol training which ensured that patrols could send secure, fast and accurate information in enemy dominated areas without being compromised; and, an ability to re-deploy patrols at night by vehicle, motor cycle or light aircraft to previously prepared depth positions, where they could continue to report on the enemy's advance.
It is the ability to report initial lodgements and to continue reporting in a ‘stay behind’ situation where enemy tactical and logistic build-ups are taking place that makes Special Forces particularly valuable to a Force commander. This special reporting ability is, in most circumstances, beyond the capacity of other reconnaissance or surveillance units of the Army such as cavalry and aviation. It also enhances satellite and air-photo reconnaissance, can be continuous if required, is readily available to the commander and difficult to compromise, given high speed code burst transmission facilities operated by patrols who have carefully pre-selected their observation posts and patrol base locations. Further, the accurate reporting on the location of large enemy fuel dumps, aircraft concentrations and shipping, provides considerable opportunity to mount strikes with high success type aircraft such as the F111, precision guided munitions, remotely piloted vehicles, commando raids or timed demolitions. Such strikes could pre-empt the enemy’s capacity to continue his operations and provide an effective and cheap means of defeating him compared to; tank against tank, fighter against fighter etc.

The provision of early warning and precise information of penetrations of our land mass and air space is particularly important where incursions may take place at a number of different and widely dispersed locations simultaneously, requiring the most careful judgement by the CDFS in committing our
A patrol carrying out a water insertion with zodiac inflatables

Long range landrover and motorcycles in rough terrain during exercise Long Vigil
relatively small land force to the right location at the right time. The confirmation of size and scope of hostile incursions into Australian Territory can only be achieved effectively by land surveillance and reconnaissance, notwithstanding the ability of our other intelligence and surveillance agencies to provide early-warning of an intent to commit hostilities (either overtly or covertly).

The success of LONG VIGIL and its potential for development has led to this article, which examines in outline the desirability and feasibility of establishing a land surveillance force for the whole of the Australian coastline which would form an intrinsic part of the total national surveillance effort. These are first thoughts only and have not been researched in any great detail.

THE NECESSITY FOR EARLY WARNING

A recent study by the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre suggests that our armed forces must be prepared to face three main contingencies in the future. The first is a peace-time requirement to prevent infringements of our 200 nautical mile economic zone (200 NMEZ), our airspace and our coastline by respectively: foreign vessels fishing illegally, unidentified aircraft, refugees, drug runners and potential carriers of diseases such as foot and mouth. The second contingency is to prevent or eradicate widespread and possibly sustained terrorist activity inspired overseas or emanating from disputes within our region which diplomacy has failed to prevent. The third is to successfully defend the nation against a major hostile act; that is lodgement or invasion.

The first two contingencies represent the most likely in immediate probability, but the third poses the greatest danger. A capability to perform the more probable lower level contingencies does not mean a capability or the potential to deal with the third. Hence the Centre suggests that the structure of our defence force should potentially at least, address all three contingencies. It must, where necessary, be capable of expansion to meet them within the defence preparation time we have available; this being the period between the Government decision to act, and the contingency actually occurring. The Centre postulates that defence preparation time in major conflicts since World War II has only once exceeded eighteen months, is more frequently less than twelve and sometimes less than three.

The Centre then goes on to state that whilst our present defence forces can possibly handle their peace-time commitments (less peacekeeping tasks with a logistics bias I would think), expansion of the Army to 150,000 men would be required to handle widespread terrorist attacks and to 250,000 men for widespread and sustained terrorist activity or more serious threats such as lodgement or invasion. Defence preparation times of two-and-a-half to five years would be required for the former and from four to eight years for the latter. Given at the best eighteen months preparation time and more likely three to twelve months, it would appear that our defence forces are likely to be incapable of handling the second and third contingencies without further time for build-up. In a widespread counter terrorist campaign, this would be disastrous, nationally, politically and militarily; no Government could permit widespread penetration of its coastline and the continuous destruction of key targets. In a lodgement or more serious situation the Defence Force may even find itself unable to mount holding or containment operations and would presumably attempt to trade space for time to allow the build-up of forces of sufficient strength to deal with the situation. From a world opinion point of view this may have unfortunate repercussions for Australia, in that over a period of time, the lodgement may attract a degree of sympathetic support for the invader. Again, lodgements into our vital ground, the South-East corner of Australia, would probably mean our rapid defeat as our means for waging war would be lost. Further, the Defence budget is not likely to increase in real terms in the foreseeable future, with the consequent lack of growth in equipment and manpower.

It becomes all too obvious from the foregoing that, should the world trend in minimum defence preparation times continue, Australia must be prepared to fight with what forces she has got at the commencement of hostilities and that the CDFS will require some form of additional land surveillance and reconnaissance capability to assist him in deciding when and where to commit his initial
force at whatever level of contingency. This requirement was recognised during World War II when the North Australia Observer Unit (NAOU) was raised in 1942, by the then Major and now Professor W. E. Stanner, CMG of Canberra. Its area of responsibility stretched from Derby to Normanton and South to Katherine. The 600 men of the NAOU operated as small patrols, generally horse mounted, the latter being driven overland in their thousands from Queensland to Western Australia in circumstances of great difficulty by soldiers of the Regiment. The NAOU was organised into three companies with the regimental headquarters based at Katherine. Logistic support was minimal, medical support almost nil. Patrols were of up to three months duration and communications were provided by high frequency radio, generally animal pack mounted. The NAOU was raised in 12 weeks and, although it did not see a shot fired in anger, it performed one of the most arduous (yet unrecognised) tasks of the war and maintained a superb morale. Its history makes inspiring reading.

OUR PRESENT EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY

General

It is important in justifying a land surveillance force, to examine in broad terms our present and future early warning capabilities. This shows firstly, that undetected penetration of Continental Australia and its air space is likely to remain relatively simple to achieve and, secondly, that Australian surveillance systems, both present and future, whilst of early warning value, are not going to be of much assistance to the CDFS or a land force commander, both of whom will require detailed tactical information before land forces can be committed to mount successful operations.

Maritime Surveillance Capability

In the last two years increasing public and Government disquiet over intrusions into our 200 NMEZ by foreign fishing vessels, the influx of refugees from Vietnam into the North-West of Australia and penetration of our air space by unidentified aircraft suspected of carrying drugs and other illegal imports, has led to the establishment of 'The Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Australian Coastal Surveillance'. This Committee co-ordinates the requirements of several Federal departments into the overall surveillance plan, to keep our waters under scrutiny using primarily RAAF and RAN resources. At 1976 costs of $10m, some 2200 hours of flying time and 1600 patrol boat days of effort, provide surveillance coverage around the coast at varying rates of intensity according to calculated need. However, undetected penetrations of the resources zone and the coastline must still be expected, particularly by submarine. Only a land based surveillance force can cater for such penetrations. Beyond the 200 NMEZ, F111 reconnaissance, Orion anti-submarine aircraft and RAN ships have a reasonable capability for surface surveillance for present peacetime needs. They can give some warning of potential penetration of the 200 NMEZ by surface vessels thus enhancing both the coastal and potential land surveillance systems. Maritime surveillance is assessed as adequate for present peacetime needs but penetrations, unknown to us, by small groups of terrorists using submarines, by refugee boats and drug runners would be possible anywhere around the coast.

For large forces attempting a conventional lodgement or invasion, an enemy would normally require adequate air and naval cover to protect his amphibious force, and to ensure security until the last moment as to where he intended to land. One would expect that he would provide the necessary air and naval cover before undertaking such a task, so that accurate and sustained information on the likely landing place/s of an enemy amphibious force and its strength may well be difficult to achieve by maritime reconnaissance. Further, it may be possible for him to achieve lodgement by employing total surprise, through a pre-emptive raid on our F111 and tactical fighter force bases and C130 transport fleet and our port based submarines and fleet units. This would be quite easily achieved using parachute dropped commando forces of relatively small numbers (3-400 men). A fall back, fail safe, land surveillance force becomes imperative in such a situation, if an enemy lodgement or invasion is to be quickly contained.

Land Based Radar Capability

Limited coverage of the order of 200 km radius is provided at RAAF bases, international airports and some other major airfields. The
RAAF has one mobile HUB-CAP radar for employment with its tactical fighter force but it is limited in range and mobility. With the introduction of JINDALEE over the horizon radar in the 1980s, the coverage will improve markedly, but it is a very large, fixed installation which would be a prime and easy target for enemy terrorists or special forces to destroy. Further, JINDALEE will not distinguish between types of aircraft or ships, or specify size, cargo and intentions. Its main purpose will be as an aid for alerting follow-up air reconnaissance missions, maritime strike, the tactical fighter force and the land surveillance force.

Our present radar coverage is therefore limited and easily circumvented by aircraft, whose pilots so wish to do. Widespread and sustained penetration of our coastline by illegal users of the air such as enemy air forces, terrorist groups, illegal refugees and drug runners is possible now. JINDALEE will improve the situation but is easily destroyed, and will not define the threat with enough precision to allow the commitment of our small Defence Force to a particular location and course of action, without detailed tactical land surveillance and reconnaissance effort being available.

Land Surveillance
The Coastwatcher Organization
The RAN has of the order of 200 part-time coastwatchers concentrated primarily on the eastern and south eastern coasts. There is very limited coverage around the remaining 12,000 km of coastline. These individuals are limited in manpower, training and communications and could not provide a sustained surveillance effort on a 24 hour per day basis.

The Army
The SASR has two understrength Sabre squadrons, each of 70 men with a limited in area and short duration surveillance capability of about 20 patrols. In the concept to be proposed its effort would be primarily directed to training the Reserve and for overseas commitments. The Army’s aviation, cavalry and infantry surveillance capability is essentially tactical in nature, belongs to the field commander and is neither trained nor equipped for a strategic surveillance role, particularly behind the lines. Nor is it organized to provide topographical data or key point information to military districts, Army, or Defence information collection agencies. In summary, our strategic land surveillance capability is poor.

The Bureau of Customs
Some 80 officers are responsible for immigration, health and customs control along 8000 km of coast extending from Broome to Queensland. They can charter aircraft and are to obtain light aircraft of their own in the near future. They are a small organization relying mainly on information for the arrest of law-breakers and provide no guarantee of apprehending all illegal encroachers of the northern coast of Australia.

Other Agencies
The police, aboriginals, civilian pilots and the fishing fleet provide considerable potential as information gatherers for a land based organization, properly co-ordinated. It should be relatively easy to achieve this through the present Federal and Defence Surveillance Committee machinery.

Summary
In summary, our present maritime surveillance capability of the 200 NMEZ is probably adequate for present peacetime needs, but some undetected penetration of the coast by refugees and drug runners must be expected. Terrorist penetration in the conduct of widespread and sustained operations using refugee boats or submarine would be possible, as would lodgement on the coast if the enemy had adequate air and naval protection or achieved total surprise through deception or pre-emptive strike measures. Penetration of the coast by aircraft engaged in illegal drug smuggling activities, terrorist activities, special force or conventional air force operations would be relatively easy to achieve given the paucity of our radar coverage. Although JINDALEE will improve the capability eventually, it has to survive as a potential enemy target, and requires back up by other surveillance means. Our land surveillance capability from a sustained and professional information collection point of view is limited to two understrength SAS Sabre squadrons, whilst the coastwatchers provide a limited coverage of the eastern and south eastern
seaboards. It is obvious that Australia lacks any sort of reasonable land surveillance system to provide the detailed information to CDFS necessary for the regular Army and Reserve to react in time to possible penetration of the coastline and air space at all contingency levels. A cheap and effective land surveillance force would therefore appear essential to Australia's defence interests.

THE CONCEPT

General

The concept is to raise on a phased basis an Army reserve territorial land surveillance force of around 3500 men which would provide seven Regiments of three operational squadrons, each squadron containing 20 patrols of six men. The force would be recruited and trained by SASR in a phased programme taking two years from the time recruiting was completed. Patrols would be raised and trained in their region of responsibility where possible. Patrol areas would encompass some 30 km of coastline by about 100 km in depth. Precise locations would be established by SASR operational staff on Regimental Headquarters co-located with each Military District Headquarters, after a land appreciation and detailed reconnaissance within each State. The reconnaissance would include likely beaches, airfields, ports and roads that could be used by landing parties of all types transported by ships, hovercraft, submarine or aircraft as appropriate. Observation of airfields and key roads in the hinterland would be done by mobile patrols or patrols not in the immediate or likely combat zone, which could be re-deployed into depth locations. Training and exercises would amount to some 60 days per year and overall costs of raising and equipping the force would be of the order of $10m or .004% of the defence budget. Costs would be halved if it was decided to provide a surveillance force for Northern Australia only.

Modus Operandi

Penetration of the patrol area by refugees, illegal immigrants or smugglers could be dealt with by the patrol or by civilian authorities reacted to the scene by the patrol. Penetration by terrorist groups (depending on numbers) would be dealt with by quick reaction troops, preferably parachute trained who would be briefed whilst airborne and jump into the terrorist location on a drop zone manned by patrol elements. Lodgements of conventional forces or the passage of enemy aircraft overhead would see patrols remain in situ and continually reporting on the enemy build-up using high speed secure, burst transmission HF radio transmission facilities, which are difficult to locate and jam. Patrols would remain in their locations as stay behinds to report on the logistic and force build-up. They would direct, through the placement of beacon transponders F11 or missile strikes on to targets of high tactical or possibly strategic importance (100,000 ton oil tankers etc.). Patrols not in the lodgement area could be re-deployed at night by light aircraft, vehicle, motor cycle, animal or water craft, to pre-arranged depth locations on probable enemy axes of advance, where they would continue reporting on the enemy breakout and advance. Additional harassment operations such as demolition of bridges, railways, water supplies and power stations could be carried out by patrols using time pencil charges on prepared demolitions or by precision guided missiles and remotely piloted vehicles. Over the years, some patrols within Squadrons could form the nucleus of a guerrilla organization, whose activities would be tied in closely with the Land Force Commander's overall design for battle.

Resupply

This would be from caches with limited night air-drop of urgent spares or specialized weaponry. As only limited mobility within patrol areas of responsibility would be required, the cache system would be quite simple to work.

Air Early Warning

Patrols could also provide a simple and effective early warning observation screen to the Area Air Defence Commander, of enemy air penetrations, as part of a proposed National Air Defence System. Possibly some of the costs of raising the force could thereby be shared by RAAF.

Peace Time Activities

In peace as part of the training process, patrols would provide information on topography, infrastructure and survival potential as input into a data base to be maintained by Headquarters of Military
Districts. The data bases would enhance the present Military Directory system of information compilation and could be transferred to Defence computer to assist in war planning and administration.

Considerable potential also exists for Surveillance Regiments to enhance the capability of the Natural Disasters Organization. Their training, mobility and communications could be of considerable assistance in providing rapid damage assessment reports on cyclones, fire, flood etc., if required.

**Patrol Composition**

Patrol members would be selected by SASR selection teams from the following civilian occupations where possible:

- **Police/Customs.** This member would have legal powers of arrest or apprehension in situations short of hostilities such as illegal immigration, drug running etc. The policeman, because of his disciplinary and leadership training could be the most suited to command the patrol.

- **Telecommunications.** The telecom member would have a sound knowledge of all the various civilian communication facilities available to the patrol in its area of responsibility, as a back-up to the patrol military radio. He would normally require minimal military radio training in order to transmit surveillance information to his squadron headquarters.

- **Demolition.** A representative from a mining concern, main roads department or any other industry using demolitions would be an ideal choice to provide demolition expertise for the harassment role in regard to port, bridge, power and water supply destruction. Again there would be minimal military training required.

- **Port and Airfield Authorities.** Where possible, it would be useful to have a patrol member with a good working knowledge of ports and shipping, airfields and aircraft in both the surveillance and harassing roles.

- **Medical.** This soldier would come from a local hospital or medical facility and provide the medical coverage for the patrol, as casualty evacuation may not be possible in stay behind situations.

- **Station Managers, Stockmen and Aboriginals.** These men would provide the bush ‘know how’ for survival in hostile terrain.

- **Vehicle Mechanics/Animal Veterinary Surgeons.** They would provide expertise for patrol vehicle repair or animal care where horses or camels might provide the best means of all round patrol mobility.

The range of skills discussed would merely require supplementing by SASR experts to fit the military requirement. Training time on specialist skills would be considerably reduced, which would allow most effort to go into the vital aspects of patrol techniques, information collection and survival.

**Training of Patrons**

There would be no intention or need to train patrols in the wide variety of techniques and additional skills required by SASR, who have to be capable of operating at very short notice in any terrain within our region in a wider range of roles and tasks. Rather the object is to train a part-time surveillance patrol operating in familiar terrain, requiring limited mobility, comparatively few military skills and using simple but effective equipment.

Training of Army Reserve surveillance patrols would be conducted by SASR patrols on a phased basis. Some twenty SAS patrols acting as a mobile wing would train in a ten week period up to sixty reserve patrols. Training would be conducted each night, on weekends and during the tenth week, full-time. On completion of the initial training, patrols would be set exercises of an information collection or surveillance nature working in accordance with the requirements of the Military Directory. The results would be forwarded by radio and follow-up written report in a standardized format to the Squadron Headquarters and then to the Regimental Headquarters at the Military District. From there it could go to the Defence Central agency responsible for wartime administration and planning. Data could be maintained on Defence computer, readily available to commanders and staffs for training and operations planning purposes. Patrols would be tested by Army, RAAF, RAN and civilian air penetration of the coastline, by RAN submarine and patrol boat activity, by
amphibious landings and by parachute drops into patrol surveillance areas. These activities could all be tied into the normal regular and reserve force planned exercises through the Joint Exercise Planning Group. Each SASR patrol member would be responsible for the training of three to four reserve members in his particular skill, e.g. communications, demolitions etc. The SASR patrol member could retain correspondence contact with his former students on completion of the ten week period. Priority areas for the first sixty Army Reserve patrols would be the Pilbara and Kimberley areas of Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Northern Queensland. Training would be hard, constant and conducted from simple patrol base camps located outside town areas. A surveillance force for Northern Australia could be in being within twelve months from recruitment of the force and would take a further year for the rest of Australia, should the requirement exist.

**Equipment Requirements**

**Personal Equipment.** This would be limited to a pack, compass, personal weapon, knife, sleeping equipment, binoculars, a patrol hand-held radar (tested on LONG VIGIL) and a laser range finder.

**Communications.** Each patrol would have an F3 high frequency man pack radio with high speed burst and code facility. This would provide secure, sophisticated and hard to detect communications to a base station up to 1500 km away. The base station could be a fixed communication installation anywhere in the State which would remain open at all times and communicate on a broadcast system. A ground/air radio would be required and a miniaturised beacon transponder for harassment and air drop tasks. Battery charging would be done by a solar system already proven on LONG VIGIL.

Camels used as a mode of transport during an exercise in Western Australia.
Transport. Local transport would be used to suit the conditions of the area. These could include motor cycles, four wheel drive vehicles, bicycles, horses, camels, inflatable watercraft, powercraft, yachts, civilian light aircraft or a combination. For the most part, patrols would provide their own transport and be reimbursed fuel and maintenance costs.

Command and Control
Twenty patrols would be commanded by a regular officer squadron commander, preferably a SAS troop commander on reposting from SASR. Three squadrons would compose the operational component of the regiment and the RHQ would be co-located normally with the Military District Headquarters. There would be two regiments for Western Australia, one for each of the other States and an independent squadron for Tasmania. The second regiment in WA would have its RHQ at Karratha or Derby. Regiments would be raised and trained by Director Special Action Forces and then placed under command of Military Districts, with Director Special Action Forces retaining technical control thereafter.

Logistic Support
During peace, patrols would be supplied by Military Districts through a small squadron logistics staff. Caches would be sited and prepared, ready for operational use. During operations, patrols would live from their caches for up to three months. Limited re-supply of urgent items would be undertaken at night using army or civil aircraft operating from bush airfields. Aircraft would fly blacked out to the patrol beacon transponder and be in the patrol area for no longer than 30 seconds. Fuel could be cached in bladders or on trucks camouflaged and pre-positioned in the field. Fuel vehicles could move to a safe air strip at night for refuelling of light aircraft and patrol vehicles. Complete vehicles or motor cycles could be airdropped at night direct to patrols or to a safe area for onward movement to the patrol. All these techniques have been proved on LONG VIGIL. Camels could provide another source of re-supply in some inaccessible areas with their pay load of 700 lb per animal, ease of training (three weeks), quietness, and simplicity of upkeep.

Costs
A force of around 3500 men would cost of the order of $6m annually in pay. A further $4m would be required for personal equipment, radios, transponders, rations and maintenance. Annual recurring costs would be of the order of $8m. If it was decided that Northern Australia required the priority of effort, costs could be halved.

Manpower
Should the Government not accede to a Reserve increase of 3500 men, it could be cost effective to disband a number of the least efficient reserve units to provide the necessary manpower for the surveillance force. The high percentage of male adults aged between 18-45 years, resident in Northern Australia between Karratha and Cape York, provide an Army Reserve recruiting base of 16,000 men. This base is expanding. The remainder of the Australian coastal population provide ample recruit potential. If only the northern half of Australia required a surveillance force, manpower requirements could be halved.

Nomenclature
Units would be named after their State, for example, ‘The Royal Western Australia Surveillance Regiment’ or ‘The Royal Western Australia Bushmen Scouts’. Squadrons would be named after the area in which they operated; viz. the ‘Kimberley Squadron etc. This would encourage both local and State esprit de corps in squadrons and regiments.

CONCLUSION
Defence contingencies facing the forces in the future are likely to include policing of the 200 NMEZ, widespread terrorism inspired from overseas, lodgement or invasion. Whilst forces are adequate now for general surveillance (but not total) of the 200 NMEZ, expansion of the Army up to 250,000 men could be necessary in a widespread terrorist or more serious situation. The defence preparation time to raise a force of this size could take up to eight years and up to four years for a force of 150,000 men. However, the preparation time available to Governments since World War II has been of the order of only three to twelve months. The Australian Defence Force will almost certainly find itself short of preparation time and will have to fight with what it has available at the time. Success in land operations under these conditions can only be attained through a superb land surveillance system which will provide sufficient information to CDFS to
allow the immediate commitment of his regular forces and the Reserve to the right location at the right time.

Maritime surveillance, satellites, radar and our present land surveillance capacity cannot provide this information completely. Therefore, we should establish a land based surveillance force, raised and trained by SASR and placed under command of Military Districts, with technical control exercised by Director Special Action Forces.

Training sixty patrols at a time over a ten week period, with simple in-service equipments, the force could be in being within two years of recruitment, or within twelve months if priority is given to northern Australia.

The raising of an Army Reserve national land surveillance force of up to seven regiments, territorially based, will provide the country with a guaranteed, high grade information, intelligence and harassment organization. In peace it will provide a means for the rapid compilation of a comprehensive data bank of topographical and key point information of vital importance to the conduct of land operations. It would assist the Natural Disasters Organization in disaster assessment and other Government Departments in the policing of the coast against drug runners, illegal immigrants, refugees etc.

In terrorist and higher scale contingencies, it will provide the instant information required by our small defence force to enable quick reaction and, as such, provides us with a good chance of defeating an enemy before he can really take hold and possibly amass world opinion behind him. The capability to inflict heavy damage through harassment operations and to provide early warning of enemy air penetration of our air space to area air defence commanders are other important capabilities.

For a cost of between 1/250th and 1/500th of the annual defence vote, the raising of such a force makes sound economic and military sense.

NOTES
1. Defence of Australia — Fundamental New Aspects
Dear Friend,

From a distant place I hear stories of your present struggle to define the enemy threat. I am compelled to write to you. My hesitations, persistent as they are, caution prudence whereas my circumstances press me hard and demand expression. I live in a world of lost opportunities; where the cost of ignorance has been bondage, where the criminal charge “inadequate preparation” echoes in my ears. As a prisoner among the ghosts of this, the graveyard of Asia, my only liberty is reflection, my only relief the stolen word, my only hope a warning heeded.

How did I come to this? My friend, you know me of old and maybe from a distance you saw more clearly. I wish I could explain what happened, but today I struggle to reconstruct the now blurred images of yesteryear.

I think the first warning we had concerning the enemy threat came before independence. How we argued as to the best way to break the nexus between our own views as to how best to defend ourselves and the views of those, both ally and opponent, who crowded in on us. In the end we profited little by this debate. We became more concerned with the means rather than the end and, in the process, we weakened the fabric of our society and damaged the prestige of our armed forces.

Finally, of course, we broke through to independence. We shook off the ties that had bound us for so long, and with a shout that belied our inner lack of confidence, we announced to the world at large that we were, at last, in firm control of our own destiny. Unfortunately, with the long struggle over, our chauvinism and our new freedom got the better of our judgement and, with some relief, we turned our minds to other, non-military matters. You might remember how very quickly we dropped our guard. We laid up our hard-won colours, we dispersed our legions, we pensioned off so much of our experience to the campaigns of peace.

Mind you we rationalised our losses. We accepted that the cost of social progress is purchased against the account of preparedness; we agreed for the time being to a return to the mundane tasks of peacetime soldiering. For some of us it was a welcome relief, after all, we had had a pretty torrid time, and besides our leaders and the public had turned their minds to other things.

I try now to recall when it was I fell captive to these seductions, when I, along with my colleagues, simply didn’t bother any more. Try as I will, I cannot recall.

However, I do remember the calls for self-reliance, the inroads of economy, the competition of other priorities, the inwardness of spirit. From time to time, my conscience stirred me and I made a special effort. I got stuck into things but, like fitness campaigns in mid-adolescence, it didn’t last. Besides, who cared?

When the grim realities of our actual circumstances did force themselves upon us, how we struggled to make up for lost time. Despite the critics and the divisions, despite the scorn that was heaped upon our efforts, despite our past neglect and our then inadequacies, we turned our country upside down. We curtailed our liberties, we conscripted our manpower, we poured out our treasures and we bled, oh how we bled! Not just us, of course, but some of our friends and many of our enemies. In the end to what account, we had left it too late, and we lost. The victor paraded through our streets and suburbs, all that we cherished was buried in the dust and the world at large condemned us to the long march of the vanquished.

That was the first enemy — neglect.

The second enemy was more elusive. Somehow we got ourselves lost during our search for “the threat”. I don’t suppose this
surprises you very much. You know how im­
portant it is in some societies for the politicians, 
the soldiers and the public to be able to identify 
the threat. What a time we had — some people 
argued that there was no point in spending 
money if you couldn’t prove who it was you 
were expected to fight; others just argued; some 
of us relied heavily, too heavily I am afraid, 
upon historical analogy. Then the question of 
timing came into it — some proved conclusively 
that the threat would not appear before a cer­
tain date, others worked out how long it would 
take us to get ready and then added a safety 
margin. Yet others complicated the whole 
business no end by talking about the help we 
would get from our friends, and that proved to 
be the most confounding argument of them all. 

For my part, I watched it all as an “expert”. 
I helped pour our history, our geography, our 
circumstances, our preoccupations, our 
assessments into the mould of national wisdom. 
At times the likely contenders for “threat” 
seemed obvious — our traditional enmities fed 
by passing events and fanned with suspicion 
and ignorance created a sense of direction that 
locked us, it would seem, upon a collision 
course. Then something would happen, 
generally unexpectedly, and the momentum of 
the obvious would be lost and my friend we 
would be thrown into utter confusion. What is 
more pitiful than a professional without an 
am? Worse still, our detractors would seize 
upon our confusion and batter us with ridicule 
until we stole meekly away or redoubled our ef­
forts on fresh assessments. 

Well I recall the preparation and discussion 
of these assessments, all based upon the best in­
formation available. Well I remember the 
theories, the claims, the twists, the com­
promises as we each scrambled to amend the 
draft. Sometimes it would seem Armageddon 
was upon us, other times when we were confi­
dent or it was politically “quiet”, we could 
banish the final battle to the distant future 
merely by the scratch of a pen. (I should add 
there were plenty of other experts, and I did 
discover that eventually they could be 
distracted to other matters.) 

How regrettable and finally fatal this myopia 
that obscured our assessments. The ob­
viousness of our course was only apparent 
afterwards. No doubt if we had been more 
sceptical we would have sought ways to help 
demolish the fiction we helped create. 

My friend, you will say that I am arguing the 
case for no assessment at all. Of course not. 
Rather I am arguing that a Government, con­
scious of the dangers of fallibility, must have a 
sufficient platform upon which to build prudent 
and purposeful action. In my view, the 
lessons of history and the realities of present 
day circumstances leave no other conclusion 
than that one day your people, like so many 
others before them, will have to pay a terrible 
price to protect what they value so highly. 
Frankly, I can see little evidence that you have 
come to a similar conclusion. 

This, then, was our second enemy — ig­
norance. In the end we had no idea of who it 
was we were to fight. 

The third enemy, the most dangerous of 
them all, was confidence. I don’t know why we 
had so much difficulty with this. Maybe we 
were encouraged by our long association with 
war, most of the time fighting to support 
another’s interest, maybe we took it for granted 
that our powerful friends would sort it all out 
certainly, on no account, did we think we 
or they could possibly lose. Maybe we just 
opted out. Some of us, I recall, found refuge in 
the belief that those who made the decisions 
were not only aware of the problems but they 
had the solutions as well. I don’t really know 
what went wrong — whatever the reasons we 
deluded ourselves. 

Probably by now you are becoming a little 
impatient with my letter — saying, if I read you 
right, you know all this, that you have spent 
the best years of your life in the service of your 
country. 

I would create an enemy, although you will 
have some difficulty as to his name. If you call 
him the “Phantom”, people will say he doesn’t 
exist, he will be seen merely as a figment of 
your imagination; if you call him the “Ag­
gressor”, people will brand you a “Cold War 
Warrior”; if you call him by nationality, you 
could well alienate future friends, and anyhow 
you will find your assessments will fluctuate. 
No, my friend, just call him the Enemy. Most 
of your people will understand that. To drive 
home the point you might expand a little and 
call him the Inevitable Enemy or even just In­
evitability. 

Frankly, I don’t think his name matters very 
much. I suggest you leave the labels to someone 
else — by the time it comes to fighting you will 
know who he is well enough. In the meantime,
your enemy has to be real, he has to be identifiable.

How to describe him? I think you could credit him with certain motives — whether by design or accident, enemies are going to be drawn by the attractions your country has to offer — whether these be resources or opportunity or space or food or status or wealth, whether the motives be ideological or fear or envy or malice, eventually someone will challenge you. Who is or will be the someone? Does it matter?

How will he challenge? Well, I encourage you, the professional, to give your earnest attention to that subject. For a start, you could make some pretty basic assumptions — you could assume that the enemy has to think the gamble would be worth it; you could assume the rate of change in both technology and methodology will accelerate, and you could also assume that you will be placed, at least initially, at a disadvantage. From these assumptions, and others, you could draw certain conclusions, and I know that in some of your manuals you have already done this.

Where I strike a difficulty is with your propensity to react rather than initiate. Would it not be more profitable to decide how you intend to fight rather than chase through the possible options available to any number of possible enemies. Certainly keep abreast of possible techniques, certainly keep your options open, but certainly also stop chasing ground. Maybe your close study could drag you back to some of those old principles of war, and under surprise you might list technical superiority and mobility and secrecy, and under security you might list dispersion and speed and surveillance, and under offensive action you might list all of these again.

Maybe then your enemy will take shape and maybe your people will come to believe that that enemy, and the threat represented, is real.

I wish you well,

Your old friend.
THE facts of history are frequently used to justify present day beliefs and attitudes. However, we often fail to ask what is the truth of history. E. H. Carr claims that the facts of history "are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use — these factors being of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch!" The numerous histories written on the events leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor provide us with the opportunity to see how Carr's fishermen work. Thus I have chosen eight of these texts for this purpose.

The earliest of the chosen texts is Herbert Feis' *The Road to Pearl Harbour*. In this book Feis begins his labours with the advantage of hindsight and sets out to build his road to Pearl Harbour. Using documents, records, official records, newspapers and personal diaries dealing with Japanese-American relations between 1937 and 1941, he narrows in on Japan's foreign policies and America's counter policies during this period.

The China Incident of 1937 and the American failure to take action over it are seen as the beginning of the Pearl Harbor Road. "The last good chance to work out a stable settlement between China and Japan was lost in 1937". From here on Feis' road twists and turns as it travels past the Tripartite Pact, the growing demand within the American Government for action against Japan, the move into northern Indo-China, the beginning of American economic sanctions, the Russian Neutrality Pact, the drawing together of America and Britain, the move into Southern Indo-China, the freezing of Japanese funds and the oil embargo. Feis selects his evidence in such a way as to build up tension as his road reaches its goal.

At the same time he looks behind the actions of each country in an attempt to show the problems and issues each country had to face in the formation of its foreign policy. Feis looks at the role played by the army in Japanese politics and maintains that the army's power over the cabinet prevented the conclusion of any agreement with the United States. He also sees the rigidity of Secretary of State Hull as being
THE HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO PEARL HARBOR

Another part of the reason for the failure of agreement being reached.

Feis' overall aim is to present his book as building up to the climax of Pearl Harbor. He chooses the breakdown in Japanese-American relations as the road leading to this climax and selects his facts accordingly.

Paul Schroeder in The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations\(^4\) sets out to present two revisionist hypotheses in his explanation of the origins of the Pacific War. The two hypotheses are firstly that the Tripartite Pact had little influence on the formation of American policy in the critical period between July and December 1941 and secondly that by making withdrawal from China the main obstacle in Japanese-American relations, America was demanding too much of Japan and thus lost its chance to win peace in the Pacific.\(^6\)

To support his first claim Schroeder argues that by late 1941 there were strong signs that the Axis Alliance was in fact rapidly becoming a dead issue because of the Japanese decision to ignore German-American clashes in the Atlantic.\(^7\)

Furthermore, Schroeder claims that Japan was willing to meet the United States more than half way in bringing about negotiations.\(^8\) The American response, however, was to disregard the declining nature of the Axis Alliance and to concentrate on the other issues, which she considered to be the real obstacles to a restoration of normal relations.\(^9\)

This leads to the second of Schroeder's themes, that withdrawal from China was demanding too much of Japan and thus brought about the war. Schroeder marshals impressive evidence to suggest that Japan could not withdraw from China without creating grave internal problems at home.\(^10\) Thus he concludes that American policy was too hard and rigid for the purpose of solving the problem of Japanese-American relation.\(^11\)

Although Schroeder does not subscribe to "the backdoor theory"\(^12\) on the origins of the Pacific War, he does maintain that America missed the chance to ensure peace at this stage by concentrating on China as the main obstacle to Japanese-American relations.

Another historian who sees the Tripartite Pact as being of small importance as a cause of the Pacific War is David Lu, author of From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor.\(^13\) As his title suggests Lu sees the China Incident as a very significant issue in the coming of the war. In his book Lu sets out with the aim of tracing Japanese foreign policy from this point in 1937 through to the decision for war in 1941. Lu's main source of information is the Archives of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Essentially a diplomatic history, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbour is written as descriptive history. Lu's method of recording history is to follow Japan's foreign policy through the issues of the Sino-Japanese War, the Tripartite Pact, the Russian Neutrality Treaty, the move south and the negotiations with America. During the course of this narrative Lu emphasises the role of the Japanese army and the peculiar system of Government that gave the military high command an unshakeable grip on the development and execution of national policy.\(^14\) In supporting this claim he outlines the army's part in bringing about the China Incident\(^15\) and in taking control of diplomatic relations with Germany.\(^16\) Furthermore, woven into Lu's description of Japan's foreign policy is an account of the importance of the China issue to foreign affairs, especially in regard to those with America.

A book which has been described as complementary\(^17\) to Lu's is Robert Buttow's Tojo and the Coming of the War. Buttow draws his information from a variety of sources, the most important being the published documents on Japanese foreign affairs, the records of the International Military Tribunal and numerous interviews conducted by the author with former Japanese leaders and Tojo's lawyers at the Tokyo trials.\(^18\) In addition various other primary and secondary sources are used.

Butow's aim is to describe the part played by the Japanese army in the events leading to war as seen through the career of General Tojo. The method he uses is to examine the role of the army in bringing about the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the China Incident in 1937 and eventually the Pacific War in 1941. At the
same time Butow pays particular attention to
the activities of the army in directing the course
of Japanese foreign policy and its efforts to
establish its influence within the Japanese
government during the 1930s through
assassination and terror. Through these means
Butow demonstrates how the Japanese army
was able to be in such a position of power in
1941.

This issue of power or rather the decision
making process in Japan is one of Butow's
frequent concerns, but, unfortunately he fails
to give it thorough analysis and is content with
generalizations such as the following: "The
Japan of which General Hideki Tojo became
premier was operated by remote control. It was
a country in which puppet politics had reached
a high state of development, to the detriment of
the national welfare. The ranking members of
the military services were the robots of their
subordinates — the so-called chicken shoko,
the nucleus group, which was active at the
center and which was composed largely of field
grade officers". Despite his failure to come to
grips with the problem of decision making,
Butow does present Tojo as a victim of this
process and not as an oriental Hitler.

Although Butow describes the same events as
Lu, he sees them from a different angle and
therefore presents different interpretations. For
instance, by concentrating on the power of the
military in Japan, Butow concludes that
Premier Konoye's attempt to meet with
Roosevelt was doomed to failure from the
beginning because Konoye could not control
the army; a conclusion which differs from
Lu's. On the other hand where Lu, as a result
of concentrating on Japan's foreign relations,
sees the Tripartite Pact as not being a major
cause of the war, Buttow maintains the
opposite.

Nobutaka Ike's book Japan's Decision for
War is essentially a translation of the records
of the 1941 Japanese Policy Conferences. The
major aim of the book is to describe Japan's
highest decision making organs and their
discussions of Japanese-American relations.
Ike's sources are the notes written after the
Policy Conferences by the secretaries of the
Army Chief of Staff. Consequently in his
introduction Ike warns his reader that these
notes no doubt represent a certain amount of
pro-army bias. Although Ike's main concern with the book is that of translating and editing these notes, he also presents an introductory chapter explaining the background to the events of 1941 and a short comment at the beginning of the notes on each Conference. Thus there are three ways in which Ike's interpretations come into the book. Firstly, in any translation there is the possibility that the translator will write his own views into the translation. This is especially in the case of the Conference notes because the notes contain many gaps and puzzling remarks. Secondly while editing the notes Ike omits those from the first eighteen Conferences on the grounds that they concern mainly South-East Asian and not American relations. Moreover in editing the notes on the five Imperial Conferences Ike rearranges the order of presentation. This no doubt could give a distorted view of the evidence to be found in the notes. Finally through his introductory chapter and commentary Ike directs his reader's attention to what he considers to be the main significance of the Conference notes.

One of Ike's overall themes is that there are
definite limits to the effectiveness of threats
used by one nation to deter another nation
from pursuing a certain course of action. To
illustrate this theme Ike emphasises in his
commentary the determination of Japan not to
bend to American pressure. Two examples of
this guiding of the reader's attention by Ike are:

"The key point in this document was the
decision to carry on negotiations with the
United States and simultaneously prepare
for war. If negotiations were not successful
by the last ten days of October, Japan would
go to war." "It (the American response to Proposal B)
called for the complete withdrawal of
Japanese troops from Indo-China and
China, the abandonment of extraterritorial
rights in China, and so on. It was regarded
by Japan as an ultimatum. The decision
makers in Tokyo assumed that the end of the
road had been reached as far as negotiations
were concerned and attention was now
focused completely on the war that was
about to break out."

Even though the bulk of Ike's book consists
of primary sources the hand of the historian is
still evident in interpreting these sources.
In David Bergamini’s *Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy* the historian’s hand is more than evident in interpreting the events of history. With this book we have an excellent example of what E. H. Carr calls the Bad King John theory of history. Bergamini has two aims; the first is to prove that Emperor Hirohito led Japan to war with the West and the second is to prove that in defeat a massive effort was made to obscure the Emperor’s role in the war. *Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy* is based on sources that are both numerous and impressive. Bergamini’s case against the Emperor, however, rests on three particular sources. These are the Sugiyana Memoranda, the Kido Diary and oral statements from persons who insist on remaining anonymous.

The method Bergamini uses is to weave a pattern of conspiracy into the events leading up to the Pacific War. But before beginning his labours, Bergamini arouses the emotions of his reader by describing the case of Matsue Iwane, the poor, unfortunate, little general who according to the author is forced to take the “rap” for the Emperor in the rape of Nanking. Thus having established Hirohito as his arch villain Bergamini presents his case.

The conspiracy is alleged to have begun during Crown Prince Hirohito’s grand tour in 1921. Bergamini infers that Hirohito first met the men who were to help him to wage war, at this time and also that during his visits to Singapore and Hong Kong he devised the plans for the later invasions of these places. With Hirohito’s succession to the throne in 1926, Bergamini alleges that the young Emperor was very closely linked with early Japanese attempts to expand into Manchuria and that he was personally involved in the planning of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Claims are also made that the many assassinations and the terror of the 1930s were the weapons used by Hirohito to control the course of Japanese politics. Among other incidents cited as being the handiwork of Hirohito are the China Incident of 1937, the Pearl Harbor raid and even the Bataan Death March. Finally Bergamini maintains that when defeat became imminent Hirohito was party to an incredible plot to hide his part in the war.

As evidence for these claims Bergamini used three sources mentioned already or perhaps it would be better to say misuses them. In his obsession to implicate the Emperor in a conspiracy Bergamini dismisses an impressive body of scholarship on the subject and conveniently slights all documentary evidence contradicting his thesis. Instead he relies mainly on anonymous sources who if uncovered would deny the statements attributed to them or else he relies on his own translation and consequent interpretation of the Sugiyama Memoranda or the Kido Diary. However, according to Shumpei Okamoto, Bergamini mistranslates various parts of these documents and thus draws the conclusions from them which in fact have no basis. Thus one is led to agree with Professor James Crowley’s comment that *Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy* is believable only by violating every cannon of acceptable documentation.

So far in this article little has been said about the importance of the background of the historian in the writing of history. Bergamini’s early life in Japanese P.O.W. camp no doubt has some relation to his charges against Hirohito. In regards the other historians, already discussed, nothing has really been said about their backgrounds. This is mainly because all have been Western or western educated historians and tend to subscribe to similar ideological interpretations of history. Leonid Kutakov is a Soviet Historian and thus has a different ideological approach to history. It is regrettable that his work over abounds with Marxist terminology, however, it is still important because it shows how a writer from another background writes history.

His book *Japanese Foreign Policy* traces the development of Japanese policy during the years leading up to the war. Moreover, the book presents the thesis that the Western Powers encouraged the Axis Alliance because they believed it was directed against the Soviet Union, only to find themselves caught in a war when they couldn’t reach agreement with the Axis.

*Japanese Foreign Policy* is written in the form of four essays, which provide a solid examination of Japan’s relations with Germany, Britain, the Soviet Union and America. Unfortunately Kutakov also insists on presenting his case against Britain and the United States in the course of the examination. In proving his case Kutakov concentrates on a very limited number of sources and ignores the significant body of information on Japan’s foreign rela-
tions. The fact that Kutakov’s case is more politcized history than political history can be seen by examining one of his claims: “Germany calculated such an alliance (with Japan) could be effected without opposition from Great Britain, France and the United States by cloaking it in the flag of anti-Communism.” Such a statement is rather hard to swallow. Surely, any threat of alliance between Germany and Japan, the two emerging militarist powers of the time would have been seen by the West as a threat no matter under what slogans they tried to disguise their alliance.

The last book to be discussed in this article is Stephen Pelz’s Race to Pearl Harbor. This book gives a rather different interpretation of the origins of the Pacific War than do the more traditional writers or those of the revisionist school. Pelz’s basic aim is to demonstrate that the breakdown of the disarmament negotiations led to an exhausting naval race, which in turn influenced Japan’s decision for War. While concentrating on this thesis Pelz claims that the naval race was only among the many reasons for the war.

Race to Pearl Harbor is based on three main sources of information. These are the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States’ State Department records and the archives of the British Cabinet, Foreign Office and Admiralty. In addition various other primary and secondary sources are used.

Like Feis, Pelz uses the crescendo method of writing history. But unlike Feis, who concentrates on the negotiations of 1940-41, Pelz focuses in on the long-term causes of the war. The first part of his book deals comprehensively with the pre-naval Conference policies of the Japanese navy and then those of the United States and Britain. He emphasises the faction fights within the Japanese navy over an arms buildup and also the navy’s use of the media in campaigning for the abrogation of the earlier Washington Naval Treaty. From here Pelz goes on to describe the negotiations at the Second London Naval Conference. His conclusion on Japan seems to be that she was playing along the International Conference, while preparing to go her own way. With the failure of the Conference, the race is on. Pelz now pays particular attention to the economic and political difficulties of the United States and Britain in entering the naval race. However once the United States enters the naval race, Japan realizes that “the new American naval program threatened to extinguish all hope for a Japanese victory by late 1943 or early 1944. Consequently, the leaders of the Japanese navy decided to strike while they had enough ships to carry out their strategy.”

Pelz also presents some interesting views on various historical figures. He sees Roosevelt as “neither an evil conspirator, nor a far-sighted statesman but rather a hard-pressed politician whose difficulties with Congress led to a fateful delay in American naval building.” Yamamoto is described at the time of the Conference as a “middle-ranking naval officer of promise.” Overall Pelz’s book is important because it represents a swing away from the traditional histories on this period in that it approaches the issues from a new angle.

Thus one can see that the history of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor can be approached from different viewpoints. The Feis-Lu-Butow-Ike school, the traditionalists see this period in terms of the rise of militarism in Japan, Japanese expansionism and the failure of negotiations. According to Schroeder, a revisionist, the rigidity of the American position on China was the critical issue in these events. Bergamini attributes the Pacific War to grand conspiracy by Hirohito while, the Soviet historian, Kutakov maintains that it resulted from Western encouragement of the Axis Alliance in the belief that it was directed against the Soviet. Finally Pel describes the origins of the war in terms of an arms race.

Hence we can return to Carr’s metaphor and conclude that historians “are like fishermen who catch facts like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean.”

NOTES
3. ibid, p.16.
4. ibid, p.75.
7. Schroeder, op. cit. p.61.
8. ibid, p.93.
9. ibid., p.61.
10. ibid., p.179.
15. Ibid., p.45-55.
16. Ibid., p. viii.
26. Ibid., p.xxv.
27. Ibid., p.xiv.
28. Ibid., p.xxvi.
29. Ibid, p.129.
30. Ibid., p.257.
32. Carr, op.cit., p.46.
34. Ibid., p.8-10.
35. Ibid, p.316.
36. Ibid., p.317.
37. Ibid., p.875.
38. Ibid., p.352.
39. Ibid., p.430.
40. Ibid., p.510.
41. Ibid., p.687.
42. Ibid., p.816.
43. Ibid., p.909.
44. Ibid., p.729.
45. Ibid., p.xxxvi.
50. Ibid., p.327.
51. Ibid., p.328.
52. Kutakov, op.cit., p.3.
54. Ibid., p.4.
55. Ibid., p.230.
56. Ibid., p.40.
57. Ibid., p.63.
60. Ibid., p.5.
61. Ibid., p.133.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue are available in various defence libraries:
German Military Uniforms and Insignia 1933-1945, WE Books, Connecticut, USA.
Raven, Alan, and Roberts, John, Man O’War, Brooklyn, RSV Publications.
Wing Commander J. D. M. Edwards  
Royal Australian Air Force

AUSTRALIA's defence policy has changed markedly in recent years. The doctrine of "forward defence" has been discarded in favour of concepts based principally on regional influences and the need for increased self-reliance in defence. Past policies both anticipated and resulted in combined military operations with allies. As a result, many of our strategic and tactical concepts were imported; philosophical as well as physical compatibility being a natural consequence of dependent policies.

Now that an independent policy is in force there is a need to re-assess the conceptual basis upon which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is founded. This article is the result of a re-evaluation of the role of air power in the Australian environment. It begins with an examination of the fundamental influences which have been attributed to the use of air power, and concludes that much greater emphasis should now be placed on our air defences.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE

Evidence of the defence policy of a government can be found in the structure and capabilities of its military forces, but change is more readily rendered in policy than in force characteristics. Limited funds for purchases, remaining life of equipment in service, and long lead-times for acquisitions — all militate against rapid physical adjustment to new policy. So, for some years to come, the ADF will continue to exhibit characteristics which were acquired under ‘forward defence' concepts.

This is not to suggest that the ADF of today is not an appropriate instrument of the new policy. Although previously emphasis was given to forward defence, contingencies which involved defence of continental Australia were not discounted. But a pronounced policy change has occurred, and the possibility does exist that it should be followed by an equally marked revision in force structure and capabilities.

The determination of the most appropriate composition of a defence force is difficult in the absence of a clearly perceived threat. However, the role of the ADF is clear — to deter aggression. To assume that a potential aggressor would choose to use against us the most economical means, assured of positive results, seems reasonable. Accordingly, an analysis of vulnerability, and particularly those areas of weakness which could be exploited at little cost and to our greatest disadvantage, can lead to the identification of force structure adjustments needed to create a truly deterrent force.

This article will provide such an analysis to determine the role of air power in the Australian defence environment. In so doing, it will begin with a summary of ‘traditional' concepts of aerial strategy, and how they have been tested in practice. The relevance of these concepts to Australian circumstances will then be assessed, in order to show which should influence the characteristics to be acquired by the Defence Force.
CONCEPTS OF AERIAL STRATEGY

The greatest single influence on the development of philosophy for the employment of air power was the Italian General Giulio Douhet. He was the first to articulate a comprehensive, integrated and coherent body of doctrine concerning air warfare. The principles he established and the conclusions he reached, still predominate in modern aerial strategies.

Yet Douhet has many detractors. In his book *Fighter*, Len Deighton asserts that the Battle of Britain proved Douhet’s concepts to have been wrong:

“...Douhet’s name is still honored, despite the fact that he was wrong on so many important issues.”

Less unkindly, Bernard Brodie suggests that “we can retain his conclusions while discarding his reasoning.”

Brodie does, however, praise Douhet, ranking him as a strategist equal in stature to Clausewitz and Mahan.

The writings of Douhet were published between the two World Wars. Since his philosophy was much influenced by his observations on World War I, there could be sufficient justification for rejection on the grounds of obsolescence alone. Yet such an argument has not been raised against him — instead, his critics invariably cite the failure of his concepts in practical application.

To proceed to examine notions which have been so thoroughly debunked may seem fruitless. But, as Deighton notes, although Douhet was a powerful influence before World War II, he was much quoted, but little read. So perhaps the problem was that he was poorly interpreted. Indeed, as the following summary of his thesis will show, Douhet’s philosophy has never been properly tested, and thus could still be relevant.

DOUHET’S CONCEPTS

The dominant theme of Douhet’s writings was the need for independent air forces. He wrote at a time when Italian air power was, as in other countries, regarded as only an adjunct to land and naval forces. This he said, constrained the potential of a flexible and powerful weapon. An independent and effective aerial strategy could only be realized if an air arm was constituted autonomously.

To support this contention, he showed that air power used as an auxiliary to either land or naval forces could achieve only limited objectives — those of the Army or Navy. Air attacks, he maintained, could realize much more. Accordingly, an independent strategy was needed, and that could only be evolved by commanders and staffs whose perspectives transcended the immediate requirements of the surface battle.

In advocating independence for air forces, Douhet thus introduced the concept of separate military objectives for air power. He extended this notion in the development of his philosophy until he reached the conclusion that offensive air action alone could decide a war. The manner in which he supported this judgement is crucial to the validity of his philosophy as a whole.

Offensive Action

Douhet closely analyzed the events of World War I. His interpretation of this conflict was that land warfare had become an end in itself and was unresponsive to the influence of the political leadership. In outlining an independent aerial strategy, he was proposing measures which would prevent a recurrence of that experience.

He surmised that land operations could end, as they had before, in stalemate, with massed armies opposed along an essentially static front line. Air power, however, could encircle ground fortifications, and thus represented a means for carrying the offensive into the enemy’s heart land. If such air attacks proved decisive, then the war would have been won without a victory on the ground; and if that could be done, then there was no longer any need even to engage the enemy on the ground.

The key elements of Douhet’s reasoning in this regard were two-fold. The potential for an impasse on the ground had to be acknowledged to support the need for a way of breaking the deadlock. But, more important, air power had to be vested with the capability to produce a decisive result.

“Terror Bombing”

Having perceived the need for potency in an air force, Douhet examined some alternative combinations of targets and weapons. He chose population groupings — cities — as the most productive targets for air attacks and candidly advocated the concept of “terror bombing.”
His reasoning was that destruction of cities would not be long tolerated by the people, and that they would then prevail upon their government to end the war on any terms 4.128.

He realized that cities could not be quickly destroyed by high explosives alone. So he suggested attacks with both explosives and poison gas. The gas would have the power to kill the resident population and render the city uninhabitable for some days and explosive bombs would both damage structures and assist in the dispersion and permeation of the gas 4.180-185.

The manner in which attacks were to be made was also important. Douhet counselled against surprise — the assaults should be advertised in advance. The fact that target cities could be evacuated before the raids was of no concern. By simply demonstrating the capability to destroy at will the entire populations of cities, the attackers would achieve their desired result. If success was not immediate, then city after city would be designated and then attacked, until resistance crumbled 4.58.

Offence vs. Defence

Douhet envisaged an air force which could range freely in enemy skies. He dismissed the capability of air defence artillery and deprecated the role of the fighter with sound arguments. Defensive action would only produce limited attrition, and more aircraft could be destroyed on the ground than through aerial combat. The bomber was thus the weapon which would most quickly gain "command of the air" 4.17-118.

He concluded, then, that air attacks should first be made to eliminate the opposing air force. Fighters would be needed, but only to protect the bombers during this preliminary phase. Bombers would also benefit from defensive armament, but this should not be allowed to prejudice payload and range. Their limited self protection capacity would be enhanced by flight in formation, and once command of the air was gained, there was no need for such defences 4.118.

Summary

Douhet's recommendations were aggressive and, in the sense that he proposed the use of poison gas, of limited acceptability. He did, however, establish a sound case for an independent aerial strategy, formulated and carried out by an autonomous air force. In consequence, his arguments had a profound influence on men who would later influence the use of air power in World War II such as Trenchard, Mitchell and Goering 3:1-18.

Therefore, when reflecting on subsequent events, the historian should recall the main points made by Douhet. His principal contention was that a war could be decided by air power alone when:

- the aggressor air force could freely roam the enemy's skies, and
- progressive, pre-warned destruction of cities so terrorized the enemy population that they forced their government to concede.

Based on his analysis of World War I, and his knowledge of the technology prevailing at the time he wrote, Douhet made some assumptions that were crucial to his conclusions.

- the attacking force would possess weapons of mass destruction (the explosives/poison gas combination) capable of annihilating a city in a single attack;
- the aggressor government would be prepared to use the most extreme measures in pursuit of its goals; and
- the attacks against target cities would begin before adequate protective countermeasures could be instituted.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Douhet's findings were thus specific to a prescribed set of conditions. They did, however, show at least the potential use of a powerful instrument of international negotiation. As events transpired, his prescription was never completely followed. At the outbreak of World War II, no weapon of mass destruction existed other than poison gas — and its use was proscribed.

When, later in the war, massed raids using both incendiaries and high explosives did result in the effective destruction of cities, essential factors in Douhet's equation were missing. The passage of time since hostilities started had allowed for the organisation of extensive passive defence measures — which substantially reduced casualty levels, and hence lessened the terror effect. The "popular sensitivity" factor was also not as had been predicted. At the
height of their trial, the British people were united and inspired to resist under Churchill’s leadership. In the case of Germany, even had the morale of the population suffered towards the end, there would have been no significant change in the conduct of the war by a deranged and dictatorial leadership. The bombing of Nagasaki was the single event which came closest to exemplifying Douhet’s thesis. For the first time, the capability to produce the effect he prescribed existed, and was used. In a sense, the earlier attack on Hiroshima had fulfilled the pre-warning criterion. But there were, at the late stage of the war, too many other influences at work to be able to judge for certain which particular one was decisive — the cumulative effect of wartime attrition; the powerful psychological effect of the threat of imminent invasion of the homeland, or the Russian declaration of war against Japan on the preceding day.

No conflict since World War II is a suitable basis for evaluating Douhet. He advocated total warfare, with unrestrained attacks on population centres. The concept of ‘graduated response,’ with its attendant limitations on objectives for air power, is foreign to his teachings. Terror bombing, as a deliberate instrument of policy, has not been practised in any post-war conflict; so today Douhet’s theories remain just that — concepts, which have never been adequately tested in practice.

The production of nuclear weapons, however, has lent new credence to these old concepts. Recognition of the awesome effects of weapons of mass destruction is now essential to mutual deterrence between the super-powers. As Brodie notes, modern concepts of aerial strategy are little removed from those first enunciated by Giulio Douhet.

Conclusion
Past events have been shown not to have precisely involved the conditions envisaged by Douhet, and thus have not conclusively shown his concepts to have been either right or wrong. Current nuclear strategies do, however, support his contentions. What remains to be determined is whether the same concepts would be operative in a modern non-nuclear conflict involving Australia.
women and children from Darwin. Subsequently, all other major outposts which were considered threatened were reduced to garrison status, with only the military and essential civilians remaining.

Some elements of Douhet’s thesis are relevant in these experiences. The threat of air attack provoked a reaction from a Government concerned for the welfare of its people. Both experienced and anticipated danger caused grave apprehension amongst some groups. But the raids against Australia were essentially tactical, and except in the case of Darwin, were not continuously repeated. Nevertheless, they had a certain strategic effect, and they have set a precedent for future Governments: the evacuation of non-combatant and non-essential people from a city threatened by attack.

The War of 19 —

If, in the future, a nation were to aggressively seek a concession from the Australian Government, and, doubting the efficacy of negotiation, were to contemplate military means to enforce those demands, we would expect an attempt to exploit our greatest defence weakness. In assessing our vulnerabilities, this hypothetical competitor would undoubtedly reflect upon the historical experiences described above, and wonder whether similar actions would cause the same effects under contemporary circumstances.

Without knowing exactly the conditions which will be of influence at a given time, prediction of the likely behaviour patterns of populations in outpost cities is difficult. But the precedent of the World War II evacuations exists, so no such judgement need be made. The inhabitants of these towns know of the precedent; and were they to feel threatened they would expect evacuation. For the Government to fail to so act, and for the threat to then materialize, with consequent loss of life and property, would almost certainly result in nation-wide disapproval. So an ‘enemy’ who in future could fly his combat power unopposed over Australia’s peripheral cities could force the Government to take actions that are both costly and embarrassing. He could, at will, close down important ports and mining operations. He would thus be in a strong bargaining position from which to demand concessions.

Aware of these considerations, the ‘enemy’ would realize that the choice of air threat alone as an instrument of coercion presents many advantages not available from other forms of military action. The threat need only be posed to be effective — the Government will evacuate before the event if it can. Sufficient targets are available which are of major economic significance, and they are so separated that simultaneous defence of all would be extremely difficult, and could not be achieved at all with current forces. He might quickly acquire the necessary offensive capability or even choose to use surrogate forces. He would know that Australia is committed to non-aggression, and that even during a period of extreme tension, she would be unlikely to attempt to destroy his attack forces with pre-emptive strikes. Should this possibility concern him, he could probably keep his bomber force dispersed or beyond range of our strike force until they were to be used.

For Australia to pose the threat of retaliation in kind would probably be fruitless. The opposing Government might not be so sensitive to popular will. A more populous, less urbanized, nation may well prove less vulnerable to terror bombing. But, most important, to return terrorism with terrorism will undoubtedly remain in Australia as it is now — anathema.

CONCLUSION

Douhet pointed out that if an effect could be produced in a country’s population, and if the Government of that country was responsive to popular feeling, then that Government could be controlled. Australia’s past history shows that this concept applies to us, and there is no evidence to suggest that it could not be applied to our disadvantage in the future. We can also be certain that a foreign Government which intended demanding a concession from Australia would not be unaware of this particular weakness.

To use even notional war-fighting considerations to establish this conclusion is to accept the risk that it will be rejected on the grounds that we face no such threat now, or in the foreseeable future. However, in conducting vulnerability analysis, some ‘war-gaming’ is necessary; without such analysis, we cannot
make proper judgements concerning force structure requirements.

This article began with the observation that the ADF of today still displays many of the hallmarks of the 'forward defence' policies of past years. It is, for example, a 'balanced force', comprising a number of discrete components. If we were going, as we intended then, to fight 'forward' with an ally, then we wanted to be able to offer him support from this wide range of capabilities. But, as has been shown in this article, Australia's defence weaknesses are not 'balanced'. Since we are peculiarly, and particularly, susceptible to air attack, we need to augment our air defences. The resulting 'imbalance' will not only be beneficial to the Nation's security, but will demonstrate abroad the real intent behind 'defence of Australia' policies.

Rarely is a paper or article written on defence issues which does not advocate more or better equipment. In showing that the ADF now needs to place more emphasis on air defence capabilities, this study acknowledges one reality — that within a budget which is effectively fixed, expansion in one area can only take place at the expense of capability elsewhere. But this too will be good for national security. It will involve assessing the value of existing force components in terms of their worth under defence of Australia concepts. Redundant strength can be traded for the protection needed in the areas of vulnerability and a force can thus be created whose parts are in synergy and whose whole is in complete harmony with it's environment.

The ADF exists to deter attack or aggressive demands accompanied by the threat of attack. We can be certain that when an attack comes, or is mooted, it will be aimed at our most vulnerable point which, at the same time, promises the aggressor the greatest return for the least expense. This article has shown that air attack against Australia will fulfil these conditions. As long as this weakness remains, the Nation stands open to a form of coercion which cannot be adequately deterred by the existing ADF. Only by acquiring a far more capable air defence force will we be able to deter unwanted incursions into sovereign airspace.

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Brigadier M. Austin, (RL), DSO, QBE, AASA.

This is a two part article dealing with the Mounted Police in New South Wales and the other colonies. Part one appeared in the previous issue of Defence Force Journal (No. 20 Jan/Feb 1980).

Victoria

As could be expected, the police in Victoria were fragmented as in NSW. At the time of the investigations by the Victorian Select Committee on the Police in 1852 there were some eight ‘forces’ in existence. The (Melbourne) City Police, operating only in the County of Bourke (see map); the Geelong Police, Water Police; Rural Bench Constabulary; Native Police; and the Mounted Police and its adjuncts the Escort, and the Gold-fields Police.

As in NSW there was little co-operation between the various forces, and there was a high incidence of “drunkenness, absenting themselves from duty, leaving their beats, and other minor matters”. Many of the City Police were discharged soldiers and pensioners who received only qualified acceptance from Superintendent Evelyn Sturt — “As a body they appear to me to be the most drunken set of men I have met with; and totally unfit to be put to any useful purposes of police”. Although he would be sorry to recommend that no further members of that class join the force, since “I have some men of the class in my force who are highly deserving men, and whom I should not at all desire to part with”. William Hall, an unpaid magistrate in Melbourne, had equally positive views of a different kind — “At the beginning of [1852] there was a number of excellent men in the force, young, healthy, and intelligent, many of them old soldiers, pensioners, who form the best qualifications — not that band of men lately introduced in one body into the Colony; but such men as have been discharged from the Army from some injury or defect that has incapacitated them from serving as soldiers, and who are yet, comparatively, young men. I think these would be found to be the best constables that could be obtained”.

The city police had apparently not changed much since 1846. In July of that year there had been disturbances in Melbourne originating “in the feelings of animosity entertained by the so-called Orange and Irish parties”. With one exception the police were “Irishmen infected more or less with the prevailing party animosities”, who were not disposed “to interfere or act with energy or independency”, and consequently quite inadequate “to grapple with any difficulty of this character”. La Trobe had to use his meagre military force to dampen down the situation, and asked for reinforcements, observing that the young recruits of the 11th were hardly up to the task “seeing that they are easily persuaded to desert, in the hopes of bettering themselves”. Fortunately there was no impending anniversary for either of the contending parties to display their animus. The tension eased and during September/October the detachment was replaced by a slightly stronger party from the 58th.

In 1838 the strength of the Mounted Police in NSW was increased by an officer and seventeen other ranks for the specific service of the Southern District. Captain William Lonsdale, lately of the 4th, but then Police Magistrate at Port Phillip, felt convinced that the addition would reduce the size of the military establishment to that required to provide one
sentry — the Mounted Police would certainly provide more amply for the protection of the District. It was a pious hope, since the Mounted Police were fully employed against sporadic Aboriginal pressure along the long line of communication to Sydney, around Portland, and in Gippsland.

The Mounted Police were withdrawn from the Southern District in early January 1850, but two years later, after an inauspicious beginning, William Mair, late of the 99th, had raised, trained and equipped a force of civil Mounted Police for duty on the gold-fields, and as escorts. At the time of the hearings of the 1852 Select Committee they numbered about 200, but had increased to over 300 eighteen months later. Sturt also had a mounted element within the City Police, and considered that there would be no difficulty in increasing the overall strength of all mounted elements, since they could be obtained from cavalry regiments in the United Kingdom.

Shortly after the hearings of the Select Committee closed a system of 'cadets' was started in the Mounted Police, with the idea of training "young men of respectability" to be officers. There appeared to be many such at the time "glad of obtaining employment, provided the service suited them. I mean such persons as are now engaged on the private escort as troopers". The numbers accepted appear to have negated the system and made it impossible to achieve the original aim, and to keep the cadets as distinct as possible from the ordinary police, it was proposed to place them all on escort service. In spite of these difficulties, O'Callaghan records that 45 were made officers by 1860, although "Whatever justification the cadet system may have presented at its inception, it soon
became apparent that it was unsuited to the requirements of the Victorian police service. The establishment of an artificial aristocracy composed of men who were in no sense superior to scores of others who had joined the service as ordinary constables was a grave error and was resented by many as an insult."

It was perhaps this aspect which caused the Argus to comment in October 1853 that discipline in the Mounted Police was falling off and was not as it should be.

As already mentioned, the Native Police Force was originally formed in 1837 to deal with aboriginal attacks in the Western District of Victoria. It was soon disbanded, however, but after being re-established in 1842 performed most useful service over the next ten years. In the early days of the gold discoveries, parties had been attached to the Gold Commissioners, causing much ill-will when they attempted to collect licence fees. Parties were also employed escorting gold, but there were very few of the Native Police left by the middle of 1852, and the obsequies of the force occurred with the death of Commandant Dana in November 1852, and the passage of the 1853 Police Act.

While Victoria's fragmented police force was unified under the 1853 Police Act, and while it continued to contain discharged soldiers and pensioners, it is important to note that it had been completely divorced from the Army.

**Tasmania**

In Tasmania the police force was not fragmented but centralized under the control of Chief Police Magistrate Francis Burgess. The influence of the Royal Irish Constabulary was strong, and Burgess required newly joined recruits to be drilled, and trained in infantry minor tactics. Part of the force was organized by Governor Arthur in 1826 as a mounted military Field Force, similar to the Mounted Police of NSW.

By 1839, the Governor, Captain Sir John Franklin, RN, had also read Colonel Breton's evidence to the Commons Committee on Transportation, and hastened to disassociate his Mounted Police from Breton's remarks. Quoting Major Deare of the 21st, he stated that the Mounted Police were by no means non-effective in the regiment, but on the contrary were among their best conducted soldiers. Over the previous year nineteen had been returned to the regiment, then preparing for departure to India; all had at least four years service with the police; five had been made non-commissioned officers, and Deare was awaiting suitable opportunities to promote more of them.

The strength of the military component of the Mounted Police was never very high, and remained fairly constant at about ten until 1845 when it was halved. The strength of this component was maintained by transferring soldiers to it under the Horse Guards orders of 1838/39, after a probation period of six months. With a strength of three it was still in existence in 1858, at which time these supernumeraries were merged in the strength returns with those in NSW and shown as attached to 1/12th. In contrast the 1853 Tasmanian Select Committee on the Police believed that, while the 1854 Estimates showed $2561.34 for Mounted Police, none had been employed since 1850.

The same Select Committee gave a dreary picture of the Tasmanian force. Out of a total of 423 policemen 211 were pass-holders; only murder, arson, perjury and rape precluded anyone from joining the force. The Committee believed that pass-holders should not be recruited after the end of 1853. If only reputable men were enlisted and the pay of certain grades of constable increased by ten cents a day and paid weekly, it would be possible to halve the size of the force.

**South Australia**

Because of the 'self-supporting' principle the development of the police in South Australia (SA) followed a slightly different pattern to that in the other colonies.

After much struggling Captain (Sir) John Hindmarsh, RN, had been allowed to add 16 Royal Marines to the complement of HMS Buffalo to keep the natives, stragglers from other colonies, and idlers in check during the initial settlement. Through 1837 he imporhned the Colonial Office for military assistance. Many of the 1,200 settlers were of anything but peaceful disposition; there was a daily import of convicts overland from NSW; the price of labour was extravagant, and there was a danger of combination and subsequent riot if wages were reduced; the colonists objected to acting as constables; he could not
get even one efficient constable, and while the marines were "not well conducted", they had prevented outrage; he had retained the Royal Marines and their numbers should be increased.

Glenelg was quite unmoved. It was not practicable to provide a military force; retaining the Royal Marines had caused serious inconvenience — Hindmarsh had to rely on his own exertions. It was little wonder that the latter was quite shocked to find Robert Torrens (retired Lieutenant Colonel, RM) accusing him of rejecting the police force and military staff which the Commissioners were prepared to supply.48

By March 1838 Hindmarsh had perhaps reached the limits of his endurance. So many desperate characters from penal colonies were now in SA, he informed Glenelg, particularly in the 'stringy bark forest', 16 kilometres from Adelaide, that it had been absolutely necessary to form a Mounted Police Force. Spies in town kept the ruffians posted as to the movement of the Royal Marines, so that it was impossible to get hold of known offenders in their haunts. Regrettably SA had no money and he had been forced to draw on the British Treasury to pay the new force.49

Hindmarsh, with the few tarnished 'vice regal trappings' of Royal Marines, departed four months later, leaving the Province with less than twenty constables, who were fully employed looking after eighteen felons and other prisoners in an insecure building used as a gaol. He was hoping, however, to recover $87.70 which he had outlaid from his own pocket to the Royal Marines as colonial pay for extra services.50

In 1839 the Legislative Council authorised the formation of the police on a more substantial basis, although with the arrival of Grey as Governor in 1841 the establishment was substantially reduced to six officers, forty-one troopers in the Mounted Police and thirty-five constables in the metropolitan police.51

During 1840 the Sydney Herald observed that in the southern districts of NSW the convict servants were leaving in hordes for SA where labour was scarce and they were unknown. To meet this threat the SA Mounted Police, in their 'dashing' uniforms were sent to Mount Barker and Gawler. Even so it was with difficulty that Grey induced Gipps on this basis, together with increased aboriginal hostility on the overland routes, and the danger of rioting by the destitute 'lower orders', to provide eighty troops from the 96th to arrive at Adelaide in October 1841. It was not long before this party was employed against the increased aboriginal pressure in the vicinity of Blanche Town and at Port Lincoln. In spite of strong Colonial Office views neither detachment was withdrawn until after Grey left for NZ in 1845, by which time the 'temporary' detachment of troops in SA had become a permanent garrison.52

Western Australia

In Western Australia (WA), arising from representations made by the colonists in June 1832, Goderich, and later Stanley, authorised the formation of a Mounted Police in March 1833, provided the force was no more than thirty men, cost no more than $6864, and was funded from colonial revenue.53

Stirling brought the matter before his Executive Council in September. This mounted force was primarily to "maintain friendly intercourse with the natives", and was purely civil in character, although its three officers and seven troopers included some privates discharged from the 63rd. Lack of funds had precluded the force being brought to authorised strength.54

The Perth Gazette and WA Journal believed that the corps would give "essential protection against Aboriginal attack". It formed part of the party which accompanied Stirling on his fateful journey ninety kilometres south to the Murray River in October 1834, and took part in the 'Battle of Pinjarra'. By December of that year, however, its strength had shrunk to the superintendent and two troopers, and although the 1835 Estimates made provision for a Superintendent, a head constable and five constables, the settlers in the previous February had considered it a grievance — "That the military force ordered for the service of [WA] renders the maintenance of a police corps unnecessary and burdensome on the resources of the colony which are required for, and ought to be applied to more beneficial objects".55

In July 1836 Stirling informed Glenelg that the establishment of Mounted Police had never been palatable to the colony at large, and that the Legislative Council (no doubt with the settlers' petition in mind) had suggested that the force could be maintained in a more effective...
manner, at little more than half its cost, by embodying a non-commissioned officer and five privates from the resident garrison, similarly to the system in the eastern colonies.\textsuperscript{56}

Glenelg was sorry that the colonists had the idea that a military detachment could be substituted for civil force. "The settlers must not be led to depend on a military force for internal protection ... In cases where it is unfortunately necessary to adopt active measures for restraining the aggressions of the natives, military aid may be indispensable in support of the civil force, but the latter ought to be the principal means on which reliance is habitually to be placed for internal security."\textsuperscript{57}

Meanwhile Stirling and his Legislative Council remained at loggerheads. The Council maintained that it was not hostile to the formation of Mounted Police per se, its only argument with Stirling was the amount involved, which if used for the Mounted Police would have starved other Departments of funds. Stirling had misconstrued their views; they did not like the tone of his language, which attributed to them the decline and virtual disintegration of the force in April 1836. Soon after its formation there were complaints that not sufficient control existed over the troopers; something better than a master-servant relationship was required, although it was vain to expect the equivalence of military discipline. Men of integrity would hardly enlist when they could obtain higher wages elsewhere. Once the superintendent had resigned it was better, and cheaper, to substitute soldiers for civil constables to carry out the same task directly under the magistrates. There was nothing to prevent this course; it was done elsewhere. And so the Council absolved itself from blame if any disaster occurred.

Stirling referred Glenelg to the 'grievance' of February 1835, and his own reply in March 1837. He had wanted three superintendents and nine troopers; the Council had reduced their effectiveness by reducing the strength to one superintendent and six troopers. The force had remained in a state of high efficiency from the time it had been authorised in September 1834 until it had been reduced by the Council in April 1835, following the public meeting the previous February. Morale had been badly affected; some had resigned at once, and further resignations had followed the Council's reduction in April 1836. Stirling had no power to transfer soldiers to civil duties, and in any case believed it wrong to entrust the preservation of peace in a free country to soldiers. He asked for further directions.\textsuperscript{58}

In May 1838 the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hill, drew Glenelg's attention to the troop dispersion in WA. As far as he could see the troops were acting more as watchmen on the settlers' private property than as soldiers. If the dispersal was necessary he suggested that twelve soldiers be mounted as police. Glenelg was not enthusiastic; Stirling had had authority to raise Mounted Police since 1832. However, he would ask the new governor, John Hutt, to report progress on the 1837 despatch. In reply Hutt informed Glenelg in January 1939 that he intended taking advantage of Hill's recommendation, and would discuss the matter with the Executive Council, even though it was strictly none of their business, as he wanted their mature experience. He hoped to keep a small number at Perth, which would be discussed further with the Legislative Council, and thus reduce the number of military outstations. While he forwarded a detailed plan of troop distribution to Glenelg a week later, it was not until November, following the "depredations of natives", that the Legislative Council passed a Bill levying a two and one half percent charge on auctions, and introduced auctioneer's licences, designed to raise $900, of which $600 was reserved for the police. Taking advantage of Hill's recommendation Hutt was raising a force of two mounted policemen, which with their accoutrements and pay of ten cents a day, would completely swallow up the first year's financial allocation.\textsuperscript{59}

In spite of Hutt's initial enthusiasm nothing much happened. By 1842 the troops were still dispersed in a police role, in thirteen localities, providing sparse protection to the settlers who were spread over an area of 480 by 113 km. Little had changed since the Commander-in-Chief had informed Glenelg four years previously that these small military detachments could neither protect themselves nor the property they were supposed to guard, and merely gave a general impression that they were stationed on private property as watchmen rather than as a military force.\textsuperscript{60}
and with the easing of tension with the Aboriginals, the number of troop locations was reduced to five by 1847, although by now the settlers had spread over an area of 480 by 322 km.\textsuperscript{61}

It was at this point that Stanley’s directions to reduce the overall Australian garrison began to take effect. Irwin, then acting as Governor, asked for more troops, but Grey was adamant — if the settlers wanted to spread themselves over such a large area they had either to accept the risks, or pay for an armed police.\textsuperscript{62}

By 1850 the WA scene was to be completely changed with the introduction of prisoners, pensioners, Royal Engineers, and the Royal Sappers and Miners.\textsuperscript{63} As a result further developments occurred in the size, management and control of the civil police over the following years, although up to 1853 there were still three mounted military policemen.

**Metropolitan Police and Royal Irish Constabulary**

Mention has been made of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and the Metropolitan Police, and before proceeding further it is necessary that they be considered in broad outline.

The Royal Irish Constabulary was basically a para-military institution to enforce law and order in Ireland by repression. Its aim, therefore, was vastly different from the Metropolitan Police, which was based on the assumption that the law to be maintained was an expression of the will of the majority of citizens. Consequently, to a large degree, the Constabulary did not have the confidence of the population; were foreign to the district in which they were located; wore a military-type uniform, and were armed, lived in barracks, and unmarried. Nevertheless, they were “superior, perhaps, to any body of the kind in existence, for which there are plenty of volunteers, service therein being so much coveted that they are immediately filled up with the very choicest materials”. Colburn’s put this down to the higher pay compared with corresponding grades in the army and navy.\textsuperscript{64}

In contrast, the Metropolitans were indigenous and not alien to the local population, were encouraged to marry, and live off-duty as ordinary members of the community. It was inevitable that while both forces contributed to the development of the police in Australia, the Constabulary theme should predominate, due to the mixed nature, disposition, and dispersion of the population, the bushranger problem, poor communications, and the use of terror.

Faced with the withdrawal of troops to NZ, the 1847 NSW Select Committee on Police came to the conclusion that there was no immediate requirement for the formation of a militia to maintain internal order and tranquility. Whether the colony could provide a “good Police corps admits of a question”, and on the basis that the colony was prepared to meet the cost the Committee suggested that “it would be better to enlist a Constabulary in the Mother Country, and perhaps under the sanction of an Act of Parliament, upon the principle of the Metropolitan Police, or Irish Constabulary”.\textsuperscript{65}

At much the same time, Grey commenting on Fitzroy’s proposals on the reduction of the military force in NSW, informed him that he held out no hope for “so considerable a force as that to which you refer will long continue to be kept there, merely for the purpose of supporting the police in the maintenance of order”. He suggested, therefore, that the police force be increased “by causing men to be engaged for this purpose in England”.\textsuperscript{66}

The suggestion was again raised in 1850, when W. C. Mayne, soon to become Inspector-General of Police, submitted a report to the 1850 NSW Select Committee on Police. He recommended a system modelled on the Irish Constabulary, which he eulogised for their activity, efficiency, discipline and zeal. However, his recommendations did not receive an enthusiastic response. While it might be desirable to enlist some persons, or even a considerable number with practical police experience in the United Kingdom, the Select Committee saw serious difficulties —

“(1) Because amongst the widely scattered population of the interior of this Colony the duty of an efficient constable presupposes the qualification of being a good bushman, which can only be acquired by long practice.

(2) Because the habits and character of the people differ so widely from those of the United Kingdom; . . . the total absence of local information must prove a serious drawback . . . Besides
the sudden and wholesale displacement of the present Constabulary, many of whom have proved themselves useful public servants, would scarcely be just”.67

In 1852 parallel with the action taken to get more troops for Victoria, measures were also taken to recruit for Victoria's ailing police force. In May of that year the situation facing La Trobe was reasonably clear in England, and that well known correspondent ‘Anon’ took the opportunity of informing the Colonial Office, that if the Government was augmenting the force in Australia, there were thousands in the Royal Irish Constabulary who would be willing to volunteer. This was already known to the Colonial Office, who at that time believed there was no real advantage in such a scheme to either Australia or Ireland, and in fact it had positive disadvantages to Ireland.68

Shortly afterwards a group of Victorians in London suggested to Pakington that a group of fifty Irish constables and their petty officers be selected and sent to Melbourne. Meanwhile Pakington had informed La Trobe that he believed “that it will be practicable to obtain the services of selected men from the Irish mounted constabulary force”. In a somewhat magnified fashion the news reached The Times which stated that “in generally well informed quarters” it was believed some 2000 were being selected, which resulted in Downing Street receiving many suggestions for improvement to the scheme, and applications to join the force. After discussion with the Irish Government, who could not spare the men, the matter was referred to the Home Department and the decision made to select a party of fifty from the Metropolitan Police. They were to be armed with truncheons, pistols, rattles, lanterns and snaps, and handcuffs. Which was probably just as well, since La Trobe had been seriously embarrassed for a considerable time by the non-arrival from England of arms and equipment for the police — “these delays are usual with the Ordnance Department ... remonstrance is unavailing. It is a serious evil if such is the case”.69

La Trobe continued to urge that more police from the Irish Mounted Constabulary, “with the most ample equipment, and fully officered”70 be sent out, although four months later, while still pressing for the increase he admitted that there was not the same difficulty “in obtaining and retaining the services of a suitable class of men for a Mounted Police, or of organizing them” which was probably just as well since Newcastle intended to “abstain from taking any measures for sending out any additional number until I shall have been appraised of the result of the first appointments, and unless I should be informed that the services of a further body would still be required in the colony.” La Trobe was somewhat disappointed that the mounted Irish were not being provided, but in view of the improved recruiting for Mounted Police in Victoria, he had “no doubt that the present measure would not be without its advantages”.

In retrospect perhaps Victoria was lucky that the Constabulary did not have to operate either on the goldfields or in the sectarian atmosphere of Melbourne.

NOTES

42. Report Select Committee on Police VPLC Victoria (Vic) 1852/33 Volume 2. The “men lately introduced” were enrolled pensioner volunteers from Tasmania for duty on the Victorian goldfields.
43. La Trobe/Col Sec 17, 24-7-46; 6-8-46; Col Sec/AMS 20-5-46; AMS/Col Sec 24-8-46; all NSW A 4/2743-3.
44. 10-10-37; 18-3-38; 23-4-38; 5-12-38 Lonsdale/Col Sec VALO-A 118, 184, 198, 322.
47. VPLC Tasmania ibid.
48. 25-6-36 Military Secretary (MS)/CO CO 13/5 R307 F301A; 18, 20-2-37 Hindmarsh/Glenelg CO 13/6 R308; 10-6-37 Hindmarsh/Glenelg ibid., F286; 1-11-37 Hindmarsh/Glenelg CO 13/7 R308 F291; 21-6-38 Hindmarsh/Glenelg CO 13/11 R378 F133.
49. 2-4-38 Hindmarsh/Glenelg CO 13/10 R578 F176.
50. 14-7-38 Hindmarsh/Glenelg CO 13/11 R578 F180.
51. Police Establishment CO 17/12, 13, 14 R1127.
52. 21-4-40; 2-3-40; 21-12-42 SMH; The ‘dashing’ uniform was based on the 6 Dragoon Carbineers with silver cords and swords, at first worn on all occasions, but later for ceremonial purposes only — 18-9-40 South Australian.
53. 8-3-33 Goderich/Stirling CO 397/2 R304 F312; 28-7-33 Stanley/Stirling ibid., F364.
54. 1-12-34 Goderich/Stirling CO 18/4 R300 F174 and minutes; 5-9-34 Executive Council Minutes CO 20/1 R1118 F371.
55. 1834 Blue Book CO 22/10 R1123 F37; 15-10-35 Stirling/Aberdeen CO 18/15 R301 F378.
56. 12-7-36 Stirling/Glenelg CO 18/16 R301 F251, 336.
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL RETIRES THIS YEAR

The Chief of Naval Personnel, Rear Admiral A. A. Willis, retires from the Navy this year after more than 40 years service.

Rear Admiral Alan Anthony Willis, OBE, of Learmonth, Victoria, entered the RAN College as a cadet midshipman in January, 1940. He was posted to the Royal Navy and served in the Home Fleet during World War II. On return to Australia he served in various RAN ships, and saw active service in HMAS Sydney during the Korean War. His ship commands included the guided missile destroyer, HMAS Brisbane, which saw operational service in Vietnam. In 1977 he became Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans with the rank of Rear Admiral. Since July, 1979 he had been Chief of Naval Personnel.

Reviewed by Group Captain Keith Isaacs, Royal Australian Air Force (Retired).

THIS big, handsome volume is the outcome of an ambitious plan by the book's three compilers to produce details of every aircraft, be they friend or foe, actively engaged in operations during the 1939-45 War. Five years of intensive research went into this prodigious project, and the dust jacket — which features John Young's dramatic painting of a damaged Avro Lancaster returning from a night raid over Germany — claims that the end result "is the most important aviation reference work to have been published for years".

Bearing this statement in mind, it was decided to review the book as the authors intended it to be used — as a reference volume. Random checks were made of the entries relating to the combat aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force, and some surprising results emerged.

In the first instance, however, the unique format of the book is worthy of comment, for it is divided into two sections. The first section comprises 64 colour pages containing 176 paintings by John Weal of representative Allied and Axis aircraft. Weal's impressive artwork is well known to readers of Air International and, on this occasion, his selection of RAAF aircraft includes the CAC Boomerang, A46-137, DAP Bristol Beaufighter, A8-116 (which varies slightly from the Pentland version in Aircraft and Markings of the RAAF 1939-1945, one of the 13 RAAF books listed in the bibliography), and Brewster Buffalo, W8153, overpainted with Netherlands East Indies Air Force markings. In addition, Handley Page Halifax, JP275, formerly of No. 462 Squadron, RAAF, appears in the markings of No. 614 Squadron, Royal Air Force. Of these four aircraft, only one — the Boomerang — appears on the single colour page allotted to Australia. The other three machines are tucked away in the sections devoted to Great Britain, and the United States of America. In the case of the A8 series of Beaufighters, this is particularly misleading because these Australian licence-built aircraft were used solely in the RAAF's South West Pacific Area; an RAAF, UK-built, A19 series Beaufighter would seem to be a more appropriate choice for the Great Britain section.

The second section of the book was compiled by Elke Weal, and contains a mass of facts and figures covering some 800 aircraft types. Complementing the text are 250 black and white line drawings of selected aircraft by Richard Barker. It is when attempting to use this section as a reference work, that three shortcomings soon become apparent — presentation of information, ease of reference, and accuracy of data.

The small type print, closely spaced lines, and five columns per page are not the best of formats for presenting technical data. Information confined in this manner is difficult to read, and cross-reference becomes an arduous task. Again, it is far from easy to establish how many different types of aircraft were in service with a specific country, or air force. For example, the half-page of data allotted to Australia lists three aircraft types only — the Wirraway, Boomerang and, of all things, the Tugan Gannet. Admittedly, the authors state that aircraft other than combat machines were selected for inclusion but, surely, this negates the book's title. The omission of the word "Combat" would have rectified this anomaly. Be that as it may, to locate all the other RAAF aircraft one has to laboriously read through most of the text. It is not good enough to check only the British and American sections, because the
RAAF also used Canadian and Netherlands aircraft — and, if the reader is alert enough, he might stumble upon the three RAAF monoplanes in the 29-page German section. The simple remedy to this problem, of course, lies in the index. An important reference work must have a comprehensive index, and not one devoted only to aircraft as in this book. The inclusion in the index of a “RAAF” reference, followed by the applicable page numbers — with similar entries for other air forces — would enhance the value of the work, and provide a quick and easy access for those seeking such information.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned criticisms, it is in the aircraft data section that the book fails to impress as an accurate and reliable work. The Hawker Demon, for example, is not listed despite the fact that the RAAF’s strength on the eve of the 1939-45 War is recorded in the Official War History as “82 Ansons, 54 Demons, 7 Wirraways and 21 Seagulls”, plus 82 trainers. Other RAAF aircraft not included in the data listings are the Avro York, Avro Anson XII, Bell Airacobra, de Havilland Fox Moth, Tiger Moth (including ambulance versions), and Dragonfly, Martin Mariner, Miles Magister, North American Mitchells D and J, Supermarine Walrus, and CAC Wackett Trainer. Surprisingly, the CAC CA-4 and CA-11 bombers are overlooked, and yet at least two obscure and one-off transport aircraft, the South African Air Force Gloster AS 31 and the Free French Air Force British Burrell OA-1, are included. By way of compensation (sic), the Martin Marauder is listed as being in Australian service, which must come as a surprise to the RAAF. Incorrect totals for number of aircraft in RAAF service include the Avro Anson, de Havilland Moth Minor and Mosquito, Supermarine Seagull, and Westland Wapiti. Also, the Gloster Gauntlet operated with No. 3 Squadron, RAAF, not “No. 1”, and the RAAF’s Bristol Bulldogs were Mark II versions.

The foregoing errors and omissions emerged as a result of limited spot checks, and they raise doubts as to the accuracy and reliability of the other facts and figures. Fortunately, the author’s introduction concludes with the sentence that “the compiler would welcome any suggestions for additional types, or authenticated data currently lacking, to fill gaps in any possible future edition”. If this proposal is fulfilled it could well be that a second edition of this ambitious book could indeed become “the most important aviation reference work.”

GERMAN MILITARY UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA 1933-1945 WE Books, Connecticut, USA
Reviewed By: WO2 A. H. D. McAulay

In its 227 pages, this book gives a quite detailed presentation on the subject, but suffers from two major defects: black-and-white reproduction and ink drawings instead of photographs. Judging by the text, the book is a direct re-print of a British World War II publication, as the references to Germany, Goering and the Luftwaffe, etc, are in the present tense.

It would appear that this book was published in 1967, and has not been updated since. More recent publications such as Brian L. Davis’ works on the subject and those by R. J. Bender and H. P. Taylor, which include colour plates and many photographs, have pushed this book into a second place.

It includes separate sections on the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as a section for the various Party organisations such as the SS, Waffen-SS, Hitler Youth, Labour Service and so on. Flags and armbands are included, and to top it all off there is a glossary of military terms at the end.

One wonders how (or if) the average German coped with the correct forms of address in an organised, militarised society in which every other person wore a uniform and bore a rank of some sort, where even boys had ranks such as Obergefolgschaftfuhrer, and your friendly local Party HQ member was a Stutzpunktleiter. Definitely not for the Australian, and his ‘mate’.

Many of the illustrations appear to be black-and-white reproductions of wartime colour charts of the various services, which definitely do not achieve the aim of informing the reader as to the various colours involved in the uniforms and their embellishments.

However it does contain the basic information on the subject, and for someone who does not require, or is not interested in, the detailed presentations now on the bookshelves (and at what prices!) this is a very useful book.

Reviewed by Major J. Hancock, OC/Editor Army Newspaper Unit, Department of Defence (Central), Canberra

A n entirely readable little book! A very thoroughly researched little book! A believable little book! A beaut piece of British fiction, of the enduring, youthful type that erstwhile Biggles fans would enjoy. A book full of nostalgia for flyers past and present. For those of us who learned to fly in open cockpit biplanes from bush pad­docks or urban grass strips, and for the later generation taking to the air with greater sophistication, this story will bring back the most vivid memories.

Robert Jackson is meticulous in his descriptions of training, transport and combat aircraft of the very early 40s, and of their "feel". An experienced pilot himself, he has painstakingly checked his material with others who also know exactly what they are talking about.

Jackson is just as meticulous with his historical references. He has obviously spent many hours ensuring that his dates, locations and events will pass examination by the most exacting military historian.

The almost casual insertion from time to time of accurate vignettes of actions of men such as Churchill, Rommel and De Gaulle add immeasurably to the certainty of reality felt by the reader as he wings through the story.

It is this atmosphere of utter reality which makes Hurricane Squadron so acceptable. It is certainly not 'great literature'. Indeed, the central story — Yeoman's adventures and incipient romance — even the air battles, are dealt with too briefly and too superficially for there to be any possibility that the book could be anything else but light reading! The feeling that every combat mission — British, German or French — is an absolutely reliable image in miniature of those missions actually flown during the early days of World War II, makes Jackson's latest venture into fiction an enjoyable experience. Jackson's previous titles include Fighter Pilots of World War I, Fighter Pilots of World War II, The Story of Bomber Command, 1930-42, When Freedom Calls, The Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1943-45, The Fall of France, Aerial Combat, and Air Heroes of World War II.

So well does Jackson portray the era, that it comes as something of a shock to find that the author himself is still only in his 30s. Born in 1941, the year after the bulk of the events dealt with in his book had occurred, Jackson developed an early interest in military history and, especially, aviation. His writing abilities have enabled him to support himself as a fulltime author for the past 10 years, but he also lectures on pilot navigation in his spare time, is a consultant to a helicopter company, and, until a year ago, was a public relations officer in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. His own flying experience covers a wide variety of aircraft ranging from gliders to jets.

As its title and sub title imply, Jackson's latest novel is centred around a British Hurricane fighter pilot, Sergeant George Yeoman. The action takes place in France from the start of the German Blitzkreig on the Western Front. Individuals on both sides of the Maginot Line are introduced, and their aircraft discussed with an easy familiarity. But the descriptions of flying characteristics of warplanes — and of combat technique — are entirely non-technical, so that even the non-flyer can appreciate the atmosphere of the situation, the emotions of the pilots.

From the perfect peace of flying through a calm, summer sky, to the horror of the beach at Dunkirk — the contrasts are all there, vivid and real. The death of children, of women, of soldiers, of airmen; the descriptions of foe and of the greater horror, of friend — unknowingly at the time — killing friend, point up some of the grim realities of war, but in a non-judgemental, factual, way.

The book itself stays alive, virtually throughout. For the reviewer, the only section that causes some disappointment is the ending. Here is something of an anti-climax. The reader is left with the feeling that the final chapter should have been concluded at its natural break in the middle — leaving indefinite the fate of the German, Richter. After such an excellent story, it seems unnecessary for Jackson to try to wrap up his presentation in an overly neat parcel.

However, other readers may feel differently. In any event, the bulk of the story is of such a
standard that readers military and civilian, flyers or not, will enjoy it to the full.

By the way, if you enjoy Hurricane Squadron: Yeoman Goes to War as much as I did, you’ll be looking out with me for its sequel — Squadron Scramble: Yeoman in the Battle of Britain.

Reviewed by Dr. L. H. Barber, University of Waikato.

I CAN still remember when, as an undergraduate of the University of Canterbury, I worked for two weeks on an essay that discussed the terminal date of Caesar’s rule in Gaul. This enforced labour resulted in a continued interest in Caius Julius Caesar’s campaigns, political decisions and military strategies, and this prolonged interest seduces me into reading works such as P. B. Ellis’ Caesar’s Invasion of Britain.

Ellis is something of an expert on the Celts and amongst his published works are A History of the Irish Working Class, The Cromwellian History of Ireland and The Cornish Language and its Literature. This expertise is used to correct assessments of Caesar’s tactics and Celtic military reaction; assessments usually based on Caesar’s De Bello Gallico. It could be argued that Ellis has given too much space to the social order of the Celts of Britain, and not enough to the actual invasion. He could well counter that the success of the Celts in military resistance came from men with a vigorous culture, and their unity and determination can only be understood when their culture is described and analysed.

Half of Ellis’ book is directly concerned with the invasion. He begins with a discussion of Caesar’s reasons for deciding, in the mid-summer of 55 BC, to invade Britain. From the military viewpoint, Caesar believed he must secure Gaul from Celtic counter-attack by taking Britain. A rare mercenary explanation is added — Caesar believed there were riches and plunder to be taken. Then, Caesar hoped for added prestige from a successful invasion and conquest, and he believed this would help him in his contests in Rome, and quest for power.

Ellis deals nicely with British intelligence of Caesar’s plans, the summoning of a huge tribal army to the cliffs (an army that followed the Roman armada) and Caesar’s stupid disembarkation at low tide. The deadly effect of the British war chariots, driven into the shallows, is graphically described. As British war horses were usually adorned with the heads of deceased enemies the consternation amongst the Romans is understandable. Ellis remarks:

The scythed wheels of the British war-chariots created havoc among the Roman troops. The chariots must have seemed to the Romans what the first British tank was to the German infantry fighting on the Somme in 1916. Caesar’s answer to the British weapon was the adaption of the movement known as the testudo, or tortoise, in which his soldiers created a metal wall by linking their shields to prevent themselves from being cut to pieces by the scythes.

Caesar’s second attempt to take Britain relied on 600 transport and twenty-eight war galleys for the channel crossing. This time his legions were accompanied by 800 auxiliary cavalry. The 30,000 Roman legionaries who disembarked near Walmer had good reason to be immediately grateful for the presence of cavalry, who quickly repulsed a war-chariot attack. While Caesar attacked several British fortresses a storm smashed his transport, and forced him to retreat to his beach-head.

Ellis gives a clear and appreciative assessment of the strategy of the Celtic supreme commander, Caswallon, who harried the invaders mercilessly, and fell on the Romans as they were scattered in foraging parties across the countryside. Celtic roads allowed speedy attack and retreat by the war-chariots. However, the discipline and steady advance of the legions, together with their siege tactics, soon deprived Caswallon of his capital, and brought him to sue for peace. With hostages secured and a tribute promised Caesar returned home. His second invasion was a success, but it was more of a raid than a settlement conquest.

What does Ellis believe that the Romans and the Celts learned from the two invasions? He argues that Caesar had found an answer to the British war-chariots and had shown that individualistic Celt ‘in-fighters’ were no match for a legion in full battle-order. The Celts had also discovered a counter to Roman tactics and soon after Caesar’s departure their armies, using guerrilla tactics, decimated three legions.

Reviewed by WO2 A. H. D. McAulay

We today must rely on the written records concerning events such as the Hundred Years' War, Custer at the Little Big Horn and so on. One wonders what impressions those who were alive at the time, and participated in such events, may have gained from reading about them. Similarly, one wonders what impressions will be gained by people who did not experience the Vietnam war, but who read books such as this one, and Michael Herr’s Dispatches.

The impression given by Miss Emerson is of a region of complete devastation; she writes of millions of craters in which the water glistens in the rain, the “39 million acres infected with shrapnel” (yet another descriptive term for the Gunners), and apparently there are no leaves or flowers from Camau to the Chinese border. Anyone who has not been there in our time, and in the future, may be forgiven for visualising Vietnam from top to bottom as a second Somme.

She writes of only two types of people; the anti-war activists and the war-mongers. The former are the working-class (who were slaughtered to further the evil designs of Johnson, Nixon and the Military-Industrial Complex) and the academics, the families of the dead, the disabled veterans and the US prisoners who turned to actively assisting the North Vietnamese. The latter are career soldiers of NCO and officer rank, US government career employees, and Vietnamese not members of the NLF or working class, who are all wicked, inhuman, greedy monsters. If you feel the need for a great big wallow in the Absolute Horror and Wickedness of the US involvement, this is it. Just sit back, open the covers and pour it over yourself.

Miss Emerson has undoubtedly been greatly affected by the war in Vietnam; she first went there in 1956 and feels deeply for the people and the country, and is also deeply ashamed that her country has been responsible for the destruction of Vietnamese society and the actual way of life of the Vietnamese. There is no suggestion that any credit is due to the US administrations involved in the Indo-China wars, neither is there any censure of the North Vietnamese/National Liberation Front policies and actions. My Lai is mentioned several times, the Hue massacres not at all; the collecting of ears by Americans is included, nothing is written about the gruesome slaughter of school teachers and village elders or the deliberate mining of roads to catch people going to market. All that exists for Miss Emerson is the Total Wrong — US involvement.

She has gone to small American towns to interview people throughout that town’s society about the death of a soldier from the town, and followed up comments by high school students after seeing exhibitions of photography on the War — no town too tiny, no adverse opinion unsought.

Through the whole book, her feelings of shame and anger at what her country has done are evident, and these make the book interesting — so much emotion and self have gone into it.

There is an interesting section on Dr Gerald Hickey, who first met Diem in Japan in 1950, and who spent many years in Vietnam, knew it and its people, but whose advice was ignored by the US Establishment; and another, as an example of the World War II generation, of Loot and His Forty Thieves, an American who plundered his way through Italy, France and Germany, and now in Texas eats off silver plates stolen from Italian and French hotels.

Miss Emerson professes hatred and disgust for the military establishment and professional soldiers, yet has ‘covered’ conflicts in Northern Ireland and Nigeria as well as Indo-China. In the book it becomes evident that the war in Vietnam absorbed her to the extent where she had, to use the US term, total involvement, and now has written the book as the anti-war movement is fading away, to leave some record of the anti-war voices and actions.

One wonders whether she saw any symbolism in The Deer Hunter and Coming Home or regarded them as straight-out films. Has she found another purpose in life, as absorbing as Vietnam?

This is an interesting, one-sided book, with a point to ponder for Australian (and, no doubt, Kremlin) readers: can these people be again energised to protest and affect US policies? How does ANZUS stand now — and for the future?

Reviewed by C. D. Coulthard-Clark

T
HE conflict which Field views as ‘forgotten’ is the South African or Boer War of 1899-1902. Most Australians would know very little of that war, despite some significant publications in recent years. This fact in itself would appear to justify the title of the book under review and, as the literature dealing with Australian involvement is not large, the book’s appearance is to be welcomed. Field’s text, however, shows that the title is not wholly apt, as the war was probably as much ignored as forgotten by a country generally only too eager to let the how and why of its participation in an ignominious conflict slip from view.

Comparisons can be as unfair as they are odious, but it is relevant to contrast Field’s approach with that of another work on the subject, R. L. Wallace’s 1976 study of Australians at the war. Wallace’s achievement was considerable within the limits he set for himself, the vivid colour of his work producing a very diverting account. It is probably this that led at least one press reviewer to charge that Field’s story fails to hold interest, yet his canvas is wider, filled with deft touches of detail which highlight the war in all its aspects. In consequence Field has produced a more balanced, and ultimately more substantial, study which will set events in perspective for general readers as well as scholars. This difference in conception becomes very evident in reading Field’s review of Wallace’s book and that author’s rejoinder in the Canberra Historical Journal of September 1978 and March 1979.

With his succinct style Field brings the performance of Australians in South Africa into sharp focus. He points out that the fine qualities which were heralded during World War I as distinguishing the Anzacs were already evident among Australians in the earlier conflict. But so, too, were the deficiencies. Their lack of discipline is now legend and, moreover, Field reveals that for all their reputation as horsemen, Australians were good riders but inadequate horsemasters — and their ability to shoot was poor.

Field’s ability to ask the right questions is also evident in his treatment of events on the home-front. The picture that emerges is hardly one which is creditable to a supposedly democratic society: grandstanding politicians, usually by-passing the colonial legislatures, volunteering their countrymen to a cause they knew next to nothing about (when asked what was known about the justice or injustice of the war, the West Australian premier, Sir John Forrest, replied, ‘We do not want to know’); and savage intimidation to silence those who questioned the right or necessity of Australia’s involvement. The golden opinions and glory won by the men on the veldt is justifiably offset by Field’s concluding observation that “the war had revealed grave deficiencies in the national character”.

It is possible that this book will not be welcome among those eager to see our military past as one great glorious chapter at whatever cost to the truth. But there is no doubt in this reviewer’s mind that Field has presented to his readers a particularly worthwhile study. His perceptions offer us valuable insight into an episode in the nation’s history.

THE FORGOTTEN WAR, by L. M. Field, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1979, $18.60

Reviewed by Major M. P. J. O’Brien, Army Office

O
NE could be forgiven for believing that the author had forgotten R. L. Wallace’s ‘The Australians at the Boer War’ (which has a chapter called ‘A Forgotten War’). However it appears that both works were being written simultaneously. It would be better to ignore the immodest editorial claim on the dustcover to ‘the first and only comprehensive history of Australia’s part in the Boer War’.

Field’s is a scholarly work that clearly shows its origin as a thesis. It is evident that his research has been painstaking, and since his style is quite pleasant the reader can reap the full benefit. His scholarship has provided a valuable insight to the Australian commitment to the war — it was a fair way removed from the commonly represented national prompt offering of volunteers. I found his oblique reference to the
Australian martial tradition in Vietnam quite offensive, however. Referring to a proud tradition established in the Boer War and sustained for seventy years, Field claims it was ‘tarnished by involvement in a war as dubious in merit as the Boer War itself’. The war perhaps, Mr Field, the tradition no!

This early slip should not be allowed to detract from the rest of the book. Mr Field’s approach, though in the main that of a political military historian, covers the battles adequately. But of course, Wallace’s book would appeal more to those interested in the battles. Field’s asides and quotations throughout the book are in themselves valuable.

Two memorable ones are a confused politician’s

‘As for the war, I go agin it, I mean to say, I kind of do —
That is, I mean, that being in it,
The best thing is to see it through’.

and Colonel Tom Price’s

‘Why . . . I’m lousy, the Padre’s lousy,
Lord Roberts is lousy and the dear old Queen
would be lousy too if she was here’.

Though in some respects it is a pity that Field and Wallace did not cooperate in the works on the Boer War at least the books are complementary. The interested reader should consult Wallace. Enthusiasts or those interested in political military history should then read Field.

MAN O’ WAR 1, by Alan Raven and John Roberts, Brooklyn. RSV Publications. Reviewed by Leading Seaman Writer T. Strasser, HMAS MELBOURNE.

OVER the last few years there have been a few additions amongst the publications describing warships in detail, the most common being the ‘Profile’ and the ‘Ensign’ series. RSV Publications have now brought out a new publication devoted to warships of World War II era, the first of which covers the County Class cruisers. Aptly named ‘Man O’ War’ the first issue has fifty seven pages which contain ninety nine photographs, all excellently reproduced with many of them never having been published before. Quite a bit of trouble has been taken to illustrate the various camouflage patterns and colours used on individual ships, and sketches abound in seven shades of grey. Like other publications of this nature ‘Man O’ War’ features a centrespread, in this case a 76 cm long side elevation of HMS Suffolk as she was in 1942, although it is a pity that a plan view of the ship is not shown on the same page. The technical data offered in the book is comprehensive to say the least, included is information like full power steam trials, alterations to weight of the ship’s equipment, stability particulars, modifications throughout the years of service and there is even a drawing of a projected, but never commenced, twin funnelled version of the class that was to have mounted three turrets forward of the main superstructure like some of the contemporary American and Japanese cruisers.

The thirteen ships of the County Class are actually divided into three groups, the seven Kents which include HMAS Australia and Canberra, four Londons and two Dorsetshires. With their high freeboards the ships made comfortable and well ventilated living quarters but at the same time were hard-to-miss targets. The protection of the Counties was such as to be insufficient to prevent loss of stability due to damage. To minimize this situation the level of stability was made comparatively high, which in turn produced ships that were ‘stiff’, i.e. with a reluctant but moderately quick roll. They were nevertheless reasonably good gun platforms. HMAS Australia was damaged five times by Kamikaze attacks and Captain Getting’s Canberra was torpedoed by Japanese cruisers in the battle of Savo Island, to be sunk the following morning by a US destroyer. HMS Shropshire was transferred to the RAN in 1943. The information on each ship’s individual service history is rather limited in this series but the amount of technical details and tables make the book an excellent cross-reference with other works and some might think it worth while to purchase it for the photographs alone. This publication will be a welcome addition to any naval historian or ship enthusiasts’ library, I hope that in the future some of the more unusual ships will be covered and that the high standard of the illustrations remains.