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Chairman’s Comments

In this edition of the *Australian Defence Force Journal* there are three articles that examine the theme of national security. Two of the articles are from overseas colleagues. Both authors attended the Australian Command and Staff Course at the Australian Defence College in 2004. These two articles provide different perspectives on the current security debate about the consequences for military and policy practitioners stemming from the events of and after September 11. While they do not necessarily represent their ‘countries’ perspective’ they offer the readership of this journal an opportunity to understand how others perceive Australia’s approach to security. The third article addressing the security theme analyses the machinery whereby policy is made in the Australian context.

In each edition of the *Journal* we seek to include at least one historical piece. It is pleasing to note that Captain Bowd’s article in the last edition on the Allied Geographical Section caught the eye of a former serving member from America. Lieutenant Colonel McWatters’ piece in this edition will no doubt be of interest to many of the readership as well.

The Board of Management would like to thank all those who have commented positively on the *Journal* and particularly thank those who have submitted articles for publication. The *Journal* can only be as good as the articles submitted by those among you with a keen interest in defence and security matters.

M. F. Bonser, AO, CSC
Rear Admiral, RAN
Commander Australian Defence College
Chairman Australian Defence Force Journal
Letters to the Editor

Dear Editor,

Rear Admiral Woodward: Political Influences During the Falklands War

Major Moore’s article examining the impact of political influences on the performance of Rear Admiral Woodward (ADFJ No. 165) states that Admiral Woodward was ‘…the commander of the British Task Force sent to recapture the Falklands’. This suggests that it was Admiral Woodward’s command that recaptured the Falklands. He reinforces this impression by references to Admiral Woodward’s ‘…ground element’ attacking Goose Green and Brigadier Thompson as the admiral’s ‘…deputy commander in charge of the ground element’. If this is the author’s belief, then I consider it to be incorrect.

The command arrangements for the recapture of the Falklands established Admiral Fieldhouse as a joint operational commander supported by five subordinate functional commanders. Of these, those directly involved in recapturing the Falkland Islands were Admiral Woodward, the carrier battle group commander; Commodore Clapp, the amphibious commander; with Brigadier Thompson, followed by Major General Moore, as land commander. While the commanders provide varying interpretations of these arrangements in their respective books, a UK JSCSC seminar in June 2002, with Admiral Woodward, Generals Moore and Thompson, and Commodore Clapp in attendance, confirmed them.

Other matters discussed during the seminar are at odds with statements in Major Moore’s article. General Moore stated that it was he who ordered the landing, and General Thompson confirmed that Admiral Fieldhouse ordered him to undertake the Goose Green operation. The advice sent to London from Ascension Island concerning the timings of the operation was a group decision and not Admiral Woodward’s alone. That the government pressed the military was disputed at the seminar by Lord Parkinson, a member of Margaret Thatcher’s ‘war’ cabinet. General Moore agreed with him and Admiral Woodward did not demur!

The notion that Admiral Woodward was in overall command probably stems from his appointment as senior commander, the first among equals, in order to coordinate the control of assets if necessary. It was not a command appointment nor did he have occasion to use it.

Major Moore, in discussing Admiral Woodward’s performance in recapturing the Falklands, casts the admiral in a role that he did not play, thereby bringing the arguments put forward into question. I suggest that the benchmark for judging Admiral Woodward’s performance is his orders and not the political issues faced by his superiors in issuing those orders.

Dr. Noel Sproles, Ph.D
Adelaide, SA
Introduction

There is little doubt that the events of September 11 dramatically changed the global security environment and the traditional concept of national security. There is now an international consensus that terrorism has global dimensions and is posing a threat to the security of all nations. No country can consider itself immune to this threat. This event signalled a fundamental change in the nature of conflict, a paradigm shift from the Cold War period. Consequently, most states in the world and especially those in the West have been forced to review their defence policies to respond to the new security challenges. In the aftermath of these events, the Australian Government carried out a review of its defence policy and published the Defence Update 2003 (DU03).

The aim of this article is to analyse DU03 to determine if it is an adequate response to the new security situation. This article will briefly outline the key conclusions and policy guidelines presented in DU03. It will then discuss the issue of terrorism to establish how it has changed Australia’s security situation. Finally it will discuss what these new challenges mean for Australian security and whether the changes proposed in the DU03 will address the new concerns.

Key conclusions of DU03

DU03 acknowledges the fact that Australian security faces new challenges in view of the changed security environment underpinned by the threat of international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and the security ramifications of failed states. It notes that for the present, the prospect of a conventional military attack on Australia is unlikely. However, terrorism and proliferation of WMD have emerged to create strategic uncertainty. DU03 does not propose any radical changes to the Australian defence policy as outlined in Defence White Paper 2000. Instead, it suggests some rebalancing of capabilities and priorities, mainly focusing on more flexible and mobile forces, with sufficient levels of readiness and sustainability. DU03 claims that for the foreseeable future Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations are most likely to occur within the context of regional contingencies, operations as part of US-led coalition in the global war on terrorism, efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD, and to contribute to the enhancement of global stability.

Terrorism: what has it changed?

The reason why September 11 changed the global security outlook lies in the fact that the attack against the sole superpower came not from a sovereign state but from a non-state actor: al-Qa’eda, with no fixed assets that could be held at risk. September 11 and subsequent events indicating the terrorists’ wider global links have brought the magnitude and significance
of this threat into sharp relief. For Australia the threat has assumed greater significance due to the emergence of Jamaah Islamiyah and other such organisations in Southeast Asia with close links to al-Qa’eda.

The ideas that motivate extremists’ activities are global in reach and therefore require multilateral responses. Moreover, terrorist organisations do not make good military targets. There are many frontlines in the war on terror: frontlines at home, abroad, in far-off places, in mountain caves and in major cities around the world. Terrorists may strike from points that we may not anticipate. The battle against them has to be fought not only with military might, but also with good international policy.5

In a purely military sense, it is important to note that September 11 not only changed the global security situation, but more importantly, it changed the nature of international conflict. What sets terrorism apart from traditional security threats is that:

- Terrorists avoid decisive engagement and do not present identifiable targets. This places serious constraints on defence forces to find appropriate responses.

- Terrorist organisations are dispersed and are networked globally with access to information, communication and technology. This gives the terrorists the capacity to strike in strategic depth.

- The phenomenon of terrorism develops hybrids by fusing with diverse and complex local, religious, ethnic, social and political issues across international borders.

- Terrorists operate in conjunction with other forms of threats, like transnational crime, people and drug smuggling, money laundering and even conventional wars as evidenced by the current events in Iraq and Afghanistan. This demands a greater degree of transnational coordination.

- As against conventional conflicts terrorist operations are not bound by time and space. Terrorists thrive on opportunity. They can strike anytime, anywhere and can dictate the tempo of operations. This places serious constraints on conventional defence forces, in terms of maintenance of tempo.

These complexities in the nature of terrorism mean that developing a pure military response to terrorism is an illusive goal. Any effective strategy to deal with terrorism would require a global and integrated response, involving agencies and organisations not only on the domestic but also on the international level. In fact, the term ‘war on terrorism’ is possibly misleading because it tends to imply that the struggle against terrorism will be primarily military, which surely is not true.6 History suggests that this struggle will be characterised by a complex set of measures aimed to undercut the terrorists’ support base.7 This struggle will continue, not primarily through large-scale military operations, but through a host of other means. As Aldo Borgu argues, ‘the so called war on terrorism will most likely continue for a long time and may end up like the war on drugs: boring, unglamorous, and never-ending but nevertheless very important’.8
The regional context

There is little doubt that terrorism is a global issue, however, local factors play an immense part in determining the scale, nature and seriousness of the problem. The risk of terrorist attack on Australia and its national interests is primarily related to the growth of extremist tendencies in the Southeast Asian region as demonstrated by the Bali bombings. This threat will not be resolved until countries in the region have stronger governance processes able to pursue effective economic and social policies that deliver consistent results for the betterment of their people. The success of these efforts largely depends on adopting a pragmatic approach by the regional countries and a policy of positive engagement by Australia and the major powers.

What does it mean for Australian security?

Should Australia abandon ‘Defence of Australia’ as the core element of defence policy and adopt ‘counter-terrorism’ as a force structure determinant in view of the emerging security environment? In answering this question, one needs to consider two issues. Firstly, has terrorism brought a fundamental and permanent change to the Australian security environment? Secondly, has the nature of conflict in which the ADF is likely to operate changed so profoundly? The following factors need consideration:

• Despite the global nature of the threat posed by terrorism, for Australia, the issue of terrorism is closely linked to the instability of the Southeast Asia and South West Pacific region, existing long before September 11.

• Current events suggest that terrorism in Southeast Asia has moved from a focus on local issues to broader extremist objectives. DU03 does not analyse systematically the impact of this development on the strategic environment. When arguing for targeted bilateral, regional and global responses to defeat terrorism, DU03 gives no hint that these approaches may not always be compatible. The review seems to affirm the need to resort to military force against terrorism without considering that the use of force might undermine broader national security goals such as the maintenance of regional cohesion and an effective global security system.

• Thinking of Australia’s security in terms of the global war on terrorism encourages an illusion that it is possible to know what the next challenge is going to be. Australia’s strategic challenges are far more complex. Australia’s strategic policy needs to recognise that surprises are as likely in the future as have been demonstrated in the past by the events of September 11 and Bali and yet will probably not involve terrorism of the type witnessed on September 11 and in Bali.

• Global terrorism has brought a radical shift from the Cold War paradigm of a finite number of threats against which we can plan our responses. There are infinite numbers of vectors through which an infinite number of potential hostiles could come. This means a fundamental change in the manifestation of international conflict.

There is little doubt that the nature of conflict has changed significantly. As a result, there is a definite need for Australian security planners to appreciate the full implication of macro
terrorism. However, in doing so they must not forget that other threats as outlined in the *Defence White Paper 2000* are as real today as they were before September 11.16

**Should Australia base its defence strategy on counter-terrorism?**

‘Defence of Australia’ has remained the cornerstone of Australian defence policy for the last two decades. It is the primary force structure determinant for the ADF. *DU03* reaffirms this policy. To answer the question as to whether Australia should base its defence strategy on responding to terrorism, one needs to examine the key concepts of warning time and the nature of credible contingencies, on which ‘Defence of Australia’ has been based and how terrorism has impacted on them.18

The concept of warning time posits that due to its unique geography and the potential military capabilities of regional countries, Australia will have sufficient warning time to respond to any conventional threat. In fact a short-warning major military attack has simply not been considered credible given Australia’s geographic circumstances. However, the nature of the threat posed by terrorism nullifies this fundamental strategic basis of defence policy. September 11 demonstrated that terrorists could strike anywhere with little or no warning time.

The second core concept is that capabilities to mount low-level military operations against Australia already exist in the Asia-Pacific countries. These credible contingencies have not been replaced by the threat of terrorism. In fact terrorism fits into the spectrum of such contingencies and gives them new form, while aiding the element of uncertainty. This means that Australia will have to maintain a force structure adequate to respond to these threats, while simultaneously developing capabilities to deal with terrorism. What would such a force look like and what force structure priorities would that dictate? How would a balance be maintained to ensure that the ADF is responsive to all the threats across the spectrum of conflict?

Contemporary security issues, arrayed against Australia require a range of government responses. There is a need to distinguish between the broader national security implications of global terrorism and those of a purely military nature. The view taken in the *Defence White Paper 2000*, that major wars, while unlikely, remain a distinct and unpredictable possibility, seems to be prudent. The current war in Iraq, tensions in the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula, support this argument. History tells us that in the world of international security nothing lasts forever.20 In addition, the current trends in warfare with the increase in intrastate conflicts indicate that there are going to be increasing demands on the ADF in future to undertake regional military operations.

The focus on a global war on terrorism seems to have blurred the sense of uniqueness of Australia’s security environment and the response to it.21 That terrorism poses a security threat is beyond doubt, however it is not a strategic threat. We must not lose sight of the fact that it is instability in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood that is a primary strategic concern. Terrorism is just one of the means by which that threat could become a reality.22

All this, however, is not to suggest that Australia should not do anything to prevent and respond to the threat posed by terrorism. There is an increased risk to Australia, and the ADF must develop capabilities to respond to that threat as part of the wider range of measures
undertaken by the government. However, this war must be fought not just in terms of what it is today, but what the threat will be 10 years from now. Moreover, it has to be recognised that security is a balance of finite resources and risks that can never be eliminated. It is impossible to imagine all possible threats and counter them.

In its efforts to help defeat global terrorism Australia must not ignore the demands of developing a high technology conventional military force for the unpredictable contingencies of the next 20 to 40 years. In the words of senior ADF leaders, the Australian defence policy must aim at developing and shaping the ADF to be effective, flexible, sustainable, connected, interoperable, deployable and integrated to respond to the threats of an uncertain future. Counter-terrorism therefore should not serve as a primary determinant of force structure. Defence of Australia and the growing demands of the immediate neighbourhood should remain the primary focus of defence policy, while developing new capabilities to respond to the threat of terrorism as outlined in the DU03. These changes must aim to address the current security imperatives and ensure that the ADF is responsive to the changing nature of conflict over the long term. New changes should focus on developing network-centric warfare capabilities: capabilities to connect Australia’s forces to information on the enemy and focus on delivering a knockout blow at a critical place, which will ensure victory.

Conclusion

The focus on terrorism must not be allowed to eclipse the uniqueness of Australia’s security environment and the imperative to develop an appropriate response. Terrorism has not replaced the traditional threats to Australian security; instead it has added new dimensions to it, and therefore it cannot form the fundamental determinant for force structure. Defence of Australia and the growing demands of its immediate neighbourhood should remain the primary focus of the defence policy as outlined in the Defence White Paper 2000. Terrorism has changed the nature of conflict and Australia must take this into consideration when developing defence policy with changes to force structure and capability development aimed at enabling the ADF to provide the government with a wider range of options. But Australia should not lose sight of the fact that it is instability in its immediate neighbourhood that poses a greater strategic threat.
NOTES

1. While the analysis is based on the declaratory defence policy as outlined in the Defence White Paper 2000, the focus in this article will remain on the Defence Update 2003.


3. ibid., p. 25.


7. ibid., p. 8.

8. ibid., p. 9.


15. ibid., p. 18.


19. ibid., p. 9.


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Defence of Australia as the Primary Determinant for ADF’s Force Structure

Major Chee Wee Tan

Introduction

The military strategy of Defence of Australia (DOA) had its humble beginnings in Britain’s decision to withdraw military forces east of Suez in 1967 and President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine in 1969. Prior to these developments, Australia adopted the strategy of forward defence that made it dependent on military support from Britain and the US. In 1976, the White Paper, Australian Defence, articulated a new policy that shifted away from forward defence and focused on the adjacent maritime areas, South West Pacific islands, Papua New Guinea, and the Southeast Asia region. Despite calls for self-reliance and independent capacity, Australian Defence did not detail any military strategy, concept of operations or rationale for purchasing equipment. It was only in the 1987 White Paper, The Defence of Australia, that the DOA strategy was formally established. Based on the concept of defence in depth, the strategy gave ‘priority to the ability of the ADF to mount operations capable of defeating enemy forces in our area of direct military interest.’ Similarly, the 1994 White Paper, Defending Australia stated that the ‘highest defence priority is therefore to build, maintain and support forces for the defence of Australia.’

The ADF’s force structure is currently guided by the 2000 White Paper Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force (D2000). The White Paper continues to give priority to DOA as the main driver for the ADF’s force structuring, noting that it ‘is the bedrock of our security, and the most fundamental responsibility of government.’ This article argues the case for retaining DOA as the primary determinant for the ADF’s force structure. To begin, an understanding of DOA will be provided through its definition within the context of D2000. The article then examines how DOA reflects Australia’s national character. It will also examine Australia’s strategic environment and propose that DOA serves as a credible deterrent. Finally, it will argue that DOA provides a rational framework to effect the ADF’s force structuring.

Understanding DOA

To understand DOA, it is important to establish the threat scenarios at which the strategy is targeted. D2000 examines the credibility and consequences of three threat scenarios, namely minor and major attacks on Australia, and the full-scale invasion of the continent. It concludes that the credibility of such scenarios is low due to the current security environment and state of military development among countries in the Asia–Pacific region. However, it should be noted that D2000 does not completely dismiss the possibility of an attack on Australia. This qualification is especially relevant in the case of minor attacks on Australia, ‘aimed at harassing or embarrassing Australia, or putting pressure on our policies.”
An attack on Australia would be the most serious and demanding military contingency Australia could face. It is within this context that the DOA strategy is defined. It involves the defence of Australia’s territory from direct military attack, through the protection of its direct maritime approaches from intrusion by hostile forces. This task is shaped by three principles: self-reliance, a maritime strategy and pro-active operations. Firstly, the ADF must be able to defend Australia without relying on the combat forces of other countries. This principle of self-reliance should be considered within the framework of the US alliance, suggesting a significant degree of support in areas such as intelligence, re-supply and logistics. Secondly, a maritime strategy is key to the control of the air and sea approaches to Australia. The strategy includes a vital role for land forces to deal with any incursions into Australian territory and to protect air and naval bases. Lastly, despite a defensive posture, Australia would undertake pro-active operations by attacking hostile forces as far from its shores as possible, including their home bases, forward operating bases and transit routes.

DOA: A reflection of Australia’s national character?

Even before the conception of DOA in 1987, there existed within Australian society deep recognition of the need to protect itself from external threats. This need was one of the key reasons behind the federation of the six colonies in 1901. Although Australians’ ancestry is primarily European, Australia itself is far from Europe and North America. With ‘a relatively small population occupying a resource-rich continent, a threat mentality has been part of the national character.’ Since the mid 1960s, public opinion polls have shown that about 45 per cent (and sometimes more than 60 per cent) of adult Australians surveyed believed other countries posed a military threat to Australia. This, despite official assessments that since 1973 had reiterated that ‘Australia faces no imminent or foreseeable threats through the 10–15 year horizons of successive reviews.’

Arguably the DOA is a reflection of Australia’s national character and should perhaps remain as the ‘centrepiece of Australian defence policy.’ The 1987 White Paper stated:

> Australians have a right to expect that their nation is able to defend itself. That is at the core of nationhood, and has long been an Australian aspiration. The exercise of authority over our continent and off-shore territories, our territorial sea and resource zones, and airspace, and the ability to protect our maritime and air approaches, is fundamental to our sovereignty and security.

During the preparation of D2000, the Community Consultation Team revealed that 85 per cent of Australians surveyed supported the idea of DOA and ‘few were prepared to discount totally the possibility of another country using military force at some time to threaten Australia or its interests.’ Despite concerns over the rising threat of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the government continues to be conscious of the expectation that the ADF be able to defend Australia. In the review paper, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, it concluded that ‘the principles set out in the Defence White Paper remain sound,’ and that the ‘rebalancing of capability and expenditure that will be necessary would not fundamentally alter the size, structure and role of the Defence Force.’
A less than benign strategic neighbourhood

In this age of globalisation and transnational threats, there are strong Australian voices claiming that geography no longer matters on issues of Australian security and a ‘Maginot Line syndrome is in operation.’ The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the Bali bombing in October 2002 support this claim.

As a result, the DOA strategy underpinning the ADF’s force structure for over 15 years is being challenged due to the ‘declining strategic relevance of geography and the proliferation of non-military, non-state challenges to security.’ These alternative views fail to recognise the continual signs of trouble and instability within the strategic neighbourhood of Australia. In particular, ‘expert opinion varies considerably about the future of Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest country and on our northern doorstep.’ Because of Indonesia’s size, proximity and cultural differences, relations with Australia may not always be consistent with the desires of Australia. Having a professional ADF capable of defending Australia is a strong deterrent against unforeseeable threats and ‘makes the emergence of such threats less likely.’

Unlike Europe where the idea of a major war is discounted, the Asia–Pacific region continues to contain key flash points that make war a credible possibility. These include tensions across the Taiwan Straits, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, and the Kashmir conflict. On transnational threats such as terrorism, the Australian people generally support overseas military operations. ‘But they will do so only if they feel secure at home and believe that Australia is secure in a secure region.’ These developments ‘have not reduced the long-term priority we need to give to the defence of our own country or protecting our interests in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood’.

A rational basis for force structuring

Due to the growing prominence of transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, there is a concern that the ADF is structured for the wrong wars. Over the last four years, the ADF has been involved in expeditionary coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, constabulary operations in Solomon Islands, and peacekeeping operations in East Timor. These operations demonstrated that the Army lacked critical mass and the ability to sustain itself, and the Navy and Air Force struggled to transport and resupply. Alan Dupont claims that these ‘deficiencies were directly attributable to an inflexible and dysfunctional strategy that privileges high-end warfare and pays insufficient attention to the force structure implications of intervening in internal conflicts, within our region and beyond.’ In particular, due to the US alliance, it is anticipated that the ADF could continue to be deployed in coalition operations. In the foreseeable future ‘the diversity and frequency of ADF’s operations will almost certainly increase as the war against terrorism gains momentum.’

Such decisions will always remain a matter for judgment by the Australian Government as Australia’s fundamental interests are not necessarily engaged across the totality of the trends discussed in Australia’s National Security in a way that compels Australia to take military action
on each of them.' It can be argued that the crux of the above concerns do not lie with DOA being the main driver of the ADF’s force structure.

Firstly, Australia’s alliance with the US has brought about particular perceptions among Australian defence planners in the areas of defence procurement, technology development, logistics management and stockpiling arrangement. While this assists budget commitments on defence, arguably it conditions the role of defence research and development institutions and local industry in support of the ADF.

Opposition to the DOA strategy also refers to the inverted logic that ‘a highly unlikely event should command the lion’s share of an organisation’s resources or be the principal focus of its attention’ and that it ‘would not get past first base in the political or corporate world.’ This comparison fails to consider the fundamental difference between the role of the ADF and that of the civil service and private sector. The former serves a ’Just In Case’ function to protect the nation from armed attack while the latter serve a ’Just In Time’ function to provide timely services and products to its customers. Just as a citizen would buy an insurance policy to protect against unlikely eventualities, a country needs to continually invest to ensure its own security. Australia must not fall into the trap of swaying to the security flavour of the month. The defence of the nation must remain a top priority in determining the way the ADF is structured.

Due to competing priorities for finite resources, the ADF like all other regional forces will be faced with the issue of budgetary constraint. In addition, high technology capabilities take long lead-times to be introduced and be fully operationalised. A framework is therefore required to decide the capabilities to be funded.

Defence commentator Paul Dibb argues that the DAO paradigm ‘provides a logical and intellectually rigorous set of force structure priorities’ as it is based on two enduring factors. The first, according to Dibb is, ‘Australia’s military geography, which presents us with particular vulnerabilities in our sparsely populated and resource rich north,’ while the second is a ‘distinct margin of technological superiority measured against trends in military capabilities being introduced into our own region.’ As Dibb notes it would be extremely difficult to argue the case that ‘acquiring equipment for distant operations can easily be transferred to defence of Australia tasks and our unique operating environment.’ He argues strongly that Australia needs to ‘resist the temptation to throw the Defence of Australia baby out with the old strategic bathwater.’ Indeed, the fact that DOA is enshrined within D2000 as the primary force structure determinant reflects its legitimacy with the Australian people because the White Paper has its origins from the community consultation program. In particular, ‘Australians have a psychological need to be reassured that the government is protecting them from an attack on the nation.’

**Conclusion**

The strategic environment surrounding Australia is not benign. The key flash points are the Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula and Kashmir. A professional ADF capable of defending
Major Chee Wee Tan was awarded the Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship in 1993 to read Civil and Environmental Engineering at the Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine (London, UK). In 1997, he graduated with a Masters of Engineering (Honours 1st Class) and proceeded to complete basic Air Operation and Communication Officer Course. In 1998, Major Tan was posted to 203 Squadron as an air traffic controller and subsequently promoted to the rank of Captain. In 2000, Major Tan was posted to Air Plans Department in Headquarters Republic of Singapore Air Force and subsequently promoted to the rank of Major in 2002. Major Tan was appointed as Officer Commanding, 203 Squadron in 2003. Amid his command and staff tours, he attended the Tri-Service Staff Course, Air Force Advanced Officer Course and the Squadron Commanders’ Tutorial. Chee Wee was a course member at the Australian Command and Staff College in 2004.
NOTES

1. In 1969, President Nixon made a policy statement in Guam that US allies in the Pacific had to be able to defend themselves against all but a major attack.


7. ibid., p. 24.


18. ibid.

19. ibid.


22. ibid.


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The Machinery of Australian National Security Policy: Changes, Continuing Problems and Possibilities

Major Gavin Keating

There is an intimate relationship between policy and the machinery in which it is made. Organisational structures and decision making processes inevitably impact on the shape of policy, while the nature of policy in turn demands particular characteristics from the decision making machinery.¹

Issues of organisation and management can be tiresome; the intricacies of government administration rarely grab attention. But the consequences of mistakes in national security policy can be severe… [and] include war with significant casualties, loss of vital interests and even defeat.²

Given the events of the last five years it is difficult to dispute the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s assessment that the country ‘faces its most challenging and turbulent strategic outlook since the mid 1960s.’³ Whilst one commentator noted in 1997 that national security policy was unlikely to be a peacetime vote winner, it was identified as an issue of fundamental importance during the recent federal election.⁴ Under such circumstances it is not surprising that there has been a significant impetus given to improving the organisational structures and decision making processes connected to the development and implementation of national security policy.⁵ The aim of this article is to consider how these structures and processes could be further improved by examining changes to them since 1996 and assessing whether these have addressed traditional criticisms. It will suggest that, whilst there have been significant improvements, a number of issues indicate a need for further reforms.

Before beginning it is necessary to consider some of the underlying imperatives behind changing notions of national security and their implications. National security has been defined as ‘that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.’⁶ Over the last two decades the concept of security has broadened beyond traditional state-centric concerns⁷ and now includes non-traditional challenges, such as intrastate ethnic conflict, failed states, terrorism and transnational crime.⁸ The increasing complexities and interdependencies created by globalisation have contributed to this trend.⁹ The coordination of what Evans once described as the multidimensional tools available to protect Australia’s security, such as military and diplomatic capabilities, but also including economic and trade relations and a host of other areas, has become particularly important.¹⁰ Increasing emphasis has thus been placed on the development of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches—a concept defined as ‘public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.’¹¹ In practical terms, however, government structures are vertical, with different agencies having narrowly defined spheres of responsibility. In contrast, many pressing security problems are horizontal and require cooperative responses, sometimes from several different government and non-government organisations, at different national levels.¹² This need was well demonstrated by Australia’s response to the October 2002 Bali bombing.¹³ The need to develop better
coordination mechanisms to achieve whole-of-government responses has been a driving force behind recent changes to the management of national security policy.

Changes to the national security policy structure

Since 1996 the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC), which is the premier national security decision making body responsible for considering ‘strategic developments and major issues of medium to long term relevance to Australia’s national security interests’\(^\text{14}\) was revitalised. In addition to the Prime Minister, its members include the Deputy Prime Minister, Treasurer, Defence Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Attorney-General. The NSC also frequently invites additional ministers, public servants and military officials to attend discussions to provide specialist perspectives. In comparison to previous security committees the NSC has met on a regular basis and during times of crisis, such as the lead-up to the East Timor deployment, it convened daily\(^\text{15}\). Although in some cases the full Cabinet will endorse decisions made by the NSC, it normally decides on policy without such consultation.\(^\text{16}\) The NSC has been described by a former minister ‘as one of the best and most effective forums in government.’\(^\text{17}\)

In support of the NSC the previous ‘non-operative’ Defence Committee was replaced by the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security (SCNS).\(^\text{18}\) This committee is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and includes all of the secretaries of the departments represented in the NSC, as well as the Chief of the Defence Force and the Director-General of the Office of National Assessments (ONA). It is essentially the main interface between the bureaucracy and the NSC, it meets on a monthly basis.\(^\text{19}\) The Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG), a deputy secretary level interdepartmental committee which is the key group concerned with the routine development and coordination of strategy issues, has remained basically unchanged.\(^\text{20}\) Use has also been made of ad hoc interdepartmental committees and taskforces to deal with particular issues of importance. For example, the Iraq Coordination Group was established during the critical phase of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) operations in Iraq in 2003.\(^\text{21}\)

To a certain extent the structures outlined above have not constituted a radical change to the basic decision making structures of Australian security policy. There have, however, been a number of recent significant structural changes within PM&C. As PM&C Deputy Secretary Andrew Metcalfe noted:

...PM&C is uniquely placed to ensure that all government agencies which contribute to our national security are working together, that there is effective communication and coordination between these agencies, and that the measures being put to government are commensurate with the threat environment and coordinated from a whole-of-government perspective.\(^\text{22}\)

In July 2003 the existing International Division within PM&C was expanded and a number of its functions transferred to a new 30-person National Security Division (NSD), designed to provide support to the NSC and oversee the coordination of security policy.\(^\text{23}\) Within the NSD there are two sub groups. The Defence and Intelligence Branch covers policy pertaining to defence policy, operations and acquisitions; intelligence; international security; regional counter-terrorism cooperation and counter-proliferation issues. The Domestic Security Branch
PM&C also now chairs the two major committees dealing with domestic counter-terrorism policy. While it has been stressed that the NSD will only be an interdepartmental coordination agency ‘it would be unusual if the division did not over time deliver more policy control to Prime Ministers on critical national security issues.’ As the NSD’s head explained shortly after its creation, ‘The Division will take a leading role in policy formulation.’ Overall, these developments have consolidated PM&C’s role in shaping national security policy, and through it the influence of the Prime Minister, a trend unlikely to be reversed by changes in government or party leadership.

**Have traditional criticisms been addressed?**

The most consistent criticism of Australia’s security policy processes in the past was the absence of suitable structures to achieve coordination. In 1982 Ball noted the existing mechanisms did ‘not provide a capability for the development and promulgation of any coherent and comprehensive national security policy.’ Similarly, Brown noted in 1994, ‘Australia has no machinery suitable for the efficient reconciliation and resolution of… [diverse organisational] perspectives in a broad national context beyond the perspectives of individual Departments.’ The suggested remedies to this situation were broadly similar and involved the creation of a staff secretariat, attached in some way to the Prime Minister’s portfolio, capable of providing independent policy advice and coordination support to an appropriate Cabinet committee. It was noted at the time that such an organisational change would be subject to the inevitable friction of bureaucratic politics. The recent changes in Australia’s security environment such as East Timor, the War on Terror (including involvement in Afghanistan and in Iraq), border protection issues, and instability in some of the Pacific Island states impelled the push for reform. To an extent the current mechanisms have met past criticisms.

There are, however, a number of problems that remain. Whilst the structure for a whole-of-government approach to national security might now be in place, it is not effective unless accompanied by clear direction on overall policy intent, priorities and strategies for combining the efforts of different organisations to meet the complex challenges facing the nation. Without a national security policy ‘there is no certainty that the defence policies enacted by Government will best serve the national interests, nor that they will combine with the other tools available to Government in the most appropriate manner.’ Of course, such high level direction does not rely on the production of a formal document. It has been suggested, however, that such an exercise would ‘be valuable for the potential it offers to clarify and strengthen key lines of policy across all government departments.’ The US National Security Strategy document, produced on a regular basis by the White House, is designed to express the administration’s ‘strategic vision’ to all arms of government and other domestic and international actors. In essence, what Australia needs to develop and articulate is what Kennedy has described as grand strategy—the policies by which nations pursue their long-term interests, during both peace and war, over long periods of time, by employing the full range of national resources.

Although it is possible to see elements of an increasingly sophisticated national security policy being developed in individual departmental white papers these are insufficient unless they become inextricably intertwined. Recent official publications produced concerning terrorism
reflect some appreciation of this need but also demonstrate limitations. For example, the *Defence Update*, despite contending that the ‘strategic environment of 2003 is being shaped by the threat of terrorism’, provides little substantive detail about how the ADF should be employed in national counter-terrorism efforts or whether this is even appropriate. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) produced *Transnational Terrorism* paper acknowledges that the ‘campaign against transnational extremist terrorism involves a contest of ideas’ but provides few details about how the nation’s resources can be organised to dominate this contest. The PM&C produced *Protecting Australia Against Terrorism* defined the national strategy for combating terrorism as a series of mainly reactive domestic measures. One whole-of-government paper articulating a total strategy for dealing with terrorism might have been more useful. The ‘war on terrorism’ is exactly the sort of new security challenge that requires a grand strategy. A critical part of developing a national security policy is the ability to transcend the whole-of-government paradigm and strengthen the ‘whole-of-nation approach’.

A number of Australian commentators have in the past raised concerns about the declining ability of the national security structure to plan and conduct mobilisation activities in the event of war or other national emergencies. Future threats may not require mobilisation of the type conducted during the First and Second World Wars but even non-traditional security threats will require a sophisticated harnessing of selected national resources. Commenting on the need to strengthen the whole-of-nation approach in terms of defence policy Babbage has noted that the Department of Defence has not given ‘sufficient attention to the potential for making greater contingent use of the vast capabilities held within the civilian community.’ The Australian Defence Association has written of the need to ‘fully involve the Australian people in the struggle against terrorism’.

The government’s counter-terrorism responses have made progress towards involving business in this aspect of national security. The fact that the corporate sector owns 80 per cent of the nation’s critical infrastructure has made government and private sector cooperation critical. What remains uncertain is whether the newly developed national security policy mechanisms will be capable of systematically developing and using the support of Australian non-government groups for dealing with other national security problems. The successful employment of national ‘soft power’, consisting of commercial, cultural, educational, sporting and many other aspects, will become increasingly critical in the future development of more sophisticated security strategies.

A further concern is the ability of the current structure to fully facilitate long-term national strategic planning. Whilst the traditional system has supported reactive decision making, it can also lead to crisis responses being comprised of a ‘long succession of short-term policy decisions made “on the run”’. Election cycles are not particularly conducive to the executive encouraging ‘anticipatory government’. This is not a problem unique to Australia and one of the major criticisms of the US National Security Council (US NSC) has been the loss of its policy planning capability and its tendency to be overcome by day-to-day crisis management, leaving no room for the creation of longer term policies. In the Australian context one possible sign that the ability to maintain a long-term perspective is lacking has been the way in which the issue of terrorism has tended to dominate the national security discourse over the last three years. Terrorism does pose a significant threat, but it is a threat that must be placed ‘in the
overall spectrum of security challenges.  

Another possible example is the abrupt change in policy towards Australian intervention in Solomon Islands. The Defence Update, released in early 2003, stated the Australian Government should not be expected to solve the problems of Solomon Islands, and anyway cannot do so. In July 2003 Australia led a multilateral assistance force, including over 1700 Australian military and police personnel, to stabilise the country. There were undoubtedly many reasons for this about turn, yet it does suggest a lack of long range policy vision.

Possible further improvements to the national policy structures

These issues suggest further adjustments to the nation’s security policy structures and processes are required. However, the Secretary of PM&C has cautioned that, ‘We need to move beyond addressing every emerging public policy issue through a redesign of the formal structures of government.’ Even given this, and despite consistent rejection of the suggestion that Australia create a US-style Department of Homeland Security, there is some validity in looking to the American national security system for guidance. This has been suggested by a number of previous Australian commentators and whilst it is not faultless the US system has the benefit of wider and longer experience. The US NSC, the central component of the American national security apparatus, was created in 1947 ‘to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security’ and to promote better interdepartmental cooperation. It consists of three parts—the statutory principals, the statutory advisers and the US NSC staff. The statutory principals include the President, Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defence, whilst the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director Central Intelligence are statutory advisers. The US NSC staff provides the secretariat support required for the routine coordination and integration of national security policy issues. The most distinctive feature of the American system is the role of the National Security Adviser, a position created in 1953, and now one of central importance within the US Government. Unburdened by departmental responsibilities the National Security Adviser’s role is to coordinate and manage the overall national security process, act as an ‘honest broker’ to mediate interdepartmental disputes, oversee the implementation of presidential policy and act as a focal point for government responses during crisis situations.

Despite superficial differences there are already significant similarities between the Australian and American security policy structures. In an overall sense both structures are built around the requirement for policy to be developed across the full range of government organisations. The NSC is almost mirrored by the statutory principals and advisers within the US NSC. The various elements within the restructured PM&C, particularly the International and National Security Divisions, complete similar roles for the Prime Minister as the US NSC staff fulfil for the American President. In both countries there has been a strong trend towards centralising control of national security decision making within the executive branch. The most obvious difference between the two national systems is Australia’s lack of an official with the equivalent responsibilities and seniority of the US National Security Adviser. Further, whilst the US NSC staff exist outside of the departmental structure, the elements within PM&C relevant to national security are only small parts of a department that has a large range of other responsibilities.

The national security policy deficiencies identified in this article could be alleviated by Australia moving closer towards the US NSC model. Whilst the Secretary of PM&C is able to partly fulfil
a similar function he has a multitude of other duties, such as being the head of the Australian Public Service, outside the arena of national security. A dedicated position, and indeed a dedicated agency, could provide better coordination of, and focus on, national security matters than a Department Secretary with other unrelated roles and two divisions within a larger government department. In short, the complexities of today’s security environment demand full-time attention—something that the NSC, SCNS and SPCG cannot currently provide.

Conclusion

The structures and processes that support and produce Australian national security policy have been under considerable pressure to perform over the last few years. The changing security environment has demanded more coordinated responses from government and this in turn has driven change. Since 1996 the NSC has been revitalised and the overall machinery and processes strengthened. Most important have been the developments within PM&C. Despite the fact that these changes have addressed important previous criticisms, there are a number of outstanding issues that suggest further refinements might be necessary. The creation of an NSC-like structure and the position of National Security Adviser, both of which would move Australia closer towards the US model, might assist in correcting these deficiencies. Whether the current system is capable of addressing them, or whether such suggestions are no more than a ‘rearrangement of the deckchairs’, remains to be seen. As one official has suggested, however, in the current environment we must constantly ask, ‘are the existing arrangements adequate in the context of the threats we face; are existing measures necessary or outmoded [and] can we reasonably do more?’

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5. This is particularly notable in the case of domestic counter-terrorist arrangements. See Michael Potts, ‘Revised National Security Arrangements’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia, 24, December 2002, p. 73.


10. Gareth Evans, Australia’s Regional Security, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1989, p. 2. For comments on how globalisation has increased the number of government departments involved in international policy issues see Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 2003, p. 77.


24. ‘The Role of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in Coordinating a Whole of Government Approach to National Security’, pp. 3–5 at <www.dpmc.gov.au/docs/metcalf170604.cfm>, accessed 4 August 2004. In addition a small Science, Engineering and Technology Unit has been established within the NSD to coordinate research and development activities in support of counter-terrorism efforts.


26. Miles Jordana, ‘Security Forum Presentation, First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’, *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia*, 25, December 2003, p. 130.


33. Beyond Baghdad, p. 52.


42. Smith, Australia’s National Security in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 18–19.


44. ‘Securing Australia in 2003’, Defender, p. 32.


47. Babbage, A Coast Too Long, p. 205.


58. Like its Australian equivalent the NSC normally has a number of sub groups, involving representatives from several different departments and various military and intelligence representatives. See Marcella, ‘National Security and the Interagency Process’, in Stuart (ed.), Organizing for National Security, p. 168.


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Australian Women and War

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony McWatters

The first time it was fathers, the last time it was sons, and in between your husbands marched away with drums and guns. And you never thought to question, you just went on with your lives, 'cause all they taught you who to be was mothers, daughters, wives—and you believed them.

Judy Small

Introduction

The opening quotation from the song, Mothers, Daughters, Wives, provides a poignant and widely held perception of the nature of Australian women’s war sacrifice and service. Using a theme of feminist awakening, the song is a moving perspective on how successive generations of Australian men went to war and women powerlessly suffered the dreadful social consequences. However, this outlook does not give credence to the diverse roles played by Australian women in war and it belies the changes in society that were instigated, or accelerated, through the wartime courage and leadership of women.

The social consequences of the nation’s participation in armed conflict have coloured many founding threads in the fabric of the young Australian society and culture. Gender relations and women’s war-roles are predominant amongst these. Society’s judgements of how gender and warfare should interrelate have also been reflected in the way that Australia has participated in modern war.

The aim of this article is to examine the role played by Australian women in 20th century warfare and the impact of this involvement on Australian society. After confirming the significance of war as a gender relations shaping instrument, women’s roles during WWI, WWII, and subsequent conflicts are examined. Gender relations, in the social and political contexts, is the prime focus.

The social effect of war—gender

War provides paradoxical effects for society’s interpretations of masculinity and femininity. It can reinforce traditional stereotypes while at once presenting opportunities for change and progression. Analysis of social implications often includes the simple but difficult question, did the experience of war reinforce existing social values or did it result in significant change? In the case of gender relations within a society, what opportunities for social progression were presented and how were they exploited? In the Australian context of detachment from the frontline of modern warfare and women’s relatively advanced societal status early in the century, answering the latter question is particularly challenging.

The Higonnett's observe that, 'the social and economic roles of many women undergo rapid and radical transformation both at the outset of war and, in a symmetrically opposed direction, at its conclusion.' The notion that war does not change but exacerbates the social and political order does not necessarily demean any short-term effects but explains, in some way,
society’s apparent desire for a ‘return to normality’ at the conclusion of conflict. The following quotation gives a pragmatic view of how war may permanently change gender relations and women’s place in society:

>a study of war is truly productive for the study of women and social change, because war crystallises contradictions between ideology and actual experience. …War exposes the relationship between women and the state, changes the material roles of women, and therefore necessarily redefines the relationship between the rhetoric of gender and the gender-specific assignment of tasks. It eventually makes possible a new consciousness of gender discourse as a social construct.  

Such confirmation of the potential of war as a gender relations change catalyst provides an instructive outlook from which to view Australia’s experience of war at ‘arm’s length’.

**World War I (1914–1918)**

Early patriotic fervour in support of the British Empire’s war effort included strong efforts on the part of Australian women to be accepted as volunteers for military or semi-military service. Notwithstanding their earlier enfranchisement, Australian women remained precluded from active military service throughout WWI in all but the previously ‘won’ nursing service roles. Women of the Australian Army Nursing Service (AANS) had fought for and won their right to deploy to a theatre of war on foreign soil during the Boer War. Their tradition of active service in support of combat soldiers in atrocious conditions on the battlefield founded a large female nursing commitment to WWI. Women have since dominated Australian military nursing.

Due to accepted perceptions of women’s ‘maternal and domestic’ instincts, nursing remained one of the only military roles for women with wide acceptance in Australian society during WWI. British women had more opportunities to serve in military support roles in organisations like the Women’s Emergency Corps. This was a source of both frustration and inspiration for Australian women as they sought ways to contribute directly. An increase in women’s willingness to voice political frustration and influence public opinion during WWI was a major change assisted by the war.

Public mass meetings and strong lobbying to gain direct war roles during the war failed to secure significant opportunities for overseas war service for women. However they did raise levels of public emotion and political discourse on gender relations. The Australian Women’s Service Corps (AWSC), the Women’s Khaki Defence Corps, the Khaki Girls, and the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) were prominent among regionally based volunteer organisations built up by women to provide the widest range of service to the war effort. The Australian Federal Government did not support proposals for military or overseas roles for women’s services but was keen to encourage patriotic home-front service and exploit women’s message to support the recruitment of male Australians for military service. This spurned the influential position that Australian women have subsequently held on both sides of the debate on the morality of sending Australians to war on foreign soil.

An emotionally charged paradox in women’s political roles during WWI is apparent. On one hand, propaganda exploited women as ‘moral guardians’, volunteer ‘comforts’, and recruiters to assist in waging war. On the other, they were prominent in questioning the war sacrifice of Australians. Women’s participation in pacifist and socialist movements grew. The defeat of
two plebiscites aimed at introducing conscription was strongly influenced by women, again in paradoxical ways. The degree of physical and moral courage of the women who spoke out against the war was extraordinary. They were labelled as disloyal and vilified by bitter returned soldiers in a divided society. Women’s important political role during WWI set the foundation for their considerable influence during subsequent conflicts. It also contributed to Australian society’s ensuing aversion to forms of conscription or national service.

A transient and divisive WWI gender issue was the participation of women in paid work. Mobilised industries recruited women for jobs that were previously in the closed domain of men. Among the longer lasting changes were the introduction of female police officers in 1915 and the increasing employment of women in secondary industry and white-collar occupations such as banking. Despite the efforts of women in the wartime workforce and the potential for increased diversity in paid work offered by the war, historians disagree on the significance of the long-term change to traditional paradigms that was effected. Significantly, women performing ‘men’s jobs’ during and after the war received less than male wages. While a return to the ‘normalcy’ of a male dominated workforce was accepted as a postwar aim, the war did contribute to an increased acceptance of women in the workforce.

The proportional scale of Australia’s contribution and human losses in WWI led to enormous social consequences for the young nation. Nearly a quarter of all Australian men between the ages of 18 and 44 were war casualties. This raw social cost aids an understanding of women’s war roles and their societal impact. Women’s accepted and predominant role in society at the time of WWI was one of wife, mother, and social supporter of the male dominated society.

In these traditional roles, women’s wartime contribution and their disproportionate postwar social burden are of great consequence yet are difficult to quantify. The terrible attrition of the nation’s young men and the physical and psychological incapacities of returning soldiers meant that Australian women were inequitably prominent in the task of rebuilding the nation. Women’s circumstances were therefore characterised by reduced opportunity and sacrifice during the ensuing 20 austere years that preceded the next world war.

World War II (1939–1945)

Many of the advances gained during WWI towards women’s continued emancipation were ‘smothered’ by the ‘conservatising’ social affects of the Great Depression. However, WWII quickly reconfirmed the earlier recognition of women’s importance in the war effort, particularly to mobilised industries.
The urgency of the national situation and clearer social focus is distilled by Patsy Adam-Smith:

During World War One there was little that women could do but ‘wait and pray’, as the saying went. But in World War Two there was an avalanche of needs for the nation. By 1941 there was a demand for labour and service. Young women were not only volunteering to go to war but many were volunteering to work in civilian jobs once believed to be fit only for men. Thousands of women, dressed in denim overalls, toiled in factories amid grease and deafening machinery all day. There was nothing genteel about it, it was all-in war, even though they had never worn denim before.

Such positive and energetic descriptions of the paid work dimension fail to highlight that despite considerable political debate, women did not receive full recognition in terms of wages, security or conditions. However, long-term gains for women’s paid work did result and more women remained in paid work after the war. Postwar acceptance of women’s expanded workplace horizons was one of the most significant social changes resulting from their wartime effort. Diverse wartime employment included heavy industry work in ordnance, machinery and munitions factories as well as clothing and textiles. Opportunities for women to serve directly in military auxiliary roles were improved rapidly by the rise of the infant Women’s Services.

Women’s military nursing contribution was again considerable during WWII and the AANS formally gained increased recognition. Other direct service opportunities available to women by the end of the war included over 200 specialist musters within VAD/AAMWS, AWAS, WRANS, RANNS, WAAF, and RAAFNS. Over 70,000 served. These Services laid the foundation for women’s increasing opportunities for service in the Australian Defence Force of today. Women’s military performance during WWII had a permanent effect on society’s acceptance of women in direct war roles:

as the war escalated so did the employment of women. World War II had at last given women in the Armed Forces the opportunity to make a real contribution to national defence. Jobs were opened, and the 600,000 women who served with the Armed Forces of the United States, Britain and Australia were at last accepted into the more technical and highly skilled work on which the organisation of the Services depended. Service women could be found employed in practically every job for which they were physically capable.

As in WWI, women’s voluntary service was widely encouraged during WWII. Opportunities were extended to service outside Australia in support of combat forces. In Australia, one of the most fondly remembered voluntary organisations of WWII was the Australian Women’s Land Army (AWLA). Developed from the British model of WWI, the AWLA holds important status through its contribution to Australia’s rural industries. Over 3,000 women served in its regional units. The diverse commitment to such service effort increased women’s sense of involvement and contributed to the overall reduction in gender prejudices in Australia that WWII brought about. Yet, the breaking down of traditional paradigms was not achieved without pain.

Women’s increased participation in long-established male roles in the civilian and military workforces caused great concern about issues of femininity and sexuality. Perceptions of serious social threats grew from notions that these women in uniform, doing ‘men’s work’,
may lose their feminine instincts or become lesbian. However, society’s concern about a dilution of femininity was dwarfed by the sex, romance, and morality challenges of the ‘GI invasion’ of Australia.48

The large American commitment to the WWII South West Pacific Theatre exposed Australian society to aspects of a new and exciting culture.49 Australian women’s attraction to and relationships with American servicemen has been widely analysed by historians. Marilyn Lake indicates the social significance of the situation in her analysis that ‘the war itself sexualised the Australian female population … different groups of women understood their lives and negotiated their experiences in terms of these developments’.50 This issue caused considerable wartime social tension. The resentment felt by Australian servicemen at the time boiled over in some very serious incidents.51 Women received mixed messages about patriotism and supporting the US war effort. They were encouraged to show hospitality to the allied soldiers and at the same time told to ‘honour’ the men of Australia who were away at the front lines.52 Much public perception placed blame for the associated social problems firmly onto women rather than men.

Women were perceived to be ‘out of control’ and young women in particular were very soon being held responsible for the spread of VD. National security regulations were introduced in an attempt to curb women’s sexual activity. And soldiers were warned about the dangers of sex with ‘Amateurs’. Amateurs were young women, not classed as ‘bad’ but sexually ignorant and actively seeking sexual adventure.53

Wartime romance and sexual relationships strongly influenced subsequent generations of Australian women on norms of sexual assertiveness and desire.54 The ‘live for today’ atmosphere of war combined with the American presence to expose Australian women to new forms of male behaviour (both positive and negative) that had lasting effects on their expectations from relationships.55 The move from ‘courting to dating’ gave women more control in pre-marital relationships and had a corresponding shaping influence on Australian men’s future sexual behaviour.56 The situation also fed the cultural ‘Americanisation’ of Australia that remains a feature of contemporary society.58 The feminist movement came to the fore in a fight against the wartime sexual exploitation of Australian women59 on the home front.

A large proportion of women’s war and postwar contribution was expended in traditional family care-giving roles in very demanding circumstances.60 While the casualty figures were not as high as in WWI, the toll in terms of grief was huge. Psychological casualties among returning prisoners of war of the Japanese caused a significantly increased social burden.61 The following quotation poignantly sums up the resulting longer term cost to Australian women in their family roles:

At the end of the Second World War, arrangements were made to repatriate prisoners of war to the welcoming arms of family and friends. The privations and cruelty experienced by male prisoners of the Japanese have been well-documented by numerous authors, yet women have also suffered in war, not only in the active arenas but also in the aftermath when the men in their lives return broken and battered. The impact of war on marital relationships, and particularly the effects on the women, has largely been disregarded and undervalued in the effort to provide care and support for the more obvious victims of war atrocities: their husbands. … The wounds inflicted on women in war are considered to be ‘... invisible, scars upon the heart’ 62
While Australian women’s WWII experience was characterised by broader social horizons, the post-WWI experience of a tendency to return to the pre-war domestic order was repeated as married women ‘returned to the home’. However, the greater magnitude of social, if not political, change brought about by WWII, shaped Australian women’s response to the remaining wars of the century.

Subsequent conflicts (1945–1999)

The second half of the 20th century, dominated by Cold War tensions, included Australian participation in war and ‘warlike’ peace operations. In Korea (1950–53), Malaya (1950–60), Borneo (1960–63), South Vietnam (1962–72), the Gulf War (1990–91), and Peace Operations across the globe, Australian men and women have served in military and civilian roles of increasing diversity. Women served in all theatres, and continue today, on active military duty. Australian female journalists, entertainers, diplomats, civilian administrators, health professionals and humanitarian aid workers have also made a large contribution. While not on the immense scale or possessing the same socialising potential as the World Wars, women’s direct and indirect roles in these latter conflicts have had significant impact on Australian society.

The post-WWII period of peace was brief for Australian Service personnel. Those serving in occupational forces in Japan were rushed into a brutal war on the Korean Peninsula in 1950. National service for males was introduced in 1951 as the Liberal–Country Party Government took steps to ensure Australia would not be found wanting if world conflict again broke out. It was in this insecure global and regional environment that the Women’s Services were once again reinstated. They continued, albeit with very gradual increases in proportional representation within their parent Services, until they were rendered irrelevant and disbanded again in the early 1980s. This disbandment was a positive step as the Australian Defence Force, latterly an equal opportunity employer, sought to fully integrate women’s service.

Up to the end of the century, female Australian Service personnel served on operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia and Timor as well as in the full range of Peace Operations Australia has supported. Continuing effort to advance women’s opportunities for Australian Defence Force service is linked to a tradition of political and social change activism that was particularly strong during the Vietnam War. Paradoxically, these forces were predominantly anti-war and anti-conscription in what marked a return for women to the political themes of the WWI period.

During the 1960s the emerging women’s movement and the anti-Vietnam War protest movement gained synergies from shared ideologies. Women were prominent in gaining the political impetus to withdraw Australian combat forces from Vietnam and abolish conscription. Their increasingly assertive social and political roles contrasted vividly with the ‘crisis of masculinity’ that the Vietnam War era brought to Australian men, particularly returning male servicemen. It is ironic that the accompanying social dislocation of Australians who served in Vietnam also affected many Service and civilian women who had given an unprecedented level of direct participation to war. The 1960s and 1970s saw the most significant advances towards sexual equality in Australia’s history from which the continuing increases in representation of women in public and private sector leadership grew. While war was not the sole change agent, it once again incited the passions and motivations of Australian women with strong convictions on war and of Australia’s appropriate role within it.
Conclusion

Australian women have served, suffered and died in modern war. This article has asserted that war provides real social shaping opportunities and does not merely perform the role of reversible social aberration. Examination of the roles played by Australian women in the wars of the 20th century has determined that the impact included permanent changes to gender relations in society and a strong influence on the way Australia conducts war. The stereotypes of submissive and powerless Australian women ‘waiting and weeping’ do not do justice to the contributions or the changes.

Paid civilian work and military service opportunities for Australian women have been improved, partially as a result of the experience of war. The direct contributions of women to two world wars and subsequent conflicts were in gradually diverging fields. Women have developed a tradition of voluntary service, both military and philanthropic, for which they had to fight on the home front during WWI. In traditional roles as wives and mothers, women have borne a disproportionate burden of the grief and effects of the psychological scarring and social dysfunction caused by war.

The Australian experience of war has effected permanent changes to the way society views issues of femininity, sexuality, and morality. The social implications of women’s mobilisation to ‘men’s work’ and the American ‘GI invasion’ were among the agents that changed norms of femininity and brought rights of sexual assertiveness to the political and social fore during WWII.

Feminism and socialism have intermittently influenced women’s involvement in Australia’s political outlook on the conduct of war. The trend has been towards political empowerment. It began with WWI activism that was focused on gaining more meaningful war roles for women but also on questioning the validity and morality of the war itself. The defeat of two WWI conscription referenda was strongly influenced by women’s political efforts and founded a legacy in Australian society of aversion to compulsory military service. While the WWII political situation was less controversial, similar political themes were adopted during later conflicts. Women’s activism in anti-war and feminist movements during the Vietnam War contributed to social change that gave women more political influence. It also expedited the withdrawal of Australian Service personnel from Vietnam and again undermined conscription.

Ironically, this vigorous and successful political tradition also paved the way for the significant gender equity advances that continue to shape the modern Australian Defence Force. Women’s opportunities for direct operational participation in combat and in strategic leadership roles continue to grow. This has irreversibly changed the roles that Australian women, and the Australian nation, will play in the wars of the 21st century.\footnote{Lieutenant Colonel Anthony McWatters, CSM is an officer of the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME) and presently commands the Army Aviation Support Group Workshop at Oakey in Queensland. He saw active service in the 1991 Gulf War with the (UK) Armoured Brigade and in 1995–96 served on loan to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force. He is a graduate of the Australian Army Command and Staff College and holds degrees as a Bachelor of Management (Human Resource Development) and Master of Defence Studies. He is currently completing a Masters degree in Business Administration.}
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3. This theme of powerlessness is supported by the observation: ‘During these years [1914–18], women were cast into the age-old abyss of powerlessness, of resignation to suffering, of waiting.’ From: C. Shute, 1995, ‘Heroines and Heroes: Sexual Mythology in Australia 1914–18’, in J. Damousi, and M. Lake, 1995, Gender and War: Australians at war in the twentieth century, p. 31.

4. The following quotation is typical of Australian historians’ perception of the social shaping role of war: ‘Participation in war, whether actively in the armed forces or on the home front, or in opposition to a particular war, has shaped the lives of successive generations of Australians in the twentieth century.’ In: P. Dennis, et al. (Eds), 1996, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. xi.

5. While many historians argue that Australia’s social character and national psyche has been shaped by the national experience of war, some assert that its effect has been transient.

6. Because of the relatively small scale of Australian participation in earlier conflicts, the article is confined to Australia’s experience of warfare in the 20th century.

7. ‘War, it is clear, is a gendering activity. War restructures gender relations in ways that must be taken account of after the war.’ M. Lake, 1997, ‘Female desires: The meaning of World War II’, p. 124.


10. The Australian nation has been physically isolated from much of the trauma and destruction of modern war. While threatened and attacked during WWII, the 20th century did not see major action fought on the Australian mainland; invasion perpetrated; or civil war threatened.


13. Australian women were already citizens with full voting rights prior to the outbreak of WWI. From: J. Damousi, and M. Lake, 1995, Gender and War: Australians at war in the twentieth century, p. 6.


15. Despite wide admiration for Florence Nightingale’s pioneering battlefield-nursing achievements during the Crimean War in the 1850s, few women served in the military medical services of any nation until the Boer War (1899–1902). P. Adam-Smith, 1996, Australian Women at War.

16. While the government/military authorities considered military nursing an ‘acceptable’ role for women during WWI, female doctors were not permitted to serve in the Australian Army Medical Corps even when there was a shortage of doctors later in the war. J. Bassett, 1983, ‘Ready to Serve: Australian Women in the Great War’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 2, April, pp. 8–9.
Bassett, 1983, ‘Ready to Serve: Australian Women in the Great War’. This was more likely due to the urgency of critical shortages of ‘workers’ and the proximity of war to Britain than to progression towards gender equality in society.

While this is true in relation to war issues, the following quotation gives a wider reverse perspective: ‘The entry of women into public life that was promised by women’s suffrage and the growth in women’s employment before 1914 seems to have been set back by the war.’ F. Smith, 1995, ‘If Australia had not participated in the Great War? An Essay on the Costs of War’, p. 185.

Examples were three mass meetings in Melbourne Town Hall in 1915-16 aimed at furthering the cause of women’s ability to serve the war effort in military or semi-military service at home or overseas. J. Bassett, 1983, ‘Ready to Serve: Australian Women in the Great War’, p. 11.

‘Women were at the forefront in the fight for peace and took a leading role in the campaign against conscription.’ J. Damousi, 1992, ‘Marching to a Different Drum: Women’s mobilisation 1914–1939’, p. 135.


Conscription proposals to recruit Australian men ‘needed’ to serve with the AIF in Europe (after horrific losses and inability to keep volunteer numbers at acceptable levels) were defeated in two referenda conducted in October 1916 and December 1917. From: M. McKernan, 1998, ‘Our Finest Hour: Land of the Brave and Branded’, p. 50.

Women’s voting numbers were a higher percentage of the population than those for men. Opposition to the war was led by active socialist feminists such as Vida Goldstein and Adela Pankhurst. The latter used an anti-feminist approach to gain support of traditionally oriented women and ‘urged women to oppose the war because its slaughter ran contrary to women’s allegedly uniquely life-giving mission.’ From: P. Maclean, 1995, ‘War and Australian Society’, p. 69.

An expansion in employment of women occurred from 24% of the workforce in 1914 to 37% in 1918. From: P. Maclean, 1995, ‘War and Australian Society’, p. 75.


During the war period approximately 60,000 Australians were killed, 170,000 were wounded, and 4,000 were taken prisoner. The vast majority of these casualties were men however these figures are not gender specific. From: Returned and Services League of Australia, 1999, Information: Australians in War.

Horrific casualty losses came from a total force of around 330,000 that served overseas from a population of less than 5,000,000. M. McKernan, 1998, ‘Our Finest Hour: Land of the Brave and Branded’.


J. Manuel, 1996, ‘We are the women who mourn our dead: Australian civilian women’s poetic responses to the First World War’.

P. Adam-Smith, 1996, Australian Women at War, pp. 2–3.

34. Women in jobs classified as men’s received 90% of the male wage. Other work, which may have been classified as essential and which women therefore couldn’t leave, such as textiles and clothing, continued to be classified as women’s work and therefore was paid at 65% of male wage. From: K. Holmes, 1998, ‘Hidden Lives: Stories of Everyday Australia: Women in World War II’, from a talk delivered to the History Teachers Association of Victoria, 20 November, <www.his.latrobe.edu.au>.


36. While statistics show that many women, particularly married women, again left the workforce after the war, the important issue is that much of the prejudice and closed occupations had been removed as a result of the war. ‘When the war ended, few middle class married women wished to remain in the workforce because there was little incentive for them to do so.’ S. Buttsworth, 1996, ‘Women Colouring the Wartime Landscape’, p. 90.

37. Initial inertia from the social conservatism in the Curtin/Ford Labor Government was overcome by the urgency of the ‘Japanese crisis’. M. McKernan, 1995, *All In! Fighting the War at Home*, p. 217.


40. VAD/AAMWS Voluntary Aid Detachments/Australian Army Medical Women’s Service; AWAS Australian Women’s Army Service; WRANS Women’s Royal Australian Navy Service; RANNS Royal Australian Navy Nursing Service; WAAAF Women’s Auxiliary Australian Air Force; RAAFNS Royal Australian Air Force Nursing Service. These were the principal Australian Women’s Auxiliary Services at close of WWII. It is not a definitive list or indicative of how they developed from earlier organisations. P. Adam-Smith, 1996, *Australian Women at War*, Appendix I, pp. 279–281.


42. They became the foundation experience although they were disestablished after the war. From: J. Grey, 1990, *A Military History of Australia*, p. 201.


44. For example: Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) and International Red Cross. J. Scott, 1995, *Girls with Grit: memories of the Australian Women’s Land Army*.

45. The AWLA held status as a Women’s Service.


52. ‘romance was another area where women’s patriotism was targeted. First they were to be patriotic by dating Americans, then they were to be patriotic by not dating Americans, and only going with Australians.’ K. Holmes, 1998, ‘Hidden Lives: Stories of Everyday Australia: Women in World War II’.


54. ‘Femininity was beginning to cast off its passivity as the logic of incitement to pleasure took its course… That thousands of Australian women did try foreign pleasures in the 1940s in the form of sexual relationships with American servicemen was well recognised.’ M. Lake, 1997, ‘Female desires: The meaning of World War II’, p. 66.

55. ‘people lived for the day, seizing pleasure when and where they might find it.’ M. Lake, 1997, p. 67.


58. Kate Darian-Smith argues that Australian concern about cultural infiltration began well before the war: ‘economic and political ties between the two nations had existed before 1941, and American films had dominated Australian popular culture since the 1920s.’ K. Darian-Smith, 1990, *On the Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime 1939–1945*, p. 235.

59. Exploitation perpetrated not solely by US Servicemen.

60. ‘But many women found the demands of raising children, managing on rations, and being the sole parent in the absence of their husbands, very difficult.’ K. Holmes, 1998, ‘Hidden Lives: Stories of Everyday Australia: Women in World War II’.

61. Casualties from WWII were less than WWI with approximately 28,000 killed and 57,000 wounded. However, a 550% increase in the number of prisoners occurred. Approximately 22,000 Australians were taken prisoner during WWII including many Service and civilian women. From: Returned and Services League of Australia, 1999, *Information: Australians in War*.


63. Approximately 76,000 Australians served in these four wars and 900 lost their lives. From: Returned and Services League of Australia, 1999, *Information: Australians in War*.


66. ‘The women’s Services had been abolished in the aftermath of the Second World War, and despite the manpower shortages there was resistance in the Service hierarchies to their re-establishment. From: J. Grey, 1990, *A Military History of Australia*, p. 201.

68. Women in the ADF may serve in combat-related roles but remain precluded from combat duties. J. Spalding, 1998.


70. ‘The experience of the Vietnam War unsettled taken-for-granted understandings of warriors as exemplary men. Such were the doubts about the legitimacy of the war that Vietnam veterans were the first in Australia’s history to be publicly “emasculated”, returning home without a heroes’ welcome.’ From: J. Damousi, and M. Lake, 1995, Gender and War: Australians at war in the twentieth century, p. 13.

71. ‘...the anti-war protests and emerging women’s movement, which would have far reaching ramifications for Australian society in terms of the politicising of women...’ From: S. McHugh, 1993, Minefields and Miniskirts: Australian Women and the Vietnam War, Chap 5.

72. ‘As we enter the new millennium, no one doubts that women will continue to play a key role in the defence of our nation.’ From: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Press Release 42/99, ‘Servicewomen’s Memorial Dedicated’ 27 March 1999.
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Wiltshire, R., 1998 The Impact of First World War Casualties on Australian Society During and After the War, Australian Army Command and Staff College Monash Paper, Queenscliff.
Professional Research Notes

To enhance the Journal’s intention to inform and promote discussion on important issues of national and international defence and security matters, we devote this section to publicising current research on defence and related topics being undertaken around Australia. Each individual research note has four parts, as follows:

1. ADFJ Index Number comprising the relevant ADFJ Issue Number and the number assigned to each research note;
2. The title or brief description of the research;
3. Brief research notes; and
4. Contact details.

By the inclusion of researchers’ contact details, we hope to provide a forum for dialogue and debate. We encourage all those who wish to publicise their research to forward details to the Editor at <publications@defence.adc.edu.au>.

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The Future of Targeting in the Royal Australian Air Force

Before the 2003 war in Iraq, the last ordnance delivered from an Air Force aircraft in an operational capacity was in 1971 during the Vietnam conflict. This represents a time-line gap of a little over 30 years. History has shown us that target systems analysis is becoming lost as an operational art. The most difficult obstacle is filling target analysis positions with personnel who have the relevant training and experience.

Many contemporary elements of the RAAF do not have a fundamental appreciation of practical targeting applications. New concepts, such as Effects Based Operations, may compel a commander to ask what the RAAF can achieve through targeting in order to meet overall military objectives. Emerging trends in modern warfare, combined with new RAAF operational structures, platform and weapon procurements, will require new levels and degrees of support. New targeting doctrines and methods will have much to offer. One example is the recent air offensive launched by the United States against Iraq on 20 March 2003. Although the original operational concept was restrained, in 72 hours critical nodes were targeted and attacked on the basis of an operational end-state, that is, the dislocation of command and leadership elements.

Corporal Mathew Butler is a Chief of Air Force Fellow at the Air Power Development Centre, Tuggeranong, ACT. The purpose of his research is to compare ADF targeting doctrine with that used by our primary coalition partners and highlight the differences in methodology used, especially with regard to air power. Given these differences a number of outcomes can be explored:

1. The development of RAAF target systems analysis as a future capability;
2. The implementation of ‘Targeteers’ as a future category of personnel; and
3. The targeting niche the RAAF can contribute to in any future, high-tempo operations.

Corporal Mathew Butler can be contacted via e-mail: <mathew.butler@defence.gov.au> or telephone: (02) 6266 1150.
Expeditionary Health Capability for the Royal Australian Air Force

The Fundamentals of Aerospace Power states that ‘Since aerospace power is expected to be a highly responsive element of the force, able to deploy at short notice and over long distances, the combat support of that force must also be highly responsive’.1 Wherever elements of air power have deployed, from World War II through to the Malayan Emergency,2 Vietnam,3 and more recently East Timor and the Middle East, a health capability has also deployed with that air power element. Not only have health elements deployed in support of deployed air power, but they have also combined with air power in the conduct of aeromedical evacuations.

Until the formation of the Health Service Wing, Air Force health capability teams were formed for each deployment from across the spectrum of health personnel. The Health Service Wing structure, based on JP2060 Enhanced Health Capability (EHC) determinations, seeks to place ‘the majority of Peacetime and Wartime establishments positions in the one location’ to ‘significantly enhance training and cohesion of deployable (health and CSG) elements’.4

Research for this paper will be undertaken by analysing the Concept of Operations for Combat Support Group and the Health Support Wing, the effect of JP2060 EHC on Air Force Expeditionary Health Capability, Post Operational Reports covering Homeland Support, and Coalition and Joint Operations; comparing intervention and mature operations, and USAF and RAF Concepts of Operations for Expeditionary Air Power and their relationship to the Australian construct for Expeditionary Air Power and Expeditionary Health Support.

Wing Commander Margaret Hine has been awarded a Chief of Air Force Fellowship to undertake this research. Wing Commander Hine can be contacted via e-mail: <margaret.hine@defence.gov.au> or telephone: (02) 6266 1129.

Strategic Air Power Doctrine: Development Framework

As part of the Air Power Development Centre’s CAF Fellowship program Flight Lieutenant Martin James is undertaking a research program investigating effective doctrine development frameworks.

Since August 1990 the RAAF has developed a series of publications describing air power and aerospace doctrine. Yet there is no definitive statement as to why each iteration of doctrine is produced or updated, nor how doctrine should be developed. The objective of the program of research is to investigate frameworks within which the development of strategic air power doctrine should be initiated and undertaken. The resulting framework will detail the fundamental principles which can be applied to the development of strategic air power doctrine and enable authors to better address key aspects of their work. The research project will concentrate on the initiators of doctrine development, establishing objectives of each iteration and the application of professional mastery in developing content. The research and subsequent framework will be comprehensive and will include such aspects as the nature of
Two key aspects of the research are:

a. **Benchmark against alternative doctrine development processes.** Research how foreign military, commercial and non-military government organisations research, develop and document their equivalent strategic doctrine. The aim of this research is to ensure we identify the optimum approaches to doctrine development and integrate these strengths into our processes.

b. **Benchmark against previous strategic doctrine development processes.** Study historic and contemporary examples of how doctrine has been developed and applied within the RAAF. This research is to identify strengths and weaknesses of previous development, identify the resulting outcomes and draw effective lessons.

The fellowship aims to describe a framework that is not a set of rules or a rigid structure, which would limit or unduly confine the development process. The framework will encourage creativity and flexibility while providing the rigour necessary to ensure that the enduring fundamentals of sound doctrine are still applied.

Flight Lieutenant Martin James can be contacted at the Air Power Development Centre via e-mail: <martin.james@defence.gov.au> or telephone: (02) 6266 1459.

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**A Measure of Contribution — Australians in Bomber Command**

Writing in the chapter on Bomber Command in *The Australian Centenary History of Defence* series, *The Royal Australian Air Force*, Alan Stephens concludes that the Australian contribution in Bomber Command was ‘the major contribution of any Australians to the defeat of Germany and, therefore, to the Allies’ ultimate victory’. However, he describes the contribution made by Australians as ‘fragmented’, because ‘it is almost impossible to identify a distinctive Australian effort’. He laments that ‘it is an institutional tragedy for the RAAF that the story of its Bomber Command crews cannot be more fully reconstructed’.

Wing Commander Mary Anne Whiting is enrolled as a PhD student at ADFA and has been awarded a Chief of Air Force Fellowship to research the contribution made by Australian aircrew to Bomber Command. During her Fellowship year, Wing Commander Whiting will be exploring the contribution of Australian Squadrons to the air operations. She will be examining a range of operational records from Nos 460, 462, 463, 464, 466, and 467 Australian Squadrons and comparing and contrasting the results achieved by these Squadrons against the results achieved by Bomber Command. A number of measures will be analysed to determine results, including:

- measures relating to target categories;
- group operational performance measures;
- bombing effort measures including sortie rates and bomb tonnage; and
- aircrew performance measures.

One of the problems associated with reconstructing the story of the Australian aircrew in Bomber Command is that they did not always serve with their national squadrons. Many Australians served with Royal Air Force squadrons that sometimes failed to forward personnel or operational records to Australian authorities. As part of the examination of operational records, Wing Commander Whiting will also be developing a database to record Australian squadron and aircrew activity. It is hoped that this database will be further developed to eventually include the activity of all Australians who contributed to the achievements of Bomber Command.

Wing Commander Mary Anne Whiting can be contacted via e-mail: <maryanne.whiting@defence.gov.au> or telephone: (02) 6266 1164.

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Psychometric Evaluation of the ADF Performance Appraisal Report (PAR)

The Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research (DSPPR) through Director-General Workforce Planning, Recruitment and Retention (DGWPRR) is responsible for performance appraisal research and evaluation. A review of the psychometric properties of the ADF PAR was undertaken between November 2003 and December 2004.

The purpose of the review was to compare the psychometric performance of the six PAR’s and to make recommendations regarding the ‘health’ of the performance appraisal system from an ADF-wide perspective. Statistical analysis was undertaken to determine the variability present in the data from the 2003 reporting period and to investigate any differences present in the data due to rank, gender, assessor rank and Service and job type (e.g. primary qualification, specialisation, Corps, mustering etc).

Based on the findings of the psychometric review of the ADF PAR the following recommendations were made:

- A tri-Service performance appraisal training program should be developed for all assessors;
- The weighting algorithms and the procedures used for handling missing or unobserved data should be reaffirmed with PMKeyS; and
- A psychometric review of the efficacy of the PAR should be undertaken every two years post-implementation of any changes made to the PAR instrument.

In 2005, DSPPR is conducting a redevelopment of PAR scales so that they are easier to understand and use, and to introduce an additional scale point to represent performance that is adequate but with minor shortcomings. Further information or a copy of the reports from this evaluation may be found at: <http://aurora.cbr.defence.gov.au/DSPPR/default.shtml>.

The principal researcher may be contacted via e-mail: <nicole.barton@ozemail.com.au>.
RAN Mentoring and Coaching Program Pilot Evaluations

In recent years, employers have become increasingly interested in the value of mentoring and coaching programs in addressing retention, particularly in critical trades. In 2003, the Navy Supply Advisory Council instigated a pilot staff development program focused on provision of both coaching and mentoring to a group of approximately 30 Supply Officer volunteers between August 2003 and July 2004. The Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research (DSPPR) was engaged to assist with the evaluation of this program and is currently assisting with the evaluation of a similar program within the Seaman Officers profession, due for completion in February 2006.

The model utilised in both programs consists of a Program Coach and a pool of Mentors from around Australia who have relevant Navy experience. The function of the Program Coach is provision of regular personal interface with each of the program participants to discuss issues that are of concern to the participant and monitor their progress toward achieving specific goals. The Program Mentors are available to participants for more specific profession related advice as required. Results from the initial pilot were positive, indicating that, in the short term at least, the program has produced numerous benefits to the participants, as well as the Supply Officer profession, including increased understanding of career options, feelings of belonging to the profession and improved retention.

The results from the pilot Supply Officers’ Development Program Evaluation, as well as the current Seaman Officers’ Mentoring Program evaluation, will provide valuable insight into the initial benefits of such a program and the effectiveness of the chosen model within the Defence environment.


The DSPPR Project Officer, Emily Jacka, can be contacted via e-mail: <emily.jacka@defence.gov.au>.

Terrain effects set to alter turbulence considerations

Models used to determine aeroplane maintenance schedules may have to be rewritten to reflect results—a University of New South Wales Honours student found.

Having studied atmospheric turbulence for the past year, UNSW@ADFA Honours student and joint 2004 University Medallist Marija Jovanovich has concluded that current turbulence predictors ignored the effects of terrain.

‘Currently the scheduling of aeroplane maintenance and lifetimes of airframes is determined by using models that predict turbulence intensity based on mean horizontal wind speed.
For a better understanding of wear and tear caused by turbulence, effects of terrain must be included,’ she said. ‘Airflow over undulating terrain could significantly increase the turbulence experienced by aircraft and this could be particularly important at locations like Canberra Airport as it is situated on the lee-side of a ridge approximately 300m high.’

Ms Jovanovich said popular aerospace tools could misrepresent turbulence intensity in situations when the effects of terrain are significant. Research results were developed after data was collected at two sites either side of the Ainslie–Majura ridgeline, in the Majura Valley and at Exhibition Park in Canberra.

Ms Jovanovich was among the 511 students graduating from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy on December 8, 2004.

UNSW@ADFA Honours student Marija Jovanovich is available for interview by telephoning 02 6268 8760.

NOTES


6. ibid., p. 99.

7. ibid., p. 99.

8. Although the performance appraisal system is tri-Service in nature, in practice there exists six individual PAR forms which contain Service and rank specific information. There are three reports against which all Other Ranks are appraised and three reports against which officers are appraised.
Book Reviews

SWIFT, SILENT, AND DEADLY: Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance in the Pacific, 1942–1945

Bruce F. Meyers
Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland, 2004

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander J. P. Robinson RANR

This very readable and absorbing book provides the reader with a fascinating and detailed insight into the world of amphibious reconnaissance, which was developed during WWII. The reader is gradually introduced to a number of key players, such as Major General Holland M. ‘Howlin Mad’ Smith who in December 1941, as Commanding General (CG) of Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, ordered the formation of the Observer Group. The Observer Group was made up of a small composite group of Army and Marine Corps officers, whose specific mission was amphibious reconnaissance. The Observer Group conducted much of the early experimentation in methodology and equipment for launching reconnaissance from the sea. Whilst much of the amphibious training was conducted on the Potomac and Chesapeake Rivers, submarine training was undertaken at the submarine school in New London, Connecticut. With the departure of the Army component to North Africa in January 1943, the Observer Group was disbanded. The Marine component relocated to Camp Elliot, near San Diego and formed the nucleus of the first amphibious reconnaissance company, under the command of Captain James Logan Jones Sr. USMC.

This initial amphibious reconnaissance company comprised a headquarters platoon and four reconnaissance platoons, each commanded by a lieutenant and made up of two six-man squads. Extensive training in scouting and patrolling techniques was conducted whilst at Camp Elliot/Camp Pendleton during the period January–September 1943. Training included operating from converted WWI destroyer transports (APDs) and submarines as well as learning to become proficient with their rubber boats in the heavy Pacific surf. In addition a training film, The Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrol (still in use today), was made whilst their skills were passed to Army, who formed two amphibious reconnaissance units. In August 1943 a further title change took place, with the company adopting the new title of Amphibious Reconnaissance Company, V (Fifth) Amphibious Corps (VAC), Pacific Fleet. In September the company deployed to Camp Catlin in Oahu, where on 16 September Captain Jones, USMC as the only marine, boarded the large mine-laying submarine Nautilus (SS-168) for a month long patrol. During this period he assisted with periscope recons of Tarawa, Kuma, Butaritari, Makin and Apmama Atolls, in preparation for future amphibious operations. In April 1944, following expansion and further changes the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company VAC finally grew into the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMF, retaining this title until its disbandment at the end of the war on 24 September 1945.
Following an introduction to a number of other Service and Foreign Reconnaissance Agencies and Units, various modes of transport, equipment and training, the reader is taken on an action packed journey through the Pacific as conducted by the amphibious reconnaissance elements. The journey up through the Pacific follows the rolling back of the Japanese occupation from Guadalcanal in August 1942 and the remainder of the Solomons, up through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, the Marianas, Peleliu, the Palau, Iwo Jima and the final amphibious landings of WWII at Okinawa in June 1945. The journey depicts the hazardous nature of conducting amphibious reconnaissance operations in close proximity to the enemy and how lessons learned were quickly adopted for subsequent operations. The book concludes with reference to post-WW II operations, in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Haiti, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, Kosovo and is brought right up to date with reference to the current operations in Iraq.

This well written and highly descriptive book provides the reader with an invaluable insight into the conduct of amphibious reconnaissance and the many challenges that were faced and overcome. Adaptation, innovation and sheer determination were all hallmarks of this particular breed of specialist, who gathered together the necessary intelligence that enabled subsequent amphibious operations to be conducted. The lessons learned during WW II and since, continue to underpin the skill sets required to successfully undertake this enduring type of operation.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF:
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his Lieutenants, and their War

Eric Larrabee
Naval Institute Press, USA, 2004

Reviewed by Major Michael Tyquin

At almost seven hundred pages, this pseudo biography of one of the most influential and perhaps misconstrued American presidents, Commander in Chief is essentially an analysis of the politics of making war. It focuses on Roosevelt’s strengths and weakness as a wartime leader and the author’s thesis is that Franklin Roosevelt interfered more often, and to better effect in military affairs than did either Stalin or Churchill. The book also looks at nine United States commanders—not only Marshall, King and Nimitz but lesser known figures like Generals Henry Arnold and Archer Vandegrift. There is a very adequate biography on each, how they came to find themselves in Roosevelt’s inner circle and how each coped with the president’s foibles and disarmingly simple approach to war.

Roosevelt sought and respected his generals’ advice but he could never permit them to shape strategies contrary to his own, which were framed in a political world vision on a grand scale. Larrabee provides some wonderful insights into Roosevelt’s idiosyncratic way of working, taking decisions and influencing others with a deft, almost conspiratorial hand. The president was a man who always insisted on getting his own way and to a large extent he did. For the most part he also chose his lieutenants well, but the author does not spare the reader from the less attractive side of some of the other key players in America’s contribution to the Second World War—the irascible Admiral Ernie King is well depicted.
Despite his notorious partiality for the Navy (having spent more than seven years as Secretary of that Department), Roosevelt was a clever enough strategist to see where and how the Army and, increasingly, the Air Force could contribute to his political aims. One of the most interesting parts of this book is the way chance and Roosevelt’s own astute reading of the American public eased isolationist USA into a massive war effort. Larrabee also analyses pre-war Japan to show its government and military deeply divided as to events on the world stage. Roosevelt himself however was never in any doubt that despite their protestations, the Japanese hated the USA.

Despite the almost complete absence of any personal archives left by Roosevelt, Larrabee paints a wonderful picture of the tensions and uncertainties within the White House and the response of each of Roosevelt’s chief military leaders to the vagaries of their commander. This is a frank assessment of Roosevelt’s time in the White House. Perhaps inevitably there is no escaping the shadow of one of Roosevelt’s main achievements, the Lend Lease program, although the author pays sufficient regard to his subject’s errors with regard to France and China.

While there is an extensive bibliography, as one would expect of a book of this length, there is almost no reference material dated after 1980 and therefore no recent scholarly work on this period of American politics. The book also concludes with a comparison between Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln, an exercise that this reviewer found out of place and perhaps irrelevant given the distance in time and technology between the two presidents. However this is certainly an interesting study of leadership and a fine addition to works on American foreign and defence policy in the early 1940s.

REDCOATS TO CAMS:
A History of Australian Infantry 1788–2001

Ian Kuring
Army History Unit Department of Defence, Australia, 2004

Reviewed by Wing Commander John Steinbach (Retired)

This book belongs to the Australian Army History Collection and follows some eight other works covering various facets of Australia’s forces, in the main, however, those of the Army. (The Redcoats mentioned here constituted the 212-strong detachment of marines of the British naval infantry accompanying the First Fleet, and responsible for the defence and security of the convict settlements.)

Starting with a useful and unpretentious introduction to what in fact the business of infantry is, the chapters, in chronological order, describe what the infantry was doing at various times and places. The colonial period records the doings of the Rum Corps and the many British Infantry Regiments (assisted by Marine, Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer detachments) rotated through Garrison Australia until 1870 when the 18th (Royal) Irish Regiment set sail for the Old Dart for the last time. It is not all that well known that British Infantry regiments helped
the Victorian police in storming the Eureka stockade. Thereafter, each colony became notionally responsible for its own defence the extent of which came to reflect the states’ prosperity, a theme that will recur and recur.

With Federation came a conscious effort to build up a force although the Defence Act specifically prohibited the raising of any permanent infantry units, but a School of Musketry was founded, the forerunner of the infantry training schools. The chapters on World War I, of the period between this war and the next—the most prominent development then being the running down of the defence forces—and World War II cover already familiar territory. More than half of the book is devoted to the post-World War II era: Korea, Malaya Confrontation, Vietnam (55 pages vs. 49 pages for WW I) and peacekeeping. The book concludes with a look into the future, one mostly based around new technologies and how these will impact on the way the infantry will fight this century.

While Redcoats to Cams is a highly detailed history of infantry in Australia: its roles, organisation, weapons, deployments, battles, awards, training, uniforms, boots, equipment, doctrine and the like, I would have liked some personal insights to explain why given the physical hardships, the brutal training regimes and the higher than average risks of becoming a casualty, the Infantry Corps remains the corps of choice for so many.

Appendices list theatre and battle honours of the Royal Australian Infantry Corps, Infantry Victoria Cross winners (83 of the 96 VCs awarded to Australians were won by infantrymen), infantry organisation, the history of the organisation of infantry battalions, types of infantry units (including SAS and commando) and badges of the Corps. The extensive bibliography includes practically every book written on the Australian Army.

The author of the book is a retired infantry soldier, and his style gives the prose a distinctly ‘Army’ feel, straightforward but with a fair amount of repetition and summarising, and very readable. It is a book not only for the many who have served in the ranks of the infantry but also those who see the infantry as little more than cannon fodder who will read in this book that there is much more. In his forward to the book, one of this nation’s best-known infantry officers, CDF General Peter Cosgrove, writes that the book will inform all and inspire many. I would agree with him.

THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN: As told by the Commanders

Bob Grandin
Allen & Unwin. Australia, 2004
ISBN 1741141990

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Derek Roylance AM (Retired)

The story of the Battle of Long Tan is well known to those with even just a rudimentary knowledge of the war in Vietnam.

We know that soon after its establishment in 1966, the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat, in the then Phuoc Tuy Province, was mortared, and that D Company, 6th Battalion, the
Royal Australian Regiment was sent out to hunt down the mortar party, estimated to be at Platoon strength. On 18 August 1966 D Company, which, with its Forward Observer Party, totaled 108 men, ran into a vastly superior enemy force and was pinned down in the Long Tan rubber plantation lashed by a heavy monsoonal downpour and by enemy fire. In addition to accurate small arms fire from D Company, it is known that this superior enemy force was checked by artillery fire from Nui Dat controlled by the FOO with the Company, Kiwi Captain Morrie Stanley. Seventeen members of D Company were killed, as was one of the crew of the Armoured Personnel Carriers which carried the relief force in.

So, one might ask, where is there a market for another book telling this well-known story?

The value of this book is that much of it is told in the first person by the commanders on the day (ranks given are those held at that time). They were: Major Harry Smith, OC D Company, 6RAR; 2nd Lieutenant Geoff Kendall, 10 Platoon Commander; Sergeant Bob Buick, Platoon Sergeant 11 Platoon (who took command when his Platoon Commander was killed); 2nd Lieutenant David Saben, 12 Platoon Commander; Captain Morrie Stanley, Forward Observation Officer, 161 Battery RNZA; Lieutenant Adrian Roberts, 3 Troop Commander, 1 APC Squadron, and Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin, Helicopter Pilot, 9 Squadron RAAF.

They each give a potted autobiography, which goes a long way to telling the reader what formed these men; they talk of their training leading up to their deployment to South Vietnam which stood them in good stead when they were able to present a disciplined and steadfast face to their enemy.

They write about their emotions; how they conducted the battle at their level, and what guided their own actions and the orders they gave to their men. In this area this book should be required reading by aspiring Platoon and Company Commanders. I am sure the Long Tan commanders could have provided even more detail but they were probably constrained by the length required by the publishers. Another couple of hundred pages would have made this book of even greater value.

One of the most interesting sections is towards the end of the book where Harry Smith deals with what he sees as the shabby way his men were dealt with in the allocation of awards. Australia was then operating under the Imperial system of honours and awards and these, it seems, were ‘rationed’.

It appears to this reviewer that Harry Smith, who was awarded a Military Cross (MC) for his leadership under fire at Long Tan, deserved something more, as did his two surviving Platoon Commanders.

The book also deals with honours and awards offered by the government of the Republic of Vietnam, and this in itself makes interesting reading.

This is not ‘just another Long Tan book’. It is a ‘blood and guts’ version by those who controlled the destinies of 108 men under horrendous conditions.
DRESDEN – 13 February 1945

Frederick Taylor
HarperCollins, New York 2005

Reviewed by Dr Andrew Gaczol

This year’s 60th anniversary of the bombing of Dresden has re-awakened a controversy that time has not diminished.

Frederick Taylor’s book, DRESDEN – 13 February 1945, is the first major work on the subject in 20 years. It re-examines the raid, by drawing on new information only available since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and puts Dresden’s destruction in its historical context. Taylor observes:

- That Dresden had been destroyed previously on a number of occasions during wars in earlier centuries—its fate in February 1945 was not unique;
- It was the Luftwaffe who had pioneered the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets as witnessed by Guernica, Coventry and Warsaw; and
- In mid February 1945 it was not clear that Germany’s armed forces were all but defeated—the ferocity of Wehrmacht’s December 1944–January 1945 Ardennes counter offensive had shocked the Western allies.

Taylor also reminds the reader that it was Germany’s Nazi regime that started the war, and conducted the extermination campaign against Europe’s Jews. Dresden Nazis burnt the city’s synagogue in November 1938.

Through his research, Taylor exposes many of the myths initiated or perpetuated by the Nazi regime, East Germany and the Communist bloc—all of whom exploited Dresden’s destruction for their own propaganda purposes. Taylor concludes:

- Dresden was not an ‘open city’—in fact, it was intended to be a cornerstone of a defensive line to oppose the Red Army’s advance. Dresden was undefended, but only because its anti-aircraft guns had been shifted to higher value targets such as synthetic oil plants. Moreover, the Allies had no inkling of this, or that no German night fighters would oppose them that night;
- Although not a high profile target such as tank production in Chemnitz, Dresden did have small scale war industries such as ammunition factories, and its railway yards were a transport hub for Germany’s Wehrmacht;
- Taylor calculates the death toll at between 25,000 and 40,000. Still a high number, but far fewer than the 135,000 figure which was considered credible in the 1970s—even in the West.
- Moreover, much of the responsibility for the high death toll can be sheeted home to the Nazi Gaulieter of Saxony who did not build adequate air raid shelters for the population, or provide sufficient training on how to deal with incendiary bombs and the fires they create; and
It is unlikely that the US P-51 Mustang fighters deliberately strafed the civilian population after the USAAF's February 14 raid. Stray bullets from a dogfight between US and German fighters are likely to be the source of the story.

Nonetheless, Taylor recognises that Dresden has become symbolic of the moral question that hangs over the Allied bombing campaign in the final months of the war.

Although the railway yards had military significance and were targeted by the USAAF on February 14, they were not targeted by the RAF on the night of 13/14 February; rather the city centre full of historic residential buildings was the aiming point. It was here that the firestorm took hold. It was also known that Dresden was full of refugees fleeing the Russian armies. Many of the bomber crews felt a sense of unease. One US B-17 radio operator confessed shame at what he felt was the USAAF lowering themselves to the same level as the Luftwaffe.

While Dresden was arguably a legitimate target, other German cities such as Würzburg were highly questionable. In early March 1945, eleven hundred tons of bombs fell on a city full of beautiful medieval buildings and unique libraries but essentially devoid of industry. Four thousand people died.

Ultimately Taylor does not seek to accuse or indict any one person, Service or nationality for the Dresden raid. Instead he provides greater clarity and information on an event which continues to generate a sense of unease in the Western world. Dresden was ‘the raid that went horribly right’—its outcome had been intended and planned for. Taylor concludes that Dresden’s destruction stands as a warning to all of us that civilised societies and individual human beings can, in times of war, become de-sensitised to the suffering of other people and routinely commit acts unimaginable and unacceptable in peace.
News and Events

The Naval Historical Society of Australia
—Journal of Australian Naval History

The Naval Historical Society was formed in 1970, is resident at Garden Island Dockyard and is dedicated to the preservation of Australian naval history. The society launched the Journal of Australian Naval History (JANH), with the first edition published in September 2004.

The Society has provided the following information about its journal.

The Journal of Australian Naval History (JANH) is published by the Naval History Society of Australia twice yearly. It will provide a new standard for Australian naval research. It will also act as a research centre, clearing house and place for collaborative research, including international collaborative research. The Society will also act to preserve diaries, naval ephemera and private records as they are uncovered.

The JANH is ensuring high quality by refereeing articles. This is an ambitious undertaking. It is intended to develop the Journal along the lines of the renowned Warship International; very high quality naval and maritime historical articles in a format lacking academic dryness, but of similar standard.

The President of the Naval Historical Society, Mr Bob Nichols, and the JANH Secretary, Captain Ian Pfennigwerth, RAN (ret’d), have marshalled many of the naval historians in Australia behind JANH. It is a worthy effort, and deserves to succeed, for too much of Australia’s naval and maritime history is under-researched.

Subscription costs are $40.00 per annum.

Contact the Secretary, Captain Ian Pfennigwerth concerning submission of papers on 61 2 4981 5551 or, e-mail: <ipfennigwerth@kooee.com.au>, and the Secretary, Naval Historical Society, The Boatshed, Building 25, Garden Island, NSW 2011 or e-mail: <secretary@navyhistory.org.au> to subscribe.
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