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REACHING THE TOP WITH YOUR MESSAGE?

The advantages of advertising in the Australian Defence Force Journal are far reaching.
What Has Gone Wrong

Dear Editor,

My attention was brought to the courageous article by Captain M.A.J. Watson by a number of serving personnel, ranging from private to commander (sic). Together with a number of former officers of the ADF (lieutenant colonel to major general), they all share similar concerns as I have, expressed with varying degrees of sophistication.

Captain Watson represents the “voice of reasoned dissent,” which Mant believes is the hallmark of leadership, but is isolated, alienated and vilified by the new technocratic (see J.R. Saul) establishment patronised by modern politicians and the mainstream media. Although he has avoided analysing the root causes (see Voltaire’s Bastards) of Army’s decrepitude, which the RAAF and RAN surely share, I do not imagine he will be welcome to serve on.

I remember discussing the political bureaucratisation, as I then saw it, of the ADF with the then Managing Editor of the ADFJ in 1988-89, highlighting a number of issues that Captain Watson touched on. They included the deprofessionalisation of officers by forcing them into content-free management pathways; in other words forcing square pegs into round holes. Also, they included the rise of the naked emperor and his courtiers, who, ten years on, include a significant Gestapo or KGB-style element.

Needless to say I was a coward, and feared to express myself on the pages of the ADFJ. However, not much later I did put my concerns in writing, and discussed them agreeably with the current National President of the RSL, then ACPers-A. We agreed that it was suicidal to raise these issues publicly.

Since then, I have worked at senior level in Queensland Heath, with the AMA, of which I am no longer a member, and lately as a contract MO to the ADF again. The environment gets worse, society becomes more amoral, and more susceptible to the predators and parasites of humankind, those who, in a civilised, true democracy would be in jail etc. I have come to realise that our fears are real.

The decline of both our democracy and our ADF perhaps was sealed when the Hawke Government expunged the Westminster Principle in 1983, in changing the Public Service Act. Prior to that, public servants in Commonwealth employ were bound to serve the people professionally, advising without fear or favour, and promoting, and expected to be promoted, solely on merit. Noblesse oblige was rewarded in the main. Now, political patronage is assiduously sought coupled with a sometimes futile chase for paper qualifications. Professionalism (using knowledge constructively, primarily in the interests of others) is punished. And conformity, and (illusory) control are valued far above competence, cohesion and compassion.

I don’t know how this message can be translated into a reconstruction of a democratic society served by a professional defence force, able to take the lead for mankind (compare Australia’s reputation worldwide in the 1950-60s with now!). Like Captain Watson I can but protest; unlike him perhaps I have no forum large and open enough to broadcast my protest. I am censored.

Is there a remedy?

Maarten de Vries
MBBs, MHP, FRACMA, FAFPHM, FAIM

Dear Editor,

I (no doubt along with many of my peers) am writing to you in response to the article by Captain Watson, “What Has Gone Wrong”, published in ADFJ No 136.

After winning a scholarship in 1991, I enlisted in the Army in 1992 to study at the Australian Defence Force Academy. I graduated from the Royal Military College in 1995 and spent a further twelve months obtaining my honours degree. I graduated into the Royal Australian Corps of Transport and have served with 1 Combat Service Support Battalion and the (then) 1st Recruit Training Battalion Kapooka. Like Captain Watson, I freely acknowledge my relative lack of time in service. Incidentally, enlisting in the Army was the only job application I made after leaving school.

Captain Watson deserves the applause of all subalterns in the modern Army. Time constraints prevent me from enumerating the number of times I have heard the same opinions expressed in messes, exercise field locations, and various other aspects of my professional working life. The difference is that Captain Watson has had the moral courage in the current bureaucratic environment to publicise his views to the Defence Force as a whole. I am well aware of the position he is potentially placing himself in. Bravo, bravo, bravo, Captain Watson you have my support.
In my experience, it has been popularly acknowledged that the strength of the Australian Army in the past has been the calibre and quality of its junior officers and junior non-commissioned officers. Like Captain Watson, I believe that incentive to encourage junior officers to not only stay in the Army, but consistently pursue excellence in the profession of arms is waning. While training, for example, we are indoctrinated and encouraged to be independent and innovative thinkers. As a logistician in an environment of steadily ageing and decreasing resources, I believe that innovative thinking and independent action are often the only way tasks can be completed.

Unfortunately, those of us who are supposed to be the future of the Army are often frustrated by decisions that we (at the lower levels) see as being motivated by political gain, rather than what is necessary to allow us to do our job. If our junior officers see it this way, what do our junior NCOs and soldiers see? Increasingly, we see decisions which seem from our point of view to be politically motivated rather than professionally necessary. Professionalism in leadership cannot survive long in an environment of regular frustration caused by limited resources and lack of clear direction. Is it any wonder the morale of the Army is as low as it has ever been?

In accordance with my professional beliefs, I am seeking solutions to the problems I see, rather than simply sit and complain about them. Some of the solutions are obvious, if not easily instigated. Others will take considerable time and collective effort to quantify and solve at the highest levels. I have to wonder if anyone has the courage to take on the bureaucrats, gambling their career prospects and stability in the process for the good of those of us at the coal face and the Army as a whole?

M.K. O’Sullivan
Captain

Military Writers

Dear Editor,

Some military writers compose their letters and stories in a too stilted fashion and use words the average person has never heard of. It’s time they forgot Sandhurst and its Cambridge language, and wrote their stories in down to earth, Australian language. After all, it’s not all and only university people who read the ADFJ.

Mr Hugh Wellesley

PACIFIC 2000
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME EXHIBITION

Pacific 2000 is a dynamic new international exhibition showcasing the world’s latest maritime and naval technologies.

Uniquely combining both commercial and naval maritime industries, the Pacific 2000 International Maritime Exhibition is being staged at the Sydney Exhibition and Convention Centre at Darling Harbour in Australia next February 1-4.

The first of its type in the Asia Pacific region, the exhibition will be a leading industry and professional forum, providing exhibitors, participants and visitors with a unique opportunity to meet peers, potential suppliers and customers, to develop networks and exchange ideas and information.

As a new forum for the world’s maritime and naval communities. Pacific 2000 will promote Australia’s considerable industrial and technological expertise as well as showcasing what the region and world has to offer. Pacific 2000 will also encourage valuable relationships between local and international partners.

More than 200 exhibitors from 15 countries are expected to participate. There will also be several thousand professional and industry visitors from around the world – with major contingents from the Asia Pacific region, the USA, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and Australia.

Pacific 2000 is being staged by the Aerospace Foundation of Australia. A not-for-profit organisation, the Foundation is internationally recognised for its AirShows DownUnder series of aerospace exhibitions. Its biennial Australian International Airshow at Avalon Airport in Victoria is firmly established on the world aviation calendar.

Major international conferences are running in conjunction with Pacific 2000. Hundreds of international and Australian delegates are expected to attend the Sea Australia 2000, Royal Australian Navy and the French Australian Chamber of Commerce conferences. A program has also been developed on US – Australian Maritime Cooperation.

Pacific 2000 is exclusively aimed at the commercial maritime, corporate, government and defence communities, and is not open to the general public nor will it feature pleasure boating or recreational fishing activities.
The end of the “Cold War” has led to unprecedented changes in security posture for most nations. Nowhere, with the possible exception of the former Soviet Union, has this re-assessment been more pronounced than in the United States.

In 1952, the governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States entered into the ANZUS Treaty. Negotiated at the height of the Cold War, ANZUS was primarily a mutual defence pact that commits each nation to respond to any armed attack against any of them. That the treaty is still in force says much for the foresight of its drafters, but does a mutual defence pact written to protect against international communist aggression have any relevance in the new world order?

By reviewing the published policy and statements of the United States and Australian governments, this article will establish that:

• The Asia-Pacific region is a focus of both governments’ security policy and as the economic and political importance of the region expands, will remain so for at least the medium term;
• Both governments have significant shared goals and interests in the region;
• The ANZUS Treaty has been re-focused to operate in the new security environment by a commitment to foster regional stability through defence cooperation; and therefore
• The ANZUS alliance remains vital to the security and defence of Australia and the United States.

The aim of this article is to examine the continued importance of the ANZUS alliance to Australia’s and the United States’ defence, and security in light of their changing priorities since the end of the Cold War.
States. This joint declaration significantly increased the scope of defence cooperation and affirmed the shared goals and priorities of the two nations in the Asia-Pacific. It also reaffirmed the mutual defence provisions of the treaty but within the framework of contributing to regional stability.

**Australia’s Strategic Policy**

Australia’s Strategic Policy, 1997, identifies the Asia-Pacific as Australia’s primary area of strategic interest. This is entirely consistent with Australia’s ongoing engagement with the Asia-Pacific which has been described by both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister as Australia’s number one foreign policy goal.

Australia’s strategic policy has two primary mutually supporting aims. The first is to reduce the likelihood of an attack on Australia or its strategic interests. This is achieved through a network of multi- and bilateral relationships with nations in the Asia-Pacific region and by fostering a vital and interdependent Asia-Pacific region where the use of force is discouraged. The second aim to be able to defeat any such attack if it did happen.

The Australian Government recognises that the United States is a “key element of regional stability” in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, ANZUS forms the basis for practical cooperation in areas such as defence technology, logistics and intelligence, as well as joint training and operational experience. This broad cooperation is a significant contributor to Australia’s self reliant defence posture, and access to high technology, or maintaining the knowledge edge, has been identified as particularly important.

The importance of the other security relationships is the way they create an environment of trust and interdependence through the ready availability of information and extended trade and political links. As nations become more dependant on each other the cost of armed aggression increases and therefore becomes less likely.

**US Policy Towards Asia and the Pacific**

As the only superpower, the United States has many foreign policy objectives and the Asia-Pacific is only one area of concern. The dismantling of the European communist threat has created for the United States both a more secure and more unsure world.

With the focus off NATO and Europe, the security policy of the United States will more and more, mirror its trade patterns, and this will focus on Asia and the Pacific. Further, several of the world’s potential trouble spots are in the Asia-Pacific, in particular North/South Korea, India/Pakistan, China and Burma.

Fifty-six per cent of the world’s population live in the Asia-Pacific. If the United States, Canada and Russia, all of which are Pacific nations, are included, the percentage is considerably higher. In 1997, 36 per cent of US trade was conducted in the Asia-Pacific region and as the proportion of world GDP produced by the region increases form 25 per cent in 1992 to 33 per cent in 2000 to an estimated 50 per cent by the middle of the next century, the economic significance of the region will greatly increase. Combined with a number of strategic trade routes and possible choke points these statistics “portray the confluence of interests – security, economic and diplomatic – which define the importance of the region to Americans [and] prompts our [America’s] national security strategy of engagement with the goal of a secure, stable and prosperous global community”.

In May of 1997, the United States Government released its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This review established a security strategy based on three principles: to shape the international environment to promote regional stability, reduce threats, and deter aggression in key regions; to be able to respond to any threat, or combination of threats, that may develop; and to prepare for the future by a program of high technology procurement.

The first aim will be achieved in the Asia-Pacific through the stabilising influence of maintaining a forward deployment of about 100,000 troops and through an extensive network of bilateral relationships. Indeed Madeleine Albright has said that “We must maintain strong alliances, for there is no better way to prevent war”.

**Shared Interests and Common Goals**

A comparison of the preceding two sections reveals many similarities in the approaches Australia and the United States have adopted in their security policy. Both have identified the promotion of regional and global stability as central to securing their national interest and both have determined that a varied and vibrant range of regional and bilateral alliances is a key contributor to this aim. Further, both recognise that they must be able to respond to and defeat any threat that does develop and plan, to
counter future threats. The key area of difference in security policy comes about primarily as a result of scale and the global perspective of the United States. The Australian Defence Force has not been called upon to preposition forces overseas, though the Australian Government recognises the contribution this type of deployment by the United States makes to regional security.

The similarities in the posture of Australia and the United States are not coincidental. They are based on deep-seated common values and substantial shared trade and security interests in the Asia-Pacific. These values such as “liberal democracy, freedom, and basic human rights [as well as a] demonstrated shared commitment to the goals of world peace and stability, and to the institutions of the post-war period such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation” have formed the core of a bilateral relationship that US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher described as “one of the most formidable, impressive cooperative relationships in the world”. 25

The Asia-Pacific region is developing into a mature and vital part of the global community. The emerging importance of regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) is nurturing a “growing sense of community in the Asia-Pacific”. 26 This creates an environment where dispute is less likely and trade and interdependence is encouraged, which in turn contributes to regional stability.

Article VIII of the ANZUS Treaty foresaw the introduction of a regional security forum. There is no clear indication that the introduction of this forum is likely at any time in the near future. The ASEAN Regional Forum has taken the first informal steps in this direction, but there is still a lot of work required to bring a large number of culturally diverse nations spread over a huge geographic area to any meaningful mutual stance. However, the region has changed greatly from the early post-colonial days when ANZUS was penned and despite the foresight with which it was drafted it must be brought into line with the post-Cold War security environment.

In July of 1996, Australian and US defence and foreign ministers met for the annual Australian-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN). The result of the two-day long talks was a joint security declaration by the two governments called the Sydney Statement. This declaration reaffirmed a number of shared policy positions and goals on subjects ranging from nuclear non-proliferation, to drug trade to engagement with China. The main achievement of the talks though was to re-focus the ANZUS alliance on promoting regional stability through defence cooperation. 27

Both countries affirmed the importance they place on the role of their bilateral defence relationships with other Asia-Pacific nations to the goal of regional stability. They also recognised the importance of and declared their support for the developing regional fora and their contribution to stability in the region.

The joint declaration then went on to significantly increase the size and scope of defence cooperation between Australia and the United States through joint training and exercises, agreements on sharing intelligence, technology and logistic support and confirmed the role that joint facilities play in fostering regional security. 28

Another area addressed through the forum of the AUSMIN talks was a greater coordination of efforts to combat international crime and in particular the trade in drugs. The nature of this undertaking indicates the depth and flexibility of the alliance between the two nations. 29

The Importance of the Alliance

There can be little doubt that the alliance with the United States is vital to Australia’s strategic interests. Indeed “Australia’s Strategic Policy, 1997” states that it “is by any measure our most important strategic relationship. It is a major strategic asset and its preservation and development is among our highest strategic priorities”. 30 Australia also maintains a technological edge largely through access to technology from the United States and joint exercises and facilities.

The effect of the stabilising influence the United States exercises within the region can not be overstated. Its military presence provides a real counter to aggression and access to the American market has been one of the driving factors of the Asian economic miracle. 31

The benefits to Australia from the ANZUS alliance are quite apparent, but does the United States profit from it as well or is it essentially a one sided agreement? As Asia becomes the economic centre of gravity of the world, the United States will have stronger and stronger economic ties to the region. The flow-on effects of the recent “Asian economic meltdown” demonstrate the growing significance of the region. The aftermath of the economic crisis is now starting to develop into political and civil unrest.
in a number of countries which demonstrates further the need for stabilising influences within the region.

The United States has particularly close ties with a number of the north Asian economies such as Japan, Korea and China and US engagement and influence in this region is undisputed, however Australia is much more closely engaged in south-east Asia and the Pacific than the United States and exerts considerable influence. The Pacific Islands where Australian influence is greatest, represent a block of eight votes in the United Nations and their support of US initiatives has often been a factor in their success.33

As an essentially maritime trading power, America depends on free access to the sea lanes. Australia’s geographic position facing “... insular and peninsular south-east Asia and vital choke points in the sea lanes” could prove most beneficial to US efforts to defend them.34 Australia would also provide important bases for US efforts to control the Indian and southern oceans if the need arose.

Australia has proven herself to be a reliable and competent ally to the United States and has been a vocal supporter in many of the United States diplomatic efforts. This is amply demonstrated by the scope of agreement within the Sydney Statement which covers aspects as broad as trade policy, to nuclear non-proliferation, to engagement with China. Further examples are Australia’s diplomatically vital, if militarily insignificant, contributions to the US-led operations in the Persian Gulf.

The United States has identified the cultivation of bilateral alliances as one of its key methods for developing regional security. This being the case, perhaps the greatest benefit the US gains from the ANZUS relationship with Australia is a substantial cross pollination of the security relationships of the two countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, the United States will benefit from Australia’s relationships with New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, and the south-east Asian states like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and a developing dialogue with Vietnam. Australia, in turn, benefits from America’s considerable network in north Asia.

Continued stability and growth is essential to maintaining the interests of the United States and Australia and both feel that the strongest contributors to stability are a continued US strategic engagement in the region, and a strong and wide range of bilateral relationships.

As part of that network of relationships, the ANZUS alliance is a significant contributor to the defence and security of Australia and the United States, and as the Asia-Pacific region grows in economic importance, will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

The ANZUS alliance has stood the test of time. It has now adjusted to an Asia-Pacific that is becoming the economic centre of gravity of the world, and it must continue to adjust as the multi-lateral regional fora increase in influence.

### NOTES

2. ANZUS Article IV.
3. While it could be argued that a security relationship has existed since the days of the Cutter trade between the two nations, a formal security partnership has really only existed since the US became involved in WWII after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
4. ANZUS was signed in San Francisco on 1 Sept 1951 and came into force on 29 Apr 1952.
6. ANZUS, Article VIII. The foresight of this article is evident as it is only now, after nearly 50 years, that the ASEAN Regional Forum is tentatively considering security issues.
8. ibid, p.2.
13. ibid, p.29.
16. ibid.
18. ibid, p.5.

### Conclusion

Both Australia and the United States have extensive and important strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Notwithstanding the recent economic crisis, the region will continue to grow into the economic centre of gravity of the world which makes these interests even more important to both countries.
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The Genocidal Events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Community’s Ability to Deter Future “Ethnic Cleansing”

By Major John Hutcheson, RA Inf

Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?
Vladimir Gligorov

Beware your enemy, but beware your friend a hundred fold. Because if your friend becomes your enemy he can hurt you all the more, because he knows the tunnels to your heart.
Passage from the Koran

Introduction

If the international community is to succeed in achieving its desired endstate in Kosovo it is important that we examine the previous events in Bosnia-Herzegovina to provide some guidance on a workable solution. Prior to 1989 Yugoslavia had evolved from an autocratic communist state into a semiconfederation of republics characterised by extensive economic liberalisation, political decentralisation and democratisation; however, the impact of globalisation began to unravel the ideological basis of Titoism. As a general decline in living standards corroded the Yugoslav national identity and social cohesion, individuals and collectives sought security in traditional ethnic groupings to ensure their survival. In simple terms, it was a desire for recognition or “sense of belonging” that political leaderships translated into ethnonationalism. In constructing ethnicity as a basis for citizenship, the leadership was able to define who belonged to the group and justify the exclusion of “others” from any social or political obligations. The real challenge, however, was dividing large territories of intermixed ethnic groups to build respective national power bases whilst satisfying the personal ambitions of certain leaders. This was achieved by using the state’s absolute control of the media to harness the explosive power of ethnie and mobilise mass support for a deliberate policy of “ethnic cleansing”. When the new ruling elites were unable to reach a peaceful arrangement, a series of successive wars to gain territorial control began, and in the process, expelled, imprisoned or killed people of other ethnic groups. For the analyst, these events are a manifestation of the incompatibility between objective or reified nationalistic cultures and the actual reality of everyday life. In essence, “ethnic cleansing” was a planned and ideologically motivated series of “sustained purposeful actions” to consolidate power along ethnic lines in response to a crisis.

Initially the international community watched events unfold until images of “detention camps” and “train wagons for cattle crowded with women, the elderly and children” galvanised domestic opinion to force western governments to broker a settlement, which for some analysts has effectively legitimised ethnic apartheid. In a “New World order”, based on tenets of solidarity and respect for fundamental human rights, how could the international community have allowed ethnic cleansing to become a viable policy option? These events are worthy of examination to improve our ability to predict and deter future occurrences, and educate the international community sufficiently to ensure Kosovo’s final solution is sustainable. The aim of this article is to assess the concept of ethnic cleansing and determine the level of deterrence and/or prevention the international community is willing to pursue in the New World order.

What is Genocide?

In attempting to analyse ethnic cleansing, it is important to understand what constitutes genocide and how to apply that definition to the events in the former Yugoslavia. In doing so, we are able to objectively counter the emotive power associated with a word that “seems to be a psychological barrier, which once passed demands increased attention”. For international lawyers, genocide involves defining a particular crime based on a perpetrator’s guilt; therefore, it needs to be rigorous enough to stand up to judicial review. On the other hand, social scientists
seek to discover the essence of genocide in order to anticipate and deter future instances, and punish perpetrators. A major stumbling block, however, is that international organisations, such as the United Nations and NATO, are comprised of nation states committed to concepts of sovereignty, self-determination and territorial integrity that significantly conflicts with notions of universal human rights.

In defining genocide, we are examining a social process based on a complex power relation between perpetrator (domination) and victim (subordination) that overlaps other behavioural patterns, such as gain, glory, fear, revenge, ideology and terror, but is not reducible to them. As a result a definition of genocide can range from the maximalist who embrace all instances of mass killings, to the minimalists who focus on themes of intentionality and distinctiveness. Chalk (1994) reinforces intent rather than consequence by highlighting the fact that past perpetrators have acted in the name of utopian or absolutist ideologies aimed at cleansing and purifying their worlds. In demonstrating “a pattern of purposeful action leading to the destruction of a significant part of the targeted group”, we are trying to bridge the gap between legal guilt (intent) and a perpetrator’s motive (accounting for social behavioural influences). In response to a social crisis, individuals may lose their moral obligations to others and act as a collective or organised actor to begin a series of “sustained purposeful actions” focusing on a defined victim group that is a perceived threat. Our dilemma is trying to understand why the dominant group in a plural society selects a specific victim group. Additionally, the language and images of genocide imply that it is primordial behaviour and deep within an individual’s psyche; therefore, what is the trigger to reduce our moral obligations to others? If we do not appreciate the fundamental tension between legal and moral interpretations of genocide, we are unable to truly understand how ethnic cleansing occurred and why international actions were unable to deter it from happening.

### The Disintegration of Yugoslavia

It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the various phases of the war in Yugoslavia or the impact of numerous peace initiatives on the fighting. It is, however, important to realise that the conflict is inseparable from the changing and uncertain international environment in the post-Cold War period. What began as a simple declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 has resulted in the complete disintegration of Yugoslavia, a bitter ethnic conflict, a major refugee crisis and numerous human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing. Within six months the conflict in Croatia had created the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the death toll after the first two years “was greater than 70,000. More than 2 million people of a population of 4.3 million became refugees or were displaced to other parts of the republic, expelled from their homes – probably never to return – by fear, war, or nationalist extremists aiming to rid their town or village of people whose ethnicity was different”.

For some observers, the use of Serb troops and paramilitary groups to protect ethnic Serb minorities in the independent Croatia, and Belgrade’s subsequent expansionist policy were the catalysts. Whilst for others it is impossible to understand the ferocity of recurring Balkan conflicts “without reference to the widespread clichés of a romantic nationalism, the deliberate fomenting of old hatreds, resentments and fears and the systematic playing on collective national memories of glorious classical or medieval empires and kingdoms”. These limited assessments, however, underestimate the impact of globalisation and widespread political disintegration, in particular in eastern European states, that is characteristic of the current transitional period of international relations.

The *raison d’etre* of Yugoslavia, embodied in Titoism, was a system of governance that allowed for the co-existence of several rival ethnic groups with competing national ideologies. By the 1980s the central government’s failure to offset the impact of globalisation by transforming to a market-driven economy caused a general decline in living standards, and “corroded the social fabric and the rights and securities, individuals and families had come to rely on”. In addressing those concerns the more prosperous constituent republics sought to maintain their autonomy over scarce resources at the expense of national objectives. However, over time the various ethnic groups had become intermixed and therefore, the peaceful division of territory was always going to be difficult. In summary, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was the result of global forces that challenged the formal state security mechanisms “Yugoslavs” had come to rely on, and created a void that ambitious and opportunist leaders manipulated to incite individual and collective fears for personal gain.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb and Croat national groups proclaimed self-determining regions within...
the republic’s previous territorial boundaries. As land is essential for recognition, the subsequent expulsion, imprisonment and mass killings of people according to their ethnic background, had little to do with ethnicity and more with securing territorial rights for the few. For Woodward (1995), the policy of ethnic cleansing is based not on “primordial hatreds or local jealousies, but with political goals”. To realise those goals, the political leadership utilised the media to portray nationalistic symbols and images to motivate a genocidal policy of “sustained purposeful actions”. Therefore, in analysing ethnic cleansing, the question is not only how political elites mobilise that support, but also what motivates someone to turn on their neighbour.

**How Could Genocide Occur in Europe at the End of the Twentieth Century?**

In examining the European landscape over the past 100 years it remains evident that the only states to survive are those that have been able to “homogenise their population culturally, developing a sense of people”. This is based on the premise that we possess a variety of simultaneous identities, such as family, town or village, region, sex, class, ethnic and religious, that ensures a “sense of belonging”. If that same identity is altered to a collective, such as ethnie, its power becomes a real force. Simply, “ethnie [is] a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity”. Whereas we could assume modernisation dissipates the unique and explosive association of ethnie, increased communication and intergroup contact have reinforced it.

The human need for survival (security) and our propensity for violence would account for individual and group aggression in response to a perceived threat. The critical observation, however, is that human behaviour is shaped by social and moral forces composing of:

- firstly, the suppression of irrational and anti-social drives, and, secondly, the gradual, but relentless elimination of violence from social life, or more precisely, the concentration of violence under the control of the state, where it is used to guard the perimeters of the national community and the conditions of social order.

As the Yugoslav federation had realised the individual’s societal needs, such as security, identity and recognition, its disintegration ensured that insecure individuals sought to re-establish a “sense of belonging” to something. For Woodward (1995), a sense of community becomes highly prized, not because of ethnic identities and cultural attachments, but because the basis of existing communities has collapsed and governments narrow what they can guarantee in terms of subsistence, land, employment and citizenship. Therefore, no individual becomes amoral, but a collective identity can shape their perceptions of certain events to offer a solution to their own insecurity.

The response, or for David Apter, a “disjuncture moment” in history was the transformation and reformation of that threat into an ideology that combined both myth and theory. The winning message of each republic in the free elections held in 1991 was, apart from Bosnia-Herzegovina, nationalism based on the dominant ethnic group. The notion of citizenship and conformity implied citizens had rights that non-citizens didn’t share; for example, the Serb minority in Croatia was asked to take a loyal oath and offered no cultural autonomy, these policies undoubtedly intensified Serbian fears.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb and Croat leaders proclaimed self-determining intensified Serbian fears.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb and Croat leaders proclaimed self-determining intensified Serbian fears. In order to consolidate their power, Milosevic, Franco Tudjman, Radovan Karadzic and other former communists used ideology in a similar way to “the opportunism that made them communists in the Tito era”. For Milosevic, the usefulness of ethnic nationalist ideology allowed him to tap “a rich seam of national grievance, officially stifled but privately nurtured for decades. Its primitive appeal, the Communist leadership believed, would revive Serbia’s stagnating political and economic system”. In essence, the leadership manufactured ethnicity as a tenet of nationalist ideology in order to use its explosive properties to consolidate their own power bases.
As the aspirations of other ethnic groups were perceived as a threat or obstacle to consolidating power, ethno-nationalism allowed ruling elites to define and justify the exclusion of those groups from any social or political obligations. In justifying their goal in terms of “we can’t live together”, they used territory as a referent object for the individual. In essence;

constructing boundaries between groups based on categorical identities and their links between these boundaries to cultural systems in nation-states, humans create purity out of impurity. The starting point for the definition of purity is not some objective point at which ‘real’ purity, or for that matter, authentic culture, existed, but rather the classificatory moment of purification and the range of issues that motivate its invention.25

Therefore, in the structural logic of “ethnic purity” the presence of “others” implies a compulsion to “cleanse”. The first instance of ethnic re-confirmation was Milosevic’s response to Kosovo’s calls for independence in 1987 in which he used a political campaign of images and “discourse of violence, rape particularly, aiming to spread fear of communication over ethnic boundaries”.26

In order to gain credibility for nationalist claims of protecting family and land, the political leadership sought the support of intellectuals to revisit history and reignite ethnic sensitivities, mutual suspicions and revenge. Woodward states (1995), territory is the link between historical analysis and moral obligations to avenge the “deaths of kin”. During the Second World War, whole villages in Bosnia-Herzegovina had latent political identities associated with either the Partisan (Communists), Chetnik (Serbian Royal Army) or Ustashe (Croatian fascists),27 and some ethnically mixed. In fact certain villages did experience atrocities at the hands of the German and fascist collaborators, however since then, people had lived peacefully together for 40 years despite those wartime experiences.28 In reviving those experiences the Serbian leadership was able to portray Serbia as the victim of post-war economic and political discrimination by their fellow Croats and Slovenes.

The use of loyal intellectuals (academics) gave an element of credibility to the leadership’s goals, and therefore legitimised their genocidal policy.

In order to shape the perceptions of individuals, in particular those that had no real wartime experience, the ruling elites used their control of the media to reinforce particular symbols and revive memories to mobilise mass support. In essence, “the transformation of idea into deed involves the explication of symbolic processes that mediate the communication between leaders and population, invoking them to think, feel, and act collectively according to its premises”.30 For example, Serbian media in the summer of 1990 used previously concealed Ustashe and the revisionist symbols of the Seagram government massacres, to rekindle animosity against Croatia perpetrators. Without offering an alternative point of view, the leadership was able to manipulate images to demonise and isolate Croats in the eyes of Serb nationals.

A series of “sustained purposeful actions”

For ethnic groups, the principle of self-determination not only legitimised homogenisation, but also justified the elimination of minorities as a logical step to nation building. In normal circumstances, the act of defining citizenship could be a form of bureaucratic ethnic cleansing, however, in order to remove recalcitrant minorities a more radical policy is required. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, all ethnic groups engaged in a systematic campaign of denying basic human rights, establishing detention camps, destroying cultural symbols, rape to demean and dilute the gene pool, killing of men to eliminate the gene pool, and robbery and destruction of property, with the sole aim of creating ethnic enclaves supported by a patriarchy.31 In the end, the key to success was the ongoing military, political and social support each ethnic group received from Belgrade and Zagreb throughout the conflict.

In analysing the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina it becomes apparent that the operation was conducted with military precision to destroy the opposition’s will to resist. For example, encirclement and use of heavy artillery to shell population centres; the use of snipers to restrict freedom of movement; and commando raids by small disciplined groups of soldiers, created conditions of starvation and disease with the clear objective of persuading people to leave without putting up a fight.32 In other cases, prior to an operation villages were infiltrated by secret police to identify local leaders that needed to be eliminated in order to prevent cohesive resistance. To instil a perpetual cycle of hatred and fear that would ensure different ethnic groups could never live together again, perpetrators used humiliation, terror and cruelty to achieve their aims.33 As a final sign of humiliation, refugees watched the destruction of their villages and were forced to sign over property, thereby legitimising their own forced removal. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the resources, such as training, weapons and even organised military forces, to achieve this series of “sustained purposeful actions”,
was provided to local ethnic leaders by the Belgrade and Zagreb governments.

Finally, given that the process involves many actors at different social levels there is a need to understand why individuals participate in genocidal activities. Disregarding the small percentage of society that are inherently evil and thrive on these opportunities, there are possibly three main reasons for individuals to lose their moral obligation to others. Firstly, intellectual ideological credibility coupled with the political leadership’s ambivalence to international concern makes the individual believe the acts they are committing do not constitute genocide. Secondly, the fact that militias consisted of untrained irregulars made it difficult to restrain personal animosities or vendettas. In turn, transporting “outsiders” into a village ensured there was no local attachment. Finally, the localised nature of the conflict and vulnerability of victims made it easy for fanatical groups to commit atrocities without formal restraint. This paradoxically allowed the political leadership to deny any responsibility. As in Northern Ireland, leaders will be able to draw on the memories of ethnic cleansing and a perpetuating cycle of conflict will continue unless the international community acts now in Kosovo to deter or prevent future occurrences.

How Successful was the International Community in Deterring and Preventing Ethnic Cleansing?

Prior to March 1991 there was a “window of opportunity” to negotiate a peaceful solution, however, other international events such as Europe’s preoccupation with integration, the Soviet Union’s political crisis and the inability of the United States to determine its role in the New World order, permitted ethnic cleansing to commence. In effect, “stopping the violence was not worth the bones of one Western soldier, and, secondly, that it was up to the west to choose how much or how little it could become involved in [the] conflict”. When the international community did intervene, it was trapped between a commitment to principles of sovereignty, self-determination and territorial integrity, and a moral obligation to protect universal human rights. The international community’s inability to agree on a solution sent a clear signal to the key actors that any collective action would not only be divided but also too late to stop ethnic cleansing.

Once the gravity of the situation became more apparent and media images began to galvanise domestic opinion, a solution in the New World order seemed simple. However, the inability of decision-makers to agree on the conflict’s causes, and therefore the goals of intervention, was an indication of wider issues that focused on what international security regime would replace the bipolar Cold War balance of power. The fundamental questions were:

Why were European powers, with substantial troops on the ground in their own backyard, unable to achieve a political settlement of ethnic conflicts over territory without the power and political leadership of the United States? What did it mean for the United States to be the sole superpower if it was unwilling to put troops on the ground in Bosnia in defence of a policy that insisted on rolling back military aggression and levelling the playing field with the use of air power? Was Russia a part of Europe?

For the United States, the conflict “was an act of aggression by Serbs on the legitimate government of a sovereign member of the United Nations”. After all if Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were recognised nation-states, then Milosevic’s actions could be associated with other rogue leaders, such as Saddam Hussein, and therefore posed a significant threat to world order and stability. For the European community, the repression of ethnic rivalries and identities by communism was the fundamental cause. Regardless of this difference in interpretation it took domestic pressure to raise ethnic cleansing to a level that ensured the international community would contribute political or military resources to solve the conflict.

The defining moment was the extermination of several thousand Muslim civilians by Serb militias at Srebrenica in July 1995. This strengthened the international community’s resolve to intensify pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and also Serbia (imposing economic sanctions and threats of NATO military strikes) to end the conflict. The subsequent Dayton Peace Accords provided a general framework for the “observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace”. However, dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethnically defined autonomous regions the plan supports the objectives of ethnic cleansing. Local ethnic authorities, to consolidate military gains, have used the process of negotiated population exchanges and UNPROFOR to assist in “cleansing” villages and enclaves. In reality, a cantonised Bosnia-Herzegovina may stop the killing for now; however, unless the groups are integrated into a heterogeneous
entity, the endless cycle of retribution and revenge will continue once the international community’s attention is focused elsewhere. For Izetbegovic, the Accords are “not a just peace, and without justice, there can be no peace”.

This lesson is central to developing a sustainable solution to the current Kosovo crisis.

It is the perception of “justice being done” that will be critical to an ongoing achievable solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The establishment of an international tribunal sets a precedent. Its legitimacy “including the problem of sentence enforcement and the spectre of victor’s justice”, is questionable. If the tribunal is ineffective it will send a clear signal to other leaderships that genocide is a policy option. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the need to continue to deal with the leadership remains a necessity to maintain the peace, therefore, it is unlikely they will be brought to trial. At the least their movement will be restricted to the territorial confines of their respective enclaves, for example, Radovan Karadzic remains elusive. The emerging trend indicates that it is more likely that their subordinates will be prosecuted.

From a layman’s perspective, the Dayton Accords are a “middle ground” for United States and European interests rather than seeking reconciliation, reconstruction and justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is emerging that a Kosovo endstate will replicate the Dayton Accords which represents a significant failure by the international community to realise that in the long term, such a solution is unworkable.

**Conclusion**

In determining what constitutes genocide it is important for us to adopt a definition that is not only realistic, but also reflects everyday usage by reasonable people. This article examines the disintegration of Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina, to prove that ethnic cleansing was a methodical series of sustained purposeful actions to create homogenous ethnic regions. In simple terms, ethnic cleansing is a deliberate genocidal policy option to eliminate “other” ethnic identities; from denying individuals their cultural identity to mass killings. Opportunist political leaderships were able to harness the explosive qualities of ethnic identity and translate it into a nationalist ideology to consolidate power. In focusing on the exclusive nature of nationalism and equating territorial control to ethnic identity, the leadership manufactured ethnicity as a principle for genocide. In order to alter an individual’s moral obligations to others, the intelligentsia and a lack of alternative views in the media gave the policy credibility. In essence, these events are a manifestation of the incompatibility between objective or reified nationalistic cultures and the actual reality of everyday life.

At the moment, the fragile stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina is maintained only with the presence of a force of international peacekeepers. It does function as a coherent state, however if the peacekeepers were to leave, it is likely that the fighting would start again. Therefore, in seeking to avoid a costly short term military solution, the international community has “made a rod for its own back” by establishing a long term economic requirement to support the Dayton Accords. In turn, its failure to respond quickly sent a clear signal to the perpetrators that external action would be divided, too late and ineffective. In the short term, the Dayton Accords have cantonised Bosnia-Herzegovina and reinforced the goals of ethnic cleansing. In the long term, “the success of state building faces three difficult and interrelated challenges: preventing a resumption of fighting among the Bosnian protagonists; developing a [democratic and] viable political system; and resettling the thousands of people who were forced to leave their homes”.

The key to these goals will be justice, however, at the grassroots level there is a fear that the international tribunal is running out of time, which will not only undermine confidence in the process but also discourage true reconciliation. As a result of the international community’s failure to deal effectively with ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina the recent events in Kosovo are not a surprise. If our assessment of ethnic cleansing is to draw any major observation, it is; if the genocidal events are not in the national interests of crucial decision-makers, then the international community’s ability to prevent and deter future occurrences in the fictitious New World order is non existent.

**NOTES**

4. That is, the basic features of genocide and the social forces that cause them to occur.
5. The nation-state is the principal agency of political power in the modern world and controls the “means of violence”. But to construct stable nation-states, state elites must control society to claim that they represent the national interest. Therefore, in the nation building stage there is a perceived need to repress
elements of society that pose a threat or obstacle to national stability and unity.


7. F. Chalk, “Redefining Genocide”, in Andreopoulos, G. (ed), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1994, p. 60. From a maximalist perspective, genocide is not a concept but a moral judgement against all unjust deaths. Charny disregards the minimalist focus on internationality to develop a matrix of definitions that are magnified by a set of degrees to weight their importance. I.Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide”, in Andreopoulos, G. (ed), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1994, p.85. However, such a matrix dilutes genocide’s unique characteristics and the realistic ability for the international community to focus its attention on particular events, such as “ethnic cleansing”.


9. There is a need to determine what problems perpetrators are trying to solve; how did they classify their victims (visible, weak, accessible, weak and hated, despised and/or feared, pose an ideological threat or obstacle); and why was genocide a solution. In doing so, we are able to understand why a particular genocidal policy is perceived as necessary, rational and/or obligatory to fulfil a perpetrator's goals. M. Freeman, op. cit., 1995, p.189.


13. The increase in the rates of intermarriage between members of different national groups is not only an indication of assimilation but also a sign of social integration. In Yugoslavia this occurred predominantly amongst Croat and Serb, and between Serb and Muslim in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the period 1950-80. R. Hayden, “Imagined communities and real victims: self-determination and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia”, American Ethnologist, Vol 23, No 4, 1996, p.788.

14. The concept of self determination is enshrined in the United Nations Charter referring to “the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples as a basis for developing friendly relations among nations and creating conditions of stability and well-being”. It does not, however, infer the right on groups that are defined as a minority within the state. L. Kuper, “Theoretical Issues Relating to Genocide: Uses and Abuses”, in Andreopoulos, G. (ed), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1994, p.39.


16. ibid, p.203.


21. In declaring nationalism as an ideological goal, leaders tend to open a process that defines which citizens have territorial rights and the need to expel, imprison and/or kill those that don’t. In turn, constitutions are an important component in analysing the implementation of nationalist ideologies, as they provide the conceptual framework for the state. R. Hayden, op. cit., 1996, p.787.


24. L. Silber & A. Little, op. cit., p.34.


26. Meznaric cited in S. Woodward, op. cit., 1995, p.229. In turn, Milosevic’s verbal response of “No one will be permitted to beat you” and “They will never humiliate the Serbian people again” became the rallying cry of the Serb national movement.

27. In comparing the ideological basis of Ustashe and Chetnik forces, we can partially understand the source of “ethnic cleansing”. Simply, the Chetniks proposed a “homogenous Serbia” to be accomplished by post-war population exchanges, whilst, the Ustashe sought similar goals for a “greater Croatia”. The fundamental difference was that the Chetniks sought to achieve their goals by expulsion rather than extermination. Whilst the Chetniks did carry out reprisal massacres against Croatian and Muslim civilians, it did not constitute an official genocidal policy. A. Denich, op. cit., p.375.


29. L. Silber & A. Little, op. cit., p.29.

30. B. Denich, op. cit., p.369. In Croatia, Franco Tudjman’s revisionist policies of Second World War atrocities and the re-emergence of Ustashe symbols from the same period, revived memories of the genocide for the local Serb minority. In turn, the exclusive definition of a Croat citizen was reinforced by state symbols, such as a “chessboard” flag and coat of arms, and an official language that rejected Serb minority dialects.

31. In the spring and summer of 1995, the process of expelling populations increased on the part of all parties:
• In May, a Croatian offensive against the Serb enclave of Western Slovonia led to the expulsion of nearly all Serbs from that part of Croatia;
• In July, Serb forces seized two Muslim “safe areas” in eastern Bosnia and expelled or killed all the residents;
• In August, a Croatian offensive in the Krajina area expelled 200,000 Serbs from Croatia; and
• In September, the Muslims, supported by the Croatian Army, conducted an offensive in western Bosnia to drive out Serbs along a line running north from Jayce to Bihac. R. Hayden, op.cit., p.795.


33. L. Silber & A. Little, op. cit., p.270.

34. S. Woodward, op. cit., 1995, p.239.

35. B. Posen, op. cit., p.33.


39. ibid, p. 6.

40. ibid, p. 7.


42. Cited in M. Nowak, ibid, p. 102. It is important to note that the guarantee to consent and cooperate with the Dayton Accord was signed by the leader of the Bosnian Muslims (President
Izetbegovic) whilst the Bosnian Serb and Croat delegations refused. The American negotiators looked to the Croatian (Franco Tudjman) and Serbian (Slobodan Milosevic) Presidents, their patrons and main suppliers of military aid, to sign the Accord.

43. The provisions of the Dayton Accord favour partition. That is, separation of the warring factions, readjustment of territorial boundaries, consolidation of the inter-entity border line, and the United States promise to train and equip a Federation army. The focus of the second phase is integration. That is, guarantee freedom of movement, a free press and refugee reparation, a legal system, including police forces and judiciaries independent of political parties, effective federal institutions and the arrest of indicted war criminals. J. Sharp, “Doing better on Bosnia: Empower the law, protect the rights”, The World Today, February, 1997, p.37.


45. From a legal perspective there are two categories of serious crimes during war, that is war crimes or those committed primarily against combatants in the course of military actions, and crimes against humanity, or crimes primarily committed against civilians. I. Charny, op. cit., pp.80-1.


47. Of the 80 suspects indicted by the UN International Criminal Tribunal as at 26 August 1998, 33 suspects have been apprehended or confirmed deceased and 25 are currently awaiting trial. On a closer examination, however, none of the major leaders have been apprehended and the bulk of Serb perpetrators are still “at large” (ICTY suspects, 1998).


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Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces

By Captain B. A. Wood, RAA

Military and naval history show a persistent pattern of deeply engrained internecine suspicions and hostilities, and a strong correlation between defeat and frustration on the one hand and victory and cooperation in wartime on the other.¹

Combined arms contributed to success. Modern warfare is all about joint operations, yet the very strengths of such operations demand strong single service capabilities.²

Introduction

Recent world conflicts have demonstrated that no longer are wars confined to one environment. As such, neither wars, nor battles can be won by decisive action on the part of a single service alone. For victory to be attained in modern conflict it requires the highest level of coordination and cooperation between the armed forces involved. Moreover, for this interaction between the navies, armies and air forces of respective nations to be truly successful, it requires commanders and their staffs to conceive, plan and execute all operations with continued regard to the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and limitations of all the services involved. This is the essence of “joint” operations.

This article will seek to illustrate that not only are joint operations essential for attaining victory in both contemporary and future conflicts, but that these operations are possible despite, or rather because of, the strong individual service cultures that still exist in today’s armed forces. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and other nations’ armed forces will be referred to throughout this article as examples of both single-service and joint working environments. To conclude, this article will seek to determine how any lingering impediments to joint operations within the ADF can be overcome through greater integration between the services at all levels.

The Need for Joint Doctrine, Training and Understanding

On the technology-intensive battlefield of the late 20th Century, the amount of firepower available to the commander is immense. Physical control and a thorough understanding of all of the many and varied weapon systems is beyond even the best commander. The rapid pace of modern battle, its fluid nature, and its encompassing of all environments exacerbate this fact. Operations utilizing all battlefield resources therefore need to be planned and understood to an unprecedented degree well before the first shot is fired. As Chesterfield continues:

Based on historical evidence, such [modern three-dimensional] operations need close co-operation and central direction, to ensure that resources are used efficiently and that the activities of one component do not inhibit the activities of another…³

While the co-ordination and direction of contemporary operations can still be achieved within deployable field headquarters, the shape of these headquarters is changing. The role of a commander’s staff is growing in importance as warfare becomes more complex. To understand and ensure the correct application of all elements under their control, commanders require representatives from all services involved. This applies as much to battlegroup level operations, as it does to formation and higher. Moreover, for the military operation to achieve all its specified tasks, the planning and doctrine utilized must represent the most recent thinking and collaboration by all services involved.

To succeed, a commander’s plan needs to remain effective after H-hour and therefore, as Weston describes, this may well necessitate it encompassing subsequent operations in all three environments.

Combat operations in all three environments [sea, air and land] can indeed produce a synergistic effect. Hence, there is an abiding need to develop doctrine, operational art, tactics, techniques and procedures so as to be assured of that synergy.⁴

This doctrine, and resultant joint training, needs to be frequently tested and revised so as to ensure that the latest combinations of weapon systems still
provide the best utilization of resources for achieving victory. Once complacency affects joint doctrine and planning, the results can be profound, as the Israeli Defence Force can attest from the reverses they suffered because of an over reliance upon the tank-fighter combination during the early stages of the October 1973 war.

To achieve the best synergy of resources in the conduct of joint operations it requires all parties to possess well-developed single-service capabilities because these form the building blocks upon which successful joint doctrine, training, and ultimately operations are constructed. The land, maritime and air force commanders at all levels must bring to any joint operation a sound understanding of their own forces’ capabilities and weaknesses, and a realistic belief that they can conduct any action required within these parameters. Just as important, however, is for all commanders to have an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the other services, and therefore be able to determine objectively where the resultant weaknesses in any joint operations may lie. As Chesterfield states, problems can arise because, “even very senior officers are mere mortals, with their perceptions very often biased to single-service experience and requirements”.

Cosgrove elaborates on this requirement to understand objectively the capabilities of the other services involved when he states that:

The common criticism levelled between the services is not one of ill-will or incompetence, but a lack of understanding. The solution to this is education and the foundation of education is doctrine.

This inherent lack of understanding between the services remains the most significant hurdle to be overcome before truly joint operations become a reality. The establishment of joint headquarters is the first step to overcoming this hurdle. The manning of these headquarters by professional staff with the requisite attitude, aptitude and approach toward joint operations is the second, and more difficult, step that needs to be taken before single-service strengths can be combined to an optimum level.

Joint operations are both a realistic and necessary goal, however, the means of achieving such an outcome does not include ridding the individual services of their own peculiar cultures. The cultures that exist within the services are the result of hundreds of years of tradition and identity forged in many conflicts, and can not be disregarded or considered superfluous. As Newell states:

These different [service] cultures are the natural product of years of operating in one of three specific functional areas. Indeed, much of the service-specific culture may in fact be essential to survival in its own environment.

Joint Framework (+)

In order for truly joint operations to be realized the incompatibilities that may stem from inter-service rivalries and cultural differences need to be addressed on two fronts: firstly, by changing the framework for operational command within the armed forces, and secondly, by changing the current opinions and perceptions within the minds of service personnel, principally the commanders. The feeling of superiority in one’s own service is only natural, but an apparent aloofness can result in a lack of communication between the services that can, if left unchecked for protracted periods, lead to significant difficulties in the development of joint doctrine and joint service training, as well as inter-service working relationships. These difficulties are often the result of military officers from varying backgrounds being thrust together to work towards a joint solution. As Newell argues, however: “The solution is not to change each other’s cultural point of view, but to understand that each will have a different cultural background”.

The best means of gaining this understanding is to force military commanders from all services to gain exposure to working in a joint environment from the initial stages of their careers. For many years the United States’ armed forces experienced this lack of inter-service understanding, and resultant animosity. Although Operation Desert Storm illustrated the essential requirement for thorough joint planning, it also highlighted to a lesser extent the friction between the individual services that has always existed within the United States’, and indeed, all nations’ armed forces. As Beaumont elaborates:

Putative causes of the frictions visible there include the range of endemic interservice frictions, personalities, structure, doctrine, and personnel policies of the kind that produced a dearth of effective jointness in the United States’ armed forces from World War II until it was curtailed if not wholly brought under control by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

Long before the Act of 1986, the United States military had recognized that the framework for joint operations was simply not present. As a result, in 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Committee was established, and two years later the first Chairman
appointed to the joint command position. However, as Powell, a past Chairman of the JCS Committee details, the establishment of a new joint structure for command could not by itself overcome the existing rivalry, lack of understanding and long-standing suspicions between the individual services: 

_The system was seriously flawed. Each chief, except the Chairman, was the head of his own service, yet also expected to vote against service parochialism in the national interest... The chiefs had trouble going “purple”... The deck was stacked against the very thing these dual-hatted leaders were supposed to achieve, “jointness.”_10

As Powell concludes: “Jointness in our time was more often produced out of the necessity of the moment rather than built into the machinery”._11

Actions, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Australia’s creation of operational positions, such as the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and Commander of Joint Forces Australia (CJFA), and operational headquarters such as Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST), have put in place the framework for joint operations and created a more streamlined joint environment. It is now reliant upon each service to develop the right personnel and experience base so as to be able to contribute to these headquarters and conduct truly joint operations. From the preliminary stages, including the writing of doctrine, through to the planning and actual conduct of military operations all personnel must think “purple” in order to ensure that the best military power is utilized to achieve the desired (joint) tasks. An obvious recent failure to conduct all aspects of operations planning along joint lines resulted in a significant number of Coalition casualties from friendly fire during Operation _Desert Storm_.

**Exposure to Joint Environments from An Early Age**

Despite, or rather because of, the technological advances in the conduct of modern warfare, the success of joint operations will continue to depend upon their commanders and their staff at all levels, and the effectiveness of the interaction between commanders from all services involved. Stephens, in describing Australian Army/Air Force relations, provides an example of how a lingering inter-service cultural difference can compound to affect joint operations for years to come:

_By about the late 1960s it probably did not matter how competent the men and women at the working level were. A generation of lieutenant-colonels and majors had come to believe that the RAAF did not care about army support, and they were to carry that belief into the 1970s and beyond._12

This suspicion with regard to the RAAF continues within elements of the Australian Regular Army (ARA), and is often reinforced by the actions of RAAF personnel supporting Army units who fail to understand the differing priorities, requirements and work ethic of the ARA.

While this is but one example of a “lack of understanding”, the net result is such that bad experiences working in “joint” environments today may well be remembered for years to come. Ultimately these experiences may prejudice both operational and doctrinal decisions in the future. Therefore, in order to achieve the optimum joint solution for military situations the perceptions of all military commanders towards the other services must be influenced for the better, and this can only be achieved by constant exposure to a tri-service environment. The creation of a joint operational command structure for the ADF, extending from the CDF through environmental component and joint force, rather than service commanders, therefore sends the best possible signal to all ranks. While the single service remains as the training ground and centre of excellence for specific environment-related skills, it has become apparent that only a joint effort will be used for future military operations. As Weston elaborates:

_The recently announced restructuring of the strategic and operational levels of command in the ADF is an important development in furthering the ADF capability to muster a seamless joint operational capability. The appointment of Commander Australian Theatre as the operational level is a watershed in this process._13

While this restructuring will be seen as a step towards greater inter-service cooperation, there remains a requirement for inter-service integration at the lower levels, because, in an ever-shrinking ADF, it is here that junior commanders are (or should be) first exposed to joint operations, and first impressions do last. If a basic understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the other services can be attained at an early stage in an officer’s career then this knowledge can be developed as his or her career progresses. This understanding and knowledge can be added to the wealth of service-particular knowledge that an officer attains to produce a potential commander possessing the correct mental attitude for joint positions. Moreover, commanders will hold no fear of future
joint operations because its aspects will not be 
unfamiliar, and any previous bad experiences 
stemming from inter-service misunderstandings 
can be placed in the context of the particular situation 
rather than being remembered as a blight on another 
services’ entire capabilities.

To achieve this level of understanding at the 
lowest levels, however, it requires, as Weston argues:

the development of a cadre of “purple suited” 
officers [as] a prerequisite for the development of 
mature, dynamic and durable joint doctrine.¹⁴

In terms of the framework to achieve this, there 
needs to be a continued emphasis upon formal joint 
professional training through institutions, such as the 
Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Joint 
Services Staff College (JSSC), and the ADF staff 
college, as well as the ADF Warfare Centre 
(ADFWC). Of these institutions ADFA provides the 
key to developing an officer corps with a widespread 
knowledge, understanding and (hopefully) 
appreciation of the other services. This understanding 
should therefore be emphasized and fostered, and not 
curtailed by segregation along service lines, as is 
currently occurring.

While a cadet’s life at ADFA is a busy one, and 
the focus for individuals is quite correctly on 
academic excellence within a military environment, 
after graduation it is the tri-service “old boy’s 
network” that becomes just as important to the 
professional officer as a demonstrated ability to 
reason and argue at a tertiary level. Consequently, as 
well as utilizing the immediate benefits of these 
institutions, the understanding of other services 
developed at this early age needs to be retained 
through the creation of a joint staff career stream for 
better performing officers who show the potential for 
working in joint staff and command appointments. 
While I acknowledge that the current demands upon a 
junior officer place the emphasis upon gaining a 
sound understanding of, and technical knowledge 
within, their particular service, these “regimental” 
postings must be interspersed with time in joint staff, 
and ultimately, command appointments. It must be 
stressed to any officer with aspirations beyond field 
rank that a background in joint staff appointments is 
required. The United States military, although a vastly 
larger organisation than its Australian counterpart, 
currently holds the lead in establishing “purple” as a 
more popular colour, especially for officers up for 
promotion to one star level.¹⁵ This attitude needs to be 
replicated within the ADF.

At present, within the ARA, the shortage of junior 
oficers in particular has resulted in many reaching 
field rank with a dearth of non-corps, let alone joint 
experience. This trend needs to be reversed with a re-
focusing of priorities in respect to officer postings 
outside an individual’s particular corps. As a first 
step, individuals must be encouraged to seek 
demanding joint opportunities instead of remaining 
within the effective “comfort zone” of their own 
corps. Although a strong single-service background is 
required for joint positions, with no exposure to the 
joint environment officers remain “blinkered” and 
professionally underdeveloped. A better balance than 
that provided currently, especially within the ARA, is 
required.

**Conclusion**

Truly joint operations are required on a modern 
battlefield that combines the latest technology, with 
manoeuvring in all dimensions at a rapid pace. While 
service cultures will remain important as a guarantor 
of the integrity of training, particular to each 
environment, this training must be planned and 
conducted with an eye to its place in the overall joint 
scheme of modern warfare. The precedent has been 
set with the widespread acceptance of the need for 
greater combined-arms training, both on course and 
during exercise. The same thinking needs to be 
applied to the general appreciation of the 
requirements for joint training and operations. If this 
shift in mindset subsequently identifies the need for a 
RAN gunnery officer or RAAF fast jet pilot to attend 
elements of a RAA Forward Observer course, then so 
be it. Future warfare will be joint in nature, and any 
inter-service rivalries that could impede the requisite 
degree of cooperation need to be eliminated at the 
lowest levels. This can be achieved with the correct 
education of the professional military; principally by 
producing sound joint doctrine, conducting joint 
training where required, and emphasizing to the junior 
leaders that they represent the future of their particular 
services within a “purple” environment. As Weston 
concludes:

> Joint application of force is not possible without 
the support of sound joint doctrine and training. 
This will require commanders with a broad 
“purple” philosophy, adaptive and flexible 
thinking, and a good understanding of the range 
of military forces and their joint synergies. Units 
must have well-rehearsed battle procedures based 
on sound joint doctrine for operating in the joint 
force environment on land, at sea and in the air.¹⁶

With the framework for joint operations in place, 
and the continuing education of commanders at all
levels of the requirement to act within a “purple” environment, truly joint operations are possible. Service cultures will always remain, and indeed are required to ensure each service continues to maintain its unique capabilities. The failed Canadian Armed Forces’ experience is testimony to this. Inter-service rivalries, however, need to be overcome through education so that, as Cosgrove states:

The land/air battle is not one to be fought first between sister services before being expanded to include enemies of the state.17

NOTES
8. ibid., p.83.
10. C. L. Powell, A Soldier’s Way: An Autobiography, London: Random House (UK) Limited, 1995, p.410. “Purple” is a term used to describe the combination of the colours of the three services’ uniforms; Navy (white), Army (green), and Air Force (blue). Hence the use of the term “purple” to describe joint positions and appointments.
11. ibid.
14. ibid., p.134.
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Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination in the Australian Defence Force

By Lieutenant Sarah Chapman, RAN

The selection of age 60 as a mandatory retirement standard was based on available studies which indicated that with increasing age there was progressive deterioration of relevant physiological and psychological functions. While there was recognition of the fact that not all individuals experience equivalent age-related deteriorations in health and performance, it was concluded that an age limitation was necessary because deterioration in performance could not be reliably and objectively measured in individuals. (Hyland, Kay & Deimler, 1994b)

Under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act (1986) discrimination means:
(a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin that has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation; and
(b) any other distinction, exclusion or preference that:
(i) has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation; and
(ii) has been declared by the regulations to constitute discrimination for the purposes of this Act;
but does not include any distinction, exclusion or preference:
(c) in respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements of the job.

The aim of this article is to summarise the literature pertaining to age, cognitive impairment and occupational performance with a view to informing policy development regarding mandatory retirement and age discrimination in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). In a recent report to the US Congress, Goldrich (1995) addressed the question of lengthening the average active-duty military career. He noted that to do so would improve budgetary expenditure by facilitating the provision of superior training and military experience to those most capable of fulfilling the mission of the US Armed Forces. However, he also acknowledged that modifications to active duty career length would have substantial impact upon the US defence budget and the operational effectiveness of the armed forces. The application of these issues to the Australian context is the focus of this article.

Maintaining the status quo

A recent Army Office paper (1994) supported the policy of mandatory retirement in the ADF, the author stating that the existing policy has proven effective in maintaining “the organisational effectiveness of the Army and the development of an efficient fighting force” (1 Psych Research Unit, 1994: 2). Whilst this assertion cannot be put to an objective and valid test, a wealth of literature exists to support the view that older persons are less well-suited to the demands of military operations.

For example, Rahe (1976) found a one per cent decline in physiological capacity per year from the age of twenty. According to this model, an individual’s fitness capacity at 45 years of age is 25 per cent less than it was at age twenty. Myhre, Tucker, Bauer, Fisher and Grimm (1997) confirmed this earlier finding, demonstrating that age and measures of physical fitness were significantly correlated with performance of a standardised, strenuous task simulating a fire-fighting emergency. Other findings which suggest a significant decline in physiological capacity with age are that older persons are more susceptible to sleep deprivation (Army Office, 1994), less able to adjust to schedule changes (British Army, 1989), and less able to resist heat stress and adapt to colder climates (Goldman, 1979).

In addition to research examining the physiological decline associated with increasing age, significant attention has also been focused on age-related psychological and cognitive impairment. Using a sample of military enlisted who had seen
active duty during World War II, Brille, Beebe and
Lowenstein (1953) found that young men of 18 and
19 years of age were better able to resist combat or
“battlefield” stress, whilst their older counterparts
(those aged between 30 and 38 years old) were found
to report a greater incidence of mental breakdown.¹

More recently, it has been suggested that a
number of perceptual, psychomotor and cognitive
skills (collectively referred to as “performance” skills)
start to decline in early middle life and are adversely
affected by age, in particular speed of information
processing (Alexander, 1989) and fluid intelligence
(Cornelius & Caspi, 1987).²

Support for the contention that performance skills
show age-related decline comes from a variety of
sources. For example, Morris and Temme (1989)
found that the mean time required to locate a target
slowed significantly with age and that there was a
significant correlation between the mean speed of
near-to-far focus and the night carrier landing
performance amongst a sample of Navy fighter pilots
(see also Morris & Hamilton, 1989). Hyland, Kay and
Deimler (1994b) found that pilot age was negatively
correlated with performance on a flight simulator.
Temme and Still (1991) found that pilots without
glasses were better able to detect targets at a greater
distance (20 per cent farther) than pilots with glasses,
irrespective of age and flight experience, suggesting
that older pilots with corrected vision may not be as
efficient as their younger, more able-bodied
counterparts.

Research has also shown marked performance
decrement with increasing age on tasks requiring
dichotomous attention (NASA, 1995; Reed & Green,
1995), with younger subjects demonstrating greater
adaptation to task demands and faster response times
than their older counterparts (Strasser, Klinger,
Limmroth, Brilling, Coates & Labuc, 1971).

In summary, whilst a substantial body of research
demonstrates age-related decline in performance, a
number of caveats need to be placed on the research
findings. For example, whilst there are real-world
implications of research demonstrating that older
persons perform less well on a variety of perceptual,
psychomotor and cognitive tasks and are less able to
complete multiple tasks simultaneously, care should
be taken in extrapolating the findings taken from
laboratory-based research to military personnel
working in an operational context. The ADF is
comprised of many highly-trained individuals who
have been “imbued with the socialisation, habits and
mores” (Army Office, 1994: 7) of military service,
which renders them better able to deal with the
challenges confronting them in this context than their
civilian counterparts.

Finally, it is important to note that whilst average
performance declines with age, individual variability
is known to increase (Hyland, Kay, & Deimler,
1994b). It is therefore important to acknowledge that
on any given dimension, a number of individuals will
perform better than their age cohort, whilst a number
will perform less well.

Individual Variability and the Role of
Experience

Whilst a vast body of literature has demonstrated
the gradual decline in physiological functioning
associated with increasing age, little research attention
has been focused on individual variability in
performance. Whilst primary ageing, the irreversible
physiological effects of advancing age, are relatively
uniform in their manifestation, secondary ageing
refers to age-related effects which are mediated by
lifestyle and other factors. These include factors such
as internal locus of control, social support, a healthy
diet and regular exercise (Rowe & Kahn, 1987 in

Several authors have argued counter to the
prevailing notion of mandatory retirement of pilots
and other technical professionals, citing research
which has shown a negative correlation between age,
experience and overall accident rate and a less
accurate correlation between chronological and
physiological age than is found in the general
population (see Hoiberg & Blood, 1982).

A number of researchers have demonstrated that
older subjects are able to compensate for age-related
decline in performance of various kinds. For example,
Knapik, Ang, Reynolds and Jones (1993) in
examining the relationship between musculoskeletal
injury and age amongst infantry soldiers, found that
injury rates decreased with age, suggesting that the
experienced soldier is better able to prevent injury
than younger colleagues.³

Kay, Hillman, Hyland, Voros, Harris and Deimler
(1994) failed to find a significant interaction between
pilot age, accident rate and experience. Indeed, further
analysis showed that whilst accident rate was
positively correlated with flying experience until age
40, further increase in flight time beyond age 40 was
associated with a decrease in accident rate.

In examining the effect of age on ability to judge
the collision course of an approaching aircraft, Crook,
Devoe, Hageman, Hanson, Krulee and Ronco (1957)
presented subjects with a simulated cockpit
containing an image of an approaching aircraft. The findings clearly demonstrated a cumulative age-related impairment in the ability to make accurate judgements concerning potential collision. Whilst Crook and his colleagues concluded that the degree of impairment was so small as to be easily compensated by an experienced pilot, they noted that in situations where speed and accuracy were at a premium, experience may not provide an adequate safety margin.

Hyland, Kay and Deimler (1994b) cite a number of researchers who have studied age differences in performance on more complex skills such as typing, chess, bridge, physics and computer programming. Whilst the older subjects showed age-related decline in the skills comprising the more complex tasks, their performance on the task as a whole was comparable to that of their younger counterparts, suggesting that the older subjects drew upon experience and established competencies to bolster their performance.

Mertens, Higgins and McKenzie (1983) found a significant interaction between age and workload such that increased cognitive load resulted in greater performance decrement with age. Finally, research has shown that older persons required to perform complex tasks under stressful or novel conditions (high cognitive load) perform less well than when asked to perform familiar tasks under those same conditions or complex tasks which have been well-rehearsed (see National Institute on Ageing, 1981 cited in Hyland, Kay & Deimler, 1994b).

Whilst somewhat equivocal, the application of the above findings to the military does suggest that older personnel employed in an operational context should be engaged on tasks which draw upon their expertise, which are not predominantly reliant upon more simple cognitive and psychomotor skills such as short-term memory and hand-eye coordination, and which may best be described as having a low cognitive load.

A Question of Competency

The preceding literature review has canvassed a representative sample of the gereontological, psychological and human factors research addressing the decline in physiological capacity and functioning which occurs with age. Ever mindful that group averages are a poor predictor of individual capability, this research suggests that older persons may be less well-suited to operational service within the military than their younger counterparts.

Whilst the development and use of a functional index designed to determine the physiological capacity and operational employability of personnel who, by virtue of their advanced age, may otherwise be deemed unfit for service, seems an attractive and viable option; the cost of developing such an index may prove prohibitive. Despite this, however, the changing demographic profile of the Australian population and its Defence Force may soon dictate that competency-based employment become a reality.

NOTES

1. Despite this oft-cited finding, it should be noted that subsequent research revealed that those men most likely to succumb to combat stress were those who had suffered significant emotional trauma prior to their military experience.
2. Fluid intelligence is defined as the ability to comprehend and assimilate new information.
3. This finding is counter to that of Jones, Cowen, Tomlinson, Robinson and Polly (1993), who found susceptibility to injury and recovery time to increase with age.

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Does Present International Communication Fuel the Concept of a Global Village?

By Amber McKinnon, Department of Defence

Everyday, 22,000 miles above the earth, images that become the substance of television news are fed across time zones, continents and cultures by supranational wholesalers of television news stories. (Cohen, A, 1995).

Communication has become the most important aspect of the average human life. We watch television and read newspapers, for news and entertainment; telephone and e-mail friends and family to socialise; and “surf the net” to research information. We don’t entertain this fact because communication has become second nature.

In the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan shared his view that, as a result of extensive development in becoming a “global village”. An international community that shares information, news and entertainment with understanding, unified through communications. This article intends to disprove McLuhan’s theory of a global village by stating a number of barriers that prevent the international communication necessary to achieve a world community.

To begin with, international communication can be defined as the worldwide transmission of ideas, knowledge and information to inform and educate people separated by distance, culture, politics, language, just to name a few.

The first barrier is communication. It branches into two different subheadings, incorporating the following:

1. Communication: concept, theory, goals, style, accent, and speech pattern; and
2. Culture: gender, religion, language, dress, food, education.

Communication as stated by Lewis & Slade (1994) is shared ideas, knowledge and feeling. We associate international communication with mass communication, in which the media play a large role. They are employed to present the facts and inform the public, but not all media factions share the same concept of communication and news. Tension exists between east and west in direct regard to differing styles and western media portrayal of eastern countries.

This next quote is a Filipino comment about the role of the Australian media reporting news about his country (Lewis & Slade, 1994).

...tends to adopt a moralistic or “foreign missionary” attitude whenever things appear to go wrong in the Philippines and therefore are deemed newsworthy... Television programs seem to harbour a fascination with prostitutes, paedophiles, murder and slavery... From most of what one reads in the news or sees on television – and there is not much – the Philippines appears to be the complete opposite of what Australian normalcy is perceived to be. Through the use of cliches and metaphors an “eternal” Philippines is concocted which is more digestible to the average Australian. A traditional perception of the oriental “Third World” is thus affirmed.

It has been documented (Lewis & Slade, 1994) that “Asian media use media to promote economic and social progress”. If this is the case and history tells us these governments have concealed important information from its public’s, then international communication is non-existent. If occupants of nations do not have access to news then what hope does the international community have of keeping in touch, except through foreign media crews who “get the story”, often at the public relations expense of a nation, considering much of it is highly unfavourable.

So differing concepts of communication that exist between media factions worldwide, as a result of government law or systems in place, do not nurture international communication.

Culture is another barrier within the concept of communication that makes international communication a fallacy. When intercultural communication is distorted in Australia, with individuals espousing racist theories, how can we achieve intercultural international communication to enjoy a global community as such?

When each culture has a different concept of communication it is difficult to effectively communicate in order to share ideas, feelings and information. The Chinese believe in the Buddhist concept of “yuan”. This communication concept places little or no emphasis on verbal communication with the belief that yuan is “a force that allows factors to play a role in determining whether people will or
will not be associated with each other” (Chang, H C, 1991).

Chinese culture is sceptical of the value of being verbally articulate. We know how much emphasis American and Australian society place on this ability. It is the basis of the level of our ability to have different relationships. With this example of one major difference in communication concepts between culture and the knowledge that there are hundreds of other cultural differences related to gender, religion, language, dress, food, education and more, how can world cultures become an international community when these differences are generally not supported in increasingly multicultural nations, like Australia?

The next major barrier to international communication is our unmatched ability to communicate via technology (communications). Third World countries and those repressed by political institutions; their inability to communicate through lack of money, technology, education, government speak volumes about a world divided. We exaggerate constantly about our mass communication ability. Sure, its fast, constant and advanced, but only for those it is available to.

“Since 1973, through organisations like UNESCO or the Non-Aligned Movement, Third World countries have repeatedly denounced the unequal international flow of news. This gave rise to a series of meetings and conferences that led to the McBride Report in Belgrade, 1980. Initially centred on combating the imbalance of news flow, this debate widened progressively to incorporate communications” (Mattelart. A, 1984). While 16 years have passed and society has progressed, we know a large percentage of this world does not have access to mass communication and technology we see each day. These people have no means by which to participate in international communication, actively or passively.

The last barrier, for discussion, is power. The media have enough power to effect individual belief systems and actions, but who controls the media? The history of mass media shows clearly enough that such control is regarded as a valued position of power. Information is regarded as power, and those with the control of its dissemination have the power. In different countries, the power of media control lies in usually one of two different areas. Either with journalists and their supporting audience, or in government control. In western society we have freedom of speech and investigative journalists; the majority of time the audience “get the story” and more. On the other hand, Asian countries repressed by economic, social and political condition have a great deal of information withheld from its occupants and the rest of the world. This is how these governments have controlled the masses in the recent past.

So, does our collective international communication presently contribute to the concept of the global village? Constant mass communication available to those with access does not create a world community linking arms. We may share information where we can, but most of the time, we don’t share the same thought, concept, feeling or understanding to make communication effective. This simply means we are all individuals, grounded by natural ability, personality and education. This article has proven McLuhan’s “global village” has not arrived courtesy of media magnets with the view mass media is neutral in terms of vast technology, only linking all of the world. We must remember that media is not just technology, but people who play differing roles. These individuals have different ethics, culture, language, power, education, money; which effect and will continue to effect international communication until Thomas Mores’ utopia.

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Mobility: What effect does it have on ADF Personnel?

By Donna Bull, Social Researcher

Australian Defence Force service places unusual demands on members. Inevitably, these demands are passed on to, and affect, the families of Service members who experience a range of difficulties not generally encountered in the civilian community. Existing research in the area indicates that mobility is the primary source of service related stress on Service families (Glenn, 1994 p.143; Snider, 1993 p.5). The extent of this stress (the “dimensions of dislocation”), however, is not well understood and investigation into the area has been called for (Snider 1993 p.58).

This article has aimed to explore the extent of disruption that mobility has on the families of ADF servicemen, and identify the areas and extent of disadvantage resulting from geographic mobility.

Through qualitative research methodology, primarily in-depth interviews, an understanding of the dimensions of dislocation from the perspective of ADF families was sought.

In this article, the term ADF family refers to the spouse/partner of the serving member, and the children in the family. Where the serving member is included, this will be specified.

Existing research in this area has tended to focus inquiry on identification of specific areas of disadvantage or difficulty for defence force families. Jessup (1996) identifies six areas (housing; children’s education; spouse employment; service related separation; geographic mobility; and overseas posting) that are problematic for British military families. Likewise, Sue Hamilton has taken this issues based approach with her study of the ADF, identifying family support, employment, education, housing, and allowances as the major problem areas (Hamilton, 1986). Nick Jans (1988) structures his discussion of the quality of family life in the ADF around issues such as children’s education, Service related separations, spouse employment, and housing.

At the commencement of this research, it was anticipated that the results would be reported in a manner similar to the reports by Hamilton (1986), Snider (1993), Jessup (1996) and Jans (1988), that is, reported in an issues based style. As the data collection progressed, however, it became clear that the themes emerging from the interviews were not easily categorised into established topic area (education, employment, housing etc.) The patterns emerging were falling instead into two distinct areas that themselves enormously influence each and every one of the topic areas researched in the past. These two areas, “control forfeit” and “diminution of community/professional relationships” play a significant role in determining the success or failure of relocation.

A diagram of the dimensions of dislocation follows. There are three levels in the model, the issues identified by past research (eg. education, family support, spouse employment etc.) forming the first level. Mobility, the factor that exacerbates potential problems with each of the level one issues is at the second level of the model. At the third level of the model are the two new areas of control forfeit and diminution of professional/community relationships.

“The ability of a population to choose where and how to live is an important feature of democratic society. The freedom to move when and where one chooses (at least within national boundaries) is generally regarded as an inalienable right.” (Maher et al, 1992 p.2).

ADF families, as a consequence of the employment obligations of the serving member, forfeit control over a large part of their lives to the ADF – the “inalienable right” that Maher et al refers to is not their right. The issue of control has been...
mentioned only briefly in *Supporting Service Families*, in which Hamilton writes, “Overlaying these major themes, and to some extent drawing them together, was a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the lack of control over their own lives that is clearly felt by many service families” (Hamilton, 1986 p.20). Although neglected in other major reports or publications relating to the military family the importance of a sense of control has been documented in literature on the relocation experience from the human resource management field (Pinder, 1989 p.58; Anderson & Starke, 1986 p.49).

During interviews conducted for this research, interviewees consistently brought up the issue of lack of control and the forfeit of control to the ADF experienced by ADF families, reflected in the following comments:

“Often the family would get to a place and they say “We hate it”, but that was just because someone else had said “This is your house, you have to move in here” and they had no control over it.”

When your life is turned around every three years, when everything – schools, jobs, friends, houses – is disrupted, its very hard to see yourself as being in control of your own future.

Going back to a place you’ve been before – even if you didn’t like it the first time – it gives you a sense of control over a little piece of your life.

*It could be so much better, if you could have more control over what is going on.*

Understandably, it was reported that this feeling of lack of control, or that the control over one’s life lies with someone else, causes a great amount of frustration and stress for ADF families, and for ADF spouses in particular. Along with the stress resulting from lack of control over education, career development, housing, location etc. is the sense that the family’s life is being invaded by the ADF, and that the family has no control over this either. Pinder (1989 p.58) in his examination of executive relocation reached the conclusion, “A transfer causes the interests of the employer to invade an employee’s personal life more directly and more significantly than almost any other type of organisational practice”. This form of invasion into the personal sphere is even more significant for the civilian partner (usually the wife) who does not have an employer/employee relationship with the ADF, and yet must be prepared to allow these intrusive practices to take place in her home.

Existing research has found that family relationship maintenance opportunities are significantly reduced for ADF families, as a result of their mobility (Jans, 1988 pp.296-309; Snider, 1993 pp.12-18). The existing research has failed to identify, however, the difficulties ADF families face establishing and sustaining community and professional relationships. These community and professional relationships include relationships with doctors and other health care professionals, relationships between teachers and students, relationships with sports teams, relationships with community organisations, relationships with church groups, and even personal care relationships. “The number of people one is in contact with and the quality of such contact may have a bearing upon everyone’s level of mental health; individuals with larger friendship networks fare better than those with smaller ones” (Puckett, 1993 pp.63-64). Regu-
lar disengagement from the community prevents individuals from maintaining networks with large numbers of people, however, and it is likely that it is these very individuals who would have most to gain from large friendship networks.

Not having family nearby means it’s important to make friends, and then you move, and you don’t have those friends any more. You are always looking for a replacement family.

For the women it can be really traumatic – the male, the serving partner, he just goes off to work in the new area and has his set-up all there for him, but it’s the wife who all over again has to find work, find new schools for the kids, find a new playgroup, establish a relationship with a doctor again, that’s where the problem is.

You don’t have a relationship with a doctor, built up over time… signs of illness get missed by doctors who don’t know much about you. Its really hard work to go to a doctor for something trivial too, if you don’t know the doctor, and so I’m sure that spouses neglect their health quite a bit too.

People think twice about going to the doctor when they are sick – they don’t have that professional relationship built up over a period of time.

Support workers interviewed expressed their concern about ADF families neglecting their health care due to the difficulties experienced in maintaining relationships with health care professionals. Managing to locate a doctor with compatible values and attitudes to the family may require any number of visits over a long period of time, and it is easy to appreciate that repeating this task every two or three years becomes arduous and exhausting for the ADF family. The temptation to either ignore or put up with health complaints that may require medical attention is understandable. It is likely, however, that as a consequence of its mobility and the resulting stresses placed on the family the ADF family has greater vulnerability than the geographically stable population to particular types of illness.

The burden of the responsibility to establish new professional and community relationships at each new locality inevitably lies with the serving member’s partner. Due to the structure of the ADF, the serving member’s partner is far more likely to be a woman than a man (Department of Defence, 1996a). On arrival at a new locality, it is rare for the serving member to have much more than a day before being required to report to the new workplace. Responsibility lies with the serving member’s partner to enrol and equip the children for new schools, negotiate childcare for younger children, settle the family into a new house, navigate around an unfamiliar town or city in order to locate suitable shopping areas, and then begin to look for employment.

Invariably when families move, they [the ADF] send the member away as soon as they arrive. This has a huge impact. What tends to happen is that they have the move, they arrive in the new place, Dad puts on his uniform and off he goes. Mum is left to sort the family out, then eventually the kids pop on a uniform and go off to school and then there’s just Mum. She doesn’t have a uniform, but she’s done all the dirty work for the family!

The serving member moves into the new area, goes to work and has his set-up all established. It isn’t like that though for the wife.

The pressure of this constant requirement to engage in an unfamiliar and temporary community was recognised by Hamilton (1986 p.26), who also noted that this pressure did not effect the serving member to the degree that it has an effect on the civilian partner. The serving member has “a ready made community based on their work for them to fall back on” (Hamilton, 1986 p.26), wherever they are posted.

Life Events, Stress and ADF Mobility

In the human resource management field Munton et al (1993 p.9) estimate as many as half of all families relocating experience stress symptoms. Molony (1995 p.7) has identified the stress associated with moving from a familiar to an unfamiliar environment as having the potential to create “a period of instability or disequilibrium that can be distressing and potentially damaging psychologically”.

“Employee assistance programs, (as they) adopt a broader focus of concern and a preventive orientation, should develop awareness and a service response to the unique stresses of the relocating employee and their family” (Anderson & Starke, 1986 p.49). Anderson and Starke’s article assumes that employees and their families will probably only relocate once or twice during their career, and yet they have drawn attention to the stresses experienced even during infrequent relocation. ADF families would not find it...
unusual to experience many more than two relocations during the serving member’s career. Jessup’s (1996 p.56) finding that the pressures of military life have a cumulative effect and are faced by a younger population lacking the life experience to deal well with the strain paints a picture of enormous stress consistently and regularly being placed on families poorly supported and ill-equipped to deal with it.

Posting policy in the ADF is guided by “operational requirements”. Postings are a part of ADF life, with serving members moving frequently through the course of their career, both domestically and internationally.

The information received from interviewees is that rotation of ADF personnel subjects the family to enormous disruption only to discover that the serving member is performing the same or very similar duties in the new locality and that the benefit in terms of broadened experience is minimal if at all. The primary reason for regular dislocation of ADF families seems to be more because it is the expectation of members based on past practice than for any other reason. It is expected that members of the ADF will be required to regularly relocate because members of the ADF have always been required to regularly relocate. Although the subject lay outside the terms of reference for her report, Hamilton questions the justification for dislocation of ADF families and the logic underlying ADF posting policy (Hamilton, 1986 p.21). “I accept that currently postings are guided by defined operational requirements, and while I do not necessarily accept that those requirements are immutable, this is not the place to challenge them”, she writes.

“It is not an exaggeration to say that the ADF must resolve the structural cause of its mobility/stability dilemma if it is to remain at all attractive to the quality people needed for the future. Fundamental change is required and the approach we propose will be regarded by many as radical. The starting point should be to work towards providing considerably more geographic stability for those who choose to serve in the ADF” (Glenn, 1994 p.273).

Glenn (ibid p.274) has put forward a series of options for the ADF to deal with the major structural causes of mobility (level two). He also discounts the claim that movement must be a part of the job, maintaining that a rigorous approach needs to be taken to demonstrating that a posting is based on the real needs of the service and will result in real benefits to the member (ibid pp.129 and 148).

One option that may significantly reduce the level two aspect of the dimensions of dislocation for ADF families may be allowing greater choice for members with families in relation to postings. If it is the case that members are being posted into positions consisting of very similar or the same duties at their new localities, why is a peacetime ADF continuing to relocate its members, particularly junior members, on such a regular basis? During his research on the staff relocation practices of a select sample of Australian organisations in 1995, Molony (1995 p.32) found the employees most likely to be relocated were senior executives, senior management, and professional or technical experts. Junior and middle ranking staff are rarely required to relocate as a consequence of their employment. It is recognised here of course that there are many ADF families who enjoy the mobility associated with their lifestyle and are enthusiastic movers. Their opportunities to relocate should not be curtailed in the development of any policy, although they must be adequately compensated for expenses associated with any movement. The proposal by Glenn (1994 p.129) that members be provided with financial incentive to relocate is of merit.

During the 1980s a quiet revolution was occurring in Defence. Attitudes were changing, women began entering the workforce in increasing numbers, men began to share family responsibilities with their partners, and ADF families began voicing their dissatisfaction over the way they were being treated by the ADF. The situation was deemed a problem requiring a solution in the form of a Family Support Policy.

Since 1992 the policy has remained largely unmodified, although aspects of it have been the subject of revision (in particular, in relation to families with special needs and in the area of spouse employment).

The aim of the ADF Family Support Policy is clearly identified as “to provide the support necessary so that families of ADF members are not disadvantaged in comparison with the general community” (DI-G-PERS 42-1). This support is based on a framework of clearly identified principles, and includes a range of measures relating to provision.
of services, fostering involvement in activities, and access to financial benefits. Just as the existing research has a level one issues based focus, this support is provided on a level one issues focused basis.

Based on the interviews and discussions that took place for this research it appears that there continues to exist, in the ADF structure, an outdated view of family and an extraordinary expectation about the role and duties of the ADF family. The military is a conservative institution, with traditional views about women’s roles (Burton 1996 p.32). These are the views and expectations around which ADF Family Support Policy developed, and presumably around which it will be further developed in the future.

Hamilton (1986 pp.16-17) suggests fundamental changes in attitudes and priorities are required to make the ADF’s view of the family a more realistic picture. The outdated view that exists, she writes, is a convenient one for the ADF because it subordinates the interests of all family members to the one (male) breadwinner (ibid). Hamilton’s suggestion is supported by Jessup (1996 p.114) who writes “…by being in the same location the serviceman’s wife is also making a commitment to the service, and an acknowledgment that the demands of the service constitute the number one household priority”.

Conclusion

Clearly, ADF families face unique problems as a consequence of the serving member’s employment obligations. The requirement for them to regularly relocate can result in dislocation due to their lack of choice in the relocation experience.

ADF families, as a consequence of the employment obligations of the serving member, forfeit control over a large part of their lives to the ADF. They are subjected to invasion of the personal sphere that is particularly violating for the civilian partner. ADF families, as a consequence of their mobility, have significantly reduced opportunities for building and sustaining, professional and community relationships and networks. The burden of the responsibility to establish new professional and community relationships at each new locality lies principally with the serving member’s civilian partner.

The life events that occur for the ADF family during the posting cycle have the potential to manifest themselves in a range of stress-related symptoms, including depression, illness, and withdrawal from the community (Anderson & Starke, 1986 p.40).

Fundamental change is required in the way in which the ADF moves its personnel. Interviewees for this research have told of ADF members being posted into positions in new localities where they will perform the same or very similar duties as they performed in their last locality.

The expectation of the ADF structure that families will continue to accept this degree of disruption and stress is based on outdated values and attitudes about the supporting role of women in the family. It has been, Hamilton says, convenient for the ADF to hold this view – it is a view that makes the task of policy-making easier (Hamilton, 1986 p.16).

It is unlikely that ADF families will become politically active in lobbying for changes in the near future. Even the practices and initiatives of the ADF families” lobby group, the NCGSF, are underpinned by a traditional social conservatism. Real change in policy, rather than piecemeal issues-based change, is unlikely to be a result of pressure from this quarter. More often, however, the possibility of real change is being explored in research.

Social policy in the ADF could undergo enormous changes if recommendations for changes to the ADF posting policy were acted upon. It is possible that the ADF’s family support agencies and services would experience a contraction due to reduced level of demand. There may also be a redefining of “community” by ADF families, who with geographical stability may come to regard themselves less as ADF families and more as Perth families, or Melbourne families.

The dimensions of dislocation have, until now, been defined as the level one issues that have been examined in past research. It is now demonstrable that policy developed on a level one issues-focussed basis is inadequate and does little to address the level three factors that actually determine the level and dimensions of dislocation experienced by ADF families. Future policy development must recognise and address the level three effects of control forfeit and diminution of professional and community relationships before it can effectively reduce the dimensions of dislocation experienced by ADF families.

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families in peacetime, Canberra College of Advanced Education, Canberra.


As the partner of a serving member for approximately 15 years, and having been a serving member of the RAAF herself for three years, Donna Bull has a true understanding of the nature of Service life and its impact on the family. Donna moved to Canberra in 1996 to accompany her husband on RAAF posting. Originally a Queenslander, she has also lived in Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, Wagga Wagga, and Malaysia. Donna completed her Masters degree in Social Policy during 1998, and wrote her thesis on the dislocation experienced by ADF families. She is currently undertaking PhD studies on the topic of dislocation and community engagement.
During an exercise some years ago, a Regional Force Surveillance (RFS) Company HQ located in their depot, was attacked by exercise enemy. The attack was in an urban environment, pre-emptive and a prelude to further Low Level Operations (LLOPs) in the region. At that time the threat scenario term had recently changed from LLOPs to Short Warning Conflict (SWC); which was a fair summary of the situation for the personnel at the RFS Company HQ. In current terminology this type of warfare is generally being included in the category, Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In some circumstances the term Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is also used. While LIC may not be the best term, considering that all fighting at soldier level is at high intensity, it is however, a suitable means of separating the scale and nature of operations from those of a conventional type recognised as being of “medium” and “high” intensity conflict.

Therefore, in the LIC being referred to in this article, there is a high level of threat against headquarters and administration elements, particularly for organisations that command operations independently of larger supporting military forces. The type of organisations referred to are likely to have:

(a) threat expected equally from anywhere;
(b) a high level of independent control of their maintenance and supply; and
(c) a requirement to provide continuing military leadership that can coordinate credible military responses in regions during LIC.

The example above demonstrates a type of warfare commonly used by resistance forces. The design of resistance force operations is to strike the enemy repeatedly without telegraphing the place, time or desired outcome. In so doing, forces trained for conventional warfare, are given only fleeting opportunities to use high cost combat power while still having to sustain it on a war footing.

“Unconventional warfare” is another term used in relation to LIC. The projection of land forces behind the lines, and in National Support Areas of an enemy to conduct small scale attacks, usually of soft targets, can be included in the term unconventional warfare. Personnel that tend to be used are special forces, internal resistance forces, and various types of agents (spies). As an aside the term Unconventional Warfare might preclude the categorisation of a great deal of LIC operations in OOTW? This is significant if commanders are to accept that there is the potential in future warfare to fully achieve political objectives using only unconventional warfare.

Recently the US appears to have successfully used air “strike” operations in Yugoslavia (as it did in Libya and Iraq) with what might seem to be, a high technology warfare approach married to the military ethics of resistance or unconventional warfare. Notwithstanding, what is being signalled, is the likelihood of armies increasing development of their capabilities to use strike operations. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) provides the means to fight smarter and the use of “strike to counter strike” is now an accepted military response.

However, a notable difference with this progression to future warfare between countries with large investments in high technology war related industry and countries less dependent on high technology military production is the manner of delivery of strike operations. Use of land forces trained for unconventional warfare to conduct strike operations deep within enemy held areas and assets surely remains a likely option for war fighting where human resource costs are low. Moreover such an option may be, in some circumstances, the only one viable as a response to high technology based strike operations.

It is suggested that tactics best suited to fight an enemy’s unconventional raiding forces in LIC will have similarities to those used around the world by resistance (and cadre) forces. It has historically been these forces that have sought to maintain the resolve
and support of the broad majority of the supporting population strategically, operationally and tactically.

**LIC Response Teams**

The term LIC Response Teams (LIC RT) is used in this article and refers to highly mobile and usually “full time” forces designed to combat an LIC enemy. An example of an LIC RT could be a combined arms mobile fighting team deployed in response to a small scale enemy attack for arguments sake in Canberra. The LIC RT could comprise groupings of up to platoon size of infantry, motorised infantry, engineers, artillery, intelligence, signals, armoured, aviation and some embedded combat service support assets. Other similar size LIC RT from the same organisation might be deployed in a number of locations in, and out of Australia. The HQ for the larger organisation (perhaps the next level of command for this mobile team) depending on earlier attacks and the level of threat to various communications systems, could remain in their home location, which could be Darwin.

**Threat**

Appreciations of the threat to Australia in the 90s resulted in defence planners suggesting significant force structure changes. These changes were designed to better conduct operations against LIC enemy. There have been a number of scenarios given for LIC enemy in various major exercises, and these are well recognised throughout the Australian Defence Force.

Rapid digitisation and high technology observation of “battlespace” should improve the chances of success for defending forces, while nevertheless “shaping the enemy”, to increase their scale of activities in urban and industrial areas. Notably, it is often in this type of terrain that high cost military hardware presents itself as an attractive target option, particularly while off-line, and in component production locations. Also critical service industries are vulnerable, where the effects of small scale attacks can be disproportionately large. An enemy might argue that there are morally defensible reasons within their homelands to explain targeting civilians involved in support of military endeavour. This is a concept that has in the past (and continues to) erased distinction in the rules of engagement that separate soldiers and civilians. It is an issue worth remembering, when considering the preferable scope for the role of a part-time army.

As this type of threat increases, it seems that major exercises continue to “write out” these enemy options. Campaigns concentrating on sabotage, assassinations and small raids over open ended periods could be devastating. The threat that exists in the design and ethics of unconventional warfighting is not dissimilar to that of strike operations.

It follows that in LIC in this country a major area of enemy weakness is supply. Too often exercises have avoided activity in civilian-military cover operations, and the conduct of enemy supply during the exercises has been through “out of exercise” means. Major exercises that have allowed this to occur have provided exercise, “special operations enemy”, with unrealistic opportunities.

In LIC an enemy can be expected to attempt to erode the will of civilian people to continue supporting their country’s military operations. They are likely to attack facility, material and human assets spread throughout the country and its interests. The design of their operations should be expected to be free from the constraints that are likely to be imposed on the defending forces; such as demands for quick results, for minimisation of ongoing costs, and assurance of minimum loss of life.

**Mission Analysis**

In LIC a theatre commander’s intent may be long term, and firstly to maintain the resolve of the country’s population to continue the conflict. This may require a rather different view of force structure, than the concept of moving a highly trained, largely motorised and armoured battalion and brigade groups around a broad range of small target locations.

The importance of the relationship of the military with not only government organisations like Customs, but also with the general civilian population, particularly in this country’s great expanses, cannot be over emphasised. Usually, in today’s force structure, ADF General Reserve personnel are well placed to achieve this function. While it is probably a task of Regional Force Surveillance Units in the north, this type of role appears to be undefined for other defence elements in the rest of Australia.

The detection of unconventional enemy in LIC is a key to the success of the defence mission. An element in achieving detection comes from “circuits” of information flow between security forces and regional communities. This source of intelligence can be given too little emphasis by commanders of transient forces who tend to rely heavily on military
high technology and high cost options to achieve detection. These are resources which can be expected to be in short supply in relation to the scope and range of enemy activity. Furthermore, an enemy can be expected to assess the strength of the military relationship with the community as part of their mission analysis. This is because the most economical sustainment of unconventional forces usually requires agents placed in communities to obtain resources and position caches. An activity which is not readily concealable, particularly to long-time residents who are quick to recognise unusual occurrences in their area.

The fading of the state as the owner and principal profit taker, from an increasing number of an enemy’s likely centre of gravity targets, is not examined in detail in this article. Problems related to this situation concern the possibility of various types of relationships that may develop between some civilian stakeholders, federal agencies, police forces and soldiers, without the formal knowledge of the state. The overt private funding of military and other security forces is another issue that will impact in the decision processes used by the enemy to select targets.

For example, protection of personnel that are critical to the operations of a corporation, targeted by an enemy, at locations anywhere in the world may be necessary in some defence mission analysis. It may be politically reasonable, where the state’s military provide these types of services that the corporation assists in defence funding.

The provision of involvement in any country’s army to increasingly smaller numbers of a country’s population is unlikely to engender broad based community commitment to a protracted struggle, which is a fundamental attacking force strategy in LIC. Defence concepts in some European countries provide examples of an approach which gives greater consideration to community involvement in war. A large proportion of the civilian populations are obliged to spend some time in the defence forces to learn basic skills and to gain an understanding of the assumptions on which a country’s defence is based.

Training for Military Responses to LIC Threats

Finding enemy trained to live increases in the ground and crevices in structures, has been practiced during the Army’s “Kangaroo” series of exercises. Difficulties in doing this have been re-visited each exercise. Scenarios recently have had the defending forces trialling modified force structures with some material associated with more recent advances in military technology.

Allocated vital assets that are the exercise enemy targets, are nominated and known by both enemy and friendly exercise participants. This is to ensure military activity occurs in a defined exercise period. In LIC as stated earlier, it is likely to be the aim of an enemy to strike at vital assets which are widely spaced and vulnerable throughout Australia and its areas of interests. Access to these types of targets is not difficult for unconventional forces, and large distances remain an important advantage if conventional force structures, lacking doctrine to facilitate the dispatch of splinter organisations, are to be used as the only source for response elements.

Therefore, an effect that can be expected in an enemy’s LIC campaigns against conventionally structured forces is to fragment the forces, separating them from their practiced command and administrative chains. It is also possible that the concept of brigade sized deployments employing wide area surveillance “outer circles”, protection activities in inner circles, and “high tech”, heavily armed, response forces, all controlled by brigade or higher headquarters, was being critically assessed in the Australian Army’s force structure trials process.

A great deal has been made of the RMA and there is an inference that the initiative in all conflict will be gained by the best technologically equipped defence forces. It is not in the scope of this article to fully discuss the reasons for the strategic defeats of usually far better resourced regular forces by a number of opponents since 1945. However, the strategic defeat of the United States by Vietnam still provides a “close to home” case study.

Although being technologically deficient the Vietnamese were able to find cheap counter-measures to technologically advanced systems and employ them despite ongoing destruction of military groupings. Rather than having a militia that was thought of as a poorly trained alternative by the full-time military, it was recognised as being the link to the real source of military strength, which is the ownership of the struggle by the great majority of a country’s people.

Force Structures

It is a reasonable assumption that Australia will not fight for major interests without US assistance. This belief does not mean that Australia must be able
to support (or lead) US Forces in conventional operations. The placement of small elements of Australian forces well-versed and practised in the complexities of what might be called medium and high intensity conflicts would be of considerable political advantage, in any conflict involving Australian interests. It may therefore be worth considerable defence budget expense to structure and maintain such elements; with the key being how much is required and maintain such elements; with the key being how much is required to do exactly what? Australia does a great deal to foster a high level of military and political good will with America in addition to its participation in coalition military training.

Defence planners have also considered that defence against possible invasion by an enemy is best conducted in the sea-air gap; Navy and Air Force structures reflect this. What is possibly advertised less is that, in addition to being able to intercept enemy platforms approaching Australia, various Navy and Air Force platforms are equally capable of conducting effective strikes against targets in an enemy’s country, generally using high cost missiles from offshore.

The point is, in general terms, offensive land warfare LIC is about the use of unconventional (or less than) warfare techniques by both sides in their opponents countries (or a corporations span of fixed assets). For example, a country’s special forces “sponsored” warfare could involve uniformed reconnaissance and small scale raid patrols, uniformed advisers for local revolutionary forces (resistance fighters against the established government), electronic warfare transmitted from a third country, or the platform of a third country (with or without their consent), agents (spies), and uniformed large scale raiding forces (raider battalions). Among these elements, while in “theatre” (4M Web), there will be a range of mission related dependencies. This is an important issue considering the developing ethical requirements for warfare in regard to an international justice system, and to the role of all non combatants moving about battlespace, particularly if from countries friendly with one or the other of the countries at war.

It is significant in recent times that it is exactly these type of LIC operations that are most likely to be sponsored by entities other than nation states. Or, also troublesome, by a group of nation states, and perhaps other entities, none of which wish to declare involvement. Despite “counter strike by using strike” capabilities, careful planning for land defence of the country’s interests against enemy LIC operations should not be diminished.

While it may be argued that conventional force structures remain essential to underpin peace operations the employment of a country’s conventional forces in battlespace “away from home” is becoming increasingly likely to result in the enemy raiding “away” from their “home” (and in a corporate sense this could mean, in some circumstances, “attacking” a next door neighbour!) Regrettably, it would appear that “future warfare” will see unconventional warfare increasingly brought to the “homelands” or “home-space” of people who both, conduct (or fight?) a war, and in the broadest sense, “support the conduct of that war”.

Conclusion

An enemy may conduct harassment operations over a long period designed simply to make a country choose to avoid ongoing hardships. Force structures involving rapid involvement throughout the country of large numbers of the country’s people, rather than just reliance on the rapid (and likely repetitive) movements of a few brigade size organisations are worthy of continued consideration by defence forces.

Furthermore, the person to person means of gaining regional and human military intelligence, and effective regional civilian supply and repair, remains likely to be as important to the success of LIC defence campaigns as “in service” technological, and other equipment based development.

Defence planning should provide concepts to fight LIC enemy using RFOs in areas, waiting for response forces or accepting their unavailability. Exercise scenarios for LIC should, at least in computer generated wargames, address a greater range of offensive LIC campaign options, designed to occur over months and years which are inclusive of realistic sustainment requirements.

The concept of using resistance organisation strategies in defence of the “homeland” is not new, although it usually suggests anticipation of a conventional invasion force. While a conventional invasion of this country is not a likely occurrence this article suggests that in order too counter the likely use of unconventional warfare in LIC some resistance organisation concepts are worthy of consideration for structuring a part-time army. The article also contends that such a structure for a part-time army would need to be complemented by full-time response forces manned, equipped and trained to kill or capture LIC enemy.
Finally, in the unlikely event of an attempt by an enemy to attack this country in force, regardless of military responses chosen for priority of effort in military training, neither a unilateral victory, nor, especially a short-time, coalition victory, should be a forgone conclusion.

NOTES
1. “Artillery” comprising observer, sound ranging, radar, unmanned aerial vehicles, alternate communications, and direct targeting systems, to support, possibly, selections of (unmanned?) missile launchers/mortars/guns.
2. The term Theatre Commander suggests a contiguous area for campaigns and operations. This, however, is not how “Theatres” are always structured. A better term might be the “Medium by 4 Web” (M4 Web) Commander. The four mediums being Sea (surface and below), Air, Space and Land. They especially require coordinated information operations planning in accordance with the M4 Web Commander’s campaign objectives.

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Globe Center Legal Updates stated that over the period of one-decade, illegal immigrant racketeers transported to Australia, under appalling conditions, 3,380 people. In spite of the efforts put in by Coastwatch (with its 14 aircraft and small fleet of ocean patrol vessels), and the efforts of the RAN’s patrol boats and RAAF’s P-3C Orions, the Australian Government does not know the exact number of people who land in Australia undetected.

It has been estimated by the Australian Customs Service that in 1997-98 alone, Coastwatch flew 15,358 hours surveying Australia’s nine million square kilometres of maritime surrounds. In addition to this, the RAAF’s Orions flew 241 hours in support of Coastwatch activities. These activities are hampered by the fact that no matter how capable these aircraft are, their endurance is relatively short, spanning a few hours at a time before having to land for refuelling, changing crews and undergoing maintenance. Add to this the time needed for more thorough aircraft servicing, when they will be temporarily out of action altogether, and one can begin to see very clearly the problems facing those involved with surveillance activities.

Our economy, no matter the bold claims from our political leadership, does not have the capability to afford buying “the best” from the international arms market indefinitely. Our economy is not highly diversified. We have only a very limited industrial capability in Australia. Thus, the importation of expensive military technology also contributes to our ever-increasing national balance of payments problem.

When a handful of capable, next-generation fighter aircraft or naval vessels can cost in the billions of dollars, a “medium power” with a small economy like Australia, is not well suited to keeping up with many of the developments currently taking place as part of the so-called Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA).

So where does that leave us? The few people we have in the ADF are high calibre. They are people that the average taxpayer can be proud of. However, a few experts in the profession of arms are arguably not enough to undertake the wide-ranging missions that the political leadership expects from them in these turbulent and uncertain times.

It would indeed be foolhardy to argue for a major increase in personnel for the ADF. As we know, the political and economic climate does not bode well for such a move. Also, there is no obvious military threat looming over Australia. Every government department is having to do “more with less”, and in this harsh bureaucratic reality, Defence is no exception.

Yet I believe there is a solution. I believe that we must return to the past to understand more clearly, the possibilities that exist; to plan conscientiously for the security of this vast land through more user-friendly and cost-effective technology.

There is one type of platform that can, with relatively little cost in comparison to other more expensive defence equipment, provide a long-range, high endurance capability optimised for surveillance and tracking – the humble airship.

Historical Background

The development of the airship has its roots going back to the early 1850s, when French engineer, Henri Giffard became the first person to combine the balloon with an engine, so that the balloon could be steered. France was again at the forefront of airship design when in 1884, a cigar-shaped “powered balloon”, La France, flew a five-mile round trip.

During the 1880s-90s, there were many other international attempts to further refine the airship. The first rigid airship was designed by Austrian, David Schwarz, who was then resident in Berlin. It was Schwarz who influenced retired army general, Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin to take up the challenge of further developing rigid airships as a commercially viable form of transport.

By 1910, Zeppelin had built-up a fleet of airships carrying people and mail throughout Germany. However, it was the outbreak of World War I that was to prove the military utility of the airship. Though primarily used in the role of surveillance and supply, the airship gained notoriety because of its use against
England as a bomber. The impacts of the Zeppelin bombing raids were mixed. Of the German naval airships that conducted raids against England, only 5,806 bombs were dropped, causing the death of 557 and injuring 1,358. The total damage caused to the UK by these raids amounted to £1,527,585; £850,109 of which was caused in London alone. While in strategic terms these raids did not amount to much, they did force the British to maintain part of their fighter aircraft strength in England proper. The persistent nature of the raids disrupted British war production as factories were closed due to warnings of impending attack. However, as the war dragged on, concurrent refinements to heavier-than-air aircraft technology made the Zeppelin prey to the nimble fighter aircraft of the day, making the German airships less of a threat to the English mainland.

During the inter-war years, the British, Italians, Russians and Americans all designed and experimented with the application of airships. Arguably the Italians had the greatest success with their semi-rigid airships, particularly with the Norge. In 1926 the Norge successfully flew an international expedition (comprised of Italians, Norwegians and Americans) to the North Pole. The Norge was the first manned aircraft to fly over the pole.

The British rigid airship programme ended after the crash of R101 in 1930, which killed 47 people. Similarly, the Americans ended their rigid airship programme after accidents claimed the USS Akron and Macon, in 1933 and 1935 respectively, killing a total of 75. Both airships used helium as a lifting agent. These airships were unique in that they were both designed to carry a flight of five fighter planes (Curtis F9Cs), being able to launch and receive them using a special trapeze device.

However, during the 1920s-30s, most famous of all were the German giants, the Graf Zeppelin (1928) and the Hindenburg (1936). Both airships were luxury liners. Unfortunately, the Hindenburg hit the front pages in 1937 for an explosion that tore the airship apart as it approached its mooring mast in Lakehurst, New Jersey. Internationally, the Hindenburg incident had sealed the fate of rigid airships. The combustible gas used to lift these great ships into the sky, hydrogen, was said to be too dangerous for continued use.

While small non-rigid airships continued to demonstrate their usefulness as adjuncts to the maritime surveillance role for the US during World War II, immediately after the war production was significantly scaled back with few non-rigids flying in either advertising (Goodyear blimps) or experimental roles. By the late 1960s, memories of the airship and its potential promise to transform travel were almost forgotten.

The Airship’s Resurgence

Around the world, non-rigid and semi-rigid airships have kept the idea of LTAs alive during the 1960s, 70s and 80s as small curiosities harking back to a more glorious past. While during this time, many feasibility studies had been undertaken to attempt to revive the rigid airship as a form of transport, or as a military platform, none had come to fruition. Arguably, this was largely a result of the ascendancy of the heavier-than-air aerospace industry that has come to dominate global transport in both the military and civilian spheres. Large fleets of jet aircraft have indeed transformed the way we travel and the way we can conduct military operations. If speed was all that was required, then the jet has indeed proved the hiatus of manned flight thus far.
However, during the 1990s a number of European and US firms have decided to seriously entertain the thought of resuscitating the rigid and large semi-rigid airship industries as commercially viable enterprises, as the following three examples show.

**Scottish airship expert, Ian Alexander established the Dutch firm, Rigid Airship Design N.V., in 1996.** He proposed to build an airship of similar dimension to the old German giants, the *Graf Zeppelin* and *Hindenburg*. Alexander sought to exploit the rigid airship’s unique characteristics, such as fuel efficiency (airships do not need to expend fuel for staying aloft – only to move and manoeuvre), and being able to stay aloft for weeks at a time.

Alexander assembled an international team of experts in LTA design. His vision was to combine the tried and proven design and production techniques of the 1920s and 1930s with state-of-the-art avionics, building materiel, and non-flammable helium to create a safe and useful platform that could be used in any number of roles, from tourist flights to maritime surveillance. Alexander believed that airships could provide countries with an alternative vis à vis being solely dependent on inherently thirsty, costly and complex jet technology.

Since the airship does not need a traditional airport, Alexander argued that airship operators would significantly reduce costs involved with embarking and disembarking passengers. Moreover, because the type of proposed airship design is large, passengers are not confined to their seats for the duration of their journeys and can easily move about the spacious interior. Furthermore, there is the airships’ lower cost to construct and maintain vis à vis jet aircraft which would give the end-user significant savings during the airship’s life-of-type. It is estimated that Rigid Airship Design’s prototype, *Holland Navigator*, will be ready for its first flight in 2001.

**This German company, formed in 1994, began to design a semi-rigid airship with a massive freight carrying capacity. The airship being designed, the CL160 will, when completed, be the largest airship ever built. A record that is currently still maintained by the ill-fated *Hindenburg*. The CL160 will be the length of 3 Boeing 747 jumbo-jets and stand at a height of a 27-story building. Like its Dutch contemporary, the CL160 will incorporate state-of-the-art avionics and materials, and use helium as its lifting agent.**

With a lifting capacity of 160 metric tons, it is envisaged that the CL160 will have the greatest use in transporting large and heavy payloads to out of the way and difficult to reach areas. The oft overlooked and greatest advantage of the airship is not so much its ability to stay aloft for weeks at a time, but also its ability to hover over a particular area, like a helicopter. Consequently, the use of such vessels in the large equipment, heavy freight transport role is obvious. Combined with a cruising speed of approximately 80 km/h and a range of 9,000 km, the CL160 has some interesting possibilities with regard to military transport, however, CargoLifter Inc. has not explicitly suggested such a role for its airship. The first CL160, according to CargoLifter Inc., will be ready for test flying in 2001, with operations beginning from 2003.

My argument is that much can be done to enhance the security around our vast island-continent and that airships, especially the rigid types, could provide a useful adjunct to current capabilities.

Satellite imaging can, to some degree, help overcome some of the gaps in Australia’s surveillance...
net. However, satellite information needs to be able to correctly identify and accurately track potential targets in real-time, then pass that information immediately to Coastwatch or ADF assets. By the time these assets are deployed, if they are not already on station, the illegal movement of goods and people may be successfully completed.

The Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar, though it might also offer a partial solution, still suffers from the same types of problems as with the reliance on satellite imagery. If the air and maritime assets of Coastwatch and the ADF are not already in position to intercept potential targets, these potential targets will escape the net. Furthermore, developmental problems encountered with the Jindalee’s ability to identify and track small targets do not bode well for sole reliance on this method of detection.

The RAAF is soon to purchase a small fleet of Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft. Approximately six to eight in total. These highly sophisticated and costly aircraft will form the backbone of the RAAF’s air defence efforts. No one has publicly estimated the time these aircraft will spend chasing “thugs in thongs” along the country’s northern coastline. Arguably these aircraft are too costly and too capable to be used in such a fashion, unless we face being swamped by an armada of illegals!

Surveillance is a task that requires neither speed nor manoeuvrability. What is needed is a crew that can stay on station for great lengths of time. For this, the rigid airship is ideal (having greater endurance and structural integrity than both semi- and non-rigid varieties). It is fuel-efficient, lightweight, and can be supported by state-of-the-art avionics. It can hover like a helicopter and lift large loads depending on the airship’s design parameters. It can accommodate crews in a similar fashion to ocean going ships. Therefore, the accommodation is neither cramped nor uncomfortable, and crews can stay on station for longer than a few hours. With unparalleled range and endurance over most heavier-than-air aircraft types, the rigid airship can be customised to suite specialist missions. This means more cost savings, and prevents the expenses and complexities associated with “multiroling”. Larger production-runs will also help reduce the rigid airship’s overall costs to the potential end-user. The airship’s potential for dual civilian and military applications should ensure that production not merely serve the small domestic military market.

What about the vulnerability of the airship to hostile surface-to-air fire? Currently, those organised criminals who enter Australia in their aircraft and boats are not known to carry anything threatening to any of our Coastwatch and ADF assets. I believe this is unlikely to change. These offenders are generally not known to openly engage the military or paramilitary forces of another country. However, should they decide to do so, the rigid airship can be equipped to carry close-in-weapons systems for protection against most shoulder-launched weapons. The rigid airship is not reliant on gas pressure to maintain its shape, so if small holes by machine-gun fire were to happen, the amount of leakage would be too slow to impede the airship’s operations. If, however, a large hole were torn into the envelope, the airship could still return to base for repairs. Using helium, a non-flammable gas as the lifting agent, there would not be any “Hindenburg incidents” in a short, sharp firefight involving small arms.

As a force multiplier, the rigid airship can be equipped like the USS Akron and Macon demonstrated, as an aerial aircraft carrier. Rather than carrying fighters they could carry unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Global Hawk currently being tested by the US and Australia. This would extend the coverage of one airship by a significant factor, and allow something that has never happened before in the history of Australia; the actual and credible coverage of the country’s sea and air approaches.

So there is something that can be done to better protect our vulnerable maritime surrounds against illegal intrusions on our sovereignty! All it would entail is a serious study into building rigid airships for the task of surveillance. I am not advocating the replacement of the current heavier-than-air assets we have with airships. Airships have their place within the military assets of a nation, but they cannot undertake all roles. In the military environment, speed is essential to undertake certain tasks. However, where speed is not crucial, and a platform is needed with the characteristics of endurance, then the airship is the most appropriate vehicle.

NOTES
3. ibid., p.1.
4. ibid., p.1.
6. ibid., pp.54-57.
7. “An airship with a framework that supports the gas envelope and is therefore not dependent on gas pressure to maintain its shape.”
12. “Having a metal keel, or “backbone” and a metal cone in its nose to help strengthen its hull.”
17. ibid., pp.141-171.
20. ibid., p.9.
24. ibid., p.2.

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Australia’s Air Strike Capability: A Personal and Critical Perspective

Squadron Leader Keith Joiner, RAAF

Introduction

The first major use of air power against Australia was the Japanese raid on Darwin on 19 February 1942. Ships were sunk, hundreds of lives were lost, the airfield was rendered useless, aircraft were destroyed, and both military and civilian personnel were humiliated by some subsequent acts of cowardice and terror. Australia was not prepared for war with Japan, however, one of the first retaliations for the raid on Darwin was led by Squadron Leader John Jackson. Fresh from air warfare abroad, Squadron Leader Jackson flew the newly created No 75 fighter squadron from Sydney to Port Moresby in late February 1942. The Japanese were unaware of the squadron’s arrival and they were able to launch an air strike on the Japanese airfield at Lae. These actions 57 years ago were Australia’s baptism in air strike and counter air strike on Australian territory.

Australia’s air power doctrine is currently outlined in DI(AF) AAP 1000, The Air Power Manual (1994, 2nd ed.). Australia’s air power doctrine describes three air campaigns: control of the air, air strike and air support. The aim is to broadly and critically examine Australia’s capacity for conducting the campaign of air strike. The article follows the structure of air power given in The Air Power Manual, starting with the air roles that directly involve air strike, followed by those air roles that support air strike, and last, the support functions that enable air strike.

Few authors criticise Australia’s air strike capability. During the Defence Efficiency Review (DER) and the ensuing reform process, political forces directly shaped the ADF in ways that have more commitment to economic rationalism and business practices than defence of Australia’s national interests. I believe DER has not only radically changed the distribution of power within the ADF, but it has changed the focus and culture of the ADF as well. This article will exercise the right and duty of officers to criticise Australia’s military capabilities and to try to correct any deficiencies. The principal aim is to provoke debate about air strike and the elements of air strike that Australia lacks. The views and opinions expressed are solely that of the author, as a student of air power and do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Government, Department of Defence or University of New South Wales; this is an accepted limitation of the article.

Background

Preparation of the ADF is determined through the broad strategic guidance provided by Australian Governments. In response to the Dibb Defence Report of 1984, the Australian Government focused more on the defence of Australian and less in participation in allied activities. Further, the strategic guidance that evolved from the Dibb Report is based on a concept of “short warning conflict”. Short warning conflict is a notion intended to focus defence planners on military capabilities that are more realistic for the defence of Australia in the short term. For example, short warning conflict might involve a period of low-level harassment of Australia over, say 18 months with short periods therein of escalated conflict (i.e. combat or surge). Strategic guidance is further prescribed in a series of classified strategic concept papers dealing with a nominal enemy force and the possible nature of short warning conflict. These concept papers guide Australia’s force capability planners in determining the type and strength of Australia’s defence posture.

Defining the ADF’s role as purely the defence of Australia in a short warning conflict is fundamentally isolationist and, if pursued for too long, may have rendered the ADF capable of only selective allied action. Defence alliance remains Australia’s most likely defence scenario for the early and effective neutralisation of global or regional security threats to Australia. Despite shifts in strategic guidance, Australian Governments continued to commit the ADF to allied peace keeping and peace-enforcement activities. Generally though, Australian Governments have committed elements of the ADF that were readily available and these commitments have only
indirectly influenced Australia’s defence capability planning. Australia’s military contributions to international allied campaigns have highlighted the following aspects of our air strike capabilities that are deficient compared to allied air power:

- a credible stand-off weapon capability suitable for air strike operations in the Gulf War (1990 and 1998);
- electronic counter-measures (flares, chaff, jammers, radar warners, missile approach warners, laser warners) for F–111 aircraft in the Gulf War (1990 and 1998);
- electronic warfare measures for Black Hawk helicopters in Cambodia;
- electronic warfare measures for Hercules aircraft in Cambodia (twice), Somalia and Rwanda; and
- an operational, as opposed to training, air-to-air refuelling capability for the Gulf War (1998).

These deficiencies would also become evident were air strike used in defence of Australia. Officers need to continue to critically appraise Australia’s current capabilities if the Australian Government and Defence planners are to prevent a further decline in Australia’s air strike capabilities compared to Western allies.

### Nature of Air Strike

Air strike has developed markedly since the Second World War, most notably in the areas of precision, lethality and standoff. The delivery of nuclear weapons by air to Japan to conclude World War II finally saw the realisation of ultimate air power and required military forces to again consider the laws of armed conflict with regard to the use of reasonable air-delivered force. Weapons were therefore designed with “appropriate” lethality. However, the Vietnam Conflict showed that when using weapons of limited lethality, the military planners often could not achieve their objectives and that collateral damage could still be unacceptable. Military planners therefore developed the accuracy of weapons to be used in “surgical” strikes on an enemy. Military forces concerned about the increased lethality and accuracy of air strike also developed air defence capabilities to engage the attacking aircraft or even approaching missiles, either through direct intersection or seduction. The air war of the October 1973 “Yom Kippur” War illustrated the rapid advances in air defences and in the use of electronic warfare. Development of air strike to counter advances in air defences therefore involves:

- increasing the stand-off of the delivery aircraft to be outside the engagement zone of the enemy air defences;
- suppressing the enemy defences with either temporary electronic measures or directly by striking at the ground based radars; and
- providing the delivery aircraft with electronic counter measures to seduce enemy air defences.

These measures improve the survivability of the striking aircraft. Air strike can therefore be assessed in terms of precision, lethality and standoff.

### Air Roles Directly Involving Strike

The air roles directly involving strike may be classified as either land or maritime, however, common to both environments is the need to suppress enemy air defences and the strike characteristics of Australia’s aircraft. Therefore, these two aspects are examined first.

### Australia’s Strike Aircraft

The ADF has three strike aircraft with a further three under acquisition. Foremost in terms of speed, range, diversity, and payload is the F–111C aircraft, which can strike any point in Australian territory from all established airfields on the Australian mainland. Second is the P–3C aircraft which has the same extensive range, a similar payload, and better endurance than the F–111C aircraft, but does lack speed and hence survivability against jet-fighter aircraft. Last is the F/A–18 aircraft, which has comparatively low range and a small payload. Without air-to-air refuelling, the F/A–18 aircraft can only strike land or maritime targets within about 400 nautical miles of an established airfield. Both the F–111 and F/A–18 aircraft lack the ability to loiter over a maritime or land battlefield, while all three aircraft require operation from well established airfields. The following new aircraft are being acquired by the ADF, partly to overcome these limitations in Australia’s strike aircraft:

- an attack helicopter for the Army for close-air support;
- another maritime helicopter for the Navy for maritime patrol and strike (both anti-surface and anti-submarine); and
- a lead-in fighter aircraft (modified Hawk) for the Air Force for close air support and some battlefield air interdiction.

In a short warning conflict, these new aircraft could deploy with the land or maritime forces and
provide quicker close-air support against an adversary’s smaller vessels or land forces than the larger existing ADF aircraft.

Increasingly strike operations are being dominated by the sophistication and appropriateness of the weapon employed rather than the delivery aircraft. Notwithstanding, the host aircraft must have the sensors and capability to easily accept these weapons to provide for flexible strike operations. To readily accept new sensors, avionics and weapons and to adapt to new threat parameters, requires modern strike aircraft to have the following:

- a digital avionics databus (i.e. MIL-STD-1553 databus) for rapid information sharing around an aircraft, between the aircraft and weapons pre-launch;
- readily supported software (i.e. can be modified and updated to local requirements); and
- a multi-functional and highly automated cockpit environment so as not to overload the aircrew.

If a strike aircraft has these features then the time and expense involved in integrating new sensors or weapons, or adapting to new threat parameters is reduced significantly. Each of Australia’s existing and future strike aircraft now have digital avionics databus, and the capability to support the software, although software support of the F/A–18 aircraft is still through the USN and subject to considerable expense and delay. Australia’s commitment to adaptable aircraft platforms is illustrated in the modification of the Hawk aircraft to include a digital databus, supported software and a multifunctional and automated cockpit environment.

**Suppression of Enemy Air Defences**

Stand-off weapons are designed to enable strike aircraft to hit targets without entering the engagement zone of an adversary’s air defences. To suppress enemy air defences, an aircraft must attack its greatest threat, and therefore such weapons have to provide the attacking aircraft with stand-off. Also, since these weapons usually target the enemy’s radars, these weapons are often comparatively light and they usually use the radar emissions as the means of homing. Homing onto the radar’s emissions is known as “anti-radiation”.

Australia’s first sought anti-radiation missiles in about 1984 and proceeded to initial qualification firings on F–111 aircraft. However, the project was cancelled in 1988. Following the Gulf War in 1990, anti-radiation missiles were again sought in 1993 and were even approved and funded in 1994 for introduction to F–111 and P–3C strike aircraft in 1999. In 1995 Materiel Division (Air Force) conducted an evaluation of three candidate missiles, including seeker head trials at DSTO, however, Defence has again regrettably pursued other priorities.

Anti-radiation missiles can be used in either the land or maritime environments and may be used against pre-determined targets, against “targets of opportunity” detected through onboard electronic intelligence, or in self-defence if engaged by enemy air defences. Not only do anti-radiation missiles suppress enemy air defences, but also they offer alternative strike options to conventional weapons. First, if enemy radar engages an aircraft this can be considered a hostile first act, requiring retaliation with appropriate force against that radar. Second, the weapon is light and primarily destroys the radar by sensing the proximity to the target and exploding fragments into the electronics. An anti-radiation missile can therefore effectively neutralise a ship or battalion as a threat to aircraft without excessive destruction of lives.

Within a short warning conflict, an adversary would be likely to initially deploy their land forces to Australia with only man-portable air defences, for which anti-radiation missiles are not suitable. If however, the adversary could establish a resupply point by sea or air, then surface-to-air defences and control radars can easily be deployed and these would then require suppression using anti-radiation missiles. Similarly, the enemy may operate maritime vessels with air defence radars and surface-to-air missiles that need to be suppressed in circumstances where stand-off anti-ship missiles like the “Harpoon” would be an overkill. Also, any offensive land or maritime strike action within an adversary’s territory risks engaging air defence radars and surface-to-air missiles that should be suppressed. Without an anti-radiation missile the ADF lacks a principle first strike weapon in any air campaign and hence puts all subsequent strike, offensive counter air and reconnaissance tasks at a considerably higher risk and cost.

**Land Strike**

In a short warning conflict, an adversary’s land-based forces could require offensive air strike to prevent resupply, or an adversary may establish a battalion size land force within Australia for which air strike is the preferred option. Australia’s main land strike aircraft is the F–111 aircraft, however, in some circumstances the F/A–18 aircraft could supplement the F–111 aircraft. The main strike weapon against land based targets has been the general purpose unguided bombs (1000 lb MK82 and 2000 lb MK84) and the more accurate laser-guided versions made from the general purpose bombs and Paveway II
guidance kits (GBU–10 and GBU 12). The general purpose unguided weapons require the aircraft to over-fly the target or the aircraft to conduct a complex tossing manoeuvre that nevertheless requires the aircraft to approach very close to the target. The laser-guided bombs achieve much greater accuracy with some limited stand-off and may be either self-designated from the aircraft or designated by specially trained troops on the ground. Recently, the ADF acquired the more advanced Paveway III weapon (GBU–24) which has improved stand-off range and precision.

Irrespective of their guidance, general purpose weapons use a compromise amount of blast and fragmentation for use against all types of targets. However, with a focus in modern warfare towards quick and effective neutralisation of a wide variety of targets early in a conflict, general purpose weapons should be replaced by more dedicated weapons, albeit at an increased logistics cost. Weapons and targets can be divided into the following categories:

- general purpose targets that are usually singular in nature and require both blast and fragmentation;
- anti-radiation targets as discussed earlier;
- hardened targets that have one or more layers of protection; and
- area targets that involve multiple sites to be hit by sub-munitions or that extend over a large area requiring extensive dispersal of armour-piercing, incendiary fragmentation.

Stand-off weapons for each of these target types have been approved and funded between 1994 and 1996; however, they remain subject, at any stage during acquisition, to mismanagement or reprioritisation as has occurred repeatedly with the anti-radiation missile capability. These stand-off weapons are the first-attack weapons, to be followed by the existing laser-guided weapons and ultimately unguided weapons if the conflict persists and control of the air is assured.

The general purpose weapon chosen by the ADF for integration to the F–111 aircraft in 1999 is the AGM–142 “Popeye”, a remotely guided, 3000 lb weapon with a stand-off range of over 60 nautical miles. The AGM–142 is guided by an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker and GPS/INS hybrid navigation. Aircrew are relayed the seeker image via data link. The AGM-142 can be used against an adversary’s resupply bridges, ships, and factories as well as key points within railway yards, docks, and airfields. The AGM–142 would be preferred to laser-guided or unguided weapons, whenever there could be enemy air defences encountered, including some man-portable surface-to-air missile types.

Stand-off weapons for use against hardened and area targets are under selection at the moment and should be chosen and integrated to the F–111 aircraft by about 2002. The Air Force has purchased hardened bombs (BLU–109) that can be integrated to a laser-guidance kit for accurate penetration of hardened targets from Paveway III ranges. This laser-guided, hardened-target weapon provides an interim capability against hardened targets until the stand-off version is chosen and integrated. In short warning conflict, an adversary is only likely to have hardened facilities within their own territory for such vital assets as C3I facilities and aircraft storage. Such facilities are usually heavily defended and are desirable targets early in a conflict to gain control of the air and isolate any area of conflict from higher command, essential communications and intelligence.

There has been no dedicated strike capability against area targets since the phasing out of the CBU–58 “Karinga” cluster bomb in the 1980s. However, if air superiority can be obtained and the ADF can risk over-fly of the target, then F–111 aircraft can ripple (rapid, staggered release) general purpose unguided weapons to some effect against area targets. The most likely use of area weapons in a short warning conflict is in battlefield air interdiction, and extensive disabling of airfields, ports, railway yards and the like.

**Battlefield Air Interdiction**

Battlefield air interdiction involves striking the supply lines of an adversary. The air-sea gap around Australia makes an enemy’s supply lines highly vulnerable to air defence or maritime strike. Notwithstanding, resupply of major equipment is likely to be either by sea to a seized port or by cargo aircraft to a seized airfield, and thereafter would be transported by road to support the land battle. Seized ports, airfields and transport columns are all good area targets. The most dramatic and recent example of the use of an area weapon for battlefield air interdiction was by the Allies in the Gulf War to prevent withdrawal of the Iraqi land forces on the road to Bhasra. The Allies truck with unguided cluster bombs (CBU–87) which rain armour piercing, incendiary (zirconium tipped) fragmentation over a large area. The ADF could significantly enhance its capability to conduct battlefield air interdiction with the F–111 aircraft through the acquisition of such area weapons. Once a stand-off weapon is acquired for area targets, the CBU–87 weapon would be relegated to a second strike weapon for use when control of the air over the battlefield had been gained.
Close Air Support

Close air support is a subset of land strike where the land force requires nominated targets in the land battle to be struck. Close air support requires aircraft to be readily available for attack of selected targets, usually through direct communication with a ground-based controller or even designator. The close proximity to friendly land forces often precludes the use of stand-off and unguided weapons, while a further complexity is that targets are often moving or partly obscured. Close air support can be provided by F–111 and F/A–18 aircraft using laser-guided bombs, however, the ability of these aircraft to loiter near the battlefield is poor, while laser-guided weapons are not as effective when targets are moving or obscured. Australia’s allies use small infra-red imaging weapons from tactical aircraft such as battlefield helicopters or vertical-take-off aircraft like the Harrier, to prosecute close air support. The ADF is procuring both an attack helicopter and the Hawk aircraft to significantly enhance the close air support capability, although the nature and extent of the weaponry sought is unknown (i.e. will the requisite weapons actually be integrated, stocked and trained with?). In short warning conflict, close air support would be necessary to reduce the cost to an ADF land force of engaging any substantial land force encountered either in Australia or within enemy territory. A substantial force may only be a battalion, if it is well trained and located.

Maritime Strike

Maritime strike may be classified as anti-submarine, anti-surface or aerial maritime mining. Each of these three areas will be considered separately.

Anti-Submarine Warfare

The hardest surveillance task of all is to detect and track a submarine, Australia’s maritime patrol aircraft and crews consistently demonstrate the highest capability to perform this task when measured in competitions with Britain, Canada and New Zealand. However, the task should never be underestimated, as it is extremely time consuming and resource intensive. Typically, given some reasonable intelligence, maritime patrol aircraft take up to three days to locate a submarine and may only get the one opportunity to prosecute the kill if the submarine senses detection.

Submarines are destroyed using torpedoes that must be highly reliable given the limited opportunity the aircraft has before contact is lost. Australia’s torpedoes (MK461 MOD1) were designed and built in the early 1960’s using technology developed in the 1950s. Hence, these torpedoes are now obsolete, particularly when subjected to the rigours of air carriage, release and water impact. In 1984, (15 years ago), force development planners began a joint project to upgrade Australia’s torpedoes, however, the Air Force and Navy sought to influence the project in different directions. Poor overall management and ubiquitous reprioritisation has plagued this essential strike capability. The Government still has not approved acquisition of a new lightweight torpedo through competitive tender (JP 2070), including sufficient stocks for both training and conflict.

Anti-Surface Warfare

Australia purchased and integrated the Harpoon anti-ship missile (AGM–84) to strike aircraft in 1980. The Harpoon is a fully autonomous stand-off maritime strike weapon with ranges of at least 60 nautical miles. Release of such a capable weapon to Australia so soon after development by the United States can probably be attributed to Australia’s strategic role in monitoring the South China Sea and Indian Ocean for Russian naval activity during and following the Afghanistan invasion. The Harpoon missile can be employed from P–3C and F–111C aircraft, as well as used in submarine and surface ships of the Navy. The Harpoon missile is an extremely competent maritime strike weapon, but it does have some disadvantages, especially in short warning conflict. First, the Harpoon is worth nearly three million dollars each and there are many maritime strike targets that are not worth that expenditure. Second, autonomous selection and identification of the target can preclude use in some maritime environments. A smaller, cheaper and more discriminate maritime strike weapon would complement the Harpoon capability, although the weapon would still require a degree of stand-off to protect the aircraft. The recent acquisition of a new helicopter to support the Navy frigates, also includes purchase of Penguin anti-ship missiles. The Penguin missile has good discrimination, reasonable stand-off and is small enough for helicopter carriage and employment. Additional, Penguin missiles could probably be purchased and integrated onto the F–111 and P–3C aircraft to provide a sound alternative to the use of Harpoon missiles for maritime strike.

Aerial Maritime Mining

Aerial maritime mining may be used to deny an adversary’s use of sea passages, harbours and landing areas. If the mining is conducted in an adversary’s or
international waters then it is considered offensive whereas within Australian waters such mining would be defensive. International laws of the sea prohibit Australia using floating or moored mines, however, bottom laid mines are permitted. Australia’s continental waters are nearly all suitable for effective defensive maritime mining, while many countries are vulnerable to offensive maritime mining.

Aerial maritime mining was extensively used in the second World War, but was neglected by Australia until after the Vietnam War. The United States used fairly crude maritime mines in Haiphong Harbour during the Vietnam War to some success and Iraq used similar very cheap maritime mines during the Gulf War. In 1996, force development planners approved funds to acquire a new maritime mining capability (JP 2045). The new mining capability will most likely include programmable target-detecting devices, dedicated maritime bombs and an air-delivered stand-off capability for F–111 and P–3C aircraft.

The analysis of the strike capability thus far has demonstrated the reliance of air strike operations on other air roles such as counter-air, reconnaissance and electronic warfare. The capability of the ADF to perform these other air roles in support of strike operations will be briefly considered.

Defensive and Offensive Counter Air

Control of the air over the target enables air strike to be performed without stand-off, without suppression of enemy air defence, with comparatively less risk to the strike aircraft, and less dependence on stand-off imaging for target identification and bomb damage assessment. These factors can significantly reduce the cost of air strike. Control of an enemy’s air is, however, difficult to maintain without the complete subjugation of enemy air defences, an action that usually requires repeated air strike operations of itself. Further, Australia’s land and maritime areas are so large (approximately 10 per cent of the World’s surface) as to prohibit any guarantee of air supremacy even within Australia’s territory. Consequently, whether striking defensively or offensively, it is highly desirable that counter air be conducted in support of air strike to attain temporary control of the air.

Australia has only the F/A–18 aircraft and a few ageing Rapier surface-to-air missile units to provide counter-air. Project Land 117 has been approved to purchase new surface-to-air missile units to provide better ground-based defensive counter-air. The F/A–18 aircraft does not have the range or endurance to accompany F–111 or P–3C aircraft on strike missions without in-flight refuelling or through careful flight planning to arrive at the target ingress area at the same time. Modern air-to-air weapons with increased range, agility and speed are being purchased by the ADF (UK ASRAAM and US AMRAAM) that could be integrated to the P–3C aircraft (AMRAAM) and F–111C aircraft (ASRAAM and AMRAAM) to provide self-reliance against air attack.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is essential for air strike to have accurate and recent knowledge of the targets to be attacked and to assess the need for re-attack of targets. Australia’s main reconnaissance aircraft for air strike is the RF–111C aircraft, although this aircraft does generally require over-fly of the target where there is a risk of being engaged. ADF force developers have endeavoured to procure a stand-off imaging capability for the F–111 aircraft, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), or satellites. At present there is a joint reconnaissance project (JP 129) examining UAV and satellite options for stand-off imaging.

Many modern stand-off weapons like the AGM–142 Popeye data-link imagery to the delivery aircraft to confirm target identification and hence provide real-time imagery of the point of impact. Knowing the point of impact improves the estimation of the damage sustained by the target, however, where subsequent ADF action depends on the target’s destruction, then post-mission reconnaissance is necessary. Also, autonomous stand-off weapons like the Harpoon and anti-radiation missiles provide little indication of target damage and therefore also require bomb damage assessment.

Surveillance

Active and passive surveillance of an adversary’s military is essential, especially early in a likely conflict when intentions are being assessed and counter moves are being planned. Surveillance of mobile targets such as ships, submarines, transportable surveillance radar and the like, is important so that the targets can be struck when necessary and preferably when at their most vulnerable. The P–3C aircraft has the endurance and sensors to conduct maritime surveillance and some land surveillance (mainly radar). The Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar (JORN) is a substantial surveillance capability in monitoring “large-scale” air
and control interception of an enemy. Australia is obtaining an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft capability. AEW&C aircraft will provide a local surveillance capability for air strike, in particular of an enemy’s land and maritime activity.

### Air-to-Air Refuelling

Air-to-air refuelling of air strike assets like the F–111C and P–3C aircraft is unlikely to be required in the defence of Australia given their extensive ranges and endurance. If the F/A–18 and Hawk aircraft are to supplement these aircraft in the conduct of air strike, then a more extensive air-to-air refuelling capability is required than the training capability that currently exists. Fortunately the need for defensive and offensive counter-air across Australia’s territory should, of itself, be sufficient to justify a full air-to-air refuelling capability for the F/A–18 aircraft. Air-to-air refuelling of the F–111C aircraft would only be necessary if Australia was required to prosecute air strike in roles other than the defence of Australia and could not secure an air base from which to operate.

### Electronic Warfare

In no other area is Australia so deficient to our allies as in electronic warfare. Electronic counter-measures are an accepted means of temporarily suppressing enemy air defences and of self-defence from surface-to-air and air-to-air threats. However, Australia has only one strike aircraft, the F/A–18 aircraft, fully fitted with electronic counter-measures against an attack, and even then the capability to modify these counter-measures to meet changing threats is limited. The F–111C aircraft has no operational means of radar, laser or missile warning and must rely purely on speed, surprise and manoeuvrability to avoid such attack. The P–3C has a new electronic intelligence fit, but this does not provide the capability to counter-attack from a radar, laser, or missile. Project *Echidna* has been established to update the electronic counter-measure capability of all ADF aircraft as well as seeking indigenous counter-measure support for tailoring the systems to changing threats. Also, Project *AIR 5395* (Phase 3) is supposed to provide the ADF with an electronic warfare training range at Delamere Air Weapons Range to enable aircraft systems and aircrew to be tested against simulated electronic warfare threats. However, both these projects have been delayed and reprioritised to the extent they may no longer redress Australia’s imbalance with our allies.

Suppressing enemy air defences with electronic counter-measures can be achieved by fitting an electronics pod. The United States used the ALQ–94, ALQ–131 and ALQ–184 pods on F–111 aircraft, that the ADF could consider using to support strike operations.

To be successful in air strike requires knowledge of the electronic warfare of an adversary and this requires electronic intelligence such as that recently fitted to the P–3C under Project *AIR 5140*. Australia has long been capable of electronic intelligence gathering, but lacks the capability to feedback that intelligence into the aircraft systems that will prosecute air strike; that is, targeting radar and communications with programmed anti-radiation missiles and programming on-board electronic counter-measures for aircraft self-defence.

### Functions Supporting the Strike Capability

Any ADF operation requires sufficient personnel, logistics, research, development, test and evaluation to be successful. The ADF began to recognise and quantify the impact of these crucial support functions on the overall capability of the ADF through preparedness planning, however, the massive “outsourcing” of all these support functions must place continued and cohesive support from these elements at risk.

Preparedness planning in the ADF recognises that readiness and sustainability are quantifiable measures based on these support functions. In its simplest form preparedness planning also recognises that within a peacetime environment, the ADF should operate at a level of preparedness lower than that required for even short warning conflict – the so called minimum level of capability (MLOC). In the event of a likely conflict, then the ADF must conduct work-up training to achieve an operational level of capability (OLOC) and must sustain OLOC by a higher level of continuation training. In terms of readiness for air strike, the ADF must maintain the following for MLOC:

- the necessary strike aircraft;
- aircrew proficient in the aircraft;
- weapons integrated to, and occasionally proven from, the strike aircraft;
- aircrew familiar, but not necessarily proficient in, the use of the weapon from the aircraft (hence the use of simulated weapon releases); and
- sufficient weapon stocks to conduct work-up training, prosecute the conflict and maintain continuation training at OLOC.
Weapon stocks are supposed to be linked to preparedness planning directives and provide for aircrew to develop their weapon proficiency during work-up and continuation training, as well as the obvious stocks sufficient to neutralise the required targets.

In terms of sustainability of air strike operations, the ADF has many support functions that need to be regularly exercised. These exercises are the role of the force element groups who should endeavour to make the training as realistic as possible. Such exercises also demonstrate continued supportability. Unfortunately, the constant state of reorganisation, limited operational funds, down-sizing, and outsourcing detract from the capacity to conduct such realistic exercises. For example, a major Contingency Air Base Wing (CABW) has not been exercised since about 1989 when the Curtin “bare base” was first activated. With the reorganisation since then, the capacity of the Air Force to establish a CABW with short notice to support air strikes in the north is questionable.

Ground Defence

A secure base from which to launch air strike operations is imperative. The chain of bases around Australia’s north that was envisioned by Air Marshal Scherger in the 1950s is becoming a reality at last with the formation of RAAF bare bases at Learmonth, Curtin, Derby and Sherger, and the establishment of a permanent base at Tindal. Ground defence of these bases is significantly enhanced by the cadre of permanent ground defence staff in the air field defence squadrons, who ensure ground defence procedures exist and that Air Force personnel are trained in basic ground defence.

Communications

Command and control depends on secure and ready communications. Secure aircraft communications between friendly forces is critical for air strike, especially where targeting may be independent or when successful attack is part of a coordinated land or maritime movement, or part of a strategic air campaign. Secure communication links provide for such coordination. The importance of transportable ground-based communications is evident in Australia’s Air Transportable Telecommunication Unit (ATTU) which would support strike operations from any activated bare base.

Intelligence

Accurate and timely intelligence about an adversary’s forces, motivations and intentions is critical in planning any strike operation, including assessing the likely impact of strike operations on an adversary’s will to continue fighting. Air strike can be a useful psychological weapon, cutting off communication with higher command, subjecting military forces to surgical strikes, and the like can be confusing and demoralising. Intelligence has both a human and electronic form.

Personnel

Personnel still form a crucial part of all strike operations. From the troop who prepares the aircraft and weapons; to the aircrew who must skilfully and confidently prosecute the mission, personnel form the motivation and crucial link in any military campaign. Force element groups are restricted by the loss of key aircrew and the uncertainty within maintenance and support elements caused by the massive reduction in uniformed personnel. The down-sizing, out-sourcing and drain of key personnel to industry has been concurrent with rapid changes in society’s expectations for work, leisure, freedom of expression, and freedom of lifestyle. Faced with such changes, the Glenn Review in 1996, recommended the ADF adopt more flexible and modern human resource management practices, but few of these recommendations have been adopted. The Air Force has at least sought to ensure that, those personnel who remain are better trained and fitter. While the technological capability for air strike can be assessed, the capability of personnel to support air strike remains the largest unknown. The capability of personnel would be better known if realistic exercises were affordable and Australia could realistically participate in allied air strike operations.

Logistics

Logistics underpins the sustainability of any Air Force operation like air strike. The ADF has pursued more efficient support of weapon systems through an Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) training regime and continual funding cuts. The initial effect of these funding cuts was increased efficiency, but now these cuts are affecting aircraft serviceability. The following logistical factors detract from Australia’s ability to support strike operations:

- current exercises are generally small and do not represent the logistic drain that concurrent operations, even a short warning conflict would represent;
logistic support to operations in the north of Australia involve some of the most hostile and intertemperate climate in the world and can be expected to, therefore, further reduce serviceability rates and hamper logistic support;
the drive for logistical efficiency has seen the military adopt business practice of “just in time” resupply, often meaning a greater dependence on quick resupply from overseas; and
Australia’s resupply routes from overseas are tenuous in any conflict, particularly to the north.

Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
RDT&E units exist in all of the Services and are supported by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). The Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) at RAAF Edinburgh, and the Aeronautical and Maritime Research Laboratories (AMRL) at Salisbury and Fishermens Bend primarily conduct Australia’s RDT&E in support of strike operations. The main areas of RDT&E conducted are:
• assessments of the life of, and repairs to strike aircraft;
• assessing compatibility of new weapons for carriage on and employment from strike aircraft;
• assessing weapon effects and target vulnerability;
• monitoring and assessing the accuracy and effectiveness of weapon releases on the instrumented range at Woomera;
• assessing the compatibility and effectiveness of new avionics and software in both strike aircraft and weapons;
• assessing electronic intelligence and implementing electronic warfare measures to enhance strike operations.
Recent endeavours towards supporting RDT&E in strike operations include:
• establishing a closer relationship between the services and DSTO;
• a greater funding of electronic warfare, aircraft stores compatibility and weapon RDT&E facilities; and
• funding of improved range facilities at Woomera (instrumentation), Delamere (EW and ACMI), and Stirling (maritime).

Training
Training of aircrew and maintenance personnel has the greatest immediate impact on strike operations. The following factors have recently detracted from the training that such personnel receive:
• the distraction of constant restructuring;
• the decrease in the size and duration of most exercises due to the reduced availability of funds and aircraft;
• the decreased availability of aircraft due to modification upgrades and reduced funding for logistic support of the aircraft;
• the increased training of civilians and service personnel that restructuring has required;
• business practice reviews as a result of quality management, ISO 9001 accreditation, Commercial Support Program (CSP) activities and the Defence Reform Program (DRP);
• upgrading of existing strike aircraft and weapons; and
• the introduction of new strike aircraft and weapons.

Infrastructure
The development of the chain of bare bases has significantly improved infrastructure for conducting strike operations in defence of Australia. The rationalisation of southern air bases should, when complete, result in additional funds to support strike operations.

Conclusion
An examination of each of the air roles of air strike and those that support air strike has revealed that Australia is constrained in the type of strike operations it can conduct. Modern warfare requires surgical strike early in an air campaign to remove an adversary’s will to fight. Also, the Australian public is likely to support only minimal losses in any conflict and want only a use of reasonable force. Many of Australia’s air strike capabilities place an unnecessarily high risk of heavy losses against a comparatively lightly armed aggressor. Further, many of the capabilities for air strike do not provide the Government with a range of force, either being excessive in some instances (i.e. Harpoon) or being too ineffective (i.e. ripple bombing general purpose bombs instead of using a dedicated stand-off area weapon). The most critical of these shortfalls that were identified are as follows:
• anti-radiation missles for suppression of enemy air defences;
• a stand-off weapon against area targets and an interim unguided weapon for area targets;
• a dedicated close-air support missile for use on Army attack helicopters and Hawk aircraft;
• a reliable lightweight torpedo;
• additional Penguin anti-ship missiles for integration onto the F–111C and P–3C aircraft as a lesser maritime strike option than Harpoon;
• a reliable stand-off and unguided aerial maritime mine for F–111C and P–3C aircraft;
• integration of the new advanced air-to-air missiles to the F–111C and P–3C aircraft for self defence and to enable more autonomous operation;
• a stand-off reconnaissance capability;
• air-to-air refuelling for the F/A–18 and Hawk aircraft;
• electronic counter-measures for all ADF aircraft;
• an electronic warfare training range for aircraft;
• realistic exercising of logistics and personnel for air strike operations; and
• a period of stability within the ADF from which to conduct such exercises and redress capability shortfalls.

Many of these shortfalls have been identified by the ADF already, but attempts to redress them are slow, particularly within the Defence Acquisition Organisation. Uniformed personnel have argued passionately for these deficiencies to be redressed, funding has been secured, and Defence Acquisition has often not delivered on time or to anywhere near the level of capability sought (i.e. torpedoes, electronic warfare range, electronic counter-measures, anti-radiation missiles). While the principal causes are tight funding and insufficient project staff, also reprioritisation is used to cover mistakes. The restructuring of Defence into more programs has so far only exacerbated progress within the ADF on these shortfalls. Another problem is the nefarious fallacy that so long as Australia has the platforms, our intelligence cycle, alliances, and technological engineering base are sufficient to arm these platforms with the latest armament only when required. Such conceptions are naive and must be challenged by asking those with such a bias to try realistically planning for these contingency options.

Squadron Leader (Dr) Keith Joiner joined the RAAF as an engineering cadet in 1985 at RAAF Base Fogganville. He graduated from RMIT and RAAF College Point Cook as an aeronautical engineer in 1988, first serving at Maintenance Squadron East Sale looking after aircraft for the School of Air Navigation, Central Flying School, and the RAAF Roulette Display Team. In 1991, he completed a Masters in Aerosystems Engineering with Loughborough University and RAF Cranwell in the United Kingdom. Then followed tours working in the certification and future requirements of air-delivered weapons with Aircraft Research and Development Unit and HQADF, Force Development (Aerospace). Since 1997, he has been a visiting military fellow at the School of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering, University of New South Wales, where he teaches engineering cadets from the Defence Academy. This year, he has completed a PhD after four years of study in education through Curtin University of Technology, WA.

Book Reviews

100 YEARS OF AUSTRALIANS AT WAR. By George Odgers, Lansdowne Publishing. 400pp. Paperback. RRP:$29.95.
Reviewed by Captain Noel Gilby

100 Years of Australians at War is not a book about heroes. As Jeffrey Grey points out in his reference book, A Military History of Australia, we do not generally think of ourselves as a military people. Quite rightly he argues that our heroes play at full-forward, scrum-half or open the batting, and when we do acknowledge the heroic qualities of someone in a military uniform it is more likely to be for self-sacrificial mateship than deeds of martial virtue.

This book is much less about heroes and more about everyday Australians who answered the call of the bugle in our nation at times of need. George Odgers has dedicated the book to all Australians of the Armed Services who in the 20th century paid the supreme sacrifice in defence of their country. Not only does the author pay tribute to the Service men and women of the two World Wars, he goes all the way back to the Boer War, the Boxers conflict in China, through to the Malayan Emergency, Korea, the Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam.

Many books of this genre stop at the Vietnam War or peter out at the Gulf War. George Odgers goes beyond the Gulf War and in Chapter 12, entitled Keeping the Peace, he investigates the role Australian Service personnel played in far-flung corners of the globe. Korea, Israel and the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Egypt-Israel, Namibia, the Western Sahara, Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda all get a mention, although not in as much detail as the chapters on the major conflicts.
100 Years of Australians at War is a revised and updated edition of the beautifully presented two-volume set entitled Diggers first published by Lansdowne Publishing in 1994. George Odgers delivers each campaign in neat, easily digested bites backed by the use of effective maps and graphics.

This book is not meant to be an exhaustive academic tome leaving no stone unturned. George Odgers enjoys a rare blend of journalistic talent and operational service in WWII (New Guinea, Bougainville and Borneo), the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam to give an insight to the soldiers he knows and obviously respects. For most research requirements this book will provide all the detail you need on just about any operation, campaign, battle or war that Australian personnel have ever been involved in. If I had to pick a flaw it was that there was no mention of Operation Coracle, a small but very professional contingent of RAE sappers providing support to Mozambique. (I know Op Coracle is not a peacekeeping operation but somehow I feel the sappers’ work deserves recognition somewhere in Chapter 12).

The book finishes with a roll of honour, listing all 96 Victoria Cross winners. It also has a comprehensive index to help find the smallest of details. No military buff’s bookshelf will be complete without this book. It is an invaluable resource for the serious and not-so-serious reader of Australian military history. Serving personnel should have a copy of this book also if they are the least bit serious about their profession.

As we come to the close of the 20th century, it is important as a defence force to pause and take a collective look over our shoulder before marching into the next century because as Australia faces an uncertain future. The only certainty is the firm foundation and legacy that its defence force has left behind. 100 Years of Australians at War is an excellent place to start looking.

AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING: Face-to-face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare. By Joanna Bourke, Granta, 564pp, $49.95

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Dr) Alan Ryan

“It is well that war is so terrible – we should grow too fond of it.” Robert E. Lee acknowledged the fact that some people could find enjoyment in some aspects of war, but recognised that, at its core, war is horrible. Joanna Bourke adopts another approach, arguing that ordinary men and women, freed from conventional constraints on social behaviour, find intense pleasure in the act of killing. She asserts that the existence of a state of war legitimises killing, unleashing a primal, even erotic joy in killing.

A reader in History at Birkbeck College, University of London, Joanna Bourke is a cultural historian with a particular interest in gender issues. Winner of the Fraenkel Prize in contemporary history for this book, she writes about men in combat as an outsider looking in – for the most part, a very comfortable position to adopt.

Based on accounts of the experiences of Australian, British and US servicemen during the two World Wars and the Vietnam War, this book has already received wide publicity and an extremely positive reception in some circles. Professor Richard Overy, the respected British historian, has called it an “extraordinary tour de force” and the product of “massive scholarship”. Released at a time when we witness, once again, man’s potential for barbarism in the killing fields of Kosovo, the author claims “to put killing back in military history”, suggesting that excitement, joy and satisfaction in slaughter are every society’s dirty secret.

Undeniably, this is a challenging and shocking work, drawing on an extensive selection of battlefield stories, most of which revel in carnage. As Bourke warns, the subject matter is traumatising; it is hard not to feel soiled by some of the accounts.

History of this type has a heavy responsibility for exposing fundamental aspects of the human condition. Given that duty, it is troubling that this is an incomplete, one-eyed work. It is also badly edited, with a number of incorrect phrases and spelling errors displaying unfamiliarity with the basic subject matter. Utilising a highly selective approach to her sources, Bourke falls back on a tired stereotype of the soldier as a bloodthirsty murderer, and attempts to make every killing in war an atrocity. While the traumatic experience of researching the book was almost “unbearable” for the author, she allows no such luxury to her subjects. Her ‘ordinary killers’ are little affected by the act of killing and re-absorb into society with few psychological scars; apparently the burden of killing is a relatively light one.

Usually, a historian claiming to challenge an established view considers how other authorities have dealt with the subject. Bourke virtually ignores inconvenient and contradictory arguments, and constructs her own discourse in a vacuum. Professor Dave Grossman’s classic 1995 Pulitzer prize-nominated study, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society does not rate a mention. Neither is John Keegan’s work on the nature of battle, and Richard Holmes groundbreaking work is only mentioned in passing.
The failure to consider contemporary psychological literature makes this a curious work of history. Bourke furthers her arguments with blithe assertions while neglecting more empirically based studies. Using the substantial historical material available, Grossman made a case that the modern western soldier has been conditioned to become a more effective killer than at any time in history. That this has come at substantial individual and social psychological cost, has been borne out by the dramatic increase in post-traumatic stress casualties in the age of industrial warfare. Bourke, on the other hand, appears to construct an artificial moral universe in which the combatant as killer and the combatant as victim can be easily distinguished. As a result, the context in which she constructs her narratives seems far removed from the reality of war.

Rather than presenting battle as the chaotic mess we know it to be, Bourke concentrates on the act of killing. Without the distraction of actual circumstances, the reader is presented with successive one-dimensional renderings of battle as a series of similar encounters. Though admitting that face-to-face fighting is now relatively rare, Bourke allows it to form the basis for her analysis of men in combat. Even then, she appears unaware that such encounters occur between exhausted, terrified, hungry, filthy and often physically sick individuals immersed in the carnage of the direct-fire battlefield. This is not the realm of eroticism; this is closer to hell.

Most damning from the historical perspective is Bourke’s failure to discriminate between first-hand accounts, literary sources and anti-war polemics. She invokes sources as disparate as: fiction, drama and “letters from the front”. Much of it falls into the category of what Richard Holmes calls “military pornography” – the sort of literature that is lapped up by a public eager for titillation and violence by proxy. As Dr Michael Evans argued at the recent Canberra conference, *The Human Face of Warfare*, “the paradox of those doing the fighting but not doing the writing has meant that the soldier’s war has been a secret war”. To understand this hidden aspect of military history, the author needs to make more informed judgments about the evidentiary value of different types of narratives.

Greater familiarity with the secondary literature might have helped. Robin Berster’s *Big-Noting*, established “porkies” as a constant theme in war memoirs and Michael Herr, author of *Despatches*, commented that after battle one is perfectly free to “make up any kind of bullshit”. Bourke fails to take the braggart factor into account and invests too much value in the foolish, puffed-up letters of inexperienced young men to their girlfriends and families. Similarly, the scar that Vietnam left on the American psyche produced some ugly literary and cinematic excrescences, but they too need to be seen in context and not viewed as historical reality.

Those familiar with war literature will question the way the historian’s craft is manipulated. Sam Damon, hero of Anton Myrer’s anti-militarist novel *Once an Eagle*, is quoted as a living character. To add insult to injury, the “quote” reflects an attitude quite out of character with his (fictional) persona. In a similar vein, Gary McKay, author of *In Good Company*, is depicted as being disappointed and morose that his first kill in Vietnam did not live up to the movies. Reading his graphic and honest account of the event, McKay does not appear to demonstrate those sentiments – instead he is awed and almost transfixed – until further shooting forces him to concentrate on the command of his platoon.

From my experience of teaching military history, I am sure that this book will get a great deal of mileage in some university courses. It purports to show soldiers, and the society that produces them, as enthusiastic killers. The fact that Australian, British and US troops are targeted relieves the reader from the uncomfortable problem of considering moral and cultural relativities. Bourke’s argument is also terribly one-sided – if our own boys are capable of such atrocities, then perhaps the SS, the Japanese Army and the Serbian militias are just another aspect of the same problem. The idea that different cultures and different eras truly do possess widely varied attitudes to killing is not recognised. Nor do we see the ordinary men who live amongst us, still haunted by the memories of what we once asked them to do.

Clearly we all approach events with a different perspective, and the military historian has a particular problem recreating the extreme emotions experienced in battle. Battlefield narratives can be constructed from any number of sources, but will they be accurate? The reader might take heed of General Sir Ian Hamilton’s warning that “on the actual day of the battle naked truths may be picked up by a public eager for titillation and violence by proxy. As Dr Michael Evans argued at the recent Canberra conference, *The Human Face of Warfare*, “the paradox of those doing the fighting but not doing the writing has meant that the soldier’s war has been a secret war”. To understand this hidden aspect of military history, the author needs to make more informed judgments about the evidentiary value of different types of narratives.

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**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN:**


Reviewed by Major Darren Kerr, Australian Intelligence Corps

The Pakistan Army has ruled Pakistan for about half its national existence, either directly under
martial law decrees or indirectly, by engineering nominally democratic elections for almost half of Pakistan’s independent existence. Even under civilian governments, the Army continues to exercise considerable influence from behind the scenes, retains the final say on national security issues and remains the country’s most cohesive, disciplined institution. This book looks at the role of the Army in Pakistan’s politics and examines the institutions that have encouraged and fostered the Army’s on-going influence. I refer to “Army” instead of “military”, because it is clear from this book, and probably to even the most casual observer of Pakistan, that the Pakistan Navy and Air Force have very little, if any political influence.

The question of who actually runs Pakistan has been of great interest to many South Asia watchers since the country’s birth in 1947. During its formative years it was an easy answer; the Army ran Pakistan. However, in recent years the situation has become more blurred, and since Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear capability last year, more important. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan can help a reader gain a better understanding of the background to Pakistan’s current situation if one is prepared to wade through a difficult to read and often tedious book.

The misspelling of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s name on the front cover does not give one much cause for confidence, however, it is just symptomatic of the wider grammatical problems in the book. It is written in the very formal and stilted English, common in South Asia (but then if I was writing in Urdu, I might have some problems as well). Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings it is a rich goldmine of thought-provoking ideas; unfortunately, the digging is hard work at times. Saeed Shafqat, Director of Pakistan Studies at the Civil Services Academy in Lahore, presents a comprehensive exploration of civil-military relations in Pakistan, concentrating on the period 1971 to 1991. It is a very theoretical work and it is this very academic quality that will turn off most readers. As previously stated, this is a difficult book to plow through. Quoting the book’s introduction gives some idea of the bombastic quality of the book; “The subject of this research has been the limitations and constraints of a successor civilian regime in the post-hegemonic political system”.

Nevertheless, what comes through most clearly in the book, are the obstacles to Pakistan’s on-going search for a viable political system. The book highlights the challenges in finding such a system and also provides clear evidence of why democracy is still under threat in Pakistan. This is probably not a book for the general reader, however, it should be of some interest for those who delve into South Asian affairs.


Reviewed by Captain S.A. Edgar

The world section of the Sydney Morning Herald of 10 June 1997 was headed by two stories: “North Korea – Regime has missiles aimed at Tokyo, defector says” and US Japan Defence Deal – Military pact angers China”. The recent tensions and historic enmity between nations of northern Asia, and the increasing defence spending in the region make an interesting basis for a fictional account of war in 2001. Dragonstrike imagines a regional conflict centred on the South China Sea, also involving the Korean peninsula and Vietnam-China border. The authors, both with considerable experience in Hong Kong and China, draw a scenario that involves all the major players in the region. Aggression by China in seizing the Paracel and Spratly Island groups and preemptively striking Vietnamese bases draws Japan, France, Britain and the US into a regional encounter. Australian and New Zealand ships and submarines contribute in a minor way. To add to the general confusion the Korean peninsula erupts, Chinese missile submarines lurk off California and Taiwan has reasons to fear for its future.

This novel moves along at a fair pace, and the plot shows how complex the political strategies of the combatants would need to be. In general, the military engagements are described sparingly. There are no detailed characterisations of those involved in the combat, such as can be found in books like Red Storm Rising by Tom Clancy. Information warfare, satellites, air combat and submarine warfare feature large in the action, however, none are described in detail. The journalistic background of the authors is shown by the focus on nations’ leaders and their press releases and conferences. Much attention is paid to global stock market fluctuations, a secondary Chinese plan to speculate on oil and Yen futures, and the involvement of multi-national corporations.

Dragonstrike is an interesting read, and remains believable throughout. A disappointing element is the portrayal of the motives and philosophy of the Chinese leadership. Apart from a reliance on the teachings of Mao, memories of the Long March and an urge to rebuild the Chinese empire of centuries past, the novel does not seem to illuminate what
drives the Chinese leaders’ actions. A final word: don’t read the table directly after the preface. It is a chronology of events in the book and is best read after finishing the text to maintain the element of suspense.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope (Rtd)

This is a book full of contradictions. There appears to be no doubt that Mike is proud of his service as a combat soldier in Vietnam, yet the bitterness he often expresses against almost everyone outside of his infantry section takes the edge off actually enjoying reading his story. It seems he either hates or despises sergeants (I think about six get assaulted at one point or another), officers, “pogos” the “system”, politicians, bureaucrats, an uncaring public, the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, etc. He likes fellow infantry, but not all or just any infantry, of course, only the rifle section infantry count. Yet this appears to be the last place he wanted to be and loathed every moment he was there! The headquarters clerks, cooks, officers and staff are regarded as just masquerading infantry battalion pogos. This low regard for all but a chosen few of the veteran’s really starts to restrict one’s circle of friends! No wonder he has had a problem! I sincerely hope this book achieves something for its author by perhaps excising some of the devils that have left him locked in his six month tour of combat duty for over 30 years.

I think one telling point on why Mike cannot reconcile the choices he made is provided at length in pages 38-45. His subsequent experience with the Army and an uncaring Australian public on his return did not sit well with his personal view that he had done his duty to the best of his ability. It is an uncomfortable experience reading the contortions he uses to explain the comment on the cover of the book that he “found himself in Vietnam without actually volunteering for that service. Against regulations!” Sorry, but he did volunteer. As he states on page 39 that “To this day it is impossible to explain my gullibility and stupidity”. When asked to volunteer for Vietnam service, he stepped over the mythical “line in the sand”. He goes on to explain that he was manipulated into volunteering for service in Vietnam against his will. Well, the secret is out, he is absolutely right. Armies have been around a lot longer than Mike Towers and by the adept use of the psychology of “peer group pressure and this contemptible reversal of normal volunteering procedure, many unconvinced and frightened men did

‘volunteer’”. Of course they did, despite the fact that it defies all logic, to voluntarily put yourself in danger, especially when you have a pregnant wife at home worrying and waiting for you almost everyone did. So, how is it done? Easy! Put a group through increasingly strenuous exercises requiring more and more teamwork to succeed then line everyone up and publicly ask them if they want to remain on the team or not. There will be a few with either the strength of their beliefs (or because they lack character) who will cross the “line of shame”. It is very hard for your erstwhile comrades to know if you are a man of belief or a coward, isn’t it? I know some who did cross the line and with only one exception, everyone of them still regrets it and lives in fear of the shame of meeting those who did their “duty”. Congratulations, Mike! You did exactly what was expected of every normal, red-blooded, trained soldier. The explanations that you regretted it and had doubts after the event are probably accurate, but do not be so harsh on those who tried to help you. They really did, but the military machine is not organised to accommodate changes of mind. Once you entered the training cycle and time, effort, resources and the uncaring taxpayers money were being lavished on you, the only way out may very well have been over the wall. There are wide perimeters and only nominal guards around every camp, so if you really did object so fiercely, you should have gone!

Mike really is a complexity of contradictions. In Chapter 19, on his way to hospital, he loses his pack from a lurching helicopter, but retains his rifle. He regards this as a mistake as “had I jettisoned my rifle, my loathing of all forms of authority would not have germinated”. Examining this foundation for his bitterness is interesting and goes as follows. When an apparently over-zealous doctor finds that his wound was caused by a piece of cartridge case accidentally embedded in his hand after it exploded in a cooking fire he charges Mike with a self-inflicted wound. So far the reader can sympathise with Mike that this is bureaucracy gone mad. Play with dangerous toys and accidents will happen. However, to minimise these forms of injury the Army punishes breaches of safety rules unmercifully, though in this case the charge appears harsh. While under the influence of anaesthetic Mike also kicks the medical “Captain Corpulent”, thus incurring a further charge of striking an officer. By his own admission he is undoubtedly guilty of both charges. However, when the CO, Lieutenant Colonel Greville hears the charges they are dismissed. Sanity prevails and that should be the end of it. Except that this is not good enough, if you have a cross to bear.
When he is released from the battalion to return to Australia with the advance party after only half his tour he appears to have little appreciation that someone made a decision that favoured him – at the expense of someone else. Too many whinges can become very wearing, even when many of the complaints listed are justified. I probably just missed the line saying “Sergeant X was a terrific professional soldier and Skip was a great officer who looked after us and that’s why we are all alive today”. It is a pity that something along those lines did not creep in to balance the very good story he has to tell of front-line operations as experienced by infantry soldiers.

As this is a very personal account, almost a diary of thoughts and events, it is not surprising that the bibliography is limited. However, his reading is too limited and appears to be restricted to books of battalions operations or those supporting his perspective of Vietnam. Many parts of this book are worthwhile, but it is too personal to make it as a generally read book on Vietnam for most veterans, the uncaring public or the bureaucrats.

It appears an unexplained mystery, if things were all that terrible, why his mate “Rowdy” transferred to another battalion to stay on. He was tricked by a conjuror perhaps? I am not a psychologist but maybe a visit to Vietnam, wider reading to understand the past, put 1968 in perspective and then hopefully Mike can get on with the rest of his life. Thirty years in repeating and reliving “Ground Hog Day” is not my idea of fun, but then what would I know – I was only a pogo.


Reviewed by Group Captain Mark Lax, RAAF

“My U-boat men! Six years of U-boat warfare lie behind us. You have fought like lions… U-boat men, unbroken in your warlike courage, you are laying down your arms after a heroic fight that knows no equal.” These words uttered in May 1945 by Admiral Karl Dönitz ended the German U-boat campaign of World War II. They tell only a little of the intense struggle that was waged over control of the seas during that conflict.

Once in a while, a new major work is released covering a subject familiar to many students of military history, particularly of the maritime realm. *Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunted 1942–1945*, is one such book. This, and its companion first volume, *The Hunters 1939–1942*, bring incredible detail and thorough research to the cat-and-mouse game of undersea warfare as waged over half a century ago. At a mammoth 909 pages, the book covers every aspect to the German U-boat campaign of the period 1942–1945. This, the second volume, examines the latter war years when the tide turned against Admiral Dönitz’s undersea hunters, forcing them on the defensive to become the hunted. As well as the struggle for control of the Atlantic through a conceived *guerre de course*, also examined are the political dimension to the war, the codebreakers contribution, the rise of ASW aircraft, U-boat patrols further afield into the Indian, Arctic and Pacific Oceans, resource implications for both sides and the final days.

As part of his overall strategy, Hitler had ordered Admirals Raeder and Dönitz to prosecute a “tonnage war” against the Allies. He argued an effective blockade of Britain would starve her of vital war material, fuel and food, eventually leading to capitulation. He had not counted on the ability of US industry to replace merchantmen or “Liberty Ships” at a faster pace than those *die Unterseebootwaffe* sunk. Roosevelt’s secret policy of “defeat Hitler first” meant greater effort was placed on the Atlantic and European Theatre than into the Pacific and Japan, with the inevitable outcome. Nevertheless, the U-boats sank over 1,000 Allied ships during their “hunted” years creating many highly decorated “U-boat aces” and in covering the action, Blair has used profuse documentation and statistics to back up his study. Perhaps surprisingly to most readers and naval historians, Blair’s conclusion for all this research, “that at no time did the German U-boat force ever come close to winning the Battle for the Atlantic”. Readers are left to judge for themselves.

This immense work eleven years in the making is in fact the second printed volume of a three-part work. Blair’s first volume, the impressive *Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–1942*, was split into two parts covering the early war period from both the British and US perspective. That work received rave reviews. This volume stands alone and at 711 pages of text with a further 107 pages of appendices and 88 pages of notes and comprehensive index makes for an extremely detailed study of the subject. It too is worthy of high praise. Clay Blair must now be considered as one of the world’s experts into World War II submarine warfare having also previously released *Silent Victory: The US Submarine War Against Japan*, as well as numerous other related fiction and non-fiction publications.

Following chronological order, the text of *The Hunted* is fully documented and cross-referenced there being many footnotes, tables and statistics.
presented throughout to allow the reader to follow what happened, when and where. The text is well written, very readable although tending to be a little monotonous if read in large sections. Curiously noticeable, however, is the author’s apparent fascination with the ages of the U-boat captains, their ages carefully placed in parenthesis after each name as he appears. In the Afterword chapter, he slips into the use of the royal “we”, perhaps since he has been ably supported by his wife Joan on a number of other publishing occasions. Neither of these detract from the book’s impact. Twenty appendices cover every fact needed to complete the story including a full list of U-boats and their fates. The book is not light reading, however, weighing 1.7 kilograms and being five and a half centimetres thick, it’s not easy to read on your favourite couch!

More of a reference work than a mere study of the U-boat war, for those interested in maritime warfare and World War II, even at $79.95, this book is a great investment. Highly recommended.


Reviewed by Major Darren Kerr, Australian Intelligence Corps

This is a book that needs to be read by every politician, military officer, soldier, sailor, airmen, or civilian who is in any way involved in the preparation, planning or deployment of men in combat. Black Hawk Down is an engaging and extremely detailed account of the 1993 debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia that left 18 American soldiers dead and 73 wounded, and killed an estimated 500 Somalis – combatants and non-combatants alike. Mark Bowden, a staff writer with the Philadelphia Inquirer, has meticulously reconstructed the failed operation using official reports, post-operation investigations, military radio transcripts, and hundreds of his own interviews. The result is a grim read that highlights the danger, when post-Cold War humanitarianism blunts the military’s fighting edge and leaves it vulnerable in the brutal reality of a place like Somalia.

Referred to as “The Day of the Rangers” by Somalis, the disastrous third of October battle was the longest sustained firefight American ground forces have been involved in since Vietnam. The operation was questionable from the start, and yet no one seems to have questioned it. A small force of 160 men with a handful of aircraft and vehicles staged a raid in broad daylight into the busiest marketplace in a crowded city of one million people, many of them hostile to the United States. The aim was to snatch the two top lieutenants of warlord, Mohammed Farrah Aideed; a task well outside the initial humanitarian intent of the United Nations Mission to Somalia.

The midday assault was to be done surgically, reflecting the precision-strike, zero-casualty mentality that has gripped America’s senior political leadership. However, from the opening moments of the battle when one young soldier fell while rappelling from a helicopter and was seriously injured, thus distracting his mates from the real task at hand, the book demonstrates that Clausewitz’s “friction”, that which distinguishes real war from war on paper, is still a critical factor in warfare. In war, things will go wrong no matter how well planned or well intentioned, and dealing with that confusion is the key to victory or defeat. The lesson is that, training must include friction, and planning must include the “what if things go wrong” factor. US planning for the Mogadishu operation included neither.

“Word spread wildly over the radio, voices overlapped with the bad news. There was no pretence now of the deadpan calm of radio transmissions, the mandatory military monotone that said everything was under control. This was a dreadful shock. Voices rose with surprise and fear.”

“We got a Black Hawk going down! We got a Black Hawk going down! We got a Black Hawk crashed in the city! Sixty-one! Sixty-one down!”

First serialised in the Philadelphia Inquirer, and subsequently widely read on the Internet, Black Hawk Down is not a book which examines the wider context of the operation. It is rather a minute-by-minute account of what actually happened in those 15 hours of desperate combat as US Army Rangers and Delta Force personnel supported by Black Hawk helicopters battled for survival against a poorly armed, ill-trained, rag-tag, urban militia. The battle scenes are vivid:

“Goodale saw the spray of bullets walk up the side of the car, right down the side of Williamson’s rifle and take off the end of his friend’s finger. Blood splashed up on Williamson’s face and he screamed and cursed.”

It is not surprising that there is already a movie in the pipeline, although it will be interesting to see what spin is placed on this “forgotten” battle. Besides the combat scenes, the book is well suited to a Hollywood-style movie, as it is written almost exclusively from the US point of view. There is some attempt to portray the motivations and reactions of the
Somalis involved, but in general they are portrayed as a nameless, growing mass that cannot be killed no matter how many die; like something out of a horror movie:

“The mob descended on the Americans. Only one was still alive. People with knives hacked at the bodies of the dead Americans. Others in the crowd pulled and tore at the dead men’s limbs. Soon people were running, shouting and cackling, parading with parts of the Americans’ bodies.”

What the book does highlight, as previously stated, is the problematic nature of the current western military obsession with clean and clear rules of engagement. In Kosovo three US soldiers were taken prisoner without a shot being fired, because they were travelling in a hostile area with weapons unloaded; ostensibly because of the rules of engagement in place. In Mogadishu, as Bowden related in a press interview, many soldiers found that, at a certain point, the rules of engagement went straight out the window.

“Pretty soon Dowdy was mowing down whole crowds of Sammies [locals]. He felt justified. When [the] Black Hawk had gone down, Somali mobs had mutilated the corpses [and], as a fellow Black Hawk crewman, Dowdy was in full payback mode. Whenever he saw a Somali fall under his guns he’d scream the name of the men killed in the [earlier] crash… Dowdy wasn’t being choosy about his targets. He figured anybody moving toward the fight at that point wasn’t bringing flowers.”

Throughout the firefight, women and children are slaughtered as they are caught in the crossfire or deliberately cut down by the American soldiers because Somali gunmen are hiding among them:

“As the helicopter moved off, yet another crowd of Somalis began to form. Nelson tried to direct his fire only at people with weapons, but those with guns were intermingled. People were closing in, just 50 feet up the road, some of them shooting. Nelson wasn’t weighing issues anymore. He cut loose with the M–60, and his rounds tore through the crowd like a scythe; one minute there was a crowd and the next instant it was just a bleeding heap of dead and injured. ‘Goddamn, Nelson!’ Waddell said, ‘Goddamn!’”

It brings into question our antiseptic training in which everything is black and white, and rules of engagement are writ in stone and treated as such. Black Hawk Down demonstrates that modern urban combat, perhaps more than ever, is cloaked in layers of gray. If an enemy machine-gunner surrounds himself with unarmed civilians and then proceeds to shoot at you and your mates, what is the appropriate response?

“Nelson found threeSomalian bodies beside Busch. There was a woman and three men. One of the men was still breathing and trying to move, so Nelson pumped two finishing rounds into him.”

Certainly Bowden does not pass judgement on the soldiers involved, he merely reports with the dispassionate eye of an objective reporter. It is hard though, to read the book in the same dispassionate way. This is a book that provokes a deep psychological response and it is likely to become a modern military classic.