CONTENTS

CHAIRMAN'S COMMENTS

Securing Space: Australia's urgent security policy challenge for the 21st century
Air Commodore Chris Westwood, RAAF

Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a difficult road ahead
Dr Claude Rakisits, Deakin University
(and Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College)

The Difficulties in Predicting Future Warfare
Ian Wallace

ADF Joint Entry Operations: why conventional airborne forces are fundamental
Major G.J.S. Cornelia, CSM, Australian Army

Colin East goes to SESKOAD – in ‘a year of living dangerously’, 1964
Lieutenant Colonel Bob Lowry (Retd)

NATO Special Operations: exploiting new structures in command, control and intelligence
Lieutenant Colonel I.D. Langford, DSC, Australian Army

Peacekeepers: Athena’s champions
Commander ‘Sid’ Heal (Retd), formerly of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department

Managing Global Supply Chains
Wing Commander Neil R. Collie, RAAF

Sustainable Defence Capability: Australia’s national security and the role of defence industry
Ben White, Australian Business Defence Industry Unit

BOOK REVIEWS

2
3
17
27
34
45
56
67
77
87
97
Chairman’s comments

Welcome to Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 183.

We conclude the year with a range of articles addressing contemporary military and geo-strategic issues, with contributors from Australia, New Zealand and the US. They include the lead article by Air Commodore Chris Westwood on ‘Securing Space’, Dr Claude Rakisits’ informed perspective on ‘Pakistan-US Bilateral Relations’ and Lieutenant Colonel Ian Langford’s article on ‘NATO Special Operations’. Ian Wallace, formerly of the New Zealand Army, provides an interesting analysis of ‘The Difficulties in Predicting Future Warfare’ and Wing Commander Neil Collie, in ‘Managing Global Supply Chains’, argues the need for improved management of global fleet support arrangements.

We also have an interesting historical perspective on the first Australian officer to attend the Indonesian Army’s Command and Staff College by retired Lieutenant Colonel Bob Lowry, an article on defence industry by Ben White of the Australian Business Defence Industry Unit, and an insightful article on peacekeeping by retired Commander ‘Sid’ Heal, formerly of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. I am pleased to advise that the $500 prize for best article in this issue has gone to Major Giles Cornelia for his article on ‘ADF Joint Entry Operations: why conventional airborne forces are fundamental’.

As usual, we also have a selection of book reviews of material published in recent months. We typically receive more reviews than we can readily publish in each issue, so in future we will be deferring some to the on-line version of the Journal, with only a referenced mention in the printed version. However, we remain keen to hear from readers wishing to join the list of reviewers. If you are interested, please provide your contact details and subject area/speciality to the Editor at publications@defence.adc.edu.au.

We foreshadowed in earlier issues that we are planning to theme our first issue next year on ‘the ADF command and leadership experience over the last 20 years’. If you are interested in contributing—and we are looking for ‘personal vignettes’ of 1500-2500 words, with no endnotes or bibliography, to be submitted by mid-January 2011—I would encourage you to contact the Editor for further details.

I hope you enjoy this final edition for 2010.

James Goldrick
Rear Admiral, RAN
Commander, Australian Defence College
Chairman of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board
Securing Space: Australia’s urgent security policy challenge for the 21st century

Air Commodore Chris Westwood, RAAF

Introduction

In 1963, there was one geosynchronous satellite in space, being used to examine the feasibility of establishing a worldwide communications network. Today, there are over 800, controlled by dozens of public and private operators in more than 50 countries, all contributing to the estimated US$123bn worth of satellite industry annual revenues.

Australia, along with most developed nations, is becoming increasingly dependent on a range of space-based systems, a dependence which has evolved on the assumption that space is a secure domain. In reality, space is an incredibly fragile and insecure environment. The US, Russia and China all have the demonstrated capability to destroy space vehicles using ground-launched anti-satellite missiles (ASATs). Also, in February 2009, the first major collision between satellites occurred when a Russian communications satellite accidentally collided with a US-owned satellite, causing a debris cloud of over 1800 trackable fragments, which joined the 14,000 or so satellites, discarded rocket parts, and detectable debris and space matter already littering space.

While there has been very little effort in Australia to ensure that its space interests are secure, many other nations have acknowledged this vulnerability and are now investigating options to secure space. This is a very complex challenge. There is no global consensus regarding how to secure space, with various nations considering options such as treaties, codes of conduct and even weaponising space. This paper proposes a national-level policy to establish a foundation for securing Australia’s future space activities.

‘Space security’ defined

James Clay Moltz defines space security as ‘the ability to place and operate assets outside the Earth’s atmosphere without external interference, damage or destruction’. During the Cold War, when the US and Soviet Union were the only significant players in the space domain, a series of agreements and treaties were initiated that formed what is often referred to as ‘the rules of the road’ for space activities. As these nations developed their individual capabilities, they also developed a realisation that there were substantial mutual benefits in a stable and secure space environment.

Even though these rules have become less relevant over the past decade, partially as a result of reduced Russian influence and an increase in new players, space has remained a relatively secure domain. While there is no doubt the US will remain the most advanced and influential space nation for the foreseeable future—in terms of assets in space, technological status and overall investment—there is some significant risk that the overall security of space is changing as newcomers with different national interests and technical abilities develop rudimentary space capabilities, without necessarily the same ‘rules of the road’ to govern their activities and behaviour.
On 11 January 2007, China destroyed one of its inactive weather satellites using a conventional ballistic missile modified to perform an ASAT function. This was China’s first successful ASAT space engagement. It left a dangerous debris cloud of more than 35,000 individual particles, large enough to cause damage to other space assets, much of which NASA expects to remain in space for at least two decades—and 10 per cent of it for up to 100 years.11 Russia and the US had conducted similar ASAT events in the past12 but, due to the mutual concern to keep space clear of debris, both countries showed restraint when it came to conducting counter-space tests and operations.13

As noted by the eminent defence analyst Desmond Ball, there is growing international concern that the unrestrained development and transfer of ASAT technology, primarily from China, could see ASATs being developed in the Middle East, specifically in Iran, and in Pakistan.14 This may prompt nations such as India and Israel to initiate their own space warfare programs.15 It is likely also that over the next decade or so, several other nations may develop the capability to undertake rudimentary kinetic space warfare.16

Australia’s space dependency

Australia, like most first-world nations, has become increasingly dependent on space to support a range of national functions. This is particularly evident in the defence domain, where over 50 per cent of the projects listed in the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) in the period to 2016 rely on space.17 Increasingly, the ADF’s weapons systems, communications, intelligence and situational awareness tools are dependent on space-based systems.

Australia’s dependence on space is not limited to Defence. Space-based technology ‘underpins transport, precision agriculture, mining, precise timing for telecommunications [and] e-commerce’.18 The routine use of space is set to increase rapidly over the next decade as more and more national functions become critically reliant on space, with little or no provision for effective terrestrial redundancy for the space-based function. As Australia’s dependence on space increases, the consequences of losing the freedom to operate in the space domain will increase commensurately.

Moreover, while first-world nations are more reliant on space than emerging nations, the dependency gap is likely to increase over the next decade as first-world nations accelerate their use of space.19 Emerging nations are becoming mindful of the strategic consequences of such dependency. Attacking an advanced nation’s space-based functions may present an attractive asymmetric war fighting option for nations with relatively low space dependency.20

So, while Australia’s dependency on space continues to increase, the development and spread of ASAT and other offensive space technology is also increasing,21 as is the potential for accidents resulting from congestion and increased debris in space. The longstanding secure space environment is rapidly becoming insecure as new players enter the space domain. Hence, assuring the security of space represents a key security challenge for Australia and, indeed, for the world over the next decade.
Australia’s space security policy history

In 2005, Senator Grant Chapman (Liberal, SA) convened an informal expert group known as the Space Policy Advisory Group, which prepared a report later forwarded to the Prime Minister. The report noted that Australia had:

… no effective whole-of-government mechanism for addressing the wide-ranging implications for our national security of the fast-moving developments in space-related strategic policy, international relations or technology—issues which most other comparable economies have long since taken up as a matter of national priority.22

The report concluded with two key ‘essential and urgent objectives’. Firstly, that the Australian Government develop and promulgate a broad and far-sighted whole-of-government space policy and, secondly, that a 10-year action plan to address Australia’s space shortcomings be developed.23 Little has changed as a result of that report. Australia remains devoid of a national space policy, its space dependency continues to increase and Australia still has no mechanism for addressing space security.

In 2008, the Senate’s Standing Committee on Economics conducted an inquiry into Australia’s space sector. Its November 2008 report, titled ‘Lost in Space’, sought to examine Australia’s role in the global space environment. It concluded with six recommendations, largely relating to the establishment of a national space organisation, deriving from the Space Policy Unit (SPU) within the Department of Industry, Innovation Science and Research.24 While this suggests a degree of commitment to the development of a national space policy, there is no specific remit for this unit to address space security.

There was also no mention of space or space security in the first National Security Statement (NSS), delivered by then Prime Minister Rudd to the Australian Parliament on 4 December 2008,25 although many of its objectives cannot be met without assured access to space.26 The subsequent 2009 Defence White Paper made several references to space and specific reference to ‘mission assurance’.27 In this context, the White Paper acknowledges that Australia relies heavily on networked space-based systems and that technologies are emerging that could threaten this reliance.28 To some extent, perhaps not surprisingly given the history of space in Australia, the White Paper infers that Defence has a leading role in space security.

Indeed, Australia’s vast and isolated real estate has provided a strategically attractive, southern hemisphere location for many military space programs. In 1971, a ground station supporting the US Air Force’s Defence Support Program satellites began operations at Nurrungar, near Woomera.29 The Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap began its intelligence collection operations near Alice Springs in June 1970 and has been operating there since. The interaction of operational, technical, scientific and policy staff at these installations has served Australia well, enabling it to gain expertise without the substantial investment in infrastructure that would normally be required.30

More recently, Australia has committed $927m towards the US Wide-Band Global Satellite (WGS) system, which is ‘the largest single direct investment that Australia has made in space to date’.31 The system will provide the backbone of ADF communications until about 2025. More broadly, the Government announced in its 2009 budget the allocation of $8.6m for the development of the SPU to provide whole-of-government advice on space and industry development. The complementary Australian Space Research Program, with funding of $40m, will similarly support space research, innovation and skills development in areas of ‘national significance’.32
Australia’s key space policy influences

There are several key influences that will drive the development of a space security policy for Australia. The various approaches that Australia’s allies and partners have to pursuing space security—and the nature of Australia’s relationships with these partners—is obviously critical. Australia’s space security policy will also be shaped by domestic influences. Indeed, domestic influences—such as supporting organisational structures and economic, industry and educational considerations—will specifically shape policy implementation and typically be more discretionary than international considerations.

International considerations

United States

The Australia/US alliance must be considered in the development of Australia’s space security policy. It is inconceivable that Australia could have a space security policy that would either lead Australia in a separate direction to the US or, worst case, be directly counter to US policy. To do so and then expect to remain so closely connected to the US space program would be folly. The Defence White paper is clear in this regard, noting that ‘our alliance with the US is our most important defence relationship. Without access to US capabilities, the ADF simply could not be the advanced force it is today’. 33

US space policy has not changed fundamentally since it was first developed during the Eisenhower Administration in 1955. 34 At the macro-level, there have been two important constants and two important variables. The first constant is that US space exploitation—while having several other motivating factors (notably national pride and economics)—has primarily been about ensuring US national security. The second is that the US has always reserved the right to use force to protect its space capability. 35 The first variable has been the degree to which various Administrations have cooperated with other major space powers in mutual space pursuits. The second is that policy approaches have fluctuated between treaties, ‘rules of the road’ and specific weapons programs, driven by contemporary party, domestic and global considerations, and by key personalities within successive Administrations. 36

In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and signalled its intention to deploy missiles to defend the US from missile attack, while also funding a series of space-based weapons projects, all of which put the US at odds with the rest of the space-faring world. 37 While the debate on whether to weaponise space is still active in the US, the Obama Administration has shown an inclination to be more cooperative with others. 38 There are also several think tanks, academics and some senior US officials espousing the value of a ‘code of conduct’ to govern space activities, likely reflecting the realisation that attaining ‘space dominance’ (a term coined under the Bush Administration), would be enormously expensive and most likely unachievable and unsustainable. 39

A final consideration is ‘technological edge’. The US is the only nation that can conduct a ‘robust’ degree of global space surveillance. It is the only nation that knows the location and activity of most space vehicles and a considerable amount of space ‘junk’. 40 And, while the global space surveillance coverage of other nations is likely to increase, the US will remain the leader for the foreseeable future. For all intents and purposes, that makes the US the ‘traffic controller’ of space and the logical key contributor to and leader of the global space surveillance effort. 41
**China**

China is the major space power of the Asia-Pacific region and, although technically decades behind the US, is increasingly becoming a competitor with the US in many space areas. China has long called for space to be free of weapons. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 2002, China (along with Russia) argued for space arms control and a new ‘Outer Space Treaty’, to include a ban on the stationing of weapons in space and the use, or threat of use, of force against space objects (although its ASAT test in 2007 arguably undermined this position).

Australia’s space security policy should recognise the importance of China as a rising space power. The different approaches to space security by China and the US, coupled with the underlying lack of trust between the two, creates a tension in Australian policy development. But it also creates an opportunity for Australia to use its bilateral ties with both to seek common ground in space security, which would make an important international contribution to space security.

**The Asia-Pacific region**

The creation of the Asia Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA), since evolved to the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO), which came into being when a memorandum-of-understanding was signed between China, Pakistan and Thailand in 1992, signalled China’s desire to be identified as the major regional space power. Japan has coordinated a separate regional forum, known as the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) since 1993. Neither has declared a policy approach to space security and, given their respective charters, neither is likely to in the near future.

APSCO was formed to bring together the substantial resources of the Asia-Pacific nations in pursuit of ‘peaceful development of outer space among Asian-Pacific countries’. With seven inaugural members, including China, Thailand and Pakistan, and invitations to the ‘space technology powerhouses [of] Japan, Russia, Australia and the US’, China had high hopes the forum would become a significant contributor to space technology development and cooperation in the region. Of interest is how wide the definition of Asia-Pacific has been cast, as the forum now includes Peru, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, as well as Indonesia.

APRSAF was formed to ‘enhance the development of each country’s space program and to exchange views towards future cooperation in space activities’. The group has 27 participants, including the US, China, India, Japan, Australia and Indonesia, and includes a series of regional and international organisations, including ASEAN and the European Union (EU). The group tends to focus on the use of space as a vehicle for socio-economic development and differentiates itself from APSCO by both its membership and objectives, and its means of cooperation. Essentially, APSCO is seen as an organisation that promotes technology transfer, while APRSAF supports a series of specific projects, including education.

There are several impediments to space security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, notably longstanding historic mistrust and strategic competition between a number of regional states. That said, if the region could agree to a space security approach, it would become a very powerful international voice. And this is not unrealistic, as the region has shown itself to be pragmatic over recent years, putting practical resolution of several key issues ahead of historic
mistrust. An example is the recent agreement in principle for an East Asian free trade area, demonstrating that the major regional powers can come together where there is collective self-interest.51

This presents an opportunity for Australia to play a leadership role in the development of space security policy in the Asia-Pacific region, where Australia’s leading export partners are China, Japan and South Korea.

**Australia’s middle power diplomacy**

Australia has a long history of shaping and influencing opinion on particular global issues. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and the protection of the Antarctic under the Antarctic Treaty are two good examples. Both suggest Australia could play a similar role in global space security issues. Indeed, as a close ally of the US, a key trading partner and increasingly a friend to China, an important member of the Asia-Pacific region and a respected ‘middle power’ in global diplomacy, Australia is ideally positioned to take an active role in progressing space security policy.

**The European Union**

The primary motivation in examining the EU’s approach to space security is the maturity of its current policy and its leadership in calling for a rules-based code of conduct for space security. In 2008, the EU adopted a ‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’, 52 taking the opportunity to play a leading role in global strategic affairs—immediately after the Chinese ASAT incident—when space security was high on the international security agenda. The EU code is less restraining than the treaty proposed by China and Russia at the Conference for Disarmament in 2002 (and again in 2008), as it is not legally binding and relies on voluntary adherence.53 An extract is as follows:

The purpose of the present code is to enhance the safety, security and predictability of outer space activities for all, recognising that a comprehensive approach to safety and security in outer space should be guided by the following principles:

i. freedom of access to space for all for peaceful purposes,
ii. (preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit, and
iii. due consideration for the legitimate defence interests of states.54

There are several examples where similar codes have been successful, including the 1972 Code of Conduct in the High Seas.55 Over the years, Australia has shown a willingness to participate actively in the development and honouring of such codes, as well as some latent interest in a ‘rules-based’ international community.56 In the space domain, a code of conduct would begin the process of providing behavioural regulation in space. This may or may not lead to more formal arrangements, such as treaties. But it would codify global behavioural expectations.
Domestic considerations

The argument for a ‘National Space Agency’

Australia has a decentralised approach to space, with multiple entities in the Department of Defence, the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science and Research, CSIRO, the Australian Communications and Media Authority, the Bureau of Meteorology, the Department of Climate Change and several other government departments. These tend to develop their own policy within their own ‘stovepipes’, with very few national-level or cross-portfolio investments. This is both inefficient and confusing for other nations and organisations trying to reach into the Australian space community. As a result, Australia is missing opportunities to engage in the global space security debate and to expand its space enterprise.

Of the six recommendations in the ‘Lost in Space’ report, five were focused on the need to establish a national space agency.57 The arguments revolve around efficiency, developing and maintaining a cohesive national approach to space development, and providing an informed and appropriate government-level point-of-contact for external space contacts. The Canadian Space Agency is referred to in the report because Canada is ‘arguably the most similar country to Australia’.58 It was established in 1989 and now includes a number of facilities, 575 permanent staff and some 100 rotating positions for students.59 It is very active in global space activities and has well-established relationships with most of the world’s significant space agencies.60

This paper agrees that Australia needs a national space agency. Under the current Australian Government departmental organisation, the obvious department to provide the necessary whole-of-government vision and perspective is the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). Within PM&C, there is an existing high-level National Security Adviser, with a growing span of influence over whole-of-government security issues. This would appear to be a logical place initially to establish a body that could grow into an Australian Space Agency (ASA). The level of statutory authority, control, staffing and budgeting would need to be subject to detailed study, as would the practicalities of relocating the existing space entities from their current departments into the ASA.

Economic considerations

Investment in space security should be seen as an essential and sensible national security cost, much like maintaining maritime or air surveillance capabilities, or maintaining alliances and regional relationships. While it is relatively easy to identify costs associated with developing space security capabilities, it can be difficult to quantify potential savings, that is, how do we cost ‘security’? If space security policy has the desired effect, there would be no hostile incidents in space, which would obviously be of significant economic and national security benefit.

The Canadian Space Agency is funded at approximately CA$375m per year.61 Apart from the security outcomes that would be expected with such a level of investment, investment in space security can also return a measurable economic benefit to industry. For example, by the year 2000, ‘[Canadian] exports in space technologies had become greater than government budgets each year for supporting space activities’.62
Development of an Australian space industry

Australia’s space industry is characterised by a series of highly-specialised companies producing technology, components and applications that generally support other nations’ space activities.63 These ‘niche’ capabilities are well-respected around the world but, in reality, even as a combined grouping they employ very few people and do not represent a significant industry sector in Australia. It is difficult to make an argument that supports Australia trying to build a space industry to compete with the established overseas producers, launchers or operators of satellites. This would require substantial Government seed investment and, in reality, it is unlikely that Australia would be able to create and then sustain a serious competitive market.

What Australian industry can do better is identify global opportunities and priorities as a sector, and focus its investment on these opportunities. With the aid of its space agency, Canadian industry has done just that and has been very successful.64 To do the same, Australian industry needs a clear understanding of what Australia’s priorities—and, perhaps more importantly, its realistic opportunities—are for space and a roadmap that identifies where Australia is likely to invest in the coming years. If space security is to be a national priority for Australia, then Australian industry should be encouraged to become involved in programs that support Australia’s space security endeavours. Australian industry needs some degree of certainty before it invests in space. The development of policy should provide that certainty.

National space education

Australia has a pressing need to educate a future space workforce. Such a workforce would need to include operators, technicians, engineers, scientists and, importantly, policy makers. Australia has historically been able to train operators, technical and scientific staff to work at sites in Woomera, Pine Gap and the various defence and scientific sites around Australia and in the US.

However, even though training and education opportunities still exist, there are few perceived career opportunities in the space industry in Australia. As a result, it is difficult to attract new students and retain graduates in Australia, particularly outside the defence area.65 Australia needs to attract engineers, technicians and scientists into key space technology areas, such as signal processing, space-focused physics, systems engineering, and network design and management. One of the benefits of introducing an ASA is the opportunity it would provide to focus on building both a sustainable national education effort and industry opportunities that would offer interesting and rewarding employment for space graduates.

Apart from professional space training, Australian executives, managers and public officials—and the general public for that matter—are largely unaware of the dependence Australia has on space. Again, the formation of an ASA would enable a targeted and coordinated education program to be initiated across all domains and disciplines within the Australian community.
An Australian space security policy proposal

Australia must decide what it seeks to secure with regards to space, before it develops policy and implementation strategies. The following vision statement is proposed for Australia’s space security policy:

Australia’s space security policy seeks to ensure that Australia has assured and secure access to space-based services, irrespective of the owner or provider of those services, which support all forms of national endeavour and which operate in space free from the threat of interference, damage or destruction.

The vision statement is simple yet comprehensive and would be suitable for the next iteration of the National Security Statement. In implementing that vision, it is suggested Australia should pursue its space security policy through three key strategies:

• **Strategy 1.** By increasing its investment over the short to medium term in the development of space surveillance infrastructure, technical and operational expertise, and information sharing with the US, Australia would raise its profile and contribution to the international development of a space security framework.

• **Strategy 2.** By engaging diplomatically with the US, China, the EU and our Asia-Pacific partners, Australia would investigate the applicability of a code of conduct for space activities for the Asia-Pacific region.

• **Strategy 3.** By the creation of the Australian Space Agency, Australia’s would advance its interests in space, in particular in space security, and provide a single centre of space expertise in Australia, linking investment and existing programs with the national space security policy and the broader national strategic agenda.

Conclusion

Australia is increasingly dependent on space-based systems for its economic, security, environmental, cultural and social interests, and yet the space environment is becoming increasingly vulnerable. While many nations are publicly debating and championing various space security options, Australia has no space security policy and to date has shown little interest in the global debate. This should change if Australia is serious about securing its space-based national endeavours.

Australia’s space policy must be developed within the US alliance framework. It must also recognise China’s strategic space aspirations and, crucially, the importance of the relationship between China and the US in future space security. It should also be cognisant of the dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the increasing interest in that region of space and space security.

The space security policy proposed in this paper is developed around the broad approach of championing a code of conduct in the Asia-Pacific region and bringing together the US and China in space security policy. It provides investment, predominantly in the space surveillance area, and seeks ultimately to bring together Australia’s national space endeavours under a single policy and a single statutory authority—the Australian Space Agency.

*Air Commodore Chris Westwood joined the RAAF in 1982 and, following air defence controller training, was posted to various operational and instructional posts. His executive posts include*
CO 1RSU (1994), CO 3CRU (2001-03) and OC 41WG (2004-08). His staff appointments include Operations Manager AEW&C acquisition project (Project Wedgetail) 1997-2001. He has participated in a number of homeland defence operations, including providing security for the Melbourne Commonwealth Games. During 2007/08, he deployed three times to Afghanistan, heading air worthiness accreditation teams. He commenced as Director General Joint Capability Coordination in January 2010. He has a Graduate Diploma in Management Studies, a Masters of Arts (strategic studies) and an MBA. In 1997, he published 'The Future Is Not What It Used To Be', as part of a Chief of Air Force fellowship.

NOTES
1. This is an abridged version of a paper submitted while attending the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Canberra, in 2009.
16. T. Allard, 'Battle Lines in the Final Frontier', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 April 2008, p. 31 as referenced in The Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 'Lost in Space: setting a new direction for Australia’s space science and industry sector', Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, p.19. In addition to ASATs, which currently target specific space vehicles, non-specific attacks by crude weapons have the potential to deny orbits in space for a very long time by creating chain reactions of debris clouds.
19. A good example of this can be found in the Defence Capability Plan. More and more equipment is being introduced into service with the ADF that is dependent on space capabilities.
21. There are several other methods of attacking in space, including lasers and radio frequency weapons. Discussion of these is beyond the scope of this paper but are well covered in several references in the bibliography, including Ball, ‘Assessing China’s ASAT Program’, pp. 2-3.
23. Chapman, Space: a priority for Australia, p. 3.
34. For coverage of US space policy history, see Moltz, The Politics of Space Security.
41. Since this article was written, the US has issued a revised National Space Policy that includes a change of focus in the US position, particularly around developing international ‘rules of the road’ (especially from an arms control perspective, but also regarding debris mitigation), the commitment by the US to maintaining a leadership position in all respects (rules, technology, industry etc) and its emphasis on international cooperation: see <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf> accessed 10 September 2010.
42. China has achieved much in the space domain over the past decade. China has a comprehensive space infrastructure that includes a space research, development and manufacturing base; a ground support segment; various launch vehicles and satellites; an inhabited space program; and a commercial space industry. See Ashley J. Tellis, ‘China’s Space Capabilities and their Impact on US

49. See APRSAF website.
58. ‘Lost in Space’, p. 68.
65. Biddington, Skin in the Game, p. 61.
66. This statement uses some elements of the definition of space security contained in Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, p. 11 and some from Biddington, Skin in the Game, p. iii.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Hall, Matthew, ‘China’s Use of Space: Growing an Offensive Military Capability and the Implications for Australia’, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, unpublished paper, 2009.


Pakistan-US bilateral relations: a difficult road ahead

Dr Claude Rakisits, Deakin University (and Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College)

Introduction

In the wake of the catastrophic floods in Pakistan from July to September 2010, US relations with Pakistan have once again come to the fore. Because these floods have destroyed so much of the country’s infrastructure—such as roads, bridges, power lines, schools, hospitals and dikes—only the US has the economic clout to be able to contribute significantly to the long-term reconstruction of the country which Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani has estimated will cost about US$45 billion.1

Unfortunately, since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, relations between Pakistan and the US have often been prickly or difficult, certainly never warm and more often simply neglected. However, more importantly, Pakistan has always been overshadowed by neighbouring India, which is much bigger and has always been democratic. The fact that India during the Cold War was a leader of the Non-Alignment Movement and in 1971 even signed a 20-year ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Cooperation’ with the Soviet Union did not seem to put Pakistan in a more favourable light vis-à-vis the US. And, on the whole, it has only been when Pakistan could play a strategic role in support of Washington’s broader international interests that the latter has paid closer attention to the relationship.

The fall-out of these floods, which have hit Pakistan with such devastating destruction, may well be the opportunity for the US and Pakistan to build in a meaningful way a bilateral relationship which has been suffering what US Secretary of State calls a ‘trust deficit’.2 However, as will be examined in this article, there is a lot of baggage that has accumulated since the two countries established diplomatic relations almost 65 years ago. It will take a lot of work on the part of both countries to fix that and move the relationship forward.

It will be argued that while the road to rebuilding this trust will be long and difficult, the US Government has no option but to do all it can to continue working hard on improving the bilateral relationship. It is not only in both countries’ interests to do so but also in the interest of the region, particularly Afghanistan and India, and the wider international community.

1947–2001: a relationship with many lows, few highs

Probably the single most important factor that explains this difficult bilateral relationship is that Pakistan and the US entered the bilateral relationship for different reasons. Pakistan joined the US-led alliance—namely signing in 1954 the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and in 1959 the Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, as well as joining in 1954 the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and one year later the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)—as an insurance policy in its confrontation with India, in the hope that the US would give it military support in case of war with its much larger neighbour.3
Pakistan could be forgiven to have thought this, given that Article 1 of the 1959 agreement stated that the US would protect Pakistan against any aggression without stipulating that the aggression had to be of a communist nature. The US, on the other hand, saw Pakistan as simply another pawn in its Cold War containment policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, these different—and in many ways incompatible—reasons for entering into the relationship led to disappointments down the road.

A number of critical policy decisions by Washington over the next 30 years would imbed Pakistan's negative perception of the US's approach towards Islamabad. The first was Washington's failure to notify Pakistani authorities of the launching from Peshawar of U-2 spy planes flying over the USSR. One of these was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960, causing a major diplomatic incident between Moscow and Islamabad. The next disappointment came during the brief 1962 Indo-Chinese border war, when the US Administration provided weapons to India without prior consultation with Pakistan as had been previously agreed. This decision by the US had a major impact on Pakistan's move away from relying solely on the West for military support. Accordingly, Pakistan began to turn to China as an alternative source of support, particularly in its confrontation with India.

However, an even more painful low in the US-Pakistan relationship came during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, when the US stopped all shipments of military aid to both countries. The US' decision to treat India and Pakistan equally with respect to the termination of military aid was a devastating blow for Pakistan, since it was virtually totally dependent on American weapons for its defence. The Americans justified their failure to meet their treaty obligations by stating that the US view is that the situation is somewhat confused and belligerence is not justified on either side. Needless to say, Washington's failure to support its 'ally' against India caused a great public outcry in Pakistan.

By 1971, when India and Pakistan once again fought each other, this time mainly in East Pakistan, relations between Pakistan and the US had nevertheless improved somewhat. President Nixon had paid an official visit to Pakistan in 1969, the US had asked President General Yahya Khan to act as courier between Washington and Beijing, and the US had lifted the embargo of arms sales to Pakistan in October 1970. However, while the US did send an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal at the height of the war—mainly as a reaction to India’s decision to sign a 'Friendship Treaty' with the USSR—Washington also ceased all shipment of military supplies to Pakistan. This was a move reminiscent of a similar decision taken by the US at the height of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.

For the next few years, relations between the US and Pakistan went into a freeze, especially under the left-leaning government of Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto. Bilateral relations became particularly difficult under Bhutto, not only because he was determined to proceed with a nuclear program but because of his decision to have the French build a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan. This impasse over the nuclear program eventually led the US in April 1971 to cut off economic assistance to Pakistan, except food assistance, as required under the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Interestingly, at about the same time as these US-Pakistan discussions were taking place, the US agreed to sell India—which like Pakistan had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—over 5,000 pounds of uranium to refuel a nuclear power reactor, the only condition being that it return to the US all spent fuel containing the plutonium. According to
Bhutto, it was his unyielding stance on the nuclear issue which caused his eventual political downfall. In his book, *If I Am Assassinated*, which he wrote from his death cell, he accused the Americans of having been the main driving force behind the 1977 coup d’etat led by the Chief of Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq.\(^\text{10}\) Nevertheless, US-Pakistan relations following the military takeover were at their nadir.

However, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, in order to prop up the communist government in Kabul, Pakistan once again became an important player in Washington’s global game. It is important to remember the geopolitical context at that time, notably the fact that the Soviet invasion occurred at about the same time as the ‘loss’ of Iran to Ayatollah Khomeini. Accordingly, the US decided that Pakistan had an important ‘frontline’ role to play in helping the West counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and stopping the USSR from potentially obtaining a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean. Having established the Carter Doctrine, which included among other things that the violation of Pakistan’s integrity would not be tolerated, the US offered Pakistan US$400 million in military aid.\(^\text{11}\) General Zia rejected the offer on the grounds that since this low level of assistance would bring more trouble than benefits, there was no incentive for him to accept.

With hindsight, and from Pakistan’s point of view, General Zia made the right move in rejecting this aid, since President Reagan, who began his term in office less than two months later, took a very different approach to Pakistan and its nuclear program. Instead of cutting off aid, he believed that a much more fruitful means to induce Pakistan to end its nuclear program would be to offer it massive military and economic assistance. The Reagan Administration managed to convince the US Congress to waive the restrictions (Symington Amendment) on military assistance to Pakistan and offer Pakistan a six-year US$3.2 billion military and economic aid package aimed at helping Pakistan deal with increased threats in the region and assisting it with its economic development needs. However, if Pakistan detonated a nuclear device, peaceful or otherwise, the aid would be immediately terminated.

In March 1986, the two countries agreed on a second multi-year (1988-93) US$4 billion economic and security assistance program. According to then Under-Secretary of State, James Buckley, ‘Pakistan was an essential anchor in the entire Southwest Asian region’.\(^\text{12}\) Having thus become a ‘frontline’ state, Pakistan—with massive economic help from the West, the Arab Gulf states and China—gave shelter to some four million Afghan refugees, as well as arming and supporting thousands of Afghan and Muslim mujahideen (‘freedom fighters’), who used Pakistani territory to launch their attacks against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. This strategic partnership with Pakistan turned out to be a successful strategy for the US: the Soviets were unable to defeat the mujahideen and the US had not needed to commit ground troops.

But when the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan lost its strategic value; it was once again forgotten. This was compounded with the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and the liberalisation of India’s economy, making India increasingly more attractive as a strategic partner. Moreover, in October 1990, the US suspended all military assistance and new economic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, which required that the president certify annually that Pakistan ‘does not possess a nuclear explosive device’.\(^\text{13}\)

Bilateral relations with the West hit rock bottom again following the 1998 Pakistani nuclear tests in response to India’s in May 1998. A scheduled visit by President Clinton was postponed and, under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the provision of credits, military
sales, economic assistance and loans to the Pakistani government. Moreover, the overthrow of the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, by the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, in October 1999 triggered an additional layer of sanctions under Section 508 of the Foreign Appropriation Act, which include restrictions on foreign military financing and economic assistance.\textsuperscript{14}

**Post-September 11 and the Bush years**

In the wake of 9/11, Pakistan once again became a ‘frontline’ state, this time in the pursuit of al Qa’ida and Taliban fighters who had fled Afghanistan to seek refuge in the tribal areas of western Pakistan. So while there was a degree of similarity to events in Afghanistan some 20 years earlier, when General Zia was then heading Pakistan and the US had to rely on Pakistan’s support to oust the Soviets, in this case General Musharraf was given very little choice about joining the ‘war on terror’.\textsuperscript{15} Accordingly, the Pakistan Government officially terminated its relationship with the Taliban, which it had nurtured since the early 1990s and had helped in its takeover of power in Afghanistan in 1996.

In return, Washington provided Pakistan over US$11 billion worth of military and economic aid between 2001 and 2008, with the bulk going to security-related assistance.\textsuperscript{16} The US also granted Pakistan ‘major non-NATO ally’ status in 2004. This allowed Pakistan to purchase or receive otherwise restricted US military equipment, such as the sale in 2006 of F-16 aircraft. In the wake of President Bush’s visit to Pakistan in March 2006, during which he and his Pakistani counterpart reaffirmed the importance of the strategic partnership, the US-Pakistan ‘strategic dialogue’ was established in April 2006. While this dialogue was meant to go beyond the narrow focus of defence, its strategic aspects stalled and the focus remained defence-focused.\textsuperscript{17}

In return for this substantial American military aid, Pakistan has captured more than 600 al Qa’ida members who had found refuge in western Pakistan. Unfortunately, while this has been good news for Washington’s objective of capturing and destroying the al Qa’ida network, this cooperation only reveals part of the picture. The reality on the ground is far from being as clear-cut and simple as that. Instead of being a bulwark against these terrorists and becoming a completely reliable strategic partner, Pakistan has become the soft underbelly of the West’s fight against al Qa’ida, the Taliban and other Afghan jihadists.

On the one hand, the Pakistan state—led until 2008 by former Army Chief of Staff General Musharraf—has been assisting the US-led coalition against the terrorists, including losing close to 2000 military personnel in the process of hunting down these fighters in the tribal areas. But, on the other hand, elements of its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Army’s all powerful intelligence service, have continued to provide back-channel support to the Taliban and other Afghan groups hiding in Pakistan, even after Pakistan officially and publicly changed its policy vis-à-vis the Taliban.\textsuperscript{18} A recent study by the London School of Economics has reaffirmed the suspicion most Western analysts have had about Pakistan: the Army is willing to go after al Qa’ida fighters (who are mainly non-Pakhtun) but the ISI continues to support the Taliban (mainly Pakhtun) and other jihadist groups which could potentially be helpful to Pakistan once NATO and the US have left Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{19} Needless to say, this contradictory and duplicitous behaviour on the part of Pakistan has created tension between it and Western countries, including Australia, which have troop commitments in Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, there is little the US and its allies can realistically do about this double game being played by some powerful and influential actors in Pakistan without weakening further the already fragile pro-West government of President Zardari. The Pakistan Government is particularly weak for a number of reasons, notably because of the tension between the different state institutions, especially the presidency, parliament, the judiciary and the military, the rivalry between Islamabad and the provinces, especially with the Punjab which is headed by the brother of the leader of the federal opposition, but most importantly because of a four-year old and growing insurgency led by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).²⁰

The TTP’s ‘home’ base is the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of north western Pakistan where the Afghan Taliban and al Qa’ida have found refuge. However, TTP militants have spread out of FATA and are increasingly joining up with Punjab-based militants and al Qa’ida terrorists. The TTP militants and their fellow ideological travellers, whose aim is to establish a Sharia-based state, have—as a result of their terrorist activities—killed throughout the country an estimated 10,000 people in the last four years.²¹ The Army’s counter-insurgency operations against the TTP in FATA, many with only mixed success, have tied down some 120,000 security forces.²²

Notwithstanding a genuinely warm personal relationship between President Bush and President Musharraf, the bilateral relationship suffered another low with Washington’s decision to upgrade its relationship with India, including signing a US-India nuclear deal in 2006. In July 2007, the two countries completed negotiations on the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, also known as the ‘123 agreement’. This agreement will govern civil nuclear trade between the two countries and open the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other’s civil nuclear energy sector. And to make matters worse, the Bush Administration publicly declared that it wanted to help India become a ‘world power’.²³

The Obama Administration and ‘Af-Pak’

With the arrival of the Obama Administration in 2009, Washington decided that if there was going to be a satisfactory resolution to the war in Afghanistan, it would be essential to implement a regional approach to the conflict. Originally, the Americans had envisaged that in addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan, India would be included in this new approach. However, as a result of strong opposition from New Delhi, which probably feared that the issue of Kashmir would eventually be put on the table, India was dropped from the equation, leaving the grouping as ‘Af-Pak’.

While there was still some merit in considering these two countries together when formulating policies regarding Afghanistan, particularly given that the border between the two countries—the Durand Line—is effectively non-existent, the Pakistanis were irritated with that outcome. As far as Islamabad was concerned, the creation of ‘Af-Pak’ was not only culturally insensitive—for it implied that Afghanistan and Pakistan were the same and could be lumped in together—but it also suggested, incorrectly according to the Pakistanis, that Pakistan was part of the problem and, presumably, part of the solution. But even more irksome to the Pakistani leaders was that this ‘Af-Pak’ policy reminded them, once again, that the Americans only viewed Pakistan as a means to achieve some larger goal.²⁴ Equally annoying to Islamabad was India’s ability to convince the Americans to drop it from the regional equation. Thus, the Pakistanis felt that yet again India’s concerns superseded Pakistan’s interests.
In order to more easily get the Pakistanis to come on board of Washington’s new policy towards the region, the Obama Administration convinced Congress to pass in October 2009 the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) legislation, a US$7.5 billion economic assistance program to be disbursed over five years. This was above and beyond the existing US$3 billion in military and economic aid already promised for Pakistan in 2005 over five years.25

In addition to that, Congress passed the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act in 2009 which allocated some US$1.5 billion in non-military aid, with special emphasis on education. However, both aid packages had significant punitive measures attached, in an attempt to ensure greater transparency in the spending of the funds and to minimise waste. There is also a requirement that President Obama be able to certify that Pakistan is making progress on combating terrorist groups and limiting nuclear proliferation opportunities.26 These oversight measures were not welcomed in Pakistan, particularly by the army generals who felt that this was too much interference in the domestic affairs of the country. While that may have been so, Pakistan had little choice but to accept this very substantial military and economic assistance.27

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made official trips to Pakistan in October 2009 and July 2010 not only to ‘sell’ this new multi-billion military and economic aid package but also to reinvigorate the bilateral relationship. Admitting on several occasions that the US had let Pakistan down in the past, Clinton went to great lengths publicly to convince sceptical Pakistanis, principally non-officials, that this time the bilateral relationship was going to be more meaningful and that the US would not walk away from Pakistan again.28 She stressed that the US wanted to help Pakistan in its own right, not simply because it could potentially help with America’s prosecution of the war in neighbouring Afghanistan. And although her second trip to Pakistan went much better than the one in 2009, it was far from certain that Secretary Clinton had convinced her hosts of the sincerity of America’s aims.

Still, at the October meeting, the two countries agreed to upgrade the US-Pakistan ‘strategic dialogue’ to ministerial level in order to give it new lease of life and broaden the issues beyond defence matters. The first ministerial level meeting was held in Washington in March 2010 and, in addition to defence and security issues, the delegations discussed agriculture, economic development and finance, social issues, energy, water and communications. The most recent meeting was in July 2010 when Clinton visited Pakistan. She took the opportunity to announce several development projects, such as hydroelectric dams, municipal water supply overhauls and hospital refurbishing.

However, much of this potential goodwill and the new ‘beginning’ was somewhat diluted in May 2010 with the release of President Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS), which stated inter alia that:

… al Qaeda’s core in Pakistan remains the most dangerous component of the larger network … [and] that Afghanistan and Pakistan [are] the epicenter of the violent extremism practised by al Qaeda…. Wherever al Qaeda or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven … we will meet them with growing pressure.29

In practical terms, this means that by focusing in the NSS on the destruction of the al Qaeda network, the US will continue to use drone strikes in Pakistan against al Qaeda and its affiliates, the Afghan Taliban, as it has for the last six years. It is interesting to note, in that regard, that the number of strikes under Obama have gone up very significantly since President Bush left office.30 Unfortunately, the political fall-out of these drone attacks is, on the whole, more
negative than positive. The one positive consequence for Pakistan is that a number of TTP commanders, including some of its top leaders, have been eliminated. However, the negative fall-out is the number of civilians who have been killed as well. While official figures of ‘collateral damage’ are very low, these deaths nevertheless fuel an already very high level of anti-Americanism among Pakistanis of all socio-economic classes.

These drone attacks would most probably be the single most important factor contributing to this negative feeling towards Washington. According to a survey conducted in Pakistan in May 2009, 82 per cent of respondents believed that US drone attacks against TTP militant camps were not justified, while 79 per cent were opposed to drone attacks against Afghan Taliban camps in Pakistan. Similar results came from a poll in 2010 in which it was suggested that only 16 per cent of Pakistanis had a favourable view of the US, compared to 27 per cent in 2006. Washington’s attempt to improve its image in Pakistan was not made any easier when the Obama Administration declared two days after the NSS was released that it was reviewing options for a unilateral strike in Pakistan if a successful attack on American soil were traced back to FATA.

These strong anti-American sentiments are not good news for an already weak Pakistan Government, which is perceived by most as being too pro-Western and simply doing what Washington tells it to do. The perception is compounded with the repeated demands from the Obama Administration that the Pakistan Army does more to hunt down the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters hiding in FATA. Following a number of failed peace agreements with Pakistani militants in FATA in 2005, 2006 and 2007, and in the Swat Valley in 2009—principally as a result of the militants reneging on the conditions of the peace accords—the Pakistani security forces conducted military operations in Swat, South Waziristan and other parts of the tribal areas over many months.

Unfortunately, these operations came at a very heavy political price for the Pakistan Government. As the Pakistan Army is trained and equipped for conventional warfare rather than counter-insurgency operations, its soldiers have inappropriately used very heavy-handed tactics, such as heavy shelling and bombardments often in semi-urban and urban areas, causing many civilians deaths and much property damage. The Swat operation alone caused the biggest sudden movement of civilians in the world since the Rwandan genocide of 1994. This humanitarian disaster caused great economic hardship for the Pakistan Government.

Even before the floods hit Pakistan in July, Washington had decided to stop asking the Pakistan Army to go into North Waziristan in FATA and flush out the Haqqani network, probably the most ruthless and effective Afghan force associated with the Taliban. Islamabad had repeatedly refused to go after the Haqqani network for two important reasons: it has helped the Pakistan Government by not supporting the TTP’s anti-Pakistan state agenda; and, second, it wants to keep its options open in case the Haqqani network has a role to play in post-NATO Afghanistan.

Accordingly, while on the one hand moving against the Haqqani network could potentially help the Americans in Afghanistan, on the other hand, it could indirectly be beneficial to the TTP and, ultimately, weaken further the Pakistani state, a development the Americans would not wish to see happen. In any case, the Americans already had doubts as to whether the Pakistan Army had the capability to take on the Haqqani network and secure the area permanently. And this was before the floods struck. With thousands of troops likely to be tied down assisting with the re-building of the country, it is obvious the army would not be in a state to go credibly into North Waziristan.
The way ahead

US-Pakistan relations are at a major crossroad. But, paradoxically, the recent floods provide an opportunity to put the bilateral relationship on a firmer footing. It is also an opportunity to assist Pakistan significantly with its long-term economic development. Building on the generous aid package the Obama Administration had already offered Pakistan, the US—with the biggest economy in the world—must take the lead and generously come to Pakistan’s help in the long-term reconstruction of the country.

Using the mechanism of ‘the Friends of Democratic Pakistan’, the US must also urge other countries to agree to the creation of a very substantial ‘Marshall Plan’ for the comprehensive rebuilding of the country. And while it will be difficult to convince other countries to contribute generously, because of the still fragile state of the world economy and the negative image Pakistan has of being perceived as the epicentre of terrorism, it will be critical not to abandon Pakistan in these very difficult times. It would be in no-one’s interest to see nuclear-armed Pakistan so weakened economically that it is unable to fight effectively the growing jihadist insurgency with which it is now confronted.

However, in return for the international community’s generous help, led by the US, Islamabad would have to abandon its short-sighted policy of supporting ‘good’ terrorists who might be considered useful in the long-term in the advancement of Pakistan’s national interests, whether in post-NATO Afghanistan or in Kashmir. As we have seen recently, some of these ‘good’ terrorists have turned against their former controllers. But more importantly, Pakistan’s continued support for some terrorists would automatically end KLB-related economic assistance, as stipulated in the act. So this is a unique opportunity for Pakistan and the US to turn the page and build a bilateral relationship which will be beneficial to the long-term interests of both nations and the international community.

Dr Claude Rakisits is Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the School of International and Political Studies at Deakin University, Melbourne. He is also the Academic Adviser and MA (Strategic Studies) program coordinator at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College, Canberra. He has researched, lectured and commented on Pakistan issues for almost 30 years.
NOTES

2. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarks with Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi following the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Islamabad, Pakistan, 19 July 2010.
6. Choudhry, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p.120.
14. US State Department.
25. US State Department.


31. ‘Out of a total of 853 Taliban and al Qa’ida fighters killed over the last six years, only 53 civilians have been killed. See Roggio, ‘Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010’.


33. As cited in Khadija Khosa, ‘Anti-Americanism in Pakistan’, Newsbrief, RUSI, July 2010, Vol. 30. No. 4, p. 14. These results are also confirmed with my own on anecdotal evidence collected over several trips to Pakistan and communications with politicians, journalists, academics and diplomats in the last three years. It is important to remember that these strong anti-American feelings are nothing new in Pakistan. For example, a mob burned the American embassy in Islamabad in November 1979 when false rumours circulated that the US was involved in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca.


37. A grouping of countries, which includes Australia, established in 2009 aimed at assisting Pakistan with the consolidation of democracy.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY


The Difficulties in Predicting Future Warfare

Ian Wallace

Aviation is fine as a sport. But as an instrument of war, it is worthless.
[French] General Ferdinand Foch, March 1913

I have a mathematical certainty that the future will confirm my assertion that aerial warfare will be the most important element in future wars.
[Italian] General Giulio Douhet, 1921

Introduction

When we take a look at past predictions regarding the shape of future warfare, one fact immediately jumps to the fore: how inaccurate such presages have usually been. At first glance, this seems somewhat surprising, as a vital part of the strategic commander’s role is surely the planning of where, why, when and how tomorrow’s battles will be fought. Yet it is also a common maxim that generals plan to fight their last war.

As an example, take the contradictory quotes above—each made by senior military commanders within ten years of the other. Difficulties in predicting the future stem from several issues. These include the way our brains work, the nature of the world we live in and the character of warfare itself. All these factors act in concert seemingly to imply that the only reliable prediction we can make about tomorrow’s warfare is that any predictions are more than likely to be wrong! A closer examination reveals that military forecasting is beset by a myriad of difficulties. Such examination also reveals why even inaccurate predictions are still important and how, almost paradoxically, a simple acknowledgment and awareness of such factors can lead towards better forecasts.

Human nature: past performance does not guarantee future returns

War is a human activity, comprised of political, social and cultural elements. As such, it has always been subject to problems of human perception. If you have ever read the detail of an investment statement, you will likely have come across the words ‘past performance does not guarantee future returns’. Surprisingly, despite the absolute unlikelihood of this statement ever not being true, words such as these are legally required on most product disclosure statements. This serves to illustrate how we need protection from the limitations of our own minds—our reasoning tends to suffer from linearity and a confined viewpoint. We naturally tend to place events within a straight-line narrative (or trend) and then project that trend’s continuance into the future.

Alternatively or worse, we also often only project a single trend forwards, ignoring the effect of other factors, while some trends may prove self-negating, as recognition of such trends spurs the development of countervailing trends. For example, the dominance of nuclear weaponry in the 1950s led to an American government seemingly uninterested in developing conventional weapons. Such thinking, however, ignored the possibility that traditional, non-
nuclear warfare would continue to dominate because of an extreme reluctance to use nuclear weapons and the risk of ‘mutually-assured destruction’. This resulted, at least in part, in an American military force under-prepared for conventional warfare in Korea in the early 1950s, an effect which arguably continued into Vietnam.

A further example has been the development of ‘smart-bombs’, which today play such a key role in modern campaigning. Although their development had begun during World War 2, it would not be until the late 1960s that their development would come back into favour—what need for accuracy when you had the atomic bomb?5 Such projections are reinforced by the brain’s tendency to form schemata of the real world and then foresee events as unfolding only within that paradigm—we assume that our personal situation is universally relevant.5 During the Vietnam War, for example, the US believed the North was fighting to spread global communism. In reality, the North Vietnamese had little interest in ideology and believed they were fighting for their very existence—two different mind-sets leading to two very different levels of commitment.

The nature of reality: complexity, non-linearity and chance

So our predictions of the future are limited by our brain’s tendency to project in a straight line and to over-simplify reality. Yet contrarily, the environment we exist in is complex, non-linear and subject to chance. We can perhaps imagine future warfare as evolving from interactions between various strands, drawn from themes such as politics, society, culture, technology and psychology (and, from a military perspective, we might add doctrine and organisation).6 Each strand impacts on the others, changing effects and relationships which, in turn, create different effects, forcing further changes downstream. Even simple changes can therefore give rise, especially over time, to incredibly complex and unforeseen effects.7

Complexity means that although we may know the behaviour of various sub-parts within a system, this information does not necessarily translate into knowledge of how the system as a whole will behave. So, for example, while it seems reasonable to take a technological strand and foresee an increasing shift over future decades toward a more exclusive use by the military of unmanned fighter aircraft, the complexity generated by other strands makes such straightforward projection unlikely. In 2006, for example, US development of the X-45 unmanned fighter was cancelled; this was partly politically motivated (because the X-45 was seen as a direct competitor to the F-22 manned-fighter) and partly cultural, driven by fears within the US Air Force over the future of ‘real’ pilots in an ‘unmanned’ air force.8

Non-linearity can be defined as a disproportionate relationship between cause and effect. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which led on to the outbreak of war in 1914, is a prime example. Non-linearity is particularly relevant today, as much of the change we are experiencing is exponential in nature, especially in the field of technology. Exponential change is rapid and can be unexpected, creating paradigm shifts which completely remove our sure-footing about the future.9

Such a paradigm shift could occur with the military implementation of robots in warfare. Driven by the rapidly-decreasing size and cost of electronics—in conjunction with increasing processing power, capacity and bandwidth—the growing effectiveness of robots opens a vast range of future possibilities, along with ethical and legal questions about the very nature of war.10 We also must not forget the effects of ‘chance’. In 1940, as in 1914, Germany planned its
main attack into Western Europe through Belgium. But the freak loss of a suitcase containing
German plans instigated a change in focus to an attack through the Ardennes—a plan which
surprised the Allies, made far better use of Germany’s superior ability in manoeuvre warfare
and, of course, vastly changed the course of the war.\textsuperscript{13}

The nature of warfare: surprise, stress and adaptation

The very nature of warfare reinforces its own unpredictability. Surprise is a certainty; its
importance in increasing combat power is well-documented in military circles and its
achievement can have a significant influence over the outcome of engagements.\textsuperscript{14} Surprise
can provide effects quite disproportionate to the energy expended and adversaries will often
ignore the easiest or most logical actions in order to achieve it. Whether obtained largely
by intention, as epitomised at Troy by the Greeks with their wooden horse, or chiefly by
chance, as with the German offensive through the Ardennes in 1940, surprise in military terms
translates to catching an opponent unprepared—a failure of prediction.

The stresses, both psychological and physical, created by the violence, fear and destruction that
characterise war can make decisions and actions prone to both error and illogical reasoning.\textsuperscript{15}
Prior to World War 2, many proponents of aerial bombing predicted it held the power to win
wars alone, through the demoralisation of civilian populations. Yet, in practice, the bombing
of civilians generated almost exactly the opposite effect.

Armed forces will also tend to adjust their tactics and strategies to maximise their own
advantages while minimising their opponents. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the benefits
that information technology provided led a trend towards highly-networked ground forces
supported by high-precision air power.\textsuperscript{16} Western confidence in the superiority of such a force
initially seemed justified by results in Afghanistan and Iraq. Little consideration, however, was
given to predicting how an enemy would adjust to fight such an enabled foe. Opposing forces
turned away from conventional tactics and moved instead to the use of irregular warfare. This
minimised Western advantages and highlighted deficiencies in counter-insurgency training
and equipment.\textsuperscript{17}

‘Black swans’ or what we don’t know we don’t know

The complexities of the human mind, reality and warfare combine to make the accurate
prediction of future trends very difficult. It is also an axiom that we can never know completely
the true state of any situation we are faced with. As Nassim Taleb puts it in his book, The
Black Swan, we can break down what we know into ‘known-knowns, known-unknowns and
unknown-unknowns’; the latter of these Taleb terms ‘Black Swans’ and they tend to have far-
reaching effects.\textsuperscript{18}

Consider American strategy prior to 7 December 1941. The US knew that Japan had developed
a strong, capable naval force. They also knew they could never be completely confident of
the disposition of Japanese naval forces but made what US planners no doubt considered
to be reasonable assumptions about likely Japanese strategy towards the US. What they did
not know that they did not know (and therefore were completely unprepared for) was that
Japan was technologically able (and strategically willing) to use its naval forces in an attack on
Pearl Harbor.
One method used historically at the tactical/operational level to cope with ‘black swans’ is the use of reserve forces. Yet at the strategic level, where longer-term planning should occur, this concept seems often to be absent, particularly if political priorities pare back military budgets, as happened with British military preparedness in the years prior to World War 2. Maintaining diversity within military forces is also paramount. Consider American military forces in Iraq this century. Although well-equipped with high-end military technology, ground forces have suffered from deficiencies in more basic equipment, such as assault rifles, ammunition and bullet-proof vests—a deficiency caused by un-preparedness to fight a ‘low-tech’ war (and of course exacerbated by the conflict continuing far longer than strategists predicted).

Predictions can be very difficult

The Danish physicist Niels Bohr is attributed with the tongue-in-cheek saying that ‘predictions can be very difficult, especially about the future’. But difficult does not mean impossible and by no means should prediction be eschewed. Without basic forecasts, strategic planners cannot formulate force composition and doctrinal changes, nor instigate equipment life-cycles. The value of prediction does not lie solely in being right. But writing of future trends will expose them to critical examination and impose discipline on the predictive process, providing a framework for making decisions, comparing alternatives and reassessing the impact of changing variables. The more scenarios we envisage and prepare for, the less potential weakness there becomes for an enemy to exploit.

The flip-side of this, however, is that predictions must avoid over-generalisation—to paraphrase a famous saying, ‘defending everywhere means defending nowhere’. In this vein, consider the current future trend of ‘hybrid warfare’, where adversaries combine both conventional and irregular tactics, taking ‘the most lethal and innovative features of each mode of fighting and adapt(jing) those for the modern battlefield to produce enhanced lethality and survivability’. The 2003 war in Iraq is given as a good example of this ‘new’ sort of warfare. However, the same description seems applicable to a variety of other wars across history, including the Vietnam War, so ‘hybrid war’ may be a too-encompassing term to hold much value for predicting future military requirements.

Making better predictions

In 2000, the author of Future War foresaw Western military action being driven by public demand for intervention in Third World nations. But this ‘future trend’ simply predicted that the previous decade's wars, in countries like Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia, would continue. By 2001, America had suffered 9/11 (a ‘black swan’), resulting in some quite radical shifts in strategic thinking. This lack of deeper thought seems set to continue. Take, for example, the future trend known as ‘fifth-generation warfare’ (5GW), the new terminology for irregular warfare carried out by non-state actors. This seems merely a reflection of current military situations already existing in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than any prediction of what warfare might look like in another decade or so.
In order to more accurately predict future trends, we need to ask such questions as:

• How can we move beyond the constraints of our own minds, to avoid the predictive mindset that what we have now will continue tomorrow?

• How could a wild-card disrupt the current paradigm and fundamentally exacerbate the threat environment?

• How could an enemy change its methods to defeat a coalition force that has adapted to 5GW?

**Conclusion**

The major trend in future warfare will continue to be its unpredictability. Limitations in our thinking are amplified by the effects of ‘unknown unknowns’, complexity, chance, stress, surprise and change. Yet, when considering future trends in warfare, we seem more often than not to ignore the influence of these factors and only forecast a continuation of the status quo, perhaps with minor ‘tweaking’. But if we apply knowledge of how these known limitations affect forecasting, we stand a better chance of devising more relevant future trends.

Simultaneously, we must also recognise that much about the future will always remain unpredictable. As Gray eloquently puts it ‘the pressing challenge is … to anticipate the future as best we are able in ways that reduce—and hopefully minimise—the risk of committing errors in prediction that are likely to have catastrophic consequences’. The role of prediction is too important to be left to poor reasoning. And without accurate trend forecasting, commanders will stumble blindly, preparing only to fight their last war.

Ian Wallace spent the first few years of his working life in the New Zealand Army as an armoured crewman. He later became involved in the aviation industry, both as a pilot and air traffic controller. He has also spent several years involved in IT projects. Following a life-long interest in military history, he is currently completing an extramural degree in Defence Studies with Massey University.
NOTES

8. These examples derive from Fruhling, *Uncertainty, Forecasting and the Difficulty of Strategy*, p. 20.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


ADF Joint Entry Operations: why conventional airborne forces are fundamental

Major G.J.S. Cornelia, CSM, Australian Army

Introduction

The Australian Government and senior defence leadership have elaborated in recent months on their commitment to ‘a more muscular, more agile and harder hitting ADF to hedge against the security environment that Australia now faces’. This includes a capacity for the nascent concept of ‘joint entry operations’. Concurrently, it is understood the operational and tactical level headquarters of Army may be considering deleting the conventional airborne force, the Airborne Combat Team (ACT), from the ADF’s order of battle.

Arguably, any such decision would be based on an argument that lacks subject-matter expertise and has avoided any broad debate on the strategic implications. The removal of this unique force element would be strategically short-sighted given that Force 2030 aims to be ‘a truly joint force which can excel on joint operations and make meaningful contributions to coalition operations.’ The aim of this article is to articulate why an ADF joint force, committed to combat success across the spectrum of conflict, should include a conventional airborne component through a standing, mass-drop parachute capable force that is combat ready and combat capable.

The enduring force structure lesson for entry operations is the need to maintain strategically-balanced forces ‘whose inherent advantages lie in their flexibility to cope with a variety of crises, rather than in their optimal performance in any one conflict.’ The conventional airborne force possesses the inherent characteristics to enhance significantly the strategic mobility, offensive action, flexibility and surprise of current and future joint entry operations and provide the means to do so without the re-tasking of Special Forces force elements— which, in the event of an ADF forced entry operation, will almost certainly be required for other tasks. The maintenance of a conventional airborne force maximises the available ADF land forces for entry prior to, or alongside, the infinite ADF maritime and embarked rotary-wing capabilities that exist now and will exist in the future.

Why did we get a conventional airborne force in the first place?

The current conventional airborne force is a legacy of a quarter of a century of ‘blood, sweat and tears’, mostly from within the Army’s 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) and the RAAF’s Air Lift Group, and with varying levels of senior leadership support over the years. Initially, a Parachute Battalion Group (PBG), based on 3 RAR, but with a variety of combat enablers from across the ADF including ‘A’ Field Battery and a Parachute Surgical Team, was created in the 1980s.

The genesis of the current Australian conventional airborne force was in 1980, when it was realised that there ‘could be a number of contingencies where we might need to use an airborne force, the most likely being to secure an airfield through which to deploy the ODF’. In 1988, the CDF issued a directive which for the first time formalised the ADF requirement
for the parachute capability to be able to ‘seize and secure a point of entry into a land area of operations; support responses to offshore contingencies, including evacuation operations and the restoration of law and order; provide a short-notice ready reaction capability; and augment the Ready Deployment Force’. 9

From 2006, this PBG was scaled back to a task-organised force element known as the ACT. However, the rationale behind its initial conception remains unchanged. Indeed, Australia’s strategic circumstances make a conventional airborne force more relevant now than ever, given the strategic and operational realities that have prompted the responses of the ‘entry from air and sea concept’ (developed in the early 2000s but now reaching obsolescence) and its replacement, the embryonic ‘joint entry operations’ concept being developed at Headquarters 1st Division and other headquarters.

**What is the Airborne Combat Team?**

At present, the Forces Command conventional airborne force is capable of forcing entry and securing a point of disembarkation, with support from Air Command and Special Operations Command through provision of airlift, escort and offensive air support and advance force operations respectively. This strategic capability is operationally supported by robust joint doctrine, namely ‘ADDP 3.9 Airborne Operations’ and ‘ADFP 3.9.1 Airborne Operations Procedures’, published in 2004 and being reviewed at the time of writing. The ground element of the conventional airborne force is currently based on the ACT, which is almost entirely generated by 3 RAR and other 3rd Brigade units.

The ACT is a task-organised, self-sufficient light infantry combat team capable of rapid long-range deployment. It includes integral ‘pathfinder’/drop zone reception force elements, capable of insertion in small groups under a steerable canopy, and is usually over 250 men in strength in its first wave. The ACT has largely remediated deficiencies identified during 2009 and is operationally capable with theatre communications, medical, engineer and offensive support assets commensurate with its size and likely tasks. The regeneration of the conventional airborne force, over the period 2009-10, again demonstrates ‘what a unit can do by driving a concept from below rather than waiting for the uncertainty above to clear’. 11

**A force structure lesson from the past**

Historian Laurence Freedman argued that wars ‘have a habit of occurring at a time and a place other than those expected in formal policy assessments or scenarios’. 12 Acceptance of this was not apparent in British force-planning decisions prior to the 1982 Falklands conflict. This campaign demonstrated what could be a strategically-relevant example for ADF force structure planning. At the brink of war in 1982, the British were well advanced in preparations to divest the very capabilities that made possible a joint entry onto the Falkland Islands—it’s two short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft carriers and two Landing Platform Docks. This was due to cuts planned as part of a 1981 review by Defence Secretary John Nott. The Minister of State for the Royal Navy was dismissed after confronting Nott over the planned cuts which, focusing on Britain’s contribution to the NATO central front, included sale of the carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible, and the assault ships HMS Intrepid and Fearless.

Another applicable lesson from the Falklands is the strategic utility of a large merchant fleet. Without the 9000 personnel, 100,000 tons of freight and 95 aircraft carried by 45 merchant
vessels to the South Atlantic, the British could not have lodged and supported the force required to recapture the Islands. If the military necessity of establishing a critical mass of force on entry is taken as an essential condition of joint entry operations, the British example of the shipping required to lodge two brigades—considered against the paucity of Australia’s maritime capacity—reinforces the need for air-delivered troops and logistics. The reach of ADF airborne forces, from Australian bases, across the entire littoral zone in which the 2009 Defence White Paper envisages projecting military force, makes it even more logical to maximise the forces available for insertion by air—and by extension parachute—means.

A loss of ADF flexibility in exploiting the air flank?

Any consideration of removing the ACT from the ADF’s force structure would have an immediate and detrimental opportunity cost for Joint Task Force (JTF) planning to conduct a forced entry operation by air and sea. And it would reduce the airborne component to Special Forces advance force operations only, thereby reducing options for the JTF Commander and Chief Joint Operations Command. The opportunity cost is that Special Forces are not likely to be able to commit fully to advance force operations if they are required to create the effects normally achieved by the ACT in its support to entry operations.

A decision to limit joint entry operations to those with little capacity for advance force operations and an airborne ‘air point of disembarkation’ (APOD) seizure—or those with significant capacity for advance force operations and none for APOD seizure in support of an embarked task force—makes as little sense as the earlier British loss of interest in expeditionary naval capabilities. The task of securing a point of entry for follow-on forces—the ‘bread and butter’ of any conventional airborne force—is one Special Forces are not currently trained, structured or ‘culturally predisposed’ to perform. It is also an essential capability if ADF joint entry operations are to have the optimal chance of success in the face of the ‘friction, danger, uncertainty and chance’ of war.14

The utility of a conventional airborne force is demonstrable across the spectrum of conflict, as enshrined in current ADF airborne operations doctrine. From non-combatant evacuation operations and stability operations (with or without supporting maritime forces) to joint entry operations to enable offensive action on off-shore territory, conventional airborne forces have a key role and are able to enhance other components of the force through the basis of combined arms theory in that they are complementary to one another and, when combined, pose a dilemma for the enemy.

Each particular component of the entry force—the airborne ground force, amphibious surface assault, close air support, air lift assets or Special Forces advance force elements—will maximise ADF ability to cover the vulnerability of one part of the force with the strength of another. The combination of maritime, land and air assets in the ADF also presents a dilemma for an enemy by triggering actions to protect against one threat which in turn increase their vulnerability to another.15

Airborne operations exploit an avenue of approach—the air flank—and allow vertical envelopment of an enemy. It is possible that the very threat of an airborne force being employed can force enemy dispositions that enable the successful lodgement of an amphibious force. This deterrent effect has historically influenced both adversary planning and disposition. Indeed, it ‘has been shown that the threat of employing airborne troops can be made a major factor in determining both the strategic and tactical layout of the enemy forces’.16
Redundancy of platforms is important for both airborne and amphibious entry to avoid the impact of having ‘all the eggs in one basket’, either tactically or operationally. Loss of an amphibious platform due to enemy action may be a national catastrophe in all circumstances. Yet a force of two to three such troop ships, supported by an airborne entry force of conventional weight and staying power, may still support mission success. Both air and sea capabilities are enhanced by the capacity of the conventional airborne force through generation of operational level redundancy.

**Strategic guidance and the handrail of history**

In conventional war against a peer or near-peer competitor, the utility of conventional airborne forces is clear. That Australia needs a basis of expansion of all types of military capability for this eventuality is explicit in national strategic guidance. The 2009 Defence White Paper articulates that ‘the weight and reach of the force the Government intends to build gives us an acceptable margin of confidence that hostile military operations in our primary operational environment can be contested effectively by the ADF’.17 The White Paper goes further to elaborate, in the event of this wider conflict scenario, that ‘we might also have to selectively project military power [in] … maritime Southeast Asia’.18 Conventional airborne forces have a combat mass and mindset that allows their employment in roles outside the normal capacity of Special Forces units.

These tasks, which are listed in joint doctrine and are likely to be required for the successful prosecution of warfare requiring force projection and entry into uncertain or hostile areas, include securing a point of disembarkation, *coup de main* operations to seize and hold terrain, seizing a forward operating base, rapidly reinforcing ground troops and the diverting or blocking of enemy reserves.19 As soon as the conventional parachuting capability is lost, these operational tasks will only be achieved by airmobile forces. Unfortunately, Australia’s military history—reinforced by endorsed planned rotary-wing projects in the Defence Capability Plan—suggests the Land Force’s ability to conduct these operational tasks by rotary wing only will be limited.

It is important to note that airborne forces have historically been decisive for both strategic and tactical objectives. Since the Second World War, the employment of conventional airborne forces has been frequent because they can:

... deploy quickly over considerable distances, crossing obstacles and difficult terrain, and can strike deep, possibly even against an enemy’s centre of gravity. They are capable of theatre entry and since their AO (or more importantly their area of influence) is difficult for an enemy to define they can achieve surprise.20

Since 1948, 30 of the 37 combat operations involving conventionally employed parachute forces were successful in accomplishing their mission, with six unsuccessful and one partially attainning its objective.21 While conventional airborne forces were particularly successful in such diverse operations as the Sinai (1956), Kolwezi (1978) and Northern Iraq (2003), every type of military capability has both strengths and weaknesses. Parachute-delivered light forces are no exception. Static-line parachute limitations include weather conditions, drop zone availability/hazards, limited integral combat support, enemy air defences and a reliance on aerial resupply or follow-on forces for anything but the shortest operational period. But reiterating these vulnerabilities or recalling the defeat in detail of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem is not ‘proof’ of the irrelevance of parachute forces.
One also hears a common argument by detractors that there are no suitable drop zones for a conventional ACT/PBG insertion in our primary area of interest. This may seem reasonable if one is looking for a completely-cleared, flat area of 650 x 3200 metres, as expounded in a parachute capability review conducted in 2006. However, those with experience can testify that a tactical drop zone is significantly different from a purely theoretical drop zone identified by imagery and geospatial means through a map study. Drop zone ‘Hinge’ in the Singleton Range Training Area is a good example of the significant differences between theory and practice.

**What conventional airborne forces are our allies maintaining?**

The current ADF concept of non-Special Forces units providing static-line mass parachute capabilities is reflected across the US and British Armies. It would represent a deviation from the interoperability aims of the ADF to disband this capability which, in recent years, has demonstrated excellent interoperability at both individual and collective levels with like US units (and is planned to do so again during the ‘Talisman Sabre’ bilateral exercise in July 2011). While the conventional airborne units of the US and UK have been heavily committed in recent years to the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns—and their available airborne forces for contingencies have therefore been reduced—both militaries have maintained sizeable force elements for traditional conventional airborne tasks at short notice.

The US Army maintains a conventional airborne force of divisional size (with a brigade on reduced notice to move for contingencies) in the continental US\(^2\) and a separate brigade in Italy for similar purposes in the European region. The British Army maintains an Air Assault Brigade with a battalion group in role for short notice deployment as a parachute capable intervention force. And both the US and UK defence establishments remain committed to providing a sizable conventional airborne force for rapid intervention.\(^3\)

This should act as a note of caution to ADF planners considering that a standing conventional airborne force could be gapped, if required, by Special Forces elements who are already committed to a wide array of operational and preparedness tasks—some of which are more ‘special’ than others and can only be effectively performed by Special Forces.\(^4\) It can be argued that the force structure of allies should be a definitive indicator of the continued and growing relevance of conventional airborne forces to an ADF seeking to defend the national interest globally or regionally with a full suite of capability and within a baseline of defence self-reliance.

**Why the ‘Fat Ships’ alone are not enough**

It is clearly feasible that an airborne joint entry operation could occur in the ADF’s context with or without a simultaneous maritime operation, because an insertion by amphibious means may not be possible for any number of reasons. These might include inaccessibility by maritime forces to the objective area, an urgent situation where insertion by surface vessel is too slow or to demonstrate a capability or aggressive intent without decisively committing other forces.

The capacity for a sizeable contingency force element to be launched from strategic distances and landed by parachute on or near an objective (possibly an airfield denied by some expedient means) with its support weapons and immediate logistics delivered by aerial delivery platforms in the space of a few minutes is what makes conventional airborne forces a worthy investment.
The option of employing both C-17 and C-130 type aircraft in a paratrooping role gives great flexibility and reach to an ADF conventional airborne force. Mass drop parachute capability is essential for deployments up to strategic distances, within timeframes that preclude surface deployment and into situations in which the ADF cannot air-land, without sizeable forces, to secure an airfield and its approaches.

The rationale to secure an APOD for follow-on forces remains unchanged and is made even more relevant by the troop carrying capacity of the soon-to-be-introduced major amphibious platforms, which are not sufficient to lift an entire combat brigade/joint task force. The benefits of the two CANBERRA-class LHDs, which are set to come on line around 2014, are obvious. They are indeed ‘a world-class amphibious deployment and sustainment capability with increased networking, more capable helicopters and a complete range of protected and unprotected vehicles’.

They are not, however, a ‘silver bullet’ that negates the necessity for other means of strategic lift or insertion. The vulnerabilities of maritime rotary-wing operations, the fact that only a medium battle group with up to ten days sustainment is the expected lodgement force of this amphibious group and the warning time required to sail a combat ready amphibious force, demands the flexibility of a combination of air and amphibious means. The tactical concept of simultaneity—an element of tactical or operational design that seeks to disrupt the decision-making process of the enemy by confronting its commander with a number of problems simultaneously is clearly strengthened by the retention of the ACT.

**But can’t Special Forces do it?**

The technical complexity of conventional airborne operations requires well-versed procedures and much practice (read joint exercises) if the functionally disparate force elements of transport aircraft and light infantrymen and enablers are to meld together successfully. Only a force that spends much of its collective training time with a focus on the airborne role can demonstrate—and therefore claim—the capability for parachute operations. The ACT is a strategic asset that is of exceptional utility in a short warning deployment in which reaction time of a militarily significant force is a consideration. The ACT is much larger and better supported (as would be expected) than the equivalent Commando structure for an APOD seizure task; and, in the seizing, holding and opening of a C-130 capable airfield, size matters.

The reason why ‘size matters’ in seizing, holding and opening an APOD is that, in most circumstances, the purpose is to allow the air-land of follow-on forces. To set the conditions for the landing of aircraft, the following must be achieved: security from surface-to-air threats, security from ground threats and technical suitability for the landing and take-off of friendly aircraft. To ensure this not insignificant piece of real estate (several square kilometres) can be held, a variety of means are employed by a conventional airborne force, which include defensive positions on key points, securing an outer perimeter through a combination of patrols and overwatch/standing patrol positions, and a dedicated and/or situational reserve. On the airfield itself, communications, airspace management and the survey/expedient repair of at least one runway is required.

The defeat threshold for a small APOD seizure element—say the size of the equivalent Commando structure conceivable for an APOD task—may be an angry crowd at the terminal and a couple of squads of threat force personnel able to interdict ground and air approaches...
to the runway. To maximise the potential for success in securing an APOD, the number of troops and their immediate combat support in the initial assault wave should be maximised. Although they have not trained to do it, Special Forces certainly could attain the capability to provide a mass-drop parachute force capable of inserting onto land and rapidly seizing an APOD. However, this would obviously be at the expense of their other operational and preparedness tasks.

**An insurance policy – the basis for expansion and alliance management**

A further argument for the retention of the conventional airborne force relates to expansion. For a force to be ready for expansion it must have residual expertise within the variety of military capabilities. The difficulty of and time required to raise an airborne force, given its complexity and intertwined requirements for individual and collective expertise, militates against disbanding the existing airborne force. It would be illogical to remove a capability that can be expunged within a posting cycle or two but will take many years to re-grow to maturity. The initial growth of the PBG over the 1980s stands as testament to this assertion.

It is not fanciful to suggest that a decision to reduce the ADF’s capability to conduct joint entry operations could harm a central tenet of Australia’s defence posture, namely its alliance with the US. What could be more evident of Australia’s lack of commitment to maintaining a capacity for intervention within its own region than the deletion of one of its few means to do so? While a brigade of 82nd Airborne Division remains on 18 hours notice for intervention anywhere in the world, it is unlikely—in the event, for example, of an unexpected and rapidly deteriorating crisis in a South Pacific capital—that our major ally would choose gladly to commit the brigade (or elements of it) because of an ADF lack of capacity.

**So why do some question the validity of the conventional airborne?**

While the ADF remains committed to high-end capability, it seems incongruous that such a relatively cheap but strategically important capability as the conventional airborne force would be considered for deletion. It presumably is not a resourcing issue as, while all Services enact the Strategic Reform Program (SRP), the ADF is committed to ensuring these savings are not detrimental to the combat force and its capabilities, with the CDF noting the need to ensure the SRP ‘does not have a negative impact on our capabilities and our ability to deliver what government requires of us’. The fact that capabilities should not be cut as a result of financial stringency is reinforced by the following explanation from the Defence Intranet SRP ‘frequently asked questions’ page:

> The Strategic Reform Program savings targets are ambitious, but have been developed to ensure that there is no adverse impact on capability. From the outset, the SRP was specifically developed with a focus on the back office and support areas of Defence and the commitment to reinvestment in Defence infrastructure and capability. Throughout our implementation planning phase the impact on capability was at the forefront of everyone’s minds.

Perhaps, like other offensive operational roles once the domain of infantry, the latest push for Special Forces to become the last vestige of ground force parachute capability in the ADF is part of what Major Jim Hammett outed in his influential ‘We Were Soldiers Once’ article in the *Australian Army Journal*, where he contended ‘a Special Forces mission creep that usurps the role of the Infantry’. Airborne soldiering has at its core the unique physical dangers of mass
parachute insertions, the psychological demands of facing combat with limited or negligible support and where collective training involves more inherent risk than some of the operational tasks for which other units prepare. The removal of such a combat-focused capability would strengthen the evidence underpinning Hammett’s question, posed in 2006, ‘have the higher echelons of Special Forces shaped contemporary military and political thinking to the point where they alone are considered combat capable’?

Alternatively, is the reason related to the neatness of the concept of ‘like brigades’? This concept envisages the separate brigades in Darwin, Townsville and Brisbane each being a mirror image of the others—two light battalions, one armoured unit with a mix of cavalry, tank and protected mobility, and some combat support and combat service support elements. An extra infantry battalion in one of the brigades, a parachute capable battalion in 3 RAR, perhaps unsettles the purist’s desires for a balanced brigade.

**Close calls on capability and airborne esprit de corps**

This is not the first time a specialised battalion of the RAR has been faced with capability deletion. An example was the decision to reduce the ADF’s mechanised infantry capability from a battalion group operating armoured personnel carriers down to one company of 5/7 RAR in 1978, rather than abandon the whole mechanised experiment. Army got the answer right in 1978 for the future of Army’s mechanised capability and it got the answer right exactly 30 years later for the future of Army’s airborne capability with the decision in 2008 to keep a rotational ACT capability in 3 RAR.

The revisiting of the 2008 decision, in the absence of any obvious change in underlying or strategic rationale, is perplexing. It is also perplexing from a personnel and individual training perspective as it relates to the sustainability of the skilled personnel required to keep ADF parachuting safe and effective across both the freefall and static-line methods of insertion. Parachuting centres of excellence are currently in several units of the ADF, namely 86 Wing RAAF, Parachute Training School and 3 RAR for static-line mass drops, and Parachute Training School and SASR for free fall techniques. These two capabilities are probably so intertwined that the demise of one would significantly impact the other, especially since the bulk of personnel at Parachute Training School have a 3 RAR background. It could also be expected that any removal of the ACT would adversely affect Special Forces personnel capability in the near to long term.

Finally, the continued maintenance of the ACT based in 3 RAR has significant intangible benefits. Not the least of these benefits is the operational focus, *esprit de corps* and positive morale derived from the unique challenges of parachute operations. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper but should be considered holistically, noting the comments of a former Commanding Officer 3 RAR at the time of the Battalion’s move from Woodside to Holsworthy who asserted that ‘the best way to concentrate the attention of the Battalion and maintain its spirit at a time of instability and movement was to focus on the parachute role’.

---
Conclusion

Wars and other conflicts requiring the deployment of military force are not often predicted with any accuracy, and success in joint lodgement operations is often predicated on possessing a balanced force able to meet most, if not all, eventualities. For ADF joint entry operations, that will demand a mix of both air and maritime-delivered force in most credible scenarios. The loss of a functional and robust capability, such as the current conventional airborne force, seems inexplicable from a capability basis.

This article has attempted to explain why the ADF should maintain the ACT. It will hopefully prompt engagement with subject-matter experts as to what the conventional airborne force is capable of and whether it has an integral place in the ADF’s renewed focus on joint entry operations. The conventional airborne force alone is clearly not the solution to all of our potential joint entry operations of the present or future. Nor is any single ADF capability alone capable of providing this—success will be predicated on balanced capabilities to project naval, land and air power. In a balanced ADF, the maintenance of an already-formed and frequently-tested conventional airborne force, the Airborne Combat Team, is a sound investment for an unknowable future.

Major Giles Cornelia has served regimentally with 3 RAR, instructed at RMC-D and held the staff appointments of SO3 Plans, HQ RMC-A and ADC to Commander 1st Division. His regimental service has included wide experience of airborne collective training as a rifle platoon commander, rifle company second-in-command, combat team commander and operations officer. He holds a BA (History/Politics) and a Graduate Diploma in Arts (War Studies) from University College, University of New South Wales. His current appointment is Operations Officer 3 RAR.
NOTES


2. Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston and Dr Ian Watt, ‘The Chief of Defence Force and Secretary of Defence Strategic Reform Program Media Roundtable’, p. 3.

3. ADDP 3.9 defines an Airborne Force as a ‘force composed primarily of ground and air units organised, equipped and trained for airborne operations’.


6. But also from the Airborne Force Planning Team which once existed in HQ 1st Division, ‘A’ Field Battery, RAA and a number of other units.

7. The Australian Army had two earlier versions of a conventional airborne force—the first being the 1st Australian Parachute Battalion formed during the Second World War. The paratroopers of 3 RAR proudly wear the wings of this unit and have done so since 1985. The second such force was the Parachute Company based in 6 RAR in the late 1970s.


10. 3 RAR is a parachute-capable light infantry battalion that maintains parachute qualifications across all its combat teams. It is currently based at Holsworthy in Sydney but is scheduled to move to Townsville in 2012.


18. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, p. 65.

19. All these tasks demand a mass that is inherently absent from Special Forces and/or the requirement to defend localities for a period of time. Provision of mass and the ability to hold ground and conduct defence are best performed by an infantry force in comparison with Special Forces. For the full list of the tasks capable of execution by both conventional and Special Forces, see ADDP 3.9, p. 2-6.

23. The Parachute Regiment provides the capability to deploy an infantry force at short notice, in the vanguard of operations and in the most demanding circumstances. As such, it is trained and ready to form the spearhead for the Army’s rapid intervention capability. It is light by design, because this confers speed of reaction, and is expert at air-land deployments, by helicopter, aeroplane or parachute. See <http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/regiments/3471.aspx>, accessed 29 August 2010.
25. The ACT has conducted tactical descents from a mix of C-17 and C-130 type aircraft in 2010.
27. LWD 3-0 'Operations, Developing Doctrine', Puckapunyal: Land Warfare Development Centre, 2008, p. 29.
28. Miles, '82nd Airborne Trains to Re-assume Global response Force Mission'.
29. Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston and Dr Ian Watt, 'The Chief of Defence Force and Secretary of Defence Strategic Reform Program Media Roundtable', p. 4.
31. Hammett, 'We Were Soldiers Once', p. 42.
32. Hammett, 'We Were Soldiers Once', p. 47.
33. For a brief description of this capability decision see Dunstan in Horner and Bou, Duty First – A history of the Royal Australian Regiment, p. 252.
34. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Connolly, quoted by Dunstan in Horner and Bou, Duty First – A history of the Royal Australian Regiment, p. 273.
Colin East goes to SESKOAD – in ‘a year of living dangerously’, 1964

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Lowry (Retd)

Introduction

By late 1962, the Dutch had been forced to surrender West New Guinea—the last bastion of the former Netherlands East Indies—to Indonesia via an interim UN administration and the promise of an act of ‘free choice’ by its people within five years. Then, in January 1963, after a foiled revolt in Brunei a month earlier, President Sukarno declared ‘Confrontation’ against the proposal to amalgamate the British colonies in Borneo into the new Federation of Malaysia, set to be proclaimed on 31 August 1963.

Cross-border raids into Borneo by Indonesian ‘volunteers’ commenced soon after, eliciting a measured British response that escalated as more Indonesian troops and resources were committed. The Australian Government declared its support for the formation of Malaysia but was reluctant to commit its ground forces stationed in Malaya, although it did agree to their use on the Malayan Peninsula (and some individuals were already attached to British units in Borneo). This reluctance arose from the Government’s desire to preserve its longer-term interests with Indonesia and distance itself from British obligations and commitments. However, in frequent confidential communications, it pressed Indonesia to halt ‘Confrontation’ and advised that it would provide military support if pressed by the Malaysian and British governments.

Surprisingly, in the midst of these mounting tensions, Indonesia issued an invitation to Australia to send a student to its Army Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in Bandung. The invitation was accepted and Lieutenant Colonel Colin East was duly dispatched in December 1963 to become not only the first Australian but the first foreign officer to attend the course. This article describes East’s experience, as recorded in his diary¹, as well as the Australian and Indonesian governments’ policy considerations surrounding his attendance at the course.

Why was the invitation issued and accepted?

By the late 1950s, a small number of Indonesian officers had undertaken specialist training in Australia. In December 1959, the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, during his only visit to Indonesia, promised—at the prompting of General A.H. Nasution, Indonesia’s Minister for Defence and Chief of Staff of the Army—to confirm the possibility of training military officers in Australia, including at the staff colleges. There was some Australian press controversy over the nature of the training offered but, in March 1960, Nasution told the new Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Patrick Shaw, that he was pleased the Prime Minister’s commitment had been confirmed and wanted to take up the offer of higher staff training immediately.²

Reciprocal funding arrangements were agreed and the first Indonesian students attended the Australian Staff College at Queenscliff in 1961. At the same time, East was instructed to
pursue his Indonesian language studies in preparation for attendance at SESKOAD in 1962 or 1963. In the event, Indonesia did not issue an invitation for the 1962 course. The reasons are unknown but were likely because of disagreements within Indonesian Army Headquarters over the attendance of foreign students and that the campaign to wrest West New Guinea from the Dutch was coming to its climax (and it was only in January 1962 that Australia withdrew its support for the Dutch).

Lieutenant Colonel Tambunan, East’s host at SESKOAD, later told him that the idea of having foreign students had to be ‘sold’ to the Army. Although Indonesian officers were already attending staff colleges in the US and the USSR, in accordance with their non-aligned foreign policy, the Army remained deeply anti-communist and had no desire to host officers from communist countries. Hence, the concern that extending an invitation to Australia would open the door for Russia to ask for a reciprocal vacancy, compounded by disappointment that the US had not been able to provide a student. Whatever the case, an invitation was issued for 1963. East was nominated but the invitation was cancelled a week later because of budget restrictions. The course, which had been scheduled to start in June 1963, was rescheduled to commence in January 1964 and the invitation for Australia to send a student was renewed and accepted.

From an Australian perspective, there were several reasons for placing an Australian student at SESKOAD. In June 1962, the Minister for Defence, Athol Townley, visited Indonesia—reciprocating a visit to Australia by General Nasution the previous year—and maintained intermittent correspondence with his Indonesian counterpart thereafter. In a letter to Nasution in June 1963, Townley congratulated him on the peaceful solution of the West New Guinea dispute, supported the formation of Malaysia as the best way to manage the ‘Chinese problem’, and looked forward to the first Australian officers attending Indonesian Army courses in the following year. He continued:

I regard this program not only as an important aspect of relations between our respective Defence forces but also as a means of increasing understanding between our two countries.

More specifically, the Department of Defence strongly supported East’s attendance at SESKOAD because it offered a unique opportunity to study first hand ‘the military role and political thinking of the Indonesian Armed Forces’. Consequently, East was posted Army Headquarters in May 1963 to await commencement of the course. He now had time to intensify his Indonesian language tuition at ANU and be briefed by Army and other departments on what was expected of him. He was also able to liaise with the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra on administrative arrangements and Indonesia’s expectations.

**Why Colin Hubert Alan East?**

There is no record of why Colin East was selected but he was indubitably a good choice. He had joined the militia in 1938 as an infantry private and transferred to the 2nd AIF in 1939. He served in the UK and Middle East and was severely wounded at the Battle of Tobruk. He later served with a machine gun battalion in Darwin and finished World War 2 as a company commander in the 29th Infantry Battalion at Balikpapan. From there, he spent three years in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, followed by 18 months in the UK on various courses and attachments, before returning to Australia to become the machine gun platoon commander with 1RAR in Korea and later an instructor at the 1st Commonwealth Division Battle School.
He was the top graduate of the Australian Staff College in 1955. While there, his wife Shirley heard a radio talk in which the speaker advised people to start preparing for life after retirement. As a consequence, in 1957, East attended the University of Melbourne three nights a week to study the language and history of Indonesia. At the end of 1957, he was sent to Malaya as brigade major of the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, part of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. This was the premier job for a major at the time and he excelled at it.

He had three top rate annual confidential reports from his brigade commander, Brigadier Mogg (later General Sir John Mogg), was so impressed with East’s performance that he wrote to the Australian Military Secretary in February 1960 saying:

There is no doubt that he is an outstanding officer. There is not an officer or soldier of the Commonwealth Brigade who has not got the greatest admiration for and confidence in his ability. He has a quick clear and concise brain combined with a very marked flair for getting on and mixing with people of all ranks, status and nationality. This particular trait of making friends with all and sundry has been of vital importance in a formation such as this and with the indigenous population of Malaya in which we, a foreign army, live.9

East returned to Australia on promotion to lieutenant colonel to become operations officer of the newly-raised Headquarters 1st Division in Sydney. Apart from his broad operational experience and knowledge of Asia, East was reasonably fluent in Malay and had a tutor for a couple of hours a week to help develop his written and oral Indonesian language skills. He was extroverted, a good sportsman and could mix easily in any company. These qualities were evident in his nickname, ‘Cha Cha’, which played on his initials. He went to Indonesia without Shirley who was recovering from cancer. He arrived in Jakarta in early December 1963 to prepare for the course that commenced on 6 January 1964.

What was the nature of the course?

The one year SESKOAD course was modelled on the US Army Command and General Staff College course but obviously adapted to Indonesia’s foreign and defence policies and strategic doctrine. In addition to staff lecturers, students were typically addressed by leading politicians, academic experts in economics, social affairs and science, the Minister for Defence (and Armed Forces Chief of Staff) and the Minister for the Army (and Army Commander) and his senior staff.

They studied Indonesian army organisations and various operations, ranging from nuclear, through armoured and airborne operations, to guerrilla warfare. They spent about one month on nuclear warfare (in an era when it was feared the use of nuclear weapons was inevitable, even at the tactical level), four months on comparative studies of foreign militaries, three on national defence and strategic doctrine and three on tactical doctrine. In 1964, the 51 SESKOAD students were joined by 19 other military and civilian students from the Indonesian departments of foreign affairs, home affairs and justice, and several others for the national defence and strategy leg of the course.10

The course was heavily interlaced with Indonesian history and ideology and the defence strategy of ‘total people’s defence’ and the territorial warfare strategy, which encompassed a combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare. They visited the various levels of government and stayed in villages and completed the year with a command post and signals exercise. They also joined the navy and air staff colleges in writing a major exercise and observed a major
joint amphibious exercise conducted at the end of the year, although, because of its relevance to 'Confrontation', this was one of the few activities from which East was excluded.

The pattern of instruction was normally lectures followed by syndicate discussions, written assignments, student lectures and lengthy periodic written examinations. Each student was required to give three presentations of two hours duration. East selected the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency 1958-60 and the Pentropic Division as the subjects of his presentations. Two essays were also set—one on the meaning of the Muslim fasting month and another on a military topic.11

Hospitality in the midst of conflict

East kept a daily diary of his time in Indonesia. Understandably, it was a fairly guarded document with very few mentions of political affairs. However, it is clear from his diary and the official reports he produced—along with an article he wrote—that he was very well received, despite the increasing tempo of operations and political mobilisation in support of 'Confrontation'. He had been farewelled by the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Brigadier General Suadi, and was met in Jakarta by the Australian military attaché, Colonel Freddie Whitelaw, and Lieutenant Colonel Tambunan, who had returned from the Australian Staff College a year before to become an instructor at SESKOAD and was to be East’s sponsor for the year.

In his opening speech to the course on 6 January, the Minister for the Army (and Army Commander), Lieutenant General Ahmad Jani (who would perish in a failed coup d’etat in October 1965), personally greeted East en route to the podium and mentioned in his speech that East’s presence marked the beginning of attendance by other foreign students to foster better understanding between their respective countries. Before departing, Jani wished East well with his studies. Then, in his opening address, the Commandant, Major General Sudirman, referred to East in glowing terms and said that he and Shirley would now be members of the SESKOAD family.12

Although Sudirman was the commandant, the dominant officer in East’s time at SESKOAD was Brigadier General Suwanto, the deputy commandant. Like most of the Army, both were strongly anti-communist. Suwanto, who had lost a leg to cancer the previous year, was often described as a 'PSI leaning officer', which meant he was sympathetic to the policies of the Indonesian Socialist Party, which emphasised ‘modernisation, economic development and rational planning and organisation’.13 He wanted to revamp the course to meet the highest standards. He was very supportive of East, entertained him occasionally and sponsored his membership of the Bumi Sangkuriang Club—which became the centre of East’s social life. He also pressed East on several occasions for his critique of the course and of the arrangements for hosting foreign students.

The other senior staff member was the chief instructor, Colonel Raden Saleh Sadeli. He was one of the last of 18 Indonesians to graduate from the Royal Military Academy in Holland between the First and Second World Wars.14 He was captured by the Germans in mid-1940 and, after the war, returned with Dutch forces to suppress the Indonesian independence movement. However, after independence, he was forgiven and accepted into the Indonesian Army. Sadeli was responsible for the day-to-day management of the course and personally escorted East on a trip to Central Java to see its ancient Hindu and Buddhist monuments. With such high level
support, it is not surprising that the staff and student body were generally welcoming and supportive. Moreover, in SESKOAD’s drive to attract more foreign students, it was imperative that East leave with favourable impressions.

The impact of ‘Confrontation’

East listened to Radio Australia and Radio Malaysia morning and night. On 7 January, Radio Malaysia reported on East’s attendance at SESKOAD and claimed that he was an intelligence officer who had spent four years in Malaya. Certainly, news of East’s attendance came at a sensitive time in relations between Australia, Britain and Malaysia. Although Australia was pressing Indonesia to end ‘Confrontation’ it was reluctant to commit troops to Borneo, despite increasing pressure from Britain and Malaysia. Concerned that the news of East’s presence at SESKOAD might be interpreted as further evidence of Australia’s ambivalence, the Department of External Affairs advised its British and Malaysian counterparts on 8 January that:

Acceptance of the Indonesian invitation to attend the Staff College follows a long-standing recognition by the Government of the value to Australian service personnel of attending courses in Indonesia.

In mid February, East recorded that his morale was low and that he was uneasy about the uncertain international situation. He also noted that the senior student, Brigadier General Surjosumeno, who shared East’s duplex, mentioned a Radio Australia report on famine in Central Java, half-jokingly implying that East might have been the source of the report following his recent visit there. This was unlikely as Tambunan had accompanied East on the trip and the itinerary shows that East would not have had the opportunity to obtain such information which, in any case, was readily available from other sources.

From early March, East seems to have taken a more philosophical view, recording developments and conversations more matter-of-factly. He made note of the mass rallies in Jakarta and Bandung in April; a discussion with Brigadier General Adjie, the Commander of West Java, who was strongly anti-communist but pro-Sukarno and pro-Confrontation; the failure of talks in Tokyo in June to resolve the dispute; a talk during a break with Brigadier General Jasin, the assistant deputy commandant, who saw the British as the villains; and the closing of the British Council in Bandung and elsewhere in August, from which he gained a few free books.

Meanwhile, in April, the British had begun covert cross-border raids in Borneo to push Indonesian military bases further from the border. The Australian Government also announced it would be sending an Army engineer squadron to Borneo, along with two minesweepers, four helicopters and other air support, and that the infantry battalion in Malaysia could be used against incursions on the peninsula. In response, Nasution warned Australia not to become involved and, in May, Sukarno formed his ‘crush Malaysia’ command, warning he could call on 21 million volunteers. There was uproar in the Indonesian press in June when Australian Army field engineers arrived in Sabah to build roads and facilities. As the pressure mounted, the Australian Embassy revamped evacuation plans for the 280 Australians in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, East was invited to all important national and armed forces ceremonies. He was present at the National Day ceremony in Jakarta on 17 August when President Sukarno gave his three-hour ‘A Year of Living Dangerously’ address. The same day, Indonesia launched its first raid on the Malay peninsula in Johore but the 100 troops involved were quickly rounded-up. The next day, East had a long chat with the Australian Ambassador, Keith Shann, who later gave
him two copies of a book by Bruce Grant to give to Tambunan.\textsuperscript{20} The book painted a gloomy picture of the region if Indonesia continued on its current trajectory.

East was due to undertake a trip to Sulawesi in September but it was postponed until the end of the course because, according to Tambunan, the Indonesian Communist Party might have used it to embarrass the Army and the government. However, the Army had its own reasons for not wanting East to go there. A couple of Indonesian units in Macassar had revolted in April, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Andi Selle Mattola, and Indonesia had accused the British of assisting the rebels with sanctuary, finance and arms, fearing also that it might reignite the Darul Islam revolt that had only recently been quelled.\textsuperscript{21}

However, East was still invited to the Armed Forces Day parade in Jakarta on 5 October, where he was seated in the VIP section. That night he attended a reception hosted by senior Armed Forces commanders, and spoke to the Russian and American military attachés. He also attended the Heroes Day ceremony on 10 November, where he was seated next to Major General Suprapto, one of Jani’s deputies. In late November, the SESKOAD students were scheduled to observe a large-scale amphibious landing and airborne exercise, which was intended to convince Britain and Malaysia that escalation was possible. Not surprisingly, East was sent on a tour of Sumatra instead. On his return, he felt a slight strain in the air and concluded that he would just make the year out.\textsuperscript{22}

The course ended on 15 December but the terms of his attachment called for East to remain for another six weeks to tour other areas of Indonesia. When he arrived at Army Headquarters, he was informed that the tours had been cancelled for internal ‘political reasons’.\textsuperscript{23} However, it was more likely influenced by a range of other factors. They included Menzies’ announcement on 10 November of a large build-up of Australian military forces and the subsequent decision not to send a follow-on student to SESKOAD in 1965, nor issue an invitation for reciprocal training in Australia.\textsuperscript{24} Also, on 14 December, Indonesian saboteurs had opened fire on the Australian minesweeper, HMAS Teal, in the Singapore Straits, resulting in three saboteurs being killed, two wounded and another two captured.

**East’s social life**

The early weeks of the course were intense for all the students as they tried to master the copious course readings and prepare for syndicate discussions and their written assignments and tests. It was doubly so for East who was also mastering the language and a different military environment. Nevertheless, he was frequently invited to dinner by his classmates and staff. And syndicate discussions, which they hosted in turn, were often accompanied by snacks and drinks, often alcoholic.

Meals for all students were provided by a central kitchen. Initially, East was provided with two ‘western’ meals per week, however, he quickly convinced the caterers that he was happy to eat the same food as everyone else. He had a good stock of beer and spirits from the Embassy canteen in Jakarta and some of the students who had trained in the Eastern Bloc had regular supplies of Eastern European wine. He was provided with a man servant, Ukra, who maintained his house and car, did the washing, brought the meals from the kitchen and, according to East, reported on his comings and goings. He also acquired a dog at the end of May that he named Rommel. He became a loyal companion to both of them and was given to Ukra when East returned home.
East was an assiduous letter writer, penning more than 100 letters to his wife during the year, as well as writing regularly to his mother and other relatives and friends. However, the postal service was erratic and inefficient. He got his first telephone call from Shirley on 11 February to complain that she had not received a letter for over a month. So it was arranged that all their mail would go via the Embassy to avoid the censors in Jakarta. International telephone calls were also difficult and expensive and it was not until 24 February that he got his first call through to Shirley. These calls had to be booked days in advance and the operator duly rewarded, but the service was nevertheless erratic and unreliable. On 7 July, he received a message from the Embassy that his mother was ill but they had no further information and he was unable to get through on the telephone. Four days later, he received news of her death.

He soon got to know the commander of the US Military Training and Advisory Group in Bandung, Major Tom Brummett, who was replaced in June by Major Fred Walters, who invited him to functions and film evenings and to stay on weekends. They became firm friends and East was also able to use their weekly courier to get his mail and canteen supplies from Jakarta. In the second semester, his circle of friends expanded among the expatriate community and he became a regular at their weekend functions and at the Bumi Sangkuriang Club, where he regularly swam and played tennis. He also joined the Australian military attachés and their families at the Embassy rest houses near Bogor for weekends on a couple of occasions.

Singing is a great Indonesian pastime and East was regularly invited to give a rendition of ‘Waltzing Matilda’ and occasionally other songs. Suwarto had musical interests and invited East to record a song with a band and provided him with a copy of the tape. He was also invited to be a judge and present prizes at a couple of fashion parades, further expanding his circle of Indonesian friends. In August, Sadeli accompanied him to Yogjakarta to see a performance of the Ramayana, which was staged over three nights at full moon on about five occasions a year. He was hosted by Major General Djatikusumo, the Minister for Tourism, who had recently been ambassador to Malaya and aspired to replace Suadi in Australia.

The graduation ceremony on 15 December was attended by several foreign military officers, including Colonel Ron Hughes, the Australian military attaché, who had replaced Freddie Whitelaw in June. Lieutenant General Jani gave East a good build up in his speech and East made a presentation to the Commandant and received mementos in return. He then gave his farewell speech, ‘which was well received’. He also organised his own farewell function, inviting Tini Tambunan, wife of his sponsor, and Nan Sadeli, wife of the chief instructor, to be his hostesses at a function in the Bumi Sangkuriang Club. East noted, however, that his party was only ‘so so’, probably reflecting a degree of exhaustion after a hectic year and the recent graduation and class functions.

Overall, East was treated most hospitably. He was given the opportunity to observe many of the broader aspects of Indonesian national life, made a wide circle of friends in the Indonesian and expatriate community, and certainly made the most of the social and cultural opportunities available to him.
East’s assessment of the course and the Indonesian Army

East’s diary, his subsequent confidential address to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs on 25 March 1965, his official report and his article in the Australian Army Journal of January 1966 all paint a consistent picture. He thought the standard of instruction was high and that the instructors were widely experienced, with most having attended staff colleges in the US, USSR, Britain, Australia, NZ or elsewhere. He particularly noted the influence that Indonesia’s history and ideological underpinnings had on the making of military decisions, noting that at times they could outweigh political and purely strategic or tactical considerations.

He also observed that the Army was strongly entrenched and very influential throughout the whole country and should be in a position to combat effectively any attempted communist takeover. He noted that Indonesian officers calculated it would take 10 years before they would be ready for conventional war, hence the emphasis on territorial warfare. This assessment was first put forward by Nasution in 1953, illustrating the lack of significant economic development in the following decade, despite the acquisition of considerable military hardware from Russia and the Eastern Bloc. Nevertheless, he noted that Jani had assured him the Army had plans, ‘when the time was ripe’, to move against the communists and crush them.

Epilogue

East arrived back in Australia at the end of December 1964, via Bangkok and Singapore where he was debriefed by Australian, UK and US officials. He was posted to the Directorate of Military Operations and Plans, where he worked on plans for the deployment of Australian forces to South Vietnam. He also accompanied ministerial visits to Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia by Dr Jim Forbes and Malcolm Fraser, in 1965 and 1966 respectively.

He wrote an article with Lieutenant Colonel J.O. Langtry, published in the Australian Army Journal in July 1965, proposing the establishment of a paramilitary force of Aborigines to counter enemy penetration and sabotage in northern Australia (a prescient foreshadowing of NORFORCE, as established in 1981). A report on the article featured on the front page of the Australian newspaper, which assumed that such a threat would come from Indonesia and implied that the article had official status. The sensitivity of relations with Indonesia at the time meant that it became the subject of a question without notice in the Senate later that day, to which Senator Shane Paltridge, the Minister for Defence, replied that it was not ‘an expression of Army or government policy’ and wanted ‘to state concisely that infiltration of the north of Australia does not occur’.

‘Confrontation’ ended after an attempted coup d’état on 1 October 1965 saw Sukarno usurped by the Army under Suharto and the conclusion of an agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia to cease hostilities on 11 August 1966. After the cessation of hostilities, East was given command of 4RAR in Malaysia but, before taking command, he was invited to Indonesia to receive his ‘staff qualified’ badge at a ceremony in late September. He had graduated 15th out of a class of 51, an impressive achievement, given especially that a future Indonesian minister for defence was 25th. He was invited to lunch and presented with his badge by Lieutenant General Maraden Panggabean, Deputy Army Commander, and later had a one hour private audience with the Acting President, General Suharto. Australia accepted an invitation to send a student to SESKOAD in 1967 and issued reciprocal invitations for 1968 onwards.
East brought 4RAR back to Australia in November 1967 and was disappointed not to take it to Vietnam. He remained in the command and operations staff stream in Australia and PNG until he resigned in February 1976. Despite his outstanding performance as a brigade major and battalion commander, he was not promoted beyond Colonel because age was against him and he was too extroverted for some of his Australian superiors, one of whom reported that he was ‘an officer who attracts and demands attention’.

It was only after his retirement that his SESKOAD experience was directly employed, not by Defence but the Department of Foreign Affairs soon after the invasion of East Timor. He spent five years there before transferring to the Department of Veterans Affairs and finally retiring in 1986. After resigning from the Army, he became a regular contributor to the *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter* and other media on Indonesia and PNG and also gave talks to a number of community groups, schools and organisations on these topics. He was an office holder in the Royal Commonwealth Society, the Australia Papua New Guinea Friendship Association and the Royal United Services Institution, as well as being closely involved in the welfare of his ex-service comrades. He maintained regular contact with the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney and died on 7 December 1999.33

One of East’s counterparts at the Australian Staff College in 1963-64 was Lieutenant Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. He visited East at SESKOAD in January 1964. ‘A pleasant surprise’ wrote East, as he brought the mail from the Embassy and offered to take his mail back to Jakarta. They chatted for an hour and East recorded that it was a ‘most enjoyable meeting – hope to see him here in December!!’.34 Both finished their respective courses but were not to meet again.

Sarwo Edhie shot to fame the next year for his role in countering the attempted *coup d’etat* and became a prominent but peripheral member of the New Order. He died in 1989 fifteen years before his son-in-law, General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, became the first directly-elected president of Indonesia.

Bob Lowry retired from the Australian Army as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1993 after 30 years service, which included tours of duty in South Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia. He is a graduate of the Australian Army Staff College (1980) and SESKOAD (1983-84). Since then, among other interests, he has been engaged in security sector reform issues in Indonesia, Timor Leste and Fiji. He is also the author of ‘The Armed Forces of Indonesia’ (1996), ‘Fortress Fiji: Holding the Line in the Pacific War, 1939-45’ (2006) and ‘The Last Knight: a biography of General Sir Phillip Bennett AC KBE DSO’, to be published in 2011.
NOTES

1. East gave his diary for 1963-64, and related papers, to the author shortly before he died. They will be deposited with the ADFA Library but the diary will not be available for public access for several years.
5. Letter Townley to Nasution dated 18 June 1962. NAA Series A1838 (1838/280), Control 3034/10/1, Part 11. Major Noel Graham also attended a one year field grade officer advanced course at the Infantry Centre from July 1963.
8. East had been promoted Temporary Major in Japan but on return from the UK had to revert to his substantive rank of Captain. He was promoted again in Korea at the Battle School.
10. The national defence college (LEMHANNAS) took this function from 1965.
11. East did not record the topic of his military essay.
12. Major General H. Sudirman, Commandant of SESKOAD from January 1962 to June 1966. According to East he was a ‘lonely and very shy’ figure and a devout Muslim who tried to live on his official salary, which was impossible. East recalled dropping by his house on one occasion and finding his wife in tears because she could not make ends meet, with her social obligations of entertaining people, and the salary he got.
16. Cablegram DEA to Australian High Commissions in Britain and Malaysia of 8 January 1964. NAA Series A1838 (1838/280) 3034/10/1, Part 18.
17. East diary, 23 February 1964. While it is obvious that foreign students derive basic intelligence about the country and armed forces of their host country, they have no access to classified plans or sensitive locations and any advantage accrued is reciprocal and useful whether the host is friend or foe.
19. Jasim had played a leading role in defeating the revolt in Aceh and was awaiting a posting to Moscow as military attaché. He was eventually promoted lieutenant general but was sidelined by Suharto in the mid-1970s.
21. The political leader of the revolt, Kahar Muzakar, was killed in February 1965.
22. East diary, 4 December 1964.
25. None of the letters was retained.
26. Australia did not favour his appointment because he had been a mischief-maker when ambassador to Malaysia, so Major General Kosasih replaced Suadi in December 1964. NAA Series 1838 (1838/280) Control 3034/10/1, Part 22. In a varied career, Djiatikusumo had also briefly been Army Chief of Staff, commandant of the staff college, a minister in several governments and a member of the presidential advisory body.
27. East diary, 18 December 1964.
28. Undated but in response to an information request of 5 July 1965 from the DMI.
32. Indonesia suffered 590 killed, 222 wounded and 771 captured. Commonwealth forces suffered 114 killed and 181 wounded.
33. His service in fostering Australia-Indonesia relations was recognised by a Certificate of Appreciation (No. 004/Konjen/1981) awarded to him by Indonesia’s Consul General in Sydney on 17 August 1981.
34. East diary 15 January 1964.
NATO Special Operations: exploiting new structures in command, control and intelligence

Lieutenant Colonel I.D. Langford, DSC, Australian Army

In this world there is always danger for those who are afraid of it.

George Bernard Shaw

Introduction

The effective continuance of NATO remains in doubt. It was established primarily to counter the Soviet Union. But this threat no longer exists. It now needs to succeed in Afghanistan—as an editorial in the New York Times recently asserted—to counter ‘ten years of post-Cold War drift and … [to confront new challenges ranging from] loose nukes to radical fundamentalism, to an unpredictable Russian neighbour’.  

At the same time, special operations forces (SOF) have become an essential part of the national defence capability of many countries. A significant reason for this is that since the end of the Second World War, the nature of the global security environment has changed markedly and now presents a series of complex and irregular challenges—and unconventional or hybrid threats—that are neither readily apparent nor easy to anticipate.

It will be argued in this article that SOF represent a unique capability that can bring to bear intelligence and operational capabilities, both at the individual national and coalition levels within the NATO construct. Furthermore, it will be contended that NATO’s current role in employing SOF in Afghanistan provides a viable model for strengthening and transforming the ‘Alliance’ so that it remains a credible force for the 21st century.

NATO origins, roles and structure

NATO was created through the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949. Its aim is to ‘safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries using political and military means’. The key element ensuring the effectiveness of the Alliance has been the relationship between the North American and European member nations, based on a common set of values and interests and, fundamentally, the maintenance of democracy throughout Western Europe. This partnership has essentially made the security of Europe and North America indivisible and is best articulated in Article 5 of the Treaty, which states that ‘an attack on one member is to be considered an attack on all members’.

NATO’s essential security tasks are defined in its ‘Strategic Security Concept’ as being:

- to provide the indispensable foundation for Euro-Atlantic security,
- to serve as a forum for trans-Atlantic consultations,
- to deter and defend against threats of aggression,
- to stand ready, on a case-by-case basis and through consensus, to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and
• to promote partnerships among countries within the Alliance, as well as engage emerging partners and new NATO members.4

NATO was seriously tested for the first time in 1989 with the wars in the Former Yugoslav Republic. These conflicts forced NATO to conduct the first offensive military operation in its history. In its aftermath, NATO faced the realisation that the operational design and key assumptions under which it had long operated were flawed, with serious political inertia and disagreements among member nations preventing decisive action. An example was the reluctance of the US to commit ground forces to the theatre without other NATO allies providing similar forces. The Europeans refused, exacerbating the military problem and undermining the effort overall.5

NATO’s structure is also not well designed for rapid decision-making. The mechanism by which NATO agrees on its missions is via the North Atlantic Council (NAC), consisting of representatives from each member and chaired by the NATO Secretary General.6 The NAC operates on a consensus model of decision-making, meaning that deliberations often take a considerable amount of time. Additionally, security initiatives are effectively at the mercy of individual members, who can oppose an initiative even if every other member approves. Unlike the UN, however, no single member can veto a proposal; instead, they must compromise to reach an acceptable agreement.7

The military element of NATO is the most visible structure within the Alliance and is based on two strategic commands. The first is an operational command, commonly known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), responsible for current operations. It is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR), who also serves as the US Combatant Commander for Europe (USEUCOM). The key command element of NATO operations is primarily centred on Allied Command Operations (ACO).8 The second strategic military command is Transformational Command, which is responsible for emerging doctrine and force organisations.

NATO and the global war on terror

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 irrevocably altered the roles and tasks of the Alliance. NATO responded by implementing OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (a maritime operation to detect and deter terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea) and OPERATION EAGLE ASSIST (using NATO airborne warning and control systems to assist in protecting US air space). While these operations were directly in response to the terrorist attacks on the US, they did little by way of actively preventing further attacks. At that time, the ability of NATO to conduct pre-emptive operations against terrorist groups was very limited and posed a significant challenge to the overall utility of the Alliance in combating global terrorism.

Shifting this posture is fundamental to the continuing relevance of NATO. Non-traditional functions, previously not considered collaboratively at the NAC or ACO level, must now be incorporated to enable the Alliance to react in a timely and effective manner against non-state based terrorists and rogue nations threatening the collective security of the Alliance. Interoperability issues, not resolved in the past because of their inherent complexity, must be overcome if the Alliance is to modernise. Examples include the collection and sharing of intelligence, the development of working relationships with non-NATO members, the development of a counter-WMD capability and the ability to act pre-emptively against non-state sponsored threats.
However, because the threshold for decisive action is different for each member of the Alliance, the ability of the NAC to achieve consensus before a threat materialises is highly problematic. Although NATO attempted in the 1990s to address many of its strategic weaknesses—and has demonstrated considerable resolve through its recent deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa and other out-of-region areas—it still remains structurally unable to conduct the full spectrum of operations required to defeat either non-state based terrorist threats or WMD-capable rogue nations. For NATO to become effective in defeating a threat that does not conform to the traditional status of a declared enemy, it must transform itself to be capable of immediate action within its consensus-based decision-making framework.

For the US, the underlying value of NATO remains its emphasis on alliance-building, collaborative frameworks and strategic partnerships for securing the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. The challenge for its members is how to do so while moving away from the restrictiveness of the Cold War paradigm. And how its many and diverse members effectively contribute to collective defence remains a major challenge, particularly given that the standards and capabilities of its member militaries vary so greatly. Where many of the smaller members can effectively contribute is in the area of niche forces or forces characterised by a highly-skilled, specific capability. SOF is one such capability. Historically, organic SOF has not existed within NATO forces and previous efforts to conduct special operations have always been conducted on an ad hoc basis. In a global security environment where it is preferable that asymmetric threats be targeted prior to the materialisation of the threat, this lack of integral SOF is a critical gap in the overall NATO transformational effort.

The need for SOF in NATO

While a SOF capability is not a substitute for conventional forces, SOF provide an alternative or supporting capability that can very effectively deliver a series of precise, potentially-devastating blows against an enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. The employment of SOF is also not limited to the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Rather, SOF remain applicable across the full range of military options, ranging from defence and diplomacy during peacetime engagement to the conduct of major combat operations. Moreover, SOF retain the unique ability to perform tasks in operating environments where conventional militaries may be at a strategic or operational disadvantage for a variety of political or environmental reasons.

SOF in essence can provide NATO a dual function, that is, a strategic offensive operational capability (utilising the ‘find, fix, finish, exploit and analyse’ [F3EA] targeting model to engage the enemy) and a defensive, asymmetrical capability (unconventional warfare via military assistance operations). In doing so, SOF can provide both political and senior military leaders with real options that retain a clear freedom of action while at the same time employing economy of force. In this capacity, SOF can create a value proposition disproportionate to their size and resources.

The attractiveness—and also the urgency—for developing an enhanced SOF capability in NATO lies in the relevance that SOF have in the fight against transnational terrorism, along with the importance and desirability of conducting this fight multilaterally. SOF have far greater capacity than conventional forces for locating and defeating ‘jihadi’ terrorist groups. For example, US SOF were highly successful against al Qaeda in Afghanistan immediately after the September 11 attacks and continue to play an important role in Iraq and other operational
theatres. In its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon underscored the value and importance of SOF, noting their heightened importance in combating and defeating global terrorism and other irregular threats.  

Based on the nature of the threat of global terrorism and the need to develop a resident SOF capability, the US President announced at the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga that NATO would ‘launch a special operations initiative that will strengthen the ability of SOF personnel from NATO nations to work together on the battlefield’.  This statement effectively tasked NATO, through what became known as the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI), to generate a functional, combined SOF entity, capable of special operations in support of NATO operations. This would be achieved by leveraging off the resident SOF skills within the Alliance. Most NATO members possess SOF capabilities in some form. Within Spain’s ‘Guardia Civil’, for example, are some of the finest SOF in the world—with considerable experience gained through Spain’s long struggle with Basque separatists. Other NATO members, notably the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Poland, also have significant SOF capabilities.

A combined NATO SOF also offers a significant opportunity to involve member nations that do not have large conventional forces, a limitation that has historically precluded some from supporting NATO operations. SOF contributions are, by their very nature, small in number, easy to deploy quickly and often the best resourced troops within a number of militaries. For most Alliance members, SOF deployments are also likely to cause less domestic controversy once deployed, as their operations tend to attract less comment than conventional force deployments. Overall, for many Alliance members, SOF contributions provide an opportunity to contribute effectively in an affordable way, with less political caveats and a more ready acceptance of high-risk missions, compared with larger-scale conventional force contributions.

The Riga Summit was a watershed because, for the first time, all member nations agreed on the importance of the SOF capability. The US underscored its commitment by accepting the role as the ‘framework nation’ for the NSTI, taking responsibility for its management and implementation. That will involve three initiatives: an expansion of the existing SHAPE Special Operations Office, the development of a ‘federation’ of Special Forces Training Centres and the raising of the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC). The most important of these is the NSCC, which is directly responsible to the NAC for the force generation of NATO SOF.

The NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre

Command and control is absolutely critical to all aspects of SOF in NATO. The NSCC is designed and structured to serve as the organisational nexus for all NATO SOF and is commanded by a flag-ranking officer responsible to SACEUR. This officer is officially designated as the NSCC Director and is directly responsible as the key conduit between SACEUR and the Alliance members contributing SOF elements. Importantly, the NSCC Director fulfils the component command role that is resident within the Land, Maritime and Air Component Commanders in NATO, thus making him a co-equal in the NATO command structure.

In addition, the NSCC is also tasked with generating multiple Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Commands, as well as dovetailing these into the conventional NATO response force rotational deployment plans. This allows NATO SOF the capacity to operate
either independently as a single component or as part of an integrated, all component NATO force. The NSCC has developed a NATO SOF vision articulated as:

... a mature and expanded NATO Special Operations Forces community that can rapidly generate multiple Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Commands consisting of well trained and interoperable land, sea and air special operations task groups that are appropriately task organised and adequately resourced to execute all special operations in support of Allied Command Operations.18

Within the NSCC itself, its functions are divided into three divisions: the Operational Support Division, (responsible to synchronise all SOF efforts in NATO with all other components), the Strategic Concepts and Interoperability Division (responsible for strategic planning) and the Training and Exercise Division (responsible for the training and certification of all SOF force elements contributing to all NATO SOF missions).19

NATO expectations of SOF capability

The 2006 Riga Summit also made clear the expectation that NATO SOF would provide:

... the ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various actors may be undertaking combat, stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian activities simultaneously.20

Typically, NATO SOF will be expected to generate operational solutions best utilising their core skill sets, namely:

- Special reconnaissance – intelligence collection operations,
- Direct action – offensive operations against an enemy,
- Military assistance – training support to indigenous forces, and
- Special recovery operations – recovery of people or materiel.21

SACEUR later included additional specialist tasks for NATO SOF, intended to better improve the interoperability of the Alliance overall. These included the transfer of satellite strategic communications, the training of advanced medical personnel, the training and qualification of joint terminal attack controllers and the teaching of military assistance training techniques to broaden the overall baseline of skills across the entire NATO force.22 These skills are seen as essential to ensuring sufficient compatibility among all member nations and have since proven invaluable to NATO in Afghanistan. Of note, the establishment of a NATO common security clearance system, including a NATO SECRET communications system, is now in operation, thanks in large part to the need for this type of security protocol to be in service for NATO SOF.23

As well as improving operational capability across the Alliance, NATO SOF are also expected to bring a considerable array of contingency response options to NATO commanders. A desired capability sought by NATO and resident within all SOF is:

... the ability to adapt force postures and military responses rapidly and effectively to unforeseen circumstances. This requires an effective capability to analyse the environment and anticipate potential requirements, a high level of readiness for our forces, and the necessary flexibility to respond to any sudden shifts in requirements.24
SOF by their nature are suited to meet this capability requirement as they fundamentally operate as versatile, independent teams that provide a highly-flexible force capable of operating in ambiguous and uncertain environments. SOF also operate as high readiness forces that can be rapidly organised into deployment packages to provide tailored response options to a variety of situations. Of particular importance to NATO is the ability to ‘anticipate and assess threats, risks and challenges’. This capability for strategic anticipation provides the opportunity to defeat an emerging conflict before it culminates into a full crisis—and to respond with agility and decisive, swift action, should those efforts fail.

In the wake of the rise of non-traditional threats, NATO today places significant priority on ‘the ability to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorism in order to contribute to the protection of the Alliance’s populations, territory, critical infrastructure and forces, and to support consequence management’. An inherent feature of this priority is the ability to defeat these types of threats beyond NATO’s borders by conducting expeditionary out-of-area operations. In this type of contingency, NATO SOF would naturally provide a highly-adept capability, specially suited to confront this challenge, that could rapidly deploy to any area of interest for NATO.

An additional capability requirement relates to WMD. Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of a terrorist group successfully employing a WMD against NATO, the European Defense Steering Agency (EDSA), an advisory group to NATO, identified this threat as a priority for capability development within NATO. Accordingly, and at the EDSA’s urging, this task has now been formally designated a responsibility to NATO SOF. This task essentially entails ‘activities designed to secure, interdict, destroy or assist with the rendering safe of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons’.

Another area of focus is the capability ‘to conduct operations in demanding geographical and climatic environments’. SOF training in demanding and stressful situations habitually prepares SOF to ‘conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support’. SOF typically thrive under these stressors because of their capacity to employ operational autonomy and independence. Additionally, SOF are able to generate ‘non-kinetic response options’, which are characterised by the avoidance of the use of force and are not typically seen as part of traditional military action. These skills are many and varied—and are so highly specialised—that SOF are often the only forces that possess these skills. Examples include:

- Explosive ordnance demolition/improvised explosive device exploitation,
- Sensitive site exploitation,
- Human intelligence collection,
- Biometrical analysis,
- Information operations,
- Public affairs operations,
- Psychological operations,
- Key leader engagement, and
- Military assistance.
NATO SOF have also been directed to provide the capability lead in for conventional force initiatives within the Alliance, both in terms of operational deployments as well as force restructuring and modernisation.

As a result of the Riga Summit, NATO now has the mechanism through which SOF can be utilised for NATO-sponsored missions. The formation of the NSCC gives NATO a dedicated effort for special operations, weighted in the same context as the other functional components. Once mature, NATO SOF will provide the Alliance with an effective, legitimate, credible capability which could effectively counter the political and military efforts of terrorist and other non-nation state threats, as well as act as the catalyst for further transformational reform across the Alliance.

Case study: the International Security Force in Afghanistan

The terrorist threat from Salafist extremism in Afghanistan has now mutated from a centralised Taliban into a decentralised, hierarchical, coherent insurgency across the entire nation, as well as in the sanctuaries that straddle the borders of neighbouring countries. While al Qaeda and the Taliban have been partly defeated, its new form—unstructured, flattened, distributed and ever-changing—is harder to locate, isolate and destroy. NATO, through its deployment of the International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), is now the principal operating force fighting the Taliban. The operational challenge for ISAF is particularly challenging, as it has experienced real difficulty in finding, tracking and engaging terrorists, whether in remote, rugged terrain or crowded cities.\textsuperscript{32}

The urgency for a SOF capability within NATO is no better demonstrated than in this current operation. Since 2002, NATO has been involved in enhancing the security and reconstruction of Afghanistan. While the operation has not been without its challenges, most experts agree that the use of SOF has been an essential component of NATO’s capacity to defeat the Taliban. Upon its formation in 2006, the NSCC immediately deployed a special operations component to Afghanistan, with the mission of supporting Commander ISAF’s plan to defeat the Taliban insurgency through the conduct of special operations.\textsuperscript{33} SOF have been used to conduct tasks ranging from attacks on terrorist camps, training the Afghan National Army and conducting hostage recovery operations. Direct action, strike and special reconnaissance intelligence operations have also led to the successful targeting of key Taliban leaders.

NATO SOF have so far proven to be lethal, well-trained and appropriately conditioned for this environment. The capabilities and strategic freedom of action that these forces have provided Commander ISAF have negated many of the traditional political and physical risks that have prevented close collaboration between NATO members in the past. Under the stewardship of the NSCC, a unity of effort among all special operations tactical units has emerged, enabling all SOF elements to conduct full spectrum operations by leveraging off each other’s capabilities.

The missions and skills that NATO SOF have demonstrated through its ISAF deployment have expanded the capacity, capabilities and contingency options for NATO both in its current operational theatres and future emerging environments. NATO SOF now provide a range of options that effectively expand the operational continuum for NATO, from passive surveillance and military assistance with local forces, to tasks such as direct action. Framework nations, such as the US via the facilitation of the NSCC, present significant national SOF capabilities that, when deployed in a collaborative context with fellow members, can be a multilateral tool for NATO military capability.
The longer-term vision for NATO SOF

There is every expectation that NATO SOF will be able to generate a world-class operational force, capable of deploying expeditionary tactical units to perform specialised missions in harsh, uncertain, hostile, denied and sensitive environments. This force will be capable of performing the aggressive F3EA targeting model mentioned earlier. NATO SOF, through joint force training and accreditation, will also continue to develop a high level of operational planning capacity through its training and accreditation centres, enabling NATO members to assign SOF to NSCC-led task forces that are trained, equipped and organised to conduct high-end special operations. This force will also act as the transformational conduit for the rest of NATO, who will modernise as a result of the NSTI demonstrating its effectiveness within SOF.

Conclusion

Just as NATO prevailed during the Cold War, NATO is compelled to stand against the threat of global terrorist groups. In order to generate the military effectiveness required to defeat extremism, a capable and relevant organisation must be built to prosecute the current war. NATO in its recent past has proven its resolve and has shown the willingness to transform itself in light of this new global security environment. NATO must continue to embrace SOF capability development.

SOF provide the capability to worry the enemy, keep him off balance and ultimately defeat him. Terrorists in Afghanistan have witnessed first-hand what NATO SOF can do. To them, the prospect of a high-performing NATO counterterrorism force, able to operate anywhere with speed, agility and lethality, while displaying democratic resolve and unity, is highly problematic and unwelcome. This is precisely how NATO and the broader Alliance can build a road map towards victory in the global war on terror.

*Lieutenant Colonel Ian Langford, DSC is a Commando officer within Special Operations Command. He has deployed as an operational commander with the Special Operations Task Group to Afghanistan. He has additionally served in that theatre with the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre on the 2008 review of ISAF special operations. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the US Marine Command and Staff College (2009) and was the 2010 Honour Graduate the USMC School of Advanced War-fighting. He has also served on multiple tours to Timor Leste, the broader Middle East, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and as part of Australia’s domestic counter-terrorist response.*
NOTES

7. The other significant political structure is the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Formally outside the NATO military structure, the assembly is a permanent institution designed to assist member-nation governments with their internal laws and policies as they pertain to NATO.
8. Kaplan, NATO Divided, p. 21. The ACO is tasked to form the basis of a functional command headquarters responsible for ensuring the Alliance has the capabilities and skills needed to transform the military component of NATO, improve interoperability and advise on the forces that need to be made available by members if NATO is to have the capacity to deploy forces quickly and reliably.
21. Jones, ‘Blueprint for change’, p. 39. These tasks are inherent to all NATO SOF.
23. The ‘BICES’ system is similar to the US ‘NIPR’ system that supports the sharing of NATO SECRET level intelligence across the Alliance. The sharing of intelligence has long been a problem to NATO but, thanks to the impetus of the NSTI, a solution has now been found. It is now possible within the Alliance to have countries as diverse as the US, Turkey, France and Slovenia all sharing the same secure communications systems.
27. NATO, 'Comprehensive Political Guidance', Part 3, Section 16.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY


Johnson, Rebecca and Micah Zenko, 'All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror', Parameters, Winter 2002-03, pp. 48-63


Leebaert, Derek, *To Dare to Conquer: special operations and the destiny of nations*, from Achilles to Al Qaeda, New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2006.


Peacekeepers: Athena’s champions

Commander ‘Sid’ Heal (Retd), formerly of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department

Introduction

Historically, war has been represented by the mythical Roman god Mars, by all accounts a very powerful but cruel and ill-tempered being. His brutal and bloodthirsty nature personified the horrors and savagery of war. As the modern world comes to grip with the difficulties in establishing and maintaining peace, the barbarous nature of Mars may not be the most appropriate symbol. The Greek goddess Athena was not only a goddess of war but of wisdom. Besides representing strategy, battle and victory, she was the embodiment of justice and leadership.

Making peace is not only fraught with danger but misperceptions and criticism. Notwithstanding the best intentions and purist motives of peacekeepers, tyranny is not defined by how it is imposed. But neither will peace be painless or easy; as described by one political leader, ‘making peace … is much harder than making war’.¹ In today’s peacekeeping operations, the warriors of Mars must become the champions of Athena. To be seen as ‘just’ is more important than to be seen as ‘powerful’. In the words of one US President, ‘the greatest honour history can bestow is that of peacemaker’.² It is in the hope of gaining a better understanding of the problem that the following insights are provided.

Peacekeeping as warfighting

Mobs and riots are not new phenomena. For at least 2,500 years, literature ranging from ancient Roman and Greek texts to the Bible recounts their mindless violence and destruction.³ Western history is likewise replete with notorious incidents, such as the rioting over civil rights and the Vietnam War in the US, to more recent problems in Ireland and Israel, not to mention the problems in failed states such as Yugoslavia, Haiti and Somalia. Governments’ efforts at quelling riots have ranged from local law enforcement to military intervention. While there are many similarities, an examination of peacekeeping and warfighting is a study of contrasts.

First, peacekeeping operations are highly sensitive to political objectives and tend to cast the military in a supporting rather than a leading role. Through centuries of real-world scenarios, the military has developed doctrine and honed procedures to prepare for and execute warfighting operations. Peacekeeping operations, however, present new and formidable challenges for which there are no readily apparent solutions. The problem is particularly complex because of the need to work with local authorities, nearly always in a supporting role.

Second, adversaries encountered during peacekeeping operations are difficult to define and even more difficult to identify. Factions with shifting loyalties and alliances can be ‘friend’ one day and ‘foe’ the next, and then ‘friend’ again the day after. These factions often seek to further their cause, not by winning, but by provoking a situation in which they can be seen as victims. The peacekeepers find themselves caught in a situation they wished to avoid from the start and then condemned for failing to resolve it effectively. While enemies can be conquered, this mercurial aspect of the adversaries in peacekeeping makes the application of any force difficult.
Third, while force is the predominant means of imposing the will of a commander in warfighting operations, it can actually be counter-productive in peacekeeping missions. The imposition of peace at any cost can be viewed as tyranny. The Roman historian Tacitus once noted that ‘a bad peace is even worse than war’. Victory is elusive but it is more likely to be determined by how a situation is handled than whether peacekeepers prevailed.

Fourth, the inherent destructive influences in a community are always in competition with society’s legitimate right to restrain them. These influences are manifested as either compliance to mandates imposed by legitimate authority or as defiance in contempt of efforts to enforce them. Because these factors never exist in perfect harmony, there is a dynamic tension between those who comply with the rules and behaviour that govern civilised society and those individuals or groups who defy them. Consequently, a peacekeeping mission will never be completely achieved. When stability is restored, the mission remains, whereby the military peacekeeping force is merely exchanged for civilian law enforcement.

**Citizens as warriors**

The evolution of a law-abiding member of the community to a dangerous and menacing antagonist is one that has been studied for centuries. In 408 BC, Euripides noted that ‘mobs in their emotions are much like children, subject to the same tantrums and fits of fury’. Like children, members of mobs tend to be emotional, unreasoning and immature. They are inclined to act out their frustrations rather than make attempts at meaningful resolution. And the manner in which this occurs tends to be one of growth and escalation. Mobs do not simply appear—they evolve.

As a result of demonstrations in the US over the Vietnam War and civil rights, a large amount of research was done in this area during the late 1960s and early 1970s. After a hiatus of some years, more advancement was made in the 1990s with studies of the Intifada uprisings in Israel and the ‘marching season’ disturbances in Ireland. Based on this research, some generalisations can be made which provide a snapshot view of the process. One of the most important is that the long-held and widespread belief that individuals in mobs are transformed into mindless automatons, surrendering to the desires and actions of the masses, has largely been debunked. Modern sociological research suggests that:

- Crowds are not simply a collection of individuals who happen to be at the same time and place but rather are comprised of ‘companion clusters’. These are small groups of people who are friends, family members or acquaintances and they tend to arrive, gather, act and leave together.

- Crowds are not homogenous entities; that is, participants retain their personal feelings of identity, goals, mores, motivations and inhibitions.

- The behaviour of individual members of a crowd is always ‘objective oriented’; that is, individual motivations are purposive and directed at attaining some goal. Actions that do not achieve satisfactory results or result in personal penalties tend not to be repeated.

- Members of a crowd nearly never act in unison and, when they do, their actions tend to be short-lived. Even benign collective actions that seem to be unanimous, such as applause, booing, singing etc, will not achieve 100 per cent participation. The more complex and malevolent the behaviour, the less likely it is that uncommitted members of the crowd will participate. And the more complex the behaviour, the more short-lived it will tend to be.
Mobs as adversaries

Mobs do not fit the customary understanding of an 'enemy'. While a violent mob can be every bit as formidable as an army, it lacks conventional attributes such as a formal command and control architecture, definable objectives or a unified focus of effort. There is no independent will but rather a loose and temporary coalition of intentions. Its motivation may be more evil than ideology, and its members are likely driven by emotion rather than a sense of duty. Leaders are more likely to be charismatic than competent. The ‘operation’ is more likely to be spontaneous than pre-planned. Furthermore, unlike armies, mobs can win by losing, because issues are ultimately decided by how a mob is treated not whether their actions were successful.

Nevertheless, the lack of an ‘enemy’ in peacekeeping operations should not be confused with a lack of adversaries. In fact, adversaries abound. Fractions of the community may be aligned along family or ethnic lines, or based on religious, economic or political beliefs, or some combination of several. Further complicating matters is that when circumstances dictate, these factions often seek temporary alliances with other factions to further their own ends. The relationships between these groups are perpetual and dynamic. The only thing certain is that intervention of any type will appease some while infuriating others.

Because mobs are evolutionary in nature, there are distinct phases that comprise the ‘life cycle’ of a crowd. Even an elementary understanding of these phases provides reliable clues for making decisions, exploiting weaknesses and avoiding conflict.

The first phase is the assembling process. This involves the congregation of people from different locations to a common place and time. During the assembling process, the companion clusters autonomously arrive and move to an assembly area, either impromptu or as part of an organised effort, as in a protest or demonstration. Impromptu assemblies are, by nature, spontaneous and ad hoc, and the process proceeds by general consensus, usually by word-of-mouth. Besides an attraction of some sort, the two conditions that favour the impromptu assembling process are easy access to the assembly area and no competing demands. Organised assemblies, however, tend to follow suggestions from a common source. Accordingly, strong clues are available for determining intentions. Furthermore, organised assemblies heavily rely on networks to attract, coordinate and focus the individual members into a cohesive force. During the assembling process, the dispersion, lack of cohesion and lack of focus of the still-evolving crowd present the best opportunities for interventions without widespread resistance.

The second phase is the temporary gathering. This is achieved when individuals and small groups are converged and often (but not always) engage in some type of collective behaviour. While about 40 different types of behaviour have been observed, they can be generally grouped into six distinct categories. These are locomotion, as in marching in a protest; orientation, as in facing a common attraction during a speech or other activity; vocalisation, as in whistling, hissing or booing; verbalisation, as in speaking, chanting or singing; gesticulation, as in gesturing, ‘flipping the finger’ or waving fists; and manipulation, as in applauding, grasping, lifting or throwing objects, overturning cars, barricades and so forth.

When disturbances begin, they also tend to follow an evolutionary progression. The process usually begins with disruptive acts that may be obnoxious, and even illegal, but relatively
harmless, such as blocking traffic or yelling profanities before progressing to crimes against property, especially acts of vandalism. More serious crimes, such as looting and arson, may then ensue before attacks against people, especially the authorities. The larger the gathering, the less likely all members will participate and often members of the gathering are at odds with each other, particularly when some attempt to maintain or restore order.

The last phase is the dispersal process. Dispersals are simply the dissolution of the temporary gathering. There are generally three types of dispersals. The routine dispersal, as the name implies, is uneventful and may occur either by the general inclination of a crowd at the conclusion of an event or in the case of organised gatherings, be predetermined, often specified during the assembling process. Emergency dispersals result from members of a crowd fleeing from a perceived danger, such as a fire, explosion or bomb threat. Coerced dispersals are the third type. As the name implies, this type of dispersal is by force. Coerced dispersals are usually employed only as a last resort because, at best, they are difficult to achieve and, at worst, may provide a catalyst to incite members of a crowd into violence. Because of the informal bonds and alliances that often develop amongst people even casually acquainted, intervention during a dispersal is usually ill-advised and second only to the gathering phase for inciting an antagonistic response.

The city as a battlespace

Some little known but interesting facts about riots are that they almost never occur in the morning or during extremes of weather. They rarely occur in rural areas and almost always last less than one day. The rioters are mostly males in their late teens through late twenties and unarmed. When they do arm themselves, it is with rocks and bottles or primitive weapons, such as clubs and slingshots. Their leaders emerge from the mob rather than being chosen by it. Certainly there are exceptions but they are anomalies. Regardless, urban terrain is their chosen ground and when understanding the city as a battlespace, seven characteristics distinguish it from rural terrain.

- Urban terrain provides a definite defensive advantage. Even the most novice adversary quickly learns to exploit the well-fortified positions which offer cover and concealment. Authorities must manoeuvre over terrain which makes them vulnerable to missiles thrown from upper stories and behind buildings. Manoeuvre is often also constricted because of channelled or compartmented terrain.

- While a 50-foot cliff is a formidable obstacle in the rural environment, a two-story building can be a ‘show stopper’ in the urban environment. Rioters frequently move up and down multiple-story buildings or even through basements, sewers and crawl spaces. This three-dimensional quality makes for difficult tactics as well as complicating command, control and communications.

- Adversaries are engaged at extremely close ranges, often less than 20 feet. Targets appear fleetingly and along restricted lines of sight. Snipers are just as likely to be armed with handguns and take shots of opportunity rather than use a rifle from an established position.

- Communications in urban terrain are often restricted and sporadic. Coupled with spontaneous and brief encounters at close ranges, the necessity for decentralised control becomes apparent. Small units are required to operate almost independently, yet rely upon adjacent units for reinforcements and higher headquarters for logistical support and sustainment. Consequently, centralised planning is critical.
• There is always the presence of a civilian population. It is virtually impossible to move through a populated area without being detected. Likewise, people may become involved in tactical operations simply because they are present.

• Unlike the rural environment, which has few reflective surfaces and no direct lighting, the urban environment has both. Under all conditions, except war, a city is characterised by harsh shadows and glaring, often dazzling lights. This uneven ambient light makes difficult the attainment of night vision.11

• Buildings in the city are more than hollow terrain features. Buildings have value. Besides their tactical significance, buildings may have cultural, historical, religious or political value. Churches, synagogues, museums, city halls and so forth, are only a few examples. Similarly, the loss of a retail outlet which sells guns would have greater tactical significance than the loss of a grocery or clothing store.

Riots as battles

Anyone who has ever been in both riots and battles can attest to the almost palpable emotion. Both foster widespread feelings of rage, fear, confusion, anguish, indignation and excitement. Both give rise to the best and worst of human motives and actions. Feats of extraordinary heroism can be as commonplace as despicable acts of cowardice and selfishness. However, there are two fundamental differences. The first is that while battles are joined by deliberate and conscious effort, riots erupt from a unique and temporary set of circumstances. This is because what starts a riot and what causes a riot are distinctly and fundamentally different.

Riots are primarily caused by deep-seated social problems such as bigotry, economic disparity, perceived injustice or discrimination. These entrenched and convoluted influences may have existed for centuries and are well beyond the abilities of any peacekeeping force to reconcile. The spark that ignites these emotion-laden issues, however, frequently results from an act of authority. Regardless of how unintentional or benign the action, in the context of emotion, nothing is so insignificant that it cannot be blown out of proportion.12 Even lack of intervention can become a catalyst because members of a mob feel empowered when authorities demonstrate a lack of ability or willingness to stop them. During the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, the image of a truck driver named Reginald Denny being beaten was repeatedly broadcast throughout the early stages of the disturbance. The lack of intervention by law enforcement was not only conspicuous but sent an implicit message that they were either unable or unwilling to intervene.

The second is that while battles are fought after careful deliberation and planning, riots follow a more impulsive and unconstrained path. Battles are joined, riots evolve.13 The progression from a law-abiding crowd to an unreasoning mob can occur very quickly but follows some identifiable steps that not only provide early warnings but frequently offer opportunities to intervene at earlier and less dangerous stages. The most essential factor in understanding this progression is to recognise the difference between a crowd and a mob.
A crowd is simply a gathering or assemblage of people. They are lawful in nature and, while they may be very vocal and expressive, they will generally follow instructions from legitimate authority. Tactical actions in controlling crowds are usually limited to traffic and pedestrian flow or resolving minor disputes over issues such as seating at a parade, blocking traffic or trespassing. Mobs, on the other hand, are belligerent, provocative and violent. They represent a formidable threat and are almost impossible to control. Tactical actions are usually defensive and protective in nature and include efforts to defend buildings, prevent looting and arson and avoid injuries. Crowds require control, whereas mobs require intervention. The importance of preventing a crowd from evolving into a mob needs no further justification.

Rules of engagement as laws of war

Rules of engagement (ROE) are the linchpin in peacekeeping operations. Without exception, every plan and action is shaped and adapted to conform with the constraints and restraints imposed by these regulations. Without them, a peacekeeping force tends to rely on ad hoc strategies where rules seem impromptu and/or arbitrary. A predicament materialises, however, because ‘keeping the peace’ and ‘fighting for peace’ are distinctly different missions and require different ROE. For example, peacekeeping operations are typically constrained to use the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission. ROE in these circumstances are designed to prevent the start or escalation of a conflict. Hence, use-of-force policies adopt a defensive posture, requiring demonstrated hostile intent before deadly force is justified. Force policies more closely resemble those for law enforcement agencies than military units. Accordingly, missions encountered by peacekeeping forces require the ability to adapt and use force proactively.

While this sounds easy in concept, difficulties arise in application. Historically, ROE have only been required to address issues involving lethal force. With the advent of non-lethal devices, an array of options (and problems) has arisen. For example, commanders are gaining an increasing ability to impose their will at an earlier stage in a conflict. Because the effects of non-lethal options are temporary, however, adversaries quickly become more resilient, which then requires commensurately more force. Further, the same adversaries are free to return to the scene, often wiser and more defiant than before. When describing this phenomenon during the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, one frustrated commander related that his efforts were the equivalent to ‘ploughing water’.

Second, political and humanitarian concerns usually require injured adversaries to be accepted and cared for. Thus peacekeeping forces are required to live with the ‘enemy’s’ wounded. Third, employment doctrine which has supported lethal options for thousands of years is virtually non-existent in the non-lethal arena. Tactical remedies tend to be extemporaneous, improvised and temporary. The impact ROE have on a successful peacekeeping operation cannot be overestimated. In societies so bereft of meaningful government that military intervention is necessary to restore and/or maintain a peace, ROE become the de facto ‘law of the land’. In this role, they personify the minimum standards of conduct by which civilised people are judged. Consequently, ROE become the standard against which the justness and humaneness of the efforts peacekeeping forces are measured.

The crafting of these rules then becomes of utmost interest to forces assigned to peacekeeping missions. Virtually all of the treaties and agreements which govern the conduct and weapons of war predate non-lethal devices and are outmoded. International laws, treaties, national
policies and customs may serve as guidelines. However, completely adequate criteria have never been crafted. For instance, of the tens of thousands of policing agencies in the world, not one shares an identical force policy. That military forces facing similar missions now find themselves in the same dilemma should come as no surprise. The inherent right to self-defence is offset by the risk a commander must accept before acting. These are competing influences which are present in every peacekeeping encounter. Too late or too little, and peacekeepers can easily find themselves victims. Too soon or too much, and force becomes a catalyst for the very situation a commander is trying to avoid.

**Weapons of peace**

When dealing with riots and mobs, the ability to impose the will of the commander cannot be achieved by mere force. If it were that simple, more force would automatically equate with victory. What is more likely to lead to success in peacekeeping operations is not the *amount* of force but rather the *type* of force and how it is used. The American psychologist, Abraham Maslow, is reported to have said that ‘if the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to think of every problem as a nail’. Non-lethal weapons may take many forms, including foams, water, lights or even smells. Thus, the ‘weapons of peace’ may not be weapons at all.

Generally speaking, there are five classes of non-lethal technology. The most well known are anti-personnel; that is, restraining individuals from doing something. Devices designed to achieve this goal act either directly on an individual or indirectly through the use of barriers or area denial of some type. Because anti-personnel devices can be used to prevent a person from driving (anti-mobility) or entering or escaping from an area (area denial) they are the most versatile of all the classes.

The second class is anti-mobility. These devices are designed to prevent the use of vehicles or other types of transportation. The third is area delay or denial. These are intended to inhibit or prevent passage through or access to an area. The fourth is anti-materiel. These attempt to render useless those necessary supplies and support necessary for warfighting. The fifth class attempts to affect an entire infrastructure. These may take the form of gathering and manipulating information, as from computers or communications, or in degrading or inhibiting their use by an opponent. Power, water, communications and mass transportation are common examples of functions which could be targets for this class.

In peacekeeping operations, a force that employs non-lethal options gains six distinct advantages over one which does not:

- First, non-lethal options are **more humane**. Although this may seem overly simplistic, it is, after all, difficult to make a case for a humanitarian effort while killing the people you are sent to protect.
- Second, they allow a commander to **exert more control** over a situation. Because non-lethal options require substantially less provocation before engagement, a commander can provide a quicker response and intervene at earlier and less dangerous stages of a situation.
- Third, they provide a commander with much **more flexibility and freedom** of action. No longer constrained to apply lethal force and ‘repeat as necessary’, a commander can tailor his or her response to more properly fit the circumstances.
• Fourth, they are less likely to provoke others. Consequently, bystanders are less likely to be sympathetic toward persons who defy a peacekeeping force but are not killed. Further, should it be necessary to resort to lethal force, the fact that non-lethal options had proven ineffective not only supports a need for escalation but provides an implicit, and almost irrefutable, message of restraint.

• Fifth, these options are less likely to raise public outcry. All peacekeeping operations are controversial and public support may ultimately be the key factor in peacekeeping operations. Even Napoleon acknowledged that ‘public opinion is the ruler of the world’.15

• Finally, they force an adversary to declare intentions. The most difficult problem in using force in peacekeeping operations is not how much or what type to be used but rather whether it should be used at all. For example, a potential adversary approaching a checkpoint may be attempting to get close enough for his weapon to be effective or simply not understand the English commands to halt. Continuing after the employment of a non-lethal option, however, presumes hostile intent because it sends a cross-cultural and language-independent signal of sanction.

Fundamental to employing non-lethal alternatives is a thorough understanding of a concept called the ‘force continuum’. Historically, military objectives have been achieved by killing or destroying an enemy. Force was always deadly, hence effectiveness was judged only to the extent and speed at which death or destruction could be introduced. A huge gap existed between presenting a threat and carrying it out. When force is viewed as a continuum, an array of options presents itself. The beginning of this continuum is initiated by a threat, while deadly force takes its proper position at the other end. Non-lethal alternatives allow a commander to increase and decrease the amount of force necessary to accomplish a mission. Movement up and down the force continuum is generally continuous and seamless, yet a careful examination reveals five broad categories.

Entry into the force spectrum begins with a threat of some sort. This may be an ‘expressed threat’, such as when a commander makes known the consequences of defiance, or an ‘implied threat’, in which the nature of the consequences are left to the imagination of an antagonist. Of the two, the implied threat is far more powerful. Although there are several reasons for this, the most predominant is because what a peacekeeping force can do and what it is willing to do are often farther apart than an adversary realises. Even the mere presence of a peacekeeping force creates an escalation of force because it creates a condition which requires an adversary to contemplate his actions. Thus an implied threat is implicit in virtually every encounter. This condition prevails throughout the spectrum and should be exploited to the maximum extent possible.

The next major category involves physical force of some type which is not coercive in nature. Generally, this includes those devices which engage an antagonist strictly on his own volition without intervention by a member of the peacekeeping force. Examples may include concertina, catlrops (sharp nails or spines arranged so that one always points up), barbed wire or other obstacles. They are placed relatively low on the force continuum, not because of the amount of injury likely to be sustained but because they are benign without the wilful defiance of the individual attempting to thwart them.
Higher on the continuum would come munitions which cause physical discomfort but fall short of inflicting trauma. Examples would include ‘flash-bangs’, tear gas, pepper spray and the like. Although the discomfort or injury may be substantially less than from a caltrop or concertina wire, the employment of these options requires a decision to intervene and are thus subject to the idiosyncrasies of the individual employing them. Still higher on the continuum are munitions that inflict trauma. Examples might include batons, saps, sting-balls, bean bags, pellet munitions and so forth. They are generally the point on the force continuum which separates non-lethal from deadly force.

Highest on the spectrum are lethal options. Although the particular conditions which merit deadly force should be identified, lethal options should always be regarded as part of the force continuum and not as a separate option altogether. This avoids ambiguity and confusion as to when they are authorised. Many situations rapidly evolve from less dangerous circumstances before requiring deadly force to resolve. An individual who is free to employ a variety of options is more likely to be proactive, retain the initiative and be quicker to recognise situations requiring deadly force than one compelled to examine a situation isolated by either/or parameters.

In the latter stages of World War 2, US President Roosevelt stated that ‘peace, like war, can succeed only where there is a will to enforce it and where there is available power to enforce it’. Making peace is a more noble calling than making war but it is not an easy pursuit. The road to peace more closely resembles a Möbius strip17; twisted, never ending and somewhat mysterious. Likewise, the ‘peace warriors’ must be imaginative, adaptable and prudent. When the battles are riots and the adversaries are mobs, Athena’s champions are better qualified than Mars’ warriors.

Charles ‘Sid’ Heal retired as a Commander from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department in 2008, after nearly 33 years of service, more than half of which was spent in units charged with handling law enforcement and emergency operations. In addition, he recently retired from the Marine Corps Reserve after 35 years and four tours of combat. He is the author of ‘Sound Doctrine’ and more than 100 articles on law enforcement subjects. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Police Science from California State University, a Master’s degree in Public Administration from the University of Southern California and a Master’s degree in Management from California Polytechnic University. He is also a graduate of the FBI’s National Academy and the California Command College.
NOTES

1. Statement by Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein political party, on Charlie Rose WNET television show, 2 February 1994.
3. References to mobs and riots in Roman texts date to the first century BC and Greek texts date back to at least 425 BC, while Biblical references (Book of Ezekiel) can be reliably dated to at least the first half of the 6th century BC.
4. Cornelius Tacitus, circa 56 AD.
6. Among the foremost sociologists involved in these studies are Dr Clark McPhail, Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois and Dr Peter A.J. ‘Tank’ Waddington, University of Reading (UK).
7. These beliefs have their roots in academia at the end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries when behavioural scientists believed that individuals came to act under the influence of a ‘crowd mind’. These stereotypes persist to this day.
8. These networks are often the ‘centre of gravity’ for an organised assembly.
9. This is not to imply that mobs are not dangerous. The oldest form of execution is stoning and hundreds around the world are killed and injured from mob violence each year.
10. Studies in the US have shown that the vast majority of police officer-involved shootings occur in 3-5 seconds at less than 15 feet.
11. There are two reasons for this. When exposed to bright light, the pupil of the eye will constrict in about ½ second. Additionally, night vision is gained largely through a fluid in the eye called rhodopsin. When exposed to bright light, this fluid quickly ‘bleaches’ out and can take as much as 30 minutes to return to its previous colour and low light vision capabilities.
12. The violent riots in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries in the spring of 2005 over the unfounded rumour that a Koran had been desecrated by Americans in Guantánamo is only one poignant example.
13. The single exception is when something causes a crowd to panic. Members of this type of mob are fleeing from some perceived threat such as a flood, fire or earthquake. Even so, the crowd must have already formed, which is an evolutionary process itself.
14. In frigid weather, a spray of water can be a strong deterrent. In freezing weather, ice provides attraction against both vehicles and pedestrians. Malodorous agents (smells) work by obnoxious or nauseating odours.
15. Napoleon I, Maxims (1804-05) ‘All becomes easy when we follow the current of opinion; it is the ruler of the world’.
16. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, during a speech at the Foreign Policy Association in New York, 21 October 1944.
17. A Möbius strip or band is a surface with only one side and only one boundary component. It has the mathematical property of being non-orientable.
Managing Global Supply Chains

Wing Commander Neil R. Collie, RAAF

Introduction

In June 2010, Joint Logistics Command circulated a discussion paper titled ‘Capability Development, Sustainment and Stovepipes: Project Support Concepts and Joint Logistics Command’ to key logistics appointees in Defence. The issues under particular scrutiny were the ‘global supply chain’ and ‘global fleet support arrangements’. This article—with the permission of the paper’s co-authors—revisits these issues and refines the discussion for a broader Defence forum.

The article will describe the supply chain and global supply chain constructs and emphasise the need for effective supply chain management. It will discuss concerns regarding individual Defence capabilities being managed under global fleet support arrangements and outline past and current work that has been or is being done overseas and in Australia in addressing some of these concerns and re-emphasise the importance of continued work in this area.

The supply chain, global supply chain and supply chain management

The ‘global supply chain’ construct is an extension of the ‘supply chain’ construct used to describe the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances and information from a source to an end-user. Academic and training texts typically describe supply chains in the form of linear models. In a linear model, supply chains are characterised by a series of nodal points that represent stakeholder facilities, where static value-add activities occur, such as raw material production, manufacture, assembly, storage and distribution planning.

A number of entities pass through these nodal points, notably products and services intended for the end-user (the boxes) but also importantly the information and data flow (the bytes) and financial transfers (the bucks) required to make the enterprise work. The human input consists of the workforce that manages and operates the supply chain (the bodies) and the knowledge and skills (the brains) required by the workforce.

Nodal points are linked to each other by channels that direct the downstream flow of goods and services, the upstream and downstream flows of information and data, the generally upstream flow of financial transfers and the reverse entities such as waste and items for recycle or repair. These entities are transferred from one node to the next. Value-adding activities are the transfer and distribution services. Modes typically describe a distribution method, for example, road, rail, sea, air, inland waterway or pipeline but also include the information transfer medium, such as an ADF communications component or commercial telecommunications or other service provider.

The key point about supply chains is that each product or service that moves downstream will follow its own path, with multiple products and services flowing—not unlike a river joining with its tributaries—towards the customer. The alternative ‘rope’ metaphor describes individual supply chains as fibres that are progressively braided into a rope at the business end, namely the customer. In a global supply chain, nodal points are typically located in several
different countries. In simple terms, the supply chain model is ‘globalised’ by locating the nodal points in different countries and separating those countries by an international border.

Global supply chains have emerged as a direct result of commercial globalisation, that is, the worldwide integration and coordination of economic activities supported by global communications, a global financial system and global logistics services.\(^5\) In this context, stakeholders seeking to reduce costs are able to exploit both their own advantages and the comparative advantages offered by other countries, such as lower labour costs, access to technology and production capacity.\(^5\) Understandably, global supply chains are complex, not least because of issues of culture, distance, the requirement for intermediaries at key nodal points, differing standards of infrastructure, border crossing regulations and so on.\(^7\)

Much of the materiel comprising the inputs to ADF capability is acquired from overseas. Hence, the reality is that Defence has been managing global supply chains in one form or other for some time. The support to imported capability has traditionally involved large amounts of Defence control and ownership. However, over the last two decades—and driven by a series of Defence reviews aimed at increasing efficiency and reducing costs—internal ownership and control of logistics and support functions in Defence has progressively been released. Defence’s confidence in its own ability to outsource non-core logistics functions has increased to where third-party provider support has become the norm.

Nevertheless, while much of the responsibility for various activities within the Defence supply chain may have been outsourced, Defence remains accountable for the combined effect. Complex supply chains obviously require skilled management and supply chain management (SCM) has emerged as a recognised business discipline that:

... encompasses the planning and management of all activities involved in the sourcing and procurement, conversion and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers and customers. In essence, SCM integrates supply and demand management within and across companies.\(^8\)

The appointment of Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG) as the senior military officer accountable for the oversight and assurance of the Defence logistics capability\(^9\) effectively makes CJLOG the senior Defence SCM. CJLOG provides either direct management or oversight of the Defence supply chain ‘in order to ensure effective integration and coordination of Defence logistics support for all domestic and operational requirements’.\(^10\) In executing this responsibility—and in order to remain fully accountable—CJLOG must be able to achieve complete supply chain visibility.

**Global fleet support arrangements**

An increasing number of Defence acquisitions involving original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are to be provided under a ‘global fleet support arrangement’. These are common in the airline industry, where a complete logistics solution package is often offered the customer airline, typically incorporating research and development, spare parts pooling and warehouse/inventory management.\(^11\) The logic is that an OEM can achieve economies of scale across an entire (and often globally-dispersed) fleet, much of which would be expected to flow to the customer.\(^12\)
Many OEMs of commercial equipment are also OEMs of military hardware and many have aggressively marketed the potential benefits of global fleet support arrangements. Defence has become involved in a number of these arrangements, most notably in support of C-17 Globemaster aircraft (and similar arrangements are planned in support of the Joint Strike Fighter). The perceived benefits of a direct reduction in ownership costs, access to established support infrastructure, and interoperability with allied nations are clearly attractive. However, there are concerns that some decisions may have been made without sufficient regard to the indirect costs and the potential impact that future support requirements may have on the Defence supply chain.

Where a global fleet support arrangement is proposed, a robust business case analysis (BCA) must support the proposal. This should comprise a full analysis and comparison of the options. It must define the performance requirements that all support solution options must achieve and, as accurately as possible, estimate and compare the total cost of ownership over the capability life cycle. The BCA should include a full analysis and comparison of explicit and implied Defence supply chain tasks, including the training requirement, the costs associated with equipping personnel to execute those tasks and the costs associated with necessary changes to the Defence supply chain infrastructure.

There are also certain specific risks and concerns that must be considered and, if necessary, mitigated which include:

- The perceived limited Defence influence on contractor and other customer behaviour,
- Allowable knowledge sharing,
- The security and assurance of supply,
- Use of proprietary logistics information systems,
- Use of an OEM’s proprietary parts inventory codification system, and
- The deployability of supply systems.

**Defence influence on the contractor and other customer behaviour**

Once Defence commits itself to a global fleet support arrangement, control over strategic fleet management policy as it affects the Australian portion of the fleet may be compromised or lost. By definition, a global fleet support arrangement involves other customers who have a stake in goods and services that are part of the arrangement. Of concern is the potential behaviour of other customers. Where their interests do not necessarily align, the customer community may operate in a condition known as ‘co-opetition’.13

Examples are where customers compete for more than their fair share of the common resource. Some competitors may indulge in selfish behaviour, such as stockpiling and the abuse of any priority system that may exist. Two potential effects are of concern: loss of control over inventory share (where others deplete the inventory to satisfy their own national interests) and loss of control over inventory apportionment (where the OEM acts to regulate customer behaviour ‘for the greater good’ as perceived by the OEM). Hence, any partnering arrangement must include an examination of the strategy to retain control over strategic fleet management policy as it affects the Australian portion of the global fleet. Also scrutinised should be the strategy to ensure that Australian interests prevail in conditions of ’co-opetition’, particularly in relation to pooled inventory share and apportionment.
Knowledge sharing

Shared information and trust are key requirements for global fleet support arrangements to be successful.\(^4\) However, much of the customer data that an OEM needs to determine maintenance and inventory strategies may be classified or commercially sensitive. Defence has to ensure that the proposed knowledge and information sharing strategies are in place and, wherever possible, be ready to release information that it might have traditionally protected, as lack of trust and insufficient knowledge sharing are the conditions behind the failure of 50-70 per cent of commercial partnering relationships.\(^5\)

Security and assurance of supply

Arrangements to address the security and assurance of supply of spares and other services must also be addressed. These arrangements must assure supply in conditions of 'surge' or significant fluctuation in operating tempo and rates of effort that induce dramatic demand oscillation. In the military context, rates of effort under normal activities can be relatively easily predicted and factored into demand forecasting algorithms that form the basis of the pooled inventory management strategy. However, major exercises, the work-up to foreseen and unforeseen operations, and the conduct of protracted operations will likely induce demand oscillation that generally swings upwards, which is difficult to predict mathematically.

The potential effect of such oscillations on the pooled inventory must be fully analysed and factored into the OEM inventory strategy as 'hedging', 'reserve', 'safety' or 'anticipation' stock\(^6\) but also to cover the situation should 'stock outs' occur where more than one customer experiences a concurrent increase in operating tempo. Three questions should be considered to address these issues. Firstly, in a situation where both Australia and the OEM’s country of origin react to a contingency, will the OEM be compelled to service its own country first? Secondly, if the situation arises where the OEM’s country of origin disagrees or objects to Australia’s participation in a particular contingency, will the OEM be prevented from servicing Australian capability? Lastly, in a situation where several other countries—all participants in the same global fleet support arrangement—react to a contingency, where does Australia lie in the pecking order?

Use of proprietary logistics information systems

Several OEMs, including Lockheed Martin and Boeing, offer proprietary logistics information systems (LIS) that service a global fleet capability through a 'hole-in-the-wall' concept. Under this concept, the customer inputs demands on the pooled inventory via a discrete portal, where the software is hosted either on the customer’s or the OEM’s enterprise architecture. The use of proprietary LIS and how it may or may not interface with Defence’s LIS—and how much it may cost to achieve this—is a major issue.

In isolation, and as a commercial prospect, proprietary LIS appear an attractive proposition. However, a number of difficulties emerge. Proprietary LIS raise concerns as to security, Defence-approved software issues, licensing issues and so on, particularly were the LIS need to be loaded on the Defence restricted or secret communications networks. The central concern is deployability into a hostile or austere operating environment, where there is typically limited bandwidth available for 'reach-back' by the deployed—and in all likelihood secure—communications system.
Similarly, the initial and ongoing training liability for personnel that operate individual or multiple proprietary LIS, in addition to generic Defence LIS, may be significant. It should also be noted that the use of proprietary LIS goes counter to the Defence intention to rationalise the range of current-use LIS and limit the use of non-standard LIS in the future. The stated intent by Defence for the new military integrated logistics information system (MILIS), for example, is ‘to provide a platform for a single system of standardised logistics processes across Defence in order to provide end-to-end visibility of the Defence supply chain and the removal of the requirement for multiple logistics systems’.17

Hence, any proposal to use proprietary LIS in a global fleet support arrangement should include scrutiny of its capability to interface with the existing Defence non-secure and secure communications and IT systems, in particular MILIS. This scrutiny must elicit any additional costs associated with the use of LIS, including hardware, software, software licensing and training. For deployable systems, the analysis should aim to determine the estimated bandwidth requirement and the potential for this to increase as and when proprietary LIS hardware or software is updated.

Proprietary parts inventory codification system

In certain global fleet support arrangements, some OEMs favour the use of their own proprietary parts inventory codification system. Problems associated with such systems can compound with each additional global support arrangement, particularly where each OEM may insist that only ‘OEM genuine parts’ may be used on ‘their’ system. The Defence inventory could end up in the entirely unacceptable position of being stocked with multiple ‘solely for the use of’ brands of the same generic item, that may be codified differently, located in separate storage locations and subject to a different inventory strategy. So the BCA must include a full analysis of any proposal to use the OEM’s proprietary parts inventory codification system. The proposal must also include an assessment of the system’s validity in accordance with extant Defence policy and its legality under Australian law.

Deployability of supply systems

Defence cannot assume that a Middle East area of operations (MEAO) support model is appropriate or valid for all capability employment scenarios. The MEAO model is appropriate where predominantly US-based OEMs are available to service their major customer and have established reasonable support structures which the ADF can access. However, in prosecuting Australia’s other ‘principal Defence tasks’,18 the availability of OEM services cannot be based on an assumed US military presence. The BCA must include an analysis of the deployability of supply systems in the context of all four ‘principal Defence tasks’, including an assessment of Defence’s capacity to act independently within any constraints imposed by the global fleet support arrangement.

The BCA should also include an assessment of:

- The potential cost of making the OEM available in the area of operations (AO) in the absence of other global fleet support arrangement customers,
- An austerity threshold that defines the point beyond which the system may not be sufficiently rugged to operate effectively,
• A contractor hazard threshold that defines a point beyond which contractors or personnel employed by the OEM cannot proceed due to unacceptable physical risk,

• A communications infrastructure threshold that defines a point beyond which the deployed communications infrastructure cannot support OEM communication and IT requirements, and

• The capability unique logistics and support footprint required in an AO.

Addressing global fleet support concerns

The challenges faced by Defence are also being faced by the US, UK and others. In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project, technology transfer and ‘operational sovereignty’ are serious issues in the UK. Other potential partners are struggling with similar concerns. Italy, for example, shares the UK’s unease over potential loss of industrial, technological and operational sovereignty and the legality of spares ownership arrangements. It is understood, through informal discussion with USAF and RAF logistics, that both the US Department of Defense and the UK Ministry of Defence (MODUK) have stipulated that all proprietary LIS must interface with their national military LIS. Both are also understood to be insisting they must maintain national inventory visibility and accountability, and retain control over the training liability for logistics and support personnel.

Faced with multiple national and global fleet support arrangements, the British have developed the ‘Purple Gate’ integrated distribution solution. It is based on five principles: the control of materiel and equipment entering the joint supply chain; centralised control and consolidation of the flow of materiel; a common standard consignment tracking method; agreed standards of physical and documentary consignment preparation; and access to joint supply chain transport and materiel-handling facilities to enable onward movement to air and sea ports of embarkation.

The impetus for ‘Purple Gate’ stemmed from dissatisfaction as to the level of uncontrolled and independent distribution activities in support of individual platforms in the Middle East and was developed as a method to reimpose supply chain discipline. ‘Purple Gate’ thinking has already been subject to Joint Logistics Command scrutiny as a potentially useful model and could be extended in an Australian context to encompass the three mutually-dependent networks—logistics control, logistics information and logistics physical—described in the ‘Future Joint Logistics Concept 2025’.

The way forward

This ‘triple network’ thinking is likely to be further explored in the forthcoming ‘Future Joint Logistics Concept 2030’ as a pathway to achieving the ‘synchronised and integrated, robust and flexible, innovative and responsive’ Defence supply chain that is at the heart of CJLOG’s vision for Defence logistics to 2030, which foresees a ‘robust, flexible and responsive logistics system capable of providing future support to operations in a global context’.

Not unlike the MODUK supply chain, Australia’s Defence supply chain comprises ‘traditional’ products and services, sourced via bilateral or multilateral/coalition agreements, OEM national or global fleet support arrangements or local contracting within an AO from third party
providers or host nation support. To return to the rope metaphor mentioned earlier, there has to be a point at which the various fibres that represent the individual supply chains are integrated into the rope that is the Defence supply chain.

How this integration will be achieved is yet to be determined. However, the principle of integration should be fundamental. Useful work in this regard has commenced in the Aerospace Systems Division (ASD) in the Defence Materiel Organisation. Currently in early development, the ASD ‘supply support solutions envelope’ (SSSE) is a tool that aims to identify how existing or future supply chains will integrate with the Defence supply chain. The SSSE shows much promise, with the possibility that a fully-developed model will be applied across Defence. The further development of this model should be strongly encouraged and supported across Defence, with particular attention to developing sound integration parameters that may then be applied as Defence supply chain policy.

Conclusion

This article has described the supply chain and global supply chain constructs and has emphasised the need for effective and integrated supply chain management under global fleet support arrangements. It is not proposed that Defence should avoid global fleet support arrangements. However, any proposal to provide capability support through such arrangements must be critically assessed. Defence must also exploit the work that has already been done overseas in addressing some of the concerns regarding global fleet support arrangements, acknowledge the importance of current work being conducted in Australia and encourage future work in this area.

Wing Commander Collie joined the RAAF in 1991 having previously served six years in the RAF as a Supply and Movements Officer. He has served in various staff and unit appointments, including as CO No.1 Air Terminal Squadron. His interagency and joint experience includes appointments in HQ Border Protection Command and Joint Logistics Command. He has served in operations in Kuwait and Iraq, and with the UN in Cambodia and East Timor. He is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course, has a Master of Arts degree from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, a Graduate Diploma in Education and Training from the University of Melbourne, a Graduate Diploma of Defence Studies from Deakin University and a Graduate Diploma of Business (Logistics Management) from the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University. Wing Commander Collie will assume command of JLC Joint Logistics Unit (South) at RAAF Edinburgh in January 2011.
NOTES


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Future Joint Logistics Concept 2025, Canberra: Joint Logistics Command (Strategic Logistics Branch), 2007.


Sustainable Defence Capability: Australia’s national security and the role of defence industry

Ben White, Australian Business Defence Industry Unit

Introduction

In 2009, the Commonwealth Government articulated in the Defence White Paper a picture of what the ADF will look like to 2030.1 The White Paper also described the tools available to Government to meet a range of perceived threats over the next two decades. Importantly, noting the typically long acquisition lead time and in-service life cycle of major items of equipment, the White Paper also outlined some of the equipment that the ADF will likely be using to 2050 and beyond.

What the White Paper did not address in any detail were the risks posed by two interrelated factors, climate change and resource security. The White Paper contended that climate change will have an effect on national security but that any effects will not be felt before 2030.2 In terms of resource security, the White Paper only considered its effects as a precursor to conflict, not as a capability limitation.3 With only three pages devoted to industry support,4 companies could also have been left to question their status as recognised Defence capability partners.

These limitations could have significant capability implications before 2030 and almost certainly in the two decades following. Hence, this paper proposes a new paradigm for a ‘sustainable national security’, with two fundamental inputs: a ‘sustainable defence capability’ and ‘sustainable defence industry’. With such a paradigm shift, Australia’s national security framework could provide Australia with both a lead role in responding to the effects of climate change and resource security, and a world-leading industry capability that would supply innovation, employment and economic benefits far greater than the required investment even before 2030.

Figure 1. Fundamental inputs for a ‘sustainable national security’
Sustainable national security

The White Paper defines 'national security' as follows:

National security is concerned with ensuring Australia’s freedom from attack or the threat of attack, maintaining our territorial integrity and promoting our political sovereignty, preserving our hard-won freedoms and sustaining our fundamental capacity to advance economic prosperity for all Australians. Defence is one element of our broader approach to national security.3

In this context, there are two aspects of ‘sustainability’ that are important. The first is that sustainable development should seek to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future.6 The second is that a sustainable state is one in which utility is non-declining through time.7

Therefore, ‘sustainable national security’ is concerned with ensuring Australia’s freedom—both in the present and future—through the provision of a defence capability that can operate effectively within climate change and resource security constraints. Introducing the term ‘sustainable’ in this context involves considering national security in economic, environmental and social terms. Unfortunately, the current national security and defence paradigm does not recognise the linkages between national security and sustainability.

According to Professor Ross Garnaut, the Government’s climate change ‘expert’, there are high risks from unmitigated climate change.8 In his 2008 Climate Change Review, Garnaut noted the likely need for ADF assistance in coping with climate change-related geopolitical instability, which he judged as having a medium-to-high risk of economic impact on Australia by 2100.9 His conclusions reinforce the link between Defence’s current definition of national security and the risks posed by climate change and resource security. They also reinforce the need for a new ‘sustainable national security’ paradigm.

However, despite Garnaut’s conclusions—and the present Government’s recognition that the costs of climate change are likely to occur earlier and to a greater extent than previously thought10—there was no discussion in the White Paper on the impact of these risks on defence capability. Nor can Defence argue a lack of awareness of these risks; one need only review a selection of recent publications and articles by a range of reputable commentators to understand what the ADF may be facing.11

Indeed, the Government’s stated intention for Defence’s planning guidance process to manage strategic risk in 3-5 year horizons12 means force structures and current acquisition plans are largely based on current technology and platforms designed without adequate consideration of sustainability and adaptive capability.13 The obvious question is how the ADF will provide a defence capability when faced with the effects of climate change and resource security, unless these issues are addressed?

Sustainable defence capability

A ‘sustainable defence capability’ is one that can continue to provide effective national security outputs while taking account of the effects of climate change and resource security. It is not within the scope of this paper to define likely capability requirements of the future ADF. However, there are fundamental and wide-ranging considerations which must be applied to the delivery of ADF capability in order to achieve sustainability.
The major strategic risk is resource security. Current and planned ADF capabilities rely on increasingly-high energy requirements, primarily provided by extant energy sources such as fossil fuels (an issue not addressed in the White Paper). Providing for these substantial requirements without sustainability considerations may result in:

- The degradation of capability if energy supplies are disrupted as a result of deliberate actions by potential adversaries, an inability to deliver energy supplies due to the operational environment, a lack of access to allied supply chains or price volatility leading to inability to afford the required supplies. Importantly, resource scarcities could similarly affect allied supply chains, which may then become inaccessible to the ADF.\textsuperscript{14}

- Increased threats to ADF platforms and personnel because of capability degradation (as discussed above) or the requirement to transport energy supplies through hostile and large areas of operations.

- Lack of public support for ADF operations (both domestically and in areas where the ADF is deployed) because of the drain on energy resources posed by the ADF, which may directly affect the civilian population.

- An inability for the ADF to meet future Government and international environmental regulations.

Importantly, disruptions to energy availability could occur without notice. And the risk of that happening exists now and not just in the future. The extent of ADF energy dependence is also important to understand. According to a 2008 study, the ADF is responsible for around 50 per cent of the Australian Government’s energy consumption.\textsuperscript{15} With many of the platforms used by Australia either acquired from or similar to those of the US, the following points highlight the scope of the problem:\textsuperscript{16}

- Within a US ‘heavy’ army division, only two of the top ten fuel-consuming platforms are directly involved in combat—the tank and the attack helicopter—with the remaining eight used to transport fuel, personnel and supplies.

- Half of the fuel transported to the battlefield for this division (approximately 2.2 million litres per day) is consumed by platforms not directly involved in combat.

While the ADF does not possess comparable ‘heavy’ divisions, its land combat force is roughly equivalent in size (17,000-21,000 personnel) and increasingly becoming mechanised. Moreover, ADF maritime and aerospace platforms often consume even greater amounts of fuel.

Importantly, investing in alternate energy sources—and adapting platforms to use them—has the potential to free up Defence and government finances to provide other capabilities and pursue other approaches, including investment in renewable energy technologies and climate change mitigation strategies, which is already being done in several overseas countries. For example, in August 2010 the US Secretary of the Navy announced that:

\textit{Within 10 years, the US Navy will get one half of all its energy needs, both afloat and onshore, from non-fossil fuel sources…. America and the Navy rely too much on fossil fuels. It makes the military, in this case our Navy and Marine Corps, far too vulnerable to some sort of disruption.}\textsuperscript{17}
Other strategies being progressed by the US Navy include:18

• When awarding contracts, consider energy efficiency and the energy ‘footprint’ in acquisition decisions.

• By 2012, develop a ‘Green Strike Group’, composed of nuclear vessels and ships powered by bio-fuel. By 2016, sail this group as a ‘Great Green Fleet’, composed of nuclear ships and surface combatants equipped with hybrid electric alternative power systems running on bio-fuel, supported by aircraft running on bio-fuel.

• By 2015, cut petroleum use in half in the 50,000-strong non-tactical commercial fleet, by phasing in hybrid, ‘flex fuel’ and electric vehicles.

• By 2020, procure at least half of the energy requirements of shore-based installations from alternative sources. Also 50 per cent of all shore installations will be net zero energy consumers.

• By 2020, provide half of [the Navy’s] total energy consumption for ships, aircraft, tanks, vehicles and shore installations from alternative sources.

The US Army is also pursuing renewable energy options, including for the power needs of remote outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan, aiming also to minimise the human and resource cost of fuel convoys, given their vulnerability to attack by insurgents.19 Minimising the weight carried by soldiers in the field is also the focus of significant effort in the US and UK. In 2009, the UK Ministry of Defence called for industry proposals to reduce the energy burden for dismounted troops, after a study found that an average 48-hour rural patrol required each soldier to carry an average of 4 kilograms of power source-related burden.20

Energy dependence is only one risk of not basing capability on sustainability. While there are others, including high financial costs, environmental impacts and the social costs of high impact military operations, it is energy dependence that can drive a changed paradigm. Addressing this risk now will lead to increased capability, increased security, lower economic costs, lower environmental impact and greater social acceptance of the requirement for and presence of a military capability both at home and overseas. Indeed, an increased awareness of sustainability requirements for the ADF may lead to these considerations further penetrating the broader Australian community, as service personnel interact with and leave the ADF for the civil sector.

**Sustainable defence industry**

Defence industry’s contribution to ADF capability appears vastly understated in the White Paper.21 Australia’s lack of offset policies and perceived lack of investment in local industry capability, such as in recent Defence vehicle projects,22 arguably bring into question the Government’s commitment to a viable defence industry in Australia. In providing a sustainable defence capability, industry will need to be seen as a vital capability partner.

A paradigm shift in Government and Defence thinking seems inevitable, at some point in the future—but hopefully prior to the realisation of a major capability gap caused by a climate change ‘September 11’.23 Lengthy acquisition lead times and the long in-service life cycle of major Defence platforms means planning for a sustainable defence capability—with industry the primary source for its innovations—must occur now.
This provides a national opportunity for the emergence of a renewed defence industry sector in Australia. Australia has a reputation for innovation and, when applied to defence capability, the opportunity exists for industry to develop Australia as a ‘centre of excellence’ for sustainable military capability. This will offer the ADF the required capability but also have significant national economic and social benefits, through exports and employment, particularly to redeploy Australian workers from non-sustainable industry sectors. Companies in Australia should focus on developing sustainable military capabilities and offering them to the ADF. If Australian industry does not, then under the current paradigm, Defence will eventually seek these innovations elsewhere.

But what type of innovations should Australian industry be offering? The potential list is endless and will continually grow. For example, major opportunities are likely in deployable and static alternative energy generation, alternative energy sources for land, air and maritime assets, energy efficiency initiatives, eco-friendly waste disposal, water and materials recycling, paperless administrative processes and innovative transport, packaging and communications solutions. Many of these initiatives are already being offered and used by industry. But widespread deployment in the ADF will only be driven by demand from the Defence customer.

A major paradigm shift could initially occur if industry adopted ‘life cycle management’ (LCM) for all products and services it currently provides to the ADF. This would better assist Defence to adapt capability to changing operational requirements, reduce exposure to future environmental regulation and resource scarcity, identify opportunities for cost savings, and increase Government and public acceptance of the requirement for large and long-term resource investments in Defence capability.

The realisation of these advantages, such as end-to-end fuel costing as one example, may convince Defence that the paradigm shift is required now if they are to deliver future capability. For industry, the shift will enable business to meet ‘product stewardship’ requirements, such as those already being introduced for many products and platforms around the world. The future will likely see such legislative requirements for all goods and services, and early adoption of sustainable practices by industry will lower adoption costs and enable industry to assist Defence to meet these same requirements.

A cynical Australian defence industry executive might ask why industry should do this, when Defence may not buy the capabilities. The answer is that the ADF will need to become sustainable, within the next two decades or sooner, otherwise operational capability will deteriorate. In addition, if the Australian defence industry can offer these solutions, it will find increasingly ready customers in international markets and the civil sector. Not only will this contribute to the broader environmental and social development of civil society but it could create markets that enable defence industry to ‘smooth the curve’ of the peaks and troughs of Australian Defence acquisitions. It will also provide defence industry its future ‘licence to operate’ through its willingness to assume responsibility for the environmental consequences of its products and services. Increasing rates of international adoption of such technologies will eventually add weight to the argument for a change in the ADF’s approach to sustainability.

Defence industry’s capabilities in systems engineering and project management may also be exportable to the civil sector to aid these companies to perform LCM. While international or civil sector sales and services may provide a capability edge to foreign militaries or divert industry resources from supporting Defence, it might also awaken ADF planners to the new
paradigm. Ultimately, unless Australian industry strives to move first and develop capabilities in the fields of defence sustainability, the ADF would understandably look to source this technology and expertise from overseas.

Creating a paradigm shift

Decision makers and strategic planners must recognise the requirement to establish a sense of urgency and partner with industry in new ways to deliver a sustainable defence capability. In the context of climate change and resource security, industry must be recognised as an integral part of Australia’s national defence capability. There will be three key drivers to the paradigm shift: Government policy, cultural change within the ADF and defence industry, and innovation and opportunities.

Government policy

Industry conducts business to profit its shareholders. Therefore, unless the market demands a product or service, it is unlikely that industry will deliver it. This is where Government must provide the demand and incentives for defence industry to address these new capability requirements by linking it to Defence funding and the requirement for cost savings. Voluntary industry or Defence codes of conduct will not ensure the delivery of sustainable capability.

Government should mandate that all offers meet strict sustainability requirements and seek an overall sustainable defence capability from the ADF. Only then will Defence’s capability planners seek options from industry to deliver this requirement. Government policy could begin with the adoption of the ‘seven principles of eco-efficiency’, which ADF capabilities could be required to meet. However implementation must give time for both Defence and industry to grow the expertise required, lest such a rapid change open the way for international companies to corner this new market in Australia.

Cultural change within the ADF and defence industry

Within Defence, the acquisition of most products and services is governed by the ‘value for money’ principle, which is an obvious and efficient use of taxpayers’ funds. While admirable, this principle results in short term and limited efficiencies, and does not currently incorporate LCM into all acquisitions. In addition, while Defence acquisition remains essentially a public sector domain, the voluntary consideration of scarce or expensive resources—and hence the need for sustainable capability—is problematic. This is why Government regulation and a culture of sustainability education among managers are so important.

The ADF’s culture of risk aversion is also an obstacle to the adoption of sustainable business and acquisition practices in the context of climate change. The adoption of innovative and developmental technologies poses a dilemma for the Defence bureaucrat seeking to achieve perceived value for money. This dilemma often manifests itself as a Defence reliance on competition to achieve value for money, in which companies bringing innovation to Defence often see their intellectual property compromised through open competition. Funding research and development in areas of sustainability also suffers with only one of twelve Defence-funded capability and technology demonstrator projects in 2008 demonstrating a sustainability focus.
The drive towards sustainability by the US Navy and others overseas reinforces a core role for the Defence Materiel Organisation and also the use of the ‘Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation’ program, particularly in terms of major capital equipment and other deployable capabilities. Adoption of sustainability thinking is also vital across other elements of Defence including the Defence Support Group and the Chief Information Officer Group for infrastructure, garrison support, non-equipment procurement and information technology. A sustainable defence capability could also see the need for greater risk-sharing, increased use of sole-sourcing and longer term contracts, all of which would further encourage industry to partner with Defence on sustainability.

The limitations of Defence’s acquisition culture were summed up by former CDF Admiral Chris Barrie when he noted:

In a great many cases, Defence must purchase goods and services overseas because Australian industry does not produce what we require. This gives Defence access to the best equipment at the cheapest price.

If the ADF is to provide a sustainable defence capability, Defence must see industry as a partner. And uncertainty as a risk must be mitigated through bold action, trust and investment. A clear statement of market demand from the Government, combined with an educated and sustainability-orientated Defence buyer—focused on real taxpayer value for money—are essential. The ‘cheapest option’ approach will continue to marginalise the ability for Australian industry to become world-leaders in the defence industry sector (and ultimately hamper the fruition of sustainable ADF capabilities). Culture change also requires Australian industry to lead by example and adopt sustainable business practices and technologies, and to begin achieving efficiencies which can be offered to the ADF both as cost savings and operational capabilities.

**Innovation and opportunities**

To be considered a strategic capability partner, industry must become a specialist in sustainable innovation. This will require investment from industry. But it should lead to world-leading innovations that will contribute to ADF and allied capabilities, as well as providing valuable export earnings. These innovations could be in a range of areas and across all products and services, from large to small and operational to supporting. Examples might include pollution prevention to minimise waste and emissions, product stewardship to address sustainable design, operation and end-of-life disposal, and clean technologies that are inherently sustainable. Other initiatives could be:

- Targeted and collaborative Government/Defence/industry/academia investment in research and development. The creation by Defence industry of strategic alliances and partnerships with innovative civil sector industries, particularly those pursuing sustainability initiatives.
- Leadership and investment by industry in sustainability principles, which would have the potential to lower industry costs as energy costs increase.
- The offer by industry of platforms and systems to the ADF that promote increased efficiency and incorporate expansion capabilities to include future energy alternatives. Also the retrofitting of current platforms and the incorporation of LCM into capability development.
- The monitoring by industry of international innovations and the follow-on securing of commercial relationships to offer these innovations to the ADF.
• Government export promotion arms—the Australian Trade Commission and the Defence Export Unit—monitoring and promoting Australian sustainability innovations to the world.

Conclusion

A paradigm shift will produce a sustainable national security framework. This is vital if the ADF is to be prepared to meet the challenges produced by climate change and resource security. At present, Defence appears largely unaware and unable to invest strategically in sustainability beyond local environmental management. Industry is also lagging behind international norms, most likely because of a lack of emphasis and urgency by the ADF to address these risks.

It has been argued that there is sufficient evidence and indeed recognition by the Government that these risks exist. It is puzzling why the ADF has not identified the need for action and why it seems up to industry to help identify capability innovations and assist in providing a sustainable defence capability. However, without Defence capabilities identifying sustainability requirements, industry will be asked to take on the lion’s share of business risk which it is unlikely to do. The Government and ADF must seek to truly partner with industry or defence capabilities and potential new Australian employment and innovative solutions will be lost. That would be to the detriment of Australia’s national security.

Ben White is Manager of the Australian Business Defence Industry Unit (ABDIU), a membership-based defence industry organisation. He is a graduate of ADFA and the Royal Military College Duntroon and served in a variety of Army logistic, civil military affairs and intelligence postings. Ben has worked in international security within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and later consulted to businesses in Latin America and Asia. He has a Bachelor of Arts, Graduate Diploma in Defence Studies, Advanced Diploma in Spanish Language and completed a Masters of Business Administration in 2010. The views in this article are his and not necessarily those of ABDIU.
NOTES


2. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, p. 40.

3. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, p. 40.


5. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, p. 20.


23. Friedman, Hot, Flat and Crowded, p. 471.
Book reviews

Tales of War: great stories from military history for every day of the year

W. B. Marsh and Bruce Carrick
Icon Books: London, 2010

Reviewed by Dr Noel Sproles

This is one of those occasions when you may safely judge a book by its cover, for the title describes the contents of this book most succinctly. For each day of the year, approximately two pages are devoted to a story connected to a historic military event that occurred on that date. Following each story is a list of other events that also occurred on the same date but in different years. A brief summary of one or two sentences accompanies each of these entries.

The scope of the stories is sweeping, covering some 3500 years of wars, campaigns, battles, sieges and individual endeavour. The earliest story dates from Pharaoh Thutmose III’s victory at Megiddo in 1479BC. The latest is of Private Johnson Beharry’s action in Iraq in 2004, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

The authors have not limited themselves to the better-known events in military history, although such events have certainly not been ignored. They consider that the lesser-known events can prove just as interesting and worthy of having their story told. The growing public interest in the past few years of the activities of the AIF on the Western Front, and not just at Anzac, is testimony of the truth of that proposition. With this in mind, they set themselves the task to choose events based not just on their historical significance but which they felt would interest their readers. In this, I believe that they were successful. I found that there were familiar stories given a fresh approach; events long forgotten to be re-discovered and little gems to be discovered for the first time.

While keeping within the broad compass of military history, this has turned out to be an eclectic collection indeed. It does not concentrate on battles alone, so Midway is covered while the stories of Milne Bay and Kokoda do not get mentioned. When discussing a battle, such as the description of Wolfe’s taking of Quebec in 1759, the story is all about the battle. On other occasions, a great battle or campaign is merely the vehicle for telling a tale about a specific event that happened at the time.

For instance, the story titled ‘The Battle of Gallipoli’ is about the British withdrawal from Cape Helles in January 1916, with Anzac receiving only a passing reference. On occasions, the connection to military history may seem tenuous. Examples of this are stories relating the manner of the death of Mehmed II, the captor of Constantinople, or the origin of the Prince of Wales’ crest and motto of ich dien. Thus, if you are looking for a compendium or reference
work of battles occurring on a particular date of the year, you will be disappointed for it was not the author’s intent to attempt such a work.

The copy reviewed was in paperback and is quite thick, comprising 732 pages. It does not contain either maps or photographs but this is neither a drawback nor a deficiency because of the nature of the book. Unlike edited collections of short stories, the authors have maintained a consistent and very readable style across all stories. The contents page at the beginning lists the story titles arranged by the day of the year. The index, at the back of the book, lists a topic and then the date(s) where it can be found among the stories in the book.

This is the type of book that a serious military historian might overlook when browsing the shelves of the bookstore but would find irresistible if seen in the ‘reduced price’ bins on the footpath in front of the store. It is a book that friends might be tempted to buy as a gift for someone they know is interested in things military. I feel that Tales of War deserves better consideration than this, as it overlooks the book’s ability to either improve one’s general knowledge of military history or as an incentive to undertake a detailed study of events from more specialised sources.

Books of this genre are intended to be read in short bursts when and as the mood strikes. It is not a book which you need feel obligated to read from cover-to-cover in a limited period of time for fear that you might lose track of the plot. Dependent on your nature, it is one that you can read strictly by date or open at random and take what you get. Whichever way, I am sure that over time it will get read from cover-to-cover. Anyone with any interest in military history will find this a worthwhile buy and an interesting, entertaining and informative read.

**The Art of Air Power: Sun Tzu revisited**

Sanu Kainikara  
Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2010  

Reviewed by John Donovan

In an era that often seems dominated by the search for the new, it is comforting to see that value is still placed on old verities. Dr Sanu Kainikara has very effectively linked Sun Tzu’s 2300 year-old classic to air power in the early 21st century, a military arm that the great Chinese philosopher of war could hardly have imagined. In doing this, Kainikara has demonstrated that some principles are so enduring that we ignore them at our peril.

Kainikara makes many useful points that can readily be related to the current undeclared war between the forces of militant Islam on one side and democratic nations and parts of the Islamic world on the other. His point about the need for a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to national security is particularly important. However, a reader who observes current events could draw the conclusion that the leaders of militant Islam have also read Sun Tzu, particularly about strategic manipulation.
Some of Kainikara’s proposals could be impracticable unless the current conflict becomes much more active or Australia enters an existential conflict. For example, approval of a pre-emptive air strike is unlikely to occur without compelling intelligence, while it is amusing to imagine the reaction of the media in the world’s democracies to a program of ‘information operations, including the use of deception’. The same media, unfortunately, routinely reports without question (or later correction) the product of information operations by militant Islamists.

Kainikara sometimes offers a counsel of perfection. In the imperfect world in which military forces operate, suggesting that a course of action should be discarded if there is ‘even the slightest doubt regarding the possibility of achieving victory’ is a recipe for paralysis. Contrarily, suggesting that if certain measures are taken, ‘offensive actions will be irresistible and always lead to success’ seems overly optimistic.

In places, Kainikara’s attempt to find something to say about each of Sun Tzu’s stanzas leads to many points being repeated to an extent that becomes annoying and to statements that are trite. The (very frequent) statement that military officers must have ‘professional mastery’ is an example of both. That said, the book has refreshingly little jargon. I recently read another monograph from Defence that referred to achieving an ‘overmatch in effects’ through the use of ‘reach-back’. I’m sure this means something but I suspect the terminology could be as obscure to many other readers as it was to me!

Overall, the book is excessively long. A better approach might have been to accept that not everything written 2300 years ago can necessarily be applied to modern air power. There are some production issues. An index of the important concepts would be useful, while the binding is too weak for a book of this size—after being read just once, pages started to fall out. Nevertheless, there is much of value in this book and it deserves careful attention, however difficult it might be to remain focused through 455 pages of main text.

**Blair’s Successful War: British military intervention in Sierra Leone**

Andrew M. Dorman  
Farnham UK: Ashgate, 2010  

Reviewed by Captain Gordon Andrew, RAN

British Prime Minister Tony Blair will almost certainly be remembered by most people as the British leader who took his country to war in Iraq in 2003. Public fascination with his motivations for doing so continues to this day, giving rise to both the official investigation currently underway in the UK (The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot) and to less authoritative examinations, such as the Hollywood film dramatisation ‘The Special Relationship’.

*Blair’s Successful War* makes the point that the war in Iraq was just the last in a series of military adventures Blair undertook, with increasing confidence throughout his tenure as Prime Minister. It also notes that Iraq was the first where ‘his ideas of humanitarian intervention …
appeared to go awry'. Prior to Iraq, Blair had used armed force against Iraq in 1998, in Kosovo
in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000 and Afghanistan in 2001, and had contributed forces to the UN
mission to East Timor in 1999. This book is a detailed examination of the only one of these
campaigns to be conducted unilaterally by the UK, the campaign in Sierra Leone. In particular,
it focuses on the evacuation Operation PALLISER and the one to free captured Royal Irish
Regiment soldiers, Operation BARRAS.

The book is structured chronologically, with the opening three chapters providing background
to both the situation in Sierra Leone and the use of force by the British Defence Forces
under the leadership of Blair. Chapters Four to Seven are detailed accounts of the planning,
execution and conclusion of PALLISER and BARRAS, and Chapter Eight discusses the impact
of, and lessons drawn from, these operations on both British defence policy and the Blair
Government.

Each chapter is rigidly formatted, with an introduction giving a detailed plan of what is to be
discussed section by section, and a conclusion giving a succinct summary and what can be
drawn from it. This formulaic approach leads to a slightly stilted style and some repetition of
the major points. However, it does not detract from the strength of the book, which for an
Australian reader lies in its detailed examination of a joint expeditionary operation which was
supporting a 'whole-of-government' approach to the problems encountered in Sierra Leone.
As an operational case study, it is extremely relevant to an Australian audience and should be
read by all involved in the planning and execution of joint operations.

There is much about the Sierra Leone intervention that is relevant to potential future operations
for the ADF. Sierra Leone had not been identified as a location for a potential deployment of
British forces. The intervention was truly joint in nature, although the author does note the
RAF's reluctance to redeploy their Jaguar squadron from an exercise in the US to provide fixed
wing support—that support was eventually supplied by the RN's carrier-based air assets on
HMS Illustrious.

The intervention and subordinate operations were well defined in terms of operational
outcomes and time. The whole intervention only lasted four months and both military and
political leadership resisted 'mission creep'. Despite being a unilateral British intervention,
many of the outcomes sought were in support of the UN mission in Sierra Leone. The
intervention was a good example of the use of a maritime expeditionary force—similar to the
force outlined in the Defence White Paper 2009. Finally, the force was employed as part of a
comprehensive 'whole-of-government' approach to Sierra Leone.

Although the intervention in Sierra Leone could be considered a 'successful war' by many
criteria, including those listed above, lasting positive change in the country itself was not
achieved. As Blair's Successful War ruefully notes '... the 2007 World Health Organisation
study placed Sierra Leone at the bottom of most development and health statistics and
whilst peace remains, the shadow of the civil war still hangs over the country and corruption
remains endemic'. Any reader with an interest in the planning and execution of expeditionary
operations has much to gain from a close reading of Blair's Successful War. Recommended.
**Counterinsurgency**

David Kilcullen  
Carlton North: Scribe, 2010  
ISBN: 978-1-9216-4034-6

Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant Travis Hallen, RAAF

ADF operations in Afghanistan are a matter of significant public interest. Daily media reports not only describe the conditions under which Australian forces operate but also question the progress being made and the West’s chances of success in ‘the graveyard of empires’. While the media’s contribution is generally fair and informative, a more informed understanding of the issues and challenges of counterinsurgency would clearly benefit any discussion on Australia’s involvement. David Kilcullen’s well-written, easy to read and informative ‘primer’ on counterinsurgency hits the mark perfectly.

*Counterinsurgency* is an anthology of Kilcullen’s writings on the subject since 1999. It covers the tactics, strategies and politics of insurgencies and operations to combat them. Of particular note, Kilcullen looks beyond current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to examine diverse counterinsurgency strategies spanning both time and geography. In doing so, he highlights that counterinsurgency is more than a problem for modern Western democracies, encouraging the reader to see an insurgency as more than the tactical fight but rather a complex phenomenon that cannot be countered by military force alone.

The book covers insurgencies from 1948 to 2009. Attempting to cover more than 50 years in 230 pages would suggest a superficial examination but this is not the case. Each chapter covers a different aspect to a sufficient level of detail to enable the reader to draw out the insights needed to understand the principles involved. These principles are reinforced in subsequent chapters so that by the time the reader closes the book’s back cover, he or she should feel sufficiently informed to be able to engage in a reasoned debate on counterinsurgency.

The book opens with the ‘Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency’, one of Kilcullen’s defining works. Written in 2006, for company commanders about to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan, ‘Twenty-Eight Articles’ provides the reader with a unique insight into the challenges and complexities of combating an insurgency at the tactical level. It lays down concise principles to aid the tactical commander, from preparation through deployment to tour completion. The tactical focus does not detract from its relevance for those not about to lead troops into battle, as the fundamentals on which the articles are built are broadly applicable and Kilcullen expands on them in subsequent chapters.

Kilcullen notes that the greatest challenge for those not directly involved in fighting an insurgency is measuring progress. It is easy to measure progress by the number of attacks on coalition forces and the number of coalition casualties, as these figures strike the public’s concerns and influence their support for operations. However, Kilcullen presents a compelling argument for a range of other metrics, including the ratio of recruitment to desertion in the
national security forces, civilian accessibility to areas and the price of exotic vegetables. The measures presented in his chapter ‘Measuring Progress in Afghanistan’ provide the reader with a deeper appreciation of how an insurgency shapes every aspect of the lives of the population and reinforce the importance of the non-military aspects of counterinsurgency operations. It is clear from the metrics advocated by Kilcullen that creating a stable state that meets the daily needs of the population is just as important as killing the insurgent.

Meeting the needs of the populace is an enduring theme of Counterinsurgency. What is difficult for Western observers to comprehend is how the Afghan population could support the brutal Taliban regime when offered the potential for a democratic form of government. A reason is provided in the chapter ‘Deiokes and the Taliban’, which addresses state formation and the rule of law. In order to survive, an insurgency needs the support of the population, be that active or passive. The Taliban’s effectiveness at meeting the needs of the population at the grassroots level enables them to retain the acquiescence, if not support, of the local population. This bottom-up process of state creation is effective and difficult to counter by a Western force supporting a government unable to make its presence felt in any meaningful way at the local level. As Kilcullen puts it, the Taliban is ‘able to outgovern the Karzai government at the local level’.

Halfway through the book, the author detours to Indonesia’s counterinsurgency experience. Having completed his doctoral thesis on Indonesian counterinsurgency, Kilcullen speaks with authority on a little known subject. In a chapter analysing the development, or lack thereof, of Indonesian counterinsurgency tactics, from fighting the Darul Islam insurgency in the 1950s through to the FRETILIN in the 1980s and 1990s, Kilcullen highlights the need to adapt operations to meet the circumstances and the adversary. This reinforces the point made strongly in the book’s opening chapter that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ template for counterinsurgency.

The second leg of Kilcullen’s detour, a report on the Moota Bridge incident in East Timor in 1999, seems slightly out of place. The incident and its narrative have little obvious relevance and the reader can feel at a loss as to why this diversion was included in the book. While the incident does illustrate the importance of company and platoon level actions in the modern battlespace, shaped as it is by 24/7 media coverage and a global audience, the connections are for the reader to make with no deeper analysis provided. The absence of analysis is representative of the book’s only flaw. It is a collection of articles with little extra effort made to update them and integrate them into a cohesive tome.

The most disappointing aspect of the book is the decision by the author to use ‘author’s notes’ rather than update the text of the articles. In places, this was quite useful, as the notes provide examples of how the points raised were influencing the current fight. In others, however, the text should have been revised to incorporate the notes. The most notable example relates to the use of the term ‘jihadist’. In an author’s note, Kilcullen states he prefers the word ‘takfiri’, as it challenges the legitimacy of the adversaries’ actions under Islamic doctrine. This is a significant point that should have been expanded in the text, rather than relegated to an author’s note.

Kilcullen concludes with a section on the nature of the global insurgency, highlighting the duality of modern counterinsurgency operations. While commanders must think and act locally in their daily battle with insurgent forces, a simultaneous fight is been fought at the strategic
and political level against an increasing global insurgency. Actions at one level invariably affect those at the other. This requires governments and militaries to adopt new strategies aimed at defeating adversaries who, although motivated to similar ends, are in reality as diverse as the regions in which they operate. Kilcullen makes it clear that combating a global militant Islamic insurgency requires global action. The question is how to ensure a unified global response when varying national agendas lead to an incoherent strategy.

David Kilcullen has arguably done more than any other scholar to increase the public’s understanding of counterinsurgency. By publishing a limited anthology of his work, he has provided an opportunity for readers to develop a base level understanding of what insurgencies are and the ways to combat them. Accordingly, Counterinsurgency is an excellent book for those seeking to understand the nature of insurgencies as well as how we should go about fighting and defeating them.

It is a ‘must read’ for all new entries into the military, be they officers or enlisted, as it provides the level of awareness of current operations that is necessary for those who will either deploy or support those deployed on operations. I also highly recommend this book to members of the public who wish to become more involved in the political discussion on Australia’s involvement in counterinsurgency operations. However, I do not recommend it for those already conversant with the subject or Kilcullen’s work, as the book holds little that is new.

*The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western perspectives on the legitimate use of military force*

Howard M. Hansel (ed.)
Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010

Reviewed by Michelle Jellett, Sea Power Centre - Australia

*The Prism of Just War* is a collection of papers written on ‘just’ war theory from various perspectives. A common theme is that despite widespread development of just war thought in the regions portrayed, no situation will be met with universal understanding (and particularly by the competing parties). As Francisco Suarez discerns, war cannot be ‘just on both sides’. It is from here that broader influences such as creed, culture, philosophy and ideology mould a society’s criterion of ‘just’ war; addressing the fundamental issue of when, if ever, to resort to the use of force to resolve a dispute. And, if force is to be used, by what means and in what manner this should be conducted.
The book is structured into three parts. Part I: ‘The Western Just War Tradition’ documents the shift in theories from those based on religion to those based on reason. Despite the antiquity of these theories, they have contemporary relevance to the Australian process of declaring war—currently the subject of debate within Federal Parliament—which is underpinned by ideas of legitimate authority (very much a Kantian consideration). These Western notions of just war are then compared to those of other societies presented within the text, largely providing an etic account.

In contrast, Part II: ‘The Concept of Just War in Southwest and South Asian Thought’ focuses on various beliefs which straddle both the political and religious, incorporating Sunni, Shi’i and Hindu perspectives. This section touches on the idea that defensive war is not technically jihad but, disappointingly, this idea is not further explored. The section substantiates the trend within societies to search for normative standards to govern conduct and behaviour, and the just use of armed force. Highly-controversial arguments of legitimate authority are addressed in this section, examining the interpretation of Shari’a tradition and other beliefs by militant groups such as al-Qaeda.

Part III: ‘The Concept of Just War in East Asian Thought’ delves into the various ways that China, Japan and Korea have defined and practised just war. The current US ‘hearts and minds’ approach in Afghanistan stems from the various ancient Chinese military texts referenced, perhaps the oldest and most influential of which is Sun Zi’s Art of War. The last two papers in this section provide very broad explanations of just war through documenting large epochs, foregoing detail in order to explain the greater trend of just war concepts employed to manipulate contemporary political requirements. However, this section does provide the background thinking underpinning North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

Collectively, these papers provide a springboard that could prompt Australia’s strategic and defence community to examine and understand our own justifications for war and our position within the global context. Outlining just war theory in relation to various military operations is central to this book, making it of worth to anyone interested in the justification of war and rules of engagement. While a background in just war and social contract theories would be advantageous to the reader, most chapters are accessible to those who are unfamiliar with the topic and wish to learn more.

The inherent value of this text is the collation of perspectives beyond western societies and documenting the influences of culture on the moral constructs of just war theory, noting that neither are mutually exclusive. At times, the broad range of topics covered comes at the expense of in-depth and detailed discussion. If the overarching question to be answered by this collection of papers is whether there is overlap in each society’s just war tradition, then I think this is reflected in the concern of the differing just war thinkers to offer norms in the regulation of war, so that military operations are harnessed to meet political ends. However, it is evident that each tradition still finds authentic ways of dealing with new problems. If you are not deterred by somewhat overarching statements (and some typographic discrepancies) and are seeking an overview on diverse socio-political entities, this book is recommended.
Religion, Conflict and Military Intervention

R. Durward and L. Marsden (eds.)
Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009
ISBN: 978-0-7546-7871-7

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Richard Adams, RAN

This book makes a valuable contribution to better understanding the ideas of moral purpose and religious identity as they encroach on the previously secular disciplines of international relations and politics. The editors and contributors seem well respected, with Rosemary Durward a senior lecturer in the Defence and International Affairs Department at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

The work explains secularism as a central construct within Western political culture. The Western religious experience is held to be a phenomenon controverted by the secular ‘enlightenment’, from which evolved the ideas of intellectual and political freedom, and the concept of human rights. The significance of this analysis is evident in its distinction from Islam, which is seen typically to draw no distinction between politics and religion.

The logical corollary of this reasoning is that, in historical terms, the West is at a further stage in its intellectual, scientific and social progression. Durward and Marsden suggest, however, that this line of argument is imperfect and present a robust counter-argument suggesting that ideas of freedom and dignity within Islam need to be understood and protected.

The study is contextualised by the religious dimension of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within this framework, the book presents ten scholarly essays which focus on four main areas: religion and conflict, religious influence on military intervention, the need to disentangle religion from politics and the relationship of religion to conflict resolution.

The religious influence on military intervention forms the second limb of the study. Although presently overshadowed by the challenges of persistent conflict, this analysis is extremely significant. Indeed, the problems and questions which are addressed by this book are much larger than the canvas of present conflicts.

The work challenges us to consider the religious concepts which have been a formidable and persistent background to world affairs, particularly since September 11—and so evident in the ‘scriptural’ themes employed by President Bush and since reiterated by President Obama. Thus, the thorough and disciplined analysis presented in this book should be regarded as an important contribution to the professional literature.
Anzacs in Arkhangel: the untold story of Australia and the invasion of Russia 1918–19

Michael Challinger
Prahan: Hardie Grant, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-7406-6751-7

Reviewed by Major Jamie Cotton, Australian Army

The northern Russia campaign of 1918-19, where winter temperatures plummeted to below −40°C, was a strange place to find Australians. They were part of a largely British coalition force aiming to overthrow the Bolshevik government of the world’s first communist state. But Australia’s involvement, as depicted by Challinger, was ‘a collective adventure by individual soldiers’, who voluntarily had to discharge from the ALF and enlist in the British Army to participate.

The British agreed, however, that Australians would wherever possible be commanded by Australian non-commissioned officers and allowed to retain their Australian uniforms, including their slouch hats. During the campaign, two Victoria Crosses were won, both by Australians, one posthumously. One other Australian was killed and 20 seriously injured in an ultimately futile operation that saw mutinies by French, British and allied forces, the use of local women in an official brothel, the British use of poison gas, and other acts—notably against mutineers and prisoners—that today would likely be considered war crimes.

Although titled ‘Anzacs in Arkhangel’—in recognition that some New Zealanders were involved—Challinger confines his book to the Australian participants. The actual number of Australians will never be known because British military records from this period were destroyed in a German bombing raid during World War 2. However, the best estimate is about 150, which included Captain FW. Latchford, after whom the barracks at Bonegilla are named.

In his first chapters, Challinger provides the background to Russia’s involvement in World War 1. Although a staunch ally of Britain and France, Russia suffered significant defeats and privations for the whole population, culminating in the abdication of the Tsar in March 1917. The provincial government that followed was unable to gain control of the Russian Army and over 2 million soldiers deserted. Germany exploited this collapse, forcing Russia to sue for peace on disastrous terms, which included ceding huge tracts of territory. The conditions were in place for the launch of the campaign that Challinger describes in the rest of his book.

Challinger explains how Australian troops in Britain in March 1918, awaiting shipment back to Australia, heard of a secret mission to an unknown destination, as part of a special expedition where the pay was excellent but only single members could join. Challinger recounts the expedition’s landing and the response from the Bolshevik Red Army, in what was likely the first combined arms landing supported by airpower (in the form of seaplanes operating from a support ship). Challinger also goes to some length to describe the attempts by the expedition, once ashore, to train their reluctant, poorly motivated and largely ineffectual White Russian allies.
Challinger’s explanations are supported by diary entries from a number of Australians. They provide fascinating insights, including how they coped with the extreme arctic cold (down to -56°C on occasions) and the effects of almost 24-hour long winter nights. Such conditions provided significant advantage to defenders, particularly if they were able to use blockhouses, while otherwise it was not uncommon for machine guns to freeze solid and metal parts to snap off weapons.

After the surrender of Germany in November 1918, a number of Allied troops saw no reason still to be fighting. Morale in the expeditionary force plummeted and several French and British units mutinied, refusing to leave Arkhangel to take up positions at the front. The US contingent was also particularly affected by poor morale, with a high number of self-inflicted wounds and a general resentment at being under British command. An Australian temporarily attached to the US force noted that the ‘cocksure and arrogant US troops had almost no experience of real combat’. Most had not fought in Europe, unlike nearly all the British and Australian troops who had fought in France and some at Gallipoli.

In subsequent chapters, Challinger explains the political chicanery of Winston Churchill in ostensibly planning to send a relief force to northern Russia to assist in the withdrawal of the expedition after other nations announced the withdrawal of their forces. In reality, Churchill was manoeuvring to send an offensive force—the ‘North Russian Relief Force’ (NRRF), which included 115 Australian volunteers—to continue the operation.

The operations by the NRRF, which arrived in northern Russia on 3 July 1919, were mostly a series of raids. But, as recounted by Challinger, they included action at the Sheika River in August 1919 which resulted in the award of the first VC to Corporal Arthur Sullivan, as well as a very successful Australian assault along the Dvina River, which resulted in the award of the second VC of the campaign to Sergeant Samuel Pearse.

In the concluding chapters, Challinger explains the effect of public opinion in Britain against the campaign, culminating in General Sir Harry Rawlinson being sent to command the withdrawal of the expeditionary force. Australian troops were among the last to withdraw and were on the last ship to sail from Arkhangel. The Red Army moved in the next day, recapturing Arkhangel on 1 February 1920. The campaign has largely been overlooked in most accounts of World War 1 and is certainly little known by most Australians. Hence, Challinger’s account provides a fascinating read to anyone with an interest in Australian military history.
Anzac Fury – The Bloody Battle of Crete, 1941

Peter Thompson
North Sydney: Heinemann, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-7416-6920-6

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

This is another book for which the title and sub-title are misleading. Peter Thompson’s book actually describes the formation of the Second AIF, the selection of its commanders and the internal pressures between Blamey, Lavarack and Rowell, the movement of the force to Africa, the campaign into Libya—with the battles at Bardia and Tobruk—then the deployment to Greece and, finally, the Crete campaign. The decisive naval surface actions and the plight of the Commonwealth air formations are included in some detail.

Peter Thompson presents an easy-to-read flowing account, with information from both Axis and Commonwealth personalities of all ranks, from dictators to private soldiers. But clichés are many—‘moved mountains’, for example—and no known small personal detail of the senior ranks is omitted, such as Blamey dancing at a nightclub, the nicknames of every commander, and the fact that one Italian general reportedly had tinted eyebrows. The personal aspect of the campaigns is provided by the memoirs of several Australian and New Zealand veterans, with contributions of their experiences throughout the campaigns and later, including some as prisoners. These have not been published before.

Most senior British commanders are portrayed as being beyond their capabilities, which solidified in 1917-18, and this includes Freyberg and the NZ brigade commanders. GHQ Middle East and the senior British officers there are presented as hopeless incompetents, with operational aspects halted during the mandatory daily siesta and a refusal to deviate from peacetime administrative procedures.

Blamey’s personal failings are presented at every opportunity, especially the conflict with Rowell and the decision to include Blamey’s son in the evacuation from Greece. He is criticised for not being at Bardia and, by implication, for his activity on arrival in Greece by selecting possible evacuation sites. Nothing is said about Blamey’s greatest service to the Australian army: that is, keeping the Second AIF in the Middle East as a complete national force and not allowing the British to reduce it to separate packets dispersed under British command.

Thompson emphasises that the Australians on Crete did not consider themselves defeated by the German airborne forces and relates the disappointment felt at the British decision to retreat and evacuate. The adventures of Commonwealth troops who did not surrender, the anti-partisan operations by the Germans and the post-1945 war crimes trials provide an extra aspect not usually included in accounts of the campaign. German manpower losses are presented with comment on the subsequent effect on operations in Russia. But there is no mention of the more important loss of transport and glider aircraft, with some 400 transports
destroyed in airborne operations in the 12 months to the end of the Crete campaign. This loss had greater effect on German capabilities than that of the casualties inflicted on the parachute division.

Owing to ‘the fortunes of publishing’, Thompson’s book has been preceded recently by excellent accounts of the attack on Bardia by Craig Stocking, Peter Ewer’s of the Greek Campaign and others on Tobruk and Crete. Nevertheless, this is a good ‘omnibus’ presentation of the selected Middle East political and military campaigns of 1940-41 on land, at sea and in the air to mid-1941.

_Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the invasion of Japan, 1945–1947_

D. M. Giangreco
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009
ISBN: 978-1-59114-316-1

Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert, Air Power Development Centre

The shattering of the hundred million like a beautiful jewel.
A common expression of Japanese ichioku gyokusa (die together gloriously as a nation) in 1945

Since 1945, when US President Harry Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there has been debate over whether the use of atomic weapons was justified or not.1 Over the last decade or so, there has been a resurgence of this ‘Hiroshima/Nagasaki’ debate. Unfortunately, much of this involves regurgitating contemporary moral and ethical views without reference to the large amount of historical source material that is available. Against the bombings are those who claim that the use of nuclear weapons was fundamentally immoral, that their use was a war crime and is evidence of racist dehumanisation of the Japanese people by the US, or that atomic bombs were militarily unnecessary.

Those who support the use of the atomic bomb claim that shocking Japan into an early surrender not only prevented massive casualties that would have resulted from the planned invasion of the Japan but also saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people across the Asia-Pacific region. Supporters of the bomb argue that, without the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese leadership would not have surrendered in 1945, as they planned to use the whole Japanese population (over 100 million) in a resistance campaign to fight to the death. This plan was known as _Ketsu-Go_ (Operation DECISIVE).

_Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the invasion of Japan, 1945-1947_ comes down strongly in support of President Truman’s decision to use the bomb, although author Dennis Giangreco does not specifically enter the debate. Rather, this book provides a thorough examination of the plans for the American invasion of Japan and for the Japanese defence of their homeland. It also contains valuable source material that informs the Hiroshima/Nagasaki debate.
Today it is difficult to truly appreciate the scale and intensity of the planned invasion of Japan. By 1946, over five million Allied servicemen (including naval, air and army personnel) would be required to subjugate Japan. One pre-Hiroshima report estimated Allied casualties between 1.7 and 4 million, including some 400,000 to 800,000 killed. The same report envisaged at least 5 to 10 million Japanese (service and civilian) deaths. Japanese plans contemplated a 'sacrifice' of 20 million Japanese in the home islands.

At the same time, approximately 400,000 people per month were losing their lives across the Asia-Pacific region, from Indonesia through Manchuria. The first American units to hit the beach at Kyushu expected 70 to 80 per cent casualties. At the time, men and women across the Pacific believed that the two years from November 1945 would be a period of impending disaster or 'punishment from heaven'. That being the case, it is not surprising that many reacted, like James Michener, with 'a gigantic sigh of relief, not exultation because of our victory, but a deep gut-wrenching sigh of deliverance'.

A number of books on Operation DOWNFALL are already available; Richard B. Frank's *Downfall: the end of the Imperial Japanese Empire* is one of the better ones. These works, however, have tended to concentrate on the political and military strategic level without getting into the nitty-gritty of warfare in the Pacific as it was conducted during 1945. *Hell to Pay* is different from its predecessors as it burrows into the large body of operational and tactical level planning documents, both Japanese and American, associated with the campaign. The Okinawa campaign clearly demonstrated that the Japanese armed forces could and would adapt to the direct Allied threat their homeland faced. The introduction of decentralised commands with their own industries, resources and logistics, the extensive use of integrated defences, the local organisation of suicide boats, submarines and wooden suicide planes, and the introduction of 'guerrilla' forces, are just a few of the tactical initiatives introduced by the Japanese for their homeland defence.

Unfortunately, with the passage of time, the absolute fear a Japanese invasion once held for many Pacific War veterans has become watered down into a somewhat abstract modern debate about ethical decision-making in politics and strategy. It is only by examining the operational and tactical implications of the impending campaign that one can truly understand the factors that led to Truman's decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

D. M. Giangreco's *Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the invasion of Japan, 1945-1947* is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the Japanese surrender and the end of the Pacific War. For Australians, this book provides details of a little known operation that, although it never came to pass, was of critical importance for our engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. If the RAN and RAAF had supported the 1st Australian Corps in an invasion of Honshu in 1946, with Tokyo as its objective, we would most probably be mourning the loss of another 4,000 Australians.

NOTES

How Wars End

Dan Reiter

Reviewed by Colonel Chris Field, Australian Army

So long as I have not overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he may overthrow me.
Carl von Clausewitz

For the Australian Defence Organisation, ‘strategy’ means the calculated relationship between ends, ways and means, and is defined as a process that ‘identifies goals [ends], determines how to pursue these goals [ways] and decides what resources are applied [means]’. In How Wars End, Dan Reiter focuses on national strategic ends, using an analysis of six wars, placing an emphasis on understanding national goals in support of war termination.

Despite Reiter’s belief that ‘quantitative analysis [is] the most productive way to test scientific propositions’, in How Wars End he decides to ‘let go of quantitative tests and really embrace case studies’. This led Reiter to survey 22 war-termination decisions—employing empirical war termination models—for the following six wars: Korean War 1950-53, the Allies from 1940-42, Finland and the USSR 1939-44, American Civil War 1861-65, Germany from 1917-18 and Japan from 1944-45. His analysis supports the premise that warfighting is a human endeavour that requires a synthesis in the art and science of war.

Reiter argues that while we have ‘mountain ranges of ideas and scholarship … about how wars start …. [we] know relatively little about how wars end’. Readers who have struggled with selecting, defining and measuring an ‘end state’ for an operation can sympathise with Dan Reiter’s challenge. Another theme of the book is understanding how to make the ending of wars permanent, with Reiter noting that ‘over the 1914-2001 period, nearly one third of all interstate war ceasefires (56 out of 188) eventually broke down into renewed war’. These areas of analysis make How Wars End a valuable reference for practitioners, especially during this period of persistent ADF operational deployments.

In simple terms, Reiter’s book ‘describes two functions of war, two purposes that fighting is meant to serve: providing information and solving commitment problems’. More formally, the six case studies are analysed using the bargaining theory of war termination. Reiter argues that this theory incorporates two insights about international relations: first, that uncertainty about the power and intentions of states pervades the international system; and, second, that states cannot make binding commitments to each other. He notes, for example:

After 9/11, the George W. Bush Administration thought about wars in the context of commitment problems, that rogue states like Iraq could not be trusted to adhere to international commitments, meaning that war culminating in absolute victory, such as foreign imposed regime change, may be the only way of assuring American national security.
One weakness of *How Wars End* is that it only explores the termination of conflict between states and not the termination of conflict between states and non-state actors. Reiter acknowledges that ‘assessing the causes of post-war insurgency is an important question … [but that] such a task is beyond the scope of this book’. Understanding the termination of conflicts between states and non-state actors may be a useful area of further study, especially as Reiter explains that:

... although American conventional forces achieved foreign-imposed regime change in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, in both states enduring and extensive armed resistance against American forces in the form of irregular insurgencies has continued.

This is a well researched and comprehensive academic work with immediate practical application. Defence practitioners will find the six war case studies particularly useful and applicable to understanding how a nation plans to terminate war. Ultimately, Reiter’s analysis leads him to issue a stern warning:

... foreign-policy makers in the 21st century need to recognise the limits and costs of using wars [as a panacea]. Other foreign policy tools such as diplomacy and deterrence may be less costly and more effective.

**NOTES**