DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

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Contents

2 Editor's Comment.

3 Letters to the Editor.

6 Man: The Measure of Most Things.
   Brigadier W. B. James, MBE, MC, SBStJ, MBBS, DTM&H, DPH, DIH,
   MFCM and Lieutenant Colonel R. J. G. Hall, psc BA dip log m.

17 The Gandhian Mode of Revolt
   Wing Commander A. W. Stephens. RAAF.

23 The RODC: It's Not Too Late to Change.
   Major G. L. Cheeseman.

29 Tanks, Shellfire and a Dazzling Torch
   Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Manley, psc, BA, ALAA.

36 The Functions of a Design Authority.
   R. E. Christensen. BE(Hons), FIREE, MIE AUST.

43 Why Tracks, Helicopters and Frigates?
   Major G. G. Middleton.

50 Bayonet and Baton (Part 1)
   Brigadier M. Austin. (RL) DSO, OBE, AASA

60 Book Review.

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We begin the new year and indeed the 1980's with what I believe to be a reasonable balance of articles. The first of these should raise some interesting debate in the Letters to the Editor section. On page 29 we have an article which was originally published in the RAEME Craftsman. It deals with the events of 2/2 Army Field workshop from its inception up to the capture of Tobruk. The final article is in two parts dealing with the Mounted Police in New South Wales and the other colonies.

* * *

The third review on the Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) begins on page 23 of this issue. This is the final review of a trilogy which has appeared in the Journal over three issues. I sincerely hope that the series has aroused some interest in the majority of our readers.

I urge those authors of articles, book reviews and letters to have them typed, double spaced, leaving a wide margin on each side of the page. Please number all folios. Numbering eliminates the problem of pages being mislaid when staples are removed for processing by the printer. Remember, manuscripts are handled by many people and machines before the final printing of an article takes place.

* * *

Still on the subject of articles, I have, in my possession, a number of articles and book reviews minus a few important details. Some in fact don't even contain the identity of the author.

I receive quite a few telephone calls from authors requesting the approximate dates of publication of their articles. These are not unfair requests. To keep a fairly even balance some articles have to be held for some time. However, even with this problem an approximate date of publication can be given.

If you have submitted an article for inclusion in the Defence Force Journal prior to September 1979 and have not received an acknowledgement or you are unsure of what has happened to it, please contact me as I am endeavouring to create a system where all articles, book reviews and letters are acknowledged and an approximate date of publication can be given.

It may take a little time before the system operates successfully as procedures for articles are quite involved. However, with your assistance in the matter, a simple method can be established, which hopefully, will eliminate these problems and be of some benefit to us all.

* * *

Exercise COMCOORD 2, the biggest annual exercise yet organised by the Natural Disasters Organisation, was conducted in Canberra on November 7, 1979. The exercise was directed by the Director-General of the Natural Disasters Organisation, Rear Admiral R. C. Swan, CBE, RAN. This exercise along with Kangaroo 3 should produce a few articles which should be of interest to the readers of the Defence Force Journal.
Dear Sir,

I would like to comment on “Drinking, Alcoholism and the Army” by Lt. Col. Larry Evans DEJ No 17 Jul-Aug 79. Frankly I was disappointed and a little confused even though the stated aim was “Towards a more rational approach”.

Admitting that the Military is likely to “produce” alcoholism and later that it is an “occupational hazard” we are given two alternatives — “Prevent Alcoholism” and run the risk of changing the whole military image — or — learn to understand and tolerate those “victims of the system”.

To help us decide we are confronted with a number of “essential questions”. I found the questions a little difficult to extract from the comment but I think the following may be a fair summary —

1. The extent of the problem and whether it is becoming more severe and to what degree it is affecting efficiency?
2. The extent of the problem in the Army etc, and the effect of cutting down on our drinking?
3. If we opt for action what course is likely to have the most beneficial effect?

Looking for some clear answers to these questions is where I found the article lacking. Most forms of intervention won’t work, we are told, because they “will probably prove ineffective and thus undesirable”. Again, “the amount of harm alcohol does to the efficiency of the Unit has not been clearly established”. Yet later on he describes “heavy drinkers and alcoholics” as being on a treadmill where their heavy drinking “will cause deterioration in their interpersonal relationships, their work performance and may also cause them some financial difficulties.”

Having dismissed most things what is left, we are told, is the “realistic situation of having to understand empathize with, tolerate and support our alcoholics”. But we are also told that “alcoholics can still function energetically and effectively in our Army”. I find this difficult to understand, almost regardless of the definition of an “alcoholic”. Perhaps the difficulty comes from the misleading alternatives proposed in the first paragraph on page 58.

We cannot “prevent” alcoholism, in the Services or anywhere else. As was pointed out “abuse is brother to use”. But the realistic issue is that we are faced with a still rising tide of alcohol and other drug excess. The extent of this harmful misuse is alarming and the proper study of it pitiful. We may lack the proper scientific evidence to prove it but every other indicator suggests that the problem in the Armed Services is not less but more than in the wider community. Even if it were the same, or slightly less, so what?

Even a blind man can discern the huge proportions of the problem in the whole society. Some are in a position where there is abundant daily evidence of the severe dysfunctioning of soldiers, caused by alcohol. Their perspective may well be different to those who only see soldiers “severely affected”.

Because of the known and massive denial of this problem, not only in those already addicted but in the drinking community as a whole, we must use every legitimate means of MOTIVATING TO TREATMENT, and that can only happen in the context of a community that has stopped denial and faced all the facts.

If we can never realistically hope to eliminate alcoholism completely neither can we sit back and passively accept the casualties at their present level. Addictive use is encouraged and increased. It can also be discouraged and decreased. We know the factors that promote the problem, and that means we also know what steps to take to reduce it.

To take another example — “We might legislate against the use of alcohol in Messes.” Why that extreme position? It sounds like prohibition. There are other measures short of prohibition, which if wisely implemented could lessen the considerable pressure exerted by mess traditions that promote not just drinking, but excessive and damaging drinking.

The mess tradition has become in many ways the tail that wags the dog. But we can change
that by some restriction of drinking hours, lunch time drinking, “free” drinks, and the strong pressure for compulsory attendance at “happy hours” and other functions.

“We could undertake educational programmes” but the writer doesn’t think that these would be likely to compete against the enormous pressures that “encourage them to partake of alcohol”. Surely educational programmes must be tailored to suit the situation, and we are not all in the same situation, but at any given stage there is information and assistance that can be of help and should be made available.

Problem Drinkers are a minority in our population, a sizeable minority, but still a minority. But the damage they do is not just to themselves. The time has come for the majority to start drawing some very clear lines as to just how far the cult of addiction can go. It is not enough for us to “understand” and “tolerate” alcohol misuse. Education will not provide the complete answer, but who said it can? Education is however, one of the vital elements in any rational recipe for recovery.

We need a programme of very deliberate intervention using all our resources. It is not only the alcoholic that is on a treadmill. Our whole society is trapped in a process that is guaranteed to produce more and more alcoholics.

Education, legislation and changes in the social environment are all important factors. Surely the medical profession believes in Preventative Medicine? And does not the very notion of prevention imply of necessity some sound measures in community education? Perhaps even in the medical profession itself.

It is not enough to talk about understanding, empathy and support once the major damage is done. If we are really to identify and assist, as suggested, in the control of alcohol related problems as they affect individuals the “System”, be it civil or military, will have to get off its bottom and wake up.

Support and toleration must be directed toward the recovery of health and, as any true alcoholic will tell us, sanity. We are dealing with a mind altering substance, a destroying drug, rated by many as the nation’s number one health problem.

To turn back the tide we have to face our complacency, our combined ignorance, our perpetuation of myth and self-deception. We also have to face the denial, the cover-up and the criminal conspiracy of vested interests which love it the way it is.

Dear Doctor, we need a more powerful and realistic remedy than you seem to prescribe. 0

Yours sincerely,

S. J. Hessey
(Chaplain)

AUTHORS REPLY

Dear Sir,

I am replying to Chaplain Hessey’s letter and comments on my article which was published in No 17 of the Defence Force Journal.

I think Chaplain Hessey demonstrates by his comments exactly the dilemma which faces us in the Army in relation to the problem of alcoholism. He tells us there is a problem, few would disagree, yet he too cannot define it. He blames us for denial yet I wonder from his exhortations to indiscriminate action against the demon drink whether he might not be guilty of the same crime. He tells us that to do anything is better than to do nothing. This I doubt. I agree with Chaplain Hessey that we should do something, the question is what. The purpose of my article was to suggest that we might think about it and the cost and consequences of our interventions before we act.

Yours faithfully,

Larry Evans
Assoc. Professor of Psychiatry
Lt. Col. RAAME (Reserve)

Dear Sir,

I refer to the timely article by Lieutenant-Colonel Evans RAAMC on Drinking, Alcoholism and the Army. I believe there are several points to be made which are relevant.

The Commander 4FFGP/4 MD Brigadier Greville brought to Officers’ attention in late 1978 the findings of the Australian Foundation on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence. It showed that statistically half a million Australians are regular alcohol abusers, that the cost to industry in absenteeism, inefficiency, accidents and premature death amount annually to five hundred million dollars. I would think any problem in the Army would be reflected in these figures proportionally at least.
As to what degree it is affecting the efficiency of the Army as a whole at this time I cannot judge, but as it has affected members of my sub-unit I can comment. Firstly let me say that I believe alcohol has a very necessary place in the system of things which enables the Army to achieve its aims. I also believe that its misuse can be attributed to either poor leadership or irresponsibility on the part of the individual. As to alcoholism as a disease I agree with the author “There but for the Grace of God go you or I”.

Soldiers need to relax at times to relieve tension and alcohol appears to be the best thing we have to do this. I am reminded of the conversations I had with American Officers in Vietnam, of their feelings of hopelessness in coping with soldiers who used drugs anywhere and everywhere. There is no place for any drug or alcohol in operational conditions. Alcohol would appear to be the easier one to control and I recommended we stick with it.

I believe the problem in the Army is manageable by the application of common sense. Nearly every discipline problem, car smash, wife beating or injury sustained due to alcohol has been caused by an extended drinking session in my experience. If an individual makes his mind up to pursue this course there is little one can do but counsel after the event. However, there is every reason why we should plan functions, canteen/mess/club hours to prevent this occurring. We should ensure that there are food and soft drinks available. If members have to drive home after a function we should ensure there is alternative transport available or the facilities to stay over-night.

Lastly as officers and senior NCO’s I believe that we should set an example in all that this implies.

Yours faithfully,
D. T. Read,
Major.

THANK YOU

Dear Sir,

I read with regret in the September-October 1979 issue of Defence Force Journal that Mr. Taylor is relinquishing its “command” and moving off to another posting in Japan.

Mr. Taylor has done good work as the Editor of Defence Force Journal in what was at times probably a difficult and discouraging job with inadequate resources and even these sometimes grudgingly given. Australia lagged far behind and for too long in the acceptance of the need for such a journal as Defence Force Journal and its predecessor with that dreadful name Army Journal which to me always had the sound and the appearance of a telegraphic code name.

Unlike Caesar Mr. Taylor’s good work here will live on in the pages of the Defence Force Journal for all to see who care to examine these pages.

I am glad too that he left us, who did not meet him personally in this “far flung” continent, a picture of himself. One shudders to think, however, how Ita Buttrose may react to an interloper daring to share her Empire of Publicity.

Yours sincerely,
Warren Perry
Major

ANNUAL PRIZES 1979

The Board of Management has awarded the following prizes for the best articles of the year (issues No 14 to 19) to:

1st Prize ($200) — Basic Defence Planning — Strategy by Wing Commander P. J. Rusbridge in issue No 17.

2nd Prize ($75) — Army Force Development by Major G. L. Cheeseman in issue No 16.
Man: The Measure of Most Things.

Brigadier W. B. James, MBE, MC, SBSjt, MBBS, DTM&H, DPH, DIH, MFCM
Lieutenant Colonel R. J. G. Hall, psc, BA, dip log m

"Morale is a state of mind. It is an attitude of confidence and well being in the minds of individuals when they identify themselves with the group and accept group goals."
— Australian Army, Leadership, 1973

INTRODUCTION

Combat power, we are told, is the total force that a formation or unit exerts in combat; the components of combat power are firepower, mobility and morale. The notion of this combination is by no means new and the practice of fire and movement has had great bearing on the preparation for war of platoons, battalions and divisions. But in recent years we have, perhaps, allowed the significance of the contribution of morale to become a rather academic issue. We derive considerable satisfaction from reading the many excellent texts on the subject, as well as comfort from the examples of great heroism of our soldiers in the face of difficult and even terrible conditions. We are easily persuaded that, when morale is high, men will be capable of further feats of incredible endurance. History is obligingly peppered with such examples and no great captain worth his salt will have passed from the scene of his greatest triumph without planting a quote that lesser mortals can harvest endlessly.

The majority of the quotations refer to the state of mind of the man, the man who is either the leader or the led. This psychological state of man, whether he is in a war or a business, a Defence Department or a marriage, is constantly exposed to stress.

It is the matter of stress and its direct effect on morale that demands close attention by all who are concerned with preparing their men for the future. Let there be no doubt as to the nature of stress. It is:

"... any stimulus or succession of stimuli of such magnitude that tends to disrupt the normal functions of the person. When the mechanisms of adjustment fail or become disproportionate, the stress can result in disability or a total breakdown."(2)

In the context of the combat power equation, we must therefore recognize stress as a significant threat to the morale factor and therefore to the total effectiveness of the force. If we are to seriously conclude that our past ability to endurance will continue to be necessary in the future, we will have to face up to the perfectly reasonable question of how men should be prepared for and utilized in the modern battlefield. To offer some answer to this question is the challenge we take up in this article.
THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE DEMAND

The stimuli referred to in the stress definition are not new and they have not disappeared in the face of technology, changing social values or education levels. In fact we shall argue that these characteristics have added new burdens that tend to disrupt even more the normal functions of the person. Readily recognizable to the soldier are such stimuli as:

- Fear of injury, death, illness or failure;
- Overwork, for example excessive physical demands that produced debilitation;
- Isolation, such as in the case of a threat to the group identity;
- Doubt in one's capacity to meet demands;
- Hostile physical environment, such as heat, cold, thirst, hunger, noise, pain; and
- Defining one's place in the scheme of things.

It should be recognized that the stress response in man has been the same over the years. The response has been given different names but there has been a growing acceptance of the effects as being a genuine phenomenon which can be controlled. Surgeon-General Hammon of the Union Army in the American Civil War gave to the psychological disintegration of soldiers the name 'nostalgia'.(5) A further group was diagnosed as 'insane' or 'paralyzed', as a direct consequence of what today we would call stress.(4) 'Shell Shock' was the term used in World War I. It was, quite erroneously as it happens, related to the number of shells exploding in the vicinity of the soldier. When not obviously associated with prolonged exposure to shelling, judgement was that the soldier lacked moral fibre or was even guilty of cowardice.(5)

Between the World Wars the impression became widespread that psychiatric casualties originated from individuals who were particularly vulnerable to battle or other situational stress by reason of character or personality defects. In World War II, despite a greater degree of selectivity, for example, the US was rejecting 10-30% of draftees(7), the First US Army experienced a psychiatric casualty rate as high as 10%. 21st Army Group also recorded 15.6% of their total battle casualties for the campaign as psychiatric casualties.(8)

With a more enlightened attitude to recognition of the cause and treatment of the effect, the term 'exhaustion' was introduced.(9) Today we recognize the physiological responses of the body to stress. It is essentially a reflex and involuntary reaction, but no-one, least of all a leader, can afford to dismiss it or assume that its sometimes spectacular and advantageous effects can be developed beyond a very definite limit in both time and capacity.

With stress reactions a hormone is secreted into the blood stream and this hormone instantly marshalls the total body defences and mechanisms to meet the stress stimuli. For example, when stresses such as trauma, cold, heat, infection, emotional crisis including fear and anxiety are experienced. It thus affects heart action, lung function, brain action, and muscular capacities of the body. It gives that well known 'super-human strength' by which a post is taken or a comrade saved in conditions of severe stress. It has been shown that to measure the level of the hormone secreted into the blood stream against a time scale is, in fact, to measure the stress reaction in man. Experimentation has shown four distinct types of reaction to stress. These are graphically represented. (page 8)

**Type 1**, stress is sudden, short-lasting and severe; for example, when an infantryman on patrol is fired on by an unseen enemy.

**Type 2**, stress is less severe, it develops very gradually and acts for a long time; for example, when moving in an advance to contact, or at home — pregnancy in a female.

**Type 3**, shows overwhelming stress ending in death; for example following massive physical injury, about to crash in an aircraft or being charged by an overwhelming enemy.

**Type 4**, shows recovery from severe stress following near overwhelming situations as in Type 3, for example, survival from enemy assault of apparently overwhelming odds.

One can conclude from such measurements that when stress is applied to man, measurable, and more importantly, predictable capacity and behaviour patterns occur. One can show that when stress is applied to man:

- His response is in direct proportion to the degree and duration of the stressful stimuli.
His rate of response can be extremely rapid (Type 3) and so can meet the most severe challenge unless overwhelmed.

His ability to recover to his previous ‘fit state’ is both slow in commencing, and involves a considerable time lag. In simple terms, recharging his batteries is both delayed in starting and takes time. He needs rest.

He has a definite limit to stress; beyond which, he cannot function.

THE FACE OF THE FUTURE

In view of the brilliance of the analysis contained in General Sir John Hackett’s book The Third World War, it would be topical to consider some of the descriptions of the participants in the war between Russia and the Warsaw Bloc countries, and NATO, that lasted from 4-22 August 1985. In choosing these examples we are confident that none who read this book would care to dismiss it as fiction without substance.

First, the account of a sergeant in the Irish Guards fighting in Saxony:

‘... about 30 T-72s and at least twice that number of BMP now west of the obstacle, sounds of a large force following them — over’. This message crackled in the headphones into Sergeant Patterson’s half-deafened ears beneath the hood of his sweat-and-dirt-stained NBC suit. He had been awake for more than 48 hours; his last real sleep had been in his quarter near the barracks three nights before.

He silently prayed that his wife and baby daughter had got back to England safely and jerked his mind back from nameless fears to the present, to the section of Milan antitank guided weapons he commanded in the Irish Guards battle group.\(^{(1)}\)

Now another description of the first day:

‘It was so violent as to leave on most of those who first had to meet it a very deep feeling of shock. Its effect was stunning. Some of the ground troops who came through the first day unscathed were by the evening as dazed and disoriented as the survivors of a savage traffic accident’.\(^{(2)}\)

Finally, there is the response of the British AOC 11 Group, Air Defence, when asked by the C-in-C how things were going on the eighth day of the war.

‘Everyone’s tails would be right up now except that they’re so bloody tired. The aircrew are still all right — just — and we’re enforcing rest periods between sorties for them, but the ground crew
have only been snatching sleep as and when they can since the first scramble. But they're pretty well flaked out now. I hate to say it but I can't see how we can keep this pace up for more than a day or two."

These accounts are of a scale of conflict that may only be realistic in a Western European battlefield. However, if our Vietnam experience is to be considered the sole indication of the future intensity of operations, then we are deluding ourselves. Whatever scenario is painted, planning cannot be limited to operations where we have overwhelming technological advantage and the choice of time of engagement. Furthermore there is no evidence to encourage the belief that future psychiatric casualties will be any less than in World War II where one battle casualty in five was classed as psychiatric.

In looking at the face of the future in some specific but not exhaustive terms, seven aspects can be identified that give rise to stress. They are either unique, or have a degree of intensity, or represent an extreme that has not hitherto been part of our experience:

- Continuous and Increased Tempo of Operations.
- Complexity of Equipment.
- No-fault Operation.
- Isolation.
- Decision Making.
- The Comfortable Society.
- Motivation, Media and the Man.

CONTINUOUS AND INCREASED TEMPO OF OPERATIONS

The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University has postulated that future operations are likely to be conducted by both day and night on a more or less continuous basis and at an intensity greater than in our more recent experiences. Tactics must clearly change because of the lack of distinction between day and night. But now, for the first time, despite our existing concept of ‘night operations’, darkness will no longer provide concealment and rest to the extent we have assumed in the past. The duration of effective future operations may be determined simply by our ability to provide the minimum rest periods in which the body can recuperate sufficiently.

In this respect there are sound reasons for accepting as very real, the problem described earlier, in General Hackett's account of the Group Commander's conversation with his C-in-C: "... I hate to say it but I can't see how we can keep this pace up for more than a day or two."

Within our own ranks, we too can be faced with not just tired soldiers, but soldiers mentally and physically exhausted to a degree where judgement is affected, soldiers whose ability to fire is reduced, and soldiers whose capacity to handle weapons can decline dramatically. In short a situation is reached where stress has brought about an effect that will not be balanced by high morale alone. Although the integrity of the group may still exist, bolstered by the qualities of self esteem, capacity is still inexorably eroded, as the UK trial on sleep deprivation showed. Three highly motivated, fit and well trained platoons were exposed to various periods of sleep loss during which they were required to perform a number of standard drills and exercises in judgement. After 24 hours without sleep, the efficient application of basic drills had fallen off considerably. After approximately 44 hours without scheduled sleep, the soldiers overreacted to, and misunderstood, orders. After approximately 68 hours without scheduled sleep, the group was judged to be unreliable as a fighting force.

We might therefore tentatively advance the proposition that the maintenance of a higher morale than that of the enemy, is for the purpose of providing a superior margin of performance level.

COMPLEXITY OF EQUIPMENT

Field armies are also becoming more dependent on computer aids to fire control, surveillance and electronic warfare, as well as having increasing responsibilities for performance monitoring of equipments, ammunition, weapons and systems. Limits to the duration of performance are imposed both in the commercial and military world on the basis of maintaining acceptable levels of efficiency. But in order to do so in the near future, we must be aware of all the stresses that add to the burden of operation of complex equipment. The extent to which the accepted operation limits can be extended is also a matter of concern and we will return to this when we consider counters to
stress. There are, however, other stresses beyond those of the basic operation of complex equipment.

**NO FAULT OPERATION**

The demand will increasingly be for operator no-fault performance. Air traffic controllers are an example where any operator mistake is intolerable. Similarly, keying in data for position or range or reading out data for decision makers, will require the same exactness of entry and interpretation as the computer will provide in execution. A significant degree of stress will therefore and quite naturally develop in the operator. In the well-trained operator this stress will remain under control for a certain period despite, perhaps, the intrusion of other stress such as fear, complexity and environment. From the graph we can conclude that there is a limit in time beyond which stress-induced inexactness of data entry will become more frequent and possibly quite unacceptable.

**ISOLATION**

The operator will also be subject to the conflicting stresses of isolation from reality and feeling of insecurity, the latter no less obvious in the hitherto 'safe' rear area than in the forward position. It would be descending to the depths of parochialism to conclude that fear is something felt only by other soldiers — not Australians. But to remain unaware of the peculiar fears associated with the inability to see the enemy or 'hit-back' is to fail to appreciate a significant stress experienced by command post, communication and data processing operators and even commanding officers.

To the obvious comment that command post operators and communicators have long endured such stress, we point out that the trend towards electronically dependent, vehicle mounted equipment, enclosed and confined, with artificial rather than natural light, together with an increased intensity of operation, presents a vastly different picture to that of the past. One might draw analogies with submarine crews. Experience has shown that only a particular breed of men can withstand the peculiar rigours of submarine service.

**DECISION MAKING**

There seems to be little doubt that commanders at nearly all levels will have an increasing range of aids to decision-making. Indeed there will be such an abundance of information that clear issues may even be obscured. Doubtless, technology will find some solution to this, but the time in which to make decisions, whilst never luxurious, will be reduced even further. With a reduction of direct observation by commanders, who could previously see and rectify errors, an increased dependence on machine-generated information will bring about a degree of remoteness of the commander from the actual events. Without question these factors will create a new and significant stress.

**THE COMFORTABLE SOCIETY**

It was said by Benjamin Constant de Rebecque, 'The Army is people in uniform'. It is an apt enough saying for Australia with a strong tradition of a militia. Historically a distinction has always been drawn between the militia and the Regular Forces. The basis of the slightly dubious distinction has been that the militia are citizens with their loins only temporarily girt for war whilst the 'regular troops alone', said George Washington, are equal to the exigencies of war... The quotations overlook the common source of both militiamen and regular — society itself. Whilst we may still cling to the notion of the Army as a closed society governed by its own ethics, subject to its own rules and fostering some special sense of discipline and dedication, Armies have been and always will be, a direct product of society.

So it is appropriate to look at this. In doing so we find western society at large considered as being in a frightening moral slump. HRH Prince Charles, in a recent address to the Australian Academy of Science, saw 'the lack of individual moral courage as a great and abiding problem'.

Now we are not going to adopt the role of the Great Australian "Knocker", but it seems clear that our society today is different from that which produced the 1st AIF, different again from that which produced the 2nd AIF, even different from that which judged or fought the Vietnam War. It is a society that might aptly be described as aggressively egalitarian. Certainly concepts of individual freedom are abroad that increasingly are coming in conflict with the concept of "the right of society", which some condemn as 'authoritarian'. For many people, the
distinction between freedom and responsibility has become blurred.

Technological advances have created standards of living on which society is ill-prepared to compromise. Increased leisure time in a machine-intensive work area has provided a level of creature comforts which we see as ours by right. There is a tolerance of a wider range of moral attitudes than in the past. Homosexuality may be de-criminalized and a relaxation of the present legal prohibition of some of the so-called 'soft drugs' is seen by some to be almost inevitable.

It is not suggested that the transition from what might be termed a Comfortable Society to the austere life of a soldier preparing for and in combat, is impossible. But it will become more and more difficult; the gap will be wider between the two. Furthermore to soften the blow we may well be drawn into directing efforts towards what Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, USN (Retired) has called 'soda fountain morale'.

The concept of 'soda fountain morale' is that high military morale is created, or at least greatly stimulated by luxuries, privileges and fringe benefits. The significance of this will be explored later.

MOTIVATION, MEDIA AND THE MAN

The society from which we will draw our resources may indeed be more 'comfortable' but it will also be better educated and, in theory, more alert to the political issues that will be part of the conflict of the future. A direct consequence of this will be a range of political beliefs, the voicing of which will be the absolute right of the citizen. Furthermore, the public media, representing every shade of opinion, will publish accounts and counter attacks, exposes and controversies, which will bring a deal of pressure on the self-respect as well as on the sense of purpose of the soldier. There is little evidence that the soldier can assume that the nation at large will automatically hold him in particular regard. Even minority views of opposition to the scale or conduct of military action will receive sufficient media coverage to have the potential to distort a soldier's belief in his role, or raise his fear that his dependants will misunderstand his role. His own intellectual doubts will be more easily exploited and even personal belief in the cause, and those of his family, will be under great threat from media coverage of contrary beliefs.

The exposure of politicians in both the visual and printed media has had a cumulative effect on an increasingly cynical population. It is wearied by the predictable and ineffective blows exchanged by many party debaters. The conditions may no longer exist in which a latter-day Churchill might engulf the masses with his own sense of purpose and stiffen the resolve of the most spineless of his listeners. As Dr Robert O'Neill and his colleagues have observed, 'Democratic Governments will be increasingly hard pressed to provide public justification for their military actions...'

It can be seen therefore that the internal tensions of the group, into which soldiers must by the nature of their temporary or even selected employment fall, will present very great stress on both the leaders and the led.

A REFLECTION

These aspects are not exhaustive but in summary it is reasonable to claim that:

- Continuous operations at full levels of activity for protracted periods will result in a degree of mental and physical fatigue that will affect all parts of a committed force to an extent not previously experienced;
- Complex equipment will place greater demands on operator concentration than ever before with an operating intensity matching that of the force;
- High equipment operating performance standards will have to be maintained;
- There will be a tendency to increased sense of operator isolation and insecurity;
- Decisions will be made in contracting periods of time and in isolation from events;
- Manpower for the forces will come from a society whose values may be in conflict with the traditional ethos of an army; and
- Motivation will be exposed to intense intellectual and public media scrutiny and even attack.

There is no medical evidence to encourage the belief that the figures for psychiatric casualties in the future will be any less than in previous operations. On the contrary, as we suggest above, the potential for increased incidence is greater than ever before. This threat of rising incidence is intolerable in view
of our limited resources and even more intolerable when it is within our capacity to lessen the stress at national, individual and group level.

COUNTERS TO STRESS
Counter at the International and National Levels

It is perhaps of no surprise to find that, in the matter of identifying the counters to stress and better preparing the soldier to operate efficiently on the battlefield, the USSR, Canada, UK and USA have all addressed the problem.

The Soviet Army places great emphasis on the psychological aspects of warfare. Army leaders are particularly conscious of their lack of war experience and operational activity since World War II. They are prepared to go to great lengths to compensate for this shortcoming. Collective training is sustained, arduous and realistic.

Canadian doctrine emphasises particularly the role of the officer in stress-related training. In the United Kingdom, the Staff College Camberley conducts a course on battlefield psychology. There is a useful War Office pamphlet dated 1963. It certainly contains advice which is sound; the recommendations are practical and achievable. The reports from Exercise EARLY CALL are also available in Australia and should be studied by commanders at all levels.

Since about 1942 the US Army has led the world in research into the effects of combat on soldiers. A study as recent as May 1977 investigated its effects on sleep deprivation. One of the goals of the US Infantry School is to improve the distressingly low percentage of men who actually fire due to combat stress, and to alleviate the feeling of combat isolation on the battlefield.

Our own Army Training Instructions contain no references to the training of individuals to cope with stress in battle or the need for junior leaders to be familiar with or practiced in battlefield psychology. Those portions of the Training Instruction devoted to leadership, do make oblique reference to the subjects and the Army Psychology Corps is cited as an adviser in the development of a leadership syllabus. Chapter 9 of the 1973 Handbook of Leadership addresses the effects of stress, but we are unaware of any wide-spread compulsion to read it. Leadership in battle is not a formal subject that receives attention in the education of junior leaders.

Furthermore in the absence of a demonstrable link between the findings of Exercise EARLY CALL, the US studies and collective training, the Training Instruction encouragement of realism tends to almost miss the point entirely. Realism seems to be seen as a means of maintaining enthusiasm. Perhaps it is more appropriate to introduce realism for the purpose of confronting face-to-face, those elements that tend to destroy enthusiasm, create stress and demonstrate limitations.

Counter at the Individual Level

In considering the individual, as distinct from the collection of individuals in an organized and directed group, we encounter some basic problems. First, battlefield stress, including all of its component stresses, cannot be accurately re-created in a laboratory. Secondly, in those few research projects conducted under battlefield conditions it was not possible to control the stresses, thus it was impossible to attribute any one effect to any specific stress. Consequently, while the data gathered in the past helps explain the physiological effects of stress it has not been very helpful in developing specific remedies. Thus, as each individual reacts differently to stress it has proved difficult to accurately predict the effectiveness of any supposed remedy. Clearly under these circumstances the effectiveness of any method of combating the effects of stress must be a matter of subjective judgement.

Following the heavy losses in World War I attributed to 'shell shock' the belief developed that the soldiers most prone to this affliction could be identified, and rejected for combat service by a battery of psychological tests. But the US Army still suffered over 1½ million psychiatric casualties in the course of World War II and consequently reduced its reliance on selection procedures. However, whilst the search for improved selection procedures continues and technique is constantly being researched, it is a very imprecise science.

Australian selection procedures are also being developed in an effort to reduce the cumulative stresses experienced by ADP and communication operators and other high skill
level performers, by trying to improve identification of particular aptitudes. Yet we suggest that final selection must be made at unit operating level with the sure knowledge that there will be losses. Heroes rarely fit the Hollywood image and one has seen so often the apparent bronzed Anzac fail whilst the man seemingly less endowed, succeeds.

Whilst some attention can and should be given to increasing the physical capacity by proper physical training, the physiological and psychological limits can be toyed with by the use of amphetamine drugs. Certainly they will combat the effects of sleep deprivation, but only in the short term. On the other hand they are addictive and regular use will frequently produce maniac or hallucinogenic behaviour, both of course being totally unacceptable for the occupation of a soldier.

The object of training has always been to prepare for war. Yet even when we have done this properly, the preparation of the soldier to cope specifically with battlefield stress has occurred as a consequence of something else. We are concerned that, from a misplaced sense of what is relevant, the nature of stress and its effect on the soldier gets too little attention. So as a direct means of reducing the effects of stress we suggest the need to consider seven courses.

First, develop a high degree of physical fitness as a means to combat fatigue and if necessary to find the personal limits of endurance. General Richardson, a former ADMS of 51 (Scottish) Div in World War II and later DMS BAOR, writes of a confrontation with his Corps Commander who was, in his view, driving the divisional commanders too hard in training. General Richardson advocated the exercise of command by their subordinates, unless, ‘it is the purpose of the Corps Commander to find weak links and break them.’ The Corps Commander, Sir Hugo Stockwell, responded that it indeed was his purpose to find weak links and to break them. General Richardson was shaken, but the merit in knowing your limit and that of your subordinates before being found wanting at a more critical moment should be recognized.

Whilst knowing that limit is desirable, driving people beyond it is certainly the greatest folly.

Second, expose the soldier to hard realistic training with an intensity and duration of the expected operations of the future. In the matter of realism, the noises and sights of battle are essential, for such realism will involve all the senses and thus produce the succession of stimuli that is stress.

Third, make the soldier aware of the effects of stress and, in so doing, encourage the belief that experiencing stress trains individuals to recognize their faults and be able to overcome its effects without necessarily becoming a casualty.

Fourth, build a strong feeling of confidence based on proven capabilities to perform under the most demanding of conditions and to exploit his weapons, equipments and training potential for reliability and effect.

Fifth, to attack the more insidious aspects of fear — that of the unknown, by familiarizing the soldier with the real capacity of the enemy and his technology, his tactics and the effects of his weapons.

Sixth, to provide positive encouragement to the value of a religious faith. We object to the more popular cynicism so easily acquired by leaders who remark “there are no atheists in foxholes”. We also have a personal reservation about mounting an attack yelling “The Sword of the Lord and Gideon” to encourage the recalcitrant. But the universal experience of generals from Xenophon to Montgomery who claim that a man’s faith is important to him and thus the Army, cannot be denied. Indeed experience has led us to believe that there is an inner strength in all men connected with this belief in God and the leader who disregards it is no better than a fool.

Finally, to develop a belief in the cause for which the soldier may be required to fight. Here we touch on a matter that has become a source of embarrassment both within the community at large and in the Army. Words like ‘patriotism’ tend to cause a soldier to blush, the concept of responsibility towards the protection of the country’s ‘interests’, ‘values’, ‘way-of-life’ is almost meaningless and cynicism clouds our trust of diplomatic posturing and justifications for military action. But belief in a cause is no less relevant than when the English King shouted to his troops, ‘Cry God for Harry, England and Saint George’ and led his army to victory at Agincourt. Perhaps we need to substitute ‘home and family’ for ‘sovereign and Country’, but to withdraw behind the claim that there are no absolute rights and wrongs and therefore no credible cause for which to
fight, is a piece of moral cowardice ill-becoming a leader. These matters deserve a great deal more thought.

The matters referred to are those that Admiral Henry Eccles would have called ‘weapon morale’. Possibly they have not made a significant addition to a list of actions that should be both well known and supported. However, some things bear repetition. In the growing absence of combat experience we do well to remember that a nation gets what it trains for neither more nor less. Yet to preach great truths and do nothing about them is disaster.

Some comment must also be made on another equally disastrous direction which can be so easily taken. Recognizing that ‘weapon morale’ can, in fact, be unpopular, even difficult to attain, the attractions of Henry Eccles’ ‘soda fountain morale’ are obvious and seductive. This is particularly so when the otherwise sound principles of good administration and a concern for the comfort of the soldier, can be perverted. Rather than delve into what are the basic elements of good morale, such as clean socks, mail, speed of medical service, general welfare, recreation, concerts and being ‘kept in the picture’, some random but topical flavours from the soda fountain are now explored.

The old military myth that a certain amount of pillage and rape is good for morale is well known. Indeed, defacto recognition of this dubious proposition has been as much a feature of 20th century armies as in less civilized times. Certainly sexual terrorism has never been countenanced by Australian leaders, but discreetly supervised bar girl establishments may be taken as evidence of the belief that soldiers have some special requirement for sexual relief. It is perhaps our tendency to avoid moral minefields, that has contributed to the plausible illusion that all soldiers being rested from operations are indeed relieved and their morale improved by intense sexual activity. Our observations in Vietnam lead us to believe that soldiers of all ranks, who were sexually active, acquired an impressive but unwelcome guilt feeling and, physically and mentally, were far from rested. On the contrary, their capacity to fully develop or maintain their potential as a soldier was considerably undermined.

Another flavour in the product of our ‘soda fountain’ is the one with the extra kick — that of alcohol and drugs.

Doctors have long recognized the value of the can of beer when over-tired or subject to particular stresses. But doctors as well as soldiers should question what is being obtained by giving tacit approval and very clear opportunity to relax from operations by two or three day binges, which bring a lack of consciousness but provide none of the advantages of genuine rest.

In the context of tomorrow’s conflict we feel obliged to ask if we have the manpower resources to engage in this sort of unwinding.

In the matter of drugs, no advantage is seen in even controlled recreational use for the reasons that after-effects and cumulative effects are undesirable and they degrade the performance of military skills.

‘Soda-fountain morale’ must be rejected because it adds not one jot to mental fitness. On the contrary it can pose a real threat to both mental and physical fitness to the extent that ability to fight can be placed in serious doubt. We are quite aware that by attacking some tacitly accepted forms of escapism, we add further to the particular stresses experienced by leaders. So in this third and last level of counters to stress, some comment on the leader and the group will be made.

**Counter at the Group Level**

There is no point considering a group unless it is in the context of being led. The groups referred to can be as closely knit as a section or platoon, but our comments are equally valid in the less obvious groupings, such as an operations centre, ad hoc functional teams, and informal groups made up of formation or unit commanders.

When offering observation on the topic of leadership, one should be conscious of the danger of advocating something which Correlli Barnett scathingly describes as a ‘cross between Billy Graham and a super Boy Scout’ but over and above those traditional requirements for loyalty, example, dedication, proficiency and the moral courage to reject the attractions of ‘soda fountain morale’, there are some practical aspects connected with the problem of maintaining group identity, which we do not hesitate to identify.

Both the leader and the led must acquire a genuine appreciation of the range of factors that bring about battlefield stress. We have described some of these already. Other factors can be identified, but we should not judge
simply on the basis of our own experience. Situations that we might brush aside can devastate another person. Furthermore, conscious that a variety of events can bring about stress, the various symptoms should be recognized. Both Richardson and Marshall have contributed to this list:

- Restlessness and sleeplessness,
- Loss of appetite,
- Instability and jumpiness,
- Deterioration in efficiency,
- Increase in smoking and drinking,
- Change in temperament,
- Failure to fire.

In order to fulfill their responsibilities, junior leaders in particular, must obviously be well versed in battlefield psychology. They must understand the types of stress which they will encounter, the warning signs of impending breakdown, and the steps to take to either preempt or cope with psychological casualties. They must also be conversant with the measures available before and during battle to minimize the effects of combat stress.

Of all the pre-emptive measures that are a natural consequence of sound leadership, an appreciation of the value of rest deserves special mention.

The Nature of Care

To date, rest has been found to be the only means of avoiding stress related casualties or of minimizing the seriousness of those casualties which cannot be avoided. The term 'rest' includes the regular relief of combat units or individuals, rest at the RAP for those who have become or are close to becoming psychiatric casualties, and, of course, sleep.

The documentary evidence of the Allies in World War II gave great weight to the recommendation for limited tours of duty which were introduced in Korea and Vietnam. Whilst this practice did provide a means of regular relief it may no longer have the same value in the context of a vastly increased tempo of operation. Nevertheless the principle of limited tours remains sound. Similarly the 1944 policy of providing rest centres co-located with unit and formation aid posts is also sound. The recent UK and US experiments with the effects of sleep deprivation have heightened the concern that should be felt for commanders and staff. The provision of adequate rest for the command element can no longer be left to chance.

When the importance of rest is related to the weight given to group cohesion, two desirable practices become obvious. Firstly units or sub-units should be rested regularly and as a group. That is, rest periods should be provided for groups, not individuals, in order that the group cohesion is maintained. In this respect we would not favour the separation of the NCO’s from the other ranks in the group. Secondly, when any unit requires large scale reinforcements perhaps it would be best to rest the entire unit so that new reinforcements can be integrated in a less stressful setting.

Yet despite all our efforts, we will continue to sustain psychiatric casualties. The seriousness of such casualties however, can be minimized by appropriate care. Properly treated, psychiatric casualties may well be able to return to duty. In general terms, the appropriate treatment will be provided promptly and as close to the front as possible. The further reaward the casualty is evacuated the harder it will be to treat him and to prevent his permanent loss from the battlefield. The best treatment is prevention, that is, reduced stress, sleep and wise counselling. The success of the treatment will depend on junior leaders and RMOS being thoroughly familiar with the subject of battlefield stress and battlefield psychology.

The leader equipped in these terms outlined is clearly in the position to contribute to the group ethos that is the fundamental nature of morale. Whatever his level he will inculcate in his group the feeling of identity and worth, security (but of course, not invincibility), confidence, belief in the cause, and faith in the leadership. The group will be encouraged to obtain high standards of performance and, in the face of the demands of the operation, reject mental and physical aberrations that will place the group capacity at risk.

CONCLUSION

It seems that we have now arrived at a position where a final review should be made. We have contended that the soldier has a limit to his endurance, which is a matter that has not always been accepted. We can also show from the data of Ex EARLY CALL that the absolute barrier can be identified and it will not retreat by pretending that it is not there. A great many stresses in future operations will drive the
soldier of every rank headlong towards that barrier.

In our next war, as in every war in the past, man is both the target and the weapon, subject to physical and psychological damage — testimony that war is and will continue to be, horrific, fear-inducing and mentally and physically destructive.

Whilst man has long been seen as the measure of all things, he is nevertheless a fairly fragile creature, prone to fears, doubts, weaknesses and, at times great courage and strength. It behoves leaders at all levels to understand the genuine limits of endurance, to husband the human resource and direct their energies now to its long term conservation.

The preparation for and utilization of the man on the modern battlefield will be in direct proportion to the success of our conservation policies.

Endnotes

(12) Hackett, op cit, p 30.
(13) Hackett, op cit, p 219.
(14) Based on DMS Staff research of American and Australian Official War Histories (Medical).
(16) Armed Forces Personnel Research Establishments (APRE), The Effect of Continuous Operations upon Military Performance on the Infantryman (EX EARLY CALL), Reports No 2/77 and 4/78, HMSO.
(18) APRE Report 4/78.
(20) Ibid, p 269.
(21) HRH The Prince of Wales in his speech at the induction as a Royal Fellow of the Academy of Science, Canberra, 26 Mar 79.
(26) Departments of Military Psychiatry, Military Medical Psychophysiology and the US Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, USACIEM Report, May 77.
(27) OCS Portsea appears to be an exception in this respect. See Bramah, J. S., Guivarra T. W., and Pennell I. J., Staff College Paper, 'Stress in Battle', 1978, p 20.
(30) Ibid, p 77.
(31) According to Shakespeare, Henry V, Act III, Scene I.
(35) Richardson, op cit, p 172.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue are available in various defence libraries:


PREFACE

The defiance of State institutions and laws by large sections of the community has been a persistent feature of social and political behaviour in many Western countries in recent years. Examples in Australia include the opposition to the Vietnam war, street marches in Queensland and the virtual open use of marijuana. Citizens have felt justified in deliberately breaching laws which they have perceived as being manifestly wrong and unjust. It is probably fair to say that civil disobedience in Australia has never threatened the government of the day, even though emotions did run high during the Vietnam protests. However, this was not the case in India where, between 1917 and 1944, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi used civil disobedience and non-co-operation as a uniquely non-violent form of revolution, known as satyagraha, as a means of overthrowing the British Government. The Gandhian mode of revolt posed singular ethical problems both for those who supported the Mahatma and for the civil and military authorities who opposed him. In attempting to outline the nature of the Gandhian mode of revolt, this article discusses the philosophy of satyagraha and its application during the 1920-22 Non-Co-operation Campaign and the 1930-34 Civil Disobedience Campaign. It concludes with several observations on the practice of civil disobedience in the West in recent years.

A revolution involves the social and political overthrow of a government, in the process of which power is transferred from one social group to another. Before the advent of Gandhi, almost all national struggles were fought in physically violent terms; Machiavelli’s notorious statement that “the end justifies the means” characterized the revolutionary ethic. Following the success of the Bolsheviks, some Indians were attracted to the formula of class struggle and violent revolution; in a message to the Indian National Congress session held at Gaya in 1923 the Comintern operative M. N.
Roy wrote: "British rule in India was established by force and is maintained by force; therefore it can and will be overthrown only by a violent revolution. The economic, social and cultural progress of the Indian people demands the complete separation of India from Imperialist Britain. To realize this separation is the goal of revolutionary nationalism. This goal, however, cannot be attained by negotiation nor by peaceful means." Gandhi totally rejected this thesis, believing that in India's fight for freedom, politics could not be separated from religion. He spiritualized politics and, instead of subscribing to conventional dogma, propounded a new doctrine which inter-related ends and means. Gandhi believed that "if one takes care of the means the end will take care of itself". Means and ends were convertible terms in his philosophy of life.

Thus, to attain Swaraj — the self-rule so eagerly sought by Indian nationalists — it was essential to use just and righteous methods. By using such methods, India not only would be liberated from British Imperialism, but the very nature of the struggle — the means — would also lead to a purging of internal ills and a moral regeneration of the country. The means Gandhi used was that of satyagraha.

To Gandhi, satyagraha was "a movement intended to replace methods of violence and a movement based entirely upon truth". The word translates literally as 'persistence for truth', but its most widely accepted meaning is 'truth force'. Gandhi held that there was truth, but no individual could obtain the absolute; therefore, there will be conflict. Since no one has absolute truth, then neither do they have the right to force or punish with their ideas. The logical conclusion of this is that conflict must take place without force, and any resort to violence usurps this dialectic. According to Jawaharlal Nehru, it is because people do not understand this reasoning process that so few conflicts are completely resolved; additionally, it is the use of the wrong methods which leads to further conflicts. While totally opposing any form of physical violence as a means to an end, Gandhi nevertheless drew a fine distinction on the use of the force of ideas by permitting satyagraha to employ moral coercion.

Satyagraha tapped the deepest roots of India's cultural heritage, for Gandhi relied not only on the Aryan cosmogonic force of satya, but also on pre-Aryan yogic powers, including meditation, fasting, silence, and non-violence to any living thing. It is important to note that the degree to which the action technique is effective is largely dependent upon the satyagrahi's understanding of, and belief in, the accompanying metaphysics, for in practice, the satyagrahi is most likely to find the truth through suffering. There was never any suggestion, however, that a satyagrahi should be passive; on the contrary, Gandhi went to great pains to distinguish between passive resistance and satyagraha in order to protect his followers from the taint of weakness implicit in 'passive'. Satyagrahi had to be prepared to accept the consequences of their beliefs and actions, and in many cases these consequences were violent reaction. The essence of the satyagraha was strength, for it was necessary to resist evil not with more evil but with good. Gandhi's doctrine was 'a vindication of truth, not by infliction of suffering on the opponent but on one's self'. He was teaching that truth is embedded in non-violence, and non-violence in truth.

There is no question that Gandhi developed his philosophy of non-violent revolution solely on religious, moral and ethical grounds. However, it is worth mentioning that satyagraha was also particularly relevant to India's situation in practical terms because of the fact that, apart from a few small bands of terrorists, the civilian population was totally disarmed. This situation stemmed from the Arms Act of 1878, which disbarred native Indians from carrying weapons. Further, satyagraha was also appropriate to the nature of the British style of rule, which allowed a large measure of civil liberty. Of all the colonial powers of the period, England was probably the most susceptible to an appeal to conscience; it is hard to imagine, for example, the Dutch or the French displaying similar restraint in the face of colonial agitation. Thus, satyagraha was appropriate to the Indian culture and psyche, the materials available, and the nature of the adversary.

A fundamental point in Gandhi's early use of satyagraha was that it should be used only to protest against specific injustices; it was imperative that those involved in disobedience campaigns were seen to be opposing something which was manifestly wrong. Thus, his first
campaign in India, the Champaran Satyagraha of 1917-18, was directed against the pernicious practices of European indigo planters. Following this, the Non-Co-operation Campaign of 1920-22 was triggered by the Rowlatt Bills, which were enacted in 1919 to combat Indian terrorism. In the event, the provisions of the Bills were never enforced, but the very fact that the legislation was even considered at the end of a war in which Indians had fought loyally for the Commonwealth was an enormous insult to them. As with the Champaran campaign, the Rowlatt Satyagraha was launched in response to a specific injustice, for Gandhi believed that his countrymen were being subjected to treatment which would never be applied to other citizens of the Empire. Gandhi’s fight with the British was not over Imperialism or Colonialism but a particularly inequitable law. He and a few followers signed a pledge proclaiming their intention “to refuse civilly to obey (the Rowlatt Bills) and such other laws as (we) may think fit and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.”

The Rowlatt Campaign attracted tremendous support from Indians of all political shades. It was suspended after only twelve days because of mob violence at Ahmedabad and other places, but it was epoch-making, for it signified the first nation-wide support for the freedom movement.

One of the most significant protests against the Rowlatt legislation took place on 13 April 1919 at Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar. Despite the fact that the protest was orderly and peaceful, Government troops under the command of General Dyer opened fire on some 10,000 people gathered in the bagh. Gandhi was outraged by the massacre, but remained a loyalist. He believed in the notion of British justice, and was confident that General Dyer would be brought to account for his actions. However, the committee of enquiry headed by Lord Hunter brought down a finding that Dyer’s action was nothing more than “a grave error of judgement based on an honest but mistaken concept of duty”. This decision, and the public approbation which General Dyer received in Britain, destroyed once and for all Gandhi’s faith in the British sense of justice and led to a profound change in his attitude to British government. In a significant reappraisal of his revolutionary philosophy, Gandhi declared that satyagraha no longer need be restricted to protest against specific issues, but should be a nation-wide campaign to ‘bring the Raj to its knees’. By its actions after Jallianwala Bagh, the British Government had shown itself to be totally morally corrupt; therefore, action against the entire Government and not just specific injustices was legally and morally justifiable. The mere presence of such a morally degenerate organization in India was sufficient cause for protest.

Shortly after the Hunter Committee Report was made public, further evidence of what Gandhi had come to see as the inherently corrupt nature of British rule was manifested in the Treaty of Sevres. Prior to the treaty talks, the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, had undertaken to protect the Moslem temporal institution of Khilafat by respecting the territorial integrity of Turkey. Despite Lloyd George’s pledge, Turkey was dismembered, placing Khilafat in grave danger. Gandhi immediately launched the Non-Co-operation Movement on 1 August 1920 to redress the twin wrongs of the Hunter Report and Khilafat, promising that Swaraj would be attained within the year.

Subhas Chandra Bose strongly attacked Gandhi’s conduct of the Non-Co-operation Campaign. He believed the Mahatma to have made a blunder of “Himalayan proportions”, firstly for allowing so much of the attention of the satyagraha to focus on himself, and secondly for making the Khilafat issue central to the independence movement. Bose felt that it was wrong for too much power and responsibility to be handed over to one man, and that by allowing this to happen, Gandhi committed the entire Indian National Congress to following the thoughts of only one man. While this criticism is not without some justification, it ignores the fact that, in its early stages, the freedom movement needed a central point which could be easily identified and around which the masses could rally. Gandhi himself acted as the focal point, as his unique interpretation of ‘peaceful’ revolution, drawn from the deepest roots of India’s cultural heritage, was a concept to which millions of Indians could relate. He “stood before the injured national pride of many of his countrymen like a rock of salvation”, and his instructions had “the influence of a semi-divine command”.

He was the Swarajist’s greatest
As far as the Khilafat movement was concerned, Bose believed that Gandhi’s introduction of the specifically Moslem problem into Indian politics was undesirable. He considered that if the Khilafatists had been encouraged simply to join the Indian National Congress, then the subsequent schisms caused when the Turks themselves killed the Khilafat issue would not have been so great, and that the Khilafatist Moslems would then have been completely absorbed into the ranks of the nationalists. However, the situation facing Gandhi wasn’t as simple as that. While he was enjoying enormous success in mobilizing the masses, Gandhi’s use of Hindu cultural roots through Hindu symbols tended to polarize India’s pluralistic communal society. The British attack on the integrity of Turkey and the holy places of Islam presented him with ‘such an opportunity for uniting Hindus and Moham medans as would not arise in a hundred years’. Although the Khilafat movement died in 1924 with Ataturk’s abolition of his own Caliphate, Gandhi’s initial success in bringing the Moslems into the Indian independence movement was a vital factor in providing support from all factions of the community for the first national satyagraha.

The Non-Co-operation Campaign infused millions of Indians with their first strong feelings of nationalism, changing them from loyal supporters of the British Raj into activists who were no longer content to obey Government orders. A feature of the campaign was the severe embarrassment it caused the Raj. A typical example of this was the boycott of the Prince of Wales during his visit in late 1921; wherever he went, the heir to the Empire was greeted by opposition and generally received a cold reception from Indians. In reaction to the growing strength of Gandhi’s movement, the Government began to implement a program of indiscriminate arrests and impose unnecessarily harsh sentences. This was a critical point in the campaign and is testimony to the effectiveness and rationale of Gandhi’s tactics. Gandhi wanted to expose the ‘satanic nature’ of the Government, and his success depended on how the British responded to his campaign. By their actions, British officials showed that they did not, at this stage, appreciate the nature of Gandhi’s revolution. If they were to resist him, it was not a matter of retaining control by force of arms, but rather of retaining respect and prestige. The mass arrests and harsh sentences simply served to illustrate the ‘illegal’ nature of their rule and was exactly what Gandhi wanted; he was undermining British prestige. His success in this respect was illustrated by the fact that, for the first time, large numbers of moderates started to join his cause.

Gandhi was riding on the crest of a wave and, when he advised the Government of his intention to start a civil disobedience movement at Bardoli on 8 February 1922, nationalist expectations were running high. However, just when he appeared to be on the verge of major triumph, Gandhi suspended the entire campaign because of the murder of 22 policemen at Chauri Chaura. His decision to stop the satyagraha brought anger and resentment from many INC leaders, including Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, Lala Lajpat Rai, C. R. Das, the Ali brothers and Subhas Chandra Bose. These men felt that to call a halt just when conditions for the success of the campaign were so good, and when public enthusiasm was reaching a peak, was a national calamity. However, if Gandhi had proceeded with the revolution after Chauri Chaura, he would have compromised his tenet of ‘ends and means’ and been false to his whole credo. He could not allow his movement to dissolve into violence. The essence of Gandhian revolution was spelt out clearly by the Mahatma when he announced that Chauri Chaura had made it obvious that Indians were not yet ready to implement satyagraha: “God has warned me that there is not as yet in India that non-violent and truthful atmosphere which alone can justify mass disobedience.”

On a more practical level, a point which Gandhi’s critics possibly overlooked was that, had India been liberated overnight by mass violence, the British Army and Police would not have been available to assist Congress in maintaining order, and the whole sub-continent might have become engulfed in uncontrollable anarchy and mass murder. Gandhi abandoned political agitation in favour of a social welfare program, hoping by such methods to prepare India’s masses for the self-control required of true satyagrahis.

Judged purely on material results, the Non-Co-operation Campaign could be considered a
THE GANDHIAN MODE OF REVOLT

failure; it could redeem neither its promise of Swaraj within the year nor that made to the Khilafatists. Further, Gandhi's sudden decision to halt the campaign was a severe blow to the morale of all nationalists. Nevertheless, in the changes in the attitude of mind it engendered among millions of Indians, the campaign was a success. The willingness and ability of the people to endure hardship and punishment inflicted by the Government was remarkable, and Indians gained a new confidence in their ability to fight for freedom. Additionally, the independence movement had become truly national, involving the active participation of the masses. Non-Co-operation also changed the character of the Indian National Congress, which in the past had been described as a 'ramshackle coalition' and a 'convivial debating society'. The INC was changed, almost overnight, into a genuine revolutionary organization. Perhaps even more remarkable was the fact that Congress was not a revolutionary party working in secret, but one which was widely accepted all over India. The Non-Co-operation Campaign made it possible for national energies to be directed in a concentrated, cohesive and positive manner towards Swaraj.

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The Civil Disobedience Campaign of 1930-34 was precipitated by three separate events. Foremost among these was the appointment by Westminster of the all-white Simon Commission to review the Government of India Act of 1919. The fact that no Indians were included on the Commission was taken as a national insult. Secondly, following the success of the Bardoli Satyagraha of 1928, the circumstances seemed ideal for another nation-wide campaign. Finally, the world economic depression had had a devastating effect on India, and the Government's inflexible attitude had had a suggested easing of individual economic burdens aroused widespread anger.

Civil Disobedience featured boycotts of foreign goods and businesses, social boycott of government officials, picketing of liquor shops and the celebration of special days. Most of these sanctions had been applied during the Non-Co-operation Campaign, but Gandhi saw Civil Disobedience as a 'fiercer' weapon than non-co-operation, with an emphasis on 'civil breaches of unmoral statutory enactments'. Thus, a high mark of the 1930-34 campaign was reached in April 1930 when the Mahatma led the famous Dandi March to deliberately breach the inequitable Salt Laws. This event took place close to the anniversary of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre; Jawaharlal Nehru marvelled at Gandhi's political acumen as he observed the abounding enthusiasm of those participating. In the five months following Gandhi's dramatic gesture 60,000 people were arrested for salt-making. Gandhi's universal appeal was apparent in the fact that large numbers of women began to take part in the agitation.

However, just when Gandhi once again seemed to have the Government on the run, he interrupted his campaign, this time to hold a series of discussions with the Viceroy, Lord Irwin. Although he was criticized by many of his followers for opening a dialogue with Lord Irwin, it seems likely that Gandhi felt he had to take the opportunity to negotiate because of his position of previously unequalled strength. The success of the Civil Disobedience Campaign was alarming the Government, while favourable conditions for negotiation existed in the fact that a comparatively sympathetic Labour Government was in power in Britain and Lord Irwin was progressive and liberal. The talks had profound significance for the Indian freedom movement. For the first time in the history of British India, the Government treated Congress and its leaders as equal political opponents. By signing a joint agreement with Gandhi, the Viceroy had increased the prestige and stature of the INC and recognized its authority to act on behalf of political India. It is also relevant to note that the whole process of the liberation of India, which took seventeen more years to complete, was contained in essence in the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. It could be argued that, by agreeing to meet with Lord Irwin, Gandhi was an opportunist. However, his belief in the inextricable link between ends and means was clearly illustrated shortly after the conclusion of the Irwin Pact when the issue of untouchability was introduced into the struggle.

In August 1932 Ramsay MacDonald announced his intention to enact a Communal Award which would make provision for separate electorates for depressed classes, among whom were the untouchables. This was totally unacceptable to Gandhi, who believed it to be more important to keep untouchables within the fold of Hinduism than to pursue his
The ultimate aim of independence. He embarked upon a fast onto death, arguing that as "a man of religion", he had "no other course left open". He regretted the frustration his action caused radical nationalists but was not prepared to compromise his fundamental belief in ends and means, summarizing his views by saying: "I believe that if untouchability is rooted out it will not only cure Hinduism of a terrible blot but its repercussion will be worldwide. My fight against untouchability is a fight against the impure in humanity."

Stanley Wolpert considers that this was yet another example of 'Gandhi's religio-political instinct (proving) its universal revolutionary genius'.

An agreement was reached between Gandhi and the untouchable leader, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, which defused the issue. The delay had, however, taken away a lot of the momentum of civil disobedience. Several campaigns were effected in the following months, but popular support had waned, so Gandhi suspended the movement indefinitely on 7 April 1934. The Civil Disobedience Campaign had not achieved its objective of Swaraj, but it has succeeded in bringing millions of previously uncommitted Indians into the fight for freedom, highlighted the unjust nature of the British India Government, and given the Indian National Congress a legitimacy unique among revolutionary organizations. In concert with the campaign of 1920-22, the foundations had been laid for the subsequent INC electoral successes of 1937, which in turn made the winning of freedom by constitutional methods inevitable.

Testimony to the suitability of the Gandhian mode of revolt to the objective circumstances prevailing in India exists in the simple fact that, while Marxism-Leninism and other violence-oriented ideologies made little impact during the period under review, satyagraha attracted the support of millions from all parts of the sub-continent. While some of the issues which Gandhi was able to use to mobilize support (eg. religion) would probably be inappropriate in most Western countries, his revolution nevertheless provided several fundamental principles which have been observed by those practising civil disobedience in the West in the past fifteen years. In particular, the emphasis on ends and means, and the notion that moral justification has rested solely with those protesting, have both been apparent. It can be argued that the Johnson and Nixon Administrations failed to recognize the nature of the public opposition to Vietnam, and that they were facing what was, in effect, a movement based largely on Gandhian precepts. It might also be argued that their initial reactions were similar to those of the British in India, and resulted in a similar loss of prestige and legitimacy. The disintegration of the morale and fighting effectiveness of certain units of the American armed forces in Indo-China was one result of this perceived loss of governmental legitimacy.

NOTES
9. Speeches supporting General Dyer were made in Parliament, while his admirers presented him with a sword of honour and a purse of £20,000.
11. A right-wing leader and sometimes associate of Gandhi. He subsequently abandoned the INC, and in World War II aligned himself with Nazi Germany.
12. 'India in 1920', in Kaushik, op. cit., p. 229.
17. V. Shean, in Kaushik, op. cit., p. 240.
THE RODC: It's not too late to change

Review Article

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The regular occurrence in the last two decades of studies into various aspects of the military profession can be taken as evidence of the changing social and strategic environment confronting the Army. The apparent failure of the Army to continue to remain in step with change, thereby necessitating further studies, probably indicates that change has occurred more rapidly than expected or that past measures that have been implemented to account for outside change have been inadequate. It might also indicate that the underlying reasons why the Army inevitably ends up out of step with a developing society have never been fully addressed.

In 1976, the Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) was established to "determine the professional development needs of Regular Army Officers and to produce a program to satisfy those determinations". Some eighteen months later, the RODC presented its findings to the Chief of the General Staff. The final report comprises six separate volumes covering topics ranging from the future environment likely to confront the services, through education, training and career management, to a report on the utilisation of officers who are outside the mainstream of the profession of arms. In view of the varied background of the members of the Committee and the nature of their task, the report represents a significant achievement and, together with the collection of documents that have been archived by the RODC, must become the reference point for all future studies.

As a result of their investigations, the Committee has recommended extensive changes to the present system of officer development, which will substantially alter the observed pattern of officer employment. Significant changes include the adoption of career streaming or specialisation, equal opportunities for female officers, substantial variations to the system of officer assessment and promotion, and the rationalisation of the method of commissioning officers. To assist the implementation of their proposals, the Committee has also provided a detailed timetable which aims to complete the recommended changes to the officer development system by the late 1980s. By all accounts, the majority of these changes are being accepted by the Army.

While the RODC findings address most of the problems and environmental changes currently faced by the Army, there is some doubt whether the solutions that have been adopted by the Committee have gone far enough to ensure that the officer corps will continue to meet its future responsibilities. These personal reservations are held on three grounds, of which only one will be considered in detail here. First, the Committee appears to have underestimated the future effects of technological change. While advances in technology have been recognised as an important determinant of the military's future environment, it does not seem to play the same role in the Committee's final recommendations. Secondly, in proposing a
‘dual career’ approach to career management, no serious analysis seems to have been made of alternative approaches that encompass specialisation. There is the faint suspicion that the dual career approach was ultimately adopted because it is the method chosen by the US Army. It remains to be seen whether an approach that may be suitable for the US, with its substantial difference in size, is the best for Australia’s unique requirements. Finally, there is the doubt whether the underlying causes of undue conservatism in the military profession (defined as the unquestioning acceptance of the status quo) have again been sufficiently addressed, thereby ensuring that the Army will inevitably fall out of step with its changing surroundings.

This article is primarily concerned with the expected predominance of military conservatism. Within the context of the RODC’s findings on Australia’s future social, strategic and technological environment, it is argued that the previously unified military profession will split into two distinct groups: a conservative component largely aligned with the traditional military ethos associated with the war-fighting role of the Army, and a new, more liberal, intellectually inspired, non-combat component which will not have the same rigid commitment to tradition or dogma as its combat counterpart. The RODC recommendations do little to reduce the potential conflict that is inherent in this military dichotomy. By stressing the primary importance of the combat role of the Army, the Committee has provided for the continuing supremacy within the profession of a conservative military ‘culture’. The way in which this conservative hegemony is achieved, the implications for the military profession of the ensuing conflict between the two ‘cultures’ and some suggested ways of restoring the balance of power are briefly described. The approach used in this article may be seen to be more polemical than analytical; that has been intentional in order to highlight the need for detailed sociological studies into the Australian military ethos as much as to criticise the RODC.

**Australia’s Future Environment**

**RODC Study Number Four** surveys the likely trends in “officer development requirements to the turn of the century”. This examination of Australia’s future environment was carried out in two ways. A forecasting study was used to identify the “‘military, social, political, economic and technological trends that might affect the manner in which the Army acquired men and material to meet its future needs’’. This approach involved the interrogation of a number of military and civilian ‘experts’ from whom a consensus on overall trends that might affect the military was derived. The primary importance of the forecasting study was that it identified those areas of change that had a general impact on officer development and therefore provided a measure with which to gauge the effectiveness of recommended changes to the system.

The second approach had a more limited goal. Three separate studies were commissioned to specifically examine “the future operational and defence policy-making settings and their possible effects on officer development”. In contrast to the forecasting study, the findings of these latter studies have had a direct bearing on the system of officer development proposed by the RODC and therefore are of major concern to this article.

**Assumptions**

Two important assumptions relating to the Army’s future role were made by the Committee, which influenced the direction, if not the content of their recommendations. First, it was assumed that Australia should direct its defence planning towards providing “for a military response capable of meeting the highest level of potential threat short of a superpower invasion”. Following on from this assumption, was the acceptance by the Committee that such a response can be provided by the current force structure. While there can be no real argument against the first of these assumptions, given the recent changes in US foreign policy, the second assumption is disappointing in the light of information provided to the Committee. The arguments contained in the submission from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University alone would seem to provide sufficient evidence to suggest that the present size and structure of the Army needs to be changed in order to meet its strategic objectives.¹

To be fair to the RODC, it should be added that they were constrained from considering organisational changes by their Terms of

¹.
THE RODC: IT’S NOT TOO LATE TO CHANGE

Reference and that the Committee did recommend that studies should be conducted into alternative force structures. They also made the important observation that Defence planning presently suffers from a lack of both a detailed strategic guidance and a statement of Australia’s national objectives. The specification of this fundamental guidance is seen as “Australia’s single most important and most urgent defence need. The future security of the nation will depend on the quality of the analytical and decision-making processes involved”.

Future Operations and Defence Policy Formulation

The first half of the study into the future operational and defence policy making requirements dealt with recent general trends in Australia’s strategic environment and the recent changes in the nature of warfare. The increased use of military force as a means of preventing the outbreak of wars, the requirement for Australia to exhibit greater self-reliance in pursuing its own defence, the escalating costs of military hardware and manpower and the likelihood that future large-scale military conflict, when it does arise, will be short-lived and will involve the deployment and destruction of significant national resources, were cited as evidence that defence is no longer the exclusive domain of the military. Rather, the defence of Australia must now be viewed in terms of ‘total defence’ where the development of defence strategies and military capabilities must take cognizance of political, economic and diplomatic considerations. Given the potential consequences of armed conflict, the military must also realise that it will be increasingly required to justify resources that it needs as well as report on the utilisation of those resources that are allocated to it.

Given these trends, the RODC has identified a number of important implications for the military profession. They argue that the future formulation of defence policy will involve the specialised contribution of a wide variety of professions and the military profession itself will be required to practise, or at least understand, many new skills that are not related to the application of violence. There will be a shift in emphasis in the activities of the military in peacetime away from the traditional perfection of war-fighting skills towards the pursuance of defence infrastructural requirements embodied in tasks like force structure analysis and the development of logistics and communications, command and control (C3) support systems.

The Polarisation of the Military Profession

An important consequence of these new requirements is that they are seen to diminish the previously held primacy of the warrior image as the focal point of our military ethos. Under the pressures generated by the changing nature of warfare and the de-militarisation of defence, the military profession can be expected to exhibit an increasingly dual character. On the one hand there will continue to be a combat-oriented component which is dedicated to fighting wars and which exhibits traditionally accepted military norms. There will also arise a non-combat-oriented component guided more by the spirit of intellectual freedom than any rigid moral commitment to tradition or dogma. This conceptualisation of the military in terms of combat and non-combat components is clearly reflected in the RODC’s findings of the respective requirements of future operational commanders and those staff officers who will be employed at Russell Hill.

Future operational commanders vested with the responsibility of deploying combat forces in a modern, conventional warfare setting will be required to function efficiently under the intense pressure generated by around the clock operations. This pressure will be compounded by the burden of the potential awesome consequences of even minor tactical errors as well as the omnipresent senior commander or politician whose ability to interfere in operational matters has been increased by advanced information and communications technology. While the personal attributes required for such tasks are largely aligned with traditional military values (military experience, leadership, ability, decisiveness, etc.), the RODC has recognised that these characteristics in themselves are not as important as the officer’s ability to continue to function under the pressures of modern warfare. The selection of officers for higher command “will demand more stringent assessment (than before) based on demonstrated performance” and measured under simulated battlefield conditions. We are not far, it would seem, from the psychological

The priority of mental stability over the more traditional positive attributes is probably reversed in lower-level contingency situations. In operations involving aid to the civil power or counter-insurgency warfare, command decisions can carry a completely different set of consequences (a point not well covered by the Study). It is recognised, however, that there is no automatic correlation between command ability in high- and low-level warfare situations. In today's electronic age, good battalion commanders do not necessarily make good army commanders and vice versa.

By contrast, the RODC has identified a quite different set of desirable attributes for those officers who will pursue the less-demanding pastimes of defence policy formulation and the design and development of automated support systems needed by the operational commander and his staff in battle. Officers working in these areas are seen to require an understanding of the workings of the Australian government and public administration. They must be attuned to the apparent vagaries of the bureaucratic decision-making process and be prepared to work towards maximising civil-military relations. They must possess sufficient technical expertise to enjoy near equal footing with their civilian counterparts. They must have the intellectual, analytical and communicative skills to be able to devise and to represent arguments in an open forum. The general staff officer will increasingly work under conditions that are not subject to the rigid organisational constraints that are found in the field. Independent work groups, committees and task forces comprising random mixtures of individuals, and dedicated to research into specific proposals, will become commonplace. It is not hard to see that officers working under these conditions will have a quite different perspective than their operational counterparts.

The conceptualisation of the military profession in terms of distinctive combat and non-combat components also predicates many of the RODC recommendations. The adoption of a dual career system of development, whereby an individual officer will move from a regimental stream to a policy formulation stream with increasing rank, is a direct reflection of the two groupings. The recognition that different career streams will require quite different educational and training requirements; the changes to the officer evaluation process; and the rejection of the principle of generalisation of officers in favour of specialisation, are others.

### The Conflict of Cultures

In terms of the spectrum of personal values and norms adopted by different officers, it can be seen that there will be a general polarisation of individuals between those holding liberal, intellectual, anti-authoritarian values located on the left of the spectrum and more rigid, authoritarian, traditional militaristic values located on the right. The potential conflict inherent in this future military dichotomy, which could manifest itself in the sort of pilot versus engineer syndrome currently found in the air force, is enhanced by the pyramidal structure of the armed forces. The military triangular organisation enables the official culture to be determined by whoever is in power. The underlying values that are sincerely held by the power group will be subtly reflected in policy decisions affecting both individuals in the service (code of conduct, dress standards, etc.) and the relationship of the service with the wider defence community (protection of service interests, military-civilian interaction, etc.). The opposing culture will attempt to mobilise its forces to reverse the trend, which it sees as inimical to its own interests and beliefs. The ensuing conflict can only serve to result in a reduction in the efficiency of the profession and considerable disenchantment of its different individuals leading to more greatly entrenched views, increased inter-personal conflict, redresses, resignations and so on.

In the past, the internal conflict within the officer corps, has never been serious. This was largely because all career officers followed a 'generalist' career pattern in which officers were subjected to an intense but common socialisation process both prior to commissioning and throughout their careers. What conflict that did exist (mainly stemming from OCS/RMC and inter-corps 'rivalry') was fragmented and of little external consequence. The most outstanding characteristic of the

*Reviewed in DFJ No. 4 May/June 1977.*
military profession in the 1950s and 60s was its unique and unassailable corporate identity. Under the significant changes that have occurred in Australia's domestic and external environment since Vietnam, all this has begun to change. The liberalisation of Australian society under Labor in the early 1970s, the renewed public interest in civil-military relations, the re-evaluation and re-organisation of Defence and a steady influx of tertiary educated officers into the bottom of the profession have all led to a questioning of the current system of officer development and the principles on which it is based. The resulting agitation for change by the more liberal elements of society and within the profession itself culminated in the establishment of the RODC in 1976. The subsequent rejection of the principle of generalism by the Committee marked the end of a strictly unified, conservative military profession and recognised the polarisation process which had been occurring within the profession since the late 1960s.

The Predominance of Conservatism

While the polarisation of the military profession has occurred as a consequence of external change, it is unlikely that events in the near future will lead to the natural dominance of either group, even though the historical trend would seem to favour the ultimate demise of the combat oriented component of the profession. In order to retain a viable and efficient defence force in at least the short term, the potential conflict inherent in a divided profession must be reduced by sound and equitable policy control. The need for evenhanded treatment of the two components, based on an assessment of their respective roles in future defence, is recognised, at least in principle, by the RODC. It believes that the answer to the problem lies “in the Army’s ability to provide officers with demanding and challenging careers that embrace both combat and staff orientations in adequate proportions”. However, by insisting that the two groups within the profession are not mutually exclusive (despite the quite different traits and attitudes exhibited by each group), the Committee has allowed for both groups to be subjected to a common set of rules and standards. As a result of the detailed recommendations made by the RODC, this single ruling ‘culture’ will almost certainly be that associated with the conservative, combat oriented component of the profession.

This potential for conservative predominance stems from the Committee’s strong belief that the primary function of the Army will always be its war-fighting role. Consequently, the selection of individuals for commissioned service in the Australian Army, and their subsequent pre-commission training, will continue to be in accordance with this assigned primacy of the combat role and its particular personal attributes (leadership, devotion to duty, loyalty, etc.). Recruits, whose personal abilities lie naturally towards non-combat skills, will be in the minority. Immediate post-commission socialisation will take place in one of the primary career streams which are essentially aligned with the present-day corps structure. It is reasonably well accepted that the existing corps are the repositories of traditional military culture and customs. The final step in the reinforcement of these early values is the requirement that all career officers undergo a number of subsequent refresher courses on all arms tactics. Even those career officers who specialise in non-combat disciplines will, by virtue of their selection and pre-commission training, be ‘primitive’ types who have been retrained for their secondary specialty.

The RODC has also recommended that a small number of officers be identified early in their careers for subsequent development for high level command. While it is problematical whether the majority of these officers will be drawn from primary combat streams, the initial benefits of a more liberal education and a greater understanding of the complex role of the military in defence will be eroded by the further recommendations for extended tenure in command positions, rapid promotion, postings to positions with command affiliations and enforced generalised experience in policy formulation areas at Russell Hill. This latter requirement will also result in the positioning of combat-oriented officers into key positions located within non-combat-oriented organisations.

In the past, conservatism was seen to be a natural and desirable extension of traditional military ideals such as service, loyalty, patriotism and self-sacrifice. To advocate the overthrow of conservatism was to question the very basis of our professional ethos. Today, the
rate of change of technology and the increased consequences of armed conflict make conservatism in at least the design and development of military forces an unacceptable and outmoded philosophy. The military can no longer afford to plan for the future use of weapons, procedures and doctrines that may have worked in the past. At the very least, the influence of conservatism must be constrained to only those areas in the military profession in which it will play a valid role.

The Restoration of Balance

In order to reduce the potential conflict inherent in the polarisation of the military profession, the recommendations of the RODC should be extended to break the artificially imposed nexus that will exist between authority and conservatism. A more balance distribution of power could be achieved by first abolishing the present system of corps and then by basing all career streams on a functional grouping of establishment positions. The responsibility for the development and career management of officers within each stream should rest with the particular stream. The concept of a ‘dual career’ system of officer development, where an officer progresses from a combat to a non-combat specialty should be replaced by a more structured career management system whereby an individual progresses from being a specialist junior officer to a senior manager at higher levels within a single career stream (which might involve overlapping career sub-streams). The required quantity and quality of officer recruits should be determined from the specific requirements of each career stream. Where it is required, tertiary level education should be provided within civilian universities, completely divorced from any covert, conservative military influence.

The polarisation of the military profession as a result of change is not limited to the Army; it must also affect the Navy and Air Force. Even with the implementation of additional reforms within the Army, undue military conservatism may not be eradicated from within the larger Defence arena. To be fully consistent in any attempt to devise a modern defence force, the traditional notion of a tri-service defence force must also be abandoned. A single Australian Defence Force should be formed which is also structured on functional rather than traditional grounds. Under such an approach, we might expect to see the formation of two separate elements: a Strategic Defence Force element vested with the sole responsibility to plan for the defence of Australia and a Tactical or Territorial Defence Force Element dedicated to war fighting and meeting lower level contingency requirements. In time this integrated approach to defence would minimise the conflict stemming from the polarisation of the military profession with the inevitable predominance of conservatism. It would also provide a more efficient defence force.

NOTES


AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

This article is a resume of the main events, and an introduction to some of the personalities who influenced the fortunes of 2/2 Army Field Workshop from its raising on 4 April 1940 up to the time of the capture of Tobruk by 6 Australian Division on 21 January 1941.

I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Australian War Memorial for allowing me access to the Unit War Diary and for permission to reproduce official photographs.

PRIOR to the Tobruk battle, the section was asked for a sub-section of three men to accompany the Tank Corps for the purpose of effecting minor repairs during the action, and Sgt Allison and his two men were selected as the most suitable for the job, from the many who volunteered, and duly set off in a utility complete with tools, equipment and welding gear. From hereon we lost sight of these chaps and often wondered just how they were faring and it was not until after the battle that we heard of the magnificent part they had played.

These men operated an oxy-acetylene cutting torch on a number of disabled "1" Tanks. This work was done under heavy enemy shellfire. Coolness and accuracy while using a dazzling torch enabled 5 Tanks to re-enter the battle. These men can claim to be the first to carry out welding operations in the front line during an action. Doubtless the work performed by these men played a great part in the ultimate result."

This account of how three soldiers of 2/2 Army Field Workshop (AFW) were instrumental in the British and Australian victory at Tobruk on 22 January 1941, is from the pages of the unit's War Diary, held by the Australian War Memorial.

In recognition of their bravery and skills, Sgt W. M. Allison, Pte E. O. J. Dunning, and Pte K. Smith were each awarded the Military Medal.

Three Military Medals in a single action is a feat any combat unit would be proud to record. And these decorations were particularly merited by the men of 2/2 AFW, for, although this workshop had seen only three weeks of action prior to Tobruk, it had already been commended by 7 (BR) Armoured Division, and 6 Australian Division.

By any measure, 2/2 AFW was a distinguished Australian Army unit. It was the first Australian Army field workshop to see action in World War II, the first allied workshop in the Western Desert to provide a forward repair team to accompany armour in battle. And it appears that it was the first unit, allied or enemy, to use an oxy-acetylene torch on the battlefield to repair tanks.

2/2 AFW was not only innovative, it also had a remarkable capacity for work. At Bardia, and Tobruk, it provided second line repair and recovery support for a corps of two divisions.

Following the capture of Tobruk by the 6 Australian Division on 22 January 1941, 2/2 AFW responsibility for repair and recovery extended from Amiriya, a town near the Egyptian port of Alexandria, to a point 40 kilometres west of Tobruk, a distance of well over 700
miles. No doubt it was also the first, and probably the last, field workshop with such a huge area of responsibility.

No job was too big or too small for 2/2 AFW. The range of equipment repairs extended from 1 ("Matilda") tanks through captured Italian vehicles to watches and instruments. Its productivity was astonishing, and the standard of workmanship of its tradesmen was highly regarded; so much so, that British units sought the services of 2/2 AFW in preference to their own workshops.

The unit was raised on 4 April 1940, at Caulfield Racecourse, Victoria. The first entry in the War Diary is dated 2 May 1940, and records the appointment of the first CO, Major W. D. Chapman. Major Chapman, a permanent Army officer and professional engineer, had previously been a staff officer on MGO Branch, Army Headquarters. The initial entry also records the march-in of Captain George Moran AAOC. He was later to command the unit in the Western Desert.

The first problem faced by the CO was to recruit tradesmen for his unit. The outbreak of war had accentuated the need for tradesmen and 2/2 AFW like other workshops, had to compete fiercely to obtain its establishment of skilled manpower from the limited national resource. Major Chapman soon perceived that many men would enlist if they were certain of a job in their own trade. It became unit policy to trade test applicants before enlistment as far as possible. Upon successful completion of his trade test, the individual was immediately enlisted and posted to the appropriate position on 2/2 AFW War Establishment. This procedure cut out the usual red tape delay in obtaining tradesmen from the central pool of Army enlists, some of whom were of dubious quality, and ensured that only very competent tradesmen joined 2/2 AFW. It also appears that the upper age limit of 45 years for tradesmen was occasionally 'stretched' to enlist the top artisans.

Major Chapman appreciated that his most valuable resource was men, and he wisely insisted on nothing less than the best. For, in truth, there was precious little available in vehicles and equipment in those grim days of 1940, and Chapman knew that skilled craftsmen will always improvise and overcome deficiencies in equipment. So, with guile and wisdom, the unit was formed.

Although it was raised in Melbourne, 2/2 AFW comprised men from all States of Australia with diverse civilian backgrounds. They showed the usual Australian resourcefulness, independence, initiative, and rascality as epitomised by this extract from Unit Routine Orders Part 1, No 2, dated 27 June 1940:

"It has been noted that certain personnel have been entering and leaving the camp by a small gate at the turnstile at the rear of the camp. This gate although locked and closed during the evening has been consistently opened again, by someone in the camp. All ranks are reminded that such a practice is a direct offence and offenders will be severely dealt with."

Obviously, the culprit was a locksmith, and a pretty good one at that!

What type of man was the soldier/tradesman of 1940? I believe the following word pictures penned by Lt Jack Battiscombe, a Platoon Commander in 2/2 AFW, serve to illustrate the character and background of the Army craftsmen of those days. It is fitting that they describe the men mentioned at the beginning of this article; the men history records as the first Australian forward repair team to repair tanks in battle.

"Sgt Allison is a South Australian and is, in civil life, employed as a technical salesman with Western Oxygen Co. Ltd (Adelaide). He enlisted as a private with No. 6 Recovery Section was soon promoted to Corporal, and before leaving Australia for service overseas was placed in charge of a section covering welding, smithing, battery-charging, carpentering, etc, and promoted to the rank of Sgt. He did excellent work during the training period, his workshop trailer was invariably held up as a pattern to other members of the section. He was held in the highest esteem by all who were associated with him.

"Ptes Smith and Dunning — These two men in civil life were employed by BHP. Smith enlisted in the unit as a welder and very soon showed that he was an expert at this trade, handling both electric and oxy-welding equipment. Dunning enlisted as a coppersmith, but soon showed that he was also an excellent hammerman or blacksmith. No job was ever too tough for 'Big Ossie'."

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The months of June and July 1940 passed all too quickly for the men of 2/2 AFW. They trained hard at the military arts, and proved to be very competent at musketry. The officers worked equally hard at obtaining the unit’s entitlement of war equipment. I sense from the War Diary that they used every trick in the trade to beg, borrow, or steal vehicles, tools and test equipment.

On 9 July 1940, the MGO had recommended to the CGS that 2/2 AFW should be despatched to the Middle East as soon as possible for maintenance of the equipment of 6 Australian Division. Sometime in that same month (the War Diary is not precise), the unit moved to Williamstown Racecourse. Here it underwent its final training before departure.

At Williamstown, the unit blossomed into an interesting organisation. In addition to the main workshop, there were three recovery sections: No. 4 (Victoria), and Nos 5 and 6 (South Australia). Their main role was to provide second line recovery support for the divisional and corps troops. However, these recovery sections also had organic repair sub-sections which were designed to provide unit and limited field repairs.

In many respects, the organisation and size of the main workshop was similar to the present day Medium Workshop Battalion. In July 1940, 2/2 AFW had a posted strength of 12 officers and 433 other ranks. Like the Medium Workshop Battalion (on WE), the AFW was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. Because of the strength of 2/2 AFW, a Medical Officer Captain was attached from 2/2 Fd Amb.

On 13 August 1940, the first element of 2/2 AFW, comprising 5 officers and 175 other ranks, left Racecourse Platform at Williamstown by electric train and embarked on RMS Strathallan at Port Melbourne. She sailed later that day, and successfully eluded axis submarines and aircraft on her journey to the port of Suez, via Bombay. On 6 October, near Suez, the men of 2/2 AFW experienced their first encounter with the enemy when Italian aircraft dropped four bombs within 25-40 yards of the ship. On 11 October, they disembarked at Suez, and departed by convoy to Helwan, a town on the outskirts of Cairo. By 13 October, the remaining elements had arrived from Australia and on 16 December 1940, the unit joined Western Desert Force and deployed to Fuka in preparation for the vital part it was to play in the First Desert Campaign.

At this time, 6 Australian Division had relieved 4 Indian Division in the Western Desert, and was preparing to attack the Italian fortress of Bardia.
their ingenuity and skills to make up temporary springs from broken Italian stocks. To overcome the equipment shortages of 6 Australian Division, two British artillery regiments were allotted to General MacKay. For tank support, MacKay was allotted 7 RTR, equipped with the then formidable I tank, and commanded by Lt Col Jerram, RTC.

For 2/2 AFW, the support of 7 RTRs tanks was a brand new challenge. However, the men soon mastered the techniques of I tank repair and recovery, and they began an enduring affiliation with the tank crews of 7 RTR. The Unit War Diary records, “The RTC cannot speak too highly of the efforts of our men, and a truly mutual admiration exists between the British unit and the Australian”.

However, I digress from the chronology of events. On 19 December, Major George Moran was appointed CO 2/2 AFW, and promoted Lieutenant Colonel. His appointment was nearly terminated a few days later when, on 24 December near Fuka, whilst on reconnaissance, his vehicle activated a land mine, and although the rear of the vehicle chassis was destroyed, the new CO miraculously escaped injury. This was extremely fortunate for 2/2 AFW because George (“Polly”) Moran was a first class soldier and leader of men. In post-war years he became DEME (4 February 1952-7 August 1955).

On 26 December, 2/2 AFW deployed at Kilo 104, a stretch of ground west of Fuka. Because of the air threat, it dispersed its vehicles and equipment in an area several miles long (sea frontage) by three quarters of a mile in depth. The deployment of the five main elements of the workshop is illustrated in the following diagram which is copied from the original Unit War Diary.

The fact that the workshop functioned effectively spread over this vast area should give food for thought to those faced with the deployment of contemporary administrative units in a similar adverse air situation. The important part that communications play in the day-to-day administration of a workshop spread over a large area is evident from this entry in the War Diary dated 2/3 January 1941:

“... Signal communications were poor but were improved by the usual improvisation and use of captured material. Without communications the work of administration in a camp extending for about two miles would be very difficult.” And another entry dated 31 January: “Thanks to Italian equipment, communications within the Camp are good!”

The attack on Bardia opened at 0530 hours on 3 January with a heavy bombardment of the Italian perimeter. Obviously, Lt Col Moran knew the attack would be successful, for on the same morning, accompanied by Capt Redpath, he carried out a reconnaissance of the coast road to Sollum from Sidi-Barrani. On his return, he signalled HQ 1 Australian Corps regarding the necessity for a move of the workshop after the fall of Bardia.

He showed commendable foresight and anticipated the need for 2/2 AFW to carry out battlefield clearance at Bardia, to quickly refurbish and put into use the immense booty of
Italian equipment. In the three days of fighting at Bardia, the British and Australian troops captured 400 guns, and 120 tanks, and several hundred vehicles. The Unit War Diary records that “throughout this period the quantity of work was very great, and included vehicles from the British and Australian Armies, both tracked and wheeled, and a great amount of captured enemy material. Lancia, SPA and Fiat trucks both diesel and petrol engined are being repaired and handed over as soon as ready. 13 M11 Italian tanks were under repair and four were ready for issue”. The War Diary also states that a large number of vehicles and other equipment were repaired for the Royal Air Force and certain Naval establishments at this time.

Recovery crews were busy all along the coastal road keeping the administrative traffic moving, and the War Diary records; “…the work in hand at No. 4 Recovery Section appears almost overwhelming and has been made more difficult by far, by the ‘cannibalisation’ (sic) which occurs whenever a vehicle is left unattended even with a minor fault. An aspect of ‘cannibalisation’, or robbing of components, was gained from the SC of the 17th Bde.

Definite orders had been given that no vehicle was to be left with any movable component and the reason given was that other units took the parts. The result is obviously a vicious circle as 2/2 AFW have, with difficulty, recovered vehicles whose only original fault was a defective wheel, and which when recovered lacked distributor, coil, fuel pump and plugs. In some cases the wheels have been removed from all four hubs. Such practice in an advance and when spares are well nigh unobtainable means that many vehicles, which could be doing useful work, are now inoperable.”

On 6 January, 2/2 AFW received the news that Bardia had fallen the previous evening. The next day, Lt Col Moran and Maj Hayman (the 2IC) were summoned to a conference with General Mackay, and Lt Col Jerram, CO 7 RTR. The specific reason for the conference was to discuss essential repairs to the I tanks. General MacKay opened the conference by stating that each I tank was as valuable to him as a battalion of infantry, and it was essential to have them repaired as soon as possible. CO 7 RTR said that his 18 I tanks were now worn out, having travelled 500 miles and fought a major action. It is chronicled that General MacKay turned to Lt Col Moran and stated, “Colonel your unit will repair these tanks.” I imagine that George Moran smiled and quietly assured the General that 2/2 AFW would relish the opportunity to refit the tanks.

On 8 January, Captain Naismith and Captain Redpath with No. 6 Recovery Section, and a forward repair detachment from the main workshop, left for 7 RTR tank lines, which were located in a plateau beyond Sollum.

In the meantime, Colonel Moran had despatched Captain Beck, the Stores Section OC, to hunt for repair parts in El-Daba, Alexandria and Cairo. Apparently “Beckie” was an extraordinary scavenger because, after being away several days, he returned with five 3 ton lorry loads of spares.
During the period 8-21 January, 2/2 AFW worked feverishly to refit the 18 I tanks, and also the 16 captured Italian M11 tanks, for the attack on Tobruk. The attack was again entrusted to General MacKay and his 6 Australian Division, supported by 7 RTR. The 16 captured Italian M11 tanks were repaired and handed over to the 6 Div Cav Regt.

And here, with the attack on Tobruk, is where this story began.

British 'I' tanks moving up to Tobruk, January 1941.

The historic part played by Sgt Allison and his forward repair team of Pte Smith and Pte Dunning, is best conveyed to the reader by the after action report written by Sgt Allison on 2 Feb 41 (the attack actually commenced at 0540 hours on 21 January when 16 Australian Brigade, supported by 7 RTR punched a hole in the southern part of the perimeter.)

"2/2 Army Field Workshop, FIELD, 2 Feb 41.

RESUME OF MOVEMENT WITH THE ROYAL TANK CORPS

Left 6 Recovery Camp with Ptes. Dunning and Smith and was escorted by a number of the R.T.C to their Camp Site. Immediately on arrival I reported to Major Hawthorn who instructed me to hold myself and men in readiness for a line-up at 6 p.m. All tanks and vehicles were then lined up at the appointed time and further instructions were given that we would commence to move up to the line of action at approximately 12.50 a.m. At the time mentioned we proceeded to move and ultimately arrived at our destination at approx. 4.30 a.m. At 7 a.m. the tanks moved into action and we followed approximately 1½ hrs after to a rally point inside the lines where tanks came back for refuelling and inspection. I was instructed by Major Hawthorn and Capt. Anderson to proceed with work on GYP SY, GALLANT II, GODIVA, and GAULLE and get them in a condition ready for immediate action. The work was carried out to their complete satisfaction and the tanks concerned then took part in another action. On the second rally, GYP SY required further attention which was satisfactorily carried out by my party. On return of all tanks an inspection was made of GOLIATH and GALLASHIELDS and quite a considerable amount of welding and cutting was required on them, but due to certain circumstances the decision for the necessary work was held in abeyance. Major Hawthorn then instructed me to report to the Colonel who in turn informed me that I was to take my party and report back to the unit immediately.

Sgd. W. M. Allison Sgt.

On 23 January, the War Diary records that Colonel Jerram spoke to Colonel Moran at 6 Recovery Section near Tobruk and expressed his thanks for the work done by 2/2 AFW, saying that: "he could not have got along without the help of 2/2 AFW". He spoke particularly of the repairs carried out after Bardia to refit his regiment, and the action of Sgt Allison and his repair team during the battle for Tobruk.

The significance of Allison's efforts was not allowed to be lost on HQ 6 Australian Division. Lt Col Moran forwarded the following letter, succinctly headed "TANK REPAIRS", to General MacKay's Headquarters:

"2 F.W. 63 A. 1. F. 2/2 Army Field Workshop, FIELD, H.Q.

6 AUST. DIV.

TANK REPAIRS

I forward herewith a report on repairs to tanks during the attack on Tobruk and also a summary of work done at Bardia.

Sgt. Allison with Ptes. Dunning and Smith carried out essential repairs with a welding plant during the action. Lt Col Jerram R.T.C. spoke highly of their work and coolness under shellfire and remarked that "he could not have got along without the help we have given him".

It is probable that the use of an oxy-acetylene torch in battle is unique and I feel that
Headquarters will wish to record the occurrence in despatches.

The repair work carried out by "B" Section and 6 Recovery Section on the tanks prior to the Tobruk action, I feel, can be commended, as repairs normally beyond the scope of second line work were carried out and many more tanks made operative than was considered possible.

Sgd G. H. S. Moran Lt.Col.
Commanding 2/2 Army Field Workshop.

Copies:--
COMD I
War Diary 2.

DETAILS OF WORK CARRIED OUT (AT TOBRUK)

T 7362 GALLANT II. Shell hole in telescope sight cut out with cutting torch.
T 6963 GODIVA. Gun turret jammed due to shell hit ultimately released.
T 6776 GAULLE. Broken supporting ring for traverse gear bent. Cut out sections for clearance.
T 6962 GYPSY. Released gun turret. Cut out B.S.A. Gun.
T 6963 GODIVA. Released elevation and depression. Shrapnel in between Gun Armour.

DETAILS OF WORK REQUIRED

T 7361 GOLIATH. Front yoke locker dragged off. New cast sections required. Beyond our immediate attention owing to the lack of suitable equipment.
T 6966 GALLASHIELDS. Tank tracks blown off. Armour holed and bent. New track sprocket required. Approximately 2 days welding and cutting.

SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED AT BARDIA

T 6777 GAMECOCK. Brazed 2 copper pipes. Welded cast steel wheel housing brazed oil cleaner. Straightened, cut and welded track guards.
T 6939 GALLOWAY. Welded plate to track gear. Straightened door stopper.
T 10031 GRAYS II. Straightened track guard side. Heated and welded 4 shell holes. Welded water can carrier steel frame.
T 6962 GYPSY. Repaired shell case canvas cover. Welded 5 shell holes.
T 6967 GRANT. Welded track suspension lever.

Men like Allison, Smith and Dunning don't just happen to be outstanding soldiers. They go through three important phases: training, battle experience, and with sound leadership, they develop confidence and esprit de corps. But, as Major Chapman knew, the quality has to be there in the first place. For there is no substitute for technical skills, and there is no time to learn these skills on the battlefield, they must be mastered in peace.

2/2 AFW had the primary ingredients for success: competent soldiers and tradesmen, and sound professional leadership. This combination gave the unit confidence to tackle any task — in or out of battle. History records that the craftsmen of 2/2 AFW were more than equal to the task of war, and they earned the complete admiration of Western Desert Force.

NOTES

1. But here luck played its part. By a quirk of fate 2/1 AFW had been diverted from the Middle East to the United Kingdom. If this had not happened 2/1 AFW may well have been the first to see action. In the event 2/1 AFW arrived at Tobruk after its capture in Jan 1941, and provided third line support for vehicles backloaded by 2/2 AFW.
2. Colonel Wilfred Disney Chapman MCE, AMICE, MIE (Aust) — later Chief Spt Army Design Unit.
The Functions of a Design Authority

R. E. Christensen BE(Hons.) FIREE, MIE, AUST.
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Introduction

WITH Defence reorganisation, and the creation of the DST organisation, engineers and scientists formerly under separate departments have been grouped under a central authority. This has created some problems in co-ordinating what seem to be mutually exclusive functions — scientific research and engineering development, especially as they relate to support of the cycle of material acquisition for Army projects.

Debate has occurred over the functions and responsibilities of a Research Authority and of a Design Authority.

It is the purpose of this article¹ to delineate the habitually practised EDE concept of a Design Authority, derived from experience spanning more than a quarter of a century on field equipment projects for the Army.

It is recognised that the term Design Authority has been, and is being used by other parts of Defence. However it is contended that the duties and responsibilities of some other practitioners of the Design Authority function are far less extensive and less technologically involved than those duties and responsibilities traditionally undertaken by EDE. Herein lies one of the difficulties of the current attempts at resolution.

EDE activities overall fall into a number of clearly defined roles, only one of which includes the actual performance of, and the supervision of study, design, development and in-service defect remedial modification of military equipment, and to which the term “Design Authority” specifically applies. The other EDE roles deal, inter alia, with the provision of consulting services, engineering tests and evaluation, and the provision of a centre to obtain, store and to retrieve equipment pattern. (This latter role is not an essential one for a Design Authority Establishment, but the pattern holding centre needs to be accessed by the Design Authority through formal pattern change paperwork.)

Whilst EDE was part of the Army organisation its functions included the technical services branch type of technical project and project resources management. Now that Army no longer has its own in-house group to perform this technical services branch function, such responsibility, on a particular project, continues to devolve upon that group establishment appointed as the Design Authority for that project.

EDE’s in-house studies, design and development role is restricted to those projects, all or the major portion of which can be accomplished in accordance with the most modern current engineering practice and expertise, and do not involve projects which are considered to be a major innovation involving major technical risk. EDE is, in general, an applier of theory and technology, not an originator of new components, new techniques or new theories (such being the province of scientific research). Reference to Figs 1 and 2 (page 39) will show the typical split of Scientific Research type work, and the Design Authority type work as applied to the Army Materiel Cycle.

Once EDE has become involved as Design Authority with a project, the exercise of the Design Authority function for the hardware that eventually emerges continues for life of type of the equipment.

With the above as background it is fair to ask what is the precise definition, duty and responsibility of a Design Authority (DA)? The term is used in different contexts and with different meanings by various government department sections, and in some instances is
applied to organisations (including non-government) which, by EDE practice, would be defined as Design Agencies. In other instances, "R&D" Authorities perform what EDE would consider Design Authority or even Design Agency functions.

This apparent state of confusion is not helped by the absence of a unique Defence Central definition of a Materiel Cycle against which the term Design Authority may be defined and developed.

It should be noted, in passing, that the DA concept described herein has, of course, been influenced by the Army Materiel Cycle. The Army Materiel Cycle is not unique in all respects; it is identical to other Service procedures as regards the Defence Central approval processes related to various defined milestones in the Materiel Cycle.

The Design Authority role encompasses the in-house (intra-mural) execution of a technical task, as well as the control of the execution of, the assumption of responsibility for and the acceptance of the outcome of a task subcontracted to a Design Agency.

The capability, military and civilian staffing of Navy and Air Force gives them the type of military engineering and Design Authority support, in general, that Army used to have when EDE was an establishment within the Department of Army. These circumstances support the contention that Army will probably continue to be the largest customer of EDE.

However, lack of manpower, and the need for outside expertise has resulted in Navy and Air Force using DSTO and Department of Productivity establishments for some of the type of functions that EDE performed for the Army eg.:

- The Fuse Development Laboratory at the Ammunition Factory, Footscray, is the RAAF DA for the Karinga fusing.
- GAF is the Ikara DA for Navy.
- MRL and ARL carry out a lot of defect investigation for the Air Force.

Therefore, in overall capability, from study phases through design, development, test and evaluation (and supervision of same) to the investigation of in service defects, EDE is unique within DSTO because of breadth of expertise, as well as because of our specialisation in field military equipments.

Definitions

A number of definitions of the term Design Authority exist. The Glossary of Terms of the Defence Standardisation Manual definition covers the responsibility "for the design of the product" and "incorporates the preparation of design drawings and other related data".

The Army Office Instructions definition, a lengthy one, says in part "the functional organisation responsible for overall control of the technical aspects of a development project . . . required to task, monitor . . .".

Neither of these definitions define precisely at which point in the materiel cycle the exercise of the Design Authority function should commence on a particular project. (The confusion in some Defence circles over this point, in relation to work for the Army, is largely the result of a lack of knowledge of the functions of a Design Authority for the Army.)

Greater clarity may be found in the Army DGMAT Standing Operating Procedures in a section called Design Authorities and Agencies. It provides a description of the Design Authority role as including the conduct of Project Definition studies and Feasibility studies, and the supervision of such activities if conducted other than by the Design Authority. This accords with the experience of EDE as a Design Authority for Army.

The Army Office Instructions definition of Design Agency is "The organisation or enterprise undertaking detailed design work on behalf of the Design Authority". In the broad sense, this has traditionally included consultancy type work and technique studies in support of projects in any phase of the materiel cycle.

Materiel Cycle

The functions, roles and responsibilities of a DA are best assimilated from the basis of a knowledge of the Materiel Cycle. Figs 1 and 2 depict the three principal phases, Conception, Definition and Realisation. (As noted later, most Army projects commence in the Definition Phase.)

These phases include:

- Requirements Study (RS) to investigate the requirement, and in outline investigate alternate means (and their feasibility) of meeting the requirement. Sufficient information must be derived to enable a
Major Equipment Submission (if required) to be prepared.

• **Project Definition Study (PDS)** covering the investigation of options identified in the RS in greater detail, and investigation of any new options. The detail is to be sufficient so that credible design parameters, equipment characteristics, development and production costs and timings are identified so that the expensive following development cycle may be entered into with high confidence. All risk areas must be identified and resolved during the PDS.

• **Pilot Model Development.** For *ab initio* development

• **Prototype Model Development.**

• **Local Pre-Production and Production,** or Overseas procurement as relevant, for existing pattern designs.

Fig 3 provides a detailed illustration of the inter-relationship of particular types of user requirements documents, pattern documentation, development phases, trials and acceptance of an illustrative (*ab initio* development) project.

Further details are contained in Notes 3-5 which also cover the initial production phase of items developed overseas.

### EDE Involvement Prior to Project Definition (See Figs 1 and 2)

Project Definition is the first part of the design process and a normal EDE type workload. EDE carries out certain Requirements Studies prior to Project Definition particularly where the technology is not in doubt, but what is in doubt is the most effective and cost effective way of achieving that implementation of technology, either by straightforward study, design and development, or by procurement. Whether or not EDE becomes involved also depends on the capacity and capability of Army to carry out the Requirements Study in-house. The work includes an investigation into the user requirement, and the conduct of tradeoffs between the meeting of the user requirement and its practical realisation.

In the context in which the separate parts of R&D (ie. ‘research’ and ‘development’) are defined in some quarters, ‘research’ could be defined as ‘scientific research’. It appears to be a fact of life in Australia that ‘scientific research’ is seldom required on Army projects involving Requirement Studies because the user creation of the concept and requirement resulted from the acknowledgement that similar or potentially suitable equipments and systems have been and/or are being developed here or elsewhere, ie. the technology already exists (usually in industry).

Also, rarely is the required Australian Army fielding date far enough in the future to permit a cycle of ‘research’ (assuming that there is a need to improve the performance and characteristics of existing technology to achieve the desired ends, which is not universally the case).

EDE consultation is also sought on certain Target Studies.

### Military Engineering Capability Required of a Design Authority for Field Military Equipments

One of the basic characteristics of EDE which distinguishes it from other engineering establishments is the proficiency and specialisation in theoretical design, and the practical execution of that design into hardware to meet the military field service environment (using knowledge of the field environment (including procedures), and the techniques necessary to cope with this environment). EDE are also expert in the technical management of Design Agencies engaged in support studies, design and development.

Some of the particular aspects involved in military equipment design are:

• **Provision of small and lightweight designs** to satisfy the requirement without undue load on the operator for portable items, or posing mobility/transportation problems for larger items.

• **Ease of operation** to reduce the specialised training of the operator, and to increase ease of using the item effectively under high personnel stress conditions.

• **Reliability** (usually well in excess of comparable civilian market items) in basic componentry and overall design and performance to enhance military mission capability, and survivability, ease the requirement for field maintenance, provide a service life of the order of 15 years for electronics items, for example, and especially reduce the life cycle cost of
THE FUNCTIONS OF A DESIGN AUTHORITY

ARMS MATERIEL CYCLE - SERVICE AND DSTO INVOLVEMENT

FIGURE 1

ARMS MATERIEL CYCLE - SERVICE AND DSTO INVOLVEMENT

FIGURE 2
the item (usually the total cost of maintenance during the life of the item by far exceeds the initial purchase price).

- Ruggedness and climatic withstanding capability which influences not only the reliability of the item, but also its field survivability.
- Ease of maintenance to optimise equipment availability by design to fit the service maintenance philosophy, future parts availability, and reduce the required training of tradesmen.

**Brief Description of Functions, Duties and Responsibilities of a Design Authority**

Using the above capabilities it is the task of a military equipment DA during study phases to develop an understanding of the operational requirement, examine and question it, examine alternative solutions which can be discussed with the operational user to permit trade-offs where options are available, and define technical cost and programme plans for the evolution of design and development.

Once such plans have been accepted, the DA conducts or supervises the design and development and provision of a proven design for production. In all of this, continuous communication is maintained with the service customer to enhance usability and acceptability of the end product by accommodating the necessary and valuable service input and comment.

In a nutshell, the DA function is an engineering and engineering management function, and is discharged against:

- the written service requirement;
- the unwritten service requirement ie. certain aspects of the field environment and field usage known to EDE from long association with the services in the field, and the procedures and hazards associated therewith;
- the requirements of good and responsible engineering practice; and
- good military field equipment design practice (derived from long experience *inter alia*).

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**MATERIEL CYCLE APPLIED TO ARMY PROJECTS FOR AB INITIO DEVELOPMENT**

![Diagram](image-url)
The functions of a design authority responsibility requires innovative competence in technology, (i.e. innovative work capability centred around the use of established theory and components, and technology that is already part of engineering practice) and time and cost programme management capability.

Apart from this performance of work, the design authority acts as an adviser to the military customer and, as his agent, helps ensure that the customer and the government get what is technically required and contractually due where design agencies are used. In our experience, all external agencies engaged on studies, design development and preproduction work need to be supervised by an independent technical assessor (the design authority) to ensure the requirements are met. This is necessitated for the following reasons:

- the ever present need for independent inspection;
- the lip service that some manufacturers, under some circumstances, pay to satisfying all detail of the design and the Quality Assurance (QA) requirements; and
- the need for transfusion of the military technical and user background information, which background cannot in general be retained by industry because of lack of continuity on defence work.

With respect to industry design agencies, contract technical enforcement capability, including the resolution of liability in the event of conflict between specification and drawing requirements (for example), has as its genesis the technical/legal and QA aspects written into the contract specification, and into the draft contract itself by the DA. These sections must be very carefully worded to ensure technical and legal enforceability. Any ambiguity, for example, is resolved in favour of the party that didn’t prepare the documentation, i.e. the contractor.

Use of outside consultants expertise

In the discharge of the above functions, as in any engineering activity, use of outside expertise may be required to support the knowledge of the DA. Whilst EDE maintains in house expertise in several areas, not infrequently the accessing of outside consultant sources is necessary to provide us with the fruits of scientific research, and with some engineering background knowledge on well established, and on state-of-the-art information. (See Figs 1 and 2.) To date such information has come from, for example, Telecom, other DST establishments, local industry and overseas government establishments.

In the interests of good management, where a consultant group etc. is employed as above, and information is required to be transferred to a third party eg. a development contractor, the transfusion of that knowledge must be with the knowledge of, and under the control of the design authority especially because of its possible impact on other areas of the contractor work (in this example) and possible cost escalation, all of which is under the surveillance of, and the quality of such work is the responsibility of the DA.

Written tasking of a design agency

The employment of another government establishment, or industry as a design agency involves the DA in the generation of explicit technical and tasking instructions comprising:

- a specification;
- drawings if relevant to that stage of the materiel cycle eg. drawings of a pilot model where prototype development is now required; and
- Tender Schedule and CAPO technical clauses which don’t cover detailed technical aspects but include the definition of government and contractor technical and legal responsibilities, aspects of inspection, progress and financial reporting ie. items outside the technical core of the task.

Numerous procedures and standard reference documentation have been evolved as a result of considerable EDE experience to aid contractual delineation of contractor responsibilities and reporting requirements in the technical, financial and managerial areas.

Laboratory and workshop base

No practical or fully effective design authority can discharge its function unless it has workbench, workshop and laboratory (i.e. practical) backing to confirm the outcome of a theoretical investigation, or the adequacy of fix of a problem. Therefore every effort is made to promote and maintain within EDE design,
construction and test capability and the theoretical and practical skills which support them.

Types of Projects Requiring a Design Authority

A DA is required for any task where engineering study, engineering design and development, and supervision and control of these activities if performed elsewhere is required. Typical tasks include:

- studies, *ab initio* design of equipments, systems and installations, design, test and evaluation;
- initial production phase of a design originated overseas and adapted for Australian manufacturing conditions;
- origination or assessment of modifications of in service equipment, and in conjunction with the abovementioned tasks.

Consulting Tasks

As a source of technical expertise especially that related to types of military equipments and systems, a DA establishment provides consultative support to the military including comments on user requirements, documentation and international military standards. Representation is also provided on ABCA/QWG matters.

Control of Pattern

Within Army the origination and approval of concepts is vested in Operations Branch. The management of the realisation of that concept, and authorisation of the eventual pattern for production is a function of the Materiel Branch.

The duties of the DA in respect to the pattern (drawings plus specification) includes:

- the production of the specification, and submission to Materiel Branch for approval;
- the production of drawings if development proceeds in-house, or the approval of design and the contents of the drawings depicting that design if development is subcontracted to a Design Agency;
- following investigation, the modification of overseas derived pattern if relevant and appropriate (where item is to be put into local production);
- investigation and modification of pattern where in service investigations and design changes are required.

Once drawings are certified as Authorised Pattern for Production, by both the DA and the military customer (Materiel Branch in the case of Army) drawings are placed under the custody and strict control of the EDE Equipment Information Section (who holds all Army Pattern) who will change a Pattern only on receipt of a formal Change Authority from the military customer.

Extent of In-House Work on Ab Initio Development

Where the process of studies, design and development is carried out in-house, the project is virtually always put into industry for prototype manufacture (off production tooling) and production. It may be put into industry much earlier in the materiel cycle dependent on many factors including the capability and capacity of industry, and the need for the Design Authority to maintain its expertise in a particular area.

NOTES

1. Which is a precis of EDE Pub 33/78 "The Functions of a Design Authority".
5. Director General of Materiel, Standing Operating Procedures (Provisional)
WHY TRACKS, HELICOPTERS AND FRIGATES?

Major G.G. Middleton
Royal Australian Corps of Signals

AUSTRALIA'S Defence policy is at somewhat of a watershed. We have emerged from the era of Forward Defence with its emphasis on meeting the (Communist) enemy in Asian land battles and have embarked on a policy of Continental Defence. Despite occasional comment to the contrary, there is now bipartisan political support for such a policy. It is doubtful whether the last vestige of Forward Defence, the RAAF Mirage force at Butterworth, will survive for very much longer regardless of the party in power.

What has not yet emerged is a consensus on what Continental Defence implies in terms of force development and force structure. There is a narrow viewpoint which concludes that F111s and aircraft carriers have no relevance and that continental defence is limited to forces operating within the 200 mile zone. In this article continental defence is taken in its wider meaning, that of being able to defend against an attacking force by striking at it over long distances, if possible at his concentration areas; it does not include stationing forces in Asia.

Our present force structure includes elements ranging from a nuclear delivery capability (F111 force) to an ability to counter terrorists (SAS Regiment). While our range of capabilities might seem impressive on paper, the reality is that the force is spread so thinly that almost all elements lack important ingredients, for example the lack of stand-off weapons for aircraft and their small number do not allow for effective training. There are two alternatives to this problem, either to expand all elements to a viable size or to scrap some capabilities entirely and devote our total defence budget to expanding the remaining capabilities.

The first option would be prohibitively expensive. For example those units of the regular Army which remain on the order of battle are well below combat strength and are ill-equipped. Our supposed nine battalions plus supporting arms and services Infantry Division has only six battalions all at a little over half strength; our Signal Regiments are at less than half strength (and so on). The equipment to outfit the units should they be raised to combat strength does not exist in many cases. Similarly the RAAF and RAN are severely restricted in the amount of flying and sailing time and hence cannot maintain a high degree of combat readiness.

Given Australia's present economic problems, it is unlikely that the proportion of the Federal budget available for defence can be significantly increased in a period of low perceived threat. When the realities of a choice between cutting back on more visible and politically sensitive areas such as social services or the short term option of reducing defence expenditure, politicians are very prone to adopt the latter course.

The behind the scenes bureaucratic manoeuvring makes defence a prime target for treasury plundering in the present climate. Clearly then, Defence is not likely to be given the capacity to develop to the full its present range of capabilities. This leaves only the alternative of dispensing with some capabilities.
entirely and restructuring our force to meet the most likely threats with all the risks inherent in such a policy.

The traditional argument for maintaining a full range of capabilities, the Core Force argument, is that whatever the threat the relevant ‘Cores’ can be expanded to meet it. This concept is questionable on several grounds. Firstly it assumes that there will be an adequate warning time. However the probability of reduced warning is now much higher than at any time in Australia’s history. Secondly, the acquisition time for modern weapon systems has increased over the years. For example, Australia was able to place in service its first Wirraway aircraft 25 months after the project was initiated. More recently, delivery of F111 aircraft took eight years from the placement of the order, while the selection and procurement process took several years longer. Significantly, we are still pondering the merits of purchasing suitable stand-off weapons for them. In a period of reduced warning time but growing weapon acquisition time, ‘Core Force’ concepts in areas of high technology are irrelevant. Finally the ‘Core Force’ concept, by requiring such a wide range of skills to be maintained is wasteful of training resources, while the large numbers of equipment types necessitates a huge inventory of spare parts. Neither our training nor logistics capabilities can function economically with such a force structure. One example of a logistic training nightmare is our current inventory of helicopters which requires the three Services to operate between them a total of seven models/types of helicopter totalling about 130 helicopters in all. Significantly Britain is to replace five types of aircraft with two variants of the Tornado. Although some capabilities might be retarded slightly the overall saving in operating costs will be enormous.

Clearly Australia must adopt a force structure which maximizes our capability to deal with the most difficult threats, while at the same time ruthlessly dispensing with less important capabilities. Our defence structure needs to be related to the major threats likely to confront Australia, which in turn dictates our major equipment needs.

At present irrelevant capabilities are maintained simply because at some time in the past 20 years or so equipment was introduced. The need for the government of the day to pay credence to defence needs and the reluctance of the Services to admit that a particular equipment no longer has a role particularly in the bureaucracy of Tri-Service committees, ensure that this will occur. The Army’s Armoured Personnel Carrier force and the RAAF’s utility helicopter force were justified very much with Vietnam in mind.

In the case of the helicopters their limited payload and range coupled with the large amount of logistic support required to maintain them mean that while they were effective operating from secure bases over short distances in Vietnam they have much less relevance within Australia. In the case of the APCs the difficulty in maintaining tracked vehicles in serviceable condition when operating over the distances which might be necessary within Australia means that rather than assisting mobility they may be a hindrance to deployment. Again like the helicopters they were ideally suited to the limited areas of operation and terrain of Asia but would we have purchased them if we were starting out with continental defence in mind?

The RAN’s destroyer escorts (River Class), designed as low cost ASW escorts are virtually defenceless in the era of cruise missiles and long range torpedoes, yet they are maintained in service, and are given expensive refits, and by so doing direct scarce defence funds from other worthwhile projects.

Not only are our DEs outranged by modern submarines and incapable of maintaining speeds approaching that of large modern cargo vessels but the relative costs of Anti-Submarine Frigates versus the much lower cost of submarines arises the question of whether we shouldn’t opt out of the anti-submarine business and by increasing our submarine arm force potential adversaries to become involved in expensive anti-submarine acquisition.

Fundamentally the threats confronting Australia fall into two major categories, the first category being an invasion of Australian territory by a significant regional power and category two embracing a range of low level threats, including intrusion on our sovereignty, smuggling and terrorism. Paradoxically, while the first category requires a high level of preparedness combined with a major commitment of resources toward high cost, high technology systems, it is the second
WHY TRACKS, HELICOPTERS AND FRIGATES?

...political consciousness.

Future threats to Australia, although not now readily apparent might come from a number of quarters. The pressures of world population and the depletion of the world's resources mean that it is inconceivable that Australia with a small population but vast resources can long escape the attention of world opinion. It is within the realms of probability that within the next decade or so the United Nations could be persuaded to carry a resolution establishing the principle that empty land areas must be made available for the world's population surpluses, regardless of natural boundaries. Australia is not presently equipped to deal with such a situation. It is not inconceivable that a resources-starved Japan, a united Indo-China, a politically volatile and overcrowded India, a barren Iran, an enormously powerful China or an overpopulated Indonesia might directly threaten Australia prior to the twenty-first century.

While a detached assessment of Australia's strategic environment does not indicate a readily identifiable threat at present, these are uncertainties and contingencies which require monitoring. While this in itself poses problems in arriving at soundly based scenarios for equipment acquisition, Australia cannot allow its defences to run down. The very existence of adequate forces lessens the probability that there will be a requirement to use them. Apart from their obvious deterrent value, strong defences underpin international economic and political strength. For example the ability to protect them gives much greater strength to our claims to the mineral and fishing resources of our continental shelf and encourages investment in off-shore drilling programmes.

Recently our weaknesses have been highlighted by the arrival of Asian refugees. They are not coming on our terms but even worse are coming on the terms of those other countries who give them fuel and water and point them south. Their arrival signifies an infringement on our sovereignty which we are unable to prevent, and overseas countries are unlikely to be impressed by our penchant for providing an honour guard of surveillance aircraft and patrol boats for the last few miles. In essence, weakness has forced us into a public position of international benevolence which might be against our national interest.

The problem posed by the refugees is not simply our inability to deal with them but that should we be so ruthless as to tow a boatload of refugees back to Indo-China we do not have the will to tough out the inevitable back-lash of world opinion. While such an action is a political decision weak defences do not allow the Government to consider such an alternative.

This situation of perceived weakness can have significant effects on the actions of others and on the structuring of our Defence Forces. At present we are structured with a limited strike capacity at enemy concentrations of shipping (F111s, Oberons and HMAS Melbourne), to fight a limited naval battle at sea (HMAS Melbourne, Destroyers), conduct token convoy escort duties (Destroyer Escorts) and fight a (very) limited land or air battle on Australian soil. The above capabilities depend on a knowledge of a likely enemy's intentions and our ability to commit our small forces at the right place and time. While we have a significant reconnaissance capability there can be no surety that the information gathered by surveillance will be correctly evaluated or that an adversary's initial deployment will not be designed to draw our forces to the wrong point. Just how effective are eight or nine destroyers and frigates (the maximum likely to be available) in the vastness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans? It is probable that if we miss the opportunity to strike at an invasion force in its concentration areas our few naval combatants will be unable to make an appreciable dent on its progress.

Additionally there will be political reluctance to commit all naval units to one battle and bureaucratic reluctance to advise on such a course of risking everything on one throw of the dice. It is probable that an enemy will deliberately attempt to entice our fleet out to its maximum fuel range or wear down its readiness by repeated manoeuvres in much the same way that Egyptian land forces, by repeatedly manoeuvring near the Suez in 1973, dulled the Israeli awareness of a probable threat. In any case the security offered by a fleet of a dozen frigates/destroyers, or even twenty or thirty such vessels, is at best illusory and at worst a dangerous drain on the defence budget which does not give an adequate return on investment. Even if additional funds were to become available we could not increase destroyer...
numbers beyond a dozen inside the next ten years. Given the present age of many of our escorts it is probable that we will not be able to maintain a force of a dozen in the foreseeable future.

The traditional defence debate in Australia has centred on whether to adopt a maritime strategy, the so-called Blue Water school of thought, or a land strategy. The maritime strategy is questionable but what of the alternative? Australia is almost unique in that it has a small population inside a large isolated land mass. The only other countries in the west with similar land mass and population are Canada, whose defence is inextricably interwoven with the defence of the United States, and South Africa. It is sobering to compare our present land force posture with that of South Africa, which despite problems of equipment acquisition, has managed to build up a significant army with a high degree of mobility, based principally on wheeled Armoured Fighting Vehicles. The resultant ground force structure of armoured, mechanized, motorized and parachute units has the ability to assemble a large amount of firepower in a threatened area very quickly. A point too frequently overlooked in the Australian context is that it is not the relative strength of opposing armies which is critical, but the ability to get to a given point 'fastest with the mostest'. By comparison with South Africa, Australia’s reliance on a hotch potch of wheeled, tracked, RAAF and civil transport casts serious doubts as to our ability to deploy a meaningful force to a distant part of Australia, even allowing for some weeks’ notice. On the other hand, the South Africans, with limited financial resources but with equipment and force structures more suited to wide open spaces, have demonstrated an ability to maintain a credible land-based defence force; that their inability to purchase major modern maritime equipments has forced them to adopt this structure is probably to their advantage.

It is apparent that maintaining a surface maritime deterrent against invading fleets is not a credible defence option while a suitably structured land force, particularly if the defence infrastructure of roads, water supplies, and national fuel reserves can be developed concurrently is. While such a land force cannot in itself stop an invading force from crossing the ocean it is ultimately going to present a bigger stumbling block to an enemy than a destroyer fleet. However, it is a fundamental maxim that offence is the best form of defence and to maintain Australia’s credibility in the modern world it is essential to maintain a long-range striking force to retain the option of making a pre-emptive strike against enemy concentration areas and to provide a visible national deterrent. Fundamentally there is a need to strengthen the deterrent forces and land forces at the expense of the intermediate force of frigate-sized vessels. Since the time in which modern conflict situations develop has become so much shorter surveillance capabilities must be maintained. The existing force of P3B and P3C Orions and Tracker aircraft when complemented by other surveillance capabilities gives us a reasonable force provided that it is not frittered away on minor but politically sensitive tasks such as refugee and fishing surveillance or searching the Antarctic Ocean for foolhardy yachtsmen.

I have not considered equipment for low threat tasks such as sovereignty surveillance or policing fishing grounds since this equipment is of a lower technology and more readily and quickly available than high threat related equipments. It is precisely because of the ready availability of such equipment that it should remain a low priority. In the present our activity in the sphere should be limited to relatively inexpensive measures including hired light commercial aircraft surveillance, distributing radios and identification kits to Australian fishermen and patrols of light naval patrol craft. These measures should prove adequate provided that potential intruders perceive the high threat capabilities which lie beyond them and we have the national will to police vulnerable areas and carry out appropriate enforcement action. Essentially the problem is more one of national will rather than window dressing. It makes little sense to fritter away large sums of money on low technology short lead-time items, notwithstanding the visits of parliamentary committees to Darwin and the scenarios painted by manufacturers all trying to invent a role for their particular piece of equipment.

Clearly then there are three major priorities. These are to maintain an effective surveillance capability which is being achieved, to establish a mobile land force capable of concentrating large amounts of firepower at threatened points
and to build up an effective credible and highly visible long-range deterrent strike force.

A mobile land force (including air elements) will be of limited use without a long range strike/deterrent force since it would inevitably be forced to react after the event while a single line of defence based on a long-range strike deterrent force would have little utility on its own if an aggressor knew that once he had survived the initial strikes or evaded them, there would be nothing left to impede his invasion.

It is about the essential ingredients of the strike deterrent force and the land defence force which debate on major equipment acquisitions should occur. Potentially the strike deterrent force could consist of a mixture of long range strike aircraft which would need to be augmented by tankers, submarines, aircraft carriers and possibly modern frigate-sized vessels with stand-off weapons. It is essential that a proper mixture of equipment is achieved in order to arrive at the most effective force both in terms of actual cost and potential to destroy an enemy's forces in his harbours or on his airfields. Of the feasible options the frigates have the disadvantage of being really impossible to hide, relatively slow speed of approach and need to get very close to the enemy (about 70 km with Harpoon). They are extremely vulnerable to air to surface missiles launched from outside effective air defence range. They would appear to have little use except to act as surface escorts to some form of sea air platform.

Submarines although slow (about 18 knots underwater) are far more likely to approach undetected and with underwater launched stand-off weapons such as Harpoon and the MK48 Torpedo and their potential for mine laying are likely to achieve surprise. They appear to be a very effective offensive weapon but obviously cannot strike at targets on land.

Long range strike aircraft such as F111s when augmented with an in-flight refuelling capability and adequate stand-off weapons provide a means of making rapid surprise attacks. They are largely limited by the base facilities which they need to operate from, which are themselves vulnerable and very costly, and since the probable direction of attack is extremely predictable it is feasible to maintain a worthwhile defence against them.

While a great deal has been written about the cost and vulnerability of a replacement aircraft carrier there has been too little comment on the positive aspects of the proposal. It is true that Naval aircraft platforms are expensive, perhaps prohibitively so when the costs of aircraft, shore facilities, training and escorts are also included. The problem of vulnerability appears to have been greatly exaggerated. For example the forerunner of today's cruise missile, namely the Japanese Kamikaze, failed to sink one carrier in World War II while the USS Saratoga, an old ship built in 1927, survived four Kamikazes in one day and was ready to land an aircraft within four hours. More recently an accident on the deck of the Enterprise resulted in the detonation of nine major calibre bombs (equivalent to six cruise missiles) yet it could have resumed air operations within several hours. The survivability which can be built into even a small carrier coupled with its own air defence and anti-submarine capacities, its ability to avoid likely areas of submarine patrol had to approach from different directions mean that the aircraft carrier is a uniquely flexible weapon system.

More importantly an aircraft carrier allows for great political flexibility since its actual despatch to a troubled area does not limit the political options associated with land-based forces or mobile RAAF elements and it can remain in the proximity of the trouble spot as a visible sign of Australian Government determination. Its flexibility in commitment and withdrawal cannot be provided by any other visible form of weapon.

The weapons which would suit the needs of the deterrent/strike force best would appear to be submarines and aircraft carriers while destroyers/frigates would appear to have little utility except to act as escorts to aircraft carriers. While land-based strike aircraft would appear to have some use the difficulties in striking at long distances with a worthwhile payload from a limited number of bases place undue restrictions on them. Some might argue for additional 'land bases' but the costs involved in establishing such bases, laying in stores of fuel and munitions and guarding them against terrorist attacks are prohibitive.

Essentially then a worthwhile strike/deterrent force of an increased number of submarines and perhaps three aircraft platforms of the Harrier Carrier or equivalent class could be built up providing other sacrifices were to be made. The sacrifices should include our present
six destroyer escorts which have little worthwhile capability, the follow-on destroyer project and probable premature retirement of three DDGs (Charles F. Adams Class). The three FFG7s to which we are committed could be kept in service to provide area air defence escorts for the Harrier Carriers. In any case political considerations dictate their entry into service. The resulting Navy would be considerably smaller in manpower terms even allowing for a probable doubling of the submarine arm since the present crew of HMAS Melbourne would be sufficient to man three Harrier Carriers while the retirement of six DEs would reduce the complement afloat by 1500. There would also be substantial reductions in the number of personnel in the training pipeline and providing back-up services. Our existing F111 force should be kept in service in the interim provided that it can be equipped with stand-off weapons and given an in-flight refuelling capacity. If we are unable to provide those adjuncts there is little point in continuing to operate such sophisticated aircraft in a modern air defence environment over restricted distances at great cost.

The remaining major components of the Defence Forces also require a long hard look. Currently our land defence element consists of the Army augmented by the Mirage force plus RAAF transport elements. Major components of this force are directly related to our earlier forward defence policies. In particular our large fleet of M113 Carrier derivatives and utility helicopters can be directly attributed to the need to provide battlefield mobility over restricted distances in Asia. Both are severely restricted in the vast distances of Australia. Clearly there is a lesson in the South African trend towards using large numbers of wheeled armoured car variants with their ability to cover large distances quickly — independent of rail and road transporters and their much improved serviceability compared with tracked vehicles. A good example of this type of vehicle is the West German Transportpanzer14.

Our recently purchased Leopard tanks are probably the most suited to Australian conditions of any current main Battle Tank. Provided that they can be transported to a threatened area in time they will provide mobile accurate firepower for which there is currently no substitute.

The next major area of concern is the lack of firepower currently available to our infantry. Since Australia presents such unique problems of distance and terrain it is crucial that the first elements to arrive at a threatened area have as much organic firepower as it is possible to provide within a limited airlift. It is vital that our battalions acquire the latest generation of man portable anti-tank and low-level air defence weapons, mortars and sustained fire machine guns. These are necessary to enable them to hold an enemy force at bay while heavier supporting weapons such as Tanks and Artillery are transported to the area by road, rail or sea.

Much discussion has arisen about the need for a TFF and more particularly for the priorities afforded to the High (Air Defence) as opposed to the Low (Close air support of ground troops) roles. As the Egyptian and Syrian forces clearly demonstrated in 197315 the survivability of manned aircraft in the close air support role over a battlefield where a multiple layer of air defences are deployed is poor. As a consequence the Israelis have placed renewed emphasis on the development of their Artillery16 and now allot the close air support role to aircraft which can be regarded as obsolescent in the high role. A case might be made out for a limited number of specialist tank killing aircraft with either the Armed Attack Helicopter or A10 Aircraft17 lending themselves to such a role. However, this would appear to be a lower priority in the ground force inventory than wheeled armoured vehicles, tank transporters, anti-tank weapons and low-level air defence and an effective artillery force. Essentially the aim should be to build up a highly mobile ground force capable of moving a large amount of firepower to a threatened area in time to forestall an enemy build up.

Finally this article would be incomplete without a discussion of the TFF (High Role). Clearly in announcing its short list of F16, F18, F18L and Mirage 2000 the Government and Defence Department have opted for air superiority as the primary role of the fighter force since all four contenders are optimised in this direction18. All have a limited secondary role of interdiction. A decision must be taken in the near future since the increasing cost of maintaining an ageing Mirage force19 and the limitation imposed by its 1950s technology heavy air frame20 mean that it cannot remain an effective air superiority fighter for very many
more years. The major concern is that of cost and its overall impact on the Defence budget: and hence on a number of competing programmes. The assessment as to whether the high cost is worth the return must clearly be based on an assessment of risk. Assuming that, at some time in the future, Australia was threatened by an invasion force it is inconceivable that such a force would not have its own air cover. The need for the Army to bring up equipment and supplies would clearly be threatened by enemy air interdiction and this could only be countered by a huge investment in ground-based anti-aircraft missile systems or air cover. Essentially then, there is a requirement for a fighter force capable of giving air cover for the deployment of ground forces. In as much as a priority clearly needs to be established there would appear to be a more urgent need for the provision of some form of sea air platform(s) and for the provision of adequate mobility and fire support for the Army.

In conclusion, there is a need to restructure our forces as a matter of urgency. This will necessitate the premature retirement of a number of equipments and the expansion of other capabilities. Serious consideration should be given to the retirement of the Destroyer Escort squadron, the phasing out of DDGs and the phasing out of tracked, armoured vehicles, with the exception of the Leopard Tank. Our defence priorities dictate the continued upgrading and future expansion of the submarine force, stand-off weapons and refuelling capacity for the F111s to ensure a deterrent strike capacity until such time as new sea air platform(s) can be introduced. Similarly, the current need to purchase helicopters for the Patrol Frigates, the attrition of the utility helicopters, the decrepit state of the RAN’s Wessex helicopters and the need to replace lost Sea Kings suggest that the time is ripe to standardize on a lesser number of types with probably less emphasis on the utility role. The Army needs to improve its mobility and firepower and the TFF project, although important, is a relatively low priority.

NOTES
5. Ibid., p.16.
13. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p.20.

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There is nothing new in military detachments giving aid to the civil power, and as far as Australia is concerned the armed forces of the Crown, in the early days of New South Wales (NSW), provided the only organized law enforcement agency — a task which was as disliked by the proletariat as it was regarded unfavourably by the regiments concerned. Organized police forces as we know them today had not even been established when the First Fleet sailed, and it was not until 1822 that the Royal Irish Constabulary was established, following a long period of civil disturbance which could not be controlled effectively by the existing police system. In London the Metropolitan Police was not founded until seven years later. In the meantime the Army provided garrisons, guarded supply depots and gales, and attempted to suppress smuggling, to such an extent that even at the time of Waterloo 18,000 men had to be retained in England for these tasks.

The type of situation which could develop along the frontiers of civilization, testing the capacity and experience of both soldiers and civilians and placing both in a dilemma, is perhaps best illustrated by an incident which occurred at Moreton Bay in November 1849. The military detachment had been called out to York's Hollow and there had been a fatal collision with a party of Aboriginals, all because a 'black boy had invented [a] story because an old gin had beaten him'. The Police Magistrate at Brisbane was promptly informed that he was not at liberty to call out the force for such a service 'the small detachment at Moreton Bay is stationed there to keep the aboriginal natives in check, and not for the performance of police duties, and should never be required even to support the police except in cases of actual emergency.' On the other hand if Lieutenant Cameron of the 11th had done his duty the matter would have rested on the shoulders of the magistrate, and any subsequent investigation, 'contrary to the wishes of the Major General', would not have been necessary. Cameron was to be instructed not to call out the detachment on a similar occasion unless he received a verbal or written requisition from the Police Magistrate, and on no account to act unless he was accompanied by, and under the immediate directions of that officer or some magistrate acting for him.

New South Wales

Altogether during the 1840s there were six separate police forces in NSW — The Sydney Police; Sydney Water Police; Rural Constabulary; Native Police; Border Police and Mounted Police between all of whom there was little communication, and in some cases hostility.

The Sydney Police reflected the composition of society — immigrants, discharged soldiers, and ex-convicts, some of whom were not above condoning crime or collaborating with the criminal elements. Turnover was high, with a significant number being discharged for drunkenness. They did not have the confidence of the population, partly because of their origins, but also because men of good character were reluctant to enter the force, and there had been an unfortunate succession of 'Police Commissioners'.

The Sydney Water Police had been formed in 1830. Their tasks were many in a 'comic opera...
atmosphere', but were mainly concerned with customs duties and checking ships. From 1840 an attempt was made to make them more efficient so as to prevent desertion from overseas vessels by imposing a rate of five cents a ton on inwards shipping. On the whole they appear to have been of a better calibre than the Sydney Police, but there was a constant friction between the Superintendent, Captain H. H. Browne, and the Collector of Customs, Colonel J. G. N. Gibbes. Between 1843 and 1846 the Sydney Water Police operated under the control of the Sydney Police, and in 1851 were merged into the unified police system.

The Rural Constabulary were purely local in character under the control of the Justices of the Peace who composed the rural benches. They were employed on general police duties, and in the pursuit of runaway convicts, bushrangers and stolen cattle. There was no overall control of their activities: little communication between the various police districts: often friction with the Mounted Police, and altogether not highly regarded.

The Native Police, as the name implies, was composed of Aboriginal troopers with white officers. Like the Border Police they only operated outside the Boundaries of Location. First organized in 1837, they operated exclusively in the Port Phillip District (present State of Victoria), although in 1848 a similar force was organized in northern NSW and southern Queensland, as a result of the disbandment of the Border Police, and the withdrawal of troops for the First Maori War. They were used almost exclusively for contact with the Aborigines, were mounted, armed with muskets, and wore green uniforms trimmed with o'possum fur, with red stripes down the trousers, and a red cap.

The Native Police were highly regarded by colonial society. By 1850 they had turned out to be capable of discharging the duties of a Mounted Police force in the most efficient and praiseworthy manner. Where there had originally been uproar, there was now quiet and it was uncommon to see a person armed, even when travelling from station to station. Moreover the 1850 NSW Legislative Select Committee on Police recorded "the almost unanimous opinion of those who have had an opportunity of observing it, that they state that the Native Police both in the Port Phillip District, where it has been more recently introduced, has proved a most efficient corps".

Such efficiency was hardly likely to endear them to Aboriginal society. As Rowley observes, "The necessary detribalisation which made the Troopers into an effective fighting force must also have been a process of brutalization; and it could have been effective enough among young men whose world was collapsing and who felt no particular loyalty to Aborigines from areas far away from their own: a 'foreign legion' at the disposal of the whites along the eastern frontiers".

In July 1836 the NSW Legislative Council had passed an Act providing for the establishment of Commissioners of Crown Lands to operate beyond the Boundaries of Location. In 1839, following the 'Myall Massacre' of the previous year, Gipps proposed that the Commissioners be provided with assistance by forming a corps of mounted men chosen from among 'well conducted prisoners of the Crown' for the purpose of repressing "the outrages which have been committed on the Aborigines, as well as by them". Thus came into existence the Border Police, originally composed of military convicts, replacing the Mounted Police outside the Boundaries of Location.

The Border Police acted under the directions of the Commissioners of Crown Lands, collecting the dues of the Crown, settling disputes between licensed graziers over the unsurveyed boundaries of their runs, and ejecting unlicensed squatters from Crown Lands. The force was unpaid, but provided with rations and clothing, promised indulgences for good behaviour, mounted, and armed with cut-down 'musquettes'. The force was really never satisfactory, and the Act authorising its existence was not renewed when it expired in 1846. As the 1850 Legislative Council Select Committee on the Police noted; "The disbanding of the Border Police and the great extension of occupied country rendered necessary a considerable increase to the ordinary Police. Accordingly in the early part of 1847 Petty Sessions, with a small Police establishment attached to each, were, for first time, brought into operation beyond the Settled Districts of the Colony, and
The need for some of the police in NSW to be mounted appears to have been first mentioned by Mr Commissioner Bigge in the early 1820s, when he recommended that patrols should be established on the main roads — Parramatta to Sydney, Parramatta to Windsor, and Windsor to Liverpool. It was not, however, until seven stock-keepers had been "murdered in the most cruel and barbarous manner", in the vicinity of Bathurst, that the Governor, Major General Sir Thomas Brisbane, approached the Secretary of State, Earl Bathurst, for authority to raise a colonial troop of cavalry (two officers and thirty other ranks), "with the view of keeping the Aborigines in check, against whom infantry have no chance of success, but also for the general police of the colony, which I consider will derive the most essential benefit from it". The situation west of the Blue Mountains continued to deteriorate and a few months later Governor Brisbane was forced, as a last resort, to declare 'martial law' over the area west of Mount York.

Earl Bathurst's reaction was predictable. The establishment of such a force would have to be fully justified; what exactly caused the disaster?; could it have been foreseen, and if so what action had the military commandant taken to prevent it? and more importantly — how much would the force cost to raise and maintain?

Governor Brisbane did not feel justified in raising the force on his own responsibility, even though he was convinced of its absolute necessity, and submitted Earl Bathurst's views to the Executive Council. The latter stated on 6 September 1825 that they were reluctant to recommend the use of military force to suppress civil outrages, such as the bushranging menace, which had by now supplanted the Aboriginal as the chief threat to domestic tranquility. However, in the short term the only practical solution appeared to be the formation of a corps of mounted soldiers to co-operate with the civil authorities. It was envisaged that three or four soldiers, with one or two Aboriginals, under the direction of a constable could be located on the roads between Sydney, Liverpool and Windsor. In the long term the Council recommended 'the training [of] a body of native youths to [the] cavalry exercise'.

Two days later a public notice in the Sydney Gazette and NSW Advertiser stated that a 'horse patrol' was to be established in the Bathurst and Newcastle districts. The Government had not yet been able to establish 'depots of provisions' for the troops, and asked settlers at the outstations to issue rations on receipt; the Chief Commissary being directed to pay in cash or kind at a price to be determined, or in case of difference of opinion at one fixed by the nearest magistrate.

By the middle of September the same newspaper reported that Colonel William Stewart of the 3rd was very active furthering the equipment of the troop of cavalry — "all the saddlers in town are employed.'

Early in November Lieutenant Everard and eleven other ranks of the 'new mounted cavalry' left Sydney for Bathurst. They were to be stationed there for the next twenty-five years.

Shortly after Governor Brisbane left Sydney to return to England in December 1825, Stewart, then administering the colony, advised Earl Bathurst that at the behest of the Governor and the Council he had some time before selected and equipped as light cavalry, two officers and twenty-four other ranks of his regiment, to act as mounted police for the express purpose of pursuing and capturing bushrangers. The use of this party in conjunction with infantry from the 3rd had been completely successful, and the most desperate leaders of the different parties of bushrangers at Bathurst and other settlements had been apprehended. For which efforts they received the public thanks of Darling.

In spite of his despatch to Governor Brisbane, Earl Bathurst had already anticipated the formation of the mounted force and had authorised the Colonial Agent to procure sixty sets of cavalry equipment for the use of NSW, and forty for the use of Tasmania. In both cases he envisaged the force being provided from the ranks of the Veteran Companies, which were to arrive in Australia as an augmentation of military force in July 1826. The dress of the new force was based on that of the 14th Light Dragoons — dark blue jackets (light dragoon undress) with red edging; overalls (colour undefined but probably grey with a red stripe down the seam); undress caps and half-boots. The outfit was completed with cavalry cloaks and dark blue saddle cloths.
In spite of Stewart’s optimism, Lieutenant General (General Sir) Ralph Darling, soon after he became Governor, informed Earl Bathurst that he had to take immediate steps to deal with the ‘banditti’. “Some of the troops were . . . disguised and sent out with the police, and a detachment of Mounted Police was also ordered to the disturbed part of the country”.

The performance of the Veteran Companies did not match Earl Bathurst’s hopes. Writing in February 1827 Darling was highly critical. “I lately detached four [veterans] to act as Mounted Police in the interior, where they were immediately required. One of them was a sergeant; but before they had reached the end of the first day’s march, they had lost their carbines, pistols and sabres. The Mounted Police at Bathurst and in the district of Hunter’s River, whose conduct heretofore had been exemplary, and whose services had been highly important, since the mixture of these men with them, have become drunken and disorderly. I have no alternative now but to put those on Garrison duty, who are observed as unfit for other purposes. I quite despair of turning them as a body to any useful purpose. They are such incorrigible drunkards, they cannot be depended on. Colonel Arthur wrote some time ago to say he thought it would be better to put up with the first expense, and disband them at once. I am of opinion our only plan is to appoint overseers from the convicts. The Mounted Police, to answer the purpose required, must be selected from the Corps in garrison as hitherto. Their services in keeping down Bushranging is of more importance than all the troops put together.”

A few months later he informed Earl Bathurst that the veterans were unsuitable as mounted police, “being in general unequal to the exposure and fatigue”. He proposed to increase the strength to sixty and complete the establishment from soldiers selected from the resident regiments. In 1830 the establishment of the corps was increased to 100 as a result of bushranger activity in the Bathurst area, although such increases were always subject to considerable scrutiny by the Colonial Office, and were only achieved by a corresponding reduction in the number of the constabulary.

By 1835 the strength of the corps was stated to be three officers, 107 mounted and twenty dismounted troopers, the duty of the latter being to take charge of barracks and spare horses, while the mounted troops were on the roads or in the bush. The 1835 NSW Legislative Council Committee on the Police recommended that some addition be made to that number, and that the Mounted Police be made a permanent corps by “retaining if possible the efficient troopers when their regiments leave the colony, as a period of eighteen months or two years sometimes elapses before a recruit is qualified to perform his duty in the corps efficiently, and more especially before he can attain such a knowledge of the country as to enable him to traverse the bush safely or expeditiously.”

Adjustments were also recommended in the arms carried - carbine, two pistols and a sword. The carbine had “been found insufficient in practice” since it did “not carry sufficiently far or true”, and should be replaced by a rifle. In addition “a bayonet and small pistol, to be worn in a belt round the waist, should be adopted, instead of the two heavy pistols now in use”. It is not clear, however, whether the carbine was replaced. Writing in October 1844, after a fatal clash between a party of Mounted Police and ‘Cursed Jack’ and ‘Hellfire Tom’, the Mudgee correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald commented on the inadequacy of the police single barrelled carbines compared with the double barrelled fowling pieces of the bushrangers. “A good fowling piece will throw ball almost as true as a rifle, and quite true enough for men who are likely to use it on horseback”.

It was at this point that the ‘Governor’s Bodyguard of Cavalry’ was merged with the Mounted Police. This peculiar establishment was first formed by Governor King in 1801, and ‘in the good old days of Governor Bligh’ they appear to have been employed as much in shooting the stray dogs as in protecting the settlers. By 1826 they were much admired in their blue uniforms “elegently turned up with yellow”, although shortly afterwards the uniform, like that of the Mounted Police was based on the 14th Light Dragoons — blue jackets (full dress light dragoons), red facings and edgings with scale shoulder straps; grey trousers with a red stripe down the seam; half-boots and chakos.
Governor Bourke was somewhat startled by their name, and would have changed it for something more suitable except that confusion could have resulted in official documents. Privately he referred to them as "mounted orderlies". The name also startled Secretary of State Goderich in 1833. He could not see why Bourke needed a bodyguard at a cost of nearly $800 a year, so he instructed him to disband the establishment and replace it by garrison troops. These instructions were repeated by Spring-Rice in 1834, although Bourke had replied before a further despatch on the subject was received from Aberdeen in 1835. Bourke was not surprised that the "ostentatious designation had caused misapprehension". They had been formerly part of the Mounted Police, but he had found it more convenient to separate them under the command of his Aide-de-Camp as "mounted orderlies". They were taken from the garrison troops, and would be a charge against the colony from July 1835.

Glenelg was now Secretary of State. He regretted that the establishment was being continued, but directed that it be placed on the same footing as the Mounted Police.

In August 1838 Gipps informed the Legislative Council that the Treasury had directed that all expenses for the Mounted Police, including the maintenance of Barracks, but excluding their military pay and rations, would be a charge against colonial funds.

By this time weaknesses in the system had become evident, and had been publicised to the House of Commons Committee on Transportation by Colonel Breton of the 4th. The regiments were seriously weakened by the withdrawal of men who were returned to them when they moved to India. These men could be a source of trouble, since they were "for a considerable time unused to military discipline, and discontented in consequence to having to relinquish an advantageous employment". To overcome this problem, from 1 April 1839 they were to be re-attested on transfer from one regiment to another, regarded as supernumeries to the strength of the incoming regiment; remain amenable to military law, and "their pensions would be granted, as at present for their whole Service both in the police and in the army".

Superficially the transfer looked attractive, although from a colonial point of view there were difficulties. The 1839 Legislative Council Committee on Police and Gaol Expenditure noted that "there will not be the power to remove any inefficient or ill-conducted men from the body", and as a consequence great care would have to be exercised in selection. There was also the question of increased cost since Glenelg had invited Gipps "to propose to the Legislative Council to make the necessary provision for carrying the measure into effect from [1 April 1838]". Nevertheless, a modus operandi seems to have been evolved. In 1848 a Garrison Court Martial sentenced a mounted policeman attached to the 99th to six months imprisonment for habitual drunkenness and insubordination. He was dismissed from the Mounted Police and returned to regimental duty.

The Sydney Herald believed that "to expect the colony to pay $285,422 in addition to the large amount of other charges imposed upon it, solely on account of its being a gaol for Great Britain, is a degree of injustice and tyranny which should not be tolerated." In November, following a public meeting, the Legislative Council, when considering the Police Estimates (which included $37,000 for the Mounted Police), resolved that the whole expense of Police and Gaols was falling too heavily on the colonial revenue, and "so long as the penal character of a large proportion of the population subsists", in equity and justice one half should be borne by the British Treasury. Thus started the acrimonious colonial debate which was to continue for many years.

Initially putting the Mounted Police on a more permanent basis appears to have improved efficiency. During the year ending 20 June 1839 for example, 522 runaway convicts and bushrangers were apprehended, of whom thirty-nine were armed. Their usefulness was nevertheless impaired by having to serve subpoenas and summonses, and escort prisoners. There were also complaints that they did not obey the magistrates "with alacrity". During 1840, however, the situation changed abruptly, and the peace of the colony became greatly disturbed by aboriginal reaction against the advance of the settlers, and the greatly increased number of bushrangers. Both groups became more active and daring, "incidents" multiplied, and results became more serious. The Press became more vocal and sharply critical of poor
leadership and inefficiency, almost completely ignoring, however, that the 160 mounted policemen were spread in thirty different localities from northern NSW to southern Victoria; that some Aboriginals were now armed, and that the bushranger was well mounted and armed, and "not an insignificant antagonist when opposed to the disciplined dragoon".25

Relations with the public was not helped when Gipps authorised in February 1840 a small detachment of mounted police to accompany Captain William Hobson, RN, then proceeding to New Zealand (NZ) to take up the appointment of British Consul. The Sydney Herald thought such action "highly judicious", considering the insufficiency of the police, and the plethora of bushrangers and aboriginal "out-breaks" in NSW. Gipps was asked to return the party in September 1841, but considered he did not have the power to recall them — NZ was no longer a dependency, and the horses and accoutrements had been charged against the NZ Administration. If the Major General commanding decided to bring them back he would be delighted to have them in the Mounted Police, but if they were to remain in NZ they should not be borne on the strength of the Mounted Police in NSW. They finally returned in May 1842.26

In April 1840 it was rumoured that Gipps had asked for a regiment of light dragoons, and for old discharged veterans to form a cordon on the frontiers of the colony where they could be used against runaway convicts and resident blacks and be rewarded with land grants. No doubt with South Australia in mind it was also suggested that the settlers be formed into 'corps' for mutual protection, although it was realized that the penal nature of NSW militated against such a course.27

As will be seen from the following summary, the Press commented widely on the 'disturbed state of the country' during 1839/1840

- the heavy expense of the Police and Gaols establishment arose from the provision of paid magistrates
- police recruits were of poor quality
- convict servants were leaving in hordes, but were rarely captured
- many mounted policemen were idle, and their officers too interested in parading Sydney in showy uniforms. The non-commissioned officers were too busy attending to their private domestic affairs
- assigned servants, sly-grog sellers, draymen and even magistrates, singly and in combination, were in league with the bushrangers
- the appointment of Aboriginal Protectors was making the Aboriginals bolder; who was supplying them with weapons?
- the Aboriginals were reacting to outrages committed by convict shepherds
- the Mounted Police had lost their discipline and had not only become useless but also ridiculous
- the problem would not have arisen except for "the stingy, starving, whig ministers"
- plundering of country stores took place "almost in view of the Mounted Police". The force was supine. What was the Commander doing?
- the military at the outstations should not have been withdrawn
- Machonachie's system of discipline at Norfolk Island was producing its expected results
- Gipps was too complacent, and the NSW Government was treating the situation far too lightly.

As the Sydney Herald said, with a curiously modern ring:

"It is no use His Excellency making clap trap speeches at Temperance and Benevolent Societies to gain popularity ... In the face of these facts and with a ruinously expensive police establishment, will the Government dare to say that the settlers complain without cause; will the Government dare to repeat that the press is factious for printing out these things. We state that any Government acting so, deserves to lose the confidence and support of the colonists, and ought immediately to be removed by the Home Government".28

The declaration of 'martial law' in the Carcoar area a month later was taken as a tacit admission that the colony was in a disturbed state.

The bushranging threat and aboriginal reaction to expanding settlement continued during the next two years, although with decreasing intensity. Gradually it appears to have been realized that the Mounted Police were not necessarily inefficient, and that their task was difficult because they were spread so thinly — a feeling which was fostered by the appointment of more efficient and dedicated officers, as their predecessors left the colony to join their
regiments in India, and a general tightening up of discipline. Various supplementary measures were proposed. For example, it was suggested that local associations be formed to keep local crime under review, with rewards, matched by the Government, for information leading to crime solution and subsequent conviction. While another correspondent proposed that magistrates be empowered to call out settlers along the lines envisaged for the West Indies Militia, Gipps, concerned with reducing the cost of the police and gaols, suggested the possibility of compounding the grog issue to the Mounted Police for three cents a day, which as a correspondent pointed out was of doubtful legality and little practical use. Nevertheless, it was a course he was to pursue, with the disastrous result of causing a mutiny in the 58th and 99th four years later.

During discussion on the 1843 Estimates, Hannibal Macarthur questioned whether the Mounted Police were distributed to the best advantage. It seemed to him that posting a mounted trooper at some localities was merely a waste of money, and better results would be obtained by using small parties under a non-commissioned officer, properly co-ordinated by an officer. Gipps agreed, but stated that an examination of the distribution of the force on one particular day could give a wrong impression. Dismounted troopers were required as station-keepers while the mounted men were out on patrol, otherwise the Aboriginals would ransack the stations. Moreover while the Government had the right to reject potential troopers from the regiments, it had no right of selection. Consequently if a trooper's horse died or sickened, it would be folly to return the trooper to his regiment, since there was little possibility of getting him back. It was this factor which made the number of dismounted troopers abnormally large. The problem was somewhat exaggerated by the movement of flocks and herds to the Port Phillip District. In spite of strict regulations to the contrary, Gipps occasionally was forced to give authority for convict servants to be used for such tasks, as free men would not undertake this type of work. On arrival many of these overlanders went into the service of other settlers. In effect, they should have been returned to Hyde Park barracks, but if any attempt was made to do so, they absconded to become runaways or bushrangers. He believed that this should be avoided, but the strength of the Mounted Police in the area had to be maintained to keep them under surveillance. It was probably these factors as much as those he gave Stanley, which induced Gipps to decline to escort parties travelling between Sydney and Adelaide.

By the mid-1840s the strength of the Mounted Police had reached five officers and 123 troopers, of whom twenty-two were stationed in the Port Phillip area. There seems little doubt that the work of the Mounted Police had reduced the 'disturbed' state of the country districts, although there had been a dramatic increase in violent crime in Sydney, leading to the appointment by the Legislative Council of a Select Committee on the Insecurity of Life and Property. However, while the country districts were quieter, difficulties continued between the civil authorities and troopers, particularly in the Port Phillip District, and Gipps had to repeat the 1840 Regulations in June 1846. The Mounted Police were not only under military discipline, but were also part of the civil police establishment. Consequently when they were not under command of one of their officers they were bound to obey the civil magistrates. Mounted Police officers being civil magistrates were "up on an equality in respect to their civil authority with all other magistrates, [and consequently] they cannot ... be absolutely called on to execute the orders of any magistrate, or even a bench of magistrates, but it is their duty as directed ... in instructions for the Mounted Police, as far as in their power lies, to aid the magistrate, and to co-operate with them for the public security."

The strength of the Mounted Police continued to grow, and by June 1847 the Estimates for the following year called for six officers and 133 other ranks, two clerks, a veterinary surgeon, six grooms, twelve convicts and twelve aboriginal trackers. The increase in troopers appears modest, considering that the Border Police had been disbanded in 1846, and while disturbance in the country had abated, the area to be covered by the Mounted Police had expanded enormously with the rapid increase in the number of squatting districts beyond the Boundaries of Location.

By now, however, many factors were operating to bring the whole police system under searching examination. Even though the increase in the Mounted Police had been made, it did mean increased costs. Grey had ordered
an increase in the military force in New Zealand, with corresponding decreases in Australia. Such a decrease mainly affected Sydney, where "on more than one occasion, mobs of the most turbulent character have assembled which it has been found totally beyond the power of the local police to overawe, and nothing but the interference of the military has dispersed". Not only had the crime rate in Sydney increased, but it was becoming exceedingly difficult "to maintain a respectable police force" because of high labour costs. Men were loath to join a force where wages were low, and which was "irksome in its duties, and which subjects them to the restraints of discipline".

In May 1847 a Select Committee was appointed to enquire into the state of the police, to which also was referred Grey's despatch of the previous November directing the reduction of the military force in Australia. In Grey's view "it is only reasonable that the colonists should themselves be called upon to provide [for internal order] by the formation of an adequate force of police, or, if necessary, of militia".

The Select Committee submitted its report the following September, and it became clear that the Mounted Police had reached the stage when they had outlived their usefulness, and would have been phased out if it had been possible to get the civil police properly organized. While their pay was lower than that of a labourer, at a time when it was possible for the latter to earn in two days sufficient to keep him drunk for the following four, this does not seem to have lowered their esprit de corps. In some respects nothing had changed since 1839. There was constant friction with the Rural Constabulary, since the Mounted Police did not consider that they should be used on routine duties such as serving subpoenas for the Supreme Court and the Court of Requests. Problems also arose when mixed parties were used for the escort of prisoners, particularly when the only civil officer available to accompany the escort was a convict — the official scourger. The rural magistracy, like their underlings the Rural Constabulary, were also likely to be ignored, and much inconvenience was caused by the Mounted police not calling at a magistrate's residence for information and orders, when passing through the country districts.

Little happened over the next two years, and it was not until August 1849 that a crisis was reached over the Estimates for the Mounted Police. W. C. Wentworth led the attack. The Mounted Police might be gallant, disciplined and active, but they were also expensive, utterly useless, and no longer necessary. It was a matter of notoriety some years ago that they did as they liked, and were not subject to the control of the local magistrates. Other speakers elaborated — they were like a noisy standing Army with clattering sabres and showy uniforms waiting for an imaginary enemy. The Estimates were reduced by two thirds, and the force was to be dispensed with by the end of 1850. However, even though a move to abolish the force immediately in the Port Phillip District was defeated in the Council, La Trobe was able to report the final breaking up of the force there in January 1850.

Not everyone was enthralled with the prospect of seeing the Mounted Police abolished, and fears were expressed that the country would again see a sharp increase in violent crime. What underlay the protests perhaps was not the loss of the Mounted Police as such, but a complete lack of information as to the type of civil force, if any, which was going to replace them. This thought was underscored as people began to realize what they were losing. As "a police magistrate reduced by the [Legislative] Council" remarked, "I am satisfied that every colonist of ten years standing will bear me out, when I say that a more efficient, better conducted, or intelligent corps never formed a police in any colony." Nor was the fear altogether allayed by the 1850 Select Committee on the Police, which recommended that "to supply the want which must be felt on the disbanding of [the Mounted Police] . . . Two of the ordinary constables at each chief place for holding Petty Sessions, should be mounted at the Public expense". In addition the Committee also recommended that "two Native Troopers might be assigned to each Petty Sessions in the Squatting Districts".

The motives behind the move by the Legislative Council were mixed. There was the long standing grievance that the full cost of the police and gaols fell upon the colony, when part should have been provided from Imperial funds. The Colonial Secretary obliquely emphasised this point when replying to a request
for the military guard to be replaced by a constable for night duty at Cockatoo Island prison. "As long as there are convicts on Cockatoo Island, under sentence of transportation from home, the maintenance of a guard there properly forms one of the duties of the military force stationed in the Colony". There were also those who "have not scripted to say that the evident dislike of some hon. members to this corps has arisen out of the the fact that its superior organization has prevented country magistrates from exercising that petty interference, and control, which the absence of all systems in the formation of the rural police enables them to indulge in, with regard to the latter force". Finally there were those, including possibly Wentworth, who would see the Mounted Police as just another obstacle to be removed in the long struggle to achieve self-government.

Considerable attention was now directed towards the Sydney police, stemming from the riotous behavior of the Sydney mob on New Year's Eve and the failure of the police to cope with the situation. The Sydney Morning Herald noted that 1844 had set in with an alarming increase in crime, and so had 1850. Sydney had been long considered as the most ill-paved, ill-drained, ill-cleansed, ill-watered, and ill-lighted town in Her Majesty's dominions. It was now the most ill-protected. So much so that the use of the military garrison was still necessary in times of public excitement. Considerable excitement was being generated by the city election for the Legislative Council. The Colonial Secretary in Sydney requested that all available troops, with the exception of fifty as a guard at the Darlinghurst Gaol be concentrated in the Old Barracks in George Street, so that if required they could preserve the peace without delay. Similarly, two years later the Sydney Superintendent of Police suggested that during the three days preceding the election of a number of the Legislative Council to represent the City of Sydney, the guards at the Inner Domain Gate, the old Barracks Gate, and the Ordnance Store be each increased to twenty men, with a reserve of 100 in the Infirmary yard.

A Board was set up to enquire into the New Year's Eve incident, although some who had demanded the Board refused to give evidence. By mid-June yet another Select Committee had been appointed. Its Report was tabled in September, and although considered disappointing, the NSW police became centralised under an Inspector General at the end of 1850. The new force was both mounted and dismounted, and the important distinction made between the executive and judicial functions. Two years later, however, the distinction became somewhat blurred, and the Inspector General only controlled the Sydney metropolitan area, the main roads to the gold-fields, and the gold-fields themselves. Elsewhere control of the police reverted to the magistrates. It was not until 1862 that effective centralised control was established.

The Sydney Morning Herald summed up the previous few years thus, "The disposition to riot and outrage so frequently exhibited by the Sydney mob, the rapid increase in burglary throughout the city and its extensive suburbs, and of highway robbery in the suburban and country districts, and the observable inactivity of the police, both in town and country, were of themselves sufficient to excite general dissatisfaction and alarm. But when these facts were coupled with the declared intention of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw nearly the whole of the troops, and the ill-advised resolution of the Legislative Council to disband our mounted police, dissatisfaction and alarm acquired redoubled intensity".

The Mounted Police slowly faded away. By December 1849 their strength had dropped to 53, and a month later to 33. The last of them left Bathurst on 9 December 1850 for Sydney, possibly pondering the munificence of the Legislative Council, who had voted $140 for gratuities to deserving other ranks of the whole force. In fact, the force did not entirely disappear. From 1851 onwards they still provided a bodyguard to the Governor General, and with a strength of about five were still in existence in 1860. However, there was an increase in June 1851 when a small number, never more than ten, were employed with the Gold Commissioners on the NSW fields until August 1854.

NOTES
1. 14-12-49 Colonial Secretary, Sydney (Col Sec)/Assistant Military Secretary (AMS), NSW Archives (NSWA) 4 3803, 49 175, 49 175, 49 11653; 4-2-50 Colonial Sec AMS NSWA ibid., 50 7, 50 445; 7-3-50 Colonial Sec/AMS ibid., 50 30, 50 2343, 50 5941; C.C. Petrie, Tom Petrie's Reminiscences of early Queensland, Sydney 1972, p. 143.
2. 23-1-41 Sydney Morning Herald (SH).
3. 18-1-50 FitzRoy Grey Colonial Office (CO) 201-426, Australian Joint Copying Project microfilm reel (R) 619, folio (f) 149 (CO 201-426 R619 F149).


6. Report of Select Committee VPLCNSW 1839, pp. 1, 15; 13-11-39 SH (Supplement); Glenelg informed Gipps on 14-10-37 that henceforth, apart from pay and rations, all costs for the Mounted Police would be borne by the colony. Consequently it is not surprising that the previous training and discipline of the military convicts were utilized to keep down costs.

7. 11-5-40 SH; 2 Vic 27; 29-6 46 Gipps Gladstone. Historical Records of Australia, Series I, Volume 25, p. 120 (UKA 25-120); PLC NSW 50.1.395; Rowley, op. cit., observes, p. 38, that "Taxation of Settlers to pay for the Border Police increased (heir defiance against the land legislation] and the Aborigines probably suffered as a result ... In spite of Gipps' caution, reprisals simply got out of hand. The Commissioners either assisted with their police, or took them off elsewhere to keep the reprisal proceedings 'administratively clean'."

8. 18-6-24 Brisbane/Bathurst HRA 11-283; 3-11-24 Brisbane Bathurst. ibid., p. 409; Rowley, op. cit., p. 29. As the stock extended, the killing of a shepherd could be serious economically; and this may have influenced the Sydney stockholders in the station properties and flocks when they pressed the government in 1824 for punitive measures".

9. 8-11-25 Brisbane/Bathurst HRA 11-897.

10. 18, 15-9-25, 7-11-25 Sydney Gazette and NSW Advertiser (SGNSWA).

11. 12-12-25 Stewart Bathurst HRA 12-85; 1-4-26 SGNSWA.

12. 11-9-26 Darling/Bathurst HRA 12-571; Requisition No. 12. Changed in 1842 to 3 Light Dragoons (3-1-42 SH).

13. 6-2-27 Darling/Bathurst HRA 12-168.


15. 5-5-27 Darling/Bathurst HRA 13-275; 5-10-30 Darling Murray HRA 15-769; 6-6-31 Darling-Goderich HRA 16-263.

16. VPLCNSW 1835 37.2.434. The remarks applied to all ranks.

17. Ibid., p. 327; 14-10-44 SMH.

18. 21-8-01 King/Portland HRA 3-181; 1-3-02 King/Portland HRA 3-420.

19. 23-1-26, 15-2-26 SGNSWA; see also change of dress, note 12.

20. 28-3-33 Goderich/Bourke HRA 17-61; 28-10-34 Spring-Rice Bourke ibid., p. 563; 10-3-35 Aberdeen Bourke ibid., p. 696; 27-4-35 Bourke/Secretary of State ibid., p. 716; 11-11-35 Glenelg/Bourke HRA 18-186.


22. Ibid.; From Adjutant General War Office (WO) 17.2322 R917.

23. 15-9-38 Glenelg-Gipps HRA 19-584; 13-11-39 SH (Supplement); 8-3-48 General Order (GO) 23 NSW RI074 E275; 26-8-39 SH.

24. VPLCNSW 1839 p. 167.

25. 13-11-39 SH (Report on Police and Gaol Expenditure); 19-2-40, 2-9-40 SH.

26. New Zealand was severed from NSW in May 1841; 24-9-41 Major of Brigade (BM)/Col Sec NSW 41-100, 41/8622, 41/2541.1, 4/3802.

27. 24-4-40 SH (Supp). The penal nature of NSW was soon to cease — transportation was abolished from 1 August 1840 (Russell/Gipps HRA 20-700).

28. 10-4-39; 14-2-40, 18, 29-5-40; 18-6-40; 19-8-40 SH.

29. Nevertheless some Officers continued to give trouble — 1-12-42 Gipps/Stanley HRA 22-380; 18-9-42 SH; 2, 21-4-41, 4, 7-8-41 SH.

30. 11-8-42, 1-12-42 Gipps/Stanley HRA 22-197, 380; 20-8-42 SH.

31. 2-6-46 NSW Government Gazette, p. 674.

32. 30-4-47 FitzRoy Grey HRA 25-531.

33. 24-11-46 Grey FitzRoy HRA 25-263.

34. The Committee could well have had the Sayer's case in mind as well as similar cases in Victoria (1-12-42 Gipps/Stanley HRA 22-380); 14-9-47 VPLCNSW 47-12-13.

35. 30-8-49 SMH; 3-1-50 La Trobe/Col Sec, Victorian Archives Letters Out (VALO) Volume K, p. 403.

36. 7-11-49; 7-12-49; 8-5-50; 29-5-50; 10-9-50 SMH; 27-8-50 VPLCNSW 50.2.395.

37. 13-12-48 Col Sec/AMS 49/173 NSW 49/11649; 24-7-48 Col Sec/Deputy Adjutant General (DAG) 48-127, 48/8283 NSW 4/3803; 25-1-50 Col Sec/AMS NSW 4/3803.

38. 18, 19-2-50, 5, 15, 20-6-50; 3, 4-9-50; 9, 13-12-50 SMH; Police Regulation Bills 16 Vic 33 (1852) and 25 Vic 16 (1862).

39. 19-6-50 SMH.

40. 8-1-51 Col Sec/Lt Bruce 11th 51/20 NSW 4/3803; WO 17 Strength Returns.
KENNETH MACKSEY has brought to life in this book Albert Kesselring, whose career ranged from pre-World War I Artillery, through the lean years of the 100,000-Man Army, the secret planning for and establishment of the new German Army, and for the Luftwaffe, command of Air Fleets against Poland, the West, Britain and Russia, to C-in-C South (the Mediterranean) and the defensive battles back up the Italian Peninsula, to finally commanding German Forces in the West in the last weeks of the war in Europe.

The author has worked closely with the Kesselring family and fellow soldiers, as well as delving into the archives, and has produced a picture of Albert Kesselring from child to freed war criminal, 'warts and all' as the saying goes.

Kesselring selected Artillery as a military career after an education in the classics, as the other Corps (he describes Infantry and Cavalry) seemed lacking in mental challenge. He spent most of World War I on the Staff, with only eight months Regimental service.

He formed an undying loathing for Communism and civil war during his short time on the Eastern Front and in the revolutions and uprisings immediately after World War I. This was later to influence him in his actions and decisions in Italy, when he worked with the Catholic Church and tried to bring about a truce with the partisans in efforts to lessen the destructive effect of the war in an historically and culturally rich country.

Personally chosen as a member of the 100,000-Man Army, he was trained and directed by von Seeckt, along with Guderian for the future Panzer arm and Wever for the Luftwaffe, among others.

Transferred to the Luftwaffe, Kesselring played a major part in organising and establishing it, winning some and losing some of the battles fought for control by the cliques in the new Service. It was as well for the West that Wever, advocate of the strategic four-engine bomber, was killed in a crash, and that Kesselring lost control of the Technical Branch to Udet, the flamboyant fighter pilot who suicided in 1941 on realising what a catastrophe faced the Luftwaffe and Germany when its technological lead had been frittered away.

From the outbreak of war, Kesselring hardly had a day’s leave. He flew with, and often ahead of, his bombers and fighters, guiding them to targets, oberving the strikes, then landing to praise, criticize and exhort the crews. During World War II he was shot down five times — surely unique for a senior officer.

During the Battle of Britain, he directed attacks on the radar system, and unknowingly was almost on the point of destroying the effectiveness of the defence, when emphasis was shifted to London, allowing the RAF to recover.

Things in the Mediterranean were somewhat of a muddle, so Kesselring was moved from Russia to Italy, to try to smooth the Italo-German relationship and co-ordinate the war effort there. Rommel is painted as a self-aggrandising man, using his LO/ Escort, one Dr Berndt, as a direct link to Goebbels and so to Hitler, to get his own way. As a creation of the Propaganda Ministry, Rommel is depicted as being promoted well above his ceiling.

Several instances are described where Rommel upsets OKW — Commando Supremo appecart by attacking early or without notice. When it is remembered that espionage and treason were the only ways by which the Axis Commanders could account for the repeated sinking of ships and Allied countering of their efforts, then almost the only way for Rommel to achieve surprise was to surprise everyone, allies and enemy. Also, Rommel had always been an aggressive commander: through World War I, as Comd 7 Pz Div and almost from his first day in Africa.

Kesselring quite early realised the Allied Commanders had two major faults; slow and rigid procedures and fear of high casualty figures, and this enabled him to hold the Allies in the Italian hills from 1943 to 1945.

The author shows by Kesselring’s conversations after the war and his actions during it,
that he was aware of the plots to remove Hitler, but like many others declined to act for or against, waiting to see the outcome. He was bound by the personal oath of loyalty sworn to Hitler, whom Kesselring regarded as a legally appointed Head of State, and while encouraging others to contact the Allies to negotiate a peace, remained true to the oath until informed by Doenitz of the Fuehrer's death.

Kesselring was tried and convicted for war crimes in Italy. Macksey remarks that no charges were brought for the air attacks on Warsaw, Rotterdam or Coventry. Kesselring would no doubt have enjoyed fighting such charges while French civilians still lay under the ruins of Caen after experimental raids at the behest of Sir Solly Zuckerman and Lord Cherwell.

Kesselring was released from prison in 1952 and died in 1960.

This is an interesting, well written book, and one wonders who is to be the subject of the author's next. Having presented Guderian of the Panzer arm, and Kesselring of the Luftwaffe, perhaps Student of the Airborne is a likely third subject.


Reviewed by D. V. Goldsmith

The authors and illustrators of this book have attempted a most ambitious coverage of the military uniforms of the world through history, with concentration on the era since the emergence of professional armies in the seventeenth century. The result is attractive for anyone either seriously or casually interested in the subject. Except where necessary to demonstrate the evolution or use of various items of uniform and related equipment, the authors have limited themselves to their field avoiding that fault all too common in works of this nature of pontificating on strategy and tactics, the province of the professional historian.

The text is crammed with snippets of interest. For example, we read that Frederick the Great's enthusiasm for very tall soldiers was due not only to their formidable appearance on parade and battlefield, but also the very practical reason that their height enabled them to handle more efficiently the long Prussian musket of the day. Only occasionally do the writers attempt irritating long shots, such as the suggestion that the predominantly red uniform appearing in the British Army in the late seventeenth century might be traced to the Berserker of Scandinavian legend. Fortunately these do not appear frequently enough to call into doubt the veracity of the writings as a whole.

Illustrations are profuse. Reproductions of contemporary military paintings, both in colour and black and white, are good. Drawings especially prepared for this work by Wilhelm von Halem, 700 of them in clear line detail, are a mine of information for the enthusiast, provided he goes warily. However, one must be less complimentary about the standard of colouring of these drawings, which can be taken as a guide only; some colours, particularly blues and greens, are misleading in shades, and the serious student would to well to research deeper and elsewhere. Many are also spoiled by imprecise, slip-shod or incorrect labelling. But perhaps the major criticism is the fact that the reader is irked constantly by the complete lack of reference in the text to any of the illustrations, presumably there as supporting detail. Nor are there any explanatory notes to the coloured line drawings. The index, too, is sketchy.

As to be expected in a book of this scope, Australia receives scant attention, with two drawings. One, a World War 1 artillery sergeant, right side view, minus chevrons, though otherwise accurate. The other, titled "Infantryman (Far East) 1944", is strange indeed. Whilst the critic could be accused of nit picking with these examples, they do sow doubts as to the authenticity of the more exotic and remote figures illustrated.

Though there is much of value tucked away in this book for serious research, it is not well presented for this purpose. However, it is easy on the eye if not the purse.


Reviewed by Major G. A. Mays, ED.

42 Royal Queensland Regiment, Australian Army Reserve
In August 1974, just before ceasing as a United Nations Military Observer in Palestine, I was invited to be interviewed by (I was told) an American who was writing a book on the 1973 Arab-Israel War. This meeting took place at UN HQ in Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic. Damascus was a strange venue, as Americans had not been popular or welcome in Syria since the Six Day War of 1967.

The man was captivating both in his knowledge of the subject and in his military manner. Here was no ordinary aspiring author. That Colonel Trevor Dupuy was and is still an internationally acclaimed military historian was not known to me until much later.

Many books and articles have been written either containing or featuring the 1973 Middle East conflict. Colonel Dupuy goes far deeper and, as the book was published in 1978, he had five years of hind-sight and study to confirm its contents. The book is without doubt the best of its kind and a worthy addition to his already brilliant list of military history publications. Reference is made to several earlier, mainly Israeli-oriented works, and these references are discussed in detail as their main points occur.

Elusive Victory gives a history of Arab-Jewish relations over the last 2000 years, the emergence of the Zionist movement in the 1890s, the turbulent British Mandate and its virtual abandonment of Palestine, and then the five abortive wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Each section is written in a logical sequence, e.g., events leading up to the campaign in great detail, and a summary which even includes the named orbat of both sides. The book is extensively illustrated.

No punches are pulled. This probably impressed me most. In all past writings some losses to both sides were dismissed as misadventure to the defeated and to luck by the victor. Colonel Dupuy researches each battle to finality and makes no bones about stupid mistakes or brilliant tactics, regardless of side. Famous names appear throughout the work. Menachem Begin, from an unknown Irgun terrorist leader in the 1930s to today's Israeli Prime Minister. The most famous son of Israel in world eyes, Moshe Dayan is followed from an obscure Major in the underground army before separation to Israeli Defence Minister, through his fall and to his rise again to prominence. Lt/Col. Gamal abd al Nasser and a little known assistant Lt/Col Anwar al Sadat from their places in the coup to unseat King Farouk in 1952, through to their both leading Egypt in later years. The list is endless.

Colonel Dupuy commences his prologue thus, "All wars have political causes, all have historical origins. However, the series of conflicts between Israelis and Arabs since 1948 have their roots further back in history than most of the wars of recent times, and their causes are a complicated mixture of political, ideological and religious differences that are not easily susceptible to negotiation and resolution. The opposing cases can be presented quite simply." He then proceeded to do just that.

The two great powers and their influence in the area is mentioned, as is the vitally important lobby of both Arab oil and world (particularly United States) Jewry, without which the narrative would not be complete.

My only complaint, and it is the usual one, is that at times the reader needs a large marked map as well as the book to follow a battle. This fault is common to most military history books, even to Slim's Defeat into Victory.

Speaking as one who was intimately involved in the War of 1973 section of the narrative, I cannot fault the description of that battle, and my own research and involvement in both Syria and Israel brings to light no other disparity. Overall I would place this book as a classic. Until one reads well into the book, the import of the title remains a mystery.

It should be compulsory reading for the seven Australian Officers presently serving with UNTSO in Palestine, and to their periodic replacements; and recommended reading for the several correspondents to this Journal on the subject.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel E.J. O'Donnell, Australian Staff College.

One of the most appealing characteristics of the Army volumes of Australia's official war histories is their democratic bias. The actions of private soldiers, platoon sergeants, company commanders and generals are all faithfully recorded, and the description of a fine patrol action can occupy as much space as
a senior commander's preparations for an attack. The result is a superb picture of the many levels at which armies operate, and a represent-ative cross-section of the personalities involved. A limitation of this approach, however, is that the reader finds it hard to focus on the larger picture of the relationships between the generals themselves. David Horner's book concentrates on this aspect for the period in which Australia found herself in her greatest danger during World War II, and a very interesting account it makes too.

In the opening chapter of 'Crisis of Command' Horner outlines Australia's defence preparedness, or rather unpreparedness, in the 1920s and 30s. Modern politicians and defence planners should find food for thought when they recall their predecessors' touching faith in the willingness and ability of a major ally, in this case Great Britain, to come to our aid. Horner also makes the interesting point that the generals on the whole perceived the real nature of the threat to Australia, our vulnerability should our major ally be fully engaged elsewhere. In the light of this it is sad to read of the punishment meted out to Colonel H.D. Wynter and Lieutenant Colonel L.E. Beavis who had the moral courage to question government policy and who might have expected to receive some protection from their senior officers.

Anyone interested in the current problems of how to defend Australia would do well to read of the experiences of Generals Mackay and Sturdee who were called on to produce appreciation after appreciation as the international situation deteriorated and the nakedness of Australia became increasingly apparent to the politicians. And if it had not been so serious there must have been something almost comical in the notion of all of our fighting troops being in the Middle East at the time when the real threat to Australia was suddenly revealed. Perhaps, on the other hand, we can be thankful that so many future brigade and divisional commanders gained operational experience just when they were about to need it most.

Horner does not concentrate on the battlefield performance of the Australian generals but, instead, takes us behind the scenes to look at the personalities and the organizations they created to direct the fighting. He recognizes the valuable work done by Generals Sturdee and Rowell to create a command structure which could operate efficiently in time of war. And he shows the jockeying for positions which went on as various commanders tried to line up the key appointments for themselves while stamping on the feet of their rivals, and the un-doubted prejudice and jealousy which existed between some regular and militia officers. He also records the extraordinary folly which led Australia to field two classes of soldiers throughout the war — the AIF and the militia. Please God we will not make that mistake again.

The remarkable characters of General Douglas MacArthur and General Sir Thomas Blamey dominate this book just as they dominated the people around them during the war. David Horner has done his homework on MacArthur; his research in the United States among the MacArthur archives has brought to light how ruthlessly MacArthur preserved and enhanced his own position. At this stage of the war, he needed victories in the wake of his disaster in the Philippines. The relentless pressure he applied to his Australian and American field commanders to gain these victories regardless of the conditions at the front have an inhuman quality. We see also how gravely he distorted the truth in his communi-ques, to the very real anger of the Australian troops in the field, and how he manipulated the command structure to ensure that victories were his while losses were someone else's, preferably Australian. MacArthur was in a difficult position during his time in Australia as he consolidated his own position and took his first steps toward the reconquest of the Philippines. His mental horizons were far beyond Australia, important though this country may have been to him initially, and it is perhaps unsurprising that he was not very worried about Australian sensibilities. "When elephants make love the ants get trampled".

One bull-ant who had no intention of being trampled on was General Blamey. In fact there is an interesting parallel to be seen between how MacArthur and Blamey preserved their respective positions throughout this stage of the war at the expense of others. And if the end does justify the means, perhaps it is a good thing that they did. Horner brings out very well the precarious position of Blamey when he was appointed C-in-C of the Australian Military Forces. He had the almost impossible task of commanding the Australian Army in Australia
and simultaneously prosecuting the war against the Japanese in New Guinea, while maintaining his delicate relations with MacArthur who had the confidence of the Australian government.

If MacArthur and Blamey had the starring roles there were many supporting actors. Other Australian generals who feature in Horner’s account include Sturdee, Mackay, Lavarack, Rowell (who provided the main crisis), Herring, Allen, Clowes and Vasey. Horner has made an interesting study of the background of these and other Australian commanders and concludes that we were lucky to have had so many experienced and relatively young commanders available. He acknowledges Blamey’s skill in weeding out the older commanders with peacetime mentalities to make way for their more experienced and dynamic successors. Not all the Australian generals emerge from Horner’s scrutiny with their reputations or motives un tarnished. By anecdote and, more particularly, by quotations from personal correspondence he lays bare rather a lot of small-mindedness, bitchiness and intrigue. The reader may also wonder at the amount of classified information which passed by letter between classmate and classmate or husband and wife.

A special word should be said about the structure of Crisis of Command. The first two chapters deal with the state of Australia’s defence preparedness up to the time of Pearl Harbor. These chapters are the least satisfactory because the author, in attempting to be concise, raises issues which are not pursued. For instance, the reader’s interest is aroused by the story of Wynter and Beavis but we are not told what eventually happened to them although, to be fair, we are referred in the endnotes to other sources which do. The remaining chapters trace the development of a wartime command structure and examine how it stood up to the various crises caused by the influence of MacArthur, the interaction of personalities and, not least, by the operational situation in New Guinea. Horner’s conclusion is that “They all made mistakes and their conduct was not always as pure as it might have been, but generally speaking Australia was well served by her generals in 1942.” The depth of the author’s research can be gauged from the 17 appendices and 45 pages of endnotes as well as a large bibliography and an index. Indeed, so thorough has been his research that future historians of this period will certainly be forced to consult Horner’s work and take his conclusions into their consideration. It seems a pity to have to mention that there are numerous proof reading errors throughout the book.

I doubt if Crisis of Command would have wide appeal to readers without a service background or involvement in defence planning. However, for the sort of people who read the Defence Force Journal I venture to suggest it is a ‘must’ to read and a ‘could be’ to buy. David Horner has investigated a topic which not only has inherent historical interest, but also has a great deal of relevance for contemporary defence planners. His research is original and his sources are meticulously recorded. The book is very readable and the author makes his points clearly and forthrightly.

Declassification of the Army Journal

The Army Journal bore a caveat restricting its access to unauthorised persons. I have now authorised the removal of the caveat and the security classification.

All issues of the Army Journal are now publicly available.