DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

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Orion P-3C based at RAAF Edinburgh, South Australia, for maritime reconnaissance and surveillance/search and rescue duties.
I SEEM to have come under some fire from two correspondents in this issue. One accuses me of dictatorial attitudes in matters of Editorial Policy (p. 4). They concern place names, and it brought to mind the anomaly in the pronunciation of two places in this country of ours — Derby and Jervis Bay. The first, according to the Australian Encyclopaedia, is named after the Secretary for the Colonies in the 1880s, in which case it should be pronounced ‘Darby’. Likewise, Jervis Bay was named by Cook after Admiral Lord Jervis, the victor of St Vincent, from which he gained his title of Earl St Vincent, so why on earth has it recently been foisted by the ABC with an ugly mispronunciation?

The other correspondent (p. 5) finds most articles dull and too “scholarly”. I have to read each article approximately six times so, believe me, I know when an article is dull! Yet there certainly is a place in this Journal for a “scholarly” article, and it need not be dull reading either. While I agree with Mr Histed that mere repetition of others’ thoughts is undesirable, neither can it be considered scholarly. No scholar worth his salt would merely draw on others to argue for him, but would use their arguments quite legitimately to back his own individually thought out case. In particular, footnotes on sources are vital to the historian for his further research, and I can proudly say that your Journal is eagerly sought after by military historians all over the world for its contributions, particularly on Australian military history. However, all authors should beware overstacking their articles with unnecessary notes, as these take valuable space without adding one iota to the credibility of the text.

A commanding officer took me to task recently for printing what he considered to be a direct “steal” of a British article on movements. In all fairness to the author of this extremely amusing piece, those who drew my attention to it did inform me that it had been adapted, and perhaps I should have made it clearer at the time. Our apologies to the original sources. I hope they will take the piracy as a compliment to a very funny and worthwhile article, appreciated by both Army and Air Force.

I have been overwhelmed with the generosity of both private individuals and service establishments in donating rare issues of the Army Journal to our collection. Because of this, I have now obtained a full set of individual issues for photocopying as necessary. We have also increased the numbers in store where these were thin or non-existent. To all those who sent back issues, sincere thanks. To those needing back issues to make up near complete sets, please contact me again. But ask for numbers within reason please. “All from 1948 to 1970” is not a reasonable request.

Australia Post in Melbourne sent me about ten issues of the Defence Force Journal No. 15, which had fallen out of an envelope. I have no way of tracing the addressee. Please contact me if you are short of an issue this year, as I have plenty of back numbers.

I would like to record my grateful thanks to Miss Dawn Stephenson who has undertaken some tough typing assignments over the last two months. Without help such as she has willingly given, this Journal could not operate with its present full-time staff of one.
PENINSULAR OR PENINSULA?
I have long been irritated by the current trend in all media, to use nouns as adjectives without inflection; e.g. “Japan” for “Japanese”; “Israel” for “Israeli”, etc.

In Major Middleton’s otherwise excellent article “Napoleon and Spain” (DFJ No. 14), the word “Peninsular” appears frequently, but the spelling does not vary according to context. The context indicates that it is used in three ways: as an outright adjective: “the Peninsular War”; an implied adjective, “in the Peninsular” (campaign); and as a geographical noun “on the Peninsular” (sic).

I submit that in the final example given above, the spelling should be “the peninsula” if it is intended as a common noun defining a geographical concept, or “the Peninsula” if it is a proper noun contracted from the “the Iberian Peninsula”.

S.J. Lloyd, AO, QHS
Surgeon Rear-Admiral
Director-General of Naval Health Services, Canberra, ACT

I am indebted to Admiral Lloyd for pointing out an editorial error. This is one of the tricky spellings which can always trap the unwary. I hope I shall remember the lesson.
— Editor

CALL TO AUTHORS
At regular intervals, I receive a ‘Defence’ envelope, extract your Journal, and settle down with hope, yet anticipation of boredom. The articles are good — oh, so carefully prepared, so long, so well annotated with dozens of footnotes, so scholarly — but so dull. Does not any Service officer have any individuality any more? Is no one prepared to honestly explain how XYZ should be run, and as examples quote how badly XYZ is organized at present? Can no one use basic English with clarity and conciseness, and explain, in two pages, without abbreviations like “The 2PK adjusts to the REPAC without KLMP”, what they believe in, how it can be achieved; and to hell with offending senior officers’ susceptibilities? Is there no fun in the Services any more? Are there no longer any skates, cards and hard cases whose snooks cocked at authority, rabitting skills and repartee provide the corner stones on which Service lore is built?

Sir I quite appreciate that erudition, solemnity and abstruseness, in a long article published in your Journal, will bring names before one’s seniors, and earn the author a “Well done, Smith! Scholarly! You’ll get on!” But how about some blood and guts, some blunt from-the-heart beliefs without worry about promotion? How about the odd par — not extracted from a thirty-year-old book, but written as the writer heard Shiner Wright or Nobby Clark say it yesterday? Where are the views of the NCOs, the basic ranks? I’d as soon listen to them as read the waffle served up to you by their officers.

Sir, your Journal has great potential. Exploit it. Bring it down to earth. Discourage the pseudo-academics among Service officers; encourage the honest blunt leaders of men to state their cases.

Good luck. I await your next issue with eagerness.

Sandy Bay, Tasmania George Histed

While I agree that there is a place for humour — and we have had excellent articles in this vein — there is also a place for scholarship as long as it does not hide merely in other peoples’ quotations. I would appreciate more articles from blunt Majors, erudite WOs and concerned private soldiers. The material from the latter category, though small in quantity, has been of the highest quality. — Editor

OH, MR EDITOR!
I refer to your editorial footnote to Sir Laurence Hartnett’s letter in DFJ No. 14, January/February 1979, in which you explained that you had altered “Pearl Harbour” to read “Pearl Harbor” to conform with editorial policy, a phrase to which you seem somewhat attached.

Sinful Sir Laurence! How shortsighted of him not to realize that some 30 years later he would prolong the exposure of the tender sensibilities of the Armed Forces of the nation to anglicized English. Unlike poor Prime Minister Chifley, however, we have the protection of an editor who does not flinch from altering historic documents of national significance.

The chummy image of yourself conveyed by your cosy editorial comments are belied, Sir, by this barbarous excision from which even the most pettifogging Staff College instructor
would shrink. If your intention is to intimidate us to the point where we dare not write to the DJ, why not save time by stating forthrightly that we will suffer disciplinary action if we infringe your editorial policy even if, like the Second Coming, it remains unrevealed and too awesome to contemplate?

Headquarters 5MD, Perth, M. A. Count, MBE
Western Australia
Lieutenant Colonel
I have often been accused of having no editorial policy or at least of not proclaiming it long and loudly. The trouble is, whether we like it or not, the place is American and they spell it, as a proper place name, Pearl Harbor. I agree, we could go to absurd lengths and spell Brussels, 'Bruxelles' or 'Brussel'; Cologne, Koln, and so on. But, at least we are each talking English, of a sort, in this case.

However, I do take the point that I should not have changed the spelling in the document, although Sir Laurence seems to have forgiven me! Incidentally he spells his name 'Laurence'. I have taken the liberty of correcting the M/S. — Editor

WARSHIPS OF AUSTRALIA

Further to Sub-Lieutenant Goldrick's remarks in DFJ No. 16, May/June 1979. HMAS Anzac (1). About twenty years ago the naval historian supplied me with quite a lot of information regarding this ship. He states "30-7-1933 ... Anzac paid off for disposal." S/Lt Goldrick is right when he says that he has always understood that Tattoo replaced Anzac in commission in 1931. In actual fact, Anzac paid off into F Class Reserve in Sydney on 30-7-1931. She also paid off in 1926 as far as that goes. However, I feel that the paying off for disposal is the paying off date for a ship, because the disposal date is the date when the ship ceases to be a fighting unit, and is deleted from the list.

"S & T" Class destroyers. S/Lt Goldrick nearly got the designation right this time. The class was officially known as the Admiralty "S" Class (modified Trenchant type). If we are to class the boats as S & T class, because some of them had S names and others had T names, we would have to give the "R" class the unusual designation of R&S&T&U class, because the "RS" had names beginning with those four letters.

I do feel, however, that we are getting somewhere in this exercise. Mr Goldrick, in his reply, says, "I wrote that I gave the work a 'grudging pass', but it was a pass nonetheless." I seem to have read the original review as, "In summary, the book could do with a couple of months more work before it receives more than a grudging pass from this reviewer." I find this hard to receive as a pass in any shape or form.

A couple of other reviews have been done on this book, and to give a fair overall review, let us hear what Lt/Cdr W. O. C. Roberts says in Navy News, dated 18 November, 1977.

Speaking of Ross Gilletts' work on the book ... "He was responsible for most of the research and for the text and, on both counts, he has succeeded admirably. His prose is clear, concise and direct." In another part "WOC" says, "whilst the profiles illustrate draughtsmanship of the highest order". Note that "WOC" assumes, the same as I, that a side-on drawing is a profile. We must both be wrong. All the drawings I possess refer to "Profile and Plain Views".

As regards the drawing of Encounter, the funnels are raked as shown in the Admiralty drawing. The "non-existent horizontal lines" on Encounter's funnels are merely the draughtsman's means of indicating that the funnels are erected from several sheets of steel, and this is quite common practice.

As regards Mr Goldrick's statement that the colour illustrations are "ruined by shoddy work", I suggest that he takes another look at the book. There is nothing "shoddy" about the colour at all.

So that S/Lt Goldrick can take a more reasonable view of this book, I draw his attention to the words of Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins, K.B.E., C.B., RAN (ret.), who says, "In fact this book contains, between its covers, everything there is to be known about Australia's ships of war, past and present, and is strongly recommended to all those interested in Australia's history and maritime affairs."

We now have to have a summary, so here it is. Who is right, the Vice-Admiral with a K.B.E., the Lieutenant Commander with a D.S.C. or the Sub-Lieutenant with a B.A.?

Before Sub-Lieutenant Goldrick undertakes a review of this type of book again, perhaps he should do a bit more study and, in particular, the system that existed in paying ships off into the several classes of reserve, and of finally paying the ship off for disposal. I, myself, am not familiar with the present system where we now "de-commission" ships. The old system was that a ship commissioned, it paid off, and sometimes it re-commissioned, and finally it paid off for disposal. What happens today I
cannot say. But, for all that, Anzac (1) did pay off on 30-7-33, just as Ross Gillett states in Warships of Australia.

As I said before, there certainly are mistakes in Warships of Australia as there are in Australia's Ships of War, and I am very surprised that S/Lt Goldrick didn't pick up at least the classification on page 116 dealing with Countess of Hopetoun. This was a glaring mistake, which Ross Gillett pointed out himself. Funny that it was missed.

Frenchs Forest, NSW

H. C. Adlam

THE RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT

I read with interest Lt/Col Lewington's article on "The Reconnaissance Regiment Resume Ideas and Concepts" (DFJ No. 15). The article provided some insights on a subject which is usually discussed in vague terms on such courses as Tactics 3. I now have an appreciation of how at least this organization might go about its business of medium range reconnaissance, but I am uncertain how other agencies might undertake this task.

This is particularly true of Army Aviation, which Lt/Col Lewington points out, has a part to play, with his Regiment, in the reconnaissance role. This, in fact, was the one disappointing aspect of the article. The author provided no detail on how he saw his reconnaissance troops working with the aircraft troops in the Reconnaissance Squadrons.

I suspect that this was caused more by lack of Army Aviation doctrine, than by a desire to ignore a potentially useful arm. My question then is, when are we going to see Army Aviation principles of operation being expounded in a similar manner to Lt/Col Lewington's reconnaissance methods; and more importantly when are we going to see these two valuable organizations practicing their common role together?

HQ Log Comd, Melbourne

R. L. G. Grant

Major, RAEME

CALL TO AIR-GUNNERS

Any ex-air-gunners among your readers are invited to write to me about their experiences in training, weaponry, or combat. I am currently researching a book about them and would welcome any comments on the subject.

Mr. S. Allinson
24 Ravencliff Cresc.
Scarborough, Ontario
Canada.

Thank you

Sidney Allinson
I WELCOME this opportunity to speak on Australia's defence. I hope you expect me to speak to you quite frankly. It is my intention to do so and it will help you to see where your assessments and mine coincide, where they diverge, and in some cases where they differ perhaps quite markedly. I do not think you would wish me to do otherwise.

Defence is an important issue. It is also a very complex matter and greater public awareness of it and debate on it, is welcome. But I would emphasise that, for debate to be productive, it must be informed. And much of the debate that does take place hardly qualifies in this respect. I therefore support wholeheartedly the League’s initiatives in keeping the matter before the public.

The adjective 'responsible' cannot be applied to any person or organization which does not view with serious concern the unstable conditions presently existing in Africa, the Middle East, Iran and North-East Asia, not to mention the current conflict in Indo-China. But despite these instabilities I believe it can still be said that Australia is presently free of direct military threat.

It is only four years since the end of the conflict in Vietnam and who then predicted the situation we see today? I remember hearing of periods of consolidation, of the balance of power being preserved — although in a situation fraught with many uncertainties. I put it to you that the period ahead is at least and perhaps more heavily characterized by uncertainty, and that it behoves us not to be caught unawares. A period of uncertainty can mean a period of change in our strategic situation.

Also, I believe the fact that Australia now is free of direct military threat is not the consolation that it seems to be on first glance. There was no direct threat to us in World War I. There was no direct threat in World War II until for a period in 1942. But in both those wars, and in other wars both before and since, Australians have fought and died for what were seen to be our national interests. And who is to say that it cannot happen again, still in the absence of a direct threat? To believe otherwise would demonstrate an ignorance of the inevitability of the effects on us of events elsewhere in the world.

We must therefore be discerning in the assessments of the importance we attach to uncertainty, to the absence of direct threat and to the steps we take to guard against the future. Let me briefly sketch in the situation as I see it at this time.

The Soviet military build up continues well beyond the limits one might reasonably ascribe to defence.

Recent events in Iran, their impact on the stability of Western economic systems, and the obviously changing nature of Iran's influence in the Gulf, pose questions about short and long term stability in that region.

Events in the Middle East and Eastern and Southern Africa, although not directly involving Australia, except possibly as a member of the United Nations if we contribute to a force in Namibia, continue to have destabilizing effects.

The conflict between China and Vietnam, which although foreseen came with relatively little warning, underlines the continuance of uncertainties in our area of interest. The implications for Australia of recent events are as yet unclear, but it cannot be assumed that they will all be to our advantage.

In North East Asia the interplay between the super, major and regional powers creates its own uncertainties — in relation to the Koreas, to Japan, to China and its modernization, to the USSR and to the US.

Despite these factors, the outlook for global stability remains reasonably favourable. Given the enormous risks of total war, on all rational calculations restraints on the use of force by the two super powers should endure. But you will note my reference to 'rational calculations'. However, we cannot rule out the development of lesser or regional situations adverse to our interests. Let us therefore look rather more closely at the current situation in Australia's immediate neighbourhood.

*This article is based on an address to the National Executive of the League on 11 March 1979, when General MacDonald was CDFS.
The long association between PNG and Australia promotes a continued close relationship, and effective co-operation in defence matters continues to be an important element. At the present time, no external threat to Papua New Guinea appears likely to arise.

Australia's long standing and friendly relations with Indonesia have successfully weathered occasional differences. The Indonesian archipelago would be an important factor in any offensive military strategy against Australia and this consideration alone gives Australia a deep interest in the continuing security of the Indonesian Republic. For its part, there would appear to be substantial advantages for Indonesia in having to its south a friendly and militarily capable neighbour.

To summarise, notwithstanding the absence of direct military threat to Australia, there are a number of uncertainties, and these have important implications for our defence preparedness. Recognition of the need to look to our own national defence interests must, however, take into account that we are a member of the Western strategic community, a partner in ANZUS, and a significant power in our area.

The Defence potential we seek to develop is necessary to protect our national interests. And this includes the ability to contribute forces in support of alliances and neighbours, if this should become necessary.

Let me turn now to the important matter of resources to develop that potential.

All of us are well aware of the Government's economic problems, and of the basic features of its plan to overcome them. In the present circumstances Defence is not and cannot expect to be immune from the effects of national fiscal policies.

But this is not to say that a Chief of Defence Force Staff automatically is content with the funds devoted to Defence, either absolutely or in comparison with other areas of Government activity. Nor does it say that I am content now.

I would like to see store houses fuller; the equipment pipeline of a larger diameter and with a faster flow; our national defence infrastructure being developed more quickly, and our industrial capacity improving more rapidly. However, I have to be realistic and so, I suggest, do you.

But realism does not mean complacency. I suggest that in the figures following there is some scope for the nation to review its priorities; and to review the insurance it wishes to take out against the uncertainties I have mentioned. I have chosen an eleven year period for the figures because it better illustrates trends in the assessment of national priorities. It is a period over which most of us will readily recall the political and strategic changes that have taken place. It is also a period in which we have seen great changes in the expectations of most Australians.

**Budget Outlays on Defence as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Market Prices)**

This figure shows the percentage of Gross Domestic Product that has been budgetted on Defence. From 1967/68 to 1973/74 the percentage fell from 4.4% to 2.6% and it has remained almost constant since then. But measuring against the GDP can be misleading, so let's look at budget outlays as a proportion of the total funds available to the Government.

In 1967/68 Defence was allocated 17.1% of the total budget outlay. This percentage fell steady to 1975/76 when it reached just under half of its earlier value. It currently stands at 8.7%.

**Outlay on Defence, Health, Education and Social Services as a Percentage of Total Budget Outlay**

This graph illustrates the percentage of the total budget outlay that has been allocated to Defence, Health, and Education. The figures show a decline in the percentage allocated to Defence, with a corresponding increase in the allocation to Social Security.
The budget outlays on Health and Education. Both have shown a steady increase, rising from 5.8% for Health and 2.8% for Education in 1967/68, stabilizing at about 10% and 9% respectively at the present time. The peak of 13.5% for Health in 1975/76 is interesting.

Social security. Its allocation started in 1967/68 just below Defence. Like Health and Education it has steadily increased throughout the period, taking off in a remarkable fashion in 1974/75. Over the last two years it has stabilized at just under 28%; i.e., about 3½ times the current Defence allocation.

I would make one point; the graphs should not be used for detailed comparisons because the effect of the Federal Government’s greater involvement in some fields, particularly those relating to the quality of life, must also be taken into account. Nevertheless they do provide a fair indication of trends.

Earlier I mentioned that in the period of 11 years covered by the figures we have seen great changes in the expectations of most Australians. Perhaps, in the present circumstances, they expect more health, more education, more social services and less defence. If they do, their expectations certainly are being realised.

But when the nation looks at priorities for what it wants, it should also take a close look at lead times. ‘Uncertainty’ does not mean that lead times, whatever they may be, are acceptable. Almost by definition, lead times for Defence capabilities are long — and this applies to people as well as to equipment. Very long lead times for ships and aircraft are well known. But the lead time associated with the recruiting and training of men to a stage where they become fully able to play a part in the defence of the country can be every bit as long.

I want now to turn to equipment. Contrary to all the recent criticism, I believe we have a better overall capability in terms of the equipment we operate and the people who man it, than has been the case in many other periods we can all recall. Whether we have enough equipment is another issue. I suppose we never have enough, including in war when, memories being what they are, there is a tendency to think that shortages did not exist.

Let us look at some of the criticisms. I do not contest that some equipment in use by the Services is old. However, I suggest that the real question is whether it is capable of performing the tasks likely to be required of it now and in the near future? Can it be said, for example, that the Government was wrong not to replace an item of equipment perhaps five years ago when that item has continued to serve a useful purpose? Maybe the breathing space provided by retaining the item in service has allowed us to take advantage of the latest technological advances with their associated improvements in performance, maintain ability and reliability. It could also have allowed us to invest in some other item needed to replace equipment which had already reached the end of its service life. Remember, the Defence Budget is not a bottomless bucket — if one item is funded then somewhere along the line probably another is crossed off the list — or at least its procurement is put off until later.

This brings me to the point of the levels of funds which have been made available over the years for major equipment purchases and what has been done with them.

This chart shows the level of expenditure on major capital equipment for the years 1967/68 to the present, and also incidentally the rising expenditure on manpower.

In view of the criticisms levelled in Parliament and elsewhere, it is interesting to note the continuing decline from 1967/68 to 1974/75 and the improvement since that time.

Currently expenditure is at 14.2% which, is not high enough but I can assure you that we are making very strenuous efforts to edge it upwards. If one adds capital expenditure on works and facilities, the percentage is of course much higher, but I am speaking only of equipment.
### MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS ORDERED

#### 1973 to 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Items Ordered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>10 Sea King Helicopters, 11 Nomad Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>HMAS Cook Oceanographic Ship, 45 Fire Support Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8 P3CLRMP Aircraft, 53 Leopard Tanks, 8 Submarine Fire Control Systems, 20 Optical Rapier SAM's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>34 Leopard Tanks, 2 FFG Guided Missile Frigates, 12 CL30H Aircraft, Ground Control Interception Radar, BARRA Sonics Processors, 2 P3LRMP Aircraft, Attack/Intercept Sonar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>ESM for Destroyer Escorts, HMAS Tobruk Amphibious Heavy Lift Ship, Light General Service Trucks, 16 S2G Tracker Aircraft, F111C Recce Fit, 15 Fremantle Class Patrol Craft, 10 Rapier Blindfire Tracking Radars, 14 Leopard Tanks, HMAS Jervis Bay Training Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Medium and High Powered Radio Terminals, 1 FFG Guided Missile Frigate (Third of the Class), ‘Harpoon’ Surface to Surface Guided Missile, ‘Standard’ Surface to Air Missile, MARK 48 Submarine Launched Torpedo, BARRA Sonobuoys, 2 Leopard Tanks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[A list of] the major equipment items which have been ordered from 1973 onwards. These, represent the expenditures shown [in figure 4.] You will observe a fairly wide range of buys, including ships, ASW helicopters, tanks, Rapier and both LRMP and medium transport aircraft.

Figure again includes ships (the third FFG, patrol craft and the training ship), tanks, aircraft and both Harpoon and Standard missiles.

Let me make it quite clear that, with the funds at our disposal, I am convinced that we are acting responsibly in ensuring that the country is receiving the best value for its money. Of course we would like more equipment, and more of everything else, but that is not a sound basis on which to criticise the Department and the Services. In fact it is not a basis at all.

I wish now to turn to the structure of the Defence Force. It is relatively easy to say that we need a Navy, an Army and an Air Force, but obviously one needs to be more precise than that. For example, what are the essential characteristics we need and can afford; and then, if we can meet all of those, what are the desirable characteristics? And how much or how many of each?

All of the uncertainties to which I referred earlier make the definition of required force characteristics difficult, but there are some features of our geography and environment, and some long term features of technology, which can assist us in our judgements. A direct military threat to Australia, whatever it turns out to be, must come over, under or on the sea. To me, this indicates the characteristics needed as including at least:

- a capability for gathering and evaluating intelligence;
- a capacity for the surveillance and patrol of our maritime approaches and resources zone;
- naval and air strike components;
- mobile land forces, with an adequate reconnaissance capability;
- mobile air defence elements; and
- elements for the protection of shipping.

To highlight these characteristics, let me review the major equipments currently in service in the Defence Force. In doing so I will also refer to areas in which we are facing critical decisions.

On the maritime side, our submarine force is the largest it has ever been. Once the submarine weapons update programme has been completed, we will have one of the best conventional submarine forces in the world. We have replaced the Neptunes with ten P3Cs, although their full capability will not be realized until the joint UK/Australia BARRA system is installed. Consideration is also being given to improving the capability of the ten P3Bs which were purchased in the 1960s. The F111 force has provided a maritime strike capability which we did not possess before the introduction of this aircraft; but its weapon capability in this role leaves
something to be desired and developments elsewhere are being monitored. A major improvement in maritime capability will occur with the introduction of the Harpoon anti-shipping weapon to be fitted to the new FFG frigates and the P3 aircraft. Consideration is also being given to its application to the submarine force and the three DDGs.

There are fifteen Fremantle Class Patrol Boats in the pipeline to augment and subsequently replace the smaller Attack class boats. Three FFGs are under construction in the United States and are due for commissioning between 1980 and 1982, although we have yet to decide on the armed helicopters for them. (Each FFG has a complement of two.) Also, there are other smaller vessels under construction, and particularly the LSH Tobruk which will give a modest but useful amphibious capability.

Frankly I believe this is a very significant equipment programme for the maritime capability.

Certainly we face the risk of some degradation in our present underway replenishment capability as HMAS Supply nears the end of her life before the replacement AOR becomes available; the destroyer force is ageing and there will need to be a follow on destroyer programme in the 1980s, our mine counter measures force is temporarily at a low ebb and the carrier, HMAS Melbourne, is nearing the end of her useful life. The question of her replacement raises a number of issues and it is not one susceptible to simple recommendations to Government, nor to simple decisions by it. Replacement costs of course vary widely, but with its complement of aircraft I suspect we are looking at something like $700M in present day prices. In these circumstances can the Government or its advisors really be criticised for wanting to validate their thinking, as far as is possible, before plunging into such a commitment?

Turning to the Army, the acquisition of Leopard tanks and the conversion of a number of M113 vehicles to the fire support vehicle role have resulted in substantial improvements to our tank and armoured reconnaissance capabilities. The delivery of Rapier has given us a state of the art capability to engage modern, high speed ground attack aircraft, and its effectiveness will be improved shortly by the addition of a blindfire capability. Looking ahead, in the very low level air defence area, a decision must soon be made on the replacement of the Redeye. The Army is also looking for a new medium artillery piece and at high technology tactical communications and surveillance and electronic warfare equipments. Quantum jumps have occurred in both technology and cost over the past few years in these latter areas, and there are some difficult decisions involved. Even replacement of the Army's fleet of B vehicles, which is making progress, represents a considerable level of expenditure.

As regards the Air Force, we have a short list of contenders for the Mirage replacement — the Mirage 2000, F-16, F-18A and the F-18L. A team is leaving shortly for overseas to evaluate these aircraft and it will, I hope, make recommendations from which two final contenders will be chosen. On current plans, the fighter eventually selected should begin to come into service in 1983 with the first squadron and operational conversion unit being fully re-equipped by 1986.

The involvement of Australian industry obviously is a major consideration in negotiations with the competing aircraft manufacturers. The need to give our industry new technologies, managerial and labour skills which will be of future defence value, calls for no emphasis by me. Decisions on these and related matters concern aircraft which will remain operational until about the year 2010, and cannot be taken lightly and on less than adequate information.

I should add that, during the re-equipment programme for the TFF, it is important that the capabilities of the present Force do not deteriorate to an unacceptable level. Accordingly it is intended to update the RAAF's existing Mirage fleet. Details have still to be worked out and depend largely on the estimated life of the aircraft, which in turn depends largely on the outcome of tests currently in progress both here and overseas.

Finally, the effectiveness of the F111 will be increased by the incorporation of reconnaissance equipment in some of the aircraft. Plans are also in hand to improve its operational survivability by fitting it with a modern Radar Homing and Warning system. Additionally, studies are being undertaken in conjunction with the USAF to update the aircraft's avionics from an analog to a digital system to enable it to carry the latest range of precision guided munitions.
I would like to remind you that Australia ordered this aircraft almost fifteen years ago. There is no other aircraft in the Western world today which would be a suitable replacement for it. Indeed, there is every indication that the F111 will continue to serve in the USAF well into the future as one of its primary, manned, offensive, airborne weapon systems.

Modifications to our F111s can provide large improvements in their operational capability at little cost when compared with the acquisition of new weapons systems, if indeed they were available. We would not be able to do this if we had not bought a high technology platform in the first place.

I should like now to leave equipment and take a brief look at personnel and training matters.

Let me say at the outset that, as much as anyone, regret that the Regular Army has not increased in strength as quickly as was forecast in the 1976 Defence White Paper. You will recall that, in the paper, it was announced that the Regular Army was planned to reach 34,000 by 1981. The Army, I know, hoped that it would continue to grow even beyond that figure by some thousands of men. I would be less than honest if I said that the Navy and Air Force enthusiastically supported such a growth, but the reason for it not eventuating has no connection with their attitudes. It is entirely a matter of funds available, the competing bids for those funds, and priorities for expenditure. But I should say right now that the Regular Army today is stronger than it has ever been, with the exception of the years between 1965 and 1973 when it was boosted by up to 16,000 National Servicemen. There is certainly no doubt as to the professional competence of those, officers and other ranks, who make up the Regular Army, and indeed the Regular Forces as a whole.

I don't propose to delve deeply into the Army Reserve. There are others who know much more about it today than I do. But it too, at an effective strength of some 22,000 is larger than at any other time since World War II except when its strength also was boosted by National Service trainees.

The rate of officer resignations continues to attract attention in various sections of the Press, but it is my belief that, except in certain limited specialist categories, there is no real cause for concern. Until six or so years ago, an officer who resigned before reaching his statutory age for retirement could only do so by attracting a fairly substantial penalty in respect of his pension rights — even to the extent of forfeiting everything except his contributions. This, of course, is no longer the case, but there are many who tend to believe that there is something basically wrong with a system which does not impose such a Draconian penalty, or something basically wrong with a person who, after perhaps twenty or thirty years of service, wishes to leave before reaching his statutory age of retirement. I do not share these views.

Resignations are not abnormal and, in fact, within reasonable limits, are considered by some, including myself, to be a healthy and desirable occurrence, as they open the way for the advancement of others. The fact is that the resignation rate has stabilized below 5% per annum, at an average of over twenty years service per officer, and I regard this as being within such limits. Also, the fact that those resigning do not appear to be experiencing any difficulty in finding good jobs in the current employment market is reassuring. By civilian standards, our standards obviously are high!

Another fertile ground for public criticism was the recent decision to withdraw from service some of our newer equipments and to reduce steaming and flying times. The decision, let me assure you, was not an easy one, nor was it taken lightly. Based on earlier, confident expectations of a higher level of funding, we had entered into long term commitments which had to be met from smaller Budget outlays. Also, a choice had to be made between sustaining a high level of investment in long life items such as ships, vehicles and weapons on the one hand, or spending more on consumables such as fuel, spare parts and ammunition on the other. The final outcome was, I think, the best compromise possible. It is aimed at preserving Service operational and training activities at levels which will keep military skills and morale at an acceptable level and at the same time, allow for the continuation of the equipment development and acquisition programme.

Let me say right now that I think a lot of the criticism of activity levels comes from members who remember only the 'hot house' conditions of preparation for service in Vietnam, when units next-for-duty in AFV came 'on stream' about ten months before embarkation and were kept at it literally day and night from then on.
This is neither necessary nor desirable in the present circumstances. Quite apart from the strains such a programme inevitably inflicts on those involved in it, it wears out equipment, weapons, vehicles and so on at a quite unsupportable rate. Others will remember the earlier post war years when there was no discernible level of activities at all. Regular regiments and battalions were looked on as sources of manpower for working parties in the nearest Base Ordnance Depot. It is worth remembering that the first post World War II Army formation exercise was ‘Grand Slam’ — and that was not until May 1959.

I have no doubt that a somewhat similar situation existed in the Navy and the Air Force.

No one, least of all me, wants to see a reversion to those days, but I do wish to inject some sense of reality into discussions on this matter of activities. It is possible, if one wishes to be so foolish, to spend far too much on activities and therefore far too little on equipment and its repair and maintenance. The eventual result of such a policy, if pursued for too long, needs no explanation by me to an audience such as this.

Despite the time, I would like now to comment on the reorganization of the Defence group of departments into the one department.

One hears a lot of criticism of what was done, but let me say that some, at least of the more vocal critics have never been in a position to know the facts. True, the present organization is not without its weaknesses. So was the old one. So, I think, is every organization.

A major misconception is that the reorganization enabled the Public Service to gain unlimited power over the Defence Force. I would like to set the record straight. It is important to understand that the relationships between the CDFS and the Secretary are now based on the provisions inserted in the Defence Act by the Reorganization Act. Those which are of particular relevance provide that:

Subject to (and in accordance with any directions of the Minister) the Secretary and the CDFS shall jointly have administration of the Defence Force except with respect to:

- matters falling within the command of the Defence Force by the CDFS or the command of an arm of the Defence Force by a Chief of Staff; or
- any other matter specified by the Minister.

I don’t propose to go into the definition of command but I would draw your attention to the references to command of the Defence Force by the CDFS and to command of the arms of the Defence Force — the three Services — by the respective Service Chiefs of Staff.

This is a far cry from the days — not so long ago — when a Service Chief of Staff was the first among equals as the Chairman of his Service Board and the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee had no statutory position or authority at all.

Let me say that I am not particularly enamoured of the division of administration into ‘matters falling within command’ and other matters and I said so when the matter was being discussed in 1975. But, in fact, the division of administration at the CDFS/Secretary level into those two categories has not produced the problems I then expected it to. This probably is because, at that level, administration is perhaps a rather too simplistic word to comprehend the whole range of subjects with which one deals.

Taken together, the Defence Act, the Audit Act, Treasury Regulations and the directives issued by the Minister to the Secretary and the CDFS are quite explicit in:

- Assigning command of the Defence Force to CDFS.
- Assigning responsibility for financial administration and control of expenditure to the Secretary. (This is to be interpreted as meaning not only financial order and regularity of accounts but also the correct and proper use of public funds in all fields of Defence expenditure).
- Assigning responsibility for general administration of the Defence Force (that is administration not falling within command or financial administration and control of expenditure) to the Secretary and the CDFS together.

There seems to be an impression that the Secretary’s responsibility for financial administration and control of expenditure empowers him to decide, on his own initiative if you like, what equipment is bought and what is not — despite the views of the Chiefs of Staff or the Chief of Staff of the Service directly concerned. This, of course, is nonsense, and it might be an appropriate stage for a few words on the Committee structure within the Department. No one person is the complete expert on
any major Defence issue. Indeed the skills and knowledge of a number of uniformed and civilian experts can be required to make a sound judgement on a matter which might call into play strategic considerations, operational requirements, defence science and technology, the capabilities of industry, financial programming and contractual aspects. Committees are a necessary part of Defence, as they are of any large organization, in order to bring together the range of views which need to be taken into account in determining complex questions.

Incidentally, contrary to popular opinion, there has not been an increase in the proportion of civilian to Service personnel in Defence. Since 1973 there has been a significant decrease.

I would like also to take this opportunity to make one point perfectly clear: I do not believe that the role of the Public Service in the Department is as all powerful as many outside Defence say it is. Such a misconception does little credit to the knowledge and understanding of those who propagate it. It underplays the absolutely fundamental responsibilities and contributions of uniformed personnel at all levels. Personally, I find this particular criticism quite insulting and if anyone has information which would stand up to scrutiny I would be interested to hear it.

Technology

During the past several decades the technological nature of much of our equipment has changed dramatically. While there appear to be no revolutionary technological advances on the horizon that can be expected to alter the whole concept of warfare, there will be sufficient advances made in existing technologies to ensure that the trends of vastly superior communications, increasing lethality of weapons, increasing costs, long lead times and the requirement for an advanced infrastructure to keep pace with the rate of change, all continue.

The development of advanced technology systems is a complex business of which few countries are capable. Research and development to achieve the initial breakthrough can be a long and enormously expensive process and it requires a sound technological base to support it. Production requires skilled workers and industrial backing as well as the necessary materials. It also takes time. The entire process, from inception to acceptance into service, can be anything from five to 25 years. Only the major industrial nations have the necessary resources, and even they are tending towards joint development. Thus, total self sufficiency for Australia is a pipedream.

Obviously it is beyond Australia’s capability to purchase every new weapons system that comes along, no matter how good it is. Apart from technological factors, other features which will have a profound impact on our selection process are the strategic environment in which we operate and the effect the introduction of a system into service will have on the Defence Force. Many will require more highly skilled operators and maintainers and more logistic support than the systems they replace. This in turn can lead to a requirement for higher enlistment standards, an increase in training times and, very probably, more support facilities and equipment.

These trends are more apparent in the Navy and the Air Force than they are in the Army, although the Army, too, is becoming more complex in its equipment. There is, I believe, a place for the Reservist in all three Services, but clearly, in the Air Force and in certain areas of the Navy, training times to operate and maintain advanced technology systems will be such that their employment will have some limitations.

The Army’s problem in this area is not so acute, which perhaps is well illustrated by the strengths of the Active Reserves of the three arms of the Defence Force. Because we can no longer plan on always meeting our defence obligations by making a contribution to a larger allied force, we must have balanced capabilities of our own. Therefore it is no longer possible to create, or measure, a defence capability merely by adding to or counting the number of heads in uniform. There is, unfortunately, more to it than a massive national service, or similar scheme and its attendant call for numbers — important though numbers will be.

Summary

First, there is at present no perceivable direct military threat to Australia — but that is not the only consideration. There are a number of uncertainties in Australia’s strategic environment which have important implications for our defence preparedness. These uncertainties are dynamic in nature and
could lead to the quite rapid emergence of new, adverse situations.

Second, the Government has to deal with the economy. Any realistic discussion of defences and advocacy of particular courses of action must take account of their costs and financial feasibility. Critics of our Defence capability should therefore face up to economic realities. Overstatements of what we need in the present circumstances can destroy credibility and be as counterproductive as not stating our needs at all.

Third, we do have an effective Defence Force taking account of the resources at our disposal. Let there be no doubt whatever about that.

Fourth, I do accept that there are areas of Defence which require improvement. But changes take time and many of them can only be attacked on a priority basis when it is opportune, or when resources are available.

Fifth, the current spate of criticism of our Defence preparedness is not justified. When the subject of defence is raised, people should be careful to spell out exactly what they are talking about. The Department of Defence is but one of many Departments responsible for providing advice to the Government. The Government may choose to accept this advice when formulating its policies. It may not for reasons which to it are sufficient. Once the policy is set, the Department of Defence implements it.

Finally, one doesn’t necessarily generate an increased defence capability merely by adding to the numbers in uniform. There is more to it than that, particularly when one is also faced with the problem of achieving some degree of self reliance.

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(RAFC STAFF COLLEGE STUDENT PAPERS continued on page 55)
INTRODUCTION

My purpose is to stimulate a broader and hopefully refreshing debate on Australian defence and other policies towards the Indian Ocean region. By looking at the ocean from a new perspective I hope to generate more realistic alternatives to the two extremes commonly heard: noisy verbal reaction to Soviet presence, and doing nothing. While admitting the low budget impact of those approaches I am concerned about their long term disutility.

This article is not about how to defend Australia from attack across the Indian Ocean. It is about the influences which bear on the region, on our position in it, and hence how we might better keep options open for future generations. The region is defined and its character described. Selected littoral states are examined in outline and the likely future attitudes and abilities of the superpowers are examined in greater depth.

I offer conclusions regarding Australian defence and other policies towards the region.
on Cape Leeuwin and sweeping an area of radius say 4,000 km taking in Cape Leveque, southern coast of Java, the Cocos Islands, Heard Island, the Antarctic coast, Macquarie Island, and Hobart. A substantial naval base at Cockburn Sound makes a lot of sense in that context.

Now conjure up a second vision, focused in the middle of the Arabian Sea, sweeping an area of radius say 2,000 km taking in India, Iran, the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Gan (at the southern tip of the Maldives) and a little further south down to Diego Garcia (at the southern tip of the Chagos Archipelago about 1,800 km SSW of India and halfway between Indonesia and Africa). Beyond that radius you can see the Strait of Malacca to the east and the African coastline to the Cape of Good Hope to the south-west.

It is this second vision which most of the world sees. That was the Indian Ocean described until 1967 as a “British lake”. That was and is the Indian Ocean through which passes a high percentage of world trade, especially oil. It lies just below the geographic centre of gravity of the USSR. It is that Indian Ocean whose littoral and hinterland states include many in the emerging third world, and almost one third of the population of the world. It is the home of OPEC. Australia has no coastline on this second vision.

To those who see the second vision, the first vision of (the largest part of) the Indian Ocean is an uninteresting non-focused void. It is common for articles dealing with roles and aspirations of Indian Ocean region powers (eg., 6) to not even mention Australia. They focus only on countries in the second vision.
such as India, Iran and Somalia. The areas in those two visions are separated by a wedge of water in the south narrowing to a slight overlap to our North West.

For the sake of brevity I will call the first vision South Indian Ocean and the second, North Indian Ocean. Such arbitrary compartmentalization can be dangerous if it prevents an integrated view of the whole problem, for after all the Indian Ocean is one large stretch of international water with freedom of use for all nations. Its dimensions are a welcome barrier against invasion. They can also be a mental barrier against realistic appraisal of the impact on Australia of other nations' use of that ocean. So the concept of separate North and South Indian Oceans is, but is no more than, a useful tool.

RESOURCES AND OTHER FACTORS

To set the scene for discussing the interests of the littoral states and interested external powers in the two Indian Oceans let us briefly note the resources in the region and other significant factors which should be taken into account.

Oil is the most obvious reason for focussing attention on the North Indian Ocean. Both the world's largest oil production and largest oil reserves are in the Persian Gulf area. There are also important exports of scarce minerals and agricultural products from a variety of countries in the North Indian Ocean region. The oil seller needs to imports goods or services to more or less balance the value of his exports (omitting the partial and limited utility alternative of buying property in the oil buyer's country), and so both North Indian Ocean nations and their non-Indian Ocean trading partners share common needs to keep stability in the region, and to keep the trade routes open.

The main buyers of Middle East oil are Europe, Japan and North America in that order and the two main trade routes are through the Strait of Malacca to Japan, and down the African coast around the Cape of Good Hope to America, UK and Europe. Also small tankers use the Suez canal and there are pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea. By comparison to other destinations Australia receives a tiny amount of Middle East oil but reliable receipt of it is increasingly vital to Australia. If no substantial discoveries are made our Australian reserves are expected to run out in 12 years or less. Australia may well become a lot more interested in both Indonesian and Middle East oil in 5 to 10 years time.

As an arena for furthering "peaceful coexistence", "detente" or the strategic nuclear balance the ocean area has slight but increasing significance. The interests of the US, USSR, and China in the littoral states is real and continuing with fluctuating fortunes, but the Middle East excepted, apparently low on all their priority lists. More of this later.

That the bulk of the over 40 littoral and hinterland states are either small, poor or politically immature and in the emerging third world group with a significant collective UN vote is significant. In the first six years of the 1970s there were over 40 attempted coups d'etat or revolutions in various African independent states. It was these states with little or no naval capability who at the Zambia September 1970 Conference of Non-aligned Nations called on all states to "consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which Great Power rivalries and competition, as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force bases, are excluded". Sri Lanka sponsored a similar resolution (adding the exclusion of nuclear weapons) which gained UN General Assembly approval in 1971 and again in several following years. On each occasion those with little naval capability voted in favor while those with a maritime capability either voted against or abstained. It is now widely appreciated that for exerting influence effectively "Control of public (or published) opinion and economic relations are now as important as nineteenth-century 'command of the seas' — though the latter remains as important as ever". The main power of most of these diverse nations is their ability to refuse use of their soil for Superpower military bases, a power which has been seen in, for example, Somalia's recent refusal to continuance of the apparently well entrenched Russian presence in the Berbera naval base. Whether Russia can regain influence on the Horn of Africa by

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*Of the 19,570 thousand barrels per day exported from the area in 1975 Australia bought 159, Japan 3,215 and Europe 12,300. (International Petroleum Encyclopedia, p. 8.)

**See C. B. Marshall's article for an interesting discussion of the different meanings the US and USSR attribute to these terms.
manipulation of the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute remains to be seen.

On the other hand consider the significance of the communist takeover in Afghanistan last year. The shortest distance from Russia to the Indian Ocean is about 1,000 km (Brisbane to Canberra) down the Iranian border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Historic tribal disputes in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan plus communist leadership in Afghanistan equals the possibly overwhelming temptation for Russian intervention.

A Russian-controlled port on the Indian Ocean sustainable by road from Russia would dramatically alter the balance of power in the North Indian Ocean and send waves into the South Indian Ocean.

Only a small percentage of the vast Indian Ocean is actually used by commercial shipping and it is this concentration in confined places to avoid dramatically longer alternate routes which gives some littoral states more attention-getting ability than they would otherwise have. These are: Malaysia and Indonesia and the Strait of Malacca; Indonesia and other routes north of Australia; the states around the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and Suez Canal; Mozambique and the Mozambique Channel. Iran and the other Persian Gulf states and the Strait of Hormuz are in an opposite category — about 80% of Middle East oil comes out through that strait and it is in the oil exporters' interests to ensure it remains open.

The sea off the Cape of Good Hope is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Europe is the destination of much of the traffic despite opening of the Suez Canal. Over half of Europe's oil supplies come in supertankers via this route in addition to food and other products. A small but significant and increasing proportion of oil for the US comes this way. South Africa and the UK jointly renounced the Simonstown Agreement in June 1975 which still had many years to run. South Africa has revamped this, the only substantial naval base on the African coast, and offered its use to any free world country but so far has had no takers.

Although not on a critical trade bottleneck and not possessed of strategically important exports the Reunion Islands (just east of Madagascar) may be important because they are a part of France. It is a full state just as Hawaii is a full state of the US. It has a population of 500,000 French citizens.

Turning to the South Indian Ocean, the major countries of interest are Antarctica and Australia. First Antarctica. This has been the scene of keen and co-operative multinational scientific exploration and study, especially during and since the 1958 International Geophysical Year. It is the focus of unrealised hopes of rich mineral discoveries and a long standing but — forgive the pun — temporarily frozen Australian claim to possession of about 45% of the continent. It has become apparent that 'tourism still appears to be the only industry capable of any real growth there'. It could be that its ice is not only its most obvious feature but also a resource of value to Australia. Substantial areas cross the south of Australia are fertile but too dry to support agriculture, industries or cities reliably. Towing icebergs to dry areas is not a new idea, and has been rejected in relation to Northern Hemisphere countries. A practical scheme, said to be 60 times more energy efficient than desalination, has now been devised for towing icebergs the comparatively short distance to the southern coastline of Australia.

Australia's resources exportable from the west coast include iron ore, natural gas, uranium, other minerals, agricultural products, and fish. Destinations are more often Japan than across the Indian Ocean. Fishing is mainly by foreign fishing fleets operating off our shores and the 200-mile economic zone when declared, either unilaterally or in conjunction with the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, will bring with it an obligation for surveillance of a dramatically increased sea area.

Against this background we can now examine Australia's position in relation to some littoral states and to the superpowers.

SELECTED LITTORAL STATES

I have selected only those states with a naval capability. For convenience I have included

* If ships had to go around the east coast of Madagascar it would add 500 miles to their journey.

** Declining US oil production has coincided with a marked change in sources of US oil imports. Sources in order of quantity in 1975 were Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Canada. The U.S. is increasingly dependent on African and Middle East oil. (International Petroleum Encyclopedia, p. 152.)

† A French "department" and a US "state" are not totally equivalent but the analogy is close enough for my purpose.
Antarctica in this section although of course it is not a nation state. The section concludes with a look at our own long coastline.

**Indonesia**

Indonesia touches both Indian Oceans, exports a modest amount of oil (mainly to Japan and Australia), and has a real interest in the ‘rights of passage through straits and archipelagos’ portion of the Law of the Sea Conferences. She has a numerically large defence force, portion of which is devoted to civil and administrative duties, and her navy is modest and attuned to the inter-island nature of the nation.

Indonesia supports the zone of peace concept but in the words of the Chairman, Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, “Any hope of neutralization of the Indian Ocean can only be seen as remote and idealistic. Since the littoral and hinterland nations do not have the means, even acting in concert, to close the ocean, a policy of neutralization requires the consent of the great powers, but the possibility of such an act of self-denial is very small.” Our largest near neighbour, recognizing the futility of trying to keep the superpowers out of the region, sees the wisest course being to accept an equilibrium between them. She sees encouragement of multinational involvement as a means of preventing dominance by any single country. (Speech by Adam Malik to UN General Assembly on 24 September 1974.) This view is compatible with Australia’s and we should encourage it.

Of the various routes from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific the Strait of Malacca is not only the shortest and best it is also the furthest from our shores. We should encourage Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to keep it open.

**India**

India is the only Indian Ocean nation other than Australia which has an aircraft carrier. Her navy is larger than ours, and is the largest in the region. It could at least for short periods be effective anywhere in the North Indian Ocean but is really geared to local defence. India is opposed to a build up of Diego Garcia and is influenced to some extent by the USSR. She supports the zone of peace proposal. Australia has significant trade relations with India as well as far reaching relations covering aid, cultural, scientific and trade agreements. We should capitalise on our ties with India to influence her to remain friendly with the West. We would surely prefer combined Australian-Indian naval exercises to combined Russian-Indian ones.

**Iran (Written prior to recent events — Editor)**

The Shah of Iran has frequently expressed ambitious goals for his country, including the assumption of a strategic role in the Indian Ocean. However the Iranian vision of the Indian Ocean is in practice limited to not much more than the Arabian Sea. She is the strongest military power in the Persian Gulf area and has a strong small navy. It is very much in her interest to keep open the trade routes carrying her oil. A common land border with the USSR, competition with Saudi Arabia and borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan tend to keep her attention close to home.

Iran has supported the zone of peace proposal in the UN, an attitude which is consistent with her objective of keeping major powers out and littoral states, especially Iran, in control of the North Indian Ocean. The Shah is however concerned about the Soviet presence and keen to have it counterbalanced: “I am not opposing the Diego Garcia base as long as there are other powers in the Indian Ocean” (remarks to Canberra press conference). Iran buys arms from and trades with both USSR and the West. She seeks regional cooperation. Her goals and approach appear to be consistent with Australia’s interests.

As Australia alone does not have the capability to secure the sea line of communication for her oil imports, regional cooperation with Iran is imperative. Mutual port visits and bilateral naval exercises would increase mutual understanding.

**South Africa**

The strategic importance of South Africa, a strongly anti-communist country, has become even greater since the permanent increase in shipping using the Cape route prompted by the advent of supertankers and uncertainties over the Suez Canal. South Africa has made improvements to her ports to handle the increase in traffic. She has the largest navy in Africa but it is much smaller than the RAN. She has excellent naval bases including Simonstown, use of which has been
unsuccessfully offered to all anti-communist countries. Her strong pro-Western attitude is beneficial but has not been reciprocated. The time may be approaching for the West to break the nexus between dislike of her internal policies and non-co-operation with her in all fields. Russian (and to a lesser extent Chinese) influence across the African continent just north of South Africa may soon leave South Africa totally isolated. South Africa may soon become Russia's next target. Little of Australia’s trade goes that way and it is by my definition in the North Indian Ocean remote from us. However it is a single easily traversed stretch of water and low key co-operation by way of combined naval exercises would lead to more economical surveillance of Russian shipping than each acting separately. We should encourage South Africa to expand her navy.

Antarctica

The most likely to be useful resources of the Antarctic region of the South Indian Ocean are icebergs, seafood and tourism. As there is no competition for icebergs and as we would harvest such a tiny proportion of this resource, we should be able simply to help ourselves off the high seas or edge of the ice shelf. If we become dependent on icebergs as a water source then we would need to assure that the long slow towing operation was not interfered with.

On the other hand seafood harvesting and tourism are subjects requiring international agreement. Australia should be active in both areas. Tourism has already started (albeit not to the area of interest to us) with regular cruises to the area by a Norwegian vessel and charter flights from Australia to the South Pole (albeit without landing there).

The future value of marine resources has already been recognized and discussed between the 13 nations interested but without formal agreement as yet.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959 regulates international behaviour in the area. The treaty was brought into effect remarkably smoothly and continues equally smoothly. It provides for, amongst other things, non pursuit of territorial claims, no nuclear explosions, and inspections of each others sites. The smooth ride so far may be attributed to the combined effect of no indigenous population, the temporary resident community (and treaty negotiators) being mainly scientists, and failure to discover mineral wealth.

The position from Australia’s view point is that we have negotiated away a right to pursue our territorial claim on 45°S of Antarctica for the indefinite duration of the treaty. This benefits the USSR and US who are not claimants (and so gave nothing away) but who have a sustained high level of exploration and presence. For example the Russian scientific bases of Molodezhnaya, Mirnyy, and Leningradskaya are in the area of Australia’s interest.

Should it become in our interests to pursue sovereignty claims or economic zone claims we would need to substantiate them not only with historical argument but also with continued active interest and presence.

As the level of our Antarctic activity is considerably below what might be expected of the closest scientifically capable nation I recommend an increase in that activity and for it to be sustained at least until pursuit of the territorial claim is positively shown to be of no value to us.

Australia

The physical isolation and strict quarantine regulations which have kept Australia free of many plant and animal diseases are being bypassed potentially to our severe detriment. The bypass may be unintentional as when foreign fishing vessels put in to shore on a remote beach to repair damage, or the result of determined effort, as with refugee boats or drug-smuggling light aircraft.

Whether maritime and coastal surveillance along our long remote Indian Ocean and northern coastline for customs, immigration and quarantine purposes should be an RAN, joint RAN/Army/RAAF, civilian or joint civil/military responsibility, deserves urgent debate. The present virtual non-surveillance situation is intolerable for both civil and military reasons. The problem is much greater when extended to surveillance of a 200-mile resource zone. Like a minefield on land it is not really ours unless we can observe it and fire on it.

The immediate motives for setting up a surveillance and patrol network are mainly non-military. The regulations to be enforced are non-military and span several government departments. The military possess some
relevant skills and some but nowhere near enough equipment or people and we lack the knowledge of the regulations needed by an enforcement agency. We would not want to unnecessarily duplicate military and civilian surveillance effort and the information from all sources must be able to rapidly flow into the military intelligence system in peace and especially in war.

Is there a case for establishing a non-military Coastguard Service? It would be responsible for enforcing in a maritime environment relevant fishing, customs, immigration, and quarantine regulations, and be organized to include patrol boats, aircraft, radar stations, perhaps a fixed sonar fence, and a structured reporting system involving remote area residents including aborigines. It could have close ties with the Defence Forces. It would allow the Defence Forces to concentrate on long distance and anti-submarine surveillance. An already existing trained remote area resident reporting system would be an invaluable asset in circumstances leading up to war.

Thus a non-military solution is appropriate to a non-military problem, but ideally the solution should allow smooth adaption to defence purposes when a military threat develops.

Surveillance satellite information would be valuable for both non-military and military purposes. Until we could afford our own we would be dependant on the US for such information. The length of our coastline, the area of our 200-mile resource zone, and the vastness of the Indian Ocean, together with the non-military utilization, may well make Australian surveillance satellites (launched by the USAF) worthwhile.

Discussion of our military role in the Indian Ocean is incorporated into the following section.

AUSTRALIA, THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE INDIAN OCEANS

Let us now examine the interests of the USSR, US and China in the two Indian Oceans and deduce implications for Australian foreign affairs and defence policies.

USSR

The Soviet ultimate objective, world domination, remains unchanged but we have seen the implementing strategy alter with time. The arms race leading to military conflict gave way to 'peaceful co-existence' and later 'detente'; phrases which in Soviet usage mean gaining ascendancy by encouraging self-defeating syndromes in non-communist countries thus enabling victory without a fight. Communist Party leader Brezhnev stressed at the 25th Congress of the CPSU that detente was a technique for creating conditions favourable for peaceful (i.e. without the need for a war) supremacy of socialism and communism over capitalism and said, "Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and cannot abolish or alter, the laws of class struggle. There is no room for neutralism and compromise in the struggle between socialism and capitalism."

We are currently witnessing a new phase: detente continues and concurrently the Soviet military strength is being built up especially on land in Europe and at sea to the point where Russia now has far more military might than could possibly be needed only for conventional warfare defence against China and NATO simultaneously.

Does this spill over into the North Indian Ocean? Of course it does. It reaches into every corner of the globe. But even superpowers have budgetary constraints and must prioritise their spending. Russia is both a European and an Asian country, with the strategic advantage of having no overseas possessions to protect and disadvantage of very long land borders. Russia's top priorities for defence roubles are doubtless strategic nuclear deterrence against the US and conventional forces against NATO and China. There aren't many roubles left after those two, however Admiral Gorshkov has convinced his political masters of the need to progressively expand and modernise the Soviet navy to the point where it quantitatively matches that of the U.S.

For a country which could adopt a continental defence posture and has hardly any ice-free coastline why such an impressive expanding navy? There are several valid reasons for them not only to have a navy but also to deploy it into the North Indian Ocean.

``Quality and type comparisons show the U.S. is ahead but in pure numbers the Soviets will soon be well ahead. The Soviets are now well into aircraft carriers with their Kiev class nuclear-powered carrier of which they will have three in service by 1980. The Soviets are already ahead on numbers of submarines but their technology probably does not match that of the U.S.``
Firstly their space program. The Indian Ocean could be an emergency alternative landing zone to their main continental one. Naval ships with their speed, communications, helicopters and so on are ideal for this purpose as the US has demonstrated. Secondly, the Soviets operate many fishing fleets worldwide. For administrative convenience and other reasons they include sophisticated electronic surveillance vessels which would otherwise travel alone. The fishing fleets are there, including in the Indian Ocean, to fish and provide an important food source, not just to hide EW ships. Loss of the fishing fleets would cause a food shortage and the Soviets might therefore reasonably seek to protect them.

Thirdly, the Soviets are engaged in continuing and significant oceanographic research. Doubtless this has not only purely scientific motives but is also directed towards benefiting fishing, sonar applications and seabed resources knowledge. Fourthly, Soviet submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) submarines are highly unlikely to be in the Indian Ocean but there is likely to be an increase in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) submarines and other ASW vessels to track US SLBM submarines should the future Trident be deployed there.

Fifthly, the North Indian Ocean is part of the only all-year-round sea route between European and Asian Russia. The rail link across Russia carries probably 99.9% of E-W Soviet internal trade. However, from a Soviet viewpoint, this link must seem tenuous, vulnerable to sabotage* and difficult to repair in their harsh winter. So to them the ability to protect an alternative sea route seems important. The same ships that do this could also severely disrupt Western trade, especially by sinking oil tankers, however, it is highly unlikely that they would do so except as part of a total war and even then it may be more expedient for them to destroy the oil rigs and loading facilities.**

All five reasons, having the merit for the propagandist of a basis in truth, are used by the Soviets in public statements as distractors from their main long-term goal of world domination. The Indian Ocean/African extension of Russian power will put the USSR in a position from which she could simultaneously contain southwestern expansion of China and strangle Europe (and NATO) by cutting off oil and other supplies. On the economic front she could limit Western access to Africa's wealth and gain it for herself.

The USSR has progressed impressively in the direction described. She has learned the lessons from her expulsion from Egypt and Somalia and has gained a solid footing in Angola and Mozambique and is likely to eventually succeed in turning the Horn of Africa countries into a pro-Soviet group. Angola's resources include iron ore, diamonds, copper, and gold. Whether or not these are exported to Russia, they are "lost to the Western economy as a safe supply source". Mozambique's resources include coal, iron ore, copper, fluorite, manganese, chrome, nickel, bauxite, and possibly gas.** Aeroflot operates to Maputo in Mozambique and Soviet merchant ships regularly call there. In 1976 the USSR was constructing a large airfield on the island of Bazaruto, off the coast of Mozambique. In March 1977 she signed a Treaty of Friendship with Mozambique. On the other side of the Mozambique Channel Russia has aid projects in Malagasy (Madagascar).”

Backing the expanding political and economic influence of the USSR is the expanding Soviet navy which Admiral Gorshkov sees as supportive of political goals by "making a visible demonstration of force", putting "political pressure on other states" and "supporting the diplomatic moves of one's own country, to deter potential enemies" (quoted by Admiral Holloway). The Soviets well understand that "... the presence of Soviet naval vessels does not create Soviet influence in the littoral states, but simply reinforces and strengthens any influence that already exists". They have concentrated on activities ashore such as aid programs, arms supplies, training in Russia, and education. Some 3,000 Soviet teachers are reportedly serving abroad. In the military field their use of Cubans instead of Russian nationals has been successful and politically sound.

The Soviet influence in Africa is not confined to the Indian Ocean coast (Somalia and Mozambique) but extends to Guinea-Bissau, **Significantly the source of this list is a Russian article quoted by Rees, op. cit.**
Congo and Angola† on the Atlantic coast so that from both sides economic and military influence can be and is being brought to bear on the landlocked countries.42 “Russian bear hugs Africa” would be an apt headline.

Soviet influence in the North Indian Ocean area is therefore much more pervasive and permanent than indicated by the presence of some naval vessels. Having a global naval capability has made it easier for Russia to intervene in areas far from her shores. To combat this Australia, the US and their free world allies need not only to counter the Soviet naval presence but also to “combat that influence at the source, on the political level, through the creation of closer ties with the states of the region”.43

Thus conclusions for Australian foreign affairs and defence policies would include the following:

While we should continue to take every opportunity to participate in talks with littoral states (as we did for example by membership of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean zone of peace proposal) we should make our presence felt in a more positive manner. At not unreasonably cost we could for example notably increase the number of our diplomatic and trade representatives in the area. Such an increase should be treated as a long term investment. It could lead to better mutual understanding, identification of suitable aid projects (along the lines for example of the Snowy Mountains Authority consultant engineering work in Malaysia), and be a non-threatening source of Western information and guidance to those countries.

However as several third world leaders have pointed out our rhetoric about fair and attractive markets for their exports will have to be converted to practical results before we will be accepted as a credible and trusted friend in the region. I see a positive change in our trade relations in the area as a prerequisite for success and also, given the strong protectionist track record of the government, the least likely to rapidly bring about.

Next we should continue to encourage the US to maintain a “matching presence”44 in the region, corollaries of which include support of US development of Diego Garcia and US use of Australian facilities.

†In fact the Soviet penetration of Angola is treated by several commentators as a case study in how to successfully gain complete influence in a country.

It is quite beyond our means to become a global naval power, but we should become an Indian Ocean naval power. We should be able to patrol both North and South Indian Oceans and have our ships regularly appear on goodwill visits to North Indian Ocean ports. As earlier indicated this is largely an empty gesture unless adequate diplomatic and other representation is already there, and trade arrangements exist which are acceptable to the countries concerned. But if these conditions are met such a naval presence should have a significant effect. Even in isolation it would demonstrate that the USSR was not the only user of the Ocean.

We should encourage France to maintain its interest and presence in the area. France maintains a larger fleet in the ocean than either the USSR or the US, albeit of generally smaller vessels but often supplemented by one of its two aircraft carriers, and located generally in an area to complement the United States. Russian influence extends right down the African coast. The US three ship Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) is based at Bahrain in the far north. The French interest (since leaving the Territory of Ifars and Issas)* is centred further south on their island possessions (especially the Reunion Islands) which simultaneously provide a base and a motive for continuing presence.

The need for us to encourage South Africa and Iran to help counterbalance the Soviet presence has already been stated.

I am not leading up to a suggestion to form a military alliance in the region. A tight knit arrangement such as NATO is only worth the considerable effort and organizational superstructure when instant readiness against massive invasion is needed. However some loose form of dialogue, combined exercises and co-ordination of effort between those Indian Ocean states which have a naval capability could well help to provide a counterbalancing force greater in total than if left piecemeal.

It would also serve to show the US that countries in the region were positively helping themselves and each other, a necessary occurrence as examined in the next section.

United States

The importance to the US of the oil and other essential minerals trade is the main motivator

*Squeezed between Somalia and Ethiopia. The capital and deep water port Djibouti has a more familiar name.
for US presence in the region. Balancing the Soviet presence and demonstrating an ability and right to operate on the high seas there, irrespective of the ‘zone of peace’ proposal, are important secondary reasons.

It seems natural to expect the US to keep some military force in the region as one element in a policy of encouraging stability, deterring terrorists and the USSR, and keeping open the option of intervening quickly on a larger scale should their interests actually be threatened. Very little military force is needed for them to achieve their aim in peace. As Adie remarked, the ‘. . . symbolic effect of even a few nicely painted old ships representing a distant but giant power is greater than that of an equal number of modern ships from a tiny power . . .’

Thus the Middle East Force (MIDESTFOR) of three rather modest ships has been in the area continuously since 1948. Significantly it is stationed at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf close to major US interests and shows the flag mainly in that part of the North Indian Ocean. It is augmented from time to time by a task force based on a nuclear powered carrier or other capital ship. Augmentation is often for exercises to gain familiarity with these waters and to demonstrate continuing international right of access but sometimes it has been related to specific events such as the Indo-Pakistani conflict. US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Holloway summed up the combined benefits of possession of a naval force and its freedom to use the high seas: ‘Naval forces may be positioned near trouble spots without political entanglement. Naval forces do not have to request overflight authorization or diplomatic clearances before taking a position in an area of potential crisis. By loitering in the proximity of a potential or real trouble spot, naval forces communicate a capability for action without entering the sovereign waters, air space, or territory of another country. Thus, naval forces provide decision-makers the capability of influencing events without committing forces to combat, and allow a flexibility with regard to commitment and withdrawal.’

Australia has interests in both North and South Indian Oceans which for the moment let us assume are threatened and that an appropriate response is beyond the capability of our forces. To plan realistically for such an eventuality Australia must assess whether the US is likely to have both the physical ability and the will to assist us.

First, the physical ability. My assessment, based on the assumption that a threat to Australia’s interests requiring a significant military response would occur only in the context of major world tensions or conflicts, is that the US would not have the physical means to assist us, just as Great Britain could not in World War II. This assessment is based on an examination of US present and likely future force levels and the US priorities for their commitment.

Firstly look at force levels. In summary, the US Navy, while including many very modern sophisticated vessels, is quantitatively at its lowest level since World War II. It is down to around 450 ships from 976 ten years ago. Take out the nuclear deterrent SSBNs and look just at conventional naval forces. The US has insufficient military resources now for its top priority tasks in support of NATO (North Atlantic, Mediterranean, US-Europe F of C) and concurrently second priority tasks elsewhere. US force planning is geared to a 1½ war scenario. The main war is commonly assumed to be in Europe and the minor concurrent war could be anywhere, perhaps more likely the North Pacific region than elsewhere. By contrast Russia has more than enough assets to take on NATO and China concurrently and at the same time she could influence North Korea to attack South Korea which the US is pledged to support.

There are insufficient US assets to go around. When reviewing US and Soviet naval capability in 1976 Admiral Hollaway concluded, “that the trend of US naval capability has been on the decline and in comparison, as well as in absolute terms, the Soviet naval capability has been characterized by steady and significant growth. The United States still retains a slim margin of maritime superiority, mainly in those areas of most vital national concern. From these conclusions, we can infer that unless the decline in US naval capability is arrested and indeed reversed, the balance of maritime power will tip in the Soviets’ favour as their capabilities increase.”

That crossover point is approaching faster now.
than in 1976 because there has been no slackening in Soviet ship construction while in
the US ship construction approvals are below the level Admiral Holloway assumed they
would be.

The nation whose industries and energy provided an incredible material and manpower
support in World War II and which put men on
the moon in less than a decade can produce
near miracles but only, as in those examples,
when there is wholehearted national will to
do so.

Against a background of US post-Vietnam
determination to keep out of wars in Asia, and
remembering that to Americans the Indian
Ocean is even further away, let us now examine
the likely US will to come to our assistance.

The official position of the Carter
Administration continues the same military
posture in the North Indian Ocean as
previously described: MIDEASTFOR of three
ships augmented with a large ship or task force
two or three times a year. This stance is a low
key one which recognizes with MIDEASTOR
the longstanding and long term future
importance of the North Indian Ocean and
demonstrates with periodic augmentation both
a recognition of growing importance and ability
to rapidly move in when necessary.

This view is widely but by no means
unanimously held. It is in the nature of the US
political system that Congress does not always
vote the money to implement the President’s
proposals. It is easy from the distance of
Australia, and with so many common bonds in
ideals and outlooks between Australians and
Americans, to overlook two radical differences
between our political systems. Firstly the US
President, unlike the Australian Prime
Minister, is responsible directly to the people,
not to Congress. He is not a member of
Congress. He is the National Command
Authority (and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces). His power to commit US forces
to combat without Congressional agreement
has been curtailed, since Vietnam, to very short
term affairs. As in Australia only Congress, not
the President, can appropriate money for
defence. Thus he can not direct but must
persuade Congress to vote the money to
support his defence proposals. Secondly, US
political parties are very informal affairs
compared with our disciplined structures. A US
politician has his power base in personally and
locally generated support within his
constituency, rather than within his party. The
track record is that most US Congressmen vote
along party lines only slightly more than 50% of
the time. They also face the voters more
often than ours: every two years for
Representatives and four years for Senators.
Thus the outcome of a vote on a particular issue
is far less predictable in the US than in
Australia.

Hence it is necessary to search deeper than
the latest public statement by the US President
to our Prime Minister, in order to postulate the
possible US responses to a call for help, and
then assess which response is most likely. What
are the views of the US ‘attentive public’; the
individuals and groups who are well informed
on world events, from whom could come future
presidents and their appointed advisors, future
Congressmen, political commentators and
others who may influence Congressional
action?

As previously stated one group takes a
central view in line with President Carter’s,
namely MIDEASTFOR plus augmentation.
Another group which includes some
academicians and commentators see a need for
both greater US presence and encouragement
of greater participation (provision of both
bases and naval forces) by littoral states in
combining with the US to oppose the Soviets.
They point to both the increasing Soviet
presence (especially in areas overlooking oil
tanker routes) and the fact that a country in
circumstances in which typical littoral states are
in can not be expected to publicly support the
US unless real US presence materializes.50

At the other end of the spectrum is a group
including some Congressmen and
commentators who question whether there really
are long term US interests in the area, claiming
that the US could survive without Middle East
oil. These people would not alter
MIDEASTFOR, but see augmentation as
counter productive to US interests. Some of
this group say that if the US ever has to
augment it should do so only in conjunction
with allies. Reluctance of allies to participate
should lead to the US reconsidering whether
augmentation is necessary or is the best
solution.51 This latter view is the more
consistent with the Guam Doctrine (the US only
helps those who help themselves), is the more
compatible with likely US force levels and
priorities, and in my view is the approach most likely to prevail.

The Presidential ‘welcome John’ greeting to Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser is not the only sample of inadequate briefing and knowledge of our part of the globe in the US. The announcement on 9 March 1977 by President Carter that the US would enter negotiations with the USSR on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean took as many Americans by surprise as it did Australians. A Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) usually sets in train within government departments a formal and detailed analysis of a situation leading at some later time to a Presidential announcement. In this case, the PRM was not issued to Defence until after the announcement. The results of the formal study together with the promptly and firmly stated views of Prime Minister Fraser and other regional leaders have led to a significant backing away from the originally announced position.

Thus in my view the US places the Indian Ocean low on its priority list and is both unlikely to be able to assist and is unlikely to be willing to assist us unless we demonstrate real willingness to help ourselves.

Now turn the ANZUS coin over and consider what would happen if the US was attacked and invoked ANZUS to obtain our assistance. I assume we would agree to help. A form of Australian assistance which the US might reasonably expect would be for us to assume responsibility in the North Indian Ocean region thus releasing US forces, including MIDEASTFOR for service elsewhere. Could we do it? A demonstrated Australian capability to do so would strengthen us as a regional power in both Indian Oceans and by helping stretch US resources would add to the total conventional warfare deterrent.

So from both sides of the ANZUS coin I conclude that our military, and specifically naval, capability should be increased. What types and quantities of ships and weapons is a separate question. It would be easy to say two aircraft carriers, several other surface ships, several more submarines, support ships and long range maritime surveillance and attack aircraft. The practical constraint of avoiding severe service and national budget distortions will lead to a somewhat different solution the possible nature of which deserves study but is beyond the scope of this article.

China

China is third in the world after the USSR and US in size of submarine fleet and has the largest navy of any country in the Asian region. However, China does not appear to have a global power vision for its navy which is essentially a coastal type operating in the Pacific.

China actively supports groups in Africa in such a way as to both further the class struggle and to deny resources to both the USSR and the US. She has been most noticeably successful in Tanzania where her aid has included construction of an important railway.

While China and Russia remain opposed to one another their presences in Africa are to some extent counterbalancing. However, since each is trying to contain the other the net effect is destabilising. Australia’s attitude to Chinese presence in the North Indian Ocean must take into account our attitude to Russian presence. For example, it would be totally unrealistic to request one to diminish its presence and not the other.

As far as I am aware China has no interest in the South Indian Ocean, however, the regular arrests of Taiwanese fishing vessels inside our 12-mile limit certainly shows an interest by Taiwan. Creation of a 200-mile economic zone may bring the extent of this interest into sharper focus. We need to develop a dramatic increase in ocean surveillance capability and an increased capability for arrest and escort as argued in an earlier section.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Indian Ocean

The discussion so far has dealt only with conventional warfare. The US and USSR are also engaged in mutual nuclear deterrence and the Indian Ocean is potentially the scene for increased activity in that context. One leg of the deterrence triad is submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). For missiles to reach substantive targets in the USSR the submarines must be located fairly close to Russia, probably in the North Atlantic but also theoretically in the far north of the Indian Ocean.

Addition of the Trident submarine and missiles to the SSBN fleet in the 1980s will open up a much larger volume of ocean in which they

The other two legs, site launched ICBMs and manned bombers are based in continental US, do not overfly the Indian Ocean, and so are not considered here.
can usefully be deployed. They could use the northern half of the Indian Ocean and quite a bit of the Pacific as well as half the Atlantic. The present SSBNs are based in Scotland and Spain. All the Tridents will be based on the US Pacific coast.

Crew endurance is the limiting factor in deploying both Polaris and Trident submarines. At present each SSBN has two complete crews which change over every two months. Much time can be lost in returning to base for crew changes, restocking food, etc., and maintenance. This combined with the small useful Indian Ocean area for Polaris/Poseidon leads to the conclusion that they are probably seldom stationed there. The area is more attractive for Trident and would be even more so if even a simple base was available. A suitable base could be very modest: an airfield to fly changeover crews in and out and bring in the food and a suitable mooring for a submarine tender with an SSBN alongside. Such a base could also support small conventional forces.

Whether US SSBNs would actually deploy to the North Indian Ocean we can only speculate. As they have only one purpose — Soviet deterrence — they would be targeted only on the USSR and not of themselves be a threat to littoral states. They would, however, attract Soviet ASW activity thus escalating the level of military activity in the area.

**Bases**

Both the USSR and the US appear to have decided to maintain a presence in the North Indian Ocean, for at least as long as Middle East oil lasts. Perhaps in the case of SSBNs much longer. For both countries the North Indian Ocean is remote, making transit time from a home country base a significant proportion of total endurance time. Both need the use of bases in the region.

The ideal base would be an uninhabited island belonging to the country which wanted to use it. Such does not exist so interest focuses on alternatives. The Russians frequently moor ships to deep ocean buoys off the Horn of Africa. While this allows a ship to remain on station without consuming much fuel it does not provide the two key requirements of a base: protected anchorage and an airfield. Satellite communications have eliminated what was once a third key requirement: space for a large high frequency radio station. A large very low frequency radio station is still needed for communication to submerged submarines and the US has such a facility already at North West Cape.

Except for Bazaruto Island which is well to the south (off Mozambique) the Russians have been unsuccessful in obtaining the use of an island. The ex British base at Gan is now part of the independent Republic of the Maldives and should be watched for signs of a take-over bid.

Diego Garcia is a tiny island much further south and only barely suitable for development as a base. It is owned by the UK who have permitted the US to use it. The US fiscal '75 budget sought USS35M to convert the US naval communications facility there into a logistic resupply centre but very little action has occurred, perhaps because of the intensity of the debate it sparked both within the US and internationally.

Expensive underway replenishment and repair and complicated crew relief arrangements would be necessary if a serious presence is to be maintained without a base. Such a course has been rejected by the superpowers whose determination to stay can be measured by their efforts to obtain bases.

The Russian solution has been to build a base for another country (eg. Berbera in Somalia) as an aid project, retaining right of use of it, including exclusive use of some parts of it. A country is only likely to agree to this if it perceives such a course to be in its own best interests. Such perceptions can change. Russia has been expelled (at least temporarily) from Berbera and the US might not always be welcome in Bahrain.

Speaking about the Indian Ocean in the UN, Mr Gromyko said, "... the region should have no foreign military bases which comprise the main element of a permanent military presence." One can argue the difference between 'having' and 'having the use of' a base.

It seems to me that as the littoral states, including Australia, are powerless to prevent superpower presence in the area, and since Russia seems both more determined and more able to stay, that Australia should encourage at least a balance of influence of the superpowers. In practical terms this means permitting US bases in Australia (on our conditions, ie. with safeguards for our own interests), encouraging the US to build up Diego Garcia, and educating the Australian public away from the complete
irrationality of opposing port visits by US ships whose engines happen to use nuclear fuel.

**SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS**

The balance, or imbalance, of non-nuclear forces has reached the point where in terms of possible simultaneous conflicts Russia has the lead. She would not want to but could tackle NATO and China concurrently, influence North Korea to attack South Korea, and still have resources to devote to the Indian Ocean region. In such circumstances the US would be totally committed in the NATO area and Korea and have no resources left for the Indian Ocean, nor indeed South Pacific, regions.

Even in less arduous circumstances the US Congress, reflecting widespread US public disenchantment with military involvement further afield than Europe and Korea, may not vote the money to support major US involvement in the region, except perhaps to keep open its own sources of and supply routes for Middle East oil.

Thus Australia should not rely solely on "great and powerful" friends who despite sharing a strong common bond of love of freedom, and containing many individuals with a keen desire to assist us, may nevertheless, simply no longer have the physical means to help, and perhaps not even the collective will to help.

It seems to me that it would be in our interests to foster the co-ordination of both surveillance and presence activities of our own forces with at least those of Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, France, the US, and hopefully India, in order to maximise the return on effort invested.

Such co-ordination would take the form of information exchange, co-ordinated patrolling, bilateral and multilateral combined exercises (which no matter how basic usually have positive effects in goodwill and mutual understanding), and port visits. The high degree of cohesion and high overheads of a NATO type organization would not be needed.

Combined Australian-US naval exercises in the Indian Ocean such as announced during the May 1978 visit of Vice-President Mondale are an excellent and fairly easy start (considering the lack of language barrier and already substantially standardised procedures). It should become a regular occurrence.

Furthermore, in my view our contribution to such a co-ordinated effort should be notably greater than our current force level allows. In particular the RAN should be expanded, without compensating reductions in the other Services.

We should encourage the US to frequently augment MIDEASTFOR.

Without changing our views on South Africa's internal policies we should recognize her strong anti-communist attitude and the increasing Soviet influence close to her. We should encourage her to increase her navy and have combined naval exercises with her.

We should allow in on fairer terms exports from developing countries, expand our diplomatic and trade representation to them, supplement such activity with RAN port visits, and take any other steps which will foster Western rather than Soviet (particularly) or Chinese influence in them.

We should capitalize on our many ties with India to influence her to remain friendly with the West.

We should continue to foster friendly relations with Iran, not just as a source of oil and investment money and recipient of our goods, but in recognition of her strategic location between Russia and the Indian Ocean. Combined naval exercises with her would not only enhance our skill at working with others but also contribute to goodwill.

I advocate an increase in the level of Australian scientific activity in Antarctica. We are the closest country to it which has a strong science community. We have long standing substantial territorial claims which are unlikely to get international recognition unless our presence is substantially increased. We stand to gain through better meteorological information, we may gain from tourism, marine resources, and water from icebergs, and although hope of mineral wealth is fading we want to be in a strong position if a major discovery is made.

I favour a non-military solution to the non-military problem of enforcement of fishing, customs, immigration and quarantine regulations in the 200-mile resource zone and along our coast. I speculate that a Coastguard Service would be appropriate, equipped with patrol boats, aircraft, radar stations, and perhaps a fixed sonar fence. It would include a structured reporting system of (perhaps voluntary) remote area residents including
aborigines. Such a Coastguard Service would have close ties with the Defence Force.

We should examine the cost effectiveness of having our own surveillance satellites to provide both non-military and military information.

Starting from a fresh look at the Indian Ocean portion of the globe and an examination of littoral state and superpower attitudes and abilities some startling and some very predictable conclusions have been drawn. I hope my readers have acquired an interest in the region and are stimulated to discover more about it and to draw their own conclusions.

NOTES
5. Ibid., p. 438.
7. Ibid., p. 84.
15. Wall, op. cit., p. 45.
20. Ibid.
23. Senate Report, Australia and the Indian Ocean, p. 44.
25. Ibid., p. 424.
26. Ibid., p. 430.
31. Adie, op. cit., p. 5.
36. Ibid., p. 8.
42. Ibid., p. 3.
43. Gill, op. cit., p. 259.
44. Australia and the Indian Ocean, pp. 204 and 205.
45. Adie, op. cit., p. 7.
47. The Military Balance, p. 5.
49. Ibid., p. 24.
51. Ibid., p. 117.
52. Hanks, op. cit., p. 19.
53. Holloway, "Tides and Currents in the Pacific . . .", p. 36.
MILITARY POLICE—ARM OR SERVICE?

Lieutenant Colonel G. D. W. Irvine, psc
Royal Australian Infantry

He (Australian Brigade Group Commander) ordered his provost . . . to shoot any man who 'fired a shot, lit a fire or panicked'.

Official War History
Greece, Crete and Syria

The Provost Image

The Historian's record refers to the withdrawal of the ANZAC Corps from Greece in April, 1941. Brigadier Allen was obviously intent on maintaining control, even if at the expense of any affection held by his men for the Australian Army Provost Corps.

Official histories and war diaries of World War II disclose that from time to time widely disparate impressions were created by 'The Provost'. It is also evident that a number of factors contributed to an image which, in a variety of forms, prevails today.

Ill-discipline among troops was on occasion deemed to be a reflection on provost competence. For example, an incident in Benghazi in 1941 drew criticism of Australian troops' behaviour. However, it is likely that the critics were unaware that the only Australian provosts in the area (9 Div Pro Coy) were at that time in action at Tobruk. The quality of Provost Corps members themselves also came under attention as occurred in February 1942, when looting was rife after the air raids on Port Moresby. The Historian comments that ' . . . insufficient provost troops (were available) and some themselves were unreliable . . . .'

Two images of the provost seem to have been dominant. Not surprisingly, the one reflected respect and admiration for provost companies which had supported formations in combat. The other was less clearly defined, but suggests that something short of unqualified praise had been earned by some provost units when otherwise employed.

RACMP

During 1974-75, the Royal Australian Army Provost Corps was reorganized and retitled as the Royal Australian Corps of Military Police (RACMP).

A prime aim of the reorganization was to organize and equip all MP companies so that they could undertake duties in any zone of an area of operations as well as in the support area. Thus, on an establishment and equipment table basis, every MP company can now be employed as a divisional MP company, albeit that only one is so designated.

With the reorganization came a revised MP company role with attendant functions and tasks. Relating these tasks to the continental defence concept prompts the realization that not for many years has there been anything comparable to their scope and nature. In fact, World War II, and in particular, the Middle East campaigns, may well have been the last occasion when similar conditions were experienced. There have certainly been few instances, if any since 1944, when Australian military police have provided the full range of...
MP support usually associated with conventional warfare. Although this lack of combat or training experience is not an affliction confined to the RACMP, other Corps are less affected. The Army Services bestow their favours, though perhaps at differing pace, both in peace and war. The Arms destroy the Queen’s enemies in war and train to do so in peace. Regrettably, the role of RACMP is not graced with such simplicity.

The withdrawal of 16 Aust Inf Bde during April involved some 600 vehicles and 6000 men moving South over winding mountain roads for three consecutive nights. The 250 mile axis was under constant enemy air attack and 6 Div Pro Coy earned praise for unstinting efforts which contributed to achievement of the mission. The effectiveness of the control measures was in contrast with the chaos that existed in other formations. Also, on 19 April 1941, the Historian records that elements of 7 Div Pro Coy (one officer and 18 other ranks) ‘... were still coolly directing the few vehicles straggling behind the main columns... ’ This took place at Larisa where 7 Div Pro Coy was part of the rear guard of the short lived ANZAC Corps at a time when the enemy advance guard was on the Northern outskirts of the town.

The standards achieved by 6 Div Pro Coy are noteworthy in that only one month earlier, in Libya, the DAPM HQ 6 Aust Div recorded his anguish over lack of resources – including shortage of men who had been adequately trained in traffic control duties. It is probable, however, that on being redeployed in Greece, the unit had been reinforced.

The command and control aspect of the MP role is of course not, as many would imagine, limited to traffic control duties. Several other MP operational functions provide formation commanders with a valuable control resource and also a means of double-checking operational progress.

MP Operational Functions

Traffic control is one of the principal tasks of all MP companies. It is a capability shared by the Reconnaissance Regiment, but one wonders when such a Corps Troops resource could be spared for these duties during operations.

To be effective, the traffic control organization requires well-practised operating procedures in order to co-ordinate the activities of regulating headquarters, sector controls, TCPs, pointsmen and signposting tasks. Obviously, much of this co-ordination demands a close working relationship between formation staff and military police advisors, as well as co-ordination between branch staffs.

This principle is equally applicable to other MP operational functions connected with physical security, rear area security, assistance in local defence and passive air defence measures, protective duties at sensitive installa-
tions, information posts, escorts and assistance in handling stragglers, refugees and prisoners of war. In addition to tasks which may arise during the day-to-day business of land warfare, there are also those related to special phases of offensive and defensive operations. Breaching, obstacle crossing and opposed landings produce the particular control requirements associated with precise navigation and timings.

A member of 9 Div Pro Coy sits beside his motor cycle protected by a parapet — Egypt 20 Jul 42

A fact not widely discussed during Happy Hours is that the Provost Corps were intimately involved in several of the opposed landings by Australian forces during the New Guinea campaign in 1944-45. Not infrequently, provost detachments were with the assaulting infantry; for example at Lae and Tarakan. Good control during the scramble to develop beachheads was essential and the need for close MP support was recognized — although, according to 9 Div Pro Coy reports, not by all participants. The landing at Red Beach, some 20 miles East of Lae, drew irrepressible Digger humour. An anonymous good scout proclaimed: "It's OK chaps. It's a false alarm — the provosts are here." And, indeed they were, with several killed and wounded in action to vouch their presence as early arrivals on the beaches and as members of clearing patrols.

Apart from special operations, there are also contingencies which lend themselves to employment of military police. Anyone acquainted with operations of the British Army in Northern Ireland will be aware of the very significant role performed by the Corps of Royal Military Police. RMP Regiments have developed considerable expertise in what must be one of the more exacting forms of aid to the civil power.

Standing procedures for United Nations Peacekeeping Forces also acknowledge the value of military police support and 'provost' is one of the principal staff sections operating under the Chief of Staff in a UNEF headquarters.

In situations at the other end of the contingency scale, such as military assistance to the community during civil emergencies or natural disasters, military police companies have particularly useful capabilities and characteristics. Mobility, communications and, of course, close liaison channels with civil police, are obviously appropriate attributes for these forms of military assistance.

And let it not be dismissed as a peripheral consideration — some situations which produce requests for military assistance can be handled very adequately by military police — without jarring political sensitivities, which the presence of the more ominous Arms units is likely to cause.

A member of 9 Div Pro Coy looks after a prisoner of war at HQ 21 Inf Bde — DUMPU, New Guinea 10 Oct 43

MP Training

The foregoing provides a sizeable packet for the training analysts to examine, in terms of both individual and collective training.
It does seem, however, that whereas individual training has become mandatory to satisfy career progression charts, opportunities to train MP companies effectively are less prescribed. And much requires to be done before military police sally forth on formation exercises.

To become proficient in the range of duties associated with its operational role, the MP company requires to assemble as a company and devote time to the development of a wide range of procedures. Most Arms units have periods allotted to individual training and administration with the balance being used for collective training. As has been stated before, MP life is not as simple. Military police are also required to cater for static duties.

That some conflict can arise is illustrated in the war diaries. For instance, in March 1941, DAPM 6 Div Pro Coy (while lamenting his Libyan lot recorded that "... about 50% of the members of the Pro Coy had had little or no previous experience in the handling of traffic, because prior to the campaign, they had been continuously used for L of C Military Police duties in the principal leave centres ..."

**Static Duties**

And this is when the Third Commandment reverberates around the hills and valleys of empty MP training areas.

Static or L of C MP duties are essentially those related to the disciplinary function. They embrace non-tactical traffic control, investigation and apprehension of absentees, supervision of detainees, ceremonial and other escort duties, investigation of serious offences, and other tasks related to the responsibilities of military districts.

These are the only MP duties which properly are part of the responsibilities of the personnel services staff. But for traditional or other specious reasons, they have caused military police to be grouped as one of 'the Services'.

If MP static duties are supposed to take priority over field training simply because of the MP function forms part of personnel services then such a situation is alive and well today.

In May 1943, when the strength of the Provost Corps equalled that of the RAAOC today — about 4000 all ranks — the need to relieve military police of one static duty was recognized. This resulted in the raising of the Military Prison and Detention Service which had a strength of about 1000 members and was to remain as a separate Service until 1946. This particular static duty — supervision of members serving detention — is one, which some would argue, is an inappropriate chore for military police to perform. Some other Armies share this view.

Quite apart from any philosophical consideration concerning 'corrective training', it is an expensive enterprise in respect of lodgers and keepers. Although an essential recourse in times of compulsory service, the need is less evident at present when the principle of obtaining maximum effective use of manpower needs to be observed to the letter.

**State of the Art**

To return to the theme of the conflicting commitments of the military police, the relationship between operational training and the MP 'service', is illustrated by proportions of manpower allocated to each. About 70% of Corps ARA establishment strength provides district support, whereas only 20% is in the Field Force.

(Australian War Memorial)

**MP pointsman on duty at DUMP, New Guinea — 15 Oct 43**

Any argument for or against the distribution must centre around the relative need for training in MP operational duties and that of military 'law enforcement' outside unit areas. Whereas the one is undertaken like golf on Wednesdays when possible, the other, being 'a Service' operates on a routine basis and, like Harry's Cafe de Wheels, 24 hours a day. On golf afternoons, congratulations are in order once having made the tee, but as Harold has no
doubt experienced, voices are raised immediately should he begin to lower the shutters.

MP supervised detention and routine disciplinary patrols are seen in some quarters to be inviolable foundations of the military structure and any suggestion of reducing the MP commitment to them is to incite rising blood pressure. This may be valid in a conscripted Army, but do volunteers warrant such attention? Should not ‘State of the Art’ include a striving towards a generally perfected discipline where unit standards of good leadership and loyalty achieve the aim?

There is no lack of expert views on Army discipline but when it comes, for instance, to large scale operational traffic control, those with experience are becoming less in number each ANZAC Day.

The point is that, under present manpower constraints, military police cannot perform effectively the diverse functions of both operational training and static duties.

The ‘State of the Art’ is therefore at stake. And if the Army is to survive on ‘perception’ of threats, then RACMP has a threat of its own. If not ‘perceived’, it is certainly one which is readily apparent to any MP corporal.

Lessons Learned — and Attitudes Formed

Military police involvement in past campaigns is not readily uncovered and deserves a more thorough study, but even a superficial examination suggests that conventional warfare, lacking in Allied support, requires RACMP to come to grips with its operational role.

In 1945, there was a total of 37 Provost Companies of which three were Corps Troops and 12 were divisional companies. On the mainland alone, military police made 98,917 arrests in a two year period. No doubt times were such that the sternest of measures were the order of the day and heavy-handedness was not unknown.

An Army, numbering as it did about 720,000 on full time duty, had its share of hard cases including those with criminal tendencies. Experience in our own and other Armies has shown that the presence of bad soldiers can breed an unhealthy attitude in military police. Those who remain too long removed from a regimental environment can become imbued with an over-zealous approach which, in turn, is deeply resented by the Army at large. Over-indulgence in ‘static duties’ is therefore doubly deleterious in that MP operational training resources are depleted and a damaging and undiscriminating reputation is created.

Even today, shades of the ‘anti-provost’ attitude linger on in some barrack rooms. Drawing as it must do from the ranks of serving soldiers, RACMP has a special recruiting problem. Any unwarranted prejudice requires to be actively discounted, particularly by enlightened officers and warrant officers at unit level.

Thus, rather than RACMP becoming an escape-route for the disenchanted, it should be recognized as a career progression for experienced NCOs, who have demonstrated proven leadership ability. Given the right opportunities, service in an MP company offers variety of employment and considerable responsibility to all members.
COPS Co-ordination?
In April 1941 at Derna, two British Generals took a wrong turn and drove into captivity. A staff officer, who had passed by earlier, noted that the only provost sighted by him had been one who was half asleep at the roadside. Whether exhaustion or some other condition contributed in any way to such a disaster is not recorded. Nevertheless, one can imagine such an incident resulting in an edict that: 'military police must at all times be properly co-ordinated'.

If responsibility for co-ordination rests with the staff branch of prime interest in the activity, a quick check of military police tasks shows varying degrees of interest by all three staff branches — operations, personnel and logistics.

Historically, traditionally and by precedent, provosts have been linked with the Legal Corps within the framework of the personnel services. If old habits die hard, then this one should be allowed to expire regardless of the hardship.

Let MPs be recognized for what they are — providers of an essential element of command and control in peace and war. And let them be controlled by the branch of prime interest in that function at each level of headquarters. Such a move may well take military police off the streets and into the fields in proper proportions.

The Policeman's Lot . . .
In 1621, Charles I in his Articles of War, said: "The Provost must have a horse . . . for he is but one man and must correct many, and therefore he cannot be beloved."

The establishment of the Directorate of Military Police, in the present climate of constraint, does not allow for a horse. But, in other respects, times do not seem to have changed much.

TARAKAN — part of the beach on the day of the landing by 26 Bde Group — 1 May 45

Award: Issue No. 16 (May/June 1979)
The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the May/June 1979 issue (No. 16) of the Defence Force Journal to Major G. L. Cheeseman for his article Army Force Development.
basic defence planning

Wing Commander P. J. Rusbridge,
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INTRODUCTION

The eighteenth century philosopher Helvetius once observed in a rather bitter moment that the nature of sound judgement is to draw accurate conclusions from accepted opinions. However, he wrote, these opinions are mostly wrong, and sound judgement, in the majority of cases, is therefore the art of methodically false reasoning.

His comments were very much in my mind when I wrote a previous article on basic defence planning.* Having come to the conclusion that the basis of our defence planning was incorrect, I was attempting to show why it was incorrect. Quite soon, I realized that I was confronted by a process which, although purporting to be methodical and sound, was, at source, based on a judgement. Helvetius would have called the judgement an opinion. Whatever it is called, unless it has the quality and certainty of an axiom, it must be open to question.

The judgement concerns the idea that the study of contingencies should form the basis of any defence planning process. Within this idea contingencies are advocated as hypothetical situations, the study of which provides conclusions which form the basis for development of strategies and operational concepts. The idea calls for one to study not one particular contingency to the exclusion of others, for contingencies are not probabilities but only possibilities. Therefore, one studies a range of them. In this way a sufficiently broad background will develop for sensible planning to take place.

In my article I sought to challenge the validity of this idea and explore its weaknesses.

*Wing Commander Rusbridge's first article on Basic Defence Planning appeared in issue No. 12, September-October 1978.

If contingency studies form the starting point of our defence planning, then strategy will be consequent upon the results of those studies. I argued that this was the wrong way round. To plan in this way was not only logically false, but was also questionable in the light of historical precedent. Fundamental strategy, I argued, must come first before consideration of individual threats.

Destructive criticism is an attitude which comes easily to us all. From our own sectional viewpoint, we can readily see how silly the other fellow is, and how distorted is his reasoning and inaccurate are his facts. From this point of view, my first article was easy to write. Nevertheless, the stand point is basically irresponsible unless some attempt is made to counter the prevailing view not only with criticism but with a reasoned alternative. This exercise is infinitely more difficult than mere destructive criticism.

Let me begin by pointing out that to plan from an examination of contingencies is to proceed from the particular to the general. Many philosophers have warned of the dangers of arguing from the particular to the general. Descartes has pointed out that the very nature of the human mind produces the tendency to form general propositions from knowledge of particulars. To see others making this mistake is easy. To avoid it oneself is infinitely more difficult. Nevertheless, the discovery of ever more general explanations of observed phenomena is a reputable intellectual process which depends ultimately on one’s ability to test the general explanation — something which is not always possible. Norman Hampson has described the historian’s dilemma, for example,
where a choice has to be made between generalizations which are never quite true in any particular instance or an incomprehensible anarchy of individual cases.

This is the sort of choice that faces the Defence planner. One can see the process at work in the study of contingencies, when proceeding from the particular cases to the general plan that is judged to be the best of the available generalities. Judgements are made in selecting a generality and in deciding when sufficient contingencies have been studied to provide that broad planning base. On what basis are these judgements made? What about the contingencies unthought of?

I have tried to show previously through reason that the contingency planning approach is wrong because the general planning base so derived is by no means broad enough. Yet, many are probably unconvinced by that argument alone. Alternatively, I might appeal to historical precedent both to show that contingency planning is wrong and to offer an alternative. However, this particular path is also difficult. Hampson again has described how an historian can be frequently led, without his being aware of it, to define his terms of reference in such a way that his inquiries will prove a thesis which he begins by assuming. So much happened, for example, in Europe between, say, 1700 and the present day, that it is not difficult to assemble a substantial amount of evidence in support of various different and even conflicting theories.

On the other hand, the whole subject of Defence planning is by no means nearly as lighthearted a matter as mere systems analysis or cost-benefit analysis. It involves many different approaches in a search for an elusive truth which is more than facts and data alone. As Lord Macauley has observed: “Facts are the mere dross of history. It is from the form of abstract truth which interpenetrates them, and lies latent among them like gold in the ore, that the mass derived its value.”

Now, Lord Macauley is reported to have been the originator of a number of portentous statements throughout his life. Indeed, his earliest recorded utterance at an exceedingly tender age, was to his mother in reply to her earnest concern after he has hurt his hand, “Thank you, Madam, the agony is abated.” Nevertheless, his observation on the abstract truth, which threads its way through recorded history, is one which I feel I must take seriously.

To search for the gold among the dross is a task which is beyond me. That is clearly the task of an historian. Yet, I cannot rid myself of the notion that this search must be an integral part of the defence planning process.

To argue towards the general case is the task of the historian. To argue away from it towards the particular case is the task of the defence planner or strategist.

In offering a reasoned alternative to the illogical approach of contingency planning, the historian I have chosen to cover my admitted inadequacy is Professor Blainey. Through his published works I have found him to be an historian of unusual perception and skill. He has surveyed the history of all international wars fought since 1700 in support of a superior explanation of their causes. The results of his work are recorded in his book The Causes of War. The most comprehensive and logically convincing analysis to date of the causes of war seems to me to be unassailable as a starting point for the development of a strategy and consequent Defence planning process for Australia. The subsequent reasoned argument is my own.

THE INADEQUACY OF OUR CURRENT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Before dealing in depth with the axiom derived from historical analysis which forms the starting point of the argument, I have a confession to make. It is that the publicly stated objective of Australia’s defence policy is not included in that argument. That I was forced to exclude such an important aspect from any discussion of a strategy for Australia is a matter of no small importance. It caused me a great deal of concern. There didn’t seem to be any place for it in my argument. It didn’t fit in. This caused me to suspect that either it or my argument was wrong. In the end I decided that the objective was wrong and excluded it. Before we go any further it behoves me to explain why.

First, the objective, as stated in the 1976 Defence White Paper:

“The first responsibility of government is to provide the nation with security from armed attack and from the constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such attack.”
What, I wonder, does this objective mean? It seems simple enough on the surface, yet concealed below may lurk all sorts of problems. For example, I wonder if it is possible to rewrite the objective in terms of a game of football:

"The first responsibility of the team is to prevent any goals being scored against us and to ensure that our play is not affected by the threat of goals being scored against us."

If we think about the objective in these terms, we can see that, if we play the game at all, then the objective is very bellicose. Of course, we have to reject right away our ability not to play the game. We have no option, and we seem to have chosen to play it very fiercely. Would we really behave like this if we had sufficient power? Is it only our relative weakness that restrains us from strutting about the world, taking ever wider "independent national decisions" and ruthlessly eliminating any opposition to those decisions? Unfortunately, it probably is so. We are human beings, capable of tyrannical behaviour. However, our present relative weakness effectively prevents us from ever achieving the objective — even if we really meant it, which we don't at the moment. Since our objective is not achievable, then it isn't credible either. This, as we shall see later on, makes it irresponsible and dangerous.

Being both bellicose and wrong is not a very good start. When these two attributes are combined, they usually spell danger for someone. Further thought is necessary to ensure that it is not we who finish up with egg on our faces.

The most important error in the objective involves the assumption that an objective can be realistic regardless of whether it is achievable or not. An objective can only be achievable if it is within one's limitations, and if there are no factors involved beyond one's control. For example, it is clearly pointless for a man to utter his own personal objective to fly like a bird through the air. No matter how hard he tries or flaps his arms, he will inevitably fail. He is the wrong shape with the wrong power-to-weight ratio. He will never fly like a bird.

A similar failure to recognize the constraints provided by factors beyond one's control will be equally unproductive. It will lead, inevitably, sooner or later, to situations in which, like King Canute, one sits at the water's edge with the incredible objective of requiring the incoming tide to retreat.

To be credible, a defence objective must be consistent with our limitations. It must take notice of outside factors over which we have no control. It must be a judicious mixture of that which we can determine and that which is inevitable. The current defence objective does not reflect that mixture. It expounds a philosophy that seems to ignore certain inevitable consequences for Australia in war at any level. Further, it contrasts oddly with our present use of the study of contingencies as a basis for defence planning. One is too imperative and the other is too responding. The two are mutually incompatible. Conflict of interest is inevitable, and confusion will surely follow.

An Alternative Strategic Objective

One of the conclusions on the causes of war at the end of Professor Blainey's book runs as follows:

"Wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength, and wars usually cease when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength."

This, of course, is a very general statement. It is the "gold among the dross" that Lord Macauley urged us to seek, and it forms my starting point.

The first step is to separate and amplify the two clauses thus:

Wars start or continue if the participants disagree about the likely outcome, and wars stop or do not start when the participants agree about the likely outcome.

In this version of Blainey's conclusion, "relative strength" has been replaced by "likely outcome". In some ways, the likely outcome to a war is a less general phenomenon than the relative strength of the participants. Its use implies the assumption that the likely outcome of war is strongly related to relative strength. Intuitively, one can agree immediately that this is a reasonable assumption that bears further investigation. As the argument expands on the theme of likely outcome, the assumption will gain validity.

That it is a necessary assumption can be justified on the grounds that the trend in the argument is now towards particularity rather than generality.

The likely outcome of a war, as used here, is not necessarily, or even usually, the end of a
war. It is a factor taken into account by both opposing parties when deciding whether to continue fighting or not. There are three possible outcomes of a war. They are first, victory for one participant and defeat for the other; secondly stalemate (the absence of victory or defeat); or, thirdly, conditional defeat or victory.

Defeat in war will go to that participant who exhausts his capacity to wage war before the other participant. This latter participant is then the victor. Stalemate in war occurs when both participants exhaust their capacities concurrently. Conditional, or Pyrrhic victory, or conditional defeat occurs in war when one participant gains victory (i.e., achieves his aim), but at unacceptable cost in resources.

These are the three likely outcomes of a war if it is allowed to proceed to its conclusion. Whichever of them might ultimately come to pass is a problem which exists in the minds of both participants as they prosecute the war. Equally important, it exists in their minds even before the war starts. So long as they agree on the likely outcome, war will either not start or, if started, not continue. So long as they disagree, then there will be trouble. Let us illustrate this process by way of example.

Let us assume that two countries are contemplating a war with each other in which each party believes that they will be victorious. One of them is likely to be wrong. Perhaps Israel and Egypt in 1967 are examples in this case. Clearly, President Nasser courted a war that he believed he was going to win when he ordered the UNO troops out of the buffer zone and moved his armed forces into the Sinai Desert. Israel, too, with her swift mobilization and surprise attack was equally confident of victory. They disagreed, thus making war highly likely.

As we all know, it was Egypt who was wrong. The war lasted just long enough for the Egyptians to change their minds. When it became clear to them that the outcome of the war was going to be defeat for them, then the war stopped. By this time, both sides were in agreement about the likely outcome of the war, whereas before fighting started, they were in disagreement.

If this reasoning is validly applied to this particular example (and perhaps it is too soon to say), then we can summarize by saying that the war started because the likely participants disagreed about the likely outcome, continued so long as this disagreement continued, and stopped as soon as practicable after they agreed.

This particular example also illustrates well the notion that likely outcomes are important usually only in contemplation. The likely outcomes are those which will ensue if war continues. They are not necessarily those which evolve in practice. Although Egypt lost the war, she was not totally defeated. However, it was the prospect of that total defeat which forced her to change her mind so quickly, and which thus safeguarded the continuation of the Egyptian nation-state as we understand it.

Alternatively, at the other end of the scale is the case of the end of the war in Europe, in which the Third Reich realized very late in the day that it was going to lose the war. In this case, total defeat and the realization of total defeat were in very close proximity. Nevertheless, they were separated by enough to safeguard the principle.

Examples of the second defined likely outcome — stalemate — are difficult to find. One is forced to conclude what is, perhaps, intuitively apparent. Although stalemate is logically possible, it is not very likely. Perhaps there may have been some medieval European war which might fit the bill. Certainly, some of them seemed to drag on and on for ages with no very obvious outcome one way or the other. However, the ebb and flow of the many diverse contributory factors in warfare seem destined eventually to tip the balance one way or the other.

No such difficulty is encountered when considering examples of the third likely outcome of war — Pyrrhic victory or conditional defeat. In this era of limited war such examples are easier to find. Indeed, they are likely to become more so in conditions of nuclear stalemate.

The war in Vietnam was a war which, it has been argued, could have been won by the United States. Nevertheless, the cost of winning was obviously a price which the Americans were increasingly disinclined to pay. In these circumstances, one can argue that the war came to an end when the Americans realized what the final bill was likely to be. One can also argue that the North Vietnamese had been aware for some time that the Americans would ultimately refuse to pay the price of victory. Thus,
whereas to begin with they disagreed about the likely outcome, in the end they agreed. It was the Americans who were initially wrong. They expected victory, when their correct expectation should have been conditional or Pyrrhic victory.

Having defined and illuminated the three likely outcomes of war that all potential and actual participants must consider, we now move on towards the definition of a strategic objective. As previously discussed, this objective must be imperative enough for our national aspirations yet realistic enough to be taken seriously not only by other nations but also by ourselves.

To define this objective, we must adopt a process of identification of classes of nation-states as they might appear to us within the terms of defined likely outcomes of war between us. There appear to be three such classes. They are first, those whom we believe would defeat us in war, those with whom we believe we would conclude a stalemate in war, and those whom we believe we would defeat in war.

The words “we believe” have been introduced deliberately, for they have great significance in this exercise. They are there in acknowledgement of the fundamental notion that war is about a disagreement. Our belief about the relative strengths of ourselves and a prospective opposing combatant can be either correct or false. Whichever is the ease, it forms half of the dual assessment on which depends whether there will be war or peace.

A review of the three relevant classes of nation-states in conjunction with the basic axiom on the cause of war suggests that part of a necessary strategic objective is to reduce to none the number of nations who, we believe, could defeat us in war. However, we are not a superpower. Even if we were, it is very doubtful whether such an aim would be realistic, even in part. Much more realistic is the modified aim of reducing to a minimum the number of nations who, we believe, could defeat us in war.

Nevertheless, there are strong grounds for arguing that even this modified objective is still not realistic enough. To illustrate this we must further subdivide the class of nations who we believe would defeat us in war. This class is split, according to the defined likely outcomes of war, into those nations who we believe could totally defeat us in war and those nations who we believe could only conditionally defeat us in war.

If we modify the objective to take account of these two sub-classes, then our objective goes something like this:

“For those nations who we believe could defeat us in war, a primary strategic objective for Australia must be to reduce to a minimum the number of nations who we believe could totally defeat us in war, and to increase to a maximum the number of nations who we believe could only conditionally defeat us in war.”

The inclusion of the likely outcome of conditional victory or defeat into the objective has profound implications for the subsequent development of strategy. Like lowly North Vietnam taking on the mighty United States, we recognize that, instead of bowing to external pressure before which we cannot ultimately stand, we can, in our turn, exert pressure. If we can convince an infinitely more powerful antagonist that his victory over us will be at a cost he is unwilling to pay, then we shall have saved ourselves a lot of trouble. Strategy based on this notion is an option we must follow up.

Necessary Adjuncts to the Alternative Strategic Objective

War is about a disagreement. A disagreement implies differing evaluations and judgements about the same situation. Helvetius would, no doubt, have stated this idea more forcefully and ironically. Although we might demur from agreeing with him that sound judgement is the art of methodically false reasoning, we must take care to evaluate correctly the consequences of our conclusions and those of our possible enemies. Either side could be right or wrong.

From this point of view, all nations can be classified into two types which are different to our former classifications. The two types are those nations who believe that they will defeat us in war, and those nations who believe that they will not defeat us. Within each type or class are two sub-classes: those nations who are correct and those who are wrong. Within each sub-class are two sub-sub-classes: those nations with whom we agree and those with whom we disagree. Each sub-sub-class can be analysed according to the likelihood of war, the probable victor in the event of war and the suggested action to minimize the risk of war. A summary of the results is shown in Table 1.
Although there are a number of possible uses for such a table at different times in the defence planning process, there is only one at this stage. It is intended to highlight the need for possible necessary adjuncts to the main defence objective already defined. This is the purpose of the required action column. By "required action" I do not mean the whole range of defence activities necessary to meet the need. The total required action, in any particular circumstance or contingency, will be a consequence of a number of contingent factors in addition to basic strategic factors. Rather, the column is intended to highlight required action at broad objective level. Thus, only two actions appear—intelligence and demonstration.

Although the need for intelligence is generally held to be obvious, the table shows that it is necessary at least to identify those nations who correctly believe that they will defeat us and with whom we disagree. Prospective staff college graduates, required to expound on intelligence as a principle of war, can draw comfort from the identification of the need in this form. It seems less of a principle and more of a necessary consequence of accepted axioms concerning the cause of war.

Demonstration is a new notion. Basically, it appears to consist of convincing a prospective enemy in peace that you can, after all, defeat him in war.

There is no doubt that the concept of demonstration can be misunderstood. A fine dividing line exists between intimidation or its more subtle partner, coercion, on the one hand, and demonstration on the other. The Navy would call it "showing the flag". Our opponents would call it "gunboat diplomacy" or worse. Nevertheless, it is a useful concept which appears to me to be necessary, and which is lacking at the moment.

Clearly, it could have an enormous impact on diplomacy. Foreign Affairs usually knows best—or thinks it does. Thus it is hardly surprising that demonstration is not a feature of our current strategy. I believe it should be. Indeed, I can recall from personal experience the difficulties with established diplomatic policy that demonstration can bring.

I remember a long period at sea in an aircraft carrier patrolling a restricted waterway adjoining the Indian Ocean. The time was post-World War II. One of the countries bordering this restricted waterway had, in the recent past, suffered a bloodthirsty revolution which had resulted in the installation of the arch-typal left-wing military dictator.

To consolidate his position, and to quell internal opposition, he was resorting to the time-honoured tactic of bellicose behaviour towards his neighbours in the hope of distracting attention from his problems.

One of his adjacent neighbours was very small but potentially very rich. It became clear that this small country was seriously threatened—notwithstanding the strong British diplomatic presence in the area.

As the first anniversary of the dictator's coup d'état approached, there were ominous signs of military activity directed against the small country. Hence our discreet presence nearby. Our captain was the senior military commander in the area and, as such, resolved to put on a display of the carrier air group. He sent a signal to the small country inviting local dignitaries to sea for the day to watch the fun.

Such an open display of military might did not suit the policy of the senior British diplomat ashore, and he replied with a terse message strongly advising against any such display. To his credit, our captain stuck to his guns, and the display of air power took place. Many locals came to sea and watched a day of attacks on the splash target and other fun and games.

Later, when we went ashore, we found the local European community delightedly scandalized by this open defiance of the holy writ of the Foreign Office. More significantly, perhaps, we found the average citizen of that small country to have been enormously impressed and encouraged by the formation flypast which took place over the capital.

The significance of this demonstration could not fail to have been observed across the border, either. The overt military activity and the scarcely-veiled threats began to subside. Today, that small country is still independent, whereas the left wing dictator has long since slipped into oblivion.

This rather particular example illustrates the advantages of a soundly based 'demonstration' as well as the associated difficulties with foreign policy that are likely to ensue. The difficulties are created, in my view, by a general failure to understand why such demonstrations are occasionally necessary. In the end, they are necessary to prevent misunderstandings and
hence disagreements which could result in needless war.

Such examples of demonstration are few and far between. Just as valid, but less dramatic, is the other face that the need for demonstration can show. This face is more subtle and possibly more important. It is characterized by the exhibition of the preparedness to fight during what are otherwise peaceful times — in other words, in our current situation. Let us not forget that our object in peace must be to convince a possible antagonist who incorrectly believes that he will defeat us that he is wrong.

As in the highly coloured confrontation example given earlier, there are two aspects to this attitude — the will and the capacity.

Hitler quite plainly attached little credence or importance in 1939 to Britain's ultimatum to Germany when Poland was attacked. Not only did he question the will of the British people, but he doubted their capacity. Possibly the one doubt fed on the other. One could argue that a people who lack the capacity must obviously lack the will not only to provide that capacity, but the stronger nerve necessary actually to use that capacity.

Thus, one can argue that, in the decade preceding the attack on Poland, Britain was irresponsible in not adequately and credibly providing for her defence. She was irresponsible in inviting misunderstanding in possible antagonists. She failed to 'demonstrate' and nearly paid the penalty. Indeed, one can go further and ask whether war would have broken out at all if Britain and France had exhibited greater preparedness — not only in 1939, but in 1929, too, when, one can argue, the trouble really started. I wonder whether Australia is any less at fault in this regard.

Before leaving the subject of demonstration, we should remind ourselves that the strategic objective thus far developed includes the likely outcome of conditional defeat as well as total defeat. As mentioned earlier, this inclusion has, or should have, a profound effect on our strategy. The effect comes through the need for demonstration.

**TABLE 1**

**ANALYSIS OF CLASSES OF NATION-STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>War Likely</th>
<th>Victor</th>
<th>Required Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who correctly believe that they will defeat us and with whom we agree.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who correctly believe that they will defeat us and with whom we do not agree.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Them Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who incorrectly believe that they will defeat us and with whom we agree.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Demonstration Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who incorrectly believe that they will defeat us and with whom we do not agree.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Us Demonstration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who correctly believe that they will not defeat us and with whom we agree.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who correctly believe that they will not defeat us and with whom we do not agree.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Us Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who incorrectly believe that they will not defeat us and with whom we agree.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those nations who incorrectly believe that they will not defeat us and with whom we do not agree.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Them</td>
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It is not enough to demonstrate to militarily mediocre nations the probability of their total defeat. We have also to demonstrate to superpowers the probability of their conditional defeat, too. Demonstrating our capabilities to superpowers has implications not necessarily relevant to demonstrating against lesser powers.

We should take care to adopt the general approach which embraces both. It is not enough to particularize on any specific contingency.

We are now in a position to conclude this section of the discussion with a re-statement of a realistic strategic objective for Australia which is yet imperative enough to satisfy national aspirations. It has three constituent parts as follows:

“For those nations who we believe could defeat us in war, a primary strategic objective for Australia is to reduce to a minimum the number of nations who we believe could totally defeat us in war, and to increase to a maximum the number of nations who we believe could conditionally defeat us in war.

In order to ensure that a possible antagonist does not falsely predict the likely outcome of war between us, thus causing an unnecessary war, an equally important strategic objective for Australia is to demonstrate our capability in war.

A third primary strategic objective for Australia is to gather and evaluate intelligence sufficient to ensure that we do not falsely predict the likely outcome of wars in which we might become involved.”

The Strategy of Deterrence

Examination of Australia’s strategic objective, thus defined, shows that the objective appears to give no guidance yet on the conduct of war. It seems to talk in terms of potential only. It defines measures necessary in peacetime for war prevention purposes rather than measures for deployment to meet an actual hot threat. What do we do next?

Do we drop all pretence of demonstration and the like when the shooting starts? Should we admit failure, start again and concentrate on meeting the actual threat ab initio? No, of course not.

It would be nice if we could. How convenient it would be if we could neatly compartmentalize the problem, if we could subdivide it and examine and act upon each part in turn: this is war; that is peace; this is a skill we need now; that is a capability we can develop later if necessary. However, we can’t. Life is not like that. It cannot be neatly catalogued. It persists in retaining blurred edges. One problem merges imperceptibly with another. You cannot separate peace and war, or diplomacy and defence or external and internal trade — it won’t work.

The consequences of action on some future battlefield are being determined now. Decisions being taken now will affect possibly unforeseen circumstances in the future. We cannot afford to separate peacetime planning from wartime.

Professor Blaevney argues in his book that one of the most dangerous fallacies in the study of war is the belief that the causes of a war and the events of a war belong in separate compartments and reflect completely different principles. This fallacy, he says, translated into medicine, would require the causes and course of an illness to be diagnosed on quite different principles.

He has illustrious support from no less a person than Clausewitz himself. Every staff college graduate knows that ‘war is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means’. Even Frederick the Great once said that ‘diplomacy without armaments is like music without instruments’. I understand that t-shirts were not available in eighteenth century Berlin. If so, it is a pity, as Frederick’s aphorism would make a very pithy slogan across some maiden’s chest.

On reflection, it seems rational to label our collective strategic objective as deterrence. If so, then we must realize that the concept of deterrence does not collapse when war starts. We fight the war as we warned in peacetime we would do. We put into practice in war all that we have planned and trained for in peace.

Thus, the ramifications of the shooting war — force structure, tactics, equipment, manpower etc. must be tailored to an overall concept. This concept is to demonstrate in peace what we will do in war. It involves every aspect of the face we present to the outside world. We deter to survive.

It follows, therefore, that regardless of the apparent preoccupation of our strategic objective with peacetime deterrence, we must extend the rationale of deterrence into all aspects of defence.
Implementation of the Strategy

The next logical step can be deduced from the answers to the following three questions: what, or whom do we deter; how do we deter; and with what do we deter?

What or whom we deter is defined in the strategic objective. What we deter with is dependent on the answer to the question “How do we deter?”. Thus, the next logical step is to determine how we deter.

How do we demonstrate our capability and gain intelligence and reduce to a minimum the number of nations likely to defeat us in war? Most importantly, how do we do it so that the most general solution is adopted without over concentration on any particular real or imagined contingency threat?

We do it in stages, by examining all the unpleasant things that an enemy can do to us. This examination can be conducted in two ways. In the first place, we could examine each unpleasant enemy action and cater for it either individually or through developing therefrom a broad planning base. Superficially, this approach is very similar to the studies of contingencies which have been shown to be wrong. We must be very careful to avoid making the same errors.

The alternative involves an examination of all relevant factors and their separation into those which are universal and permanent and those which are particular and transient. As discussed in my earlier article, universal and permanent factors should be the foundation of our strategy. Particular and transient factors involve contingencies and should be excluded until much later in the planning process.

As a result of such an exercise, we can identify a maximum of two general and unpleasant things that an enemy might do: he can invade us or blockade us. All other possibilities are lesser versions of these two.

That they are so can be checked through contingency studies. Indeed, as I previously argued, this is the more likely reason for the use by other countries of these studies in their defence planning studies.

So long as Australia remains an island we shall be vulnerable to these two threats. They are universal and permanent factors in any strategy we might develop. Similarly, the strategy developed to counter these threats will also be unchanging. If it isn’t, then there is something wrong with the strategy. It, too, must be based on universal and permanent factors. Some of the more permanent of these factors are geographic, demographic and economic — although I am beginning to experience increasing doubt about whether economic factors are permanent enough. However, the central and most important factor is geographic — Australia is an island.

Now, it is important to recognize that this basic strategic factor has different consequences for the two types of threat we face. If we are attempting to deter an invasion, then the fact that Australia is an island is an advantage. If it is the prospect of a blockade that we face, then being an island is a disadvantage. If we should have to face both threats at the same time, and there is no reason why we should not, then developing a general strategy will have struck a snag in the form of choice.

However, the issue of choice must be faced if we are to continue efforts to base strategy on such permanent factors as geography. There is a temptation to settle the issue by making a judgement which enables priorities to be set. Will the emphasis be more with deterring invasion or blockade? Such an exercise is dangerous stuff. This is because the setting of priorities is an aspect of defence which usually is predominantly concerned with factors that change — like contingency threats. For example, nation A could invade us, whereas nation B could blockade us. Contingency studies assess the threat of the latter as more likely than the threat of the former. Therefore, one could argue, we should concentrate on a strategy of resistance to blockade to the detriment of our defences against invasion.

Whether or not this form of reasoning takes place in Australia today, I am not in a position to say. Nevertheless, as previously described, there is evidence to suggest that this is the way we do things. If so, then we’re wrong.

The setting of strategic priorities on grounds which are not strategic, but contingent, is wrong. Such priorities can only be set on strategic grounds — i.e., grounds which themselves are permanent and unchanging.

To acknowledge and act upon this proposal is to transform the entire debate on strategy, concept of operations, basic defence posture and the like. This is because strategic factors thus defined are not usually quantifiable in any practical way. Thus, a strategic decision-maker
has to rely more on advice based on intuition, experience and historical precedent than on advice based on forms of parametric analysis.

Stephen Roskill, describing the development of operational research from its early beginnings in World War II, makes the point that this ‘new’ art is a combination of the scientific and the historical approach to the problem. We can illustrate his point by imagining a spectrum in which at one end an operational research problem is tackled employing the maximum historical and minimum scientific or analytical approaches. Alternatively, the same problem might also be tackled by maximum analytical and minimum historical approaches. Of course, there are an infinite number of intermediate combinations. Only one such combination will be the cost appropriate for the solution of the problem.

It is my belief that the solutions to strategic problems are best derived using the maximum historical and minimum scientific approach. By ‘historical’ is meant not only genuinely historical aspects but also aspects that it takes half a lifetime of flying, or driving ships at sea, or controlling armies or fleets or whatever to learn.

In keeping with the prevailing beliefs of our age, we have permitted science to drive what is essentially a non-scientific subject. We now allow psychologists to tell us how to lead men; we allow sociologists to determine our welfare needs; our officer and NCO training is concentrating more and more on management rather than leadership; and we are being forced more and more to adopt the techniques of cost-benefit analysis in the day-to-day business of operating our Services.

Such scientific methods, whatever their individual justification may be, are not appropriate in the study of strategy. That we now allow contingency studies to determine strategy is evidence that our system does not agree.

Confining the assessment of strategic priorities to strategic grounds alone forces concentration on the historical rather than the scientific aspects of defence. The calculation of obscure mathematical probabilities based on transient and particular data and other related techniques are then largely shed from the decision process. Such an event would tend to shift the centre of gravity of the process away from the academic and the scientist and back towards the practical man with long service and experience in the Defence Force.

Settling the issue of choice between emphasis on the invasion threat or on the blockade threat can be argued on strategic grounds in the following way. There are two conflicting arguments that could be put forward. In the first place, one could argue that nothing worthwhile can be accomplished in war without a secure base. Thus, even if the blockade threat is of equal or even greater magnitude to that of invasion, our first strategic priority must be to deter invasion and hence the threat to our secure base.

Alternatively, one can argue that a country which is not self-sufficient must safeguard the supply routes necessary to ensure the continued functioning of the secure base. We need supplies from outside in order to deter credibly an invasion. Thus, the blockade threat is a greater strategic priority than the invasion threat.

When allocating strategic priorities, deciding between these two arguments on strategic grounds alone is to be faced with what appears to be ‘Hobson’s Choice’. Neither is acceptable. They conflict with one another. The urge to take into account transient factors in a contingency study is very strong in such a situation. Nevertheless, it is not necessary if we consider the factor of time.

The imposition of a blockade — even if fully effective, which is usually difficult to achieve — is historically slow to take effect. The cessation of supplies for a day, or a week, or even longer, does not bring immediate catastrophe in its wake. On the other hand, a successful invasion can rapidly generate an irretrievable situation. Thus, we must respond to an invasion more quickly than we need respond to a blockade.

Time is the factor which fixes our strategic priorities for us. Thus, our first strategic priority is to deter invasion; our second, to deter blockade. Our choice is made at last. Thank heaven for that!

Having decided that Australia’s strategic objective should be deterrence, we must now ensure, in line with the first part of that strategic objective, that we maximize our deterrent capacity, or deterrent power. In order to see how this might be done, we need to recognize that our deterrent power, or any other organizational phenomenon we may
create, will depend upon three features—quantity, efficiency and effectiveness.

All of these features can contribute to maximizing our deterrent power. As usual, throughout these investigatory exercises, we find that some of the features are transient and contingent, whereas others are permanent. We need to isolate the permanent first, and then determine how that feature and that alone can be maximised before involving the others.

Quantity and efficiency are not strategy. They are purely contingent features, reflections of all the transient and particular factors, which are so important in the study of contingencies.

The other feature to be considered, effectiveness, is different. It is essentially strategic by nature. It is ‘doing the right job’. Maximum effectiveness is ‘doing the right job’ in the best possible way. The strategic grounds on which we should seek to maximize our deterrent power are those of effectiveness. Although there may be many contingent, particular and transient factors contributing to the level of deterrence at any one time, maximising effectiveness in deterrence is the permanent and universal contribution that strategy makes to the strategy of deterrence. The achievement of maximum effectiveness in deterrence is the next step in the defence planning process.

To illustrate this idea, I would like to recall an example of strategy that I gave in a previous article, where I argued that the English deterred invasion of their country by a strategy which was essentially unchanged from the time of the Armada until the time of Hitler. In order to prevent invasion, the English developed a strategy which was founded on control of the geographic approaches to their island and which included armed assault on the invasion fleet at its home base.

The first and most lasting decision that the English took, either consciously or unconsciously, was on the means by which invasion should be thwarted. Throughout all the subsequent years, which have seen vehicles of war change so dramatically, throughout the demise of the sailing ship, the invention of steam engines and the conquering of the air, the English never found it necessary to alter that strategy. Not only was it of permanent benefit but, no doubt, they believed it to be the most effective strategy. There must have been many times during all that history when supposedly ‘low threats’ had led erroneously to the decline of quantity and where efficiency was reduced, but these were matters that were transient and did not directly affect whether or not the basic strategy was correct, or fully effective.

We must now decide how to achieve maximum effectiveness in deterrence. If my argument is accepted, then this must be done on strategic grounds alone. This means that we consider only those contributory factors that are permanent and universal.

Maximum Effectiveness in Deterrence

So far, we have concentrated on the permanent and universal fact that Australia is an island. The strategy of maximum effectiveness for Australia is that which exploits to the maximum the strategic advantages of being an island and which minimises the strategic disadvantages.

What such a strategy might be begins to become clear when we look at the various aspects of being an island (and this island in particular) and consider how those aspects can be exploited to our advantage. For example, the sea is a great natural barrier to invasion. Thus, any military action we can take which strengthens that barrier, is an exploitation of a natural advantage.

Similarly, on land, we need to recognize the vast tracts of inhospitable country in Australia. How can this phenomenon be exploited? Is it an advantage to be maximized or a disadvantage to be minimized?

A former Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Richard Peek, has considered these questions. In an article in the journal of the Navy League of Australia, he questioned the current structure and role of the army in the event of an invasion of Australia. He suggested that, should the Navy lose control of the sea such as to allow an invader to establish himself ashore, then the Army had no reasonable prospect of repelling the invasion. “As I see it”, he wrote, “if Australia is ever successfully invaded, the only way we could force an enemy to withdraw would be to harass him by means of guerrilla land forces until the cost of the invasion was more than its successful completion was worth.”

If we were to take up the Admiral’s suggestion, then surely the regular army would look very different to what it looks today. Perhaps we wouldn’t need all those tanks which
are currently being put into storage. Perhaps we wouldn't need any of them. However, does his suggestion not exploit the inhospitable nature of the Australian land mass? I believe it does. Is he right or wrong?

This is a basic strategic issue whose solution is independent of all the contingent factors associated with a particular threat. If you accept my argument, then the issue must be decided on strategic grounds alone. A land strategy thus conceived forms one plank for the basis of all other aspects of defence planning, i.e., studies to assess threats, and force structure necessary to meet those threats within the strategic guidelines.

This process can be applied to the air as well. We must determine how we shall use the air above us. Lastly, because war is indivisible, we must ensure that all three forms of warfare — land, sea and air — together can be blended in order to exploit to the full the strategic factors of our subcontinent.

Those readers who have stayed with me this far may be aware that for some time I have been exhibiting a tendency to formulate technical judgments. By 'technical' I mean judgments about how best to fight on the land and at sea and in the air. This, of course, I am not entitled to do. It is a matter for the professionals. Strategy is best left to those people who by their long experience in their respective services possess the demonstrated ability to identify the permanent and universal factors of their profession and to separate them from the transient and the particular. My intention has been primarily to outline the beginnings of a defence planning process which is more soundly based on long lasting principles than is our current system. I have tried to argue forward from observed general phenomena in order to highlight some inevitable necessary consequences that flow from those phenomena and must now stop short of any deeper involvement.

The observed general phenomenon from which I started was Blainey's conclusion on the causes of war. I used his conclusion to identify classes of nation-states relevant to the formation of a general strategic objective. A useful simplification is to describe that objective as a policy of deterrence. I then argued that to deter effectively is to deter convincingly. The maximum effectiveness can only be achieved through exploitation of the permanent features of Australia, the most permanent of which is the geography. How this should be done is a matter beyond my competence to determine.

Clearly, if we start from the most abstract principle and work towards the particular, there will develop a growing involvement by people, organizations and factions who may not be fully aware of their position in the necessary order of things. This growing involvement is concerned with more and more particular applications and interpretations of the basic principle.

However, although not possessing the competence to develop these more particular applications, I can still be conscious of the need to write a short manifesto which is neither so general that it is banal and incomprehensible, nor so detailed that it is a complete textbook on the defence of Australia. Every dog has his day and, having come this far, I feel entitled to have an attempt at such a manifesto. It is short enough and simple enough to be learnt by heart and understood by everybody who contributes to the formal defence of Australia and encapsulates everything that I have been trying to say:

"We must deter our enemies by showing a will and capacity to exploit the air above us as a natural medium for offensive action; to exploit the sea as a natural barrier and shield; and to exploit our land as a natural trap.

War is indivisible and, because this is so, each element of warfare must supplement the others.

They must blend together to create deterrence in peace or victory through offensive action in war.

The whole must be so flexible as to react meaningfully to any greater state than peace and to any lesser state than war within the constraints of these principles."

To sum up an exercise such as this in one sentence may seem a very tall order, and yet it isn't. The message is at heart very simple yet profound. What other nations already known by instinct or have learnt to their cost about their defence, Australia must derive from first principles — the most fundamental of which involves the identification and application as strategy of all that is most enduring and universal about Australia's physical nature.
NOTES
1. Bertrand Russell reveals that, although Macauley’s remark to his mother was his first recorded utterance, it was not his first. Macauley’s nurse recalled the little lad, not yet three years old, running up to her from the garden and blurting out, “Nurse, in the ideal constitution, there should be a just balance of forces; while on the one hand the will of the people should be adequately represented in a popular house, on the other hand the wisdom of those who through their stake in the country have acquired a certain stability of political judgement should not remain unheard.” Any sceptics may refer to The Collected Stories of Bertrand Russell, Simon and Schuster, 1972, and decide for themselves whether or not he is pulling our legs.

2. There is some suggestion that realism in setting objectives was just what the king was attempting to illustrate when he sat at the water’s edge. He at least understood this point.

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FIFTEEN YEARS

Elaine M. Loewe

A time could come when we might say,
The fifteen years are up today,
Some thoughtless cad has pressed his switch,
Best we push ours, the question — which?
For in the course of time we’ve found,
Department policies — not quite sound,
Hence when Defence in panic cries,
“‘We must have cash’”, says Treasury, “‘Lies’”.

“Last year we gave you quite enough,
You sent it back, so this year — tough.
Besides, two years ago we wrote to you,
You never answered — nix to you.”

Defence was now a dithering wreck
As rockets flew, where was that cheque?
We sent a minute yesteryear
To someone, thing is, was it here?
Or did we give it what- ‘is-name
To file — ah ha, sounds just the same
As that one that turned up last Spring
Just after Budget — bloody thing!
We found it then beneath the pile
Our registry forgot to file,
I bet I know — it’s still in draft —
I beg your pardon! Treasury laughed. Q
THE ESSENTIALS
OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL

Captain I.F.G. Whittington
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INTRODUCTION

In the modern peace-time military environment, where cost control is assuming increasing importance, a greater proportion of an officer's or senior NCO's time is spent as a manager. It is no longer sufficient for a military establishment to be able to justify its existence on its war role alone, for if it is to survive successive defence economies, to be there to perform that role, it must have a worthwhile and economical peace-time function as well. In fact the peace-time role of many military support establishments is very similar to that of civilian industry, needing the adoption of a professional approach to management and control to maximise the potential of the resources and manpower involved.

This article takes a general view of the essentials of Management Control, where most of the points raised occur in slightly altered forms in every organisation whether it is a small private company or a large military production unit. For example, all organisations need to know their objectives and to have a strategy by which they can achieve these. There are organisational problems, problems relating to communications and information; the services provided by a military production unit still have to be marketed in a similar way to consumer goods, with production problems and planning and control difficulties to be overcome by good management. In general, although the emphasis may change, the essentials of Management Control and the problems facing a military manager remain much the same as those facing his civilian counterpart; likewise the solutions.

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FOUNDATIONS

Directing a production unit there will be a Staff executive body, who in the same way as a civilian Board, will lay down the long term strategy for an establishment by reference to Defence Policy, planning predictions and by experience or intuition. This provides the foundation on which the establishment management will then construct the framework within which a unit will operate. The task of an executive is similar to that of a manager but with one important difference. A manager is dealing predominately with facts, the reliability of which will depend on the organisation that presented them, whereas an executive is called on to deal with predictions and theories, which may be supported by fact but which are open to variance and interpretation.

The long term plan will have been influenced by the availability of funds for capital expenditure (eg. equipment procurement) and criteria for budgetary control. These will effect unit planning in turn, hence ideally a manager should have the basic knowledge of the methods used so as to understand the implications of management decisions on the budget of the establishment. The resources requirements to implement the executive strategy, in terms of unit establishment, equipment tables, manpower planning, training and recruiting, should be considered at Staff level but in conjunction with unit management.

An efficient manning staff should supplement rather than replace unit managers in the control and training of manpower.

With the foundation and framework of the establishment laid in an efficient and professional manner, a unit manager has the sound basis from which Management Control can operate.

MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Organisation

The Executive will have provided Management with objectives and strategy which will form the constraints within which operations will be conducted. From this framework a manager has to complete the structure and
produce the specified product. The initial requirement for Management Control is an effective administration system.

The essentials of such a system revolve round the unit organisation, most easily represented by an organisation chart. It is necessary to ensure that the structure is as simple and logical as possible so that everybody understands where he fits in. An organisation chart will indicate the responsibilities and the reporting channels or relationships between people and appointments.

This leads to the provision of job descriptions for all, which are simply a description of each job written by the supervisor, specifying each major activity as accurately as possible and stating boundaries, limitations and responsibilities. The use of a job description not only saves duplication or neglect in a task but also serves as reference when defining exactly what qualifications and abilities are required of the man who is to do the job. Neither the selection of suitable recruits nor their subsequent training can be carried out with any precision, nor can one evaluate a man’s performance if it is not clear what he has been employed to do. The failure to provide a job description could be considered the most fundamental error that any manager can make.

Information

Having established a suitable organisation where everyone understands what they are doing and for whom, the next requirement for management control is to establish whether the organisation is performing as specified. To do this a Management Information system is required. The aim of such a system must be to collect all the required information, with the minimum of delay or duplication, collate it into the required statistics and then distribute it in the shortest possible time to those managers that are required to take action.

Each day a great mass of information can be collected, which could be passed to everyone, which would quickly swamp unit managers with a mass of unimportant data. With the increased use of computers, managers tend to receive too much information rather than too little. This leads to the requirement for a manager to be selective in the reports and statistics he obtains from the information system. By receiving only exception reports, that is those items which fall outside the normal pattern of a smooth running system, he can concentrate on the areas most in the need of attention. Management by Exception requires an initial management decision to be made as to exactly what constitutes an exception. The time taken to reach this decision and to adapt the Management Information system will be repayed by the substantial savings in the times required to prepare and read the exception reports. The advent of the computer for the provision of Management Information has made such a technique a necessity as a computer can print out unnecessary information at a remarkable rate, whereas, if properly programmed a computer can select information, using the principle of reporting by exception, more reliably than many manual systems.

Having established a Management Information system, there remains the need to monitor the system and to question the requirement for all routine statistics in a systematic way. It becomes an essential control problem for managers to ensure that reports and statistics are not generated if they require no action to be taken and add nothing to the ability to get the job done.

PLANNING

Long Term Planning

The strategy formulated by the Executive will have been reduced to the fundamental terms of an equipment procurement plan, production requirements and priorities, ideally in consultations with unit commanders. It is then up to the unit to plan and operate within these constraints. To achieve this successfully managers at senior levels must have a fundamental understanding of the policy and principles used so that an accurate evaluation of the plan can be made. The basis for long term planning should be a rolling programme for not less than five years.

To translate the Long Term Plan into unit production is a major management problem. Equipment procurement usually involves the purchase of fixed assets normally with a low second-hand value. It is thus important to ensure that the appraisal of such projects has been reliable as once a decision has been taken it becomes virtually irremediable. The requirement for correctly assessing overheads and costs is fundamental and can only be met by the
blend of technical and financial awareness that has become essential even in a military manager. The accountants cannot function in a technical field without the unit manager as a bridge to concentrate accounting techniques on the critical items in a technical flowline.

Short Term Planning

Short term planning, which could also be termed production planning, is the main concern of a manager. Any product will be produced by completing a considerable number of individual actions in such a way that they all dovetail neatly into the production flowline. Unfortunately, many of these individual activities cannot be started until some other activity has been completed. Additionally the problem of allocating resources to a production flowline is exceedingly complex especially when limits are imposed on cash flow, special machinery or skilled labour. It is in this field that management techniques can be best applied and seen to work.

The requirement for short term planning is fundamental and the benefits of good planning are seen in maximum returns in output and in efficient utilisation of equipment and resources. To achieve this ideal state each project has to be analysed, in terms of requirement for work, equipment and labour, the problems identified and analysed prior to formulating the plan for the production flowline.

The analysis of production flowlines can be undertaken by Method Study if the flowline is operational or by Network Analysis methods prior to, or during, production. In either case once the problems and critical operations have been identified the production planner has sound foundations on which to build the complex framework of inter-dependent activity. The planning process can be broken down into basic components as follows:

- Identification of a requirement (or problem).
- Analysis of the requirement.
- Production of the plan for the production flowline.
- Implementation and control of the flowline.
- Check on results.
- Comparison of results with plan.
- Isolation of variance between plan and results.
- Adjustments to plan if required.

With the identification of the variance the planning cycle can be re-actuated to modify the plan in the light of experience. It is only by the use of an efficient Management Information system that there will be the rapid comparison between planned and actual performance that leads to the planning cycle achieving the optimum utilisation of equipment and resources in the minimum time.

Co-ordination

Every part of an organisation interacts with some other part and a change in one section can affect many others. It is important to know what every major section of an organisation intends to achieve in the near future, say the next year, so that some form of co-ordination can be attained and each section can contribute the required effort to achieve the common aim. Without such an overall view planning will be hampered or curtailed.

To achieve the required co-ordination planning forecasts will be required for materials, manpower, equipment etc., which in turn when accepted, influence production planning.

Neither the tasks of planning nor budgeting for re-supply can be achieved in isolation. Regular consultation is essential between management concerned in planning, production and supply. This can best be achieved by regular co-ordination conferences with the resulting mutual exchange of information necessary for effective planning.

CONTROL

Progress Control

The planning cycle relies on the Management Information system to provide the necessary feedback for the adjustment of plans. The production plan will not achieve the optimum utilisation of equipment and resources demanded from it unless progress is monitored to identify the variances and hence initiate adjustments to the plan. Whereas Management Control has no meaning without a plan, planning will become ineffective without progress control. The form that progress control will take will vary depending upon the number of products and plans that are inter-related. The essential of any control system designed to monitor progress is the accurate recording and reporting of actual progress. Planning and control of work is dependent on the use of accepted standard work rates. The
system for establishing these work rates must provide a realistic rate which is acceptable to both manager and staff if planning objectives are to be achieved. Unless a realistic approach is taken to work rates, planning at standard rates will be frustrated as a variance in proportion to the difference between true and standard rates will inevitably occur.

**Cost Control**

In addition to Progress Control (to establish performance related to the production plan) there is an increasing requirement for Cost Control to monitor performance related to a budget. An efficient Cost Control system can be blended with the Management Information system and by so doing will ensure all managers are working with the same basic information. The setting up of a separate Cost Control system may be desirable as it can provide an independent check of progress by the comparison of budgeted costs and actual costs.

Many different Cost Control systems exist but all follow the same principle, which is to supply information to a manager relevant to his job and which indicates variations from the budget in time for him to take corrective action. Each type of cost is recorded, daily, weekly or monthly — hours of work, equipment times, outputs, etc. — the system then allocates every cost to the activity for which it was incurred. In this way the management in each sub-unit and for each activity is kept informed at regular intervals of the cost of his area of responsibility. He can check these against the standard that he was set in the budget and initiate any necessary corrective action.

**Stock Control**

The essentials of stock control lie in the holding of the optimum stock level, all things considered, rather than in the holding of the minimum level one can get away with. Stocks held fall into three main categories; material received from the supply system and waiting to be processed, materials in work and partly processed and completed work awaiting collection or despatch. Obviously, high stocks will cause an increase in overheads whereas low stocks may reflect in increased re-supply costs and possible production delays due to re-supply lead times.

Stock control is thus bound up with forecasting, production planning and re-ordering policy. Failure to realise how interdependent these areas are may lead a manager into taking a decision that saves money within his area but loses much more in another. To avoid this situation requires a comprehensive system of stock control that takes account of production planning and output forecasts based on simple (statistical) analysis of demand patterns, hence selection of optimum stock levels. Such a system, although comprehensive, can remain simple in operation within the limitations of the available resources — the main limitation arises from the fact that many establishments have to hold so many different items in stock that the only practical way to calculate the optimum stock level is by using a computer.

**Quality Control**

It is rare for the quality of a product to be so unimportant to an establishment that its control can be left to random inspection based on intuition. Most articles are produced to a specification and unless one reaches the standard laid down, its value to the user is much reduced. In order to ensure that every article reaches this standard some inevitably will be produced that are above it. Such excess of quality can be expensive in terms of wasted output.

It has been suggested that for quality control system to be effective it must be based on the principle of statistical analysis. The cost in lost production time of producing work consistently above specification is great, and likewise the penalty for producing work below standard can be even higher in terms of repeat work requirements, that it is essential for efficient management control to have a system of quality control which will react before the work is sub-standard yet not run consistently far above standard to achieve this aim.

There is, however, no point in so elaborating a control system that it costs more to use than it saves. It can save due to reduced user complaints and rejections or by direct reduction of waste, but the increased costs of sampling, testing, and maintenance must be borne in mind.

**MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM**

**Pre-Production Considerations**

The main pre-production areas in which it is essential that management are concerned are:
• Research and development.
• Manpower training.
• Product design.

The extent to which an establishment embarks on research and development will depend as much on policy as availability of resources. The manager's responsibility lies in the generation of new ideas, selection of the best research projects, assistance in the design of experiments and the evaluation of the results. The subsequent trials and implementation, with any additional experimentation, will effectively follow the normal planning cycle. The element of risk attached to a research project, that it will have wasted scarce resources, is probably higher than for any other type of work as it is not until the end of the research programme that full evaluation can be made. With the increasing sophistication of technology the cost of research and development is increasing, hence management decisions become increasingly important in this field.

The task of recruitment and training is taken away from the unit manager by the training establishments. A unit manager is however required to systematically examine the requirements of a job description and to compare these with the skills of the products from the training establishments and to rectify deficiencies by in-house training programmes. These programmes should aim to train in the skills that are lacking rather than cover a wide range of subjects (the latter type of training is more aptly described as educational and is the task of the training establishments). The essential contribution of unit management to effective training and recruitment lies in the maintenance of accurate and up-to-date job descriptions for all staff.

Design problems can be distinguished from quality control problems, the former is what the work is intended to produce, the latter is how far it actually comes up to this intention. The design of products should be under continual review and perhaps the most reliable indication of problems in this field can be obtained by listening to user complaints and making comparisons with equivalent civilian products. It is useful for the production unit to have the responsibility for replying to user complaints if production methods are to benefit from such complaints. To divorce the user complaints from production units will divorce their work from improvement.

Production Considerations

The additional production related areas for management concern are:
• Reduction in through-put times (and increasingly, reduction in costs)
• Technical innovation.

These two areas are linked in that technical innovations can produce reductions in throughput times or costs. A manager must continually assess the existing procedures and flowlines in terms of efficiency. The adoption of Method Study is one direct way of achieving results. However many indirect methods can also produce useful savings such as suggestion schemes and selective shift working.

Technical innovations can arise through research or through studies of civilian products. A manager is required to remain abreast of current developments in relevant fields. To this end time should be allocated to attending relevant technical meetings and for reading relevant technical literature.

Post Production Considerations

Due to military requirements the military manager tends to become specialised. This leads managers to lose sight of overall aims and to tend to look upon the activities of other units as less important and even superfluous. This can result in a serious lack of co-operation between units to the detriment of the operation of an establishment. To overcome this problem units must have a working knowledge of each other and promote free exchange of ideas by suitable meetings. In establishments large enough for lack of inter-unit co-operation to be a serious problem, suitable management training or conferences will become essential to the efficient overall management of the establishment.

SUMMARY

To operate successfully as a manager the military officer or NCO needs to adopt a professional approach to the problems of Management Control to achieve the best return from the resources and manpower at his disposal. A unit that can run efficiently in a peace-time production role under good management will survive to make the transition to an effective fighting force should the need arise.

To achieve this aim the unit Management
Control system relies on the provision of realistic Staff directives, in terms of policy and objectives, a viable establishment, in terms of manning and equipment, within which the unit can create an accurate information system on which to base the planning required to implement the policy and achieve the objectives. For the plan to achieve the objectives set without exceeding budget controls it is becoming essential to maintain both a cost control system and a production control system.
I REALLY would like to have as a secondary or subtitle to this article "Towards a more rational approach to boozing and boozers in the Army".

St. Paul’s exhortation to Timothy was, “drink no longer water but use a little wine for thy stomach’s sake” and most of us will know the comment of Napoleon that an army marches on its stomach. Napoleon also saw to it that his troops had a regular supply of wine even when they were away from their native France, no doubt realising the prophylactic effect that this wine might have on some of his army.

The relationship between drinking and the military goes back much further and we know that it was the Roman Legionaries who took the grape with them from Italy and introduced it to the rest of Europe. In fact so shocked were they by the responsiveness to and enthusiasm for wine of the inhabitants of Southern Britain that one of the Roman Governors destroyed the British vineyards in the first attempt, I suppose, to use political legislation to control drunkenness.

Later this association between drinking and the military is shown by the fact that most of the recruiting for the British Army and Navy occurred in Taverns during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. It is said that the Recruiting Sergeants of the Army did this quite subtly by placing the King’s Shilling in the bottom of the tankard of beer which they bought for the poor unsuspecting potential recruit. Once he drank this and the shilling ended in his mouth he was deemed to have taken the King’s Shilling and by doing so to have enlisted in the Army. This of course, accounts for why tankards with glass bottoms became so popular at that time.

The Royal Navy seemed much less subtle in their means of recruiting and they waited outside pubs in press gangs to railroad unsuspecting drunks into the Service. By the time these unfortunates had recovered sufficiently from their alcoholic delirium to realise what was going on, they were generally too far out to sea to do much about it.

As you will see, in both groups the population selected is likely to be one fairly heavily committed to the consumption of alcohol. Many of those enlisted might need further supplies to keep them sufficiently well to continue to function in a reasonably adequate way, and as the water was so bad anyway, alcohol was issued on a daily basis. Initially in the 17th century, the issue was 1 gallon of beer daily, but this was changed to ½ pint of rum towards the end of the century; this was doubled if there was severe weather. In 1740 Admiral Vernon diluted this with water; and in 1824 this was reduced to 1 gill and they were given tea with this to supplement the funds. In the Royal Navy, until the end of the 1960s, it was traditional for every seaman over the age of 17 to be given this tot of rum every day, a present from Jamaica following the Battle of the Saints. In Australia similar
traditions evolved. The first fleet were the first major importers of alcohol to Australia. The marines and sailors being given their daily rum ration, by Lord Sydney who said, "he was a man too" and was anxious to avoid causes of dissatisfaction. Major Grose the commander of the N.S.W. militia allowed his officers the licence to deal in rum, which became a currency amongst the soldiers, many of whom were paid in the golden fluid. Some of the officers established their family fortunes in this way.

Since this time to the present day, the link between alcohol and the Services has continued. During World War I, troops were given rum and brandy before they went into action in the trenches. In recent years, the link has probably become much more subtle, but the military image is of one of masculinity, of comradeship, of conviviality and of course much of this involves drinking alcohol. The advertisers know this, and adverts to sell alcohol use these subtle persuaders, giving the unsuspecting buyer a feeling that drinking a particular brand will improve interpersonal relationships as well as sexuality. It is interesting to note that many of the advertisements published a few years ago to attract recruits into the British Army used the same techniques, the social groups with attractive bikinied girls were pictured around the swimming pool of a Serviceman’s Club in Cyprus or the Far East enjoying their glasses of beer. Potential Officers were attracted by the vision of congenial, convivial and somewhat sophisticated gentlemen relaxing in the atmosphere of their mess drinking their glasses of brandy or gins and tonic.

I suspect the P.R. men really do have a point here. That this probably is what goes on to some extent within a military community and might well be an integral and important part of the life of the soldier. In the 18th and 19th century the total life of the soldier was within his regiment which functioned rather like a large family. Within this extended family were smaller family groups which like any family lived, ate and, as they were soldiers, fought together. These groups became known as messes. Messes were the central part of the soldiers life and it seems very likely that the morale of a regiment depended heavily on the morale within the messes and the identification that the individual soldier had with his mess and of course his regiment.

It is interesting how messes have developed, and how the bar seems to have become a central part of mess life. This is an extension of the mess tradition. Drinking and all that goes with it has always been present, but has now become more formalised in the creation of bars within the messes. Unfortunately as the pharmacologist Louis Lewin wrote in his famous Phantastica, a classic work written nearly half a century ago, "acute and chronic alcoholism are as old as alcohol beverages themselves and the first users of alcohol were the first to abuse it". He also pointed out that the fundamental truth is that abuse is brother of use. It would seem that we must look at alcoholism as being the inevitable consequence of drinking in some people. Many of these are not people, as we would like to think, who have some character defect or inborn weakness, but are people like ourselves who because of the social pressures exerted on them to be convivial and friendly, and possibly because of some inherent tendency to metabolise the drug less well end up by becoming physically dependent on it.

I hope this brief introduction helps to put the problem of alcoholism in the Army in some perspective. For here we have a system which has depended on the use of alcohol for many centuries to sustain its members and still does. Whose image (the image of masculinity and virility) is closely linked with the use of alcohol and whose morale will to some extent be dependent on the use of alcohol and those relationships of feeling that this use engenders; as Emmerson has said, "the secret of drunkenness is that it insulates us in thought but unites us in feeling". It is a system which, one might even say, has cynically, at least in some armies, recognised the value of alcohol as a means to recruit members and of course also to keep them.

For example, most armies when serving overseas will provide as an attraction to overseas service, duty free alcohol in copious quantities as well as duty free cigarettes. But many other items, some of them necessities, are not subsidized in the same way. So it is my contention that here we have an organisation or series of organisations which by virtue of its activities is likely to produce a condition which in the past it has sought to stamp out or has dealt with harshly when it has occurred, and by this I mean alcoholism.
This to me seems quite anomalous. We must either prevent alcoholism in the services and by doing this, of course, it might be necessary to change the whole of the military image. Or if we do not wish to do this, then we must learn to understand and tolerate those victims of a system which will inevitably produce victims of this type.

To enable us to decide which course of action we wish to take, there are a number of essential questions which must be answered and the first of these relates to the extent of the problem. Like many other clinicians I have the clinical impression that alcohol is a problem in the Australian Army. As I only see soldiers who are severely affected by alcoholism, I think this tends to give me a view which may be slightly out of perspective.

Not only must we establish whether alcoholism is a problem in the Army and the extent of the problem, but we must also establish whether this is a problem that is becoming more severe and, if so, to what degree it is affecting the efficiency of the Army as a whole at this time.

There is no doubt that alcoholism has been present and recognised in military populations for many generations and in fact the whole concept of alcoholism itself was first described at the end of the 18th century by a Doctor Thomas Trotter, an Edinburgh physician serving in the Royal Navy at Newcastle-Upon-Tyne in the north of England.

During World War I a number of studies were carried out in different armies and the remarkable fact was that the incidence of alcoholism requiring treatment or eventual discharge from the service was similar in the British, French, German and American Armies. The figures being somewhere in the region of between 16-20% psychiatric admissions. Meyer in the German Army stated that in peace time it was the officers who were likely to suffer from this rather than the soldiers. He went on to state that during the Russo-Japanese war, alcoholism was the most pronounced aetiological factor in mental illness, and that some 50% of the psychiatric disorders in that were probably caused by alcoholism. Khorosako in 1915 reported an incidence of chronic alcoholism of 3.1% in the Russian Army. A number of papers around this time did point out, however, that the incidence of alcoholism was much higher at the beginning of the war than it was at the end and also that the people most likely to be alcoholic were not the regular soldiers but were the conscriptees who came in from civilian life. Chavingy in the French Army suggested that the problem of alcohol excess in the army really only just reflects what occurs within the civilian population. He commented that when the French Government took action to legislate against the abuse of alcohol in France in 1915 this had an effect on public alcoholism by reducing it considerably but also the incidence in the army seemed to drop corresponding with this.

I think this raises the second point we must establish if we are to decide on the extent and severity of the problem within the Australian Army; and that is we must establish whether the incidence of alcoholism in the Australian Army is any higher than that in a comparable civilian population matched for age and sex. It seems quite likely that nowadays people learn their drinking habits early in life and from the interesting studies of Yahoda, Stacey and Davis this fact would appear to be well confirmed. If these patterns of drinking or attitudes to drinking are established prior to adolescence one wonders whether they will be changed, or can be changed within a military population later in life, particularly when the individual will be returning to the community in which he learns his drinking attitudes and returning to this community on a regular basis each day.

Other questions that might be answered are I think related to the amount of harm alcohol does to the efficiency of the unit anyway, for I feel that this really has not been clearly established. In view of my earlier remarks, it is possible that alcohol might do more good than harm to morale and recruiting etc. So, related to this, we have to find out what effect cutting down drinking in the army might have on the army itself, the military image and through this on overall morale. It could be argued that although the tot was withdrawn from the Royal Navy at the end of the 1960s the Navy has not suffered particularly from this. But I would point out though that here the circumstances are somewhat different in that the tot was taken at midday and had to be drunk immediately, that many sailors were finding this incompatible with working on the highly sophisticated electronic and mechanical equipment the Navy now employs. I should
point out also, that the Royal Navy still allows sailors to drink at sea and issues them with cans of beer rationed to so many per individual per day.

Finally, I think that if we decide that we do need to make some assault on the problems of alcoholism within our army then I think we must assess carefully what is likely to have the most beneficial effect. Legislation over the years has been shown to be effective as we know from examples in France, the United Kingdom and Scandinavia with the introduction of fairly rigorous licence laws. Within the military context, I suppose it could be argued that we might legislate against the use of alcohol in messes. It does seem also that when the drinking environment has changed from one which is entirely masculine to one which encourages family contact then drinking seems to diminish and so maybe we should invite families into the messes on a regular basis. We could undertake educational programmes to warn soldiers about the dangers of drinking but I really do not think that these would be likely to compete against the enormous pressures they have been and continue to be subjected to with the community to encourage them to partake of alcohol. There is a danger as well that educational programmes, as we have seen with drug education programmes, draw attention to the issue and by doing so stimulate the interest of the young and suggestible.

My own view is that these measures will probably prove ineffective and thus undesirable. I think this leaves us with the situation, which seems to me to be much more realistic, of having to understand, empathize with, tolerate and support our alcoholics, for it seems that they have succumbed to an occupational hazard. They can still function energetically and effectively in our Army and by allowing them to do so we might possibly save large amounts of money which have already been invested in their training.

I think to help these members we must learn how to identify them at an early stage so they might be helped to at least control their drinking to a stage where it does not cause total physical, socio-economic and psychological disintegration. The problem with many heavy drinkers and alcoholics is that they seem to get on a sort of treadmill where their heavy drinking will cause deterioration in their interpersonal relationships, their work performance and may also cause them some financial difficulties. Stress produced by these situations is likely to precipitate even heavier drinking patterns. By identifying potential alcoholics at an earlier stage it might be possible to prevent them sinking into these situations. This might be done by helping them to recognise the stresses which precipitate their drinking patterns and possibly advising the administration in some instances to relieve them of these stresses particularly when they apply to employment situations.

I think also we have to change our own attitudes towards the person with the alcohol problem. When we look at them as being unworthy or as being sick, then as happens in the services, colleagues will often protect them against an administration which they feel might be hostile. So in many instances they only come to medical attention after some disaster or crisis has occurred, frequently when they are being scapegoated for this and there is a great deal of hostility directed at them. By this time it is often too late to help.

It might be healthier to look at the service alcoholic as somebody, who but for the grace of God might be anyone of us, and who knows it might not be such a bad fate. There is an old French proverb which says, “There are more old drunkards than old doctors”. For as the Elizabethan poet John Fletcher said, “Wine works the head up, wakes the wit, there is no cure against old age but it”.

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IN 1976 the Arms and Armour Press, together with the United States Naval Institute, published the first English language translation of Flottes de Combat, which since 1897 has been the well known French equivalent of Jane's Fighting Ships. This translation was well received and the venture must have been financially successful, because the latest edition of Flottes de Combat has again appeared in English under the above title.

Combat Fleets describes the ships, aircraft, weapons and, where possible, sensors of the world's 122 navies in some 650 pages (10 per cent more than the 1976/77 edition) and 1500 photos and line drawings, some 450 of which are new to this edition. Most photos in the Australian section, however, remain conspicuously out of date.

In addition to the standard details given for each ship or class, qualitative comment is sometimes made under a “Remarks” heading. For example, Russian Nanuchka class corvettes are said to be poor seaboats with very unreliable engines. HMS Bristol is said to be an expensive failure, with the intriguing comment that “although nominally ‘Commissioned’ in 1973, she had not been accepted for active service by the time of her first refit in 1976/77”. The new British Type 21 frigates are said to be overweight, and Combat Fleets alleges that the “real” reason for the Royal Navy removing VDS from some Leanders is “insufficient mastery of VDS employment techniques, plus a preference for development of a towed passive linear array like the U.S. Tass.” Such comments, together with the lack of criticism accorded French warships, suggests that Anglo-French naval rivalry is not yet entirely a thing of the past!

Quite apart from being a most useful reference work, there is much of interest to be found even if one is only browsing through Combat Fleets. This reviewer was particularly struck by the developments planned for the Japanese Navy under the Fifth Defence Plan, which covers the period from 1 April 1977 to 31 August 1982. Inter alia, the plan calls for four large helicopter destroyers, to give a total of eight DDG's; 6 to 8 frigates; and 6 to 8 submarines. The helicopter destroyers will almost be small aircraft carriers, as they will each have six ASW helicopters on board. Very few of the vessels planned are required for replacement purposes, so that the Japanese Navy will receive a major boost in strength, even if the plan in modified in its passage through Parliament. On the negative side, the new DDGs will carry Harpoon and Sea Sparrow, but no area defence anti-aircraft missile such as Tartar. The number of its ships equipped with Tartar will therefore remain at 3, and the Japanese Navy will continue to have a major weakness in its anti-aircraft capability.

On a lighter note, it comes as a surprise to find that the world’s oldest active naval ship was built in 1865. This honour is held by the El Horria, formerly the Egyptian Royal Yacht, and now a training ship.

In comparison with Jane’s, both reference works publish similar data on the major combatants. Lesser ships and lesser navies are not so well covered in Combat Fleets, but this reduced coverage, along with no advertisements, permits a more compact volume which sells for only two-thirds the price of Jane’s. For the individual, a choice between Combat Fleets and Jane’s will largely depend on the extent of his data needs and the state of his personal finances.

Reviewed by WGCDDR W. J. Belton, Air Force Office

THERE is little doubt that Bruce Myles became an enthusiast for Harrier while researching for this book Jump Jet. His initial coverage is of the situation that occurred in the United Kingdom to allow the vectored thrust aircraft concept to be developed. The story continues through the aircraft's development, the multi-national involvement and then its use with the two major users, the Royal Air Force
and the United States Marine Corps. The author has also included the more recent developments of the Royal Navy's Sea Harrier, the ski-jump technique, and the Marine Corps AV-8B. His thoughts on civil applications of VSTOL are appended.

The unconventional usually has a rough passage to acceptance and the Harrier is no exception. From the start the vectored thrust concept had its doubters and opponents. It is surprising that Harrier was conceived in the design office of the very conservative Sir Sydney Camm. The opposition to Harrier often was not directed at the V/STOL concept as such, but in the desire to preserve existing and developing conventional aircraft in an era of rapidly diminishing defence budgets. While that opposition nearly killed Harrier development in the early day, a similar situation presently obtains for the much improved AV-8B.

The account starts with Hawker Aircraft's P1103 single-engine, March 2 plus fighter proposal losing to the Fairey FD2 to satisfy the RAF target in the mid 1950s for a supersonic fighter. The company's efforts turned to adapting the P1103 design into a multi-role supersonic fighter (defeated by the 1957 'missiles-only' Defence White Paper), and then into a twin engined aircraft that couldn't meet the operational requirement (later satisfied for a short time by TSR2). The demise of activity at Hawker's provided the opportunity to initiate the concept of an aircraft built around an engine with swivelling jet nozzles.

How the Pegasus engine was initiated by Bristols, how its development was supported by the Americans with considerable funds, and how critically important the engine was to the prototype Harriers (P1127), The Tripartite Squadron's Kestrels and then to the production Harriers, receives an extensive coverage by Myles through several chapters.

Two chapters, 'The Role of the Harrier' and 'The Most Effective All Round Fighter in Existence', reflect Myles' enthusiasm and his desire, shared by many Harrier converts, to praise the full range of the Harrier's capabilities and to dispel the impressions that Harrier is just a small-load carrying, short-range, vertical take off aircraft. While the author has concentrated on the advantageous characteristics of V/STOL and Harrier in particular, and has not raised alternatives in presenting his conclusions, he has exposed a number of characteristics that may not be known to those considering V/STOL. To have covered all the arguments would have led to a different coverage. The author was better equipped to present the Harrier story as told by those involved, not to argue V/STOL concepts.

How the Harrier entered United States Marine Corps' Service as the AV-8A is an interesting exposure to American political and military attitudes to the foreign developed product. While the Marines won this difficult case for buying AV-8As from the United Kingdom, the present battle to keep the advanced Harrier AV-8B programme going beyond the two prototypes will be even more difficult. Rather than battling the 'not made here' attitude, the Marines are now facing the problems of reducing defence budgets.

The development by the Marines of the thrust vectoring in forward flight technique (VIFF) to expand the manoeuvre envelope of the Harrier is well covered by the author. The Marines' exploitation of a characteristic inherent in the Harrier nozzle design has improved the aircraft's self defence capabilities. However as in some other coverage, Myles has limited his discussion to the advantages of the technique. He has concentrated on close combat. There are other periods in an engagement where superior weapons of an attacker could finish a Harrier before the VIFF technique could be exploited.

Jump Jet is a good account of the Harrier V/STOL story. The reader should allow for the author's enthusiasm for this aircraft and VSTOL concepts in general. The military advantages of Harrier extolled in this book need deeper consideration than that given by the author.


Reviewed by CPO J. J. Laub RAN.

At 0300 hours on 22 June 1941, a new chapter in military history began to be written. Advances in technology ushered in an era in which warfare was no longer confined to a single field or country, but was fought on a continental scale. Millions of men, hundreds of
thousands of artillery pieces, tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft clashed in a series of running battles over an area the size of Australia.

Hitler boasted, "When 'Case Barbarossa' is launched, the whole world will hold it's breath!" This time he was right.

The Russian Front attempts to tell the whole story of the thirteen major battles of the Russo-German War, complete with an extensive set of tables, charts and maps. The material is presented in a series of essays which treat one facet of the war or the armies involved, and the resulting modules untangle the complex campaigns of the Eastern Front.

The statistics are given clearly and are interpreted in an objective and very readable style which makes the book an excellent text for the military buff as well as the reference library.

Reviewed by K. I. Taylor
Managing Editor, Defence Force Journal.

"SOCIALISM", said Churchill, "is the philosophy of failure, the creed of ignorance and the gospel of envy." The great man was, to use his own words, "put out to grass" by the British electorate before the Japanese war was ended, a democratic decision which came as a shock to ally and former enemy alike. His later record as a peace-time Prime Minister leads one to believe that, had he retained power, he could have proved a disappointment. The Conservative Party certainly gained from not having to take responsibility for the economic chaos which by 1950 was to make Britain the latter-day "sick man of Europe".

How much of this continuing malaise was caused by Labour mismanagement and how much was unavoidable is not within the scope of this book. Rather it is a biased and euphoric account of why Labour gained a landslide victory. Laced with personal anecdotes, it could be a useful social history of the period. By its very one-sidedness, however, it loses credibility.

According to the authors, the Conservatives were remembered by the electorate for their stance during appeasement in the 1930s. There was a demand for something new, though few would have gone as far as those on the left of the party wished. Nationalisation, with its encumbered bureaucracy and its monopolistic disregard for the individual's needs was generally unpopular and was played down in subsequent Labour manifestos. The Russians soon showed themselves to be other than "gallant allies" as they increased their grip on Eastern Europe. So the Labour party soon slid from a band of hope to a disillusioned, broken rump in five dreary years.

The part the services' vote played in putting Atlee into power was not as great as the left wing indoctrination effort through books, pamphlets, films and discussions led by young firebrand education officers would seem to warrant. Strangely, the authors are silent about this irregular use of government time and taxpayer's money. Most private soldiers seem to have been more motivated by the naive belief that a vote for Labour would get them home earlier and keep them out of the Far East war — selfish, but natural.

"The most vivid, vital and valid political experience of their lives" it may have been for a few intellectuals. For most of us it was the beginning of a grey, depressing half-decade, the remembrance of which was to push the British Labour Party into the wilderness for the following 13 years.

Hard Cover $13.95, Soft Cover $12.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel R.J.G. Hall, RAAC

THE Royal Australian Armoured Corps has recently taken delivery of its final consignment of the Leopard tank which has now replaced the hitherto indefatigable Centurion. Almost simultaneously the Corps has heaved a collective sigh as it already faces the threat of 'mothballing' of some of its new equipments. Readers of Major General Hopkins' book will also sigh as they recognize these recent events as yet another shift in the fluctuating fortunes of Australian armour.
From the emergence of the Australian Volunteer Automobile Corps in 1908 to the operations of tanks and APCs in Vietnam in 1970-72, both regular Army and militia men of the RAAC have experienced their ups and downs. It is our good fortune that it is Major General Hopkins who has chosen to tell this tale of military snakes and ladders, for he shared not a few of the slippery climbs and falls. He served with the 6th Light Horse (AIF) in Palestine* but made the transition from cavalry to mechanization with an ease that was far from universal in a world of conservative military thinking. In command and staff appointments, in both cavalry and armoured units, he served in campaigns in which entrenched ignorance, lack of imagination and indifferent support by Australian authorities, often scored more devastating hits than were to be received at the hands of an enemy.

The author first sets out to record the events that lead finally to the formation of the 1st Australian Armoured Division. Despite the infertile years of the thirties, two light tank companies and two armoured car regiments had emerged by the beginning of World War II. The 6th Cavalry Regiment (AIF) was deployed abroad with other Australian forces into the Western Desert. Feverish activity at home also brought results and approval was given to raise an armoured division.

High hopes were held by the many Light Horse converts who joined the division, that their fast developing new armoured skills would soon make a significant contribution in support of the infantry in the Middle East. But it was the Papuan Campaign, not the desert, that was to claim the division's units — frequently in no greater concentration than a squadron. Too often the spectre of 1918 tactics clouded good sense, as in the Buna operations where infantry support was by single tanks. Difficulties in combating the ground conditions were enormous, but the effort made to overcome them usually proved worthwhile.

Unfortunately it was the difficulties and not the triumphs that lurked in memories in the post-war years. Those of us who served in the 1950s will recall the indignation and disbelief of the Director of Armour (Lt Col Eldridge) when he was confronted with a document claiming that effective use of tanks in South East Asia would be confined to 25% of the country and then only in the dry season. Despite successful practical demonstrations and a further survey conducted in Thailand that reversed the dubious conclusions of the original paper, the Regular Army component of the RAAC remained locked in Puckapunyal, isolated from those they were so well trained to support.

General Hopkins views the 1950s and early 1960s as years of reorganization and declining health of equipments. If they were, as he writes, 'years of despair', he acknowledges with satisfaction the cracks that began to appear in the thinking that claimed only infantry and artillery could fight in the jungle.

The initial deployment of APCs to Vietnam saw the Corps fortunes really rise. Of more significance, it saw the re-emergence of the concept of the 'balanced force'. It was only a matter of time before the full potential of this concept would be realized with the introduction of the medium tanks. Vietnam veterans will enjoy the author's selection of armoured/infantry operations in 'Stirrup-Cup', 'Stafford', 'Surfside' and 'Goodwood', and the actions at 'Balmoral' and 'Coral'. Armchair strategists will be no less delighted with the revealing comments on armoured support from Major General Vincent, Colonel (Now Major General) Bradbury and Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Hughes.

The book is generously illustrated with a number of well known photographs and some meticulously drawn pen and ink sketches by David Hammond. The maps are simple and readable, and appropriate to the text. Eight appendices provide valuable source material for those interested in technical and personal data and there is a useful index.

The appeal to armoured men is obvious. It is enhanced by descriptions of training in Puckapunyal and references to the properties of Tehan and O'Sullivan. One can read of Cec Ives, Hec Brain and I.T. Murdoch and have memories rekindled that bridge generations. But it is in the concluding chapter, which identifies some validly deduced lessons, that the author demonstrates that this is not simply a book for nostalgic 'black hats'. Australian Armour deserves the attention of all who wrestle with the problem of how to do better with less and who have on their shoulders the burden of making timely defence preparations for our future.

IN this small book (104 pages) the author sketches his way through more than two hundred years of naval history and design. Each drawing is accompanied by a small caption which in limited detail explains the importance of the particular occurrence or vessel. The book is based on a monthly feature by Captain Thornton entitled 'Naval Lore Corner' which originally appeared in the Royal Canadian Navy's now defunct magazine Crowsnest from 1952 to 1965. Separate sections cover naval oddities, memorials, accidents at sea, converted merchantmen, aborted projects, naval vignettes and a host of other topics.

The sections covering the age of transition from sail to steam are particularly interesting. This is the era which produced French pre-Dreadnoughts like Brennus, Formidable and Hoche with pronounced tumble home and hair raising multi tier fighting tops, while on the other side of the Channel the belted armoured ship Alexandra remained in Service as a remnant of the decades when central batteries vied with turrets for practicality and final adoption in naval architecture. The author includes sketches of a few ships with their turrets arranged en echelon, this disposition was adopted by most major naval powers until all main armament on the centre line finally made more sense. Leafing through the pages the reader finds examples of first, second and third generation Dreadnoughts, which of course culminated into the awe-inspiring Yamato and Iowa Classes.

Some of the better known incidents covered are the ramming of the German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper by the Royal Navy's destroyer Glowworm in 1940 and when in 1923 due to fog and navigational errors seven U.S. destroyers consecutively piled themselves on rocks off the Californian coast at Honda Point. A couple of the lesser known facts stated in the book would be the conversion of the British monitor Humber (of Rufiji River fame) to a floating crane and how the U.S. submarine Tang torpedoed herself when one of her torpedoes fired at the enemy about turned and hit home. The pen drawings in this volume are the author's own, and as there are up to ten sketches per page with a somewhat messy layout the reader sometimes has difficulty determining which caption and drawing belong together. With over 450 entries there are quite a few inaccuracies although the errors that do occur are mainly small. A particular favourite is the abbreviating of ships' names, for example Potemkin for Kniaz Potemkin Tavtretchesky and Zeven Provincien for De Zeven Provincien. Admiral Tryon also has his name changed to Tyron. A rather sad mistake is in the section 'Relics of the past' where Captain Thornton advises: the monitor Cerberus 'is being restored'. Although the Cerberus has now been classified by the Australian National Trust, this important link in warship evolution has not as yet been touched. What is left of the coastal defence monitor, once the pride of the Victorian Navy still serves dutifully as part of a breakwater off Black Rock in Port Phillip Bay, where, concrete filled, she will remain unless a sudden influx of funds change her fate. In this book ships' tonnages are sometimes given wrongly, for instance the 14,500 ton (displacement) U.S. armoured cruiser Memphis has her tonnage rounded off to 18,000.

Due to the number of small irritating mistakes this book is not particularly for a naval historian or shipping buff who is a stickler for detail; it does however give the reader a varied insight into the interesting history of warships and might so stir his imagination that he will dig into reference books for more information on the specific incidents and ships referred to in the text. Behind each of Captain Thornton’s drawings lies definitely an interesting story in the annals of naval history.