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© Commonwealth of Australia 1979
The fleet oiler, HMAS Supply, centre, refuels the guided missile destroyer, HMAS Perth, with the destroyer escort, HMAS Derwent in background.
I wish to express my gratitude to my predecessor, Mr Ian Taylor. Ian was most helpful during a very short handover period.

Mr Taylor joined the Public Service in 1973 after 26 years with the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. He was Editor, Army Journal in 1975-76 and has been Managing Editor, Defence Force Journal since its inception in November 1976. He has recently taken up a post as Editor with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Okinawa, Japan. It is only fitting, that his article 'The Dragon and the Bear' should appear on page 23 of this issue.

We wish Ian and his family our very best wishes for the future.

Governed by space I have had to omit a few of the smaller articles from this issue. I will try to include them in the early issues of 1980. This issue is the final one for 1979 and it contains, on pages 58 to 64, an annual index. Time and space permitting, I have endeavoured to make it as practicable as possible. In 1979 we have had a total of 43 articles from 41 authors, one poem, and 41 books were reviewed by a small number of talented and devoted book reviewers.

I urge those ladies and gentlemen with overdue book reviews, to complete them as soon as possible. If you find you are unable to fulfil the obligation in reasonable time, send the book back to me. I shall pass it on to another to complete the task.

My thanks to those people who responded to an earlier plea and volunteered their services as book reviewers; I shall be in contact with them in the near future.

* * * * *

The Anzac Memorial Chapel of St Paul, Royal Military College, Duntroon appears on the front cover of this issue.

The official opening ceremony was performed by His Excellency the Governor-General of Australia, the Right Honourable Lord Casey, PC, GCMG, CH, DSO, MC, KStJ, on Saturday, 30 April 1966, and the first services were held on the following day after the Chapels had been blessed and dedicated.

The Chapel is unique in the history of the Australian Army, being the first single building to contain two separate Chapels. The combined Anglican and Protestant Denominations Chapel has seating capacity for 550. The Roman Catholic Chapel has seating accommodation for 350.

At Duntroon, the staff consists of two full-time Chaplains, one Anglican and one Roman Catholic representative. There are also two part-time CMF Chaplains.

The role of the Chaplain in the Services is basically the same wherever he may be called upon to serve, namely to provide every opportunity for the serviceman and his family to practice their religion.

* * * * *

On behalf of the Board of Management and the staff of the Army Audio Visual Unit, I wish you a Happy Christmas and a Prosperous New Year.
Dear Sir,

I read with interest the two reviews of *American Caesar* in DFJ September/October 1979, and agree with most of the comments. The book does not add much to an understanding of MacArthur's generalship and at times is rather superficial in its judgments, but it does give a good account of his fascinating personality. One reviewer noted that those who might seek to gain an insight into MacArthur's relationship with the Australian forces would not benefit greatly. Since this topic is likely to hold the most interest for Australians, I believe that both reviewers have done their readers, and the reputation of Australian servicemen, a severe injustice in not pointing out the many errors in this area of the book.

MacArthur's relations with the Australians are dealt with in one chapter of about 100 pages. I detected errors of fact on 13 of those pages. And they were not just minor errors. Obviously Manchester has chosen to believe some of the books written by MacArthur's sycophantic subordinates, rather than the official histories or the three volume biography by Clayton James. The most pernicious error occurs on page 296 when Manchester writes that in July 1942 'Curtin's military advisers, on the other hand, were defeatist. They continued to be wedded to their Brisbane line, which would be fixed along the Tropic of Capricorn just above Brisbane'.

In a letter to the editor in DFJ March/April 1977 I wrote at length about this matter and there is little to be gained in spelling out the story again. MacArthur's, and Manchester's, claims are, of course, quite false. Nevertheless, it is disturbing to find that two reviews in this journal are assisting the great panjandrum to get away with denigrating Australian military leaders once again.

D. M. Horner
Major
To my knowledge, organizational planning based on objectives and management — by objectives schemes have rarely been given an effective trial in the non-operational areas of the Australian Army. Rather, there is an excessive incidence of what Drucker calls the “pernicious business malpractice” of management by “crisis” and “drives” (4). The use of objectives can help reduce this incidence. If the teaching and practice of “management” is to be a conscious discipline in the Australian Army, the topic of objectives deserves eminence.

N.A. Jans, Major.

Notes:
3. Ibid, p 119.
4. Ibid, p 125.

Dear Sir,

Maj Graco’s article on ‘Civilian Models’ (DFJ, Sep/Oct 79) not only warns of the miscibility of Service and civilian doctrines but advocates the dehumanisation of the soldier. Is he suggesting a return to the tenets of Troy, foot soldier fanaticism or a separate social enclave for the practitioners of the ultimate weapon of diplomacy?

Given the deluge of information to which the community is subjected, it is difficult to see how the soldier could meet his professional military standards without loss of sanity, unless he was equipped with sufficient intelligence and education to allow him to grapple with his role in life.

Maj Graco’s fundamental premise that the services are not civilian in nature to my mind causes his whole exposition to founder. Why should military professionalism not be able to stand the scrutiny and analysis of complimenting professions. And at what stage does he see civilians being allowed to influence military thinking? Perhaps he believes that politicians have no place in his scheme either; a view forcibly effected in a few African countries recently.

That the Western Forces have come out of the trenches over the last fifty years, taken an active part in the community and enjoyed its benefits along with all its other members, without loss of role, is to their credit. The community as a result is certainly richer and I would hope the services’ absorption of the useful facilities available from the civilian world has enhanced their profession.

Mr Bill Coburn
Defence Force Industrial Branch

Dear Sir,

Major Graco’s article on Civilian Models (DFJ, Sept/Oct 1979) is disturbing for its implications. Its form of presentation creates an aura of authenticity, ironically because he chose the civilian model of an academic paper to present his case. His argument could serve a divisive influence in our Defence structure, and it bothers me that either party might accept his case and believe it implicitly.

Technology, scientific methodology, swift communications and civilian political control are irreversible influences in our modern world which demand more from defence forces than ever before. It is easy to demonstrate that the new demands cause conflicts with traditional military values which still count. They always have. Major Graco’s article, its bibliography, and many other writers attest to it. But so what?

It seems churlish to identify civilians influence as the villain. If the civilian models are wrong they must be countered or corrected by sound military advice. If they have gained credence because military arguments are found wanting, we should improve the military reasoning. The total view then improves. Civilians ought not to be criticised for misunderstanding or misdirecting the services if we fall short in explaining our methods and values.

If anything, Major Graco’s case epitomises some of the difference and paranoia that the modern serviceman must overcome. I hope this was his real purpose. That the thinkers, the doers, the boffins and the heroes must co-exist in today’s armed services is unavoidable. Perhaps we should recognise our corporate split personality and stop worrying about it.

D. L. H. Buring
Lieutenant Colonel
Accommodation and Works — Central
Mature age Civil Engineering Students at RMC Duntroon

T. G. Chapman
Professor of Engineering
Faculty of Military Studies
University of New South Wales

Of the 36 students graduating in civil engineering at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in the period 1974-77, seven were mature age students. These students had entered Duntroon in the period before degree courses were established, and completed studies in civil engineering which qualified them for a College diploma. After several years experience as engineer officers, they returned to complete a BE degree by two years of full-time study.

The performance of these mature age students, as measured by marks and the award of degrees at honours level, was significantly higher than the other students who had entered the BE course directly from school. It was also higher than would have been expected from their earlier academic attainments.

Although there is no control group for statistical comparison, there is little doubt that the performance of the younger students in this period was improved by the inclusion of the mature age group.

This case study is analysed in terms of factors such as motivation, professional experience, non-study commitments, and ability to relate to academic staff. The results give rise to a broadened interpretation of the significance of an honours degree.

Background

From the inception of the Royal Military College (RMC) at Duntroon in 1911, there has been a significant academic content in the curriculum. The original curriculum, based on that of the United States Military Academy at West Point, was designed for a four year course, equally divided between military and academic studies. The exigencies of the 1914-18 and 1939-45 wars caused reductions in the course duration, but a revised four year course, including alternative academic courses in arts or science, was introduced for the 1947 intake.

By 1958, the College offered three courses — in arts, science and engineering, each at two levels. These courses enabled selected graduates to obtain exemptions for up to two years of the corresponding courses at universities or institutes of technology. New post-matriculation courses were introduced in 1964.

In 1967, under an agreement with the Minister for the Army, the University of New South Wales established a Faculty of Military Studies at Duntroon, responsible for the development and conduct of courses in arts, applied science and engineering, and leading to degrees of the University. The courses in the new Faculty began in 1968, and the first degrees were awarded in 1971.

The Civil Engineering Course

The courses in civil, electrical and mechanical engineering at Duntroon are similar to the corresponding courses in Australian universities generally. The curriculum extends over four years of full-time academic study, with a common first year, and leads to the degree of Bachelor of Engineering in the Faculty of Military Studies. In addition, the cadets undertake five hours per week of military training during the academic year and eight weeks of full-time military training between academic years; satisfactory performance in this training is a pre-requisite for award of the degree. (A recent change in these arrangements is described later in the paper.)

The BE courses were accorded provisional recognition by the Institution of Engineers, Australia in 1971, and this was confirmed in 1975 following the introduction of a requirement for all students to obtain sixty working days of practical engineering.
experience during the period of their enrolment.

Within the constraints set by the maintenance of accepted academic and professional standards, there are some features of the civil engineering course designed to take account of the future employment of the graduates as engineer officers in the Royal Australian Engineers. The main features are an emphasis on finite mathematics and computing studies, inclusion of management science as a major subject in the final year, a final year project oriented to engineering planning and design with military application in an environmental context, and less emphasis on structural analysis and design than in most Australian BE courses in civil engineering.

Selection and Entry of Mature Age Students

Seven of the 27 civil engineering graduates of the 1964-67 entries were sent to universities or institutes of technology to complete their academic studies at degree or diploma level. In 1972, after the first BE graduates from Duntroon joined the Royal Australian Engineers (RAE), it was decided that a larger proportion of the 1964-67 group should have the opportunity of obtaining full engineering qualifications, and that this could be best achieved at Duntroon. Over the years 1973-77, eight RAE officers of this group were posted to Duntroon for ‘full-time civil schooling’.

These students, who were aged 25 to 28 and had the rank of captain or major on their re-entry to Duntroon, were enrolled with advanced standing in the BE course. Initially, an attempt was made to determine their advanced standing on the basis of performance in individual subjects during their earlier period at Duntroon, but this quickly developed into adoption of a standard set of exemptions and requirements. The mature age students are exempted from the military, practical engineering experience, and general studies requirements of the degree, and from all of the first two years of the BE course except the first year course (4 hours/week) in finite mathematics, and (from the 1976 entry) the second year course (2 hours/week) in numerical analysis. They therefore undertake the third and fourth years of the BE course with the cadets in those years, but have a marginally higher academic load because of the additional mathematics requirements.

Performance of Mature Age Students

Of the seven mature age students who had graduated by the end of 1977, six graduated with honours, four with first class honours, and one was awarded a university medal, the first such award in the Faculty of Military Studies.

Table 1 lists three measures of performance of the officer undergraduates (the RMC term for these mature age students) and the 29 cadets who graduated in the same years. The differences are striking; it should be noted that data have not been included for the five cadets who failed to graduate in these years.

Table 2 shows that the academic performance of the officer undergraduates, when they were previously at Duntroon as cadets, was marginally below that of the other students in the 1968-70 graduating classes.

Similar patterns are evident among the electrical engineering (2 mature age students in a group of 14) and mechanical engineering (2 in 12) graduates in the same period.

Discussion

A number of reasons can be advanced for the transformation of this group of underachievers into students with high academic performance. Motivation certainly plays a large part. The average Duntroon cadet has the primary aim of becoming an army officer; academic study is often regarded only as a means to that end. Not all cadets studying engineering are initially motivated towards technology; many regard the engineering course as being more 'practical' than arts or science, and therefore of greater potential relevance in an army career. However, after some years as an engineer officer, the lack of a university degree is seen as a shortcoming which may result in exclusion from the more technically interesting postings, may be a drawback in consideration for promotion, and certainly reduces potential employment opportunities in civilian life. The opportunity to gain such a qualification by full-time study, while on full pay, is therefore highly valued, and leads to a high work effort.

Other major factors are personal maturity and some years of experience in the areas of engineering and management. The officer
Table 1. Performance of civil engineering cadets and officer undergraduates graduating in period 1974-77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officer Undergraduates</th>
<th>Cadets</th>
<th>Significance of difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average mark (%) third and fourth year</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>t = 4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>(P &lt; .001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% subjects passed at credit level (65%) or better</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% subjects passed at distinction level (75%) or better</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The officer undergraduates can immediately appreciate the relevance of the ‘professional’ topics in the degree course, which are sometimes confusing in their detail to a student without practical experience, and are strongly interested in the analytical subjects which form the basis for engineering design. Several have remarked that they have felt inadequate in carrying through certain designs without understanding their basis, and admit that they have built up some fundamental misconceptions. The officer undergraduates are invariably strong in management science, again partly because they appreciate its relevance and partly because their experience assists them in their studies, particularly in the non-quantitative aspects such as organisational theory and industrial psychology. They generally take more advantage than the cadets of library facilities, the opportunity to discuss problems with staff, and the system of continuing assessment.

The status and age of the officer undergraduates certainly give them some advantages over the cadets. In the first place, they have virtually no commitments other than academic study during the academic year. The cadets, though having a marginally lower academic load than the officer undergraduates, have 5 hours/week of military training, compulsory sport on two afternoons and at the week-end, and may other time-consuming duties. Secondly, the officer undergraduates have greater confidence in approaching the discussion of technical problems with academic staff, and they have more appreciation of the teaching philosophy underlying the academic curriculum.

The officer undergraduates also suffer some disadvantages, of which the most obvious is the long absence from formal study. On entry, the students expect to have difficulties on this count, particularly in mathematics-related subjects, and most do in fact have a struggle to cope with the first half-year’s work. They also suffer from the difficulties, common to all mature age students with families, of obtaining the time and quiet conditions for personal study at home.

Although it can not be more than a subjective view, the academic staff believe that the officer undergraduates have raised the overall performance of the civil engineering students. They have assisted in motivation (don’t waste the opportunity, as I did, of getting the best possible academic results’), by setting high standards and so stimulating competition, and
by use of their professional experience in discussions. The presence of highly motivated and experienced students has also been a stimulus to academic staff, who have received helpful criticism from the officer undergraduates.

The award of honours in the engineering courses at Duntroon is based on the overall standard of achievement in the last three years of the course, with greater weight on the later years; the criteria used are the same as those in the Faculty of Engineering on the main campus at Kensington. Some of the mature age students awarded honours degrees have not fitted conventional views about honours graduates as being students with high innate academic ability. They would perhaps be better described as very well organised professionals. The universities use the honours system to distinguish those students capable of undertaking higher degrees by research. I have no doubt that this criterion could be applied, with at least as great a likelihood of success, to the mature age civil engineering students graduating with honours at Duntroon. The award of honours should therefore be regarded as indicating a mix of intelligence, motivation, organisation and experience which may occur in quite different proportions from one student to another, but which overall is an indicator of above average performance and potential.

The future

In 1976 it was decided to convert the BE in the Faculty of Military Studies into a five year degree, based on three years of academic studies and a year of full-time military studies, after which the cadets are commissioned; they return the following year as officer undergraduates (age about 22) to complete the final year of the degree course. The first such students are currently in their final year. They have the advantages previously noted of virtually no commitments outside academic work, and one year of maturity compared with previous final year students. They lack the engineering and management experience of the group of mature age students discussed in this paper. It would be informative to determine their relative performance, given appropriate data. They are expected to do rather better than cadets on the four year course, but not as well as the older group of students.

It may be noted that, possibly as a result of the experience with mature age students at Duntroon, planning for Casey University, Australian Defence Force Academy, is based on admission to the senior years of each course (arts, science and engineering) of officer undergraduates from each arm of the Defence Force, who will study with the cadets entering immediately after matriculation.

References
1. The Royal Military College of Australia, Duntroon, "Royal Military College and Faculty of Military Studies Handbook 1978", University of New South Wales.

Acknowledgement
I am grateful to my wife and several colleagues for suggestions which have assisted the final preparation of this paper.
INTRODUCTION

The prime aim of this article is to continue the effort to synthesize the theory of organizational leadership from many disciplines and overtones which have moral and emotional implications. An endeavour is made to present those factors which will enable readers to answer the question "are leaders made or born?" In addition, it is stressed in the article, that effective leaders in private, public and military organizations are produced by selection and development. This development is seen to be a multifaceted long term process which includes the acquisition of leadership resources such as knowledge, skills and a professional orientation; as well as the utilization of practice, evaluation and feedback to improve leadership performance.

Man is an activist who has created and destroyed civilizations as well as developed vast technological complexes. These achievements have been accomplished through man's ability to develop and manage social organizations. "It is worth reminding ourselves that management does not really exist. . . . It is an abstraction. But managers. . . . exist. And managers are not abstractions; they are men, they are human beings. Particular and special kinds of human beings. Individuals with a special function: to lead and move and bring out the latent capabilities — and dreams — of other human beings." 1

These managers co-ordinate men, material, money, time, machines and space within internal and external environments such as technology, structure, goals and values. The most critical aspect of the managerial task is the integration of individual efforts towards the objectives of his organization. This aspect of the managerial role is leadership, and it is this aspect which gave the inspiration for this article. With a view to deriving pragmatic conclusions, the following topics are analyzed in sequence — the group, the organization, definition of leadership, leadership patterns, leadership training, and finally conclusions.

The Group

Concept. The dynamics of group processes are important to an understanding of leadership because many important and complicated organizational tasks are achieved only by individual effort co-ordinated through group interactions. A group may be defined as "a collection of individuals among whom a set of interdependent relationships exist." 2 This definition presumes that there is a collective goal and a set of norms which regulate the behaviour of the members of the group. The most significant finding of research into group dynamics is that leadership tends to emerge to achieve the group goal and to satisfy individual relationships within the group. Deviation from the existing group norms may be consequent upon factors such as anxiety of the individual members, vague or ambiguous goals and environmental uncertainties. Because it can destroy the cohesive effectiveness of a group, pronounced deviancy is of concern to the group leader.

Conformity. Individual behaviour may be chaotic and unpredictable unless it is influenced...
by group norms. In contrast, an unproductive, stifling uniformity may be produced by pressures to conform. Therefore, conformity should be seen as a special problem for the group and its leader. Researchers have found that individuals can be induced to behave similarly. This conformity in behaviour seems to be a function of causes based on personality, stimulus, situational and intragroup factors. Cohesive groups tend to have greater conformity. Regardless of his own level of competence an individual conforms more when the competence of the majority if perceived to be high rather than when it is low. The manipulation of rewards and punishments are a common group means of exerting pressure on the individual to achieve conformity. Over dependence on the group, as illustrated by slavish loyalty to that group at the price of individual integrity, seems to be a characteristic of insecure individuals. Group and individual interests appear to be satisfied when pressures to conform are restricted to those matters which are vital for co-ordinating group operations. To be realistically effective the group should identify and foster the degree of deviance essential for flexibility and adaptability. Sometimes, stability of the group and its identity can be assisted positively by its deviants. "... people with whom one works in an organization can — and often do — have rather substantial effects not only on behaviour but on how one thinks and feels as well." However, most people who feel alone and unsupported are less likely to be themselves than when they are in groups where they feel secure.

**Power.** "Power is the innate right of an organization. It is not only inherent but indispensable. For without it, how can the organization accomplish its mission." Therefore, the organization may be considered to have a 'legal' authority over its employees. However, unless the employees concede authority over themselves to the organization their jobs are merely a means to an end, eg., wages and salaries, rather than a positive commitment to the mission of the organization. If person or organization 'L' can reward or coerce person 'P' at minimum cost to L than L has considerable power over P. 'Reward power' is a function of the perception by P that L has an ability to provide rewards. 'Coercive power' is based on P's perception that L has the ability to punish. 'Referent power' is a transformation of 'reward power' to the degree that P is attracted to L. 'Expert power' is concerned with P's perception that L in certain situations has some critical knowledge. 'Legitimate Power' is the acceptance by P of the authority of L, consequent upon norms and values which prescribe particular behaviours such as deference to age, social class and designated authority. The above five types of power have interacting effects which may reduce or augment each other. The power bases may be altered by the continued exercise of power which has changed identification, norms, values or expert knowledge. So that each exercise of power is an exchange of rewards and costs. The magnitude of power is determined by the dependence of P on L, together with the resources of L as well as the consequence of not complying. Dependencies may be mutual or balanced or disparate and unbalanced; so that P is much more dependent on L than vice versa, with resultant pressures to redress the balance. Some attributes of individuals relative to power include commitment, effort, interest, skills, attractiveness as well as a willingness to exercise and concede power. Force, law, role, ability and spirit might be delineated as a 'hierarchy of power' which ideally should be implemented in reverse order.

**Transactions.** Conformity, power, leadership and other elements of the group are transformed from static to dynamic concepts by transactions between those elements. Research has indicated that democratic leadership is not characterized by the group choosing its own method of interacting. The successful group has been found to have a leader who ensures that all members of the group participate in communication. Hence the leader must be perceived by the group to be influential. Although nonverbal behaviour has a very limited range it can be used to communicate feelings, likings and preferences. It frequently reinforces, contradicts or even adds a new dimension to verbal transactions. Therefore, the leader seems to need to communicate by almost every form of human behaviour found in an organization. The leader should evaluate how to communicate with each group of people in different situations. Guidelines for improving the clarity and accuracy of transactions between the leader and the group and within the group might include
feedback, simple language, repetition and multiple channels. It may be better to consider communication as a people rather than a language process. So that leaders may have to consider changing inter-personal relationships, even if only to reduce the degree of defensiveness.

Leadership Utilization. The contingency model theory maintains that the effectiveness of an organization is a function of the personality of the leader combined with the degree to which the situation gives the leader power, control and influence or, alternately, confronts him with uncertainty. The personality of the leader may vary from relationship-motivated to task-motivated. The more open, more approachable relationship-motivated leaders are contrasted by the group with the more controlled and controlling task-motivated leaders who may be as likeable as other leaders. The second variable, 'situational favourableness' is a function of the leader-member-relationships, together with the task structure which varies with goals, procedures and measurable progress, as well as the leader's position-power which is based on his ability to obtain compliance from subordinates by rewards, punishments and constraints. There are many large organizations where it may be necessary for top management to utilize their leaders by rotation sideways or even upwards; likewise these leaders may become bored, stable, disinterested or unchallenged.

Leadership Defined

The study of leadership becomes more dynamic and challenging as a search for (scientific) knowledge expands. The foregoing analysis of the group has identified three factors which seem to be identifiable in acts of leadership: the members of the group, the leader's personality and the situation. It appears that the dynamic interaction between these three factors creates the scale of success of the role of the particular group. With a view to establishing a foundation it is now proposed to collate and analyze the various concepts of the definition of leadership.

Leadership has been defined as the art of influencing people. This definition sees leadership as a dynamic motivating process. Leadership is only part of management. Leaders motivate and guide people towards goals by activating dormant management activities such as planning, organizing, directing and controlling. There is a suggestion that leadership releases latent human capacity in the group. Leadership is 'interpersonal influence, exercised in situations and directed, through the communication process, toward the attainment of a specified goal or goals. Leadership always involves attempts on the part of a leader (influencer) to affect (influence) the behaviour of a follower (influencee) or followers in a situation.' With the growth of large organizations in the public and private sectors many people are appointed as managers without the concurrence of the group they are to manage. This positional authority may be inadequate to influence the group to perform effectively, in the absence of leadership by the appointed manager.

Influence by a leader implies a reciprocal relationship between the leader and his followers as well as others with whom the leader must deal. These others would include the leader's peers and his superiors. The leadership process may be interpreted by the exchange theory which analyses in terms of reward-cost outcomes to the leader. Ideally, the leadership process should generate creativity, productivity and ethical behaviour. These latter three characteristics are not necessarily present in managerial leadership, despite the existence of competence, control and balancing of inter-group power relationships. Leadership tends to use power to influence people. This power entails the risk of getting immediate results, the risk of ignoring the legitimate means of accumulating power and the risk of the leader lusting for power. Hedging these three risks has led to the development of collective management leadership. Consequently, inertia and conservatism in the culture of large organizations develop managers and curtail individual leadership. So that business fosters bureaucracy rather than being the last bastion of protection against governmental bureaucracy. So that any definition of leadership must presume that organizations will see the wisdom of taking risks by allowing leaders to emerge.

Managers make rational/assessment of goals and situations, then systematically develop and execute plans to meet those goals in the face of those situations. Under this concept,
Managerial leadership may be developed to use people in a structured way to operate, to derive and execute the plans of the organization. There is much evidence that our democratic society has compromised by deriving a bureaucratic management system for business as well as the defence services, government, education, health and other institutions. Here, managers require persistence, intelligence, tolerance and goodwill rather than the genius and heroism of leaders. In contrast to this mundane and perhaps practical concept of leadership as managing the work of people there is the lonely person who has control of themselves and an ability as well as the opportunity to substantially exceed the results achievable under managerial leadership. Leaders who need challenge, emotional interchange and mentors for their development may be stifled in the bureaucratic society in which we now live. In this article, it is proposed to continue to define leadership as the art of influencing people. However, it is intended to strive to flush out the elusive phenomena of ‘perfect’ leadership as the vital component of managerial leadership. It appears feasible that leaders and managers may be different sorts of people and that the conditions favourable for the emergence of one may hinder the emergence of the other. Hence, ‘pure’ leadership may be difficult to determine.

THE ORGANIZATION

Evasive Leadership. There are relatively stable environments in small face to face groups where leadership tends to emerge more smoothly than in larger groups. As groups grow, face-to-face contacts are dramatically reduced and interrelationships in the organization multiply so that management is difficult and leadership evasive. An organization has been defined as a sub-system of its broader environment composed of goal oriented people. This organization has a technical subsystem with people using knowledge, techniques, equipment and facilities as well as a structural subsystem of people working together on integrated activities combined with a psychosocial subsystem of people in social relationships and co-ordinated by a managerial subsystem of planning and controlling the overall endeavour. This definition highlights the need for management throughout organizations. In addition it is readily apparent that leadership is also needed within the subsystems as well as to utilize the abilities of all the people in the organization. The separation of ownership from management tends to stultify leadership within business and public organizations as the bureaucratic mazes develop.

Limits of Authority. Authority may be considered to be the power conceded by a subordinate to a superior. This power may be reinforced by legal authority conferred on the superior by the organization’s rules and ‘directors’. Even where compliance can be secured through the exercise of authority, influence through suggestion or persuasion may be preferred, so that leadership emerges from the mantle of management. The critical element of the role of subordinates is the area within which the superior is able to have his decisions accepted. A leader needs to assess the size of the area of indifference within which an organization will accept his leadership. The superior’s authority over a group is limited in the same way as a driver whose passengers will leave the bus unless he takes them on their preferred road. A leader’s area of influence varies with the circumstances. The severe sanctions and customs give an army the greatest area of acceptance. The smallest area of acceptance lies with voluntary organizations with poorly defined objectives. Business and public service organizations lie somewhere between these two extremes. There is every reason to suggest that legal and even conceded authority should not be used to its limits. So that, influence leading to conviction which calls for leadership rather than management is required to achieve the goals of an organization. Utilization of authority leads to little more than acquiescence.

Motivation. Individuals are motivated to achieve certain goals, which goals result in satisfaction. Productivity is a means to attain goals. Hence, high productivity and satisfaction occur simultaneously when productivity is perceived as the path to the individual’s goals and these goals are achieved. Vroom defines motivation as a “process governing choices made by persons, among alternate forms of voluntary activity.” Vroom uses the term valence to indicate the strength to an individual’s desire for a particular outcome. Vroom also uses the term instrumentality to show the extent to which a first-level outcome is
seen to lead to second-level outcomes. So that performance of individuals and groups is a direct function of the product of the perceived instrumentality of performance for a reward and the valence of that reward. Leaders may be able to use Vroom’s concepts in predicting the behaviour of their group. However, leaders will need to ascertain all the goals that have positive valence to individuals in his group as well as to the group as a whole. Secondly, leadership requires an assessment and preferably a mastery over the amount of force which is necessary before one outcome is chosen in preference to another. Thirdly, leadership as distinct from management is required to determine the combination of measures which yields the best prediction for success in each situation.

Interface with Society. Society may be considered as being the sea of which the organization forms part — the size of that part being a function of the type of society. The society is a group of human beings who cooperate for common interests, in particular self-perpetuation and self-maintenance. The views of society should reflect the policy, control, goals and morale of the organization. The organization is itself composed of members of society. If these members are not a homogeneous sample of the society then the views and actions of the organization may conflict with their society. Indeed a creative leader may himself have views which conflict with society. However, leadership requires that the organization comes to terms with its society. Otherwise one or both may not survive. In society there is a conflict between functional bureaucratic imperatives making for objective control and the social, economic and political imperatives making for subjective control. Hence, leaders in business as well as government organizations must find ways to minimize the effects of this conflict on their own groups. In short, creative leadership calls for an ability to seek, find and hold a place in society within which organizations can survive. Organizational leadership reflects the moral foundations upon which the organization and its society are established. Society will continue to reject that conduct in its leaders which it considers to be unethical. Before being sentenced at the Watergate trials, Magrudcr testified, “Somewhere between my ambition and my ideals I lost my ethical compass . . .”11

The role of leader demands that he maintains the ethical compass not only for himself but also for his group throughout his whole ‘watch at the helm’.

LEADERSHIP PATTERNS

Choice. The successful leader seems to have two implications in his choice of a leadership pattern. Firstly, he must be aware of those factors which are relevant to his behaviour at any given time. In addition he needs to understand himself, his subordinates, his group, his organization and his society with a high degree of accuracy. At the same time a leader must be able to assess the potential for growth (and reliability) of his subordinates. However, this sensitivity is inadequate without being combined with the second implication of choice of a leadership pattern. There is a need for him to behave appropriately in the environment of these perceptions. So that he provides freedom or strong direction or any other requirement to the group to enable its goals to be achieved. Therefore, successful leadership calls for flexibility and insight in assessing the most appropriate behaviour to meet any situation and then to behave to maximize the needs of the group. Hence a leader is required to develop a pattern of styles rather than become personified with one style. Such a pattern may have to change over time, with changes in factors such as himself, his subordinate’s personality, group dynamics and the psychosocial system of his organization as well as the environment of his society.

The Intermix. Leadership is an intermix of three fundamental elements — the leader, the led, and the situation. While certain basic behavioural characteristics and traits of personality may be of assistance they are not sufficient nor necessary for leadership success. Undoubtedly, traits of intelligence, achievement drives, inner motivation, social maturity, and appropriate attitudes in human relations positively assist but do not guarantee leadership success. However, an analysis of the entire system is required in evaluating leadership effectiveness. More effective leadership may be attained by matching particular skills with specific situations. It may be appropriate for top management to use Fiedler’s dimensions of position power, task structure and leader-member relations to fit individuals to their organization and to restructure groups to give
better overall performances.\textsuperscript{13} To understand the relationships between the led and himself, a leader must assist in the resolution of the conflicts of subordinacy. Hence, there is a need for both the superior and the subordinate to recognize the concrete and abstract truths of their human relationships. Otherwise change cannot be effected in either or both the superior and the subordinate(s).

**Style.** The ‘trait’ approach to leadership examines what a leader is. For pertinent traits the differential between the led and the leader cannot be too great otherwise the leader may not be able to maintain rapport. For example, if he is too intelligent he may have difficulty in making and maintaining contact with his group. In contrast to the trait approach the style approach analyses what the leader does. Hence, terms such as autocratic, democratic, bureaucratic, ‘neocratic’ and laissez-faire have been conceived to depict the approaches used by leaders in human situations. Autocracy is seen as rule by one man. The leader is a monitor in a pure bureaucracy which is ruled by rules and has been described as a special form of autocracy. Reddin\textsuperscript{14} has developed a three-dimensional model to illustrate eight different styles of management. The dimensions are ‘task orientation’, (TO) the extent to which a manager directs his subordinates toward goal attainment characterized by planning, organizing and controlling, ‘relationship orientation’, (RO) the extent to which a manager has personal job relationships; characterized by mutual trust, respect for subordinates ideas, and consideration of their feelings); ‘effectiveness’ (E) (the extent to which a manager achieves the output requirements of his position). The eight styles result from eight possible combinations of the three dimensions. The eight styles might be scored in terms of (RO)(TO)(E) as follows:-

- Deserter (1) (1) (0)
- Autocrat (1) (2) (0)
- Benevolent (1) (1) (2)
- Executive (2) (1) (2)
- Missionary (2) (1) (0)
- Developer (2) (1) (2)
- Promoter (2) (2) (0)
- Executive (2) (2) (2)

Reddin supplements his eight managerial styles with three additional concepts which can be used to give a more comprehensive description to each of the eight styles. These concepts are dominant, supporting and overrejected styles. A manager’s dominant style is the one he uses most frequently. A manager may use two dominant styles in two different roles, for example, one as a project manager to consultants, and a second to his foremen. A supporting style is one used next most frequently by a manager after his dominant style. Overrejected styles are those which a manager uses far less frequently than does the average manager, often with a loss of effectiveness. The use of the term ‘manager’ by Reddin tends to be synonymous with the leader as used in this article. Reddin seems to have derived a matrix to describe leadership which categorizes the intermix of the leader, the led and the situation.

**Facilitating Effective Leadership.** Livingston\textsuperscript{15} considers that there is no direct relationship between performance in school or training programmes and records of success in management. He believes that many highly educated men are not able to learn, from their own firsthand experience, the secret of gaining willing co-operation from other people. In short they have not learned how to assess feedback from their actions. "... the principal contribution that personal leadership can make to organizational performance is the projection of the leader’s own quality as a person. The depth and durability of his personal values, his personal inner standards of excellence, and the clarity of his integrity can be influential... Leadership is finally most effective when it clarifies the quality of purpose."\textsuperscript{16} A leader may be likened to a producer-director and his subordinates to the cast of a play. Here there seem to be five crucial factors which affect relationships. The leader must create the environment. The leader should be very discreet in using his authority. For example, he should allow his cast to give their opinions before expressing his own opinion. Leaders should improve their rapport by being friendly in handling responses. Leadership may be developed by using techniques such as being patient, being impersonal and avoiding conflict of personalities. Finally, the actors appreciate their leader’s ability to arouse interest, in particular by stimulating thinking. Zaleznik\textsuperscript{17} considers that the human dilemmas of leadership stem from a fear of success and a fear of failure and hence there is a need for leaders to manage their inner conflicts. For which conflicts he suggests that it is necessary to acknowledge and accept the diversity of motivations, to establish a firm sense of...
identity, to maintain constancy and continuity in response, to become selective in activities and relationships and to learn to communicate. Facilitating effective leadership stems from overcoming the sense of inertia to which executives tend to succumb.

One Step Further. The newly emerged Path-Goal Theory of Leadership suggests that effective leadership stems from impacts on subordinates' motivation, satisfactions and effective performance. In this theory it is considered that the behaviour of a leader is satisfying or motivating to the extent that behaviour increases the attainment of goals by subordinates and makes the paths to these goals clearer. The Path-Goal Theory maintains that there is a significant move away from the Trait Theory of Leadership or that situations completely determine performance. Researchers in the Path-Goal Theory consider that they have gone one step beyond the complex matching of types of leaders and situations as proposed by Vroom, Fiedler and others. Path-Goal Theory is offered as a tool for stimulating research rather than as a proven leadership guide. A combination of culture, words, philosophy and values provides a particular outlook to leaders, and similarly to their followers. Pascale suggests that successful managers employ subtle arts of dealings with others in organizations. Such as, permitting situations to remain ambiguous rather than seeking premature conclusions. It may be that leaders should improve their sensitivity by being more subtle in approaching situations in a typical Western crisp, explicit and determined manner. Eastern 'Zen' may give the ideas to provide a metaphor for attaining such a skill.

LEADERSHIP TRAINING.

"Some men see things as they are and say 'Why?'
I dream of things which never were and ask 'Why not?'"

Robert F. Kennedy

The Requirement. There now appears to be a situation where leaders are being evaluated on their intellectual skills in achieving increased rates of growth in the goals of their organizations. The participants in the systems of management will require advanced education. At all levels of organizations — the operating, co-ordinating and strategic, there will be a need for flexibility, innovation and creativity. Hence, leadership education should emphasize these three characteristics. Likewise, leadership education should endeavour to establish guidelines for survival in Seas of Ambiguities which have become even more complex for all organizations. Managerial leaders will be given greater future challenges and resultant rewards. However, the training of these leaders will need to stress high tolerances for ambiguity together with the skills and propensity to cope with complex issues in uncertain but dynamic situations. A dominant need has arisen for self renewal through motivation and training for innovativeness by leaders. “Unless we foster versatile, innovative and self-renewing men and women, all the ingenious social arrangements in the world will not help us.” Post experience re-education will be required as leaders develop their careers so that they can adapt organizations to new functions, new activities and new challenges.

The Method. Effective organizational leaders come from a combination of selection and development. The selection process continues as those people who fail to develop are discarded by or within their organization. Development of leaders is a complex process of longevity. This process includes development of the performance of leadership via practice, evaluation and feedback. Students of leadership need to have an initial training in basic psychology, social psychology and individual behaviour so that they can appreciate the elements of organizations. The crux of leadership training lies in teaching aspirants to learn from their own firsthand experience. In the absence of anything more sophisticated and/or proven, formal leadership education seems to require a foundation based on the careful teaching of pertinent case studies. The goal at each level of leadership should be to use each opportunity for practice to utilize observation, to evaluate feedback and resultant self, superior's or peer group counsel. So that each experience improves the leader's performance.

Organizational Development. To improve organizations leaders should be taught to integrate individual and organizational goals. At the same time leadership training should stress group processes, organizational roles, intergroup relationships and structures. In all professions the price for failing to train leaders in development of their organizations is usually
irrevocable and can be appalling. Organizational change techniques should be taught so as to emphasize the development of objectives, a plan to develop the organization followed by the co-ordination, direction and controlling of the development. Leaders should be taught to appreciate that information 'sent' up to them is usually subjected to hierarchical bias. Therefore, methods need to be taught to show leaders how to develop their organizations in the provision of information to facilitate decision making on development.

**Ethics.** History is replete with examples of society's rejection of dishonest or otherwise unethical leaders. Samuel Johnson is alleged to have remarked that even the devils know enough not to lie to one another — apparently it only confuses things — even in hell! Some leaders such as in banks and public corporations occupy particularly sensitive positions in the upholding of ethics. The armed services, in at least the United States, require that their officer cadets take and execute an oath of honour. Stability of society seems to imply trust in its leaders. Hence reinforcement of ethics should be made at each level of leadership training.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This article has endeavoured to stress that leadership is a component of management. Organizational leadership being defined as the art of influencing human behaviour. While management is the science of employing men and material in the most economical way to accomplish the organization's goals.

The essence of leadership is to ascertain and control those forces in the organizational environment which concern social systems. There is a danger that the concept of power may divide the organization into two groups with divergent interests — those for the owners and those for the employees. Where employees have no commitment to the organization, their wages and job are undifferentiated from another occupation. Hence there is no basis for loyalty and employment opportunities are similar. Therefore, there is a need for leadership to breakdown the dichotomy between the organization and the individual's goals.

Appointed or elected organizational managers will be granted power by their subordinates when they perceive the manager as a leader who influences behaviour to maximize the mutual goals of the individuals and the organization. Perfect leadership is an elusive phenomenon, but must be sought if society is to have creative and productive organizations to meet the challenge of satisfying lifestyles. Leadership patterns or styles are the consequence of intermixing the leader with the led and situations. Leaders need to manage their inner conflicts of fears of failure and of success. Absolutely ethical behaviour is expected of all leaders by society both inside and outside their organization. The essential elements of leadership should be stressed in the early training of managers. However, the key to success lies in formal and informal reassessment of leaders by themselves as well as by their superiors, subordinates and peer group. Creative organizational leadership seeks a challenge beyond mere survival of the leaders and their groups.

**NOTES**


LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (See also pp. 4 to 6)

THE AUTHOR REPLIES

Dear Sir,

Before I reply to the letters on page 5, a few general comments are warranted. Firstly, I intended that the article be controversial. I am of the opinion the civilianisation of the Defence Forces is an issue that needs addressing and I had hoped that my paper might stimulate debate.

For those readers who might consider this article to be an indirect attack on the recent reorganisation of the Defence Department, I would like it put on record that this was never one of my aims. Like many servicemen, I have certain reservations about some aspects of the current organisation of the Defence Department. However, I consider that many reforms made as a result of the Tange Report (1) were long overdue.

In terms of Mr Coburn’s and Lieutenant Colonel Buring’s letters, the thrust of their arguments appears to be that the Armed Services and the civilian community at large have, and will continue, to benefit mutually if there is an open, two way interaction between them. If this is their view, I fully concur with it. However, they cannot ignore the fact that the adoption by the services of some civilian models, practices and procedures, though done with the best intentions, have had mainly negative rather than positive consequences. In my article, I have tried to address some of the not so obvious but more serious consequences.

W. J. Graco,
Major,
Australian Army Psychology Corps.

FOOTNOTE

FREDERICKSBURG-ASSAULT ON A PREPARED POSITION

Group Captain F.R. Lonie, BA, M Pol Sc
Royal Australian Air Force

General Situation

The period following the failure of the Southern counter-offensive in autumn 1862 was one in which both North and South attempted to 'start afresh'. Three armies were to be involved: the Army of the Potomac, following the dismissal of McLellan was led by General Burnside and was poised for operations in Virginia; the Army of the Tennessee was disposed along the Mississippi; and the Army of the Cumberland was located in Central Tennessee. The Army of the Potomac was to be mostly directly involved in the North's renewed attempts to threaten Richmond, the heart of the South. For this purpose Burnside proposed to move east towards Fredericksburg, where he meant to cross the Rappahannock, force Lee to give battle somewhere between Fredericksburg and Richmond and then to drive on the Southern capital. Opposing Burnside at a distance of less than thirty miles but on the opposite side of the Rappahannock, was the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee. The Southern Army comprised two corps, the first commanded by Longstreet, the second by the redoubtable Stonewall Jackson. About the 19 November, Sumner's grand division of more than thirty thousand men moved on Fredericksburg; in reply to two of Longstreet's divisions, after a forced march, took up position on the hills surrounding Fredericksburg. Over the next few days both sides completed their dispositions. By 13 December Burnside had built bridges across the Rappahannock and proceeded to move the Army of the Potomac against Lee's 75,000 veterans, in their entrenched positions. This was the sort of defensive operation in which the southerners excelled. The scene was set for a military disaster for the North.

A prominent point in the Southern defences was Marye's Hill, where Ransom's and McLaw's divisions were entrenched. This was the most advanced of the hills occupied by Lee's forces, lower and less steep than the others and consequently represented the most easily-assailed point in the Southern defences. In front of this soon-to-be-famous hill stood a plateau, and at its base lay a sunken road. On the Fredericksburg side of the road stood a shoulder-high stone wall, against which earth was banked.

These were the famous sunken road and stone wall, manned by the Confederate veterans of Cobb's brigade; a classic 'prepared position' which was to be the objective of a sustained, heroic, but futile infantry assault.

Technology - The Rifle and the Trench

The tactics of the assault, described later, had changed very little from those used in the great infantry campaigns of the early 19th Century. In the meantime, however,
technology had produced at least one development which made the mass frontal infantry assault a very doubtful option, indeed.

In 1848 a French Army captain, C.E. Minie, had produced the new bullet which bore his name. Conoidal and hollow at the base rather than round, as was the traditional musket round, the minie bullet could be used in a rifle, rather than a smooth-bore barrel. By 1861, American arsenals were turning out in large numbers the ‘rifle musket’ with which both sides were largely armed at Fredericksburg. The increase in the killing power of infantry was impressive. Whereas the effective range of the musket had been about 100 yards, the rifle musket could kill at up to 1000 yards. When massed in defence the percussion cap-fired, 0.58 in. calibre weapon could, as the Confederates would shortly demonstrate, stop an infantry assault at 200 to 250 yards.

Although the rifle musket had by now been in service for some years, the tactical implications appear largely to have escaped commanders on both sides. When combined with the construction of trenches or other fighting positions, the rifle brought a new potency to infantry defence. General Fuller contends that:

"the bullet and the trench, due to heightened firepower, dominated the battle fields of the civil war and continued to do so at least through the first World War".

The most significant implication was, of course, for the assault. The massed infantry assaults of the Napoleonic era were by now irrelevant. Few civil war commanders realised this in time; certainly, Burnside appears to have overlooked the development completely.

At Fredericksburg, the Confederates did not need to dig trenches — at least, not at Marye's Hill, the centrepoint of their defensive arrangements, where the sunken road and the stone fence provided a first-class fighting position.

Under virtually complete cover, they were able to stand four deep in the sunken road. The stone fence, at shoulder-height, was an ideal rest for the long-barrelled rifles.

**Strategies of the Commanders**

It has been suggested that Burnside had no real plan for the assault, beyond bringing his force to bear and charging the Confederate positions in simple frontal assault. This judgement seems somewhat simplistic. Burnside appears to have appreciated the nature of the situation confronting him and to have decided to probe the left flank in strength (Franklin) while at the same time launching his main assault with Sumner's ‘grand division’ against the Marye's Hill strongpoint.

Jackson's appreciation differed little from Burnside's and his dispositions were made accordingly. Spalding has recently re-examined Jackson's strategy and identifies a deliberate plan to ‘pin’ the Confederate left on the Marye's Hill position while disposing his formations on the more readily-accessible right in an early form of ‘flexible defence'; the idea being that if a significant Federal penetration occurred on the right (as indeed it did), the assaulting force could be enveloped and perhaps, but off from the main body. The results justified Jackson's assessment.

Under the pressure of artillery and rifle fire the advance in column of brigades lost formation and impetus. General Couch, having committed his division to the frontal assault, saw from his OP on the outskirts of Fredericksburg that,

"the whole plain was covered with men, prostrate and dropping, the line men running here and there and in front closing on each other and the wounded coming back. The commands seemed to be mixed up."

And so, brigade by brigade, the troops of Sumner's Right Grand Division assaulted Marye's Hill. By nightfall, seven Federal divisions had attacked, been repulsed, and were mingled in an incredible confusion of dead and wounded around the base of the hill. Longstreet described the scene in these words:

"the ground was so thickly strewn with dead that the bodies seriously impeded the approach of the Federals."

General Lee, visiting Longstreet when the assaults were at their height, expressed his concern that Longstreet's line might be broken.

"General", replied the Southerner, "if you put every man now on the other side of the Potomac on that field to approach me over the same line, and give me plenty of ammunition, I will kill them all before they reach my line."

Longstreet's judgement was dreadfully accurate, as the statistics of the assault confirm. There appears to be no accurate estimate of the number of infantry committed to the assault of the stone wall that day. There were, however, at
least seven ‘waves’ launched against the prepared position before nightfall brought a halt. At that time, over 7,000 killed and wounded lay around the base of Marye’s Hill. Of these, Longstreet estimates that at least 5,000 casualties were inflicted by Confederate musketry alone. Throughout that awful day of courageous, pointless infantry assault, only one Federal soldier came within thirty feet of the stone wall.

Lessons for then and Now

Fredericksburg offers many lessons. Perhaps the most direct and the most immediate, for both sides in the Civil War, was the futility of assault by infantry against a well-prepared, strongly-defended position held by well-protected riflemen with artillery support. Contemporary comment is typified, perhaps by the following:

"the position which Lee held was so strong that it seems wonderful that Burnside ventured to assault it"!

And this raises the obvious question; was Burnside stupid, ignorant, or just plain criminally negligent? Put another way, had advances in technology (in this case, the combination of the rifle and the trench) escaped the attention of the responsible military commander? Alternatively, were infantry tactics so firmly-rooted in tradition that they could not readily be changed to adapt to new situations? These questions did not die with the end of the Civil War. A recent historian, describing the Boer War (1899-1902) notes that the Boers were given to the construction of trenches and even fortified them with barbed wire, to the consternation and tactical discomfort of the British, who, in the best traditions of Napoleon and Burnside, were obstinately devoted to “frontal attacks against strongly-fortified Boer positions (in which) they suffered repulse and severe losses”. With regard to the brave, but fruitless and stupid, frontal assault against a prepared position, direct lines may readily be drawn between Fredericksburg and the Somme, between Burnside and French or Haig.

Tactics of the Assault

Mahon\(^2\) describes a “typical” civil war assault formation as consisting of:

“a succession of lines, containing two ranks each, with a prescribed distance of thirty-two inches separating ranks . . . the usual width was that of a brigade and the resulting formation, really a succession of lines, was called a division in column of brigades . . . (they) advanced on a front nearly \(\frac{3}{4}\) of a mile wide (and) officers on foot led the charge, while mounted officers followed the line.”

Burnside’s arrangements conformed to this model of the assault. General Couch, of Sumner’s ‘Right Grand Division’ describes the infantry formation as follows.\(^3\)

"French was at once directed to prepare his division in three brigade lines and Hancock was to follow with his division in the same order. The distance between brigade lines was to be about 200 yards."

Thus, in Napoleonic formation, the incredible troops of Sumner’s Grand Division proceeded to the assault. The geometric precision of their advance did not last for long, however. As the first formation emerged from the streets of Fredericksburg, they encountered their first significant obstacle, the canal over which there were only two bridges, which had, of course, to be crossed in column. On the other side they formed line and proceeded towards Marye’s Hill, maintaining steady step and closing up their broken ranks.

Tactics of the Defence

McLaws dispositions made maximum use of his excellent defensive position, disposing infantry and artillery in depth, in mutual support. The sunken road was, of course, fully manned by riflemen.

In the rear of the road and on the crest of Marye’s Hill, occupying a front of about 400 yards, were nine artillery pieces. Two hundred yards behind these guns and sheltered by the slope of the hill was another infantry brigade and behind them, another battery of six guns. Generally speaking, Confederate and Federal artillery lines of fire converged on the town of Fredericksburg. This meant that the assaulting northern infantry came under the cross-fire of Confederate guns disposed on Marye’s Heights, Stansbury Hill and Lee’s Hill as soon as they had left the shelter of Fredericksburg. From his position on Marye’s Hill 1st Lt W.M. Owen (CSA)\(^4\)

“could see our shells bursting in their ranks, making great gaps; but on they came, as though they would go straight through and over us. Now we gave them canister, and that
staggered them. A few more paces onward and the Georgians in the road below us rose up and, glancing an instant along their rifle barrels, let loose a storm of lead into the faces of the advance brigade.”

Torn up, first by the Confederate artillery and then by the dreadful storm of Southern rifle-fire, the Federal lines melted away. The pattern had been set for the assault and the destruction of the first Federal brigade was to be repeated with awful persistence throughout the remainder of the day. General McLaw gives the following description of the tactics employed by the Georgian infantry massed in the sunken road,

“the enemy formed a strong column . . . and . . . came forward along our whole front in the most determined manner; but . . . I had lines four deep throughout the whole sunken road and beyond the right flank. The front rank, firing, stepped back and the next in rear took its place and, after firing, was replaced by the next, and so on in rotation. In this way the volley firing was made nearly continuous [sic] . . .”

The overriding lesson of Fredericksburg — as pertinent to military operations today or tomorrow as it was to the assault on Marye’s Hill, the carnage of the Somme and Paschendale and the 1972 offensive by B-52s against Hanoi — would seem to be simple and self-evident. It relates to the necessity for commanders constantly to modify tactics to conform to changes in technology. Simple enough, surely, yet overlooked in more examples than this short article could hope to address. Longstreet has, perhaps, the last word on Burnside's irresponsible assault;

“history fortunately records but few instances of brave men sent to destruction by the incompetence of their General in a more hopeless undertaking”.

NOTES

1. Military analysis of the Civil War (an anthology by the editors of Military Affairs, 1977.
2. Mahon, J.K., “Civil War Infantry Assault Tactics” in (1) above.

AWARD: ISSUE NO 18 (SEPT/OCT 1979)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the September/October Issue (No 15) of the Defence Force Journal to Major W. J. GRACO for his article Civilian Models.

BOOKS REVIEWED IN THIS ISSUE

The following books reviewed in this issue are available in the various defence libraries: Pacific Defence Reporter Yearbook 1978/79 (p 58), Swearingen, Rodger, The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan (p 58).
The Dragon and the Bear

Mr. K. I. Taylor
Managing Editor, Defence Force Journal

INTRODUCTION

Vice Admiral Vasili Golovnin, captured by the Japanese in 1811 and imprisoned for two years, gave a prophetic warning that, if China and Japan were Europeanised, they would cause the imperial powers a great deal of trouble.

There has been a channel of communication between Russia and China since the Thirteenth Century when vast areas of both countries were under Mongol rule. After the Mongols were expelled from Russia, the Russians began to grope eastwards, and, by the mid-Seventeenth Century, the Manchus began to thrust westward in an effort to oust the Mongols from the borderlands.

China and Russia now have a mutual border of 4,500 miles. Even without the long frontier with the Soviet orientated Mongolian People’s Republic, it is the longest frontier between two states in the world.

Chiang Kai-shek, at the age of twenty-five, recognised the importance of this border when, in dismissing the British presence in Tibet as purely commercial, he urged border defence against Japanese and especially Russian imperialism.

Russian Communists had long held China to be of great importance. As early as 1900, on receipt of the news of the Boxer’s siege of the Peking Legations, Lenin called for “enslaved humanity in China to break its chains”. He correctly evaluated the significance of the uprising, but overestimated its potential.

A Czarist Minister of Finance, Count S. Y. Witte, said, “(It is in) Russia’s best interests to have as its neighbour a strong, but passive, China.” Perhaps the most important word in that statement as far as Russia is concerned is “passive”.

The early Soviet Government showed its concern for, and interest in China by sending a strong military mission in the early 1920s. By 1925, the size of the mission was 1000, including such important men as Galen and Yegarov, the Chief of the General Staff, and a future Marshal of the Soviet Union, Zhukov.

How, then, has such a split developed between two great countries with a common border, a common ideology, and a potential common dominance of the Asian landmass? This article will attempt to show that, although different ideological interpretations exist and
have been used to explain the rift, economic
and nationalistic motives have caused dissen-
tion in the past, and are likely to continue to do
so in the future.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It was the fur trade which drew the Russians
eastward in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries. By 1636, the Amur River had been
reached and by 1639, the Cossacks, who had
taken the role of border guards, were at the Sea
of Okhotsk. A conflict between Ivan IV (The
Terrible) and the incumbent of the Dragon
Throne, “Legitimate Ruler of All Mankind”,
was inevitable.

In the next two hundred years, there were
many border clashes, sieges of trading posts,
deaths and humiliations but generally both
sides agreed to the continued need for trade. It
was the Opium Wars of the 1840s which made
Russia realise the inherent weakness of China.
In 1849, there was a demand from St.
Petersburg for further privileges.

Permanent settlement on the Amur began in
the early 1850s, but the Crimean War relieved
further pressure. Indeed, Russia proposed that
China should make a diversionary attack on
India, but this was coolly received in Peking.

Returning to the attack in 1860, and
exploiting the Anglo-French successes in
obtaining concessions from the Manchus,
Count Ignatiev managed to get Prince Kung to
sign an agreement on the Amur-Ussuri River
border.

In 1891, Czar Alexander III authorised the
construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway,
thus making Russia settlement in the Maritime
Province permanent and more secure.

China gained heart in the drubbing handed
out by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-5, but when, first the Manchus
and then the Romanovs fell, it seemed as
though a new era was dawning in Sino-Russian
relations.

At the First Kuomintang National Congress
in Canton, convened on 20 January 1924, Sun
Yat-sen favoured a pro-Soviet orientation. The
Congress resolved to act in alliance with the
Soviet Union. The Whampoa Military
Academy, a revolutionary politico-military
school near Canton, staffed by Soviet advisers,
was the concrete form of this alliance.

But as time went on, China and the CCP*
came to the unwitting battleground for the
Kremlin power struggle. Indeed Trotsky
accused Stalin of helping in the massacre in
Shanghai in 1927. Although a harsh criticism,
this was not without some grain of truth, as it
was acting on Stalin’s misguided advice, based
on Russian rather than Chinese experience,
which led the CCP into an impossible position
in the cities.

SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE
As the War went better for the Soviets after
Stalingrad, they could afford to take a tougher
line towards the KMT, particularly in Sinkiang,
where they had a military and economic
presence. Their withdrawal of military aid;
medical facilities and light industrial machinery
echoes a later withdrawal they were to make
from the rest of China in the 1960s.

Later, when they entered the war against an
already defeated Japan in August 1945, they
removed extensive war booty from Manchuria,
completely destroying the Manchurian
economy. It may or may not have been
coincidental that in March and April 1946, as
Soviet troops moved out of the North East,
Communist forces moved in.

It is entirely likely, according to Raymond
Garthoff, that Stalin wanted a divided China,
and therefore chose to aid both sides.
Otherwise, why should he destroy the
Manchurian arsenals which would have given
the CCP such a good base from which to fight?

In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation was formed in Western Europe to
combat Soviet expansion. On 30 June, in a
major policy statement “On People’s
Democratic Dictatorship”, Mau Tse-tung
declared China on the side of the Soviets.

* Chinese Communist Party
Rather reluctantly, the Chairman visited Moscow later in the same year and gave an ambiguous speech, "The East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind". On the surface, he appeared to be referring to the Eastern and Western Blocs, but astute observers could see that possibly Mao was using more geographical terms, putting the Soviet Union firmly in the Western, or developed, World.

After the death of Stalin in 1953, N. S. Krushchev began a "de-Stalinisation" policy with his "Secret Address" to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Apart from criticizing Stalin, Krushchev launched certain peace initiatives.

Almost immediately, there was trouble in the Soviet Union's European satellites. Gomulka steered a careful course in Poland and won some concessions, but Nagy in Hungary could not control his hot-blooded countrymen. When the Red Army moved in to bloodily crush the revolt in the streets of Budapest, China, who had supported Warsaw's move, restrainedly approved the Soviet intervention.

Two years earlier, Krushchev had been in Peking for the Fifth Anniversary celebrations of the Chinese People's Republic. The visit had been far more than ceremonial. In an effort to stem Chinese chauvinism, he had pledged the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur (Lushun) by 31 May 1955. In the event, they moved out six days early. Plans were also made for a Sinkiang railway to link with the Chinese system at Urumchi via the Dzungarian Gate. We shall see later why this project was never completed.

It is curious to consider during this decade of alliance the shift of roles between the Soviet Union and China vis-a-vis the rest of the world, and particularly the Western Powers. In the mid-1950s, there was a "Bandung Spirit" in Chinese policy based on the decisions of the Bandung Conference of 1955 for peaceful coexistence and expanding prosperity for the Asian and other non-aligned peoples.

But by June 1957, there was a call for greater centralisation of the Communist system, and an aggressive stance towards Capitalism. Ironically, but understandably, it was the Party men who were militant, because they sought political advantage in a hawkish attitude, and the military men who urged caution, because they realised that the Chinese defence forces were totally inadequate to fight an aggressive war against an enemy armed with sophisticated weaponry.

**BEGINNINGS OF SPLIT**

In 1943, Stalin revealed to Ambassador Harriman of the United States his thoughts on the Chinese Communist Party. He saw them as radishes, red on the outside and white inside. It now appeared that his simile was more appropriate to the CPSU* rather than the CCP.

The cost of the USSR's nuclear insurance seemed to be too high for China. She had sustained heavy losses both in men and materiel in Korea, and Harvey Nelson feels that it is doubtful if the Military clauses of the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950 were still operative by the early 1960s.

A secret treaty of 5 October 1957, revealed by the Chinese in 1963, much to the annoyance of the Soviets, gave more aid to China than to the Warsaw Pact allies. This was aimed as a possible lever to the Chinese defence policy, but Mao's Great Leap Forward (1958) scotched any hope the Soviets might have put in this.

Not everyone in China grasped Mao's attempts to make China economically self-sufficient with enthusiasm. The Minister of Defence, P'eng Teh-huai, met Krushchev in Albania in May 1959, and, in a manner which was regarded by the Party as "factionalist" and was distinctly disloyal to the Chairman, presented the Soviet leader with a memorandum P'eng had written criticizing the Great Leap Forward. He had not previously submitted it to the Party.

If Krushchev was in any doubt before of the factionalism within the CCP, he could be in no doubt now. In his overtures to Eisenhower, the arch-imperialist, he aroused xenophobic hatred and scorn in Mao Tse-tung. The famous editorial in the Red Flag of 16 April 1960, "Long Live Leninism!" spelled out clearly severe criticism of Krushchev's policies of peaceful coexistence and the achieving of World Communism by peaceful competition, since the capacity for destruction of modern weapons made any other course unthinkable.

The downing of the U-2 reconnaissance plane and the consequent failure of the Vienna summit meeting in May 1960 were greeted with restrained enthusiasm by China. Mao declared, "our common enemy is US Imperialism".

* Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
At the conference of twelve Communist parties in Bucharest in June 1960, Krushchev delivered a counterblast to Mao, declaring, "only lunatics and maniacs can now come out with appeals for a new world war." In July and August, following harassment by the Chinese, carried out undoubtedly with the approval of Peking, Soviet technicians and their families, some 4,000 people in all, were withdrawn from China. As a result, of 336 major industrial enterprises set down for completion in the period 1954-1959, only 154 had been completed.

Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, tried to play down the exodus when talking to a western Ambassador, but it was now clear to the world that a serious rift had occurred.

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was another embarrassment for the Soviet Union, which was attempting to woo the Indians and to persuade the international Communist movement of Moscow's leadership. Now, quite brazenly, China had asserted her independence.

Krushchev's removal from office on 14 October 1965, may have been partly due to his handling of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but any illusions the Chinese might have had about a change of attitude were shattered when Brezhnev and Kosygin showed that they were adhering to the Krushchev line as far as policy towards China was concerned.

The Cultural Revolution produced incidents which did nothing to relieve tension. There was a demonstration by Chinese students in Red Square, and the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Peking were harassed. Red Guards detained the Soviet freighter Zagorsk in Dairen after one of the officers had "insulted" Mao. As a result, all foreign students were required to leave Peking by 10 October 1966, and all Chinese students were told on 7 October that they had until the end of the month to leave the USSR.

Even Chou En-lai, the diplomatist, roundly condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, calling it "an abominable crime against the Czech people."

There had been a notable reluctance on the part of western observers to recognise the conflict. There seemed to be every advantage to be gained in cooperation between the two nations. Obviously this was more than just an ideological quarrel.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES

The Soviets generosity to China in terms of economic aid had been somewhat narrow, amounting to only US$300m. as a repayable loan, much less than the outright aid being given by the United States to Taiwan. Trade had decreased from 21.4% of total Soviet foreign trade figures in 1955 to 1.9% in 1966.

China was further annoyed with the Soviet largesse to Cuba, the United Arab Republic and Guinea. The Soviets were equally upset to see the Chinese competing in the same markets. They made a $25m. loan to Guinea (as opposed to the Soviet's $35m.) and also entered sensitive areas close to the Soviet Union like Iraq and Mongolia.

At the Unity Conference in Havana in 1966, delegates were shocked by China's vitriolic attacks on the Soviet Union. At the World Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow in June 1969, China was not represented, and the Russians were able to re-emphasise their leadership of World Communism, a severe blow to Mao.

After Ho Chi-min's funeral in September 1969, Kosygin visited Peking and met Chou En-lai in an apparent effort to patch up the rift, but in a speech on the Twentieth Anniversary of the People's Republic, Lin Piao made a fiery denouncement of the "faceless enemies", unspecified, but certainly directed at the Soviets.

Closer ties between the Soviet Union and the United States were clearly an anathema to the Chinese. In heated exchanges, although never referring to each other by name, the Russians were always "Yugoslav Revisionists" and the Chinese "Albanian Doctinaires". The two
small Balkan states were used as whipping boys by their giant Communist confreres.14

BORDER DISPUTES

But words were not the only things flying in 1969. On 2 March, there was a clash between Soviet and Chinese border troops at Damansky (or Chen Pao) island, one of many low lying sandbanks which are inundated when the Ussuri River is in flood. 34 Soviet soldiers were killed, indicating that the attack may have been an ambush by the Chinese.

On 15 March, there was a bigger incident involving Soviet “tanks”.26 According to a report by the New York Times Correspondent writing from Irkutsk on Lake Baikal, some 1200 miles away,27 the Soviets brought up artillery, killing 800 Chinese for the loss of 60 of their own men.

Such incidents are by no means “minor”. In the North East, the frontier is potentially indefensible for a passive defence.28 From the Soviet point of view, the Trans-Siberian Railway runs close to the frontier, and the rich Manchurian industrial and mining areas are less than 300 miles of good tankable country from the border. For this reason, the Soviets tend to keep their formations close to the border, and the Chinese guard the border with light forces, keeping their precious armour well back covering Harbin and the eastern approaches to Peking. (see map)

This is obviously a sensitive area. In 1967 alone, there were 119 violations of Chinese airspace in Heilungkiang Province alone, according to the Chinese.

In the Central sector, along the Mongolian frontier, there is even more concern for the Chinese. In 1945, against determined Japanese resistance, a mixed force of Soviet Cavalry and tanks crossed the Gobi Desert and reached Peking in 12 days.

Mongolia has always strongly influenced the development of Sino-Soviet relations. On the issue of Mongolia, provincial governors and assemblies called for war against Russia in 1905.29 Chiang Kai-shek advised that, in an attack on Russia, a holding action should be fought in the North (Manchuria) while the main attack was put through Central Asia (Mongolia).30

It must have caused the authorities some concern that, in late 1968, there was no Revolutionary Committee (pro-Mao) in either Inner Mongolia or Sinkiang.31 According to the Inner Mongolian Daily (Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao), published in Huhehot on 15 July 1968, class enemies had prevented the forming of such a committee in the province.

When China exploded her first atomic device in October 1964, Sinkiang (NW China) took on a new strategic significance, in that her main atomic and missile testing area is at Lop Nor, some 280 miles south east of Urumchi. Likewise, the Soviets have an anti-ballistic missile facility at Lake Balkhash, 600 miles in the opposite direction.

The “Friendship Railway” to link the Soviet system with the Chinese at Urumchi was never completed; indeed little work was ever done on the Chinese side of the border. There is a reported security zone 20 miles deep in the Dzungarian Gate area, a traditional route for armies invading North West China.

There is an added complication in this area, in that the racial minorities, the Uighers and the Kazakhs, tend to react in a hostile manner towards any attempt to sinification.33 Indeed the latter are spread over the other side of the border and have been used to wandering at will across their tradition grazing lands.

The Russians have for long attempted to detach Sinkiang from Chinese hegemony, indeed, according to Soviet defector, Alexandr Kaznacheev, the special department of the Soviet International Relations Institute training cadres for Sinkiang has never closed.

Soviet duplicity on the border issue has long been a feature of Sino-Soviet relations. The Karakhan Declaration of 25 July 1919, renouncing all claim to border areas gained in the “unequal treaties” has never been implemented.

K’ang Shung, Director of Intelligence, ordered a lengthy dossier of hostile actions by the USSR. As an early anti-Soviet member of the Politburo, he wanted to substantiate his case. He discovered that the KGB, who were responsible for all mapping, had grossly falsified maps of the border area, changing the position of parallels of latitude among other devices.34

THE FUTURE

It was long held that Mao Tse-tung was the main architect of anti-Soviet moves in China. On 14 July 1964, in an article entitled “On Krushchev’s Phoney Communism and Its
Historical Lessons for the World”, he said (of the cadres), “They must be revolutionaries who wholeheartedly serve the overwhelming majority of the people of China and the whole world, and must not be like Khrushchov (sic) who serves both the interests of the handful of members of the privileged bourgeois stratum in his country and those of foreign imperialism and reaction.”

Mao expressed fears to a delegation of Japanese Communists that the United States would attack China, and that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the situation.

On his death, many thought, as at Krushchev’s removal, that policies would change as elitism returned. This has proved to be not the case. Increasing detente with the United States has not changed the Chinese distrust for the Soviet Union. The old border tensions remain. Russia shows no signs of giving up a yard of territory. Their Pacific Fleet is a potential menace to the shores of China. Economically, and politically, China and Russia are still rivals in Europe, Africa, Asia and South America.

Recent events in Vietnam seem to indicate that, while China is aware of the Soviet threat, she is prepared to take a calculated risk on limited action where her interests are threatened.

But we should not be complacent. Although China, unlike Russia, has historically shown little aggressive intent beyond her claimed sphere of influence, she is still an active advocate of World Communism. In the words of a modern Chinese saying.

(老虎屁股摸不得)

NEVER PAT THE TIGER’S BACKSIDE.
Dear Colonel Wood,

Your letter pierced my apathy. It forced me to read again the letter from your friend and to bestir myself and put pen to paper. To me both letters contained a plea for a more flexible and creative approach to tactical doctrine. This had my full support, but the letters also contained significant oversimplifications and appeared to ignore the experience available to us in military history and other writings on military matters.

I feel that any discussion of tactics which is general and not applicable to a particular situation can be very misleading. It does seem common, in Australia today, for such discussions to be concerned with advanced technology and super equipment in quantities the Australian soldier is never likely to see, let alone use. Rarely does one see discussion centred on how Australians can successfully operate now, with the equipment we already possess, or even the equipment we can reasonably expect to obtain in the future. It is a sadly materialistic outlook: one that equates military success with the possession of the latest equipment and technology. It is a negative attitude which creates more problems than it solves. The dangers of such an attitude have been clearly demonstrated in Vietnam.

Writing on the American Army's experiences in Vietnam, Charles Levy said, "The bureaucracy attached to technology was intended to make it manageable but, in the fluidity of combat, the bureaucracy made it all the more unmanageable. When technology did the managing its usefulness was cancelled out".

At a lower level, I have experienced the negative approach which results from an obsession with technology. In New Guinea a company commander came to me with a recommendation that a long patrol into the interior be postponed or cancelled because there was no helicopter available to support the patrol. We had been lucky enough to have had the use of a helicopter for the last six months and had found it most useful in a variety of ways. The company commander was relatively new and since his arrival the battalion had always appeared to have a helicopter in support. To him it was indispensable. Without it we could not patrol, yet he had never bothered to enquire as to how we had managed without one. He was a materialist and his approach to any problem was first to list the material he considered necessary to solve it. If any of this technology was not available the problem could not be solved. He was blinded by materialism but, to his credit, when informed that he was expected to carry out the task with whatever was available, he buckled down to the job and in the end found to his amazement that a helicopter, although very useful, was not essential. The experience altered his attitude and he quickly became adept at solving problems whether advanced technological aids were available or not. The materialist approach spawns a dogma of its own and dogma, of any kind, spells defeat.

It was Major General J. F. C. Fuller who said, "The adherence to dogma has destroyed more armies and lost more lives than anything
else in war". Doctrine is necessary but it must never be allowed to become dogma. It must never be regarded as the complete answer. It provides a guide to what is a reasonable approach to various situations but it should not be regarded as an excuse for not being unorthodox when the situation demands it. The answer is of course in flexible thinking on the part of commanders. The commander must be prepared to think of how he can best apply his resources to obtain the desired result in a given situation. In certain situations you can use helicopters and APCs in an assault role but to dogmatically lay down that they will always be used in an assault role will probably cause more casualties in men and equipment than blind adherence to a doctrine that regards them as means of transportation. On 21 November 1941, the commander of The Afrika Korps, General Cruewell, attacked Sidi Rezegh with two regiments of infantry trucked closely behind his tanks and with orders not to dismount until they came under heavy infantry fire. Cruewell's unorthodox approach worked and resulted in the annihilation of the remainder of 7 Armd Div and most of 1 SA Div. Despite this success even Cruewell did not suggest that the German Army doctrine be changed and trucks be regarded as assault vehicles. The lesson is rather, that a commander be mentally flexible and use his resources in the way that best meets the situation. He must not allow doctrine to become dogma.

In much the same way it is wrong to confuse mechanisation with mobility. It all depends on the situation. Theoretically the French Group Mobile was supposed to have superior mobility to foot soldiers but in the situation in Indo China they didn't, as their fate has shown. The doctrine did not fit the situation, but in another situation the reverse could apply and nobody can quibble with your friend's desire to get the infantry off its feet. As General Patton has said, "No soldier should be compelled to walk until he actually enters battle", but, dependant on circumstances, Patton himself could well be wrong. Our soldiers must be trained to use foot, vehicle, sea, water or air transport to attain mobility dependant on the situation. That which is most suitable is right.

My interest was quickened when your friend mentioned the problem of weight and the infantryman. I was most disappointed that he did not proceed further with that point. It is one of the most important aspects of combat yet one that is generally ignored. Worn out men cannot fight or think, yet, despite new and lighter equipment, the infantryman is still as heavily loaded as he was in 1000 BC. In Russia in December 1942 and January 1943, the commander of 17Pz Div, said, "It was shown once more how wrong it is to ignore battle exhaustion when assessing a situation. Only those who have seen the facial expressions of men growing apathetic through exhaustion — even among troops whose morale is high — can form any idea of the loss of fighting power and physical strength involved".

The book, The Soldier's Load and Mobility by Brig-Gen S. L. A. Marshall should be required reading for every soldier, commander and staff officer. Marshall says it all. He does not deal just in theories but in facts culled from actual combat experience. It is indeed criminal that so much has been known for so long about the problems of fatigue and the results of overloading the infantry soldier, yet the problem has been largely ignored in the armies of the West. It is however basic in the Israeli army. It believes you should never overload the soldier and during training the maximum load permitted the soldier is one third of his body weight, including uniform, pack and all else. During combat this load is lightened according to the theory that energy is less under fire rather than more. They read Marshall's book. There is a copy in the Army Library.

The Israeli army also places a high premium on night fighting, something your friend suggests is worth our attention. Training is conducted, by night or day, in the same proportion as the activity would be carried out in combat. The East German Army uses the same system. It does provide food for thought.

As you say we need to pay more attention to the value of our direct fire weapons and here again Marshall provides information that is generally ignored. In his book Men Against Fire he shows that, in World War II, only a maximum of 25% of men in battle actually fired their weapons and this in the best units. In average units it was nearer 15%. Yes, only fifteen men in every hundred fired their weapons at the enemy.

Marshall shows that we lack knowledge of man and his reactions and because of this, we do not get anywhere near the maximum
firepower or mobility that we believe we do in action. By our ignorance of man, we lose all sorts of other opportunities yet there is ample evidence of the success such knowledge can bring, enough to at least excite our curiosity. Otto Skorzeny took the impregnable citadel of Budapest with a plan based on the perception of the Hungarian soldier. Lieutenant Colonel Penniakoff (Popski), who incidentally would disagree with your friends’ contention that soldiers pay too much attention to detail, travelled freely around the roads in German rear areas because he realised that the average soldier does not expect to see the enemy driving openly down the road in a secure rear area. There are many examples of successful operations based on the knowledge of man, yet little attention is paid to them.

Your friend is again right when he says we cannot survive on memories, but I would disagree that there is little use in even distant experience. We have a large reservoir of experience which can easily be drawn on by anyone; it is contained in military history books, other military writings, and even in fiction. Suvarov was right when he said that tactics without military history was tantamount to groping in the dark.

Military history is full of experience and only the idiot scorns learning from the experience of others. Situations, equipment and technology change but ideas apparently go on for ever. Very few ideas appear to be original; rather are they adaptations from situations in the past. The basic idea is the same but the application of it is changed to meet the current situation. Military history is replete with ideas, and a knowledge of them not only helps us to formulate possibilities for today but also prevents us turning doctrine into dogma. The commando brigadier who took his 1,500 men, in single file, at night, over a mile through the forward German positions in Bois de Bavent may not have passed a Tac 5, but his action was the key to a successful attack, with the minimum casualties, in that situation. The Germans airdropped on top of the objective at Fort Eben Emael. They used gliders, but it could have been helicopters, had they then been available. At Umm Katef, in the 1967 war, General Israel Sharon attacked the supporting artillery at night with helicopter-borne paratroops and destroyed them as the prelude to his co-ordinated divisional attack on the position. It really is possible to benefit from past experience and there is more than enough to go around. So why not use it? After all, Liddell Hart found that the Chinese Art of War written SunTzu in 500 B.C. helped him to realize the agelessness of the more fundamental military ideas, even of a tactical nature.

I must not take up more of your time but before closing may I say how much I have enjoyed your comments and I trust they will encourage others in putting their point of view. The Defence Force Journal does appear to provide the opportunity for the individual to express his personal ideas, an opportunity which was not available during the latter part of The Army Journals' life. As you and your friend say, we have a unique opportunity to reassess what we are doing. Such assessment must be based on past experience and on a thorough understanding of man in battle as he really is. With knowledge gained from past experience and a thorough understanding of man in battle we can make up for many of the material disadvantages we will continue to suffer.

Another optimist

COPIES WANTED

The Editor urgently requires copies of Army Journal Nos 235 and 237.
A SHORT time ago, in the early stages of my recent spell at university, I was chatting about my research interests to an officer in the Army Reserve. I told him that I wanted to investigate manpower and career planning for Army officers. Referring to his civilian employment (he was a middle-level manager in a large Australian manufacturing firm), he remarked “Career planning, eh? that’s a good idea — wish I had some”. This took me rather by surprise. “Surely”, I enquired of him, “you don’t really mean that — I mean, surely there is some sort of career planning done for you”. “No”, he replied, “none”; and he didn’t know anyone among his business acquaintances who was in a different situation.

I realised afterwards that the reason for my surprise was simply because, being used to working in an institution where career planning is constantly stressed by both the organization and its members, I had naively imagined that all institutions had similar values and procedures. But as I got further into my research at university, and as I began to establish more professional contacts with trainers and personnel people outside the Army, it became obvious that my Army Reserve friend is not an unusual case. In fact, his case is the norm and it is we in the Regular Army who have an uncommonly healthy system of career planning.

This observation underscores the significance of The Report of the Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC). Although the services can be proud of their record in the fields of training and personnel management, many of the procedures which exist have been around for so long that they have become institutionalised. They are regular ports of call in the military career voyage, marking a route which so many have taken that to seriously question it is to challenge the very basis of military professionalism. Some elements have been around for so long that they are known by terms which are part of military jargon — “knife and fork” course, “Tac 3”, “P & S”, “MS”, and so on. Far from breeding contempt, such familiarity has made the total system somewhat rigid. External developments which could contribute something to the system are rarely evaluated promptly and without prejudice and, when specific elements are questioned, they are questioned as isolated systems, rather than as integral components of a total career planning and development system. The RODC avoided this error and, in fact, took the opposite tack. To a large extent, the RODC began by identifying the service’s needs and then deriving the elements of career planning and development which would meet these needs. Their findings are not without strong links with tradition, but, where these links exist, they do so because they are rational rather than because they are traditional. In the approach taken, the RODC thus represents a new era in military personnel management. After the RODC, nothing in this field will ever be quite the same again.

The RODC published its report in six volumes, in which are set out its reasoning, its conclusions and its recommendations. The first of these is the “Report” proper: a summary of the Committee’s reasoning and recommendations. The other five are supporting studies: Study One — the Asset; Study Two — Education and Training; Study Three — Career Management; Study Four — The Future; and
Study Five — Women Officers and Specialised Corps. This article is a review of the RODC report.

Before getting into detail, let me make a few caveats. Firstly, this review does not comment on every recommendation made by the RODC. (For obvious reasons: there are 204 paragraphs in the chapter summarising the recommendations, many containing more than one recommendation), it does not even discuss in detail every issue which the RODC addressed, since many are either fairly straightforward and uncontroversial, or require further research and development. Secondly, since I believe that there are important lessons to be learned from how the RODC went about its task, as well as what it came up with, there is some discussion of processes as well as products. Thirdly, let me acknowledge source of possible bias: I was involved, usually on the fringes but sometimes in the fray, with the RODC from its inception. It cannot be said I was unaffected by the experience. Finally, the usual rider — that the views below are entirely my responsibility and do not necessarily reflect official policy — applies.

Perhaps I should start by briefly describing what the RODC was tasked to do, how it did the task and what is included in its report (although few readers should be now unaware of these details, as they were extensively publicised, and a brief summary appeared in the November/December 1978 edition of this Journal). The RODC was chaired by Brigadier P.J. Norton and included a colonel, three lieutenant colonels, a major (secretary) and clerical staff. Their Terms of Reference directed them to determine the military and civilian education qualifications, training levels, and career experience needed to prepare ARA officers for their jobs, and to prepare a programme for officer professional development to satisfy these needs. They were to take account of all stages of officer development from first appointment to the point of promotion to colonel. The RODC tackled these tasks in a number of ways. They commissioned studies from military and academic agencies. They invited submissions from the Services and the public. They consulted with leaders in business, the public service and academe. They surveyed, by interview and questionnaire, the opinions of a majority of serving officers in the ARA. They conducted a study of the possible range of futures — military, social, technological and economic — which the Army would expect to face in the next two decades. All of these inputs were used to derive implications for officer manpower and career planning, and these implications and the subsequent recommendations were presented to the Chief of the General Staff in six volumes.

In reviewing these volumes, I intend to cover the following aspects

- A general evaluation
- The rationale used to justify a study of this nature, and the implications for conducting it by the particular approach chosen.
- An important central theme — Change and the Army.
- Career structures.
- Career planning and management.
- Education and training.
- Some deficiencies.

General Evaluation

The RODC exercise was a costly one: a quarter of a million dollars for the staff salaries alone. What would it have to do to justify such expense? On what grounds can we judge whether it was a success or not?

As an overall evaluation, two criteria are important. The first is whether there is a reasoned and clearly expressed theory or set of principles of personal development on which the report was based and which could be used to guide officer development planning in the future. This criterion is of a theoretical, or philosophical, nature. The second point is more practical. How well has the RODC identified both the strengths and weaknesses of the existing system of personal development, and what is the programme for retaining the strengths and shedding the weaknesses? These two criteria — the theoretical and the practical — are, of course, complementary. Whilst most officers will be more concerned with the second (and perhaps would maintain that these aspects could be derived mainly from “commonsense”), the first is a vital foundation: it is important to be able to recognise the boundaries of commonsense, and to proceed beyond them when necessary. (Furthermore, as Voltaire remarked, the problem with commonsense is that it is not common).
From the practical point of view, one is hard pressed to identify any serious issues in contemporary military personnel management which the RODC overlooked. The importance of tertiary education, in-service commissioning, the employment of in-service commissionees, management training, women officers, specialisations, promotion on merit, ‘fast streaming’ — all these and more are discussed comprehensively and dispassionately. There is, moreover, little evidence of professional bias in the Committee’s judgements: no instances of the “it worked very well when I was a subaltern” style of thinking. Where change is recommended, programmes are suggested which are based on the need for acceptance, trial, and gradual implementation. On the ‘practical’ criterion, therefore, the investigation was sound.

In regard to the first criterion — the existence and consistency of guiding principles — an evaluation is a little more difficult. A programme is not theoretically sound merely because it cites a large number of references. What should be looked for here is the presence of a consistent theme running through the total RODC package of proposals: a few vital basic principles of personal development and manpower planning which allows each of the programmes to be derived and evaluated “from first principles”, and allows the various recommendations to be linked. The RODC Report, immediately introduces such a set of principles (Chapter 1); these are they:

- The primary justification for officer development is the contribution which it makes to the Army’s ability to fulfil its role of national defence.
- Contributions may, however, be indirect and in areas somewhat removed from the operations. Successful preparation for operations may require competence in areas not traditionally associated with military leadership such as strategic policy, equipment development and personnel management.
- In the profession of arms, two divisions of officers exist and different career development policies are required for each. Firstly, there are those officers whose occupation is the study and practice of strategy, tactics and logistics and who are employed in a wide range of Corps and non-Corps, staff and regimental appointments. These officers are “members of the profession of arms”. Secondly, there are officers who are members of another profession, whose occupation is the study and practice of that profession within the Army, such as doctors and psychologists. These officers are “close affiliates of the profession of arms”.
- Officer development, like many other policy areas, is amenable to systems analysis. The derivation of policy should view past practices as merely one of a number of considerations to be analysed when identifying goals, constraints and options. Others include the pressures from the external environment and the possible nature of the future internal and external environment.
- The goal of career planning should be optimum utilisation of people, both individually and collectively.
- Because of the infrequency with which an officer is required to use his professional skills in war, he must be able to view his career as inherently self-satisfying and thus, aside from his motivation of service to the nation, he must be stimulated intellectually and professionally by the environment in which he serves.

These seem to me to be principles which are sound. It is fairly clear that the RODC has used these principles to critically evaluate the present situation and view aspects which were suggested to it, and that this use has been consistent.

There is, however, an important omission among the guiding principles: there is no acknowledgement of how the nature of the working environment affects personal development, and thus there is no set of conclusions on the need to redesign jobs and organizations to facilitate personal development. This principle, which could be called “job design to assist development”, will be emphasised later in the article.

Another way of checking the report for an underlying theory is to assess the extent to which the various major proposals fit in with each other, as opposed to being fragmented and unconnected. In this respect, the report is fairly cohesive. The proposal for greater non-Corps specialisation, for example, is complemented by suggested career management programmes and education schemes.
As an overall evaluation of the RODC Report and its companion documents, then, the impression is favourable.

**The Rationale and Approach to Such A Study.**

Why was a detailed study of officer development and career planning required? Chapter 1 of the Report identifies and discusses 16 “key issues” in the development and maintenance of the profession of arms in Australia, from which it is possible to see fairly clearly the problems in officer development. These problems were the incentive for the study.

The problems are of two kinds: those of performance, and those of development. In regard to performance, there were disturbing signs that the officer corps of the late 1960s lacked many of the capacities which would be required of the officers of the 1980s. This was not simply a manifestation of the “young officers are not what they used to be” cry. Some deficiencies were obvious: officers groomed by regimental experience were making heavy weather of their roles in the Russell-Campbell environment; development which had aimed at a ‘generalist’, all-round background was inadequate preparation for an increasing number of demanding, technically-oriented staff appointments; the Army appeared to be wasting talent in its employment of women officers and officers commissioned from the ranks; promotion exams were a joke. Less obvious, but at least equally important, were considerations such as the alleged discomfort of many middle-level and senior officers with change, and the increased importance which many officers were placing on non-occupational factors when planning their lives.

As disturbing as problems of performance are problems of development. As the report points out, the army had an overlying general framework of personal development which served as the justification for career development programmes, but this framework was entirely the legacy of tradition. There were no stated principles and no coherent philosophies of training and development on which it was based.

This is demonstrated in a number of ways. The great debate of ADFA (Australian Defence Force Academy) was (is?) belatedly in full swing; the small number of officers with post-graduate degrees was causing headaches for the Military Secretary’s (MS) staff, who were uncertain as to how they could best be used and whether their education was cost-effective; the systems approach to training had gone a long way towards rationalising soldier and NCO-level courses but had had less success in officer training; the first half of an officer’s career seemed crowded with courses (and these were proliferating), yet the second half had virtually none: was Staff College really the ultimate in learning experiences?

Thus there was a situation where performance aspects were worrying and there were no clear guidelines on how to tackle them. And both these aspects were exacerbated by events outside the Army, such as the increased importance of and difficulty in justifying military spending, of the pressures in non-military work areas for programmes such as “participative management” or “industrial democracy”, of the effects of multidimensional change on organisations, and the emergence of academic disciplines which could apparently make a contribution to tackling the problems which such pressures caused.

The need for a comprehensive study of officer development was recognised in 1970 but, it was not until 1976, that something concrete was done about it. The action taken was, fortunately, unconventional. In a situation which was ripe for the formation of yet another high level, do-nothing committee, Personnel Branch (to its everlasting credit) decided to employ a group of officers of various levels of experience, full-time, for a year to look into the problem. (The RODC’s Term was later extended to 18 months.)

From its inception, the RODC faced a number of serious problems. These included:
- the short time given to it to operate, which lead to rushed preparations for supporting research;
- the lack of a full-time academic expert on career planning and development on the Committee;
- the lack of definitive operational guidance for the defence force;
- the direction to the RODC that it was to take as “given” the major existing and planned Army institutions of learning (such as the Joint Services Staff College and ADFA).
Of these, the latter two are the less serious. It is realistic, perhaps, to accept the inevitability of existing institutions as well entrenched as the Army's Staff College system, and the ADFA was a "given" for the RODC.

Indeed, these "givens" can assist in getting started on conceptualisation. As to lack of guidance on operational policy, since this was simply unlikely to be forthcoming in the foreseeable future, it was sensible to proceed without it. It can be accepted as a limitation, and other arrangements made. (The input from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU was a worthy substitute.)

But the lack of adequate preparation time for supporting research, and the absence of an immediate academic influence on the Committee's planning and deliberations, were not so easily substituted. One of the main ways in which this deficiency showed itself was in the identification of detailed theoretical issues and their investigation in the major studies which the RODC conducted or commissioned. These studies included a questionnaire survey of officers' attitudes and opinions on a range of career issues, analyses of what officers do in their jobs, and identification of what education and development officers felt was needed for their jobs. The preparation for these studies was rushed, and one particular preliminary step was neglected. It is usual to begin such studies with a review of the literature on the particular topic, to identify which issues are important and thus require data to illuminate them, and which methodological approaches might be workable or otherwise. This step would require, say, three months. Beyond this, the planning and conduct of the survey would be unlikely to be complete in six months. However, the RODC's original time frame was 12 months.

The survey data obviously had to be available in sufficient time for it to be evaluated without undue haste and used to form conclusions which would be reflected in the final report. Planning backwards from his target date, it is plain that the RODC project manager realised that his time frame did not allow the full and proper preparation for the surveys, and so decided to dispense with the literature review. This was a reasonable decision under the circumstances but one which should not have been necessary. This three months might have been saved had the RODC had an academic expert on the subject of personal and organisational development. However, they did not.

There were, therefore, important issues and variables in career development which were unnoticed and unresearched until rather late in the RODC's life. Among these was the 'principle' mentioned above: that personal development and job development are closely connected. It would have been most useful if the RODC had been able to obtain data on personal characteristics and job characteristics and their interrelationships. Another neglected issue was the relationship between an officer's personality and his adjustment to his jobs and professional specialities, of obvious importance in influencing policy for employment area allocation.

However, these issues had apparently gone unnoticed by Army career managers and, consequently, by those planning the RODC's research; thus data relating to them was not systematically gathered. For the want of an extra three months preparation time, or the salary of a professional in the field, a great chance was lost. Although it is plain from Study Three — Career Management that the RODC eventually took cognizance of certain psychological theories of career development in framing its conclusions, the latter lack the validity and authority which empirically-based evidence gives. Time spent in reconnaissance . . .

Despite these problems in the planning stage, the research conducted by the RODC was valuable (one might say essential) and, in the military context, quite innovative. Apart from the studies commissioned from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and military agencies, the RODC's deliberations were based on five major research projects. There were two which collected the opinions of the officer corps on career planning and development (an interview survey and a questionnaire survey), a "futures study" based on a multi-questionnaire survey of a group of civilians and military officers, a job analysis of officers and an analysis of military education topics. It is important to note the value stance which such studies represent, a value stance which goes beyond mere recognition of the need for data. It shows a recognition of the need to bring into the decision-making process those who will be affected by the decision, a significant shift from the authoritative modes of management traditionally practised in the Army. Whether this
was because of a respect for the views of the “ordinary officer” or because of a hard-headed recognition that sweeping change is not possible without contribution and support at the grass roots, is immaterial. The point is, it was done.

Another implication of the value stance of the research approach is the recognition of the limitations of amateurism in personnel management, and the need for specialist advice and sophisticated system analysis. With any luck, the hard lessons learned by the RODC in its early days will not be forgotten, and the need for professionalism in personnel management will be established.

An Important Central Theme — Change and the Army

Before discussing some of the specific issues contained in the report, attention is drawn to one organisational need which is stated over and over by the RODC. This need is for officers to be able to handle change effectively. The RODC emphasises this theme because, as stated early in its report, it sees the need for modification of some traditional approaches and attitudes in order to improve military effectiveness and to better accommodate the expectations of a changing society.

Although we see the need for serving officers to understand and accept the changes, we suggest it is of greater importance in our view that future generations of officers join an Army that embraces these changes. (Report, p. 1-11)

Although the RODC consulted widely in the early stages of its investigation with many administrators and educators who were conscious of the importance of change on the internal and external workings of organisations, it is likely that the most telling evidence they uncovered was contained in their two major forecasting studies. One of these was a multiquestionnaire survey of over 100 military officers and civilians; the study aimed to identify changes in society which would affect the Army. Apart from the many quite radical changes which were mooted, one issue which was isolated was the impact of change itself. As Alvin Toffler has suggested, in Future Shock, change has an impact in terms of its rapidity and uncertainty, quite apart from its content, i.e., what actually changes. This was recognised by many of the participants in the study who, when given a number of issues on which to comment, chose “change” as an issue which would affect the Army in the future.

Their predictions and prescriptions included the following points:

- Changes in all aspects of (the social, political, economic and technological) environment will be more frequent, widely felt and more difficult to forecast (Study Four, p. 16).
- The Army will have to be aware of and adapt to social change in an institutional context. (it) will require internal mechanisms which will enable it to remain continuously sensitive to change (Study Four, p. 17).
- This increased level of internal and external stimulation to change will require all officers to be adaptable, it being at least as important that senior officers accept and adapt to change as it is for junior officers. Institutional change and individual change are inextricably linked (Study Four, p. 18).

The other study, which stressed the need for the Army to be ready to adapt to changes in its professional and social environment, was the commissioned from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. This study was no less concerned with social change and additionally discussed the likelihood that the Army would need to experiment with new weapon-organisation forms, including the requirement to fight in ways quite different to those to which we have been used.

The RODC concluded, therefore, that officer development required attention to both profession-oriented and adaptability-oriented needs; indeed, their writing leaves little doubt that they regard the two as inseparable. Professional survival, as a profession, requires adaptability as well as technical competence. Thus, in virtually every issue which the RODC addressed, the need for organisational and individual adaptability was emphasised. Career structures, training, education, employment of women officers — the discussion, conclusions and recommendations for all reflect the importance which the RODC places on the matter of “change”. There will be some, perhaps, who will believe that the theme is overplayed. Objectively, however, it is more likely that, if criticism is made, it will be because the prescriptive measures to cope with the predicted problem do not go far enough.
Many professions are presently under attack because of failure to meet changing requirements. The Army must make an even bigger effort than most to achieve an ability to adapt to change because of the absence, in peace, of immediate external pressures which signal the need to change. Most successful business organisations have developed mechanisms by which they monitor and react to changes in the external environment, and by which the managers of the organisation are held accountable for their decisions and actions. Their survivability depends on such mechanisms. No great incentive exists for this in the peacetime Army; it is really only when it is engaged in warfare that these mechanisms are generated. However, as many as are the institutional barriers to change in the Army, encouraging features also exist. It is to the RODC's credit that it faced up to and highlighted the issue, so as to give these features the best possible chance to give the nation the military profession it needs.

We now turn to some of the substantive issues of the RODC report.

Career Structures and Specialties

The Army has long embraced the value of the "generalist" background for officers. This was challenged by the RODC and an alternative proposed. The detailed rationale for this proposal is contained in Study One — The Asset (Chapter 7).

The need for a balance between regimental and staff appointments is well established as a principle of officer career planning and this was accepted by the RODC. Study One spends several pages sketching the historical background of this, and its gradual transformation into the "generalist model" of career development. A long list of indicators of the generalist are presented, the most important of which are:

- extensive regimental experience, often including command of a field force unit, and
- eclectic experience in training and non-Corps staff appointments.

As the study points out, the reason for the popularity of the generalist system is that it has appeared to be capable of developing, "officers who are versatile, flexible in mind and capable of meeting the demands of mobilisation or rapid expansion in times of emergency . . ."

Corps indoctrination and various myths and institutions leave the young Staff Corps officer in no doubt . . . that he should shape up as a well rounded generalist" (Study One, p. 7-8).

Study One presents a "pro and con" discussion of the generalist case, including as input the opinions identified in the questionnaire survey. The officer sample was evenly divided on the virtues of the generalist model as a career development strategy, but the RODC eventually concluded that, "the status quo, a uniform generalist case, could not be defended" (p. 7-11).

As an alternative to the generalist scheme of career development, the RODC proposes a greater degree of individual specialisation in non-Corps employment areas (such as Operations and Force Development, Materiel and Logistic Management, Training Management, and Personnel Management). One form of such an approach is the "dual specialty" model, as presently used in the US Army. This works as follows. If a typical career is imagined as having an early, a middle and a senior phase, the main difference between the present generalist scheme and the proposed dual specialty model is in the "middle" phase. In the dual specialty model, the officer is employed mainly in the regimental units of his Corps in his early career, but at a certain career point he is allocated to and trained and/or educated for another specialty. In the middle phase of his career, the officer alternates between his two specialties. For example, an officer may be a specialist in both Infantry and Personnel Management.

The RODC recommends that specialties should be known as Officer Employment Categories. These would be of two types: Regimental Officer Employment Categories (ROEC), such as Infantry and Field Artillery; and Staff Officer Employment Categories (SOEC), such as Training Management and Personnel Management.

The advantages of career planning schemes which resemble the dual specialty concept rather than the generalist concept, appear to this writer to be very powerful. Space precludes a discussion of these but the RODC lists and discusses a number*. It would be unrealistic to expect that the Army will wholeheartedly

*See Study One pp. 7-8 to 7-19. See also my chapter entitled "Generalism, Specialism and Career Development of Army Officers" in F. A. Mediansky (in press).
embrace the concept of widespread dual specialisation, or that such a scheme could be implemented rapidly. (The RODC estimated that two years would be needed before the ROEC/SOEC would be fully operational.)

It is to be hoped, however, that the Army takes steps to implement the spirit, if not the letter, of the scheme, and gradually increases the degree of non-Corps specialisation.

There are a number of issues dealt with by the RODC on this aspect, such as when the individual should be allocated to a second specialty, exactly which employment areas could be designated as OECs and which OECs should not be paired as dual specialties. One of these issues deserves particular mention. This is the issue of career management. Given a generalist model, the powerful influence in career planning by Corps directorates works rather well, for the satisfaction of corps needs at any rate. The problem is that non-Corps employment areas receive an inadequate share of power in deciding who will staff their organizations and for how long. This imbalance in power is not a real problem as long as each generalist officer is as well (or as poorly) fitted for employment in this non-Corps field as any other. But the situation will change if dual specialities are introduced. One can imagine that there will frequently be simultaneous demands for an individual officer from his Corps, which nurtured him, and his second specialty, which has recently trained him. Recognising this potential source of conflict, one proposal put forward by the RODC is that every OEC should have an “employment sponsor”, who has a responsibility to MS and the officer’s Corps for the management of the careers of the officers in that OEC. This, however, has a number of disadvantages, including the fact that an officer may still be pulled in opposite directions and that, even with the most co-operative arrangements, there is a career period where the relative responsibilities of ROEC and SOEC sponsors are rather vague. To overcome this, the RODC proposes individual career managers, of which more later.

The recommendation to introduce greater non-Corps specialisation for Army officers is probably the most important made by the RODC, because, if the system is introduced, it will affect the service in a number of ways, not all of them intended. For example, the possession of a specialty different from one directly associated with “the management of violence” will have “industrial relations” consequences within the officer corps, since it increases the probability that officers will develop occupational identities which cut across institutional boundaries. Differences in occupational status and reward systems are just two of the factors which will be important here. Another change will be the lessening of rank as the major rationale of authority and power. With greater specialisation, rank is likely to be largely replaced by expertise. (Lest the reader believe that rank level implies experience level in the specialty and is thus correlated with expertise, he should reflect on the rapidity with which professional knowledge becomes obsolescent: see Kaufman, 1974). Further, the propensity to vary organizational procedures and structures to meet task and environmental demands will increase with greater specialisation, not because there will be a new need to do so (the need exists, largely unrecognised, now) but because the fetters of the generalist scheme, with its innovation-stifling learning experiences, will have been thrown off.

There are other implications for the adoption of this philosophy of career planning, and let us not underrate their revolutionary nature. It is going to make the Army a more challenging, more exciting and more rewarding place to work, as well as a more effective institution, but the transition may not be comfortable.

Career Development

Career development is the learning undergone by an individual as a result of an on-job experience — it is reflected in changes in his knowledge, skill, attitudes or identity. It is distinct from off-job learning, such as training and education.

Career development planning has links with questions of generalism versus specialism, OEC allocation and promotion policies but is distinct from each. The philosophy and technology of career development requires attention to four areas: what is going to be developed, where this development is to occur, how it is to be effected and who will be developed. How well does the RODC address each of these questions?

What is to be developed requires the specification of career development learning objectives — the abilities which intended people need to acquire before they occupy key jobs in the organisation. This requires identification of
the key jobs and analysis of the attributes (knowledge, skills and attitudes) needed for their effective performance. The process is precisely analogous to the development of training using a systems approach, although the analytical and measurement problems are considerably more challenging. The RODC gave some attention to both these aspects, though rather fleetingly. There is mention of the desirable attributes of "high calibre" officers in Study One (p. 7-14) and Study Four (pp. 20-21), and Study Three (p. 3-17) also lists key jobs which require officers with such characteristics (including unit commander, chief and senior instructor and overseas appointments). The designated attributes include an ability to perceive how the Army functions in a larger environment, comfort with change and uncertainty, interpersonal skills to deal with people inside and outside the Army, ability to innovate, commitment to the Army's norms and ethics, and technical and administrative competence in the appropriate appointment.

The absence in the report of complete objectives and of a full list of key jobs is not serious, provided it is emphasised (as the RODC did) that this is a task which must be tackled later. Since in-depth job and task analyses were not done by the RODC, it was wise to defer the task until the results of these analyses become available. The RODC makes a general recommendation on the production of "officer appointment specifications" (OAS), which is intended to get this going.

The RODC paves the way for the OAS by advocating a particular format to be adopted, including the need for "qualitative job criteria". It is in this section of the OAS that the career development objectives for a particular job would be listed*. (Sensibly, the RODC recommends that not more than three such qualitative items be specified in an OAS.) If the OAS is developed by job and task analysis, as the RODC recommends, the "What" question will be effectively covered.

How and Where these abilities and attitudes are to be developed are other important elements of a career development philosophy. The identification of the development learning objectives ("What") is followed by selection of appropriate learning experiences to achieve them ("How"), and the identification of jobs where such experiences are available ("Where"). The "How" question is straightforward in some cases: for example, development of leadership ability is unlikely to occur without opportunities to lead. Others are not so obvious: how does one acquire coolness under stress? (The question is made more complex by the possibility that it may not be feasible to use career development as the personnel strategy to produce such qualities: selection, or changing the job, may be more economical.) In any case, the selected jobs may need redesign to increase their "development potential". Among the more important design attributes of jobs, in terms of "development potential", are challenge, autonomy, leader support, feedback, and clear goals which the incumbent helps to set (Hall, 1976; Hall and Fukami, 1978). Personal development is inseparable from organisational and job development: a particular kind of organisation implies a particular set of learning experiences and vice versa. This highlights the importance of the principle "job redesign to assist development", which was mentioned in an earlier section.

One way of "redesigning" jobs is to change the behaviour of the incumbent's supervisor. This can be done in a number of ways, including training the supervisor in certain management skills. The supervisor has a particularly strong influence on individual development. Hall (1976) tells us that challenge, autonomy, clear goals and feedback are indispensible elements of job experiential learning: the supervisor controls all these. Yet in the Army's scheme of things (and we are not alone here) officers are not rewarded for developing their subordinates (which, as Hall and Fukami, 1978, point out, also means that supervisors will place a low priority on developing their subordinates, since they will tend to spend all their time on activities which are rewarded). Further, officers may lack the skills necessary for subordinate development — goal setting, coaching, counselling, planning and feedback.

It is evident from both the RODC's interview and questionnaire surveys that the officer Corps perceives and acknowledges this deficiency. The poor standard of appraisal and

*Given the pooled qualitative criteria for a specific rank and OEC, the most frequent attributes can be identified and used to set selection criteria and common career development objectives.
counselling skills is discussed at length by the RODC, which recommends both a new A26 (Confidential Report) and training for officers in counselling skills.

It is hoped that the reader is now aware of the reason for the earlier emphasis of the omission of the principle of "job redesign to assist development". Individuals are, in many ways, products of their career environments. If deficiencies in individuals are identified, we must assume that there are also deficiencies in organisations. This goes beyond generalism versus specialism and, although the RODC touches on this and allied aspects here and there (in Study Three, Hall's theory is briefly mentioned, and there is acknowledgement of Kaufman's 1974, findings on the prevention of professional obsolescence; and Study One contains a well-argued section on the pros and cons of different career patterns for personal development), there is no consolidated discussion on the matter and hence no firm conclusions as to the desired attributes of developmental jobs and hence no recommendations on these lines.

Having pointed this out as a deficiency, it must also be acknowledged that the specific recommendations the RODC makes on career development show recognition of the importance of challenge etc. in jobs, and of the jobs where these design qualities are likely to be found. For example, the latter include command appointments in the Regimental OEC, and the requirement for a "broadening" appointment outside the officer's normal regimental and staff streams is specified. Since the RODC was unaware of which jobs have these qualities in abundance and which are seriously deficient, it was perhaps wise not to be too precise in this regard. This, however, again highlights the unfortunate deficiencies in the RODC's original research programme. Given sufficient time, it is likely that a more sophisticated and comprehensive programme could have been mounted, and such data would have been gathered. (It should be noted, therefore, that the need for such data still exists, and it is to be hoped that it is acquired as soon as possible.)

Finally, career development for Whom? Who should experience the appropriate experiences and when? Not everyone will occupy a key job in his career, and some of those destined for a key job may be unable to undergo all or part of the desired career development. On the other hand, some individuals need certain kinds of development more than others. How is a priority of individuals arranged and managed? Here the RODC ventures into controversial territory. For a number of reasons, they recommend that "the most able" officers be identified for sub-unit command as early as possible and, at this stage, that these officers be designated as either "above average" or "average". Later, in the "middle level" employment zone (Major and Lieutenant Colonel), each individual should be allocated to one of three categories: well above average, above average and average.

Each of the three groups will receive different treatment for career development (and promotion). There are, it is obvious, many practical problems in streaming, but the RODC handles these rather well. For example, on the question of how objectively such allocation would be made, they recommend that, for Majors, it be done using criteria which currently exist: namely, the point in the promotion zone at which the officer is cleared for promotion to Major, plus whether he is selected for Command and Staff College, and his assessment history. Other questions which are faced and given at least a "commonsense" solution are the programming of career planning for "fast stream" officers, what to do about late developers and those who "burn out" early, and how such a scheme might be handled during the phasing-in period.

To sum of this review of what the RODC had to say on career development, we have looked at whether the RODC dealt satisfactorily with questions of What should be developed, Who should be developed and Where and How this should occur. Essentially, the RODC's treatment of these aspects is satisfying: where they have not been able to make detailed recommendations on action for career development, they have recommended that appropriate research and development be undertaken; and where the RODC has not been guided explicitly by theoretical principles of personal development, their conclusions and recommendations show implicit recognition of these. There is only one obvious serious omission. This is the need for supervisors to be trained in designing jobs and organisations so as to maximise each job's development potential. A vital part of the whole process, this
aspect needs to be highlighted even though it is partly covered by other recommendations in the report (such as the need to train officers to delegate so as to increase job satisfaction of their subordinates).

**Career Management**

Considerations of career development lead to considerations of career management. The method by which careers are managed is one of the key problems tackled by the RODC. Not only was there evidence that the present scheme — of divided responsibility between the Military Secretary and Corps directorates — is ineffective, but some of the important recommendations of the RODC on other matters hinge on their execution through career management. For example, achieving the correct balance and sequence of appointments if individuals have two specialties requires careful career management, as does personal development through on-job experiences.

The RODC’s solution is a single, centralised career management system controlled by the Military Secretary. This would be executed by a special group of “career managers”, each of whom handles the careers of about 350 officers. Their *modus operandi* is to be based on six principles, such as direct access of the managed to the manager, continuity throughout the career and advice input by ROEC and SOEC sponsors.

In common with other recommendations, those pertaining to this change are argued objectively and at length (Study Three). A number of major problems in present career management are identified, principally the overload on the individual officers in the office of the Military Secretary and the Corps directorates who presently handle career planning, and the shift in responsibility for career management as an officer becomes more senior. It was quite clear from the RODC’s opinion survey that most officers are dissatisfied with how careers are presently managed. (This is confirmed by the results of my own research into officers’ attitudes to their work and careers.) However, the desirability of the “personal touch” in career management is something the RODC wanted very much to preserve. The present problem of career managers may largely be “information overload” from using manual personnel data systems. If such data was computerised, the career managers would be able to maintain adequate files and also have more time to apply this personal touch in the execution of their duties.

The scheme (which includes an outline job and man specification for the job of “career manager”) seems to be sound, given the espoused principles of the RODC on these matters. One or two practical matters are not raised, however. For example, who looks after the career manager’s career when the career manager is out managing careers? Also, given that the scheme’s rationale is the need for “the personal touch”, how are the group of career managers going to share their various charges? Career Manager A, say, has a group of 350 officers to manage; when he is posted to his other specialty, Career Manager B takes over. Which group of officers does A assume responsibility for later, when he returns to the career management field? A possible arrangement here is for three or four career managers to be responsible for a given group of 350 or so officers; this would allow the career managers to rotate themselves between the OEC of career management and other OECs, yet retain continuity in their career managess group.

**Education and Training**

“Education and Training” are the topics addressed in RODC Study Two, the two being considered separately. The RODC saw the difference between education and training in terms of the degree of generalisation and intellectual orientation of learning. “Education” is general intellectual development, aimed at knowledge for the job(s), capacity to manage change in a personal sense and a basis for future self-development. “Training” is job-oriented but not just to the job being done at the time: it includes the aim of preparing people for increased responsibilities.

The professional officer is, to use Drucker’s phrase, a “knowledge worker”. He works not with his hands but with his head: at times he is a manager of other knowledge workers, but even then he is generally responsible for some intellectual input to the group task.

He works with concepts and principles in a situation which is not only in a state of subtle yet significant flux but which may, in time of war, propel him into a circumstance for which his preparation has been largely “theoretical” and where his specific performance “on the
"day" could be an important event in the history of his nation. The requirement for the knowledge worker to have knowledge of a conceptual, as well as a concrete, kind is generally accepted in the Army. Given this, it might have been expected that the RODC would have few difficulties in determining the philosophy and detail of an educational system for the officer corps. Yet I doubt if this was, in fact, easy: whilst the need might now be virtually an act of faith, this often subjectively-based and general feeling is an inadequate basis for the analysis of the "what" and "when" questions in education. Thus, whilst the analysis would have to be logical and persuasive in an intellectual sense, it would probably be labelled as "commonsense" by many of its readers. Only the writer who has faced this paradox knows the problems of expression and approach which it causes. In the event, the RODC's rationale for a certain educational philosophy is well argued.

The RODC rightly criticises the present lack of a coherent educational policy in the Army, the results of which can be seen in a number of areas: the frequent lack of a connection between what an individual studies at university at public expense and his subsequent career path, the under- and mis-utilisation of officers who have attended lengthy overseas courses, and so on. How does the RODC plan to correct this? The major theme of the first part of Study Two is that educational planning should be based on a number of principles. Most of these principles boil down to this: that the value of an educational experience is a function of (1) professional relevance, (2) intellectual challenge or capacity to "stretch" the individual, (3) the extent to which it is part of a progression of related educational, training or job experiences, and (4) the extent to which it makes the individual more adaptable and able to react constructively to change. In addition, the RODC proposes that, consistent with the needs of the Army, educational opportunity should be available to all officers, but especially to the ablest.

Armed with these principles, a number of key issues are tackled. These include postgraduate courses, management studies (which they rightly insist should not be considered outside the context of the organisational characteristics and needs of the Army), the study of tactics and logistics, military history, computer studies, ADFA, senior officer education and simulation and war gaming. None of these are particularly controversial issues and the RODC makes proposals which are logical, well-argued and likely to be quite acceptable to most officers. To say that many of these proposals should have been put forward ages ago is not to denigrate the service the RODC does us by making them now: unquestionably, demands for change are more politically acceptable in coming from the RODC than from other agencies. For example, there has, for many years, been agitation for changes to the formal programmes of command and staff development but, apparently, it took the RODC's weight on this matter to produce action.

Perhaps one of the most contentious issues the RODC considered in this area is the extent to which education should be "liberal" or "vocational". Proponents of the former approach argue that the primary benefit of education is its mind-stretching effects, and that a course in one thing (say, archaeology or biology) is as good as any other. The "vocational" advocates rarely deny that education of any sort is useful as intellectual development, but add that it will be of most value to those paying for it when the content is applicable to the problems and processes of the organisation. The RODC leaned heavily towards this latter view, whilst constantly stressing the point that education, which is of high relevance to the military, is quite compatible with education which develops the intellect and gives social awareness. We are constrained, the RODC argues, by a number of factors which demand a fairly "hard headed"* approach to educational planning. These include the rapid obsolescence of technical knowledge, the demands for greater awareness of how decisions in the Army affect, and are affected by, the environment, the need for specialists, and, dominating all, the influence of the unstretchable dollar.

The RODC's solution for balancing liberal and vocational needs really represents a bias towards the latter. "Liberal" education is to be achieved by (1) collective variety, or by ensuring that, as a group, officers are educated in a variety of institutions and disciplines; (2) a

*This is not their exact phrase but one which I believe reflects their philosophy.
balance between the physical and the social sciences in each officer's education; and (3) stressing, in the process of becoming "well versed" in the social sciences, the role of the military and its relationship with society. There is a strong implication that exposure to the social sciences, especially psychology, sociology, and political science, will do the trick in creating a "liberal outlook": in avoiding what C.P. Snow called "the two cultures" effect. Yet the RODC on the same page (Study Two, p. 4-6) appears to classify the behavioural sciences (a significant component of what they see as "social sciences") as "vocational". I suggest that the psychologist or sociologist is as much a technocrat as the engineer, his raw material being elements of social rather than physical systems. This probably gives him the opportunity, if not the capacity, for greater insight into the processes by which his organisation interacts with the rest of society and how it can best be managed in the short and long term. In this sense, the RODC's proposals represent an advance on current thinking. However, the empirical stuff with which behavioural scientists work is rarely "historical" in nature, and it is historical analysis which represents one of a profession's most useful ways of avoiding insularity and tunnel vision. From that point of view, it would be more than a pity if the RODC's recommendations on this matter were "overinterpreted" and "humanities" disciplines, such as history were neglected.

One hopes that commonsense would guard against this, but perhaps this aspect should have received a more prominent place in the RODC's proposals.

The requirement for improvements in officer training is neither so obvious nor so well accepted. The officer's first decade of commissioned service is already well stocked with courses, most of them lengthy. Many would argue that a quantitative reduction in officer training is necessary but, at the same time, some anomalies in the officer training system exist. The staff training programme, in which most officers have already had at least one staff appointment before attendance at Staff College, is one such anomaly. Furthermore, the systems approach to training, being based on clearly-specified training objectives derived by job and task analysis, could not be expected to be as easily applied to officer training as it had been to non-officer courses. The RODC has to assume, to a certain extent, that the technology for such application could be developed. (They did, in fact, take account of some scanty, yet encouraging, evidence in this respect — see Study Two, paragraphs 1210 and 1211.)

In regard to officer training, the RODC had again adopted a fairly "hard headed" approach. The influence of recent developments in training technology is evident in their review and critique of present practices. For example, training is not seen as solely an activity which occurs in schools; in fact, "formal residential courses" is the last of six training options given (Study Two, pp. 11-6 and 11-7) and it is pointed out that, whilst such courses are "highly effective", they are also "costly and their cost-effectiveness has not always been analysed". (This is a charitable view: "never" would be closer to the truth.) In discussing officer training, the RODC avoids embroilment in details of the "what", "where", "how" and "for whom" questions for training, but does have some interesting and concrete proposals to make.

The most important of these, indeed the bones of the whole matter, is a career-long programme of courses by which officers acquire the knowledge and skills in tactics and logistics and technical aspects required at their professional stage.

The scheme formalises and rationalises what exists in some Corps and is neglected, for not-always-obvious reasons, in others. The sequence is: commissioning course, Regimental Officers Basic Course (ROEC-oriented), Staff and Operations Course (previously mooted as the "junior staff course"), Regimental Officers Advanced Course, Intermediate Operations Course, Command and Staff College (if the officer is selected), Advanced Operations Course (for Lieutenant Colonels who have not attended the Command and Staff College), and Senior Officers Operations Study Period. Whilst this pattern is similar to many which presently exist, a number of significant departures from current practice are stressed, principally the need for courses to be interrelated so that personal development can be logical, effective and efficient.
A number of other recommendations for change are made, one of the most welcome being the call for promotion exams to be scrapped.

One Deficiency — the Matter of Individual Choice

The RODC deals most satisfactorily with most of the issues it addresses, but there are at least two deficiencies in the report. The first is concerned with individual choice at work. The RODC devotes considerable space in Study Three to discussion of the need for increased consultation between officers and career managers, and it recommends that individuals be given greater opportunity to influence their career plan. It argues that officers will be required to realistically evaluate their own performance and potential for advancement in rank and to establish where their ability and aptitude seem most likely to be employed most effectively. All of this will require closer liaison between officers and their career managers and will require officers to have a clear understanding of the alternatives and of the career planning and management process (Study Three, p. 5-43).

This is most necessary if career planning is to be improved, since occupational psychologists have shown that a person is more likely to be satisfied with an occupation if the occupational role provides a good match with his self-image, or the way he perceives his own capacities and inclinations (see Hall, 1976, and Super et al., 1963, for reviews). My own recent research attempted to take this theory a step further: to see if a person’s self-image influenced his feelings about the work in his sub-occupation, or particular specialty in the profession at large. The results tend to support the hypotheses.

The RODC fails to acknowledge the psychological basis of career planning, touched on above. Its recommendations, therefore, whilst worthy and in the correct direction, are unsophisticated in terms of the depth of policy and procedure change which is possible. This is, perhaps, a legacy of the decision not to include a full-time behavioural scientist in the RODC; sub-occupation choice and allocation would surely have been identified and developed as an issue had an experienced behavioural scientist been available. (Perhaps not, however, if the RODC Terms of Reference had been strictly adhered to: for some reason, a “sociology adviser” was stipulated whereas the general orientation of the RODC’s work — towards individual development — seemed to demand a psychologist’s input.)

The RODC’s omission is not that it does not address the issue but simply that the issue is not developed nor emphasised strongly enough. In Study Three — Career Management (pp. 3-26 and 3-27), it is concluded that, “improved consultation on appointment proposals between officers and management is essential”, and it is recommended that officers, “be sent a personal letter making quite clear . . . (that) the individual is responsible to provide on a continuing basis, the information he or she requires taken into account by career managers in appointment decisions”.

The context of this conclusion and recommendation, however, implies that “the information” is likely to be primarily of an “extrinsic” nature, i.e. extrinsic goals which the officer wishes to achieve in his life (mainly the domestic situation, including children’s education, wife’s job, etc.). I suggest that intrinsic goals ought to be equally stressed and, very importantly, the career management system must include the means whereby the individual can find out more about his strengths, weaknesses and interests and the possible roles with which he could be successfully matched. Again, the RODC discusses some of these, chiefly in terms of performance appraisal and counselling, but greater stress is needed if such aspects are to become part of career planning technology.

Two aspects which could be improved by procedures built around the concept of work role-self image match are OEC allocation (including Corps choice) and job choice. On the matter of Corps choice/allocation, however, the only issue addressed by the RODC is ‘‘the spread of talent’’ between Corps, and the only mention of SOEC allocation is when it should be done, not how. But, following on from the ideas expressed in the earlier paragraphs, there are a number of practices which can be used to assist vocational choices. A modern view is that the use of tests and “profile similarities” is only part of what could be done to fit a person to a role where he is likely to be both “satisfied and satisfactory” (Hall, 1976, discusses some of these other ways). It would have been very
beneficial for the RODC to have evaluated exactly what is done now to make the individual officer aware of his abilities and aptitudes and what is offered in career work options, and what extra could be done to improve the system.

A Second Deficiency — Rewarding and Stimulating Development

The RODC discusses at length how individuals can be encouraged and rewarded for self-development. Self-development is, however, seen by the RODC as an extracurricular kind of activity — private study, personal trips to broaden one’s knowledge, attendance at non-military professional seminars such as those run by the Australian Institute of Management (AIM), and so on. But this is only one aspect of the matter. There is another which the RODC neglected; this is that which is intrinsically associated with the successful meeting of challenges at work.

To illustrate exactly what I mean by this, and why it is so important, I can do no better than quote a speaker at a recent AIM meeting I attended. This gentleman, the managing director of a very large national retail organisation, was giving advice to the “Manager Development” Group of the AIM. His theory was that you will never grow in competence and confidence until you “put yourself at risk”. Even if the organisation was unprepared to plan the younger executive’s career, he could still do a lot for himself, by choosing every chance to run risks: in grand ways, by engaging in bold projects; and in small ways, by becoming involved in extra-vocational committees and similar task-oriented groups. By doing so, he would develop his nerve, his knowledge, and his ability to analyse and make decisions. To stick to situations where one can be rewarded for taking the “safe way” out, is to stifle personal growth.

I’ve thought a lot about what that man said and I’m convinced he’s on to something very important. Can you develop bold, decisive and masterful commanders if you don’t give them the chance to be bold, decisive and masterful in their formative years? Are these qualities likely to emerge as if by magic after half a lifetime in an organisation which has few rewards (and many subtle punishments) for officers who are radical in their actions? In most jobs in the Army, even the most senior, there is no significant reward for an officer who is entrepreneurial in style: on the contrary, it is simply very easy for an individual to conform to the system, to see out his two years in each job and get his ticket punched.* (When was the last time the reader saw a really good and new idea tried out seriously?)

The managing director’s principle has support in Hall’s theory that growth is a function of, among other things, challenge. It is arguable that real challenge is not possible unless one puts oneself at risk, and that real “stretching” of oneself is not possible without the incentive of putting one’s reputation on the line.

Edward de Bono was quoted in the newspapers recently as saying that the purpose of society is to so arrange things that the collective good is served by the self-interested, or selfish, actions of each individual. It seems to me that a great deal of collective good would accrue from schemes which reward the innovative officer. This good would be realised in both the short term, by probably increasing the number of really worthwhile projects which were implemented in the Army (not to mention the improvements in the way projects were conducted) and, in the long term, through the development effect it would have on the individuals involved.

It may be argued that the RODC had no charter to concern itself with such schemes which, quite obviously, go beyond the traditional boundaries of personnel management. Yet, not only is the argument in the previous few paragraphs compelling in terms of the development effect of the social system (which includes the reward system), but the need to free one’s thinking from such “traditional boundaries” is academically respectable. Leaders in personnel management

*The Army’s current doctrine calls for “cool, thoughtful, resourceful” leaders, “aggressive in action” and capable of exploiting “any opportunity on the battlefield with energy and boldness”; each of which is “imbued with the idea that success will depend on the skill, initiative and imagination with which he carries out his task” (Australian Army, 1977, p. 5-2). I agree with this and with the notion that “Success in training such leaders will determine how well the Army is to fight” (ibid); I would, however, go further and agree with those who argue that similar qualities are required in the policy and staff area to prepare the situation and the force which such leaders would command.
philosophies and techniques, such as Professor Alec Rodger of Birkbeck College, London (Rodger and Cavanagh, 1965), and Professor Dexter Dunphy of the University of New South Wales (Dunphy, 1973), quite clearly point to the influence which reward systems have on personal development and management problems. It is true that the RODC's "Future Study" concluded that officers require "an ability and a willingness to innovate when innovation is necessary: to both anticipate and react to external and internal change" (Study Four — The Future, p. 21), and that there is a need to "reward ability to a greater degree" (p. 23), but there is insufficient follow through of these findings in their recommendations for change.

Is entrepreneurial behaviour compatible with the vast bureaucratic system in which we pursue our careers? If it is not, then which should be changed — the system or the requirement for such behaviour?

Conclusions

There are many other issues which the RODC addressed in its short life span. Indeed, the scope and depth of the investigations are quite admirable given the comparatively brief time allotted to it. Even to have produced the weighty volumes of generally crisp prose which comprise the report would, one would have thought, required much more time than was actually taken. The report is therefore somewhat of a tribute to the Army's staff training system. The RODC report, I venture to suggest, exceeded most expectations.

In this review, a number of issues have been evaluated. A general assessment was made of the extent to which the total study was based on a coherent and explicit philosophy of individual officer development and the extent to which the RODC was able to identify the strengths and weaknesses of present practices. In both these regards, the report was judged satisfactory. A second general issue was the way the RODC went about its task, especially in regard to commissioning studies and gathering survey data. On the latter point, it was concluded that deficiencies were caused by lack of time to adequately prepare for such an exercise. This may have been avoided had the RODC included a behavioural scientist or research director but, either way, there was a strong risk that the ship would be spoiled for a ha'p'orth of tar.

The substantive issues tackled by the RODC and discussed above were career specialisation, career development, career management and education and training. The RODC recommendations in these areas appear to be generally sound in terms of both theoretical bases and political acceptability, although some — especially career specialisation — are likely to have significant unanticipated side effects. In some cases, the RODC had overlooked some principle or points but, for the most part, these omissions are not crippling.

However, one matter which had been neglected, and which is very important and in need of study, is allocation of individuals to OEC. It was shown that the effectiveness of allocation has implications for career development and career identification and motivation, and that the omission is therefore serious.

What lessons can be learned from the RODC experience? The following are among the most important. Firstly, whilst such an undertaking can be successfully tackled by a group of comparatively junior officers (junior compared to the high-level task force which might have typically been formed), such as project requires the more-or-less permanent assistance of a professional behavioural scientist and a greater research facility than the RODC was given. This research facility should have been directed by an extra full-time executive and should have included support staff such as social survey designers and research assistants. Secondly, the decision not to limit the study solely to internal matters, resulted in a study (The Future), which was of benefit not only to the RODC but to others as well. Future projects would do well to imitate the RODC's enlightened approach on this matter. Thirdly, and as another enlightened action, the use of objectively gathered and objectively evaluated data on the attitudes and opinions of officers at many levels, made a valuable contribution to RODC thinking. It was a means not only of culling ideas but of evaluating proposals against likely reactions and, by involving all officers indirectly in the decision-making process, increasing the probability of general acceptance.

The members of the RODC deserve enormous credit for their product. One may
criticise, but the fact remains that their approach was innovative and generally successful. The RODC product is something to be proud of. The Army didn’t deserve as good an investigation as it got. The question is: will it recognise and act on its worth?

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**BOOKS IN REVIEW**

The following books may be received and are recommended. Reviews of many of them will appear in later issues of the Journal.

- **COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF WORLD WAR TWO** by Elke C. Weal, John A. Weal and Richard F. Baker, Melbourne, Lothian.
- **MAN O’WAR I** by Alan Raven and John Roberts, Brooklyn, RSV Publications.
Introduction

In most military respects the 1965-1972 National Service Training Scheme is now simply a part of military history. It may never be invoked again as a form of national service training and a future Australian government and society may demand an entirely different form of conscription to meet a real or apparent defence threat. In military sociological terms however the scheme will continue to be of interest not only because of its initial impact on society at the time but also because of the continuing impact on society generally in a number of areas such as education, employment, marriage, health, social attitudes and political preferences.¹

Throughout the paper the words ‘conscript’ and ‘national serviceman’ or ‘conscription’ and ‘national service’ are used interchangeably. The expression ‘national service’ was not simply a euphemism for ‘conscription’ but was meant to reflect the civilian responsibility to effect registration, balloting, interviews, medical examination, compliance and in fact everything up to the gates of the army training establishment. The Department of Labour and National Service was responsible for the actual military service. This may not fully reflect the degree of liaison between the two Departments but the difference in responsibility in essentially as stated.

Structurally and in manpower terms the Army emerged from the period 1965-1972 with the experience of having managed a standing army, consisting of long term volunteer soldiers forming a peacetime nucleus, and a high proportion of short term men. These short term men comprised not only general three year enlistees to which the Australian Army had become accustomed but also national servicemen selected by ballot and obliged to perform two years full-time service.

The significance of the induction of men for two year service was that, using cost effectiveness criteria, these men would not normally have been considered. It was the rate of expansion beyond what were assumed to be the possibilities of volunteer recruiting which made such a induction seem necessary. The scheme was also significant in that the age of the national servicemen was twenty years at time of entry (unless previously deferred) as compared with seventeen or eighteen, the average age of a male general volunteer enlistee.

National Service Scheme 1965-1972

In November 1964 the Government of the day decided to introduce a compulsory selective national service scheme. From the beginning, this scheme was introduced to increase the
effective strength of the Regular Army to meet its commitments as well as to provide a reserve of trained manpower available to supplement the forces in an emergency.

It was military opinion that experience to that date had demonstrated that the voluntary system of recruitment could not have produced the required Army strength within acceptable time limits. A compulsory selective scheme to supplement voluntary recruitment was considered necessary to overcome manpower deficiencies.2

The scheme was directed to the Army only and the first servicemen under this scheme entered into training on 1 July 1965. It operated continuously from then until December 1972 and in that time a total of 804,286 men registered for service and 63,740 were called up and enlisted in the Army. The relevant statistics are provided in Table 1.

**TABLE 1**

NATIONAL SERVICE 1965-1972
FINAL STATISTICS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 19722

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: DLNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balloted out and granted indefinite deferment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Balloted in) Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exempted from liability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Theological students, ministers of religion etc., physical or mentally disabled, conscientious objectors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted indefinite deferment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(married, members of citizen military forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Served or serving in Permanent forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected on medical, psychological or educational grounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not immediately available for call-up (students, apprentices, hardship, breach of National Service Act etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called up and enlisted in the Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Service commitment**

As introduced in 1965, the scheme provided for a period of two years full-time service followed by either three in the Australian Regular Army Reserve (ARAR) or the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) or four years in the Australian Regular Army Emergency Reserve (ARAER). Alternative service of six years in the CMF, or five years depending on whether or not 12 months membership and efficient service had been completed in the CMF prior to registration, was acceptable.

The term of two years full-time service was subsequently fixed in 1965 having regard to the recruit and corps training requirements of a minimum of six months and up to ten, a minimum term of twelve months effective duty with a unit, and an additional five for induction, discharge and leave.

On 16 August Government approval was given to a reduction in the period of full-time service from two years to 18 months but the preservation of a total commitment of five years service. The period in the Reserve (or CMF) was thereby increased to three and one half years.

This move to reduce the period of full-time service could not be viewed however as an indication that two years was an unsatisfactory period from a military point of view. It was a reaction partly to pressures to reduce the size of the Army without increasing the selectivity of the scheme and partly to encourage a more favourable attitude on the part of potential conscripts. From an overall management point of view the most desirable way of reducing numbers might have been to reduce the numbers called up but in phased manner. This would have produced a new NS 'steady state' but without the disruptive effects of shortening the period of service and reducing 'effective service'.

Some thought had been given to reducing the period of full-time service even further. As a generalization, however, as the period of full-time service decreases, the greater is the number of men in the training pipeline in relation to effective soldiers available to fill military establishment positions. Below six months there would be no effective service as the whole six months would be required to train an effective soldier.

Thought was also given to the national advantage to be gained from doubling the
number of young men who were given military training, with its physical and, hopefully, character building effect. It was reasoned however that the cost in terms of money because of equal pay for regulars and conscripts at civilian levels, and loss of effectiveness in the Regular Army, because of high training and support requirements with little appreciable defence gain, would make the proposal uneconomic.

**Age of call-up**

The official stated position as provided by the Department of Labour and National Service (1966) was that:

"In deciding on the twenty year old age-group the Government took into account the paramount issue of meeting the Army's needs, the likely effect on civilian employment including reinstatement after service, and the importance of preventing avoidable interruption to the training of apprentices and the progress of students pursuing courses relevant to their careers. It was recognized that at twenty the majority of young men were already employed and therefore would have jobs to return to after completing their service; most apprentices and similar trainees were at or near the completion of their apprenticeships or training courses; and many students were close to completing their studies or, if attending universities, within a year or two of graduating. It was envisaged that temporary deferment of call-up, where appropriate, would enable apprentices or trainees to complete their trade or training courses and students to obtain at least the primary qualification being sought at the time for registration. Besides benefitting the men themselves this would help to meet the Army's need for a proportion of skilled or qualified men. Further, with this age-group, call-up could be arranged at the earliest practicable stage after registration while still ensuring that no man, unless he requested otherwise, would be actually enlisted until after he turned twenty." (DLNS, 1966)

Under regulations in existence in 1964 a soldier was required to be 18 years before he could serve outside Australia and 19 years of age before entering an operational area. Therefore, as it was necessary for 'Selective Servicemen' to be available for operations after a period of six months training, the minimum acceptable age for induction was 18 1/2 years.

Both the civilian and military factors led to the conclusion in 1964 that induction was to be between the ages of 18 1/2 and 20 years — preferably 20 years to meet the army's requirement for a relatively mature trainee.

To allow a wider option, however, the stated military position was that provided that, at the time they were posted to units, trainees were above the minimum age which allows them to serve in an operational theatre (19), they could be drawn from any age group to 25 years.

**Balloting**

The purpose of the ballot was to select from the men who were born between 1 July and 31 December (or 1 January to 30 June) in a particular year and who registered in the corresponding registration which commenced July (or January) twenty years later, those who were to be considered for call-up. The ballot referred essentially to birth-dates.

Persons who were ordinarily resident in Australia but who were absent from Australia at the time their age group was required to register were required to register within 14 days of their return for inclusion in subsequent ballots.

Provided they were not eligible for exemption or deferment those balloted in by this particular ballot were considered for the Army intakes in January and April when approximately 4,000 men would be called up in each intake.

Not all men balloted were called up. The major exceptions were:

- those married on or before a certain date
- those who had undertaken to serve in the Citizen Forces as an alternative to NS
- those who did not meet the standards of fitness required for Army Service.

Temporary deferment of call-up was granted to students, apprentices and other trainees engaged in courses of study or training relevant to their careers. Temporary deferment was also granted by a court of summary jurisdiction if the court was satisfied that call-up would have imposed exceptional hardship on a registrant, his parents or dependants.

The number to be selected by ballot to meet the Army's requirements was determined after a detailed statistical analysis was conducted by the Department of Labour and National
Service of the information provided on the Registration Forms, and after taking into account the temporary deferments from previous call-ups.

The analysis of the birth dates of those men who were included in the ballot had shown (in a typical ballot) considerable differences in the numbers born on different days; that is, each date drawn did not necessarily yield the same numbers. A decision to draw only a specific number of birth dates therefore created the possibility of shortfalls or numbers surplus to needs.

It became practice to publish the dates drawn in the ballot and a certified list of the birth dates was available together with a statement by the Minister shortly after the completion of the draw. All registrants (eg. 53,000 in one ballot) were notified officially in writing by the Department of Labour and National Service how they stood.

A different problem arose later when numbers became more settled, partly because of high numbers involved in medical wastage immediately after call-up and because of the inflexibility resulting from publication of birth dates.

Selective Versus Universal Scheme

From the point of view of equality of sacrifice there would have been advantages in compulsorily requiring every fit man and woman on attaining the age of 20 to have undertaken National Service.

Selective as opposed to universal conscription was introduced because, with the latter, the whole of the Regular Army would have been required to be employed in a training role and this would have disrupted the effectiveness of the available field force units. (Civilian service options were considered but not adopted.)

It was judged that a selective ballot was the best means of meeting Australia's military commitments.

Attitudes of National Servicemen

J. Ross as a research student in the Department of Government, Sydney University, and later a lecturer in sociology, arranged for a questionnaire to be administered to a sample of National Service recruits and discharges in 1969-1971 (Ross, 1974). The information obtained was related to social background, military experiences and to social and political attitudes. Ross points to the particular problem of the men in the sample being instructed by authority figures, in an authoritarian setting, to complete the questionnaire.

Nothing in her research proved or disproved the particular hypothesis that National Servicemen became very pro-Army as a result of their service (army apologists of the future). NSM showed no signs of being anti-conscription or anti-military on any ideological grounds. On the other hand, on more pragmatic grounds, the majority apparently demonstrated a degree of alienation from the organization which had fostered them for two years.

On the general military theory of the effects of army experience, Ross concludes that on both sides (regular officers and conscripts) only a certain minimal behavioural amount of conformity to the army norms was expected or demanded and this led to a “stagnant and often unpleasant atmosphere of mutual dislike but mutual tolerance because of the low expectations”.

On the evidence gathered in her research Ross concluded that the army had no systematic influence on political preferences, nor on attitude syndromes such as authoritarianism egalitarianism, and to many conscripts their two years in the army seemed to have been largely irrelevant to the development of their political and at least some of their social attitudes.

Unfortunately as Ross herself remarks there was very little opportunity for progressive refinement of her research instrument and unless conscription was re-introduced there was no way the research could be replicated.

This theme of irrelevance is pursued in her other work (Ross, 1975) in which she concludes that the apparent high morale of national servicemen (or their liking of the Army) is due more to informal group relationships ie. mateship, and the opportunity to do and be something different from the normal routine of early adulthood. In this case the good informal group relationships displaced the work output as the group’s goals, and the military aspect of the army experience was merely incidental.

(The author believes personally that the military must be afforded some credibility in assessing military worth of conscripts as
opposed to volunteer soldiers, and finds it difficult to believe that a personally satisfying military and social experience with conscripts could be based largely on work irrelevance.)

Education, Employment and Marriage Impacts

Withers (1976) compared the Australian experience with National Service in the period 1965-1972 with the available evidence on the United States Selective Service system in the post-war period. Allowing for imperfection in estimation techniques and data base used, he concludes quite clearly that conscription provides incentives for many individuals to alter their personal planning, particularly in important life choices such as education, employment and marriage. Withers (1976:11) gives as an example an estimate that National Service in Australia was associated with 1800 more marriages each year than would otherwise have taken place.

A man married before the date applicable to the registrant’s age group was granted indefinite deferment of his national service obligation. Marriage therefore became a means of avoidance of service obligation, or alternatively, marriage was brought forward earlier than normally contemplated.

In relation to education Withers suggests that conscription arrangements of the US and Australian type do tend significantly to increase educational participation. The system of deferments encouraged young men to postpone military service and to continue training when they otherwise would not.

Employment effects flow from the education effects but are also manifested in the unwillingness of employers to hire 'draft-liable' individuals and the propensity of the individuals themselves to defer educational and employment choices until the uncertainty of the ballot has been resolved.

From the author’s personal viewpoint, Withers’ contribution is important in the distinction he makes between the ‘uncertainty’ and the ‘avoidance’ effects of selective conscription and the emphasis (coming as it does from an economist) on the cost of the social effects of compulsory military service. Withers concentrates on the initial impact of selective conscription on society, as evidenced by the uncertainty and avoidance effects; he does not pass judgement on the value of military training and experience as former conscripts rejoin the civilian community. Much in inferred about the employment disadvantages suffered by educated young men but little is suggested about the educational benefits within the national service system and the general raising of levels of aspiration.

Advantages and disadvantages of National Service

Arising from the 1965-1972 scheme the advantages of selective national service over increased voluntary recruiting were seen by the military to be:

- Whilst acknowledging the desirability of a 'steady state' of national service induction and discharge (for training and 'absorption' reasons), selective conscription could be used to overcome deficiencies or fluctuations in the level of volunteers. It provided a measure of flexibility in raising or lowering strength levels which was never, in practice, available to a wholly volunteer force. It could do this without the introduction of new legislation and without recourse to ad hoc manpower decisions which were so damaging to the volunteer professional element of the Army.

- National service, with its reserve commitment after full-time service, ensured that the number of reserves of relatively-young trained soldiers were maintained at a high level. This was because of the greater turnover of conscripts and their lower age on discharge as compared with volunteers.

- National servicemen were generally older, more mature and better educated than the average volunteer recruits and this was reflected in their training and military employment.

- The use of national servicemen made the army more representatative of the society from which they were drawn.

- National service was a valuable source of specialist officers, otherwise difficult to obtain through voluntary channels, and of general list officers a high proportion of whom accepted regular commissions.

- National service contributed skills which were valuable in civic aid programmes.

- On the more subjective side there were seen to be national benefits through
character-building, the mixing of classes and creeds, improved physical fitness and the association of military service and a duty of citizenship.

The disadvantages were seen to be:

• The selectivity of the scheme and the fact that the burden of service was not shared equally through the community. Military service became a selective tax in kind.
• Uncertainty in the motives and justification of the scheme when the concept of national service was not endorsed by all political parties or community groups.
• National service required a heavy training commitment because of the high turnover (and hence low average length of service) involved in a two year call-up system. The training pipeline was longer for a conscript army than for a volunteer army relative to the length of effective service. This was reflected in the large number of men who at any one time could not fill effective establishment positions in units.
• National service involved a high turnover of men in units and this contributed to a high level of turbulence in postings which affected both national servicemen and regulars.
• The scheme did not provide supplies of experienced NCOs and officers and very specialized military skills (as might come from reserve forces).

This list of advantages and disadvantages was gleaned (but with some modification) from conventional military wisdom of the time.

Not mentioned are the social effects which were later examined by Withers (1976) or the alienation from the army system of the average conscript as alleged by Ross (1975). To my knowledge the Army has never admitted to any of the regular/conscript friction or mutual dislike which Ross detected in her survey; certainly it did never see any possible regular/conscript rivalry as a serious disadvantage in the operation of the scheme or the operational effectiveness of the army as a whole. Perhaps most regular officers tried so hard to avoid any friction that they refused to believe it could happen. (It was the author’s experience that unit effectiveness was enhanced by the presence of national servicemen, and given the different motivations of a regular and a national serviceman, neither perceived a threat in the other.)

Absorption of National Servicemen

‘Absorption’ refers to the capacity of the Regular Army to accept the training commitment involved with national servicemen and remain a viable operational force. There is a limit to the degree to which a regular force can be ‘diluted’ by intakes of short service soldiers.

Absorption (or dilution) capacity factors are related to the ‘steady state’ system. One expression of the steady state system is that NSM should be spread equally throughout the Army by intakes so that at no time will the routine turnover affect the viability of units. Another is that no unit should contain a disproportionate number from any one intake of NSM, and yet another is that each intake should be spread equally over all sub-units and within sub-units.

The most obvious advantages of the steady state system of NS induction are the stability of the training system, the regular and even replacement of NSM who have completed their NS full-time obligation, steady levels of experience in operational units and predictable manpower levels.

The principal factors governing the capacity of the Army to absorb NSM were:

• the compatibility of categories of manpower eg. officers and other ranks (‘enlisted men’), men and women, skilled and unskilled;
• wastage and recruiting rates for regular soldier;
• transfers of NSM to the Regular Army;
• Regular Army non-commissioned officer potential;
• experience levels in the Regular Army;
• NS rank potential and skills ie. quality of the NSM inducted; and
• differences in absorption capacity across the various corps of the army eg. Military Police units have a greater ability to accept dilution than infantry operational units.

Any system of conscription be it universal or selective presents problems in absorption, and the greater the degree of defence threat or involvement the greater the problems.

There is obviously a transition period between the time of induction of the first intake and the attainment of a steady state, and it is suggested that the difficulties in this transition
period can be minimized by an understanding of the operation of the steady state system. The absorption problems encountered by the Australian Army throughout the 1965-1972 scheme were however relatively minor compared with the problems encountered by, say, Britain at the commencement of World War II when massive numbers of men were inducted beyond the capacity of the defence services to absorb. Presumably every other country which has attempted partial or total mobilization (with or without being engaged in concurrent military action) has faced similar problems.

Conclusion

In this article the essential elements of the system of conscription have been described:

- selective rather than universal
- two years full-time obligation for service
- military service in the army only (with no civilian service option)
- male only
- age at induction twenty years (older if previously deferred)
- selection by ballot
- categories of limited or indefinite deferment after the ballot
- conditions of service, including overseas service obligation, same as for regular soldiers
- civilian administration of induction

The advantages and disadvantages of national service over volunteer recruiting are listed. The views so expressed are those predominant in the military and are not necessarily representative of the community or the government.

Also included is mention of the problems associated with the absorption of national servicemen into the Regular Army and the factors which govern the degree of dilution or the absorption capacity of the army. The importance of the maintenance of a steady state system of national service induction and discharge is stressed.

Reference is made to attitude surveys carried out by J. Ross, the attitudes being those of national service recruits and discharges to conscripted military service. The findings of G. Withers in regard to the impact of national service on employment, education and marriage are included not only because of their sociological significance, but also because the Australian community is reminded that decisions relating to the future introduction of conscription should not be made only in a political or military context.

NOTES

1. No mention is made of the controversial history of conscription in Australia and, in more recent times, of the political dislocation and dissent associated with the 1965-1972 scheme in its closing stages. It is a study in itself to dissociate in terms of public opinion the scheme itself from the nature of Australia's external involvement.

2. The necessity to introduce conscription (as opposed to voluntary recruiting) is disputed.

3. 24.3% of all twenty-year old youths were chosen by ballot, and not being granted exemption or indefinite deferment, were subjected to examination. Of these 50.6% did not have to serve due to failure to meet enlistment standards.

The 1951-1959 scheme, 60.4% of all eighteen-year olds were subjected to examination. Of these 15.1% did not have to serve due to failure to meet enlistment standards. The relatively low medical rejection rate of the earlier scheme reflects the fact that it was a Universal training scheme of short duration.

The 1965-1972 scheme had to impose higher enlistment standards because the NSM were being used to expand the operational capability of the Regular Army.

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PACIFIC DEFENCE REPORTER YEAR BOOK 1978/79
Reviewed by Major D.R. Morton, RAE, Australian Joint Warfare Establishment.

This, the second annual edition of the Pacific Defence Reporter Year Book as well as providing a quantitative assessment of military power and defence expenditure of countries throughout the world, also contains many relevant, well-researched and timely articles on matters of international and regional concern. The introductory section "The Year in Perspective" covers broadly the major international events of the year which are then developed in subsequent chapters. Such important current topics as Disarmament and Nuclear Proliferation, the Camp David Middle East Peace Agreements, the European Military Balance and the situation in Africa are authoritatively addressed.

Future world defence problems are also considered in the specific areas of Trans National Terrorism, The Law of the Sea, Antarctic development and the rapid advances being made in Electronic Warfare capability. Closer to home South East Asia, and in particular the Indochina problem, and the Indian Ocean are discussed in detail.

A comprehensive look at the Australian defence scene concentrates on the threat, the capability of the three Services and the Defence Force as a whole to meet the threat, ANZUS and Australia's involvement and the problems being experienced in surveillance of Australia's remote coastal areas. Of particular interest are the sections on the regional defence industrial capacity and future problems of world security and how they relate to Australia.

This edition does not contain as many articles from the Pacific Defence Reporter as the first edition and it now includes a country index as well as a table of contents for ease of reference. The Pacific Defence Reporter Year Book is an essential reference book of the problems, facts and statistics of world security with emphasis on Australian defence.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel R.D. Manley psc, BA, ALAA, RAEME (R of O).

Rodger Swearingen is an expert on the relations between the USSR and Japan. He is professor of international relations at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California where he specializes in Soviet foreign policy, world Communist movements and Soviet-Asian relations. This is his eighth major book in the field, and it is a comprehensive study of the interplay of the foreign policies of Russia and Japan. It is addressed to the serious student of international affairs who is concerned with East Asian international relations and contemporary Japan.

The author has carefully organized his work into five parts. Part One is an overview of the historical rivalry of Japan vis-a-vis Russia, dating from almost a century before the Meiji Restoration of 1868, and Japan's momentous decision to modernise. The reasons for the Russian drive to the East, which prompted Japan's distrust of Russia, are briefly mentioned. This conflict of interests resulted in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and a resounding and humiliating defeat for Russia. It was the first time that an Asian nation had defeated a major European power. Henceforth, the Russians maintained a healthy respect for Japanese military power and pursued a policy of rapprochement to placate Japan.

Occasionally, during the late 1930s, the veneer of normal diplomatic relations was displaced by Soviet-Japanese border clashes in Manchuria; however, the Soviets discreetly backed away from full scale confrontation with Japan. Stalin knew that a war on two fronts, with Russia facing Nazi Germany in the West, and the Japanese in the East, would be disastrous for the then economically and militarily weak
Soviet Union. Japan had also decided to point its military machine southwards to capture the resource rich region of South East Asia. Japan considered that a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union would best serve her interests rather than joining her ally Nazi Germany in war against the Soviet Union. Russia ignored the overtures of the United States to declare war on Japan, and shrewdly maintained its neutrality in the East almost to the end of the Pacific War.

Part Two deals with the efforts by Russia to infiltrate Japanese postwar politics in an American occupied Japan, and draws heavily upon previously unpublished archival material from SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). Soviet exploitation of the Allied Council for Japan, and Moscow’s use of the well established (1922) Japanese Communist Party to combat American influence are closely examined. I found the account of the Soviet indoctrination of Japanese troops captured at the end of World War II compelling reading, particularly the part played by the Soviet orchestrated Japan Newspaper (Nihon Shimban), and the Friendship Societies (Tomo no Kai). However, only a relatively small number of Japanese servicemen joined the Japanese communist Party on their repatriation to Japan.

In Part Three, the author describes the still “elusive peace” between the Soviet Union and Japan, and traces the economic and trade treaties of the 1960s through to the present, highlighting the burning, unresolved issue of the return of the Northern Territories to Japan, and the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1977.

Joint economic ventures in Siberia, and trade and business arrangements between the two countries are examined in Part Four. The attractiveness of access to the huge oil and gas areas in West Siberia for an energy hungry Japan must assume increasing significance, even though the Japanese are acutely aware of the political implications and strategic risks entailed.

It is clear that Russia wants Japanese technology and funds to develop the huge resources of Siberia. How far Japan is prepared to go to accommodate Russia in the development of Siberia will depend largely on continued access by Japan to the raw materials of the West, including Australia, and also access to the resources of China. Denied this access, Japan may well have to co-operate with Russia on Russian terms.

Part Five gives a lucid account of the postwar policies of China and Russia toward Japan, and the effects of the breach in Sino-Soviet relations. In addition, the implications of these policies to the United States are discussed. The burgeoning trade between the People’s Republic of China and Japan over the past decade culminated in an important private trade agreement signed on 16 February 1978. The terms of this agreement will allow Japan to import Chinese crude oil and coal. In return, China will import Japanese industrial plants, construction materials and equipment. This Part also discusses the security of Japan including military deployments of various nations in and around Japan. The significance of the military build up of North Korea, and the decline of US military power in the Far East is discussed in some detail. Faced with growing Soviet naval power and the threat this implies to Japan’s sea lanes, the Japanese appear to be concluding plans to build up their naval and military forces.

The author does not dwell on the implications of a militarily independent Japan; however, he attributes the Japanese military buildup as an inevitable consequence of Soviet intransigence and also the reduction of United States power in the region. No doubt Japan’s rearmament will be accompanied, at an opportune time, by a regional defence cooperation treaty between herself and the People’s Republic of China in order to meet the growing Soviet challenge.

The text is well supported by illustrations, notes and an excellent Index. There are also six Appendices giving the full texts of the important postwar treaties and agreements between the Soviet Union and Japan, and summaries of the lesser agreements from 1956 to 1977. The last Appendix is a break down by organization and item of the Japanese Defence Budget for the Financial Year 1977.

I recommend this book to those interested in the so-called “Moscow-Peking-Tokyo triangle”. It is particularly relevant to the serious student of international relations as it contains a wealth of factual information presented in a clear and graphic style. It is an important reference tool for further examination of the issues between Japan and Russia.
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