21st Century Sims: innovation, education and leadership for the modern era

Benjamin F. Armstrong (ed.)
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2015, 176 pages
ISBN: 978-1-6125-1810-7
US$21.95

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Scott, Australian Army

21st Century Sims is a well-edited book of century-old writings on the profession of arms that is highly recommended for all officers of the ADF. US Navy Lieutenant Commander Benjamin F. Armstrong, a PhD candidate in war studies at Kings College, London, has done a very good job of collating and introducing Admiral William Snowden Sims’ writings. The articles are great examples of professional writing that both demonstrate how to present well-formed arguments and highlight the necessity of healthy professional debate to introduce innovative ideas or disprove accepted theories and concepts.

Admiral Sims was at the forefront of US naval affairs for more than two decades from the early 1900s, although his legacy has been overshadowed by the successes of his protégés in the Second World War—including Chester Nimitz and Raymond Spruance. Sims, a Pulitzer Prize-winning author, was an innovative problem solver, an expert researcher and a critical thinker with an exceptional ability for deductive reasoning. None of these traits was more impressive than his moral courage when challenging well-established theories and concepts, especially those of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the ‘father of maritime theory’.

As a Lieutenant in 1900, Sims realised that while battleship designs were flawed, he could better the ship through tactics, techniques and procedures. He earned the nickname ‘The Gun Doctor’, after he introduced a new gunnery system to the US Navy, one that revolutionised naval warfare. Sims learned from Captain Percy Scott of the Royal Navy the idea of ‘continuous-aim fire’. He took this idea, which he combined with a new telescopic sight for even greater effect, and sought to introduce the technique into the US Navy. Sims wrote several reports to the Bureau of Ordnance in the Washington Naval Yard, to which he received no response. The experts in the Bureau dismissed Sims’ claims as outlandish and impossible. Although he understood that the bureaucracy was blocking him, Sims’ dogged determination ensured that he continued to improve the technique and send reports to the Bureau.

Sims finally got a break-through when the Rear Admiral in command of the Asiatic Squadron read Sims’ reports and added his endorsement. Word quickly spread through the fleet of the revolutionary technique. However, the Bureau completed its own ‘tests’ and concluded that Sims’ techniques were impossible. He had enough and wrote to the President, Theodore Roosevelt, who had previously been Assistant Secretary of the Navy and was a naval historian. The President ordered a gunnery exercise to demonstrate Sims’ technique and, after the exercise was successful, ordered that Sims be appointed the US Navy’s Inspector of Target Practice. This appointment gave him the opportunity to revolutionise the entire fleet.

While ‘The Gun Doctor’ is a naval-specific example of successful professional writing, Sims’ other significant writings are very relevant to all members of the profession of arms. These articles and papers, written a century ago, are still very applicable today. Sims wrote on topics that ranged from military character, promotions and reporting to innovation in the military and preparedness. These are topics that are still grappled with today.

Regarding ‘Military Character’, Sims’ subject and paper was the point of discussions at the Naval War College in 1913. The same issues, especially qualities of leaders, were again discussed across the Australian Army in 2013-14, with similar conclusions. Sims espoused the qualities required for a military
mindset. Using examples from across the Services, and from other nations, Sims argued the case for mission command. A critical component of his argument, one that is often missed, is the responsibility of subordinates (that is, the followers) to ensure the success of mission command. Sims concluded that the essential twin qualities are loyalty and initiative, and that mission command is a habit of a trained mind. This article is a 'must read' for all leaders.

In 'The Practical Naval Officer', Sims articulated the need for a continuum of professional development in military officers (not just naval officers) necessary to become a senior officer. He espoused the crucial quality of critical thinking, essential to innovation and adaptation in any organisation. To garner this quality, Sims—much like the Prussian innovator Schonhorst—prescribed the requirement for self-imposed lifelong learning. Doing one's current job well does not prepare one for advancement. Through Sims' argument, the reader should ask if Australian officers are being adequately prepared for conducting war at the operational and strategic levels.

The lessons for junior and mid-ranked officers taught by Sims are clear. Ideas are powerful; however, they need to be clearly communicated. Professional writing forums are a means to share ideas as well as test or disprove accepted theories and concepts. To be successful, though, requires well-formed arguments and critical-thinking abilities built on a platform of research. Critical thinking reduces conservatism and risk aversion. Additionally, successful officers require the moral courage to challenge the ideas of others—but should not be vindictive or use inappropriate tone and language, and offer only objective criticism and always offer solutions.

21st Century Sims presents readers the opportunity to be mentored by a great leader who lived a century ago. The book highlights the importance of healthy professional debate, which can sometimes be frowned upon in Australia. Armstrong has done an excellent job to draw parallels to the current day. He notes that 'there is a tendency for Americans in general, and naval officers in particular, to consider the challenges they face as something new and unique to their time'. This observation can also be extended to Australia. The lessons of others should be learned and not 're-experienced'. This book provides such lessons, through examples of effective professional writing, and is highly recommended for all leaders, both in the military and across the wider community.

**The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles goes asymmetrical**

Pauline M. Kaurin  
Ashgate: Farnham, 2014, 143 pages  
$125

**Reviewed by Brigadier Chris Field, CSC, Australian Army**

*The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles goes asymmetrical*, authored by Pauline Kaurin, is the fourth book in Ashgate’s ‘Military and Defence Ethics’ series. This series is co-edited by Don Carrick and James Connelly from the University of Hull, Paul Robinson from the University of Ottawa, and George Lucas from the US Naval Academy, Annapolis. Collectively, these writers seek:  

[F]or all those involved in issues of national defence—from policy makers to armament manufacturers to members of the armed forces—to behave, and to be seen to behave, ethically.

The Military and Defence Ethics series aims to provide people involved in national defence with the ‘finest possible advice and support [on ethics]’, presented in a manner that is ‘readily accessible to all’. Pauline Kaurin’s *The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare* is an excellent addition to this series.

Kaurin bases this book on the protagonists from Homer’s *The Iliad*—Hector and Achilles. In exploring the idea of ethics as an asymmetric advantage, Kaurin examines the ‘perfect warrior’ Hector and the
'dishonourable' Achilles. Kaurin emphasises that the 'warrior archetype or warrior ethos ... still holds sway in the [modern] military self-conception, rooted as it is in the more existential notions of war, honour, identity and meaning' and 'independence of judgement'.

Confirming the power of this idea, the ADF frequently portrays a 'warrior ethos' in recruit advertising, through the concepts of 'future leaders'; 'the team works'; 'challenge yourself'; 'accomplished people'; and 'where leaders are made'.

Central to Kaurin's thesis is that 'moral asymmetry' between Western militaries and their enemies is a 'fact' of the contemporary battlefield, and that:

[It] is one of the few things that can virtually be taken as a given. Therefore, moral education and all training must be conducted with this fact firmly in mind ... allowing military personnel to maintain and nourish their own integrity/identity and the standards expected of their profession.

Kaurin acknowledges that the tactics and ideas associated with 'asymmetric war'—including 'terrorism, torture, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, [and] guerrilla and insurgent forms of combat'—have existed for thousands of years. However, Kaurin believes asymmetric warfare is worth studying because it is 'an enduring part of war' and 'the more successful and adept the West become at [its] preferred version of war [that is, conventional war] ... the more asymmetric options [for the enemy] become attractive, and even militarily necessary'.

Employing Achilles as a flawed warrior archetype, this book is designed to assist readers to 'think through the moral implications and challenges posed by asymmetrical warfare' and to 'think through fighting asymmetric opponents'. Kaurin is particularly interested in moral asymmetry which 'relates to the differences in moral practices and the moral norms that undergird [the] strategies and tactics parties of a conflict are willing to utilise in war'.

Kaurin integrates the 'moral questions about the justification and conduct of warfare [with] questions about the moral education and training of soldiers'. To develop these questions, she examines three areas of military ethics, namely the nature of the military and military professionalism; the nature and morality of war—jus ad bellum (justice of the war); and moral questions related to the use of force—jus in bello (just conduct).

In these three areas, Kaurin explores two moral virtues: courage and loyalty. These virtues resonate with ADF values. For example, the RAN's values include courage and loyalty; the Australian Army's values include courage; and the RAAF's values include integrity, meaning the courage to do what is right.

Kaurin describes two types of courage; courage in the face of personal danger (physical courage), and courage to accept responsibility (moral courage). Her argument is that while Achilles displayed physical courage and a willingness to die in battle, he lacked moral courage because he was 'largely obsessed with his own honour and glory, ignoring the pleas of his comrades to come to their aid'. In contrast, Hector's courage involved 'doing his duty so he can get back to his life and his family'.

Kaurin describes loyalty as 'standing by' an object of loyalty, where a person considers 'the claims of obligation related to the object [or person] of loyalty to outweigh other claims'. In the military context, Kaurin argues that loyalty 'becomes the mark of the [military] professional, as well as a crucial virtue that must be internalised if one is to become a full and authentic part of the [military] group'.

She argues that Hector displayed 'loyalty to fellow soldiers, his “state” (Troy), his own sense of his duty as a son, husband, father and citizen, and his moral obligation to the craft of war ... [as well as] the rules and standards of war'. In contrast, Achilles was 'loyal to his own sense of what it means to be a warrior, his own prowess and self-reliance ... to his fate to die ... his glory, his honour and later, his revenge'.

Kaurin sees Achilles' sense of loyalty as similar to 'traditional warrior or honour societies' faced by Western militaries in the asymmetric context of insurrections. Like Achilles, many contemporary insurgents are driven by loyalty to ‘clan’ above ‘nation’. Kaurin poses the question: ‘if the West identifies with Hector and sees their adversaries as Achilles, what follows?’. 
She argues that Western militaries must proactively embrace the broad and inclusive definition of Hector’s courage and loyalty, while countering Achilles’ narrow self-serving application of these two virtues. Practically, Kaurin envisages four aspects of moral education for the military:

1. Moral education is not hierarchical—this education is required for the entire chain of command;
2. Western militaries must transition from a narrow ‘warrior’ ethos to a broader ‘guardian’ ethos;
3. They must also measure and reward in ways that are ethical, for example by eliminating the ‘zero defects’ military mind-set; and
4. They must acknowledge that change, development and experimentation, with attendant risks, are necessary components of military service.

Finally, Kaurin recommends an ‘open-ended approach to case studies [to] develop the moral imagination and empathy necessary to the development of military virtues—like courage and loyalty—that need to be developed with more attention to [the] nuance and complexity [of future] missions and tasks’.

**The Military Covenant: its impact on civil-military relations in Britain**

Sarah Ingham
Ashgate: Farnham, 2015, 231 pages
£85.50

Reviewed by Wing Commander Jo Brick, Royal Australian Air Force

The relationship between the state and standing military forces is a vast subject that can be examined from many different perspectives. One view focuses on the issue of the relationship between the military and society, particularly the exertion of civil control over military forces in liberal democracies.

On this issue, Samuel P. Huntington’s *Soldier and The State*, published in 1957, and the more recent publication by Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: agency, oversight and civil-military relations*, are pertinent. These works have examined the duties that military forces owe to the nation, either through the development of professionalism as a prerequisite to Huntington’s theory of ‘objective control’, or in relation to the duties arising in a ‘principal-agent’ context in Feaver’s work.

Sarah Ingham’s work, *The Military Covenant: its impact on civil-military relations in Britain*, dissects the relationships discussed within the broad theories of Huntington and Feaver by examining the interaction between the state, the military and individual soldiers. Specifically, her work contributes to the field of civil-military relations by examining the duties owed by the nation to the military and its individual members through the lens of the British ‘military covenant’.

Ingham’s work includes an historical examination of the origins of the ‘military covenant’. A publication called *Soldiering: the military covenant*, published by the UK Ministry of Defence in 2000, discussed the moral responsibilities arising from the duties of a soldier, particularly in relation to the taking of life. However, the co-opting of the ‘military covenant’ by various civilian institutions has resulted in the term obtaining mystique that asserts a centuries-old bond of loyalty and responsibility between the nation, the military and the individual soldier. While the original focus of Ingham’s *Military Covenant* was the Army, the book also considers the evolution of the covenant to incorporate a joint perspective.

Ingham argues that trust lies at the heart of a ‘covenant’—and this is particularly the case in a civil-military context, where soldiers may have to make the ultimate sacrifice to further the nation’s cause. The covenant-based relationship also implies an element of reciprocity, where soldiers who serve the nation can expect support from that nation when they return from operations. However, arguments have been made that there is often a significant ‘gap’ between the military and the nation it serves.
In an American context, the issue of this gap was examined by the US-based Triangle Institute for Security Studies, with findings published in 2001 in *Soldiers and Civilians*, edited by Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn. Ingham’s work complements such studies by contributing the British experience, particularly her discussion of the role of the military covenant as a means of bridging the civil-military gap, as manifested by the increased support for veterans’ groups, such as ‘Help for Heroes’, and for remembrance activities.

Ingham also considers the evolution of the military covenant to include significant moral issues, and its quasi-judicial status, in the context of British military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This includes consideration of how the covenant was allegedly ‘fractured’ by the UK Government in providing insufficient and unsuitable military equipment during Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan. The discussion also includes the appropriation of the military covenant by various civilian groups, including the judiciary, which used it as the basis for providing members of the armed forces with ‘citizen-plus’ status.

This was evident in the UK High Court’s *Limbu* judgment, which resulted in residency being granted to a group of Ghurkas, who had served with the British Army. It demonstrated that the moral reward under the covenant extends to material support, and significant legal rights of residence and citizenship. These developments are extensions of the original ‘military covenant’, which started as a simple moral code but is now a fundamental aspect of executive policy and judicial decision-making.

The bulk of the literature on civil-military relations is from the US and encompasses a broad range of issues, many of which are addressed in Ingham’s work. However, this book makes a particularly valuable contribution to the narrative by considering the field through the prism of the British experience. Importantly, it highlights that the covenant needs to be seen in the context of the interaction between the nation, its people and its warriors—and asks what the nation owes to the men and women who serve in its name. This can become a highly emotive and controversial issue that is often debated in the public domain. Ingham’s work usefully serves to frame this important discussion.

*The Sea Devils: Operation Struggle and the last great raid of World War Two*

Mark Felton
Icon Books: London, 2015, 334 pages
$27.99

Reviewed by Jim Truscott

The story of the interdiction of the undersea cables which provided the Japanese with secure telephone communications between Singapore, Saigon and Hong Kong is not a well-known or recently-told history. This is surprising given the strategic importance of the Allies not being able to intercept radio communications when the Japanese defence perimeter had contracted in 1945 and they were no longer using radio as much.

This book, about four secret mini XE submarines, part of the British 14th Flotilla, is replete with tense and danger-close reading about special and hazardous duties. Interestingly, the author states that the Far East was the only theatre where special operatives were issued with suicide tablets due to the high risk of their compromise.

While used with some success in Europe, the mini-submarines had a chequered start in the Pacific, with the British seeking to use them in some way to maintain their sovereignty in the Far East after the war. However, by the time the mother ship and six mini-submarines had arrived in the American-controlled Pacific Theatre, the naval war was running out of Japanese shipping targets to attack, and neither Nimitz nor the British Pacific Fleet wanted anything to do with the 14th Flotilla.
However, just as the Flotilla was about to be decommissioned, the American High Command had a need to be able to read Japanese communications after the dropping of the first atomic bomb. So Operations FOIL and SABRE were authorised to cut the cables off Hong Kong and Saigon at the end of July 1945. To appease the British, the Americans also offered two moored cruisers as targets in the Straits of Johore, as the Japanese heavy cruisers Takao and Myoko were threats to Operation ZIPPER, Mountbatten’s planned invasion of the Malay Peninsula. This raid was labelled Operation STRUGGLE.

Final rehearsals took place at Subic Bay, with the raid on Hong Kong launched from there, while three other mini submarines were launched from Brunei Bay, which had just been retaken. The four mini-submarines were towed into position by other British submarines but with the Americans retaining naval command from on board HMS Bonaventure, the mother ship.

The brown-water skills and fortitude required to locate the undersea telephone cables and for divers to actually leave the submarines to cut them are formidable. The professional skill and bravery required to penetrate naval defences, which included near collisions with other vessels, and place explosive charges on a hull covered with growth while jammed on the sea bed under an enemy cruiser are deserving of the VCs awarded to the diver and captain of the XE3.

It is timely that this book has been published just as Australia’s politicians and military commanders are making decisions about its future submarines, and when telecommunication companies are also seeking to build new undersea cables linking Australia to the rest of the world. This book should be mandatory reading for SAS operators, clearance divers, submarine captains and those in military headquarters and other government departments responsible for planning and executing special operations.

**Britannia’s Shield:**
*Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton and late-Victorian Imperial defence*

Craig Stockings
Cambridge University Press: Port Melbourne, 2015, 348 pages
ISBN: 978-1-1070-9482-6
$59.95

Reviewed by John Donovan

Professor Craig Stockings has cast a bright light on the troubled career of Lieutenant General Sir Edward Hutton. Like a modern Cassandra, Hutton seemed condemned to produce well thought out, practical plans to improve Imperial defence (at least as regards Britain and the self-governing colonies), while being unable to ensure their implementation. Even today, many of his ideas, particularly about infantry mobility, have resonance.

As Stockings demonstrates, a significant part of the problem was Hutton’s own personality. Hutton’s failures were often for constitutional reasons that he respected in theory but ignored in practice. His difficult personal relationships with political leaders in the colonies were a significant obstacle to achieving his objectives, while his habit of appealing directly to the press, over the heads of his constitutional masters, was not particularly helpful.

Hutton regularly warned his British colleagues and superiors that the colonies could not be forced to commit themselves to binding peacetime arrangements. He saw that while leaders in the self-governing colonies were willing to seek volunteers in time of crisis, they would not commit themselves at other times, without some control over Imperial policy. However, he then pressed the governments he worked for to move further than they were willing.

Hutton believed that a system of ‘Cooperative Empire Defence’ could be based on an Empire-wide volunteer militia force comprised largely of mounted infantry. This would provide a deployable reserve
that could be used wherever the Empire was threatened. Stockings shows that Hutton's emphasis on mounted infantry, developed at Staff College, was confirmed by command of a mounted infantry company in South Africa in 1881, and polished in Egypt and during campaigns against the Mahdists. In 1888, in one of his few clear successes, Hutton established a mounted infantry school at Aldershot.

Stockings shows how Hutton used his time as Commandant of the New South Wales forces to plan a force based on a split between a static Garrison Force and a mobile Field Force. Economic problems, and Hutton's arrogance towards and impatience with the compromises inherent in politics, left his plan incomplete. Similar problems ensued during Hutton's periods in command in Canada, and commanding the new Australian Army after Federation. The period in Canada was particularly difficult, as Hutton attempted to reform a politicised militia.

However, Stockings shows that even though his 'master plan' was never implemented in any of the forces he commanded, those forces did benefit from improvements to training and organisation that Hutton was able to put in place. The closest that Hutton came to implementing his dream was as commander of the 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade in South Africa. Stockings' discussion of this period demonstrates again Hutton's inability to 'cooperate to succeed'.

As well as falling out with his colonial political masters, Hutton also antagonised his British superiors. Stockings records that when the 'Roberts Ring' replaced the 'Wolseley Ring' in the War Office, the writing was on the wall for both Hutton and his ideas. The cavalrymen French and Haig later ensured that mounted infantry did not replace the cavalry. Even the Australian Light Horse, given the role of mounted infantry by Hutton in 1902, was converted to cavalry regiments from late 1917, albeit some regiments were again converted to motor or machine gun regiments in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

It would take another war before mounted infantry (particularly in the British motor battalions, American armoured infantry battalions, and German panzer grenadiers) became fully accepted. Ironically, Hutton's old regiment, the 60th Rifles (King's Royal Rifle Corps), provided many of the motor battalions.

Hutton was at the centre of the development of Imperial defence policy in the last decade of the 1800s and the first few years of the 1900s. As Stockings demonstrates, however, while Hutton's theories were known in London, the actual course of events followed a path based on the work of others. Reforms to the British Territorial Army implemented after Hutton's retirement were based on the work of others, although they resembled his ideal scheme.

That did not stop Hutton from claiming that he could see his ideas in many developments before and during the First World War. Despite his failures, however, Hutton seems to have been the most capable of the men discussed in Jim Wood's book (Chiefs of the Australian Army, 1901-1914, Australian Military History Publications, 2006).

While the printing standard in this book is excellent, the editing is somewhat eccentric for a product of Cambridge University Press. The words 'a' and 'the' seem to have been dropped on random occasions and there are other quirks. Homonyms seem to have been used incorrectly in a couple of places.
Unmanned systems have unique attributes which have encouraged militaries all over the world to introduce them into service. Since the 2003 Iraq War, these platforms have rapidly proliferated—but not without their fair share of controversy and criticism. In particular, the Obama Administration has had a fondness for drones as a risk-adverse method of pursuing the ‘War on Terror’. However, like all disruptive innovations, there have been some unforeseen consequences which strike to the core of the nature of war.

Former RAN officer Jai Galliot pens *Military Robots* with a mission to explore the moral, political and military application of unmanned systems, through a deep and comprehensive analysis. Not many books on military technology start with Homer and traverse through Hobbes, Sun Tzu and Kant. However, Galliot bases unmanned systems in their legal, moral, historical and socio-political context. This is the right foundation from which to discuss any military issue, as we are reminded through Clausewitz’s trinity that war has its fundamental tenets which are based in the human condition.

This is the problem we face when considering unmanned systems—a technology which deliberately puts distance between combatants in an attempt to remove the human element from warfare. But instead of changing the nature of war, unmanned systems force us once again to understand another shift in war’s character. The drive for autonomy is not a new phenomenon—in World War 1, tele-operated technologies were introduced, while in World War 2, basic task autonomy could be seen on the battlefield. The limiting factor has always been communications related, as it is difficult to send signals over large distances and they are inherently vulnerable to compromise.

With satellites and cyberspace, communication impediments have reduced, thus the mass proliferation and advancement of unmanned platforms in the 21st century. The book comes to a modern definition of an unmanned system as being a group of powered electro-mechanical systems, all of which have in common that they do not have an on-board human operator; are designed to be recoverable; and exert power to deliver a lethal or nonlethal payload, or otherwise perform a function in support of a military force’s objective.

Galliot advances the central problem with the use of unmanned platforms, which might be shortened to ‘you are not getting what you think you are getting’. While unmanned systems are thought to remove people from harm and, therefore, remove the tragedy from war, this idea might be counterproductive and somewhat paradoxical. If war is without risk or cost, the threshold to enter war is lowered, which in turn encourages leaders to use war more prevalently as an extension of their politics. The de-risking of Western societies invites the use of unmanned platforms, which are sold as fostering less devastating wars, which ironically means it becomes easier to wage war politically, and tactically easier to kill people without respect for *jus in bello*.

Galliot argues that if you aim to de-risk war, you remove the barriers to conflict and the need for the rules of war which have been built up over the centuries. Adherence to ‘just war’ theory and the laws of armed conflict are important because they reduce the risk of harm to your own military forces; rules are designed not to be punitive but make us safe. But if there is no risk, there is less incentive to uphold them. An example is the use of unmanned systems in Pakistan against terrorists, which ignores the considerations of sovereignty that would be considered in more conventional operations.

The book argues that fully-autonomous systems would never be able to meet the strict rules of conflict in a complex modern, and overwhelmingly-human, operating environment. These autonomous weapons...
would remove the human responsibility for war—thus politically de-risking the chance of a human being responsible for any disaster or war crime. But are we more likely to accept a human error on the battlefield or a mistake from a machine?

Galliot provides a broad analysis designed to give the reader a deeper understanding of the underpinning issues when it comes to the application of Military Robots. Unfortunately, there is not a strong voice of Galliot himself. As a result, the reader feels the benefit of his formulaic research but not his expert opinion. However, he does leave us with a conclusion that far from the perceptions of the label ‘unmanned’, warfare is a human activity and a social institution, despite the current policy to reduce risk. Therefore, as war is organised violence through contractual arrangements, there must be human responsibility in unmanned warfare, no matter the difficulty in moral accounting.

**Winning the Peace:**
**Australia’s campaign to change the Asia-Pacific**

Andrew Carr  
Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 2015, 336 pages  
$59.99

Reviewed by Justin Chadwick

It could be argued that Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes began the country’s journey toward middle-power status. His demands for access to the table during the Treaty of Versailles negotiations, following the First World War in which more than 60,000 Australians were killed, were strident. This desire for the country to appear more than just an outpost of Empire in the Pacific could only be achieved through cooperation with a greater power.

Initially, this was Britain; following the Second World War, it was the US. The successful negotiation of ANZUS, initially opposed by the US, displayed Australia’s skills in promoting its own self-interest. At the conclusion of the Cold War, however, Australia had to reappraise its approach to diplomacy and interaction with its neighbours and the wider global stage. In order for Australia to continue achieving its foreign policy objectives, it needed to be proactive. No better example of this was the period from the early 1980s, following the election of the Hawke Government.

Andrew Carr, in *Winning the Peace: Australia’s campaign to change the Asia-Pacific*, uses this as a starting point to commence his investigation of three main campaigns—irregular immigration, weapons of mass destruction, and trade liberalisation—that have been instrumental in Australia’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. After a thorough discussion of what constitutes a ‘middle power’, Carr embarks on a necessary history of Australian foreign and defence policy from Federation until 1983. Each of his three campaigns are then discussed in detail, and conclude at the end of the Rudd-Gillard era in 2013.

By covering a 30-year period, Carr is able to provide long-term evidence that Australia has achieved its goal of middle-power influence. As he states, Australia ‘was almost uniquely positioned over the last few decades to have an influence on shaping [the] international rules-based order’.

This is a scholarly text and does not attempt to shy away from the fact. However, it is written in an approachable style that is suitable for undergraduates and those with an interest in the subject. The literature review on the concept of middle powers and norms is extensive and demonstrates how important middle powers can become and what they are able to achieve in their best interests. Carr’s selection of ‘campaigns’ shows how far Australia has come in its foreign policy goals and achievements. Although the book focuses on the Asia-Pacific region, it also touches on global aspects of Australian foreign policy.
Winning the Peace is an important title to be added to the literature of not only Australian foreign policy but also the concept of middle powers and their ability to 'punch above their weight'.