GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The Australian Defence Force Journal seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters, such as strategic studies, security and international relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the Journal does not pay for articles but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best in each issue.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without the use of templates or paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable (and contributors should view previous issues for style). Length should be between 3500 and 5000 words. Please ‘spell check’ the document with Australian English before sending.

Articles should contain endnotes, bibliography and brief biographical details of the author.

Endnotes


References or bibliography


Tables, maps and photographs are acceptable but must be of high enough quality to reproduce in high resolution. Photographs must be at least 300 ppi in TIF format and obviously pertinent to the article.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by an independent referee with some knowledge of the subject. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and, if accepted, will be published in the next Journal. Be advised, it may take quite a while from submission to print.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Editor via email at:
publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Authors accept the Editor may make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author, however, the theme or intent of the article will not be changed.
## Contents

**From the Editor**  
2

**Chairman’s Comments**  
3

Thoughts on Joint Professional Military Education  
Rear Admiral James Goldrick, AM, CSC, RAN  
7

Naval History and Joint Professional Military Education: a personal view  
Dr John Reeve, University of New South Wales, ADFA  
14

Professional Mastery in the Joint Environment: Air Force and joint professional military education  
Wing Commander Mark Hinchcliffe, RAAF  
21

Myth-busting the Joint Professional Military Education Strategy  
Lieutenant Colonel Richard King, Australian Army  
25

Reflections on Defence and Education  
Professor David Lovell, University of New South Wales, ADFA  
30

Joint Professional Military Education in the ADF: a junior naval officer’s perspective  
Lieutenant Bernard Dobson, RAN  
34

*PowerPoint* Does Not Become Us: in search of a new teaching method in junior officer education  
Captain Andrew Hastie, Australian Army  
37

It’s Time for an ADF Joint Warfare Studies Centre  
Dr Aaron P. Jackson, ADF Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre  
41

China’s National Defense University: a case study  
Loro Horta, Nanyang Technology University, Singapore  
52

Beyond Joint: professional military education for the 21st century  
Dr Kate Utting, King’s College, London  
62

Let Us Dare  
Admiral James Stavridis, United States Navy  
72

**Book Reviews**  
79
From the Editor

Erratum

The article by Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd in Issue No. 180, titled ‘Of Men V Machines: who knows what lurks in the hearts of men’, contained an editing error on page 79 (second paragraph) that altered the context of the article.

The version as printed read ‘Singer contends the answer to both questions is “well, not really” …’. It should have read ‘I would contend the answer to questions such as these [as posed by Singer] is “no, not really” …’, with the remainder of the article then refuting why the author believes Singer is wrong.

The error is regretted and apologies are extended to Lieutenant Colonel Floyd.

Book reviewers

As highlighted in our last issue, we are keen to hear from readers interested in joining the list of reviewers. We typically receive 4-5 new releases each month from publishers keen to have their books reviewed by the Journal.

Reviewers get to keep the book, so it is a good way of adding to your professional library. If you are interested, please provide your contact details and your subject areas/speciality to the Editor at publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir

Entries are now invited for the 2010 Victorian Veteran Community’s ‘Story Writing and Art Competition’. This competition is open to eligible members of the ex-service community, including widows and children of the above 18 years and older who live in Victoria.

Entries may be story writing, poetry, art, craft or photography. There is a special writing category in 2010 on wartime romances, titled ‘Love and War’. For entry forms, call the SWAC coordinator on (03) 9496 2290 or 1800 134 864 or email swac@austin.org.au or write to Veteran Liaison Officer, PO Box 5444, West Heidelberg VIC 3081 or see www.dva.gov.au/news_archive/events/swac

Regards
George Drakos
SWAC Coordinator
Department of Veterans Affairs
Chairman’s Comments

This edition of the *Australian Defence Force Journal* is a special issue. Its intent is to focus on the subject of ‘joint professional military education’ (JPME) and my hope is that the articles and commentaries in this edition will stimulate further comment and debate.

While I have taken the opportunity to provide my own perspective on JPME in my role as Commander of the Australian Defence College and Commander Joint Education, Training and Warfare, I emphasise that this is a personal perspective and one that I provide in order to inspire a response from others interested in the subject.

Similarly, the majority of the other contributions reflect the authors’ personal views of JPME and the challenges that the ADF is facing; they are not an official line and not intended to be considered as such. I ask that the readership of the *ADF Journal* study these contributions in the same spirit. We need more debate and discussion on professional issues and that of education is surely one of the most important.

On the following pages is a list of approved and draft definitions relating to JPME and to Defence education and training. That of JPME has been developed from the mandated US version. It is offered with the request that readers consider it and provide their views as to whether the definition really does define what JPME is and should be.

I am particularly grateful to Admiral Jim Stavridis for his article ‘Let Us Dare’. He is an officer who has made many significant contributions throughout his career to the military debate. If you have any thoughts as to whether you can contribute – you should read ‘Let Us Dare’.

The prize for the best article in this edition has been divided between Lieutenant Bernard Dobson, RAN and Captain Andrew Hastie. Their contributions not only raise some key concerns with junior officer JPME but also suggest some different approaches.

In future, at least one issue a year of the *ADF Journal* will be on a special topic. That for next year is currently being considered and is likely to focus on the ADF command and leadership experience over the last fifteen years.

Good reading – and better writing.

**James Goldrick**
Rear Admiral, RAN
Commander, Joint Education, Training and Warfare Command
Chairman of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board
JPME definitions

The definitions set out below are a mix of approved and draft definitions. Those which refer to a Defence Instruction or ADF publication are currently approved Defence definitions. The remainder, particularly those defining JPME, have been developed as a result of discussions led by Joint Education, Training and Warfare Command over the last year as part of our effort to determine the best way ahead for our education effort.

Comments on all the definitions are welcomed and should be sent direct to the Editor. It is intended to publish any comments, together with possible revisions to the various definitions, in the next issue of the ADF Journal.

Development is the growth or realisation of a person’s ability through conscious or unconscious learning. (ADDP 7.0)

Education involves participation in activities which aim at developing the knowledge, skill, moral values and understanding required in all aspects of life, rather than skill and knowledge relating to only a limited field of activity. (ADDP 7.0)

Education can further be described as the development of the intellectual skills and character necessary for the understanding of professional knowledge and as a foundation for all other aspects of professional development. Education also develops, in those being educated, strategies for continued learning, flexible thought processes, structured analytical processes and an ability to adapt to unfamiliar and changing circumstances. Education in the ADF comprises ‘academic education’, which is that education principally embodied within programs of higher education, and ‘professional military education’ (PME), which is principally embodied within military studies programs conducted by defence and military colleges and schools. (DI(G) PERS 05-22)

Liberal education is complementary to the training in technical skills or methodologies that comprises a large and necessary part of what is popularly understood as education. The ability to reason (which can be described as a technical skill) needs to be complemented by the capacity to reason effectively from the broadest and most knowledgeable perspective possible. Liberal education involves the development of an attitude toward to the world that includes creativity, self awareness, a desire to pursue the truth, a capacity to adopt an open-minded approach to the subject at hand and an ability to make effective decisions in circumstances of ambiguity and uncertainty. (DI(G) PERS 05-22)

‘Joint professional military education’ (JPME) is that component of professional military education which promotes the theoretical and practical understanding of joint matters, including, as appropriate to the level of rank and specialisation involved, at least the following:
1. Joint organisation and capabilities

2. Joint command and control

3. Joint culture and its interaction with single Service cultures

4. Joint doctrine

5. National and Defence strategy

6. Joint planning and operations at all levels of war

7. Joint force and joint requirements development.

As appropriate, JPME includes developing the understanding of inter-agency, whole of government and combined/coalition organisation, culture, command and control, planning and operations.1 (CJETW)

Training is a planned process to inculcate and modify attitude, knowledge or skill behaviour through a learning experience to achieve effective performance in an activity or range of activities (ADDP 7.0)

Military training can apply to both operational and non-operational individual training and involves the systematic provision of technical and professional knowledge, attitudes and skills required in the competent performance of specific duties in war and peace. It encompasses generic training (ie induction training), as well as continuation training designed to maintain or develop skills appropriate to both workforce groups and professional streams. (DIG(G) PERS 05-22)

Joint military training is that component of military training which involves the provision of the technical and professional knowledge and skills required by personnel to operate effectively in executing specific activities within a joint environment. (CJETW)
NOTES

1. The definition of JPME enacted by the US Congress in directing the joint education programs of the US Armed Forces is as follows:

JPME consists of the rigorous and thorough instruction and examination of officers of the armed forces in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical in-depth understanding of joint matters and, specifically, of the subject matter covered. The subject matter to be covered by JPME shall include at least the following:

1. National military strategy
2. Joint planning at all levels of war
3. Joint doctrine
4. Joint command and control
5. Joint force and joint requirements development.'
Thoughts on Joint Professional Military Education

Rear Admiral James Goldrick, AM, CSC, RAN

Introduction

Just what is ‘professional military education’ (PME) and, more specifically, what is ‘joint professional military education’ (JPME)?

Elsewhere in this edition of the Australian Defence Force Journal are offered draft definitions of PME and JPME. These drafts have been developed in the wake of work over the last year by Joint Education, Training and Warfare Command (JETWC), in concert with the Services, to achieve a better understanding of our PME and JPME requirements and what these mean for the career development continuum of ADF personnel. I do not wish to dwell on the definitions, which remain work in progress, although I would ask all the Journal’s readers to consider the draft versions and contribute their views to our correspondence pages.

What I would assert is that the product of successful PME and JPME comes not only in formal skills and knowledge but in possession of the right outlook and that these parallel requirements exist at every stage of the continuum and must be provided for. PME and JPME in their full sense encompass a host of activities—the achievement of all the skill sets for their people that modern defence organisations require.

Even confined to specifically military issues, the subject is a very broad one. In this article, I want to provide my own perspective as Commander JETWC and Commander of the Australian Defence College (ADC) and to highlight a few key principles which need to underpin any PME programs, as well as some associated challenges for the ADF. My thoughts on PME and the language which I use are not those of a professional educator but of a practitioner.

My focus relates principally to personal development in areas specifically related to the military profession, rather than those which are applicable elsewhere. The difference is that many of the latter skill sets can most effectively be acquired either from outside authorities or in close cooperation with them. My key effort as Commander JETWC must lie in understanding where we need to go in those areas in which the military profession is unique or where it has very particular requirements.

My emphasis, in an attempt to achieve simplicity in a complicated subject, is on the classical aspects of ‘jointery’, that is, between and amongst the Services, rather than on international or inter-agency factors. The truth is, however, that the right approach to resolving inter-Service issues readily extends to the wider stage and this wider stage will occupy more and more of our time in the years ahead.
The reality behind joint success

The first principle of PME that I will declare is derived from the basic reality of successful joint operations—they are successful because of what each Service and each specialisation within that Service brings to the joint environment. Jointery depends upon professional mastery within each Service—and international and inter-agency successes depend in their turn upon professional mastery within the ADF as a whole.

In creating a continuum of education and training, it is axiomatic that joint things cannot come at the expense of the single Service foundation but instead must build upon that base. This is reflected in the organisation of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) military training programs where every midshipmen and officer cadet at the Academy not only undertakes the full ADFA military education and training (AMET) program but also completes the full general service officer initial training of their own Service that those who have not entered through the Academy undertake.

The real aim of ADFA in this aspect does not in fact relate to the additional skills and knowledge that the AMET program provides for the Academy’s graduates, however desirable they may be, but to the goal—nicely defined by a former Commander ADC—of creating ‘joint mates’. In other words, it is the lifelong friendships and bonds of trust that the graduates will have with each other across the Services that will really benefit the ADF. From the time of the East Timor operation, some ten years after the first graduates left the Academy, the dividends of those friendships and that trust have been obvious in the contribution that they have made to more effective co-operation between the Services.

We cannot realistically give the three year-long ADFA experience to all our junior officers in the ADF and the creation of artificial mechanisms to do so would not be a practical solution. Academy graduates represent approximately one-third of the officer corps and what we need is for these officers, through the joint outlook that they have developed, to act as a catalyst to encourage trust and cooperation amongst others. In fact there are now officers undertaking the Defence and Strategic Studies Course (DSSC) who are graduates both of ADFA and the Australian Command and Staff Course (ACSC). And, yes, time flies!

I am confident that they have been agents for greater cooperation between the Services from the time they graduated but it is also probably true that the relationships which have been developed between other individuals of different Services on operations during the high tempo of the last decade have also been of critical importance—they are certainly apparent amongst the course members of both the ACSC (at O4 and O5 ranks) and the DSSC (at O6). If, for any reason, the level of operational inter-action were to be reduced, then the ADF would need to consider very carefully the form and scale of its joint exercise and training programs to ensure that the impetus is maintained.

What we do need to get right is the provision of the skills and knowledge that junior officers must have when they are moved from their Service into a joint environment, particularly a joint headquarters in which they will be involved in preparing and executing joint plans. This was the responsibility of the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC), which has now
passed on its disestablishment to the Joint Warfare Doctrine and Training Centre (JWTDC). The courses which are offered tend to be short and relatively compressed but they do appear, in general, to provide not only the basic skills but in their own right help with the development of the personal relationships which are so important.

They are also probably offered at the right time—just before officers move into the joint environment. For timeliness is a critical factor in ensuring credibility and readiness to accept new concepts and skills. It is quite possible for officers to spend a decade or more wholly within a single Service environment, even when on operations. The challenge in getting the balance right for junior officers is best reflected in the issue of the joint military appreciation process (JMAP). Understanding of the JMAP and the ability to conduct it are central to the utility of a staff officer in a joint headquarters.

The truth is, however, that both the Navy and the Air Force have at the tactical level other planning processes developed for and more suited to the problems that have to be solved there than the JMAP. The latter can appear somewhat arcane if it is presented in the wrong way and both its theory and practice of doubtful utility to the warfare officer in the operations room or to the pilot or air combat officer aloft. JMAP training for junior ranks therefore works best as ‘pre-joining training’ before a joint appointment.

There is an additional tension in the ADF situation, one that relates to our relatively small size and the consequent need for our people to possess generalist skills earlier than is the case for our larger partners, particularly the US. The latter can much more easily maintain career structures to high rank for many deep specialists in a way that the ADF simply cannot. This means that all the Australian services have to place a high premium on the development of professional ‘operator/specialist’ skills and standards from the outset and as quickly as possible. It also means that our junior officers have to squeeze every ounce out of the professional experience that they gain on exercises and operations and seek every opportunity to extend their understanding and their expertise—and any additional joint education and training have to be aligned with that requirement.

I am not convinced, however, that we provide our junior personnel with enough grounding in the basic structures, equipment and capabilities of the ADF as a whole. If we make the effort to provide this too early, it runs the risk of not only interfering with the needs of the single Service but also of going right over the heads of the intended recipients. If it is provided too late, then there will be key deficiencies in the understanding of our people.

We need to look at new ways of providing such grounding to more than a selected few and this is one of the areas that the new JWDTC will be examining as it maps out its path for the future. Some of the work being done within the ADF on e-learning packages for the new amphibious capability suggests that there is real promise in these areas. I should add, however, as I have already implied, that the most important thing is to encourage curiosity and a burning desire to extend their own professional horizons amongst our junior personnel. A generation brought up on surfing the web does possess the skills to seek out and understand without too much external guidance—once they have the right grounding.
Meeting all needs within a JPME construct

Another principle is that *one size does not fit all*. This is true within the Services and between the Services. This principle is associated with the fact that you cannot have everything in a continuum of training and education, although the subject is sometimes debated in such a way as to suggest that many believe that you can. Indeed, it is fair to say that everyone in the ADF has an opinion about how they were trained and educated and on how other people should be trained and educated. The satirist John Winton once had one of his characters remark that half the people in the Royal Navy spent their time training and the other half criticising training and this is probably just as true for the ADF.

PME and JPME include much more than preparing officers to command forces in conflict, however much this requirement is central—or even unique—to their purpose. And even with the equivalent of the ‘arms corps’ within each Service, the development requirements are not the same for each individual and it is not necessarily easy to align a cohort. For example, it has been estimated for the US Navy that it takes approximately two years longer to produce a major surface combatant captain than the Army does a battalion commander.

The fact that the Army Technical Officers Staff Course (ATSOC), a long standing and very successful program of the Army, has now been renamed the Capability and Technology Management College (CTMC) as a joint organisation and placed under the command of the ADC within the ACSC is a significant recognition of the fact that there must be significant diversity in our understanding of just what the PME and JPME needs really are for the ADF (and Defence) as a whole. We must factor in the requirements of our specialists, whether in logistics, technical services or in other areas such as medicine and law.

Focus on what is unique

The third principle is that *a defence force or a service needs to focus on providing with its own resources what is unique within the PME requirement and use external capabilities for what is not unique, particularly when these achieve economies of scale*.

We have become much better at recognising the training and education activities which can be conducted on a joint basis with shared administration and facilities and it is likely that the ADF will move further down this path in future. Similarly, we should not hesitate to use academic institutions and other providers when what we want is the same as the civilian world.

My own view is that the potential for ‘distance learning’ that is being opened up by rapidly developing information and communications technology will accelerate this trend because it will become progressively easier to access the centres of excellence in any particular area of expertise, no matter where the students are located. I have been particularly encouraged by the success of video lectures for the Defence and Strategic Studies Course (our senior program), as a way in which the world’s leading experts on particular topics can be tapped for their expertise without having to make the expensive and time consuming journey to Australia on every occasion that we need them.
One of the associated issues is how much we should attempt to achieve external accreditation for our training and education efforts. This is not a simple question because, if we apply the principle that the ADF should focus on what is unique to the military profession, it follows that what is being taught and learned does not have exact equivalents in the civilian sphere. In reality, there is a cross-over of significant elements, no matter how ‘military’ the course, but lines do need to be drawn.

There is some evidence from overseas, for example, that efforts to make staff courses fully accredited and complete postgraduate degree programs in their own right have sometimes had the effect of skewing the priorities away from the military requirement. The ACSC currently has some accredited elements which go a significant way towards the achievement of a postgraduate degree but not completely. Officers can do something in their own time to gain formal academic and external professional qualifications if they want them. The numbers currently undertaking part-time or external studies are such that it is clear that they are willing to do so.

**JPME in the future**

Do I see difficulties ahead? The greatest danger is that the apparent capabilities of distance and part-time education and training and the increasing cost of the time of our best personnel could combine to reduce or even end the practice of removing our officers for up to a year to undertake staff or higher defence courses—or allowing them time for full-time civil schooling. Learning is not a linear process and people do not necessarily gain all that they can or should within a high pressure environment in which they are forced to husband inadequate time to meet only the most pressing priorities. Space for reflection and debate is vital to intellectual growth.

Henry Kissinger once commented that a person does not actually become wiser while doing a highly responsible, demanding and complex job. Wisdom comes, he suggested, only during an inter-regnum, in which one can consider and build upon one’s experiences to develop a more complete and better judged picture of the world and an understanding of what still needs to be done. And then go out again. It may indeed be that the nature of warfare has changed in ways that make this kind of personal ‘operational pause’ even more important in ensuring that people do not burn out permanently. There will be a place for both part-time and full-time endeavours but we need to get the balance right.

Nevertheless, we can utilise distance processes to offer PME opportunities to a wider range of people and this possibility is currently being examined by the ACSC, which already runs very successful distance programs for the Naval and Army Reserves. It may be that a good part of the ACSC opportunity can be extended to a larger audience—a way not only of providing more staff trained officers to the ADF but of developing in more officers the skills and attributes that they will require in higher ranks.

Another danger would be either erosion of or a failure to further develop the ADF’s capacity to educate and train in the unique elements of the military profession. This relates not only
to the higher command and planning levels but also in the basics of our profession, what the British Admiral Richard Kempenfelt described more than 200 years ago as the primary and secondary elements. As I have already noted, the pressure on the Australian career continuum is such that we have to keep the maintenance of very high training standards in developing our junior personnel as an absolute priority.

In this context, I do believe that the ADF will need to further integrate warfare training between the Services. This has been a gradual process for many years but it will have to go further. Apart from the unprecedented amphibious capabilities that the new landing ships and their associated assets will bring to the ADF, the networked nature of our ships, aircraft and, increasingly, land based assets means that we are not speaking of the five environments of space, air, sea, land and cyber-space but, in some respects, of one. The skills which will be required of an air combat officer in an aerial early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft are very largely the same as those of an air warfare officer in an air warfare destroyer (AWD). Indeed, the former may well end up giving the order to fire for the weapons carried in the AWD, albeit from 60 nautical miles away and from 30,000 feet above sea level! How we do this will be one of the key training challenges of the next decade.

We will certainly need to continue to develop our efforts in training and educating for higher command. There has been significant change within the DSSC program over the last few years and it now includes not only a comprehensive higher command module but also classified and unclassified electives which allow potential operational commanders to examine campaigning and higher command issues in depth. The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies will continue to evolve this aspect of the course.

We will also need to continue to extend our leadership programs and, as an integral part of them, our ethics education. The Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics (CDLE) is not only working closely with the three Services but also conducting its own courses and research to support our personnel at all levels in the increasingly complex, even chaotic, environments in which they must operate.

Finally, we need to work on developing JPME for our non commissioned personnel. I have not dwelt on this aspect of PME but it is clear that there is a hunger for such activities and not only at the warrant officer and senior NCO levels. The participation by warrant officers of all services in key elements of the ACSC program and the annual NCO Forum represent an excellent start in this direction and they will be something, subject to the availability of resources, which the ADC will seek to build upon.
Conclusion

This article is intended to provoke comment and debate on what is—and always will be—a 'work in progress'. I welcome any response, either in the pages of the ADF Journal or to me personally at the Australian Defence College or via my email James.Goldrick@defence.gov.au

James Goldrick joined the RAN in 1974. A Principal Warfare Officer and anti-submarine warfare specialist, he twice commanded the frigate HMAS Sydney and later served as the inaugural Commander Australian Surface Task Group. During this posting, he commanded the Australian task group deployed to the Persian Gulf in early 2002 and also served as commander of the multinational naval forces enforcing UN sanctions on Iraq. He commanded ADFA from 2003 to 2006. He was promoted Rear Admiral in May 2006 and appointed Commander Border Protection Command. In May 2008 he assumed duty as Commander Joint Education, Training and Warfare Command. He has a BA from the University of NSW and a Master of Letters from the University of New England. He is a graduate of the Advanced Management Program of Harvard Business School. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Letters honoris causa by the University of NSW in 2006 and is a Professorial Fellow of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security.
Naval History and Joint Professional Military Education: a personal view

Dr John Reeve, University of New South Wales, ADFA

What follows are some personal reflections on the experience of teaching naval history and, inevitably by implication, maritime strategy at UNSW@ADFA over a period of more than a decade. This teaching has been at both the undergraduate and postgraduate levels, encompassing eras from the age of sail to the early 21st century and in classes which have been completely joint. Subjects in naval history and amphibious warfare constitute integral parts of the degree curriculum in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at ADFA. These observations are those of an academic and a civilian, who has simultaneously been involved in teaching, research and writing, and extensive interface with the RAN up to its most senior levels, as well as dealing with other navies. Insofar as these reflections add intellectual value to a debate on joint professional military education (JPME), it is within these contexts and from these perspectives.

Naval history: content and issues

Unlike many students in civilian universities, undergraduate officer cadets and midshipmen have made a choice about their careers for the foreseeable future. This has many implications, two of which are their needs for both specialisation and breadth. They naturally and rightly seek relevance in their studies. They are inexperienced, however, in understanding what constitutes relevance. They are also frequently unaware of the need for breadth to balance specialist interest. In naval history, they are instinctively attracted to the tactical and technological topics—especially the dramatic ‘bang-bang’ episodes—and need no encouragement to write about battles, campaigns and weaponry.

A sensible approach is to provide them with plenty of this. But it is also important to encourage the study of naval affairs in the wider context: political and diplomatic, economic and social, intellectual and cultural. One benefit of such an approach is to foster an awareness of variables and a suspicion of mono-causality—of belief in one determining factor such as technology. The British Royal Navy has for centuries proven that superior ships alone, often those of their enemies, will not win wars at sea. If future naval officers are aware of the fallacies of mono-causality, in history as well as strategy and operations, then one has kicked a goal.

JPME is by definition, however, joint. There are certain lessons which can be learned with equal value by future leaders of all three Services. In terms of sea power, it is worth their knowing that modern navies, including the RAN, are the inheritors of one of history’s great warrior traditions, one which has contributed extensively to making the world a better place. It has created and sustained inter-continental contact and commerce, underwritten international stability and security for generations, developed scientific knowledge, combated slavery,
piracy and terrorism, and been critical in the defeat of tyrannies and fascism. Sailors are rightly proud of what they have achieved over the last half a millennium and it is useful for others to know why. Future officers of all three Services can also be made aware of the nature of the society which they, as members of the ADF, are defending: a maritime society which is part of a wider family of maritime nations and which, in important ways, is therefore intrinsically a friend of democratic, free, humane and productively commercial life.¹

Naval history, however, can be different things to different students. Army and Air Force officer cadets can be introduced to the concept of ‘all that blue out there’: the fact that more than two-thirds of the earth’s surface is water, which has arguably been the greatest strategic lever in history and which represents great opportunity. If future Army officers, for example, many of whom will serve in amphibious ships, can become aware of the value of the sea in strategic-operational manoeuvre and of how so many of history’s greatest land commanders have used it effectively, then an invaluable seed is sown.

Midshipmen, by contrast, will have many years to be indoctrinated by navies and taught by their own experience the value of sea power. Historical education can introduce them to the nuances and paradoxes of naval-maritime issues, which will in turn make them better informed practitioners of, and advocates for, maritime power. They can consider how sea power has limits, that it is usually strategically essential but alone inconclusive, that its enormous value is difficult to explain and usually only obvious to its specialists. There is, of course, much overlap in the audiences for these lessons but the points hold good.

**Training and education**

Navies are meritocracies but they are also technocratic, with their modern origins in late 17th and 18th century British professional society. Traditionally, their level of training, however excellent, has exceeded their level of education. Broadly speaking, there is much consensus on this issue.² There is a need in all forms of senior military responsibility for a reflective, imaginative and deeply-analytical capability; military history is replete with defeated victims of lack of imagination.³ Training alone, however proficient, cannot provide such a capacity, and liberal education in the humanities and in history is extremely well suited to foster it.

History, including naval history, encourages students in such areas as the transcendence of present-mindedness and prejudice, the search for original explanation, the consideration of human, material and ideological variables, awareness of the interaction of change and continuity, the balancing of deterministic and contingent views of causation, attention to the workings of both individual human beings and social systems, sensitisation to complexity, cogency in argument and lucidity of expression. This kind of intellectual—and hence professional—breadth, depth and sophistication is an invaluable investment in future military leadership and the national interest. Its value is underlined in an era in which PowerPoint presentation frequently undercuts clarity of thought and appreciation of complexity, not least in the military.⁴
There are particular, immediately practical, spin-offs from such historical education. Historical and strategic thinking are intimately related. Both are arts, not sciences, and both involve the making of choices conditioned by contexts. Introduction to historical analysis therefore provides tools for greater strategic awareness in professional military life. This is potentially of significant benefit to naval officers whose traditional first unit command, the warship, is an inherently strategic instrument, and in whose realm the levels of warfare from the strategic down to the tactical are arguably closer than those in the other environments.

Further, it can be seen as useful to encourage future officers to think explicitly about strategy at a young age. If one is aware of how one’s individual efforts contribute to the bigger picture, one will usually be a better contributor and have better morale. One may even want to stay in the Navy longer. One of the most rewarding experiences I have ever had as a teacher in any university is a chance encounter with an RAN Lieutenant in a wardroom, who volunteered the information that because he had heard a lecture I had given on the fundamentals of sea power, he understood what he was doing in a fleet unit in Timor in 1999-2000 and was able to tell some of his fellow crew members as well. In the long run of their careers, it is also important for the military officers of a middle-power such as Australia, so often a satellite force, to think at the strategic level, because nothing is probably more critical to our national sovereignty.

**Historical education as professional empowerment**

There is another area, less tangible, in which the intellectual benefits of liberal education translate into improved professional military proficiency. This is the development—and it probably cannot happen too soon for future military leaders—of a subconscious sensibility which processes complex observations within the context of experience, which seizes on significant detail, which can prompt timely command intervention in an evolving situation and which generally puts intellectual subtlety and acuteness at the service of leadership.

This is probably akin to what sailors have for generations called ‘sea sense’ and it is what soldiers call the ‘eye for ground’. Cavalry officers of the old world called it the *coup d’œil*: the ability to take in a whole scene and choose precisely the moment to act. One serving RAN flag officer and experienced commander has recently testified to it and linked it to a reflective and liberal education. It is the temperament for command which Alfred Thayer Mahan believed, according to Jon Sumida, could and should be inculcated in naval officers by the study of history and its complexities.

Navies worldwide have matured intellectually during the last generation and it has been interesting to observe the latter part of this continuing process. It is tempting to see as no accident the fact that three currently-serving RAN flag officers are practising historians. But certainly the support that the RAN has evidenced for the tertiary education of its future leaders at ADFA speaks for itself. Paradoxically, one noticeable consequence for midshipmen of a university education in a joint military environment is a heightened sense of uniquely naval contribution and purpose.
This is a development which has been clear over the course of a decade: midshipmen now have significantly greater professional confidence and sense of naval identity within the Academy. This is partly due to their experience of a naval environment and sea time before arriving. But it is also, I would suggest, due to their experience of an Academy which has evolved its own culture over a quarter of a century: one which is academic, joint, mixed in gender, and which has developed against the backdrop of a recent decade of high tempo operations. More specifically, this heightened sense of naval identity has been encouraged for many midshipmen through the experience of comparing and contrasting the business of their own Service with those of the others in the reflective environment of historical classrooms.

Not long ago, a leading RAN four-stripe captain told me that his was a naval generation which was taught how to do their jobs but not why those jobs were important, and which was consequently handicapped when it came to explaining that importance to others. In short, I inferred, he was saying that they had been trained more than educated. The generations which came after them have benefited from the broad trend in naval education towards integrating academic study and training regimes. They are more professionally self-aware and are therefore more professionally empowered. They are visibly able to speak with a degree of confidence, conviction and plausibility, born largely of academic understanding and intellectual facility, which will serve them, the Navy, the ADF and the nation well in the years to come.

**Jointness, command and the face of naval battle**

There are several professional naval areas which relate very directly to the study of naval history. One is that of jointness. This is an issue which is immediately liable to misconception, perhaps mostly by the young. Jointness is not sameness; its fundamental building block is the unique environmental expertise professed by each of the Services in complementary fashion within a capability-driven force structure. Jointness means compatibility and coherence but, in the main, difference. The tribal cultures of individual military services are intimately related to their expertise, and need to be respected. The study of naval history is thus a means of deepening midshipmen’s sense of professional identity, while introducing future leaders of other Services to naval culture. It is a vehicle for understanding why maritime strategy, naval operations and naval people are different. It is also a vehicle for appreciating how individual navies, while exhibiting family resemblances, can also differ significantly.

Another area is that of leadership and command. The study of figures such as Nelson and Cunningham, Nimitz, Waller and Collins has obvious value in terms of professional naval development, as has the study of defeated commanders such as Dönitz and Yamamoto. History is here a window on to the operational, administrative and human dimensions of leadership, and a lesson in how great commanders have been serious students of their profession and in their different ways scholars.

History gives a reality to abstractions. Nothing is more graphically holistic in illuminating the principles of war than to study a battle such as Trafalgar, which had the lot and which was effectively won before it was fought. The study of command is also a perfect opportunity to bring uniformed practitioners into the classroom both as witnesses and role models. A series of former RAN Task Group Commanders have given highly successful addresses to naval
history classes during recent years about their Gulf commands before, during and after the Iraq war, some of them explaining how historical study and reflection have informed their planning and execution of operations.

How can one study and discuss the human experience of naval warfare without having experienced it oneself? For this writer, the opening sentence of John Keegan’s well-known book *The Face of Battle* remains haunting: ‘I have not been in a battle…. And I grow increasingly convinced that I have very little idea of what a battle can be like.’ Keegan was of course discussing war on land, which in some ways remains easier, and in others more difficult, than naval warfare to penetrate.

The question of the teacher’s moral authority remains, and the closest this teacher has got to naval warfare is listening to and questioning an uncle who served in the RAN’s ‘Scrap Iron Flotilla’ during the Second World War and talking similarly to various serving members of the Navy. Honesty is therefore important in the classroom, as are images on film, the testimony of veterans, and study and imagination. While naval operations are more of a continuum, and sailors are less preoccupied with the ‘baptism of fire’, some inkling of what may await them during hostilities can almost certainly help prepare future naval leaders for the experience.

**The postgraduate experience**

Many of the observations above apply more to the education of midshipmen and undergraduates than to postgraduates. Historical and strategic education is as readily applicable to postgraduates’ professional development, however, as to that of their younger colleagues. Postgraduates differ from the latter in their ages, professional achievements and personal (frequently family) commitments. They have usually seen more, done more and want more from their teachers and courses of study. They are a more demanding clientele in their way, even if they have less time to make those demands.

These days, even when relatively young, they also often have a record of personal operational experience which they can relate to their studies: a whole additional dimension and teaching resource into which they, and their teacher, can tap for the benefit of the class, whether it is the vivid memories of a British Para who fought in the Falklands, the impressions of an ADF lieutenant colonel on the value of sea power in Timor or the reflections of a RAN officer working with the RAAF in the area of maritime patrol.

Postgraduates, through their experience, are also more aware of jointness and its importance. They can also find the study of naval-maritime issues very broadening and consciously appreciate it, if from a different service background. Above all, postgraduates are only in the class because they really want to be there, because they are keen to deepen their professional knowledge through higher academic study and are willing to sacrifice precious time to do so. They are also refreshing in the confidence with which they are willing to disagree.
The academic-naval interface

One of the rewarding aspects, both professionally and personally, of teaching naval history at the Academy has been an ongoing collegial involvement with a group of naval officers, both serving and retired, who have appreciated what history can contribute to JPME. This has been the basis of an enriching discourse, both inside and outside the classroom, about what navies are and do, as well as much else. Such an involvement, for a professional historian, has afforded insights into the strategic and diplomatic episodes of the past and one trusts that the benefit has been mutual.

What has been enabling is to discover that naval officers and academics share many common values, despite belonging to very different professions, even without considering history as a point of contact. A critical factor is that the environment of a military academy, and of a defence community, can be intellectually liberating for scholars interested in areas such as diplomatic and military strategic-operational history, which in many civilian universities would be seen as politically incorrect because unduly warlike or intellectually retrograde, neither of which is necessarily true. Military services, in this writer’s experience (and in that of many other defence academics), are often bastions of intellectual freedom because they cannot afford not to be; their stakes are too high.14

The uses of history

Historical education has manifold uses for navies and military services generally. It is a source of tradition and identity, an intellectual enabler, a sharpener of professional judgment, a strategic resource and—above all—a means to self-awareness. As a reliable record and source of understanding of actual military operations and warfare, history has no peer; as I have said elsewhere, it is real, unclassified and we know who won. Military services, and navies, have a significant vested interest in allowing academics the opportunity—and the freedom—to research, write and teach it.15

John Reeve is Senior Lecturer and Osborne Fellow in Naval History at UNSW@ADFA, a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and a Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. A graduate of Melbourne University (MA) and Pembroke College, Cambridge (PhD), he is the author or co-editor of five books and more than 20 articles and chapters on diplomatic and naval history and contemporary maritime strategic affairs. He is a Visiting Fellow of Wolfson College, Cambridge, during the first half of 2010.
NOTES

1. I have argued this at greater length in D. Stevens and J. Reeve (eds.), *The Navy and the Nation: the influence of the Navy on modern Australia*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2005, Chapter 19.


5. I have argued this in detail elsewhere: see D. Stevens and J. Reeve (eds.), *Southern Trident: strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2001, p. 9.

6. I am grateful to CDRE Jack McCaffrie, RAN (Ret’d) for this point many years ago.

7. I am grateful to Professor Hew Strachan of All Souls College, Oxford, for discussion of this issue.

8. RADM James Goldrick RAN, ‘Command and Leadership – Setting the Scene’: address to the Australian Command and Staff Course, Australian Defence College, Canberra, 16 February 2009.


11. A work which is very revealing of the depth and nature of RN culture, for example, is Captain David Hart-Dyke’s memoir of the Falklands War: D. Hart-Dyke, *Four Weeks in May: a Captain’s story of war at sea*, London: Atlantic Books, 2007.


13. For one attempt to elucidate the culture of naval warfare, see J. Reeve and D. Stevens (eds.), *The Face of Naval Battle: the human experience of modern war at sea*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003, Chapter 1.


Professional Mastery in the Joint Environment: Air Force and joint professional military education

Wing Commander Mark Hinchcliffe, RAAF

Australia faces, so the 2009 Defence White Paper suggests, a time of strategic uncertainty. A time in which, the authors argue, it is necessary ‘to strengthen the foundations of Australia’s defence’. While the White Paper goes on in large part to describe the capability priorities for the future force, it says very little, beyond the cliché, regarding the development of the human dimension of Australian defence. But the apparent lack of attention to Defence personnel in this document belies the significant progress the individual Services, and Defence as a whole, have made in recent years in recognising the need for a more professional and educated force.

It has been something of an article of faith amongst Western air forces, since the establishment of independent air services, that air power is not only commanded to best effect when done so by airmen but that the capabilities that air forces bring to the modern campaign are fundamental to successful operations. An effective, professional and integrated Air Force consequently is seen as a vital component of the Australian national security community. Ensuring it remains so depends not only on the physical capabilities, systems and platforms that Air Force operates but, most fundamentally, on the quality of the people who comprise the Service, the standard of their education and training, and their ability to operate as professional, co-equal contributors to Australian security.

But how does Air Force go about providing for the professional development of its members, especially its officers, to meet the apparently competing demands of single-Service technical competency, meaningful individual employment, career development and progression to meet Air Force organisational needs, and the competency required to operate as effective members of the joint, interagency and coalition operational environment? How can Air Force’s organisational requirements be squared with the operational demands that the ADF and Australian Government will levy in the coming years?

In 2008, Air Force initiated a comprehensive review of its professional military education and training system (PMET) under the auspices of Project AFTER. It did so in recognition of the fact that, despite previous attempts at reform, Air Force’s existing PMET system was unlikely to produce the kind of professional mastery that Chief of Air Force had identified as vital to the continued success of the organisation and the effective provision of air power for Australia’s security in the 21st century.

Of the numerous recommendations to come out of the review was the clear need for Air Force to take a deliberate, coherent and strategic approach to the professional education of its members. An approach that would ultimately deliver training and educational outcomes that would not only meet the operational warfighting needs of the Service but also prepare its members for careers in an Air Force that was evolving to meet the challenges of the emerging security environment.
Preparing to set its own house in order, in terms of the professional development of its members, is a necessary and overdue measure for Air Force. It may prove, however, an insufficient one if it is not coupled with an equally necessary review of how Air Force prepares its members for duty in the joint and interagency environment which will characterise Australian security operations in the coming decades. With the release of its latest high-level doctrine series in 2007, Air Force announced its intent to inculcate a culture of professional mastery of air power throughout the force. The generation and application of air power, Air Force claimed, was premised on the professional mastery of its people. Similarly, Air Force’s capacity to contribute to joint operations and to guide the force into the uncertain future security environment were underpinned by ‘the expert decision making of [its] professional masters of air power’.4

For Air Force then, professional mastery represents individual and collective development beyond technical mastery. It encompasses not only the organisational dimension of raising, training and sustaining the force but the operational application of that force within the context of a whole-of-government, that is, a national coordinated approach. Revitalised professional military education and training, in conjunction with relevant operational experience, are seen as foundational to the development of a force imbued with the professional mastery of air power.

While the ‘getting of wisdom’ through real world experience is part-and-parcel of everyday operational life in the Air Force—particularly in those force element groups that are on virtually perpetual operational footing—transitioning the PMET system from one that achieves technical competencies to one that can foster professional mastery is a very big ask. Hence, although necessary, these measures may not prove sufficient for either Air Force’s needs or the ADF’s. Single-service expertise and professionalism may be the sine qua non for combat operations but history would suggest that the ability to function effectively as a team, in joint and coalition operations, may be predicated on more than specialist competency alone.

It is hardly new insight to suggest that successful joint or coalition operations require appropriate joint and coalition exercises and training. Nor might it be especially novel to note that historically, effective militaries have trained the way they intended to fight—including joint training (and the Israeli Defence Force experience in the lead-up to the Six Day War is instructive here). Moreover, while joint exercises and training have been regular features of ADF activity for many years, a coherent, common educational strategy to underpin that exercising has been somewhat less regular.

The increasing professionalisation of the individual single Services has been a necessary and appropriate response to the growing complexity and specialisation of conflict in the air, land and sea environments. And while this increased professionalism, such as Air Force’s focus on the professional mastery of air power, is laudable, it would appear to be insufficient if it ignores the joint and integrated fashion in which the ADF will fight in all future operations.

Within a whole-of-government operational construct, individual Service professionalism must logically be placed within the context of building joint professional mastery of the application of military force. As the ADF and Australian Government move toward a more integrated whole-of-government framework, the need for a common educational foundation that builds
toward professional mastery of joint and coalition operations (the ‘profession of arms’) would appear to be more necessary than ever.

There are two clear implications of the preceding. First, a broad conception of joint professional military education (JPME) and its role and purpose needs to be articulated. Second, the professionalisation of the single Services needs to be aligned with the professionalisation of the ADF as a whole. The primary objective of JPME ought to be to educate Service members both to the operational demands of joint activity and, more importantly, the organisational requirements of the ADF. While evidence suggests that the single Services adequately prepare their members for duty in their respective single-Service fields, through well-established PMET programs, the development of these same individuals within the profession of arms would appear to be a rather more ad hoc affair.

It is probably fair to say that operationally, Service members generally are able to translate their single-Service experience and expertise quite effectively into the joint context, that is, to work relatively harmoniously with each other and representatives from other agencies or nations and to get the job done with minimal fuss. While this is a happy condition that probably reflects the high quality of ADF servicemen and -women, it is not a particularly sustainable or systematic approach—a more deliberate approach that aims to prepare individuals for joint operations is warranted.

In addition to these operational considerations, JPME can have a role to play in translating single-Service career and organisational needs into joint organisational requirements. A well-designed JPME program could provide the overarching framework within which single-Service PMET could be aligned to better satisfy the ADF’s needs for joint professional development. Such a framework would not only identify the objectives of joint development and education but serve to synchronise single-Service PMET also, so that the professional and career development of members from the different Services would be more closely aligned. Thus members entering joint education opportunities, such as staff college for example, would be roughly comparable in career and professional development—a condition that is largely lacking at present.

For Air Force, the focus on inculcating a culture of the professional mastery of air power is an important step in the overall development of professional servicemen and -women. While single-Service mastery is not a sufficient condition for mastery of the profession of arms, it is a necessary one. Pursuing a program for the development of professional mastery, vice technical competency, would appear to be a very promising start. Aligning the professional mastery of air power with the professional mastery of military power should logically be the next step.

In a 2003 article, General Richard Myers, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that not only must JPME ‘match the demands of the new security environment’ but also ‘inculcate a culture of understanding and trust among the leaders of the services and agencies’. This article has suggested that in response to the emerging security environment, the concept of Australian security operations has moved progressively toward an integrated whole-of-government approach. This shift has accentuated the need for the ADF and relevant government agencies and departments to operate, understand and trust each other to a greater and more practical extent than ever before.
The capacity to operate in such fashion can only be built upon the foundations of JPME and a large degree of mutual respect and understanding. Each of the Services brings a range of capabilities, specialist skills and particular ‘perspective’ to the joint and interagency arena. A JPME program that leverages off these single-Service contributions whilst providing an overarching framework within which to align single-Service PMET to joint organisational and operational ends should not be considered a luxury the ADF can afford to do without.

Wing Commander Mark Hinchcliffe is the Chief of Air Force Fellow at the University of NSW at ADFA. He is an Air Combat Officer (Nav) with C130H, B707 and HS748 operational and training experience. He holds a 1st class Honours Degree in Politics, a Masters Degree and PhD in International Relations.

NOTES


2. Integrated here refers to the joint and interagency context, that is, Air Force as a co-equal member of the ADF.


Myth-busting the Joint Professional Military Education Strategy

Lieutenant Colonel Richard King, Australian Army

The vast majority of people in Defence will not have given much thought to the requirement for a joint professional military education (JPME) strategy. In fact, the vast majority of Defence members are completely ignorant of the issues surrounding the need for—and the development of—a JPME strategy. This article is intended to challenge Defence staff to think about and, hopefully, take part in a discussion about what is an important subject. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the Army position on this subject.

There are three key myths surrounding the issue of a JPME strategy:

1. Defence knows what a JPME strategy is.
2. Defence staff understand the purpose of a JPME strategy.
3. Defence staff know who should be involved in the JPME strategy.

Myth 1: Defence knows what a JPME strategy is

Broadly speaking, a JPME strategy is simply a long-term plan or policy for achieving a worthwhile result for JPME. It is the definition of JPME that presents challenges. The ‘joint’ component of JPME is not contentious in meaning, although the management of ‘joint’ PME is problematic. The Services have significant influence over PME and they must be engaged if a JPME strategy is to succeed.

So what is PME? Currently the term means whatever you want it to mean. Each of the words ‘professional’, ‘military’ and ‘education’ are commonly misunderstood. Individually, they have been so widely used and misused as to become almost meaningless jargon. If you want proof of this then ask any ten people to write a single sentence that summarises what they understand by either ‘professional’, ‘military’ or ‘education’. I can pretty much guarantee that you will not have a consensus on the meaning of any of the words. Understanding is further diluted when you combine the three words in what appears a simple construct. Consider the following questions about the meaning of the key words.

- **Professional.** Does this mean education we pay for, as opposed to education we receive for free? Does it imply education provided by universities as opposed to education delivered by second-tier academic institutions? Does ‘professional’ imply that only officers receive the education? Does it mean military-specific education as opposed to ‘civilian’ fields such as medicine, law, engineering, etc? Does it apply only to the ‘Profession of Arms’?
• **Military.** Does this relate to the nature of the education provided, thus excluding a liberal arts education? Does ‘military’ relate to the recipients of the education, thus excluding Australian Public Service members? Does ‘military’ relate to the context for the delivery of education?

• **Education.** Does this exclude training and personal development? Does education imply formal education (courses) to the exclusion of less formal education (participation in professional journals and reading lists)? Does education imply the cognitive level of learning outcome required, for example, focusing on higher-order thinking (going beyond knowledge/recall to synthesis, evaluation, reflection and problem solving)?

You could consider the issue of defining PME for a long time and never reach a consensus. This, however, would be a pointless exercise. I would propose that Defence adopts a simple and inclusive definition that supports the broadest interpretation of JPME. Something along the lines of ‘JPME is a continuum that develops personnel and employees to lead Defence effectively in peace and war’.

It is much better to automatically include components of education than to arbitrarily exclude them. If we accept this definition of JPME then we should also consider that JPME is not a single entity but consists of a number of interrelated elements, such as:

• **Foundation skills.** These include language, literacy and numeracy, thinking skills (critical thinking, analytical thinking and creative thinking) and decision-making skills. Foundation skills are critical to ensure that Defence and the individuals we are educating achieve the best outcomes from PME. Foundation skills need to be assessed and developed at key stages during an individual’s career.

• **Professional military development.** This includes career development courses in generalist and specialist military subjects, foreign military training, operational experience and exchange postings.

• **Professional (non-military) development.** This includes courses to enhance broad academic and business skills and to promote personal development. Defence should not view these courses narrowly as ‘nice to haves’ or for their relevance only to current duties. These types of courses represent an opportunity to invest in the long-term development and broadening of Defence’s knowledge base.

• **Higher education.** Higher education is a significant cost to Defence and every effort must be made to ensure that the short-, medium- and long-term benefits from higher education are maximised. Higher education supports the attainment of qualifications required for licensing, professional recognition, career and/or personal development purposes.

It is also worth asking the question ‘does Defence need a formal ongoing program of continuing professional development?’ If we are the ‘Profession of Arms’, then should we have a program along the lines of those available to or required of engineers, doctors, lawyers,
members of the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators etc? The reality is that all professional knowledge degrades over time, whether it is simply forgotten or becomes outdated. Defence must consider the need for a process to ensure that the professional knowledge of its staff remains relevant.

**Myth 2: Defence staff understand the purpose of a JPME strategy**

If you ask the average Defence staff member to outline their understanding of the purpose of JPME, you again should not expect a high degree of consensus. Having a purpose is important because a well-understood purpose enables people to deal with uncertainty when making decisions regarding JPME. A useful start point might be to state that JPME has the following main purposes: preparation for military operations; the development and maintenance of a broad, advanced knowledge base; preparation for life as thinking members of Defence; and personal development.

- **Preparation for military operations.** This is the prime reason for undertaking JPME. JPME must equip Defence staff with the knowledge, skills and attitudes required for success on operations.

- **The development and maintenance of a broad, advanced knowledge base.** A broad and advanced knowledge base is essential if Defence is to be a learning organisation. While some skills and specialist knowledge can be ‘brought in’ (or ‘bought’ in) during times of need, there is no substitute for having an appropriate number of Defence staff who can develop and then apply specialist skills and knowledge from a military perspective.

- **Preparation for life as thinking members of Defence.** Defence’s ability to remain relevant and successful depends on the active participation of educated members. This requires a broad education in a variety of fields coupled with the ability to think effectively (and analytically and creatively).

- **Personal development.** The JPME strategy must facilitate personal development while ensuring that the wishes of individuals are balanced against the organisation’s requirements to ensure success on operations and to facilitate organisational learning and future development.

**Myth 3: Defence staff know who should be involved in the JPME strategy**

Most Defence staff would be happy to know that people were actively involved in implementing and managing JPME, as long as they are not the ones who have to do it. Unless we recognise and accept that we are all part of the joint responsibility for JPME, it will be extremely difficult to achieve anything worthwhile. Too often we focus exclusively on the provision of education and assume that the responsibility for JPME is vested in education providers. How misguided we are. A useful outcome from JPME will only be achieved when the shared and overlapping responsibilities of stakeholders are understood and accepted.
This will require individuals, education providers, personnel and career managers to work together in developing JPME. The key stakeholders include Joint Education Training and Warfare Command, People Strategies and Policy Group, all education providers, all recipients of education, all consumers of education services, the Services etc. In short, one-in, all-in. And herein lies the core of the problem—when everybody is responsible, nobody is responsible.

The principal challenge for Defence is to develop a JPME strategy that recognises the shared responsibilities and enables all stakeholders to participate in the management of JPME in a meaningful and coordinated way. To paraphrase Karl Marx, ‘from each according to their responsibility, to each according to their need’.

While it might be unfair of me, I am going to focus on the under-appreciated role of career managers in contributing to JPME. Let us be honest—career managers are not ‘career’ managers. At best they manage the careers of the anointed few; the majority are shuffled from vacant position to vacant position. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the big lesson about JPME. JPME accumulates only when people are doing work that is relevant to their professional needs.

A useful model to illustrate this hypothesis is the five-stage Dreyfus Model of Skill Acquisition.² The original model postulates that people move upward through five levels of skill: novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient and expert. The level of ‘expert’ can only be reached through prolonged exposure to and practice in the field in which expertise is needed. This is not facilitated by a succession of two-year postings that aim to make as many people as possible into ‘generalists’. The ‘jack of all trades, master of none’ model of career management guarantees that we waste a significant portion of the investment made by Defence in professional education. It would be interesting to analyse the following statistics:

- How many Defence personnel have higher-education qualifications?
- How many Defence personnel are employed in areas that make direct use of those qualifications?
- How many qualifications that Defence paid for have been rendered irrelevant because the recipients have not stayed current in their field?

Career management should facilitate the structured accumulation of experience through relevant postings. This would require postings to be designed to achieve two outcomes. Firstly, to build on qualifications by supplementing the knowledge gained through education. Secondly, to deepen understanding and encourage the development of expertise in relevant fields. The focus on making people into ‘generalists’ virtually guarantees that the aspirations of a JPME strategy will be undermined.
Conclusion

In conclusion, the development of a JPME strategy has the potential to enhance the development of relevant expertise in Defence and to improve Defence’s performance as a learning organisation. If this initiative is to succeed then we must define what we mean by JPME and then be willing to play our part in implementing the strategy.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard King is an Ordnance Corps officer and is currently the SO1 Thinking Skills Projects in HQ Forces Command-Army. He worked in the private sector from 1998 to 2003 and has been researching and teaching ‘thinking skills’ since 1998. He is a graduate of the Royal Thai Army Command and Staff College and holds a Master of Management Studies (in Economics). Lieutenant Colonel King is the desk officer for the ‘Towards a Smarter Army’ initiative and the development of a Professional Military Education Strategy for Army.

NOTES

1. These ‘purposes’ are adapted from the ‘Bologna process’, a joint initiative by 46 European countries to improve higher education. These seem to provide a reasonable start point for explaining the ‘purpose’ of PME. Further information can be found at <http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/Bologna/>

2. For more information on this model you can start with its Wikipedia page, at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dreyfus_model_of_skill_acquisition> But do not be confused by the six stages on the Wikipedia page, the original model only had the first five stages.
Reflections on Defence and Education

Professor David Lovell, University of New South Wales, ADFA

The views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of New South Wales or ADFA.

Of all the Australian ministries of state, the Department of Defence is the one most concerned with the professional education of its members. Those with relevant knowledge might well be justified in making a similar claim of ministries of defence in other advanced democracies. Defence devotes serious attention to this domain and has established an extensive system of professional education, especially for its uniformed personnel.

This ranges from entering into agreements with my University since the mid-1960s for an explicitly ‘liberal and balanced’ tertiary education for a substantial proportion of its officer cadets and midshipmen; through mid-career education for those on the pathway to promotion; to encouragement for the further development of reflective and research skills for those who are its pre-eminent leaders. This system sits alongside the regular training programs it provides for the many technical tasks its members are required to undertake. Defence is perhaps the largest single education and training organisation in Australia and has held this position for a long time.

My reflections on the Defence approach to education are born of 26 years of working in a Defence education environment: first at RMC and now at ADFA, since its first classes in 1986. They are sharpened by a deep commitment to the education of the young men and women who play a vital role in our national security and our national life, by a deep respect for the intellectual and moral seriousness of those young people and by a frank acknowledgement of the goodwill of those who lead them. It may seem surprising, then, that my reflections are tinged with frustrations. The latter may be explained by my encountering, among other things:

• A very high turnover of Defence staff at all levels within Defence education institutions, which is disruptive in itself and may leave non-Defence staff as the custodians of their corporate knowledge.

• A determination among many senior staff to initiate conspicuous change and thus add to their case for promotion, whether or not the change is seen or thought through.

• A hostility to any courses of study not deemed to be ‘relevant’, where relevance is conceived instrumentally.

• A conflation and fundamental misunderstanding of the differences between education and training.
I infer from such experiences that among all but the most able of Defence staff there is a ‘command and control’ approach to educational matters and a consequent reluctance to accept the trust and ‘letting go’ of learners that is the hallmark of a genuinely effectual education, something to which I will return. My frustration emerges from a belief that better outcomes are possible and I would relish being a part of making them happen. Within Defence, I am certain there is a will to confront such issues but it will require more than lip-service to make a real change—it will require a fundamentally different approach.

The attention given by Defence to professional education and the breadth required of such a ‘professional’ education is a direct consequence of the complex, uncertain and dangerous nature of the tasks confronting servicemen and -women, as well as their overarching national importance and visibility. Not only are these tasks complex but they are increasing in scope as the ‘new security’ concerns become regarded both as commonplace and, more contentiously, as the proper province of Defence responses.

What is perhaps even more significant is that the rapid historical development of weapons, transport and communication technologies that has transformed modern warfighting is now being confronted with a renewed, or perhaps simply new, appreciation of human factors. Our technologically-advanced age has encouraged an assumption that technology is the key to success in war. Let us grant that technology is an extraordinary aid to many of the tasks that service personnel undertake but it is a tool, not the ‘answer’ to lasting security. Furthermore, mastering a particular technology is a short-term fix, while education is for the long term. We are currently educating the Defence leaders of 20 years hence but we do not know the technologies they will be using or recommending to policy makers. Nor do we know the particular challenges they will face. In the past 20 years, for example, communism in Europe collapsed, the Cold War ended and the ‘war against terrorism’ began.

Militaries are increasingly being tasked not so much with winning the war but with winning the peace, to risk descending into cliché. Indeed, many contemporary Defence operations, such as those related to peacekeeping, disaster relief and assistance, and border protection, do not have a predominantly war-like aspect. Defence has responded to these changing realities, broadening demands and often increasingly-straitened financial circumstances by expecting more of its education systems and thus more—adaptability, diversity, new knowledge and new thinking—from its personnel.

That is understandable and appropriate. But the issue is not—or not simply—to learn Arabic, to analyse the history of asymmetric conflicts or to turn out armed anthropologists, though each may have its place (and none should be at the mercy of changing fashions as now). The key issue, rather, is to allow individuals to develop life-long learning skills, to develop self-motivated learners and problem-solvers, to nurture those who can take a broader view, wherever it might lead them, intellectually speaking. These are the people who can respond to new challenges without recycling old ideas.

I am not an educational philosopher. I learnt my theory on the job, as most academics of my generation and earlier did. Nowadays, for what it is worth, all universities offer courses and qualifications in education to their academic staff. But in so far as I understand what happens
in the minds of some (perhaps most) of my learners—and that is complicated especially in young people by the massive leaps in social and other learning they are also experiencing as they mature—education happens when they understand what I am trying to convey to them, both in itself and in the connections they make with other things (events, ideas, persons, histories, etc).

This means that I cannot tell exactly what difference I make to a student’s education. But it also means that education is not simply stuffing heads full of knowledge that can be regurgitated and assessed. Of course, I mark many assignments that make—with varying degrees of elegance—the points that I expect students to make having listened to my lectures, read broadly within the subject and reflected on the results. But I do not think of that as the whole sum of their education within the courses I offer.

My view is that education is a product of the long term, when the areas of learning I have opened up to students are supplemented and brought into contrast with other areas of learning so that information can be filtered to produce knowledge, and knowledge can be refracted through experience to glean insight and wisdom. This is a set of processes I cannot wholly control or channel. In fact, as I wrote earlier, I do not know how much influence my own teaching is having on individual students. I am certain, however, that learning is not linear; that it is influenced by a number of factors and in unpredictable ways and its results are genuinely novel.

The trust I have in learners that allows them to forge their own way, with resources I can supply only in part, is not always repaid. But I do not believe that an education worth its name is possible without it. None of this is to say that I cannot compel uniformed students to sit in my classes and submit assignments on time; but these formal markers of an education are among its least important parts. I have observed a strong Defence preference for focusing on ‘products’, things that can be measured and accounted. Education may be—and has been—categorised into ‘learning loops’ and new structures; doubtless many Defence personnel are kept busy with such formalities. But real education is in a different conceptual league. I know very well and have often endorsed the managerial dictum that ‘if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it’. But one needs to be clear about what is being measured.

In the area of education we are in relatively uncharted waters; perhaps we always will be. I accept this—welcome it—in a way that I believe most Defence-oriented minds currently cannot. Consider, for example, how differently we respond to time set aside for reflection.

As a humanities scholar, frequently affecting a persecuted demeanour in response to implied or real charges of trafficking in ‘irrelevant’ subject areas, I might be expected at this point to plead for certain courses of study in the humanities and social sciences as fitting the educated individual required for the future needs of Defence. I insist, by contrast, that an education needs breadth: humanities students need exposure to developments in science and engineering, and vice versa. An education also needs an appreciation of the developments in the subject matter and that can only be given by academic staff actively involved in contributing through their research to such developments.
An education needs to provide a basis for and develop a love of inquisitiveness and even serendipity, so that new and unexpected connections can be explored. And an education needs a sense of history. I do not mean by ‘history’ a subject that provides us with ‘lessons’ that we can apply to our present challenges. Historical situations and outcomes are, strictly and properly speaking, unique. Rather, the study of human stories provides us both with analogies for contemporary situations and with a sense of the diversity of human responses to analogous situations. History, then, is useful not in providing solutions but in supplying perspective. The latest crisis, for example, may not amount to a fundamental strategic shift.

As an educator engaged in and vitally concerned about a very important Defence-initiated and -funded activity, what would I like to see from Defence in this area? First, the development among all senior ranks of a sophisticated understanding of the educational task as being more about developing knowledge and insight than about ticking boxes in templates. Second, the adoption of a consistent approach that does not regard formal educational processes as so many widgets to be moved about to suit the convenience of other demands or as subjects to be added or deleted at the whim of perceived immediate ‘needs’. And, finally, the courage to appreciate that education is not something to be ‘done’ to others but requires that learners be given latitude to educate themselves. In sum, I would like to see Defence education adopt a consistently education-centric approach.

The longstanding relationship between Defence and the University of New South Wales is unique in the world of defence-related professional education, an object of perplexity from some visiting overseas delegations and an occasional target of self-styled defence education experts who have their own axes to grind. Despite the real and continuing frustrations to which I earlier adverted, ADFA is testament to the ability of Defence to allow the latitude required for the foundations of a genuine education. The challenge confronting Defence is to extend this approach to its other education ventures.

David Lovell is a Professor of Politics and Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales at ADFA. During 2004, he was Acting Rector of UNSW@ADFA and in 2008 he was Deputy Rector (Special Projects). He is the co-editor of The European Legacy, on the editorial board of the Australian Journal of Political Science and a member of the Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. He has written or edited more than a dozen books on topics including Australian politics, communist and post-communist systems and the history of ideas.
Joint Professional Military Education in the ADF:
a junior naval officer’s perspective

Lieutenant Bernard Dobson, RAN

As Australians, we find ourselves in the unique situation of being a Western culture in a largely Asian region, with a population that is remarkably tiny when compared to the immense size of our landmass. Consequently, our defence force is also small when compared with our geographical neighbours and it is continually challenged by the disproportionately larger border it is tasked to defend. Yet it is because we are so small that we have set upon a path of ‘jointery’ between the three Services. It is a relationship of necessity and it makes sense. While the three Services have worked alongside each other in a tactical sense in war and peace since their inception, it is only relatively recently that we have formalised the relationship and embraced jointery at a national-strategic level.

The Navy, Army and Air Force now exist to ‘raise, train and sustain’ a capability for use by the Chief of Joint Operations, exercising operational control from a joint headquarters. At a national-strategic level, the development over the next decade of Australia’s new amphibious capability and the significant spending on maritime assets in all three Services shows us that as a nation we are finally recognising the sea as our most important strategic theatre. It is our highway to and from the rest of the world and the defensive ‘moat’ around our homeland. As an officer who started his career during this last decade, I have developed an appreciation for the benefits of operating in a joint defence force.

The crux of operating as a joint force—and its biggest potential achilles heel—is the way in which we provide joint professional military education (JPME) to our officers, sailors, soldiers and airmen and -women. It is essential that we correctly develop our people to work seamlessly within a joint environment, while maintaining their sense of identity within their own Service. This is a two-part process. The first is fostering professional excellence within individual Services before the second, which is putting that excellence to use in the joint space.

It is the combination of an individual’s skills within their own Service that makes a joint force successful. The secret in ensuring cohesion between the Services in the joint space is not about becoming the same but rather it is having an understanding of the way each other thinks, their specific Service mentality and what each different colour of uniform can bring to the table. This appreciation of joint cooperation needs to be one which comes naturally to our people. The way that we achieve this is through JPME and joint training from the very earliest stages of an individual’s career.

In looking at one model adopted by the RAN for the training of some of its officers, we can see an example of one way this might be successfully achieved. Potential officers who intend to undertake tertiary studies in the Navy through ADFA find themselves accepted into the ‘NOYO’ scheme (Naval Officer Year One), which is open to all main officer specialisations with the
exception of aviation. This scheme provides a year of service-specific training before an officer attends ADFA. It consists of six months basic training at HMAS Creswell and, in the case of the Executive (Seaman) Branch, six months of further training ashore and at sea. On completion, officers accepted into ADFA commence their tertiary studies in a ‘tri-service’ environment.

This immersion into joint culture for 3-4 years is one of the most commendable aspects of ADFA. Midshipmen live alongside their Army and Air Force counterparts and begin to make friendships across the Services. An acceptance of the ADF as a joint force develops through sport, military training, strategic studies and, if nothing else, osmosis from sheer proximity to one another. It is this very early introduction to JPME that is lacking in other professional training continuums in the ADF.

Unfortunately, due to both economics and the need to get officers quickly into positions where they are productive (as opposed to being under training), we have slipped somewhat in placing emphasis on ADFA and its benefits as a means to provide officers with JPME from an early stage. Many officers entering the ADF as an undergraduate or direct-entry officer will rarely experience an opportunity to receive JPME until they attend staff courses at the O4/O5 rank. Unfortunately for the ADF, this is usually not until they have completed around 15 years service. Consequently, we as a defence force suffer from a chronic lack of understanding of each other from one Service to the next, which travels through the ranks and is rarely gained if officers are not exposed at an early stage.

Of course, the model at ADFA as I experienced is far from flawless. There were certainly opportunities to learn leadership skills but these were mostly focused on the leadership of small teams and tended to be very Army-centric, focusing on field craft and group problem solving. Such exercises are of course highly valuable and I appreciated every opportunity. What was lacking was specific training or, in the very least, a basic introduction to areas of joint and service doctrine, capability, service cultures and psyches.

My Navy peers and I found that there was rarely a forum in which to educate the Army and Air Force on very basic things, such as the difference between a frigate and destroyer or, conversely, opportunities to learn about the practical aspects of air and land power. There were of course lessons in military history and strategic studies but these were for the most part more academic than practical in substance. Nevertheless, I came away from my time at ADFA with a good understanding of the national strategic direction and military history. This, combined with the friendships gained and experiences had in a tri-service environment, has given me something my non-ADFA peers in the Fleet have yet to experience.

There exists a great potential at ADFA and our initial training establishments for the ADF to invest in JPME. For example, the not-so-distant arrival of the ADF’s new amphibious capability is an area we should look at seriously educating and exposing our current officer cadets and midshipmen to. The employment of new 27,000 tonne LHDs, along with new vehicles, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, will see a phenomenal shift in the way we as an ADF (not just Navy) think and operate. We need to train our people in what it is to be an integrated maritime force—necessitated by our island status. We need to educate our people to understand that while we all operate slightly differently from one Service to another, we all
have to achieve the same mission. Furthermore, in the case of the LHDs, all three Services will be living and working together—we need to closely manage this transition.

JPME should not stop at the Academy and junior officer level. It should naturally progress through the ranks. All three Services have compulsory courses prior to promotion to lieutenant commander equivalent. Such courses may prove to be a convenient vehicle for providing further JPME at the O3 level if classes on the subject could be injected into the curriculum or as a stand-alone course appended at the end. Such a course would only need to be brief and could be developed by the Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre (JWDTC) in line with those it already offers in joint operations and planning. This would build upon that taught at initial training establishments and bridge the gap between that training and JPME at higher level staff courses at the Australian Defence College.

The process needs to be a continuous one that is built on as individuals progress through the ranks. JPME and good understanding and recognition across and between the Services should be something that enlisted men and women are exposed to as well. In this we have the benefit of being a small defence force. It is easier for us to integrate as we often work with people we know. We need to foster relationships across the Services and reach out into other government agencies. Our junior officers want to feel part of the wider ADF and therefore are eager to receive tangible, real and practical training and education. We need to get our midshipmen to Army and Air Force bases and we need to get our officer cadets and staff cadets to sea. Ideally, this would continue at the different rank levels just like classroom training. Our people should be able to look at their counterpart in another Service and understand exactly what that person is there to do. We can’t afford to get this wrong.

Lieutenant Bernard Dobson joined the RAN in 2002 and began his career as a Seaman Officer at the RAN College at HMAS Creswell. After a brief period in HMAS Sydney, he attended ADFA in order to complete a Bachelor of Science. He went on to conduct Honours in Naval History with a thesis on Nelson’s captains. After the Academy, he spent time in patrol boats off the north of Australia and in the frigate HMAS ANZAC. Having been posted to the position of Flag Lieutenant to the Chief of Navy throughout 2009, he is now training as an Air Intercept Controller at RAAF Williamtown.
PowerPoint Does Not Become Us: in search of a new teaching method in junior officer education

Captain Andrew W. Hastie, Australian Army

When I reflect on my time of formal military education at ADFA and RMC, my enduring memory of the classroom is PowerPoint. Theories of war, tactics, strategy, leadership and command were all reduced to comfortable, bite-sized bullet-points that were often served up with a complementary yet cryptic ‘dead-guy’ quote (usually Sun Tzu, Clausewitz or Patton). The aim seemed to be to complete the lesson in 40 minutes and confirm the learning by asking leading questions that always linked back to three key bullet-points. No reasoning, no engagement, no intellectual rigour. I have long forgotten most of these lessons and without much grief along the way. For me, the lesson is clear: we who serve in the profession of arms are people of action—PowerPoint does not become us.

The main sources of meaningful learning in my career have been through the teaching excellence of individual instructors and mentors, my own hard-fought and often humbling service experience on the job and a personal commitment to self-education through reading and research. In short, my learning has come through a continuous rolling discussion with senior officers, instructors, peers and soldiers, and the books that I have read. Experience, either directly through my own senses or indirectly through the written word, has been my teacher.

In this piece, I propose that the military education system in the ADF should be remodelled to enhance learning along the following lines. First, a master-and-apprentice approach to instruction and education that promotes ongoing discussion between students and instructors, whereby doctrine is taught and tested against the backdrop of historical case studies. Second, a self-directed program of education where students are imbued with more responsibility for their own learning, promoting both initiative and independent thought (although I do not include technical skills such as gunnery or ship-driving in this do-it-alone approach).

Teaching future officers how to think rather than what to think is a common mantra in the ADF. I have heard this many times in my educational experience but I have only seen it modelled by individual instructors and mentors who were the exception rather than the norm. Releasing students from lectures where group-think is perpetuated by PowerPoint and placing them under the tutelage of gifted and trained instructors, who encourage freedom of thought, will inevitably produce officers who are intellectually rigorous, independent thinking and ultimately more inquisitive—all qualities that are essential to military commanders.

At a glance, what does this look like in practical terms? A smaller instructor-to-student ratio, more time spent in tutorial-style classes where the Socratic method is employed to enhance interactive learning, and more engagement with military history and memoirs, instead of slipshod and hurried PowerPoint presentations.
Increasing the ratio of instructors-to-students is a personnel problem and not one solved easily in a defence force that is already stretched with manpower shortages. However, this could change over time if the ADF hierarchy placed greater emphasis and importance on instructional postings. The desire to instruct, at least from my perspective, comes from the hope that I might be one day be able to make a difference and have a personal impact on future junior officers. To do so would require building relationships and, judging from my own time spent at ADF training establishments, it seems quite a challenge with the current emphasis on large lectures centred on the ubiquitous PowerPoint. Shrinking the size of training groups, empowering instructors with more responsibility in mentoring trainees, and making postings to junior officer training establishments a precursor to sub-unit command could change the way we do business in training our future officers.

My greatest gripe is the way the ADF teaches doctrine. For example, we are taught key principles of the attack and defence but they are rarely tested in any great depth against historical case studies. Again, the curse of PowerPoint and the imperative to hurry through slides prevents a thorough discussion of the principles. This hasn’t always been the case. When Clausewitz was asked to lecture on small war at the Prussian war school in 1810, he taught the basics through case studies and advised his students against ‘the assimilation of rules by memory’. Teaching according to this method highlights the complexity of war, shows the relative usefulness of principles on a situational basis and grounds the student in historical reality.

I recall a university tutorial where we studied President Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Each student was assigned one of the historical figures in the US government and was required to research their involvement in the decision-making process and then act out the final cabinet meeting. This encouraged the students not only to deepen their understanding of the issues and context surrounding the decision but also to empathise with the historical figures and exercise their creativity and imagination—all mental qualities integral to effective military command. This was one of the most meaningful learning experiences in my education. I came away with a multi-dimensional understanding of the decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan that a 40-minute PowerPoint slide show would not have been able to communicate.

From the perspective of the ADF and the desire to encourage a joint culture among the three Services, there are plenty of historical case studies that could be used to enhance our understanding of joint operations. For example, the Falklands War would be an ideal case study that could be used to foster inter-service understanding. Assigning key military players for research and presentation while walking through key decisions made at sea, in the air and on land would yield a host of worthwhile lessons.

There are plenty of memoirs available to shed light on some of the decisions made by the British forces. From a naval perspective, Sandy Woodward’s One Hundred Days provides insight into the challenges of commanding a carrier battle group. From a ground perspective, Julian Thompson’s 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands highlights the grim challenges he faced commanding the landing force. Finally, the air perspective of British Harrier pilots is given by the senior air adviser, Commander ‘Sharky’ Ward, in his memoir Sea Harrier over the Falklands. In all of this, tactical, operational and strategic principles would become self-
evident to students without being stripped of their context—in turn guarding against the inclination of the military mind to make absolute rules out of relative situations.

Of course, the demands of service in the ADF, either through operational tempo or geographical dislocation, often preclude officers from participating in such activities on a regular basis and with the best of their peers. There are online tools that can bridge the gap, which are already being used by universities in their distance education programs. However, time and access to such online activities can be very limited to personnel serving on operations and the onus is then on the individual to learn alone, without the sharpening presence of instructors and peers. Therefore, the question becomes: how are our training establishments equipping our junior officers independently to take charge of their own professional development? What methodology is being taught to enable them to dissect military history and memoirs to broaden their professional understanding—particularly of joint operations?

The ADF needs to equip its junior officers with the ability to conduct similar exercises on their own to the ones described—and to be confident they are drawing the right conclusions. The former Chief of Army released a highly detailed reading list in 2007 for the specific purpose of professional development. This is an excellent resource and I make no criticism of it. My argument is with the way that junior officers are graduated from ADF junior officer training establishments without a helpful methodology for attacking the reading list and others like it. Instead we graduate with copious and forgettable PowerPoint slides floating in our heads, naively thinking that we understand the principles of war. Hundreds of hours are wasted in banal lectures when instead we could be assigned reading lists and then spend our time unpacking the principles of war through small group tutorial work. Doctrine would come to life on past battlefields. Junior officers would develop a methodology for critiquing the collective historical experience of their profession. And instructors would have the opportunity to develop and hone their teaching skills and professional knowledge.

With Amazon readily available online, officers are able to order all sorts of books direct to them on operations. In my own experience in Afghanistan in 2009, I ordered a series of books on Operation ANACONDA, conducted in the Sha-I-Kot Valley during March 2002. There have been several memoirs written by key personnel to the operation and reading the sum of those works while on operations was another defining point in my professional career. I learned more about the principles of war, joint operations and inter-agency cooperation, and the impact of command personalities on organisations than anything I was taught at ADFA and RMC on PowerPoint.

Of course, the primary aim of these institutions is to graduate junior officers who can command small unit organisations. But teaching even those basics effectively is made difficult by the trappings of modern teaching methods, notably spoon-feeding via PowerPoint. What is needed is a method where a student of war can examine tactics, operations and strategy from every perspective and be able to see clearly for themselves the principles behind actions and reactions. From that would come an understanding of doctrine and its purposes and, most importantly, the individual wisdom to apply it correctly.
Captain Andrew Hastie is a graduate of ADFA and RMC-D, with a BA (Hons) from the University of New South Wales. He recently returned from Afghanistan where he served as a Cavalry Troop Leader as part of the 2nd Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force.

NOTES

It’s Time for an ADF Joint Warfare Studies Centre

Dr Aaron P. Jackson, ADF Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre

Over the past four decades, the ADF has undertaken a series of innovative joint reforms, primarily to its national headquarters, its operational command and control structures, and its professional military education (PME) establishments. In support of these reforms (and as a component of them), the ADF has produced a series of comprehensive joint doctrine manuals, which contain several joint operational concepts. Although this has placed the ADF’s joint reform process on a sound conceptual footing, the available evidence suggests that joint conceptual development within the ADF has nonetheless been limited in scope and vision.

Following a brief summary of the evolution of jointery within the ADF, this article posits that the creation of a ‘joint warfare studies centre’ would greatly enhance the ADF’s existing institutional knowledge of the conceptual foundations of jointery. Additionally, such a centre would be able to assist in the identification of what would constitute ‘best practice’ regarding the implementation of future joint reforms and would also be able to contribute to the delivery of the ADF’s joint PME courses. This is providing, of course, that the centre has an appropriate mandate and corresponding financial support.

In making the case for the establishment of such a centre, this article thus proposes a possible mandate and structure. These would involve the centre taking on roles that would complement the existing roles of the ADF Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre (JWDTC) and the Australian Defence College (ADC). It is noteworthy that several of these roles would also constitute joint equivalents to the functions currently performed within each Service by Australia’s three single-Service studies centres.

The evolution of jointery within the ADF

Although limited joint organisational reforms occurred as early as 1968, the main catalyst for the ADF’s joint innovation was the early 1970s shift in defence strategy towards policies of ‘self reliance’ and ‘continental defence’. These policy shifts required the ADF to prepare to defend Australia in the unlikely event of an attack upon the continental landmass, without allied assistance if necessary. As the ADF went about implementing this requirement, a series of joint reforms gradually emerged. Then, commencing in the late 1990s, a change in defence strategy brought about a new period characterised by ADF participation in several expeditionary operations. The requirement for joint approaches to these operations served to enhance and expand earlier joint reforms.

The first element of the ADF’s joint reforms is organisational. The 1973 delivery of the Tange Report led to the official establishment of the ADF, as well as to the creation of the position of Chief of the Defence Staff (later to become the Chief of the Defence Force), in 1976. As subsequent joint reforms emerged, they brought about numerous changes to the ADF’s higher
command arrangements, as well as leading to the creation then expansion of joint command and control organisations. The first such organisation was Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF), which was established in 1984. Although HQADF’s initial role appears to have been almost entirely administrative, this was progressively expanded. In 1997, the delivery of the Defence Efficiency Review led to another major joint organisational reform, which included HQADF’s replacement by Australian Defence Headquarters. The new Headquarters had a significantly broader role and included newly-formed joint logistics and personnel organisations.4

The second element of the ADF’s joint reforms involves the establishment of operational command and control structures. In 1985 and 1986, the three Services were divested of their operational command and control responsibilities and three joint headquarters, organised along functional lines, were established to take over the operational role the three Service headquarters had previously performed. This reform was taken a step further in 1987, when the three Service chiefs were removed from the operational chain of command entirely. In 1988, the establishment of Northern Command Australia (NORCOM) ‘constituted the first joint theatre headquarters established in Australia’.5 A Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) was subsequently stood up in 1991. In 1996, a newly-established Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) assumed overall command of this previously separate array of joint operational headquarters.6

In the early 2000s, the ADF’s joint command and control organisations were tested by the conduct of several operations, especially in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. Commencing in March 2004, this operational experience led to further streamlining of Australia’s joint operational command and control processes. As part of the streamlining a Joint Operational Command (JOC) was established to replace HQAST. With the exception of NORCOM, which became the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC), JOC took over command of all the units and formations that had previously reported to HQAST. In 2001, it was announced that Bungendore, near Canberra, had been selected as the future site of the ADF’s joint operational headquarters (what would become Headquarters JOC after 2004).7 Following numerous delays to construction, the headquarters finally became operational in late 2008 and early 2009.8

The third element of the ADF’s joint reforms is educational. Moves towards the establishment of a joint PME course began in 1967, following the identification by the Chiefs of Staff Committee of ‘an urgent need for the establishment of a Joint Services Staff College and for integration of the existing single Service Staff Colleges’.9 The newly-established Australian Services Staff College commenced its first course in 1970, operating alongside the three single-Service staff colleges until its closure in 1998. In 1997, the Defence Efficiency Review recommended several changes to the ADF’s officer education programs. These recommendations led to the establishment of the Australian Defence College (ADC) in 1999. Over the following few years, ADC gradually assumed command of all of the ADF’s joint educational facilities, with the single-Service staff colleges being closed following the inauguration of the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) in 2001.10

Internationally, the 1991 Gulf War provided a prominent example of a highly successful (if not entirely flawless) joint operation, especially where coordination between the US Army
and US Air Force was concerned. In the wake of this conflict, joint reforms began within several Western militaries and existing reform programs within others were either expanded or accelerated. During this period, Australia’s joint reform program first received significant international attention. This was accompanied by widespread recognition that the ADF had become one of the world’s leading militaries in the realm of joint organisation.11

So what’s the problem?

Despite the extent of joint reforms within the ADF (particularly where command and control arrangements are concerned), the ADF’s understanding of the conceptual foundations of jointery could nonetheless be further enhanced. This is not to say that conceptual innovation has been lacking within the ADF. On the contrary, the ADF has developed and refined several joint operating concepts and procedures, many of which are featured prominently within its comprehensive series of joint doctrine. This series includes a capstone military-strategic level manual that defines both the Australian approach to warfare and the key Australian warfighting concepts.12

Rather, when it is asserted that the ADF’s institutional understanding of the conceptual foundations of jointery could be further enhanced, what is meant is that the scope of the ADF’s current joint conceptual innovation could be broadened to incorporate more rigorous analysis in several areas. For example, little to date has been produced regarding the history or broader significance of Australian joint reforms.13 There is also little evidence to suggest that the conceptual foundations of the Australian approach to warfare and the key Australian warfighting concepts advanced within the ADF’s capstone doctrine were debated in any meaningful way outside of the team that wrote the doctrine. Ultimately, a broader debate about such important concepts would probably lead to their conceptual refinement. This in turn would enhance joint doctrine and ultimately has the potential to indirectly improve joint operational performance.

Furthermore, it has been suggested that in recent years the ADF has neglected to keep abreast of the conceptual development of operational art that has occurred within other Western militaries and that it has failed to sufficiently develop an approach to the theory and practice of operational art that is suitable to Australia’s present strategic conditions.14 Although this has been a contentious assertion,15 it nonetheless draws attention to the requirement for ongoing development and refinement of operational art and campaign planning processes, which is a vital prerequisite for maintaining a robust intellectual approach to operational conduct. If the entire Australian approach to operational art does in fact need to be overhauled, such a task would be ideally suited to a dedicated joint warfare studies centre. Regardless of whether a significant overhaul is required or not, however, such a centre would nonetheless be able to substantially contribute to enhancing existing operational concepts and campaign planning processes.

In recent decades, the ADF’s structure has included various organisations that have contributed in a range of ways to the conceptual development of jointery. Unfortunately, the mandates of these organisations have usually been too narrow for them to undertake the breadth or depth of analysis that could be undertaken by an appropriately mandated joint warfare studies
centre. Frequently, narrow mandates have been exacerbated by resource and time constraints and together these issues have tended to result in the primary focus of these organisations being directed elsewhere. The recent restructuring of the Joint Education, Training and Warfare Command (JETWC), which came into effect on 1 January this year, has moved the ADF one step closer to addressing its joint conceptual development gap, however this restructure has not gone far enough to entirely close it. Examples of two organisations within the current ADF structure are illustrative.

The first is the recently-restructured and renamed Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre (formerly the ADF Warfare Centre). According to the JWDTC’s website, its role ‘is to enhance ADF Joint and Combined operational capability’.\(^{16}\) To fulfil this role, its organisation is functionally divided into five components:

- The Training Centre is responsible for the conduct of joint training and education courses for ADF personnel;

- The Doctrine Centre is responsible for coordinating the management, development and production of ADF joint operational doctrine;

- The Training Technology and Simulation Centre (TTSC) is responsible, firstly, for developing new concepts for joint doctrine, training and education, and secondly, for maintaining a simulation capability that can be used to support joint doctrine and training activities and exercises;

- The Peace Operations Training Centre provides training and doctrine development for peacekeeping operations; and

- A Support Section manages finances, personnel and facilities, as well as providing administrative support to the JWDTC.

While the first and second of these five components, along with elements of the Peace Operations Training Centre, have the potential to function as joint conceptual ‘centres of excellence’, it is the TTSC that presently comes closest to performing this role. Formed as part of the recent restructure that involved demerging the functions of the ADF Warfare Centre (the Centre’s major exercise planning and control, and communications and information systems functions were transferred to Headquarters JOC at the end of 2009),\(^{17}\) the TTSC has taken on some of the functions previously performed by the now defunct Development, Wargaming and Evaluation Wing of the ADF Warfare Centre.

It is noteworthy, therefore, that the Development, Wargaming and Evaluation Wing of the ADF Warfare Centre never operated as a joint conceptual ‘centre of excellence’. The reasons for this include its divided focus, along with the priority accorded to joint operational conceptual development, which was quite innovative but narrow in focus. Although the TTSC has a clearer mandate than its predecessor regarding its role in developing new concepts for inclusion in joint doctrine, there is still considerable potential that its other function, the maintenance of
a simulation system, will detract from this. Indeed, the relatively large amount of space on the TTSC’s web page that is devoted to describing its simulation role already indicates that this role has considerable potential to become its de facto priority.18

The second example is the Australian Defence College, which is responsible for the delivery of joint PME within the ADF.19 Like the JWDTC, the ADC consists of several components:

- The Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) provides opportunities for midshipmen and officer cadets to undertake university studies alongside their junior leadership training;
- The Australian Command and Staff College conducts courses, most notably the 46-week Command and Staff Course, which prepare mid-ranking officers for command and staff appointments; and
- The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) conducts a training course for senior officers, which on completion may lead to the awarding of either a Graduate Diploma or a Master of Arts in Strategic Studies.

Although its primary focus is on the delivery of joint PME, the ADC also undertakes several other activities that have the potential to enhance the conceptual development of jointery. Key among these is the production of a tri-Service refereed journal, the Australian Defence Force Journal, and the publication of a series of security and defence related monographs.20

Despite the joint conceptual, doctrinal and educational roles of the JWDTC and the ADC, their primary focus is not on joint conceptual development. As a result, joint conceptual development beyond the operational level continues for the most part to elude the ADF. The remainder of this article examines the possibility of establishing a dedicated ‘joint warfare studies centre’, which would be capable of significantly expanding the scope of the ADF’s existing joint conceptual development programs.

What would a joint warfare studies centre do?

Having suggested the establishment of a joint warfare studies centre, the inevitable question is ‘what would it do that isn’t being done elsewhere already?’ As stated above, the simple answer to this question is that a dedicated joint warfare studies centre would be capable of undertaking a level of joint conceptual development that is currently unseen within the ADF. To add further detail to this answer, an examination of the three existing single-Service studies centres is useful.

The first single-Service studies centre established in Australia was the Air Power Studies Centre, which was inaugurated in August 1989 and subsequently had a major role in producing the first edition of the RAAF’s capstone doctrine, AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual.21 Since renamed the Air Power Development Centre, it currently undertakes five tasks:
• The provision of strategic advice about air power (presumably this advice is provided to the Chief of the Air Force);

• The development of RAAF doctrine;

• The provision of air power education (most notably through research fellowships for RAAF members and the conduct of international conferences);

• Conducting ‘air and space power assessments’, which can help further the development of air and space power theory; and

• Conducting historical analysis of both the RAAF’s history and the broader history of air and space power.

As part of these tasks, the Air Power Development Centre produces numerous publications, including books, occasional and working papers and a monthly bulletin, *Pathfinder*.22

The Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre was established in 1997. As the front matter of one of the Centre’s early publications stated:

The role of the LWSC is to provide land warfare advocacy and to promote, coordinate and conduct research and analysis to support the application of land warfare concepts and capabilities to the security of Australia and its interests. The LWSC fulfils this role through a range of internal reports and external publications; a program of conferences, seminars and debates; and contributions to a variety of professional, academic and community fora.23

Currently the Centre’s mandate is threefold: to promote understanding of land warfare; to provide an institutional focus for applied research about land warfare; and to foster professional and intellectual debate within the Army. The Centre’s regular publications currently include study and working papers, as well as a refereed journal (*Australian Army Journal*) and a monthly newsletter, *Vanguard*.24

The third single-Service studies centre established in Australia was the Sea Power Centre, which was formed in 2000 from the existing Maritime Studies Program. The Sea Power Centre has five key roles:

• To promote an understanding of sea power and its role in protecting Australia’s national interests;

• The development of RAN doctrine;

• To contribute to the development of maritime strategic and operational concepts;

• The development and promotion of Australian naval history; and

• Contributing to RAN regional engagement.
Like its RAAF and Army counterparts, the Sea Power Centre conducts lectures, seminars and conferences, along with holding an annual essay contest for the personnel of Commonwealth navies. Its publications include working and occasional papers and a regular newsletter, Semaphore. Additionally, the Sea Power Centre conducts strategic planning and forecasting tasks, and is able to act as the Chief of Navy’s personal ‘think tank’ if required.25

From this brief overview, it can be observed that the three single-Service studies centres have very similar roles. In summary, these roles are:

1. Promoting the role each Service has to play in the provision of Australian national security;
2. Advocating on behalf of each Service;
3. Analysing the history of each Service;
4. Developing doctrine, particularly at the military-strategic (keystone) level;
5. Furthering the conceptual development of each Service (especially at the military-strategic level); and
6. Educating the members of each Service about the intellectual foundations of their Service.

Furthermore, a vital contribution to achieving these roles is the publication of numerous papers of varying length and content.

At the joint level, the JWDTC currently undertakes the fourth role listed above, along with some aspects of the fifth and sixth. The ADC undertakes the sixth role, along with producing publications that are similar to those of the three single-Service studies centres. Despite the recent restructuring of JETWC, this distribution of tasks leaves the fulfilment of the first three roles lacking entirely at the joint level. As the success of the three single-Service studies centres in fulfilling these roles for their own Services demonstrates, the creation of a joint warfare studies centre would be an ideal remedy for this situation.

The centre’s mandate would, of course, need to include tasks such as promoting the roles joint organisations play in the defence of Australia and its interests, expanding the scope of joint analysis and conceptual development (especially at the strategic level), monitoring international trends in the development of jointery in peer militaries, and providing advice to senior officers about joint ‘best practice’ (especially concerning the options for future joint reforms). In the latter of these roles, a joint warfare studies centre would be capable of functioning as a personal joint warfare ‘think tank’ for the Chief of Defence Force, in the same way that the Sea Power Centre is able to perform this role for the Chief of Navy. In support of such a mandate, the centre would also need sufficient funding, as well as an appropriate structure.
How should a joint warfare studies centre be structured?

Were a joint warfare studies centre to be established, its mandate should include roles akin to those identified above. The exact scope of these roles and the manner in which they would be implemented would have to vary slightly from the single-Service studies centres, however, so as to accommodate unique requirements at the joint level. For example, a joint warfare studies centre should contribute to the joint education of individual personnel by offering fellowship programs for selected officers. Beyond this, the provision of joint PME and the conduct of other joint training courses should continue to be undertaken by the JWDTC and the ADC, with the joint warfare studies centre providing intellectual support to these organisations where appropriate.

A joint warfare studies centre should, however, assume responsibility for the production and distribution of joint academic publications such as the *Australian Defence Force Journal*. It should also be capable of occasionally publishing longer study papers (whether it would take this function over from the ADC or publish a new series of papers is extraneous). Regarding its role in joint operational and strategic concept development, the mandate of a joint warfare studies centre should complement that of the JWDTC’s Training Technology and Simulation Centre. This could be achieved by tasking the TTSC to undertake the enhancement and refinement of existing, primarily operational, concepts, ready for their inclusion in joint doctrine, while tasking a joint warfare studies centre to undertake long as well as short-term operational and strategic concept development that could be more theoretical and original in nature.

Complementary joint concept development arrangements should not, however, be the only grounds for interaction between the JWDTC and the ADC on one hand, and the proposed joint warfare studies centre on the other. To add depth to the historical, conceptual, advocacy and advisory functions of the proposed centre, it would be logical for it to have a research staff comprised of people with an appropriate academic background, in addition to being staffed by members of the three Services. As part of the fulfilment of the centre’s advocacy and educational roles, these staff could provide academic support to JWDTC and ADC courses as required, for example by the delivery of occasional guest lectures to ACSC and CDSS courses.

For this reason, if a joint warfare studies centre was established it would be logical to place it under the command of Commander JETWC, although it should nonetheless function independently within this organisation. Taking this arrangement one step further, it would be logical to co-locate the centre with other elements of the JETWC, in particular the ADC. This would have the additional benefit of allowing the centre’s staff to easily access existing library facilities.26

To enable a joint warfare studies centre to achieve the roles discussed herein, a possible structure would incorporate the following four components:

- A joint conceptual development cell, which would be tasked with undertaking detailed joint conceptual development at both the operational and strategic levels;
• A joint warfare history and theory cell, which would be tasked with conducting historical and theoretical research about the nature of jointery within the ADF and more broadly;

• A research fellowship program, including at least one participant from each of the three Services at any given time. While the primary task of the ‘fellows’ would be to contribute to the development of joint warfare studies by the completion of a research project during their fellowship, they could also act as single-Service representatives if required;27 and

• A support cell, which would conduct the editorial, administrative, financial, publishing and event coordination functions required to support the centre’s other cells.

Although this list provides only very basic details, these are sufficient for the purposes of this article. The exact staffing of each cell, how the leadership of the centre would be organised, the finances required and numerous other such issues are second-tier when compared to the overall mandate and basic functions a joint warfare studies centre should perform. These other issues are thus beyond the purview of this article.

Conclusion

Although the ADF has been recognised as a world leader in joint military innovation, the extent of its institutional knowledge of the conceptual foundations of jointery could nonetheless be greatly enhanced by the establishment of a joint warfare studies centre. It has been proposed herein that such a centre should be made responsible for joint conceptual development, for the study of joint warfare history and theory, for undertaking joint warfare advocacy and educational roles, and for providing advice to senior officers regarding joint ‘best practice’, especially where future joint reforms are concerned.

It has also been proposed that such a centre be structured in such a way that its functions complement the roles of the JWDTC and the ADC, in addition to establishing a joint equivalent to several functions that are currently performed by single-Service studies centres but which to date have not had a joint equivalent. Although the creation of a joint warfare studies centre would constitute a significant joint reform in its own right, its ultimate value would be the contribution it would make to furthering the many other aspects of ADF jointery.

Dr Aaron P. Jackson recently commenced employment in the Department of Defence, where he has been appointed as Doctrine Desk Officer at the ADF Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre. He is also an Honorary Visiting Scholar in the Department of International Relations at The Flinders University of South Australia, and his research has been published in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. He is an active member of the Army Reserve and a graduate of the Royal Military College of Australia. An infantry officer, he is currently posted to 2/17th Battalion, The Royal New South Wales Regiment.
NOTES

1. 'Joint' is defined by the ADF as 'activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate'. This article uses the ADF definition throughout. Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 101 Glossary, Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 1994, p. J.1.

2. This requirement was first addressed in the 1976 Defence White Paper, although the nature of the requirement was more comprehensively developed in the 1987 Defence White Paper (see Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987, Chapters 2-3).


11. For example, see Thomas-Durell Young, “‘Top Down’ Planning and Joint Doctrine: The Australian Experience’, Joint Force Quarterly, No. 12 (Summer 1996), pp. 61-6.


13. Notable exceptions to this dearth in the literature are the previously cited works by Horner and by Behm et al.


20. These publications are available online and are linked to the ADC homepage. See http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/index.htm


26. It is not known how much space is available at the ADC’s Western Creek Campus or at ADFA; hence this part of the proposal may be untenable. Notwithstanding possible space issues, these are nonetheless logical locations for a joint warfare studies centre. If possible, the three existing single-Service studies centres should be collocated with each other as well as with the joint warfare studies centre, although the autonomy of each centre is of utmost importance to their mandates and under no circumstances should they be amalgamated, regardless of whether a joint warfare studies centre is formed or not. Their collocation, on the other hand, would economise on costs, enhance the availability of resources and (perhaps most importantly) facilitate more inter-Service cooperation during both joint and single-Service conceptual development.

27. The single-Service studies centres run similar fellowship programs, which could be used as the basis for such a program within a joint warfare studies centre.
China’s National Defense University: a case study

Loro Horta, Nanyang Technology University, Singapore

Introduction

While considerable attention has been given to the study of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the focus has tended to concentrate on materiel improvements and doctrine. Very little research has been done on the ‘soft’ elements of Chinese military power, such as its growing and sophisticated defence diplomacy in military education where, in the past decade, China has invested significant amounts of time and resources in training thousands of officers from around the world. Their training and education at Chinese military schools has gained the Chinese military considerable influence around the world, while helping to improve the image of the People’s Republic of China.

The NDU

The National Defense University (NDU) is China’s foremost military education institution. The NDU is tasked with the training and education of the country’s military elite and plays a central role in shaping PLA doctrine. It is also the only institution where senior officers from all four services of the PLA, plus the People’s Armed Police (PAP), are brought together for advanced military education.1

In recent years, the NDU has assumed a pre-eminent role in the Chinese military’s defence diplomacy, particularly its foreign education programs. The NDU is by far China’s largest military education institution, with two campuses; Campus One for Chinese officers and Campus Two for foreign officers, both located in Changping in the outskirts of Beijing. On average, 1,000 Chinese officers graduate every year from the NDU in diverse fields of study.2

For many years after its founding in 1984, the NDU had been relatively unknown to the outside world, with very few foreign officers being allowed to attend the more advanced courses. Those who were accepted came primarily from countries perceived to be friendly to China, such as Iran, North Korea and various other third world states that usually had poor relations with the West. The very few Western officers who attended the NDU were usually confined to short, symposium-type courses with very little substance.

To this day, the NDU does not host a website where prospective students could obtain even basic information about the university. Rather, information is provided to future students directly by the Chinese military attaché in their respective country, with students only gaining access to the school’s site a few days after enrolment. Despite these restrictions, the NDU—just like China itself—has been quickly opening up to the world. From a very limited number of foreign students, the University is fast expanding its international reach. In 2002, 89 foreign
officers graduated from three courses, the longest being the six-month defence and strategy course. In 2004, 400 foreign officers graduated from four courses and, in 2007, more than 500 officers graduated from six courses. All the courses designed for foreign officers are hosted by the College of Defense Studies (CDS).

In recent years, Major General Zhu Cheng Hu and Lu Guo Zhong—commandant and political commissar respectively—made significant efforts to expand and modernise the CDS curriculum. This was despite some resistance from ‘the old guard’, who preferred to keep the courses more geared to selling China’s image as a great power. Whether the current leadership will have the same energy and open mind remains to be seen although, judging by the progressive expansion of CDS, it seems that their dynamism will be continued. In 2004, the six-month defence and strategy course was expanded to one year and a more balanced curriculum, containing both military and non-military subjects such as economics and human rights, was introduced. Interestingly, the Chinese have been modelling this course on the one-year defence course at the Australian College of Strategic Studies, while also borrowing some elements from similar courses in the US and Russia.

Several new courses have also been introduced, including separate 4½-month courses for Spanish and Russian speakers, a two-week security and defence course for Caribbean officers, a command and staff course for French-speaking officers and a one-month young officers course. In addition to these new courses, the NDU runs each year a 45-day international security symposium—the most open course at the NDU, with the regular participation of American and other NATO officers—and a one-year strategy and defence course for English-speaking officers. CDS also conducts some occasional courses especially designed for specific regions or countries, such as a 10-day course organised in May 2007 for 12 Jamaican military and civilian officials. Other courses have included programs for Arab-speaking officers and one-week seminars for French and German officers.

In order to carry out such an extensive and multilingual academic program, the university has a large number of competent interpreters, usually recently-graduated PLA cadets. Lecturers are generally fluent in the respective languages of the course in which they are allocated although, as a rule, the instructors lecture in Chinese and make use of interpreters. Attesting to the NDU’s growing investment in training foreign officers, many of the courses mentioned above are conducted simultaneously at different locations in Campus Two. For instance, in March every year, the CDS is running four different courses simultaneously; the one-year defence and strategy courses in English and French that start in September of the previous year and the 4½-month courses for Spanish and Russian-speaking officers.

In order to accommodate the growing number of foreign students, the Chinese government has invested significant amounts of money to expand and modernise the campus infrastructure. Today, the CDS possesses quite modern facilities with both single and married officers’ apartment blocks, which are fully furnished and equipped with air conditioning, central heating, cable TV and the latest model of China’s most advanced computer, the Lenovo. A gym and other sports facilities such as squash, tennis and basketball courts and a large soccer field are also available. Other recreational facilities include a games room, karaoke bar and disco. Many of these facilities are adorned with pictures of China’s military products, no doubt in the hope of attracting prospective buyers.
Following the example of similar institutions in the West, CDS in 2004 began to organise an officers’ wives club and organised an extensive social program for them that includes visits to parks and gardens, shopping, cooking lessons and mandarin courses. The NDU also runs a kindergarten next to Campus Two for the children of foreign officers and an on-campus clinic. In addition to the academic program, CDS hosts a wide range of social activities for the various course participants. A series of visits to China’s major historical sites are organised for the foreign students, in addition to visits to PLA military facilities and industrial complexes, such as its main arms corporation, the NORINCO Group. Visits to various locations outside Beijing are also organised, with Shanghai and the Three Gorges Dam the most popular among students.

Plans for expansion

Perhaps as an indication of China’s growing confidence and eagerness to expand its ties with foreign militaries, the NDU announced plans to create an official website to be available in 2009. Also, while the NDU and CDS are the main providers of military and defence education to foreign officers, other PLA schools and academies are playing a greater role. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Command and Staff College in Nanjing has in recent years begun to accept greater numbers of foreign officers, facilitated by the introduction of English and Spanish language instruction. In 2006, 37 officers from 18 countries graduated from its naval strategy for senior officers and staff college courses.

In early 2008, PLAN launched its naval command and staff college course in English. The first course was attended by 14 officers from 11 countries. A four-month French language course for senior officers also commenced in 2009. The PLAN school has also been hosting various foreign delegations that visit the College for short periods of time. These short visits of a day or two are part of wider programs that include visits to various Chinese naval bases and other facilities. Delegations from the PLAN Command and Staff College have also travelled abroad for seminars and naval symposiums. In 2008, six delegations from the College visited Australia, Europe, South America and Southeast Asia.

The Navy Technical University and the Air Force University are also training smaller numbers of foreign students. The Air Force University has a number of Spanish- and French-speaking staff to assist students from these linguistic backgrounds. Various other schools, including infantry, logistics, engineers and communications, are now running English-speaking courses for foreign officers. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAA) has in recent years begun to expand its international links. The Aviation University of the Air Force has become the main recipient of foreign officers with an estimated 1200 foreign officers graduating from its 18 courses since 1995. The University provides both undergraduate and postgraduate studies in addition to small and specialised courses. In recent years, several courses have been provided in English thus facilitating the entry of foreign students and allowing for greater numbers to participate.

Other PLA educational institutions training foreign officers include the Dalian Naval Academy, the National University of Defense Technology, the National University of Military Engineering and various other small schools and centres. While most of these universities teach courses in
English, the smaller ones face considerable problems such as lack of interpreters and updated teaching materials. Despite these obstacles, it is estimated that over 6000 foreign military officers have been trained in Chinese military academies since 2002.9

In addition to military schools, the Chinese government has begun to offer scholarships for foreign military officers to attend courses at some of China’s top universities, notably in Beijing and Shanghai. The courses offered range from Chinese language courses to engineering and social sciences. For instance, in 2007 three South American officers were attending a one-year course at the Petroleum University situated near the NDU’s Campus Two.10 Foreign officers also attend the Foreign Languages University in Nanjing, which is widely rumoured to be the training hub of the PLA’s intelligence department.

**The curriculum**

In terms of the curriculum, the NDU’s flag course for foreign officers is the one-year defence and strategy course (War College) which increasingly resembles similar courses around the world. Officers with a minimum ranking of lieutenant colonel or civilian equivalents attend the course that starts in early September and ends in late July the following year. The course begins with two modules: one on Chinese history and another covering China’s current economic and political issues. These are followed by modules on Chinese and Western military thought, geo-strategy, the strategy of great Western powers, the national strategy of Japan, operations, air power theory, naval theory and land warfare.

A series of simulation exercises are also conducted as part of the one-year course. The simulation exercises cover primarily a battlefield scenario at the tactical and operational levels. The battlefield simulation exercises start in late December and run on the scenario of an all-out attack on China by an aggressive and expansionist hegemon. In addition to having to deal with this hegemon, students have also to deal with domestic reactionaries, religious fanatics and two separatist groups; one is from the supposedly-fictitious island of Jao, supported by the hegemonic aggressive state and headed by a weak yet morally-devious president.

Apart from this exercise—which lasts for two weeks—smaller, crisis management exercises are also carried out.11 These smaller exercises tend to cover non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, outbreaks of infectious diseases and organised crime. In these smaller exercises, the very few civilians who usually attend the defence and strategy course are encouraged to assume the leadership of the teams purportedly to emphasise to foreign officers the primacy of civilian control over the military.

To conduct these exercises, CDS possesses two relatively modern exercise rooms and a modern crisis bunker two levels below ground. The three facilities are equipped with multiple phone lines, wireless internet, electronic maps and large flat-screen displays. During the exercises, several Chinese officers are assigned to the two contending groups as interpreters and one as an observer. At the end of each phase of the exercise, a Chinese officer, usually of major general rank, makes an evaluation and adds suggestions and criticism. At the end of the exercise, various Chinese officers specialising in fields such as logistics, air operations, naval
warfare, special operations etc, give their assessment and opinions and engage in a debate with the groups.

At PLAN Command and Staff College, the curriculum has been modernised and brought closer to those in similar academies in the West. The College’s library has been updated and furnished with the works of the top experts in the West, such as Geoffrey Till, and Western classic scholars, such as Mahan and Corbett. Gaming and simulation exercises are now an integral part of various courses both at the junior and senior levels.

The underlying rationale

Various factors are behind the opening of the NDU and PLA schools to the outside world. As mentioned above, China has been opening up to the world for three decades and the opening of its academies is a natural part of this progression. Second, Beijing feels the need to replicate to the largest extent possible the well-established and far-reaching education and training programs that have allowed the US to maintain strong links with various militaries around the world. These programs have not only allowed Washington to develop close relations between its officers and their counterparts around the world but to facilitate issues such as basing, arms sales, joint operations and alliance maintenance. Therefore, China’s current investment in training and educating foreign officers can be seen in the context of its overall strategy to balance American pre-eminence on the world stage.

China is also increasingly realising that mere weapons sales are not enough to secure its influence. It is, therefore, beginning to engage in a similar global military education program with an aim to train and influence the leaders of the countries where it has its interests. Defence and military education is also a way for the PLA to build contacts with countries where it has little or no arms sales. For instance, while China has not sold any major weapons to Uruguay, 13 officers from that country have graduated from PLA academies since 2002.12

While the level of influence that China may obtain from such educational programs may be limited, it nonetheless allows China to at least have some sort of presence in a country which otherwise would not be possible. These educational programs are then complemented by other cost effective initiatives, such as official visits by Chinese military and defence officials, donations of non-lethal materiel such as transport vehicles, uniforms, tents and the building of infrastructure.

Another obvious factor is that China possesses far more resources than it ever did in the past. This allows it to host such programs. Making use of its newfound wealth, China is working to build up its reputation and prestige as a centre of military excellence among the world’s militaries. The hope is that as the country’s resources grow, China will be able to replicate the large US educational network successfully and to compete for the preferences of the world’s militaries. Prestige is definitely an important factor, with some visits being clearly designed to impress the guests.
China’s military education programs have given Beijing some tangible benefits, with many of its graduates assuming senior positions in their respective countries. Among them is President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in addition to a few chiefs of staff and cabinet ministers in Africa and Asia. While many such countries still send their best (chief of staff material) to Western academies, many officers reaching less senior positions, such as one-star and two-star generals, are increasingly being trained in China.

Nearly all armies in Africa and a few in Latin America and Southeast Asia have NDU graduates at the rank of colonel or brigadier. In countries such as Nigeria, Poland, Nepal and Indonesia, the PLA’s Defence and Strategy Course has become a promotion course, while in Indonesia it is also being used to compensate for the decrease in interaction with the American and Australian militaries and for the lack of vacancies at the country’s top strategy school.13

China is also assuming a major role in regions where the US presence has been curtailed by domestic politics, such as much of South America and some parts of the Middle East. From Venezuela alone, an estimated 30 officers have graduated from various PLA academies in recent years. Between 2005 and 2007, 44 South American officers from Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay graduated from various courses at the PLAN Command and Staff College in Nanjing. In the academic year 2006-07, 26 officers from South America graduated from two NDU courses.14

In the Middle East, China has also been making inroads. In 2007, 26 officers from Lebanon attended courses in the PRC.15 Various officers from the region with the rank of general have attended the NDU one-year strategy and defence course. In the 2006-07 class, three generals from the region graduated from the course including two officers from the Saudi Arabian Navy and the UAE Air Force. A significant number of Middle Eastern officers have also attended the one-year defence and strategy course for French speakers, with officers from Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia and Lebanon graduating from it in July 2007.

The US still maintains its role as the major defence and military education provider in countries such as Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore. However, Chinese influence has been growing, particularly in Thailand, although more as a result of economic and political reasons than academic excellence, with most Thai officers still preferring to go to the US, UK or Australia. Nevertheless, the military coup in Thailand in 2005 and the resulting freeze in US military aid allowed China to significantly increase its influence among the Thai military. In 2007 alone, 32 Thai officers attended various courses at PLA schools. If the current situation persists, China is most likely to become the main provider of advanced military education to the Thai military.16 Taking into account that China is already Thailand’s main trading partner and one of its most generous and flexible weapons providers, Beijing’s greater role in educating the Thai military can only come at the expense of its relationship with the US.

China’s role as a defence education provider has also been on the rise in South Asia, a region traditionally dominated by India. The rise of anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh, coupled with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, has led the Bangladeshi government to seek closer ties with China. In the past few years, literally hundreds of Bangladeshi officers graduated from various PLA education institutions. China is currently the main supplier of weapons to its
armed forces, supplying it with frigates, fighter jets, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and other equipment sold at ‘friendship prices’.17

Beijing’s influence has also increased in Nepal, where decades-old resentment over alleged Indian colonial attitudes has paved the way for greater cooperation with the PLA. Last year, some 22 Nepalese officers graduated from Chinese military schools. However, China has carefully avoided greater involvement, conscious of not fuelling tensions with India, largely restricting its military dealings to training and sales and donations of non-lethal equipment, such as transport and logistical items.

In South Asia, like in Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, the emergence of a political atmosphere unfavourable to the traditionally-dominant power has allowed China to increase its influence in ways that may not otherwise have been possible. It remains to be seen if China’s increasing influence will be able to survive political change of the very same nature that brought Beijing into the picture.

This is not to suggest, however, that China or the PLA have some grand design to undermine US interests in these regions. Rather, China is acting within its national interests by taking advantage of a series of international and domestic circumstances that happen to be unfavourable to the US in order to maximise its gains. It is now up to the US to carefully study and understand these circumstances in order to appropriately deal with them and minimise the costs resulting from second-party actions.

Limitations to progress

While China’s military academies have improved significantly in the past decade and greatly extended their international links, there are some significant challenges to the PLA’s military education program and its objectives. For instance, while the one-year defence and strategy course at CDS has been modernised in the past 10 years, it still contains some serious deficiencies. Foreign officers, particularly those who had been trained in the West, complain about the excessive time spent talking about political issues, such as Tibet and Taiwan. Another source of complaint comes from inconsistencies within the curriculum, with some subjects having little or no relevance to military affairs and the constant change in modules offered from year to year.

Other issues include basic organisational matters such as constant changes in timetables, poor library facilities and a rudimentary language lab. For instance, despite being located in a new modern building and having on its shelves the latest issues of the world top military journals, the CDS library lacks a printer and a photocopy machine, forcing students to go to another building for these services. These deficiencies have so far prevented the NDU from having the one-year defence course recognised by Chinese educational authorities as a masters degree level qualification.

Other PLA schools face similar and in many instances greater problems than the relatively well-funded NDU. In some PLA schools, even basic matters such as sanitation and adequate food
for students is a problem. Poor and inconsistent curriculums are an even greater problem in PLA schools outside Beijing. This was vividly demonstrated when in August 2007 thousands of civilian students rioted at the PLA artillery academy in Hefei over disputes concerning degree recognition.18

Smaller non-violent protests have also happened at the Navy Technical University and the Air Force University involving mostly civilian students. However, even at the elite NDU there was a case in 2005 of a military interpreter who was arrested for desertion after she failed to report for duty. The NDU and its main college, the CDS, are facing considerable challenges in retaining many of the young interpreters who had joined the military because it was the only way to get an education and leave rural China.

Conclusion

While China’s top military institutions have improved both in terms of sophistication and scope, they still face serious problems. Even the NDU, the country’s top military institution, has faced problems of poor and inconsistent curriculums and some materiel deficiencies, such as poor libraries and poor audio-visual facilities, particularly those for foreign officer courses. A sign of such a weakness has been the NDU’s inability to have its Defense and Strategy Course awarded the level of masters due to resistance from civilian universities over its alleged poor curriculum.

Despite these problems, China’s military schools have seen an impressive renaissance with more attention being dedicated to the study of the military art instead of the dry, ideological tirades of the past. Its facilities are improving year by year, with various officers from developed countries expressing their surprise at the quality of the facilities they encounter. While lagging behind US academies in areas such as academic excellence, a modern curriculum and teaching facilities, Chinese military schools are fast catching up and presenting themselves as credible alternatives for the world’s military elites. This works to China’s advantage by expanding its military and soft power influence. More significantly, China’s defence and military education programs and its defence diplomacy in general has gained greater success in areas where the US has lost some of its influence, notably in Latin America, the Middle East and parts of Southeast Asia.

Defence and military education is an important component of China’s defence diplomacy and its overall strategy of building its soft power around world. As China grows more prosperous and able to provide ever-growing budget spending to its military, one can only expect greater investment in its foreign education and training program. While the US and its allies such as Australia and UK remain the first choice of many militaries when it comes to training and education, China is fast and aggressively creating a space for itself in this discipline. Defence and military education, while not a very visible aspect of military power, is indeed an important tool in the PLA’s arsenal and one that has gained China various new friends and influence in areas once outside its reach. As such, this largely unnoticed dimension of Chinese power should not be underestimated.
Loro Horta is a Visiting Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technology University, Singapore. He is a graduate of the PLA's National Defense University senior officers course and has visited the PLAN Command Staff College, the Navy Technical University, the Dalian Naval School and the East China Fleet base at Qingdao. Previous to his Chinese education, he was educated in Australia, the US and Singapore.

NOTES

1. Due to the lack of published sources on the PLA's NDU and the Chinese foreign military education program, the current work relies primarily on the one-year period the author spent at the NDU's College of Defense Studies (CDS) between 2006 and 2007 and subsequent research visits to CDS and other PLA educational institutions. Therefore, I rely heavily on personal observation and interviews with both Chinese and foreign officers studying at PLA schools.

2. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Lio Chang, head of administration at CDS, NDU, 14 September 2006.

3. Data given to the author by Senior Colonel Xu Hui, Chief of Academics during a 12 March 2007 interview in Singapore.

4. The author is grateful to Major General Zhu Cheng, Commandant CDS, and Political Commissar Major General Lu Guo Zhong for their hospitality and kindness during my one-year stay at CDS and in subsequent visits.

5. Interview with Senior Colonel Tong Jie, former deputy military attaché to Australia, and then military attaché to Timor-Leste, 14 March 2009.

6. The first course hosted for Caribbean officers took place in mid 2008 and the author met several of the participants.

7. Information provided to the author during a research visit to the PLAN Command and Staff College in November 2006 by Captain Yang Li.

8. Interview with Major Gao Rong, PLAF public relations officer, Beijing 18 June 2007. Information also contained on a PLAF pamphlet entitled 'Cooperation for harmonious skies', given to foreign officers during a PLAF air show near Beijing in the summer of 2007.


10. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Lio Chang, head of administration of the College of Defense Studies, NDU, Beijing, 14 September 2006.


13. Interview with Brigadier Joko Sentiono, Indonesian Air Force and a graduate of the PLA’s NDU, Beijing, 12 June 2007.

15. Interview in Singapore with Lebanese diplomat based in Beijing, 10 May 2008.


Beyond Joint: professional military education for the 21st century

Dr Kate Utting, King’s College, London

From the editor: It is regretted that the e-version of this article is not available because of licensing restrictions imposed by the original publisher.
exploration of why change occurred and how it affected the design and delivery methodology of the ACSC will provide a useful contribution to practitioners of PME.

The DTR recommendations

Looking out to 2015, the DTR was 'a comprehensive and wide-ranging examination of all aspects of individual training and education, both service and civilian'. It found that while training and education was already of a high quality, improvements were required to incorporate best practices and to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The DTR determined what training and education was needed, who it was to be given to and at what point in a career. The aim was to ensure that training and education was 'more aligned to operational and business needs'.

By building on what was considered to be the strengths of the UK's existing system, the Review recommended the introduction of 'more joint, multinational and inter-agency training and improved leadership and management training' to fulfil the mission statement that called for the MOD to 'generate battle-winning forces [that need to be] versatile, adaptable and rapidly deployable'. In order to achieve this, PME needed to be rationalised to reflect the needs of the business space as well as the battlespace, with greater integration between the Services, between the Services and civilians, and between the defence community and wider society.

The DTR recognised that the profile of the British officer cadre had changed, as nearly all were now graduates. Hence, the PME focus for the majority of officers would be at the postgraduate level. Core areas were identified to match the provision of PME to operational and business requirements, namely the theory and practice of military operations, international studies, security policy, strategy, doctrine and the operational art; command, leadership and management; defence business management, acquisition and logistics; and defence-related areas of science, technology and engineering.

The DTR recommendations for the ACSC included the removal of single-Service training, allowing it to become a truly 'joint' course, with single-Service requirements to be achieved earlier in an officer's career at an intermediate single-Service training and education level.

PME and drivers for change

Historically, the purpose of education for military professionals has been to prepare armed forces to fight by preparing officers for the unexpected and to 'cope with uncertainty'. Staff colleges, like the JSCSC, were created in the first place to teach the art of war, thereby 'reducing the risk of defeat on the battlefield'. Indeed, 'the history of military innovation and effectiveness in the last century suggests a correlation between battlefield performance and how seriously military institutions regarded officer education'.

During eras of relative strategic stability, such as during the Cold War, PME tended towards training: a predicted response to a predictable situation. Since the end of the Cold War, this...
predictability has disappeared. Armed forces have an 'expanded professional jurisdiction' that has changed as a result of the evolution in the nature of armed conflict. The widening of the spectrum of defence missions, including humanitarian assistance and peace support, means there is no clear delineation between military and non-military tasks.

To meet these challenges, officers need a particular intellectual skill set and PME that develops them to be 'flexible and enquiring; capable of rigorous analysis and of objective thinking in the formulation of policy and its implementation; that have the agility and robustness to take tough decisions, against the clock, on and off the battlefield; and that are able to cope with uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity; and to embrace change'. This is not to say that the requirement for specific specialist and pre-employment training and education has disappeared. But that staff colleges should 'teach cookery' rather than 'hand out recipes.'

The post-Defence Training Review ACSC

In October 2003, a 'customer working group' chaired by Commandant JSCSC began a review of the ACSC course. They agreed that the revised course would be 42 weeks long, preceded by a 4-week course to deliver a common ACSC entry standard. The course aim was retained but, crucially, the rank target of developing the skills to work at the operational level of Captain RN-equivalent was removed as it was recognised that for many British officers the ACSC would be the last PME they would undertake.

The DTR recommendation for specialist modules at the end of the course was rejected as potentially repetitious of courses offered elsewhere. Moreover, the benefit was recognised of all ACSC students sharing the same educational experience, irrespective of Service or specialisation. It was decided that a non-modular ACSC would provide a larger and more flexible pool of ACSC graduates, educated in skills that could be employed across a number of areas in Defence (and lessen the temptation for Services to pull students from the ACSC in times of high operational tempo).

In November 2004, Commandant JSCSC issued further guidance on course re-design, reflecting current defence challenges. The biggest change identified was the evolution in understanding the operational level of war, reflecting not only the changed international security situation but increasingly the need to work not just with other Services and coalition partners but other actors, such as other Government departments, non-governmental organisations and inter-governmental organisations. The re-design also recognised the change in the age and experience of the student body, with increased levels of operational and combat experience. British students nominally represent the top 25 per cent of their UK peer group, while international students represent 30 per cent of the student body and come from up to 49 countries.
The overall learning objectives of the ACSC were also reduced to five higher-level training objectives as shown at Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training objective</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Strategic Component</td>
<td>Analyse and evaluate the current and future geo-strategic factors which shape the international system, how these affect UK foreign and security policy and explain the implications for the delivery and employment of capability at the operational level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Conceptual Component</td>
<td>Analyse and evaluate the characteristics of extant and emergent component and joint doctrine and demonstrate how they are applied in the context of single-Service, joint, combined and multi-agency operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Physical Component</td>
<td>Evaluate present and future generations of UK military capability and their employment in single-Service, joint, combined and multi-agency environments across the full spectrum of conflict and demonstrate how they are used at the operational level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Moral Component</td>
<td>Analyse the characteristics of command, leadership and management in single-Service, joint, combined and multi-agency environments and demonstrate how these are applied at the operational level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Intellectual Component</td>
<td>Demonstrate the personal, intellectual, decision-making and communication skills required of a staff officer in single-Service, joint, combined and multi-agency environments and staff appointments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this way, the post-DTR ACSC was designed to deliver learning outcomes derived from a precise definition of operational level decision making and problem-solving skills based on learning objectives. With the development of skills, rather than the acquisition of knowledge as key to the re-design of the ACSC, there was also an expectation that students would be motivated to learn based on the benefits of the educational opportunities they would be offered and that these would be relevant to their career development. Intellectual risk would be encouraged and rewarded. And, for the first time, the ACSC would be a pass/fail course. Overall, students would be required to identify the operational level issues and implications that arise from converting strategic intentions into practical outcomes and to demonstrate creativity, innovation, independence of thought and originality in reaching solutions to the problems posed. Demonstrating such skills requires time for research and reflection, and the allocation of time for private study was increased from 27 to 38 per cent of the program, requiring also students to effectively organise and use their research time. Progressive development of skills in this way is congruent with the aims of the recognised postgraduate (Masters) level of education. Assessments were to be directly related to learning and, as the course has placed increased emphasis on active skills development rather than passive knowledge acquisition, the ‘criteria referenced assessment’ reflects attainment.
where students for the first time compete against the standard—not each other—and all student feedback is relative to the defined criteria.18

ACSC syllabus content

The post-DTR ACSC consisted of four core areas of study to provide both the knowledge base and the opportunity to enable the development of skills. The first core study area, 'Conflict and the International System' (C&IS), was designed to examine the purpose of operations in a strategic context. Starting with the nature of the international system and the behaviour of its actors, it moved to examine the nature of power, the development of strategic aims, foreign, defence and security policy and the development of strategy. It then examined options to implement aims and the use of force and the constraints on its employment, including international law and ethics. C&IS culminated in strategy and policy case studies on the strategic causes of war, the strategic prosecution of war and a consideration of war as a strategic tool through a study of the Vietnam war, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the 1991 Gulf war.

The second core area of study, 'Component Studies', examined capabilities and how capability can be measured, applied and managed to achieve strategic ends. In Block 1, each Service aimed to refresh student understanding by studying the capabilities, organisation and roles of their Service. Block 2 then provided the opportunity for each environmental component to be studied by the joint course, with 'combat power visits', run by each Service, demonstrating their capabilities and the issues of conducting operations within their environment. Block 2 culminated in a joint overview and exercise to practise the opportunities and risks associated with combining components to produce joint effects.

With a greater understanding of the joint environment, students returned to single-Service syndicates in Block 3 in order to analyse the nature of their own Service in greater detail. Historical evidence showed how their Service had changed as the political and economic climate has altered. Enduring themes were identified and when applied to the present political environment and future trends, students were able to analyse the suitability of their own Service to meet the changing needs of the future. The conclusion of 'Component Studies' was a return to joint syndicates to discuss and challenge the views of the other Services on their future structures and capabilities.

The third core area of study was 'Campaigning', which examined and practised methodologies and decision making appropriate to the employment of capability for joint effect. Beginning with an examination of strategic planning and its execution, 'Campaigning' then focused on the evolution of operational art through case studies, then critically studied doctrine before examining operational design in depth. Operational design took as its subject the challenges of non-warfighting operations in a peace-keeping scenario and operational management in a counter-insurgency scenario. The study culminated in a two-week theatre wargame, focused on a complex inter-agency, multi-spectrum scenario.
The final core area of study, 'Defence Policy and Strategic Planning', examined and practised the methodologies appropriate to the management of defence. This study examined the defence resource challenge—the competing demands in allocating resources to deliver policy—by considering the decision-making process of a fictitious state in five steps. Step 1 examined strategic choices in outlining a defence budget. Step 2 analysed defence planning assumptions and the military tasks and assumptions that flowed from these. Step 3 articulated a statement of future capability requirements and produced a balanced equipment plan. Step 4 examined the impact on the defence budget and capability areas following a reduction in the budget and determined a series of proposed savings options. Step 5 examined the political, industrial and operational impact of the proposed savings options that culminated in a decision conference and re-balanced equipment program.

Together, the four core studies provided the basic framework for the design of the course. Six supporting areas of study were developed to enhance student knowledge in specific core study areas and to help refine analytical ability by applying problem-solving and decision-making skills to specific issues and areas. The first supporting study, 'Command, Leadership and Management' (CLM), examined the determinants of effective command, leadership and management, decision-making tools and techniques, and reflections on individual student experience.

'International Security Studies' (ISS) linked directly to furthering the understanding of the strategic context of operations. It analysed behaviour in the international system across the spectrum of conflict that affects current and future global, regional and national security interests. Specifically, the following subjects were studied: the UN as a global security provider; the US and power in a unipolar world; European security, security dynamics and the role of institutions; the Middle East, Persian Gulf and perceptions of security; African security dynamics and the state; and Asia-Pacific power balances and security dynamics.

Students also went on a number of study visits to examine first-hand how other countries evaluate current and future geo-strategic factors, how these affect the development of their foreign and security policies and the delivery and employment of capability at the operational level, and the principles of allocating and managing defence resources in order to deliver their defence policy. Through this comparative examination, students developed the ability to analyse how strategic choices are made in different states and societies, how to use this to consider what responses or actions might arise from various types of stimuli and to better appreciate how military power can contribute in combination with diplomatic and economic power to the achievement of specified outcomes.

'Stability Operations' examined the military contribution to the effective prosecution of multi-dimensional operations in complex environments including peace support, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and long-term stabilisation efforts. Beginning with an examination of peace support operations, the study moved on to counter-insurgency and then international terrorism and homeland security. An exercise examined the European Union and NATO approach to peace support operational planning, particularly utilising the experience of students on exchange from staff colleges in France, Spain, Italy and Germany.
‘Influence Operations’ was designed to develop an appreciation of the effects of influence on strategic and operational outcomes, primarily in the cognitive domain and how military activities (principally information operations and media operations) are employed as part of a military effects-based approach. ‘Sustainment’ focused on an understanding of the logistic realities that impact effectiveness at the operational level. It evaluated the implications of the UK’s joint approach to logistics and the sustainability and deployability factors that need to be considered early in contingency planning. Finally, ‘Future Trends’ examined the likely impact of scientific developments and global trends on security and defence, including climate, demographic changes, nanotechnology, biotechnology, space technology and genetic engineering.

ACSC concluded with two weeks of culminating studies. ‘Realities of Conflict’ developed further appreciation of the stresses and strains of operational service and team leadership performance. The final exercise aimed to bring together, as a forward looking and culminating activity, the operational level themes taught on the course, based on an analysis of Operation OVERLORD. Students who successfully completed the ACSC and passed the military assessment achieved an Executive Diploma in Management, an Executive Diploma in Strategic Management, a Postgraduate Diploma in Executive Strategic Management and/or 90 credits towards an MBA (with accredited partnering institutions).

Further review

After the completion of the first revised course, there was a perception that some students had struggled to meet the educational challenge, as it had been a long time since many of them had been involved in formal education as opposed to continual professional development. Nevertheless, actual validation supported the assessment that the post-DTR ACSC was ‘fit for purpose’ and that the aim of delivering against its educational objectives had been met. Indeed, the results of the King’s College MA in Defence Studies for that year indicate that student results were commensurate with those of students on previous ACSCs, with an increase in students achieving distinction degrees.

The general view was that in order to achieve the learning outcomes and objectives for each study and the progression of thinking skills development, an increase was required in the overall amount of programmed time for student research, as well as better spacing between formal assessments. This has now been introduced for future courses. Over and above the consolidation of research time into larger blocks, two discrete research weeks have also been introduced, one in March and one in May. This has been achieved by reducing the number of lectures, with a target reduction of 20 per cent. In order to better prepare students for the ACSC, an introductory studies skills package has been developed and a ‘learning guide’ prepared to encourage students to think about thinking.

‘Component Studies’ and ‘Campaigning’ have also been the subject of major revision. ‘Component Studies’ Block 3 was rationalised and instead of students studying their own component in greater detail, all students undertook the same learning requirement to enhance joint understanding. ‘Campaigning’ has been revised and refocused as ‘Decision Making and Military Planning’, with greater emphasis on decision making and planning irrespective of service and specialisation.
In 'ISS', the UN, US, European security, Middle East and Gulf elements will remain largely unchanged. However, the Africa element has been reviewed to better identify security themes and, to better reflect UK strategic priorities, it has been decided to examine South Asia (India and Pakistan) as part of a larger Asian element and also to re-introduce the study of Russia. 'CLM' has also been reviewed, with a more explicit consideration of self-reflection introduced by adopting a 'self, team and organisation' approach that is consistent with the approach of the Defence Leadership Centre. All British students and international student volunteers will also visit Auschwitz to study the moral, physical and conceptual components of fighting power.

Conclusions

This article has examined the re-design of the UK's ACSC following the national strategic direction provided by the 2001 DTR. It has shown how the design of the post-DTR ACSC was informed by developments in how the operational level of war is understood and the changing nature of conflict and security. It has outlined the design parameters, the focus on the intellectual skills set designed to enhance military decision making and problem solving. The emphasis on the development of skills to equip officers to deal with the thinking challenges presented by contemporary warfare was the driver behind revisions to the ACSC. Nevertheless, the debates that influenced the development of the new ACSC will continue to exist on how PME should be developed to be current, relevant and contribute to the achievement of military success.

The development of the ACSC is, therefore, an on-going activity. The need for currency, professional relevance and the linkage drawn between the application of PME to operational success and hence strategic success, together with the concomitant risk of failure, means that the development of PME—like any education for professionals—is and should be an iterative process that assesses educational aims, curricula and methodologies. This investment in a year-long command and staff course for mid-career military professionals may seem at variance in an era of high profile controversies over defence spending. But, as some in the US have argued, 'the more you cut force structure, the more vital your professional military education system becomes'.20 Officers with developed thinking skills, commensurate with a postgraduate education, may be the only real insurance against the changing requirements and generalist roles of the 21st century environment. It remains to be seen if the post-DTR ACSC has met this challenge.

Dr Kate Utting has been with King's College London in the Defence Studies Department at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) since 1997. Between 2003 and 2006, she was Director of Course Design and lead academic on the design and implementation of the new Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC). She teaches in Defence Studies, ACSC, Joint Warrant Officers Staff Course and Intermediate Staff Courses for Land, Air and Maritime, specialising in media-military relations, propaganda and British policy overseas since 1945. She completed her MPhil and PhD at the University of Leeds.

2. Broadly 110 British Army, 75 RAF, 55 RN, 90 international and the rest made up of students from other UK government departments, including the MOD and FCO.


4. This academic-military relationship to accredit the UK staff course pre-dates the establishment of the JSCSC. It began in 1992 at the RAF Staff College, Bracknell and was extended in 1993 to the Army Staff College at Camberley and the Royal Naval College at Greenwich with a supplementary MA package.


7. MOD, Modernising Defence Training, pp. 3, 7 and 8.


10. Leonard D. Holder and Williamson Murray, 'Prospects for Military Education', Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1998, p. 90. This kind of measurement of success was also found in the DTR report that 'Recent operational success has shown our training is of a very high standard', MOD, Report of the Defence Training Review, p.13.

11. In the UK, Defence differentiates between training and education in the following way. 'Education' is defined as 'the development of intellectual capacity, acquisition of supporting knowledge and inculcation of attitudes that underpin performance and engender understanding, commitment and ethos'; whereas 'training' is defined as 'activity that aims to impart the specific knowledge and skills and/or inculcate appropriate attitudes required by an individual in order to perform adequately a task or job'. MOD, Director General Training and Education, Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) Quality Standard (QS) 002:2003, London: HMSO, 2003, pp. 3 and 5.


80 per cent of ACSC10 students had operational experience and 42 per cent combat experience. The average age of UK students has increased from 36 to 40. British Army students are now of Major and Lieutenant Colonel ranks, thus mirroring closer the age profile of RN and RAF than previous courses. Other government departments (OGD) are represented on the ACSC but historically it has proved difficult to achieve representation of non-Service or civil servants. OGD representation tends to be from the MOD and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.

International students are fully integrated into the ACSC. In view of the increasing demand of the course, the International English Language Testing System entry standard was lifted to 7 for ACSC10.

The educational aims that focus the ACSC at the post-graduate (Masters) level are as follows: To develop the learner’s knowledge and understanding of defence in the modern world. To demand critical engagement with current research and advanced scholarship on defence and its relationship with the fields of international relations, security studies, military history, war studies and operational experience. To encourage a systematic and reflective understanding of contemporary conflict and the issues that surrounds them. To promote initiative, originality, creativity and independence of thought in identifying, researching, judging and solving fundamental intellectual problems in this area of study. To develop relevant transferable skills, especially communication, use of information technology, and organisation and management of the learning process.

For students to achieve ‘pass staff course (joint)’, they are required to pass three tiers of assessment. There are five assessments for Tier 1: a 4000-word essay on strategy and policy, a 6000-word essay on componency, a 15000-word research paper, a Campaigning formal exercise and a Defence Policy and Strategic Planning formal exercise. Tier 2 assessments are formal oral presentations and are assessed against the following criteria: intellectual competence; knowledge; analysis and effective intelligence and professional competence; understanding of doctrine, policy and strategies; quality of work, delivery style and performance in cross-examination; communications skills and time management. Tier 3 assessment is a through-course assessment of broader qualities of leadership, management and inter-personal qualities; management and organisation; leadership and ability to act as a team member; decision making; motivation and dynamism; courage and values; social engagement and inter-personal skills.

On ACSC10 all students visited the US, Portugal, Belgium, Germany and France.

Let Us Dare

Admiral James Stavridis, United States Navy

James William Fulbright once said, ‘We must dare to think unthinkable thoughts. We must explore all of the options and possibilities that confront us in a complex and rapidly changing world’.1 To that I add that we must also dare to read, write, learn and publish.

Those of us who have chosen a life of military service are—in a very real and often deadly sense—everyday confronted with the challenges of this complex and rapidly changing world. Ours is a life of purpose and consequence. It’s a life that requires learning and thinking—deliberate, calm thinking even in the midst of chaos—and the courage to share our thoughts.

As military men and women, ours is the profession of arms. But it’s also a profession of scholarly pursuit. As Thucydides once wrote, ‘The nation that makes great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools’.2 The scholar and the warrior are thus inseparable—one and the same. From our warrior minds have emerged countless literary works ranging from treatises on tactics and strategy, like Mahan’s seminal work on seapower and Clausewitz’s enduring thoughts on war, to fiction and even poetry, like Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers and John McCrae’s In Flanders Field. The heritage of our literary achievements is one worth knowing and preserving but, more importantly, it’s one for each of us to contribute to and improve.

And what better time than the present … so read along and when you are done, pick up your pen or get to your keyboard and get started.

Read and expand your horizons

If you read good reads, you’ll write good writes. So read. Read a lot. Read about a lot of things. Fulbright’s call to explore new ideas and all of the options and possibilities that confront us demands we understand the world around us. A daunting task for sure but without avid reading, it’s an impossible one. So what are you reading? It’s a simple question I ask my staff every chance I get and one whose answers very much interest me. How are you answering Fulbright’s call? I encourage building a reading list and a well-rounded personal collection of works covering the gamut of history, policy, international relations, political science, biography, strategy and my personal favourite—fiction. It’s good advice and one I take to heart. I am committed to continually learning so I read constantly and incessantly and encourage everyone around me to do the same.

Not long after taking the helm at US Southern Command, I introduced a command reading list (http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/readingList.php) and shortly after my arrival at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe and the US European Command, I launched our new command reading list as well (http://www.eucom.mil/english/Reading%20List.pdf). Between the
two lists you will find over 120 books, a product of both my own reading and a great dialogue with sources ranging from US, Latin American and European scholars to my team-mates from US Southern Command, all NATO nations and non-NATO partners.

The lists are neither comprehensive nor complete. Nor are any of our own readings. They are a dynamic compilation of works intended to be periodically updated and meant to serve as bridges to understanding the complex cultures and linkages between their respective theatres and the world beyond. When, for example, I pick up a book like *Crime and Punishment* by Fyodor Dostoyevski, I can immerse myself in Russian traditions, history and sensibility. In poring through a book like *Hombres de Maíz* by Miguel Angel Asturias, I can gain understanding of the cultural divides in Guatemala and better understand the struggle of the indigenous people to survive in post-colonial Latin America. Likewise, to read Simon Schama’s masterful biography of Rembrandt, *Rembrandt’s Eyes*, is to understand Dutch history and the power of their artists in a new way entirely. I love to read and I’m convinced that by reading books I literally expand my horizons. I dare you to expand yours.

Below are a few recommendations from both the SOUTHCOM and EUCOM reading lists to help widen your aperture:

*Inés of My Soul: a novel* by Isabel Allende

This historical novel—set in Spain, Perú and Chile—describes the time of the Spanish conquest of the Americas through the eyes of Inés Suárez, the real-life wife and widow of one conquistador and later lover of another. Inés writes of her humble beginnings as a seamstress in Spain, her marriage to a conquistador who spent most of his time away from his family in search of the New World’s treasures, her journey to Perú and, following her husband’s death, her long affair with one of Pizarro’s officers charged with carving out ‘civilisation’ in Chile.

*History of the Conquest of Peru: with a preliminary view of the civilization of the Incas* by William Hickling Prescott

Embroided in a bloody civil war pitting two Inca factions against one another, Perú fell to a small group of Spanish conquerors led by the Pizarros. This did not bring an end to the factional fighting, however, as the conflict then shifted to competing groups of conquerors. This sweeping study captures the drama and detail of the events that shaped the region.
Forgotten Continent: the battle for Latin America’s soul by Michael Reid

Latin America’s diverse nations are taking equally diverse paths as they seek to grow and further develop. In some, market-based economies and ‘conservative’ fiscal policies have yielded varying degrees of success. In others, state policies are driven by populism. Still others creatively blend socialist and capitalist philosophies. Reid believes that creativity within a capitalist, democratic framework is the key to addressing the region’s underlying challenges of poverty, inequality and corruption.

Out of Captivity: surviving 1,967 days in the Colombian jungle by Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell and Tom Howes with Gary Brozek

On 13 February 2003, an unarmed, single-engine Cessna with a crew of four Americans and one Colombian crash-landed in the Colombian jungle. Although all survived the crash, two crewmembers were murdered by Colombia’s narco-terrorist guerrillas, the FARC. The remaining three survivors—Marc, Keith and Tom—would endure the next 1,967 days as FARC hostages. This moving memoir recounts the psychological battles and the physical punishments they suffered at the hands of the FARC before the Colombian Army rescued them and 12 other hostages on 2 July 2008.

The General in His Labyrinth by Gabriel García Márquez

Simon Bolivar’s founding role in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panamá, Perú and Venezuela is an unprecedented achievement. But, by 1830, the 46-year old Bolivar is portrayed as bitter and disillusioned. He embarks on what turns out to be his final voyage on the Magdalena River, contemplating his legacy, what might have been and his own decline.

Three Cups of Tea: one man’s mission to fight terrorism and build schools – one school at a time by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

Drawing upon Mortenson’s experiences in Pakistan, the authors show development can really help the people who need it most. They argue that the US must fight Islamic extremism through collaborative efforts to alleviate poverty and improve access to education, especially for girls.
**One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich** by Alexander Solzhenitsyn

From the icy blast of reveille through the sweet release of sleep, Ivan Denisovich endures. A common carpenter, he was one of millions imprisoned for years on baseless charges, sentenced to the waking nightmares of the Soviet work camps in Siberia. Even in the face of degrading hatred, hope and dignity prevailed. This powerful novel, published in 1963 after Stalin’s death, is a scathing indictment of communist tyranny and an eloquent affirmation of the human spirit. Solzhenitsyn was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1970 but expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974.

**Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?- the transformation of modern Europe** by James J. Sheehan

Sheehan charts perhaps the most radical shift in Europe’s history: its transformation from war-torn battlefield to peaceful, prosperous society. For centuries, war was Europe’s defining narrative, affecting every aspect of life. After World War 2, Europe began to re-imagine statehood, rejecting ballooning defence budgets in favour of material well-being, social stability and economic growth. Sheehan reveals how and why this happened and what it means for America and the rest of the world.

**Islam After Communism: religion and politics in Central Asia** by Adeeb Khalid

Khalid combines insights from the study of both Islam and Soviet history in this sophisticated analysis of the ways that Muslim societies in Central Asia were transformed by the lengthy Soviet presence in the region.

**Absurdistan** by Gary Shteyngart

This novel follows its protagonist and narrator from St Petersburg (or St Leninsburg as he prefers to call it) to a fictional country in the Caucasus called ‘Absurdistan’, where a multi-sided conflict is raging.
Learn and expand your audience

Wenn Sie Deutsch könnten, wären Sie nicht nur in der Lage diesen Satz zu lesen, sondern auch sich die Vielfalt deutscher Literatur zu erschließen. Unless you speak German, I lost you in the lines above. Allow me to translate: the lines simply say in German—the language of just one of our 28 NATO nations—that if you spoke German and read German, you would be able to not only read this sentence but also access the rich variety of German literary works.

True, English is an incredibly rich and important language and the body of literature is enormous. But just imagine how much more you can access if you learned just one additional language. It could be Turkish or German or French, Italian, Russian, Arabic, Spanish or any of the nearly 7,000 languages spoken throughout the globe. Now, consider just how many more people can access your ideas if you wrote in multiple languages. The implications are staggering. If, for instance, your pen delivers strokes in Chinese, your ideas could potentially and more effectively reach the more than 1.2 billion people whose first language is Chinese. And if you encountered a Chinese line or two, you wouldn’t be lost.

Learning a new language is challenging—for some it’s downright unthinkable. But think and do the unthinkable we must. There are many resources available to make many languages of the world much more accessible. Beyond modern means, like software-based programs, those of us in the military also enjoy the benefits of world travel and the possibility of tours in countries not our own. Take full advantage of those resources and opportunities and dare to learn another language. You will be glad you did.

Write, publish and expand your reach

As someone who has done his fair share of thinking, reading, writing and publishing, I offer simple counsel. Share your ideas. Share your thoughts. Tell your story! All of us who have served have ideas. We all have a story to tell. It might be technical, it might be tactical, it might be right, it might even be wrong. But get it out there and let’s debate it. Whether you realise it or not, you are probably doing that every day. We often express our thoughts, our ideas and our observations in our daily discussions with our juniors, our peers and our seniors. Those discussions sometimes have an impact but more often than not, that impact is local. Broaden your audience. Expand your reach. Put pen to paper and dare to publish your thoughts. Then watch how your ideas spark a larger discussion and a larger professional conversation.

You can publish locally in smaller but high-impact publications or you can ‘go big’ and publish in journals such as this, the Australian Defence Force Journal, or Foreign Affairs, Defence Systems or any number of professional journals. Regardless of venue, if you write as best you can, with honesty and integrity, your ideas will potentially influence a great many and inspire conversations in many an office, mess, academic centre or café. Of course, there is no guarantee that what you write will be published; even the best writers have their flops. Don’t fret. Hits and misses are how you learn and improve. Keep at it.
Have no fear

If there’s one thing that tempers debate more than ignorance, it’s fear; fear of criticism, fear of rejection and fear of ridicule. Let’s face it, the thought of having our ideas scrutinised by others pegs the risk meter on high. Once our thoughts are out there, we may feel we’ve lost control. Sadly, sometimes mentors add to our fears and trepidations by exaggerating this notion of risk. Fear not. Dare to write and dare to publish. Have the moral courage to hang your ideas out there. Responsibly spur the debate. Some may disagree with you but your efforts will be considered as attempts to contribute and will be respected as such.

Finding a venue to write in is getting easier all the time too. There are the myriad print journals, of course, but don’t discount the power of blogs and internet forums for testing your ideas, sharpening your arguments and galvanising your thoughts. Naturally, as a military professional, you should always strive to keep the conversations beyond reproach and use good judgment in ensuring what is posted is free of classified or otherwise sensitive information. I’m sure we’ve all wished we hadn’t clicked on ‘send’ at one time or another, so use all media available to you but do so within the bounds of the law, of policy, of regulation and, especially, of classification. And have no fear!

Launch your ideas

It’s often said that we are in a war of ideas. I disagree. Rather, we are in a marketplace of ideas where thinking the unthinkable and imagining the unfathomable have become de rigueur. Those of us who value the enduring ideas of freedom and liberty compete in that market with those who do not. As military professionals, it’s our obligation to understand and effectively compete in that marketplace, be good strategic communicators and do our part to get our message out to the customers whose attention we vie.

We can’t take the marketplace of ideas for granted. As attractive as the ideas of freedom and liberty are, their competitive advantage is not guaranteed. There is stiff competition out there and our competitors are savvy, they are connected and they are persistent. We must thereby do as the second President of the United States, John Adams, once wrote and ‘Tenderly and kindly cherish the means of knowledge … and dare to read, think, speak and write’ and publish. Let us dare to be persistent too.

Admiral Stavridis assumed duties as Commander US European Command in June 2009 and as Supreme Allied Commander Europe in July 2009. He is a 1976 graduate of the US Naval Academy. He commanded the Destroyer USS Barry from 1993-95, completing deployments to Haiti and Bosnia, and a combat cruise to the Arabian Gulf. In 1998, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 21 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf. From 2002-04, he commanded Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat operations in the Arabian Gulf. From 2006-09, he commanded US Southern Command. Ashore, Admiral Stavridis has served as a strategic planner on the staffs of Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also served as executive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and senior military assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He has a PhD and MA from Tufts University and is a graduate of both the Naval and National War Colleges.
NOTES

1. Address to the US Senate, 27 March 1964.
2. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (431BC), variously translated.
Ethics Education for Irregular Warfare

Don Carrick, James Connelly & Paul Robinson (eds.)
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2009
ISBN: 978-0-7546-9400-7

Reviewed by Dr Hugh Smith, Australian Defence Force Academy

Western armed forces, Australia included, are taking ethics more seriously than ever before. This is partly in response to the rise of human rights principles which have been embodied in the international humanitarian law of armed conflict. It is also partly due to the growing demand for accountability among servants of governments, especially military personnel who are often the most visible and most publicised. These factors have pushed armed forces more than ever before to ensure that those in uniform act both legally and ethically. Allied to this is the recognition that improper actions in a conflict can severely damage a nation’s cause and the honour and professionalism of the military force concerned.

Nowhere is the potential for unethical and illegal actions by armed forces greater than in irregular warfare, however the term is defined. Many reasons for this are canvassed in this collection of essays. It is often difficult to identify the enemy—or friends for that matter. Military and civilian targets blend or are deliberately blurred. Insurgents may disregard normal conventions of war or blatantly breach them in order to provoke their opponents into overreaction.

The treatment and interrogation of prisoners is often a grey area. As well, a military force tends to be pulled in different directions by nation-building and non-military activities on the one hand and the need to use lethal force and exercise self-defence on the other. Coalitions drawn from nations with different cultures and values complicate the problem, as does the need to deal with governments that are corrupt and have little regard for human rights. Add to this the fact that such campaigns often have ‘morally ambiguous objectives’ (Lucas, p. xv) and it is clear that irregular war is an ethical minefield.

The eleven contributors to this volume (mostly North American and British but including one each from Australia, Israel and the Netherlands) are generally in accord about the challenges to ethical behaviour presented by irregular warfare and the importance of meeting them. Their focus, however, is not on the ethics of irregular war per se but on how to educate and train military personnel to respond to complex and dynamic ethical dilemmas, often with little time and inadequate resources. How can armed forces prevent their personnel from committing abuses or at least reduce the risk?

Some familiar problems are rehearsed. How much blame can be legitimately placed on a few ‘bad apples’, rather than on ‘bad barrels’ ie systems and procedures that positively encourage wrong behaviour (Robinson, p. 76)? Is it lack of education and training in ethics that causes wrongful behaviour or is it, as McMaster (p. 15) argues, primarily the stress of combat that induces otherwise good soldiers to do bad things? How much fault can be found
at higher levels—whether commanding officers who turn a blind eye to potential problems, senior officers who provide too little support or inadequate guidance, or political leaders who demand too much too quickly? Wolfendale, for example, argues that torture in irregular warfare ‘is rarely a one-off incident’ caused by the pathology of individual soldiers but is ‘often authorized by military superiors, with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of the political administration’ (p. 58).

No contributor claims to have the complete answer to the question of how to educate soldiers to act ethically in irregular warfare. There is some consensus that sensitising personnel to the culture and customs of the country to which they are deployed is necessary. Another common theme is that personnel need to be more aware of the structural pressures in a military organisation—such as the norm of obedience and the culture of solidarity—that make for rationalising unethical behaviour and placing ethical demands behind the perceived need to accomplish the mission. Different views emerge on the value of separate courses focused specifically on military ethics but most contributors seem to favour integrating ethical and legal perspectives into military education and training across the board.

There are also different perspectives on the goal of ethics education in the military. Is the aim to make soldiers into ‘better people’ in the sense of wanting to be more ethical or is education intended simply to enable them to analyse the dilemmas more clearly? Is the objective to improve the intrinsic character of soldiers—virtue ethics—or to change their conduct to accord with desired principles—value ethics? Where does international law come in and does it complement ethics or overlap with ethics? And who should or can best educate future and serving officers in ethics—military personnel or academic staff? As Deakin notes, somewhat wryly, the awkward political, ethical and legal issues of irregular warfare tend to be left to civilian academics (p. 122).

The barriers to ethics education are also examined by some of the contributors. Lucas argues that the US military has not only failed to educate personnel about the challenges of irregular warfare but has actively resisted doing so (p. xiv). Similarly, Cook points out that the curriculum at the US Air Force Academy remains resolutely oriented toward the Cold War with technology squeezing out social science.

He also points to inter-service differences, criticising the ‘fighter generals’ of the US Air Force for failing to adapt airpower to the needs of conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and ‘almost any anticipated future conflict’ (p. 114). The contributors from Israel, the Netherlands and the UK, by contrast, are rather more positive about the success of their national forces in dealing with irregular warfare. But all contributors acknowledge the extent of the challenge of ethics education in this context and recognise that each military force, existing in a different social, cultural and political environment, needs to work out its own solutions.

The ADF has been paying more attention to ethics education in recent years, notably at the staff colleges, the Defence Force Academy and the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics, but more can certainly be done. This volume is commended as one that will stimulate thinking about how to build on what has already been achieved.
For an Australian reader, the title of this book needs clarification so as not to be misleading. When the author uses the word ‘Navy’, he does not do so generically — this book is unapologetically and specifically about the US Navy (USN) and US strategic policy. Further, it is about the strategic culture that led to US maritime strategy in the 1980s. This was, in the author’s view, ‘a unique focusing of the various elements of Navy strategic culture … [and] … a coherent, persuasive and powerful strategy document’.

Since the publication of that strategy, the Navy — according to the author — has been ‘cast back’ and its strategies of the last 20 years ‘have not qualified as operational or even planning strategies’. This view of the Reagan-era’s maritime strategy as the pinnacle of US naval strategic thinking is perhaps unsurprising given that the author’s last job in active naval service was Head of Strategic Concepts Branch, which was responsible for the production of the 1984 maritime strategy document.

However, the book doesn’t end there. There is one final chapter prior to the conclusion entitled ‘Retrospective’. The author explains its role is to ‘address counter-cultural issues — ones with the potential to thwart the full realization of the culture’. It deals with the perceived evils of a changing global security environment, increased ‘jointness’, those that would charge the US Navy with a disinterest in mine and riverine warfare, those who believe that a modern surface navy is vulnerable, and those that would impose civilian social constructs onto a military. While not adding much to the main argument of the book, it is an interesting account of the author’s view on what has gone wrong since he left the service — but more on this later.

Arguably, the USN is also the only navy in the world that could unilaterally publish a document called ‘The Maritime Strategy’. In Australia, a maritime strategy is, of necessity, a way of describing the Defence strategy. But the US Department of the Navy is ‘the most strategically
independent of the services, [with] its own army, navy and air force’. Given the unique nature and size of the USN as a service and strategic entity, what then can an Australian reader draw from *Navy Strategic Culture*? Is it worth reading and why?

Firstly, our alliance with the US is, in the words of the White Paper, ‘our most important defence relationship’. *Navy Strategic Culture* gives the reader a detailed and coherent explanation of US maritime strategy of the 1980s. It does not attempt to discuss the contemporary US maritime strategy (*Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*), which is more relevant to our current circumstances. However, if one views strategic development as evolutionary, then this book is invaluable in providing insight into its antecedents.

Secondly, it is an interesting reflection on why naval officers are different from their land equivalents. The book opens with a list of senior joint command appointments in the US that in 2007 were filled by USN admirals: Admiral Fallon at CENTCOM, Admiral Stavridis at SOUTHCOM, Admiral Mullen as CJCS and Admiral Olson at SOCOM. Navy would appear to be over-represented and Barnett asserts that ‘the ability of Navy officers to think strategically, to rise above the minutiae of the tactical battlefield and to discern “where the big picture fits in” rendered them uniquely valuable as combat commanders in that particular global security environment’.

Barnett further notes that Napoleon is reported to have said that ‘an admiral commanding a fleet and a general commanding an army are men who need different qualities. One is born with the qualities proper to command an army, while the necessary qualities to command a fleet are acquired only by experience’. One wonders what Napoleon would make of Australia, where the concepts of jointness and joint command are well-developed and entrenched and the RAN is proportionally less well-represented in joint commands and senior appointments than in the US.

Unfortunately, this is one of the least well-developed of Barnett’s arguments. He never establishes whether a navy trains and develops its officers to be different or just attracts different people. Neither does he look closely at differences in availability and curricula of schooling and education in comparison to other military officers. Indeed, far more interesting treatments of the development, or lack thereof, of a naval officer’s character can be found elsewhere—notably *At War At Sea* by Ronald Spector.

Thirdly, despite the difference in scale, the discussion of expeditionary warfare, the employment of naval forces and the role of technology are applicable to all maritime forces. As the ADF develops its expeditionary capability with the introduction into service of *Canberra* class LHDs, the discussion of the USN view of what it means to be expeditionary—forward, mobile, offensive, self-reliant and adaptable—is relevant and worthy of more discussion as it relates to our circumstances.

Fourth, his litany of contemporary ills in Chapter 9 is a valuable ‘compare and contrast’ exercise for the RAN. The US is, on the whole, more socially conservative than Australia, and this is reflected in the respective militaries. Where Australia now unexceptionally has our surface combatants commanded by females, sends women to sea on the *Collins* class submarines
and does not discriminate on sexual orientation, the USN is still grappling with its ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy and whether or not to allow women at sea on submarines. Reading Barnett’s reflections on this issue, I was struck at how anachronistic the arguments sounded—and was reminded very strongly of the similar debate Australia had in the mid 1980s. We have moved on and I expect the USN will also, given time.

Finally, the Appendix alone is a ‘must-have’ for any staff college student or general writer on naval and maritime affairs. I started this review by saying the title for the book was misleading. The title of the Appendix—Treasure Chest of Quotations—is, in contrast, absolutely accurate. Fifty-six pages of short quotations assembled from a wide variety of sources covering all the subjects discussed in the book and then some. It is a treasure that rewards regular revisiting.

_Navy Strategic Culture_ is an idiosyncratic look at the USN and maritime strategy in the 1980s by an author who retired from active service 25 years ago and has viewed the subsequent development of USN strategy from an academic’s stand-point. The author’s closeness to the maritime strategy of the 1980s is both a boon for the rich detail he can bring and a distraction as his personal views sometime cloud his logic. Although the book does not completely satisfy its sub-title’s claim to answer ‘why the navy thinks differently’ it is, overall, a valuable commentary on navies, on maritime thought and on the USN’s view of the world. It is a valuable touchstone for how our navy, and our defence force, conducts itself as a maritime force operating in a maritime environment under a maritime strategy and it should encourage us to think more about our own Navy strategic culture.

_Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War_

Garth Pratten
Cambridge University Press: Port Melbourne, 2009
ISBN: 978-0521-763-455

Reviewed by Colonel Chris Field, Australian Army

Garth Pratten makes a significant contribution to understanding the background, role and conduct of Australian infantry battalion commanding officers (COs) in the Second World War. The book employs a chronological review of Australia’s war efforts, including preparation and training for war, the Mediterranean and North African campaigns, Malaya and Singapore, Papua and New Guinea, and the final amphibious campaigns in Borneo.

Of note, Pratten examines professional military education programs, such as the British Army’s Middle East Tactical School (METS), where the 2nd AIF quickly commenced regeneration of its command structure and where ‘a quarter of all Australian Military Force (AMF) infantry COs, including ten future brigadiers, completed either the company commanders or senior officers courses’. At schools such as METS, future COs were exposed to studies on the latest British tactical doctrine, leadership, discipline, battalion administration, formulation and conduct of unit training programs, tactics and organisation of enemy and allied forces, navigation, delivery
of orders, use of radio equipment, conduct of reconnaissance under tactical conditions, air force cooperation, and combined arms operations in open, urban, mountainous and forested terrain.

Following significant learning and adaptation by the Australian Army in 1939-42, Pratten details the AIF’s ‘increasingly sophisticated approach to warfare’ from early 1943. This increased sophistication included Army’s realisation that ‘COs needed to be specifically trained for their role on the battlefield, just like their men, [and that] it was simply not enough just to rely on the accumulated experience of their military career’. This realisation led to the establishment of the Australian Training Centre (Jungle Warfare) at Canungra in southern Queensland in November 1942 and the relocation and reorganisation of the Regimental Commanders School as the Land Headquarters School in January 1943. Pratten notes that, in many ways, both schools ‘seemed to have been modelled on METS’.

By 1945, Pratten notes that ‘the employment of combined arms was at the heart of the AMF’s operational doctrine’. This required COs to orchestrate dispersed operations in complex environments, supported by significant combined arms, and joint effects including naval gunfire, air support, tanks, field artillery and engineer assault and demolition teams. Pratten concludes with his assessment of ‘a series of common characteristics’ that can be identified when seeking to understand the Australian command style of the Second World War (and current-day ADF members may choose to reflect whether these characteristics remain relevant in a 21st century joint fighting force):

… strong, coercive discipline; leadership based on trust and respect; tactical and administrative proficiency, with a commitment to aggression and offensive action wherever possible; a willingness to lead by personal example; and capable and cohesive command teams with a high level of delegation.

Despite focusing on infantry battalions, Pratten’s work is a ‘must read’ for all serving and aspiring ADF COs, especially as Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War is a story of ‘improvisation, adaptation and evolution … learning from hard-won experience to integrate [people] and technology and to overcome both human enemy and hostile terrain’.
Flyers Far Away: Australian aircrew in Europe during World War 2

Michael Enright
Longueville: Woollahra (NSW), 2009
ISBN: 978-1-920682-40-1

Reviewed by Air Commodore Mark Lax, CSM (Retd)

In recent times, the RAAF’s contribution to the war in Europe in World War 2 has been discovered by a new generation after the Australian War Memorial exhibited ‘Striking by Night’, an audio-visual display of Lancaster ‘G for George’ on a typical mission over Germany in 1943. Unfortunately, the excellent presentation only tells part of the story of Australian airmen and their contribution to the air war in that theatre.

Likewise, there has been a plethora of books on the exploits of Australian airmen in Europe in World War 2. Many are autobiographical, as the veterans realise their mortality and seek to preserve their memories. Most relate the story of the RAAF’s main contribution to that of Bomber Command. Few seriously examine the role of the many Australian airmen and -women who did not serve in formed RAAF squadrons or Bomber Command but with other units within the greater RAF organisation.

Of the more than 185,000 members of the RAAF in World War 2, over 15,000 of them served in Europe. While they wore the dark-blue RAAF uniform, they had no cohesive identity and, as such, their contribution has largely gone unheralded until now. Author and academic Dr Michael Enright has turned his efforts to correcting this deficiency using official records, personal interviews and well-researched historical narrative. Apart from Herrington’s official histories written in the 1950s and 1960s, studies of the subject have been piecemeal. Professor Hank Nelson’s Chased by the Sun, John McCarthy’s Last Call of Empire and Don Charlewood’s No Moon Tonight are perhaps the best of them.

Flyers Far Away makes for an excellent, concise coverage of the broader subject and includes chapters on training in Australia, Coastal Command and Fighter Command operations, the Second Tactical Air Force and operations in the squadrons formed for special operations, transport and electronic warfare. The book, like the war, ends rather suddenly but this does not detract from its presentation, accuracy and content.

The 287-page paperback is slightly smaller than B5 format and includes a bibliography and short index. It is illustrated throughout with over 50 black-and-white photographs, many from veterans quoted in the book. Although well captioned, the size of the photos as printed and the quality of the print unfortunately make them rather difficult—and sometimes impossible—to relate to the captions and text.
If you are looking for a well-written and concise summary of the contribution of Australian airmen and -women to the war against Germany, then this book is a must. Perhaps it will be the last word on the RAAF in Europe in World War 2 but somehow I doubt it. Highly recommended.

Confronting the Chaos: a rogue military historian returns to Afghanistan

S. M. Maloney
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland (US), 2009
ISBN: 978-1-59114-508-0

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Richard Adams, RAN

In Confronting the Chaos, Sean Maloney presents a first-person narrative which is structured, we are told, ‘as a travelogue … [so] the reader might put the pieces together to discern the picture that emerges’ of stabilisation operations in Afghanistan. Yet Confronting the Chaos verges on the inaccessible. The conversational tone is laboured and mismatched to compelling historical analysis. The clutter of acronyms might give the impression of serious scholarship but—unsupported by any glossary—they only costume a work of limited historical substance.

Following an earlier publication, Enduring the Freedom, it is the second title in an unfinished trilogy describing Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. The narrative focuses on Canada’s participation in Afghanistan as part of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2004-05. Describing stabilisation operations, which ‘sit on the conflict spectrum somewhere between peacekeeping or short-term humanitarian aid and counter-insurgency operations’, Maloney focuses on the ‘incredibly important non-combative aspects of the counter-insurgency … indeed, the aspects that will determine whether we will succeed in Afghanistan’.

A perceptible theme of the work is that Canada and her allies are fighting a war where weapons and objectives differ from the orthodox conflicts with which many are familiar. Maloney restates the unremarkable case that holding ground or destroying the entrenched positions of an enemy are of little significance when the insurgent does not adhere to conventional tactics. Enlarging on this theme, Maloney observes that countries collaborating in Afghanistan’s rehabilitation are often distracted by uncooperative political gamesmanship. Maloney’s readers will presumably not be surprised by the foibles of politics and military bureaucracy. However, many will likely be disappointed that the text never rises to careful analysis.

For example, while the shortcomings of established civil-military operational concepts are disparaged, there is no attempt to outline an alternative. The shortcomings as Maloney found them are illustrated and readers are at liberty to ‘discern the picture that emerges’. But the examples are neither well chosen nor expertly developed. Commenting, for example, on the Kabul Multinational Brigade, Maloney criticises ‘French and German national “stovepipes” from ISAF HQ to KMNB HQ’ and observes that ‘the national caveat issue was so bad in the KMNB that it was apparent to me that numerous national force contributions were for show,'
not use'. There is more than the whiff of a cheap shot to this remark and others, such as, ‘I saw a lot of clean uniforms at Camp Warehouse’.

Conspicuously unmeasured, Maloney asserts that ‘experience … has demonstrated to some in ABCA circles that the French cannot be trusted’. His contention that the French ‘will blow operations if their politicians deem it necessary to embarrass the Americans and British’, underlines tabloid hearsay, which contributes little to the serious historical record.

With similar imprudence, Maloney observes the importance of detainee policy in the multinational stabilisation arena. Yet he fails to develop a mature and thoughtful critique. Instead, the fiasco which was Abu Ghraib is belittled as a ‘fraternity prank’. The debate which followed this moral debacle illuminated much about the challenges of modern war and the devilish complexity of counter-insurgency operations. Yet Maloney discounts debate as the ‘high pitched scream’ of ‘wound-up’ bureaucrats concerned with nothing except ‘reducing potential liability’.

Discussion of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar is engaging and cohesive. Yet this revealing discussion cannot redeem an ineffectual text.

Confronting the Chaos makes little contribution to the historical record. References—overly based on a ‘confidential interview’ or ‘in camera discussion’—fail to give credence to flimsy argument and impolitic opinion. When Maloney himself intrudes upon the narrative, his swagger distracts the reader from the contribution of service personnel in Afghanistan. This is not the historical witness of an objective observer. The author has an immodest role in his own thriller, a work which falls shy of the standards we are entitled to expect of an author who cites his credentials as ‘associate professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada’ and ‘Historical Advisor to the Canadian Army’s Chief of the Land Staff’.

Australian Peacekeeping – sixty years in the field

D. Horner, Peter Londey & Jean Bou (eds.)
Cambridge University Press: Port Melbourne, 2009
ISBN: 978-0521-51606-8

Reviewed by Dr Dominic Katter

It was the sometime military artist George Gittoes who relevantly stated: ‘… like all Australians I have heard the legends of ANZAC since I was a child …. [Australian peacekeepers] deserve to take their place in this respected tradition’.

This book is a compilation of 17 individual essays, based on papers presented at a 2007 conference commemorating 60 years of Australian peacekeeping. The essays focus on Australian peacekeeping through four perspectives: history, the agencies involved, personal experiences and the future. A range of topics are addressed, including the difficulties of
managing a multi-national command, operating in former conflict zones, the role of non-government organisations in peacekeeping and Australia’s developing role as a regional ‘watchdog’ of sorts.

The authors traverse a wide array of distinguished backgrounds. Each is able to provide a unique vantage of Australian peacekeeping, based on their respective knowledge and experience in numerous peacekeeping missions. The varying perspectives provide a practical compilation that reinforces this continuing Australian contribution to global relations.

This collection of works is an informative source for those seeking to discover a considerable, yet sometimes diminished element of Australia’s international relations. The book is a tangible recognition to those Australians that ‘were not fighting the nation’s wars; they were trying to sort out someone else’s’.

Beersheba: a journey through Australia’s forgotten war

Paul Daley
Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 2009

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

The sub-title is quite accurate, as this is Paul Daley’s journey through the locations of the ‘forgotten war’ by the Australian Light Horse from 1915-18—’forgotten’ in the sense that the overwhelming recent emphasis has been on Gallipoli and the Western Front. Today’s organised, ever-growing gatherings at sites and tours of battlefields tend to ignore the Light Horse’s activities in Egypt and Palestine, although that might partly be due to the security situation in those countries.

Paul Daley makes clear that he is pursuing a long-time interest in the Light Horse campaigns, one that began when he was a young journalist sent to interview a 1914-18 veteran of a desert battle that Daley had never heard of. So what we have here is an account of Daley’s travels though the area, his visits to relevant sites and descriptions of how they appear today, with information from 1915-18. There are accounts of the actions from official records, complemented by diary entries, some of which have not been published before, and personal photos, again, some not published before.

Daley makes it clear that this is not a military history but an account of his travels through the area. It includes the focus on Beersheba by certain groups who saw the well-known ‘charge of the Light Brigade’ as an act of God to bring about the creation of the State of Israel. This is balanced by the opinion of several Israeli commentators that the charge had no effect, in either myth or reality, on the subsequent creation of Israel in 1948.
Daley devotes one-quarter of the book, seven chapters in all, to the events at Surafend, where Australian and New Zealand soldiers killed a number of male villagers. The killing was in retaliation for the murder of a soldier during a robbery in the New Zealand camp, exacerbated by the perceived British policy of appeasement towards the Arabs, which was widely resented by many Australians and New Zealanders. Allenby reportedly was infuriated by the incident and, although he berated the paraded ‘colonials’, he supposedly did not linger for fear of being humiliated by the hardened veterans who had a poor opinion of British command and staff performance. Whether readers will be as obsessed as Daley with Surafend will be a matter of personal interest.

Overall, this is a genuine effort to remind Australians of the Light Horse campaigns, with useful information about local conditions for anyone interested in following Daley’s example. My only criticism, apart from the over-emphasis on Surafend, is that the maps could have benefited from more detail, as many places mentioned are not included in those provided.

Mont St Quentin: a soldier’s battle

R.S. Billett
Rosenberg: Kenthurst (NSW), 2009

Reviewed by Ian Johnstone

Although there is a diorama of it in the Australian War Memorial, the battle of Mont St Quentin (France)—from 31 August to 5 September 1918—is largely unknown to most Australians, notwithstanding that eight Australians were awarded the Victoria Cross, six on the one day. Strategically, the battle is notable for the part played by General Sir John Monash and for its speed and masterfully-planned manoeuvres, managed without tanks or cohesive artillery support.

Les Carlyon has written that

Anzac Cove on Gallipoli has atmospherics [and is part of Australian folklore and a place for pilgrimages]…. Mt St Quentin isn’t like that. It doesn’t have the atmospherics: a low hill rises out of the plain; the village, church and memorial to the 2nd Division lie near the summit, from where you look down on Peronne and the tree-lined river. Nor does Mt St Quentin have a place in our folklore; it is hardly spoken of. There is no sense to these things. The Great War, 2006, p. 694.

In the official history, C.E.W. Bean noted that ‘the capture of Mt St Quentin is held by many Australian soldiers to be the most brilliant achievement of the AIF’ (Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. VI, p. 873), while General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Commander of the British Fourth Army, wrote a few days after the battle:

The capture of Mont St Quentin by the Second Division is a feat of arms worthy of the highest praise …. I am filled with admiration at the gallantry and surpassing daring of the Second Division in winning this important fortress and I congratulate them with all my heart (Billett, pp. 16-7).
There were some 20,000 Australian soldiers in the battle—35 battalions, including units raised in NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia—who suffered more than 3,000 casualties. I recall standing in the school yard at Villers-Brettoneux in 1993 and being intrigued by the famous sign on a building, ‘Noublions jamais l’Australiens’ (We will never forget the Australians). We are still genuinely honoured there—and in Peronne and nearby—for liberating the local French inhabitants from the Germans. On that day, I was fortunate to be standing next to Bernard Legouillier, a retired schoolteacher and trustee of the World War I museum in Peronne, which is mentioned by Billett.

Billett is both a scholar and a soldier, having served with the Royal Marines and Australian SAS. His understanding of battle from a soldier’s perspective is well presented. However, he could have improved the text with more details of the actions leading to the awards of the Victoria Cross, as well as more accurate and comprehensive casualty figures.

He also could have written in a more interesting style. As I read Billett’s book, I recalled Peter Fitzsimons saying that after drafting his history of Kokoda, he took advice from an American sports writer and rewrote his book as an exciting story in everyday language, which proved a best seller. Billett’s story seldom develops any pace, as it is often interrupted by deflatingly-flat throat clearers like ‘now we return to Guard’s notes’ and ‘now back to the main advance’.

Billett has broken new ground in giving us a most detailed account of the progress of the units in the battle but the story is at times confused. This is partly because the two maps—inside the front cover with the position on 31 August and inside the back cover with the position on 1 September—do not show many of the places referred to in the text. In summary, I was somewhat disappointed that Billett’s telling is more about the detail of troop movements than what could have been an engaging, exciting and inspiring epic of an iconic Australian victory.

**A Place to Remember: a history of the Shrine of Remembrance**

Bruce Scates  
Cambridge University Press: Port Melbourne, 2009  

Reviewed by Air Commodore Mark Lax, CSM (Retd)

Few visitors to Melbourne’s Domain fail to be impressed with the imposing edifice of the Shrine of Remembrance, reputed to be at one time the largest granite structure in the world. Officially opened in October 1934 in front of a crowd of over 300,000 onlookers, it was the largest of the state war memorials to be built in Australia and the last.

Victoria sent 114,000 enlistees to the Great War and 19,000 never returned. With such loss, it is not surprising that Victorians wished to create a place to honour the war dead and remember their sacrifice. The winning design drew heavily on ancient Greek architecture and conjured
up the ‘classic temple tomb of Halicarnassus’, its impact according to one writer was ‘solemn, reposeful and majestic’. The concept was to cost no more than £250,000, much of which came from public subscription but, like all such endeavours, it was not without controversy.

There were many detractors against a shrine, a situation played upon by the popular press. So a public plebiscite was held and the overwhelming response was for a hospital to be built; yet other suggestions included an orphanage, a carillon, a square or a cenotaph. The impasse was eventually broken by General Sir John Monash’s fervent support for a shrine, together with the impassioned pleas from members of Legacy who argued it was for the fallen, not the living.

Once the matter was decided, the book next charts the story from the selection of the winning design by architects Montford, Hudson and Wardrop through the building, dedication and landscaping of the ‘city block’ upon which the Shrine now sits. World War 2 posed the next dilemma for the Shrine trustees—how best to commemorate another war that, as much as the Great War, consumed Australia and Australians. Extension of the existing rather than duplication was the agreed solution.

The book was commissioned in 2009 by the trustees of the Shrine to commemorate its 75th anniversary, with all royalties from sales going to support the Shrine maintenance program. A Place to Remember comprehensively covers the concept, designs, location and function of the Shrine and, despite what might seem to some a dry subject, is well researched, well written and lavishly illustrated, making this an interesting if sometimes humorous read.

That almost every country town has a memorial of some description is indicative to how much an impact the Great War had, so it is not surprising Melburnians likewise sought to remember the fallen. Following such scholarly works on the subject of memorials and changing Australian attitudes to them as Ken Inglis’ Sacred Places, this book is as much about human interaction as it is about a stone structure. The book concludes by recognising the Shrine now serves three roles—commemoration, tourism and outreach, the latter being the basis for the publication. One veteran is quoted in the book as saying ‘The Shrine has changed for me from being a “tombstone” to being a vibrant, interesting, educational experience’. His words sum up the structure and intent of this work.

This 307-page hardback, coffee-table style book is beautifully presented and worthy of readers who wish to study not only the building’s relevance to the community but to those keen to understand the social aspects of how Australia remembers its fallen. Included are extensive notes, bibliography and index. Congratulations to Professor Bruce Scates and Monash University for donating their time in producing this excellent and sometimes moving publication—a remarkable book covering a remarkable story. Highly recommended.
The Path of Infinite Sorrow – the Japanese on the Kokoda Track

Craig Collie and Hajime Marutani
Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 2009

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

This book actually covers more than Kokoda. It has sections on Japanese history from 1868, Japan’s entry into World War 2, the capture of Guam and Rabaul, the campaigns for Kokoda, Milne Bay, Buna-Gona and Sanananda, and post-war Japan. There is much information from the Japanese side, from official documents, published memoirs and the recollections of a few survivors, with particular details of the effects of starvation and disease (although there is no examination of why this eventuated).

The over-riding and disappointing aspect of this book is the apparent endorsement by the authors—an Australian television producer and a Japanese translator—of the mass murders, killings and brutality perpetrated by the Japanese in some parts of the campaigns, and the complete absence of reference to them in others.

The massacres at Tol on New Britain of members of the Rabaul defence force are written off as ‘cold-blooded perhaps but very pragmatic’. The massacre by bayoneting of dozens of bound prisoners is admitted ‘as an act of barbarity’ but then there is the strange suggestion that the onset of malaria among the Japanese had something to do with the killings..!

Further, allegations of Chinese women captured in Rabaul being raped are dismissed because some Chinese women had been prostitutes in Rabaul before the war. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Owen, a veteran of Rabaul and a witness to the murders at Tol, was killed in action at Kokoda. This is insultingly described as ‘[Owen], who had kept his head down at Tol, wasn’t smart enough to do the same at Kokoda’.

The description of Japanese activities at Milne Bay omits mention of the numerous atrocities committed against Australians and local people, of which there is ample evidence. The mass killings of military personnel and civilians on the north coast of New Guinea are admitted but accounts of the events are relegated to ‘circumstantial evidence’ and one Japanese eye witness who spoke about the killings was ‘under interrogation so his sincerity is open to question’. We are also informed that ‘it would be naive to imagine that events of this nature would not happen in the course of a long and difficult military campaign’.

In summary, a further example of the Japanese refusal to acknowledge the atrocities and brutality perpetrated by Japan in World War 2.

Disclosure: the reviewer’s own books include titles on Kokoda, Buna-Gona, the Bismarck Sea battle and the air campaigns against Rabaul, Wewak and Hollandia.
Keep the Men Alive: Australian POW doctors in Japanese captivity

Rosalind Hearder  
Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 2009  

Reviewed by Robert S. Bolia, Office of Naval Research Global, Tokyo

Military history is devoted almost exclusively to the story of battles and campaigns in which prisoners of war figure only as a statistic, offered alongside the number of killed and wounded as a measure of the success or failure of an operation. There are exceptions, of course—dozens of volumes have been written about the horrors of Andersonville Prison in the American Civil War and occasional memoirs are published highlighting the abusive treatment of POWs, especially at the hands of the Japanese. But by and large the prisoner’s tale is seldom told.

Lesser known yet is the story of medical doctors taken prisoner in war, even in Australia, where one of the few widely-recognised heroes of the Second World War was Lieutenant Colonel Sir Edward ‘Weary’ Dunlop, an Australian Army surgeon celebrated for his compassion and leadership while a prisoner of the Japanese. Well, this used to be the case. Rosalind Hearder has made a significant effort to promote awareness of the heroic role of POW doctors in her book, Keep the Men Alive: Australian POW doctors in Japanese captivity.

Based on more than two dozen of the authors’ own interviews with survivors and their families, as well as diaries, memoirs and service records of dozens more, Hearder has given us the fascinating story of the Australian POWs held prisoner by the Japanese in a volume that is both thoroughly researched and well written. An astonishing one-third of all Australian doctors served in the Australian forces during the war. The author tells us who they were, where they were from and what motivated them to serve their country. She also focuses on the training they received, not only at medical school but in their pre-war practice. Although the ailments they saw in the jungle were nothing like what they had experienced in Australia, the practice of ‘outback medicine’ had left them with an adaptability that would serve them well in the POW camps.

The majority of the 22,000 held in Japanese captivity were captured in the first few months of the Pacific War—14,972 were taken prisoner at Singapore, Java, Timor and Ambo—and hence spent nearly four years in captivity. This would have been trying at any time and place in history but the Japanese soldiers and conscripted Koreans responsible for guarding the camps were often spectacularly brutal; the fact that nearly two-thirds of those imprisoned survived was due in no small part to the medical treatment given by the POW doctors.

The doctors had to learn most of their job as they went along. Although all of them would have been trained in clinical and surgical practice, most of the ailments they saw in their day-to-day life in the camps—malaria, beriberi, yellow fever, dysentery—were completely
foreign to them. Many of them found the fact that their medical training was of so little use extremely frustrating. They learned what they could from the Dutch doctors, who were trained in tropical medicine and understood the medicinal value of local herbs, as well as from old medical texts that they hid from their captors. But much of their practice was based on trial and error. Over time they learned about the effects of diet in preventing and curing diseases, although controlled medical experimentation in such an environment was impossible and many men died.

Much of the book is about relationships: with the men, with the combatant officers, with American, British, Dutch and Japanese doctors but, most importantly, the relationship between doctors and their Japanese captors. It was the responsibility of the POW doctors to decide who was fit to work and who wasn’t. If the Japanese didn’t feel they had enough laborers, conflict between the doctor and his captors often ensued. The fact that the doctors routinely stood up for their men, even when it occasioned a beating, improved morale and left a long-lasting impression.

In addition to describing the role and influence of the POW doctors, Hearder also devotes space in the book to exploding the commonly-held misperceptions of Singapore’s Changi prison and ‘Weary’ Dunlop as ultimate exemplars. She argues that Changi was one of the most hygienic and least brutal of the Japanese POW camps at which Australian prisoners might find themselves and repeatedly attempts to shift the focus from Changi and the Burma-Thai railway camps in order to examine the experience of POWs throughout Southeast Asia and on the Japanese home islands. Similarly, she analyses the wartime activities of Dunlop in the context of the other 105 Australian POW doctors and concludes that he was no more heroic than any of them; he simply achieved greater popularity due to such factors as his pre-war status as a noted rugby player and the publication of his memoirs.

The book winds up with a discussion of the aftermath of the war: participation by Australian doctors in war crimes trials, the effects of the war on their medical careers and the incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder in doctors relative to other POWs.

Although Keep the Men Alive is generally well written, it is not perfect. Hearder’s use of last names only for doctors once they have been introduced becomes confusing, making it difficult to connect the individual she is talking about at the time with someone who has been previously referenced. In a book with three or four principal characters, this would be acceptable but she offers anecdotes from dozens of doctors. Obviously this is a small matter and, on the whole, the book is an informative and engaging read, as well as a moving tribute to a group of heroes who are seldom accorded the recognition they deserve.
GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The Australian Defence Force Journal seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters, such as strategic studies, security and international relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the Journal does not pay for articles but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best in each issue.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without the use of templates or paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable (and contributors should view previous issues for style). Length should be between 3500 and 5000 words. Please ‘spell check’ the document with Australian English before sending.

Articles should contain endnotes, bibliography and brief biographical details of the author.

Endnotes


References or bibliography


Tables, maps and photographs are acceptable but must be of high enough quality to reproduce in high resolution. Photographs must be at least 300 ppi in TIF format and obviously pertinent to the article.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by an independent referee with some knowledge of the subject. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and, if accepted, will be published in the next Journal. Be advised, it may take quite a while from submission to print.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Editor via email at: publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Authors accept the Editor may make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author, however, the theme or intent of the article will not be changed.
Thoughts on Joint Professional Military Education
Rear Admiral James Goldrick, AM, CSC, RAN

Naval History and Joint Professional Military Education: a personal view
Dr John Reeve, University of New South Wales, ADFA

Professional Mastery in the Joint Environment: Air Force and joint professional military education
Wing Commander Mark Hinchcliffe, RAAF

Myth-busting the Joint Professional Military Education Strategy
Lieutenant Colonel Richard King, Australian Army

Reflections on Defence and Education
Professor David Lovell, University of New South Wales, ADFA

Joint Professional Military Education in the ADF: a junior naval officer’s perspective
Lieutenant Bernard Dobson, RAN

PowerPoint Does Not Become Us: in search of a new teaching method in junior officer education
Captain Andrew Hastie, Australian Army

It’s Time for an ADF Joint Warfare Studies Centre
Dr Aaron P. Jackson, ADF Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre

China’s National Defense University: a case study
Loro Horta, Nanyang Technology University, Singapore

Beyond Joint: professional military education for the 21st century
Dr Kate Utting, King’s College, London

Let Us Dare
Admiral James Stavridis, United States Navy