DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

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Illustrations by members of the Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick.

Printed and published for the Department of Defence, Canberra, by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne.

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed, double spacing, on one side of the paper and submitted in duplicate.

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The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and should not be construed as official opinion or policy.

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

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Soldiers undertaking rappelling training at RAAF Base Fairbairn during RMC annual field exercise with Iroquois from No. 5 Squadron, RAAF.
This issue is, of necessity, a bit of a patchwork. No derogation of the authors is implied. Their articles are both interesting and diverse, ranging as they do through Napoleon in Spain via Stanner in the Northern Territory to management, training and parachuting.

I am particularly pleased with the large volume of letters received. In accordance with editorial policy, they are all being published in the current issue. It is, after all, Letters to the Editor which have an urgency and currency which demands the quickest possible publication. If a short article has had to fall out to make room for them, I'm sure you will agree that it is for the best. Interesting and pressing issues are here discussed and a number of distinguished names appear among the signatures.

The letters and at least one of the articles appear in a slightly different type. It is cleaner, easier to read, and has at last done away with one of my particular bêtes noires, the slipping "s". This new type is set by computer, a great advance on the old hot metal type. The only snag is that the computer is unable to use its brains as the old hot metal operator used to do to correct obvious errors like the non-use of italics in ships' names etc. It emphasises the need for still greater accuracy on my part. The old hot metal galleys will soon be used up (a few book reviews remain) and it is hoped that by the middle of the year the type will all be computerised.

I have received two letters about the index system in the Defence Force Journal. There is an annual index in each last issue of the year (at present issues 8 and 13). Librarians have expressed the need for a cumulative index, both for the present Journal and its predecessor, the Army Journal. This is an excellent idea, which runs into two snags. One is lack of staff, the other lack of funds. It is, however, something to strive for, even if it can only be produced on a typed and photo-copied basis. I am grateful to Ms Elaine Alexander of the Defence Regional Library, Melbourne, for her offer to help in this undertaking.

Talking of libraries, I have placed on p. 33 a list of defence libraries in which some of the books reviewed in this issue are available. I hope with the help of the Director, Information Requirements, that this service can continue.

I am most grateful to those readers who have responded to my call for back issues, especially to Brigadier Parslow, the Solicitor-General in Queensland for the whole swag he sent me. In return I have promised to run a small commercial for his local RSL. (see p. 64) We are still looking for the following back numbers of the Army Journal: 108, 109, 113, 114, 116, 121, 123, 128 and 130. I would be most grateful if anyone holding any of these issues surplus to requirements would forward them to me. This would complete an unbound collection for photo copying of individual articles. I hope to publish a list of the early issues still available to make up readers' collections.

I was reminded that in my list of "thank yous" in the last issues I forgot to mention Mrs Gwen Lawless of the Typing Pool who did such a good job in filling in the wording in the rather complicated spiders of the article "The B-Mobile Force". The effect even in the greatly reduced blocks is most pleasing.

We welcome a new Chairman of the Board of Management, Air Commodore R.C. Rowell. We also have a new Naval member, Captain P.R. Sinclair, RAN, who replaces Captain M.W. Hudson, RAN on his promotion to Commodore. Mr J.G. Menham has also moved on and is, at least temporarily, replaced by Mr B.W. Oxley.

To all the retiring members of the Board of Management I would like to extend my personal thanks, but especially to Brigadier D.J. McMillan who has been a tower of strength to me and to the Defence Force Journal since its inception.
DEFENCE PRODUCTION

Mr. A.G. Gibbs, Chairman of the Victorian Railways Board, who worked with me when I was Managing Director of General Motors Holden and also Director of Ordnance Production on the 2 pdr. anti-tank gun, has brought to my attention articles in your Defence Force Journal, in particular “Lead Times for Weapons — An Expert View”, (DFJ No. 11 July/August, 1978) and especially as listed on Page 16, Table 4 of DFJ No. 8 (January/February 1978).

As Director of Ordnance Production, from its initiation until it was closed down at the end of the war, I was responsible for over 500 major projects some of which are mentioned in your list but one outstanding exception is the 25 pdr. Gun Howitzer, of which about 1,200 were manufactured in Australia and the first one in record time of three months which was highly praised and appreciated by U.K. and Canada.

There is no mention of the most critical point which we experienced in the last war namely, the overcoming of the non-availability of optical munitions. This shortage was nearly our undoing and could have been a very serious matter if we had not overcome it.

We produced, with much resistance from overseas interests, 4 grades of optical glass, designed optical systems and produced an enormous range of optics, lens, etc., exporting some to U.S.A. for their military use.

To bring this optical munitions into operation took 10 months even though the then Australian High Commissioner, Sir Stanley Bruce cabled the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Chifley — “The Admiralty, Chance Brothers and other Authorities with experiences in the U.K. state that it would take at least 4 years and cost over a million pounds to achieve the result.”

The point probably overlooked and not appreciated today and which condition could easily arise in the future, Australia did not have a line of supply of military equipment for 22 months between Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor; our Army troops were moved from North Africa to New Guinea and were to a remarkable degree dependent on the munitions equipment we made in Australia, in particular the 25 pdr. Gun Howitzer.

I have a very extensive and full record of the operations of the Ordnance Production Directorate which the National University in Canberra will be taking over and to which I have agreed. They will be compiling the facts in due course.

As pertinent I enclose a copy of the recollection of a memorandum I sent to the then Prime Minister at his request, on my ideas of Defence In Australia, which I still think has much merit.

Mt. Eliza, Victoria

Sir Laurence Hartnett, CBE

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

10th May, 1945.

Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. B. Chifley.

L.J. Hartnett, Director, Ordnance Production, M.M.

Defence Plan for Australia.

You suggested I could submit to you a Plan for the Defence of Australia which need not follow the traditional approach.

I am not an expert in this particular field but have a wide experience, served as a pilot, made munitions and engaged in other aspects in two Wars some of which is known to you in the last War and overall is briefly recorded on the attached sheet.

The Plan for the Defence of Australia I now submit is certainly not traditional.

It would be quite normal and natural for our Armed Forces to oppose this Plan because they have been trained to use foreign designed equipment well suited probably to other countries requirements, but not specifically to Australian requirements. Our requirements vary greatly to those of Europe and most other countries.

It is absolutely essential that a Defence Plan is drawn up in every respect applicable to the country in question; no two countries requirements are exactly alike. This especially
applies to Australia in terms of length of coastline, population and financial resources.

The requirements of the Plan must be projected at least five years forward preferably ten years and forecasted further.

Limiting factors must be recognised, accepted as challenges and means devised to minimise or even overcome them.

Some are hazards which we must accept and live with.

We have magnificent examples of small nations, like ourselves, who have devised excellent Defence Plans, designed and made their own equipment and been successful, such as Finland, Switzerland and Sweden.

As to Australia, we must recognise and accept we are the largest single nation island continent in the world. We have the longest coast-line in the world and proportionally the lowest population. Our coast-line is 22,709 miles and the population is 8,000,000. It is impossible to fortify and garrison our coast-line. It would be futile, even suicide, to select locations on our coast-line for fortifying. We would have a repeat of Singapore and similar situations in the last War when landings were made far away by air or water and attacked from the rear. Then in effect our fighting units and equipment, much of which are fixed fortifications such as radar, anti-aircraft guns with predictors and artillery are lost.

Attack and landings can come from any direction, especially air borne, possibly from the South is least likely but even that cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, we want to be centrally located so that we can strike in any direction. Fortunately today this can be achieved by the use of air transport and air protection. In the centre of Australia, Alice Springs or Tennant Creek or Mount Isa, there is stationed with a degree of local dispersal to reduce target vulnerability a Mobile Force highly trained of say 25,000 who can move off at short notice as a Fighting Force by air to any coast section of Australia. Such force would have specially designed light weight equipment manufactured in Australia.

As a founding Director of Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation and as advised by the General Manager, Mr. L. Wackett, the large four engine troop and supply transport aircraft, one hundred or more of which would be required, could be designed and manufactured in Australia. Similarly, some 60 or more protective escort fighter aircraft could be designed and made in Australia.

As regards weapons, guns, small arms, predictors, mortars, engineer equipment, all could be designed and manufactured in Australia as was effectively done in the last War.

For some 22 months between Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor*, we had no lines of supply open to us, and with our troops moved from North Africa to New Guinea, yet we supplied all guns, rifles, ammunition and engines equipment adequately with many modifications to suit the terrain and climatic conditions of New Guinea. In total some 3,000 artillery guns of four different calibres.

Our Navy is another branch of our Defence, yet would be closely co-ordinated with the Mobile Force to the extent that some personnel of the Mobile Force would in effect be Marines and trained in underwater operations.

I commend merit in numbers of high speed well armed radar equipped torpedo carrying relatively small craft rather than a few cruiser types.

The Air Force has many roles to play apart from transporting and protecting the Mobile Force, including surveillance, submarine search and destruction and air combat.

The Ministry of Munitions should be maintained even in shadow form. So much was learnt in a hurry and its achievement remarkable, as acknowledged by our allies.

Practically every major project especially guns took no longer than 6 months from approval to production in volume as against other countries — 11 to 16 months.

Items on which we were nearly caught out which must be preserved and maintained as essential to our Defence are —

1. Optical glass production in 5 grades.
2. Design and production of Optical Systems for gun sights, cameras, binoculars, spirit levels, microscopes, etc.
3. Searchlight mirrors and lenses.
4. Ball and Roller Bearings.
5. Spark Plugs.
8. Copper.
10. High Speed Tool Steel.
11. Tool Room Capacity.
12. Petrol.
A serious situation in the early days of the War was the non-existence of drawings of many items of military equipment in use and required by the Services. Not only did this prevent production but made it very difficult to manufacture spare parts. An extreme case was the all-important urgently required 25 pdr. Gun Howitzer, approved and urgently required by Cabinet. No sample or drawing in Australia. One set was smuggled through U.S.A. from Canada with much difficulty weeks after approval. Even these drawings did not cover recent modifications.

Every item of equipment approved and in use should have at least two sets of separate drawings on record. Microfilm could suffice. Importantly, all modifications as made must be recorded on all drawings to ensure they are up to date.

In Ordnance alone some 30,000 drawings were involved.

For the record Australia had no overseas line of supply for munitions for 22 months from Dunkirk to Pearl Harbor, with strict neutrality by U.S.A. and nothing available from U.K. Australian troops moved from North Africa to New Guinea with little equipment and that which was brought over needed much modification plus landing craft and much of this special equipment — guns, ammunition, etc., all from Australia.

Scientists. I had much benefit from Scientists which I co-opted, mostly leading physicists from all the Universities.

It started when we were in a parlous position with no optical glass or optics for gun sights, and other optical equipment.

It later went to fungi problems in New Guinea, in electrical and optical and other instrument equipment. I recommend such activity should be maintained as a Defence requirement because when War occurs immediate problems of this kind always arise and such organisation is invaluable. (An example of this scientific work was the degaussing equipment to meet the problem of the German Magnetic Mine. A simple answer was found in 14 hours and ships were safe to sail again).

L.J. Hartnett.

THE BOER WAR CONCENTRATION CAMPS

As a student of military history, I was very interested in the article 'The Boer War 1899-1902' published in the DFJ No. 12 (September/October 1978). However, the reference to the concentration camps erected by the British was coloured in such a way that the casual reader might believe that the camps were innocuous and undeserving of criticism. In fact the record of these camps was infamous.

In the two and a half years war, the British lost 22,000 men and the Boers, 6,000, yet during the last two years of the war, 4,000 Boer women and 16,000 Boer children died in the concentration camps. Had the Boers persisted in their struggle their families would doubtless have been exterminated.

Perhaps the concentration camps rather than the "scorched earth [policy] created the lasting bitterness which persists after 75 years between the Afrikanders and their oppressors, the British".

RAAF Staff College, D. T. Pollock, Fairbairn, ACT Squadron Leader, RAAF.

Acknowledgements


DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

With reference to the Book Review by Mr R. Pelvin (DFJ No. 12) I would like to make a few points. Firstly it is not difficult to justify the inclusion of the Battle of Tsu-Shima. One of the aims of the book under review is to describe battles which have most affected the course of 20th century warfare. As far as naval warfare is concerned, Tsu-Shima has done just that. This battle was decisive, dramatic and pregnant with lessons. It was the last naval battle which can be studied before the outbreak of World War I and showed how action experience generally lagged behind theoretical and technical advance. It as the first naval battle in which wireless telegraphy was used and the last battle in which each gunlayer was responsible for his own aim and fire, subject to no central control. Tsu-Shima emphasised certain trends in naval warfare, ie. the increasing gun ranges, the mixed armament of various calibres, refuelling at sea and it threw doubts upon the value of the...
armoured cruiser as a supplementary to the battleship.

Secondly, Mr Pelvin goes on to say that the Russian ships were of extreme age and doubtful design. The nucleus of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was made up of four battleships of the Borodino class, launched in and after 1902, therefore just three years old when sent into battle. The 16 other major Russian warships were on an average ten years old, ranging from the Osljaba launched in 1902 to the Vladimir Monomakh launched in 1881. If these are ships of extreme age at the time of the battle, what do we call our three RAN DDGs? (launched 1963-66). The flagship Kniaz Suvoroff sank after more than four torpedo hits and after having been under concentrated fire for five hours and twenty minutes. Not bad for a ship of ‘doubtful design’ and overloaded with coal.

Finally in regard to the speed of the Queen Elizabeth Class Dreadnoughts, Mr Pelvin and the book under review are both wrong. Although the ships were designed for 25 knots, it is understood that 24 was about the best obtained; as for the Queen Elizabeth herself, best speed in service was 22.5-23 knots. I have quoted these figures from Sir Oscar Parkes’ book British Battleships.

Ski-jump trials are apparently proceeding apace and over 17° has now been achieved. Launch weights of 3000 lbs. over and above flat-deck launch weights are expected — which if converted to fuel endurance equates to perhaps an extra hour’s flying time. The benefits of the ski-jump can therefore be readily appreciated and the incremental aircraft performance obtained cannot but ameliorate some of the criticisms which have been laid at the door of sea-based VSTOL aircraft.

Office of DNP, 1. Strasser
Canberra, ACT
Leading Seaman

VSTOL VARIATIONS
A.K. Richardson’s letter (DFJ No. 12 September/October 1978) could be considered confusing when he states that Vstol Variations (DFJ No. 9 March/April 1978) claims that ‘Aircraft weight is less than total lift prior to point Z, equal to the lift of Point Z, and greater thereafter’. ‘Prior’, in this sense, would apply to the relative location of the event as depicted in Figure 1A when reading from left to right across the page; the opposite is of course true if ‘prior’ is taken in the more commonly used temporal sense (as addressed in the article).

Apart from some confusion caused (at least to this writer) over the above, Mr. Richardson’s point is well taken that an error has been made in the printing of Figure 1A and that weight would in fact equal lift at the point of inflexion of the flight path, i.e. approximately at point Y, (it would also have been clearer if Figure 1B had been printed to ‘line up’ with Figure 1A). A.K.R.’s observation does not of course alter the basic theory of the situation.

Australian Division, A.M. Hickling
Canberra Branch Honorary Secretary
The Royal Aeronautical Society

COUNTER TERRORISM
I have just been browsing again through the July/August issue (No. 11) of your Defence Force Journal and I noticed your reference in the Editorial to “Counter Terrorism”.

It struck me that the recently published book Peace-keeping in a Democratic Society by Robin Evelegh might be a suitable book for review. The author was a Colonel in the 3rd. Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets and he deals with countering terrorism in general based on his experiences in Northern Ireland. My own reading suggests that he is rather too legalistic although I am inclined to agree with his verdict that the Army there has not been given the powers necessary to cope with the situation.

Cliviger, Lanes, England
W.F. Whitehead

IN SUPPORT OF AN AUSTRALIAN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
What a great job Commander Peter Shevlin has done pushing the amphibious bandwagon in the face of growing home and overseas opinion that the sun has already set on the golden age of “gator” navies. I too believe that there is a role for an Australian Amphibious Force; casting aside the logistic, disaster relief and evacuation roles which are obvious, I would like to add a few thoughts to the section devoted to operations on the Land Commander’s rearward flank. A quote from the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, General Louis H. Wilson Jr. would not go astray. Speaking of striking at the flanks or rear he said,

“Used in this way, amphibious forces provide, as they did in World War II, a strategy option which the enemy cannot ignore. If history is an accurate guide, an
amphibious force would operate against the enemy’s mind, influence his operations, and tie down a substantial portion of his forces.”


Those folk interested in the subject have heard all the traditional arguments against this line of thought, some of the more popular are:

- The force will be detected by satellite and surprise cannot be achieved.
- Enemy air power will knock out the ship before the troops reach the shore, and
- the Australian Navy won’t have the extra shipping to maintain the force once it is ashore.

Naturally these arguments must be taken into account, but the fact remains that any potential enemy would be very foolish indeed to leave his flank or lines of communication exposed against a meaningful amphibious capability. Inchon still remains one of the greatest operations in the history of warfare. It is doubtful that any country in the world, including the U.S. will ever again possess the specialized shipping to conduct an operation of such magnitude, but the message still comes through loud and clear. A small amphibious force may be able to exert influence out of all proportion to its cost and size.

HQ Training Command, W.J. Reynolds Sydney, NSW

Lieutenant Colonel

WHO COMMANDS THE DEFENCE FORCE?

One of the cornerstones of British civilization, one enshrined by the Magna Carta, is the specially defined relationship between the Crown, the parliament and the armed forces. Yet we find that in Australia this cornerstone has been precipitately demolished.

The traditional relationship, which an historical perspective shows to be a correct one, is that in principle the armed forces are commanded directly by the Crown without the intervention of the parliament. The parliament expresses the will of a majority of the people in exercising control of the resources that will be made available to the Crown for the armed forces. In practice there are two qualifications of this principle. The parliament advises the Crown on the employment of the armed forces and, the will of the majority of the people may not always coincide with that of the parliament on particular issues.

When the position of Chief of Defence Force Staff was established in 1975, the Government (not the parliament you note) was introduced as an intermediary in the command chain between the Crown and the armed forces of Australia. The Defence Act, as amended by the Defence Reorganization Act 1975, provides in Sections 8 and of that “the Chief of Defence Force Staff shall command the Defence Force” and, “the powers vested in the Chief of Defence Force Staff . . . shall be exercised subject to and in accordance with any directions of the Minister”.

I have wondered for several years how this piece of subtle parliamentary draughtsmanship was able to go un-noticed or at least un-argued. After discussion with other officers I accepted that, if this portion of the Act were ever tested, it would be over-ruled by the Constitution. However, following the comments of General Hassett made public by the ABC and The Canberra Times on 13 November 1978, to the effect that the Constitution is merely an historical oddity, I am prompted again to ask “Who commands the Australian Defence Force?” In particular, who commands in the event of a conflict between the Crown and the parliament, and; who commands when the parliament is acting contrary to the general will of the people on a particular issue?

As to the change itself, can the parliament legally give the Government or itself this power; and why was such a fundamental change made almost surreptitiously, submerged in a morass of administrative detail? The informed cynic would be suspicious of the motives behind this change.

Department of Defence, A.J. Emmerson Canberra

Squadron Leader

A REPLY FROM DALS

I agree with Squadron Leader Emmerson that one of the cornerstones of British civilisation is the specially defined relationship between the Crown, the Parliament and the armed forces, but thereafter our views become divergent.

Section 68 of the Constitution vests the command in chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth in the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative. However, the Governor-General must exercise the command thus vested in him in accordance
with the principles of responsible government, namely, in accordance with the advice of his Ministers. The British Sovereign no longer exercises the supreme command in person. The king gave up personal command of the Army in 1793, when the first commander-in-chief was created (See Clode's Military Forces of the Crown, p. 240). Similarly the supreme command of the armed forces of Australia which is vested in the Governor-General, is titular.

May I describe the position of the Governor-General, the Minister and the Chief of Defence Force Staff as I see it.

**The Governor-General**

I know there is controversy about the "command" of the Governor-General but I am content to rely on the view in the classical treatise on the Australian Constitution by Quick and Garran. These views are that the Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military forces is one of the oldest and most honoured prerogatives of the Crown. It invests the Crown with wide powers as to the disposition and use of the Army and the administration of its affairs, and it is still largely uncontrolled by Statute. The manner in which these powers are exercised is constitutionally subject, like the exercise of other prerogatives, to the advice of Ministers of the Crown.

As an earlier edition of the Australian Military Regulations and Orders pointed out: "The command in chief thus vested in the Governor-General is not required to be exercised with the advice of the Executive Council, as are the powers conferred on the Governor-General under the Defence Act; but like all other prerogatives is exercisable under the advice of the responsible Minister."

Finally, as Dr. Evatt points out in The King and His Dominion Governors (pp. 238-240): "In accordance with constitutional usage the power vested in the Governor-General under Section 68 of the Constitution is only exercisable on ministerial advice and confers no actual military authority upon him personally."

**The Minister**

Chapter II of the Constitution deals with the Executive Government of the Commonwealth and Section 64 states:

"The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish. Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth."

I remind Squadron Leader Emmerson that the Governor-General, not the Parliament, appoints Ministers.

The Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, makes an Administrative Arrangements Order setting out the principal functions of the various Departments and the enactments administered by the Ministers heading those Departments. The Minister for Defence thus administers, inter alia, the Defence Act, the Defence Reorganisation Act, the Naval Defence Act and the Air Force Act. Put shortly, the Minister for Defence administers all Acts relating to Defence, including those Acts which relate to organisation and control of the Military Forces.

The Minister is responsible to the Parliament for every legislative and executive act which relates to the Defence Force and its members.

While Cabinet (for which there is no provision in legislation) decides major policy, it is the Minister who, in the normal course, promulgates that policy to his Department which includes both the Public Service and the Defence Force, and answers for it in the Parliament.

Accordingly Section 8 of the Defence Act, in my view, merely declares what is the constitutional and long accepted practice.

**Chief of Defence Force Staff**

With that background, it is plain that what is given to the Chief of Defence Force Staff is the practical command of the Defence Force. He is assisted by the Chiefs of Staff of each Service.

In the exercise of their command each is subject to directions from the Minister, and each Chief of Staff is further subject to the directions of the CDFS.

**The 1976 Change**

I cannot agree that the changes brought about in 1976 were un-noticed or un-argued. The Secretary and his senior Staff, the
Chairman Chiefs of Staff, each member of each Service Board, and the lawyers, civil and military, were all vitally involved. Prior to this the issue had been given a wide airing in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. It is also understood there was careful consideration in the Party Room of each of the major Political Parties.

I believe it was ultimately fairly well accepted that the present Sections 8, 9 and 9A of the Defence Act did not depart significantly from the traditional position and therefore it was not surprising that they did not provoke animated debate in the Houses of Parliament.

Keith Isaacs' letter (DFJ No. 13, November/December 1978) suggests that in my review of Sir Richard Williams' autobiography These Are Facts (DFJ No. 11, July/August 1978) I was misled on two points. In fact, I was misled on only one point and that was the reference to Keith Isaacs having supplied some of the historic photographs — the misleading was done by the editorial staff of DFJ, and on that I will say no more.

The second ‘error’ in the review as published was the statement that Keith Isaacs "made available many of the interesting annexes". Sir Richard also noted this error and we have corresponded on the subject; as demonstrated to Sir Richard, the offending words were not in the review as submitted by me but were added by the editorial staff of DFJ, and on that I will say no more.

As a reviewer of longstanding I am keenly aware of the need for accuracy in matters of fact. Accordingly, and particularly in view of the implication in respect of facts contained in the 'Editor's Comment' (DFJ No. 13, November/December 1978), would you please, in an early issue of DFJ confirm the foregoing and so redeem my undeservedly tarnished reputation for accuracy in reviewing.

RAAF Staff College
J.D.F. Philip
Canberra
Wing Commander

A POOR SORT OF MEMORY

In his generous review of my book, A Poor Sort of Memory, (Defence Force Journal No. 13 November/December 1978), Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgkinson mentioned that Jock Irvine’s drawings complement the text. They do indeed.

Jock came to Duntroon fifteen years after I did. By then there had been many changes — small, perhaps, when compared to those that were to come later, but still significant. It says much for his sensitivity and something for the durability of the place itself that he has managed to show it and its people as I remember them.

The drawings are simple, often deceptively so. This was a quality Neville Cardus found in Wilfred Rhodes’ bowling; and just as the great man’s deliveries demanded the closest attention so do Jock’s drawings. For instance in “At the feet of a latter-day Gamaliel” the expressions on the faces are those we all have seen sometime, somewhere in the land of TEWTS and military make-believe. In “Afternoons in more privileged surroundings” Duntroon House is shown just for what it is, a large, handsome but unpretentious colonial homestead. Most other aspirants have shown it and the grounds as altogether too grand. Where they have failed Jock has succeeded.

The subjects are seen with a nostalgic but sharp eye. The backs of the defaulters are positively mutinous and the shoulders of the cadet whose bed has been upturned for the last time (or so he hopes) have the proper degree of resignation. The gangling adolescents splashing in temporary freedom in the Murrumbidgee should be contrasted with their lack of it as they are festooned around the Gymnasion. Where they have failed Jock has succeeded.

In 24 Hours Peter Ryan finds the drawings “as authentic as they are informative” and for John Rowe writing in The National Times, “they evoke the gauzy images of old soldier memories”. For me they are and do. Others, I am sure, will share my pleasure in them but there is also a sense of personal gratitude they cannot share.

Campbell, ACT.

Geoffrey Solomon

Chairman Chiefs of Staff, each member of each Service Board, and the lawyers, civil and military, were all vitally involved. Prior to this the issue had been given a wide airing in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. It is also understood there was careful consideration in the Party Room of each of the major Political Parties.

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A POOR SORT OF MEMORY

In his generous review of my book, A Poor Sort of Memory, (Defence Force Journal No. 13 November/December 1978), Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgkinson mentioned that Jock Irvine’s drawings complement the text. They do indeed.

Jock came to Duntroon fifteen years after I did. By then there had been many changes — small, perhaps, when compared to those that were to come later, but still significant. It says much for his sensitivity and something for the durability of the place itself that he has managed to show it and its people as I remember them.

The drawings are simple, often deceptively so. This was a quality Neville Cardus found in Wilfred Rhodes’ bowling; and just as the great man’s deliveries demanded the closest attention so do Jock’s drawings. For instance in “At the feet of a latter-day Gamaliel” the expressions on the faces are those we all have seen sometime, somewhere in the land of TEWTS and military make-believe. In “Afternoons in more privileged surroundings” Duntroon House is shown just for what it is, a large, handsome but unpretentious colonial homestead. Most other aspirants have shown it and the grounds as altogether too grand. Where they have failed Jock has succeeded.

The subjects are seen with a nostalgic but sharp eye. The backs of the defaulters are positively mutinous and the shoulders of the cadet whose bed has been upturned for the last time (or so he hopes) have the proper degree of resignation. The gangling adolescents splashing in temporary freedom in the Murrumbidgee should be contrasted with their lack of it as they are festooned around the Gymnasion. Where they have failed Jock has succeeded.

In 24 Hours Peter Ryan finds the drawings “as authentic as they are informative” and for John Rowe writing in The National Times, “they evoke the gauzy images of old soldier memories”. For me they are and do. Others, I am sure, will share my pleasure in them but there is also a sense of personal gratitude they cannot share.

Campbell, ACT.

Geoffrey Solomon
BASIC DEFENCE PLANNING

At the end of his article “Basic Defence Planning” (DFJ No. 12) Wing Commander Rusbridge promised a further article setting out his views on how defence planning should be undertaken, but there are some aspects of his first article, devoted essentially to a critique of the present practice, on which I would like to comment.

First, my understanding of the quotation from the Minister’s statement of 22 September 1977 is that because Australia’s defence problems have some characteristics different in kind or degree from those of other countries, we should not be surprised if the solutions in terms of defence force capabilities are not identical to the solutions adopted by other countries. This does not mean that we have to reject methods of analysis of the requirements that others have developed and found useful: all that the Minister has said is that because our inputs to the analytical process are different, the outputs also are likely to be different. This is true even if the process we use is itself identical to that used by others.

Secondly, and more importantly, there seems to me to be some looseness in the terminology used by Wing Commander Rusbridge, that has somewhat confused the argument. This lack of precision has led to rather more emphasis than is justified being given to the technique of contingency formulation and analysis, and a lack of clarity about the purpose of such analysis.

The term “basic defence planning” is itself ambiguous. I suggest that there is a need to make a clear and explicit separation between the totality of defence policy formulation and the formulation of policies concerning the structure of the defence force and concerning the doctrines relating to the use of that force in combat or otherwise. The latter seems to be what Wing Commander Rusbridge is discussing, but this is only part of the total compass of defence policy concern. In a situation where there is a low probability that the defence force will be required to engage in major military combat to protect Australian territory or interests (which is what I take to be the meaning of the term “low threat”) the primary objective of defence policy is to maintain this situation. In these terms our overall foreign policies, including such things as trade and immigration policies as well as our international political relationships, can be seen as part of our defence policy — as part of the continuing need to convince the governments and nationals of other countries that it is not necessary or useful to mount a military attack on Australia or its interests.

That Australia has only once in its history (in 1942-3) faced unambiguously the kind of military threat that Israel, for example, has faced for every day of its existence does not, in my view, in any way lessen the need for us to maintain a defence force, but it does have implications for the structure of that force and for the things the force should do. Part of the posture that contributes to the minimization of the likelihood of a threat to Australia developing is the maintenance of an evident military capability and resolve to meet such threats if they should arise. Where there is room for debate is not over this need, but over how, and how far, it should be met.

It is here that contingency analysis has an important and, I suggest, an inescapable role. Australian defence force planners, as Wing Commander Rusbridge pointed out, are in the unfortunate position of not having the experience of regular military invasions of Australia to define the parameters of the requirement, so that I can see no alternative to the process of postulating a variety of plausible scenarios involving Australian forces in combat, and exploring the problems that would arise in dealing with the various situations to define the force we need. Military exercises are one useful means of exploring some contingencies, particularly as they permit a public demonstration of capability to those that we would wish to impress, but the techniques of analysis on paper are a valuable adjunct which permit the examination of a much wider range of possible situations at minimal cost.

It is true that to analyse any contingency more than superficially a scenario must be developed that is quite specific as to time, place, characteristics of the assumed enemy force, etc., so that the solution cannot be assumed to be other than specific. However it is possible to test the effects on the preferred solution of varying the parameters of the scenario, and provided that a considerable number of contingencies are examined, covering a wide spectrum of situations and of required force responses, it seems reasonable to assume that the common elements of the solutions would indicate the universal
requirements that the Australian defence force must meet. To go beyond these requirements to make a judgment on the extent to which we should develop capabilities that would be required for some contingencies but not others, the defence force planner has to emerge from the world of hypothetical possibilities that we call “contingencies” to the much more difficult world of cost/benefit analysis within a limited budget, of competing capability requirements, and to the evaluation of whether a possible threat is of such likelihood, or seriousness, to justify the acquisition of capability specifically to meet it.

The problems that I see facing defence force planners is not simply to establish which capabilities it would be desirable to establish and maintain in the defence force, but to identify which of the various desirable capabilities are sufficiently important that they should continue to be maintained even if this means that resources will not be available for other theoretically desirable capabilities. We may protest that on matters of national security, cost should not be a constraint, but in the world in which we live, it is.

I therefore would not agree with Wing Commander Rusbridge that there is any serious defect in the methodology of present defence force planning. I do have some concern however that the necessary study of contingencies by defence force planners leads too easily to the assumption that the study of such contingencies somehow establishes that the threat that has been postulated as an analytical hypothesis must be of sufficient likelihood to be of immediate concern. In turn this leads to the attitude that the proper and only function of the defence force is to continue to prepare itself to engage in substantial military combat with an enemy military force. In this view, such activities as coastal surveillance to detect fishing craft, smugglers, refugee craft, etc., do not constitute “proper” defence force functions and should be passed on to someone else.

Without asserting flatly that such a view is wrong, I suggest that it can at least be argued that in a situation where the probability of a major military invasion of Australia seems low, and likely to remain so, but where the probability of continuing minor encroachments on Australian sovereignty is much higher, and the significance of such encroachments may well be increasing, and in a situation where there is strong competition for government funds, a defence force which accepts as its responsibility the overall protection of Australian sovereignty in peace as well as war may well be more effective in serving the national interest and in providing a rewarding career for its members than one which dismisses everything but preparation for the next war as an irritating irrelevance. Because such a force would be providing a necessary continuing service to the community it could be expected to have less difficulty than the present defence force in obtaining the resources it needs and in the long term may well be able to better build up the competence and resources for the strictly military roles appropriate to the Australian defence force than can be achieved at present.

Whether this is so or not, I believe that the proper role of Australian armed forces in a low threat situation is an issue that deserves more thought and considered debate than it has yet received.

Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT.

B.C. Brett

THE AUTHOR REPLIES

Thank you for giving me the opportunity so soon to comment on Mr Brett’s thoughtful letter. It seems to me that Mr Brett makes two main points. He first argues that, contrary to my suggestion, there is after all, no serious defect in the present defence planning process. His second point argues, somewhat obliquely, in times of ‘low threat’, a defence force which concentrates on providing for the deterrence of armed attack to the detriment of other quasi-military roles does not serve the community as best it could.

To begin with, I believed that Mr Brett’s second point was none of my concern. Although I didn’t agree with it, I couldn’t see the connection with his first point, and I resolved initially not to comment on it.

However, on reflection, I became more and more concerned by his proposal to divert the defence forces from their primary role. Indeed, I eventually perceived a direct link between his arguments, although perhaps not in the way that he intended. Thus, I shall comment on both of his arguments. I’d like to take the second point first and hope to persuade you...
that to argue for such a role diversion is yet another symptom of the current problem we face — that current defence planning is incorrectly based.

In the first place, any argument in favour of military role division must consist of two parts. The first part must argue that, in times of so-called ‘low threat’, the overt requirement for military forces reduces. The second part must argue that, in the light of this reduced requirement, other quasi-military activities are more appropriate for the existing forces.

The first part of the argument seems to me to be directly related to the question “Is the degree of threat consequent upon the level of military preparedness, or is it the other way round?” The argument requires the latter alternative to sustain itself. I, however, am not convinced. I would like to see a much stronger justification for this idea than has so far been offered. For the time being I am quite satisfied that, whatever particular and transient circumstances Australia believes she currently faces, the degree of threat is consequent upon one’s military preparedness. Thus, I could not agree that, in times of so-called ‘low threat’ the requirement for military forces reduces. The concern that I referred to earlier arises from the discovery that the contrary view is being argued within the Defence Department.

The appropriateness of the quasi-military roles suggested as alternative occupations for the Defence Force is also open to question. I wonder whether to argue for the introduction of military forces into what is really an extended civil police function is not to misunderstand some deep-rooted and painfully established precedents concerning the role of permanent military forces in a free society.

Over the centuries we have learned the hard way that the inevitable power held by the military is not always used democratically to benefit the ordinary citizen. We have learned that military aid to the civil power should be just that and no more. It is supplemental power, provided as a temporary measure at the request of the civil power, that we can offer. The civil power should remain predominant and prime throughout. If a task can be performed by a civilian organization without military intervention, then free peoples seem to sleep more easily in their beds. I don’t blame them.

The protection of national sovereignty in peace is a task which can and should be borne by the community as a civil exercise. From time to time, help may be needed from military forces but not in their primary role. The US Coast Guard is a good example of the proper discharge of a quasi-military role in peacetime. The changing involvement of the British army in Northern Ireland is a good example of aid to the civil power. This has varied from almost total responsibility as the civil power breaks down to a reducing commitment as the civil power recovers.

The suggestion that we might more easily obtain necessary resources through a continuing quasi-military role of service to the community only begs the question “What resources do we need; — guns or truncheons?”. The proper role of armed forces in so-called ‘low threat’ situations is just the same as for ‘high threat’. It is deterrence.

To argue otherwise is, in my opinion, a symptom of having been misled by the study of contingencies — not the studies, per se, but their position in the planning process. To compartmentalize into low threat and high threat, or ‘the totality of defence policy formulation and the formulation of policies concerning the structure of the Defence Force’, or capabilities we need now and those that can be left till later is a consequence of contingency studies. You cannot put things in little boxes like that. All the boxes tend to have blurred outlines and their contents tend to mix with one another. The term ‘basic defence planning’ is only ambiguous if one insists on such compartmentalization.

The term means exactly what it is says. It is the starting point of the planning process and I believe it should consist of a strategy, to be followed by a concept of operations. They are what should form the core of the planning process. I don’t believe they do at the moment. What is our strategy? Where is our concept of operations? They don’t exist — perhaps because contingency studies tell us that we face no significant threat in the foreseeable future. This information seems to so bemuse us that we can go no further. The current Defence planning process can only perceive needs in relation to a threat.

Mr Brett uses perhaps unintentionally revealing terminology when he writes of the
defence planner "emerging from the world of hypothetical possibilities to the much more difficult world of cost benefit analysis within a limited budget". I sympathize. It must be a painful emergence. The process I advocate would have at least offered a strategic principle at an earlier stage based, not on transient factors, but on factors that are always true, so that the studies would have been given a surer foundation. At least, it would lessen the confusion, at best it would prevent defeat in war.

Sir, the current methodology is leading nowhere. Are we really sure that there isn't a better alternative?

Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT

P.J. Rusbridge
Wing Commander

* * * * *

Award: Issue No. 13 (November/December 1978)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the November/December issue of the Defence Force Journal to Lieutenant Colonel S. Krasnoff and Captain W. W. Houston for their article The Bi-mobile Force.

* * * * *

We fight not for glory nor for wealth nor honours; but only and alone we fight for freedom, which no good man surrenders but with his life.

— Scots' "Great Declaration".

* * * * *

There are two levers for moving men: interest and fear.

— Napoleon.
The Surveillance of Northern Australia

-its history

The story of Stanner's Bush Commando 1942

Captain Amoury Vane
Australian Army Reserve

INTRODUCTION

THIS story concerns a man and the unit which he invented and commanded during World War II. Today the man is Emeritus Professor W. E. H. Stanner, CMG, anthropologist, author and soldier, of Canberra.

It has been possible to write the story only with the help of the Professor's many communications and discussions. Acknowledgement is gratefully made for these and also for details of the War Diary received from the Director, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, together with help, by way of recollections, from ex-members of Stanner's unit.

The Australian Army's historical wartime surveillance of north and north-western Australia, over thirty-five years ago during the war in the Pacific against Japan, makes a story which may well be recalled today in view of the importance of northern surveillance to the modern Australian Defence Force.

Prelude

Flashback to the speeding, early, dangerous months of 1942. At that time, as McCarthy has indicated in his volume of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1939-1945, the Chiefs of Staff had decided that part of northern Australia would have to be left undefended and that the north-west would have to remain an open door, through which the enemy could come, either to make their way by a series of steps down the coast of Western Australia, as General Bennett thought, or to launch an attack against the western flank of NT Force via the approaches of the Daly and Victoria Rivers, as General Herring, GOC NT Force, feared. Herring had the additional worries that the Japanese might approach the eastern flank of his Force via the McArthur and Roper Rivers or attempt direct encirclement of Darwin with landings to its east and west on the rivers and peninsulas.

Requirements of the Chiefs of Staff and the GOC of a Force

The decision of the Chiefs of Staff implied a requirement of highest priority—the surveillance of the undefended continental coastline. Work on this had already begun. Not long after the outbreak of war with Japan, Intelligence at LHQ had sent an officer to report on the security of the exposed north-west of Western Australia and of the Northern Territory. On his return he came to see the Minister for the Army.

At that time there were three members on the personal staff of the Minister for the Army — W. E. H. Stanner, C. R. E. Jennings and H. V. Howe. The views of Stanner in particular were sought for several reasons. He had just completed the report on the state of the defences of Eastern Command in late 1941, which had been read to a secret session of Federal Parliament. He was an anthropologist and had considerable knowledge of Northern Australia, gained during travel and research there in 1932 and in 1934-35 for the Australian National Research Council.

As well as this, Stanner had other relevant experience. He had worked in Kenya in 1938-39
and had become quite knowledgeable about the role of the Boer Commandos in the Boer War and about the Germans' remarkable performance in World War I in East Africa under von Lettow Vorbeck, in country and circumstances not unlike those which might face us in North Australia. Both had a considerable effect on Stanner's outlook and thinking. He was also influenced by Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Henderson, IA, who befriended him while in Kenya.

Learning of Stanner's interest in soldiering and of his certainty that war was coming, Henderson went to great pains to insist Stanner should 'see' large scale country in terms of time, space, physical movement and supply. They saw an enormous amount of Africa together, from Kenya to Uganda and the Sudan.

Shortly after the Intelligence conference, Stanner was asked by the then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Rowell, to fly north to HQ NT Force to be interviewed by Major General Herring, who, having returned to Australia from the Middle East as commander of the 6th Australian Division, had been appointed on 24 March 1942 as GOC NT Force.

Herring and some of his staff officers had left Adelaide for Darwin on 27 March, a little over a week since their return from the Middle East. On arrival at Darwin Herring found a somewhat dejected force, mainly deployed on the coast in the immediate vicinity of Darwin itself. The deployment positions were tactically unsound and there was as well a disturbing supply position.

When Stanner arrived at NT Force, General Herring and his BGS, Brigadier R. B. Sutherland, examined him closely on what he knew of the outlying country of Northern Australia. Stanner told Herring that he thought if the Japanese landed, they could gain tactical advantages from the use of the back bush country of Northern Australia. "WHAT tactical advantages?" Stanner was asked. Stanner was asked to put his views on paper and he stopped up all that night to do so.

It was realized that if the Japanese attacked, they would not come in 'by the front door but by the side windows or the back door' as they had done in Malaya. What Stanner proposed was the formation of a new type of unit for the Army, one so structured as to implement the requirement of the decision of the Chiefs of Staff, which has already been referred to, and to carry out surveillance, reconnaissance and scouting for the Commander, NT Force, of all the critical area of the north from the Gulf country of Queensland to the north of Western Australia.

Stanner was put through a grinder on every aspect of the problem by Herring and Sutherland and presently Herring said that it was his wish that Stanner raise and command the special unit which he had suggested. "It is your duty to do this," said Herring, or words to that effect. The BGS, Sutherland, told Stanner that he must "get going", waste no time and be back with his men in their positions within ten weeks. Actually it took Stanner twelve weeks but the aim was achieved.

**Formation of a Bush Commando**

It is a very rare flower in the history of any army which can blossom in the face of danger as readily as did Stanner's new unit. He conceived and invented it, raised and organized it, manned and equipped it, and put into the field a unit of regimental size and specialized beyond the then currents of military thought. It was a unit which fulfilled all the requirements of the Chiefs of Staff and of the GOC NT Force.

If Stanner had had his way, his new unit would have been called the 'Bush Commando', which is what it was, or else the 'Bush Watch' or the 'Bush Scouts'. (The influence of Stanner's studies of the Boer War is apparent here.) Army Headquarters, however, had its way and in May 1942 issued a secret memorandum in connection with the training of the new unit, which was called the 'North Australia Observer Unit'. The unit was approved by LHQ as having AIF status and hence, being an AIF unit raised prior to the cut-off date for AIF regimental titles (which was in September 1942), it was entitled to the use of the prefix '2/'. Quaintly, but correctly, it was the 2/1 North Australia Observer Unit or 2/1 NAOU.

At this stage the unit was regarded as being in the nature of a special type of independent company and was allocated the coveted double diamond shaped colour patch of the Independent Companies. The original colour patch
worn in 1942 was a green and gold double diamond; however, this was altered in late 1943 to an orange and mid-green colour patch.

The Role of the NAOU

It is customary in studying a particular unit to consider its allocation, role, organization, characteristics and tasks. In the case of the NAOU, the role as seen by the Chiefs of Staff and the tasks as set by the GOC NT Force were decided first and the unit then built to achieve them. The implementation of these secret matters was given top priority by the new Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Vasey, who had succeeded Rowell, and who now stamped all aspects of the unit as ‘MOST IMMEDIATE’. Shortly, Herring, who had so much to do with the formation of the NAOU and the setting of its tasks, was promoted to Lieutenant General and given command of II Australian Corps. He was succeeded as GOC NT Force by Major General J. Stevens who had been commanding the 4th Division in Western Australia.

The dramatic urgency of the role of the new unit is revealed on reading the terse wording of the Operational Instruction received by the commander of the NAOU from the Commander, Northern Territory Force, which was as follows:

“Your role will be to watch for and to report to HQ NT FORCE, by the quickest means, any landings of the enemy on the Australian coast between NORMANTON, Queensland, and YAMPI SOUND, West Australia, and you will report any subsequent enemy movement including movement of his aircraft.”

Creating the North Australia Observer Unit

Stanner found raising his secret unit was no simple job, with a dead-line of just over ten weeks and the risk of immediate action facing him. General Vasey’s ‘MOST IMMEDIATE’ stamp meant top priority, and opened many doors which might otherwise have not opened at all or else opened very slowly and reluctantly. Stanner was aided by his service on the staff of the Minister for the Army, which helped him considerably. Even so, he had to cut corners, especially as regards obtaining equipment in short supply and this tended to land him in trouble.

He could not have succeeded in the assignment without the enthusiastic help of Jennings.

THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

[Map showing areas such as Darwin, Normanton, Yampi Sound, Broome, Wyndham, Alice Springs, Cloncurry, Derby, Hall's Creek, and Halls Creek]
and Howe on the Minister’s staff, and the practical guidance of the officers of the General Staff, such as Colonel Taplin and Major Jimmy Harrison, a calm, diplomatic and skilful man, who was later to become Sir James Harrison, Governor of South Australia. They helped Stanner to design the unit’s War Establishment and its War Equipment Table. Other helpful and envious members of the various arms and services played their parts as well.

The Observer War Establishment

Stanner wanted a highly mobile unit, horsed rather than wheeled (because as he liked to say, horses can go where wheels cannot), with good radio links, with light weapons, considerable firepower, and made up of men with a bush background who had an adventurous spirit, and who could live outdoors for months at a time, operating on their own initiative in small groups.

A provisional War Establishment of approximately 400 all ranks was prepared. Selection of personnel for the new unit was made by recruiting teams who called for volunteers for the NAOU when they hurriedly visited all the AIF training units and depots as well as units of the Militia where they canvassed members who would join the AIF and then volunteer again for the NAOU.

Although the men were wanted urgently, a strict selection had to be made and the volunteers had to meet the following requirements:

- Be volunteers aged 20 to 40 years.
- Have medical fitness Class 1.
- Have had bush experience in private life.
- Horsemanship.
- Possess initiative, resource and intelligence.
- Be prepared to serve as follows:

  “The personnel of this unit will be called on to undertake, in the north of Australia, adventurous duties requiring a high degree of endurance and the ability to act independently.”

Many fine types of Australian men were recruited for the NAOU and these included a large number of experienced bushmen and a large number with service in the pre-1939 Militia Light Horse Regiments. Also there was a group with ‘DX’ army numbers who had lived most of their lives in the Northern Territory and had travelled into Darwin earlier to enlist in the AIF and who already had knowledge of the far-out Australian Bush.

By July 1942 a progress report gave the strength as 20 officers and 399 other ranks, the establishment now being for 421 other ranks. Later, by taking with the main party the ‘first reinforcements’, the unit was increased in size but even this was not sufficient for the observer task so eventually an over-strength unit of nearly 700 all ranks was needed.

The Means of Mobility

As the essence of Stanner’s new unit was to be mobility, as well as the swift transfer in of the personnel, there had to be a rapid allocation of nearly fifty vehicles and the selection and the purchase of sufficient horses and sea-going schooners and motor yachts to mount, move and supply the NAOU throughout the vast area of its responsibility.

The total number of horses purchased for the Establishment was 1500; in addition in some areas later on, a large number of wild brumbies were caught and broken-in and several herds of wild donkeys caught to increase the number of pack animals. The best of the horses were for riding and the strongest for use as pack-horses. Naturally in such a large number of horses, all grades and qualities were found.

The NAOU was, as can be seen, the largest mounted unit which the Australian Army has ever had. Indeed it is interesting to note that a pre-1939 Cavalry Brigade (horsed, not mechanized) had an Establishment for the whole brigade of 1846 riding horses (or ‘rides’ as the correct term was), plus 324 draught horses and 159 pack-horses. This made a total of 2329 horses for the brigade; the NAOU having with the Establishment purchases, the brumbies and the donkeys, a total very close to the same figure.

As well as the mobility which the mounted troops would have, Stanner had to provide for the exploration and the investigation of rivers and inlets and the coastal transportation by sea and river craft of personnel and their equipment and supplies to inaccessible Forward Observation Posts or coast-watcher points. To effect this there were on the Establishment a
number of such vessels. These included a fleet comprising the Lady Yetive, the Lady Ruth, the Toorbul, the Hurricane and others. In addition, a number of craft were utilized which were found at places in the north where they had been abandoned after some incident of the war. An important one of these was the large Koolama motor launch. This had belonged to the M.V. Koolama which had been bombed in the Joseph Bonaparte Gulf by the Japanese on 20 February 1942. She beached on the shores of the gulf and was later refloated on

(Note: The original WE of the NAOU provided for a unit of four field companies commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. It took the field with three companies commanded by a Major. Stanner, the commander, was later promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.)

1 March to set off to reach Wyndham on 2 March. The next day there occurred two air raids—one on Broome in which 35 to 40 people were killed—and one on Wyndham.
During the Wyndham raid the *Kodama* sank and turned turtle alongside the jetty, its launch also being sunk. Later when elements of the NAOU reached Wyndham, they refloated the launch and one of the platoons made good use of it for river work.

**Into the Field**

Meanwhile the development of the NAOU had been proceeding at the camp at Ingleburn in NSW. In early July a march-past of the whole unit took place and within a day or so the Advance Party left for North Australia. In the beginning of August the Main Party was able to follow, travelling by railway from Sydney to Townsville and across to Mt Isa, thence by the trucks of an American Transport Battalion on through Camooweal into the Northern Territory and up to Katherine.

What an ideal place Katherine was for the HQ of a unit like the NAOU, based as it was in the roots of the giant salient which the Northern Territory made. The Independent Companies stayed there; the 2/2 Independent Company was there for a few weeks before leaving for Timor in December 1941. The 2/4 Independent Company, commanded by Major Walker, had already arrived there in March and was now deployed at Herring's wish, watching and patrolling the lines of possible Japanese approach along the Roper, Victoria and Daly Rivers until they were relieved by NAOU in August. The next month the Company departed to reinforce the 2/2 Independent Company in Timor. Shortly, the 2/8 Independent Company in its turn, made its way also into the Northern Territory.

Katherine had the advantage that wireless telegraphy worked well from there right across the whole of the continent, allowing for such problems as skip-distance and so on. In addition, Katherine was central and communications by road and air easier. Further, it was deployed away from Darwin itself, which was Herring's wish. The actual site of the HQ was on the southern bank of the river there, about half a mile from the rail crossing and almost exactly on the present site of the CSIRO experimental station. It was a beautiful site, with fair cover from air observation, with splendid water, and with heavy grass (which was not burned, but trampled under foot to keep the dust from rising, a lesson many units were very slow to learn).

From here, the grand deployment was about to begin. Its scope is even at this day, thirty-five years later, difficult to appreciate without a thrill: "your task", the men would say, even though but to themselves, for they were Australians, "your task lies from the Gulf Country to the Kimberleys". To survey, in one's mind's eye the hundreds and the hundreds of horses, soldiers' horses, was to give back to these men a generation far past from their own present. From the trucks and tanks of modern war, as it was even then, to give them a glimpse of that epitome of the Australian Army, the Mounted Soldier.

Stanner noted in his diary, "28 August, Friday. Intense preparation all day. Loading of gear in platoon and company lots to facilitate movement and discharge. Officers' conference last night. Put Operation Instruction No. 1 into verbal terms—as little writing as possible, as a principle—discussed tactical disposition, use of reserves and mobility and essentials of role and method. All quiet and attentive."

Stanner held his unit CO's parade at dusk that evening, under the trees at Katherine, the moon shining, all his men seated quietly on the grass. A scene not easily forgotten. Stanner wrote, "All men seated in the grass near the Orderly Room, all very interested and responsive. Spoke strongly and told them they could not now turn back from a task so well begun." There was a general air of tension and of excitement in the atmosphere. The unit stayed up late and then slept restlessly and lightly.

The next morning the 'A' Company and 'B' Company convoys moved out in good order, enormously long convoys piled high with the men and their equipment, off to the east and, longer still to the west, carrying thousands of gallons of petrol for the journey out and back in. The work of NAOU had begun.

On reaching their destinations the companies had to implement at their level the implications of the operational role. This implied the patrolling, the exploring, the watching and the 'backing-up' of the immense coast, with the additional tasks of accumulating and collating all topographical information likely to be of operational value and the constant observance of the movements of enemy aircraft.
NAOU Signs Network

The function of the NAOU depended upon the reporting of information from observer personnel by a rapid and reliable wireless telegraphy network which was to be laid with speed across the north of Australia.

The chosen method of communication was, in the main, the transmission of messages in Morse Code using pre-arranged calendar code blocks. Special consideration was given to the problems of long distance communication. The diagram of the unit structure and geographical distribution indicates this need. Equipment needed to be capable of both local net usage and infra-continental communication. The signallers had been trained in special schools before movement north and were strengthened by the transfer in of members of Signals, 1st Australian Corps.

Older and unsophisticated methods of reporting were used when wireless equipment was insufficient in quantity for a particular task. Small groups of men, in twos or threes, might investigate an area of many miles of coast, without wireless equipment (because the sets were already being used by the other
patrols), completely isolated from any outside contact should things go wrong, and then their work completed, would hurry back on horseback to hand their reports in to their platoon HQ or to a patrol with wireless facilities, in exactly the same way as mounted scouts did in reconnaissance against the Boers at the end of the last century.

Stanner has said that as well as his army sets, the unit was linked in with the Flying Doctor network of pedal radios which still remained on cattle stations and outback towns, whence most people had been evacuated, but which still had a staff which carried on. Wyndham, for example, still had its post office staff when the NAOU from 'B' Company arrived, although the remaining population mainly consisted of the storekeeper, the Police Sergeant and the Town Marshal, but not forgetting the Publican of the "Six-Mile Hotel" outside Wyndham. The town's main hotel was closed.

The first wireless sets used were an Indian Army type, the FS6, which were very cumbersome for work out in the far bush. The sets needed one pack-horse to carry the transceiver and its vibrator unit and aerial, another pack-horse to carry the two very heavy accumulators in their protective boxes, and another pack-horse to carry the Briggs and Stratton battery charger set to recharge the accumulators as they ran down, and yet another pack-horse to carry the drums of petrol to run the battery charger and still another two or three horses to work as reliefs for the others, owing to the great weight of this equipment. Later on, lighter and more portable W/T and R/T sets were obtained, especially for forward patrol work.

At each of the field company HQs, there was a Company Net Control Station with its sub-stations at the platoon HQs and at the outlying forward observation posts or on the mounted patrols. Similarly, substations were located on the NAOU coastal vessels. These nets were in turn linked to the main NAOU Unit Control Station at Unit HQ at Katherine. Direct links were made between each of the Darwin coast-watch posts and advanced HQ of NT Force. Direct nets joined up HQ NT Force, as well as RAAF Darwin, RAAF Townsville, and HQ YORKFORCE, in Queensland. Fall-back links were to Halls Creek in W.A., Cloncurry in Queensland and to Alice Springs. This aggregate of networks is shown in the Signals Diagram and extended from Normanton, at the south-east corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria, around the continent, to the west of the Cambridge Gulf in north-west of Australia, ending in the northern Kimberleys with the mounted patrols from the Forrest River base at Bremla Farm extending across to the old Drysdale River Mission, officially to Yampi Sound.

**Operation of the Sub-Units and Sections**

The NAOU field companies were not organized as separate administrative sub-units with their own WEs and WETs as are squadrons today, but nevertheless when they were deployed it was so that each field company could operate independently in its observer task; local problems had to be worked out by the man on the spot. Each of the companies had four platoons, each with a platoon HQ and a number (on an as-required basis), of outposts, or 'OPs', and mobile mounted patrols moving through the platoon area. The theme for this basis was on the idea of 'best means for the work to be done', rather than by the deployment of set sections, for each company and platoon had its own different geographical and topographical problems. There was, therefore, no set number of independent patrols which a company might mount.

Typical of these independent patrols or sections are the following examples. In the 'B' Company area, a platoon HQ was established at the Timber Creek Depot on the Victoria River. An outlying Forward Observation Post was established by a section of an NCO and three privates (one of them being a signaller) eighty miles down the winding Victoria River, on the slopes of Endeavour Hill, on the southern bank and directly behind Blunder Bay at the river's mouth. Another section, mounted, was based at the Old Bradshaw Station across the river. As well as these, one or two mounted roving patrols covered the area between the Platoon HQ at the Depot and the wild country south of the river westward to Turtle Point, which lies some forty miles further on north-west of Blunder Bay, the river here being lined by masses of man-
groves and mudflats. Linking the platoon for supplies and relief, there also was a river motor vessel to travel to Bradshaw and down to Blunder Bay. And all of this was the responsibility of one platoon. The officers, each a lieutenant, in command of each such platoon, were exceptional men with endless energy, initiative and reserves of personal substance and resource.

The arrangement in the northern Kimberleys is another example well worth studying. Here a platoon HQ was located at the Bremla Farm on the Forrest River. The site is not marked on the new Survey Corps maps (1964-69 series), but was on the southern side of the Forrest River, not too far away from the Forrest River Mission Station (which lay over on the north side of the river), and was tucked away in the curling foothills of a branch of the Milligan Ranges; a site well supplied with fresh water and well chosen from the point of view of concealment both from the land or from the air. One section of the platoon was stationed back at Wyndham with its lookout on the top of the hill behind the Wyndham Hotel, which is a hill in its own right and not to be confused with the outcrops of the Bastions. From the HQ at Bremla Farm, patrols moved out to inspect and seek a path for a tactical withdrawal of the HQ, if one should be needed in the weeks ahead if the Japanese came, to a new site south of the Milligan Ranges near the water supply of Nulla Nulla Creek, a site which was protected, should an invader occupy Wyndham, by the large areas of mudflats between the Steere Hills on its north and the Durack River on its south.

A very important wet-season mounted patrol departed from the HQ at Bremla to cross the Forrest River going north and west of the Collison Ranges, across the wild country west of the Seppelt Ranges, over creeks and rivers through hilly and stony country to reach the old Drysdale Mission at Mission Bay. This patrol was an important one because it was a classic example of how a small patrol of about four men, mounted on horseback and with their supplies on packhorses could set out in the midst of the ‘Wet’ to make their way cross country, persisting in their purpose, sliding in the mud, swimming across rivers and getting through”, no matter what the terrain or the season. Two sorts of horses were found by the NAOU, the small footed mountain bred horse which would try hard enough in the ‘Wet’, and the heavy-muscled, big footed horse which would revel in the water-logged land with feet so big even the biggest horseshoes the Army could supply would barely fit. Between the two sorts, of course, was the average, good, dependable stockhorse purchased from the stations of the cattle country.

Notable in the use of mounted surveillance patrols was the absence of the noise which rings out across the plains when armoured or tracked, or even transport vehicles are used.

There was a big factor which modified the operations of the sub-units. This was the maintenance of the health of the great number of horses. The WE did not provide for a Veterinary Officer, as did the Establishments of pre-war mounted units, but officially there were sergeant-farriers but not horse-breakers. The unit was lucky, just the same, and had some excellent farriers and horse-breakers who were particularly good at handling raw, unbroken bush horses. The horses had to be kept shod constantly and the platoons became adept in the art of shoeing horses as well as other aspects of horsemastership. The bushman’s skill in caring for his horses was soon to be learned by all. The horses were fed in the main by grazing on grass, with a certain amount of hard feeding with bran and oats. Even with grazing, the feed bill must have been enormous. A reserve of remounts and packhorses had to be kept at remount depots, such as at Nutwood Downs, some distance back from the areas of likely first-contact.

A certain amount of experimentalism had to be allowed for Stanner’s plans to be carried out. He had to consider the functional efficiency of the ‘drover’s plant’ or ‘mustering plant’ concept for those regions in which there would be no conventional Army back-up of the kind which would accompany the use of mounted troops under ordinary conditions of service. Even so the care of the horses was very good and a matter of pride. Looking back, Stanner has said that he might have done better with mules for pack-work rather than horses. They may have carried as much, longer and farther than pack-horses would. None the less there are many bushmen who do say they will work longer, better, happier and with more courage
with horses than with any other animal. The donkeys used were not, in mountain country at least, very successful.

**Long Range Patrolling**

The subject of long range patrolling and of operations carried out deeply (if the enemy occupied parts of the north), and for indefinite periods, is a subject needing a careful approach if the concept of the NAOU is to be maintained. There is a tendency to consider that a patrol operating at long range and deeply, though it may do so for intelligence purposes only, has within its structure, no matter how small or how equipped, the ability or the capacity to carry out tasks in the nature of, for example, a sudden, small, limited, offensive operation, or to use its 'locale of patrol' to harass or disrupt the enemy. It might even be considered that this should be the principal purpose of such patrols and other purposes secondary ones.

It is obvious from what has already been related that the NAOU could carry out with ease, and in all seasons and over all sorts of terrain, by day and by night, the longest of long range patrols. Patrols of distances of 300 and 500 miles, locating water as they went and living off the land (for which purpose the patrols were issued with shotguns to shoot game) and with no resupply, were organized without fear. By the aid of water location and caches of food, ammunition, medical supplies and other needs, the patrols could, and did, continue to the limits of geography, pressing on through the bush, their clothing often in tatters, saddlery hanging together with makeshift repairs, to come along, with no previous group with which to compare them, except perhaps the Boer Commandos, with long beards down their chests after months on end in the bush, their hats and other gear worn out by exposure. Some of them after a second dry season after a long ‘Wet’ spent out in the open, resembled nothing else but a group of bush-rangers, reincarnated from an Australia of long ago, as they rode into sight after a long patrol, appearing from among the trees as a long line of riders and packhorses, coming on quietly, the horses nose to tail, with an occasional jingle from the saddlery. Ragged they looked and dangerous to tangle with, for bush scouting does things to a man.

It is with the difference in the intent of such long range patrols, that the difference between the NAOU and certain modern units of a very similar nature and tradition is found. Stanner has said there is a world of difference between a unit manned, equipped and backed up, to go out and pick a fight at a great distance from Big Brother, and (all technology and communications apart) one like the NAOU, which was manned, equipped and sent out into the blue, with a tight, limited, but positive role.

**The Bush Vedettes**

When the NAOU began its operations and its roving patrols went out into the bush and stayed there, they were to act as vedettes, as mounted sentries patrolling and stationed away from the outposts of NT Force itself. The watch and surveillance of the coast for the enemy landing apart, the essential role of NAOU was to be through its patrols and OPs, the scouting and the reconnaissance of the enemy for the GOC NT Force, wherever the enemy might be, or move to, in the bush of the north of Australia from Queensland to the Kimberleys.

The important thing about the NAOU patrols was that they were to be like shadows, hiding in the bush, coming out to scout the enemy’s moves and to report them to NT Force, and to keep on reporting them no matter what, so that NT Force would not be caught unawares upon its flanks, and then to return to their hide-outs, to use the bush as their natural element, for its survival values as well as for its military values, for food, water, rest and shelter and recreation for tired bodies, as well as for concealment, secrecy, surprise and as a hide-out for supplies, signal-posts and horseyards. They were prepared to stay out in the bush until kingdom-come.

Certainly the NAOU patrols could hit the enemy and hurt him, if the chance arose, providing the patrol could get away quickly afterwards, to hide again in its bush cover. The NAOU patrols actually were well prepared for such events as these. Each patrol was heavily armed with the 50-round drum type of Thompson sub-machine guns as well as rifles and grenades, a rare fire power in small arms even for special units in those days. Carrying the ammunition for the SMGs was always a weighty problem in more ways than
one, especially as to re-supply, if action did occur.

Stanner has said that he used to be haunted by thoughts that elements of the NAOU would get involved in needless, close-contact fights with the enemy, resulting in NAOU personnel being wounded and with absolutely no means of casualty evacuation, and as well, by doing so, just for the satisfaction of the fight, leaving the true role of shadowing, watching and reporting upon the enemy.

A NAOU Bush Scout’s Diary

It is worth quoting here an entry from a diary of comments on scouting and patrolling in the bush by the NAOU, as follows:

“We eat what we can shoot, and carry shotguns for that; we kill beef and make it into salt meat the way they did years ago, and there is damper made the way that drovers do in a camp oven and the coals of our fire, when we see fit to make one. When we stop at the end of each day’s march, we place the pack saddles in a row, taking our bed-rolls, which have been strapped crossways over the pack saddles, off to make each our one night’s home beneath the stars, or if it is raining to seek the off wind side of trees.

“We sleep on the ground after watering the horses; we each have at least one or two to ride and one or two are also ours to see to their packs; the horses know us all by now and teach us a lesson in patience as they wait to be unsaddled. We strip them completely; some we rub down, favourites I suppose, but we look at all their feet and check each day their shoes and look them all over for sore backs or for saddlery that really was not as well balanced as we thought.

“It is good to watch our horses at the water-hole, they stand in it and blow water with their nostrils; heavens, how much they drink! They will drink it dry we fear. We drink it too, brown, churned up, how strange it was to think that water is always white and crystal clear, no, white is not the word, but brown will do, or else we strain it until it seems clear enough in a billy full of black tealeaves, which presently is on the boil. They stand around us, the horses in their hobbles, they need each other in their bush friendship, and even us it seems.

“We seldom wash and our clothes start to wear to pieces on our bodies; we do not wear the woollen breeches we started off with but just the ordinary long trousers that all soldiers wear, but ours are all wrinkled up in curves.

“We find that we can do without many things out on patrol, and though we miss them, there comes a sense of pleasure after a while from being the complete master of oneself and all one’s possessions.

“During the night one of us is awake in turns for sentry and to watch the horses and before dawn, at what they call ‘piccaninny daylight’, the last watch and also our faithful tracker (who is called ‘Lightning’) get the fire started anew for breakfast. The horses have been grazing and sleeping through the night and now wait to have their hobbles off and be saddled up.

“Up you get into the saddle, your water-bottle on one shoulder (you learn not to hang everything on the saddle), and there is the problem of one’s rifle (no rifle-buckets, please, on this patrol), it is better carried over your shoulders on its sling, and there is the shotgun to carry, whose turn is it today?

“And do not forget your bandolier, please, with its ninety rounds, wear it yourself and rouse on those who would dangle its weight around their horse’s neck. And so we go; its all the same whether you head out for a day or for a month, it matters not; only where’s next water’s our only problem.

“Above all others, this bush life does develop your faculties, sharpen your senses of hearing
and seeing, and in practical ways of thinking too; it takes time of course to change a man and better him, but he soon starts to note little things and little portents and draws conclusions from them and then he is really observing things. And that’s when you start to feel more alive than ever before. For every day you are more or less dependent on your own faculties. Not only for food and drink for yourself and your horses, but for your life itself, so you’ll not break down nor careless be with your trail or what you do. Your faculties respond to the call. Your glance as it scans the bush, the rocks, the plain, the hill, the river, becomes now more wary and you are vigilant; your ears, as you sit, or lie upon the ground resting, pick up the slightest sound, and it or a movement seen is questioned in the instant."

Flexibility of Unit Deployment

This characteristic is mentioned here, because with the continental-wide deployment of the NAOU as took place, there may be a tendency to consider the NAOU structure to have been a fixed affair, within the limits of the company mobile patrol areas. This even suggests to the researcher, that there was a limited tactical movement possibility. Was this so? The answer is ‘No’. Indeed nothing could be further from the truth.

Very late in 1942, Stanner organized an exercise for total NAOU tactical movement. In this exercise the ability of the whole unit to move while keeping in good communication throughout its entirety was effected. The Unit HQ was moved from its fixed position out to one in the bush, and the companies from the Kimberleys to Queensland, manifested in their far flung sections, were kept with every element on the move and in good communication. This exercise was the widest geographically and from a Signals aspect, ever carried out by a single unit of the Australian Army up to that time. It was a success and it showed the NAOU concept would work and demonstrated the tactical possibilities of the far out bush and showed the scouting and reconnaissance capability of the NAOU, as distinct from its surveillance of the actual landing of the enemy.

Comments on Unit Characteristics

The characteristics of the NAOU have been revealed in a general way in what has already been presented in this study. However, these characteristics do need some particular amplification which is of benefit in the study of modern units of a nature which includes a similar role.

As regards the capability of rapid, limited offensive action and of limited defensive operation, it has already been stated that the NAOU was especially well equipped with automatic weapons and that the small-arms firepower of the patrols and platoons was very high. In addition the Companies were equipped with a certain number of mortars. It has been stated also that the NAOU patrols could hit the enemy and hurt him, PROVIDED they could get away to their bush hide-outs and not endanger their true role.

Had the enemy landed in 1942, the NAOU role of surveillance to pick up the actual landing would have then blossomed into its further and fuller capability of the scouting and reconnaissance of the enemy in order to report on him to HQ NT Force. The picture which Stanner had in his mind was, so far as offensive/defensive action, one of guerrilla activity rather than the commando style. Stanner has said that he had trouble with one or two of his officers in getting this idea across, ie., ‘hit and hurt the enemy if the occasion arose but then disappear in guerrilla fashion’.

None the less, the point is made that a Section or a Platoon (less likely to be a Company owing to the difficulty in getting the men together) might have had to take on, or to delay, an enemy party and if it did so it would have been expected to have given a good account of itself. This was also one of the reasons for having ammunition as well as food and medical supplies hidden away in secret caches around the coast and in the deep bush. Indeed it was this actual fighting capacity which lead to the unit being regarded, in its early days, at least as an independent company.

Such action was not, as a thing in itself, to be sought, whereas the watching and reporting was. The worry of needless close contact fights, which Stanner felt, has already been referred to. Of course the NAOU was not required to hold ground, nor could it undertake infantry offensive operations.

Comments on Unit Tasks

In a general way the tasks of the NAOU have also already been given. Further com-
ment is made now on some aspects of these. The surveillance of the coast based upon the employment of small self-contained patrols and the performance of ‘medium reconnaissance in limited war’, which is what the scouting and reconnaissance patrols for the GOC NT Force, to guard his flanks and to warn him, were all about, have been discussed.

The task of the collection of intelligence on the location and movement of the enemy forces, has been said by Stanner to have involved five separate screens. These screens were —

- The offshore and river fleet of NAOU vessels.
- The forward observation posts, at such places as Cape Dussejour and Blunder Bay on the Cambridge Gulf and on the Victoria River, Roper River and in the Normanton-Burketown area and by the coastwatch around Darwin.
- By the mounted roving patrols moving in all the coastal regions between the observation posts.
- The Headquarters of each of the three field companies, located on the Roper River, in the Ivanhoe-Ord River area and in Queensland, together with the Headquarters of the twelve platoons making up the three field companies.
- The pedal radio sets on the cattle stations, linked in via the Flying Doctor Network, together with the sets on the mission stations.

All the information received from these screens was fed through the signals network already described to UHQ NAOU and thence to HQ NT Force.

The task of providing ad hoc teams for special missions was acceptable. Indeed the formation of the Darwin Coastwatch Platoon in 1943 was an ad hoc party for a special mission and its HQ and outlying coastwatcher posts around Darwin were rapidly put into action when NT Force received intelligence of the added threat at that time. On another occasion a special mounted detachment was raised from HQ Company to demonstrate its ‘ground clearing’ ability in an NT Force exercise.

The reconnaissance of, the seizing initially and the marking of landing and dropping zones was a task, which had the enemy landed, the NAOU could have performed upon request.

(Australian War Memorial Neg. 5H429)

Lt Chapman, the Signals Officer with radio equipment in pack saddles.

Action to Harass, Disrupt, Ambush the Enemy

This has been given a separate heading, although it should be dealt with under the ‘Comments on Unit Tasks’. An effort has already been made to emphasize the real concept which Stanner had when he invented the Observer Unit in early 1942—that the unit would act as ‘bush shadows’ and cling to and hang onto the enemy, whatever he did and wherever he went and report on him and keep on reporting on him no matter what.

Having again emphasized that and having indicated the restraints on active limited offensive/defensive operations, it is clear that, from a guerrilla viewpoint, on the occasion presenting itself, harassment, disruption and the ambush of the enemy could well have been tasks effectively carried out. So far as ambush of the enemy goes, certain areas were actually considered, such as the Jasper Gorge, which lies on the way between Timber Creek and Victoria River Downs.

Unit Support, Its Resupply and Medical Care

Resupply and unit maintenance were effected by the unit by its own vessels, trucks and packhorses. Elements in the far out bush were expected to live ‘off the land’, which meant shooting wild fowl, catching fish and killing
cattle found in the bush, the latter being converted, by the methods of the bushman, into salt beef, which, with damper, made up the diet of lonely patrols for months on end. They were to find their own water supplies.

Defects in nutrition were a concern and were to be expected. Experiments in nutrition were carried out, especially in the detachments stationed in the Kimberleys. An interesting account of these is to be found in the chapter on nutrition, chapter 28, in Volume 1, of the Medical Series of the Official History of the War, 1939-1945.

The dual questions or problems of the health care of the far-flung sections on their patrols or at their OPs and the dilemma of medical casualty evacuation, caused Stanner both worry and anger. There was just no principle applicable to the medical care of such a widespread unit—except perhaps not to get sick, or when the action starts, not to get wounded. There was no means of medical casualty evacuation.

The NAOU WE provided for one Regimental Medical Officer but it went into the field without one. During the difficult initial period in particular, the unit had to function with none. Stanner complained to the most senior medical officer on the staff of HQ NT Force and was turned down with the remark “You don’t need one, your men volunteered for a rough job, didn’t they?” Stanner made a storm about it. and having to go to LHQ on another matter, he asked whether, if he returned with two or more doctors when he came back, could he have one for the NAOU. At LHQ Stanner moved heaven and earth and ended up getting quite a good reception. As a result something like a dozen new RMOs were drafted to NT Force, but alas, they were all posted to other units of NT Force. Stanner felt this called for drastic action so he told the director of the medical services for NT Force that he, Stanner, would camp outside the latter’s door until the NAOU was given a medical officer. Stanner did just that and stayed there until he got one—which he did!

The appointment of the medical officer did not however do much towards solving the puzzle of care for such sickness as might occur in the dispersed patrols and posts, nor did it reassure the commander of the NAOU with regard to any wounded which might occur, when the action started, whether the NAOU tried to avoid close-contact fights with enemy or not, quite apart from an expected level of accidents such as might occur in active, mobile, mounted men out in the deep bush.

Besides all this it would take the RMO some six weeks—as it did Stanner too, of course—to get around the outposts. Indeed, try as he might, the medical officer just could not get to all the men, all the time across the continent. There were a certain number of medical orderlies, but generally each platoon had an issue of medical stores and the help was sought of such of the men as had some first aid experience. The self-help of the old bushmen had to be called upon—just as had to be the case in the care of the horses, as already mentioned. The big concern was if the action started, how best the job could be done without casualties. It was a fact that, considering the distances involved, should a patrol have got into serious trouble with the enemy, the men would just have been expendable.

Men, Morale and a Word of Praise

Troops who served in North Australia went through various ups and downs in morale according to their time of service, whether it was 1941, late 1941-early 1942, 1942-43 or 1944-45. There was a difference whether the men were in the arms units or in the services units. In general the members of services units, who after all were doing their proposed tasks anyway, were of better heart than the members of the arms units.

Of the morale in 1942-43 in the arms units, there was a tendency, as the months went by, notwithstanding the extra threat in early 1943, for a drooping of spirits, with a wish amongst all ranks to be with their comrades in battle in New Guinea. This was marked notably among men who had enlisted in the AIF in late 1941 and who were still to see action, whilst young members of the militia, in some cases even sons aged eighteen years, were already at grips with the Japanese. The fact that the Operational Area, ie. the Northern Territory north of latitude 14° 30’ S (or South), had already suffered over some sixty air-raids did little to alter these private feelings of the ordinary soldier, who knew little of the threats
which the enemy held towards the Australian forces in the SWPA, or of the measures, each of complementary importance, which must be directed against him.

With this background of soldiering in the Northern Territory in 1942-43 in mind, it is particularly refreshing to find records of the unusually high morale and pride in the Unit which existed in the NAOU. Indeed Stanner noted in his diary on 6 September 1942, when he was in Alice Springs, discussing with Brigadier Loutit, the various possibilities open to the enemy in their approach to the NT, that the Brigadier said, "Your unit has the most interesting job in the AIF". And later, in 1943, when General Blarney inspected the NAOU unit headquarters at Katherine and looked over the widely-spread signals chart and the details of the patrols and OPs, he said exactly the same, "Stanner, you have the best job in the AIF".

There were certain things which had much to do with this high morale in the NAOU.

As a basis was the fact that all the members of the NAOU were volunteers for an unknown, adventurous and dangerous job in conditions of extreme isolation. Many of the men were experienced bushmen, and there were station hands, farmers and graziers, former members of Light Horse Regiments steeped in the pride of old traditions now carried on into the largest of the mounted units raised in the Australian Army, and others—men from the cities, who learned quickly the secrets of the bush and could hold their own with anybody. Many of the men became expert marksmen, and Stanner encouraged expertise in rapid and formidable small arms fire capability. The men were mounted—and this really did make an enormous psychological difference—and they knew they could go anywhere in the bush, where wheels would never go; they were kept active by the constant patrols in the deep Australian bush, a land which may be benign when it will, but which at other times or seasons may be as malign as any wild country can be. In many cases the patrols lived off the land, as already detailed, and this in itself breeds quite a sense of inward superiority and confidence as nothing else does. The men developed lots of self-reliance and good companionship which filled in their lonely hours.

There were very proud too, of their self-chosen nick-name—the 'Nackeroos'—which had its genesis in a humorous description of the unit by Lieutenant Travers, of 'B' Company (who later went on to win the Military Cross on Tarakan). They were very proud of their colour patch and fought for it too, when they went south on leave eighteen months or so later.

At the end of 1943 the unit was dismounted and in early 1944 most of the men went south on leave and for re-posting. The unit headquarters was moved to Manton Dam; the field companies were disbanded; the horses were sold; the men were heartbroken. Stanner tried to interest the higher command into preserving the disbanded segment of the NAOU and into forming it into a long-range penetration group for a Chindit-type job in Java or Borneo or the Philippines, but nothing came of it. The Australian Army was no longer interested in private armies and 'cloak and dagger' outfits. The men were posted, after leave, to various depots for re-training and then posting as reinforcements, to the AIF divisions. The command of the remaining NAOU passed to Major White and Stanner left for other duties. Stanner remained however in the memories of his men, with considerable affection; "There's Bill Stanner", some rough-rider would remember having said when Stanner appeared at an outlying detachment after a trip in Eddie Con- nellan's aeroplane, "it's him all right, I know him by his hat." (Stanner usually wore his hat straight all round.)
The smaller, and dismounted section of the NAOU continued through 1944-45 and did well the task allotted to it. The days in the deep bush were gone though, and with them the riders of Stanner’s ‘Bush Commando’, coming along beneath the trees, all in a line, horses head to tail, generally quietly with an occasional jingle from the saddlery, ragged they look mostly, but dangerous too, for bush scouting does things to a man.

Epilogue

In the Australian Army newspaper, *Army*, dated 18 August 1977, there was published a photograph of Stanner, who was described in the accompanying article as “an elderly, white-haired civilian, dressed in camouflage greens and carrying a walking stick, who recently spent a few days with one of the Army’s toughest units”. “Professor Stanner”, the article said, “was visiting the Special Air Service Regiment, which was exercising in the Northern Territory on Exercise LONG VIGIL. He had been the commander of the 2/1st NT Observer Unit, formed in 1942. The unit, formed by the Professor, was the first of its type and was used for coastal surveillance, scouting and reconnaissance . . . today a unit that follows similar traditions is the SASR.”

And so the odyssey of the NAOU, begun so long ago, has had its fulfilment.
THE CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT

Colonel John M. Hutcheson, MC
Australian Army Reserve

The Adversary

"Loyalty was not to the President of the United States, to truth or integrity, or even to subordinate officers risking their lives; loyalty was to uniform, and more specifically, to immediate superior and career. It was an insight into why the military in Saigon, despite all the contrary evidence in the field, despite the arrival of as bright an officer as Dick Stilwell, managed to retain their optimism."

The Challenge. It is often wise for managers, of all industries and professions to look at the criticism of their management by outside observers. It may transpire that such outside criticism has little foundation. However, an unbiased examination seems to be warranted if management is to lead effectively. This article challenges the profession of arms to look objectively at its management.

The Criticism. The above quotation by David Halbertson might be justifiable on his reputation as the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize and several other awards. On its own, and despite Halbertson's reputation, the critic may rightly question the validity of the purport of the quotation, even after reading the whole of his book. A second critic of military management in Vietnam is C. L. Sulzberg who as a journalist for forty-four years saw many battles. He wrote on his retirement from the New York Times.

"... The American century's greatest accomplishment was the New Deal ... And its worst accomplishment was the Vietnam War, which, although its initial goals were by no means so sordid as current history proclaims, was a compound of mismanaged drift, bad generalship, increasing lack of purpose and befuddled leadership at all levels."

The Sample. There are those who would consider the foregoing sample of two quotations as inadequate evidence, despite the eminence of the authors as journalists. However, we did lose the war in Vietnam. That is assuming that "we" means those who fought for South Vietnam. One might argue that some elements, such as Australia were too small to influence the higher military management of the war, although there can be no denial that these smaller elements participated actively in lower management. Despite the small and perhaps biased nature of the sample and smallness of Australia's military involvement compared with the USA it might be wise for Australian military management, at all levels, to look subjectively if not objectively at our own expertise—past, present and future.

The Attack

The Aim. It has been traditional in military and in formalized business management to start with an aim. What should be our aim? If we accept at least some of the criticism it might be appropriate to start with the aim— "To improve military management". There are probably many variations on this theme but for this article let us accept the foregoing simplistic aim.

The Method. History is replete with military mismanagement. History also contains many examples of successful military management. There has been some thought that at least some of the principles of business management are directly or indirectly applicable to military management. There has been a world-wide explosion of research into business management and related disciplines. Therefore, there might be some grounds for a comparative analysis to be made between business and military management, in particular in comparing past military and business successes and failures. Anyway, such analysis is at least a starting point.

Some Business Management

General Management. "The successful general manager does not spell out detailed objectives for his organization, nor does he make
master plans. He seldom makes forthright statements of policy. He is an opportunist, and he tends to muddle through problems — although he muddles with a purpose. He enmeshes himself in many operating matters and does not limit himself to ‘the big picture’.

“The general manager possesses five important skills. He knows how to: firstly, keep open many pipelines of information, secondly, concentrate on a limited number of significant issues, thirdly, identify the corridors of comparative indifference, fourthly, give the organization a sense of direction with open-ended objectives and finally, spot opportunities and relationships in the stream of operating problems and decisions.”

“My definition of a good manager is a simple one: under competitive industry conditions, he is able to move his organization significantly toward the goals he has set, whether measured by higher return on investment, product improvement, development of management talent, faster growth in sales and earnings, or some other standard. Bear in mind that this definition does not refer to the administrator whose principal role is to maintain the status quo in a company or in a department. Keeping the wheels turning in a direction already set is a relatively simple task, compared to that of directing the introduction of a continuing flow of changes and innovations, and preventing the organization from flying apart under the pressure.”

**Analysis.** The above quotations by Edward Wrapp on general management arise from “working closely with many managers in many different companies.” While some of the goals could be couched in different (more) military terms, much of the thought might be applied to military management. The separation of the administrator from the manager is an interesting thought that has been also indicated by other writers. This separation may be critical in military management thought. While the statement that a “general manager muddles” may be repulsive to some, the five “important skills” listed above will be recognized by most military managers.

**A Pot-pourri.** If the foregoing has wetted the reader’s appetite, then the following may assist in continuing the attempt to challenge military management to make a comparative analysis with business management. “The only constant in the management of business organizations is change. The leadership in adapting corporate operations to the changing business world must come from the chief executives.”

“For centuries social philosophers have been investigating the proper relationships between individuals and societies or organizations; the balance between order and chaos. Early thinkers, such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Machiavelli, in varying ways thought that the intractable nature of man had to be subjugated to the wishes of the whole in order for there to be peace and security. The aims of the individual and those of the collective were thought to be incompatible . . . Frederick Herzberg asserts that regardless of how organizations shift tasks, fit tasks to individuals and individuals to tasks, the individuals will not be motivated unless their jobs entail some elements that allow them to grow and expand their competence . . . John J. Morse and Jay W. Lorsch would add that an effective organization must also be designed so that its tasks fit its people, not some universal theory . . . Paul R. Lawrence maintains in ‘How to deal with Resistance to Change’ that organizational problems occur when changes in social relationships are made at the same time technological innovations are introduced.”

**Military History**

“Every professional is concerned with the use of knowledge in the achievement of objectives . . . the professional draws upon the knowledge of science and of his colleagues, and upon knowledge gained through personal experience.”

Case studies and other forms of research on business enterprises may be continually updated. Each successive war, battle or police action usually employs new technologies and is often on a terrain requiring military techniques which are different from previous campaigns. Unfortunately, unlike business, wars are not continuous operations. Therefore, where personal experience was inadequate or rusty the military manager has been forced to rely on military studies in the form of military history and the various forms of training exercises with and without troops, war games, etc. If history books are objectively critical, as well as reports of (all) the facts, then such books should be, at least, a partial substitute for experience. Perhaps there is a requirement for the inadequacies of the
quantum of analytical military studies to be balanced by the 'best' from the vast array of analyses of the studies of the battles of business.

**Conclusions**

It was not intended that this article should do more than issue a challenge to military managers, at all levels, not to repeat the shame of the Vietnam debacle. Either the critics, such as Halberstam or Sulzberger must be answered or military management must be perfected for the next time. The role of an army in peace is to train for war. The role of military management is to ensure that the development and practice of their thinking in peace is more than adequate for the next war. Having entered the war, military managers must react quickly and positively to their inadequacies to win that war on a cost effective basis. Some relevancy seems to exist in using an intermix of analysis of military and business studies as a basic template for the training of military managers. However, such training will undoubtedly fail unless bigotry, rigidity and other barriers to change to meet new challenges are entrenched at any level of military organizations. Are you able, let alone prepared, to overcome the challenge to management? ‘Kill’ the critics!

**NOTES**

4. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
5. Ibid., p. 18.
6. Ibid., p. 18.

**BOOKS IN REVIEW**

The following books reviewed in this issue are available in various defence libraries:

Russell, 2MD, 5MD, Cerberus, JSSC, RANC, RANSC.
O'Neill, Robert (ed), *Insecurity* (p. 61).
1MD, 2MD, 4MD, 6MD, Balcombe, Oakey, Albatross, Williamtown, Cerberus, Campbell Park, HQ Sup Comd (RAAF), Inf Centre, JSSC, Leeuwin, LWC, Lavarack, OCS, Puckapunyal, RAAOC, RANC, RANSC, Remington Centre, RAAF Staff College, Russell, School of Arty, SME, School of Sigs, Def Regional Library (Victoria), Watson, WRAAC.
Russell, JSSC. On order for 6 other libraries.
Richardson, F. M., *Fighting Spirit* (p. 63).
On order for Campbell Park and 6 other libraries.

**Books held for review**

HOW many of us make errors through carelessness? Our errors may be quite small, of little consequence and of only brief inconvenience to ourselves and others. The magnitude of errors varies with the particular circumstances operating at the time. Two people may leave their car windows open overnight. In the morning, one may find that the seats are wet from the evening storm. The other may find that the car has been stolen. Small errors have caused disasters. Basic training has emphasized to us all the importance of safety catches and buttoned pockets.

Some errors result from lack of understanding by individuals of the processes involved in given situations. A car buyer may purchase a stolen car if he does not realize that the preferred licence and registration papers may not necessarily belong to the seller. The buyer must ensure not only that the registration papers belong to the car but also that the identity of the seller and owner is established. On a similar theme, we may recall soldiers on guard duty who ask incoming personnel to show their ID cards but who do not check the face with the photograph. Many errors in the service environment are caused by members' neglect in checking and lack of understanding of the techniques of double checking.

Decisions and actions based on decisions require the establishment of accurate conclusions from evidence and a clear perception of the procedures necessary to the solution of any given problem. There is the absence of a course in the Australian Army that promotes specifically the development of the skills of 'Problem Solving'.

This article has been written to summarize the Programme in Problem Solving (PIPS) developed for Officer training at the Joint Services College of Papua New Guinea. The College was established to train personnel selected for Officer training by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary and the Corrective Institution Services. The terminal aim of the program is to promote in Officer Cadets the ability to organize their thought processes in solving a range of job related 'problems'.

The processes of logical deduction and decision making were dissected carefully and a hierarchy of enabling skills established to support the terminal skill. The skills were then incorporated into a series of objectives. A range of 128 problems was established after a detailed survey into the tasks that a junior officer could
be expected to perform in a work situation and in the area of personnel administration.

The task analysis was conducted through a detailed survey of jobs. Existing statements of jobs were examined. A job statement had been prepared in 1975 by a team of RAAEC officers for the junior infantry officer of the PNGDF. Key personnel from the three services were interviewed. There was extensive collation of known situations within the services and private enterprise in which errors had been made and unfortunate circumstances had arisen. It was considered that the collation of error situations enabled the highest degree of job relevance possible. The problems taken from private enterprise were used for comparative purposes and for development of the Consumer Protection aspect of the Programme.

The performance of Officer Cadets was studied to ascertain areas of weakness. Again there were interviews with staff and collation of error situations. This work was complementary to and often merged with the task analysis.

It was established that Officer Cadets found difficulty in applying even a basic decision making process to the solution of problems. Many failed to consider alternative conclusions and courses of action. Many found difficulty in recognizing the very existence of a problem in many contexts. ("So what?" "I don't know"). Most had difficulty in applying insight gained from the solution of one problem to the solution of a similar problem in a different context. Much of this may be explained by the inexperience of the Officer Cadets. It was intended that such difficulties could be reduced significantly during their time at the College. These difficulties are not unknown among Australian servicemen.

The problems were to be simple enough to enable the solution of four to six problems in any one lesson period. This would permit a comparative approach to solving of problems and the establishment and application of principles of method. The program was developed in terms of the Systems Approach to Training.

At the College, the skills of the program complemented those of the Communications Skills and Administration Courses. It may well be that the skills of this program could be incorporated into any service course in PNG and Australia. Which service in the Australian Defence Force would not benefit from a course that developed the skills of checking, error location and establishment of check-lists?

An overview of the program will now be provided. This will include a sample of problems of one particular type, the related theoretical basis, the hierarchy of skills and a sample of objectives related to the hierarchy.

The following problems comprise five of the 128 problems that make up the program:

- A man approaches a bank teller and seeks to withdraw money from a bank book. The account is with another branch of the bank. What is the teller's aim? factors? courses? steps?
- A soldier is informed by a fellow soldier that there is a unit stand-down on the following day. The soldier had not previously heard of this. Aims? factors? courses? steps?
- A shop attendant progressively passes five pairs of trousers to a customer standing in the dressing room. The customer chooses a pair and informs the attendant that he will wear the trousers home. After the sale is completed, the attendant enters the dressing room to find only three pairs of trousers. What has happened? errors? aims? factors? steps?
- A police officer receives a phone call at the station at 2200 hrs. The voice says: "This is Superintendent Miasa here. Go to the cells and release the prisoner. I will explain in the morning." Aims? factors? courses? steps?
- A CIS officer has been assigned to construct a new prison farm. He obtains the title of the land and checks the dimensions given to him by his supervising officer. He commences the clearing of the land. During the first day of clearing operations, a crowd of angry villagers arrives and demands that the work be stopped. They claim that the land belongs to them. Errors? aims? factors? courses? steps?

From the solution of the problems above, the Officer Cadets reinforce the basic decision making process. The theoretical background is developed in terms of such concrete prac-
tical problems. The Officer Cadets apply the following theoretical points:

- logical development of 'cause' and 'effect'.
- application of the techniques of checking and double-checking by means of an independent source of evidence.
- recognition of deception as a possible cause of a given situation.
- recognition of the type of situation in which confirmation of evidence must take place before further action is carried out. Further situations involve checking during the process of carrying out the task (as in the response to a fire alarm) and checking after the action has been complete (confirmation of a claim made by a soldier after emergency leave has been granted).
- development of basic Flow Chart Analysis.
- development of the Staff Duties format of Service Writing. This framework is used throughout the program to develop the concept and practice of 'the whole to the part'.

The performance statements are summarized in the following hierarchy:

1.00 Identify a statement of fact
   1.10. Establish the characteristics of a statement of fact.
   1.20. Select statements of fact from a given list.
   1.30. Select statements of fact from a given passage.

2.00 Identify a statement of opinion
   2.10. Establish the characteristics of a statement of opinion.
   2.20. Identify the types of statements of opinion.
   2.30. Select statements of opinion from a given list.
   2.40. Select statements of opinion from a given passage.

3.00 Establish the techniques of valid argument
   3.10. Establish the validity of a given argument.
   3.20. Prepare an argument.

4.00 Establish the criterion for the arrangement of a given series of items
   4.10. Recognize 'spatial' order as the criterion of arrangement.
   4.20. Recognize 'concrete to abstract' order as the criterion of arrangement.
   4.30. Recognize 'whole to part' order as the criterion of arrangement.
   4.40. Recognize 'part to whole' order as the criterion of arrangement.

5.00 Arrange a series of items in terms of a given criterion
   5.10. Arrange a series of items in given 'spatial' order.
   5.20. Arrange a series of items in 'concrete to abstract' order.
   5.30. Arrange a series of items in 'whole to part' order.
   5.40. Arrange a series of items in 'part to whole' order.
   5.50. Arrange a series of items in alphabetical order.

6.00 Describe a given subject
   6.10. Describe a given item.
   6.20. Describe a given process.

7.00 Illustrate a given description
   7.10. Prepare a map.
   7.20. Prepare an Organization Chart.
   7.30. Prepare a Flow Chart.
   7.50. Prepare a Gantt Chart.
   7.60. Prepare a Critical Path Chart.

8.00 Establish a Conclusion from given Evidence.

9.00 Establish the Evidence that would be required to establish a given conclusion.

10.00 Establish the range of aims necessary to the solution of a given problem.

11.00 Establish the range of possible causes of a given situation.
   11.10. Establish the possible causes of a given situation.
   11.20. Categorize a given series of situations.

12.00 Establish the range of possible effects of a given action.
   12.10. Establish the possible effects of a given action.
   12.20. Categorize a given series of actions.

\(^1\) A convention of classification used in taxonomies of objectives has been adopted.
13.00 Establish the range of factors that apply to the solution of a given problem.

13.10. Establish the factors that apply in the design of a given item.

13.20. Establish the factors that apply in the development of a given process.

14.00 Establish the range of possible courses of action relevant to the solution of a given problem.

15.00 Select a course of action from an established range of alternatives.

15.10. Select a course of action that involves confirmation of evidence.

16.00 Establish the order of steps in a given process.

16.10. Establish a list of steps.


16.40. Construct a Gantt Chart.


17.00 Establish the accuracy of a given process by double-checking each step in the process.

17.10. Establish the techniques of double-checking.

17.20. Double check a given arithmetic computation.

17.30. Double check a given administrative process.

18.00 Assess the effectiveness of a selected course of action.

18.10. Assess the effectiveness of a given item in achieving a required result.

18.20. Assess the effectiveness of a given process in achieving a required result.

19.00 Locate an error in a given process

19.10. Locate an error in the preparation of a given argument.

19.20. Locate an error in the categorization of given items.

19.30. Locate an error in the arrangement of given items.

19.40. Locate an error in the description of a given subject.

19.50. Locate an error in the illustration of a given description.

19.60. Locate an error in the establishment of a conclusion from given evidence.

19.70. Locate an error in the establishment of the evidence that would be required to establish a given conclusion.

19.80. Locate an error in the establishment of the range of possible causes of a given situation.

19.90. Locate an error in the establishment of the range of possible effects of a given action.

19.100. Locate an error in the establishment of the range of possible aims relevant to the solution of a given problem.

19.110. Locate an error in the establishment of the range of possible factors relevant to the solution of a given problem.

19.120. Locate an error in the establishment of the range of possible courses of action relevant to the solution of a given problem.

19.130. Locate an error in the selection of a course of action from an established range of alternatives.

19.140. Locate an error in the order of steps in a given process.

19.150. Locate an error in the assessment of the effectiveness of a selected course of action.

The skills are developed in consecutive order. The Officer Cadets are to achieve the required standard before proceeding to the next skill. It is the task of the instructor to ensure that those who proceed quickly are not held back and that all students are given the opportunity to achieve a minimum standard. There are three stages to each lesson block—instructional, practice and evaluation stages.

A Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy has been prepared. The selection of problems is left to the discretion of the instructor and this selection may vary according to the type of course. The instructor may choose to develop
a number of objectives within the framework of the same problems and bring each problem to complete solution. He may choose to focus upon only one objective in relation to a number of problems and to leave solution of the problems until the next objective is applied. The program does not harness the instructor into an imposed pattern. There is much left to professional discretion. Summarized below is a selection of objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Standards</th>
<th>Period Allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>• 3 sets of 10 sentences each containing at least 5 sentences of fact.</td>
<td>Accurate in 60% of examples at practice stage.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select statement of fact from a given list.</td>
<td>• Set 1 — instruction.</td>
<td>Accurate in 80% of examples at evaluation stage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Set 2 — practice.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Set 3 — evaluation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sentences to contain statements of fact and non fact. Opinion not to be introduced at this stage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Refer to Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Handouts to be prepared.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of supplementary exercises where necessary.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3.10        | • 3 x 4 sets of passages. | Accurate in 60% of examples at practice stage. | 4 |
| Establish the validity of a given argument. | • Use of the same passages as in 2.10. | Accurate in 80% of examples at evaluation stage. | |
|            | • Refer to unsupported opinion, incorrect information, generalization, incorrect assumptions. | | |
|            | • Refer to Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy. | | |
|            | • Handouts to be prepared. | | |
| Use of supplementary exercises where necessary. | | | |

| 5.30        | • 3 x 4 sets of items | Accurate in 60% of examples at practice stage. | 4 |
| Arrange a series of items in ‘whole to part’ order. | • to include: | Accurate in 80% of examples at evaluation stage. | |
|            | • descriptions of items as in a police description. | | |
|            | • Passage of logical argument — introduction body, conclusion. (whole to part to whole) | | |
|            | • lists of items and components | | |
|            | • to be distinguished from ‘part to part’ and unordered arrangement. | | |
|            | • Use of Staff Duties approach to service Report Writing. | | |
|            | • Refer to the Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy. | | |
|            | • Handouts to be prepared. | | |
| Use of supplementary exercises where necessary. | | | |
A PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING

Performance  Conditions  Standards  Period  Allocations
15.10  Establish the order of steps.

- 3 x 4 sets of situations in a given process.
- Examples from problems 1-128.
- Situations to include:
  - no alternatives
  - alternatives
  - alternatives some of which are interdependent.
- Refer to the Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy.
- Handouts to be prepared.

Use of supplementary exercises where necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.10 Establish the order of steps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conditions

- 3 x 4 sets of situations in a given process.
- Examples from problems 1-128.
- Situations to include:
  - no alternatives
  - alternatives
  - alternatives some of which are interdependent.
- Refer to the Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy.
- Handouts to be prepared.

Standards

- 60% of examples
- Accurate in
- at practice stage.
- Accurate in
- 80% of examples
- at evaluation stage.

Period

12

Allocations


Summarized below is a selection of problems that are included in the program:

- (1) “Checking of the Water Tower”
- (2) “The Call to the Duty Officer”
- (9) “The Dying Pigs”
- (10) “The Non-arrival of Stores”
- (11) “The Prison Escape”
- (13) “The Navigational Error”
- (15) “Car 59, where are you?”
- (23) “The Soldier and the Salesman”
- (27) “Is that you, Joe?”
- (31) “The Soldier and the Car Repair”
- (38) “The Missing Unit Typewriter”
- (39) “The Car is broken down”
- (46) “The Discrepancy in the Bar Stock Take”
- (48) “The Paying Officer”
- (49) “The Missing Document”
- (50) “Counting of Bar Takings”
- (55) “Confirmation of Transport”
- (60) “The Duty Officer and the Movie Takings”
- (61) “The NCO, the Soldiers and the Return of Stores”
- (79) “Loss of Equipment on the Exercise”
- (84) “The Error in the Noticas Report”
- (103) “The March Out of the Married Quarter”
- (108) “Audit of the Club Books”
- (113) “The Telephone Caller and the Orderly Room NCO”

Each problem involves the Officer Cadet in establishing a course of action based on sound reasoning. Many of the situations if handled incorrectly on the job can lead to disastrous consequences. Error in checking the level of water in the water tower may result in disruption of the water supply to the camp. Careless checking procedures in the Noticas situation may lead to misidentification with the resultant trauma to relatives.

A number of the problems in ‘error location’ require the same basic procedures — the non-arrival of stores, the navigation error, the missing typewriter, the missing document, the loss of equipment on an exercise, the paying officer, the broken-down car. An officer will locate the error; he may guide a subordinate to recognize his error (did you check? how did you check?); he may prepare checklists to reduce the possibility of future error.

Certain terms have been used throughout the program and these require explanation.
- **A Flow Chart** is a diagramatic representation of steps that include alternatives:

```
Draft to Typist

Receive from Typist

Accurate

Make Corrections

Return to Typist

Receive from Typist

Accurate

YES

NO

Distribute

Distribute
```

Problem 53: “Submission of work for typing”

- **A Flow Diagram** contains no alternatives:

```
Letter register at Lae

Received by P.O. Port Moresby and signed for

Received by P.O. Daru and signed for

Signed for by owner
```

- **A Gantt Chart** sets out a series of steps to be taken over a period of time, some of which must be carried out simultaneously. The simplest form of Gantt Chart is the pocket diary of the year’s activities. In the present program the Gantt Chart is used in the organization of:

67) a mess function
69) an exercise
76) Unit activities
85) the monthly tasks of a Mess Treasurer
75) a college work program.

- **A Critical Path Chart** enables the organization of a process comprising a number of steps. The time taken for each step is specified. Step 1 can be carried out at the same time as Step 2 but the completion of the step 1 awaits completion of step 2. For example, the walls of a prefabricated garage can be constructed at the same time that the foundations are being laid but the walls cannot be bolted into place until the foundations are completed. The Critical Path consists of the establishment of the logical order of steps in the process. A critical path chart can be used for the following processes:

20) construction of a prison
89) construction of a building
120) construction of an ambush site.

Thus a process is set down in its most logical form, in terms of available labour and the time allocated. The Officer Cadets practise the task of completing a job and employing their subordinates in the most efficient way.

```
0 5 6
1 2 4 7 9
3
```

Problem 89: “Construction of a Building”
Instructor explains process

Student understand?

YES

Student practices the skills

YES

Recognize weakness?

NO

Achieves required standard?

YES

Student completes evaluation stage

YES

Recognize weakness?

NO

Achieves required standard?

YES

Finish

NO

Proceed to next skill

Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy
Care has been taken to ensure accuracy, comprehensiveness and validity of the program. This has been achieved by conformity to the Systems Approach to Training, selective adaptation of existing frameworks of Decision Making, testing of selected problems in the classroom and quality control by colleagues skilled in the related areas.

It should be emphasized that Officers must be able to make decisions and solve problems logically and efficiently. To do so they must develop an understanding of processes and be able to commit these to paper. They must be capable of transmitting the skills of logical thinking to subordinates by example, counselling and preparation of logical, clear paperwork. The program is still in its early stages at the Joint Services College of Papua New Guinea. The final test will come in the form of feedback from Commanding Officers of units on the performance of future junior officers.

Below: An example of a GANTT Chart.

### MONTH OF NOVEMBER 77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MON</th>
<th>TUE</th>
<th>WED</th>
<th>THU</th>
<th>FRI</th>
<th>SAT</th>
<th>SUN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RECEIVE MOVIES WARNING IN SHEET</td>
<td>MESS BILLS OUT</td>
<td>RECEIVE BAR MONEY</td>
<td>'HAPPY HOUR'</td>
<td>MOVIE NIGHT</td>
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<td>BANK</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLETE MONTHLY RECONCILIATION</td>
<td>PREPARE MESS BILLS</td>
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Additional Reference:

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Some thoughts on ADFA

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BACKGROUND

The requirement to handle large bodies of men and quantities of material is an important aspect in the profession of arms. In the Twentieth Century, this quantity factor has been complicated by a quality factor as military planners and commanders have access to greater and more sophisticated resources.

These resources have increased the options available to defence planners and commanders alike. The need for senior officers to understand the complexities of Twentieth Century technology and the consequent options has caused us to upgrade the educational qualifications of officer aspirants.

Most countries involved in training officers have come to accept that a proportion of its officer corps needs to be tertiary qualified, however, the proportion that need to be so qualified has not yet been universally resolved.

The decision to create ADFA to provide the Australian armed forces with its tertiary qualified officers has caused an uneasiness in the minds of academics and soldiers alike. The need for senior officers to understand the complexities of Twentieth Century technology and the consequent options has caused us to upgrade the educational qualifications of officer aspirants.

Despite the need to use the whole spectrum of defence resources in concert to gain the desired effect in future conflicts the nature of each service may require a different sequence of initial officer training. Do pilots do their flight training before or after their studies; do tertiary qualified midshipmen like going to sea (or should this be established before attendance on a long and expensive course); and do army officer aspirants join to return to school or to lead men?

COST OF ADFA

The last cost I saw for ADFA was $80m. (in an article in The Australian). This apparently is the cost of providing the facilities for ADFA. Although I have not seen a detailed breakdown of this estimate, I suspect that this is an 'opera house prediction'. It may not allow for the upgrading of the three service colleges required by the introduction of ADFA or the ongoing maintenance and staff costs. It can not accurately estimate the cost of 'academic tradition', in money terms or in terms of the time it will take for ADFA to gain recognition from the academic community at large. This acceptance may be speeded by investment in the field of research and the offering of research scholarships, but at what cost? I suspect that the real cost of ADFA over the next 20 years, should it be established, will be many times this original estimate.

In 1975 there were eighteen universities in Australia (with 94 Colleges of Advanced Education and Teachers' Colleges). These universities received grants from the Federal Government through the State Governments totalling $443,980m.

My own uneasiness about ADFA concept stems from my understanding of the reasons for maintaining a defence force. We do not maintain the armed forces so that they can compete with another branch of government, (the education department). Nor is the establishment of ADFA fully utilizing an existing and very expensive national resource (the existing universities system).

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One must ask what we get for our money and the answer must be, initially, a series of buildings and facilities. The amount involved is a lot to spend on capital works at a time when finance to maintain and improve existing facilities and buildings is limited.

THE OFFICER CORPS

To reach the higher echelons within the officer corps requires a commitment from each member at an early stage in life. The scope for entry directly into the middle or upper echelons is very limited. Therefore, the corps itself is seen by many as a ‘closed shop’. This causes many outsiders to be skeptical about the corps and its ability to examine itself. I do not believe this skepticism is well founded. ‘Hybrid vigor’ within the corps has been achieved by dual or multi-streaming officers through various initial training systems and then broadening further officer educational experience by using various staff colleges, joint service institutions, civil staff colleges and the like. An ‘elitist’ label is still put on the officer corps by some sectors of the community. In the light of the development of the elitist German General Staff, this attribute is generally accepted as being a bad one.

Many factors contribute to prevent the Australian officer corps becoming a narrow-minded group of ‘Colonel Blimps’. These include:
- selection from all parts of Australia,
- selection from all social/economic groups; and
- selection from all sectors of the population regardless of race or creed.

In the Australian Army, the dual streaming of officers provided by RMC Duntroon and OCS Portsea must have also contributed to broadening the outlook of the officer corps. This system allows us to select from a broad population base. Having a single stream based on ADFA and then a single army officer training source, will only restrict our outlook and ability to accept officer aspirants from this present wide population base.

THE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENT

Although accepting the argument that we require a proportion of our officers to be tertiary qualified, the reasons given for this are often conflicting or confused. The argument that only a tertiary qualified person will become a good officer is non sequitur. A tertiary education in itself does not qualify anyone for high military command. A common, and possibly an anti-intellectual, argument heard is that we do not train officers in tertiary institutions in fields of direct use to the services. This argument is then extended to the proposition that ADFA, under military control, would only teach subjects of ‘direct military use’. I am at a loss to identify more than a few subjects that are of ‘direct military use’ which are not covered within the existing university system. Before a physicist can apply principles to military applications or the mathematician apply formulae to military situations, the principles must be broadly understood. Sciences and the study of humanities may contain largely given knowledge, however, the peripheral benefits of tertiary education cannot be overlooked. Exposure of students to the academic tradition of free thought will cause the development of an enquiring mind. An enquiring mind and knowledge are the basic ingredients of original thought.

Some subjects that may have ‘direct military use’ may include:
- war studies,
- strategic studies, and
- military technology.

To only study a narrow field within a military environment would put us in danger of losing the real benefits of tertiary education.

If a full list of subjects of ‘direct military use’ were drawn up, and then those subjects not already taught in Australian universities isolated, we may be presented with a very short list. A proportion of the present estimates could be allotted (say $20m.) for the establishment of faculties within existing Australian universities to teach the subjects required. This would have the following advantages:

- Better use would be made of existing education department facilities and institutions while avoiding the huge initial capital costs involved in establishing our own facilities.
- Scholarships to study in these facilities may be given by the defence forces to promising students in the same way as large civilian firms give such scholarships.
- Students within these and other faculties may be recruited directly from the campus. Those not chosen will still be of some value
in the community at large as people capable of speaking authoritatively on defence related matters.

- The service may select applicants with proven, not suspected academic ability, at some financial saving, from such institutions. In this situation officer qualities and potential, rather than suspected ability to pass an academic course, becomes the main selection criteria.

At a time when the university system is training more graduates than can be employed within the community at large, the idea of building yet another university and not using this existing resource seems pointless.

THE MILITARY TRAINING REQUIREMENT

The service responsibility for officer production must be to train each aspirant in the techniques and procedures he will use as an officer. Army experience has shown that competent officers can be produced regardless of tertiary experience. Therefore the timing of tertiary training is not critical to officer production. ADFA will impose a sequence that may not be appropriate for all services, branches or individuals. It seems that at every turn the introduction of ADFA serves to limit our options — rather than broaden them.

It is of little long term consequence that an officer aspirant is recruited with a tertiary qualification, given the opportunity to gain tertiary qualification within the service prior to commissioning or gains such qualifications after being commissioned by part or full time study. The present army system leaves these three options open to us. If, at great expense, ADFA is established, how could we justify the recruitment of tertiary qualified aspirants? The number of tertiary qualified members in the armed forces has steadily risen this century. The need for a significant number of post-graduate qualified personnel has not been recognised to any great extent yet. The lack of a significant post-graduate requirement within the services may cause ADFA to lack academic depth.

The cost of ADFA may distort our outlook in regard to the proportion of tertiary qualified officers required. When such facilities are available, are we not ignoring their potential, unless all officer aspirants enjoy their benefit? The question must then be asked again; in preparation for war, what proportion of the officer corps should be tertiary qualified?

The integration of academic and military training under military control will be criticised by the academic and military communities alike. These two communities have successfully co-existed in the past but marriage may be more than each could tolerate.

CONCLUSION

Although estimates exist for the cost of establishing ADFA, it is unlikely that these bear any true resemblance to the final cost of establishing it and upgrading the supporting service colleges.

The establishment of ADFA would represent a failure of the defence department to use an existing resource (Australia’s university system) and would be an indictment on the education department who, at a time when it produces more graduates than can be employed in the community at large, cannot train graduates for one of the nation’s largest employers.

The strength of the corps of officers has been derived in part from the diverse backgrounds of its members. The creation on a single initial stream for the three services must reduce the size of the population from which we draw our aspirants.

There is no doubt that most of the subjects that will be taught at ADFA will be the same as most of those taught at other universities. Therefore we have very little to gain from its establishment and risk losing some of the peripheral advantage of attendance at universities within the community at large.

Any subjects not presently taught in Australian universities but recognised within the existing system at a fraction of the cost involved in building a new university.

The prime responsibilities of the services is to train for war. Failure to use existing resources to their fullest goes against that principle of war, economy of effort. Having committed ourselves to such an ambitious project may limit our options in the future selection of officer aspirants and this must be contrary to the principle of flexibility.
Napoleon and Spain

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On 25 June 1807 Napoleon Bonaparte effected the Treaty of Tilsit with Tzar Alexander of Russia. It marked the height of his power having conquered Russia, Prussia and Austria as well as most of the lesser states of Europe. He was, however, still at war with Britain which maintained a naval blockade against France, a blockade which enabled Britain to control the seas and had resulted in her gaining a stranglehold over maritime trade, a consolidation of her existing colonies and the acquisition of Cape Colony, Mauritius, Ceylon, British Guinea and several West Indian islands.

Although France had extended peace feelers from time to time, they were rejected by Britain who was not prepared to tolerate any single power dominating Europe, a situation which would inevitably lead to unfavourable trading conditions. The expeditionary forces Britain had dispatched to the continent since the French Revolution had shown themselves to be ill-organized, ill-supplied and ill-led. Her continued existence as a belligerent depended on the Royal Navy, but the Royal Navy alone could not affect Napoleon's Grand Armée during a period in which Britain could raise an expeditionary army of only 60,000 soldiers compared with a million French and following Tilsit, Napoleon could call upon assistance from powerful European allies.

The Royal Navy ruled the seas with approximately 100 battleships opposed to a combined French-Dutch fleet of 75, some of which were in disrepair. French calculations had determined that they needed 50 per cent superiority of ships to force the Straits of Dover and impose a peace settlement on Britain, that is approximately 150 ships. Napoleon attempted to establish this superiority by treaty and by annexation and after gaining the support of Russia and Spain by treaty, planned on annexing the fleets of Denmark and Portugal. This was agreed on with Alexander in one of the secret clauses of the Tilsit Treaty.

The British quickly learned of this threat and dispatched a powerful fleet to Copenhagen which seized the Danish fleet while at the same time retaining friendly relations with her long time ally Portugal. However, the outnumbered British realized that they must ultimately be outstripped in the naval race since Napoleon controlled much greater resources for the manufacture of ships and armaments as well as the manpower resources to crew a much bigger navy.

The British strategy was one of maintaining a naval blockade against France, often by desperate measures, and at the same time searching for situations on the continent which would allow her to weaken France at an acceptable cost to herself. Napoleon responded with a continental blockade aimed at stifling Britain's trade and collapsing her economy by draining all currency from her. In order to mount an effective blockade he needed the support of all maritime trading nations of Europe and after Tilsit only Portugal, Sweden and Sicily maintained trade with Britain. The latter two were easily coerced into ceasing trade but Portugal...
proven intransigent and in addition the prize of the Portuguese fleet was even more tantalizing following the British capture of the Danish Fleet.\(^6\)

Napoleon first tried to cow the Portuguese into submission and addressed himself publicly at a diplomatic reception to the Portuguese ambassador thus:

"If Portugal does not do what I wish, the House of Braganza will not be reigning in Europe in two months."\(^7\)

When Portugal failed to sever relations with Britain, Napoleon sought Spanish permission for Marshal Junot's army to pass through northern Spain to occupy Portugal and at a stroke gave Britain the means of attacking his army on favourable terms, for in occupying Portugal he sent a small unprotected army close to a coast where Britain's sea power could land and support troops to crush it. Nor did he succeed in blockading the British, as large scale smuggling was carried out through the Spanish ports, despite Spain being theoretically at war with Britain.\(^8\)

Napoleon next decided upon determined action in Spain and was able to exploit the political intrigues of the corrupt Spanish court with factions led by King Charles IV, Crown Prince Ferdinand and Manuel Godoy, the queen's lover. He was able to remove the Spanish Court to Bayonne on the pretext of mediating in their disputes and at the same time insert troops into northern Spain under the guise of reinforcing Junot in Portugal. Following civil rebellion against the Spanish throne in March 1808, Marshal Murat occupied Madrid and Joseph was named King of Spain.\(^9\)

He had compounded his initial error, for almost immediately the Spanish in Madrid rebelled against France even before Joseph could ascend the throne, while guerrilla warfare swept the country. The war which ensued was to tie down large French armies at enormous cost for the following five years.

Not only had Napoleon committed large numbers of troops on the Peninsular but he had lost the opportunity of turning to use the traditional enmity of Spain toward Britain and Portugal. The situation was exploited by Britain who moved quickly to re-establish peace with Spain, harbour the Portuguese royal family and remove the Portuguese fleet from Napoleon's reach. In Napoleon's words,

"... when that disastrous affair of Spain presented itself to effect a sudden change against me and reinstate England in the public situation. She was enabled from that moment to continue the war; the trade with South America was thrown open to her; she formed an army for herself in the peninsular, and next became the victorious agent, the main part of all plots which were hatched on the continent ..."\(^10\)

Had Napoleon supported a Spanish regime he could have neutralized Portugal and kept Britain out of Europe. Ultimately he could even have built a fleet powerful enough to have invaded her. As things turned out even his continental blockade failed for it depended on the co-operation of the civilian population and this he never won.\(^11\) British trade continued to flow into Europe by smuggling under neutral flags, and by the bribery of customs officials.

On 23 July 1808 Dupont's army was surrounded by Spanish forces and surrendered near Baylen, the first surrender of a Napoleonic army. Over 18,000 French troops were forced to lay down their arms and many were later massacred.\(^12\) Apart from arousing tremendous enthusiasm throughout Spain the defeat had a far reaching effect on Europe. Austria had already begun re-arming against Napoleon in the hope of just such an event. In the words of Metternich:

"Napoleon's mind was full of the overthrow of Spain. He was preparing to appear personally on the scene where the great drama was to be played. This might lead to contingencies for which the Vienna cabinet must provide. The preparations made in Austria pointed to warlike designs."\(^13\)

The downturn in Napoleon's fortunes became evident from the concessions he made when negotiating with Tzar Alexander at Erfurt in October 1808. He agreed to withdraw his troops from Prussia, reduce Prussian indemnities, give reassurances concerning Poland and drop his earlier insistence that Russia evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia.\(^14\)

His standing was also damaged at home as defeat encouraged Talleyrand and Fouche to
plot against him. Not only did Talleyrand spend the nights at Erfurt undoing the negotiations which Napoleon had concluded by day but he returned to Paris and requested that Metternich (at this time the Austrian ambassador) work toward a union between Austria and Russia saying:

"The interest of France itself demands that the powers which are in a position to hold Napoleon in check unite to oppose a dam to his insatiable ambition. Europe can only be saved by the closest union between Austria and Russia." 13

In November 1808 Napoleon intervened personally in Spain with over 200,000 of his best troops. Despite the reoccupation of Madrid and several minor victories over Spanish forces he failed to consolidate France's hold on Spain and allowed a British army under Sir John Moore to escape. Already he had found the hostility of the Spanish peasants costly as it deprived him of intelligence and he had been forced to guess at Moore's whereabouts. When rumours of a coup and Austrian rearmament sent him hurrying back to Paris, Metternich noted that Talleyrand and Fouche were ready to seize power given a suitable opportunity pointing to the:

"very difficult position in which the French army finds itself in Spain... It is said that the loss in the affairs with the English has been horrible... The Emperor's return proves more than the rest." 14

From April 1809 when Wellesley (later Lord Wellington) returned to the Peninsular, the French were to become increasingly involved, with disastrous results. The remarkable feature of Wellington's campaign is that he fought so few battles over such a long period. 15 By maintaining an army on the Peninsular and encouraging the Spanish and Portuguese, the British were able to tie down a French army approximately ten times the size of their own. During the entire campaign Wellington's forces inflicted about 45,000 casualties on the French but their total casualties were 300,000, the majority of them inflicted by guerrillas. It is apparent that Wellington's major achievement was in creating a climate in which guerrilla warfare could flourish. The situation became somewhat akin to the Vietnam War with the guerrillas cast in the role of the Vietcong and Wellington darting in and out of Spain from Portugal performing a similar function to the North Vietnamese Army. Prime Minister Percival noted that Portugal was the best theatre to fight the war since it provided Britain with an opportunity:

"to carry on operations with the most advantage to ourselves and most inconvenience to the enemy". 16

By February 1810 Napoleon had 324,996 troops in Spain 17 and had appointed one of his ablest generals, Marshal André Massena, Prince of Essling, to command 138,000 of them with orders to drive the British into the sea. Massena had built a formidable reputation in the Italian and Austrian campaigns and was a specialist in mountain warfare. Nevertheless Wellington, conducting a brilliant withdrawal and scorching the earth as he retired, was able to lure him to prepared defences at Torres Vedras. Massena found the positions too formidable to attack and eventually had to retreat over the same scorched earth, losing between 25,000 and 30,000 men and abandoning much of his equipment as he went. 18 A British soldier following the retreat recorded:

"We could not advance one hundred yards without seeing dead soldiers of the enemy stretched upon the road, or at a little distance from it, who had laid down to die, unable to proceed through hunger and fatigue". 19

Napoleon was outraged at the defeat saying to Massena's Aide-de-Camp, Pelet:

"You have lost everything that you can lose in war; you have lost the honour of arms. It would have been better if you had lost the army! Damn it, sixty thousand Frenchmen retreat before thirty thousand English! Is my army to be as (ineffective as) my navy..." 20

From this point on the French troops on the Peninsular were to be increasingly tied down by the guerrillas and the threat of Wellington's army and never controlled more than the ground on which they stood.

The French defeat was hastened by the attitude of the indigenous population. Spain, unlike Germany and Italy, had been a unified state with a strong sense of nationalism. The imposition of a French king was an insult while
the occupation by French armies brought real hardships. Spain’s agriculture was barely sufficient to sustain the population in normal times. The French policy was to make war support itself; in an ally’s country sustenance was required as proof of allegiance, in an enemy’s it was taken as a right of war. French armies foraged as they moved, laying waste to the countryside as they went and turning the peasants into guerrillas, as in the case of the peasants of the Valles who stated in a proclamation in April 1809 that:

“They held it a great honour to form a part, though a small one, of the Spanish nation . . . their peaceful habitations had been invaded, their property plundered, their women violated, their brethren murdered in cold blood, and above all, the religion of their fathers outraged and profaned; nothing remained for them to repel force by force ...”

The French armies committed many atrocities although in fairness, the British on occasions did likewise, and these rebounded on them. On 26 April 1809 the Spanish Government published details in its gazette of atrocities at Viles in January 1809 involving the rape of 300 women. In February 1809 the French burned the villages of S. Miguel de Zequelinos and S. Christobal de Mourentan leaving 2,000 homeless, and on 17 April 1809 they summarily executed 24 inhabitants of Arnifara as a reprisal for an attack on a French patrol. In June 1809 the French hanged 30 religious and 49 leading citizens of Lourizin. In return the Spanish executed 130 French prisoners. If the French placed little value on friendly relations with the Spanish the same mistake was not made by the British who supplied 2 million pounds in gold per year to assist the Spanish Government as well as enormous quantities of munitions much of which was landed clandestinely at coastal rendezvous with the guerrilla forces. Even more fundamental to amicable relations was the British system of supply, whereby a properly stocked supply service in the army’s rear provided for their needs. Where local supplies were required they were purchased.

So powerful did the guerrillas become that French deaths by their hand averaged more than a hundred a day and not even a messenger could move in the country without an enormous escort. They menaced tax collectors, attacked grain convoys, causing shortages in the capital and keeping troops on constant alert. The guerrillas were encouraged by the Spanish clergy who Napoleon found quite unlike their Italian counterparts. A catechism circulated in Aragon read in part: “Are we at liberty to kill the French? . . . It is our duty to do so.” In May 1812 a strong convoy escorting Spanish prisoners on the way to France was attacked by guerrillas; 600-700 French were killed, 500 wounded and 150 taken prisoner. The 400 Spanish prisoners were set free. In June 1813 Joseph sent desperate orders from Burgos ordering Clausel to join him. 1,500 men escorted the message which reached Clausel but his reply did not reach Joseph.

From the beginning to end, the Peninsular campaign swallowed up 600,000 French troops, of whom 300,000 became casualties. Never after 1808 were less than 200,000 French troops involved at times this rose as high as 370,000. Even following his defeat in Russia, Napoleon was forced to leave 200,000 troops in Spain while Wellington commanded a mixed British, Spanish and Portuguese force of about 70,000 aided of course by the guerrillas.

The numbers involved on the Peninsular are significant when compared with the period of The Terror when France had an effective army of about 600,000 although its theoretical strength stood at 1,100,000. The Peninsular greatly weakened Napoleon elsewhere as rarely after 1808 was he able to muster a decisive majority at the point of battle. Thus at Ratisbon in April 1809 he was able to muster only 172,700 troops compared with Archduke Charles’ 161,500 and at Wagram on 4 July 1809, 189,000 against 167,500 supported by Tyrolese rebels in Napoleon’s rear. When forced to meet enemies on equal terms he suffered much greater casualties and the results were often inconclusive. In any case it is improbable that his enemies would have taken to the field had they not been encouraged by events in the Peninsular.

The Peninsular proved to be expensive in other ways. It diverted Napoleon’s most successful generals, including Massena, Ney,
Mortier, Victor and Suchet and from this time onwards French armies elsewhere fell into errors because the generals promoted in their place lacked their skill and experience in commanding large formations.

Despite Napoleon’s dictum that war should be self-supporting the French inability to institute an effective civil government, the general poverty of the countryside and the harassment of tax collectors by guerrillas meant that Joseph’s kingdom became a gigantic burden on the French treasury. By June 1813 the Spanish adventure had cost 4,000,000,000 reals (over a billion francs) as well as enormous quantities of material, armament, munitions and supplies.

If the Peninsular War was disastrous for France it enabled England to become not only the premier naval power but a major military power on the continent. In the overall sense it was Britain which gained most from the Napoleonic era including trade, colonies, naval supremacy, a strong army and a greater lead in the industrial revolution.

While we can only speculate on the difference that the invasion of the Peninsular War made to the actual invasion of Russia, since the problems in Russia were more ones of distance and climate, there is little doubt that the Peninsular army would have sufficed to stem the tide following the Russian debacle had it not been tied down in Spain. As things were, Napoleon salvaged less than 50,000 of the 450,000 he took to Russia and had to levy raw recruits against the invading forces. In any case it is doubtful whether Russia would have become so transfigured in her relations with France as to cause Napoleon to invade her had France not been involved in Spain.

It is clear then that the invasion of the Peninsular was the turning point on the Napoleonic era, up to that time he never suffered a defeat on the continent, afterwards he rarely gained a victory and the ones he did gain were both costly and ineffective. Spain became a greater drain on France than the Boer War on Britain and Vietnam on the USA. Speaking with hindsight from St Helena, Napoleon said of it:

"...that miserable Spanish affair turned opinion against me and rehabilitated England. It enabled them to continue the war... they put an army on the Peninsular (which became the agent of victory, the terrible node of all intrigues that formed on the continent... (the Spanish affair) is what ruined me." 40

NOTES
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 24.
15. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 498.
27. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 67.
32. Ibid., p. 237.
34. Ibid., p. 257.
38. Ibid., Map 103.
40. Ibid., p. 270.
A THIRD DIMENSION TO TRAINING

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Services Analytical Studies Group

WHAT can war-games do for the training of military personnel in the art of war? The answer to this question was provided by the Prussians in the last century when they employed war-games to develop their summer manoeuvre exercises. The skills that were acquired as a result of these war-game activities in the 19th Century were passed on through World War I and the success of this technique in the opening phases of World War II is well known to students of military history.

What is the role of a war-game in training? This question may be simply answered by saying a war-game provides a facility for a student, having prepared a plan, to execute that plan, obtain the results of that execution and on identifying a weakness, or another option, change his plan, exploit that situation and obtain a further result of that action. Throughout this process the student is obtaining intelligence as he would in real war.

The Services Analytical Studies Group (SASG) as a section of Defence Science and Technology (DST) has developed a series of war-games to meet a wide spectrum of training requirements both in tactical and administration areas. The games being:

- a one-sided movements war-game designed to assist instruction in critical areas of transportation. These areas involve the movement of supplies, terminal facilities and modes of transport.
- a two-sided Corps III level tactical war-game designed to provide instructions in both armoured and infantry tactics.
- a two-sided Task Force/Battalion HQ level war-game designed to exercise students in the application of the principles of tactics and staff work.
- a two-sided Division HQ level war-game designed to exercise a divisional staff in the production and execution of both operational and administrative plans.

In addition to these, SASG is at present developing a family of games in an Australian setting from Division level through Corps, Comm Z to support area. When these games have been developed it may be possible to obtain a more coherent approach to the understanding of the sensitivity of a change from the steady state in the main support area to its effect on the Combat Zone (see Map).

Method of Play

In a war-game only the initial problem is issued to the player teams and random numbers are then employed to select the sequence of events which will occur during the game. Thus a dynamic rather than fixed approach is achieved. Another important aspect of the play is that the players must make decisions and take action to gain intelligence which in a TEWT would be presented to them.

Sequence of play is as follows:

a. Control issues:
   (1) Pre-game intelligence (Instructions and Background Narrative);
   (2) Initial unit deployment and tactical situation (General Idea); and
   (3) The local situation (Special Idea).

b. Problem One is issued.

c. Player teams develop their plans and then submit their plans to control. (The plans are examined by assistant controllers for incorrect use of planning data such as Movement Rates, etc.). The plans are prepared as overlays with their associated orders.

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d. Control then adjudicates and feeds the result of the adjudication back to the player teams.
e. The player teams on receiving the result of adjudication make adjustments to their plans, re-submit and so the cycle is repeated.

This continuing process emphasises the essential difference between a war-game and a TEWT. In a TEWT a series of problems is set. In a war-game only the initial problem is issued to player teams. From then on it is the result of adjudication that determines the sequence and type of problems that are presented to the player teams.

**Control**
Control has two important roles, the first being game management and the second being adjudication.

- **Game Management.** The most important area of game management is to ensure that the conduct of play meets the game objectives and to ensure that a comfortable relationship between game time and real time exists.
- **Adjudication.** The adjudication rules as employed in a training war-game are designed to give the controller a quantitative guide to assist him to make a qualitative judgement. The basis of adjudication in combat engagement is the Fire Power Score whose value is a measure of the Combat Power of a Force. The adjudication process employs probabilistic rules which were obtained from US training games. The rules have been developed from data obtained from World War II and the Korean War and updated as a result of training exercises and improved technology.

**The Player's Role**
Player teams must undertake the following activities:
- Prepare a plan with associated orders.
- Gain intelligence.
- As the intelligence base develops, further develop plans to cover the new situation.

**The Adjudicator's Role**
The adjudication sequence is as follows:
- Determine physical limitations, weather, visibility;
- Determine intelligence (sightings);
- Adjudicate any independent engagements such as artillery, air or armour duals;
- Adjudicate the results of combined arms engagements. A more detailed description of the method of adjudication will be covered in a later article. The control teams must at all times be aware of the dual role of control; that is, game management and adjudication.

**The employment of war-games in training**
War-games may be employed in three ways:
- **As an aid to Instruction.** In this form of play the war-game resembles the model exercise employing simplified adjudication rules and maximum player participation. Here player teams are presented with problems pertaining to both the Red and Blue forces with the instructor carrying out the adjudication and the player teams (students) reacting in turn to the adjudication and the result of their plan. An example of the use of this type of play would be in providing instruction in the Phases of War or the identifying of movements problems at terminals.

- **The Testing of Concepts and Proposed Doctrine.** In this role the approach to play would be more general and imaginative, fewer players would be required and several repeats of play might be required. Possible requirements for war-games in this role would be to establish criteria for, say, the role of mechanised infantry, the development of a large scale field exercise, the employment of containers in a supply system and the providing of assistance to concepts teams.

- **Staff Work.** War-games provide training for HQ staff. In this role game play must adhere to all the requirements of standing operating procedures and staff procedures.

**Essential Requirements of Game Play**
There are three important requirements of game play that have to be considered. These are as follows:
- the recording of game play data;
- analysis of data; and
The Recording of Game Play Data

The recording of game play is important for the following reasons. In the development phase of the war-game records of play would provide a data base from which the requirement for changes in the game design could be assessed, and in the final stage would provide a record of game play for further analysis. A suggested method of recording game play events would be to use a field army teleprinter system for game play communications. The use of such a system would provide a paper tape record of game play in a form that could be processed by a computer.

Analysis of Data

The analysis of war-game play is a very important requirement of war-gaming. If it is not carried out correctly many man-hours of game play may be wasted. The method of analysis to be used together with what aspects of game play are to be analysed must be considered in conjunction with game play and the game objective. It would be from the analysis of game play that study groups could obtain the design criteria for future war-games. The validity of the design criteria would improve with the number of game plays.

Computer Assistance

As the number of game plays increases, one area of concern to be examined would be to what degree a manual war-game could be automated, in particular in the adjudication and planning area, without effecting the criteria of military participation. The game plays would be observed and the result of game play analysed and examined for repetitive tasks not influenced by military participation. These are the areas which would benefit from computer assistance. As examples, the results of a tank-tank engagement, movement planning data, stores accounting and ammunition expenditure would all fall into this category.

Conclusion

War-games are not the complete cure for all of the Army's training problems; they are only a means to an end, but in the areas where they are best suited, they have a lot to offer for a large saving in cost. They provide an inexpensive means to familiarise leaders with the complexity of battle, military decision-making and practise in the function of command and staff relationships. They provide a third dimension to training.
PARACHUTE
FAMILIARISATION
COURSES

"A Graduates report"

Major M. R. Irvine
Royal Australian Infantry

General

This report is designed to provide information to those who have never heard of the course or are still hesitating.

Venue

The course is conducted at PTS WILLIAMTOWN. PTS is not a private transport system (although it acts as one) but PARACHUTE TRAINING SCHOOL, an Army-run school at the RAAF Base WILLIAMTOWN.

The Course

The CI introduces himself (Good morning, I am LT. COL . . . , CI of PTS; on behalf of the Base Comd. . . .) and gives a brief on the course. The brief is well presented and the attitude of the CI, and the humour of the slides, relax (temporarily) all but the most devout cowards. You learn that:

a. if you are in the Army, you are probably too old or too important to be fully trained as a military parachutist (he forgot too much of a coward);

b. the course is nothing more than familiarisation, that is, you don’t get ‘wings’, a certificate or even a chicken feather; and

c. you will enjoy yourself (sickly grins).

You then observe a live commercial (called a demo by PTS) for the parachute. This leads you to believe (temporarily) that:

a. there is no chance of the ‘chute NOT opening;

b. your arms are not going to be ripped off;

and

c. there is no need to cancel any planned vasectomy; all parts will still be functional.

If you are chosen to be in the first flight (that is, you stood in the front rank when they line you up), you move to your equipment where you are:

a. introduced to the life jacket (good morning Miss West);

b. shown how to fit and adjust your parachute (I might cancel that vasectomy after all);

c. practised in exit position, descent positions and water entry drill (haven’t I mentioned landing in the water?).

You then move to the mock-up Caribou aircraft (which is cunningly disguised as a partly finished shed) where you practise hooking-up and stepping out of the aircraft. By this stage, you feel that you are thoroughly familiar with parachuting and can go home. But no!

You then are given a cup of tea or coffee (I declined due to a funny sensation in my lower abdomen), lined up and counted off in fours. You are delighted to find that this is your jumping order and not teams for a tag-wrestling match.
You put on your parachute, line up for a check (buckles, straps, pack, NOK); and board the bus in the reverse order to jumping order. First into bus, last into aircraft, first into water; last into bus, first into aircraft, last into water. At least it gives you something to think about for a while.

The Flight
Caribous are still noisy; the pilot looks so young (Does your mother know you’re out?). You reach the right height and speed (about 1500 feet, 100 knots, or for non-technical people — awful high and fast) and approach the DZ (Drop Zone or Dribbling Zombie, depending on who you are).

The dispatcher (the grinning clown who knows he’s not going out) throws out some streamers. I’m told they establish wind drift and are not for use by the nervous to cleanse certain parts of the anatomy. (Why did the water look a funny colour after the first drop? Then, four at a time, you stand up, hook up, stand in the door and GOOOOOOOOOOO!

Initially it’s a shock to see them standing there one minute and completely out of sight the next (reminds me of some lifts in the city). You also learn if you’re not first out that:

a. the dispatcher can break the tight grip of the jumpers arm;

b. bending at the knees as you walk down the ramp doesn’t get you that much closer to the ground; and

c. the parachutes DO work (at least up until now!)

Then it’s your turn, 30 seconds — Red light — Green light — GO. If you’re not first in line, stare intently at the back of the head of the person in front; when he goes, gaze fixedly at the horizon (I don’t think they taught that, but it was better than looking at that drop below).

I must admit I have no recollection of the time from hearing ‘GO’ to the time I felt a tug on my shoulders, opened my eyes and saw that big, beautiful, wonderful parachute open above me (fear does some funny things). Even if it was all twisted, it looked good. Remember the instructor said if it’s twisted, don’t worry, it will untwist itself! It did! (I mean what condition was I in to do anything about it?) By this time about 20 seconds have elapsed since you took that first step.

For the next 20-30 seconds you really enjoy yourself. The feeling of floating free, the scenery, the admiring (?) crowds on the beach, the fact that you’re still alive makes it all worthwhile. Then you remember something about preparing to land!

Level with the hills (500 ft), work yourself into the straps so that you’re sitting in the harness, grasp the rigging with one hand, turn and hit the buckle releasing your straps, flick the leg straps clear, grasp the rigging with both hands and prepare to hit the water. It DID work when we practised it! Oh well, don’t worry about sitting in the harness, wait a few more seconds. There! You can see the pick-up boat clearly — must only be about 100 ft below — undo the buckle — you can hang on with one arm (King Kong couldn’t break that grip). Straps free; both hands gripping shoulder straps, feet hit the water and you’re under. Arch your back, arms up and the parachute does come clear! Up to the surface, crew men with grinning faces pull you into the boat, collect your ‘chute and take you to shore. It is the cold water making you shiver!

A change of clothes, cup of coffee and a sandwich and down to the local for a couple of beers, swap lies with the others and watch the second plane-load descend. Being an expert you can now appreciate the ungainly exits and watch it all with condescending amusement.

Was it worth it? Would I do it again? My oath!

Reviewed by Major General E. H. Dar
Pakistan Army

R OGER PARKINSON is not exactly a prolific writer but he is on the way to becoming one if he keeps up with his publishers' date line of a book every two years and this he has done with alarming punctiliousness so far. His latest book is a biography of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the last Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army and the spirited, if luckless, commander in the desert from July 1941 to August 1942.

Parkinson claims that "much invaluable material has become available not contained in the Auchinleck Papers. Chiefly, this additional information is to be found in the War Cabinet papers, including the documents relating to the Chiefs-of-Staff and other military files, which were opened in 1970 . . . the official documents bring to light startling new facts . . ." But the book fails to show what these startling new facts are except possibly a few allusions of a personal nature for or against Auchinleck. There is nothing new in the central theme and parameters of the book:

- That there were two battles of Alamein. The first—a defensive battle—was fought and won by Auchinleck. The victor of the second, Montgomery, was both unfair and uncharitable in denigrating Auchinleck.
- That Auchinleck was shabbily treated by Churchill.

There is much in this story that would interest the military historian and the general reader. For the military historian the study and analysis of offensive operation code named 'Crusader' especially Auchinleck's intervention and enterprise is an excellent study in command. His second intervention following the axis counter offensive which the official South African historian calls "Crusader in reverse" but was named operation 'Venezia' is equally interesting. He intervened in a halting and enigmatic fashion but was firm and decisive in its later stage. The last phase came to be known as the First Battle of Alamein.

The general reader sees Churchill at his best and worst, the interplay of local parliamentary political pressures, the conflicts between global strategy, theatre strategy, campaign strategy and the shadows cast by political pulls and pressures.

Auchinleck's career can be easily summarised. He was a company commander during the First World War for almost two years with a brief period as the acting battalion commander of 6/2 Punjabis (now First Battalion, The Punjab Regiment, Pakistan Army). He took part in defensive and offensive operations in Mesopotamia (now Iraq) and during 1917-18 was appointed Brigade Major of an infantry brigade and later General Staff Officer grade 2 in a divisional headquarters. In 1933 and 1935 he took part in anti-Mohmand operations as a brigade commander. He distinguished himself both in command and staff. But two points must be noted. First, that he belonged to the Indian Army. Inevitably there was considerable envy between the British Army and the Indian Army and there is much that can be said to support either. But of one thing there is no doubt: the Indian Army was treated as a colonial army, its fighting capacity and qualities especially in continental environments were doubted. There is enough evidence to support this view. Churchill's low opinion is recorded. Montgomery, on assuming command of the 8th Army ordered disbandment of Indian divisions, and their employment in rear areas and line of communication duties. General Tuker Commanding 4 Indian Division threatened to resign and got the decision reversed.
No Indian Army formations were used during the World War II in France or Germany and even during the World War I the decision to employ them in France had been reversed. And the reasons—at least from the British point of view were part political, part military. It is for this reason that an Indian Army Officer however capable and promising had no long range future outside the Indian Army. Auchinleck’s employment during the Second World War in Norway, as corps and army commander in England and his appointment as Commander-in-Chief Middle East was most unusual and a tribute to his military reputation and ability.

Secondly, in the two world wars the decisive theatre of war was in Europe. Auchinleck had no experience of—even if he had the knowledge and understanding of—European war. And all his colleagues and rivals had savoured the smoke and cordite in Europe.

But if Auchinleck started with such serious psychological and functional handicaps, he did little to improve the state of affairs while in command. It is difficult to fault his selection of Cunningham as the 8th Army Commander, although Wilson, proposed by Churchill and disregarded by Auchinleck, presumably because of personal reasons, would have been a better choice. But his subsequent choices are incomprehensible. Both Ritchie and Corbett were chiefs-of-staff and it is most unusual for them to have been appointed or selected to command an active Army during operations. Even if they were eminently suitable their selection and appointment would create an unsavoury effect of intrigue and jockeying. It will be noted how Brooke declined to step into the shoes of Auchinleck when offered and urged by Churchill. Auchinleck’s handling of Ritchie—a subordinate army commander—is equally open to question. There is no shortage of written notes and memoranda which were sent and proffered in true Churchillian form and one is tempted to remark perhaps in unconscious imitation. In the strategic field, as a theatre commander, Auchinleck showed more concern for a battle yet to come than was necessary. Assuming that the Germans had broken through the Caucasus the primary responsibility at grand strategic level lay with Churchill and the Chiefs-of-Staff. In any case there would have been enough warning and the time and space factor, as also the communications and movement problems were not entirely unmanageable. Placed in more difficult environments, what was Rommel’s worry: Malta? Northwest Africa? or the war in the desert? Therefore, Churchill’s moan that what mattered except Rommel’s defeat, has much sense and substance.

Some of Auchinleck’s difficulties were institutional. He says in his preface to Desmond Young’s biography of Rommel that the Germans were better grounded in minor tactics and mobile warfare. The resilience and riposte mounted time and again by Rommel are apposite pointers. He recovered much more quickly from ‘Crusader’ to mount a “Crusader in reverse”. Churchill was impatient at what he thought was the slow regrouping, re-equipping and an operational response which showed lack of alacrity and bounce. Was it really an irrelevant criticism after all? The British Army tended to be slow as an institution.

Roger Parkinson makes no mention of the fact that German codes had been broken and the extent to which knowledge of German plans was known to Auchinleck. The Field Marshal is also silent, although this could, in part, be an explanation of Churchill’s impatience. He knew what the enemy was going to do and presumably what he was capable of doing.

It is interesting to reflect if the First Battle of Alamein would have acquired the controversy and reputation that it did, had it not been for the inept, anti-Auchinleck observations made by Montgomery. After all how many defensive battles and their commanders are thus venerated? Is Rommel known for his defensive battles? Auchinleck may have been more dignified but he has not been entirely silent—not that he should have remained silent against such grave provocation caused by serious aspersions on his military ability and capacity. Following the publication of Montgomery’s memoirs, which were serialised in the Sunday Times, he wrote, almost immediately a letter of protest to the newspaper, followed by contact with the publishers of Montgomery and Churchill leading to amendments and revision in books. He also tried, if unsuccessfully, to get the 8th Army clasp for his period of command for the Middle East Medal.

Auchinleck’s reputation rests on his decisive intervention in ‘Crusader’ and a late but
equally effective intervention in the summer battles in Libya and Egypt. Auchinleck showed better strategic sense than any contemporary British General at the time, an ability to assess the centre of gravity correctly, and adherence to the maintenance of aim and an admirable offensive spirit. Where he misjudged was his own troops, their capacity and incapacity. And finally, could he or should he have continued to attack in July 1942? General Bayerlein says, "You very nearly succeeded in breaking through our position several times between the 10th and 20th. If you could have continued to attack only a couple of days more you could have done . . ." To sum up, in his encounters against Rommel, Auchinleck won the first round and was even in the second. He proved a brilliant fighting general. This much is shown by a critical after event study. During the war, both Churchill and Brooke appear to have given considerable importance to the subjective factors of Auchinleck's background and experience.

There is one aspect of Auchinleck's role as Commander-in-Chief India, which, though much beloved of his biographers is open to serious disputation. Immediately following partition and independence, the ruler of Kashmir had prevaricated. He should normally have joined Pakistan but following a planned and systematic massacre of Muslim population of Kashmir and tribal intervention, decided instead to accede to India. This brought in the Indian Army in October 1947. In his despatch to the Chiefs-of-Staff, Auchinleck cabled on 28 October 1947, "Gracey (Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army) reported by phone to me 01.00 hours night October 27-28 that he had received orders from Jinnah which, if obeyed, would entail issue 'Stand Down' order. (The 'Stand Down' order meant the withdrawal of all British officers). Flew Lahore morning October 28 and met Gracey who said orders which he has not obeyed were to send troops into Kashmir to seize Baramula and Srinagar also Banihal Pass and to send troops into Mirpur district of Jammu. Met Jinnah who is in Lahore and discussed situation at length explaining situation vis-a-vis British officers very clearly . . . Jinnah withdrew orders but is very angry and disturbed by what he considers to be sharp practice by India in securing Kashmir's accession . . ."
is based on solid achievements. “The Art of War,” says Napoleon, “is a simple art. Everything is in performance.” Montgomery was the most successful British general of the war. Auchinleck was not.


LITTLE did one expect to read a better book about the soldier in Vietnam than R. J. O’Neill’s “Vietnam Task”, but here it is. No account has brought the feelings and the changing attitudes more visibly into focus than Caputo’s autobiographical sketch.

Growing up in a small country town in the United States of America where everything opened and shut, everyone had all he needed and “with dirtless streets on which nothing ever happened”, there was no challenge a young man had to meet. The call of President Kennedy to save Asia from an imaginary vision of communism provided a useful justification for him to join the Marine Corps.

Only then did he find out the extent of his physical ability and what is meant by fitness. The description of Boot Camp is superb. The experience converted him from a soft, small-town youth into a self-confident man but not, as he guiltily suggests, with a diminished capacity for compassion. “Even if the essence of the Marine Corps experience was pain, I felt proud of that spirited company and happy that I was one of them” and he realised that the most important changes in him were not the physical ones. What a pity many of our Australian youth, especially those entering the services, are not having a comparable experience.

Then, in Vietnam, his real education began. Over sixteen months he saw horrors he had never dreamt of; had opportunities, and took them, to behave generously and decently to friend and foe this men gave no approval to a Marine who tried to emulate an Australian who had taken “two brown and bloodstained human ears” as a trophy; understood the emotions on both sides—“There were also several wallet-sized pictures of girl friends or wives... I wondered if the other side had a system, as we did, for notifying the families of casualties. I hoped so.” A PFC said: They’re just like us, lieutenant. It is always the young men who die.”

Sometimes he felt a hatred for everything in existence except his men. “Yes, except those men of mine, any one of whom was better than all the men who had sent them to war.” So, as his time sped on, human feelings, duty, preservation for himself and his men, dragged him in conflicting directions.

Finally, the torture of a mistake: “There was something about the dead man that troubled me... It was such a young face and, while I searched him, I kept thinking, ‘He’s just a boy, just a boy’. I could not understand why his youth bothered me.” The reader must wait for the climax in the penultimate chapter.

Ten years later, he returned as a war correspondent to cover the last few weeks of the American withdrawal. “Those men had died for no reason. They had given their all for nothing.”

This is a great war book, so gripping that no officer cadet will put it down, and yet a book that will make him think deeply about his responsibilities. By the end, it has become a great peace book.

MILITARY MINIATURES—THE ART OF MAKING MODEL SOLDIERS, by Simon Goodenough and “Tradition”, $10.95, available in Australia through Hodder and Stoughton (Australia) Pty. Ltd., 2 Apollo Place, Lane Cove, NSW 2066. Reviewed by D. V. Goldsmith

MOST of us as small boys collected toy soldiers. Some of us were lucky enough never to grow up, and continued our collecting into middle age and beyond, though somewhat disdainful these days of the tag ‘toy’. Until after World War II, the toy variety was the only type available, at least to the collector of modest means. About 1950, high class professional makers of model soldiers began to appear, among them the British firm of Tradition, which has held the spotlight among collectors ever since.

Simon Goodenough, journalist and military historian, has now co-operated with Tradition to produce a handsome book. Its contents cover
the history of the model soldier from Ancient Egyptian times, sources available to the private collector, painting, and methods of making one's own figures, from simple conversion to 'scratch building' an original, then moulding and casting it. There is a guide to dioramas, and a few words on war gaming.

The book is illustrated profusely, with quality coloured photographs showing the work of skilled professional modellers, Tradition appearing regularly but unobtrusively among them. Many snippets of interesting information are scattered through the text such as the fact that, here in "London's model soldier Mecca", enthusiasts for the World Wars period buy 20 German figures for every Brit, the author attributing this to a sort of preference for the losing side. A similar sentiment could explain the absorption with the armies of Napoleon, though here at least there is the saving grace of colour and spectacle.

The real aim of the book is to draw the beginner to the serious business of model soldiering, and it claims to be a simple introduction; for example, included is a glossary, defining such terms as "sword knot", "aiguillette" and "bandolier". The reader with a casual interest in the subject will find it attractive, though perhaps rather expensive at $10.95. For those who might be hooked by this bait, there is available for further reading a wide range of instructive books, many inexpensive by comparison with Military Miniatures.

In illustrating the various modelling techniques, there is a tendency to oversimplify. The 'raw material' metal models used as examples are most expensive (a fact not stressed in the book), and the beginner should not lightly set to work with hacksaw and paint. I for one have watched with horror some dollars' worth of metal model dissolve under my soldering iron, unskilfully wielded. As in many other areas, plastics have come to stay in the model soldier world, and in fact are pushing the metal variety hard, the French firm of Historex in the van. On the whole, fair treatment is given in this work to plastics, the finest illustration of the modellers art in the book, from Géricault's painting of a Chasseur of the French Imperial Guard, being an adaptation from a plastic kit. However, Tradition is a 'metal' firm, and one could dispute the author's inference that the metal figure is superior, and something to which the novice should aspire after an apprenticeship in plastics. Another point that might have been stressed is that plastic models on the whole are cheaper than metal, a strong factor in their favour for the beginner's experiments.

For anyone with experience as a collector-cum-modeller, this book is a handsome though not essential addition to his bookshelf. For the newcomer, it is a good if expensive starter, provided he is wary of the pitfalls that the simple line drawings and text tend to conceal.


Reviewed by Dr Hugh Smith, Department of Government, University of New South Wales, RMC, Duntroon.

N EVILLE BROWN'S book is subtitled 'A Predictive Study of World Security, 1977-1990'. In 400 pages it provides an account, as exhausting as it is exhaustive, of all the factors which might influence world security in the next decade and a half. It embraces such disparate topics as urban terrorism, inflation, pre-natal sex selection, changes in global temperature, food shortages, nuclear energy, the fast patrol boat and satellite surveillance. It examines nuclear and conventional strategies. It diagnoses the problems faced by Russia and America, not forgetting the countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. The raw material in trends and events of the last ten or twenty years mixed in with predictions, extrapolations, guesses and speculations.

In vain one waits for some attempt to tie everything together, to lift the book above the level of good journalism. There are some interesting points if you can find them: military strategy cannot as in the past ignore social and economic factors; democracies with internal problems find it difficult to concentrate on problems of international order; the philosophy of education will become increasingly important in debates on public policy. But there is no indication of which factors are more signifi-
cant than others, no real analysis of how they will affect military strategy (Brown has done this better in other publications), no satisfactory definition of world security. There are some prescriptions such as promoting parliamentary democracy and according higher priority to the North-South division but there are few useful suggestions on how to carry them out.

It is difficult to perceive the purpose for which this book was written unless it was to convince readers of the complexities and problems which the world must face in the next decades. Readers might be more convinced, however, if arguments were spelled out and the sheer volume of facts and speculation reduced.

The O'Neill book is also concerned with security. (One man's security, it is said, is another man's insecurity.) This collection of nine articles and a conclusion is focused on a specific topic, namely the spread of weapons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Not that the issues raised are simple or narrow. On the contrary, most of the elements that affect Australia's security are discussed in one form or another.

There is a chapter on nuclear proliferation and President Carter's initiatives (Michael Nacht) and another on the enormous expansion, acceleration and diversification of the conventional arms trade (Ron Huisken). Steven Rosen looks at some current weapons development, arguing that the implications for offence and defence are far from self-evident. Michael McGwire's chapter on maritime weapons proliferation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans points up the fact that for some time yet only the United States will be capable of invading Australia. Various other authors look at political developments in the Indian Ocean littoral, South-east Asia and North-east Asia, while Tom Millar laments that even in the South Pacific we can't get away from it all.

These studies, most of them presented to a conference at the A.N.U. in July 1977, are clearly wide-ranging. They indicate the numerous and diverse factors that must be observed, if not influenced, by Australian policy-makers. Australia's security is an immense problem which, at least in the defence field, has to be reduced to a more or less coherent strategy involving very concrete decisions: how many tanks? what sort of fighter aircraft? what tasks for the Navy? This book provides support for the view that security in the contemporary international situation is both necessary and impossible.

The book does not attempt to spell out the implications for the security of Australia. This is outside its brief and is left to the reader. Robert O'Neill does contribute some brief general observations on how the proliferation of weapons in the areas concerned might be modified. But inevitably the prospects for arms control appear minimal. All the more reason, therefore, for studying insecurity.


Reviewed by Captain B. Cameron, MC, RAAC 4 Cav Regt, Enoggera, Qld

WILL Australia's Military Forces become involved in a NATO vs Warsaw Pact conflict? General Sir John Hackett, in his book The Third World War, projects into the scenario the engagement of Soviet naval and air forces in the Middle East, by a combined US, British and Australian force. He assumes therefore, that in the circumstances portrayed, Australia will declare war on the Soviet Union. The considerations involved in making such a declaration, the mobilization of Australian forces, and their allotted tasks, are not the subject of this book. It is left to the reader himself, in light of the disturbingly credible progression of events, to judge what part Australia might play and how her future might be affected, as the outcome swings in the balance.

The consequences for Australia would not, however, be completely unconsidered by the principal author. John Hackett was born in Western Australia in 1910, and educated in Victoria, before completing studies at Oxford. The imminence of the World War II led to the commencement of a military career that included the command of a parachute brigade at Arnhem, and finished with the posting of Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine. On retirement from military duty, General Sir John Hackett, GCB, CBE, DSO and Bar, MC, MA, BLitt, LLD, has in con-
junction with other highly qualified contributors, compiled a book that hits like a 'neutron bomb' at public apathy towards defence.

The gripping narrative is put together as though it were written shortly after the conclusion of World War II. This war commenced at 0400 hrs on 4 August 1985, when Warsaw Pact forces invaded Western Europe. It finished three weeks later, with consequences which completely changed the course of the world. The international background, causes of conflict, daily progression of events, aftermath, and lessons learnt, are all convincingly described. In military terms, a very realistic projection of weapons technology and appreciation of the capabilities of opposing forces, is used to startling effect. It is not just the European situation that is described either, the causes and resulting effects are related to the world as a whole. 'Only names are changed to protect the innocent' is a phrase which can be said to be applicable. The identity, however, of a bulky Ugandan Field Marshal, who meets his demise by being blown from the muzzle of a 76 mm gun, is not hard to imagine.

Imagination is, in fact, stimulated throughout the book. Personal narratives of those involved in the actual battle itself, add considerable excitement. These include a Royal Tank Regiment squadron commander, a German fighter pilot, and an anti-tank guided weapon section commander. Skilful and plentiful use of photographs and maps also adds to the impression of realism, as does the inclusion of appendices containing supplementary details on such aspects as British Defence Policy; the Rise of Soviet Sea Power; and extracts from diaries of British Civil Defence members.

No comment is herewith made as to the validity or likelihood of the events described. Many will probably say that "it could never happen"—they have before. It can only be suggested that, before such a view is taken, the qualifications and experience of the authors be considered.

One might well ask why so many eminent men have become involved in the publication of this book. Part of the answer is thought to be found in the Authors' Note at the end of the book, "There is (also) the very high probability that unless the West does a good deal within the next few years to improve its defences, a war with the Warsaw Pact could end in early disaster". Another quote, taken out of context from earlier in the book, is considered to be indicative of Sir John's intention, "If his reputation meant anything at the end of this war he would do his damnest, he resolved, to see that the politicians did not forget a second time".

I regard The Third World War as a book which should be compulsory reading for members of the Armed Services.


Reviewed by Major W. H. Bishop, Directorate of Personnel Plans, Army Office, Canberra

MAJOR GENERAL RICHARDSON (ex RAMC 1927-61) has long been interested in morale and the psychiatric casualty. He lectured on morale at Staff College Camberley from 1953 almost to retirement. He resumed after retiring. The hiatus was caused by a superior RAMC officer (down from the War Office) who disapproved some aspects of the lecture.

Fighting Spirit gives the impression that it is an expanded version of the Camberley lecture. The style is conversational and quite readable although I found the frequent use of quotes from other sources distracting at times. Indeed in many instances the impression was that the author had written around the quote and not merely used it to support the argument.

The main theme of the book is that advances in science, technology and society have changed the nature of warfare which in turn has affected the problems faced by soldiers. No longer do soldiers line up in their squares or retire for the night. No longer can the commander display his presence at a battle with "a brief tippit along the line to a ripple of cheers". Moreover, whereas soldiers in "those days" were tough, says Richardson, the modern soldier has to be toughened. The effect is that the pressures in battle on the less psychologically strong soldier are greater. The solution according to Richardson is proper selection and training and attention to the various aspects of morale—from individual to through esprit de corps to national spirit. Indeed he suggests even broader cohesion is feasible—in his term "esprit de NATO".
There is nothing new in Richardson's view of morale or the effects of low morale. There is some novelty in how morale should be developed and maintained. He would like to see soldiers kept fully informed and urges frank discussions aimed at helping soldiers understand the psychology of fear and the causes of psychiatric casualties. Richardson also describes his method of teaching that it is a disgrace for a unit to have many cases of "exhaustion": publication weekly of a divisional health ladder listing all units reporting cases of exhaustion. The idea is that units strive to climb off the ladder.

Richardson proposes that soldiers in "shell shock" should be treated as any other casualty—as far forward as possible. Too often, he says, do we allow soldiers to use psychological 'injuries' as a means of escaping nobly from the battlefield. Too often, he says do officers and NCOs fail to detect the incipient signs of impending breakdown. We need to teach leaders what to look for and what preventive or remedial action to take to arrest the problem.

I would have preferred a more succinct statement of Richardson's thesis. The significant points are often buried in the conversation. However, the book contains some interesting and thought provoking ideas. It is essentially a book on man management which asks officers and NCOs to consider whether they are "come on" or "go on" leaders.


Reviewed by Captain C. D. Coulthard-Clark, Australian Intelligence Corps

On 7 February 1885 news reached the Australian colonies that Khartoum, on the remote upper reaches of the Nile in the Sudan, had fallen to Dervish besiegers and that the garrison had been massacred along with its charismatic commander, General Gordon. Five days later a retired commissary general—Sir Edward Strickland—made his now-famous suggestion in the Sydney Morning Herald that Australia should send a contingent to aid imperial forces in reconquering the rebellious Sudan, with the result that New South Wales embarked on Australia's first experiment in military adventurism. Strickland had acted, at least partly, in the belief that Canada had offered 600 men to assume duties in England to free more regular troops to aid in the rescue of Gordon. This desire to prove that Australia, in Strickland's words, 'yields not to Canada or to any portion of the British Empire in loyalty and affection towards our mother-country' was to figure again in Australia's participation in both the South African War of 1899-1902 and again in 1914, but in 1885 the reports of a Canadian contingent were erroneous.

MacLaren shows in this book that Canada was not eager to become embroiled militarily in the Sudan on Britain's behalf, despite the efforts of Canadian militia men to get to the scene of the fighting. As Sir John Macdonald, Canada's Prime Minister, frankly told his High Commissioner in London: "The Suez Canal is nothing to us, and we do not ask England to quarrel with France or Germany for our sake. The offer of . . . [the Australasian] colonies is a good move on their part. . . . Why should we waste men and money in this wretched business?" Canada's participation in the Sudan was consequently a civilian effort, although militia officers directed it. In 1884 General Garnet Wolseley recruited 400 Canadian voyageurs to assist in transporting imperial troops up the Nile in a daring but dilatory attempt to relieve Khartoum, recalling their unique skills and special aptitudes from his earlier military life in Canada. A generation later, another Canadian, Sir Percy Girouard, built the desert railway which enabled Kitchener to capture Khartoum in 1898.

Many Canadians won distinction in the Sudan excursions, and MacLaren's conclusion that their participation contributed to the impetus to full nationhood as Canadians became aware of their separate identity through their military achievements can, to a very much lesser extent, be viewed as one of the few benefits for Australians derived from New South Wales' action in 1885. Equally his attempt to answer the question of why Canadians should want to serve in such exotic outposts of Empire offers interesting insights into the motives which inspired Australians also. MacLaren's book is a perceptive, exciting and frequently humorous account of the personalities and events of the time.
Reviewed by Captain B. Cameron, MC, RAAC 4 Cav Regt, Enoggera, Qld

SOME ten years ago I was given the task, as an assignment in Military History, to compare the tactical concepts of Mao Tse-tung with Lawrence of Arabia. This involved the study of The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, and kindled my interest in T. E. Lawrence. I was thus enticed to subsequently read amongst others The Mint and With Lawrence in Arabia (by Lowell Thomas). During a stay in the United Kingdom, I also visited Lawrence’s cottage at Clouds Hill.

As one who therefore had certain ideas about ‘The Man’ and ‘The Legend’, I wondered what Solitary in the Ranks had to offer. Was it to be a rehash of past writings and ‘in depth’ appraisals from people who, like Lowell Thomas, had only met Lawrence twice? The short answer is “no”. In fact, H. Montgomery Hyde’s treatment of the life of T. E. Lawrence during his service in the RAF and Royal Tank Corps (1922-35), turned out to be completely the reverse. The portrayal of Aircraftman Ross, Private Shaw and Aircraftman Shaw (the names Lawrence used to conceal his identity), is drawn, in the main, from previously unpublished personal correspondence. The material made available to the author provides a penetrating and comprehensive account of this remarkable man. Quotations are taken, for example, from letters between Lawrence and Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, whom Lawrence met at the Cairo Conference in 1921, and with whom he was to develop a firm friendship. This relationship is in itself fascinating and probably unique, with regard to its being between the lowest and highest ranks of an Armed Service. In his Foreword, Viscount Trenchard states that the author “has, as I know my father would have wished, brought out the strength of the plus points of this eccentric and courageous genius”.

Although H. Montgomery Hyde does deviate from the strict scope of the book to describe Lawrence’s family and upbringing, he does not elaborate on his desert exploits. He thus rightly leaves The Seven Pillars of Wisdom to be the testament to this aspect of Lawrence’s life. Another temptation which the author has fortunately avoided, is that of colouring the narrative with his personal interpretation of Lawrence’s actions, and resulting character dissection. In consequence one is enabled to look at Lawrence’s thirteen years ‘in the ranks’, as if seeing it through his own eyes, and in so doing, thus seeing Lawrence himself. The observation gained is a more encompassing one than that provided by The Mint (written by Lawrence himself whilst in the RAF), though of course neither book could be considered a replacement for the other.

The story (for it reads as such) is taken up on Lawrence’s return from the Desert. One wonders what history would have made of Colonel Sir Thomas Lawrence, KCB, DSO, had he not declined all the honours (he was also recommended for the VC, and offered the Order of Merit). Following enlistment, with Trenchard’s help, in the RAF, the sequence of Lawrence’s service experiences and personal relationships is masterfully tracked. The changes he was instrumental in making within the RAF, the donation of all the profits (£20,000) of the abridged version of The Seven Pillars of Wisdom to an RAF Benevolent Fund, which still exists in his name, and his involvement with people such as George Bernard Shaw, Thomas Hardy, and Winston Churchill, as well as his personal friends in the ranks, are just some aspects that make tremendously interesting reading.

Solitary in the Ranks is a book that one regrets, during the course of reading, is coming to a close, especially if one is aware of the tragic end, to which it is leading, of a man who surely had the measure of greatness.

SANDGATE RSL, QUEENSLAND
Sandgate RSL are looking for militaria to fill their showcases, constructed to preserve the service atmosphere of the club. Weapons, badges, colour patches, insignias, books, photographs, paintings and other souvenirs no longer wanted should be sent to Brigadier Thomas Parslow, ED, LLB, QC, MIBA, (RL), C/- the RSL, Keogh Street, Sandgate, Qld 4017.