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Chair’s comments

Welcome to Issue No. 192 of the Australian Defence Force Journal.

As the incoming Commander, Australian Defence College, and Chair of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board, I am pleased to thank Major General Craig Orme for his chairmanship since 2011.

For this issue, the Board once again had before it more articles than needed, enabling it to be critically selective in its choices. The quality of prospective articles continues to be an encouraging development, enhancing the professional standing of the Journal. It also reflects what seems to be an increased willingness on the part of ADF members to contribute to the professional debate, which I will continue to promote both as Commander, Australian Defence College, and Chair of the ADFJ Board.

I am pleased to announce that the first article, by Major Michael Thomas on the topical issue of climate change, is joint winner of the ‘best article’ prize. His co-winner is Midshipman Nam Nguyen, writing on the complex and vexed issue of disputed claims in the South China Sea. As always, it is commendable that such relatively junior officers are contributing to the Journal, a comment applying also to the later article by Petty Officer Trish Dollisson.

This issue also features four geo-strategic articles by officers currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College. The first, by Colonel Tony Rawlins, examines the challenges of Korean reunification. Group Captain Steve Goodman of the Royal New Zealand Air Force looks at China’s growing presence in the South Pacific. Colonel Duncan Hayward addresses responses and opportunities for Australia and Indonesia deriving from the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific, and Brigadier David Wainwright questions Australia’s policy framework for its relations with India.

As an aside, we are planning to publish similar contributions from students at the Australian Command and Staff College, with a selection of articles from each course featuring in successive issues of the Journal, with others posted on the Australian Defence College website, as is occurring now with the Defence and Strategic Studies Course (see <http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/publications/shedden.html>).

Returning to this issue, we have four other articles on a range of topics. Lieutenant Commander Rachel Jones examines the contemporary challenge of piracy. Squadron Leader Hyder Gulam provides an interesting article on Islamic law in relation to military service in Australia. Petty Officer Trish Dollisson writes on bullying in the workforce. And Dr Clint Arizmendi questions the value of the external review process into cultural change within the ADF.

The issue concludes with a selection of book reviews, with an additional selection in the on-line version. As always, we remain keen to hear from readers wishing to join the list of reviewers, who are sent books provided to the Editor by publishers. If you are interested, please provide your contact details and area of interest to the Editor at publications@defence.adc.edu.au
Our March/April 2014 issue will be a ‘general’ issue and contributions should be submitted to the Editor, at the email address above, by mid January. Submission guidelines are on the Journal website (see www.adfjournal.adc.edu.au).

In closing, I would like to mention two matters. The first is that the Board has decided to discontinue the practice of awarding a prize of $500 for the best article in each issue. Instead, the Board will be considering alternative options to recognise and encourage contributions, with effect from the next issue. The second is that the Board is intending to modernise the website, as part of its e-publication strategy. We are aiming to have the new website operational by June, to coincide with the discontinuation of the printed version of the Journal.

Finally, I would like to thank Colonel Dennis Malone for his contribution as Army’s representative on the Board. His replacement is Colonel Rodger Shanahan, non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy.

I hope you enjoy this edition and would encourage your contribution to future issues.

Simone Wilkie, AM  
Major General  
Commander, Australian Defence College  
Chair of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board
Letter to the Editor

Dear Editor

Major Giles Cornelia has made a useful critique on military strategy and tactics (‘The Influence of the Malayan Emergency on Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, *ADF Journal*, Issue No. 191, 2013). He introduces some practical notions which still have current relevance. Soldiers with equal operational service are better equipped to audit his findings.

For myself, as an ADFA postgraduate student, I approach the subject from a theoretical and thus academic perspective, being more interested in the political dimensions of counterinsurgency, as limited as those insights might appear. While Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson were cited, I was surprised that the author’s literature review did not source Richard Clutterbuck and Anthony Short.

The British experience in Malaya (1948-60) was a successful military campaign, at all levels. At once, the combined efforts of many defeated a protracted and chronic insurgency. Malaya also had something to fight for—namely, its independence from the British, which was granted in 1957. To their credit, not a few Australians also soldiered on for the next three years to secure the stability of this fledgling nation, which became Malaysia in 1963. Victory in Malaya also gave the British and her allies the background, expertise and confidence to surmount the threat by Indonesia during its confrontation with Malaysia (1962-66). That conflict was resolved by military and diplomatic means.

Australians soldiers took with them a corpus of knowledge when they deployed to Vietnam for a decade. The Americans respected the authority they brought with them to yet another contested battlefield. Malaya may well have informed US Army warfighting doctrine. The influence of Colonel David Galula, a French Army veteran of World War 2 and Algeria, should also be put in relief. Indeed, as Major Cornelia affirms, Galula was influential in developing the theory and practice of modern counterinsurgency warfare. While the French Army effectively broke the FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algeria, it did not prevail. Under Charles de Gaulle, the war-weary French accepted the conflict could only be resolved politically.

What lessons can any army learn from Malaya? It is timely to revisit and enunciate the successes. The Briggs plan succeeded with a simple agenda. Firstly, clearing the country of communist terrorists by isolating them from the populace. Secondly, this policy withheld their support from civilian sympathisers. Thirdly, by flushing the terrorists into the open, the security forces could then control the operational phases. Fourthly, civil-military-police cooperation was enhanced in a whole-of-government response.

Malaya’s Chinese also performed an invaluable role in the police special branch and with the official propaganda wing. Psychological warfare played its part. Malaya also consolidated its national defence forces. The British and their allies took the initiative and sustained the momentum to defeat the communist insurgency. By 1960, it was no longer a major threat to challenge the nation’s political stability.

In summary, why was Malaya a success story? In short, the British gained civilian help, the communists were not accepted as a viable political force, terrorism eroded any vestige of
support, the guerrillas made bad judgments and could not capitalise on their early impetus, and a denial of food, intelligence, foreign aid and arms made them vulnerable. The Internal Security Act had a pervasive hold as rights were abrogated in a critical period of a nation’s history.

Yes, the lessons of Malaya still have undisputed influence on current counterinsurgency doctrine. But warfare is a turning wheel. Different strokes for different folks. Major Cornelia is correct in sheeting home some valuable lessons learned in Malaya.

Mike Fogarty
Weston ACT
[The writer is a former naval officer and retired diplomat - Ed.]
The Securitisation of Climate Change: a military perspective

Major Michael Thomas, Australian Army

Introduction

This article explores the current debate regarding the securitisation of climate change. Unlike most of the literature, which tends to focus exclusively on the political dimension of climate security, it examines issues more relevant to a military perspective.

The first section provides a summary of the main theoretical approaches, including a passing critique of the military as a ‘climate-securitising’ actor. The second provides a brief history of climate securitisation, while the third shifts to key debates on climate security and why the international community is divided in its approach. The final section examines the securitisation of climate change in practice by the US military.

In examining climate-security matters in a wider strategic setting, including theoretical perspectives, it is intended that this article will deepen the ongoing discussion regarding climate change within the ADF.

Theoretical perspectives

It is important to provide an understanding of what is meant by the term ‘securitisation’ and where it came from. The ‘Copenhagen School’ and ‘Paris School’ offer two theoretically distinct perspectives, with both commonly used in climate securitisation studies.

Copenhagen School

The most widely cited is the Copenhagen School’s ‘securitisation theory’, deriving from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (1985-2003). First outlined in 1995, securitisation theory received its fullest treatment in Security: a new framework for analysis (1998) as a means to broaden the scope of security studies to include a range of non-military threats and as a method to ‘distinguish the process of securitisation from that of politicisation’.

According to the Copenhagen School, securitisation is the process that takes an issue beyond the established rules of normal politics and frames it as an ‘existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’. Actions (including ‘speech-acts’, sanctions or even military build-up) that contribute to this state of affairs are generally referred to as ‘securitising moves’. Beyond this, the Copenhagen School offers a number of other criteria, including the idea that an issue can only be fully securitised if an audience accepts it as such.

Traditionally, the military has been a major actor in the process of securitisation. However, its role has been far more dilute in climate securitisation. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the challenges posed by climate change are so ubiquitous that the military is only a bit-player in what is a far broader problem. Varying positions exist in relation to this point. On
one level, there is a sense that the military is already ‘tooled-up’ for what is largely expected of it in relation to climate threats (for example, in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations).

On another, there are those who argue the military is redundant in the face of climate security threats. This position is advanced by one major study, arguing that:

The new security threats posed by global environmental change [including climate change] are fundamentally different. These threats are not posed by ‘them’, the other societal system, the competing military alliance or political or economic bloc … but by us, by our lifestyle…. ‘We’ are the threat.5

In this view, the ‘military strategies, policies and means based on the mindsets of the Cold War have become obsolete for coping with this new threat’.6

Secondly, there is some resistance for militaries to be involved in climate security matters where the causal connections to national security may not be so obvious or immediate. In this context, traditional security threats continue to dominate strategic outlooks, where any number of crises renders the long time-scales of climate change somewhat detached. For instance, to compare a few centimetres of sea-level rise across 50 years against the deteriorating situation in the Middle East illustrates this point.

Understandably, and perhaps more so in a period of austerity, scarce resources continue to be allocated to fighting, preparing and thinking about today’s conflicts, and those possible in the near future, rather than to climate change. Lastly, even where the security implications of climate change are obvious (such as in the Arctic), there are strong views that armed force involvement may militarise the situation, deteriorating the conditions needed for cooperation between nations.

Regardless of these debates, most scholars have concluded that—when judged in terms of the Copenhagen School criteria—the securitisation of climate change has failed.7 That is to say, while there are instances where securitising moves have occurred, there have been no instances so far of exceptional measures outside normal political or military bounds.

**Paris School**

The second theoretical perspective, widely known as the ‘Paris School’ and based on the work of Didier Bigo, seeks to examine the process of securitisation below the threshold of exceptionality.8 Grounded in earlier work by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, the Paris School focuses on revealing the everyday practices of the ‘professionals of (in)security’, and examines ways in which ‘subjects and objects are produced as security problems’.9

In lay terms, the Paris School examines the bureaucratisation—the translation into new policies and initiatives—of security issues, especially by the agencies of the police, intelligence, military and associated security professionals. In addition, the Paris School also examines how these agencies exert disproportionate influence on state-level security agendas through their control and use of national security capabilities.10

For the Paris School, the military-security establishment has already begun to frame climate change as a legitimate security threat and has commenced to ‘bureaucratise’ the issue—
developing climate change strategies and roadmaps, requesting budgets to address climate risks with new capability, and incorporating climate change into doctrine and strategic scenario planning. In this form, securitisation does not require the crossing of a ‘red-line’. Rather, it is indicative of an incremental, almost imperceptible process, whereby climate change becomes normalised until it exists as part of the strategic fabric, and measures that might once have been considered exceptional become strategy du jour. It is, in some respects, securitisation by bureaucratic stealth.

In this context, some scholars warn of a gradual encroachment by the military into areas it need not enter. Betsy Hartmann in the *Journal of International Development* argues this point by declaring the climate-security nexus goes uncontested and is rather used as a ‘crisis narrative’ by those with vested interests. She warns that securitisation may lead to military encroachment into areas that have typically been the remit of civilian agencies. She also cites the development of an ‘aid-military complex’, where a strategic shift in military thinking on climate threats is translating into a focus on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and stability operations. Despite this, there are valid counter-arguments in favour of involvement due to the sheer array of capabilities the military brings to the table.

Notwithstanding these debates, the Paris School approach represents an increasingly favoured analytical framework in climate securitisation studies.

**A brief history of climate securitisation**

Broadly, the securitisation of climate change followed two earlier phases of ‘scientisation’ and ‘politicisation’. Scientisation has taken place since the discovery of the basic mechanism of global warming (1827, Fourier); the discovery of the main greenhouse gases (1859, Tyndall); the quantification of those gases to global warming (1896, Arrhenius); the proposition that industrial pollution was a major contributor (1908, Arrhenius); and scientific confirmation that rising CO$_2$ would produce noticeable warming by the year 2000 (1957, Keeling). World Climate Conferences (1979, 1990 and 2009) and the Villach Conferences (1980 and 1985) are notable for high-ranking scientists warning on the potential consequences of climate change. Continual advances in climate science, and the iterative, self-correcting process of the scientific method itself, make this phase ongoing.

Politically, climate change began to emerge following the 1960s ‘environmental awakening’, although it did not register as a mainstream global governance issue until the 1980s. Key events since have included: being placed on the agenda of G-7 (1988), scientific testimony in the US Congress on the threat of climate change (1988, Hansen), the Brundtland Commission Report on sustainable development, the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1988) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). The requirement for meaningful action by an internationally-binding protocol (1997, Kyoto) escalated climate change to an issue of international political significance. This moment was characterised by division as to who should bear responsibility for reducing emissions. Noticeably, the US failed to ratify Kyoto while rising emitters in China, India and other emerging powers were largely exempt.

Post-September 11 and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, global interest in climate change was again piqued in the mid-2000s following extreme weather events (Hurricane
Katrina, 2005), popular media (An Inconvenient Truth, 2006) and increasingly strong scientific statements. As the perceived political urgency reached a crescendo at the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (2009), high-level efforts had already been made for some years to escalate the importance of climate change by framing it as a securitised issue, presenting it as a threat to human, national and international security. Indeed, the heightened sense that ‘something must be done’ witnessed unprecedented interest, with the mid-2000s marking the effective commencement of climate change as a mainstream security issue.

In this context, climate change and its security implications were included on the agendas of several high-level forums, including the European Union, G8/G20, African Union, Major Economies Forum, OECD and UN General Assembly. Many political, scientific, business, community and military leaders declared climate change a grave and serious threat, with many also attempting to present climate change as an existential security threat requiring extraordinary measures (such as the fundamental transformation of energy supply). Climate change has also increasingly been factored into many high-level national security planning documents. As a case in point, every major Australian national security statement since 2008 has addressed the security aspects of climate change.

Further securitising moves have culminated in discussions by the UN Security Council in 2007 and 2011. In the most recent, the UN Secretary-General described it as a real and accelerating problem that ‘not only exacerbates threats to international peace and security, it is a threat to international peace and security’. In the same debate, the US delegate warned that:

The security and stability of every nation and every people are in jeopardy. Our prosperity, health and safety are in peril. Time is not just moving ahead: time is running out. Climate change has very real implications for peace and security.

The progressive securitisation of climate change has been accompanied by a deluge of related literature. In the US, reports have focused on understanding climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ and how this will impact on national security. In Europe and the UN, attention has also been on the impact that climate change will have on human and international security. Also, while many earlier assessments tended to be ‘big hands, small map’, recent reports are now establishing links between climate change and contemporary security challenges. The 2013 report by the Center for American Progress—linking climate change-induced drought in Russia and China, and extreme weather in Canada, with lowering grain production, increased food prices and the Arab Awakening—is one example.

The idea that climate change has failed to become a truly securitised issue only makes sense when viewed through the theoretical prism of the Copenhagen School. In reality, the process of securitisation is ongoing and perhaps indicative of the long timescales of climate change itself. However, were a climate ‘tipping point’ to be crossed, then existential threat and emergency measures may well be invoked.

The climate securitisation schism in international relations

Nevertheless, the securitisation of climate change remains a contested topic in international relations. The thrust of this debate does not necessarily concern the nature of the security threats per se, rather it concerns the nature of the response by nations.
Broadly, two camps exist. In one camp are countries working to ensure climate change remains a non-securitised issue. Although exceptions exist, this position is mainly advanced by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as developing countries and the Third World (hereafter BRICS+). The main argument held by the BRICS+ is that while climate change may present certain kinds of threats to international peace and security, it primarily remains a sustainable development issue where focus must be on delivering mitigation and adaption strategies as well as finance mobilisation, technology transfer and capacity building in developing countries.

Not surprisingly, the BRICS+ strongly refute any discussion of climate change in the UN Security Council, let alone action. Rather, they contend the issue is best conferred on multilateral forums such as the UN General Assembly, UN Economic and Social Council, UN Commission on Sustainable Development, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and other non-securitised regional and national frameworks.

Debates in the UN Security Council reveal clear points of demarcation and disagreement on climate security. The G-77, for instance, remonstrated against the ‘ever-increasing encroachment by the Security Council on the roles and responsibilities of other principal entities of the UN’. Not without irony, China noted that the Security Council ‘lacks expertise in climate change’, adding that it is ‘not a forum for decision making with universal representation’. Russia contended that Security Council involvement would ‘bring no added value whatsoever and would merely lead to a further politicisation’, and concluded by questioning the very basis of climate change as a security threat.

Many countries in this bloc also pressed developed countries not to become distracted by hypothetical scenarios but to provide greater and quicker assistance in areas of adaption, mitigation and finance. India, for example, argued that remedial action must be anchored in ‘development, adaptive capacity, risk assessment and institutional build-up’ rather than ‘climate-induced disasters in the distant future’. It also targeted those responsible to ‘come forward with firm greenhouse gas commitments and ensure that there is adequate resource and technology flow to developing countries’.

Adding to the sense of historical injustice, Bolivia urged the UN Security Council to ‘adopt resolutions … or reparations that effectively hold those countries responsible for the damage’. As part of this initiative, Bolivia’s ambassador called for a 10-20 per cent reduction of military expenditure in developed countries to fund adaption and mitigation in developing ones.

Many of these remarks could be dismissed as stereotypes of the ‘poor, under-developed South’ against the ‘rich, industrialised North’, or as strategic acts of national self-interest. Nevertheless, criticism has concentrated on a lack of peer review process of the climate-security nexus; lack of empirical data linking climatic change to violent conflict; a suspicion that Western militaries are framing climate change as a new ‘threat’ to buttress against austerity measures; and a risk that the normalisation of climate change in security institutions may lead to issues of sovereignty if powerful nations seek to enforce emission reductions via sanctions or other means.

In contrast are ‘pro-securitising’ countries that have sought to frame climate change as a securitised issue to be dealt with through multilateral, non-securitised and securitised forums.
Countries subscribing to this ‘two-track’ approach mainly consist of developed countries, such as those within the EU, and the US, UK, Australia and a collection of other small island nations, as well as some developing countries most affected by climate change. These countries argue that securitising climate change raises its profile, engenders a sense of purpose and urgency into international mitigation and adaption strategies, and should be viewed as part of a wider strategy of ‘preventative diplomacy’. From a military perspective, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the pro-securitising countries have also been most active in registering climate change as an issue of national security significance.

A case study of the US military

Although ‘climate change’ as an environmental security threat first appeared in the 1997 National Security Strategy of the Clinton Administration, it was not until the Obama Administration that it received widespread currency in the US Government’s national security agenda. The inclusion of climate change as a national security issue has progressively been translated into a number of policies and initiatives within its armed forces, providing a good approximation to the Paris School framework outlined earlier.

In the context of its military, the US Government has addressed climate change in two fundamental ways. The first has been through the imposition of regulatory measures and the second has been through mainstreaming it as an issue of strategic significance. The former reveals a bureaucratisation of climate change, while the latter points more towards securitisation of the issue.

Regulatory measures

The most influential regulatory measure has been the Obama Administration’s Executive Order 13514 – Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy and Economic Performance of 2009 which mandated that the US military (among other agencies) must reduce non-operational emissions, formally evaluate the risks posed by climate change, publish an annual sustainability plan (improving resource conservation, water efficiency and green procurement), and develop a climate change adaption plan.

First published in 2011, the US Department of Defense established its Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan around four core objectives: ensuring resource availability; maintaining readiness in the face of climate change; waste and pollution minimisation; and improving the Department’s sustainability practices. Most of its focus is on cutting energy usage, including through improvements to energy efficiency, the uptake of large-scale renewables to power its bases, incorporating lifecycle energy and cost of fuel as part of upfront acquisition decisions, reducing demand through fossil fuel conservation programs, and smart metering.

In terms of these goals, the US military is aiming to reduce the energy intensity of its fixed installations by 37 per cent by 2020; achieve a 30 per cent reduction in use of petroleum products in its non-tactical vehicle fleet by 2025; and to have 18 per cent of all fixed-site electricity generation come via renewables by 2025. To meet this, the US Army, Navy and Air Force each intend to install one gigawatt of renewable power by 2025.
Accompanying this, the Department has declared it will cut emissions in its facilities by 34 per cent by 2020, which would equate to 9 million tonnes of CO$_2$(e) (or about six times the entire annual emissions of the ADF). Although the plan excludes operational energy (which, at some 82.5 MT CO$_2$(e), constitutes about 75 per cent of all US military energy use), the Department has—for the first time—published an operational energy strategy and an implementation plan with specific energy targets for operational elements.

In another first, the US military also published in 2012 a *Climate Change Adaption Roadmap*. The plan lays out four main goals. Firstly, the US military will appoint a coordinating body to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of climate-related policy, guidance and practice across the Department. Secondly, the Department will develop assessment tools that guide its climate adaption, including processes to ensure the best available science is included in assessment and adaption planning. The third goal seeks to fully integrate climate change considerations into existing policies, planning, practices and programs. The final goal, and a point of consideration for the ADF as the US rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, will see the US military partner with other federal agencies and allies on the challenges of climate change.

**Mainstreaming as an issue of strategic significance**

The conditions for this to occur were laid during the final year of the Bush Administration through the 2008 *National Defense Authorization Act*, which directed the Department of Defense to consider the effects of climate change and include it within the next round of strategic policy.

Climate change was accordingly addressed in both the 2010 *National Security Strategy* and *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*. The *National Security Strategy* declared climate change ‘real, urgent and severe’, and listed required action at ‘home’ (including transforming the energy sector to reduce emissions) and ‘abroad’ (implementing and building on international efforts to reduce emissions and provide assistance for developing nations). The *Quadrennial Defense Review* asserted that climate change is affecting the US military both in an operational manner, by shaping its future environment, roles and missions, and also as a burden multiplier, by degrading its homeland and global estate, facilities, infrastructure, training and testing grounds.

Other initiatives that have mainstreamed climate change—and in which the US Department of Defense is an active member—include the 2009 establishment of the Interagency Climate Change Adaption Task Force (involving 20 agencies) and the US Global Change Research Program (involving 13 agencies) to address cross-cutting issues and develop a coordinated federal response.

The mainstreaming of climate change has also stimulated action within the individual Services, with the US Navy largely at the forefront. In 2009, for instance, the Chief of Naval Operations established a climate change task force, headed by a three-star officer (the US Navy’s Oceanographer), with its early work focused on developing a strategy to address climate change in the Arctic. With 50 per cent of the summer ice-cap now melting each season, the opening of the Arctic has not been lost on the US Navy. In 2009, it published the *US Navy Arctic Roadmap* and, in 2011, the Chief of Naval Operations called it ‘a phenomenal event … the opening of the Fifth Ocean.’
As a companion to the *Arctic Roadmap*, the US Navy in 2010 published its own *Climate Change Roadmap*, addressing implications of climate change beyond the Arctic region. Indicative also of the deepening climate program is the inclusion of climate change in Naval War College coursework.

Lastly—and complementary to broader US Navy work on climate change—are the Secretary of the Navy’s *Energy Goals*. On assuming office in 2009, Secretary Ray Mabus declared ‘I am committed as Secretary to addressing climate change and energy consumption in the Navy’. Mabus set five targets for the Navy and Marine Corps which included:

1. by 2020, half of its energy, ashore and afloat, will come from non-fossil fuel sources;
2. by 2020, half of its installations will be net-zero energy consumers, using solar, wind, ocean and geothermal power;
3. by 2016, the Navy will sail a carrier strike group (‘Great Green Fleet’) composed of nuclear ships, hybrid electric ships and aircraft running on biofuel;
4. by 2015, the Navy will halve the amount of petroleum used in its commercial vehicle fleet; and
5. incorporating energy efficiency, energy footprint and cost of fuel as mandatory acquisition factors, and ensuring that capability contracts make industry accountable for meeting new targets.

Although the program has not been without resistance, particularly given cuts under austerity measures and ‘sequestration’, Mabus remains adamant on transforming the Navy’s energy use and culture. He has championed a range of initiatives, including one that even directs the 2014 officer selection boards to give special consideration to those who have made energy resource management a priority.

It would, of course, be misleading to leave an impression that the US Department of Defense is the lead agency on climate change or, for that matter, that climate change is the military’s top priority. However, it is inarguable that the US military has recognised climate change as a significant issue in the 21st century. As such, it has begun the policy work to mainstream the issue within its organisation. If this leads to a reduction in emissions and enhances international security, then the ‘climate-securitisation’ process underway within the US military should be viewed as a constructive contribution and—of relevance to the ADF—a potential model for other militaries.

**Conclusion**

While there is ongoing discussion as to how nations should best address the security implications of climate change, there are few who argue as to the nature of the threat. In the broad agenda of climate change, the military can play a niche and constructive role in both national and international mitigation and adaption efforts by developing polices that strengthen international security, reduce emissions and progress technological development on renewables.

To avoid suspicion and dispel old arguments that the military is ‘greening’ to its own advantage, militaries should be transparent in their climate-related policies and intent. In this respect, the securitisation of climate change within militaries need not be framed as a zero-sum game.
Major Thomas joined the ADF in 1994 and has had a range of instructional, regimental and headquarters roles. He completed Technical Staff College in 2007 and recently contributed to the Department of Defence’s Global Change Seminar series. He is currently on leave from the Army as a PhD candidate with UNSW@ADFA, researching the securitisation of climate change within the Australian and US militaries.

NOTES

1. The term ‘climate security’ is used interchangeably with ‘climate securitisation’, ‘securitisation of climate change’ and other like expressions. Climate security is a broad term used in this article to describe the security impacts, opportunities, risks and vulnerabilities that a rapidly changing climate (from anthropogenic causes) will have on human, national and international security.
related research from the 1950s. Noteworthy was sponsorship by the Office of Naval Research of research conducted by the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. A seminal 1957 Scripps paper argued that the world’s oceans did not absorb CO$_2$ at expected rates or volumes, thereby realising the importance of the atmosphere as a greenhouse gas ‘sink’.

15. Domestic activities by military forces were included in respective national emission inventories as part of government-sector emissions reported on an annual basis to the UN. However, offshore military activities (for example, deployments or exercises beyond territorial boundaries) were excluded.


18. Michael Brzoska identified a further 31 countries where climate change is considered in national security statements or defence planning documents: see M. Brzoska, ‘Climate Change as a Driver of Security Policy’ in Scheffran et al, *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*, pp. 176-83.


30. The final point listed here is based on comments from ‘anti-securitising’ nations in UN Security Council debates and concepts, outlined in C.K. Penny, ‘Climate Change and the Security Council: a preliminary framework for implementing remedial measures through chapter VII of the UN Charter’

31. Sindico, ‘Climate Change’, p. 32.


35. US Department of Defense, DOD Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan FY 2012, p. 36. The calculation is based on Total Comprehensive Scope 1 & 2 (74.4 MT CO2[e]) and Scope 3 (8.1 MT CO2[e]) greenhouse gas emissions for financial year 2011-12. For a definition of operational energy (that is, energy consumed by military deployments and in the support of such deployments, either training or direct support), see US Department of Defense, Energy for the Warfighter: operational energy strategy, 2011, available at <http://energy.defense.gov/Portals/25/Documents/Reports/20110614_Operational_Energy_Strategy.pdf> accessed 5 September 2013.


42. US Government, Council on Environmental Quality: climate change resilience, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/resilience/> accessed 13 September 2013. The CIA also established the Center for Climate Change and National Security (2009-12), although it was closed following the departure of Leon Panetta and subsumed under other departmental operations (see, for example <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/c-i-a-closes-its-climate-change-office/?_r=0> accessed 10 September 2013).

43. Although the US Navy has led, the other Services are undertaking similar transformations in energy. The US Army, for instance, is aiming to have 25 per cent of its facility energy from renewables by 2025, costing up to $7 bn. See, for example, <http://www.army.mil/article/75960/Army_to_invest__7_billion_in_renewable_energy_projects/> accessed 4 October 2013.


Introduction

The South China Sea maritime boundary dispute is of increasing concern for ASEAN and other states in the Southeast Asia region. Not only is there an issue of sovereignty for claimant states but the purported wealth of natural resources complicates the issue when trying to find a resolution. Moreover, use of the South China Sea as a route for maritime trade ensures a level of prosperity for the participating nations, and any form of conflict or tension detracts from delivering this.

While a number of confidence-building measures have been implemented in relation to the South China Sea, including the signing of the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to the South China Sea’ in 2002, China’s handling of its territorial claims suggests that a more practical solution is needed. Even though diplomatic efforts have resulted in a few agreements, there have been continued cases of reported clashes and arrests by one state against another. This poses a potential risk to freedom of the seas and, on a higher level, the risk of lethal force. Even though recent hostilities have generally involved commercial actors and civil maritime law enforcement, the need for navies to cooperate is essential in building stronger diplomatic relations.

Australia has an interest in ensuring that conflict does not develop in Southeast Asia, both from a maritime trade perspective as well as the principle-based motivation of ensuring freedom of the seas. Australia’s current energy needs, particularly in liquid fuels, are primarily addressed through petroleum products that transit the South China Sea and the port of Singapore. Over 51 per cent of Australia’s imported petroleum products come from Singapore through the South China Sea and any disruption due to conflict in the region would significantly impact our trade and shipping movements. Furthermore, as a dialogue partner with ASEAN, Australia has a vested interest in ensuring stability across the region and positive relations between member states.

This article will explore the context around the South China Sea dispute. It will also assess Australia’s current contributions to ensuring security in Southeast Asia, as well as practical methods of engaging the key claimant states to prevent armed conflict. This will be examined under the auspices of the 2013 Defence White Paper, which calls for greater regional engagement. However, any recommendations must take into account the national considerations of the claimant states and others with interests in the South China Sea.

Background

Tensions over the South China Sea have become one of the most important geopolitical issues in recent times, with immediate and long-term consequences for global security and economy. It has arisen as a result of competing claims for the area made by various countries which currently include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. All lay claim to
at least some part of the islands within the broad area of the South China Sea, encompassing the Spratly Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Paracel Islands.

All these countries assert that the islands to which they lay claim fall within their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as defined by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which confers special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources, ranging from marine life to energy production.

The economic and strategic significance of the South China Sea relates to the following three factors: it has a high level of biodiversity and abundant marine resources; its geographical location puts it astride the busiest sea route in the world, linking Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; and, lastly, it is believed to contain vast oil and gas reserves under the seabed. By asserting sovereignty to parts or all of the South China Sea, each country aims to secure the legal rights to exploit the resources of the seabed and its waters.

Attempts have been made to implement regional frameworks and confidence-building measures to resolve the dispute or to provide some level of governing dynamics to the way security forces act. One of these is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1993 to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern, and make significant contributions towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

China was not particularly supportive of the ARF when it was first proposed in the early 1990s, citing concerns that the Forum would become involved in regional conflicts on its own initiative. The main concern was that the ARF would legitimise interference in the internal affairs of other states. However, it was further interpreted by analysts that the Chinese reasons for not being supportive of the ARF were that it did not want the South China Sea disputes to be part of ARF discussions, nor did they want a multilateral agreement that could constrain Chinese foreign policy.

Another measure implemented to reduce tensions was the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002, with the parties committing to ‘resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force’ and ‘to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability’.

This was viewed at the time to be a positive change from the Chinese because they had previously insisted that any issues relating to the South China Sea dispute were to be handled only on a bilateral basis, and that states that were not party to the dispute should not be involved. Recent actions by several Chinese maritime agencies, such as arresting fishermen from other claimant states for fishing in ‘Chinese waters’, highlight the potential for hostile actions to undermine the 2002 declaration. As a result, there have been calls for a more restrictive code of conduct to govern how forces behave.

**Setting the scene for cooperation**

Cooperation in handling border disputes in Southeast Asia has not been limited to territorial claims in the South China Sea. There have been numerous examples of cooperation in patrolling joint boundaries, as well as reaching agreements on boundary delimitations. For example,
the Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic relationship has yielded successful resolution to boundary disputes in the past. In the Gulf of Tonkin, both parties were able to reach an agreement over the disputed maritime boundary and decided on a 50-50 boundary demarcation.\textsuperscript{11} China and Vietnam were able to reach a similar agreement along their land border.

Moreover, recent cases of Chinese cooperation in the maritime domain demonstrate the ability for the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) to operate in a combined effort with coalition navies. Both dimensions serve as a catalyst for future cooperation, and provide a clear example of how to model peaceful resolutions and meaningful cooperation in the South China Sea. However, future attempts at finding an internationally viable solution are made difficult by virtue of the fact that multiple states are claimants to the same maritime boundary.

With the South China Sea dispute ongoing, it is ironic that the PLA-N’s first overseas mission is one that is concerned with maritime security and maintaining freedom of the seas. The Chinese deployment to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy and protect merchant shipping is taken to be a great opportunity to demonstrate a willingness in China’s foreign policy to contribute to cooperative security.\textsuperscript{12}

Cooperative security refers to a multilateral security arrangement that is inclusive and creates habits of dialogue and cooperation. It does not necessarily involve operating under the umbrella of a combined task force. Furthermore, there was a clear acknowledgement about the need to protect vital sea lines of communication to ensure a level of economic prosperity, albeit originally only in escorting Chinese-flagged freighters.\textsuperscript{13} This deployment and the introduction of China’s first hospital ship provide greater scope to engage in similar non-traditional security in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{14} This type of strategy could result in an international willingness to accept China as a less aggressive actor in the region, thus lowering the risk of escalation.

While these examples set a precedent for future cooperation in the South China Sea, they are by no means 100 per cent ‘exportable’ and applicable to this debate. A recent report from the Lowy Institute highlights the challenges of Beijing’s latest forms of defence diplomacy:

> Beijing is becoming more comfortable with some kinds of security engagement with potential strategic competitors, but—at least when it comes to the maritime domain—this focuses on measures remote from or indirectly related to the main issues, zones or capabilities of contention and concern. These indirect confidence-building measures have only a marginal impact on issues of trust, stability and crisis management.\textsuperscript{15}

Furthermore, there is a risk that China could redeploy some of its forces to conduct unilateral, non-traditional security operations in the South China Sea. Even ostensibly benign operations conducted unilaterally, such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, could be interpreted as a signal that Beijing is subtly exerting hegemonic tendencies. Although the physical effort of such operations would result in a positive outcome for beneficiaries, the distrust that could develop from a seemingly ulterior motive could have adverse political ramifications. Indeed, this could contribute to further instability and outweigh any physical, positive contributions made by China’s operations.
Defence diplomacy: a commonsense approach

A binding code of conduct could alleviate some tension in the region but it is by no means the end of the political debate. Nor is a binding code of conduct going to be a fool-proof measure to prevent conflict. Therefore, the need for greater strategic engagement (defence diplomacy) is needed to ensure that tensions do not flare up and result in the loss of life. This form of foreign policy can be taken for granted but there are good reasons as to why it can be considered a ‘solution’ to prevent conflict.

International relations commentators Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster argue that defence diplomacy is on the rise and that it not only prevents conflict but also assists in building strong networks for mutual cooperation. Greater capacity for defence diplomacy prevents conflict by encouraging greater transparency in defence relations. It assists in changing the mindset of the militaries involved and carving away at historical mistrust that could be a catalyst for escalating the use of force. Strategic engagement can also serve a political purpose, as military cooperation between states can send a signal to demonstrate a willingness to avoid armed conflict.

The positive aspect of strategic engagement is that military commanders would be hesitant to resort to lethal force when they personally know their counterparts. Yet even this form of diplomacy may not actually resolve maritime boundary disputes. No matter how strong the networks are between military personnel from different countries, it will not be able to prevent an escalation of hostilities if that is the political intent of their respective governments. After all, militaries exist to provide a state with a means of using force to achieve a political aim—and militaries must prepare for the worst case scenario.

A different perspective on Australia’s defence strategy

Australia is currently refocusing its defence strategy to engage the Indo-Pacific region. In broader terms, it calls for greater participation in maritime domain awareness and cooperation. As the then Australian Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Shalders explained in 2006, the RAN continues to engage with regional partners to build capacity and encourage cooperation wherever possible. Indeed, the current ADF operation in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean (Operation GATEWAY) is an ongoing example of Australia’s foreign policy commitment to engage with the region.

Chris Rahman, an Australian maritime affairs commentator, describes the current practice as generally benign deployments aimed at bilateral and incremental cooperation. Under this model of defence diplomacy, there is low political risk for Australia as it is largely concerned with building confidence among regional partners, particularly because the concept is primarily concerned with peaceful employment of military forces for diplomatic purposes. To that end, Australia has sent units to participate with the PLA-N and navies of other claimant states for a number of port visits and military exercises. This, coupled with the fact that Australia has no claim in the South China Sea, gives Australia the opportunity to play a leading role in building trust between claimant states, particularly when higher-level diplomacy fails to achieve a resolution.

Recent deployments to Asia by RAN frigates draw attention to the higher level of trust between the PLA-N and RAN, with joint training activities venturing beyond the scope of search-and-
rescue exercises. By working together in more operationally-related scenarios—and to an extent revealing some of one’s operational model—confidence becomes an intrinsic element in the Sino-Australian relationship and helps to underpin further international cooperation. This is because a level of predictability and certainty is developed from repeated exposure to how other states’ foreign policy goals are manifested.\textsuperscript{21}

Current cooperation has extended beyond the immediate region, and both navies have shared experiences in operating in the Gulf of Aden during counter-piracy missions.\textsuperscript{22} Through a deeper understanding of how one another operate, a stronger sense of trust can be developed. This follows the mantra that friends are less likely to fight.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, a greater level of trust is developed between the two states, albeit at the operational level between militaries. This does not limit the scope for future cooperation; in fact it opens up the many pathways for cooperation that Australia’s military has with other states in the region.

In spite of some diplomatic tension that ensued after the 2009 Defence White Paper was released, Australia and China were able to maintain a positive outlook in engaging militarily. With Australia’s ongoing contributions to regional security, there could be potential for large-scale multinational cooperation in the region. Even small-level operations, such as week-long search-and-rescue exercises, could generate more trust between navies.

Beijing has only recently started sending its forces to multinational exercises but even those deployments occur in regions away from the contested waters of Southeast Asia. What is needed is a revision in how Australia’s foreign policy and, as a consequence, its defence strategy is articulated in the region. All of this, however, is dependent on where Australia sits in terms of trying to prevent conflict in the region. Moreover, it should seek to engage and ‘incentivise’ China to participate in multinational efforts in the region.

One strategy that can be developed under the broad umbrella of ‘defence diplomacy’ could involve a model whereby Australia would either lead, or encourage key regional states to lead, multinational patrols in the South China Sea. The joint maritime patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam clearly demonstrates the capacity for claimant states to work with others in security operations. This strategy is what Michael Swaine, an Asia security analyst, calls ‘quiet diplomacy’, with a strong emphasis on close, personal relationships between parties to enhance the level of trust and cooperation between them.\textsuperscript{24} How a partnership or cooperation plan manifests will be crucial in determining the maintenance of peace.

\textbf{Recommendations}

While it is difficult to propose a policy solution for resolving the South China Sea territorial dispute, there are a number of practical measures that could be taken in building confidence and preventing conflict in the region. While some of these recommendations are not necessarily ‘new’ in the South China Sea debate, greater emphasis or renewed delivery of the following recommendations is needed.

It is recommended that Australia should:

1. Continue to engage Southeast Asian states in bilateral and multilateral military engagements;
2. Increase engagement with Chinese military forces in exercises and bilateral security dialogues;
3. Enhance diplomatic engagement with China to encourage greater participation in multinational exercises and operations;
4. Pursue a strategy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ through benign forms of military engagements, such as through greater levels of port visits and humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations;
5. Encourage, or even host, multinational exercises between claimant states that concentrate on security operations’ warfighting skills, and
6. Engage claimant states’ domestic law enforcement agencies to cooperate on international responsibilities and protecting global commons. Joint patrolling against piracy and maritime search-and-rescue are two areas that could be conducted to generate cooperation.

**Conclusion**

The territorial boundary disputes in the South China Sea are highly complex and have been marred with inconsistent precedents by claimant states. It is imperative that further measures are taken to ensure that trust and stability are enhanced between claimant states.

The emphasis should be on deeper levels of trust. Regional frameworks and codes of conduct may provide a legal basis to govern behaviour but they may not actually address underlying tensions. Otherwise, any attempt at a regional framework that tries to resolve the dispute or prevent conflict would just amount to regional instability that is loosely suppressed by codified practices.

Australia is well positioned to be a leader in building regional maritime security in the region. Moreover, it has a genuine strategic interest in ensuring that major trade routes do not become embroiled in conflict. Any action that affects the free flow of trade by sea will reverberate throughout the region and the world, particularly for countries that are so dependent on maritime trade as Australia.

Midshipman Nam Nguyen is a Maritime Warfare Officer in the RAN and is currently completing a Bachelor of Business at the ADFA. He is a previous winner of the Australian Naval Institute Annual Essay Competition and is a member of the Kokoda Foundation’s Future Strategic Leaders Program.

**NOTES**

1. This paper was developed by the author in preparation for attending the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Asia Security Summit, the so-called Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore in May/June 2013, as part of the Australian Youth Delegation under the auspices of Global Voices. Global Voices was established in February 2011. It selects, funds, prepares and coordinates delegations of Australia’s future leaders to a variety of major international events. See <http://www.globalvoices.org.au/>


8. ASEAN, ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’.


Korean Reunification

Colonel Anthony Rawlins, DSC, Australian Army

Unification is one thing, and stability in Northeast Asia is another ....

Kim Dae-jung, President of South Korea, 1998

Introduction

In an incredibly dynamic region, it is ironic that the 1945 partition of Korea and the 1954 Armistice, both edifices of Cold War rivalry, remain as primary determinants of Northeast Asia’s security matrix. Despite such longevity, the respective Korean governments—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South—remain publicly and ostensibly committed to reunification.

Their intractable and largely irreconcilable visions of a unification end-state have not discouraged a general academic consensus favouring its inevitability. Thus for many analysts and planners, the real question is not whether reunification will occur but rather when and how it will unfold. The importance of this study is patently obvious—in geopolitical terms, reunification would drive a fundamental revision of Northeast Asian security architectures. Most assume this would result in an inherently positive outcome.

Many peaceful reunification scenarios have been developed. The most popular posits a sudden collapse of the DPRK regime, leading to a rapid absorption of the North into the South, creating a unified nation governed under ROK-style democratic, free-market auspices. However, the scale of national inequity between North and South is likely to overwhelm the capacity of the ROK government acting unilaterally, thereby forcing its hand to seek international support in creating the conditions for lasting success. Accordingly, two key regional stakeholders, the US and China, will demand a voice in constructing the final architecture of a unified Korea. Their respective caveats, conditions and démarches will greatly complicate the task confronting any ROK government in developing and executing a reunification strategy that advances, rather than erodes, regional security.

This article examines the current ROK mindset, against the strategic interests of the US and China, to a reunified Korea borne from a collapse/absorption scenario in order to analyse the nature of the challenge facing a ROK government in planning for this contingency. Stark differences in South Korean, American and Chinese attitudes to peaceful reunification reflect the fundamentally different national interests at stake. These strategic interests are not readily reconcilable, and their resolution prior to the contingency materialising is effectively precluded by an exclusionary ROK focus on consensus-based reunification planning.

The article argues that the real complexity—and thus impediment—to realisation of a peacefully-unified peninsula under ROK governance remains this continuing reluctance to discuss, develop and collegiately plan for such a contingency prior to its materialisation. This, in turn, dramatically increases the likelihood of unfavourable security outcomes in a post-DPRK world.
ROK planning for reunification

According to one commentator:

The question [preparing for collapse of the North Korean regime] has been completely taboo. The major players are completely unprepared. The South Korean’s don’t want to touch it, and the US takes its lead from the South.5

Prima facie, South Korea seems well prepared in its planning for peaceful reunification with the North. Article 4 of its Constitution entrenches peaceful reunification as a national objective.6 Presidential and governmental diplomatic overtures to the North have remained faithful to the consensus-based reunification model first espoused by President Park Chung-hee in his Declaration of June 1973.7 In December 2005, the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act was passed, legislatively obligating Seoul to pursue inter-Korean relations with Pyongyang to achieve peaceful reunification.8 Policy and planning is the dedicated purview of a Ministry of Unification, and public policy is developed and distributed in the form of unification White Papers.9 However, this incremental model of reunification fails to address the unique exigencies that would arise from a collapse-absorption contingency.

This exclusive planning focus is by no means accidental—it has been a deliberate and consistent policy position for all ROK administrations since 1973.10 Official policy, planning and messaging portray a sophisticated facade of acknowledging the constitutionally-entrenched imperative, while practically acknowledging the reality that the massive economic disparity between North and South imposes political, social and economic costs outside the capacity of a ROK government and the propensities of the populace.11 While the language of reunification endures, the political and societal stomach for a rapid absorption—akin to the German experience—has evaporated.12

The reality is that while reunification is held aloft as an unassailable symbol, it is now subordinate to a national desire for regional stability that preserves a ‘quality of life’ status quo.13 Accordingly, any official planning that baselines DPRK regime collapse as a precondition for reunification is discouraged, due to the risk of destabilising inter-Korean relations and encouraging DPRK nuclear capability development.14

Since the late 1980s, the official South Korean unification formula has therefore favoured sustainment of the DPRK regime, rather than any action precipitating its collapse.15 Policy measures promoting coexistence, collaboration and cooperation have dominated, effectively precluding any national or alliance planning for DPRK regime collapse and stabilisation of the peninsula under ROK control. The result, unsurprisingly, is serial unpreparedness across national cognitive, interagency coordination and alliance planning dimensions. Inevitably, this means the ROK will have little choice but to reach out to the international community for assistance should such an eventuality materialise.16

The anticipated contingency position for the ROK is to seek a temporary stabilisation of North Korea under UN administration, setting the conditions for a more gradual and progressive integration of the two Koreas into a democratic, free-market based national entity.17 However, given the lack of any substantive stakeholder dialogue on this issue, there are no guarantees that key contributors would subscribe to this preferred ROK approach. The interests and actions of the US and China will be principal determinants in shaping any ROK contingency plans for the temporary stabilisation and/or long-term absorption of North Korea into the South.
US position on Korean unification

America’s position on unification has not changed significantly since the Korean War. Deterring North Korean aggression, reducing inter-Korean tensions and promoting peaceful reunification under a ROK lead have been enduring trademarks of US policy. Forward-basing of US troops as part of strong alliance relationships with South Korea and Japan has been a fundamental pillar of this strategy. More recently, denuclearisation of the peninsula has emerged as a capstone principle driving US diplomacy in respect to reunification outcomes.

More broadly, since 2009 the US and ROK have accelerated a transformation of their alliance from the primary purpose of defending against DPRK aggression to a broader regional and global partnership. A driver for this transformation has been concern about China’s rising influence in Northeast Asia, now an integral consideration in US-ROK strategic planning and economic policy development. The recent US strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region has been interpreted as a mechanism to monitor—if not contain—the rise of China as a hegemonic power in Northeast Asia.

In either guise, forward positioning of substantial military power will be an essential and indispensable element of continued American influence in the region. Of some concern to the White House is a view that peaceful reunification would remove the existential threat underpinning the US-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, thereby reinvigorating arguments for a reduction in US military presence in the region. In a forceful counter to this, the US Government has argued that a strong American military presence is necessary for regional stability. Forward-basing of a substantial military presence on the peninsula, particularly given ongoing concerns about the future of basing in Japan, would therefore likely constitute an essential condition of US support to the ROK in support of peaceful reunification.

These strategic imperatives suggest the US would lobby for the following concessions from the ROK in providing support to a peaceful reunification effort: first, continued basing of US military forces on the peninsula; second, complete denuclearisation of a unified Korea under ROK (or UN) administration; and third, maintenance of the fundamental principles and provisions of the US-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, irrespective of the removal of its historical threat basis. Two of these key concessions will be highly anathematic to Chinese strategic interests in Northeast Asia.

China’s position on Korean unification

China’s primary strategic goal in Northeast Asia remains the preservation of domestic and regional stability conducive to continued national development. Domestic stability is viewed as the foundation stone for preservation of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) regime, territorial integrity, continued economic growth and increased regional influence. The Chinese interpretation of regional stability stands in stark contrast to many other regional perspectives; a reunified Korea maintaining any measure of the existing US-ROK alliance posture is considered inimical to Chinese national interests. This strategic analysis has historically underpinned China’s support for the DPRK, and thus precluded any real Sino-US-ROK dialogue or cooperation on the issue of Korean unification to date.

China seeks to maintain the northern part of Korea as a ‘strategic buffer’ between the US-aligned South Korea and its fragile and restless northeastern provinces. While part of
this strategy is driven by a strong nationalistic affront to the perceived American policy of containment, there also exists a parallel anxiety over consolidation of ethnic Korean influence on China’s border regions. Reunification could ignite pan-Korean nationalism and irredentism in the northeastern provinces, thereby encouraging similar secessionist activity by other minority groups within China.32

Whether as a result of refugee inflows or consolidated Korean societal integration post reunification, this sovereignty vulnerability underpins China’s objections to the reunification formula espoused in the US-ROK ‘Joint Vision for the Alliance’.33 China suspects the US would push military forces into the North on the pretext of establishing social order, supervising denuclearisation and/or providing humanitarian relief, which in turn would lead to permanent stationing of military forces on China’s northeastern border.

Expansion in the scope and range of activity within the US-ROK alliance is already seen as evidence of a strategy of containment,34 and the presence of US forces on its previously-secure land boundary with North Korea would be viewed as virtual encirclement.35 Thus an essential precondition for any support to reunification under ROK or UN administration (if provided) would be permanent geographic and temporal limitations on the size, scope and mandate of any US forces participating in stabilisation and/or reconstruction activities in the former DPRK.36 It is difficult to see how this could be statutorily enacted as a permanent and binding guarantee that would placate China’s strategic concerns.

China’s position on peaceful reunification of the Koreas therefore prioritises continuance of a pro-China, anti-US political entity on its northeastern border, for as long as possible, to ensure uninterrupted expansion of national power. It is unlikely that any shared strategic interest, such as denuclearisation of the peninsula,37 could provide sufficient commonality of interest to overcome this fundamental difference in US and Chinese standpoints.38

In response to any DPRK collapse/ROK absorption scenario, China would likely seek an outcome maintaining some kind of territorial ‘buffer zone’ within Korea, free of US military presence, to reduce North Korean refugee flows into China in the short term, and to insulate against destabilising pan-Korean nationalism in the longer.39 Concurrently, it would seek to progressively improve the general standard of living in its border provinces through economic development, while limiting the spread of separatism among ethnic minorities in these regions.40 This approach would be the most benign Chinese response to a collapse-absorption scenario that the ROK or US governments could possibly expect.

A highly conceivable and more dangerous outcome would be seizure of the opportunity to remake North Korea in China’s likeness. This might entail a rapid, pre-emptive and large-scale political and military intervention in North Korea to shore up the collapse and install a replacement regime more susceptible to direct CCP influence.41 This action could constitute an end-state in itself, or form the basis for future bilateral negotiations with the ROK on a unification end-state more conducive to Chinese strategic interests.42 This high-risk but potentially high pay-off option would also preserve China’s preferential and advantageous economic interests in North Korea, and protect China’s large investments in the border regions.43

Of all stakeholders with an interest in Korean reunification, China is in the most powerful position to act pre-emptively due to its extensive intelligence presence in the DPRK,
established commercial and diplomatic interaction, and pervasive party-to-party and military-to-military links.  

This response option risks a repeat of Sino-US military confrontation on the peninsula, with deleterious consequences for long-term peace and stability in the Northeast Asian security matrix.

**Cognitive dissonance and reunification dialogue**

While there exists seemingly intractable differences between US and Chinese strategic positions on unification, the ROK’s deliberate policy of avoiding absorption planning arguably exacerbates the strategic risk of confrontation between the parties. While there may be secret national contingency plans for a collapse-absorption scenario, the ROK has not extended this preparation into broader alliance or regional dialogue. Rather, it has actively militated against this level of discourse.

Given that the ROK maintains strong bilateral relationships with both stakeholders, it occupies an ideal position to engage in discrete diplomatic dialogue with each party to broker potential compromises ahead of any crisis becoming manifest. Without this level of pre-emptive engagement, there is a strong chance of polarisation in strategic suspicions, leading to confrontation and miscalculation that would undermine stability in Northeast Asia. The ROK’s symptomatic cognitive dissonance on this issue—its desire for reunification but abject fear of the process—militates against this, which does not bode well for regional peace and stability should the DPRK regime collapse with little or no warning, as is often predicted.

**Conclusion**

Should the DPRK regime suddenly collapse, South Korea’s monolithic focus on a consensus-based, integrative approach to reunification will place it in an invidious strategic position. The depth of inequality between North and South, and the scale of the ensuing humanitarian crisis, would require a ROK government to seek international assistance to stabilise and then integrate the two societies. For any solution to stand an even reasonable prospect of success, the ROK will need political and economic buy-in from the regional superpowers—the US and China.

Reflecting the enormity of the integration task for the ROK is the ‘wicked problem’ of bridging the chasm that separates the strategic interests of these principal stakeholders toward a reunified Korea. The US will demand a strong military presence in a unified Korea concomitant to a fortified US-ROK strategic alliance, and China will actively oppose this and seek to maintain the North as a strategic buffer zone. Areas of common strategic interest, such as denuclearisation of the peninsula and expanded economic interdependence, do not seem sufficiently weighty to bridge these polarised geopolitical positions.

The ROK ‘approach’ to this dilemma is a seminal study in cognitive dissonance. It remains rhetorically and statutorily committed to peaceful reunification but adopts a contradictory public policy position, by actively discouraging contingency planning for the highly feasible but potentially debilitating collapse-absorption contingency.

Having put all its eggs in the integrative reunification basket, the ROK has essentially abrogated its responsibility for facilitating stakeholder dialogue, negotiation and potential
compromise on a DPRK extinction scenario. It actively discourages any pre-emptive dialogue or contingency-based planning for reunification by absorption in order to preserve a fragile inter-Korean dialogue, which underpins a relatively comfortable status quo and a familiar strategic balance among the key regional stakeholders. This is a strategic gamble of epic proportions.

Given the DPRK has already upset the status quo through accelerated nuclear weapons development, the ROK has little to lose and much to gain by expanding its planning remit across all potential reunification scenarios. While ROK-brokered dialogue, whether bilateral or multilateral, does not guarantee successful mediation of Sino-American strategic differences on peaceful reunification, it would at least enhance ROK preparedness for the exigencies of DPRK regime collapse, future stabilisation operations and societal integration of the two populations.

At the very least, it would allow the ROK and US to act in relative concert in response to any pre-emptive unilateral action by China should DPRK regime collapse appear imminent. Otherwise—as Kim Dae-jung’s 1998 seemingly prophetic statement suggests—the opportunity for peaceful reunification could prove to be the harbinger of instability in a ‘New World Disorder’, rather than a force for enhanced cohesion in a revised Northeast Asian security matrix.

Colonel Anthony (Tony) Rawlins entered ADFA in 1986 and was commissioned from RMC Duntroon into the Royal Australian Armoured Corps. His early postings included 2nd Cavalry Regiment, a Divisional Officer at ADFA (and concurrently Aide de Camp to the Governor General), a Military Observer with the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Israel and Lebanon, and in the Directorate of Officer Career Management-Army.

In 2006, he was appointed to command the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and deployed as Commanding Officer of Overwatch Battle Group (West)-Two in Iraq from late 2006 to July 2007. He then served as Directing Staff on the Australian Command and Staff Course, followed by an exchange appointment at the Canadian Forces College. On return, he served in Headquarters 1st Division/Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, before his current attendance at the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Australian Defence College. Colonel Rawlins has a Bachelor of Arts (Honours), Bachelor of Laws (Honours), Master of Defence Studies and Master of Management (Defence Studies), and was admitted to the ACT Supreme Court in 2011.

NOTES

1. This is an edited version of a paper developed by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College in 2013.


7. This model was followed in President Chun-Doo-whan’s ‘Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification’ (1982), President Roh Tae-woo’s ‘Korean National Community Unification Formula’ (1989), President Kim Young Sam’s ‘National Community Unification Formula’, President Kim Dae-jung’s ‘Reconciliation and Cooperation (Sunshine) Policy’, President Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ and President Lee Myung-Bak’s ‘Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity Policy’.


13. Bae, ‘South Korean Strategic Thinking Toward North Korea’, p.344.


15. President Kim Young Sam emphasised, in his inaugural address in February 1993, the need to preserve the North more than the alliance with the US, in response to unilateral American plans to pre-emptively strike the DPRK’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon; see Bae, ‘South Korean Strategic Thinking Toward North Korea’, p. 337-8.


43. Choo, ‘Sino-North Korean Relations in the Post-Kim Jong-il Era’, p. 110. UN figures indicate that Chinese investment in DPRK grew almost 30 fold, from US$1.5 million to approx US$42 million between 2002 and 2008—some 94 per cent of direct foreign investment that year; see Gill, ‘China’s North Korea Policy’, p.5.

44. Saeed and Przystup, Korean Futures’, p. 5.

45. For example, President Roh’s National Security Council rejected the ROK-US Combined Forces Command Operational Plan 5029, a military contingency plan for an unexpected incident in the DPRK, such as regime collapse or mass defections in January 2005, citing concerns that it limited South Korean sovereignty: Bae, ‘South Korean Strategic Thinking Toward North Korea’, pp. 337-8.

46. Saeed and Przystup, Korean Futures, p. 16.

Countering Piracy

Lieutenant Commander Rachel Jones, RAN

I’ll be a pirate until I die. We understand what we’re doing is wrong. But hunger is more important than any other thing.

Abshir Abdullahi Abdi ‘Boya’, a Somali pirate

Introduction

The phenomenon of kidnap and ransom piracy originating from Somalia since 2008 has refocused attention on maritime piracy, much like a spike in incidents in the Malacca Strait did earlier in the decade. Despite a range of military responses, piracy incidents off the east coast of Africa have increased in number and seriousness over the past four years, while Southeast Asian piracy continues to be a problem.

The aim of this article is to consider the effectiveness of military actions and whether such means alone can solve piracy. It will argue that by emphasising deterrence and focusing on treating the symptoms of piracy, rather than addressing the underlying causes, military means can only suppress piracy for a period until it recurs in a different time or place.

People mired in poverty, some barely surviving on subsistence living with little or no hope for the future, are likely to place more importance on satisfying hunger and other basic needs when interpreting norms of right and wrong. A solution to piracy needs to incorporate a holistic approach that not only suppresses piracy in the short term but takes advantage of the space created by suppression to address the root causes and achieve a long-term effect.

Understanding piracy

Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the UN’s 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and includes ‘violent acts taking place on the high seas, by one ship against another, for private ends’. A less nuanced, layperson’s understanding pays no heed to the legal niceties of maritime jurisdictions; to most, an act of piracy can be committed anywhere at sea. This wider understanding is captured in the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) definition of ‘armed robbery’, which includes acts against ships in waters within a state’s maritime jurisdiction.

All piracy-reporting organisations collate acts of piracy and armed robbery in a single report that does not distinguish between them. Indeed, it is not clear that there is any real distinction to be made between the causes of piracy and armed robbery, as what contributes to one often also contributes to the other. For this reason, the term ‘piracy’ will be used in this article to refer both to piracy as defined in UNCLOS and armed robbery as defined by the IMO.

Whether an act is committed for private ends is also problematic. In many cases, the available information about the motives and intentions of the persons committing the act of piracy is limited and, while assumptions can be made, there is no real way of distinguishing this aspect. It is likely that some incidents reported as piracy or armed robbery are actually committed
for political ends, as may be seen in piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea associated with the ‘Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta’.7

Like the distinction between armed robbery and piracy, it is not clear that the causal contributors to piracy committed for private ends and piracy committed for other means are mutually exclusive. Given these difficulties, this article will not distinguish private from other ends, although the problem of state-sponsored maritime violence is not dealt with.

Piracy is not a homogenous phenomenon. It ranges from hostage taking and ransom of crew and vessels, to hijack and the ‘re-birthing’ of vessels, to major theft of cargo through a temporary hijack, right down to lower levels of cargo theft and theft of personal items.8 In all cases, however, piracy is a group crime. By its nature, it cannot be carried out by an individual—and more sophisticated piracy has evolved to a form of organised crime.9

A classic construction in US criminal law is that a criminal must have the means, motive and opportunity to commit a crime.10 The many diverse assessments of the drivers of piracy can all be placed into one of these categories.11

For example, ‘means’ relates to the access to enablers, such as competent mariners, weapons, boats, infrastructure, finances, information and trading systems. ‘Motive’ encompasses the push-and-pull factors that make piracy a thinkable and attractive alternative to legitimate activities, such as poverty, economic crises, lack of viable employment, marginalisation, disenfranchisement and disadvantage, the promise of reward for comparatively little risk, and even boredom. ‘Opportunity’ covers factors such as favourable geography, high shipping volume, cultural acceptance, lax law enforcement (whether by reason of limited capability or will) and corruption.12

With a wide availability of means and opportunity, pirate enterprises are relatively easy to start and sustain, and pirates have proven to be adaptable, opportunistic and relatively decentralised.13 Heinz Gohlish, a former Canadian naval officer and now shipping and underwriting consultant, suggests that different types of piracy are carried out by different types of people, and should be addressed with different means; his typology divides pirates into:

• Those who live near the sea or make their living from the sea but are sufficiently poor to risk criminal activities in order to supplement their income;
• Those who are part of organised crime, both willing and unwilling, and respond to orders from a crime boss or syndicate; and
• Those who have, at least in part, a political objective or use political discontent as an excuse for criminal activities.14

Gohlish has proposed that social and economic measures should be used to deal with the first type, constabulary measures with the second, and that the third should be dealt with wholly through a terrorist paradigm.15 While the typology reflects the range of actors involved in piracy, his division of proposed solutions is arguably simplistic. Social and economic measures generally address the ‘motive’ element of criminal incentive and should, therefore, not be excluded in relation to piracy associated with organised crime or terrorism.

Similarly, constabulary means could be relevant in denying the opportunity to pirates, whatever their typology. Finally, it is not clear what Gohlish means when he suggests that
politically-motivated pirates should be dealt with as terrorists, nor how that would assist in addressing the underlying causes of piracy. As the analysis below will show, piracy requires a range of measures undertaken in a complementary way to address all aspects of means, motive and opportunity.

Piracy is firmly entrenched in history and is generally considered to be endemic in nature. Given its recurrence, it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to eradicate and any realistic assessment of what it means to ‘solve’ piracy must take this into account. As Commodore Simon Williams of the UK’s Ministry of Defence acknowledged in 2008, ‘[g]etting to a minimum acceptable level is probably the closest that one can get’.

This construction, however, does not make clear who determines the minimum acceptable level. Piracy does not affect all states evenly and, with differing internal situations and varying levels of resources, the minimum acceptable level for one state may be markedly higher than another. In Indonesia, for example, a comparative assessment of crime rates indicates that piracy is a minor problem compared to other crimes such as murder, serious assaults and violent thefts in the broader domestic context.

Further, Indonesia is predominantly a transit state, which gains less economically than others from the passage of international shipping through its waters. It may, therefore, perceive that the costs of suppressing piracy outweigh any loss it might sustain from higher rates of piracy. In contrast, those nations heavily invested in international shipping and freedom of the seas may perceive a greater threat and thus a lower minimum acceptable level.

In 2004 and 2005, this dichotomy led to the application of pressure on states bordering the Malacca Strait by Japan and the US—and by Lloyds’ declaration of parts of the Malacca Strait as ‘high risk areas’—which visibly impacted upon states’ reputations and led to increased levels of regional security cooperation. While getting to the minimum acceptable level is probably the best construct to define ‘solving’ piracy, it is likely to remain an amorphous concept, influenced by interests, values, capacities, priorities and risk levels of various actors in the international community.

**Military approaches to piracy and their effectiveness**

Military approaches to countering piracy typically include escort, patrols, the establishment of recognised transit corridors, surveillance, interception, destroying equipment and the release or transfer of offenders for prosecution, blockade, exclusion zones, disguising military ships as bait, and direct attack on land bases. Military action usually also focuses on capacity and capability building of littoral states. This type of military action is designed to deter and suppress acts of piracy by raising the risks to pirates, disrupting their activity, lowering the resources available to them, and reducing opportunities for success by protecting shipping.

However, deterrence is an uncertain business that relies upon an understanding of the motivations, values and cost-benefit analysis models of the intended targets, and the ability to communicate a credible threat of punishment or denial. Empirical studies have long shown coercive measures of deterrence to be inherently unreliable. This is evident in the case of Somali piracy, where military means—intended to deter pirates by denying opportunities for successful attacks and raising the prospect of consequential punishment—have largely been ineffective.
Although military efforts have reduced the effectiveness of piracy attempts, pirates are continuing to make such attempts and are adapting their methods and targeting strategies in order to combat the denial effect. They have shifted to night attacks or targeting alternative areas not under surveillance or patrolled by military forces. It seems that pirates do not need high success rates to survive and often are prepared to risk death or capture.

Hence, the deterrent measures that militaries can reasonably impose have only a transient and localised effect, and are unable to raise the stakes sufficiently to make piracy unviable. The inherent problem with coercive measures of deterrence is that they fail to address the ‘push’ factors that drive people into piracy in the first place. When individuals have limited opportunities and are surviving hand-to-mouth, a higher degree of deterrence will be required than if they had alternative livelihoods available to them.

The effectiveness of military action is also reduced by the symbiotic relationship of crime and control. When faced with increasing control measures, criminals—and especially organised crime groups—become highly reactive, flexible and adaptive. Adversity and control drives innovation, which in turn increases the competence of the criminal. Like war, the relationship between crime and control is a dialectic in which action drives reaction. In a worst case scenario, hints of which have already been seen in the Somali piracy situation, the application of military control measures may even drive more competent and more violent acts of piracy.

In some cases, the effectiveness of military measures as a reason for decreasing pirate activity may have been overstated. While many acknowledge the impact of the Asian financial crisis on increasing rates of piracy seen around the turn of the 21st century, the improved economic conditions since the middle of the last decade are rarely cited as a reason for subsequent reductions in piracy incidents. Similarly, the impacts of the 2004 Asian tsunami and subsequent political resolution in Aceh are seldom considered.

The International Maritime Bureau is conspicuous in attributing decreasing numbers of piracy incidents solely to military and cooperative measures, with no accompanying analysis to support this correlation. The effectiveness of military patrols in the Malacca Strait has been questioned by a number of commentators, and alternative reasons for decreased piracy rates—such as the increased compliance with the ‘International Ship and Port Security Code’, best practice measures, domestic economic reforms and grass-roots opposition on piracy-prone coasts—have been posited. With this range of possible contributing factors, it seems unlikely that the dominant element was military action. More likely, the effect on piracy was a result of a complex interaction of factors, which included military measures.

Military action as a solution to piracy is expensive to maintain over the long term. In a recent article, Martin Murphy has assessed that ‘naval action is the least efficient and cost-effective form of piracy suppression’. It is generally accepted that the maintenance of military force is not sustainable in the long term and is a disproportionately expensive response when compared to the costs of piracy.

A more cost effective strategy would be to use the military in the short term to deal with the symptoms of piracy, providing the time and space to tackle the sources and roots of the problem. The European Union perhaps inherently reflected such a change in strategy when it adjusted the mission of Operation ATALANTA from the ambitious goal of ‘bring[ing] an end to
piracy in the region’ to one of ‘deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy’. This sort of mixed strategy has been used successfully in the past, with Indonesia applying a range of military and non-military approaches since 2004.

The military is ultimately a reactive, blunt and expensive instrument. Although directly and violently targeting piracy on land has been effective in the past, in the modern world such action is more likely to drive extremism and lead to second- and third-order effects worse than the original problem. Unfortunately, the cost-effective military answer that transcends mere retaliation and retribution and sets the conditions for a long-term resolution has proven elusive.

**Alternative approaches to piracy**

If military measures alone cannot solve piracy, what sorts of measures might be successful? The Center for Naval Analysis, a federally-funded research and development centre for the US Navy and US Marine Corps, has proposed a framework for counterpiracy that takes a comprehensive approach. It recommends the pursuit of six lines of effort: supporting and/or establishing effective governance; providing economic alternatives; disrupting enablers; mitigating and/or eliminating shipping industry vulnerabilities; supporting and enhancing maritime security; and direct military action.

The last two lines of effort broadly reflect the military action currently taking place. The counter-piracy framework acknowledges the common understanding that the military can only contribute to the greater effect and that root causes must be dealt with as well as symptoms.

In respect of supporting and/or establishing effective governance, studies have shown that incidents of crime decrease as governance improves. A recent study of piracy has challenged this linear model and indicated that this sort of association is not seen across the spectrum of governance effectiveness. Instead the relationship is a linear ‘hump’, whereby pirate activity is rarely seen in totally ungoverned states, increases and can become endemic in weakly- or corruptly-governed places, and begins to fall off in a gradual curve when faced with relatively strong levels of governance.

Hence, increases in governance in very weakly-governed states can create a ‘sweet spot’ for organised crime, where piracy may actually increase, reflecting an intuitive truth that corrupt governance breeds crime. Efforts to establish and develop effective governance must, therefore, persist past the sweet spot: state-building is a 30-year solution, not a ‘now’ solution. Military action can assist in this respect by continuing to treat the symptoms while governance improvements take root. The challenge for those dealing with piracy is to maintain the commitment.

The idea of providing economic alternatives to piracy is not new, with the Roman and British Empires both solving piracy problems through the use of targeted military action coupled with the provision of alternative livelihoods. Although it has been noted that there is little empirical evidence to show that organised crime can be overcome purely with a strategy of alternative livelihoods, the motives of lower level participants may be able to be affected with relatively low investment, coupled with deterrence action.
Technical means to disrupt enablers, such as tracking and freezing funds, have been used in law enforcement previously and are likely to yield some positive results. However, a key enabler for low-level piracy is the support of the local community and cultural acceptance of piracy. Measures to reduce support for piracy in Indonesia and Somalia have seen some positive results, with grass roots anti-piracy sentiment in Eyl (in northeast Somalia) facilitating the clearance of pirates from that port, and community attitudes in Indonesia shifting.\textsuperscript{51} Social means to undermine trust, change the narrative, emphasise negative effects for local communities, and recognise and address community grievances to delegitimise pirate activity should be pursued.\textsuperscript{52}

Proven measures to mitigate and/or eliminate shipping industry vulnerabilities, such as the introduction of the ‘Automatic Identification [locating and tracking] System’, the introduction and increased compliance with the ‘International Ship and Port Security Code’, the shipping industry’s development and use of ‘Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia-based Piracy’, and information sharing, reporting and analysis should continue.\textsuperscript{53} Like other measures, however, they will ultimately be successful only as part of a holistic strategy to address underlying factors, rather than merely responding to a threat.

The above discussion should reveal no surprises. It is self-evident that such a complex problem as piracy requires a nuanced and wide-ranging approach. With such an obvious conclusion, it is easy to question why the emphasis has been on military means. The answer lies in the process of securitisation. After the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and with rising concern about a potential nexus between maritime crime and terrorism, the problem of piracy was increasingly seen as one of security, rather than social and economic development.\textsuperscript{54}

When the label of security is applied to a problem, many instinctively turn to the security community to resolve it. Compounding this, the alternative means generally take a long time to take effect—and our globalised and fast-paced world demands a solution today. Too often, the military solution, however inappropriate in the long term, was seen as the only possible way of reducing the perceived threat in the short term.\textsuperscript{55}

**Conclusion**

The above discussion has shown that piracy is an endemic, heterogenous phenomenon that requires a holistic approach to reduce it to minimum acceptable levels. There are significant challenges in developing complementary solutions that raise risk, lower relative gain and alleviate the ‘push’ factors that drive disadvantaged and marginalised people into piracy. Ultimately, the suite of solutions needs to address all aspects of means, motive and opportunity.

Military measures are likely to be most effective in impacting on means and opportunity by denying pirates the opportunity to successfully attack merchant shipping and destroying their means of conducting attacks. While military action is intended to have a deterrent effect, such coercive measures have a limited impact on motivation, particularly when applied to individuals who are focused on their primary needs and who have few alternatives to meet them other than by illicit activity.

A comprehensive approach to solving piracy must provide economic alternatives to reduce the attractiveness of piracy as a livelihood, support effective governance through and beyond
the ‘sweet spot’, disrupt enablers such as community support and cultural acceptance, and continue to mitigate shipping industry vulnerabilities.

The most important contribution that military action can make to this effort is to suppress piracy long enough to provide the space for measures that address root causes to achieve a long-term effect. The main challenge for those taking action against piracy will be to recognise that piracy is more than a security problem and to maintain the momentum and commitment in the face of what is likely to be slow progress.

Lieutenant Commander Rachel Jones is a Legal Officer in the RAN. Her operational service includes Operations RELEX II, CATALYST and SLIPPER. She graduated from the Australian Command and Staff College in 2012 and was the recipient of the Chief of Navy prize. She holds a Master of Military Law and is currently undertaking further studies to complete a Master of Arts (Military Studies) with the Australian National University.

NOTES

1. This is an edited version of a paper, titled (slightly reframed) ‘A discussion of the statement by the Secretary of the UN’s International Maritime Organization that ‘piracy cannot be solved by military means alone’, submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff College at the Australian Defence College in 2012.


3. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Maritime Bureau (IMB), *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: report for the period of 1 January-30 June 2012*, ICC International Maritime Bureau: London, 2012, pp. 5-6. Editor’s note: Since this article was written, attacks off Somalia decreased from 75 in 2012 to 10 as at October 2013 (according to IMB reports).


6. The core piracy reporting organisations are the Piracy Reporting Centre of the International Chamber of Commerce, IMB (http://www.icc-ccs.org) and the Information Sharing Centre of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (http://www.recaap.org). The IMO (http://www.imo.org) also publishes statistics on piracy and armed robbery, drawing its data from the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre.


11. See, for example, Murphy’s seven factors that encourage piracy: legal and jurisdictional weakness; favourable geography; conflict and disorder; under-funded law enforcement and inadequate security; permissive political environments; cultural acceptability; and the promise of reward, in Murphy, *Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money*, p. 28.


19. Murphy, *Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money*, p. 82.


42. Weir, ‘Fish, Family and Profit’, p. 27.
45. A number of theoretical and empirical studies are cited in De Groot et al, *Gov-arrgh-nance – ‘even criminals need law and order’*, p. 2.
**Fiqh for Military Service:**
**guidance for Muslims in Australia**

Squadron Leader Hyder Gulam (Retd)

**Introduction**

This article examines Islamic law (fiqh) in relation to military service in Australia. It outlines the moral, legal and practical challenges faced by Muslims undertaking military service in a country where they are not in the majority nor form the governing polity, and discusses the relevant Islamic ‘knowledge’ that may assist in reconciling these issues.

It commences with an introduction to relevant Islamic law before discussing the rights and obligations of the Muslim minority in military service. While it is not comprehensive in scope, it discusses a number of relevant ibadah rulings (literally meaning religious rituals, such as prayer and fasting) and how these may be practically applied in the context of service.

Given that a significant number of Muslims live outside the political jurisdictions of the Muslim world, fiqh for military service is an important topic in a number of non-Muslim states, both for individual Muslims and the wider society. That obviously includes Australia, where an increasing number of Muslims are serving as loyal soldiers without compromise to their religious beliefs.

**Islamic law and fiqh**

Islamic law, generally, is derived from four main sources: the Holy Qur’an (the Muslim religious text considered to be the word of God, as unblemished by man), the Sunna (the normative legacy of Prophet Muhammad, of which a Hadith—reports describing the words, actions or habits of Prophet Muhammad—are a vehicle), ijma (the consensus of opinions among the learned scholars) and qiyas (analogical reasoning).

The interpretation of these principal sources, via a process known as fiqh, provides a complete code of regulations for Muslims in all aspects of their lives, effectively a canon of obligations.

In addition to the Qur’an and the Sunna, the sources of Islamic international law include treaties made between Muslims, publicly-issued orders to commanders and governors in the field and regions by the early Caliphs, and the opinions and interpretations of great Muslim jurists.

Mazhabs are the major schools of legal thought in Islam and provide differing perspectives on rulings from the Qur’an and Sunna. The formation of the mazhabs generally occurred in the major centres of Islam in the 8th and 9th centuries. The differences between the schools stem entirely from the different weight each attaches to various Qur’anic verses, and the degree of validity they assign to various prophetic traditions. In matters concerning fiqh, the source of the mazhab is an important factor in understanding the basis for a particular ruling. A brief explanation of the major schools of thought is therefore appropriate, as follows:

- **Jafari** is the major school within Shi’a theology. Its founder was Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq, a direct descendent of the Prophet. The Jafari school of thought utilises ijtihad (independent reasoning) by adopting reasoned argumentation in finding the laws of Islam. It is
predominant across North and East Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and, to a greater extent, in many common law countries.

• Abu Hanifa, a student of Imam Jafari, founded the Hanafi school in Iraq. It is characterised by the exercise of free opinion, and was the object of ‘bitter invectives’ of proponents of Hadith, given its strenuous rejection of free opinion. This school is predominant in Western Asia, lower Egypt, Pakistan and India.

• Malik ibn Anas, also a student of Imam Jafari, founded the Maliki school in Medina. This school places its reliance on the ‘living tradition’ (Sunna) of Medina. Malik collected a body of legal traditions, which he compared with the living practice in Medina, and developed a system of juridical opinion called al-Muwatta (the levelled path). The Maliki school holds sway in North and West Africa, including Upper Egypt.

• Idris al-Shaf’i was a pupil of Malik, who formulated the principles of Islamic jurisprudence where the verbal tradition was regarded as the sole vehicle of the Prophetic Sunna. In the Shaf’i school, itijihad (or reasoning) was discarded from the process of consensus in deriving legal opinion otherwise known as ijma. This school is prevalent in Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, The Philippines and Thailand.

• The Hanbali school continued to push the al-Shaf’i’s insistence on Hadith in law, and was an orthodox opponent of the rationalist school. Its founder, the arch-traditionalist Ahmad ibn Hanbal, has been championed by ‘puritanical movements’, such as the Wahabis, notably in Saudi Arabia.

Fiqh itself can be divided into two main categories: fiqh al-Ibadah (rituals) and fiqh al-mu’amalah (rulings).

Fiqh al-Ibadah are the rulings that govern the relationship between man and God. This category is divided into four sections relating to rulings on solat (prayer), sawm (fasting), zakat (the compulsory giving of a fixed portion of one’s wealth to charity) and hajj (a religious duty expected to be carried out once in a person’s life, which consists of the pilgrimage to Mecca).

The first two sections are particularly relevant to military service. The rulings in relation to prayer detail the entire spectrum from the prerequisites of prayer through to what will invalidate prayer. The rulings in relation to fasting include the obligations in the month of Ramadan and other types of optional fasting, including restrictions on fasting.

Fiqh al-mu’amalah (or al-adah) govern the relationship between man and man, and other creatures of God. This part of Islamic law concerns how man should respect the rights of another. It provides ‘guidance in a certain direction’, the scope of which is ‘very wide when it comes to social affairs, which are limited only by the infrequent prohibitions found in scriptural sources’. Hence, in these relationships, Muslims must decide their commitment using their reason, intellect, freedom and, ‘more broadly, their imagination’.

While not a formal aspect of these rulings, fiqh al-agailiyat (or fiqh of the minorities) was coined in response to the recognition that the conditions of a specific group, living in a specific place in specific circumstances, may not be applicable to others. The former Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Gomaa, for example has stated that the ‘circumstances of these minority groups affords them … a fatwa (legal verdict) … [possibly] contrary … [to that] in areas where Muslims are the majority’, not least to enable them to integrate into their wider community.
Muslims in Australia

Muslims are a distinct minority group in Australia, comprising approximately 3 per cent of the population, with its 500,000 or so adherents originating from over 70 countries, including Europe (notably Albania, Bosnia and Turkey), Africa, Asia (including Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia), the Pacific Islands, and North and South America.

Australia’s Muslim population is not as homogeneous as say Singapore, where Malay ethnicity, language and culture, and the Shaf’i school of interpretation dominate. In Australia, all the mazhabs have some support, with this diversity supporting the notion of ‘Islams’ rather than one Islam. However, there is an argument that as Australia’s closest Muslim neighbour is Indonesia, and that because Southeast Asia generally utilises the Shaf’i school, so should Australian Muslims. Another view is that the closest in proximity or practice of any school that has been recognised under Australian law has been Malay custom, which again would mean the Shaf’i school.

If we can conceptualise Australia as ‘newly acquainted with Islam’ (notwithstanding the long trading history between Indigenous Australians and Muslims in Southeast Asia), one possible framework would be to look to the European Council of Fatwa and Research (ECFR) for guidance in terms of the obligation of Muslims to follow a particular mazhab. It has stated that following a particular mazhab is not obligatory and that following the common mazhab of the country where a Muslim lives is permissible. Given that there is no dominant mazhab in Australia, first principles from shariah (the moral code and religious law of Islam) would place the onus on the individual.

Fiqh of the Muslim citizen as a minority

Classical scholarship described Islamic law as dividing the world into three distinct spheres or territories, dar al-Harb (abode of war), dar al-Islam (abode of peace) and dar al-Aman (abode of safe conduct). Dar al-Harb referred to the regions where Islam did not dominate, where divine will was not observed, and therefore where continuing strife was the norm; by contrast, dar al-Islam encompassed those dominions where Islam ruled, where submission to God was observed, and where peace and tranquility reigned. The position of Muslim minorities residing in non-Muslim territory is problematic because they fall outside of the traditional dichotomy between dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb.

The Shaf’i view was based on a tradition of the Prophet, where he allowed nomadic tribes that converted to Islam to remain outside the domains of the lands of Islam. The Jafari view arose when someone reportedly asked Imam Ja’far if he would die an unbeliever if he would die an unbeliever if he entered the lands of unbelief; the answer was that he might in fact be able to better serve Islam in the non-Muslim place. Thus, these views contended that a Muslim is permitted to reside in non-Muslim lands provided they are able to manifest their religion but that hijra (migration) from non-Muslim areas is obligatory if a person fears the loss of their religion.

The Maliki position, which predominated in early Spain and Sicily, was heavily influenced by its own historical experience, namely that Muslims would lose their mastery over the Arabic language and would be influenced by non-Muslim mores, habits and fashions. According to this view, non-Muslim authorities would unfailingly impose unfair taxes on Muslims, and Muslims would not have the chance to question or challenge these levies; they would, therefore, inevitably be reduced to subjugation and invariably end up losing their culture and religion.
For the Hanafis, a territory may be ruled and controlled by non-Muslims and yet still be classified as a part of *dar al-Islam*. According to the Hanafi school, a territory is considered to be part of *dar al-Islam* if the laws of Islam are applied.\(^{32}\)

A summary of the early jurists was that:

\[\text{… a Muslim should reside among Muslims in a place in which religion could be learned and practised. But those who chose to reside in non-Muslim territory were not necessarily considered to be immoral or un-Islamic.}^{33}\]

Early Muslim jurists assumed that a Muslim sojourning or residing in non-Muslim territory could do so under an agreement of safe conduct (*aman* or *dar al-Aman*), according to which a Muslim is promised protection and, in return, he or she promises not to take action that is detrimental to the host state and to obey the commands of the host state. All jurists agreed that a Muslim must abide by the terms of the *aman*. Consequently, a Muslim must not commit acts of treachery, betrayal, deceit or fraud, and may not violate the honour or property of non-Muslims. The condition for remaining in such lands was that Muslims must be allowed to practise their religion freely.

Paraphrasing Imam Dr Zijad Delic, Australia cannot be conceived as *dar al-Islam* or inconceivably classed as *dar al-Harb*, these legal concepts ‘being wholly irrelevant in the context of [Australia] and its citizens of Muslim faith’.\(^{34}\) Zelic argues that Muslims who emigrate to non-Muslim countries, as well as those who were born in those countries, are all qualified to be citizens, sharing with all other citizens the identical social obligations, as ‘Islam commands its followers to obey the laws of the land they live in, even if its rulers and dominant powers are from other religious traditions’.\(^{35}\)

Further, Zelic concludes that covenants or contracts between a non-Muslim country such as Australia, and its citizens of the Muslim faith are considered sacred and binding in Islam. The rationales for ‘the abode of safe conduct’ are two-fold. Firstly, without the mutual fulfilment of shared rights and obligations, society would dissolve into chaos, and rampant injustices would destroy the fabric of peaceful human co-existence, making it impossible for people to live together as contributing members of society. Secondly, formative Islamic principles demand from Muslims that they faithfully abide by the promises they make.\(^{36}\)

To that end, naturalised citizens of Australia enter into a contractual agreement with the Federal Government when they declare the citizenship pledge, as follows:

\[\text{From this time forward/(under God), I pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people, whose democratic beliefs I share, whose rights and liberties I respect, and whose laws I will uphold and obey.}^{37}\]

Muslims are indebted to keep their word as a religious principle. Therefore, the citizenship pledge becomes religiously binding on them. Australian-born citizens do not declare any such pledge, so they fall under the second category described in Islamic law, where the covenant of security is considered a customary understanding, in the sense that even though they did not physically affirm the pledge or sign a document of loyalty, it is understood that there exists between the citizen and the government a covenant of security.\(^{38}\)
The Muslim combatant in a non-Muslim military

As a general rule, early Islamic jurists posited that Muslims should not contribute to the military strength of non-Muslims, and that Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory should remain neutral in any military conflict engaged in by their host polity, especially if it involved other Muslims. The primary reason for this position is that if resident Muslims support other Muslims in conflict with the host non-Muslim polity that would constitute a betrayal of their aman or binding promise, which is strictly forbidden. If the non-Muslim territory is attacked, resident (non-military) Muslims should remain neutral unless they fear for their lives or for their homes, in which case they may join in defence of the territory.

In a 2012 article, Dr Christian Bleuer examined three case studies where Muslim soldiers were fighting in the military of non-Muslim countries, namely in the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan, in the US armed forces in various conflicts dating to 1991, and in the Indian military in disputed areas of Kashmir and elsewhere. Despite the diverse nature of these conflicts, Bleuer concluded that Muslim soldiers overwhelmingly choose to ‘fight for the country of their citizenship over and above any potential complicating ties of Muslim solidarity’. In the US, post-9/11, many Muslim Americans, including those in the military, felt compelled or motivated to declare their loyalty as American citizens. However, one Muslim military chaplain, Captain Muhammad Abdur-Rashid, anticipating a deployment of US forces to Muslim countries, sought advice from a prominent American Muslim scholar, who in turn brought the issue to a Qatar-based Islamic scholar, Sheikh al-Qaradawi. The reply came in the form of a fatwa, giving permission to American Muslim soldiers to participate in US military efforts against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, even if that involved the declaration of war against a Muslim country. By giving such permission, the fatwa specified again that the principal allegiance of the Muslim soldier was to his or her own country, especially in war.

The fatwa dealt with a particular source of unease that American Muslim military men and women would have had in fighting other Muslims, originating from an authentic saying (Hadith) by the Prophet: ‘When two Muslims face each other in fighting and one kills the other, then both the killer and the killed are in hell-fire’. Someone said ‘we understand that the killer is in hell, why then the one who is being killed?’ The Prophet said ‘because he wanted to kill the other person’.

According to the fatwa by Sheikh al-Qaradawi, the Hadith only referred to the situation in which the Muslim is in charge of their own affairs, namely when they are capable of fighting or not fighting. The fatwa clarified that the Hadith did not address a situation where a Muslim is a member of the regular military forces of a non-Muslim state. In such a situation, the fatwa declared they had ‘no choice’ but to follow orders, otherwise their allegiance and loyalty to their country would have been challenged. It also made clear that even if fighting against other Muslims produced spiritual or psychological discomfort, this ‘personal hardship’ must be endured for the sake of the greater public good.

According to Basheer Nafi, the fatwa is based on the recognised Islamic legal principle of preferential differentiation: the choosing of the less harmful of two harms (aqallal-dararayn). Hence, while US military action against a Muslim country in the context of 9/11 could be expected to cause harm to other Muslims, any refusal by American Muslim soldiers to participate would likely have resulted in the dismissal of a large number of Muslims from the
American military. That prospect—and the potential labelling of Muslim military personnel as unpatriotic and disloyal—would have had a negative effect on the position of the American Muslim community as a whole, which would be a greater harm than the potential ‘personal hardship’ of individual American Muslim soldiers.

Of course, there were dissenting opinions expressed elsewhere, including at one stage from the ECFR, which issued a fatwa prohibiting Muslim soldiers in the British, American and Australian militaries from participating in the Iraq War. However, this was ignored by Muslim soldiers serving in those militaries and the fatwa no longer appears on the ECFR web page.

**Fiqh of al-Ibadah in the military setting**

The main issues concerning Islamic religious ritual observance in military service relate to prayer, fasting and the consumption of halal food. In discussing these issues, the views of the mazhabs will be examined, specifically those rulings which provide the greatest ease for those in military service.

**Solat (prayer)**

In Islam, prayer means not only preparing for prayer but the actual prayer itself. The times for prayer can be found in the annual timetables issued by the peak Muslim bodies in any given jurisdiction, as well in various mobile phone applications such as iPray. Other matters that impact on preparing for prayer include attire, state of purity or ablution, Qibla (the direction of Makkah or Mecca) and place of prayer. Each of these will be dealt in turn in relation to military service.

Matters relating to dress for prayer, Qibla and the place of prayer can be readily dealt with. The minimum standard of dress for Muslim men is to cover the aurah, which is from the navel to the knees. For women, the standard of dress for prayer is to cover the whole body except the face and hands. Generally, this is not an issue when in uniform, or by using a sarong packed in field equipment or even a poncho to cover this region. Covering the head is not mandatory for males. Qibla is easily ascertained using a compass. The whole earth is considered a mosque in Islam, so prayers may be offered anywhere, individually or in congregation. The only caveat is that the ground ought to be clean. Prayers may even be said in a non-Muslim house of worship, if certain conditions are met (primarily relating to there being no idols or pictures).

Tayammum refers to the act of wiping one’s face and hands with ‘purifying dust’ in a specified manner when there is no or limited water to perform the ablution to attain ritual purity for prayer. If water is available, then normal wudhu (ablution prior to prayer) ought to be undertaken. However, it is possible to perform a ‘smart wudhu’ and only wash the necessary parts of the body (face, arms, head and feet) or even use ‘wet wipes’. In addition, it is permissible to wipe over one’s combat boots without washing the feet. The conditions for this dispensation are that the boots must be put on while in a state of purity, the boots must be waterproof and reach up the ankles, and must be in good repair, and the duration of the wiping is one day and one night as a resident, or three days and three nights as a traveller (in accordance with the Shaf‘i school).
It is obligatory for Muslims to pray five times a day, which should be performed at dawn, noon, mid afternoon, sunset and at night. Islam allows the prayer to be performed in a position appropriate for a particular situation. Thus, if one cannot stand, one may pray sitting down or even lying down, permitting prayers even in a confined space, such as an aircraft or tank, or while in a trench or manning a weapon.

If a Muslim is unable to pray at the scheduled time or misses a prayer, Islam allows for the shortening of prayer so that it is performed on time, which is known as *qasar* (the prayer of the traveller, although the travel must entail a minimum distance of 81 kilometres) or to perform the *jama*, which is to combine two prayers from different specified times. It is also possible to pray after the appointed time (*qada*), although this should not be intentionally undertaken. The Noble Qur’an acknowledges the possible imperative to shorten the prayer when in a combat state, saying:

> And when you travel throughout the land, there is no blame upon you for shortening the prayer, [especially] if you fear that those who disbelieve may disrupt [or attack] you.

*Jama*, as mentioned, permits the combining of two consecutive prayers, either by performing both at an earlier time or a later time (although certain prayers cannot be shortened or combined). The basis for this dispensation is that Islam lays no undue burden on the faithful, thus allowing ‘ritual prayers to be performed at other than their originally designated times in situations where performing them on time would create hardship for the person concerned’, albeit the reasons and conditions associated with this ruling differ in detail among the mazhabs.

The Friday noon prayer is known as *solat al-juma’t* and is a congregational prayer, preceded by a sermon. It is half the normal noon prayer. However, if someone misses the Friday prayer for operational reasons, they must perform the normal noon prayer. According to the Shaf‘is, Hanafis and Hanbalis, the Friday congregational prayer can be performed outdoors. The Hanafis permit the quorum for the Friday congregational prayer to be a minimum of three people, including the Imam, even if not all of them attend the sermon, which is the most flexible stance of the mazhabs.

**Sawm (fasting)**

Fasting in Islam is a ritual obligation in the month of Ramadan. It is a pillar of Islam, and an individual obligation on every Muslim who is capable of fasting, between prescribed hours each day, as explained in the Holy Qur’an:

> O ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you, that ye may [learn] self-restraint ... Ramadan is the [month] in which was sent down the Qur’an, as a guide to mankind, also clear [signs] for guidance and judgment [between right and wrong]. So every one of you who is present [at his home] during that month should spend it in fasting.

The precedent for Muslims in the military is that of the Prophet during the Battle of Badr (624), which fell during Ramadan, where the Prophet fasted during this armed conflict. However, those who are temporarily unable to fast must make up the missed days at another time or feed the poor an average full meal or its value per person per day.
**Halal (permissible)**

*Halal* means lawful or permitted. It is the standard of conduct for Muslims, prescribed in the Qur’an. The opposite is *haram*, meaning unlawful or prohibited. *Halal* and *haram* apply to all facets of life. They are commonly used to describe cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, food products, ingredients and food preparation materials. Alcohol is *haram*, as is any pork produce. All foods are considered *halal* except the following non-exhaustive list, which are *haram*:

- Alcoholic drinks and intoxicants
- Any type of pig products, including bacon, ham and salami
- Carnivorous animals, birds of prey and certain other animals, and
- Foods contaminated with any of the above products.\(^{68}\)

In a combat situation, where *halal* food may not be available, the ‘Guideline of Performing *Ibadah* at the International Space Station’ provides useful guidance in asserting that ‘if there is doubt on whether the food served … is *halal* or not, it is then permissible to eat the food on the basis of not to starve’.\(^{69}\) This guideline, approved by Malaysia’s National Fatwa Council in 2007, was drafted when Malaysia’s space agency convened a conference of 150 Islamic scientists and scholars in 2006 to address these and other questions.\(^{70}\) However, a person must only eat enough food that is not *halal* ‘to alleviate hunger when no other food other than the prohibited food is available’.\(^{71}\)

**Conclusion**

Recent studies have concluded that the overwhelming majority of Muslim soldiers in non-Muslim militaries have been able to reconcile their religious beliefs while supporting and even directly participating in conflict against fellow Muslims as reliable nationals of their country of citizenship.\(^{72}\) In Australia as elsewhere, the quest for an Islamic way of life ought not be conditional on living in a country that applies the *shariah*.\(^{73}\)

Implicit in this refocusing of the Islamic worldview is an acknowledgement that Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim countries—and in the context of this article, Muslims living in Australia and wishing to serve in the ADF—should be able to adhere to Islamic commitments and injunctions, and uphold the values of their religion and, insofar as the situation allows, enjoin good and forbid evil for all of humanity.

*Hyder Gulam is a registered nurse (UK), qualified lawyer and accredited mediator, as well as a Fellow of the Royal College of Nursing in Australia. He has postgraduate qualifications in business/management, law and nursing. He has served as an officer with the RAAF, both in Australia and overseas. Hyder has also worked in indigenous health, paediatric nursing and aged care, as well as in remote communities in outback Australia.*

*As a lawyer, Hyder has worked across the legal spectrum, including as a human rights lawyer, military prosecutor, senior commercial lawyer in private practice, and legal editor of Al Wasat, one of the largest circulating Arab newspapers in Australia. He is also an Honorary Associate in the School of Law at La Trobe University. Hyder has served as President of the Islamic Council of Victoria and Honorary Solicitor to the Australian National Imams Council, and is co-founder of the Muslim Legal Network. He is also General Legal Counsel for a sovereign wealth fund based in Singapore.*
NOTES

1. This article is based on a paper developed by the author as part of his proposed doctoral studies at ANU. Hyder would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Azman Mohd Noor (International Islamic University Malaysia), Trenton Breeze, May Khanam and Zarina Jumat for their feedback.


9. Rahman, Islam, p. 82.

10. Rahman, Islam, p. 82.


12. Rahman, Islam, p. 82.

13. Rahman, Islam, p. 82.


18. The precise number of Muslims is not known because many do not declare their religious status for census purposes. It is believed this is an under-representation and that there has been considerable growth in the Muslim demographic over the last five years. See generally Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: ‘About Muslims’ online: <http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/muslims_in_Australia.html> accessed 20 May 2013.


25. ‘There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, the Right Path has become distinct from the wrong path. Whoever disbelieves in *Tâghût* and believes in Allah, then he has grasped the most trustworthy handhold that will never break. And God is All-Hearer, All-Knower’: *Qur’an* 2:256.


35. Delic, ‘Muslims and Citizenship’.

36. The Holy Qur’an commands the following in regard to contracts: ‘And fulfill every covenant. Verily, you will be held accountable with regard to the covenants’: *Qur’an*, 17:34. Additionally, God instructs believers: ‘O you who believe! Fully discharge (the obligations arising through) contracts’: *Qur’an*, 5:1. And those who are blessed in God’s sight are ‘those who truly care for their trusts [left by others in their care] and their covenants’: *Qur’an*, 23:8. Moreover, the *Qur’an* condemns those who break covenants, describing them as untrue to their faith: ‘It is not the case that every time they make a covenant, some party among them throws it aside. Nay! The truth is most of them believe not’: *Qur’an*, 2:100.


38. Delic, ‘Muslims and Citizenship’.


41. Bleuer, ‘Muslim Soldiers in Non-Muslim Militaries at War in Muslim Lands’, p. 492.

42. Bleuer, ‘Muslim Soldiers in Non-Muslim Militaries at War in Muslim Lands’, p. 497.


44. As cited in Nafi, ‘Fatwa and War’, p. 81.


46. Bleuer, ‘Muslim Soldiers in Non-Muslim Militaries at War in Muslim Lands’, p. 497.
49. Jābir reported that The Prophet (pbub) said ‘I have been granted five things which were not granted to any one before me: and for me the earth has been made a mosque and a means of purification; therefore, if prayer overtakes any person of my community, he should say his prayers [wherever he is] … ’.
52. PERDAUS, ‘Boy Meets Tekong’, p. 28.
56. al-Jaziri, Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools, p. 627.
57. PERDAUS, ‘Boy Meets Tekong’, p. 49.
59. al-Jaziri, Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools, p. 642.
60. Kamaruzaman, Understanding Islam, p. 181.
61. al-Jaziri , Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools, p. 491.
62. al-Jaziri , Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools, p. 509.
63. al-Jaziri , Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools, p. 510.
64. al-Jaziri , Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools, p. 727.
65. Qur’ an 4: 183 and 185.
72. Bleuer, ‘Muslim Soldiers in Non-Muslim Militaries at War in Muslim Lands’, p. 506.
China’s Growing Presence in the South Pacific: regional expansionism or global politics?

Group Captain Stephen Goodman, MNZM, Royal New Zealand Air Force

Introduction

Traditionally, the influential nations in the South Pacific have been the US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and France. However, this is changing, with China now expanding its foreign policy interests across the globe, including in the South Pacific, with the focus of its engagement being the pursuance of China’s long-term economic and social development.

Some commentators are suggesting that Chinese influence in the South Pacific may now be rivalling that of the traditionally-dominant nations of Australia and New Zealand. In 2009, New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully, noted that ‘China is a rising superpower with an interest in acquiring markets and resources in the region’.

This article will examine growing Chinese engagement in the context of its diplomatic, identity, military and economic objectives. It will argue that while China is taking a more ‘hard power’ approach in other parts of the world, such as East and Southeast Asia, it is pursuing a more low-key, ‘soft power’ approach in the South Pacific, based around economic and diplomatic initiatives. The article concludes that this is part of a broader strategy to position China as a global power—with the recognition and influence this entitles—rather than being indicative of expansionist plans within the region.

For the purpose of discussion, the South Pacific will be considered as the geographical area often referred to as Oceania—a region that includes Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia—encompassing from Australia in the west to French Polynesia in the east. The region is characterised by a number of small, independent states with frequently-troubled economies, limited employment opportunities (particularly for their increasing youth populations), and traditional hierarchical leadership structures impacted by urbanisation, combined with extreme climate and weather phenomena.

Why is China growing its presence in the South Pacific?

A Chinese presence in the South Pacific is not a recent development. Chinese immigration goes back to the mid-1800s when they came to the region as traders and labourers. Throughout this period, Chinese nationals and Pacific Islanders of Chinese descent settled and developed strong commercial interests within nearly all the islands’ economies.

Diplomacy

Early Chinese diplomatic representation occurred with a consular presence in Samoa and New Guinea in the 1930s. This ceased during the Second World War and it was not until 1975 that formal Chinese representation resumed with the re-establishment of relations with Samoa, soon to be followed by Fiji, PNG, Kiribati, Vanuatu, the Marshall Islands and, finally, the Cook Islands in 1990.
While China’s activities in the region over recent years can largely be explained with reference to its growing economic development, there is one key exception. A major objective of Chinese foreign policy has been to counter recognition and support of Taiwan. In the South Pacific, this has been described as ‘a desperate contest for diplomatic recognition’ between China and Taiwan. Of the 23 countries worldwide that recognise Taiwan as the Republic of China, six are in the South Pacific. But this is not simply a case of numbers; it is fundamental to the diplomatic recognition and competitiveness of Taiwan. So for China, a key objective under its ‘one-China policy’ is to generate international loyalty and commitment at the expense of Taiwan’s legitimacy.

However, in comparison to what occurred during the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century, diplomatic competitiveness between the two has become less visible in the South Pacific. Following the election of Ma Ying-jeou as President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 2008, more positive engagement has occurred within the China-Taiwan relationship. Moreover, while recognition and legitimacy issues have certainly not been resolved, there is now greater dialogue and openness, which has lessened the focus on international competitiveness.

Nevertheless, China is generally regarded as the third largest aid donor in the region and is also a significant supplier of soft loans. This aspect of Chinese-Taiwanese rivalry in the South Pacific has been described as ‘chequebook diplomacy’—an attempt to buy diplomatic support from small, largely-impoverished nations. It has long been considered to involve bribery of officials and embezzlement, and is associated with a broad range of corruption which has been, and continues to be, a concern within the region.

As an example, there have been instances in the past of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, most of which are now complete, not aligning with the priority needs of recipient nations, bringing into question their utility and ongoing sustainability. Whether these problems are solely a result of this influence is difficult to confirm. However, it is generally recognised that Chinese aid is not always managed in accordance with the same outcomes, conditions and accountabilities as aid provided by New Zealand or Australia—and the concern is that this may undermine regional governance efforts.

China is also aware that it enjoys considerable diplomatic recognition and support from the two main players in the region, Australia and New Zealand, not to mention the significantly greater trade value of its relationships with these countries compared to other Pacific Islands nations. China would be conscious that any aggressive or destabilising moves in the South Pacific could jeopardise that support and be counter-productive to its broader diplomatic and economic aspirations in the region.

**Chinese identity**

A more recent reason for China’s growing presence is related to Chinese ethnicity and the maintenance of some element of support and protection for the growing number of people of Chinese heritage living in the region. This is especially so given recent anti-Chinese riots in PNG, Solomon Islands and Tonga. In all these instances, the economic and political frustration of the local population was focused as anger and violence towards the ethnic Chinese within their community.
In the past, Pacific Islanders have tended to reject assistance or economic activities which have impacted adversely on their traditional way of life. Hence, balancing any increase in Chinese (or Taiwanese) presence and influence in the South Pacific is the growing resentment by many of the indigenous populations, a key element of which are strong ideological differences, derived from Christian traditions which are anti-communist and generally uncomfortable with Chinese values and attitudes to human rights and civil liberties.

In addition, some Chinese have been involved in exploitive and extractive activities, such as logging in the Solomon Islands, which have denuded valuable local resources without adequate remuneration to the affected community. A further source of resentment has been the use of Chinese companies and imported Chinese workers for such work, rather than employing local companies and local labour. Moreover, when locals are employed, there have been not infrequent reports of poor working conditions and ill treatment.

Collectively, these issues have made it difficult for China to be completely accepted in the region, instead continuing to be viewed with mistrust and suspicion, notwithstanding the benefits it may be providing. China is also viewed as being ‘emotionally detached’ from the region, again notwithstanding its considerable interests and influence within it. This presents a conundrum for China; its expanding activities are not sufficient to completely influence and shape the South Pacific beyond buying some temporary support, yet it is sufficient to adversely impact and possibly unsettle the region.

Indeed, Chinese authorities would be acutely aware that China’s growing presence in the region may in fact contribute to, rather than reduce, tensions. They will, therefore, likely tread cautiously with any future engagement to ensure it is seen in as positive a light as possible, consistent with their desire for broadening global power and engagement.

**Military considerations**

It has been suggested by several commentators that Chinese policies in relation to the South Pacific are part of a broader initiative to cement its global influence and counter US power, including its so-called ‘pivot’ into the Asia Pacific region. Certainly, there seems to be recognition within US policy that it needs to engage more actively with the region if it is to counter the growing influence and capabilities of China—which some would assert is intent on developing military dominance in maritime and trade areas beyond its second-island chain, which includes Guam, the northern Marinas and Palau. While the South Pacific is beyond that chain, a Chinese military presence in the region would provide strategic space and mitigate or, at the very least, complicate US freedom of movement.

To date, China has not possessed the military capability, including a ‘blue water’ capability, to challenge US military supremacy in the region. Realistically, this disparity is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. However, this can be expected to change eventually with the development by China of new-generation air and maritime platforms and systems, providing the capability to project force beyond the defence of its traditional borders. Some argue that China’s development of an aircraft carrier capability—with the commissioning of the 65,000-tonne Liaoning in late 2012—is further evidence of the expansion of its global military influence, with some even contending Beijing may one day seek to base military assets in the South Pacific as part of an area denial strategy.
Other commentators suggest there is little evidence to support these assertions.\textsuperscript{36} Others argue that while the growing competition between China and the US within the South Pacific is acknowledged—as could reasonably be expected between two global powers pursuing their own strategic interests—this does not mean it will develop into serious military confrontation.\textsuperscript{37} Rather, the likely outcome will be increased power-sharing across the globe, with greater emphasis on diplomatic and economic measures to gain access and influence among smaller regional nations.\textsuperscript{38}

Certainly, it would seem that the South Pacific has relatively little military or strategic value to China’s overall national security, trade and economic development, either now or for the foreseeable future. It is simply too far away from mainland China, not significantly resource rich, and not part of any key trade routes. While China will seek to exert some influence over the region for reasons of resource access and overall global influence, it does not need to control it. In fact, the assumption of greater control would bring with it sovereignty, logistical and economic challenges that would likely outweigh any derived benefit. Accordingly, any Chinese military presence in the region is more likely to be part of a growing global presence, rather than targeted expansionism.

\textbf{Economic considerations}

Economic power is becoming increasingly important as a strategic influencer and determinant of status. China’s economic growth has been dramatic over the last decade and while there are indications that this growth is slowing, Beijing can be expected to continue progressing policies aimed at a consistent and positive trend in economic performance. With respect to the South Pacific, there are several reasons why China would seek a greater connection.

The natural resources of the region, which include fish, timber and minerals such as nickel and cobalt, are important to China.\textsuperscript{39} However, China’s access to such resources is really just a commercial issue, consistent with a more globalised economy.\textsuperscript{40} Similarly, because of its increased presence and influence in the region, China has been able to grow its exports, ranging from everyday domestic products through to the provision of aircraft to states like Fiji.\textsuperscript{41} Nevertheless, the importance of these trade links should not be overstated as, apart from fish stocks and some mineral commodities and timber, most of the South Pacific is neither resource rich nor a large consumer market.\textsuperscript{42}

In terms of China’s economic aid to the region, there has been a shift in recent years from grants to an aid program more heavily focused on loans and investment.\textsuperscript{43} Such programs are typically more commercially structured, reinforcing the perception that ‘despite Beijing insisting that no strings are attached to Chinese money, actually those funds do come with political strings’.\textsuperscript{44} In short, China’s aid will come with an obligation to recognise and support the Chinese interpretation of a ‘one-China’ policy over any recognition of Taiwan and, in the case of loans, will need to be paid back.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Conclusion}

China is more progressively expanding its foreign policy interests across the globe, including in the South Pacific, with the focus on increasing its engagement and global influence. It is doing so for strategic and practical reasons. Diplomatically, China is seeking to ensure that its
‘one-China’ policy—and the avoidance of Taiwanese international legitimacy—is progressed in the South Pacific region just as it seeks to do across the globe. However, in doing so, China is aware that it enjoys considerable diplomatic recognition and support from the two main players in the region, Australia and New Zealand, and will prudently seek to build on that support and not jeopardise it.

Chinese authorities will also be acutely aware that there is a steadily growing number of ethnic Chinese living in the region, who would expect protection and consular-type support from Beijing. They will also be cognisant that full acceptance within the Melanesian, Micronesian and Polynesian communities of the South Pacific will remain difficult. There is a history of anti-Chinese attitudes and reactions across the region, which is unlikely to change. So Chinese authorities are likely to tread cautiously with any future engagement to ensure it is controlled and seen in as positive a light as possible.

Militarily, the South Pacific is so distant from China and its primary trade routes that it presents little strategic significance to China’s overall national security. Indeed, for the present and foreseeable future, the conduct of substantial military operations in the South Pacific would pose a major challenge for China, despite significant advances in its military capability, primarily because of the vast distances between China and most of the South Pacific—mirroring the major constraint on China’s ability to project force globally.46

Finally, although there are some natural resources in the South Pacific of strategic economic value to China, access to them is not restricted and they can reasonably be acquired through normal commercial arrangements, consistent with a more globalised economy. Moreover, reliable access and two-way trade with the region will likely be facilitated more readily by the ‘soft-power’ approach of normal diplomatic, business and cultural ties than any harder-line alternative.

In summary, there would seem to be no convincing reason, in examining China’s motivations in the South Pacific against the diplomatic-identity-military-economic construct, to support any suggestion of hegemonic expansionism or regional domination. Instead, this article has argued that there are valid and not unreasonable reasons for the incremental expansion of China’s strategic and economic footprint in the region, consistent with a growing global role and desire to be recognised as a major power.

**Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or views of the New Zealand Defence Force or the New Zealand Government.

*Group Captain Goodman was commissioned into the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) in 1984 as a logistics (Supply) officer. His postings at senior levels have included command of a Base Supply Squadron, Director of Aeronautical Supply in RNZAF Headquarters and Head of the Joint Logistics Branch in Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand, as well as Director of Air Force Plans and Director of Career Management (Air Force). From 2008 to 2010, he was New*
Zealand’s Defence Attaché to Singapore. His most recent appointments have included Chief of Staff in Defence Logistics Command and a second tour in the upgraded position of Head of the Joint Logistics Branch in Headquarter’s Joint Forces New Zealand.

Group Captain Goodman has deployed twice on operations, firstly to East Timor in 2001, and then to the Solomon Islands in 2004, where he was New Zealand’s Senior National Officer. He is a graduate of the RNZAF Command & Staff Course and the UK’s Royal Air Force Senior Logistics Management Course. He also has a Masters in Philosophy (Defence and Strategic Studies) from Massey University in New Zealand. He is currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College.

NOTES

1. This is an edited version of a paper developed by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College in 2013.
6. This conclusion derives in part from discussions with Chinese military officers during the visit by students and staff of CDSS to China from 7-14 April 2013.


30. See, for example, Hanson, ‘China’, p. 91.

31. Wesley-Smith, ‘China in Oceania’, p. 27.


33. Discussions with Chinese, US and Japanese officials, and observations of military capabilities during the CDSS visit to China and Japan, 7-18 April 2013.


36. See, for example, Wesley-Smith, ‘China in Oceania’.


40. Hanson, ‘China’, p.88.


42. Yang, ‘China in the South Pacific’, p. 144.


Work Shouldn’t Hurt

Petty Officer Trish Dollisson, RAN

Introduction

If you were asked the question ‘what would you prefer: brand new state-of-the-art equipment to hone your war fighting skills or to see ten of your colleagues medically discharged after their mental health and sense of identity has been shattered?’, you would believe it a rhetorical question because your answer would be predictable. Who in the ADF does not wish for new and exciting technology and the opportunity to deploy with it?

If asked ‘what would you prefer: a cohesive unit, high in morale and fighting fit or a workplace pervaded with fear and plagued with health concerns?’, again your answer would be obvious. The unit high in morale with the better equipment which allows you to focus on the primary mission of the ADF will always be the preference. However, to ensure that you have that option and can function well as a fighting force, you need to ensure that your workplace—whether on deployment in the Middle East area of operations or an office space at ADF headquarters in Canberra—is free from unacceptable behaviour.

According to Defence Instructions (General) Personnel 35-3: Management and Reporting of Unacceptable Behaviour (DI[G] PERS 35-3), there are several categories of unacceptable behaviour, including harassment, workplace bullying, sexual harassment, discrimination, abuse of power and inappropriate workplace relationships, and conflict of interest. Recent media has focused on unacceptable behaviour in the ADF, the most common issue reported being sexual harassment and crimes of a sexual nature.

This article focuses on bullying and its impact on the ADF, as the author believes this remains a more prevalent and insidious form of unacceptable behaviour. Bullying affects more than one in five working-age Australians. In some industries, such as health, welfare, education, and government and semi-government services, the figures are far higher, ranging from 25 to 97 per cent of the workforce.¹

What is bullying?

DI[G] PERS 35-3 defines bullying as:

… an aggressive form of harassment. Bullying is a persistent, unreasonable pattern of behaviour directed towards a person or group of persons, which may create a risk to health and safety, including a risk to the emotional, mental or physical health of the person(s) in the workplace. Personnel at all levels can be affected.²

Bullying can place health, wellbeing, safety and careers at risk. In extreme cases, bullying can result in mental illnesses, such as depressive and anxiety disorders, complex post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), self-harm or suicide. As such, the prevention of bullying and the provision of safe work environments are essential, and guidelines to ensure this are outlined in the Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011.³

While the health effects on a target of bullying can range from uncomfortable to clinically significant, many organisations seem to downplay the impact on emotional and mental health.
Resolving complaints at the lowest possible level can, at times, result in worse behaviour towards the target. Subsequent complaints that are dismissed or inadequately resolved begin to have a greater effect on the target which, more than 70 per cent of the time, result in the target leaving the organisation.4

If, on your way to work, you have ever felt a sense of dread, experienced anxiety, nausea, panic, sweating palms, increased heart rate or felt on the verge of tears, you are quite possibly manifesting some of the emotional and psychological symptoms displayed by the target of bullies. While all of us experience good and bad days at work, if the latter is the more common, you might begin questioning whether you are being subjected to bullying in the workplace.

It is important to point out that lawful, general orders given to subordinates by their superiors must not be confused with bullying. The duty of all members to carry out lawful, general orders must be maintained.

**Findings of recent ADF studies**

As outlined in the executive report of the 2010 ADF Mental Health Prevalence and Wellbeing Study, the prevalence of mental disorders in the ADF has the potential to have a substantial impact on individual wellbeing and operational capability.5 Results from the study indicate that 11,016 (or one in five) ADF members had experienced a mental disorder in the previous 12 months.

ADF personnel reported a significantly greater number of partial (rather than total) days out of role due to psychological distress than the general community. The data indicates that mental disorders have an impact on the ability of personnel to work, not only in terms of absenteeism, but also in the number of days where they are unable to perform at work. Individuals with affective disorders, for example, reported an average of 23 days off per year due to the disorder.

This loss not only reduces the member’s wellbeing but creates a significant drain on the capability and resources of the ADF, with initial impacts felt by the member’s workplace and then slowly across the whole ADF. The disorders primarily affecting absenteeism were panic attacks (32.7 per cent) and depressive episodes (32.4 per cent). The most frequently reported symptoms displayed by those who have suffered from bullying include both panic attacks and depressive episodes.

**Physical stress-related damage from bullying**

According to workplace bullying experts Dr Gary Narmie and Dr Ruth Narmie, the physical stress-related damage caused by bullying can include (but is not limited to):

- Cardiovascular problems from hypertension to heart attack
- Reduced immunity to infections: more colds and flu
- Itching, skin disorders
- Stress headaches and migraines
- Increased allergies and asthma
- Indigestion, colitis and irritable bowel syndrome
- Rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue
• Hair loss
• Weight swings, and
• Diabetes mellitus.6

**Emotional-psychological damage from bullying**

In addition to the physical damage caused by bullying, Narmie and Narmie assert that the emotional-psychological damage that can result also includes (but is not limited to) the following:

• Poor concentration and forgetfulness
• Loss of sleep and fatigue
• Stress and irritability
• Complex PTSD
• Mood swings, bursts of anger
• Spontaneous crying, lost sense of humour
• Indecisiveness
• Panic attacks and anxiety
• Clinical depression
• Feelings of insecurity, being out of control
• Nightmares about the bully
• Obsessive thinking about the bully
• Always anticipating the next attack (hyper-vigilance)
• Shattered faith in self, feeling of worthlessness
• Shame, embarrassment and guilt
• Altered personality, unrecognisable to family and friends, and
• Suicidal thoughts.7

The impact of physical illness, when combined with mental illness, can result in exacerbation of both or either aspects of an individual’s suffering. In turn, this again can lead to self-harm, suicidal thoughts or suicide. A 2008 Yale study concluded that targets of bullies are between two and nine times more likely to contemplate suicide than those who have not experienced bullying.8 Many of the conditions listed can result in medical discharge, ruin lives or, in some cases, lead to self-harm or suicide.

If an ADF member died due to a workplace health and safety (WHS) incident involving the incorrect handling of electrical equipment, resulting in electrocution, questions would be instantly raised regarding the training of the member, and the WHS practices in the workplace—effectively, ‘how could this happen when we are so careful with safety?’ It is doubtful that an ADF member who committed suicide after prolonged exposure to workplace bullying would have the same questions asked after their death. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the statements would more likely be that ‘they took the coward’s way out’, ‘they must have been soft’ or ‘there must have been issues at home we weren’t aware of’.
Complex PTSD and associated stigma

The stigma attached to mental illness is acknowledged in Australian society but is even more prevalent within the ADF. While most of us have been touched by mental illness in our personal lives, either through direct experience or having a friend or family member affected, there is still a stigma that exists around mental illness, particularly in the workplace.

Breaking down this stigma and opening the channels of communication around mental health means that people who are in distress or are unwell can receive help as quickly as if they had a physical health problem.

The Army has made significant steps to address this stigmatic barrier. With an increasing number of ADF personnel deploying (and redeploying) into war zones, there has been an increase in the number of PTSD sufferers being diagnosed. The Army’s Joint Health Command, in collaboration with singer-songwriter John Schumann, has produced a 30-minute documentary entitled ‘Dents in the Soul – Helping to Cope with PTSD’, designed to address stigma, offer support and raise awareness of the issues surrounding PTSD for Army personnel and their families. Featuring Army members who share their own experiences with PTSD, the movie supports an important message: ‘Look after yourself, your mates and your family.’

The documentary aims to ‘de-stigmatisle’ PTSD and to show that it can potentially happen to anyone who has been exposed to a traumatic event. Developing symptoms of post-traumatic stress after exposure to trauma is not a sign of weakness—it is simply being human. Recovery rates from PTSD are high but early diagnosis and treatment are particularly important. Generally, the longer the symptoms persist—and go untreated—the longer the eventual recovery will take and the greater the disruption to the person’s work, family and enjoyment of life.

What many people do not realise is that PTSD is not solely a reaction to the trauma of war. According to Farrell, some scientists now believe that the effects of PTSD may also be caused by a number of smaller incidents, causing what is known as ‘complex PTSD’. Many individuals will have a breakdown (of which there are different types) and suffer severe fatigue from lack of true rest. Simply put, stress does not allow the body and the mind to rest.

Since this article is specific to bullying, it is difficult to include more than a general introduction to the effects of PTSD. However, it is crucial that people know that the end-result of bullying (to adults or children) is a compromised and traumatised individual. In brief, people suffering complex PTSD as a result of bullying report some, if not all, of the following symptoms (which have been reduced for the sake of brevity):

- Fatigue, with symptoms of or similar to chronic fatigue syndrome
- Anger over injustice that is stimulated to an excessive degree (sometimes but improperly leading to the application of the words ‘manic’ instead of ‘motivated’, ‘obsessive’ instead of ‘focused’, and ‘angry’ instead of ‘passionate’, especially from those with something to fear)
- An overwhelming desire for acknowledgement, understanding, recognition and validation of their experience
- A simultaneous and paradoxical unwillingness to talk about the bullying or abuse
- A lack of desire for revenge but a strong motivation for justice
- Extreme fragility, where formerly the person was of a strong, stable character
- Clumsiness
• Forgetfulness
• Hyperawareness and an acute sense of time passing, seasons changing and distances travelled
• A constant feeling that one has to justify everything one says and does
• A constant need to prove oneself, even when surrounded by good, positive people
• An unusually strong sense of vulnerability
• Feelings of worthlessness, rejection and a sense of being unwanted, unlikeable and unlovable
• A feeling of being small, insignificant and invisible
• An overwhelming sense of betrayal, and a consequent inability and unwillingness to trust anyone, even those who are close
• An initial reluctance to take action against the bully and report him/her knowing that he/she could lose his/her job
• That later reluctance giving way to a strong urge to take action against the bully so that others, especially successors, don’t have to suffer a similar fate
• Proneness to identifying with other people’s suffering
• A heightened sense of unworthiness and non-entitlement (some might call this shame)
• An unusually strong desire to educate the employer and help the employer introduce an anti-bullying ethos, usually proportional to the employer’s lack of interest in anti-bullying measures, and
• A desire to help others, often overwhelming and bordering on an obsession, and to be available for others at any time regardless of the cost to oneself.

Accountability and duty of care

There have been many out-of-court settlements reached in Australia as a result of legal action taken against bullies. A security guard, Devandar Naidu, suffered serious psychiatric injuries as a result of bullying while working for Group 4 Securities. His settlement, awarded in 2005, included $2 million in damages. In 2010, a 17 year-old received a $290,000 settlement as a result of a claim lodged against the school where she was subjected to bullying that included threats of physical harm and physical abuse.

In Victoria, individuals who engage in workplace bullying are now potentially liable for criminal sanction, including up to 10 years gaol. Is it so inconceivable that an aggressive bully in the workplace, having driven a subordinate or colleague to suicide shouldn’t be charged for manslaughter? Why shouldn’t a subordinate, having been exposed to prolonged and systemic bullying in the workplace, have the right to sue the bully under the provisions of the employer’s failure to uphold the Workplace Health and Safety Act?

The primary duty of care under the 2011 Act outlines that a person conducting a business or undertaking must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the health and safety of other persons is not put at risk from work carried out as part of the conduct of the business or undertaking. The follow-on legislation that took effect in January 2012 contains new and tougher provisions outlining significant penalties for those who fail to meet their obligations for WHS.
Other significant changes include enhanced protections from discrimination, victimisation and coercion over WHS matters which go beyond what is currently available through anti-discrimination and other laws. Individuals found guilty of some offences under the Act can face fines of up to $50,000 while Defence as a body corporate could be fined $500,000. Particularly relevant are Section 104 – Prohibition of discriminatory conduct, and Section 107 – Prohibition of requesting, instructing, inducing, encouraging, authorising or assisting discriminatory conduct.

Furthermore, the Federal Government’s Human Rights Commission (HRC) can investigate complaints of discrimination, harassment and bullying that have occurred because of gender, disability, race, age, sexual preference, criminal record, trade union activity or political opinion. The HRC advises that people who are bullied at work can report bullying incidents to state and territory WHS authorities.

Should members of the ADF feel the need to approach outside organisations for assistance with complaints or in their search for validation? The optimal answer to that question is ‘no’. However, some members do and, in the majority of those instances, it means that the systems we have in place to address unacceptable behaviour in the ADF have failed.

**Cost of negative public relations on the ADF**

Most people who stay abreast of current affairs would realise that allegations of abuse in Defence usually result in front-page stories. While dated, the HMAS Swan incident was the first well-publicised incident involving sex discrimination in the RAN. Following on from that, there have been numerous and highly-publicised cases, including the HMAS Success Commission of Inquiry, the ADFA Skype sex scandal and, most recently, the so-called ‘Jedi Council’ which exploited female colleagues and members of the community.

All of these cases have a profoundly negative impact on ADF recruiting. Parents have every right to ask ‘Do I want my child to join a service in which they may potentially be subject to some form of inappropriate behaviour?’ or ‘Am I confident that my gay child will be treated with respect and tolerance in the ADF?’ Young people looking for future careers may and do steer clear of a workplace with a track record of bullying and unacceptable behaviour.

Every negative media release about unacceptable behaviour in the ADF has a significant impact on the morale of the ADF—and lowered morale can lead to retention issues. For a fighting force to be effective in operations, a high level of morale is required and negative media will not assist us in achieving this aim. Recently, Chief of Army, General David Morrison called on innocent members to ‘show moral courage’ and take a stand against those who displayed degrading behaviour in the ADF. He concluded ‘If you’re not up to it, find something else to do with your life. There is no place for you among this band of brothers and sisters’.

**The financial cost of bullying – a case study**

If, until this point, the reader has felt that the above facts are ‘wishy washy’ and/or ‘touchy feely’, perhaps putting a financial cost to bullying will provide a different perspective. Rather than citing more of the intangible effects of bullying, such as mental and emotional trauma, the author has conducted a case study on an ADF member who reported a period of prolonged bullying and the effects it had on them and their career.
As part of their conditions of service, ADF personnel are provided with free medical and dental services. However, the term ‘free’ is ambiguous in the context of bullying, as the financial cost of supporting ADF members through the potential physical and mental illness impacts can be approximately measured and can be considerable as demonstrated by the case study below. This particular case study examined the financial impact that bullying had on a senior non-commissioned officer, who was a technical specialist in a critical trade on approximately $80,000 per annum including service allowance.

Table 1: Hypothetical assessment of the cost of bullying

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition/treatment</th>
<th>Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two months’ sick leave for severe depression and acute anxiety</td>
<td>&gt;$13,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced working hours, on average five hours per day over a four-month period = loss of 240 working hours</td>
<td>&gt;$6,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of external psychology services (in excess of 12 sessions)</td>
<td>&gt;$1440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortnightly medical officer reviews, approximately 90 minutes each, including travel</td>
<td>&gt;$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist medical consultations and tests to diagnose fatigue relating to mental illness</td>
<td>&gt;$3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time out of work for tests (in excess of 10 hours)</td>
<td>&gt;$278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceuticals, including antidepressants and blood pressure medication</td>
<td>&gt;$360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate medical costs over a six month period</td>
<td>&gt;$25,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary for 11-year period not including training and travel costs</td>
<td>&gt;$693,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate cost of losing a member to medical discharge</td>
<td>&gt;$718,913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For argument’s sake, if ten members per year were to suffer a mental breakdown as a result of prolonged bullying and be medically discharged due to mental illnesses suffered as a result, it would cost Defence in excess of $7.18 million. This does not include other potential costs such as DVA pensions, compensation and the ability of the member to access other assistance, such as the Defence Home Ownership Assistance Scheme and outplacement services which they would not otherwise be entitled to with 11 years’ service alone.

Following on from the case study presented, in the event that those ten members had not suffered as a result of being bullied, the ADF could have an additional $7.18 million to spend on procurement. To put this figure in context, $7.18 million could purchase:

- 1 x Blackhawk helicopter with spare parts ($5.9 million)
- 3 x M1A1 Abrams tanks ($2.4 million each)
- 7 x magnetic resonant imaging machines (> $1 million each)
- 90 x annual salaries of $80,000
- 259 x combat soldier’s kits ($27,700 each), or
- 160,000 x ration packs ($45 each).

Raising awareness

Through education programs such as Pathway to Change, ‘New Generation Navy’ and ‘Navigating the Change’ awareness program in 2011-12, the ADF is beginning to address the impact that bullying can have on our workplace. Every member of the ADF is required to
undergo annual awareness training that covers alternative resolution and equity, and suicide awareness. This, however, is only the very first step towards acknowledging the extent to which bullying can affect our workplace and destroy lives.

It should be acknowledged that as a government department, the ADF is open to public scrutiny, unlike private institutions such as universities and corporations. One fact is that ADF establishments are not required to employ roving security in order to prevent high incidents of rape or assault, such as that required by Australian universities at their college accommodation. Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick recently commented in relation to the Inquiry into the Treatment of Women at ADFA that the National Union of Students (NUS) had ‘uncovered an alarming rate of sexual harassment and serious sexual assault’ (at academic institutions).16

The figures cited by the NUS found that more than 67 per cent of female students surveyed had experienced an unwanted sexual experience, whereas Ms Broderick reported that, in contrast, only 27 per cent of women surveyed at ADFA reported some form of sexual harassment. These figures clearly demonstrate the relative safety of ADF establishments in comparison with civilian universities. Viewing these comparisons might make many ADF members feel that superior glow of a job well done.

However, while we may lead private organisations in our own statistics, this is only a reflection of reported incidents. Yes, in comparison to reported figures we are employing cutting-edge education and training to great effect. But this does not mean that we can comfortably rest on our laurels and pat ourselves on the back for a job well done—indeed, we should be using these figures to spur us on in our efforts to completely eradicate unacceptable behaviour from our workplace. Only once we can confidently and proudly state that no member of the ADF has suffered some form of mental or emotional trauma as a result of a colleague’s unacceptable behaviour can we say ‘stand easy’.

Everyone in Defence is required to be treated with respect, fairness and without harassment. Defence requires everyone to accept personal responsibility and accountability for their actions and to think clearly about the consequences of their actions. DIG PERS 35-3 states that a commander or manager must act on all unacceptable behaviour complaints brought to their attention in a prompt, fair and impartial manner. Even if you are not a bully, simply by observing unacceptable behaviour in the workplace and doing nothing to address it means you are a silent accomplice to the bully. Theodore Roosevelt aptly captured this sentiment when he said, ‘Knowing what’s right doesn’t mean much unless you do what’s right’.17

**Conclusion**

If a member believes they are being subjected to bullying, they should consult their chain of command, DIG PERS 35-3 or an Equity Adviser. Support and resources are available and those listed below provide a starting point for anyone questioning whether they are being subjected to unacceptable behaviour or for those who are wondering whether their own treatment of others would ‘pass muster’ if questioned.

Before dismissing the next complaint presented to you as ‘just whinging’, carefully consider the costs of bullying: financial, medical, legal, mental, social and moral. As members of the ADF, we have a responsibility to defend the rights of those who are unable to do so for themselves—
and we need to apply that thinking to our brothers and sisters in arms before we can direct our energies more effectively to the needs of others.

The mission of the ADF is to fight and win wars against the enemy, not each other. Three brand-spanking new M1A1 tanks or ten members left emotionally and socially crippled, reducing the ADF’s ability to fight and win wars? Cutting-edge equipment is worthless without the personnel to utilise it effectively. It’s not rocket science: work shouldn’t hurt and bullying is just bad business.

Petty Officer Trish Dollisson joined the RAN in 2002 as an Electronic Warfare Linguist. She speaks seven languages other than English, specialising in Indonesian and South West Pacific languages. Trish has completed a variety of deployments with the RAN, the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Australian Customs Service, as well as undertaking specialist technical training with the US Marine Corps in Hawaii.

Trish has represented the ADF on the Parliamentary Exchange Program, and has participated in the Navy Women’s Leadership Program, the Australian Women’s Leadership Symposium and the Australian Regional Women’s Leaders Conference. She is also a graduate of the My Mentor program and the Australian Applied Management Colloquium. Trish is currently Staff Officer to Director General Chaplaincy Navy.

**SUPPORT FOR DEFENCE MEMBERS**

The Defence Equity Advice Line is **1800 DEFENCE** and provides a confidential information and referral service for all Defence members. Callers can ask about their rights and options before taking action relating to any form of harassment or discrimination.

**Resources**

http://www.bullyinginstitute.org/
http://www.bullyingstatistics.org/
DI(G) PERS 34-4 – Use and management of alternative dispute resolution in Defence
DI(G) PERS 35-3 – Management and reporting of unacceptable behaviour
DI(G) PERS 35-4 – Reporting and management of sexual misconduct including sexual offences
DI(G) PERS 35-7 – Defence Equity Adviser network
DI(G) PERS 45-5 – Whistleblower scheme
NOTES


7. Narmie and Narmie, *The Bully at Work*, p.135


The US Pivot to the Asia Pacific: responses and opportunities for Indonesia and Australia

Colonel Duncan Hayward, Australian Army

Introduction

The Indonesian proverb *Air tenang jangan disangka tiada buaya* roughly translates as ‘Never think that still water does not have crocodiles’. This proverb could well be applied to describe the challenge and dilemma facing the nations of Southeast Asia posed by the uncertain future of Sino-US relations or, to put the Bahasa proverb another way, ‘never take for granted a peaceful outlook, for danger may lurk underneath’.

China has emerged dramatically from its ‘century of humiliation’ with 30 years of remarkable economic growth. It is proud of its culture, traditions and rising international status—and sees the next 15-20 years as a time for ‘national revitalization through continued economic, social and military development’ to advance its foreign policy objectives and emerge to what it sees as its rightful place in the region.

The unprecedented speed, scale and reach of China’s rise has created growing regional concern about its intentions, while for China there is the historical fear of being contained by a Western nation—currently the US and its regional allies—acting in concert to prevent China from reaching what it sees as its full potential.

This strategic uncertainty about the true, long-term intentions of each side has been compounded by the US ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ policy in the Asia-Pacific, where Washington is seen as ‘affirming to allies, friends and adversaries alike that the United States is a Pacific power with inalienable strategic rights in the Asia-Pacific region’.

Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono, in his opening address at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in 2012, espoused a ‘win-win’ strategic culture and identified a clear role for middle powers like Indonesia and Australia in fostering peaceful cooperation between China and the US, noting that:

> Given their combined strategic, diplomatic, economic and demographic weight, US-China relations will have impacts far beyond their bilateral relations. With their enormous economic potentials, it is natural that many countries want to build good relations with both China and the United States. Both the US and China have an obligation not just to themselves, but to the rest of the region to develop peaceful cooperation…. Indonesia is willing to be part of these efforts.

The article will argue that there is a key role for both Australia and Indonesia to play with respect to the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific. First, it will analyse the US aims. It will then examine the Indonesian foreign policy approaches to engaging external powers, to provide context to the Indonesian response to the pivot. Finally, it will consider the implications for both Indonesia and Australia, and identify opportunities that may be presented to the benefit of both.
What is the US trying to achieve?

Although the renewed emphasis by the US in the Asia-Pacific has been alternatively reframed by Washington as a ‘pivot’, ‘rebalancing’, ‘shift’ or, most recently, by the US Secretary of State as ‘the Pacific Dream’, this article will refer to the US’s enhanced economic, diplomatic and military investment in the Asia-Pacific as ‘the pivot’. US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon has articulated what America is attempting to achieve as:

… a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms. To pursue this vision, the United States is implementing a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy: strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; building a stable, productive and constructive relationship with China; empowering regional institutions; and helping build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity.

Clearly, the pivot is not solely about a military increase, although this has seen the greatest physical manifestation with the basing of the ‘first-of-class’ littoral combat ships in Singapore and the deployment of US Marines to Darwin. The US has increased its engagement with its five regional alliance partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia, The Philippines and Thailand—and deepened its partnerships with India, especially in relation to civil nuclear cooperation, and with Indonesia through the ‘US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership’, focusing on energy, security, trade and investment, democracy and civil society, education, and climate and the environment.

The US has also dramatically increased its engagement with regional institutions—notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by appointing an ambassador to ASEAN, and increasing participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—rectifying a period of neglect between 2005 and 2007, when then US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice was repeatedly absent while top Chinese leaders unfailingly attended.

Predictably, China has been less than enthusiastic about increased US engagement with the region, sending strong messages through foreign officials alluding that the pivot may be emboldening some US allies, such as Japan and The Philippines, in their territorial disputes with China, and stating in its April 2013 Defence White Paper that:

The Asia-Pacific region has become an increasingly significant stage for world economic development and strategic interaction between major powers. The US is adjusting its Asia-Pacific security strategy, and the regional landscape is undergoing profound changes.... Some country [sic] has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser. On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation.

The pivot has been welcomed by a number of Southeast Asian countries, especially those with unresolved territorial disputes with China in the East and South China Seas, at a time when China’s military modernisation has been coupled with what seems to be a more assertive stance in Chinese policy. Nevertheless, the possible implications of this policy shift have caused concerns among some in the region.
Indonesian foreign policy – from bebas-aktif to ‘strategic trust’

Indonesia, by virtue of its strategic geography, dynamic economy, large population, democratic transition and regional leadership aspirations, is not in a position to ignore global and regional dynamics, nor should it feel compelled to play ‘second fiddle’ to other regional and global actors. Indeed, these factors make Indonesia of significant political, strategic and economic interest to both China and the US—not least because Indonesia is one of the few ASEAN members without a territorial dispute with China.

Indonesian foreign relations since independence have been characterised by bebas-aktif (or ‘free and active’ policy), which has seen it take a leading role in the global Non-Aligned Movement and in shaping the diplomatic activism of the developing world, with a refusal to side completely with one global power bloc or another. The policy of bebas-aktif has grown from Indonesia’s historical colonial experiences with the Dutch and the Japanese, fuelling a sense of vulnerability and distrust of external foreign powers interfering in the affairs of the new republic.

Indonesia has sought to engage large powers, such as Russia, China, India, Japan, the US and various European nations, through mechanisms such as ASEAN, the ARF and the EAS, while at the same time developing strategic partnerships among emerging powers. By drawing in multiple partners and engaging in multilateral forums, Indonesia has been able to negate a regional structure or architecture in which China’s power would outweigh that of other members. Indonesia has followed a policy of ‘a million friends with no enemies’, which has seen its modern history devoid of heated regional rivalry and enmity, and free from the complications and foreign policy obstacles that some North Asian nations face.

President Yudhoyono and his Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa have further espoused a policy of striving to build strategic trust among the countries of the region and with external nations, notably China and the US. This is a logical extension of Indonesia’s foreign policy of ‘dynamic equilibrium’, where the powers of the region, including China and the US, are encouraged to act less as rivals and more as partners in a win-win arrangement—accommodating rather than constraining. Whereas the concept of ‘balance of power’ is traditionally conflictual in nature, ‘the concept of dynamic equilibrium envisages a more cooperative system of relations between powers without any clear cut adversaries’.

During the Jakarta International Defense Dialogue in 2013, attended by senior delegations from both China and the US, President Yudhoyono described a lack of strategic trust as the key challenge in the Sino-US relationship. This speech also affirmed Indonesia’s desire to be seen as a ‘balancer within the region, not only between global and emerging powers but also between Asia-Pacific partners’.

Indonesian responses to the pivot

As an extension of its ‘dynamic equilibrium’ policy, Indonesia has welcomed the higher priority that the US has given to relations with ASEAN, particularly its signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the Indonesia-US Comprehensive Partnership Agreement during President Obama’s visit to Indonesia in November 2010.
The military component of the US pivot, and in particular the increased presence of US forces in Australia, has met with mixed responses from Indonesia. Given the strong US-Australia alliance, based on strategic, political and cultural closeness, Canberra’s support of the US pivot would not have been unexpected in Jakarta. However, the close relationship has led to both domestic and regional criticism of a lack of independence in Australian foreign policy.

The announcement that up to 2,500 US Marines would be training in northern Australia was met with caution in Indonesia, with Foreign Minister Natalegawa expressing ‘the hope that such a troop presence would not lead to increased tension or add to misunderstanding’. However, the news that the US would be basing littoral combat ships in Singapore did not generate the same concern. In part, this was because of Indonesian sensitivities that the positioning of US Marines in Australia was aimed at enhancing US leverage over Indonesia itself, rather than China, particularly in relation to the troubled Papua province and to protect, if necessary, the US-owned Freeport mine.

Consistent with Indonesia’s desire to promote ‘strategic trust’, and to defuse potential tensions between China and the US, President Yudhoyono suggested in the days immediately after the US-Australian announcement regarding the US Marine presence in northern Australia that it could create opportunities for trilateral (Indonesia-US-Australia) humanitarian and disaster relief training. Importantly, he also envisaged that such training could involve ‘all ASEAN members including China ... [and that] involving China would improve trust with the US’.

This Indonesian message was repeated by President Yudhoyono during the 2012 Shangri-la Dialogue, when he asserted that:

One way to promote greater confidence building to reduce this gap is to hold joint military exercises, which would include countries such as the United States and China. Indonesia is willing to be part of these efforts.

Opportunities for Australian-Indonesian cooperation

Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper states as its opening premise that Australia’s future prosperity is tied to the security and prosperity of the region. It goes on to identify the relationship between the US and China as the single most important factor that will determine Australia’s strategic environment into the future, with the Indonesian relationship seen as Australia’s most important regional strategic partnership.

Differences between Australia and Indonesia are often pointed out—language, religious composition, population size, geography, ethnicity, culture, social, political and legal systems—yet their foreign policy objectives show a remarkable closeness in their respective aims for the future of the region. While the method to achieve these may differ, there is a remarkable similarity between the aims of the two nations.

First, both seek to promote cooperative arrangements among the major powers in the region (China, Japan, Indonesia, India and the US). Second, both nations desire to promote Asian representation in key international organisations and to help shape and promote rules-based institutions. Third, Australia and Indonesia support China’s participation in the region’s strategic, political and economic development, and both seek to work with the US to ensure a presence in the region contributing to regional stability, security and peace.
The development of closer ties between Indonesia and Australia—building on the 2006 Lombok Treaty, the 2012 Defence Cooperation Agreement and the 2+2 Dialogue (of Defence and Foreign Ministers)—has paved the way for continuing close bilateral cooperation.\textsuperscript{35} While it currently focuses on practical collaboration in areas such as counter-terrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, peacekeeping, maritime security, intelligence and defence equipment, many of these areas can be readily expanded into multilateral activities.\textsuperscript{36}

The presence of regular deployments of US Marines in Darwin, and their transit through the Indonesian archipelago, creates the potential for Australia and Indonesia to participate in Marines-related security cooperation programs and readiness training with other regional partners.\textsuperscript{37} Humanitarian and disaster relief, peacekeeping, and maritime security activities are areas where the inclusion of other ASEAN member states—as well as China—operating alongside Australian, Indonesian and US military personnel, would assist in achieving ‘strategic trust’.

**Conclusion**

The Sino-US competition for power and influence will likely profoundly impact Southeast Asian politics and security throughout the 21st century. While Indonesia and Australia take different approaches as to how they will deal with potential great power competition in the region, the outcomes each are seeking are remarkably similar—cooperative arrangements among the powers of the region; promotion of key regional and international rules-based institutions; Chinese participation in the region’s strategic, political and economic development; and a continued US regional presence contributing to stability, security and peace.

While the US has a network of alliance partners throughout the region, unlike China which lacks a compatible alliance system, there is no message that ‘you have to be exclusively a friend or an ally of the US’. Australia and Indonesia, like many of the region’s nations, have strong economic and military ties with both China and the US, and seek not to have to make a choice between the two.

The Indonesian approach of ‘strategic trust’ and ‘dynamic equilibrium’, where China and the US are encouraged to engage with the region in a cooperative manner, is a far better option than unhelpful, combative ‘axis of evil’-type policies which have promoted exclusion over inclusion. Neither Australia nor Indonesia is in a position to dictate the strategic direction that Washington or Beijing will take. However the US pivot provides opportunities for both nations to engage in deeper bilateral and multilateral political, economic and diplomatic cooperation with regional states.

Colonel Duncan Hayward graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1988. He has served in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation on the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon, in Iraq on the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, as Commanding Officer of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Armoured Regiment, and in Afghanistan on the Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul. His more recent appointments have included acting Director General Joint Capability Coordination, and Director International Engagement-Army.
Colonel Hayward holds a Bachelor of Arts (Strategic Studies/International Relations) from Deakin University, a Master of Management (Defence Studies) from the University of Canberra, and a Master of Strategic Affairs through ANU. He is currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College.

NOTES

1. This is an edited version of a paper developed by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College in 2013.

2. Interview with Colonel Nanang Santaso, Indonesian Air Force, CDSS course member, 9 May 2013.


28. Anwar, ‘A Problem of Mixed Messages’, pp 3-4; and Anwar, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the US Rebalancing Effort towards Asia’, p. 3. These accounts of Indonesia’s concerns carry some weight as, while written in her academic capacity, she is still Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President.
34. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper*, Executive Summary, ‘Twenty Five national objectives for 2025: a roadmap to navigate the Asian


A Culture of Reviews ¹

Dr Clint Arizmendi, Department of Defence

Introduction

This article questions the value of the external review process into cultural change within the ADF, and its implications for leadership and organisational learning. Using the 2011 ‘Skype incident’ as an example of a contemporary trigger for cultural change in the ADF, the article argues that external reviews potentially undermine the authority of senior leadership and inhibit organisational learning.²

Such leadership and learning is especially important, if not essential, when culture is at the heart of a review and the organisation is attempting to modify both behaviour and attitudes—key elements of cultural change. The opportunity for organisational learning for the ADF and its people is lost if driven continuously by external forces.

In order for the ADF to learn, it should ‘own’ not only identified problems, such as unacceptable behaviour,³ but also the review process by which it investigates and eventually addresses those problems. The Skype incident is a valuable example of when organisational learning was outsourced, potentially jeopardising a critical learning process for the ADF.⁴

The past 17 years of ADF reviews targeting unacceptable behaviour and its management not only identified the same or similar issues but also provided the same or similar solutions. It is, therefore, timely to question the value of the external review process to the ADF, particularly during a time of austerity and when the reviews resulting from the Skype incident cost approximately $12 million.⁵

Method

Research for this article examined internal and external reviews of the ADF related to behaviour, management of critical incidents, and culture for the period 1995-2012. Key words used during the literature search included ‘behaviour’ and ‘culture’, yielding 24 individual results. The review results were then categorised into ‘internal’ (6) and ‘external’ (18) categories of review, the latter being those led by independent third-parties outside the ADF chain of command.

In addition, Australian media releases, editorials, letters to the editor and articles were reviewed by searching key words such as ‘Skype’, ‘behaviour’ and ‘culture’ to loosely gauge public sentiment and social commentary. The sole purpose of this classification process was to frame the research for the article, rather than undertake a comprehensive discourse analysis of key words or themes.

Research for this article excluded legally-mandated review processes, such as Royal Commissions and Senate inquiries. The external reviews examined in this article are therefore reviews conducted by non-Defence personnel on behalf of Defence and which Defence was not legally obliged to circulate externally.
Background

In April 2011, the Commandant of ADFA was stood down after details emerged of a ‘Skype incident’ at the Academy. The incident involved the use of Skype by a male cadet to covertly stream live video of him having consensual sex with a female cadet to other cadets in a nearby room.6

In response to the incident, the then Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith, initiated an independent external inquiry (the Kirkham Inquiry) and commenced the Broderick Review into the treatment of women at ADFA and more broadly within the ADF.7 Approximately one year later, giving due regard to legal process,8 the outcomes of the inquiry were announced, rather than published, and the Commandant was reinstated to his post.

The Skype incident not only encouraged the Australian community to question the professionalism, morals and ethics of ADF personnel but also served as a catalyst for a wider series of reviews into ADF culture,9 which resulted in a number of recommendations. Those recommendations are currently being implemented by the Department of Defence under the framework established by the Pathway to Change document.10

Minister Smith was understandably placed in a challenging political position as a consequence of the incident, which required that public concern about the ADF’s culture be addressed, particularly in relation to transparency, objectivity and due process. His public statements at the time indicate that the decision to externalise the process was made to ensure neutrality, integrity and rigour.11

The opportunity for the ADF to own the problem, drive organisational change and (re)define its culture was arguably lost when the decision was made to externalise the review process. The Minister’s decision to outsource the review process to an independent third party arguably reflects a historical default mode, as discussed in the following section.

A history of reviews

The ADF has been the subject of frequent reviews,12 averaging more than one per year for the past 17 years, often triggered by unacceptable behaviour and its management. Since 1995, there were approximately 24 behaviour-related reviews, with three quarters of those being external. Topics ranged from the cultural, social and institutional barriers impeding the merit-based progression of women13 to how the ADF responds to allegations of serious incidents and offences.14 Although the number of reviews generally remained steady throughout the last decade, they tripled in the three years from 2010.

Several of the issues currently being addressed by the ADF were reviewed almost 20 years ago; the two examples listed in the previous paragraph were initiated as a result of gender inequality for the former and sexual assault for the latter. Why then, are contemporary reviews addressing similar issues today with regard to women in the ADF and the management of critical incidents?15

It may be that the ADF refuses or does not know how to change its attitudes and behaviours—often considered to be critical elements of culture. It may also be that the traditional external review method has become tired and ineffective, possibly never actually working in the first place. More likely, it is a combination of these two reasons.
It is interesting to note that the criticisms of the ADF’s behaviour and its management rarely question either the rigour of the external review process or the political context within which it took place. While beyond the scope of this article, these two elements are considered by the author to be essential criteria for those interested in researching the efficacy of the external review process.

Regardless of the reason, it may be time to try an alternative approach. Recycling a dated method, such as the external review process, to address the same or similar contemporary issues has arguably only provided a recycled solution.

**External reviews: the norm rather than the exception**

There are several possible explanations for why external reviews have become the norm, rather than the exception. The two listed below—while not exhaustive—are based on a brief analysis of media reporting relating to the Skype incident, as well as anecdotal evidence gathered through dialogue with select members of the ADF and the broader academic community.

Explanations for why external reviews have become the norm, rather than the exception, fall into two separate, yet inter-related categories: the political realm and the public realm. In the political realm, the external review process can be used as a proxy indicator of organisational change for the sake of political leverage. Here, a deficit view of the organisation—such as the portrayal of it as lacking in some manner—gives the impression that the individual responsible for the portfolio is effecting positive change within the organisation through the external review process. Regardless of whether organisational change is necessary or achieved, the very action of having a review represents a tangible outcome for the politician and, presumably, a measure of effectiveness for her/his constituents.

In the public realm, the external review process represents objectivity with regard to investigating the actions of the ADF. At the core of this possible explanation is the public’s perception of the ADF. If the public does not have faith in the military’s ability to be ‘introspective and self-critical’—and drive positive change when required—then an external review becomes not only logical but necessary. Moreover, the public may be more tolerable of heavy expenditure for external review processes.

The combination of public perception and political action during the Skype incident may have harmed the way in which the ADF was viewed. At the time, one may have concluded that the organisation was a misogynistic, oppressive and bullying environment, corrupted to such an extent that even the senior most ranks were unable to discern the difference between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. However, if one were to compare the frequency and ratio of unacceptable behaviour to contemporary educational institutions or football codes, it becomes apparent that the ADF’s rates of unacceptable behaviour are significantly lower.

**The difficulty of defining ‘culture’**

Culture, by its very nature, is hard to define and even harder to change. Historically, it has been defined by the scholarly work within the human sciences as they sought to understand the relationship between individuals and society through the analysis of attitudes and behaviours. Within contemporary Australian society, the term has been loosely applied by a mixture of professional scholars, social commentators and amateur observers alike, arguably to the
extent that we have reached a point of ambiguity. We spend an enormous amount of time debating culture but make little effort to define it. To demonstrate this point, brief scans of Australian media headlines undertaken after the Skype incident revealed a ‘culture of abuse’, a ‘culture of sexism’ and a ‘drinking culture’.

The potential problem for the ADF as a result of political and public misappropriation of the term is that such ill-defined uses inevitably influence the organisation, whether overtly or covertly. The primary text of the Pathway to Change document is a prime example of such influence, mentioning the term ‘culture’ nearly 60 times in fewer than 60 pages, yet failing to define it. Perhaps an easy starting point for the Pathway to Change document could have been Deal and Kennedy’s definition of ‘the way things get done around here’.

Aside from neglecting to define culture, Pathway to Change, as the cornerstone of the Department of Defence’s formal mechanisms for incorporating the external review recommendations and commitment to cultural change over a five-year period, has two notable flaws. The first is the timeframe. The second is the presumed starting point that a singular, static and clearly-defined ADF culture exists.

With regard to the timeframe, it is unlikely these changes are going to occur over the next five years—cultural change requires intricate knowledge of the relationship between the ADF, its people, and their attitudes and behaviours. Each time an external review is undertaken, the organisation is essentially resourcing an independent third party to gain that knowledge and there is no guarantee of knowledge transfer or lessons learned.

Politically, five years places the outcomes of the evolution of Defence culture beyond the realm of the election cycle. Perhaps more important is the fact that five years is also more than two posting cycles for the ADF personnel who are likely to have to react to and implement the changes. The risk for the ADF is continuity, in that there is no guarantee of political commitment or accountability from the government-after-next. This has implications for both resource and organisational learning, which this article discusses in the next section.

As to the second flaw, this article posits that there are a variety of dynamic sub-cultures operating within the ADF which should be identified and researched with a goal of better understanding the intrinsic and external motivators that contribute to unacceptable behaviour. The argument for acknowledging military sub-cultures is not new, as Snider noted with regard to the American context, yet appropriate for the Australian context:

A … fruitful approach to the understanding of military culture questions the homogeneity that is seemingly taken for granted in our uninformed public debates. Is there, in fact, such a thing as [a] … ‘military culture’ that politicians and other advocates should be concerned to preserve, reform, or abolish? Or are there, instead, an identifiable set of subcultures about which the public needs to be educated?

An acknowledgement of culture as dynamic, combined with an awareness of the sub-cultures within the ADF, may enable the organisation to refine its research into topics that require investigation in the future. One potential organisational benefit is the improved understanding of its people, which has the ability to directly influence both policy and practice. In instances of unacceptable behaviour, such as those displayed in the Skype incident, the recognition of multiple cultures provides an opportunity for targeted intervention strategies and the identification of individuals and groups at risk.
Leadership and organisational learning

This section will discuss the implications that externalising the review process has for leadership and learning, considered here to be indispensable to one another.24 With regard specifically to leadership and organisational learning during the Skype incident, the initiation of an external review process denied senior leaders the opportunity to lead their organisation during a critical period of organisational self-reflection. Interestingly, military leaders are renowned for their ability to make decisions during challenging times, so what made the Skype incident unique?

When the review process was outsourced, so too was the organisational learning process; individuals with limited exposure to the ADF were tasked with engaging intimately with the organisation and its people, while the organisation’s leaders were placed in a subordinate role. Arguably, senior ADF leadership culture was not enabled during the process, a concept Nick Jans touched on when he noted that ‘a leadership culture is an environment in which certain “enabling” factors operate in ways that make it possible for leaders to get things done’.25

As a result of removing the lead role in organisational learning from the ADF, it is debatable whether the externalisation of the review process after the Skype incident resulted in lessons learned by the ADF or lessons observed.26 As retired Lieutenant General Frank Hickling noted, the differentiation between the two is behavioural change.27 There is no denying that the recent tranche of external reviews has led to ADF policy change; however, it is not possible to tell whether attitudes and behaviours have changed.

This is because of the absence of established behavioural and attitudinal baselines for the ADF prior to implementing the recommendations from the reviews. While the ADF collects data about the organisation in a rigorous and methodical way, it was not collecting data with the goal of evaluating behavioural and attitudinal change in light of the reviews. The risk for the ADF is that it invested significant resources into driving organisational change that may not be formally recognised by external bodies or measured appropriately. The consequence for the organisation is that it missed out on the opportunity to build its leadership and learning capacity both collectively and individually.

Conclusion

The use of the external review process as a result of the Skype incident represented an absence of trust in senior leadership in that the ADF was viewed as neither willing nor able to undertake an unbiased review of its attitudes and behaviours. The externalisation of the review process had significant learning and leadership implications for the organisation and its people, especially for identifying and owning problems related to cultural change.

As such, this article argues for building the organisational capacity with regard to the review process, so that it can not only genuinely take ownership of a problem but also be responsible for the solution. However, this needs to be done without circumventing the ADF’s responsibility to be answerable to the government and compliant with legally-mandated oversight requirements.

The ADF’s ability to conduct its own reviews is about ownership—there are strong cultures that function, collectively, to provide the foundation for organisational identity.28 Therefore, a
potential pitfall of the external review process is that recommendations from those external to the organisation may not be seen as understanding the organisation, which decreases the likelihood of review recommendations being fully owned and implemented.

It may be well worth spending the next five years defining ADF culture, identifying its subcultures, learning to undertake targeted interventions and identifying what components of the organisation genuinely require change before investing any more time, money and energy into further reviews. Only then can Defence culture truly evolve.

Dr Clint Arizmendi is a Research and Analysis Officer at the Land Warfare Studies Centre. His MA and PhD are from Central Queensland University and he has more than ten years of social research experience in both the public and private sectors. His interests range from military sociology in the areas of the construction of ‘culture’ and post-traumatic stress disorder in the ADF to the future of land warfare and information operations. Dr Arizmendi has written on advanced technologies, such as 3D printing, autonomous robotics and cyber capabilities, and is currently researching advanced human performance and its implications for the Army.

NOTES

1. This article was presented at DSTO’s Human Science Symposium in Adelaide in November 2012. It is a summary version of a broader and more comprehensive research project on culture being undertaken by the Land Warfare Studies Centre.


4. Personal communication between Dr Samantha Crompvoets (research fellow, Australian National University) and the author in October 2012.

5. The cost estimate provided by Air Marshall Mark Binskin before the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee’s Estimates hearing on 15 February 2012.

6. It should be noted that these individuals were first-year cadets who had been in an ADF training environment for a short period of time (months), so it is questionable whether this incident is genuinely attributable to ‘ADF culture’.

8. The report was announced, rather than published, because of legal proceedings in train as a criminal case in the ACT Court.


12. See Annex A.


15. ‘The Broderick Review’ and ‘The Early Review’ (see endnotes 7 and 9 respectively).


27. ‘An Interview with Lieutenant General Francis Hickling (Retd)’.

# Annex A

## A Recent History of ADF Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Investigator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report to the Senate on the Elimination of Sexual Harassment in the ADF</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Internal: Prepared by Defence in response to Senate Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in the ADF: Two Studies (Burton Report)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>External: Consultant appointed by Minister for Defence Science and Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Harassment in the ADF (Quinn Report)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Internal: Major Kathryn Quinn, Australian Army Psychology Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study into Judicial System under Defence Force Discipline Act (Abadee Report)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Internal: Deputy Judge Advocate General, Brigadier A.R. Abadee, appointed by CDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ombudsman’s OMI (Own Motion Investigation) - How ADF Responds to Allegations of Serious Incidents and Offences</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>External: Commonwealth Ombudsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Justice Procedures in the ADF</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>External: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: Rough Justice? An Investigation into Allegations of Brutality in the Army’s Parachute Battalion</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>External Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report of Inquiry into Military Justice in the ADF (Burchett Report)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Internal: Investigator appointed by CDF (although lead investigator not a member of the ADF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on Bullying at Singleton</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Internal: Army-led investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of Australia’s Military Justice System (Senate)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>External: Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on Learning Culture</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>External: Andrew Podger, Catherine Harris, and Major General Roger Powell, AM (Retd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ombudsman’s OMI - Management of Unacceptable Behaviour Complaints in ADF</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>External: Commonwealth Ombudsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAS Success Commission of Inquiry: Part 1 (Gyles Report)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>External: The Hon Roger Gyles, AO, QC, appointed by CDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review into the Treatment of Women in the ADF (Phase 1)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>External: Elizabeth Broderick, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission (appointed by Attorney-General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review into the Use of Alcohol in the ADF</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>External: Professor Margaret Hamilton, chairing an independent advisory panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the Use of Social Media and Defence</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>External: George Patterson Y &amp; R (advertising agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Personal Conduct of ADF Personnel</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Internal: Major General C.W. Orme, AM, CSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Management of Incidents and Complaints in Defence</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Internal: Inspector-General of the ADF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of Employment Pathways for APS Women in Defence</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>External: Ms Carmel McGregor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of the Defence Accountability Framework</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>External: Associate Professor Rufus Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review into the Treatment of Women in the ADF (Phase 2)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>External: Elizabeth Broderick, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission (appointed by Attorney-General)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of Allegations of Sexual and Other Forms of Abuse in Defence - DLA Piper Report</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>External: DLA Piper (law firm)</td>
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</table>
Australia’s Policy Framework for its Relations with India? ¹

Brigadier David Wainwright, DSC, Australian Army

Introduction

Australia’s global standing in what the Government has defined as the ‘Asian Century’ is largely influenced by regional transformation, motivated by the economic growth of a rising China.² Australia’s emphasis and somewhat synergised policy approach towards China appears widely evident in Australian diplomatic, security and economic policy circles, reinforced by a common perception that Australia’s economic resilience is directly related to China’s seemingly-insatiable demand for Australian resources.³

Within Australia’s geostrategic region, China’s global economic influence is closely followed by the emergence of a rising and growing Indian economy.⁴ However, the strength and coherence of Australian-Indian strategic relations is somewhat less clear, particularly when examined in comparison to China. In fact, an initial examination of Australia’s approach to India indicates that the strategic framework has been plagued by misunderstandings and has lacked political consistency to the degree that it is questionable whether Australia has actually ever had any clear and meaningful policy priority towards its Indian Ocean neighbour.

This article will argue that Australia still does not have a coherent policy framework for engaging with India.⁵ The argument will be presented from a national perspective, briefly examining key aspects of the diplomatic, identity, military (security) and economic approach. The article will briefly look at the importance of the Australian-Indian relationship, in particular within the Indo-Pacific context. It will examine extant Australian Government policy and then, under the auspices of security relations, provide some considerations that may enhance future relations. For the purpose of this article, a ‘coherent policy framework’—using the OECD definition—means ‘enduring national policies that synergise the orchestration of national instruments of power’.⁶

The importance of strong Australian-Indian relations

Until recently, the Asia-Pacific has been Australia’s principal economic frame of reference. This reference is very likely to, if it has not already, be increasingly replaced by the ‘Indo-Pacific’ framework, more appropriately reflecting Australia’s evolved geostrategic environment. This renewed frame of reference captures the region spanning the Indian Ocean through to the western Pacific Ocean.⁷ Most importantly, the Indo-Pacific perspective recognises the growing significance of India.

Obviously, however, it is in the eastern Indian Ocean that the bilateral strategic interests of Australia and India most evidently intersect.⁸ And it is through this prism, particularly from an economic and security perspective, that the importance of Australian-Indian relations need to be seen. Both Australia and India have increasingly shared security concerns, ranging from the rise of economic ties to China, and US security alliances within the region, to transnational maritime issues.
The logic of closer ties between Australia and India also exists through deepening economic and societal links, with Australia now a major energy exporter to India, and Indian migration and investment both integral factors in Australia’s economic success. Moreover, on the international stage, both India and Australia appear to share similar interests in fostering a closer participation with ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit.

India’s importance to Australia is clearly articulated in the 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, which emphasised the need for both foreign and security policy dialogue through an enhanced ‘Australia-India Strategic Partnership’. This suggests that strong Australian-India relations would seem very logical. Both nations are vibrant democracies with economic complementarities and mutual strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify any emphasis on strong synergistic and effective Australia-India policy.

Diplomatic

From a diplomatic perspective, the trend of inattention by successive Australian governments has arguably inhibited the development of meaningful bilateral Australian-Indian ties. In simple terms, history suggests that there just has not been enough ministerial activity in the relationship. In fact, Australia’s relationship with India differs in marked contrast to Australia’s relations elsewhere in Asia, with diplomatic engagement with India ranking significantly lower than Australia’s relations with Japan, China and Indonesia.

Shared British history and the common linkages of colonial rule created very similar constitutional frameworks for Australia and post-colonial India—and both nations emerged with similar political, legal, administrative and social legacies. Despite these common historical linkages, relations over the past several decades have not translated into mutual understanding or trust.

On closer review, it seems that Australia’s relationship with India has passed through several phases, ranging from a brief moment of closeness during the years immediately following Indian independence to ‘frosty’ decades during the Cold War, when India developed a closer relationship with the Soviet Union than the US. Indeed, relations have been strongly influenced by this Western-Soviet divide, which has characterised much of the relationship, in particular from the 1970s through to the post-Cold War period when India was largely isolated by the West because of its stance on nuclear non-proliferation.

Overall, Australia-India relations have been something of a puzzle to foreign policy analysts. There are obvious reasons for stronger ties. Yet successive Australian government have been unable to foster the links necessary for fruitful collaboration. One contributing factor, which undoubtedly strained recent relations, was Australia’s decision in 2007 to supply uranium to (communist) China but not to (democratic) India. While the decision was perhaps not surprising, given Australia’s longstanding position on non-proliferation, it exemplifies why limited policy development has been made. And it exacerbated the culture of mistrust that unfortunately has existed between New Delhi and Canberra over the years.

In 2011, Australia removed this blanket ban and entered talks with India on uranium sales. This change in Australian policy may have injected a healthy level of optimism into relations. In fact, the recent Australian High Commissioner to India, Peter Varghese, asserted that relations improved significantly following the resolution of uranium sales and a number of
trade-related differences. Similar views were evident at the Australia-India roundtable held in New Delhi in December 2012, leading to predictions that the relationship is poised at an historic moment, with new levels of mutual trust and confidence, expected in turn to generate refreshed policy momentum. While encouraging, practical examples in support of this ‘injection of confidence’ are largely absent.

Identity

Australian perceptions of India’s identity are typically based on the context of the British Empire, where India was the ‘jewel in the crown’, and Australia a loyal servant to the empire on which the sun never set. From a cultural perspective, the colonial past of both countries has shaped the respective identities of each nation, one key and notable example being their shared enthusiasm for cricket.

Common heritages have equally promoted the strong perception that Australia and India have a healthy and insightful understanding of each nation’s respective identity. However, such claims are simply a myth. The greatest perception problem affecting Australia-India relations is the misconception that the respective identity of each nation is well known. Unless addressed, this misconception will very likely remain counterproductive, with the potential to be a key obstacle to improved Australian-Indian relations.

In the 1990s, for example, Prime Minister Paul Keating’s emphasis on Asia did not include India. In fact, Keating never visited India at any stage during his term as Prime Minister, a factor that Keating reveals was because the respective nations had a tendency to ‘look past each other’. John Howard and Kevin Rudd did visit India as Prime Minister, as did Julia Gillard in October 2012. However, prime ministerial visits have not been proportionally reciprocal and it has been more than 25 years since an Indian Prime Minister has visited Australia.

Another key influence and useful insight into Australian policy relates to education. By 2007, Australia was the number two destination for Indians to study overseas. In 2009, the treatment of Indian students studying in Australia gained widespread media concern in mainstream India. The Australian Government arranged a visit to India by a high-powered delegation composed of both federal and state representatives, with the clear message that Australia does not tolerate racism and would ensure the safety of all Indian students studying in Australia. However, it seems reconciliation was achieved less by government representatives than the efforts of two well-known Australian cricketers who were able to promote an effective dialogue over the issue.

Economic

The primary intersection of Australian and Indian economic interests is the mutual dependency both nations have on the oceans for economic growth. The Indian Ocean is the world’s most important long-haul maritime route, one of the busiest sea-lines, and a crucial global trading thoroughfare of the future, particularly in relation to energy. For example 85 per cent of China’s oil imports cross the Indian Ocean.

Similarly, the rationale for a revived Australian-Indian relationship is not their shared British heritage, democratic traditions or passion for cricket. The driver is simply India’s need to secure energy resources, with the overwhelming volume of Australia’s exports to India concentrated
in energy resources. For example, Australia supplies over 50 per cent of India’s demand for coal, wool and steel. Furthermore, in 2012, two-way trade between Australia and India was valued at A$17.4 billion, making it Australia’s eighth-largest export market.

These high demands on Australian exports suggest an element of high importance to Australian-India engagement. But at the economic level, there appears to exist only limited formal and established arrangements between the respective trade policy areas of government. This is quite surprising, especially when examined in comparison to the trade policy Australia has established with both the US and China.

However, there have been some efforts on this front, in particular at the December 2012 Australia-India roundtable, which is the leading informal dialogue between the two countries. These talks included the Lowy Institute, working with the Observer Research Foundation and the Australia-India Institute. Themes discussed included strategic assessments of the Indo-Pacific region; economic relations; the role of cities and states in creating external linkages; maritime security; and new frameworks of governance and diplomacy.

One notable attendee at the 2012 roundtable was Martin Ferguson, then Australian Minister for Resources and Energy, who highlighted opportunities for energy security and cooperation. These are all positive steps. However, unless such actions are strengthened by an equal emphasis on government policy engagement, they will do nothing to enhance the limited priority currently being afforded by Australian policy makers.

Arguably the one intersection of Australian-Indian policy that should not be reliant on informal dialogue is the linkage between economic and security interests. Compelling economic and energy factors, along with significant mutual strategic interests, give Australia-India relations a persuasive rationale that demands greater cooperation. Unfortunately, research suggests this linkage is somewhat under-developed.

Security

Security relations between India and Australia have been marked by a series of tensions and disunity. For example, in 1990, Australia decided to sell 50 mothballed Mirage III combat aircraft to Pakistan, during a period of heightened tension over Kashmir. Then in 1998, Australia recalled its Defence Attaché in protest at India’s nuclear tests, resulting in ties becoming frozen and not re-established until 2000. As a result, military engagement between both nations over the past decades has been largely limited to periodic visits by senior officers and staff college exchanges.

A key step forward occurred in 2009, with India and Australia signing a ‘Security Cooperation Agreement’ aimed at strengthening cooperation to include counter-terrorism, defence, disarmament and non-proliferation, and maritime security. The agreement demonstrated a shared desire to promote regional and global security, as well as a common commitment to democracy, human rights and rule of law. In 2010, India hosted the inaugural ‘Defence Policy Talks’, which were followed by service-to-service talks. In December 2011, relations were further enhanced through a meeting of Defence Ministers in New Delhi, which included a discussion on confidence-building measures between their respective navies.
Nevertheless, while there have been some recent positive signs, the consensus appears to be that despite the logic of strong relations, the bilateral strategic and defence relationship remains weak.\textsuperscript{43} Reasons for such pessimism, particularly from India’s perspective, appear to relate to the apparent residual distrust of Australia’s military, which includes a history of limited genuine military-to-military engagement, through to continued suspicion of surveillance by Australia’s P-3C Orion maritime aircraft of Indian naval ships operating in the eastern Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea.\textsuperscript{44}

These views appear particularly held by a number of senior Indian officials, suggesting that entrenched resentment and negativity will hinder any meaningful improvement to Indian-Australian relations.\textsuperscript{45} Hence, it will be critically important for Australian security policy makers and future engagement to explore mutual security options that build trust, dispel past resentments and enrich confidence. One possibility may be through trilateral endeavours, in particular building on the common linkages that both nations have with the US.

Certainly, past experiences indicate that the commonality of interests in relation to the US has been advantageous, and has led to the benefits of combined military exercises, such as Exercise Malabar in the Bay of Bengal, held annually between US and Indian naval forces since 1992.\textsuperscript{46} India, however, maintains that its US-related security policy is quite different to that of Australia, in that India has a stronger sense of independence and non-alignment.\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, building alliances—such as an Australian-Indian-US trilateral naval arrangement—would likely be at odds with India’s broader strategic interests—and India would certainly shy away from any initiative that provided Beijing with any reason to suspect India was even remotely involved in a strategy of US containment.\textsuperscript{48}

Regardless of their relations with the US, both India and Australia have active interests in maritime security through the entire Indo-Pacific littoral.\textsuperscript{49} They share strong interests in a stable, multipolar regional order. And it would be logical for them to embrace security policies that promote stability in this region.\textsuperscript{50} The development of geostrategic trilateral security coordination with Indonesia is one such option.\textsuperscript{51} In fact, the development of an Australia-India-Indonesia troika, perhaps under the aegis of the ‘Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation’, could provide a basis for maritime security dialogue among the three countries.\textsuperscript{52}

While it may be rational strategic development, this could nevertheless heighten perceptions by China of ‘containment’ on its southern flank. However, any such concerns are not insurmountable and could be mitigated by deepening Chinese dialogue and enhanced clarity on mutual maritime security interests. Furthermore, there is no reason why China could not become an integral part of a new Indian Ocean strategic order as a further step towards maximising long-term regional security.\textsuperscript{53} Any such initiatives would require a paradigm shift in Australian policy frameworks, particularly when considered in the context of Australia’s 2012 National Security Statement and the 2013 Defence White Paper.

Enhanced Australian-Indian security ties

Improved security ties stand out as the one policy area with the potential to genuinely deepen Australian-Indian relations. Furthermore, they have the potential to become a strategic balancing factor within the Indo-Pacific region, a factor that directly influences economic
and diplomatic interests. The creation of an Australia-India-Indonesia troika, for example, would be a promising initiative to provide the basis for three-way maritime security dialogue and cooperation.

It would also set the stage for India and Australia to strengthen direct security collaboration, most notably through the creation of regular bilateral naval exercises. In turn, that could lead to enhanced defence cooperation in areas such as the development of amphibious capabilities and operational linkages.

To enhance security ties, Australia should consider the following policy initiatives:

• Foster a formal and mature Australian-Indian-Indonesian trilateral Indian Ocean maritime security arrangement;
• Increase military maritime engagement by establishing a permanent naval attaché position in the Australian High Commission in New Delhi;
• Invite the Indian Government to establish a naval attaché position at the Indian High Commission in Canberra; and
• Foster consistent and transparent dialogue with both the US and China on Indo-Pacific security interests.

Conclusion

This article has argued that Australia does not have a coherent policy approach to India. While in some instances economic policy may appear highly effective, the existence of a comprehensive policy framework—addressing shared interests and developing coherence across the identity, security and diplomatic sectors—remains largely absent. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that Australia is prepared or otherwise willing to invest in the growing strategic intersection it shares with India in the Indo-Pacific region.

Overcoming years of misgivings will not happen overnight and Australia will need to place a higher priority on engagement with India. Canberra will need to do more than just persuade India that Australia is a great place to live, work, study or play cricket. Relations will need to be based on a fuller appreciation of respective national interests and identities—and, indeed, biases. It has been argued in this article that improved security ties, particularly relating to mutual maritime interests in the Indo-Pacific region, have the potential to foster enhanced relations and contribute to the development of what one day could be a true Australian-India partnership.

Brigadier David Wainwright graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1990. His postings have included Commanding Officer 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment, as well as a two-year exchange with the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division (Light) in Hawaii and a two-year assignment in London as the CDF Liaison Officer to the UK Ministry of Defence/UK Permanent Joint Headquarters.

He was also Commanding Officer of Reconstruction Task Force-Three in southern Afghanistan in 2007/08 and, most recently, Chief of Staff to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army School of
Advanced Military Studies. His qualifications include a Bachelor of Management, Masters in Strategy and a Masters in Operational Art. He is currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College.

NOTES

1. This is an edited version of a paper developed by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College in 2013.

2. Australian Government, *Australia in the Asian Century (White Paper)*, Australian Government: Canberra, 2012, p. 37. The White paper asserted that while the US will remain the most powerful strategic actor in Asia for the foreseeable future, the economic growth and broader international interests of Asia’s large powers, especially China and India, will change the established strategic order.


28. Bonnor, ‘Australia-India’, p. 4. In 2007, more than 65,000 students enrolled in various educational institutions throughout Australia. By 2008, this had increased to 95,000.
32. ASPI, *Shared Interests*, p. 75.
40. Shekhar, ‘India and Australia in the Twenty-first Century’.
50. Medcalf and Mohan, ‘The 2012 Australia-India Roundtable’.
51. ASPI, Shared Interests, p. 36.
52. Medcalf and Mohan, ‘The 2012 Australia-India Roundtable’.
53. Sheridan, ‘Australia and India could lead region’.
54. Medcalf, ‘Australia and India’.
58. Medcalf, ‘Australia and India’.
Book reviews

_The Marines Take Anbar: the four-year fight against Al Qaeda_

Richard H. Shultz, Jr
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2013

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Scott, Australian Army

Professor Richard H. Shultz has written a very well researched book that provides two extremely insightful case studies for both planners and leaders: the first a case study of cultural anthropology from Iraq, and the second a case study of an adaptive organisation. However, the title is somewhat misleading in that _The Marines Take Anbar_ does not reflect the true nature of the joint effort that was required to turn the province around. From a state of extremely poor security, where nationalistic and religious extremist insurgents combined to dictate security events, the US forces transitioned al-Anbar to a state where the Islamic extremists were ejected and local authority was restored.

While the US Marines provided the campaign plan and senior leadership required in Anbar, there was always one US Army Armored Cavalry Regiment or Brigade Combat Team under command of the Marine Expeditionary Force (the US Marine Corps equivalent of a corps) in the area of operations, integrating seamlessly with the Marines. Additionally, Joint Special Operations Command played an essential supporting role to the Marines. To be fair, Professor Shultz fully acknowledges the contribution of US Army formations under command of the Marines, as well as Joint Special Operations Command, in all areas of the book bar the title.

In writing _The Marines Take Anbar_, Professor Shultz does not go into the painful detail that some authors do when writing narrative and chronological histories. Instead, he describes the events that convey the level of security at each key point in time, as well as those decisive events that led to the changes that enabled the Marines to take control of the province. Research material comes from primary and secondary sources, including interviews by the author as well as interviews and official records from the US Marine Corps’ History Division and the Marine Corps Research Center within the Marine Corps University. The author provides sufficient endnotes (33 pages in all) to allow readers to research specific events in greater detail.

As a case study of cultural anthropology in Iraq, the book is a ‘must read’ for any military planner preparing for operations among the people of other nations and societies. When the Marines arrived in al-Anbar from the US in early 2004, having earlier successfully contributed to the 2003 invasion and seizure of Baghdad, their initial planning for operations in Anbar was based on flawed assumptions, largely founded on their 2003 experiences in other Iraqi provinces. Much like the vast majority of US forces and other US government agencies when preparing for the 2003 invasion, the Marines did not understand the context or environment within which they would be operating.
The first chapter, ‘This is Al Anbar’, succinctly dissects the human terrain in the manner that should have been completed prior to 2003, covering all aspects of Anbar culture, history and geography—and what they mean to the population, beliefs and values, Bedouin traditions, Islamic principles, Arab culture, and social organisation and political power. All of the references for this chapter are from open-source material—books, journal articles and research reports, mostly pre-dating 2003.

The author leaves the reader with the strong opinion that there was no excuse for not understanding the operating environment and context of operations in both Al-Anbar and Iraq as a whole—a key lesson for all military planners. Chapter One is highly relevant to the planning and preparations for future operations among the people, not just to put operations in Al-Anbar into context as part of an Iraqi case study, but to provide a structure for the understanding of other cultures.

As a case study of an adaptive organisation, *The Marines Take Anbar* is also a ‘must read’ for all leaders of organisations who, as General David Petraeus stated, need ‘the capacity to innovate, to learn, and to think deeply about complex and very difficult problems’. The author leaves the reader with no doubts that the US Marine Corps is such an organisation, with a proud history of learning and adaption at all levels. The Marines in the 1930s studied and reflected on their own experiences and those of others when they wrote the *Small Wars Manual* and developed amphibious techniques—concepts used heavily from the Second World War onward.

In the 1990s, then-Commandant General Charles Krulak foresaw future campaigns and espoused the concept of ‘The Three Block War’. This foresight focused US Marines on skills that would become key manoeuvre concepts in Iraq and then Afghanistan. It is not just at the highest levels where learning occurs—although General James Mattis is shown to be the exemplar warrior scholar—but throughout the Marine Corps, where the Commandant’s reading list is more than just a list of books on a website but an actual physical library in each unit, to be accessed by all ranks, where its reading is expected.

Being an adaptive organisation enabled the Marines to succeed in Anbar province, prior to the ‘surge’ into Iraq of 2007-08. *The Marines Take Anbar* shows that an adaptive military formation is able to overcome poor assumptions, prepare for unexpected events and make the most of ‘chance’ on the battlefield. Being adaptive allowed the Marines to detect that the human environment was changing in their area of operations and then take a pragmatic approach to the Coalition Provisional Authority’s rules regarding the engagement of sheikhs and traditional leaders.

The Marines did this by embracing the ‘Anbar Awakening’ movement and supporting local authorities as they united against Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Marines, as well as the Army units under their command, were prepared in both mind and body to turn threats into opportunities and exploit what some may perceive to be luck. It should be noted that two of the US Army commanders in Al-Anbar are also respected scholars and were authors prior to 2003: H.R. McMaster, authoring *Dereliction of Duty* in 1997, and Sean B. MacFarland, writing the paper ‘Non-Linear Operations: a new doctrine for a new era’ in 1994.

In addition to being prepared to adapt on the battlefield, the continuity of the Marines’ campaign plan from one rotation to another ensured that success was achieved. So often of late, commanders on operations ignore the concepts of their predecessor and try and ‘win the war’ in their own novel way—most often achieving only marginally more than what was inherited.
The campaign design from one Marine Expeditionary Force to another stayed true and was only modified when conditions on the ground changed. Egos did not get in the way. Finally, the Marines also understood from experience that counter-insurgencies require a balanced mix of kinetic operations, often intense and violent, and softer non-kinetic approaches.

*The Marines Take Anbar* is an enjoyable read, although I suggest flagging the maps to help orient the reader to the accounts within would have been useful, and is recommended to readers from all backgrounds. Professor Shultz captures a success story from Iraq—a war that lasted over eight and a half years when it was predicted to last no more than one. This book provides counterinsurgency lessons that should be read alongside those garnered from Malaya and Algeria. Overall, *The Marines Take Anbar* is a ‘must read’ for military planners and leaders of adaptive organisations.

**Conducting Counterinsurgency: Reconstruction Task Force 4 in Afghanistan**

David Connery, David Cran and David Evered  
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2013  
ISBN: 978-1-9219-4177-1

Reviewed by John Donovan

This is the second in the Army History Unit’s ‘Australian Military History Series’, which has been added to the ‘Campaign Series’ and the ‘Combat Support Series’ of short, well-illustrated books on aspects of Australian military history. All three series provide excellent introductions to the Army’s history. Some are genuine ‘condensed books’, being edited versions of full-length books, aimed at a different readership.

The authors use the experience of Reconstruction Task Force 4 (RTF4) as the basis for analysis of the principles of counterinsurgency. They do not claim that the operations of RTF4 were ‘textbook examples’ of those principles but ‘emphasise the value of the principles ... in understanding responses to the insurgency’. They have succeeded admirably in this aim.

After detailing the principles of counterinsurgency and providing a summary of the Australian military commitment to Afghanistan, the authors discuss the principles as they were applied by RTF4. These are discussed in three chapters, each covering a group of principles.

One chapter covers the political aspects of counterinsurgency. The differences between Afghan and Western societies are emphasised, leading into a discussion of the major cultural issues that faced RTF4. Members of the task force had to work at the local level, discovering quickly that the influence and relevance of the national government were limited.

The local population actively resisted some developments desired by the central government (such as new police stations, which they saw as means to enforce taxation, rather than elements in an impartial rule of law). Members of RTF4 found aligning funding to local needs was essential to avoid waste of money and effort but experienced frustration when the definition of ‘need’ was set by the central government or even by authorities outside Afghanistan.
The waste of a million Euro on a failed solar lighting system was an example of poor alignment between local needs and the ambitions of some aid organisations, as were hospital latrines built in a location which locals did not consider appropriate. The batteries installed for the lighting system failed in the extreme climate, while the latrines were demolished once payment was made!

An important chapter emphasises that counterinsurgency is not primarily a military activity but requires a comprehensive approach. RTF4 members saw weaknesses here, one commenting that ‘coalition partners weren’t working together for a common aim’. The final chapter on counterinsurgency principles focuses on the reality that insurgents exist among the people. RTF4 noted that when the Taliban were not receiving support, they could blend back in, re-starting active operations once conditions became more favourable. This made assessment of progress difficult.

Physically and morally isolating the insurgents is essential but was not a primary role of RFT4, which built infrastructure to support the Afghan government, while providing its own security. Construction funds, however, could be used to attract potential insurgents to take up regular employment on construction projects. For this approach to work, a balanced force is required, under the mantra ‘clear, hold, build’.

The key lesson in this book is the need to temper theory (the principles of counterinsurgency) with reality (the physical, cultural and military environment in which counterinsurgents are operating). Without this, the probability is that the counterinsurgency will not be successful.

Two interesting aspects of this book are the comfort that the Army has with using unit-level combined arms task forces, and the degree of integration of female soldiers into units that, if not in the forefront of battle, are deployed into areas where the probability of face-to-face combat exists.

**From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: the US at war in Afghanistan and Iraq**

John Ballard, David Lamm and John Wood
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2012
ISBN: 978-1-6125-1022-4

Reviewed by Brigadier Chris Field, Australian Army

In the last decade, the US has led two near-simultaneous campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. These campaigns are the subject of *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: the US at war in Afghanistan and Iraq*. The book’s thesis is two-fold. First, despite the US definition and practice of campaigning (see ‘definitions’ on page 105), mistakes have occurred in both theatres, and US strategic direction has not always guided operational objectives. Second, despite the US strategic intent to simultaneously ‘rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region’ and ‘continue to place a premium on US and allied military presence in, and support of, partner nations in and around [the Middle East]’, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq significantly challenged US human, material and financial capabilities.
The authors—John Ballard, Dean of Faculty at the National War College, David Lamm, Deputy Director, and John Wood, Associate Professor Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University—have written an ambitious book. In 306 pages, they attempt to frame more than 10 years of US foreign policy in two intractable conflicts. They complete this task well. The book provides a useful description of developing US strategy and policy related to campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back* demonstrates that campaigns require complex, often contrary, sometimes unexpected and always evolutionary policies, strategies and operational concepts.

*From Kabul to Baghdad and Back* is recommended as an Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) primer. Many current and future ACSC course members lived part of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns—some as participants, others from afar. Ballard, Lamm and Wood provide these course members with interesting observations on leadership, strategy setting, campaign design, objective writing, and end-state setting and achievement. In the context of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, campaign mistakes are as instructive as campaign successes.

Also instructive for ACSC course members are the seven pages of acronyms and abbreviations in *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back*. A reader might reflect on the proliferation of acronyms and abbreviations in both campaigns. These short-hand terms are designed for efficient communications to quickly enhance people’s understanding of their environment and battlespace. Instead, rapid-fire acronyms and abbreviations flood conversations which become, even for the initiated, largely incomprehensible. This troublesome trend in warfighting is reminiscent of General McChrystal’s comment on the squiggles shown to him on a PowerPoint slide in the summer of 2009, titled ‘Afghanistan Stability/Counterinsurgency Dynamics - Security’, to which he replied: ‘When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war’.

Ballard, Lamm and Wood grapple with the challenges of sustained campaign leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both campaigns, the US encouraged and supported first Iraqi and later Afghan leadership. Additionally, coalition leadership in Afghanistan varied to include the US Department of State, special envoys, the Central Intelligence Agency, special operations forces, International Security Assistance Forces from NATO, and the US Department of Defense.

Coalition leadership in Iraq, albeit without the complexity of NATO, also experienced leadership misalignment. For example, in 2003 at the end of initial combat operations, misaligned leadership occurred within the US Department of Defense. To quote the then US Central Command Commander, General Tommy Franks, in a conversation with retired US Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, Chief of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, both of whom worked for the US Department of Defense, ‘You pay attention to the day after, I’ll pay attention to the day of’.

The lesson from both theatres is that from the outset, strategic thinking must be clear on lines of responsibility and leadership for a campaign. As demonstrated in both Afghanistan and Iraq, confused command and control arrangements lead to uncoordinated actions, loss of campaign momentum and wasted lives and resources. As Clausewitz states, no nation should enter a campaign without visualising the end result:

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in [their] senses ought to do so—without first being clear in [their] mind what [they] intend to achieve by that war and how [they] intend to conduct it. The former is its political purpose, the latter its operational objective.
Ballard, Lamm and Wood make astute observations on the relative importance of the Afghanistan campaign after the Iraq campaign commenced. In 2003, US Army General McNeil and later General Vines were under significant pressure from US Central Command ‘not to overcommit resources to Afghanistan to make sure everything possible was available to Iraq’. As Ballard, Lamm and Wood note, the idea of ‘over-commitment’ to Afghanistan implies that the US Government would at least ‘sufficiently commit’ to the theatre in order to meet the needs of the mission. The authors conclude that after the commencement of the Iraq campaign, Afghanistan became the ‘economy of force’ theatre, making it—in the simplest of terms—the theatre to ‘not lose’ rather than to ‘win’.

The Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns were also fought under two US Presidents, the Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Barak Obama. Proving Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is merely the continuation of policy by other means’ and that war is a ‘true political instrument’, US strategy in both theatres changed frequently and rapidly, driven largely by US political rivalry, domestic requirements and political change. For example, from November 2008—as the US presidency transitioned from President Bush to President Obama—the US conducted, in less than 12 months, five strategic reviews of Afghanistan: Lute (November 2008); Mullen (January 2009); Petraeus (January 2009); Riedel (February 2009); and McChrystal (August 2009). Interestingly, all five made similar conclusions and ‘endorsed a more fully resourced civil-military counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan’.

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back emphasises the impact civil-military leadership had on the confluence of US strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. This impact is exemplified by the Ambassador Crocker-General Petraeus team. The cooperative relationship of Crocker and Petraeus produced eerily parallel national goals for both campaigns, namely:

**Goals for Iraq 2007:**

1. Let the Iraqis lead
2. Help Iraqis protect the population
3. Isolate extremists
4. Create space for political progress
5. Diversify political and economic efforts
6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.

**Goals for Afghanistan 2011:**

1. Transition to Afghan led
2. Help Afghan National Security Forces protect the population
3. Separate the Taliban from the people, break links to Al-Qaeda
4. Pursue reconciliation (through the ‘diplomatic surge’)
5. Build infrastructure, economic capacity, and governance
6. Pursue a multilateral, regional solution.

Campaign clarity enabled by the teaming of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus reminds ADF personnel of the value that civil-military partnerships can bring to operations. Importantly, these operations may include the spectrum of war, peace-making, peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other tasks.
Finally, ADF personnel may use *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back* as a prism to consider Australia’s own two near-simultaneous campaigns over the last decade. As stated in the 2013 Australian Defence White Paper, the ADF has led one campaign, ‘contributing to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste’ and followed in the other, ‘contributing to the international campaign against terrorism’. Like the two near-simultaneous campaigns led by the US, Australia’s two campaigns have challenged our human, material and financial capabilities. For these reasons and in preparation for future campaigns, *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back* is a useful professional study for ADF personnel.

**DEFINITIONS**

*campaign*: a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space

*campaign plan*: a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space

*campaign planning*: the process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theatre strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign.

**NOTES**

Australian Eagles: Australians in the Battle of Britain

Kristen Alexander
Barrallier Books: Canberra, 2013

Reviewed by Dr Mark Lax

‘I have a knack of getting into and out of trouble’. So wrote Desmond Sheen in a letter to his parents after his second successful bale-out of a damaged Spitfire in 1940. Sheen was an Australian fighter pilot who flew in the Battle of Britain and was one of the survivors. He later recalled he had about 700 hours in fighters but only 20 minutes he would never forget. This was a common theme.

Each year on ‘Battle of Britain Day’, on the weekend closest to 15 September, veterans and representatives of today’s RAAF, and their families, gather in Hobart to commemorate the sacrifice of ‘the Few’ in the Battle of Britain. There is also a service at the Australian War Memorial. But why do we still remember a distant air battle with such devotion and ceremony?

Officially, 2949 pilots from Britain, the Commonwealth and other allied nations flew in the Battle of Britain, with 544 being killed. However, less than 40 Australians fought in the battle, 13 of whom were killed. Compared to the Australian contribution to the land campaigns in North Africa and Southeast Asia, and the efforts of the men of Bomber Command, such ceremony seems hardly relevant.

Perhaps it is the connection many Australian still feel to the ‘Mother Country’ and how we rose to her defence in her ‘darkest hour’. Perhaps it is the Australian characteristic of cheering for the underdog which appeals—or our respect for the hero who overcomes impossible odds. Maybe it was because the battle was the first time in history that the outcome depended solely on air power. Whatever the reason, those heroes of ‘the Few’ remain in our collective consciousness and we still remember them.

Australian Eagles: Australians in the Battle of Britain by Canberra author Kristen Alexander provides a further clue. The book is a biographical collection covering the lives of six Australian pilots who fought in the battle. Through these vignettes, we come to realise these young men were just like the many others who rose to the call. Their stories contain all the excitement, the expectations and fears held by that generation as they went off to a distant war. Through this book, they are portrayed as very human, not poster boys—they are just like today’s young men and women who go off to a distant war.

This book is Kristen Alexander’s third foray into airmen biography and Australian Eagles follows her books on RAAF World War 2 airmen Clive Caldwell and Jack Davenport. Both previous publications were well received and Australian Eagles should be likewise. Alexander’s sometimes forensic detail about her subjects allows the reader to fly with them in life and, in some cases, follow them down to their death. The book is well researched and a moving tribute to a few of ‘the Few’ and I thought was pitched at the right level and tone. Each is a
very human story and often quite emotional. You cannot help be touched by the sense of loss felt by each family when told their loved one would not be coming home.

Each of the six has their story told using official records, personal documents and letters, and family interviews. Importantly for the stories, Alexander has taken great pains to trace the aftermath of the loss of four of the men and, in so doing, brought out the human tragedy of a wasted youth. I found John Crossman’s story particularly moving as Alexander describes the family reaction to his death and the drawn-out aftermath, not just with grief, but with the need to clear John’s debts with the RAF before personal items could be returned. In Crossman’s case, this took some time but, today, visits continue each year to his grave in Chalfont St Giles in Buckinghamshire.

Apart from Dennis Newton’s A Few of ‘the Few’ published in 1990 and released to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the battle, very little has been written specifically about Australians in the battle. Kristen Alexander’s Australian Eagles is thus a fresh reminder of their service and sacrifice and adds to the rich biography we have of Australian military airmen.

Why do we still remember the Battle of Britain? Perhaps the best answer was given by Des Sheen, another of Alexander’s ‘Eagles’, so many years ago when he said: ‘It is not enough to celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Britain. We must honour its obligations, particularly to the airmen who won this and other battles leading to victory’. I am sure he was right.

For those interested in RAAF history and the Battle of Britain, this book is not only well written and a great read, it is a must. Highly recommended.

**Lessons from the Hanoi Hilton:**

*six characteristics of high-performance teams*

Peter Fretwell and Taylor Baldwin Kiland
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-6125-1217-4

Reviewed by Jim Truscott

This book is an unusual POW story about leadership. It compares POW culture to high-performing teams in business and life—a veritable case study in sustainable culture. From August 1964 to February 1973, 470 of the 800 American POWs in Southeast Asia were in North Vietnam and many where incarcerated in what they called the ‘Hanoi Hilton’ (and which the Vietnamese called Hoa Lo or ‘Fiery Furnace’).

The book explains how the POWs built a high-performance, resilient organisational culture. The tenet is that no matter what the situation, you can control your response to it. In this case, it was to stick to one’s value and get home without shame.

It was a culture that was sustained across concrete walls, geographic distances and several years, with the mission of returning everyone home safely. Torture meant that they all had to break the code of conduct, which normally leads to a tendency towards ‘every man for
himself’, although that did not occur in this case. Why did they not succumb when that was the undoing of POW camps in previous wars? The book explains that their mission focus on the propaganda battlefront was to ‘return with honour’ and this they did.

Post-war surveys show that the POWs drew some benefits from the experience. As a group, they were resilient—with very low rates of post-traumatic stress disorder—largely due to virtual leadership, viral culture and social network. The tap code they developed to communicate between cells was an early form of social media. Like sports psychology, it was a culture of hyper focus, no excuses, and all-in commitment by aviators who had an unusual combination of ambition and affiliation.

The book argues that a culture of optimism is the single most important buffer against any psychiatric diagnosis. In their case, race, service, rank and family background were replaced by bonds of compassion and sacrifice. The POWs simple orders were to not bow in public, stay off the air, not to admit crimes, never ‘kiss the guards goodbye’, and unity over self, including through their allegiance to the United States.

Their description of their group as the Fourth Allied POW Wing epitomises a high-performance team operating in a difficult and dangerous environment against formidable odds. It is testimony to these men that they produced 16 generals, six admirals, two ambassadors, two college presidents, one presidential candidate, two senators, two lower-house representatives, a state governor, several state legislators and numerous presidential political appointments. The book should be read by all current-day servicemen and -women at risk of capture.

_The British Pacific Fleet Experience and Legacy, 1944-50_

Jon Robb-Webb
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2013
ISBN: 978-0-7546-6851-0

Reviewed by Commander Robert Woodham, RAN

The Pacific War necessitated a completely novel approach to warfare, spanning as it did vast distances, and shaped by air power as never before. In response to these challenges, the US Navy developed a whole new way of fighting at sea, based around carrier-borne aviation, projecting power ashore through amphibious assaults, supported by hugely extended logistics lines, and commanded over great distances.

By the time the Royal Navy came to the theatre, in the form of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF), the Imperial Japanese Navy had been confined to limited operations in home waters, and an ineffectual presence at Singapore, although significant threats from the air, submarines and mines remained. But it was important to the British that they were seen to participate in the final conquest of the Japanese homeland, hence the somewhat contentious decision in September 1944 to despatch the BPF for operations in the central Pacific.
The contention around the BPF, and its mission, stemmed from disagreements between some prodigious personalities, chiefly the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. This book unravels these differences of opinion, as well as the efforts made at lower levels of command to implement the agreement in a workable manner.

On the British side, this task fell to the Commander-in-Chief of the BPF, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, who had to establish a working relationship with Admiral Chester Nimitz, and quickly get his Fleet up to speed with new techniques, such as replenishment at sea, and the setting up of logistic support through a sizeable ‘Fleet train’. These were new concepts, unknown in the European theatre.

Differences in carrier design between the US Navy and Royal Navy (RN) are also explained, such as the means by which the US Navy was able to generate much greater sortie rates, and the reason why RN ships were less vulnerable to Kamikaze attacks. For my money, the book is at its best when presenting these sorts of detailed explanations of how the Pacific War was fought.

Taking a more academic approach, the book attempts to apply a ‘levels of war’ analysis to shed light on the significance of the BPF. The author’s contention is that its importance was seen at the grand strategic level rather than the operational level: the fact that it existed was more significant than the combat power it brought to bear. It was obvious that the BPF was playing second fiddle to the US Navy in the Pacific, and this served to highlight the eclipse of Britain as a superpower by the US in the post-war world. It also set the context for the later UN response to the crisis in Korea. This aspect of the story includes a fascinating exposition of post-war naval strategy and the rise of the Soviet Navy.

It has to be said that, to an Australian reader, this seems to be a very British book about a not entirely British Fleet. It is disappointing that the significant contributions made to the BPF by the RAN, and other ‘Dominion Navies’, do not even rate a mention. These contributions include no fewer than 18 RAN ‘Bathurst’-class corvettes and six ‘Q’- and ‘N’-class destroyers. Other British Commonwealth contributions included two Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) cruisers and a large number of naval aviators who served in the RN carriers, four Royal Canadian Navy cruisers, and personnel from the South African Navy.

Perhaps the term ‘British’ was understood in the 1940s to include the ‘Empire’. But I suspect there is more to it than that. Dr Robb-Webb gives away his northern hemisphere bias in a little Freudian slip, referring to the visit of the battleship HMS King George V to Melbourne in ‘autumn’ 1945 (it was in October and November—in time for the Melbourne Cup).

Overall, this book is thoroughly researched and a very worthwhile read, addressing an important period in Australian history, and drawing conclusions which remain relevant today.

NOTES

1. As quoted by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser in Hugh Campbell, Notable Service to the Empire: Australian Corvettes and the British Pacific Fleet 1944-45, Naval Historical Society of Australia: Garden Island, 1995, the Fleet train as at January 1945 was made up of 40 ships of various types, including repair ships, stores ships, oilers, depot ships and hospital ships. At the same time, the main fleet contained

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two battleships, four fleet carriers, five cruisers (one RNZN) and fifteen destroyers (three RAN), while the escort force contained 18 corvettes (all RAN) and seven frigates and sloops.

2. As cited in Hugh Campbell, *Notable Service to the Empire*.

3. As reported in *The Argus*, 30 October 1945. Under the headline ‘Biggest warship to visit Melbourne for 20 years’, the paper records the arrival of HMS *King George V* at Port Melbourne. *The Argus‘ shipping movements column for 10 November 1945 notes that it departed that day for Sydney.
On-line book reviews

*Lonesome Pine: the bloody ridge*

Simon Cameron

Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-9221-3230-7

Reviewed by John Donovan

Simon Cameron’s book on the battle for Lone Pine in August 1915 will appeal to a readership seeking descriptions of the detailed events during the battle and of the personal experiences of the soldiers there. However, the battle is also placed in its wider context, as a diversionary element of the last Allied attempt to resolve the Gallipoli impasse by offensive action.

Cameron describes clearly the debilitated state of the men of the 1st Division before the attack. The similarly debilitated state of the men in the brigades making the main attack from Anzac on Chunuk Bair and Hill 971 probably contributed significantly to the failure on Sari Bair, for which Lone Pine was a diversion.

The descriptions of the attack and defence of Lone Pine are well set out. When they are linked with the many maps, it is easy to gain a clear picture of events. Cameron’s use of anecdotes also gives a good sense of how the battle affected the individual participants on both sides. Cameron records the part played in the battle by the Ottoman Major Zeki Bey, who later helped Bean to understand the course of the battle from the Ottoman side when Bean was researching his official history.

Personalities such as Chaplain McKenzie—said to have buried some 450 men at Lone Pine—are featured, as are men who rose to fame in the Second World War, such as Leslie Morshead and Iven Mackay. The delightfully named Lieutenant Everard Digges La Touche (an ordained minister with a PhD from Trinity College, Dublin, who had originally enlisted as a private soldier) features briefly, before being killed. More junior soldiers are not neglected.

Cameron makes the case that Lone Pine was a success because the Australians held part of the ridge after the attack but not the part overlooking The Cup, in which the Ottoman forces concentrated for counter-attacks. He similarly points out that significant Ottoman forces (three regiments from the reserves of the northern group) were sent to Lone Pine and thus were unavailable to counter the attacks further north.

As a simple statement this might be true but, in the absence of success on Sari Bair, success at Lone Pine was nugatory. Even Cameron concedes that the ‘ground itself offered little advantage … since [it] … did not [provide] a commanding view of Owen’s Gully and Legge Valley’. The new Australian position was a salient vulnerable to fire from three sides.
Bean records some 2277 Australian casualties at Lone Pine during the battle, of whom Cameron estimates around 900 died during or in the immediate aftermath of the battle, with more succumbing in later years. To quote one of Rome’s many enemies, Pyrrus of Epirus—after a particularly bloody victory over Roman forces—‘One more such victory and we are lost’.

Cameron’s account of the origin of the name of the battle site as ‘Lonesome Pine’, from a pre-war music hall melody, is interesting. I had always assumed that the name was based on the single Aleppo pine tree that once grew on the ridge. However, the contemporary evidence that Cameron quotes clearly indicates the then-widespread use of Lonesome Pine, which was later shortened. Bean even used the name in an early report on the battle.

The maps are generally useful aids to comprehension. That said, it is unfortunate that Map 1 has the key reversed, so that the feint attacks are shown as the principal objectives, and the principal objectives as the feints. Fortunately, the adjacent text clarifies the issue. Leslie Morshead also has his name occasionally spelled incorrectly as ‘Morsehead’ or as ‘Moreshead’.

**Big Guns Brave Men:**
*mobile artillery observers and the Battle for Okinawa*

Rodney E. Walton  
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2013  
ISBN: 978-1-6125-1130-6

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

In all the writings on military matters 1939-45, little has been devoted to the forward observer teams. Rodney Walton’s father was a lieutenant in a forward observer team in the ferocious fighting to capture Okinawa: the names of 14,000 US killed there are on the memorial. After his own military service in Vietnam, Rodney Walton began to research the experiences of his father and other veterans of the Okinawa campaign, with personal interviews and official records and unit histories.

Walton first puts the forward observer experience on Okinawa into perspective with an overview of the development of the control of artillery from the American Civil War to 1939, and the US preparations for war from 1940.

He makes the interesting point that US society of the time included large numbers of men of military age with a background of secondary education and participation in mechanical and technological matters that allowed the creation of modern armed forces in all three Services, capable of employing military equipment of recent design. Among all the other specialist requirements for a world war, this reservoir of men familiar with machines permitted the creation of artillery forward observer teams. Japanese society could not match this national capability to induct, test, allocate and train men in the mass to create a modern armed force.

In the Okinawa campaign, rather than have the services of forward observer teams capable of reacting to the situation and calling in artillery, the Japanese largely relied on pre-planned fire
onto likely targets, such as road and track junctions, urban areas and similar. Sometimes the Japanese procedures took hours to result in shells arriving. The Japanese had prepared for a defensive battle, with tunnels, bunkers, strengthened caves and fortifications, all making good use of the terrain, with its steep ridges, narrow gullies and valleys and exposed ridge tops. Many positions were on the reverse slope, creating difficulty for the attacking units.

Because the Japanese had thoroughly mapped the island, good observation places were known to them, so US observer teams often came under fire, with lethal results. A ‘tour of duty’ in the front line for the observer teams was only three days—but typically three days of intense activity and participation in actions, day and night. The Japanese had many observers and one such saw a procession of US vehicles arrive at a good vantage point looking out over the battle area. The observer deduced the occupants must be of senior rank, and delivered the location detail to what was reportedly the last 150mm gun in action. That gun’s shells killed General Buckner, the US commander, who had arrived to watch an attack.

Prior to his death, General Buckner had decided to clear and secure the entire island, rather than do what General MacArthur had done elsewhere, which was to secure the area necessary for airfields and harbours and let the Japanese attack the defensive lines established. He had also followed US practice in employing concentrated accurate artillery to blast his lines forward. This had worked in Europe and in other Pacific campaigns, where Japanese artillery was not a major force.

However, Okinawa was to be different, in that the underground positions tended to negate the effect of artillery, and ground had to be searched and cleared several times by infantry, with tank and flame-thrower teams. Even after the island was declared secured on 22 June, over 8,700 Japanese were killed, and the last fatality by enemy action in US artillery units was suffered two weeks after the atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki.

The Japanese sometimes fired on US positions when US artillery was in action, resulting in allegations of ‘friendly fire’ and abuse of the artillery teams by their infantry unit for the presumed incompetence of the gunners at the firing position and the forward team. This Japanese tactic was difficult to prove to the US unit on the receiving end. Apart from the enemy, the physical conditions were daunting. US radios were so heavy that sometimes the operator could not climb the steep ridges and had to be pushed and pulled by others, and the equally heavy battery had to be hauled along as well.

The US Army tried to have forward observer teams with each rifle company, reporting to the parent unit at battalion level. It was soon found that the rank structure and forms of address in training melted away in action, and anyone who could perform the necessary duties, regardless of rank, was needed. Japanese snipers were so dangerous that it was forbidden to salute or address officers by rank, and communication in person by use of family name was routine.

This book does provide a good account of the operational demands on forward observers in the Okinawa battle, with a solid base of personal contributions. Its appendix includes memories not included in the main text, from veterans of the battle in various units and arms, to provide more personal illustrations of their experiences. And four charts usefully illustrate the structures of a firing battery and observation team, observer teams compared with liaison teams, and artillery support for infantry units.
The images of Robert William ‘Blowtorch Bob’ Komer epitomise the classic figure of a 1960s US National Security Council member. His name and his image reflect the images and names of others from that US foreign policy generation including, in no order, McGeorge Bundy, William Colby, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr and Robert McNamara. They wore dark suits, white shirts, simple ties, white handkerchiefs, short clean-cut, brushed-back hairstyles and rimmed, dark-edged glasses.

This book by Frank Leith Jones is the first monograph of a biographical nature as to Komer. It is a comprehensive work, at some 400 pages in length, and is organised into three parts (of four, six and four chapters respectively). The book is exhaustively referenced, with approximately 70 pages of endnotes, and includes a bibliography and index. The author is Professor of Security Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College, and holds the General Dwight D. Eisenhower Chair in National Security.

Komer served as a national security policy and strategy adviser to three Democratic Party Presidents: Kennedy, Johnson and Carter. Particularly, Komer is known for his time in and his advice regarding South Vietnam. It is significant that in 1968 he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey but was expeditiously removed by President Nixon.

This book is a comprehensive biography of a key policy maker. A reader is left with an underlying theme that military power does not so efficiently transfer into the political-military sphere, and the research articulates that theme as a constant challenge within the mind of a key foreign policy advisor. At the initial dispatch of troops to South Vietnam, Komer stated, ‘the point of installing token US forces before the event is to signal our intentions to the other fellow, and thus hopefully avoid having to face up to the commitment of substantial US forces after a fracas has developed’.

Komer was a key constituent part of the escalation which occurred in the late 1960s, as to South Vietnam, particularly under President Johnson’s leadership. However, Komer later argued that the provision of additional troops would harm ongoing attempts at pacification. He was knowledgeable about the French experience in Indo-China and the British counterinsurgency practices in Malaya, and understood Vietnam as a political-military struggle which demanded a political strategy, rather than a pure military solution.

Komer was an individual of his generation. It is not appropriate to judge him through the prism of hindsight but this book provides a factual basis for any assessment to be made of him. He was aggressive as a person, distasted bureaucracy, was educated as a businessman and reflected that in his decision-making but believed that the US military had a capacity
for nation-building. His 15 or so years at the Central Intelligence Agency and his time at the Harvard Business School provided foundations as to the courses of action taken by him in Vietnam, with a take-no-prisoners attitude based on statistics.

It is remarkable that the period of time between the end of the Second World War and the conclusion of the military presence in then-South Vietnam is a shorter period than the time period between the military commitment in Vietnam and today. Many of the key policy and strategy persons are gone. For those old enough to potentially recall, time may have 'dimmed' their recollections of specific reported events. This book is, therefore, an important addition to the volume of information relating broadly to Vietnam.

**The Bush Leadership, the power of ideas, and the war on terror**

David B. MacDonald, Dirk Nabers and Robert G. Patman
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2013

Reviewed by Dr Noel Sproles

This is an edited book with nine essays by different authors, including several by the editors themselves, covering a broad range of topics relating to international relations. While some provide a factual background to events, others are speculative and full of conjecture on what might or might not have happened if this or that course of action was followed. As a result, their value varies. They are written solely from the perspective of the US as a superpower but there are lessons there for a regional power such as Australia.

One essay, for example, discusses the ‘Bush Doctrine’ in some detail and puts it into an historical perspective. Others articulate historical events, such as the US-Iran relationship, or explain the difference between soft and hard power, and how each may be employed. There is an essay on how domestic politics can influence a nation’s international policy. Another is by a senior army officer with a civil affairs background, who provides forthright views on the decision to disband the Iraqi military, police and civil administration after the second Iraq war.

Having read the book twice, cover to cover, I remain confused about the editors’ intent in putting these essays together. The book’s title would have the reader believe that its scope is less than it really is. Instead of being limited to the presidency of George W. Bush and the ‘war on terror’, it encompasses the entire post-Cold War era and the activities of all the US Presidents who held office in that period. There are only two specific references to the power of ideas. Each one is a definition and, most confusingly, neither bears much relationship to the other. It poses a question to the reader; have I missed something here or is there something amiss with the book? I suspect the latter.

The introduction fails to make a clear statement as to the aim of the book and it is only in the conclusion that some indication is given as to what was hoped to be achieved. This refers to such concepts as the differentiation of the art of leadership at the international level from the exercise of power; what constitutes effective leadership at this level; the effect of material
capabilities on the leadership process; the relationship between leaders and their followers; and the role of ideas in international politics. President George W. Bush and his administration provide the basis for a case study to illustrate these points.

If this had been stated in the beginning, and if the book had followed this scheme, then muddy waters may have become clear. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Instead, the discussions on leadership per se are shallow and contain nothing that readers of this journal would not already be aware of. The concept of the power of ideas is barely discussed, and not developed. While the war on terror is referred to frequently, some essays are devoted to other matters such as border control with Mexico and the attempts to establish a relationship with Iran during the Khatami regime.

I feel that the problem with this work is that it fails the test of an edited book, for it is not a collection of viewpoints on a single subject as would be expected in works of this genre. The editors, in failing to establish a clear aim, have made an impossible task for themselves to select essays with a common focus. Perhaps the range of topics covered, as indicated in the conclusion, was too ambitious for one book. Perhaps the editors’ views could have been better expressed in a standard book drawing on the thoughts of the essayists.

Whatever the reason, the individual essays tend to be isolated from each other and leave the reader struggling to make a connection. This is exacerbated by the sequencing of the essays in the book, which seems to have been done in a random manner without thought to the development of a theme. This suspicion is reinforced in the concluding chapter, where each essay is reviewed but not in the order in which it appears in the book.

Several chapters are on sociological topics. The language of one essay in particular is arcane with passages such as '[this] shows how hegemonic discourses serve as the nexus between crises and social structures and how they make identity construction possible'. Such language is incomprehensible to the uninitiated or those not comfortable in dealing with such deep abstract ideas, and does not fit the tone of the majority of the essays that were written with the general reader in mind. To be fair, the author may not have intended his essay for a general readership and I feel that the editors should have arranged for it to be rewritten or not included.

Mention must also be made of the number of typographical and grammar errors in this book. The most glaring must be a reference to the ‘Wight House’ instead of the ‘White House’. This may have come about as one ‘C. Wight’ was the author of a book referenced elsewhere in the essay where this occurred. What is strange is that most errors are in the form of either the omission or inappropriate inclusion of items such as prepositions and articles. That such unusual errors appear across all essays indicates that it was not the authors who were at fault so much as the editors or publisher who clearly did not perform the most elementary proofing. The sheer scale of the errors is a distraction for the reader and, at times, makes ascertaining meaning difficult.

The editors, in failing to establish a clear purpose for this book, have made it difficult for the reader to benefit from the essayists’ views. While individual essays may be of interest, the absence of some common focus does not merit presenting them as an edited book. None of this is helped by the number of typographical errors throughout the book. I would suggest that anyone who does decide to purchase this book do so for the essays themselves and treats them more as they would in reading a journal than an edited work.
Hustling Hinkler
The short tumultuous life of a trailblazing Australian aviator

D. R. Dymock
Hachette Australia: Sydney, 2013
ISBN: 978-0-7336-2983-9

Reviewed by Kristen Alexander

Everyone knows the story of Bert Hinkler, the first to fly solo from England to Australia. Or they think they do. They certainly don’t know it in detail and many would be surprised at the extent of his complicated personal life. In *Hustling Hinkler*, Darryl Dymock reveals the life and career of the Australian aviation pioneer who had been captivated by flight from boyhood. Bert Hinkler built his first plane while still a teenager and he dedicated his life to flying and aerial adventure even at the expense of a proper job and financial security.

I am not particularly keen on ‘creative non-fiction’, where the narrator purports to know exactly what someone is doing and thinking, even when that is unknowable, such as during Hinkler’s last hours. Dymock’s prologue opens with this technique but the main work is more soundly based, drawing on a wide range of source material including Hinkler’s unpublished ‘Eighteen Years of Flying: dips into my diary’, and letters to his mother.

Dymock is selective with quotes, weaving them into the narrative rather than chunking them in, and they reveal much about Hinkler’s vibrant personality and humour, including his interesting turns of phrase and flexible spelling. *Hustling Hinkler* is pitched towards the broader reading public rather than the technically minded aviation enthusiast. The title, subtitle and back cover blurt ‘part adventure, part mystery and part tragedy ... the unforgettable story of Bert Hinkler’s astonishing life’ all attest to this. Nevertheless, Dymock’s research is transparent with decent endnotes and a thorough bibliography, demonstrating that popular history can be well grounded.

One chapter deals with Hinkler’s military service and Dymock highlights how his letters home are at odds with the mayhem of battle. Part of this belongs to the tradition of not worrying your people about the dangers of warfare. But it is partly because, to him, military service was the ends to the means of learning to fly and, even as an observer, he was closer to his goal and the prospect thrilled him. From observer to air gunner, and being awarded the Good Conduct Badge 1st Class and the Distinguished Service Medal for his part in sinking a German light cruiser. He had just about given up hope of qualifying for a pilot’s licence with the Royal Naval Air Service when he was recommended for pilot training. He received his wings in July 1918.

The bulk of this biography covers Hinkler’s flying achievements but Dymock does not write about Hinkler in isolation. He touches on the international brotherhood of the air which developed almost from the beginning of powered flight. He highlights the rapidly changing aviation world. Records fell almost as soon as they were made, better aircraft were constantly being developed, and new gimmicks were needed to maintain public interest.

Hinkler gained his fame for his first solo flight but failed to find a place in aviation history despite public acclaim. His ambitions fell in the face of technological change and public fickleness as
much as through his belief that he could walk into a position without formal qualifications or current industry experience. Dymock emphasises the fleeting nature of Hinkler’s fame, signified by the demise of ‘Ibis’, the monoplane he designed in 1930, which was abandoned and then languished for years before being scrapped in 1959, ‘without ceremony, and due recognition of its significant place in Bert Hinkler’s heart and history’.

Dymock has produced a competent, well-written, engaging and accessible biography, where the research has been seamlessly integrated. Too much technical detail can bamboozle and it is to Dymock’s credit that he never allows necessary explanations to affect his pacy narrative. Maps of the flights would have been helpful but Dymock has almost made up for their absence by including modern place names along with the 1920s/30s names. The selection of photos is good, if a little sparse, but perhaps this is explained by the fact that Hinkler’s fame and thus interest as a photographic subject only lasted five years.

I enjoyed Hustling Hinkler and recommend it as a ‘good read’ and sound biography.

_Human-Robot Interactions in Future Military Operations_

Edited by Michael Barnes and Florian Jentsch
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2010
ISBN: 978-0-7546-7539-6

Reviewed by Dr Patrick Hew, DSTO

The title evokes a goal of establishing what human-robot interactions (HRI) ought to be, from a strategic assessment of future military operations. Readers seeking such a book should look elsewhere. The editors have compiled 23 papers from current research into HRI in a volume that has the feel of being the proceedings of a conference.

The research is heavily influenced by post-2001 operations in Southwest Asia. Much attention is on unmanned ground and air vehicles, controlled at the soldier team-level under land battlefield conditions. The recurring themes included how can robots be controlled, preferably with one controller having effective control of multiple robots? And how can HRI foster controller performance and situation awareness?

For this reviewer, the stand-out articles were:

- Chapter 3, where Murphy and Burke proposed that the baseline safe human-robot ratio is ‘Number of humans = number of vehicles + number of payloads + 1’. The proposal argues that in sustainable safe operations, one person can hold one viewpoint. For remotely-controlled vehicles mounting video cameras, this amounts to three viewpoints: a pilot focused on the vehicle, a mission specialist focused on the view through the payload camera, and a flight director holding an overview. The article’s significance is in giving designers and planners a base estimate on the number of people that the ADF will need to raise and train as it introduces its robots.
• Chapter 11, where Wickens, Levinthal and Rice studied the threshold at which an automated system alerts an operator to an event of significance, when the human can optionally choose to monitor the raw information. A high rate of false alarms can lead to the ‘cry wolf’ effect, where the human fails to comply with the automated system’s alert. At low thresholds, the human relies on the automation to the extent that if the automation misses an event, the human will also miss it. The research nonetheless concluded that there can be an overall benefit to human performance if the overall error rate remains below about 20 per cent. The article may have application to automated sensors in ADF use, with optional human intervention.

• Chapter 16, where Chen studied the ability of an operator to find targets in the remote environment (via robot surveillance), as well as their immediate environment (own sensors). The article may have application to the control of robots by crews of ADF fighting vehicles.

The volume otherwise gives an insight into how ergonomics scientists are approaching questions in HRI, in conceptualising the problems, running experiments and exploring solutions. The book will thus be a useful addition to libraries in human factors.

**Gallipoli: an Australian medical perspective**

Michael Tyquin  
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2012  
ISBN: 978-1-9219-4186-3

Reviewed by Jim Truscott

This book is a sober compilation of a litany of errors that must be read by every future senior force commander. While the Gallipoli campaign was an amphibious operation, without parallel in modern military history, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was woefully unprepared for the surges and large numbers of battle casualties, and the subsequent outbreaks of disease, due to serious defects in medical management and the evacuation system.

Prior training was also basic—two weeks at best for medics and stretcher bearers—and the lack of military training for doctors also explains some of the errors. Australian medical units were under British control and there was no senior Australian medical officer in Egypt with responsibility for the Australian forces there.

Planning was haphazard, as the force commander did his reconnaissance by ship without any staff in attendance, leading to the untested assumption that there would be enough land to position the force. A navy surgeon was appointed over an army doctor to design the medical evacuation system and there was no destination planning for casualties. There was also no director of medical services on the force commander’s staff until the eve of the landing and, with final orders issued on the 23rd April, there was no opportunity for field ambulances to coordinate with brigade medical officers and regimental medical officers. There is even a suggestion that the force commander dismissed advice to delay the landings for two days until proper medical arrangements could be put in place.
The precipitous terrain dictated the collecting of wounded primarily from two gullies. But poor quality maps and ill-defined tracks meant that few regimental aid posts actually knew where they were and there was difficulty in finding forward units. Regimental aid posts had to carry casualties all the way to the beach until field ambulances could establish themselves. The force also ran out of stretchers, as they were not returned from ships, and there was a critical shortage of medical staff, with the casualty clearing station on the beach treating 800 casualties on the first day.

Most hospital ships did not arrive for another 24 hours and the one hospital ship that was in location rapidly filled, as casualty sorting was not possible on the beach. Navy beach masters did not arrive until mid-morning and the description of the medical evacuation was more akin to a debacle. One medical ship only had a vet and a medical orderly on board to look after 200 serious casualties and 1,000 slightly wounded. No medical officer of any rank had access to wireless communications and there was no deputy director of medical services on the beach headquarters.

There was no medical doctrine for amphibious operations and the procedures they did have required communication links that simply did not exist. These serious shortcomings continued from 25 April through until some stability was achieved in early- to mid-May. When the armistice took place on 14 May, 3000 rotting Turk bodies were buried.

Medical preparations were still grossly inadequate for the August offensive, where the medical and evacuation system was overwhelmed again. There were appalling casualties and the casualty clearing station treated 5,000 men in two days. There were 15 per cent casualties among medical services alone, and Australian Army medical units received few reinforcements. Following the August offensive, there was accelerating sickness through until the evacuation. Disease necessitated massive reinforcements and led ultimately to the withdrawal.

By September, the entire hospital and evacuation system almost collapsed for a second time. Severe weather conditions and steep terrain impacted medical accommodation on land, as did weather conditions at sea, and the evacuation required two of the largest passenger liners afloat at the time to be pressed into service as hospital ships to ensure there was no repeat of 25 April.

Medical units functioned under primitive conditions with constant water shortages. The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had no provision for storing water and the scarcity of water contributed to the failure of the Sulva Bay attack in August.

The description of the treatment of wounds and surgery for head injuries and fractures would worry any combatant. There was no provision in the Australian Army for dental treatment, and alcohol was the standard remedy for exposure. There was no professional sanitation unit operating until 13 August, leading to dysentery, typhoid, jaundice and influenza. The very few front-line rotations, absence of respite, and lack of variety in diet led to decimated soldiery from physical and mental exhaustion, acute psychological problems and self-inflicted wounds.

Medical arrangements were flawed and reactive except at the very end. The failure of British Army staff to consult with medical officers, lack of planning and generally poor liaison overall led to much logistic bungling. The distance between front-line medical units and base hospitals had severe implications for surgery and an orderly evacuation, with ships discharging human cargoes in Egypt without any notice. It was impossible to triage on the beaches and it was not understood that hospital ships were actually the province of the army.
There were woefully inadequate numbers of medical staff on hospital ships and treatment was very basic. There were no rehearsals of loading casualties onto ships and, while there was a need for additional ‘black-coloured’ ships to be pressed into service—which were not protected by the Geneva Convention—it was difficult for small boat crews to locate them. The impact of enemy submarines also meant that only night operations were possible. On top of all of this, there was poor organisation to return treated soldiers from Egypt to duty.

In retrospect, there was a mistaken belief that the British war machine would help the Australian Army medical corps, compounded by the absence of any medical controlling officer on the beach, radio communications blackouts, duplication of army and navy controls, command friction and poor medico-military relations. Australia should have insisted on Australian army medical officers being in charge.

**Postscript:** I had the unusual opportunity to review this publication while spending four memorable days pushing through thick, impenetrable scrub on the Gallipoli Peninsula (see accompanying photo), looking for Leane’s Trench. It was the first ever Turkish trench taken in the Gallipoli campaign, by C Company 11th Australian Infantry Battalion, just south of Lone Pine. With dozens of cases of individual heroism and self-sacrifice, both in the capture and subsequent recapture of the position, one can only imagine the ferocity of the action. At the time, Lieutenant E.W. Morris wrote:

> When a man sees men walking about with no arms, pieces of men’s heads etc it makes him feel mad. If the powers that be could only spend half an hour in Leane’s Trench and see our brave men being blown to smithereens by the dozen, I am quite convinced there would be no more war.
