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The Loss of HMAS Sydney

Dear Editor

Senator Macdonald may not be aware that the published results of historical research give answers to some of the questions over the loss of HMAS Sydney that his letter (ADFJ Jan/Feb 96) posits.

Historians Barbara Winter in her *HMAS Sydney: Fact, Fantasy and Fraud*, 1984, and Tom Frame in his *HMAS Sydney Loss & Controversy*, 1993, have carefully analysed what evidence exists. Frame writes convincingly after meticulous review of the circumstances: “Those with an interest in the loss of this proud Australian ship must learn to live with the unknown, and the unknowable”.

The Senator accepts that “the prospects of solving the mystery will always be limited”, but he then presses for the consideration of a public search for the vessel. There must be doubt whether a search could be justified. As Frame tells us, world experts have agreed the ship could be anywhere within several hundred square miles: Dr Robert Ballard of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute of Massachusetts “remarked that finding the wreck of Sydney cannot be described as looking for a needle in a haystack because the haystack has not yet been found!”.

Frame goes on: “In any case, the wrecks of either Sydney or Kormoran might not add very much to what we presently know about the action”.

It may be a political plus for the Senator to declare that the country “owes the surviving family members” but the cost of an operation to find the wreck would be high and at the most optimistic it could provide only marginal evidence. I therefore suggest that the Senator could easily find better uses for the millions of dollars the search would cost. Even its “consideration” may absorb funds that could be better spent on naval historical research and publication that might provide some lessons and worthwhile guidance for the current operators of the RAN.

The Senator also wants Australia to go chasing a British war file on the sinking of HMAS Sydney. He gives us no reason to believe there is such a file or that, even if there is one, it would contain anything not already in the Australian Archives.

On the other hand, the Senator’s suggestion for the erection of a memorial to HMAS Sydney warrants pursuing.

Robert Hyslop

Dear Editor

In the *Australian Defence Force Journal* for January/February 1996 you published a letter from the NSW Senator Sandy Macdonald which sought more information on the sinking of HMAS Sydney on 19 November 1941. In his letter he implies that the British Government is still holding a “war file on the sinking”. A similar misunderstanding was the basis of a query raised with the British High Commission here in Canberra by Senator Beahan, President of the Senate.

Having taken up the matter with the Naval Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defence in London, I can assure your readers that there has never been a 70 year moratorium on releasing papers on the sinking of HMAS Sydney. The few papers that were held in London on this sinking of an Australian warship under Australian command and acting under local orders have already been released in accordance with the Thirty Year Rule and have been available for the past 25 years at the Public Record Office at Kew. No papers have been withheld by the Ministry of Defence.

P C Wykeham-Martin
Commodore Royal Navy
British Defence and Naval Adviser

The Revolution in Military Affairs Debate

Dear Editor,

Recent articles in the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Combat Arms* and the *Australian Defence Force Journal* have given the wider defence community an opportunity to follow the ongoing RMA debate.

It would be interesting to hear some of the arguments put forward in Brigadier Dunn’s impromptu debates in the following four areas:

1) Higher strategy is determined by politicians who have historically embraced holding terrain as their defensive philosophy, whether it be Hitler or Stalin in Russia or Churchill at Singapore. Seizing
and holding terrain may be forced onto the Army by our political masters;
2) Tactics as an art is entirely dependent on logistic possibilities. Higher technology generally demands a greater logistic effort to service and maintain the technology. This has resulted in armies developing a longer logistic tail or relying on existing civil infrastructure. The scarcity of infrastructure in northern Australia may well be reason enough to seize and hold terrain for purely logistic reasons, even if only for limited periods;
3) Any enemy would have a strategy of their own that could include forcing the RMA adapted army into fighting an Industrial Age campaign by developing limited offensive technology that attacks one or more of the six pillars on which Minimum Mass Tactics are built. Electronic warfare that disrupts C3I may achieve this; and
4) It could be argued that the campaigns cited in Time x Technology x Tactics = RMA were not necessarily examples of the shortcomings of seizing and holding terrain, but perhaps the failure of Iraq to force the Coalition to fight at a technological level suited to Iraq. The Vietnamese and Afghans forced their technologically superior adversaries to fight at the defenders technology level thereby negating the ability of the Americans and Soviets to properly employ their technologically superior equipment.
I look forward to reading further debate on the Revolution in Military Affairs.

Anton Kuruc
Major
Royal Australian Infantry Corps

RAAF Intelligence Operations

Dear Editor,

Issue Number 112 (May/June 1995) of Australian Defence Force Journal contained an excellent article by Wayne Gobert entitled “RAAF Intelligence Operations – 1921 to 1945”. Wayne provided a general overview of RAAF Intelligence for 1921 to 1945, but did not describe any efforts to ascertain the Order of Battle of Japanese Army and Navy air forces, nor how intelligence was disseminated within the RAAF.

I would be interested to know whether Wayne or any other reader could enlighten me on this issue. I know that RAAF Intelligence recorded the numbers and types of Japanese aircraft operating from various airfields. What is unclear is whether any attempt was made to identify the precise units from which these aircraft came. Also, did RAAF Intelligence attempt to compile biographical information on Japanese Army and Navy air commanders? Finally, how was this type of intelligence disseminated (eg intelligence summaries and/or intelligence briefings), and to whom (ie to what headquarters/units/individuals)?

I suspect that much of the intelligence available was only disseminated to RAAF headquarters, and was never passed down the chain of command to units in the field. I would like to know whether anyone can confirm or deny this.

Jim Sinclair
Major
AUSTINT Corps (ARES)

Ethics and the ADF: Political Correctness in Peace — Unnecessary Baggage in War

Dear Editor,

Another article on Ethics in the ADF rolls off the presses. It seems almost every issue of the Australian Defence Force Journal, and every other professional Journal throughout the Defence Force, has its “regular” ethical/moral article.

Has the debate on ethics and morality in the Defence Force reached a point where they will take precedence over tactical and military skill? Will the leaders of tomorrow be more concerned about the morality or political correctness of their decisions rather than them being tactically or military sound? The answer is worrying because at the moment it appears to be yes.

Captain Keith Joseph’s article “The Teaching of Military Ethics” (November/December 1995 issue of the Australian Defence Force Journal) put forward yet another case on this subject. At least twice in the article he poses ethical dilemmas for leaders in which a leader has to make a decision in which the moral outcome and the military outcome could well be at odds.

The teaching of ethics can become a double edged sword. Let’s take for example a scenario put forward by Captain Joseph:

“You are a section commander, advancing after a hasty attack on an enemy position. After reorganisation you attend to the wounded; one of your riflemen will require medical evacuation and one of the enemy is more seriously injured, but can be saved with some effort on your part. Who do you treat first with your limited medical supplies? Who do you evacuate first?”
This raises a plethora of moral and military problems:

a. Do you expend scarce medical resources on the wounded enemy soldier? A few hours later a sniper shoots one of your men and you watch him die, in agony, through lack of medical supplies. Your troops won’t be thinking of the great moral gesture you made only a few hours before, only that their mate is dead and you let it happen.

b. Do you evacuate both men by stretchers thus reducing your forces to repel an enemy counter-attack which occurs half an hour later?

c. Do you shoot the enemy soldier and evacuate your own wounded man? Cuts down your problems by half but you face a possible court martial.

In the air conditioned classroom, or Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT), or even the live exercise (where no one will realistically die) the answers could be simple.

But on the real battlefield there is no “staff answer”. The leader and their troops will live or die by instant decisions. Therefore should not that decision be the tactically correct one rather than the morally correct one.

For instance, in the Burma campaign of World War II a British patrol executed a number of Burmese civilians. Why? Because the loyalty of the Burmese was questionable and it was thought they would reveal the presence of the British to the Japanese forces. The British officer made the military correct decision ie dead men tell no tales, and the patrol escaped detection, but few if any could argue that it was morally correct.

In another scenario a German U-Boat Commander sank a merchant vessel and then machine-gunned the survivors in the water. Definitely morally incorrect but maybe perhaps military correct. He knew he had sunk a ship in an area regularly patrolled by Allied aircraft. Once the survivors have been found the Allies would know a U-Boat was in the area and commence a search.

If no survivors exist then the loss of the ship may not be discovered until it fails to reach its next port and then the loss could be attributed to a mine or bad weather. The U-Boat Commander has bought himself and his crew time to get away from the scene of the sinking. Murder or an operational necessity?

Much has been written about the rules of war, but couldn’t it simply be expressed as to win the battle with the least number of casualties to your own side. That is surely what your enemy is also trying to achieve.

On the battlefield ethics and morality can become as dangerous as your enemy. Having never experienced active service, I can only rely on the experiences of others. One World War I veteran who I spoke to sums up the argument simply “If someone (the enemy) got in your way you just did whatever it took to get them out of the way”.

The recent Glenn Review states the following about the special nature of military service, “They train for the application of extreme violence in a controlled and humane fashion”. However, at the end of the day the leader also has an obligation to ensure he is on the winning side and brings as many of his troops safely through the conflict. Should not our leaders be trained to fight, to win and have the “guts” to stand by their decisions.

Those in command, and those who expound the righteousness of morality and ethics (such as Chaplains, academics at various training institutions, Medical personnel) should realise that in the split seconds that a leader has to make a decision, it should be the sound military one that takes precedence. If that happens to coincide with the moral decision then so be it. If it doesn’t then the leader will have to live the rest of their days with the outcome of that decision. Will he/she sleep better at night with the ghost of the enemy soldier they shot or the ghosts of their own soldiers whose lives were squandered when they made the morally correct decision.

“...You are a platoon commander on patrol through a village when you are fired upon from a hut. One of your men is killed. As you attack the hut an eleven year old girl runs away from the building carrying an AK 47 rifle. She also has her younger brother running with her – he is holding her hand and he is unarmed”. What do you do?

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TQM and the Australian Army – The Continuous Improvement Culture

By Major M. L. Phelps, RAA

"The goal is clear. To eliminate chronic waste costing Army at least $20M per year."

Directorate of Resource Management, Feb 92

Introduction

The above comment relates to a Management Audit Report that identified chronic waste in the area of unit equipment accounting within the Australian Army. Notwithstanding problems in extrapolation, this report provided a snapshot of chronic wastage across the Army, and added support to the “generally accepted presumption that chronic waste of up to 30 per cent can be expected in most systems or processes” (DRM-A, 1992, p.2). Allied to this chronic wastage was the scope of change being undertaken as a result of significant changes affecting Army.

Whilst the Army has continually maintained well developed doctrine for the conduct of combat operations, what had been lacking was a doctrinal base of management to support change and reduce chronic waste. Total Quality Management (TQM) was seen as the answer to fill this hole in Army’s doctrinal base. The aim of this article is to assess the introduction of TQM into the Australian Army from an Organisational Development perspective.

This article will briefly outline the background behind the introduction of TQM, the plan for its introduction and the implementation to date, before finally assessing the results achieved. Before doing that however, a short overview of organisational development is necessary.

Organisational Development – Effectively Managing Change

Organisational development is the systemwide application of behavioural science knowledge to the planned development and reinforcement of organisational strategies, structures, and processes for improving an organisation’s effectiveness. Organisational development is concerned with change that enables an organisation to move towards improved problem solving, quality of work life and effectiveness.

Organisational development seeks to improve an organisation through interventions; a set of planned change activities intended to help an organisation increase its effectiveness. There are four types of interventions, depending on the issues to be addressed:

1. Human Process Interventions. These interventions focus on the people within organisations and the process through which they accomplish organisational goals. Human fulfilment is valued and it is expected that organisational effectiveness follows from improved functioning of people and organisational processes.

2. Techno-structural Interventions. These interventions focus on the technology and structure of organisations. Emphasis is on productivity and human fulfilment and it is expected that organisation effectiveness will result from appropriate work designs and organisational structures.

3. Human Resource Management (HRM) Interventions. These interventions focus on personnel practices used to integrate people into organisations. Emphasis is on the people in organisations, believing that organisational effectiveness results from improved practices for integrating employees into organisations.

4. Strategic Interventions. These interventions link the functioning of the organisation to the larger environment and transform the organisation to keep pace with changing conditions. Organisational effectiveness results from a fit between business strategy, structures, culture, and the larger environment.

TQM is an employee involvement activity falling into the category of techno-structural interventions. It is a long-term effort that orientates all of an organisation’s activities around the concept of quality. Total quality is achieved when organisational processes reliably produce outputs that meet or exceed customer expectations and when commitment to the continuous improvement of all processes becomes part of the organisation’s culture.
Throughout the late 1980s periodic audits highlighted chronic waste within Army’s bureaucratic system. Concurrently, Army was undertaking a number of major strategic and techno-structural interventions as previously mentioned. Changes to Army’s bureaucracy, according to Bunston, could only ever hope to be about 80 per cent effective, as many of the informal interdependencies that contributed to bureaucratic efficiencies were severed. It was recognised, however, that individuals within Army were generally aware of those deficiencies that prevented the system from reaching its full potential. What was needed was a management philosophy that encouraged individuals to act to improve the system so that imposed changes reached their full potential and chronic waste was reduced. Individuals within the Army needed a philosophy of “continuous improvement.”

The catalyst that prompted Army to act was the coincident occurrence of two events in November 1991. The Army found itself in the embarrassing situation of having to borrow money from the Reserve Bank to fund a shortfall in its salaries vote. At the same time, the audit report mentioned in the introduction was delivered to Army (Bunston, Noye). Never was the need to reduce waste seen more acutely by Army’s top management than at that moment.

The Directorate of Management Development (DMD-A) undertook a review of management theories to determine which was best suited to meet Army’s needs. TQM was emerging as the appropriate approach as its key emphasis was on continuous improvement. TQM had already been introduced into the RAN and RAAF, and some elements of Army had independently instituted TQM programs. Additionally, many of the tenets of TQM were seen to already exist within the culture of Army (Dunn, 1991, p. 5).

TQM was endorsed in July 1992 in Army’s key strategic planning and development document, Army Into the 21st Century (A21C), as the doctrinal base for management training and techniques (A21C, p. 6). Before any detailed planning could be undertaken, DMD-A had to obtain senior management policy guidance and funding approval for the introduction and development of TQM. The Chief of the General Staff’s Advisory Committee (CGSAC) Submission No 26/92 was developed throughout 1992 by DMD-A and approved by the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in March 1993. From an organisational development perspective, CGSAC 26/92 was the “contract” between the change agent, DMD-A, and the Army, for the TQM intervention about to be undertaken.

The key tenets for the introduction of TQM were a top-down approach through the chain-of-command, the integration of TQM with the Army’s leadership ethic, the employment of the Army Training System, the use of external/internal consultants in the initial phases of implementation, and DMD-A sponsorship of the development of management doctrine and training and the design of an evaluation methodology. An allocation of funds of $0.55m for FY 93/94 and $0.52m for FY 94/95 was approved for efficiency programs and initiatives to provide the initial investment to implement TQM (CGSAC 26/92, p. 6). Further funding of $0.284m per annum has been approved for the remaining six years of the implementation program and is considered adequate by DMD-A staff (Noye).

The objective of the TQM implementation strategy is to develop a culture of continuous improvement as the basis for Army’s management doctrine and practice by the sustained application of Quality Management (QM) principles. The outcomes sought from the application of quality management principles are:

1. Improvement in Army’s capability and productivity.
2. More effective leadership and exercise of command, through better management practices.
3. Improved management of change.
4. Management focused on processes and outcomes, not simply on conducting activities.

Planning for the implementation of TQM commenced in early 1992 as part of CGSAC 26/92. The broad strategy, objectives and plan were complete in draft form in January 1993 and this was considered sufficient to commence implementation (Noye). The final plan, Army Office Staff Instruction 17/94, The Army Improving Management Program: Quality Management in the Army (AOSI 17/94), was promulgated in July 1994. AOSI 17/94 is a comprehensive document outlining Army’s TQM principles, goals and objectives, the implementation...
strategy, the evaluation strategy, TQM’s relationship with other current quality management practices, and detailed tasks and responsibilities for those Army agencies that are associated with the introduction of TQM.

TQM is to be introduced over an eight year period in three phases:

1. **Phase 1: Introduction (FY 93/94 and FY 94/95).**
   The aim of this phase is to create an awareness of TQM and commence its application in units.

2. **Phase 2: Development (FY 95/96 to FY 97/98).**
   The aim of this phase is to promulgate doctrine and establish continuous improvement as a normal management practice.

3. **Phase 3: Consolidation (Beyond FY 97/98).**
   The aim of this phase is to ensure that continuous improvement is embedded into Army’s culture.

   Essential to the long-term success of this intervention is this last phase, the necessity to embed in Army’s culture the notion of continuous improvement as the normal management practice. Army believes it has a “DO” ethos (CGSAC 10/95, p.3), and solving problems is a strong element of Army’s culture. Rather than attempt to change this ethos, it is to be used to move the culture from continuous problem solving to continuous improvement of processes. Thus the Army seeks to use its culture to change its culture.

   Phase 1 is now complete and Army has trained 1321 personnel on 65 TQM courses. Some 300 projects have been commenced within units as a direct result of this training and a number of other projects have been initiated separately by commanders and other staff (CGSAC 10/95, p. 2).

### Continuous Improvement – Evaluating and Institutionalising Change

The requirement to conduct continuous evaluation is an integral part of the TQM implementation strategy and this evaluation consists of an annual cycle to:

1. Measure achievements against planned objectives/outcomes.
2. Establish benchmarks for evaluation in subsequent years.
3. Monitor and refine the strategy for the introduction and integration of TQM.

   This accords with what Cummings and Worley (1993, p. 573) term “implementation feedback” aimed at guiding implementation, and “evaluation feedback” aimed at discovering intervention outcomes.

   The evaluation for FY 93/94 was conducted during August and September 1994 with the report being finalised in May 1995. This report was supplemented with data from FY 94/95 as available. Statistical data was collected through two sources: a Compliance Questionnaire to determine numbers of personnel trained, projects started, savings achieved and general attitudes towards TQM; and Army’s existing Officer and Soldier Attitude Opinion Surveys again to gauge general attitudes towards TQM. Additionally, the evaluation team conducted interviews with key personnel in selected units to supplement the data gained from the above questionnaires.

   The full cost effectiveness of TQM has been difficult to assess. To date Army has invested $1.07m in direct costs, and approximately another $3.0m in indirect costs, towards implementing TQM (DMD-A, 1995, p. 12). Difficulty has been experienced in gaining data on direct savings associated with TQM projects. Initial data indicated that in FY 93/94 some 103 projects had been completed as a result of TQM, however, further analysis indicated that some 50 of those projects were actually reported as belonging to another Army rationalisation project, DNSDC (DMD-A, 1995, p. 27).

   Nevertheless, a number of projects have indicated significant savings (see CGSAC 10/95, pp. 2-3). The cost of TQM courses have been reduced by 56 per cent since July 1993. Projects at 1 Armoured Regiment and Brisbane Logistics Group have resulted in annual savings of $0.6m each. A project at the School of Military Engineering has identified a one-off saving of $6.1m and annual savings of $0.75m. In non-dollar savings, processing times for certain vehicle repairs have been reduced from 172 days to 5 days, 546 days to 3 days and 197 days to 1 day. The rehabilitation time for soft tissue injuries resulting from parachuting accidents has been reduced by about 25 per cent (Dunn, 1994, p. 16). These cited examples alone indicate a significant return on investment to date. It is expected that the actual savings as a result of TQM are much greater, however, the ability to accurately assess those savings is hampered by an immature evaluation process.

   The Attitude Opinion Surveys indicate that there is acceptance of TQM by Army personnel although less than 5 per cent of the Army have received training to date. The results of the Officer and Soldier Opinion Surveys are shown in the following graphs. The survey response ranges from 1, Most Negative, to 10, Most Positive.
The results show a bimodal distribution in both officer and soldier opinions, and strongly so in the latter case. To date TQM training has only targeted officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers, Army’s line, middle and upper management levels. This may explain the strong negative response from soldiers. Initial research by DMD-A on both findings indicates that those who are reporting unfavourably have not yet received TQM training and may indicate a bias against TQM as a result of ignorance or prejudice. Since the Attitude Opinion Surveys are randomly distributed and only 5 per cent of the Army has undertaken TQM training, the survey results do indicate that the TQM implementation project has enjoyed a measure of success to date (CGSAC 10/95, p. 4).

Whilst awareness of TQM is increasing and showing positive results, there persists an attitude that TQM is an activity which diverts Army personnel away from their “real work” (CGSAC 10/95, p. 3). Whilst this attitude persists, Noye believes that leaders at all levels will continue to go for the “quick fix” to problems, rather than the improved solution of treating the cause not the symptoms. Therefore, the concept of “using the culture to change the culture” appears not to be working. Army attempted to show that the move to a culture of continuous improvement from that of continuous problem solving was not a paradigm shift.

Unfortunately, this has tended to reinforce in many individuals the notion that there is no need to change.

**Continuously Improving, Continuous Improvement – Some Comments on the Way Ahead and Concluding Remarks**

The Army has two main areas to address over the remaining years of the implementation program. First, it must improve the evaluation methodology so as to better determine cost savings associated with TQM. Second, and most importantly, Army must place greater emphasis on changing Army’s culture to accept TQM.

There is some difficulty in correctly identifying savings associated with TQM due to the large number of interventions being undertaken within Army. The impetus for projects is becoming blurred and a number of projects are being reported as belonging to more than one, or the incorrect, intervention. What is needed from Army Office are clear recording and reporting procedures. In addition to cost and benefit capture associated with interventions, Army must lay down guidance for determining with which specific intervention the project should be linked. This will not only benefit TQM, but the other interventions as well.
Army's biggest problem by far will be the ongoing difficulty in changing its culture. There are a number of suggestions as to how this can be achieved. First, Army should clearly identify the need for management training and its place within the continuum of training. Second, TQM must be integrated into unit strategic/management plans and not be undertaken as a stand alone activity. Third, Army should broaden the base of TQM training so that soldiers and their civilian counterparts are better able to participate in the continuous improvement process. If the desire for change is being driven from both Army's top leaders and from the bottom by its "workers" then change stands a better chance of success. Fourth, despite Army's intention to avoid using the label "TQM" for its quality management program, the label persists. Indeed DMD-A itself persists with the label. Army should avoid using the term "TQM" and instead push the attitude of continuous improvement as was stated in the implementation plan.

Finally, one further area that must be reviewed by Army is the application of rewards linked to quality improvements. The linkage between process improvements and rewards promotes and reinforces the assumption that continuous improvements are an important part of Army's new culture associated with TQM. Whilst this has been recognised by Army (AOSI 17/94, p. 7), it believes that financial rewards are inappropriate due to their perceived negative effects upon fairness between teams and amongst team members (CGSAC 26/92, p. 5). Recognition for contributions towards continuous improvement is to come from within the existing Defence reward spectrum.

The ability of rewards to motivate individuals is dependent upon five factors: availability, durability, performance contingency, timeliness and equity (Cummings and Worley, 1993, p. 408). Whilst the existing Defence rewards possess the first three of these factors, they are often greatly separated in time from the performance they are intended to reinforce. Additionally, there is some doubt as to their equity as there is no guarantee that similar contributions by different individuals will receive the same reward. Equity must exist both internally, that is within units, and externally, that is across all units. Army should take action to address these issues as improvements in timeliness and equity are needed to ensure the long-term efficacy of rewards as a motivating factor.

Declining Defence budgets, chronic waste and the requirement to manage change effectively, has lead Army to adopting TQM or continuous improvement as a doctrinal base for management. Army has adopted a somewhat classical approach to managing this organisational development activity, with good
diagnosis, a well planned implementation and finally continuous evaluation to determine the effectiveness of the intervention and provide feedback as to the way ahead for the remainder of the implementation period.

The program to implement TQM has only been underway for two of its eight years and initial results are encouraging. Savings have been demonstrated as a direct result of TQM training but refinements must be made to recording and reporting procedures so that the full effects of TQM can be better assessed. TQM is gaining in acceptance but there is still a degree of opposition to its introduction. The Army must drive home that quality management is not done in place of "real work", but the way smart people do "real work" better.

NOTES
1. The 1987 Defence White Paper, the 1991 Force Structure Review, the Ready Reserve Scheme, the Commercial Support Program, the Defence Regional Support Review, and the Financial Management Improvement Program are just some of the more significant interventions.
2. The Army in this context refers to both military personnel and defence civilians.
3. A comprehensive overview of TQM is given in Ferndale's Total Quality Management (TQM) and the Australian Army.
5. Army uses the terms "Quality Management" and "continuous improvement" in preference to TQM. Quality Management is all aspects of management that contribute to good planning, continuous improvement and the achievement of quality outcomes. Avoidance of the term TQM is to foster the long-term aim to have the quality management approach accepted as the normal way of doing business. TQM has been used throughout this article for consistency.
6. The issue of the plan was deliberately delayed as DMD-A staff were on a steep learning curve. DMD-A waited so that lessons learnt in the early part of Phase 1 could be incorporated into the final plan. This ensured that the issued plan had adequate longevity.
7. There are four types of courses: a two day QM awareness course for senior officers (Colonel and above), a two day QM introductory course for senior unit staff, a five day QM facilitator's course and a five day QM advanced facilitator's course.
8. The direct costs are the approved funding of $0.55m for FY 93/94 and $0.52m for FY 94/95. The indirect costs are an extrapolation of costs given in the Evaluation Report for FY 93/94 of $1.5m.

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Major Phelps graduated from RMC in 1989 and was allotted to RAA. He has served with 1st Field Regiment, 8th/12th Medium Regiment, P&EE Port Wakefield, 4th Field Regiment and Materiel Division – Army. He has attended RMCS Shriverham and Command and Staff College, and recently completed a Masters of Management Studies at ADFA.
Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement – The UN Dilemma

By Lieutenant Colonel M.C. Studdert, AM

"It is no longer enough to implement agreements or separate antagonists; the international community now wants the United Nations to demarcate boundaries, control and eliminate heavy weapons, quell anarchy, and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in war zones. These are clearly tasks that call for 'teeth' and 'muscle'...In other words there are increasing demands that the United Nations now enforce the peace, as originally envisaged in the Charter.”

"To rush into a generalised advocacy of the use of force, on a misguided assumption that the UN can succeed where so many states and empires have failed, is to invite disaster. The risks in the expansion of the concept of peacekeeping...and of proposals for increased use of force, are obvious. Major military activities in the name of peacekeeping may get mired in controversy, and tainted by failure.”

**Introduction**

These epigraphs illustrate the conflicting positions which have been adopted in the debate over the increased willingness of the United Nations Organisation (UN) to employ military force within “peace operations”. This trend, apparent since the end of the Cold War, has resulted, as Adam Roberts suggests, in a “blurring of the distinction between peacekeeping and coercive action”. The “blurring” to which Roberts refers, relates to the abrogation, inherent in “peace enforcement”, of the principles upon which “traditional” peacekeeping operations have been based. The principle polemic of this debate centres on the extent to which the UN can ignore the principle of consent in order to “enforce the peace” through military action and remain consistent with its underlying principles, as expressed in the 1945 UN Charter. It is not only the practicalities of large scale peace enforcement operations which come under review in this debate, but also the philosophical basis and ethical standing of the UN itself.

This article seeks to describe the post-Cold War inclination of the UN to place less significance on the “principle of consent” and to employ force within peace operations. The significant problems associated with this trend, which became particularly apparent in the UN operation in Somalia, are used to support the conclusion that large scale peace enforcement operations are damaging to the UN and that the organisation will better serve its member states through consensual rather than by coercive interventions.

**Historical Perspective**

The most obvious, and arguably the most important, manifestation of the existence of the UN during the last 50 years has been its commitment to peacekeeping operations. Ironically, such operations were not envisaged within the original formulation of the UN Charter, which provided for a collective security system, very much based on the strength of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which would deter and, if needs be, punish inter-state aggression along the lines of that which had characterised World War II. It was the Security Council, rather than the member states of the UN, which was to wage war on behalf of the organisation. Chapter VI of the Charter provided for solutions to tension and disputes through peaceful means, and Chapter VII described stronger action available to the UN with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The proposed collective security arrangements proved to be incapable of implementation because relations between the United States and the Soviet Union became embroiled in the suspicions and ideological machinations of the Cold War. In order to overcome this obstacle to the employment of collective security measures, the UN conceived and developed peacekeeping operations as a “non-coercive instrument of conflict management when Cold War constraints prevented the Security Council from taking the more forceful role envisaged by the Charter.”

The ability of the UN to commit peacekeeping forces during the decades to the late 1980s was
always conditioned by the mutually antagonistic attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States. This “superpower” rivalry, according to F.T. Liu, “...often prevented the Security Council from taking any effective action to contain or resolve conflicts.” The result was that almost all of the thirteen peace operations deployed during the period of the Cold War operated within the parameters of Chapter VI of the UN Charter (the Pacific Settlement of Disputes) where Security Council resolutions are recommendatory only and where action requires the full consent of the parties in dispute. It was this compliance with the principle of consent, which gave the UN its credibility as an “honest broker” and which allowed it to contribute significantly to the containment and in some cases, the resolution of dangerous conflicts and “superpower” rivalry in a number of regions of the world. It was, however, not until the end of the Cold War that the UN, revitalised by the new spirit of cooperation between the five permanent members of the Security Council, could expand the number and scale of peacekeeping operations and could consider the use of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. This cooperative spirit complemented a trend, which became apparent within Europe and the United States, away from forceful intervention on a unilateral basis and towards multinational activities sanctioned, and preferable managed, by the UN.

**An Agenda for Peace**

The trend towards a more forceful approach by the UN continued after the Gulf War. In 1992, the Secretary-General of the UN, in a report entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, recommended a number of proposals to “strengthen” UN peacekeeping operations. Included in his proposals was the concept of “peace enforcement units” which would be “more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces” and which would support peacekeeping operations, specifically, “...to restore and maintain the cease-fire”, a task which the Secretary-General believed, “...can on occasion exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors...”. In addition to the peace enforcement units, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of an armed force, available to the Security Council, “...not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis”, for employment against an aggressor in a Chapter VII (military response) operation. Most significantly, however, was the definition within *An Agenda for Peace*, which intimated a disassociation between peacekeeping and the requirement for consent. This re-definition formalised the significant attitudinal change which had occurred within the UN and presaged the higher level of peace enforcement powers accorded to the UN mission in Somalia.

**The Gulf War**

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, in August 1990, provided the Security Council with its first opportunity to implement a Chapter VII enforcement action and marked the beginning of the change in attitude to the use of force by the UN and the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations. The Security Council condemned the Iraqi invasion, imposed economic sanctions and authorised member states to “take all necessary measures” to compel Iraq to comply with the UN resolutions which ordered its withdrawal from Kuwait. A UN authorised coalition, commanded and controlled by the US, conducted a short, intense and financially expensive war to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. The apparent success of the peace enforcement initiative led many commentators to regard it as a model for future UN operations which would provide the means to enforce world peace. A more objective assessment, however, may have recognised that the extraordinarily unambiguous conditions, which led to an almost unanimous decision by the member states of the UN to conduct war against Iraq, were unlikely to be replicated elsewhere and, therefore, that the extrapolation of the characteristics of the Gulf War to future operations may be problematic.

**Somalia**

UNISOM I

The civil war and tribal anarchy, which characterised post-Cold War Somalia, was clearly exacerbating the famine conditions which were plaguing the country. In August 1992, the Security Council approved a team of 50 military observers (UNISOM I) to monitor a UN sponsored cease-fire. This force was subsequently expanded to 3000
peacekeepers who were mandated to: "...facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities ...and permanent cease-fire, to provide urgent humanitarian assistance, supervise the indigenous police force and to promote national reconciliation...". The UN was unable to obtain consent or cooperation of the various war-lords and factional leaders in Somalia and progressively authorised their "peacekeepers" to employ force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and to establish secure zones within the country. The increased use of force created a divergence between the stated aims of the UN and its actual activities and attracted criticism and animosity from the local protagonists.

**UNITAF**

The UN force was unable to establish a secure environment and, following a US offer of assistance, the Security Council authorised a Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led and controlled by the United States, to "...use all necessary means to establish ...a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." Interestingly, the preamble to the resolution spoke in terms of a Chapter VII operation and justified the evocation of the enforcement powers on the basis that the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, "constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security." Given the strategic and regional insignificance of Somalia, this was a considerable overstatement of the situation and could more accurately be seen as a rationalisation in response to the increased UN frustration at its impotence in Somalia. The UNITAF adopted an aggressive stance which enabled it to achieve its aim of facilitating the distribution of humanitarian relief. It did not, however, attempt to generate a peaceful settlement to the civil war based on the consent of the interested parties and there were a considerable number of casualties amongst the UNITAF force, the tribal "gangs" and the local population.

**UNISOM II**

The UNITAF was replaced, in May 1993, by a 28000 strong UN contingent (UNISOM II) which was authorised to use force not only to ensure humanitarian relief but also to restore peace, disarm factions and protect relief workers. This authorisation led to increased levels of violence in the form of street
warfare and UN attacks on stronghold positions. By June 1993 at least 31 UN peacekeepers and a considerable number of Somalis had been killed. Dissatisfaction and disunity developed amongst the contributing members of the mission which resulted in problems with command and control and contributed to the ineffectiveness of the operation.

The level of force authorised and employed by UNITAF and UNISOM II, whilst considerably less than that employed in the Gulf War, went well beyond that authorised for "traditional" peacekeeping operations. In the debate over UN peace enforcement, the UN mission in Somalia is particularly significant in that it was the first UN mission to make the transition from consensual peacekeeping to non-consensual, forceful intervention. From this perspective it represented the acme in the trend towards an increased use of force by the UN. Ironically however, the failure of the operation highlighted the problems associated with such a use of force, as well as the dangers of non-consensual action by the UN. In this respect it marked a turning-point for the inclination to employ force under UN auspices.

**UN Legitimacy**

The legitimacy of the UN is very closely linked to its ability to apply, in an impartial and objective manner, the principles which it represents. As Michael Barnett suggests: "As an international institution the United Nations both articulates various norms, codified in the Charter and numerous other international documents and resolutions, and monitors the compliance of states with these norms."

Throughout the history of the UN there have been questions raised about which nations set these "norms", which cultural constructs dominate the judgements made by the UN and whose interests the codified standards of behaviour represent. The post-colonial era and the subsequent expansion of the membership of the UN have engendered criticism of the organisation as being unrepresentative of Asian, African and Latin American nations and as largely representing the interests of the "developed" nations of the "north". Both the "smaller" and the "developing" states have been concerned about "domination and arm-twisting by the big powers" within the Security Council and by the "imposition of democratisation, human rights standards and environmental safeguards". Whilst these criticisms can be levelled at the full range of UN activities, it is large scale peace enforcement operations which have the greatest potential to be regarded as "promoting narrow national and/or small group interests" because any decision to forcefully intervene will inevitably be taken by the Security Council, in which the five permanent members dominate. The accusation of "selective intervention", or of the UN behaving as a "chauvinistic colonial power", looms large. There is great potential for accusations of double standards and ethnic, national, religious or "North/South" bias in the process which leads to the decision to deploy a UN peace enforcement mission. Such potentialities threaten the whole basis of UN credibility and legitimacy. If it is to retain credibility as a world body providing an element of world governance, the UN cannot afford to be seen as a "tool of the West". Samuel Makinda and Shona Dodds support this view when they suggest that: "...when the national goals of the Council's permanent members override the global security concerns of members states, UN decisions cease to be collective."

**Attitudes Post-Somalia**

Since the Somalia operation, there has been a discernible decrease in the willingness of the UN and of the member states of the organisation to become involved in enforcement operations. Indeed the body of academic and diplomatic opinion has swung to the view that peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are incompatible. This more sober view of the UN's interventionist powers was reflected in the 1992 follow-up to An Agenda for Peace, which not only reverted to the "traditional" definition of peacekeeping, but also suggested that "Peace keeping and peace-enforcement are not adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to another."

The reversal of the inclination by the UN to employ force within peace operations derives directly from the problems associated with such an approach in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia. Whilst there are a number of practical problems related to the large scale use of force by the UN, it is the potential that such an application of force has to compromise the legitimacy and credibility of the UN that most concerns contemporary analysts.
Collective Security

The principle of collective security, which is the basis of the UN’s institutional strength, remains credible only if all acts of aggression are regarded as of equal importance. In practice, however, economic, political and strategic factors influence the major powers in their decision to support intervention. These are interesting and revealing comparisons to be made, for example, between the extent of UN intervention in Iraq and Bosnia and between its willingness to intervene in Haiti and not in Burma.

Because of the higher propensity for conflict in developing nations, and because any conflict within the territorial boundaries of a permanent member of the Security Council cannot be influenced because of the veto power of such nations, (note for example the situation of China and Tibet), it seems inevitable that peace enforcement operations will be regarded as selective. As Jeffrey Gerlach points out: "In practice, small, weak countries are most likely to be the target of U.N. intervention. ...[A] large and populous country, especially if equipped with nuclear weapons ...would be relatively free to commit action that would cause a less powerful state to become a target [for intervention]... Inevitably, the five permanent members of the Council, and perhaps their clients, would be treated differently than other states."

Practical Problems of Peace Enforcement

The delegitimisation of the UN’s status as an even-handed arbiter of accepted international principles and modes of behaviour is further threatened by the inevitable complications of actually conducting a peace enforcement mission. Once involved in a military confrontation, particularly given that contemporary conflict tends to be internal and internecine rather than inter-state and finite in nature, it is almost impossible for the UN to be seen to be impartial; rather it will be regarded as merely one additional belligerent party in the dispute. This is certainly the view of Lieutenant General John Sanderson, the UN Military Force Commander for the UN mission in Cambodia, who asserted that, "...if peacekeepers fail to maintain their neutrality, they have to be prepared to go to war — or to go home." But any decision for the UN to "go to war" is fraught with problems; UN military forces are subject to the political and strategic demands of their national governments which makes the command and control of such an eclectic force in a state of war difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore such forces are neither structured nor trained to fight as a cohesive army. Again, a UN Military Force Commander, Lieutenant General Michael Rose, who commanded the UN force in the Balkans (UNPROFOR), has clear views on the problems associated with going to war with a UN force: "Hitting infrastructure command and control, logistics, that is war, and I’m not going to fight a war with [white] painted tanks." It is not just the military commanders who are concerned with the philosophical and practical problems of the peacekeeping/peace enforcement mix. Makinda and Dodds, for example, suggest that, in Bosnia, "...the UN has wavered between protracted diplomacy and military threats", and provide the example of the UN approved NATO air strikes against Bosnian-Serb soldiers. The response to these air strikes from the "enemy", (for how else could they be regarded or regard themselves), was to take 370 UN peacekeepers hostage. The subsequent efforts by the UN to free the hostages occurred at the expense of protecting Bosnian civilians. The result, according to Makinda and Dodds, was that the UN, "...alienated all sides in the conflict, and increasingly the Croats, Muslims and Serbs have come to see it [the UN] as part of the problem."

The UN as "War-fighters"

The UN’s experience in Somalia and former Yugoslavia indicate very clearly that any transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement by UN military forces escalates the requirement for them to operate in an effective "war-fighting" mode and inevitably lays the peacekeepers open to retaliation and casualties. Moreover, given the fierce commitment of belligerents in a civil, ethnic or religious war, there is considerable potential for a UN peace enforcement operation to continue for an extended period. The effect on international perceptions of the UN and on public support within contributing countries for the continued involvement of national contingents in a prolonged war is likely to be negative. Furthermore, it is difficult to ensure that a military force of diverse origin and standards of training remains proportionate, discriminating and balanced, both in the way that it applies force and in its
general behaviour. There is great potential for ethical and disciplinary problems which will attract criticism from humanitarian and human rights organisations. Indeed, as Adam Roberts points out, "forceful peacekeeping may itself involve violations of rights and even, as in Somalia, lead to civilian deaths". 

### Conclusion

The history of UN sponsored large scale peace enforcement operations has been a short and unhappy one. The UN operations in Somalia and in former Yugoslavia indicate very clearly that the UN is not designed, structured or equipped to meet the practicalities of "war-fighting". More importantly, however, coercive intervention without consent is completely inconsistent with the philosophical, ethical and moral status which is the sole foundation of the UN's existence as a world body. This belief is increasingly recognised by the member states of the UN and by the academic and diplomatic body of thought. The problem of peace enforcement lies, quite simply, in the fact that such operations dispense with the principle of consent and require the identification of an enemy. To use Charles Dobbie's analogy of a football game, peacekeeping operations require an impartial referee, peace enforcement demands that the UN become a player — partial and competitive. These characteristics are inconsistent with those that are accepted and indeed demanded by the member states of the UN; impartiality, equality (at least plutonic) amongst states, observance of the principle of sovereignty (and axiomatically therefore of consent) and compliance with the standards and behavioural norms that the UN sets for the world community.

The United Nations makes its greatest contribution to maintaining international peace and security through providing a forum for discussion, fostering the peaceful resolution of conflict between states and, when the conflicting parties agree, by employing UN resources to mediate a conflict through non-coercive means. Any decision to operate without consent should be treated as an exception; consent, as Michael Barnett points out, "...has been the foundation for, and the source of legitimacy of, UN activities and its value will be tarnished, if not lost, if it becomes another coercive instrument." Large scale military operations conducted by the UN have the potential to undermine, and perhaps destroy, the only source of "world governance" that exists. The dangers of UN peace enforcement far outweigh any benefits that may derive from such operations.

### Notes

3. ibid, p. 99.
4. I use the term "peace operations" as an overarching term to cover the range of operations which have been variously described as peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping plus, Chapter VI & 1/2 operations and peace building amongst others. There have been numerous attempts to define these terms, none of which have been satisfactory, and it is beyond the scope of this article to attempt another definition. I use the term peacekeeping to describe "traditional" peacekeeping, that is UN sponsored operations which are characterised by: a requirement for the consent of all parties involved, UN impartiality and the use of force by the UN only in self-defence. By peace enforcement, on the other hand, I mean the use of military force by UN sponsored missions to coerce (forcibly restrain or compel) compliance with a UN resolution.
5. Sean Jorgensen, ("UN Operations and Third World Security: Expanding the Agenda", in Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 15, No 1, April 1994, pp. 4-37), has argued that the UN can best maintain international peace and security by "state building", i.e. by mediating domestic disputes, democratisation and development. Discussion and development of this interesting and convincing argument is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article although such measures could arguably be included under the rubric of "consensual rather than coercive interventions".
7. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for a range of measures which start with economic sanctions and embargoes and end with military action. For the purposes of this article, I will deal only with the use of military force; whilst the full range of Chapter VII options comprise "enforcement" measures it is the use of military force which is most problematic. I say "most" because, for example, the use of economic sanctions has associated problems which relate to the impact on the civilian populations of a country.
10. The only exception was the sui generis case of the UN force which was constituted to resolve the Korean "Crisis" (1950). This force was neither a peacekeeping operations (because it used force and was not directed by the Secretary General under Chapter VI) nor a force constituted under the provisions of Chapter VII, because it was not under the control of the Security Council. The force could only be employed at all because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time that the resolution which established the force was passed and therefore was unable to veto the US resolution which approved the creation of the force. See Parsons, op cit, p. 192.
11. Many of the conflicts in which the UN became involved were "third world proxy" conflicts where the interests of the superpowers contributed to the conflict; the Middle East and Congo provide examples.

12. Barry M. Blechman. ("The Intervention Dilemma", in Washington Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, Summer 1995) argues that there was increasing pressure from European and American populations for governments to intervene more frequently in the affairs of other states (particularly for humanitarian reasons), but that there was also great opposition to the use of military force. The "use" of the UN to sanction forceful intervention legitimised "military interventions in the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences." pp.63-67, p. 67.

13. Interestingly, despite the rhetoric which emphasised the UN sanction of the operations, the US led operation was not, technically, a Chapter VII operation because it was not commanded by the Secretary General nor controlled by the Security Council.


15. An unambiguous act of aggression by a powerful state against a defenceless neighbour, within a strategically important region and at the nadir of superpower rivalry. Additionally, as Sir Anthony Parsons notes, op cit, p. 90, the huge cost of the war could be defrayed by the oil-rich Arab states.


18. In addition to the Somalia operation eight new UN peace operations were established after the Gulf War. These missions, predominately peacemaking in nature, reflected the new found belief in the efficacy of the UN. This belief also prompted an extension of the scope and scale of peacemaking operations to include political, humanitarian and electoral functions previously not attempted within peacemaking operations. Sean Jorgensen, op cit, provides an interesting discussion of this broadening of the scope of UN peacekeeping operations.


20. UN Security Council Resolution 794, quoted in White, op cit, p. 156.

21. Ibid. This phrasing evokes Article 1 of the UN Charter, as well as the generally accepted foremost role of the UN — the maintenance of international peace and security.

22. Whilst I am critical of the underlying philosophy, conduct and success of UNITAF and UNISOM II, I am in no way extrapolating that criticism to the 1 RAR Battalion Group and other ADF commitments to Somalia. The performance by the Australian contingents deployed to Somalia was exemplary, as judged by both Australian and international observers. For a detailed description of 'Operation Solace' see, Lt Col D.J. Hurley, "Operation Solace", in Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 104, January/February 1994, pp. 29-33.


25. Whilst the UN operation in former Yugoslavia may be regarded as an exception to this, I would argue that there has been a desire on the part of the UN to avoid becoming embroiled in a mixed peacekeeping/enforcement operation of the kind that occurred in Somalia. The situation in the Balkans continues to evolve; at the time of writing NATO forces under UN auspices are employing air strikes in an attempt to safeguard Sarajevo from the Bosnian-Serbian forces. Indeed this "sub-contracting" of the application of force to a regional organisation (similar but not identical to the UN sanctioned/US led operations in the Gulf and Somalia) may point to a future direction for the UN in operations regarded as requiring peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. Although I have drawn conclusions from the UN involvement thus far in the former Yugoslavia, I have not described in detail the situation there because of its ongoing nature.


29. Makinda & Dodds, op cit, p. 25.


34. Adam Roberts, op cit, p. 115.


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Lieutenant Colonel Studdert graduated from the Royal Military College in 1978 after completing a Bachelor of Arts degree. On commissioning and allocation to RASigs he completed postings to the 2nd Signal Regiment, 1 RTB, Civil Schooling, SASR and 142 Signal Squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Studdert attended Command and Staff College in Canada in 1990-91 and was then posted to Land Headquarters. He assumed command of the Australian Contingent to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (ASC UNTAC) in December 1992. Upon return to Australia he served as the Staff Officer Grade 1 Communications and Information Systems Plans in Army Office and was posted, in 1995, to the Australian National University to complete a Masters in Strategic Studies. In January 1996 he assumed the post of Military Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. In 1993 he published an article in the Australian Defence Force Journal entitled, “The Ethical Dilemma in Counter-Terrorist Operations”. Lieutenant Colonel Studdert was made a Member of the Order of Australia for his services to ASC UNTAC.
Policing Duties: Coastguard or Navy?

Lieutenant Commander Peter Ong, RAN

Introduction

It will be very expensive if navies exist only to prepare for war. Their assets are there to be used in peacetime. Ken Booth has cleverly divided the following three roles for navies:

a. Diplomatic;
b. Military; and
c. Policing.

In the Diplomatic role, the range of activities could include ship visits, combined naval exercises, exchange of naval personnel, cooperation in joint projects such as the ANZAC ship and provision of naval training. These activities are designed to inform potential enemies of the special relationship that exists between the countries involved and the threat they will be facing. It is an act of deterrence with the aim of achieving a favourable result without using force. The Military role is obvious and it is used to maintain the sovereign rights of the state. The Policing role has, in recent years, assumed more prominence for navies around the world. The factors which account for this change are:

d. the end of the cold war and the perceived peace, caused navies to justify their existence;
e. the 200nm (nautical miles) maritime boundary from the coast known as Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) due to the United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III which came into force on 16 November 1994; and
f. the exorbitant cost of maintaining a navy and a credible coastguard force.

The end of the cold war gave the Peace Movement the ammunition to convince the public and governments that Defence forces are now irrelevant, and that money should be channelled into other peaceful purposes such as the environment. Many countries have structured their forces based on Short-Warning Conflict (SWC), the term used in Australia’s Strategic Review 1993. The risk of a full scale war in SWC is minimal, the more probable conflict being confined to harassment of the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), offshore oil platforms, fishing fleets as well as mining of maritime choke points and waterways. Such measures are easy and inexpensive to conduct and the risk is minimal to the adversary while the victim suffers maximum disruption and inconvenience which could badly affect the economy and moral.

Several countries such as Norway and India, anticipated the enforcement of the 200nm EEZ maritime boundaries under UNCLOS and opted for the establishment of a Coastguard (CG). The Norwegian Coastguard was formed on 1 April 1977 and the Indian Coastguard on 1 January 1977. They exist purely to perform maritime policing and safety duties although they can be utilised for coastal defence in times of conflict. Since CG is not a cheap option, countries with smaller navies task their navies to perform the policing role beyond the 12 nm territorial sea.

The aim of this article is to examine the problems facing navies in trying to cope with the additional policing duties in the extended maritime boundaries of the EEZ. It will look at the roles of the Navy and the CG, and then provide some analysis on the possible impacts on the Navy.

Roles of Navies in Peace and Wartime

The RAN peacetime roles and tasks are:

a. maritime surveillance;
b. maritime patrol and response;
c. protection of offshore territories and resources;
d. intelligence collection and evaluation; and
e. peacetime activities.

The first four roles can broadly be classified as policing or military duties as described by Ken Booth. Surveillance and patrol in peacetime are different from wartime. The peacetime role involves the detection and tracking of drug smuggling and illegal fishing. The wartime role involves the detection and tracking of enemy surface, sub-surface and air crafts; in effect denial of the use of the sea. Peacetime operations do not require high level manning onboard the ship and sophisticated equipment such as the Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) and sonar need not be used. The best period for intelligence collection is in peacetime or periods of low threat. It
will be extremely difficult to collect such information when hostilities break out. Peacetime activities include naval exercises, ship visits and training activities. It is a diplomatic function of the navy conducted between friendly nations known as Maritime Confidence and Security Building Measure (MCSBM). It has the aim of deterring potential enemies from attacking the countries involved because of the threat of the combined forces.

The RAN has an additional task of looking after all hydrographic and oceanographic matters. The Hydrographic Service conducts hydrographic surveys, produces and sells charts, assists in the determination of maritime boundaries and provides oceanographic data and meteorological information. The information is useful both to the civilian and military organisations both in times of peace and war.

The wartime roles of the RAN are:
- all the peacetime roles except peacetime activities;
- protection of shipping;
- strategic strike; and
- operations in support of land forces.

In contingencies, the protection of offshore territories, resources and shipping, considered soft targets by the enemy intensifies since they are easy to be sabotaged, captured or destroyed by the enemy. For example, SLOCs can easily be disrupted if merchant vessels are harassed along the route. This may cripple the economy of an affected nation which is heavily dependant on shipping for its trade e.g. Australian sea transport carries approximately 76 per cent (A$82 billion) of Australia's total international trade (A$107 billion). Unfortunately it is also the most demanding task for the navy. Strategic strike involves the removal of potential enemy threats by interdicting and destroying enemy surface vessels. The support of land forces could either be by Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) or landing of troops vehicles.

Some of the most important tasks of the CG is anti-smuggling (including drugs), illegal migrants interdiction and illegal fishing surveillance. They are all Maritime Law Enforcement. The extended maritime boundary of the EEZ (200 nm) has caused many navies to perform this additional task at the 12nm to 200nm maritime boundary where sea states are usually greater than three (which is beyond the capability of most small surface vessels).

The national security of the country can be protected by guarding the economic resources of the country including offshore resources such as the offshore oil fields and platforms. The USCG has been involved in many military type operations during peacetime such as the operations in Grenada in 1983. The missions set for the USCG in that operation were to:
- prevent the escape of wanted Marxist fugitives; and
- demonstrate a continuing US Commitment.

The USCG had the assets and expertise for both tasks and its presence was not seen as a military but humanitarian operation. Recently in defending the national interest, the USCG assisted the US Navy in enforcing United Nations embargoes against Iraq. In Australia, the RAN is involved in patrol duties in the northern part of Australia which is the focus of the 1987 Defence White Paper.

In Australia, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) which is part of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), is responsible for SAR duties but uses military and civilian assets for the mission. However, the main coordinating body depends on the type of vessel or aircraft involved. If it is a pleasure craft disaster, the sea state police will be in charge, for the larger seagoing vessels it will be the MRCC, for military aircraft it will be the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and for civilian aircraft it will be the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).

HMAS Sydney joined the search for the Air Commander plane of Air Seaview flight to Lord Howe Island (the air crash site was about...
Policing Duties: Coastguard or Navy

AMSA is also responsible for other maritime safety aspects and environmental protection.

Impact of Increased Coastguard Duties for the Navy

The preceding paragraphs provided a compressive guide on the duties of the CG. Clearly, some of the functions are not suitable for the navy. Should the navy absorb all the CG duties, it would be a very large organisation with the potential to lose focus on its main role: the protection of the country. In 1992/93, AMSA had a total of 533 employees and the operating cost was around $59.4 million. In 1992/93, Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel costs already accounted for 36.7 per cent ($3.5 billion) of the total budget. Therefore, it will be totally unacceptable to the government and the public if the RAN absorbs all the CG duties, increasing the manpower and hence the budget allocation.

The debate on the establishment of a CG is not new in Australia. In 1978, Independent Senator Harradine advocated the immediate establishment of an Australian Coastguard modelled along the lines of the USCG. The current Deputy Chief of Naval Staff of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Rear Admiral David Campbell, argued against it with a counter proposal to increase the resources for the Defence Force to undertake the surveillance and policing duties.

Which part of the CG duties should navies absorb? Looking at the roles of the CG, the only sensible and acceptable role is to provide surveillance and law enforcement from the 12 nm territorial sea to the 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone. However, it will not be without cost. Law enforcement is not a straightforward matter, as personnel must be trained to understand the laws of the country and be given the authority to arrest offenders. There is also the issue of prosecuting the offenders in the court of law. If the Commanding Officer of the ship is involved, it will affect the operation of the vessel whenever he has to appear in court. A good way out of this problem is to embark law enforcement officers to carry out these duties. They can be replaced without affecting the operation of the ship.

The other major problem for the Navy is acquiring the right resources for the role. The ideal ship for conducting CG duties must be able to:

a. withstand heavy seas beyond Sea State 3 - a ship which exceeds 700 tonnes displacement is capable of meeting this requirement;

b. close and investigate suspicious vessels - top speed which exceeds 25 knots is necessary;

c. be a deterrent and have an effective firepower - a 25mm or larger calibre gun is recommended; and

d. act as a command and control ship when required - a good communication system is necessary.

It is timely that the RAN has decided to replace the Fremantle class patrol boats with twelve larger Offshore Patrol Combatants (OPC). The OPC could be a joint project with the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and would have significant strategic, political and economic benefits for both countries. The RMN is expected to announce the supplier of 27 OPCs for EEZ patrol at the end of this year. The following are possible specifications of the Australian OPC.

c. Length : 75m
d. Speed : >25 Knots
e. Displacement : 1250 tonnes
f. Weapons : 76-127mm
g. Electronic Equipment : Electronic Support Measure
h. Complement : 35 + Helo Flight Personnel
i. Range : 6000nm at 12 Knots
j. Communication : MILSATCOM, UHF, VHF and HF
k. Fitted for but not with : Surface-to-Surface Missiles, Surface-to-Air Missiles, ECM Jammers and Decoys

The OPC carries more sophisticated equipment its complement is larger than the Fremantle class patrol boats. The ship is designed to perform combat duties with policing duties taking a secondary role. The vessel is expensive and Australia has planned to acquire only twelve vessels to guard her more than 24000km coastline. The U.K. has 64 patrol vessels (include mine countermeasures, but not CG vessels) for her 4000km coastline, Norway 38 for her 2300km coastline and Japan 39 for her 9500km coastline. Other countries may opt to procure more vessels which are “fitted for but not with” combat capability.

Since part of the navy would be concentrating on peacetime or law enforcement roles, it may affect the moral of the crew involved in such operation.
Patrolling the vast seas is a laborious and monotonous task especially if there are no incidents during the period of the operation. Incidents such as the undetected landing of 56 Chinese refugees at Montague Sound in the north-west Western Australia on the New Year’s Eve 1991, are embarrassing and immediately incur a barrage of criticism from the media. Coastwatch (managed by the Australian Customs Service) accepted the blame for that incident, since it was responsible for the northern coastline. This type of incident highlights the thankless and unglamorous nature of CG duties. Coastwatch uses 15 contracted civilian aircraft for the operation. Coastwatch patrols up to 200nm offshore between Cairns and Broome searching for all illegal activities e.g. drug smuggling, illegal immigrants and illegal fishing. The RAN provides 1800 boat days per annum for Coastwatch utilisation. Shorter posting cycles for the OPC’s crews and frequent involvement in naval exercises, to sharpen the crews’ combat skills, may solve the potential morale problem inherent in CG duties.

An interesting concept being promoted by regional countries is the sharing of responsibilities. Methods of accomplishing this include a regional CG for the ASEAN (Association of the South East Asian Nations) region, as suggested by Captain Dela Cruz of the Philippine Navy or using navies of regional countries to cooperate in the surveillance of the EEZ. Bilateral cooperation should be initiated first before multilateral. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), a gathering of navies from ASEAN, China, United States, Japan, US, Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea to discuss areas of cooperation, is a good forum to further the concept of multilateral cooperation. The first step is information exchange. It is important that navies learn to operate with other regional navies. This is a MCSBM which is worthwhile to explore.

**Conclusion**

The increased maritime boundary of 200nm has certainly resulted in many navies around the world looking at extending policing roles especially in peacetime. The decision to use the navy or create a CG for the extended coverage is a dilemma for government and defence planners. Instead of a CG, Australia is maintaining the current peacetime organisation using Coastwatch to undertake those responsibilities but with the RAN contributing her assets. The civilian organisation is less likely to create tensions especially when maritime border incidents occur. They are cheaper to operate and are more flexible than established military organisations. However, there are limitations as the Department of Defence is better equipped to carry out such surveillance tasks. It could be an overkill to use Defence assets for such operation, but the skill acquired is very useful in times of conflict. It could be a wasted opportunity for the Navy.

In trying to cover policing roles in peacetime, navies have to compromise with the numbers of vessels they can have which could also be utilised in contingencies. The task will be made easier if more vessels are available, but this is not possible because of the exorbitant cost of procuring and maintaining them. Countries could have vessels “fitted for but not with” equipment for combat duties, but it will reduce the capability of the force. Time may not be available for training when conflict breaks out.

The extended coverage of the EEZ could be undertaken by the navy or CG or even civilian organisations like the Australian Coastwatch depending on the country’s affordability. A rich country like Norway and the United States can afford a CG. India is not a rich country but the manpower cost is low so she can afford a CG. Malaysia is using the navy to patrol her EEZ. The Australian Coastwatch arrangement is the most cost effective option at the moment for Australia due to financial and budgetary constraints. Regional cooperation is another option but it will take time to materialise.

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**NOTES**

Lieutenant Commander Peter Ong joined the RAN in 1986 after completing his service as a naval officer in the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). He served in the RSN for more than fourteen years and was at sea most of his career. He became the Commanding Officer of several Patrol and Missile Gun Boats whilst in the RAN. He obtained his Masters Degree in Maritime Studies from the University of Wales in 1985 and is currently doing a Graduate Diploma in Information Systems at the University of Canberra. He completed the RAN Staff Course in 1989. In his RAN career, he was involved in a variety of duties from operations (Directorate of Naval Operations), to personnel (Directorate of Naval Manning Policy) and to strategic studies (RAN Maritime Studies Program). Currently he is working in the Directorate of Personnel Plans (HQADF) as Deputy Director Workforce Planning.
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The Future of Amphibious Warfare in the ADF

Cognitive Dissonance or "Catch 22"?

By Major R. E. Moyse, Royal Marines

Introduction

Cognitive dissonance can briefly be described as the capacity to unconsciously ignore facts and evidence which did not accord with the observer's interpretation of a situation. Even experienced and capable planners are not immune from this tendency. It was, for example, evident in the decisions to proceed with Operation Market Garden (Arnhem) and Operation Jubilee (Dieppe) in the face of intelligence which predicted their failure. It is a tempting explanation for the low priority which the ADF attaches to amphibious warfare but other more quantifiable reasons are worthy of examination.

The defence of Australia is a unique military problem. Nowhere else does an island continent have to be defended with a Regular Army Infantry strength of 5 Battalions. Despite the uniqueness of the problem the solutions applied by the ADF appear to owe more to philosophies which have arisen in Europe, for continental warfare in an infrastructure-dense environment, than to our own geographical reality.

Land Force Mobility at the Three Levels of War

Whatever disagreements may exist over the strategic appreciation leading to DA94 there is almost no dissent on its emphasis on the need for force multipliers, particularly the mobility necessary to allow the small ARA to cover its vast geographical area. Sydney to Exmouth Gulf, by sea or road, for example is as far as from Exmouth to Madras, Bamaga to Shanghai or three times the distance of Hitler's deepest penetration into the Soviet Union.

DA94 requires that land forces be highly mobile to allow rapid deployment to areas of contention and to be sufficiently mobile in theatre to conduct dispersed operations. This is as close as the paper comes to analysing what it means by the generic term "mobility" and, in essence, the paragraph describes the requirement for mobility at three levels. Firstly strategic mobility, to enable deployment of forces from their bases into theatre. Secondly operational mobility to enable them to out-maneuver the enemy at the operational level and thirdly tactical mobility. (It can be argued that the internal deployment of forces within Australia is operational rather than strategic but the distances involved can make it practically a strategic movement problem.)

There is only one form of land force mobility which spans all three levels of war effectively and that is amphibious mobility. This is not widely understood in the ADF, where amphibious movement is often viewed as little more than a means of administrative transport, rather than in the broader sense of operational manoeuvre from the sea.

Operational or Strategic Mobility

Long-range movement within the Australian mainland is possible by air, road, road and rail or sea. It is outside the scope of this article to analyse in depth the difficulties of road and rail movement on the few and isolated routes leading to northern Australia, but suffice to say that roads and railways are fixed and offer no scope for route variation, dispersal or deception. In other words they are just a means of getting to where they lead to. In much of Australia roads are vulnerable to weather and, since WWII, even the best mobile air defences have been unable to reduce the vulnerability of road and rail transport to air interdiction. In any event to fail to provide a degree of redundancy for strategic mobility is reminiscent of pre-WWII levels of complacency. Furthermore there are no roads or railways to Australia's offshore possessions.

When roads are unsuitable or the problem is beyond the Australian mainland then sea or air are the only options. It is frequently stated that 90 per cent of Australia's international trade goes by sea and the
hard-nosed commercial logic which dictates that situation is equally applicable to military logistics. The futility of trying to deploy and support even a light military force by air alone has been conclusively demonstrated on several occasions. During Operation Haven/Provide Comfort in 1991 the UK initially attempted to deploy an “advance party” of approximately 5 per cent of 3 Commando Brigade to Northern Iraq by air. This included a number of Landrovers and “B” vehicles. The 5 per cent were still arriving in theatre three weeks after the main body had arrived by sea. This is not to denigrate the importance of strategic airlift, but simply to illustrate that it is not best employed in shifting vehicles or any other heavy equipment. Amphibious and air mobility are complementary and synergous with one another. The former provides weight and endurance while the latter provides speed of response.

Operational Manoeuvre

History shows that the outcome of war is usually decided around the centres of population and communication and that the empty spaces in between are important only in their bearing on those centres. Except in the south and east Australia has a very low infrastructure density and what there is is predominantly coastal. The philosophy of operational manoeuvre has largely been developed in a European context, where key centres are several tens of kilometres apart rather than several hundreds or even thousands as in Australia. Consequently the level of mobility required in Europe is an order of magnitude less than in Australia and can be met by mechanised forces manoeuvring at a couple of hundred kilometres per day, with a self supported range of five or six hundred kilometres. In Australia this is an appropriate scale for tactical, not operational manoeuvre. Land force operational manoeuvre in this unique area requires the range, endurance and speed normally associated with maritime operations and this can best be achieved by endowing land force tactical combat power with amphibious mobility.

A seaborne force has effectively no range limitations and can cover over 600 km in any direction in 24 hours. This enables it to threaten a linear distance of over 1200 km which may represent 2 or 3000 km of coastline. In most terrain a land based force cannot normally move to protect such an area at comparable speed, nor even maintain observation on most of it. This enables a seaborne force to outmanoeuvre a land based opponent, which can be exploited to achieve an unopposed landing in the area most unfavourable to the enemy. Alternatively it can achieve other positional advantages just by threatening to land. It is also capable of sustained and repeated manoeuvre. Having struck, the force can re-embark and strike again elsewhere. Alternatively elements of the force can be redeployed along the seaward flank into the enemy’s tactical or operational rear to raid or block, in support of the original landing. The possibilities are considerable provided the Commander uses his imagination and is not limited by an obsolete perception of amphibious operations.

A Structural and Organisational Problem

This degree of operational manoeuvrability is only possible if the process does not lose too much momentum in getting from sea to shore. Rapid transfer of a force from sea to shore is a matter of sound training and planning and the right equipment. Rapid, orderly ship to shore movement is the core art in amphibious operations and can only be achieved with experience and maintained by continuous practice. Once acquired such experience is a vital asset which should be protected and maintained. At present there is no centre of excellence in amphibious matters in the ADF to act as a repository for such skills. There is a wealth of knowledge in both Navy and Army. On K95 the well worked-up team of Tobruk and 2RAR, supported by 2 Commando Company, firmly scotched the myth that the ADF cannot make a tactical landing on a hostile shore. However, the expertise is quickly dispersed in non-amphibious posts and, subsequently, not easily accessed.

The lack of a centre of amphibious excellence is symptomatic of a larger problem which is lack of “ownership”. Neither Navy nor Army sees amphibious warfare as a core capability, to the extent of, say, naval aviation or armour, and it is down-prioritised accordingly. It is hard to envisage Navy giving up an ANZAC for an amphibious ship or Army sacrificing an Artillery Battery for an Amphibious Squadron. This in turn is symptomatic of the fundamental problem which is lack of strategic direction. Theoretically the “rigorous and disciplined process” leading to force structures, described in
DA94 should have resulted in an objective analysis of the problem of mobility at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and consequently taken a searching look at the amphibious solution. Instead it is not even discussed except as an incidental paragraph on the purchase of *Kanimbla* and *Manoora*, which is completely unlinked to the Capabilities Judgements, the Executive Programme and the Capital Equipment Programme. It would be naive to suppose that the formulation of policy is immune from the influence of single service interests, after all the three services are the sources of expert advice in their respective fields. No single service has a particularly vital self-interest in promoting amphibious warfare in the resources scrum, nor is there any other body to represent the amphibious case. This results in a “Catch 22” relationship, thus: Lack of representation has lead to lack of strategic direction, which has in turn perpetuated the lack of representation.

Provided it was sponsored at such a level that it could not be ignored, a single point of responsibility for amphibious warfare would bring peripheral benefits. It could provide a planning capability for a joint headquarters or a deployable joint force headquarters or even a Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF). Perhaps more importantly, it could lend some much needed coherence to the development of the amphibious force structure by the production of a Concept for Operations.

**Without a Concept for Operations** or a single sponsor the task of designing a sound amphibious force structure is an unenviable one and there is no shortage of evidence of the consequences in the present force structure. The LCH, originally designed for Army, is incapable of keeping up with an Amphibious Task Group or transporting troops over operational or strategic distances, yet it is too big to be transported in the available ships. The primary means of moving troops ashore since Suez in 1956 has been by helicopter, yet Air Force chose the Blackhawk, which is non-marinised. Effective command and control during the landing phase is dependant on proper facilities and communications, yet an amphibious operations room is two thirds of the way down the priority list for modifications to the THSS. At the Australian Army Historical Conference on amphibious warfare last year, Mr David Stevens of the RAN Maritime Studies Programme described pontoons as “essential” to the success of Australia’s amphibious logisticians, yet the capacity to transport them is soon to be sacrificed. Each of these decisions was made to meet a need, perceived in isolation and without the discipline of a Concept for Operations.

### The Dangers of a Limited Concept for Operations

A Concept for Operations based on an outdated concept of amphibious warfare could be worse than no Concept for Operations at all. During ADFWCs dealings across the ADF it is clear that many people’s perceptions of amphibious warfare owe more to 1945 than 1995. Lack of understanding of the term Amphibious Tactical Lodgement (ATL) is a source of some of the confusion. At one extreme it can be an administrative landing in a benign environment while at the other it can be a landing in a very hostile situation, lacking only an enemy on the beach, such as the British landings at San Carlos. Both meet the doctrinal definition and consequently Navy and Army can be using the same words but speaking different languages. The whole art of amphibious operational manoeuvre is to turn a potential assault into an unopposed landing by using superior mobility, supported by deception and stealth where appropriate. An amphibious landing can be initiated over most shorelines, either by helicopter or by small craft. Properly trained amphibious infantry can overcome cliffs, mangrove and most other obstacles. While eventual possession of a suitable beach may be a logistic requirement the initial tactical waves need not be bound by it. The primary means of modern amphibious tactical deployment and initial tactical manoeuvre is by helicopter. A sea delivered airborne force, or better still air-mechanised force, can then conduct operations in its own right and/or secure a beach for armoured forces or heavy logistic support should sustained operations be necessary. At present the beach limitations imposed by in-service equipment are restrictive, especially in conditions pertaining in Northern Australia, but the technology to overcome these problems has existed for over fifty years and is constantly developing. A Concept for Operations must take account of possibilities provided by both the concepts and technology of the late 1990s, not the 1940s.

Equally debilitating is the surprisingly prevalent notion that the case for amphibious force structures can only be examined with respect to low-level operations and that they are somehow exempt from the logic which applies to the procurement of surface warships, submarines, fighters or artillery. While amphibious forces configured for conventional operations have considerable utility in low-level operations the converse is not true, any more than a counter-insurgency aircraft can have an air-superiority role.
Proportionate Cost Effectiveness

There is a perception that amphibious warfare is a resource intense and costly business but this is not borne out by the evidence, especially when weighed against its force multiplication capability. An Amphibious Battalion Group poised off King Sound can cover from the Barrow Island Oilfield to Darwin at a fraction of the cost of the forces it would take based ashore. It has been stated that the UK amphibious capability absorbs about one per cent of the UK defence budget. If this is correct, the same capability would appear to represent some 4 to 4.5 per cent of Australia’s budget, but this figure ignores the fact that most of the resources required are already in the ADF orbit!

Neither do the enhancements necessary represent massive expenditure. A worthwhile illustration is that the cost of purchasing and modifying the two THSS is in the same order as the cost of a single Minehunter (MHC). The French Navy runs its Bougainville Class Landing Platform Dock (LPD) on a complement of 53. Even if some sacrifice is necessary to fund a proper amphibious capability surely a small force which can get to where it matters, when it matters, is better value for money than a larger one which cannot.

The cost effectiveness of amphibious mobility is rapidly being realised elsewhere in the world, in many cases in countries with smaller budgets than Australia. Frequently the inability to finance previous land force levels has forced governments to seek a mobility based force multiplier. In the last two years, in the face of declining defence spending, major new amphibious ships have been ordered or put into service by India, Japan, South Korea, The Philippines, Greece, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, UK, France and the USA. Germany intends to join the club this year. Closer to home Indonesia recently purchased 12 modern Ex-East German LSMs and, like Malaysia, is acquiring an Ex-USN LST. Thailand is acquiring a new-built helicopter carrier, a type of vessel which has been used effectively in the amphibious role for forty years. China, which had no dedicated landing force in 1980, has raised a Marine Corps of 6000 and designated a further 50000 PLA troops as an army amphibious force. Both forces exercise regularly. Similar increases in landing forces are taking place elsewhere, often by reassigning and retraining existing Army units. It is seldom a good idea to do something just because everybody else is doing it but it is prudent to examine whether their rationale is applicable to ourselves.

Flexibility

The case for an increased commitment to amphibious warfare has been argued on the defence of Australia, in accordance with current political guidance, but an amphibious capability designed for the defence of Australia would have the flexibility to support operations further afield. The applicability to operations like Bougainville, Fiji and Somalia is obvious but there is a more vital application. The so-called sea-air gap to our North is in fact a sea-air-land gap and an enemy wishing to attack Australia would be hard pushed to do so without a land base to support his attempts. It is unlikely that an Australian Government would allow a hostile power to occupy any Papua New Guinean or Indonesian possessions to our North without expecting the ADF to assist PNG or Indonesian forces to remove them. World War II proved the importance of amphibious mobility in archipelagic areas with poor land communications and, in that respect, nothing has changed.

Conclusion

There has been enormous progress in the ADF in amphibious warfare in recent months. The THSS modification contract has been agreed. JP 2048, the replacement watercraft project, has started on an excellent footing. A procedural supplement to ADPP 12 is being developed. Perhaps even more importantly, in the long term, the relevance of the seaward flank to land manoeuvre warfare has been stated formally in ADPP 6, “Operations”, and supported by a requirement of amphibious mobility in ARMY 21. This has enabled Land Command to start work on a single service Concept for Amphibious Operations. The fact remains however that these things have been achieved in spite of Defence Policy and not because of it.

Any objective analysis of the problem of the defence of Australia with such a small Regular Army must conclude that, along with surveillance, mobility is the key force multiplication factor. This must be considered in a structured and joint manner and the relationship between strategic, operational and tactical mobility properly examined. The retention of an
amphibious capability despite the lack of strategic direction is a tacit admission of its utility.

For amphibious mobility to get a fair hearing it needs a body of advocacy with some expertise in the subject. That such a body does not exist has lead to a lack of strategic consideration of and direction on amphibious warfare, which has in turn perpetuated its lack of representation. Unless amphibious warfare is recognised as a core capability and represented accordingly, the “Catch 22” cycle will not be broken. The future of amphibious warfare will remain dependent on individual enthusiasm at desk officer level and this alone can never overcome the lack of top-level direction. If the present situation persists, the ADF will not get the best from what is potentially its best force multiplier.

Major Moyse was a UK exchange student at the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre in 1995.
Australia Remembers records many of the activities of Australian Service men and women who served overseas and at home during World War II. It also records the role played by the men and women of the Australian Defence Force in ensuring that the ceremonies for the pilgrimages of the "Australia Remembers" program were conducted in the most fitting and solemn way.

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Engineer Battlefield Assessment – A Manoeuvre Tool

By Major N. D. Greet, RAE

Introduction

The embracement of manoeuvre theory into our tactics involves the acceptance of a new philosophy of war fighting. Manoeuvre warfare extends beyond the tactics of armoured and mechanised forces; it influences our methods of decision making. Timeliness of decision making and therefore the maintenance of tempo is the key to success for the commander applying manoeuvre. Tempo is either mounting (before battle) or execution (battle) tempo and can be viewed simply as keeping one step ahead of the enemy. In order to increase tempo all parts of the decision making process need improvement and the provision of communications is absolutely critical throughout the entire process. The platform for decision making is the appreciation process, which requires information gathered from many sources. The intelligence cycle develops this information into useful military intelligence. The military appreciation and the intelligence cycle are well developed and logical processes that serve the army well. However, these tactical decision-making tools can always be improved in order to meet the changing needs of warfare.

The integration of the engineer intelligence estimate into the engineer appreciation and resulting effects on the all arms plan is not clearly defined in any tactical or intelligence doctrine. This inability to clearly define the links between these activities means there can be repetition in staff work, which will result in loss of tempo on the battlefield. This poor definition of linkage also results in poor definition of the relationship between the information needs for engineer activities and manoeuvre requirements. Finally there are minimal and misguided efforts to gather engineer relevant information. The Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) provides a quantitative assessment of the engineer characteristics of the battlefield and is a renewed application of the engineer intelligence estimate, which starts the engineer intelligence cycle. The aim of developing the EBA concept is to better integrate the engineer intelligence process into the engineer appreciation, therefore providing better engineer input into the commander’s manoeuvre plan.

Development of the Engineer Battlefield Assessment represents an attempt to review information practices to aid decision making. Information practices such as that offered by the creation of the EBA aim to lighten the information overload problem plaguing our modern planning process. Fighting the information war is not simply the application of glossy information technology. In fact, the application of command and control practices systems as they exist in an integrated Communications, Command and Control and Intelligence (C3I) system will result in a suite of inefficient information systems on the battlefield. Information and decision making processes will be rigorously examined frequently in the future to determine the suitability of practices in the modern environment. The aim of any examination of our information practices, here the development of the EBA, is to ensure the manoeuvre commander can maintain superior tempo on the battlefield.

Engineer Battlefield Assessment

The EBA is an assessment of terrain, enemy engineer capability and our own engineer capability. The aim of producing the EBA is to provide early engineer input to manoeuvre and the production of information gaps for the engineer intelligence cycle. It is convenient to view the topics as separate layers, described in Figure 1. The first layer contains the terrain analysis, where the engineer assesses ground in military terms. Once there is an adequate picture of the battlefield, the next layer contains an estimate of how the enemy engineers can enhance or degrade the raw aspects of terrain. This will involve an understanding of the enemy design for battle because it will affect the employment of engineers. The second layer produces a somewhat different view of the ground. The third layer is an estimate of our own engineer capability to help in the shaping of the battlefield and how we might affect the enemy engineer activities. Comparison of the enemy and friendly engineer gives a contrasting view of the
battlefield. The three layers when combined allow the engineer to make an accurate assessment of the mobility characteristics of the battlefield and complete an assessment of engineer related information gaps.

Understanding ground is of fundamental importance in a military operation. Clausewitz stated: “...geography and the character of the ground bear a close relation to warfare. They have a decisive influence on the engagement, both to its course and to its planning and exploitation.”

The outputs of the terrain analysis process are a description in words of the military attributes of the ground supported by a graphical overlay. The military attributes of the ground are:

a. Observation and fire;
b. Cover and concealment;
c. Obstacles;
d. Key terrain;
e. Avenues of approach; and
f. Weather effects.

An overlay supports the military description of the ground. The overlay delineates the terrain into unfavourable (double cross-hatch), marginal (single cross-hatch) and favourable (no marking). Avenues of approach are shown as an arrow with the appropriate military symbol showing the size of military force able to move in tactical formation in that corridor. An example of the terrain analysis overlay is at Figure 2. A battalion moving from the left-hand edge of the diagram moves through several possible company sized, mobility corridors, before it can reform as a battalion on the right side of the diagram. This battalion can move through one company mobility corridor in echelon or through several corridors concurrently. At this early planning stage the EBA provides a clear picture of the military opportunities that the ground offers. The terrain analysis overlay will also be a useful tool for determining priorities for the gathering of ground intelligence.

![Figure 1: The Layers of the EBA](image-url)
The initial terrain analysis will incorporate many necessary assumptions. Ground reconnaissance is now necessary to determine the validity of these assumptions. The terrain analysis section of the EBA provides the focus for the gathering of ground intelligence. Some avenues of approach are influenced by factors such as observation and fire more than others and will therefore require greater examination. The collection planners can now focus on the locations, which influence the key terrain and seek further reconnaissance where necessary. Terrain analysis provides easy to assimilate terrain information and a focus for ground reconnaissance early in the planning process. Greater understanding of why reconnaissance is required should ensure better employment of scarce reconnaissance assets. Planners are now able to assess key terrain easily and understand the military reasoning for the choice of key terrain. However, the limitations of the tool must be understood, for instance, unfavourable terrain must not be interpreted as an area where a force cannot go. Military history is full of examples where it was assumed a military force could not cross a piece of ground. Terrain analysis provides better quality information for decision makers. However, without sound integration of the terrain analysis with other pieces of intelligence, the risk of poor interpretation is possible.

The additional layers of the EBA will provide some of the intelligence necessary to balance the pure vision of the ground. Enemy and friendly engineers are assessed in the following manner:

a. **Intent.** The commander's intent must be clearly understood because the engineer is employed within these constraints.

b. **Mobility.** A mobility assessment involves detailed examination of the avenues of approach identified in the terrain analysis process. The aim is to identify pieces of ground that may offer advantages or disadvantages to certain types of vehicles. A mobility assessment requires a good understanding of vehicle capabilities.

c. **Capability.** Capability assessments require knowledge of engineer forces, equipment, location and time. When considering the enemy engineer the use of a situational template will help identify the unexpected location of the enemy engineer. A situational template is a doctrinal overlay, which shows the expected layout of the enemy engineer forces. Abbreviated worksheets are then completed for both the friendly and enemy engineer that will quantify the ability of engineer forces to complete...
tasks. The constraint of time is introduced in a Time/Equipment Matrix, an example of which is at Figure 3. Engineer forces are compared for their ability to provide equipment at a time on the battlefield.

d. Vulnerability. The key aim of this assessment is to identify any engineer related vulnerability. An enemy vulnerability offers an opportunity for exploitation, whilst our vulnerabilities must be protected. This will help the commander complete a better risk assessment early in the planning process with respect to engineers and the ground.

The EBA has so far been presented as a tool for general war. This does not limit the application of the EBA to these conditions only. The tools of the EBA are developed to enhance the process of decision making. It is not developed to suit one type of information that is gathered for a particular circumstance. For example, the aim of the friendly and enemy engineer assessment is to provide part of an early risk assessment and terrain analysis provides a picture of the military opportunities that the ground offers. The aim of the EBA is to communicate the engineer vision of the battlefield with little confusion. Content of the EBA is similar to that contained in the relative strengths and ground sections of the engineer appreciation process. The EBA however, represents a marked change in management of information in that it has combined the repetitious information contained in the engineer intelligence estimate and the start of the engineer appreciation process into one document. Graphical tools, templates, matrices and abbreviated worksheets are an essential part of the EBA. Each area considered in the EBA will have unknowns and it is these unknowns that are carried through into the Engineer Intelligence Collection Worksheet. The key to the EBA concept is the cohesiveness it brings between the engineer appreciation and the engineer intelligence cycle. This can only have a positive result on the Manoeuvre Commander’s ability to make informed decisions.

![Manoeuvre](image)

Manoeuvre warfare is not simply mobility and firepower but represents a philosophy of decision making. Lind suggests in his *Handbook of Manoeuvre Warfare* that the Boyd Cycle or OODA (Observe Orientate, Decision and Act) loop, is the essential element of Manoeuvre theory. The OODA loop is shown at Figure 4. The manoeuvre commander is aiming to reach decision points on the battlefield before the enemy can reach the same points. Our ability to be continually first to a decision...
Point will result in confusion and disillusionment in the enemy ranks, which will culminate in capitulation. Increasing the speed of decision cycles is not only a function of practice or good SOPs; it also often requires an examination of the fundamentals of our decision making process. The EBA is a new way of looking at one part of our decision making process that will aid the commander’s OODA loop.

The processes of observe, orientate and decide will benefit from the use of the EBA. Establishment of a better link between the engineer intelligence cycle and the appreciation will result in a more focused flow of intelligence in a better priority. The observe section of the loop contains the functions of the intelligence cycle and reconnaissance as subsets. Unknowns are established early in the planning cycle and the terrain analysis process will help decide priorities for ground reconnaissance. The orientation process will benefit from clear and concise engineer information at the start of the planning cycle and forces can commence the orientation process. As the unknowns are determined the orientation process is honed. Engineers must make assessments of the engineer vulnerabilities to aid the commander in visualising the battlefield. This will enhance the decision phase of the OODA loop. The EBA aims to present engineer information in a form that can be assimilated at the decision stage. This is achieved by using graphics and the early provision of engineer options to the commander. The result is an action, hopefully, at the right point of the battlefield at the right time.

Timeliness of advice and intelligence is critical in the art of manoeuvre. Engineers must ensure that their assessment of the battlefield does not arrive after the manoeuvre commander has made a decision where engineer advice would have been helpful. Commanders require tools that allow the tempo of battle to be controlled and not as a reaction to the enemy’s design. A laborious engineer appreciation or intelligence cycle that is not tailored to meeting the needs of a manoeuvre commander, who is attempting to raise the tempo of battle, will result in decisions being made with poor engineer information. The EBA will provide some engineer assessment as early as possible so tempo can be increased if necessary with some engineer understanding of the battlefield. Manoeuvre warfare relies on better quality and more timely information than that provided by current engineer making practices.

Relevant information made available at the right time will lower the unknowns for the Commander. This should not be confused with uncertainty and friction, which are encouraged as part of manoeuvre theory. Instead of viewing Clausewitz’s “Fog of War” as a constraint, confusion is something exploited in

**Figure 4: OODA Loop**
manoeuvre warfare. Encouraging uncertainty demands greater intellectual rigour from commanders and their staff because to accept greater uncertainty in conflict the greater are the options that must be available. The EBA represents this stronger intellectual rigor applied at the start of the engineer planning process. The terrain analysis technique shows clearly the options available on the ground and can also be directly applied in manoeuvre tactics.

The link from the EBA to manoeuvre tactics is essential. If a product such as terrain analysis can be used throughout the planning process by the specialist and the manoeuvre staff, the efficiency of planning is improved. There will be a consequential improvement in the OODA loop. For example, a technique of manoeuvre warfare is “Surface and Gaps”. From Lind this theory is to attack the enemy gaps, which are weaknesses, while avoiding surfaces that are enemy strengths. Liddell Hart drew the analogy with flowing water and the manner in which it will attack an earthen wall in its path. A path of least resistance, for example, a crack in the wall is detected by the flowing water and the breach is made. Nature’s forces will wear down the stronger elements of the wall sufficient only to allow the force of the torrent to dissipate. The EBA will provide the first elements of “Gaps and Surfaces” as it describes quite clearly the initial shape of the ground. The enemy will design his battle plan based on options provided by the ground. A gap may be an area of unfavourable going or, it may be the head of an artificial obstacle that is attempting to cause a turn into a killing area. It will always be extremely difficult to identify a gap and the EBA is a tool that will help in this difficult task.

Once the gap is exploited, the aim is to defeat the enemy centre of gravity, which may be ground orientated or it could be a mobile force such as the reserve. Indeed this force may be less tangible. For instance, it may be an ideological head of an organisation. Whatever form the centre of gravity takes it must have spatial reference. An understanding of the ground provided by the EBA is necessary to decide where these critical points might be on the battlefield. The commander’s ability to move to or at least influence the critical point on the battlefield can be assessed from the EBA. A clear understanding of the enemy centre of gravity and the ability to influence it is foremost in the manoeuvre commander’s planning and the EBA aims to meet these needs. The linkages between the EBA, the engineer appreciation, manoeuvre tactics and the engineer intelligence cycle are critical to meeting these less tangible aims. Products such as terrain analysis can be used directly as a part of specific manoeuvre tactics such as surfaces and gaps or identification of the centre of gravity. The ability to complete a timely EBA in the future will be enhanced by information technology. Advances in technology will, if wisely used, provide another essential element in the manoeuvre commander’s arsenal of decision support tools.

The Future

There is no doubt that society is experiencing a revolution as a result of the exponential growth of technology. The world gained some insight in what this meant to military operations in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 where there is no doubt technology influenced the outcome. A recent survey of defence technology in the Economist expressed this opinion:

“Technology does not win wars. But an innovative combination of new technologies and tactics can, on occasion, give an overwhelming advantage to a well organised, ardent fighting force. In response to such changes, all others must either try to master the same tactics and technologies or to develop counters. In so doing they revolutionise the way the world fights. Such a revolution is now underway. It turns on the ability of countries, armies, commanders, soldiers and individual weapons to gather, process and use information.”

The ever increasing requirement for digital information has seen the US Army commence the implementation of a plan to digitise the battlefield as part of the Force XXI concept. These trends clearly show that our information and decision making practices are not going to remain as they currently exist.

The increasing power of technology will mean better and more timely engineer intelligence assessments will be made. An engineer decision support system is required that will allow the
commander to understand critical elements of engineer intelligence. There is a system being developed under the AUSTACCS umbrella titled Engineer Command Support System (ESCSS) which aims to fulfil these needs. This system must be a filter not a bigger pipeline that merely encourages more engineer information to flow down the “Information Super Highway”. An information technology solution that repeats the reporting process is not an intelligent solution and will actually slow our ability to manoeuvre on the battlefield. The EBA concept is a cautious first step in the evolution of our information practices to suit the needs of modern CI systems.

The linkages defined within the EBA concept will be important for the information systems designers of the future. The use of information technology will allow the handling of vast tracts of data that will enhance the ability of engineers to provide better terrain analysis advice. Results from functions such as terrain analysis and assessment of enemy engineers will be available for all AUSTACCS users. The development of the digital data required for the terrain functions represents a large investment for the Australian Army as it does for the US Army. As our CI systems develop our information management practices and ability to collect digital data will improve in tandem and this will surely see a commensurate improvement in the commander’s ability to make fast accurate decisions.

The EBA provides the start point for the engineer appreciation and the engineer intelligence cycle and will provide an early assessment of mobility possibilities on the battlefield. The contents of the EBA; terrain analysis, the assessment of friendly and enemy engineers are not new. What is new, is the management of the information and the ability to make the results from engineer analysis readily available and easily understood. Production of an EBA will enhance the manoeuvre commander’s ability to visualise surfaces and gaps and understand how to influence the battle for the enemy centre of gravity. Terrain analysis, in particular, is a tool that can be used directly by manoeuvre staff after development by the engineer staff. The commander who clearly understands the intent of commanders and can visualise quickly the military characteristics of terrain will be able to react in a very quick manner. The concept for employment of the EBA relies on an understanding of how the engineer processes fit into the wider spectrum of planning.

The future will rely on integrated information practices that maximise the potential offered by information technology. The ability of time honoured decision making practices to withstand the requirements of manoeuvre conflict must be questioned. Development of our CI systems will suffer if there does not exist a climate of change when considering our doctrine, tactics, decision making and information practices.

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"Performance Appraisal" – A Critique of the Officer Performance Appraisal System

By Captain S. A. Herbert, RAR

Introduction

Perfromance appraisal is a valuable tool for the development of individuals. It also offers great potential for the strategic management of the Army. The type of appraisal system used says much about the goals of the organisation and the procedures in place to achieve these. The Australian Army has developed comprehensive appraisal systems for the management of both officers and soldiers. This article looks at the methods used to evaluate the performance of officers in the Army.

As with any management tool, performance appraisal must adapt to reflect a changing environment. The current Army process of evaluation has great potential for guiding the organisation through a period of rapid environment change. However, the officer appraisal system is not without a number of weaknesses. The Army is shrinking and adopting new technologies. One opportunity to ease the effect of change in the Army is to redesign the appraisal process to make it a more effective management tool.

Description

Personnel evaluation and development for Army officers is coordinated centrally by the Directorate of Officer Career Management (DOCM) in Canberra. Various sections of DOCM have responsibility for the 3000 Army officers depending on job category and seniority. Career management of officers is an important expectation of members and a valuable management tool. Guidelines and policy for career progression are well documented and closely adhered to.

With such a number of officers throughout a large and diverse organisation, contacts between DOCM representatives and members is rarely more than an annual event. Members are able to contact Career Advisers by telephone or letter and often will use this means on an irregular basis. Interviews, correspondence and telephone calls are used to inform of any major changes to career goals or personal circumstances. However, the primary appraisal tool used is the Form PR-19, Evaluation and Development Report – Officers (EDRO).

The various sections of the EDRO can be categorised using Henderson’s Methods description (Henderson 1988). The ‘Ratings’ section uses a “Ratings-Scale Technique”. This method lists nine characteristics of job performance. Raters identify the phrase which best describes the degree of performance of each characteristic or quality. Each degree is allocated a score from one to five. A maximum score of 45 is therefore possible. This score is a primary source of input for computer models used for comparison.

The ‘Comments’ column allows for an “Essay Method” using the “Narrative Descriptive Review Technique”. The rater gives a brief description of the officer’s performance in this section, as well as an overall impression or work picture. Space is provided for additional comment at each recommendation stage in Parts 3 and 4. Finally, at DOCM the whole range of officers are ranked using a “Forced Distribution Ranking”. A bell-shaped curve can be generated from the ratings scores of all officers, with set percentages of officers allocated to each stage of the curve for comparison.

PA Analysis

An important question to establish for any PA system is its purpose. The dual objectives of evaluation and development are identified in the structure of the EDRO. In the one document raters are required to assist the officer in defining future career goals and also to report on the officer’s past performance. These two roles are rarely complementary. In the first case, “evaluation” suggests looking at past performance and scoring the rated officer against his or her peers. The “development” phase requires the officer to honestly admit weaknesses or failings to the rater and to
discuss methods for improvement. The inclusion of evaluation may create a psychological barrier to honest development. As a result many of the responses on the PR-19 may not be relevant.

As a strategic management tool the EDRO has great potential in the current Army environment. In a period of Defence spending cuts simultaneous with the development of a more technological Army, the EDRO provides Army planners with a tool for “shaping and skilling the workforce to meet future needs”. (Dunphy 1991). Firstly, the information gleaned from the PR-19 and subsequent interviews can be used to form a skills database. Knowledge of the skills available in the Army allows strategic planners an understanding of the capability of the organisation to adapt to change. Secondly, identifying deficiencies in the skills base allows training needs to be addressed before they become a serious threat. Finally, the interpretation of PR-19 questions, and the emphasis placed on their answers, gives the rated officers an indication of the strategic goals of the organisation. This knowledge is useful in influencing officers toward performance aimed at achieving these goals. This strategic management goal is a major result of the “Development” side of performance appraisal. The current EDRO format has the potential to provide each of these.

When compared with current literature, the method of appraisal used under the EDRO system has a number of weaknesses. The incompatibility of the evaluation and development objectives has already been outlined. A second problem is the lack of participation by the appraised. Although the rated officer does complete parts 1 and 2 these provide little more than background information. The officer has only a small role in the evaluation process. The “open and honest participation of the employee” (Lansbury 1991) in a self assessment role is a valuable evaluation tool. Only when identification of weakness “leads not to punishment but rather to further training and development” (ibid) can this co-operation work. The EDRO provides no scope for participation during the formal reporting process.

Informal feedback during the reporting period—such as trial reports and “Platoon Commander Notebook”—are a valuable addition to the formal development process. However, these types of feedback are only useful if they are acted upon and lead to changed behaviour. Often, time constraints or lack of a formal process prevent continuous feedback from being successful. For the feedback to be effective it must be consistent across the PA system. Currently there exists no comprehensive, formal feedback process. An effective “feedback loop” requires regular recorded interviews between the appraiser and appraised which lead to agreement on the changes required. These changes should consist of skills, attitudes and experience that the rated officer is deficient, and should also result in a program to rectify the situation. Officer development then becomes a process of continuous improvement within a strategic framework. Evaluation supports this development process by annually assessing the officer’s achievement of development goals.

Much of the potential value of the EDRO is lost due to an absence of training of reporting officers. Kaye and Krantze assume that in an effective PA system “supervisors are well accustomed to being trained to carry out performance appraisal” and that only the subordinates would benefit from training. (Kaye 1982) On the contrary it is far from usual for Army officers to undertake formal training in performance appraisal. Most supervisors conduct this important function with only their own experience as the rated officer for guidance. Supervisors who are unaware of how to properly use the EDRO may inadvertently sabotage many of the strategic goals of performance appraisal. Negative attitude by supervisors, inequality of ratings between officers, “halo effect’ error”, unwillingness of raters to give either a high or a low score, prejudice and bias, and the effect of recent behaviour standing out all serve to disrupt the workings of the ratings process. (Stone 1991).

The sheer number of raters and rated officers is justification for a broad PA system. Improved training of raters would help to reduce the incidence of discrepancies. However some weaknesses will always remain when a broad based performance appraisal system is applied to a number of jobs, locations and levels of responsibility. The results of the EDRO are utilised by DOCM for the career management of officers. Each officer is compared using the T-score from the Ratings section and the word picture from the Comments section. DOCM will use up to eight previous reports in order to identify trends in behaviours.

Jobs requiring different experience and different levels of responsibility are rated using the same criteria. To overcome differences, DOCM must apply a subjective order of merit in addition to the ratings and comments from the EDRO. In the “Guidance For Completion” section of the EDRO, Assessing Officers are warned against inflating ratings, as “you will disadvantage others wearing the same worn rank.” Individual assessing officers should avoid making their own subjective comparisons of various jobs. However, DOCM is required to do just that. For
example, an officer who is employed in a relatively difficult job may not score highly. The subjective ranking and trend analysis from past reports are therefore used to counter what would otherwise be a penalty.

A final point that may cause the Army some concern in the future is the legal implication of the EDRO. Only recently are civilian firms, particularly in the USA, realising the importance of analysing their performance appraisal system to conform to equal opportunity and unfair dismissal legislation. Army raters should similarly be wary. As the comments written on the EDRO can have far reaching effects on an officer’s career, it is legally important for recommendations to be supported by documented evidence, as well as opportunities to improve behaviour. The Army Redress of Grievance procedure provides guidelines for pursuing complaints. Assessing Officers should however be prepared to support EDRO comments with evidence of observed behaviour rather than just opinion.

**Redesigning the System**

A number of deficiencies have been observed from the previous analysis:

a. The dual purposes of the EDRO are not compatible;
b. The full potential of the EDRO for strategic management through officer development is not yet fully realised;
c. Lack of participation by rated officers reduces the value of the system;
d. Lack of training for appraisers and appraised may undermine the strategic goals of performance appraisal through rater failure and lack of objectivity; and
e. Legal aspects may become a problem in the near future.

The EDRO needs to be divided into two separate systems each with a clearly defined purpose. Evaluation could still be conducted on an annual basis as is the current practice. The use of self-assessment techniques would aid evaluation but only if the performance appraisal was used to identify weaknesses rather than to punish poor performance. The development side of the system should be conducted continuously, with annual recommendations reaching DOCM. This should include participation by the rated officer through a formal feedback system, agreement on weaknesses and goals for improvement, and support by the appraiser to allow the officer to achieve the desired changes. The evaluation system then supports the development side by reporting on the officer’s achievement of goals, thus closing the feedback loop.

Interestingly, the redesigned soldier evaluation Form PR-66 approaches the goals of participation outlined above. Separation of the document into PR-66 Confidential Report, PR-66-1 Development and Posting Preferences, and PR-66-2 Performance Counselling Record, allows appraisers to address each goal of the PA system separately and with the full and continuous participation of the appraised.

Comprehensive training in the use of appraisal systems must be conducted during each officer’s initial training. Further refresher training could then be conducted at each rank level. This should have the dual purposes of training both the appraiser and the appraised. The annual evaluation system should include questions assessing the officers ability to appraise subordinates. This would have the effect of making raters accountable for the quality of the system. Together these measures help to ensure equity across the system.

The reduction in the size of the Army provides the opportunity to overhaul the evaluation of officers. With fewer officers competing for increasingly specialised jobs, evaluations could be made more complex to assign different weightings for specific jobs and levels of responsibility. In Britain and the USA, the development and application of “Management Competencies” to various positions has become commonplace. Management competencies recognise that there are both generic skills required of all managers, as well as specific attributes for particular positions. Studies in those two countries have assigned detailed descriptions of the type of work performed by managers, the education, skills and experience required to succeed in different positions, as well as a method for comparing managers in different roles within industries. Job responsibilities are translated “into the key competencies needed to achieve them,” so that officers can “know what skills they need to learn or refine”. (Cousens p13)

The recently released Karpin Report into management practice in Australia has identified a severe lack of comprehensive management development in Australian business. Legislation has been proposed in Federal Parliament to institutionalise a competencies approach to management development. In many respects, the Army’s Core Education Requirement policy represents the first tentative steps toward a more strategic development of officers through their
careers. However, far more work is required to develop comprehensive performance indicators following the management competencies approach. Clearly establishing the skills and behaviours required of an effective officer in a particular posting, and rating against achievement of these, would provide a sound basis for both participative evaluation and constructive officer development. Cousens sees the value of these performance indicators as allowing officers to “map the journey to exemplary achievement”. (p12)

Finally, performance appraisal must be cognisant of equal employment opportunity considerations. This means that all employees must be assessed on equal terms and all given an equal chance to achieve high scores. This may become increasingly difficult, particularly if officer posting tenures are increased. A number of areas are important in this respect. The content of the system must be based on “job-related, specific work behaviours” and not generalisations or ‘gut-feelings’. Detailed instruction and training must be given to appraisers. Employees must receive positive feedback and early notice of weakness. (Holley 1982) Army commanders cannot arbitrarily dismiss soldiers for poor performance. Instead, detailed, documented histories of weaknesses must be maintained along with evidence of remedial action. In the same vein, both good and bad comments on an officer’s evaluation report must be backed up by documented evidence to meet strict equity requirements.

Conclusion

As a strategic management tool the Army EDRO is potentially very useful. Continuous officer career development is vital to the individual and the organisation. Evaluation of performance is a necessary part of the human resources management process. However, these two are separate goals and require separation in the performance appraisal process. A number of other recommendations aimed at making the EDRO more equitable have also been described. In particular, two separate appraisals would be more able to contribute to the strategic goals of the Army. The Army workforce is shrinking. More use should be made of performance appraisal on the development side to post officers to positions, develop future skill needs, and to provide guidance on future performance expectations.

Performance appraisal can be “one of the most powerful tools in an organisation for building the skills and morale that underpin strategic enterprise.” (Cousens p13). The changing environment facing the Army of the 1990s has the unexpected effect of providing the opportunity to address weaknesses in the appraisal system. Realising the full potential of performance appraisal will greatly assist the Army to achieve its strategic objectives into the future.

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Gender Awareness within the Australian Defence Force

By Lieutenant J. A. Weatherill, RA Inf

"The great question that has never been answered and which I have not yet been able to answer, despite my thirty years of research into the feminine soul, is 'What does a woman want?'."

Sigmund Freud

Introduction

Gender and sex are not the same thing. Gender specifically refers to the social meanings attached to biological differences. In other words, gender is the social construction of maleness and femaleness in a particular society. Gender plays an important, if not decisive role in the expression of the individual's life choices. The way we see ourselves and the way we interact are affected by our values and assumptions about gender.

Our society has clearly defined "acceptable" and "unacceptable" behaviour for both males and females, but these definitions are not even-handed. For instance, behaviour deemed unacceptable for women is often that prized in a man, and women are more likely to be defined in terms of gender stereotypes. Masculinity is generally seen as a matter of breaking away from the feminine. Male dominance is even reflected in our language.

Clearly there is a conflict between males and females in Australian society today, and more importantly, the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Therefore, feminists have defined our society as being "male dominated or patriarchal and that a hierarchical structure which favours males is embedded in our culture".

Discussion

Women in Uniform

The existence of female soldiers is by no means a foregone conclusion. In virtually all armies, females have been viewed as working in supporting roles "for the duration of hostilities only" and then to be demobilised at the end of the conflict. Changes within the civilian sector have altered this approach to a certain extent, especially since the post 1960s expansion of women into a wider variety of occupations. Responding to social change, in May 1990, the Chief of the Defence Force expanded the employment opportunities available to servicewomen by waiving the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 exemption, which excluded females from service in combat related duties. Figure 1 compares the total number of males to females that have enlisted into the army since 1984.

The argument for and against women in uniform operates on three levels. The broadest issue is whether females should be in the Defence Force at all. The second, whether they should be in positions of command, and lastly, if women should participate in combat. Although the first two issues can be dismissed on the grounds of equal opportunity in the work force and the present Defence White Paper directives, the problem that still exists is the argument for and against women participating in combat.

Whether women will or should participate in combat is primarily based upon attitudes and beliefs about gender roles rather than empirical evidence or ones ability. These attitudes and beliefs are undergoing dramatic changes within the civilian and military sector, but just as civilian practices are slow to alter, changes in the ADF will be neither swift nor easy. The ADF, and especially that of the Army, is undoubtedly one of the strongest bastions of male dominated attitudes, beliefs and practices.

Despite the growth of numbers of females within the ADF, they are virtually absent from all "decision making echelons of the countries armed forces". It is this exclusion that takes the whole issue of taking for granted the equal status of females so dubious. It appears that females may be in the services, but their prospect of further advancement to positions of senior command are based upon their gender. This can be directly linked to the aforementioned; that females will or should not participate in combat.

In 1987, a questionnaire was posted to two thousand servicewomen randomly selected from all rank levels of the three services. The questionnaire covered such topics as career aspirations, how long they intended to remain in the armed services and what factors were likely to influence their decision to
stay or leave. It was assumed that a woman's behaviour would be driven more by family rather than career considerations. The results indicated the exact opposite. The most frequently selected option to leave the services was "for better career opportunities elsewhere". Although it could take up to 20 years service to aspire to the rank of Colonel, seeking better career opportunities could also indicate why so few women have persisted with a career within the Army. Over the past three years there has been a slight growing trend in the number of female discharges, as indicated in Figure 3.

**Women in Arms**

The British, American and Australian Governments all have legislation in place which forbids the active involvement of female participation in combat. During the latter part of the 1970s, the ADF reviewed their policies concerning the employment of women and there are currently wider employment opportunities available for females. Since December 1992, women have been eligible to compete for about 67 per cent of Army positions. Apart from minor areas related to specific occupational health concerns, the only categories of employment not open to women are infantry, armour, artillery and combat engineers. The ADF exists to perform a combat function and therefore the directions of their activities require commanders who are capable in this field. The idealised image of any Defence Force is that the best commanders will rise to the top. The flaw in this idealised model is that it excludes females. By excluding women from the experience of both performing in and commanding actual combat units, means that there is no way for females, regardless of their individual qualities, to ever attain the ranks available to their male counterparts.

Service members must be encouraged to pursue opportunities and career enhancement in the Armed Forces, limited only by the needs and goods of the Service. But when it comes to combat assignments, the needs of the military must take precedence over all other considerations, including the career prospects of individual service members. The military service is not a corporation, and being a soldier, sailor or airman is more than just a job. Civil society protects individual rights, but the military, which protects civil society, must be governed by a different set of rules.

The confusion created about women in combat has been compounded by a problem of clearly defining combat. Regardless of any definition, the fact is that the improvements in technology have expanded the
battlefield to such an extent that terms such as combat and non-combat zone have become meaningless. The range and accuracy of weapons, plus the development of air power and more recently missiles, means that there are no areas out of combat. In the case of an unconventional war setting, or as the ADF describe it, Low-Level Conflict, there is no way of guaranteeing that any area is safe and as a consequence all military personnel can be said to be in the combat zone.

Although having accepted females into the armed forces, and increasing the number of command appointments they fulfil (Figure 4), we have by legislation managed to prohibit them from participating in combat, and thus restrict them to those jobs defined as non-combatant. The ADF's failure to come to terms with a concise definition of combat, as it now stands, has thrown the argument that women will not participate in combat into scepticism. Servicewomen performing their duties in areas of greater or lesser danger is a reality. That they are barred from the traditional combat units means that the only "combat restrictions" placed upon them are that they are not allowed to physically strike back at the enemy, or to command and control those who do.

Civilian society forbids employment discrimination. But the military, in building fighting units, must be able to choose those most able to fight and win in battle. There is a good reason for this. In a combat unit serving on land, at sea or in the air, the inability of any member of the group to perform to the levels demanded by the battlefield can present a direct risk to the lives of not only themselves, but those around them, and more importantly to the accomplishment of the mission.

Modern armies have long recognised the need for a screening process to select those soldiers who are most suitable for direct combat roles. While the myths about soldiers assume that everyone will fight, the evidence and military practice demonstrates that even with a fairly stringent screening process the level of idealised performance is low. General George Patton argued that battle was not as alarming as people expected it to be. “Battle is less frightening than those of you who have not been in it are apt to think”, he declared.
A male's competence and likely effectiveness in combat is judged in terms of his individual performance. Although every member that joins the ADF volunteers for combat, after mental and physical testing some men are deemed suitable, while others who fail the test are allocated supporting roles in other Corps. The debate concerning the inclusion of women is a clear demonstration of the way in which matters concerning women are treated as a gender issue, not as a question of an individual's competence, regardless of sex.

Introducing women into combat units could have adverse effect on the units cohesion. The lower stamina and endurance of women has already been established. In the likely situation that women were unable to carry their full load without male assistance, unit cohesion would suffer. Furthermore, lack of privacy in combat units could result in cohesion problems when normal and widely accepted standards of personal modesty must routinely be sacrificed to military necessity.

While many civilian employers discourage interoffice affairs, they nonetheless occur on a frequent basis. In the civilian world this is relatively unimportant. In combat, however, we are dealing with human lives and the survival of that unit. Imagine the consequences if a male company commander had a strong attraction (requited or not) for a female platoon commander, section commander or soldier. It would result in hesitation, indecision and possibly a wrong decision. What can be tolerated in the civilian world cannot be in the military world.

The case against women in combat roles revolves around the argument that they lack physical strength and that they are not tough enough emotionally to stand up to the rigours of combat or the strain of command. In any type of warfare there will always be aspects of combat that require considerable strength and physical stamina. However, there are areas within the ADF which are of high technology, which require a high intellectual ability and manual dexterity. Also, there will always be some females who will pass the most stringent of physical tests.

A 1989 decision by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal opened all combat positions in the Canadian Forces except submarines to women. Based on this decision, the Canadian Forces invited women from both inside and outside the military to join the infantry; 103 women responded to the offer. Due to limited interest and the need to integrate women quickly, none of the women were prescreened or required to meet any minimum standard before being assigned to a unit. Consequently attrition was severe, due primarily to physical and endurance considerations, with only one woman able to meet the requirements of the infantry test.

The only modern nation that has actually used women in combat units is the former Soviet Union. This was due to at the time their national survival in World War II demanded it. Despite reports of a number of women in all branches of its military, the Soviet Union virtually eliminated women from its Armed Forces after the war, assigning those who remained to traditional roles of medicine, communications and administration. Before the Soviet Union's breakup, women made up only 0.7 per cent of its active force.12

Whether females are emotionally suited to the rigours of combat is yet to be seen. The clearest message that emerges from the available evidence on
combat performance is that despite any testing procedures, there is no real way of knowing how any individual will perform in combat unless they are actually in it. Nor is there any way of predicting how long any individual will continue to function effectively. All that can be stated with certainty, “is that everyone has a breaking point and that some reach this point before others”.13

Conclusion

"It will avail us little if the members of our defeated forces are all equal. History will treat us for what we were: a social curiosity that failed."

Professor R. A. Gabriel

There is a clear parallel between the current sexist attitudes and gender awareness relating to the employment of females in combat related roles within the ADF. Changes in the civilian practices have altered the position of women in terms of both their jobs and the amount of authority they now have.

In order that a “generation gap” not be established between the ADF and the civil sector, a number of changes must occur within the ADF. Abolishing the stereotype about “real combat soldiers” and clearly defining what constitutes combat is a necessary preliminary action, but more importantly, the deeply embedded structural inequalities have to be challenged if the individuals who perform a combat role are to be chosen for suitability and not as a result of gender.

However, military policies must be based on actual experience and sound judgement, not doctrinaire notions of sexual equality unsupported by human experience and history. By necessity, the military must be free to pursue policies aimed at maximising combat readiness, unit cohesion and military effectiveness.

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Lieutenant Justin Weatherill enlisted into the ARA as a soldier in 1988 and served with the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment. He graduated from RMC, Duntroon mid 1992 and was commissioned into the RA Inf. He served with the 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment as a rifle platoon commander and the Mortar Line Officer. In 1995 he was posted to the School of Infantry as a platoon commander within Depot Company.
Failures of Defensive Imagination

By Robin Higham and Charles D. Bright

Introduction

In the last half century there have been a number of cases of victories which might have been complete and of defeats that might have been averted or delayed.

If defensive imagination had been employed, history might have been different.

That such events took place can be blamed on a number of interlocking causes from mindsets inculcated by education and experience, to lack of technical knowledge and intelligence. Also a factor was a failure to see the enemy's position.

As examples we have selected the following: the failure of the Royal Air Force to attack German airfields during the Battle of Britain of 1940, the Luftwaffe's omission of a forward offensive against USAF escort fighters in the Battle of Germany of 1943-1945, the North Vietnamese neglect of USAF tankers during the “Thud” attacks on Hanoi, 1965-1973, the Argentine neglect of the British fleet off the Falklands in 1982, and Saddam Hussein's allowing the Allied build-up before the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991. In contrast, the aggressive flexibility of Israeli pre-emptive defensive tactics bears examination.

The Battle of Britain

After its loss of roughly 900 pilots and 1 000 aircraft in the May-June Battle of France, the RAF, like the army, retired to Britain to lick its wounds. Churchill at once characterised the forthcoming Battle for Britain as one for the fate of Western Civilisation.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, AOC in C, Fighter Command, had a daunting task. He believed that he was at a serious disadvantage in fighters since a chunk of his frontline strength was made up of obsolete biplanes, highly vulnerable two-seat Defiants and twin-engined Blenheim Is. Much of his force of 52 fighter squadrons had only 12 planes and two spares per squadron and many of his pilots were newly trained and had little experience of aerial gunnery. His intelligence officers who would debrief the pilots were freshly drafted from civvy street and had not yet been schooled.

As the battle developed, Dowding would have additional problems. While the number of Spitfires and Hurricanes shot down, mostly over England, equalled the number being produced, his reserves would be eroded at an alarming rate in August and September and his pilots would become exhausted. The causes were to be found in inadequate planning and training for continuous operations, which as a consequence overlooked the need for a salvage and repair organisation greater than the ordinary squadron's maintenance establishment and mindset in order to cope with wastage. In part this came from the loss of memory of World War I and the neglect of salvage and repair in peacetime. The fatigue of both aircrew and ground crew came both not only from continuous operations, sometimes under bombing, but also from the building of peacetime airfields with their compact hangars, messes and quarters design. Noise became fatiguing on top of constant alerts, sudden scrambles, and the debilitating effects of combat.

Linear defence behind the trench known as the English Channel and the radar line prevented the panzers from overrunning the Home airfields, but wore down crews. Linear defence also neglected to make sound use of the flexibility of airpower through the failure to apply “the Nelson touch” in briefing commanders so that all understood the battle plan and in the unwillingness of Dowding to demand the replacement of a disloyal subordinate who did not understand the necessity for fast action in modern aerial battle.

The biggest hindrance to the application of defensive imagination was a product of the Victorian training of the senior RAF officers, of politics and lack of imagination and understanding of modern war in the Air Ministry, and of the command reorganisation of 1936.

An ill-thought-out critical decision brought on by the rapid rearmament expansion of the RAF was the abolition of the single unified Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) and its replacement by functional commands under independent air officers...
commanding. Thus instead of there being an Air Officer Commanding ADGB, from 1936 onwards there were AOCs of Bomber Command, Fighter Command, Coastal Command, Training Command, and, from 1938, of Maintenance Command. Though technically they all reported to the Chief of the Air Staff, his role, unlike that of the First Sea Lord at the Admiralty, was not executive, but only advisory to the Secretary of State for Air, the political head. It is true that this defect was recognised early on and an attempt made to create the position of AOC-in-C, RAF as the fighting commander of all forces at Home. But it failed for internal service political reasons.

Dowding was forced to fight the battle in summer 1940 under three misimpressions. The first was a shortage of RAF pilots; the second was a shortage of aircraft; and the third was the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force, was much bigger and stronger than his own forces.

It is true that there was a shortage of commissioned fighter pilots, but not of NCO pilots. However, the latter were only allowed to fly for seven years and then reverted to their ground rank and Air Ministry personnel experts did not count them. But equally important was that in spite of government instructions to give top priority to the Home Defence Force, i.e. Fighter Command, two thirds of the pilots coming out of Training Command were being allocated to Bomber Command. The shortage of aircraft was drastic, but temporary, and quickly solved once Lord Beaverbrook, the new Minister of Aircraft Production, sent trained repair teams out to the fields where aircraft taken off charge languished and put factories on 24-hour shifts, something the Germans failed to do till 1944.

The matter of the odds was an intelligence failure that was of the same genre as the interwar estimates of the weight of bombs that an enemy could drop on London. It was a cumulating exaggeration, not resolved until Mr. Justice Singletary’s inquiry of early 1941, which then noted that the Luftwaffe was only about one-third the size the Air Ministry thought.

While Dowding was fighting the battle with defensive fighters, Bomber Command during this crucial battle for the survival of Western Civilisation, sat on its airfields. It sat there because its vaunted daylight of tight formation flying with bombers equipped with power turrets had been blown out of the sky by December 1939 and because its navigation was abysmal. Yet it had 82 per cent of its heavy bombers constantly ready for operations and 106 per cent of its light bombers in No. 2 Group.

The British side of the Battle of Britain was not being fought as a unified effort. But did this matter?

After all the Germans were beaten off, the proposed Operation Sealion to invade Britain was called off and Hitler turned east to attack the Soviet Union.

The answer is yes, the Luftwaffe could have been badly mauled, so much that the invasion of Russia might have been delayed long enough, perhaps, to convince Stalin that he was about to be attacked. A delay would have meant that the panzers would not have had enough time to be successful before the winter of 1941 and that would have meant postponing Operation Barbarossa until 1942, by which time the USSR would have been in far better condition for war and might not have lost those 1 500 aircraft on 22 June 1941.

But how could this have been accomplished?

The Luftwaffe had fought a series of lightning campaigns from Norway to France in a matter of weeks with the philosophy that in a short war it could neglect many things as long as victory was being achieved. Thus the Luftwaffe entered the summer of 1940 with many of its frontline squadrons run down to 30 per cent serviceability or availability. The deficiencies had to be made good with new pilots, aircraft, mechanics, and spares. Thus it was not until August that some 2 500 aircraft were divided across 50 airfields in the Low Countries and northern France, all within striking distance of Britain. But conversely, all also within striking distance of the RAF.

Could the RAF have undertaken counter-attacks?

The Poles demonstrated that even the obsolescent Fairey Battle, which had been massacred in France, could be flown across the Channel to harass the barges being accumulated in the invasion embarkation ports. Moreover, post-battle analysis of operations in France showed that Bristol Blenheim medium bombers could operate successfully in daylight if, instead of flying at 12 000 feet, which World War I flyers had noted was the worst possible height, they had flown below 2 500 feet, which the veterans had pointed out made them virtually immune to AA fire in hilly country. Further, experienced Blenheim crews noted that a vic of three Blenheims was largely immune to attacks by enemy fighters when it flew at low-level in a close formation so that the three rear guns could be brought to bear on any attacker. In other words, Blenheims could have been used for intruder, hit-and-run, and guerrilla style tactics.

On average there were 50 German aircraft on each airfield across the Channel or in Norway.

Yet the evidence is that they enjoyed a restful time. The aircraft were lined up in rows and the pilots sunned themselves in garden chairs. Surely random counter-attacks, which might have cost the Germans at night (as the French had done in World War I) to
set off their flak would have paid dividends in higher Luftwaffe casualties plus loss of sleep, declining attacks on Britain, and a general lowering of Field Marshal Hermann Goering’s reputation?

Why did not such disruptive attacks take place?

Apart from the flaws mentioned above of divided command, etc., the RAF high command had bifurcated its forces and it lacked imagination. Yet exercises in the early 1930s had included attacks on the airfields of both sides.

The failure lay beyond these things. It lay in the rapid expansion of the service, in the constantly changing roles of personnel, in the division of staff minds into the newly established commands and their purposes, and in the doctrine at the heart of the British air service, that it was a grand-strategic strike force pointed at the enemy will, at his capital city. The RAF high command had failed to address the problem of defeating rapidly a tactical air force such as the Luftwaffe in the field and not in a slow campaign against the capital city and the factories. (Yet, the British thought the Germans could destroy London in three days!)

**Technological Weakness – The Battle of Germany**

Significant offensive operations by the Luftwaffe in western Europe began with the Norwegian campaign and continued with the Battles of France and Britain. The Luftwaffe switched to the defensive in December 1940.

The first important threat it faced was a night strategic offensive by the RAF operating out of the British Isles. A night air defence force under Colonel Josef Kammhuber was organised in response. He believed in an aggressive defence; to strike at the bombers from take off to landing. A key element in his plans was to establish night intruder operations. His available resources were small for this task, and in the division of staff minds into the newly established commands and their purposes, and in the doctrine at the heart of the British air service, that it was a grand-strategic strike force pointed at the enemy will, at his capital city. The RAF high command had failed to address the problem of defeating rapidly a tactical air force such as the Luftwaffe in the field and not in a slow campaign against the capital city and the factories. (Yet, the British thought the Germans could destroy London in three days!)

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The Fuehrer order has not been directly associated with the air superiority fighter, but their operations also remained on the defensive after 1940. This was a fundamental mistake, if avoidable, because fighters are most efficient when used aggressively. The defensive posture was also influenced by other factors. Hitler put top priority on attack aircraft, and there were not enough fighters built. Pilot training was stopped during the 1942 Stalingrad Airlift so instructor pilots could be used to fly transports. Their losses were heavy and difficult to replace. The interruption in training was never made up nor recovered from for the rest of the war. Fuel shortages late in the war shortened and otherwise worsened the training situation. The result was poorly trained pilots and a shortage of them. The Luftwaffe central commander was a flak officer who believed in point air defence and that flak and not fighters was the most effective weapon. Nazi Party Gauleiters (district leaders) used political pressure to get more defence for their districts, resulting in less than optimum basing overall.

Field Marshal Goering made important decisions as well. At first he believed U.S. bombers would never be able to reach German territory. When they successfully attacked Wilhelmshaven on 27 January 1943, Goering reacted by assigning two fighter units to a peripheral defence, based in Holland and the German Bight. The unconcentrated fighters were unable to use more than 20 to 25 aircraft against any raid. At the time, the U.S. VIII Bomber Command (VIII BC) was mounting raids of around 100 bombers, German General of the Fighters, Adolf Galland believed that a victorious defence required a fighter force which would outnumber in an action the bombers by three or four to one. In addition, he believed escorts should be fought on a one-for-one basis. Goering’s allocation to the German air defence forces was always far below those levels. The U.S. escorts used at this time were P-38s, which were outclassed by German fighters. This probably inspired a false confidence in Goering. He did not believe there could be deeper penetrations of German airspace, or better U.S. escorts used.

Soon the Americans were outfitting P-47 Thunderbolts, adequate fighters with single external 200-gallon fuel tanks. This gave them a radius for action of 280 miles. The sudden appearance of the P-47s in July 1943 surprised the Dutch-based German fighters, and the German defence was driven back to the Emden and Cologne areas. This did not shake Goering’s beliefs.
The VIII BC dispatched 376 bombers on 17 August 1943 on a deep penetration of German airspace to raid Regensburg and Schweinfurt. At Frankfurt, beyond the P-47's radius of action, the German air defence massed 300 fighters. Sixty B-17s were shot down for a loss of 25 fighters, a victory for the defence. A similar victory was gained on 14 October 1943 on another raid on Schweinfurt. The VIII BC dispatched 320 bombers and 196 P-47s. The Luftwaffe attacked as soon as the escorts turned back; available were 300 fighters, 40 attack aircraft, and some night interceptors. Another 60 bombers were shot down for a Luftwaffe loss of 35 fighters and attack aircraft. These victories probably contributed to Goering's complacency.

In the autumn, the P-47s switched from one to two external fuel tanks and their radius of action went up to more than 300 miles. Then the German peripheral defence was abandoned and Luftwaffe fighters retreated further into the Reich. The Americans shifted from close (defensive) escort to area (aggressive) escort after January 1944. In February 1944, the Luftwaffe had 345 fighters and 128 attack aircraft for defence against what was now the Eighth Air Force (8AF). From February on, the Americans attacked the Germans en route from and back to their airfields and when the planes were on the ground. About the same time, the Luftwaffe command ordered its fighters to attack bombers and ignore the escorts. This unaggressive tactic, inappropriate for fighter operations, proved a losing proposition and cost the Luftwaffe dearly.

Most important of all, the P-51B became available as a long-range fighter. The P-51 was probably the best piston-engined fighter of the war. With internal fuel of 269 gallons and two external tanks of 110 gallons each, it had a range of 2,080 miles. The Luftwaffe could no longer wait for the escort to go home before engagement, and could not use its attack aircraft and night interceptors in the presence of enemy fighters. The P-51B went into action on 15 January 1944. Its first long-range operations were on the 6 March 1944 attack on Berlin. The 8AF dispatched 730 bombers, 86 P-38s, 615 P-47s, and 100 P-51s. The Luftwaffe had 200 fighters and attack aircraft available for defence. The 8AF lost 69 bombers and 11 escorts. The Germans lost 80 aircraft, an unbearable loss.

By the end of May 1944, the 8AF had won command of the air over the heart of the Reich. For example, the 8AF launched a deep penetration to Berlin on 19 May with 888 bombers and 750 fighters dispatched, including 363 P-51s. It lost 28 bombers and 19 fighters. The Luftwaffe lost 77 aircraft in the air and 10 on the ground, and it was reduced to 174 fighters and 25 aircraft for the defence of the west. In addition, in the spring it had catastrophic and unrecoverable losses among its experienced fighter pilots.

Galland said the Luftwaffe knew the technical details of the P-51 in December 1943. It is not clear how he knew the new P-51B had an Achilles Heel which the Luftwaffe never attempted to exploit. But tests of shot down examples might have told him. A critical means used to get the long-range out of the P-51 was to add an aft fuselage tank, in combat or not, burned that tank’s contents down first and not gasoline in the external tanks. AFF Manual 51-127-5, Pilot Training Manual for the Mustang, says:

*Be especially careful in handling the stick when the fuselage tank contains more than 25 gallons of gas. In this case the flying characteristics of the airplane change considerably -- increasing so as the amount of fuel in the tank is increased. When you are flying more than 40 gallons of fuel in your fuselage tank, do not attempt any aerobatics. The weight of this fuel shifts the centre of gravity back so the airplane is unstable for anything but straight and level flight.*

What the technical order does not say is that a P-51 with much of this fuel aboard would try to swap ends in even a gentle turn. None of the fuselage internal fuel could be jettisoned; it had to be burned down at the rate of 50-60 gallons an hour.

Could the Luftwaffe have exploited this flaw? At the beginning of March 1944, the Luftwaffe was not yet crushed and the number of P-51Bs was not large. On 4 March 1944, the 8AF attempted to bomb Berlin en mass. Bad weather interfered, and only a few bombers reached the target. After the 4th, further such attacks should have been expected. The escorts could be expected to number 600 P-47s and 100 P-51s for 600 bombers. As the course of battle was going, the Luftwaffe had a window of opportunity of about 10 weeks for a counterstroke and the earlier the better. A scenario might have been to pick a night when the next day's weather forecast would be favourable for bomber operations, and send the Luftwaffe fighters below radar to the base near, or on, the North Sea coast. About 100 could have been mustered from the west’s defenses, so an effective force would have had to draw on reinforcements from the southern or eastern fronts. They might have been able to achieve surprise when the P-51s were over the North Sea or the Low Countries. They should have been able to massacre the Mustangs even if the P-51s
dropped their tanks. Any P-47s in the area would have had to drop their tanks, but then would not have been at a disadvantage. This would leave the bombers with no, or greatly reduced, escorts for flight over the Reich. The bombers might then have abandoned the mission, but they had never before done so when there was no escort. If the bombers went on they would have faced perhaps 40 attack aircraft and night interceptors.

Such a strike, even if it could have been repeated, would not have changed the war’s outcome. But it might have been a victory, and should have forced the 8AF to use counter measures which would divert some of its resources. The air defence of the Reich lost some opportunities, and one may have been a failure offensively to exploit the P-51s weakness.

**The Refuellers’ Heel – Vietnam**

With seven Allied air forces operating over Vietnam from 1963 to 1973, it is scarcely surprising that there was confusion as to the roles and doctrine as well as in the use of equipment. One apparently singular example of where Hanoi could have eased the pressure on North Vietnam and not have consumed so much of its effort in flak defenses against American raids, lay in the counter-attack against the F-105s coming in from Thailand.

These were tactical bombers being used in the grand strategic role, part of the upside down nature of the war in Indo-China.

The F-105 Thuds had to fly a round trip of some 700 miles from their bases in Thailand. Because of their heavy bomb loads and the necessity for full-power maneuvering at low-level, where jets gulp fuel, they had to be refueled both on the way in to the attack and on the way back out. On the way out they rendezvous with tankers 125 miles out of base, but on the way home it had to be much closer to Hanoi. Because of lack of interference by NVN Migs, the USAF came more and more to accept refueling as routine and inevitable.

On the other hand, Migs rarely rose to combat the Thuds or the F-4s and so air-to-air battles were few.

The USAF and USN dominated the skies over North Vietnam, but the SAM belts and the flak made life very difficult.

The Migs remained largely a relatively ineffective force in being so that the initiative lay with the Americans, who would monitor North Vietnamese air space with AWACs. Moreover, the long Rolling Thunder campaign was so badly conducted and so lowered SVN morale that the North may have been content to let the wastage go on. Migs might have been moved and hidden on forward grassfields, but could they have lain there undetected?

But suppose the North Vietnamese Air Force commander had used his defensive imagination. He could have sent out missile-armed Migs on evasive routings, allowing for American radar coverage, and stalked and shot down the tankers.

Even one such surprising loss in flames would have made the strike forces more cautious and more nervous and have diverted USAF resources and assets to guarding the KC-135s. The problem for the NVAF was that its superior Mig-21s only had a radius of action of 370 statute miles allowing the tankers to be 500 miles from base and still safe.

But why did not the NVNAF do it? The mindset was essentially defensive. With few aircraft, the main aim was to keep them intact unless an attractive opportunity appeared for a brief combat.

**Out of Reach? The Falklands**

The Argentine seizure of the Falkland, (Malvinas, Islas) Islands of the southeast coast of South America underestimated the patriotic interest of Britons in general and of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, in particular. The British had within six days dispatched a task force to recover the Falklands.

Except for the World War II carrier, HMS Illustrious, the task force was composed of thin-skinned ships, especially merchant ships, vulnerable to missiles, such as the French-made air-launched Exocet.

Now what the Argentines should have recalled was the corollary to Disraeli’s famous “Nothing succeeds like success,” and that is that if you are going to be illegal and immoral, you had better be successful. The Japanese learnt that the hard way after Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Argentines would be taught the same lesson in 1982.

The British had the advantage of staying to the east of the Falklands beyond the range of the Argentine air strikes, until the actual landings began in Goose Green and in San Carlos Waters. There some of their low-flying attacks did prove successful against both frigates and logistics ships.

But the main British forces still cruised out of range, rather as the German fighters pulled back in
France in 1941 when the British undertook their Rhubarb fighter sweeps.

The Argentines could have made life very unpleasant for the Royal Navy and the British troops if it had figured out how to refuel its A-4B Skyhawks and Mirages so that they could get within Striking range of the fleet. Yet they did not. Why? The Skyhawks were fitted for aerial refuelling but the Argentines had no tankers and had failed to develop the “Buddy system” of in-flight support using some A-4s as tankers. Not until 1984-1985 did the AAF acquire 707s with a tanker capability.

While professionals, Argentine airmen had not been placed in such a situation before, they had not wargamed a hostile response to their seizure of the Falklands, and they were not used to acting in a life or death situation where time was of the essence.

Saddam and the Persian Gulf War

As at Pearl Harbor and as at the Falklands/Malvinas, a strike which the international community regards as immoral has to be successful. Saddam Hussein of Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait was a defiant land-grab. But Iraq, in spite of or because of the long-drawn out Iran-Iraq War on 1980-1988, was one of the more powerful military establishments in the world. As no one was willing to use nuclear weapons to right the wrong done Kuwait, so what eventually became the Allies had to undertake a diplomatic offensive, while building up coalitions and forces in an 18th century manner for a showdown.

Given the fact that it took from August 1990 to early 1991 to establish Allied forces in Saudi Arabia and surrounding waters as well as in Turkey, should Saddam have sat still?

He did, but again that was a failure of the defensive imagination.

The Iraq Air Force has already had experience against Iran making grand-strategic air strikes into the heart of the country. It had apparently demonstrated the ability to undertake similar attacks on the assembling Allied forces. Just as in the Battle of Britain the bombing and harassment of the German airfields would have had great moral and psychological effect, such threats would have been highly disruptive to the American and Allied preparations. Moreover, a considerable delay in the launching of an American attack might have placed the Bush administration in the same danger of the erosion of domestic support that Vietnam had earlier or Somalia more recently.

On the other hand, Saddam had only a small window of opportunity because after Day 5 of the Allied reinforcement the Saudi’s and the remnants of the Kuwait AF were reinforced by the USN and USAF aircraft and power shifted to the Allied side. The parallel to the Battle of Britain radar was AWACS, which made low-level sneak raids no longer sly.

Why didn’t Saddam undertake such pre-emptive strikes?

Was it that like Hitler in his attack on Poland he never thought that the United States would do what Britain had in 1939? Was it that he thought in his posturing that the brutality of Kuwait would deter others as had his internal policies? Or was it that he had so decimated his higher officer corps through his Stalinesque suspicions of all around him that he had purged those who might have given him wise advice, who might have exercised the defensive imagination? He rated the AF most likely to stage a coup. Surely it was not fear of retaliation in view of his stubborn resistance to President Bush’s ultimata? Or was it that like many Arabs he loved to play politics?

Saddam’s propaganda was very potent in making it appear that his air force had been more effective in the indecisive Iran-Iraq war than now appears to be the case.

Defensive Imagination in Action

The one power which has been frequently in action against the odds, whose strength has to prevail in days, is Israel. Her wars have been examples par excellence of offensive defensive actions and use of imagination.

The classic case is that of the pre-emptive strikes against the bases of the Egyptian Air Force in June 1967 at the beginning of the Six-Day War. These effectively put the Egyptian Air Force out of action on Day 1.

The whole of the Six-Day War demonstrated the value of planning and the flexibility of air power when it could be based on the same set of airfields for operations against three enemies – Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

Later in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Israel was surprised because of poor intelligence and its assessment, the tightness of Israeli society and its armed forces well demonstrated in the way in which
the SAM-belts were taken out by ground forces so that the air force could again operate.

**The Defensive Imagination**

Every offensive has its weakness and every defence its strengths and opportunities. But neither of these will necessarily be obvious.

It takes intelligence, technical knowledge, wide reading, a flexible command structure, war-games, and imagination to develop solutions and set a counter-thrust in motion.

Intelligence requires assessments of geographic, technical, economic, political, diplomatic, and social factors, hopefully wrapped in a grand strategy.

But the defensive imagination requires also planning for the worst possible case (the one even worse than that) training, and leadership.

Defensive imagination requires an unconventional mind. If successful, as Liddell Hart noted in *Strategy* (1954), an unexpected riposte has a far greater psychological than physical impact. It may even carry a political message all the way to the enemy leadership as the NVN Lot offensive did in 1968. Moreover, the defensive imagination has to be able to operate quickly, quietly, and unexpectedly. Its plan has to be simple and based upon immediate capabilities and using, at times, less sophisticated equipment than the enemy.

And lastly, the successful use of defensive imagination requires a flexible command structure able to make rapid adjustments mentally and physically to unusual situations, only some of which may be read about in history.
Troops landing in ANZAC Cove, Gallipoli 1915 (AWM G00905)
Naval Support at Gallipoli

By D. M. Stevens, Department of Defence

“If we are disappointed we are far from being beaten, in fact we have learned a great deal and will know what to do in the future”.

- Admiral J.M. de Robeck, February 1916

Introduction

The assault on Gallipoli has always held a particular fascination for Australians. The loss of nearly 8000 Australian lives on a distant shore, in an ultimately failed campaign, has assumed mythlike proportions. The official historian, Charles Bean, even glorified the battle as the birth of consciousness of Australian nationhood. Perhaps understandably, the Gallipoli tradition in Australia has been almost exclusively based on the experiences of the soldiers of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). The participation by greater numbers of English, Indian and French troops is largely ignored, while the active involvement of maritime forces is conveniently forgotten. Yet the campaign was originally planned to be an almost purely naval operation; a breathtaking, but unrealistic proposal to send a fleet of battleships sweeping up the Dardanelles to bombard Constantinople and force Turkey to surrender. It was only after the strong Turkish defences foiled the initial attempts to force the Narrows, that the naval commander, Vice Admiral John de Robeck, contemplated operations in conjunction with the Army. The planned role of the troops thereafter being to secure the Gallipoli peninsula so that the Navy could penetrate unopposed into the Sea of Marmara.

However, the failure of the landings in April 1915 and the ensuing degeneration of the land campaign into immobile trench warfare, caused a subtle, but unmistakable shift in the perspective of the naval role. As de Robeck's Chief of Staff, Commodore (later Admiral of the Fleet) Roger Keyes, was to argue, “real naval co-operation” at Gallipoli subsequently meant extricating the Army from the deadlock ashore by forcing the Straits. The merits of a renewed naval attack on the Dardanelles have been argued about ever since, but Keyes was certainly wrong to cursorily dismiss so many other areas of naval support. From the time of the first landings and throughout the later phases – consolidation ashore, repelling of Turkish attacks, renewed assaults in August and the final evacuations in December 1915 and January 1916 – the Navy was comprehensively engaged in an abundance of direct and indirect support operations. Operations that embraced not only the obvious tasks of bombardment and the ferrying of troops and supplies, but also interdiction, air support, and the enforcement of a blockade. Only by looking at the entirety of the expedition can the positive lessons of Gallipoli be determined and the value of maritime involvement fully appreciated.

Bombardment

After the actual landing the special naval task was to support the troops ashore and provide conditions to ensure that the flow of reinforcements exceeded that of the enemy. This, the combined British and French fleets set out to do, but though combined expeditions were a familiar facet of British warfare, the expedition to Gallipoli was the largest amphibious venture yet undertaken and called for unprecedented levels of naval and military cooperation. Moreover, like many aspects of military operations during the First World War the participants faced a novel situation. New technologies were proliferating and not only provided new techniques to be learned but also new problems to be overcome.

At Gallipoli the most immediate and apparent naval support was through the provision of bombardment from the sea. The alleged failure of naval gunfire has since been the subject of considerable criticism. Bean claimed that it was useless in the situation on the peninsula; the ships being unable to “fire over impossible angles at undiscoverable targets”. The official historian noted moreover, that observation from the ships was as likely to result in fire against friendly rather than enemy troops, while poor communications made direction of fire from the shore too slow. Bean even
asserted that the innovative use of balloon ships and seaplanes provided no solution. Certainly Lord Kitchener, the man responsible for the campaign, and who before the invasion had envisioned the Turks swept away by the Navy’s guns, was by early May expressing his disappointment on the effect produced on the enemy. At the same time de Robeck was admitting to the British Admiralty:

“...The help which the Navy has been able to give the Army in its advance has not been as great as was anticipated, though effective in keeping down the fire of the enemy’s batteries, when it is a question of trenches and machine guns the Navy is of small assistance, it is these later that have checked the Army.”

The geography of the peninsula did undoubtedly pose some difficult problems. Often only the outer edges of a Turkish position were exposed to direct fire, and as the campaign drew on, ever deeper and more elaborate fortifications made the low angle fire of naval artillery less effective. Naval fuses too, were inadequate. High explosive shells required a large angle of impact to detonate and with the hilly nature of the country de Robeck was soon requiring a more efficient fuse, capable of detonating shells on graze. Moreover procedures and communications with the Army and spotting aircraft were initially poor with problems compounded both by shortages and by the delicate nature of the existing wireless sets.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to simply ignore the contribution of naval gunnery on the operations ashore. With equipment priority going to the British Army in France the Dardanelles expedition was always seriously undergunned, while the ammunition supply for the force “was never calculated on the basis of a prolonged occupation of the Gallipoli peninsula.” Thus throughout the campaign the Army commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton, found himself reliant on the covering ships for adequate firepower, particularly when dealing with Turkish shore batteries. That Hamilton could do this for the eight months of the campaign, demonstrated not only the Navy’s capability to sustain support over a lengthy period, but also unfortunately, the extremely slow pace of advance.

Neither should naval bombardment at Gallipoli be dismissed on the basis of its effectiveness against well-entrenched positions. In the early days of the campaign the Turkish trenches were still very shallow and several sources point to the severe casualties and demoralisation caused by expertly controlled fire from the sea. As early as 27 April Rear-Admiral C.F. Thursby, embarked in HMS Queen Elizabeth, reported:

“The covering ships had by now got to know the best position from which to fire and had become accustomed to working with the spotters on shore. A central control over all the covering force fire had been organised with General Cunliffe Owen, on General Birdwood’s staff, directing it on board QUEEN by which definite objects, rate and duration of fire, etc were regulated, which added greatly to the efficiency of the fire and prevented waste of ammunition.”

A 15-inch shrapnel shell contained 15,000 bullets and an Australian colonel noted at the same time as Thursby’s report that one of Queen Elizabeth’s shells “had wiped out a whole Turkish Regiment.” After the devastating fire they received during their early counter-attacks the Turks would make no further attempts to attack by daylight over ground that was in direct view of the supporting ships. The heavy guns of the battleships were also instrumental in preventing the Turks from using their warships in support of their own troops. Using aerial spotting to fire over the peninsula it would take only one or two salvos from the British ships to force the enemy to withdraw back up the Narrows.

In fact, the mere presence of the whole range of naval support vessels was of immense reassurance to the troops. It is little wonder then, that the loss of the battleship HMS Triumph to a U-boat on 25 May was regarded by the soldiers at Anzac as being “like an old friend gone.” If the British official history is to be believed the troops were for subscribing a month’s pay all round towards salving her. The loss of HMS Majestic two days later and the subsequent departure of the battleships, transports and stores ships to netted harbours was no less heartening to the Turks. As Hamilton reported to Kitchener, “...the temporary withdrawal of our battleships owing to enemy submarines has altered the position to our disadvantage; while not of the highest importance materially this factor carries considerable moral weight.”

That the material effect was not insufferable was not simply due to assessments that naval gunfire was doing little permanent damage. It also had much to do with the inherent flexibility of the fleet to alter its disposition and respond to changed circumstances. While awaiting the arrival of additional anti-submarine nets and monitors fitted with torpedo bulges, de Robeck instituted a policy of using the battleships only when necessary. In the meantime daily covering fire for the Army’s flanks was carried out by destroyers. The situation was less than ideal, as de Robeck had insufficient destroyers and they were not supplied with shrapnel, but it meant that the...
The Majestic off Cape Helles, 1915

Support for the forces ashore did not unduly falter. Furthermore, improvements in techniques for aircraft and balloon spotting and procedures for tactical support meant that even the smaller warships were able to apply their firepower more effectively. Even when unable to penetrate the enemy's trenches, naval artillery continued to ensure that Turkish fire was kept down during an attack and their heavy guns kept engaged.

By the time of the August offensives three mixed squadrons of cruisers, monitors and destroyers operated independently to support the Army at Cape Helles, Suvla Bay and at Anzac. The general in command of an area would either request bombardment of a feature on a daily basis or requisition fire as the situation dictated. The peninsula was divided into 1000 yard squares and when an artillery attack was to take place a ship would be ordered to fire slowly into the square until satisfied she was on her target. Salvoes would then be fired to either destroy the target or sweep the whole of the area. Unless engaged in a special bombardment individual ships might routinely operate for either 48 or 72 hours on and then a similar period off task. The time off being used to go to Mudros for ammunition and replenishment.

Practical experience continued to improve the methods of gunnery and immensely increased the power of ships to find targets ashore. By December the success of an attack made at Cape Helles was attributed by the Army mainly “to the effective fire from the sea”. Despite the weather preventing aircraft spotting the staff report then went on to compliment the accuracy of fire and conclude: “the chief point is that cooperation in attack has now become a practical reality, and that a system has been established which with further development will prove a powerful factor in both attack and defence.” According to Keyes the level of cooperation at this stage “was far ahead of anything contemplated at home”.

Blockade and Supply

Vital as it was, naval bombardment took up only a small portion of the fleet's time. Away from the peninsula the main task was maintaining a blockade of the Turkish coast and ensuring the safe transportation of supplies and reinforcements through the Aegean Sea. At Gallipoli, as in most other amphibious campaigns, everything came and went by
expedition was in the inadequate allocation of small steamers could load and unload. Piers would be possible to construct piers, alongside which had confidently expected that after a short time it craft. When organising the supply service, planners patrol, transport and watching anti-submarine nets. Marmara. Trawlers and sweepers were employed on communications with submarines in the Sea of watch movements around the isthmus and to maintain One was always stationed in the Gulf of Saros to ships coming down the Straits. Destroyers, except for at Cape Helles to deal with possible attack by enemy adjacent ports, or employed with French submarines interdiction missions, mine laying off Smyrna and were kept at Port Mudros with two at immediate flanking the Army as required. All other battleships were kept at Port Mudros with two at immediate notice. One cruiser was at Port Lero in charge of the detached squadron, while the remainder were based at Port Mudros or patrolling the northern part of the Aegean Sea, leaving the French to patrol the south. The submarine base was also at Mudros and British submarines were either in the Sea of Marmara on interdiction missions, mine laying off Smyrna and adjacent ports, or employed with French submarines at Cape Helles to deal with possible attack by enemy ships coming down the Straits. Destroyers, except for at Smyrna, were concentrated at the Dardanelles. One was always stationed in the Gulf of Saros to watch movements around the isthmus and to maintain communications with submarines in the Sea of Marmara. Trawlers and sweepers were employed on patrol, transport and watching anti-submarine nets.

One of the greatest planning failures of the expedition was in the inadequate allocation of small craft. When organising the supply service, planners had confidently expected that after a short time it would be possible to construct piers, alongside which fairly large steamers could load and unload. Piers were indeed constructed. Unfortunately, the check to the Army's advance combined with the failure to hold the Asiatic shore at the entrance to the Straits made those at Cape Helles very vulnerable to shell fire. The position at Anzac was even worse. The beach shelved very gradually and to be of use to large ships a pier would have had to extend several hundred feet, offering in consequence an easy target. Unable to use piers it was necessary to continue to unload the ships using lighters and de Robeck had not been provided with suitable tugs. The stories of the troops ashore at Gallipoli are replete with examples of improvisation in the face of shortages. The same is true of the situation at sea. Without tugs the duty of towing lighters instead fell to the fleet's steam pinnaces which thereafter suffered heavily from shell fire and constant use.

The reliance on small craft was made worse by the appearance of the German submarine menace which as noted above, forced the withdrawal of the larger ships to safer waters. Since all transports would now remain in Mudros to discharge, de Robeck ordered fleet sweepers, trawlers and destroyers used to transfer troops to their landing places, conducting all movements at night with no more than 500 troops per vessel. In the meantime he requested from the Admiralty a large number of shallow draft cargo steamers to carry supplies to the peninsula. Frantic efforts to purchase suitable vessels in Egypt and Italy met only slight success and the situation was only just kept under control. In June 1915 de Robeck further warned the Admiralty, "To date able to deal with Army's stores requirements because of limited space on beach and so only small reserve accumulated. This hand-to-mouth existence however, necessitates landing stores in all weathers thus increasing casualties in boats." Destroyers, light craft and sweepers were not only needed to perform the many duties in connection with covering and supplying the Army. They were also used to prevent contraband going into Turkey through Greek or Bulgarian ports and to hunt for enemy submarines and their depots in the Aegean. The role of these smaller craft is often forgotten, but as de Robeck reported, "Without sweepers and trawlers the appearance of the German submarine menace which offered in consequence an easy target. Unable to use lighters and de Robeck had not been provided with suitable tugs. The stories of the troops ashore at Gallipoli are replete with examples of improvisation in the face of shortages. The same is true of the situation at sea. Without tugs the duty of towing lighters instead fell to the fleet's steam pinnaces which thereafter suffered heavily from shell fire and constant use.

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Denham wrote in July of the complex layered defences provided to HMS Agamemnon when she arrived off Gabe Tepe:

"we were met by eight destroyers and a dozen drifters, the latter carrying a big, mesh wire net which they laid the seaward side of us when we got in position off Anzac, about 1½ miles from us. Six destroyers then patrolled the shoreward side of us while the others kept a look-out for submarines to seaward with the drifters. An aeroplane went up to look for submarines, but had to come down again owing to engine trouble."

Interdiction

The necessity for sea transport was not limited solely to the Allied forces. There was no railway to Gallipoli and the nearest station was 50 miles from the town of Bulair at the northern end of the isthmus. From an early stage British naval forces attempted to cut off all Turkish lines of communication and isolate the peninsula. On 30 April, only five days after the landings, Hamilton reported to Kitchener, "Bulair is watched by the Fleet, and already three demonstrations have been made, ... Generally reinforcements arrive by sea to Gallipoli, but as the Fleet have now two submarines off that town, I hope this will be rendered very dangerous in future."

To control access via the isthmus, the battleships and monitors would shell the road and single bridge while naval aircraft worked even farther afield by attacking the railhead. By the first week of May Turkish prisoners were reporting that they entered the peninsula from the Asian coast because the Bulair road was considered too dangerous. Meanwhile the exploits of the British submarines – not coordinated with the military operations but one of the few undoubted successes of the campaign – were reported to have practically stopped sea communications between Constantinople and Gallipoli. By July the Turks had abandoned the sea route for the transport of troops, while by the end of December only one large steamer was left operating in the Sea of Marmara."
The lack of alternative routes forced the Turks to bring in almost everything by land at night, troops on foot and supplies by camels and ox cart.

Conclusions

In conclusion, though there is clear evidence of misunderstandings between the Army and Navy, and regular criticisms of the methods of the other service, the despatches and reports from the peninsula are still full of mutual expressions of confidence and admiration. Intimate cooperation, one of the basic tenets of joint warfare, was definitely achieved. Unfortunately the tradition that recalls the Dardanelles as the scene of the Navy’s failure to force the Straits, and Gallipoli as a heroic land campaign, also tends to neglect the totality of the maritime role. Yet it was only through naval supremacy that the combined expedition could be mounted in the first place, and though the Army was chiefly concerned with the few square miles extending from the beaches, the Navy in contrast took it for granted that its sphere of operations extended throughout the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean and Sea of Marmara.

Continuously tailored to developing events, the Fleet denied access to enemy forces and interdicted the enemy’s movement by sea, while simultaneously securing the communications of the Allies. Moreover the Fleet provided continuous on-scene response and was flexible enough to accommodate changed circumstances. Though ultimately a failure, the campaign at Gallipoli provided a wealth of shared experience. From improved command and control, to the introduction of a common terminology and new approaches to handling medical evacuations, the fundamental doctrines of modern amphibious and joint warfare had been established.

With hindsight, perhaps the lasting legacy of Gallipoli should not be seen in terms of the slaughter between the trenches. A more worthy memorial is
surely the succession of successful amphibious landings carried out in the years since 1915 and the important role that combined arms power projection continues to play in global security.

NOTES
1. Letter, de Robeck to Birdwood, 3 February 1916, Australian War Memorial (AWM) 3DRL.3376, Item 8A.
5. Telegram, de Robeck to Admiralty, 10 May 1915.
6. It was felt that a more sensitive fuse would also be of material assistance against submarines as common shell of large fragmentation had little disruptive effect, the chance of a direct hit being small. However, the detonation of a high explosive shell on the water in the vicinity of a periscope was likely to at least cause some damage. Telegram, de Robeck to Admiralty 10 June 1915.
8. Telegram, GHQ Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to War Office, 4 May 1915.
9. For example the front lines at Anzac were never much more than 1600 yards from the beaches.
13. _ibid_, p. 313.
15. There appears to be no mention of this generosity in the Australian Official history. Nevertheless, the troops at Anzac seem to have gained some consolation from the discovery of the wardroom wine, washed ashore on 15 June. Two men were given ‘six months’ as a result. K. Fewster, _Gallipoli Correspondent_, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, p. 130.
16. Telegram, Hamilton to Kitchener, 2 June 1915, AWM 51/46.
17. If sweeping an area fire would continue either for a particular period or until the ammunition allowance was expended. Memorandum, Senior Officer 3rd Squadron to Ships concerned, 9 December 1915, AWM 25 367/26
18. Memorandum, Senior Officer 3rd Squadron to HM Ships of Third Squadron, 20 September 1915, AWM 25 505/2 367.
21. All the rest of the Mediterranean, except British and Italian territorial waters was under control of the French Commander-in-Chief. Corbett, p. 80.
22. The lack of fresh water on the peninsula posed particular problems and the ships off shore were often distilling hard to make more.
24. Malta was used for refit and major repairs.
25. The blockade, declared on 2 June, extended from the Dardanelles down to Samos and was primarily imposed to restrict sources of supply for German submarines.
26. Telegram, VA Eastern Mediterranean to Admiralty, 3 June 1915, AWM 51/46
27. Telegram, Admiralty to Admiral Superintendent Malta, 6 May 1915.
29. Telegram, de Robeck to Admiralty, 3 June 1915._ibid._
31. Telegram, Hamilton to Kitchener, 30 April 1915, AWM 51/46.
32. Telegram, VA Eastern Mediterranean to Admiralty 5 May 1915._ibid._
34. James, _op cit_, p. 327.
35. Gallipoli provided the basis for both the US Navy and US Army doctrinal manuals on landing operations before World War II. This doctrine survived virtually unchanged throughout the World War II era.

David Stevens is the Director of Naval Historical Studies in the Maritime Studies Program. Prior to this appointment he had served for 20 years with the RAN, including time as the anti-submarine warfare officer onboard HMA Ships Yarra and Hobart and on exchange in HMS Hermione. Other postings included attachment to the Staff of the Commander of the RAN Task Group during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and three years in HQADF Development Division. In 1992 he graduated from the ANU with a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies.
AUSTRALIA REMEMBERS 1939-1945.  

Reviewed by John Buckley

Throughout 1995, over 4,000 activities were organised in Australia and overseas as part of the Australia Remembers program. Michael Tracey was given the task to publish a book which would be a fitting record of Australians thanking Australians, celebrating with their countrymen, and most importantly, remembering those who were no longer here to be part of this 50th Anniversary of the victories of World War II.

Ex-service people will agree that the outstanding success of the Australia Remembers year was, in part, due to the effort, leadership and dedication put into it by the then Minister; Con Sciacca seemed to be everywhere. It was most pleasing to ex-servicemen and women to observe the apolitical nature of the celebrations – Con Sciacca and Wilson Tuckey, the Shadow Minister, teamed splendidly to ensure that politics was kept out of the activities.

This book is very wide ranging and versatile – it seems that every organisation gets an appropriate mention and this exhibits the splendid research. The publication will be a lasting memorial to the Australian deeds of World War II. It is an excellent record of the Australian input in a global context.

It seems that our servicemen and women fought, or were present, in every major theatre of operations. For a nation of several million people, its wartime record was second to none on a population basis. We should not be afraid to say so. We received little publicity in Europe, Middle East and the Pacific during the war. The major Allies “grabbed” all of the publicity and the “little blokes” got none.

Michael Tracey has been the Managing Editor of the Australian Defence Force Journal for at least a decade, in which time many fine campaign records have been published. These have all been an important contribution to Australian military and national history. If Defence had not published these books, it would not have been done, leaving large gaps in our history.

General Peter Gratton seized the opportunity to encourage the research and publication of these important contributions to our heritage and patriotism. His successors, Admiral Alan Beaumont and General John Baker, are continuing to support this most important task. General Baker has written an excellent foreword to this book.

It is best to describe the Australia Remembers 1939-1945 as a reference book for all aspects of World War II. The narrative, photographs and excellent illustrations by Jeff Isaacs combine to provide a classic publication.

During the past fourteen years I have reviewed over 250 books for Australian Defence Force Journal, Stand To, (the RSL National Journal), Mufti and some newspapers. This publication is one of the best books I have had the pleasure to read and review in that period. Congratulations to the ADFJ for providing a most significant and valuable contribution to our military and national history and heritage. We should be proud of our contribution to fight tyranny whenever it has raised its ugly head during the past century. Not only have we fought for liberty and freedom for Australia, but we have assisted others to do so for themselves.
Another Australian Service has joined Defence.

As your airline, we're proud to offer all members of the Australian Defence Force the best service across Australia and around the world. So, from one great Australian service to another, welcome aboard.