Junior Leadership in the ADF
Corporal Mark Donaldson, VC, Australian Army
Lieutenant Commander Robert Smilie, RAN
Corporal Brendan Reid, Australian Army
Flight Sergeant Penny Baker, RAAF
Leading Seaman Trish Dollisson, RAN
Warrant Officer Class 1 Craig Simmich, CSM, Australian Army Reserve
Warrant Officer Ian Pinch, RAAF
Corporal Karen Cahill, Australian Army
Sub Lieutenant Viruben Watson, RAN
Corporal Tim Hughes, Australian Army Reserve
Flight Sergeant David Turnbull, RAAF
Private Andrew Boutillier, Australian Army Reserve
Lieutenant Commander J. David Jones, RAN
Corporal Alex Howard, Australian Army
Warrant Officer Cary Thompson, RAAF and Flight Sergeant Greg Purdue, RAAF
Warrant Officer Class 1 Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM, Australian Army Reserve

A view from Canada – ‘Reform and the Non-Commissioned Officer’
Master Warrant Officer Stephan R. Smith, Canadian Forces

A view from the US – ‘Leadership and Life’
Colonel John D. Sims, US Army

A view from Singapore – ‘More than warfighters: the role of “strategic corporals”’
Dr Ong Weichong, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Junior leader professional development— who has the time? 
Dr Steven Metz, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The Australian Defence Force Journal seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters, such as strategic studies, security and international relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the Journal does not pay for articles but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best in each issue.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without the use of templates or paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable (and contributors should view previous issues for style). Length should be between 3500 and 5000 words. Please ‘spell check’ the document with Australian English before sending. Additional guidelines are available from the website.

Articles should contain endnotes, bibliography and brief biographical details of the author.

Endnotes


References or bibliography


Tables, maps and photographs are acceptable but must be of high enough quality to reproduce in high resolution. Photographs must be at least 300 ppi in TIF format and obviously pertinent to the article.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by an independent referee with some knowledge of the subject. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and, if accepted, will be published in the next Journal. Be advised, it may take quite a while from submission to print.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Editor via email at: publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Authors accept the Editor may make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author, however, the theme or intent of the article will not be changed.
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Dr Steven Metz, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

BOOK REVIEWS
Chairman’s comments

Welcome to Issue No. 187, themed on ‘the junior ADF leadership experience’.

The lead article is by Corporal Mark Donaldson, VC. We are obviously very pleased that he has taken the time and effort to contribute to this special edition, sharing his thoughts on this important subject. His contribution is also an exemplary demonstration of the importance of Defence practitioners, of all ranks, being prepared to participate actively in the discussion and debate on matters of professional interest to the ADF.

This is followed by a further 15 articles by ADF contributors, ranging in rank from Private to Lieutenant Commander, and with representation from all three Services, including several reservists. Again, it is pleasing that so many relatively junior ADF members have made the effort to contribute and, indeed, we are hopeful that their example will encourage others to contribute more generally to future issues of the ADF Journal.

The issue concludes with individual views on the subject from Canada, the US and Singapore, as well as an opinion piece from a respected academic at the US Army War College. It is not suggested, of course, that these articles necessarily reflect the views of their respective militaries. Nor are we inferring that the militaries of these countries mirror the culture or practices of the ADF. The articles have simply been included because they provide another perspective for our readers.

It will become apparent from this issue that our contributors have brought varying approaches and differing emphases to the subject of junior leadership. Our readership will similarly take differing messages from the articles. There are, however, several ‘themes’ that are common to a number of them. One is that junior leaders are increasingly finding themselves in situations where they are expected to make on-the-spot, ‘tactical’ decisions, notwithstanding the greatly-enhanced communications available to modern militaries.

Another is that junior leaders primarily need to provide leadership, not management, and that they must be prepared to make firm and timely decisions, with several contributors commenting that—at times—any decision is better than no decision at all. Some of the contributors also provide leadership ‘tips’, such as the article by Colonel Jim Sims, US Army, most of which are relevant to any leader, regardless of rank. Our expectation is that the articles will generate interest and stimulate debate, and that some of our readers will take the opportunity to comment via letters to the Editor or by submitting short opinion pieces expressing a contrary or supporting view.

It certainly was not easy to select the best overall article. Ultimately, the Board decided that Warrant Officer Class 1 Craig Simmich, CSM, Australian Army Reserve, should be awarded the $500 prize for his article titled ‘How Technology Has Changed the Way We Contact Home While on Deployment’, which also wins the $250 prize for best article from Army.

Some may be surprised, given that the article makes no specific mention of junior leadership. However, the Board felt that the article raises an extremely important issue for today’s ADF, namely the reality that deployed forces, regardless of Service, typically—and for better or worse, and more so than ever before—are intimately aware of the trials and tribulations being experienced by their family and friends back home in Australia and elsewhere.
That is a markedly different situation from World War 1 and 2, and even Korea and Vietnam, where the main form of contact was by mail. In the recently-published *Farewell, Dear People*, recounting the lives of ten Australians killed in World War 1, Ross McMullin mentions the poignant tragedy of families back home still writing letters, unaware that their loved one had been killed several months earlier. And while the occasional letter contained distressing news or was the dreaded ‘Dear John, I’ve found someone else’, most deliberately portrayed a rather ‘rosy’ picture of the home front. Compare that to the situation today, when a soldier under fire in Afghanistan could have been talking hours earlier to his family at home, in tears over the sickness of a child, at wit’s end over a financial dilemma or arguing over a personal relationship.

That is not to suggest our forebears didn’t worry about their family and friends back home. But those deployed today usually have much more immediate and intimate contact with their family and friends, which can of course be either a positive or a negative. It clearly has implications for the motivation and morale of our forces, making the task of the ADF’s junior leaders even more complex and demanding. It is a subject that arguably deserves greater discussion and debate, and would certainly be a welcome topic for an article in a future edition of the *ADF Journal*.

I am also pleased to announce that the $250 prizes for the best articles from Navy and Air Force have been awarded as follows:

- Navy – Leading Seaman Trish Dollisson, RAN, ‘Women in the ADF – Navy leading the way’

As usual, we have a selection of book reviews, with an additional number in the on-line version of the *Journal*. We remain keen to hear from readers wishing to join the list of reviewers, who are sent books provided to the Editor by publishers. If you are interested, please provide your contact details and area of interest to the Editor at publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Our next edition, Issue No. 188 (July/August 2012), is a ‘general’ issue, with contributions required by late May. The following edition will be November/December 2012, for which contributions will be required by late September. Submission guidelines are on the *Journal* website www.adfjournal.adc.edu.au

In closing, I would take the opportunity to welcome to the Board, Colonel Dennis Malone, Director of Army Research and Analysis, representing the Army. Lieutenant Colonel Luke Carroll, who has been on the Board in a ‘dual-hatted’ role for a number of years, will now be representing the Reserve.

I hope you enjoy this edition.

**Craig Orme, AM, CSC**
Major General
Commander, Australian Defence College
Chairman of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board
Junior Leadership in the ADF

Corporal Mark Donaldson, VC, Australian Army

There are many levels of leadership. It could be argued that there is senior leadership and junior leadership—or strategic and operational leadership—and that they are intertwined respectively. Generally, people in a military environment will associate senior-level leadership with a higher level of rank, and junior-level leadership with lower ranks.

But we must try to remember that this is a preconception. And to think that it is only senior levels of rank who have to make ‘senior’ leadership decisions and that corporals and captains make only junior-level leadership decisions is, in the writer’s opinion, an outdated and restrictive way of thinking.

Leaders, both junior and senior, need to remember and constantly revisit the purpose of their job. Is it to appease those superior to you or is it to lead and inspire those around you to mission success?

Before continuing, it is important to acknowledge that a leader must have the guts to lead. All the education in the world does not make a leader. In war, some of the hardest decisions are faced by those at the tip of the spear—privates, corporals, sergeants and, to be fair, lieutenants and captains.

In today’s battlefield, the ramifications of soldiers’ actions can have international consequences, even policy-changing consequences. You only have to look at recent events in Afghanistan to realise this.

Within the context of this article, however, the important thing to consider is that those in a leadership position have to do just that, lead, and not pass the buck or filter the process so that no-one is really responsible in case of failure. Leaders at all levels need to be doing what is asked of them and to lead to achieve the mission.

One of the best examples of leadership I have witnessed personally was on a recent deployment in Afghanistan. The soldier in question unequivocally backed the ability of his men and, at the same time, held those in support of the ground troops to doing their job. The result was that those he led were happy and 100 per cent willing to do whatever was required, and more, to complete the task that was asked. Those supporting the group of soldiers executing the mission he held to their respective jobs and, at times, was possibly seen as unrelenting, maybe even unreasonable. However, he made leadership decisions that were critical to achieving the mission and then demonstrated leadership by being willing to fight to achieve the desired outcome.

One of the benefits of junior leadership is the position you are in to pass on wisdom and to lead others into not making the same mistakes as you yourself may have made.

It is a unique position to be in and, from my own personal experience, it is rewarding to see those who have taken heed and really understood the lessons passed onto them.
It is also a powerful position to be in, especially when you consider the old adage that, in combat, no soldier can be managed to victory; he or she must be led.

*Corporal Donaldson enlisted in the Australian Army in June 2002. He served in 1RAR before completing the SAS Selection Course and being posted to SASR in 2004. He has served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan.*

*On 16 January 2009, he became the first Australian in almost 40 years to be awarded the Victoria Cross. His citation, relating to an action in Afghanistan in September 2008, reads ‘for most conspicuous acts of gallantry in action in a circumstance of great peril’. He was promoted Corporal in 2010. In the same year, he was also named Young Australian of the Year.*
Operation ANODE: heavy landing craft — ‘the quiet achievers’

Lieutenant Commander Robert Smilie, RAN

I assumed command of HMAS Wewak as a Lieutenant in December 2008. At the time, I was the youngest and most junior Commanding Officer in the Fleet. My time as CO Wewak had a profound effect on me, both from a personal and career perspective. I found the ship’s company of Wewak to be professional, resilient and dedicated to the often ‘quiet achiever’ role that comes with being posted to heavy landing craft (LCH).

My command team, while small, held a great deal of experience, far more than I had. When Wewak deployed to Operation ANODE, I was 30. My Executive Officer was a 49-year old Lieutenant, who had changed over from the Royal Navy as a sailor and then commissioned in the RAN. My Chief Engineer was 45 and my Chief Coxswain needed to be carbon-dated to determine his age but was, suffice to say, very experienced. Apart from the obvious fact that my second-in-command was the same rank as me—let alone almost 20 years older—which could seem to cause issues, it did not. I remain grateful to all of them for their unwavering support and frank advice, which led me to a very successful command.

Wewak deployed to the Solomon Islands in company with HMAS Brunei from July to September 2010 for Operation ANODE, as part of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ships were deployed to provide a heightened presence and suitable response options during the Solomon Island national elections.

Wewak provided an intra-theatre lift capability to the Combined Task Force (CTF), comprising of Army personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. Wewak also provided assistance to the participating police force, made up of Australian Federal Police (AFP), New Zealand Police Force and Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) personnel. The first priority was inter-operability, as working with all of these agencies with differing command structures, cultures and priorities had the potential to cause all kinds of challenges.

Wewak’s command team put together an excellent training package that included safety briefs, embarkation and disembarkation of vehicles, personnel and stores, ship tours and overall workings of a RAN ship, including command structures and key personnel. Not everything was smooth sailing as far as relationships between agencies, cultural understandings and differing operational methods went; however, overall Wewak integrated well into the CTF.

We dedicated the first week of this training to taking every member of RAMSI through the briefs and embarkation procedures, ironing out our own procedures including vehicle marshalling, securing of loads and positive control of large groups of troops and police who were unfamiliar with the maritime environment. We also focused on seaboot operations, utilising Wewak as a mother ship, and had all personnel conduct multiple-boat entries over the bow door and by jumping ladder.
The training and procedures themselves seemed relatively straight forward; however, it highlighted many issues from both sides which we were able to rectify. The time spent training came to fruition throughout the deployment with the requirement to conduct real insertions into remote areas of the Solomon Islands.

The most memorable of these occurred with very little notice. I was asked by the CTF Commander to attend a combined brief run by the AFP. They had recent intelligence to indicate that two of their most wanted fugitives were located in a small village to the west of Honiara, which was not accessible by road. The AFP’s plan was to gather as many boats as they could and conduct the 40-nautical mile transit to insert into the village under the cover of darkness.

The landing party consisted of approximately 60 personnel, led by AFP Special Operations Group members and included Army and RSIPF personnel. At that time, the CTF Commander suggested they may wish to use Wewak as a staging platform. I provided a quick brief on LCH capability and what we could do for them in terms of the proposed mission. I determined that I would be unable to beach in order to land the teams, because of the lack of beach intelligence on the area. The fact that it was a night-time insertion without prior intelligence compounded the issue further. The AFP’s main concern was the ship would be seen and heard from ashore. I assured them that this was not the case and the planning began.

With only 3-hours’ notice, the ship’s company prepared Wewak to receive 60 personnel from various agencies, several seaboats, equipment, ammunition, weapons and two rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs), which were to be towed astern of the ship. The ship sailed at 2330 having already worked a full day and then the late notice preparations, safety of personnel on the deck, and fatigue became my primary concerns.

The wardroom became the briefing room and the flag deck was transformed into a deployable headquarters, consisting of AFP and Army command teams. My only demand was that I controlled all of the movements of the seaboats and RHIBs at all times, as they were being driven by AFP, Navy and Army personnel. This was to prevent any misunderstandings or contradictory orders from other commanders that may have placed the boats and Wewak in a compromising situation. Overall, it worked well. We treated it as a mini amphibious raid.

While the weather for the insertion was favourable to us, the tidal stream was not. I manoeuvred Wewak as close to the beach as was safe under the cover of darkness within poorly surveyed waters. The offload into the boats took longer than anticipated, due to the tidal stream, and while I wanted to anchor, the AFP commanders were concerned about the noise alerting the village. To my great satisfaction, the first wave of boats was unable to see or hear the ship once they got to the beach and needed to be vectored back under the positive control of my command team. All personnel were ashore by sunrise and the village surrounded without any compromise. Unfortunately, the two fugitives were not there but did turn themselves in at a later stage.

At sunrise, I anchored the ship in the vicinity of the beach and conducted a beach reconnaissance. I found a large sandbank about 200 yards from the beach which prevented me from beaching Wewak. This was also my first reality check on my personal fatigue levels, as I fell asleep in the front of the seaboat sitting up while conducting the survey. While I had taken care to ensure the ship’s company was rotated through rest periods, I had failed to do the same for myself.
We conducted the recovery via boat transfers. The weather turned on us as rain squalls set in. One of the RHIBs became swamped on the beach and only just made it back to the ship. The ship’s company moved into damage control mode and quickly recovered the RHIB without too much difficulty, much to the surprise of our AFP friends. Every member involved was now drenched to the skin and fatigued from a full night’s work.

Perhaps the best lesson I took away from the whole experience was that it is the little things that matter. On the return journey, I had the Chef cook up some doughnuts for everybody onboard. The sombre mood changed in an instant and everyone forgot how tired, cold and wet they were, for the sake of two doughnuts. For the remainder of our time in the Solomon Islands, the troops and AFP members constantly asked us for doughnuts!

We berthed the ship acutely aware of our fatigue levels, with extra precautions put in place. While the objective was not achieved, as there were no arrests, the mission itself was an overwhelming success, a demonstration of professionalism and collaboration of a multi-agency operation. The resounding success for me came later when a senior AFP commander asked how the AFP could request the use of LCHs in the future.

My two years in command of Wewak have proved to be the best so far of my career and have me craving another opportunity for command in the future. The experience exposes you to many different aspects of the ADF and particularly personnel management at a junior level. I would encourage any Lieutenant in the Navy to pursue a minor war vessel command.

Lieutenant Commander Smilie graduated from ADFA in 2000 with Bachelor of Science (Computer Science). He has completed a Masters in Management and his postings have included Executive Officer HMAS Geraldton, and Officer Commanding Navy Squadron at ADFA, along with other support roles. Lieutenant Commander Smilie commanded HMAS Wewak from December 2008 to December 2010, and is currently the Operational Requirements Manager for JP2048 Phase 5, the Heavy Landing Craft Replacement Project.
Leadership: a section commander’s view

Corporal Brendan Reid, Australian Army

Leadership is the art of influencing and directing people to willingly achieve the team or organisational goal.

Australian Army doctrinal definition

Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision; its practice is an art. Leaders are essential.

Field-Marshall Sir William Slim

Leadership within the Australian Army seems to be something that we always talk about but do we really understand it? From this writer’s experience, I have been witness to some excellent leaders and some very poor leaders, at all ranks across the Infantry Corps. In a lot of cases, leaders were taking the ‘easy wrong over the hard right’.

First, we need to talk about the difference between ‘command’ and ‘leadership’. Although the two can be transposed, there are subtle differences. Command is the legal authority bestowed on an individual by virtue of their rank. Leadership, on the other hand, is the art of influencing, motivating and inspiring people to achieve team goals. Leadership can survive without command—and history is littered with examples of a single digger, without command authority, leading a team to achieve an objective. It is the influencing, motivating and inspiring that differentiates whether people follow, because they have been ordered to, or whether people believe in the task and the leader to achieve the task.

A large part of being an effective leader is the strength of the individual’s character and, unfortunately these days, it is something mostly overlooked. Not everyone is a leader, despite what the Army posters may tell you—some people are just not leaders. That isn’t to say they aren’t good soldiers, it’s just a fact of life. Time within the Service doesn’t automatically make you a leader; a person’s character does. A person’s character—and how they can become an effective leader—can be broken up into several important and distinct areas, including:

• Commitment to service;
• Living the Army’s ethos and values, and behaving ethically;
• Professional knowledge;
• Decision making; and
• Effective communication.

Commitment to service

Commitment to service doesn’t just mean coming to work every day. It means taking your section, platoon or company out for training, instead of sitting in the office doing paperwork. Corporals/lieutenants can conduct training, while second-in-commands/sergeants conduct
administration or vice versa. Administration can be conducted after the training day or before PT. Leaders need to conduct PT with their team—and also be one of the best performers.

A team will be inspired and more motivated if you, as the leader, are physically strong and robust. If a leader needs to use his or her own personal time to physically improve themselves, then that’s what has to be done. No-one with rank—and especially within the Infantry Corps—should have trouble passing a basic fitness assessment (BFA). If a leader does have trouble passing a BFA, then they need to take a long hard look at themselves. As a leader, how can you inspire or motivate your team if you can’t pass a BFA or conduct hard PT/training? It is often all too easy to ‘pay off’ from training/PT but commitment to service means doing all these things with the team and conducting administration when the diggers have knocked off.

Courage, initiative and teamwork

These are the Army’s core values, which every infantryman should live by. The courage to continue on during tough times and not give up. The ability to use one’s initiative to exploit a weakness, at the correct time and place, to render the enemy combatant ineffective. With initiative also comes a certain amount of trust that must be observed, both up and down the chain of command. This trust is built through hard training and teamwork. Teamwork is the cornerstone of our organisation, with the section being the foundation, without which the whole structure could collapse.

Professional knowledge

Professional knowledge is a key aspect for any leader. How can one mentor their team without the prerequisite knowledge. Knowledge of the profession of arms can inspire confidence in your subordinates, whereas lack of knowledge can degrade credibility. This writer is constantly amazed, especially at the junior NCO/lieutenant level, at the lack of knowledge. This wouldn’t be such a problem, except that some people are too lazy to ask or find out when they discover the gap in their knowledge. This writer knows junior NCOs who consistently cannot tell you the four stages of the attack or the conduct of the close assault drill.

Now I don’t mean to say that you, as a junior (or even senior) leader should spend all your free time reading doctrine etc; however, every leader needs to continue developing their professional mastery of the profession of arms, and impart this knowledge onto the diggers.

Decision-making skills

Sound decision-making skills are a must for any leader. A team that has faith in a leader’s ability to make timely and sound decisions will be inspired and motivated to keep going in tough times. No-one wants to follow someone into war whose answer is always ‘up the guts, lots of smoke’. Sound decision-making skills are achieved through hard training and professional knowledge. All too often, however, the Australian Army (at section/platoon level anyway) seems to wait for a ‘trip to come up’, then begin professional development and TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) training.

Professional military education should be run in the battalions at least once a month. Knock the diggers off early on the first Friday of every month, for example, and get all the NCOs and officers together for some training. A white board, markers, projector and a bit of creative
thinking are all that is required to spend an afternoon working through some TEWTs. That, in turn, exposes everyone to alternative ways of solving problems, with the flow-on effect of improving the group’s decision-making processes.

All too often, this writer sees people making decisions in isolation. For a deliberate task, call in the junior NCOs/sergeants/company sergeant majors/lieutenants etc. Yes, the burden of responsibility is on the leader; however, ‘more heads are better than one’ and a different perspective on a problem might highlight some strengths or weaknesses with a plan. A leader should never be too proud to accept constructive advice from either superior or subordinate—although, in my experience, this is often not the case and it needs to change.

Communication

In regards to effective verbal communication, I believe that the Infantry Corps as a whole has it just about right. This is through Subject 1 and Subject 2 training for corporals and the experience of delivering back-briefs and public speaking during training, at both the soldier and officer ranks. More experience comes through the delivery of training within the battalion, as well as time and practice. An effective communicator can influence their team to achieve things with a mere utterance of a few words. Clear-cut and simple orders, effectively given in battle, should be all that is needed. However, effectively communicating is a degradable skill and it takes continuing practice to ensure these skills don’t fall by the wayside.

Conclusion

This article has explored but a fraction of leadership and how to improve it. The old saying ‘hard right over the easy wrong’ applies here. A little extra work now in training for our leaders can have untold effects on one’s team in a life-or-death situation and the ability of the leader to motivate, influence and inspire the team to achieve the objective or task.

Corporal Reid enlisted in the Regular Army in 2005 and, after training, was posted to 3RAR, where he served until 2011. He was then posted to the School of Infantry at the Infantry Centre. He deployed on Operation ASTUTE in 2006, 2007 and 2008.

NOTES

1. Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0: Command, leadership and management, Chapter 1, paragraph 33(b).
2. From an address to the Australian Institute of Management, while Governor General of Australia, April 1957.
3. Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0: Command, leadership and management, Chapter 1, paragraph 45(a).
The First Rung of the Leadership Ladder

Flight Sergeant Penny Baker, RAAF

I remember doing my Corporal Promotion Course many years ago and most of us thinking in the beginning that it was pitched too high and wondering why we needed to know about leadership. Throughout the course, I kept hearing us all say, ‘but we are only corporals’. On the course, we covered a lot about leadership and it wasn’t until the last few days that the ‘penny’ actually dropped.

Fast-forward six years and there I was standing up the front, ‘on stage’ facilitating the same course. I can see 18 fresh faces sitting in front of me. Some of them already doubted their ability to pass the course, some of them thinking that it was a waste of time—as they thought they knew everything about being a corporal already—and some who were quite excited about the whole thing.

The students would go out on breaks and I would hear them discussing the topics that would be covered. One of the most talked about is the role of an NCO and, after discussions with the students, they thought it was quite a simple assumption, as we think most corporals automatically know what those roles are. There was a lot of pre-lesson chatter about this topic, together with enthusiasm, as they were about to be informed, ‘formally’, of what is expected. After further questions, it becomes apparent that most were not aware that there is an actual order written, detailing their role. And until they do their promotion course, most do not realise the responsibilities and expectations that are involved with the rank of corporal.

Some of the other topics covered are RAAF ‘Values, Equity and Diversity’, as well as the Defence Force Discipline Act, although these were not a shock to the course members. There were two subjects that did cause quite a lot of discussion in the classroom, as well as on the breaks, and these were ‘Leadership’ and ‘Subordinate Development’.

These subjects were ones that I jumped at to facilitate, as these were the two areas where most of the students had their so-called ‘light bulb moments’ or the ‘ahaaa’ moments. The reactions from the students at the beginning of the subject lessons are varied. From the doubters you observe frowns, from the ‘know-it–alls’ there are eyes being rolled, and finally from the enthusiastic, many a jaw-dropping. But during the lesson, all parties start asking very relevant questions and start showing great interest.

A majority of the corporals on the course did have subordinates who they were responsible for but had no idea initially that these troops were their responsibility with regards to dress and bearing, discipline, military ethos, and development, as well as being their mentor and a positive role model. They considered themselves equal with the aircraftmen/-women and the leading aircraftmen/-women, just with a bit more knowledge. After realising their responsibilities, all the lessons that were being given fell into place and received more interest.

Many of the examples of leadership models that were shown were the same examples given to students at Officer Training School. When this was told to the students, they sat up and listened intently and took the whole thing a little more seriously. Many of the points brought up by the students encompassed decision making and having the courage to do this.
We provided a lot of time for general discussion about the subject and encouraged members to share their own experiences in the workplace of situations that they had found themselves in but were unsure how to handle. We then went into the lesson and provided ideas and tools that the corporals could utilise to help them in these situations. After the main body of the lesson was delivered and discussed, we then went back to those questions that were initially asked and asked the students to now have a look at how they would deal with those situations, knowing what they now knew.

It was amazing to see the turn-around and how their perceptions had changed in relation to leadership and their involvement. It was evident that their confidence had grown and it was as if they had now been granted the permission to be a NCO. We still had many discussions and questions about how do you know if you are making the right decision and what if you make a wrong decision. It was bantered around the room for sometime until one of the quieter corporals brought up a scene from the movie, ‘Band of Brothers’. He mentioned a scene that went along the lines of saying a bad leader isn’t a leader who makes bad decisions, a bad leader is a leader who makes no decisions. Suddenly, you see many of the ‘light bulb’ moments, as they could all relate to the movie, thus understand the meaning and could relate it back to their own work.

After a few hours of discussion about leadership, the students themselves were coming up with scenarios in their workplaces where their superiors were particularly bad leaders and why they thought this. Also, times when they saw their boss not having the courage to make the ‘D’ and the lack of respect people had for him/her. I put the situation back to them and asked them what would they do now, knowing all this extra ‘stuff’ and how would they handle these situations.

Examples then arose of times when their bosses did do the right thing and why they have so much respect for them. The students dissected each of these scenarios to see what worked, why it worked and would it work in their environment. They were coming up with their own ideas and own solutions. They were enthusiastic about their roles now as NCOs and understand that if they are thinking these things about their bosses, maybe the junior ranks are thinking these things about them.

On graduation, whether they like to admit it or not, we had 18 inspired, enthusiastic corporals who now felt that they been given the permission or the ‘go ahead’ to go back to their units and make a difference. It was also evident in the way they carried themselves on graduation that they were a lot more confident within themselves. It was still up to them to have the courage to go back and utilise their new skills but the difference in them was that now they were aware of these new skills.

*Flight Sergeant Penny Baker joined the RAAF in 1988 as a Personnel Selection Assessor and in 1992 remustered to a Clerk Admin. Her postings have included HQ Integrated Air Defence Systems Butterworth, where she experienced working with troops and supervisors from the Five Power Defence Arrangements’ partners. She has also been a facilitator on the Corporal Promotion Course at the School of Post Graduate Studies in Amberley. She is now a Personnel Manager in the Directorate of Personnel – Air Force and will be moving across to Adaptive Culture at the end of the year.*
Women in the ADF – Navy leading the way

Leading Seaman Trish Dollisson, RAN

I start with the premise that the function of leadership is to produce more leaders, not more followers.

Ralph Nader

The concept of leadership is not a new one to the ADF. Indeed, one of the core tenets of the ADF is leadership, and this is underpinned by the hierarchical structure those serving their nation adhere to.

During my time in the ADF, just shy of a decade, I have always understood that good leadership is what enables us to achieve our missions in a timely and accurate fashion, with minimal loss of life or injury. Indeed, our leadership structure is reinforced by our successes and justifies the generally high regard and standards in which we are held by the Australian public. On those rare occasions where an incident reflects poorly on the ADF, the leadership of those involved is always called into question. This demonstrates further how imperative good leadership is within our ranks.

Let me assert that leadership is not the sole province of rank. As a Leading Seaman and junior NCO, I represent the first level of management within the RAN. I have been fortunate to benefit from many opportunities to develop my leadership skills while in the RAN. I have been a proud and willing participant in most of the programs offered by the Navy’s ‘Women’s Leadership Program’ (NWLP) and, from each of these successive development opportunities, have sought more challenges on which to hone my own leadership style and management skills.

The NWLP affords Navy women, from the ranks of Able Seaman through to Captain, the opportunity to pursue leadership development opportunities at no cost to the member. Each year, a range of programs are available for Navy women to attend, upon successful selection. The primary aim of the NWLP is to raise the profile on female participation in the workforce, to encourage women to recognise their leadership potential, and to realise that women and men have inherently different leadership styles.

The Senior Service was suitably the first Service to implement a leadership program specifically designed for women. The Navy recognised the intrinsic value of women in the workplace and has developed the NWLP accordingly. The NWLP falls under the ideologies of ‘New Generation Navy’ (NGN), the reform initiative that identified the need to educate and embed desirable ‘signature behaviours’ in all sailors, at all ranks.

Our leadership—and lack of formal education in it prior to the Leading Seaman rank—was called into question and resulted in the creation of promotion courses for all ranks beyond Seaman. These too have been welcomed by the many hundreds of sailors who have already benefited from them. Formalised education and training has resulted in a greater understanding throughout the Navy of leadership styles, good communication, knowledge of policy and decision making, and the ability to put all of those skills into action. The realisation that there is more than one kind of leadership style has been a revelation to many, and embraced by all—particularly women.
Through attendance at several seminars and completion of the 'Australian Applied Management Colloquium' (AAMC), under sponsorship by the NWLP, I have learnt more about leadership than I could fit into a small essay. The AAMC is an intensive six-month management development program that focuses on the critical dimensions of effective management. The program provides a unique platform for frontline and mid-level managers to deeply explore their own strengths, weaknesses and opportunities as they relate to building and maintaining highly effective teams. The AAMC is run by the Australian School of Applied Management and is underpinned by extensive research undertaken by Workplace Training Advisory Australia and the National Leadership Institute. While I do not have sufficient time or space here to discuss all I have learnt, I would like to share some of the following key points.

Every woman who has attended the NWLP in any form has gained ideas, advice, networks and lessons on how to be successful because of, not in spite of, their gender.

In particular, the ‘Navy Women’s Mentoring Program’ highlights the value of mentoring on leadership development. John Quincy Adams stated: ‘If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, you are a leader’. My mentors embody this quotation in every facet of their day-to-day lives; they have led and continue to lead me to believe that I can accomplish anything I set my mind to. I hope that one day we will simply be able to support a ‘Navy Mentoring Program’—the majority of my mentors have in fact been men—and not distinguish between genders.

I have learnt that it’s okay to ‘lead like a woman’. This is essential to the success of CDF’s ‘Action Plan for the Recruitment and Retention of Women in the ADF’. Women should not have to ‘fit the mould’ to be successful in their respective occupations—especially not a mould that was cast hundreds of years ago in Great Britain by a very different Navy to that which we enjoy in 2012.

I have also learnt that which I asserted at the start of this article: leadership is NOT the sole province of rank. I have had the pleasure recently to be a keynote speaker and panelist for two different civilian leadership conferences: for Accenture, the world’s largest consulting company, on International Women’s Day, and for the Public Sector Young Leaders Conference. That I was requested to speak at these events, as a young leader, highlights the value in which the public regard the training and experiences that I have gained from serving in the RAN. Those in the public sector did not look at my rank and dismiss the importance of what I could bring to the table—I believe that NGN is fostering this positive attitude, acknowledging that every individual has something valuable to contribute.

The ADF is a prominent supporter of equity in the workplace. The RAN has been identified as an ‘employer of choice’ by the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, and this acknowledgment is indicative of the efforts and achievements of a traditionally male-dominated environment to cultivate gender-based leadership. The ADF invites and implements recruitment and retention strategies that are focused on opening a portal through which anyone can contest and realise their potential, regardless of gender.

This realisation constantly allows thousands of individuals to surpass their own perceived limitations and exceed expectations on a daily and life-long basis. I am proud that Navy has the highest recruitment figures in the ADF for women, and that we currently represent one-in-five of all Navy members, from Recruit through to Rear Admiral. Navy women have now
commanded warships (Captain Michelle Miller, RAN, former Commanding Officer HMAS Perth, and Captain Allison Norris, RAN, former Commanding Officer HMAS Melbourne), major Naval establishments (Captain Katherine Richards, RAN, Commanding Officer HMAS Cerberus, and Commander Lisa Batchler, RAN, Commanding Officer HMAS Harman) and Rear Admiral Robyn Walker, RAN became the Navy’s first female Admiral and the ADF’s first female Surgeon General in 2011.

As the Senior Service, it is only right that we dominate the ADF in promoting good leadership throughout all ranks, regardless of gender. The Navy-inspired leadership journeys we are all undertaking, through the implementation of those aforementioned programs, strengthen us as an individual Service and reinforce the integrity and high regard in which the ADF is held as a whole. They make me proud to serve as a female member of the RAN today.

While ships are no longer wood, the following quote serves as a summary and reminder of the intrinsic importance of good leadership in today’s Navy:

   The pessimist complains about the wind, the optimist expects it to change, the leader adjusts the sails.

   John Maxwell

Leading Seaman Trish Dollisson joined the RAN in 2002 as an Electronic Warfare Linguist. Over the last nine years, she has completed a variety of deployments with the RAN, the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Australian Customs Service. Trish was selected for and completed specialist technical training with the US Marine Corps in Hawaii, and has represented the ADF on the ADF Parliamentary Exchange Program.

Trish speaks seven languages, other than English, specialising in Indonesian and South West Pacific languages. She has been a participant in the Navy Women’s Leadership Program, attending and/or completing the Australian Women’s Leadership Symposium, the Australian Regional Women’s Leaders Conference, the ‘My Mentor’ program and the Australian Applied Management Colloquium. Trish currently works at Russell Offices in Canberra as an information security analyst.

NOTES

How Technology Has Changed the Way We Contact Home While on Deployment

Warrant Officer Class 1 Craig Simmich, CSM, Australian Army Reserve

I am a soldier with 27 years experience in the military and have deployed on overseas operations on three separate occasions. My first deployment was to Western Sahara in 1991, my next to East Timor in 2003 and then to Afghanistan in 2007—and how things have changed for the better with access to contact to loved ones back at home while deployed.

Western Sahara, 1991

My first deployment was to Western Sahara in September 1991. At that time, there was no internet or email access. To give you some background on policies some 20 years ago, times have changed a lot. In 1991, for this deployment, the Government would not authorise the deployment of females or Reservists. Deployments back then were not set for a duration of six or eight months; this deployment was for 6-18 months, dependent on if the job was completed within this time.

While deployed, the Government confirmed that there would be rotations of six months’ duration. As the first contingent, we spent nine months deployed and there was no opportunity to return home for ROCL (relief out-of-country leave). There was no such thing as ROCL back then. Instead, we were able to go on a holiday, with a fully-paid return flight, to Rome or London, including seven nights’ accommodation while away. We were given two weeks leave and one of those weeks we paid for ourselves.

We had a contingent of 45 men with three computers and no such thing as internet or email. We had a satellite phone and radio systems for communications. We were allowed to phone home once a week for five minutes on the satellite phone ($20 a minute), with limited privacy.

The other option was to use a radio link back to Australia, over the air-waves, which was relayed to Glenbrook in the Blue Mountains. From Glenbrook, they would connect us to a home phone line over the radio and you could speak with loved ones. The downside was that your loved ones had to use radio protocol (using the word ‘over’ when they had finished talking, before you could speak next). These conversations were able to be heard by anyone listening in on the same frequency anywhere around the world. They were not secure radios, so the conversations were limited on what could be said.

These types of communications made contact limited to once a week and you could not be guaranteed of the system working or your loved ones being available when you were. The other form of contact with home was the mail system. Unlike now, post was not free. Postal costs were the standard costs from Sydney to home or home to Sydney. We had locked mail bags we could send mail home from Western Sahara, which saved the cost of international mail but we still had to pay the cost of post in Australia.
Our postal system would take a minimum of seven days for mail to get through, as it travelled from home to Sydney, Sydney to London, London to Agadir (Morocco) and then to Layounne (Western Sahara), which was the Australian headquarters base for deployment. In many cases, other nationalities would send their mail through our system, as it was quicker than the local postal system.

In summary, while deployed to Western Sahara we had limited phone contact and the postal system was slow and costly. I thought this is how deployments worked until I had my next overseas deployment.

**East Timor, 2003**

I deployed to East Timor some 12 years after my first deployment. By this time, we now had access to computers and there was access to emails and internet, so this made contact simpler if you had access to a computer. We also had access to welfare phones, which you could ring a special phone number and then use your home phone number and the cost of calls was free to home. However, there were only five lines available, so this made it difficult to get a line and there were others waiting, so calls were limited in time. This facility was still great and made contacting loved ones more regular.

The postal system was also changed and the big change was that overseas postal was free. This meant you were able to send mail easily and loved ones could also access this free system. The postal system was also far quicker, with only a 3-day turn-around in the majority of cases. After this deployment, I was thinking this is a great change and very happy to be able to contact loved ones more regularly.

**Afghanistan, 2007**

I deployed to Afghanistan and this is when I really discovered that we were not as far away from loved ones as I had been previously. I work in an administrative role and worked from an office environment. This meant that I was able to access phones at any time I wished and was able to phone home regularly. These regular calls allowed me manage home affairs from abroad and have an input to family matters while deployed.

Access to the internet and email was available in the office, which also meant that I could confirm/resolve issues as they arose at home in a timely manner. This access was not as available to all that were deployed as it was for me but it was available. This is a huge change from my first deployments and a real boost to morale.

The postal system was the same as it was for East Timor except that it would normally take five days or so for mail to get through. I now recognise how much technology changes have, in my opinion, made our deployments far easier to manage while we are away from loved ones.

In conclusion, thanks to technology, we who deploy overseas appreciate the changes it has made to our lives and access to our loved ones while deployed.

Thanks technology..!
Warrant Officer Simmich enlisted in the Regular Army in December 1984. After recruit training, he was allocated to the Royal Australian Corps of Signals, with postings including 139 Signals Squadron, 2 Signals Regiment, 1 Signals Regiment and 126 Signals Squadron (1 Commando Regiment). In December 1994, he transferred to the Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps, where his postings included Defence Force Recruiting Lismore, 2 Cavalry Regiment and Headquarters 5 Brigade as a Warrant Officer Class 1 in 2005.

In July 2006, he transferred to the Army Reserve but served full-time with 2 Combat Engineer Regiment until the end of 2008. In 2009, he transferred back to the Army Reserve and has since been serving in Army Headquarters, working on the eMPA website from Victoria Barracks in Brisbane.
‘Leadership 101’

Warrant Officer Ian Pinch, RAAF

Here are some quotes to set the scene for my article:

Rank does not confer privilege or give power. It imposes responsibility.

Management is doing things right, leadership is doing the right things.

A leader leads by example, whether he wants to or not.

So my take-away from the three quotes is that ‘rank imposes responsibility to do the right things and lead by example’. My view also is that ‘leadership is the ongoing study of human nature’. I do not know if anyone has used that quote before or not. But it sounds easy, doesn’t it?

Introduction

I suppose that I started to develop ‘leadership’ skills as a result of interactions with my family members. I refined those thoughts and ideas through my time in school and when playing sports. And, finally, I started to put these embryonic skills into practice at work.

I went straight from finishing school at Year 10 to joining the Air Force in less than six weeks. I graduated from initial employment training at RAAF Base Wagga Wagga, gaining my trade qualification as well as an insight into various leadership styles and skills.

Between joining an Air Force of approximately 26,000 people to an Air Force of approximately 13,000 on my (many years later) promotion to Warrant Officer, lots of things changed; leadership skills and styles were just one of them.

This article has been broken into three areas; ‘Leadership mechanics’, ‘Decision-making tips’ and ‘The last words on leadership’ (according to me).

Leadership mechanics

Lead down but manage up

Different styles and techniques are required for leadership and managing. Effective application in both areas is necessary to be an efficient leader. What you require from your leader is for them to understand why the issue is important in your eyes and why your leader should take heed of your concerns. Your subordinates expect and need you to lead them as much as it is your responsibility to lead them.
Chain of command

No-one likes a micro-manager, so why should you be one? Passing responsibility and accountability downwards develops your subordinates’ leadership development, skills and styles. Keep an eye on their process and mentor them into what you want of them. At the end, debrief them so they know where they could have improved as well as what they did well.

Voice

Speak to people as you wish to be spoken to. Talk to, not down to, and ensure they understand, and understand why it is important to you. This is a big challenge with the different workforces that we have. When someone comes to you knowing they are in trouble, the usual expectation is that you are likely to rant and rave at them. If this happens, normal people will close themselves off for self-protection purposes. If you use a calm voice and controlled manner, they will be more inclined listen and be engaged.

Computers

Get out from behind your desk and walk around the work environment. This will give you an appreciation on what the workforce is experiencing. This will also give you a chance to provide input into their work or to initiate improvement to their environments.

Meetings v telephone v email

The preferred interaction should be face-to-face. If this is not possible, then telephone is next best. Verbal communication gives you a chance to have valuable discussions that are not possible via email and are generally a lot quicker. By all means follow up your meeting and telephone calls with an email, for recording purposes if needed.

Email should be used for information, not communication. Most of your subordinates are normally working and may not have the time, or the ability to check emails more than a couple times a week. Additionally, a lot of work environments may have limited numbers of computers for the entire junior ranks, so access for them is an issue.

Expectations and left and right of arcs

Let your subordinates know what you expect of them and let them go about their daily business but monitor what they are doing. They expect you to monitor (shows you care) and they will push the boundaries to see how far they can go before they get pulled back into line. Set limits and expectations such as ‘if you are going to be late for work, ring and let the section know instead of speeding, being fined or killing yourself. We will discuss options when you get to work’.

Monitoring means that you actually know how many times they have been late or when they have been late, like parade mornings. Gather all the information before you determine what follow-on action is necessary.
Take risks

When you need a task to be completed, outline the expected outcomes and a realistic timeframe you need it completed by, then let them do the task by themselves. Monitor the process and provide support and assistance as needed.

Know your people and take care of your people

If you have a large workforce you cannot know everyone. However, the Warrant Officer can know the Flight Sergeants, the Flight Sergeants can know the Sergeants, and the Squadron Leader can know the junior officers and Warrant Officers etc.

I would expect the Corporal to know some of their Leading Aircraftmen/-women’s (LAC) personal circumstances, such as sporting team, family situation, pets etc. This builds a rapport with the subordinate. This has the advantage in that the Corporal would notice when the LAC is not ‘on the game’. The Corporal can then find out what has happened and, if needed, to pass the information up the chain for action to be taken. It would be hoped that in the ideal situation, the LAC would come to the Corporal with the issue in the first place.

Praise in public, punish in private

Human nature says everyone likes to be praised in front of their peers. But they hate to be belittled in front of them. Again, a calm approach is required when discussing the issue. However, if needs be you can berate a group to solicit an outcome but this should be very much a rarity and not the norm.

Maintain high morale

Having people come to work because they like being there is a result of having high morale and should be one of the goals you are trying to achieve. Simple things like having people organise BBQs is easy and has an immediate impact.

Decision-making tips

Mistakes

No-one is perfect when it comes to making leadership decisions. Apologise, get over it but the most important thing is to reflect and learn from your errors or, better yet, learn from other people’s leadership mistakes (and successes).

Leaders (good and bad)

Admire the good leaders and try and figure out what they do to be a good leader but don’t try and emulate them. You will learn more off the bad leaders on what not to do. Combine the two to develop your own leadership style and skills.
Leadership assistance

No-one knows it all, so ask for help from experts (such as the administration officer, padre, Defence Community Organisation etc) or mentors when you are uncertain. But if it is dealing with personal issues, advise the person that, with their approval, you are going to ask for additional support from other experts in the applicable field without disclosing their identity.

Education and training

The more education and training you have, the easier it is going to be to make the ‘right’ decisions. Completion of ‘Leadership Exchange’ (contact Air Force Adaptive Culture for further information) is one of the areas that provides education on leadership that may be of assistance to you. Completing professional military education training courses will also help improve your exposure to leadership theories.

The last words on leadership

Loyalty

Everyone has to sing the same tune in public no matter what. Discussions opposite to those should be held behind closed doors or in remote locations away from work, where you cannot be seen or heard, and so that you cannot be seen to be undermining the decision.

Developing your subordinates

This is one of the prime tasks commensurate with your time in rank. The development of effective subordinates capable of maintaining processes etc while you are absent from work is how you know you are developing competent subordinates (and your future replacement).

Light in the dark

It is human nature to pick the bad things and emphasise them. No matter how bad it is, there will always be something good there, you just have to find it. Focus on that (no matter how small) to try and bring the other things up to that level.

Leadership is 24/7

Leadership is not a coat that you only wear at work, you are a leader all the time. You will be seen outside the work environment by your subordinates and you will be judged by them there as well. Do not do anything to bring yourself down in your people’s eyes, as you will not get the respect back easily.

Decision-making responsibility

You are responsible for the leadership decisions that you make or don’t make, remember it is the responsibility associated with your rank.
Leadership is forever learning

There are forever new challenges to being an effective leader. As soon as you stop learning or stop reflecting on your leadership decisions, you cease to be an effective leader and are just free-wheeling and going along for the ride. No-one benefits from working with an ineffective leader.

Summary

The further you progress along the ranks, the more ‘leadership’ responsibility you have, so you need skills and styles commensurate with your area of influence. The challenge is to continually develop new skills and techniques to meet our/your changing environments.

Personal education value-adds to the organisation but it is not always immediately evident where or how. When someone completes a course have them sit down with you to discuss how that course might be able to be used for improvements, and not just be seen as a ‘box ticking’ exercise. The more education you have, the easier it will be to make you more effective in making decisions, leadership or otherwise.

There is no holiday from being a leader. A leader is a leader every minute of every day, regardless of where you are. This does not mean that you cannot have fun anymore, just have the fun appropriate and expected by your leader for your rank.

Sounds easy…

Disclaimer

This is my style, it may not suit you. Reflect on what I have written, take what you want, discard what you don’t need, and make your own decision.

Warrant Officer Ian Pinch joined the RAAF as an Engineering Apprentice in January 1980. After graduating as an Instrument Fitter in June 1982, he has enjoyed postings to various maintenance workshops, Mirage fighters, Hornets, Caribou and C130 H Hercules and various educational positions. After attending Australian Command and Staff College in 2011, he re-mustered as an Executive Warrant Officer and is currently at Air Power Development Centre.

NOTES

Junior Leadership Experiences in East Timor

Corporal Karen Cahill, Australian Army

Three months after my promotion to Lance Corporal, I deployed to East Timor as a command post supervisor. Under my chain of command were two troopers about to embark on their junior leadership course and another fresh out of initial employment training. With the operational tempo slowing down, the opportunity for training increased and, even though I was still relatively new to the supervisor role, I found myself in a position to mentor my soldiers and prepare them for what was to come.

The very basis of most Army lessons is structured around an initial demonstration, an explanation and then a practice. So I structured the training around taking the experienced soldiers through a lesson plan, weapons lesson or technical skill and then giving them the opportunity to pass that knowledge on to our newest soldier.

We started their training with written and oral presentations. These were not heavily assessed, with emphasis being on building confidence and having a go. The finer points of presentations, wording and structure were given and a month later the soldiers resubmitted their presentations this time to a bigger audience.

The next topic was lesson structure. I wrote several lesson plans for future weapons training and took each soldier through how I wrote the lesson plans. They were then tasked to write a lesson plan themselves to take our newest member through some weapon drills. Following a trip to the armoury, I took one of the soldiers through strip-and-assemble of the F89 Minimi, the other through F88 Steyr, following the lesson plan I had earlier written. Under supervision, they then took the remaining soldiers through the lesson using their own lesson plan, testing both the lesson plan and their ability to conduct a lesson. Through this technique, all the soldiers got a good understanding on lesson structure, lesson plans and refreshed on weapon drills.

We created exercises that gave us the opportunity to advance our technical trade skills. In one such example, I took one of the experienced soldiers into the field and supervised him establishing a radio retransmission station. Once confident of the soldier’s ability, the following week the soldier took our newest soldier out to establish the station. Sometimes they were unsuccessful in gaining communications, however, every time each of the soldiers involved gained valuable experience in leadership and mentoring.

These exercises also gave us the opportunity to write and deliver a set of orders. The senior troopers saw firsthand what happens when items were missed out of orders or information was incorrectly communicated. On one such occasion, I saw one of my senior troopers make a very basic error. I found myself laughing and recalling that several years ago, when I was a new trooper, it was the very same error I had made. If I hadn’t made the mistake back then, I may not have known that was the problem this time around. After much laughter, I pointed out the error to my soldier and hoped one day he would find himself supervising a new trooper making the same error.
My two senior troopers were also very committed to their fitness. This gave them another opportunity to lead, with one of them taking the detachment for several PT lessons. Plans were written, safety hazards were taken in consideration and their ability to control a large group of people, in various ranks from major to private, reinforced their readiness to complete their upcoming courses.

This method of training had many benefits. I was given the opportunity to further develop my skills as a junior leader, the senior troopers got firsthand experience at teaching, leading and mentoring, the newer trooper gained exposure to further develop his trade skills and the team as a whole bonded closer. My first operational experience as a junior leader was very rewarding and, at times, rather humorous. Fifteen months later, my two senior troopers are now corporals and I hope in future years they will find themselves enjoying the role of a junior leader and leading the next wave of soldiers.

Corporal Karen Cahill enlisted in 2006 as ground crew mission support within the Aviation Corps. After completing her initial training, she was posted to 1 Aviation Regiment in Darwin. She deployed to Timor Leste in July 2007, August 2008 and August 2010. During her career, she has worked with Hueys, Kiowas, Blackhawks and has been involved in bringing an armed reconnaissance helicopter capability into service for the Army under Project AIR87.
Operation RESOLUTE: leadership through teamwork

Sub Lieutenant Viruben Watson, RAN

‘Are you OK Sir?’ the Buffer yelled. I gave him a thumbs-up, my other hand tightly gripping the wheel. The seas were unforgiving and unrelenting. Our little fishing boat was barely a match for the swell and losing a man to the depths was my biggest fear. Thick diesel fumes bellowed out of the belly of the vessel, covering me in black soot. Two Marine Technicians were frantically moving around the hull to keep the engine running. The Buffer was ensuring the safe navigation of the vessel. Finally, here I was, the lone Sub Lieutenant on this barely seaworthy boat.

We were proud members of Patrol Boat Crew ‘Assail Four’ tasked to Operation RESOLUTE. We were driving an old Indonesian fishing vessel, which had been converted into an asylum-seeker transport boat, commonly known as a SIEV (suspected illegal entry vessel). This vessel was of a very poor standard, a battered shell. We had intercepted it that very morning off Christmas Island as part of Operation RESOLUTE, focusing on protecting our north-western approaches. This particular apprehension had resulted in the detaining of around 80 people. Due to the quarantine danger posed by the vessel, it had to be destroyed. The job of a steaming party is to take the vessel clear of land and eventually destroy it. I was a member of this steaming party, carrying out this uncertain task.

This experience had given me an insight into the real dangers faced by the men and women I lead every day. As a junior officer, it gave me the opportunity to appreciate the challenging tasks that as a leader, I often fail to grasp. The example above shows how through actively participating in these often perilous tasks, you can quickly earn the respect of your peers and subordinates. It was also a clear and practical demonstration of the Navy’s principal ethos of teamwork.

It became clear to me just how heavily we relied on our team to get these risky jobs done. Their professionalism, dedication and expertise stood out to an observer like me. Patrol boats are tight units and rely on seamless teamwork in order to function. When one has fewer responsibilities as a trainee, there is often more time to reflect on the environment around them. It was therefore in this environment that I began to understand the interdependence of teamwork and leadership.

Maintaining teamwork through emotional adversity

In mid-2010, ‘Assail Four’ had been tasked with patrolling off the coast of Christmas Island. Having received word that a SIEV was approaching the island, we kept vigilant watch. The frustration and disappointment started to build as it became clear that the boat in question was nowhere to be found. Perhaps it was lost, maybe it sank, maybe it changed course or maybe it never even left.

Eventually, the decision was made to maintain watch within the confines of Christmas Island harbour, which would greatly reduce our response time. Tough decisions, as I was soon to
realise, were a regular part of being a junior officer on ‘Assail Four’. Strong teams require strong leaders. When morale and optimism are at their lowest, it can infect even the strongest of teams. Command was faced with the challenge of keeping an alert and motivated crew, while at the same time defeating rumours and feelings of futility. Junior ranks had their own internal challenges to overcome with maintaining discipline and high work ethic in the face of growing idleness and repetition. Regardless of our emotional state, we had a very important task that still needed to be achieved.

These obstacles were put to the test when the elusive SIEV was finally sighted. As expected, the crew pulled together as a team ensuring that through quick action and early detection, the vessel was intercepted. The apprehension relieved a lot of tension for the crew. The success of this mission relied heavily on the team maintaining their sense of duty and not allowing emotion to get in the way of the task at hand.

**Team leadership works at multiple levels**

It wasn't long before we were once again called to action, this time to rescue a sinking SIEV with approximately 80 men on board. It was a moonless night and the wind was picking up significantly. Another patrol boat was called on to assist, as ‘Assail Four’ only had the capacity to take on 40 people. Our boarding party was struggling to evacuate the men, while simultaneously trying to keep the vessel afloat. Communication became crucial, particularly as there were times when we couldn’t readily account for the people rescued.

I was attached to the radio on the bridge, continuously monitoring communications and attempting to relay messages to command. Maintaining a sense of order and leading by example, I had to ensure that information was passed on accurately. We eventually succeeded in our mission of rescuing all the men and scuttling the SIEV. It had been a long operation but throughout the confusion and excitement, we still functioned as one unit.

Some of the boarding party were junior sailors tasked with keeping the SIEV afloat for as long as possible while evacuation took place. As a team within the bilge of the vessel, they came up with solutions to get the water out as fast as possible. Their efforts allowed command to carry out the bigger picture task of evacuating the vessel and saving lives. The Commanding Officer was firm and thoughtful in her decision making, keeping the team together and providing direction. However, it was initiative and leadership at all levels that allowed the operation to be a success, regardless of whether it was in the bilge of a SIEV or on the bridge of the patrol boat.

**Influencing a team towards a goal**

Probably one of the greatest challenges of being a leader is influencing a team to cooperate toward some goal which they may not find desirable. Although leadership within a team can work on many levels, as we have discussed, the leader of the team often needs to take charge when it comes to keeping the team motivated. The high tempo, long delays, uncertainties and time away from families were commonplace on Operation RESOLUTE. We as officers needed to lead by example and believe in what we were doing. Nothing affects morale greater than an expectation that hasn't been fulfilled.
As leaders, we need to be cognisant of what we can promise but often we need to be ready to deliver the bad news when it arrives. The day before leaving on another patrol, we were under the expectation we would have a full weekend to spend with family before departing for four more weeks. This didn’t eventuate and we were tasked to sail the next morning. Patrolling for weeks on end, rumours went around of pending shore leave on Christmas Island. Once again, rumours were dispelled as quickly as they started. Our Commanding Officer did an amazing job on both occasions to keep morale up and balance the needs of the Service with the needs of the crew. It was never easy but, wherever possible, she encouraged us to feel that we were working towards bigger and better things.

This article is a reflection on my thoughts regarding teamwork and how critical it is to achieving mission success, especially on Operation RESOLUTE. By its very nature, it was a dynamic and unpredictable environment and required a cohesive and motivated unit to work. My time with ‘Assail Four’ has also taught me a great deal about the importance of leadership and how this contributes to the overall morale and effort of the team. Without effective leaders at all levels, a team isn’t effective. Where lives are at stake, the consequences can be catastrophic.

Sub Lieutenant Viruben Watson joined the RAN as a Maritime Warfare Officer in 2009. He completed his Phase II training in HMAS Newcastle while she was conducting Long-N assessment for Navigators of the Fleet. In 2010, he joined Patrol Boat Crew ‘Assail Four’ to complete his Phase III training, serving as part of Operation RESOLUTE to protect Australia’s north-western approaches. In 2011, he transferred to the Aeronautical Engineering Branch of the RAN and currently serves as a Trainee Engineer at 723 Squadron.
Junior Leadership on Operation ASTUTE

Corporal Tim Hughes, Australian Army Reserve

The third rotation of the Timor Leste Task Group (TLTG-3) deployed in June 2011 for an eight-month stint, the rifle company of which was comprised of reservists, led by a reserve Major. The country was in a fairly stable condition after 12 years of turmoil following the 1999 referendum and ensuing unrest.

Many of the soldiers of the rifle company had not deployed before, although some had deployed on Operation ANODE or RESOLUTE and we had a couple of ex-Regular Army corporals and diggers for good measure.

The tasks on deployment were forward operating base (FOB) security, quick response force (QRF), local Dili patrols and regional patrols. The tempo was for the most part fairly calm and the tasks were comparatively simple but, as with any operation, there were opportunities to apply and adapt leadership experience, as well as identify key learning for the future.

FOB security

The FOB security tasks were at three bases, an airfield and a re-transmission station. The manning ranged from a platoon down to a four-man ‘brick’ at the re-transmission station. The junior leaders’ mission for these tasks was to maintain the standards of their sections by way of a good standard of orders, teach lessons and maintain their team’s morale.

The more successful activities for maintaining momentum and morale were the lessons. The soldiering lessons were fairly successful, especially those concerning new ideas, activities or weapon systems. Something that was very successful was the lessons given by the soldiers on what they know from their civilian careers. Learning about free-diving techniques, followed by some pointers on real-estate, then a practical on how to cook good barbeques was so well received that, by the end, we had visitors including the Officer Commanding and Company Sergeant Major. The most useful lessons as part of our job in-country were the language lessons, which proved invaluable when on patrol, unlocking the soldiers’ ability to speak directly with the locals.

Quick response force

The QRF was the most active role we had on the trip, in that we were training for the task most days. Before we could take up the task, we as a platoon had to be tested. The ‘opposing force’ was to be the outgoing New Zealand platoon, which was very well prepared for the task. Getting pelted with stones, mud, rotten eggs and yoghurt, as well as dealing with rolling water tanks and rope snares, was a long and arduous test of the soldiers’ training and resolve. The best memory of the day was watching one of the opposing force smash one of the QRF with a carton of rancid milk and then ‘retire’, gagging and retching, while the soldier wearing the mess carried on with the task at hand.
The junior NCOs in the QRF had a difficult task, as they had to assemble a new set of skills and drills into a cohesive set of actions in a dynamic, threatening environment, with soldiers who, for the most part, had not been exposed to such conditions before. One of the key lessons learned from this deployment was the need for more and better specialised training for reserve soldiers and leaders as part of their annual training program.

**Community engagement patrols**

The community engagement patrols (CEPs) were usually four-hour patrols out to sectors of Dili, where a section would be responsible for covering the ground, finding information, speaking to some key people and projecting a professional presence. The CEPs were, for most of the deployment, the best opportunity that the junior leaders and soldiers had to meet with the people of Timor and to see what their lives were like and what their perspective on their security situation was.

On the CEPs, we saw how life was for the locals—which was pretty humbling for most—but we were generally pretty well received, with most people happy to talk to us, especially the kids. The kids love a game of soccer or volleyball, so we usually found it easy to break the ice. Some memories that stand out are watching some drag racing on a beachfront road between two local groups and going to a youth centre to help teach English as a follow-up to a patrol.

The CEPs had a positive impact on the soldiers and junior leaders alike, as they are closer to what many regard as an infantry task. Some of the lessons learned were that the locals respond significantly better to an Australian Army vehicle than a UN-badged vehicle and that they respond very well to soldiers who speak their language, often even better than to the local interpreters, which was key learning for a junior NCO and one we take with us into future operations.

**Regional engagement patrols**

The regional engagement patrols were monthly patrols of seven-to-ten days to other parts of Timor. They were the soldiers’ best chance to see what the rural communities and outlying communities were like. The people were mostly very friendly and, as they hadn’t seen so much of us, were very curious and quite keen to talk to us. The soldiers would play soccer or volleyball with the locals while the junior NCOs, interpreter and civil-military cooperation representatives would speak to the chief and other local people.

The locals of one village invited us to a child’s birthday party, however, we found that in that village they treated the party as a big occasion with a band, dancing and at least 60 guests. The next night, we were able to return the favour by putting on a dinner for the chief, his family and some of the other locals that we had met. We ate and talked for quite a while and generated a lot of goodwill. We were going to have soldiers coming back to the town in the next month, so we made sure they and the junior NCOs with them would have as good a welcome as we did.
Overall

While there were many positive operational experiences to be had for officers, junior NCOs and soldiers all round, the length of the deployment, together with the lack of previous experience of some soldiers and the repetitive routine, led to some minor issues for junior NCOs to deal with. Some lessons learned were:

1. Prepare the soldiers for the tempo that they will operate in
2. Keep your soldiers informed, and always give proper orders
3. Maintain discipline and be consistent and fair
4. Give your soldiers ownership over their work and responsibility in line with their experience and ability, and
5. Maintain the team ethos, and avoid singling out soldiers.

As the tempo of the operation itself was reasonably calm, maintaining effective section standards was key, not only to operational posture but also to the morale of the troops, which any junior NCO will confirm can be a challenge at even the best of times.

By providing the soldiers with discipline, routine, consistent and fair guidance, and leadership at all levels, you can combat some of the down-sides of operational deployment quickly and effectively. After all, it is during operations where experience comes to the fore and the important lessons about leadership are learned and honed and future junior NCOs are forged.

_Corporal Timothy Hughes enlisted in the Army Reserve in 2005. He is currently serving with 2nd/17th Royal New South Wales Regiment as a section commander. He deployed on Operation ASTUTE in May 2011, having previously deployed on Operation ANODE in 2008. In his civilian work life, Corporal Hughes is a sports coach at Sydney Girls High School._
A Warrant to Lead

**Flight Sergeant David Turnbull, RAAF**

Warrant Officers occupy an essential position within every Air Force unit. Warrant Officers are expected not only to be proficient in their mustering but also proficient in the elements of command, discipline and leadership. In this article, I will provide an overview of what I believe it is to be an Air Force Warrant Officer; define the associated roles and responsibilities; delineate between command, leadership and discipline; characterise the leadership qualities expected of a Warrant Officer; and detail the strategic importance of the Warrant Officer rank.

What is a Warrant Officer? A Warrant Officer is a manager. A Warrant Officer is a mentor. A Warrant Officer is many things to many people but, above all, a Warrant Officer is a leader. Warrant Officer is the highest rank attainable by an airman/-woman. With this rank comes a high degree of power, prestige, privilege and, above all, responsibility. ‘Warrant Officers are required to assist their commanders with the maintenance of discipline ... and are to set an example to all personnel’.

Wearing Warrant Officer rank means wearing Warrant Officer responsibility. In order to maintain discipline and set an example to all personnel, Warrant Officers must exhibit exceptionally high levels of personal standards and discipline; and actively promote the values, attitudes and behaviours associated with—and expected of—RAAF ‘professionals of arms’.

**Roles and responsibilities**

I would argue that the role of the Air Force Warrant Officer is vital in providing high organisational performance levels and effecting air power. Warrant Officers provide a conduit between a unit’s senior leadership and greater workforce, affording direct support to both in order to maximise unit effectiveness. Given the importance of this unique position within a unit, Warrant Officers hold specific responsibilities to both the airmen and -women under them, and the officers above them.

As the Service’s senior airmen/-women, Warrant Officers ensure the maintenance of unit discipline and esprit de corps, and set an example to all—with a duty to provide encouragement, cajollement, education and support to Air Force personnel. As command advisors, Warrant Officers provide measured counsel to their chain of command, and provide valuable assistance and insight in developing and maintaining unit capabilities and conditions for success.

**Command, leadership and discipline**

The differences between command, leadership and discipline are at times subtle—and other times vast. Command stems from rank and appointment. Leadership stems from influencing others to achieve a goal. Discipline stems from teaching and enforcing acceptable patterns of behaviour. Each of these elements requires distinct knowledge and application, where the advantages and disadvantages of each are identified and considered in the prosecution of Air Force objectives.
I believe that mastering the elements of command, leadership and discipline is a key requirement of an Air Force Warrant Officer; as is knowing when, where and how to apply the correct dosage of each element in order to achieve Air Force outcomes. While each of these elements can be applied in isolation to achieve a result, it is the considered application of command, leadership and discipline to achieve the best possible result that defines and characterises the role of a Warrant Officer.

**Quality leadership**

What is leadership? Leadership is perhaps the most important—and most difficult to master—of the command, leadership and discipline elements. ‘Some Warrant Officers are highly effective leaders; others are totally ineffective and there is a wide gap in between’.3 Effective leadership complements command and cultivates discipline. Therefore, it is essential that Warrant Officers value and develop effective leadership qualities.

Leadership is ‘the process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of [goals]’.4 Leaders must be able to influence their followers; they must have a goal, and they must take purposeful action toward achieving the goal. Followers must consent to achieving the goal, and both the goal and actions taken must be ethical.

Transformational leaders bring about change in their personnel and organisations by ‘motivating others to do more than they originally intended and often more than they thought possible’.5 As role-models, motivators, teachers and leaders, Air Force Warrant Officers play a pivotal role in transforming the RAAF, and shaping the Air Force of the future. The following qualities associated with transformational leadership6 are reflective of the qualities required of Warrant Officers:

- Communicates a vision
- Develops staff
- Provides support
- Empowers staff
- Is innovative, and
- Leads by example.

Where transformational leadership aims to influence personnel to achieve a goal, strategic leadership aims to influence an organisation to achieve a goal. Strategic leadership is ‘primarily concerned with developing and maintaining the ADF’s military and professional capabilities and creating the conditions for operational success’.7

Warfighting is the core competency of the ADF. Capability provides the capacity to carry out and sustain ADF warfighting operations and achieve an operational outcome. Given their unique position within the Air Force structure, Warrant Officers play a pivotal role in the development of Air Force capability, and the ability of a unit to employ air power. It is my belief that understanding capability—and understanding Air Force’s future strategic direction—is an essential aspect of a Warrant Officer’s strategic leadership role.
Conclusion

Above all things, a Warrant Officer is a leader. The rank of Warrant Officer is exercised using the fundamental elements of command, leadership and discipline—centring on the qualities found in transformational leaders. By exercising these elements, Warrant Officers influence those around them to achieve goals and, in turn, facilitate the achievement of ADF organisational outcomes. Strategic leadership is essential for the prosecution of ADF warfighting operations. In summary, I have three recommendations on how Warrant Officers can be more effectively employed as strategic leaders:

• Warrant Officers must proactively engage in unit strategic planning processes and understand both the organisational goals expected of the unit, and the overall Air Force strategic intent.

• Warrant Officers must provide the NCOs and senior NCOs below them freedom to autonomously carry out day-to-day operations. This in turn allows Warrant Officers more scope to focus on strategic objectives and leadership.

• Warrant Officers must outwardly (strategically) focus on unit operations and objectives, while remaining cognisant of workforce and operational limitations and issues.

Flight Sergeant Turnbull enlisted in the RAAF as an Engineering Trade Apprentice in January 1989 and graduated as an Armament Fitter in September 1990. He has enjoyed postings to 75 Squadron, 77 Squadron and 3 Squadron, before being posted in 2009 to the Advanced Aircraft Bombs Project Office in the Defence Materiel Organisation. Flight Sergeant Turnbull is currently with Project AIR5349 Phase 2, Super Hornet Weapons.

NOTES

1. RAAF, ‘Warrant Officer Course Reading’, Warrant Officer Course Joining Instructions, RAAF School of Post-Graduate Studies, 2010, p. 1–1.
3. ‘Warrant Officer Course Reading’, p. 1–1.
7. ADDP 00.6, p. 4–1, Executive Summary.
Operation ASTUTE – East Timor

Private Andrew Boutillier, Australian Army Reserve

Flying into East Timor, I had little idea of what to expect. All the briefings and scenarios never quite prepare you for the atmospherics. You can never capture the soul or feeling of a nation in a presentation, nor can you express cultural ideas out of the context of the location they are in. Things simply don’t make much sense until you are there with the people, in the thick of it.

Being in the transport cell, my main concern was the condition of the roads, as well as the differences between driving in Australia and Timor Leste. Stepping off the C-130 Hercules at Dili airport and into the front seat of a New Zealand Unimog was a good start to getting a feel for the country.

Building on our prior driver training and experience, my initial guide was a New Zealand Army Corporal with a good deal of experience in country. His experience and advice was very helpful in preparing me for the unique traffic conditions in Dili.

I was immediately alarmed by the erratic behaviour of the local scooters swarming around our vehicle. Seemingly oblivious to the size difference between a truck and a scooter, many vehicles would pull out from the on-coming traffic to try their luck at sneaking across before the Unimog moved along their chosen line. The Corporal seemed unfazed by the erratic driving around him, laughing it off and informing me this was a slow day in Dili.

I was very keen to negotiate the roads myself and, after some further familiarisation training, soon had the opportunity. The roads range from average, to pitted with pot holes, more or less pot holes, more pot holes than less, right up to outright landslides or ‘what road’? Driving a Mack truck on roads with these conditions is interesting, no matter where you are. Mix in the erratic scooters and you have a recipe for a very engaging drive.

You’re constantly watching in the mirrors and reading the road ahead to ensure you’re driving as safely as possible. Transport has had instances in Dili where a scooter has ridden between a truck and trailer, hanging on for a free ride. The tropical rain plays havoc on the roads and leads to some really unique off-road and water crossings.

Leaving Dili, I head into the mountains on re-supply runs to our Infantry friends. This is where I find the Timor I always imagined. Stunning tropical hills, woven huts and sweeping views. The roads contain perilously steep cliffs, sheer drop edges, sharp hairpin turns, hard left, hard right and hard left again. You get a full workout just steering your way up the mountain. Nearly two hours of driving to go no more than 30 kilometres. You could not speed if you wanted to; the roads are fraught with danger, obstacles and fallen trees. There are oncoming dump trucks, which are used as buses by the local population, with some holding more than 30 people. Not forgetting the ever-present scooter, seemingly the workhorse of Timor Leste, fighting their way up the mountain and passing on the slimmest break to overtake.

Rewardingly, we often stop into local schools to spend time with the community in order to build friendships between our countries. I make use of a variety of magic tricks I have picked up from working with kids through programs run by my school back home at Macquarie College.
The illusions make use of everyday objects around the school, and the children love to learn how the tricks are done. It keeps them well and truly entertained, and is also something they can take home to share with their families. Ideas are often just as important as resources. The locals are very quick to learn new skill sets, which is a very encouraging sign for the future of Timor Leste.

Politics is evident in the country, which is littered with political flags and posters. People everywhere, wearing shirts showing support for different political players. It is so good to see such a grassroots community interest in politics, where so many people in the community can openly voice their political opinion.

I see a lot of support and goodwill towards Australian soldiers. Everywhere I go, people wave, Police salute, even children walking to school will often stop and high-five us as we pass by on tasks. Flowers are left at the gate of one of our forward operating bases here in Dili by one elderly woman, who stands in vigil prayer, quite often for hours. The smiles and waves everywhere we go are very heart-warming.

I am a fair way through my deployment. However every day is still an exciting adventure. These things are what you make of them. I feel blessed in transport to have the opportunity to get among the local population and meet new people, learn a new language, try new foods and see things that are so far removed from what I’m used to back in Australia.

Letters and phone calls from my family back home are so important in keeping that connection with my loved ones. I’m thankful for every day here with this wonderful experience but also thankful that every day is one day closer to my wife.

_Please allow me to introduce Private Andrew Boutillier._

*Private Andrew Boutillier enlisted in the Army Reserve in 2006 and was posted to 16 Transport Squadron as a driver. He is a qualified to drive heavy vehicles and has completed the required modules for driving instructor. He deployed to Timor Leste from April 2011 until February 2012, primarily in support of the University of NSW Regiment. To date, he has completed close to 200 days for each year he has been in the Army Reserve.*
The Importance of Junior Officer Training Staff

Lieutenant Commander J. David Jones, RAN

At graduation parades, the overwhelming comment by parents of young graduates is how much their beloved son or daughter has changed. Mostly, their comments relate to maturity, responsibility, social skills, bearing and cleanliness. This indicates, albeit anecdotally, that the initial training period is a profound experience, where the trainee is substantially influenced. We would hope that this is so. After all, it is the intent of officer training to change the civilian into a service officer. It is proposed then that this period, more than any other in the career of an officer, is the greatest lever for achieving cultural change in the ADF.

This is important, not only because of the potential change in the trainee. It has leverage because of the potential influence that the graduate will have in her or his career. A small act of kindness by a senior officer, self-driving their official car or making the coffee or taking the time out to help with a divisional problem, can have a huge impact on an individual, their family and friends. The strength of the impact is proportional to the seniority of the officer. Despite the emphasis in the ADF that everyone is a leader, officers have more ability to influence others because of the responsibility inherent in their leadership appointment. The officer will influence the troops one way or another!

The officer trainee then should be a key focus of attention in the cultural change process. If a change is introduced into Defence, then it is the training establishments that should be changed first. This applies equally to contextual changes, such as combined messes, as well as educational curriculum changes and specific cultural programs.

Having said that, there is one group of ADF personnel that should have our focus even before the officer trainee and that is the officer training staff. Leadership is a process of influence. Initial trainees are particularly vulnerable to the influence of the experienced instructor, both positively and negatively. Invariably, members will remember the person who had the most profound effect on them during initial training.

For me, it was a highly-experienced Petty Officer, who was unforgettable for his impeccable high standards, colourful language and genuine concern for us all. Conversely, history tells us that often the abused becomes the abuser. Therefore, it makes sense to put a priority on the selection and development of training staff at all levels. This is a force multiplier, whereby high quality staff are attracted to the job, staff are motivated and retained, and their behaviour is modelled for the benefit of the impressionable trainee.

The focus should be in two areas: staff selection and staff development. Many of the following ideas are already implemented in officer training regimes but all areas need our continued focus and some need urgent attention.

A good argument can always be made to have the ‘best’ officers in one’s own area of employment. In reality, in workforce planning targets and posting processes, there is always a prioritisation. Postings to officer training, however, should not be on the basis of ‘the best’ but on ‘suitability’. The best operational officer is not always the best trainer. We must dispel the myth that is ingrained in our culture, that a good warfighter is naturally a good ‘people
developer’. They are not mutually exclusive competencies but, in practice, the combination is rare.

This article will not go into the selection criteria for an officer trainer but it can be summarised that the officer should model what we want the generic officer to be: namely, teachable, team player, considerate, listener, communicator, decisive and morally upright. We will produce not clones but replicas of our staff. While all staff influence trainees, the divisional staff with 24-hour contact are the most important. The curriculum contains what the trainee should know and experience but the staff demonstrate, in every interaction, who the trainee should be.

Once the suitable staff member is selected, it is essential that they are trained for the job. Ideally, this is ‘prior to’ and ‘part of’ the selection process but, in practice, this is often on-the-job and, sadly, ad hoc. Part of the training, however, needs to be on-the-job. Staff need to be constantly mentored in the actual context and at the time when the training is needed. The complexities of managing initial officer training cannot be underestimated. Staff decisions and attitudes, advice and guidance, even comments and inflections, can all have profound influence on the individual and the team. There needs to be peer and supervisor input to ensure that the learning philosophy, cultural aims and equity guidelines are consistently applied.

Above all, staff need continually to be learning and modelling the behaviour required of the trainees. The tendency for staff is to always be the expert in all areas. They are often the one who is the expert in the Defence culture. However, in different contexts, the staff have much to learn from the trainee. It is essential to teach the trainee to use the skills and talents of others. This can only be modelled by the staff acknowledging the abilities and knowledge of the trainee and valuing their opinions. Sadly, trainees often learn to just shut up and comply, to ‘survive’ rather than to ‘thrive’.

Alongside this ‘mentoring’, staff should be offered formal and informal development opportunities. This is a fundamental part of being a professional trainer. This can take the form of internal and external staff discussion forums, academic and business leadership seminars, staff development conferences, short courses etc. If we are in the professional business of personal development, then we should keep up with the literature and the current trends and techniques to improve our performance.

All of these activities take time and so need to be entrenched in job statements and billet structures. A staff development program cannot be imposed on staff who are already overworked. My experience is that instructional staff, at all levels, are generally very dedicated and perform well, which is a tribute to their dedication within a system that often pays little attention to their development. The potential is there to sharply accelerate cultural change by developing our staff.

The Navy is well into cultural reform and the ADF is about to respond to the many cultural enquiries commissioned over the last six months or so. ‘Bang for buck’ will be very important as we continue with Strategic Reform Program initiatives. Focusing on staff for initial officer training is therefore vital. This is the most effective lever for long-term cultural change.
Lieutenant Commander Jones joined the RAN as an observer in 1971 and has spent 20 years of his career in officer training. Early in his career, he was posted as an instructor to the simulator complex at HMAS Albatross and the School of Air Navigation at RAAF East Sale. He has completed instructional postings to ADFA and three postings to RAN College, including a posting as Head of Officer Initial Training Faculty. He holds a Graduate Diploma in Human Resource Development from the University of Canberra.
Junior Leaders in the Small-Team Environment

Corporal Alex Howard, Australian Army

I am a Sniper Team Leader at the School of Infantry, and have worked as such in 1RAR and 8/9RAR. I have deployed to East Timor and Afghanistan. Most of my time as a junior leader has been spent in a small-team environment, where every member is a vital player.

In my eyes, one of the most important attributes for a commander, at any level, is to identify their weaknesses and also those of their soldiers. From this comes the foundation of training and gives the direction necessary to become a strong, complete soldier.

With regards to training the team, a commander needs to lead by example in whatever training he or she does. The type of training needs to be purposeful, ideally focused on identified shortfalls within the team or potential operation/exercise employment opportunities. Your team’s development is paramount; the more complete they are as soldiers, the more capable your team and the higher your survivability on the ground. In Afghanistan, we trained extensively for overwatch tasks, counter-IED (improvised explosive devices), satellite patrolling, and a host of other mission-specific employment requirements. Together, these skills built a solid, reliable team that worked well together.

As a leader, detailed planning is essential. With only two or four people within a team, you still need to operate with the comparative sustainability of a larger force, and at the same time potentially providing a specialist capability. There was many a time when our team was utilised in an unforeseen manner in Afghanistan and, because of our preparation and an assessed need for flexibility, we were able to positively influence events.

In the planning phase, it is a good idea to have your members understudy you, especially your second-in-command. Firstly, it is essential for the team to understand the mission, including in case you are taken out of the scenario for whatever reason. Secondly, this is a good opportunity to show those below you the bigger picture and just where they fit in. Thirdly, it assists in professional development and prepares them for their prospective career progression.

A good leader is aware that the people below him have families, personal ambitions or just the need to get away from the normal grind. Long deployments overseas exacerbate this, even be it a low intensity operation, such as East Timor, close to home. Being sensitive to the needs of your soldiers is extremely important if you expect the most out of them. This assists in the creation of a tight-knit group at work and high morale in the field.

Following on from that, know your people; their likes and dislikes, what is happening on the home front, who is training for special forces or who is thinking of trade transfer or getting out. These all impact on an individual’s commitment to work—and, if negative, can quickly spread. You want to stay tuned into your men (and/or women) and assist them where you can, yet at the same time maintain their focus while on the job.
To be an effective leader in the small-team environment requires a high level of mental dexterity, from planning missions and organising training, to influencing those under your command and those above. Sometimes walking a tight rope and other times juggling. Observe, act, adapt, overcome and keep moving forward.

Commanding a small team has been a very rewarding experience for me. It forces you into the lives of the men you are leading and them into yours. You can see the effects of your leadership within the team on an individual basis and also the team as a whole. For me, it’s about leading men, not commanding them.

Corporal Howard enlisted in the Australian Regular Army in May 2006. He has served with 1RAR and 8/9RAR, and is currently posted to the School of Infantry as a sniper supervisor. He deployed to East Timor in 2007 with 1RAR on Operation ASTUTE and to Afghanistan in 2009 as a sniper team leader with 1RAR on Operation SLIPPER.
Air Lift Group and Junior Leadership

Warrant Officer Cary Thompson, RAAF, and Flight Sergeant Greg Purdue, RAAF

Introduction

The greatest challenge facing organisations is the ability to recruit, train and retain suitable personnel. The ADF is not alone in this endeavour and, in fact, has more stringent recruiting requirements than many, due to the additional health requirements and compliance with ADF values. So what consideration is given in the early stages of employment to assessing future leadership traits, in an organisation that needs to grow leaders into higher rank positions through the attrition of career progression and capability?

Also, how can we—particularly as an employer that uses such sophisticated, technologically-advanced and expensive equipment—prepare our people for leadership in roles which may include conflict or responding with minimal notice to devastating acts of nature, such as the Queensland floods, cyclone Yasi, tsunamis and earthquakes of 2011? Moreover, is it reasonable that junior airmen and –women, promoted predominantly on technical ability, are then expected to act as NCOs with a broad range of skills, having been given only two weeks of professional military education training?

Fortunately, Air Lift Group (ALG) has developed over several years a junior leadership and personal development program called REACH. The program initially came into existence in 2005, beginning with a pilot program. Since then, competing priorities have seen the program fluctuate, until 2009 when—with Air Commodore John Oddie at the helm as Commander ALG—REACH had new life breathed into it.

REACH began with the aim to ‘Grow the Air Lift Group team by engaging and empowering its workforce’. In its early days, REACH was centred in grass-roots leadership and leveraged off the foundations laid by the RAAF’s School of Postgraduate Studies (SPS) during promotion courses; however, it was always accepted that, like leadership, REACH has to be contextual and adaptive. The workshops, which had begun as a revisitation of the work done by SPS, are now always evolving and keeping pace with ALG and the dynamics of its changing workforce.

An imperative since 2009 has been for REACH to be aligned to ALG strategy. Today, the REACH strategy is directly linked to the Air Mobility Strategy and directly contributes to the ALG mission, which is ‘Flying important people and stuff to tough places on time’. To do this, the REACH mission has been redefined as ‘Develop dynamic leaders equipped with the necessary skills in the pursuit of achieving the Air Mobility Strategy’.

So what does this mean?

REACH is specifically set up to provide relevant and beneficial professional development to junior personnel within ALG. But this doesn’t happen through the delivery of rigid course training outcomes, which has proven to be challenging for some participants to accept. Rather, REACH breaks the mould of traditional ADF courseware, focuses on its participants and, through its strategies, seeks to influence values and behaviours.
REACH focuses on capability, culture, people and innovation. The facilitation differs from any other course or workshop that we have experienced in Defence in many ways. REACH doesn’t have a team of accredited facilitators or instructors backed by courseware developers; instead, REACH is led by the Group Executive Warrant Officer and facilitated by a group of volunteers, who are all passionate about ALG, the Air Mobility community and its people. This passion and energy is felt in the workshops and fills any void left by the lack of polished facilitation skills.

This mix of facilitators is akin to the aircraft of ALG—diverse, versatile, adaptive to the dynamic environment, and effects based. While we acknowledge that REACH 2012 is built around the same strategies as Air Mobility—capability, culture, people and innovation—the greatest attributes of successful organisations reside in the ‘below the waterline’ traits of leadership, strategy and alignment, behaviour and engagement, culture and empowerment.

It is these traits that lay below the waterline of the embedded/nurtured culture of an organisation (see Figure 1 below). And it is these traits that are the necessary enablers to grow an organisation to become one that is dynamic, respectful of its people and culture, encourages a one-team approach, and seeks innovation and new ways of doing things, while preserving things that are important to its people. This is the focus of REACH in the development of junior leaders. It is the ‘stuff’ often overlooked but, importantly, these traits are essential in assisting personnel to know their place in the organisation.

![Organisational Management Tools](image)

**Figure 1. REACH concept for junior leadership**
A key feature of any REACH workshop is to challenge participants on their understanding of leadership. Participants are asked to align themselves to one of the many leadership quotes placed on the walls and to share/defend why it strikes an accord with them. These quotes are not from the ‘pillars of business’ or from the pages of textbooks but come from members of the Air Mobility community. When the authors of these quotes are revealed, many participants are surprised to see that they come from a range of ranks, from the most junior to the most senior—for leadership exists across all planes.

To consolidate the leadership discussion, participants also challenge their beliefs and knowledge of command, management and leadership, where we define the difference between each—often leading to very candid banter!

A highlight of every workshop are the guest presenters, who share their experiences of leadership in operational environments and lessons learnt, demonstrating that leadership has transferrable skills. This provides an excellent understanding to all ranks, especially when topical leadership challenges are presented from their peers, capturing real examples and encouraging frank discussion.

So how exactly does REACH contribute to junior leadership? Each workshop begins with a pre-recorded presentation by Commander ALG. During this presentation, the Commander articulates the strategy and alignment components of Air Mobility, allowing participants to gain an understanding of where REACH fits into Air Mobility and into Air force, and the role that they play—a team must understand its purpose!

During the ‘behaviour and engagement’ component, behavioural models are examined with relevance to current daily tasking discussed, including the importance of providing and receiving effective feedback. Time is spent on coaching and mentoring to hone the skills of the participant, and to aid them in developing the potential of their subordinates. Linked to this are sessions on communication, where discussions are centred on roadblocks, obstacles, ways to overcome them and an insight into their (and other’s) ‘operating systems’.

With regard to ‘culture’, the concept of emotional intelligence is explored and how the key competencies mirror leadership, as well their importance and how to develop them in themselves and their people.

REACH seeks to empower its participants and the wider Air Mobility community through its work on leading change, including the processes and strategies. Junior leaders are today more accountable than ever in accepting the challenge to look for more efficient ways of doing things. Facilitating change management and overcoming resistance assists the group in learning how to improve the opportunities for implementation of improved processes.

The key to the success of REACH is its participants, who are drawn from all facets of the Air Mobility community, typically with representatives from the ADF, Australian Public Service and contractors. These participants vary in their age, work and life experience, and rank/position. Regardless of this, open lines of communication are established and networks formed. But it doesn’t stop there.

To capitalise on the development opportunities that REACH provides and to ensure continued networking and learning, a ‘community of practice’ (COP) has evolved. It further fosters the relationships and networks established during each individual workshop but also builds a
community and sense of belonging, where previous participants meet informally to discuss life since REACH, such as what has been beneficial, what challenges can be shared and what could also be incorporated into the program. This information is invaluable and is fed back into the program to ensure continuous improvement, as well as ensuring a dynamic model built on the relevance and appropriateness of its topics.

Although the COP concept is still in its infancy, considerable constructive feedback has already been provided, including from one participant who went off to be a detachment commander in the Middle East area of operations, who used the skills learnt on REACH to foster a cohesive team with a culture of performance. Another example is from a Leading Aircraftwoman clerk who, through REACH, found the confidence to be able to speak publicly, assert herself and is now becoming a facilitator.

So what?
The REACH leadership and development program is not a silver bullet that provides a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to the leadership development of our junior people. It does provide a suite of topics for discussion and discovery, based on years of experiences and challenges of the Air Mobility community. Overwhelmingly, the program is highly considered, as it provides tools to junior personnel that allow them to return to the workplace more confident in their ability to manage not only their day-to-day functions and activities, but the challenges which may appear from ‘left field’.

Where REACH really helps is that it provides an opportunity for leadership to be discussed openly and challenged laterally, while providing a supportive and learning environment that is endorsed by all levels of command within ALG.

Warrant Officer Thompson joined the Air Force as a technical apprentice. His first posting was to C-130 aircraft as an Engine Fitter and he has since been employed as a technician on Macchi and Hornet aircraft. During his career, he has also been employed in Recruiting, Directorate of Personnel, Project Vulcan (a technical workforce capability review) and Management Services Agency (now AFI) as a management consultant /business analyst. As the Group Warrant Officer ALG, one of his main priorities is the development of the group’s personnel.

Flight Sergeant Purdue first joined the Air Force as an air defence guard under the Ready Reserve Scheme, before re-enlisting in 1996 into the technical stream. He has maintained C-130 E, H and J model aircraft, as well as DHC-4 Caribou. He has deployed on numerous occasions, and is also a mediator for Defence.
Has ADF Leadership Changed Over the Last 20 Years and Can We Make It Better?

Warrant Officer Class 1 Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM, Australian Army Reserve

Introduction

The Australian Army has come a long way from when I enlisted over 38 years ago, particularly in a number of specific areas. We are now without a doubt a much better equipped Army. We are also a more highly-trained Army, both from an all-corps and trade perspective. Another area that has improved over the years is the way we lead our people, although I have always thought that we, as an Army, have for the most part been good at leadership.

The fact that we have been on non-stop operations since 1999 has also added to further develop our leadership skills. In recent years, the focus on our Defence values and Army values of ‘Courage, Initiative, Teamwork’ and the ‘Rules for a Fair Go’ has also enhanced the leadership skills of our people.

I truly believe that 97 per cent of our people do an outstanding job; however, I still believe we can improve in a number of areas. I feel at times we, as leaders in the profession of arms, let ourselves down in a number of areas. They are a lack of compassion, risk aversion, not reporting honestly on our people, leaders who lack moral courage, and finally leaders who micro-manage.

Compassion

‘Compassion’ in my opinion is one of the leadership qualities that is not used enough in today’s Army. There is a belief out there, particularly at the rank of E-4 and below, that we have a zero-defect attitude within the Defence Force as a whole. We should at all times be encouraging our leaders and commanders to make decisions, accepting that as a result some inevitably may make mistakes along the way. As long as their decisions are not illegal or do not involve safety, is it such a big deal? It is imperative that commanders guide and mentor their subordinates and then allow them to learn from their mistakes. He or she will move on to become a better and more knowledgeable leader than before. Tolerance is a wonderful thing.

When I talk about mistakes and compassion, I am not talking about the sergeant who punches out the RSM at the bar; that is just dumb and needs to be dealt with accordingly. What I am referring to are simple errors in judgment; for example, the platoon commander not submitting his or her platoon training program on time. Was it wrong? Yes. Was anyone hurt? No. So a stern word from the OC would have sufficed, not the ranting and raving by an OC who sounded like he was about to go thermal. And all this done within earshot of the other Platoons of the company!

Screaming at subordinates who make non-life-threatening mistakes will lower the morale of the team and the unit. Now if the platoon commander did the same thing the following week, that’s when he or she needs to be counselled in a more appropriate manner.
The use of compassion applies particularly to the skills area; some leaders take longer to acquire the required skills than others. This is not meant as a criticism. It is a statement of fact. I have seen young platoon and section commanders take up to six months to become proficient at map-to-ground navigation, while others took only three months. While map-to-ground navigation would be considered by some as a trivial issue, the point I am making here is that when the young leader gets lost, have a bit of compassion, as he or she is just trying to learn their skills—I do not believe they would get lost on purpose!

This thinking should apply equally across all skills, regardless of whether we think it’s easy or not. Remember, we are all different and we must never forget what it was like when we were in their shoes. It’s a shame some of us do. Compassion is a very valuable and effective leadership tool if we choose to apply it.

**Risk aversion**

I am certain risk aversion is a result of a lack of compassion. Some leaders have become extremely hesitant to make a decision for fear of receiving a bad report at the end of the year if the decision they make is wrong. This type of attitude is like a cancer and once it starts it is hard to stop. Commanders and leaders at all levels need to know that they are free to make decisions and that they have the support of their superiors, therefore giving them the confidence to make the right decision.

Why shouldn’t a section commander be able to take their section down to the beach to do PT every now and then? Would it be that the section commander’s superior was worried that the section may in some way do something wrong in a public place and therefore he or she would be held responsible by his or her commander? It is good to see the section commander showing some initiative, considering it’s one of our Army’s values. We allow our section commanders to command their eight men and women in peacetime, and on operations in extremely arduous and dangerous situations, yet we won’t allow that same section commander to stand down the same eight men or women early on a Friday afternoon without getting permission from up to three different superiors.

We spend far too much time telling our leaders what they cannot do instead of advising them what they can do. Give them guidance and set the boundaries for action and have a completed-by time; perhaps our leaders will surprise us all. We need to afford our people the responsibility and confidence to make decisions and then they will make them. However, at the same time, we should also hold them responsible for the decisions they make. Trust your subordinates and allow them to be the leaders the ADF needs. This and the use of compassion are the only cure for this type of cancer.

**Honest reporting**

We have all at some stage in our military lives sat back and said, either to ourselves or to someone else, how did he or she get promoted or who was foolish enough to promote that person? Much has been said by our people about poor leaders but we have no-one else to blame but ourselves because we write their interim and annual reports.

Why are we reluctant to give a subordinate an adverse report if he or she deserves it? I have a theory on this issue, albeit unproven. I believe there are leaders out there who just want to be everyone’s friend. Superior ranks in and outside the work environment allowing junior ranks
to call them by their first name or nickname, and superiors turning a blind eye to subordinates’ misdemeanours instead of dealing with them on the spot. Could this be because they just want to be liked? If I am soft on my subordinates, they will like me. Not necessarily. However, do they respect you? I doubt it.

There have been times when commanders have voiced to me personally their disappointment in their subordinates, such as the RSM failing on a number of occasions to abide by the commander’s written direction. Yet the commander himself failed by not recording these facts on an interim or annual report.

Another unacceptable way of dealing with our poor leaders is to post them to another unit. This action does not rectify the problem, all it does is pass it on to another commander to manage. Unfortunately, I have witnessed this action too many times over the years. Examples of this are where an NCO posted to a training establishment is about to go to court for his third DUI charge. At the same unit, a lieutenant and two NCOs, with no medical or physical excuse, are unable to pass a basic fitness assessment. Another corporal from a different unit believes there is nothing wrong with ‘roughing up’ soldiers undergoing initial employment training—and the same corporal has two cases of assault on his record!

The question here should have been, why weren’t these issues dealt with at the previous unit? Why didn’t their reports reflect their performance? Many in the system are quick to blame the career management agencies. However, if performance issues are not recorded on paper, there is very little that these agencies can do. Poor leaders need to be administered through counselling or re-training. If this fails, they should be reduced in rank or dismissed from the Defence Force.

Poor leaders set bad examples, they affect the morale of the team and the unit, and they could unnecessarily get people, good people, injured—or even worse—killed. As I travelled around Australia and overseas, and spoke with our personnel of all ranks who were in the process of leaving the Service, one of the questions I always asked was why were they electing to discharge from the Army? The most common response I received was that ‘I am sick of working for people who are poor leaders’.

**Moral courage**

While I consider our Army values of ‘Courage, Initiative and Teamwork’ to be important for Army’s culture, I believe that the value of ‘courage’ is the most important one we have. Some leaders only see the Army value of courage from a physical point of view and, as a result, generally fail as leaders. I agree physical courage is very important for all soldiers. However, the other half of courage, that being the moral aspect, should be the most important leadership quality that we as an Army should possess.

Moral courage is all about having the intestinal fortitude to do what is right. As a leader, you must have a commitment to do the right thing, even when doing so could be risky in either physical, personal and/or career terms.
Most of the issues discussed in this paper would not have occurred if the leaders at the time had displayed moral courage. Some more examples of the lack of moral courage (and some that involve inappropriate, illegal or criminal acts) are:

• Why do some of our leaders apply double standards?
• Why do some of our leaders say one thing and they themselves do another?
• Why do we stop our juniors from taking disciplinary action against subordinates?
• Why are subordinates told not to do something by a superior yet, a short distance away, other superiors are doing the same thing?
• Why did the warrant officer knowingly conduct an unsafe range practice?
• Why did the lieutenant steal from the Q Store?
• Why did the captain touch a female subordinate on the breast?
• Why did the warrant officer inappropriately grab a female guest in the mess?
• Why did we allow bullying and harassment at some of our training establishments?
• Why did the major drive a service vehicle under the influence of alcohol?
• Why did the sergeant assault three members of subordinate rank?
• Why did we allow soldiers to do sentry duty on operations, both day and night, who were not qualified on the weapons that they were expected to use?
• Why did the commanding officer disregard higher direction?
• And the hits just keep on coming.

To correct the leadership issues raised in this paper and to help prevent them from recurring in the future, all leaders at all times need to exhibit moral courage. And, just as importantly, we need to encourage all our people to demonstrate moral courage at all times. When it comes to doing our everyday jobs, let’s adopt the motto, ‘nothing personal, this is business’. There is no doubt that if you do not possess moral courage, you will never be an effective leader of soldiers.

**Micro-management**

Micro-management is another issue affecting our leaders and commanders today, as it involves both the perception and reality of being micro-managed. We like to preach ‘mission command’ but some leaders refuse to put it into practice. We must go back to the basics. Commanding officers need to be commanding officers and not officers commanding. Platoon commanders need to be platoon commanders and not section commanders. Company sergeant majors need to get out of the platoon sergeant’s area of responsibility and so on. I think you understand my meaning.

We should allow the company commanders to get on with training the company. Give our junior leaders room to progress. Let the junior NCOs plan and conduct their own training program one or two days a week. As commanders go and view their training, but view it from afar. And, at the end of the activity, a ‘well done’ and some guidance provided from the commander personally goes a long way.
It was just great to hear young platoon and section commanders tell me at the Chief of Army’s ‘Lessons Learnt from Operations Forums’ that when they go ‘outside the wire’ to conduct a mission, the micro-management problem disappears. But it’s very disappointing to also hear that once back inside the wire, the problem returns. This can be very demoralising for the commander and leader.

Similarly, why does the captain on operations in Iraq walk down to the guardroom near the entrance to the camp while the corporal in the guard room is busy writing up his roster, just to tell him to sweep out the guardroom building? I am sure the task was on the corporal’s list of things to do, however, the roster was and should have been his priority.

When a subordinate is given a task to complete, it is the commander’s (and rightly so) responsibility to monitor the task. However, this is where the perception comes into play, as some commanders and leaders monitor so closely, leaving the subordinate with the perception that he or she is being micro-managed. By all means monitor the tasks but do it from a distance. Supervise through observing and reporting back. Leaders enjoy responsibility but detest being watched and directed 100 per cent of the time.

Values

My final point may upset some. However, I believe it is a point worthy of debate. As I mentioned in my first paragraph, I absolutely agree with being a values-based organisation. However, there is one of our Defence values that I feel is very divisive and, dare I ask, should we replace it, that being ‘loyalty’. A lot of us, including myself (during my younger days), have risked our honesty and integrity to cover for a mate knowing it was wrong. But we felt we needed to be loyal to our mates and not the organisation (misguided loyalty). Why, because we didn’t understand what loyalty actually meant.

Should we replace it with ‘personal accountability’ (as we are all personally accountable for our own actions)? Another option would be to keep loyalty and put more effort into educating our people when they join the organisation on what the value of loyalty really means. When someone wants you to do the right thing, they will appeal to your sense of integrity. However, when someone wants you to do the wrong thing, they will appeal to your sense of loyalty.

To answer the article heading, has leadership changed over the last 20 years? Absolutely, and for the better. However, the organisation is not perfect and, while we strive for perfection, we will never be perfect because, like it or not, as humans we all make mistakes.

Conclusion

This article has been written based on my observations, findings and views as a Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) during my final years in the Regular Army and, since 2008, in my time working in the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics. It is also based on comments received from soldiers of all ranks. I have also included some of the thoughts from soldiers who have attended the Chief of Army’s ‘Lessons Learnt from Operations Forums’. When I have used the term ‘soldier’ in the paper, it refers to all personnel regardless of rank.

Every incident I have cited is a true account and it is just the tip of the iceberg. Now don’t get me wrong, our people do very good work in most cases but I know that if we all take steps to address the issues raised in this article, we can do much better in the leadership space.
I have also attached some feedback that I collected while RSM of the Army. The groups in question were given ten minutes and without discussing with anyone else, asked to write down five things they liked most about the Army and five things they hate most about the Army. The purist would say the results don’t constitute an official survey. That’s fine but I believe their responses were relevant, sincere and honest. Most gave more than five responses (although I’ve only included the five most ‘popular’) and most put their name on the paper.

The feedback targeted the Subject One All Corps Courses, including the then Subject One for Corporal, Sergeant and Warrant Officer Class 2, most of the then current RSMs, and students attending the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC). It does not include ACSC Navy and Air Force comments, however, they did participate and their remarks were similar to Army comments.

What is very evident is that leadership is the heart and soul of the Profession of Arms.

Warrant Officer Kevin Woods retired from the Regular Army after more than 34 years service in Infantry, which included regimental appointments from rifleman to RSM. He served as the RSM-A for four years before his retirement in 2008. He now works for the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics in Canberra.

### Subject One for Corporal Course (371 students)

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### Regimental Sergeant Majors (102)

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### Australian Command and Staff College (Army students 110)

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A view from Canada –
‘Reform and the Non-Commissioned Officer’

Master Warrant Officer Stephan R. Smith, Canadian Forces

One of the most profound challenges is re-defining what the role of NCOs will be in the Army of the future. NCOs have earned an excellent reputation within the Army, a reputation based on the execution of difficult tasks and missions assigned to them. But today’s NCO lives in a paradoxical world. The Army, through its training and culture, has traditionally prepared the NCO to function in a very limited role as part of its ‘backbone’. However, technological changes, operational commitments and decentralised control frequently now expect more from the NCO, such as being the sole decision-maker at an observation point or the lone voice of reason at a checkpoint.

Discussions about the future of NCOs come at a critical time, since action needs to be taken to revitalise the leadership function and restore command confidence in the unique contribution the NCO plays within Canada’s Army, both today and in the future. The goal of reform should not be ‘to re-invent the wheel’ but to examine the grounds on which NCOs are required, the functions they fulfil and what voids are filled by their presence.

Historical legacy

In many ways, the Army and the Canadian Forces are suffering from a 'borrowed concept' syndrome. Until the 1970s, Army training, language and publications were written in relatively plain English. Currently, we take concepts from the civilian world and apply them directly and extensively to the manner in which we conduct all our military affairs. In the 1970s, as a method of self-improvement, we applied contemporary educational concepts to military training. As an organisation, we moved from instructor to teacher, if you will. More recently, there has been extensive application of business terminology and practices. We now appear to be moving from being leaders to being administrators. This is not to argue against progress in providing the best instruction or improving financial practices—but it illustrates the blurred lines that now exist between the military and civilian communities.

One of these borrowed concepts is the perception of the NCO as the ‘middle manager’ within a unit. For many years, we saw the function of the NCO as a leader of men within a very narrow application. This application reflected the traditions and values that were part of our colonial experience. It was during the 1960s that certain social and military changes had a great impact on the Army, notably the Canadian Forces Bilingual and Bicultural Plan, unification of the Armed Forces and anti-Vietnam War sentiments. The impact of these changes directly altered the traditional manner in which NCOs functioned.

There developed, albeit with great resistance, the beginning of a more diverse military culture. And it was during this cultural transition that the NCO underwent considerable changes from being a ‘military leader of men’ to a ‘civilian manager of human resources’. Corps disappeared and branches were established in their stead. Where regimental or unit ties remained strong, these changes were not as severe. Within the combat arms, there were significant but less
drastic changes for the NCOs. However, as the predominance of the combat arms within the Army has waned, the concept of the middle manager has expanded and is perhaps now at its peak. We are at that point in time when the question arises, what model for the development of NCOs will next be established?

**The function of the NCO**

There are two common functions that the NCO has always served. And whether we speak in business terms or in military terms, those functions are fundamentally the same. In business terms, we identify the two functions of the middle manager as having to ‘manage the business’ and ‘manage the people.’ As NCOs, we recognise ‘the business’ as ‘the mission’ and ‘management’ as ‘leadership’. But the mission is not a product, nor is leadership just about human resources. It is in how these terms are defined that others view us as NCOs. If the mission is the only priority, the leader—such as the well-known generals from World War 2—are seen in a traditional light. It is far more difficult to identify those who are known for their personal battlefield leadership, such as Audie Murphy, who still serves as a shining example to current American soldiers. So why is it so difficult to identify the common heroes or role models for today’s NCOs?

At the national level, NCOs need to have positive role models whose influence is seen and felt. Most Army NCOs view the Regimental Sergeant Major’s position as the pinnacle of their career. This may explain why senior NCOs in appointments such as area, brigade, division, command or Army are seen as political rather than leadership figures. It is acknowledged that these appointments are necessary and an integral part of our system. But they lack the perceived status among many NCOs of being personal goals. Accordingly, there needs to be a close look taken at the impact of personal leadership within the NCO corps. Who are the role models and how are they rewarded by the organisation for living up to this obligation?

If leadership is the art of influencing human behaviour to accomplish the mission in the manner desired by the leader, we must see ‘managing the business’ and ‘managing people’ as having equal or almost-equal priorities. If these are seen as equal priorities or are viewed as integral parts of each other, then reward for NCOs should be based on performance measured by these two criteria. Being a good or even a great leader must have its place within the Army, and those who are in this position of responsibility and trust must function as national role models for subordinates to emulate.

**The role of the NCO in maintaining ‘conduct’**

Notwithstanding the leader’s obvious focus on mission, it is essential that the NCO corps retains also the original emphasis on conduct. No matter what the technology, terminology or political influence, the NCO will be judged heavily on his or her conduct—and the conduct of those under his or her ‘command’. This particular concept of conduct may be sliced in many different ways. The three essential elements that will be examined here are deportment, discipline and leadership by example.
Deportment

In practice, we have traditionally viewed ‘deportment’ as something that changes somewhat with the geographical situation. Deportment can at least be partially seen as that unwritten ‘code of conduct’ by which soldiers abide. During war and in peacekeeping, the code of conduct followed within our home garrisons has not necessarily been the same as that followed on foreign soil. Even at home, we also informally have divided this code into different forms, namely one code of conduct for the garrison and another for the field. However, as a result of certain negative media reports generated during recent years, both public pressure and the military requirements have demanded that a more universal code of conduct be adopted.

It needs to be accepted by the chain of command that during the selection and development of a NCO, his or her posting, tasking and training should be given with a common purpose. The purpose of training should be the development of the NCO as the monitor and enforcer of those standards by which professional soldierly deportment is measured. This should be universally applicable when in garrison, or instructing on a course, or serving on an operational deployment.

As the principal monitor of soldiers’ conduct within a disciplined environment, the NCO has a unique function within the Army. The NCO must not only be concerned with achieving the mission but also with enforcing the same high standards relating to respect for others and to issues of security, health, welfare and the morale of one’s charges in all environments. It is fully understood that in the application of these standards, variations will be found depending on the situation. But all soldiers, and especially NCOs, must be aware that the integrity of this code of conduct must always be maintained in a consistent manner.

Discipline

The second essential element is ‘discipline’. Traditionally, armies are organised in a hierarchical nature. Therefore discipline, historically within the military context, is seen as the ability to follow and to give orders. Whenever there is a discussion about discipline, reference is often made to the ability of the soldier to follow direct orders. But there is more to discipline that just the ability to follow a direct order. Much of a soldier’s experience in training is based on receiving and giving operational orders. NCOs need to have the opportunity to develop both the informal delivery of orders and direction, as well as the formal order process. There needs to be a re-examination of the concept of formal and informal orders, since orders do not have the same meaning in today’s Army as they did 50 years ago. One thing that is different about today’s Army is that NCOs and officers are now trained in smaller groups and, in many circumstances, they deploy in re-organised sub-units, frequently operating in a relatively unstable or less controlled environment than ever before.

Basic training, common Army courses and professional development sessions must all be aimed at ensuring NCOs are thoroughly familiar with more than just issues of technical and tactical competency. NCOs must be taught not just ‘how to read’ but also ‘how to read between the lines’. There is a requirement for NCOs to be formally prepared to interpret the vast amount of military and civil laws, rules and restrictions. Courses such as current military law, applicable international laws, rules of engagement for specific operations and the laws of armed conflict are all examples of courses that support a holistic approach to the development of a leader.
NCOs must have the ability to apply these rules of conduct in various circumstances. And NCOs must be intimately familiar with them in order to impose discipline. The NCO must be enabled to develop the ability to make the appropriate decisions necessary to accomplish the task or mission successfully. Each aspect of career development must enable a NCO to apply this guidance and these forms of restrictions and limitations in an appropriate manner, day-to-day, from year-to-year and from operation-to-operation. In this context, we must now view the word ‘discipline’ not within its current, known context but to change the mind-set from discipline as punishment to that of discipline as a product of positive leadership.

**Leadership by example**

Within the domain of discipline is the application of knowledge, which is an essential tool of leadership. Here again is an example of a borrowed concept. Much of our present training was modelled on the civilian educational system. Increasingly, the Army provides training in an adult educational style. Courses dealing with the military environment, military law and harassment, just to name a few, are taught as if they were part of a program of electives. Most of the ‘core’ trade training is still being presented through formal lectures in the traditional fashion, such as recruit course material, small arms lectures or leadership lessons. And some of the courses offered to NCOs are considered to be peripheral or speciality knowledge that not all NCOs have the opportunity or even the desire to acquire.

But some of the skills that are operationally required of a NCO are not taught in any forum, either formally on course or as part of pre-deployment training. In some cases, these mission-essential skills are not even encouraged for development within the Army as a whole. Two good examples of what I perceive to be the type of required skills are ‘negotiation’ and ‘mediation’, although it should be acknowledged that these are taught to a limited extent as part of unit pre-deployment training. However, a wider spectrum of courses offered to NCOs as part of regular career progression needs to be developed.

When we use phrases such as ‘leadership by example’ or ‘never pass a fault’, much of their true meaning is lost because these are used so frequently and routinely. The language and terms used are often equated to punitive measures and not to corrective actions. Frequently, these phrases are used in jest and their impact or importance has now diminished to the point of being viewed as trite. What should be conveyed is a positive message, one that emphasises the need for all leaders to assist in the development of their subordinates by being the best role model possible.

**Future considerations**

The intent of this article has been to highlight some of the factors that need to be examined in order to gain a better understanding of the need to impose change on the role of the NCO. Essentially, NCOs need to be involved in that process. Doctrinally, there needs to be a ‘think tank’ approach to gain a thorough comprehension of the tasks at hand for the NCO of the future. There is also a requirement for specific NCO development to be linked to that of the officer stream. Training should be structured so that NCOs are taught alongside officers, whereby a deep trust, mutual respect and mutual awareness of responsibilities are embedded in each other as an essential element for success; success that will be generated both while on course and, subsequently, within a field unit.
NCOs have long proven their ability to make timely, sound decisions in environments characterised by highly-decentralised command. Formal training for NCOs should encompass more than the conduct of battle. Instruction in peacekeeping, aid to the civil power, and other skills should not be placed at the periphery of career development. The Army as an organisation must recognise that the NCO holds a unique position of value and that there needs to be an updated, relevant training system and concurrent career development plan that is supported by effective mentors, including the officer corps.

The result of adopting this training methodology will have a two-fold benefit. Young NCOs will have advice, experience and real assistance, and senior NCOs will have a hand in the actual development of their subordinates, who will then, in turn, be more likely to develop their own ability to be positive role models within their unit.

Conclusion

Canadian NCOs have been successfully able to adapt and succeed through many social and military changes. Within the Army, the NCO corps possesses valuable practical experience for the commander. The ability to translate policy and direction into direct action is essential for success, and practical experience is usually the basis for the successful accomplishment of a major mission or even of a minor task. Leadership is that essential art that addresses the manner and fashion in which the human factor is involved in executing the mission. The NCO should no longer be considered to be the vague and somewhat trite ‘backbone of the Army’ but must be properly developed as the eyes, ears, voice and hands of command and to be properly and universally acknowledged as such.

As a ‘coal face’ guardian of soldierly conduct, the NCO corps has the experience and ability to act as a guarantor of high standards of conduct and discipline, including in less structured environments. There must be career development paths that educate and support an NCO’s ability to ensure these high standards of conduct. Through timely, effective training that reflects the current requirements of the Army, the NCO should be properly prepared for any and all future tasks.

A high standard of conduct must be demanded at all times and all NCOs, regardless of trade, appointment or location, must universally apply and demand that standard. This will, in turn, help achieve both the military mission and the desired political end-state. The display of positive leadership must be the basis of real reward for the soldier, and recognition of the unique contributions and the potential that NCOs possess will help assure our Army’s credibility within this country and will assist in maintaining Canada’s place on the world stage.

At the time of writing, Master Warrant Officer Smith, was an infantryman from the Princess Louise Fusiliers, having served in the Canadian Forces since 1980. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from McMaster University.

NOTES

1. This is a substantially abridged version of an article, with the title ‘Reform and the Non-Commissioned Officer’, published in the Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 2005, reprinted with permission.
A view from the US – ‘Leadership and Life’

Colonel John D. Sims, US Army

What follows is a humble attempt to share lessons that have sustained me in my career and family life. I hope that these are of some use to you, the reader, as well. We cannot afford to lose you who serve from the ranks, nor can you afford to lose your family while remaining in the ranks. With a balanced approach to life, I believe we can keep both goals alive.

The lessons

• Take time to sharpen your axe
• Just be you
• Never walk by a soldier without an encouraging word
• Integrity is just a word, until tested
• Command is not what you want, but what your soldiers need
• Make your own coffee
• Build your legacy through your soldiers
• Seek and give honest feedback
• Go to work early and come home early
• Tell me how this really ends.

Take time to sharpen your axe

One day, as a young lieutenant, I was called to the major’s office. As I arrived, I noticed he was staring out the window. I thought: ‘The major must have more important things to do than daydream. I certainly don’t have time for that!’ When he turned, he must have noticed my questioning look. He began to tell me the story of two lumberjacks, Bubba and Smitty, who went into the forest to chop wood. Bubba chopped as hard and fast as he could, never taking a break. However, Smitty took a ten-minute break every hour. At the end of the day, Smitty had a larger pile of wood than Bubba. ‘How is it that I worked without breaks, but you cut more wood?’ Bubba asked. Smitty answered: ‘Cause on those breaks I was sharpening my axe!’.

That was when I learned the lesson of taking time to reflect, think, pause or just relax. If we don’t sharpen the axe often, we begin to dull and will miss ‘the big picture’—or something critically important. Take time to ‘sharpen your axe’ and teach your soldiers to do so as well.

Just be you

I was a terrible lieutenant. It wasn’t that I didn’t work hard. I studied, learned my job and cared for my men. I came to work early and stayed late. I learned and lived our Army values. I did all the things that were expected of a young officer. But I spent too much time trying to be
like the other lieutenants. I made bad decisions because I tried to copy what the successful lieutenants did, not what I should do. I wrongly believed there was a narrow mould in which I needed to fit to succeed. As a result, it stifled my personality and creativity. Bottom line, I was afraid to be unique; to be me.

A leader’s job is to bring out the best in people to improve the organisation and to accomplish the mission. I was lucky to have a great battalion commander who was good at being himself. He broke the stereotypical mould I had of military commanders (too many war movies, I guess). He laughed a lot, often at himself. He broke unnecessary rules, took calculated risks and was creative. He patted soldiers on the back every day, ‘sometimes a little higher, sometimes a little lower’. He was a great commander in every sense of the word but he was himself first. From him, I learned that I could be myself while being a soldier. As I became more comfortable being me, I became a better officer. In turn, my soldiers became better because they were given licence to be themselves. The Army is people, not equipment. Leaders enable people.

**Never walk by a soldier without an encouraging word**

I was on duty in the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 when the US was attacked. I was part of an operations team in the National Military Command Center. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, were in the Center with a host of senior leaders making nationally-important decisions. After many hours of intense work, I needed a comfort break. I literally ran down the hall to the latrine. As I entered, I almost ran over an Air Force guy who was in my way. I had no time to be polite. I had a job to do. I was important and I needed to get back to my station.

As I began to abruptly push by, I stopped in my tracks as he turned around. It was General Myers! Though he must have been under enormous stress, he looked serious but calm. My guess is that I didn’t look so calm. Paraphrasing the brief conversation: ‘How ya doing, major?’, he asked. ‘Fine, sir!’. ‘Well hang in there major; we’ll get through this’. And off he went. This was the man responsible for coordinating the military response to 9/11—and he still took the time and effort to pass on a few words of encouragement. Those few words renewed my energy and courage, providing a calm that allowed me to do my job more effectively. You are that leader to every soldier with whom you come in contact. Soldiers are always watching and it is your job never to walk by a soldier without a greeting or word of encouragement. Encouragement is a combat multiplier.

**Integrity is just a word, until tested**

As a young captain in 1992, I commanded the best battery in the battalion (no bias here!). We were good at firing artillery and we knew it. We constantly pushed ourselves to beat the other batteries. Unfortunately, we pushed too hard and had a firing incident; specifically, we shot out of the impact area. Even worse, the trajectory took the round directly over the observation post where my battalion and brigade commanders were, the round impacting about 700 metres behind their position.

I expected to be relieved as commander in accordance with what I perceived as the Army’s ‘zero-defect’ culture. But I wasn’t relieved. For the first time in my career, my integrity was tested as an investigation began and tough questions were asked of me and my men. Before
then, integrity was just a word to me. Now I was finding the depths of my own honesty and that of my men. Those who were truthful were rewarded with the strength and power that comes from being honest. Those who lied were weighed down with the burden and insecurity that comes from being dishonest. In the end, it was a life-changing experience, for which I am very grateful.

I also came to appreciate the command climate created by my bosses. They put an end to any perception of ‘zero-defect’ in our unit. I resolved to create that same environment—where integrity and Army values are supreme, and honest mistakes are indicators of hard work and risk-taking, not failure. This should be the same for you. Each time your integrity is tested and you pass, you gain strength and confidence to face more difficult situations. Integrity, when tested and passed, provides the calm at the end of the most difficult days.

**Command is not what you want, but it is what your soldiers need**

Many incoming commanders formulate what they want to accomplish even before the unit’s colours are passed. ‘I want to go straight to the field. Train my men. Improve physical training, marksmanship, and other scores by 20 per cent etc’. But is that what the unit needs? When I assumed command of a field artillery battalion, I was no different. I’d written my vision statement even before I was in the unit. On meeting my command sergeant-major, I enthusiastically laid out my vision for what I was going to do with my battalion. In the firm but tactful way of our NCOs, he re-directed me. ‘Sir, you might want to consider that your battalion just returned from 12 months in Iraq. The soldiers and families have been through a lot. You might want to find out what this battalion needs, not just what you want!’ Wow, what a mental shift. You mean this is not just all about me?

I took his advice. The next week I met with the entire battalion in the theatre. I gave them a short summary of my core beliefs and values: family, hard work and integrity. Then I gave every soldier a 3x5 card to write three things the unit does well, three things we can improve, and the name of the best or worst leader in their organisation. That weekend, I read every card and identified trends to sustain and improve, and I also homed in on leaders to watch (both good and poor).

From their cards, I learned the unit needed to recharge from a challenging deployment and reconnect with their families. As a result, instead of heading straight to the field, we planned an organisational day and social events. We had a ‘bring your kids to work day’, which helped reconnect families. And we did lots of demanding physical training and team sports. Once we rebuilt the soldiers and their families, then we could rebuild the battalion as a combat unit. Eventually, we did go to the field. And I am convinced the soldiers performed better and the families were healthier because we shifted the focus from what I wanted to what they needed.

**Make your own coffee**

‘Rank has its privileges’. We’ve all heard that said. The logic goes: ‘When I become the commander, I’ll have my own office and parking spot. I’ll have a vehicle with my name on the windshield and a soldier to drive me places. Soldiers will bring me a cup of coffee. Boy, won’t I be important!’. Wrong. These aren’t the privileges of command. The privilege is the opportunity to serve soldiers in a larger capacity and to have a greater positive impact. We have to avoid being seduced by the privileges of rank and position.
One of the best ways is to make your own coffee. If you support the premise: ‘I am here to serve soldiers’ versus ‘They are here to serve me’, that establishes the correct perspective and keeps your ego in check. An absence of ego allows you to be humble. It allows you to laugh at yourself and to show your personality. When soldiers see you in this light, dealing with the same basic aspects of living as they do, it ‘removes you from the pedestal’, whether you intend to be or not.

When you can load your own kit, make your own photocopies or make a pot of coffee at the office. Doing the seemingly menial tasks reveals you as a humble servant, while still being the commander. Sure, you’re busy but these simple acts send powerful messages. Your unassuming approach ultimately will lead to making the unit more at ease and effective. Take the opportunity to make your own coffee. And while you’re at it, pour a cup for the private on duty.

Build your legacy through your soldiers

Have you ever thought what your legacy might be? Consider that a career typically spans 20 years; some will serve more, many will serve less. What do you want people to remember about you when you’re gone? Common responses are: ‘He/she was a great leader and commander’ or ‘He/she cared for their soldiers’ or ‘I want to be just like him/her in my career’.

Although these are great responses, those legacies are short-lived. Walk through any headquarters and look at the photos of previous commanders. How many ‘old dead guys’ do we really remember for their contributions? The point is that our legacy is not in what we did as individuals during our service but in how we developed our subordinates to replace us. Our legacy is in developing strong subordinate leaders who can face and win battles in conflicts more complex than our own. It is in how we train our subordinates to embody our military values of duty, honour, personal courage, integrity and respect. Our legacy rests in leading soldiers through tough missions while caring for their families. Soldiers need leaders’ interest and concern. Deciding to stay or leave the Army is a personal decision—and leaders must support and encourage soldiers to make that decision without prejudice. We should show interest and encourage soldiers to continue to serve. Ultimately, they will make their own decisions—but at least they will know we care.

There are countless ways to develop your subordinates, but try this: be unavailable occasionally—which encourages subordinates to make decisions that are rightly your own. Let junior leaders make mistakes without fear of failure. Then provide ‘top-cover’ and back them up when things do not go well. In the end, it doesn’t matter what rank or position we attain or if anyone even remembers our names or faces. What matters is that we left our legacy embodied in a lineage of quality, well-trained, values-based soldiers who continue to serve.

Seek and provide honest feedback

Give honest feedback. Sounds simple, right? Not! Providing and receiving honest feedback, especially about the things we don’t do well, goes a long way toward improvement.

Here’s a technique to try. It takes some guts but it is worth the effort. At the conclusion of each job, once all the reports and evaluations are complete, write three to five open-ended
questions to your subordinates to provide feedback on what you might not have done well and how to make improvements. Avoid questions designed to pump up your ego. Instead, focus on questions in areas that you sense didn’t go well or where your motives may have been misunderstood. The most brutally honest comments are often the most beneficial to your development. Don’t be afraid of these responses or try to justify your actions. Instead, be open, reflect on their perspective and consider what you might change or improve for the future.

Not only should you seek honest feedback from your subordinates but you should provide honest assessments to them. Honest and considerate feedback lays the foundation for improvement. Perhaps the simplest and most effective tools are evaluation reports and counselling sessions. Hopefully, none of us base our self-worth on the glowing comments written in our evaluation reports. I haven’t ‘walked on water’ lately but that is the kind of strong language that often seems needed to advance through a given system. Unfortunately, these comments, although nice to hear, do not improve our leadership skills. Honest feedback, however, does so.

**Go to work early and come home early**

My father, who served in the Korean War and Vietnam, gave me some great advice. He said, ‘Go to work early and come home early’. I understood the ‘go to work early’ part, because it reinforced the perception I held of the Army—that you had to work long and hard to succeed. But I did not understand the ‘come home early’ bit. His point was that if you go in early, your kids really won’t miss you because they’ll still be in bed. Plus you can get a lot of work done before other soldiers arrive and you begin to change focus.

‘Come home early’ really meant being home in time to sit down at the family table for dinner and to help with homework, baths and bedtime stories. Those are critical times in raising a family. Kids have a simple but vital need: to be with their mothers and fathers. Just being there will do more for family and world peace than any other activity. There will be deployments or training missions that prevent you from being home for dinner. Make those the exception. If this lesson isn’t sufficiently clear, just ask your kids and they will tell you.

**Tell me how this really ends**

A well-respected US general rhetorically asked a reporter, when referring to the war in Iraq: ‘Tell me how this ends’. Envisioning how a situation might end helps shape the path to reach that end-state. We should ask the same question about our careers and our lives. How do you see your military service ending? What will your family relationships be in your twilight years? How do you measure your success? A lieutenant-general once told me: ‘The last act of the Army is always one of rejection’. Regardless of how much rank you attain or how high the position of authority, the Army will eventually not select you for something. Whether it is the next level of command, military schooling or promotion, eventually we all get told ‘No’.

All of us are leaving the Army some day. Unfortunately, rejection may lead to bitterness. A common complaint is: ‘Why wasn’t I selected and so-and-so was? I’m better than them!’. This is an error in perspective. Instead of feeling cheated, we should feel privileged to have served at each rank and position we attained. Military service is not a race or a competition. It is an opportunity to serve soldiers as circumstances and the institution permit.
There are successful leaders who sacrifice and lose their families for their career. Why is that? Perhaps we take our spouse for granted. As soldiers, the Army gives us orders but our spouse gets invitations. Did you ask your spouse for his/her continued support during your next assignment? Was his/her opinion part of your decisions? Have you thanked him/her for the contributions to your career, children, community and country? Bought any flowers lately? It is when we take spouse or family for granted and fail to nurture our relationships that we are no longer successful. Spouses sacrifice a lot to allow us to serve. Acknowledging and appreciating their contributions helps reinforce why they make such sacrifices—namely, you.

You define your success. It is based on factors that you can control—primarily your attitude, thoughts and actions. Therefore, allowing an external force you can’t control to define your success—the institution, for example—will ultimately lead to disappointment and bitterness. And so the question remains: Imagine you and your family long after you have left the military—and tell me how this really ends.

Conclusion

Some will argue these lessons are not new. That’s probably true. But we have to check our priorities constantly to ensure they are balanced between career and family. Some may also pick up on the fact that I wrote more about command or leadership, and less about family. They may consider this as evidence of poor balance. But I believe all of these lessons apply to career or family. Throughout this article, replace the word soldier with spouse, child, friend or stranger and you will see the lessons still ring true. At some point, we realise that we are all connected.

At the end of the day, this isn’t about career, it’s about life. Life isn’t a race or competition. It is more a dance or a song where we all affect each other. It’s often a question of priorities. Being a soldier is a profession but being a father or mother, husband or wife, is life. We have to invest in career and family simultaneously, as neither will wait for the other to be completed. Balance cannot be just a buzzword. It must be bred into our culture through our actions. My hope is that some of these lessons may help you sustain your military service and your family through a balanced life.

At the time of writing, Colonel John D. Sims was an artilleryman in the US Army, serving with the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. From September 2008 to June 2009, he was a student in the National Security Program conducted at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

NOTES

1. This is an abridged version of an article titled ‘Balance in a Military Career: lessons learned on leadership and life’, published in the Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2009, and reprinted with permission.
A view from Singapore – ‘More than warfighters: the role of ‘strategic corporals’”

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In December 2008, some 1100 full-time national servicemen and regulars marched into the 50th Basic Section Leader Course bearing the new ‘specialist cadet’ rank. The rank was introduced in recognition of the increased roles and responsibilities of the ‘Specialists Corps’ in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). As an organisation, the SAF is cognisant of the fact that the tactical decisions and actions of its small-unit leaders, the ‘specialists’—more commonly known as NCOs in other militaries—can have a wider strategic impact on the battlefield.

Indeed, the concept of the ‘strategic corporal’ has been readily embraced as part of the SAF’s contemporary ethos. In the realm of tactical decision-making, specialists of today’s third-generation SAF have become more empowered than their counterparts of the late 1960s and 1970s. However, the tyranny of the conventional persists, and the core business of the SAF’s ‘strategic corporal’ remains traditional force-on-force warfighting. Thus, it remains to be seen if the ‘non big-war’ aspects of the ‘strategic corporal’ philosophy can be as easily absorbed into the SAF as the conventional ones.

The strategic corporal, the ‘Three-Block War’ and the CNN effect

Fighting the ‘Three-Block-War’, as General Charles Krulak, former Commandant of the US Marine Corps calls it, junior military leaders of section/squad-sized units will increasingly find themselves in operations where they have to deal with hostile, friendly and neutral forces within an amorphous and unpredictable battlespace that may—and can—include traditional warfighting, peace-keeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

More often than not, these operations are likely to be ‘far from the flagpole’ and removed from senior leadership. Tactical decisions have to be made by these junior military leaders in the ‘hot seat’—strategic corporals—whose judgment calls and individual actions can make or break the larger mission.

With the advent of the ‘CNN effect’, seemingly lonesome checkpoints, led by a junior NCO and manned by a handful of men, can suddenly find themselves under the glare of global media attention. Reports and images of alleged abuses by junior Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers at various border-crossing check-points are readily available in the mainstream news media, websites of non-government organisations, social-network sites and YouTube. In November 2008, the circulation of recent video footage depicting a Palestinian humiliated at a West Bank check-point by Israeli soldiers forced the IDF leadership to react.

Likewise, once the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib by certain US army junior ranks hit the airwaves, the Bush Administration had no choice but to practise strategic ‘damage control’. In short, the ‘conspicuousness’ of the actions of junior military leaders in the information age can affect not only the immediate tactical situation but the strategic outcome of the mission, as well international relations and public opinion.
In most contemporary post-modern militaries, it is commonly recognised that tactical, operational and strategic outcomes may hinge on the decisions of small-unit leaders and their actions at the lowest level. The contemporary operational environment is dominated by low-intensity conflict and peace-enforcement types of missions, where small-unit operations are the norm. At any given moment in the same area of operations, one infantry section might be engaged in an intense urban firefight, another disarming militia groups, another supervising the distribution of humanitarian aid and another faced with an angry gang of stone-throwing youths.

The ability to respond appropriately to each of these situations requires a different skill set by the ‘strategic corporal’. Indeed, success of the overall mission will depend on the political, cultural and ethical sensitivity of the ‘strategic corporals’, as much as their professionalism, technical expertise and martial prowess as fighting men and women.

**Moulding the ‘strategic corporal’**

There is no doubt that the roles and responsibilities of small-unit leaders in the contemporary SAF are more complex and decisive as compared to their earlier-generation counterparts, whose leadership was primarily demonstrated in the confines of the parade square and regimentation. In the integrated and networked environment of the SAF, an earlier-generation NCO may well be able to call on the combined fire support from a wide array of artillery systems, air strikes from Apache attack helicopters and multi-role fighters, and naval platforms. However, the very same NCO, adept in the ways of networked warfare, might not be the right person to send on ‘military operations other-than-war’ (MOOTW) missions, where the use of minimal force is the rule rather than the exception.

The age of inter-state industrial wars is over and the era of ‘war amongst the people’ is upon us. This at least is the view of General Sir Rupert Smith, commander of the UN protection force in Bosnia in 1995, and former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe in NATO. Wars of this century will no longer be about defending national sovereignty but rather a way of life.

While there is a need for a credible conventional military deterrent and maintenance of competent traditional warfighting capabilities, the SAF must be able to respond to the needs of MOOTW. The SAF has been successful in moulding a technically-proficient Specialist Corps that should acquit itself well in any conventional warfighting scenario. Nonetheless, this success does not necessarily translate into the MOOTW sphere. Proficiency in MOOTW requires a much greater range of skill sets than traditional warfighting.

Having said that, the SAF’s recent participation in various multilateral overseas missions has proved encouraging. Operation FLYING EAGLE, the largest humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation undertaken by the SAF to date, is a case in point of how knowledge of the local culture, politics and language is fundamental to the success of any mission. The deployment to the tsunami-hit Indonesian province of Aceh in 2005 proved to be an invaluable experience for the SAF. However, would the SAF, particularly its junior military leaders, be as successful when deployed in similar large-scale multilateral missions further away from home or faced with an actual Three-Block-War scenario?

What is certain is that—as the SAF finds itself increasingly deployed on overseas peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and post-war reconstruction
efforts—its small-unit leaders must be prepared to be a ‘strategic corporal’ in every sense; not just warfighters but peacekeepers, goodwill ambassadors and winners of hearts and minds.

At the time of writing, Ong Weichong was Associate Research Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He also served on the Military Transformation Program at the school’s constituent unit, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. He was a doctoral candidate with the Centre for the Study of War, State and Society, University of Exeter, UK.

NOTES

1. This is an edited version of an article by the same title, published as RSIS Commentary 5/2009 on 12 January 2009, reprinted with permission of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

2. Editor’s note: The ‘Three Block’ aspect related to the complex spectrum of challenges that could be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield within the space of three contiguous city blocks.
Opinion piece

Junior leader professional development—
who has the time?

Dr Steven Metz, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

While researching General Matthew Ridgway’s oral history at the Military History Institute, author Tom Ricks came across this astute quote: ‘My advice to any young officer is read—read—read. And learn from the successes of the great ones and their failures’. Few Americans speak with greater authority on the requirements of military leadership than Ridgway. He commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in World War 2, the 8th Army in the Korean War, replaced Douglas MacArthur as the overall commander in Korea, served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and then as Army Chief of Staff. He was both an exceptional leader and a strategist. We should heed what Ridgway had to say.

However, the complexity of the contemporary security environment and the demands placed on the Army make professional development—both the formal component undertaken in courses and schools, and the informal elements—more pressing than ever. Now, it is not only about leadership and the art of war but also about culture, language and management. In a very real sense, the professional development of the Army’s junior leaders is vital to national security.

Why then is it even necessary to make the point about the importance of reading and other forms of informal professional development for junior leaders? Motivation is not the issue. Junior leaders are certainly aware of the importance of professional development. The problem is time. Today more than ever, junior leaders are exceptionally busy. Their jobs demand long hours. And most have young families which need attention.

Beginning with General Earl Wheeler in 1963, many Army chiefs of staff provided an official reading list for both junior and senior leaders. But the implication was that this should be done on one’s own time. This requirement might have made sense when Ridgway and his peers were young officers and military life moved at a more leisurely pace. Even Army Chief of Staff George Marshall was famously able to take a daily horse ride, at least until the onset of World War 2. Today’s leaders are, to put it lightly, a bit more preoccupied.

But there is a solution: senior leaders should consider reading and other forms of informal professional development, like physical training, to be a vital part of duty time. Here is how this could work. Every commander and other senior leader whose unit is not deployed or preparing for an impending deployment should set a target of around 10 per cent of their staff’s time for reading and informal professional development.

This, of course, would require commanders and senior leaders to exercise rigorous discipline for the other demands placed on their staffs. They would need to seriously examine every staff function—preparing reports and briefings, attending meetings as a representative, and
all forms of what could be called the ‘care and feeding’ of senior leaders—to decide what is absolutely necessary and what could be sacrificed to free time for reading and informal professional development. This assessment should be brutally honest and begin with the assumption that any staff function that is not absolutely crucial for mission success could be pared. Often one or two fewer versions of a briefing (or a shorter briefing) or half as many reports and meetings would suffice.

Such a program would be an investment in the Army’s future. But it would require accountability. Junior leaders should regularly report on their reading and individual professional development. Duty time should be set aside for discussions and workshops. But again, the time for this should not come ‘out of hide’ or be considered an additional requirement. It should be seen as a central element of duty and made available by cutting back existing staff work.

Undoubtedly, there are many commanders and senior leaders who already take this approach or something like it. But to really work, it should become an integral and universal part of the Army’s culture, something expected of all commanders and other senior leaders—just one of the ways that the Army does its business.

Ultimately, the informal professional development of both non-commissioned and commissioned officers should be as important to a performance evaluation as other elements of staff work. Today’s junior leaders, most with multiple deployments in challenging environments, understand its value. When it becomes apparent that commanders and other senior leaders do as well, by carving out time—that most valuable of commodities—for professional development, then the Army will make great strides in not only sustaining but augmenting its quality.

**DISCLAIMER**

The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or the US Government.

**NOTES**

1. This is a reprint of an article by the same title, published in the Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter in April 2011, reprinted with permission of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
The principal agent behind China’s rise as a maritime power was neither a naval strategist nor someone who was even particularly interested in maritime strategy. However, the Chinese leader and economic reformer, Deng Xiaoping, by opening China to foreign investment, the global market and competition as part of his ‘socialist market economy’, engineered the beginnings of sustained economic growth which allowed a growth in China’s maritime power unparalleled in modern times.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the reasoning behind the rise of China’s navy was explained almost solely in terms of Taiwan—China was developing a maritime force that could return Taiwan to Chinese rule by force. There was a widely-held view that ‘the day after Taiwan’ would see China again turn inward and its maritime build-up would either cease or slow down considerably.

Roughly at the turn of the century, analysts began to realise that Chinese naval development was starting to head in a different direction. It was developing anti-access and denial capabilities which would pose a serious threat to any opposing forces in the western Pacific. Further, it was clear that China was determined to develop a naval aviation capability, based around aircraft carriers, which would allow it to project force well away from its own coast.

Analysts also noted a change in attitude. China was becoming more confident and aggressive. It was willing to deploy destroyers to the Gulf of Aden to assist in counter-piracy operations, it was challenging foreign vessels in international waters and it was deploying its submarines to patrol where the US Navy and the JMSDF (Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force) were also present. It was also developing its ‘soft’ maritime power, with deployments by hospital ships to Africa, and a more active presence in multilateral naval fora, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.

While the growing capabilities of the Chinese navy are well documented and discussed, the grand strategy behind the rise of China is not so clear. It is into this grey area that Red Star over the Pacific is aimed; and it postulates that the rise of Chinese maritime power can be explained in terms of the American strategist, Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan.

In discussing the Chinese strategy, it also documents the changes in US maritime strategy by contrasting the ‘1986 Maritime Strategy’ and the ‘2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Sea Power’. The telling point is made that as Western navies have moved to a ‘post-modern’ approach to sea power, based on good order at sea—as exemplified by the shift in US Navy strategies—Asian navies have remained essentially modern or neo-Mahanian in nature, focused on fighting for command of the sea.

Yoshihara and Holmes have written an accessible yet comprehensive explanation of the precepts of Chinese maritime strategy and, by contrasting it to US strategy, have provided a framework by which to understand the rapid growth and where it might be heading. Although knowledge of Mahan’s work is useful, it is not essential to understanding the book, as the argument is well structured and logically argued.

Given Australia’s unique position as a major beneficiary of Chinese economic growth, our reliance on maritime trade for our own economic well-being, and our longstanding and strong alliance with the US, the topic of maritime strategy in the region to our north should be of vital interest to us. Red Star over the Pacific is recommended as an important contribution to the field.

**Australia’s Palestine Campaign, 1916-18**  
*Australian Army Campaign Series No. 7*

Jean Bou  
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2010  
ISBN: 978-0-9808-1000-4

Reviewed by Brigadier Chris Field, Australian Army

With impressive vision, in 2004 the Chief of Army’s Strategic Advisory Group established a scheme to promote the study and understanding of military history within the Australian Army. From this decision, the *Australian Army Campaign Series* was created, with *Australia’s Palestine Campaign* the seventh publication of the series.

Remarkably, and reflecting an operationally busy Army, the *Australian Army Campaign Series* has produced on average only one publication per year since 2004. Notably, these publications—which are designed as broad, illustrated and concise ‘primers’—have been written mainly by established military historians including, among others, Dr Albert Palazzo, Dr Garth Pratten, Roger Lee, Glen Wahlert and the author of *Australia’s Palestine Campaign*, Dr Jean Bou.

The now eight publications in the series focus on World War 1 (Gallipoli, Palestine and Fromelles), World War 2 (Crete, Western Desert, Malaya and Wau) and a single volume on Vietnam. This publication list indicates that many campaigns in Australia’s military history remain available for analysis, from the Anglo–Maori wars of the 1840s and 1860s, to modern campaigns in Australia’s region and afar.

Given that fighting and winning campaigns are core business for an Army and a Defence Force, it seems reasonable to pose two questions: (1) why is there no ADF equivalent of *Australian Army Campaign Series*? and (2) why haven’t many non-military historians written volumes in the *Australian Army Campaign Series*?
The answer to the first question is that *Australia’s Palestine Campaign* is a joint campaign, and includes descriptions of a fledgling Royal Air Force and Australian Flying Corps supporting General Allenby’s advancing coalition-based Egyptian Expeditionary Force. In addition, although unmentioned in this volume, the Palestine campaign relied on a significant naval supply and blockade effort in the Mediterranean Sea. Now is the time to recognise that the Australian Army has always fought as a joint force, and that perhaps the *Australian Army Campaign Series* may merge with an ‘ADF Campaign Series’.

The second question sits firmly with the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) which, among other educational objectives, prepares officers at the rank of Lieutenant Commander/Major/Squadron Leader to work and fight at the operational level of war. It is ACSC graduates who will lead staff and create the detail for campaign plans in the ADF operational level headquarters in Sydney for Navy and Air Force, Brisbane for Army, and Bungendore for the ADF.

All ACSC graduates are also expected to write, so perhaps ACSC could merge the requirements to work and fight at the operational level of war with the ability to study and write about the operational level of war, while providing direct input into the *Australian Army Campaign Series* or ADF Campaign Series. Perhaps an entire volume is too much for a single ACSC graduate to write, so the volume might be jointly written by three service colleagues, or particular aspects of a campaign may be analysed by ACSC graduates for final editing and collation by established military historians.

*Australia’s Palestine Campaign* is well written by Dr Jean Bou and complemented by period photos and Mark Wahlert’s detailed maps and drawings. Bou’s narrative guides the reader through the strategic reasons for Australia’s participation in the campaign and then analyses key phases including the Sinai, Gaza-Beersheba, Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and Megiddo. Bou uses the book to debunk some myths from the campaign, including the decisiveness of Beersheba in October 1917 for achieving campaign objectives, compared with rapid and decisive advances by Australian and coalition forces in 1918. In emphasising this point, Bou states that ‘Megiddo [September 1918] should be more deeply examined by a modern Australian Army that subscribes to manoeuvre doctrine’.

A useful benefit of *Australia’s Palestine Campaign* is that Dr Bou examines service by Australian soldiers after the 30 October 1918 armistice of Mudros, which confirmed the Ottoman Empire’s cessation of hostilities. In this epilogue to *Australia’s Palestine Campaign*, Bou draws out important lessons in campaign continuity; that is, in order to maintain the continuity and momentum of a campaign, commanders must visualise and plan the campaign’s next steps. For Australian commanders following the Palestine campaign, planning was required for war-hardened and war-weary troops to commence occupation duties; guard against diseases, such as pneumonia and malaria; interact with local populations, to include quelling uprisings in Egypt; sell or dispose of horses; and repatriate to Australia.

The book includes excellent vignettes from the campaign on leaders, enemy forces, battles, tactics, weapons, aircraft, logistics and transportation. These vignettes make *Australia’s Palestine Campaign* an interesting read and allow ready adaptation for unit training with enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers or officers.
Having served with the International Force in East Timor, I was keen to read this book. Graeme Ramsden is no ordinary padre, having also served as a soldier in the Vietnam War. He provides a very human perspective of the daily lives of soldiers and officers alike across all fields of operational endeavour. The book itself is a collection of letters sent home to his wife, interspersed with descriptions of other happenings and goings on. It is a personal history through the eyes of a padre, who was effectively a ‘command barometer’ for measuring morale.

It begins like any other soldier’s story with descriptions of the uncertainty of entering a theatre of conflict. His account of the opening hours brought it all home to me as, while I have never met the author nor did I even know him in East Timor, we must have slept not far apart on the heliport tarmac on that first night in country. He provides insightful views, in particular about the close relationships that existed between our troops and the East Timorese people, perhaps not unlike other conflicts where Australia has fought in the past.

The stories vary widely, from the effort that went into cleaning up Dili and making it habitable, to getting the churches going again. The descriptions of acts of violence by the Indonesian military and the militia after the referendum—particularly by one militia group known as Team Alpha—and their bringing to justice, brought back memories to me, including the role of our SAS in apprehending and detaining those responsible. Other stories bring reality to the fore, as finding and burying bodies is a gruesome task even for a man of the cloth. There is some introspection about the role of the padre which he sums up as just to be there; for soldiers just to know that he is around.

Other stories depict a myriad of days in the life of a padre on operations. One story is about the iconic Jesus statue which towers above Dili and which is known to every Australian who served in East Timor. Another is a detailed description of ‘shitters’, which can only be fully appreciated by soldiers who have lined up over the ages on these thrones. There are several ‘travelogue’ type chapters as he had the luxury—his job really—to travel widely and speak to as many troops as he could. They provide an interesting exposé of the country’s culture. He also describes the surreal concert by Kylie Minogue and the many donations of support from Australia. Then there is an emotional farewell and fond memories.

This book will be enjoyed by anyone who served in East Timor, as well as the Australian population at large who supported the intervention. It is also an important contribution to Australia’s military history in East Timor.
The past as a whole is unknowable… The future cannot be known at all…. Yet, despite its many ambiguities, historical experience remains the only available guide both to the present and to the range of alternatives inherent in the future.1

The author—Professor Emeritus of History at the Ohio State University, a defence consultant in Washington and a researcher at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College—has published numerous books, reports and articles on the history of warfare. This book is a collection of previously published and unpublished essays written over the last couple of decades, some of which are based on lectures given by the author at the US Army and Navy War Colleges, and the London School of Economics.

Murray argues that while ‘war is neither a science nor a craft’, it is the most physically, intellectually and morally-demanding profession. As such, a sophisticated understanding of history, current international political climate and an opponent’s ideology, as well as ‘a realistic evaluation of means in relation to ends’, are critical to effective strategy development.

However, the author argues that many political and military leaders, including those of Germany in the first half of the 20th century and US more recently, have been ignorant of key historical lessons and, as a result, have repeated past strategic mistakes, the damage of which ‘no matter of tactical and operational virtuosity can repair’. Citing Michael Howard (The Lessons of History), he makes a point that ‘ignorance, especially the ignorance of educated men, can be a more powerful force than knowledge’. He also argues that the US military, in particular, has focused too much on tactics and technological ‘silver bullets’, often dismissing past events as irrelevant, as evidenced by recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Chapter One also implicitly discusses the principal-agent problem inherent in bureaucratic defence organisations, arguing that such organisations often act in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of the nation as a whole. While the author alludes to potential issues inherent in the military-industrial complex, arguing that strategy is often shaped by ‘desires to preserve the procurement of expensive weapons systems’, he fails to pursue this issue further.

Murray argues that adaptability and creativity/innovation in defence are critical in the contemporary world; however, they are severely stifled by risk-avoiding behaviours that are driven by overregulation. He contends that innovation, ‘which occurs in peacetime, allows military organizations the luxury of time to drive forward the process of change, but often without coherent real-life experience’, whereas adaptation ‘occurs in war and provides…"
considerable evidence as to what works and what doesn't, but often without the time to consider what is relevant’.

Chapter Two relates Thucydides and Clausewitz to contemporary and future conflicts. Invoking Clausewitz, Murray argues that war theory ‘has the strictly utilitarian purpose of educating the mind; it cannot aim at discovering universal truths applicable to all situations, all places, all times’. He also argues that such theory ‘can only indicate the most important questions we might ask’ and that ‘principles of war are … useless and misleading’. Given Clausewitz’s description of war as ‘a continuation of political activity by other means’, the author emphasises the importance of getting the strategy right.

In terms of Thucydides, Murray argues that because of its range, The History of the Peloponnesian War is ‘the greatest book ever written about war’. A brief overview of the conflict is given and key insights drawn from the book are elaborated on, including that power, which is ‘amoral in character’, is ‘the basic determinant of human affairs’, and that war inevitably leads to moral degradation of the societies that wage it.

The third chapter, ‘Military Culture and Technological Hubris’, briefly describes the evolution of US military culture since World War 2. It argues that McNamara’s drive for quantitative measures and technological sophistication (a paradigm adopted from the business environment) had significant negative influence on the military culture during the Vietnam War. Murray further contends that following the failures of Vietnam, the next generation of officers started to place greater emphasis on uncertainty, adopting Clausewitzian concepts and approaches; however, such approaches have again given ground to technocratic views, which have recently been making a comeback.

Chapter Four reiterates the idea that simplistic principles of war are useless, and warns against their blind application without a comprehensive understanding of the cultural and political environments. Instead, the author recommends the study of military history, or history in general, which he argues is currently lacking in US professional military education.

Chapter Five continues the discussion of military culture and, in particular, of the need for discipline. Ancient Greek and Roman military cultures are briefly described, and their influence on later European military institutions. The author is critical of today’s US military culture, as well as that of the political and intellectual elite, who he argues have used ‘military institutions in a haphazard and careless fashion, as a general reflection of the inability of those who cast US foreign policy to understand how the world works’.

Chapter Six, which deals with the history of strategic planning, defines strategy as ‘the use of military means to achieve political goals’. While the author does not provide any specific guidelines, he discusses strategic planning in the context of range of conflicts, including the War of Spanish Succession, the Seven Years’ War, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, German Wars of Unification, and World Wars 1 and 2.

Chapter Seven examines how the Pentagon might better incorporate ‘red teaming’ into its examination of future capabilities. The author defines ‘red teaming’ as ‘the willingness to establish independent teams or other means to challenge the assumptions and preconceptions that military organizations often make’ and, through historical examples, illustrates six
areas across the tactical, operational and strategic levels where ‘red teaming’ has positively contributed to military effectiveness.

Chapter Eight examines how the relatively peaceful period in Europe between 1815 and 1914 eventually led to World War 1. Murray attributes much of the blame to Germany’s ‘flawed strategic policies’, which followed Bismarck’s removal from office and led to an ‘anti-German alliance system’.

Chapter Nine deals with German strategic failures in World Wars 1 and 2. The author identifies a number of reasons due to which Germany had mainly focused on tactical and operational excellence, at the expense of strategic planning. He also discusses the operational and tactical effectiveness of each of the three services: the Army, the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine, arguing that while the first two had a high standard of performance, the ‘navy’s effectiveness throughout both world wars remained consistently dismal’.

Chapter Ten presents an overview of the allied combined bomber offensive during World War 2 and examines its intended and unintended consequences and lessons. Murray argues that while many relevant initial assumptions turned out to be wrong, the offensive ‘was crucial in causing the final German collapse’. Besides the oil and area bombing campaigns, the author singles out the transportation offensive as having had the greatest contribution.

In Chapter Eleven, the author discusses the challenges involved in the Gulf War air campaign. He identifies various areas of friction and discusses the impact of two major incidents involving collateral damage: the RAF attack on the bridge of Nasiriyah, and the F-117 bombing of the Al-Firdos bunker. The attacks on Iraq’s air defence system, the electrical system and the mobile SCUD launchers are viewed as having been successful, while the attacks on the Iraqi leadership are described as having been less effective.

Chapter Twelve examines the evolution of British intelligence during World War 2 and draws some lessons applicable to contemporary challenges faced by Western intelligence organisations. In particular, the author stresses the importance of recruiting talented individuals from a range of (technical and non-technical) disciplines, identifying high-performers and providing them with suitable career paths.

The final chapter summarises the key events of World War 2, repeating much that was already covered in previous chapters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the author morally defends allied actions and condemns those of the Axis.

In conclusion, the book provides a good overview of a wide range of military cultures and historical conflicts. Much of the book deals with the events of World War 2. But given that each chapter stands on its own, there is considerable repetition as well as a general lack of flow throughout the book.

NOTES

‘Strategy’ is a word often used loosely and, as a result, it has acquired a variety of meanings and even nuances of meaning. It can be found in fields as varying as sport, business and the military. Each field of expertise has its own understanding of the term. It is therefore understandable that Heuser should spend some time at the beginning of her book discussing and defining what she intends the term to mean. That it took 35 pages and an estimated 10,000 words to do so was a portent of things to come, for this work is a tour de force of the literature relevant to her definition of ’strategy’.

For the purposes of her book, Heuser defines ‘strategy’ as the process by which human, material and cultural factors are brought to bear upon war. She maintains that this concept of a direct association between politics and organising war is primarily Western and relatively recent. It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that writers connected both the political aim and war directly. Up until then, they had always been considered separately from each other.

Over the past half century, writings on strategy in this context have been so extensive that the author suggests they have produced libraries to compete in size with those on Shakespeare. Heuser intends her work to fill a perceived gap by providing a selective study of the literature over history. Such a study of the evolution of Western ideas on strategy, as recorded in the literature, is considered important as writings on strategy influence the actual conduct of war; they indicate the thinking of the era on both politics and war, and they can reveal generalisations which allow for a better understanding of war. The reference in the book’s title to ‘thinking war’ sums up the intent of this book quite well.

Heuser has divided her work into parts in which the development of this thought process is discussed from pre-Roman times to the modern era. Much of it is devoted to land warfare but there are separate parts devoted to maritime strategy, air power and nuclear strategy, and to asymmetric warfare. At all times, the emphasis is on how writers thought about war and there is little or no discussion as to how this thinking was applied in the field. This is not a discussion on the application of strategy, so there is little or no discussion of how particular campaigns were planned or developed, or the rationale behind specific conflicts.

All the familiar names such as Vegetius, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet and Liddell Hart will be found, as well as a plethora of less familiar. They are primarily European, with only a few non-Western authors such as Mao, Giap and Sun Tzu being briefly mentioned. The scope of her survey is extensive in its breadth and an indication of this is to be found in the size of the bibliography which, at 60 tightly printed pages, is almost a book in itself.
There is no doubt that this is a significant scholarly work reflecting the author’s depth of knowledge of her field. It would provide any serious researcher with an extensive range of resources for studying strategy, for it is essentially one vast literature review. While much of what has been covered may well be available elsewhere, it does map out the steady evolution of strategic thinking in the West and it provides a contribution by bringing an extensive collection of resources together in one volume. It also contributes by bringing to the reader’s notice authors whose works have yet to be translated from their original language, and who may be unknown to the Anglophone world as a result.

The author’s style of writing with over-long sentences expressing several lines of thought does not make for easy comprehension. The seemingly interminable litany of references to authors makes reading the book eye-glazingly tedious at times. Martin van Creveld, by comparison, used a similar approach in his book *Command in War* but it was more didactic and more selective in quoting authorities, hence it is more readable. Heuser does manage to bring the book to life at times, such as when she presents her critical view on Clausewitz and his influence on Western thinking; but these are few in number and were not developed to any extent. There were topics about which I know little and which piqued my interest. On the other hand, there were topics which I do know something about and have read widely on, and I found the discussion broad but shallow.

There can be no dispute that this is a major work by a recognised authority. Heuser set out to provide a survey of the literature discussing this subject over much of European history and there can be little doubt that she has achieved her aim. However, I feel that she has produced a book with a limited audience. It certainly deserves a place in the library of scholars, researchers and establishments such as Staff Colleges. However, I am not convinced that there is much here to reward the more general reader for the effort needed to come to grips with the book. What argument or conclusions she does tease out get lost in the sheer mass of the detail in the book. Perhaps it is one of those works that needs to be read not once but twice. I may do that—but not just now.

*Empowering Our Military Conscience: transforming ‘just war’ theory and military moral education*

Roger Wertheimer (ed.)
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2010
ISBN: 978-0-7546-7700-0

Reviewed by Dr Ian Wing, United Arab Emirates

This book provides an interesting collection of essays by prominent theorists as part of Ashgate’s ‘Military and Defence Ethics Series’. It considers ‘just war’ theory (JWT), which has long been recognised to consist of *jus ad bellum* (the ethics of going to war) and *jus in bello* (ethical conduct during war), and increasingly now includes *jus post bellum* (the ethics of post-war conduct).
The book opens with an essay by its editor, Roger Wertheimer. He describes the ‘great awakening’ of applied ethics education within US military academies that followed the exposure of the nefarious activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North during the Iran-Contra affair. One of the outcomes of these events was the creation of the Distinguished Chair in Ethics at the US Naval Academy and the editor was the last holder of this visiting chair. The opening essay argues convincingly that professional military ethics education (PMEE) has been a key factor in promoting the awareness of JWT among military professionals.

The remainder of the book is organised in three parts which are entitled *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus ante bellum*. The title of the third part refers to the pre-war ethical development of military professionals, which is more specifically referred to as *jus in disciplina bellica* (the ethics of educating for war).

Part One opens with a very persuasive essay by the prominent scholar Michael Walzer, the author of the ground-breaking work *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). Walzer argues that JWT is now so familiar to military professionals that it risks being taken over by them and abused. While Walzer believes that war is sometimes necessary, he is concerned that the language of JWT may now be used to explain ‘unjust’ wars. He describes this as ‘a certain weakening of the critical mind, a truce between theorists and soldiers’.

The second essay by George G. Lucas presents the case that recent military strategy has followed no particular ethical or legal methodology and describes it as characterised by ‘vigilante justice’. Richard W. Miller provides the third essay which covers the developing school of humanitarian intervention, which within international relations circles has become known as ‘responsibility to protect’. These essays are thoughtfully written and recommended to scholars and others who are interested in JWT.

Part Two provides three essays that deal with *jus in bello*. The first, by T.M. Scanlon, provides a counter-argument to the prevailing wisdom of the importance of intention in military decision-making in relation to the morality of military outcomes. The essay raises the issue using a range of hypotheticals but acknowledges that more work remains to be done to fully investigate its implications. Jeffrey Reiman’s essay, which follows, takes another iconoclastic position by arguing for the erosion of the strict rule against the targeting of non-combatants. Reiman introduces the concept of ‘calamity ethics’ which are utilitarian rather than moral, and operate above normative ethics during times when national survival is threatened.

The final essay of Part Two, by Richard Schoonhoven, discusses the accepted view that military professionals are obliged to serve loyally without a complete understanding of the reasons for war. In other words, they must faithfully follow *jus in bello* without full knowledge of *jus ad bellum*. Taken together, these essays are best suited to students of JWT rather than military professionals per se. One reason for this is that each essay presupposes a relatively high level of academic knowledge about JWT on the part of the reader.

The third part of the book consists of two essays written by the editor. The first describes the very special nature of military professionalism. The profession is unique because it revolves around the calculated use of terrible violence. The essay deals with a range of moral issues that result from the contradictions inherent in using violence to achieve good ends. It also considers the importance of obedience and loyalty among military professionals who each possess independent consciousness and consciences. The relevance of the essay is weakened...
because it uses the term military professional to refer almost exclusively to full-time personnel within national armed forces, and mainly officers. From this exclusivist standpoint, little time is given to part-time service personnel, other ranks or hired soldiers—although all are arguably members of the military profession.

The essay follows the trend set by the other authors in the book by taking a US-centric view of the entire subject area. Within Australia, the understanding of the profession owes much to General Sir John Hackett’s *The Profession of Arms* (1983) but the American orientation of this essay leads it to cite other authors. The second essay considers PMEE, primarily within US service academies. The essay deals with the high return on investment that the academies provide in terms of promoting the ethical behavior of warrior graduates. Taken together, the two essays are thought-provoking additions to the literature on the subjects of military professionalism and PMEE.

Overall, this book is best described as providing three quite different collections of works, which have been published together under the common theme of JWT. The book is recommended to academic students of JWT. It is also likely to prove useful to motivated readers from the military profession who wish to challenge their understanding of this contested and developing field.

*Training the Bodes: Australian Army advisers training Cambodian infantry battalions – a postscript to the Vietnam War*

Terry Smith
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2011
ISBN: 978-1-9219-4101-6

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Gavin Keating, Australian Army

The Australian Army has a long history of providing advisers to foreign military forces, ranging from Dunsterforce in 1918 to recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the best known of these commitments is the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV). Terry Smith, the author of *Training the Bodes*, served as a member of AATTV in 1972, during the last months of the unit’s decade-long service in Vietnam. His book covers the employment of a small number of AATTV personnel to assist the US Army Republic of Vietnam Individual Training Group (UITG) train Cambodian infantry battalions in South Vietnam between January and November 1972.

By 1970, heavy infiltration by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) of Cambodia’s eastern border regions had effectively dragged it into Vietnam’s long running war. US military aid to the Khmer Armed Forces (FANK) was correspondingly increased and, by March 1970, official agreements were reached to authorise the training of Cambodian military personnel in South Vietnam. Between May 1970 and December 1972, 86 Cambodian light infantry battalions were trained as part of this program.
The primary purpose of this training was to enable the FANK to combat the growing indigenous Khmer insurgency, rather than to fight independently against NVA or VC main force units. Throughout 1972, 64 members of the AATTV assisted in delivering training to 27 of these units, involving over 13,000 officers and soldiers. The Australian commitment to the FANK training program never exceeded 30 personnel at any given point, with the majority being instructors based in Phuoc Tuy province at either the Long Hai or Phuoc Tuy Training Battalions. The redeployment of US instructors from these establishments after May 1972, to retrain South Vietnamese units mauled in the communist Easter offensive, meant that the Australian instructors increasingly delivered a substantial amount of the training.

The Cambodian battalions trained by members of the AATTV ranged from new units, comprised of untrained recruits and inexperienced officers and NCOs, through to more experienced units which were being rebuilt around a nucleus of veterans. The 12-week program developed by the UITG covered the full spectrum of individual and collective training subjects, from basic weapons training through to battalion-level field exercises.

Smith leaves little doubt that the task of trying to transform the arriving units into entities which could at least hold their own against the strengthening communist insurgency within Cambodia was formidable. It was estimated that 60 per cent of the private soldiers had no prior military training. Shortages of officers, poor educational standards, high rates of illiteracy, general ill health and the presence of a sizeable number of young soldiers under the age of 16, all compounded the fundamental difficulties caused by the language barrier between the Cambodians and their advisers.

Not surprisingly, the standards of leadership, discipline and motivation within each battalion were highly uneven and impacted greatly on the training results achieved. One of the FANK battalions had to be returned to Cambodia after only eight weeks of training due to its poor performance. This included an exchange of fire between a feuding company commander and a platoon commander, resulting in five wounded soldiers. While relations between the Australian and US instructors (most of whom were Green Berets) were strong, they were not without their own cultural and linguistic challenges.

A final challenge was the requirement, at least during the first part of 1972, for the UITG to equip the Cambodians on their arrival in South Vietnam. Although this responsibility was later transferred to an American organisation in Phnom Penh, the instructors still had to assist in managing the ensuing shortages, which plagued many of the units throughout their training.

The programmed field training exercises were considered critical to assessing the standards achieved by the Cambodian units and necessitated the close involvement of the Australian and US advisers. All field training was essentially conducted inside a contested area of operations. Smith noted in a letter home:

This is not to be construed as a real war however, because officially we are not on operations but on field training exercises. The only difference is the bad guys are real and nobody bothered to tell them about it not being fair dinkum.

The AATTV’s official reports identified 44 enemy contacts or incidents within Phuoc Tuy during 1972 involving FANK battalions deployed on field exercises. These resulted in 14 Cambodians killed, 54 wounded and two US advisers killed and eight wounded. It is not surprising that the author notes that ‘the first time out [outside the wire] with Cambodian soldiers could be
an eye-opening experience for a new adviser’. Given the large amount of live fire training in the syllabus and the general standard of the Cambodian soldiers, it is not surprising that their casualties were not limited to field deployments, and the book records a number of other training mishaps.

Ultimately, attempts to bolster the FANK’s military effectiveness were doomed to fail for a multitude of reasons, not the least of which was that by the mid-1970s the Khmer Rouge had developed well beyond being the indigenous guerrilla force the FANK had been built to defeat. However, for the Australians involved in the training of Cambodian battalions throughout 1972, this ultimate fate was unknown and irrelevant.

Despite the many challenges associated with training the Cambodians, which were set against Australia’s declining military commitment to the Vietnam War, Smith makes it clear that the Australian advisers worked hard to maintain the standards set by previous AATTV members. Smith concludes his preface by stating that ‘in retrospect, we were just a postscript to the Vietnam War and to the AATTV story’. While this may be an accurate summation, his story remains an important one, particularly for those with an interest in the challenges of training and advising foreign military forces.

**Sir William Glasgow: soldier, senator and diplomat**

Peter Edgar
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2011

Reviewed by John Donovan

As a student in the 1960s, I occasionally walked past the statue of Sir William Glasgow in its then obscure location. At that time I knew little of Glasgow, except that he was Queensland’s senior officer of World War 1. Peter Edgar has filled the gaps in my knowledge with this biography.

Glasgow started his military career in the Queensland militia. He soon met men who could later influence his career, serving with Chauvel in the Queensland shearsers’ strike and in Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee contingent, while Brudenell White was a fellow bank clerk in Gympie. Chauvel was also Glasgow’s company commander in South Africa, where Glasgow served under General Sir Edward Hutton, GOC of the Australian Army after Federation, and General Sir Ian Hamilton, British commander at Gallipoli.

Glasgow’s principal military service was during World War 1. Initially second-in-command of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment in Chauvel’s 1st Light Horse Brigade, Glasgow was wounded at Pope’s Hill and later commanded the 2nd Light Horse. Rather than remaining with the Light Horse, he took command of the 13th Brigade, apparently at White’s instigation. It seems
unlikely that Glasgow would have had the same opportunity to develop as a soldier had he remained with the Light Horse in Palestine.

Military planning improved in parallel with Glasgow’s career. Within the 13th Brigade, the need for units to coordinate with each other was not well understood at Mouquet Farm, albeit it improved at Noreuil, as Glasgow’s skills developed. By Messines, planning had improved but the skills of troops and commanders remained insufficiently developed. At Zonnebeke, the operation went according to the plan for the first time in the 13th Brigade’s experience.

By Dernancourt and Villers-Bretonneux, the benefits of training and experience to Glasgow and his men were clear. The brigade and its staff were so well trained that they moved around 13 kilometres on foot to the battlefield, the staff reconnoitred the ground and coordinated planning with ‘Pompey’ Elliott’s 15th Brigade and the 8th British Division, and orders were issued, all in around 12 hours.

Training, good organisation and experience were essential parts of Glasgow’s success, as was moral courage. While Glasgow abandoned an attack at Pope’s Hill that had the potential to be another Nek, his skills (and perhaps confidence) in the early Western Front battles were not sufficient for him to do the same there and he accepted poor plans without demur. By 1918, however, he told a British major-general that if ‘God Almighty … gave the order, we couldn’t do it in daylight’.

On 30 June 1918, Glasgow took command of the 1st Division. Under his command, the division followed the 8 August offensive with an advance to Chuignes. It took Hargicourt in mid-September but Glasgow’s final action was marred by a mutiny in the 1st Battalion. Believing that men should accept the consequences of their actions, Glasgow rejected Monash’s suggestion that those convicted should be released. They were pardoned after the war by Hobbs, then commanding the Australian Corps.

After the war, Glasgow entered Parliament, later becoming Minister for Defence, with Chauvel as CGS. Edgar traces Glasgow’s efforts to improve Australia’s defences in the late 1920s. Later, Glasgow rose in the Senate to honour the life of his comrade, ‘Pompey’ Elliott, who committed suicide in 1931.

After being defeated in the 1931 election, Glasgow’s last public duty was during World War 2 as High Commissioner in Canada. His responsibilities included oversight of Australians training there under the Air Training Scheme. The reader can get the impression that, except for the Air Training element, Edgar found this chapter less interesting to write than earlier chapters but it is still covered in a workmanlike fashion. Late in the book, Edgar describes Glasgow explaining to the present Queen that one of his medals was received for attending her great-great-grandmother’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations early in his career.

This is a readable biography of a great Australian, whose statue now stands in central Brisbane overlooking ANZAC Square, memorial to so many of his comrades.
**Australia and the New World Order:**
*from peacekeeping to peace enforcement – 1988-1991*

David Horner  
Cambridge University Press: Melbourne, 2011  

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Richard Adams, RAN

Since 1947, Australian peacekeepers have contributed to more than 50 operations in theatres around the world. Acknowledging this contribution to global peace and disaster relief, the Australian Government commissioned the Australian War Memorial to bring together a six-volume ‘Official History Series’, comprising:

- Vol. 1: Missions between 1947 and 1987
- Vol. 2: Missions between 1988 and 1991 (the subject of this review)
- Vol. 3: Missions from 1991 (except those covered in Volume 5)
- Vol. 4: Missions from 1992 (except those covered in Volumes 3 and 5)
- Vol. 5: Missions in the Pacific region since the mid-1980s, and
- Vol. 6: Overseas emergency relief operations.

David Horner, who served for 25 years in the Australian Regular Army, including active service in South Vietnam, and is currently Professor of Australian Defence History at ANU, has prepared Volume 2 with conspicuous care and insight. The work is painstaking and meticulous, and very much more than a featureless catalogue of dates and occasions. It provides an intelligible, thorough and significant analysis of the changing approach to international engagement, and to peacekeeping in particular.

By including ‘the New World Order’ in its title, the book prefigures a central concern with the peace operations which followed the cessation of the Cold War. However, the span of the work is more far-reaching, insofar as the ideas which inform it have a wide and significant resonance. Between 1988 and 1991, ideas of human rights—now prominent in international affairs—were just emerging from the Cold War asphyxia to which they had succumbed in 1948. Dormant for 40 years, they are seen in the present volume to be powerfully resonant with the foundational principles of the UN, and increasingly critical in international affairs.

The idea of a ‘New World Order’ is first attributed to H.G. Wells. Along with Lord Sankey, J.B. Priestley and others, Wells spoke under this caption against the swelling tide of fascism. Wells however, escapes mention by Dr Horner, and the *leitmotif* is introduced to the narrative by reference to Prime Minister Hawke. Addressing the Australian Parliament on 21 August 1990, less than three weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he averred that ‘the frightening rigidities of the Cold War have dissolved, and the threat of global war between the superpowers has receded’. The task, as the Prime Minister saw it, was ‘to construct a new world order which will guarantee the end of the Cold War and bring an era of peace’.
In such an era, the UN was acknowledged to be moving back to the position its founders intended for it. Resonant with this thinking, Prime Minister Hawke asserted that Australia was sending ships to the Gulf not to serve our allies but ‘to protect the international rule of law which [was seen to be] vital to our security’, regardless of political alliance. Consciously or not, he was echoing the words of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in an address to the UN on 7 December 1988, when he identified ‘the emergence of a mutually connected and integrated world’, where further progress was possible ‘only through the search for a consensus of all mankind in movement toward a new world order’.

These references to post-Cold War world affairs are contextualised by authoritative reference to more distant events. In particular, the narrative cites Dr H.V. Evatt, Australian jurist, Minister for External affairs and historical grand seigneur. When he arrived in Paris on 10 December 1948 as President of the General Assembly of the UN, Dr Evatt announced the advent of a new international law of human rights whereby, for the first time, human rights would transcend the laws and customs of sovereign independent states.

Though these aspirations would nearly suffocate in the following four decades of Cold War politics, Evatt was an exemplar of post-Westphalian idealism. He was remembered in March 1988 when Richard Woolcott, Australian Ambassador to the UN, declared proudly how Australia ‘stood tall’ as a constructive and responsible influence on the international community.

Australia’s reputation in this regard has now been established over more than 60 years and, in this accessible, significant and robustly documented research, David Horner sets out a considerable and noteworthy part of that history. It is a history of which our nation should be justly proud and which, as members of the profession of arms, we should be well aware.

The volume is in three parts. In Part One, discussion of strategy and policy is set against the dissolution of Cold War animosity. More than an historical survey, the discussion frames awareness of evolving defence and foreign policy, an understanding of which can only enrich professional understanding of similar missions in the future.

In Part Two, the narrative describes the new peace missions to which Australia committed between 1988 and 1991. Significantly, these deployments included the commitment of engineers to Namibia (1989), the deployment of observers to Iran (1988) and humanitarian de-mining operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan (1989). In the concluding part, the volume reviews Australia’s involvement in the Gulf crisis and First Gulf War (1990-91). As an historical reference, the volume is supported with maps, photographs and robust appendices.

Australians serving and interested in the profession of arms will find this volume, and the larger series of which it is a part, an invaluable and authoritative resource. Together, they retell the story of respective missions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The narrative reflects the sort of scrupulous, professional analysis which enables personal stories to be set against the larger and infinitely more complex historical and political context. This is a scholarly account and an impressive official historical record.
Malaya, 1941-42
Australian Army Campaign Series No. 5

Brian Farrell and Garth Pratten
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2010
ISBN: 978-0-9805-6744-1

Reviewed by Dr Dominic Katter

Malaya 1941-42 is the fifth addition to the ‘Australian Army Campaign Series’, published by the Army History Unit. This work is a concise historical account of the Australian Army campaign in Malaya and Singapore from December 1941 to January 1942. That campaign began with the sometimes ‘forgotten’ Japanese invasion of Malaya on 8 December 1941. Regardless of the result of the campaign in Malaya, this book illustrates the bravery of the Australians and the skill of the Japanese. The authors summarise this volume in the introduction, headed ‘Fighting Soldiers’, as follows:

This volume does not beat a nationalist drum. It clearly recognises Australia’s role as part of an infant coalition fighting a global war. By reducing history to a set of shallow clichés, we rob ourselves on two accounts. First, we deny ourselves an insight into the true complexity of the human experience of war. Second, we deny ourselves the chance to profit from that experience.

Co-authors Brian Farrell and Dr Garth Pratten both have academic military backgrounds. Brian Farrell is Deputy Head of the Department of History at the National University of Singapore and has been teaching military history since 1993. He has also published The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942, Sixty Years On: the fall of Singapore revisited, A Great Betrayal? The fall of Singapore revisited and Churchill and the Lion City: shaping modern Singapore, making him a pre-eminent author on the ‘fortress’ island.

Garth Pratten is an academic in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, having previously been a senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He has extensive experience working for both the Australian Army and the Australian War Memorial as an historian, in addition to some 17 years service in the Army Reserve. Prior to this volume, Dr Pratten had already published Still the Same: reflections on active service from Bardia to Baidoa, and Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War.

This text follows a logical and chronological order, examining first the situations that gave rise to the Japanese attack, before considering the subsequent deployment of Australian soldiers and the fighting withdrawals that were to follow. The account is interspersed with informative and detailed historical photographs and maps, as well as current images and digital graphics of various battlefields and weapons.

To further develop the context and interest, there are frequent pages intermingled throughout the book dedicated to explaining specific weapons, vehicles and tactics used in the campaign. Although the Malayan campaign is not among the most famous of Australian military conflicts, the length of this work, the generous photographs and comprehensive research provided by this narrative would make this book of particular interest to those entering this realm of research for the first time.
On-line book reviews

_Wau 1942-1943_  
*Australian Army Campaign Series, No. 6*

Phillip Bradley  
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2010  
ISBN: 978-0-9807-7740-6

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

Having captured Rabaul in January 1942, the Japanese moved to secure Lae—and did so on 8 March. The small Australian force in the area moved inland, was gradually reinforced and began commando-style raids on Japanese positions. In January 1943, the Japanese sent a regimental force to capture Wau, to protect Lae and Salamaua, and counter Australian attacks from the mountain area.

So began the fighting along steep mountain ridges and deep valleys in which the Australians prevailed, because airlift successfully delivered units, ammunition and supplies, and evacuated casualties, while the Japanese were unable to use this important asset. The airstrip at Wau, one of the most hazardous in New Guinea, was vital to the Australian effort in the campaign.

The Japanese almost reached Wau itself, and air-lifted Australian troops were in action soon after arrival. The climax came in early February and, after losing over 1,000 killed, the Japanese desisted. The Japanese earlier had been forced back along the Kokoda track, been defeated at Milne Bay, had just evacuated Guadalcanal, and the Buna-Gona bridgehead was lost; consolidation was necessary before operations could continue in New Guinea.

_Wau 1942-1943_ is an excellent presentation, with a tightly-written text component, complemented by a good selection of clear ‘then and now’ photographs of specific locations mentioned in the account of the campaign. Other photos are of places mentioned in the text and have annotations for the benefit of the reader. These, with the clear precise maps and computer graphics, combine to inform the reader of where events took place, what the terrain was like, what happened, and who was involved. Some of the participants are the subject of biographical sketches of varying size, and order-of-battle charts as at a certain date provide relevant information.

The battles in the campaign are clearly described, with detail of personal decision-making and actions performed. The weapons used, now found only in museums, are described in detail, from personal small arms to artillery and aircraft.

This is No. 6 in the ‘Australian Army Campaigns Series’. The Chief of Army Advisory Group in 2004 considered a proposal to promote the study and understanding of military history within the Army. The Army History Unit accepted this task and tried computer games and e-books with little success but found the paperback books of the campaigns were accepted in preference to the other versions. From this came the present ‘Campaign Series’, using text and specially-prepared maps, artwork and computer graphics in well-designed packages.
A criticism of the book as a presentation is the unnecessary inclusion of drawings of aircraft (for which many photos exist) and paintings of representative soldiers (for which photos also exist) and battle scenes (where photos of locations would likely do better).

*Whispering Death: Australian airmen in the Pacific War*

Mark Johnston  
Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest, 2011  

Reviewed by Air Commodore Mark Lax (Retd)

Mark Johnston’s *Whispering Death* is a mammoth 514-page epic story of the RAAF’s campaign in the Pacific War. It is a modern interpretation of the two Gillison and Odgers volumes of the Official History, and takes a similar path. The story begins with the RAAF’s formation in 1921 and struggle for survival between the wars. To set the context, the European War and the Middle East are briefly mentioned, as is the Empire Air Training Scheme, which produced thousands of RAAF aircrew, mainly for the war against Germany. Following chapters cover the air campaign chronologically, with the fall of Malaya as the beginning of the Pacific War. There are diversions throughout the text to discuss a number of the higher command controversies, the childish bickering between senior commanders, and the general lack of support from Australia, all of which sullied an otherwise hard earned reputation.

The RAAF’s early war experience in Malaya and Singapore is well depicted as not a happy one and not until after the Battle for Milne Bay in 1942 did things start to improve. The behaviour of some airmen at Darwin, the ignorance of senior commanders well to the rear, and the very second-rate equipment the RAAF had to fly did not help the RAAF’s reputation either. The Milne Bay turning point is also about halfway into the book, so the first 12 months of the Pacific War make up a large part of the work.

In the later chapters, Johnston also—quite correctly in my opinion—portrays the role of MacArthur and Kenney as spoilers, with the RAAF being left behind in mop-up operations as the Americans go up through the Philippines and on towards Japan. That the Australian Government was so beholden to the Americans and did not seek RAAF participation in the final push is a national disgrace. Surprisingly, the book concludes rather apologetically. Johnston uses that clichéd term, ‘punching above one’s weight’, to exonerate the RAAF and goes on to explain why the RAAF didn’t perform better. I’ll leave it to the reader to decide if this is really necessary.

*Whispering Death* nicely complements Michael Enright’s *Flyers Far Away* (see the review in *ADF Journal Issue No. 181, 2010*), which covers the European theatre in a similar vein. Between them, they give a very good summary of RAAF operations in World War 2 as seen through a modern historian’s eyes.
Mark Johnston is perhaps better known as an Army historian, so this venture is a bit of a welcome change. I congratulate him on his research effort and the fact that he has taken the trouble to fully name each of the characters he refers to, not just by initials and surname. These small niceties are the mark of a professional researcher. I also liked the inclusion of appendices which cover the various aircraft types (on both sides), RAAF casualties by squadron, aerial victory claims (a mammoth effort in its own right), aces and aircraft tallies. A comprehensive index completes the work. There is a set of maps up front, although I would have liked to have seen them at the appropriate place in the text, and there are two sections of eight pages of B&W photographs. This is the publisher’s house style but, with today’s desktop publishing software and computer printing methods, it would be relatively easy to illustrate the appropriate text.

To criticise anything about the book is difficult as the research is first class, accurate and comprehensive. My only complaint is with the title! *Whispering Death*, really? The term actually comes from allied propaganda spread around the RAAF that the Beaufighter was called ‘Whispering Death’ by the Japanese, apparently due to its ‘quiet’ engines. Obviously Allied propagandists, or the author, hasn’t heard the noise made by two 1770 hp Hercules aero engines roaring towards them! Funny too that American propaganda had it that title was given to their P-38 Lightnings, also operating across the Pacific. The term might have been better used for the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M *Reisen*, better known as the Zero, which caused so much trouble, especially in the early war years. Anyway, the title doesn’t do justice to the book, enough said. Overall, a great book with an average title. Recommended.

**Targeting Peace:**
*understanding UN and EU targeted sanctions*

Mikael Eriksson
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2011
ISBN: 978-1-4094-19327

Reviewed by Dr Noel Sproles

Conventional or comprehensive sanctions, which are directed at national governments or societies, have gone out of favour since the end of the Cold War, as they were often seen to have been unfairly onerous on innocent populations. Instead, there has been an increase in the use of what have become to be known as ‘targeted sanctions’. These are aimed, or targeted, at those specific individuals or groups considered to have the power to correct behaviour deemed unsuitable by the outside world. At first sight, these more sharply focused sanctions should be better able to force change on those in power, while avoiding doing harm to innocents. However, *Targeting Peace* tells us that this is often not the case. Targeted sanctions give rise to many complex issues and can produce results that are surprisingly counter-intuitive.

The complexities of targeted sanctions are discussed, as well as descriptions of the various sanctions which are available for direction against individuals or groups. This is supported by
case studies from regions spread from the former Yugoslavia, across the Middle East, and as far away as Burma. A revealing explanation is given of the manner in which targeted sanctions are selected and administered by both the UN and the EU. This provides a sobering insight into the workings of international bureaucracies, where sectional interests, poor command structure and lack of resources to supervise and implement sanctions tend to make them ineffective. Eriksson at one stage makes the point that this process is frequently the antithesis of a properly run military operation. The case is made that the manner in which targeted sanctions are decided upon, the choice of targets and the administration of them once imposed needs to be re-thought. Or even perhaps, thought through properly for the first time.

As the book’s title suggests, this work is only intended to give an understanding of targeted sanctions as applied by the UN and EU. It makes no attempt to assess any particular sanctions regime, although it does question the manner in which they are currently being assessed. The implication is possibly that an understanding is needed before methods of assessment can be sensibly formulated. It could also be suggested that targeted sanctions are a solution to a problem, or a needed capability, yet to be rigorously established.

There is much in this book to suggest that it is based on a post graduate thesis. A great deal of effort is directed in providing corroborating evidence for each argument, which is necessary in a thesis but can become tedious in a book. The layout reflects that of a thesis, with a review of what is contained in each chapter and a section dedicated to a conclusion at the end of each chapter. This, as would be imagined, proved to be most useful. The possibility of its origins being in a thesis was reinforced not just by its being restricted to sanctions imposed by the UN and EU but by a narrowing of its focus even further to sanctions against individuals only. As a result, there is no discussion on sanctions imposed on groups such as the Taliban or al Qaeda; against regions where, for example, arms embargoes may be applied; or against commodities such as tropical rainforest timber or ‘blood’ diamonds.

I once read a critique of a writer where it was claimed that ‘… he is no Joe Friday nor is he a Hemingway’. This criticism could well be directed at Eriksson, for he seems unable to express himself either succinctly or in plain English. At times his manner of expression is so convoluted as to be incomprehensible and so his message is lost. There were entire sentences which I had to peruse several times in an attempt to glean some meaning from them—and sometimes I just had to proceed being none the wiser. The book’s readability was not helped by the large number of typographical errors, many of which I suspect are the result of cutting and pasting with a word processor. On one page, I counted as many as five such errors and it is clear that the publisher did not have the book properly proofread. I feel that this is unforgivable for what is quite an expensive book.

But, putting this aside, Targeting Peace is a serious book which merits consideration but it is certainly not for bed time or holiday reading. It provides a useful insight into targeted sanctions, albeit an insight limited in its scope. Its references and case studies and discussion should be a valuable resource for anyone with a serious interest in the subject. The effort needed to read and comprehend it, and the cost, would possibly be a deterrent for the more casual reader. This is a pity as there is much there that would be of use to anyone with an interest in politics and international relations.
This book is a battle history and not a war history and I liked the fresh approach. While I had read about almost all of these battles before, the summation was still an enjoyable summer time read. I would even go so far as to say that the book should be mandatory reading for politicians and that all suburban libraries and schools must have a copy, as it will be useful for generations to come to put all 40 battles into relative perspective. Each story starts with an account of a dramatic individual action, followed by a description of the wider battle and then some whole-of-war context.

Why only 40 battles? The author states that they had to be really significant in some way. They were actions where men rose to the occasion as heroes, or where there was demonstration of collective skill, or where the scale of human tragedy stood out, including some situations which were disastrous defeats. They are essentially stories of individualism and actions with some analysis. Most are from World War 1, such was the carnage and comparative numbers of troops involved.

There is an interesting start, with the Irish convict rebellion in Sydney in 1804. Gallipoli is described as the greatest battle of all; a divisional attack that almost ended up as every man for himself. There are incredible individual actions by men like Albert Jacka and the seven Victoria Cross winners at Lone Pine. There is the slaughter at ‘The Neck’ and again at Fromelle, with 1,917 men lost from the 5th Division. Pozières is more densely sown with Australian sacrifice than any other place on earth, with 23,000 casualties and 6,741 dead.

The Hindenburg Line was initially breached at the first battle of Bullecourt, then breached again and held in the second battle. There is the underground mining at Messine, incredible fighting prowess at Polygon Wood and Brooseoinde, the living hell of Passchendaele—with the worst conditions of any battle in World War 1—the charge at Beersheba, and decisive victory at Villers-Bretonneux, which was the pinnacle of the AIF (Australian Imperial Force). There is the exemplary ‘all-arms’ strategy at Hamel, and the corps attack by five Australian divisions at Amiens in the second battle of the Somme, with ten per cent of the one million men being Australian; and after which Monash was knighted in the field. Mont St Quentin is described as the greatest military achievement of the war.

In World War 2, there is the capture and eight-month siege of Tobruk, the loss of HMAS Sydney, the fall of Singapore and the loss of two brigades into captivity. There is the battle of Darwin in the first of 64 attacks and another 36 bombings of many towns over 20 months, Sydney Harbour, the first and second battles at El Alamein, the first defeat of the Japanese at Milne Bay, Kokoda, and Balikpapan—which was bigger than Gallipoli. There is the human wave at
Kapyong, Long Tan and Coral-Balmoral in Vietnam, which was the biggest battle lasting 25 days, and then more recent long-war engagements by warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is the book to take with you on any battlefield tour, as it is useful to put all of these epics in sequence and to obtain a powerful comparative perspective across time. Australian troops can proudly and rightfully ‘march easy’, such is the legacy of their forebears.

**Grab Their Belts to Fight Them:**
*the Viet Cong’s big-unit war against the US, 1965-1966*

Warren Wilkins
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2011

Reviewed by John Donovan

Warren Wilkins has drawn extensively on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong records to write this compelling account of the battles between Viet Cong main force units and US forces in 1965-66. While mention is made of North Vietnamese units, the principal focus is on the Viet Cong. The battle of Long Tan, however, is mentioned as an example of allied use of firepower.

Many western historians discussing the Vietnam War offer a narrative of indigenous Viet Cong fighters—largely part-time guerrillas, wearing black pyjamas and sandals made from old truck tyres, and armed with captured weapons—defeating a clumsy US force armed with the latest military technology. Wilkins demonstrates the falsity of this narrative.

Using North Vietnamese documents, Wilkins traces the North’s involvement and leadership from the earliest stages of the conflict, with deployment to the south of ethnic South Vietnamese who had ‘regrouped to North Vietnam in the aftermath of the north-south division’. They were armed with modern Soviet weapons and followed orders from the ‘Central Office for South Vietnam’, which was wholly subordinate to the North. Northern soldiers reinforced even nominally Viet Cong units.

The major limiting factor for the Viet Cong was US firepower. This caused a Viet Cong squad leader to tell his men to ‘grab the enemy’s belts to fight them’, to close with US forces to prevent them using the full force of their firepower so as to avoid causing friendly casualties. As Wilkins demonstrates, the real difficulty was in passing through the firepower zone to grab the belts!

Wilkins’ descriptions of battles between Viet Cong and US forces highlight the courage of many Viet Cong soldiers but demonstrate their command structure’s inflexibility, which restricted Viet Cong options once their forces were committed. US firepower also led the Viet Cong to develop another tactic that became a hallmark of their activities—digging. Whether for the construction of field fortifications, bunker systems or tunnel complexes, the spade became a key Viet Cong tool.
Wilkins uses North Vietnamese documents to show that the communist leadership was not unanimous in supporting the ‘big-unit’ war. Many, including some southern leaders, preferred to revert to a guerrilla campaign while the north built up its economy but they were overruled. The result of this debate, and the failure of the big-unit strategy to cause the US to withdraw, was the 1968 Tet offensive. This cost North Vietnam and the Viet Cong massive casualties but gained them a psychological victory that paved the way for ultimate military victory, though not as quickly as desired.

Both sides fought a war of attrition; the US intending to use its firepower advantage, the Viet Cong to close with their enemy for hand-to-hand combat. In attritional terms, the US should have prevailed; even in less successful engagements, the casualty ratio favoured the US by a factor of three; in more successful battles, ten or more Viet Cong casualties were inflicted for each US casualty.

Had Field Marshal Haig or Marshal Joffre been able to inflict casualties at that ratio on the Western Front in 1915 or 1916, they would probably have won their war of attrition. The North Vietnamese, however, were prepared to accept heavy casualties to gain victory. Whether the victory was worth the cost is for them to judge but the key lesson for western nations might be to choose tactics other than attrition when fighting opponents who place a low value on their subordinates’ lives.

**EU Counterterrorism Policy**

* A Paper Tiger?

**Oldrich Bures**  
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2011  

Reviewed by Dr Noel Sproles

An outside observer, having witnessed the amount of effort expended in developing the EU’s counterterrorism policy, may well expect that an effective European response to terrorism would have been put in place by now. But this would be a mistake, according to the Czech researcher, Oldrich Bures. EU member states, while endorsing policies at the supra-national level, apparently have not been all that conscientious in putting them into practice at the national level. It is argued that while the EU ‘talks the talk’ when it comes to counterterrorism policy, it fails to ‘walk the walk’ in implementing it.

The author has relied on open sources and interviews with a broad cross section of EU bureaucrats and politicians to develop an impressively rigorous argument. Those interviewed present a variety of opinions in both support of, and opposition to, the current policy. These interviews and other sources form the basis for a wide-ranging discussion of the effectiveness of the policy in countering the various types of threat that terrorists pose to the EU. The author has adopted an even-handed approach when presenting opposing views and avoids providing overt support for any one view in preference to another.
While Islamist terrorism may be uppermost in most people’s minds, the threats posed by other groups, such as separatist movements and the IRA, are also addressed. It needs to be noted that these latter threats have been much more numerous than the former and how this has shaped the European public’s view on terrorism generally is explained in some detail. Discussion on the reasons for, and the means to prevent, problems such as the radicalisation of ethnic groups adds depth to the discussion. Throughout the book, the author critically questions whether or not each policy or piece of legislation or organisation ‘value adds’ to the achievement of the desired operational outcome.

Some of the organisations and appointments created to implement EU counterterrorism policy would probably be quite unfamiliar to most people living outside the EU. I must admit to not being aware of the existence of the European Police Office (Europol), the EU Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), the European Arrest Warrant or the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator. These entities have all been established at the supra-national level to coordinate the EU fight against both crime and terrorism. However, other than the European Arrest Warrant, none of them seems to have lived up to expectations.

The reasons for this are varied and they are discussed in some detail. For example, some member states perceive the policies to be a threat to their sovereignty. On occasions, what is agreed in Brussels can contravene the law in individual member states, resulting in complex legal problems that can be difficult or time-consuming to resolve. Again, existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements have proved satisfactory in the past, are working well at present, and a further vertical layer of control holds little attraction to national agencies.

Approaches adopted by different nations when addressing the same problem can also work against a supra-national approach. For example, some nations see terrorism as a criminal matter and make the police responsible for counterterrorism operations. Others see it as a national security problem and a matter for their intelligence agencies. The different objectives and culture within such agencies can lead to mistrust and rivalry which is not helped when some are disdainful of each other. It is ironic that the FBI has proven to be a more effective ‘hub’ for exchange of information among member states than the EU structures ostensibly established to achieve the same purpose.

The story is disturbingly similar to that presented by Victor D. Comras in his book Flawed Diplomacy, which was reviewed in the on-line version of Issue No. 185 (August 2011) of the ADF Journal. In this case, it was the UN where there was a discrepancy between what was agreed at the supra-national level and what was being implemented by the member states. There is one important difference, however, in that the EU, unlike the UN, at least has a definition of terrorism providing a consensus on what it is trying to counter.

But there are some positive indications that the policy may be slowly evolving from a ‘paper tiger’ to a real tiger in some areas at least. The success of the European Arrest Warrant is one indication of this. However, the sluggishness of this evolution suggests that perhaps too much was done too soon and that the policies were too ambitious. The author goes further in questioning whether the European level is even the best platform for some activities, contending it may be more effective in the long term if some powers are retained at the national level. The suggestion is perhaps that while individual member states are handling counterterrorism well using the existing internal and external arrangements, the value of a wholesale change to a supra-national apparatus is questionable.
The book is well laid out with a brief outline of what is to come at the beginning of each section or chapter and a standardised approach to developing the argument in each chapter. A considerable amount of detailed information is provided by means of tables, bar graphs and footnotes, as well as an extensive bibliography. Unfortunately, there are some unusual errors in grammar and vocabulary which disrupt the flow in a book that demands a lot of a reader attempting to absorb its content. This is again another example of what seems to be an increasing trend by publishers not to have manuscripts properly proofread before publication.

However, this is a substantial work on a serious topic. By drawing attention to the strengths and weaknesses of past decisions, it can serve to ‘make muddy waters clear’, thus focusing attention on what should be the best courses of action to take in the future. I feel that students of disciplines such as government, politics or international law would find it a valuable resource as a case study of the disjoint that can occur between the ideals of legislators and the practicalities of implementing their policies.

By providing such a detailed critique of what is happening on the ground with EU counterterrorism policy, it must be sobering reading for legislators and practitioners both inside and outside the EU. It also poses another question. If what the EU says it is doing in this policy area is so different from what it is actually doing, does the same situation apply to other policy matters where the EU is being held up to us as a model of what we should be doing here in Australia?

Crossing the Wire:  
the untold stories of Australian POWs in battle and captivity during WWI

David Coombes  
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2011  
ISBN: 978-0-9870-5741-9

Reviewed by Jim Truscott

This book may well be unique. While there is no dearth of stories about individual and collective actions during the Great War, none ventures like this account into the fate of the some 4,000 Australians who became prisoners-of-war. Tragically, almost 1,700 were taken at the first battle of Bullecourt on 11 April 1917. It represents an incredible research effort by David Chalk, who was a grandson of one such POW, and their compilation by David Coombes. It largely focuses on the actions of the men of the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Battalions in the 4th Australian Brigade, from Gallipoli through the Western Front and eventually to capitulation.

It takes five chapters to set the scene for captivity. I felt somewhat frustrated by this lead-in text, as I was already conversant with this aspect of our military history. However, it is a necessary reminder of what these POWs endured up to the point of capture. For example, there is the incredible bravery by the 13th Battalion at Stormy Trench and also the folly and anguish of the lost battle at Bullecourt. What happened next is somewhat of a shock to the
reader. There is much fright at the point of capture. Some prisoners are shot, particularly the injured. There is also the humiliation of capture; disbelief and astonishment. There is the brutality by the enemy to wounded men, with some left behind to die on the battlefield.

What stands out is that many of the men were then forced to work for eight months behind German lines as prisoners-of-reprisal. Combat death did not stop, as they endured frequent bombardment by own artillery. Unless injured or too sick to work, they remained at the front as labourers and were not even registered as POWs. This official recognition did not occur until they were moved to camps in Germany. The book argues that this slave labour was a tit-for-tat response by the Germans, due to the same treatment of German prisoners behind the British lines. I would have liked to have known more about whether this was indeed true; but the book rapidly moved on.

There are countless stories with reoccurring themes of ever-present cold, constant starvation and many men faded to skeletons, thoughts of escape, support from some French people, heavy hard work and nothing to sleep in, prevalent dysentery, men dying for lack of medical attention and paper bandages; all horrific reading. The saving grace is the chapter on the Red Cross, whose life-saving actions undoubtedly have won it a place in humanitarian history.

There are stories about many failed escape attempts, some in tunnels. There is one incredible story about the first Australian to escape and return to London, who subsequently ended up as the Commanding Officer of the 48th Battalion before the war ended. There is the dramatic increase of 90,000 allied prisoners after German offensives in 1918. There is the constant boredom of captivity, constant dying and constant moving between camps at no notice. There is constant dejection in captivity. Even after capitulation, repatriation is slow, as the Germans were tasked to do this by the terms of the armistice. When the men return home to Australia, neurosis is common until they all die.

The book is quite mind-numbing really. As there have not been any Australian POWs since the Korean War, it serves as a reminder to governments and military professionals alike about the reality of conflict. It should be mandatory reading for any veterans’ agency bureaucrat.

**SEAL Team Six:**
*the incredible story of an elite sniper – and the special operations unit that killed Osama bin Laden*

Howard Wasdin and Stephen Templin
Hachette Australia: Sydney, 2011

Reviewed by Dr Dominic Katter

The US Naval Academy website boasts as to its alumni including President Carter and 52 astronauts. However, during President Carter’s term of office, a US Army ‘Delta Force’ team was used in Operation EAGLE CLAW, the 1980 mission to rescue US hostages in Iran.
Subsequently, things have changed and it was said in the 1980s that President Reagan’s National Security Council was ‘saturated’ by those having affiliation with the Department of the Navy, including Vice-President George H. Bush, James Baker, George Schultz and Robert McFarlane.

It could be argued that the Navy under President Reagan was disproportionately strengthened. In the ‘US National Defence Strategy’ of January 2012, it was relevant to note that US Navy funding would be generally maintained, despite budgetary reductions elsewhere. Inter-Service rivalry is well-known within the US armed forces. The rivalry between Delta Force and the ‘SEALs’ (Sea, Air and Land Teams) is symptomatic to the greater Service rivalry. Within this historical context, it is therefore significant to note that it was a Navy SEAL team that was used on the bin Laden operation in 2011.

*SEAL Team Six* is the military memoir of former SEAL, Howard Wasdin. The monograph does not deal in detail with the bin Laden operation but follows Wasdin’s career, from initial selection and training to action as a SEAL Team Six ‘shooter’ in both the Persian Gulf (First Gulf War) and Somalia.

The book concentrates on the specifics of Wasdin’s service but is also a general study of the early 1990s period for *SEAL Team Six*. That team, now known as the US Naval Special Warfare Development Group, increased its public profile following the bin Laden operation in early May 2011. The preface to the book does traverse the bin Laden mission briefly.

Wasdin was a SEAL until his medical retirement in 1995. The injuries that ultimately required his retirement were sustained in the 1993 battle of Mogadishu, for which he won the Silver Star. Co-author Templin also has a military background and is a professor at Meio University in Japan.

The book is more an autobiography than a military history in that it examines Wasdin’s childhood and schooling experiences, as well as including a detailed account of the ‘abusive’ relationship he had with his step-father. The extensive challenges of the SEAL training process are a primary part of the text, with detailed descriptions of various training exercises.

The text indicates that much of it was likely dictated by Wasdin and re-drafted by Templin. This book is indicative of the commercial market now available for military-related monographs. The text constantly shifts between diary excerpts and extended prose but has an informal, easy-to-read style that is well-suited to a memoir such as this. The book would appeal to those with a military interest but, given the comprehensive glossary and relaxed writing style, it is potentially more appropriate for those from a non-military background.
I Confess: a memoir of the siege of Tobruk

John Joseph Murray
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2011
ISBN: 978-0-9870-5748-8

Reviewed by John Donovan

Major General John Murray, DCO and Bar, MC, VD, drafted this memoir in 1945 while he was General Officer Commanding Northern Territory Force. He had intended to publish it himself but his early death at the age of 59 (in 1951) denied him the opportunity. His family have now arranged for it to be published, before the passage of time and the deaths of his siblings and children lead to his papers being scattered among grand-children and great grand-children, and lost to wider community access.

The memoir does not focus on the battles in which Murray took part. Rather, it gives an account of his personal life as commander of the 20th Brigade of the 9th Division before and during the siege of Tobruk, with the battles as a backdrop. Many anecdotes show Murray’s companions in a humorous light. His writing style is easy to read, with some memorable phrases, such as a reference to the Army’s troubles with ‘women who become professional camp followers for pecuniary gain’. Delicately phrased but very informative!

His first batman (one Jack Murray, not related) seems to have been the kind of ‘character’ that might best be played by a younger Paul Hogan, who helped himself to the Brigadier’s alcohol stocks, in one case leaving a promissory note for a bottle of gin ‘borrowed’ when Jack was despatched back to his unit after getting drunk (on another bottle of the Brigadier’s gin), when he should have been digging a shelter in the desert. Not long after, Jack reappeared at brigade headquarters (minus the ‘borrowed’ gin but still promising to replace both bottles), as the brigade major’s batman.

Signallers were often considered to be good sources of the ‘dinkum oil’ on future events, but when Murray had his hair cut, the 20th Brigade headquarter’s barber was primed to ask whether he wanted a full cut or just a trim. The former was considered a sign that relief was not imminent. As the actual time for relief came near, the barber asked the question but provided a trim without waiting for an answer—perhaps the signallers had restored their position as the leading distributors of ‘furphies’!

While much of this memoir is fairly light-hearted, Murray is always conscious of the harsh background of war. He pays frequent tribute to the front-line soldiers, who faced the greatest dangers, and whose living conditions in Tobruk were considerably less comfortable than even the spartan conditions experienced by Murray.

Murray’s grandson, Andrew Murray, who prepared the draft for publication, has added an interesting selection of photographs, some well-known but many that will be new to readers. He has also added several original documents, and some notes of speeches on leadership and
the duties of staff officers that Murray gave while commanding the 4th Division and Northern Territory Force respectively. Even after almost 70 years, the speeches remain cogent.

One matter shows what a tight community Australia was in that era. Murray’s driver in Tobruk was the son of A.B. (Banjo) Paterson; two of his poems are reproduced in the book and have a style recognisably inherited from Banjo. The record of military service by members of Murray’s family in two world wars is also a reminder of the impact of those wars on Australia, when the population was much lower than it is now.

Big Sky Publishing has turned Murray’s memoir into a handsome book, well worth reading.

The Architect of Kokoda, Bert Kienzle –
the man who made the Kokoda Trail

Robyn Kienzle
Hachette Australia: Sydney, 2011
ISBN: 978-0-7336-2763-7

Reviewed by Jim Truscott

This book was an eye-opener to me, despite having patrolled and trekked through much mountainous jungle. It came as some surprise to read that the Kokoda Trail was officially opened in 1905 to service the goldfields, as an alternative to coming in from Buna. The Kokoda area experienced a gold rush from 1905 until 1910, however, it was Bert Kienzle, a civilian of many talents including rubber planter and gold miner, who later etched its place in Australia’s and PNG’s military history.

The author, his granddaughter, states that the book is a biography and not a military history. But I disagree, as his story fills a critical gap in widespread knowledge about the first decisive strategic land victory in the Pacific War. While only Chapter 6 of this social history of the colonisation of PNG is devoted to war, no-one did more to ensure Australian victory than Lieutenant Bert Kienzle, in one of the costliest victories in the Pacific, where there was one death for every 11 soldiers in battle. The campaign was not just the initial fighting withdrawal and tactical victory, as more men died engaged in muddy coastal swamp warfare than in the entire mountain campaign. I was to learn that Kokoda means ‘place of the skull’, and that the battle was known to the Japanese as the ‘Death Valley Massacre’.

Bert Kienzle was no ordinary Australian. As a boy, as a consequence of his father being a naturalised German, he and his family were interned by Fiji in Australia during World War 1. Later, he returned to school in Germany with his grandparents. As a young man, he spent seven years as a planter before getting into gold mining and setting up Mamba Estate in 1935 near Kokoda. Accounts of the early German influence in Australia, the isolation of expatriate life in the jungle, and drinking after sunset are not new, but it is easy and enjoyable reading.
On 11 December 1941, he reported for duty to 8th Military District in Port Moresby but nothing much happened until defences were hastily arranged in February 1942. On 31 March 1942, he abandoned his plantation and mine to serve his commission in ANGAU (Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit) and later warrant in the Citizens Military Force. In June 1942, he was incredulously told to build a road to Kokoda and given 1,000 labourers and two months to establish it as the line of communications!

Not so surprisingly, they only constructed 11 kilometres to Ower’s Corner when, in July 1942, he guided B Company from the 39th Battalion over the mountains towards Buna. The Japanese had landed at Buna on 21 July and they attacked Kokoda on 29 July. He was subsequently to traverse the trail eight times in the next four months, commanding 60 Europeans and 2,500 natives, known as ‘fuzzy wuzzy angels’; effectively a brigade responsibility. This book is much to do about field engineers, pioneers and logistics.

It soon became apparent that the eight-day logistic resupply chain had to be short-circuited by air-dropping of supplies, even if there was little to no experience in doing so. Then Bert Kienzle, road builder, guide, explorer and supplier found some suitable dry lakes for air drops, known as ‘the place of the ghosts’. The first supply drop took place on 12 August and it was the logistic turning point of the campaign. He found a second lake area on 21 August and there was continual conflict between moving supplies forward and casualties back.

Kokoda proved pivotal to logistics and it showed the lack of air ambulances in Australia’s warfighting capability. He came under direct fire in mid September, when the fighting withdrawal was in earnest and he was in continuous action for 120 days before becoming very sick, about the same time that the Japanese ran out of food. There is a final gut-wrenching account when the war ends and 34 Papuans are found guilty of treason and hanged. The story goes on to describe the post-war restructuring of plantations, the shutting down of the Kokoda Trail as a mail route in October 1949 and the road reaching Kokoda in 1970.

Bert Kienzle assisted the establishment of three war cemeteries in 1953 for the 7,989 Australian soldiers, sailors and airmen who lost their lives, and he met with some returning Japanese soldiers in 1968. He endured the loss of a young son after the war and a volcanic eruption in 1951. He was instrumental in establishing the cattle and airline industries before independence in 1975 and he sold Mamba Estate to the PNG Government in 1979, to return to and die in Australia in 1988. Despite all of these endeavours, he was surprisingly not decorated apart from a MID and MBE during the war, a CBE in 1968 and the Independence Medal in 1986. This book should be read by all Australians.
The reference to ‘fighting spirit’ in the title of this book comes from the Japanese term \textit{yamato damashii}. It expresses ideas such as respect for Japan’s long history, for one’s ancestors and for the Emperor, as well as the ability to meet any challenge, even if it means sacrificing your life. This spirit was put to the test in earnest as 21,000 Japanese Imperial Army and Navy troops fought to the death in a delaying action on the island of Iwo Jima in February and March 1945. Along with the subsequent assault on Okinawa, this produced one of the bloodiest periods of World War 2. While not directly involved in the fighting, Major Horie’s position as a senior staff officer enabled him to present what may be a unique view of the battle from a Japanese perspective.

Horie was a regular army infantry officer who was seriously wounded in China before the commencement of the Pacific campaign, which precluded his further active duty in the infantry. On his recovery, he was employed as an Army liaison officer with the Navy’s Convoy Escort Fleet Headquarters, responsible for logistic support for Army units and formations scattered around the islands of the Pacific. After a year in this posting, he was appointed to the staff of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi, commanding the 109th Division on Iwo Jima. General Kuribayashi sent him to the nearby island of Chichi Jima to supervise the transhipping of supplies from Japan to Iwo Jima. It was this appointment that not only ensured Horie’s survival but gave him access to the material that formed the basis for this book.

In mid-1944, following the capture of the Marianas by the Americans, the Japanese decided to strengthen the defences of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The narrative follows the build-up of the forces on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima from that period and discusses the difficulties and the strategy adopted for the defence of the islands. It reveals the problems caused by the lack of a unified command as differences of opinion arose between the Army and Navy. Although Kuribayashi was able to reach an accommodation with his naval counterpart for the allocation of resources, it resulted in a less-than-satisfactory defence plan.

Gripping accounts of living through intense naval and air bombardments and of sheltering in caves while being attacked with aviation fuel and flame throwers are provided by means of survivors’ stories. Then, as the battle reached its climax, came the futile and suicidal \textit{banzai} charges. Finally, after the island was fully occupied by the Americans, there are the stories of the survivors and stragglers who evaded capture and death for weeks afterwards living ‘the life of troops defeated and alone’.

This book was originally published in Japan, in Japanese, and this edition is an edited translation into English. It is full of the names of individuals and lists of units deployed to both Iwo Jima
and Chichi Jima. At times, the author appears to be reaching out to the families of those who vanished without trace on the battle field, as if the lists were a way of providing some connection with the dead. Horie recounts how he would be approached by next-of-kin seeking information on soldiers whenever it was let known that he had survived Iwo Jima. The list of units would also provide valuable information to anyone interested in the order-of-battle for the forces defending the island. There are several appendices explaining the defence plans adopted for both Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, along with the thought processes used to arrive at those plans. Unlike the book, which he wrote in his native Japanese, Horie wrote these in English. The editors made no attempt to correct his fractured English, the intent of which is not always clear.

Paralleling this story is the grim saga of events on Chichi Jima and Horie’s part in it, which he conveniently and adroitly skirts by mentioning only in passing. A number of American aircrew were shot down over and around Chichi Jima and some were captured. One pilot who was shot down but plucked to safety by submarine was George H. Bush, who later became US President. Many of those captured were mistreated and tortured. Some were executed by beheading and some were the victims of ritual cannibalism. Although Horie did not participate in these events, he was aware of them and was less than truthful about the events when questioned by the Americans immediately after the war. He even expresses regret at one point that Lieutenant General Tachibana and Rear Admiral Mori, the commanders on Chichi Jima, were executed as war criminals. Yet these men were not only in the position to prevent the mistreatment, both of them participated in the ritual cannibalism!

Throughout the book, Horie portrays himself as an officer of substance, advising generals and having an influence seemingly out of all proportion to his rank. At one stage, he comes close to suggesting that it was he who devised the plan for defending Iwo Jima. Other sources, recording the accounts of American officers who met him immediately after Japan’s surrender, paint a less-than-glowing picture. I gained the impression that Horie was not only prone to self-aggrandisement but that he was at heart a ‘survivor’, willing and able to bend in whichever direction events dictated.

This book presents an interesting insight into the Japanese side of a significant World War 2 battle. It may not have been its intent but it serves to show that however grim the fate suffered by the Japanese on Iwo Jima, it was one of their own choosing. Although it is not a polished work, it is worth taking the time to read. However, I suggest that it should be read in conjunction with other narratives telling the story that was unfolding at the same time on Chichi Jima, such as Flyboys by James Bradley.

Unwittingly or otherwise, Fighting Spirit is more than the story of a battle; it is also the story of someone who witnessed criminal events connected with the battle. Horie made a deliberate effort to establish personal relationships with American aircrew shot down over Chichi Jima. He then watched them being taken away to be executed, some to be cannibalised, and this cannot be disentangled from his story of Iwo Jima. In addition, the book portrays the defenders of Iwo Jima in a heroic and self-sacrificing light. Perhaps this is because the book was written for a Japanese audience. But the story of Chichi Jima will serve as a counterpoise to remind the reader of the other side to Japanese conduct in the Pacific campaigns. Together, these stories combine examples of the loftiest and basest elements of human nature.
More than Bombs and Bandages:
Australian Army nurses at work in World War 1

Kirsty Harris
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2011
ISBN: 978-0-9808-1405-7

Reviewed by Ian M. Johnstone

This is a highly-satisfying account of the nurses who served overseas with the Australian Army Nursing Service (AANS) in World War 1. A.G. Butler, in his renowned and now scarce three-volume official history of the Australian Army Medical Services, recorded a total of 2,286 nurses. Kirsty Harris estimates there were closer to 3000 (and is still in the process of compiling a nominal roll of those who served in the AANS, with a view to publishing it once it is further updated).

The nurses served wherever there were Australian soldiers. They also had plenty of patients, as about 213,000 Australian soldiers became casualties in the war. This excellent book is their story. It is encyclopaedic but easily readable. It won the annual C.E.W. Bean prize for military history in 2008 and is based on a massive collection of data that Harris collated for her PhD thesis from the University of Melbourne. The bibliography of 21 pages reveals the breadth and depth of her research, supported by 969 endnotes and 26 listed illustrations.

As well as A.G. Butler’s three volumes, readers may also know of the two autobiographical accounts by AANS staff nurses; Anne Donnell’s Letters of an Australian Army Nursing Sister (1920) and May Tilton’s The Grey Battalion (1933). Of course, Harris draws from these five books and many others, as well as academic theses, Australian War Memorial records and an array of other resources.

She says in her introduction: ‘At the heart of this book is the detailed examination of the transition of the World War 1 nurse from civilian to military nurse and the evolution of military nursing per se’. It must also be said that at ‘the heart of her book’ is a deep and detailed knowledge and appreciation of just what our World War 1 nurses did; and the service and sacrifice these women made to the war effort.

Some highlights of particular note are:

• In the aftermath of the South African War, British surgeon Sir Frederick Treves wrote that nursing duties were the ‘indefinable ministrations of women’.

• In September 1916, with the decision that nurses were to wear military badges of rank, Anne Donnell received the warning that ‘now that you Sisters have been given the rank of officers, … you are not to go out with NCOs or privates, nor speak to them excepting on duty. If you do, you will be immediately sent away to a British hospital’. Many nurses had fathers, brothers or friends enlisted in the ranks and felt that it was ridiculous that the Army should prevent them from seeing the men purely because of their differing status. Donnell reported that, in its short existence, the rule was ‘simply ignored by the majority’, while a later investigation revealed that no such order has been officially issued.
• One Australian soldier wrote in a letter home: ‘From now and forever, I am in love with all Army nurses. I was brought in yesterday, wounded and feeling frightened, and the first person I saw was a Victorian nurse. She smiled at me and said “well soldier, I’ll do what I can to help you but you’ll have to look a bit more cheerful”. I was cheerful from that moment’.

• Padre David Garland wrote: ‘One boy who is paralysed badly and will only leave the ward when he is carried out for the last time, could not talk much. A Sister just stood by him quietly and stroked his forehead and crooned in gentle words to him. I could have kissed her hand for the beautiful thing she did’.

• May Tilton described her depth of involvement in the tasks she performed: ‘Saying goodbye to our patients was like parting from brothers. Some held my hand against their faces under cover of the bedclothes, not uttering a word, while I stood silently swallowing a big lump in my throat’.

• Hope Weatherhead, based at the 2nd Army General Hospital in Boulogne, wrote of the effects of mustard gas: ‘It was a very deadly gas and the patients suffered terrible pain. One would not recognise a patient who had been badly gassed, they were so disfigured with burns and swollen, the eyes very swollen and closed. The skin was always burnt worse … under the knees, groins or in any parts where skin rubbed against skin, also the membrane of the mouth and throat. Some patients were unable to speak, the voice having completely gone’.

• Many patients did not require nursing but simply needed the right sort of companionship. Nurses sought a cure through improving the ward’s general atmosphere and maintaining a cheerful demeanour, rather than by deliberate and conscious effort. Gertrude Moberley massaged heads, held hands and spoke soothingly to her shell-shocked patients. The nights were the worst, for both patients and nursing staff, when ‘the cheerful ward became a place of torment, with the occupant of every bed tossing-and-turning and moaning in a hell of memories let loose’. Nurses could only tuck men sobbing hysterically into bed and talk to them ‘as one would to a child’. Noisier men would fight their battles over again and Leila Brown noted that the nurses had to be careful getting disturbed soldiers back to bed as they could attack the staff.

• The extensive use of the transfusion of blood for treating haemorrhage and shock was among the most significant developments during the war. Healthier patients, such as walking wounded and light duty men, could volunteer to give up to two pints of blood and nurses then rewarded them with additional food and drink, such as champagne, and bacon and eggs. Anne Donnell happily rewarded her blood donors with stout and reported that ‘needless to say they liked that part of the business though they had not looked for compensation’.

There are also plenty of technical details, including ‘long Liston’ splints, Thomas splints, Hodgen’s splints, Bryant beds and Fowler beds. The author also explains the pre-war gender convention in all hospitals which excluded them from nursing men who had contracted venereal disease.

GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The Australian Defence Force Journal seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters, such as strategic studies, security and international relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the Journal does not pay for articles but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best in each issue.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without the use of templates or paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable (and contributors should view previous issues for style). Length should be between 3500 and 5000 words. Please ‘spell check’ the document with Australian English before sending. Additional guidelines are available from the website.

Articles should contain endnotes, bibliography and brief biographical details of the author.

Endnotes


References or bibliography


Tables, maps and photographs are acceptable but must be of high enough quality to reproduce in high resolution. Photographs must be at least 300 ppi in TIF format and obviously pertinent to the article.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by an independent referee with some knowledge of the subject. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and, if accepted, will be published in the next Journal. Be advised, it may take quite a while from submission to print.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Editor via email at: publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Authors accept the Editor may make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author, however, the theme or intent of the article will not be changed.