Board of Management
Air Commodore R. C. Rowell RAAF (Chairman)
Captain P. R. Sinclair RAN
Colonel F. P. Scott DSO
Group Captain J. M. Chesterfield RAAF
Mr R. H. Mills

Managing Editor
Mr K. I. Taylor

Illustrations by members of the Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick.

Printed and published for the Department of Defence, Canberra, by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne.

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed, double spacing, on one side of the paper and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:

The Managing Editor
Defence Force Journal
Building C Room 4-25
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600.

(062) 65 2682 or if unanswered 65 2935
Contents

3 Editor's Comment
4 Letters to the Editor
9 Anzac Address
  Major General Sir Kingsley Norris, KBE, CB, CBE, DSO, ED, KStJ, MD
11 The Professional Army Officer
  Colonel P. W. Blyth
20 Captain F.H.C. Brownlow, OBE, VD, RAN — A Pioneer of Australia's Naval Forces
  Mr R.G. Hyslop
24 The United Nations — A Critical View
  Captain M. L. J. Smith
33 Language Training in the Defence Force
  Captain G. R. Hill BA (Mil)
35 The Reconnaissance Regiment Resume Ideas and Concepts
  Lieutenant Colonel C. E. T. Lewington
46 The Equity of Conscription
  Captain John Nicholson
51 Peace in Our Time?
  Ms Alison Littler
57 Book Reviews

Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readily given by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Any reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.

The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and should not be construed as official opinion or policy.

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1979
R.A.N. Skyhawk ranged on the catapult of H.M.A.S. Melbourne.
THIS is the time of year when we remember those Australians and New Zealanders who gave their lives in two World Wars, in Malaya, Korea and Vietnam. Especially we remember the fateful dawn of 25 April 1915, when, on an unnamed beach in European Turkey — not, in fact, the beach originally chosen for the landing — a legend was born.

It may be that we shall remember them while we march through our city or township; perhaps only during that short minute's silence between the Last Post and Reveille; or as we raise our first schooner in the RSL. We seem only able to spare them a fleeting moment in our crowded lives. Not long ago, we allowed them two minutes. Now even that short period has been cut in half. Whether those remembered are fathers, husbands, sons, daughters, brothers, or a mate who is now but a name on a country cenotaph, we seem to have them so little in our thoughts.

As we remember, we may pause and wonder, rather cynically, whether we or they are the lucky ones. Have we achieved the millennium for which they fought and died? Is the world a better place because of their supreme sacrifice? I think not. We still have around us greed, small-mindedness, suffering, the oppression of one group of humans by another. Words like 'honour', 'loyalty', 'nation', which they held dear are derided. Even their very memorials are vandalised. 'Peace' and 'friendship' have taken on a sinister connotation when associated with those regimes which are striving actively to impose the opposite on us.

There is more than one way to serve one's country, as General Norris points out in his thought-provoking address on page 9. Yet indifference and a 'she'll be right' attitude is not one of them. We in the Defence Community should fight such a philosophy with every argument we possess. Nations unwilling or unable to take a firm and timely stand pay for their folly with the slaughter of their young, the loss of their freedom. Nowadays Defence is no vote catcher; but we disregard it at our peril.

*   *   *   *

I am writing this in the lovely northern New South Wales city of Armidale, where I am attending a short residential course at the University of New England. Editors from industry, government, professional and charitable organisations have gathered to exchange views and learn from each other. It is stimulating and helpful, and it comforting to know that others have the same problems of design, distribution and financial constraint.

*   *   *   *

You will notice that two telephone numbers appear on the inside cover. The first of these is my office, the second an emergency number in Policy Secretariat. Mrs Heather Staier has kindly agreed to take telephone numbers of inter-state callers so that she can let me know to phone them back if they cannot get me direct. I hope in this way frustrations experienced in the past can be avoided.
LEADERSHIP THEORY AND RESEARCH: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Wing Commander M. Long, in commenting upon Lieutenant M. F. Petty's article^ on leadership (Defence Force Journal), contended that the article emphasizes the fact that after decades of learned tomes of Behaviourists, Social Psychologists and Sociologists, we know no more about Leadership than did the generals, philosophers and theologians of centuries ago. The author considers that this assertion should be challenged.

It must be recognized that Lieutenant Petty's article dealt with leadership from a sociological perspective in terms of the effects that certain social and educational factors have on leadership selection and training. This is one of a number of perspectives that can be used. For example, some Behavioural Scientists have approached leadership from a personality point of view, some from a Behavioural perspective and others from a contingency line of approach (ie., leadership is contingent on the interaction between the leader's personality and situation). These different perspectives have generated a number of different theories and models. In turn, many of these theories and models have been empirically tested. As a rule, all theories and models generated so far have been found to have their limitations. That is, they explain some aspects of the leadership process but not others, or they predict what a leader will do in one situation but fail to predict what he will do in other situations.

Some Reasons for Lack of Definitive Answers

If one can be bold, it can be asserted that some of the reasons why the leadership field appears to lack definitive answers include:

• Research in this area has been largely piecemeal and has been mainly dictated by what approaches are fashionable at the time the research was carried out.

• Theories have tended to be over-simplistic. Though there has been a recent trend for theories and models to be based on the approach that leadership is contingent on the interaction between the leader and the situation, most have failed to account for the complex and dynamic nature of the leadership process. It must be recognized that the effectiveness of a leader is determined by the complex interaction between a large number of factors. Furthermore, leaders and the circumstances under which they perform, are not static. Consequently, the manner in which a leader performs in one situation, or at one point of time, is not necessarily how he will perform in another situation or at another point in time.

• Research studies have been oriented towards what characteristics a leader should possess and what actions the leader should perform. Few studies have concentrated on what characteristics a leader should not possess and what actions he should not perform. For example, the question could be asked: "What chance would a person who has low intelligence, poor education, and a serious speech impediment have of becoming a leader?" One would expect that he would have a low chance of becoming a leader in most situations. Dixon^ is one author who has attempted to identify characteristics military commanders should not possess if they are to function effectively as leaders. These characteristics are generally indicative of a dogmatic and unstable personality.

• Behavioural Scientists have, in a number of cases, been guilty of two sins. Firstly, they sometimes have become over-concerned with detail to the point where they have lost sight of essentials. Their preoccupation with detail is illustrated by their pedantic
concern with the pluses and minuses of various theories and models and their failure to view them in terms of their broader implications. Secondly, they have at times peddled simplistic notions and panaceas for solving organizational management and leadership ills. It is considered that there are no simple cures to resolve an institution's administrative dilemmas nor one theory or model that will satisfy an organization's leadership requirements. (This is one reason why the author considers that it is a mistake for the Armed Services to adopt a single leadership theory or model as their doctrine.)

As a result of their training, behavioural scientists tend to be guarded and cautious in what conclusions they draw from their research results. That is, they tend not to venture too far from what the evidence indicates and, as a rule, avoid speculation. To make statements that are not supported by evidence is to invite criticisms from fellow scientists and leave one's reputation and credibility open to question.

What is Known

Having said this, it does not mean that behavioural scientists have not advanced our understanding of the leadership process. In some ways, substantial progress has been made in certain areas and, generally, behavioural research has highlighted the inadequacies of previous ideas about leadership. For example, prior to World War II, it was fashionable to view leaders in terms of personality characteristics. This approach proved inadequate when it was continually demonstrated that no one collection of personality traits was indicative of leadership in all situations.

Stogdill recently completed an extensive review of the empirical research literature on leadership and summarized the status of the field in terms of what is known about the subject. His approach was typically orthodox and he did not speculate beyond what evidence suggested at the time was the nature of the process. Other authors have also reviewed the status of the field.

The author is in the process of completing a series of technical notes that review leadership theory and research. These notes deal basically with the following propositions that:

- Leaders are not isolated individuals divorced from other people in their social system. They are part of the social fabric of their group or organization and, consequently, they influence and are influenced by those they interact with in the system. This includes superiors, colleagues, subordinates.
- Leadership is not concentrated in one position but is usually distributed throughout the system. That is, more than one person performs the role of leader.
- Each leader's role, in terms of his responsibilities and duties, is determined by the position he occupies in the social system. These responsibilities and duties, in turn, determine the type(s) of leadership required to carry out the role.
- The effectiveness and resilience of a unit is partly a function of how well its leaders and followers mesh together and work in a synchronised and co-operative way. This is evidenced by such things as:
  - All members performing their duties and responsibilities;
  - Absence of unnecessary duplication of effort;
  - Correct employment of personnel;
  - Teamwork in terms of people working co-operatively towards common objectives;
  - Clear lines of communication upwards, downwards and sideways
- The effectiveness of a unit is also shown by its:
  - Cohesion or Solidarity (i.e., absence of factional infighting);
  - Morale (i.e., members identifying with the unit);
  - Espirit de Corps (i.e., members' enthusiasm);
  - Discipline;
  - Training;
  - Members' satisfaction.
- It is factors such as these that enable a unit to carry out its missions and to withstand the test of adversity or triumph such as that found in war.
- If the traditional, pyramidal, organizational hierarchy is considered, the higher the leader in the organization the greater the likelihood that his leadership will have a multiplier effect in the unit. That is, the more far reaching will be the consequences
of the leader's decisions, policies, etc. For example, a divisional commander's mode and method of command defines the boundaries within which his lower formation, unit and subunit commanders can operate.

- People attain and maintain their leadership status because they have personality characteristics, knowledge, skills, resources, etc. that assist them to participate in unit activities, to expedite the work of the unit in terms of achieving its goals and to satisfy superiors', colleagues' and subordinates' expectations and needs.

- Personality characteristics give a person the potential to be a leader. People possess different personality characteristics and these characteristics in combination give them a level of potential to be a leader. Some people will have high potential and others low potential. Research suggests that positive characteristics such as intelligence, drive, persistence, confidence, character, etc. are associated with leadership potential. It is how the person interacts with others in a social system that basically resolves whether his potential is realised. If the individual's characteristics do not match the requirements of the situation or if they result in a poor interaction with other members, his chances of attaining leadership status are reduced.

- Effective leaders perform both work-oriented behaviours (those dealing with the accomplishment of tasks, e.g., organizing activities) and person-oriented behaviours (those dealing with managing people, e.g., attending to their welfare), but are flexible in the way they use them. That is, they adapt, modulate, tune, alter or modify their leadership style to match the requirements of the situation (e.g., they are work-oriented in some situations, person-oriented in others). Leaders who are effective in some situations but not others are those who have a propensity towards certain personality and/or behavioural styles (e.g. are work-oriented in all situations).

- The leader's development in terms of the learning experiences he receives (e.g., education, training, on-the-job experience, etc.) equip him with the knowledge, skills and perspectives he requires to perform his role. That is, a leader could fail at one point in time because of inexperience, but could succeed at a later point once he has gained the necessary practical knowledge.

- Situational variables moderate the leader's performance in terms of assisting, modifying or impeding the execution of his role. For example, a leader could be placed under the command of a repressive, autocratic superior who stifles his initiative and prevents his expediting his responsibilities and duties.

Evidence is presented in the technical notes to support these propositions. These propositions imply that, since leaders are part of a social system, an ineffective leader could perform to required standards if his deficiencies are compensated for by other members of the unit or by the situation itself.

These propositions also point to the ubiquitous nature of leadership and help explain why there is no simple formula for identifying, developing and employing leaders. In addition, they show while there are still many issues that are far from resolved, it is wrong to assume that behavioural scientists have not advanced our understanding of the leadership process.

NOTES
   b. Hendrix, W. H., Contingency Approaches to Leadership, AFHRL-TR-76-17, Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas 78235.
7. Stogdill, op. cit., chs. 5 and 6.
WHO COMMANDS THE DEFENCE FORCE?

Thank you for the opportunity to reply to Brigadier Ewing whose naturally informed comment I was very pleased to read.

Most would agree, I think, that it is accepted practice for the Crown to delegate authority for the administration of the Defence Forces in the way the Brigadier describes. This process may be viewed, alternatively, as one in which the Crown accepts the advice of Parliament by giving assent to the legislation proposed by Parliament. The effect of this advice is passed to the Defence Forces as a direct order in the form of an Act — an instruction over the signature of the Governor General.

However, this would seem to me very different in principle from the situation in which orders to the Defence Forces come directly from the Minister — a situation, too, in which the direct link between the military commander and the Crown has been severed. I make that comment notwithstanding knowledge that in the past Acts may have empowered the Minister to make regulations governing the administration of the Defence Forces.

The essence of this argument lies in a point the Brigadier seems inadvertently to have made for me. The authorities he cites speak of Ministers providing 'advice' to the Crown, yet, as the Brigadier says, under the present arrangements CDFS exercises command subject to the 'direction' of the Minister. Service officers will identify this as a question of the differences between a staff and a line relationship.

It seems, again to me, that we need more evidence before agreeing that it is long accepted good constitutional practice to place the commander of the Defence Forces under the Minister in a line relationship. Moreover, we need more evidence to show that this is good practice for the control of the disposition and use of the Forces as distinct from their administration — aspects which are clearly separated by one of the Brigadier's authorities.

Turning now to the other points made by Brigadier Ewing, I first leave the question of who appoints and daily directs Ministers in practice to the judgement of my colleagues. Secondly, I must accept the Brigadier's statement that the matter was well aired. That being so, I am surprised that so few officers of my acquaintance are familiar with the resultant arrangements. Finally, I can think of many reasons for the lack of animated debate on this topic, none of which have anything to do with the amendment's representing good constitutional practice.

Sir, the Brigadier's choice of words "ultimately fairly well accepted" implies the existence of some dissenting views which I would like to hear expressed. This is a subject where, surely, unanimity is essential.

RAAF Staff College, A.J. Emmerson Fairbairn, ACT Squadron Leader

TO CORRECT AN ERROR

Thank you for forwarding me copies of the Defence Force Journal No. 13. No doubt I will receive many comments later when the Journal is fully read after the leave period. (Air Mobility — A Game for 100 or More Players. p. 45).

I am however concerned that my surname was spelt incorrectly. In view of the editor's comment in the editorial "... many errors, particularly printing errors, are undetected by the untrained eye ...", I feel sure that my name was spelt PRINTY rather than PRUNTY by mistake or by poor information passed on by my directorate.

In any case would it be possible to make the true spelling known as the officer cadets of Portsea, amongst others, have already accused me of using a rather poor pseudonym. This, as you realise, was not my intention at all.

May I take this opportunity of saying that I thoroughly enjoy reading Defence Force Journal and I hope to contribute again in the future.

OCS Portsea, Victoria M.L. Prunty Captain

I should have checked the Corps Lists. My apologies — Editor.

JOB SATISFACTION

I read with interest Major Hudson's article 'Job Satisfaction in a Changing Army' (DFJ No. 13 November/December 1978). Many of his points are applicable to the other services and deserve further consideration. However, the article contains one glaring fallacy which should not be allowed to pass.

Under the heading of 'The Organisation Structure' he draws attention to the
(statistically) normal distribution of "abilities" within a service and its apparent discrepancy with the skewed distribution implied by the typical organisation pyramid. Unfortunately, this interpretation ignores the dynamic nature of the services personnel structure.

The broad base of the pyramid includes not only the born Indian who will remain at this level but also the makee-learner chief who is on his way to higher things. This applies at all levels but the top and it is quite reasonable to expect that, at any given time, many people will be at a level below that dictated by their natural ability.

This is not to suggest that the services' organisations are ideal and there are, in fact, significant differences in the shape of the three pyramids. Despite this and the recurrent manpower crises which further distort the structure, the level of misfitting ability to function is nowhere near as high as Major Hudson would have us believe.

Navy Office, Nick Hammond Canberra, Lieutenant Commander RAN ACT

JOB SATISFACTION — THE AUTHOR REPLIES

I didn't think it possible to have a "glaring fallacy", but the issue made in Lieutenant Commander Hammond's letter is worthy of consideration.

I interpret the expression "dynamic nature of the services personnel structure", in the second paragraph, to refer to both the high throughput of personnel in the Services and the opportunity to obtain relatively speedy promotion and experience in the variety of postings available. Granted, a high turnover of personnel may help the organisation fulfil its requirements for 'indians'. However, the crux of my argument is that the talent electing to remain cannot be effectively employed, when forced into the typical pyramid structure that all three services exhibit.

Indeed, my study in 1975 of the then recently introduced Warrant Officer rank in the RAN, revealed the inability of the organisation to use successfully the considerable knowledge and skill that those senior sailors had to offer.

Many organisations have used a similar ploy (sop?) for having 'Chiefs' do 'Indian' type work.

HQ Field Force Command, P.R. Hudson Sydney

AUSTRALIAN STUDY GROUP ON ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

Following a modest beginning in 1976, the Australian Study Group on Armed Forces and Society has held two highly successful conferences at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, during 1977 and 1978, and a further Conference is planned for May 1979. The 1978 conference was attended by about 70 serving and retired officers of all three Services, academics, public servants and other interested persons, and had as its theme 'The Individual and the Armed Services'. The theme for next year's conference is still being finalized but is likely to be 'Soldiers, Citizens and Society, 1939-1979'.

The Study Group convenor is Dr Hugh Smith of the Department of Government in the Faculty of Military Studies at Duntroon. It is largely through Dr Smith's efforts and the generosity of the Commandant of the Royal Military College in providing the facilities in the past two years that the Study Group has gained some impetus.

Involvement in the activities and general development of the Study Group is open to all. Inquiries may be directed to Dr Smith (062 66 3661) or to members of the Committee of the Study Group:

- Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Black, Directorate of Personnel Plans, Army Office (062 65 3835),
- Professor Hugo Wolfsohn, Department of Politics, Latrobe University,
- Mr Malcolm Van Gelder, Department of the Capital Territory,
- Dr Phillip D'Alton, Department of Sociology, University of Wollongong,
- Mr Frank Hayes, School of Social Work, Milperra College of Advanced Education.
ANZAC MESSAGE

Major-General Sir Kingsley Norris, KBE, CB, DSO, ED, KSJ, MD

ANZAC is not a place — you will not find it on the map; Anzac is not a battle, not a campaign — Anzac is not a Day.

How often we commemorate an event by a Public Holiday, then forget about it for 364 days! The significance of Sunday is often neglected for the remaining six days. Anzac is an inspiration for every day of our life — an example of those qualities that are so sadly absent today — courage and generosity.

Anzac is the inspiration of Australian men and women in the Boer War, in World Wars I and II, and in Korea, who volunteered to demonstrate these rare qualities — whatever the cost, and often the price was death.

**Courage** — I suppose there is no quality we would more worthily claim than bravery. There are two types of courage — physical courage — the conquest of fear in the face of danger is not rare. Moral courage — the courage of conviction — what Napoleon called "the courage of the early morning when all is dark and lonely" — is priceless. Fear is one of the most powerful motives in the world today.

Injustice is often inspired by fear of the power of others. So many parents today seem afraid of their children, but while injustice is rightly rejected, fair discipline is generally respected. How many of us make our decisions, cast our vote or voice our creeds according to their effect on our pocket, our popularity or our promotion? That is why the unions fear a secret ballot. The courage of conviction may be lonely and costly, even fatal, but the reward is beyond value. There is not greater achievement.

In the final phase of the New Guinea Campaign at Sanananda we were very short of medical personnel; battle casualties and malaria, dysentery and scrub typhus had hit us hard. As reinforcements a company of 'conscientious objectors' had been flown over. I do not believe there is such a normal human being as a 'pacifist', one who, when he or a dear one is attacked would not defend, but a
conscientious objector' is either a coward, indifferent or has the bravery of a conviction that he will not bear arms.

This company of "conscies", as they were called, were derided and sneered at by their battle-scarred comrades. They were sent down to Oro Bay, about 12 miles east, where barges loaded with ammunition would pull in on dark nights to dodge the Japanese air raids. The "conscies" were ordered to unload these barges — they refused.

About midnight I received a signal from Oro Bay and jeeped across the bumpy jungle track to sort out the trouble. I told the officer who gave the order what I thought of him, paraded the "conscies" and told them they had disobeyed a lawful order in the presence of the enemy — a most serious military crime. They were all put under open arrest.

Next morning, at Sanananda, battle had been joined with a Japanese force strongly dug in about 100 yards away in the dense jungle. Our casualties were heavy and the "conscies" were ordered to come back at once and get on with their duty of stretcher bearing. I watched them. They never hesitated — some were killed, others wounded, but no sooner had they brought out a casualty than back they went — with no arms to defend themselves. One of the bravest deeds in battle I have witnessed.

Ever afterwards "conscie" became a proud possession — just as those magnificent men of Mons transmuted that base word "Contemptible" into a golden guerdon on their colours.

Not only were these valiants physically and morally brave, they were generous — "all they had they gave — themselves they scorned to save".

Generosity — how different from signing a charitable cheque on a tax free expense account. One employer said to me, "We don't mind how wages go up, we pass the increase on to the customer and add a little more — we don't lose".

How often do we give less and ask for more? If only we would be satisfied with a fair deal, a just reward for a worthy deed. If we worked honestly for more than 30, or even 40, hours of the 168 hours each week, the world would be a happier, brighter and richer world.

Those we honour today were always on duty — they had no "danger pay" or strikes, as had those civilians who, far away, handled their ammunition.

But Remembrance alone may be morbid and vain — unless it leads to Resolution.

Some day we will all meet those valiant hearts. At the entrance we will be challenged by the guard — "Halt, who goes there"? — "Friend" — "Advance friend and give the counter sign". If we can look him in the face and say "I, too, have been brave and generous", he will shoulder his arms and salute — "Pass friend, all is well!"

(Defence Public Relations)
THE PROFESSIONAL ARMY OFFICER

A Review of Some Matters which Impinge on the Nature of Professional Soldiering in Australia Today.

Colonel P. W. Blyth, MBE, JSSC, PSC, MCIT, AFAIM
Director of Movements and Transport — Army

INTRODUCTION

MILITARY professionalism is a non-issue for most Australians. While most Western countries have had the benefit of detailed analysis of their armed forces, particularly in the last twenty or thirty years, very little has been done in Australia to evaluate the nature and quality of military service. Australians show little public concern about the social or political relevance of their armed forces, the need or otherwise for social integration of the military with its parent society, or the requirements of the Australian profession of arms today, and more importantly, tomorrow.

Regular military service, in Australia as elsewhere, is subject to major change resulting from new social and technological perspectives and the changing nature of warfare. The lack of protracted examination of our armed forces in other than an historical context leaves us poorly equipped to grapple with the military challenges of the future. Recent adjustments in Australian defence posture demand that informed public debate occurs sooner rather than later — military costs alone are a potent reason for all Australians to understand how their defence dollars are used. There are signs that the profession of arms is being subjected to closer scrutiny outside the Services; however, until the community shows a real desire to understand the nature of professional soldiering there is little likelihood that the Nation will treat the question of national security with the attention it warrants. The lack of debate is as much the fault of the Armed Forces as it is of Australian society generally. Unless the military professionals are willing and able to articulate the realities of contemporary military service there is little likelihood that a useful dialogue will result.

Our military history has generally been that of a satellite nation with close ties to Britain and more recently the United States. Thus it is not surprising that we have been rather unquestioning in determining whether or not Australia has or should have her own unique perception of the role and place of her armed forces. As a nation with a recently declared and nationally accepted policy of greater defence self reliance, supported by identifiable regular forces, it seems more than appropriate that this quite large and very expensive structure of armed forces should be subjected to

Colonel Blyth graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1955. He spent eighteen months in Malaya as a platoon commander with the British Army's 55 AD Coy and two years as an exchange instructor at the British Army School of Transport. In SVN he filled the appointments of DAQMG and SO2 (Ops) HQ 1 ATF. More recently he was a member of the Directing Staff and Director of Studies at the Australian Staff College. This article is based on research undertaken by Colonel Blyth during his membership of the Regular Officer Development Committee. He is currently posted as Director of Movements and Transport — Army in Materiel Branch.
examination, if only to satisfy Australians of the necessity or otherwise of maintaining it at all.

One prerequisite of informed debate appears to be that our military officers should possess solidly based perceptions of their reasons for existence as representatives of the 'profession of arms'. This article addresses this requirement from the standpoint of the professional (or regular) Australian Army officer.

WHAT IS A PROFESSION?

It is difficult to discuss notions of a profession without considering the matter of the code, actual or perceived, under which members of any such group are constrained to act. Whether or not a code is called an ethos, an ethic or simply a code is not especially relevant. Each of these terms emphasises a community of interest, adherence to a set of values, moral or otherwise, and a frame of reference in the form of rules of conduct. The pursuits of law, medicine, the church, the military and more recently, engineering have long been subject to codes of this nature. Recently, these professions have been joined by a number of other pursuits that have evolved in concert with the growth of modern society and which by virtue of their role in society, have acquired the status of a 'profession'. Irrespective of the detailed differences between them, they have tended to find common ground in the concepts of:

- service to the community, the nation or to individuals;
- acceptance of trust;
- concern for standards of conduct and excellence in performance;
- regulated behaviour from within the group;
- high motivation or a sense of vocation;
- impartiality in the proffering of service;
- a sense of brotherhood; and
- elevated standing in the community.

In latter years more pragmatic perceptions have intruded into notions of professionalism. In the main these relate to material advantages that accrue from membership. The industrial model of the profession of arms as espoused by Kerr/Woodward probably serves as an adequate example. However, this article concentrates on the less material concepts because it is these which tend to be more readily overlooked in an increasingly materialistic world.

THE ARMY — PROFESSION OR VOCATION?

The Oxford Dictionary tends to view the terms 'vocation' and 'profession' as almost synonymous. If a distinction can be drawn, it appears to be that 'vocation' emphasises matters of the spirit (not necessarily religion), whereas 'profession' places greater stress on more visible precepts such as levels of learning, qualifications and corporateness. An Army officer's career would appear to embrace most of the classical characteristics of both profession and vocation. It is unique by comparison with other professional pursuits in that:

- the skill and knowledge acquired are normally only applied in a total sense in times of national or international stress;
- membership of the Army has an inherent degree of risk and personal sacrifice not found in many other professions;
- society's acceptance of the value of the military is subject to wide variance which can be proportional to the extent to which that society feels that it is under threat, or it can reflect different perspectives between groups in the society;
- the demands of a military career require that members be prepared to forego a considerable portion of their personal freedom and often that of their families. Perhaps only the church appears to ask as much of the individual; and
- of all the 'professions' only the military performs its task by order of the political authority in power.

These unique features of military life suggest that regular officers require a high measure of commitment in the face of danger and must accept considerable personal inconvenience, varying degrees of social acceptability and a significant measure of political control. In addition to these features, the military demands those professional commitments of its members that govern the behaviour and performance of most other professional bodies.

Charles Moskos' highlights some limitations on the professional concept of the military, in particular the notion that "military compensation is a function of rank, seniority and need — not strictly speaking, professional expertise". He also emphasises "the reality that few officers can make the military their entire career (unlike civilian professionals, whose
endeavours are lifetime careers). Nonetheless he argues that the officer education process is “patterned on the professional model” and that by general usage the military is regarded as professional.

On the vocational aspect of military life, Lieutenant General Sir John Hackett states: “It [the profession of arms] has become at some times and in some places a calling resembling the priesthood in its dedication. It has never ceased to display a strong element of the vocational”. Again, Moskos sees strong vocational overtones implicit in the military models. While he uses the term ‘calling’ in lieu of ‘vocation’ he draws attention to the institutional values, the submergence of self-interest to the ‘presumed higher good’ and the paternalistic nature of the military as support for the vocational nature of military life. Moskos goes one step further and indicates the increasing occupational trend in the US military in particular. In support of his case he suggests that trends towards trade unionism and the greater use of civilian technicians in military functions are contributing to perspectives that see the military as just another occupation.

There is little doubt that even in Australia the distinction between military and civilian tasks is becoming increasingly blurred. These sources lend support to the view that a military career embraces not only strong elements of a profession and vocation but also that, in some ways at least, military life is a job like many others. It is possible that the emerging occupational emphasis may or could be at odds with professional and vocational requirements, particularly if the latter were diminished in any way by the more pragmatic perceptions implicit in the ‘job’ approach. Suffice it to say that the pursuit of a military career is complicated by the necessity for all these notions to co-exist in a single person — the regular officer.

WHAT OF AUSTRALIA?

In Australia, the Army has not reached the point of codifying these requirements, tangible or otherwise, into a credo or philosophy for its members. Although this observation is in the nature of an assertion, support for it can be found wherever groups of officers meet to discuss the raison d’etre of their calling. There is normally sufficient disagreement on fundamental issues to indicate that the officer group is in some doubt as to the way in which it should approach military life in a corporate sense. This phenomenon is far more evident today than it was say 10 years ago and was well demonstrated to the Regular Officer Development Committee during recent investigations.

The philosophical basis of the Australian Army has long been firmly rooted in the British military tradition. The visible evidence of this can be seen in our uniforms, ranks, insignia, colours and general organizational structure. Our approaches to tactics, staff training and mess life still show strong evidence of the British influence. In more material matters our Army has tended to move in other directions, for example, in the introduction of large quantities of American equipment. However, this latter trend does not seem to have extended widely to our military values, even though some officers may have rejected some traditional precepts. While the retention of the British basis was probably appropriate in the past, it is prudent to re-assess these traditions and standards against the contemporary Australian context. This is not to suggest that what has served as our military credo should be discarded; it is a plea to re-evaluate our approach to determine its relevance to current Australian military and social requirements, and to adjust it if required.

With the formation of the Australian Regular Army in 1948, a major deficiency may have been the failure of its architects to note that the philosophical military basis for an Australian Regular Army was quite different from that of the pre-war PMF cadre or the 2nd AIF. For this reason, and also because of the changing nature of Australian society, we appear to have an imprecise corporate view of the nature of Australian professional soldiering, both as it is and more importantly, as it should be.

One frequently heard justification for any lack of precision in this regard is the extent of our Army’s operational commitments over the past 25 years. While it is possible that our legitimate pre-occupation with military operations may have contributed to our lack of capacity to analyse military life, there are other, equally important reasons. For example, a factor that appears prima facie to contribute to our lack of military self-examination is the reluctance on the part of many Australians
(military or otherwise) to debate abstract and more particularly, emotional issues. In analysing the military and the officer's role in it, abstractions, emotions and realities must be reviewed together in order to gain a balanced view of military professionalism. Another contributory factor appears to be the high rate of social change that has faced Australia, no less than other countries, in recent years. Whatever the reasons, it appears that our corporate view of the role of the regular officer is somewhat confused, or even simplistic when the complexities of modern military life are taken into account.

FACTORS AFFECTING AUSTRALIAN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Change

Australia has reached a watershed in her military history. For the first time she is attempting to grapple with the reality of complete self-reliance in military terms, at least for some of the operational possibilities that she may face in the future. In common with most other nations she is also facing great changes in political, social, educational, economic and technological fields. These changing perspectives have marked military, as well as national significance.

For an army such as Australia's, the pressures on the professional officers have become demanding in the extreme. The challenge is to develop and sustain the capacity to adapt to change while simultaneously maintaining the high levels of battle skills, fitness, self denial, discipline and dedication, which are fundamental to our Army's mission, either as a deterrent force or as a force committed to operations at home or abroad. Until recently our task was much more straightforward. Our operational involvement was largely based on the assumption that the supporting infrastructure and, to a large extent the political and strategic direction of our commitments, were in the hands of our allies. It is therefore not surprising that our preoccupation has been towards the development of combat capability at unit and formation level. Our success in developing such capability is a matter of record. However, in developing a regular army capable of handling the full range of military performance, our combat orientation has contributed to a lack of balance in breadth and knowledge of the military profession in many Australian officers.

In examining the traits and capabilities that Australian regular officers must possess or acquire to perform their roles, the following paragraphs cover:

• the various notions of the nature of the Australian Army;
• the question of the Army's role in, and relationship to, the community;
• attitudes to authority;
• the changing nature of political/bureaucratic control of the military;
• education and technology;
• the traditional demands of Army life;
• conservatism in the Army; and
• the impact of the new pension scheme.

The Nature of the Australian Army

The notions of 'Core Force', 'Force in Being', 'State of the Art' and, to a lesser extent, 'Cadre Army' are often used to describe the nature of the Australian Army. They also serve in part as an aid in determining force structure and equipment requirements. It is debatable if the Army has a uniform understanding of their meanings. Each of these notions places particular demands on officers and the system that sustains them. These demands are sometimes in conflict when measured against the time and facilities available to prepare officers to operate effectively in all of them.

The problem can be shown in a brief comparison of 'Core Force' and 'Force in Being'. The prime purpose behind the notion of a core force is to provide a basis of professional expertise from which the nation can mobilize to meet a variety of threat levels beyond the capability of the regular force to perform. This suggests that:

• officers should be trained and educated so that, at short notice, they can handle increased responsibility one or even two rank levels up, in the full range of military activity; and
• officers should be capable of operating the vastly expanded training organization essential to rapid mobilization.

On the other hand, the 'Force in Being' concept demands that officers be able to play their operational role at virtually no notice, using existing Army manpower and equipment. This implies high levels of specific skill, physical
fitness, the ability to improvise, and proven
capability in command and staff operations.
Therefore, the regular officer must accept the
need to be highly competent and motivated at
all times. He must also accept that he requires
additional skills and knowledge in order to
meet the great demands of mobilization of
reserve forces, and possibly the civilian popula-
tion, at any time.

The Army and the Community
Much of the comment on armies and their
relationships to their parent societies
concentrates on the separate nature of the
military and the ways in which the differences
in social and military attitudes might be
reduced or eliminated. In Australia today, the
relationship of the Army with the community is
coming under increasingly close scrutiny, a
trend that seems likely to grow. Historically
Australia has had little experience with
relatively large standing forces. Until 1948
Australia conducted all military affairs with
reserve and civilian capacity backed by a small
permanent cadre. Moreover, by comparison
with other nations, our Army has had little to
do in the nation-building sense or in 'home
defence' in a direct way. Thus it is not
surprising that our Society is not particularly
vocal about, or supportive of, defence, except
in times of national emergency.

Recently, Australia's defence has been
analysed more actively by politicians,
bureaucrats and academics; the questions of the
Army's place, its role and its costs have become
the subjects of increasing questioning and
debate. Whereas previously it was possible for
the Army to shield itself to some extent from
such pressures, this is no longer true. More than
ever, officers must understand their national,
social and military history and be in tune with
changing perceptions as they occur. This does
not mean that the Army must become a trend-
setter. The nature of military life is such that it
seems likely to retain a higher degree of
structure, greater discipline and probably a
greater measure of conservatism than does its
parent society. Army officers must also
recognize that their soldiers bring to the Army
social values which probably change faster than
military values. Therefore officers must
continuously study and question the Army's
role and place in the national scene. In the past
we have tended to let our society draw its own
conclusions based on dated premises and
inadequate information. A revised approach to
public relations can greatly assist the Army to
establish and confirm its social relevance. Each
officer has an individual as well as a collective
role to play in this regard.

Authority
The application of military force has
traditionally though not exclusively provided
the justification for military discipline.
Although the military code of discipline has
undergone some change to conform with social
pressures, the Army has always maintained a
more demanding disciplinary approach than
society. High disciplinary standards are
primarily justified by the need for cohesive
action under stress and particularly in combat.
The conversion of recruit manpower to the
Army's code of discipline, and the ability of
officers to convince soldiers of its necessity, are
far harder to achieve and maintain today than
in the past. The Army's future success will
continue to depend on how well officers can
describe the aims and goals of the Army to the
modern soldier, in particular those related to
the limiting of individuality through military
discipline.

The contemporary Australian soldier is
better educated, more liberal in outlook and
more questioning than his forebears. The test
for officers is to recognize this and project
military requirements in such a way that the
aim can still be achieved, albeit with something
different to the traditional leadership
approach. The current Australian Army
Leadership Pamphlet advocates a variety of
approaches that appear more relevant to
today's military scene than our traditional
leadership philosophy of the past.

Political and Bureaucratic Control
The increasing complexity of warfare, both
technologically and politically, is placing
increasing pressure on military forces. The
advent of nuclear weapons alone has
encouraged nations to stop short of ultimate
commitment in the interests of world survival.
Therefore the Australian Army, in common
with those of other nations, will probably have
to accept high levels of political control and
even direct intervention in operations, whether
or not Australia acquires a nuclear capacity.
an aside, such intervention will be matched by greater capacity of the media to scrutinize military activities as events happen. In addition to these pressures, Australian officers must recognize their expanded role at the bureaucratic and political levels in war and in circumstances short of war. It is here that our previous emphasis on the combat ethos has created difficulties in that many officers in the Australian Army, in common with those of the other Australian Services, have found the change in emphasis difficult to accommodate. Bureaucratic demands will increase rather than decrease and our officers must become accustomed to working in the departmental defence setting as a legitimate and necessary part of their career expectations. For most officers at the ranks of Major/Lieutenant Colonel onwards, this will entail working closely with public servants. Officers must be trained to recognize and accept the differences between this environment and the purely military scene. The two fields demand quite different personal approaches but this does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. Army numbers are such that most officers will need to be capable in either situation. On the other hand, regimental officers must sustain their operational orientation and capacity to make decisions on limited information and at short notice. On the other, they must understand and adapt to the bureaucratic milieu where judgement by committee, compromise and negotiation are the prevalent tools of decision making. Furthermore, as military bureaucrats they must learn to accept that, while public servants may think and act differently to soldiers, they are a permanent feature of a defence bureaucracy. It is the soldier, as the less frequent visitor who will have to adapt most. It is unlikely that the bureaucracy will adapt to him. There will, however, be occasions when soldiers will have to persuade bureaucrats to their viewpoint. This will be essential in war and, in many instances, no less important in peace.

Education and Technology

To date, this article indicates the need for a well educated body of regular officers with diverse skills and attributes. If the rapid growth rate of knowledge and the general increase in community levels of education are also considered, the need for improved officer education is further reinforced. In future, officers face the prospect of commanding numbers of men and women who are increasingly well educated. Levels of awareness in all fields are far higher than before, and seem likely to rise even further. Thus the officer of the future will need at least a comparable educational background in all cases, and probably a better one in many cases vis a vis his subordinates and his civilian counterparts in the Defence community. The Australian Army has not been noted for its military scholarship in the past notwithstanding its high reputation in combat. The future will create the need for change in this regard and this will add to existing pressures for higher levels of officer education.

These pressures demand a reappraisal of the Army’s traditional ‘generalist’ approach to officer development. Technology aside, the increasing diversity of military tasks alone will demand better job performance in all fields than we have been satisfied with in the past. Some form of specialization appears inevitable. When the matter of technological change is added to the bill one has to ask here if any officer can be expected to be proficient, in anything but a microcosmic way, in the full range of military skills, technology and general military knowledge.

The Traditional Demands of Army Life

History and tradition are seen as fundamental to the maintenance of esprit-de-corps in most armed forces. These, together with the hierarchical structure of armies, make acceptance of change rather more difficult than in other corporate bodies. Our Army is no exception. Our history and our present situation strongly suggest the need for affirmation of a distinctively Australian basis from which we can meet the challenge of the future. Therefore, the Army needs to evaluate its mores, retain the best and most appropriate features of its past and if necessary rid itself of those facets, if any exist, which are no longer relevant. Furthermore it must embark on a conscious process of developing in its officers a universal understanding of, and belief in, the less tangible matters which regulate officer behaviour and reinforce officer standing in the eyes of their soldiers and society. Specifically it is the human qualities and values which the military has traditionally and correctly
cultivated in officers that fall into this intangible category. On the question of values in particular, these must be reviewed in contemporary social and national terms.

To suggest that the more cherished military values should be subject to close scrutiny can be to brand oneself as a radical at best or as a pariah in the worst case. In conservative military forums such views frequently produce outright rejection. Assuming that the rate of social change in Australia continues even at its present tempo, our Army faces the possibility of sustaining values that could become socially and nationally irrelevant. Officers must acquire the capacity to objectively review and question the Army’s methods and standards, measure their effectiveness and make adjustments where necessary. This capacity can only be provided:

- by equipping officers with the personal capability for detached enquiry;
- by encouraging officers to discuss and analyse the nature of their profession, to criticize constructively and to advocate change without fear of recrimination;
- by the Army publicly recognizing that the officer body is dynamic and at any point will comprise a mixture of social and individual views that are constantly changing; and
- by sustaining the military essentials that tend to set the Army apart from society and without which no Army can perform its role.

There are significant implications here for the regular officer. In a sense he must be quite ambivalent. On one hand he is the guardian of the military ethos whilst on the other hand he must be progressive, innovative and constantly questioning.

Conservatism in the Army

If it is accepted that the ultimate justification for an Army is the management of violence, then it is reasonable to assume that such justification confers unique responsibilities on an Army’s personnel. It is therefore logical that military bodies should and do stress the need for officers to have highly developed personal and corporate senses of responsibility. It is against this requirement that the Australian Army inculcates the ideals of service, loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice and the maintenance of high standards in all things. The establishment of these ideals in the formative years of an officer’s service tends to accentuate the uniqueness of the profession and, not surprisingly, it engenders essentially conservative (some would say elitist) attitudes.

Apart from the initial impetus to enlist, these ideals provide much of the vocational thrust of an Army career. If they were not fostered and reinforced it would be difficult if not impossible to maintain motivated military forces, particularly in circumstances short of operational commitment. Even when actively encouraged, these ideals tend to take a back seat to more practical matters the longer that an Army is at peace. The further that an Army is removed from operations the stronger becomes the trend for society to call in question the very basics of the profession. The defence of these ideals is necessary if true military capability is to be maintained, even in embryo form as it is in Australia. Short of war itself this is probably the greatest test of military professionalism. Regardless of how progressively an Army addresses the need for change, it will always be open to charges of ultra-conservatism as it protects the basis of its existence.

The Pension Scheme

The advent of the revised military pension provisions is only now beginning to suggest that Australian Regular Army officers may have a different perception of their personal military commitments to that which has prevailed in the past. Before the introduction of the 20 year service for pension provision, officers were generally committed to serving to the retirement age determined by their rank. Since the change there has been a steady reduction in mean length of service (on wastage) for officers from just over 28 years to about 21 years. It seems quite likely that with the passage of time, many officers may join the Army with a different career perspective than previously. There has already been an adjustment of career perspectives for many officers now serving. This does not mean that a 20 year career prospect should entail a reduction in military motivation for officers. On the contrary, it is still necessary for the Army to ensure that, during their military service, all officers obtain and retain their essential military dedication and motivation. The Army may have to alter its approach to career indoctrination if it is to retain a highly motivated body of officers under these conditions.
The Effects

This brief overview of the elements of military professionalism underlines the diversity of skills and knowledge, together with the need for highly developed human qualities, that all officers who aspire to a service career need, regardless of whether that career is a life commitment or of shorter duration. These demands confirm the necessity for the Army to remain highly selective in acquiring its officer manpower. In a world where competition for talent and increasing materialism are prevalent, the tasks of attracting and retaining quality personnel will become increasingly difficult. How the Army approaches this problem at the military/social level will largely determine the success or failure of its future officer policies. Prima facie support can be found for the proposition that the Australian Army must adopt a more positive and aggressive approach to 'selling' the value and attractions of military service as a career, vocation and occupation. This is not a task that can or should be left to the PR or recruiting staffs alone. Every serving officer has a role to play. Therefore the military structure should attempt to engender in its officers a consistent perception of the nature of the Australian military profession. Moreover, conditions must be created which permit officers to play their part at the community level. The creation of such conditions suggests greater acceptance by the Army of public involvement of officers in general than has been permitted to date.

The impact of the growth in complexity of military life has subjected the Army's modus operandi to greater scrutiny than ever before. Virtually no area of military endeavour is immune from such examination and if anything, the need for continuing re-appraisal will expand rather than contract. The organizational implications of this trend are outside the scope of this paper but the effects on the human resources of the Army are fundamental. Previous military generations in Australia were largely able to carry out their duties within a fairly stable framework of procedures and tradition. Now, and in the foreseeable future, officers and the system itself must adjust to change at a faster rate than before. It therefore seems highly desirable that much greater codification of our corporate rationale is required. Furthermore, the Army must use every means available to acquaint its personnel and its parent society with this rationale. Adapting to change is difficult for most corporate bodies and for many individuals. The hierarchical nature of the military has tended to inhibit acceptance of change more so than in non-military structures. Ways must be found to involve officers at all levels in the testing and challenge of contemporary methods and beliefs. To achieve this, senior officers will need to recognize that rank of itself does not automatically confer on the wearer superior knowledge or intellect. However, the liberalization of hierarchical attitudes must be tempered by the need to retain a clear perception of the roles of rank in a military structure. Officers must be developed in an environment which is both conducive to progressive thought and individuality, whilst simultaneously they must accept the ultimate nature of military authority. The development of these attitudes must begin for officers in their undergraduate years and must be progressively reinforced throughout a military career in training institutions and in work situations.

Career Aspirations

It has been common practice in the Australian Army to emphasise to all young officers that the acquisition of high rank is the prime criterion of a successful military career. To a marked extent this perception has been the spur to the continued advocacy of the 'generalist' philosophy. The pressure for a greater measure of streaming or specialization in sophisticated armed forces is creating a large number of military officers who are just as concerned to perform well in specific areas of work. The promotion pyramid in the Australian Army becomes very steep beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. There is a good case to be made that the rank of Lieutenant Colonel constitutes career success of no mean order for most officers. Acceptance of this view suggests that our Army should structure careers around the 'median officer' as he constitutes about 95% of the regular officer asset at any given time. Such an approach demands though that outstanding officers be identified relatively early and be given specific attention in postings and education to fit them for higher responsibilities. It is not sufficient to expect the most able to rise to the top through a process akin to natural selection.
The advocates of a 'generalist' approach may suggest that streaming or specialization inhibits the quality officers from gaining the broad military experience demanded by the most senior positions. This need not be the case, as correct identification of appointments, higher education and training can provide a structure for senior officer selection and development. At least as much emphasis should be given to the identification and development of the human qualities required for high rank as is given to the possession of broad military experience. Our lack of practical opportunities at senior rank also suggests that in peace, potential senior officers must acquire and develop many of these attributes and experiences in a theoretical environment, or by direct exposure to other armed forces that have senior field headquarters at all levels. In this way the Regular Army can prepare sufficient officers to meet the needs of full or partial mobilization.

Conclusions

The Australian Army faces the most challenging period in its short history. Its ability to meet this challenge successfully will depend very largely on the quality of its regular officer component. The professional demands placed on regular officers are growing rapidly in a community which is demanding closer civil and military relationships while simultaneously creating attitudes which in many ways are inimical to the basic tenets of military life.

While many of the traditional perceptions of a military career are being questioned inside and outside the Army there is an undiminished need for strong vocational dedication in regular officers. If anything, the requirement for even greater dedication exists if the attractions of, and pressures from, society in general are taken into account. The Army must develop the ability to place these pressures in perspective, allowing each to play its proper part in order to achieve its objective.

The standing of the Army in the eyes of the community will depend in the first instance on the Army's (and therefore its officers') ability to project its needs, beliefs, role and relevance externally. A defensive military approach will only create doubt and cynicism in the community.

In summary, a career as a Regular Army Officer in Australia today and in the future must be viewed as one of the most demanding and diverse pursuits in our national structure. Like all professions, military service imposes constraints on its members. At the same time it provides great rewards to those who regard the acceptance of trust, the ideals of service and responsibility for other human beings' lives as human values of the highest order. Failure on the part of the Army to specify, and of society to recognize, the requirements of the profession of arms could lead to an emasculated military structure which is incapable of fulfilling its role in national defence.

NOTES


ANNUAL PRIZES 1978

The Board of Management has awarded the following prizes for the best articles of the year (Issues No. 8 to 13): to:
1st Prizes ($200) — The Requirements of National Strategy by Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Baker in Issue No. 10.
2nd Prize ($75) — An Operational Concept for the Australian Amphibious Force by Commander P.J.M. Shevlin, AM, RAN in Issue No. 12.

Award: Issue No. 14 (January/February 1979)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the January/February 1979 issue (No. 14) of the Defence Force Journal to Dr Amoury Vane for his article The Surveillance of Northern Australia — its history. The Story of Stanner's Bush Commando 1942.
A Pioneer of Australia’s Naval Forces.

Robert Hyslop

An outstanding characteristic of the Royal Australian Navy before the outbreak of the War of 1939-45 was that almost all of its senior officers were officers on loan from the Royal Navy. Captain Frederick Hugh Cust Brownlow (1859-1931) was an exception. From 1913 to 1921 he was the only serving captain of the Royal Australian Navy who was not on loan from the Royal Navy or who had not earlier been an officer of the Royal Navy. Captain Brownlow’s entire naval service was spent in naval forces in Australia.

Brownlow was born in Westminster, London, on 8 August 1859, the son of Edward Brownlow, a sergeant in the Coldstream Guards, and his wife Charlotte Esther, nee Burroughs. Edward Brownlow had served through the Crimean War (1854-56) with the Second Battalion, Coldstream Guards; his wife was associated in the same campaign as a nurse with Miss Florence Nightingale at Scutari.

From the St. Olave’s Grammar School in Southwalk, London, Brownlow went into a surveyor’s office but soon left this employment in 1873, to run away to sea, as a Boy in the brigantine Fornax. Later, in July 1874, he became an apprentice in the employment of Richard Wynn, a shipowner of Sunderland. He served in a number of sailing vessels of the British Mercantile Marine in all parts of the world; his ships included the barques Forest Grove (1878), Skimmer of the Wave (1878-80), Her Majesty (1880-81), and Parramatta (1881-82). He eventually gained a foreign-going second mate’s certificate issued by the Board of Trade, London.

Brownlow reached Sydney in the Parramatta in 1882 at the age of 23 and he left the sea and settled there to learn coachbuilding with T. Moore & Son of Oxford Street, Sydney.

Brownlow’s work in coachbuilding — about which nothing is now known — was interrupted in March 1885 when Brownlow gave meritorious service as a private soldier in the New South Wales Soudan Contingent. He left Sydney in the ss Iberia on 7 March 1885 and returned in June 1885. A diary he kept on his participation in the Expedition records his being under fire at Suakim and Tamai, and also being very busy indeed on picquet and guard duty, road construction, camp maintenance and parades. He was in the advance on Tamai in April 1885, and for his services he was awarded the Medal and Clasp with the Khedive Bronze Star. During the sea voyages from and back to Australia Brownlow attended choir practices and helped give concerts, one evening singing “Jolly Good Company”. Divine services were important for him too. He records each service, the hymns sung and the subjects of the sermons delivered. On his return to Sydney, Brownlow resumed his employment in coachbuilding.

In the same year he began his naval service when on 22 July 1885 he joined the New South Wales Naval Artillery Volunteers, then commanded by Captain Francis Hixson. He remained a part-time volunteer until 1911, and during that period he was for six years in command in Sydney of the torpedo boats Acheron and Avernus, gaining a certificate from the Navy Office then in Melbourne, to command local defence vessels. He was commissioned sub-lieutenant on 1 June 1889, and promoted to lieutenant on 4 January 1892. In 1900 he assisted in organising and equipping the New South Wales Naval contingent which Captain Francis Hixson took to China for active service in the Boxer Incident.
Brownlow left coachbuilding in 1888 when he joined the Department of Mines in Sydney on 16 August 1888 as a temporary clerk and then from 6 June 1890 as a permanent clerk of the Public Service in New South Wales.

On 18 March 1891 at St. Michael’s Church, Surry Hills, New South Wales, Brownlow married Ellen Gillespie of Double Bay, Sydney, the daughter of William Gillespie. She was born at Gympie, Queensland, on 24 December 1869, and was thus ten years younger than her husband.

Brownlow’s promotion in the Department of Mines was slow but on 17 November 1908 he was appointed Clerk-in-charge of the Inquiry Branch and Mining Registrar at Head Office, holding this dual post until 1911. Concurrently with his service in the Department of Mines, Brownlow continued to discharge his part-time naval duties as a lieutenant. After Federation he was appointed on 17 July 1902 to the part-time post of Officer Commanding the Commonwealth Naval Forces in New South Wales with the rank of lieutenant commander from 1 August 1902. In 1904 he was given the additional responsibility of Registrar for Royal Navy personnel in New South Wales. These duties as Registrar principally related to receiving and recording the names and addresses of reservists who were required to report their whereabouts annually. On 1 October 1905 he was promoted to the rank of commander and remained posted for part-time service as Officer Commanding the Commonwealth Naval Forces in New South Wales.

Brownlow was a foundation member of the New South Wales Division of the Australian National Defence League established in Sydney on 5 September 1905 to “take . . . measures . . . to secure an adequate and effective system of National Defence”. He was a member of its executive committee the chairman of which was Sir H. Normand McLaurin, MLC. Other members of the committee included Professor T.W.E. (later Sir Edgworth) David, Deputy Leader of the New South Wales Labour Party, W.A. Holman, A.W. Jose who was a journalist (and later an official naval historian) and Professor M.W. (later Sir Mungo) MacCallum. Brownlow made a significant contribution to the League’s cause by having an important article “Naval Defence and Training” published in the first issue in August 1906 of the League’s journal *The Call*. In it he pressed for an Australian Navy. With remarkable prescience he wrote that “the creation of a local navy is therefore urgently required to promote our national growth and assist us to hold our true position in the Pacific . . . when the exigencies of war require the Imperial ships elsewhere.”

On 1 June 1906 Brownlow was appointed to the Naval Board in Melbourne as a Consultative Member. He held this appointment until 31 May 1909 when the post lapsed. He is the only person ever to have held such an appointment, and we must now doubt whether at the time that appointment was of any particular value, or of any significance to the part-time Naval forces. I have seen no mention of any activities or decisions in which Brownlow was concerned as Consultative Member; indeed the minutes of the Naval Board do not record him as having attended any meeting of the Board.

In 1906 he was a member of a committee of naval officers that submitted a substantial memorandum to the Minister for Defence in rebuttal of a report of the (United Kingdom) Committee of Imperial Defence on a general scheme of defence for Australia. The memorandum, written under the chairmanship of the Director of the Naval Forces, Captain W.R. Creswell, made an important contribution to the continuing public and parliamentary debates on the need for Australia to have its own Navy.

On 1 July 1911 Brownlow was transferred with the rank of Commander to the Administrative and Instructional Staff of the Permanent Naval Forces, and appointed for full-time duty in the post of District Naval Officer for New South Wales, located at Beach Road, Edgecliff, beside Rushcutters Bay, Sydney. He was responsible to the Director of Naval Reserves at Navy Office, Melbourne, but unlike District Naval Officers in other States of Australia, he was from 1 July 1913, also subordinate to the Captain-in-Charge, Sydney. His duties related primarily to the entry, organisation and training of naval reserves, but he was also responsible for recruiting for the permanent naval forces, and for the Naval Examination Service and Naval Intelligence work in New South Wales. He was assisted by a Sub-District Naval Officer at Newcastle, Sub-Lieutenant L.S. (later Rear-Admiral Sir Leighton) Bracegirdle, RAN.
On 21 July 1913 Brownlow reached the zenith of his naval career when he was promoted to the rank of captain and he retained his appointment of District Naval Officer of New South Wales.

Brownlow was an honorary Aide-de-camp to the Governor-General from 1 January 1912 to 31 December 1916 and during this time he served in this capacity two Governors-General, namely, His Excellency Lord Denman and His Excellency Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson who later became Lord Novar.

In 1913 the naval command in Australian waters was transferred from the Royal Navy, whose responsibility it had been since 1859, to the Royal Australian Navy, and in this transfer Brownlow played some part in Sydney. On 27 June 1913 the Admiralty office in London issued an order to the following effect to the Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station, Admiral Sir George King Hall:

"On 1 July 1913 the administration of the Sydney Naval Establishments — Dockyards, Victualling Yard, Naval Ordnance Depot and Medical Depot — will be taken over by the Naval Board of the Commonwealth of Australia, and HMS Penguin — thereafter to be known as HMAS Penguin — and the officers and ratings borne in that ship will come under the orders of the Naval Board. Direct Admiralty correspondence with the Captain-in-Charge — except as regards his duties as Transport Officer and Naval Intelligence Officer — will consequently cease."

On Saturday 4 October 1913 the ships of the Royal Australian Navy steamed into Sydney Harbour, led by the battle cruiser HMAS Australia which was the flagship with Rear-Admiral Sir George E. Patey on board.

With this arrival of Rear-Admiral Sir George Patey in Sydney Harbour, Admiral Sir George King Hall's flag was struck and the appointment of British Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station, and the Australia Station of the Royal Navy ceased to exist. Henceforth, within the limits of the new Australia Station of the Royal Australian Navy the Naval Board in Melbourne was the principal naval authority, and all communications from London to Australia which related to His Majesty's Australian Ships on the station and His Majesty's Australian Naval Establishments were to pass through the Naval Board in Melbourne.

Brownlow served throughout the War of 1914-18 as District Naval Officer for New South Wales; he carried heavy burdens in the control of shipping movements on the New South Wales coast and in its ports.

In 1917 when Brownlow was overseeing in the Port of Sydney the arrival and departure of between 500 and 900 ships each month, there was an exchange of correspondence that seems to have given him some mild irritation. The Sydney Chamber of Commerce wrote in a letter dated 16 March 1917 to the Naval Board in Melbourne asking that the Office of the District Naval Officer, that is, Brownlow's Office, should be moved from Double Bay (sic) to a more central position as ship owners and ship agents came in almost daily contact with that office because of new regulations. The Naval Secretary, Mr G.L. Macandie, referred the letter for comment by the Commodore-in-Charge, Sydney, and the District Naval Officer; Macandie wrote on 16 March 1917 "It has been suggested that offices in the Commonwealth Bank buildings might be obtainable."

The Commodore-in-Charge in Sydney, Commodore John C.T. Glossop, R.N., wrote on 22 March 1917 that he considered it to be essential that the District Naval Officer should remain at Rushcutters Bay "observing that he has many more important duties in connection with the Examination Service, Harbour defence, patrols, etc., (that) require him to be at the waterfront, with boat-landing place ..."

Brownlow was subordinate to the Commodore-in-Charge, Sydney, but he also was in direct communication with the Naval Board in Melbourne, the channel of communication being the Naval Secretary at the Department of the Navy in Melbourne. Brownlow wrote to the Naval Secretary on 23 March 1917 that in the first place the Naval Depot was situated at Rushcutters Bay and not Double Bay as stated by the Chamber of Commerce in Sydney and that no new regulations had been issued that necessitated Shipowners and Agents having to come to his office. "In fact," he said, "I can safely say that for the past twelve months there have not been over one dozen of these gentlemen to see me as all my communications with them is done on the telephone. The only persons in the Shipping
Community required to see me are the masters of overseas vessels before leaving the port on their outward voyage”. Brownlow pointed out that his “office was not in an inconvenient locality” that “it is only three minutes walk from the tram stopping place”; and that “trams run from King Street, City, to Beach Road every 2 minutes, the time of tram journey being 10 minutes.” The traffic changes and the transport developments that have occurred in the sixty years that have since passed would hardly have impressed Brownlow. No changes were made in his office arrangements in 1917 as a consequence of this complaint.

For long and meritorious service he was awarded the Volunteer Decoration in 1913. On 4 October 1918 Brownlow was appointed an Officer of the Order of the British Empire. Hostilities ceased in the following month on 11 November. For his devotion to duty during the War of 1914-1918 — during which he often stayed in his office continuously — he received in 1919 the thanks of the Admiralty in London12 and of the Naval Board in Melbourne; he was also awarded the General Service Medal 1914-1919.

In 1919 Brownlow served as a member of a court-martial assembled at Sydney and presided over by Commodore J.C.T. Glossop, RN, which sentenced five sailors to terms of imprisonment for the crime of mutiny in HMAS Australia at Fremantle on 1 June 1919. The public and parliamentary furore engendered by the sentences imposed and by the refusal of the Naval Board to remit them, provide a revealing story in the relationships between ministers, members of parliament and naval officers.13

Brownlow’s naval career came to an end about three years after the conclusion of the war of 1914-18. He retired from the Royal Australian Navy on 9 October 1921, with the rank of Captain and immediately prior to his retirement he was the senior Captain on the Active List of the Royal Australian Navy.

After his retirement Brownlow remained at Double Bay, Sydney, popular and active in naval circles. From 1922-29 he was Secretary of the Rawson Institute for Seamen. He became a Fellow of the Royal Geographic Society (New South Wales) in 1924, and he was Secretary of the New South Wales League of Ancient Mariners at the time of his death on 1 June 1931 at Darlinghurst, in Sydney.

Brownlow made a seamanlike contribution to Australia’s naval defence without himself ever having served at sea after the arrival in Sydney in October 1913 of the ships which constituted the first fleet of the new Royal Australian Navy, or without himself ever having stood in the front rank of the nation’s naval officers. His life and his career illustrate clearly Pope’s thought that

“Honour and shame from no condition rise; Act well your part: there all the honour lies”.

NOTES

1. A barque of 1521 tons, owned by Richard Wynn.
2. Kindly shown to me by Brownlow’s grandson, Mr. E.J. Williams of Double Bay, New South Wales.
3. Captain Francis Hixson, VI), born on 8 January 1833 at Swanage, Dorset, England. Joined Royal Navy 1848. In Australia from 1848 to 1852 in HMS Havannah, and in HMS Herald 1852-1861; then employed in Australian Survey; resigned from Royal Navy in 1863 with the rank of Master. Appointed Superintendent of Pilots, Lighthouses and Harbours 1863; became President of the Marine Board of Sydney in 1872; sometime a member of the Defence from Foreign Aggression Commission. From 1863 Officer Commanding the Naval Brigade, later absorbed into the New South Wales Naval Forces. Commanded the New South Wales Contingent that served in the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1901. Died at Double Bay, Sydney, 2 March 1908.
5. The NSW Contingent of 260 men and the Victorian Contingent of 200 men under Captain Tickell, RN, left Sydney in the ss Salamis on 8 August 1900. It arrived back in Sydney on 25 April 1901.
7. Senate Paper No. 62 of 1906.
10. Australian Archives, Sydney, Box 67 File D.7.
UNITED NATIONS FORCES
A CRITICAL VIEW

Captain M.L.J. Smith
Special Air Services Regiment

"In southern Lebanon the people have been too much used to observers. The observers are not armed. They have been subjected to all sorts of indignities, frustration and depression, their technical equipment and personal effects stolen. They were shot at, all sorts of things happened... We are going to function under maximum restraint, but when it becomes necessary to fire back, we'll shoot". (Major General Emmanuel Erskine, Commander United Nations Force in Lebanon, 1978)

WHAT is this strange phenomenon we refer to as peacemaking and who are the faceless servicemen and administrators who instrument it? Are they really of any positive value in maintaining world peace or are they simply an encumbrance to all with whom they are involved? Australians have been among them, and remain so today. As the world stumbles along the path of progress, from one crisis to the next, it is probable that we will again provide personnel and logistic support. We may ask ourselves how well we, as members of the Defence Force, have prepared ourselves for the task? United Nations Forces have often been raised almost overnight — tomorrow may well be too late to learn the lessons and understand the questions.

United Who?

UN peace keeping forces are not simply troops, but include sailors, airmen, police, civilian administrators and diplomats. The term 'UN Forces' really describes any form of UN manpower directed towards the establishment of a pacific state in international affairs. Even this interpretation understates the value of other methods which operate beneath the surface, but which work to remove those frictions which might eventually result in the need for UN forces (or extra UN forces). Unlike the old League of Nations which relied heavily on the concept of collective security (whereby a coalition of national armies were moulded into one force for a collective action) the United Nations has been forced to diversify its efforts to maintain world peace by including a technique termed Peacekeeping or Peacemaking.

Collective Security: The Impossible Dream

The framers of the UN Charter in San Francisco appear to have originally conceived the international role of UN forces in terms of collective security arrangements, and envisaged an international state where the big four willingly co-operated in the prevention of global conflict; benevolent overseers, awakened by their new social conscience intent on world peace and determined to make great sacrifice for its promotion. The unprepared for ingredient came with the escalation of the Cold War and the abject refusal of East and West to agree on almost any issue where their mutual interests conflicted. The real objectives of the charter were subsequently transformed to exclude collective security as a viable (and fair) peacekeeping procedure. Instead UN members fell back on articles 51 and 53 of the Charter; their right to enact treaties of collective defence (i.e. NATO and the WARSAW PACT). In effect bi-polarization was threatening the workability of the international body as an instrument of peace, at least as it had been envisaged at San Francisco.

Captain Smith is a previous contributor to the Army Journal. He graduated from RMC in 1973 and was posted to 6 RAR as platoon commander. After service with HQ 3 TF, Townsville in 1978, he completed the Military Free Fall Parachute Course and is currently serving with the Special Air Services Regiment in Swanbourne, WA.
The Korean Experiment

It took the Korean War, the first and only UN attempt at collective security, to underline the fact that post World War II developments had made this method of keeping peace impracticable. At this time a running debate in the General Assembly was still undecided in principle, over the relative virtues of this type of peace enforcement in relation to the much less provocative technique of peacekeeping. Events of 1950-52 helped settle this dispute.

It became clear after 1950 that many UN members were not prepared to support actions of the Korean type by providing either troops or moral support. It was the view of many member nations that the Korean War was simply an extension of cold war tensions and a vehicle for East/West competition; the 'free world' versus 'communist expansion', or Socialism defending itself from Western Imperialism — the view depended on which particular side of the political fence each member nation put itself. No major power could afford not to take sides, though some third world countries became from the outset the first components of the 'non-aligned' bloc, a powerful voice in UN affairs today. The Korean action was (for the USA and her allies) a testing ground for their plan to contain world communism. It was unthinkable that any nation aligned with Russia or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) should support a UN action so blatantly opposed to the communist bloc's vital interests. National and Bloc interests clearly took precedence over international unity.

The struggle became one between the USA and her followers on the one hand, and the communist world on the other. Australia was established firmly in the American camp. In theory the UN operation in Korea was a concerted act by the world community at large to redress the product of unwarranted North Korean aggression; it was clear to the world the war was really East versus West by proxy. President Truman took the initiative by dispatching an American military force expressly designed and waiting for such a task, without first calling for UN benediction thereby presenting the General Assembly with a fait accompli. By doing so he successfully bullied the world body into taking sides in what was in essence a cold war dispute. The UN, by bending to American pressure permitted the USA to choose the extent of its involvement in a given peacekeeping situation. The resultant coalition action had in real terms only a superficial appearance of UN action, an appearance which proved insufficient to convince neutral members and those without close ties to either camp to undergo the loss of life, expense and general responsibility entailed in a cold war squabble of such magnitude.

The Korean War highlighted several limitations and weaknesses in the UN concept of keeping peace. The UN could not hope to remain neutral if it took sides in the cold war. There would have been no UN force in Korea without the USA and equally, there would have been US troops in Korea with or without UN sponsorship. The only impartial plan in 1950 would have been for the UN force in Korea to consist of armies from non-aligned member states. There was neither time nor support for this option. It became clear that if neutrality in its handling of cold war disputes was not possible, the UN would do well to avoid involvement.

A second weakness highlighted by the Korean experience was the susceptibility of the body to big power pressure, a continual threat to its neutrality. Thirdly, it became clear there was a general reluctance on the part of members to undertake any large operation, especially when they (or their friends) as individuals, stood to gain nothing but a pat on the back. It was argued the whole concept of collective security implied the mandatory use of force anyway, a proposition to which the UN by its very nature was diametrically opposed.

Whatever the reasons the UN lost interest in this type of control rapidly after 1950-52. Peacekeeping missions had been used before 1950 (Greece 1947, Middle East 1949, Indonesia 1948-51, Kashmir 1944). However after Korea they became the linchpin of UN policy and remain so today. Small but capable, these forces sought not to bring about peaceful settlement by military coercion but rather to make use of their comparative weakness and internationality to combine diplomatic and military methods in order to "coax, cajole, demand, motivate, urge, persuade and sometimes to simply browbeat the contestants
into line”.\textsuperscript{12} Instead of attempting to reverse
forgone events peacekeepers undertook an
anticipating and restraining role aimed at
preventing a given situation from deteriorating
rather than correcting injustices after the act.
Broadly speaking these holding operations have
taken three forms each of which warrant
separate explanation: Barrier forces, law and
order types and trusteeship concerns. Fact
finding missions, commissions and observer
teams might be considered a hybrid of all three.

**Barrier Forces.** During the Suez Crisis of
1956 the Assembly was spared the
unwholesome task of having to vote for
coercion by its being able to persuade the
French, British and Israelis to withdraw from
the Canal Zone and Sinai.\textsuperscript{13} The subsequent
UN barrier force, the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) consisting at first of
six thousand and later five thousand troops,\textsuperscript{14}
was placed on the Egyptian’s side of the border
in order to complement the ceasefire.\textsuperscript{15} “Its
unchanging objectives (until 1967 when it was
withdrawn at Egyptian request) were to deter
border violations by both sides, to report
violations by either, and to serve as an
international plate glass window should Egypt
or Israel suddenly attack the other.”\textsuperscript{16} This
barrier force was really little more than a patrol
and observer group with little real power
“beyond their ability to expose violations of
agreements and other instances of
misbehaviour”,\textsuperscript{17} however fear of exposure
may in itself deter parties from a renewal of
hostilities. The availability of a trusted third
party on the spot, often contributes to the
expeditious resolution of minor flare ups
neither combatant wishing to be deemed the
initiator of contacts.

In the refrigeration of trouble spots, barrier
forces do perform a valuable service, but they
rely on a large element of self deterrence by the
disputants,\textsuperscript{18} the UN presence itself enhancing
this interest. Despite this presence, if two or
more parties are determined to fight they will,
by either arranging for the withdrawal of UN
forces (Egypt did this in April/June 1967) or by
simply avoiding them.\textsuperscript{19} Refusal to interpose
or withdraw forces may compel the parties to
come to terms, but ultimately the country in
which the UN troops are located has, by
agreement, the right to veto the use of UN
troops in any action and to determine which
countries will constitute the UN force within its
borders.\textsuperscript{20} The beligerent parties have the
initiative.

When in danger it is normal for a minor state
to call on friendly super powers for assistance,
the impartially cool UN alternative being seen
as less desirable. Such was the case in Lebanon
in 1958 when its Government asked the US
military aid, and for Kuwait in 1961 when it
chose Great Britain.\textsuperscript{21} As recently as May 1978
the Zaire Government’s preference for Franco-
Belgian support in its southern township of
Kolwezi is evidence to this point. If on the other
hand a particular crisis looks like escalating to
any unmanageable extent it is often in the
interests of the major powers concerned to
withdraw in favour of the face saving and
relatively impartial UN alternative. Similarly
small neutral or non aligned countries with no
wish to side with any of the major nations find
in UN peacekeeping forces a valuable stabilizer.
This consideration was important in the case of
Kashmir 1949\textsuperscript{22} and during the Indo-Pakistan
crisis of 1965-66.\textsuperscript{23}

Impartiality is the predominant ingredient of
the barrier force coupled with a general
reluctance to use force and physical coercion as
an instrument in the attainment of its
objectives, which are often dependent on the
goodwill of the host countries. Strict non-
interference in the internal state affairs is a
basic consideration. Several factors combine to
limit the effectiveness of the barrier force. If
for instance the crisis has the smell of the cold
war about it, it will be handled with care (ie. the
Laotion call for UN assistance in 1959 was met
with an investigatory commission only).\textsuperscript{24} All
parties involved in the crisis must want a UN
presence if it is to be effective, and in turn the
general sentiment within the Security Council
and the General Assembly must favour UN
involvement (eg. the body did not act following
the Indian invasion of African Goa because it
objected to Portuguese colonialism). The
overall cost in terms of effort, money and lives
is perhaps one of the most important restraints
on the employment of any UN force. Often it
may be decided the crisis does not warrant the
outlay and risk entailed in employment of a
force. “This is a consequence of the fact that
such forces are not designed to hold frontiers
by fighting invaders but simply to mark them
with men, men whose principal armour consists
of a modern and as yet unestablished talisman,
the UN capbadge”.\textsuperscript{25}
Law and Order Type Operations. As might be expected the characteristics of Law and Order Type Operations are in many ways similar to those of the Barrier Force, however there are complexities which are of particular interest to the military commander at the scene of the crisis as well as to the UN diplomat in New York. How does a UN force create a stable situation of law and order without some degree of interference with the internal political and socio-economic affairs of the country or countries concerned? To prevent a partisan involvement, and to avoid unnecessary tampering with internal affairs, Secretaries-General have at times, when the UN has been involved in such operations, laid down rigid codes of conduct.

Congo: The Impenetrable Jungle

The decision to respond to the Congolese request for a UN force in 1960 was made because of concern that internal chaos in the newly independent Belgian colony might have far reaching repercussions throughout Africa. It was feared that one or several of the superpowers (primarily the USSR and USA) might intervene in the Congo, thereby inviting a competitive scramble for influence. The stated objectives of the UN Force in the Congo (ONUC), with its maximum strength of twenty thousand and cost of US$402 million dollars, were to restore and maintain law and civil order, ensure the independence, territorial and political integrity of the Congolese State and to eliminate the interference of foreign military officers and advisors assisting secessionist Katanga. The UN Force was not initially designed to make the Congo a viable state as this was considered to be interference in the country’s internal affairs. UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold insisted on strict non-interference in Congolese affairs, a point made explicitly clear in the 9 August 1960 resolution on the Congo. The dilemma for the Secretary-General and in particular the field commanders was that the instructions, “prevention of civil war” and “non intervention in internal affairs”, were in essence a contradiction in terms. Thus the troops and commanders had no clear aim from the outset of operations.

As a matter of necessity the strict limitations on the UN troops authority to apply force were extended on 24 November, 1961 in order to curtail foreign subversion. Following this limited use of force, the UN troops succeeded in ending the Katanganese secession thereby preserving Congolese territorial integrity. By closing airports to the Russians in September 1960, the Force acted to preserve political integrity, all without prostituting its good offices to any particular Congo faction or person. When the UN departed in 1964 however, law and order was still in real terms, as chaotic as it had been in 1960. The UN found that to restore law and order it had to actively support one government or another, but throughout the Congo operation it refrained from doing so wherever possible. The objectives and approach to the entire action were in this case narrowly and academically conceived. The Secretary-General was more determined to serve the purposes of the UN Charter and Mandate, than to finding a practical and firm solution to Congolese problems. Although a valuable service was rendered, the obscure objectives given to the force, the blind adherence to the principle of minimum force and the unrealistic attempt to remain absolutely non-partisan prevented the attainment of really tangible results. Later in 1964, when the seven thousand man United Nations Force in Cyprus was established, similar deficiencies developed.

Guardian and Trusteeship Operations. A third and relatively uncomplicated task for UN Forces is that of guardian or trustee. The aim here is to provide a neutral force, necessarily small and including non-military personnel, to accept trusteeship of a potential trouble spot. Such a force was suggested for Palestine in 1948 and existed in West Irian for seven months in 1962. In this latter case the objective of the force was to organize and control the administration of the Dutch territory during the period of its transfer from Dutch to Indonesian
hands. Simultaneously the UN Forces in West Irian (UNTEA and UNSF) were a great face saver to the sensitive Dutch consciousness, and the seven month incubation period a very tactful pause. Necessarily invited by both parties the UN presence facilitated a relatively amicable settlement to a potentially dangerous problem. The 'risk' factor in establishing such a force was understandably slight, suggesting that should circumstances require it, such an operation might again be willingly undertaken.

I have considered observer and fact finding missions, a part of guardian type forces, however they are often constituted to complement or follow barrier and law and order type operations. These teams may perform the dual function of 'barrier' and 'stabilizer' in one, as in the case of the UN Force in Kashmir (constituted in 1948) and the Middle East in 1949 (700 observers). Alternatively the groups may be independent (if conciliatory) gestures on the part of the UN as in the case of the 1963 fact finding mission sent to Sarawak and North Borneo to assess local opinion on the proposed Malaysian Confederation. Experience in this field since 1945 would suggest that such missions might yet prove the most valuable means by which the UN may seek to influence world events.

Patches and Prevention: UN Handywork

Peacekeeping then, as distinct from Collective Security, seeks to stabilize world trouble spots by employing a UN Force to perform one (or a combination) of specific roles. In effect, these forces either 'patch up' a trouble spot after the crisis has developed, or they seek to 'prevent' it from developing. The UN involvement in Palestine, following the British withdrawal in 1947-48 is a good example of a 'patch up' operation. The UN Force currently attempting to provide a barrier between the Israeli Army and Palestinian Guerrillas in Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) is another example of action after the crisis has developed.

On the other hand, the UN Observer Force in Kashmir (to which Australia contributes a number of officers yearly) aims at preventing the situation from deteriorating. By anticipating such deterioration, preventative action can often be taken.

A third form of UN operation seeks to eradicate undesirable situations by means of peacekeeping efforts "which are neither conciliatory nor preventative but which are instituted out of a desire to upset certain aspects of the established order of things . . . in order to rid the international society of situations which the majority regard as little better than sinful". For instance, the toppling of Tshombe's Katanganese secessionist regime in the Congo during 1961-62, and the implementation of economic sanctions by means of force on the high seas in an attempt by Great Britain to outcast Smith's renegade Rhodesian regime by preventing oil supplies. Some UN member nations are still actively advocating the extended use of trading boycotts as an effective means of peacemaking.

UN operations, may entail a combination of these techniques of 'patching up' and 'preventing', in any order. The UN presence in Lebanon 1958, for instance, performed the two fold task of 'patching up' (establishing the extent of Syrian subversive activities in Lebanon) as well as the prophylactic task of exposing an undesirable situation (ie. uncovering the suspected Nasserite plot to subvert Lebanese independence) both objectives having been well within the scope of the force.

The UN Goal: Limitations on the use of Force

Having examined briefly the different types of operations the UN undertakes, it becomes necessary to look more deeply at the real goals it hopes to secure. The point has been made that peacekeeping (unlike collective security) rejects the use of military force except in self-defense or in exceptional circumstances, and requires the consent of host states before being made to operate. It can, therefore, be assumed that "the diplomacy, which the UN displays in its holding forces, supplements a pacific intent rather than checks a warlike one". It is only one short step further to conclude that peacekeeping forces are valuable only when the belligerents are prepared to attempt peace. If they want to fight it out they cannot be stopped.

This highlights the limitations on the use of force by UN troops. Although coercion has been mildly applied by peacekeepers in the past (eg., Congo), they remain in general terms, diplomat soldiers; their rifles may as well be unloaded, they will normally abandon a mission when conflict threatens loss of life.
are signs of a change to this policy, the result of events involving UN contingents in the Middle East (UNEF and UN Disengagement Observer Force — UNDOF) where unarmed observers have often been exposed to a variety of dangerous situations. Reports make it clear that "Frequently, the PLO leftist bands pillaged UN camps, stole vehicles and supplies and pushed observers around in a humiliating manner... There were also reports that some of the UN troops had been sexually attacked by Palestinian guerrilla bands."

In another incident, "On the western side of the border the PLO set up a mortar position in a bunker next to a UN observer post, where they would be safe from Israeli fire. UN soldiers there said they had been unable to do anything about it." In Lebanon, UNIFIL has been given orders to shoot back when it becomes necessary. A number of UN casualties have been evacuated from the Litani River area. Three Australian Army officers currently serve with this force. The UNIFIL case has highlighted the fact that, although UN Forces must operate in tune with the spirit of the UN Charter cases may occur when it is impossible to execute it to the letter.

The requirement for complete impartiality precludes any UN commitment on the side of one country in dispute with any other, particularly when the dispute is between Super Powers. The neglect of this convention would meet violent opposition from the great nations and their allies. The UN may be of great value in confrontations involving minor states alone, however, its ability to handle the 'big five' (USA, USSR, China, Britain, France), is curtailed by the Security Council's power to veto General Assembly resolutions. Originally designed to protect the 'big five' from the votes of less economically and politically powerful member nations, this right to veto has led to an inability for the UN to coerce or act against any country or interest supported by a permanent member of the Council, hence the cold war deadlock. It was the desire to counter this non-co-operation that prompted the UN to create the UN Security Council in 1945, to have at its disposal UN Peacekeeping forces when the need arises for a negotiated settlement, but is it always best to stop the fighting immediately? The purposes of the UN may well be best served by a tactful delay or 'put off'. This was certainly behind the UN inaction following the Indian invasion of Goa in December 1961, the aggressive action apparently being a lesser crime than Portuguese colonialism in Africa. No doubt many members of the General Assembly would prove as reluctant to take action if the same fate were to befall 'racist' South Africa or Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

The UN Team: The Final Limitation?

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the UN team. Because there exists no pool of forces from which the UN may draw, it relies upon combinations of national armies and police often hastily stuffed together, relying financially and technically on the resources of individual members and instructed optimistically to operate together as one nominally unified (but neutral) force. "There is today still no joint multi-national training of military peacekeepers under UN auspices." One meagre Scandinavian attempt, a series of conferences, was restricted to a small number of officers only. There is no UN Peacekeeping College. All other efforts to prepare officers, servicemen and civil ser-
vants for UN service have been undertaken independently by well meaning states (ie. Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland). A slightly larger number have allocated units (on paper) for possible UN work. This permits Commanding Officers of units earmarked for UN service to ensure their commands have received the political and military instruction necessary for their rapid deployment should it be called for. No official support from the General Assembly has encouraged such training, largely the result of division in the Assembly over the virtues of preparations of this type. It is important for the officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force to appreciate that the decision to train is essentially a political one. There are good military reasons for preparatory training, but it is the political factors which must be reckoned with. There are considerable complications involved with the construction of a permanent UN force, the mere existence of which might encourage its over use. On the other hand, the absence of any definite policy has in the past resulted in tremendous organizational and administrative difficulties once the final order to mobilize has been given. Following the May 1978 parachuting/air landing of the Franco-Belgian force sent to rescue Europeans from Kolwezi in Zaire, whilst answering Opposition criticisms in Paris that France should have acted through the United Nations, the Foreign Minister, Mr de Guiringaud angrily retorted; “We cannot wait 15 days for the UN to send a force to see if there are any corpses.” Perhaps that comment underlined best what is a fundamental limitation on the effectiveness of UN forces.

The Force. The multi-national character of any UN force, whilst usually assisting its impartiality, leads to a number of weaknesses in fields such as staff duties, language, intelligence and communications. Nations comprising the force whilst being familiar with their own systems and procedures often have trouble adapting them to meet the UN requirement. Apart from the basic differences in religion, customs and tradition more basic problems develop over matters of discipline and military law, discrepancies in pay and allowances, resupply and staff procedures as well as command and control, all of which is complicated when the force includes civilians and para military categories.

An important consideration is that although a national contingent may be operating under a UN Command Headquarters it rarely does so at the expense of its National loyalties. A Pakistani contingent comprising part of a UN force to which India is also providing support is likely to do so cautiously at best, particularly if for instance, the UN Force Commander was a Bangladeshi General. The structure of any force in any theatre must therefore take into consideration national jealousies and vested interests, a matter which can be particularly frustrating for the senior commanders, who may be kept wondering what activities are being undertaken by their sub units on behalf of their parent governments, from whom they invariably receive directions from time to time. An example of this lack of co-ordinated effort is provided by UNIFIL in Lebanon 1978 where the Ghanaian General Erskine has passed on instructions from UN headquarters to ‘fight back’ when necessary, but is finding some of the national contingents under his command reluctant to do so, whilst others have apparently accepted the orders enthusiastically.

The fact that host countries have the nominal veto over selection of countries which comprise peacekeeping forces within their borders ensures a degree of favouritism which often limits the effectiveness of the force (eg. Makarios selections in UNIFICYP Cyprus). In its cold war perspective this problem of partiality is an East/West affair and despite detente, remains so today. The UN Commission on Korea with its ‘fifty/fifty’ ratio of members proved a deadlock and failed resulting in the present “troika” system (one eastern country, one neutral, one west) which appears to have alleviated at least some of the difficulty. As recently as October 1973 the USA and the USSR were still squabbling over this, the apparent result being a force drawn entirely from neutral sources. Combined with the financial limitation (the Congo force — UNOC — was withdrawn largely as a result of the lack of funds) and the general difficulties of technical and logistic support (eg. compatibility of ammunition and equipment), these factors all limit the value of any UN force.

The UN Soldier. At soldier level UN work is often a mundane and uninteresting task, involving endless hours of sentry duty in observation posts or static positions which rarely change; routine patrols, along the same much
traversed routes and the manning of static roadblocks. UN troops are rarely required to actively pacify an area by searching homes or disarming combatants as this would be out of tune with the concept of minimum force. Subsequently UN troops often feel their presence is simply a formality (which in many cases it is) as they cannot see any positive results coming from their efforts. They must often put up with insults, or simply stand by as violations of ceasefire and other agreements occur before them, helpless to act other than reporting the matter. In short they may be required to risk their lives to perform what must seem to many an unworthy task; far more importantly they must do so with one hand tied behind their back, if not both. To a soldier who has been trained incessantly from his first day of service to react firmly to a crisis with positive, definite and aggressive action, it is often hard to understand that to simply do nothing may well be the best course open to him. The effect of these influences upon the junior leader (NCO and officer alike) should not be underestimated. They invariably lead to significant leadership problems. The following account of an incident which occurred during the tour with UNIFICYP by 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment of the British Army in 1976/77 (written by a soldier) best sums up a soldier’s view: “Operationally A Company has had a fairly quiet but busy time (one junior NCO spent the entire tour simply escorting farmers around the orchards in his sector). An incident of note occurred at the end of October when a section of Turks contravened the cease fire agreements by making a forward move of 700 metres and establishing an OP. A Company countered by establishing an OP not six feet from it. Both are still there and enjoying one another’s company. Soldiers being soldiers, the Brits and Turks immediately became firm friends, swapping cigarettes, girlie magazines, war stories and kicking a football around. When the weather became really cold our lads donated an oil heater to the Turks for which Johnny Turk was very grateful, until his officer came along and told him to give it back. Dammit all, we are NATO allies. Perhaps, if the world were inhabited only by lance corporals and private soldiers, a spirit of international co-operation would be a fact!”

Conclusion: Epitaph or Foreword

Although the Organisations peacekeeping experience is diverse, it bears little resemblance to the commonly circulated idea of an “international police force”. Ultimately, it depends on the attitudes of its members for survival and, at present, that attitude precludes all but a limited role for UN Forces in controlling international events. Any increase in UN activity threatens to deprive states of their standing as centres of power and policy, an unthinkable situation for any national state. All nations are not equal, even in the UN General Assembly, and it is the most powerful of them who have made the concept of collective security unworkable, thereby eliminating any prospect of a genuine and comprehensive role for the UN in ensuring world peace in the immediate future. Instead, peacekeeping forces seek to put moral and political pressure on states to “conform to the principles of international conduct which the charter prescribes”. The fact that these operations depend upon the co-operation of the states involved together with a genuine determination by the combatants for peace, and because the super powers (or any one super power) can render them ineffective, the capabilities and the usefulness of such UN Forces will remain limited, but not redundant. They are unable to ‘force’ peace. “Even though United Nations activities have been remarkably successful in stopping the fighting in a number of cases, it has a less than enviable record in obtaining permanent solutions to the various conflicts.” This shortfall requires UN attention.

Despite this, the ‘patch up’ and ‘preventative’ functions of peacekeeping forces provide a valuable service. Such forces ensure that pacific intent is assisted towards reality and that
some form of internationalism, however insignificant it may seem, is cultivated. They provide a face-saving platform through which powers may settle their conflicting interests and minimize the possibility of escalation. In effect, UN Forces play the part of an impartial third party in the same way that a football umpire supervises a game, but is helpless to act if an all out brawl develops, often having to be escorted off the field. Most importantly, they can be extremely effective in stopping the fighting (if only temporarily) and in preventing Super Power competition.  

The vague set of factors which will probably always limit the effectiveness of UN efforts to improve the earthly condition lay somewhere deep within the egotistical mind of social man and the nation state, which really want to see within the world community. This appears to be a long way off. In the meantime, UN Forces will continue to play an important part (if a limited one) in the guarantee of world peace. Australia could be called upon to provide at any time. Let us be sure we understand the political and military problems before we look for the answers.

NOTES
1. The Australian, 3 April 1978, p. 5.
2. For example, diplomatic discussions at UN headquarters in New York, committee research and bilateral discussion and communications between representatives.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Ibid., p. 557.
10. James, op. cit., p. 3.
17. Fabian, op. cit., p. 18.
18. Ibid., p. 17.
19. Fabian, op. cit., p. 264 (UAR ignored the UN presence in Yemen 1962-64).
22. Fabian, op. cit., p. 262.
23. Ibid., p. 265.
24. James, in Cosgrove and Twitchet, op. cit., p. 150.
25. Ibid., p. 152.
27. Fabian, op. cit., p. 265.
29. Ibid., p. 23.
30. Ibid., p. 22.
31. Lefever, op. cit., p. 213.
32. Ibid.
33. Lefever, op. cit., p. 42.
34. Ibid., p. 213.
35. James, op. cit., p. 3.
36. Ibid., p. 12.
37. Fabian, op. cit., p. 264.
38. James, in Cosgrove and Twitchet, op. cit., p. 158.
40. James, in Cosgrove and Twitchet, op. cit., p. 158.
41. Thunt, in Falk and Mendlovitz, op. cit., p. 528.
42. James, op. cit., p. 10.
43. Ibid., p. 7.
44. Ibid., p. 7.
45. Ibid., p. 8.
46. Ibid., p. 4.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 10.
50. Ibid., p. 151.
51. The Australian, 3 April 1978, p. 5.
52. Ibid.
55. For details of this resolution see Kay, op. cit., p. 189.
56. Nicholas, in Falk and Mendlovitz, op. cit., p. 536.
57. Had the USSR really determined to intervene in the Congo the UN peacekeepers would have been powerless although ONUC did, of course, make a Russian decision to intervene that much more difficult.
58. Nicholas, in Falk and Mendlovitz, op. cit., p. 538.
60. Nicholas, in Falk and Mendlovitz, op. cit., p. 537.
61. UNOC in the Congo was an exception.
62. Fabian, op. cit., p. 36.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 37.
66. For example the law and order forces in the Congo and in Cyprus outlined in Fabian, op. cit., p. 19.
68. Ibid., p. 27.
69. Ibid.
73. Kay, op. cit., p. 190.
74. Note that UN action following the October War in the Middle East 1973 stalled the use of U.S. or Russian troops.
THE last decade or so has seen an unprecedented movement of Australians overseas for a variety of reasons. Whilst overseas, even the least perceptive of travellers could hardly have failed to notice two points, both related to language. The first point is that English is steadily asserting a dominant role as an international lingua-franca. The second, is that conversation in the language of the country visited, even at the most basic level, produces returns disproportionate to the effort involved. Inhabitants of the country in question are delighted if one makes the effort to blurt out even the most elementary phrases and numerals. “If English is becoming the international lingua-franca, then so-be-it” you might say, “let us be thankful that we speak it and are therefore spared the bother of having to learn it as a second language”. Those who seek comfort in this smug conclusion could easily find a place in the ranks of those who believe that shouting loudly in English will produce satisfactory results anywhere in the world. Though this trait is not peculiar to the Australian traveller, I have seen sufficient of my fellow countrymen in Asia doing this, to conclude that we are not blameless. It is not a very fascinating spectacle.

There is a lesson to be derived from this point to which a greater degree of attention should be directed by the appropriate Defence Force authorities. The lesson (and I don’t claim for a moment that it’s new) is that besides being aware of the customs of a country, the greatest compliment one can pay a non-English speaking person is to speak to him in his own language. There is incalculable advantage to be gained from this, both in the narrow military sense and in the broader social and cultural interaction between diverse peoples. In the Defence Force we do not pay sufficient attention to this fact.

It is an area in which the Defence Force may show leadership to the Community and one which does not present insurmountable problems or financially ruinous demands on the military budget.

Australian Government foreign policy over the last five or six years has laid great stress on the need for closer ties with our regional neighbours and numerous initiatives have translated policy into action. We have seen contingents of foreign troops visiting on joint exercises and those who have been in contact with them cannot have failed to notice the efforts our visitors made to speak English (or “Strine as she is spoke”). How many could have responded in the language of the visitor?

Therein lies the crunch. Not nearly enough of us make the effort to add a second language to our formal qualifications and the Defence Force mechanism to achieve this (including the School of Languages at Point Cook and the Language Wing of IRTB at Kapooka) whilst admirable in its intent, hardly encourages the average serviceman to achieve the additional qualification. I say this because, of necessity, the vacancies are few, the entrance test’s difficult, the time involved for full time study is damaging to careers and the pitiful remuneration both at the time of qualification and subsequent re-qualification (if the student has the opportunity to do so) places a strain on the language student’s dedication.

It is incumbent upon the Defence Force to recognize the long term advantage to be gained from a much larger cross-section of the Force being able to converse, at least at the colloquial level, in a regional language. If we are seen by our neighbours to be making a determined effort in this regard, it can but enhance the prestige of the Defence Force.

---

Captain G. R. Hill BA (Mil)
Royal Australian Infantry

Captain Hill graduated from RMC Duntroon in December 1971. From 1972-74 he served in 2P1R, Wewak, PNG. He then had two years of regimental duties and one year as Adjutant of 3 RAR. In late 1976, he went as RAR Exchange Officer with the Brigade of Gurkhas. Since February, 1977 he has been a Rifle Company Commander with 2/2 Gurkha Rifles in Hong Kong.
There are three problem areas for consideration:

- **Which language to learn?** We can never overcome the fact that the languages of Asia are as diverse as its people; however, we can estimate with some degree of certainty which regional languages are likely to be important, say to the end of this century. I would suggest that besides English, Bahasa Indonesia, Japanese, Chinese (Mandarin) and perhaps Vietnamese are good bets for the future.

- **Incentive.** This is a problem because human nature being what it is, there are very few of us who respond without it. Since the prospects for appropriate regional postings are currently limited, we are left with financial remuneration, an incentive which demands realistic treatment otherwise it may suffer the disregard with which the current financial incentives are burdened. There would be no harm in awarding to those who graduated with the top language qualification from Point Cook, appropriate letters in lower case, after the style of other similar long courses (eg. Pass Staff College — psc, Pass Indonesian Language — lIndon).

- **Opportunity.** I have touched on the Language Schools in existence and the difficulties involved. I am aware too that servicemen have and are studying regional languages at Australian universities and that these people are usually sent overseas to broaden their knowledge. The opportunities however are all too scarce.

We have an ideal opportunity in the near future to meet the problem at the officer level at least, by requiring each student of the proposed Defence Force Academy (Casey University) regardless of his academic discipline, to qualify at a second language during the four year period. Which languages are studied, to what level and the proportion of students who study each one, are questions for policy decision at the highest level. Qualifying at an additional language need not necessarily be linked to the award of the individual’s Degree however; if the incentives are right, this harsh measure need not be required.

For those not Casey University students, part-time study at the individual’s own pace seems an attractive alternative. In its most convenient form, this study should be done in the home with appropriate provisions to confirm the student’s progress and hence revise or cease incentives. It is my impression that existing commercial, part-time language courses do not currently enjoy the blessing of Defence Force sponsored, self-improvement programmes, due to certain inadequacies in their composition. I wonder if the Companies concerned have been advised of the inadequacies which, once adjusted, could result in their product’s acceptability.

**Conclusion**

I have sought with the above comments, to alert servicemen to our responsibility as citizens of South-East Asia to achieve a closer community with our neighbours. Language is one medium through which this may be achieved.

I was in a taxi in a South-East Asian capital recently when, upon identifying myself as an Australian, the driver’s delighted response was, “Ah, then you are a South-East Asian just as we are.”

His response caused me to pause and reflect; not on his touching acceptance of myself, an Australasian, in the midst of his community, but the fact that he could speak to me in my language and I could not speak to him in his.
Lieutenant Colonel C.E.T. Lewington
Royal Australian Armoured Corps

THIS article is divided into two parts. The first part is a resume of the organisational framework of the reconnaissance regiment and the mechanics of its general method. The second part is designed to present to the reader some ideas on the use of the reconnaissance regiment in operations.

Many of the ideas presented are the authors own and so the reader must assess this article in that light and reject ideas which his experience suggests are ill-founded. I have used the British publication Royal Armoured Corps Training — Armour, Volume 1, Part 2 The Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment, which is a fair troop leaders' guide and little more, and the only Royal Australian Armoured Corps publication, the Division in Battle, Pamphlet No. 4, Armour, which is more suited to general reading and has little detail other than that which is a copy of the British publication.

THE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM
The reconnaissance regiment is part of a three-tiered system, consisting of:
- close reconnaissance,
- medium reconnaissance, and
- long range reconnaissance.

Close reconnaissance is the reconnaissance of a unit or formation's immediate area. This is a responsibility of all units and formations. Spatially we can locate it in the terrain from the forward defence line to, say, 6,000 metres.

Medium reconnaissance is reconnaissance for a formation and can be placed in the area 6,000 to 100,000 metres from that formation. It is a formation controlled task usually performed by the reconnaissance regiment — especially tasked but integral infantry elements and, I believe, Army aircraft.

Long range reconnaissance is reconnaissance at Army level at distances varying from 60 to 300 km from the force. It is usually the province of RAAF aircraft and the SAS, but it may involve the reconnaissance regiment and special long range groups.

To refresh the readers mind, Figure 1 shows the organisation of the reconnaissance regiment.

Lieutenant Colonel Lewington graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea in 1957 and was commissioned in the RAAC. He served with a number of armoured units including 1 Armoured Regt and A Sqn 2/14 QMI. In 1965 he attended the Long Armour course at Bovington, England and then served as Trials Officer at ADE in 1967. Further regimental experience was gained with B Sqn 3 Cav Regt which included a tour of Vietnam in 1968-69. He attended the Australian Staff College in 1972 and then served in AHQ (MAT Branch) as the Project Officer for the Fire Support Vehicle (Scorpion) and as SO, Coord. He is currently the Commanding Officer of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment.
The significant features to my mind are:

- Each reconnaissance troop has two vehicles with a light gun (the fire support vehicle), three light reconnaissance vehicles and one section of assault troopers — the equivalent of a mechanised infantry section.
- The assault troop is the equivalent of a mechanised infantry platoon.
- The surveillance troop has four radar equipments.
- The air defence troop is an unknown quantity at this stage but is likely to have four low level air defence equipments.
- There are two 81 mm mortars at squadron headquarters, mounted in APC.
- The squadron and regimental headquarters are well equipped as a mobile headquarters with the staff and facilities to accept and collate information and provide preliminary assessments.

The organisation obviously lends itself to squadrons of four troops with a radar equipment and possibly an air defence equipment each. The assault troop and the mortars remain with squadron headquarters. Its weakness lies of course in the inability of squadron headquarters to support the line troops. The two mortars have such an insignificant range that they could not possibly support the troops when deployed. The distance to the deployed troops would not permit rapid movement of the assault troop to their aid and consequently the assault troop and the mortars are really a reserve for special preplanned or delayed tasks and not really of immediate help to the reconnaissance troops.

The air defence troop may remain at squadron headquarters, not so much to protect that organisation — concealment should be its protection — but as an air defence group to cover defiles and obstacles during the movement of forces through them.

The reconnaissance regiment is equipped to see both by day and night. First and foremost are trained crewmen and binoculars. These are backed by radar equipment and passive night vision devices of greater range than any other in service. Perhaps more important than all these is the training in reconnaissance deployment and techniques which the regiment should carry out in order to provide the framework for the use of its equipment and men.

The squadrons contain a small administrative element which permits them to operate only within a regimental framework. If they are to operate independently of the regiment, the regiment must be supplemented. Despite statements to the contrary in the only pamphlet issued, I do not believe that the squadrons as organised are administratively independent.

The regiment would have at any one time fifteen tracked load carriers which are available for the carriage of POL, ammunition and rations. Each squadron requires a minimum of three of these load carriers for resupply each 24 hours. Because the resupply echelons may have to travel 50 km forward and 100 km from flank to flank in the 24 hours and avoid enemy interference, a system has to be devised which provides full vehicles for empty vehicles within the squadron area — you need six vehicles to keep the three minimum going. This is possible with two squadrons forward in a regimental system — it is difficult with three squadrons forward in a regimental system. It is impossible with independent squadrons without external support.

**DEPLOYMENT OF THE RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT**

If we make the usual assumptions depicted in so many of our pamphlets of a grand line advancing dressing by the right, then a little mathematics will describe the deployment of the reconnaissance regiment.

This grand deployment pattern gives a frontage of about 20,000 metres for the regiment and is based on an effective range for

![Figure 2](image)
each fire support vehicle of 1,500 metres with mutual support between fire support vehicles and of course the maintenance of a reserve at each level. This frontage is far too small to provide adequate information for a division, let alone a corps, if the reconnaissance regiment is in fact corps troops. A hook of only 10 km would take an enemy around the reconnaissance regiment’s flank. The regiment has to cover a much greater frontage and this it does by doing away with mutual support between troops. Now, once you have decided that this will be the case, then any frontage is feasible. The frontage becomes a function of the degree of search required, the speed of movement required and the nature of the ground.

As a rough stab, the compromise of the ground, degree of search, speed of movement, and frontage may be like these examples.

**EXAMPLE ONE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Force to be detected</th>
<th>Speed of movement</th>
<th>Frontage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 km/hr</td>
<td>40 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 km/hr</td>
<td>70 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 km/hr</td>
<td>100 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXAMPLE TWO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Force to be detected</th>
<th>Speed of movement</th>
<th>Frontage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 km/hr</td>
<td>30 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 km/hr</td>
<td>50 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 km/hr</td>
<td>70 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second example is an attempt to show the reduction in frontage that an increase in speed would entail.

This is the sort of calculation that the staff must make. It should underlie their instruction to the reconnaissance regiment. It is a compromise between the detail which must be found, the speed that is required by our commander or forced upon us by the enemy, and the frontage to be covered. There is no way that this compromise can be avoided. Given the nature of the terrain and its cover a commander must juggle the requirement for information, with the frontage to be covered and the speed of the movement required.

A simple approach that was used by the British is as you would expect dominated by the search of the road and track network. A search or cover of main roads only is called a green search, of main and subsidiary roads an amber search, and of all roads and tracks, a red search.

**DEGREE OF SEARCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Km/hr</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Roads</td>
<td>15-20</td>
<td>green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main &amp; subsidiary roads</td>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>amber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All roads &amp; tracks</td>
<td>5-8</td>
<td>red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontage standard</td>
<td>6 to 9 roads or about 70 to 100 kilometres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is a rough guide to the speed of the search you could expect. In the Australian context I would suggest that a green search would mean first and second class roads; an amber search, first, second and third class; and all roads and tracks would have the same meaning in the most detailed red search. The sort of frontage usually used as a yardstick is one main road per troop— that is, six to nine main roads, or 70 to 100 km for the regiment.

Now, I’m sure you remember the grand deployment pattern of mutual support — dressing by the right.
When the frontage exceeds our 20,000 metre limit, then it is not correct to merely maintain the same formation and spread out - dressing by the right. This would leave lanes between troops of four, ten or even twenty km which may contain the most interesting items or permit the passage of significant enemy forces between troops. The deployment of a reconnaissance regiment under these most normal circumstances is not like this parade ground picture. I think it can best be likened to the tips of the fingers of a clawed hand with each fingertip describing patterns within its manipulative ability.

The regimental reserve, presuming a squadron is kept in reserve - which is highly desirable, is directly controlled by the regimental commander who would use it to search areas bypassed by the forward squadrons for more detailed search and recording, and to cover gaps. The reserve squadron in this diagram is depicted moving side to side and a troop is shown detached for a short task. An example of a task for a reserve squadron might be the checking of an enemy approach regarded by the commander as possible but secondary.

This diagram depicts the deployment of the reconnaissance regiment in this fashion. The forward troops move in patterns determined by:
- the troop leader's decision within his allotted area,
- the information given to the troop leader by his squadron, and
- the squadron leader's orders to the troop leader.

The rear or reserve troops move directly under the control of the squadron leader who directs it to those areas of interest noted but not thoroughly checked by the forward troops or to areas bypassed by the forward troops.

This diagram is a further attempt to illustrate deployment.

The regiment is moving with two squadrons up. The left hand troops movement is marked by the dotted line - weaving from point to point through its 10 km of front. The reserve troop of the same squadron is carrying out a detailed check of a group of buildings not thoroughly checked by the forward troops.

The right forward squadron has dropped an infantry patrol near a drop zone already occupied by the enemy. They will maintain continuous observation on this position.

The rear squadron has been given the task of checking the group of features on the lower right of the diagram bypassed by the forward
squadrons and of providing protection for an engineer party at the bridge.

A point to note is that the reserve troop or squadron is really a reconnaissance reserve not a combat reserve.

**PLANNING AND CONTROL**

Reconnaissance is a closed loop system.

The staff ask questions, the reconnaissance elements answers of course lead to further questions, the answers to which lead to more questions and so on, gradually building a picture of the forthcoming battlefield for the commander. It is a loop where the questions asked are as important or perhaps more important than the answers. Effective reconnaissance depends on effective direction by the staff and it is this direction and the control measures which it calls into being that I now want to discuss.

There are three basic planning elements in a reconnaissance regiment's control system which can be applied to any situation or terrain.

These are:
- sector search,
- route or line search, and
- point search.

The area to be checked, watched or cleared is in the first instance divided into sectors. These can be as large as the regimental commander requires. They can be the areas enclosed by formation boundaries and report lines and bounds or they can be specially designated areas. Sector reconnaissance is the most broad category and presupposes no detailed knowledge of the enemy in that sector. The degree of search, the size of the sector and the force allocated will determine the time of search.

The next category is route or line reconnaissance which must be accompanied by the area each side of the route or line which must be checked and the clearance required. For example, mine and obstacle clearance or construction may be required.

A point that may be made here is that if engineers are not placed under command of the reconnaissance regiment, then a liaison officer must be allocated by the reconnaissance regiment to the engineers.

The last category is point reconnaissance. This as the name implies is checking specific features, buildings, bridges, cross roads or any definite location which prior reconnaissance by aircraft, SAS patrol or staff assessment might indicate is of interest.

It is a British convention to use letters for sectors, names (for some reason more often animals' names) for routes or lines, and numbers for points.

**CONVENTIONAL SEARCH CONTROL**

This diagram shows this form of symbolism. It is low level control and not a form of security. You will appreciate that the dimensions of the average sector at regimental level will vary with the terrain but would most likely be about ten by ten kilometres in open terrain.

Although the staff do not need to know these internal control methods, it is of advantage to couch requests for information or other tasks in terms of sectors, routes and points. Apart from the ease in translation, it is a convenient guide to planning.
BYPASS RULES

At this stage I should like to discuss the bypass rules which frequently cause problems. There are two rules — not one! The first is that enemy however located are not to be bypassed by elements of the reconnaissance regiment without approval from the headquarters two above the bypassing troops. Thus, regimental headquarters must approve a troop’s bypass action and formation should approve a squadron’s bypass action.

The second and often forgotten rule is that the bypassed enemy are never to be left unwatched without the approval of the next higher headquarters. Thus, a squadron never leaves a bypassed enemy without leaving someone to watch them or without requesting that some other arrangement be made by the regimental headquarters.

The staff must therefore advise the regiment:
• the enemy who may be let pass or be bypassed, and
• what arrangements are to be made to maintain observation on located enemy who are let pass or are bypassed.

I feel that it is in the area of maintaining observation of located enemy that staff instructions are frequently lacking. A conscious decision must be made by the reconnaissance regiment commander each time an enemy force is bypassed or allowed to pass. Failure by staff to provide some criteria makes the reconnaissance commander’s task difficult.

ORDERS

Orders to the regimental commander should include the following:
• Task in General. An example might be — ‘establish and maintain contact with the enemy advancing from the Texas/Goonwindi area’.
• Detailed Questions. These should be specific requirements and should include any time limitations set by the commander. Examples might be:
  (1) ‘Establish the enemy flanks and direction of advance by 2200 hrs’.
  (2) ‘Find 41 Armd Regt’.
  (3) ‘Check enemy activity especially engineer reconnaissance at the river crossing sites at GR 246789, etc’.
• Bypass Instructions. Based on rules 1 and 2, these might be:
  (1) ‘You may allow all advancing enemy to pass’.
  (2) ‘You must maintain observation of company and above groups encountered until they pass line BRAVO when the covering force will assume responsibility’.
• Boundaries, Bounds and Report Lines. These are the normal force controls.
• Degree of Search. Here, some pre-arranged instruction such as the British colour code system is used, or an assessed requirement to find, say, company sized groups, within a front of, say, 100,000 metres is stated.

Before proceeding further two important terms should be defined:
• Covering Force. This is a force appropriate to the occasion, that is tank and anti-armour heavy if the enemy have tanks, which has the task of preventing enemy interference with main force deployment for the period required by the commander. It can use harassment and deception but ultimately it must have the power to deal the enemy a blow sufficient to slow his action or force his deployment. It should be at a distance from the main force sufficient to counter enemy attempts to reach that force in the time allotted. If it is, relative to the enemy force, light in combat power, then it needs a great deal of manoeuvre space.
• Screen. The screen is a force whose task it is to prevent or disrupt enemy direct observation of the main force and to provide warning of his approach. In simple terms, it operates within visual range of the main force.

I note with interest the Pakistani view that covering and screen forces are also part of a whole pattern of attribution of the enemy outside the main force position. Perhaps we should also consider attrition as one of their tasks. (ASC Paper 1976, Major Shiek).

If we turn again to the deployment of the reconnaissance regiment it should be obvious that when one combines the appearance of the finger tips of a clawed hand manoeuvring in their allotted area — but widely scattered and the fact that bypassing must occur, then part if not all of the regiment is going to be behind and around enemy troops in many cases.

In the advance this makes administration difficult and may require echelons to travel for-
ward and across the regimental area, perhaps distances of 100 to 150 km for each resupply — avoiding contact with the enemy. It may mean resupply by air drop or landing in areas away on a flank but perhaps 50 or 100 km behind the leading enemy troops.

In withdrawal the problem is increased by the need to move against the direction of movement of our own troops and to move through or around an enemy who had the initiative and is more than likely advancing on a broad front.

What is the reconnaissance regiment doing behind the leading enemy troops? It is of course providing information on the enemy strength, weapons, dispositions, movement of guns, armour, ammunition — in short, information to tell the commander what the enemy is and what he is about.

It is also finding gaps in the enemy’s disposition, ferreting out the location of his headquarters and other prime targets for disruptive attack.

The question of engagement of the enemy by the reconnaissance regiment itself must also be considered by the staff. There are two possibilities:

- Troops fight only to extract themselves when physical contact occurs. They seek to avoid physical contact. Their success in this endeavour is usually a function heavily dependent on the nature of the terrain.
- The other alternative is to harass the enemy whenever they present an appropriate soft target with the aims of inflicting casualties, distracting attention and diverting resources away from the main effort.

I personally favour seizing every opportunity to distract the enemy. A convoy of three to four water tankers destroyed or a headquarters disrupted, can perhaps have greater effect on enemy morale, because it happens behind their forward troops, than the number of casualties would warrant. It is of course a matter of judgement, by the troop leader, of his chances in each engagement and the value of such an action.

Having accepted the need to be behind the leading enemy troops the deployment during the advance should present no conceptual problems.

This picture also could apply to a withdrawal where the enemy is advancing on a narrow front. The situation changes considerably of course as soon as we are faced with an enemy advancing on a wide front.

DEPLOYMENT IN THE ADVANCE

Now the reconnaissance regiment becomes stretched in a semi-circle cupping the enemy advance — watching maintaining contact with the front and flanks of the enemy — trying to assess the direction changes and flanking moves of the manoeuvre elements held behind the first echelon, because it is the commitment of these forces which will announce the enemy design for battle.
Eventually it may be that the semi-circle must flatten and turn inwards until the regiment is deployed like a horseshoe trying to maintain contact with an enemy who is also looking for our main force flank. It is at this stage that the covering force battle should commence. A most important preliminary to this battle is for the reconnaissance regiment to send a liaison officer to the commander of the covering force. Three things can happen as the covering force comes into contact with the enemy:

- The reconnaissance regiment can be withdrawn to other tasks.
- The reconnaissance regiment can simply be moved to the flanks as main force flank protection.
- The reconnaissance regiment can come under command of the covering force and provide it with front and flank reconnaissance.

I think that the third of these alternatives is by far the most productive. The reconnaissance regiment would, as the covering force battle unfolds, be forward of the covering force — behind the leading enemy troops and out on the flanks of the whole battle area. It is of course the most difficult choice and requires a high degree of training. We can visualise it with this diagram.

I think you can see how this form of deployment will provide the most effective information of enemy intentions and weaknesses. Its problems are mainly two:

- The calibre of the information gained is extremely dependent on the nature of the terrain. Although each troop is only five small vehicles, they do require some cover if they are to gain close information. Very open country will lead to long range observation — valuable, but like air observation lacking in detail and subject to misinterpretation and deception.
- Administration is a problem. Resupply by long movement to flanks by both supply vehicles and the forward troops is time consuming and subject to interference. However, the regiment as a whole — with its first line — has about three days endurance especially given that the enemy’s thrust forward will be slower at this stage.

I believe this form of deployment is still valid and possible when the reconnaissance regiment reverts to main force command as the covering force is withdrawn and the screen and subsequently the main battle commences. It is a difficult concept and will require a high degree of training but it will provide a commander with information on the movement of enemy formations not in the forward line whose activity will be decisive in the coming battle.

**COMMENCEMENT OF COVERING FORCE BATTLE**

*Figure 12*

**TASKS**

**Reconnaissance**

What I have been describing until now has been the reconnaissance regiment in its primary role of reconnaissance under the command of a force commander. In this role information gathering has priority over all other tasks. Harassment is an important but secondary part of this task.

TIB 28 rightly places reconnaissance as the first task of the reconnaissance regiment.

**TIB 28**

**RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT TASKS**

A. RECONNAISSANCE.
B. PROTECTION.
C. OFFENSIVE TASKS.

(1) to provide security forces, namely:

a. COVERING FORCES,
b. SCREENS,
c. ADVANCE GUARDS,
d. FLANK GUARDS or e. REAR GUARDS:
(2) as part of a counter penetration force;
(3) as part of a counter attack force or
(4) to secure obstacles and defiles.

D. PURSUIT.
E. SUPPORT FOR INFANTRY.
F. MISCELLANEOUS TASKS,
(1) vehicle escort duties,
(2) defence of key points,
(3) radio communications,
(4) rear area security.

Protection
The second task listed 'Protection' is a rather odd hotchpotch of the reconnaissance and covering and screen force tasks. It confuses protection by providing warning and information with physical action to protect the deployment or preparations of our own forces. The reconnaissance regiment is only equipped to impose delay on lightly equipped or immobile forces such as other light armoured forces or foot infantry. It cannot and should not be used to combat tanks.

Offensive Tasks
Now the tasks of covering force, screen, flank and rear guard imply an ability to prevent:
- interference with main force deployment,
- observation of main force preparation.

These tasks cannot be performed by the reconnaissance regiment alone and can only be done by properly balanced forces of tanks, infantry and guns. If the reconnaissance regiment is allotted to these tasks it should be to provide those forces with that which they are equipped and trained to do — reconnaissance. If the regiment is tasked with the command of such forces then it must be appropriately reinforced.

Reconnaissance Regiment as a Flank Guard
If the reconnaissance regiment is required to provide cover to the flanks or rear without appropriate reinforcement by tanks, guns and infantry, then it should be thought of under an old term 'Watching an Exposed Flank'. The reconnaissance regiment can work at considerable distances to the flanks of a force, say 50 to 100 km, and thus provide early information of enemy movement on the flanks. This early warning should enable the commander of the main force to make the appropriate deployments to counter the enemy action.

If the country is suitable and the terrain and/or the road system runs parallel to the main force area of operation, then moving patrols can be used and a regiment could watch both sides of a force to a depth of 50 to 100 km dependant on cover and visibility.

This diagram is an attempt to illustrate this type of watch. Two squadrons are shown on the right because the visibility is less than that on the left.

![Watching Exposed Flanks Mobile Patrols](image)

This type of mobile deployment is suitable whether the main force is moving or static.

If the terrain or road system does not run parallel with the position or axis of movement of the main force, then it will be necessary to picquet the roads or approaches to the main force. The maximum for the regiment then is to picquet six approaches and maintain a reserve, or nine approaches without a reserve. The number of patrols required for each approach of course depends on the nature of the approach. A wide valley may absorb a whole squadron, that is, three to four patrols. It is best therefore for commanders to work on the basis of six approaches for a regiment. The number of flanks that can be covered are then a
function of the number of approaches. If the main force is moving then the staff and the regimental commander may adjust the picquet positions as the force is exposed to new lines of approach. The thing to bear in mind is that as the number of approaches exceed six then regimental reserve becomes less and less able to cover the gaps and unforeseen approaches.

Counter Attack and Counter Penetration

The next two ‘Offensive Tasks’ listed in TIB 28 — ‘Counter Attack and Counter Penetration’, are not tasks for the reconnaissance regiment alone. In counter penetration it may be that the reconnaissance regiment can harass and perhaps slow the enemy’s attack, but unaided it would not stop an attack by tanks. I would suggest that its primary tasks would be to establish the direction of the penetration, find the flanks of the penetration and harass the enemy as much as possible. It would be the task of a properly constituted counter penetration force of tanks, guns and infantry to halt the penetration.

In the counter attack, unlike counter penetration, the reconnaissance regiment really should perform its major role before the attack itself is launched. It should seek out the soft parts of the enemy dispositions whose attack will counter the enemy’s plan — force the withdrawal of his penetration force if one has penetrated, or disrupt the next part of his design for battle.

When the counter attack is launched the reconnaissance regiment performs its normal reconnaissance role to the front and flanks of the counter attack force. I repeat that I do not think it is proper to use the reconnaissance regiment as an assault force and, as I will show later, I do not think it a proper unit to provide fire support for infantry in an assault.

Securing Obstacles and Defiles

The last of these offensive tasks is securing obstacles and defiles in the advance. Again the regiment must be tasked with the knowledge that the enemy equipped with tanks will find what they would relish, lightly armoured vehicles trying to hold ground and therefore awaiting destruction.

Pursuit

The bold and aggressive use of the reconnaissance regiment in this phase can be an important factor in a successful action. The regiment must thrust well out and maintain contact with the enemy, striking at his flanks, cutting his communications, shooting his soft vehicles and capturing bridges and defiles. It must however be borne in mind that if the enemy make a determined stand then the reconnaissance regiment must have immediate support from a properly constituted pursuit force of tanks, infantry and guns which should be deployed to take advantage of opportunities for destruction of the enemy, found by the reconnaissance regiment.

Support for Infantry

The 76 mm gun of the reconnaissance regiment is a direct fire weapon of very low blast effect and minimal fragmentation. Like the tank gun it is not at all suitable for neutralisation tasks and must really see its target in order to be effective. It is pointless firing the 105 mm tank gun or the 76 mm FSV gun into a clump of trees to support infantry. Therefore tanks and FSV must move so that they can see both the enemy and our own infantry. To do this, it is inevitable that they must accompany the infantry fairly closely. This is not the sort of thing one should do with light AFV and I would suggest the reconnaissance regiment should not be used to support infantry unless guns and tanks are not available and the inevitable losses from anti-armour weapons and tanks are realised and accepted.

Miscellaneous Tasks

Whether we accept the concept of our reconnaissance forces working behind the enemy forward troops or not, we must make provision for an enemy who does do this sort of thing. During the enemy advance, we should expect his reconnaissance forces to be up to 200 km ahead of his main force (Pamphlet — The Enemy, TIB 26, p. 4-3). In addition, we must expect guerrilla and terrorist activity along our lines of communication.

The tasks listed as miscellaneous, with one exception, are all related to this problem of rear area security. They are all tasks which the reconnaissance regiment is equipped to organise and perform. I would stress that organise is an operative word. The staff should present the total requirement and leave the regimental headquarters to plan the details. It is a matter for the man on the ground to decide
whether convoys should be protected by escorts or by picqueting the route. There is, in my experience, a tendency for staff to forget that the various headquarters of the reconnaissance regiment are well equipped to plan and control such activities.

The obvious exclusion from this concentration on rear area security is the task of assisting with radio communications. It is pertinent to warn you that the reconnaissance regiment communications systems are based on commander to commander operation. There are no operators who are not users as is the case in, say, infantry battalions and most headquarters. There is therefore little facility for remote operation away from the noise of generators and the hindrance of antennae. It is in my opinion, better to consider this form of assistance in the fashion of a post office where you pass the message to the reconnaissance regiment, who, through their internal nets, transmit it to the addressee.

A task not mentioned is that of traffic control; it is simple for troops to be deployed as sector controls, a squadron headquarters to form the basis of the regulating headquarters, assault troopers become pointsmen and DRs or individual vehicles become patrollers. The internal communication system of the regiment provides the basis of a traffic control net.

A less complicated list of reconnaissance regiment tasks can be constructed under the following headings.

(The gnomonic is of course, ‘SIR’ backwards).

- **Reconnaissance Tasks.** Under this heading, I would place all tasks where reconnaissance is the duty. It can be for main force, covering force, counter attack force or counter penetration force, and the regiment will be under command of that force. It would include watching an open flank which is really reconnaissance based on a line.

- **Independent Tasks.** Under this classification, I would list those tasks which use the regiment as a basis of a force appropriately structured for specific operations. For example, where the reconnaissance regiment with a squadron of tanks, a company of infantry and a regiment of medium guns, acts as the covering force for a division.

- **Security.** Here I would place road convoy escorts, picquets and the multitude of tasks associated with the security of the main force lines of communication.

**CONCLUSION**

There are three essential points which should be considered when employing the reconnaissance regiment.

The first is that the reconnaissance regiment is an integral organisation. Operationally and administratively, it works best as a whole. The three squadron organisation provides balance, capacity and an internal reserve. The headquarters at unit and sub-unit level are mobile, well equipped and have a capacity for the tasks discussed previously. Like the tank regiment and the infantry battalion, the whole has greater capacity than the sum of the parts. This is not a case of pleading the penny packet rule which, as you know, states that if you have 1,000 tanks, use them all together — if you have only five tanks use them all together, but never, never divide your tank force. The penny packet principle is concentration and shock action. The integrity of the reconnaissance regiment is a question of capacity and endurance.

The second point is that the reconnaissance regiment is organised and equipped for reconnaissance and harassment. All other tasks are instances of non optimal use of resources. A major example of this is, the tendency to use the regiment for rear area security to the detriment of its information gathering role. All units are responsible in open country warfare for their own security. No commander ever had sufficient information about his enemy.

The last point is my idea of the personality of the regiment. It is light, flexible, aggressive and inquisitive. It is the eyes and ears of the commander and the extension of his senses. I was always taught that the reconnaissance regiment was the divisional commander’s personal regiment to emphasise its responsiveness to the commander. The concomitant of this attitude is that a commander should retain, as far as possible, control of the regiment and carefully consider any decision to delegate that control.
THE EQUITY OF CONSCRIPTION

Captain John Nicholson
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps.

This article focuses on a peace-time situation. In wartime, when the majority must serve for reasons of national security, alternatives to conscription are generally infeasible.

The dictionary defines the term "equitable" as meaning fair and just, and within this context it has often been said that conscription is the only equitable way of forming an Army, and hence sharing the defence burden amongst all members of society.

Several arguments are put forward defending conscription on grounds of equity, including social justice, budgetary cost of an all volunteer force, and sharing of the defence risk. It is the aim of this article to briefly examine the basis on which these arguments are formed and offer criticism on their validity. It must be stated from the outset that any discussion on equity raises mainly normative issues and it is not my aim to discuss what should or should not be done but rather to consider the economic effects of any government action and analyse it accordingly.

The belief that conscription is a form of social justice rests on the contention that without conscription the defence burden will fall almost entirely on the 'poorer' classes, that is to say that class of persons who because of their relatively lower class backgrounds will be induced to join the military as a means of securing employment which otherwise might not be available to them in civil life. This argument is demonstrably unsound. The Australian experience of conscription from 1964 until 1972 has indicated that only 6% of all eligible males are actually called up for military service. Furthermore, only some males are eligible to be conscripted. Aboriginals, expatriates and certain religious groups are granted exemption from military service for example. When this is coupled with the fact that conscription will form only a minority of the total military strength, it will quickly be appreciated that the social sharing of the so called burden is in fact a myth. Even in the United States, where conscription was more widely distributed throughout the male population, the percentage of young men actually conscripted was low.

There is a line of argument which suggest that the budgetary costs of an all volunteer force are so high as to place too great a tax burden on society. Whilst it is reasonable to assert that an all volunteer force might involve higher budgetary costs, it is difficult to convincingly argue that therefore conscription provides a more equitable solution. This will be discussed further throughout the paper.

National defence has all the characteristics of a public good. The product is consumed by all regardless of the liability to pay; people who do not pay for the service cannot be excluded from its benefits. Defence is financed by taxation and in this area the conscript is being forced to pay more than his fair share of the tax burden. The conscript's tax is the opportunity cost of the best employment alternative which he has had to forswear for compulsory military service. As the conscript is young and hence earning, on the average, less income than his elders this particular tax is extremely regressive in nature.

It is in the area of moral obligation of sharing the risk that the pro-conscription argument is, I believe, at its weakest. With the possible exception of civil jury service, conscription is the only obligatory public service which Australians have had to endure. In all other occupations the individual's freedom of employment choice remains of paramount concern, regardless of the relation to the
national interests. Far from sharing the defence burden more evenly, conscription actually achieves the reverse. The conscript is typically young, single and healthy. He furthermore forms a small minority of the total work force.

Hereafter greater consideration will be given to what is an efficient allocation of resources rather than a normative discussion on what is equitable. This paper concerns itself with the means of achieving Pareto optimal allocation of resources.

The concept of cost is a vague one unless stated more specifically. In this article I shall confine discussion to the costs to government, the costs to conscripts, the costs to the volunteers and finally the costs to society as a whole.

One argument for conscription is that the wage costs of an all volunteer army are, by necessity, higher than those which must be paid to a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers and is therefore a less equitable method of achieving our defence requirements.

Historically the army has recruited its male other ranks (non officers) from the not so well educated group in society. Consequently the wage rate the soldier has received has been aligned with the unskilled or semi skilled civilian wage. This still remains the case in Australia even though the average education of today's soldier is higher than it has been in previous years. Hence it appears unlikely that the efforts of recruiters to induce higher levels of enlistment will succeed on the basis of job opportunity alone. The tendency of Australian youth to continue on to higher education suggests that the numbers available for voluntary enlistment will fall relatively as more and more young men and women obtain a higher education and seek superior employments. If this is the case then care must be taken to ensure that the force level does not drop to unacceptable levels.

Voluntary enlistments can best be increased by improving pay and conditions. Other methods such as improved recruiting campaigns will undoubtedly have some effect but will not be considered here. Improvements in conditions will be regarded as part of the overall wage cost. What are the costs? The question is basically one of considering the interaction of supply and demand. Put at its simplest, under free market competition price will vary until the supply and demand curves are in equilibrium. Conscription is an artificial constraint on free market operation. The government can regulate the level of supply and consequently prevent free market forces from operating normally.

The supply and demand analysis for voluntary enlistments in the forces can be expected to follow normal lines. The labour market is perfectly competitive with the Army being just one of the many employers seeking the labour resource.

Consider a supply function for an Australian all volunteer force. The supply of volunteers depends upon the size of the population base from which volunteers can be expected to be drawn and also the rate of enlistment from this population. Australian statistics indicate that 95% of all volunteer enlistments have come from the 17-24 years old age group; a group whose relative educational achievement is rising, hence suggesting even greater taxation on those that are misfortunate enough to be conscripted. The rate of voluntary enlistments is dependant upon many variables. Such inducements as patriotism, the opportunity to travel and security are examples. If we denote the wages paid to the serviceman and his civilian counterpart as \( W_m \) and \( W_c \) respectively, and denote the non-pecuniary advantages (or disadvantages) as \( d \), then it will be intuitively clear that to obtain a voluntary enlistee it will be necessary for \( W_m > W_c - d \). (\( d \) will be negative in the case of a perceived disadvantage). As it is difficult to quantify to what extent these external inducements would affect the supply function, they have not been considered. The sole determinant is assumed to be the wage rate. Various possible supply functions have been proposed by economists and have all displayed the usual upward sloping characteristics expected. What is of particular importance is the elasticity of supply.

\[
\varepsilon = \frac{dQ}{dP} \frac{P}{Q}
\]

\( Q \) = total members

\( P \) = current military wage rate

\( dQ \) = change in number of members

\( dP \) = change in military wage

The elasticity of supply will be greater in the long run when all adjustments in response to higher price have been made. In the short run lags may be too large for any recognizable response to be noticed. A wage rise for soldiers will not provide an immediate reaction;
however, in the long run, such pay rises may be quite significant.

Turning to the demand side of the enlistment function we are best served by considering a gross ‘flow’ rather than ‘stock’ demand for accessions from civilian life. The number of accessions which must be enlisted in any year must cover the losses during the year plus the change in stock demand\(^4\).

\[ \text{At} = \text{Lt} + (\text{St} - \text{St}-1) \text{, where } t \text{ is the current period.} \]

If we assume constant stock requirements, i.e. no required increase in military strength, then the net accessions required will be equal to the losses incurred in the previous period \(t-1\).

Graphically the situation looks as follows:

![Graph](image)

**Figure 1**

- **S** = Supply curve for military labour in a free market
- **S’** = Supply curve for military labour with conscription

Making the assumption that demand is constant and set at a government determined optimum figure, the resulting demand curve will be a vertical line.

Secondly, assuming that the supply curve will be upward sloping, we can see the market clearing equilibrium point is at wage rate \(W_v\). Now by introducing conscription the government is effectively moving the supply curve outward thus causing a drop in the equilibrium wage (equilibrium only in the sense that at this point demand and supply intersect) and the wage rate will be at \(W_c\). \(W_v - W_c\) is the additional wage which must be paid to attract enough volunteers into the forces.

When analysing the additional costs involved in raising an all volunteer force, there are considerations to be made other than the increased wage rate alone. The real cost is actually considerably less as the personal turnover rate of a force made up partly of conscripts is higher than that of an all volunteer force. This higher turnover rate involves a higher number of men in training, both as trainees and instructors, than is the case for a voluntary force who tend to serve for much longer periods. As a logical consequence to the above, it is reasonable to assume that if the number of training staff could be reduced so too could the level of overall manpower strength, thus producing a further reduction in the total wage cost. The demand curve of Figure 1 would be shifted to the left.

There exists a further possibility that the volunteer will prove to be more efficient than his conscript counterpart, and hence the real cost will be lessened further.

As most of the increased wage bill for the forces will be subject to personal income tax, a certain percentage will be recouped by these taxes thus lessening the total government cost. Nevertheless, the cost to the Department of Defence will not be lessened as the monies collected from taxes will be paid straight to the treasury.

The final offsetting aspect to the additional wage cost relates to the capital-labour ratio. With conscription available and the consequent wage rate lower than the free market equilibrium level, military labour can be viewed as a relatively cheap resource. Hence labour is often used inefficiently. An increase in the wage rate for servicemen would induce the military planners to become somewhat more capital intensive in their defence strategy. Reasonably this could be expected to produce an increase in the nation’s technological advancement.

At the beginning of this article the taxation aspect of conscription was introduced. An analysis of this cost will now be developed further. The conscript is obliged to forego his civilian occupation and devote a period of his life to compulsory military service. There are two aspects of his opportunity cost to be considered. Firstly, it is probable that the actual wage rate he will earn in the Army will be less than that which he would have received in civilian employment. This of course does not have to be true but at least for him \(W_m < W_c - d\). Added to this is the implicit loss in future earnings by having his civilian career delayed by the period of his conscription;
although some studies have indicated that in the United States the income of ex-servicemen in civilian employment is not significantly different from the income of civilians who have not served in the forces.

In addition to the purely financial loss which the conscript must bear, are the non-pecuniary disadvantages he faces. In direct opposition to the inducements for some young men to voluntarily choose a service career, are the disadvantages of military life as seen by some. The physical training, need to submit to authority and discipline are examples.

Quantifiably, seen at its best, this tax will be at least equal to:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{W_C - (W_v + d)}{(1 + r)^i} \right)$$

where

- $n$ = number of years served as a conscript
- $r$ = interest rate

On grounds of equity alone, surely an explicit tax on all taxpayers is more equitable than the implicit tax which the minority conscript is unwittingly obliged to pay.

Consideration must also be given to the costs which the volunteer faces because of conscription. In Figure 1, this loss in potential earnings is equal to $W_v - W_c$, and is a rent paid by the volunteer. Pareto optimality does not exist. Both the conscript and the volunteer are being made worse off whilst those who are not conscripted, the majority, receive a gain because they do not have to financially contribute as much to the cost of defence as they otherwise would.

Furthermore, the volunteer must work with others whom he knows would prefer to be employed elsewhere. It is not unreasonable to assume that consequently his morale and esprit de corps will be somewhat lessened, and perhaps so too will his military efficiency.

Turning to the costs to society aspect of conscription, we consider the real economic costs of conscription versus voluntary enlistment. Is conscription efficient? The answer is demonstrably NO. The 1970 Gates Commission Report stated in part:

"It is true that the budget for a voluntary force will generally be higher than for an equally effective force of conscripts and volunteers, but the cost of the voluntary force will be less than the cost of the mixed force."

The real costs of conscription include the implicit taxes which have been discussed earlier, the uncertainties that it induces and specifically the inefficiencies that it introduces.

The facets of conscription which create inefficiencies have been briefly mentioned before, and will now be further developed.

As was stated previously, it is not the manpower strength per se, but the manpower capability and effectiveness which is important. The Australian experience has been that the average volunteer provides an average of almost five years service and he reaches a high state of proficiency over that time. In comparison the same level of service from the conscript requires three men, assuming a conscription period of eighteen months. It is highly improbable that those three soldiers in total will reach the same level of proficiency as the five years of voluntary service has achieved. The minimum length of time given in training to the new recruit is three months basic training and a further three months trade training. Any lesser period has been proven to be ineffective in producing efficiently trained soldiers and in fact, the average length of time spent in training the Australian soldier is considerably longer.

When we consider the number of people who must be employed in the administration and training of the additional recruits as a result of conscription, it will be apparent that the strength of the volunteer force can be considerably lower than the mixed force figure. Hence, the conscripted force involves the withdrawal of a large number of men from the workforce and therefore a larger opportunity cost. Perhaps more importantly, some of these conscripts have valuable civilian skills which could be put to more efficient uses. However, it does not appear to be the case that the conscript obtains any high degree of training in the Army that he can transfer to his future civilian occupation. In a survey of 10,000 former U.K. National Servicemen only 3.5% of those who had been in employment before call up said that they wanted to change from their pre-service occupations in order to make use of skill and experience they had acquired in the forces.

A further example of the inefficiencies of conscription was also mentioned briefly in this article earlier. The lower military wage which will be apparent with a mixed force leads to
inefficient use of the military labour resource. The economist Von Thunen may have overstated the situation somewhat when he said in 1845, "... one will sacrifice in battle a hundred human beings in the prime of their lives without a thought in order to save one gun (because) the purchase of a cannon causes an outlay of public funds, whereas human beings are to be had for nothing by means of a mere conscription decree." However it is the case that conscription leads to more labour intensive methods being used than would be the case with an all volunteer force.

There is another real cost which conscription imposes; that of the costs that arise from the uncertainty of the draft. Young men in the age group liable to be conscripted will find that the uncertainty of the draft will induce them to defer decisions relating to further education and employment until they are sure of their fate. In conjunction with this, there will be considerable efforts by some to avoid conscription by such methods as deliberately inducing medical conditions, marriage, etc.

CONCLUSION

The budgetary expense of an all volunteer force is not necessarily a real cost to society. Conscription, however, imposes real economic costs considerably greater than with an all volunteer force. It is perhaps understandable why governments take a narrow, budgetary view of the costs of alternative actions rather than a broad social viewpoint. Undoubtedly the additional explicit taxes required to raise an all volunteer army weighs more heavily on the political scales than the additional civilian production foregone.

There are offsetting savings to government associated with a volunteer army; including the lower rate of labour turnover, the fewer number of training staff required, and also a more efficient capital-labour ratio.

Conscription imposes real economic costs on society in as much as considerable civilian production is lost.

Conscription is inefficient and inequitable. The real costs are high and to a great extent borne by an unfortunate few.

NOTES

1. Notably by a former Defence Minister, Mr Fraser, when he said, "A system that insulates the wealthy, privileged, better off and higher educated from the implications of obligations for defence is an unjust system."
2. Pareto's view is that resources are not optimally employed if it is possible to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. Singling out labour, labour is not optimally employed in Pareto's sense if any individual is willing to work for the net value of his marginal product and is unable to do so. Tisdell C.A. The Theory Of Economic Allocation, Sydney, John Wiley, 1972, p.4.
6. Withers, Glen, Concription, Necessity and Justice, Angus and Robertson, 1972, p.95.
PEACE IN OUR TIME?

-An examination of the attempts to achieve peace in the inter-war years through the theories of disarmament and collective security

Alison Littler

Preface

INTERNATIONAL politics is a fascinating yet complex area of study. Understanding the forces that determine political relations between nations and the way in which these forces act upon each other is no simple task because we come up against the massive questions of peace, power politics and war. However, having an understanding of these questions is a key to making sense of current international relations and tensions.

For many years now the international political scene has been dominated by the US and USSR and while new elements have made their presence felt in the past decade, namely the European Community acting with a unified voice and the Third World nations (including China), the US and USSR are still the main active participants in the struggle for world power. While the 1970s are witnessing a stepping up of rivalry and open competition for spheres of influence between these two giants, there has been a parallel increase in 'peace initiatives'. Efforts to achieve international peace and security generally have fallen into broad areas, those of disarmament or peace through limitation and alliances, or peace through collective security.

The theory of disarmament, that is the abolition or reduction of arms, is generally based on the assumption that armaments and competing national build-ups of armaments (an 'arms race') is responsible for the outbreak of war. The outcome of an arms race is always a 'constantly increasing burden of military preparations devouring an ever greater portion of the national budget and making for ever deepening fears, suspicions and insecurity.'

The situation preceding World War I, with the naval competition between Germany and Great Britain and the rivalry of the French and German armies, illustrates this point. The disarmament theory says than since "men fight because they have arms" take away or reduce their armaments and there will be no fighting.

It was this belief which led to the first serious attempt to achieve disarmament after World War I when the Versailles Treaty made provisions for the unilateral disarmament of Germany. Articles 159-210 of the Treaty were the disarmament clauses and clearly banned the use of 'offensive' weapons, those which had helped Germany to attack. They included, for the army, mobile field guns of over 105mm calibre, tanks, armoured cars and 'all similar constructions' and all forms of poison gas. For the navy, surface vessels of over 10,000 tons displacement were banned, also aircraft carriers and submarines. Any military or naval air forces were prohibited. The manufacture of arms, ammunition and other war material was to be strictly limited and subject to allied control. Certain German fortifications were to be disarmed and dismantled, and limits were placed on manpower. To ensure these terms were followed an allied commission of control was established.

Despite these comprehensive disarmament terms it became clear to the Allied Control...
Commission that many clauses were being evaded and that Germany was ‘secretly’ rearming. The tale of Germany’s ‘secret rearmament’ is a masterpiece of circumvention and surreptitious maneuvering on the part of the Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, Colonel General Hans von Seeckt. The Allied Control Commission was powerless to stop this rearmament and was withdrawn, as scheduled, in 1927. The Commission issued a report stating “Germany had never disarmed, had never had the intention of disarming.” The result of the first serious attempt to achieve disarmament was failure.

It was claimed that an imposed disarmament would not work, that disarmament had to be voluntarily undertaken. The task of disarmament then fell to the League of Nations which, under Article 8 of the Covenant, had a duty to draw up a plan for world-wide reduction of arms. Article 8 states: “that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.” Much of the work of the League of Nations between 1920-33 was taken up with the question of disarmament.

The only successful provisions of the interwar years are found in the Washington Treaty of 1922 for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 and the London Naval Conference of 1930. These treaties were concluded outside the jurisdiction of the League mainly between the US, Britain and Japan. France and Italy could never agree on parity and Japan withdrew from all treaties in 1934 to resume its freedom of action. Despite these limited successes failure was the common result of discussions from 1920-24 under the auspices of the League. Initial discussion became bogged down in a mass of technical problems, not the least being how to define “disarmament”. How could nations with different sized armies and navies agree on the ratio on which they would disarm? How would nations with vastly different population numbers agree on a ratio? How many field guns is a tank worth? How many men is an officer worth? How to determine which weapons are “offensive” and which “defensive”? The technical aspects of the ratio and standard of allocation of armaments between nations turned discussions into long and laborious sessions, and complicated discussion to the point of stagnation.

During this period three main problem areas fundamental to disarmament discussion constantly arose. The first concerned qualitative disarmament where the aim is direct numerical reduction of forces by agreed ratios. The problem was the immediate practical one of obtaining agreement on ratios. There was also the great complexity of land and air disarmament compared with naval disarmament. Agreement was impossible to reach when nations felt they were being penalised or unfairly treated.

Arisng out of this was the second problem area which concerned nations’ feelings of security or lack of security and their consequent distrust and suspicion of each other’s ambitions and motives. Those nations closest to Germany, particularly France, and the most vulnerable to German attack, felt that disarmament should follow security whereas those nations not under threat and further away, especially Britain and the US, wanted direct disarmament as the first step.

The belief that disarmament should follow, not precede, security led to the idea of providing additional guarantee in addition to the Covenant itself. But of course to guarantee assistance against aggression the aggressor has to be identified first, and herein lay the crux of the third problem.

In response to these problems a Preparatory Commission for a World Disarmament Conference was set up by the League Council in 1925. It was to make its approach to disarmament by means of the “direct method — to leave aside the question of the political conditions which might eventually lead to a reduction of armaments, and to concentrate its attention on the armaments themselves, in the hope that such a study might reveal, as the Washington Conference had done, the possibility of immediate and proportionate reduction in the existing figures. If this were once achieved, it was widely believed, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries and among the former neutrals, that there would follow a rapid increase in confidence and co-operation, which would make subsequent reduction progressively easier.”

The Preparatory Commission represented most countries and in leaving aside political
considerations concentrated its efforts on solving the technical complexities of the technical aspects of armaments and disarmament. "How should armaments be defined? How could they be compared? Could offensive weapons be distinguished from those intended only for defence? What were the various forms which limitation or reduction might take? Could the total war strength of a country be limited or only its peace establishments? Was it possible to exclude civil aviation from the calculation of air armaments? How could such factors as population, industrial resources, communications, geographical position, be reckoned in preparing an equitable scheme? Could there be regional schemes of reduction, or must reduction necessarily be planned on a world scale?" — were some of the questions with which the Commission had to grapple.  

While various technical committees were at work compiling lengthy documentation on the whole field of armaments it became clear that political considerations could not be ignored. The French suspected the British of trying to rid itself of peace-keeping commitments while the British suspected the French of trying to maintain their military predominance in Europe. Italy claimed equality with France in naval matters to which the French objected and in the matter of international supervision of members fulfilling their responsibilities, the US and Italy refused to allow any international team on their soil. Continual suspicion and distrust led to competition and disagreement between nations, rather than limitation and mutual trust.  

An Arbitration and Security Committee was set up as a parallel organisation to deal with political concepts but relations between nations were becoming more tense as events external to the Commission were beginning to undermine all its efforts to achieve disarmament. These external events included growing concern over Germany's unashamedly obvious rearmament programme; the rise of fascism which was increasingly threatening to change the balance of power in Europe and Asia; the world economic crisis with its wake of internal disorder and unrest requiring Governments' attention; and the world-wide public outcry over the threat of another war and the urgent need for disarmament. These political pressures were forcing nations to reconsider their priorities. There was simply not time to be tied down to the endlessly complex technicalities of disarmament.

At the end of five years' work by the Preparatory Commission there was still no satisfactory agreement to disarm.

When the World Disarmament Conference (1932-34) began it was dominated by Japan's undeclared war against Manchuria, the advance of German fascism and the world financial crisis. Overshadowed by mutual distrust and accusations apportioning blame, the Conference was thus placed very firmly in the context of international politics and became significant as a pointer to the future course for international relations.  

The Conference opened with proposals for qualitative disarmament, that is the abolition or reduction of 'offensive' weapons. There was the possibility of agreement at last on this basis and after various interruptions to the Conference, not the least being Japan's continued aggression in China, the US continued the debate with an additional proposal for quantitative reduction. Germany simply withdrew from the Conference on the pretext that equality of rights was not being respected, and was thus free to continue its preparations unhindered.

The second year of the Conference too, reflected general developments in the international situation. Japan resigned from the League as her armies advanced in China and was undisturbed by the League's disapproval. The Nazis in Germany were becoming stronger and their brutality against internal opposition and resistance was growing. Italy attempted to draw herself, Britain, France and Germany together into a Pact outside the confines of the League, but that, too, failed when France objected to equality with Germany. Then Germany finally left the League, making the Pact void.

The Conference once again became deadlocked and not even the diversion of the World Economic Conference in London, which discussed the question of economic stability before political stability, was not enough to revive the dying Disarmament Conference. By 1934 armaments were the preoccupation not disarmament. The Disarmament Conference ended in failure and no measures were taken for another meeting.
Morgenthau, in his *Politics Among Nations*, sees the history of disarmament raising four fundamental questions. Success or failure to disarm depends upon the answers given to these questions. "(a) What should be the ratio among the armaments of different nations? (b) What is the standard according to which, within this ratio, different types and quantities of armaments are to be allocated to different nations? (c) Once these two questions have been answered, what is the actual effect of the answers in view of the intended reduction of armaments? (d) What is the bearing of disarmament upon the issues of international order and peace?"

As the struggle for international peace during the inter-war years shows, the answers to the above questions depend very largely on a climate of political stability and mutual trust. Disarmament by itself cannot prevent war just as an arms build-up does not create a war. The work of the Preparatory Commission shows this particularly well. It attempted to concentrate solely on the technical aspects of disarmament and avoid all political considerations, yet independently of their efforts external events were developing international tensions and undermining their work. Morgenthau expresses this relationship between armaments and political concerns clearly when he says, "Disarmament or at least regulation of armaments is an indispensable step in a general settlement of international conflicts. It can, however, not be the first step. Competition for armaments reflects, and is an instrument of, the competition for power. So long as nations advance contradictory claims in the contest for power, they are faced by the very logic of the power contest to advance contradictory claims for armaments. Therefore a mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest is a precondition for disarmament."

Certainly an arms race can aggravate a tense situation, just as Germany's secret then open rearmament worried League members. But Germany's rearmament was to facilitate both the internal rise of fascism and aggressive claims for further territory. The assumption that an arms build-up causes war is to confuse causes and symptoms. "A mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest is a precondition for disarmament", and it was after the Preparatory Commission reached an impasse, strangled by technical complexities, that this settlement of the power contest began to concern the World Disarmament Conference and provided the link with the League's principles of collective security.

Throughout efforts to achieve disarmament it was clear that nations would never agree to any disarmament proposals if they felt threatened or insecure. Most individual nations see armaments as a necessary defensive step to gain security for themselves. With the system of collective security however, the group of nations takes collective care of the security of individual nations. The theory of collective security is based on the belief that international organisations will provide a bigger deterrent to a possible aggressor and provide a stronger defence for nations under attack.

During the 1920s the League of Nations dealt with a series of formalistic attempts to regulate problems of international peace and security beginning with its own Covenant. Under the Covenant every member state was obliged "to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Article 11 stated that "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League." So, the League in fact began its existence on the assumption that it should facilitate and even create a system of collective security. This initial statement was followed by the League's "Interpretative Resolutions" of 1921, the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Locarno Treaties of 1925 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.

According to David Ziegler in *War, Peace and International Politics*, a system of collective security exists where states "join together, usually by signing a treaty, and make an explicit commitment to do two things: (1) they renounce the use of force to settle disputes with each other and (2) they promise to use force against any of their number who break Rule 1." For the theory to be practical and workable, however, there are three preconditions which must exist. Firstly, the collective system must be strong enough to prohibit challenge from possible aggressors; secondly, members of the collective must be prepared to defend the same concept of security; and thirdly, individual members of the collective
system must be prepared to subjugate rival interests to the common good.9

The theory and logic of collective security is flawless and it is possible that all these preconditions may exist in a particular situation. However, as Morgenthau succinctly says: “there is nothing in past experience and in the general nature of international politics to suggest that such situation is likely to occur.”10

The League’s doctrine of collective security was not tested with a major international crisis in the 1920s. The first practical test came with the Manchurian crisis of 1931. In September of that year Japan’s economic control of Manchuria was sealed with a military takeover of Chinese arsenals and garrisons and the establishment of a puppet government. The League set up an inquiry into the events and the result, the Lytton Report, concluded that China had been the victim of aggression. But rather than go to China’s aid the League took refuge behind the legalistic claim that because Japan had not formally declared war, the league was powerless to intervene and could only refuse to recognize the changes in territory. The league’s moral condemnation did nothing to alter Japan’s flagrant acts of aggression. Japan simply withdrew from the League and was free to continue its aggression unopposed.

This crisis revealed a basic weakness in the system. To take effective action against a far-distant country like Japan, the League had to rely on Britain bearing the brunt of the effort. But since Britain judged it a diversion from the main threat in the European theatre, nothing was done. Thus, in the Manchurian crisis, the promise to use force against an aggressor was disregarded and individual nations were not prepared to subjugate their interests to the common good.

The second major crisis which developed and confronted the League came from South America in the territorial dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932. An arms embargo was imposed by the League but without US co-operation to enforce the embargo, the League’s actions were futile. It was later discovered that failure to take decisive steps against Italy was the deliberate result of a secret agreement between Britain and France to apply only limited sanctions so that Italy could keep control of about half of Ethiopia under the pretext of administering it for the League. Even Emperor Haile Selassie appeared before the League in 1936 to plead for support and he appeared as a “living reproach to its cowardice and passivity,”11 the League did nothing to help. In fact the reverse occurred when sanctions against Italy were lifted.

It was this third crisis confronting the League which led to the collapse of the system of collective security espoused by the League and illustrated some of the theory’s structural weaknesses. The Great Powers with convincing rhetoric supported the principles of collective security but secretly believed in the old balance of power and were not prepared to give up their own rival claims for power. The attempt by Britain and France during the Ethiopian crisis to keep Italy ‘on side’ against Germany is an illustration of the point that “preparing a defence against Germany in Europe was more important to Britain and France than the abstract principle of opposing aggression no matter where it occurred.”12

Perhaps the most serious weakness in the theory of collective security shown by these crises is that “no nation or combination of nations, however strong and devoted to international law, can afford to oppose by means of collective security all aggression at all times, regardless of by whom and against who it may be committed.”13 With such a fundamental weakness as this, can the theory ever work at all?

Despite the wishes and intentions of the League after World War I to achieve a lasting peace all efforts were unsuccessful. Proponents of the disarmament theory could not guarantee security to nations and no nation which feels itself under threat is likely to give up its means of defence. Without mutual trust and a sense of security disarmament is impractical and an unrealisable aim. By the same token collective security is just as impractical and unrealistic. The theory is flawless but in practice is doomed to failure. “It is the supreme paradox of collective security that any attempt to make it work with less than ideal perfection will have the opposite effect from what it is supposed to achieve.”14

The theories of disarmament and collective security failed to achieve peace during the interwar years because they could not work in an atmosphere of mistrust, tension and conflict. Despite the rhetoric and promises made the Great Powers first and foremost acted in their own interests. It would not be difficult to con-
clude that these powers were never really interested in disarmament or collective security but only the struggle for the balance of power.

Conclusion

It is reasonable to ask at this stage "Is our situation very different today?" The same theories are still expounded and they are based on the same assumptions about peace and war, as they were after World War I. Even the rhetoric of "lasting peace", "peace initiatives" and "peace in our time" sounds the same.

When we assess the likelihood of current "peace initiatives" by the superpowers of securing a lasting peace, whether these initiatives be under the cloak of detente, the optimism of Pugwash or the euphoria of Camp David, we should be aware of the lessons of the events preceding World War II. Unless superpower rivalry and competition for control of large areas of the world ceases, all attempts to achieve arms limitation and security through alliances are surely doomed to failure.

In the light of this statement is it too cynical to ask whether detente is a feasible concept? Or does it really signify a breathing space for each side to reorganize ready for the attack? 

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 383.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 500.
7. Ibid., p. 401.
9. Ibid., p. 405.
10. Ibid., pp. 192-8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue are, or will be, available in defence libraries shown below:
Rust and Brassey's Defence Year Book 1977-8 (pp. 57-8) 1MD, 2MD, 3MD, 6 MD, Armoured Centre, ASC, Campbell Park, Russell 'F', Defence Regional Library (Victoria), JSSC, LWC, N. Queensland, RANSC, Remington Centre.
Watson, Peter, War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology, (p. 64) is on order (12 copies).
Once again Brassey’s Year book brings together a distinguished group of authors, all of whom, both male and female, contribute regularly to the defence debate in the free world. It is not often that such diversely differing and politically polarised personalities are brought together under one cover, and the result is to provide at once both a well-informed and thoroughly stimulating publication. The most striking note that the majority of the authors make is that defence must continue to receive priority both financially and philosophically if the dangers posed by those who threaten world peace and stability are to be effectively met. The compilation is made even more effective by virtue of the variety of subjects covered.

To take the subjects geographically, perhaps the most unusual area covered is South America and the Falkland Islands. Both articles clearly highlight the dangers involved in ignoring this part of the world, and the strategic gains that such apathy might leave open for the USSR to exploit. In addition, South America has suffered considerably from terrorism, and this subject is covered both in David Bronheim’s article on South America and more fully in Peter Janke’s fascinating article on Nuclear Terrorism. Several of the authors have alluded to the vacuum left as a result of the nuclear stalemate, and terrorism has perhaps been one of the new players in this vacuum. It is commonly felt that nuclear terrorism could seriously endanger not only life, but the nuclear balance that has ensued over thirty years free from world war. However, this author in some measure manages to allay our fears by taking an objective look at both the problems facing the terrorist and those facing the counter terrorist, and by outlining the methods available to counter the threats.

The many problems facing the Europeans in the NATO alliance are well covered in articles on West Germany and Belgium, in addition to a very lucid contribution from Field Marshal Lord Carver on Britain’s Defence Effort. The problems facing standardization of equipment appear frequently in these articles, and the compilers of the Year Book have laid emphasis on this by including an article by Patrick Wall devoted exclusively to standardization. The author is an often and vociferously heard parliamentary defence speaker for the Conservative Party in Great Britain, and so it is of particular interest that the compilers have included an article by a Labour politician, Lord Thompson, on ‘Defence and the European Community’. It is perhaps no coincidence that they both agree markedly in what they say, and it is a measure of the concern felt in Europe about the economics of defence that has brought two such politically disparate gentlemen to similar conclusions. As Lord Thompson quotes from Mr Leo Tindemans’ Report on European Union, “European Union will not be complete unless it has drawn up a common defence policy”. The price of modern defence escalates in the face of growing sophistication of Soviet technology, and it is only by close political co-operation and thus cohesion that Europe will produce the political will to give defence the economic priority it is due, and only by rationalization of equipment procurement and production that Europe will be able to palatably carry that financial burden.

The compilers have also included articles on the Asian scene, and in particular on the capabilities of the three key Indian Ocean states, and China. The weakness of Pakistan is highlighted, and in view of the increasing modernization of Chinese forces covered in the article on China, and the continuing potential for violence in the Iran, Pakistan, India and China hub, the West must continue to provide the means and equipment to maintain an equilibrium in this area.

It is fitting perhaps in these times of political apathy towards the financial responsibilities...
involved in defence that the sternest warning against inactivity should come once again from a Churchill, in his article on Africa. As in the articles on South America and the Falkland Islands the message to the West is that to remain aloof from the increasing tension in Africa merely leaves the door open for Communist exploitation, in the aftermath of 'bloody catastrophe'.

The compilers of the 1977/78 Brassey's Year Book have indeed gathered up a gloomy strategic picture. Apart from the more encouraging articles on logistics and nuclear terrorism, and the slightly misplaced article on airships, the tenor of thought of these authors who think seriously about defence and strategy is that the dangers and threats to the Free World are as great as ever. They urgently emphasise the need for the Western nations to have the will and the political cohesion to make the sacrifice necessary to meet the threat. Brassey's Year Book should be applauded for once again serving as a reminder to us all that the threats to freedom have not diminished despite the illusion of virtual world peace.

PART 2 — WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

The ‘Weapons Technology’ part of the Year Book balances the ‘Strategic Review’ very effectively. It is well laid out and manages to cover an enormous amount of material without ever becoming bogged down or confusing. The diagrams are both clear and helpful, but perhaps there could have been a few more pictures.

The coverage of the current strategic weaponry of the super powers at the beginning of this part of the book is most useful. It emphasizes that whilst the strategy of the great powers has not changed dramatically over the past two decades, the ever-increasing effectiveness of military technology has been found to affect the flavour and nature of that strategy. For instance, the cruise missile issue has seen a blurring of strategy and tactics, and has added a new dimension to the SALT talks. Despite the technological revolution however, men are still of vital importance in battle, and this is emphasized on several occasions in this section —whether it be on the battlefield, flying an aircraft, or fighting a warship.

On the tactical side there are a number of strands running through the three main sections covered. For instance, the importance of surveillance in all three environments is stressed. The firepower of modern weapons can be so swift and so overpowering that quick, reliable and long range surveillance is essential if the effects of such weapons are to be properly countered. At sea ASW and ELINT play a greater and greater part in naval tactics. Modern technological developments such as passive sensors to guide surface effect warships and satellite surveillance to monitor hostile movement have greatly extended the ability of the fleet to increase its ‘reach’. On the battlefield the RPV is being continuously developed for reconnaissance beyond the FEB A, and will release manned aircraft for other tasks. This in turn will mean more aircraft for air defence and integrated fighter ground attack, assisting in repelling the massive air and armour thrust that will probably presage a major Warsaw Pact incursion.

Another continuing technological process is in the field of weapon guidance and ‘smart bombs’. In all three environments the use of lasers and terminal guidance systems is discussed. In addition there is some interesting material on ‘smart torpedos’ and other forms of weapon guidance.

Perhaps of most rapidly increasing importance is the field of electronic warfare, which is not unnatural when one considers the increasingly complex technological emphasis of modern weapons. Each revolution in weaponry triggers off a massive technological effort to counter, confuse or seduce the weapon before it can reach its target. In contrast the aim of the weapon designer is to produce a system that can not only out-maneuvre known electronic counter measures, but can be an improvement in terms of accuracy and if necessary, power as well.

The authors of this year's Brassey's Year Book have taken nothing for granted in their section on weapon technology. They have covered the whole complex spectrum of modern weaponry, but at no stage do they assume great knowledge on the part of the reader, and when greater knowledge is required the writers are at pains to explain matters clearly and simply. This publication is a must for all those interested in modern warfare, and should be required reading for all military officers.
NAPOLEON — THE LAST CAMPAIGNS

Reviewed by Wing Commander P. J. Rusbridge
Department of Defence, Canberra

Nemesis for Napoleon

When asked on television once what he thought were the main consequences of the Napoleonic Wars, an eminent British historian paused for a moment to think. Eventually, he replied that he thought it was too soon to say. As I recall, he did not mean, primarily, that the events of those days were still being analysed. Rather he meant that the enormous changes caused by the wars are still being felt throughout Europe and the world.

One could argue over a few beers far into the night on this question—indeed I have done so. However, since reading this book, I am beginning to wonder whether it is not after all true as well that the wars are still being analysed. Colonel Lawford’s book is replete with maps and diagrams—far more so than the average book on history. The maps are presented with such clarity and care that I believe they can give fresh insight into the story of Napoleon’s last three great campaigns.

The insight I gained leads me to question many authorities, including Clausewitz, who argue, for example, that Napoleon’s 1814 campaign before Paris was one of his most brilliant. I would hesitate to recommend a better campaign of Napoleon’s—I have some ideas, certainly, but they do not relate to this book. However, I can legitimately try to explain how reading this book has lowered my estimation of Napoleon. The explanation covers both the strategy and tactics of Napoleon and his enemies.

To begin with, one can argue that throughout most of the Napoleonic Wars, the French fought continental armies built around and operated on the extremely formalized and ritualistic methods of warfare of the eighteenth century. The French armies were not like that at all. That style died out in France with the fall of the Ancien Regime. It was replaced, initially, by sheer disorganization and chaos. Out of this chaos grew a new army of citizens, rather than soldiers, who were unversed in military traditions, styles and values.

In the very early days, they were little more than a hungry rabble, rushing to the frontier to repel enemies who sought to deny them the fruits of their Revolution. What they lacked in discipline and military skill they more than made up for in fervour, elan and courage.

Their impact on their more conventional enemies was dramatic. Even at this distance in time, one can sense the feeling that if only the French had played the game properly, without breaking the rules, then they could have been beaten. However, what else could one expect from soldiers who were not gentlemen. To fight the French was almost beneath one’s dignity—especially as one kept losing.

From this point of view, it is but a short step to argue that, almost by accident, and certainly not by design, the French improvised a method of warfare which made the previous eighteenth century style hopelessly inadequate. So long as a commander insisted on meeting a French revolutionary army with outmoded methods, the odds were heavily against him.

One can further suggest that Napoleon’s secret of success was to recognize this state of affairs and exploit it. So long as none of his opponents observed what he had observed, then permanent success was almost assured. Indeed, throughout most of the Napoleonic Wars, success attended all Napoleon’s endeavours. It was not until the Russian Campaign of 1812 that he showed signs of being vulnerable. By this time, thoughtful military strategists had had years to analyse Napoleon’s methods and to try to determine the secret of his success.

Following the breakdown of peace negotiations between Napoleon and Metternich in Dresden in 1813, the Allies resolved to agree a strategy that would lead to Napoleon’s defeat. This was the first time that the continental allies of Prussia, Russia and Austria had attempted such a sensible course of action. The strategy they eventually agreed was developed by the Austrian Chief of Staff, Count Radetsky. Students of modern warfare will find it very familiar. According to Radetsky, it was “to avoid any unequal struggle and so exhaust the enemy, fall upon his weakened parts with superior strength, and to defeat him in detail”.

Perhaps as he developed his strategy for guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-Tung might have...
been amused by these words of Solomon from the Book of Ecclesiastes:

"The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be;
And that which is done is that which shall be done;
And there is no new thing under the sun."

Whether new or not, the strategy was as unfamiliar to early nineteenth century military commanders as it appears to have been to generals in our own time. Blucher, the Prussian commander disliked it intensely. He preferred to stand and fight. Nevertheless, he co-operated loyally, and the strategy was put into effect in the campaign which led to Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig.

By refusing to combine into one large target, the Allies kept Napoleon guessing. By retreating whenever he advanced against them and by offering battle only to his subordinates, they gradually caused Napoleon to expend his resources fruitlessly until he stood at bay before Leipzig. Napoleon refused to acknowledge Leipzig as a defeat, and it is certainly true that he was not defeated on the battlefield. The Allies still had to learn the necessary tactical lessons. He claimed that he was let down by his engineers (Oh, Solomon! How right you were!) and that he was on the point of victory when some damn fool blew up a bridge too soon.

However, Colonel Lawford's maps and text clearly show that Napoleon had been strategically outmanoeuvred until his position became untenable. Although his army was still more or less intact, he had no option but to retreat into France.

In their elation at their success, the Allies plunged over the frontier in a race for Paris. However, in their eagerness, they forgot their strategy, thus causing the campaign in France in 1814 to be much longer than it need have been. Eventually, they convened at Bar-sur-Aube, only 80 miles from Paris in order to thrash out a new plan. In fact, it was but a very simple modification to their previous plan — namely to keep separate, to advance on Paris when Napoleon was occupied elsewhere, and retreat when he threatened attack.

Thus, the so-called "brilliant" campaign of Napoleon before Paris can be seen as no more than a reaction to a pre-determined enemy strategy. He marched himself and his men into the ground almost as ineffectively as the Grand Old Duke of York. He had no option, and the result was inevitable. The campaign ended with Napoleon being exiled to Elba after a strategic defeat resulting from the first serious attempt by the Allies to break with eighteenth century warfare. Once again, Colonel Lawford's charts clearly show the inevitability of it all.

While all this evolvement of strategy was going on, Wellington in the Peninsula had been developing the necessary tactics to defeat a Revolutionary French army in battle. Napoleon's exploitation of basic Revolutionary tactics eventually settled down into a fairly recognizable sequence of steps. He would first mass his artillery columns, preceded by clouds of skirmishers, against the enemy position. Later attacks might be supported by heavy cavalry. When the enemy had committed all his reserves, Napoleon would strike with his Guard at the decisive point.

Of these tactics, the key to them all is the infantry column. A French infantry column in attack was an impressive sight. Advancing in column on a narrow front, it had an enormously intimidating effect on an enemy already unsettled by the artillery and by fire from the skirmishers. Most of the French infantry's work was done at close quarters with the bayonet. The basic formation prevented the effective use of musket fire anyway. This style was not only Napoleon's but that of his marshals, too. Some of them were to learn in the Peninsula that there was an equally effective counter to these tactics.

Wellington's answer was one in which an eye for a good defensive position was the key factor. The first step was to select an elevated position — not necessarily of great height — which lay at right angles to the enemy advance. The next step was to position his men on the far side of the top of the ridge. This had two purposes. In the first place, it often deceived the enemy into believing that the ridge was lightly held. In the second place, it protected his men from the first phase of the Napoleonic attack — the artillery barrage. Finally, when the enemy columns were within musket range, Wellington would order his men to rise and deploy into line rather than column. At a given signal disciplined musket fire from "the thin red line" would then pour into the dense enemy
columns. Time and time again the French broke under these simple tactics. Many marshals learnt at their cost to respect the man that Napoleon contemptuously dismissed as "the Sepoy General".

Perhaps, after Waterloo, Napoleon might have wished he had listened to them—particularly Soult, his Chief-of-Staff in that final battle. Soult had bitter memories of Wellington. "You think Wellington a great general because he beat you," said Napoleon. "I tell you it will be a picnic."*

Nevertheless, it was at Waterloo, in the last campaign, that the Allies learnt the tactics necessary to defeat Napoleon on the battlefield. They learnt them by example, through the phenomenal staying power of the British infantry. Colonel Lawford's graphic description shows how the battle stayed in the balance all day, with the advantage usually with Napoleon, but without his being able to deliver the final coup de grace.

As the day wore on Napoleon became desperate. "Will the English never show their backs?" he asked, whilst gazing through his glass at the fearful carnage taking place. "I fear they will be cut to pieces first," replied Soult.

Napoleon ordered in his Guard as a last resort. They had never fought against Wellington and so were unaware of his tactics. Like lambs to the slaughter they advanced up the slope so carefully chosen by Wellington, like eagles they reached the ridge in triumph, like tigers they fought against the thin line of musket fire that appeared from nowhere, and like the disappointed and beaten men they were, they fled back down the slope. When the French realised that the Guard had been repulsed, they disintegrated in panic. The Guard had never retreated before.

Waterloo had brought an era to an end. It was the end, not of Napoleonic tactics, but of the stylized battles of former years. Napoleon had now been beaten strategically and tactically by the first opposing commanders prepared to sit down and work out why they were being so consistently defeated.

Individually these arguments have been put many times. However, it is the benefit that Colonel Lawford's book bestows on the reader that these simple but basic lessons are more effectively presented. I thoroughly enjoyed this book.


Reviews by Brigadier K.J. Taylor, Director General Computer Operations (Computing Services)

The era of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon has been one of the favourite topics for historians and other writers. Some 13 years ago, it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. This volume of work reflects the fascinating material available and the interest it inspires in a wide catalogue of readers.

The greatest attraction of this particular book will be, not so much for the serious student of Military History but for those who read history solely for pleasure. Most serious students will no doubt have been familiarised with the tactics and arts of warfare early in their studies, for without some knowledge of the patterns and designs of war their understanding of the pageant of human conflict would be seriously deficient. For such students manuals galore exist.

For the more 'dilettante' amongst us who read history for pleasure, it is not easy to find a guide through the patterns and customs of the conduct of wars. All such readers will therefore greet Professor Rothenberg's excellent and concise volume with enthusiasm.

The word concise is accurate for a book of a mere 272 pages. Within these pages the Professor gives his readers a graphic insight into the conditions of warfare at the fighting level—the level of the ordinary soldier.

In so doing the author largely fills the lack that has existed, for the general reading public, in the description of the major changes and trends in the art of warfare. He touches only briefly on organisational details, strategic inter-

* From W. S. Churchill's History of the English-speaking Peoples.
interpretations, analyses of major commanders, and the development of military theory.

The volume contains many passages of interesting and illuminating facts that flesh out our images of what it was really like at the 'sharp end', and further exposes the weaknesses of armchair strategists. For example; the Prussians found that the 1782 musket hit a 10 ft x 6 ft (!) target 60 times out of 100 at 100 paces and only 25 times at 300 paces. Further, in 1814 a British ordnance officer concluded '... a soldier must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aims at him'. Add the elements close conflict to this and we find the number of hits ranged between six and 15 per cent of rounds fired.

Discussing French Revolutionary Armies we find: 'The 1st Bn of the Pas de Calais, for instance elected a regular sergeant, Godart, as their Lieutenant Colonel. But when Godart, later a general under Napoleon, tried to drill them, they denounced him as a 'despot who despises Liberty and Equality', and attempted to hang him.' People's armies do have their disadvantages at coup time.

Brief summary through this book is, it manages to pull together the strands of Military History during a tumultuous period. The 'lay' reader will find his understanding and enjoyment has been considerably enlightened and enlivened by this book. Accounts of great battles and campaigns of the Napoleonic era are transformed into another dimension by viewing them then in terms of 'The Soldiers Trade' (Chapter 3) — through the actual war experience of the soldier. Mention of the theme of some of the other chapters should be enough to convince the intending reader to press on — outlines of the military 'status quo' at the end of the Ancient Regime; the wars from Valmy to Waterloo; staff problems, fortifications and medical services, etc.

All this lively information is enhanced by 19 diagrams, and 20 illustrations and a comprehensive and most useful bibliography. Professor Rothenberg's central guiding question was 'What was Napoleonic warfare like in practice?'. In pursuing and answering this question the author has been notably successful and has produced a very readable, interesting and useful volume.


Reviewed by Greg Austin
Department of Defence, Canberra

The first volume of the Review Annual, originally conceived as a supplement to the new Military-Naval Encyclopaedia of Russia and the Soviet Union, could easily be regarded as a basic text of Soviet defence planning. Anybody wanting to acquaint themselves from first principles with most facets of that subject could probably not find a better starting point.

At the same time even specialists may find several useful reviews and articles in the Review Annual because the range of topics is so wide.

As subsequent editions appear the Review Annual could easily begin to present most readers with a cheap alternative of sorts to the Encyclopaedia it was originally designed to supplement.

The Review Annual is introduced by a general article by Peter H. Vigor, Director of the British Army's Soviet Studies Centre at Sandhurst, in which he examines the significance of 1973 and 1974 to current Soviet policies—1973 for the Yom Kippur War and the elevation to Politburo status of the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Head of the KGB; and 1974 for MBFR and SALT issues. Vigor's article is followed by reviews of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, National Air Defence, Air Force, Navy, Naval Air Force, Merchant Marine, Military Developments in the Far East, Defence Industry and the Space Programme. There are background articles on Soviet Think Tanks, Leadership Changes at the 25th CPSU Congress, and Ballistic Missile Defence.

The Review Annual is remarkable in that while the editors did not seek to establish a consensus on the objectives of Soviet defence policy, the contributors agree for the most part
on the general trends. By placing the elements of Soviet defence planning in context, the contributors debunk the "shrill alarms" of some Western politicians and commentators about the warlike intentions of the Soviet Union.

The picture painted by the *Review Annual* of the Soviet defence bureaucracy is one more typical of western defence bureaucracies than of the well-oiled Hitlerite machine, intent on war, that some commentators hold up. For example, in the review on the Navy, Michael McGwire shows just how slow the defence planners were in responding to a threat. The Soviet reaction to Kennedy’s 1961 decision to accelerate the programme for submarine-launched strategic weapons was to adopt the policy of forward deployment to those waters from which the Soviet Union could be threatened. According to McGwire the policy makers were still talking about how to do it in 1963-64 and took until 1971 to achieve steady deployments to the Norwegian Sea and the Mediterranean.

The Charts and Tables in the *Review Annual* provide a good source of reference on a range of subjects, including characteristics of deployed Soviet ICBMs and Soviet merchant ship inventory as a percentage of the world inventory.

A principal quality of the *Review Annual* is its treatment of subjects which are not always directly military, such as merchant shipping and space, but which have a military significance. The article on Aeroflot promised for the next edition will fill in the picture of Soviet strategic mobility which this edition’s article on merchant shipping sketched in outline.

The *Review Annual*’s bibliographical sections, though limited in the present volume to short time periods, should prove to be most useful to anybody interested in Soviet defence policy. There is also an annotated bibliography of Soviet military literature 1965-1971.

Many readers will probably feel slightly frustrated that the *Review Annual*, having become available in Australia in 1978, only covers events up to the end of 1976. While this is inevitable in such publications, the information in the *Review Annual* must be supplemented by familiarisation with more recent developments if the reader wants to use the *Review Annual* to discuss current situations.

The *Facts and Figures Annual* covers 15 aspects of the Soviet Union in 300 pages, including the Communist Party, Government, Demography, Armed Forces, Economy, Agriculture, Foreign Trade, and Domestic Welfare. It is not as useful as the *Review Annual* because its statistics, deprived of informed interpretation, could be very misleading.

The editor makes the boast that the *Facts and Figures Annual* consulted a wider variety of sources than any other statistical handbook. Perhaps he should contact the *Guinness Book of Records*. The specialist is more likely to consult the original sources and find additional information than to rely on the abridged information available in the *Annual*. One advantage perhaps is that the *Facts and Figures Annual*, in providing the references for a lot of its information, would be of some assistance to researchers who are not too familiar with the specific subject.

Soviet defence information occupies only 23 pages of the 300 page *Facts and Figures Annual*. The interesting feature of this section is that there are figures for the Warsaw Treaty Organization as a whole and NATO, and these allow some most telling comparisons!

According to US government sources, annual NATO defence expenditures from 1965 to 1974 were greater than those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In 1974, NATO countries spent 136 billion dollars and Warsaw Treaty countries spent 119 billion dollars. NATO arms transfers in 1974 alone were only 200 million dollars less than the combined total for Warsaw Treaty arms transfers for 1973 and 1974—the time of the resupply of Egypt after Yom Kippur and the aid for the MPLA in the Angolan civil war.

Like the *Review Annual*, the *Facts and Figures Annual* is a first edition which will be updated each year by a new edition with a slightly different emphasis. Later editions of the *Facts and Figures Annual* will provide detailed information on Soviet relations with Japan, Europe, and other countries. The emphasis of the current edition is more exclusively directed towards Soviet domestic concerns.
WHAT makes some men better combat soldiers than others? What reduction in efficiency occurs as a result of stress or fatigue? What weapon causes the most fear on the battlefield? These are some of the questions that the reader of Peter Watson’s very comprehensive book will be better able to answer.

Unlike previous books which have been confined to either specific aspects of psychological warfare, or to its use in particular conflicts, War on the Mind investigates the total concept of the interaction of psychology with the Armed Services of today. As well as providing a detailed study of the psychology of counter insurgency, other topics include: combat psychiatry; atrocities; leadership; captivity; interrogation; and survival.

It may be expected that such a coverage would necessitate a purely analytical approach. Such is not the case, however, rather the results of thorough research are provided in a descriptive manner that is both very readable and thought provoking. An example of this stimulating style occurs when the author enquires whether political and social changes in the years to come will affect the availability of men to recruit as soldiers, and their willingness to take part in war: “Will there be a reduction in the number of causes worth dying for?” The psychological effects of military unions (already introduced to five European armies), and of nuclear war, are other aspects which Peter Watson leads the reader to examine. Such relevance to the future adds considerably to the book’s importance for the professional serviceman.

As a reference in which each section is self contained, and conclusions are summarized, War on the Mind is particularly valuable. Statistical evidence, diagrams, and references, are all clearly presented. The only criticism which may possibly be levelled against the format is the lack of a glossary of psychological terms. This could, however, only be marginally justified.

It is an unfortunate result of military security that more information concerning the use of psychological warfare in Northern Ireland could not be provided (especially as the author was connected with such a story for the insight team of the Sunday Times). It would appear that the British maintain an overall policy of non-disclosure of military psychological data. Most studies and documents consulted throughout the book are of American origin. Another observation is the belief that Peter Watson himself has not served in the Armed Forces. This is thought to have led to a partially inaccurate and misleading description of Australians in Vietnam being accepted from another source, as well as to some minor misconceptions of military technology.

These comments do not, however, detract from the value of War on the Mind as a comprehensive study of the military uses (and abuses) of psychology. The responsible serviceman cannot deny the relevance of this book to the Armed Forces of today.