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The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

Dear Editor,

I was doing quite well with D. Weir’s critique of Lieutenant Colonel Orme’s article (Letters, Australian Defence Force Journal No. 130, May/June, 1998), until I got to the last paragraph.

D. Weir was making some interesting and relevant observations, until he/she resorted to the cheap shot about “upwardly mobile military officers [satisfying] the word count requirements of their post-graduate studies”. Surely, D. Weir would recognise on reflection that any objective criticism he/she had made has been much diminished by such a silly, mean-spirited statement.

Further, as a teacher (in the broadest sense of the word), D. Weir might reflect that constructive criticism would always seem preferable to destructive criticism, particularly when the latter involves resort to ad hominem attack.

You have been too tolerant of D. Weir by printing his/her letter, dear Editor, but perhaps you intended it to serve as a bad example?

J. H. Robbins
Brigadier (Ret’d)

Dear Editor,

I found D. Weir’s pointed criticism of Lieutenant Colonel Orme’s article in your May/June 1998 edition to be quite one-sided and suggest that his use of Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers as the basis for this criticism to be rather narrow.

Mr Weir invokes Paul Kennedy’s views on global power relationships as if they were universally accepted among historians and international relations theorists. This is not the case. I therefore found his reliance upon Kennedy’s discourse on the relationship between a nation's economic capacity and its ability to project national power as a questionable basis for a convincing counter-argument to the views of Lieutenant Colonel Orme.

Put simply, Kennedy gets it wrong. As an historian, Kennedy failed to resist the temptation to get into the speculation game. In doing so, he opened himself up to being judged by history itself. Published in 1989, Kennedy’s study predicted, among other things, the relative decline of the United States as a “great power” and a low prospect for comprehensive political and economic reform in the Soviet Union!

Mr Weir draws upon Kennedy’s speculation that the world will continue to consist of “sovereign, egoistical nation-states” whose economic power will remain as the primary determinant of their status in the world order. In arriving at this conclusion, Kennedy failed to even acknowledge the existence of the neo-liberal perspective which posits the emergence of an incontrovertible trend towards globalisation as the basis for future international economic activity.

The neo-liberal economists argue that the international mobility of capital and the foreign investment practices of multinationals mean that state economies of the 1990s are no longer entirely nationally constituted and available for use at the disposal of the state. Thus the arguments of the economic liberalists are fundamentally at odds with Kennedy’s thesis that state power is determined by its Gross National Product.

Mr Weir obliquely criticised Lieutenant Colonel Orme for failing to read beyond Kennedy’s introduction. My criticism of Weir is that he fails to read beyond Kennedy.

Roger Wilkins

Dear Editor,

Your last edition (May/June) contained a letter from D. Weir in which he refuted Lieutenant Colonel Orme’s article on the relationship between intelligence and national security. I believe that Weir’s dim view of Orme’s reading of Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1989), to be quite justified. Weir’s contention that Orme “arbitrarily” elevated the status of national intelligence to that of economic capacity as a basis for national power, is also correct. One can only speculate as to the reasons for Orme’s curious claims.

Paul Kennedy argued that military power (which necessarily encompasses the function of national intelligence and security) “… that all the major shifts in the military power balances have followed alterations of the productive balances”. (p. 567).

Kennedy used this broad trend as a basis for speculation about a future global order. Although some of his predictions were wrong, and despite the contemporaneous rise in the fortunes of economic liberalism, it is fair to say that Kennedy’s opinion that the wealth of nations will continue to determine their strategic relevance has never been seriously or successfully challenged.
The accuracy of Weir’s criticism suggests that military officers should avoid being perceived to be engaging in biased historical analysis in order to suit their own limited agendas.

Victoria Hamilton

Kokoda Trail

Dear Editor,

I refer to the March/April 1998 edition of the Australian Defence Force Journal and, in particular, the book review of “Kokoda Trail – A Walk in Their Footsteps” by Flight Lieutenant (Ret’d) H. S. Brennan RFD JP.

Reference is made in the review to the well kept condition of Bomana War Cemetery. Readers may be interested in knowing that Bomana War Cemetery, one of three Commonwealth war cemeteries in PNG, contains the graves of over 3800 Australian and other allied war dead. All three cemeteries are cared for and maintained by the Office of Australian War Graves, on behalf of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Together with the cemeteries at Lae and Rabaul, Bomana War Cemetery will be maintained in perpetuity, commemorating the sacrifice of those who gave their lives on the Kokoda Track, or elsewhere in PNG, in defence of their country. Also to be found at each of the cemeteries is a Memorial to the Missing, recording the names of those casualties who died in battle but who have no known grave.

Our manager in PNG is a retired ADF member, Major Peter Ainslie, which will no doubt explain the well kept look of Bomana. However, over the coming months, extensive drainage work will be undertaken within the cemetery. While the cemetery will remain open to visitors during the work, anyone contemplating visiting Bomana during this time is asked to be aware that this disruptive work will be taking place.

This Office is able to provide information on the location of all Commonwealth war dead throughout the world, from both the first and second world wars. Anyone researching their family history can write to the Research Officer, Office of Australian War Graves, PO Box 21, Woden, ACT, and the above details will be provided. Photos of individual headstones from around the world can also be supplied but, depending on the location, may take some time.

For the benefit of Flight Lieutenant Brennan, and other readers, I enclose a colour photograph of Bomana, Lae and Rabaul (Bita Paka) War Cemeteries.

Finally, PNG authorities several years ago requested that the Kododa “Trail” revert to its original name and be known as the Kokoda “Track”. All official references, both in Australia and PNG, now reflect that request.

Kerry Hodge
Department of Veterans’ Affairs

Rabaul (Bita Parka) War Cemetery
Bomana War Cemetery

Lae War Cemetery
Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis?

By Major C.J. Shine

Reference: A. Restructuring the Australian Army (RTA), Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997

“The Army remains the problem. The whole focus of Army 21 and the reorganisation announced by the minister is on an ability to operate in Australia. …that organisational focus is simply wrong. Because the potential for future conflicts involving Australia’s interests is so extensive, so narrow a concept of operations for the Army possesses within itself the seeds of future crisis.”

Introduction

In October 1996, the Defence Minister, Mr Ian McLachlan, introduced into the Australian Parliament a plan to address the force structure, capability and manning balance of the future Army titled, Restructuring the Australian Army (RTA). RTA was the product of the “Army in the Twenty First Century Review” (Army 21), announced in the defence policy white paper of the previous Government, Defending Australia 1994 (DA94). While the Army 21 Review conformed to the established strategic guidance and defence policy parameters contained within DA94, RTA will be implemented in an environment of change to defence policy direction and strategic guidance emerging as a result of the change of Government in early 1996.

Alternative Themes in Australia’s Defence Policy History

Own Geography or National Interests? Two defence writers have recently reviewed the historical development of defence policy and thinking since Federation in 1901 to highlight two recurring and alternative themes in Australian defence policy. Major General Sir Edward Hutton originally identified the alternative policy aims of the “Australia First” and “Empire First” schools of thought in 1902. The defence historian Michael Evans uses Hutton’s arguments to trace the alternating prevalence of the “narrow” and the “broad” defence policy focus from Federation through to the 1990s. Evans defines these terms to mean primarily “national” and “international” in Australian defence policy focus, later simplified in usage as “continental” and “forward” defence.

The narrow view has promoted defence of Australia’s own geography and territory from invasion or attack as the priority for defence planning. Alternatively, the broad view has recognised the relationship between defence, diplomacy and national interests, promoting national security by the commitment of defence forces to international crises throughout the region and the globe.

Variables and Constants. Australian Government decisions to commit military forces suggest that the variables of international affairs and national interests inherent to the broad approach dominate over the geographically narrow approach to defence policy. As a constant, Australia has invariably committed to international coalitions of military forces in support of perceived national interests regardless of the task; fighting wars, peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. As noted by O’Connor, preoccupation with the defence of Australia’s territory has resulted in the defence force often being ill-prepared for the commitments Governments have made. History reveals that reorganisation and retraining have been required every time Australia has committed to a significant operation.

Policy Change. In general terms, current official defence policy (DA94) is a narrow approach. This is evident in the centrality of “self-reliance” as a military strategy prescribed for the “defence of Australia” relative to other defence interests such as regional engagement, alliances and global security issues. The base assumptions and methodology of the Army 21
Review 11 conformed to the policy approach of DA94. Although RTA modified some outcomes of the Army 21 Review, the base assumptions and key elements of RTA remain those of the Army 21 Review and thus also equate to a narrow approach. Changes to the structure of Defence Headquarters, the commissioning of a classified Strategic Review in 1997 and political statements made by the Defence Minister, suggest that a fundamental change in defence policy from a narrow to a broad approach is underway following the transition of political power from Labor to Coalition government. Policy change will result in change to strategic guidance with consequent affects on the ADF and the Army.

The dilemma of policy change for the Army is that RTA originated in a narrow policy environment but, given political change, it will be implemented in a broad policy environment. The opening quotation presents a salutary warning to the Army in relation to the force structure, doctrine and training initiatives inherent in RTA. There is a clear strategic risk that these elements are too limited to be appropriate for the nation’s security needs and too narrow to adequately meet future policy and strategic level guidance. In rigorously implementing the “defence of Australia” force structure inherent in RTA, the Army may become highly capable of performing the least of its likely future tasks. In short, to be “employable only in Northern Australia”, unlikely to be readily interoperable with the forces of established allies and regional neighbours, nor attuned to the actual military requirements of broad national interests. RTA imbalances in force structure and preparedness for support to Australia’s wider security interests may contain the “seeds of future crisis” for the Army and the nation.

Scope

The first part of this article outlines major aspects of defence policy, strategic guidance and RTA pertinent to the ensuing evaluation of the utility of RTA. The second part of the article proposes change to policy formulation, strategic guidance and key elements of RTA.

This article assumes familiarity with Australia’s geostrategic environment, the main elements of defence policy extant in DA94, and the implementation of RTA.

Defence Policy

Since the Vietnam War, Australia’s defence policy and strategic guidance has progressively developed within the independent conceptual framework of “defence self-reliance.” The high point of this development is accepted by some defence commentators to be the Labor Government’s policy of “self-reliance within a framework of alliances” detailed in Defence of Australia 1987 (DOA87). While DA94 maintained strategic guidance which placed the highest importance on the defence of Australia’s geography, the growing importance of ADF commitments to regional engagement and UN missions lead some writers to question whether Australia was developing a neo-forward defence policy in the post-Cold War 1990s.

Political Change

The Coalition Government has retained DA94 as official defence policy since its election in March 1996, but some policy changes in keeping with philosophical differences to the Labor Party have emerged. This is most apparent in the increased importance placed by the new Coalition Government on the US Alliance, regional engagement and in funding combat over support capabilities.

Strategic Guidance. Indicating significant change to strategic guidance in a 1997 speech entitled “Defending Australia’s Interests”, the Defence Minister rejected what he called “the defeatist… isolationist approach which would have us adopt a “fortress Australia” mentality.” Describing DA94 and DOA87 as “a narrow approach to the defence of Australia” he criticised their “emphasis in force structure planning on meeting low-level contingencies in northern Australia – rather than on preventing attacks from reaching our shores.” In a marked departure from the continental defence posture of DA94 he states:

“the ability to operate our forces beyond our shoreline, if necessary, is an essential objective for our national defence policy. We are seeking security in and with Asia, not against the countries of our region.”

This statement is supported by the observation that the Minister:

“has repeatedly signalled the importance of Australia being able to make a contribution to an expanded range of peacekeeping or enforcement actions by international coalitions.”

In other speeches, the Minister has referred to “a maritime focus for defence” and stated that in being
“serious about defence engagement, we cannot have a stay-at-home ADF.” 23 In “Defending Australia’s Interests” the Minister referred to the ADF’s role as an important regional “force for peace and stability” within a policy that “stresses the need for cooperation with friends and allies in the region.” Importantly, he forecast that new defence policy would openly take a broad rather than a narrow definition of Australia’s defence interests, stating:

“It is not our intention to mask the range of our policy interests. We want to have a rather more direct link between what our forces actually do, and what we say they do.” 25

**A National Security System**

**Defence Policy.** This review of defence policy under Labor and Coalition Governments illustrates the propensity and capacity of Australia’s political parties to alter defence policy based on variations in perception of military force. Simply put, Labor entrenched a narrowly focused continental defence policy during a 13 year term in Government. The Coalition, while accepting defence of territory as a primary responsibility, 26 appears to be taking an internationalist view of defence; outward looking and capable in accordance with perceived threats to broad interests regionally and globally. Defence policy and the ADF are properly subject to this change in philosophy as part of Australia’s democratic system, but the net effect over the post-Vietnam period has been significant alteration to national security capacity through significant change to defence policy. This suggests a systemic weakness in the national security planning system which has been raised by many defence commentators. 27

**Interests Based Planning.** Australia’s enduring security interests remain as they were before the Cold War: “seeing disputes resolved and a satisfactory power equilibrium struck at a distance, not on its shores.” Coherently linked defence and diplomacy, proceeding from broadly defined national interests to specific security interests, is permanently required in Australia’s approach to national security and defence policy. Once defined, security interests can be established in a hierarchy which in turn informs defence strategy and force structure needs, 29 such as those appropriate to the Army under RTA. This approach is important to defence planning because long acquisition lead times are required to develop defence capabilities. 30 Change to address this shortcoming is proposed in the second part of this article.

**Strategic Guidance**

Strategic guidance to the ADF under the Labor Government provided continuity and consistency in defence planning throughout its term of office. However, a number of aspects of strategic guidance flowing from defence policy illuminate deficiencies inherent in RTA. The length of this article limits full discussion of the policy objectives, force structure priorities, threat assessments, military strategy and funding difficulties of DA94 which flow through into RTA.

The key aspect of strategic guidance in DA94 relevant to evaluation of RTA is its narrow military strategy for the defence of Australia. DA94 prescribes for Australia a continental defence strategy with a maritime focus on Australia’s northern approaches, in level military threat of short warning conflict (SWC). 31 This form of conflict is assessed to be based on existing regional capabilities and to involve raids and other harassing military actions affecting infrastructure or population bases in the sparse north of the continent. DA94 elevates this military strategy as the force determinant for ADF capabilities but in the proper context of Australia’s security interests in international affairs, defence of the continent itself should be considered the last operational resort for deployment of the ADF, not the first. 32 Australia’s security interests originate in complex international security relationships and power balances which do not have immediate connection to Australia’s island territory. Without a contiguous land border to any other country fuelling territorial ambitions or conflict, there appears to be little strategic imperative for Australia to adopt a continental military strategy. 33

**Impact on the Army**

The cumulative impact on the Army of a narrow policy focus on defence of Australian territory since 1987 has been threefold:

a. a progressive yet fundamental philosophical shift in training and doctrine towards operations within Australia, 34
b. physical relocation of significant personnel strength to northern Australia under the Army Presence In the North (APIN) program, 35 and
c. a drive to structure and equip the future Army to meet the SWC scenario in northern Australia (the Army 21 Review and RTA).
Organisational Focus. The Army’s organisational focus and military capability can be seen to have narrowed in conformity with extant defence policy over time. Arguably, despite high capital expenditure and ongoing operating costs, the APIN program has not increased the Army’s generic combat capability over what existed before the APIN program commenced. If it is accepted that SWC is at the lowest end of the conflict intensity spectrum, defence policy has clearly decreased the Army’s combat capability through emphasis on the defence of Australia scenario. Significant training and preparedness implications, affecting Australia’s ability to contribute to alliance obligations and to adequately share capability burdens with allies in potential international conflicts involving Australia’s interests, have arisen from the Army’s focus on northern Australia. A major conclusion from the Army’s participation in the ABCA conventional warfighting exercise Cascade Peak 1996 echoed this point:

“Had 1 Brigade concentrated (staff training) only on short warning conflict for the last two years, as it had for many years prior to 1995, it would have been incapable of performing at anything like the standard required in this important activity, and the credibility of the Army as a whole would have been in question.”

Alliance and Other Obligations. DA94 asserts that Australia’s other operational obligations, such as alliance training and interoperability, regional and global coalition operations or United Nations (UN) deployments, are sufficiently met by the unique force structure, equipment and training priorities of a continental defence strategy. That the Army retains “dual capability” to adequately meet both defence of Australia and other commitments is questionable given the limited diversification possible due to its small size, lack of force projection capability and logistic sustainability. Increased reliance on civil infrastructure through strategic guidance has reduced the Army’s international deployability and increasingly tied its operational capability to the defence of Australia task. Army’s strategic plan for the future, RTA, was developed in the context of this policy and strategic guidance.

Objectives. The key objectives of RTA is to provide a “long-term force structuring vision” for the Army. In general terms, RTA provides this through an integrated full-time/part-time force consisting of modern, high mobility task forces and units, capable of autonomous operations of a widely dispersed and dynamic nature. Restructuring to this force is to be achieved by a “graduated and incremental approach” incorporating trial and development of key concepts for conducting military operations in Australia. The key land force capabilities defined by RTA “to operate in concert with the combat elements of the other Services in the execution of a joint strategy for the defence of Australia” are detection, protection and response capabilities. In turn, these lead to a high capability emphasis for the Australian Army on reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, defensive forces to protect infrastructure assets and adequate mobility and firepower capabilities for response to hostile forces.

Plan. The RTA force model establishes an Army structure of seven “Task Forces” (of brigade size) with additional specialist units. These are allocated to specific geographic regions of northern Australia with a response force retained in reserve. A three to five year trial process is established to confirm force structure and personnel options (such as a “revitalised” reserve force) prior to implementation of the findings across the remainder of the Army over time up to 2010. The process aims to “create an Army in which structural and technological adaptation is regarded as an essential norm.” As an implementation philosophy, gradual modernisation and adaptation has much to recommend itself as changes to military technologies and Australia’s strategic circumstances emerge. Importantly, the “change culture” engendered by RTA provides a legitimate framework for modification or adjustment of the RTA plan itself where change to policy or strategic guidance requires it.

Components of the Plan. Important components of the plan are:

a. The “revitalisation of the reserve” through increased allocation of resources, improvements
to capability and integration of part-time personnel across the Total Force. This portion of the plan proceeds on the assumption that SWC on Australia’s territory is the most likely scenario for deployment of the Army and has primacy over other potential operational tasks.

b. A shift from the traditional Corps/Division structure of armies towards “flatter and more responsive” structures that are equipped, trained and focused for independent and dispersed operations over specific regions of north Australian terrain. The Army’s structural ability to mass tactical combat capability by the effective concentration of multiple formations in a conventionally restricted Area of Operations is to be reduced.

c. Interoperability and standardisation of RTA structures, doctrine and training with allies and emerging regional partners is accorded a low priority.

The Defence Minister’s introduction to Reference A states that “the Army plays an essential role both in plans for the defence of Australian territory and in possible contributions overseas.” However, only the defence of Australian territory part of this equation is evident in the methodology and force structure modelling used as the basis of RTA. Hence there is a serious imbalance between the essence of RTA which conforms to the previous Government’s narrow strategic guidance and the demands of current political direction. This flaw in RTA informs the following evaluation of its utility to broad strategic guidance, noting as mentioned earlier that change to refocus RTA is inherent in the philosophy of the plan itself.

Defence of Australia’s Geography

The threat model used in RTA is derived from DA94 and implicitly acknowledges a low probability of actual military threat to Australia. A more realistic appraisal of the strategic environment suggests that potential sources of disruption to international power balances and therefore Australia’s security interests are rather more likely to occur initially in Australia’s immediate and neighbouring regions than through attacks on its territory. The utility of restructuring, equipping and training the Total Force for a “small” threat with a low probability of eventuating, rather than focusing the Army for the more likely international destabilisations that may initially affect Australia’s security interests is questionable. While military threats to Australia remain non-identifiable, a more prudent starting point for force structure determination than territorial integrity would be to structure ADF capabilities to the range of possible security contingencies facing the nation; provided that the capability decision making process itself is focused and prioritised.

Employment of Reserves

Army’s resourcing and administration of the integrated employment of reserves into a Total Force proceeds from the enormity of the task of defending Australia’s territory. A military strategy appraised against the likelihoods of possible contingencies affecting Australia’s security interests and economically affordable combat capabilities, may not warrant such resource and planning focus on reserve forces in Australia’s foreseeable geostrategic circumstances. Less resource intensive options for providing defence of Australian territory may be based on special forces and strategic strike assets. This may represent a more appropriate response in terms of the “economy of force” principle of war for the ADF in long term peace. Unlike Australia, maintenance of large numbers of trained reserve forces is mostly appropriate where a nation lives with the expectation of frequent high intensity conflict.

A major reform of the US Army has been to remove Reserve forces from critical combat/manoeuvre readiness tasks. In short, the US has reinforced the concept of separating regular and reserve manpower at the unit level (though it has developed integrated formations and specialist reservists in lower readiness force categories). In RTA, Australia may be going against the tide of US experience and against anecdotal evidence of its own difficulties in long term maintenance of a strong and capable Reserve force.

Interoperability/Regional Focus

An RTA focus on defence of continental Australia may detract from Australia’s ability to contribute future interoperable land forces of “world’s best” calibre to coalition warfare or peace/humanitarian tasks. Under RTA, development of the Army is not deliberately planned to be in concert with allies under existing military force standardisation agreements (the ABCA Armies program). Although Australia has traditionally maintained units with comparable combat capability to allies and emerging regional partners, in RTA this expedient strategic planning principle appears only to be an afterthought as concluded following Australia’s
participation in Exercise Cascade Peak 1996. In this aspect RTA is a radical departure from Australia’s military heritage which may only serve to elevate the role of uncertainty in defence and security planning. The assertion that RTA will meet the expectations of allies while proceeding to develop an internationally unique force structure model based on narrow assumptions pertinent mainly to Australia’s geography is questionable.

Utility

RTA offers a vision for the future Australian Army distorted by the prism of preoccupation with northern Australia. Significantly in this context, RTA appears to have emerged without full and integral consideration of the logistic support required to support the operational concept for defence of Australia. It has not been informed by or subjected to, wide professional or public debate and may therefore be seen to lack veracity. In an uncertain security environment, an Army narrowly focused on a single indigenous scenario may be too readily poised for defeat in actual conflict when a different situation arises; the seeds of future crisis.

Importantly, the “RTA Trials” period is designed to prove new concepts and technologies before Army-wide implementation. With RTA clearly straddling a period of transition from narrow to broad in policy and strategic guidance, its utility may lie in the “change culture” it has unleashed into contemporary thinking on force structure, doctrine and training for the future Army, rather than in the immediacy of the particular force model it nominates.

Policy Level Change

A Coordinated Approach to Security. Defence planning should be formalised as one component of a national security system compatible with Australia’s multidimensional security needs. The related departmental interests of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Immigration and others should be overseen and coordinated within clearly established national security priorities. A similar staff to the United States National Security Council as a permanent organisation within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet may address this current shortcoming in security policy machinery. Under this proposal, the basis for defence policy would be upgraded from temporary political stewardship (with “biparti-sanship” at best), to firmly established national security principles that guide government defence policy formulation.

Change to Strategic Guidance

Strategic guidance should coherently link defence and diplomacy as key policy tools of Australia’s international interests. Security interests once defined, can then be established in a hierarchy which in turn informs the military strategy and force structure needs important to the acquisition lead times required to develop defence capabilities. Cognisant of the official Strategic Review underway at the time of writing, the following “broad” approach to defence policy is proposed as a realistic framework for strategic guidance relevant to Australia’s strategic circumstances:

a. International Focus. Australian defence policy, as an integrated element of a multidimensional approach to security, should reflect readiness to commit the ADF to support national security interests in international affairs as its first priority. This approach integrates “strategic warning” with actual defence posture. It would provide a direct link between geostrategic reality, force structure and ADF preparedness. An international focus accepts the notion that Australia seeks “security in and with Asia, not against it.” It would lift the ADF’s strategic gaze outwards with a focus on shaping and preserving a secure regional and global environment for Australia’s national interests. To migrate towards this focus, two current aspects of policy need to undergo rhetorical shift in meaning or emphasis:

1. Defence Self-Reliance. DA94 interprets “self-reliance” as the independent defence of national territory against armed attack. In contrast, “self reliant defence” can be reinterpreted to infer broad strategic freedom of action. This concept may be based on two components; first, the national agility to act or respond to international affairs derived from Australia’s range of traditional and emerging alliances and strategic partnerships. Secondly,
the defence national support base, including the range of inherent government, industry and community dimensions of that support.

2. **Defence Posture Statement.** The extant defence posture; “self-reliance within a framework of alliances” is an awkward statement of “how” defence is organised. An international focus in defence policy would state “what” defence is for, or “what” it should achieve, rather than “how” this is done. A suggested defence posture statement with this outwards orientation is; “Defence readiness for the security of Australia through support to national, regional and global interests.”

b. **Alliances.** As a byproduct of an international focus, alliances and military interoperability should be a primary, rather than secondary, consideration in defence policy and strategic guidance. Established interoperability in structures, procedures and training may ease the friction of future operational deployments with allies. In turn this may raise the level of deterrence provided by the ADF against regional aggression or action that may curtail Australia’s shared interests with allies.

c. **SWC and the Defence of Australia.** The term short warning conflict should be de-linked from the single concept of defending Australian territory. The term itself implies the rapidity with which international crises and events of widely differing scale, intensity and importance to Australia’s interests may emerge. Given the strength of Australia’s geostrategic position, the probability of SWC involving the requirement to directly defend Australia’s territory must be less than SWC in wider international affairs affecting Australia’s interests. Thus defence of Australia’s territory becomes one example of a broad range of possible SWC’s requiring military action or response. The alternative term “short warning crises” covering both national and international dimensions is suggested to more accurately describe the nature of future likely commitments of the ADF to other than deliberately planned military operations.

d. **Framework of Interests.** A flexible framework based on an appreciation of national interests requiring military action and likelihoods of threat to these interests should form the basis of Australia’s military strategy. Implicit in this notion is a “most likely” and “most dangerous” planning approach. Under this approach, international coalition operations would be considered the most likely threat and direct attacks on Australian territory would be considered the least likely, but most dangerous, threat. Current force and reserve capabilities, structures, doctrine and training should reflect this descending priority.

e. **Force Structure Determinants.** A “broad” defence policy fusing an international focus, Australia’s alliance obligations and national security interests into a military strategy suggests that capabilities, including the force readiness of the ADF, should be determined on the following principles:

1. **The Range and Likelihood of Probable Contingencies.** Defined national security interests and probable contingencies impacting upon them can be readily assessed within the strategic warning system. The standard planning principle of maintaining high current readiness and capability for those considered most likely and reduced or reserve capability for those least likely should apply. The requirements for direct defence of Australian territory under this rationale would be considered unlikely and of low priority in relation to broad security interests. Because of its “danger” however, it should be allocated a slice of force readiness mixed with reserve capability for adequate response.

2. **Coalitions.** Because of their higher short term likelihood, the standing force should be structured and planned to contribute to short warning crisis coalition actions as a primary consideration. For the Army as an example, this may be assessed as an upper limit of one brigade sized formation with supporting combat and logistic elements. Expansion or mobilisation of greater force should be linked to the integrated strategic warning/defence posture focus proposed earlier.

f. **Funding.** Defence strategic planning must accept the reality of funding restrictions and develop an achievable military strategy contained within funding limits. The enormity of the ADF’s current primary task, defending the territory of a continent, persistently challenges the cap on funding and may represent a defence funding crisis in its own right.

**Change to RTA**

“To play a part in shaping our strategic future we need to be an active participant, not just a spectator. A narrow perspective on Australia’s security focused solely on continental defence would sell us short.”
RTA’s shortcomings in meeting “broad” strategic guidance suggest that change is required. This should occur under the imperative of formal change to defence strategic guidance to provide a balanced force based on the existing strengths of the Army as modified by RTA. The following key elements are proposed for change to RTA.

**Defence of Australia.** It can be accepted from the Army 21 Review that the Task Force quantities, dispositions and structures derived for the defence of Australia in SWC is that required for the “most dangerous” scenario. Given the hierarchy of realistic contingencies affecting Australia’s interests and their likelihoods discussed earlier, the low probability of SWC on Australian territory suggests that this contingency should be reprioritised within the ADF and the Army as a single task rather than as a force determinant. Existing surveillance assets, such as Over the Horizon radar and in-place Regional Force Surveillance Units, supported by Special Forces, Joint strategic assets and a reserve land force of brigade size, may provide both adequate deterrence and sufficient initial force for a graduate response to achieve the task. Northern Command in Darwin provides an appropriate existing headquarters for coordination. Further study to develop such a measured and low-priority approach is required.

**The Total Force**

General Baker, then the Chief of the Defence Force stated that the ADF under the Defence Reform Program, would reduce to about 50 000 full-time personnel by the year 2000. This is likely to comprise a reduced full-time army component of approximately 20 000 personnel. It follows that the Army must focus and select its core expertise and capabilities carefully and to balance the full-time/part-time force mix cognisant of the likely range of contingencies that may threaten Australia’s security interests. RTA should ensure that deployable readiness for short warning crisis in support of Australia’s international interests primarily resides in a well manned, trained and technologically equipped full-time force with existing reserve backup forces and a reliable expansion base for longer term conflict. This was the original rationale for raising the Australian Regular Army in 1947 and it remains a valid rationale for the future.

Reprioritising the defence of Australian territory as a single task within a framework of security interests obviates the imperative for RTA to “revitalise the reserve” and to integrate it into a Total Force Army. RTA should affirm the benefit of maintaining separate full-time and part-time formations to meet short warning crises and long-term conflicts respectively. Reductions in the number of poorly resourced part-time formations and units may be a more effective option to reduce the current “hollowness” in the Army’s structure than the large scale full-time/part-time integration proposed under RTA. The following specific changes to RTA are proposed to achieve that capability focus in the Army:

a. **Regular Army.** The regular army of 20 000 should be focused on modern combat capability and readiness for likely contingencies. Rather than fundamentally change Army’s force structure, RTA should modernise and incrementally upgrade capabilities from the existing sound combat base. The two existing regular deployable brigade formations (mechanised and light infantry) with appropriate special, combat and logistic support forces appear to provide credible international deployability for the likely range of contingencies facing Australia’s interests. An area for further development is integral force projection, essential for the credibility and sustainability of ADF deployments.

b. **Army Reserve.** RTA plans seven integrated formations to meet defence of Australia tasks of which five are envisaged to be raised from the current reserve. RTA should reduce the quantity and tasks of reserve formations in order to increase the capability and resources available to the remaining regular force and reserve formations. An extant reserve force of three Task Forces is proposed to meet the requirements of Australia’s geostrategic needs. Of these, two reserve Task Forces should mirror the mechanised and light infantry roles of the two regular Task Forces. One motorised Task Force would provide “defence of Australia” expertise and readiness. This would provide a readily achievable force gradually derived from the current structure, balanced to meet likely contingencies and structured to maintain long term viability through depth (in selected capabilities) and balanced geographic dispositions across the nation.

c. **Individual Emergency Reserve (AIER).** Increased reliance on the Individual Emergency Reserve, appears an economical and practical method of providing for a long-term expansion base in a benign strategic environment. Reductions in standing part-time formations may be offset by exploiting the full potential of the AIER scheme.
Policy and Strategic Guidance. Under a new government, defence policy and strategic guidance to the ADF is changing from the narrow approach to defence of Australia’s territory to a broad approach primarily focused on supporting Australia’s interests in international affairs. This article has evaluated the utility of RTA against that changing backdrop and highlighted the interrelated nature of defence policy, strategic guidance and the utility of single service plans such as RTA. Systemic weaknesses in defence policy formulation and extant strategic guidance identified in this article have contributed to the shortcomings inherent in RTA. The following concluding points are pertinent to extant defence policy and strategic guidance:

a. Defence planning needs to be coordinated as one component within an overall approach to national security to provide enduring security principles across interrelated Government departments. Long-term national principles for defence policy and strategic guidance relevant to Australia’s geostrategic circumstances should be established to guide ADF strategic planning.

b. The base principles and planning assumptions of extant defence policy and strategic guidance need a fresh approach to account for inherent strategic weaknesses, Government change to a “broad” defence policy and domestic funding restrictions on defence spending.

c. The military strategy for the “defence of Australia” in DA94 and DOA87 is a narrow interpretation of national interest based on defence of territory from invasion. It has lead to a fundamentally narrow and inflexible rationale for force structuring in the ADF and the Army. This rationale is not well suited to the “broad” approach to defence adopted by the new Government and it requires change. The “defence of Australia” should be reprioritised as a single defence task rather than a force determinant, given the low likelihood of such a contingency among the range of Australia’s national security interests.

d. Defence policy and strategic guidance which provides for a small, balanced, technologically capable and affordable defence force with a primarily international focus, backed up by the strength of interoperability and development in concert with allies, should negate defence preoccupation with Australia’s geography. A more sound philosophical basis for progressing RTA than the imperative to defend Australian territory may thereby be established.

The Army. RTA originated from the narrow military strategy of DA94. Its aim to primarily structure and equip the future Army with standardised Task Force maximises the Army’s capability against threats to continental Australia but may sell it short in readiness for other crises affecting Australia’s interests including coalition warfare, regional instability and other short term emergencies. It is therefore best seen as a force structure vision providing one solution to a specifically determined threat, rather than providing an Army of balanced and diverse readiness for a range of likely short term crises, with affordable provision for longer term developments.

Reappraisal and refocussing of key elements of RTA is required for the Army to be relevant to broad political and strategic guidance from Government. The following conclusions are made on the Army and RTA:

a. The Army needs to adjust to the imperatives of new broad political and strategic guidance by incorporating an international focus as a primary consideration in its structure, equipment, doctrine and training orientation.

b. The current emphasis in RTA towards defence of Australian territory, should be adjusted towards capability and readiness for contribution to Australia’s interests in international affairs and interoperability with allies as primary considerations.

c. The Army should be prepared to allocate specific forces including special and reserve forces, to a reprioritised single joint task for the “defence of Australian territory.”

d. The utility of RTA lies in the “change culture” it seeks to engender in the organisation rather than in the specific force structure model proposed by it. The “RTA Trials” period provides a sound framework for managing future organisational change to achieve an Army culture and structure that is successfully aligned with a broad approach to Australia’s defence.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a. at the political level an appropriate staff be instituted to provide a coordinated approach to
national security across interrelated Government departments
b. defence planning be formalised as one component of a coordinated and multidimensional approach to national security founded on established national interests and specific security interests
c. Australia’s change to a “broad” defence posture and strategic guidance be formally clarified by the issue of appropriate new policy documents. A suggested defence posture is: “Defence readiness for the security of Australia through support to national, regional and global interests”
d. a concept be developed for the defence of continental Australian territory as a specific task, commensurate with its low likelihood as a defence contingency. This concept should be based on strategic surveillance assets, in-place RFSU’s, special forces, strategic strike assets and one motorised Task Force
e. the Army change force structure aspects of RTA as outlined in this article to provide an international capability-based force rather than a specific threat-based force focused on operations within Australia. This should comprise:
1. a core of two full-time Task Forces (one mechanised and one light infantry) with supporting special, combat and logistic support forces
2. three part-time Task Forces to provide standing backup to the regular force. Of these, two Task Forces should mirror the roles of the core force and one motorised Task Force should provide “defence of Australia” expertise and
3. expansion to meet long term conflicts or the “most dangerous” threat to Australian territory by thorough exploitation of the AIER scheme.
f. doctrine and training within the Army be reassessed to ensure an appropriate balance in content between “defence of Australia” operations and broader alliance and regional interests that may require future Australian Army contributions.

guidance”, while not officially defined, is taken to mean an amalgam of political direction and military strategic concepts for employment of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
5. M. Evans, op cit, pp.123-125, draws on Hutton’s 1902 “Minute upon the Defence of Australia” and other sources to establish the origins of alternating themes in Australian defence policy.
6. M. Evans, op cit, p.123 Preoccupation with the “narrow” generally coincides with periods of peace (pre-1914, 1920-30’s and 1972 to the present) and implementation of the “broad” with the major World Wars and the extended tension of the Cold War until Australia’s withdrawal from Vietnam.
7. This has become evident in the post-Cold War environment. Australia has committed the ADF to numerous United Nations or coalition force operations since 1990, including the Gulf War, Somalia and Rwanda.
10. DA94, op cit, p.14 states that under defence self-reliance, “our highest defence priority is to build, maintain and support forces for the defence of Australia. By this we mean specifically that we should be capable, without combat assistance from other countries, of defeating any attack which could credibly be mounted against Australia. This task determines the capabilities we require in the Australian Defence Force” (Authors italics).
11. These are outlined in Reference A, pp.10 and 13-20.
12. Reference A, p.iii.
14. M. Evans, op cit, p.133.
15. For discussion of this evolution see Dibb, P., Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat: A Model for Middle Powers, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, Canberra, 1996.
16. For discussion of this view see Cheesman, G., “Back to ‘Forward Defence’ and the Australian National Style”, in Cheesman G. and Bruce R. (Eds), Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War, Allen and Unwin, St Leonard’s, Sydney, 1996.
17. See for example Cheesman, ibid, p.252.
18. The Coalition views state power and security through bilateral alliances as keys to foreign policy whereas the Labor Party tempers this view with a defensive emphasis and the promotion of global ethical behaviour. See S. Burchill, Australia’s International Relations, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 1994, pp.6-9.
21. ibid, p.5.
22. Restructuring the Australia Army, Ministerial Statement, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Canberra, 15 October 1996.


25. ibid, p.4. (Author’s bold)

26. ibid, p.2.


29. O’Connor, op cit, p.10.


31. DA94, op cit, pp.24-25.

32. O’Connor, op cit, p.12.

33. See Sen Ray, R., “The Strategic Imperative of the Move to the North” in Horner, (Ed), Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 1990’s, pp.229-38. Only the historical fact of Japanese aggression against north Australia in 1942 (a scale of world conflict unlikely to be repeated) and the economic imperative of ADF “contributions to capital works in the area which will mean jobs and revenue for the north”, are given as the basis of policy focus on northern Australia.

34. In operational training, the Kangaroo series of exercises have been based on this narrow policy focus. In doctrine and general training for example, ADFP Operations Series – Doctrine and Army’s Manual of Land Warfare (MLW) Series, such as “Formation Tactics” and “Logistics in Support of Operations”, use the military for the defence of Australia as the selection criteria for their content.


37. “Generic combat capability” may be measured in terms of numbers and types of Army units and/or specialist combat equipments on its inventory for warfighting tasks.


39. DA94, op cit, p.15.


42. ibid, p.10.


44. ibid, p.1.


47. Reference A, Chapter 13.

48. ibid, p.104.

49. ibid, p.101.

50. ibid, p.101.

51. See Reference A, p.54. Under the “core concept for operations”, “embedding” specialist assets such as armour, aviation and fire support in Task Force groupings is proposed specifically because “the size of northern Australia and the impact of the dispersion of forces” militates against the timely regrouping of assets from pre-allocated tasks to new specific task. Embedding is contrary to orthodox military practice where scarce assets are retained centrally and allocated to units/formations when required by specific tasks. This is a clear example of how the “defence of Australia” military strategy has influenced force structuring plans in RTA.

52. ibid. This aspect rates only a brief mention on p.74 of the Reference.

53. ibid, p.116. (Author’s italics emphasise the “broad” policy approach taken by the Minister. In this interpretation, the Army only “plans” the defence of Australia [because attacks against Australia are believed to be remote] while “possible contributions overseas” are more likely and are given positive status and a higher priority).

54. ibid, p.10.

55. ibid, p.16. “Notional adversary capabilities” are described as limited in scope to “concurrent operations by a number of special forces across northern Australia possibly supported by terrorist actions in other areas” or possibly a “unit sized landing into a population centre.” See Brown, op cit, p.19-24 for discussion of the potential for low level threats or raids on Australia. While not completely discounting the likelihood of such threats arising he states, “the more substantial the threat, the less probable it is it will materialise, and the longer its lead time in any case.”

56. For example, Lim and McLennan, op cit, p.267-275 assess China as the major beneficiary of the Cold War outcome; no longer pinned down by the Soviet Union, holding strategic ambitions and willing to use force. Possible future conflict due to breakdown in the East Asian balance of power involving the key powers, China, Japan, United States and Korea would become manifest in SE Asia. Hence these writers evaluate “the emerging balance of power in East Asia as the critical factor shaping Australia’s strategic security” with implications for alliance management and regional security “based on application of interests.”

57. This is a major element of the “DRP” changes to Defence Management introduced in 1997. Historically it is enlightening to note that the Dibb Review of 1986 and the Government’s subsequent policy, DOA87, promoted the “defence of Australia” concept mainly as a mechanism to “discipline” and give “intellectual rigour” to the ADF force structure process. This was viewed as necessary by Defence Minister Beazley to break the Defence bureaucratic log jam in forward defence planning which had persisted for the decade or so after the Tange Review of 1973. See Dibb, P., op cit, pp.9-10.

58. DA94, op cit p.73.

59. ABCA Exercise Cascade Peak 96, op cit, p.19. One of the key lessons learned by the United States in responding to the “short warning” Gulf War conflict was the difficulties posed in mounting a timely and adequately supported military response when that response incorporated reserve elements on long call-up notices.

60. See Hartley, J., “Army’s Future Plans/Strategy” in Dennis and Grey (Eds), Serving Vital Interests: Australia’s Strategic Planning In Peace and War, op cit, pp.148-9 for a description of the US Army Force XXI and British Army BA2000 projects. Unlike RTA, both are based on global/regional force projection across a wide spectrum of military contingencies.

61. It is worth quoting from the Australian Brigade Commander’s report in ABCA Exercise Cascade Peak 96, op cit, p.18. He states: “If the probability of engaging in coalition warfare is
more likely than a Defence of the North scenario, as must be the case in any reasoned appreciation, then the type of structures encountered by 1 Bde during (the exercise) must be used to inform the process of force structure about to be embarked on by the Australian Army. To restructure that part of the Army that is likely to be sent to conduct coalition warfare so that (its) units are optimised for a specific level of warfare in a specific geographical location, would be to strike at the very heart of interoperability and credibility. I cannot overstate this observation as a conclusion from Ex Cascade Peak.” (Author’s italics).

62. Hartely, op cit, p.148. In contrast, the US Army under Force XXI is moving from a threat-based structure (anti-Soviet) to a capability-based Army, concentrating on power projection and the proliferation of new threats, missions and coalition partners in likely future crises.

63. CGS Directive 7/96, op cit, refers to the requirement for completion of the Army 21 Log Review.

64. Evans, M., op cit, p.137.


66. Brown, op cit, pp.159-167. Also, Coalition Defence policy at the 1996 election detailed these shortcomings and proposed formation of a National Security Committee of Cabinet and Secretaries to address this weakness. Implementation has not provided the staff independence identified by Brown as essential to the enforcement of compliance between various departmental policy aims. It therefore probably does not go far enough to alleviate the concerns expressed here.

67. DA, p.166 outlines the strategic warning function of the “Strategy and Intelligence Program” of Defence.

68. DA94, p.25. Defence “posture” means the combination of defence policy and military strategy.

69. McLachlan, op cit, p.4.

70. As put by O’Connor op cit, p.12, Australia should develop a military strategy to suit the philosophy rather than persisting with the current military strategy which presumes the loss of Australia’s strategic environment and its’ interests within it. As O’Connor states: “Australia’s defence priority ought to be directed towards preserving the strategic glacial rather than assuming its loss.”

71. Lim and McLennan, op cit, pp.267-268, consider the policy of “self-reliance within a framework of alliance” pursued by the Labor Government of 1983-96 to be prudent domestic politics but a “conscious ambiguity” justified by the ambivalence of Labor’s constituency towards the reality of Australia’s military dependency on the US.

72. Apart from the enhanced security of alliances and the historical constant of all ADF and Army deployments of the twentieth century having been in coalition with existing allies and other nations, there are considerable cost benefits to be gained by elevating interoperability with allies to primary consideration. For example, alliance compatible equipments rather than indigenously developed ‘capital’ equipments may reduce significant on-costs in repairs and maintenance to major naval and air platforms and some land warfare equipments.

73. DA94, Chapter 4.

74. The term “short warning conflict” has a more literal meaning which is not applied under DA94 or RTA. The 1990 Gulf War arose with “short warning” as did the ADF’s participation in the regional peacekeeping task at Bougainville (Operation Lagoon) in 1994 and numerous UN deployments since 1989. International diplomatic crises and events requiring an actual commitment of a military response by Australia such as Namibia in 1989, Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 do occur at “short warning.”

75. Lim and McLennan, op cit, pp.267-275. Examples would be sudden conflict on the Korean Peninsula or in the Middle East. Both of these potential crises may affect Australia’s trading interests with major partners, South Korea and Japan. Quick restoration of the security status quo in these examples would be required in Australia’s interest. As such, ADF contribution to resolution of the conflict may be ordered by Government.

76. Capacity for response to unexpected contingencies needs to be maintained.

77. Defined interests should include the range from UN sponsored coalition warfare (in the unstable Korean peninsula, for example), peace keeping/enforcement tasks (especially of regional importance like Bougainville and Cambodia), international sea lanes protection, training with alliance partners and evacuation of Australian national from overseas among others interests.

78. See Cheesman, G., “Funding the 1994 Defence White Paper” in Bonnor and Brown, op cit, pp.175-180. It is stated that by 2001 the cumulative total of unfunded defence capability expenditure initially forecast in DOA87 and continued by DA94 would be in the order of $25 billion.


80. Publication of the 1997 Strategic Review (at unclassified level) would provide the appropriate catalyst for the change suggested.


82. ABCA Exercise Cascade Peak 96, op cit, p.19.

83. Reserve mechanised and light infantry brigades located in south east Australia would provide alternative southern posting localities for the Army’s regular personnel, given the APIN move of the majority of the regular Army units to the tropical zones of Australia. This may assist in providing “respite” postings for Army personnel closer to the social support base of the Australian population.

84. Langtry, J.O., “The Role of reserve Forces” in Hall, R.A. (Ed), The New Look Defence Force: Perspectives on the Force Structure Review, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1992. The AIER was first introduced with the Force Structure Review of 1991 with a 2500 personnel target. This portion of defence readiness could be enhanced by legislative action to require compulsory allocation of ex-regular personnel to the AIER for time periods following discharge and by providing sufficient “shadow” manpower for up to one division or more in strength. In a period of no threat, this mobilisation method could be much further exploited to reduce the wastage of defence funds on existing low capability reserve formations, simultaneously providing a publicly demonstrated long term capability to meet “most dangerous” scenarios.

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The problem of providing air defence to amphibious operations - or more to the point, establishing local air superiority over the Amphibious Objective Area - is one that involves both equipment, integration and cooperation between all three Services. Discussion on this last point, the issue of cooperation, was the focus of a seminar which examined the topic of Air Defence in the littoral environment. This seminar attracted support from all three Services, Headquarters ADF and a substantial complement of Defence Science and Technology Organisation staff; and was important because the participants soon came to recognise that no single Service alone will be able to protect the sea and land forces participating in an amphibious operation from air attack. The seminar also discussed the significant limitations of all three Services which, when stretched to the worst case, could make the successful conduct of operations in the littoral area - particularly amphibious operations - a problematic affair.

This article will follow on from that seminar and examine the role of Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) in one type of amphibious operation, the Amphibious Tactical Lodgement (ATL). It will first look at the distinction between the ATL and amphibious assault, and briefly explain some of the problems faced by RAAF and RAN assets involved in defending forces from air attack in such operations. The discussion will then move to considering how GBAD, using an RBS-70 troop as an example, can be tasked to assist in achieving local air superiority over the AOA through its contribution to the agreed air picture and by providing firepower to defeat enemy air operations. This will involve the description of four methods of tasking GBAD, and the issues relating to deployment that require consideration. The last section of the article will look at the integration of GBAD into the operation, providing advice on command, control, communications and logistic issues and suggesting airspace control measures to ensure that GBAD weapons have the maximum freedom to engage targets. The article will show that while GBAD is an essential element of a balanced force, it will not claim to provide a single solution to the problem of providing air defence to this inherently risky operation.

Amphibious Operations

The basic aim of amphibious operations is to move friendly troops, which are prepared to meet armed opposition at some stage, across a body of water using the Navy as the major form of transportation. This is no simple procedure however, and success will be determined by the co-operation between all three Services. Given that the ADF does not have the ability to assault a defended shoreline, this article will focus on the amphibious tactical lodgement (ATL).

The ATL is an offensive operation that aims to “land forces in tactical order to establish a beachhead on a potentially hostile, but undefended, coastline.” In this definition, “undefended” is taken to imply an absence of ground-based enemy in sufficient numbers to effect the conduct of the operation. While our intelligence may be able to determine that the proposed landing area is free from hostile ground or naval forces, an “undefended” area is difficult to find when the enemy has sufficient air power to challenge our lodgement. Our plan for conducting the ATL must take the air threat into consideration, and a joint approach to providing air defence of the fleet, aircraft and troops must be formulated.

The RAN and the ATL

The RAN will be responsible for the command of any ATL, and it has the ability to make a significant contribution to the air defence of the operation through ship-borne weapons, early warning capabilities and their command and control organisation. However, participation in operations
close to the shoreline, or what is termed the “littoral”, poses particular problems for the RAN. This type of environment effects a ship’s ability to detect and engage hostile targets due to the masking of aircraft detection radar and “seduction” of fire control radars by land masses. The proximity to land and shallow water also limits the ship’s freedom to manoeuvre. The net effect of this situation is that the usual level of air defence (AD) provided to RAN forces in “blue” water is degraded by the change in environment.

RAN ships (such as the Guided Missile Destroyers [DDG], Guided Missile Frigates [FFG] and ANZAC Frigates [FFH]) are highly capable in the air defence role, with the ability to detect targets out to approximately 260NM, and engage out to 25 NM using SM1. Other weapons, such as Evolved Sea Sparrow (with a range of 10NM) and Close-in Weapon Systems (CWIS) such as Phalanx, will help to provide a layered and mixed air defence envelope over the task force. AD Ships can be employed to directly protect other elements of the task group, or to act as pickets on likely approaches or “blind spots”. Ships such as the FFH may also act in the “goalkeeper” role, where they use their weapons to protect ships without self-defence systems. The effective use of communications systems such as Link 11 also help to protect the fleet by providing accurate and rapid updates of the air picture around the operation. These ships provide a significant capability, but they have some limitations when employed in operations around the littoral.

These problems arise because the main assets that would be employed to provide air defence of the ATL are designed to fight in “blue water”. Their surveillance radars have significant problems when attempting to look over land, as clutter caused by landforms can effectively white-out the radar picture and make it near impossible for radar operators to distinguish incoming threats. This is especially the case for targets with a slow radial velocity. Land masses also have an effect on fire control radars and semi-active missile guidance, as land clutter serves to “seduce” weapons away from their intended paths. Other problems, such as sea states and the limited coverage of accurate hydrographic survey in the north of Australia and in the Pacific, also effect the ability of the RAN to conduct amphibious operations.

Other RAN ships designed for amphibious operations have only very limited self-defence ability. The HMAS Tobruk has 40mm Bofors guns, and has used Army-supplied RBS 70 on exercises. The RAN will soon augment its amphibious troop lift capability with the acquisition of two Landing Platform Auxiliary (LPA). These ships are capable of mounting Phalanx and have the communications necessary to link into an air defence plan. Despite these improvements, and when all other factors are taken into consideration, the RAN has significant
limitations in protecting its ships and any assets close to the shoreline from air attack: therefore, other Services must assist in this vital task.

**RAAF Contribution**

The ability of the RAAF to assist in maintaining local air superiority in an ATL is directly influenced by the distance of the Amphibious Operations Area (AOA) from suitable operating bases. At best, the RAAF will be able to provide combat air patrols (CAP) using FA 18 and F111 in the area to detect and intercept enemy aircraft. It could also conduct strike operations against enemy surface vessels approaching the AOA, interdiction near the battle area and against bases, and provide an airlift capability to initiate an ATL or assist in the reinforcement and resupply of a successful lodgement. All of this support is contingent upon the distance that this operation is conducted from suitable bases. The provision of CAP over the AOA is a resource intensive operation, and will require air-to-air refuelling if it is to be maintained far from bases. The ability of the RAAF to contribute to the agreed air picture will be greatly enhanced if Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft come into service. While these aircraft are the ADF’s best air defence assets, they can only project combat power out to their maximum combat range.

**What If?**

A “worst case” scenario for the maintenance of local air superiority over the AOA can be reasonably created out of a combination of the limitations mentioned above. What if the ADF was required to conduct an ATL onto mainland Australia or an off-shore territory that was a sizeable distance from any fighter-capable airbase? The situation could be compounded if the effectiveness of RAN radars was reduced because the AOA was a large island (such as Norfolk Island) or was on the mainland itself. We would therefore have a situation where CAP (and AEW&C) operations were limited, and where aircraft approaching from overland or down the coastline would be essentially “invisible” to the ships of the Amphibious Task Group due to the effects of terrain masking.

**GBAD in the ATL**

The discussion of the limitations of the RAAF and RAN must be balanced by understanding that the Army’s ability to contribute to the AD of this operation is also limited in certain ways. These limitations include the small number of GBAD assets available to the ADF, the space that will be available on ships for the transit of AD weapons, and the possibility of the Commander Landing Force (CLF) having different priorities for GBAD assets to the Anti-Air Warfare Commander. The small number of fire-units available is a well-known problem and need not be recounted here. However, the imminent introduction of the LPA may allow for the reconsideration of the allocation of space aboard ship during the ATL. The Landing Force Indicative Grouping does not include any GBAD assets at present, and so the allocation of space to any extra assets will be an immediate problem. The CLF may be faced with the problem of choosing between assets within the Indicative Grouping - such as a choice between engineers or armoured personnel carriers - in order to take GBAD assets a shore in the first echelon. Either way, the CLF will be reticent to allocate a large amount of space to GBAD equipment and troops unless the threat to his forces from the air is particularly high.

The space limitations present on any ship leads towards placing the focus of this article on the employment of an RBS-70 troop in the ATL. While this equipment has the significant limitation of being a day-only equipment at present, the compact size of the weapon system and small logistical tail places the least imposition on the available space. This stands in contrast to the highly capable Rapier system, which would occupy a significant amount of space aboard ship with its 14 vehicles and five towed equipments. The following section will outline some of the issues relating to the employment of GBAD assets (specifically an RBS 70 troop) in the ATL, focussing on tasking, command, control and logistic issues. It will seek to offer suggested solutions to the problems that have been identified, as well as indicate some of the questions that still need to be addressed.

**Tasking GBAD in the ATL**

**Vital Point Defence.** GBAD assets could be employed in one of two basic ways in the ATL, with two further employment options available if required.
The first is the conduct of a Vital Point (VP) defence of the Point of Entry (PoE). This type of defence will provide a high degree of protection to the ships, aircraft, troops and stores that are in close proximity to the PoE. It will also provide limited protection of landward approaches to ships participating in the ATL by engaging or reporting the movement of aircraft transiting over or close to the PoE. The ability to weight the defence in favour of certain approaches, such as along the coastline, may make the selection of the PoE as the VP complementary to other tasks, such as defence of the ships at sea.

**Mixed Systems Defence.** The second basic option for employing GBAD is to utilise the available fire units in a mixed systems defence with RAN and RAAF assets. This type of defence assigns the highest priority to the ships of the Amphibious Group, and concentrates all available firepower to protect them: In effect, all surface to air and air to air weapons available to the taskforce combine to create a type of area defence. This type of defence would be coordinated by the RAN Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC), and see GBAD weapons sited in such a manner that they can cover the approaches to the AOA that are “blind” to the ship’s radar and weapons. This will probably mean that GBAD systems will be tasked to detect and engage any hostile aircraft approaching the Task Force from over-land or along the coastline, and means that the troop will not in itself form a co-ordinated defence. The major advantage of this option is that it helps to reduce the vulnerability of the task force by providing a compensator for limitations of ships’ radar and weapons. GBAD personnel would provide ships with early warning of raids coming through their arcs, and so give those ships time to deal with the threat. It still provides a measure of protection to the PoE, but the degree of the protection afforded should not be overstated. In the mixed systems defence, the AD Task Commander would be likely to deploy his weapons in an almost linear manner along the coastline or immediate hinterland in order to create a large enough barrier to force enemy aircraft to divert around (or over) the Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ - See Diagram 1 for a representation of this defence). The limited range of RBS 70 may mean that detachments may need to move if ships move due to changes in tides and currents. This will influence the length of the screen provided and cause some detachments to be out of action if they need to move.
Other Employment Options

The option to use RBS 70 as a point defence weapon for RAN Auxiliaries has been recognised as an important task for GBAD since one detachment was deployed on HMAS *Success* during Operation *Damask* (The Gulf War of 1990-91). Since then, RBS 70 has been deployed on a variety of RAN auxiliary vessels and the method of employment in this role is well understood by both Army and RAN.

The task of ship point defence may be supplementary to the major task given to the GBAD unit supporting the operation or may be the task of extra weapon detachments assigned specifically for the purpose. RBS 70 deployed aboard ship will provide a degree of protection during the sea passage phase, and help to bolster the morale of those aboard. A decision on whether this task is continued during the landing phase will need to be made early, for the effectiveness of the defence ashore will be reduced unless extra weapons are allocated to the operation specifically for task of point defence. In addition, commanders should not plan on a troop providing more than two detachments during the sea passage in order to allow the troop to prepare for operations and minimise detachment fatigue.

The second minor employment option for GBAD Weapon Systems could be to land man-portable systems with the advance force. If enough weapon systems were landed, and if they were coordinated, a GBAD umbrella could be created ashore before the landing commenced. This would reduce the vulnerability of the Amphibious Force to air attack and could be a good option when faced with a high air threat. The main disadvantages of this type of employment include the possibility that engaging hostile aircraft would compromise the security of the landing, that tasking advance force troops with a secondary role of GBAD may not represent the best employment for these soldiers, and that the use of soldiers not skilled in aircraft recognition and the use of IFF could lead to friendly aircraft losses.

Deployment and Protection

The use of GBAD forces in an ATL may influence the landing plan because of the need to protect the weapons from ground attack during the operation. Under most circumstances, the GBAD troop should go ashore just behind the leading combat
elements of the Landing Force in order to give the GBAD troop time to deploy to their positions and confirm the suitability of sites assigned from map reconnaissance. The possibility of landing GBAD detachments prior to H-Hour could also be an option and may be attractive if the ground threat is low to nonexistent and the air threat is high. The British employed this type of tactic in the Falklands Campaign, where SAS teams used Stinger SAM to engage opportunity targets. Teams landed before H-Hour could be tasked with attrition of enemy forces, or tasked to take their place in a coordinated task such as protection of the PoE or defence of the ships.

The four-man GBAD detachment may require assistance to maintain ground security until the area they occupy has been cleared by friendly infantry. In any case, landing GBAD detachments by helicopter is the preferred method as it will put them in place quicker and allow for more missiles and combat supplies to be transported.

**Command**

The need for GBAD to be used during all phases of the operation - including the sea passage, during unloading and when the Landing Force is ashore - complicates the command structure (see Diagram 2 for one possible representation of the command structure for an ATL). It is therefore necessary to examine the use of GBAD during each phase of the operation and plan for alterations in the command status to suit the change in situation. Similarly, the “light scales” nature of this deployment will create an administrative liability that can be eased if it is recognised and addressed during the planning process. It is important to note here that the “command” of AD weapons is very different to the “control” of their fire. For Army AD, “command” implies the right to determine tasking, order redeployment of weapons and includes responsibility for administration. The control of fire is a different issue, and the authority to determine weapon control orders and rules of engagement is vested in the Air Defence Commander, who is responsible for (amongst other things) the co-ordination of airspace in a designated area.

**Overall Command.** As the overall command of GBAD assets should be maintained at the highest possible level, the Commander Task Group (CTG) is the person who is best placed to exercise the function of over GBAD assets allocated to an ATL, and Operational Command would be the most suitable level of operational authority. This would allow the CTG to decide the mission for GBAD assets during each phase of the operation, and ensure that the weapons were employed to best effect. The CTG would be able to delegate his authority, or degrees of it, to the subordinate commander best placed to use the weapons; and ensure that he has the flexibility to change the command status of the GBAD asset at some time during the operation. Commanders at all levels - especially the GBAD Troop Commander - must ensure that changes of command status (and tasking) occur at clearly defined points, and the implications of these changes are known and understood by all.

**Administration.** The responsibility for administration will need to be decided early and should remain with the same organisation throughout. One possible solution is to give the responsibility for administering the RBS 70 troop to the field battery deployed with the Landing Force. This arrangement makes use of the degree of familiarity between field and air defence artillery units, but it will place a strain on the field battery because an RBS 70 troop is unlikely to be able to bring its full complement of vehicles aboard and will need resupply support over a relatively large area.

**The Sea Passage.** In the ATL, supply and troop transport vessels would benefit from utilising RBS 70 as a point defence weapon. The command status of weapons employed in this manner should take into account the responsibility of the ship’s captain for the defence of the ship, and so not limit his ability to use the weapon within the guidelines of the task. The appropriate solution would be to place the detachment under Operational Control of the Ship’s Captain, with the limitations that it be employed only on his ship for a defined period. It is also important to note that weapons deployed on point defence will need early warning from AD ships, and that they are fulfilling a broader role than just AD of the ship during the operation. This makes it essential for these weapons to remain as part of the overall AD plan, and so have communications with the Anti Air Warfare Commander (AAWC).

**The Landing Phase.** The Landing Phase is the Amphibious Force’s most vulnerable moment to air attack, especially since ship’s manoeuvre would be restricted by the need to offload the landing force in shallow water and close proximity to land. As there is still a need to ensure that the GBAD asset remains focused on the CTG’s main effort, he should maintain Operational Command over all assets and decide the mission of the troop. The Commander Landing Force (CLF), as the person responsible for troops ashore, is best placed to ensure that the GBAD assets are landed and placed in secure locations. It would allow him to
plan for their movement and ensure that they are able to meet time to be ready. It would be appropriate to allocate the GBAD assets under Tactical Control to the CLF for the duration of the Landing phase, for the purpose decided by the CTG.

**Light Scales Deployment.** The space limitations aboard ship that were mentioned earlier may force the RBS 70 troop to undertake their task on “light scales”, which means that the troop will leave all but two of its integral vehicles behind (the others should follow on at a suitable time), and that four man detachments will deploy with only three missiles each. The landing force will therefore need to take on some of the administrative and movement responsibilities for the light scales GBAD Troop. Deployment times will be slow if helicopter or vehicle support is not provided, and missile resupply could become a high priority in a high-threat environment. The number of men allocated for this operation is likely to be quite small, and any addition to this group by way of men and vehicles would help the troop to re-assume their logistic responsibilities.

**Termination of the ATL.** Once the ATL has been completed, and assuming that the GBAD assets will not be re-deployed to another task, Operational Command of the GBAD troops should pass to CLF. This would represent the transition from the maritime to the land battle, and would allow the CLF to re-task the asset to help him achieve his mission. It is important to note that the changes to command status must be well understood, and take place at times that are well defined. Commanders should be aware of the time that it will take to re-deploy assets on a new task and give the AD Artillery Commander (ADAC), and their logistic support organisation, plenty of warning. The change would have a limited effect on the administration of the GBAD Troop if they were being supported by the field artillery battery. One further point to note is that other GBAD forces could be landed later (eg Rapier) and that this circumstance could see a new task commander appointed and so change the GBAD command chain.

**Control**

GBAD units need a well understood and integrated control structure to create optimal conditions for their use. A number of measures will need to be taken in order to ensure that this will happen, including creating a communications system capable of rapidly passing early warning information, preventing the duplication of advice, placing liaison officers at the right places, implementing appropriate airspace control measures, and having standardised means for identifying aircraft within the AOA.

**Early Warning.** Early warning is the crucial control issue for maximising the effectiveness of RBS 70. Without it, individual fire-units are reliant upon their own ability to detect targets, and will need to remain on high states of alert for long periods in order to ensure that they engage hostile targets prior to their line of weapon release. Therefore a number of related elements must be drawn together into a coherent and
effect to the early warning and friendly aircraft movement information produced by the RAN and RAAF, the AD/Anti Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) will need to pass Weapon Control Orders (WCO) to weapons promptly, and GBAD units will need to pass early warning to ships (especially after VACS is introduced) and the landing force.

**Liaison for Control.** If responsibility for the air defence of the operation is given to the RAN, the AAWC will require an Army Air Defence Liaison system similar to that provided to a RAAF Sector Air Defence Commander. This will involve up to two officers (one Senior Army Air Defence Liaison Officer and one Army Controller, plus at least two signallers) to provide the necessary advice and liaison support to the AAWC. This advice will extend to information on the dispositions, in-action status and results of engagements. Further, the AAWC and his staff will need to be kept informed about the impact of Army AD on the movement of friendly aircraft.

**Liaison for Information.** As the ATL demands a high level of co-ordination, other LO will be required throughout the Task Force. The most important is the provision of an LO to the Support Arms Coordination Centre (SACC). This officer will need to liaise with the Field Battery Commander (BC), and to provide air raid warning to troops ashore. Liaison Officers (LO) should be maintained with any RAN AD asset that remains within the area after the ATL has been completed, for these ships can continue to provide information on the air picture that is helpful to the GBAD troops ashore. A suggested control organisation for an ATL is shown at Diagram 3.

**Advice on Army AD Matters.** The AAWC will also need advice on GBAD matters. The possible problem that may arise here is the duplication of duties between the Artillery Commander and the Air Defence Artillery Commander. It is important to note that the Artillery Commander (who will be the commander of the field artillery battery) is responsible for the provision of Army AD advice to the CTG, but is employed in the SACC and so removed from the AAWC and his principle source of advice, the Senior Army Air Defence Liaison Officer (SAADLO). The ADAC, who will be the Troop Commander, must therefore work closely with the Artillery Commander to ensure that the advice is complete and correct. An LO to the SACC must also be provided to facilitate this and to pass air raid warning to ground forces and information on our dispositions and coverage. Other LO will be required during the operation - for example, to ships with RBS 70 point defence weapons. This will cause Troop resources to be stretched, and the AD Regt Controller Troop will be required to provide one or more parties.

**Communications.** The SAADLO will need the ability to pass information on the air picture and any WCO to the Troop CP. As Army AD does not have Link 11, the passage of information will be slower than the “real time” that is characteristic of Link operations and need to be passed using VHF (Voice) systems. This will require direct communications between the SAADLO Party and Troop Command Post, and to LO in SACC for the passage of early warning to troops ashore.

**Airspace Control.** It may be prudent to attempt to exclude friendly fixed wing aircraft from the MEZ (if close air support is not required), and allow GBAD weapons to be on “Weapons Free” for fixed wing aircraft. This method of control, which was successfully used in the Falklands, helps to speed up identification of hostile aircraft and reduce the reaction time of GBAD detachments. In line with this, RBS 70 should be allowed to engage whatever hostile targets it can. Attempts to control the fire of GBAD weapons, such as through the allocation of aircraft approaching over-land to detachments, may prove to be counterproductive: while the absence of centralised control may waste missiles, the chances of allowing enemy aircraft to slip through are potentially disastrous. Aside from this, standard airspace controls will be needed for the ATL. These may also include MEZ for any ships with RBS 70, and means to direct the movement of any ship-to-shore helicopter traffic.

**Identification of Aircraft.**

The correct identification of aircraft within the AAWA is an essential issue that must be tackled early. It will be important to ensure that the RAN system of OPTASKAAW is compatible with the Rules Of Engagement and WCO used by Army, and to ensure that all personnel understand and are able to implement these rules using the equipment that is available.

**Logistic Issues.**

The major logistic issue concerning the employment of GBAD relates to resupplying the RBS 70 detachment during a light scales deployment. Initially, troops will be able to carry three days of combat supplies, but they may use missiles and freon more quickly if the air battle is intense. The troop’s administrative staff will be able to coordinate this resupply, but they will need help with transportation. Other logistic issues include the loading of ships – we would not want to relearn the lesson of the Falklands, where inappropriate loading of Rapier prevented
Ground based air defence units need to be provided with the opportunity to practice.
daily tests from being conducted and saw technical stores separated from equipment.

Equipment maintenance is another logistic issue. The current RBS-70 is very sensitive to salt air and water corrosion, and so needs frequent preventative maintenance from the detachment when it is employed aboard ship. While the marinised sea stand for RBS-70 solves one problem, it is a rare piece of equipment and more of these would be required if more than one ship required protection. There is no marinised version of the sight at present. The problem of corrosion will be compounded when the RBS 70 Clip-On Night Device (COND) becomes available and the equipment no longer comes out of action at night.

Conclusion

Creating an effective and integrated air defence system which can achieve local air superiority is an essential element of the conduct of an ATL. While GBAD has been the focus of this article, it is important to remember that the provision of AD to the ATL is a team effort, and the failure to use all combat systems to the best of their capabilities will jeopardise the entire operation. This article has shown that GBAD is an essential part of the joint force because it has the ability to provide early warning and firepower to the most vulnerable flank of the ATL. Regardless of how GBAD is employed, it must be properly integrated into the control structure and have the ability to communicate with those who need information – or those who provide information – in a fast and direct manner. While this may seem to require a large control organisation, the ability to respond to the fast changing situation presented by the air war dictates the requirement for the large control organisation.

The ideas presented in this “concept” article now require detailed consideration by all Services (including Army formations likely to be tasked as landing forces), and GBAD units need to be provided with the opportunity to practice this operation.

NOTES
1. The author would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Appleton RAA for his comments on this article. Major T.D. Pickford RAA for his contribution to the section on the employment of GBAD and command and control, and Lieutenant Commander P.B. Cooke for his comments and advice on RAN capabilities.
2. The seminar was hosted by RAN Surface Warfare School (RANSWARS) at HMAS Watson on 5-6 Jun 96.
3. These operations are termed Amphibious Assaults. See ADFP 12, paragraph 106a.
4. ADFP 12, paragraph 106b.
5. The “littoral” is a term used to describe the coastal region of a land mass, and includes the land, sea and air environments contained within. RAN SWARS recently defined littoral operations as those where “proximity to land effects the employment of weapons or sensors” in order to create the distinction between “brown” and “blue water” operations (RANSWARS Seminar, 5-6 Jun 96).
6. The range for SM 1 varies according to the conditions. 25MN is the optimal range.
7. Link 11 helps commanders to make and disseminate decisions and information, share track information and control workloads using data transferred by radio.
8. RAN ship AD capabilities are discussed in ADFP 13 (Draft) Chapter 11 Annexes A-E.
9. The FFG has the most problems with this, while the DDG has a better capability to search over land, although land still has a significant effect on the quality of the picture. FFH will be equipped with improved features such as clutter mapping and adjustable radar to help eliminate this problem.
10. Each LPA can carry up to 4 medium lift helicopters and 450 troops (including crews)
11. RAAF Fighter combat radii, weapons fit and station times are included in ADFP 13 (Draft) Chapter 11 Annex G.
12. While the security of the operation will be greatly enhanced if Combat Air Patrols are available, the RAAF’s ability to contribute to the air defence of the task force will be decided by the distance of the AOA from their operating bases. The provision of support to this operation may also prove to be very resource intensive, and could perhaps be difficult to achieve without sensors such as land-based or airborne early warning radars within the AOA.
13. Two LPA are required to lift a Battalion Group.
14. See ADFP 12, Chapter 2 Annex B.
15. Note that the air threat may influence planning in other ways, such as determining whether a day or night landing may be needed in order to minimise the risk of interference from the air. It is interesting to note that the Argentinian air threat compelled the British to land at night during the initial landing phase of Operation Corporate (see Admiral S. Woodward, One Hundred Days, London, Harper-Collins, 1992).
16. RBS 70 will receive a significant capability enhancement in 1998 when a VLLADS Alerting and Cuing Radar (VACS) and the Clip-on Night Device are introduced. These systems will provide RBS 70 with a day/night capability and enhance the local early warning resources of the troops.
17. These figures are based on 4 x Rapier Kits, 1 x DN181, 2 x Conm Vehicles and 3 x logistic vehicles. Ground Based Air Defenses would be improved if Rapier could be flown in or arrive by ship during later phases.
18. Vital Point defence is covered in RAA CTN 4.1 Air Defence Artillery Units - Organisation and Deployment 1993, Chapter 2.
19. See CTN 4.1, Chapter 2 for a description of an Area Defence.
20. AD Task Conm could provide accurate assessments of the degree of protection provided to the PoE by re-assessing his layout with the PoE as the vital point if this is required.
21. Being a “fire and forget” weapon (using an Infra-Red seeker), it is relatively simple to use and could pay large dividends by causing attrition to the enemy airforces.
22. While an RBS-70 detachment consists of five men, the detachment driver is unlikely to participate in a light scales deployment.
23. A Blackhawk can carry 2 RBS 70 detachments, with stores and missiles underslung.
24. The AAWC is the RAN officer responsible for the air defence of the naval operation.

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**GLOSSARY**
AADLO - Army Air Defence Liaison Officer
AADCP - Army Air Defence Command Post
AAWA - Anti Air Warfare Area
AAWC - Anti Air Warfare Commander
AD - Air Defence
ADAC - Air Defence Artillery Commander
ADF - Australian Defence Force
AEW&C - Airborne Early Warning and Control
AOA - Amphibious Operations Area
ARMCON - Army Controller
ATL - Amphibious Tactical Lodgement
BC - Battery Commander
CAP - Combat Air Patrol
CTG - Commander Task Group
CATF - Commander Amphibious Task Force
CLF - Commander Landing Force
CP - Command Post
GBAD - Ground Based Air Defence
LO - Liaison Officer
MEZ - Missile Engagement Zone
RAN - Royal Australian Navy
RAAF - Royal Australian Air Force
SACC - Support Arms Co-ordination Centre
SAM - Surface to Air Missile
TSM - Troop Sergeant Major
VHF - Very High Frequency
WCO - Weapon Control Order

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**Annex A**

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Major David Connery graduated from OCS Portsea in July 1995 and was allocated to RAA. He has served in various Regimental Appointments with 8/12 Mdm Regt, 4 Fd Regt, 1 Fd Regt and 16 Fd Bty. He was Adjutant School of Artillery in 1993-94 and has served at 16 AD Regt since 1995. He is currently BC 111 AD Bty (Lt). He has served with 29 Commando Regiment RA, Rifle Company Butterworth and HQ Integrated Air Defence System. Major Connery holds a BA from University of Queensland and a Master Of International Studies (Honours) from University of Sydney.
Australians are being asked to dig deep on August 15 to raise money for our service nurses, whose courage and dedication during conflicts meant many sons, husbands and fathers returned home to their families.

Saturday, August 15 is Million Dollar Day - a day dedicated to raising $1 million to build a National Nurses' Memorial on Anzac Parade, Canberra. Million Dollar Day will be a national fundraising day and will raise money for the Nurses' Memorial Fund.

For almost 100 years, Australian troops have gone into battle knowing that should they get wounded, Australian nurses were right by their side. Despite the service of more than 100,000 nurses from the Boer War to present-day conflicts, Australia has yet to reward them with a National Memorial.

Million Dollar Day will provide a way for all Australians to recognise the compassion and outstanding care that service nurses gave our soldiers in past wars. Support for the Fund can be shown by purchasing a $5 or a $2 Million Dollar Day sticker, available from most Coles Supermarkets, hospitals and the Fresh Food People Supermarkets – Woolworths (NSW), Safeway (VIC), Furity (Hobart) and Rooff Van (Launceston). The stickers will depict the Nurses' Memorial Fund Badge and all donations are tax deductible.

The Nurses' Memorial Fund, headed by committee chairman Ms Butrose, needs to raise a total of $2 million to build the Memorial. Ms Butrose says: "Million Dollar Day is Australia’s day to say thank you. We know Australians are very generous and we’re appealing to them on Million Dollar Day to buy a sticker and help our fellow Australians."

Supported by other service organisations, the National RSL President Major General Peter Phillips says: "If it wasn’t for these angels, many of us would never have made it home."

It is hoped to have the Memorial completed by 1999, which will commemorate 100 years of Service Nursing in Australia.

"It is important for some of the older nurses to see the Memorial built in their lifetime. It will serve as a tribute not only to the returned nurses but also to their families and will become an inspiration for other Australian nurses," Ms Butrose says.

On Saturday, August 15, stalls will be set up in shopping centres in all major cities with information about Million Dollar Day and the Memorial. Stickers will be on sale at these stalls.

And, if you can’t find a sticker on the day call toll free 1800 24 1170 for a tax deductible donation or c/o: National Nurses’ Memorial Trust, Royal College of Nursing, 1 Napier Close, Deakin, ACT 2600.

Stickers will be available at most Coles and Woolworths Supermarkets.

Returned service nurses and returned soldiers are available for interview.
The proliferation of lasers in recent years has produced significant changes on the battlefield. The most notable has been the ability to engage accurately targets at ranges which would previously have been considered unthinkable. Through the use of laser rangefinders, target designator and laser guided munitions, the battlefield has become a haven for devices capable of causing electro-optical sensor damage. In order to provide maximum laser protection, commensurate with operational requirements, it is important that the battlefield commander be provided with the best available laser protection devices. These devices should protect against all perceived laser threats and may involve a number of technologies.

Conventional weapons rely on chemical or kinetic energy in the form of a projectile. The laser produces electromagnetic radiation (light) and is capable of delivering large energy densities essentially instantaneously. For comparatively low laser energies, sensors, such as the human eye or night vision goggles, may be dazzled. On removal of the laser light the sensor performance will return to normal. The recovery time of the sensor can vary from seconds to hours depending on the type of sensor and the characteristics of the laser source. If the laser energy is above a certain threshold the sensor will suffer physical damage resulting in permanent impairment.

The most likely targets are electro-optical sensors located behind devices such as vehicle sights and sighting systems. A laser can attack heavily armoured targets at their most vulnerable points – their sensors. Soldiers most at risk from laser energy are those looking through devices with magnifying optics (i.e. binoculars). A laser targeted on see-through optical devices can damage the eyes of the targeted operator.

When the optical device has a magnifying capability (such as binoculars), the energy density is magnified, increasing the risk of injury to the eye.

Exposure to laser radiation may either be from weapons designed for intentional blinding, or from accidental exposure to lasers designed for other purposes, such as a rangefinder on an artillery range. Laser range finders present a widespread threat with their constituent laser usually of either a ruby type operating at a wavelength of 694nm or a Nd:YAG type operating at 1064nm.

The Nd:YAG laser output can generally be converted to radiation at 532nm with high efficiency, thus introducing a laser threat in the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum. The sensitivity of the eye to light is greatest in this region, and therefore the use of filters to remove the 532nm threat tends to cause a reduction in visibility.

Laser technology is a rapidly advancing field, with the time between laboratory concept demonstrator and commercial device being typically 2-3 years. Two areas attracting research interest are laser frequency-agility and size. It may not be long before portable, solid-state laser sources capable of producing intense energy at any wavelength across the visible and near infrared regions of the spectrum are readily available.

Having identified the laser threat it is appropriate to consider what protective measures are available. These may take the form of physical and/or procedural measures that are designed to limit the sensor’s exposure to harmful laser radiation. The “perfect” laser protection device would provide adequate protection against all laser threats, have a field-of-view at least equal to that of the sensor it is trying to protect, have a very high transmittance at non-threat wavelengths and would not alter the perceived colour balance. As expected, the “perfect” laser protection device does not exist.

Commercially available laser protection is provided in the form of laser filters, which work by selectively absorbing or reflecting unwanted wavelengths. Examples include general purpose laser goggles, pilot visors, spectacles and filters which can
be fitted into equipment such as binoculars and rifle sights. The use of these filters requires a detailed knowledge of the laser threat and as such these filters are ineffective against wavelengths for which they were not designed.

The likelihood of multiple threat wavelengths, particularly if visible laser sources are considered, significantly increases the complexity of the laser filter. While it is often possible to obtain laser filters that offer such protection, they are generally accompanied by a reduction in transmission and a distorted colour balance (e.g. everything appears orange).

In cases where the laser filter must have a negligible effect on the user’s sight, such as for pilots, the ability to provide protection against multiple laser threats is severely restricted. Consequently, the use of mission (or threat) specific laser protection is required. While the use of threat specific filters simplifies the design, thus increasing user acceptability, appropriate filter selection relies on an up to date threat assessment for the respective area of operation.

The choice of laser protection relies not only on access to the latest technologies and an accurate threat assessment, but also on an understanding of the relationship between the user, the user’s role and the laser filter to be worn. This implies a need for human factor studies. While product evaluation and user trials are an integral component of the procurement process this does not necessary result in the procurement of the optimum laser protection device. To date the impetus for eye protection has come from occupational health and safety requirements relating to the “peacetime” employment of ADF lasers. Consequently laser protection devices procured to date have been primarily limited to eye-protection against a single wavelength.

Consideration needs to be given to countering several threat wavelengths with one filter, or, if this is not possible, having in place a mechanism that allows the filter to be upgraded at a later date, possibly through the use of interchangeable filters.

### Procedural Measures

In addition to laser filters, the ADF should employ procedures aimed at minimising the risk of exposure to laser radiation. Such procedures will include educating ADF personnel on the hazards of laser radiation, looking for signs of laser damage, and more importantly, minimising the number of personnel at risk at any one time.

Just as a commander employs a fire unit to avoid the hazard of fratricide, he must likewise plan his laser fires. While the possibility of an accident is remote, a victim might unexpectedly move into the hazardous path of a laser beam. To prevent such accidents, operators of lasers must be kept constantly aware of friendly troop locations, and must positively identify targets before irradiating them.

A distinction needs to be made between the safety constraints used for training and standard operating procedures to be used in an operational environment. An assessment should be made on whether current doctrine needs to be altered to include a variety of laser threat scenarios, where protection may, or may not, be available. An example of a doctrinal protection measure is ensuring that soldiers use the naked eye to scan the battlefield until target cues such as movement or dust are observed, then use precision optics to identify and engage targets.

Of increasing importance would be the development of procedures for use in theatres where multiple laser sources are present. In such an environment commanders will have to consider the following issues:

1. How do I determine what laser threats are present in my area of operations? How do I advise my subordinates? What method will be used to report a laser attack?
2. When are laser filters to be worn? and what actions are to occur when laser filters are not available?
3. Will the presence of laser sources alter my observation/reconnaissance plan? And what priority of effort should be given to neutralising enemy laser sources?

One method of standardising reporting language, and the appropriate response, is to establish a series of laser protective postures. One example of such postures, based on threat activity and the use of lasers in the area of operations, is shown in Table 1.

The preceding discussion highlights the importance of combining both physical and procedural protective measures in response to the laser threat. This necessitates educating the ADF about the threat and coordinating the procurement of laser filters.
In most cases where laser protection is procured it is only a minor part of a much larger project. The role of laser protection is often overshadowed by more important objectives, such as the attainment of a high performance weapon system. While not disputing the relative importance, there is a need to ensure that the program or platform nature by which laser protection is procured does not inhibit the optimum laser filter from being obtained. A coordinated approach to laser protection would ensure a common set of principles governing the procurement and employment of laser filters, thus ensuring uniform levels of laser protection throughout the ADF.

The absence of a coordinated approach has resulted in separate agencies procuring different laser filters, albeit for similar roles. The result is an assortment of laser filters which provide varying levels of eye protection. There are several cases where it is possible to provide protection against laser threats, in addition to 1064nm, by simply choosing a different goggle, visor or glass. In other cases increased laser protection would require the design of more complicated filters.

A comprehensive list of ADF equipment that may require laser filters should be compiled. Furthermore the list should include details of all filters currently in service. This information would enable specifications to be drawn up for filters capable of being used in multiple applications and that would provide as broad-band protection as possible. The next step in such an approach would be the procurement of small numbers of filters for multi-user trials. Benefits associated with standardisation and economies of scale should offset the effort expended in establishing this coordinated approach. Furthermore, projecting ahead for future laser threats will reduce the need for costly upgrades of laser protective measures at a later stage.

The ability of lasers to cause eye damage in both training and operational deployment necessitates that laser protection measures be considered. A coordinated approach should endeavour to provide the widest possible laser protection to service personnel and equipment. The provision of “peace-time” laser protection measures should not preclude the provision of protection against threat wavelengths possibly encountered in an operational theatre.

The laser threat, and hence the need for laser filters, must be weighed against other threats that are present on the battlefield. An assessment should be made of the effect laser radiation would have in a number of battlefield scenarios. One possible outcome of such an assessment could be that, in the case of infantry soldiers, the effect of a laser threat may be negligibly small compared to that from indirect and direct weapons, such that the use of goggles would present an unwelcome encumbrance not justified by the level of risk. Whatever the outcome of such an analysis, ADF personnel should be advised of the effects of laser radiation and procedures for minimising injury should be adopted.

### Conclusion

The ability of lasers to cause eye damage in both training and operational deployment necessitates that laser protection measures be considered. A coordinated approach should endeavour to provide the widest possible laser protection to service personnel and equipment. The provision of “peace-time” laser protection measures should not preclude the provision of protection against threat wavelengths possibly encountered in an operational theatre.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>LASER USE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L0</td>
<td>Use of laser technology highly unlikely.</td>
<td>Store laser filters nearby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>Laser sources spotted in the area of operations. Use of laser capability possible.</td>
<td>Laser filters to be carried on the person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2</td>
<td>Laser usage is highly likely. Reporting system in effect.</td>
<td>Laser protection to be worn at all times.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: An example of postures based on the threat activity and the use of lasers in the area of operations.**

**A Coordinated Approach to Laser Protection**

In most cases where laser protection is procured it is only a minor part of a much larger project. The role of laser protection is often overshadowed by more important objectives, such as the attainment of a high performance weapon system. While not disputing the relative importance, there is a need to ensure that the program or platform nature by which laser protection is procured does not inhibit the optimum laser filter from being obtained. A coordinated approach to laser protection would ensure a common set of principles governing the procurement and employment of laser filters, thus ensuring uniform levels of laser protection throughout the ADF.

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NOTES

1. The 1991 Gulf War illustrated this point. For example the precision bombing made possible by the use of laser guided munitions, or the influence of laser range finders on the ability of US armoured vehicles to engage targets at ranges over 2000m.


4. The proliferation and use of class 3 laser pointers, available for about $50, indicates the ease with which a potentially harmful laser source can be obtained.

5. Such filters may result in all objects appearing bright orange and/or introduce transmission losses greater than 50 per cent. These factors may reduce observation distances and target detection capabilities.

6. While the UN agreement on Laser Weapons prohibits the use of such devices as mass blinding weapons it must be remembered that the agreement does not limit the employment of such devices against personnel using viewing aids, for example the targeting of observation posts or armoured vehicles.


8. General purpose laser goggles are manufactured by Pilkington Optronics and have been supplied to the UK Defence forces. They were designed to provide inexpensive broad-band protection to large numbers of personnel.


Tim McKay is a Research Scientist in the Electro-Optics Systems Techniques Group within Electronic Warfare Division. He has been at the DSTO since January 1994 and his areas of interest include laser protection and solid-state tunable lasers.

Jackie Craig is a Senior Principal Research scientist in Wide Area Surveillance Division. Prior to February 1998 Jackie was Head, Electro-Optic Systems Techniques Group within Electronic Warfare Division. She has been at DSTO since October 1990. Prior to working at DSTO Jackie was with the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment (RERE), UK for a period of nine years.

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**DSTO and AAII to Collaborate on Intelligent Agents**

The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) will join with the Australian Artificial Intelligence Institute (AAII) to collaborate in research into “Intelligent Agent Technology”.

The two organisations have signed a non-exclusive collaborative research and development agreement.

The agreement will result in DSTO and AAII conducting joint research expected to result in significant enhancements to defence-related computer simulation and modelling.

“Intelligent Agent Technology is seen as a way to improve the modelling of tactics and scenario generation, assess and develop prototype decision-support systems and improve DSTO’s ability to more effectively model human behaviour,” the Director of DSTO’s Adelaide-based Electronics and Surveillance Research Laboratory, Dr Ian Chessell said at a ceremony to formally sign the agreement.

“At the operational level, research into the roles of intelligent agents should permit their use for such low level tasks as sensor monitoring and data fusion, leaving defence personnel to focus on tactical situations.”

Dr Chessell signed the agreement on behalf of the Commonwealth. Dr Mike Georgeff signed on behalf of AAII.

AAII was established in 1988 to promote research and development in advanced information technology and has directed its efforts at solving problems of commercial and strategic importance to industry and government. It employs about 30 staff.

Dr Georgeff said the AAII and DSTO had undertaken many joint activities in the past ten years but Agent technology was new.

“It’s a software paradigm which is showing great promise. It is especially well suited to Defence and I am very excited that we now have an arrangement that enables us to jointly focus on some of those challenges.”
Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review?

By Captain Andrew Plunkett, RAInf

“Before the management of violence became the extremely complex task that it is in modern civilisation, it was possible for someone without specialist training to practice officerhood. Now, however, only the person who completely devotes his working hours to this task can hope to develop a reasonable level of professional competence.”

Introduction

Now that most personnel have heard and read about the integrated and deployable Force in Army 21, some hard questions need to be asked. Who is going to lead the Combat Arms Corps elements of the Total Force on active operations?

Lack of Confidence in Army Reserve Leadership

“There is a pervasive scepticism about the role of GRes units and the quality of their administration and leadership. Only 4 per cent have favourable perceptions of GRes units.”

With the advent of Common Induction Training, much has been done to improve the individual training levels held by part-time soldiers and subsequently the Regular Army’s perception of them. However, the Jans III Study also highlighted the Regular Army’s and General Reserves’ perception of Army Reserve leadership. Both groups perceived leadership as inadequate and a general source of dissatisfaction amongst the ranks.

Similar to the Jans III Study, the US Defense Force conducted its own Reserves attitudes study called; “The Army Reserve Soldier in Operation Desert Storm: Perceptions of Being Prepared for Mobilisation, Deployment, and Combat”. From the results published in 1995, of concern were similar negative perceptions of Army Reserve officers. These negative attitudes were recorded before and after deployment, indicating the negative attitudes were intensified by observations made on deployment. “In 1991, after Desert Storm, about one-third of the deployed panel reported that they could not trust their unit officers; unit leaders did not apply discipline fairly; and officers did not provide good supervision.” From analysing lessons learnt from the Gulf War, the US General Accounting Office indicated poor Reserve leadership was responsible for “rendering the unit dysfunctional” and was therefore cause for immediate concern.

The Australian Jans Report, albeit comprehensive, only focused on the perceptions of members of the Army. It did not extend its terms of reference into why intelligent soldiers and junior officers have formed their negative opinions on GRes leadership. However, both studies have brought to the fore a measurable lack of confidence in Reserve leadership which is of significant concern.

Focus on GRes Combat Arms Corps Officers

The Army will always require specialists and consultants to fill areas such as medical and legal roles within the Total Force. Many of these positions are filled by Senior GRes officers because they can bring their civilian skills directly into their military roles. A civilian surgeon can be a military surgeon with few differences in surgical competencies.

When reviewing civilian workplace skills learned as a gardener or QC it is hard to translate this experience into Combat Arms Corps competencies. Time spent in the garden or law court is not the same as conducting armoured vehicle battle runs or TEWT’s. As a result, doubt exists as to whether GRes Combat Arms Corps officers can bring to their Corps the same transfer of civilian skills to make up for a lack of military experience; therefore GRes Combat Arms Corps officers are the focus of this article.

Morale and Common Competencies
“Readiness implies that servicemen have the leadership, morale and esprit de corps necessary to be an effective fighting force.”

Now that we are in an Integrated Army where Task Forces are on reduced notice to move, all elements should be at the same high training level and standard for deployment. When elements of the Force do not hold the same training competencies it becomes apparent to soldiers and junior officers and their confidence subsequently declines. It is understood that Units remain on different notices to move, however individual and collective competencies on deployment should be common. Common training competencies between the Forces and the training level of GRes officers is fundamental to the confidence of all concerned.

In May 1997 the GOC Training Command directed a review of the continuum of officer training. Part of the review addressed the need for commonality in part-time and full-time officer training. The review is a step in the correct direction in establishing and maintaining a common standard throughout the Army for officers. When adopted, the review intends to promote a sense of equivalence and partial raising in confidence of the GRes. However, the review has only extended as far as ‘all-corps’ competencies, while there is a further need to review corps specific competencies.

Confidence in leadership influences morale on the battlefield. During peacetime it can influence the transfer of personnel between the full-time and part-time Army. When a regular soldier and officer leaves the Services they depart with training experience and valuable corporate knowledge. Unless they transfer to the Reserve Force this experience is lost from the Army. This lost experience has a dollar figure when it comes to training costs, and a time factor when it comes to operational readiness. A transfer from the ARA to the GRes is more economical for the Army than training a GRes member to the same training level. Regular Army confidence in GRes leadership is an important factor in transfer numbers between the Forces. If ARA confidence in GRes leadership is high more members will transfer to the GRes Units.

It has been suggested in a recent Australian Defence Force Journal article by Lieutenant Colonel Tamsitt, RFD, to overcome the GRes officers’ lack of military experience “peacetime administration should be run by full-time members” so GRes officers can concentrate on training for war. It is reassuring that a GRes officer acknowledges there are deficiencies in training priorities for GRes officers. However, if as Lieutenant Colonel Tamsitt suggests, the full-time Army is continually conducting administration for the part-time Army, this lost time in administration can be detrimental to time spent in their own primary training. Given the full-time members conduct the suggested “peacetime administration” for the part-time members, it is important to consider what war-training GRes officers need to complete to be at the same training level as their regular army counterparts.

Table 1 shows a comparative sample of Army Reserve and Regular Army Combat Arms Corps courses in weeks.

From Table 1, Command and Staff College Graduates must be confused by the anomaly that what took them 10 months to learn on course at Queenscliff to command a Regular Army Unit, is not required by a Reserve officer to command a Reserve Unit. The common response from Reserve officers is the Reserve officer has more initiative and can absorb more information over a shorter non-continuous course. Such idle rhetoric does not equate to training levels and competencies that are equal between the Forces.

Table 2 shows a comparative indication of weeks a Combat Arms Corps commander spends in the field in collective training for calendar year 1997.

Both tables indicate a large disparity in time spent in training between part-time and full-time Arms Corps officers. When viewing the Collective Training figures, it is important to note that time spent in the field varies between training years and Units, the figures should only be used as a rough guide.

Chart 1 is the conceptual basis of Australian Defence Force mobilisation planning, the broken line indicates the work-up training for a part-time Combat Arms Corps Unit commander.

In order for the part-time commander to be at the same individual training level as the full-time commander, the entire period of “work-up” training during a 180 day mobilisation would have to be used to meet the shortfall in just individual training levels and competencies alone. A part-time Infantry Unit commander has to make up over 300 days of
individual training. This is to make up for the competencies he would have completed if he attended the full-time career courses. Some short cuts could be taken and weekends worked to compress the individual training required within the various Training Management Plans (TMP). However, it is the author’s opinion a successful 180 day mobilisation would not be met by the part-time commander, least of all the collective training competencies required for deployment.

**Table 1:** Time Spent Individual Training (weeks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Regular Army</th>
<th>Army Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regimental Officer Basic Course (RAAC)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4 (Phase 2&amp;4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Staff Course</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental Officer Advanced Course (RAInf)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Staff</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4 (4000 Series)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes CPX’s & TEWT’s*

**Table 2:** Time Spent in Collective Training (weeks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Level</th>
<th>Regular Army</th>
<th>Army Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Unit Commander</td>
<td>12 (D COY, 1RAR)</td>
<td>3 (B COY, 8/7RVR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Commander</td>
<td>6 (2RAR)</td>
<td>3 (8/7RVR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation Commander</td>
<td>5* (3BDE)</td>
<td>1* (4BDE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1990, the US President authorised the mobilisation of three National Guard combat brigades for the Persian Gulf War. These brigades were the highest priority Guard brigades with a wartime role. “At that time, the brigades estimated they would need 28 to 42 days of post-mobilisation training to be ready to deploy. However, the two brigades that completed training needed 91 and 106 days, and the Army estimated they would have required an additional 24 days of post-training activities before deployment. None of the Guard brigades deployed to the Gulf; they remained in a training status until the war was over.” Shortcomings in unit leadership were a major factor that contributed to the brigades not deploying. However, these deficiencies did not go unnoticed by the US Army. After the war, one initiative to remedy the problems with Guard leadership was the “Leader Development Action Plan”. Five years after the Gulf War the US Army was still concerned about the Guard brigades ability to be ready for war in 90 days.

With Army 21’s focus on force deployment of integrated Task Forces it becomes a greater reality

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"There is little justification for maintaining an Army at all, unless it can be made capable of opposing an enemy attack, when and where required."

Weaver, 1936.

“If we are to provide effective options for government, the future Army must be strategically and operationally deployable.”

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**Operational Readiness and Command**
that GRes units and GRes commanders will be deployed on operations. The last time an Australian Reserve Combat Arms Corps Unit was deployed on operations was during the end of the Second World War. The nature of modern warfare has made conflict more rapid and intense with Units required on a reduced notice to move, as such, peacetime training levels need to be maintained at higher levels then ever before. Unlike the Second World War, modern Reserve Units and their leaders will not have the luxury of lengthy pre-deployment training.

Even with lengthy pre-deployment training, it is hard to imagine how a GRes officer, who has not transferred from the Regular Army, could as competently command a Task Force on active operations as a regular Army counter-part. This is not to say senior GRes officers are incapable of higher level command because of any fault of their own, rather it is due to the fact that the higher the level of command the more professional experience is required. Due to time constraints from their civilian occupation, a part-time Combat Arms Corps Officer can never expect to achieve the same time in individual and collective training as a full-time Army officer.

Currently GRes Formation and Unit commanders have to rely too heavily on the Regular Army cadre staff’s experience and direction. This heavy reliance prevents them from commanding more independently. It is true that Regular Army commanders also have to rely on their staff, but not to the same extent. Experienced commanders need to be able to make Units and Sub-Units accountable as well as their own HQ staff officers. Sub-Unit commanders are trained and assessed by Unit commanders, Unit commanders are trained and assessed by Formation commanders. On mobilisation commanders should not be concentrating on their own catch-up individual training levels, at the expense of assessing and participating in collective training within their own Units. “Collective training can only be conducted effectively if a command and control element exists and is itself proficient.”

Within a 180 day mobilisation, there would be a minimal possibility a Sub-Unit commander would be able to complete the individual training required as indicated by Table 1. The Sub-Unit commander would still need good guidance during “work-up” training to make up for a lack of collective training experience. Strong guidance would have to be provided by Regular Army cadre staff with a high level of training experience. The cadre staff would have to be available to give assistance both on
mobilisation and operation. If the notice to move for the Unit was 90 days to be deployable; the Sub-Unit commander would not have sufficient time to be at the correct training level. This training level is both individual and time spent in Unit collective training.  

The Army is not a charity, nor should it toy with soldiers’ lives on operations, only to give career opportunities for a part-time officer corps. The Total Force should be lead by officers who have the highest trained experience. As such, all command appointments in Combat Arms Corps Units and Formations should be held by the most experienced officers available.

**Proposed Ceiling Rank**

“There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.”

Niccolo Machiavelli

“...we carry in our current doctrine, organisation, and equipment the residue of the strategic perceptions of an earlier era and of outmoded views on the nature of warfare.”

It is understood changes effecting the structure of the Army Reserve officer corps can be met by strong opposition through political channels. It is also evident senior Army Reserve officers have a vested stake in keeping the status-quo, to maintain their establishment positions. However, if Reserve officers are honest about command on operations they must realise they can no longer go through the motions in peacetime. Training levels and operational readiness are such that command above Sub-Unit can only be the domain of the Regular officer, anything else is a selfish and dangerous experiment where soldiers’ lives are concerned.

It was read in an *Australian Defence Force Journal*: “In quite recent memory, a Regular Major-General’s proposals to restrict Reserve officers to command at unit level reputedly stymied his candidacy for Chief of the General Staff.” When Reserve officers use veiled threats against dissenters or “rusty nails”, it is little wonder reasoned debate has never occurred on reviewing ceiling ranks for Army Reserve officers.

To quote a British Minister of Defence: “It should be remembered that NATO has no interest in reserves which are without training and equipment, particularly on the day war breaks out. There will not be time in another war to train and equip forces once it has started.” Most British Territorial Army (TA) Infantry Battalions are commanded by a regular officer, with an even higher regular Army presence in their NATO role TA Units. With current regular manning a similar system could be adopted within Australian GRes Units. If Australia is to take its defence seriously and be able to do so by friend and potential foe alike it must adopt such a system. We cannot allow outdated and reactionary cultural attitudes to prevent the Australian Army from aligning itself to the reality of short reaction and preparation time for modern warfare.

**Conclusion**

Army 21 has proclaimed bold moves towards a total Army. The intent is to give Australia the most deployable and effective Force structure. GRes Combat Arms Corps officers do not have the experience necessary to allow them to effectively command as the onset of hostilities commences, given the short lead times imposed by modern warfare. The review of readiness in the part-time Army needs to address this fundamental problem and resolve it by putting Unit effectiveness and soldiers’ lives ahead of political expediency.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations are proposed:

a. Combat Arms Corps Sub-Units on 90 days or less notice to move be commanded by a Regular Officer; and

b. Combat Arms Corps Units and Formations on 180 days or less notice to move be Commanded by a Regular Officer.

**NOTES**


4. ibid., p.209.
5. ibid., p.211
6 Senior Army Officer List 15 April 1997.
8. Level 1 - Familiarisation or background knowledge only; Level 2 - Skill level below speed and accuracy required of the job. Examined but not under job conditions and/or standards; Level 3 - Skill level at job standard. Examined under job conditions and at job standard; Level 4 - Taught to level 3. Practiced and examined under job conditions and job standards to ensure longer term retention.
9. Being able to carry out tasks and objectives related to a rank, trade and corps to the correct training level.
12. Notwithstanding other factors such as Unit availability of equipment and training days.
18. ibid., p.2.
21. Pending the Sub-Unit commander was released from their civilian employment and commenced training on day one of mobilisation.
24. The Defence Reserve Support Committee has a direct chain of command to the Minister of Defence Science and Personnel, and the Defence Reserve Association has direct liaison with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Army.
25. Defence Reserve Association meeting, Briefing on A21 from Minister of Defence and Chief of Army, Melbourne, 19 October 1996.
By Lieutenant Felicity Rogers, RAN

Introduction

It is now well accepted in the Defence community that Australia’s obligations under the law of armed conflict affect the planning and execution of ADF operations. The effect which Australia’s obligations under international human rights law may also have upon the conduct of operations, is not often acknowledged. The obligations, which we have voluntarily accepted, under various human rights conventions, form part of what is commonly termed “operations law”. That is, the law which affects the planning and execution of ADF operations.

The relationship between the law of armed conflict and international human rights law has been the subject of much debate amongst academics. All agree that these two streams of international law have developed independently. The regulation of warfare can be traced back to medieval times when, it has been argued, its basis was more in regulating the financial gains of war than in the idea of humanity. The law of armed conflict as we know it, is usually traced back to the latter half of the nineteenth century. The most significant development in the law of armed conflict was the conclusion in 1949 of the four Geneva Conventions. These Conventions are now so well accepted by states that they are considered to constitute customary international law.

While it has been argued that the concept of human rights can be traced back to the French Revolution, the development of an international law of human rights cannot be said to have truly begun until after World War II. The development of this area of the law was prompted by the atrocities which occurred during that conflict. The Charter of The United Nations contained the first explicit recognition in international law that an individual was entitled to the observance of certain fundamental rights and freedoms. Article 1 of the Charter sets out as one of the purposes of the United Nations, cooperation “in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”. In 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which gave some content to the undefined notion of human rights contained in the Charter. While the Declaration was not drafted in terms of a convention to which states may become party, its adoption prompted the formulation of several conventions which are formally binding, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR).

Despite their separate development, some academics argue that the law of armed conflict and international human rights law have now become fused. Others argue that this is more a matter of them becoming confused. The relevance of the debate to this discussion lies simply in the question of whether the law of armed conflict and international human rights law apply in mutually exclusive circumstance. That is, whether in circumstances where the law of armed conflict applies, international human rights law no longer applies.

The law of armed conflict does not apply until an armed conflict has commenced. But does the law of armed conflict replace international human rights law? An examination of opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, supports the contention that international human rights law continues to apply during armed conflict.

The United Nations has, on a number of occasions, affirmed that international human rights law continues to apply in times of armed conflict. UN General Assembly Resolution 3675(XXV) of 9 December 1970 states that the first of the fundamental principles concerning the protection of the civilian population in times of armed conflict was that, “[F]undamental Human Rights as accepted in international law and established in international instruments remain manifestly applicable in an armed conflict”. Again, in Resolution 2852 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 the General Assembly declared itself “desirous of securing the effective application of all existing rules relative to human rights in time of armed conflict.”

The most explicit acknowledgement of the continued application of international human rights
law can be found in the recent Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons. In this Opinion, the Court stated that “the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in time of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in time of national emergency”.10

There is therefore strong evidence to suggest that the existence of an armed conflict does not absolve states of their responsibilities under international human rights law. In a situation of armed conflict, both the law of armed conflict and international human rights law may apply. In undertaking planning of both exercises and operations, the ADF must bear in mind both these aspects of international law.

Australia’s International Obligations with Regard to Human Rights

Australia has not been reluctant to formally bind itself to conventions concerning the law of armed conflict. We became party to most of the Hague Conventions in 1909. The four Geneva Conventions were ratified by Australia in 1959 and the additional Protocols were ratified in 1991.

Up until the late 1970s however our attitude towards ratification of human rights instruments was more hesitant. This was due to a reluctance on behalf of the Federal Government to adopt international obligations before it could bring Australian legislation into line. The implementation of Australia’s international obligations through domestic legislation is complicated by the fact that many of the relevant areas are within the jurisdiction of Australian state parliaments rather than that of the Commonwealth.

In 1972, the Whitlam Government adopted a radical change of policy in this regard. This Government indicated early in its term of office that it would not wait for the states to bring their laws into line before ratifying international treaties. As a result, Australia ratified many of the existing human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).11

In September 1991, Australia accepted the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. This allows an individual who is under Australian jurisdiction to communicate directly with the Human Rights Committee with respect to any alleged breach of the ICCPR by the Australian Government. In January 1993, Australia made a declaration under Article 41 of the ICCPR that it recognised the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from other States party claiming that Australia is not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention.12 Once received, a communication is examined by the Committee, the Committee’s views are forwarded to both the State and the individual involved, and are published in the Committee’s annual report to the General assembly. Whilst the Committee’s views are not binding upon the State concerned, they can prove politically and diplomatically embarrassing.13

Article 4 of the ICCPR allows derogations from certain of the Conventions provisions in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed. Such a derogation must not discriminate on the basis of race, colour, sex, language or social origin. Certain fundamental provisions of the Convention may not be derogated from in any circumstances and these are; the right to life (Article 6), the prohibition on torture (Article 7), the prohibition on slavery (Article 8), the prohibition on imprisonment for inability to meet a contractual obligation (Article 11), the prohibition on retrospective punishment (Article 15) and recognition before the law (Article 16).

A state wishing to avail itself of the right to derogate from its obligations under the Convention must communicate its intention to the UN Secretary-General. This communication must set out the circumstances which necessitate a derogation and the specific domestic laws which constitute the derogation. Twenty-two states have communicated their intent to derogate since the ICCPR entered into force in 1976.14 Communication to the Secretary-General does not however instigate a consideration of the validity of a derogation. It is not until a communication is received by the Human Rights Committee that the validity of the derogation will be considered.15

In considering the validity of a derogation, the first issue is the existence of a public emergency. Article 4 of the ICCPR was modeled upon Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights and both Articles refer to the requirement of a public emergency. The European Commission of Human Rights has considered this requirement on a number of occasions. In the case of Lawless, the Commission undertook a thorough analysis of the conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland before concluding that a public emergency did in fact exist.16 In the Greek case however, the Commission considered that there was not such an emergency.17 In the latter case, the Commission stated that the following elements were
required (i) an actual or imminent emergency (ii) involving the whole nation (iii) threatening the continuance of the organised life of the community (iv) the normal measures or restrictions permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public health and safety being inadequate.

The requirements for a public emergency appear to be quite strict. While a serious domestic crisis may meet the requirements, it is difficult to imagine an overseas operation which would. Many of the contingencies planned for by the ADF would not meet the criteria of a public emergency. In these operations we must work within our existing obligations.

During an armed conflict, combatants are entitled to Prisoner of War (POW) status. Detention as a POW does not equate to arrest under criminal law. Civilians or other persons who are not entitled to POW status are subject to the criminal law of the state in which they are present. The practicality of bringing arrested persons before a judge or other persons promptly during an ADF operation therefore needs to be considered.\(^\text{19}\) It is suggested that in most circumstances in which ADF units would be deployed, this would not be possible. This Article has often been the subject of derogation by states and it is foreseeable that its application may be problematic in an ADF operation.

Article 12 of the ICCPR provides that everyone lawfully within the territory of a state shall have the right to liberty of movement. This provision precludes the internment of aliens or any restriction of movement placed on a population.\(^\text{20}\) The Article does however contain what is commonly referred to as a “claw-back provision”. That is, there is an exception for laws necessary to protect national security and public order. The situations in which, and extent to which, the rights contained in the Article may be restricted is unclear. This provision has been the subject of many derogations, the implication being that many states believe they are unable to respect these rights even under the claw-back provision.

Other Articles which may require consideration in the context of a particular operation include Article 13 of the ICCPR which provides that an alien lawfully in the territory of a state may only be expelled from that state in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with the law. Articles 17 and 19 of the ICCPR which deal respectively with the prohibition against arbitrary or unlawful interference and the right to freedom of expression have been the subject of many previous derogations in situations of serious domestic unrest.

Australia’s obligations under international human rights conventions are applicable at all times, even during armed conflict. These obligations must therefore be considered when planning ADF operations. Article 4 of the ICCPR allows states to derogate from provisions (other than certain fundamental Articles) in time of public emergency. A public emergency is; (i) an actual or imminent emergency (ii) involving the whole nation (iii) threatening the continuance of the organised life of the community and (iv) where the normal measures

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**What Impact will these Obligations have upon ADF planning?**

In planning an ADF operation, consideration needs to be given to the totality of Australia’s human rights obligations. The obligations which will impact upon a specific operation will obviously depend upon the specific circumstances. There are some provisions however which will be of relevance to most operations.

Article 6 of the ICCPR is a non-derogable provision which states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”. The ICJ in its recent Opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons had cause to consider whether the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict would necessarily breach this provision of the ICCPR. The Court stated that, while the provisions of the ICCPR continue to apply during armed conflict, the question of what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life must be judged according to the law of armed conflict.\(^\text{18}\) ADF members, in taking action against legitimate combatants in an armed conflict would not necessarily be in breach of Article 6. A breach of the law of armed conflict however could also be a breach of Article 6 of the ICCPR. An arbitrary killing in a situation short of armed conflict would not only be a breach of the ICCPR but also of the criminal law in the country where it occurred.

Article 9 of the ICCPR provides a right to be free from arbitrary arrest. It states;

> Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.
or restrictions permitted by the Conventions for the maintenance of public health and safety are inadequate. In situations where these requirements are met, the provisions of the ICCPR may be derogated from to the extent necessary. Any such derogation must be communicated to the UN Secretary-General.

In situations which do not meet the requirements of a public emergency (and this will be the majority of ADF operations) the ADF must be aware of its human rights obligations and work within these parameters. In undertaking ADF operations we are seeking to uphold international law, we must therefore ensure that in doing so we comply with the law ourselves.

NOTES
1. There may also be human rights norms which are binding upon Australia as customary international law. This article discusses only those rules which are indisputably binding upon Australia, that is, the Conventions which we have voluntarily ratified.
3. See Draper, ibid p. 199.
4. After witnessing the aftermath of the battle of Solferino in 1859, Henri Dunant founded the organisation which we now know as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC has been the driving force behind the codification and development of the Law of Armed Conflict during this century.
5. If a convention reflects customary international law it will bind all states, regardless of whether they become party to the actual convention.
7. Other conventions include The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), The Genocide Convention 1948 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984.
8. Draper argues, “[T]he two regimes are not only distinct but are diametrically opposed. The confusion between the two was a heresy of the UN, brought about by political forces which achieved their purpose by the inclusion of struggles for self-determination within the law applicable in armed conflicts. Op. cit n 3, p. 205.
9. There is much debate over the circumstances in which the law of armed conflict will apply. The majority of the Geneva Conventions only apply to an international armed conflict. The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were intended to apply in some situations of non-international armed conflict.
10. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons at 25.
11. Also ratified during this period were the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.
12. Some other human rights instruments contain similar provisions. In 1993, Australia also made a declaration under Article 21 of the Convention against Torture, allowing individuals to communicate directly with the Committee Against Torture. The ISESCR however, relies only upon compulsory reporting mechanisms.
13. The first communication made to the committee under Article 41 was on behalf of an Australian citizen Nicholas Toonen. Toonen argued that Tasmania’s criminal code, in prohibiting homosexual conduct was in breach of Articles 2(1), 17 and 26 of the ICCPR. The opinion of the Committee was that the Tasmanian law was in breach of the Convention.
14. For the full text of submitted derogations see UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/8, p. 147.
17. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Netherlands v Greece, Report, Nov 5 1969. In this case the Commission considered in detail the evidence put forward by Greece regarding the conditions in that country but ultimately decided that these did not constitute a public emergency.
18. The Opinion goes on to state, “the Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance”. Op. cit n 11 at 95.
20. See Francois Hampson who discusses the possibility that the detention of aliens by the British Government during the Gulf War was in breach of the European Convention of Human Rights in “The Geneva Conventions and the Detention of Civilians and Alleged Prisoners of War”, Public Law, 1991 p. 507.

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On 4 December 1908, Senator Edward Findley made the first reference to aviation in the Australian Houses of Parliament when he asked if the Minister for Defence, Senator Pearce, knew of a cablegram appearing in the morning paper headed “Military Aeroplanes. Sir Henry Hiram Maxim’s Opinion. Revolution in Warfare.” Findley then read from the Age:

In a lecture delivered before the Society of Arts last evening, Sir Hiram Maxim, the famous inventor, who has devoted much attention to the problem of artificial flight, expressed a striking opinion with regard to aeroplanes as a military adjunct. Sir Hiram asserted that aeroplanes would soon be a very important military weapon, enabling troops to bombard towns from a great distance, and create a revolution in warfare equal to that resulting from the invention of gun powder.

Pearce had not, but nevertheless insisted that his personal commitment to inventions was positive, and that he had taken steps to establish a board in each Australian state which would recommend to the Minister the value of any invention submitted to it, and if the government ought “to assist the inventor to bring it to fruition”.

The following year was that which, according to Flight, made “[t]he age of flight… the age we live in”. The defining event was the first international aviation meeting at Bétheny Plain, near Reims in the last week of August, where 23 aircraft competed for cash prizes in speed, distance and duration races. Glen Curtiss would take out the speed event at 75.7 km/h in his Golden Flyer, Henri Farman made the first flight of more than 100 miles while Hubert Latham climbed to a hitherto unreachable 155 metres. A Grand Prix de la Champagne for the longest flight also went to Farman who “remained in the air, plodding steadily around the course for more than three hours”. In Sydney, George August Taylor would found the Aerial League of Australia (28 April) and become the first Australian to make a flight in a heavier-than-air machine, a glider, at Narrabeen on 5 December. It was also the year the Commonwealth Government decided to establish an Australian Navy. This conjunction, compounded by the British War Office’s indifference to aeronautics, and a dearth of technical knowledge and official enthusiasm for the new science, would delay the beginnings of military aviation in Australia. Debate about aviation in Australia’s defence centring on the relative efficiencies of naval, land and air power, would therefore be hampered by ignorance of the capabilities of aircraft. Most surprisingly however, was that “aerial” defence’s most ardent supporters would be parliamentarians with humanitarian and anti-militarist leanings who regarded the aeroplane either as a lesser threat to peace or as a deterrent.

In 1909, Deakin’s Fusion Government was preoccupied with Australian security in the Pacific. An Imperial Defence Conference had been called by Britain to discuss naval cooperation and the creation of regional naval units. The beginnings of military aviation coinciding with the birth of the Royal Australian Navy had an inchoate aviation lobby already arguing that naval should give way to aerial defence. In that spirit, on 21 July 1909, Senator Clemsons asked if Colonel Foxton, Deakin’s appointee to the conference, had also been instructed to make “reference to the question of Aerial Navigation, as affecting the question of Defence” with the British. Although aircraft were not on the agenda, Senator Millen responded by saying that Cabinet discussed that with Foxton but prevaricated on precisely what Foxton’s instructions were. With the UK authorities’ indifference to aircraft as weapons already entrenched, it would in any case have been futile. During the Naval Loan Bill debates later in the year, air power advocates were even more vocal, accusing the Government of neglecting air defence. While £3,500,000 was sought for ships of war, where was provision for an aerial fleet? After all “other nations are beginning to develop aerial navigation and study aerial defence”.

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Dreadnoughts, Pacifism, Poising and Procrastination – A Parliamentary Pre-History of Air Power in Australia 1908-14

By Wing Commander J. W. Steinbach, RAAF

Introduction
The Naval Loan Bill was argued with great animus. Air power proponents railed at the expenditure on hardware that would be quickly relegated to the scrap-heap because:

\[\text{[it] is possible that in the next few years we may have perfected flying machines which may hover over other battleships, and from which bombs may be dropped upon our fleet and destroy it.}\]

Those for the Loan lampooned the idea: insisting that Australia would never be invaded by aerial machines, that no aircraft could sink a ship, and that other governments were also building battleships out of loan money. The naval defence scheme should not be postponed because of aircraft.

Whether or not air power has lived up to its early claims, in the years just after Federation it offered a solution to the defence of Australia, a problem already recognised as immense. In 1913, Senator Findley would remark that any future war would be different because it would be fought not on sea and land, but in the air and underwater. The static warfare of the Western Front would belie that but the idea became a tenet of Labor defence thinking: aircraft and submarine forces being cheaper to establish, entailing a professional rather than conscripted force and for just £5,000, to do something that none of the great inventors of the world have been able to accomplish.” Could the conditions be relaxed? Definitely not! According to Cook, a large number of applications had already been received and inquiries were continuing. Moreover, he added, the regulations were set by people who were “intensely interested in the scientific side of the question, and by known experts in the science”, the intent being “to stimulate Australian inventors”.

The requirement for helicopter-like “poising” looks odd, but the prevailing wisdom (or ignorance) was that an aircraft had to be stationary to release weapons accurately.

Charles Garland, in The Lone Hand, wrote presciently:

\[\text{Let it be said again that a country within striking distance of the future aerial fleet may possess its outposts, its city fortifications, and a million unbeaten troops in the field, yet in one fateful night its arsenals may be shattered, and its chief cities... suddenly and effectively obliterated... When efficient aerial fleets take a hand in war, cities will be destroyed before opposing armies or navies have time to meet... Successful aerial navigation means in war time the power to transport at small cost terribly destructive elements with unprecedented rapidity, with sufficient precision to ensure the maximum of their destructiveness.}\]

Garland’s ideas are modern, resembling the doctrines of the Coalition air forces (the Warden model) at the time of the Gulf War. Yet Garland too thought that the helicopter had greater potential than fixed wing aircraft, and so did others. After a July 1910 RUSI lecture by George Taylor (now an Honourary Lieutenant in the Intelligence Corps), entitled “The Air Age and its Military Significance”, the Chairman, Colonel Walleck, District Commander of the Defence Forces in Sydney, agreed on “the tremendous importance airships will be in the future
as regards warfare” but remarked that “at present they fail in one thing… It does not appear they can hover over any given point – they are not yet sufficiently under control”. He would add that the results of an attack on a fort by an aircraft would be certain “provided the airship could hover over the fort and drop her projectiles down.”

Taylor pointed out that dirigibles could do that, and that helicopters were constructed by placing the propeller on the top of the aeroplane. In an article, “Stability in Warfare” (Sydney Morning Herald, 8 September 1913) reporting the sensational aerobatic exploits of the French pilot Adolphe Pégoud, the first to fly inverted, credit for such feats was given to a Blériot stabilisator fitted to Pégoud’s craft. Charles Harvard Gibbs-Smith, the doyen of British aviation historians, would later refer to Pégoud’s aerobatics as forming the “unconscious prelude to the necessary manoeuvres of wartime flying”. In Sydney, the District Commander hoped that the increased stability now possible would give “increased ability to hover over a place” while Taylor explained to a reporter that the stabilisator would “retard further practical progress” and that the capability to “loop the loop will be of no advantage in aerial warfare”. The problems of helicopter flight and control envisaged by Taylor and Walleck, would only be solved once Igor Sikorsky put full cyclic pitch and tail-rotor control in the VS-300.

Reasonably well-informed of aeronautical developments, King O’Malley was the most vocal of the anti-militarist faction in the House. His motivation rested not so much on the cost-effectiveness of aircraft vis à vis dreadnoughts as protectors of Australian sovereignty, but rather that savings on defence could be diverted to commerce: the £500,000 set aside annually for the upkeep of the new fleet, would be sufficient to buy a fleet of flying ships. Joseph Cook, having just put his competition in place, assured O’Malley that the Government was looking into the matter, and challenged him to find a machine “to do all that is needful in the air.” Ten days later, O’Malley told the House that in ten years, Germany would have 10,000 aeroplanes, which when armed with torpedoes, would imperil the British fleet in the event of war. How, he asked, can it be worthwhile to continue building ships instead of aeroplanes? Cook countered by simply pointing out that the Germans themselves were still constructing dreadnoughts.

With the aircraft competition failing, some other governmental initiative was in order. Taylor, writing in The Lone Hand, now claimed that the conditions set by the Minister, could have been fulfilled by a Farman or Sommer biplane. He argued that although Australian inventors had tried, success had eluded them because they were not “birdmen”, and their flights, to date, had ended disastrously. What Australia really needed was a corps of aerial engineers. In the same issue, The Lone Hand argued some 29 “facts” why Australia should have a system of air defence, the salient ones being: the length of Australia’s coastline, the inadequacy of the army, no weapons self-sufficiency, and the expense of maintaining a credible navy while Japan was seeking naval supremacy in the Pacific and Great Britain was preoccupied in Europe with Germany.

Despite all the press reports of a role for the airship in war, the official line in Britain (and therefore Australia) was that it still had to prove itself, and no one had any idea whether heavier or lighter-than-air airships were the future. The War Office had been asked to supply the Department with full information and Senator Pearce said that the Government had instructed Australian military officers in the UK “attending manoeuvres there, to pay particular attention to what is being done in connection with the use of aeroplanes and dirigible balloons.” He added that although some information had been received from them, nothing to date was positive. The Opposition was not content with the Government’s progress. Mr Kelly, would ask on notice: who in the Australian General Staff was charged with studying advances in aerial navigation in Europe and advising the Government whether aircraft had any military potential; how many aircraft were used by the Germans, French and Japanese in recent exercises; and should not the Government send an officer to the UK for training in aeronautics so that it will not find itself out of touch? The replies, were, in order: no-one, don’t know, but the figures would undoubtedly be classified; and no! Kelly would not let the Government off so lightly. On 23 November 1910, he told the House that in other countries, aircraft were now well and truly out of the experimental stage and ready for practical use and that for reconnaissance work they were unrivalled. France, Germany and Japan had established schemes to train pilots. “My idea” Kelly added, “is that it is necessary to learn the ABC of flight before we start manufacturing.” We should “import a few aviators” and buy some machines, because, paraphrasing Taylor whose influence was apparent, “We should teach men to fly before we ask inventors to build machines.” Further, the Government should not waste a lot of time worrying about the type of aircraft and
“put us a year further in arrears in dealing with this matter than we are.”

At the end of 1910 the Government had nothing to show. It fell to the increasing number of enthusiasts to progress aviation in Australia. On 21 February, Harry Houdini was credited by the Aerial League (probably incorrectly) as having made the first powered flight in Australia (in a Voisin Boxkite) while Jack Duigan flew over 196 yards, in a pusher biplane of his own construction, at Mia Mia, Victoria. Duigan, according to Flight, gave due recognition to “Sir H. Maxim’s figures given in his excellent book on artificial flight, and that book has been all I have had to work on”.

Salesmen too were busy demonstrating the possibilities of aircraft, a major undertaking being that of the Bristol Company which was giving the army a taste of what aircraft could do.

In May 1911, the Sydney Morning Herald carried a story “Aeroplane in Warfare: What the Nations are Doing.” Subtitled “Apathy of the British Authorities,” it also reported on General Gordon’s flight over Sydney in a Boxkite flown by one of Bristol’s pilots. The flight impressed Gordon, currently District Commander, with the value of the aeroplane in warfare and the urgent necessity for the establishment of a school of aviation. The article also dealt with “what the powerful nations of the world are doing in the matter.” In the case of France and Germany, “keen competition has arisen,” while England would spend much less, mostly on expensive dirigibles. It summarised the uses of aircraft in war as:

Attacks on troops on the march with machine guns. Dropping incendiary bombs on supply stores. Destruction of bridges by bombs, and attacks upon lines of communication. Attacks upon bivouacs, and the harassing of an enemy during the night by the dropping of bombs.

A turning point came in 1911. While Pearce was in the UK attending the Imperial Defence Conference (in May) and George V’s coronation (W.G. Higgs was there as well), he was invited down to the Avro Flying School at Brooklands. Here he met Captain Sykes who was to take him flying. Pearce declined the opportunity but spent his time with the pilots. In his memoirs, Pearce recalls this episode as crucial,

…it convinced me of our wisdom of our having a flying school in the Defence Department. The advance that Australia made in aviation before the war through the activities of the Defence Department owes something to that Sunday’s experience.

During the Conference, Lord Haldane (then Minister for War), told Pearce that Britain expected to be at war with Germany by 1915, which led Pearce to “push on with all possible speed with our defence programme.” The Government’s first financial commitment to military aeronautics after the aeroplane inventions débâcle followed shortly. On 26 October 1911, beginning with the claim that his defence plan had now assured £3,000,000 of the £4,000,000 necessary for fleet construction, Prime Minister Fisher added that £4,000 was being provided “in aid of military aviation.” It was a disappointment for those who had been anticipating something grander.

The Commonwealth finally placed an order for aircraft on 3 July 1912, and a month later Fisher announced that the Government intended to establish “a school for the training of officers in aviation” and that provisions had been made for “two pilot aviators and four mechanists.” It was timely: eight months earlier, the aircraft had gone to war. On 22 October 1911, Capitano Piazzo of the Italian Air Flotilla, in a Blériot monoplane, had reconnoitred a Turkish force, and on 1 November, Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti dropped grenades from an Etrich, on a Turkish camp. Despite such demonstrations, in some quarters, there was still no general acceptance that aircraft had a war role. On 16 December, the Earl of Hardwicke in the House of Lords asked what HM Government was doing about flying training, “in view of the practical demonstration of the utility of the aeroplane in war”. Viscount Haldane replied that he was not about to lavish it in the hope that something might come of it. He pointed out that aircraft were required by armies and since Britain did not have a large army, the Navy might find a better use for them, and an Aeronautical Society discussion concluded that “used as a bomb dropping device, the aeroplane... was not successful.” Such uncertainties in the “mother” country did little to encourage Australians. W.G. Higgs made the first mention of the Italian exploits in Libya in the House on 16 July 1912 when he inquired if a military observer would be despatched to Tripoli to study the latest methods of warfare. The answer was that the British Government has military attachés there who in due course will report to the Home authorities for the benefit of the Commonwealth Defence Department.

On the success of aircraft in Libya, Major Giulio Douhet would write that, “A new weapon has appeared: the weapon of the air, a new fact has presented itself in the story of war: the principle of war in the air.”

In March 1912, Flight wrote: “The Australian Government seems to have difficulty in finding either pilots or machines to meet their requirements, and it is...
now announced that they have postponed the selection until after the Army trials.\textsuperscript{50} Australia after all, was “part and parcel of the Empire and it would have been useless to make progressive movement in aviation until the Imperial Army and Navy moved at the same rate”.\textsuperscript{50} The Military Aeroplane or Army Trials took place on Salisbury Plain in August, witnessed by some 200 Westminster parliamentarians, the object being to select the type of aeroplane best suited to the requirements of the British Army. The aircraft that won was obsolete and not suitable, the B.E.2 however, made a great impression. But the War Office could still not make up its mind. Surprisingly, it had already made a recommendation to Pearce, which led to orders for two B.E.2a and two Deperdussins being placed some two months before the trial. The B.E.2 was the best British design of 1912; Geoffrey de Havilland with Major Sykes as passenger, had just set a British altitude record in one, climbing to 9,500 feet in one hour twenty minutes, whereas a Deperduassin held the 1912 speed record of 108.18 mph. That one type was a biplace biplane and the other a single-seater monoplane suggests that the Commonwealth Government was now not just keeping an open mind, but had given the selection considerable thought: unfortunately they were not suitable for ab initio training which led to a later order for the Boxkite.

The Defence Department had despatched Oswald Watt to England at the end of March 1912 to investigate aviation developments.\textsuperscript{51} Writing in the May 1912 edition of the Military Journal, he felt that “the engine-in-front biplane and the two-seater monoplane” were the best types for “defence purposes”, and that “[e]very army should also possess a few single-seater racing monoplanes, as these can go anywhere and have nothing to fear from slower machines”.\textsuperscript{52} He also mentions that it “is an open secret that the efficiency of the French aerial fleet alone prevented a European war during 1911”. Watt was an exponent of building aircraft in Australia under license. “Once we get into our stride” he wrote, “we should be absolutely independent, and import nothing, even from England, except some fittings which it would not pay us to make out here”.\textsuperscript{53} The anti-dreadnought pacifist-air power line O’Malley had been promoting was now taken up by Dr Maloney\textsuperscript{54} and Higgs. Maloney saw air defence as a cheaper alternative leaving funds for other projects in the Treasury. Having gotten an admission from the Government that 1,800 biplace biplanes could be bought for the price of one battleship,\textsuperscript{55} he would argue that a single aircraft could sink a dreadnought, and as half the cost of a capital ship would pay for an aircraft factory, Australia would be getting better value for money from a strategy of defence from the air. He told the House he regarded “dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts as in the same category as the armoured man in the Middle Ages”,\textsuperscript{56} and that he would vote for funds being diverted away from naval expenditure, because it was ridiculous for a nation like Australia “to think that we can build ironclads to destroy any other nation… Our problem is to develop and populate the untold spaces in our midst, and that is where we ought to build”. To which O’Malley would add, “Hear, hear; we are defence mad”.\textsuperscript{57} Higgs had seen a demonstration at Hendon, of sandbags released from an aeroplane impacting within the outline of the deck of a warship marked on lawn. Aware of events in Tripoli and The Balkans where aircraft were configured for war, and the build-up of air forces in France and Germany, he wished to: emphasise the folly… in proposing to spend so much money on vessels… It would be better to spend money on technical schools in the big cities, and establishing others in the country, for the training of our children.\textsuperscript{58} For Higgs, the priority was children’s’ education, “to equip them for the battle of life”. Child labour, which prevented that, was a consequence of the enormous expenditure on defence.

In 1909, the War Office had commissioned Messrs Vickers, Son & Maxim “in conditions of the greatest possible secrecy”, to build an airship similar to a Zeppelin, for the Royal Navy. On 24 September 1911, the ship broke its back owing to structural weaknesses. The Committee of Imperial Defence then decided to buy two lighter-than-air airships abroad. Zeppelins were unavailable because the German Government forbade their export, so a Parseval semi-rigid type was bought.\textsuperscript{59} The London Daily Chronicle thought it “one of the grimmest ironies of the time, that the British Navy should apply to Germany for an air-cruiser”. When news of this reached the House, Higgs’ humanity drove him to ask if in the event of war between Great Britain and Germany, “will it [the Parseval] be used to kill the German workmen who made it?”\textsuperscript{60,61} Higgs believed, as did Thomas Edision, that:

\textit{the war game has been spoiled for good by the perfection of the aeroplane. Aerial navigation will end war. Universal peace will be assured as soon as it is realised that the airship which carries a man could carry 150 lbs. of nitro-glycerine just as well, and 20,000 airships thus equipped could amnihilate the assembled navies of the world.}\textsuperscript{62}
When O’ Malley returned to the Opposition benches, he told the House he would take the guns off the dreadnoughts, load them up with Australian produce, and send them off to the Panama Exposition at San Francisco. Like Findley, O’Malley supported the thesis that the defence of Australia should be provided by submarines and aeroplanes. On 18 May 1914, the Argus carried a story of an armed aircraft attacking a gunboat in Guayamas Harbour in Mexico, smashing her decks with bombs, and driving the ship out to sea. O’Malley seizing on the story, a practical exposition and portentous validation of the thesis that aircraft are superior, called on the prime minister not to spend any more money on vessels of war and the like until a Royal Commission investigated expenditure on defence. Cook agreed to look into it, but with war now a distinct possibility, O’Malley and the peace faction were out of step.

The very next item of business in the House was the presentation of papers, including Sir Ian Hamilton’s review of Australia’s Military Forces. Hamilton reported that a beginning had been made with military aviation and that in deciding to continue with it, the Government must have been well advised. However, he cautioned against neglecting the older arms that had to be kept “in the van of progress” to the point of suggesting that perhaps “it might be prudent to hold back in the matter of flying”, but nevertheless that Australia should “aim at being ultimate mistress of her own air as she is of her own land and sea”. His only firm recommendation was the purchase of two Bristol biplanes to “provide intermediate instruction” at Point Cook.

One of Pearce’s proudest claims, that Australia was the first Commonwealth nation after Britain to form a military aviation unit, is hollow: the British were themselves behind the Danes, Turks, Portuguese, French, Germans, Japanese and a few others; a consequence of Britain’s focus on her navy. Most Australians still looked at the world through British eyes, and while the Australian Government depended on the War Office for the “foreign adaptation of the science of aviation to the art of war”, Australia’s progress would be tied to the UK’s. Priority would go to the establishment of the RAN. The Defence Department lacked not only the experts to advise on air power but also the interest to promote and pursue its study: that was left to amateurs like Taylor and his Aerial League whose technical competence was always questionable. Air power was not understood. Even Pearce’s own commitment to flying training was only firmed after discussions with pilots in the UK and given urgency by an impending European war.

With the outbreak of war, O’ Malley, Higgs and Maloney were checked. They had seen air power, first, as a modern and potentially more efficient form of defence allowing for more funds for welfare or national development; second, as providing, along with submarines, a force that could not readily be deployed overseas and therefore more appropriate for national rather than imperial ends; third, as increasing defence self-sufficiency and so, self-reliance and a measure of independence; and finally, as a deterrent to end war, through an early manifestation of what this age calls dissuasion. Air power was not a means to some defence end, but rather, an adjunct of a wider and idealistic social, economic and international relations agenda. It was ironic that the most ardent and best informed advocates of air power in the parliament were not from the militarily disposed but from among its radicals and reformers. It was they, with their eyes on the future, who grasped the war potential of the new science. Outside of the pacifists, there were few air power supporters in parliament to take up the cause on its own merits. Pearce, as a practical politician with a realist streak and a pro- Empire outlook, coped with the pacifists and got his defence programme through in spite of their fervour. If he had a failing, it was his reliance on the British War Office for the professional aviation advice that body did not hold.

Air power first became an issue in the Australian Houses of Parliament in 1908. Apart from a few farsighted pacifists with optimistic views of its capabilities and holding some advanced ideas of its eventual impact, its proponents in both chambers were few. The majority, including Defence ministers, looked towards Britain. Consequently opportunities were missed. It took governments over four years to act and even after aircraft were ordered, a start to flying training would be repeatedly deferred for trivial reasons. It was only by the narrowest of margins that Australia managed to produce military aviators in the year the Great War broke out.

NOTES
2. More precisely, the first occasion to be indexed as such in Hansard.
3. Actually the Society of Arms.
5. Between 1908 and 1914, the governments, prime ministers and Ministers for Defence were:
6. Australia, Senate 1908, Aeroplanes: Inventions, IX, p.2698. On 20 December 1911, Pearce told the Senate that of £150 allocated for that purpose in 1910, only £19 was spent. Whatever he may have meant by encouragement, it did not extend to direct financial support, because “It is no part of the duty of the Defence Department to finance inventors in any way.” That included inventions deemed promising by the Inventions Board. Senate 1911, Appropriation Bill, LXIII, p.4922.


9. Taylor had collaborated with Lawrence Hargreaves in the experimental boxkite work in the 1890s.

10. Australia, Senate 1909, Imperial Defence Conference: Aerial Navigation Colonel Foxton’s Instructions, LI, p.1367. Would the British have been intellectually prepared to discuss air power at this time? In 1908, the CGS, General Sir William Nicholson had said that no Aeronautical device would be of much use to the British Army. On 23 July, one year and two days before Blériot’s most famous flight, the War Office issued a communique stating that only when someone flew across the Channel with a party of excursionists would aircraft be taken seriously. See Collin, Alfred, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and Government 1909-14, Macmillan in association with King’s College London, 1989, p.13.

11. Australia, Representatives 1909, Naval Loan Bill, LIV, p.6773.

12. ibid., p.6782.


16. ibid., loc. cit.

17. Raleigh, op. cit., p.76.

18. Flying Machines. Although the deadline for the competition was extended to 30 June, no one got close to the prize. While some 45 proposals were received, no entrant was able to submit a machine for a preliminary trial. The government therefore decided not to renew the prize.


20. For example the “Five Rings Strategy”, using air power to strike across the spectrum of objectives unconstrained by traditional limitations, and directly at the key production and civil/military leadership. See Richard Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air power and the Gulf War, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992, p.152.


27. Australia, Representatives 1909, Military Aeroplanes, LI, p.2769.

28. ibid., p.3334.


30. Australia, Representatives 1910, Aeroplanes and Dirigibles, LVIII, p.5682, 5 November.

31. Australia, Senate 1910, Supply Bill, LVII, p.4104. The British Army was holding its annual manoeuvres on Salisbury Plain, which featured a Boxkite used as a “spotter”.

32. Liberal and later Nationalist MHR for Wentworth, 1903-19.


34. Britain notably, did not establish a military flying training school until June 1912. Officers wishing to join the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers could learn at a private school run by George White for 75 Guineas. White was also founder of the British & Colonial Aircraft Company, manufacturer of the Boxkite.


38. Labor MHR for Capricornia.

39. Sykes’ role in the formation of British military aviation is well known.

40. George Foster Pearce, Carpenter to Cabinet: Thirty-Seven Years of Parliament, Hutchinson, London, 1951, p.82.

41. ibid., loc. cit.

42. Australia, Representatives 1911, Budget, LXI, p.1897.

43. Australia, Senate 1914, Orders for Aeroplanes, LXIII, p.1083. Two Deperdussins monoplanes and two B.E.2a biplanes were ordered on 3 July and the Bristol Boxkite on 6 December 1912.

44. Australia, Representatives 1912, Budget, LXV, p.1576.

45. Flight, 16 December 1911.

46. Flight, 30 December 1911.

47. Australia, Representatives, Defence Department, LXIV, p.797, 16 July.


49. Flight, 23 March 1912, p.270.

50. Parnell and Boughton, p.12. This section includes a summary of events leading to the establishment of the Australian Flying Corps.

51. One of the most distinguished of Australia’s first pilots (holder of Royal Aero Club license No. 112 and the first military officer to obtain flying qualifications) who went on to serve in the Australian Flying Corps. By 1918 he had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel to command the four Australian training squadrons at Tethury, Gloucestershire.


53. ibid., p.427.

54. Labor Member for Melbourne, humanitarian, ardent anti-militarist, and articulate defender of the White Australia Policy, according to the Australian Dictionary of Biography.

55. Australia, Representatives 1912, Budget, LXV, p.1680, 6 August.
60. Australia, Representatives 1912, British and German Relations, LX, p.7366.
61. When the war began, this Parseval was not impressed as a bomber, rather as an observation platform patrolling the English Channel over the heads of the Expeditionary Force.
63. Australia 1914, Governor-General’s Speech: Address-in-Reply, LXXIII, p.506, 30 April.
64. ibid., p.507.
67. ibid., loc. cit.

Wing Commander John Steinbach is presently Commanding Officer No 382 Combat Support Squadron at RAAF Amberley. He has previously contributed to the Australian Defence Force Journal.
The Role of C.E.W. Bean in Australian Historiography of The First World War

By Major M. J. Dugdale, RA Sigs

“Bean’s Anzac writings have had immense influence upon the way in which Australians understand their participation in the Great War”

Introduction

The outbreak of the Great War found in Australia a young nation reaching for national identity and a sense of purpose, with the opportunity before it to overcome the shame of its convict past and concurrently forge a national ethos on the battlefields of Europe.

The selection of journalist Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean to be Australia’s war correspondent and official historian with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was fortuitous. In pre-war years he had developed an idealised perception of the Australian character based on the independent and egalitarian men of the Australian bush. Additionally, Bean had a conviction that an official history must be accessible to ordinary Australians so that they may know how and why their country fought. He also felt that he owed it to his countrymen to ensure the accuracy of his writings. Thus Bean, who was not trained as an historian, approached his work as official historian with a fervour to tell the truth about Australia’s participation, but within the limitations of his own preconceptions.

His approach to writing the official history was radically different from that taken by earlier and contemporary historians. His work impacted on the lives of many Australians: the way in which returned servicemen recollected their part in the war; how ordinary Australians felt about the young men who went to fight and those that did not return; and how a fledgling nation grasped with pride the notion that it truly came of age in the trenches of Gallipoli and France.

Bean’s Methodology

Theme

The central theme in Bean’s writings in the pre-war years concerned the development of the Australian character. He became convinced that the colonial dominion was advancing the Anglo racial lines through the greater self-reliance typical of those in rural areas. He transplanted the same characteristics to urban dwellers, and intertwined this theme with his belief in patriotism and devotion to duty.

His terms of reference for the official history required him to describe the participation of the AIF in the war. With his well established personal views, Bean determined to extend his objective “to examine how the Australian people and Australian character come through the universally recognised test of their first great war”. Therefore, his official history became a means of assessing national character and particularly a way of measuring his theories regarding the idealised Australian. This theme was markedly different to that dominating other military histories. Bean was determined that his history move beyond the usual dry recitation of fact that left the reader with little understanding of how or why events occurred, to instead become a potent argument for nationalism. In effect, through his underlying theme, Bean’s official history was to affect Australians’ understanding of their history and their perception of themselves through until today.

Sources

Previous and contemporary military histories, including the British official history of World War One, were based on official dispatches and campaign orders. Bean could not restrict his sources in this way and hope to fulfil his thematic objectives. Additionally, he believed that the true story of the war lay beyond the bland details of the campaigns themselves, resting instead in the hearts and minds of the front line soldiers. Accordingly, he broke with accepted practice and sought to write from the point
of view of both the private soldier and the commander.

To Bean, it was essential that he attribute responsibility for events and decisions, and he felt that this could only be achieved by an understanding of the motives, character and qualities of the individuals involved. Thus Bean initiated oral history as an important facet of Australian historiography. He conducted numerous interviews with members of the AIF, making detailed diary entries that would later be used as anecdotes to not only personalise the official history but to support his generalisations regarding the Australian character and the performance of the AIF.

Bean drew on even more sources. He consulted unit histories (many of which he also wrote), the British war records, held discussions with senior British and Australian officers both during and after the war, compiled a large collection of his own war photographs and sketches as well as those he commissioned immediately after the war, and conducted post-war research at Gallipoli including discussions with Turkish officers.

Bean’s primary sources however, were his own experiences and observations. He was devoted to accurate and detailed recording and to the need for him to be close to the action to facilitate this. However, this necessarily coloured his recording as it was impossible for him not to be emotionally involved.

He not only drew from a range of sources but was fastidious in ensuring the accuracy of his information. He personally conducted investigations to cross-reference sources to ensure the integrity of his writing could not be questioned. This approach established a valuable precedent for later historians. Thus Bean greatly expanded the range of sources that were valid contributors to the compilation of military history, established the necessity to ensure the veracity of all information including that from official documents, and denied military commanders their former exclusive access as contributors to military history. This represented a truly innovative approach to military history.

Style

Bean’s official history was also innovative in the language he used. Drawing on his background as a journalist and his belief that he was writing the history for the ordinary Australian people, he adopted an easy narrative style that was both lyrical and emotional. Given his deep interest in defining the idealised Australian and his empathy for the subject matter, it was impossible for Bean to write in a detached style. Bean was living the experience with fellow Australians, risking his life, hearing their stories, sharing their fears and hopes; he could not write an objective history. This is a double-edged sword. The benefit is that his affinity with his subject makes his writing compelling; it draws the reader in and arouses excitement and sorrow. This is no dry academic text in the mould of previous military histories but a heartfelt and personal rendition of Australians’ sacrifices. Whilst the reader benefits from the insights this approach presents, the drawback is that questions are raised about the extent to which Bean was actually influencing the history by being such an integral part of it. His subjectivity meant that Bean interpreted events, particularly the actions of individual Australians, to accord with his extant opinions on Australian identity, and those whose actions he considered less than adequate he labelled as being not real Australians. He may also have contributed to the soldiers’ developing perceptions of themselves and therefore skewed the evolving character of Australian soldiers both through personal interaction but more widely through his control of the ANZAC Annuals in which, as editor, he published only articles that reinforced his understanding of Australian soldiers and their identity.

The official history also clearly attempts to convey to the reader something of the true nature of war, moving away from the common practice of glorifying war or depicting battle as an adventure. Though Bean’s war correspondence was censored, as was that of all journalists, and his newspaper articles were expected to encourage conscription, Bean determined to have the freedom to tell something of the horror of war in the official history - the brutality of trench warfare and the mistakes made by British and to a lesser extent Australian commanders. Accordingly, he vehemently opposed any form of censorship other than his own judgement and was supported in this by the Australian Prime Minister. Nevertheless in recent years his work has been criticised for not delving deeply enough into and interpreting the events he recorded. Gavin Souter has stated that “his history was microscopic in attention to detail but it was not very critical” and that “where he attempted criticism it was conspicuously shrouded in careful phrasing and almost apologetic reasoning for the morale of Australian troops”. Frank Farrell has stated that Bean restricted critique and discouraged theoretical speculation.

In a popular and widely read official history hailed by critics and contemporary historians as realistic and truthful, it was inevitable that Bean’s subjectivity would be accepted and then reflected
in subsequent military histories. Australian historiography of the First World War enthusiastically embraced Bean’s less academic and more personal style, but with little debate in the process also embraced his interpretation of events and their place in the national psyche. This impact on historiography was so profound that Australian social development was affected: whilst Britain and Europe in the 1920s were seriously questioning the methods, objectives and achievements of the war through books such as “All Quiet on the Western Front”, Australia readily adopted a legend brought to prominence through Bean’s writings. As stated by Frank Farrell: “Australians were to derive their national pride from their soldiers’ bravery, strength of character, mateship and loyalty. No further forward thinking was encouraged” and “Australia was above all else her fighting men”.

Influence on Other Military Historians

Bean set new standards for the research and writing of military history. His methodology engendered a sense of immediacy and personal identification in ordinary Australians and in the process fuelled a perception of national worth. But it was not only his writing that influenced Australian historiography of the Great War. He compiled collections of detailed maps of battlefields, his own sketches of Australian soldiers, and his own photographs. Of particular importance, his photographs of the Australian Gallipoli campaign are the only ones in existence. His preference for informal pictures of soldiers going about their daily duties highlighted the horrors of war but also the warmth of Australian mateship. Later war photographers and artists attempted to capture the same emotionalism in their work.

The stature of his official history dominated Australian historiography for decades and still holds great power. His methodology was adopted by later generations of Australian historians, including the perpetuation of his theme. For example Gavin Long, Australia’s official historian of World War II, was personally selected by Bean. Long was himself a journalist with experience of writing during war and peace, and he quite consciously set out to echo Bean’s spirit and methodology when writing his own official history. The official history of Australia’s participation in World War II shows the same thematic development of Australian character and the Anzac spirit.

It is only in the past two decades that historians have begun to review Bean’s interpretation of Australia’s participation in the Great War and to be critical of some of his conclusions and his impact on Australian society, particularly his marginalisation of some sections of the AIF and society not living up to his idealised Australian character. Whilst during the late 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam experience this criticism generally rebuked the Anzac legend cultivated by Bean, much of the re-awakened interest in the historiography of the First World War has drawn on issues touched on but not developed in the official history, such as the war’s impact on society, its effect on Australian women, and how returned servicemen remember their experiences. Historians Joy Damousi and Pam MacLean have highlighted the setbacks precipitated by Bean to the emerging Australian feminism. Gender inequality was reinforced by Bean’s emphasis on masculinity as the Australian identity; this was in contrast to the progress of feminism in other post-war societies where the causes and conduct of the war were questioned rather than held up as representing the birth of a nation. Historian Alistair Thomson has made particular inroads in the recording of returned servicemen’s oral histories. In the process he has clearly exposed the detrimental effects that Bean’s portrayal of Australian soldiers as laconic and reluctant heroes had on the many returning soldiers whose wartime experiences conflicted with the type of soldier that their nation expected them to be. Their inability to identify with Bean’s Australian soldier and therefore feel worthy led many of them into emotional breakdowns, lives as social outcasts and, in some cases, political agitators predominantly as socialists, communists or pacifists. Bean’s stature in the historiography of the Great War and the extent of his influence on the historiography of World War II may, through further research, show a similar marginalisation effect on the subsequent generation of returning servicemen.

Conclusion

During the war Bean compiled detailed recordings of his observations and experiences in almost 300 notebooks. Drawing on revised versions of his diary entries he commenced his official history four years after the Gallipoli landing in a project that was to occupy 23 years of his life. By the time he commenced the official history he was writing with certain themes already well entrenched in his thinking and well accepted by Australians through his efforts as a war correspondent. He also had a strong motivation for the ready acceptance into Australian
society of repatriated soldiers. Bean therefore sought to emphasise in the official history the growing Anzac legend that he had helped to cultivate in his wartime writings.

Though his official history in many instances tones down the emotionalism of his diary entries, his inability to remain a neutral recorder of events is clear and unselfconscious. He brings the history to life through his use of theme, language and narrative style, that stirred a sense of pride in a young country in need of something to instil national unity. In this way his official history took on a stature that saw Bean dominate the Australian historiography of World War I.

Bean’s role in the historiography is prominent at a number of levels. At the surface level he produced an extensive and detailed accounting of Australia’s involvement in the war by drawing on a range of official and unofficial sources, including oral histories, and using an engaging narrative style. At the next level he influenced soldiers’ perceptions of themselves by his predilection for describing them and their acts in terms of his perception of national character. At a deeper level Bean has had an ongoing influence on the description of national character and its contribution to Australia’s participation in the war by perpetuating his personal views in an official document. Even further, his methodology and interpretations were essentially unchallenged and embraced by later generations of historians. Only recently has C.E.W. Bean’s dominance of Australian historiography been tempered by more critical analysis of his methods, interpretations and omissions, and his impact on post-war Australian society. Even so, Bean’s official history remains the pivotal influence on Australian historiography of the First World War.

**NOTES**

3. Thomson, Alistair, *op cit.*, pp.64-66. Bean edited a number of ANZAC Annuals that were even more popular than his newspaper articles. The most popular was The ANZAC Book of January 1916. Though the books purported to be written and illustrated by the troops, the material did not represent a cross-section of Australian opinions and experiences in the war.
6. Ibid., p.112.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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Major Dugdale graduated from WRAAC School in 1982. She has held a variety of corps and non-corps postings including Staff Officer at HQADF, Squadron Commander at 7 Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare), Project Manager in Materiel Division-Army, instructor at the School of Signals, student on the first Australian Technical Staff Officer Course at ADFA in 1992, and the Contingent Commander of Exercise Long Look in 1995. She holds a Graduate Diploma in Telecommunications Systems Management and a Masters of Technology Management. Major Dugdale completed Army Command and Staff College in 1996 and is currently studying for a Masters of Defence Studies through Deakin University.
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OCEAN BRIDGE - The History of RAF Ferry Command, by Carl A. Christie, University of Toronto Press, Canada, Paperback, 458 pages, US$19.95

Reviewed by Group Captain Mark Lax, RAAF

The year 1942 was critical for the Allies. Japan’s ascendancy was at its peak, the Germans were driving deeper into Russia and in Africa, and the British 8th Army were struggling against Rommel’s Afrika Korps. The resupply of ammunition to Egypt became a major problem given the Axis control of the Mediterranean supply routes. The only way supplies could get through was by air. It was a little known part of RAF transport operations that brought in that vital ammunition – RAF Ferry Command. The same organisation was responsible for ferrying more than 10,000 aircraft across the Atlantic and Pacific to aid the war effort. This book is their definitive history. The role of the organisation that was responsible for delivering those aircraft is today little known outside the circle of those who were involved. This book seeks to address that deficiency in our collective understanding of this small but critical part of military aviation history.

RAF Ferry Command together with its American counterpart took on the challenge of providing aircraft to Britain when the U-boat menace made delivery by sea very uncertain. Before 1939, very few aircraft had successfully tackled the Atlantic Ocean crossing although BOAC had established a flying boat service some years prior. It was these men from the civil airline companies who would develop the aircraft lifeline. They soon developed three routes; directly across between Canada and Ireland, to the south via the Bahamas and Africa and to the north via Greenland and Iceland. Each route had its unique challenge and each claimed its share of lives.

One of the Pioneers of the initial services was an Australian, Don Bennett, later to become famous as the leader of Bomber Command’s Pathfinder Force. He had joined the RAF in the early 1930s, but had left to try his hand in civil aviation when he was co-opted by the Ministry of Aircraft Production to help plan the new ferry service. Much of the early part of the book is dedicated to Bennett’s contribution. The service he started went on to fill British and American war losses from American and Canadian aircraft plants allowing the RAF and USAAF to continue their daily onslaught against Germany.

Not all flights were easy or successful. According to the statistics (p. 254) more than 500 aircrew were lost delivering aircraft, 23 of whom were Australian. The book records that only two women were ever allowed to make the crossing as delivery crews, partly because of the dangers involved. The description of some of the accidents and the losses is a little depressing but incredible escapes and rescues are also given fair billing.

Author Carl Christie is a Canadian academic and although the book in places reads like a PhD thesis, it is well written, detailed and extremely well researched. I do warn that it is a little heavy going in places, but is excellent as a reference. My main complaint is that it takes a very parochial Canadian view of the whole issue of the Ferry Command organisation, particularly the politics of establishing airfields and air routes which would later become the basis of commercial air ways post war.

The book is available through the University of Toronto Press or from most good aviation bookstores. Its 458 pages contain 306 pages of text, 25 of appendices, 80 of notes and comprehensive index. Fifty black and white photographs and four maps complement the narrative. Certainly a worthwhile addition to any serious World War II air historian’s collection, but a bit heavy going for the average reader. Recommended, but check it out first.

A VOYAGE WITH AN AUSTRALIAN SAILOR, by Ken Cunningham, Balgowlah-Seaforth-Clontarf Returned Services League of Australia Sub-Branch, PO Box 3, Seaforth, NSW 2092, 1997, 277 pages, 46 photographs, $20 plus $5 postage anywhere in Australia, Paperback.

Reviewed by Vic Jeffery, Defence Public Information Branch, Department of Defence

Former Chief Petty Officer Ken Cunningham describes his book as “a collection of notes and anecdotes”. This claim does not do justice to the contents of this book that includes a wide expanse of articles relating to the Royal Australian Navy and Australian soldiers of both world wars.

The author has drawn on his memories of 26 years of naval service, including wartime service aboard the cruiser HMAS Hobart, destroyer HMAS Nizam, survey sloop HMAS Moresby, and finally the corvette HMAS Pirie which was present at the Japanese
surrender in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. His other sources have been articles, jottings, conversations, and relevant literature to produce a most readable book giving a layman’s view of some of Australia’s most famous military actions. Fittingly this book commences with the Gallipoli landings on 25 April 1915 and concludes with the Borneo campaign of 1945.


Naturally being a book on servicemen, there is a degree of humour included. One instance was during the dark days of 1942 after the Japanese midget submarine attack on Sydney when the United States Navy cruiser USS *Chicago* left No. 2 Buoy east of Garden Island at 0230 after rapidly raising steam. It seems in their haste to get underway the Americans left a sailor known as a “buoy jumper” on the wet, slippery, sharp barnacle encrusted buoy much to his chagrin. As dawn broke the cold and tired cursing American sailor attracted the attention of a passing launch and was rescued. He then had problems proving his story to the authorities, the fact he was still clutching his blacksmith’s tools finally convincing them of the authenticity of his ordeal. The sailor’s stranding possibly saved his life. Sadly USS *Chicago* never returned as she was sunk soon afterwards with heavy loss of life at the *Battle of Savo Island*.

I enjoyed Ken Cunningham’s lay-back and uncluttered style of writing. His obvious pride in Australia’s military history is evident and his endeavours to enlighten people are commendable. The 347 footnotes that are included are a treasure trove of snippets of military information. This book has been well researched and is a worthy addition to the available literature recording the exploits of our Navy and Army both in peace and war.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Derek Roylance, (Ret.)

It is an interesting diversion in an age where there are concerns about the number of women in the Federal Parliament and of quotas to ensure “proper” representation, to read a delightful volume penned by the first woman to grace the House of Representatives.

First published in 1972, and republished in this edition in 1997, it, above all else, exemplifies the remarkable spirit of this witty, intelligent woman whose contribution to Australia was much more than just being “the first”.

When she entered the House in 1943 she was the mother of nine children and the widow of former Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, who died in office. Joe Lyons, also a former Tasmanian Premier, had earned the opprobrium of the ALP for defecting from that Party to the United Australia Party. Dame Enid writes “He had done it at a time when to defect from the Australian Labor Party was, in the view of most of its supporters, ‘just about the lowest thing anyone could do’.”

That much, in politics, has not changed today … although defectors from other parties seem very welcome!

Her election for the northwest Tasmanian seat then known as Darwin caused some of the hate against her late husband by some members of the ALP to be leveled at her. A challenge to her election was on the grounds that, as the widow of a former Prime Minister she received an annuity (this was in the days before superannuation).

She asked the Prime Minister (Curtin) to repeal the Act granting her the annuity. He declined, but suggested she repay the money to the treasury each month. No more was heard of the challenge.

In the book Dame Enid gives delightful cameos of great men of the past like King O’Malley, WM Hughes, RG Casey, RG Menzies, H Holt and others.

It is well worth a read if only to discover how politics and the intrigues of parliament have changed over the past 50 years; and how much they have remained the same.


Reviewed by Bruce Davey

The author of this book is professor of history at the University of Western Ontario in Canada. The book is based on a course which is comparable to units of study offered by Australian universities, such as the Ancient History 455 course conducted by the University of New England. The scope of the work encompasses classical Greece to Republican Rome, a very popular period in the study of ancient history,
which covers the Persian, Peloponnesian and Punic wars, Alexander’s invasion of Persia and the wars of the Alexandrian succession (largely omitted). As stated by the blurb, particular emphasis is placed on the investigation of how the role of the warrior related to the role of the citizen, and how the symbols and propaganda stemming from war expressed and promoted society’s values.

Some of the most famous battles of the ancient world feature heavily in the discussion, as do some of the most important problems in the surviving records of these battles. For example, the actual role of the phalanx in Alexander’s famous victory at the battle of Gaugamela and the flow of battle which lead to Alexander’s successful river-crossing engagement at the Granicus River. Although examination of Alexander’s sieges is entirely missing, it is amazing that such a slim book is able to discuss so completely, the many battles that occurred.

The reader is informed by this work that “…in Greece, except for the mercenaries, the citizen remained an amateur soldier who fought when his state required it …in the various Hellenistic kingdoms there was also a tendency for the professionalisation of the army …in Rome, the citizen eventually became a professional because war was a permanent feature of everybody’s life.” The book abounds in really excellent analysis of the various periods under discussion. About the Macedonian era we read that, “…the greatness of the Macedonian innovation was, however, an extension of the roles of cavalry and infantry,” (and elsewhere), “ …the Macedonian solution …was a combination of personal skill, improved weapons, and, most of all, co-operation between different army units.”

Coverage of the Republican period of Rome is also full of insightful commentary, such as “… service in the army was a necessary stage for any aristocrat interested in a political career …"war represented the highest and most perfect fulfilment of the key values of the community.” Further notable assessments include comparison between the use of cavalry by Hannibal and Alexander. Hannibal’s cavalry, the author explains, so dominated his Roman counterparts that the use of this arm became the chosen method of defeating his enemies whereas in the case of Alexander’s cavalry, a one-on-one struggle against the numerically superior cavalry force was usually avoided in preference to the use of cavalry against broken infantry formations or against the position of the enemy leader. Santosuosso concludes that, “complex use of light cavalry differentiated Hannibal’s men from the armies of Alexander and his successors.”

It is not inappropriate within the theme of the book for the author to provide a certain rating of the famous individuals discussed. Hence we read that, “…the truth is that Hannibal the tactician was faultless and Hannibal the strategist was clever, Hannibal the grand strategist was not quite so brilliant” But later in the text we read that, “… it was the political leaders in Carthage, not Hannibal, who fashioned some of the major decisions.” So that the former grading of Hannibal as a leader at the various levels of war is slightly tarnished. We just don’t know enough about the people in Carthage who called the shots (wide of the mark as they were) to accept the judgement at face value. The reader must make the judgement whether the author’s uncritical acceptance of the received record of some of Scipio Africanus’ Spanish victories becomes a negative especially since propaganda is noted as one of the foundations of the book.

Many of the crucial elements of warfare in the ancient world receive lucid treatment in Santosuosso’s fine blend of narrative and contextual analysis. Elements such as citizen soldiers; professional and mercenary armies; naval warfare; weapons and tactics; command and leadership; national strategy; the war leaders religious identity and the process of change in warfare are all aspects that are well explained. The book is richly illustrated with many battle diagrams and maps which help the reader to comprehend the discussion of both strategic and tactical events. Although the general reader will find this work easy to read, the book displays high academic credibility, boasting extensive explanatory notes and a compendious bibliography.

WAR TORN by Fiona McKay, published by Allen & Unwin, PO Box 8500, 9 Atchison Street, St. Leonards, NSW 2065, in the Little Ark Books series, 95 pages with four colour photos and numerous black and white drawings, in soft cover printed with colour photo on front cover and synopsis on rear cover. Priced at $9.95. Contains a mini index and cross reference list in back of book.

Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant H.S. Brennan RFD JP (Ret.)

This small book compiled by Fiona McKay whose occupation is given as “teacher” contains eleven separate chapters, each dealing with thoughts and expressions of children in various war or strife-torn countries commencing with thoughts of a fourteen year old English boy during the 1939-45 War and concluding with excerpts from George Gittoes diary.
kept during the peace keeping tour of Somalia by Australian Peace Keeping Force.

Throughout each chapter, Fiona McKay includes snippets highlighting the problems of children embroiled in strife torn situations in their respective countries and manages very successfully in bringing home the element of fatal risk involved by these children who are sometimes unwitting participants in risk not always of their own making.

According to the publicity letter included with the book this book is intended for distribution throughout schools in the 10-13 year old age, and I feel this is a positive step in the direction of informing our school children of the problems other children face and suffer in their own countries. To me it demonstrates the huge gap between Christian based communities and those of other Religious beliefs. I would sincerely recommend this book to any school library as it is only by reading and absorbing stories of other children from other countries that we may be informed of just what goes on under adverse conditions and that our growing population realise just how lucky we are here in Australia.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing

It is important that military professionals develop an understanding of the role of the United nations in contemporary international relations. In my view the UN’s interventionist policies are one of the three crucial external influences on recent ADF operations – the other two being the broadened definition of security and the revolution in military affairs.

In the second edition of The United Nations and Changing World Politics, Thomas Weiss, David Forsyth and Roger Coate have produced a highly informative and readable text. The book states accurately that the UN is “...no longer ignored and neglected...” although the mixed results of the UN in Somalia, Bosnia and Zaire still energise its critics. The book is far from an idealistic defence of UN internationalism and the authors recognise the continuing primacy of the realist sovereignty paradigm. They also note that the UN runs the risk being used as a cipher to legitimise the global policing efforts of the United States. Nevertheless, the authors point out that the UN Charter is the closest thing that we have to a global constitution.

The book is organised into three parts; international peace and security, human rights and humanitarian action, and sustainable human development. Part One traces the development of collective security theory and its various applications culminating in the creation of the UN in 1945. It then deals with the performance of the UN during the Cold War (generally lacklustre results caused by the dominance of superpower rivalry) and after the Cold War (once again mixed results, although the UN has undergone a revival with the implementation of its interventionist agenda). Part Two examines the increasing importance of human rights which were often disregarded during the Cold War. The contradictions between concepts of universal human rights and national self-interest are illustrated, as is the rising influence of non-state actors. Part Three continues the theme of the non-military dimensions of world peace. The authors argue convincingly that economic, social and environmental disorder may cause problems for world peace which surpass even those posed by aggressive militaristic states.

Not withstanding these changing concepts of security, the UN was born from a war and it continues to define itself through the grim business of war. As this review was being prepared the US was considering launching an attack on Iraq for disobeying UN resolutions, and the ADF was likely to participate. If for no other reason than the need to understand the interventionist forces in contemporary international relations, Australian military professionals should read this book. It will provide them with an understanding of the complicated international constructs of the UN and the way in which they may decide to wage war in the interests of peace.


Reviewed by Major Warwick Graco, Inactive Army Reserve

This book uses the US Civil War 1861-1865 as a background to examine the combat leadership of six generals: four professional Army Officers and two citizen soldiers who rose to command divisions in the war. They include what Buell refers to as the “yeoman” General Ulysses S. Grant, the “aristocrat” General Robert E. Lee, the “roman” General George H. Thomas, the “knight-errent” General John B. Hood, the “cavalier” General John B. Gordon and the “puritan” General Francis C. Barlow.
Grant was a rugged, dependable professional soldier who rose to be General-in-Chief of the Federal armies in 1864. He achieved this rank because of his victories at Vicksburg and Chattanooga in 1863. What Grant lacked in imagination, planning and judgement, he made up with steadfast determination and his ability to improvise and make use of what he had at his disposal. Whereas many Federal generals lost the stomach to continue fighting when their armies were mauled, Grant took no heed of losses and other setbacks and maintained pressure on his opponents.

Lee, who embodied aristocratic virtues and who proved to be a formidable Confederate commander, succeeded in intimidating many of his more cautious Federal opponents during the war. He was a master of defensive warfare but was found wanting in strategy and was neglectful of administration and logistics. He paid the price with his decision to move north of the Potomac River and wage war in Pennsylvania in 1863. This excursion proved costly at Gettysburg and thereafter he was not able to regain the strategic initiative. The strength of his forces steadily ebbed away as a consequence of administrative neglect and the toll the war and the weather took on the discipline, morale, commitment and fighting spirit of his troops. While Lee’s forces were not conquered in battle, he was forced to surrender his Army to Grant when it was reduced to a skeleton force in 1865.

Thomas, in Buell’s opinion, was the outstanding general of the war. He rose to command the Federal Army of the Cumberland and it inflicted a decisive defeat on Hood’s Confederate Army of Tennessee at Nashville in late 1864. This gave Lincoln a victory that Grant’s armies in the East had not been able to deliver in seven months of combat against Lee’s forces. Thomas was thoughtful, methodical and thorough. He was an excellent administrator, a sound tactician and a resolute commander. He was also an officer of rate integrity and did not, like many of his peers, resort to politicking, intrigue and self-promotion to advance his career. He rose to the highest ranks on merit alone. Grant and Thomas were never able to relate to each other, and Grant interfered with Thomas’s command at various critical moments during the war. Yet Thomas’s forces swept the Confederate Army from the ridges overlooking Chattanooga and thus gave Grant this important victory in 1863.

In contrast to Thomas, Hood was an ambitious, aggressive and capable Confederate brigade and divisional commander who was full of dash and daring. But he was too headstrong, too impulsive and too incapacitated by an amputated leg and other injuries to function effectively as a corps and later an army commander. He squandered his troops in wasteful and unnecessary frontal assaults in battles and in the end was decisively defeated by Thomas at Nashville.

Gordon, a Confederate divisional commander, and Barlow, a Federal divisional commander, were superb combat leaders who, as volunteers, quickly mastered the art of war. Both sustained serious wounds in combat and both recovered to fight again. Both were fearless and determined commanders who repeatedly rallied, drove and inspired their troops in the heat and tumult of battle.

This book is pregnant with lessons on war. It brings home the importance of having accurate maps and of ensuring that troops are properly clothed and fed and are given first-class medical support. It stresses how intelligence, communications and logistics are critical to the success of a military campaign. It discusses politics, ambitions and petty jealousies and how generals on both sides spent more time “fighting” rivals, trying to even the score for an earlier personal slight or injury, than fighting the enemy. It shows how tactics is not so much a case of moving and positioning the “chess-pieces” on the battlefield, but is more a case of psychology. It involves misleading, confusing and then paralysing the mind of the opposing commander so that he ceases to function effectively. Lastly, the book illustrates how contagious fear is in battle and how it can cause fright and then flight in troops. The book deals with the measures taken by both sides to cope with malingerers, stragglers and deserters in war.

Overall this book strips war of its glamour and brings home many of the stark realities of combat. From this perspective, it is of a similar genre to Evan Connell’s (1985) Son of the Morning Star (London: Guild Publishing) which is a graphic and gripping account of Custer and the Battle of the Little Bighorn. In the reviewer’s opinion, Buell’s book is a “should read” for those involved in land operations and those involved in the higher direction of war.

**THE RAAF IN RUSSIA:** by Geoffrey W Rabel in hard cover of 130 pages with very numerous photos and illustrations. Published by Australian Military History Publications 13 Veronic Place, Loftus 2232, Priced at $30.00 including postage.

*Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant (Retd) H.S. Brennan RFD JP*

My first impressions of this book were that here was an attractive publication presented very intelligently by the colour scheme of the outer cover of mid blue with black lettering and carrying a replica of a painting done by Tony Corbett and representing RAAF Hampdens patrolling the Arctic Ocean which refers to the crux of the story written by the author in collaboration with many other older people and RAAF
records of the period of occupation by the then 455 Squadron RAAF when attached to the Russian Air Force during period of the 1939-45 War.

The reader is taken virtually step by step from the formation of 455 Squadron at RAAF Williamtown in 1941 through training and operational service to the return of the rear party, one of which was the author’s father, in December 1942 and finally to the disbandment 455 Squadron in May 1945. From the commencement of formation at Williamtown through to leaving England for attachment to the Russian Air Force the author has incorporated actual facts from RAAF sources and personal diaries of his late father and others to put together an interesting and sustainable record of the service work of 455 Squadron and its personnel, particularly during their service with Russia. On reading just what the circumstances of service in an area where climate was very hostile in terms of temperature and living facilities the narrative leaves one with the realisation of how physically intolerable it must have been for the Australians who were used to a temperate climate and it is a tribute to their ability to adapt to their surroundings so well even though they may not have been in the “front line” so to speak.

From the author’s narrative it would appear that 455 Squadron were sent to Russia to assist in protecting convoys by sea of supplies both to and from their area of operations which were based in the proximity of Vaenga, Murmansk and Archangelse, all of which are not very far from the North Pole, but because of German blockages were subjected to severe bombing and strafing and at the time the Hampden bomber, which because of the serious condition on the Eastern portions of Europe and England were the only available aircraft. The author has included considerable comment on the German Navy of which the battleship Tirpitz, which was quartered in the Arctic area, is featured together with the Luftwaffe units of Ju88’s and 89’s plus numerous submarines of the German Navy.

The book contains about 80 photos and plates plus a map of the area concerned plus a dedication to the author’s son a grandson of the Bob Rabel featured in the narrative, a lengthy acknowledgements, a list of Chapters, a list of plates and illustrations, a Preface and Foreword in the front of the book, plus at the back a very concise diary of 455’s movements, a convoy list of shipping plus Royal Navy attachments, German Luftwaffe and U Boat units, Abbreviation Glossary, complete list of 455 Squadron members who served in Russia a Bibliography and Index making the book a must for everyone interested in detailed wartime experiences.