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ISSN 1320-2545
Published by the Department of Defence
Canberra 2000
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Front Cover
Night Exercise
Photograph courtesy of Defence Public Affairs

Printed in Australia
by National Capital Printing,
Fyshwick, ACT 2609
Inspection of Federation Guard at Parliament House during the INTERFET Welcome Home.
Photograph by LSPH K. Bristow – Navy Photographic Unit
Women in Combat

Dear Editor,


During WWII, in all services, women performed magnificently in signals, administration, nursing services to mention just three important duties, releasing a significant number of men for service in combat areas.

But combat is another matter. I’ll confine comment to the Army where I spent six years from 1939-45.

Imagine a female as a member of an infantry section during the Owen Stanley campaign in the second half of 1942. She would be wet through, soaked to the skin, day and night. If lucky she might get a change of clothing every six weeks and would go without a wash for up to three weeks. The personal hygiene materials she would need to carry would be perpetually wet and renewed supply would be a lottery. Because of so many razor back ridges to attack or defend, when the trench was only a few feet wide with precipices on either side, she would have to urinate and defecate within a few feet of her comrades. She would know starvation and malnutrition.

Let’s get real. Close combat is no place for a woman certainly so far as the Army is concerned.

I have a granddaughter officer recently returned from East Timor where she had an arduous, tiring job in supply. Women in this sort of posting can undoubtedly serve at least as well if not better than men.

But combat, never – they would prove an awful liability.

M.L. Roberts, Captain, (Retired)

Cadet Scheme

Dear Editor,

After reading the well researched article by Dr W.H. Jones in Australian Defence Force Journal No. 140 of January-February 2000 on the value of Cadet Forces training at the present time and in particular the AIRTC I feel that as a person who instructed and supported the AIRTC both before and after 1975 my thoughts and experience may be of some help or value in supporting Dr Jones.

When No. 28 Flight was formed in 1955 we had a Flight Commander (the late Wing Commander Warren Bishop), who was a resident Doctor at the Bathurst Hospital and in the CAF Reserve at the time, three other civilians, two of which had wartime experience in the RAAF and myself who had gone from the Army to the RAAF then joined the CAF Reserve in 1951 and was the initial instructor with the wartime rank of Sergeant. For the first year or so all staff were ex-servicemen, mostly RAAF.

Over the years we developed a fine Flight of Cadets and Reserve personnel with the guidance of permanent RAAF officers and cooperation of RAAF Bases for camps and flying which sometimes carried a joint staff of ten Reservists and up to 150 Cadets who always seemed to enjoy the break from school work and showed interest in flying and shooting plus other outdoor activities.

When on the advice of the Millar Report, the Government withdrew support for all Cadet forces, No. 28 Flight elected to carry on despite the loss of active Government support and relied on parent support plus recycling of uniforms and conducting local camps for the Cadets plus local money-raising efforts to keep us going.

With the elected change of Government the support of Cadet training both from the Government and the personal angle resumed much as it had been, we had support from the RAAF both in camps and in flying but the numbers allowed into regular camps slowly diminished although from experience the cooperation of those cadets who were lucky enough to attend seemed to be just as enthusiastic as before. However over the years the outlay from the Government has diminished, no doubt due to other circumstances, and parent cooperation has increased. As regards staffing levels they have decreased from three to four officers and two NCO’s with No. 28 Flight to one officer and very infrequent support from other people. As an example, pre 1975 rifle shoots with No. 28 Flight would involve 90 per cent of the cadets once a month but now when I called for support to re-establish shooting in the early 1990s I would be lucky to get 25 per cent of cadets to attend. No doubt the rapid advances in electronic equipment has resulted in young people of cadet age devoting their weekends to earning money in order to buy whatever they require and also there is quite a varied supply of entertainment over the said period which they can attend. It is beyond my ability to suggest alternative methods of encouraging young people to support the cadet system as most not already involved have a ready answer when questioned on joining, however, I support Dr Jones’ article, it is the first which I have seen relating to cadet training and I trust there will be more forthcoming.

Hubert (Hugh) Brennan
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Are We Going to Fight Again?

Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Orme, CSC

Is Australia going to fight again? This fundamental question lies at the heart of our national security planning. We speak of peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, contributing to regional security, establishing confidence building relationships, fulfilling a leadership role in our region, and all the issues that accompany any serious debate of our security environment and future; yet for all that, do we address the most fundamental issue of all – are we going to fight again? If the answer is yes then we will need a defence force which is capable of fighting as part of a joint, coalition, and multinational force in a range of environments. If the answer is no, then we need to understand what it is we want our defence force to do and how we are going to organise ourselves to do it. But to answer the question we need to understand the relationship between security and human nature, and approach the problem realistically, not optimistically.1

Through a Glass Darkly

In 1899 Jean de Bloch wrote an ambitious book titled The Future of War in which he argued that “war has become impossible except at the price of suicide”.4 He outlined in detail why it was not rational for nations to go to war. His argument was not based on military logic, but on the logic of the political economist. He stated that “the soldier by natural evolution has so perfected the mechanism of slaughter that he has practically secured his own extinction. He has made himself so costly that mankind can no longer afford to pay for his maintenance, and he has therefore transferred the sceptre of the world from those who govern its camps to those who control its markets.”5 His logic was sound; his assessment of human nature was flawed.

The 20th century can be seen as the apex of man’s potential for both civilisation and barbarity. No century so completely reveals the duality of the human spirit; from the rise of democracy and man’s ability to make phenomenal medical and scientific advances; to his apocalyptic capacity to wage a nuclear war, kill millions on the conventional battlefield, and hack and slash his way to an ethnically cleansed purity in any number of countries in any number of decades of the last century. The only deduction that we can safely make is that man has not yet proven himself to be so logical, rational, reliable, predictable and stable for us to be able to say with any degree of confidence that we will enjoy peace in our time. Of course this leads us to our fundamental question; are we going to fight again?

The future can be seen only “through a glass darkly”. There are as many alternative futures as there are futurists. However, four writers stand out as offering some view of the future from which we can draw broad indicators of the way ahead.6 The Tofflers argue that developed,7 Western societies are undergoing a transformation from the second to the third wave of development; that countries like USA, Britain and Australia are heading into the information age, away from their industrial and agrarian roots. Their future is one of globalism, homogeneity, and information and technological superiority. Kaplan sees the world more pessimistically,8 with his darker predictions of environmental disasters due to overpopulation, deforestation, water salination, and natural resource abuse. Huntington sees the future in terms of civilisational conflicts with clashes occurring along cultural and civilisational fault lines,9 which have, and always will, exist. And finally Peters suggests that the new enemies will be warlords, terrorists, charismatic demagogues, international criminals and the militaries of rogue states.10 Peters’ new battlefields will be urban landscapes and information jungles. So who is right?
Our Quest for Certainty

The answer cannot be found with any one prophet. We should accept that the future is impossible to predict. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle supports this view when it argues that the very act of observation influences the outcome of an experiment. As soon as we think we know the future, it immediately changes. Couple this with the concepts of Chaos Theory which argue that even the most minute change in any of the variables of a process may result in an enormous change to the predicted outcome, and we see that any attempt to predict the future is flawed. We need only think back to de Bloch’s very rational argument of 1899 to see that even the most painstaking research and logical arguments are defenceless against the ravages of the future and human nature.

So, are we going to fight again? If we are the difficulty is that we cannot with any confidence predict where, when, or why. This is Heisenberg’s chaotic conundrum; whatever we prepare for will not occur because we have prepared for it. When one nation goes to war with another it is generally at a time and a place and in a manner which the other was not expecting. Surprise, deception, and duplicity are not new and will be the hallmarks of future conflict. Compounding this problem is one that Australia has faced since 1788 – we are more likely to become involved in conflicts or disputes outside Australia than we are to have threats to our physical sovereignty. To believe that our sole security threat is one of invasion or raids on our soil is to fail to see the new millennium and the trends it portends.

In a country as lucky as Australia, we often fail to reconcile our desires and aspirations with the harsh realities that are everywhere to be seen. The world should understand de Bloch’s rational logic; “there will be no war in the future... for it has become impossible, now that it is clear that war means suicide.” But it would appear that for some unknown, illogical, irrational and intensely human reason, the world does not know it. So where does that leave Australia at the dawn of the new millennium and the beginning of our second century of independence?

Our Security Challenges

Our security challenges demand that we think in clear, logical, and realistic terms in order to understand what the future might hold. We must discipline ourselves to avoid optimistic assessments and focus on what is the fundamental nature of society and the world. Even after the lessons of The Great War, and World War II, we entered the last decade of the 20th century at the end of the Cold War with an impetuous optimism that was dashed by harsh reality. There was no peace dividend. For a decade that offered so much it delivered so little. The Gulf War, Somalia, Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, continued tensions in Iraq, China’s rhetoric across the Taiwan Straits and the Spratlys, Chechnya I and II, Kurdistan, North Korean recalcitrance, African crises, nuclear testing in India and Pakistan, drug wars in South America, East Timor, terrorism, any number of smaller internal wars, and ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses are cumulatively taking their toll on world optimism; and rightly so. Optimism needs to be tempered by realism; and it is from a realistic view that our security needs must be addressed. Of course this realism must also include the ability to pay for our security.

The nature and fabric of society is evolving away from the natural, concrete and tangible artifacts which have defined it until now. Australian society, and those of what may be called the “information age” nations, are evolving to a point where the physical is only an enabler to reach into the cyber world. Information, knowledge and data are becoming the currencies of our society, and although very much in the early stages of this evolution our future lies in this direction. However, for the foreseeable future Australia will rely heavily on our first wave fundamentals and natural resources to allow us to live in an information-age society. Therefore
our approach to security must encompass and embrace this. But embracing this does not mean that the nature of security totally changes with it. Rather, our security problems expand to include the information dimension while preserving our industrial and agrarian bases. Future Australian security concepts will rely on us being able to protect the physical and tangible, those critical enablers, while also protecting the information element. This does not appear to be widely appreciated.

**A Developing Paradigm**

The answer does not lie in our current view of the world. The world does not begin just beyond our 12-mile coastal borders; nor does it end at a 1,000 kilometre radius from our sovereign soil. The world for all its problems is now so totally integrated, linked, joined and transfused among all nations and regions that any concept which sees a regional or geographic foundation as its basis is flawed and inadequate to meet the demands of the 21st century. Geostrategic imperatives will continue to inform our security policy; but they are not the only determinants.

An enduring theme of Australian security is that it has always been provided within the context of an alliance with a major partner; either Britain or the US. This will continue in the future and should be a core planning imperative. We must retain our sovereign rights and independence, but be cognisant of the economies and advantages offered by commonality of systems, doctrine and procedures. Our interests coincide so closely with the US that while we may be caricatured as a deputy, we are in fact pursuing our own agenda. The truth is that our aspirations, goals and interests complement those of the US. Our mutual interests therefore demand we take a broader perspective.

The seeds of change have been sewn and we are seeing fundamental shifts from the Cold War paradigm. We are beginning to see a change in posture in Europe, China, India and Pakistan, Japan, the Korean Peninsular, and importantly Indonesia; all of which affects Australia.

The fall of the USSR and the consequent removal of the unifying threat against Western Europe is beginning to have an effect. We are seeing a fundamental though slow shift from European reliance on an Anglo/US dominated NATO as the major security mechanism, to a greater sense of European independence. The concepts being developed for a European crisis response capability, being driven very much by an irascible and precocious France, is a first and early step toward the “deYankification” of European security. The key issue for Britain is to determine whether its future lies with the US or with Europe. The US needs to determine whether it is willing to compromise its role in European security. The call for greater European modernisation of its military may backfire on the US.

Europe remains extremely important to Australia for a host of reasons. The EU is Australia’s largest merchandise trading partner and our commercial, cultural, and historical links with Europe, the US and Britain ties us to the outcomes of a change in European dynamics; whatever impacts on them will affect us. Also, it is important to note that our Asian neighbours tend to see us as more European than Asian, and link us to trends there. Events in Europe will impact on Australian security and should not be underestimated.

China enters the new millennium as a major concern to the US and Australia. Simple demographics dictate that Australia must follow events in China closely. A regional country with 1.26 billion people at the start of the century and a growing economy, both as a supplier and a consumer, makes it formidable enough. Couple this with the growth and modernisation of China’s military, the increased rhetoric over Taiwan, their incremental occupation of the disputed Spratly Islands, their recent loose language concerning the use of nuclear weapons, and concerns over closer Chinese-Russian and Chinese-Indian
relations; and Australia and the world has a clear security challenge. China can only be expected to grow over the next decades and will represent our most significant security issue for the 21st century.

Japan is also undergoing major, though subtle change. The peace generation who inherited Japan after World War II is passing and the economic generation who have so recently brought Japan such major structural and ethical economic dilemmas are being replaced slowly by a new guard whose aspirations are changing. The notion of reliance on economic power alone to sustain the nation has been challenged and it is likely that some of the restrictions on the use of military power may be lifted. This is not to say that Japan will become more militaristic, although it is false to assume Japan has maintained a pacifist approach to defence. With the fourth largest defence spending and one of the most modern militaries in the world, Japan has both economic and military power. Once the problems with its current economic crisis and constitutional limitations are resolved we will see a different Japan; a more confident and outward looking Japan.

India and Pakistan are wildcards because of their nuclear capability. But to focus only on the nuclear issue is to miss some of the fundamentals of each country. For Pakistan the nuclear issue is more than just a response to India. It is a demonstration of Islamic achievement. Having said that, Pakistan under its current military dictatorship represents a reasonable bastion of stability in an otherwise volatile region. Although recent demands that the country develop an Islamic, non-interest based economic system sees a shift towards fundamentalism, its location at the intersection of one of Huntington’s Muslim/Hindu/Sinic faultlines is more significant for its potential instability.

Of all nations, India has perhaps the greatest potential for gain in the developing post-Cold War paradigm. Often resentful of the world’s lack of respect and appreciation, it has the demographic power and the intellectual aspirations to be a major contender for alternate influence in the world. Its population alone demands respect, and its internal pressures serve to make external solutions to domestic intransigence more attractive. Indian rhetoric, supported by increasingly hegemonic ambitions, will need to be watched very closely. India’s relationships with China and Russia also need to be monitored.

While having much in conflict with China, it may be mutually beneficial to create an alliance of interests between India and China to gain leverage over the US, especially through the World Trade Organisation.

Perhaps one ray of light on the horizon is the hopeful reunification of the Korean Peninsular. This is unlikely to occur quickly but the South Korean “sunshine policy” is intended to draw North Korea back into the fold although at some considerable expense. The Korean Peninsular is one of the last remnants of the Cold War and no longer contains the relevance it once held. While there are many in the US defence establishment who rely on the continued threat from Kim Jong Il to justify large forward deployments of troops; and the Peninsular provides one of the two major theatres of war which underpin the US National Security Strategy; it is more likely that reunification will occur over time than an invasion from the North.

Finally, Indonesia and its future is of vital concern to Australia. The world’s fourth largest nation; the largest Muslim state; its control of the vital Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits; and its vast natural resources, remain constants which make Indonesia critical to the world, not just Australia. Fundamental economic problems have yet to be solved. East Timor and the success it represents for other disgruntled provinces such as Aceh and Irian Jaya demonstrates the instability of the nation and its vulnerability. East Timor was eventually allowed to leave, Aceh and West Irian with their vast natural resources may not be so lucky. The future for a free and democratic
Indonesia will be sorely tested over the next decade. The economic, social and political difficulties it faces will require solutions which it is not presently structured to provide. Indonesia faces a tough period requiring strong leadership and it is questionable whether this can be provided.

So What?

So what does this mean for Australia; are we going to fight again? Given the instability of the post-Cold War world; the volatility of our region; the global trend towards polarisation along Huntington’s cultural and civilisational fault lines; the resource constraints and potential for disaster revealed by Kaplan’s travels; the rise in asymmetric and non-conventional threats identified by Peters; and the unpredictability of human nature; it is vital that we be prepared to fight again. But also given Australia’s trend towards the Tofflers’ third wave, it is likely that we will fail to see the writing on the wall as we retreat into a cyber world of information abundance and virtual blue skies.

Defence forces are not built overnight; nor are they mobilised as they were in Blamey’s day. The world can be a peaceful and stable place but that stability does not come through weakness. Australia, whether it likes it or not, is increasingly a member of the global society; we cannot opt out. Therefore the only conclusion we can draw is that we will fight again and must be prepared for it. It was convenient in the 1930s to ignore the unpleasant and politically incorrect Lavarack when he signalled the threat to Australia. Had our politicians listened to him then our preparations for war in the Pacific would have been different. Whilst we cannot rewrite history we can prepare honestly and realistically for the future.

Conclusion

Are we going to fight again? The demands on Australia’s defence force are going to grow in the next decade and will be regional and global in nature. We will keep and enforce peace around the globe, but especially in our region; and we will fight war in the next century at a place and at a time and for a reason that we cannot even begin to imagine now. If we do not make some hard decisions about funding, doctrine, capabilities, equipment, force structure, and interoperability, we will not be ready.23 Yes, Australia will fight again, and it is our responsibility to ensure that when we do we are on the winning team!

NOTES

1. Since 1945 there have been 250 wars with 23 million killed and tens of millions homeless.
2. “Through a Glass Darkly,” is from the Apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 13:12, “For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.”
3. de Bloch, J; The Future of War: copyright 1899, translated by R.C. Long and published Boston, 1914 by the World Peace Foundation. de Bloch was a Polish Jew who grew up in Warsaw. He studied in Berlin and returned to Warsaw where he developed a reputation as a banker, an economist, and a sociologist. He was intimately involved in the development of European railways and saw that the key menace to future European prosperity was war. To signal this threat he wrote The Future of War.
4. ibid., p. xxxi.
5. ibid., p. xvii.
6. While I mention only four writers, there are numerous authors who could be mentioned. Many others are worthy study for those with the time, in particular Francis Fukyama, Steven Metz, and Robert Leonhard.
7. Alvin and Heidi Toffler are well known and indeed may be considered a cliche. Their works have had significant impact and include Future Shock, War and Anti-War, and The Third Wave. Of the authors discussed the Tofflers’ view of the future is probably the most optimistic.
8. Robert Kaplan has travelled widely and written about problems facing the world, especially in underdeveloped regions and warring areas. Three works of note are Balkan Ghosts, The Coming Anarchy, and an interesting analysis of contemporary America, Empire Wilderness. He has been criticised for making sweeping assertions based on discredited theories (Malthus in particular), but he provides an insightful approach to the realities of world problems on the ground.
9. Samuel Huntington is the grand old man of contemporary security analysis. From his
powerful *The Soldier and the State* (1960) to *The Clash of Civilisations* (1994) he has been at the forefront of international security debate. In many ways Huntington is the antithesis of de Bloch – war will be a natural outcome of the cultural difference, regardless of how much we develop.

10. Ralph Peters is a relatively recently retired US Army officer (Intelligence) who does not appear to be in favour with the US Military establishment. His book *Fighting for the Future* outlines the changing nature of the security landscape, away from conventional symmetric military relationships to a future of asymmetric threats. He is contentious for his criticism of the ability of the current US military and their ability to adapt to the new environment.

11. First stated by Werner Heisenberg in 1927. It arose from some careful thinking by Heisenberg about a very simple fact, namely you cannot measure any property of an object without interacting with it in some way. Two key deductions from his work with sub atomic particles were that the very act of observation changes the system’s properties; and the vision of a perfect, rational, objective observer finding the truth cannot be fulfilled.

12. See articles by LTCOL Ian Wing in previous copies of this journal for excellent discussion of the influence of Chaos Theory. There is enormous potential for the application of the principles of Chaos Theory to the development of warfighting concepts; especially for the ADF.

13. Australia’s “luckiness” has been the topic of two of Donald Horne’s works, *The Lucky Country* (1964), and *The Death of the Lucky Country* (1976). Horne’s view of our luck is less sanguine than might appear on the surface; many Australians still use the expression as a description of Australia as the land of milk and honey. Horne saw our luckiness as being a myth based on optimism and hope, not on the hard realities of our nation; hence the counterpoint in 1976 to his first work and its widespread misinterpretation. The real issue is; has anything changed?

14. de Bloch, p.xxi.

15. The Government appears to have recognised the shift to greater security demands with its recent indication of a modest increase in the defence budget in 2001-2002.

16. The EU is Australia’s largest merchandise export market. Trade in merchandise for 1998-99 was worth A$34.9 billion. Australian merchandise exports to the EU (primarily including non-monetary gold, coal, wool and alcoholic beverages) totalled A$11.6 billion in 1998-99. The EU is also Australia’s largest source of merchandise imports (mainly medicaments, passenger motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment and paper) which was A$ 23.3 billion in 1998-99. Bilateral trade in services is also very healthy with the EU being Australia’s largest overseas market for services with exports worth A$4.8 billion in 1998. As a source of imported services, the EU again ranks first, with A$ 5.6 billion worth of services imported in 1997-98. Investment in Australia from EU countries was worth A$193.1 billion at end June 1998, making the EU our largest source of foreign investment. In addition, the EU is the second largest foreign destination for Australian investors, with investment totalling A$60.8 billion at end June 1998. (Source: DFAT)

17. In China on 2 March 00 the state-run People’s Daily ran several articles touting the benefits of strategic partnership between Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing are exchanging top-ranking officials in preparation for a summit involving oil and weapons. It appears that a more vigorous strategic partnership between Russia and China is beginning to take shape. (Source: Stratfor.com)

18. Japan is currently undergoing a five-year review of its constitution with a view to adjusting restrictions on the use of the Japanese Self Defence Force.

19. This perhaps controversial view was expressed by General Anthony Zinni, US Commander in Chief Central Command in early March 00.

20. It is assessed that India will surpass China and have the world’s largest population by 2020.

21. Agence France Presse has reported that an Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that the Indian and Russian Governments will sign a strategic partnership later in 2000. The partnership is to coincide with a planned post-election Russian presidential visit.


23. If the sentiments of this article apply to Australia, then New Zealand should take a sober look at its security strategy. Our collective future is so closely linked that unilateral policies which do not mesh are not only grossly inefficient but culpable, regardless of political ideology.

*Lieutenant Colonel Orme is the Australian Exchange Instructor at the US Command and General Staff College. His previous appointment was the Australian Liaison Officer to the Coalition Joint Task Force in Kuwait.*
Cooperative Security: A China Perspective?

By Lieutenant Commander W. Heron, RAN

Within this article it will be argued that the emerging multipolar security environment post-Cold War is providing considerable scope for China to participate in a cooperative security regime, based on the normative changes transpiring in China. It will be argued that the post-Cold War world provides increased stability for China, allowing the Chinese leadership the opportunity to develop alternative security arrangements to the Realpolitik paradigm which prevailed prior to 1989. It will be demonstrated that there is a normative link between economic liberalisation, and China’s participation in multilateral fora, providing scope for China’s eventual inclusion into a cooperative security regime.

Normative change will be discussed from the perspective that traditional Marxist norms have been transformed to accommodate broader policy choice, as China gains experience in international fora. Finally, it will be argued that while the Chinese leadership may be willing to consider cooperative security as an approach to its security problem, there are normative constraints associated with the norm of sovereign dignity and China’s own historical experience which may hamper policy movement in a more cooperative direction.

Realpolitik is defined as a policy using practical power considerations as its basis over moral or ethical considerations. The attainment and maintenance of state security in a hostile world through power or balance of power politics is viewed as the primary goal of leaders.¹

Cooperative security is defined as “a multidimensional, gradual security approach promoting reassurance over deterrence, emphasising the value of creating habits of dialogue between potential antagonists while providing for peacekeeping and enforcement”.²

The use of norm here is that which is common to most current definitions in International Relations, norms are “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors within a given identity. They evolve through social practice, through conscious promotion by actors in political interaction, and through deliberate negotiation among actors. Norms influence behaviour.”³

Background

China was a revolutionist state during the period 1949–1971. During this period her dogmatic, Marxist approach to foreign policy together with her “dual adversary strategy” towards both superpowers hindered her ability to gain international experience in multilateral diplomacy via the UN. This was because from 1949–1970 China was refused entry from all International Organisations including the United Nations. China proclaimed herself to be


a self-styled moral state, “an independent G1 in the global group of politics”.4

After the success of the Chinese communist revolution, symbolised by the establishment of the People’s Republic Of China, came the Korean and Vietnam Wars. These wars saw China at odds with US and UN forces. During the Cold War period China was enmeshed in a bipolar balance of power arrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which China formed the third arm of a strategic triangle, first siding with the Soviet Union on ideological grounds and then breaking with the Soviets when China felt that her sovereignty was being threatened from within.5 In 1962 Soviet policy was deemed revisionist by China which, according to Mao “precluded any meaningful relationship”; with the Soviet Union. After China’s breakaway the success of Chinese socialism was deemed to depend upon a “total opposition to the Soviet Union”; and thus the Soviet Union was totally abandoned as an ideological ally for rapprochement with the US.

The Post-Cold War Security Environment

The end of the Cold War in 1989 facilitated a reduction of nuclear tensions with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and therefore a marked reduction in the prospect for global nuclear war. Additionally, the change in a bipolar balance of power (between the United States and the Soviet Union) to a unipolar world with a single superpower, has facilitated the emergence of a more multipolar security environment, after the fall of the Berlin wall. The collapse of the Soviet Union has allowed China to become the pre-eminent power in mainland East Asia.6 While US democracy has triumphed over Soviet socialism, China has been able to modernise its armed forces and geostrategically transform its focus from a purely continental perspective to one incorporating both continental and maritime strategies, on its southern and eastern maritime fringe.9

Multilateralism is synonymous with the emergence of a new world order in the Asia Pacific. This includes the gradual establishment of bilateral, sub-regional and regional security-ensuring mechanisms.10 As a result of this move from a distinctively bipolar basis, there are new transnational and transterritorial cooperative opportunities arising. These are even occurring in Communist China, where, for example, the Chinese domestic sector is actively embracing multilateralism in its quest for economic development.11 The linkage between multipolarity and multilateralism is supported by Job. Job uses an example of multilateral action in a post-Cold War world between states with divergent national interests, to illustrate the potential of multilateral security action. For example, a collective action to preserve regional stability prompted China, the US and Japan, to conduct multilateral action in order to “prevent North Korea from developing a deployable nuclear weapons capability”.12 In this case multilateral action was considered to be more effective than unilateral or bilateral action.

The Chinese leadership is of the opinion that the emergence of multipolarity is in its national interest. This is because China is no longer the junior military power between the US and the USSR. The disappearance of the USSR has meant China’s sphere of influence has widened. “Encouraging multipolarity is a means by which China sees its quest for great power status advanced”.13 This augers well for future cooperative security relations within the Asia-Pacific. Some commentators suggest that China is ready to deepen cooperation with Japan, noting that the Chinese economy is being modelled along similar lines to the Japanese economy, and that economic relations between the two states have vastly improved. For example, Japan is supporting Chinese entry into the World Trade Order (WTO). Furthermore, dyads of cooperation are now emerging in the Sino-Russian relationship, both from a military and from an
economic perspective, which assists with more peaceful cooperation in the East Asian region.

It is worthy to note that a strong and stable China assists US regional interests, and with the exception of the Taiwan problem, paves the way for greater regional cooperation. For example it may soon be the case that Japanese and Chinese troops are working side by side in multinational theatres as part of UN forces. East Timor has the potential to achieve this. This level of peacekeeping is unprecedented between these traditional rivals. According to Rozman “the Chinese since 1993 have been dropping their reservations about multilateralism... and are now keen to find a regional approach (to security) that would diminish the role of the US – Japan alliance without prompting a Japanese military buildup”.14

Taiwan is still the major hurdle for meaningful security cooperation between China and US. Specifically, China sees the deployment of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system in Taiwan by the US as a major threat to the reintegration of Taiwan.15 The fact that the US have in the past dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait to act as a deterrent to China over Taiwan,16 does not auger well for security cooperation over the Taiwan issue. Conversely, the United States has pressured Taiwan not to push for total independence and therefore exacerbate tensions with China. While this does not resolve the issue it goes some way towards maintaining the status quo.17

Normative Change

Despite the Taiwan issue, normative change began to occur in China upon her entry into the UN in 1971. Interaction with the global community has created new understanding of international matters among Chinese statesmen, facilitating the appearance of some new dyads of cooperation, initially in economic matters, however, also moving into the security arena. While the security environment presents a different set of normative challenges to Chinese reformers than the economic sphere, it can be argued that future security cooperation could parallel the economic cooperation already achieved in the post-Cold War environment.

According to Samuel Kim, “participation in the UN has enabled the Chinese leadership to gradually accept the principles of the common heritage of mankind, broadening conceptual understanding of the sources of international law...”18 A similar sentiment on the changing of norms through participation within Western institutions is expressed by Stuart Harris. Harris views normative change within China occurring because of an acute need for economic development. A pragmatic Chinese leadership took a major policy decision when they decided to “abandon many deeply rooted assumptions about the nature of the international economic environment and concluded that ... trade, rather than being exploitative as Marx had indicated, could be mutually beneficial”.19

The abandonment of deeply rooted Marxist principles puts Chinese government policy in tension with Marxist doctrine. This phenomena places pressure on traditional Marxist institutions within China. That being the case, China has attracted vast amounts of foreign capital through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Again, this has been in direct contradiction to traditional Marxists policy. Mao style Marxism forbade the use of foreign capital based on a fear of normative influence.20 To illustrate the extent of borrowing once the policy was changed, FDI rose from absolute zero in 1975-79 to 3.5 per cent in 1990-94.21 According to the World Bank, this is the sixth most rapid rise of the 120 countries studied.22 FDI has been attracted to China by the large, low wage labour pool. FDI is increasing employment opportunities and reducing poverty, achieving a level of development and growth of phenomenal
proportions. This type of growth rate was not possible before Deng modified the laws of FDI.23

Based on Deng’s work, China, still a Marxist state is now highly vulnerable to Western normative change through ongoing economic interaction with the West. Long-term reliance on FDI is causing China to become a strategic dependent of the US, at least from an economic perspective. Up until 1977, China’s Marxist-based, self-reliant economic, military and political theory, precluded use of foreign capital specifically because of a fear of Western normative influence.24 The pragmatic Deng, however, reinterpreted the norm of self-reliance to become “a more Utopian principle”,25 opening traditional markets to international capital flows.

The Chinese Government’s self-interested approach both in security and economic matters, gradually led to a confrontation with traditional Marxist thought. According to William Tow the dilemma was “how to forge links with Western industrial powers...without subsuming its (China’s) strategic identity to the political agendas of its new found suppliers”.26 Domestically, there is now greater pressure on the Chinese leadership to integrate faster with international financial markets and instigate further reforms. The argument follows that faster integration would facilitate the dismantling of traditional state economic institutions so that greater trade liberalisation can be achieved.27 Further trade liberalisation would ensure a wider introduction of Western norms into the Chinese community, and broaden the degree of normative change already occurring in the domestic sphere.

The Chinese Communist Party has not always coped well with this change. The Realist, George Segal, paints a rather ugly picture of how well equipped the Chinese Government is to cope with this phenomena. Segal’s view is that China has always struggled to understand its place in the world community. Furthermore, that China sometimes shows resistance to the logic of international interdependence, evidenced in the Tiananmen Square catastrophe. Segal is of the opinion that China has been at times frustrated with its place in the global community;28 with the belief that no country enjoys surrendering sovereignty and power to the “western dominated global system”.29 The fact remains that the poorly equipped Chinese leadership “believes that it is able to learn what it must from the outside world and still retain control of its destiny”.30

While the Chinese leadership may believe that they are ultimately in control, from the US perspective the issue of the translation of economic power into projection of hegemonic capability is raised. Just how well can China control its destiny with the power of globalising forces ravaging within China? Moreover it is the currently widely accepted view that “economic development and mercantile success precede a would-be hegemon’s ability to project military and political power”.31

There is however an alternative view emerging, that “international systemic power is becoming less fungible, less coercive and less tangible”.32 Nye supports the view that international systemic power is becoming less coercive and less tangible because of five trends in the international economic system: economic interdependence, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, the changing determinants of political behaviour in the international environment and finally multinational corporate behaviour.33 It appears that there is correctness in both perspectives. While the US as the remaining superpower is influencing the future direction of China to a degree, there is also evidence that globalising forces are also having an impact on China’s future direction. In light of the fact that a superpower balance of power arrangement does not exist and the fact that globalising
forces are impacting on traditional Chinese norms, this may give rise to tolerance of a more ad hoc and cooperative security arrangement within China, reflecting the sum of these post-Cold War changes.

**Cooperative Security Potential**

In the early days of multilateral security dialogue, China was a reluctant participant, viewing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a mechanism to constrain China. With the passage of time through Chinese academics and strategic “think tanks” have been actively discussing new approaches to security, emphasising interdependence, common interests and a widening of the concept of security. This view of renewed interest in multilateral policymaking is shared by other analysts. For example, Johnson notes that the Chinese initially viewed the multilateral dialogue within the ARF sceptically, looking for developments which may have impinged on China’s domestic security or internal political issues. Over time though, these same analysts have become more relaxed. Now it appears that these observers see their ARF involvement as “a means of educating their own government”. One observer has noted these individuals are... groping toward variations of... cooperative society”. Perhaps the penultimate achievement of this process was at the fifteenth CCP party congress, when China formally endorsed multilateralism, “stressing of the need for China to participate actively in multilateral forums”.46

A strong and stable China assists US regional interests, and with the exception of the Taiwan problem paves the way for greater regional cooperation. China has already participated in UN activities. It has supported recent US initiatives on North Korea and is a signatory to the nuclear *Non Proliferation Treaty*. The Chinese polity has sent personnel as part of UN inspection teams working in Iraq. In recent times China contributed a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) peacekeeping contingent under an Australian UN Commander in Cambodia. In recent times, Chinese troops have been committed to a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force in East Timor. This inventory of participation in international fora has been facilitated by the ongoing broadening of the Chinese IR perspective, and affirms the view that greater participation in international fora is promoting normative change within Chinese policymaking circles.

Cooperative security offers a viable security solution for China. It is a security mechanism which can replace or coexist with bilateral alliances. It promotes both military and non-military security. It is compatible with Chinese security norms including bilateralism, and avoidance of hegemony because all actors within the regime are of equal parity. Cooperative security is a vehicle from which to “develop multilateralism from ad hoc, informal and flexible processes until the conditions for institutionalised multilateralism become more favourable”. It advocates movement from bilateralism through trilateralism evolving into multilateralism. This formula encapsulates China’s security requirements and is also accommodating of China’s normative needs.

**Normative Constraints**

China is an ancient civilisation which has been historically embarrassed by foreign imperialism. The Boxer Rebellion, was an example of the exploitation of Chinese sovereign territory and Chinese national interests by foreigners. Reparations were paid to Imperialists for 40 years by the Chinese Government, after the rebellion by a Chinese nationalist group to overthrow Western Imperialists. The legacy of this event is a Chinese cultural norm reflecting “a powerful nationalistic determinism never to be humbled again by Western imperialists”. The aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion has been the vehement maintenance of this norm to uphold sovereign dignity against imperialism. Recovery of lost territories including Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macao and even the Spratly Islands is viewed as a mechanism to undo the effects of the humiliations, suffered at the hands of the West.

There is also some resistance to liberal norms within China. Total liberalisation of the domestic sphere is highly unlikely. When the Chinese Government felt that liberalisation had gone too far, they had no hesitation in using overwhelming force to crush liberalising forces. The lesson here is that despite the normative change which had occurred in the domestic sphere, normative change had not occurred in the polity. The result was Tiananmen; liberalisation was seen by the Government as a subversive force. This in turn constituted a threat to regime security, which provoked a realpolitik response by the CCP.

The Chinese Government has repeated a normative pledge never to act like a superpower. Additionally, it has maintained a constant anti-hegemony rhetoric in international organisations. China has even turned down leadership of the developing world on that basis - that her actions may be misunderstood and therefore that China may be viewed as a hegemon. This behaviour is also linked to China’s historical experience under hegemonic influence from the imperialist powers. China believes the line between an active and a bullying role to be “in the eyes of the beholder”.

In terms of the success of a future security arrangement involving China, it is apparent that hegemonic acts by other states against China is likely to be interpreted through this normative lens. Moreover, imperialist action from the US or other Western nations “is likely to precipitate a crisis”, mainly because “China has instilled a nationalistic determinism not to be humbled again and therefore will never “kowtow”.

While existing normative structures may be constraining China’s security behaviour, it is apparent that China is reluctant to remove those structures which may be achieving some form of resistance to outside imperialist forces. Provided reformers both within and outside China are aware that the pace of normative change will be dependent on the degree of resistance afforded it by the Chinese polity, then cooperative security remains a likely possibility. Notwithstanding, the question remains, just what lessons will China learn in the coming years, and to what extent will China abide by the lessons of the past? Will China learn that great powers do not always feel the need to adhere to the international rules and norms, and therefore seek to change those rules as others have done once she gains great power status?

In this article I have argued that the post-Cold War security environment provides increased stability in the East Asian region when compared with the Cold War period. Unipolarity has facilitated the emergence of a multipolar security arrangement, where dyads of conflict still exist yet are being addressed through more multilateral means, rather than the historical bilateral balance of power arrangements which were synonymous with the Cold War. Emerging multilateralism together with a reduced security threat is giving rise to increased cooperative security possibilities. In China’s case, the evidence presented in this article supports China’s increasing engagement with international society, caused through participation in multilateral fora as well as through economic liberalisation. There are parallels between the normative change being experienced in China within the economic and security sectors. It is also acknowledged that the Chinese leadership has accepted multilateralism, and that cooperative security is in step with China’s normative needs. The current state of China’s security relationships with the rest of the world is best summed up in terms of Sun Tzu’s classical writing:

“We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.”
NOTES

6. S. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 244.
7. S. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 246.
20. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 426. Mao’s self-reliance theory was published in the People’s Daily as late as 1977. It consists of the five nevers: never permit the use of foreign capital, never run undertakings in concert with foreigners, never accept foreign loans and never join the international capitalist IGO’s, and never incur domestic or external debts.
22. ibid.
24. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 426. Kim explains also that Mao’s 3 conceptual pillars – self-reliance, minimising dependency, and transforming the capitalist world economy has been repudiated.
27. op. cit., China 2020, p. 3.
29. ibid.
30. ibid.
32. ibid.
33. ibid.
34. S. Harris, op. cit., p. 14.
35. A. Johnson, op. cit., p. 74.
36. S. Harris, op. cit., p. 15.
37. S. Harris, op. cit., p. 15.
39. ibid.
43. S. Kim, op. cit., p. 408.
44. S. Kim., op. cit., p. 409.
45. C. Johnson p. 49-50. China sees Japan as kowtowing to US interests and is opposed to this behaviour.
46. S. Harris, op. cit., p.16.

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Lieutenant Commander Heron is currently posted in Canberra as the Operations Officer to the Director General Coastwatch. He is completing a Master’s degree in International Relations at the Australian National University.
The Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion

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This article discusses the use of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) in the Australian Defence Force. It is concluded that (a) prior to the widespread administration of a questionnaire designed to determine stress levels amongst ADF personnel, the Defence research community should attempt to define stress in a conceptual, strategic and operational fashion; (b) that only after an optimal conceptual definition of stress has been operationalised can the Defence research community attempt to accurately determine whether (and how) current stress levels are affecting the performance of personnel and begin to impart effective stress management techniques to those in need; and (c) that no one measure can replace the GHQ, which in itself has been inappropriately applied to the ADF population in an attempt to measure the extent to which personnel experience the debilitating effects of physiological and psychological distress.

In addressing the issue of reporting and accountability in stress management within the Defence environment, Gilbert (1996) noted that in recent years the Department has begun to experience the negative impact of increased stress levels amongst employees in the form of increased compensation payments. This finding is concurrently validated by data indicating abnormally high stress levels amongst uniformed personnel from each of the Services (see Grieg, 1997; McIntyre, 1998; Timmins, 1998).

The 12-item version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12; Goldberg, 1972) was originally selected for use in the Australian military by 1 Psychological Research Unit in an attempt to measure levels of work-related or occupational stress amongst members of the Australian Regular Army. It was considered an accurate and rapid measure of psychological distress with robust and well-established psychometric properties. Subsequent to its widespread administration in the ADF, the GHQ has come under increased scrutiny. The aim of this review is to determine the appropriateness of the GHQ in providing a suitable metric for measuring stress levels in ADF personnel and to assess the potential for other instruments to replace this measure.

A Brief Description of the Scale

The GHQ has primarily been used as a screening device to detect psychiatric illness or to estimate the prevalence of psychiatric disorder within a sample of individuals. It may be administered as a 60-, 30-, 28- or 12-item measure in which subjects respond to a number of statements regarding the state of their psychological health (for example, “Have you recently been feeling sad and gloomy?”). Scoring methods vary depending on the desired outcome of the administrator. The binary method involves assigning a score of zero to the responses Less so than usual and No more than usual, with response options Rather more than usual and Much more than usual assigned a score of one. Subsequent to the selection of a cut-off score, this allows determination of psychiatric “caseness”. The Likert method employs an interval scoring method, respondent scores ranging from 0 (No more than usual) to 3 (Much more than usual) for each item. This provides a linear index of the severity of disruption to normal functioning.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis is designed to determine which cut-off point (using the binary scoring method) maximises both sensitivity (the proportion of true positives: independently diagnosed cases which the test correctly identifies) and specificity (the proportion of true negatives: non-cases which the test correctly identifies). Sensitivity and specificity have been found to vary considerably depending on the sample under investigation. Banks, Clegg, Jackson, Kemp, Stafford and Wall (1980) note that the binary method best discriminates between “cases” and “normals”.

One of the most hotly debated issues surrounding the use of the GHQ is its inability to detect the longevity of respondent symptoms (Newman, Bland & Orn, 1988). That is, given that GHQ items are phrased to emphasise recent changes in psychological functioning, the GHQ tends to misclassify individuals with chronic symptoms. Conversely, “individuals experiencing acute stress-related symptoms may be erroneously included as clinical cases because they report sudden changes in symptomatology” (Goyne, 1998: 11).

Many researchers have also debated the merits of the different versions of the GHQ. Whilst some researchers caution that respondents are more likely to give affirmative answers to the GHQ-12 (see van Hemert, den Heijer, Vorstenbosch & Bolk, 1995), others endorse all versions of the GHQ for rapid and accurate determination of general psychiatric status (Lo Bello, 1995). Reynolds (1995) discourages the use of all but the GHQ-60, claiming that the shorter measures fail to withstand psychometric scrutiny. Further to this he asserts that the GHQ is best (and perhaps solely) suited to providing the general practitioner a clear and objective measure to assist him or her in referring a patient for psychiatric assessment (see also Winefield, Goldney, Winefield & Tiggemann, 1989).

Gureje and Obikoya (1990) confirmed the use of the GHQ-12 as an initial screening instrument in the detection of psychiatric illness; however note with concern the paucity of research examining the validity of the shortest version of the GHQ (although see Banks and colleagues, 1980). Conversely, Goldberg and colleagues (1997) assert that the GHQ-12, when scored in a binary fashion, provides as accurate an indication of psychiatric morbidity as do the longer versions of the instrument and the more complex methods of scoring. Additionally, Banks and colleagues (1980) have confirmed the internal consistency and unidimensional factor structure of the GHQ-12 across three different samples.

The brevity of the GHQ-12 makes it attractive for use in busy clinical settings and amongst those of limited literacy (Goldberg et al., 1997). The implications for administration of the GHQ-12 within the ADF are clear: In an operational setting the respondent will be eager to complete the required questionnaire and return to their normal duties; it is unlikely that the 12-item measure will tax the attention span of the respondents; and the simple language and low comprehension level of the measure aids in its administration to those members of the ADF whose educational attainment may predispose them to reading difficulty.

Given the more sophisticated awareness of stress and its deleterious effects amongst employees in the modern workplace, the face validity of the GHQ and the tendency for subjects to distort their responses is worthy of mention. Schei (1994), in administering the GHQ-12 to a sample of Norwegian Army conscripts, queried the extent to which conscripts had suffered under training or whether the high scores obtained during his research merely reflected a “widespread complaining attitude” (Schei, 1994: 43). When this question was put to them, almost a third of respondents agreed with the proposition that they had adopted a negative attitude without
due cause. This finding is equally pertinent to the Australian military context. Furthermore, it is plausible to suggest that personnel in an operational environment, with an enhanced awareness of diminishing resource allocation, may be highly suspicious as to the purpose of the questionnaire and attempt to “fake bad” in order to achieve a favourable financial or materiel outcome.

Winefield, Goldney, Winefield and Tiggemann (1989) assert that the GHQ is resistant to the potential differential effects of sex, socioeconomic status and cultural background on the scores of respondents. Despite this, however, earlier researchers have claimed that differential response profiles are indeed observable. For example, McCabe, Thomas, Brazier and Coleman (1996) found that GHQ-12 scores were affected by age, whilst Hobbs, Ballinger, Greenwood, Martin and McClure (1984) found that the GHQ was more accurately and reliably applied to men than women. Furthermore, and despite the assertion from Goldberg and his colleagues (1997) that education level did not affect GHQ validity, Mari and Williams (1986) found that poorly educated respondents were more likely to give positive replies to the questionnaire which were not subsequently validated during interview.

The Utility of the GHQ in the Australian Military

Perhaps the most definitive paper addressing the utility of the GHQ in measuring stress levels amongst military personnel is that of Goyne (1998). She notes that the GHQ was first administered to Army personnel by way of the annual soldier and officer attitude and opinion surveys, but that research is yet to be undertaken to determine an appropriate cut-off score to determine caseness for an Australian Army population.3

Prior to the development of a new tri-service attitude survey, the single services were administering the GHQ to personnel on a biennial basis. The question now remains whether to continue administering the GHQ-12 or to adopt another more expansive measure. Currently, there are a number of reasons to caution the use of the GHQ in an Australian military environment. These include:

a. the current lack of consensus in the literature regarding the most appropriate or accurate scoring method;

b. the lack of substantial normative data within the ADF which has been validated by concurrent administration of a diagnostic clinical interview;3

c. the lack of research attempting to define the most appropriate cut-off score within the ADF population to determine psychiatric caseness;

d. that the GHQ measures transient or reactive stress. The GHQ does not provide an indication of the number of personnel suffering chronic disruption to normal psychological functioning, which is arguably a far more useful statistic for Defence management purposes;

e. that whilst the shorter version of the GHQ is more appropriate for administration in a Defence context (for the reasons previously discussed), longer versions of the instrument provide a greater behavioural sample and therefore greater reliability in measurement;

f. that the GHQ screens for psychiatric morbidity which may or may not be related to work-related stress (determination of which is the primary reason for the administration of the GHQ by Australian military researchers);

g. that a number of GHQ items may encourage those with tendency toward hypochondria and psychosomatic illness or those with a cynical attitude as to the intended purpose of the questionnaire to distort their responses; and, finally,

h. that the use of the GHQ to demonstrate the existence of a stress epidemic does not elucidate the nature of the distress experienced by personnel (are they
predominantly suffering depression, experiencing generalised anxiety, or some other problem?) and is therefore of limited utility in assisting those responsible for the emotional well-being of personnel to address the problem.

General Issues Surrounding Stress Management in the ADF

In order to more accurately determine the construct validity of the GHQ and to determine its comparative worth as a measure of occupational stress, further investigation of instruments such as the Occupational Stress Inventory (OSI; Osipow & Spokane, 1981) needs to be undertaken. A cursory perusal of the relevant literature suggests that the ability of current measures to determine levels of occupational stress is heavily dependent on item content. That is, items must correctly and explicitly identify sources of occupational stress to allow respondents to attribute their distress to the appropriate source (see Terry, Nielsen & Perchard, 1993). This is particularly the case in the military environment, where items referring to an office environment or job sharing are inapplicable to personnel serving at sea aboard a submarine.

Evidently, the necessary criteria for selecting a measure to accurately determine stress levels amongst ADF personnel are reliability (the degree to which an instrument demonstrates internal consistency in measurement); validity (the extent to which an instrument measures that which it intends to measure); practicality (that is, time efficiency and ease of self-administration); the availability of normative data for comparative purposes; and utility (the availability of other military, or paramilitary data; the ability of the data to determine areas of weakness and/or need in existing policy and resources).

Further to this, the following issues are considered particularly pertinent to the consideration of stress measurement within the ADF:

a. should stress measurement be undertaken in a similar fashion to the collection of attitude and exit survey data (on an annual or biennial basis)?
b. should the emphasis in stress measurement be on the concurrent administration of standard health measures (a symptom checklist and a measure of life satisfaction) and the collection of data pertaining to health service utilisation (statistics regarding medical and psychological treatment, suicide rates, compensation claims)?
c. should the Defence research community endorse a stress measure as “the instrument of choice” for researchers examining work-related stress in specific contexts, or should researchers identify the best means of determining stress levels on a case by case basis consistent with their research design and preferred methodology?
d. is it preferable to measure stress in an objective fashion (visits to health professionals, physiological indices) or to obtain data from the individual based on their appraisal of the number and impact of stressors within their work and/or personal life?
e. is it preferable to obtain a measure of coping behaviour (thereby obtaining a measure of the frequency and perceived success with which individuals employ coping techniques) than to have a respondent provide an assessment of the degree to which they experience the debilitating physiological symptoms of stress?
f. should the ADF focus on occupational stress to the exclusion of others forms of stress (which may impact upon their work performance, such as life satisfaction or financial difficulties)?
g. if we are to assume that we can accurately measure stress, which factors are best indicative of the military respondent’s perceived level of stress and his or her
ability to cope with the stressors s/he is experiencing?

If we are to focus more exclusively on occupational or work-related stress, the picture becomes only slightly clearer than if we were to focus more broadly on life and job satisfaction. The Office of the Surgeon General (Senate Legislative Committee Brief, 7-8 Jun 99) has identified the following factors as indicative of occupational stress:

a. work characteristics (task design; work quantity, diversity and complexity; resources and equipment; time availability; deadlines);
b. the physical work environment (noise, light, ventilation, temperature, space, working hours);
c. the nature of the work and its relation to employee temperament, training skills and experience; and
d. the human environment (organisational structure, management styles, methods and practice, clarity and perceived fairness of conditions, conflict resolution, direction, communications, training and support, relations with peers and clients, the clarity of roles, reasonableness of exceptions and outcome, the usefulness of the work and stability of employment).

Obviously the ability of any one measure, or indeed any one research design, to measure each of these potential contributors to occupational stress is limited. Further to this assumption, a cursory perusal of the relevant literature suggests that the ability of current measures to determine levels of occupational stress is heavily dependent on item content. That is, items must correctly and explicitly identify sources of occupational stress to allow respondents to attribute their distress to the appropriate source (see Terry, Nielsen & Perchard, 1993). It seems that measures such as the Occupational Stress Inventory (Osipow & Spokane, 1998) is comprised of three questionnaires that may be administered independently. These are:

a. the Occupational Roles Questionnaire (for which an example item is “My job requires me to work in several equally important areas at once”);
b. the Personal Strain Questionnaire (for which an example item is “My eating habits are erratic”); and
c. the Personal Resources Questionnaire (for which an example item is “I avoid excessive use of alcohol”).

Reliability and validity. The OSI contains a significantly greater number of items than the
GHQ. Whilst this may be an impediment to ensuring its completion by respondents with a limited attention span or low reading ability, it is advantageous insofar as it provides a greater behavioural sample and therefore potentially greater reliability in measurement.

The OSI boasts modest validity, concurrent validity having been demonstrated between the Occupational Roles, Personal Strain and Personal Resources Questionnaires with job satisfaction (Bunda in Conoley & Impara, 1995), burnout, locus of control and absenteeism and other nonproductive behaviours (Cochran in Conoley & Impara, 1995).

**Availability of normative data.** The manual provides both paramilitary and military norms for the purpose of scoring and interpretation, however the lack of normative data for the instrument in its entirety is cause for concern.

**Utility.** Arguably the most significant advantage of the OSI in relation to the GHQ as a potential measure of stress in the ADF is that the former explicitly measures occupational stress, whilst the latter merely provides a generalised index of stress which is dependant upon respondent acknowledgement and experience of physical symptomatology. Specifically, the results obtained from the OSI may provide policy-makers and human resource professionals with a clear indication of deficiencies in organisational resources and practices (“I have the resources I need to get my job done”; “I have divided loyalties on my job”), job design (“I have more than one person telling me what to do”) or personnel selection procedures (“I find that I need time to myself to work out my problems”; “I am bored with my work”).

Despite these advantages, it is not recommended that the questionnaire be administered on an annual or biennial basis either within or between Services, but rather that it be applied for the purpose of more focused research. This is because the item content is sufficiently specific as to become meaningless were the OSI to be applied to personnel employed throughout the ADF and generalisations made as to the nature and extent of occupational stress associated with military employment in Australia.

**The Occupational Stress Indicator**

The Occupational Stress Indicator (Cooper, Sloan & Williams, 1998) is a measure designed to “clarify the nature of stress in organisations by identifying sources of stress, intervening factors and the effects of stress on employees” (Conoley & Impara, 1995: 620). The Indicator is a 167-item measure comprised of the following subscales:

- a. sources (intrinsic to job, managerial role, relationships with other people, career and achievement, organisational structure and climate, home-work interface);
- b. individual characteristics (attitude to living, style of behaviour, ambition, broad view Type A, organisational forces, management processes, individual influences, broad view of control);
- c. coping (social support, task strategies, logic, home and work relationship, time, involvement); and
- d. effects (achievement value and growth, job itself, organisational processes, personal relationships, broad view of job satisfaction, mental ill health, physical ill health).

Witt (in Conoley & Impara, 1995) has questioned the scope and veracity of the validation research which has been undertaken and recommends that further research be conducted before the instrument is endorsed as a measure for use in industry. However, he has no such reservations for its continued use as a research tool, arguing that it has significant potential in that regard.

The initial Indicator scale, “How you feel about your job” may be appropriate for administration on an annual or biennial basis in addition to some of the more generic attitude survey items that are currently...
administered to ADF personnel. Whilst items from the latter instrument attempt to measure similar constructs to those contained within the Indicator scale (such as job satisfaction and task autonomy), they do so with a view to obtaining a more global measure of “organisational satisfaction”. The Indicator is designed to measure the degree to which the respondent is experiencing occupational stress and may prove a useful measure when applied to the ADF for that purpose.

The Maslach Burnout Inventory

The Maslach Burnout Inventory (Maslach, Jackson & Leiter, 1996) is a 22-item measure comprised of the following three sub-scales:

a. emotional exhaustion;
b. (reduced) personal accomplishment; and
c. depersonalisation.

As noted earlier, the Maslach Burnout Inventory has significant potential for administration to senior officers and personnel working in high-stress and/or operational settings. Despite this, its use in conjunction with a measure of occupational stress (such as those outlined above) is not recommended, due to the problem of criterion contamination. Whilst occupational stress and burnout may prove overlapping constructs, concurrent administration of instruments designed to measure each of these constructs will result in contamination of the stress criterion used in the research design. This, in turn, does not enable policy-makers and human resource professionals to apply the research findings and address deficiencies in organisational policy and resources.

The Ways of Coping Questionnaire

Some researchers consider it preferable to obtain an indirect measure of stress and stress reactivity by determining the frequency and perceived success with which an individual employs coping techniques. Two of the more promising instruments measuring coping behaviour are the Coping in Stressful Situations measure (CISS; Endler & Parker, 1994) and the Ways of Coping Questionnaire (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). The CISS is a 48-item self-report measure designed to assess the frequency with which the respondent employs task-oriented, emotion-oriented and avoidance-oriented coping strategies, the latter “To identify the thoughts and actions an individual has used to cope with a specific stressful encounter” (Conoley & Impara, 1995: 1012). The CISS boasts particularly impressive reliability and validity data.

Despite the conceptual and psychometric virtue of these measures, their use for the purposes of stress measurement on an ADF-wide basis is limited. Neither instrument measures the experience of occupational stress nor identifies its source, necessarily focussing on the stress management of the respondent. These measures are therefore unable to provide policy guidance on stress management. The CISS and WCQ are only recommended for further consideration in the stress measurement debate with respect to specific stress and coping research focussed on a discrete population (cf. Brown, 1999). They are deemed to have significant potential in that regard (refer Conoley & Impara, 1995).

Conclusion

The preceding discussion has canvassed a number of questions that are pertinent to the consideration of stress measurement in the ADF and the identification of a replacement measure for the GHQ. The GHQ was originally selected for use in the Australian military for the purpose of rapid and robust stress measurement. However, subsequent to widespread endorsement of the GHQ a considerable body of literature has suggested that it may be appropriate to seek an alternate measure.

The following conclusions are drawn from (an albeit) brief consideration of issues surrounding stress measurement in the ADF:

a. researchers tasked with stress measurement in the ADF should avoid criterion contamination by attempting to measure
stress using a combination of objective physiological data (for example, health service utilisation), self-report of psychological and/or physiological debilitation and sources of occupational and/or organisational stress (such as lack of human, materiel or financial resources and workplace conflict);

b. annual or biennial stress measurement within the ADF is only recommended for data pertaining to objective indices (such as health service utilisation and compensation claims), however further examination of measures such as the job satisfaction scale of the Occupational Stress Indicator is warranted;

c. it is not advisable that the Defence research community endorse a stress measure as “the instrument of choice” for those wishing to obtain a measure of the extent, prevalence and type of stress experienced by ADF personnel as the requirements of a given researcher will vary according to their research design, preferred methodology and target population; and

d. it is preferable to measure the prevalence and incidence of stress throughout the ADF in an objective fashion (visits to health professionals, physiological indices) than to obtain data from the respondents on preferred coping style and stress management, as this enables policy-makers to focus on addressing deficiencies in organisational policy and resources.

Prior to the widespread administration of a questionnaire designed to determine stress levels amongst ADF personnel, the Defence research community should attempt to define stress in a conceptual, strategic and operational fashion. It is only after an optimal conceptual definition of stress has been obtained, operationalised and tested that we can attempt to accurately determine whether (and how) current stress levels are affecting the performance of personnel and begin to impart effective stress management techniques to those in need.

The four instruments identified in this article appear able to assist in obtaining conceptual, methodological and operational clarification in the stress measurement debate. However, caution is warranted in relying solely on self-report measures of stress in the absence of more objective data such as health service utilisation and other physiological indices.

NOTES
1. Concurrent validation was determined using the World Health Organisation Composite Diagnostic Interview (CDI).
2. See Tomlinson, Gilks & Chapman (1998) for an objective analysis of working hours and concomitant stress levels amongst Army personnel.
3. This is problematic insofar as it deviates somewhat from the application of the GHQ in the Australian military context (group level analysis and determination of the prevalence of work-related stress), however it remains the best means of validating the measure.

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Make War No More
Indonesian Islamic Fundamentalism and Aceh in the Twentieth Century

By Lieutenant Commander P. Flynn, RAN

There are many variations of Islamic practice throughout the sprawling Indonesian archipelago, and consequently many highly localised versions of Islamic fundamentalism in addition to those which have had a general effect throughout the national socio-cultural structure. No region is more independent, stubborn or troublesome to the national government than that of the northern Sumatran province of Aceh where, for some six centuries at least, the local people have practised an unusual form of Islam based on fierce loyalty to their traditional leaders and a real sense of historical connection with their independent past. Probably the site of the first permanent Islamic community to develop in the Indonesian archipelago, Aceh is yet one of the most distant provinces from the national capital of Jakarta, and consequently is less susceptible to the winds of change, cultural and religious, which have moved through the general population, particularly in the 20th century.

It has frequently been observed that because of their constant exposure to travellers and traders, and observance of different cultural and social behaviour, the inhabitants of coastal areas have a wider world view and acceptance of change than those who live inland. This observation is particularly valid in Indonesia where, over the past two millennia, waves of Hindu and Buddhist influence entered the islands through seaborne travellers and, gradually mixing with local animist beliefs, came to create a mosaic of belief systems, with a plethora of local variations, radiating out from the major population centre of Java. The arrival of Islam in about the 13th century was probably accelerated by an increase in trade between the region and the Arabian peninsula, as the demand for the “exotic” produce of the islands began to grow in increasingly wealthy Western Europe. As Arab traders monopolised sea-borne trade to the West, more and more of them settled in the region to establish trading centres; they would have bought their own life styles with them, including their religion.

Heavily influenced by Sufism, the most colourful and tolerant variant, the brand of Islam introduced into the islands proved to be popular with local people who, not surprisingly given their syncretic approach to religion, in many cases simply added aspects of the new religion to their existing practices. Thus Islam penetrated and influenced local religious practices to varying degrees, in some places simply as a thin veneer of quasi-Islamic folkloric behaviour scarcely distinguishable from previous practices, and in others to a depth and breadth worthy of the most pious proponents of Islam; Aceh was one of the latter, far from Java and less affected by Hindu-Buddhist religious penetration. Established as a Sultanate and growing in military power and wealth, Aceh became a power to be reckoned with in the region, and constantly went to war, usually over trade against its neighbours, particularly the other Islamic power centre nearby, Malacca. Just as important as trade though was the pre-eminent role Aceh played in regional Islam as “... the ‘Gate to the Holy Land’ the point of departure for the pilgrimage to Mecca”.¹

The arrival of the European colonial powers in the 16th century, first as traders and later with imperial ambitions, did nothing to change the attitudes and behaviour of the Acehnese, who continued to fight – and usually win – against all comers until they were finally
contained in the 19th century. Even then Aceh was a name which continued to hold a special place in the hearts of Muslims and, although the Sultanate was to disappear, the concept remained alive in the hearts and minds of the population who simply lowered their allegiance to the next surviving level of power, the traditional chieftains who, along with the village ulama, provided the leadership the people required. The resultant amorphous structure owed nothing to state interference and the Acehnese, so different in language and ethnicity and so far from Jakarta, continued to exist in an environment of their own making in which for centuries there had existed a “... close relationship between religion and political authority”.2

The big difference with the Acehnese, then and now, is that both their secular and religious lives are indivisible, truly in the spirit of Islam, but not necessarily for the same reasons as others because their leaders are all indigenous and the Acehnese will not voluntarily acknowledge any outside authority. While Islam continued to spread through the archipelago, first in patches but later with increasing effect, centres of Islamic learning began to be established, and one of the first was in Aceh. It was from there that students went to Mecca, Medina, Cairo and other centres of Islamic education to expand their knowledge and later return to the islands to continue teaching. This process continued for centuries, with Islam still having an uneven effect on the general population. Johns defines the occasional spurts of growth and change in Islam which came over the centuries, either from internal or external sources, as “pulses”, each of which led to further developments, not all of which were positive for Islam.

Johns goes on to explain though that “... the sheer diversity and extent of the region renders impossible the formulation of any single theory of Islamization, or pattern of Islamic life, or any periodization common to the region as a whole”.3 What is important to recognise here is that the process which occurred then, and is still relevant today, did not affect all of the inhabitants to the same degree; indeed, outside of the centres of Islamic learning and the homes of the pious there was very little effect on the peasant masses as far as the intricacies of theological dispute were concerned. Hall sums up the result as one of “... Islamization, not conversion”;4 and goes on to explain that in Malaya and Indonesia, unlike other Muslim countries, customary law, or adat, rather than Sharia law continues to hold sway over everyday lives.

What is known is that Islam in the islands, as with every other part of the Muslim world, suffered a decline in purity and motivation with the decay of the Ottoman empire from the 16th century, its subsequent collapse, and the seemingly inexorable rise to global influence of the Western powers with their novel views on the creation of the nation state and the subsequent separation of church from state in matters secular. For two centuries Islam languished and lost its momentum, with many followers slipping back into pre-Islamic religious practices or, worse still, twisting the purity of Islam into a barely recognisable gibberish. The capture of Mecca by the purist, reformist Wahhabis in 1803 signalled the start of a movement to re-invigorate Islam at its heart and, as the 19th century progressed, the religion began to pulse with life once again. New schools of reformist thought sprang up, many with the dual aims of restoring the faithful to the path of correct worship, and of putting an end to the decay so evident in Muslim society. It was from this point that fundamentalism commenced in Indonesian Islam, although the current model is the product of many more modern influences, particularly the political, social and cultural changes which have occurred, or been prevented from occurring, in the modern state of Indonesia.

Among the major influences on Indonesian Muslims were the reformist ideas of al-Afghani
and Muhammad Abduh, taught to two
generations of students from South-East Asia
by a remarkable native of the islands, al-
Nawawi al-Bantani, who settled in Mecca from
1829 for more than 40 years. His pupils
returned to spread the ideas they had absorbed,
and Muslims in the islands grew to understand
that things could be changed, and that their
religion had a new lease of life. While this
revivalism was growing, the colonial powers
had increased their physical power over the
region to such an extent that, by the end of the
19th century, there were no truly independent
states, only those that gave up all real secular
power were allowed to exist, and then only as
shadows of their former selves. As always,
Aceh proved to be an exception to this rule
and, although no longer a military or trading
power, the people refused to be subdued by the
Dutch who by that stage had conquered the
rest of the Indonesian archipelago, and a long
and costly war ensued from 1873 to 1908.
Finally defeated in battle, the Acehnese never
really accepted Dutch rule and remained
fiercely independent in their behaviour.

In 1942, little more than a generation after
the final triumph of Dutch arms, the invading
Japanese encouraged the people of South-East
Asia to develop their own brands of
nationalism; thus, as the religious aspects of
Muslim's lives were gradually developing, their
ability to think as nationalists rather than at
the village level was spurred into action. In the
case of Indonesia though the post-war
government of the newly independent country
was not about to preside over an Islamic state,
but rather a secular state which did not even
recognise Islam as the state religion. It was the
activities which led up to the declaration of
independence, particularly the infamous
“Jakarta Charter” incident which involved the
omission of the seven words which would have
made Indonesia an Islamic state, that caused
the more militant Muslims to eventually take
up arms against the Government in the hope
of creating an Islamic state.

From 1948 to 1962 Aceh and other western
Sumatran provinces existed in a state of
rebellion against the central government as
they tried to establish an Islamic state or Darul
Islam. These activities caused a deep division
within the Muslims of Indonesia which is still
felt today and, just as importantly, led the
Government to ban religion from politics, and
then to de-politicise the population as a whole.
Various Muslim or Islamic social and political
groups or parties started to be formed in the
first decades of the 20th century, but they had
little in common, no united front or agreed
focus, and were rendered easy prey to first the
Dutch, then the governments of Sukarno and
Suharto, who all relied upon the “divide and
conquer” principle to render Islam politically
impotent. The term “Islamisation” became a
symbol for “... the use of ethnicity in
articulating the organisational functions of
interest groups that for one reason or another
cannot organise themselves formally”.

From 1910 onwards socio-cultural or
purely religious organisations such as the
Muhammadiyah, originally founded as a
religious revivalist group, deliberately
eschewed anything to do with politics. In the
same vein Sarekat Islam started as an anti-
Chinese traders league with, once again, little
evidence of any political ambition. These
organisations, and the many variations they
spawned both during the colonial period and
after independence all eventually became tools
to one degree or another of the politically
ambitious, and all were either destroyed,
amalgamated into meaningless coalitions run
by government puppets, or emasculated by
other means. Given the all-embracing nature
of Islam it was only a matter of time,
particularly when fundamentalist energies were
unleashed, before an issue (any issue really)
espoused by these organisations brought them
up against the authorities; and they lost every
time. They had all crossed “... the thin and
artificial dividing line between the religiously
tolerable and the politically intolerable”.

Fear of religious strife has been a constant for Indonesian governments since independence because they inherited a society which “... was sorely lacking in unity because it was a matrix of communal, ethnic, religious and cultural segmentation.”7 Essentially, those Indonesian Muslims who practice their religion seriously (the santri), as opposed to the nominal Muslims (the abangan), have had to accept the fact that, because of general apathy in the masses, any fundamentalist changes they may wish to introduce will only have an effect on a small number of Indonesians. At the same time the santri are up against the entrenched power and authority of the priyayi, those mainly Javanese descendants of the old Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of that island who still control the nation and its organs of state. The santri have no political power base worthy of the name and, even in free or controlled elections over the years they have watched their share of votes decrease at a steady rate, and it has become obvious that the people of Indonesia are largely hostile to the concept of a religion that has a political role.

The current crop of fundamentalists are still largely concerned with removing the indigenous embellishments from Islam, and returning to the original purity of the teachings of the Prophet. In addition to the problems they face because of the holistic nature of Islam, which would of course include a political dimension as that is an integral part of life, this course of action also brings them up against the Traditionalist ulama, those who owe their status and very livelihood to their positions as leaders of the abangan masses and who, quite understandably, have no intention of giving up their perks of office to someone who would have no use for them in the future. Emmerson points out the major pitfalls facing fundamentalists because “In Indonesia, Islam is an active minority – within a numerical majority – inside a pluralistic society under an authoritarian government engaged in secular development”.

This paradigm is most unlikely to change and, to borrow from Emmerson again, as there is no chance of Islam gaining political power, or of disappearing, then both Muslim leaders and the Government have to come to some form of compromise, hopefully less antagonistic than the current model. “Religion is like a nail. The harder you hit it, the deeper it goes into the wood”.9 The causes of Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism vary for every community but Esposito lists four common themes, all of which are relevant to Indonesian fundamentalism:

1. an identity crisis precipitated by a sense of failure, loss of identity and lack of self-esteem;
2. disillusionment with the West; the failure of many Muslim rulers and their Western-inspired governments to respond adequately to the political and socioeconomic needs of their societies;
3. the newfound sense of pride and power that resulted from military (Arab-Israeli war) and economic (oil embargo) success in 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1978-79; and
4. a quest for a more authentic identity rooted in an Islamic past.10

The virtually impenetrable society created in Aceh over the centuries has not been affected quite in the same way by Esposito’s four common themes; for the Acehnese and their “… peculiar, Muslim-tinged Patriotism”,11 little has changed in the last century. They rejected the revivalist concepts espoused by the Muhammidayah in the earlier part of the century because they regarded them as alien, or not of Aceh or the true Muslim world. Unique in the archipelago, the Acehnese version of Islam does not fit with any ordinary description, it is violently patriotic, all-pervasive, clan and tribe based and, without exaggerating it would probably be true to say that they identify more with their Malay ethnic brethren and the Arab world than with the national government. The Dutch pursued a
policy of keeping politics in the outer islands at a very low level, preferably the village, so that with the demise of the Sultan of Aceh the masses were kept in ignorance and, as long as their highly parochial needs were met they were at least less likely to rise in revolt (no one could ever say that they were passive).

The Indonesian Government has followed a similar policy but, as with the Dutch, they have found that the Acehnese have simply turned their backs on them and focused inwards, deepening and strengthening their sense of “otherness” and social cohesion to the exclusion of outside influences; Islam has been only one among many factors in this process. The implacable hatred of the Acehnese of all things Indonesian is only fueled by the constant imposition of “foreign” troops, police and government officials into their society, to which they react savagely. This should not come as any surprise though, because that is how the Acehnese have lived for centuries; the current state of affairs is only one more challenge to them – and they love a challenge.

One of the big benefits of their behaviour for the Acehnese has been the virtual exclusion of the Chinese from business in the province; the overseas Chinese, with their vast financial resources, have never been able to penetrate the web of Muslim trading concerns and families that connect the province with the rest of the world, and consequently the Acehnese have been protected from the worst of the crony capitalism which is so evident in the rest of Indonesia. The current troubles in Aceh are fueled more by economic reasons than religious, as the oil and gas rich province sees little of that capital or profit invested or returned in the form of government goods and services. The fact that Islam is used as a rallying call to rebellion is simply the way the Acehnese react in any crisis because of the role that religion plays in their lives. The last word on Aceh goes to Benda who, discussing the formation of the nation state of Indonesia, opines that “Under the banner of a distinctly Islamic local and ethnic patriotism, Aceh thus entered independent Indonesia as a virtually autonomous Imperium in Imperio”.

Conclusion

We can see that the causes and nature of Islamic fundamentalism are many and varied, with both external and internal influences playing their parts to one extent or another. Islam in Indonesia has undergone practically the whole range of experiences seen and felt in other Muslim societies; perhaps not at the same time or with the same intensity, or even with the same results, but still the learning and development process has many universal parallels. A vigorous religion, still largely confined to the socio-cultural sphere, Indonesian Islam is alive and well, but not doing well at the polls – a fact which does not seem to worry too many Indonesians, who have always regarded religion as an intensely personal aspect of their lives. The current jockeying for political power, fundamentalist or otherwise, is a very long way from producing a consensus with which the vast majority of Indonesians can live comfortably, and it will be many years yet before there is a comfortable equilibrium or even relationship between religion and state.

As for Aceh, which in its time honoured way is now engaged in a savage rejection of all things Indonesian while the world watches events in East Timor, it will take more than a change of government for relations to improve. Both parties need to take a good hard look at their own peculiar paradigms before too long, otherwise we may well find that the long-dreaded unravelling of the Indonesian polity starts in the north of Sumatra rather than elsewhere. Given the depth of religious feeling amongst the Muslims of Aceh, and the way in which it is intertwined throughout every aspect of their lives, there is little chance that these natural fundamentalists are going to suddenly find cause with those they regard as foreign occupiers, usurpers of power, stealers of wealth
which rightly belongs to the province and, to a degree, heretics – or at least largely non-believers or nominal Muslims.

NOTES

9. ibid., p. 160.
12. ibid., p. 204.
13. *Imperium in Imperio* (Latin), a sovereignty within a sovereignty; an absolute authority within the jurisdiction of another.

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Lieutenant Commander Flynn is the Assistant Defence Attache at the Australian Embassy in the Philippines. He is soon to complete his Graduate Diploma in Islamic Studies.
The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Carrier Fleet temporarily crippled the United States Pacific Fleet.
The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Force

By Rodrigo C. Mejia

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Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, air unit commander of Fleet Carrier Akagi from Pearl Harbor to the Battle of Midway succinctly summarises Japan's defeat in these terms...

"I am firmly convinced that the Pacific War was started by men who did not understand the sea, and fought by men who did not understand the air. Had there been a better understanding of the sea and air, Japan would have pondered more carefully the wisdom of going to war. And even if she had then decided that no other course was possible, many of the blunders she made could have been avoided. Because she judged the sea by land standards and applied to air warfare the concepts of sea fighting, Japan's tragic fate was foreordained."1

The rise of Japanese Air Power started when Japan launched a devastating air attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Except for the absence of the three carriers of the fleet (Saratoga, Lexington and Enterprise), the entire Pacific fleet was present at Pearl Harbor when the first wave of Japanese planes passed over shortly before 7:55 am. with the help of local intelligence operatives in Hawaii,2 the Japanese knew the precise position of their victim and wasted little time completing their mission successfully, sinking two battleships the Arizona and the Oklahoma and badly damaging the other six battleships in port, the California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia and the Nevada which had managed to get underway before being hit. The total was grotesquely impressive. In less than 120 minutes, the Pacific fleet of the United States had been neutralised. The United States lost 311 aircraft while the Japanese lost only 29 aircraft during the fighting.3

After brilliantly executed advances in the first six months of the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) suffered its first crushing reverse at Midway in June 1942. The Battle of Midway was regarded as the turning point of the Pacific War. It gave a striking lesson in the vulnerability of aircraft carriers to air attacks. At Midway, the United States fleet inflicted an enormous defeat on Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s task force. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first naval battle waged solely by the use of air power with both fleets more than 250 kilometres apart. The result of the battle indicated that the battle between carrier fleets was a war of attrition. This battle also strategically ushered in the decline of Japanese air superiority. This was followed later by the decisive battles in the Philippines, particularly the Battle of Leyte where the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered heavy casualties. By fall of 1944, American aircraft
were flying freely over the Japanese homeland and it was virtually incapable of defending the nation.

This article will examine the reasons why the Japanese air power gained a headstart in the initial stages of war. It will study the causes of its downturn and why it was virtually incapable of defending the Japanese homeland by 1945.

Overview of the Japanese Air Power

At the start of World War II, Japan had two separate air forces, the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF) and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAFAF). In terms of organisation the Army organised aircraft in small specialised groups called *sentai*. While the Navy organised their aircraft in naval air corps called *kokutai* usually of one aircraft type and attached either to a fleet or an area as the tactical situation demanded. Military cadets and officers both in the Army and the Navy were heavily indoctrinated in the Imperial Rescript of Emperor Meiji which emphasised loyalty to sovereign and country. The Japanese Army was authoritarian and conservative while the Navy was more cosmopolitan and less political. The Army looked to Germany while the Navy looked to Britain. The two services had also different strategic outlook with the Army looking to the mainland of Asia while the Navy focused on South-East Asia and the Pacific. This rivalry severely constrained the early development of the Japanese air power capability. By the early 1930s the Japanese Army and Navy pilots were gaining valuable combat experience in China and Manchuria. The war with China had given much experience to both Army and the Navy in establishing air tactics and in organising air force to achieve its maximum effect. The use of bombers and dive-bombers on both sea and land targets had been perfected over China and in the China Sea. By 1934, it was under the tutelage and command of Admiral Yamamoto that brought about the proficiency in night flying and carrier flying operation. In addition to their role as support of surface forces, Japanese aircrews had carried out long-distance transoceanic bombing raids, sometimes in poor weather, from bases in Japan and Formosa against a target around Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow. By 1936, Japan’s military budget was increased almost 50 per cent as a result of coup d’etat that was staged by a group of young military officers.

A comparison of air force strength at the start of the Pacific War indicated the Japanese superiority in first line aircraft, carriers and combat experience of aircrew. By December 1941, the Japanese Army and Navy air forces had a combined strength of 3,000 first-line aircraft as compared to 668 of the allied. The Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force had 3,500 first-line pilots while the Imperial Army Air Force had 2,500 averaging 500-600 flying hours. Japanese Navy aircraft carriers outnumbered the US Navy carriers ten to three. The Japanese possessed a clear-cut superiority over the air force of the three allied nations in the Pacific and a decisive margin in aircraft carriers.

The Early Triumphs

The Japanese air power was so impressive at the beginning of the Pacific War that within a span of five months Japan had crippled the American, British and the Dutch battle fleets and air forces in the Far East. It had captured two of the greatest fortresses in Asia, Corregidor “Rock” of the Philippines and the impregnable fort of Singapore. At this point it is significant to identify the key reasons why the Japanese gained a headstart in the initial stages of the war.

Flawed Cultural Perceptions

Japanese air power was seriously underestimated by both the British and the Americans. There was evidently a flawed cultural perception before the war started. According to one British instructor, Japanese pilots were, fifth-rate, inconsistent and showed
very bad judgment. The best Japanese aircraft were thought to be a European design rather than the Japanese. Western intelligence regarded Japanese pilots as inferior to their Western counterpart and were pictured as myopic, night-blind, poor at dive-bombing and accident prone. Japanese warplanes were also described by Western intelligence as shoddy, technologically inferior, made of flimsy materials like plywood and glue paper and having a limited operating range. The Zero fighter clearly was more superior to any American aircraft in many ways. It was fully appreciated over the Pearl Harbor attack and was looked upon as nearly invincible because of its speed and manoeuvrability. Indeed, Japan had reached and in many cases, exceeded the aviation technology of that of the Western powers for that time of the war. Japan also went to great lengths to ensure that as little detail as possible of the advances made during the 1930s reached the Western powers. In fact, they displayed only obsolete and obsolescent weaponry and equipment to the public. They also propagated the slogan “every foreigner is a spy”. Underestimated Japanese War Machine

Before the beginning of the war in the Pacific, the Far East had a low priority for reinforcements and modern equipment, reflecting the weakness in Allied strategic calculations. The United States and Britain had agreed in 1941 on a Germany first strategy because Germany was considered the more dangerous opponent. They underestimated the capability of Japanese carriers to protect air power as far as Hawaii. The range of Japanese bombers were likewise thought to be limited to 515 kilometres which led the Americans to believe that Clark Air Base in the Philippines was beyond the reach of Japanese land based bombers. The capabilities of the Japanese Zero were likewise misjudged until its performance in aerial combat proved superior over Allied fighter aircraft then in use. This excellent performance of experienced Japanese combat pilots was not anticipated and resulted in heavy losses to Allied air crew particularly in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. The United States losses were related more to their unpreparedness. Also, the lack of adequate defences especially radars for early warning of air attack was a great blunder. The United States Army was a neglected service, starved of funds. Only 2 per cent of the national budget was allocated for research and development even though there was a clear indication of Japan’s emergence as a military threat in the Far East.

Air Power Training

By the early 1930s the Japanese Army and Navy pilots were gaining valuable combat experience in China and Manchuria. The war with China had given much experience to both Army and Navy in establishing air tactics and in organising the air force to achieve its maximum effect. The use of bombers and dive-bombers on both sea and land targets had been perfected over China and the China Sea. By 1934, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack brought about proficiency in night flying operations. Japanese aircrews had gained experience in carrying out long distance transoceanic bombing raids, sometimes in poor weather, from bases in Japan and Formosa against targets around Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow. The strong emphasis by the Japanese of 300 hours of flying training before posting pilots is another factor compared to the US Army Air Corps pilots who received only 200 hours basic training.

Setbacks and Defeat

Japan did not Envisage a Total or a Prolonged War

The Japanese Master Plan was to advance towards the intended area of conquest, the Americans in the east and the British in the west which had to be attacked simultaneously at the outset to secure the flanks of Japanese
forces and to protect Japanese lines of communication to Japan. Japanese war strategy was simply to destroy the British, American and the Dutch forces in the Pacific as quickly as possible and to secure a strong defensive perimeter that was calculated to keep Allied forces beyond striking distance of the Japanese homeland. This was to be followed by the phased landing of seaborne land forces to occupy Allied colonies in South-East Asia and Southwest Pacific. The Japanese Supreme Council did not really envisage engaging in a total or prolonged war with Britain and the United States. The long-term aim was to wear down Allied forces’ resolve and means of fighting until the weight of struggle and losses in Europe and the Pacific would bring about acceptance of the reality of Japanese conquests and an eventual Allied overture for peace. However, it was a war Japan thought could be initiated and then later limited in its conduct and aims.22

Lack of Oil Supply

Japan had extended its operation far beyond the distances that it could logistically support. The extent of conquest and the great interdiction of the sea lines of communication were extensive. Imperial Japan certainly waged military operations on a grand and massive scale. Dispersed Japanese forces were scattered around the Southwest Pacific and South-East Asia. During 1943 and early 1944, the Japanese were losing their momentum in every corner of their operation in the Pacific and this was primarily due to the shortage of oil supply and aircraft spare parts. Japan depended on overseas supplies of oil for 90 per cent of its requirements. Aware of this weakness, supply lines were virtually cut by Allied submarines or air interception. US forces gave priority to sinking oil tankers. The number of US submarines on patrol rose from an average of 13 in 1942 to 18 in 1943, to 27 by January 1944 and to 43 by October. After March 1945 no oil entered Japan.23 As a result, Allied sea blockade had completely cut off all outside sources of supply thus crippling the key economic and military pillars supporting Japan’s strategy. Also, Allied forces successfully developed a supply and training system for replacements while the Japanese remained very limited in this area.

Decrease in War Industry Production

At the start of the Pacific War, Japan had an edge with its superior Zero fighter planes and longer distance torpedoes. During the first twenty-one months of the war, Japanese industry production decreased significantly. America then pulled ahead, developing strategic materials such as new aircraft, radar, homing torpedoes, proximity fuses and new medicines and eventually the atomic bomb. By January 1943, American front-line air strength in the Far East already exceeded that of Japan and by January 1944 reached 11,442 against a Japanese strength of only 4,050.24 The Japanese could not match the American capability of mass production as Japanese military factories were targeted by American bombers.

Massive Loss of Combat Pilots

The loss of great numbers of skilled pilots particularly in the decisive battle of Okinawa and the Leyte Gulf in the Philippines was among the foremost reasons for the collapse of Japanese air power. Having began the war with some 3,500 Army and 2,500 Navy pilots in 1942 and 5,400 in 1943, the losses of 10,000 pilots between 1942 and 1943 developed a severe shortage. New pilots were therefore sent into battle with 60 to 70 hours of flying against American pilots in better aircraft with five time more experience.25 This resulted in a greater attrition rate with the eventual decision to go “Kamikaze”. By June 1944 the operational lost rate of pilots in the Japanese Navy had reached 50 per cent and the losses amounted to about 1,000 aircraft.26

The use of the American B-29 “superfortress” which was beyond the altitude reach of
The Arizona burning after the great explosion.

Casualties of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor – The West Virginia.
Japanese fighter planes was another blow to the Japanese. As a result of an early German surrender in Europe, these heavy bombers (B-29) were diverted to Japan to conduct high-level bombing of Japanese industry. As a result of massive losses in the Battle of Leyte and impending defeat in Okinawa the use of special attack operations Tokubetsu Kogekitai (tokkotai), also known as “Kamikaze” – the Divine Wind, was used in the latter part of 1944 as a desperate measure to counter Allied naval and air superiority. On October 20, 1944, the Japanese 201st Air Group in the Philippines was constituted into the first Kamikaze unit. By October 25, 1944, Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo announced the formation of the Kamikaze Special Attack Force – named after the “divine wind” that had saved Japan from Mongol invasion centuries before. In the next few months, in a frenzy of desperate courage, 1,228 Japanese pilots tried to plunge their bomb-laden planes onto the decks of US ships, sinking 34 and damaging 288 with heavy loss of life. The cost of Kamikaze operations further depleted Japanese air power of aircraft and trained aircrew. Their losses in aircraft for special operations was 560 in the second Philippine campaign and 1,890 in Okinawa. While the Kamikaze more than adequately demonstrated its potency as a precision guided weapon of terror, its use was not sufficient to reverse the strategic outcome of the war. To Western culture it was perceived as suicide but to the Japanese it was the supreme sacrifice of one’s life in the performance of a sacred duty for his country and the emperor.

Conclusion

The elements of surprise, secrecy, intense training and prejudiced and flawed perceptions were critical factors in the success of Japanese air forces in the early stages of the war. This was brought about by Allied prejudice on the capability of Japanese pilots, ignorance of the combat characteristics of Japanese aircraft particularly the Zero and the lack of appreciation of the potentials of aircraft carriers for long-range projection of air power. It enabled the use of pre-emptive strikes against Allied air and naval targets.

The causes of the downturn was primarily because Japan was not prepared for a prolonged war nor had envisaged a total war with Britain and the United States. Secondly, the vital role of industry and the economy in winning the war never clearly established itself in the mind of the Japanese Supreme Council. The Japanese were unable to compete technologically and replenish the losses of soldiers and aircraft. And lastly, Japan extended its operation far beyond the distances that could be logistically supported. It was in this logistic war that Japan’s war machine was exposed for the hollow shell it was. Without supplies, food, ammunition, medicine or reinforcements, no modern military can maintain even a semblance of capability for very long. Japan’s military position disintegrated precipitately.

NOTES


2. Although it was an awesome demonstration of the power of aircraft carriers, the Japanese victory was incomplete. Admiral Osami Nagumo's refusal to allow his pilots to make a further attack against an alerted enemy had left the vital infrastructure of Pearl Harbor virtually unscathed. The base was able to begin repairs immediately and to continue operating its surviving ships – notably the Pacific Fleet’s three aircraft carriers, the *Saratoga*, *Lexington* and the *Enterprise*. At the time of the raid, *Saratoga* was on the dry dock on America's west coast while *Lexington* and *Enterprise* were on missions to Pacific outposts. Cited in Eric Grove, *World War II: The Pacific War*, in Richard Holmes (eds), *The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History*, Mitchell Beazley Publishers, London, 1988, p. 211.


6. ibid, p. 268.
19. Pelvin, op. cit., p. 11.
25. Overy, op. cit. p. 44.
27. American B-29 bombers operated above 20,000 feet which created difficulties for the Japanese aircraft reaching the bombers and maintaining their height and aircraft balances. Japanese aircraft were designed to give optimum performance at 15,000 feet, with higher altitude performance causing malfunctions and increasing the need for engine overhauling. Cited in Alan Stephens, *The War in the Air 1914-1994*, Royal Australian Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, p. 23.
28. In 1281 Kublai Khan organised a mighty Mongol armada to invade and conquer the islands of Japan. The success of this venture was all but assured when a great typhoon off the Japanese coast destroyed or dispersed the Mongol ships. The Japanese people considered this fortuitous storm an evidence of heavenly protection and have ever since credited the salvation of the Empire to Kamikaze – the Divine Wind. Cited in Rikihei Inoguchi, Tadashi Nakajima and Roger Pineau, *The Divine Wind*, Ballantine Books, New York, 1958, p. ix.
30. Inoguchi, op. cit., p. i.

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A Feeling of Belonging

Poems of peace and conflict

A Feeling of Belonging contains poetry written by Captain Barham J.R. Ferguson. Many of the poems contained in this book were written during his time as a member of the peace monitoring group in Bougainville.

The poems are backdropped by images from the island and depict the activities of Operation Bel Isi. The book is available from the Australian Defence Force Journal, R8-LG-002, Russell Offices, ACT 2600 for $10.00, including postage. Please send a cheque or money order to ADFJ made out to the Receiver of Public Monies.

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I enclose cheque/money order payable to the Receiver of Public Monies for $ ............... being for ............ copies of A Feeling of Belonging.
I want to start with a very big bouquet by placing on the record my utmost admiration for Defence’s professional performance in East Timor, an admiration shared by all Australians.

Defence’s performance was based on good intelligence, sound implementation and logistical support.

That’s not to say our execution was perfect – we will be undertaking quite a few “lessons learned” studies and feeding them back into the system. That’s as it should be. But, we should all be impressed by the talents of our uniformed colleagues in the field.

After six years’ absence, I return to Defence to find that its greatest strength continues to be its people – a committed, loyal bunch of professionals with a “can do” attitude and a capacity to deliver, while recognising the need for significant change in the way Defence business is conducted. These strengths plus our current capability, community support for Defence, and the US alliance provide a platform that we can build on.

The Australian Defence Organisation has been through massive change that is often not well appreciated. Let me give you a few figures.

Fifteen years ago there were more than 70,000 people in the ADF and around 40,000 on the civilian side. Today, there’s some 50,000 in the ADF and around 16,000 in the Department.

In the last ten years, over 11,000 positions (military and civilian) in around 100 functions have been market tested with average savings in excess of 30 per cent.

This is large scale change by any measure.

The reality today, however, is that there is widespread dissatisfaction with Defence’s performance in Canberra – from ministers, central agencies within the public service, industry, and even from within the Defence organisation itself. In essence, we have a credibility problem.

Being from Transport (and Regional Services), my “road test” of a sample of Defence’s people about our mission, vision and values demonstrates that they are not well understood – even at senior levels within the Organisation.

Nor are all in Defence sufficiently seized with the importance of serving the nation through its ministers and the government of the day. It is far too inwardly focussed.

A major focus for myself and other leaders in Defence must therefore be to restore confidence – both externally and internally. Improving our performance will be fundamental to this.
Planning

Some argue that the three-year electoral cycle and two-year staff postings in the ADF combined with an annual budget leads to a short-term focus and is not conducive to good planning. Posting turbulence needs attention in its own right, to help combat increased turnover.

One of the first things I looked for after arriving at the end of October last year was Defence’s planning regime. I hoped to find an overarching corporate plan, derived from government policy and objectives, setting out our purpose, our future directions, our priorities and our values. I hoped to find a succinct document which people in Defence were committed to and owned – which gave direction and meaning to the work they did.

I hoped to find a business plan for each functional unit, derived from and clearly linked to the Corporate Plan – what’s to be done, by whom and by when.

I hoped to find something like each person’s “plan on a page”, derived from their group’s business plan, clearly articulating what they were expected to contribute. A cascading framework from the top down, where each of the key people at the top level met with me to agree their objectives for the next quarter; discuss their plans, priorities, development and aspirations; and how they intend to go about achieving them. And, for them in turn to do the same with their next level reports, and so on.

I hoped to find the record of achievement and progress against the Government’s policy platform and priorities.

And, I hoped to find an understanding of how we serve the Government of the day through our Ministers, the Parliamentary Secretary and their private offices – including what they consider the characteristics of good advice on policy options to be, and an appreciation of the fundamental importance of establishing and maintaining good working relationships.

I’m not saying there’s no planning in Defence. Far from it. Some areas are better than others. Some have bits of the jigsaw, but not the whole puzzle. What I do find, is that we fail to make the mark on three fundamental criteria:

• planning which is clearly derived from our raison d’etre;
• planning which is logically linked, and
• planning that is not only understood but owned.

It is, in my view, a CEO responsibility (which I share with the Chief of the Defence Force) to put this framework into place and to shape and share a vision which gives meaning to the work of others. So that’s another area I’ll need to spend a bit of time on.

This is an appropriate point to say something about what’s called the diarchy – the unconventional vesting of authority in two equals – Admiral Barrie as Chief of the Defence Force and myself. While we each have particular responsibilities our joint roles might be compared to a good marriage – where there’s synergy at the top.

Performance and the Budget

Performance, achievement – outputs if you like, in the new jargon – should be reported against the plan. Businesses do so through their annual report. Interestingly, I note that the definition of Defence’s outcome in the Portfolio budget statement is not the same as the Defence mission.

Financial performance is reported in financial statements. The Auditor General and his senior staff have left me in no doubt that Defence’s financial statements are at risk of being qualified next year in relation to the valuation of Defence assets. This tends to focus the mind a bit!

While there are significant costs involved in the current deployment of our defence forces, nationally and internationally, defence spending (or put another way, what Australians spend on
defence through their taxes) is essentially focussed on conducting current operations and building a contingent capability – the capacity of Australia’s defence forces to fight and win if called on.

I would expect to be able to report on what activities were undertaken and what capability was in place for the $11 billion or so cash budget expended each year in the defence of our nation.

I would expect to be able to advise the impact on that capability of an additional investment of \( x \) per cent or a reduction of \( y \) per cent.

I would also like to be able to do this for our preparedness – that is, the readiness of the ADF to conduct and sustain operations.

I am not in a good enough position today to do so to my satisfaction. That must change.

My recollection is that, when the Coalition came to office, its platform commitment was to match the previous Government’s forward estimates projection. That’s what was promised – that’s what was delivered!

The current state of Defence’s financial situation against the Forward Estimates might best be described as parlous. I don’t make that statement lightly – considerable pain will be required to get us back on track. The plain fact is that Defence has not been able to match the ends it is trying to achieve with the means it has been given to do so.

This goes to the fiduciary duty of a Secretary – something which is sometimes overlooked in the public sector. Not only am I responsible for delivering the “Defence product” to the Government (Government wearing its purchaser hat), but I am also responsible for ensuring the financial and other sustainability of the Government’s investment in the business (Government wearing its owner/shareholder hat). In the words of the Commonwealth’s Financial Management and Accountability Act, Secretaries are responsible for managing in a way which promotes the proper use of Commonwealth resources – i.e. efficient, effective and ethical.

Perhaps it should come as no surprise then, that soon after I started, a team of Department of Foreign Affairs officials arrived in the Department to work full-time on our financial position. They and their central agency colleagues will be applying a wire brush to our position and our processes.

As the Minister has made abundantly clear to me, the Government will need to be satisfied that Defence is managing its affairs properly and that they are getting value for money before considering any increase in Defence funding.

There are many reasons why Defence is now confronted with this most unpalatable situation.

One of these I’m told, is that over the last five years, our new investment commitment has increased markedly (96-97 $1.4Bn; 97-98 $7Bn; 98-99 $1.8Bn; 99-00 $2.3Bn). That new projects have been approved at a rate significantly higher than what is affordable in the long-term – and that’s just in terms of the acquisition costs.

The number of approved major capital projects has increased from around 160 in 1991 to 240 today.

Many of these projects represent either a big increase in capability or are totally new. Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW& C) aircraft, ANZAC helicopters, the LPA Amphibious Transport ships, missiles, Electronic Warfare (EW) systems, the new Coastal Minehunters, additional Light Armoured Vehicles, and the Bushranger Infantry vehicles, to name a few.

All of these projects bring with them a big downstream liability in terms of personnel and operating costs. Adding up all the projections is enough to badly frighten the horses. In his speech at the recent Pacific 2000 Conference, the Minister signalled the intention to address this issue through a proper whole-of-life capability process.
Then we need to add to this, significant bids for more support costs for existing capability, for
sorely needed corporate Information Technology systems and the seemingly relentless growth in
per capita personnel costs.

If that’s not enough, what about the block obsolescence which is predicted to begin around
2007?

The state of Defence’s financial situation may well come as a shock to you, just as it has to the
Minister and the Government.

Getting the budget/FYDP into balance is a, if not the, most critical issue we face. We have no
expectation that Defence resources will be increased in 2000-01, beyond the promised funding for
the East Timor deployment.

We have, therefore, been undertaking a comprehensive review of all expenditure and
investment priorities. This will help us to provide the Minister and Government the widest possible
range of options for their consideration.

In relation to major capital equipment projects, these considerations include already approved
projects which are not yet under contract, as well as projects which are yet to be approved by
Government.

No recommendations have, however, yet been made to Ministers and no decisions have been
taken, either in relation to particular projects or the overall allocation of resources within Defence.
The Minister’s clear aim is to maintain the maximum possible flexibility in terms of possible future
projects while seeking to minimise any resulting disruption to industry.

Providing for Australia’s defence is a long-term undertaking. It is therefore important that
decisions on future defence capability and related projects are taken within the wider policy
framework which the Defence White Paper will provide. We will be seeking to consult and
cooperate with industry to maintain the necessary flexibility while the White Paper is developed.

I also take this opportunity to mention that the $380m reduction in the 1999-2000 Defence
equipment investment program effected during last year’s Additional Estimates process was
designed to accommodate cost pressures at that time, particularly in relation to increased readiness,
the Y2K issue and maintaining a Defence Force of 50,000 people. Contrary to press speculation, no
projects were cancelled as part of these investment program adjustments.

We must shift the concentration of Defence’s management and decision making from a short-
term cash driven input-based approach to a focus on outputs and financial sustainability. Accrual
based output budgeting and better cost accounting will help here, but we’ve still got some way to
go to get our associated systems in place and operating effectively.

The forthcoming strategic outlook, Defence White Paper and budget/FYDP deliberations should
provide a firmer base for Defence funding and the force structure for the foreseeable future.

In my experience, organisations that perform well regularly report performance internally; this
is normally linked to their external reporting mechanisms and some means of frequently checking
“organisational health”. While such mechanisms exist in many functional areas within Defence,
there is no coherent ongoing corporate performance assessment.

Perhaps this, combined with poor communication, and the internal focus I spoke of earlier, has
contributed to Defence’s capacity to deliver “surprises” to its owners, the Government. Experience
tells us that few surprises past childhood are pleasant ones.

Planning, measurement and striving for better performance are part and parcel of an approach
that anticipates issues and problems and actively controls them rather than being controlled by
them.
Governance

Many elements of Defence’s structure are sensible, but there are issues which need to be addressed.

The separate acquisition and logistics organisations are both engaged in procurement. The role of the Service Chiefs must be clarified – they have essential responsibilities. The functional split within Defence Headquarters is not clearly understood by many within it, let alone those outside whom it is intended to support. The so-called corporate support groups are not seen by their customers as sufficiently responsive to their needs.

More importantly, our top structure is not consistent with the previous 14 functional groups or with our 22 outputs. As you will have guessed, I’m not a fan of matrix management.

When I asked our senior military and civilian staff to identify Defence’s strengths and weaknesses, one of the most significant areas identified was lack of clarity in direction; in roles, responsibilities and structures; together with blurred and poor performance accountability – in other words, accountability, responsibility and authority are not aligned.

Let me quote to you from an internal minute (to me) from a senior manager. Referring to a number of organisations, he identifies “certain characteristics as transcending apparent differences in business types. Each of these large, diverse and complex organisations are characterised by:

- a genuine and demonstrated commitment to strategic management, guidance and planning;
- a business plan regime displaying rigour, discipline, documentation and accountability;
- an integrated cascade of subordinate planning and accountability throughout the organisation, including personal performance agreements; and
- effective, open and frequent internal communications.”

My due diligence diagnosis would suggest that Defence is presently lacking against elements of these characteristics. While in some cases, such as purchaser-provider arrangements, a foundation has been set upon which to build and improve the current relationships, it is fair to say that those components that do exist are usually partial, uncoordinated and/or poorly understood by most.

CDF and I recently spent some time with our senior executives discussing the role of the Service Chiefs and their relationship with other executives. Issues relating to the headquarters structure and role will be resolved by new top structure arrangements. Structure and outputs will be aligned with the accountability /responsibility chain.

Acquisition and logistics reform are among the Minister’s highest priorities. He has sought advice on moving to a single procurement organisation. And he is determined to engineer fundamental reform of the way the Defence Acquisition Organisation conducts its business.

The Submarine Program remains our biggest project risk – a subject the Minister is monitoring closely. He has also asked us to review and report to him on the next 15 most costly acquisition projects in an endeavour to prevent similar problems arising.

The Chief of Navy’s proposals regarding a new Navy structure based around force element groups (e.g. Major Surface Combatants, Submarines, Minewarfare, Patrol Boats etc.) have been endorsed. Army and Air Force will test their structures against the new Navy arrangement.

Admiral Barrie and I will be putting in place a set of commissioning or charter letters clarifying roles and responsibilities, accountabilities, authorities and priorities for the members of the Defence Executive, starting with the Service Chiefs.

Much of this will be settled during March.

The role of the Defence Executive needs to be clarified and we have to review the associated committee structure and our corporate governance framework. All of this, and much more, will be settled and in place by 1 July 2000.
People

When one thinks of Defence, one is often tempted to think of tanks, aircraft and ships. Yet people represent about one-third of our investment in capability. As I mentioned earlier, one of the major strengths identified by Defence’s senior staff was our people. Our workforce is highly committed. It’s highly skilled. It’s educated and developed to deliver.

We have already reviewed and refined the Defence Force career management scheme – CDF and I are taking a keen interest with the Service Chiefs in developing our senior uniformed people as part of succession planning. A civilian equivalent has been introduced but needs quite a lot of development to get it up to scratch.

People and their intellectual capital are Defence’s value added. They are our future. So it’s important that we identify, attract, recruit, develop and retain talented people. The right people with the right skills in the right job at the right time. And, most importantly, people with the right attitude.

Putting the budget/financial situation to one side, the most significant organisational issue we face relates to leadership. Not to put too fine a point on it, too many of our people lack confidence in many of Defence’s senior leaders. Justified or not, Defence’s leadership is seen as lacking coherence, as failing to accept responsibility and as reactive. Issues such as visibility and caring arise.

Far too often, it seems that wherever one sits in the hierarchy, all the problems besetting the organisation in terms of its management and leadership come from higher up the ladder.

There are certainly elements of what I would call a culture of learned helplessness among some Defence senior managers – both military and civilian. Their perspective is one of disempowerment. This may, of course, reflect the inadequacy of our performance framework.

Change

As many of you will know, the defence reform program sought to transfer up to 10 per cent of the budget to the operational “sharp end” through cost reductions and other efficiency measures.

It has already achieved a substantial proportion of those savings and the resultant resources have been reinvested in improved operational capacity including the substantial cost of providing increased readiness. At the end of this financial year, we will have achieved recurrent annual savings of $482m against the estimate of $403m at this stage of the game. The further realisable savings, yet to be harvested, have already been programmed and spent in our Five Year Defence Program. We’ve confirmed that we can still achieve $730m of the original estimate of $773m.

There have also been problems here: in change management; implementation; communicating the purpose and intended results; tracking the savings and most especially where those savings have gone.

In the assessment of those who recently reviewed the program, it has been less than successful as a vehicle for cultural change in the organisation as originally envisaged by the authors of the Defence Efficiency Review. Many in Defence continue to see the results of this review as one-off changes, to be ridden through before things return to their normal state.

As you will gather from my earlier comments, Admiral Barrie and I are seeking to create a more adaptable defence organisation – one which is more effective and efficient, and one which is therefore comfortable with an ongoing program and philosophy of continuous improvement. One which is not so reliant on major externally-led reviews as a spur to change.

Macro change can be awfully seductive. In my opinion, enabling people throughout an organisation to improve the processes in which they are intimately involved is far more powerful.
Most of you will recall the publicity earlier this year surrounding Defence’s use of consultants – $16.8m in 1998-99. We do seem to have had more reviews than *Gone with the Wind* and Defence has been a lucrative hunting ground for consultants.

One of the great management gurus, Deming, considered that only about 4 per cent of people in any particular organisation were likely to be brain-dead. The vast majority want to give a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay. The ingredients to create this environment are, of course, often missing. But there are lots and lots of bad systems and processes that we can simplify, make more efficient and effective, and less costly. Involving the front-line people in this is a key step, as Defence’s market testing program has demonstrated.

We are establishing two small units to help address this:
- an organisational effectiveness unit led by a one star military officer; and
- an organisational renewal unit led by a SES Band 1 civilian.

**Communication**

Defence is probably the biggest and most complex organisation in Australia – second only to Coles Myer as Australia’s largest employer. Historically, we’ve been a little secretive, due to the nature of some of our business. In areas like intelligence, high levels of security continue to be important, but in a modern democratic society, an overall approach of secrecy can no longer be used as an “easy way out”.

There is no doubt that the Government – and taxpayers – should know what Defence is doing, where it is heading, and where their money is being spent. This transparency is a vital ingredient to inform decisions about priorities and the balance between competing resource demands – it’s also essential to maintain community trust and backing so that we can fulfill our crucial responsibility of defending Australia’s security.

In these days of instant global communications, successful military operations rely fundamentally on the ability to communicate. It’s not good enough to have exemplary military
plans, if they are not complemented by a coordinated whole-of-government plan that carries our – and the international – community with us.

As Australia’s strategic environment becomes increasingly dynamic – as we come to crunch – time on some crucial decisions about the future role and shape of Australia’s Defence Organisation – this becomes even more important.

With the many, and sometimes vociferous, competing demands on Government and our people, Defence can no longer take for granted that the community it serves understands why they need a Defence Organisation. And having to “sell” ourselves in a modern society is not something we are used to doing.

Defence has a mixed track record with its communications, borne out by the wide range of perceptions held by both the Government and our community. On the one hand, perceptions about the operational record and professionalism of the Australian Defence Force have never been higher, both at home and internationally – while on the other, Defence’s reputation continues to be degraded by stories of poor project management and isolated but unacceptable behaviour by some of our people.

We are addressing the communications issue by implementing the findings and recommendations of a report that found shortcomings in our strategic approach, our communication focus, and the structures we employ to support our communications activities.

Conclusions

Defence is a great place. It has so much to commend it. It is fair dinkum about wanting to improve its performance.

But, we need to devote much more energy and effort to getting our corporate processes and systems right – that will enable and sustain a substantial improvement.

We need to focus on communication – both outside and within the organisation, on planning, on performance, on governance and especially on people, particularly leadership. At the end of the day, it’s all about getting results through people – a simple phrase that reflects my leadership philosophy.

In a book called On leadership John Gardner writing about change, says:

“ Institutions that have lost their capacity to adapt pay a heavy price. Continual renewal is necessary. Leaders must know how the processes of renewal may be set in motion.”

That’s the essential task for Defence leadership – fundamental renewal of our organisation from within.

I have been pretty candid with you in my necessarily short study of these issues and the potential solutions.

How do I know that these are the key issues, I hear you ask? I know because the people in the organisation and other stakeholders have told me so. And, I know from my own observation and analysis at the end of nearly four months back in the place.

Many things have changed for the better in the six years I’ve been away. The issues identified today are capable of resolution and I believe there’s a head of steam, a will and the capacity within the staff to do so. I will not be walking alone. I know there’s a substantial constituency which seeks change – a constituency that is eager to be part of the process.
It gives me great pleasure to talk to you about leadership, especially when it is such a topical subject around this town right now.

Our new Secretary, Dr Allan Hawke, put his finger right on this issue at his address to the Defence Watch Seminar.

And let me say I fully support his views.

It is refreshing for me to be joined by a new partner at the top of one of Australia’s largest and most complex organisations – one who shares my vision and is as determined as I am to continue to drive through the changes that we need to ensure Australia’s security into this new century.

It’s probably worth pointing out at this stage what this mysterious and unconventional diarchy at the top of Defence means in real terms for the management of Defence business. It can best be described as a “marriage”.

Broadly speaking I command the ADF. I have particular responsibilities for ensuring that the three Services skillfully undertake joint operations and are effectively and efficiently administered.

I think a lot about my command responsibilities too, in ways which are not noted in legislation. Firstly, to the people of Australia through the Government for providing the forces needed for our security. Secondly, to the young men and women in our Defence Force for ensuring that they are well trained, have the right equipment and all the tools they need to be successful in carrying out any missions I assign to them.

I also have particular responsibilities for establishing a network of bilateral relationships with other Chiefs of Defence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Secretary, on the other hand, has particular responsibilities under the financial and audit acts, and as the head of a public service department. The Secretary signs the accounts.

Together the Secretary and I are responsible to the Minister for a range of matters. We advise on force structure requirements. We jointly run the intelligence organisation and are responsible for providing strategic assessments.

And we are responsible jointly for the administration of the entire Defence Organisation, as well as effective liaison with other Government Departments for the provision of national security.

So if you had a Venn diagram, you would see a large lump in the middle jointly shared between myself and the Secretary, and you would see at the side two particular sets of responsibilities that we do not share.
I fully subscribe to the view that to be a good leader these days, you must also be a good manager.

I was interested to read about Frank Blount and Bob Joss’s comments on this subject in their recently published book, *Managing in Australia*.

Mainly because most of the attributes they talk about of a successfully led and managed organisation have been vindicated in my mind by the outstanding performance of our young men and women in East Timor.

They talked about their view that good leaders were made by:

- knowing the tasks that need to be done and the best way to do it;
- belief and passion in what the individual is contributing to the greater whole;
- rigorous training through experience, not sitting in classrooms but getting in the water;
- knowing and aiming for world class standards; and
- developing a culture of leadership and teamwork at all levels.

Frank Blount also noted that when he came to Australia he found a workforce which was pound for pound more capable than the US workforce – dynamic, positive, multicultural, well educated. However, he also found that they didn’t seem to aspire to leadership.

Well, I hope that those days are well and truly over, and the Australian Defence Force in East Timor has just demonstrated very successful leadership to both the international community and our community.

For the first time in our history we have taken the lead, put together a coalition in record time and managed it successfully to provide a good foundation for security to the people of East Timor.

To bring this about, required foresight and planning, as well as a number of improvements in the way Defence did business over the last few years. We have been implementing reforms at an ever increasing pace.

However, these improvements are patchy so far. We need much more corporate coherence to make sure that we have the plans, the structure and the right people in the right jobs with the right skills to create the adaptable organisation we are seeking.

The most important element for success that we need is an ongoing program and philosophy of continual improvement.

It is not entirely fair for people to draw the conclusion from Allan Hawke’s speech that this was lacking from the organisation. This is not the case.

What we have to do in this very profound change process is identify those leaders who are able to perform in the new environment as well as those who cannot measure up. This aspect requires serious cultural change in the way Defence does its business. It also requires a lot of work in identifying the variety of skills required at different levels within the organisation.

We should keep in mind that cultural change requires constant and long-term commitment and action before there are perceptible results – and certainly from my point of view, it is hard work but we are getting there.

So what has changed in our overall environment to create the tensions now being played in our Defence as far as our operations, capabilities, strategies and budget are concerned?

Our productivity has increased dramatically by any measure. There is now what I call expectation creep, which has resulted in a marked increase in our strategic tempo. As an indicator, the operational tempo set in 1999 surpasses that set in any year since 1972.

Put simply, those jobs the Government wants done today rather than sometime in the future.
But there has been no change in the policy framework to support this increase in demand, which the Government now recognises – and this is driving the *White Paper* process where we will be fundamentally examining the future role and shape of the ADF.

And this brings risk management issues to the forefront. It is really a case of improving our business processes to meet the demands of our core business – being able to fight and win when called upon by the Government.

But the reality is that we need more robust business systems to solve our investment versus current tasking conundrum. But it would be irresponsible for me to recommend the paying off of Defence capability to the Government unless I am absolutely certain that we are an efficient as well as an effective organisation.

We have still a fair way to go before reaching this point in my view, and as events of the last six months show me, Australia does need a balanced force structure if it is to be able to play its part in building peace and stability in our region.

Let me point out that you don’t get the outstanding results we have demonstrated in East Timor with a completely inadequate organisation.

Nobody can now doubt the excellence of the Australian Defence Force’s operational performance. Now our departmental processes need to catch up to match.

Turning to the improvements that are needed in our Headquarters, I think that the organisational and structural issues are simply the result of the need to create flexibility to match the demands of our increased strategic tempo.
We are now more than two years down the track from the Defence Reform Program. This program has transferred up to 10 per cent of the budget to the operational sharp end and increased the market testing program throughout the organisation. However, this alone will not be enough to meet the cost-crunch we are facing.

We all expected that more adjustment would be needed, especially to embed the right attitude and skills that our people require to enable them to improve the processes in which they are intimately involved.

So there will be a number of changes that Allan Hawke and I will be pursuing this year. These include:

• making sure we have an overarching corporate plan derived from Government policy and objectives that cascades down to a clear articulation of what each person is expected to contribute;
• expanding our performance framework so that our people can take responsibility;
• refining our corporate management information so we can quickly and easily make critical decisions such as balancing our investment between the future and the current force;
• moving to a single procurement organisation and fundamentally reform the way Defence Acquisitions conducts its business;
• clarifying the role of the Service Chiefs – they have essential strategic responsibilities which need to be adjusted to the new environment;
• aligning the top structure arrangements with the accountability/responsibility chain – it lacks a framework and consistency at the moment;
• taking a keen interest in senior succession planning – this is important. We have a quickly improving system for the ADF, but this needs to be spread throughout the organisation;
• improving our communications both externally and internally – this needs to be strategic, constant and consistent;
• and we are intending to do most of this by July this year.

In fact, the area of leadership and management change – particularly accountability and responsibility – has been one of my top priorities since assuming command of the ADF more than 18 months ago.

In conclusion, I’d like to emphasise that many things have changed for the better, but this is still not good enough for the challenges that face us.

The essential task for Defence leadership is fundamental renewal of our organisation from within. And this will only happen through strong direction and our people owning the process. We have come a great distance, but as you all know it never ends.

We need to improve our performance across the board, get our corporate processes and systems right, focus more on communications, planning, and people and their intellectual capital as Defence’s “capability edge”.

Both the Secretary and I are sure that there is a substantial constituency for change in Defence which is eager to be part of this vital renewal process.
THE OTHER ENEMY, by Glenn Wahlert, Oxford University Press, 1999
Reviewed by Allan McKay

Generally, in today’s modern Army most soldiers do not like or trust their Military Police. Ask a soldier and they probably would not be able to accurately describe why they feel as they do towards the Military Police. What the author of *The Other Enemy*, Glenn Wahlert has done is explain in detail why Australian soldiers have held the Australian Military Police in such low regard. The author takes the reader on a journey from the landing of the First Fleet in 1788 through to the conclusion of the Second World War. Along the way he describes in detail the genesis and formation of the Australian Provost Corps in 1916 and the methods of policing Australian soldiers in two World Wars.

In this narrative historical work the author makes use of personal letters and interviews with soldiers who were involved in policing the 1st and 2nd AIF. He also uses similar sources to give the viewpoint of the diggers who were being policed. You do not have to read too many pages of *The Other Enemy* to realise that Australian soldiers and particularly those of the 1st AIF were no angels away from the front-line. Highlighted throughout the book are instances whereby Australia’s proud battlefield behaviour was sullied by soldiers’ ill-discipline behind the lines. The author points out that the Australians had the worst disciplinary track record of any Empire troops. Between January 1917 and December 1918 the ANZAC Provost Corps in England dealt with more than 26,000 cases of Australian soldiers for either desertion or absence without leave.

The book relates how the experience and skills learnt through the First World War were whittled away and lost after the ANZAC Provost Corps was disbanded in 1920.

Many of the hard won lessons of that war had to be re-learnt in the first years of the Second World War. Wahlert states that generally the Australian Military Police of World War Two were better accepted than their predecessors. He believes that this is due in the main to a greater civil police influence in the 2nd AIF. This new breed of Military Police were certainly more professional, proactive, less confrontational, more tactful and pragmatic when carrying out their duties. The role of the Military Police changed from that of primarily being concerned with administering discipline to a combat support role that often included front-line service.

This book provides a compelling insight into the mind-set and behaviour of the Australian digger over the course of two World Wars. The author highlights the fact that both the 1st and 2nd AIF were not squeaky-clean as some historians have made them out to be and that the Military Police were both an important and necessary adjunct to the fighting in both wars. *The Other Enemy* is easy to read and contains a range of interesting photographs. The book is not only for those involved in the profession of Military Police work but for anybody that is interested in Australia’s military heritage and history.

THE BATTLE AFTER THE WAR: The Story of Australia’s Vietnam Veterans, by Ambrose Crowe
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope (Rtd)

Intrigue, double-dealing, duplicity, disinformation, distortions of the facts and of the truth for the sake of ideological “correctness”. Add a few deaths in unusual circumstances and you almost have a John Le Carre spy thriller. Unfortunately, the reality of
this book is a little more mundane and factual. The author has achieved the feat of producing a very readable (almost enthralling) book on a subject that is neither exciting nor topical. Most Australians, public servants and politicians would much prefer that the subject would just fade away.

However, the aftermath of this particular war will not go away as too many of those who served in Vietnam have already suffered (and continue to suffer) a range of ailments with exceptional rates of occurrence. In some cases, for particular types of cancer the rate of occurrence is ten times the national average. Yet politicians and those public servants appointed to assist veterans often behave towards the veterans as if they are dealing with a criminal gang trying to rort and rob the “system”!

The book does not try to analyse why the veterans of the Vietnam War apparently suffer a greater degree of psychological trauma than their counterparts of previous wars. The Battle simply recounts the events that have occurred, warts and all. This is one of the fascinations of this book. It neither hides the problems of individuals (though some are protected from identification by the use of nom de plumes) nor of the veterans’ organisation itself. Within the veterans there are equally bitter divisions about the war, its effects, the actions which should be taken to rectify the treatment meted out by both Government and the public and how to treat those most affected. It is equally refreshing in its honesty in naming those concerned with both the good and the bad aspects of its arguments. Most books tend to hide behind the bland “a spokesman for the Government/Department/organisation said...”, whereas the Battle names the politicians and public servants concerned. Surely some of the things the politicians and public servants said, and which are quoted in the book, may have been expedient at the time but must haunt them now? One would like to think so. More likely, for the public servants promoted for their compliancy (now either in comfortable retirement on an indexed pension, or approaching Departmental Head status) the sacrifice of justice and of the rights and entitlements of a few disaffected soldiers is a small price to pay for their own advancement.

Do not expect to find these pages lined with heroes, except for the veterans themselves, who sustained a battle with an unfeeling bureaucracy for more than ten years against exceptional odds. I think the irritating part is the realisation (actually it is more a case of “reinforcement”) that some government departments are so internally focused that their “clients”, i.e. those they are supposed to serve are but incidental to them. How the few dedicated veterans who solely focused on the chemical poisoning issue for so long in the face of constant rejection is a study in dedication. Even though they were convinced they were right, their resources, when matched against those of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) (and frequently the RSL!)), were so puny as to surprisingly lead me to draw a comparison of their bureaucratic fight with that of their enemy, the Viet Cong, taking on the might of the USA. In both cases, by perseverance and stamina, each David defeated their Goliath.

This is not a book that will appeal to the general public, and it is not intended to do so. It is a book for veterans and their families, for those interested in the machinery of government and for those sons and daughters interested in understanding yet another aspect of their veteran father’s (or mother’s) struggle. This book stands as a record of a fight for recognition and justice against great odds. It reveals the nature of many people who, for personal or professional reasons, neither had the courage or the character to reveal what they knew and risk their jobs. Yet by standing by they allowed an injustice to be perpetrated and then perpetuated. Ambrose has the courage to identify them. On the other side are those who argued their case and lost, who picked
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themselves up and argued again, and again, and again, until finally they won. For many, this was not about winning or losing, but about finding out why they now have exceptional physical and psychological problems and getting help to alleviate them. The fight was essential because it was not just a fight for the veterans themselves but for their children congenitally affected by the chemical poisoning passed on to them. The Vietnam War may remain with Australia for generations to come. Recognition of that fact makes this book well worth retaining by our children as a baseline description of the level of determination and understanding they may have to develop when dealing with the next generation of politicians and public servants likely to oppose them.


Reviewed by Naji Najjar, Department of Defence

This volume (No. 5) in a series published by RAN Maritime Studies Program, consists of two papers written by visiting naval officers from Indonesia and the Philippines. They focus on issues that are of maritime significance to the Asia-Pacific region – maritime environmental management and maritime surveillance.

The first article concerns the Malacca Straits – the second busiest waterway in the world. The author argues intelligently for the urgent establishment of industry, shipping and environmental laws to halt the ecological degradation of the Malacca Straits. He reviews the experience Australia has had with concern to the environmental protection and management of the Great Barrier Reef, and successfully draws lessons from that experience which could be applied to the Malacca Straits. His discussion encompasses international environmental marine law, diplomacy and environmental management.

The second article concerns the Philippines. The authors contend that the Philippines needs to develop a viable maritime surveillance, monitoring and enforcement regime so as to effectively halt ecological degradation, halt resource and mineral depletion and halt illegal activities. The consequences of such a policy would be to manage the maritime environment and the abundant resources provided in a sustainable fashion. They analyse Australian, Indonesian and Malaysian models of maritime management to provide possible solutions the Philippines Government can adopt. Their convincing case is sustained with an abundant number of maps, graphs and tables.

This volume of discussion papers focusing on maritime environmental management and surveillance should be of great value to international legal practitioners, environmental conservationists, and naval personnel. Such material that is easily read and understandable is worthwhile reading.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret’d) Noel Sproles

The author has reconstructed the experience of his uncle, First Sergeant “Addie” Martin, who was captured at Bataan in 1942 and subsequently died in Japan in 1945 while still a POW. The reconstruction has been made by means of searches of the archives as well as interviews of former American POWs, some of whom knew Sergeant Martin personally.

Addie Martin enlisted in the Permanent Army in 1940 and was posted to a Coastal
Artillery unit of the New Mexico National Guard. An immediate reaction is that someone must have had a wry sense of humour to form a coastal artillery unit in New Mexico but in fact this was an anti-aircraft unit. Within a year, Addie and his unit were in the Philippines given the task of defending Clark Field just north of Manila. A potted history of the Philippines Campaign is given and a definite impression is one of an ill-prepared force with inadequate equipment and training. The story proper commences once the force on Bataan Peninsula surrenders to the Japanese.

Along with several hundred of his comrades, Sergeant Martin is put to work building an airstrip at Las Pinas near where the Manila International Airport is currently located. This work finished in late 1944 but in September of that year the airstrip was destroyed by US Navy carrier based aircraft. After this, Sergeant Martin was sent to Japan to work in a copper mine at Hanawa in the northern end of Honshu Island where, instead of the tropical heat of Manila, they had to contend with 40 foot snowdrifts. On 8 June 1945, Sergeant Martin died at Hanawa of tuberculosis, about two months before VJ Day.

This is a story of brutality and inhumanity as the prisoners are subjected to beatings, malnutrition, and such privations that one wonders how they could possibly have survived. A particularly inhumane episode is the story of how the POWs were transported to Japan deep in the holds of unmarked freighters running the gauntlet of US Navy submarines and aircraft in the South China Sea. The author describes these barbarities but does not dwell on them as the interest is more in uncovering the likely story of his uncle as a POW. Interspersed in the narrative are anecdotes such as Japanese flying instructors standing up in the rear cockpit of their aircraft beating student pilots over the head for their errors. Again, there is the incident of a twin-engine transport laden with Japanese VIPs coming for the official opening of the Las Pinas airstrip. On touchdown, the aircraft broke through the surface and flipped onto its back. In the words of one veteran, “Unfortunately, it did not burst into flames!” Once the war was over, the POWs at Hanawa had to wait for over a month to be rescued but in the meantime they were air-dropped food and clothing by B-29 bombers in scenes reminiscent of the film version of “Empire of the Sun”.

Most Australians will be aware of the story of our own POWs from the Pacific Campaign so it is of interest to be able to see that of US forces in similar circumstances. On the other hand, this is a very narrow view being concentrated on developing what might have happened to a particular individual. It is not intended to be a comprehensive history of the US experience but more of filling in the missing pieces of a family history – a search by a relative for the story of his namesake. It is a story of ordinary men in extraordinary circumstances and there are no Weary Dunlops to be found in this book. If you are interested in adding depth to your knowledge of being a POW under the Japanese, then this book will be of some value.

SILENT MEN, by Peter Dornan, Allen & Unwin, St Leonard’s, 1999. $24.95 rrp. ISBN 1 86448 991 X

Reviewed by Bruce Davey

Of the many superb Australian fighting battalions of WWII, the 2/14th battalion can hardly have been surpassed. Since the end of WWII few works have seen fit to draw attention to the efforts of this and the other battalions involved in the Syrian Campaign of 1941. However in the last decade thanks to the efforts of a handful of authors and historians (some of whom are mentioned in the authors acknowledgement), several books have been published about that campaign and about the critical New Guinea battles in which this
battalion participated – thereby elevating public awareness.

Dornan’s book joins this group – for a number of reasons it is a unique work. It concerns a section of the battalion and traces its path through the war following the tactical level career of a section that had the astounding bad luck to be present for a number of diabolical “shows” such as the hideous but fortunately brief campaign against the Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon and leading inexorably to the battle of Isurava in New Guinea – an action that was by far the single most critical land combat ever conducted in defence of the continent of Australia.

The book is a distillation of the oral histories of a number of veterans and is essentially an “anecdotised” account of tactical level action, soundly based on history. It contains a foreword by Sir Roden Cutler, several maps, a section dealing with further reading but lacks any reference to relevant and widely available video productions wherein Bissett, Avery, Bear, Saunders and Kingsbury amongst others are featured. An explanatory note is included showing the organisational connections between the section under discussion and its higher formations. The author also discusses the reasons why the Australian 7th Division earned the sobriquet “the Silent Seventh” and whilst he dismisses any conspiracy of silence in favour of a kind of unity of ignorance – the reader must search elsewhere for the solution to this mystery.

This book is another superb addition to Australian military history published by Allen & Unwin. At a time when Australian soldiers are patrolling in Timor, it is fascinating that a book based on soldiering over 50 years ago can provide an insight to section level activity which has such a contemporary feel and appeal. Peter Dornan has succeeded in giving a meaningful voice to the Silent Men.


Reviewed by Lex McAulay

Stephen Ambrose had already written four books on military subjects and seven on other matters, and had decided to cease military history writings, but was prevailed upon by his publisher to do one more. This is not the best basis upon which to base a book, and the result shows it. Ambrose seems to have recycled his earlier research to provide yet another general view of the evolution of US and British units before, during and after D-Day, with a few comments thrown in from a couple of Germans. Once again we are led through the preparations for Operation Overlord, what happened to the selected groups and individuals on the beaches, then in the hedgerows, the breakout and the battles on the German border, then the final actions. Ambrose fails to acknowledge that Montgomery’s forces attacked continuously and drew onto their front the majority of the German Waffen-SS and panzer formations, making possible the great breakthrough to the southeast by Patton and Bradley. There is little or nothing new in this book and it is another written by and for the insular US market.

THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE, by Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin; Allen Lane The Penguin Press USA 1999

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

This large book, of 735 pages of main text, and another 230 pages of appendices, notes, bibliography and index, details only some of the enormous amount of material copied and secreted by Mitrokhin during his duties as a KGB archivist, which, in an SIS operation in 1992, was removed to Britain after Mitrokhin’s retirement, and defection to the UK.

The sheer volume and detail included in the collection staggered Western intelligence organisations. The information included Soviet discussions and decisions about operations against the West, front organisations, and the
identities of thousands of Soviet agents and those foreign citizens recruited to work for the USSR, at the highest levels of government, academia and society.

As well as revelations about operations in the West, there is much detail on individuals, such as Philby, who was dismayed to find that he had not been, and never was to be, given officer rank in the KGB, for the simple reason that he was a foreigner – no matter what he claimed in his own writings. Mitrokhin’s information shows that none of the traitors who fled to the USSR enjoyed life in the Workers’ Paradise.

The value of the information passed to the Soviets about all aspects of Western political and diplomatic matters, defence, research and technology, and personnel, was beyond price, and the revelations in this book, coupled with the almost blatant activities of some of the agents and traitors involved, doubtless will appeal to those involved in security as a career or as part of their departmental duties.

The book concentrates on Canada, the USA, the UK and Europe; Australia and the Pacific Basin receive little attention. However, read in conjunction with Breaking the Codes, by Desmond Ball and David Horner, probable revelations about our region can be anticipated.


Reviewed by Major Darren Kerr

Australian Prisoners of War is the 10th book in the outstanding series of commemorative books produced by the Australian Defence Force Journal. Like earlier works in the series such as Australia Remembers 1939-1945, The Spirit of ANZAC, and Return to Greece this book is another fine addition to Australia’s burgeoning military heritage.

Written by Michael Tracey, the ADFJ’s noted editor, Australian Prisoners of War covers the varied experiences of Australian POW in the Boer War, World Wars I and II, and the Korean War (noting that no Australians were captured during the Vietnam War). In addition to detailing specific POW experiences, each chapter provides a broad overview of each conflict, concentrating of course on Australia’s involvement, as well as short vignettes of memorable incidents – such as Australia’s first submarines and the development of the Australian Red Cross. The chapters discussing each war, despite providing only a cursory overview, are worth the price of the book alone for the non-historian. The military history buff will probably not find anything new, however, for the average reader these sections make for a very illuminating read.

A similar comment can be extended to the actual discussion of Australian POW. Although not an exhaustive study of POW experiences, it is a very human-focused book that befits its subject matter. The end result is very accessible military history that should appeal to a wide audience. Quoting extensively from actual POW records and diaries, and using numerous well-chosen photographs, the book is at once sweeping – covering several entire wars – but also deeply moving at a very personal level. Not unexpectedly those who became prisoners of the Japanese during the Pacific War were the most ill-treated and suffered accordingly the highest death rate (with about 1 in 3 dying in captivity). The use of POW diaries is particularly effective in bringing this suffering starkly to life. The sections covering POW of the Japanese are particularly memorable and can be uncomfortable to read, especially for those whose relatives where POW – but it is a story that deserves to be told plainly and honestly, as Michael Tracey has done.
Written in a clear and succinct style, *Australian Prisoners of War* is a powerful and moving book. It is not a book about battles and wars; rather it is about ordinary men and women placed in extraordinary situations and how they struggled – and sometimes failed – to survive in often inhuman conditions. Despite having to operate on a broad canvas, Michael Tracy never lets the reader lose sight of the fact that being a POW was a unique experience for each individual, no matter the shared conditions and suffering. It is unlikely that any reader will be untouched by what these men and women went through and wonder if he or she could survive in similar conditions. And that is the power of the book. To dismiss it as a mere coffee-table book would be to miss the point of this memorable and poignant book. Its very accessibility is what makes it so powerful. This is a book that every Australian should own.

Videos

**NIAGARA’S GOLD: The Epic Story of the Greatest Gold Salvage in History**, a documentary by Jeff Maynard and distributed by Film Australia, 1994.

*Reviewed by Major Jim Truscott*

This fifty minute video provides an entertaining account of an operation funded by the Bank of England, to salvage eight tons of sunken gold from the Royal Mail Steamer *Niagara*. On 18 June 1940, the ship hit a mine laid by the German *Black Raider* and it sunk off the coast of New Zealand. In the following eight months a private consortium operated in between long periods of bad weather to initially locate the steamer, then blast an opening into its bullion room. The blasting required ten tons of explosives. Advanced technology for the day, in the form of a diving bell, was then used as an observation chamber to direct a mechanical bucket into the bullion room. Ultimately 555 out of 590 bars of gold were recovered. A subsequent operation was mounted in 1953 to recover thirty additional bars; in the end only five were lost. It was the greatest gold salvage in history, and the consortium was to become the forerunner of the Commonwealth Salvage Board.

To put this salvage into a military perspective, it was ordered by Churchill to buy arms from America for the British war effort, and it was conducted in the middle of an unchartered minefield at great risk to the ship and crew involved. The Royal New Zealand Navy did not become involved until the bullion had been located, at which point a piquet ship was tasked. There is little then of any consequence for military viewers, other than the documentary providing a salient reminder that wars must be paid for by politicians.

**TIME LIFE VIDEOS FROM THE SERIES, “THE CENTURY OF WARFARE”**: Four videos were reviewed: *Blitzkrieg: Air War 1939-45* ($24.90), *Sea War 1939-45* and *Jungle & Ocean 1943-45*. Time Life. $29.95.

*Reviewed by Lex McAulay*

When the necessity to deal with the subject in 52 minutes is kept in mind, the result must be broad-brush, and each video is a credit to the editors. The narration, by Robert Powell, is excellent: clear enunciation, unobtrusive, and provides the necessary linking string on which the pearls are threaded.

The four videos reviewed were aimed at the North American and British/European markets, with Australian efforts mentioned once in passing. The content and narrative is quite impartial, with Allied shortcomings and failures presented in balance with successes, and the same treatment given the Axis. Only the most senior figures are named, or even on screen, while the images present the campaign – the environment, the machines, and the action.
The subjects are self-explanatory, and there is little point in providing detail of each, but a resumé might be of assistance. Blitzkrieg describes the evolution of the theory, and its practice by the Germans, with good graphics and some little-known film footage, culminating with German films of the destroyed British and French armies at Dunkirk and along the roads of France, ending with Hitler’s exuberance at the surrender ceremony. Jungle and Ocean 1943–45 devotes roughly equal time to the US Navy’s advance in the Pacific, MacArthur’s isolation of Rabaul and liberation of the Philippines, and the British campaigns in Burma, with much attention to Wingate’s adventures. The Aussies are mentioned only in passing; Borneo 1945 is not mentioned.

Sea War 1939–45 really is an example of good editing, covering the subjects of battleships and their employment, aircraft carrier development and operations, submarine and anti-submarine warfare, merchant shipping, amphibious warfare, and the logistics aspect.

Air War 1939–45 is another good result from the editors, and describes the inter-war bombardment theories, the early campaigns, and progresses naturally to the A-bomb missions, along the way describing air defence, “the Blitz”, ground-attack, night-fighting, day fighting, bomber escorts, tactical and strategic bombing, “round-the-clock” bombing, airborne and glider operations, and the destruction of enemy cities by Allied bomber fleets.

What became evident while watching these videos was the major role of the German Luftwaffe in Hitler’s plans, first in frightening Germany’s neighbours, and then in projecting the power of the 3rd Reich ahead of the Wehrmacht into those countries, and later onto the cities of Europe and the UK. Today adulatory books and websites devoted to the Luftwaffe abound, but the German Air Force was literally first in the attacks on weaker neighbours.

These videos are quite suitable for someone requiring an overview of the subject matter. Do not expect a lot of detail on any aspect, such as Midway, D-Day, or the destruction of Dresden, for example.

Given that these are broad-brush treatments of the campaigns, and presumably an enormous amount of film was available, it is a little disappointing to see the same film clips in the different videos. It might be considered nit-picking, but some myths are repeated when post-war research has exposed them, such as that of the “three Gladiators, Faith, Hope and Charity defending Malta alone”, in reality a public relations creative exercise, because there were 10 Gladiators, and that Hitler intervened in the development of the Me262 jet fighter with drastic results for the Luftwaffe.

However, all in all, these are good treatments of very large subjects.