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Front Cover
The Australian Army Bushranger vehicle at Majura Range near Canberra.

Photograph by
Sergeant Dave Broos

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REACHING THE TOP WITH YOUR MESSAGE?

The advantages of advertising in the Australian Defence Force Journal are far reaching.
Dear Editor,

Major Basan provided a cogent analysis on a relevant topic in his article “Airborne Forces: The Twenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution”, *(ADFJ* Nov/Dec 1998).

His thesis is well supported by contemporary trends in warfare and the emerging strategic environment. Importantly, airborne operations have the potential to be decisive for either strategic or tactical objectives. Furthermore, with imaginative planning and appropriate capability sets, airborne forces are employable across the spectrum of conventional to irregular warfare.

A key force development issue arises if we accept the tenets of Major Basan’s article. Could the development of Australia’s airborne forces significantly enhance our military options in the context of a maritime strategy? Airborne characteristics such as strategic mobility, strike power and versatility should be carefully considered.

However, airborne forces alone are not the solution. Ultimately, an effective maritime strategy will rely on balanced capabilities to project air, naval and land power. Perhaps further developing our airborne capability is an opportunity to improve the balance. Certainly, responsive and lethal airborne forces would add to the operational options for Australia’s emerging maritime strategy.

*P.K. Singh*

*Lieutenant Colonel*

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Isn’t it about time we took a more positive view of defence and decided that if Australia is worth defending then its about time Federal Governments made the resources available to do the job properly. What we need is a large dose of the American “can do” attitude instead of the dreadful “can’t do” mentality that pervades so much of Australian life.

The fact is that the ADF’s present force structure wouldn’t, as Sir James Killen noted about twenty five years ago, be capable of defending Bondi beach on a Sunday afternoon. And yet we are fed a constant load of rubbish by Government, Bureaucracy, and Service Chiefs about our self reliance. Self reliance for what?

If it had the will, Australia could and should become a genuine middle ranking power that had a real influence on events in our region to an extent that has not been visible since World War 2.

Our Foreign Affairs Department gives the impression of being a toothless tiger staffed by people incapable of assessing events in our region and advising a succession of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers swanning around the world gladhanding their counterparts and achieving little.

Bougainville is the classic example of a serious dispute for which we had a prime responsibility, but did nothing for nine years until New Zealand took up the cudgells to try and broker a solution. Already the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister are hedging their bets in relation to Timor with Mr Downer making the unfortunate and stupid comment about not wanting Australians coming back in body bags.

Perhaps someone ought to tell someone in Canberra that the armed forces do occasionally suffer casualties when on operational duties. We can only be pleased that no one these days has to make the kind of decisions that had to be made during the two world wars.

Paul Dibb observes “What will have to be avoided, however is any temptation for politicians to reach down into military operational decisions”. God forbid that ever happening, but it could occur if our military leaders don’t show more determination in protecting the integrity of the ADF than they have in the recent past.

There needs to be a serious commitment by Federal Governments to provide the resources for the ADF to take an effective role in whatever troubles may occur in the future, because its present structure to either defend Australia against a hostile threat, which is unlikely in the foreseeable future, or participate in meaningful support in regional trouble spots is totally inadequate.

*Peter Firkins*
Australian Prisoners of War spans the Boer War to the Korea War and commemorates those Australians who suffered as Prisoners of War in all conflicts.

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What Has Gone Wrong

By Captain M.A.J. Watson, RAA

Author’s Note

This article is addressed to the senior officers of today. The Army and indeed the Defence Force that you intend to bequeath your subordinates and on a wider scale the Nation will not be worth the paper it is written on.

The previous statement is deliberately inflammatory, I make no apologies for that. It expresses the view of a single disgruntled malcontent, who is to boot just a mere Captain. Or does it? Disaffection within the junior officer ranks is widespread. Whether you choose to acknowledge that fact is irrelevant. The perception that the Army lacks direction and purpose is reality for many junior officers. Alarmingly, recent graduates from the Royal Military College expressed the view that the only worthwhile Corps for aspiring graduates was RASIGS - for the potential it offered for civilian employment upon completion of their ROSO! The relative merits of this statement and the commendable insight of those who arrived at its deduction are outside the scope of this work, it does however, offer a telling insight into the psyche of the modern junior officer.

Initially I intend to outline what is wrong with the Army from my perspective. Your criticism of my presumptuousness is predictable. How could I, with my dearth of experience and narrow global perspectives, with any hope of credibility, denigrate what is in effect your life’s work? If your minds remain closed I can’t. I would however remind you that at the end of 1998 the ARA was short 240 Captains on its post DRP strength. I wager that this represents an increasing proportion of “wheat” to “chaff”. Separation at this stage of one’s working life implies the reasonable prospect of advantageous alternative employment. There is no reason to believe that this trend will be reversed, and thus, by default my opening statement will come to fruition.

Your next logical objection to my train of argument will be to imply that it is so typical for those of my “generation” to undermine establishment without feeling the need to propose a viable alternative. I intend to propose a vision for the future, not in this article, but in future works. It is anticipated that you will find my solutions simplistic and puerile, perhaps they are, but that may be because objectivity is not so problematic when self interest is removed from the equation.

Finally, you will employ your ultimate leveller. The assertion that if I no longer care for a life of servitude that I should resign my Commission and seek an existence elsewhere. I would remind you of the numbers that have chosen to do just that. The truth is that I still care enough to voice my concerns, fully cognisant of the fact that the vast majority of the Army community will have no inclination to read this document and those that do are likely to find something within it that will cause offence.

I beseech you to read the opening quotation of my article. I believe it is a fine watershed for readers of this article. Some readers will lament on how much truth the passage contains whilst others may feel a twinge of discomfort. To the latter I commend the words of Oliver Cromwell in his address to the Rump Parliament, “You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!”
“Unwatched, a peacetime military will degenerate into a bureaucracy designed by Megalomaniacs to be a vehicle to satisfy their ego’s. Tactical prowess will be allowed to be subordinate to bureaucratic manoeuvre, leadership will become an intangible used to conceal a lack of depth, and loyalty will be used as censorship to enable the unfettered imposition of careerist initiatives”

Major Pat Stogran, PPCLI, 15 Jul 97

Introduction

The personal circumstances of Major Stogran are irrelevant, as is the fact that the intended target of his insightfulness was the Armed Forces of his own nation. The above passage, however, is entirely appropriate for the current circumstances that prevail across the Army. At junior officer level there is a palpable sense that the Army has shrugged off any semblance of its perceived corps values and has indeed lost its way. The result of this is the belief that the Army has begun an inexorable slide into irrelevance. It was widely lampooned in the Author’s previous unit that the Army was akin to an old car, on blocks, slowly rusting away in a paddock, a depiction of which is included as Figure 1.

As stated in the Author’s Note, this article represents one junior officer’s perception on the prevailing attitude of his fellows. If the reader fundamentally disagrees with the above perception, the validity of this objection being questionable at best if the reader is not currently a junior officer, then this article will have no bearing. This reader should proceed no further, rather, they should ensconce their self in the belief that their ongoing toil is valuable and valued, unconcerned by the reality that they are the reason for the inclusion of “inexorable” in the above paragraph. If this reader gets the impression that the author is laughing at them, they are entirely correct.

This article will expose the Army’s increasingly dilapidated appearance from the perspective of a junior officer. Three primary indicators will be used to attest to the Army’s waning fortunes. Firstly, Army’s share of the Defence Budget, secondly, personnel issues and finally, Army’s muddled “vision” for the future. All three issues are intrinsically linked and their cumulative effects are speeding the Army towards oblivion.

Money Is The Root Of All Evil

Nowhere is the decline of the Army more obvious than in the percentage of the annual Defence Budget that it manages to secure for itself, particularly in the area of Capital Equipment Procurement. Army apologists will attempt to sight the unsympathetic Defence Policies of successive Governments for having the effect of syphoning funds into projects for the Navy and Airforce in order to allow them to deny the air-sea gap. It will be the contention of this article, however, that outside of a vague notion of providing for Australia’s defence, Australia’s elected officialdom have neither the capability nor the inclination to actually dictate what the 10 plus billion dollars allocated to the Defence Budget are actually spent on. If the role played by politicians in spending the Defence dollar is minimal then surely the relative success of the Navy and Airforce is due in no small part to both the quality of their personnel and their ability to quantify and articulate a vision for the future.

Figure 1

“Total defence spending for the coming financial year has been set at $10 945.5m, up $589.2m from outlays in the current financial year.” The previous statement is obviously in relation to FY 98/99. The Army Program Actual Outcome for 1997-98 was $1 268.3m, in comparison with Navy $721.3m and Airforce $695.0m. Not surprisingly this reflects the higher total numbers in Army, Service Personnel Running Costs alone accounted for $1 098.4m. As a
“ball park” figure, the Actual Outcomes for programs 2, 3 and 4 are unlikely to change a great deal in FY 98/99. Whilst not strictly linked to this portion, it is impossible to leave this section without a passing snipe at the Defence Reform Program (DRP). In 1997-98 DRP saved a total of $96.9m. Army’s contribution to this total was a whopping $7m.11 Army “saved” 117 uniformed and 109 civilian positions at a cost in redundancies of $27.9m, go figure!

The above paragraph sets the rough parameters by program but doesn’t tell the real story. A story that is better reflected in a look at the Acquisition Program budget. Program 9: Acquisition, “acquires equipment and promotes industry support to underpin Australia’s defence capability.”10 In short, Acquisitions is not only Santa and his Elves, but also his accountant as well. In 1997-98 there were 230 Capital Equipment Projects (CEP) approved with $14.0b odd dollars. In 1997-98 there were 230 Capital Equipment Projects (CEP) approved with $14.0b odd dollars.

Of these, Army had three projects in the Top 20, a $343.3m ASLAV project of which $19.2m was spent in 1997-98, a $73.5m Chinook Helicopter project of which $37m was spent in 1997-98 and an $85.5m Wagtail Tactical Radio project of which $23.2m was spent in 1997-98.12 In summary, of the Top 20 projects in 1997-98, dedicated Army projects took up $79.4m of $1 700.0m on offer, or 4.67%. By comparison, the Navy secured 57.66% (Collins Class Submarines, ANZAC Frigates, MHCP, etc) and the Airforce 22.41% (C-130J, Lead In Fighter, F/A-18 Upgrade, P3C Upgrade, etc).13 It is true that there was another $677.5m spent on minor CEPs of which Army did secure a higher portion of funds, but in comparison they are small change.

In 1998-99 the situation didn’t get any better, “with total capital equipment expenditure set at $2 727.0m.”14 and new approvals totalling $1 768m.15 Army secured approval for one new CEP, Land 106, the M113A1 Upgrade to M113A3 Standard, for between $200m and $500m.16 Ominously the first rumours are beginning to circulate in the press that the budget proposed for Air 87, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter project, may be “squeezed” from $1.2b to under $1b in order to make way for other procurements priorities.17 This is not a good sign for a project whose contract isn’t due to be signed until late 2000. The same pressure is probably being bought to bear on Land 116, the Infantry Mobility Vehicle, Project Bushranger, the contract for which is due to be signed in March this year.18

Looming large on the horizon is the Hornet Replacement Project, for which the pricetag being bandied around is $14b,19 the largest project in Australia’s Defence history. Keep in mind that as yet the contract hasn’t been signed for the Hornet Upgrade Project (HUG), itself worth more than $1b.20 The distinctly bearish nature of the CEP world and the difficulties that will befall any future Army projects should now be obvious.

Let us review. Army gets an impoverished portion of the funds that are available for equipment acquisition, relative to the other two services. It should be obvious to even the casual defence observer that “block obsolescence” is not the exclusive domain of the Navy and Airforce. It should be equally apparent that the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is affecting the useful in-service lifespan of equipment in the realm of the land battle at the same rate as the sea and air. As much of the three services’ Capital Equipment will reach the end of its useful lifespan at about the same time, the current environment has a distinct air of crisis about it. There appears to be little in the way of a balanced approach to the management of this impending crisis. Navy and Airforce continue to secure large CEPs to replace ageing equipment. Viewed in isolation, this would seem fine. In the extremely unlikely event of direct military action against Australia, Navy and Airforce platforms will bear the brunt of maintaining Australia’s territorial integrity. Across the remaining gambit of military operations in which Australia could become involved, these platforms are next to useless. Too few in number and too costly in both dollar and personnel terms, Government and Defence are understandably flighty about risking such platforms, “in anything short of Armageddon.”21

The means by which the Navy and to a greater extent the Airforce successfully lobby for new CEPs is rigorous scientific analysis linked directly to the capabilities which they view as being essential to the defence of Australia. The cleverly nurtured and promulgated notion of denying the Air-Sea Gap is as indicated, one of the least likely defence scenarios currently confronting Australia. The 1987 Whitepaper on Defence, resulting largely from the work of Professor Paul Dibb, intrinsically linked Australia’s Defence outlook to the capabilities required to achieve self-reliance, principally by denying the Air-Sea Gap. Professor Dibb now shamelessly describes “a coming train smash” in terms of CEPs, without at the same time acknowledging that he may have been driving the locomotive that caused the smash.

The position of Government on this issue is predictable, if not particularly helpful. The unhealthy, and in many cases unwarranted, negative publicity associated with some recent high dollar CEPs has resulted in some truly insightful perspectives on
Defence and Defence Policy at Government level. Examine the following. “With the 20-20 vision of hindsight, a former Labor Cabinet minister admits: ‘We never did properly scrutinise Defence. There was nobody in bloody cabinet apart from Kim who understood it. (sic) And he could always talk the rest of us under the table.” Defence’s worthy political masters know what they want, “Government wants options”, a balanced amorphous mass, capable of responding to whatever contingency Government wishes to commit to. This is not an unreasonable request for close to $11b a year. The excuse that Army is missing out on its share of the Acquisitions Budget due to an unfavourable external environment is preposterous in the extreme. Army is missing out because no one has the nous to dispel a lie.

Would The Last One To Leave Please Turn Out The Lights

The Mission of the Directorate General Career Management-Army (DGCM-A) is, “To maximise Defence capabilities by managing Army’s personnel asset in accordance with agreed priorities (sic) ensuring that ‘the right person is in the right job at the right time”’. It would be too easy to launch into a venomous diatribe at the above statement, which in truth would be unwarranted. DGCM-A’s responsibilities, like those of the Directorate General Personnel Plans (DGPP) are the metaphorical equivalent of a large bag filled with two-inch lengths of string. Their job is a thankless one, analogous to a small boy suspended from a dyke with all his fingers and toes jammed into an ever-increasing number of holes. Whilst Army failed to stop the blue and white suites from making off with the cookie jar, in terms of CEPs, this isn’t what is killing the Army, the Army is bleeding to death.

It sounds dramatic and there are undoubtedly some that would dismiss the statement as overly emotive, however the gravity of the situation will be outlined in the following statistics. It is widely joked that all the rats haven’t deserted the sinking ship as yet, they are too busy studying for postgraduate qualifications. The following discussion will centre on Officer separations in the ranks of Captain to Lieutenant Colonel. The principal source of data was the Deputy Directorate Workforce Planning-Army (DDWP-A) Data Analysis meeting of 17 Feb 99. There has been a 400 per cent increase in the ARA Officer monthly rolling separation rate in FY 98/99. ARA wide the separation rate as at the end of January was 11.92 per cent, the forecast separation rate for FY 98/99 was 10.5 per cent. The total liability in the afore mentioned ranks as at the beginning of January was Captain 6.81 per cent, Major 14.17 per cent and Lieutenant Colonel 19.8 per cent. Whilst the Lieutenant Colonel figure is alarming it is noted with malicious and barely concealed glee that it is in the Captain rank that the first crisis will occur. In the Author’s Note a shortfall of 240 Captains was outlined, it would seem that in the time of writing this figure has climbed to 308 with no sign of abatement, the upshot of this is the recognition that there won’t be enough Lieutenants in two years eligible for promotion to fill Captain positions. The suggested response to this dilemma is interesting, to hold Captains in rank for at least another year, the predictable course of action for those who are not promoted is only likely to exacerbate the situation.

The Army should look no further when allotting blame for this debacle than the culture that it has managed to inculcate in its members. The author, when assembling this article approached both DOCM-A and DDWP-A in writing for data on the number of Captains in the last two years who had discharged after undertaking partial or complete post graduate study. By act or omission the information was not forthcoming. The basic proposition here is that the stated requirement for Officers to obtain tertiary qualifications and the ease with which support, in the form of DFASS and such schemes, for tertiary qualifications and the ease with which support, in the form of DFASS and such schemes, for post graduate study can be accessed when combined with a favourable external employment situation is paving the way for Army’s brightest, if not best, to leave. This is indeed what they are doing. In the current environment there is little or no incentive for junior officers to pursue professional knowledge. The effect of neglecting professional study is exacerbated when it is combined with carte blanche access to mechanisms geared to increasing the prospect of gaining lucrative employment outside the service. The net effect is that it shouldn’t come as a surprise that junior officers can converse with more lucidity on the latest rates for an MBA than the Advanced Warfighting Experiment.

The statistics of people exiting the Army is only one portion of the quotient. It is necessary to consider those opting to join as well. From an Officer perspective, the figures don’t look too bad. This year 150 Officer Cadets were inducted for ADFA from a target of 155 and 130 Staff Cadets were inducted for RMC from a target of 142. This does however have to be tempered against consideration of those candidates that were selected to those that enlisted. For ADFA, non scholarship candidates yielded 98
enlisted from 122 selected (or 80 per cent) and scholarship candidates yielded 52 enlistees from 100 selected (or 52 per cent). In essence, Officer positions will be offered until the target has been reached, hence the passable figures. General Enlistment (GE) figures have been included because they provide a more level perspective on recruiting trends. As at the end of February the year to date target for Full Time (FT) GE was 879 of which 771 (or 87.71 per cent) had been enlisted. It is essential to consider the Part Time (PT) GE figures as well, for they are intrinsically linked to Army’s vision for the future, their year to date target is 2416 (from a total of 3790) of which 1493 (or 61.80 per cent) have been enlisted. These statistics are crushing the PT Army. Cadre Staff, many of whom are FT junior officers, can relate a litany of PT Army stories that centre on the common themes of wavering morale, transient commitment and a genuine questioning of the worth of the PT Army concept. There are even rumblings amongst the staff at Headquarters 2nd Division as to the convenient coincidence of the general running down of the PT Army and the introduction of phased careers for FT personnel.

Personnel issues are a paradigmatic enigma in as much as Army, having created the problem in the first place now has no idea of how to solve it. It was with amusement that the author learnt that “What Colour is your Parachute?”, a guide for job seekers, was one of the widest read, non compulsory texts for the graduates of Command and Staff College last year. This attitude is endemic, not that this should come as a surprise, if a portion of Officers from the highest echelons down are unashamedly pushing their own barrow, middle and junior ranking officers would be fools not to follow suit. Superimposed over this is the implicit message that dissent will not be tolerated. The resultant duplicity, exemplified by those who outwardly exude a veneer of conscientiousness whilst harbouring their own agendas, is, like most of the cause and effect issues discussed in this article, entirely predictable. Read the opening quotation again. This situation isn’t likely to change and the resultant exodus of people isn’t likely to decline until Army gives its personnel something tangible to believe in.

“We are simply kidding ourselves if we think we are not doing a bit of catch-up here. There are some technologies already fielded by other armies which we should have had a long time ago – the army has simply fallen behind from a technological point of view compared to the navy and air force.”

Brigadier J.J. Wallace, AM

Surely the above passage is the understatement of the millennium. As the then Commander of Task Force 21 (TF21), Brigadier Wallace’s delicate position is entirely understood, as is his measured response. For reasons outlined at the end of the last section it would have been ultimately futile for him to have nonchalantly uttered words to the effect of:

“We really need to have a good look at ourselves. In the neglectful years since our Army’s fine performance in the Vietnam War we have allowed ourselves to deteriorate, both physically in terms of equipment and intellectually in terms of the operational art to the point where the notion of interoperability exists only in the most vivid imagination.”

Yes the Army is pursuing new equipment, “the army has embarked on its own program of modernisation instituting projects like Ninox, Wundarra and Bushranger to take it into the next century”. Well thank you very much, these should be the tools of today’s Army (and sadly in many cases yesterdays), they are likely to be worse than useless in the time of the empty battlefield, information warfare and autonomous “brilliant” Battlefield Operating Systems. Equipment is only one, very obvious portion of the metaphorical iceberg that Army collided with long ago.

The Army needs to undergo a cathartic process, for different reasons, but similar to that of the US Army post its Vietnam War experience. General Fred Franks (Retired) and Tom Clancy describe such a process in painful detail in their collaborative work, Into the Storm. There is extreme danger in attempting to find a way ahead that is constructed on a series of piecemeal solutions (A21, RTA, TF21) which are underpinned by false premises and unrealistic assumptions. If the One Army concept is the foundation of RTA, with its focal areas for Brigade sized Task Forces (TF) (including PT Brigades whose Manning figures as illustrated would make even the most optimistic observer cringe) then an obvious disparity exists with the entire TF Trial process. Whilst TF Trials proceed on their merry, resource hungry way, there are very disturbing rumours circulating about the continued viability from a Manning perspective of 7 TF in the near future.

We’re On A Road To Nowhere

“We are simply kidding ourselves if we think we are not doing a bit of catch-up here. There are
Consider the process outlined below:

![Diagram of process]

If it is accepted that this diagram represents a process for achieving the grandiose notion of “The Road to the Future through Continuous Improvement”\(^{29}\) then it is worth examining how Army’s vision for the future stacks up against it. If it was the intention of the architects of Army’s future to create a force who’s fundamental capabilities lie in its ability to populate the North of Australia, defend key installations (usually the property of the other two services and housing their shiny new toys) or chase a disproportionately small enemy around the sunny North whilst expending enormous amounts of resources (seemingly the thing that the enemy wanted to achieve in the first place) then they should be given top marks. Army should cease and desist with this charade forthwith.

Strategic Review 97 looks at this early stage like it may provide some hope of tangible change in the near future. Recent media reports sight the increased likelihood of United Nations sponsored Operations that would undoubtedly be joint in nature but with a requirement for a sizeable and sustainable Army component.\(^{30}\) There are inherent dangers in this possible change, on both the conceptual and physical planes. Conceptually, whilst this shift in policy has the potential to improve Army’s fortunes, it means that Army is still subject to the vagaries of changing policies, whether they be waxing or waning. Army has little or no control of its destiny. Physically, the neglect of Army’s procurement needs outlined in the first portion of this article means that there is a necessity for Army to rely overwhelmingly on the quality of its soldiers, particularly at the JNCO level.\(^{31}\) There are no rosy outcomes on the horizon, no panaceas that will ease Army’s collective woes and definitely no quick fix, compartmentalised solutions that will have any real effect. What is required is dedicated visionaries with the intelligence and drive to make a difference, blessedly they are few and far between.

### NOTES

4. ibid., p. 198.
5. ibid., p. 216.
6. ibid., p. 207.
7. ibid., p. 152.
8. ibid., p. 153.
9. ibid., p. 154.
10. ibid., p. 249.
11. loc. cit.
12. ibid., p. 250.
15. loc. cit.
16. loc. cit.
22. ibid., p. 52.
23. loc. cit.
27. The Officer Enlistment (OE) and General Enlistment (GE) cells of the Operations Section at Defence Force Recruiting Organisation (DFRO) compiles and maintain all manner of statistics on recruiting. This data is accurate for early March 1999.
31. Address by COL Pat McIntosh, AM, Commandant, Land Warfare Centre-Canungra to the 2/97 Intermediate Staff Course on his experiences as Commanding Officer, Australian Medical Support Force, Rwanda.

Captain Mark Watson graduated from Royal Military College, Duntroon in December 1992 and was allocated to the RAA. He has served as a Section Commander, an Intelligence Officer, a Gun Position Officer and a Forward Observer with 103 Medium Battery, 8th/12th Medium Regiment. In January 1998 he became a Visits Officer with the Directorate of Protocol and Visits. He is currently Operations Officer, General Enlistment, Defence Force Recruiting Organisation.

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY – MARITIME STUDIES PROGRAM
King-Hall Naval History Conference

“History, Strategy and the Rise of Australian Naval Power”

Introduction
The first “King-Hall Naval Conference” will be held in Canberra 22-24 July 1999 in the Telstra Theatre at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. It has the theme “History, Strategy and the rise of Australian Naval Power” and aims to examine maritime strategic issues at the turn of the century with particular reference to events leading to the creation of an independent Australian Navy.

The conference is being jointly sponsored by the Royal Australian Navy’s Maritime Studies Program and the School of History at the University College, Australian Defence Force Academy.

Program
Conference speakers include a wide range of experts from Australia and overseas, and include:

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Professor Jon Sumida – Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, and Corbett: Misunderstanding and Misuse of Canonical Strategic Texts.
Professor John McCarthy – The creation of Australian Naval Strategy.
Dr Nicholas Tracy – Collective Imperial Defence: The Laboratory For Trans-Nationalism.
Dr John Mordike – Australian Defence Priorities 1880-1914: the Nation and the Empire.
Dr Peter Overlack – “A Vigorous Offensive”: Core aspects of Australian Maritime Defence Concerns before 1914.
Dr Michael Evans – Strategic Culture and the Australian Way of War: Past, Present and Future Perspectives.

Registration
Formal registration for the conference will open in May 1999. The cost of attendance is likely to be approximately $120.

Registration. Early indications of likely attendance, or requests to be included on conference information distribution lists, should be lodged with:

Mr Dave Griffin
King-Hall Naval Conference
Naval History Directorate
CP3-4-41
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Telephone: (02) 6266 2654
CANBERRA ACT 2600 Facsimile: (02) 6266 2782
Email: navy.history@dao.defence.gov.au
Images from the Back Seat is a collection of some of the more interesting airborne photographs taken by Defence photographer Denis Hersey. Some of the images portrayed in this publication have been used for publicity purposes. However, many have never been published before.

The majority of the collection is of Royal Australian Air Force aircraft past and present. There is also a fine display of air-to-air photographs of aircraft from the Army and Navy as well as aircraft from New Zealand, Britain, Italy, United States and Singapore. The book is available from the office of the Australian Defence Force Journal at a cost of $19.95.
Introduction

Mallet and Murray’s statement is a potent reminder of the imperative for decision makers at the highest levels to get it right. But if it’s true for the conduct of routine national affairs, then it is even more important in crisis. While we no longer live with the immediate fear of incidents degenerating into a nuclear exchange, the stakes in national security crises remain high. A benign interstate security environment only works to increase the relative political and moral value of individual life, when it is suddenly threatened by terrorism or intrastate violence. National prestige forfeited in the inept handling of crisis is not easily recovered, particularly when the adversary is no match in terms of power.

Yet crises are increasingly characteristic of the contemporary security landscape. As guerrilla wars once exploited the inability of major powers to mobilise an appropriate response, today’s crises seek to exploit the cumbersome nature of their inevitably large conventional bureaucracies. Minor powers and even terrorist groups, often lead the national crisis managers of powerful countries a merry chase through international institutions and media, just as handfuls of guerrillas once lead their armies through jungles. Strengthening the analogy is the fact that despite the weight of technical, intellectual and political resources being heavily in their favour, national bureaucracies, and their masters, have largely failed to come to terms with the nature of this challenge and the potentially pivotal role of strategy.

The problem lies first in the very nature of both crisis and strategy. The dynamics at work in crisis directly attack the decision-making process, and particularly in large bureaucracies. In addition, crisis exhibits, as Coral Bell has identified, “the asymmetry of decision-making” and therefore doesn’t lend itself to prescriptive analysis. In this it is similar to strategy, which Luttwak describes as “pervaded by a paradoxical logic of its own, standing against the ordinary linear logic by which we live in all other forms of life.” It is perhaps not surprising then that strategy is so little understood. To some it is simply long term planning or any action at the strategic level, while in reality it is much more, and is certainly an indispensable element in any competitive activity.

This article maintains that despite the acknowledged difficulty of being prescriptive in either the analysis of crisis or the application of strategy, a better understanding of the two can benefit crisis management. More than this, there is a window of opportunity in the early stages of most crises, where by the use of some simple models, strategy can be applied so as to ameliorate many of crisis’s negative effects.

Crisis

Much time and academic effort have been devoted to defining crisis. However for the purposes of this article, dealing as it is within a national security context, Hermann’s definition is appropriate:

“Specifically, crisis is a situation that (1) threatens high priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for the response before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence.”

Threat, time and surprise therefore become the key determinants of crisis. Experience generally proves that while there might be some short term stimulus and benefit from mild increases in the threat or time constraint, significant adverse movement in any of these factors over time will place additional, mainly negative pressures on the decision unit and crisis management process. This becomes particularly relevant at the national strategic level, where the stakes are such that perceptions of threat impose disproportionate pressures of themselves, even without the impact of the other two dimensions. These pressures, described as “disruptive stress” by...
Hermann and Brady, impact on the performance of both individuals and organisations.

At the individual level, the most obvious effect of disruptive stress is fatigue, which though it effects each individual differently, generally reduces mental performance, and increases irritability, paranoia and defensiveness. The result is reduced individual and team effectiveness, and a tendency to seek simple options and entertain fewer alternatives. At the same time the triggering of natural defensive mechanisms under stress, can cause otherwise incisive thinkers to give undue weight to “expert” advice and to find refuge in value judgments and precedent. Unfortunately however, national security crises do not lend themselves to such simplistic default action. Each situation is usually unique and the consequences of error too critical. In addition, national crisis almost inevitably demands a strategic long term view, even while dealing with the immediate. But under the stress of crisis, there is a strong predilection for solving the short term problem and ignoring the longer and often more strategically relevant consequences.

The major effect of disruptive stress on organisations is that senior decision makers take a uncharacteristic interest in even minor issues and their management; what Hermann calls “a contraction in authority”. This has both positive and negative effects on the management of crisis. On the positive side it increases the responsiveness of otherwise bureaucratic structures, cutting out unnecessary levels, and also increasing the possibility of more innovative solutions. The tendency to use a small core management group, increases security and therefore enhances negotiating flexibility, while also permitting greater control. But over reliance on a few key players can also increase the vulnerability of the organisation to fatigue, and too much secrecy can limit the diversity and integrity of information. The very status and direct influence of the decision makers, may interfere with the efficient operation of communication and information channels and cause them to be overloaded, as subordinates respond directly to key players in an ad hoc hierarchy. In the end, whether the balance of effects is positive or negative, is very much personality dependent, but it is prudent to plan for the worst case.

In the case of national security crises, we can predict with reasonable certainty the institutions and therefore general types of individuals who are likely to play key roles in crisis management. There can be little doubt that the individual and organisational paradigms within which the key players formulate strategy, will impact significantly on its quality. One description of crisis as “the imposition of a cumulation (sic) of nasty events on passive authorities and decision-makers”, suggests that those who will inevitably deal with national crisis are perhaps, in some important ways, the least suitable.

Politicians will have the major impact, but where both national strategy and crisis demand a long term and usually internationalist view, politicians have, understandably, a predominantly short term and often domestic perspective. Bureaucrats will also play a key role. However while the requirement is for innovative and speedy decision-making, the internal dynamics at work in bureaucracies often cause them to rationalise their actions in terms of: “most crises resolve themselves”, refuge in procedures and a sometimes overriding interest in preserving the good name of the organisation and ensuring its internal operations remain intact. The military will be prominent in matters of national security, and although its officers are usually better skilled in strategy than their civilian counterparts, it suffers all the same symptoms of bureaucratic inertia, and in some cases shows too little empathy for political imperatives.

But if this is the nature of crisis, then as important is to understand the essential processes taking place. Crises do not occur in a vacuum. They are manifest in the failure or frustration of other channels of interaction, usually conventional diplomatic ones. They are, with apologies to Clausewitz, the continuation of negotiation by other means. The stakes and/or criticality have been raised by one party or group of parties, to force, if not their position on the other, then at least his immediate consideration of it. It is then, as Bouchard maintains, “a series of bargaining interactions” between two or more sides. There is a competition at play, where no one is likely to have exclusive control of events, but where each is attempting to resolve the situation in his interest. In this competition the instigator of the crisis will initially hold the initiative. He can be expected to retain it and keep the other side reactive, unless losing it through error or the premeditated action of the opponent. In the final analysis, given the phenomena of contraction of authority discussed above, this bargaining or competition may actually be between just a few individuals in each of the participating parties.

Therefore the nature of crisis, and particularly national security crisis, is such that the balance of forces is against the exercise of effective decision-making and management. Figure 1. summarises the key effects of crisis on decision-making. The aim must be to maximise the potential positive dynamics of crisis, while at least mitigating its negative impacts.
Mandating processes will not do, as the seniority of the players is such that they have the authority to overturn procedures and are likely to do so under the inevitable pressures of crisis. Instead we must introduce a new dynamic, a stronger inherent logic, something that focuses action without limiting its options and is relevant to the essentially bargaining process which is crisis.

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<tr>
<th>THE MAJOR EFFECTS ON DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS</th>
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<td><strong>POSITIVE EFFECTS</strong></td>
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<td>Reduced team performance</td>
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<td>Lack of long term view</td>
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**Figure 1**

**A Role For Strategy**

Figure 2 suggests four key functions necessary to redress or enhance as appropriate, the effects of crisis on decision-making. Establishing and maintaining a relevant focus for activity becomes a major function, because the negative psychological consequences of disruptive stress, mainly affect the ability of both individuals and organisations to focus on the real situation. The fatigue factor is essentially a result of actors assuming too deep a scope of responsibility. Although difficult to mandate, anything that can limit this, can separate functions, will reduce both the fatigue on key players and on those lower in the organisational chain disrupted by their sudden attention. The two remaining functions are imperatives for crisis management. They must be present to acknowledge the strategic realities in national security crises and the fact that crisis management is essentially a competitive bargaining process. It is precisely the concern of strategy for these four functions, that provides its utility in crisis.

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**Figure 2**
Strategy

A major reason for the inadequate command of strategy by national bureaucracies, has been its monopolisation as a subject of study, by soldiers and military academics. This has served neither the soldier nor civilian well. To use Liddell Hart’s definition of strategy as: “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy”,17 is to suggest that it is somehow the unique province of the soldier and only starts when the matter is handed to him. For the soldier the danger is that the definition evokes such military imagery, that he can too easily find refuge from tackling its deeper sense, by resorting to the more familiar ground of tactics.

Instead the start point needs to be the definition in its ordinary usage of “skilful management in getting the better of an adversary or attaining an end.”18 The essential notion is that strategy is applied in a competition between two or more players; and that that competition is in fact a contest of wills. Clausewitz and Liddell Hart used the images of boxers and wrestlers respectively to evoke this dynamic in strategy. The strength and relevance of the image being in the personal interplay between the two contestants, the fact that each is locked in concentration on the other in an effort to pre-empt or counter every move. Unfortunately the impact of this analogy tends to be lost with the inevitable remoteness of the strategist from the field and/or the fact that the medium of competition is sometimes the less demonstrably competitive environment of policy. But holding onto this image of being engaged in a competitive struggle is an essential first step in the effective formulation and application of strategy; and in crisis a most appropriate one, given its essentially competitive bargaining nature.

Equally important, and illustrated by the same analogy, is the personalisation of the opposition. It is no coincidence that both boxers and wrestlers lock on to each others eyes. What the arms and legs do is inevitably forecast in the eyes. The boxers intensity in searching behind the eyes, must be copied by the successful strategist. But to get inside the mind of the opponent, you must first personalise him. Too often the opposition is seen and treated as a country or an organisation, without identifying in it, or if necessary attributing to it, the personality essential to focus the strategist. The sense of competition is too easily lost without this essential step, and strategy quickly sacrificed to the application of procedures or plans. As we have seen by the contraction of authority characteristic of crisis, there is perhaps more opportunity to exploit this subtle but essential aspect of applying strategy here, than in more routine activity where the opposition’s decision-making function may be more diffuse.

The image of strategy being exercised in a competitive environment, and the need to personalise the opposition, are important tools in assisting crisis managers to focus on the actual situation. However before identifying more of strategy’s potential contribution in crisis, it is necessary to determine its various dimensions and functions. Like so much military terminology, these have become confused in the dual usage of the word in its military and ordinary context. Strategy has two dimensions, both relevant, whether it is being applied in a military or general sense. They have been described as: “the vertical dimension of the different levels that interact with one another; and the horizontal dimension of the dynamic logic that unfolds concurrently within each level.”19

The vertical dimension of strategy can itself have many layers.20 However while the detailed functions in each may vary, the overriding purpose of the strategic level does not. Its principle purpose is to identify and initiate the campaigns necessary to achieve political or policy objectives. In doing this it provides directives, usually in broad terms, and creates the necessary strategic environment, including ensuring adequate resources, so that the next level of command can achieve the intent of the strategic level. If properly understood and exercised, this function will more than occupy strategic crisis managers and so provide a natural delineation between theirs’ and their subordinate levels’ responsibilities. However in practice it is as much observed in the breach, and then more through misunderstanding of the functions and responsibilities of the levels below, than through lack of trust in them.

The levels below the strategic are in military parlance the operational and tactical levels. But putting aside the language, the importance is in their functions, which have equal relevance in the civil domain. The significance of the operational level is that it takes the broad direction of the strategic level and designs a coordinated sequence of tactical activities to achieve it. It might in a national crisis be a Mission or Embassy or a special team dispatched or planned to be dispatched to the general area of the crisis. Its value is in its proximity to the crisis and local knowledge, or at least focus. This places it in the best position to respond in a timely way to rapidly changing circumstances and to identify appropriate tactical activities to achieve the higher direction. Nonetheless, it too eschews as much detail as
possible, making this the responsibility of the tactical level of command, whose activities it directs, facilitates and coordinates. In this context these tactical activities may range from on-site negotiation, to military action.

If properly understood and applied, this vertical dimension of strategy contributes to crisis management in two main ways. First it frees each level to focus better on the actual situation by reducing the scope of its responsibility. Secondly, by separating functions, it reduces fatigue and the negative impacts of the inevitable contraction of authority in crisis, which is essentially the result of key players not understanding the role of the strategic level, but at the same time being under incredible pressure to do something. Of course this vertical rationalisation of responsibility can always be overturned on the whim of personality under the inherent pressure of crisis, but the deeper the understanding, the less this is likely.21

The horizontal dimension of strategy follows naturally from the acceptance of it being applied in a competitive environment. This notion provides the “dynamic logic” that should be acting throughout every level of an operation or crisis solving activity. It is the process of outthinking the opposition and manipulating both him and the situation to achieve our ends. Although speaking of its application to war, von Moltke well captures the more general sense of this second dimension of strategy:

“Strategy is a system of expediencies. It is more than a science; it is the application of knowledge to practical life, the development of an original leading idea in response to constantly changing circumstances; it is the art of action under pressure of the most difficult circumstances.”22

This concept of it providing an original leading idea in response to constantly changing circumstances, together with its being applied in a personalised competitive environment, are the crux of its relevance to crisis management at the strategic level. The absence of a leading idea at this level inevitably leaves the whole organisation wallowing passively in procedures. Its presence gives focus. This leading idea must be kept out in front by the adoption of a long term view and maintaining tempo.

The adoption of a long term view is inherent in the vertical dimension of strategy and reinforced in the horizontal. It is implicit that the highest level, the strategic, adopt the longest view. But this is not restricted to the time frame for dealing with the immediate problem, or the legitimate need to provide lead time for action at the subordinate levels. Even more important is to retain sight of our long term national objectives. As the opposition will usually have initiated the crisis as an alternate means of achieving his otherwise frustrated long term aims, it is essential that our response not contribute to his aim by default. The Clinton administration’s response to Iraq’s incursions into the UN Safe Haven in Sep 96, is an example where the immediate political and strategic advantages of being seen to be tough with Saddam, had the potential to put long term objectives at risk. The correct application of strategy demands not losing sight of the long term aim, and framing responses to the immediate problem in this context.

At the same time the need to outthink the opponent, the horizontal dimension of strategy, demands a long term view in a different sense. By constantly focusing on the desired end state, the circumstances we wish to prevail at the end of the crisis, the successful strategist shapes the near and mid term situation to his own advantage. Taking a long view causes him to anticipate developments and drives his information requirements, naturally assisting him to build on the most valuable commodity for the strategist, foreknowledge. But without the ability to apply it in a timely manner, to establish a tempo of decision-making and action faster than the opposition, even the best strategy is often doomed to failure.

Establishing and maintaining tempo23 in the application of strategy is an essential drawn from its basically competitive nature. The aim is not just anticipation for its own sake, but to render the opposition’s actions irrelevant because they were framed for old circumstances, which we have since changed or caused to be changed. Therefore while the sheer speed of our responses can contribute to tempo, the strategist has additional, more subtle tools. If for instance as Wylie observes “we deliberately make his theory invalid, we have gone a long way to making his actions ineffective”,24 and have therefore gotten inside his decision cycle, thus establishing superior tempo. In the same indirect way, if we can slow his decision-making process, perhaps by complicating it, we have achieved a relative advantage in tempo. As indicated in Figure 2., the function of maintaining tempo seeks to maximise the few positive effects of crisis. As it happens, it is a fundamental objective of strategy and applying strategy in crisis will reinforce this function well.

Therefore strategy potentially provides a very powerful tool for crisis management. Its real utility is in the fact that it provides a compensating dynamic to the inherently disruptive forces characteristic of crisis. More practically it reinforces four functions critical to
overcoming these negative forces while enhancing its positive consequences. But those thrown into the breach in times of crisis are seldom if ever experts in crisis management or strategy. If for all the logic of applying it, we are to hope to see strategy actually used in crisis, then initial crisis management procedures and expectations by key players must facilitate it naturally. This is not to suggest mandating procedures for the duration of the crisis. But in that initial few hours of chaos, even the most senior and competent executives are naturally looking for some framework in which to act. If one can be provided that facilitates their thinking strategically from the outset, the natural dynamics of strategy may well take over. Even if it doesn’t withstand the disruptive effects of crisis in the long term, such a start to crisis management will be of immeasurable benefit as the situation unfolds.

### Getting a Strategic Start in Crisis

The lack of reliable information at the outset of any crisis is usually so pronounced that remedying it becomes the focus of even the highest level planners, often distracting them from their real responsibilities, and inviting the contraction of authority and preoccupation with detail we should be seeking to avoid. Instead the paucity of information should be seen as an advantage. The reality is that at this point strategic planners only need to know what has happened in the most general sense in order to fulfil their responsibilities. They need to know how this act or situation might affect national security and therefore what their objective should be in dealing with it. Precisely because of the paucity of accurate information and also to allow maximum flexibility for subordinate levels, this objective should not be set in concrete terms, but expressed as the intent of the government.

Crafting this intent therefore becomes the first responsibility of the strategic level. It must be carefully done and will deal not so much with the means the Government might use, but be an expression of its resolve, and most importantly detail the conditions it requires to prevail after resolution of the crisis. The aim is to incorporate implicit rather than explicit qualifications on the means that might be used. An example of an intent for a hostage taking by a renegade group in a foreign country (“Seeland”) might be:

*The Government’s intention is to achieve the safe release of the hostages, while reinforcing the authority and sovereignty of the Seeland government and without heightening the residual threat to Australian nationals and expatriates after resolution of the incident.*

It is immediately obvious that such a statement is not reliant on the detail of the situation, but on the intention of the Government. It incorporates the strategic imperatives and a longterm view. It is robust, and while making clear the main objective of gaining the safe release of the hostages, implies constraints that will be as relevant whether the eventual solution lies in diplomatic or military action. Its utility for crisis managers is that it sets important parameters within which to operate as more information comes to hand. It allows skilled analysts and staff to already identify the type of information that might be required and in broad terms, the types of contingencies they should be considering. Most importantly it provides everyone a focus.

Having crafted our intent the second step is to determine the opposition’s. It might appear that this should be done before deciding our own, but at the strategic level I believe not. The incident has been initiated to disturb the status quo. While in the course of the crisis we may be forced to accept a compromise solution, or even see advantage in doing so, to be responsive to the opposition from the outset is to cede the initiative. In the absence of detailed information, it is initially both valid and relevant to use the status quo as our reference point. Valid because to do nothing is to risk slipping into a responsive mode and relevant because he will have initiated the crisis in order to disturb a status quo that favoured us more than him. In the absence of reliable information, this makes the re-establishment of the status quo a reasonable immediate aim for us. This is not to ignore the realities of the situation. However the significance of our focusing on the actual situation, is to take account of it in achieving our intent, not just in responding to the crisis and particularly the opposition’s manipulation of us through it.

Like ours, the opposition’s intent can usually be determined from its broad strategic context before all the details of the incident are available. While it is important to identify the opponent’s actual purpose in instigating the incident, it may only be possible to list his likely objectives at this stage. These first two steps are the first order issues in the model at Figure 3.

As we move down the left and right hand sides of the model, we are looking to ensure that however chaotic conditions become, or whatever side issues have to be dealt with on the way, that like the boxer, we are all the time seeking to weaken his position
while defending ours. We examine our intent and his objectives, and decide for each, the thing or things that are critical to their achievement. These are our respective Centres of Gravity. Those things that if accessed or manipulated by one side, could cause the other to fail in his intent or objectives. In some cases each side’s Centre of Gravity may be the same. For instance in the hypothetical hostage example, the support of the Seeland government could be the most critical factor for both sides. However more often they will be different, and the Centre of Gravity for the hostage takers in this case could be the support of a third country sponsor. But having determined the respective Centres of Gravity, our aim is to focus as much of our activity as possible on manipulating his, while ensuring at the same time that ours is protected.

To achieve this requires discerning the activities or avenues through which the Centres of Gravity can be manipulated. These general activities are termed Decisive Points, for the effect they can have on the Centre of Gravity. For each of these Decisive Points specific activities are then identified to generate or reinforce these effects. This process need not be exhaustive at this point. If the aim is ensure focus, then discipline must be exercised by considering only the more effective and efficient methods. Staff can provide more detailed analysis latter. The logic of this process is illustrated in Figure 4.
THE LOGIC LINK BETWEEN CENTRE OF GRAVITY, DECISIVE POINTS AND ACTIVITIES

Figure 4

The final step in arriving at the initial strategy is to select those activities that provide the most effect, that manipulate the more important Decisive Points. Economy of effort will also be a consideration here, and some activities may be selected for the fact that they impact on more than one Decisive Point. If tempo is to be established quickly, priority may also be given to some activities because of the speed with which they can be initiated, even though other activities may replace them later.

This combination of activities, together with a general scheme for their implementation, is the initial strategy. It will invariably be modified in execution as more information comes to hand, but allows both individuals and the organisation to respond purposely and with the best chance of avoiding the disruptive effects of crisis. Importantly, as the model at Figure 3, shows, each of these stages generates information requests, that both help focus intelligence agencies and facilitate the early validation of the original assumptions.

Conclusion

Most studies of the subjects of crisis and strategy have failed to bridge the gap between theory and practice. The asymmetry of the concepts complicates this necessary step in both cases. However it is the very fact that both have been described as art not science, that makes strategy a natural partner for crisis. Crisis resists order and strategy should never be more ambitious than to try to use or shape chaos. Instead of seeking to control chaos, it provides the leading idea and trails a central thread around which crisis teams can manoeuvre to advantage through crisis.

National security crises may have lost some of the portent of catastrophe they held in Cold War days, but the interests and prestige of nations and coalitions still ride on the success with which they are managed. If crisis managers acknowledge from the outset that crisis is a competitive bargaining process, and use its early hours to establish both a strategic orientation and intent, we will see far more successful outcomes. Hopefully this model will assist in this process.

NOTES


16. As Coral Bell illustrates by the Cyprus crisis in 1974, there are usually more than two major players in a crisis. This has an exponential effect on the considerations and interests that might be vying for satisfaction. See: Coral M. Bell, pp. 50-51.


20. The military hierarchy of strategy has been variously described, but has included:

   a. The Grand or National Strategic level, where all elements of national power are considered.
   b. The Military Strategic level, where all the elements of military power are considered. (Note that any functional area of government could be substituted here for the word “military” e.g. foreign affairs, police, or attorney generals; to reflect the strategic level of that function.)
   c. Theatre Strategic level, where a subordinate HQ has some strategic responsibilities, usually including in-theatre political liaison.

21. The need for this vertical separation of responsibility in crisis management has also been identified by students of crisis. Legadec describes the two functions as “strategy construction and implementation”, and emphasises the need to maintain a critical distance between them throughout a crisis. See: Patrick Lagadec, *Preventing Chaos in Crisis*, trans. Jocelyn M. Phelps, McGraw Hill, 1993, p. 184.


23. Tempo is not speed, but the rate at which decisions are made and enacted. This has been variously described as a “Decision Cycle or Loop”, and in Lind’s account of decision-making in combat, as an “OODA Loop” (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Action). See: William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, Westview Press, 1985, pp. 5-6.


25. Crisis should not only be seen as a threat, it may provide opportunities to enhance our interests, in ways or areas not normally available. In fact the Chinese word for crisis means both threat and opportunity. See: Thomas W. Milburn, p. 270.

26. Purists would argue that there can only be one Centre of Gravity at each level for each protagonist. This generally applies in a military strategic analysis, where the solution lies mainly in the application of force. However it is not always so simple an issue, when considering the broader and more subtle instruments of national power. Nonetheless it is advantageous, for the focus it provides, to have only one Centre of Gravity at each level of possible and appropriate.


Brigadier Jim Wallace graduated into the Royal Australian Infantry from the Royal Military College in 1973. He has served in the 89th Battalion RAR, and the Special Air Service Regiment which he commanded from 1988 to 1990. He is a graduate of both the British Army Staff College and the Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies. Brigadier Wallace was Commander Special Forces from 1993 to 95 and has recently handed over command of 1st Brigade in Darwin to become the Director General of Land Development. He has seen service in UNTSO in the Middle East and has previously had an article published in the *Journal of Strategic Studies, London*. 
The Flight of the Pig, a full colour publication depicts the F111 fighter aircraft in all its glory. The book traces the history of the aircraft over its 25 years of faithful duty with the RAAF. Defence Photographer Mal Lancaster, who has had an affinity with the F111 since its arrival in Australia has spent the best part of his career photographing the “Pig” as the F111 is affectionately known.

The book is available through the office of the Australian Defence Force Journal at a cost of $29.95.

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By Dan Baschiera, 
Defence Community Organisation

“The complexities of Peace are far more difficult to manage than the decisions of War”

Shimon Peres

With no definition there is no vision. The United Nations charter has no clear definition for peacekeeping, therefore, by default, no real vision in peace management.

Peace development (PD) is a longer term strategic outcome of military based community development (MCD).

MCD is a tactical means to bridge the current gap between humanitarian aid and peacekeeping.

A Short Preamble

Post cold war, as the global fabric of stability is torn by the numerous “low tech”, “grey zone” and social conflicts, we still do not have any real definition for peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping has no real definition in the United Nations Charter. No definition implies no vision. Something well-demonstrated as peacekeeping struggles to manage the challenges to peace in our current democratic paradox - “The New World Order”.

In my reading I came across this statement “...an \textit{ad hoc} approach to military and political objectives carries with it high risk. It is sometimes this approach that makes managing the peace more difficult than managing the war” (T.R.Dubois). Wise words when it comes to the challenge of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping in its various forms is currently the only military based “peace management formula” we have, and it is \textit{ad hoc}. It is a formula that struggles to evolve as the phenomena of social conflict and its generated Human crisis accelerates, “in minutes rather than months” (Weinberger).

A reporter “in zone” beams our immediate Human History into millions of homes. For the infield peacekeeping commander this can, and does, result in a rapid transition from the tactical to the strategic, and therefore to the high ground of political diplomacy. Unfortunately this tends to further obfuscate an already ambiguous situation. \textit{Ad hoc} is often an understatement.

Media coverage of the graphic violence has created substantial humanitarian interest and the desire to do something. The political pressure is of course to do something. But what does “doing something” mean?

Since the end of the cold war we have witnessed the emergence of bolder peacekeeping. Bolder Peacekeeping implies more than just keeping two conflicting armies apart, it should imply the use and promotion of resources in the conflict region to build for a longer sustainable peace - a step beyond just “doing something”.

However, Bolder Peacekeeping is more often than not the \textit{ad hoc} trouble shooting innovation of an infield commander dealing with a local crisis, rather than part of a mandates overall strategic plan. The basic problem with bolder peacekeeping, peace making, peace development, or whatever label you give it is the fact that it lacks a strategic vision and costs money. This is partly why bolder peacekeeping has not moved toward peace development.

Peace Development has to be proactive, effective, and sustainable. It is going that extra mile. It has to be the tactical implementation of a strategic and effective peace. A peace that promotes harmony in the cultural and political ideology of the host community.

This article outlines a number of concerns associated with peacekeeping and suggests a tactical model in Military Community Development that may give us a pathway to Peace Development.

Introduction

Peacekeepers (PK) and Humanitarian Agencies (HA) are and will continue to find themselves deployed side by side in the same conflict zone and quite literally in the same foxhole. Traditionally the military has not had a role as an emergency relief provider and Humanitarian Aid workers, who have this role, do have differing perceptions and approaches to that of the peacekeepers. As a result
they have tended to alienate rather than cooperate with peacekeepers. It is a situation generally described as a somewhat awkward experience.

The complex emergencies in our recent past have certainly had their mandates, but as recent history reveals these were no more than a wish list. Peacekeeping mandates, other than those keeping traditional armies apart, it appears, have had no effective strategy for success with civilians and civilian based militias in dislocated war torn communities. Success should be defined as a sustainable politicised peace.

This article debates a tactical pathfinding Military Community Development model, which could deliver to the ADF and in turn the UN, a means to fine tune complex emergencies. In using only current resources (civilian and military) it would link the dual deployment of PK and HA with effective and achievable objectives. It is a scenario that could deliver constructive results moving beyond Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and into Peace Development (PD). This would be an achievement that links the ADF’s strategic battle winning role to any given situation - military and/or social conflict.

The ADF is referenced as a platform to adopt this model for four reasons. Firstly our substantial and effective on the ground tactical experience has successfully touched on this discipline in UN Deployments. Secondly our well regarded international status makes us an effective “diplomatic chip” that can be inserted while negotiations continue. Thirdly the UN Member countries will develop specialist services to UN Deployments, and fourthly UN Members would value, and therefore pay for, a skilled and effective asset in this area. To this end the Australian Community should have no problem with the ADF taking on something of a mercenary role for a humanitarian cause, particularly if it can, in the longer term, reduce the Defence/UN Budget.

The model explores a first stepping stone toward providing the ADF with a means to Peace Development (PD) as an effective Peacekeeping type strategy in war torn communities. It would give the ADF an innovative, lateral and real tactical ability to proactively address complex, often violent Intra or International socio-economic conflicts. In addition it may well lead military intervention in a shift away from imposition on a host government/community to a paradigm of self-determining support. In turn as a military tactic it will also provide a further tangible direction to intelligence gathering and improving the security and safety of the deployment. It can potentially achieve this by creating demarcations of stable community influence.

The model could also provide a tactical means for the ADF to address potential strategic threats to continental Australia beyond those of a traditional military conflict without incurring international condemnation.

Background

The shift away from the Cold War has resulted in a multifaceted mix of global tensions. While analysis and preparation in the past tended to focus on international tension, a whole new and rapidly fragmenting socio-political environment is effecting the balance of International Peace. Some of the increasingly significant shifts are now in intra-national tension such as ethnic/civil militancy, social dysfunction and economic instability. These shifts also have a potential for catastrophic domino effects.

In the main these elements are not new and have tended to be contained by governments in one form or another since the start of this century. The major containment of this fragmentation in the latter half of the century appears to have been the cold war with (as Einstein so correctly predicted) its threat of thermonuclear conflict. Additional factors that have helped contain fragmentation are the dynamic shields of technology and economy, but these are being rapidly stripped away by environmental degradation, economic meltdown, and the social chain reaction of our exploding population bomb.

In an ironic twist it should also be noted that since the beginning of the century the process of containing this fragmentation has appeared to have gone full circle with a form of “Gun Boat Diplomacy” now returning under the banner of UN PK.

Historically the UN is a cumbersome and reactive political management system based on an antiquated ethos. The lack of a peacekeeping definition for example is well demonstrated in the confusing “chapter six and a half” of the UN Charter. The UN Charter itself still appears frozen in a 1940s and 50s mindset.

The mindset enshrined in the UN Charter, is still reactive, and not warming quickly enough to meet a new, post-cold war, and therefore complex world order. From a futures perspective it is too slow and lacks the finesse, flexibility and delicate tangible skills of analysing and proactively working with the sensitivity of socio-economic and political fragmentation. The variables leading to fragmentation
are ideological and cultural, multiplying, and tend to rapidly accelerate in time frame.

**Fragmentation**

To effectively deliver a peace keeping mission in our rapidly changing global environment we need to realise that the traditional and conditioned boundaries of social, psychological, economic and political dynamics, no longer frozen by the Cold War, are now ever changing. This ever changing, highly populated, unpredictable global environment is defined for the purposes of this article as fragmentation.

A misunderstanding of fragmentation has led to mismanagement and a cycle of culturally confused conflict that UN involvement has tended to compound. In turn it has caused the immediate acceleration of further social fragmentation/ dysfunction, as Somalia attests to. Additionally there also appears to be a longer-term hidden cyclic effect, potentially more catastrophic, as we are currently seeing and will continue to see as Economic Rationalism appears to accelerate the Asian Economic meltdown.

Much to its chagrin, the UN, as it emerges into the post cold war era, is beginning to proactively identify the concerns of a totally different world. However it is hamstrung by the economics of its old reactive management model and the dictates of an International Monetary Fund that continues to lock the solution of human crisis into money with no experimentation into subsistence and barter economies.

Without doubt this general scenario accelerates the potential for a single dysfunctional nation state to draw its satellites into either conflict or collapse in catastrophic proportions.

**Fragmentation – Issues of a Peace Keeping Concern**

The common UN Response to the social conflict zones is a peacekeeping mandate that regularly has a sensitive application but with an ambiguous implementation.

Both peacekeeping and humanitarian aid when inserted into these zones, have an enormous impact but are still used ambiguously by the International community. This ambiguity and the differing roles of PK and HA creates both a strategic and tactical dichotomy.

It is an operational schism and a potential trigger to the fragmentation of intra and international dynamics as a confusingly faster pathway to a nuclear or biological incident or conclusion. Will it be a thermonuclear suitcase or a can of fly spray?

In a final analysis, it could well be argued that the ambiguity in current problem solving creates a dichotomy of operational approach in every UN Mandate. To date this creates imbroglio, slows intervention, compounds crises, and places all participants together in a “grey zone” of operational compromise and lack of strategic commitment.

In short, UN military intervention as it stands, with no clear-cut commitment to, let alone philosophy on, the distinction between a social conflict and a military conflict is and will always remain just a gunfight away from total disaster. It is to the great credit of all military commanders in the field that this has not happened.

Commanders have had to think on their feet. The evolution of PK has had to accommodate crises at a tactical level where terms such as “wider peacekeeping”, “bolder peacekeeping”, “peacemaking” and “hearts and minds” are all now in vogue. This development has grown to the extent that some of it has been put into doctrine and command field manuals for peacekeeping operations. But essentially it is a “bottom up” effort to “do something” and not part of a strategic “top down” planning process. In short it reflects the lack of definition and by default the lack of vision in the UN Charter.

Social conflict is a crisis. It is a force, but it does not manoeuvre in any traditional military sense - you don’t counter act it, - you work with it. This is the experience gained in the Social Work Discipline of Community Development (CD) when working with this type of crisis at a “grass roots” level. The Military Community Development (MCD) model proposed with this article is just a first step based on this disciplinary experience, but designed to suit the larger scale of UN operations. The ADF with its unique UN deployment experience is well positioned to adopt MCD as a committed strategy. In doing so, this, by example, should assist the UN to move into the next stage beyond the “grey zone” of a “doing something” PK mandate, and by example, into a mandate for PD.

The biggest problem with the process of fragmentation is our fear of it. It is a fear of the change it creates and the humanitarian crisis it generates. In dealing with fragmentation we need a completely fresh approach. An approach which challenges current mindsets, by not fearing its process but to proactively “change manage” it. Hence we
need UN intervention as a change manager and to make the change management effective. Particularly as the process of fragmentation will continue to unravel one social disaster after another.

Military Community Development
A Pathway to Peace

“On the ground” tactical skilling in community development (CD) for military units on a PK deployment is a first step to clarifying and taking a stage further the military activity which has often been loosely defined as a bolder peacekeeping or “hearts and minds” engagement. Traditionally this has only been employed with a security enhancing objective, rather than with a PD mandate and commitment. The British Army in Bosnia for example employed “Hearts and Minds” to reactivate the schools, however not as a military interest in restoring education. It was a short term objective to remove the children from the streets, and improve local attitudes toward the military. Put into a bigger picture it could also have been part of an overall strategy and a first step toward PD.

What it lacked was commitment to a full PD strategy and possibly a short fall in the type of skilling that an extended “Hearts and Minds” tactic needs. “Hearts and Minds” is not a military label for CD. Coined during the Vietnam War, at best, it is basic PR with very limited CD.

It can be argued that an extended and well managed bolder peacekeeping “Hearts and Minds” tactic can lead to enhancing and prolonging a truce environment. In turn, particularly if there is an effective marriage between PKs and HAs, such a “CD tactic” may well improve the chances of disarming and demobilising the militias that form as a natural part of the fragmentation process.

From current research it appears that the overall peace process would be assisted by commanders in the field working with an effective “bridge”, a professional link, between the Peace Keepers, the Host Community and Humanitarian Aid/Non Government Organisations (NGO). Military based Community Development deployed as a distinct unit to the main force but “in support of” shows promise as that bridge. The model outlined in this article describes the skills and identified objectives of Military based Community Development (MCD). Or in other words a distinct professional base to wider peace keeping, peace making, or “Hearts and Minds”.

Diplomatically it is also a process that can be used as a first step, a diplomatic chip, to UN Intervention, and then withdrawn or substantially supported as the case may be.

The UN Charter to achieve inter alia, “international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character”, is essentially flawed in its reliance more on ambiguous cooperation than tangible skill in developing practical solutions and resolving operational dichotomy. As a result, despite all the best intentions, both PK and HA have found themselves constantly operating in a vacuum. While sensible efforts have been made to cooperate, strong reservations remain and will continue to divide NGOs and the military. It is a root cause of difficulty in peacekeeping, and a reason why “peace development” is so hampered and has not progressed.

PK and HA should not be confused with one another. This is very relevant in that to do so it can create a serious and often confusing overlap in PK delivery. The reverse however is as equally relevant in that a separation between PK and HA creates a vacuum of compromise. It is a classic “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” scenario and one of the issues that has put PD in the too hard basket. Military based Community Development directly linked to command and control, however, offers a bridging process that assesses, filters, distils and coordinates the opposing operational approaches to the same problem with a site specific objective.

The above process addresses the difficulties commanders in the field have had in relying on indeterminate intelligence gathering in their interaction with NGOs, and the social/cultural elements of the host community. MCD would therefore compliment standard intelligence gathering by putting a PD objective based focus to the data.

A critique to this model maintains that the military do the same things as CD only it is called gathering intelligence. To some degree this may be so, but the intelligence would lack a skilled focus and direction, and therefore unable to deliver tangible results in the CD target areas you want it to. The priority of military intelligence, is and always will be, security and not CD.

PD maintains that the UN policy in giving HA responsibility only to NGOs is antiquated. Past UN strategy has been based on the “mindset” of establishing an ambiguous “cooperative strategy” between the NGOs and military tradition. It does not in any way address the reality of two opposing operational approaches to the same problem. The solutions to this dilemma are left to the commanders in the field who often have to deal with not only a threat to security but a “snobbery” that occurs toward
the military. This is not a scenario that generates
effectiveness or communication. It is a UN policy that
is essentially flawed.

This ethos of “cooperation”, without an effective
ability to cooperate, is seen by the author as a main
reason for the burgeoning costs (human and monetary), ineffectiveness of mandates and end
results to date. It is an issue, which repeats itself over
and again, in associated literature.

Real cooperation translates into effectiveness and
tangible commitment to the overall objective of any
UN mandate and that has to be politicised peace and
not militarised peace or dependency.

The means to generate PD, to measure it, and
sustain humanitarian targets has seemingly eluded
UN intervention despite large budgets and an
extensive bureaucracy.

Quite possibly this has been due to a number of
reasons, two identified in this article are:

a. The inept use of traditional Peace Keeping in a
civilian environment, and;

b. The fact that CD, as a Social Work discipline,
has resided at grass root local levels divorced from the
powerful realms of either military or international
strategy.

Historically and philosophically, Social Work and
combat do not seemingly mix. Despite the fact that
Social Work deals with micro disasters every day, no
study, apparently, has been done to test the hypothesis
that CD in a military environment could be a valuable
and effective skill.

UN PK deployments are to date an imposition on
the host nation, and regardless of its humanitarian
high ground, the UN must get it right - this is its
ethical responsibility. To date this ethical
responsibility, and the skills to deliver it, seemingly,
have been lost in the obfuscation of civilian and
military bureaucracy, and the ambiguous commitment of the International Community - the UN itself.

PD is possibly in the early stages of coming into
being, and MCD as mentioned is an innovative
military tactic in peace keeping that has already taken
a few tentative (yet successful) steps down this path
under a range of different guises and smaller
objectives. The excellent efforts of 1 RAR in
Somalia, for example, come to mind. In short, while
the ADF can skillfully play the ball, we could also be
putting runs on the board.

CD appears well suited as a means to “marry” the
opposing operational approaches that exist between
PK and HA and with its skills and direction it can
provide the missing tactical link in PD.

The sensitivity in fragmentation so aptly
demonstrated in Bosnia shows that PK and Peace
Enforcement (PE) are a contradiction and cannot
realistically be conducted simultaneously in the same
area. When PK becomes PE, community
development has simply not happened. Other than in
self-defence there is no place for active use of force in
a PD type operation. However a key distinction here
must be made between having a force in place and the
active use of that force.

A strong force in place is essentially the gunboat
diplomacy of history and there is nothing wrong with
this in a dangerously fragmented environment. In fact
minimum force is only a confusion that creates and
does not negate the danger of violence and
precipitates the hostage factor. In PD the larger the
force the better - it does not necessarily have to act,
just be there in “training” while MCD is constantly
active.

Large size has the essential role of being culturally
sensitive yet simply but seriously deterring violence
thereby allowing normalisation, democratisation, and
CD to develop and evolve under its umbrella. A large
and appropriate UN force must be deployed in a PD
mission as an effective gesture at both tactical and
operational levels. As IFOR demonstrated it conveys
the weight of international commitment and the real
possibility of retribution to renegade violent militias
regardless of faction or political leaning. It forces
combatants to the discussion table.

While a large force is expensive in monetary
terms, it creates an environment that minimises
human cost, and can immediately put in place the
basic physical infrastructures, including media, that
accelerate CD, thereby enabling sustainable PD. The
large force remains in training. Use of its mechanised
units depending on logistics is minimised with
armour and air power in reserve. It will maintain
battle ready status, thereby disallowing the expensive
retraining of troops “gone soft” on human relief
operations that some doubtful critics observe. Critics
who in turn fail to acknowledge the invaluable
preparation and in the main “safe” experience that a
deployment of this nature exposes all ranks to.
Minimum force is not “safe”.

The large force uses extensive, diplomatic, soft
target foot patrols which are ideal for intelligence
gathering, in being able to identify war damage,
political sensitivity, basic community needs, levels of
cooperation, and re-employment of local manpower.
 Violence when encountered is quickly identified,
isolated, and judiciously eliminated on the age old
principle that every culture understands - an eye for an eye regardless of body politic.

The argument that isolated pockets of violence will turn local communities against the UN intervention are only valid where renegade militias hold influence and where CD intervention is non-existent. Something of a “catch 22”, however MCD should be an excellent tool to undermine the influence of renegade militias. HA organisations experiencing the negative influence of renegade militias should have the immediate support of MCD.

The need now is for the development of alternative strategies and the means by which pressure could be best applied to non-compliant culturally diverse factions. Tangible skill in accurately assessing socio-cultural and ideological site specific conditions, with an application of eclectic skills based on the principles of CD are required. A spectrum of objectives focusing on the achievement of community owned yet practical/viable solutions would be generated. A commander with the ability to constructively divert problems back to community ownership and away from his/her troops immediately creates a safer environment for the deployment.

Modern military philosophy in moving away from the anchors of tradition aims to de-mystify rather than re-mythicise. The spectrum for tasking is therefore as broad as the desire to effectively and viably problem solve. This is the type of ethos required to deal with fragmentation and where MCD, which would have a very broad problem solving commission, could evolve into a practical and elementary manoeuvre, a reality based tactic in PD operations.

If peace cannot be achieved at the discussion table then the Carthatic benefits of battle need to be explored. This has to be in the context that a large UN PD force in place can control the site, the battle time, and the weapons of the belligerents. It will allow the anger and animosity to burn itself out with out the “ethnic cleansing” which destroys the basic infrastructure and the children of the host community. A cartharsis as such would enable an easier, less expensive (in monetary and humanitarian terms) transition to political peace management in the longer term. We need the courage and ethical fortitude to allow this and to avoid constantly losing the plot in our current ambiguity.

Fragmentation is now too complex and too dangerous to humanity as a whole to allow for an ethical and obfuscating debate on controlled violence. Controlled violence has to be safer than uncontrolled violence. It must be easier to manage a controlled conflict, than a complex uncontrollable limbo of aggressive belligerents, which the media mistakenly defines as peace. An aggressive limbo is not peace, it is a conflict that has not happened. Sadly we appear to be more skilled in managing battle than in managing peace. If this is the case then may be our battle management skills, used constructively, could be a support to the peace process.

CD principles and practice have been refined and developed to the point where they could now have a very definitive role in bolder peacekeeping. Additionally with some research MCD may well assist by putting a clearer focus on the demarcating “line in the sand” between PK process and a need to turn to immediate defence/peace enforcement. The CD process in itself enables a clearer reading of the “political tea leaves” in any given situation. This in its own right would be of great assistance to commanders in the field.

It is argued that Community Development should be solely the role of NGOs in any UN peacekeeping mission, and to a greater extent NGOs have been tasked in this direction. In context however, and as recent history reveals, it would appear the NGOs have had minimal, to no effect in this area. The reasons for this are complex, but it would appear that the lack of skilled and strategic knowledge in community development at higher levels again references the UN’s antiquated and slow management model. Often as not, the problem has already accelerated to the point of being overwhelming before real resources flow to the relevant NGO.

Involvement in MCD processes could well enhance troop morale. Where in the past meaningless boredom, fear of threat, and the gruesome burial details of a PK deployment have had a negative effect on morale, active community building would act as a “counter balance”. It would give our diggers a real sense of achievement, and not the empty disheartening vacuum many return home with.

The rough military labelling of PR and very limited CD tactics as “Hearts and Minds” indicates that CD is probably not on any military academy curriculum. Surprisingly, given the fact that Thomas Edward Lawrence essentially employed Community Development principles to motivate the Arabs into battle against the Turkish Army during World War 1.

UN member countries simply do not like the concept of foreign troops going into any other country and approve it as a last resort i.e. when humanitarian
need cannot be ignored any more. This is a reactive ethos based on the fear of fragmentation and one of the reasons why PD is undeveloped, and why UN intervention is in the main unsuccessful. As mentioned a change of mindset is required here if the job is to be done properly. The age-old adage “don’t do a job unless you do it properly” applies.

A key problem identified with using CD in a UN deployment is the time it can take to find strategic entry points to an unsatisfactory social situation and facilitating a solution. PK and HA operations by the UN, due to the above ethos, are usually on the basis of “get in and get out as soon as possible”. Subsequently there often is only a very narrow window of opportunity endorsed by the UN member countries to keep the combatants apart long enough to take the heat out of a situation. This, though, is often the immediate situation after months of deliberation. It denies the fact that a MCD unit can be a first stage of deployment, a “Weinberger Doctrine” diplomatic chip during the deliberation phase, and then the last to leave if need be. Additionally one can also ask how often do UN deployments become protracted and frozen for years into a dangerous “minimal force” PK mode when full PD can be put into process?

CD is not suited to the current process of the antiquated UN “minimal force” Peace Keeping intervention, but then who is really satisfied with the current process of UN Intervention in war torn communities? Can Peace Keeping re-strategise to Peace Development?

Within the UN model a dichotomy also exists between philanthropy and military. Reasons for this appear to be deliberate in that no one member country can afford to do it all, and if the two were merged, aid could be used as a “weapon”. Firstly, this fails to recognise modern military philosophy, which can easily absorb a small, effective, and purpose trained philanthropic unit as a resource to the commander in the field. Secondly a merging of resources with proper impartial management would accelerate the PD process and quite likely, in the longer term, reduce the costs of failed and protracted UN deployments. It really is a “shooting yourself in the foot” mindset.

The cumbersome nature of current UN PK operations can well mean that we have a HA team coming from a language/cultural group differing to that of the local Australian military commander. This HA team is headed by a non-English speaking civilian with an independent brief and cautious in any protocol with PK. This mix of circumstance only exacerbates a situation where HA, overwhelmed by the need to save people from starvation and death, operates reactively all over the region without communication/coordination and PK in turn is overwhelmed by the multiple security task.

The technical dynamics of CD can work toward ensuring a tangible cooperation between military and NGO. If this does not happen, as is often the case, the right arm will not know what the left was doing. An end result being generated aid dependency without any self-determination. This is certainly a lesson to come out of UNOSOM I & II.

The CD process is dynamic, and fluid. It is often an ongoing rapid transfer of information as it psycho-socially “tunes in” to its client group. It works with change agents, the finesse of empowerment and investment in stakeholders, while fusing leadership across its client community. These are only some elements of its complex technical skill, which without question would be seriously impeded by a language/philosophical/protocol barrier between the military commander and HA service deliverer. It is no wonder then, that due to this particular dichotomy in UN Peacekeeping, there has never been any real movement toward PD. The issue raised in this paragraph forms a key point in the concept that the chain of Command and Control in a military group inserted into a UN PD mission should have a MCD unit (complete with a workable budget) attached to it and “in support of” to make its mandate workable. In due course with training and experience this also presents as a means to tackle any future ambiguous mandate effectively.

The ADF is ideally positioned to develop a highly professional, coordinated and complimentary tri-service training regime combining the interdependent management between community development and military support.

The MCD Model –
Military based Community Development

The model envisions a highly skilled and mobile unit/team tasked with:

a. Regional Profiling and site specific conditions

Assessing target region site specific conditions in such areas as civilian resources, the cultural mix/beliefsystems/local political agendas, and effective aid distribution. It identifies community needs and means to implement self determined training to meet those needs. It identifies achievable objectives in balance with local site specific conditions and need - hence appropriate tasking to military developed infrastructure;
b. **Social Communication**
Alerting field commanders to sensitive civilian communications, hidden agendas, and propaganda manipulation, while implementing and sustaining constructive links with the target population;

c. **Principles of Community Ownership**
ASSisting field commanders to develop soft strategies aimed at working with localised difficulties through the promotion of local ownership of problems/benefits, self esteem, and self determination;

d. **Community Empowerment & local participation**
In liaison with chain of command working with community leaders and stakeholders in correctly identifying problems, developing and linking benefits and generating self determined problem solving. A soft strategy based on cyclic process focused on returning localised power. Immediate moves in this direction will start a process that impedes local conflict with the UN mandate, as was the culturally based case in Rwanda/Somalia. This strategy develops the foundation for the longer term PD goal of socio-political harmony/stability with the host region. It has the advantage of practical, on-the-ground skilling/training, and “big picture” orientation, as distinct to ambiguous “cooperative diplomacy” or short term “Hearts and Minds”;

e. **Using Change Agents**
Based on appropriately assessed site specific conditions the use of relevant change agents aid in support to promote training, regional economy/infrastructure eg. in Somalia a good change agent was provision of veterinary care by the Indian contingent as distinct from mechanised farming implements. Media control, but with demonstrated movement toward community ownership, is integral to this process. In PD a community-based vacuum of information can be manipulated by belligerents;

f. **Local Participation in project cycle**
The encouragement of all involved in local project cycles, with leadership from behind in the context of predetermined provision of logistical support, basic infrastructure and community based infrastructure training with set timeframes and set objectives. In liaison with local leadership, agreed general coordination while generating a real, active and constructive image of PD throughout the community. This would have the effect of nullifying resistance, alienating and/or pacifying belligerents and developing/maintaining a constructive, culturally based, self-determining local political agenda. It would be objectively and essentially an enabling role. Alert to and defining/maintaining impartiality-controlled emotional involvement as an objective in itself. Soft patrols using “Hearts and Minds” with a long term objective;

g. **Creating Stakeholders**
There are stakeholders in every community. A key skill in community development is identifying and creating relevant stakeholders, and working with them to identify issues, meet community need and identifying community owned benefits. Stakeholders are a key element in generating self-determination and community ownership;

h. **Tracking Progress**
With the tactics outlined above objectives are tangible, and more to the point professionally definable. Within corporate methodology, progress can be tracked toward the achievement of objectives. So at any one time the field commander can assess the effective status of his operation, effectively troubleshoot, and not rely on fluid, potentially double barrelled or ambiguous information/outcomes;

i. **Linking Benefits**
This is a key area where cooperation between PK and HA can play a very powerful role in local area stabilisation as part of the process toward PD. Appropriately linked benefits in liaison with the local community can make the whole operation of resource and its implementation effective. Particularly if the strategy is focused on promoting self determination in the host community;

j. **Distribution of Benefits**
Appropriate distribution that enhances community empowerment/ownership allows the local area PD strategy to spread into neighbouring regions;

k. **Involving Community**
This is the first stage and political side of the PD Leaders process. The approach is clinically professional with no political objective other than the mandate. A large military force enables enforcement to the impartial discussion table and where all parties are assigned rules and roles in the PD process. The key positive motivator here being stability and infrastructure in the region. Non cooperation by a belligerent will therefore be a self grown negative political image. Positive respondents will rapidly gain ground as a result of the PD process Any violent reaction is isolated and controlled, but access to the discussion table and HA continues (only a large force will enable
this). The objective is politicisation and reduction/destruction of militarisation as a first stage to democracy. It is this process that should dictate the time frame of any UN PD mandate. This is a short outline of the model’s concept.

**MCD Model S.W.O.T.**

**Strengths**

a. Provision of community based intelligence for commanders.

b. Provides commanders with the ability to work laterally and informatively across the chaotic, cumbersome and systemic problems that currently effect UN PK missions.

c. Provides definable, and tangible objectives to PD missions.

d. Reduces threat to troops on the ground, by moving quickly and effectively.

e. Support to CISM.

f. Linking of local resources to a PK/PD mission.

g. Provides increased options in communication and coordination.

h. Monitors and facilitates NGO operations as part of Command and Control.

i. Will assist as a filter for “misinformation”.

j. A “Military Mould” already exists.

k. Identifies and works with host community leadership.

l. Provides the field commander with a skilled means of communicating across the multifaceted civil - military environment thereby reducing open ended mission statements/endstates.

m. Information supplied could well assist commanders relying on decentralised execution of decisions and orders, particularly in assessment of opportunity and risk in seemingly ambiguous political situations.

n. Information gained will constantly drive mission re-analysis.

o. Being able to provide a focus for troops by linking multiple and seemingly unrelated political, community, and military activities into a unifying mission concept.

p. Potentially very cost effective.

q. Generates positive morale for troops in the field.

**Weaknesses**

a. Will need skilled and appropriate staffing.

b. In sensitive path finding work such as this mistakes will be made.

c. As a new concept, and a diversion from traditional military manoeuvre it will encounter resistance within ADF.

d. It will require time for R&D plus training.

e. Will initially impinge on budget

**Opportunities**

a. A marketable ADF model/resource with potential to sell/export to other UN members.

b. A pathway toward real UN PK resolutions and “Peace Development”.

c. Reduce belligerent ability from using PK forces for their own purposes by negating/alienating the “fight - talk, talk -fight” technique.

d. Enhance communication in unilateral PK missions.

e. Can commence working immediately and continue through the stages of interposition, observation, reporting, assessment, and action.

f. An opportunity to research and highly tune peacekeeping liaison between factions.

g. Effective delivery of service should reduce “Mission Creep”.

h. The development of highly skilled negotiators as a resource support to the field commander.

i. Increased access and control to community based information could well provide an ADF field commander with political leverage, and an improved ability to “read the political tea leaves” in any given UN PK situation.

j. Will assist in the promotion of the ADF as a proactive futures based tri service defence force, and provide leadership in future PK missions.

**Threats**

a. Loss of credibility through inappropriate tasking.

b. Rejection/resentment from NGO’s to the formation of a CD military unit.

c. Budget limitations.

d. Conflict with Operations Other Than War doctrine, and ADF UN PK general doctrine.

e. Communication/change resistance by commanders in the field.

f. Communication/change resistance by ADF bureaucracy.

g. Communication/change resistance by Australian Govt and UN bureaucracy

**Conclusion**

The basic tenets of community development are local participation, communication analysis, creating
stakeholders, linking/distributing benefits, involving community leadership, participation in project cycles, using change agents, correctly identifying site specific conditions, tracking progress and promoting community ownership.

To some extent and with out an identifiable professional model (other than “Hearts and Minds”) these tenets were endeavoured by the 1 RAR Battalion Group, UNOSOM II, Baidoa Human Relief Sector, Somalia. As mentioned previously modern military philosophy is demystifying to the point where MCD could well be an effective tool in the field for commanders servicing a UN mandate. This exemplifies the point that a platform already exists in the modern military for community development. Additionally a well trained unit would be able to develop an effective community intelligence network on a par and working with PSY OPS.

Most literary arguments indicate that UN charter work will increasingly make demands on the ADF and in this context it requires a role similar, but different from the traditional military operation. The author believes this is part of the challenge that the future offers the ADF.

Australia is additionally well positioned in its civilian police forces to assist in civilianising PD deployments. The Northern Territory Police Force for example has been dealing and working with with community based fragmentation for years.

The concept outlined with MCD will require ongoing refinement, and can provide a step toward tangible and effective PK/PD operations. What is needed is an opportunity to put together all the elements defined in this paper and then demonstrate it in the field.

The author is a Social Worker with the Defence Community Organisation (DCO) however the DCO does not auspice this discussion article. This not to say that the DCO thinks the model will not work. It is viewed, and quite rightly so, as a radical departure and a long way from the theoretical social work frame work of CD as practised anywhere in the world. This is simply due to the concept of its application in what is essentially a combat situation.

I am of the view that the ADF will increasingly be involved in UN Humanitarian deployments as the process of fragmentation continues. Any suggested tactical skill that can assist the ADF with its responsibility in minimising human life loss on these mandates, and improving the quality of life gained, is I believe, also part of a social worker’s duty of care.

Having worked in the field of Community Development on and off for some twenty years I have a habit of linking benefits, and somewhat stunned myself with the realisation that quite possibly what UN military deployments might need was a tangible CD model. I could not believe that after all the expenditure on UN deployments and their constant shortfalls that no one had really looked at a CD model. In researching this article this factor became more and more obvious.

I started writing this article in late 96 after a few discussions with ADF members who having been deployed on UN mandates were expressing some measure of frustration. It seemed that a lot of those involved on UN deployments saw themselves, at various levels, working in something of a vacuum and trying to grasp at something that was always just beyond their reach. It was a common ground expressed by all ranks. This aspect was also reflected (directly and indirectly) in the articles I was reading on the subject. I have drawn, and based some of the argument on the material listed in the bibliography. John Mackinley’s article however was published after the first draft of this article. It is recommended complimentary reading as it helped to link the model together and touches on the above mentioned “common ground”.

The first draft was completed in late 96, by March 97 it was a rough model, but enough for the A/DGDCO, Mr Lindsay Kranz to give it an excellent critique. In addition one of my consultant's FLTTLT Rohan Gaskill took a copy with him on his deployment to Bosnia. On his return he contacted me to tell me he had found it a useful reference platform and encouraged me to finish the work. Not having been on a deployment myself I was a little uncertain writing about something I had not experienced first hand.

Everything is fluid in this world and the MCD model pushes the envelope of my profession. The small bibliography and my lack of experience “on-the-ground” ascertain's that this is not an authoritative work. It is only a discussion article and hopefully the work will generate a healthy debate.

To all I have spoken to on the subject, and to those who have taken the time to read the drafts and offer comment. Your feedback has been constructively critical and helpful, thank you.
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Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence and Foreign Policy since 1985

By Flight Lieutenant S.A. Madsen, RAAF

Introduction

Throughout their progression from colony to dominion and finally independent democracy, Australia and New Zealand have shared common security and foreign policy priorities. During the first half of this century, their membership of the British Commonwealth bound them to the Mother country and each other. Differences emerged during World War II when Australia turned to the United States, and withdrew its divisions from the Middle East to defend Australia. At the same time, New Zealand continued to send its forces to the Middle East and Europe despite the threat posed by Japan.

In the immediate post-war period, Australia was eager to bring about a Pacific alliance binding the United States to the region, and underwriting its security. New Zealand welcomed the Treaty as essential to Pacific security but was careful to remain committed to Middle East security in support of Britain.

The ANZUS Treaty became the cornerstone of foreign policy in Australia, and successive governments, both Conservative and Labor, were careful to preserve it. Thus, when actions by New Zealand in 1985 looked set to destroy the Treaty, Australia sided with the United States. Consequently, ANZUS became, in effect, two bilateral agreements for Australia with the other former tripartite partners.

The ANZUS crisis forced Australian and New Zealand to change foreign and defence policy. New Zealand freed from a degree of United States dominance became more tightly allied to Australia, as a result of the ANZUS crisis. Both countries have taken more independent positions in the World since 1985 but in broad terms they desire similar outcomes in today’s global society.

Three important themes have emerged to dominate defence and foreign policy in both countries:
1) defence self-reliance,
2) regional engagement, and
3) good international citizenship.

While they embraced these policy directions, Australia and New Zealand have not necessarily implemented them in a similar vein.

The 1985 ANZUS Crisis

In 1985, the New Zealand (Labor) Government sought assurances from the United States that a visiting Naval (USN) vessel did not carry nuclear weapons. The US policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons effectively meant New Zealand had banned port visits by the USN (or any other Nuclear Power with similar non-disclosure policies).

The United States reacted swiftly, and suspended its defence cooperation, and high level diplomatic interaction with New Zealand. New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel found themselves suspended from training in the USA, and cut off from the large US defence and intelligence networks overnight. Diplomatic access to the Pentagon and White House was also suspended.

The Australian (Labor) Government saw New Zealand’s actions as a threat to the ANZUS Alliance, and publicly expressed their objections to any action that led to a break with the United States. New Zealand would not relent, and ANZUS, in essence, became two bi-lateral agreements between Australia and the other signatories. Although not solely responsible, the crisis precipitated a period of change in Australian and New Zealand foreign policy. Today the treaty, though still important, is no longer central to foreign policy in either country.

Defence Self-reliance

In 1969, President Nixon, in the so called Guam Doctrine, stated that the United States expected its allied nations to be more responsible for their own defence. The United States military would only become involved in conflicts where another major power was a belligerent. The effects of this policy shift on Australian and New Zealand defence...

The first aim of defence self-reliance is to give Australia the military capability to prevent an aggressor attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on any part of our territory, or extracting concessions from Australia through the use or threat of military force.9

To back up this rhetoric, the Labor Government set out a program of defence expenditure larger than at any other time in Australia’s peacetime history. Commitments to acquire new submarines, the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN), Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft and replacement of the aging Mirage fighters were the more significant defence acquisitions endorsed at that time.10

New Zealand, by contrast, espoused self-reliance within the bilateral alliance with Australia that ANZUS became for them, and foresaw no direct military threat to the country.11 A direct military threat to New Zealand has always been difficult to identify, even during World War II, and the expense of a large force capable of defending the country was politically unacceptable.12 The 1991 Defence White Paper issued by New Zealand stated:

Self-Reliance in Partnership is the strategy used for implementing this policy. “Self-reliance” is essential for the national tasks that any independent nation must carry out - resource protection, counter-terrorism, and surveillance of our approaches. “Partnership” involves the protection of our wider security interests, such as the maintenance of international law and order, and freedom of the seas. This can only be done in cooperation with countries who share similar interests.13

In the period since 1987, Australia has become central to New Zealand Defence Policy. In 1991, New Zealand and Australia agreed to pursue better interoperability and coordination between their Defence Forces through the Closer Defence Relations (CDR) process.14 Defence spending in New Zealand has declined in the period since 1985 (more recently remaining stable in dollar terms), and Australia has questioned the usefulness of CDR if the New Zealand Government does not bring about modernisation of the NZDF and remain interoperable.15

Defence self-reliance has assisted the Antipodean neighbours to become more independent in their dealings with the world, especially within the Asia Pacific region. Australia and New Zealand are founding members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and Australia was instrumental in forming the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process in 1989.16 APEC and ARF are considered amongst the most important diplomatic successes of the Hawke and Keating Governments, and highlight the extent to which Australia sought to become enmeshed with the region.17 The Howard (Coalition) Government continued this engagement with the region, as evidenced in their policy white paper:

Australia’s most important strategic and economic interests lie in a region—the Asia Pacific—of great cultural and historical diversity. This region covers South East Asia, North East Asia, the Pacific, and the eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean. Australia’s biggest markets are in North East Asia.18

New Zealand has not been as aggressive in its moves into Asia but its links to the Pacific are stronger [than Australia’s] through their former mandated territories.19 Regardless, the defence white papers of 1991 and 1997 emphasised regional security as a primary role for the NZDF:

contributing to regional security which includes maintaining our key defence relationships with Australia and our Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) partners - Australia, United Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore 20

A major difference between Australia and New Zealand is their relative positions (as perceived by themselves and other nations) in the world. Australia is seen as a middle-power, and as such can wield sufficient influence (with other middle-powers) to bring about more desirable outcomes for the region.21 New Zealand could not claim to have the same influence, and had hooked its trailer to Australia in the face of an indifferent Britain, and unfriendly United States.22

Successive Labor Governments in Australia took the initiative on a number of global issues, and strode the world stage with growing confidence, particularly after Gareth Evans assumed the role of Foreign Minister in 1988. APEC and ARF aside, Australia
brokered the peace proposal in Cambodia and agricultural reforms in GATT during Evans’ period of office, all significant achievements. In 1995, Australia signed an agreement with Indonesia on maintaining security. This agreement (with treaty status) recognised both countries’ interests in regional security, and both agreed to consult on common security matters, and develop cooperation to benefit regional security.

New Zealand has taken part in the negotiations for GATT, APEC and ARF with Australia but it can be argued that the more important agreements were concluded with Australia alone. CDR, and its economic counterpart Closer Economic Relations (CER) have been significant instruments of New Zealand foreign and defence policy since their inception. CER has been used as the vehicle to engage with the ASEAN countries; fostering better trade relations with the tiger economies of the region. New Zealand did not embrace Asia as quickly as Australia, remaining more committed to its European roots, but they have benefited from Australia’s vigorous regional engagement. Closer cooperation has afforded Australia a bigger voice in the region, and further opened the gates to Asia for New Zealand.

The end of the Cold War, and the strengthening of the United Nations that followed, presented opportunities for smaller nations to contribute to the “New World Order” in international forums. New Zealand and Australia have taken their responsibilities as “good international citizens” seriously, and their contributions have been significant.

Ironically, New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policies are probably the first signs of the move to become good international citizens. Support for the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand was wide spread (69 per cent in 1986) and ultimately embraced by all political parties. New Zealand implemented these policies in the face of hostile reaction in the United States, and disapproval elsewhere including Australia. Australia’s government took a less altruistic stand on the anti-nuclear movement. Australia ensured the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, allowing signatories to permit visits by nuclear armed vessels and aircraft vital to the ANZUS Alliance. This ensured that Australia’s relationship with the United States was unthreatened while the government committed to a politically correct anti-nuclear policy.

New Zealand clearly enunciated its intention to play their role in the world to bring about justice and peace in their Defence White Papers: being a good international citizen by playing our part in global collective security efforts, particularly peacekeeping.

The NZDF has been active in peacekeeping and other United Nations operations throughout the world since 1990. In the Gulf War, the government would not commit combat forces but did provide support and medical elements which were accepted eagerly by the United States despite continuing post-ANZUS tension. This decision, supported by 80 per cent of the population, emphasis the countries growing anti-militarism since 1985. New Zealand supported the United Nations in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and more recently had a major part in brokering the peace negotiation ending conflict in Bougainville.

Australia articulated its support for the “good international citizenship” concept continually throughout the years since 1985, especially during Gareth Evans period as Foreign Minister. Evans explained:

Good international citizenship is perhaps best described, not least for the cynical, as an exercise in enlightened self-interest: an expression of idealistic pragmatism. Our refugee program, for example, shows how we can be faithful to humanitarian concerns and, in the process, also acquire for Australia human resources and skills which strengthen our economic and enrich our society.

Support for the global community when Australia’s national interest is satisfied does not quite the altruistic policy Hedley Bull conceptualised in the 1970s. However, it shows Australia’s growing confidence on the world stage, and all governments have displayed a responsibility to their country first and foremost even in the “new world order.”

Australia’s credentials as a “good international citizen” were further enhanced by acceptance of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1992. Ros Kelly, Minister for the Environment, stated, “Australia and many other countries worked and negotiated for stronger outcomes on climate change, biodiversity and some of the items in Agenda 21 ...”. Australia saw itself as leader in the environmental cause but the government’s motives were not all together unselfish. Evans saw the problem as a threat: as low lying nations were claimed by the rising waters; Australia would be inundated by refugees. He advocated a policy that
called on all nations to play their part to halt the greenhouse effect, following Australia’s lead. Despite the rhetoric, Australia was backpedalling on its own responsibilities by 1994, and did not create any significant initiatives to meet the targets set. A “carbon tax” was proposed but rejected by Cabinet, and the business community thought the targets agreed to in Rio unattainable. The targets were finally abandoned by the Coalition Government in 1996.36

Conclusion

Australia and New Zealand share a common heritage and history, and their relationship with each other has been strong throughout the short period of their independence. By 1985, both were in full control of their defence, and foreign policy, ready to play their part in global issues.

As a result of the ANZUS crisis, and the United States withdrawal from the region, both countries had to adjust their defence policies and began to look to Asia for partners in regional security. Australia, while sympathetic to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy, saw ANZUS (and hence the United States) as the centrepiece of the country’s foreign policy, and would not jeopardise that relationship. New Zealand shifted its defence dependence to Australia, and in doing so, found itself serving a far harder master than the United States. Both countries have strengthened their defence relationships in Asia: New Zealand through its continued commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), and Australia through a number of bilateral agreements, the most significant with Indonesia.

The moves by both countries to become engaged in Asia, and strengthen bilateral relations with the important North Asia countries, highlight the discarding of the final colonial baggage. The formation of ARF and APEC are significant defence and foreign policy initiatives, and together with Australia’s security agreement with Indonesia highlight the developing relationships in the Asia Pacific region.

“Good international citizenship” is a growing trend in western societies and both countries embraced it as an ideal in the early nineties. New Zealand has had the conviction of its ideals, defending its anti-nuclear policy against the might of the United States, yet joining with them to defend peace across the globe. Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and Bougainville are but a few of the countries in which NZDF personnel have served as peacekeepers since 1985, and this role is a centrepiece of New Zealand defence policy. Australia tempered its “good international citizenship” with national interest particularly when addressing anti-nuclear and environmental issues. Economic growth and the relationship with the United States were considered more important than becoming a truly altruistic society. Australia has been successful in promoting peace in the region (Cambodia most notably), and contributes peacekeeping forces to a number of global trouble spots.

Both countries have matured as nations since 1985, displaying growing confidence on the world stage. Successive Australian and New Zealand governments recognised the importance of becoming full partners in the region. As the colonial influences (European and American) diminished, and Asian economies boomed, they implemented policies that will continue to influence each country’s stature for the foreseeable future.

NOTES
6. ibid., p. 283.
7. ibid.
10. ibid.
17. G. Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, op. cit., p. 87.
Flight Lieutenant Madsen joined the RAAF in 1980 as an Air Defence Operator. He served in various operational roles, both in Australia and Malaysia, before being commissioned as an Air Defence Officer in 1992. Upon graduation from Air Defence Controller Basic course, he served at No 2 Control and Reporting Unit from 1993-1996. He graduated as a Fighter Combat Officer, and later served in various operational roles both in Australia and the United Kingdom. He was appointed as the Defence Staff Officer in 1997 prior to taking up his current duties as a Staff Officer at Headquarters No 41 Wing.

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Minister Launches Medals Booklet

A new booklet launched in Canberra recently will provide readers with an easy-to-read and understand guide to Australia’s campaign and Operational Medals.

The Minister for Veterans Affairs and Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, Mr Bruce Scott, launched the booklet Campaign and Operational Medals of the Australian Defence Force at the Australian War Memorial.

The booklet contains colour illustrations, descriptions and the eligibility criteria for campaign and operational medals.

“An important part of Australia’s history has been written on the many battlefields and in the many countries in which Australian Defence Force personnel have served,” Mr Scott said.

Apart from the colour pictures of medals, the book provides plain language outlines of eligibility criteria for each of the awards.

Operational Medals Awarded to the Australian Defence Force which was written by the Defence Staff Officer – MEDALS, Mr Ron Horton, is being distributed to Australian Defence Force units and Headquarters, MPs and Senators, the RSL and Sub-Branches and other veterans organisations.

It may be bought by interested members of the public at the Australian War Memorial Bookshop – and AusInfo (formerly the Government Bookshop).
Collins Class submarine undergoing trials
The Importance of Training Needs Analysis in Integrated Logistic Support

By Lieutenant Commander Jim Kenny, RAN

“The secret of successful purchasing and maintenance of expensive technology lies in the management of risk. There are numerous potential risks associated with acquiring training technology which can be a part of integrated logistic support philosophy for control of procurements of training systems.”
(P.Gramson - Director, Independent Training Systems: consultant to RAF, 1993)

Three fundamental questions that major project management needs to be clear on could be distilled down to: why is the project happening, how will it happen and with what will it be able to occur. The last question relates directly to the concept of logistics which provides the resources to get the work done. Although the logistics concept is not new to the military, the tying together of the various resource needs of a project that come together under the logistics umbrella in an integrated fashion is relatively new to the ADF. Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) is a discipline developed out of the systems approach to engineering. In many ways ILS embraces an eclectic approach which brings together other disciplines such as Needs Analysis (NA) such as in training, Value Analysis (VA) and Life Cycle Costing.

Essentially ILS is defined as a unified and interactive approach to management and technical activities necessary to influence research and design and support of a project. The ILS process serves to focus attention on identifiable outputs including computing support, HR, facilities and supply support. ILS has developed three conceptual roles; influence the design, or selection of design to ensure support considerations are taken into account. Secondly, develop the support system and integration into the existing infrastructure and its through life support. Thirdly, manage the acquisition of the logistic support system. In the typical life of a project, ILS costs over an equipment’s life often exceeds the initial acquisition cost by a significant amount. Special concern in the cost of ILS support, is the cost of the HR component which is a major contributing factor, especially the training resource element which normally runs on for a lengthy period after the initial acquisition phase. This element can cover items such as training development, conduct as well as the facilities and devices eg: simulators used in training. Considering the importance of this component of the overall costing, the RAN needs a methodology and “total project cost appreciation” in order to capture to true level of investment made in any new asset. Activity Based Management may do this, but only if the structural relationships are made connecting currently perceived isolated costs to the overall picture. Equipment and services purchased for the COLLINS Class submarine as an example, be they spare propellers or sophisticated training simulators are all costs on the one project - not isolated to the organisation from which the funds come from.

The acquisition of complex (and expensive) training systems is not a trivial matter. The consequences of getting it wrong will impact on a project or at least the larger organisation, such as the RAN well into the future. These consequences can range from trivial matters as facility support at place of use to buying devices that have obvious shortcomings in their performance, or require technical skills for their upkeep which may be incompatible with a planned or anticipated skill base or service budget. Avoiding, some of the major cost “blowouts” is not magical, as with the analysis for justification of the asset in the first place, the derivation of the need for the training or Training Needs Analysis (TNA) is also a critical aspect in the success of the whole training process, indeed arguably the asset’s ILS process. Potentially, poor TNA will probably lead to an inappropriate mix of training devices which may be under (or indeed over) utilised for the capital invested, or do not cover the range of tasks as effectively as they should. Without knowing precisely (as possible) the underlying reasons and factors for acquisition of training resources, the
potential to make significant error is high. There is no suggestion that the future can be read accurately, but most major asset acquisition projects in themselves need to be “forward looking” by more than a few decades, so the same for the ongoing training (indeed HR) requirements. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence\(^1\) has recognised the inadequacies experienced with definition analysis of training needs and failures in making the most effective use of available technology. These flaws, pointed out by the National Audit Office, have had a major impact on training systems and associated resource expenditures failing to satisfy user’s requirements. The RAF have subsequently introduced a policy on synthetic training in 1989 which has appropriate TNA as a cornerstone to ensure that acquisition choices are based on improved, and more timely, definition of training needs and on a full appreciation of the technology available.

**How Does the TNA Process Work**

The start really should begin with the end or outcome. This is a clearly defined statement of what is expected at the end of the project. All further work must relate back to this and because we deal in outcomes, there should be no restrictions on alternatives to achieve the outcome. RANTS Vol 2 “Training Analysis and Design” Chapter 4 stresses the point, management has to make a decision as to the most cost effective means of closing the competency gap (people to do the work), they should consider a range of options of which training is but one. This feasibility analysis is a “number crunching” exercise largely focused on cost benefit of the various forms of training options. It may well show that other non-training options are more cost effective, but only a thorough analysis will show. The end result of this study is the “formalisation” and interpretation of data collected in documentation form.

Training documentation is not an end in itself, but the necessary method collecting, collating and retaining the corporate knowledge of the analyses done. It is not the intention of documentation to be sacrosanct, on the contrary, it is vital that adequate resources be put into this aspect of the TNA process so as to keep it up to date and readily useable.

**Conclusion**

Project management uses a comprehensive ILS programme to provide the necessary through life support essential for the types of major projects undertaken by the ADF. ILS is an eclectic discipline which must be developed early in the project’s life so that costly modification and unnecessary waste can be avoided. HR is a significant long term component of the ILS package, and training is a primary element in terms of cost and resource utility. For training to be resourced in a cost effective manner, especially in areas such as simulators and the like, comprehensive TNA is required. TNA is a related discipline to VA and by using, both purchasing and maintenance decisions have a far better chance of being made on lower risk basis and ultimately saving resource in a time of constraint.

**NOTES**
1. HMSO 247, 6 November 1992 - “Ministry of Defence: Use of Simulators in Training”.

**Training Needs Analysis**

ABR 5286 (RANTS Volume 2) describes TNA as a multifaceted process which identifies relevant factors of the training situation which will have a bearing on the training strategy adopted. TNA equates to the four fundamental forms of analysis used in the RANTS - job, training, feasibility and task analyses. The aim of the four is to determine the “training fit”, that is, does training need to occur and if so what is the most effective way to do it. In the logistic support continuum, before any determination on how to acquire training systems is made, the more basic question of do we need it must be answered - using a high proportion of fact and analysis and much less “basic instinct”.

DRB 37 “Value Analysis (VA) Handbook describes VA as: “the systematic effort directed at identifying the functions of systems, etc for the purpose of achieving the essential functions at the lowest cost consistent with the needed purpose, performance, reliability, sustainability and maintainability. Before any assessment of the capability of a piece of kit is determined, the domain of the engineer, its purpose must be clearly determined. Both VA and TNA are disciplines using a systematic approach to problem solving, both take time and effort, however, both are necessary, especially for high value items - like training simulators.

**Lieutenant Commander Tim Kenny is the Logistics Officer – Training for the New Submarine Project (UWS Branch).**
Unconventional Warfare – An Overview

By Major R.C. Moor, RA Inf.

**Background**

The history of unconventional warfare in the 20th century is rich and colourful. Many myths and legends have been created and many decisive campaigns conducted. Prime examples include Lawrence in Arabia, Lettow von Vorbek in East Africa, Wingate in Abyssinia and Burma, Vockmann and Fetig in the Philippines, the 2/2nd Independent Company in Timor, Wright on New Britain, Tom Harrison and his band from Z Special Unit in Borneo, and Barry Petersen in Vietnam.

Lawrence’s exploits are perhaps the best known. He was able to effectively protect General Allenby’s right flank during the British advance through Palestine and Syria. More importantly Lawrence examined unconventional warfare in terms of conventional theory and formulated a modern doctrine outlining an indirect approach to warfighting. The essential elements of his doctrine are:

- **The algebraic element or science of war.** That is those aspects that are fixed. Those aspects that can be calculated, that are subject to mathematical law; for example space, time, terrain, weapon capabilities, number of personnel etc;
- **The biological element of lives.** The recognition that the use of mass and the expenditure of lives does not necessarily guarantee victory, conversely in some circumstances the life on one’s own troops must be guarded at all costs in order to preserve the will to fight.
- **The psychological element.** A recognition of the importance of the psychological element in shaping and influencing attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.1

Lawrence saw the power of a revolt in terms of its effect on the mind. Whereas conventional theory required decisiveness through battle, either by destroying the enemy or capturing ground, Lawrence postulated “our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.”

The fact that a revolt was taking place and that it had the potential to cause harm to the Turks if not checked meant that Lawrence could achieve his aim without resorting to force. “Battles in Arabia were a mistake, since we profited in them only by the ammunition the enemy fired off.” He only confronted the enemy when he wished to weaken their morale or to boost the esprit de corps of his own troops. He did not confront the enemy to lessen his numbers or to take ground. The Turks were unable to counter the revolt, they responded both disproportionately and inappropriately. The exacerbated the situation. Their troops remained tied down in a secondary theatre defending open desert, while the Arabs gained confidence and cohesion and the British took Damascus.

Essentially all successful unconventional warfare campaigns follow a similar pattern. They have been able to force the enemy to react disproportionately and inappropriately. The 2/2nd Independent Company were able to tie down a Japanese Division on Timor for nearly a year at a time when an extra Division in New Guinea may have been fatal to the allied cause. In New Britain Wright and his cohorts were able to effectively stop the eastward retreat of the Japanese and prevent them from consolidating their position in Rabaul. In Borneo a handful of Z Special troops were able to arm and train 2000 Dyak guerrillas behind the Japanese lines. They then commenced operations in time to support the 9th Australian Division landing at Brunei Bay. Z Special’s operations accounted for an estimated 1500 Japanese killed, disrupted their tactical regrouping and seriously hindered their defence against the 9th Division. Immediately following the Japanese surrender the same troops were instrumental in hunting down renegade Japanese troops, disarming others in remote areas and re-establishing the civil administration.

**Current Significance**

In the Clausewitzian context of nation states composed of the trinity of government, military and people, nations have exerted power and influence...
through economic policy, the control of information, diplomacy and warfare. In this context warfare has two forms, conventional and unconventional. Conventional military forces exert overt combat power to destroy or neutralise the enemy’s plans and capacity to wage war. Conventional military forces generally focus on neutralising or destroying an opponent's military capacity.

This view, however, restricts conflict to that which occurs between nation states, and does not take into account the rise of the trans-national corporation, international crime syndicates, radical religious movements, the break down of states and growing disaffection within many societies. Many nation states are losing control over economic policy and information, while others are disintegrating entirely. In addition the effectiveness of bi-lateral diplomacy is constrained by multi-lateral agreements, conventions and organisations. With these changes low intensity conflict appears to be becoming endemic, war without beginning or end. In these circumstances the traditional utility of conventional operations, as a means of projecting national power or protecting national interests, is reduced.

Unconventional warfare, on the other hand, allows for the use of resources and capabilities beyond the scope of conventional forces. Whereas conventional forces primarily depend on firepower and mobility to achieve their aim unconventional forces delve into the realm of illusion, half-truths, deceit, disguise, deception, cunning and guile. As Thomas Hobbes observed “force and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues.” Unconventional warfare is primarily concerned with the second element of Hobbes’ observation. Its use enables nation’s to project national power and protect national interests in an unstructured combat environment. Unconventional warfare also shifts the focus in warfighting from defeating an opponent’s military capacity to undermining his will to wage war.

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**Concept**

The concept of unconventional warfare is to protect national interests by influencing a potential adversary to such an extent that conflict is avoided or, if this is not possible, to weaken an enemy's warfighting capability primarily by exploiting his political and psychological vulnerability’s and if necessary his military and economic weaknesses. It may be implemented unilaterally by selected force elements or where appropriate, by providing support and direction to indigenous resistance forces. Unconventional operations may be mounted in a range of contingencies before, during and after conflict, and frequently rely on the indirect application of military force to achieve strategic or operational objectives. In effect unconventional warfare can be either passive or active.

Passive operations aim at preventing conflict or restoring stability following conflict. They include bilateral and multilateral military programs and activities that aim to enhance stability and security or to restore law and order.

Active operations traditionally embrace, but are not limited, to intelligence gathering, subversion, sabotage, evasion and escape, and the fostering of resistance movements.

In an established theatre of operations, in which significant conventional ground operations are underway, unconventional warfare may be conducted primarily to complement, support, or extend these operations. Within geographical areas under enemy control or influence, to which conventional forces cannot be deployed, unconventional warfare may be conducted as an economy of force measure and to reduce or dissipate the enemy effort.

Unconventional warfare also allows senior commanders to extend the area of operations. This can be achieved by disrupting an enemy’s operation behind his forward elements or by extending the conflict to another front. In addition by exploiting to the maximum extent the principles of surprise and deception a commander can lower the enemy’s efficiency and morale as well as obtain valuable information. Unconventional warfare has the potential to play a significant role in all levels of conflict. The magnitude of the effect, relative to the effort required when this effort is judiciously applied, will normally exceed that which can be achieved by conventional means and will maximise the use of friendly resources.

The effect and effectiveness of unconventional warfare is felt principally at the operational and strategic levels. Operational effect is achieved through the application of essentially tactical level techniques to influence local political, military and/or economic circumstances. Strategic effect is achieved through the manipulation of the operational level environment to achieve national political or psychological objectives. For example during *Operations Desert Storm* and *Desert Shield* US and British Special Forces operated in Western Iraq. By conducting long range reconnaissance, disrupting the local infrastructure, and attacking selected military targets they were able to disrupt communications and locate and destroy a
number of Scud Missile Launchers. At the operational level this disrupted Iraq’s launch program. At the strategic level it helped prevent Israel’s entry into the war and thus preserve the Arab coalition.

Unconventional warfare allows the full warfighting capacity of a nation to be exerted. It can be used to:

- manipulate a potential adversary so as to prevent bellicose behaviour;
- maximise force to coerce the enemy to accede;
- divert part of the enemy military effort away from their main objective;
- sow doubt in the minds of the enemy hierarchy, armed forces and populace;
- reassure and bolster friendly forces and people;
- provide time for conventional forces to prepare for operations;
- prepare the way for and/or directly assist conventional forces; and
- re-establish law and order following the resolution of conflict.

Subversion

As outlined unconventional warfare traditionally embraces subversion, sabotage, escape and evasion and the fostering of resistance movements. Subversion is defined as “action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens.” Subversion embraces passive resistance. Typical acts of subversion include boycotts, riots, demonstrations, ahimsa (non-violent non-cooperation), ostracism, defamation, rumour and innuendo, strikes, civil disobedience, non-compliance, and so on. Subversive activities can stand alone or be integrated into a wider unconventional warfare campaign.

Sabotage

Sabotage is defined as the “malicious injury to work, tools, machinery, etc, or any underhand interference with production or business.” Sabotage embraces active resistance normally against an adversary industry or infrastructure. Typical acts of sabotage include the destruction or damage of industrial plant and tools; tampering with the quality of raw materials and manufactured goods; tampering with food production and distribution, disruption to power, water, sewerage and telecommunications; disruption to radio and television; tampering with information systems, and so on. Sabotage activities can stand alone or be integrated into a wider unconventional warfare campaign.

Evasion and Escape

Evasion and escape is defined as “the procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.” All Special Operations and strategic strike missions that enter hostile territory require the establishment of evasion and escape procedures. Except for Combat Search and Rescue escape and evasion is generally conducted using unconventional warfare techniques. Escape and evasion plans can stand alone or be integrated into a wider unconventional warfare campaign.

Resistance Movements

Resistance is the effort by individuals or groups to resist, oppose, or overthrow an established government or occupying power which exercises authority over them. This resistance may be passive and use subversive techniques or active and resort to sabotage and armed opposition, such as terrorism, guerrilla warfare and paramilitary operations.

Historically, resistance movements have been given such labels as, guerrilla warfare, revolution, rebellion, civil war, liberation movements, underground, and so on. For clarity resistance is best defined as “an organised effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist, oppose, or overthrow the existing government or occupying power.” It is important to recognise, however, that in using this definition resistance must be considered as an armed political movement and not as a simple military action.

Before resistance occurs there is a requirement for set grievances and a level of rebellion against the ruling authority by the local populace. Resistance can be entirely indigenous or initiated, sponsored and directed by an external source. Whenever a nation goes to war it is possible, and indeed likely, that a portion of the enemy’s indigenous population will have a significant grievance against their own government. The initial development of a resistance movement may occur locally or could be externally sponsored. The nature of any resistance, cannot be predicted for its reasons, motives, ideals, cultural, religious and ethnic backgrounds may differ. Consequently any two resistance movements, even when operating against a common enemy, will most
likely be quite different and may even be opposed to one another.

The various historical accounts of resistance movements often use confusing and overlapping definitions of just what constitutes the movement. For clarity and understanding resistance movements are best viewed as consisting of the following elements:

• the guerrilla force,
• the auxiliary, and
• the underground.

While it is possible and even likely that in practice these clear cut delineation’s will be blurred, the roles performed by the three elements are interdependent and need to be conducted to a greater or lesser degree by someone or some organisation.

• Guerrilla Force

A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel, organised along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy or enemy held territory. It is the overt combat element of the resistance movement. Its training, organisation and employment follow military principles. In order to survive, grow and prosper, guerrilla forces must have the support of the local populace, who must be organised to provide logistic support, security and recruits. The guerrilla is normally a combat participant in unconventional warfare. He has the legal status of a belligerent and his conduct is covered in the laws of armed conflict.

• Auxiliary

The auxiliary is that element of the resistance movement established to provide and organise civilian support for the guerrilla force. Its organisation and operations are clandestine and its members do not openly indicate their sympathy of involvement with the resistance movement. The auxiliary is generally composed of local civilians. Its members carry on everyday activities and assist the resistance movement part-time. They are not expected to move from place to place to conduct operations, however, they are expected to support mobile and possibly non-local forces. Ideally the auxiliary should be organised to parallel existing government and administrative functions. One of the principal functions of the auxiliary is to organise and operate an internal supply system for the resistance and, in addition to the procurement of food, clothing and medicine, the auxiliary also provides transportation, security and early warning, intelligence and counter-intelligence, recruits and other missions as directed by the resistance command.

• Underground

The third element of the resistance movement is the underground. Enemy security measures or the antipathy of certain segments of the population may deny some portions of the area of operations to the guerrilla force and the auxiliary. The underground is used to conduct operations in these areas. It is employed to reach targets that would otherwise be inaccessible and to provide supplies, equipment or information that cannot be obtained from any other source. The underground is a valuable and important intelligence source. It is clandestine and organised on a cellular or “fail safe” principle of compartmentation and parallel lines wherein if one element is compromised, the entire system will not be incapacitated. In addition to gathering intelligence it may also participate in sabotage and subversion and will control escape and evasion nets if established.

Principles and Prerequisites

Principles

During the conduct of unconventional warfare the traditional principles of war apply with added emphasis on:

• Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. Particular attention must be paid to the political and diplomatic overtones associated with the aim.
• Security. Security is the dominant consideration. Protection of information prior to, during and following operations is of prime importance. In certain instances sophisticated deception plans may be required.
• Flexibility. Unconventional warfare provides the means for a nation to enhance its diplomatic effort to prevent conflict, or to exercise power at that critical point where diplomacy has failed but actual hostilities have yet to commence. It allows for a flexible response to a wide range of situations through the selected use of force. It has the capacity to:
  • demonstrate political will and military capacity, while limiting escalation of hostilities; and
  • use deniable force.

Prerequisites

In addition the following prerequisites must be met for a resistance movement to flourish:
**Unity of Effort.** In most instances the “cause” provides unity. If, however, this unifying factor is not present or if the movement is divided the chance of ultimate success is slim. In addition, should a divided resistance gain victory there is the possibility that the fruits of victory may be subsequently lost to opposing parties or fractional infighting. Therefore, where major differences exist they must be resolved as early as possible. There must be unified direction over psychological operations, intelligence gathering, communications, combat operations and logistics. When sponsoring a resistance movement every effort must be made to submerge the personal ambitions and jealousies of all individuals and units so as to obtain unity of effort against the common enemy.

**Support of the People.** Once the unifying cause is established it must be supported by the people. The support provided may be either active or passive. Active support will probably only come from a relatively small portion of the population with even a smaller number actually bearing arms. While it is not necessary that the entire population be engaged in active support there must be at least passive support from the majority of the people. This passive support may, however, represent a significant effort on the part of the people as they will in all probability be subjected to extreme trial and duress. Where necessary this support may be gained by persuasion, and on occasion, coercion. Coercion should, however, be kept to a minimum as its indiscriminate use will in the long run be counter-productive.

**Will to Resist.** It is necessary to promote the will to resist to prevent the development and spread of a fatalistic attitude. That will must then be developed into active resistance.

**Leadership.** The will to resist must be properly directed through the exercise of strong and decisive leadership. Resistance leaders must be politically astute, tough, tactically competent and have an abiding faith in the “cause”.

**Discipline.** Discipline in a resistance movement is strongly if indirectly maintained by identification with the cause and the maintenance of the will to resist. This, however, does not preclude the necessity of a formal code. Discipline under the conditions of resistance must necessarily be strict and justice must be melted out swiftly and decisively.

**Intelligence.** Information about the enemy is absolutely essential to the survival and success of the resistance forces. A concerted, comprehensive and well coordinated intelligence effort must be established from the outset to determine the enemy’s weakness and provide security for the resistance movement.

**Propaganda.** One of the most important uses of good intelligence lies in the preparation of effective propaganda. The means for the dissemination of propaganda must either already exist or be able to be developed. It can be used to gain popular support for the cause, sustain the will to resist or undermine the enemy’s will to fight.

**Favourable Environment.** The environment has a great influence on all resistance operations. The environment includes geography, climate, terrain, civilian infrastructure, economic conditions, locations of population centres, population density, attitude of the people, as well as the ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic and political divisions. Differing combinations of factors tend to support differing *modus operandi* and the various elements of the resistance usually find different segments of the environment more favourable to their individual operations.

**Outside Assistance.** Outside assistance greatly enhances the effectiveness of resistance movements, especially if a sanctuary is provided.

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**Characteristics and Techniques**

Many of the characteristics and techniques of conventional warfare apply to unconventional warfare. There are, however, certain techniques which must be significantly modified and even reversed if the resistance fighter is to survive. The principle difference between the two are:

**Concentration vs Dispersion.** In resistance operations, the insurgent force is not capable of mounting a decisive offensive. The insurgent does not seek to engage the enemy’s strength but rather strikes at his weakness. The underground members survive by remaining dispersed among the population, the guerrillas survive by remaining dispersed throughout the area of operations. There is no target, other than the civilian support base, for the enemy to strike, thus his superior power is of little military advantage. The resistance concentrates its force only at a point chosen by the
resistance for the attack. In this way, the resistance fighter survives and lives to fight another day.

- **Centralisation vs Decentralisation.** In resistance operations, the forces employed cannot always be as responsive through the command structure as can conventional forces. Due to problems caused by the paramount importance of security and the subsequent difficulty with communications, directive control must be practised at all times.

- **Disciplined Strategy vs Freedom of Movement.** When moving large masses of men and large quantities of material, it is necessary for those engaged in such an enterprise to have common expectations and for individuals to know and be able to predict how others are going to act. Therefore, the bigger the organisation the more complex and restrictive the regimentation. As the resistance, however, is relatively small it normally takes maximum advantage of its freedom to move and strike at will.

- **Decisive vs Non Decisive Battle.** In the exercise of conventional battle tactics the army attempts to close with and destroy the enemy. Decisive combat is the key to victory. This is precisely what the resistance fighter must avoid unless he believes that by engaging in battle he can decisively influence the enemy’s national will to wage war. It is normally the mission of the resistance to harass, demoralise, and weaken the enemy through a campaign of attrition, or to conduct intelligence gathering and interdiction operations in the enemy rear in support of friendly conventional operations.

- **Standing Army vs Deliberate Development.** At the onset of hostilities the regular army is generally fully developed and can be quickly expanded if necessary. The resistance must, however, be carefully and deliberately developed under conditions of clandestine existence. This is usually a protracted process requiring a considerable amount of time. In some instances, especially in the case of recently occupied countries, the opposite holds true. In these circumstances the resistance strength is greatest at the outset, before the enemy is able to establish population control measures and a viable counter resistance intelligence net. In such circumstances, it may be that by rapidly unifying the resistance effort, arming them, and conducting widespread interdiction operations as early as possible, the greatest harm can be done to the enemy, and that they can be defeated or at least halted in their advance before they are able to establish firm control over the country. The resistance and its outside sponsors must continuously and carefully evaluate its strength. It must carry out only those operations within its capability while fully utilising that capability to inflict damage upon the enemy yet work towards the common objective.

- **Reserve vs No Reserve.** “In a regular army, the reserve is the significant medium of the general’s art. It is his insurance against the unknown. Defensively, it is used to contain a superior attack; offensively, it is used to deepen and widen success.” In unconventional warfare, however, reserves are seldom available. As guerrillas avoid defending ground there is no necessity to contain attack. Occasionally during offensive operations a part of the guerrilla force might be used to create a diversion or assume the posture of a reserve force.

- **Fixed Bases vs No Bases.** Due to the great problem of supply and communications in regular armies, elaborate rear area bases are needed. As Mao writes, however, “while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is in the enemy’s rear areas, they themselves have no rear.” As guerrilla operations are usually on a small scale they do not need the elaborate rear bases of the regular armies. In fact, their “rear bases” may often be the airfields of the sponsoring power that supports them. In addition, guerrillas may have “safe areas”. These may be in a friendly foreign nation across the border or even in the country itself. These areas must be well hidden, well guarded, and easily moved at very short notice.

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**Conclusion**

War is an extension of politics. In war, politics will continue to be the central theme which drives and directs all actions be they economic, psychological or military. Available to a nation at war are both conventional and unconventional warfare techniques. Conventional techniques use combat power to dominate the enemy through the control of ground or the destruction of the enemy’s warfighting capability. Unconventional techniques are able to complement and in certain circumstances replace conventional techniques by providing an indirect means to engage and occupy the enemy where the direct application of combat power is either unsuitable of unavailable. In addition unconventional techniques can be used in unstructured combat environments where the enemy and/or the centre of gravity are not obvious and the
use of direct force is ineffective. While these actions are often indecisive in isolation they have the effect of draining the enemy and dissipating his effort and thus gaining time during which alternate solutions can be explored, developed and implemented. Unconventional warfare is, however, an art within itself. While many conventional principles and practices apply several key distinctions exist. These distinctions must be understood and embraced before an unconventional approach to warfare can be developed and adopted.

NOTES
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
5. ADFP 101 Glossary.
7. ADFP 101 Glossary

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USAIMA. (1979) “Special Forces Officers Course – Students Notes”.

Major Moor graduated from RMC in 1976. His formal qualifications include a BA(Mil) and Graduate Diploma in Adult Education. He has spent the majority of his career with Special Forces and has participated in and led many adventurous training exercises both in Australia and overseas. He was the Officer Commanding and Chief Instructor of the Army Adventurous Training Centre. Major Moor is currently posted to HQ Special Operations Detachment in Canberra.
Still Action: the war photography of Damien Parer is on display in the Australian War Memorial’s new Special Exhibition gallery from 1 April to 23 July 1999.

Damien Parer is best known for his wartime cinematography, winning an Oscar for *Kokoda Frontline*, produced while he was an official Department of Information photographer. But, he was also a very accomplished stills photographer, and this exhibition features a selection of his very best stills work.

In fact, Parer started his career in stills. Apprenticed to Melbourne photographer Arthur Dickensen, he trained in taking glamorous fashion shots. His appetite for movies was whetted when he worked as stills photographer on Chauvel’s *Uncivilised* and *Forty Thousand Horsemen*. But his love of still photography remained, fuelled by stints working with Max Dupain and Olive Cotton.

*Still Action: the war photography of Damien Parer* is a tribute to Parer’s professionalism, talent and his life as a stills photographer. The exhibition consists of 55 framed black and white photographs, seventeen of which are framed enlargements of films. It shows Parer’s pre-war work, his work in North Africa and the Middle East and later in the South West Pacific. It also explores Parer’s fascination with the sinister beauty of planes, tanks, ships and guns and depicts the mood and emotion of Australia’s fighting men.

Almost all works come from the extensive collection held by the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. The exhibition was developed by the Australian War Memorial in cooperation with the Orange Regional Art Gallery and is being toured by the Memorial.

Parer was born in Melbourne in 1912, grew up on King Island in Bass Strait and at the age of 11 went to boarding school in Bathurst.

In 1940, Parer joined the Sixth Division, 2nd AIF in the Middle East, and covered land, sea and air actions at Tobruck, Derna, Greece and Syria. In July 1942, he returned to Australia and was sent north to cover the fighting in Timor and New Guinea. During his time in New Guinea, Parer was in the front line, exposed to the same dangers as the soldiers he was capturing on film, and it’s perhaps these images that are most familiar to Australians. Ultimately, it cost him his life. Parer, now working for the Paramount News Corporation, was killed on 17 September 1944, filming US Marines storming a Japanese bunker on Peleliu Island. He was just 32.

As Frank Hurley’s images provide the lasting memories of Australia’s involvement in the First World War, so Damien Parer’s are the benchmark memories of our part in that second great conflict.

The exhibition is part of the Australian War Memorial’s travelling exhibitions program funded by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs *Their Service – Our Heritage*. Other travelling exhibitions include: *Ivor Hele: the Heroic figure*, *Too dark for the Light Horse*, *Impressions: Australians in Vietnam*, *Up Front: faces of Australia at war* and *1918 Australians in France*. 

Reviewed by A. Zoiti-Licastro

“Australians have little respect for politics, and less for politicians…91% of those interviewed…said that politicians twisted the truth to suit themselves, and 66% believed that politicians were not usually truthful” (p11).

For anyone who remembers WA Inc., the closure of Fairlea women’s prison and the protests over Grand Prix racing at Albert Park, this is an interesting book. Moira Rayner, a lawyer with her heart in the right place, was so good at her job as Commissioner for Equal Opportunity in Victoria that she became the last one. The Liberal Government in Victoria has an economic agenda they were voted in to pursue. Once a party has been elected is that where the democracy ends? Who can argue with the winner in the race? This book asks you to consider what democracy is and where we, as a society, are going.

Using examples such as children being strip-searched before they are allowed to see their imprisoned mothers and the famous Rosa Parks refusal to give up her seat for a white person on a bus in 1950s America, Rayner examines modern Western culture; the way we act (are we inherently selfish as some believe) and the way Kant says we should act (your treatment of others is the end not just the means). Does a parent have the right to bring up a child in a way that contradicts the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child? This book asks you to think about what you believe, even people who say they are not interested in politics will have an opinion on such matters. Rayner brings politics home to the reader’s backyard in plain language.

A government will never represent every single person. The day after an election, how do people feel who voted for a minority party and had their preferences crawl up the ladder to wind up putting one of the big two back in? How long will Australia thrive with only two major parties? Queenslander Russell Hinze said to Joh Bjelke-Peterson: “If you want the boundaries rigged, let me do it, and we’ll stay in power for ever. If you don’t do it, people will say you’re stupid” (p51). What does that famed “ordinary Australian” know about such workings?

The message is that an elected government cannot be the first and last word in the running of a democracy, we who vote the parties in must be able to hold them to account. There must be a separation of powers, an independent judiciary, an independent public service and security of tenure. If the steady erosion of our civil and human rights continues is our democracy going in the right direction? “Total power must never be concentrated in one place” (p64), says Rayner who recounts her experience in Latvia where state officials acted as if they were exempt from following the law.

The days when student lawyers were taught that UN treaties were unenforceable are over, an independent judiciary can call up a UN treaty as justification for a decision. Rayner says when this did happen, bureaucrats were stunned. Human rights as part of everyday life did not occur to them. Remember the apprentice who was set alight during the course of their work day? People who will never have to face being set alight during the course of their work day might roll their eyes when human rights are mentioned, for the apprentice and for those of us who read about him, justice was an imperative. “Human rights cannot be doled out by the powerful as a kindness to those who “deserve” them” (p.73).

The three parts of the book address the past, the present and the future of democracy. Part two, “A Wilting Democracy”, describes the signs of a healthy democracy and why we should be concerned when our voices are not heard or are over-ridden by economic considerations.

Rayner quotes US President Thomas Jefferson, who suggested the review of the constitution every 30 years to ensure its relevance. Approaching 100 years of age, the Australian Constitution is overdue for a review. Although we do have a constitution, those voted in to represent us are often so engrossed in the big picture they forget the local ramifications of their big picture decisions, alternatively, they know enough about the workings of government to use it to the community’s disadvantage. One former minister said he enjoyed giving long-winded answers because it prevented anyone else from asking questions. “By such strategies the all-important Question Time has become a travesty” (p.93).

The midnight sessions of Parliament in Victoria show the zeal with which new laws can be enacted, would the government meet with such gusto to pass through reforms “that are likely to subject their own..."
actions to closer scrutiny” (p.101). Rayner quotes Gough Whitlam who says that after his own ambush by the Governor-General, “no Prime Minister can ever afford to trust a governor-general again; (p.104). After WA Inc, where reasons for decisions in many cases were not documented, can anyone believe the party made an honest mistake? Did the 91% of people who thought politicians twisted the truth think twice about this affair?

Public servants, who leave paper trails wherever they gather, have faced the axe “in the name of efficiency” (p.113). Rayner argues that tenure protects the public service from political interference. As Commissioner for Equal Opportunity in Victoria, her explicit duty was to administer the Equal Opportunity Act; when she did this to the letter of the law her position was dissolved by the Victorian Government. What happens to laws the government in power does not like?

With the outsourcing of government contracts to private companies, where is the “commercial-in-confidence” line drawn. The public has a right to know how public funds are spent. Rayner says “The need for an independent, neutral public service is as great now as it was a century ago” (p.121). She quotes the story of Major Hills of the British Army who was ordered to repatriate prisoners he felt sure would be shot on their return. The moral dilemma that followed required a creative solution. In the end 200 of the thousands he began with were knowingly sent to their deaths.

Rayner says the “the whole principle of justice is polluted” without independent judges, “removable only by a fair, public, parliamentary process” (p.131). Without independent judges, Northland Secondary College could not have been re-opened. The Kennett government adamant that it was in the right viewed the decision purely as a financial one. Rayner says state governments can often initiate “new directions in political strategy and public policy, for good or for ill” (p.148). The failure of the Kennett government to close Northland Secondary College reminds the party in power that government is not just another money-making business representing the wealthy. Rayner remembers when “it was still quite novel for non-property owners to vote at all” (p.165). When the government focuses decision making on the free market, economic rationalisation and asks wage and salary earners to bear the tax burden what does democracy mean? When we vote in politicians we expect to lie to us what does our vote mean?

Politics used to be “White, Anglo-Celtic men’s business” (p.249). Parties with “hierarchical organisation, rigid membership structures and a mastery of meeting procedures” (p.250) flourished. Rayner says parties with these characteristics are not a movement of the people, the measure of good government is their concern for social not just financial well-being of the people. Rayner says “Governments have set their face against civil society, and actively discouraged citizens from becoming informed, egalitarian and active; we are all dwarfed by their neglect” (p.263).

Finally, when all else fails, look to a former politician’s attitude to independence of the media, Joh Bjelke-Petersen said in 1986, “The greatest thing that could happen to the State and the nation is when we get rid of the media. Then we could live in peace and tranquillity and no-one would know anything” (p.194).

ALL MEN BACK – ALL ONE BIG MISTAKE, by W.A. (Bill) Bee.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden, RAN

An odd title for a very interesting book. This is the story of young Signalman Bill (Buzzer) Bee, who served in the cruiser HMAS Perth at the Battles of the Java Sea and Sunda Strait and was later a Prisoner of War of the Japanese.

Following the sinking of Perth, and the cruiser USS Houston, in the Sunda Strait the story follows the adventures and misadventures of Bill Bee and the other Perth survivors as they are held captive in a variety of Japanese POW Camps. These include camps in Java, Singapore, Thailand, Burma (including their time spent on the infamous Thai – Burma Railway) Indo China and finally Japan where they were employed underground in Japanese coal mines.

The title of the book comes from a habitual saying of their Japanese overlords; when a planned move from one camp to another fails to eventuate due to some breakdown in the Japanese communication or logistics chain (a bit like the Australian version of “packs on, packs off – hurry up and wait”).

The book ends with Bee returning safely to his family home in Western Australia, however, over 100 of his comrades did not return – victims of untreated wounds received in battle, malnutrition, Japanese brutality or killed when their unmarked prison ships were sunk by Allied submarines or aircraft.

I found the authors style of writing very easy to read and the story captivating, no pun intended, and finished the 156 page book in a few hours. Although the story of Australian POW’s held by the Japanese
has been told several times before, both collectively and on an individual basis, the tales of the hardship they endured and their determination to survive never cease to amaze me.

Hesperian Press published this book and they have done a very good job in doing so. The book includes over 30 illustrations, mainly photo’s of HMAS _Perth_ and members of her crew and a folded map of South East Asia which is a copy of a Red Cross publication from World War II showing the location of Japanese POW Camps. An appendix lists the Ships Company of HMAS _Perth_ their final fate (i.e. killed in action at Sunda Strait, died as a POW, died since the end of the war, or still living).

I purchased my copy for $19.95 from a small bookstore in Western Australia (where the publisher and author are located), however; it may not be readily available on the east coast. The book is available from Hesperian Press PO Box 317 Victoria Park WA 6979 for $23.50 (which includes $3.50 postage and handling) or direct from the author, William Bee of 26 David St Mullaloo WA 6027. Payment in both cases is by cheque or money order.

WIRRAWAY TO HORNET: A history of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Pty Ltd, by Brian L. Hill, Southern Cross Publications, PO Box 420, Bulleen, Vic 3105. 1998, casebound, blue linen, gold lettering on spine, 180x155mm, x/294 pp. 117 b&w photos, 23 aircraft dwgs, 4 organisation charts, factory layout, 10 pages glossary, index, 10 pages aircraft and engine basic data, 9 pages profiles senior CAC people, list of CAC Board members. Cost $68.00.

Reviewed by Major General John Whitelaw

One does not need to be an aviation enthusiast to read this book - but it would help! The Author at the end, and looking to the future, quotes Santayana “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” This is a sad tale; sad for Australia. The CAC started with promise and more than a smattering of idealism in 1935; it was right for its time; it made a rapid significant contribution to Australia’s defence during the dark days of 1942-44 and onwards to the 1950s and 1960s then it started to fall apart.

Why was this so? Brian Hill tells us in detail. The narrative is splashed with “what may have been”, stories of opportunity lost, timing astray, conservative forces at work, indecision at the highest level, delay upon delay, everlasting enquiries, recommendations ignored. But through it shines the dedication, talent and sheer determination of such outstanding Australians as Essington Lewis and Lawrence Wackett together with a wonderful team of aeroplane designers and engineers who were patently “before their time”.

The opening and closing chapters which describe the circumstances of the founding of CAC and its lingering demise are of great interest and should be carefully noted by the Department of Defence and politicians involved with the equipment cycle of the Defence Force. They should heed Santayana’s aphorism.

Not a book for the faint hearted; but a valuable record of a little appreciated facet of our national story.

PORTLAND’S HISTORIC BATTERY (1889): Including the Western Artillery Corps (1866-1884) and the Portland Battery Garrison Artillery (1884-1904), by Gwen Bennett, printed by E. Davis & Sons, Portland, Vic. Card cover, 240x150 mm, 10 b&w photos, seven line drawings, iv/52 pp, nom roll personnel 1866-1904, Copies available from author, 43 Edgar Street, Portland, Vic 3306, $11 per copy incl. postage.

Reviewed by Major General John Whitelaw

This book is one of those little gems which one comes across every now and then. It is bursting with information about a little known facet of Australia’s military history even for those familiar with the history of colonial Victoria.

In this book we get quite a number of evocative photos of the colonial period, some of which could usefully respond to enhancement. The line drawings are well done and add much to the narrative, while the nominal roll of those who served has been painstakingly assembled from available records. It will be much appreciated by those people interested in genealogy or research into records of service of the Australian Commonwealth and Colonial forces.

There is an interesting, if brief, coverage of the formation of the Western Artillery Corps from 1866, which does not describe in any detail the political pressures leading to the allocation of, what were then, quite significant resources into a distant military venture. From there the story progresses to the building of the battery, emplacement of the guns and the continuing progress of the Artillery in Portland until closure of the Fort in 1904.

There are some delightful minor stories told about the guns themselves, including a wooden gun for training (what a wonderful item for a museum!), the
band, the Orderly Rooms and some redoubtable personalities.

This book is recommended for those interested in Australian and colonial history and those who wish to grasp something of the flavour of our military history.


Reviewed by Major General John Whitelaw

This is not a “military” history in the accepted sense. It does not deal with the wide sweep of events in the Pacific War, evaluate the decisions of commanders or examine strategy and tactics; but it does tell in a plain, straight forward fashion the story of a gunner regiment from formation in 1940 until disbandment at war’s end. The author has drawn skillfully on the official war diaries lodged in the Australian War Memorial, the memories of his comrades, their photographs and sketches, together with items from wartime news-sheets of the Regiment The Drum started in 1955 by the post-war regimental Association was also a valuable source.

Some 700 ordinary Australian men came together in 1940 at Puckapunyal to form one of the major units of the 8th Australian Division. They pooled their talents, skills and intelligence to build a regiment fit in all respects for operational service. They also achieved, although many would not have recognised it at the time, an exceedingly strong regimental spirit which was to stand them in good stead in adventures which lay ahead.

Firstly was their long and arduous service in Darwin under a perceived threat of Japanese invasion and enduring some 50 air raids. The loss of their companion units in the 8th Division in 1942 as the Japanese successively captured Malaya, Singapore, Ambon, Timor and New Britain was sorely felt by the Regiment, the sole remaining major combat unit of the Division. To mark this sad circumstance a perpendicular “break” was inserted in their colour patch to signify The Broken Eighth.

After re-equipment and training in NSW and Queensland, the Regiment embarked for New Guinea and operations with 5th Australian Division along the north coast of the Huon Peninsula to Alexishafen, then to Jacquinot Bay where the task was to isolate the very large force of Japanese in the Gazelle Peninsula. The Regiment again showed its reliability and ability in some sharp actions in the Open Bay and Wide Bay areas. The cessation of hostilities led to a period of garrison duty in Rabaul where, for the last time, the Regiment demonstrated its amazing “can do” attitude so carefully nurtured from those far off days in 1940. It returned home for disbandment in December 1945.

The Broken Eighth is an attractive, quality production with a “good feel” to it. It is a credit to Clipper Press and Ron Jackson. While it is sad that so many years have passed before this story has been told, I am sure that it will prove of much interest to the families of those who served and will bring back memories to those members still with us. It should also find a deserved place with the histories of other distinguished units of the Australian Army on the shelves of any military library.

THE THUNDER OF THE GUNS; A History of the 2/3 Australian Field Regiment, by Les Bishop, printed by Brown Prior Anderson, Burwood, Vic. Hard cover, 250 b&w photos, 1 colour page, 11 maps, xxvii/746 pp, nominal roll, roll of honour, lists of POW, wounded and awards (with citations), bibliography and index. Copies available from author 12 Wyralla Road, Yowie Bay, NSW 2228, $50.00 per copy (+$5.85 p&p).

Reviewed by Major General John Whitelaw

This book has been many years in the making, yet it deals with only six years in the lives of its many characters, both as individuals and collectively as part of one of the most notable regiments of the 2nd AIF.

It tells the story of how ordinary Australian young men from around the Commonwealth came together in their various troops and batteries for their “great adventure” during World War II. Their adventures in North Africa, Greece, Crete and New Guinea and described in vivid colour in large part from personal reminiscence, supplemented from War Diary and Official History sources, and enlivened by many personal photographs. It will surely please the survivors of this Regiment while serving as a memorial to those who have left us.

The difficulties, the rush of action, the fear, and the heartbreak at the loss or incarceration of their mates is told with sensitivity. The periods of training in various countries, some short and specifically objective, others long drawn out, the boredom, the rumours bring out the wry humour of the Australian soldier and give a good idea as to why he was
respected by friends and enemies for his soldierly qualities.

Les Bishop has produced a unit history which will prove of unfailing interest to those who shared in its making as members of the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment. They are fortunate to have a comrade with the imagination, skill and sheer perseverance to carry it to a successful outcome. Through it they will relive their years of war and their families will understand.

In the wider field of military history, this book does not contribute to our knowledge of the clash of nations, nor does it pretend to do so. But it does tell the story of how a diverse group of young Australians came together in 1939 and forged a strong and successful weapon of war. It will be a mine of information for future research, and in its own right is a unit history of considerable worth, exceedingly well illustrated and pleasingly presented. It deserves a place in any library of military history and will find a valued place on general library shelves.


Reviewed by Major General John Whitelaw

The authors of this book were kind enough to invite me to write the foreword so, “declaring my interest” I offer it in lieu of the traditional review.

“‘No six years of history has been more written about than 1939-1945.” These are the final words of John Keegan’s book The Battle for History. While the views of this eminent military historian are always worth attention we must be thankful that people like Reg Kidd and Ray Neal have seen fit to add to the quantum of our available knowledge. Their work will give pleasure to their surviving comrades and serve as a comprehensive guide to a little known aspect of Australia’s great effort in World War II for those who may care to research further.

This book is not about the broad sweep of grand strategy, it is about the endeavours of a wonderful lot of young Australians thrown together by the chances of war into 19 heavy batteries and three fire commands of the Royal Australian Artillery.

The entry of the Japanese into the war on 7 December 1941 gave sharp focus to the gaps in the arrangements for the coastal defence of many of our important ports. Before long it was also appreciated that coastal defences would be needed to protect our forward bases as the Allied forces held, and then pushed back, the Japanese. The solution was seen in acquiring guns, searchlights and associated equipment from the United States of America and forming mobile coast batteries which could be deployed to meet changing circumstances Reg Kidd and Ray Neal have delved assiduously into the records of the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Archives. They have consulted wisely and widely to unearth detail of each of these units in the years 1942-1945. The result of their work reveals fascinating insights into the difficulties encountered and surmounted, the months of isolation of both the batteries and their detached elements, of the growing “family feeling” within each battery, the establishment of a strong espirit de corps and above all the dedication of these young men in the service of their guns.

The last few years has seen a surge of interest in the history of Australian units during World War II. This has been partly due to the excellent “Australia Remembers” program in 1995, but also as Ray and Reg observe, because now the “old chaps” have had some time to look back and remember. We are in their debt for having done so and in particular the Royal Australian Artillery welcomes their endeavours as another enduring contribution to its history.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Alan Hinge, RAN

The Department of Defence’s procurement and project management of major equipment has been heavily criticised by the Australian National Audit Office and various parliamentary committees in recent years, and an obvious way of improving performance is to transmit to today’s project managers the lessons of what went right and what went wrong in projects. However, it is ironic that Defence appears to have made remarkably little effort to systematically pass on lessons learned. This is where Dr Paul Earnshaw’s book, Billion Dollar Business comes in as an outstanding and all too rare example of
comprehensive, objective analysis of Defence acquisition and project management – warts and all.

Rather than rely on project theory, Earnshaw takes a systematic, case study approach in order to illustrate significant lessons for acquisition strategy and project management. He examines three major capital acquisition projects in considerable detail – the Black Hawk Helicopter (largely managed by Air Force), the Army’s Perentie vehicle and the Navy’s Australian Frigate. The lives of these projects are traced from identification of requirement, through bureaucratic, political and committee approval processes and right into production. While all projects eventually delivered serviceable products, some fared worse than others in terms of cost and schedule blowout and from the perspective of defence/industry partnerships.

Overall, Black Hawk and Perentie emerged as seriously flawed projects in several aspects, with the Australian Frigate getting a “satisfactory” report card. Importantly, reasons for these assessments are spelled out in meticulous detail. For example, Army’s inability to justify to committees the number of vehicles it required was a key factor in what proved to be a dysfunctional acquisition process involving piecemeal ordering, disrupted production runs, assembly plant closures and dis-bandment of project teams. Similarly, the Black Hawk suffered from phased acquisition and attendant contract, cost and delivery problems. In both cases, the author emphasises the importance of Industry participating more fully in Defence acquisition processes.

Dr Earnshaw gives credit where it is due and points to key project success factors, many of which should be applied in the planning and source selection phase of projects. The Australian Frigate, for example, benefited enormously from research undertaken by the Defence Naval Destroyer Group (DNDG) which was established specifically to resolve a range of complex issues concerning follow on destroyer force requirements and acquisition.

Of particular interest to me is Chapter Seven (Decision Making Rationality) where, after describing each project in detail and then comparing them in the four previous chapters, the author seeks to clarify, as much as possible, the extent of rational decision-making in the three projects – this is important because non-rational decision making for new high-technology projects has resulted in notable planning disasters that we live with today. The author expertly traces the context of bureaucratic politics and suggests why committee players adopted particular positions from their apparent behaviours, perspectives on long-term strategic planning and “incremental bargaining tactics”.

Earnshaw frequently points to where fundamental improvements in defence decision making process can be achieved. For example, he suggests that, “… (a) system should be developed whereby ideological differences and values can be expressed and explored in relation to strategic capabilities required to meet national security objectives, and a far greater emphasis on research and appropriate resource allocation in the early planning stage. The relative success of the Australian Frigate...can be attributed to the unusually comprehensive research conducted by bureaucratic adversaries during the conceptual and project planning stage of that project, the extensive training and experience of successive project directors and pragmatic initiatives such as a two year delivery band...”.

While the three case study projects were completed in the late 1980s/early 1990s, their lessons are enduring value in terms of application to today’s acquisition and project management decision making. For example, Earnshaw reveals the poor economics of Black Hawk assembly in Australia (unit assembly time never got below 16,000 hrs – almost twice the US figure). This highlights the questionable nature of deciding on Australian assembly of penny packets of aircraft where skill levels will be quickly lost or degraded without real follow-on work (not simply maintenance contracts).

_Billion Dollar Business_ is a work of great value and sets a solid benchmark for the honest and objective evaluation of projects. It is essential reading for those who are serious about improving what is now generally accepted as Defence’s lack lustre performance in key aspects of major capital acquisition and project management.