GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The Australian Defence Force Journal seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters, such as strategic studies, security and international relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the Journal does not pay for articles but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best in each issue.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without the use of templates or paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable (and contributors should view previous issues for style). Length should ideally not exceed 4000 words, including endnotes. Please ‘spell check’ the document with Australian English before sending.

Additional guidelines are available from the website.

Articles should contain endnotes and brief biographical details of the author. A bibliography is not required but may be included to identify ‘additional reading’.

Endnotes


Bibliography


Tables, figures and maps are encouraged (with original data ideally included as a separate attachment). Maps etc must be of sufficient resolution to be reproduced in high quality print.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by a Board member or independent referee with subject-matter expertise. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and, if accepted, will be published in the next Journal. That process typically takes 3-4 months.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Editor via email at: publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Authors accept the Editor may make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author, however, the theme or intent of the article will not be changed.
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Welcome to Issue No. 191 of the Australian Defence Force Journal.

Encouragingly, the Board had 21 prospective articles for this edition, which again provided the opportunity to be critically selective in the quality of articles to be published. While the Board is obviously pleased to have a continuing ‘abundance’ of choices, it has meant that several very worthwhile articles have been deferred to the next edition and several others will be published on the Australian Defence College’s website (<http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/publications/Commanders_Papers.html>).

With the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper, there is now in place a full suite of Government guidance reflecting the security environment in which the ADF will likely be operating for the foreseeable future. This edition features ten articles, the majority of which specifically address the challenges and opportunities facing the ADF, particularly in the ‘post-Afghanistan’ environment.

The lead article by Major Giles Cornelia, which has also been awarded the ‘best article’ prize, examines the influence of the Malayan Emergency on the development of counterinsurgency doctrine by Australia and its allies. It is followed by Cate Carter’s article in which she argues that the ADF should reclaim its regional expertise, and position itself as ‘the partner of choice’ for regional states, in order to improve its engagement with the region.

Brian Agnew’s article then usefully examines the recent Libyan campaign, questioning its relevance for Australian defence planners, particularly given the geostrategic similarities in conducting maritime campaigns in and near Australia. Nearer to home—and similarly relevant to the ADF—Commodore Brett Brace argues that PNG needs to strengthen its maritime security, not only to protect its marine resources but to improve its control over shipping movements and reduce the risk of maritime incidents in remote areas of the archipelago.

Commander Jennifer Wittwer then contributes a timely article on the role that gender plays in NATO’s crisis management planning process, drawing on her current experience in Afghanistan. NATO’s approach—including its legislative, policy and program framework—provides an exemplar of international behaviour and Commander Wittwer argues that the lessons learned from its experience would likely assist the development and implementation of the ADF’s response to Australia’s national action plan.

Captain Louise Brown, formerly of the British Army, brings a fresh approach to the question of ‘the ADF beyond Afghanistan’. After assessing four geo-strategic scenarios, she concludes that the future force structure should be reassessed to better reflect the likely requirement, noting that most of Australia’s recent military operations have involved deployed forces, with significant land components, seeking to engage and protect communities from a range of threats from non-state actors.

Of the remaining four articles, two—by Wing Commander Jason Begley and Rachel Mourad—address the role of air power in expeditionary operations and irregular warfare respectively. A jointly-authored article by Major General Paul Brereton and Lieutenant Colonels Geoff Orme and Jim Kehoe looks at how well the current selection, training and preparation of Army reservists equips them to undertake short-tour stability operations. Former British Army
Colonel Peter Brown concludes the edition with an insightful assessment of ‘living within a constrained defence budget’, drawing on his experience from a similarly-targeted review in the UK.

For this edition, the Board decided to publish a selection of book reviews in the on-line version only, to enable the inclusion of more articles in the printed version. As always, we remain keen to hear from readers wishing to join the list of reviewers, who are sent books provided to the Editor by publishers. If you are interested, please provide your contact details and area of interest to the Editor at publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Our November/December 2013 issue will be a ‘general’ issue and contributions should be submitted to the Editor, at the email address above, by early September. Submission guidelines are on the journal website (see www.adfjournal.adc.edu.au).

This is my last issue as Chairman. I will be handing over to Major General Simone Wilkie, AM, who takes over as Commander, Australian Defence College on 18 July, before assuming command of Joint Task Force 633 in the Middle East. I want to close by thanking the members of the Board of Management, and the editor Dr Bob Ormston, for their continuing commitment to the journal and for their support to me.

I hope you enjoy this edition.

Craig Orme, AM, CSC
Major General
Commander, Australian Defence College
Chairman of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board
The Influence of the Malayan Emergency on Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Major Giles Cornelia, CSM, Australian Army

Introduction

It is widely recognised that the Malayan Emergency, fought between Commonwealth armed forces and the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party from 1948 to 1960, has had a significant impact on the counterinsurgency doctrine of Western militaries. While some elements of the campaign are not particularly relevant to modern operations, overall it was ‘a good example of a successful counterinsurgency strategy’, which yields useful lessons for the student of war—as every military campaign can—not least through the influential writings of Sir Robert Thompson and General Sir Frank Kitson.

One persisting theme, refuted in this article, is that the Malayan Emergency has had a disproportionate impact on the development of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine. There has also been an associated inclination by some, in assessing the contemporary relevance of the Emergency, to seek universal, ‘cookie-cutter’ solutions or ‘cherry pick’ selective findings to support pre-conceived ideas on counterinsurgency—particularly relating to ‘hearts and minds’.

This article would argue that the key to continuing relevance of the experience of the Malayan Emergency is in the context of a nuanced appreciation of counterinsurgency (and war in general) that can be derived from what has been termed a ‘Horace-informed attitude’ to the profession of arms, by applying Professor Michael Howard’s approach to historical enquiry, and an appreciation of how the character of war has changed since this unique campaign.

Such a comprehensive appreciation could not easily be addressed in the space of a few pages. Accordingly, this article confines itself to two aspects. Firstly, it briefly examines the extent to which the campaign has influenced the development of the counterinsurgency doctrine of Australia and its allies, including the question of whether the Malayan Emergency has had a disproportionate influence. It then identifies several particular areas where the lessons of the Malayan Emergency are still relevant today, as well as several areas where they are not.

Counterinsurgency doctrine and the influence of Malaya

The doctrinal texts examined in this article are the British doctrine written during the Emergency itself, a highly-regarded Australian counterinsurgency pamphlet from the 1960s, and then the current US and British counterinsurgency doctrine. The current manuals are deemed of most relevance to the contemporary nature of the topic, while the earlier pamphlets provide necessary context to doctrinal development vis-à-vis Malayan influence.

A key text in considering the origins of Western counterinsurgency doctrine is the UK pamphlet The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya. Given its Malaya-specific focus, this pamphlet’s Malayan theatre emphasis is entirely proportionate. Its influence on subsequent
doctrine is also significant, as ‘The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya [has] served as a basic introduction to counterinsurgency strategy, and its structure ... a template for armies around the world to follow for the next 25 years’.10

As noted by Lieutenant General Peter Leahy in 2008, the Australian Army’s ‘doctrine for counter-revolutionary warfare was the distilled wisdom of our experiences’.11 Obviously, the most readily accessible of these experiences was the Malayan campaign against a communist-inspired insurgency. That the Australian counterinsurgency manual published in 1965, The Division in Battle, Pamphlet No. 11: Counter Revolutionary Warfare,12 drew heavily on The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya is evident in the structure, content and principles that are common to both.13 Indeed, as argued in a highly-regarded monograph on Australian doctrinal development, ‘The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya certainly was the intellectual basis of Pamphlet 11’.14

That Malaya was the central contributor to the ‘rebirth of Australian jungle warfare doctrine’—and particularly Division in Battle, Pamphlet No. 11—seems both proportionate and relevant in the context of Australian commitments to Borneo and South Vietnam.15 While it is reasonable to assume that the experiences of both Malaya and Vietnam would still feature prominently in Australia’s latest counterinsurgency doctrine, it is not possible to be more specific as the ADF’s current document (Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-1) is classified.

Having briefly reviewed two examples of Malayan influence on past doctrine, this article turns now to an evaluation of the impact of Malaya on extant US and British doctrine.

United States

The current US Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM3-24) was published in 2006.16 It is written for general usage in counterinsurgency operations17 but must also be seen in the context of the protracted US campaign in Iraq—and a perception that new doctrine was needed for that theatre—with informed commentators noting that ‘[the] manual was a necessary and important tool for fighting the war in Iraq at that time’.18

A key influence on FM3-24 was clearly the counterinsurgency approach of General David Petraeus, later the Commanding General, Multi-National Force–Iraq and Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander US Forces Afghanistan, whose 14 observations contained in a 2006 article, titled ‘Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq’, are prominent in this doctrine.19

Indeed, while the influence of the Malayan Emergency is evident in FM3-24,20 it is intertwined with that of other case studies and counterinsurgency theory and experience, and clearly subordinate to the influence of the US campaign in Iraq. For instance, while the influence of Petraeus’ Iraq assessment leaps from the pages of Chapter 1 of FM3-24, only four of the six principles of counterinsurgency articulated by Thompson are enshrined within the eight ‘Historical Principles’ identified by FM3-24. Moreover, of 21 historical vignettes, only one relates to Malaya.21 It is difficult to sustain an argument that the influence was disproportionate vis-à-vis other case studies in the sense of an excess of explicit reference to Malaya examples.22
It has also been argued that notwithstanding General Petraeus’ influence, the ‘intellectual touchstone’ of FM3-24 was the work of David Galula, a French military officer and scholar who was influential in developing the theory and practice of modern counterinsurgency warfare, including through his experience in Algeria.\textsuperscript{23} As noted by one of FM3-24’s authors, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, ‘of the many books that were influential in the writing of Field Manual 3-24, perhaps none was as important as David Galula’s \textit{Counterinsurgency Warfare}.\textsuperscript{24}

A 2009 assessment of FM3-24 by Colonel Gian Gentile, a prominent critic of the perceived dominance of counterinsurgency thinking within the US Army, also attributes more influence to Galula than Malaya, while other informed commentators have similarly argued that the roots of FM3-24 are ‘selective reading of the seminal counterinsurgency works by Mao, David Galula, Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson’, of which Galula was the most influential.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{United Kingdom}

The current British Army counterinsurgency doctrine is \textit{Counterinsurgency (Army Field Manual 10)}, published in 2009, which is drawn largely from an amalgam of British campaigns over the last 60 years, particularly Malaya, Oman, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{26} This iteration appears to have answered criticisms that the previous (2001) version was too ‘Malaya and Northern Ireland focused in the distillation of lessons learned’\textsuperscript{27} and that contemporary doctrine ‘needs to be more firmly tethered to broader historical context if it is to form valuable guidance for future operations’.\textsuperscript{28}

The 2001 version articulated six principles of counterinsurgency operations which almost mirrored the Malaya-related principles expounded by Sir Robert Thompson who, as a serving officer, was on the staff of the British Director of Operations during the Emergency. However, the current edition has ten principles that seem to be drawn from a combination of the old principles, complemented by the more recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a review of contemporary US doctrine.\textsuperscript{29}

The bulk of \textit{Army Field Manual 10}’s reference to the Malayan Emergency is contained in ‘Case Study 5: A Classic Campaign: Malaya 1948-1960’, which is one of seven in the publication.\textsuperscript{30} On this basis, it would seem that the influence of the Malayan Emergency in UK doctrine has decreased and that, while it may have been disproportionate in the 2001 edition, that is not so for the current version.

\textbf{The suggestion of disproportionate Malayan Emergency influence}

If the current US doctrine is largely based on the experience in Iraq and Galula’s theories, more than any other influences, and current British doctrine has been broadened to encompass a wide variety of operations, including ‘important lessons from Iraq from both the US and UK perspectives’,\textsuperscript{31} where does the suggestion come from that the Malayan Emergency has had a disproportionate influence on the development of counterinsurgency doctrine?

A plausible explanation is that it derives from the notion that the concept of ‘winning the hearts and minds’—originally attributed to the assertion by Sir Gerald Templer, UK High Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya, that ‘the answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people’—has unbalanced counterinsurgency doctrine.\textsuperscript{32}
This suggestion seems largely directed at current US doctrine in the form of FM3-24. Indeed, there is a body of criticism of the use of Malaya as a case study, as an exemplar of ‘how to do counterinsurgency’, on the basis that the winning of hearts and minds in Malaya was a myth. Further, this sentiment—espoused particularly by an article titled ‘Malaya: The Myth of Hearts and Minds’—links the ‘Petraeus doctrine’ (a clear reference to FM3-24) to simplistic and erroneous beliefs regarding the role of the so-called ‘winning hearts and minds’ concept in Malaya.

Dan Cox and Thomas Bruscino, writing for the US Combined Arms Center, have identified the commonly-held view that the winning of hearts and minds is ‘best done through non-violent and non-coercive means ... [whereby] aid and development become a major component of the counterinsurgency [strategy]’. They also contend that the Malaya-style ‘hearts-and-minds’ approach (which they identify as deriving particularly from the ideas of Thompson and Kitson, based on their experience in Malaya) is responsible for the ‘implied and explicit “violence aversion” of the current population-centric approach’ as espoused in FM3-24.

One of Gentile’s criticisms of FM3-24 is that it fails to sufficiently acknowledge that counterinsurgency is warfare, noting that ‘war is not clean and precise, it is blunt and violent’ and that ‘the Army’s new [counterinsurgency] manual’s tragic flaw is that the essence of warfighting is missing from its pages’. It is reasonable to surmise that the influence of the Malayan Emergency, as it relates to Thompson’s principles as expounded in Defeating Communist Insurgency—and which, in isolation, have no direct reference to warfighting—may have at least partially contributed to this alleged shortcoming.

Thompson’s principles and the sentiment in Templer’s ‘hearts-and-minds’ quotation are often cited elsewhere and are in evidence to some degree in FM3-24. However, the only explicit reference in the manual to the term ‘hearts and minds’ is far more robust than some of the previously-cited criticism would suggest, as what it actually says is that:

‘Hearts’ means persuading people that their best interests are served by counterinsurgency success. ‘Minds’ means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless…. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.

The above quotation reinforces the point that suggestions the Malayan Emergency has had a disproportionate influence on the development of counterinsurgency doctrine are more about perceptions of implicit meaning than explicit guidance within current doctrine.

Recent revisionist perspectives on the Malayan campaign from academics such as David French and Karl Hack provide balance to perceptions that the British defeat of the insurgency in Malaya was achieved predominantly through ‘hearts and minds’. They contend that the British campaign was underpinned by a largely coercive approach, which ‘was about persuading minds more than winning hearts’, and that such techniques were designed to ‘intimidate the civilian population into throwing their support behind the government rather than behind the insurgents’.

In summary, the issue of whether the Malayan Emergency has had a disproportionate impact on the development of counterinsurgency doctrine seems overstated. Current UK doctrine has deliberately widened its historical basis, to the extent that the Emergency is but one of
seven case studies. And it seems reasonable to conclude that the campaign has not had undue influence on US doctrine in the sense that it is explicitly over-cited; rather, it is more that some of its lessons have been used to support certain contemporary views on ‘the winning of hearts and minds’, which has resulted by extension in criticism of the influence of the campaign where those views seemingly originated.

**The contemporary relevance of the Malayan Emergency experience**

Notwithstanding the proportionality of its influence on the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, there are a number of lessons from the Malayan Emergency that are still relevant today. That is particularly so when the campaign is appreciated by applying Michael Howard’s ‘three general rules’ of study of military history, namely ‘in width … in depth … [and] in context’. Indeed, a nuanced and broad understanding of previous counterinsurgency campaigns is ‘an essential starting point when devising successful counterinsurgency strategy for current and future campaigns’.

An excellent example is the work by academics Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian in identifying 14 ‘themes’ that can be drawn from previous counterinsurgency campaigns. Almost all are readily discernible in the Malayan Emergency. However, four particularly important lessons relate to adaptation to local situations and learning, the achievement of population security/control, the role of coercion, and the cost of winning hearts and minds.

**Adapting to local situations and learning**

A most relevant lesson from Malaya is the crucial nature of adaptation and learning in ‘expeditionary’ counterinsurgency operations. Lieutenant Colonel James Corum, writing for the US Army War College, asserts that ‘one of the most important innovations, and a key element of the success of the British in Malaya, was the establishment of a jungle training school at Kota Tinggi in 1948’. The writings of Marston and Corum outline how this was possible (through prior jungle fighting expertise of the Indian and British armies in World War 2) and what a fillip this Malayan theatre ‘centre of excellence’ provided to the security forces.

The success of the British Army’s adaptation in Malaya—much cited in Nagl’s renowned book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*—provides a compelling model for establishing a framework for learning and adaptation as early as possible in any counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, the relevance of this example to the contemporary environment is borne out by the success of the counterinsurgency schools that were established by coalition forces mid-way through the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

**Achieving population security/control**

A second specific relevant lesson relates to the attainment of population control as an essential condition to defeating an insurgency. A salient lesson for the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and for the future can be gleaned from the Malayan example of establishing an effective indigenous police force. In Malaya, it performed a policing function in population centres, in order to achieve population control and thus deny access to the insurgents. This then freed up the Commonwealth security forces to conduct enemy-centric operations to
‘kill or capture communist terrorists’.

As identified by Lieutenant Colonel Mark O’Neill, the ‘attainment of control’ remains vital in contemporary operations, including most recently in Iraq:

The British use of ‘protected villages’ during the Malayan Emergency reflected the success they experienced with the concentration camps … to control the Boer. [This counterinsurgency characteristic] … is perhaps the most problematic to modern democracies. However, its difficulty does not diminish its importance. Examples of control within the Iraqi theatre included using concrete ‘T’ walls to segregate elements of Baghdad’s population for information and identity control.

The role of coercion

The central nature of coercion to British success in Malaya is another essential lesson that retains relevance to counterinsurgency operations generally. In Malaya, these methods included detention without trial, curfews, deportation of non-citizens, food control, ‘shoot-on-sight’/‘Black’ areas, forced resettlement, and re-education camps for reconcilable insurgents. While the use of coercive measures was a crucial factor in the Malayan Emergency, such methods initially appear irrelevant to contemporary Western military operations because, as French correctly points out, ‘each and every one of them would be unacceptable to public opinion in Britain today’.

However, regardless of the changes in Western mores and the dissemination of information, enduring challenges for counterinsurgency commanders remain the mix of coercion and inducement required to control populations. While Malaya-specific methods may not be employable in today’s conditions (at least for liberal democracies), an understanding of them is a valuable precursor to devising bespoke solutions to counterinsurgency operations of the present and future.

The cost of ‘winning hearts and minds’

A final lesson of Malaya that retains freshness and is very topical today is that of the frugal British approach to attaining their political aims. The Emergency is estimated to have cost US$800 million (in today’s value) over the course of 12 years, which contrasts significantly with the enormous financial cost of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Thomas Henrikson has asserted, some contemporary interpretations of what ‘winning hearts and minds’ actually entails are a significant departure from the Malayan model, as:

\[
\text{[In] the British handling of the Malayan Emergency, the authorities opted for very modest enhancements of the populace’s living standards. In the new American way of counterinsurgency, ‘winning hearts and minds’ leapt from basic medical and minimal social services to mammoth facility projects for the population.}\]

In the current global economic climate and with corruption blighting the ISAF effort in Afghanistan, very relevant lessons as to the measures directed at the betterment of the population in counterinsurgency can be found in the Malayan Emergency.

Obviously, there are a number of other relevant lessons that can be gleaned from the Malayan Emergency. While space precludes elaboration, they would include the efficacy of recruitment of all ethnic groups into the security forces in a multi-ethnic society, and the power of inducement to cooperate with the government afforded by ‘white’ area status.
Where the Malayan Emergency is less relevant

The Malayan Emergency has less contemporary relevance in three important areas, namely the misconceptions that have taken hold regarding the role of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in Malaya, the widespread changes since brought by globalisation and urbanisation, and the currently feasible levels of civil-military integration.

The myths of ‘hearts and minds’

A major reason for a lessening of relevance of the Malayan Emergency to counterinsurgency broadly, and in contemporary circumstances, is the myths that have persisted regarding a British counterinsurgency model, as noted by historian Hew Strachan:

The model was more selective than the reality, and has increasingly tended to overlook some of the campaign’s more unpalatable features—or cherry-picked those that are compatible with today’s operational concepts and their legal and moral norms.\textsuperscript{57}

An over-emphasis on the idealised perception of what ‘hearts-and-minds’ involved in Malaya—and an avoidance of the historical reality of coercion’s role in success—has rendered the Malayan case study irrelevant to some degree, albeit not because of its intrinsic worth but because of the pervasiveness of certain superficial consideration.

Brigadier Justin Kelly’s 2009 article on ‘How to Win in Afghanistan’ identifies actions required for success in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{58} He provides a valuable counterpoint to the counterinsurgency scholarship which downplays the use of coercive force to obtain objectives in favour of development activities:

There will be a time when reconstruction and other aid will begin to produce dividends and that time will be marked by the establishment of security which, in Afghanistan, requires the removal of the insurgent and the extension of the coercive authority of the Afghan state into Pashtun areas … [and] establishing control over the Pashtun population. Without security there is nothing.\textsuperscript{59}

Unfortunately, the misleading analysis of Malaya (that the campaign was won largely by non-kinetic means, that is, by the ‘winning of hearts and minds’) has made it a tool to support erroneous approaches in current operations. Kelly’s argument that security must be established first, then development and other aspects be employed to provide effective counterinsurgency solutions, can be supported by detailed understanding of what the Malayan campaign entailed but not by the simplistic interpretation that it was about ‘winning hearts and minds’.\textsuperscript{60}

Globalisation and urbanisation

A second area in which the Malaya example is less relevant is because of the effects of globalisation. As noted by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott,\textsuperscript{61} the character of counterinsurgency has changed since Malaya and other classical campaigns in the post-colonial era. He argues that ‘this change is due in part to the influences of globalisation, a globalised information network and a pervasive media presence’.\textsuperscript{62}
A prominent counterinsurgency author, David Kilcullen, also identifies developments in urban terrain and the pervasive reach of the media which differentiate conditions of the present day from Malaya:

Traditional counter-insurgency methods like fencing villages, cordon and search, curfews and food control (accepted as routine in Malaya) have drawn sharp criticism in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the enhanced disruption they cause in urban neighbourhoods, combined with the negative propaganda effect of enhanced media coverage.  

Civil-military integration

Finally, a significant area where the lessons of Malaya are less relevant today is to be found in the gap between the levels of integration espoused in current doctrine and that actually practised in earlier campaigns. Malaya was a well-integrated campaign with regard to civil-military cooperation, where ‘war by committee’, from district- to state- to federal-level, provided harmony of effort between the civil authorities and military commanders. Unfortunately, in some cases, its lessons cannot be practically relevant without a substantial increase in interest and commitment by other government agencies. As argued by British Army Colonel Alex Alderson:

In today’s warfare, the soldier has to carry far more responsibility than he would otherwise wish, being present in harm’s way without the crucial support of civilian agencies that cannot or choose not to be present. While FM 3-24 explains … the integration of non-military lines of operation into the campaign, this is still an area of weakness. This is not in terms of what the pamphlet outlines but in terms of the absence of doctrine and policy to draw in the full range of instruments of national power.

Conclusion

This article has articulated why the Malayan Emergency has not had a disproportionate influence on the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and why the campaign retains broad relevance for contemporary counterinsurgency strategy and operations. It has argued that while the campaign ‘has long been hailed as the textbook case of effective counterinsurgency,’ too much of its textbook status has been derived from excessive focus on Sir Gerald Templer’s emphasis on ‘the winning of hearts and minds’.

The British-Commonwealth defeat of the Malayan Communist Party insurgency was achieved through a largely coercive approach, which ‘was about persuading minds more than winning hearts’. In recent scholarship, this fact has at times been obscured by a superficial treatment of the concepts of counterinsurgency.

Key areas of direct contemporary relevance of this campaign include the usefulness of the Malayan Emergency within a balanced approach to the study of counterinsurgency, the lessons that can be identified regarding adaptation and learning, the importance of population control and coercion, and the costs of contemporary approaches to counterinsurgency.

While certain misconceptions regarding ‘hearts-and-minds’, the advent of globalisation, and current limitations on civil-military integration make some aspects of Malaya less relevant, these do not negate the utility of the Malayan experience in contributing to a nuanced appreciation of counterinsurgency. With judicious study in the Professor Howard manner of
historical enquiry—in width, depth and context—the Malayan Emergency does indeed ‘have important lessons’ that are directly relevant to the contemporary student of war.69

Major Giles Cornelia has served with 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (Parachute) in two postings and instructed at the Royal Military College-Duntroon. He has also served as a Staff Officer in Headquarters Royal Military College of Australia, Aide-de-Camp to the Commander 1st Division, and Chief of Plans in Headquarters Combined Team Uruzgan. He is a graduate of the 2012 Australian Command and Staff College course at the Australian Defence College. His current appointment is Career Advisor Infantry-A at the Directorate of Officer Career Management-Army. Major Cornelia has deployed on operations in East Timor and Afghanistan.

NOTES
1. This is an edited version of a paper, titled ‘It has been suggested that the Malayan Emergency has had a disproportionate influence on the development of COIN doctrine. Do you agree? Is the experience of Malaya still relevant after sixty years?’, submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff College in 2012.
2. ‘Doctrine is the formal expression of current military thought. It is typically derived from a mixture of operational experience, observation and applied thought, and describes the fundamentals, principles and preconditions of military operations at the different operational levels’: see, for example, Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1 (LWD1) – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2002, p. 103.
5. As argued by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Gleiman: ‘The temptation to cherry pick the history of counterinsurgency campaigns is great and must be avoided by the serious scholar, student and would be practitioner….. “Cookie-cutter” templates … cannot apply to either insurgencies or counterinsurgency doctrine’; see J. Gleiman, The Organizational Imperative: theory and history on unity of effort in counterinsurgency campaigns, CGSC Foundation Press: Fort Leavenworth, 2011, p. 9.
8. Given the classification of current Australian counterinsurgency doctrine, the relevant manual is not discussed in this article.


16. The author acknowledges that this manual is a joint effort between the US Army and the US Marine Corps. For simplicity, it is cited as an Army publication only. See US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM3-24), Signalman Publishing: Kissimmee, 2006.

17. For example, it states that ‘[t]his manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine Corps recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges’: see US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. iii.

18. It states, for example, that ‘we can and must do our best to generalize about specific techniques for specific wars, and teach those generalizations and techniques to the military professionals set to engage in those wars. That method, despite any grandiose claims for its universality, was precisely the value of FM 3-24. That Counterinsurgency Manual was a necessary and important tool for fighting the war in Iraq at that time and within that context’: see D.G. Cox and T. Bruscino, ‘Introduction’, in D.G. Cox and T. Bruscino (eds.), Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: a false idol? Three monographs from the School of Advanced Military Studies, Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010, p. 6.


20. Henriksen identifies the ‘seminal role played by the Malayan Emergency in the formation of early US counterinsurgency doctrine’, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that this earlier doctrine was at least one source of Malayan influence on FM3-24: see T. Henriksen, WHAM: Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere, Report 12-1, Joint Special Operations University: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 2012, p. 9.


22. See US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, particularly p. viii. Also pp. Bib1-6 for an extensive bibliography which suggests a large of variety of texts.


38. See Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, pp. 50-8.


42. Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History’.


44. These themes are cited in a table within Gleiman, *The Organizational Imperative*, p. 13 and attributed by Gleiman to Marston and Malkasian, ‘Introduction’, p. 10.

45. See Marston and Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*.


48. See Marston, ‘Lost and Found in the Jungle’, especially pp. 98-100 and Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, p. 9. As Corum elaborates: ‘Men trained in the jungle school would return to their units and, in turn, train them to live and fight in the jungle. The Jungle Warfare School taught the difficult arts of land navigation in the jungle and jungle survival, but the core of the program was small unit patrolling and combat tactics. Combat marksmanship was stressed, and each
course ended with a series of realistic exercises’. The author’s own experiences at the Australian Army’s Jungle training Wing (which has a training regime very similar to Kota Tinggi) reinforce the absolute necessity of specific training to effectively operate in this environment.


50. British Army, Countering Insurgency, p. xi.


59. Kelly, ‘How to Win in Afghanistan’.

60. The ‘it was WHAM’ approach is evident in the many simplistic comparisons of British in Malaya = good v US in Vietnam = bad. As Grey states (perhaps not forcefully enough) ‘the depiction of Commonwealth counterinsurgency practices as subtle, nuanced and successful, where the American equivalent is crude, kinetic and generally a failure … is overdrawn’: see Grey, ‘Australia’s Counterinsurgencies’, p. 19.

61. Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) Trent Scott was Commanding Officer of 3 RAR Task Group on operations in Afghanistan at time of writing. Also see T.M. Scott, The Lost Operational Art – Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force, Land Warfare Studies Centre: Canberra, 2011.


63. D. Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2006, p. 120.


A Time to Speak: finding a voice in the Asia Pacific

Cate Carter

Introduction

Two recent articles in the ADF Journal provoke thought on the issue of Asia-Pacific relations. The articles by Peter Brown and Ben McLennan provide alternate approaches to balancing the perceived ‘southern power play’ between China and the US. Brown’s article suggests one option for Australia would be to contemplate a partnership with China to provide tailored aid packages to developing states, while McLennan’s proposes a robust joint arrangement with US forces on bases and training activities.

While each approach seeks to support a major player in the region, this article offers another approach for the ADF, namely to reclaim the regional expertise it once held and position itself as the partner of choice for regional states undergoing stabilisation. It acknowledges that the ADF often does not speak up about its experiences and suggests ways in which it can improve its engagement with the region.

Certainly, the dominant theme of the ‘eroding status’ of Australia in the region is evident in much of the commentary on this subject. One aspect of this position is the relative status of Australia vis-à-vis the US; the other is the absolute status of Australia as a regional leader.

In an earlier article in the Australian Army Journal, I argued that Army is occasionally embarrassed by the superior language skills and cultural knowledge of other military forces operating in our neighbourhood and engaging with our neighbours. This is particularly pertinent to US forces, who seem to upstage us in regional engagement without being necessarily present in the region. This relative advantage is apparent to the US Department of Defense, which prefers short, energetic visits and infrastructure projects over long-term capacity-building programs.

The absolute advantage of Australian presence in the region is mostly overlooked by our preference to react to natural disasters and emergencies, over a broader plan to engage proactively and aggressively. The mission to regain regional expertise ‘post Afghanistan’ addresses both our relative and absolute status, and galvanises a position of influence with neighbouring states.

The good news is that the reclamation of regional status need not involve expensive new programs. The ADF’s involvement in peace-building and state-building projects in the Asia Pacific region has made it, quite unwittingly, a leader in several fields. These capabilities are somewhat taken for granted but offer a marked advantage over others. The ADF needs to speak up now about its experiences in the ‘global south’ or risk having them taken over and rebranded forever.

Our Asia Pacific experience

ADF operations in the Asia Pacific region have been characterised by a strong history of post-conflict reconstruction and natural disaster assistance. Our tendency is to visit and revisit as
often as necessary but maintain a light footprint. This means that we can act decisively and maintain the ‘force of the punch’. The ‘punch’ has invariably involved some element of security response, which requires an authoritative body but also some cultural understanding.

This is precisely what ‘second generation approaches’ in post-conflict reconstruction try to do, ‘shift[ing] the emphasis from top-down interventions designed by outsiders to more community-designed … approaches’, typically involving both ‘formal and informal consensus and cooperation with existing (including customary) local institutions’.4

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is one element of a ‘second generation approach’ but other elements, historically included in successful ADF post-conflict reconstruction strategies, include security sector development, civil-military operations, and regional cooperation.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

This element traditionally is a linear process which involves removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures, and assisting them to integrate socially and economically into society.5 However, experiences in Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan have revealed some problems with this essentially technical approach, with Robert Muggah, for example, warning that ‘post-conflict contexts are not a terra nullius [empty land] upon which discrete technical solutions are readily grafted’.6

Reflecting such concerns, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations released a new critical analysis in 2010 entitled ‘Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration’.7 This guidance proposes hybrid alternatives to procedural actions. For instance, it questions the misinterpretation of armed groups as sources of violence; it looks at weapons as objects of status and part of the collective memory; it targets specific groups like commanders and senior officers; and it examines weapons management as opposed to disarmament.8

Many of these proposals are established practices in the Asia Pacific region and, indeed, Australia may already be even further advanced. For example:

• In East Timor, the ADF’s approaches have included community security mechanisms, schemes focusing on youth and gangs, weapons-for-development activities, weapons lotteries, urban renewal and population health programming.9

• In the Solomon Islands, advantages were gained by including police officers from Pacific Island backgrounds within the International Deployment Group to mitigate any negative political perception behind disarmament activities and to understand cultural subtleties. Furthermore, targeted engagement of civil society, including through women’s and church groups during the weapons amnesty period, led to the successful persuasion of militia members to give up firearms.10

• In Bougainville, the process originally focused on ex-combatants11 but later adapted to recognise the importance of community interpretation of reintegration, the long-term nature of the process, and the need for ‘community compromise’. Significantly, it included women—both foreign and local—and projects to improve life skills in villages.12
Encouragingly, ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’ offers the ADF something else—a gateway into regional arms control. The UN’s Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA) believes that armies have a lot to contribute professionally to the broader debate on arms control. Armies, according to ODA, have institutional knowledge that encompasses technical, human, cultural and moral-ethical dimensions.13

Moreover, arms control in Africa and the Asia Pacific suffers from a lack of a champion—ideally a stable nation with a good economy and a degree of moral leadership—which Australia is arguably well suited to provide.14 Furthermore, it is the ADF which deals first hand with the consequences of small arms proliferation and it is the ADF which could be explicitly more vocal on appropriate regional armaments.

**Security sector development**

A second element of a ‘second generation approach’ relates to security sector development, where the challenge is the balance between controlling arms transfers and assisting the development of national security-related capabilities:

The urge to control arms transfers is part of a broader wish to find ways to control and ameliorate conflict. But it runs up against an equally strong desire to aid—or at least permit—friends and allies to acquire the weapons they believe are needed to ensure their national security.15

In Australia, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament fall under the portfolio of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which is involved in creating various inter-governmental agreements.16 ADF personnel have been consulted in the drafting and ratifying of some of these agreements although, at times, force development interests have arguably undermined wider non-proliferation obligations.17 As a consequence, Defence has a political but not necessarily partisan voice in balancing the two responsibilities.

Tactically, the ADF as a force development partner can influence the *modus operandi* of an emerging security force but it can also set an example of what might be an appropriate style. What I mean by this is that a new regional force might be trained by a foreign training partner whose military norm could be urban, land-based, European or paramilitary. Hence the processes and procedures of its style may be at odds with the emerging role of the new force, which is likely to be rural, archipelagic, Melanesian and lightly armed.18 In contrast, ADF joint exercises and regionally-based operations with emerging forces provide the opportunity to demonstrate the employment of appropriate weapons systems and reinforce sustainable procurement choices.

Certainly, the acquisition of weapons by countries in the region poses several challenges. Firstly, there is a small arms race of sorts relating to the credibility of developing countries, which sometimes results in the acquisition of high-powered weapons without due needs analysis or proper acquisition processes. Secondly, standards of maintenance and storage, and competency in weapon handling often deteriorate drastically after the initial purchase. Thirdly, in the aftermath of World War 2, some weapons have been adopted into communities as part of cultural practices, resulting in them being seen differently than primarily instruments of law and order. Fourthly, there are fundamental questions about whether some security forces need firearms at all for what is essentially community policing. Finally, the transfer of small arms may inadvertently result in some falling into the wrong hands.
Australia has the regional cultural expertise and disarmament experience to meet these challenges. In particular, the challenges illustrate where the ADF’s partnership with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) can come to the fore. While the ADF-AFP relationship is arguably more cooperative than interoperable, the current arrangements include a memorandum of understanding, a joint steering committee and AFP liaison officers posted to Headquarters Joint Operations Command and the Australian Defence College.

But more can be done. The Australian Civil-Military Centre has identified that ‘integration and coordination processes should begin at the planning stage and include joint pre-deployment training’. An important element of this training is to identify discrete, mutually-supporting roles, which must be demonstrated in the field with regular communication at all levels of command and a united ‘brand’, institutionalised by shared experiences in joint civil-military operations.

_Civil-military operations_

In a review of Australian activities in Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor, the Australian Civil-Military Centre identified the need for operations to ‘align [their] support with local priorities … through a mix of formal mechanisms and informal practices’. This mix reflects the very core of second generation approaches but cannot be achieved by a military force alone. For instance, a military force cannot form civil society partnerships, and a civilian group may not be able to facilitate the collection or destruction of weapons.

Australia’s civil-military experience has also encountered the danger of excluding local leadership in decision making. The lack of success of many transitional administrations can be put down to centralised institutional transfer followed by a regional implementation which makes little sense to local communities. In contrast, Australian operations in Bougainville were noted for their early involvement of local leaders and a high degree of consent through various stages of the process. This allowed the deployment of small, civil-military groups which could provide the best matched person (woman, priest, commander or Pacific Islander) to negotiate each agreement.

Building capacity into a post-conflict state also requires a civil-military mix. Community confidence will be boosted by seeing the emergence of an accountable police and military force—and careful economic advice will allow an increase in quality of life. Such changes in the ways of governing will require a long-term commitment. Militaries cannot support open-ended deployments or be ‘the only ones left in country’ providing a wide spectrum of advice and assistance. But they can secure, surge, train, extract and reinforce the long-term advisors as necessary—and they should always position themselves to hand-over to civilian authority. In the meantime, Australia’s civil-military operations have demonstrated the ability to operate under civilian or military command, and to change from one to the other.

One problem with the cooperative relationship is undoubtedly language. Civilian and military staff do not so much use different vocabularies but rather the same vocabularies with different meanings. In the field, the local context is understood by participants but, at strategic decision gatherings back in Australia, terminology can confuse and even hinder mission progress. Usefully, the Australian Civil-Military Centre is developing a ‘common language guide’ to help bridge the gap.
The post-conflict space in which ‘peace operations’ occur has undoubtedly come out of a conflict involving military and civilian parts of the community, and it will take military and civilian efforts to rebuild it. The consequent multi-dimensional problems require an integrated methodology. However, integrating groups within a single supporting nation is hard enough without also addressing the challenges of international integration.

The ADF typically participates in regional engagement through ‘force-to-force’ activities. Training exercises and disaster relief efforts practise the interoperability of forces and identify gaps. But much engagement in the region happens through business, government and academic exchanges. Despite this, the first time that representatives from the government, the engineering firm, the university, the army and the non-governmental organisation meet is invariably in the field or at a displaced persons’ camp under hazardous conditions.

Integrating the various elements of Australian assistance before a deployment, however, will prove helpful to problem solvers on all sides. These lessons have been validated through ADF experience and need to be built on as the key capability that the ADF will provide at the next regional engagement. When we build on our civil-military partnerships, we support the strategic imperative of promoting regional stability through cooperation as opposed to imposing order through power.

**Regional cooperation**

The Asia Pacific region presents many opportunities for regional states to confer on matters of immediate concern. The archipelagic nature of states, the natural resources and the geo-climatic idiosyncrasies call for a collective approach to security, and often a collective response to disaster. In Australia’s experience, it has nearly always been expedient—and often more successful—to lead with a regional response in the face of broader international mandates.

Bougainville is one such success. The response to the civil crisis in Bougainville in the 1990s was led by the governments of New Zealand and Australia, and followed by civil-military (unarmed) forces from New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu. As Rolfe notes:

The presence of Maori and Pacific Island personnel in the teams was as important for the Truce Monitoring Group as had been the use of Maori cultural practices in the New Zealand meetings. Their presence helped to ensure that the Group was accepted and able to carry out its role.24

Later, when the Peace Monitoring Group replaced the Truce Monitoring Group, its cultural context was also noted:

The willingness and capability of the Peace Monitoring Group to accept local traditions and behave with appropriate cultural sensitivity laid the grounds for its success…. Given the significance of personal relationships in Melanesian cultural context, this relationship building was of utmost importance.25

Understanding regional cultural practices is something that, despite generational turn-over, the ADF builds on quite well. There is a general recognition of ‘the Pacific way’, an approach which involves ‘sitting and thinking about the process and getting that right, as much as it does in trying to develop solutions’.26 There is consideration given to the time needed to listen as well as to speak. There is room for what has been described as ‘an ethic of attention’.27
Attendance at Australian Defence training institutions by regional military personnel has meant that over time, professional relationships have been cultivated throughout the careers of leaders on all sides. Time spent maintaining regional contacts has paid off when quick access to official information has been needed in emergency situations and when trust is a matter of importance.

This, combined with what is now commonly referred to as ‘South-South exchanges’, stands the ADF in a good position to demonstrate successful second generation approaches in the Asia Pacific region. In summary, if geographically and strategically the ADF’s colleagues are its regional neighbours, more than its northern-hemisphere allies, then engagement should be our enduring modus operandi, more than the deployment of the joint force.

The rest of the world and why they’re interested

All of this might seem rather obvious to those who operate in a relatively benign region. However, when I returned from East Timor in 2010, it was hard to find anyone in the ADF who wanted to know about the political-military situation.

But I did find interested audiences at the University of Queensland’s School of Political Science, in the Responsibility to Protect Research Unit in the UN’s Department of Political Affairs, in the Finnish Consulate’s Governance Branch on Africa, at the US Institute of Peace and at the ABCA (America, Canada, Britain and Australia) quadripartite working group office in Washington. Essentially, anywhere but the ADF. My point is that even brief observations on governance and security were valuable to people who were undertaking reconstruction and state-building projects in the Asia Pacific and elsewhere.

The rest of the world is taking increasing interest in the Asia Pacific region but, even more importantly, they are interested in what lessons the Asia Pacific can teach them about post-conflict building in the northern hemisphere. Models for interagency cooperation, second generation disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, cultural engagement and hybrid governance have great potential to be exported to governments and non-government bodies who are investing in development projects in their own regions.

Acting like a profession

So how do we have a voice in this discussion? How do we earn a place at this meeting? To shore up its position as the military partner of choice, and set an example for supporting forces of other states, the ADF has to come to terms with its social obligation as a profession. At the end of 2010, at the request of its Chief, the US Army produced a White Paper to review the Army as a profession. Its acknowledgement of the relationship between a profession and society is clear:

Professionals require years of study and practice before they are capable of expert work. Society is utterly dependent on professionals for their health, justice, and security. Thus, a deep moral obligation rests on the profession, and its professionals, to continuously develop expertise and use that expertise only in the best interests of society.

One of the ways to develop expertise is to retain lessons long enough to stop the endless cycle of reinvention. Short-term lessons have been duly highlighted by concepts like ‘Adaptive
Army’ and improved through tactical employment of lesson collectors and analysts. But the gap lies in the long term. Army alone has, at the time of writing, 499 officers holding the rank of Colonel and above. These officers have over 13,000 years of collective experience—and undoubtedly hold a plethora of thoughts and visions about operational employment. Yet Army struggles to disseminate them to the next generation (let alone the peer community), to stimulate discussion in a visionary and creative way. But this is precisely what a profession does.

Let me offer an example. Recently, I was researching a paper on peace building and came across an interesting article on British and American chaplaincy experiences in Afghanistan. It came from a journal called *Religion, State and Society*, published by Routledge and readily available online. Curious, I typed in a search within the back copies of this journal for ‘military chaplains’ and got 62 articles. They were written by chaplains from Canada, Germany, South Africa, Cuba, Russia, Britain and the US, from a wide variety of faiths and across a wide variety of theatres.

I then typed in ‘Australian military chaplains’ and got one article by three US military chaplains referring briefly to Australian military doctrine evolving to incorporate a religious liaison role for chaplains in stability operations. I knew that Australian Army Chaplains had much to contribute to the conversation, having recently held a chaplaincy conference in Canberra—and having, seemingly, been one of the few voices on chaplaincy experiences in the Asia Pacific. But where was their contribution to the global discussion?

To find the voice of military professionals, we must first examine their place. Australian society has always had a tolerant (albeit slightly suspicious) view of the professional military officer. Military personnel hold rather private positions in the community and typically only play a public role when civic assistance is needed during natural disaster. In fact, it is probably former military officers who are more valued in positions of public office.

Within government, military professional engagement is already practised in a number of organisations. The Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College promotes examination of ethical questions and has links to such organisations as the International Society for Military Ethics. The Australian Civil-Military Centre participates in international conferences and promotes Australian Defence initiatives. The RAN’s Professional Studies Program was established to serve as a bridge between the ADF and the corporate sector. And the UN now provides a renewed forum to discuss regional security interests. However, these assemblies do not include the majority of operationally-experienced ADF members—and I suspect much unofficial engagement occurs elsewhere.

I suggest that the ADF can engage with society in a much broader and practical way, and some simple examples follow. First, make ADF professional journals proper e-journals, rather than a series of portable files to download. Having ‘live’ spaces for comment and discussion brings ideas into a dynamic environment and develops them within a collegiate domain. In particular, the sharing of information between practitioners and theorists of regional operations should be encouraged.

Second, form professional relationships at unit level. Combine ideas in the local community with business owners, engineers, magistrates, farmers, teachers, judges and journalists—not in a social manner but as a group of professionals. Solve problems together. Learn their language.
Third, move modules of ADF courses to tertiary institutions to avoid the homogenous ‘group think’ of the training unit. Many ADF members undertake further study outside the organisation during their careers. But their remote and nomadic lifestyle often makes distance education more palatable. This does not engage with anyone, so hold courses in capital cities and be part of the functional participatory community.

Fourth, invest in the professional networks which already exist in the region. The fact that more than half the officers in the ADF at O6-level and above are reservists should give the proposal a start. These officers are presumably already connected to professional networks and may be aware of relevant projects which can inform regional operations.

Conclusions

A new focus on the Asia Pacific region is stimulating a scramble for regional expertise. Australia has a position in the region as a middle power, potentially forming a bridge to smaller powers, but has to balance that with bilateral relationships with security partners also operating here. The ADF has a lot of operational experience through post-conflict reconstruction and disaster relief, which it takes somewhat for granted. It demonstrates good practice of contemporary second generation approaches which have utility in the wider developing world.

Moreover, the ADF does not talk about its experiences with either Australian professional society or the international community. The Australian and international communities can benefit from the ADF’s experience but they need to hear about it first. At this strategic moment, the ADF knows a lot more than it thinks—and it is not all counterinsurgency. But until it speaks up, global powers and small neighbours will look elsewhere, to the detriment of Australian regional influence.

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NOTES


13. Author’s discussions with Nicolas Gérard, Conventional Arms Branch, UN’s Office of Disarmament Affairs, February 2012.

14. As above.


16. The Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the UN’s Program of Action, Arms Trade Treaty are the most significant examples.

17. Obstacles to signing the convention on Cluster Munitions included concerns about continued interoperability with the US, which has not signed up to this agreement.

18. Rolfe notes that in the use of an unarmed force in Bougainville, ‘there was a strong belief that this would offer a good model to the young guerillas who would be able to see that professional soldiers could work without weapons’: Rolfe, ‘Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville’, p. 49.


23. In 2011, the University of Queensland hosted a series of seminars with regional leaders, and members from the public and private sectors, to address the issues concerning ‘Working with Local Strengths to Institutionalise the Responsibility to Protect’. The resulting draft framework is available at <http://www.peaceportal.org/articles/-/asset_publisher/9mYE/content/id/129564530>


30. The recent amalgamation of the Australian Army’s Centre for Army Lessons and 1st Division’s Adaptive Warfare Branch has streamlined the ‘short-term lessons loop’ to an extent where deploying units gain the lessons of the unit in country, before they deploy.


32. RAAF’s Air Power Development Centre already leads on this, providing interactive space for readers’ comment. see <http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/>
The 2011 Libya Campaign: some implications for Australia

Brian Agnew, Department of Defence

Introduction

Despite the successful intervention by Western and Arab countries in the Libyan civil war of 2011, the campaign is generally viewed as a strategic quirk and not a model for similar interventions. Moreover, the conditions that led to intervention may not or are very unlikely to be repeated.

The 42-year long Gadhafi regime had become politically isolated and widely condemned for not just failing to protect its citizens but threatening their lives. Notwithstanding these threats, on 17 March 2011, when requested to approve a military intervention—applying the new concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’—five countries on the UN Security Council abstained, namely China, Russia, Brazil, Germany and India. But when China and Russia chose not to exercise their veto, a unique opportunity for a short, ‘small’ war emerged.¹

Nineteen nations, employing the most powerful military coalition in the world—NATO—engaged a country of 6.6 million people for seven months to eventually force a change of regime. No NATO personnel were lost in combat, there were few civilian casualties and the mission was clearly achieved.² These achievements become attractive to future planners and politicians facing similar interventions.

The Libya campaign also revealed a number of lessons for defence planners who have been forced by financial austerity to limit their military capabilities. For Australia, still fighting alongside NATO in Afghanistan and continuing to strengthen an already close alliance with the US, learning from this campaign—which relied on a similar coalition arrangement—has some relevance.

This article reviews the intervention for implications applicable to Australian defence planners. Six observations are relevant. First, the geostrategic similarities between operating from the Mediterranean Sea and conducting maritime campaigns in and near Australia are apparent. Second, the lack of a ready coalition of well-practised forces available to respond to crises in the Asian region is exposed.

Third, operating with the US military is examined, including the multi-tasking ability of special forces. Fourth, the capability design implications are reviewed, particularly the traditional capabilities—notably maritime forces—which remain essential for force projection. Fifth, the legal basis for conducting the Libyan operation is assessed and the implications for future operations are unpacked. Finally, the opportunities and frameworks for applying these implications in Southeast Asia are briefly explored.

Australian strategic decision-makers well comprehend these implications and have either already accepted them or are positioning to do so. ‘Back-casting’ often places contemporary decisions into a context that provides better understanding.
Geostrategic similarities

With its global reach, the US is able to react to any part of the world quickly, and to plan and execute complex operations. Other militaries require more time to concentrate and have limited endurance once they arrive, unless operating adjacent to their bases. Libya was in easy reach of coalition maritime forces in the Mediterranean Sea, and air and other military assets were able to use the many NATO bases nearby (for example, the Sigonella base in Sicily is only 500 kilometres from Tripoli). In addition, air strikes were launched from 29 airbases in six European countries, up to 3,000 kilometres away (see Figure 1), demonstrating the vital requirement of air-to-air refuelling.

Libya, being twice the size of Afghanistan and with better air defences, presented greater challenges in establishing air superiority. Only the US could deliver the required command and control capability that offers targeting definition, resource and air de-confliction. Libya’s major urban centres being near the coast, and widely separated by desert, further dispersed the military effort. The four major Libyan air bases are also located on the coast. These geostrategic characteristics fostered maritime access and also allowed the coalition to apply its forces sequentially, from one concentrated area to another. Libya’s large hinterland was largely strategically irrelevant.
Australia’s neighbourhood presents similar geographic characteristics. A maritime strategy is well suited to operations in either Asia-Pacific theatres or to theatres within Australia. Just as the Mediterranean Sea allows access to coastal towns and cities, so too does the sea to regions near Australia. The forward bases in northern and western Australia are available to provide ready support to military forces. Additional arrangements, however, would be required to extend similar access into the near region.

The 1971 Five Power Defence Arrangements offer one approach to providing access and to presenting assistance. The Arrangements currently make available a headquarters for an integrated area defence system for Malaysia and Singapore, with supporting forces and annual training exercises. Even so, the Asia-Pacific region—with a series of ‘hub-and-spoke’ bilateral arrangements with the US and embryonic multilateral security architecture—lacks a relatively cohesive military coalition such as provided by NATO. A unifying demand for such an arrangement has previously been absent. Small groups of nations conducting periodic low-scale exercises, such as occasional humanitarian operations, do not come near to replicating the kind of coalition cooperation exhibited during the Libyan campaign.

Furthermore, the Libyan intervention was conducted while NATO was engaged in a war in Afghanistan and had forces deployed elsewhere, including in the Gulf. Accordingly, some redeployment from these out-of-area theatres to Libya was necessary. To further illustrate the extreme proficiency of NATO’s air capability in Libya, in the first day of operations to establish a no-fly zone, 22 of Libya’s 24 fixed air defence sites were destroyed. Weapons used included over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles from naval assets, long-range Storm Shadow strikes from the UK and B-2 stealth bomber strikes from the US.

Libya’s air defence system, however, was mostly 20-30 years old and at least two generations behind current surface-to-air missile technology. A more capable adversary would, perhaps, have taken more time, resources and possibly casualties to be eventually defeated. Yet this was only the air superiority phase of the campaign. Overall, a total of 222 days were required to defeat the Libyan government forces.

**A model war?**

As the US withdraws from lengthy troop-heavy interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, some commentators see the Libyan success as a model for future US military operations. Now known as the ‘Obama doctrine’, this model has three elements. First, the humanitarian crisis in the target country must warrant military intervention. Second, the military action should be strictly limited, including there being no commitment of ground forces. Third, the action should be multilateral, and with others sharing the burden and lead where possible. This model also re-kindles the debate on the role of airpower in modern warfare as it delivers a response without troops on ground.

As attractive as a ‘casualty-free’ war is, as least for NATO, together with few civilian deaths attributed to NATO, the Libyan experience did not provide this, nor prove the model the West might aspire to. The legal and geostrategic issues associated with escalating UN sanctions, a blockade and eventually a no-fly zone will be examined shortly. Russia and perhaps China will no doubt remain wary of a West that seeks a humanitarian intervention but delivers a regime change, as evidenced by the current absence of support to intervene in Syria.
Viewing the Libyan intervention as an example of a strictly limited and tightly controlled military engagement is accurate. But to suggest that the operation was without troops on the ground is misleading. In addition to the rebel forces, special forces from several countries were involved. Furthermore, without the eventual success of the ground forces, the outcome may have resulted in a stalemate.16

Libya was a proxy war, fought on the ground by a broad rebel uprising, eventually coalescing to the political leadership of the National Transitional Council.17 From the Libyan uprising perspective, the mainly ground conflict had three phases. The first occurred before the international intervention, during the period 18 February to 19 March, and involved initial rebel successes, which were then pushed back by Gadhafi’s forces to Benghazi in the east of the country.

The second phase once again saw the two forces advance and retreat. In the east, the rebels were again pushed back, while in the west they eventually gained control of the city of Misrata but were stopped there by the Libyan armed forces. By the third phase, beginning in mid-July, the rebels had gained the advantage and pushed onto Tripoli in August. By mid-October, residual state forces were being supressed, the Gadhafi’s hometown of Sirte fell, and Gadhafi himself was killed on 20 October.18

Special forces from several European and Arab countries made a significant contribution to the eventual outcome. To avoid legal sensitivities, these troops came under national, rather than NATO command, but clearly coordinated their activities with NATO.19 While small in number—a total estimate not exceeding a couple of hundred—special forces performed a varied range of key missions. They were initially deployed to rescue civilians working in Libya in non-combatant evacuation operations. They were used next to gather intelligence on, and to conduct liaison with the rebels. These tasks evolved into training and mentoring, provision of weapons, target de-confliction and, eventually, in combat coordination.20 Special forces were reportedly deployed from the UK, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and United Arab Emirates.21

Only in the third element of the US model—multinational involvement with others, where possible, sharing the burden and the lead—does the Libyan war become closer to the Obama doctrine. Initially, the US, together with others in ‘a loosely coordinated series of national operations’, enforced UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to establish a no-fly zone and to conduct actions consistent with ‘the responsibility to protect’.22

The opening attack on the night of 19 March was initiated by the converted Ohio-class submarine USS Florida, which fired 93 (of a potential load of 154) Tomahawk ground attack missiles. One hundred and ten Tomahawk missiles and 45 Joint Direct Attack Munitions from three B-2 bombers aircraft were employed during this opening salvo against air-defence and other targets. The British, being the only other country with Tomahawks, also launched them from submarines and delivered Storm Shadow cruise missiles from Tornado GR4 aircraft operating from Britain.23

This initial engagement was crucial to the eventual outcome. It enabled the subsequent operations to occur unencumbered by an air threat, and commenced the attrition of Libyan military assets. Eventually, the Europeans conducted about 90 per cent of all strike sorties but this could only occur once air superiority had been established.24
The sophistication of this initial, primarily US military effort, involving assets commanded through US Africa Command, cannot be overstated. It was ‘remarkably rapid both in its ramp-up and execution’. Planning occurred over three weeks and execution over a few days. Considerable maritime and air assets were positioned and briefed, enabling the full spectrum of military capabilities to be accessed. Yet target development was difficult, especially as in-country intelligence was dated. While the initial US involvement was significant, so too was its continuing involvement, albeit in a largely supporting role.

Without joint tactical air commanders on the ground to laser designate targets, other solutions were found. Seven specialist aircraft and four uninhabited aircraft were employed for intelligence and targeting. But despite this number of aircraft, the sheer scale of the theatre and the speed of events meant that intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissnace (ISTAR) coverage was limited to a layered picture for 10 hours a day.

Development of military capability

Several weapon systems made their combat debut in the Libyan campaign. Their increased lethality and precision underscored the demand for continuous development, risk and expenditure if effective outcomes are required. First deployments included the guided missile submarine USS Florida; the Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile, otherwise known as TLAM-E, with its ability to change targets on command (more like an armed unmanned aerial vehicle); the Eurofighter Typhoon jet; and the Growler electronic warfare system. Of these, Australia is purchasing the Growler system (and has similarly capable missiles and 4.5 generation combat aircraft).

The recent decision by Australia to acquire the Growler electronic warfare system for the Super Hornet aircraft, at a cost of around $1.5 billion, shows that the lessons of having a powerful capability to suppress hostile aircraft and land-based radars to support achieving air superiority have been accepted. Australia will become second only to the US to have the Growler electronic attack capability on Super Hornets. For Australia, the Growler becomes available for operations in 2018.

The US deployment of the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft in Libya, for 700 combat missions, provided its first combat experience. Given the extreme sensitivity of having such a potent capability in the region, Australia needs to build confidence with regional militaries so that air superiority missions can be exercised.

Many existing capabilities were confirmed by their employment in Libya. As discussed above, having highly-capable special forces allow for discreet, flexible and useful options. Achieving combat aircraft loiter time over targets is best achieved from aircraft carriers or close bases. In Libya, however, this was attained by the US providing about three-quarters of the aerial tanker support. Australia’s five new KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft have achieved initial operational capability. Again, US assistance was critical in providing ISTAR, electronic warfare aircraft and supplies of precision-guided weapons when European stocks ran low.

In the maritime environment, a potentially significant feature was the use by Gadhafi’s forces of fast attack craft to mine coastal waters. The navies of the UK, Holland and Belgium, in particular, were employed in mine countermeasure operations to keep sea lines of communications open for humanitarian support. Australia maintains a modest mine countermeasure capability,
based on the Mine Hunter Coastal platform, which is currently approved for augmentation with a range of deployable uninhabited systems.\(^{34}\)

The utility of surface ships and submarines—to conduct non-combatant evacuations, impose the UN arms embargo and to support the campaign with naval gunfire, command and control, surveillance and logistics—was also significant. NATO employed 21 classes of naval assets, including supply ships, frigates, destroyers, submarines, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers.\(^{35}\) For the UK, its newly-formed Response Force Task Group was deployed and proved its flexibility by being able to adapt to the circumstances by splitting to provide planners a range of suitable options. As Australian force designers consider concepts for the new amphibious task group, the flexibility of operating in sub-groups may present options for consideration.\(^{36}\)

**Legal implications**

The UN Security Council followed an escalated approach, seeking to prevent the Gadhafi regime from brutally suppressing the rebellion. On 26 February 2011, the UN released a media statement in an effort to limit the bloodshed. Later that same day, after reports of massive human rights violations and realising that the media statement had been ignored by the Libyan regime, an arms embargo and sanctions were imposed through UN Security Council Resolution 1970.\(^{37}\) When this too proved inadequate, Resolution 1973 was passed on 17 March, permitting member states to use ‘enforcement measures’ under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\(^{38}\)

The crux of the subsequent criticism of NATO’s actions under this Resolution relate to NATO’s decision to pursue political objectives, by removing the government and not restricting itself to purely humanitarian goals. The authorisation given by Resolution 1973 was ‘to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’.\(^{39}\) Criticism included that NATO continued operations long after the threat directed at the citizens of Benghazi from the Libyan armed forces was lifted. Furthermore, some commentators suggested that the decision to supply weapons and training to Libyan rebels appeared to represent a break from any stretched interpretation of a Resolution designed to save lives.\(^{40}\)

As an example of how differing interpretations are offered, in a UK House of Commons Defence Committee’s inquiry after the Libyan operation, a legal counsellor from the Foreign Office argued that the arms embargo resolution incorporated some ‘exemptions’.\(^{41}\) The legal counsellor also argued that Resolution 1973, by including the phrase ‘notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970’ (which related to the arms embargo), in effect allowed Resolution 1973 to set aside the arms embargo.

The contrary and more widely supported argument is that this expression was included to ensure that the military means used to implement the protection of citizens did not interfere with those conducting the arms embargo.\(^{42}\) This highlights that context and understanding of the original intent is critical to a fuller understanding and accurate application of what could have been a hastily- and poorly-drafted resolution. Also, nations are guided by interpretations made by officials and, ultimately, politicians often dislocated from earlier advice and decisions.

Essentially the broad language of Resolution 1973 invited expansive interpretation. The subsequent debate on Resolution 1973 centres on whether it precluded regime change and
prohibited the use of ground forces. In a substantial article, legal academic Mehrdad Payandeh concluded that as the Resolution authorised the protection of civilians, and that as the Libyan regime committed illegal violence against civilians, the regime could be attacked whenever it attacked civilians.43

Furthermore, as regime change was a legitimate means to pursue the objective of protecting civilians—and as the Security Council had not excluded it—Payandeh argued it was permissible.44 On the matter of excluding ground forces, while the Resolution explicitly excluded ‘a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’,45 Payandeh contended that ground forces were permitted as long as the military force did not hold ground; he also concluded that the mandate was not limited by time, nor did it have other restraints, except on holding ground.46

Yet, almost regardless of the legal distinction of conforming to the Security Council Resolution, the political implications of NATO’s intervention remain relevant. Ultimately, judgment will depend on whether Libya becomes stable and peaceful. Unfortunately, the experience of NATO operating under such a broad UN mandate has eroded the perception of the UN as a neutral actor.47 Payandeh believes it ‘reveals [a] general weakness and shortcomings in the international system of collective security, deficits that have the potential to significantly weaken the international community’s enduring acceptance and support of the system’.48

These criticisms are reflected in discussions on the current Syrian crisis. As Western countries propose resolutions, Russia and China continue to reaffirm their support for the respect for sovereignty and non-intervention.49 Of note, during the considerations of UN Security Resolution 1973 on the Libyan crisis, Brazil, India and South Africa also elected to abstain.50 Australia will confront similar contextual, cynical and complex political challenges particularly during its two-year term at the Security Council and also when providing military forces in response to UN Security Council resolutions.51

Building and maintaining coalitions is far easier when supported by a clear and unambiguous mandate. Such mandates are buoyed by general support from the international community and regional stakeholders.52 But in Libya, escalating the political intent—from the protection of civilians though to regime change—hampered the political cohesion of the coalition and further prevented the military means being fully aligned to the political objectives.

Australian diplomats, security and legal advisers need to monitor closely normative developments in international law, particularly experiences at the Security Council and at the International Criminal Court. And providing advice to political leaders is clearly dependent on interpreting events and ensuring that the context of resolutions and decisions is fully understood.

**Coalitions in Southeast Asia**

The application of coalitions to regional issues, as occurred in Libya, could be contemplated in Southeast Asia. With ASEAN’s adoption of the Charter and establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, mechanisms are in place for ASEAN to overcome its traditional reluctance to interfere in the affairs of member states. While it is not being suggested that ASEAN, at this point in time, should implement the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle in relation to any particular regional state over human rights issues, ASEAN—with perhaps an Indonesian lead—is the only regional body available to do so.53
A further observation from the Libyan experience, and also evident in Afghanistan, is that 'winning requires more than combat'. A comprehensive approach, deploying economic, diplomatic and intelligence, as well as military efforts, ensured eventual resolution in the Libyan campaign. This is not to imply a large footprint—but that all elements available to a nation need to be engaged. Critically, the legal preconditions to employing force need to be set prior to deployment. UN sanction is the accepted norm. With a maturing national security architecture and environment, Australia is well placed to employ the levers of national power, through a whole-of-government approach, to pursue its interests.

Another structure to support the building of coalitions to maintain security in Southeast Asia, as suggested by noted academic Carlyle Thayer, could be modelled on the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Through these Arrangements, two Southeast Asian countries are already joined by extra-regional middle powers in conducting annual military exercises, involving a multi-threat environment with up to 60 aircraft, 30 ships and several submarines.

Other embryonic moves of regional groupings to enhance their military proficiency are also evident. The ASEAN and East Asian Summit nations, for example, are reaching out to their membership to join military exercises, albeit focusing on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. Australia, with the concurrence of its alliance partner the US, is seeking further opportunities to conduct military exercises with regional partners. A number of activities are being suggested in response to regional uncertainties and to engender confidence building. Australia has placed a priority for the next five years on enhancing regional engagement, envisaged as expanding beyond the current regime of training, exercises and dialogues.

How this enhancement is achieved is yet to unfold but may include logistics and intelligence-sharing agreements and perhaps Five Power Defence Arrangements-type coalitions. Whether there is a need to develop coalitions of a more substantial nature will be largely driven by regional interests and events. However, the benefits of coalition building can be easily demonstrated when militaries have to work together at short notice as demonstrated in the Libyan campaign.

Conclusion

The 2011 Libyan campaign is seen as unique in international relations, where military force imposed the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ against the will of an incumbent government. The UN Security Council resolutions authorising the campaign were similarly unusual in that two permanent members did not exercise their veto, and the main resolution for the campaign (Resolution 1973) was broad enough to permit a range of NATO military options that contributed significantly to eventual regime collapse.

But certain perennials were also present. The political will to prevail during a campaign and to deploy adequate forces to achieve the political outcomes remains a prerequisite. In this case, when the overall cost was US$1 billion, compared to the US$10 billion that is spent in Afghanistan every month, public support was more easily gained (and retained).

Furthermore, the political will needs to be able to be matched by the military and its application of deadly force. Military tasks and the capabilities deployed must align with the political intent. As the political direction changed in this campaign from implementing a no-fly zone to changing a regime, different forces with appropriate tasks were required. Again, this underscores the need for a balanced range of ready capabilities.
The force design issues showed that a balanced ready force best meets the requirements of the day. In austere times, delivering such a force can be difficult. Despite the poor quality of Gadhafi’s forces, advanced technology with a full range of capabilities was needed, especially to reduce casualties and the time taken. The high-end capabilities available in the US forces cannot currently be replicated by any nation but coalitions can create both the political will and military forces for such campaigns.

Australia remains largely on track to have capabilities attractive to regional coalitions should they be required. But even limited conflicts will demand large and comprehensive deployment of forces. Establishing regional coalitions does need further focus, and additional engagement with regional partners remains a priority for Australia. This topic is worthy of further debate.

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NOTES

1. Jonathan Eyal, ‘Did This Operation Set a Precedent?’, in Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libyan Operation, An Interim Royal United Services Institution (RUSI) Campaign Report, September 2011, p. 4. Germany could abstain from contributing to the NATO campaign as Article 5 had not been activated and contributions were voluntary.
5. This map was referenced from an unpublished article by Moses Bangura and Patrick Hew (both from DSTO), titled ‘Relevance of NATO’s Libya operation to ADF capability development’, which was submitted for publication in the ADF Journal in 2011.
7. The one attempt to replicate NATO in Asia failed. The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) arose in 1954 in response to the perceived threat of communism to Southeast Asia. Without regional support and a commitment of military forces, it was dissolved in 1977.
8. The uniqueness of NATO being able ‘to respond quickly and effectively to international crises’ is well made in Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, ‘NATO’s Victory in Libya’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, Issue 2, March 2012, pp. 2-7.


14. For example, the air war proponents argue that the tipping point of the campaign was the use of air to prevent the defeat of the rebels in Benghazi. Douglas Barrie, ‘Libya’s Lessons: The Air Campaign’, *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2012, p. 59.

15. There were at least 72 civilian deaths from NATO air-strikes. Barrie, ‘Libya’s Lessons: The Air Campaign’, p. 61.


17. Applying international humanitarian law criteria, there were two conflicts occurring next to each other. One, classified as a non-international conflict, was between the Libyan government and the rebels and the other, an international conflict, involved NATO and the Libyan government.


22. *Accidental Heroes*, p. 5.


24. Quintana, ‘The War from the Air’, p. 31. In the campaign, 26,000 sorties were flown, with 7,600 air-launched weapons used to engage 6,000 targets: Barrie, ‘Libya’s Lessons: The Air Campaign’, p. 58.


27. Assets included three E-3 Sentry, three E-8C JSTARS, one RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, two MQ-1 Predator UAV, one Global Hawk UAV and one U-2: Johnson and Mueen, *Short War, Long Shadow*, pp. xii and 36.


34. Project SEA 1778 Phase 1 Organic Mine Counter Measures has been approved and cost capped at $100m: Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel, Joint Media Release, ‘Defence project
approvals’, 3 June 2012. The plan for a multi-role platform for mine countermeasures, hydro and patrol vessels on a common hull (Project SEA 1180) has been criticised: see Greg Mapson, ‘RAN Mine Countermeasures Capability – Where to Now?’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, 12 December 2011.

35. NATO, Fact Sheet: Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats, 2 November 2011.


47. This is particularly applicable when UN forces act as peacekeepers: Payandeh, ‘The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya’, p. 401.


49. This position by Russia and China surfaces in other geostrategic situations. For example, Myanmar is balancing its relations with China and the West as it responds to emerging popular opinion and levels of economic investment: see Yun Sun, ‘China and the Changing Myanmar’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2012, pp. 51-77.

50. Eyal, ‘Did This Operation Set a Precedent?’, p. 4.


52. Bruce Jones suggests that the US was prudent to wait until it had regional (Arab League) and international (a positive vote in the UN Security Council) before using force.: Bruce D. Jones, ‘Libya and the Responsibilities of Power’, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 3, June–July 2011, p. 58.


56. Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence, interview with Barrie Cassidy, Insiders, 11 November 2012. Significantly, one exercise will include 18 East Asian Summit countries.


60. $1 billion was the cost for the US operation, and the Europeans will repay for the assistance provided to them about $222 million: John Barry, *America’s Secret Libya War*. One measure of the support for the operation was that two days after the start of the conflict, the British House of Commons voted overwhelmingly to support the Government’s actions by a margin of 557 to 13: Gertle, *Operation Odyssey Dawn*, p. 19.
Strengthening PNG’s Maritime Security

Commodore Brett Brace, RAN

Introduction
PNG comprises an extensive archipelago that provides great national benefit but also creates significant challenges and obligations. The PNG Government’s 2009 strategic development framework, Vision 2050, acknowledged that the oceans and waters of PNG ‘possess a great abundance of marine and mining opportunities for sustainable development’. However, while Vision 2050 stated that an appropriate ‘ocean policy’ must urgently be developed to enhance PNG’s prosperity, it is yet to be promulgated.

PNG’s declared aspiration to rank in the top 50 on the UN’s ‘human development index’ relies on the implementation of policies and strategies that would take advantage of the country’s immense natural wealth. Its Development Strategic Plan 2010-2030 outlined the Government’s vision for becoming a middle-income country by 2030, which include strengthening national sovereignty and retaining resource revenues for nation building, while also protecting the environment. But without an ocean policy, its framework to exercise national sovereignty in the maritime domain and protect the marine environment is incomplete.

In the meantime, increasing globalisation and climate change expose PNG to a broad range of non-traditional threats. Critically, the demand for scarce resources presents a potentially serious threat to PNG because others will increasingly threaten the sovereignty of those that cannot protect their resources, particularly at sea, where ‘comprehensive knowledge of what is happening … is an essential element of maritime security’. The scale of this task would be problematic for many developed countries. For PNG, it will be nearly impossible without a coordinated strategy to address the legal, administrative, financial and capability components of a comprehensive maritime security framework.

PNG’s maritime environment
PNG has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 3.12 million square kilometres and a coastline of 17,110 kilometres. Its geographic location and extensive river delta systems produce some of the richest marine, coral reef and estuarine faunas on earth. Its hard coral and mangroves rival Australia’s Great Barrier Reef and much of PNG’s maritime domain is part of ‘the global centre of marine biological diversity’. PNG is also rich in natural resources, including gold, oil, gas, copper, silver, timber and abundant fisheries.

Although the threat to PNG of external, state-based military interventions is very low, contemporary threats cover a broad spectrum of non-traditional security challenges. A number of analysts have identified internal land-centric security threats that stem from law and order problems, corruption, disease and tribal fighting. But threats within, and originating from, PNG’s maritime domain also have the potential to cause long-term economic and environmental damage.
Much of PNG’s maritime domain is remote and a potential haven for illegal activities. These include the unauthorised exploitation of marine resources, illegal movement of people and drugs, and international criminal activities. A 2002 report highlighted that ‘lucrative ventures in illicit activities have … become a permanent feature of [PNG’s] socio-political landscape’. The report also questioned PNG’s capacity to ‘ensure and maintain adequate surveillance over its sea, land, and air space’, highlighting PNG’s vulnerability to ‘low-level incursions’, including exploitation of its EEZ by illegal foreign fishing vessels.

Numerous busy shipping routes pass through PNG’s waters (see Figure 1), including routes from Australia and New Zealand to commodity markets in North Asia. However, navigational hazards within PNG’s archipelagic waters, such as extensive reefs and numerous small islands, often restrict freedom of movement, and in some cases act as choke points to the flow of traffic, such as in the Vitiaz Strait, near where the passenger ferry Rabaul Queen sank in 2012. Shipping that passes north of Australia transits Torres Strait and through waters in which Australia and PNG share seabed and fisheries rights. In July 2005, the International Maritime Organization declared Torres Strait a ‘particularly sensitive sea area’, because of its vulnerability to damage by … shipping activities.

Figure 1. Shipping density and routes in PNG’s maritime domain
(dots represent actual shipping, tracked across a three-month period)
Coastal shipping is also particularly important in PNG, ‘provid[ing] an important building block for economic development’, because of the country’s demographics and topography (59 per cent of its population lives in ‘maritime’ provinces), its lack of effective national road and rail systems, and its reliance on links to remote export mining and agricultural activities. The Development Strategic Plan projected a five-fold increase in domestic and international cargo from 2006 to 2030, which would require a significant increase in shipping to and from PNG’s ports and through its waters.

Fisheries are also very important to PNG. The world’s largest tuna fishery, by value and volume, lies in the western and central Pacific Ocean and represents ‘a critical store of “natural capital” for economic growth and political stability’ for Pacific Island states. PNG’s fishing zone is the largest in the South Pacific, with an estimated market value of almost A$175 million per year. However, while it is increasingly important to PNG’s economic prosperity, it is also increasingly attractive to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, which poses a significant threat to PNG’s sovereignty and food security.

A 2005 review concluded that the illegal catch from PNG’s fisheries is about 14 per cent of the total, representing a nominal loss of around A$25 million per year. Bateman and Bergin contend that ‘illegal fishing is the main transnational crime at sea in the region’ and that ‘fisheries protection and law enforcement have become major tasks for maritime security forces’. Although the remoteness and inaccessibility of PNG’s fisheries afford a degree of protection from illegal fishing, these attributes also provide ‘natural cover for perpetrators of unlawful activities’.

PNG and other Pacific Island states have implemented governance, monitoring and regulatory programs to counteract illegal fishing. However, such measures largely only influence those willing to accept good governance and sustainable fishing. If PNG allows illegal fishing to continue, the consequences will include ongoing environmental damage, economic impact (and detrimental effect on local and subsistence markets) and reduced credibility as a regional leader.

**PNG’s rights, obligations and responsibilities**

As an archipelagic state, PNG has sovereignty over waters enclosed by archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast; its sovereignty also extends to the air space, as well as the seabed and subsoil, and their associated resources. However, the issue of archipelagic waters and maritime security is complex. Foreign ships and aircraft undertaking archipelagic passage may do so through the customary routes and ‘in the normal mode solely for the purpose of … transit’. Archipelagic states may designate sea lanes and air routes (which limit navigational freedom) but, in the absence of such designation, transiting foreign ships and aircraft may interpret, with a high degree of freedom, the routes they take.

As a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), PNG ‘has considerable service responsibilities’ which include providing navigational aids, hydrographic charts and navigational information, search-and-rescue services, and marine pollution contingency arrangements. PNG must provide these services without any form of cost recovery and without denying or impairing the right of passage, although transiting ships are required to ‘comply with generally accepted international regulations … and practices for safety at sea.’
PNG also has an obligation under UNCLOS to protect the marine environment and undertake measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution. PNG has implemented a number of compliance measures, including enacting relevant legislation and empowering authorities to enforce the legislation.\textsuperscript{31} However, UNCLOS and other conventions do not expect PNG to act alone. It requires states to cooperate on a regional and global basis to protect and preserve the marine environment, protect highly migratory species and marine mammals, and conduct peaceful marine scientific research.\textsuperscript{32}

Similarly, PNG has obligations under the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue to undertake and cooperate in search-and-rescue activities. PNG’s National Maritime Safety Authority is the agency responsible for providing services in the search-and-rescue region allocated to PNG by the International Maritime Organization (see Figure 2), which covers approximately 690,000 square nautical miles of land and sea.\textsuperscript{33}

![Figure 2. PNG’s search-and-rescue region (SRR)](image)

**Developing an ocean policy**

The foreshadowed ‘ocean policy’ in *Vision 2050* would be a good starting point for PNG as a unifying statement of the Government’s intent, building on framework policy initiatives from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2002 and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in 2005 (see Figure 3).
**Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy**

**Vision:** A healthy ocean that sustains the livelihoods and aspirations of Pacific Island communities

**Goal:** To ensure the future sustainable use of our ocean and its resources by Pacific Islands communities and partners

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### Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Framework for Integrated Strategic Action

#### Ocean Governance

- Improving our understanding of the ocean
- Sustainably developing and managing the use of ocean resources
- Maintaining the health of the ocean
- Promoting the peaceful use of the ocean
- Creating partnerships and promoting cooperation

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**Figure 3. The ‘Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy’ framework**

PNG’s ocean policy should be a whole-of-government statement, providing a coherent strategic planning and management framework to address the complex maritime issues confronting PNG. Its principal aims would be to define PNG’s maritime domain and jurisdiction, and relationships with regional policies, and focus on possible uses within that domain, which could include:

- The recovery of raw materials from beneath the sea bed
- Utilisation of the sea bed
- Exploitation of sea water and its contents
- The use of the surface for transportation
- The projection of national influence, and
- The protection of national interests.

The regional policy framework included specific initiatives to ‘enhance monitoring, compliance and enforcement’ and to ‘ensure all activities meet relevant international, regional and national standards’. In the context of developing an ocean policy that strengthens maritime security, it would be critical for PNG to:

- Strengthen national monitoring, compliance, control, surveillance and enforcement through improved maritime domain awareness and surveillance, patrol and response capabilities
- Broaden and enhance local, national and regional partnerships and compliance networks
- Build political will and appoint high-level government sponsors
- Promote awareness of PNG’s maritime laws and regulations, and
- Educate, inform and involve industry, enforcement agencies, armed forces, judiciaries and others in ocean management and enforcement.
PNG’s Government would also need to consider holistically the legal, administrative and resource framework. As a first step, this would likely involve the appointment of a national-level coordinating body to establish, catalyse and strengthen coordination mechanisms, and to implement partnerships at national and provincial levels, while engaging with regional arrangements.39

Currently, a number of authorities and departments have responsibility for the use and protection of PNG’s marine environment, including the enforcement agencies. Significant coordination and cooperation between these departments and agencies would be required to avoid resource waste and ‘turf wars’. Also, the complexity of managing relationships, agendas and resources across these authorities is likely to erode the effectiveness of the policy unless there is a ‘lead agency’ for each program, which would be responsible for seeking and administering the respective budget, sponsoring relevant legislation and regulations, and being accountable to the overall coordinating body for program outcomes.40

**Strengthening maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction**

Before determining the capabilities needed to protect PNG’s sovereignty and marine environment, PNG’s Government would also need to determine and promulgate the extent of its maritime domain and consider additional protective measures.

**EEZ and fisheries waters**

The *National Seas Act 1977*, enacted by PNG pre-UNCLOS, established its territorial sea, internal waters, offshore seas and archipelagic waters.41 Its ‘offshore seas’, as defined in the Act, ‘extend to a distance of 200 [nautical] miles seaward from the baselines’.42 Although the Act defined ‘baseline’ as a territorial sea baseline, the interim delimitation of archipelagic waters in the Act made clear PNG’s intent to claim sovereignty over its archipelagic waters (broadly equivalent to a modern EEZ).

In a subsequent proclamation, PNG defined its archipelagic waters and the outer limit of offshore seas by adopting ‘limits of 200 [nautical] miles from the baselines where no boundary lines with other States may appropriately be drawn’.43 Although the *National Seas Act* did not define an EEZ, the *Fisheries Management Act 1998*, a post-UNCLOS enactment, defined PNG’s EEZ as ‘all of the offshore seas, seaward of and adjacent to the territorial sea’.44 PNG, therefore, had declared a 200 nautical mile EEZ, albeit through simply updating existing national legislation with UNCLOS terminology.

However, the UN considers that PNG claims a 200 nautical mile ‘declared fishing zone’ (DFZ), rather than an EEZ.45 Despite any technical difference between the two, in the absence of other legislation or definitions, the *Fisheries Management Act* provided a degree of protection of PNG’s sovereignty and rights by defining ‘fisheries waters’ as:

> … the internal waters, including lagoons, the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters, the [EEZ] and any other waters over which [PNG] exercises or claims jurisdiction or sovereign rights, and includes the bed and subsoil underlying those waters.46

In 2002, PNG deposited with the UN a list of coordinates that defined the baselines to locate its archipelagic waters.47 UNCLOS provided PNG with sovereignty over those waters in accordance with an international convention, rather than just national legislation; as a result, PNG and the
international community had the baseline framework from which to measure the breadth of PNG’s maritime zones, which include the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf (see Figure 4).48

Figure 4. PNG’s maritime zones49

**Continental shelf**

Although still related to fishing and living resources, PNG clarified its claim to the continental shelf in 1977 by amending the *Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) Act*, again to align with the *National Seas Act*. PNG declared a continental shelf that included all seabed and subsoil underlying waters from the high water line to offshore seas ‘to a depth not exceeding 200 [metres] or, beyond that limit, to a depth where the [overlying] waters admit of the exploitation of the natural resources’.50 PNG extended its sovereign rights to marine resources within the nationally claimed EEZ and on the continental shelf by claiming jurisdiction over seabed and subsoil underlying ‘fisheries waters’.51

In 2009, the governments of PNG, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Solomon Islands deposited a joint submission with the UN to establish the outer limits of an extended continental shelf in the Ontong Java Plateau region.52 The claimed area encloses approximately 600,000 square kilometres of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from respective baselines53—which arguably would provide the claimants with access to mineral rich resources. PNG also foreshadowed a similar claim for the Mussau Ridge and Eauripik Rise areas, while acknowledging ‘that several maritime delimitations [within those areas] remain outstanding’ between PNG and the Federated States of Micronesia and Indonesia.54
Maritime neighbours

Within 12 nautical miles of its archipelagic baselines, PNG has land and maritime borders with Australia, Indonesia and the Solomon Islands—and maritime boundary treaties and agreements with these countries that reflect the agreed sharing of maritime zones. Because of the extent of PNG’s EEZ and fishing zone claims, PNG also has a maritime border with the Federated States of Micronesia. The proximity of these maritime neighbours and associated maritime zones has the potential to cause conflict and disagreement over sovereignty and marine resources, which could usefully be clarified if more clearly articulated in an oceans policy.

Bougainville

Although Bougainville is presently part of PNG, a planned referendum on its future political status is due between 2015 and 2020, specifically to ‘include a choice of separate independence for Bougainville’.55 PNG’s Constitution makes clear that the boundaries of Bougainville extend only to three nautical miles from the low water mark,56 inferring that the maritime area outside of Bougainville’s maritime territory is part of PNG’s national archipelagic waters and territorial sea.

However, the Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, agreed by the PNG Government in 2004, provides equally clear statements on revenue sharing from fisheries and ‘activities in areas of sea and seabed beyond the guaranteed three [nautical] mile limit’.57 The referendum, therefore, has significant potential impact on PNG’s maritime domain (and potential revenue), as an ‘independent’ Bougainville could lay claim to a significant portion of PNG’s archipelagic waters, territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. Unless handled very skilfully, such claims could prompt a resurgence of the divisive issues that contributed to the 1988 Bougainville crisis.58

New maritime legislation

In 2009, the PNG Government informed the UN that it was preparing new maritime zones legislation, ‘which will declare all of the maritime zones, including the continental shelf, in a manner that reflects the relevant provisions of [UNCLOS]’.59 The new legislation, the ‘Maritime Zones Act’, is intended to replace the National Seas Act. However, PNG is well behind schedule, which is also hampering the introduction of related marine pollution legislation.

Similarly, PNG is yet to declare a regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage, notwithstanding the generally well-defined routes used by ships in PNG’s waters, particularly north-south transits. This creates problems for an archipelagic state trying to maintain sovereignty and minimise threats to its marine environment. PNG needs to expedite the declaration, taking account that decisions ‘that affect navigation in international straits cannot be made unilaterally, or even regionally, but must continue to reflect a balance of interests of all states’.60

When enacted, the broad suite of legislation should provide appropriate laws and regulations to protect the marine environment. Australia, for example, has introduced comprehensive protective measures specifically for the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait that include marine protected areas, designated shipping areas, compulsory pilotage, and a vessel traffic service.61 Similar legislation by PNG would make it clear to transiting and visiting ships, offshore installation operators, neighbouring states, and any potential perpetrators that PNG has a strong regime of laws with which to uphold its maritime interests and responsibilities.
Self-reliant maritime security

Since independence, Australia has played a supporting role in PNG’s development and security. Australia’s support to PNG’s maritime security has primarily been in the form of patrol boats and supporting programs under the Defence Cooperation Program. Australia donated five Attack class patrol boats and two Balikpapan class landing craft heavy (LCH) to PNG in the 1970s. As part of the broader Pacific Patrol Boat program in the late 1980s, Australia supplied 22 patrol boats to 12 regional states, which replaced PNG’s Attack class patrol boats with four Pacific class patrol boats. The LCHs remain in service.

The ADF periodically provides surface and air surveillance assets to patrol PNG’s maritime domain. However, because of higher priority commitments in the Middle East and to Australia’s own border protection tasks, the ADF’s contribution to surveillance in the region ‘has declined over recent years’. Moreover, despite the Australian Government highlighting the importance of the new and evolving Pacific Maritime Security Program, ‘development has been hampered by procrastination’. With assets provided under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program starting to reach the end of their operational life in 2018, Australia’s contribution to regional maritime security ‘remain[s] opaque’ and resourcing of the new program seems problematic, given continuing constraints on Australia’s defence budget.67

Moreover, the value of Australia’s ‘goodwill’ is decreasing as the relative value of aid funding to PNG declines. Expected revenues from current and future extractive resource projects in PNG will overshadow Australia’s annual aid contribution of A$450 million. PNG can still make good use of Australia’s expertise and advice, particularly in maritime security. But it will likely become increasingly less needy of Australia’s financial contributions, particularly as colonial-era influences wane and new economic influences emerge.

PNG aspires to self-reliance, while demanding respect and achieving its objectives and goals in a ‘Papua New Guinean’ way. The fundamental way for PNG to shape and maintain its sovereignty is through sustained awareness of all activities in its maritime domain, combined with the ability to respond quickly to threats or incidents. Although a few orders of magnitude greater than PNG’s aspirations, Sir Walter Raleigh wrote that ‘whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself’. PNG’s immediate world is its maritime domain, which it must ‘command’ if it is to maintain sovereignty, exploit its natural resources and protect the marine environment.

Maritime ‘domain awareness’ and capability gaps

Domain awareness

For a state to have maritime domain awareness, it ‘must know what merchant shipping is transiting its waters and whether it constitutes a threat, as well as the presence of any foreign naval forces or non-state actor threats’. The Western and Central Pacific Ocean fishing area (see Figure 5) falls under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum’s Fisheries Agency, which has relatively good monitoring, control and surveillance systems. However, it is ‘not [an] entirely perfect framework against illegal … fishing’. Similarly, while the counter-illegal fishing measures of PNG’s National Fisheries Authority are relatively strong, they are part of the broader ‘imperfect’ framework, and are equally imperfect for countering other maritime threats to PNG.
A significant component of a comprehensive monitoring, control and surveillance framework is the ability to conduct surveillance, patrol and response operations, which includes the use of surface and air assets. As with many of PNG’s enforcement capabilities, surveillance patrols conducted in cooperation with PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) air and maritime elements often ‘fall short of target’. In accordance with an agreement signed in April 2009, the National Fisheries Authority has a commitment from the PNGDF to undertake 150 days of surface patrols per year, comprising 15 ten-day patrols of PNG’s EEZ. Although the task is feasible, the age and condition of the current patrol vessels heavily restrict the operational effectiveness of PNG’s maritime force, with only two such patrols conducted in 2011 and with little prospect of improvement.

The National Fisheries Authority has proposed a similar agreement with the PNGDF for 140 days per year of aerial patrols on the extremities of the EEZ. However, the degraded capability of the PNGDF air element mirrors that of the maritime element and would likely result in equally poor task completion. As a result—and reflecting the PNGDF’s increasing irrelevance in maritime surveillance and response operations—the National Fisheries Authority has been forced to make increased use of contracted services for patrol and surveillance tasks.
According to PNG’s Development Strategic Plan, ‘the current lack in maritime surveillance capacity is resulting in the loss of millions of kina in illegal or under-reported fishing activities’. The plan also stated that ‘development of the maritime surveillance capacity … will support higher returns from PNG’s fishing resources’. However, an Australian Senate review in 2010 concluded that ‘even when States are provided with the vessels … they simply do not have the financial, technological and human capacity to use them to their potential’.

This was exemplified in the four-day search-and-rescue operation following the sinking of the Rabaul Queen, when not one of the participating 15 ships and 13 aircraft was provided by the PNGDF.

**Capability gaps**

In addressing the capabilities needed to demonstrate PNG’s authority in its maritime domain—and to protect the environment and users of that domain—the PNG Government has a number of options, which should not be limited to a PNGDF solution. Contemporary trends show maritime security ‘is becoming more civilianised’ and ‘many non-military agencies are involved in providing some dimension’. Without being prescriptive, it would make sense for PNG’s national agencies to mirror, where possible, the coordination and integration of Australia’s agencies. Moreover, regardless of which agencies have enforcement capabilities, the national coordinating body must be able to apply these elements to PNG’s national interests.

PNG’s most recent Medium Term Development Plan, released in 2010, outlined the capabilities needed to address a range of threats to PNG, particularly in the maritime domain. Specifically, it called for an increase in personnel to enable the PNGDF to ‘effectively execute its mandated roles of border surveillance and patrols and sovereignty protection’, and outlined a staged approach to capability enhancements to align with the Development Strategic Plan’s 2030 targets.

In overseeing the identification and acquisition of these capabilities as they relate to maritime security, the national coordinating body must consider a range of capabilities that provide the right mix of surveillance, patrol and response. The size and nature of PNG’s maritime domain requires high speed and broad coverage capabilities for awareness and surveillance tasks, followed by quick-acting enforcement and response capabilities.

In a 2008 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, relating to maritime capabilities in the broader South Pacific, Bergin and Bateman contended that ‘one size does not fit all’. Although this advice reflected differing requirements across Pacific Island states, it is equally relevant to determining the right mix for PNG, whose diverse maritime and offshore zones require a range of capabilities. Essentially, an effective maritime surveillance and enforcement system should comprise three basic elements: an air surveillance capability, a surface response capability, and the facility to coordinate a response.

The PNGDF’s record of air operations and reliability would suggest that the commercial operation of air surveillance assets is the most effective strategy for PNG. Appropriate contractual arrangements would provide dedicated air hours and platform availability, as well as emergency response for search-and-rescue and other maritime incidents, with a good model being Australia’s Coastwatch organisation. Such an approach would also demonstrate a whole-of-government approach to asset tasking and effective resource management, where ‘surveillance planning takes account of the aggregated needs of all clients and the combined effect of all flights’.
The type of patrol vessels necessary to provide the maritime surveillance, patrol and response capability depends not only on ‘domestic’ requirements but on the Government’s broader intentions, as an emerging regional leader, to be able to provide assets to assist regional stability and response activities. PNG’s current patrol vessels ‘have inadequate range and sea-keeping qualities’ to patrol the full extent of PNG’s EEZ and adjacent waters, with Figure 6 illustrating the maximum operating ranges, within a 24-hour transit, for patrol vessels operating from bases in Port Moresby, Manus Island and Rabaul.

Figure 6. 24-hour patrol vessel ranges covering PNG’s maritime domain

Larger, offshore patrol vessels would significantly enhance PNG’s surface capability. Their increased range, endurance and sea-keeping capabilities would afford a more potent enforcement and response capability, while also supporting PNG’s regional engagement activities by undertaking more wide-ranging patrols. An embarked helicopter capability would be a complex capability to operate and sustain but would provide additional local area surveillance. PNG’s surface capability could also include a mix of inshore patrol vessels and smaller coastal patrol vessels to provide a rapid response capability from a number of smaller operating bases throughout PNG’s archipelago.

Increased civilianisation of maritime security tasks might reasonably guide the PNG Government to a balanced personnel solution that incorporated the physical enforcement capabilities of the military with jurisdictional officers specialising in fisheries, customs, quarantine, immigration, and maritime safety. The Government could also decide to establish a coastguard-style organisation, which would still meet the UNCLOS requirement that powers of enforcement against foreign vessels ‘may only be exercised by officials or by warships, military aircraft, or
other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect’.97

Finally, it is axiomatic that coordination, particularly at the regional level, is critical for an ‘effective appreciation of maritime security threats and coordination of regional responses’.98 In May 2010, the Pacific Islands Forum agreed to a regional monitoring, control and surveillance strategy to counter illegal fishing and manage fisheries more broadly.99 Notwithstanding some concerns about the capacity of Pacific Island states to maintain a regional coordination centre,100 there is an opportunity for PNG to take the lead, not only to avoid duplication across the region but to take advantage of the threat-related information that would become available.

Conclusion

PNG has claimed an extensive maritime domain, and the seas within it ‘represent an incontrovertible emblem of national sovereignty’.101 In claiming such a vast maritime domain, PNG must have the capabilities to conduct maritime surveillance, patrol and response operations to fulfil its international obligations and responsibilities. A critical aspect to improving these capabilities and providing maritime domain awareness is assurance of adequate financial resources and technology, and effective interagency and international cooperation to pool and coordinate the necessary resources.102

As a first step, PNG needs to develop a maritime security policy, as a component of a broader ocean policy, as well as defining the legal, administrative, financial, and capability components of a comprehensive maritime security framework. Implementing a range of new policy initiatives as part of that framework will improve PNG’s regional and international standing—as well as protecting its marine resources and significantly improving its control over shipping movements, while reducing the risk of maritime incidents in remote areas of the archipelago. Importantly, the development and nurturing of a maritime security sector should result in a long-term, ‘multiplier effect’ on PNG’s overall economic prosperity.103

Commodore Brace joined the RAN in 1984. His seagoing experience encompasses hydrographic surveying operations around Australia and PNG, and has included command of HMA Ships Mermaid, Leeuwin and Melville. Shore positions have included Officer-in-Charge RAN Hydrographic School, and Deputy Hydrographer. In 2010-11, he undertook specialist employment with the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, focusing on deep draught ships transiting Torres Strait.

His qualifications include a Master of Engineering Science in Spatial Information Systems from the University of NSW. He attended the Centre for Defence Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College in 2012, where he obtained a Master of Arts in Strategic Studies from Deakin University. In January 2013, Commodore Brace was appointed Hydrographer of Australia and Director General, Navy Hydrography, Meteorology and Oceanography.
NOTES

1. This article is an abridged version of a paper, titled ‘Strengthening Papua New Guinea’s Maritime Security’, submitted by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College (ADC) in 2012. It was written before the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper: see Editor’s comment at note 65.


14. Warwick Andrew, Commission of Inquiry into The Sinking of Rabaul Queen, PNG Government: Port Moresby, 28 June 2012, p. 188.


25. UN, *UNCLOS*, Article 49.


27. UN, *UNCLOS*, Article 53, which states that ships and aircraft undertaking archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles either side of the fixed continuous axis lines of designated lanes and routes, which provides a supporting framework for enforcing sovereignty and protecting national interests.


32. UN, *UNCLOS*, Articles 192-237, 64-65 and 242 respectively.


38. Secretariat of the Pacific Community, *Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy and the Framework for Integrated Strategic Action*, p. 18. The author based these tasks on those at Appendix 2 of the regional policy.


48. UN, UNCLOS, Articles 48-9.

49. Kailola, Fisheries Resources Profiles, pp. vii–viii. The author adapted (shaded) and relabelled the map to aid in identifying the various maritime zones and locations.


51. PNG’s EEZ is only ‘nationally claimed’ because the UN only acknowledges PNG’s original ‘fishing zone’ claim.

52. Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the Ontong Java Plateau by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, 5 May 2009, p. 3.

53. Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the Ontong Java Plateau by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, p. 10.


59. Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the Ontong Java Plateau by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, p. 4.


63. Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, Staying the course: Australia and maritime security in the South Pacific, ASPI: Canberra, May 2011, p. 3.


65. Bateman and Bergin, Making waves, p. 5. Editor’s note: the subsequent 2013 Defence White Paper (DWP13) makes specific mention of the Pacific Maritime Security Program (PMSP) and assistance to PNG at paragraphs 6.56-6.60, including that ‘the centrepiece of [the PMSP] will be the gifting
of a fleet of vessels to replace the existing Pacific Patrol Boats, which need replacing over the period 2018-2028'. In addition, DWP13 notes that 'the Government is committed to deepening Australia’s longstanding defence relationship with Papua New Guinea, to support its Defence Force’s sustainability and ability to perform constitutionally mandated tasks professionally'.

66. Bateman and Bergin, Staying the course, p. 1.
67. Bateman and Bergin, Making waves, p. 5.
74. UN, 'FAO Fishing Areas: Area 71: Pacific Western Central': see <http://www.oceansatlas.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0zMTIyJjY9ZW4mMzM9KiyzNz1rb3M~> accessed 7 October 2012.
78. An assessment by Jane’s in 2011 concluded that ‘the size of the task of patrolling an EEZ with three sea borders is too great for the Navy’: see Jane’s Information Group, 'Navy (Papua New Guinea)', 9 November 2011, available at Jane’s online (Australian Defence College, Defence Library Service), accessed 5 October 2012.
80. Based in part on a visit by the author to PNGDF maritime and air elements in August 2012.
82. Department of National Planning and Monitoring, Papua New Guinea Development Strategic Plan 2010-2030, p. 93.
83. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee of the Australian Senate, Volume II, p. 80.
84. Andrew, Commission of Inquiry into The Sinking of Rabaul Queen, pp. 249–50.
85. Bateman and Bergin, Staying the course, p. 6.
89. Bateman and Bergin, Staying the course, p. 11.
90. Bateman and Bergin, Making waves, p. 6. The cost would likely be considerably less than the A$30 million paid by Australia each year, and could be as low as A$5 million.
92. Bateman and Bergin, Staying the course, p. 12.
93. The range circles represent an estimate of the maximum ranges possible within a 24-hour transit from base port (Manus, Port Moresby or Rabaul) for a medium-sized patrol vessel. The distorted ranges from Port Moresby account for the transit around the mainland peninsula or through Torres Strait.
94. Bateman and Bergin, Staying the course, pp. 12–3.
95. Bateman and Bergin, Making waves, p. 7.
96. The annual operating costs for two offshore and four inshore patrol vessels is estimated at A$140 million (which includes capital costs and depreciation), derived from New Zealand Defence Force, Annual Report 2012, New Zealand Government: Wellington, 2012, p. 69. Although New Zealand’s personnel costs are likely to be significantly higher than those of the PNGDF maritime element, they provide a reasonable baseline.
97. UN, UNCLOS, Article 224.
98. Bateman and Bergin, Staying the course, p. 13.
100. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Volume II, p 14.
The Gender Agenda: women, peace and security in the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions

Commander Jennifer A. Wittwer, CSM, RAN

Recognising that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection, and full participation in the peace process, can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 2000

Introduction

With a renewed focus on the treatment of women in the ADF, including through the conduct of reviews in 2011-12 by the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Ms Elizabeth Broderick, it is worth reflecting on the role that gender plays in military operations and operational planning, and its link to capability building and sustainment. This is not a modern form of affirmative action—gender perspective, analysis and mainstreaming plays a real part in NATO’s crisis management planning process and the conduct of operations and missions designed to support areas of crisis and conflict.

NATO’s planning process is designed to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to female engagement capability, that women are supported and engaged in the decision-making and planning process, and that the impact of armed conflict on women and children at risk in crisis situations is minimised. It is a strategy to achieve gender equality by assessing the implications for men and women in conflict areas of any planned action.

This includes legislation, policies and programs in all areas and at all levels, to ensure that the concerns and experiences of men and women are taken into account in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation process in all political, economic and societal spheres. This process also contributes significantly to the growth and development of stability, governance and security of host nations following conflict and instability, to which NATO responds.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325

We can no longer afford to minimise or ignore the contributions of women and girls to all stages of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peace-building, peacekeeping and reconstruction processes. Sustainable peace will not be achieved without the full and equal participation of women and men.

Former UN Secretary Kofi Annan

In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325. It recognised that the experiences and needs of women and girls differed from those of men and boys in conflict and post-conflict situations. The resolution also underlined the essential role of women in conflict prevention, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Specifically, the resolution reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and stressed the importance of their equal participation and involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.
Further, it aimed to protect women’s rights and to take account of their specific needs in conflict and post-conflict situations. Importantly, Resolution 1325 confirmed the need to expand the role and contribution of women in UN field-based operations and to mainstream gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, to include consideration of:

- The special needs of women and children during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;
- Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution; and
- Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.4

The focus of the resolution is ‘protection, prevention, participation and gender mainstreaming’ in order to achieve gender equality. Gender equality in areas affected by armed conflict is essential for ensuring that basic human rights are protected and the needs of women and girls are met. Gender equality also enables men to break away from often limiting and rigid gender roles and expectations.

Men and boys have a role to play in ensuring women’s and girls’ security. Members of defence forces have a key role to play in promoting gender equality and preventing violence against women in conflict and post-conflict settings. With equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in prevention and resolution of conflicts, gender perspective considerations are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

Resolution 1325 tasked the UN system and its member states with thoroughly integrating a gender perspective into all peacekeeping operations and peace processes, as well as return, resettlement and reintegration programs in post-conflict settings. Since 2000, NATO command, member nations and other ‘Partnership for Peace’ and contact countries (including Australia) have developed national action plans to mainstream the provisions of the resolution into current and future crisis management and operational planning, training and doctrine and all elements of operational tasking.

During the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO called for a strong and effective implementation of Resolution 1325 and related resolutions throughout all its activities. The Chicago Summit Declaration of May 2012 further reinforced the mainstreaming of Resolution 1325 and related resolutions into NATO-led operations and missions.5

Gender in operations: gender perspective, analysis and mainstreaming

In 2009 and again in 2012, NATO released specific directives to the military organisations and forces within the NATO command structure to implement Resolution 1325 through a framework focused on gender perspective integration. This mandated gender framework, with a series of subordinate directives, provided guidance for the integration of gender perspective into the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations in order to improve operational effectiveness.6

It also established and clarified the role of gender advisors and the extended gender network (in specific missions), who provide gender analysis specific to the area of operations, as well as subject-matter expertise on resolution implementation and the protection of civilians.7
An understanding of some key definitions is crucial. These lay the groundwork for how NATO integrates gender perspective and Resolution 1325 in response to NATO’s political and military commitments and expectations. In this regard, gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female, learned through socialisation, which determine a person’s position and value in a given context. Most notably, gender does not equate to women. Integration of gender perspective is a way of assessing the gender-based differences of women and men reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and access to resources.

‘Gender analysis’ can broadly be defined as the systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand gender-based inequities. An example would include understanding how customary conflict-resolution mechanisms affect women and men differently and how their social status may change as a result of war.

‘Gender mainstreaming’ in this context represents the process to recognise and incorporate the role gender plays in relation to operational missions. Gender mainstreaming does not focus solely on women but the benefits of this practice recognise their disadvantaged position in various communities. Gender perspective should not be limited to the protection and participation of women. With issues such as violence against women and reproductive health issues prevailing in areas of conflict, the engagement of the male population and their subsequent buy-in is critical to the success of any action taken by NATO to address these challenges.

Gender is a topic that never stands alone. It is a theme that cuts across and affects various aspects of operations and missions, including governance, security reform, humanitarian relief, reintegration, rule of law, and development activities. A full integration of gender perspective should therefore occur in the planning, execution and evaluation phases of operations by conducting gender analysis throughout the process.

**Australia’s women, peace and security agenda**

For Australia, this has occurred to a significant level with work taken forward in both domestic agencies and international settings, within and across governments, and through engagement with the non-government sector and civil society. The fundamental connection between gender equality and peace means that the Australian Government’s commitment to achieving gender equality more broadly is a key component of its implementation of the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda.

The Government also has a number of mechanisms in place to facilitate a greater consideration of gender quality across a range of government work, including peace and security policy. This includes a strategic agenda to reduce violence against women, improve women’s economic security and ensure women’s equal place in society. Australia’s national action plan, which was released on International Women’s Day 2012, sets out what Australia will do at home and overseas to integrate a gender perspective into its peace and security efforts, protect women’s and girls’ human rights, and promote their participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution.
As the UN has recognised, equal access and the full participation of women in power structures and their involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. The potential contribution of women in the ADF was extended in September 2011 when the Australian Government formally agreed to the removal of gender restrictions from ADF combat roles.

The Broderick Review into the treatment of women in the ADF further defined the principles that will underpin ongoing efforts to increase women’s representation in the ADF and in key leadership positions. This work is seen as critical to sustaining the force in-being, enhancing capability building and improving operational effectiveness. Complementing the ADF’s gender reforms, the implementation of Resolution 1325 should further underpin the ADF’s efforts to increase female participation and encourage more opportunities for women to contribute to security efforts, the prevention of conflict and building peace.

Australia’s plan will seek to integrate a gender perspective into Australia’s policies on peace and security, and embed the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda in the Government’s approach to human resource management of the ADF, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and personnel deployed on operations and missions overseas. Specific actions include building on training programs to enhance staff competence and understanding of ‘women, peace and security’, ensuring women have opportunities to participate in the AFP and ADF (including deployments overseas and decision-making positions), ensuring formalised complaint mechanisms for safe reporting of gender-based violence and harassment, and investigating all complaints of gender-based violence and harassment.

The plan contains five strategies and a total of 24 actions, for which Defence is included as a responsible agency for seventeen. These actions accurately reflect the intent of NATO’s mandates and gender framework, which has been applied with some considerable success by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan since 2009 in the peace-building, reintegration and reconstruction process.

Gender equity in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the requirement for gender perspective and analysis in NATO-led operations is essential, in order to give effect to the country’s gender equity policies and human rights reforms. Article 22 of The Constitution of Afghanistan states that men and women have equal rights and duties before the law. It also states that any kind of discrimination between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden. Nevertheless, while there is no explicit reference to sharia in the Constitution, no Afghan law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islam. In this regard, Islam recognises the right of women to have property, receive equal pay, claim compensation in divorce, participate in military service, resist a forced marriage, and be involved in politics, as well as the full range of social equality and educational opportunities.

However, while women comprise approximately 50 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, the condition of and the environment for Afghan women continues to be one of the worst in the world. In general, Afghan women’s exercise of rights and freedoms are encumbered by gender-biased practices, segregation, lack of security, weakness of government institutions and civil society, and women’s overall subordinate position in Afghan society.
While this appears contrary to the Afghan *Constitution* and the Koran,

the Koran, it has likely been caused by the beliefs and interpretations of influential Afghan culture. Therefore, as part of an overall effort to strengthen civil society and increase the involvement of citizens in bringing stability to their communities, women and women’s organisations need to be empowered to play a prominent role in reintegration, reconciliation, transition and achieving a sustainable peace.

The ultimate goal of the Government of Afghanistan is ‘gender equality’, a condition where women and men fully enjoy their rights, equally contribute to, and enjoy, the benefits of development—and where neither is prevented from pursuing what is fair, good and necessary to live a full and satisfying life.

I ask our leaders and religious scholars to tell people that women have equal rights under our constitution and religion. To break those equal rights is wrong, in both the law of Afghanistan and in Islam itself.

Mursal Ahmadzai, Head of Kandahar’s Women’s Rights Office

Because of this, the Government has developed a framework through which it aims to achieve specific gender equality objectives. Firstly, the *Afghan National Development Strategy 2008-2013*, the Government’s strategy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction, is focused on developing basic institutional capacities of ministries and government agencies on gender mainstreaming. The strategy provides a roadmap for various sectors to bring about changes in women’s positions in society, their socio-economic condition and access to development opportunities. It targets three main outcomes:

- A significant number of government entities embracing and implementing gender efforts and an increasing number of ministries with functional gender equity-promoting mechanisms;
- Measurable improvements in women’s status, increasing leadership and participation in all spheres of life, adequate access to justice systems that are gender sensitive and reduced vulnerability to violence in public and at home; and
- Greater societal acceptance of gender equality, increased appreciation of the value of education for women and girls, an increasing number of influential men and institutions promoting gender equity, and participation for women in policy discussions.

Secondly, the *National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan 2008-18* is the instrument by which the Government has and will pursue gender equality and empowerment of women in all spheres of life, which recognises that this can only be achieved through participation, support and partnership between and among women and men. The plan focuses on three pillars that are critical in accelerating the improvement in the status of women, namely:

- Security;
- Governance, rule of law and human rights, which includes leadership and political participation; and
- Economic and social development, which includes work and poverty, health and education.

The plan’s goal is to eliminate discrimination against women, develop their human capital, and promote their leadership in order to guarantee their full and equal participation in all aspects of life. It also highlights the policy framework that shapes the Government’s gender policies, including:
• The *Declaration of the Essential Rights of Afghan Women*, signed by President Hamid Karzai in 2002, which enshrines equality between men and women, equal protection under the law, institutional education, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and political involvement, and the right to wear or not wear the burqa or scarf; and
• *The Bonn Agreement*, which recognised that the participation of women, and attention to their rights and status, are both a requirement and a vision for the national peace and reconstruction process.

Lastly, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs *National Priority Program 4* (2010-13) is the strategy to enable the Government to implement its gender equality commitments, by pursuing four objectives:

- Developing the capacities of relevant government entities to mainstream the national action plan into their policy making, planning and implementation processes;
- Institutionalising the development of knowledge, and building the technical resource bases to support the pursuit of gender equality goals;
- Raising public awareness and appreciation of gender equality as a means to attain the vision of a progressive and peaceful Afghanistan; and
- Establishing effective mechanisms to oversee the implementation of the national action plan across Government.

**Implementation of Resolution 1325 and gender perspective in Afghanistan**

In 2009, ISAF Afghanistan adopted a population-centric strategy, which recognised Afghan women as critical enablers. This included the role women could and would play in the security of Afghanistan, and who should be recruited, trained and sustained with the Afghan National Security Force and supported by gender-informed policies of the Government. In this regard, ISAF Joint Command’s goal was and is to support the Government’s efforts to mainstream gender policies in accordance with the ISAF mission, and to incorporate gender perspective into all joint command lines of operations.

To enable this, the ISAF gender advisors’ network was established in 2009. As a result there are gender advisors at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, responsible for advising various Government ministries and agencies on the involvement of women in governance, security and politics. They also interact with women’s organisations at all levels and advise ISAF commanders on the gender perspective aspects of operational missions and activities, which include:

- Ensuring that gender perspective is mainstreamed into all joint command lines of operation according to Resolution 1325 and NATO directives;
- Providing advice to ISAF Joint Command on gender topics and awareness training on the role of gender in operations;
- Establishing and maintaining contacts with international and national organisations, and influential Afghan women, supporting gender equity efforts in Afghanistan; and
- Informing ISAF Joint Command staff on the Government’s gender equity policies.

In addition, the gender advisors’ network has supported ISAF Joint Command’s ‘Female Engagement Team’ program manager on all related topics. The Coalition Force’s female
engagement team, which has now drawn down, provided the trained capability to enable ISAF and the Government to influence the Afghan female population and achieve mission objectives at the provincial and district level across Afghanistan. This capability enabled significant information gathering and dissemination, partnering and mentoring of women in the Afghan National Security Force, educational outreach and security support.

Through ISAF’s support, Afghan gender advisors have also been established in Government ministries and Afghan National Security Force ‘tashkils’ (force structures), to provide gender awareness training to men and women in the Security Force and to promote and implement Resolution 1325 and the Afghan national action plan.

This is a capacity that is essential to the long-term development and growth of women in the Afghan workforce and across all sectors, and to the Afghan economy. Thus ISAF’s mission in this respect has been twofold: to consider gender in all aspects of operations and planning; and, by focusing on Afghan women’s empowerment and gender equity, assist and support the Government in the implementation of its gender equity policies and legislation.

Effect of ISAF’s gender perspective strategy

As part of its contribution to governance and development, ISAF supports and enables the ISAF and Afghan structures dealing with transition and capacity building. This includes the inclusion of women in the security, reintegration and peace process. Afghan agencies—such as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the provincial Departments of Women’s Affairs—supported by ISAF, function as oversight bodies to design policy and evaluate national action plan progress. ISAF gender advisors continue to advise, assist and mentor officials in the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior in the development of women, particularly in the security sector.

The integration of gender perspective into ISAF’s operational documentation has ensured a focus on, and a considerable contribution to, the recruitment, retention and development of women in the Afghan National Security Force, as well as providing advice and assistance on education and training in regard to Resolution 1325 and gender perspectives. In this regard, there is a need for the increased recruitment and hiring of female Afghan National Police personnel in order to support women within communities and to combat the increasing use of burqas by insurgents.

The Afghan National Army and Police also require women searchers in order to search other women. To achieve this, the Government set targets for females in the Afghan National Security Force. The 2012 recruitment statistics were: Army 0.2 per cent (goal 10 per cent), Air Force 0.5 per cent (goal 10) and Police 1 per cent (goal 3). While the Afghan National Security Force is currently falling short of its female recruitment goals, because of numerous recruitment challenges and lack of attention by senior officials and hiring companies, ISAF continues to work collaboratively to rectify this.

The consistent presence of women in law enforcement is necessary to ensure legal protections for women and female police, and to improve access for women seeking to report violence and pursue justice. A recent report by Human Rights Watch, however, indicates that the lack of access to separate, safe and lockable restroom facilities in Kabul police stations for female officers, despite orders by the Kabul Police Chief, makes them more vulnerable to workplace sexual harassment, abuse and even incidents of sexual assault.
This is despite the gender awareness training provided to Afghan National Security Force recruits during initial training, and the Government’s implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in 2009. This law created an essential tool for police and prosecutors by criminalising a range of different acts, including forced marriage, underage marriage, sale of women and girls, rape and domestic violence.41

Four years later, however, the impact of this law has been disappointing. Prosecutions have occurred but the number has been small, and the number of convictions even smaller—and in many provinces the law has yet to be invoked. Abusive practices, such as the jailing of women or girls who flee domestic violence or forced marriage on accusations of ‘immorality’, continue unchecked. Violence against women continues to be an epidemic; Afghanistan’s national human rights commission recorded a 30 per cent increase in reported cases of violence against women in 2012 over the previous year.42

In part, the law has also not been adequately enforced because of the lack of female officers whose presence is critical to assisting female crime victims. The Government, with the support of ISAF, international advisers and donors, has tried to address this problem through the creation of specialised units in police stations called ‘Family Response Units’, which are staffed by female officers to assist female victims of crime. However, their effectiveness has been hampered by the lack of female officers to staff them.

That said, there has been considerable success with ISAF assisting the Afghan National Security Force to develop mixed gender training and providing professional development opportunities for women. Earlier this year, two female sergeant majors from the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police became the first women to graduate as command sergeant majors from Kabul’s prestigious Military Training Centre. Both women are taking up senior enlisted advisor roles in the Army’s logistics department in Kabul and the Ministry of Interior’s gender department respectively.

More recently, a number of Afghan women have completed special forces training, to enable culturally sensitive roles in protecting civilian women and children during operations. This in itself has created challenges, as women in these roles face potential physical violence in the home and being shunned by families and friends due to cultural sensitivities. Also the lack of child care constrains the ability of women to attend training and subsequent postings away from the family home.

While it would appear that the military advantages of having female Afghan special forces have not yet offset these social issues, women continue to seek positions within the Security Force to contribute to Afghanistan’s security, growth and development. As noted by Sergeant Major Rashan Safi, the most senior enlisted soldier in the Afghan National Army, ‘Afghan women have always been considered defenders of Afghanistan too’.43

A more contemporary example of the requirement to assess women’s needs and ensure gender perspective will be the Afghanistan presidential elections in 2014. The Afghan National Security Force will assume the security role in this instance but ISAF’s role will be to ensure that the Government and the Security Force have considered carefully the particular security requirements for women, which includes protection from violence by male relatives, or insurgent activity and searchers at voter registration centres and polling stations. The success of ISAF’s role in supporting the Government’s gender equity policies and the implementation of Resolution 1325 will likely be tested by this event.
These examples demonstrate how difficult it is to implement Resolution 1325 and the Government’s gender equity policies in the face of cultural challenges and Afghan societal norms. That said, the ISAF mission has contributed significantly to supporting the Government in its endeavours and has done this through a systematic approach to considering the needs of men and women and providing the training, support and mentoring necessary for Afghanistan’s stability and growth. This has only been achieved through the application of NATO’s mandate on gender perspective in operations and planning. Examples of these achievements include:

• An increase in the number of women in Parliament and high-level peace and provincial councils, as governors and mayors, judges, lawyers and senior military officers.
• The development and implementation of the national action plan, the *Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women* and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.
• The development of agencies such as the ‘Human Rights, Gender and Child Rights’ office in the Ministry of Interior, and ‘Human Rights and Gender Integration Directorate’ in the Ministry of Defence.
• The development and implementation of Resolution 1325 and gender awareness programs for the Afghan National Security Force.
• The development and implementation of family support offices and family response units to assist female victims of crime.

**Conclusion**

For NATO command, exercises and operations, gender has become a key feature in planning, and command and control. It is essential for mission effectiveness and enabling host countries to establish sustainable security development, and economic growth and development. It also helps to address challenges such as the protection of human and other rights for men, women and children, and security concerns for women as they strive to achieve gender equity.

To enable the implementation and integration of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and NATO gender policies, a network of gender advisors has been embedded in NATO’s command structure at the military-strategic, operational and tactical levels. This enables a focus on the gender perspective consideration of operations and missions and their impact on men and women in conflict areas.

While there remain significant cultural and societal challenges for Afghanistan in achieving its *National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan* objectives, overall the concept of gender in NATO operations provides the framework to assist and support the advancement of women and the implementation of gender equity policies in order to contribute successfully to stability, governance and security. The lessons learned and experiences gained in the NATO context may assist the development and implementation of the ADF’s response to Australia’s national action plan.
Commander Wittwer joined the Navy in 1981. Her appointments have included Deputy Supply Officer HMAS Nirimba, Charge Supply Officer HMAS Swan (1996) and Officer Commanding Supply Squadron ADFA (1997-2000). Commander Wittwer was Navy’s first Director of Navy Organisational Culture in 2002-03 and again served in that appointment in 2008. She was a foundation member of the New Generation Navy (cultural reform) development team in 2009 and served as the inaugural Navy Women’s Strategic Adviser from 2010-12. In January 2013, Commander Wittwer deployed to Afghanistan as the ISAF Joint Command Gender Advisor.

NOTES

4. UNSCR 1325, p. 3.
5. NATO, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure (UNCLASSIFIED), Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, 8 August 2012, pp. 4-5
6. NATO, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure, p. 3.
7. NATO, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure, p. 12.
8. NATO, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure, p. 5.
9. NATO, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure, p. 5.
11. NATO, Gender Makes Sense, p. 17.
12. NATO, Gender Makes Sense, p. 44.
16. AHRC 2011 and 2012 made 52 recommendations, all of which were agreed either fully or in-principle to be implemented.


22. ‘Sharia’, the moral code and religious law of Islam, deals with many topics including crime, politics and economics, as well as personal matters: see, for example, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia> accessed 12 May 2013.


25. The Koran or Qu’ran.


27. Mursal Ahmadzai, Head of Kandahar’s Women’s Rights Office in Sada-e Azad, Issue 54, p. 11


37. NATO, ISAF Joint Command Fragmentary Order 520-2013, paragraph 2 (UNCLASSIFIED), pp. 2-4


41. Human Rights Watch, ‘*Inadequate Facilities Imperil Women Officers*’.

42. Human Rights Watch, ‘*Inadequate Facilities Imperil Women Officers*’.

43. Sergeant Major Rashan Safi in Sada-e Azadi, Issue 55, p. 10
The ADF beyond Afghanistan – four possible scenarios

Captain Louise Brown, Australian Army

In 2012, therefore, we look at the high probability that operational tempo will decline in the next few years and that we could relive the ‘great peace’ of 1972 to 1990. These changes will bring new challenges to the ADF, challenges compounded by the increasing pace of change in our neighbourhood and the budgetary constraints that we face.

General David Hurley, AC, DSC, Chief of the Defence Force

In his 2012 address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, General David Hurley discussed the challenges facing the ADF. While the drawdown of Australia’s commitment in Afghanistan and the cessation of operations in both the Solomon Islands and Timor marks a step change in the tempo of ADF deployed operations, a period like the ‘great peace’ of 1972 to 1990 is by no means a certainty.

This article will examine four possible scenarios that the ADF could find itself facing, using a spectrum of security challenges and a range of defence budget outcomes as the two key variable factors, as summarised in Figure 1. The analysis will focus on the strategic and budgetary conditions that form the basis of each scenario, as well as the potential impact on the ADF and the risks therein.

![Figure 1: Four possible scenarios](image-url)
A ‘great peace’

The prospect of a ‘great peace’ is probably not the most likely of the scenarios. It would require a relatively benign and stable strategic environment, in particular in Australia’s immediate region of interest, making it difficult for the government-of-the-day to justify increased or even current levels of defence spending. In this scenario, ADF capabilities are either very slow to be modernised or, in some cases, at risk of disappearing altogether.

Australia’s immediate area of strategic interest, the Indo-Pacific, is still emerging as a geostrategic system. The nature of potential threats is difficult to predict but there are likely to be fewer wars fought to redesign the borders of nation states and more tensions arising from the protection of national interests and supply of natural resources. Transnational or non-traditional security threats are also gathering momentum, including from piracy, offensive cyber activities and illegal fishing, through to demographic shifts, water shortages, potential pandemics and the effects of climate change.

In such a scenario, the role of an expeditionary force is much diminished. There is little need for regular forces trained for a broad range of missions; little requirement for transport, communications and logistic capacities; and little requirement for the ancillary services, such as medical and dental support, fuel and water handling, and so on. The priority becomes the development and funding of a classic territorial defence force, designed to operate on or around its national borders. Such a force delivers substantially more ‘shop window’ combat capability per dollar because it is not burdened with the high overheads of deployability and military self-sufficiency. The defence budget is thus able to be reduced in real terms, as has happened before.

The end of the volatile Sukarno era in Indonesia and the emergence of a relatively benign near region after the end of the Vietnam War contributed, by the early 1970s, to a shift in Australian Government policy away from regional and international force projection. In 1976, a newly-elected government issued a Defence White Paper that explained Australia’s changed strategic circumstances and emphasised force projection into the ‘neighbourhood’ rather than ‘some distant or forward theatre’. The prevalent strategic thinking was that Australia’s national security should be predominantly concerned with defence of the mainland against state actors. This led to an investment in capital equipment to defend the air-sea gap but allowed a run-down of the Army (both Regular and Reserve components) and the national capability to deploy and sustain an armed force.

The implications of this approach were brought into stark reality when, in 1999, the ADF deployed to East Timor, ending ‘the great peace’. Despite UN resolutions and eventual support from 22 nations, Australia’s initial deployment had to rely on existing capability that ‘proved to be just over the line’ to deal with a lightly-armed militia. In the decade following that shock, Australia regenerated its military capabilities through deliberate investment.

The current National Security Strategy, like the ‘defence of Australia’ policies of the 1980s, assumes that there will be time to prepare for conflict against a state actor and that there will be time to put in place and train the ‘expeditionary tail’ required to sustain combat forces deployed away from national support service infrastructure.
Recent experience shows that the requirement for deployments such as East Timor (or the French in Mali) arise at very short notice, meaning that the ADF will deploy with whatever it has available. The risk of assuming away the problems of the region is that Australia could find itself in a position where it simply does not have the time to regenerate its military capability before a crisis impacts its national interests.

In both the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers, there has been a strong focus on procuring modern air and maritime equipment but much less investment in the land environment. There is a real danger that, if continued, such unbalanced priorities might see Army losing its technological edge—and all three Services losing knowledge and hard-won operational skills.

**Strategic risk**

Rather than assuming a long period of peace, the 2013 Defence White Paper describes the increasingly contested nature of Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific tensions and relationships, with China rising, the US rebalancing its attention to the Asia Pacific, and Japan, India and other middle powers seeking to redefine their defence strategies.

As one of those middle powers, Australia has sought to protect and promote its national interests through a combination of a close US alliance, a range of Asian and South Pacific security partners, and a relationship with China based on mutual respect. Defence diplomacy has received new emphasis, reinforcing the idea that we ‘must seek our security in the region, rather than defending ourselves from it’.

However, the 2013 Defence White Paper has already been heavily criticised for its less-than-transparent approach to funding, and the ‘absence of an investment plan to execute its policy and strategy objectives’. A detailed analysis by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in 2012 contends that since the 2009 Defence White Paper, the defence budget has been reduced by A$10 billion, a further A$10 billion has been deferred from the forward estimates to ‘later years’, and A$4 billion of cost pressures has been imposed through absorbed costs and hand-backs.

Depending on how the deferrals are treated in future budgets, Defence will have ‘lost’ between A$14 billion and A$24 billion over 10 years. Australia’s defence spending is now 1.56 per cent of GDP, the lowest level since the 1930s. And yet the 2013 Defence White Paper reiterates that the Government remains committed to delivering the core capabilities identified in the 2009 Defence White Paper.

The 2013 Defence White Paper does not acknowledge that there might be a link between the two themes. Diplomacy is cheaper than military capability, so some might argue that although the ADF cannot afford all the insurance it would like in the form of ‘hard power’ defence capability, it may compensate a little by increasing use of ‘soft power’ diplomacy. After some carefully balanced and sophisticated analysis of US-China relations, the paper briefly considers how the wider strategic environment in Asia is steadily deteriorating, suggesting this may not be the best time for Australia to be ‘under-investing’ in defence.

One criticism of the 2009 Defence White Paper was that it ‘spoke loudly whilst holding a small stick’, in that it annoyed China, yet did not actually fund a potent and balanced Australian defence capability. A senior Lowy Institute commentator has likened the 2009 Defence White Paper to a red rag but the 2013 Defence White Paper to a white flag.
By recognising that the strategic situation, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, is unstable and uncertain—and yet not funding defence to the level required—Australia is arguably taking a strategic risk. It may be that investment in other priority areas, such as education and health, will do more to promote Australia’s national interests over the next decade than investing in defence. Or it may be that Australia may look back after the next crisis (assuming it is able to) and wish it had invested in a much better ‘insurance policy’ from defence.

What would it be like to be ‘over-insured’?

To understand the dynamics at play, it is useful to examine an opposing world view. Compared to the ‘strategic risk’ scenario, the opposite end of both the strategic security and the defence budget position is a scenario where Australia benefits from a relatively benign security environment, and yet the ADF has a large defence budget.

Even the rather gloomy 2009 Defence White Paper admitted that the conventional threat to Australia is low—and will remain so for the foreseeable future. China, India, Japan, North and South Korea, and Indonesia are the only nations likely to be capable of generating enough military capability to potentially destabilise the region for the next couple of decades. But given the strength of global economic interdependence, it could be argued that there is a major disincentive for any power to resort to hostile moves against anyone, let alone Australia.

Following that logic, does Australia really need the high-end capabilities envisaged in Force 2030, and that Government remains committed to delivering in the 2013 Defence White Paper? Of course, there are strong counter-arguments—similar reasoning on the pacifying effect of increasing globalisation of economies applied in the run up to 1914, and yet World War 1 still happened. Secondly, given ongoing tensions and rhetoric on sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, and ongoing tensions in the Korean peninsula and over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, is it safe to assume a ‘rationalist’ approach by all nations in the region? However unlikely, the setting in this quadrant is a benign security situation and a well-resourced ADF.

If successive governments do find the ability to fund the requirements of Force 2030, the ADF will be well equipped, and funded to activity levels that should enable the requisite training levels to be achieved and maintained. But by 2025 or so, in this scenario, we would have a well-equipped and well-trained ADF that is lacking any real direction or challenge, and the force would not get used, other than in defence diplomacy and in seasonal humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home or in our near abroad. Familiar problems such as irregular boat arrivals, refugees, piracy and terrorism are unlikely to diminish. But the ADF would have either a limited or a highly-specialised role in all of those challenges, rather than finding a new raison d’être. In this scenario, the ADF will not have had a ‘proper’ fight since Afghanistan.

A well-equipped, well-trained and capable but un-blooded ADF may sound like the best of all worlds to a civilian. However, inside the ADF, the ‘wicked problem’ to be solved would all be about the inter-play between hard training, turnover, focused retention and, above all, how to maintain a hard-edged fighting spirit in such times. It may well be much better to be lean and mean, than fat and jolly.
Rising to the challenge

The fourth scenario would see a properly resourced and balanced ADF, with the requisite capabilities to respond effectively to the full spectrum of potential threats in what is acknowledged to be an increasingly complex and contested strategic environment.\(^{19}\) The challenge would be in finding the right balance between resourcing and structuring the ADF such that it is capable of responding to both traditional, state-based threats and irregular conflicts.

Increasingly, any assessment of the security environment is a blur of conventional and unconventional threats, requiring a full-spectrum defensive strategy. As the 2005 US National Defense Strategy puts it:

\[\ldots\] ... traditional inter-state conflicts, irregular conflicts, catastrophic weapons of mass destruction threats; and disruptive threats from adversaries who may possess break-through technologies are increasingly merging into a deadly cocktail.\(^{20}\)

For example, the global Islamist jihadist movement emanating from the Middle East may be cellular, non-state and irregular in its methods. But its fanatical ideology compels it not only to use roadside bombs but to seek to acquire catastrophic capabilities, previously only imagined as part of a traditional, state-based threat. Moreover, states such as North Korea and Iran have the military potential to present a medley of traditional, irregular and catastrophic challenges simultaneously. This was graphically illustrated as early as 1982 when, in the Iran-Iraq war, children—some as young as 12—were used as human minesweepers sent in advance of Iran’s other military forces to clear the fields, desert scrubland and marshes.\(^{21}\)

While most Defence capabilities have utility in either circumstance, the most expensive are typically more tailored to high-end, state-based threat contingencies. The currently-envisaged structure, as set out in Force 2030, would be dominated by key major cost programs: 12 long range conventional submarines, 100 Joint Strike Fighters, two LHD amphibious assault ships, three air warfare destroyers and Army’s Plan Beersheba. Whether this is a perfect structure or one perhaps that is heavily weighted towards the high end of conflict is debatable.

In order to achieve this scale of modernised capabilities, the defence budget would need to be made robustly affordable in terms of both the forward estimates and the longer term. While there is no fixed ‘magic ratio’ between the costs of capital investment, manpower and operating costs, most allied militaries divide their costs roughly between the three; the Australian defence budget has become unbalanced by a shortfall in capital investment,\(^{22}\) and it is this component which would need to be restored in order to generate the envisaged Force 2030 capabilities. A broad order of magnitude of the required investment would be to increase defence spending immediately to around 2 per cent of GDP, which could generate Force 2030 by the roughly-envisaged timescale.\(^{23}\)

Conclusion

This article has assessed four potential scenarios for the future, differentiated by the strategic security situation and Australia’s investment in the ADF. It would be hard to imagine a realistic scenario in which the defence budget envelope is significantly enhanced; equally difficult to envisage is a scenario where the strategic environment is so benign as to be described as a ‘great peace’.
Arguably the remaining scenario, strategic risk, is both the most realistic and most dangerous course of action—a defence force operating in an unstable security environment within the constraints of a tightly-controlled budget envelope.

In acknowledging this fact, perhaps it is time to reassess the envisaged future force structure to better reflect the likely requirement. Most importantly, in considering the nature of warfare and the shape of the ADF after Afghanistan, every attempt should be made to avoid the assumption that because of trending shifts in political, strategic or budget assumptions, our past experiences have little relevance. Most of Australia’s recent military operations have involved deployed forces, with significant land components, seeking to engage, influence and protect communities from a spectrum of threats from non-state actors, including in Somalia, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan.24

Captain Brown graduated from Sandhurst in 1998. She served with the ACE Mobile Force in Norway and Turkey; a REME Battalion in Germany; in a Training Regiment; operations officer in HQ Northern Ireland; battery operations officer in Cyprus; officer-in-charge of an Armoured Infantry Battalion workshop; and then Adjutant of a REME Battalion. Promoted Major, she served as SO2 Psychological Operations in the Coalition HQ in Basra, then completed the UK Intermediate Command & Staff Course. After 3 years in the City of London with Barclays Wealth and Bank of America Merrill Lynch, she emigrated to Australia in 2012. As a lateral transfer to RAEME, she is now serving in 7 CSSB in Brisbane. She has a Masters of Engineering from Cambridge University, and is a UK and Australian Chartered Professional Engineer.

NOTES

2. The ‘great peace’ refers to a lengthy period in which the ADF saw no combat after withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972.
16. The opposite of President Roosevelt’s advice, in his speech at Minnesota State Fair, 1901.
19. Australian Government, Strong and Secure, p.3.
23. While both sides of Australian politics claim to aspire to an eventual return to defence spending around 2 per cent of GDP, neither is making that a priority in the current election year, with the May 2013 budget forecast stating this as the intent ‘by 2023’: see, for example, David Watt and Alan Payne, ‘Trends in Defence expenditure since 1901’, 2013-14 budget review, May 2013: <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview201314/DefenceExpenditure> accessed 24 May 2013.
24. It may be harder to accomplish such engagement and influence at 30,000 feet or from a submarine.
Is the RAAF Optimally Configured to Undertake Expeditionary Operations? 1

Wing Commander Jason Begley, CSM, RAAF

Introduction

As the RAN and Army progress their expeditionary posture prior to the introduction into service of the Canberra-class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD), the RAAF’s response has been comparatively low key. This is not surprising given that RAAF doctrine and the Air Power Development Centre’s publications have been focusing on air power’s critical role in expeditionary operations since at least 2006.2

However, closer examination of this literature suggests that—notwithstanding the RAAF’s aspiration to become an expeditionary air force of influence—the structure and sustainability of its expeditionary configuration may not be as robust as it seems. The obvious concern, exacerbated by constraints of the forecast budgetary environment, is that the RAAF may struggle to support the LHDs and other expeditionary tasks.

This article reviews the RAAF’s capacity to undertake expeditionary operations and concludes that its current configuration is inadequate for its baseline roles.3 The argument is formulated in two stages. Firstly, it assesses the adequacy of the RAAF’s conceptual framework for expeditionary operations. It then measures the RAAF’s current configuration against a ‘benchmark’ framework, supported by a comparative analysis against the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the US Air Force (USAF).

Measuring expeditionary adequacy

Three challenges limit any effort to objectively measure the adequacy of the RAAF’s capability to conduct expeditionary operations.

The first regards the RAAF’s interpretation of the definition of expeditionary operations. The definition used by the ADF is ‘the projection of military power over extended lines of communication into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective’.4 However, rather than focusing on the ‘distant operational area’ aspect of this definition, the RAAF tends to consider as ‘expeditionary’ its normal business of deploying capability away from a home base, including exercises within Australia.5 This broad conceptualisation has arguably hindered the development of a genuine expeditionary mindset within the RAAF, including the need to adapt its doctrine and force structure accordingly.

A second challenge is the limited amount of publicly-available detail regarding the RAAF’s configuration and capabilities. While acknowledging the obvious security imperatives, the dearth of objective after-action reporting in favour of anecdotal recollections makes any realistic assessment of the RAAF’s adequacy in expeditionary operations difficult to achieve. As a consequence, analysis is largely confined to the public perception that the RAAF chooses to project of itself, the subjective nature of which undermines the validity of any self-assessment regarding the adequacy of its expeditionary configuration.
Finally, the RAAF arguably lacks a methodology to measure its capacity for expeditionary operations. Although it uses the ‘Air Force Capability Evaluation and Reporting Tool’ to monitor the ‘raise, train and sustain’ aspects of capability, the absence of a baseline against which to measure capacity or deficiencies limits the utility of this tool.

While RAAF doctrine and Air Power Development Centre publications assert the inherently expeditionary nature of the RAAF, they again do not provide measurable data against which a baseline of expeditionary configuration can be assessed, such as force structure details. Similarly, the criticality of network-centric warfare is assumed rather than explained, and no plan that could be assessed for its functionality (detailing platforms, systems, doctrine and training) has been articulated, at least in the public domain.

These issues appear to result from two problems. First, the official literature is heavily technology- and platform-centric, such that the operational force element groups have their roles defined by their systems and platforms. Second, this literature also has a disproportionate focus on combat operations—from traditional conflict and irregular warfare to cyber attack and weapons of mass destruction—which distracts attention from the lower intensity stabilisation and humanitarian operations which represent the most likely expeditionary operations for the ADF.

In essence, the RAAF appears to be of the view that to remain relevant, it requires the capacity to respond across the full spectrum of operations and diverse geographic regions. Hence, rather than a configuration optimised for its most likely deployment scenarios, the RAAF seeks the most advanced systems available to modern air forces. While some of these are obviously necessary for both the defence of Australia and expeditionary operations—including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and integrated command and control systems, strike capabilities, air-to-air refuelling, and a combat support capacity—others, such as the forceful suppression of enemy air defence, ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic air-space vehicles, and capabilities related to the ‘weaponisation’ of space, remain questionable given the fiscal constraints faced by Defence.

In viewing the spectrum of operations as a single entity, rather than one allowing a range of scalable military responses, the RAAF cannot easily assess what is actually required for an adequate expeditionary configuration in the Australian context, as distinct from a default approach that seeks a balance of ‘everything available’. Fortunately, the capability requirement models for expeditionary operations developed by Thierry Gongora and published in 2004 provide a suitable alternative.

Gongora’s first model describes seven criteria for a baseline of expeditionary capability, premised on ‘the ability to respond quickly to crises abroad through the deployment (often over strategic distances) of task-tailored military force for an operation limited in time’. The second expands on this baseline with a number of additional requirements to generate a robust expeditionary capability able to respond independently to high-intensity crises in contested theatres without host-nation support.

The differentiation between available levels of military response and the associated force structure affords these models a particular utility for measuring the adequacy of the RAAF’s expeditionary configuration. Gongora’s baseline model seems particularly appropriate in terms of assessing the minimum requirements for an adequate configuration for the RAAF, not.
least because its focus on independent lower-intensity operations—such as peacekeeping, stabilisation and humanitarian response, or participation in coalition operations—would seem to align closely with Government intent regarding the use of expeditionary military force.\textsuperscript{17}

**The ‘baseline’ expeditionary configuration**

The first criterion in assessing the RAAF’s ‘baseline’ configuration is a *high state of readiness*, including training and availability. RAAF readiness is specified through ‘Directed Levels of Capability’, which detail each capability’s preparedness—including roles, competencies, concurrency of operations, notice to move, and operational viability periods—and commits the enabling resources.\textsuperscript{18} However, Directed Levels of Capability only fund the highest priority roles achievable within budgetary provisions, and not every possible response desired by Government. Therefore, some roles are sacrificed to enable others, such as the reduction in AP-3C anti-submarine warfare proficiency to enable ISR operations in the Middle East.

Another issue is that commanding officers report on Directed Levels of Capability through the Air Force Capability Evaluation and Reporting Tool and, notwithstanding guidance, these assessments are ultimately subjective.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, this reporting tool is vulnerable to the same unwillingness to report deficiencies identified by the 2011 Rizzo review with respect to the lack of readiness of HMA Ships *Kanimbla* and *Manoora*.\textsuperscript{20} Consequently, despite the appearance of adequate readiness for expeditionary operations, the RAAF is constrained by both a misalignment between what the Government desires of the ADF and the resources provided, and the lack of an objective means to identify and report deficiencies.

Despite recognition that Gongora’s second criterion provides the foundation of expeditionary operations,\textsuperscript{21} the RAAF does not utilise a standardised approach to *sustainable force generation*. Different units employ different approaches to force generation and sustainment, and often apply different duty and deployment regimes to their aircrew and ground support teams. While theoretically this allows forces to be optimally configured for each deployment, it also precludes the generation of an integrated expeditionary force, as non-aligned deployment schedules create a personnel and equipment ‘churn’ that inevitably reduces operational effectiveness.

It was this need for integrated, timely and sustainable expeditionary response that led the USAF to establish Air Expeditionary Forces in 1999, comprising ten modular air power packages that could theoretically be rotated and sustained indefinitely.\textsuperscript{22} The model was refined in 2005, after extended concurrent deployments diminished personnel and planning stability,\textsuperscript{23} and again in 2008 to ensure an expeditionary process that not only met combatant commanders’ requirements but was also measurable and sustainable.\textsuperscript{24} Since then, the USAF has undertaken continuous reassessment of the organisation, manning sustainability, logistics support and fatigue levels of its Air Expeditionary Forces,\textsuperscript{25} and established an Expeditionary Center to focus training for expeditionary operations.\textsuperscript{26}

Although the modest size of the RAAF precludes wholesale adoption of this approach, the RCAF’s recognition of the need to adapt to ensure sustainable force generation suggests that size is not the key issue.\textsuperscript{27} Through a highly-detailed series of directives and updates to its doctrine, the RCAF has commenced an extensive restructure to develop an expeditionary capability that will ‘generate, training, equip, deploy and sustain forces in a *standardised* [emphasis
added] manner’. The RCAF has not only articulated a detailed, measurable implementation plan for generating an expeditionary configuration and readiness but has also acknowledged the need for continuous doctrinal evolution. Given the robust and evolutionary approaches of the USAF and RCAF, the lack of equivalent reviews and programs by the RAAF renders unconvincing the argument that it can adequately sustain force generation.

The third requirement, strategic mobility, is an area in which the RAAF has made significant progress in recent years. Acquisitions of C-17 Globemaster heavy transport aircraft, KC-30 air-to-air refuelling aircraft and C-27 Spartan tactical transport aircraft, to complement the C-130J Hercules fleet, have significantly enhanced the ADF’s airlift capability. Assuming readiness is maintained, these assets offer responsive projection of military power across a range of distant theatres, including airborne operations, logistics support and aero-medical and humanitarian evacuations, and provide an adequate configuration for expeditionary strategic mobility.

A fourth necessity identified by Gongara for expeditionary operations is deployable command and control. The RAAF has opted to retain this capability at the Air Operations Centre in Headquarters Joint Operations Command. This approach is premised on the ‘centralised control and decentralised execution’ of air power, which is perceived—in network-centric warfare terms—to allow greater flexibility and efficiency compared to collocation of command and control with the expeditionary force.

Organisationally, however, this assumption is problematic. In Australian-led regional coalitions, security arrangements at the Air Operations Centre would likely hinder the integration of coalition partners, thereby negating the perceived benefits of ‘centralised control and decentralised execution’. Further, the lack of a suitably senior air commander in-theatre may limit interaction with a host nation and inhibit access to basing and facilities, while separation from land and maritime commanders would inherently reduce joint integration, despite network-centric warfare development. Meanwhile, as a member of a larger coalition, the lack of a member of proportionate rank to the Combined Force Commander in-theatre may diminish the prioritisation of Australia’s objectives.

Such issues cannot be dealt with through network-centric warfare, which itself raises concerns. Firstly, a remote commander may receive either insufficient or too much information, impeding effective decision making. Secondly, remote decision making detracts from the decision-making capacity of local commanders—should network-centric warfare be degraded, they may prove unable to act independently or lack the credibility within the coalition to do so. Finally, network-centric warfare requires a secure, reliable network accessible to all battlespace participants. To date, the ADF’s network-centric warfare capability has not achieved its planned milestones in the air and joint domains—even if regional representatives had access to the Air Operations Centre, their connectivity to the battlespace would be limited.

RCAF and USAF experiences reinforce these concerns. Studies on military command by the former recognise the criticality of interpersonal interaction with subordinates and allies in the expeditionary environment; the misperception that more information enables better decisions by a remote commander; the importance of ensuring national interests are appropriately respected, necessitating collocation with the Combined Force Commander; and the potential for the ‘thousand-mile screwdriver’ to slow decision making and undermine the authority of subordinate commanders. Consequently, the RCAF deploys a suitably senior ‘Air Component Coordination Element’, collocated with the Combined Force Commander.
In Afghanistan, the USAF identified that the lack of a forward-deployed command echelon impeded coordination and, in response, established the ‘Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force’. While the Air Operations Centre kept the 72-hour tasking process functioning, the expeditionary task force commander provided strategic and operational support to the Combined Force Commander to ensure that the air campaign was integrated from planning to execution, as well as redundancy for Air Operations Centre processes should network-centric warfare fail, and robust command and control for expeditionary air base security forces during attacks.

In the ISR air power role, the RAAF has matured its command and control concept as a result of its experiences in the Middle East. While remaining committed to the ‘centralised control, decentralised execution’ model, its ISR operating concept recognises the improvement in decision-making speed and quality afforded by adopting a mission command philosophy among its deployed ISR units.

In this model, an ISR mission commander is appointed from the ISR unit to direct employment of assets in order to maximise their operational flexibility and effectiveness in support of theatre requirements. Despite this, and some initial steps towards the integration of air power into ADF amphibious capability planning, an assessment including all of the RAAF’s air power roles against Gongora’s fourth criterion would suggest that its command and control approach does not consistently or convincingly ‘ensure that mission objectives are achieved, that resources are used efficiently and that national interests are taken into account’.

Gongora’s fifth requirement for optimum baseline configuration is interoperability with coalition forces in multinational environments. While the RAAF’s tendency to acquire systems primarily from the US facilitates this requirement, it still faces shortcomings in multinational and ADF joint integration. Critical network-centric warfare capabilities, such as Link-16 (an entry-level requirement for coalition operations) are not universally fitted. For example, Link-16 communications between the RAAF’s maritime patrol aircraft and the RAN’s Canberra-class LHDs and Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer or US Navy combatants will not be achieved until the P-8 is delivered in 2017.

Given that Australia’s expeditionary strategy will be maritime in nature—and the RAAF’s recognition that ‘wars can generally only be won by a joint force’—this inability to provide critical support to maritime amphibious operations is disconcerting, particularly given the assertions that current preparedness levels can support LHD deployments. Meanwhile, despite a similar history of expeditionary operations to the RAAF, the RCAF considers an inherently joint and expeditionary mindset as a key trait that it must continually evolve to realise its expeditionary capability.

Gongora’s next criterion, the capacity to operate with lean in-theatre support, requires air forces to establish and sustain forward basing. While the RAAF has acknowledged this, it has primarily been in the context of enabling force projection. As a result, sustainment has not yet been adequately addressed to guarantee a configuration to support expeditionary operations, despite a 1996 study that noted a range of shortcomings and recommended specific doctrinal change by the RAAF.

The RAAF has acknowledged that the sustainment of forward basing is a ‘vexed issue’ and has noted the risk of denuding permanent bases resulting from a reliance on these personnel to
activate and sustain forward bases. However, media releases such as *Impossible Airfield*—implying a robust capacity to establish and support expeditionary operations in a hostile environment—understate the complexity of this task and the sustainment problems the RAAF would face by omitting the artificialities of this activity. In this instance, the airfield was not only within a day’s road travel from permanent basing but the defences would have been unable to oppose any serious adversary action, and achievement of the task—even one limited in scope and duration—required the support of two expeditionary combat support squadrons operating as a combined formation.

Whereas the RAAF largely relies on ‘corporate knowledge’ to manage in-theatre support, the RCAF and USAF use formal studies to underpin their doctrine. Although the RAAF has a classified concept of operations for combat support group and its subordinate expeditionary combat support squadrons, this lacks the degree of intellectual rigour applied by the RCAF and USAF. For example, the USAF has utilised numerous RAND studies to examine operational lessons. This has resulted in a range of methodologies to optimise in-theatre support for the USAF, which have then undergone trial implementation in exercises.

Gongora’s final criterion for baseline adequacy is *modular force packages* that can be tailored to meet the specific requirement of each expeditionary operation. As previously mentioned, the USAF and RCAF have restructured their forces for this purpose, whereas the RAAF tends to plan each deployment based on the circumstances of the time. While this does allow forces to be tailored against requirements, it has several shortcomings compared to the ‘standardised menu’ approach.

Firstly, responsiveness is slowed while the required force is identified, generated and its unique needs determined prior to deployment. In contrast, the standardised menu approach enables the almost immediate deployment of force. In the case of the USAF, scalability is enhanced through its ‘Strategic Tool for Analysis of Required Transportation’. This defines support requirements for every unit type in the order of battle, which enables rapid configuration and coherent, phased deployment of air expeditionary force components. This is achieved by ensuring that previously identified and well-understood logistic requirements for deploying units are swiftly incorporated during planning, thereby enabling their simultaneous deployment.

Secondly, the standardised menu approach overcomes a flaw of *ad hoc* planning, where planners are often accused of trying to ‘get as much of the “fighter community” or the “long range patrol community” into theatre,’ rather than focusing on operational requirements. For the RAAF, its deployment of fighters to defend Diego Garcia in the wake of the September 11 World Trade Centre attacks is arguably an example of this issue.

Finally, the standardised menu approach recognises a definition of capability broader than the platform-centric focus both the RAAF and its critics tend to employ. For example, despite extensive commentary on the RAAF’s limitations for concurrent air operations, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s last review of RAAF capability made no mention of the human elements providing support to operations in Haiti, Pakistan, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan or UN monitoring in the Sinai and Jerusalem. This is not insignificant—the original Air Expeditionary Force was identified as mature in combat forces but weak in humanitarian capabilities, an issue that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the USAF to address and that subsequent studies have helped it implement.
The robust model

While it is clear that the RAAF’s configuration for expeditionary operations has several shortcomings regarding the baseline model used for this analysis, elements of Gongora’s robust expeditionary model provide further context. With respect to forcible entry capability, the lack of stealth and electronic attack capabilities within the RAAF have previously made it heavily reliant on the establishment of a benign air environment by its allies.\(^57\) While this deficiency has been addressed through the recent decision by the Government to acquire 12 EA-18G Growler aircraft,\(^58\) realising an effective and useful airborne electronic attack capability will require attention to many other fundamental inputs to capability than the platforms themselves.

The same is true of the RAAF’s capacity to provide full spectrum force protection. Despite acknowledging the importance of air base protection to air operations,\(^59\) its limited number of airfield defence squadrons and lack of any surface-to-air missile capability is a significant limitation for the RAAF. So too is the lack of sufficient self-protection systems across RAAF platforms to counter the latest generation of air defence and surface-to-air missile systems. As a result, the RAAF remains reliant on its allies to provide ongoing protection in a contested theatre or to ensure a benign environment is established if it is to undertake any sustained forward deployment of RAAF assets.\(^60\)

However, from a multi-mission perspective, the RAAF has a demonstrated capacity for expeditionary operations within a coalition. The AP-3C has transitioned in the Middle East from maritime patrol missions to overland ISR operations.\(^61\) Similarly, the FA-18 Hornets have been ‘swing-roled’ from combat air patrols over Iraq to providing on-call close air support to ground forces.\(^62\) This type of flexibility, for which the RAAF is well known, sees it continuing to be a welcome contributor to coalition expeditionary operations, despite its limitations.

Conclusion

This article has identified that the RAAF’s adequacy to conduct expeditionary operations is deficient in a number of respects, despite assertions to the contrary. It has also shown that the RAAF has yet to articulate a plan to achieve a genuine expeditionary configuration or to develop a methodology by which its adequacy for expeditionary operations can be measured. When considered against Thierry Gongora’s baseline model—which seems to align reasonably with Government intent regarding expeditionary operations—some of the weaknesses in the RAAF’s capability become apparent, a situation highlighted when compared against the approaches and experiences of the RCAF and USAF.

In essence, the RAAF has largely pursued the option of building forces for continental homeland defence and then deploying those forces for expeditionary operations when required. As a consequence, it has also experienced a number of the challenges predicted by Gongora for forces in this position.\(^53\) The RAAF arguably lacks the excess capacity necessary for sustainable expeditionary operations beyond the ‘defence of Australia’ force structure. And, given Australia’s geostategic circumstances, much of the capability required for expeditionary operations is not required for the defence of Australia or regional operations. As a result, the RAAF lacks robust ground and air defence systems, deployable command and control systems and processes, and—until recently—the self-protection suites and electronic attack capabilities required in contemporary contested environments.
However, the immediate issue for the RAAF appears to be one of culture, rather than capability. Its doctrine and associated publications assert an inherently expeditionary nature yet fail to provide the analysis to support this contention. Contrasted with the degree of commitment and intellectual rigour applied to evolving the expeditionary forces of the RCAF and USAF, assertions of the RAAF’s adequacy for expeditionary operations could be considered complacent.

It is true that history suggests the RAAF’s ‘can-do’ attitude affords it a capacity to overcome its limitations in expeditionary operations—the reality of going to war with a force not designed for this purpose was recognised shortly after World War 2. However, a crisis akin to East Timor in 1999, either more distant to Australia or in a less benign environment, would likely prove beyond the current capacity of the RAAF. Unless the RAAF acknowledges these limitations and applies the necessary intellectual effort to identify all of the requirements needed for expeditionary operations rather than pursuing the latest generation of platforms, its configuration will remain most effective within Australia—very much the wrong side of the Cresswell-Foster Divide.

Wing Commander Begley joined the RAAF in 1991, graduating from ADFA in 1993 and qualifying as an Air Combat Officer in 1996. Since then, he has flown as a Tactical Coordinator and Electronic Warfare Mission Coordinator on P3 Orion aircraft for over 15 years, briefly interspersed with a posting in Capability Group between 2006 and 2008. He has deployed on numerous P3 operations throughout the Asia-Pacific, as well as to the Combined Theater Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell within the Air and Space Operations Center in Qatar. He graduated from the Australian Command and Staff College in 2012 and is currently posted to Air Force Headquarters as the Deputy Director Surveillance, Maritime Response and Attack.

NOTES

1. This is an abridged version of a paper, titled ‘Is the RAAF adequately configured to undertake expeditionary operations? Assess in relation to the development of expeditionary air wings in at least one other country’, submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff College at the Australian Defence College in 2012.


3. Editor’s note: At least as premised on the requirements of the 2009 Defence White Paper, noting that this article was written before the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper.

4. RAAF, AAP 1000-D, p. 169.


18. Department of Defence, DI-AF(ADMIN) 2-3, pp. 2, 4-5, 7 and A-2. See also Department of Defence, ADDP 00.2 Preparedness and Mobilisation (Provisional), Australian Defence Doctrinal Publication Executive Series, Defence Publishing Service: Canberra, 2004.


32. RAAF, AAP 1001.1: Command and Control in the Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Air Publications, Air Power Development Centre: Tuggeranong, 2009, pp. 2-2 to 2-7, 4-5 to 4-7 and 6-3.


40. RAAF, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operating Concept, p. 5.
42. Gongora, 'Expeditionary Operations: Definition and Requirements', p. 108.
47. Parent, 3030-1, p. 4.


60. For a detailed discussion of the security challenges facing expeditionary air bases, see Holmes et al., ‘The Air Force’s New Ground War: Ensuring Projection of Air and Space Power through Expeditionary Security Operations’. See also S. Cameron, ‘INTERFET – Intervention in Timor – 1999’, in Brent, Air Expeditionary Operations from World War II until today, p. 120.


64. C. Clark, ‘RAAF Expeditionary Operations in World War II’, in Brent, Air Expeditionary Operations from World War II until today, p. 16.

The Reintegration of Deployed Reservists: an Australian perspective

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Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Orme, RFD, Australian Army
Lieutenant Colonel Edward (James) Kehoe, Australian Army

Introduction

The transformation of the ADF Reserves over the last decade, from a strategic to an operational reserve, has seen reservists deployed on a scale unprecedented since the 1940s, contributing in excess of 15 per cent of deployed personnel. Many other defence forces have undergone a similar transformation. For example, up to 40 per cent of deployed US forces in Iraq were reservists. Current global trends, with constrained defence expenditure and transition from conscript to all-volunteer defence forces, point to the ongoing operational use of reservists.

The Australian Army, in particular, deploys reservists mainly in scheduled, lower-intensity regional stability operations in the Solomon Islands and East Timor, and domestic-event security operations and domestic response operations. More recently, special forces reservists have been deployed to Afghanistan. From a training and operational perspective, this use of reservists matches their overall readiness and training levels. Use in lower-intensity operational requirements makes optimal use of their civilian skills and life experience, and frees the regular forces for short-notice and higher-intensity operations, best suited to their levels of readiness and training.

The overseas experience

The deployment of reservists has been recognised as entailing risk factors for adjustment and post-deployment well-being in research in the UK, US and Canada. Higher levels of adverse mental health outcomes for reservists, compared to permanent forces, have been reported among UK and US reservists. Recognition of these issues has led to increased attention to and support for the preparation of reservists and their families for deployment and redeployment. Despite significant initiatives, including reintegration programs in the UK and US, reservists remain at increased risk for post-deployment mental health issues. Moreover, issues relating to reservists’ families and careers remain major sources of stress during and after deployment.

According to a 2006 study, UK reservists serving in Iraq in 2003 were around twice as likely as those who did not deploy to report symptoms of common mental disorders (26 v 16 per cent) and probable PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) (6 v 3 per cent). The same study found this was not replicated for regulars nor was it apparently associated with differences in combat exposure. These symptoms appear more closely related to reported problems at home, both during and after deployment.

A recent study of a large cohort of UK reservists returning from deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan confirmed that reservists were significantly more likely to report post-deployment adjustment issues than regulars. Problems in civil employment arising from their military
service were reported by 40 per cent of the respondents, and inadequate support by the military in the weeks following repatriation was reported by 44 per cent, compared to 30 per cent of regulars. These two factors, plus lower levels of post-deployment social engagement, were associated with increased reporting of common mental disorders, probable PTSD and alcohol misuse. Altogether, 70 per cent of returning UK reservists reported adverse post-deployment experiences in civilian employment, perceived support from the military, and/or civilian social engagement.

Similarly, a significant minority of US reservists deployed to Iraq attributed civilian job loss or financial difficulties to their deployment—and these difficulties appeared to contribute to mental ill health. For example, at one year after deployment, the PTSD rate of US National Guardsmen who had lost jobs (48 per cent) was at least twice as high as those who had not deployed.

The Australian experience

Prior to the deployment of reservists to East Timor in 2002-03, the Australian experience with deployment largely concerned regulars, plus a handful of specialist reservists (such as medical personnel) as 'augmentees' to regular formations. In 2002, a company of reservists was deployed to East Timor, as the first formed body of reservists sent overseas on warlike service since World War 2.

Subsequently, and since 2006, company-sized bodies of reservists have been the primary ADF contribution to a low-intensity (non-warlike) stability operation in the Solomon Islands. The company sent to East Timor and the initial three rotations of reservists to the Solomon Islands were systematically surveyed with regard to their adjustment and wellbeing. Depending on the particular rotation, questionnaires were administered at the commencement of the tour, the end of the tour, six months after return, 12 months after return and two years after return, with Table 1 showing the response rates. In addition, those deployed underwent a 'Return to Australia Psychological Screen' (RtAPS) immediately prior to repatriation and a 'Post Operational Psychological Screen' (POPS) between three and six months after their return.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group/dates</th>
<th>Theatre</th>
<th>Number deployed</th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>End of tour</th>
<th>3-6 months after return</th>
<th>12 months after return</th>
<th>24 months after return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Company (October 2002 – May 2003)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotation 11 (December 2006 – April 2007)</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotation 12 (April – August 2007)</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotation 13 (August – December 2007)</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not assessed

Table 1. Group size and response rates of reservists deployed to East Timor (2002-03) and the Solomon Islands (2006-07)
The deployments were generally reported to be positive experiences and mental health issues were rare. That said, after return to Australia, a number of reservists reported some difficulties with separation from the military milieu and reintegration into their civilian environment. Specific findings were as follows:

**Retention**

Following the deployments to both East Timor and the Solomon Islands, the reservists generally have shown continued motivation to serve in the Australian Army and maintain their deployable status. Figure 1 shows the percentage of reservists who remained in service over periods stretching up to six years. In comparison to known rates of retention for Australian Army reservists, those who deployed showed a significantly higher rate of retention. For example, at the end of six years, 70 per cent of the reservists who deployed to East Timor continued to serve in a deployable status, which is more than double the expected rate.18

A more detailed analysis of the larger number of reservists who deployed to the Solomon Islands revealed that 61 per cent remained in the Active Reserve component, 19 per cent had transferred permanently to the Regular Army, 6 per cent were on contract full-time service, while only a total 14 per cent had ceased serving actively. Among those who remained in service, 12 per cent had voluntarily deployed overseas at least once more within two years of returning from their first deployment.

![Figure 1. Retention in service following deployment](image)

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**Adjustment to life**

Reservists were surveyed for difficulties experienced in three areas of their lives, specifically their work, personal and home lives. The options for each item were worded as ‘none’, ‘some’ or ‘many’ adjustment issues. Figure 2 shows the percentage of reservists who reported either ‘some’ or ‘many’ adjustment issues in each area. The reservists from the East Timor group were surveyed at 12 and 24 months after their deployment, while those who deployed to the Solomon Islands were surveyed at five time points, as indicated.
The East Timor group, who completed the questionnaire in 2004-05, reported a moderately high proportion of adjustment issues, around 60 per cent. Further examination of the data revealed that not more than 11 per cent of the respondents reported ‘many’ adjustment issues. Among the Solomon Islands group, who were first surveyed in 2006 at the start of their deployment, approximately 30 per cent reported ‘some’ or ‘many’ issues, of which not more than 6 per cent were reported as ‘many’. Open-ended questions associated with these ratings revealed that the ‘issues’ included positive events (for example, birth of child, becoming engaged or promotion at work) as well as negative events (such as family illness, end of relationship or job loss).

Comparing the East Timor group to the Solomon Islands groups, it can be seen that there was a sharp decline in the overall prevalence of issues. This may have arisen from all or some of the following circumstances: the nature of the deployment (warlike versus non-warlike), length of deployment (7 months versus 4) and improvements in support services for reservists from 2002 to 2006, in areas such as access to rehabilitation. For both groups, the reported issues appeared to be more-or-less equally distributed across the three areas and any variations across time were not statistically significant.

**Psychological health**

Just as the great majority of reservists reported no or only some adjustment issues, the reservists returning from East Timor and the Solomon Islands were in sound mental health, as measured at the end of deployment and approximately three to six months later. On both occasions, two well-validated questionnaires were used. The first was the ‘Kessler-10’ (K10) questionnaire, which asks 10 questions related to non-specific psychological distress (for example, ‘in the past four weeks, about how often did you feel tired for no good reason?’) that are predictive of depression and anxiety disorders. The second was the ‘Post-traumatic Checklist’ (PCL-C), which asks 17 questions, such as ‘have you experienced repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts or images of a stressful experience from the past?’

Figure 2. Adjustment to life events following deployment
In brief, both measures revealed that the vast majority of reservists showed no appreciable distress or signs of post-traumatic stress. Of those that did, only a very small percentage reported levels for which immediate action was advisable. Figure 3 shows the percentage of reservists whose reported levels of distress were in the lowest range (10-15, which required no action), an intermediate range (16-29, which would alert the interviewer to consider providing information or advice to the member to seek assistance) or a high range (30-50, for which referral was indicated). The figure also shows the corresponding percentages for all deployed members from the Australian Army (2003-06). The pattern for the reservists was very similar, if not better, than the Army as a whole. However, it must be borne in mind that the whole-of-Army data includes individuals who were exposed to higher-intensity operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

![Figure 3. Psychological health following deployment](image)

Examination of the Post-traumatic Checklist data, summarised in Figure 4, indicated nearly all returning reservists, and similarly other Army personnel, reported very few post-traumatic stress symptoms at either screening occasion. More than 85 per cent showed scores in a range (17-29) for which no further action was required. A small percentage (2-11 per cent) reported symptoms in a range (30-39) that would lead to the provision of information or advice to the member to seek assistance. Finally, a very few members (<5 per cent) reported symptoms in the upper ranges (40+) requiring follow-up. The rates of actual referral and follow-up were equally low, in accord with these reporting percentages.
**Figure 4. Post-traumatic issues following deployment**

**Alcohol use**

Figure 5 shows levels of alcohol use reported by reservists on the ‘Alcohol Use and Disorders Identification Test’ (AUDIT) at the various post-deployment testing points (noting that no measures were taken during the deployments, because land-based deployments by the ADF are ‘dry’). This questionnaire has 10 items that assess the respondent’s frequency, amount and felt consequences of alcohol consumption. On all measurement occasions, a solid majority of reservists had scores in a range (0-7) that required no action. Among the remainder, the bulk of them (17-41 per cent) had scores (8-15) for which the recommended action is ‘simple advice focusing on the reduction of hazardous drinking’. Scores in the higher two bands were infrequent (1-7 per cent), where the recommended actions for scores 16-19 was ‘brief counselling and continued monitoring’ or for scores 20+ was ‘further diagnostic evaluation for alcohol dependence’.
Discussion

This study of Australian Army reservists on stability operations— as distinct from combat operations—demonstrates that they resettle well after both a short (4 month) operation in a low-threat environment and an even longer (7 month) operation in a warlike environment, which is virtually identical to regulars after the same operations.19 The major findings were:

• Up to six years following deployment, retention of reservists in a deployable status was more than twice the level seen among reservists as a whole,
• Overall psychological health remained sound after deployments to either environment, and
• Self-reported alcohol use remained constant, and largely in lower ranges that at most required simple advice.

The only notable area of difference among the reservists appeared in reported adjustment issues. Only a very few reservists (1-6 per cent) reported ‘many’ adjustment difficulties. However, a moderately high proportion of those returning from East Timor in 2003 reported ‘some’ issues when asked 12 months and 24 months after returning to Australia (approximately 60 per cent in all domains). In contrast, only around 30 per cent of reservists who deployed to the Solomon Islands reported any issues at any time. In fact, this level appeared constant between the start of the deployment and all subsequent measurement occasions up to 24 months after their return. These issues appeared to arise from positive as well as negative life events. However, there is a need to further investigate the sources and nature of the issues, large and small, for adjustment during and after deployment.

The multiple differences between the deployment to East Timor in 2002-03 and the deployments to the Solomon Islands in 2006-07 make it difficult to identify which factors contributed to both the positive outcomes, as well as the apparent difference in the experience of adjustment.
issues. One contributor may be found in the shorter tour, with its lesser exposure to hazards and reduced separation from civilian life. Moreover, the deployment to the Solomon Islands had a lower-threat environment than East Timor. In addition, the ADF enhanced its strategies for selection, preparation, training and reintegration of reservists between the two deployment periods, which could also be expected to have had some impact.

Notwithstanding the differences between the two groups in the frequency of adjustment issues, the pattern over time was similar. During and immediately after the deployment, home and personal life were the predominant adjustment issues, considering the separation from and reunion with family and friends. These issues appear to resolve progressively with the passage of time. Thereafter, work becomes a larger source of adjustment issues, in all groups, with more than 60 per cent in the East Timor group and 33 per cent in the Solomon Island group reporting ongoing issues with reintegration into civilian employment, persisting two years after their return. This is consistent with other research, with reservists often reporting a loss of motivation in the early stages of their return to civilian employment.

Nonetheless, the overall experience of the deployment and its effect on morale is reported to be positive by most reservists, comparable to that of the Army as a whole (see Figure 6), including regulars. This positive impact is evidenced by superior retention rates for reservists after deployment, with some (12-25 per cent) transferring to the regular component, and some others (12 per cent) deploying again within 2 years. Thus an operational role and an opportunity for reservists to deploy overseas appear to be effective retention enhancers. Furthermore, the sound psychological health of the reservists indicates that their levels of training and readiness augurs well for their deployment on future operations of a duration and threat level commensurate with those in East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

![Figure 6. Deployment experience and morale](image-url)
Implications

Although the Australian experience with the recent deployment of reservists in formed bodies has been successful, deployed reservists in the future may face more significant operational challenges. Even in stability operations like those in East Timor and the Solomons, the threat level can rapidly escalate. Accordingly, the strategies for reintegrating reservists into their civilian lives must be able to adapt to those increased operational challenges. These strategies will be most effective when proactively implemented before and during the deployment, rather than waiting until after the fact. To address this need, we propose the following principles:

Maintain the reservist’s sense of worth

The deployment experience for reservists can work significant changes in self and in other life areas. Australian Army reservists have returned from deployment with a positive perspective and high morale, as much as for all other deployments. Improvements in the reservists’ skills, maturity and self confidence are highly visible to their families and employers. Nevertheless, acknowledgement and recognition of the returned reservist’s service are important to maintaining that sense of worth. This can be facilitated in the following ways:

1. Formal ceremonial acknowledgement, for example, ‘welcome home’ parades.
2. Active recognition of their ‘veteran’ and/or deployed-experience status by their use as mentors within their home unit.
3. Encouraging the validation of the deployment experience by families, employers and friends through, for example, reserve-specific briefs before and after deployment on the significance of the deployment—including that ‘it’s not a holiday’—and what may be expected when their reservist returns.
4. Provision of opportunities for reunion with members of their deployed cohort, which will help minimise the sense of loss that can arise from the separation of the returning reservists from the people, unit, milieu and modus vivendi to which they have bonded during the deployment.

Enhance re-entry to civil employment

Strong legislative employment protection is in place in Australia and financial assistance is available to employers of deployed reservists. These may not always be fully appreciated by reservists or employers. Anecdotal reports indicate some Australian reservists still (needlessly) resign from their civilian employment in order to deploy. Moreover, the source of information to Australian employers about their reservists’ deployment, including conditions, entitlements and the date of return, often depends on the reservists themselves. A sound environment for the reservist’s reintegration may be fostered by:

1. Regular information to employers directly from the Defence organisation before, during and after the deployment concerning the general nature of the deployment, available support services and what to expect when their reservist returns.
2. Employer engagement with their reservists during the deployment through use of web-enabled contact (for example, Skype) and continuation of visits to their operational area, such as those currently undertaken to East Timor and the Solomon Islands (Exercise BOSS LIFT).
3. Provision to the reservists and their employers of documentation attesting to their performance on deployment and their acquisition of additional knowledge and skills.
Ease reintegration into family and social life

Reservists, their families and friends often fail to recognise that on return from deployment, there may be a 'new normal' for some of them. In light of the experience of Australian reservists, there has often been discernible maturation and growth, but this positive aspect can be accompanied by challenges arising from changed circumstances at home arising from life cycle events, for example, change in partner’s employment, death of a family member, moving house and adaptation to the reservist’s absence. These challenges can be accommodated by:

1. Information presentations, both live and on the web, before, during and after the deployment, for family and friends—as well as reservists—regarding the repatriation experience.
2. Assistance in making post-deployment living arrangements, particularly for those who may need to find new accommodation on return from deployment.
3. Financial advice, as some reservists may end a deployment with more money than they have ever had, which can be misapplied and become a source of distress.
4. Development of a network of local volunteers to assist returning reservists and their families with information and referral information.

Ease reintegration into the home unit

In addition to being separated from the civilian environment, deployed reservists have also been separated from their home unit. Unlike US National Guard units that are activated in toto, Australian reservists volunteer from their home units to make up the deployed formation, tailored to the particular operation. On return from deployment, the home unit personnel will themselves be particularly well placed to recognise the emergence of deployment-related issues should they arise. Similarly, home unit personnel may be a source of information for families or employers who have found that their reservist is having difficulties in reintegration. Defence organisations should contemplate providing training and information to the leaders and key personnel within home units to monitor and assist returning reservists.

Conclusion

While the reintegration of reservists has unique complexities and challenges, overall they adjust very well after short-tour stability operations. Generally, they perceive deployment as a positive experience, reflected in superior retention rates and sound mental health. These findings strongly indicate that current selection, training and preparation of Australian Army reservists renders them well suited to undertake shorter-tour stability operations like those in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Nevertheless, there is room for further evolution of strategies for assuring the successful reintegration of reservists back into their civilian environment and with their home units.

Implementation of these strategies should allow the reservist to have considerable flexibility in respect of their reserve service to enable this, particularly in the months following return from deployment. Recognition of their status and use of their operational experience enhances their self-esteem and sense of value and purpose, and provides an experience base for the training of others.
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NOTES


Air Power in Irregular Warfare: lessons from Operation CAST LEAD

Rachel Mourad, Department of Defence

Introduction

The principles of air power theory and doctrine demonstrate that the use of air power has historically been centred around high-intensity, inter-state conventional warfare. The 21st century, however, has seen a rise in operations involving violent non-state actors participating in the sphere of international relations in what has come to be known as irregular warfare. Modern armed forces, typically configured to conventional warfare, have found themselves struggling to adapt to such operations. In particular, there is a lack of understanding of the challenges of modern air power in irregular operations, and how it can most effectively be applied.

From 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) was embroiled in a complex and violent irregular warfare operation against Hamas, known as Operation CAST LEAD. Its stated objective was to end the rocket attacks into Israel by Hamas and other Palestinian factions. The operation also hoped to secure the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier who was captured by Hamas insurgents in 2006 in a cross-border raid.

The application of offensive air power during Operation CAST LEAD delivered devastating battlefield effects, hitting and destroying over 400 Hamas targets in the first week. However, by 18 January 2009, when Israel and Hamas both declared unilateral ceasefires, the Palestinian death toll—according to Amnesty International—had risen to 1400, including 300 children and hundreds of civilians.

While many consider Operation CAST LEAD to have been a military success due to the successful destruction of every target identified, it failed to convert that success into a long-term victory or peaceful solution to the conflict. Four years on, the rocket attacks continue and Hamas appears to have gained further support and legitimacy. The primary reason for Operation CAST LEAD’s inability to achieve and secure a long-term victory was Israel’s failure to adopt and implement a whole-of-government approach, with basic military objectives intimately linked to the achievement of national security goals.

This article addresses the importance of air power in irregular warfare. It considers the different capabilities that various platforms bring to the battlefield and examines the IDF’s application of air power in Operation CAST LEAD, which was largely an urban conflict. It then explores characteristics of irregular warfare and considers the asymmetric approaches that insurgents employ in order to achieve their objectives. It analyses the negative effects that air power can potentially wreak in irregular warfare and demonstrates how insurgents can exploit this to strengthen their own cause. The article deduces that Operation CAST LEAD’S failure to obtain a long-term solution was, among other things, due to the IDF’s lack of consideration of the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign that Hamas accordingly was able to exploit.
The importance of air power in irregular warfare

Air power theorists from Douhet to Warden have stressed that to command the air means victory and to be beaten in the air means defeat. But before we explore the ‘how’, it is necessary to firstly define ‘air power’. Air power is broadly defined here as ‘the ability to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension above the surface of the earth’. At an operational level, air power is the combination of capabilities espousing air mobility, surveillance, reconnaissance, aerial supply, air-to-air refuelling, strategic bombing, close air support, air interdiction, and offensive and defensive air activities.

It must be recognised, however, that the proposition that air power is dominant does not suggest that air power is supreme. These two concepts are independent. Air power is not supreme in irregular warfare as it cannot, in and of itself, achieve or secure the political end-state of which war is an extension. An overall victory in irregular warfare can only be achieved through a whole-of-government approach to security which involves both military and non-military means to achieve the political aim. Nonetheless, air power has certainly become a dominant factor in warfare due to its unique and lethal capabilities, as well as the role it plays in creating the necessary preconditions for attaining both military and political victory.

Just how airpower creates the necessary preconditions can be found within the Clausewitzian paradigm. If war, in Clausewitz’s terms, is about ‘compelling [one’s] opponent to fulfil [one’s] will’, then it is the unique capabilities of airpower that are well placed to achieve this outcome through striking and destroying an adversary’s centre of gravity. The destruction of an adversary’s centre of gravity will lead to their collapse as it is ‘the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends’.

In so far as an adversary’s centre of gravity incorporates physical targets, airpower’s ability to carry out lethal and rapid strikes, undertake mobility operations to enable rapid insertion, conduct interdiction and close air support functions, and traverse over great distances and terrains, are but a few reasons as to why air power is often the first choice in carrying out such operations. In irregular warfare, an adversary’s or insurgent’s centre of gravity will typically be a complex structure that conglomerates roots that are not only physical but also ideological, religious and/or political.

The combination of both physical and non-physical centres of gravity in irregular warfare requires military planners to thoroughly consider all the strategic factors of a campaign before employing air power. Without careful consideration and planning, the very capabilities that make air power an invaluable asset can become vulnerabilities easily exploitable by an insurgent. While air power’s speed of response, reach and lethality are all capabilities that make air power a dominant element in warfare, when these capabilities result in the deaths and injuries of civilians, domestic and international support for the insurgency is often increased as its people are seen as the victims.

Yet these challenges can be overcome through the careful consideration of air power’s application. Air power today has the capability to apply lethal force with precision, proportion, discrimination and minimal collateral damage against a range of targets. The outcome has effects that go far beyond the tactical destruction of the target and have much broader strategic benefits. The development of precision technology and the discrimination and proportionality with which air power can be applied has made the use of air power a frequent
‘weapon of choice’ in irregular warfare, as it is undeniably an extremely effective means of projecting military power in an urban environment while minimising collateral damage.

However, the complexities of irregular warfare require air power to be applied with both military and political objectives in mind for it to be effective. The IDF’s failure to thoroughly consider and link the basic objectives of military strategy to the achievement of national security goals and a political end-state was evident in Operation CAST LEAD and was one of the main criticisms of the IDF in the aftermath of the operation.

While an analysis of the various armaments deployed by the IDF during Operation CAST LEAD will provide an understanding of why particular weapons were used and what their tactical advantages were, it will also provide a background as to how various military decisions made by the IDF to some extent jeopardised the political objectives of the operation and resulted in considerable condemnation of Israel.

Employment of air power in Operation CAST LEAD

I want aggressiveness—if there’s someone suspicious on the upper floor of a house, we’ll shell it. If we have suspicions about a house, we’ll take it down.... There will be no hesitation.... Nobody will deliberate—let the mistakes be over their lives, not ours.

An Israeli commander in a briefing to soldiers during Operation CAST LEAD

Operation CAST LEAD began at 11.30am on 27 December 2008 with a 3-minute 40-second ‘shock and awe’ bombing campaign, involving 64 fighter aircraft hitting more than 50 Hamas-related targets across the Gaza Strip. After the initial strike, the operation consisted of two phases; the air phase and the air-land phase. The IDF had three stated objectives: to create a long-term period of calm through ending the rocket attacks into Israel by Hamas and other insurgents in the Gaza Strip, to prevent Hamas from rearming itself, and to secure the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit.

The air phase

The air phase consisted of a week-long air attack successfully hitting 526 targets. It was a carefully planned attack with the objective of destroying Hamas’ various physical centres of gravity, including killing pre-identified Hamas leaders and striking command facilities, communications networks, weapons storage sites, rocket assembly plants, Hamas training camps and underground weapons smuggling tunnels, all of which were struck with extreme precision. It was the largest assault ever carried out on Gaza.

The IDF primarily relied on its fleet of 300 F-16s to carry out the majority of the strikes. As a multi-role tactical aircraft, with the ability to travel at supersonic speeds, the F-16 was able to provide a rapid response to intelligence that was collected by ground troops, as well as successfully strike ‘targets … marked by intelligence collected during the months preceding the attack’. AH-64 Apache and AH-1F Cobra helicopters were also used.

The IDF made a decision to use only guided munitions in Operation CAST LEAD, because of the urban environment. As Hamas insurgents attempted to launch rockets and mortars, they were met with well-planned, precision fire from Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft. While rocket and mortar attacks were not stopped completely, the IAF dominance of the air seriously maimed...
Hamas’ rocket firing capability. By 30 December, such was the damage inflicted on Hamas that an IDF officer went so far as to say ‘the IAF began its attacks at 11.30 and could have ended them at 11.40’. There is no doubt that Israel’s air campaign had successfully achieved domination of the air.

**The air-land phase**

The air-land phase began at around 8.00pm on 3 January 2009 when Israeli ground troops entered the Gaza Strip from the north, sending thousands of ground troops across the border in tanks and armoured personnel carriers. One of the key objectives was to divide the Gaza Strip along Gaza’s main north-south highway to prevent weapons being supplied from the south of Gaza to insurgents in the north. Other key objectives were to secure control of areas in the north from which insurgent rockets were being fired into Israel and to conduct more precise targeting of insurgents.

Troops in the air and on the ground worked together to carry out these objectives. Each brigade was assigned an IAF forward air operations officer, enabling ground commanders to closely coordinate air operations in support of their operations. In addition, each brigade had ‘its own attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as on-call strike aircraft’. This was a significant change in the way that the IDF conducted military operations, as it had ceased using fixed-wing aircraft to provide close air support to ground forces prior to the 2006 Israeli war with Lebanon. This change proved extremely successful and was described by one IAF officer as ‘groundbreaking’. He stated that:

> … the concentration of air assets in a tiny territory permitted unparalleled air-land coordination. These included unmanned aerial vehicles clearing around corners for infantry platoons, Apaches helicopter gunships providing integral suppressive fire during movements by small units, jet fighters employed to remove mines and improvised explosive devises and to prepare the terrain for ground movements, as well as overwhelming firepower ahead of ground advances, servicing even the smallest unit.

Operation CAST LEAD also saw the IDF dominate the intelligence arena. The unprecedented amount of highly-sensitive intelligence that was gathered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was not only critical in gaining an insight into Hamas operations but also played an important role in saving many lives, both of IDF soldiers and innocent civilians.

Yet despite the precision targeting and clear imaging capabilities of UAVs, and the precision with which the IDF employed UAVs against insurgent targets, Human Rights Watch and the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict found that UAVs were also involved in attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, resulting in the death of numerous civilians. Noting the preparation that went into determining and designating targets, as well as the high precision capability of the weapons and platforms involved, these reports raised the question of whether the IDF had deliberately targeted and attacked civilians.

While the air strikes carried out by the IDF during Operation CAST LEAD achieved their military aims, the destruction that air power inflicted on Gaza eroded any possibility of Israel achieving a long-term solution to the conflict. The collateral damage was exploited by Hamas to erode the legitimacy of the Israeli government’s actions and to win the support of the international and domestic population.
Exploiting the negative effects of air power

The US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, approved a working definition of irregular warfare as:

… a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favours indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.40

Although this definition has been criticised as not encompassing the full extent of irregular warfare,41 it pinpoints one fundamental basis of irregular warfare; that insurgents do not need to employ advanced military capabilities in order to achieve their objectives, which are primarily ideological, religious or political. In fact, irregular warfare is the only form of warfare in which inferior forces have been able to claim victory over world ‘superpowers’.42

In analysing irregular warfare, Kainikara identifies four important characteristics of the non-state adversary or insurgent. Firstly, the insurgent will try to create asymmetry in the battlefield by using unconventional means, such as taking hostages or conducting terror campaigns against civilians.43 Secondly, the insurgency will use the urban setting as its battlefield, camouflaging itself within the civilian population through not wearing uniforms, using civilian infrastructure to support its operations, and using collocated civilians—often women and children—as part of its strategy.44 This compels conventional forces to limit their use of air power due to the high risk of extensive collateral damage that is inevitable in the urban environment, no matter how precisely air power is applied.

Thirdly, the insurgency will draw-out the conflict in the hope that a democratic state will lose its population’s support for the ongoing war. Maintaining popular support has been seen to be a crucial ‘centre of gravity’ for states, especially where military conscription is involved, as is the case with Israel.45 Finally, a political or religious insurgency cannot be defeated by military means alone. The political and long-term objectives of irregular warfare, which include psychological and ideological aspects, can only be successfully achieved though diplomacy and other whole-of-government initiatives.46

These four characteristics importantly highlight that irregular warfare is not only a tactical military battle but is also, and perhaps more significantly, a strategic political one. As irregular warfare is largely a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, winning the support of the population should be the central strategic objective of both sides.

Of all the issues that arise during any conflict, civilian casualties is the one that receives the most media attention and can be easily exploited by insurgents. This is especially the case in relation to casualties resulting from air strikes, which is primarily a result of the lethality that air power is capable of projecting.47 With nothing to lose and no respect for the Laws of Armed Conflict, insurgents will try to exploit the negative effects of air power to gain an asymmetric advantage.48 The insurgent’s aim is to either diminish the state’s application of air power or create an environment in which the lethal effects of air power can be exploited.

By using the urban environment as its battlefield, insurgents force states to reduce or withhold the use of offensive air power due to the high risk of collateral damage. When offensive air power is applied in the urban environment, insurgents use the media to exploit the resultant
collateral damage in an attempt to drive a wedge between the civilian population and the state,\textsuperscript{49} and to gather international sympathy and domestic support. The end result is that while the application of offensive air power will be an invaluable asset in gaining a short-term military advantage, it can be counter-productive in securing a long-solution to an irregular warfare campaign if it leads to the loss of a state’s domestic and international support.\textsuperscript{50}

The exploitation of offensive air power was a tactic that was widely used in Operation CAST LEAD. Hamas insurgents routinely fired rockets from within densely populated areas, using civilians as shields.\textsuperscript{51} When the IDF employed offensive air power to strike Hamas targets in heavily populated areas, Hamas insurgents used the media to exploit and portray the resulting collateral damage. Further, on occasions where the IDF’s use of air power was indiscriminate or disproportionate, Hamas was able to create a ‘David and Goliath’ perception to gain international and domestic sympathy, further jeopardising Israel’s ability to achieve its strategic political objectives.\textsuperscript{52}

Despite the many benefits of air power, Operation CAST LEAD demonstrated that when air power is applied without thorough consideration of the political objectives, it risks jeopardising the achievement of long-term victory. The destruction of infrastructure and the number of civilian casualties arising from the IDF’s air strikes were counterproductive to Israel’s campaign. In the short term, Hamas was weakened. But the rocket attacks from within the Gaza Strip did not cease and Corporal Gilad Shalit was not returned. The price that Israel paid for this short-term solution was the ‘loss of international support and, to a certain extent, the credibility [of Israel] as a law-abiding citizen’.\textsuperscript{53}

**Balancing the offensive capabilities of air power**

No-one starts a war—or rather, no-one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Clausewitz, On War}

As contended by Clausewitz, a political or religious insurgency cannot be defeated by military means alone. This highlights the necessity for the political aim to be kept at the forefront of military planning in irregular warfare. Military planners need to strive to keep civilian casualties at a minimum through carefully managing the precision capabilities, ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and concentrated blast radius of air power. Further, and more importantly, militaries must implement more stringent means to guide operators in discerning combatants from non-combatants in the battlefield and to ensure that combatants are adequately briefed on the Laws of Armed Conflict.

The IDF’s failure to adequately consider the hearts and minds element of the campaign was the primary reason for its inability to achieve a long-term solution to the conflict. A military operation that does not have as its primary consideration the support of the population is destined to fail. Galula refers to this as the first law of irregular warfare.\textsuperscript{55} He expands on this rule by explaining that having the support of the population means having their active support and involvement in the fight against insurgents.\textsuperscript{56}

In addition to reducing collateral damage, McFeely suggests that another effective way of winning the support of the population is through investigating air strikes that have resulted
in civilian casualties, communicating the findings of the investigation and compensating the families of the victims.\textsuperscript{57} If the outcome of the investigation determines that civilians were killed as a result of incorrect targeting or other errors, the state needs to be proactive in adequately compensating the families of the victims.\textsuperscript{58} Compensation essentially represents a public apology for the lives lost and property damaged. Further, it demonstrates to the local population that the state is taking responsibility for its actions.

\section*{Conclusion}

Four years after the ceasefire of Operation CAST LEAD, the situation in Gaza remains much the same. Rocket attacks have not ceased and Hamas continues to enjoy considerable popular support. While Corporal Gilad Shalit has now been released, this has largely been the result of diplomatic efforts rather than the use or threat of military force.

Operation CAST LEAD’s inability to achieve a long-term peaceful solution is in no way a criticism of air power’s capabilities. The IDF’s application of air power was undeniably a military success. Rather, the operation is an example of the basic tenet that irregular warfare is won at the strategic political level. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign is in no way novel to military doctrine. But military planners, contemplating the use of air power in irregular warfare, could usefully be reminded of its importance by the experience of Operation CAST LEAD.

\textit{Rachel Mourad started flying when she was 14 years old, as she wanted to be a RAAF pilot. A flying career in the RAAF did not eventuate, so she undertook a combined undergraduate degree in Law and Asian Studies (majoring in Chinese and Security & Strategic Studies). On graduating, she went into private practice as a corporate lawyer for 2 years, before joining the Defence Materiel Organisation, where she provided contracting support for the C-130H and C-130J Air Lift capability. Earlier this year, she moved to the strategic procurement cell of Naval Inventory Procurement Office.}

\section*{NOTES}

1. This is an abridged version of a paper submitted in 2011 as part of the Chief of Air Force Essay Writing Competition. It was published as a finalist essay on the Air Power Development Centre’s website in 2012.


51. Goldstone et al, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, p. 113.
52. McFeely, ‘Balancing Kinetic Effects of Airpower with Counterinsurgency Objectives in Afghanistan’.
56. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 53.
Some Defence Budget Ideas from the UK

Colonel (Retd) Peter Brown, OBE

Introduction

This article examines the scope for living within a constrained defence budget and what that might mean for Australia’s defence capability over the next two decades. At the outset, it is worth making clear that it does not make the case for more funding. Rather, it takes the position that the Government has set the budget envelope and Defence must live within it.

Such a setting is similar in many respects to the position faced by the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) in 2010 in the wake of the global financial crisis. A number of different tools and techniques were employed in the MOD’s review process, some of which may be worth considering by others facing a similarly-constrained budget, and particularly by Australia as it seeks to reconcile its Defence-related requirements over the next two decades.

To have a credible strategy, the defence budget must be made robustly affordable in terms of both the forward estimates and the longer term. In terms of the analysis in this article, only the most enduring characteristics of Australian Defence policy are assumed as being an absolute constraint. Specifically, this means the broad tenets of ‘defence of Australia’, while maintaining the US alliance, in support of which Australia would continue to contribute to regional security and deploy forces in support of global security imperatives.

Within that very broad setting, this article proposes areas for examination that may enable Australia’s defence program to be brought into balance within the strategic setting and available funding.

The UK’s recent review process

In May 2010, the incoming UK Government commissioned a ‘Comprehensive Spending Review’ across all government departments which, in MOD’s case, was informed by, and run parallel to, a ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’.

The new 4-year budgets for each UK government department, which emerged in October 2010, announced cuts in real growth ranging from 3-51 per cent in operating costs and 7-74 per cent in capital investment. Every department—apart from International Development—was cut, even Health. For Defence, the cuts were less severe than many departments, at only 7.5 per cent over 4 years, applied to both operating and capital costs. However, the effect was to remove nearly £40 billion (A$60 billion) or about 10 per cent of the previously-assumed budget over the decade.

Much political capital was made by the incoming Government when it ‘opened the defence books’ and established there was a further problem, often quoted in the press as ‘a £38 billion black hole’ (a further A$60 billion over 10 years). The origins and precise make-up of this sum are politically contentious but it is accurate to say that the overall financial problem facing UK Defence was of the order of £78 billion (A$120 billion) over 10 years, representing 20 per
cent of the annual UK spend on defence. The Government directed that Defence’s program was to be brought into balance with the revised budget, and something quite significant had to be done.

The author was the leader of the small team of tri-Service officers and civil servants charged with formulating costed options across the entire defence budget in order to advise on the available choices. Needless to say, these ‘evil creatures with smoking calculators and no humanity’ became universally hated throughout Defence.

In summary, the UK Government chose to implement measures that reduced the British Army from a regular strength of 101,000 to 95,000 (and after subsequent decisions in 2011 to 82,000), the Royal Navy (RN) from 37,500 to 29,000, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) from 42,500 to 31,500. The review also resulted in the decommissioning of all existing aircraft carriers, the sale of the Harrier force and the deletion of the recently-modernised Nimrod maritime patrol capability. It reduced all ‘non front-line’ manpower and operating cost budgets by 25-33 per cent, and deleted a wide range of smaller equipment projects. However, in addition to a commitment to procure two new aircraft carriers, some other vital enhancements were agreed, notably to cyber capability and a significant increase in special forces capability.6

These measures—and a second round of cuts announced in late 20117—put the UK defence budget on a sustainable footing after what was arguably the UK’s largest defence cuts since the end of World War 2. It is not being suggested that the UK experience can translate directly to Australia’s situation or that Australia needs ‘external assistance’ to wrestle with these issues. But this article—aimed primarily at the reader who has not previously had to engage in applying painful logic to programming a defence budget at the strategic level—illustrates the nature of high-level prioritisation and decision making.

Australia’s situation

Eight days after the 2009 Defence White Paper (DWP09) was published, the 2009 Federal Budget was announced. The wording of the funding commitments in DWP09 was retained but there were major deferrals of A$8.8 billion, as well as the direction for Defence to ‘absorb’ new cost drivers of A$1.7 billion over the following decade.8

The 2010 Federal Budget included a further deferral of A$0.5 billion, and Defence was directed to absorb new costs of A$0.5 billion for force protection.9 In the 2011 budget, a further $1.3 billion of deferrals were applied, as well as $4.5 billion in ‘efficiency’ measures over 10 years.10 In the 2012 budget, there was a straightforward cut of A$5.5 billion over the first 4 years, with Defence also absorbing the A$0.3 billion cost of the Moorebank-Holsworthy relocation.11

In summary, funding for Defence was reduced by A$10.6 billion of deferrals and $10 billion of savings, on top of the cost pressures arising from A$4.1 billion of absorbed costs and handbacks.12 The net effect is that A$24.7 billion of funding has been taken out of circulation. Depending on how the ‘deferrals’ are treated in future year budgets, Defence will have ‘lost’ between A$14.1 billion and A$24.7 billion over 10 years, which is between 4 and 10 per cent of the Australian defence budget over that period.

If, on top of normal running costs for Defence in the ‘steady state’, the additional investment in new equipment (and training) to achieve the force levels detailed in DWP09’s ‘Force 2030’ is
reasonably assumed to be about one third of the total defence budget, then over 10 per cent of the required investment has already been removed, and a further 20 per cent deferred to the second half of the decade.

In the words of a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute:

Like the Norwegian Blue parrot in the classic Monty Python skit, the 2009 Defence White Paper is dead. It’s not just having a rest, waiting for the economy to bounce back so that it can begin chirping anew, it’s kicked the bucket, shuffled off its mortal coil, run down the curtain and joined the bleedin’ choir invisible.13

If it is the Government’s intention to retain the Force 2030 concept as the basis of defence capability planning, it clearly will be a major challenge for future defence budgets to fund it, which is now addressed in the remainder of this article.

Meeting the challenge – the standard tests for defence planners

Drawing on previous experience, the three core tenets used in UK strategic programming can be expressed in terms of the overall program’s affordability, balance and coherence. There is no ‘rocket science’ behind these terms and, although different terminology may be used elsewhere, the same logic will be applied in most defence departments.

A strategically affordable program is one that matches the available budget or offers the potential for savings against that budget. To meet the demands of annual funding allocations, there will be a need for regular assessments of which areas of spend or projects might be able to be ‘re-profiled’ across different years.14 Re-profiling usually involves moving money ‘to the right’, which typically means that more money has to be invested in the longer term—as a production line has to be kept open for longer, or an existing platform has to be maintained in service for longer or a service provider will be receiving a delayed income stream.

For a strategic program to be balanced, it must meet the broad requirements of the underlying defence policy and strategic setting. But it does not mean there should be some form of artificial balance between the amount of money for each Service or environment.

Coherence is all about checking internal links. The UK’s ‘Defence Lines of Development’ and Australian Defence’s ‘Fundamental Inputs to Capability’ are equally useful in testing those links. Procuring an aircraft type but being too profligate, or too mean, with the number of pilots to be trained, or providing inadequate or ‘gold plated’ maintenance facilities are basic examples of testing for internal coherence. Very simply, does the overall expenditure provide capabilities that are, and will remain, ‘fit for purpose’ through the life of the equipment?

Before any of those tests are applied to any project or area of spend, the overriding question should be ‘what is the requirement’? And as a key part of that, who gets to be judge (and, when required, the executioner) for a requirement, particularly one that is new (or has overstayed its time) and before agreed Defence-level recommendations are made to Ministers?

To fairly judge the merits of such a case, a degree of distance and disinterest is vital—and this is not necessarily just a public servant with a sharp pencil. In the UK’s review process, there were several occasions when single Service (or Arm within a Service) champions took great exception to emerging recommendations made from within their own Service on the
prioritisation of ‘their’ project. Similarly, there were disagreements between Services on specific cases and, on those occasions, a ‘neutral’ third Service was usually invited to chair the discussion and recommend a solution.\textsuperscript{15}

The more conventional aspects to what the UK calls ‘requirement scrutiny’ centre on the need and, inevitably, the numbers. The Australian capability system gives lead responsibility for the statement of ‘need’ to Director-General Strategy, which is a useful separation. However, there is less ‘distancing’ from the end user when considering existing areas of spend for potential reductions or termination, where capability managers clearly have a vested interest.\textsuperscript{16}

The final test is ‘value for money’. This can often be about how best to spend money to achieve an outcome which has met requirement scrutiny, is balanced to the needs of Defence, is internally coherent and has been judged affordable. In the real world, achieving value for money is when an option has been identified that, compared to other possibilities and a baseline check of ‘should cost x’, meets the needs of Defence at optimum cost.

\textbf{How does Australia measure up on the core tenets?}

While there is no fixed ‘magic ratio’ between the costs of capital investment, manpower and operating costs, most allied militaries divide their costs roughly equally between the three. The Australian defence budget (see Figure 1) has arguably become unbalanced by the shortfall in capital funds, particularly across the years 2012-13 to 2014-15.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{The underlying trends in Australian defence costs}
\label{fig:figure1}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: ASPI analysis of 2012-13 Defence portfolio budget statements.}

Needless to say, when a government has to reduce defence expenditure in the short term to meet competing priorities elsewhere, it is easier to defer or cancel planned but uncommitted capital expenditure (in any number of portfolios), rather than bearing down on operating costs or reducing personnel costs. This has happened to varying degrees in the last four budgets in Australia, resulting in the current ‘hole’ in Defence’s capital investment.
What are the alternatives?

Since the release of DWP09, there have not been any ‘strategic shocks’ to Australia’s security environment. Moreover, the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region has continued to develop in the broad direction anticipated in that document, as power relativities among the US, China, India, Japan and others continue to shift, and broader forces of strategic change slowly develop.

Given that the strategic environment is largely unchanged, the three alternatives open to Government are to do nothing, inject new funding or find the money by rebalancing or from elsewhere within Defence. As this article does not argue for additional funding, it will address some of the options examined by the UK’s review team in order to identify comparable areas of savings in Australia, which may assist Defence to live within a constrained budget.

The ‘other-than-force structure’ options

Non front-line positions

In preparation for the UK review, a body of work was conducted to categorise ‘front-line’ and ‘non front-line’ manpower for each Service. This established that broadly 25 per cent of all Service manpower was employed in posts that had a ‘day job’ with no operational role. Examples might include the equivalents of Defence Headquarters, Defence Materiel Organisation, Service headquarters, non-deployable regional headquarters, training establishments, medical and logistic support posts, and so on.

To be absolutely clear, there was no discrimination between combat arms, supporting arms and services within a deployable formation—these were all firmly classified as front-line posts. It was also recognised that the uniformed individuals in non front-line posts were liable to return to a front-line post in future, and internal coherence was required to ensure that niche trades were sustainable.17

In general, the 25 per cent of all uniformed posts that were established in the non front-line were examined for the opportunity to be cut altogether, simply accepting the loss of their output. Failing that, the baseline assumption was that, at a minimum, one third of the positions would be cut altogether and the remaining two thirds of military staff posts would be tested for the ability (in order) to be:

• Replaced by a contractor
• Replaced by an in-house civilian where contracting was inefficient
• Replaced by locally-engaged, full-time reservist staff, or
• Retained because the case was sufficiently strong.18

The UK review directed, broadly speaking, that of the uniformed posts in non front-line posts, about 20-30 per cent would be removed without any amelioration and about 10-20 per cent of others could be replaced by non-regular manpower. This meant that between 5 and 10 per cent of the number of total regular armed force manpower posts became surplus to requirement, which included a 33 per cent cut in the number of ‘Head Office’ military posts in Whitehall (the equivalent of Russell), in total removing between £5-10 billion of manpower cost across 10 years, with no loss in operational capability.
In Australian terms, it will be claimed that commercial support and other reforms did exactly this in the 1990s and that there are no further savings to be had, mirroring similar pleas from many quarters in the UK. Regardless, there seems scope to conduct a thorough analysis of non-deployable military posts on a tri-Service basis, with sufficient granularity to allow central judgments on the opportunities to cut a sizeable percentage.

**Pay and allowances**

In the UK review, in parallel with the Government’s direction across most of the public sector, the military was restricted to a zero per cent pay rise for two years (in 2010 and 2011). This of course represented a real pay cut, as the consumer price index (CPI) in the UK has been running around 2.5 per cent per year.

While one would obviously hesitate to recommend a similar approach in Australia (not least because of its likely implications for morale and retention), limiting future ADF pay awards to match CPI for 4 years would probably result in savings to Defence of A$0.6 billion over the same period, assuming that provision has been made in the forward estimates for pay awards at about CPI plus 3 per cent.19

Similarly, there are a range of allowances, including subsidised housing and relocation packages, which combine to grant ADF personnel a material benefit compared to their civilian counterparts. In perhaps the worst received component of the UK review, some £250 million of savings per year were directed against allowances, reducing daily or annual rates, or removing entitlement altogether (although no changes were made to allowances for operational service). In Australia—and as unpalatable as it may be—any serious review should at least address the current range of non-operational allowances.

**Superannuation**

The ADF superannuation package, alongside some other public service schemes, is unfunded (that is, paid out of general taxation receipts). In financial terms, the cost is in effect borne as annually-managed expenditure. That could be reduced, and used to increase capital investment, by moving to a less generous package. To restrict criticism, this could be brought into effect for new entrants only, protecting current members.

The UK’s approach was to move to a new ‘armed forces pension’ scheme for all members, although all employer contributions already assumed for current members were guaranteed to a certain date and members of the existing scheme within 5 years of their planned retirement were not required to convert to the new scheme. In the short term, the measure was broadly cost neutral. However, reviewing the ADF’s superannuation scheme to a lesser package for new entrants, commencing from say 2014, would result in savings for re-investment.

**Senior officer and senior official structures**

The ASPI report cited earlier documents a growth in ‘generals and mandarins’ over the past 15 years, noting that the number of civilian SES Band 1 to 3, and 1- to 3-star military officers, have both grown by some 70 per cent over the last 15 years, whereas the civilian workforce has grown by just 27 per cent and overall military strength by 11 per cent.20
This is not unique to Australia. The UK review removed half of all Service 4-star appointments, downsized the 3-star construct, and directed considerable retrenchment for the 2-star level and below (with the latter requiring a 700-person reduction in 2- and 1-star appointments and senior civilian posts by 2015, followed by a further 335 by 2020).

For Australia, a similar analysis could be conducted, aiming to reduce senior officer and senior official numbers by 20-25 per cent, which would return the number of posts back to approximately their 2006 levels. The amount of money potentially released by downsizing senior structures is not major but such an exercise is particularly appropriate if there are military or civilian staff reductions taking place across the rest of the organisation.

The force structure options

It is only after having examined the above options that planners should turn to aspects that may directly impact on outputs, namely the force structure. It would be non-compliant with current guidance to cut parts of the force structure that have a place in Force 2030 but there may be areas where savings could be made, at least in the medium term.

In the UK review, the emphasis was on reducing costs while preserving outputs that were compliant with policy. The iterative cycle used was to examine the policy, determine the appropriate force structure by using operational analysis and force development tools, cost that force structure, and then compare the cost with the funding envelope. Where the force structure was too expensive, the policy envelope was re-opened and a lesser policy tested for affordability.

At the time of writing, Australia’s current policy is Force 2030, including specific numbers of key platforms and combat units, with full-time numbers at 59,000. To stay within that policy setting, the only real variable is time. The programmer’s tool to examine that dimension for cost savings is sketched out at Figure 2, showing different ‘growth’ profiles.

![Figure 2. Growth profiles for cost savings](image)

The start and end points of each curve are the same but the manpower costs over the intervening period are quite different. The key factors in considering the feasibility of the cheaper options are lead times for recruiting and training, both individual and collective, and the risk of losing corporate knowledge.
One of the key measures taken in regard to British Army numbers was to drop regular numbers and increase the size of the Reserve. Along those lines, it would seem sensible to examine and cost the effect of slowing the growth of manpower, including by shrinking regular ADF manpower over the medium term, in order to generate savings that can be re-invested in capital equipment. Certainly, if a review chose to look again at the overall size of the ADF, the key areas for investigation could obviously include:

- Regular/Reserve balance, considering a greater use of Reserves, and
- Force generation factors, including scale, concurrency and endurance.

**Regular/Reserve balance**

Current strategic guidance notes that the main aim of having Reserves is to help the ADF sustain prolonged operational deployments and reduce operational concurrency problems. On this basis, increasing the size of the Reservist element could also allow a reduction in full-time ADF numbers. The UK review adopted this approach by deciding on a 20 per cent reduction of the regular Army and a near doubling of the Territorial Army (Army Reserve).

**Force generation factors**

One of the key areas of detailed study in the UK review, covering all of the force structure, was the mechanics of ‘force generation’. In summary—and acknowledging that the subject rapidly becomes classified once any real numbers are inserted—there are a series of drivers for determining the required size of any type of underlying force structure to deliver set output. Taking an easy example, if the final output is one frigate on a standing task, that will need to be matched by at least one other to allow rotation of both the platform and crew. The platform and crew will then have different factors to cover transit times to the area of operations, alongside-time for routine minor maintenance and deeper maintenance refits; and, for the crews, adequate ship-to-shore and work-to-leave balance and training activities.

Using hypothetical numbers, sustaining a single frigate task could require 2.7 platforms and 4.2 crews. Combining a number of frigate tasks then requires a consideration of how the factors relate to each other (overlapping or not) within the overall picture and, ultimately, determines the overall fleet size and personnel numbers. These figures then allow consideration of what an assumed ‘best effort’ force could look like, if some or all standing tasks were discontinued, to generate a response for a higher priority task.

A fresh examination of all force generation factors during the UK review, led by numerate 1-star officers from other Services, revealed a number of opportunities to reduce fleet sizes and personnel numbers while not cutting final outputs. Most of those opportunities were taken, although some areas were left in technical surplus against standing tasks, reflecting concern over what the remaining ‘best effort’ response would reduce to.

Three of the areas where costs are large—and where the UK review made significant findings, and where an Australian review could similarly be usefully conducted—are aircraft and aircrew numbers for fast jets and helicopters, expeditionary forces, and maritime platforms. A maritime example was sketched out above.
In the case of aircrew and aircraft, the optimum numbers necessary to generate a given capability are mostly driven by the number of recurring flying hours required to train a crew and keep the crew certified and at appropriate operational readiness. When that is combined with ‘non availability’ factors for crew and aircraft, it is possible to establish whether the system is internally coherent and balanced to the required operational output. A system that is out of balance will be consuming excessive flying hours, which increase the number of required aircraft or, conversely, deliver insufficient crews for the aircraft type.

Finally, when determining the required underlying force structure to cover a policy requirement for expeditionary forces, the key factors of concurrency, scale and endurance come into play. Although the Australian policy requirement is different to the UK’s in a number of important respects, expeditionary capabilities should be included in any examination of force structure options.

Operating costs and infrastructure

The second major area of spend in the Australian Defence budget, currently forming some 36 per cent of the overall budget, is operating costs. This area has been the subject of several reviews over the past decade and the opportunities for further significant savings are unlikely.

Most of the expenditure that was removed from the equivalent ‘operating costs’ in the UK review was manpower related. However, the early ‘release’ of so much manpower was not without cost. Redundancy payments had to be factored into the cost to be absorbed by Defence, potentially involving some 37,500 service and 18,500 civilian posts. If all removals had involved redundancy, the additional cost could have been ±£3 billion (A$4.5 billion), so a balanced strategy for targeted redundancies had to be developed. The key lesson was to spread the costs and detailed decision making over a number of years, while slowing (but not stopping) recruiting.

In terms of infrastructure, Australia’s current Force Posture Review provides a useful insight into the key basing factors. The UK review had government direction to repatriate all units based in Germany as soon as possible, which became possible without major upfront investment only when the military was reduced in size. Until that point, it was recognised that every relocation option had an upfront cost—and the break-even point in terms of value for money was measured in decades. A key consideration for the ADF is to examine all basing requirements on a joint basis, and the opportunity for disposals or rebasing across all three Services.

Defence Capability Plan

The reason that the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) is being considered last in this article is because it is the single most important part of the route to Force 2030 and thus the last place that savings should be considered.

Within extant policy, the key question is which projects are the most important to be delivered early in the growth path, and which may have to take lower priority if not all can be afforded in the same timeframe. The four major cost programs identified in DWP09 were:

- Twelve long-range conventional submarines, at a cost of about A$60 billion (including through-life operating costs)
• 100 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), at a cost of about A$20 billion
• Two LHD amphibious assault ships, and
• Army’s Plan Beersheba (including Project Land 400), at a cost of some A$20 billion.

The rest of the forward program is dwarfed by these projects. Two of the above are planned to be largely assembled in Australia, namely the submarines and LHDs. The future submarine program is essentially speculative but there appears to be a general expectation that they will be assembled in Australia, based on a European design that has been modified for the Australian requirement.

It is clearly not easy to prioritise these projects. However, one approach that could be taken is a combination of timing, level of commitment and pragmatism—a central feature of the UK review in terms of ‘room for manoeuvre’. Indeed, in considering the key factors of timing, maturity of the requirement, level of contractual commitment and degree of flexibility in spending profiles, it would be useful to take into account that:
• The LHDs are essentially ‘committed’ funding,
• The Army requirement is important but can be used as a regulator, with levels of available funding adjusted on a periodic basis, depending on the status of the JSF and submarine projects,
• The full scale of the proposed JSF buy (currently ‘up to 100’) is not yet a commercial contract. It may be that numbers reduce over time, as the ability of government to pay for such an investment becomes clear, and the requirement matures, and
• Although the Government has declared its intention to build 12 submarines in Australia, there is not yet a commercial commitment to any company, or to 12, or to building any in Australia. So the concept has plenty of time to mature.

Conclusion

The Australian Defence budget has been put under considerable pressure as a result of a range of significant savings and deferrals, largely focused on capital investment, that have been made over the course of the last four Federal budgets. This has placed a large question mark over the ability of Defence to deliver the future force structure as envisaged in DWP09.

In this article, it has been assumed that a firm resource envelope has been set and that Defence must live within those means while striving to achieve a reduced or delayed Force 2030. Potential tools and approaches used in the broadly-comparable UK review have been outlined and applied to the key drivers of cost. Although there are some opportunities to rebalance the program by reducing the cost of manpower, within a current policy setting of no reductions in ADF strength, any prospective measures which constrain pay and allowances or reduce senior officer or senior official numbers would be insufficient to meet the financial challenge.

A more conventional approach would be to examine the relative prioritisation of the largest uncommitted projects in the Defence Capability Plan and delay at least two of them, gaining time for further decision making. The only credible alternative would arguably be to make a sizeable reduction in the size of the ADF.
Peter Brown retired from the British Army in January 2013. His most recent service, before attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College in 2012, was at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall as the lead strategic programmer for the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, and its less well known sequel in mid 2011. He is now a permanent resident of Australia, working for Arrow Energy in the coal seam gas industry in Queensland.

NOTES

1. This article is an abridged version of a paper, titled ‘Working within a constrained defence budget: some ideas from the UK strategic defence & security review 2010/2011’, submitted by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College (ADC) in 2012.

2. This article pre-dated both the May 2013 Federal budget and the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper. However, its key messages arguably retain ongoing relevance.

3. This was broadly the same financial effect as having no budget uplift for inflation, and it could be argued that there was no actual defence cut, just a freeze of defence spending at current levels for 4 years.


7. This reduction fell principally on the equipment program but also reduced the Army by a further 8,000 posts.

8. Thomson, The Cost of Defence 2012. This was in addition to Defence’s ‘Strategic Reform Program’ savings of A$20 billion over 10 years.

9. Also, between 2009-10 and 2010-11, Defence handed back A$1.6 billion that had not been expended.


11. Thomson, The Cost of Defence 2012, pp. 112-5. When a cost is described as ‘absorbed’, the organisation has to conduct a new activity with no additional funding.

12. The figures do not include measures that are on the ‘path’ to DWP09’s ‘Force 2030’, such as acquiring two C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft (albeit offset by the early retirement of Hercules C-130Hs) and the former British Royal Fleet Auxiliary Largs Bay, now HMAS Choules (offset by retiring older amphibious capability). Instead, these are additional costs which would by convention have been met by new funding, as a new policy proposal or as the net additional costs of operations.


14. ‘Re-profiling’ is effectively juggling the required spend across a number of years, while investing the overall volume of money required and maintaining an industrially deliverable project or infrastructure build or recruiting pipeline etc.

15. It would not meet the ‘Chatham House’ rule to spell out any details, but taking a couple of real-life examples: having an Army officer to consider and advise on the relative merits of how best to task organise the numbers of certain helicopters between the RAF and RN, who both had very strong vested interests; and, on one memorable occasion, a rather bemused 1-star navy officer found himself leading the study of how best to downsize and re-organise a joint unit made up of Army and RAF personnel.
16. The potential for conflict of interest in the UK resulted in a temporary ‘gathering of the financial reins’ very closely in the ‘deep centre’ during the CSR and SDSR period, allowing prioritised but in some quarters distinctly unwelcome recommendations to be made to ministers. However, after the CSR and SDSR, it was decided that the Service Chiefs would be empowered with more authority over the prioritisation of their emerging (smaller) budgets – including direct control over most ‘capability area’ (equipment procurement plan) spending in their environment.

17. The classic ‘non example’ of a saving opportunity was that the steam plant servicing the MOD’s main building was maintained by naval stokers, to help with a sustainable ‘ship-to-shore’ ratio for that vital trade.

18. Here, for example, it was readily accepted that recruit training establishments require a high proportion of experienced military personnel as instructors.

19. The basis for this figure is the ‘delta’ between flat real pay awards and an average rise of 3 per cent per year above flat real for 4 years. This averages at 6 per cent of the wage bill across 4 years, which at 42 per cent of $22 billion (6/100 x 42/100 x A$22 Billion), equals A$0.6 billion.


22. In a perfect world, regular numbers would only be reduced once the Reserve had grown, trained and demonstrated its capabilities. In practice, to make savings, there may be a period of risk where regular numbers will reduce in parallel with an assumed growth in the Reserve.

23. Among the non-manpower measures were several straight cuts. The budget for the Science, Innovation and Technology organisation was reduced, saving about £1 billion over 10 years, and there were a series of measures which pushed together a range of single Service organisations into a joint construct, releasing the overhead costs of operating two of the three centres of excellence, in addition to manpower costs. Further ‘efficiencies’ were sought in major contracts, including the renegotiation of support contracts at several sites, based on lower manpower or activity levels. But the serious money was in manpower.

24. The calculation is derived as follows: £50K additional cost x 56,000 posts = £2.8 billion = A$4.4 billion.
On-line book reviews

*The Landing at Anzac, 1915*

Chris Roberts
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-9221-3220-8

Reviewed by John Donovan

Chris Roberts’ book had an extended gestation, starting as an Army Staff College paper in 1978, and developing via articles in the *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* and *Wartime*. The wait, however, has been worthwhile.

Roberts has provided a clear description of the landing at Anzac and its immediate aftermath, concentrating on the first day. He has resolved some misconceptions about the landing (to the extent that these can be resolved definitively at this remove). The issue of Ottoman artillery, however, remains unclear, with markedly different accounts between this book and Peter Williams’ *The Battle of ANZAC Ridge* (2007).

Roberts describes the limited training received by pre-war members of the Australian citizen forces (and their New Zealand equivalent, the Territorial Force). RMC Duntroon, founded in 1910, was intended to provide professionally-trained officers for both nations but the short time available before the war restricted its immediate effectiveness. He compares the rushed training of the AIF with the systematic training provided to Australian soldiers preparing for deployment to Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

Roberts discusses the actions of the principal leaders of the ANZAC: half of the eight brigade commanders and above were British regulars, Bridges was an Australian regular, who had partially completed training at the Canadian RMC, the other three were Australian citizen soldiers. The battalion commanders were all citizen soldiers. Apart from Johnston of the NZ Brigade, who was ill, the influence of most of the more senior officers on the battle, including Johnston’s replacement, ‘Hooky’ Walker, another British regular, was negative.

Colonel Sinclair-Maclagan, in command of the 3rd Infantry Brigade and covering force, made the fatal decision to change the plan soon after the landing, without referring to the divisional commander, Major General Bridges. McCay, commanding the 2nd Infantry Brigade, accepted this change, deferring to the regular soldier. According to Roberts, it was Sinclair-MacLagan’s ‘actions, rather than the misplaced landing’, that destroyed the plan.

Bridges let this decision stand and Godley later supported Bridges’ recommendation to evacuate the force. Birdwood supported them and the force was saved only by Hamilton’s refusal to consider evacuation. Walker sent the Auckland Battalion by a roundabout route to Baby 700, ‘seriously affect[ing] their eventual deployment’. MacLaurin remained on the beach and Monash did not come ashore until 26 April, neither having any impact on 25 April.
Some battalion commanders, including Braund, Weir and Elliott, performed well, others 'lost control of their units', collapsed under the strain or were simply ineffective. In contrast, Roberts shows that many of the junior soldiers and officers fought hard, despite their limited training, often showing a higher level of discipline, resolution and initiative than their seniors. While stragglers did drift back to Anzac Cove, others held their ground, often unto death.

Roberts explains satisfactorily the misplaced landing and incorrect reports of Ottoman machine guns opposing the landing. In the latter case, inexperienced soldiers probably confused rapid rifle fire for machine guns, a common error. Further confusion came from the fire of Maxim guns mounted on the steamboats towing the landing boats.

The issue of Ottoman artillery support remains unclear. Roberts and Williams come to different totals of Ottoman artillery pieces available by the evening of 25 April (44 for Williams; 16 for Roberts, increasing during the night to 32). By the end of 26 April, they have similar totals (44 for Williams, 40 for Roberts, the difference probably being the guns at Gaba Tepe and behind Palamutlu Ridge, apparently not counted by Roberts). On balance, Roberts seems more likely to be correct. Given the difficulties of moving artillery into the broken terrain, not all those guns present might have been brought into action.

There is some confusion in the book between the Ottoman 2/27th and 2/57th Battalions, with the latter seemingly the battalion that slipped from First Ridge down to the beach near Fisherman's Hut, although the former, the original defenders of the Anzac Cove/Gaba Tepe area, sometimes appears in that position. Also, the 1/27th is referred to in one map caption (but not on the map) as being on Baby 700, when the 1/57th seems intended. Also, a minor point, but Major Henry Bennett of the 6th Battalion is more commonly known by his middle name, Gordon.

**Air Disaster Canberra**

*The Plane Crash that Destroyed a Government*

Andrew Tink
New South: Sydney, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-7422-3357-4

Kristen Alexander

*Air Disaster Canberra* is an account of the aircraft crash that occurred near Canberra in August 1940, in which all ten people on board were killed, including three members of the Australian Cabinet and the Chief of the General Staff. The book is divided into three sections, the political rise of the Anzac generation; the last flight of Hudson A16-97 on 13 August 1940; and an account of the subsequent destabilisation and destruction of the Menzies government which led to John Curtin's prime ministership in October 1941.

This is Andrew Tink’s third book; his first, *William Charles Wentworth: Australia’s greatest native son*, won ‘The Nib’ CAL Waverley Award for Literature, and his gift for narrative is again apparent. A former member of the NSW Legislative Assembly, Andrew Tink’s parliamentary
experience is evident as he expertly argues the political ramifications of the crash. I was particularly impressed by the word portraits of the ten men who died. He also brings his descriptive talents to those who appear briefly, such as Jack Lang of the ‘rasping voice, snarling mouth and flailing hands when he spoke ... [and] lower jaw like a steam shovel blade’, and Charles Hawker whose ‘limping gait and glass eye were powerful reminders of wartime sacrifice’.

Air Disaster Canberra touches on some significant side issues including the apparent mishandling of the evidence at the crash scene—careful treatment of the human remains would have left no doubt as to who was the pilot—and the foolhardiness of allowing so many key personnel to travel together. At its heart, however, are two arguments: that the crash of Hudson A16-97 and the deaths of all on board led directly to the change of government the following year, and that the man at the controls was Jim Fairbairn, the Minister for Civil Aviation and Minister for Air, who was not the official pilot.

Fairbairn was a skilled pilot who had served with the Royal Flying Corps during the Great War. He had flown many different types of aircraft and brought a depth of personal flying experience and administrative ability and innovation to his ministerial portfolios. He believed his work would benefit from his knowledge of every aspect of aviation and so he wanted to fly as many different types of aircraft as possible, including the Hudson.

For the main part, Andrew Tink has assembled solid evidence to support his speculation about Fairbairn. I feel, however, that that of Herb Plenty, a fellow pilot of Bob Hitchcock who became a senior peace time air force officer, is less sound. Plenty claimed almost 70 years later that Hitchcock’s squadron leader had orally condoned Hitchcock allowing Fairbairn to have ‘a touch of the controls’. This information had been intimated to Plenty by the squadron leader at a post-war social function. Plenty’s hearsay testimony aside, Andrew Tink considers many other factors which better support his argument.

For many years, Bob Hitchcock’s flying ability has been called into question, most notably by former RAAF historian Chris Coulthard-Clark, in The Third Brother and Hitchcock’s near contemporaries, Richard Kingsland and Herb Plenty. In arguing that Fairbairn was at the controls, Andrew Tink provides evidence attesting to Hitchcock’s skill with the Hudson and the number of incident-free hours flown in this type of aircraft.

I was very pleased to see this reappraisal of Hitchcock’s airmanship—after all, many fine pilots took time to develop their skills. Pat Hughes, for instance, who was a year behind Hitchcock at Point Cook, was ranked 28th in his course and assessed as having no outstanding qualities, yet he went on to achieve the highest number of ‘kills’ by an Australian pilot in the Battle of Britain.

Andrew Tink claims that it was reasonable for Fairbairn to take the risk of landing the Hudson and that he deserves his place in history as a respected ‘aviation hero, whose pioneering work, both before and during the war, helped to make flying safer for everyone’. I agree but I am not comfortable that Andrew Tink fails to acknowledge that, if Fairbairn was at the controls, he was responsible for the deaths of nine men as well as his own.

To me, Fairbairn’s hubris in believing he could do what RAAF pilots had to be properly trained to do and his selfishness in putting his own desires ahead of the safety of those nine men equates to the selfishness of Richard Hillary, the Australian-born Battle of Britain pilot, in
wanting to fly again despite fire-mutilated hands that could, apparently, barely hold a knife and fork, with the ultimate consequence of his own death in 1943 and that of his radio-operator/navigator.

I might not agree with every aspect of his argument but I was fascinated by Andrew Tink’s account of the demise of Hudson A16-97 and all on board. Ultimately, I was swayed by his reasoned speculation. I was entranced by his careful analysis of the consequences of the loss of three cabinet ministers. I firmly agree with his disappointment in the current state of Canberra’s memorial to the crash victims. But where Canberra fails to honour, Andrew Tink does not. He is to be congratulated for writing not only their tribute but in placing their death in a broader political context. Highly recommended.

**War Wounds: medicine and the trauma of conflict**

Ashley Ekins and Elizabeth Stewart (eds.)
Exisle Publishing: Wollombi, 2011

Reviewed by Major Jamie Cotton, Australian Army

*War Wounds* is an edited collection of chapters from various contributors, derived from presentations to the ‘War Wounds: Medicine and the Trauma of Conflict’ two-day conference held at the Australian War Memorial in September 2009. It is edited by Ashley Ekins and Elizabeth Stewart from the Australian War Memorial (who also contribute separate chapters).

Each chapter addresses a discrete subject, themed on the closely-entwined topics of the history of medicine in the context of warfare. They range from studies of the psychological injuries and resulting treatment from World War 1, to venereal disease during the Vietnam conflict. Each chapter is separately authored and understandably has quite differing writing styles and tone, ranging from detailed academic historical review to simple first-person accounts derived from the diaries of deployed medical staff.

Chapter One, ‘Shell shock and the lives of the lost generation’ is by Jay Winter, the pen name of a professor of history at Yale University, who is a recognised scholar of World War 1. His chapter addresses World War 1 wounding, with emphasis on shell-shock and the establishment of the obligation to care for returning combatants after World War 1, including the change in attitude towards those suffering from psychological injuries.

Chapter Two, ‘Chewing cordite, self-inflicted wounds among soldiers of the Great War’ is written by Ashley Ekins, head of the Military History Section at the Australian War Memorial. It is an interesting recounting of evidence of self-inflicted wounds during World War 1, including contemporary accounts of ‘Australian soldiers in military prisons show[ing] considerable ingenuity in the methods they used to render themselves unfit for front-line service’.

Chapter Three, ‘Scarred by war: medical responses to facially-disfigured soldiers of the Great War’ by Kerry Neale, then a PhD candidate at ADFA, is a fascinating insight into some of
the developing treatments of those who suffered significant facial injuries during World War 1, including early methods of reconstructive surgery with important emphasis on the psychological trauma involved in rehabilitation.

Chapter Four, ‘The home is always here for him: disabled soldiers and family care-giving in Australia after the First World War’, is by Marina Larsson, a historian and university lecturer from Melbourne, who is also the author of Shattered Anzacs: living with the scars of war. Her chapter describes the challenges facing the families who became the carers of physically- and psychologically-damaged soldiers and the burden they faced while Australia came to grips with the need to provide rehabilitation services for those returning from World War 1.

Chapter Five, ‘Rabbit War Wounds’, was provided by Paul Weindling, a Professor in the History of Medicine at Oxford Brookes University. It is a harrowing chapter on Nazi medical experimentation on concentration camp prisoners during World War 2. Such abuse included wounding experiments to trial anti-bacterial treatments and bone transplanting experiments.

Chapter Six, ‘Medical responses to the liberation of Nazi camps, April-May 1945’, is by Debbie Lackerstein, who was a lecturer in history at ADFA. It is an account of the daunting difficulties faced by the Allies in providing effective medical treatment for liberated concentration camp victims during World War 2, where often tens of thousands of critically-ill cases were discovered by advancing troops, causing significant difficulties in providing aid and heart-rending decisions by medical staff on who could be saved and who had to be left to die.

Chapter Seven, ‘An Australian army doctor – Bryn Gandevia’, is by Simon Gandevia, a neurophysiologist who was the Deputy Director of the Prince of Wales Medical Research Institute. Gandevia provides a biography of an Australian medical officer (his father) who served in the Korean conflict, which draws on considerably detailed personal records and is a valuable recounting of an important aspect of Australia’s involvement in the Korean conflict.

Chapter Eight, ‘Diggers and a “dose of the clap”: the problem of sexually transmitted infections among Australian Soldiers in Vietnam’, is by David Bradford, who was a sexual health specialist who served as a Regimental Medical Officer in Vietnam. It includes but is not confined to the author’s experience and exposes the considerable threat these diseases posed to Australian troops serving in Vietnam.

Chapter Nine, ‘Surgery under fire: civilian surgical teams in Vietnam’ is by Elizabeth Stewart. It describes the less well documented history of civilian Australian medical teams inserted into Vietnam during the conflict to help address the shortage of effective health support for the South Vietnamese civilian population. It recounts the stresses faced by such teams, including their need to develop cordial relationships with key American Army personnel in order to gain continuing access to much-needed essential medical supplies.

Chapter Ten, ‘The official history’s Agent Orange account: the veterans’ perspective’, is by Graham Walker, an RMC graduate and Honorary Research Officer of the Vietnam Veterans’ Federation of Australia, who himself saw service in Vietnam. This is a very interesting view of the veterans’ perspective on the use of ‘Agent Orange’ in Vietnam, where over 75 million litres of chemical defoliants were used, before being discontinued in 1971 because of health concerns. It has particular emphasis on the official, political and legal efforts to recognise the repatriation entitlements of veterans exposed to such agents.
Chapter Eleven, ‘Australia’s Agent Orange story: a historian’s perspective’, is by Peter Edwards, a historian and writer who has held positions at ADFA and Flinders university, and as the Official Historian of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts between 1948 and 1975. It provides an alternative view to that by Walker, suggesting the veterans would have been more likely to succeed by placing their claims in the hands of the political-military establishment instead of claiming against the chemical corporations that manufactured the agents. Edwards provides a comprehensive review of the difficulties involved in the debate, leading to his contention that the Agent Orange issue delayed the way in which the great majority of Vietnam veterans were compensated more broadly.

Chapter Twelve, ‘A short walk in a minefield’, is by Tony White, who saw service in Vietnam as a Regimental Medical Officer with 5 RAR. It provides an account of the injuries caused by mines in Vietnam, particularly affecting 5 RAR in 1967. He cites a specific operation where an armoured personnel carrier was destroyed by an improvised mine (what we would now call an improvised explosive device), killing five and wounding nine Australian troops. Soldiers trying to assist the victims then triggered a further mine (which likely would have been lifted by the enemy from an Australian- or American-laid minefield) killing another two soldiers and wounding 19.

Chapter Thirteen, ‘Military nursing in Afghanistan, 2008’, is by Sharon Cooper (now Brown), who served as a RAAF nurse in East Timor and Afghanistan. This chapter is an anecdotal account of her experiences in a number of theatres and includes her recovery from an injury sustained in a helicopter crash in 2004 while serving in East Timor.

Chapter Fourteen, ‘Living with war wounds’, is by Graham Edwards, who lost both legs from a mine blast while serving with 7 RAR in Vietnam in 1970. His is a moving and detailed account of the injuries he sustained, of the extensive and painful rehabilitation, and the difficulties in adjusting to a family, a job (which included being a Federal MP from 1998-2007) and a life after such a traumatic and shocking event.

War Wounds is an interesting and unique book, or more accurately a collection of chapters. It offers considerable reflections and details of an aspect of war that deserves further study. It would have been enhanced by including some of the topics that were suggested in the introduction but not subsequently covered in detail in subsequent chapters.

These might have included malarial research efforts since World War 2 and the challenges of patient recovery from modern combat trauma, including analysis of the significant advances in treating traumatic limb loss and the resulting prosthetic developments since the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, as well as recent developments in the understanding and treatment of traumatic brain trauma. Although at times it was a harrowing read, I enjoyed War Wounds and would recommend it to anyone who shares an interest in Australian military history.
Some people may find this book unsettling as it is not your usual British SAS veteran’s story. Theo Knell opens his heart and soul to the reader, as he is a victim of post-traumatic stress disorder after experiencing multiple combat situations. The book is highly unusual in another way, as many parts of his account are also described through poetry. You often find that many SAS soldiers have some unexpected skills. A close colleague of mine in the Australian SAS had a Degree in Philosophy, much to everyone’s amazement.

With all of his operational experiences, Knell describes a soldier’s qualities as being dependable, having the will to win, a sense of humour and an ability to share. He further separates a SAS soldier as one who can function in a hostile environment with little external support. It is little wonder, as he had an incredibly tough childhood. He spent four years in a mental hospital, five years in a state-run boarding school, where he learnt to use his fists to deal with predators, six months as an itinerant on the streets, and then one year living with his grandparents before joining the army. By this time, he had become a strong, independent, single-minded, angry loser. The story reminded me of one of my own SAS troopers, who once opined to me in the middle of a difficult guerrilla warfare exercise that the ideal soldier was a single, living in the barracks, orphan!

Knell’s experiences began with an 18-month tour in Northern Ireland, in the early days, where he witnessed the immediate aftermath of a horrific car bombing and the sensation of being shot at. There are the usual parachuting stories and associated vomit during three years in the Paras, with a slow moving description of a deliberate sniper-on-sniper killing in Northern Island. There is the rather dispassionate description of SAS selection and basic training before the callout frenzy begins; something that I can relate to having crashed out of barracks on several occasions. There is the pervading echo of failure not being in the Special Forces psyche, and intensive medical training. Interestingly, there is a very different story about the ‘army wife’, high divorce rates and the long periods of silence and mood swings when SAS soldiers return from operations.

He describes preparing for combat and the fear of failure. His first kill is told only by poem. His other operational accounts are more like stories, some with humour and some leaving me guessing as to their exact country. His experiences in a Rhodesian SAS patrol, desperately fighting for survival in a rolling contact with an enemy platoon equipped with a mortar, and while waiting for extraction, are enthralling to say the least. A poem describes the carnage he saw following the barbaric murder of a white farming family by the enemy. I know several SAS colleagues who have the ‘black dog’ in their heads and every reader can relate to what is bouncing around in Theo Knells’s mind after reading this poem.
The book then enters a different phase, becoming melancholy and morbid. He describes the denial of God, the coming to terms with God, and the influence of padres. He talks about the guilt he feels in the aftermath of losing friends in combat, some in stories of Britain’s secret wars. There are descriptions of the graveyard set up by people in the Falklands for soldiers who have committed suicide long after the conflict. His hidden mental scars appear, along with the stress of leaving the SAS where he finds that his wife is his only friend.

He struggles to find a new career as a civilian, fails financially and post-traumatic stress disorder sets in. He says that he is not a drinker but he talks about others who resort to alcohol. He talks about nightmares, overarching suicidal depression and how publishing this book for others and not just himself has helped him to get rid of the demons. Eventually, he achieves some semblance of normality. This is a book that should be read by government agencies, and medical and community organisations who are involved in the welfare for veterans of any conflict.

*The Swamp Fox: lessons in leadership from the partisan campaigns of Francis Marion*

Scott D. Aiken
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2012

Reviewed by Thomas Messer

It is incumbent on service personnel, defence officials, diplomats and their political masters to learn from the successes—and avoid repeating the mistakes—of their predecessors. The American Revolutionary War can seem so far removed from the contemporary environment as to be irrelevant. Not so, argues Scott Aiken. His recent book, *The Swamp Fox*, offers leadership insights from Brigadier-General Francis Marion’s partisan campaign against pro-British forces during the American Revolutionary War.

Aiken, a US Marine Corps Colonel, is candid about any potential bias, describing Marion as his ‘lifelong hero’, a formidable military leader and a ‘patriot’, whose wisdom remains relevant today. Aiken examines the battles and engagements in which Marion and his followers took part and identifies those elements transferrable to the current era.

While Aiken’s enthusiasm and knowledge of Marion’s campaigns are evident in his descriptions, his prose is succinct and *The Swamp Fox* is structured along logical lines and tightly argued. The style within the book contrasts internally with considerably descriptive passages about the battles, followed by dispassionate analysis. This style ensures the book maintains the reader’s attention, while the tone varies according to the purpose of the passage.

Throughout, Aiken provides a granular analysis of Marion’s campaign within the context of current and historical armed forces doctrine and practice. In the first half, he examines Marion’s tactics, his leadership and the manoeuvre warfare of the American Revolution. In the second, he addresses the majority of Marion’s engagements and battles within the context
he established in the earlier chapters and against the current doctrine of positional and
information warfare. He also posits how Marion would manage contemporary situations.

The *Swamp Fox* is neither a philosophical nor theoretical work, and Aiken does not situate
the book within any particular political science or international relations framework. Despite
his evident respect for Marion, Aiken’s approach is methodical and he avoids the tendency of
some authors to provide ‘ipso facto logic’ when analysing a historical military figure. Aiken
examines historical records and varying accounts of Marion’s campaign, places them within a
historical context, and then identifies relevant lessons for modern readers.

Aiken’s research draws on a wide range of published sources, as well as personal visits to
many of the sites of the engagements, enabling him to determine the authenticity of historical
records. Despite his favourable disposition toward Marion, he scrupulously examines historical
accounts, and notes where these appear to be either factually wrong or leading towards the
hagiographic, which is particularly relevant when many accounts of the campaign were written
by Marion’s subordinates.

There are already multiple books, both in and out of print, about Francis Marion and his
campaign against the British. What Aiken provides is a systematic evaluation of these
campaigns within a modern framework, complete with contemporaneous references. While
some of Aiken’s comparisons are a little simplistic or unnecessary, there is much within the
book that would prove useful for currently serving military members and those interested in
military history and tactics.

Perhaps one area of weakness is that the book could reasonably have included a section on the
lessons from Marion’s experience relating to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Elements
such as Marion’s ability to maintain irregular forces, to pull troops from local communities
when needed, and to disband groups enabling the individuals to return to their community,
are particularly relevant. Similarly, Marion’s deliberate attempts to interrupt British forces in
their attempts to ‘Americanise’ regions and transfer power to local allies, in order to allow
British forces to fight rather than hold territory, is particularly relevant in the modern area,
where the distinction between combatants and civilians is often fluid or blurred.

Also, in what is an otherwise well-structured book, the abrupt ending—which lacks any
synthesis of Aiken’s key points of argument—is somewhat anticlimactic. Should an updated
edition be published, a brief final chapter reiterating the author’s arguments and a chapter on
the lessons applicable to current insurgencies—and how to counter them—would be useful
additions. Despite these minor criticisms, *The Swamp Fox* is a sound analytical inquiry, an
engaging read and a solid contribution to informed debate.
Secrecy and Science:  
a historical sociology of biological and chemical warfare

Brian Balmer  
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2012  
ISBN: 978-1-4094-3056-8

Reviewed by Commander Robert Woodham, RAN

‘Secret science’ is much more than normal science with access restrictions applied; a world neatly divided into an inside and an outside. Brian Balmer uses various metaphors, including concentric spheres, labyrinths and archipelagos, to illuminate and explain a world with few absolutes. In his case studies, drawn from biological and chemical weapons research in the UK during the Cold War, scientific knowledge and secrecy are co-produced, with the two interacting to affect each other in unexpected ways.

By-products include the social structures, such as hierarchies, which in theory control the process, but in practice complicate it through feedback loops and interdependencies of their own. Thus a trawler which blunders into a biological weapon test site at sea unwittingly becomes a part of the experiment, the bureaucrats who sponsor the work become experimenters, and various authorities—plus the hapless fishermen themselves—are forced to take up positions on a spectrum from complete ignorance to being fully in the know. Everyone is somewhere in the labyrinth, though seldom in a position of their own choosing.

This complicated picture is created by the interplay of secrecy and science, but only partly. Contrary to what many scientists would probably like to believe, scientific knowledge is seldom about absolute and irrefutable truths of nature. Rather, scientific knowledge and its associated uncertainties are socially produced. The generation of scientific knowledge brings social rewards, such as recognition, status and funding. Uncertainty becomes a resource, to be drawn on for various social benefits, such as undermining an opponent’s argument, hedging against future contradiction or making a bid for further funding.

When secrecy is added into the mix as an additional social process, the results are fascinating. The imposition of secrecy onto the production of scientific knowledge also seems to go against the grain, because the scientific method is built on openness. The open publication of scientific knowledge not only exposes it to rigorous testing through peer review but also attracts social rewards. It is these clashes and interplays of the social processes around science and secrecy which the book explores.

Naturally enough, social processes affect science policy too. There was a time in the UK when biological and atomic weapons were seen as alternative means to the same end and hence vied with each other for resources. Policy decisions were affected by the status of the advocates of the weapons and how they represented uncertainty in terms of what might be achieved and what it might cost. Attitudes to secrecy by allies, particularly but not exclusively the US, provided further complications.
It is evident that the biological weapons researchers at the UK Government’s establishment at Porton Down came in for a good deal of vilification over the years. A range of justifications for their work were deployed, including the idea that being killed by a biological weapon is no worse than being killed by a conventional one. At times, it was even thought to be preferable, on the grounds that it can be more humane.

A more convincing argument is that biological weapons were studied only so that countermeasures could be developed. Furthermore, before the Biological Weapons Convention of the 1970s, the first use of biological and chemical weapons was banned by the Geneva Protocol, but not their development or possession. This meant that biological weapons could legally be developed as a deterrent against first use by an adversary.

Some of these arguments seem more convincing than others—and the overall impression is that their purpose is to resolve the cognitive dissonance arising from ‘good people’ (as one assumes they viewed themselves) working on ‘evil weapons’ (which seems to be the public’s view). This thread provides a further fascinating example of social processes impinging on routine scientific work.

As the author explains in the preface, this book operates on two levels: it is a history of biological and chemical weapons research in the UK during the Cold War, and can be read as such. But it will also appeal to a smaller group, with an interest in science and technology studies, by illuminating the social processes by which science and secrecy are co-produced.

I believe that the book’s insights and conclusions are much more broadly applicable even than this and will certainly interest an Australian readership. Although it sometimes uses technical language, with which a social scientist might feel more comfortable, this book is very accessible. It provides an intriguing perspective on the production of scientific knowledge, and the complications introduced by secrecy. The phrase ‘social science’ now seems tautological to me: since scientific knowledge is socially-produced, how could the two ever be separated?

**Shadows of ANZAC:**

*an intimate history of Gallipoli*

David W. Cameron  
Big Sky Publishing: Newport, 2013  

Reviewed by Jim Truscott

Just when I had thought that there was nothing new to learn about Gallipoli, along comes this really enjoyable book. The reason is that the author dissects the campaign every which way. Yes, there is the horror, the absurdity, the monotony and the humour, but it is done from the perspective of some 90 personal stories, all retold in the author’s context and from an international perspective; both friend and foe. Some stories are small. Some are very small and just one page. Some are a little longer and all are grouped under ‘the invasion’, ‘the stalemate’, ‘the offensive’ or ‘the decline’.
The invasion is an open secret, originally scheduled for 21 April and delayed by bad weather. The stories begin through the eyes of an army nurse, a navy beach landing officer, a Turkish company commander, a Turkish private, and a war correspondent on the boats. Very few of the 250-man Turkish company that reports the landing survive, and the first boat ashore realises that the navy has taken them a mile north.

The stories continue with a Turkish platoon commander and an Australian battalion scout who make it to the third ridge. I was to learn that many diggers hated the smell of lavender after Gallipoli, as it reminded them of the thyme bush. A section corporal leads a desperate charge on day one and lies under fire all day. There is a story of a Turkish platoon commander and the opposing Australian platoon commander. Some see the water of the Dardanelles from high points, then Lieutenant Colonel Kemal (later known as Ataturk) enters.

There is a divisional signaller who later becomes a lieutenant and is awarded a DCM, an engineer lieutenant, a colonel Director of Medical Services who evacuates 1,500 casualties on the first day and who provides the dying with morphine on ‘a more hellish Sunday one could not conceive’. There is a NZ infantry lieutenant and NZ infantry corporal, and a lance corporal promoted to sergeant who was also awarded a DCM. The Turks put on clean clothes and prepare themselves spiritually for martyrdom—‘Allah, Allah, Allah’. There is the Turkish regimental commander, and light rain falls throughout the first night. There is the AE2 submarine commander, and a possible evacuation.

Stalemate sets in. There are stories of Simpson and his donkey, a gunner signaller, a nurse in a Cairo hospital, the scuttling of the AE2, the raid on Gaba Tepe, and the 77th Arab Regiment who repel the raiders. There is failure at Helles and the decimation of the NZ Brigade. An artillery reconnaissance patrol is away for three days. A sapper lieutenant drills for water and is killed by artillery. There is an Indian mule driver, another reconnaissance patrol, and Simpson is shot dead.

There is the overwhelming stench of the dead during the 9-hour armistice, a most poignant story, and another story in a Cairo hospital. There is the battle for Quinn’s Post, which I had heard all before but not in this sequence and not with such humanity. There is a beach water resupply, a hospital, and the Kiwis failing to hold Quinn’s post; very grim reading. There is a two-man reconnaissance patrol, Kiwis drinking rum, one water bottle per day, Kemal’s counterattack planning, nursing, and building up supplies for the offensive.

The offensive begins with the story of a Salvation Army chaplain who does more for Christianity than a host of sermons. Charles Bean listens to the charge at the Nek. The Kiwis raid, and there is mincemeat at a German officer’s trench. There is the attack on Hill 971, and the first wave of the Light Horse is killed within five metres; grim again. The attackers on Dead Man’s Ridge are decimated and then we read of the Turkish side. There is another unsuccessful wave, more slaughter and British casualties as well, a German officer, Kiwi slaughter, and unusually some injured are taken prisoner by the Turks. Kiwis are killed by friendly artillery. The dead are trodden on everywhere. We read of Lord Slim as a lieutenant, burials and surgery on a hospital ship, stretcher bearers and a hospital again.

The decline begins with an aviator crash landing, an Indian mule driver, and the battle for Hill 60, which is ‘easier than going to the Claremont show’ (not). There is the delight of eating bread, more Charles Bean, and the Turks who call Lone Pine, Bloody Ridge. There is hand-to-
hand fighting in underground tunnels, the winter ordeal, ‘tonight’s (Turk) password’, frostbite injuries, and death from shock. At the end, there are self-firing ‘drip’ rifles, grave visits as it comes time to evacuate, the rear guard waiting to be overrun and then a very silent but physical reunion 75 years later between former enemies at Gallipoli. What more needs to be said about a divisional attack that almost ended up as every man for himself?

**Lancaster Men**  
*The Aussie Heroes of Bomber Command*

Peter Rees  
*Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 2013*  
ISBN: 978-1-7417-5207-6

Reviewed by Kristen Alexander

In June 2012, the Bomber Command Memorial was dedicated in London. Those present witnessed 55,573 poppies tumbling from a Lancaster, one for every Bomber Command man killed during the war. Peter Rees mingled with the 106 Australian survivors who attended that significant and moving event. Just as the poppies symbolised the souls of those lost to Bomber Command operations, *Lancaster Men: The Aussie Heroes of Bomber Command* represents the collective experiences of the Australians who fought, survived and died in the RAF’s bomber war.

Rollo Kingsford-Smith, Jack Davenport, Noel Eliot, Jim Rowland, Jack Mitchell, Mickey Martin, Alick Roberts, Blue Connelly and Ted Pickerd are just a handful of those who appear in this fine account. Rees follows the general course of the war and covers the full gamut of their wartime episodes. ‘Pathfinders’, ‘Dambusters’ and ‘Great Escapers’ are included and even the Sydney Harbour bridge stunt by ‘Q for Queenie’ gets a mention.

Rees discusses the bombing of Dresden, long considered the darkest moment of the bombing campaign, and places it in a new perspective. He includes historical commentary where appropriate but the personal stories are the heart of his book. Jack Mitchell’s story for instance, encapsulates the wartime experience of many. ‘I wonder if this [a stick he ‘planted’ on Tasmania’s Sugarloaf] will be here when I come home’. Some subjects, like Ted and Rollo, appear and reappear during the course of the war. Others only appear once, illustrating one aspect of the vast Bomber Command experience.

Rees shows the readers how close these men became in their shared experience and commitment to bringing the war to the enemy. Their dedication to their fellow aircrew was exemplary. Take, for example, Rawdon Middleton’s heroic last flight, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross, or the dramatic night when Geoff Smith gave up his usual position of mid-upper gunner to a young chap on his first operation. Now, there is a tale.

When their Lancaster was hit, the new boy’s turret was put out of action and his leg was broken. Even so, he managed to crawl from the turret to beat out an oil fire with his helmet. Then he tried to make it to the pilot to tell him of the damage. He was found unconscious.
by the wireless operator. Geoff Smith, in the rear turret that night, had also been injured. His leg was shattered but he refused to leave his position. With the mid-upper gunner and turret out of commission, he was the Lancaster’s only defence. In the cockpit, with instruments all but useless, the pilot skilfully evaded enemy anti-aircraft fire and nursed the crippled bomber home. He was unable to make a normal landing because the bomb bay doors were wrecked; he had to belly land on a damaged undercarriage.

If the selflessness of Smith and the young mid-upper gunner were not enough, here is another incredible demonstration of the strong ties of this crew. The bomb aimer and the wireless operator lay down beside Smith to protect him in case they crashed. The only blemish in this beautiful and remarkable testament to both courage and friendship is that the other gallant men in this crew are not named. That flaw aside, this is simple, restrained yet powerful storytelling at its best.

I had the pleasure of reading and commenting on an early draft of this book and was disappointed to hear that Rees’ original title, ‘All the Fine Young Men’, had been rejected by Allen & Unwin, who decided it should be called Lancaster Men. Catchier title perhaps but this book is not only about those who flew the mighty Lancasters. Rees’ fine men also flew Hampdens, Whitleys, Stirlings, Manchesterers and Wellingtons. In excluding those who flew other aircraft from the title, the marketers have somehow diminished their experience.

However, if the marketers got it wrong, Rees certainly got it right. As demonstrated in *The Other Anzacs: Nurses at War, 1914–1918* and *Desert Boys. Australians at War from Beersheba to Tobruk and El Alamein*, Rees is a natural story teller with a gift for dealing with multiple stories. He competently weaves them into a moving and dramatic narrative, all within the general chronology of the war.

The text in this book is supported by a good selection of photos, many supplied by the families of his key subjects, two decent maps, a useful index, notes and bibliography, and great cover art. I enjoyed this very much. It is ‘un-put-downable’. A first-rate testament to all of Australia’s fine men who flew Stirlings, Wellingtons, Lancasters and the rest. Highly recommended.

*The Nek
A Gallipoli Tragedy*

Peter Burness
Exisle Publishing: Wollombi, 2012
ISBN: 978-1-9219-6610-1

Reviewed by Dr Dominic Katter

When Australians associate this nation with ‘a place’, perhaps there are thoughts of Circular Quay, the Opera House, the Harbour Bridge or Uluru. However, the narrow stretch of ridge in the Anzac battlefield on the Gallipoli peninsula, known as ‘The Nek’, should also be associated forever with this nation.
Peter Burness, in the revised and updated edition of this book (first published in 1996), indicates that his interest in the Battle of The Nek potentially developed from the famous George Lambert painting, ‘The Charge of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at The Nek’. In 1984, Burness had the privilege of interviewing a number of soldiers who had served at The Nek on 7 August 1915, including Sergeant Lionel Simpson, DCM. Further, Burness had the private papers of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander White (1882-1915), who died leading the charge.

The book is some 148 pages of text, together with an appendix and notes. The author carefully combines the primary research referred to above with the official history and other documents, making it an interesting read, even for those with a relatively detailed understanding of the battle.

The book is a part of the ‘ANZAC Battles Series’, investigating military battles fought by Australian and New Zealand soldiers throughout the 20th century. Author Peter Burness is a Senior Historian (and the longest serving employee at the Australian War Memorial), whose military publications have a particular emphasis on First World War battles.

There is some onomatopoeia in the Afrikaans word (Nek) for ‘a mountain pass’, being the name given to the tennis court-sized area at Gallipoli to which this book refers. In reading the work, there is a mixed sense of sorrow combined with great pride in the courage displayed by those who served at The Nek. It is easy to reconcile the extraordinary respect that is imbued from a young age as to the Light Horse Regiments when one reads this book. As the book is read, the quote from Charles Bean in the official history, reproduced at page 13 in this work, continues to resonate:

… in the history of war there is no more signal example of reckless obedience than that … by the dismounted light horsemen at The Nek when, after seeing the whole of the first attacking line mown down within a few yards … the second, third, and fourth lines each charged after its interval of time, at the signal of its leaders, to certain destruction.

Burness describes The Nek in similar terms to ‘the glorious charge of the Light Brigade’, where he says there were ‘inadequacies, incompetence and bitter personal rivalries’. Burness surmises that the famous words of Lord Tennyson’s poem are also appropriate to The Nek:

They that had fought so well
Came through the jaws of Death,
Back from the mouth of Hell,
All that was left of them,
Left of six hundred.
A History of Eastern Europe, 1740-1918: empires, nations and modernisation

Ian D. Armour
Bloomsbury Academic: London, 2012

Reviewed by Robert S. Bolia,
Office of Naval Research Global, Tokyo, Japan

Ian Armour’s *A History of Eastern Europe, 1740-1918: empires, nations and modernisation* is the second edition of what he refers to in the preface as a ‘general textbook’ for a ‘primarily undergraduate readership’. I was very much looking forward to reading it, having over the years read bits and pieces of Eastern European history—most of it military—but never a general treatment covering the region, either in this period or in any other. It was a good read—well written and well researched—but in the end quite unsatisfying.

The problem is that it is not, despite the title, a history of Eastern Europe. It is a book about Eastern Europe but one that focuses almost exclusively on three themes—modernisation, the rise of nationalism, and the persistence of multi-ethnic states—to the exclusion of anything else. To be fair, the author admits that these are the foci of the book almost from the beginning (although not before labelling it a general textbook) and does a reasonable job of discussing them, assuming you are well-versed in Eastern European history.

The problem with the book is not what it contains but rather what it does not. Going on the expectation that it is actually a history of Eastern Europe, one might expect some political history, some social history and some cultural history. It might be nice to know what people did with themselves, what their art and literature was like, how they worshipped. Were there any noteworthy scientific or medical discoveries? What were the wars like—not only the battles but their effects on society. There is none of this in Armour’s book.

Even if we assume that the book is *only* about the aforementioned three themes, these need to be contextualised in order to make sense to people who are not already immersed in the field. There is, for example, virtually no biographical information provided on the men whose actions are the subject of the work. The average undergraduate history student will hopefully know who Bismarck and Maria Theresa are but will not likely have heard of Piłsudski, Masaryk or Štúr. Perhaps space was an issue but for a book with only 253 pages of text, it should not have been.

This is not to say that I did not like the book. In fact, I enjoyed it very much. It was thought-provoking and offered interesting analyses of issues which remain important today. Nevertheless, the author has missed the boat by not making it a true history of Eastern Europe or at least a more narrow history with enough background to engage and retain the interest of the non-specialist interested reader.
GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The *Australian Defence Force Journal* seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters, such as strategic studies, security and international relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the *Journal* does not pay for articles but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best in each issue.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without the use of templates or paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable (and contributors should view previous issues for style). Length should ideally not exceed 4000 words, including endnotes. Please ‘spell check’ the document with Australian English before sending. Additional guidelines are available from the website.

Articles should contain endnotes and brief biographical details of the author. A bibliography is not required but may be included to identify ‘additional reading’.

Endnotes


Bibliography


Tables, figures and maps are encouraged (with original data ideally included as a separate attachment). Maps etc must be of sufficient resolution to be reproduced in high quality print.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by a Board member or independent referee with subject-matter expertise. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and, if accepted, will be published in the next *Journal*. That process typically takes 3-4 months. Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Editor via email at: publications@defence.adc.edu.au

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