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THIS is both the easiest "Comment" I have had to write in the three years' life of the Defence Force Journal, and the most difficult.

I leave for Japan and a new job with mixed feelings. I feel regret, for this has been a most satisfying and rewarding task; sorrow, for I have to say goodbye to many friends, some of whom I know only through the written word or as a voice at the other end of a telephone. I would like to express my gratitude to a host of people who have helped me. To name names would take up too much space, and there would be the danger of missing someone out. I would like to thank the members of the Board of Management, past and present, who have helped fight my battles; the Public Relations Staff and, before them, the staff of the Directorate of Personnel Support — Army, who have looked after my administrative needs; the ladies and gentlemen of Policy Co-ordination Division who have taken phone messages, and generally been there when I needed help; the ladies of the typing pools in Buildings C and G; the fine artists of the Army Audio Visual Unit; the printers, who have done miracles with my paste-ups; the authors, reviewers, letter-writers and readers. I hope you feel it has all been worthwhile and will continue to support my successor.

I have also felt frustration at my inability to improve and expand the Journal as I should have liked; anger at the problems of distribution and the indifference of some authorities to what is, after all, their own free house journal. I cannot for the life of me see why anyone in the Defence Community should feel that there is nothing within these pages which is of interest to them. One might ask what they are doing in such a community?

I am delighted that we are able to carry out at least one more of your suggestions in the questionnaire — that of an individual cover for easy recognition of each issue.

The first of three review articles on the Report of the Regular Officer Development Committee is included at page 52. As one correspondent has said, it is "unquestionably the most innovative manpower planning initiative, in this manpower intensive occupation of ours since heaven knows when". He goes on to say that, "It would be tragic if it became just another set of volumes, gathering dust in unit libraries". Amen to that. May I suggest you read it, regular, officer or not; or from whatever service. There is something of interest in it for you.

I could never hope to compete with the glamorous Ita Buttrose of The Australian Women's Weekly in looks or charm, but I felt some of you might like to see just what the dictatorial ogre, who has been putting this Journal together for three years, looks like. It also solves the problem of what to do with a photograph, taken at the February Symposium at the University of New England, which my family wants me to burn.

(Photograph: Jane Palmer)
AUSTRALIA'S WARTIME SECURITY SERVICE

Without meaning to sound like the outraged author railing at an editor's tampering with his literary masterpiece, I would like to draw attention to a liberty taken with my article on war-time security (DFJ, May/June 1979) which must have left readers wondering. The copy I submitted to the Defence Force Journal ended with the sentence, "Although Justice Hope commented critically on the reliance of ASIO in its early years on persons with experience in military intelligence for a large part of its staff, this was a development which was hardly surprising in view of the domination of Australia's war-time security service by Army personnel." For some reason, and without my knowledge, this sentence was deleted during editing and omitted from the piece as it appeared in published form. Readers of the article may be excused for wondering exactly which pattern I was referring to as having been set, although from the foregoing I hope the point I was seeking to make is clear. In making the point, however, I did not mean to ignore the fact that Mr Justice (later Sir Geoffrey) Reed was head of ASIO from that Organisation's inception in March 1949 until June 1950, when he was succeeded by Colonel (later Brigadier Sir Charles) Spry. That was an omission on my part.

Kambah, ACT. C.D. Coulthard-Clark

My apologies to the author. The cut was necessary owing to lack of space. The decision had to be made quickly as the copy had to catch the post. I did not realise at the time the full significance of the final sentence—Editor.

THE EQUITY OF CONSCRIPTION

Captain Nicholson's article "The Equity of Conscription" (DFJ No. 15 March/April 1979) covered an interesting subject not often debated in military circles. However, I thought that his approach was superficial in some respects, and from the thrust of his article it would have been more appropriately entitled "The Economics of an All Volunteer versus a Conscript Army in Peace".

In arguing that conscription is inequitable, Captain Nicholson quoted two examples — Australian conscription between 1964 and 1972, and the Selective Service System in the USA during, I assume, roughly the same period. Both are un-representative I suggest, and the Australian example particularly so. Conscription in that instance was introduced to meet a finite manpower requirement that could not be met by voluntary enlistment and where the conscriptee was selected by ballot. The previous Australian National Service Scheme 1951-59 where all 18 year old males were conscripted is a more representative example.

Conscription has generally been reluctantly introduced in both the UK and Australia in time of war or of a perceived threat, and never for lengthy periods in a real sense. Without going into other examples of conscription at greater length, ie. the Continental mass conscript armies of the 19th and early 20th centuries and the more recent Israeli experience, I think that it is fair to say that the relative equity or inequity of conscription depends on how it is applied. Most forms of conscription may be inequitable, but then so are wars which are basically fought by the younger generation.

As part of this argument concerning the economic desirability, ie. cost effectiveness, of the volunteer over the conscript, Captain Nicholson goes on to state that voluntary enlistments can best be increased by improving pay and conditions (in the Regular Army). Although this would appear to be axiomatic, I have some reservations about this statement. Firstly, there is a limit to pay and conditions for servicemen and servicewomen other than the ability of the exchequer to pay. Public opinion would not support attractive increases in our emoluments above community norms. Therefore it is only reasonable to expect that military salaries will reflect the going rate at best plus service loading. Secondly, the military life is not attractive to the majority of the population and even with extravagant increases pay and conditions are unlikely to produce volunteers beyond a certain limit. While applications for enlistment increase to some extent in times of high unemployment and economical difficulty, there is still no flood of voluntary enlistees during such periods. It seems reasonable to deduce that in the Australian context...
conscription, regardless of whether it is equitable or cost effective or not, is sometimes necessary to meet manpower requirements.

I rest my case.

HQ 11 FF Gp, Townsville, L.R. Summers, Qld.

THE AUTHOR REPLIES

Major Summer's comments are made, I believe, in ignorance of one of the basic points my article was trying to make. It was not my intention to suggest that conscription is indefensible under any circumstance. Clearly, questions of economic efficiency or equity must be relegated when perceived or actual threat to national security is evident.

However, I cannot accept that conscription "is sometimes necessary to meet manpower requirements", and it is against this type of argument that my paper was principally concerned.

My example of the Australian experience between 1964 and 1972 was merely intended to indicate the narrowness of the burden sharing. A comparison of any other conscription model, including the Australian National Service Scheme 1951-59, would clearly indicate that conscripts still form a very small percentage of the total population. Nevertheless, in view of the government's defence policies at the time I have not suggested that conscription was unwarranted.

Major Summers implicitly suggests that the military forces are somehow different and not subject to the usual operations of market forces for labour. What is inherently different about military labour? We do not suggest, for example, that the police forces should be increased by involuntary conscription; but rather we allow supply and demand to determine the relative wage rate and hence the level of employment. In peace time I can see no valid reason for treating the military in a different manner. If the government wants a military force of a given number, it should be prepared to pay them their free market worth, rather than create distortions which are both inequitable and inefficient.

In any case, the budgetary costs of an all-volunteer force are conceivably less than the real costs apparent under conscription, and surely this fact alone must provide strong support for the voluntary force argument.

Russell Offices, Canberra, ACT

J.R. Nicholson
Captain
THE controversy over coastal surveillance is relatively quiet in Australia at present whilst the Department of Transport is conducting a two-year data-gathering programme aimed at establishing the extent and nature of the surveillance problem. Components of this programme, which is co-ordinated on a routine basis by the Department of Transport's Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre in Canberra, are:

- daily air patrols of the northern coastal area between Geraldton and Cairns, using civilian aircraft under charter to the Department of Transport;
- the extension of aerial surveillance by RAAF Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft to cover the 200 nautical mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) and other special requirements;
- the continuation of existing surveillance by Tracker aircraft of the approaches to Darwin, primarily to detect refugee boats;
- three radar-equipped civil aircraft on full time charter to the Bureau of Customs;
- nine RAN patrol boats and three specialized Customs launches, mainly for enforcement tasks; and
- the improvement of intelligence collection and voluntary reporting systems.

This interim system, which was introduced during the latter half of 1978, has its origins in the report by the Government Members' Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee's Report on Surveillance and Reaction and the recommendations of a small Committee of Permanent Heads. The upgrading of status quo arrangements for surveillance was preferred, rather than one of the two possible alternatives — the establishment of a separate coastguard, or the allocation of primary responsibility to the Defence Force.

In earlier months of 1978, there was some debate over the extent to which the Defence Force should be involved in surveillance. Whilst the official line was to limit defence involvement, mainly because diminution of resources for the primary role of external defence could result, some newspapers, notably The Herald and The Australian, strongly supported coastal surveillance becoming primarily the responsibility of the Defence Force. The Australian put its view succinctly in one editorial:

"Coastal surveillance must be an integral part of our defence system and must be under the control of the Defence Department or closely allied to it."

The controversy over coastal surveillance, and the level of defence responsibility, will probably surface again in 1980, when the time comes to review the present interim arrangements. Meanwhile, dust should not be...
allowed to settle on the issue. Coastal surveillance, particularly that required to meet civil requirements, is a comparatively new role for the Australian Defence Force, but it seems likely that it will grow significantly in the years ahead, especially as a result of the continuing Vietnamese refugee situation, the proclamation of the 200-mile AFZ, and resources competition generally.

Accepting that the present level of Defence Force involvement in coastal surveillance is relatively low level, this article reviews some of the arguments for and against a higher level of involvement, without necessarily the assumption of full responsibility. The conclusion is reached that the Defence Force could have much to gain from greater involvement, particularly through the routine experience of joint operations entailed and the better knowledge gained of the Australian operational environment. Trends in Australian defence policy evident in recent years make these factors increasingly more important.

Some Background Issues

An underlying consideration with this article is that the coastal surveillance debate has become clouded with some transient, almost emotive, issues which tend to obscure the basic aim — the defence of Australia. Estimates of the resource requirements for a high level of surveillance and reaction in the 200-mile AFZ provide classic examples of the trees which hide the wood of defence. Fertile growth in this regard is stimulated by vested commercial interests pushing some particular hardware item of dubious surveillance value. A hardware oriented, overly expensive dead-end is easily reached in these circumstances, and it is little wonder that the Defence Force is reluctant to accept a higher level of involvement.

This article is concerned with peacetime surveillance in the broadest terms. A relevant definition is that suggested by a former senior RAN officer, ie.,

"Surveillance . . . may be defined as the systematic observation of the sea and air space surrounding the Australian coastline and its island territories to determine the extent, nature and purpose of ship and aircraft movements possibly prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of Australia."4

Although this definition limits surveillance to the "observation of sea and air space", surveillance of land space, particularly in the more remote areas, must be seen as an equally important, interdependent requirement. Some land activities in the remote areas of the continent, particularly near the coastline, could also be prejudicial to the "peace, good order and security of Australia", as well as undetectable by air or sea surveillance. Potentially, coastal surveillance is a task for all three Australian Services.

A distinction can readily be drawn between civil and defence (or military) surveillance but the tools of trade for both seem essentially similar when applied to the remote coastal areas of Australia. Organization and command and control principles are identical, and, with the limited resources available, there can be no question of a duplication of effort. Far enough that the subsequent responses required to each type of surveillance may be different. A more meaningful distinction would appear to be between surveillance and response (or reaction) rather than between civil and defence surveillance. Even if defence surveillance units detect some suspicious activity, this does not necessarily mean that they also assume the enforcement role in response to such a detection.

Australia is a thinly populated continent with a long, and in some places, very lonely coastline, although sometimes it can be surprising to find out just what is happening. Surveillance in the more remote areas means simply knowing what is going on, as well as something about the environment of such areas. This seems a vital defence issue and an essential ingredient of any defence policy based on deterrence.

It is all too easy to be swept away with hardware considerations (eg. one hundred percent effective coastal surveillance is said to require 300 Orions at a total cost of $3,900 millions)5, and lose sight of some basic organizational and information-gathering considerations. If the organization is right, if the intelligence is being collected and appreciated, then the problem is fully understood and the equipment required logically follows. This approach is thus the complete opposite of that taken by one Australian defence journal which advocated that —
"The need in the first instance is basically for more patrol craft and more aircraft to meet the minimum demands of a coastal surveillance. The planning for bases and command structure and the integration of any form of lesser inshore force into a defence plan can come later — during the lead time required for the production of the basic tools."6

Arguments Against Greater Defence Involvement

There are two major arguments against the Australian Defence Force assuming a greater responsibility for coastal surveillance. First is the one that in peacetime, coastal surveillance is primarily carried out to meet civil requirements and hence should not be seen as a valid defence responsibility. The enforcement of civil law is the responsibility of civil authorities.

Notwithstanding this doctrinaire approach to the allocation of functions, the decision point in deciding what is a valid defence force function, and what is not, is becoming an increasingly blurred one. In the realms of theory, military sociologists speak of defence force assuming a ‘constabulary role’, not in the sense that this term initially suggests of a civil police function, but rather as regards exercising control of a particular situation to prevent or inhibit the outbreak of an actual shooting war.7 There is a shift in the military mission towards the increased importance of deterrence as a more important part of the military objective than the actual fighting. In the Australian context, a vigilantly patrolled coastline, both onshore as well as the sea approaches, could well constitute better deterrence than a small, high technology defence force with sophisticated equipment most relevant to open warfare on a relatively large scale. Is it too far out to suggest that the requirement for coastal surveillance could be the origins of a non-scenario oriented, meaningful national military strategy?

Archetype defence forces, as far as Australia is concerned (notably the United Kingdom and the United States), are increasingly involving their military forces in what traditionally would be seen as civilian functions. The heavy involvement of UK forces in Northern Ireland and the Royal Navy’s acquisition of the Island class patrol vessels, specifically for off-shore resource protection, provide striking examples. The existence of the US Coastguard clouds the situation somewhat, as far as the US is concerned, but then such a sophisticated paramilitary force could only be afforded by a highly developed rich nation.

The second major argument against a higher level of defence involvement in coast surveillance is the view that the defence force could only assume a greater role in surveillance at the expense of the primary role of external defence. A greater surveillance role would divert resources, financial, manpower and material, away from the primary raison d’etre of a defence force. This view, as far as the RAN is concerned, has been put in the following terms — "There are mixed feelings within the Services, with the younger officers within the Navy most excited about the prospect of a larger number of junior command slots. Wiser heads however worry firstly that Melbourne replacement plans may be affected and secondly that the relatively unsophisticated patrol boat task might interfere with the more balanced higher technology development of the younger officers.8"

On the manpower side of the argument, the question to consider is how personnel will be employed if they are not employed on the unsophisticated task of coastal surveillance. The employment to consider is the likely alternative and not the optimal. In the case of a Naval officer, if he is not employed at sea in a surveillance vessel, albeit a relatively unsophisticated patrol boat, he may well be ashore in an uninspiring shore posting, not at all demanding of his higher technology skills. The emerging problem of placing Principal Warfare Officer trained Seaman officers in relevant billets at sea is a telling manifestation of this argument.

The view that coastal surveillance could divert financial resources away from more legitimate defence activities shows some lack of confidence in the principles of functional budgeting, now the basis of the Australian Government’s financial management. With a functional budget, resources are allocated in accordance with desired output or function rather than as inputs. In a simple example, a bag of cement is budgeted for as part of the cost of the road or building being built rather than as a material input. Output (or objective) is the
basis for expenditure rather than the inputs. If coastal surveillance is a desired government objective, then resources will be allocated to that objective, according to its priority relative to other government objectives, and regardless of which department holds the primary responsibility. If other functions suffer as a result, then this can only mean that they were not accorded the same priority in the political decision-making process. These principles apply whether the total allocation of resources to the defence sector or the allocation of resources within the defence sector is being considered.

Arguments for Greater Defence Involvement

So far this article has identified arguments against those which are normally used to justify some limitation of defence force participation in routine peacetime coastal surveillance. There are however, good positive reasons to support a case for greater defence involvement. There is excellent experience to be gained by personnel of all three Services conducting routine peacetime operations in the wide range of operational environments available, remote from the South-East corner of the continent. The task could be a joint operation, demanding of command and control arrangements, and rather more typical of the likely defence requirement than the periodic major joint exercises which suffer so much from limitations of time and area. Possibly more importantly however, so far as the Australian public is concerned, a coastal surveillance role would allow some of the Defence Force to be visible in a task which must be seen as relevant and useful.

Given that the major task of the Australian Defence Force is now the defence of continental Australia, the question must be asked whether the Force knows enough about its likely operational areas. Vast stretches of coastline remain poorly charted and little known, even to the new generation of minor war vessel experienced naval officers who possess most local knowledge of the North and North-West. Ashore, even though superficially adequate maps, based on aerial photography and cursory traverses are available, real terrain knowledge is sketchy — where are the helicopter landing pads? is this area passable to a tracked vehicle? a four-wheel drive vehicle? where are the water or gravel sources? Such questions lack answers for large parts of Australia, although good local knowledge would be so vital to military operations in those areas. Associated with this local knowledge is the confidence that military equipment has been tested and proven in the likely environments in which it will be used. The acquisition of a major exercise area in the north-west will help to alleviate the potential problems somewhat, but even with that area supplementing Shoalwater Bay in the east, this still only means that experience is being gained in two limited areas, not necessarily typical of the northern half of the continent.

The argument against more frequent remote area operations is usually based on the line that there is nothing there, so why should an enemy go there? If he does, then let him wither on the vine. Unfortunately the history of war is well documented with examples of victories arising from enemies appearing where they were least expected.

Finally in this section some thought should be given to what happens if the Defence Force does not assume a greater share of the coastal surveillance burden. As the task increases, more government resources will be allocated to it with other departments utilising or acquiring ships and aircraft, which by nature of their peacetime role, should also have some capability of playing a part in the defence of Australia in a less peaceful situation. A para-military organization (or even worse, organizations) will eventually emerge. In the longer-term, none of these developments will be in the best interests of defence efficiency or economy.

A Possible Defence Surveillance Organisation

The Government Members' Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, mentioned earlier, recommended that “there should be a Surveillance Command established at Darwin under the command of the senior Service officer with the regional operations centre being integrated into that command”.

The concept developed in this article goes one step further and suggests that coastal surveillance should be the responsibility of several joint headquarters established across the north of Australia, each responsible for approximately one thousand miles of coast, with an area of operations including the adjacent AFZ and the
relevant hinterland. This organization would embrace northern Australia from say, Cairns in the east to Carnarvon in the west. Possibly three separate commands would be required — North-East, North and North-West Australia. The present Services' command structure would cover southern Australia and offshore areas beyond the AFZ in northern waters.

The Commander of each northern command would be an officer of any Service, probably at the one-star level, responsible direct to the Chief of Defence Force Staff in Canberra. His staff would include the appropriately qualified officers to enable him to exercise operational command of all assigned forces, land, sea and air. Separate component commanders would not be required.

The command organization of the Australian Defence Force envisaged would be broadly similar to that of the United States with unified commands (i.e., the three joint commands in the north of Australia) and the present Single Service (or specified) commands (e.g., Army Logistics Command, RAAF Operational Command and the RAN's Fleet Command). The responsibilities of the unified commands would not be limited to just surveillance activities but would include full responsibility for defence activities in their regions, with special attention being paid to regional defence planning, an activity which receives all too little attention at present.10

There are two good reasons for the unified commands being responsible direct to the Chief of Defence Force Staff, without any intermediate headquarters. On the one hand, coastal surveillance is a very sensitive issue, requiring good inter-Departmental liaison and subject to close political scrutiny, both domestically and internationally. In these circumstances, a fairly tight degree of control from the Central Office of the Department of Defence in Canberra is almost inevitable. On the other hand, coastal surveillance is a 'grass-roots' operations requiring good local knowledge. This latter consideration suggests that the exercise of any operational command by the single Service Operational Headquarters in the Sydney area is undesirable.

Although existing towns and cities, such as Cairns, Nhulunbuy (Gove), Darwin and Port Hedland, could be preferred as the locations for the headquarters of the regional commands, a case can be made for them to be located in areas which are as yet, sparsely inhabited. This would be with the intention of displaying Australian determination to use and hold territory. Military colonization of remote areas has been used in many parts of the world as an effective tool of national strategy.

By way of an example of a very suitable remote location, Napier Broome Bay to the West of Wyndham springs to mind. This bay's strategic location and relatively low tidal range was appreciated during World War II, when it became both a forward operating base for submarines, using depot ship facilities, and a major air-base (Truscott Field). For similar reasons, it would appeal to defence planners of the 1970s and 1980s.

This article is only intended to float the idea of a possible organizational concept for Defence Force participation in surveillance and not to deal with the details of the organization. However, the following is a broad outline of a possible regional command organization to give some idea of what is being suggested:

- **Headquarters** — including operations, logistic and personnel branches, a Force Operations and Intelligence Centre, and a Communications Centre (all being staffed by personnel from all three Services).
- **Surveillance Forces** — three or four patrol boats, a flight of surveillance aircraft, and an independent company of mobile infantry equipped with rough terrain vehicles.
- **Base Facilities** — airfield, wharf, workshops, stores, fuel tanks, transport, accommodation, canteen, hospital, married quarters, etc.

Although for normal peacetime surveillance of the command's land area of operations (most importantly, the remote coastal regions), one company of infantry, with appropriate supporting services, should be sufficient, the base would have the capability of supporting a much larger land force should the need arise. An article in the *Army Journal* some years ago argued for a more active military presence in the north-west with five unaccompanied outstations, through which all Field Force units would be rotated to "build up a level of expertise in operating in a new and vital environment".11 The concept envisaged in this article is rather different since land force operations would be conducted, using long range patrols, involving say, six to ten men in each patrol,
building up the intelligence picture, data gathering in remote areas and being able on land, within the limits of their authority and capability, to react as required to a sighting report or SAR emergency.

The Australian Defence Force probably has a steep learning curve ahead of it, as far as joint operations in defence of the homeland are concerned. A recent article in the Defence Force Journal by a senior RAAF officer, well experienced in joint operations, spoke of "the lack of experience the Australian Defence Force possesses in joint operations", with the further observation that "the members of all three Services generally know more about operating with equivalent Allied services than with each other".

Major biennial joint exercises are good value but they can tend to obscure the more fundamental problems of co-operation and communications which are frequently encountered on a routine day by day basis at the working level. The great spill-over benefit of the organization described briefly in this article is that the Services would become attuned to operating together on a routine basis towards a common goal. Although the manpower involved in the northern commands would be but a small part of the Australian Defence Force, the principles involved are relevant to much larger scale operations. The knowledge and experience gained would soon spread and germinate in other parts of the Force.

If the reader with experience of Papua New Guinea is reminded of something akin to the PNG Defence Force, albeit on a smaller scale, in the system I have outlined, then I make no apologies. That is where the idea started. In the two years or so before Papua New Guinea's independence, the taxpayer received his money's worth out of the operations of the defence units based in that country. Unified command in a clearly defined operational area ensured that a high degree of operational efficiency was achieved in working together towards a common end.

Nobody denies that coastal surveillance is a national commitment which must be undertaken. The fundamental question is not so much one of determining whether or not it is right and proper for the Defence Force to take on the commitment, but rather one of appreciating that no other organization, or group of kindred organizations, has the capability at present of taking the task on, as efficiently or as economically as the Defence Force can. The large scale use of the capacity of the Defence Force in meeting this national need is a practical, economic and responsible course of action which must be in the public interest. This action need not be detrimental to the primary functions of the Defence Force, since as this article has shown, there are benefits involved which could be exploited to the best advantage of the defence of Australia.

NOTES
9. loc. cit., p. 46.
10. Although mainly concerned with civil defence, a recent Defence Fellow wrote of 'the need for defence planning on a geographic and regional basis'. Colonel D.K. Baker, 'Requirements for Civil Defence as an Integral Part of the National Defence Posture', Australian Defence Fellowship Paper, Canberra, Department of Defence, 1978, p. 214.
The purpose of this article is to address the issue of the civilianization of the services and outline some of the dangers and consequences of applying civilian models and solutions to the Armed Services.

The concept of civilianization and its determinants and implications will be briefly discussed before examples that illustrate the dangers and consequences of this process are given. These examples deal with the effects of civilianization on the services from personnel, organizational and operational/administrative points of view.

The Concept

The term "civilianization" refers to the process where the Armed Services adopt, or incorporate, civilian values, practices and procedures. Civilianization of the services is illustrated by changes in conditions of service. The suggestion of the need for a service trade union and the practice of servicemen wearing civilian clothes, instead of uniforms, are examples of the process of civilianization at work.

In another sense, the concept of civilianization refers to the mutual and increasing involvement of civilians and servicemen in each others traditional areas of employment. For example, Janowitz put forward the proposition that given the 'permanent' threat of war, it is well recognized that the tasks which military leaders perform tend to widen. Their technological knowledge, their direct and indirect power, and their heightened prestige result in their entrance, of necessity, into arenas that in the recent past have been reserved for civilian and professional politicians. The need that political and civilian leaders have for expert advice from professional soldiers about the strategic implications of technological change serves to mix the roles of the military and the civilian.

From an opposite point of view, civilians involvement in the service arena is illustrated by:

- the increasing use of "boffins" or "whiz kids" and their mathematical models to solve strategic, tactical and logistic problems; and
- the rapidly changing communication technology which is allowing politicians to view, via electronic media, progress on the battlefield and which is giving them capability to influence operations.

Determinants

Janowitz also advanced a number of propositions explaining some of the determinants of civilianization. These include:

- The services' increasing responsibility for economic management since an increasing percentage of a nation's national income is spent on the preparation and execution of war and repair of its consequences.
- The increase in the destructiveness and automation of weapons. Weapons of mass destruction increase the danger to a point where they equalize the dangers for both civilians and military personnel.
- The services' current orientation and posture is to deter violence. This approach in turn requires that military leaders...
concern themselves with broad ranges of political, social and economic consequences of their policies and decisions.

- The complexity of warfare and requirements for research, development and technical maintenance have resulted in the services requiring and relying on civilian technicians.

These propositions revolve around the themes that the technological sophistication of the services and their possession of weapons of mass destruction have resulted in greater civilian involvement in military affairs and military involvement in civilian matters dealing with politico-strategic policy and management.

Implications

In terms of the Australian services, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University\(^5\) outlined some implications of the civilianizing trend within the Department of Defence. For example, it commented that there is a greater need for specialization within the officer corps of the services in terms of having expertise in strategy, defence science and technology, policy formulation and other areas.

The Centre\(^6\) also suggested that streaming might be required for officers employed in positions requiring specialized military inputs into Defence policy making. In this respect, Admiral Sir Victor Smith wrote:\(^7\)

"... the more time that an officer spends on courses or in field postings the less time there is for him to develop the special skills required in policy formation. One solution that comes to mind is that a Service officer should be selected relatively early in his career and his future postings in the main, but by no means exclusively, would be Russell. Consequently as he progresses in rank so his skill in areas of defence policy formation will develop and his input will be all the greater."

The civilianization of the services has also had a number of other implications dealing with a variety of matters which have an impact on the services generally and on their members. What has not been fully recognized and acknowledged is the potential dangers and consequences of applying what are essentially civilian models and solutions to an institution that is not civilian in nature. It is now proposed to discuss some but by no means all the dangers and consequences of applying civilian models and solutions to the services.

PERSONNEL PERSPECTIVE

From a personnel perspective, the process of civilianization has had a number of undesirable consequences. These stem from the impact of civilian models and solutions on servicemen in terms of their orientation to their career, their career development, their professional image and identity and their training.

Career Orientation

Toner\(^8\) put forward the theory that the traditional military ethic of "duty, honor and country" is bolstered by the military ethos of:

- Primacy of the organization — it is more oriented towards the group, or unit, than the individual.
- Hierarchial structure — the military organization is hierarchial, not egalitarian.
- Authoritarian command process — that stresses discipline and obedience rather than freedom of expression because military operations often require immediate decisions and prompt action, not judicial decision making, thorough analysis and extensive debate.

The military has traditionally relied more on teamwork, training, simplification and predictable behaviour and less on education, nuance and empiricism.

Toner warned that the trend towards civilianization of the service with its reverse emphasis on:

- Individual rather than organization;
- Egalitarian structure rather than authoritarian structure; and
- Judicial decision making rather than authoritarian decision making;

is undermining military efficiency.

Toner cited two examples to support his proposition. The first example concerned a case where an admiral complained that the Navy is being swallowed up in the faceless bureaucracy of the Defence Department where "whiz kids" and computers are taking over the job of "running ships at sea". The second example concerned "back seat driving" by politicians. During the naval quarantine of Cuba, local commanders received repeated orders about the
details of their military operations direct from political leaders — contrary to two sacred military doctrines. These violations were the circumvention of the chain of command and the denial of the autonomy of the local commander. These problems in turn created serious friction.

Toner further stated that with the military objective denied, service members turn to careerism where they seek advancement in the organization following the civilian model rather than seeking advancement on the battlefield. This trend can sometimes reach the level where personal interests and individual needs become the sole focus or concern at the expense of the traditional military principles of accomplishment of mission and provision for welfare of men. Toner saw the solution of this dilemma in restored professionalism.

Career Development

Gillert suggested that the U.S. Army must set as its first priority the policy that duty assignments take precedence over formal academic education. If this policy is not adopted and the civilian model is pursued by giving higher premium to educational qualifications in terms of being necessary "tickets" to be punched for career progression both within and outside the Service, it will result in careerism and dilution of professional military standards.

Gillert argued that the U.S. Army Officer Personnel Management System is placing too much emphasis on individual career programmes to a point where it leads to self-interest. He suggested appropriate managerial skills for senior command are better developed through a programme of command and leadership assignments. He considered that a company command assignment should be perceived as more important to the military profession than possession of a post-graduate degree. It is company commanders who provide the "glue" that holds the "military fabric" together.

Professional Image and Identity

In terms of services' professional image and identity, Van Doorn noted that the danger of civilianization of the military is that those trained as "technicians" are less willing to identify themselves as soldiers. He stated this threatens the internal cohesion of the service and undermines its professionalism. Lindeman voiced similar sentiments.

Van Doorn also commented that the generalist officer skilled as a combat commander does not seem to be the most effective one in coping with the realities of atomic and guerilla warfare. He lacks the skills of a military technician and military manager and sometimes the skills of a para military officer (e.g. guerilla). He suggested that technocracy and scientific management have proved to be, as indeed is the case in society as a whole, the mainstream in motivation and opportunity. A new elite or would be elite is rising in the military establishment, the technocrat of the new weapons systems supplanting the commander of armed men. Yet the ideal of the 'heroic' leader still persists as an attractive military self image. Van Doorn concluded the main problem is to find a new orientation for the military of the future. He added that civilianization of the armed forces constitutes a direct attack on the hard core of the professional concept.

Janowitz stated that the ideal model of the military professional is not that of a scientist or the engineer or the business administrator. There is an irreducible component of a heroic posture in his professional self image, for he must be prepared to face danger. The development of the military profession has been a struggle between the heroic leader who embodies traditionalism and glory and the military manager who is concerned with the rational and scientific conduct of war. He added that the martial spirit of the traditional profession seem to be less adequate if the military establishment is intended to prevent hostilities.

Lindeman saw the problem differently. For him, today's soldier embodies both a fighter and technician orientation. He considered that advances in technology require that the member be technically and militarily proficient.

These views show that neither the traditional "warrior" image nor the "technocrat manager" image is the solution to the services' problem of how they develop their manpower. The ideal solution is to accommodate both images, provided the services continue to recognize that their primary responsibility is to prepare their manpower for war.
Military Training
Taking the above proposition further, Lindeman noted most Western countries seem to be trying to take the military out of soldiering and in so doing replace the soldier with technology. He refuted the views that strict discipline and other bygone military traditions are unnecessary during peace time because modern day technology compensates for the deficiencies in today’s soldiers. He argued that discipline forms the basis of military command and that this along with good training and the time required to build strong troop unity and esprit de corps provide the soldier with the combat spirit he needs in war.

Gillert argued along similar lines that the regimental system that emphasizes discipline, dedication and duty is still required. He also argued that the intricacies of command and control, rapidity of manoeuvre and lethality of the modern battlefields demand tactical and operational experts, not electronic data processing and management information systems specialists. We need commanders with a comprehensive understanding of combined arms operations, weapons employed and terrain; a leadership trained to analyse and make tactical decisions in war.

ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
From an organizational perspective, two dangers of civilianization are:
• Services’ adoption of civilian organizational models; and
• Services being overawed by economists’ cost/benefit ratios when it comes to manning requirements.

Organizational Models
One trend evident in many armies is a movement away from fixed scale Army formations of armies, corps, divisions and brigades towards variable scale organizations of field forces, task forces, battle groups and combat teams. This movement has been brought by the policy of varying the size and composition of formations to suit operational requirements based on principles of flexibility, reality and austerity. For example, the British Army has reorganized its divisions to improve the ratios of weapons to men in fighting units so as to make more efficient use of available manpower. It has eliminated the brigade level of command in the division, increased the span of control of the divisional commander and his lieutenant colonels. It has concentrated specialists into supporting corps and units and reorganized logistic support to ensure continuous movement of supplies from rear to front.

Once the division is in the field it can be broken up into a number of task forces, each headed by a brigadier. Each task force consists of two or more battle groups. (There are five battle groups in a division.) Each battle group is normally composed of four sub-units such as two armoured squadrons and two infantry companies and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Battle groups then form a number of combat teams each commanded by a major.

The movement towards variable formations parallels the organizational movement in industry where it is experimenting with organic structures. Toffler, Bennis and Macrae, to name a few futurists, visualize that the traditional mechanistic organizational structure will give way to a variable, adaptable, kinetic design that is determined by the task to be solved and resources available. These organizational structures will be characterized by short time spans, absence of traditional chain of command and constant redefinition of roles. Bennis sees organizational charts as consisting of project teams rather than stratified groups, each made up of diverse specialists linked together by co-ordinating and task evaluating executives.

Though there will be a movement towards variable scale organizations, Guiot warned: “All the principal ground forces of the world are structured in four echelons: brigade, division, corps and army. Yet, in the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli command, admired for its flexibility, apparently dispensed with at least one echelon. In the Sinai, they maneuvered five armored brigades directly from corps headquarters. Although they may have paid a price in decreased information, this still raises the question as to whether a ground force operating in the more complex environment of Western Europe might eliminate the division or the corps. One consideration is that tactical nuclear weapons
require an overseer not too close to the front nor too far away, and, for this, the corps is better positioned. It also has the stability desirable for a complicated control mechanism, but would too much be lost by giving up the rapid maneuverability of division Headquarters?

At present, the division is a necessity for technical reasons in the transmitting of messages. There are already difficulties in making hookups when a large command post displaces and tries to tie into several nets. This problem would be trebled in size if connections had to be made with three brigades instead of one division. There are even greater problems right now with range. The solution seems to lie in the direction of nadal systems and automatic switching. Not until communications are more advanced in capabilities will it be possible to eliminate the division echelon. Command structure and communications systems must march hand in hand at all times."

Other dangers of introducing variable scale formations into the Army are that they could undermine organizational cohesion, solidarity and morale. Success in battle depends partly on the soldiers’ feeling of belonging to a unit they can identify with, their establishing meaningful relationships with fellow members and the generation of regimental spirit. If soldiers are subjected to rapid changes of command and organizational identity, it could weaken their identification with their primary unit, undermine their feeling of comradeship, hinder the development of effective teamwork and lower their resilience in war.

Finally, Beaumont\(^3\) concluded when reviewing the decline of mass forces since the American Civil War:

- In World War II, there was a salutary amount of concern for the “man behind the gun”. Now the focus is on the system. But the system has failed too often and the man behind the gun is still there, often alone, amid all the jargon, the hardware and the systems.
- God would not be on the side of the big battalions, but on the side which has the most resourceful tactical leaders.

Beaumont has argued in two articles\(^4\) that it is resourceful, well trained leaders who win wars and not technology, systems and other panaceas.

The argument presented here is not against the military using variable scale formations for many experts,\(^5\) including Beaumont,\(^6\) have presented arguments that presage their use in future wars. What is argued is that the services should guard against adopting what are passing organizational fads — especially those who propose simplistic concepts and solutions to many service organizational dilemmas. For as Beaumont\(^7\) stated, when discussing the pitfalls of faddism:

"That military institutions differ from civilian ones generically can be lost sight of in the gaudy supermarket of organization theory, unmonitored by an equivalent of the Food and Drug Administration. The demand that institutions change for change's sake has been steady in the 20th century, but the record shows that the results are a mixed bag at best. It is time for the architects of organization to take into account that attitudes, as well as mechanical systems, require lead time and careful tooling-up, and that panaceas are rare indeed."

**Economic Mentality**

From a manning point of view, Kantor\(^8\) listed criticisms of the U.S. Department of Defense's drive to reduce manpower requirements. He stated the thrust is to reduce overheads, to reduce so called non-essential functions, to establish what he labelled “mythical/reified ratios”, to create uniformity in operations, to increase the “teeth” and reduce the “tail”. He commented that one general expressed that “if we cut off more of our tail, we are going to fall on our teeth”.

From another point of view Kantor criticized the complaints that headquarters and training establishments are too fat and that redirections will increase combat capability if headquarters positions and training positions are transferred to combat force and combat support units. He retorted that these criticisms fail to take into account the loading of lower unit commanders with additional tasks which interfere with the execution of their primary responsibilities and duties. Beaumont\(^9\) also commented on this issue.

Kantor’s criticisms point to the potential dangers of basing manning reductions and redistributions on economists' "cost/benefit ratios".
OPERATIONAL/ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Since the end of World War II there has arisen a new generation of academic strategists using totally different disciplines and at times speaking a different language based on a vocabulary borrowed from economics, sociology and systems analysis. In this time there has been a communications revolution. Both these trends have had an impact on the services and have had some undesirable consequences.

"Whiz Kids"

Toner previously criticized "whiz kids" and the tendency of politicians to rely too much on them to produce solutions to politico-military problems. Gray also criticized them. He stated the Vietnam War, the conduct of the strategic arms race and major intra-alliance difficulties suggest that civilian strategic scholars have been at fault. He attributed their failures to:

- Their methodology — it has been dominated by the inappropriate "economic conflict" model.
- Their being overimpressed with the potential transfer of theory to the world of action.
- Their success in gaining intellectual access to political and military elements in the Eisenhower administration era and eventually their gaining access to government in the Kennedy era. The end result was the prophets became courtiers and they tended to produce both irrelevant policy advice and poor scholarship.

Some examples of civilian strategic blunders cover:

- The failure of the graduated response strategy in Vietnam.
- The failure of systems analysis. The then U.S. Secretary of State, Robert McNamara, wrongly associated systems analysis with strategy. He was by training a statistician and had a reputation for being a "whiz kid". Consequently, he was influenced by the potential savings in developing the F111 fighter bomber for both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force but did not recognize that it would not meet the exacting requirements of the Navy.

Watt and Bidwell voiced similar criticisms.

Bernard Brodie, while supporting some of Gray's assertions, replied that the failure of civilian strategic thinking should be in part attributed to the military's failure to contribute anything significant to strategic thought. Both Gray's and Brodie's criticisms indicate that the process of civilianization should not be allowed to go too far in the Services just as militarization should not be allowed to go too far — especially when it comes to strategic and policy matters.

Communications Revolution

Toner commented earlier about the consequences of "back seat" driving by politicians in the quarantine of Cuba. Van Gelder stated the communications revolution is imposing great stress upon military commanders. It has allowed the intrusion of political direction right down to platoon commander level. This, plus the real time exposure of battlefield to the public via the Mass Media, is placing constraints on local commanders' freedom of movement and initiative. They must as is emphasized in Army Doctrine be very mindful of the political consequences of their decisions and the likely effects their actions will have on public opinion. These constraints if allowed to go too far will prevent military commanders from achieving their missions.

Conclusion

The dangers and consequences outlined by no means exhaust the list of possibilities. They represent a sample that point to the central issue that it is fallacious to compare a services with civilian institutions and expect them to adopt carte blanche civilian models and solutions. Only those models and solutions that do not undermine military efficiency and morale should be considered. This is not to suggest that the services remain essentially conservative organizations that are cautious towards reform and progress. It is merely suggested that the services must discriminate between reforms which would undermine or prevent their achieving their missions to those that assist them to achieve their missions whilst providing for the welfare of their members.
CIVILIAN MODELS

NOTES


6. Ibid.


15. Lindeman, op. cit.

16. Ibid.

17. Gilbert, op. cit.

18. The following references deal with variable scale Army Formations:


23. Bennis, op. cit., p. 34.


26. a. Ibid.

27. a. Stewart, op. cit.
   b. Mace, op. cit.
   c. Caine, op. cit.
   d. Milner, op. cit.
   e. Ayers, op. cit.
   g. Weller, op. cit.
   h. Dodd, op. cit.


32. Toner, op. cit.


34. a. Ibid.

35. Gray, op. cit.


38. Bidwell, op. cit.


40. Toner, op. cit.


The RAAF Staff College Student Papers which appeared in the July/August and September/October issues are available for study, subject to the authors’ permission, on application to the Commandant, RAAF Staff College, Fairbairn, ACT 2600.
ON 10 February 1943, the United States submarine, U.S.S. Gudgeon, rendezvoused with a small group of Australian troops near the Dilor River on the south-east coast of Portuguese Timor. The subsequent evacuation of this group to Australia ended almost twelve months of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, and one of the most skilful campaigns engaged in by Australian troops in World War II.

In April 1941, amid growing fears of war with Japan, the 23rd Brigade of 8th Division was moved to Darwin. In the event of war involving Australia, this force was to assist the Dutch garrisons in the islands to Darwin's north (in particular, Dutch Timor and Ambon), and was to provide early warning of an attack against the Australian mainland. Therefore, with the Japanese attacks on Malaya and the Philippines in December 1941, a battalion group designated Sparrow Force left Darwin for Kupang in Dutch Timor. The main body, consisting of the 2/40th Battalion, a battery of the 2/1st Heavy Regiment (coastal artillery), and ancillary troops, took up defensive positions around Kupang in conjunction with the Dutch. An outpost was also established at Atambua near the border with Portuguese Timor. Additionally, the 2/2nd Independent Company, trained and equipped for irregular warfare, was tasked with the occupation of Dili on the north coast of Portuguese Timor in order to forestall any Japanese plans for occupation of that area. The 2/2nd and a small Dutch force achieved this objective by the beginning of 1942 without opposition from the Portuguese, whose sympathies generally lay with the Allies.

In terms of sovereignty, the island of Timor was roughly divided in half, the western and eastern parts respectively under Dutch and Portuguese rule. Approximately 300 miles long and 40 miles wide, the island as a whole was undeveloped, but unlike New Guinea for example, contained little tropical jungle. The most striking feature of Timor was its mountains, a "... lunatic, contorted, tangled mass of mountains." Portuguese Timor, in which the Australians were to fight the Japanese until February 1943, also contained low rolling hills in an environment very similar to north-western Australia. However, right from the start the whole nature of life and fighting in the coming months was dictated by the mountains.

The 2/2nd Independent Company, which was to bear the brunt of fighting in Portuguese Timor, managed to adapt to the terrain without great difficulty. The reason for this may partly be found in the demanding training they had received and partly due to the 2/2nd not being as stricken with malaria as the main body of Sparrow Force. The soldiers of the 2/2nd, 270 strong when it left Darwin, were well armed and equipped; for example they had 60 Thompson sub-machineguns (which were unknown to the other units of the Force), and some four tons of plastic explosives for demolition tasks. The organisation of the 2/2nd was also different to that of a standard infantry company in that there were three 66-man platoons in the Independent Company, each consisting of three 18-man sections and an HQ element led respectively by officers, with sub-sections commanded by sergeants. This company which, in combination with the air and naval operations in the area, was to convince the Japanese that an Allied invasion of Timor was probable and lead them to commit a division there at a time when Allied counter-attacks in other theatres were placing a heavy demand on Japanese manpower and resources.

The Japanese Invade Timor — February, 1942

On 30 January 1942, Ambon fell to the Japanese. Air reconnaissance of the Australian
positions in Timor soon began and grew in intensity until mid-February, when five days of bombing attacks heralded the Japanese seaborne assault on Timor. Prior to their landings at Kupang and Dili on 20 February, an air attack was launched against Darwin from a carrier group in order to neutralise RAAF and USAF air units there, and to protect the flank of the landing force sailing from Ambon. The raids were a complete success, allowing a regimental group to land at Kupang, and a battalion group to land at Dili, without interference from the forces based in Australia.

The main body of Sparrow Force found itself out-maneuvered, out-numbered and out-fought. Led by a Marine detachment and assisted by a battalion sized paratroop drop, the Japanese infantry quickly overcame the Australians in three days of intensive fighting, despite being strongly counter-attacked and despite the almost complete annihilation of their paratroops. The surrender of the main body of Sparrow Force on 24 February exposed the folly of sending such a small force to Timor — it was inadequately equipped, generally inexperienced, and understrength. If its objective was to deny Timor to the Japanese, the raids on Darwin, Broome and Wyndham on 4 March by Timor based aircraft soon exposed the inadequacy of the defence planning in Australia in 1941. The Force Commander, some staff, and the remnants of the troops from Kupang and Atambua who had managed to escape the enemy’s assault, eventually joined up with the 2/2nd in Portuguese Timor, where events had taken a different turn from those at Kupang.

The 2/2nd had taken up positions in the low hills around Dili shortly before the Japanese attack, and had established section posts overlooking the town and the road west to Dutch Timor. A section of sappers which had been positioned near the Dili airstrip, successfully fired pre-placed demolition charges, cratering it in the face of the Japanese landings. Joining other forward patrols, the section withdrew into the hills after causing considerable numbers of casualties to the enemy with only a small loss to themselves. This was to be a pattern repeated time and again in the next twelve months.

The 2/2nd immediately began to organise for guerrilla warfare, moving its 100,000 rounds of rifle and Bren ammunition and 60,000 rounds of Thompson ammunition back into safe areas, and distributing it between caches hidden in a variety of small and inaccessible bases, along with rations and other essentials. This was the ‘hideout principle’, and was to provide the sections and sub-sections with invaluable opportunities to replenish and rest with the minimum chance of Japanese interference.

There were three factors which greatly assisted the 2/2nd to initiate irregular warfare successfully. The first and most important was the attitude of the local native population and their willingness to assist by providing food, bearers, and information concerning the enemy. The second was the unofficial help provided by the Portuguese administrators, who were not obliged as neutrals to assist either side. Their attitude in turn influenced the natives and allowed pony trains, for example, to be assembled very quickly when required. The third factor was the capacity of the area of operations to provide food for the 2/2nd over and above the needs of the local population. Where this was not possible, RAAF airdrops of supplies would later ease the situation.

Guerrilla Warfare — February to July 1942

The period between 20 February and the end of July was characterised by the unsuccessful attempts of the Japanese to eliminate the elusive 2/2nd, which harassed the enemy’s forces with such telling effect that the Japanese were compelled to withdraw after suffering substantial casualties. In March, the 2/2nd re-established radio contact with Darwin by means of a homemade radio, and the RAAF soon began dropping supplies to them and attacking Japanese positions, although both activities were conducted at a low intensity due to the paucity of air units in north-western Australia at that time.

The 2/2nd started to harass the Japanese at the first opportunity. A series of rotating patrols was begun, leading the enemy to over-estimate the Australian strength. Patrols were also despatched to investigate the veracity of rumours; with such a large area to watch (some 300 square miles), it was imperative that their intelligence concerning the enemy was accurate. Sub-sections and even smaller groups laid ambushes for Japanese transport, forcing the enemy to establish posts along their few motor roads. These posts were observed, and once the
routine was established, a raid would be mounted. With the aid of the native bearers, the enhanced mobility of the Australians allowed them to escape the Japanese counter-thrusts and attack the enemy columns from the sides and rear.

Despite the Japanese advances into the mountains, up to 20 miles from Dili itself, the harbour and the airstrip (where six and later nine Zeros were based) remained under the observation of the Australians. On the night of May 15/16, a section made a daring raid into Dili, which caused considerable consternation among the Japanese. Their columns could not pin down the 2/2nd, which continued their operations against the enemy lines of communications.

“It was seldom that a week passed without two or three successful raids being carried out. The individual number of Japanese casualties was small; it might be five or as high as fifteen, but these numbers quickly provided an amazing total, and their effect on Japanese morale was tremendous.”

Soon the Australians were being blamed for everything that happened, and greater and greater numbers of the enemy became tied down with protecting their communication lines and Dili itself. By late July, the Japanese had had enough and, when the 2/2nd (now renamed Lancer Force) declined the enemy’s rather optimistic request that they give themselves up, the Japanese withdrew into Dili so as to reorganise.

The 2/2nd had by this time established a ‘line’ of section posts covering the most likely enemy approaches. Based on the ‘postos’ (Portuguese administrative centres) and their own previously placed caches, patrols operated continuously from these posts against the Japanese. Company HQ had been located behind the central sector of this line so as to best maintain control. A short distance from Company HQ, a small training depot and hospital had been established. The training centre was used to train those survivors of the main body of Sparrow Force who had retained their weapons and who were considered suitable for training in 2/2nd techniques. Most of these men, however, were evacuated to Australia due to their poor physical shape and lack of weapons. The existence of a hospital and the means of evacuation to Australia by way of flying boat or navy corvette if wounded badly enough was an important factor in maintaining the morale of the troops of Lancer Force, as indeed were the mail drops by RAAF aircraft. Force HQ had been set up near the south coast, where it kept the radio links with Australia in operation and received air and sea drops of supplies.

The Japanese Counter-Offensive — August 1942

August was to see Lancer Force brought to the edge of disaster. There were growing indications that the Japanese were planning a counter-stroke against the 2/2nd, including an increase in reconnaissance flights and then bombing attacks against all the ‘postos’. A more ominous sign of things to come was a gradual change in the attitude of the native population towards the Portuguese and, consequently, the Australians; a result of Japanese propaganda efforts to disaffect the natives from their colonial rulers. Several Portuguese were murdered, and fighting broke out between those natives loyal to the Portuguese (and Australians) and those who felt that their future lay with the Japanese. However, Portuguese plans to suppress the native uprisings with their small army were postponed as the Japanese chose this time to begin a general offensive against Lancer Force.

The 2/2nd had prepared for the expected attack. Generally, the Australians used the Portuguese telephone network (as did the enemy), and a system of native couriers to pass messages and information. New radio sets from Australia, however, had given the Independent Company greater communications flexibility, although their use had been restricted up to then in order to hide HQ locations and conserve this new resource until urgently required. Rallying points had also been established in each platoon’s area of operations to allow sub-units to re-organise rapidly following dispersion from an ambush position or delaying position. “... it was this continual dispersing after an attack and rapid reforming which frustrated the Japanese efforts to exterminate us.”

Nevertheless, the enemy thrusts of August 1942 returned the initiative temporarily to the Japanese, in what was to be, for Lancer Force, a battle for survival.

On 10 August, the arrival of two enemy transports and a destroyer off the south coast at Beco, and directly south of Force HQ,
coincided with simultaneous thrusts from Dili and Dutch Timor into the territory controlled by the Australians — eight columns in all, supported by air and artillery. The Japanese who had landed at Beco and were moving north were the most dangerous, but RAAF air attacks managed to retard their progress sufficiently to allow the 2/2nd time to meet their advance. It was at this time that the change in native attitude began to make the position of Lancer Force increasingly perilous:

"... reports were coming in of native treachery, ambush positions given away to the enemy, and the refusal of food and assistance. This was most disturbing as our opposition to the enemy relied mainly on ambushes to force him to deploy, slow up his advance and split his force. The most serious blow fell when natives in two widely separated areas attacked our troops."8

The 2/2nd, in an effort to avoid being cut off and being forced into the eastern end of the island, maintained as much pressure on the flanks of the enemy columns as numbers could permit, and delaying positions were established whenever possible. Japanese success seemed certain none the less — the Australians had increasing difficulty in obtaining food, were becoming exhausted after constantly fighting and moving since 10 August, and were being forced into unfavourable battle situations by unrealistic instructions from Darwin. Despite RAAF airdrops to Lancer Force on 19 August and widespread air attacks on the Japanese, defeat seemed inevitable. The western and northern sectors were not under Japanese control, and they appeared poised to capture Ainaro, key to further Australian resistance in the central sector.

On 20 August, however, patrols discovered that the enemy columns had retreated. The Japanese had failed to trap the sub-units of Lancer Force and defeat them in detail and, in the face of mounting casualties and failing supplies, had left the mountains almost without exception to the Australians. However, due to the lack of food and the hostility of the natives, there was little chance of an Australian return to the majority of the areas previously controlled, by anything but patrols. Lancer Force reorganised for the next Japanese attack, while the Portuguese began their operations to neutralise the rebellious natives.

The two companies of troops available to the Portuguese suppressed the natives with much brutality, but the Japanese immediately stepped in, occupied various 'postos', took the Portuguese into detention 'for their own protection', and halted the punitive expedition in an effort to cause further deterioration to Portuguese authority and encourage the natives to oppose the Australians. Although many tribes remained loyal to the 2/2nd, continuing to act as bearers, guides, and couriers, transport was now particularly difficult to obtain, and information (and therefore intelligence) was less and less available.

Reinforcement — September-November 1942

In view of the situation and the condition of the 2/2nd, it was decided in Australia to reinforce Lancer Force with the 2/4th Independent Company, whose advance party arrived in HMAS Vigilant on 16 September. The main body arrived shortly afterwards in HMAS Voyager and the new troops were distributed amongst the weary platoons of the 2/2nd. Unfortunately, the Voyager became grounded, and was spotted and sunk by a now alert enemy, who immediately sent columns of troops into the mountains with a view to advancing right through the Australians to the south coast and pushing the Australians further to the east before they had a chance to consolidate both their new strength and their new positions.

Once again, the Japanese were skilfully avoided by Lancer Force. The enemy supply system could not sustain their troops in a village or area for any period of time, so as the Japanese moved on, the Australians followed them up or moved aside. This deadly minuet was to continue, on and off, into 1943, as the Japanese tried to keep the Australians off-balance and at arm's length from their development of Baucau on the north-eastern coast as a base to rival Dili. Japanese attempts to pin the Australians to a battle situation in which their superior firepower and numbers could deal a telling blow failed time and again. After all, in the words of the Lancer Force commander:

"We were in no hurry to kill them; this was a private war, and there was no time factor. We considered it much better to kill five or ten Japanese and suffer no casualties than to attempt to kill more and suffer casualties."

"
Time, however, was running out for Lancer Force. The resurgence of ambushes and harassment of the enemy after the arrival of the 2/4th; the success of the RAAF and USAF air raids against Japanese shipping and bases; and the effects of submarine attacks by the USN operating out of Fremantle convinced the Japanese that the Allies were contemplating even stronger action in the Timor area. A new Japanese division, the 48th, began to arrive in the island. The Australians had to contend with an ever-increasing intensity of operations against them, yet the Japanese casualty rate began to drop as the enemy started to employ large numbers of natives stiffened by a few Japanese, against Lancer Force.

By now the 2/2nd was thoroughly exhausted after nine months of constant fighting and privation, and the Force as a whole was suffering from an almost complete lack of advance warning of Japanese movements due to the hostile native attitude. As a result of these factors, the role of Lancer Force was changed to one of observing and reporting air and shipping movements and logistics buildups. To this end, a number of observation posts were set up and reports began to flow back to Australia. The growing enemy pressure could not be ignored, even so, especially as the Japanese were gradually extending their occupation into the mountainous hinterland, and pushing the Australians further to the east, while mounting several further drives which threatened the south coast links with Darwin. Plans were initiated to evacuate the 2/2nd.

Evacuation — November 1942 to February 1943

In November and December 1942, the 2/2nd was withdrawn to Darwin in two seaborne lifts. Careful security and aggressive patrolling disguised the intention to evacuate from the Japanese, the enemy still managed to drive the observation posts away from the northern coast and Lancer Force generally even further to the east. Attempts by the Australians to train and arm loyal natives as auxiliaries and carry out drives against the Japanese achieved only limited success. By Christmas 1942, it had become obvious that any value in maintaining the 2/4th in Portuguese Timor was now negligible and, accordingly, on 5 January, 1943, the order for their evacuation came. Security, and control of far flung patrols was of utmost importance for this withdrawal to the beaches because, if the Japanese were alerted, the Force could have been involved in a running battle all the way to the evacuation point at Quicras on the south-east coast. In the event, the rendezvous with HMAS Arunta, on the night of 9/10 January, was achieved without incident — the evacuation of Lancer Force had been a complete success.

Two small groups of Australian troops remained in Timor. ‘Z Special Force’ was a small clandestine party which had been operating independently of Lancer Force in the far eastern end of the island organising the natives to fight the Japanese since September 1942. ‘S Force’ was a stay behind group from the 2/4th, consisting of 17 men, with orders to infiltrate back to the north coast while avoiding direct contact with the enemy, and resume monitoring of Japanese air and shipping movements. ‘S Force’, however, was contacted by a strong enemy patrol in late January and were dispersed, suffering the loss of their vital radio equipment in their desperate attempt to evade the enemy. Finally, the remnants of ‘S Force’ managed to link up with ‘Z Special Force’, but then the entire group were ordered out of Timor. The U.S. submarine Gudgeon, evacuated them to Fremantle on 10 February, 1943, thus ending Australian presence on the island until after the Japanese surrender in 1945.

Conclusion

The guerilla campaign in Portuguese Timor achieved results out of all proportion to the numbers of Australian troops involved. Not only did they cause an estimated 1500 casualties to the Japanese for a loss of only 40 to themselves,10 but they also made a significant contribution to the operations of the Allies in the South West Pacific Area by tying down large numbers of Japanese troops when the battles on Guadalcanal and in New Guinea were at their height. It was a classic campaign by the Independent Companies of harassment and ambush against a superior force, demonstrating both the high fighting qualities of the soldiers and the validity of their training for irregular warfare. Despite their eventual withdrawal, the success of their operations could be judged by the large numbers of Japanese troops which were deployed against them,11 and the complete failure of the enemy to isolate and destroy them in battle.

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Notes

1. Allied Geographical Section SWPA, Terrain Study No. 50, Area Study of Portuguese Timor, 27 February, 1943, p. 57.


4. It must be noted, however, that the best Australian troops were all overseas in other theatres and could not be spared at the time. These and other factors in Australian defence planning in the pre- and early war years have been covered by other writers.

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INTRODUCTION

WITH the assurance by the Whitlam Government in 1973 that Australia would face no threat to her security for 15 years, an important part of Australia's national Defence Planning became the development of contingency plans for various threats in the late 1980s. One such scenario for this period is that of an attack on north-west Australia by a middle-ranking power. The enemy's objective is limited to the control of the rich mineral deposits of the Pilbara region.

As a lead up to such an offensive, the enemy could well mount a surprise attack on RAAF bases, with the aim of neutralizing these elements of our Air Force which would be involved in opposing the enemy occupation. Part of this initial attack could be a strike against the RAAF's Tactical Fighter Force (TFF) by Submarine-launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs).

The following assumptions apply to the scenario:
- The enemy's objectives are limited to control of the Pilbara.
- The enemy plans to achieve its objective within two weeks of the initial attack on the RAAF elements.
- The SLCM attack consists of a single wave of 36 missiles launched from six submarines. Missiles are equipped with various forms of high accuracy terminal guidance, and each carries a 1000 pound HE warhead. The attack is aimed at neutralizing the TFF for the two-week period required for occupation.
- The enemy wishes to avoid both nuclear escalation and super-power involvement. This policy is successful and prevents the overseas supply of replacement aircraft and spare parts during the occupation period.
- All TFF aircraft are located in Eastern Australia at the time of the attack.
- Complete surprise is achieved by the enemy.

The problem is to select various base facilities and TFF dispositions that would minimize the effectiveness of the SLCM surprise attack and yet preserve reasonable efficiency in the operations of the TFF. A cost-effective solution for the late 1980s will be recommended.

Clearly the solution to the problem will involve the investigation of both the capabilities of the SLCM, and the various methods of passive defence and security that could be employed against such an attack. In considering the SLCM, it will be necessary to consider both the accuracy of various terminal guidance systems, and effectiveness of the warheads against aircraft and ground installations. An important consideration must be to determine what sorts of targets are most likely to be attacked. Targets may include the aircraft, runways, maintenance facilities, and fuel and ordnance storage areas.

The problem is then to determine what cost effective measures would best counter such an attack. Some of the important measures are to deploy the TFF to several bases, disperse the aircraft on each base, and protect...
POSSIBLE TARGETS

Airfields, being large open stationary structures, are by their nature vulnerable to air strikes. Military airbases in Australia, such as Amberley, Richmond and Williamtown are particularly vulnerable, because of the presence of extensive maintenance facilities, limited tarmac area with resultant close packed lines of aircraft, and long runways.

The question of which specific targets the enemy would choose for his SLCMs in order to neutralize the TFF for two weeks is not an easy one. Without some idea of these specific targets, no decisive plan for a defence can be formulated. The following are considered to be likely targets for the surprise attack:

- runways, taxiways and parking areas;
- hangars and maintenance facilities;
- fuel and ordnance storage areas;
- personnel;
- the aircraft; and
- some combination of the above.

Runways, Taxiways and Parking Areas

Most modern aircraft, due to considerations of all-up weight, tyre pressure and take off and landing roll are entirely dependent on tarmac or concrete runways, taxiways and dispersal areas. Aircraft suitable for operations on unprepared surfaces are generally unsuitable to fulfil the role of TFF aircraft. Thus, these hard stand areas must also be considered as targets.

Neutralization of runways is best accomplished by cratering. However, simple craters do not take two weeks to repair. Thus some sort of harassment weapon must also be deployed to slow down repair work. Of the 36 cruise missiles that strike, some could be equipped to penetrate and crater runways, while others could distribute delayed-action penetration weapons to delay repairs.

Even so, it is unlikely that this would neutralize the TFF for two weeks, particularly if the 36 SLCMs are divided between several bases owing to deployment of the aircraft. In the event of all the aircraft being at the one base at the time of the attack, then this mode of strike could be highly effective. However, its impact would be partially neutralized by deployment to several bases. If runways were seriously damaged, the aircraft could be transported on the ground to the nearest airfield big enough for them to take off from. Thus runways will not be as important a target as the aircraft.

Hangars and Maintenance Facilities

With the limited size of Australia's TFF now and as seen in the future, it is unwise to opt for other than the present system of centralized maintenance as employed for the current F111, C130 and P3B fleets. Decentralization, whilst desirable for the minimization of damage from just such a surprise attack, imposes problems of capital costs of facilities, logistics, uniformity of standards, and training of many more technical personnel. A country such as the United States, owing to the size and distribution of its fleet of a particular aircraft type, can use decentralized maintenance, but Australia cannot afford to, since efficiency would drop. This makes the TFF vulnerable to attack in the area.

It is debatable whether the destruction of the centralized facilities would completely neutralize the TFF for two weeks. Some factors cast doubt on this:

- increased reliability of modern aircraft;
- intervals of up to 200 hours between major servicing;
- provision of quick, on tarmac engine changes for the latest generation of fighter aircraft; and
- a switch to all solid state and integrated circuitry, giving trouble-free operation in avionics and communications equipment.

These factors all serve to reduce the number of flying hours lost through breakdown.

While the above factors all reduce the probability of unserviceabilities, it should be borne in mind that with the complexity of modern aircraft, unexpected breakdowns can, and do, occur. Certainly if the centralized facilities are destroyed, some aircraft will also be destroyed, along with spare parts on hand and maintenance equipment. This would leave, at worst, more than half of the TFF still flying, assuming some serviceable aircraft were also destroyed. Thus it is doubtful whether such an attack would completely neutralize the TFF.
Fuel and Ordnance Storage Areas

By their nature, fuel and ordnance areas are highly vulnerable to air strikes. Thus they are generally sited well away from hangars, tarmac areas or areas where their accidental destruction could jeopardize other installations. The destruction of fuel dumps could cause considerable inconvenience for several days, until alternative sources of fuel were found. Only by knocking out all oil refineries and associated storage tanks in eastern and southern Australia could a fuel shortage that would keep the TFF grounded for two weeks be created. It is unlikely that such an acute fuel problem could be achieved with 36 cruise missiles even with the use of fuel air explosive warheads. Even so, the destruction of on-base fuel stocks could cause serious disruption to operations. It is therefore still desirable to protect fuel supplies as well as possible.

Similarly, the destruction of all ordnance designed for use by the TFF would effectively neutralize the force's capability to strike at the enemy for as long as it would take to renew supplies. Obviously it is desirable to protect both stockpiles and working storage areas on the bases as well as possible.

Personnel

Air and ground crews are easy to kill or maim by a missile attack. However, in order to hospitalize sufficient numbers of such personnel to cripple the TFF, the intelligence and detail of planning would probably be beyond the scope of a middle ranking power. Thus, this attack must be ruled out as being possible but improbable.

The Aircraft

All modern aircraft are inherently easy to damage in the sort of attack being discussed here. The use of light, strong alloys in the airframe, the presence of integral fuel tanks in the wings and fuselage, and the use of delicate electronic components in many areas of the structure make a modern aircraft highly susceptible to damage, especially by the sort of high explosive warhead that would be used with the SLCM.

The aircraft that Australia chooses as its replacement for the Mirage will almost certainly be in service at the projected time of the attack. Australia will probably opt simply to re-equip the present three operational squadrons and operational conversion unit, giving a total of between 70 and 80 aircraft. Such an aircraft will be likely to need at least a runway length of 5000 feet to ensure safe operations at maximum all up weight.

 Destruction or at least severe damage could easily be done to these aircraft by the comparatively cheap SLCM. In this case, the aircraft themselves must be regarded as a prime target for the neutralizing of the TFF.

Combined Targets

One very effective attack would be a coordinated strike on all of the above targets at once. If the enemy should succeed in even damaging aircraft, runways, maintenance hangars, fuel tanks and ordnance storage, then the TFF would be in poor condition to retaliate. If all of the TFF's aircraft and facilities were concentrated at the one airbase, then the job of the enemy would be half over, even before launching the SLCMs. By judicious allocation of missiles to targets, the TFF would be out of action for more than two weeks. Obviously, simple ploys such as deploying the aircraft and some maintenance facilities to different bases would be an effective counter measure. However, in order to decide on the best course of action to protect the TFF, some characteristics of the SLCM must be investigated.

THE CRUISE MISSILE

The cruise missile, though not a new idea, is indeed a formidable weapon. Some of the characteristics that make it so are these:

- It is small and cheap to build, bringing it within the budget of many low to medium powers.
- While easily visible at launch, due to its solid fuel booster rocket, once in flight, it can fly at altitudes so low as to make it extremely difficult to detect by electromagnetic means.
- It is an air breathing missile, supported in the air by aerodynamic surfaces.
- It can be fitted with several systems for overwater transit and terminal guidance.
- It can be fitted with a variety of conventional warheads for tactical use, and nuclear warheads for strategic use.

In this discussion, the aspects of the accuracy of the guidance systems, and the destructive power of the tactical warheads are the relevant
ones. It may be assumed that enroute guidance systems, such as inertial navigation will ensure that the SLCM will be on track, arriving within a few miles of the target. Either here, or earlier, some form of terminal guidance will take over to guide the missile to its pre-determined impact point. Some terminal guidance systems that may be used are:

- terrain comparison (TERCOM);
- area correlation;
- infra-red or optical TV camera with data link; and
- homing onto a beacon.

These systems will be discussed separately.

**Terrain Comparison**

The TERCOM system, while still under development at present, is a very promising system. It has the advantage that during operation it is self-contained and cannot be interfered with by weather or jamming. It operates by dividing a particular area on the missile’s path into squares, currently about 100 metres on each side. The average height of the terrain in each square is stored in an internal memory, as a function of position.

A downward looking radar altimeter, capable of resolving objects smaller than the map squares is incorporated. This provides a stream of elevation data, thus enabling the actual location of the missile to be determined, and corrections to be made to the flight path. Accuracy is limited only by the size of each square. Clearly, by the late 1980s, advances in micro circuitry and computer memories will enable accuracies of ten metres or less to be achieved; however, the system will not work over water.

Such a system relies heavily on accurate relief information being provided. Although it would not be impossible for the potential aggressor to obtain accurate, large-scale military survey maps of Australia’s entire eastern seaboard, the question of accuracy of such maps, and hence of an attack must be queried. It must be assumed that although the system may be able to do better, it will not do better than ten metres, on the basis of relief data.

It is quite feasible that the missiles would use internal inertial navigation for the over-water transit. An initial landfall map with large squares or even standard navigation beacons would either provide an update for the inertial system, or directly take over and correct the flight path. As the target is approached, the TERCOM squares could become progressively smaller until the necessary accuracy is obtained.

**Area Correlation**

This system, while still in the research stage, could be highly developed by the late 1980s. It works by sensing the difference in spectral reflectivity of the terrain beneath the missile, in the infra-red or micro wave portions of the spectrum. This is compared with data stored in a memory, much the same as the TERCOM system. Such a system would require overflights by reconnaissance aircraft beforehand to compile the master map. This would not be impossible for the enemy to achieve, but would be unlikely to occur without direct involvement of a super power, and therefore should be discounted.

Accuracy of this system is at present not known; however, it would be safe to say that it would be comparable with that of the TERCOM system by the time of the attack. It should be noted that this system has the advantage of working over all types of terrain, whereas the TERCOM system, at present, requires hilly ground for best results.

**Infra-red or Optical TV Camera and Data Link**

A data link guidance system, with direct command control by a human operator viewing a TV picture taken from the nose of the missile would allow maximum flexibility of operation. If the attack was to be at night, then the camera could operate in the infra-red portion of the spectrum. The major disadvantage of this system is that both the television data link and the command data link can be interfered with or jammed from the ground. Furthermore, the system demands that the controlling submarine remains on, or near to the surface until impact is reached, thereby risking detection. It is therefore doubtful whether such a system would be used, since the idea of the attack is to bring the submarine within the missile’s range, launch, then retreat.

**Homing Onto a Beacon**

The use of existing navigation beacons on our military airbases should not be discounted from the discussion. A cruise missile could easily incorporate TACAN equipment that would make it appear the same as an ordinary military aircraft using this aid. By simply
incorporating a program to offset the impact point by the required range and bearing from the beacon, a high degree of accuracy could be achieved. Alternatively, a passive receiver that would rely on other aircraft interrogating the beacon to obtain a fix could be incorporated.

The possibility of fifth-column action should not be ignored either. It would be quite possible for some person employed by the enemy to plant an inexpensive radar transponder, or radio beacon, at a pre-arranged position. Such a transponder could be interrogated by a radar in the cruise missile, and with an offset aiming point, could also provide highly accurate terminal guidance.

**Warheads**

Once the missile has been accurately guided to the target, the question of the likely type and destructive power of the warhead arises. Of the vast array of blast, fragmentation and incendiary warheads available to the potential aggressor, the most powerful for a given weight, and the obvious choice for this attack are the Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) warheads. Matched pound for pound of explosive, FAEs have between 2.7 and 5.0 times the power of conventional high explosives such as TNT.

The development of FAE warheads by both the United States and the Soviet Union is now well into the third generation stage. These weapons work by dispersing an aerosol cloud of highly volatile fuel over a relatively wide area. A precise time delay before detonation is required for optimum blast effects. After initial development and tests, some of these weapons were employed in Vietnam, and were shown to be effective in defoliating an area 30 metres in diameter, even in thick forests. Such weapons were to be particularly effective against area targets, since neither land contours nor protective walls could limit the effects of the blast waves produced. Furthermore, operational tests in Vietnam showed that factors such as flight angle to the ground, dropping speed and length of delay before detonation strongly influenced the shape and size of the resultant affected area.

In quantitative terms, the CBE — 72/B, a second-generation FAE weapon, disperses ethylene oxide in three separate containers over an area 15 metres in diameter and 2.5 metres thick. The mixture is ignited after a delay of 125 milli-seconds, to achieve over-pressures as great as 300 psi. It has been estimated that a B-52 would be disabled at an overpressure of three to five psi, while a 1000 pound methane FAE would destroy parked aircraft over 200 metres from the centre of the blast. An overpressure of seven psi would collapse an ordinary brick building, and a reinforced concrete aircraft shelter six feet thick, designed to resist blast effects, would collapse at 70 psi.

Thus FAE warheads would be an obvious choice for use with SLCMs against the TFF. Such warheads possess enormous destructive power at relatively low cost, and will surely be highly developed over the next ten years as a viable alternative to a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon. The problem now remains to formulate methods whereby the effects of such powerful warheads, delivered with high accuracy could be minimized in a cost-effective manner.

**PASSIVE DEFENCES**

**Methods of Passive Defence**

Throughout the world today, there are many different methods of protecting aircraft and associated installations from the effects of air strikes. Although the details of these protective measures are often veiled in secrecy, there are a number of general methods which are relevant to this discussion. The techniques that are to be discussed are:

- deployment of TFF units to various bases,
- dispersal of aircraft on base,
- protection by revetments and bunkers,
- construction of underground facilities,
- use of camouflage and decoys, and
- security and counter-intelligence.

The merits, disadvantages and cost effectiveness of these methods will be discussed.

**Deployment of TFF Units**

The deployment of TFF units, either on a rotational or permanent basis, to various bases on the east coast of Australia has one big advantage. It forces the enemy to divide his attacking force of 36 SLCMs into smaller groups against each base thereby limiting the number of warheads that may be employed against the TFF on each base. By creating as many targets as is possible, the TFF would greatly increase its chance of survival as an effective fighting force.

Suppose that the Federal Government does
approve purchase of 75 aircraft, of which five would be dual for training purposes, with another five single seaters for the Operational Conversion Unit. Allowing for between eight and twelve undergoing major servicing at any one time, this would leave between 53 and 57 front line fighters at any one time. Assuming that the present three operational squadrons are simply re-equipped with new aircraft, this would give each squadron between 17 and 19 operational aircraft. It must further be assumed that the squadrons have become thoroughly conversant with the new weapons system and are in a state of operational readiness at the time of the attack.

The present major Operational Command bases on the east coast of Australia are, from north to south, Townsville, Amberley, Williamtown and Richmond. The last three are located to protect the main industrial areas of eastern Australia, while Townsville exists to support the army and maintain a presence in north-eastern Australia. Ideally, in the context of the SLCM surprise attack, the four bases should be upgraded as described later, while two additional bases should be provided.

Possibilities for provision of two extra bases are to upgrade facilities at the present base at East Sale, and to build one new base. This could either be between Canberra and Sydney, on the central Queensland coast in the Gladstone or Rockhampton hinterland, or at Nowra. TFF presence in Sale would serve to protect the mineral rich areas of the La Trobe Valley and Bass Strait. A base between Canberra and Sydney or one at Nowra would extend the air defence net over the national capital, while a base in central Queensland would plug the large gap between Amberley and Townsville.

If this work were carried out, the TFF could deploy eight or nine operational aircraft to each of the six bases. The three squadrons could be split into six, or for ease of administration three smaller additional flying squadrons could be reformed. Maintenance facilities able to cope with up to C Servicings could be provided on each of these bases in the interests of efficiency, while all major servicing would be carried out at a central depot such as Williamtown. This would make the task of the enemy with only six SLCMs per base more difficult, whilst still maintaining the operational efficiency of the TFF’s squadrons.

Dispersal of Aircraft
An important lesson from the 1967 Six Day War was that undispersed, close packed rows of aircraft are very easy to destroy. In four hours, the Israeli Air Force succeeded in wiping out more than 80 percent of the strength of Egypt’s air forces, with conventional ‘iron’ bombs and strafing cannon fire. Clearly, with moderate sized FAE warheads being capable of destroying parked aircraft at distances of over 200 metres from the blast centre, an important feature of any TFF base will have to be its dispersal area.

Allowing for improvements in FAE warhead efficiency, a distance of at least 600, but preferably 800 metres, should be allowed between the dispersed aircraft. With provision for parking up to 20 aircraft in four rows of five and a buffer zone around them, then with 600 metres between aircraft, the land required would be 3.0 kilometres by 3.6 kilometres. With 800 metres between aircraft, the requirement would be for 4.8 kilometres by 4.0 kilometres.

Capital cost of land for this exercise would be high, but not as high as the cost of two aircraft being destroyed by the one SLCM because they were parked too close. Of course problems would arise with flight line maintenance, and distances to be covered by aircrew between briefing rooms and the aircraft. These, however, could be overcome with small loss of efficiency.

Revetments and Blast Pens
Once a suitable dispersal area has been provided to minimize loss due to FAE warhead blast waves, the problem remains to protect the aircraft from the secondary effects of such blasts, namely damage by fragments and flying debris. Simple revetments around the parked aircraft could help to some extent, but would not afford protection from large fragments falling from above. A practical solution to the problem would be a bunker, dug into the ground, with a domed roof almost flush with the ground and strengthened doors to minimize blast effects.

No doubt this sort of structure would be costly; however, it would include facilities for flight level and other routine maintenance. Furthermore, if up to twenty bunkers were built on each of the TFF bases, the aircraft could be rotated around these on a random basis,
thereby minimizing loss due to direct hit or near miss.

**Underground Facilities**

The construction of underground facilities, while affording excellent protection against all forms of conventional attack, is effective but not cost effective. It is simply too expensive to bury entire hangars, maintenance and crew facilities. For such things as fuel and ordnance storage, then underground tanks and bunkers are cost effective and necessary. Already most major Australian bases have some underground fuel storage, so the idea is not new to Australian defence planning. However, before the projected time of the SLCM attack, all such fuel and ordnance storage should be placed underground.

**Camouflage and Decoys**

Due to present methods of photographic reconnaissance, the use of camouflage is often easily detected by the enemy intelligence service. However, judicious use of camouflage to make some structure appear to be something else can often confuse or mislead the enemy sufficiently to cause his strike to be misdirected. Simple ruses such as leading the enemy to believe that old unused fuel storage tanks are still in use may be sufficient for him to attack the wrong area of the base.

Similarly, well constructed wooden mock-ups of the aircraft when moved about between maintenance areas and flight lines in a realistic manner, may serve to mislead the enemy as to the true operational strength of the TFF, and cause him again to misdirect his strikes. Any tactic that can supply the enemy with false or misleading information will help reduce the impact of the attack. Such measures are generally simple, cheap and often highly effective.

**Security and Counter-Intelligence**

Of course it would be impossible to mislead the enemy if he has access to the correct information. Thus tight security and effective counter-intelligence measures are important in protecting the TFF. Simple measures such as screening off from public view the activities of our operational bases by use of fences and stands of trees would be highly cost effective in this area. Further, the fostering of a greater security consciousness among the personnel of the air force would hamper any attempts by the enemy to gather intelligence overtly or covertly.

**A COST EFFECTIVE PLAN**

In a purely objective sense, any plan of action that would leave the TFF as an effective fighting force after the SLCM attack, thereby preventing the take over of the Pilbara, would be worthwhile. However, it is often difficult to convince the taxpayer or the militant trade unions of the value of going ahead with many worthwhile projects. In this case, an effective plan to protect the TFF must be formulated, while costs are kept as low as possible.

The acquisition of the new TFF aircraft, weapons systems, spaces and facilities, will probably represent a capital cost of between $1500 million and $2000 million, with a unit cost of $15 million per aircraft. In real terms, the value of the Pilbara region could not be estimated so this will not be considered. Thus any plan must be reconciled with the investment made in the TFF’s new aircraft. Note that cost estimates are based on present money value, not on projected value.

Deployment of the TFF around six bases in eastern Australia would be a relatively inexpensive operation; however, construction of the facilities on those bases could be very expensive. The plan for deployment is a sound one, since it divides the force of SLCMs into groups of six. If the enemy chooses to direct all six missiles at the runways of each base, then no aircraft would be lost, and the damage could be rapidly repaired. If necessary, the aircraft could be transported by road to the nearest airfield with a runway long enough for them to operate. There are many non-military airfields in this category in eastern Australia. Alternatively, if some missiles are directed at the aircraft, then they should be dispersed and protected sufficiently so that if one is destroyed by a hit or near miss, then the others are far enough away to remain untouched.

Capital cost of land to build one new airfield and disperse the aircraft around all six bases should not run to more than $5 million per base. Constructions of the semi-underground protective bunker for each aircraft, with associated maintenance equipment and taxiways could cost up to $1 million. There would be as many as 20 of these bunkers per base. Underground fuel and ordnance facilities could cost as much as $3 million per base. A
further million dollars per base should be allowed for construction of decoys and other facilities to mislead enemy reconnaissance. This gives a total of $185 million on facilities designed to protect the TFF against the SLCM surprise attack. The figure is only 12 1/2 percent of the minimum expenditure on aircraft, weapons, spares and ground support equipment.

Now assume that the worst possible strike could take place, and all 36 of the SLCMs destroy one aircraft each. This would leave all runways, fuel and ordnance, and other fixed facilities virtually untouched, and would leave between 17 and 21 front line fighters unscathed. To this could be added five single seat, and three or four dual training aircraft, and up to four aircraft that could be rushed through servicing. Thus, between 25 and 35 aircraft could still be put into the air against the enemy, and in all probability, these figures would be exceeded. The TFF would have an effective and, to the enemy, dangerous fighting force still intact. The enemy’s aim of neutralizing the TFF for a period of two weeks would have been defeated.

The following cost effective plan is recommended to be implemented in parallel with the phasing in of the new aircraft, as the Mirage is phased out:

- construct one new base, and upgrade the present bases at Townsville, Amberley, Williamtown, Richmond and Sale to give six TFF bases;
- on each base provide dispersal areas so that no aircraft is within 800 metres of any other;
- provide for each aircraft a protective hangarette, with its domed roof level with the ground outside, and include at least flight level maintenance facilities;
- bury all fuel and ordnance storage facilities;
- provide suitable camouflage and decoys to mislead enemy intelligence;
- screen all bases from public view; and
- tighten security and counter-intelligence to deny the enemy information.

The above measures should be regarded as the minimum requirement, and should be integrated with the overall program to re-equip the TFF with its new aircraft, whatever they may be. It should be apparent that the TFF, with these facilities, would be well equipped to survive almost any form of attack, short of nuclear, and to strike back at the aggressor. Further, the distribution of TFF units would be suited to protect Australia’s industrialized eastern seaboard in the event of an attack from some other direction.

CONCLUSION

The Tactical Fighter Force will form a key part of Australia’s defence in the 1980s. As pressures of shortage of resources and overpopulation force other countries to look outside their own borders for resources and land, they may be tempted to test the defences of a comparatively sparsely populated and resource-rich nation such as Australia. In such a case, Australia may well find herself on her own, due to international sympathy for the aggressor’s cause, thereby leaving her with the unenviable task of having to defend her own shores unassisted. In this case, the defence forces will be fighting for their country’s very existence as one nation continent, and the RAAF’s TFF will play a vital role in this defence.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that targets such as the aircraft, runways, hangars, maintenance facilities, fuel stocks and weapons of the TFF are protected as well as possible against the SLCM surprise attack. Being such an accurate and lethal weapon, the SLCM poses a grave threat to TFF security. The measures employed to counter the effects of such an attack must therefore be commensurate with the threat.

A cost effective plan to meet this threat has been outlined in the preceding discussion. It includes deployment of the TFF to bases all along Australia’s east coast to divide the enemy’s attacking force yet preserve operational efficiency. Dispersal of the aircraft and protective measures for them and the other facilities has been recommended. Finally, measures designed to starve enemy intelligence of reliable information with which to plan the SLCM attack have been outlined.

Not only is the outlined plan cost effective, but it is practical and feasible. Australia would stand to lose more than just $1500 million in aircraft destroyed if such a plan were not adopted. She would lose a large area of valuable land and mineral resources, her territorial integrity, and above all, her pride as a nation. Is the cost too much to protect this? The answer must be 'NO'.
The Legacies of Experience
A letter to a friend

Lieutenant Colonel J. Wood, ED, BA, MA
Melbourne University Regiment

My Dear Friend,

YOUR letter on The Future of Infantry came as a welcome surprise. It was good to hear from you. When I have had time to think through some of the ideas you put forward, I will reply in more detail.

For the moment, however, I will reply only to your charge that we have not learnt from our long and extensive involvement in Asia. I am convinced to the contrary and in this letter will attempt to draw out some of the lessons and, where possible, stress their particular application to our present circumstances — those of the Army's role in the defence of the Australian mainland. Obviously, for reasons of space, I will leave aside a number of other issues which you will be no doubt quick to notice.

Over the years of our involvement in Asia, elements of the Australian Forces have had unique opportunities to gain and maintain combat experience. However, it is necessary to recognise the serious deficiencies that exist both in experience and in present capability. No one Australian Service has been subject to the full range of tactical and strategic exposure despite this long involvement in regional conflict, and the experience has been gained in fairly narrow areas.

The bulk of the Australian military combat involvement has invariably fallen on the Regular Army and within the Army upon the Infantry. As a result, there exists in Australia a large reservoir of infantry-oriented combat experience. The initial experience, gained in Korea, was broadly an extension of the conventional warfare doctrines developed during World War II. With time, the nature of the fighting changed, and the Army began to concentrate on countering guerrilla initiated activities developed to the more advanced levels evident in the latter period of the Vietnam War. The nature of the fighting and the continued commitment of infantry based forces ensured an emphasis upon this particular (and narrow) facet of military doctrine.

In its turn this emphasis has led to the perpetuation of Infantry as the dominant arm of the Australian Army. Seen over the longer term this has been advantageous for the Infantry in that the regional involvement paralleled a growth in the number of regular Infantry battalions from one to nine, nine being generally considered as the minimum number required to form an Infantry Division. Mindful that it took almost twenty years to achieve this growth, there are other relevant comments that need to be made. Although this quantitative improvement in Infantry combat power did much to raise the level of expectation of the Army as a Service, political and economic changes have since reduced the number of regular battalions available. Secondly, this post-war Infantry Division was never deployed in either peace or war.

A further observation is that the experience in Vietnam particularly, where for the first time in the post-war period a Task Force was deployed, led to a preoccupation with planning and training at Task Force and lower levels of deployment rather than, at least until recently, training at Division and higher level. Thus, while the combat deployments have led to a necessary upgrading of the level of tactical thinking from post-war levels, necessity has placed practical limitations upon the Army in its application of this improvement. Fortunately, one real benefit of the deployments has been the continued...
development of an All Arms outlook, within the Task Force setting, and valuable experience has been gained in this field. This experience could prove invaluable when detailed proposals are prepared as to the most appropriate tactical employment of Australian combat arms. The early experiments with mechanisation of infantry are a promising move in this direction. However, long term restraints on armoured development may, in turn, further restrain a bold revival of this important arm.

Even so, the support of even one Task Force in Vietnam, placed severe strains upon the Army as a whole. Australia-based Army resources were either directly supporting the Task Force, were preparing to replace it, had recently returned from service or were covering for that Task Force the domestic obligations of the rest of the Army. Valuable as this realization of the effort involved in a sustained commitment was, even more important was the appreciation of the difficulties encompassed when the Army had also to cope with a limited National Service intake, let alone that required at a time of mobilisation. What it is not possible to assess is the wider, public and political awareness of the difficulties involved in the maintenance of even a small force in action. Such an awareness will be vital to any meaningful consideration of the problems associated with the successful defence of the Australian mainland.

Doctrinal specialisation has directed attention away from the peculiar factors relevant to the defence of the Australian mainland. Given the pressing requirement to satisfy the Vietnam commitment, much of the training effort conducted during this period was tailored accordingly. Earlier obligations followed a similar course. Australia’s regional involvement has generally meant the deployment of a force into a known and circumscribed combat zone and resources have been moved to that zone from a distant secure base over routes undisturbed by enemy action. With time, the conditions of terrain and climate in the combat zone became fairly predictable, as did the nature of the enemy and the scale of the resources available to him.

It is not proposed within this letter to outline in detail the peculiar features of the Australian mainland and the approaches to it but vast distances, varieties of climate and terrain, restricted infrastructure, the physical deployment of population and resources confer advantage and disadvantage on both attacker and defender.

Although Australians will be operating now on their home ground, conditions in the operational zone could vary enormously, e.g., an enemy threat could eventuate at any point on the Australian mainland and so take advantage of the terrain and climate of that particular area. It would also dictate the type of response required. Secondly, the scale of enemy force required to complete a successful lodgement presupposes a degree of available air, maritime and ground support of such dimensions not only adequate to counter an Australian reaction but also seriously to interfere with those Australian facilities vital to the support of this reaction.

It is this question of dimension that will cause our planners so much trouble. Past experience has been with an enemy of manageable size. Australian Forces, in comparative terms, have always been a small part of the total force deployed and peacetime restraints make it likely that Australia’s regular forces will remain small in number. Given the attention afforded the Australian system of reserves, it is also likely that, even with a measure of strategic warning, the total force fielded will still be small in comparison to that available to an aggressor, executing a major deployment. The other serious disadvantage could be that, unlike previous deployments, Australia may not only have to bear the brunt of the initial fighting alone, it may have to continue without outside help. It is possible that, either as a result of inadequate warning or preparation, the initial engagement could be so disadvantageous to the Australian Force as to seriously limit the subsequent responses.

As well, the possible size of an Australian initial response force could be further seriously depleted when resources are deployed to cover other likely contingencies and to defend key political and military resources. Certainly the Army has had in the past to protect its operational bases, but none of the above constraints of these expected dimensions have applied to its strategic deployment. Neither have the penalties for failure ever been so high. The forward deployment of Australian Forces, which contributed to a modest build-up of the defence infrastructure within Australia, has also directed attention away from the
vulnerability of this infrastructure in times of direct threat.

Improvements have been made in this direction, but the more leisurely construction of advanced support facilities at Cockburn Sound, Learmonth and Darwin bear witness to the lack of urgency in defence spending. The unprotected nature of these facilities even to the ravages of nature was distressingly exposed by Cyclone Tracey in 1973. No doubt a more expert study would further identify the weaknesses of the defence infrastructure, but even a casual survey would note the need for extensive road and rail links, the need for prepositioned and protected stores, the absence of fuel, repair and maintenance facilities and the lack of a comprehensive surveillance, early warning and communication system.

A similar survey would highlight the vulnerability of the Australian economic infrastructure essential to a successful defence, eg., the concentration of key resources; the nature, supply and refining of Australia's oil; the directions and volume of its external trade; the wide range of options available to an aggressor wishing to disrupt these resources; the limited defence industry capability.

The third major effect of our Asian experience has been the lessening of the general awareness of changes in the conduct of warfare. As already indicated, the likely size of an enemy force, capable of both lodgement and harassment, presupposes for the Australian force an initial position of at least strategic disadvantage. Australia's regional involvements have created, in the public mind at least, a tradition of success and of strategic advantage. The desperate days of World War Two, the early reverses in Korea and the frustrations of subsequent campaign, have been smudged by the judgment of eventual success.

Australian governments have had a great deal of difficulty in publicly and convincingly defining threats to Australian security. There have been, of course, good political reasons for this imprecision but, related to this imprecision has been a belief, built up in the public mind at least, as to the physical remoteness of any threat to Australia. Apart from the distance separating Australia from its military involvements, there has been always the comforting knowledge that should the worst come to the worst Australian Forces could be withdrawn without any ongoing physical threat to the Australian mainland. The absence of any actual physical threat since 1941-42 and the regional conflict experience have reinforced this belief in the remoteness of the possibility.

Nevertheless, most countries within Australia's strategic environment have had to face, over the period of the last thirty years, pressing and substantial challenges to their national integrity and in the wider scheme of things the indivisibility of events has become an established fact of life. Additionally, there have been new developments in the conduct of warfare — eg., opportunities now exist for civil hostage situations or for the selective denial of key resources and installations by small forces acting on behalf of more distant powers, eg., the Soviet Union's support of local rebels and sponsorship of Cuban forces in the destruction of Angola. Such situations, given certain conditions, could be repeated within Australia's immediate area of interest, say in Indonesia or Papua New Guinea, even on its territory.

Maybe this should be an important lesson from our earlier experience — the need to mobilise Australian public opinion in support of plans and preparations for the defence of the Australian mainland.

There exist, of course, the accepted means of enlisting support available to a democratic society — Ministers, Parliamentary Committees, the machinery of the Public Service. Without denying the significance of these means, their success or otherwise, is very dependent upon the priority accorded to national security by the Government, the Opposition, of the day and upon the competence and enthusiasm of the persons involved.

Central to any campaign to stimulate public awareness are the personnel of the defence forces. However, under the presently accepted formal and informal constraints, the defence force involvement in public debate is severely curtailed and, obviously, at any time a serviceman must be acutely attuned to the possible effects of his views upon his service career. While the exponents of better health, improved trade, primary and secondary industry and so on are able to muster their own well established, powerful and publicly vocal lobbies, the defence forces are the least able, in terms of organisation and opportunity and by the very nature of their charge, to press publicly
for change. This is not to deny the opportunities for expression but a recognition of the restraints upon that expression.

It would be easy to denigrate in advance the possible contenders for aggressor and to underestimate their capabilities. Similar confidences in the past have come seriously undone. Our regional involvement and the collapse of Indo-China may have helped to contribute towards a more realistic assessment of the possibilities but, what is often overlooked in the current debates are the changes, both qualitative and quantitative, in the international arms race. Under the new rules of strategic significance, the latest and most sophisticated equipment of the major powers is available to the most unlikely and unexpected recipients. Who would have thought that countries like Libya and Israel or Egypt and Iraq would have ever possessed inventories far in excess of anything possessed by Australia? Australia remains one of the few countries in the world untouched by the largesse of these massive programmes of arms aid and purchase and, while we may point to our possession of a few F111s or Leopards as a sign of strategic consequence, it has been the Israelis and the Egyptians who have fought major and conventional actions with comparable and more advanced weapons and incurred losses and results of a magnitude Australians have yet to fully comprehend.

Tactically as well as strategically we could be disadvantaged. Australian Forces have for many years now operated from a position of air superiority. As already indicated, in a future conflict it is unlikely that this advantage will be available, and yet the sheer physical distances involved in tactical deployment across the mainland demand a versatility and capability within a condition of air superiority or at least parity. Quite apart from a shortage of aircraft and helicopters, we are also aware of chronic weaknesses in air defence, medium and heavy artillery and missilery.

Similar conclusions could be reached about the availability of new weapons systems, e.g., numerical and equipment disadvantages demand compensatory resources such as fire power and, in most assessments of tactical requirements, it becomes necessary to consider the nuclear option. This is a highly sensitive and emotional issue in Australia and our Asian experience has to a large degree shielded the Australian public and its defence forces from the realities in the development of the nuclear option elsewhere. While it is often said that this or that time is not the most politically opportune, it is unlikely that reasoned assessments of this option can be ignored for much longer.

Our earlier specialisation in tactical doctrine may encourage our current planners, when faced with a wide range of options, to press for continued specialisation as the most sensible way of keeping alive at least some of the skills upon which Australia may have to rely. This raises the question of whether Infantry should continue to be the dominant arm of the Australian Army? While it is difficult to recommend reasonable alternatives to this approach penny packets of specialisation could give a potential enemy an additional advantage.

It could also be that years of experience have emphasised tactical doctrines that will be hard to change — the experience in Korea, Malaya and Vietnam has emphasised the tactical necessity to hold vital ground whether this be a secured village or a key physical feature. It may be that in Australian mainland defence the vast distances and likely disadvantage may suggest that it is more important to actually inflict casualties than to hold this or that piece of ground. The additional complication, not normally an earlier consideration, is that Australian citizens are now the potential pawns in any such decisions. The enemy, with a wide range of tactical possibilities open to him, might easily bypass a defended locality to gain a more attractive prize or inflict a tactical disadvantage. That war is both a political and military activity has been well learned in Asia. The application of this truth to mainland defence is not so easily achieved.

Restricted and restrictive though our previous experience has been, it has provided the opportunity for a significant reappraisal of Australia's defence needs and capabilities. There has been the opportunity to consider and then implement a major re-organisation of the Defence group of Departments; the establishment of a basic groundwork in common user activities, and extensive reviews of individual services. It would be easy to overestimate the significance of these changes and to assume that weaknesses uncovered or overlooked has been corrected. Nevertheless, it appears that Australia now has a defence
organisation more responsive and better structured to cope with the peculiar challenges with which it is now faced.

Twice there have been opportunities to introduce and assess systems of National Service. The use of National Service as a means of providing the necessary manpower to satisfy Australia's defence requirements has long been a contentious issue, and the matter was forcefully debated when National Service, in support of the Vietnam commitment, was introduced in 1964.

As a result of this National Service input, the Army was faced not only with its combat commitment in Vietnam but with the additional task of a major expansion in order to train and usefully employ these additional resources in manpower. The rate and the scale of this change no doubt severely taxed the existing resources of the Army but, at the same time, it provided a valuable opportunity to experience and examine the effects of a rapid expansion in support of a defence commitment. A further advantage was the raising of the level of expectation and training of the Army generally in that there was a major expansion in the number of combat units, mainly infantry, and a strengthening of the staff, training and logistic establishments previously geared to a fairly static and predictable input.

There have been opportunities to examine the relationship between defence commitments and the availability of defence equipment and technology.

Despite major achievements and contributions by Australian based industry to the equipment requirements of its defence forces, the escalation in the costs of defence equipment and the constant changes in technology, have placed limits upon the vigorous pursuit of new equipment programmes and successive governments have been able to postpone or avoid major outlays on capital equipment and technology. This approach to defence purchase has encouraged an imbalance in present force capability and has led to major restraints upon the size of the forces available.

While it would be economically misguided and chauvanistic to assume that Australia could be self-reliant in defence equipment, experience has emphasised the need for a sound domestic defence industry and has highlighted the dangers of extensive or selective reliance on overseas supplies of equipment and technology.

Often in this letter it has been suggested that the regional commitment has led to imbalance in defence capability. This imbalance has not always been disadvantageous. Experience has demonstrated repeatedly that high levels of men, money and material are necessary to combat the activities of numerically smaller and inadequately equipped forces. Our earlier commitments have provided opportunities to gain experience in combating such activities. A current assessment of past experience against likely mainland defence requirements suggests the need for a capacity to cope with low levels of threat. It is possible that during the initial stages of a developing conflict an enemy could deploy small forces against the Australian mainland to gain information, to signal or disguise intentions, to test Australian firmness or to erode our defence capability. Australian ground forces have had a long and useful exposure to such activity.

Central to any military response to a demonstrated threat is the ability to call upon and effectively deploy reserves, whether existing or created.

Unfortunately, Australia is not well equipped in terms of available reserves. There are various reasons for this situation and, while it is not proposed to examine them in detail, some general observations are offered. The first is that obligations have been met almost entirely from available regular forces with only a minor input from the reserve system. This concentration upon the commitment at hand has adversely affected the development of the reserve system, but, as already indicated, also development priorities both within and between the Services.

The second observation is that the actual nature and size of commitment undertaken has been such as to make it unnecessary to seriously consider the employment of reserves.

Thirdly, the absence of any substantial threat to the Australian mainland has led to the downgrading of the preparations for mobilisation in defence of the mainland or in consequence of a major threat elsewhere. Thus, the future importance of a strong, large and well trained and equipped reserve element does not flow easily from our earlier experience.

However, primary attention needs to be given to the creation of an Australian defence
capabilities, both actual and potential, that could inflict intolerable losses upon any aggressor. There are several components in such a capability. The first is the declared willingness to defend the clearly defined Australian territory at whatever cost. The second is the clearly perceived capability to make good this declaration.

In other words Australia, by the known capability of its existing and reserve forces, and the intangible factors such as allies and options, could offer a strategic deterrent to an aggressor. This deterrent would need to be capable of inflicting intolerable losses upon any approaching or initial lodgement force by counter attack, both directly and at the bases and lines of communications of the force itself — or, in the worst case, to seriously harass the attacking force so as to necessitate its extraction.

However, valuable such a known policy could be, what is absent from a current assessment of the Australian capability is a demonstrable credibility. The regular forces, even with adequate warning, have neither in being or promised the offensive or defensive weaponry of any comparative significance. The Australian reserve system has been run down and any attempt to build it up again would require a complete reversal of present policies at a time when there is a known and pressing requirement merely to strengthen the credibility of the regular forces.

While vigorously endorsing the proposition that regular and reserve forces must be developed simultaneously as dual elements of the one Force, it is possible that governments will be increasingly attracted towards the economic and political advantages inherent in the development of reserve forces at the expense of regular forces.

Our experience has provided a valuable opportunity for the development of defence forces and policies, but without the urgency of a direct threat. There are many lessons that can be drawn from this experience of direct significance to the present planning of Australia's mainland defence. It remains to be seen whether we can now combine the lessons with the dimension of thought now required to plan and execute the successful defence of the Australian mainland.

Regards,

Your optimistic friend.
THE SINO-VIET CONFLICT
- A SYNOPSIS

Squadron Leader P.J. Bennett
Royal Australian Air Force

The punitive strike launched by the People’s Republic of China against its former ally, Vietnam, on 17 February 1979 lasted only 17 days, but in that time provided many significant answers and raised even more questions on political and military aspects. Although the conflict had been predicted, the world was nevertheless surprised, and concerned, when it finally erupted. However, it soon became apparent that the conflict was not an unbridled military assault, but was instead largely a politically motivated and directed exercise, closely constrained at all times. Specific Chinese objectives were discerned from the outset and, coupled with Vietnam’s restrained response, meant the military action was strictly limited. As such, superpower involvement was averted. Following the achievement of its limited objectives, the PRC withdrew from Vietnam. The military and political scars it left behind, however, will have an enduring effect on Sino-Viet relations and security with the Asian region.

BACKGROUND

Sino-Vietnamese tensions can be traced historically through a number of centuries. More recent tensions attributable to the armed conflict have evolved inexorably and expanded to include the complexities of international relations.

An early sign of inherent tension occurred in January 1974 when the then South Vietnam invaded the Chinese occupied Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Although the PRC maintained control of the islands, North Vietnam was conspicuously quiet, neither condemning the South’s action nor praising the Chinese victory. Shortly after the establishment of the new Republic of Vietnam, denunciations of Chinese sovereignty claims to the Paracel and other island groups in the South China Sea became frequent.

Relations steadily deteriorated despite continuing Chinese aid to Vietnam which was seen as an effort to offset growing Soviet influence. Ideological differences became more apparent. Culturally, the persecution of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam caused further discord. Tension heightened in 1978 when Vietnam announced the expulsion of 200,000 ethnic Chinese. Then, in July, the Friendship Pass border crossing between the two countries was closed, stranding the expelled Chinese. Border skirmishes steadily intensified thereafter.

On the international front, the PRC had long been conscious of a growing threat from the USSR and was disturbed at its increasing influence, particularly in Vietnam. Fears manifested when the USSR and Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship in November 1978. However, the PRC was able to allay some of this fear when it concluded its own treaty with Japan, followed shortly after by US diplomatic recognition. Soviet annoyance at these moves coincided with increased localised tensions between Vietnam and China.

Finally, on 25 December, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. Following a lightning military campaign, the Chinese-backed Pol Pot regime was replaced with one wholly sympathetic to Hanoi. This humiliating defeat seriously challenged China’s standing as a leader amongst communist nations and its ability to protect a client state. Further, with pro-Soviet, and therefore antagonistic, Vietnam, Laos and now Kampuchea to its southern flank, China perceived an encirclement approaching that achieved by the US in the 1950/60 era. Such a situation was intolerable.

BUILD-UP

Border fighting intensified following the Kampuchean invasion and China began to increase its military presence in its border regions. Accusations of armed border provocations and civilian and military casualties flowed freely between the two protagonists. Vietnam accused China of abrogating the border agreement re-affirmed...
by the two communist governments in 1957, in what was shaping up as a border dispute.

China has a reputation for using military force in border disputes and so it came as little surprise when China commenced a marked military build-up. Besides the eight local divisions in Kuangchou and Kunming military regions, China was reported to have moved two additional armies totalling a further 60,000 men from the strategic main force into the area. Total troop concentration in the two military regions was increased to 300,000. The deployment of additional armies included substantial increases in artillery, together with an increase in the mechanized force to 1200 tanks and APCs. Tactical air power within striking range of Vietnam was boosted to a total of over 700 aircraft. Over 15 squadrons of combat aircraft, including the indigenously designed F-9 ground attack fighter, MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters and IL-28 medium bombers were deployed to the border region.

Vietnam on the other hand was heavily committed in Kampuchea where it allegedly had over 100,000 troops of its main battle divisions, together with armour, engaged in military operations. The border region was defended by up to 100,000 regional force troops and irregulars, including ill-trained militia. Only 300 armoured vehicles were estimated to be available. Combat aircraft capable of commitment included Soviet MiG-21 and US F-5 fighters, but numbered only 300. Despite the Chinese build-up, however, no force mobilisations or deployments were reported in the weeks preceding the invasion, possibly partly because the Vietnamese were largely unaware of the size of China’s force. Hanoi’s air defence was known to be extensive and the presence of a Soviet naval detachment, including a Kresta II guided-missile cruiser and a Krivak guided-missile destroyer in the South China Sea, probably offered Vietnam a sense of security against attack.

Vietnam’s continued presence in Kampuchea and the unbridled Soviet support incited condemnation and threats from the PRC. Only days before the invasion, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping warned that Vietnam “must be punished”. That China was poised to launch a strike was obvious, but some observers believed the blatancy had destroyed the necessary element of surprise, indicating no armed assault would eventuate.

**PHASE I — The Invasion**

Such illusions were shattered with the pre-dawn invasion on 17 February. 130mm artillery batteries maintained a concentrated barrage at points along the border as a prelude to the PLA assault. Following this bombardment, breaches were then effected at 26 different points along the border. This tactic was obviously designed to confuse Vietnam as to the main axis of the attack. Where terrain permitted, hundreds of tanks poured across the border in advance of APCs and infantry. In particularly mountainous areas where access was limited, mounted cavalry and infantry provided the main thrusts. The Vietnamese claimed that throughout this advance, strike aircraft, including MiG-19s and F-9s, carried out forward attacks. Rather than provision of close air support, the strikes were aimed at strategic targets including communications centres, power plants, and radar and missile sites in a pre-emptive attempt to disrupt Vietnam’s defence. There were no reports of aerial engagements and it would seem that the PLAAF achieved early air superiority.

Employing the Korean war tactic of human-wave attacks involving massive numbers of infantry, the PLA rapidly overran Vietnamese border positions. Within the first three days of the assault, the PLA controlled most of the border to a depth of up to 10 kilometres. By 19 February (Day 3), the wide front of attacks subsided into two remaining principal thrusts — down the Red River Valley to the provincial capital of Lao Cai, an important rail and road junction controlling access to Hanoi; and through the Friendship Pass toward the provincial capital of Lang Son, another strategic town with access to Hanoi. Heavy fighting for Lao Cai was reported on Day 3, and by Day 5 the city fell to the Chinese. In pursuit of the second objective, the PLA had taken Dong Dang by Day 4, where the advance halted. During this initial attack phase, other major centres to fall were Muong Hong, Tra Linh, Cao Bang, and Mong Cai (see Map 1).

Despite the availability of over 700 combat aircraft, the PLAAF reportedly flew only 500 sorties in support of these thrusts, with little or no opposition from the Vietnamese Air Force. These air strikes were apparently effective, causing considerable disruption to communications and power supplies. Seven surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and a number
of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) locations were claimed to have been destroyed or damaged. Chinese aircraft losses were not, however, disclosed.

By the end of Day 5, elements of four PLA armies totalling 125,000 troops were estimated to be committed in Vietnam, and were concentrated on two major fronts: Eastern front (Friendship Pass) under command of Kuangchou Military Region and Western front (Lao Cai) from Kunming Military Region.

On the other hand, Vietnam's response had been minimal. Many of the border forces seem to have retreated ahead of the massive Chinese assaults, although Vietnam claimed to have inflicted over 5,000 casualties and destroyed 60 tanks by Day 5. Vietnamese artillery appeared incapable of suppressing the rate of advance of the PLA. No regular reinforcements were moved to the front and the Chinese encountered little concerted opposition in seizing territory. The Vietnamese Air Force was kept almost completely out of combat, either because of a desire not to escalate the conflict or because conditions for a counter-air war were not suitable.

**PHASE II — Consolidation**

By Thursday 22 February (Day 6), the Chinese advance had largely halted, and there ensued a period of consolidation and reinforcement of occupied territory which now extended up to 20 kilometres inside Vietnam. No major new fronts were being established, although numerous skirmishes continued. A report that on Day 7 the Vietnamese had driven a Chinese division from coastal Quang Ninh province was not substantiated, and subsequent reports indicated China still controlled the border region of this province.

Vietnamese counter-attacks against occupied positions were characteristic of this phase. The movement of Vietnamese heavy artillery to the Lao Cai and Lang Son areas had commenced by 23 February, although no regular infantry units were being deployed. Reports indicated some Vietnamese units were withdrawn from Kampuchea to assist in national defence. To halt deeper Chinese advances, an extensive defence ring was established north of Hanoi, including SAM and AAA sites to counter air attack, artillery, and, further beyond, entrenched regular infantry. A reported Chinese air-strike on the coastal port of Haiphong against Soviet merchant ships discharging military cargo on Day 7 proved, not surprisingly, incorrect. The survivability of the PLAAF aircraft would have in any case been slim, and such a provocative action would have risked dangerous escalation.

Indeed, China's overall objectives in the conflict had become quite evident. The prime aim of the initial phase was to inflict heavy casualties and damage to Vietnam's border defence and regional centres to permit Chinese control of the area and limit further harassment. Seizure of provincial centres was intended to further demonstrate the capability of China's military response and expose Vietnam's weakness. The conflict was also designed to force Vietnam to loosen its military hold in Kampuchea, hopefully to the extent whereby guerillas of the deposed Pol Pot regime could escalate their activities. Other objectives were political in nature, attempting to regain lost stature and reinforce a claim for dominance in the region. China did not appear to be fighting for a large scale, prolonged war, and therefore limited both its objectives and actions. Vietnam also appeared content to maintain the conflict at a low level, minimising losses and controlling its response.

The lull in military activity during this intermediate phase permitted an intensification of the propaganda war. Predictably, there were vehement accusations flowing from both sides. The Soviet Union, through its treaty with Vietnam, attempted to exert considerable pressure on China, threatening punishment and 'grave consequences' if the invasion was not halted. The United States played an even-handed role, calling on both parties to withdraw from their respective invasions in Kampuchea and Vietnam. Vietnam accused the US of tacitly approving the Chinese invasion, although it would appear the US position vis-a-vis China was far less sinister than the USSR's with Vietnam. The United Nations, forum for much of the propaganda war, again proved its impotence, with the Security Council shackled by vetos of the Soviet Union or China. Although Vietnam appeared to be winning the propaganda war, sympathy for the Chinese position was widespread.

It was soon apparent though that, despite the early military victories, the PRC had one further military objective.
PHASE III — Battle for Lang Son

By Monday 26 February (Day 10) Chinese reinforcements were reported moving down the highways from Cao Bang and Friendship Pass toward Dong Dang. Substantial numbers of infantry were accompanied by artillery and tanks, and it seemed the PLA was amassing a number of divisions for a major assault on Lang Son. The civilian population of the provincial capital was evacuated, and some 10,000 Vietnamese regular infantry were moved to the front, in addition to those irregular forces already in the area. Vietnamese artillery was moved in and emplaced on strategic mountain slopes. The heavy Vietnamese buildup and commitment of regular troops was the first during the conflict, and indicated the importance both sides obviously placed on the outcome of a fight for Lang Son. Artillery bombardment by each side had commenced on Day 11.

Air interdiction had not been employed by either party during this preparatory stage. Thus, each was able to prepare for the battle with virtual impunity. The Chinese could have attacked the infantry and artillery columns moving toward Lang Son, but did not. Speculation followed that each side wished the battle to be a major encounter, involving regular forces, so that the outcome would be viewed as decisive for the victor. Ironically, in the midst of the massive build-up, China fired a psychological shot by accusing Vietnam of 'armed provocation' by refusing to 'negotiate' a settlement to the conflict.

The Chinese initiated their drive for Lang Son on 28 February (Day 12). Again, artillery provided a heavy barrage before infantry attacks, shelling the city and mountains, as the Vietnamese returned the fire. Moving from three sides, the PLA divisions, estimated at 60,000 personnel, then surged forward employing the human-wave tactic. Some PLAAF air strikes ahead of the Chinese attack were reported, and were probably flown against the artillery positions and other tactical targets. Air commitment however, was not extensive, and no Vietnamese air force retaliation was launched. Extremely heavy fighting was reported during the first two days of the assault, and Vietnam claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties. Vietnamese resistance was concentrated from within the city initially, but the forces gradually withdrew and bunkered into the surrounding hills as the enemy advanced.

In a possible diversionary tactic, Soviet naval vessels were supposedly deployed to the vicinity of the Paracel Islands. In response, the PLA Navy dispatched a number of vessels to avert any Vietnamese attempt to take the islands under a Soviet Navy smokescreen. No such action apparently eventuated and some doubt exists as to the veracity of the reports. Considering the presence of the two US Navy aircraft carriers Midway and Constellation in the South China Sea, any Soviet naval action against China could have been inflammatory.

Soviet pressure was further applied on Day 13 when 'volunteers' were reported ready to be sent from the USSR, Warsaw Pact members, and Cuba to aid the Vietnamese cause. Reiteration of the ultimatum to withdraw or face the consequences was also made.

However, on 2 March (Day 14), Lang Son fell to the Chinese, giving them control of all major provincial capitals in the border area, including all northern roads and rail centres, and occupation of a considerable area (Map 2). The PLA had achieved its final military objective, and at least some political prestige had been restored.

Therefore, on Day 15, it was hardly surprising that the Central Military Committee of the PRC Communist Party agreed to a ceasefire. China next announced it had ordered its troops to withdraw from all occupied territory on Day 17. Whether the Chinese intended to pull-back entirely beyond the original border was not clear, but the major military actions of the offensive had finished.
ASSESSMENT AND LESSONS

Although each side claimed an overwhelming victory, closer examination is necessary to qualify the statements. Clearly, the conflict had been tightly limited, with objectives and actions designed to prevent escalation and protraction. Indeed, Vietnam may have intentionally withheld large scale commitment of regular forces and air power, knowing China's aims were limited and did not involve anything more than a punitive strike. Any large-scale counter-action by Vietnam could have prolonged the conflict and forced further action by China in pursuit of its objectives, whilst inflicting unnecessary casualties. Because of Vietnamese restraint, for whatever reason, China more readily achieved its required threshold for withdrawal.

Casualty claims were widely divergent. Vietnam claimed to have killed or otherwise 'put out of action' over 60,000 Chinese and destroyed over 280 tanks and APCs. China, however, disclosed that the PLA suffered 20,000 casualties whilst inflicting 50,000 casualties on Vietnam. The extent of China's admitted losses was considered extremely high considering the level of conflict. An undisclosed number of prisoners was taken by both sides.

Despite the Soviet Union's constant rhetoric and threats, China maintained its objectives, apparently undaunted. Soviet retaliation was potentially massive, including conflict on China’s northern border, but China's perseverance suggests an understanding of international tolerance, provided the conflict did not escalate. The Soviet Union played no overt military role other than resupplying Vietnam with military stores.

China again demonstrated its resort to military action to protect its territorial (and political) integrity, as it had done previously in Korea and with Taiwan, India and South Vietnam. Political aspects aside, the military action was designed to secure and protect the border with Vietnam.

CAPABILITY OF THE PLA

Although the intention of demonstrating the PLA's superiority over Vietnam's forces may have been realised, it was certainly with reservations. Vietnam evaded, until the battle for Lang Son, a major confrontation with China, so the PLA was not fully extended as a fighting force. Even so, weaknesses were exposed.

An obvious realisation was the PLA's lack of sophistication as a modern fighting force, with much of its strength continuing to lie in a numerical rather than technological advantage. In terms of commitment, this was the largest conflict involving the PLA since the Korean War, yet many of the tactics demonstrated little improvement. The continued reliance on human-wave infantry assaults illustrates the inflexibility of the PLA to cope with different warfare environments, such as urban, jungle or mountain. Technological shortcomings further restrict the PLA.

Communications hampered the Chinese conduct of military operations. The widespread dispersal of fronts and the number of different PLA fighting elements involved, together with segregated control between two military regions, frustrated command and control aspects of operations. Field commanders were further hindered through inadequate communications, being unable to effectively co-ordinate artillery, armour and infantry. Air-ground communications also restricted application of air support to ground operations. By contrast, for example, the Soviet Union deployed a command and control ship to co-ordinate its naval and air elements in the area. The Sverdlov Class cruiser, Admiral Senyavin, also acted to co-ordinate intelligence collection activities. The Chinese certainly demonstrated no equivalent capability.

Besides the limitations imposed by political considerations, the PLAAF also suffered under technological obsolescence. Terrain and weather hampered air strikes in the initial phase, as aircraft such as the MiG-19 and F-9 lack an all-weather capability and an effective terrain avoidance radar to permit low level operation under adverse conditions. Thus, the PLAAF could not provide support at all times when required. Air support further suffered through poor communications. Although numerically immense tactical air power was potentially available, the air war was dramatically limited. However, if the various claims were correct the PLAAF would appear to have achieved and maintained air superiority for the duration of the conflict, although in the absence of a Vietnamese response this may be somewhat of a false indication of capability.
To be able to survive in a larger scale conventional war, the PLA would need to undergo drastic transformation, but at least it now has a recent experience on which to base improvements.

OUTLOOK

Vietnam and China are still not at peace following the conflict, and tensions will probably continue indeterminately. Should political conditions again dictate, further armed action could be anticipated. However, this experience suggests that any such conflict would be localised and strictly limited to prevent escalation. Direct superpower intervention was averted in this conflict, but the potential exists for involvement if further conflicts were to occur. But if the Chinese action has forced restraint upon Vietnam, the likelihood of further armed conflict will be reduced, and this in turn could assist stability in the region.

NOTES


MAP 2. APPROXIMATE AREA OCCUPIED BY CHINESE BY THE END OF THE CONFLICT

—RAAF STAFF COLLEGE STUDENT PAPERS—

(Continued from p. 37)

ROBERTSON, SQNLDR A.K. 28 Course 1975
Thiers is Not to Reason Why? An Essay in Military Ethics.

ROBERTSON, WGCGR D.A. 32 Course 1978

RODGERS, S.K. 32 Course 1978
Antarctic Development — The Strategic Implications for Australia.

ROFF, SQNLDR C.M.V. 28 Course 1974
Option Denial and the Peacetime Selection of Military Weapon Systems for Australia.

ROGERS, SQNLDR D.N. 30 Course 1976

ROSSITER, WGCGR J.V. 30 Course 1976

ROWLAND, SQNLDR C.E. 32 Course 1978
Optimized Pilot Training.

RULE, SQNLDR D.W.M. 30 Course 1976
The Maritime and Continental Defence of Australia.

RUSHBRIDGE, WGCGR P.J. 31 Course 1977
Humanity as a Principle of War.

SACH, SQNLDR R.H. 31 Course 1977
A Soldier’s Dilemma.

SAINSbury, SQNLDR G.A. 32 Course 1978

SALMON, Lcdr R.T. 32 Course 1978
The Contemporary Relevance of Conventional Island—Continental Deterrence to the Australia Defence Force (Policy & Structure).

SCHLEIGER, WGCGR W.F. 31 Course 1977
Australia’s Nuclear Options.

SCOTLAND, SQNLDR J.W. 31 Course 1977
Towards a Logistics Doctrine for the RAAF.

SCOTT, WGCGR W.E. 31 Course 1977
The Strategic Impact of the Tactical Fighter Force.

SEYMOUR, SQNLDR C.C.B. 32 Course 1978
The Neutron Bomb and NATO Strategy.

SILCOCK, WGCGR P.R. 32 Course 1978
The Force Structure Fallacy.

SIMMONDS, WGCGR A.J. 29 Course 1975
The Definition of Weapons that have Indiscriminate Effects.

SKETCHLEY, Lcdr J. 30 Course 1976
The Commanding Officer and the Law of the Sea.

SMITH, SQNLDR D.J. 30 Course 1976
Military Standardization.

SMITH, SQNLDR G.E. 30 Course 1976
Military Officer’s Education — Another Approach: A Tri-Service Defence Educational Establishment.

SMITH, MR G.M. 30 Course 1978
Coastal Surveillance — An Alternative Method for Australia.

SMITH, SQNLDR J.S. 32 Course 1978
RAAF Training Needs in the 80’s — The Systems Approach.

SMITH, WGCGR R.G. 30 Course 1976
Development of RAAF Weapon Delivery Capability.

SMITH, SQNLDR N.A. 30 Course 1976
The Future Role of the Australian Aircraft Industry in the Support of the Defence Forces.

SMITH, WGCGR P.G. 31 Course 1977
Command and Control of the RAAF’s Operational Element.

SPENCER, WGCGR J.N. 29 Course 1975
More Defence for the Australian Defence Dollar.

SPURGIN, SQNLDR P.C. 32 Course 1978
Concepts for the Defence of Australia.

SQUIRE, SQNLDR N. 30 Course 1976
A New Look at RAAF Apprentice Training.

STALL, SQNLDR J. 28 Course 1974
The Concept of INTRA Theatre Transport for the RAAF in the 1980’s.

STEPHENS, SQNLDR A.W. 30 Course 1976
United Nations Peacekeeping and the RAAF.

STEVENS, SQNLDR D.C. 32 Course 1978
In Defence of Australia — Where do we go from here?
Lieutenant Commander R. M. Jones
Royal Australian Navy.

In Australia the name Jellicoe is most often associated with the Battle of Jutland and the Grand Fleet of the Royal Navy. Seldom is the influence of this officer on the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) realised, yet he had a major impact on the RAN in the turbulent few years after World War I (1914-18). It is possible to trace his influence on the attitudes and organization of the RAN for at least the next 20 years and very long-term effects can still be observed today.

Jellicoe's influence was exercised through his 1919 report on Australian Naval Defence. At the time the report appeared not to influence events and in the material sense this is a reasonable conclusion and the one which is best remembered now.

This article will outline events leading up to the report, the report itself will be briefly summarized and some of the consequences examined. I intend to show that the Jellicoe report was not irrelevant and achieved its aim to a remarkable extent.

Formation of RAN
Consideration of the Jellicoe Australian Report must begin some years before the year in which it was prepared and in some respects its origin can be traced back to 1859 when the Australian Station of the Royal Navy (RN) was established. Events with more immediate influence on the report begin in 1900 when the separate states of Australia established a federal form of government.

On 15 December 1900, the first Governor-General of the new Commonwealth of Australia arrived off Sydney Heads in HMS Royal Arthur. He was welcomed in a manner befitting his station by the assembled ships of the RN Australian Squadron. Merchant ships assembled astern of the warships to pay their respects in turn. Notably absent were any ships of an Australian navy because there was no such organization. There were some ships in various small navies belonging to the states of Victoria, South Australia and Queensland, but they were of limited performance and their role was strictly harbour defence. Any attempt on the part of a state navy to expand beyond coastal defence had been strongly opposed by the Admiralty which sought complete control over ocean-going naval vessels.

On 1 March 1901 the State defence departments were taken over by the Commonwealth Government. With minimum reorganization the State navies became divisions of the Commonwealth Naval Forces and were still responsible for local defence only. The RN Squadron continued to use Sydney as its main base and to police the Australian Station at the direction of the Admiralty in London.

There was some interest in establishing an effective indigenous navy and in 1901 the Prime Minister (Barton) asked the RN Commander-in-Chief for his advice on ships required. Rear Admiral Beaumont's reply that 6 cruisers were needed was a model of brevity but did not include any details on how this number was calculated. He added that any such ships should be under the control of the C-in-C, ie. they would be effectively part of the RN although financed by Australia.

The issue of control of an Australian navy (if there were to be one) dominated discussion on naval matters for several years. Admiralty attitude was quite clear. Naval defence of the British Empire was a world-wide problem and must be centrally controlled. The Dominions...
were expected to contribute to the cost of the Royal Navy and to defend fleet bases and commercial harbours but the concept of an ocean-going Dominion navy was strongly opposed at the Admiralty. A rarely stated reason was the fear of what a colony with an effective navy would do by way of territorial expansion. Consideration of appropriate size and organization of an independent Australian navy was anathema.

In 1902 the Commonwealth Government accepted the Admiralty view and under the 1903 Naval Agreement Australia contributed £200,000 per year towards the upkeep of the Australian Squadron. Passage of the legislation necessary to formalise Australia’s payment was difficult and opposition within Australia to the practice of paying for the Royal Navy remained widespread. Several subsequent requests to the Admiralty for assistance in obtaining destroyers were refused on ‘policy’ grounds. The Admiralty pointed out that destroyers should be used in numbers, not singly.

At the 1907 Imperial Conference the Australian Prime Minister requested changes to the 1903 Agreement which would have increased local participation while further limiting the Admiralty’s freedom to move ships from the Australian Station. The Admiralty already felt the 1903 Agreement too restrictive as it committed them to agreed numbers of specific classes of ships permanently on station. Any change was unacceptable. Negotiations began on a replacement for the 1903 Agreement which would expire naturally in 1913.

By 1909 Australia, New Zealand and Britain had agreed to establish a Pacific Fleet made up of 3 separate ‘fleet units’. Each unit would consist of 1 battle-cruiser, 3 light cruisers, 6 destroyers and 3 (later 2) submarines. One of these units would be manned, financed and administered by Australia and would be the Royal Australian Navy. Initial cost would be £3,700,000 and annual maintenance £750,000.

On 1 July 1913 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board took over the shore facilities of the RN in Australia and assumed responsibility for the RAN. A few months later, on 4 October, the battle-cruiser HMAS Australia led the new ships of the RAN into Sydney Harbour. This date is now celebrated as the birthday of the Australian Navy.

In as much as in October 1913 a series of ships bearing the title prefix ‘HMAS’ was initiated this day is appropriate. However, a navy is far more than a collection of ships; establishing the essential and support organization took many years before and after 1913.

Development of this naval infra-structure was based largely on two reports on the RAN prepared by senior officers of the RN. The first was prepared by Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson in 1911. His report proposed a fleet of 52 ships and 15,000 men with commensurate costs and the Australian Government gave no indication of being prepared to spend that much on warships. Recommendations on naval bases and shore training establishments were taken more seriously and by the time World War I disrupted the programme, the Henderson proposals concerning training facilities were being implemented. A second report was prepared by Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe in 1919. This report was requested by the Australian Government because of changes brought about by World War I.

Between 1914 and 1918 ships of the RAN integrated with the RN. For the latter part of the war most Australian ships served in European waters under Admiralty control. The title of HMAS was retained but they served in RN squadrons and were usually commanded by RN officers with a proportion of RN personnel serving in them. Sending the major units of the RAN to the other side of the world was in accordance with the view that a threat to the British Empire anywhere was a threat to individual members.

**Imperial Post-War Organization**

The shape of post-war navies in the Empire was continually uncertain during the war and became a subject for serious discussion as early as 1917. In that year the Admiralty began preparing their advice on the post-war naval defence of the Empire. After Cabinet approval this advice was presented to the next Imperial Conference in June 1918. The Admiralty scheme was for a single Imperial Navy under the control of a yet to be established Imperial Naval Authority. Local Naval Boards would control dockyards, training establishments, personnel entry, training and construction and repair of ships. The naval C-in-C on each station would be in command of all naval forces afloat including local defence forces.
This plan was described as impracticable by the Dominion leaders. Canada pointed to the example of the Australian Navy’s integration with the RN as proof that the Admiralty’s suggested Imperial Naval Authority was unnecessary. The Dominions readily conceded this wartime integration was possible only if the smaller navies were closely aligned with the RN in peacetime. To ensure this close relationship continued, the Dominions asked for a visit by a qualified representative of the Admiralty. This representative was expected to advise on training, administration, organisation and equipment acquisition policies.

In December 1918, Admiral Jellicoe was formally appointed to visit the Dominions and prepare reports on naval development in each. His experience of the RN was extensive and ensured he was a ‘qualified representative’. He had joined the Navy as a 12-year-old cadet in 1872 and had subsequently specialised in gunnery. Since 1908 he had been Controller of the Navy (responsible for ship construction and repair), Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Second-in-command of the Home Fleet, Second Sea Lord, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet (1914-1916) and First Sea Lord (1917). He immediately began gathering a staff and planning the programme of HMS New Zealand (sister to HMAS Australia) which had been allotted to him as flagship. Initially the visit was to include Australia, New Zealand and Canada; while enroute he was directed to include India and called there first. A visit to South Africa was the subject of some negotiation but there was little South African interest in a navy and the visit lapsed.

Written instructions to Jellicoe from the Admiralty were brief and general. The Admiralty recognised his primary task as the promotion of uniformity of naval organisation throughout the Empire. If particular governments wished to take a more active part in naval defence he was to assist in preparation of plans for a new organisation. Although the First Lord believed that Jellicoe was to be given a good idea of Admiralty policy prior to departure this did not happen. In fact, he left the United Kingdom before the Government view of the post-war world had clarified; at that time the results of the Peace Conference were unknown and the function of the projected League of Nations was conjectural.

Even the Admiralty’s plans for naval organization were uncertain. The plan of May 1918 for a single Imperial Navy had been rejected by the Dominions. A substitute plan accepting independent Dominion navies had been prepared but until it received approval by the Committee of Imperial Defence it was not Government policy and Jellicoe was not given details.

The RAN in 1919

When Jellicoe arrived in Australia in May 1919 the RAN was undergoing post-war expansion of the original fleet unit. Flagship was still the battle-cruiser HMAS Australia (19,200 tons) supported by three 6-inch cruisers — HMA ships Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane (5,400 tons) with a fourth cruiser of the same class under construction in Sydney. The older cruiser HMAS Encounter (5,880 tons) was training ship. The destroyer flotilla consisted of six Yarra class (700 tons) built between 1910 and 1916. A further five ‘S’ class destroyers (1,250 tons) and the flotilla leader HMAS Anzac (1,660 tons) had been accepted as gifts from the RN and were still in the United Kingdom. Six J-class submarines had also been presented to the RAN; these would be based on the submarine depot ship HMAS Platypus which had been built during the war as part of the original fleet unit (both E-class submarines purchased as part of the fleet unit had been lost during the war). Supporting the larger units were four 1,250 ton sloops and a miscellanea of older vessels which had been part of the old State navies. A Fleet Auxiliary of one collier and one oiler provided logistic support.

Shore bases were developing quite well although many facilities were still under construction. The main base was in Sydney Harbour which had two dockyards and was also Australia’s main commercial port. In Victoria a new major training establishment was under construction on Western Port and dockyard was available at Melbourne on Port Phillip Bay. All of these facilities were clustered in the south-east corner of the continent where the population density was highest. An alternative fleet base south of Perth in the south-west was at a very early stage of development.

Inevitably the RAN still relied heavily on the RN for manning assistance, particularly for the supply of officers and senior sailors. A sailor
training ship in Sydney Harbour (HMAS Tingira) and the Royal Australian Naval College (RANC) at Jervis Bay for training officers had been functioning since 1912 and 1914 respectively. The first graduates of the RANC had recently been promoted Sub-Lieutenant but many years must elapse before a graduate of the College sat on the Naval Board.

The Jellicoe Report

Prior to his arrival in Australia, Jellicoe received a comprehensive list of items of particular interest to the Australian Government. This began with the strategic threats in the Australian area and went on to the future organization, administration and composition of the RAN. General subjects were amplified by 22 specific questions on every aspect of naval affairs from probable routes of an attack on Australia to the congestion in Sydney Harbour.

In the next two months Jellicoe travelled extensively on the Australian Station and visited most harbours along the east coast. By August his report was completed. This Australian Report was a most comprehensive document of 251 printed pages in 4 volumes. The first volume was unclassified; volumes two and three were confidential while the last volume, dealing with the threat to Australia, was secret. To ensure limited distribution for the fourth volume very few were printed.

No firm guidance was yet available on Admiralty or British Government policy so Jellicoe based his advice to the Australian Government on his own understanding of naval strategy. Not surprisingly, he continued the pre-war practice of basing the size of a navy on the size of the prospective enemy fleet. In South-East Asia he quickly discounted the Dutch and the United States of America as the fleets to equal. The former because their squadron in the area could be countered by light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The United States was held not to be a threat to Australia partly because it was officially a friendly power but more because South-East Asia would be peripheral to any naval contest between Britain and the United States which would be in the North Atlantic. Although both were discounted as enemies, neither was included as an ally.

Japan remained as the threat to the British Empire in the Pacific. The Japanese Navy was known to be building a modern fleet of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers which were expected to be in service in 1924. Defence against this fleet required, in Jellicoe’s view, a similar number of ships of equal capability. Addition of various support ships resulted in a recommended British Far Eastern Fleet of eight battleships, eight battle cruisers, ten light cruisers, 40 destroyers, three flotilla leaders, two destroyer depot ships, 36 submarines, four submarine depot ships, four aircraft carriers, 12 fleet minesweepers, one large seagoing minelayer and two fleet repair ships. Since this fleet would exist to protect the interests of only part of the Empire, Jellicoe felt that those parts of the Empire which benefited should provide and maintain the fleet. The major providers would be Britain (75%), Australia (20%) and New Zealand (5%). India would pay for the upkeep of some of the ships built by Britain while Canada and South Africa would contribute to independent forces.

The composition of the Australian portion was carefully planned so that, even if the Admiralty did nothing, the RAN could follow the plan and have a balanced navy able to act independently to fill all naval requirements on the Australian Station. Australia’s naval requirements were studied under the three headings of ‘striking force’, ‘direct defence of trade’ and ‘harbour defence’. The striking force would integrate in wartime with the Far Eastern Fleet (if it existed), and was based on a fleet unit similar to that on which the RAN was already planned but modified in the light of wartime experience. A unit would consist of one battle cruiser, two light cruisers, six destroyers, four submarines and two fleet minesweepers. Additional ships which would be needed on a scale of approximately one for every two fleet units were a destroyer depot ship, a flotilla leader, a submarine depot ship, an aircraft carrier, a fleet repair ship and a minelayer. Jellicoe recommended the RAN striking force should consist of two fleet units.

For direct defence of trade four light cruisers and eight armed merchant ships would be Australia’s share of an Imperial trade protection force. All should operate an aircraft with a large radius of action. Harbour defence would absorb 20 destroyers or patrol-boats, 10 submarines, 82 minesweepers (including 72 requisitioned fishing trawlers) and four boom defence vessels. Harbour defence vessels could be old
ships no longer suited for the striking force or trade protection.

All together, he recommended the addition by construction and purchase of two battle cruisers (including replacement for HMAS Australia by 1928), six light cruisers (including replacements for HMA ships Sydney and Melbourne), 21 destroyers, 12 submarines, four sloops, one fleet repair ship, one destroyer depot ship, one aircraft depot ship and one minelayer. Assuming a gift from Britain of the older destroyers and submarines for harbour defence the cost of the new construction programme was estimated at £12,300,000. Maintenance of all RAN vessels from 1920 until mid-1929 was estimated at a further £27,400,000. There was much more in the report but the 'eye-catching' part was the recommended size of the British Far Eastern Fleet and the strategic assessment of that part of the world.

Responses and Financial Problems

Admiralty reaction was strong and unfavourable. The first Sea Lord recognised the Australian Government had asked precise questions but still felt the original terms of reference had been far exceeded. Particular exception was taken to the strategic advice and Jellicoe was informed that any further proposals on strategy to Dominions should receive prior approval of the Admiralty. The exact reason for this reaction is not clear, especially as the Admiralty Board independently concluded (in September 1919) that the main threat to the British Empire in the Pacific was Japan. The suspicion exists that the First Sea Lord (Wemyss) was antagonistic to Jellicoe and possibly felt the report usurped Admiralty responsibility.

Whatever the reason, the Admiralty's adverse reaction meant no real notice was taken of the report in London. The First Sea Lord suggested advising Australia that Jellicoe's advice did not have Admiralty approval. Whether such a message was sent is not clear, but it is clear that the British and Australian Governments agreed to postpone any discussion on the report until the 1921 Imperial Conference.

Meanwhile, the Australian Naval Board received no firm indication of the Government attitude to the report so set about implementation. Budget Estimates prepared by the Naval Board for 1920-21 (the first after the report) included provision for the first year of the recommended ship building programme. The total estimate for the Navy, including Jellicoe's programme was £4,186,567 but the Government would only allow £3,250,000 which was insufficient to even maintain the existing ships. Hope of implementing a building programme in the near future faded.

Outside the Services in Australia the report was completely overshadowed by financial problems attributed to World War II. Expenditure on defence was pruned as much as possible; instead of the RAN expanding to adapt to the rising power of Japan it was severely reduced. The stated aim was to reduce from 576 officers and 6052 men to 457 officers and 4194 men. Where possible RN personnel would be returned to effect the reduction although there was some 'axing' of cadets at RANC. The reduced numbers could man fewer ships and the active fleet would be reduced to one light cruiser, six destroyers (with a sloop as destroyer depot), six submarines and their depot ship, one surveying sloop and one training light cruiser.

Financial considerations had a similar effect on the RN. The Admiralty put forward Navy Estimates for 1920-21 of £171 million. Cabinet allowed £60 million. By March 1920 all warship construction had stopped and over 200 surplus cruisers, destroyers and submarines were being disposed of by scrapping, gift or sale. There was now no chance of a Far Eastern Fleet being established as it would have absorbed roughly two thirds of the ships left in the commission in the Royal Navy.

The inability of the RN to establish a Far Eastern Fleet is illustrative of the deficiencies of the Jellicoe report. The main criticism must be that it applied to a world which the World War I had destroyed; a world centred on Europe in which the RN was the acknowledged dominant maritime power. The size of the RN then had been based on the size of other European navies — the rest of the world did not count. After 1918 that situation was gone and there were no other major European navies. The United States of America was antagonistic to Britain and was determined to have a navy 'second to none'. Unlike Britain, the United States could afford a naval building race. Further abroad, Japan was determined to have a navy large enough to dominate the Western
Pacific. And Britain had major financial problems. Of more immediacy, in August 1919 the British Cabinet issued the Ten Year Rule which stated that Britain was not going to be involved in a major war for the next ten years\(^2\). In that political climate naval construction on a major scale was impossible.

Although the report may have been unreal, at least inasmuch as it recommended an unreal level of naval strength, Jellicoe could not have been expected to have recommended otherwise. The Australian Government asked him to give the strategic advice knowing his background and he assessed the threat to Australia from his own experience. To do otherwise would have been dishonest.

Any serious joint consideration of the report by the Australian and British governments was delayed until the next Imperial Conference in 1921. In the meantime the Admiralty was quick to advise interested enquirers that the report had been endorsed by neither the Australian nor British Governments. In preparation for the 1921 conference the Admiralty drew up a statement of naval strategy which assumed insignificant RN forces stationed in the Pacific or South-East Asia. In the event of Japanese hostilities reinforcements would have to be sent from Home waters. Simultaneously a paper for the Cabinet recommended the development of Singapore as a base for these reinforcements\(^3\). This was the only shadow of Jellicoe's report at the conference, he had recommended Singapore as one of a series of bases strung out north of Australia.

The 1921 Imperial Conference did not produce a coherent naval policy. The final statement committed nobody to any definite action and, despite careful preparation by the Admiralty, little was achieved. A major reason was that while the conference was still in session the President of the United States announced a conference to be held in Washington to limit naval armament.

The conclusion that the Jellicoe Australian Report had little immediate impact on the strength of the RAN is inescapable. The main reasons were financial — there was no money for ships; and political — there was great faith in international treaties. An international treaty was to lead to further reduction of the RAN when HMAS Australia was sunk off Sydney Heads under the terms of the Washington Treaty.

### RAN Organisation

On the organisation of the Australian Navy the Jellicoe Report had immediate beneficial impact. By 1920 the RAN was moderately well off for ships and had reasonable support facilities ashore. As a result of the 1911 Henderson Report training was on a sound material basis; Australian born officers and sailors were under training and the proportion of loan personnel would reduce as time went on. The basic training system received Jellicoe's general approval and little was subsequently changed.

The administrative system was not in the same state and appeared to be confused. Jellicoe commented, "... I could not fail to be struck during a brief visit to the Naval Department by the want of system prevailing throughout the office ...".\(^3^4\) Senior officers at Navy Office were mostly ex-state navy personnel of very limited sea-going experience. What experience they did have had been obtained in very small navies which could be run on a day-to-day basis. The higher organisation of the RAN at that time appears to have happened rather than been planned.

Disquiet at Naval organisation had already led to a critical Royal Commission report on the subject. This report, in turn, had been criticised by a Cabinet sub-committee mainly because of the recommended composition of the Naval Board. Since 1913 the Board had consisted of the Minister (as President), three Naval members, and a civil member. The Royal Commission felt the Board should consist of the Minister (as President), a Naval member, a business member and a finance member while the Cabinet sub-committee preferred to exclude the Minister from a Board of two Naval members (one as President), a business member and a finance member. A fundamental difference existed over the manner of control over the Navy.

Apart from a request to the Admiralty for a loan RN officer to serve as First Naval Member the Royal Commission appears to have achieved little concrete result. However, disagreement between the two reports probably influenced the Australian attitude to Jellicoe. In July 1918 the Minister for the Navy (Cook) considered talk at the Imperial Conference about post-war naval organisation did not really concern Australia because, "We have had our arrangements for the last eight or nine
years, and upon these lines we are developing . . .". 35 In October 1918 the Australian Cabinet adopted the recommendations of their sub-committee which had criticised the Royal Commission. The over-ruling of a Royal Commission is bound to cause disquiet and it would not be co-incidental that in November 1918 Cook explained to the First Lord of the Admiralty that a comprehensive report on all aspects of naval defence was required. He (Cook) had heard that Jellicoe was being considered for the task and was keen to see him undertake the Empire Mission because his "... authority and status will secure for it unquestioned respect throughout Australia". 36

Jellicoe reviewed the Naval Board organisation and recommended a Board composition unchanged in numbers but with clearly defined duties for its members. He also felt that a properly organised Naval Staff was needed to assist the Board and a major reorganisation of the civilian element of Navy Office was overdue. Another major organisational change proposed was the rationalisation of the management of the dockyards at Garden Island and Cockatoo Island in Sydney Harbour. The report also covered personnel matters in detail with the general theme that the Australian Navy should align itself with the RN in procedures for selection, training and promotion of all officers and sailors. This would mean training in the United Kingdom in more specialised tasks for both officers and sailors. One specific recommendation was that sailors should be entered for a minimum engagement of 12 years to ensure there would be experienced sailors who would accept advancement to Petty Officer.

Most of the important organisational changes were largely within the control of the RAN and cost little; they were implemented immediately. In the Statement on Naval Defence 1920-21 in which he described the reduction in RAN strength the Minister for the Navy announced the adoption of Jellicoe’s administrative recommendations as already in progress. A Naval Staff was being established and Navy Office reorganised; dock-yard organisation was being reviewed and sailors’ engagements were to be extended to 12 years. Other small changes would be the RAN more in line with the RN. The same statement also announced the adoption of a Naval Board Flag, another of Jellicoe’s recommendations.

Assessment

In his covering letter to the Admiralty, Jellicoe summarised his aim: "... All my efforts, therefore, in Australia, have been directed to laying down principles, and a line of action, intended to make the Royal Australian Navy an efficient fighting force capable of working as one with the ships of the Royal Naval, imbued with the same traditions, and working on absolutely the same lines . . .". 38

Undoubtedly he succeeded. Nothing illustrates his success more than the principle of interchangeability stated in September 1920 — "The Naval Board consider that it is most important that the RAN and RN officers should be interchangeable . . .". 39 This principle was adhered to by the RAN with the co-operation of the RN for at least the next 20 years. Officers of all ranks and specialisations moved easily and frequently between the two Services and the RAN became a microcosm of the RN. In 1939 RAN ships were able once again to integrate with the RN.

Overall, the Jellicoe Australian Report effectively achieved its aim of standardising the RAN with the RN. Adverse reaction at the Admiralty to the report’s strategic advice and the ship-building limitations imposed by the Washington Treaty overshadowed the major benefits of his work. The brief from the Admiralty, and indeed from the Dominion leaders, was to promote the uniformity of naval organisation throughout the Empire. In Australia Jellicoe achieved his aim admirably. For its part the RAN was able to use the author’s authority to implement important and overdue organisational changes which were to prove a sound basis during the next decades.

NOTES

2. Despatch from Governor-General to Colonial Sec., PRO CO 418/9.
3. The Governor-General and Governors could request assistance in local matters from the Commander-in-Chief.
6. Letter from Commodore Erskine (C-in-C Aust Station) of September 1883 and minute by Admiralty Secretary, PRO ADM 116/68.
The C-in-C reported each stage in the passage of the Bill by telegram to the Admiralty and was at no time confident the Bill would be passed, PRO CO 418/26.

One cable (22 June 1904) from the Gov.-Gen. to the Colonial Sec. requested assistance with two or three torpedo boat destroyers. A Colonial Office minute on the request began, "I hope the Admiralty will refuse this ridiculous request . . . .", PRO CO 418/31.

Letter from Admiralty to Colonial Office 7 Dec. 1907, PRO CO 418/56.

Keith, op. cit., p. 132.

Ibid.

Keith, op. cit., p. 133.


Keith, op. cit., p. 132.

Keith, ibid., p. 133.

Admiralty memo dated 17 May 1918, PRO ADM 116/1815. This memo is reproduced in A. Temple Patterson, The Jellicoe Papers — Vol II, Naval Records Society, pp. 284-6. The latter work is henceforth referred to as the 'Jellicoe Papers'.

Letter from Prime Minister of Canada to First Lord (Geddes) 15 Aug. 1918, PRO ADM 116/1815 and ADM 116/1831 also reproduced in Jellicoe Papers pp. 286-7.


Letter Secretary of the Admiralty (Murray) to Jellicoe, 23 Dec. 1918, Jellicoe Papers, p. 289.

Instructions were enclosed with his appointment.


26. Roskill, op. cit., p. 280 has further details on this antipathy.

27. MP 1049/1 Series 1, File No 20/0215, Australian Archives, Sydney.


29. Letter First Lord (Geddes) to Colonial Secretary (Long), 25 Nov. 1918, PRO ADM 116/1831 and Jellicoe Papers p. 288.

30. Various Navy Lists.

31. Jellicoe's Australian Report, PRO ADM 116/1834. This report has been partially reproduced in Jellicoe Papers pp. 315-354.


34. Roskill, op. cit., p. 215.


36. Cook to Geddes, 16 Nov. 1918, PRO ADM 116/1831.

37. See note 29.


39. See note 29.

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South-East Asia — Its Place in Major Power Strategy in the 1980's.
INTRODUCTION
It is a formidable task to take up the Report and its five Studies, read it with some understanding of the complex issues which it addresses, and then attempt to assess its usefulness in the future officer development. The terms of the reference of the Report were very wide and its freedom of action significant even for today.

The Report is impressive for these two reasons, as it is for its size, its layout, the long list of recommendations and the obvious thoroughness of its compilation. It represents a peak of attainment in the display of military personnel planning expertise. As far as the Australian Army is concerned it will be an historic document not only because it records accurately the structure of the Army in 1978, and reveals the state of the art of officer planning, but also because it records most of the conventional and unconventional wisdom which is associated with such planning.

The Report is not a uniformly impressive production — the multi-authored chapters vary greatly in quality and literary aspiration. The Report rises to great heights of philosophical expression only to plummet into short bursts of military jargon. The Report should have been reduced to a simple, concise, coherent and readable document followed as necessary by explanatory documents and the Studies.

For example, there should have been overall conclusions in the Report; instead the conclusions are scattered throughout the chapters. Does Chapter 1, “Key Issues”, purport to be the conclusions upon which the recommendations are based? For a while I thought that Chapter 7, “A Concept for Officer Development”, might have fitted the role. The Introduction at page xiii hints at great things to come but then leaves the reader grooping to find out what the Committee wants to put across (apart, that is, from a rather long list of recommendations of varying importance).

Looking at such lists of recommendations is reminiscent of perusing examination results — look for items with which you can personally identify and forget the rest.

If indeed it was ever an objective, the Report has failed to seize the imagination of readers, be they Army or civilian. The great opportunity in thirty years to project a new or refreshing image of the Army officer has been lost, perhaps inevitably but, nevertheless, regretfully.

In case there is simply a defect in presentation, and to find out whether there is much of new substance hidden in the Report and recommendations, it will be necessary to review the Report in sequence.

APPROACH
What indeed is the modus operandi of the Committee? It was given a most comprehensive terms of reference but which represented a pot pourri of suggestions rather than a simple theme of officer development.

Is the reader to infer the approach adopted by the Committee from the sequence of the five Studies? Not so, because “The Future” is RODC Study No. 4.

If one goes by the Chapters in the actual Report, one is disappointed because Key Issues appear to have been identified before a study of the Asset, or the Future and other considerations. Intriguingly, a Concept for Officer Development rather belatedly appears in the concluding chapter just before Recommendations.

One problem is of course the immediate contradiction in the terms of reference. To use the Committee’s own words, it was directed to concentrate the Study between the points of
commissioning and promotion to Colonel, with the proviso that due regard was to be paid to professional requirements for the highest military ranks. When will the Army specifically, and Defence generally, realize that officer development is a flow of personnel from the lowest to the highest commissioned ranks? The artificiality of the creation of a promotion hurdle at the rank of Colonel will continually impede officer development. The “liability” consciousness of the defence hierarchy still reigns supreme in that it perpetuates the mystique of the ranks of Colonel and above. The ranks of Colonel, Brigadier and General and the promotion criteria should be as much a part of the whole officer development process as any other ranks. This is not to say that there cannot be differences in selection processes, but there should be an essential nexus between the respective numbers of senior and junior ranks.

The Committee believes that its concept for officer development can provide an enduring rationale against which current and future practices and procedures can be measured. I maintain that any concept based on the degree of liability or establishment consciousness exhibited in the Report (as opposed to respect for the integrity of the asset) cannot provide the stability in the officer development process for which the RODC is allegedly striving.

I shall develop this theme later.

KEY ISSUES

Chapter 1 states that the Regular Army is the core of Australia’s land forces and its officers sustain military expertise in periods short of mobilization. I thought that officers of the Active CMF also fulfilled this role. Is it not possible for part-time officers to indulge in the occupation of the study and practice of strategy, tactics and logistics and be employed in a wide range of Corps and non-Corps, staff and regimental appointments? Is a doctor or lawyer, who practises only part-time, any less a professional?

The Active Reserve provides much of the training expertise which will be required to prepare an expanded Australian land force in a period of increased threat. The Regular Army was stretched to the limit to maintain the Vietnam commitment and, at the same time, train national servicemen. It is reasonable to assume that any commitment much greater than this will require a degree of mobilization and hence use of the available expertise in both the Active and Inactive Reserve.

Chapter 1 contains some excellent thoughts, particularly in its stated recognition that the Army’s manpower is its most valuable asset (para. 126); that education must be undertaken in a liberal fashion (para. 127); and that a force of a given size can perform effectively only to a level consistent with the available manpower asset (para. 111). (It should have added “… and its potential to expand”.)

Unfortunately, one’s expectations that these thoughts would be developed in the Report, are not fulfilled and the later Chapters inexorably lapse into “liabilitarianism”.*

One should also applaud the Committee’s identification of areas of neglect (paras. 129 and 130) and the recognition of the problems of family, the latent usefulness of women officers, and the importance of equitable promotion procedures.

It would have been an appropriate chapter in which to introduce the difference between personal management as opposed to personnel management. Whereas the first is concerned with the individual and a name, the latter is concerned with numbers of anonymous people. All too frequently one is confused with the other, or alternatively much which goes under the name of personnel planning is really only stop-gap personal management.

One of the statements which I would contest is the one which says, “From the rank of senior captain onwards, it is essential that future employment be meticulously planned to maximize Army effectiveness and to take account of individual aptitude and inclination.” This is not what military personnel management is all about! As soon as we become overly worried about individual officers and their effectiveness in various employments, we lose sight of what the officer development process in a core force situation should be. Peace time efficiency and the meticulousness with which individual officers are placed in positions have little to do with preparing numbers of officers to meet the needs of expansion to match future threats.

*The author admits to the use of some personnel planning jargon. The concepts of “liabilitarianism” or “liability consciousness” as opposed to personnel asset considerations, are explained further on in the review under “Asset”.

The essential point is not to allow the stifling mechanism of job descriptions, considerations of day-to-day peace time efficiency, and the minutiae of personal management to cloud the requirement for sound personnel flow in the officer structure, and thus prevent the attainment of a good basis for expansion.

THE FUTURE

The forecasting study, which was launched to identify probable trends in national and, in particular, social perspectives and hence desirable trends in the development of the Army, appears to have been only a partially successful exercise. This is not the fault of the RODC, but simply indicates how difficult it is to forecast the future as a basis of determining selection, training and development programs for future commanders and staff officers.

On that note how disappointing it was to find unacknowledged and trite quotations like "The only certainty about change and the future is their uncertainty" or "As the environment becomes more complex so, too, will the demands on officers" or "Economic factors are becoming increasingly important in international relations"

My first major disappointment about the Chapter was with the Committee’s main conclusion, and that was that “Our study has convinced us that the Army is not adequately prepared to meet the demands of the future". This theme, which calls for a thorough and honest assessment of the capabilities of the present and new generation of officers to meet such demands, was not developed in the body of the Chapter. There are strong inferences but that is about all.

The summary of conclusions on society and authority is disappointing. If the Committee could not escape including such wide generalizations, it would have been better to simply acknowledge that the forecasting study had indicated nothing new. Para. 211 says that the future changes will be more extensive in scope and will reach deeper into the conduct of Army affairs. More extensive than what? Deeper than what?

Under “Organization and Accountability”, the point is not that all officers must be broadly aware... but that the Army’s officer development process should ensure that an adequate number of officers are correctly equipped for higher responsibility.

The RODC has chosen the expression civil-military relationships in preference to others such as “Armed Forces and Society”. I have no great complaint except that there are vigorous Inter-University Seminars on the subject of “Armed Forces and Society” in the USA, a healthy Research Committee on the same subject within the framework of the International Sociological Association, and a growing study group in Australia. I would have preferred greater reference to the topic of “Armed Forces and Society”.

The surprising conclusion of the RODC was, and I quote, “whether the threats are actual or perceived, the military will play an increasingly important and visible role in national affairs”. I read the conclusion just as defence expenditure was being further pruned, much equipment was being put into mothballs and the defence voice appeared to have become quieter than at any time since before World War II. It is presumed, therefore, that the current events are against the longer term trends as revealed by the forecasting study.*

Under “Current Defence Perspectives”, I cannot understand why the Committee has persisted with the notion that it is mainly the development of the regular defence forces that is necessary to meet any threat short of a major conventional lodgement by a superpower. The co-operation of the Regular Army and the Army Reserve is mentioned at other times, but is all too frequently omitted as it is here.

On the general problem of identifying a range of threats upon which to base the size of the regular forces and an expansion capability. I am reminded of the expression most used in the past by Brigadier R. K. Fullford (RL), and that is, “We should build an army to do anything rather than something”. The attitude of mind, which this expression engenders, is one which is less concerned with worrying about identifying specific threats but more concerned with all round capability of the core force (both Regular and Reserve).

The only remaining strong criticism of the chapter is the loose idealism which the authors allowed to creep into their descriptions of unit

*More recent events in Iran and Vietnam and government statements on defence policy have left the situation a little obscure.
and senior commanders. Selection based on the criteria enumerated by the Committee would practically ensure that most units and senior appointments went unmanned. The ubiquitous "liabilitarianism" crept into the Committee's analysis and they started thinking about developing individuals as supermen instead of taking groups of officers up the development ladder in the reasonable expectation that the right number of suitable commanders would emerge.

For my part, the best of Chapter 2 is contained in the following RODC statements — I would have liked them all to have appeared in the conclusions.

Para. 209 "...we emphasize that the Army exists to fight should the need arise, and nothing done in the name of change can be permitted to diminish that capacity."

Para. 225 "The Army must develop the capacity to monitor the social trends that most affect it; this will require increased interaction between the Army and community elements...." 
"There is a growing prospect of increased army involvement in aid to the civil power and military assistance to the civilian community."

Para. 227 "Ideally, the Army should be structured so that it can manage change in a positive rather than in a reactive way."

Para. 231 "The increasing importance of written communication skills requires emphasis; not only must the Army officer reach the most workable solution but he or she must be able to persuade others of its worth, often in writing."

Para. 239 "We concluded that primacy must be given to maintaining a core-force capability that is structured for expansion. This suggests that the core-force must cover the full range of skills and techniques required, it must be operationally effective at low level and must have the capacity to plan for, and meet, expansion needs."

### THE ASSET

Chapter 3 is memorable for its inconsistencies. Some statements are strongly liability-orientated, such as appear in para. 301. "The Structure of an Army should reflect its roles and tasks and those of its formations and units." Again in para. 334, "...we consider that the Army can no longer support the existing promotion system which is incompatible with establishment needs". (Better that they said that the establishment is incompatible with the asset and the promotion requirements.)

They are enough to make the seventeenth century Samuel Pepys turn in his grave.*

The inconsistency arises through the complete reversal of philosophy in the later sections of the Chapter. It is almost as if the Committee felt the need to state the orthodox military line, but was then forced by the sheer personnel logic which emerged from the Studies to recognize the importance of the personnel asset and the dynamic personnel considerations which attend it.

In para. 304, the Committee went as far as seeing the need "for those who sponsor various military employments to become more involved in the creation and modification of establishments in order to ensure that establishments are functionally, feasible and capable of being manned". In para. 306 f, it is stated that "The rank structure of the officer establishment does not allow for times in rank which approximate to officer development needs; nor does it provide for workable promotion flows"; para. 324, "An OEC should be large enough to provide a rank structure that is mannable and, where possible, provide a spread of appointments in different geographic areas."

The Committee, in para. 334 c, said that it was convinced of the need for the following step:

"A detailed review of the officer establishment should be undertaken with the aim of adjusting the distribution of ranks to meet both the operating requirements of the core-force Army (short term and long term?) with an expansion capability, and to provide a career structure which will attract and retain

*Samuel Pepys (1633-1703), a historian and sometime naval administrator in England in the seventeenth century, who intuitively knew more about personnel planning than most of our modern administrators with their computers.
quality officers in the necessary numbers." This statement of manning philosophy is the antithesis of the earlier "liability" statements.

In para. 348, likewise the Committee says that the rank distribution of the establishment requires adjustment urgently (because the proposed minimum times in rank based on considerations of maturity and experience result in average times in rank which do not satisfy the rank demands of the present establishment).

Paras. 358 and 359 confirm this view, and finally in para. 366 the Committee emerges from its earlier diffidence and states that they believe that the Army must decide the extent to which authorized establishments recognize the officer asset available.

Why did the Committee choose this tortuous passage to the ultimate truth of manning wisdom? Why was it necessary to restate ad nauseam the liability shibboleths generated in another age?

The Committee, like many before it refuses to back up the statement that personnel are the Army's most important asset with the corollary that, under most circumstances, the personnel asset or its likely development potential should dictate the establishment cover and not the reverse.

Long term operational requirements dictate a manpower objective which can be expressed in a target establishment or structure which, of necessity, must be mannable. Plans are laid to take the current asset and develop it in numbers and quality to reach that target. The current asset must be accommodated by the current establishment — it is the establishment, which can be changed by the stroke of a pen, which must bend to ensure that the asset is not distorted.

Distortions in the asset caused by unthinking changes in recruitment, promotion blockages, or simple establishment cover are not eradicated until years after the event.

Without attempting to detract too much from that which in Chapter 3 is a valuable contribution to manning philosophy, I shall simply enumerate some lesser criticisms or comments:

a. Both the terms "manpower" and "vertical flexibility" should have been defined with the other terms in para. 305.

b. The definition of "mannability" is almost back to front. We should talk about establishments being "mannable" not mannability as the ability of the manning system to produce personnel to fill positions on establishment. (This inconsistency is redressed a little in the following para. 306 f, which is the very essence of mannability.)

c. Para. 307 and RODC Study 1 are an inadequate acknowledgement of the investigation and research conducted by the Directorate of Manning and subsequently the Directorate of Personnel Plans in the period 1968-1972. The "problems of the asset" were highlighted during this period by the officer shortages during the Vietnam involvement. The manning philosophies, which underlie the RODC Report, were uncovered during this period, techniques of manning were explored using mathematical models, and the very terms "mannability" and "vertical flexibility" were introduced into the military lexicology. The essential nexus between asset and liability was identified during this period and, to the best of my knowledge, it was not addressed in any of the succession of officer studies since 1944, except perhaps in an intuitive sense. Apparently, there was a hint of manning philosophy, as it developed later, in the AG's Branch Review of 1963.

d. The recommendations concerning the new personnel classification of General Service Officer presumably relate to the brief references in para. 306. There seems to be inadequate discussion on the need for the classification. In addition, the terminology is unfortunate, GSO already being the common abbreviation for General Staff Officer. Likewise, the introduction of the term of Prescribed Service Officer, is all too sudden.

e. The section dealing with in-Service Commissioned Officers requires more explanation or understanding of the typical soldier commissioned from the ranks. The committee's statement against discrimination in para. 315 is a very bold one but lacks conviction without further
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discussion. It must always be a less than satisfactory source of officers unless it is shown that the other ranks subsequently commissioned were so-called officer material in the first place, or there is scope in other rank service for late development of potential officers, or officer quotas were already filled and some men were just “doing time” as other ranks, pending opportunities for commissioning. Without better explanation, advocacy of in-service commissioning contradicts other recommendations of the Committee about the essential nature of officer recruitment and development. In para. 370 the Committee makes the mistake, perhaps only semantic, in stating that in-service commissioned officers are and should remain a secondary source of officers. (My emphasis.)

f. The promotion framework summarized in para. 332 leaves me with some unease. Time in rank, promotion chances, total numbers, wastage and input are parameters of the manning system. I see promotion only in this light. The fact that there are various ranks, and there should be times in rank, derives from the essential nature of military command and responsibilities. The rationale of the promotion system is not to man the upper levels with the most able officers but to ensure that sufficient officers of the right quality and quantity are promoted to all levels. It is no use having able officers at the top if the promotion system produces poor, or inadequate numbers of officers at the bottom or middle. Officer establishments, which are mannable, can be built from the top downwards or the bottom upwards, or from the middle outwards as long as the manning parameters are carefully selected.

g. “Pool” is an unfortunate choice of word in para. 333 d. A pool is a static concept, whereas what is needed is a dynamic system, providing with some precision the correct numbers from which officers are selected for higher command.

h. The definition of “vertical flexibility” is admirably concise, but lacks the essential notion of expansion.

i. The statement made by the Committee that it was unable to find an Army definition of rank is probably an unconscious but nevertheless hurtful slight on the author of the military paper, “A Matter of Rank”, presented to the Manning Conference circa 1971.

j. It is stated in para. 342 that the research has been based on the need to man the officer establishment with the best talent available. Surely it is not too difficult a concept to understand that the establishment in peace time should be designed to nurture the asset, and that expansion capability is just as important as day-to-day functional efficiency.

k. Albeit with limited time to peruse the supporting Studies, I would consider that a promotion zone should start earlier for promotion to Captain, and I would make the later promotion zones longer than three years. Equal average ages of promotion can be sustained by either short or long zones; and the longer zones give greater flexibility in that they allow both younger and older officers to be promoted.

Chapter 3 is a very important chapter. It contains the heart of the officer manning problem and states very well, albeit with some inconsistency in the development of its logic, what are the essential remedies. Its conclusions on the nexus between establishment and asset are forthright, and it is to be hoped that some of the resulting recommendations are implemented resolutely by Army Office and Defence.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

I have little argument with their Chapter, and I am sure that most thinking officers would endorse the statement at para. 413, viz, “We are left in no doubt that the Army increasingly needs officers who are articulate, literate, socially and technologically aware, and who possess considerable intellectual capacity.” Likewise, the statement (para. 416), “... we conclude that the Army must address the question of more education for more officers in its own interests and those of its officers who aspire to it”; and that at para. 432, “In the
light of the limitations imposed on the gaining of experience, we have concluded that commanding officers, and staff officers who control other officers, must accept much of the responsibility for developing their subordinates."

The recommendation to establish a junior staff college in the form of a Staff and Operations Course (SOC) is to be applauded. It will meet a very great need in the Army as is explained in the Report. Care must be taken, however, in the selection of officers for the Command and Staff College (C&SC). The Committee has, erroneously I believe, recommended that the C&SC course should be designed to prepare officers for the fulfillment of more senior command and staff responsibilities. This is explained as follows.

As with all training, at whatever level, training should be for the next employment or range of appointments. To do otherwise means that much training is wasted because many worthy officers, having done the C&SC, will waste out of the system before reaching the higher appointments. Training should be progressive and more senior staff and war colleges should take over the responsibility of developing those going on further in the rank and appointment hierarchy. If only officers with high potential attend C&SC, what happens to those officers who would make very good grade 1 staff officers, need the benefit of the staff training of a senior staff college, but who do not aspire to or are not required for higher appointments.

Without a deeper study of the RODC supporting documents, I am not in much of a position to disagree with the Committee's conclusions on promotion requirements and examination system. I think, however, that the recommendations are a little trendy and are analogous to the current civilian debate on the relative virtues of HSC examinations and school assessment.

Without attempting to justify it, I would believe that:

- the nexus between promotion requirements and training should be retained, albeit, in modified form;
- TAC 5 should remain formally assessed, particularly in the absence of opportunity for stressful operational experience; and
- the examination system, updated as necessary, be retained.

The Committee acknowledges the greater pressure on the somewhat subjective officer reporting and evaluation system as the result of its recommendations.

In this and other Chapters, the Committee has directed the readers' attention to the need for trained personnel managers and for greater management training for all officers, but has stopped short of taking up the suggestion originally made by a former Director of Personnel Plans (now Brigadier R. L. Fullford (RL)) of a School of Personnel Management. What the RODC has suggested by way of training falls very easily into the scope of such a school.

CAREER MANAGEMENT

Chapter 5 is a "nuts and bolts" chapter, and one's attitude to it depends on one's acceptance of the earlier philosophical propositions about key issues, the future, the asset and education and training. The management tools described in this chapter on career management are appropriate to a wide range of personnel "scenarios", particularly if they ensure that "the organizational requirement is satisfied with the least damage to individual-organizational relationships" (para. 502). This chapter, more than the others, points to the need for the type of training one would receive in a School of Personnel Management.

Women Officers and 'Specialized Corps'

I am happy to believe that both women and specialized officers have an important role to play in the Regular Army. With particular regard to women, I can never understand why the Army does not simply accept women on completely equal terms with men.

Personal opinion aside, present day conventional wisdom and logic dictates that the best way to find out the true level of employment of women in the Armed Services is to "open the floodgates". Then the same criteria, which restrict some men from undertaking certain employments, will likewise restrict most if not all women from undertaking those same employments. I am particularly referring to the more physically demanding combat employments.

Chapter 6 and numerous other studies indulge in so much unnecessary speculation as to the employment of women. Would it not be best simply to get on with it?
Concept for Officer Development

In the introduction, the RODC stated that the need for a concept, such as they have proposed, stems from their conviction that it can provide inherent stability in the officer development process over a long period. In Chapter 7, the Committee recognizes the need for an underlying rationale for officer development, but does not say how it has, or how it proposes, to derive such a concept.

I suspect it is a mixture of conclusions emerging from the Report and a little ab initio theorizing on the part of the authors. I could accept a philosophical dissertation at this stage of the Report on a concept for officer development, or a good conclusion which summarized the arguments in the body of the Report; but what the Committee has come up with is neither fish nor fowl.

The Committee could have at least relieved its readers of some confusion by simply introducing the chapter a little more appropriately, dwelling a little on the idea of a concept and, earlier in the introduction, explaining the part which Chapter 7 should play in the Report as a whole.

Conclusion

I now have the task of attempting to summarize my own conclusions about the Report.

For a start, the document is impressive in its scale and coverage, but not in its style. It does not make an impact on the average army reader who was looking for something refreshingly different. The lack of consolidated conclusions and the failure to discriminate between the recommendations will of necessity restrict the readership.

The Terms of Reference provided to the Committee, whilst attempting to broaden the scope of the inquiry, have in fact been an inhibiting factor. The Committee was restricted generally in the officer development process to the rank of Colonel, and was to assume the advent of the Australian Defence Forces Academy.

It is a Regular Officer Development Committee, but the Committee unwittingly alienated some of its readers by explicit omission of the role of the Reserve Forces in the core force and expansion concept, and the contribution of Reservists to military professionalism.

Under Key Issues, the Committee begins well in its recognition of the Army’s personnel as its most important asset and the constraints that asset places on military performance. It lapses, unfortunately, as it does on numerous occasions later, into what I call ‘liabilitarianism’ or establishment consciousness. The Committee keeps being drawn back inexorably to the conventional wisdom that the peace time asset should somehow or other accommodate itself to the artificial concept of a peace time establishment.

The chapter is notable for its identification of areas of neglect in personal and personnel management in the Army.

The difficulty of forecasting the future was amply demonstrated in the chapter under that heading. Unfortunately, the Committee lapsed into jargon and triteness instead of simply facing up to the difficulties, and allowed itself to be carried away with a certain idealism in their description of future unit and senior commanders. There are a number of notable expressions, and the one which will have the longest appeal is that one which said “... we emphasize that the Army exists to fight should the need arise and nothing done in the name of change can be permitted to diminish that capacity.”

Chapter 3 on the Asset is remarkable for its inconsistency. It reveals the greatest understanding of the importance of the personnel asset, and the need for the peace time establishment to accommodate it, in the later sections of the chapter, but precedes it with the most blatant examples of liability consciousness. I can only repeat, “Why did the Committee choose this tortuous passage to the ultimate truth of manning wisdom?”

There are some technical inadequacies in the chapter, but these are not necessarily vital or damaging. One persistent fault is the lack of acknowledgement of previous work done in the development of personnel models and manning philosophy.

Chapter 3 is nevertheless a very important chapter, containing as it does the heart of the officer manning problem. Its conclusions on the nexus between establishment and asset are correct and forthright.

There is little in the remaining chapters to offend. The recommendations relating to liberality of education and the restructuring of the staff college system are timely. Depending
on one's point of view, the Committee may be right or wrong in advocating that the nexus between promotion requirements and training be broken, that TAC 5 and similar courses be non-assessed, and that the examination system be abandoned. Personally, I disagree.

The chapters on Career Management, and Women Officers and 'Specialized Corps' are very valuable contributions to future personnel management in the Army.

The Report represents a milestone in the development of both manning and manpower planning philosophy in the Australian Army. I suspect, however, that the Committee overreached itself in that it failed to come firstly to a fundamental understanding of the essential nature of the personnel asset and its behaviour. (Alternatively, something in its terms of reference or constraints imposed by higher authority, did not allow it the liberty of expression.) Such an understanding would have rendered much of their labour unnecessary and the Committee could have come more quickly to its conclusions.

In addition, I think the Committee has done both itself and its readers a disservice in not identifying the really important recommendations, or those which would appeal to a young officer corps looking for challenge and inspiration. It will remain an historic working document rather than a report to stir imagination; a compendium of ideas and techniques rather than a catalyst for welcome change.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in issue No. 17 (May/June 1979) and in this issue are available at the defence libraries listed below:


Award: Issue No. 17 (July/August 1979)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the July/August 1979 issue (No. 17) of the _Defence Force Journal_ to Wing Commander P.J. Rusbridge for his article _Basic Defence Planning — Strategy._
Reviewed by Dr L.H. Barber
Senior Lecturer in History, University of Waikato

WILLIAM MANCHESTER has already proved himself as a popular biographer by the success of The Death of A President and The Arms of Krupp. There are not too many journalists-cum-historians who can boast that their works have been translated into seventeen languages and into Braille. World War II Marine Corps veteran, William Manchester, has that honour. Manchester's most recent work, a mammoth 793 pages bibliography of America's most controversial commander, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, will add to the author's reputation in his chosen field — popular history.

William Manchester's choice of title for his MacArthur biography is particularly apt. Julius Caesar and Douglas MacArthur dominated military zones of about the same size, both generals were brilliant strategists who secured their victories with the minimum of man wastage, the two leaders were imperious in command, and MacArthur, like Caesar, was better suited to an imperial role rather than to the time-consuming machinations of republican government.

The title is well-conceived, but is the book well written? Manchester takes his readers through MacArthur's long and distinguished career, using anecdote and paragraphs interwoven with fine attention to detail to maintain a quick pace. MacArthur's veneration for his distinguished father, General Arthur MacArthur, his brilliant class years at West Point, his time as Theodore Roosevelt's military aide, and his promotion to a divisional command at the age of thirty-eight, are skilfully treated. The General's tour as Chief of Staff in the 1930s and his confrontation with a penny-pinching President and with hunger marchers, add to our understanding of this patrician who never felt the need to defer in the presence of the elected great. The campaigns of the Pacific War cover old ground competently, but the analysis of MacArthur's reign as Supreme Commander in Japan offers a keen insight into MacArthur's political ability. Manchester notes:

It is ironic that MacArthur should be remembered by millions as a man who wanted to resolve the problem of Communism in the battlefields. Actually his approach to agrarian unrest in Nippon was so radical that it shocked Americans who believed in large corporate farms . . . All lands held by absentee owners were subject to compulsory sale to the government . . . Altogether, five million acres changed hands, and when the transactions were complete, MacArthur announced that 89 per cent of the country's farm land belonged to the people who tilled it.

As for the Korean interlude, Manchester is rather restrained in his analysis and MacArthur's title Reminiscences are far more revealing.

This is undoubtedly a useful 'everyman's MacArthur' and it deserves to sell well. From the more demanding reader there will be a disappointment that the National Archives have been largely ignored and the well-researched histories of World War II and the Korean war have not been thought worthy of Manchester's close attention. Dorris Clayton James' several volume The Years of MacArthur may not convey the excitement Manchester feels for his subject but the analysis is more careful and better suited to the needs of the student of military history.

Some of Manchester's revelations concerning the General's personal life raise important questions of evidence. Surely General Pershing was not so unprofessional and petty as to post MacArthur to the Philippines in 1922 simply because MacArthur had stolen his girl? MacArthur's reputation, his father's association with the Philippines, and the son's close interest in these islands, together with good judgment on Pershing's part, provide a better explanation.

A further criticism can be levelled at Manchester's assumption that his hero acted with undoubted wisdom over the surrender
ceremonies on the USS Missouri. This was certainly not the view of Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, who noted in Defeat into Victory that MacArthur’s decree that the formal surrender in South-east Asia should take place only after it had been ceremonially completed in his own theatre forced Lord Mountbatten to disregard MacArthur’s decree in order to bring urgent aid to the thousands of prisoners of war still in Japanese hands.

There are other criticisms of Manchester’s rather superficial judgments that could be levelled — especially over his explanations for MacArthur’s inactivity after Pearl Harbor. However, for all its defects, William Manchester’s American Caesar is a most readable work about an egotist who in his reports allowed no place for the successes of his brilliant lieutenants and yet, for all that, deserves Field Marshal Montgomery’s description — “A soldier who was a complete master of his profession, who always knew exactly what he wanted to do, and then did it”.

DISPATCHES by Michael Herr, Picador/Pan Books
 Reviewed by Warrant Officer Class 2 A. H.D. McAulay, Headquarters, Field Force Command

MICHAEL HERR was a journalist in Vietnam and operated from Saigon, covering Khe Sanh, the Tet Offensive, USMC operations and other activities throughout the country.

After reading his book, a person with no other knowledge of the Vietnam War could be excused for believing that there were only three types of people in Vietnam:

— The Colonel/General class, spouting the MACV phrases, always optimistic, unthinking and incredibly stupid;
— The ‘grunts’, PFC and equivalent, who are all psychiatric cases, including homicidal maniacs and others on the very brink of insanity, with quotable graffiti on their helmet liners; and
— The small band of fifty or so perceptive journalists and photographers among the 600 representatives of the media in Vietnam, who alone understand the war, how terrible it is in its effect on the country, the USA and the ‘grunts’, and who alone can appreciate the full flavour of the horrors.

The ‘grunts’ are deeply appreciative of the journalists’ efforts, however, and Mr Herr cites several examples of the lengths to which they go to provide shelter and comfort for him, and the never-ending amazement of the simple soldiers that Mr Herr and his friends are in Vietnam voluntarily. The Australian side of the picture comes to mind — the repeated complaints from journalists of various nationalities, and varying levels of fame, concerning the non-committal, almost disinterested responses by Australian soldiers when approached by them for interviews.

While Mr Herr is at pains to show us how dull and stereotyped are the higher ranks, he fails to consider the possibility that the Colonels and Generals may have spouted the MACV phrases because there were over 600 reporters, photographers, TV teams and journalists roaming the country, all seeking ‘news’.

A recently published study, The War Managers, by Kinnard, shows that there were only 183 US Army Generals in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. At any one time, the Generals were outnumbered by representatives of a free Press, who considered the commanders should be available for interview.

Mr Herr recounts on pages 121 and 122 one instance of such an interview where his colleague delivers (for want of a better word) a long winded question reciting weapon characteristics, weather, reinforcements and so on, taking over three minutes to put to the General, who at the end of the sustained burst could only say, “What?” The two oh-so-worldly journalists leave in disgust.

There are lessons in the text, though perhaps not intended so by Mr Herr. On p. 50 he writes of people dying every day “because of some small detail that they couldn’t be bothered to observe”. What he is saying is that the NCOs and junior officers did not supervise their men adequately. Undone flak jackets and weapons too dirty to fire are faults to be corrected by the junior leaders, not passed off as caused by the climate or MACV-wide enervation.

Another is that despite US superiority in material and mobility, the VC/NVA held the initiative. The US could seldom involve them in significant contact unless the VC/NVA wished to do so. The Americans were launching large
operations from one end of the country to the other, but the bigger battles were initiated by the VC/NVA. Loc Ninh and Dak To were examples of the US forces reacting to VC/NVA moves, not the other way around.

Despite their superior attitude, none of the media representatives were able to predict the launching of the Tet Offensive during the Tet Holidays, whereas the battle indicators had been read by the MACV and ARVN staffs, and interpreted as signs of an attack before or immediately after the event. Despite the advantage gained by launching the assault during the holidays, the Tet Offensive was a military and political defeat for the NLF/VC and Hanoi/NVA because of pre-Tet preparations made by the GVN and MACV commands. The media, with their "Shock-Horror-Outrage" reporting of spectacular but really unimportant aspects such as the battles for the US Embassy and Hue Citadel, gave Hanoi a psychological victory in the USA.

The book is interesting despite the 'we-know-the-truth-but-they-would-not-believe-us' stand, but really must be kept in perspective. One wonders how Mr Herr and his fifty or so 'approved' colleagues would have reported the North African and South West Pacific Campaigns, or the six weeks in Normandy prior to the breakout.

Reviewed by Captain B. Cameron, MC, ADC, RAAC

The film Zulu will have been viewed by most military personnel, either in connection with organized training, or as a result of personal interest in the action (Rorke's Drift) for which the largest number of VC's have ever been awarded. As one whose training courses have provided three such screenings, and whose personal interest in the events was further aroused by a visit to the South Wales Borderers Museum, I found Wilkinson-Latham's book to contain an illuminating account of one of shortest and bloodiest Colonial wars. Such personal value was gained however, from only a small section of the total content.
Reviewed by Captain B. Cameron, MC, ADC, RAAC

One definition of a biography is that it is a written record of the life of an individual. To describe Manchester's story of General Douglas MacArthur in such a way would be inaccurate.

American Caesar is not a record of MacArthur's life and deeds in the normal sense, rather it is an exhaustive examination of MacArthur — the person — from birth to death. The reader finishes this mammoth volume with the overwhelming feeling that he knew the man himself; his aspirations, strengths, weaknesses, habits, and personal relationships. Everything that influenced him or was close to him in any way is described in fascinating detail. Included is MacArthur's relationship with a Fillipino paramour, as well as the lobbying his mother conducted with her son's military superiors in order to secure his further promotion. This sensation of intimate involvement makes the narrative a very moving one.

The author's endeavour to create such a detailed personal portrayal does, however, result in many aspects related to MacArthur's 'generalship' being overshadowed. For those who wish to understand his individual ideals, code of honour, moral standards or personal vanity, a wealth of information is provided. On the other hand, those who seek to gain an insight into, for example, MacArthur's relationship with the Australian forces he commanded in the SW Pacific, will not benefit so greatly.

It is unfortunate that this broad coverage of events that do not have an individual bearing on the General himself, detracts slightly from the reader's overall perspective of the situations in which MacArthur became involved. This limitation may however, have been self-imposed by the author, and credit for his meticulous research into matters pertaining to MacArthur's personal life cannot be denied. Although Manchester attempts to balance the correctness of MacArthur's decisions against the arguments of his opponents, occasionally one wonders if a more critical analysis might not be necessary to confirm the reader's confidence in his military reasoning. Such a feeling is dispersed toward the end of the book, however, when history itself is seen to vindicate MacArthur's judgement with regard to the dangers of committing troops to Asia (Vietnam) in a limited war.

Biographies of renowned people generally appeal to two groups of readers: those whose personal association with the events portrayed gives them a historical interest; and those who, as members of later generations wish to benefit from the experiences of their predecessors. For the former, American Caesar is only of significant value to those who can relate to MacArthur himself, or to those principle personages associated with him. For the latter, many lessons are to be learnt from the very descriptive account of a leader whose individual concept of command won many strategic victories, but lost him the Presidency of his own Country.

This is a second review of this book. — Ed.


Reviewed by Captain C.D. Coutlhard-Clark, Australian Intelligence Corps.

The contents of this slim soft-cover book can be easily digested at a single sitting. This is not to say that it is an inconsequential work — far from it. Dr Barber, a senior lecturer in History at the University of Waikato and a major in the Territorials, has produced a lucid account of a unit with a proud history, a story that benefits from the book's brevity and economy of detail. It serves as an ideal handbook for a new recruit to the battalion, or indeed to anyone looking for a quick introduction to the Haurakis. Similar short histories could be attempted by any number of units in the Australian Army — in fact it would be worthwhile to have a whole series produced along these lines — and a far worse example might be followed than the standard set by Dr Barber. A judicious selection of photographs, including full-colour reproductions of the battalion colours, add considerably to this handsome little book's appeal.

*Australian Distributors