The fact that an advertisement is accepted for publication in the Australian Defence Force Journal does not imply that the product or service has the endorsement of the Australian Defence Force Journal, the Australian Defence Force or the Department of Defence. Readers are advised to seek professional advice where appropriate as the journal can accept no responsibility for the claims of its advertisers.

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:
The Managing Editor
Australian Defence Force Journal
Building B-4-26
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600
(06) 265 2682 or 265 2999
Fax (06) 265 1099

Advertising Enquiries:
(06) 265 1193

General Enquiries:
(06) 265 3234

© Commonwealth of Australia 1995
ISSN 1320-2545
Published by the Department of Defence
Canberra 1995
Contents

3. United Nations: Agenda for Peace
   Chief Petty Officer M.G. Ryan, RAN

11. The Application of General Sir Brudenell White's Command
    Major B.M. Young.

17. Making and Shaping Navy Leaders
    Lieutenant Tim Kenny, RAN

25. Career Choices: A Dilemma for Engineering Officers
    Lieutenant Commander Zakir Rahmani, RAN (Res)

29. Manoeuvre Theory
    Australian Army Doctrine Centre

33. A Code of Professional Ethics for Army Officers
    Major T.L. Stevens, RAAC

39. The Foundation of the Australian Army
    Richard Pelvin, Department of Defence

43. Command of Australian Joint Force Operations
    Group Captain Gary Waters, RAAF and Chris Mills.

49. Australia Remembers

53. Book Reviews

Front Cover
A S70B2 Seahawk of the Fleet Air Arm's 816 Squadron.

Photo: Navy Public Affairs

Managing Editor
Michael P. Tracey

Editor
Irene M. Coombes

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.
Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readily given by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Any reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.
The views expressed in the articles are the author's own and should not be construed as official opinion or policy.
Stabilisation and resolution assistance.
This year will see the 50th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations organisation. Since its inception the United Nations (UN) has essentially remained true to its original charter; however, with this auspicious date approaching there will no doubt be a profusion of essays written and theses submitted concerning its future roles. This article then, is an attempt to bring the casual military reader up to date with some recent proposals and will introduce a few areas that have a potential for review. Additionally, definitions of some loosely understood terminology will be explored.

As most ADFJ readers will probably be more interested in the UN’s military function rather than the humanitarian side, the article will consider some of the organisational changes that may be proffered in regard to the authority, structure and operation of the United Nations to improve its capabilities as the world’s “Peacekeeper”.

It is not the purpose of this article to criticise the UN as an organisation and no slur is intended upon those personnel who selflessly serve as a soldier, international civil servant or contractor, in either the field or in New York. The article will seek to merely raise points for future debate.

In founding the UN, the military victors of World War II envisaged that it could, by collective action, punish an aggressor nation. By establishing the Military Staff Committee, provision was made for the advice necessary to enact this collective security option. Though such action has occurred only a few times in its history, it remains a principal aim of the Charter. Evolution of this function was stalled by the Cold War as the combatants were often client states of either veto-wielding superpower.

The Secretary General has, in his Agenda for Peace, listed six aims of the UN in regard to peacekeeping: identification of causes, preventative diplomacy, peacemaking to reduce tension, peacekeeping following a cessation of hostilities, to assist in peacebuilding and; to “address the deepest causes of conflict, economic despair, social injustice and political oppression”.

Before proceeding any further in highlighting some of these possible avenues of change, it will be useful to define what the words “Peacemaking” and “Peacekeeping” refer to and how then do these separate, though interdependent activities compare to each other.

Peacemaking occurs when the UN is aware of a potentially explosive situation. It must act quickly to restore an atmosphere where negotiation and conflict de-escalation can be conducted. By utilising its agencies as mediators, it extends the avenues for discussion. Thus the UN may, via its good offices, reduce the potential for an irreversible sequence of events. This term is also sometimes incorrectly used in reference to armed intervention, which is a method of conflict resolution more correctly called “peace-enforcement”.

Senator Evans in his Blue Book (Cooperating for Peace) amplifies the term peacemaking by identifying two stages. Stage one concerns obtaining a cessation of hostilities and stabilising the situation and Stage two seeks a more durable arrangement for political settlement. In advancing the cause of peacemaking, Senator Evans has proposed that six regionally based teams of negotiators be made available to act as a permanent UN presence. These teams may eventually replace the current trend of crisis management and shuttle diplomacy.

Peacekeeping involves either unarmed Military Observers (UNMOs) an example of which is the MFO, or lightly armed ad hoc Military Forces assembled under the UN flag, an example of which was UNTAC. These operations are conducted to separate the combatants after an accepted cease-fire has been found by peacemaking. This is the traditional style of UN field operation. Force may not be used. Roles are conflict defusion, stabilisation and resolution assistance. Contingents are drawn from a wide geographical area, though generally excluding the permanent members of the UNSC and may not possess a high degree of interoperability. It is essential that all parties to the conflict agree to the presence of UN personnel. Once this agreement has been breached, the operation is effectively put on
hold. There are two other terms that are complimentary to the previous two: these are peace-enforcement and peace-building.

Peace-enforcement or Second Generation Peacekeeping Operations (SGPOs) differs from normal peacekeeping in that "a state of hostilities continues to exist in a territory and at least one party wishes to continue [with such hostilities]." The aim of a SGPO may be to either reverse aggression or end ongoing hostilities. This form of military contingent would be via large size preexisting military formations and may possess major war fighting capabilities; this was the type of operation conducted under UNOSOM II.

Peacebuilding refers to those measures and activities undertaken to remove the root causes of conflict to support the process of the peaceful resolution of disputes between interested parties by peaceful and sometimes low key manoeuvres. Additionally, the term preventive diplomacy is a term used by the Secretary-General.

Review of Authority

Apart from reformation of the UNSC and the Secretariat itself, there is presently a lack of a definitive role for the Secretary-General as a peace-maker. This needs rectification.

In order to reform its peacekeeping functions, it would be necessary to undertake a comprehensive review of the Security Council (UNSC) itself. There are many alternate proposals that would increase the number of permanent seats on the UNSC, as yet though none of these have been agreed on. However, economic preponderance might offer a descriptive indicator for permanent membership. If so, then certainly Germany and Japan would rate serious consideration for inclusion as permanent members. If population, coupled with a potential for regional power was another indicator, then India or Nigeria could be added to the list. Additionally, regional organisations may be granted Observer status at the UNSC. Certainly NATO, the Organisation of African Unity, the Arab League, the Organisation of Non-aligned States and the Organisation of American States could be included. However, it must be clear that the UNSC should not expand its membership too far. Senator Evans has recently announced some proposals of his own; these include an additional eight quasi-permanent members to the current structure of 15. Also the permanent five's option on veto would be diluted to the extent that two or even three permanent members need to apply the veto to halt proceedings.

Structural and Organisational Review of the Secretariat

In regard to the Secretariat based in New York, the Secretary-General has asked the Administrative Committee on Coordination to look at reviewing the role and operation of the Secretariat. Progress is slow however, with phase one due for completion in 1995 (what phase one consists of is not clear). Senator Evans has proposed that not a mere review but a sweeping reform of the Secretariat is necessary. In place of the many lesser agencies, seven "macro-authorities" should emerge. Functionality rather than bureaucratic familiarity would be the principal means of reallocating resources. Heading these newly created authorities would be Deputy Secretaries-General. These managers would need to have responsibility delegated to them for the daily administrative functioning of their respective departments. Thus the Secretary-General would be spared from relatively minor bureaucratic functions.

Whilst undergoing such a reform, consideration may be given to the Deputy Secretary-General for Peace Operations gaining control over assets and personnel allocated for all peacekeeping or peacemaking operations that are not already under the control of a relevant SRSG or CAO. Thus that office has an independent source of personnel and materiel from which to start a new operation or to modestly increase one already under way.

For many years there has been a lack of inter-agency cooperation in the operational area. UN agencies committed to the area are under no obligation to coordinate their activities. All operate under their own mandate and maintain individual agendas. In Somalia, not only were UNITAF supplied and UNOSOM chartered aircraft operating in the region, but so too were WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNDP aircraft. Often these aircraft would visit the same location daily, transferring personnel that could readily have used other agency assets to move about, thus saving considerable time, money and effort. From this example it is apparent the UN's field operations are in desperate need of a bureaucratic streamlining.

Military Force Review

Although in existence for half a century, the UN has made no substantial development on its ability to assume a comprehensive peacekeeping role; to do so
will require a review of its fundamental structure. Recently, there have been many initiatives; one option involves the creation of a standing UN Military force with the Military Staff Committee expanded into a full ‘General Staff’ to control it. Additionally, there have been calls for the UN to expand its peacekeeping centre into a fully manned worldwide operations centre with all the command, control and communications facilities to equip it and with suitably trained staff to manage it. There have also been calls for member states to pre-commit forces to constitute a standing force available at short notice. However, this option appears as unpalatable as ever in the matter of a willingness to devote such forces in the post-Cold War era and the problem of who should command such a military force is still under debate.

In reviewing the UN’s peacekeeping and peace-enforcement roles, Senator Evans has argued for a signposted exit point. If there is a clear sequence of goals that require fulfilment before the operation progresses, then this is sensible. However, if it is intended that a withdrawal date be set before intervention, then all the combatants need do is bide their time till the UN has departed and recommence hostilities (as is the case in Somalia).

The UN often has difficulty in starting up a specific operation because of the need to request troop contributions from member states in the General Assembly (UNGA). If the UN possessed, under its own flag, an established independent military force recruited along non-nationalistic lines, a high degree of flexibility as to when, and where, UNMOs are deployed. The UN permanent force could also act as security escorts for the UN delegations in areas where central authority has broken down (witness Somalia and Afghanistan). These personnel could also “kick-start” an operation until replaced by the UNGA supplied contingents. Thus an operation could be set into motion in days as opposed to weeks or even months.

Financial Review

In financing the UN, considerable intellectual effort has been spent in seeking a means to ensure its fiscal viability. Although this may at the outset appear to be a simple task, reality is somewhat different. Nations that are either in isolation or non-members, cannot be easily cajoled into contributing to the organisation. Therefore, apart from the absence of any social benefit from being a good international citizen, there is no penalty from not being a financial contributor to the UN. Thus a state can use this shortcoming as leverage to gain its way. In this manner the USA withheld an eventual amount of US $526 Million from the peacekeeping fund. Ostensibly this was to force a reformation in the manner that the UN conducts its operations, but it also had the benefit of permitting the USA to remain aloof from the UN’s desire for fiscal generosity. Thus the UN may be hindered by the private agenda of its strongest fiscal members.

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, proposed several ways of gaining secure revenue for the organisation. Three proposals were put forward and three recommendations were made: that the UN establish a fund for humanitarian assistance, that the Secretary-General be able to suspend competitive bidding for contracts to save time, and that one third of the costs of an operation, once authorised by the UNSC, be immediately obtained from the UNGA.

Conflict Management Roles

Another form of peacemaking or conflict management is shuttle diplomacy and good offices. This form of negotiation, when used regularly at the last-minute may be counterproductive. A high level delegation, or an individual, engaged on a seemingly endless merry-go-round of airport departure lounges will eventually tire to the point of exhaustion. Arbitration has an advantage over this prospect, by the avenue of further negotiation away from the political headquarters of the belligerents; plenipotentiaries would be despatched to an agreed and neutral forum with a non-biased third party as the intermediary or adjudicator. Moreover, this is a proposal that appears to have the support of the Secretary-General. Thus the pressure is placed on the belligerents to come to a solution rather than continuing to attempt to delay proceedings in the attempt to better their position.

At present, neither UNMOs or military contingents may be redeployed without the prior approval of the donor nation. Although this permits the donor to control precisely their commitment, it significantly restricts the freedom of manoeuvre for the UN. This may also apply to the specific geographic areas of an operation that the troops are deployed to, for example, the transfer of US-supplied UNPROFOR troops...
Humanitarian assistance.
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to either Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina would require specific approval from Washington.

Final Points

In conclusion there are many points worth noting for review:
- That the review of the structure of the UNSC be set as a matter of priority.
- That the Secretary-General’s role as a negotiator be entrenched in the Charter.
- The SRSG should possess the delegated authority to make “on the spot” decisions concerning the political and operational side of the mission, thus negating the need for constant referral to a New York bureaucracy (often outside business hours), for minor decisions.
- That peacekeeping operations be promoted from a limbo of Chapter “six and a half” to inclusion in Chapter Seven, thereby giving official status to such operations.
- That the UNSC be restructured to permit the presence of regionally grouped associations.
- That the authoritative head of peacekeeping be given control over assets and personnel allocated for all peacekeeping operations that are not already under the control of a SRSG or CAO.
- There is a definite need for skilled administrators and staff to be present on a 24-hour basis in New York. This will permit peacekeeping guidelines to be established that are suitable to all contributors in either ongoing or future operations.
- That the SRSG, who at present does not possess the mandate to make unilateral decisions concerning the operation of all UN agencies and...
NGOs in the area of operations should be given such authority. This is to minimise the duplication of effort and wastage of scarce resources. Additionally, for the purpose of military command, the SRSG might act as a quasi Supreme Commander for the military component of the force.

- The New York Secretariat should administer the UN as a whole, while the relevant Deputy Secretaries-General should administer their specific department and allocated funds.
- Following a reorganisation of the UN Secretariat, personnel should be reallocated according to relative priorities of the UN as a body corporate.
- Seconded UNMOs be recognised as possessing the status of worldwide international observers and thus not fixed into a geographical location. Thus the timely redeployment of personnel will permit a situation to be quickly categorised as “under observance”.
- Access to be obtained to verifiable and pertinent intelligence information.
- The UN should establish a permanent and independent UN military force.
- Funding for the UN should be put on a sound footing. Members should be made responsible through some form of program participation penalty to be a regular fund contributor.
- Consideration should be given to the formation of a panel of experts to advise the Secretary-General on peace making and conflict management.

NOTES
9. Author’s personal observation.
16. Additionally, the World Court is mooted as a venue for arbitration Ibid., (1992), pp22-3.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRIMARY SOURCES

Periodicals

Newspapers

Chief Petty Officer Ryan is currently posted to HMAS PERTH as the Combat Systems Manager. During 1993 he served a six months tour in Kenya and Somalia with the UN in both the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement phases of UNOSOM.
CPO Ryan has previously contributed to the ADFJ on the matter of non-purpose built helicopter support platform.
Who supports the power behind many world navies?

ADI - The Clever Australian

Australia's ADI manufactures key components for General Electric's LM2500 gas turbine engine, the power behind many world navies. ADI is now GE's sole supplier of engine base structures and exhaust ducts and is the major supplier of acoustic enclosures to this leading North American company. ADI has also supplied aft shafts for the engine.

The aft shaft exemplifies ADI's engineering expertise. Machined from an extremely strong nickel alloy forging, the tolerances achieved are beyond all but the most technologically advanced facilities. But then, ADI is no stranger to engineering feats...or fresh thinking.

ADI project manages complex tasks embracing a vast range of technologies, from the installation of high tech windfarms to the development of combat systems software and the construction of minehunter ships for the Royal Australian Navy. The Company also manufactures weapons and munitions, modernises and repairs warships and commercial vessels, treats industrial contamination and operates major installations.

So supporting the power behind many world navies is only one aspect of this multi-faceted Australian company. If you'd like to know more, please call or write for a copy of our company brochure. Contact the General Manager, Corporate Relations, ADI Corporate Headquarters, Level 22 Plaza II, Cnr Grosvenor and Grafton Streets, Bondi Junction, NSW 2022, Australia. Tel (02) 365 9300, Fax (02) 369 2404.
Portrait courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
The Application of General Sir Brudenell White’s Command and Staff Style to the Modern Australian Army

By Major B.M. Young

‘If there are any more like you in Australia young man, send them over here — we can do with them’

...(BRIG Wilson, COMDT of British Staff College in 1907 to LT Brudenell White).

Introduction

A n analysis of the command and staff methods of a senior Australian commander on operations, post 1913, allows one to better understand those characteristics that, in the past, have contributed to success on the battlefield. Further evaluation of the extent to which these characteristics are relevant to modern Army operational concepts and doctrine will enable us to make best use of the lessons from the past.

This article’s scope is focused on achieving the following purposes:

a. To analyse the command and staff methods of General Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham White. The scope of this analysis is limited to White’s career up until the end of World War I.

b. To determine the applicability of that style to the low-level conflict scenario portrayed in Defence of Australia, 1987 (DOA 87).

c. To determine the extent to which White’s style is applicable to the modern Australian Army command doctrine of directive control.

d. To make recommendations pertinent to assimilating those methods into modern officer development.

Aim

The aim of this article is to examine options open for assimilating applicable traits of General Sir Brudenell White’s command and staff methods into the modern Australian Army.

Brudenell White’s Command and Staff Style

White spent most of World War I as chief assistant to a succession of commanders, and was one of the three men who led Australians to victory in that war. Under Bridges he was the perfect Chief of Staff, having a reputation for offering his commander clear and direct operational and administrative options from which he could make a decision. Under Walker, who had a reputation for being slightly less of an administrator than Bridges, White found himself more restricted to the administrative matters than was the case under Bridges, but the results were no less impressive. Finally, White’s operational and administrative expertise was consolidated under Birdwood, who was more concerned about remaining in contact with his men in the field than becoming bogged down in planning details. Consequently, under Birdwood, White found himself “the tactical and administrative commander in all but name”.

There is very little, if anything, written about White that does not depict an image of military flawlessness. It is apparent, from a dissection of the few texts available, that the style utilised by White to discharge his duties in his staff and command functions can be described under each of the following headings:

a. Directness and honesty;

b. Selflessness and loyalty;

c. Professional competence;

d. Courage and resolution; and

e. Sound judgement and foresight.

Directness and Honesty

Field Marshal Lord Birdwood, who was White’s commander for most of World War I, composed an analysis of White in 1940, which included the claim that White:

...gave his views to his leader fearlessly and unhesitatingly and then carried out the decision of the leader although they may have been contrary to his.

On a similar note, discussing White’s performance as Bridges’ Chief of Staff at Gallipoli in
1915, the acclaimed historian, C.E.W. Bean, recounted in his book *Two Men I Knew* that:

White's transparent integrity, ... was combined with quickness of grasp and decision... lucidity of thought ... incessant driving force, unerring sense of proportion, and standards of care and duty, which from the first made him the idol of the staff of the [First A.I.F.].

Selflessness and Loyalty

White’s outstanding performance and devotion to his work as a staff officer throughout the various appointments he held, was also plausibly the reason for him never being granted a formation command of his own, although it would be totally incorrect to suggest that he was never considered for senior command appointments. In 1916, when the Australian Government was contemplating either Monash or White for command of the newly raised 3rd Division, it was only Birdwood’s insistence that he remain in his appointment as Chief of Staff of I Anzac Corps, that prevented White from gaining the command. Birdwood stated that “Australia’s interests required his [White’s] retention at the side of any British officer commanding Australia’s overseas force” - no other available staff officer possessed the necessary knowledge or influence.” General Birdwood reiterated this situation in a letter he wrote to General Hutton on 30 September 1916: “... I often have a feeling of regret that he [White] is perhaps being kept back on account of his usefulness as a staff officer”.

On more than one occasion during 1916 and 1917, White wilfully forfeited his greatest aspiration of commanding an Australian Division in the field, in order to function in a position where his proficiency was considered more important.

Peter Firkins, in his book *Australians in Nine Wars*, proclaimed White’s magnanimous conduct in relation to his command frustration as “a tremendous sacrifice on his part, but one which was to be to the enduring benefit of the A.I.F.”

White unquestionably ranked the needs of the Service above his own ambition for command and likely distinction. The “sacrifice that we should make for the whole”, that White often talked of, was a personal conviction that White not only preached as being desirable in others, but practiced faithfully himself.

Professional Competence

White’s professional competence can be attributed to two principle mannerisms. First, his scrupulous attention to detail, and secondly his preoccupation with involvement in situations that demand meticulous organisational skills.

This was demonstrated very early to the officers and men of the first A.I.F. when, while COFS to Bridges, he was responsible for the training of the Australian troops in Egypt. It was generally judged that “they [Bridges and White] were relentless in their drive for perfection”.

This enthusiasm to polish his professional adeptness earned a solid reputation as a steadfast and trustworthy planner. White’s endeavours were even perceived as “indispensable” by many officers of the A.I.F.; as narrated by Captain W.J. Foster, who was Bridges’ senior aide at Gallipoli. When someone mentioned the possibility of White being killed in action, he exclaimed “White!, Good Lord, I hope nothing happens to White! It’d simply knock the bottom out of the whole show. He’s the one man we cannot afford to lose.”

White’s distinguished service during those eight months at Gallipoli was “capped by his ingenious plan for the withdrawal; one which surely has few equals in the history of warfare ... The British Official History analysed White’s contribution to this phase of the campaign when it recorded that:

*He had exercised almost single handed control over the movement at Anzac. It was White whose vision, combined with an unerring sense of proportion and power of lucid explanation and courteous insistences in conference, influenced probably more than any other human agency the tactics by which the evacuation, not only at Anzac and Suvla, but also at Helles, was carried out.*

Later, in 1915, White was also responsible for another great planning and organisng feat when the Australian divisions in Egypt were to be expanded from two to four. White achieved this and their subsequent relocation from Egypt to France in little over four months. White was the chief coordinator and motivator for all the myriad details in this immense task. He had taken his tactical success of the Gallipoli withdrawal, and followed it with a comparably momentous administrative success; “two of the most solid achievements by any Australian Soldier until then”. With regards to these achievements, even Monash declared, in a subsequent letter to his family, that White was “far and away the ablest soldier Australia had ever turned out.”

Courage and Resolution

As a complement to his high degree of professional competence, White also had the moral courage and resolution to force through what he knew to be right in the face of opposition. His constancy of purpose was well demonstrated during the planning for the withdrawal from Gallipoli. Strong opposition to the
plan was encountered from the Royal Navy staff, as well as from all the Army commanders concerned.”

But White was so convinced that his plan would work, and he spoke so convincingly to Birdwood, who was then the senior commander, that Birdwood finally agreed and impressed his wishes upon all other commanders — both Navy and Army. “The proof of his arguments came when 80,000 men were withdrawn from Suvla and Anzac on the final two nights, for a loss of six men wounded.” Later, in that other stroke of organisational brilliance, when the AIF expanded and moved from Egypt to France, White and Birdwood had a major disagreement with the two Senior British commanders in the French theatre, Murray and Haig. Both Murray and Haig wanted direct control over the Australian forces. White fought convincingly to retain the right of Australian commander’s direct access to their Government. Haig and Murray were finally convinced by the vitality of White’s reasoning and conceded Australian commanders this right of direct access; this position has been adamantly followed in every theatre of war in which Australians have served since then. There are several other equally notable illustrations to exemplify White’s courage and resolution, but it is not necessary to include them all in order to make the point.²³

**Sound Judgment and Foresight**

A study of any of the achievements referred to so far will reveal that judgment was one of White’s strongest traits. It was his judgment that established White’s reputation as a meticulous military professional. He was widely regarded as being able to read each development in any important situation, interpret correctly in the light of the evidence available, and arrive at a well-balanced decision. In the *British Official History*, White’s part in the planning of the withdrawal of Australian and British troops from Gallipoli, for example, is described as “a model of precision and clear thinking.”²⁰

When combined with sound judgment, foresight is a remarkable combat multiplier. White’s foresight was recognised long before World War I. In 1911, White was recalled to Australia, from England, to assist in the implementation of the Kitchener scheme — as the newly appointed Director of Military Operations (DMO) and Chief Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff Brigadier J.M Gordon. He was tasked with supervising the training of Australia’s expanding citizen Army. During the following years, but long before the outbreak of World War I, and in the face of extreme political scepticism, White “saw Australia’s need for a blueprint, not only for mobilisation, but also for the dispatch of an expeditionary force in case of war between Britain and Germany.” In July 1914, the CGS retired and returned to England. At the age of only 38, Major White was appointed his successor in an acting capacity, and proceeded to draft the necessary plans. When war did break out in August 1914, the Australian Prime Minister, Cook, asked White if Australia had a plan for the dispatch of Australian troops overseas. “Ironically, the Prime Minister was talking to the only man in the country who had given the subject any professional consideration.”²²

**Applicability to Low-Level Conflict**

In the low-level conflict scenario that has been described in DOA 87²², it should be apparent that the reported qualities that characterise Brudenell White’s command and staff style, will be no less desirable in modern commanders and staff officers than they were in White’s day. With consideration to the level of conflict, it should be remembered that, “Land force tactical doctrine ... requires a flexible command and control system, and commanders at all levels who are well versed in exercising command under difficult and rapidly changing circumstances, irrespective of the level of conflict.”²⁴

It stands to reason, therefore, that the successful exercise of command demands a combination of professional features that remain applicable regardless of the level of conflict. Section 2-1 of MLW One.1.2., Command and Control 1991, outlines these features as “leadership, robustness, courage, and resolution, boldness, professional knowledge, judgment, decisiveness, integrity and imagination”. It is no coincidence that these are essentially the very qualities that are used to define Brudenell White’s command and staff attributes earlier in this article. Brudenell White’s style is therefore truly applicable to low-level conflict, just as it was to the elevated levels of conflict of World War I.

**Applicability to Directive Control**²⁵

There is very little detail written about the manner with which White dealt with subordinates during his military career. Those rare instances where a subordinate is offered the opportunity to describe his dealings with Brudenell White tend to support the claim that decentralised control was exercised to the extent that the trench style warfare of the day permitted. There is,
however, clear evidence to verify that White, as Birdwood’s Chief of Staff, benefited immensely from Birdwood’s philosophy of decentralised control. MLW One.1.2., “Command and Control”, states that “it is the Commander who determines the objective, who conceives the plan and who provides the will, motivation and energy to attain it”. As has been already stated, under Birdwood, White found himself the tactical and administrative commander in all but name. Such a claim is not intended to be a slight against Birdwood’s reputation - but merely reflects the particularly fine working relationship that existed between these two officers, and is plausibly evidence of Birdwood’s early cognisance of the importance of what we now know as “directive control”. Such decentralisation of control was particularly rare in those days, but was probably one of the early models for the Australian Army’s doctrine of directive control.

Apart from the general command qualities required for successful command as described earlier in this article, when applying directive control, an additional emphasis is placed on certain of the commanders personal qualities. Qualities such as the commander’s decision making ability, capacity for decisive action, risk acceptance, acceptance of responsibility and powers of execution are all particularly important. Brudenell White excelled in each of these additional command qualities and it is, accordingly, easy to liken his style with that required of any commander in the modern Australian Army employing the doctrine of directive control. It could be argued, consequently, that these additional qualities must be developed in commanders from their earliest training, and continue to be developed throughout an officer’s career. Interpreting how these methods could be incorporated into modern officer development is worthy of further consideration.

### Posting Durations

Directive control demands certain essential personal attributes, specifically, reliability, trust and understanding between a commander and his subordinates, ability to understand intentions and capacity to accept risk to achieve success. These all take time to develop. To achieve this, posting cycles should be designed to allow for a two year minimum duration in each command level posting. Although the Military Secretary attempts to define posting tenure in two year blocks, current peace-time constraints do not always permit this to occur. This is particularly the case with junior officer postings, which are arguably the most detrimentally influenced by shorter posting durations.

### Assessment Attributes

Officer assessment needs to concentrate on those attributes that are considered crucial to the application of directive control. These attributes are covered earlier and are spelled out in more detail in MLW One.1.2., para 1-22. The current Officer Assessment Proforma does not adequately cover these attributes.

### Task Oriented Assessment

The accent for assessment should be task oriented. That is, the assessment should be oriented towards ascertaining the subordinates aptitude to accomplish his allocated tasks. The assessment process must incorporate a capacity to allow for failure, as long as the officer has acted positively, and decisively. Failure to act, or failure to display decisiveness, either in field or barracks conditions, should be viewed as a lack of ability to operate employing directive control.

### Synchronisation of Training and Philosophy

The successful application of the command and staff styles utilised by Brudenell White clearly demanded an understanding of the higher commanders’ intention. Current Army doctrine, particularly directive control, requires the commander to be able to think two levels up. However, the current Army training system does not discernably cater for this requirement. For example, an infantry company commander must be able to understand and analyse the brigade commander’s intention. Brigade operations are taught on the Intermediate Operation Course. However, it is common practice to panel students who have already completed, or are in the final stages of, their company command appointments on this course. Similar examples can be found at other rank levels and in other corps. Consequently, the
training system needs to be changed to cater for the training philosophy requirement to think two levels up. This should noticeably improve the performance of commanders at each level.

**Conclusion**

Brudenell White’s command and staff techniques are characterised by his directness and honesty, selflessness and loyalty, professional competence, courage and resolution, and sound judgment and foresight. These attributes are applicable to all levels of conflict, including the low-level conflict scenario defined in DOA 87. This scenario is summarised at endnote 23 of this article.

As well as being applicable to low level operations, the above qualities that characterise Brudenell White’s command and staff style are no less desirable in modern commanders and staff officers employing directive control, than they were in officers of White’s day.

The successful application of directive control will place new demands on the commander. As well as the usual command qualities required by a commander, he will need to foster a new emphasis on certain personal qualities such as decision making ability, capacity for decisive action, risk acceptance, acceptance of responsibility and powers of execution. Brudenell White excelled in each of these essential personal traits.

Formulating the means by which Brudenell White’s command and staff style can be incorporated into modern officer development will demand a number of adjustments to the present officer development program.

**Recommendations**

The recommendations are:
- the yearly officer personal evaluation proforma should reflect the application of directive control in terms of assessment attributes and task oriented assessment;
- the span of postings for commanders, at all tiers, be not less than two years;
- the training system be scrutinised to guarantee it caters for the timely training of commanders, two levels up; and
- the study of historical military commanders in a context which relates their style to modern doctrine should be encouraged as a tool for improving modern officer development.

**Condensed Biography of General Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham White**

Born: 23/9/1876 St Arnaud Victoria.
- Joined Wide Bay Infantry (Qld Militia) in 1897 and was commissioned a junior officer.
- 1897 (same year) joined the Qld Permanent Artillery.
- 1902 — South African War as Subaltern in Commonwealth Horse.
- 1906-07. First Australian to attend British Staff College. Excelled at Staff College.
- 1908 - Promoted Captain.
- Oct 1908. Sailed for four years appointment to England - at British Army special request.
- Aug 1911. Promoted Major. Returned to Australia (one year earlier than expected).
- 26 Jul 1914. At 38, MAJ White appointed as acting CGS.
- 3 Aug 1914. White drafted cablegram offering an expeditionary force of 20,000 men to Britain (the day before Britain declared war on Germany).
- 6 Aug 1914. White promoted LTCOL and COFS to Bridges.
- 22 Nov 1915. Landed at Gallipoli with Bridges.
- Aug 1915. Promoted BRIG and COFS to Birdwood.
- 22 Nov 1915. Commenced planning the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Plan effected by 19 Dec. 80,000 men evacuated, over ten days, without enemy knowledge. Only six friendly casualties.
- Jan 1916. Commenced “doubling” of the AIF in Egypt and relocated AIF to France.
- Mar 1916. Appointed Commander of the General Staff of the ANZAC Corps (still under Birdwood) in France. Played major roles in both tactical and administratively planning operations for I ANZAC Corps.
- 1 Jan 1917. Promoted MAJGEN.
- 31 May 1918. White was promoted LTGEN and COFS AIF; and COFS Brit 5th Army (Still under Birdwood).
- 31 Oct 1918. White and Birdwood participate in conference with General Haig to establish terms for German Armistice.
- 16 Nov 1918. White sent to London to preside over the AIF Demobilisation and Repatriation Branch; to plan the RTA of over 150 000 Australian servicemen.
- 1919. Back in Australia, White was tasked with organising the reorg of the military forces.
- 1 Jun 1920. Appointed CGS.
1. An abbreviated biographical chart of Sir Brudenell White appears at the end of the article.
2. This is due mainly to the fact that Bradenell White died shortly after the outbreak of World War II. Also, because White is certainly best remembered for his World War I (and prior) deeds.
5. Ibid.
8. At this stage the British Army commanded the Anzac Corps, while Australian officers were only granted command up to Division level.
10. Veiny, op. cit. p. 36.
18. Ibid, p. 60.
19. One other conspicuous illustration of this courage and resolution occurred following the ill fated battle of Frommells, in late July 1916. White was openly critical, in Haig’s presence, of the poor planning and lack of detailed preparations by the staff of the British formations to whom the Australian units were attached. Much to the shock of Haig’s staff officers, White then proceeded to dissect each blunder in turn, exposing the extent to which Haig had botched the operation due mainly from having been misinformed by his own staff. Haig’s staff expected him to explode; but instead he put his hand on White’s shoulder and said: “I dare say you are right young man”.
22. Ibid.
23. The general scenario painted in DOA 87 is as follows: in circumstances where an opponent wishes to force concessions from Australia over some matter of dissension, and the means of gaining those concessions involves direct (although not substantial) military conflict on Australian land, the level of conflict is defined as “low level conflict”. Sustained low-level military pressure against Australia of this nature, generally poses significant advantages to an opponent because attacks could be widely dispersed and erratic in nature. The enemy could seek to hold the initiative, with regard to escalation, by constraining the scale and intensity of military conflict through the use of overt and demisable operations — causing public acceptability of Australian military retaliation to be less likely.
25. Directive control is the philosophy for command in the Australian Army. It is a system that requires a commander to direct what is to be achieved, making his intentions thoroughly clear. The commander then allocates the resources and tasks necessary to realise his intentions, but conceded, to the subordinate commander, the licence to decide how the task will be accomplished. This ideology was cultivated with a view to capitalise on every opportunity that presents itself on the battlefield, circumventing the necessity for detailed orders and plans.
26. MLW One, 1,2, op. cit. p. 2-2.

Major Warren Young graduated from the Officer Cadet School Portsea in December 1976. He served in a number of Troop and Platoon Command appointments before joining the 1st Commando Company, Sydney as the Senior Instructor Water Operations. Maj Young spent two years with the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division, Hawaii where he served as the Assistant Operations Officer of the 65th Engineer Battalion. In January 1988, he was promoted Major and since then has had Staff Officer Grade 2 (Operations) appointments at Army Office, Division and Brigade Headquarters levels. Major Young graduated from the Australian Army Command and Staff College, Queenscliff in December 1992.

Career highlights include Commanding the Australian Contingent of the United Nations Mine Clearance Operation in Afghanistan/Pakistan from June 91 to January 92 and commanding the tri-Service contingent responsible for returning the Unknown Australian Soldier from France. Major Young was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross for his part in Operation Unknown Soldier.
Making and Shaping Navy Leaders for the Next Century — Developing an Effective Leadership Training Taxonomy for the RAN

By Lieutenant Tim Kenny, RAN

Introduction

Since the implementation of Program Management and Budgeting (PMB) in 1991 and its integration with Total Quality Management (TQM) in 1992 to form Navy Quality Management (NQM), there is an increasing need for RAN managers and leaders to be not only military leaders but efficient resource managers as well. Since the endorsement of NQM as the guiding management philosophy for the RAN, the challenge for the RAN is to develop within all Navy personnel and especially its leaders, the relevant skills and knowledge of management so that the appropriate attitude can be developed and NQM can establish itself within the organisation.

NQM, to survive and thrive, is the concern of everyone but the responsibility of management, so it is vital that management know what it is to give direction on as well as how to lead. A vital dimension in the NQM integration strategy and indeed effective and efficient resource management practices per se, is the adoption of an approach to leadership that will not only complement the mechanics of quality management, but provide leaders with skills to develop the vision and culture for the RAN of the future. The importance of this cannot be underrated. A survey conducted by the Centre for Corporate Change (UNSW) involving 300 major Australian organisations, asking the reasons for resistance to implementing quality management*, showed that of the top three causes of employee resistance to change, leadership issues and communication failure were by far the predominant reasons. There is no reason to believe that the RAN would be any different.

This article will propose that the current situation in leadership training in the RAN is unsatisfactory for the development of a quality system and culture and that any taxonomy of leadership training in the RAN must be done in systematic fashion for all levels in the RAN hierarchy toward the development of NQM.

Management Assumptions and their Success in the RAN

There are two fundamental assumptions that need to be clarified before investigating the necessity for a review of leadership in the RAN. Firstly – the role of NQM. A major and significant reason for the endorsement of NQM as the RAN corporate management philosophy, was that there would be a more uniform set of principles and practices in the way resources are utilised across the RAN. This being the case, the endorsement of NQM as the guiding corporate management philosophy for the RAN should have also meant that the core principles and management imperatives of NQM form the basis on which all formal management processes take place. Flowing from this is the universal adoption of the endorsed tools and techniques of NQM especially the principal problem solving and decision making management tool of PLAN-DO-CHECK-ACT (PDCA). As with the processes and techniques involved with the PMB side of the equation — that every manager had to adopt in some fashion, the mechanics of quality management are to be commonplace and well known. For this to happen, all appropriate training, be it either new or through modification to existing courses, would reflect the philosophy and mechanics of NQM above and beyond all other forms. Navy has a clear statement of management philosophy and direction for all to adhere to, the task as defined is to implement it effectively.

The second assumption is that in order to complement this statement of management direction, there requires an equally clear definition of leadership and its role in the change management process. People with their habits and norms, developed over many generations would have to come to terms with change and appropriately trained leaders need the knowledge, skills and attitudes to effect this process. Few could argue against the contention that the primary role of officers in the RAN, indeed the Services, is a manager and leader-change agent with perhaps more emphasis on the latter than the former. This being the case, the importance of middle and senior leaders having a thorough understanding of what leadership
is for the RAN is essential. Before corporate acceptance of change is undertaken, management must first have the tools and vision to effect that change. This also goes for senior sailors as their attitude, largely based on their understanding of new concepts, will make or break any major change to the “way we do our business”.

Unfortunately, both assumptions have not come into reality and many of the difficulties faced by the NQM Implementation are as a result of this. Training in management skills and practices across the RAN have not changed anywhere near adequately enough to reflect the requirement and none of the current sailor management/leadership courses fully integrates quality management principles or practices into the training. More importantly, the RAN has no comprehensive uniform doctrine that is a definition and universal set of principles of leadership, on which to build a leadership training taxonomy. This is not to say that some very good progress has not occurred, such as in the development of training at RANC and some application courses for officers and at the Leadership and Management School, but it is not uniform and in no way integrated into a broader training taxonomy.

Current RAN Leadership Theory Guidance

Throughout the RAN, leadership and management course and module developers, even individual instructors have had a great deal of autonomy in deciding which model or philosophy to follow with little or no comprehension as to how they are (or not) complementing the NQM doctrine. This has resulted in an uncoordinated spread of competing interpretations of leadership across the RAN. ABR 2010 introduces the importance of leadership, however, it does not go beyond a cursory appraisal of the relationship between leadership factors and NQM. In comparison, the Army has had an endorsed and successful leadership philosophy and training model since 1973. The RAAF has recently implemented a comprehensive and coordinated leadership training scheme especially for airmen and NCOs. Overseas Service organisations such as the Royal Navy, have also been far more proactive in this area. Although there has been significant resources and planning gone into the NQM Implementation Strategy, its final success would be infinitely enhanced with a commensurate approach to leadership training and practice.

Some current guidance as to leadership characteristics desired of RAN managers, has been put forward by a previous ACPERS-N and by interpretation of the recommended readings of a previous CNS and as listed in ABR 2010. Although worthwhile in the context this guidance was given, it has been largely in support of the NQM Implementation Strategy and more a spin off of defining quality management for the RAN and articulating the principles and imperatives of that philosophy, than a comprehensive articulation of an RAN leadership doctrine. For what they are worth, these references generally consider management as non-personnel based, essential for system efficiency and effectiveness. Leadership, by comparison is an art and as put forward by ABR 2010: “It is the art of getting people to do what you want them to do because they want to do the same thing themselves”. In other words, convincing personnel — the leader’s followers — what is to be done is for everyone’s good. These distinctions are not only widely accepted but superficial and not comprehensive enough for trainers to use as a basis for developing courses.

Current RAN Leadership Training

The use of leadership theory in the RAN has tended to follow albeit, with some lag, the fortunes of the dominant theory in academia. Up until the late 1960s, leadership was largely based on the assumptions and model, commonly known as Trait Leadership Theory. This was applied to the RAN context in the dependence on recruiting criteria and selection procedures to “find” the RAN’s leaders and do little in the way of “training” potential leaders. This theory has fallen into disrepute over the last few decades for various reasons which can be summed up by a statement from Jennings that: “Fifty years (much more now) have failed to produce one personality trait or set of qualities that can be used to discriminate leaders from non-leaders”.

From the mid to late 1980s, most of the primary RAN management training institutions, that is the RAN Management School and RANC, adopted the Hersey-Blanchard Model of Situational Leadership (Life Cycle Theory) to their Management and Leadership training courses. Although there was no specific directive that this was to be the primary leadership theory to follow, trainers at these institutions developed their courses in isolation and with little or no questioning of its relevance by senior management. Although other models are discussed, this theory of leadership has, up until recently, been the endorsed or at least predominant theory in the RAN, by default. The RAN has been proactive in developing leadership
potential amongst its junior sailors and officers without any real guidance from senior management as what sort of leaders they require. Even at the RANSC level, graduates are given exposure to a range of leadership theories, however, again no one philosophy is endorsed, even as a preferred. Officer’s leadership training has recently taken two distinct paths, that being ADFA trained and the other from RANC. The leadership training at ADFA has strong Army influences exemplified by the Functional (Action-Centred) Leadership models as developed by Dr Adair being the endorsed theory taught at this institution. To balance this, Blanchard’s Situational Leadership II theory (SLII) is instructed to ADFA trainees during their Single Service Training time at RANC similarly with direct entry officers. RANC direct entry stream graduates are not given an equally comprehensive exposure to functional theory. Having two theories taught is not a bad thing in itself, what is lacking is a determination of which theory is to be used when and what training is appropriate.

Over the past 20 or so years there has been no corresponding leadership and management training for sailors, not withstanding the POMSSC. With the implementation of the Leading Seaman Leadership Course (LSLC) and revised Petty Officers Management Course (POMC) this is changing. The LSLC uses Adair’s Functional approach to leadership with exercises and lessons developing sailors skills along these lines. This is in contrast to the POMSSC which has traditionally used the Blanchard model for leadership theory and corresponding exercises and there are no plans to introduce a comprehensive overview of the functional model of leadership into the course.

There has been little or no development toward a leadership philosophy for NQM facilitators or general awareness training. There are attempts to link the Blanchard SLII and Functional models to NQM, however this is only on a superficial level without any in depth application. A program of training for senior RAN management in ‘Quality Leadership’ is underway sponsored by DGCMN and as part of the general NQM (TQM) Implementation Strategy, however this has not been done as part of an overall leadership training plan underpinned by a defined philosophy or doctrine of leadership.

The development of a cohesive framework for leadership training does not necessarily mean that choosing one theory is an imperative, indeed, many theorists believe that there is no one best way of leadership, what is required is an understanding of what leadership theories are relevant to Navy and decide how to best apply them so that leadership development is incremental and training produces the type of leaders the RAN requires at each level of rank structure. Once this leadership doctrinal guidance is provided, the onus switches to trainers who must implement it into all relevant courses.

### Overcoming the Void

A leadership doctrine for the RAN has become critical for at least two reasons. Firstly, leadership skills are now vital in the change management process as the number of senior management initiated programs place an increasing burden on personnel to absorb a huge amount of change to an otherwise “change-saturated” organisation. Leadership, unlike management, is the ability to change compelled performers into willing participants, which means, in effect, leaders changing the culture of the organisation. The second reason, being closely related to the cultural change requirement, is that with the proposed leadership and management training continuum for both officers and sailors, a suitable RAN senior management endorsed doctrine is a necessary precondition before valid course development can be undertaken. In effect, the RAN must decide what to teach before determining how. Apart from these two dominant reasons, the endorsement of a leadership model and philosophy will also allow all trainers in this area to talk the same language and develop a corporate approach to RAN leadership skills with senior leaders showing “beginners” how the accepted and endorsed doctrine is to be applied in the workplace.

A comprehensive doctrinal statement on leadership should have consideration for two important environmental factors: firstly, it how it complements all Navy’s current initiatives and, secondly, how it relates to other Defence and external organisations attitudes to management and leadership. Complementing initiatives such as Good Working Relations, Occupational Health and Safety, as well as NQM, is a prerequisite for any leadership doctrine to be useful, matching it with Army’s, RAAF or HQADF philosophy, although not vital, must be at least considered. In the current Tri-Service environment there is a temptation to simply go with whatever is being used at institutions such as ADFA. This could be a quick solution; however, if not done with the specific RAN context in mind, it will be difficult to “sell” or even apply to Navy leadership.

The current decision to establish a controlling body for leadership and management training is a necessary first step toward the Leadership and Management training continuum. Their role should complement that of DGNCM and the result should be an integrated approach to Quality Leadership and Management.
Using the existing medium of ABR 2010, with a complete chapter (immediately after the explanation of NQM) on the leadership doctrine would provide for the broadest possible dissemination of the doctrine and its use in all relevant training.

A New Taxonomy of Management and Leadership Training - Knowing the End Before the Start: Systematic Requirement (Training) Needs Analysis

The paramount activity required to develop a successful, effective leadership taxonomy is to determine the leadership doctrine for the RAN and then to develop a comprehensive Leadership and Management (LM) Training Implementation Plan. It is imperative that there be a complete understanding of the desired outcomes for training to be successful. By having a vision of the type of leader desired by the customer—the RAN and ultimately the Australian public—trainers can better choose the models to be used in training. This plan should be developed by a single group so as to ensure continuity of training methodology and conduct across the continuum.

This does not mean that existing development and courses are wasted, on the contrary, they can be utilised as preliminary work and drawn into a larger project under the auspices of the Board of Studies (Management Training sponsor). Given the premise that officers are best given this training as early as possible, training during the initial officer (NEOC and ADFA SST phase) is considered appropriate. Simply creating separate leadership, management and staff skill courses is contrary to the holistic approach of quality management.

Developing leadership and management training should occur in two distinct phases: firstly, an examination of the experience of other organisations including Services such as the RAAF, in their leadership training development would be of great benefit and secondly, determine the target groups and provide an acceptable overview of the general distribution of the skills, knowledge and time devoted to management/leadership activities. To begin this, the use of existing theoretical studies is a very useful base, however they should not be simply "cut and pasted" into the Navy context.

WHAT and WHO are the Managers and Leaders?

The LM Implementation group would of course not have to start from scratch in determining what a manager or leader is and what they do, studies in this area are prolific. Stoner (1982), the foremost writer in this field, identified three distinct levels of manager (leader) throughout any organisation. Also, leaders can be classified in two ways, by their level in the organisation—so called first line, middle and top (senior) leaders—and by the range of organisational activities for which they are responsible—so called functional and general managers/leaders. In the RAN context using a degree of flexibility, line managers can usually equate to senior sailors (even Leading Seaman), middle managers to junior officers (up to Lieutenant Commander rank) and top/senior management to Admiral. Functional managers/leaders are usually senior sailors and junior officers, dealing in their specific area of organisational activity or related areas. General management can be observed more at the very senior officer (and perhaps Warrant Officer) levels, where a broader view and skill base is more important than functional expertise in the context of their employment. This breakdown is not without qualification however it would be considered optimally more specific, this framework has advantages and has obvious applicability to the Navy—albeit using some flexibility in activity definition. This is complementary to an earlier study by Mahoney et al. which showed that most time spent by managers/leaders was different across the three levels with lower levels being occupied with direct supervision of followers nearly three times as much as senior level managers. Also, senior levels are far more involved in planning, evaluating and generalist roles. These figures are not astounding in themselves but do show that there is a major difference between supervisor leadership and senior management roles and therefore there must be different training needs.

As for skills, R. Katz categorised three basic types of skills—technical, human, and conceptual—identified as needed and most commonly called upon by managers/leaders. Katz suggests that although all three of these skills are essential to effective management, their relative importance to a specific manager depends on his or her position (category) in the organisation. Katz’s study of skill distribution show two important conclusions: technical skill are high in
A’HOY
YOUNG AUSTRALIANS!

OPPORTUNITY TO SET SAIL FOR ADVENTURE IN 1995!!!

An adventure that could change your whole life.

If you are between the ages of 16 to 23 then you’re ready for a voyage on YOUNG ENDEAVOUR in 1995, Australia’s national sail training ship!

Apply Now!

A voyage on YOUNG ENDEAVOUR is a unique and unforgettable experience — a truly great adventure. It is a lot to do with learning about sailing and the sea, also learning about yourself and other people.

YOUNG ENDEAVOUR is operated by the Royal Australian Navy on behalf of the Young Endeavour Youth Scheme, a specially created organisation whose aim is to give a broad range of young Australians an opportunity to develop personal skills, initiative, teamwork and leadership qualities through participation in an “adventure under sail” on board the ship.

On each sail training voyage, there are berths for 24 young Australians (12 male/12 female). If you are between the ages of 16 to 23, are in good health and can swim at least 50 metres, you can apply.

No previous sailing experience is necessary. In fact a lot of people who come aboard haven’t been to sea before.

There is an all-inclusive fee, but if money is a problem, financial assistance can be applied for through the Young Endeavour Youth Scheme. No one misses out if they can’t afford to pay for a berth.

“YOUNG ENDEAVOUR offers young, enthusiastic people a chance to discover new things about themselves by overcoming personal and shared challenges and by learning from others. By the end of the voyage the challenges that have been overcome bring an amazing sense of achievement. This unique experience binds all those on board in a way not possible on “land” and the friendships formed seem more real. For me, YOUNG ENDEAVOUR will be an ongoing part in my life — its an experience that in my opinion is priceless and beyond measure”.

Youth Crew Member, V9/93, Age 17, from Queensland

For Further Information and Application Forms: Young Endeavour Youth Scheme PO BOX 399 Potts Point NSW 2011 Telephone: (02) 368 1800 Toll Free: (008) 267 909 Facsimile: (02) 368 0183
lower levels of management and conceptual skills being important in the senior management level. Also, human skills are considered important across each of the levels and probably occupy up to 50 percent of a manager/leaders time. Taken as a reasonable reflection of RAN leaders, this is a useful base on which to study the requirement for any particular leadership skill training.

Dimensions of Leadership

A number of leadership theorists have recently put forward that any distillation of leadership characteristics will probably fall into two dimensions or types: Transformational and Transactional Leadership. Mukhi et al (1993) defines transformational leadership as: "...a large or grand view that catches the broader issues of defining, building and maintaining an organisation's distinctive character and culture." Similarly, Stumpf and Mullen (1991) have called this leadership form: Strategic Leadership which considers broader planning processes of organisational mission and objective setting, performance evaluation, information systems as well as personnel and organisational development.

On the other hand, Mukhi describes leadership as a narrower and much more interpersonal approach, though no less important. This type of leadership has been traditionally of great importance to RAN leaders and trainers to a degree where much greater emphasis, even complete concentration on interpersonal skills training, has meant broader organisational leadership skills training has gone lacking. All of the current leadership theories presented at RAN management schools are transactional. The concept of 'thinking globally - acting locally' has only recently been put forward, largely as a result of the introduction of PMB and the requirement for strategic planning.

The implications for this two dimensional view of leadership to military training has been broached by Clay. In her article she examines the concepts of transformational leadership and its relationship with transactional theories and how it can complement leadership training already successfully conducted in the Australian Army. The carry over implication of this argument to the RAN is substantial as there is much discussion throughout senior RAN management as to the requirement for leadership training that is transformational in character. The transformational leadership style is required of senior management and current training (if there is any) would not seem to fill this requirement.

Leadership Models in Training

The LM Implementation team should determine the outcome characteristics of any leadership training at all levels, however there will be little doubt that the existing leadership models currently instructed in the RAN will probably find a place within the training continuum. Functional models, especially Adair's Action Centred Leadership, are pertinent as is Blanchard's Situational Leadership II model. The primary objective here will be to determine where and to whom these models are presented and given this, in what form. Past success in the training of senior sailors using the situational model can be readily gauged by the quality of this level of management currently working in the fleet, so its usefulness is accepted.

The functional models (Action-Centred) of leadership are used in many military and civilian organisations in Australia and overseas for leadership training purposes. The functional approach views leadership in terms of how the leader's behaviour affects and is affected by, the group of followers. This approach concentrates on the nature of the group, the followers/subordinates. It focuses on the content of leadership rather than style. The success or usefulness of this approach can be attested by the Australian Army's application to its training for over twenty years.

Criticism of the model is largely based on the applicability of the model in the important determination of individual followers development needs and style of leadership for a heterogenous group. This inadequacy does not render the model worthless, but in conjunction with SLII, they could supplement and complement each other over the leadership training continuum.

The discussion about functional and situational leadership models, as are currently presented to RAN personnel, does not mean other models and theories are not useful. The McKinsey Model has been applauded as a multi dimensional model much more in tune with current thinking on management. Also, Path-Goal and expectancy theories of motivation and leadership are all worth serious consideration - if they satisfy the training requirement.

Conclusion

The current state of leadership training in the RAN is uncoordinated and inadequate to provide the necessary skills, knowledge and attitudes to sailors and officers for the requirements of a rapidly changing
organisation. The leadership training that is occurring and, by validation, has been proven successful, is isolated and is not a part of a general framework of a training continuum that is complementary to the RAN’s overall management philosophy – NQM. For an efficient and effective leadership training continuum to develop, senior management must provide a doctrinal statement on leadership detailing a precise definition and principles of what constitutes leadership in the RAN.

### Recommendations

The following recommendations are made for leadership training:

1. Senior RAN Management produce a leadership doctrine (philosophy and definition) that complements the NQM management philosophy and principles. This should become a major section within ABR 2010 and which should be renamed — The Navy Management and Leadership Handbook.

2. Endorse Leadership Model(s) that complement and reinforce the RAN leadership doctrine and oversee the appropriate implementation of the doctrine into the training continuum.

3. Establish a Leadership and Management Training Implementation Team on a corporate basis for the purpose of developing a structure for leadership training based on customer—RAN Fleet and Australian public—requirements. The purview of the team to cover all ranks in the RAN. The Board of Studies (Management Training Centre) to provide for and oversee the activity of the team and endorse its findings.

4. The Leadership and Management Training Taxonomy to be developed along the principles of:
   a. all concepts and skills to be complementary to NQM principles and practices as laid down in ABR 2010.
   b. concepts to be presented in an incremental fashion over the continuum.
   c. Existing courses ie: LSLC, POMC, NEOC/SST, JOSC, RANC to be used (in modified form as required) as far as possible for this training before the development of new courses.

### NOTES


5. CNS 84/93 Minute dated 18 January 1993, Leadership V Management — Recommended Reading. This book is cited as a good guide to leadership qualities in a quality organisation.


7. ABR 2010, Chapter 2.2-3.


10. RANC course notes


12. ADFA Leadership training notes.


14. POMC Training notes. As the LSLC covers functional leadership, trainees progressing to the POMC, will not need comprehensive training and will only review. The constraints of time and resources does not allow for the current POMC trainees to consider both leadership theories in depth.

15. NQM facilitator training notes.

16. DGNCM is sponsoring this training for a limited period and only for Warrant Officers and above. No plans for on-going training have been promulgated.


23. Mukhi et al. op cit, 334-336


25. Mukhi et al. op cit, 53-54

26. ibid, 314-316
The Battle of Leyte Gulf

“The Battle of Leyte Gulf” is a brief history of Australian participation in the Liberation of the Philippines and the 50th anniversary commemorations in 1994. The text is supported by numerous illustrations in colour and black and white which capture the spirit of the events.

This is the 6th book in a series produced by the Australian Defence Force Journal. It highlights the role of Australian sailors and airmen in the liberation of the Philippines and General Douglas MacArthur’s promise to return.

“This work constitutes a significant contribution to the domain of public knowledge about the participation of the nation’s profession of arms in the Second World War”

Paul Keating
Prime Minister of Australia

“This book is more than a collection of illustrations and narrative of the Leyte landings. It contains valuable insights into the personal experiences of Allied service men who fought in numerous battlefields during the Liberation of the Philippines.”

Fidel V. Ramos
President of the Philippines

To order a copy of “The Battle of Leyte Gulf” send a cheque or money order for $25.00 made out to The Receiver of Public Monies to Australian Defence Force Journal, B-4-26, Russell Offices, Campbell, CANBERRA ACT
Military-specialist officers - such as gunnery officers in the Navy, infantry officers in the Army and pilot officers in the Air Force - possess certain basic skills which are exclusive to the operation of the organisation, and the successful implementation of their role is dependent on the skill, knowledge and experience gained within the organisation rather than acquired outside the employing body. Some others such as engineers, doctors and lawyers, although recruited on the basis of their civilian skills, or trained to acquire these skills, are also expected to possess military skills to a somewhat equivalent standard to those of military-specialist officers. This article summarises the major findings of a recent study, which made a detailed examination of factors which assist and constrain engineering officers in advancing in their chosen work and career paths. For simplicity, technical details are not shown, but can be obtained from the author.

The results of the study were based on a questionnaire survey conducted during the second half of 1986, which captured usable responses from some 1,836 military engineers, including 442 from the Navy, 597 from the Army and 797 from the Air Force. This study examined engineering socialisation in terms of professional values and ethics, technical quality, practical orientation, social responsibility and satisfaction with the profession. Service behaviour was examined in terms of military values and ethics, career involvement, career motivation, career prospects, career management and spouse support. The factors believed to be important for an officer's as well as an engineer's success, such as managerial skills, adaptability, intellectual style, foresight and analytical skills, were also examined.

The concept of career commitment used in this study was the importance attached to different kinds of career ambitions - engineering, military, or both. The questions relevant to progress up the career pyramid were which of these three career ambitions was held in highest esteem by military engineers. Commitment was treated as long term bonding and strength of desire to maintain membership of that preferred identity. In all, 18 predictors were identified as influencing career commitment. Out of these predictors, seven had a strong influence on the military career, the rest influencing engineering preference, although they were not mutually exclusive.

The predictors for military orientation were military values (Service commitments over and above any family or personal needs), military conservativeness (preservation of military traditions and values), military effectiveness (belief that the Service is forward thinking, progressive and an effective organisation), military institutional values (desire to do something worthwhile for the country, excitement of the job and comradeship) and rank, among the military institutional-organisational constructs, as well as pragmatism (preference for the practical over the theoretical and for well tried over new approaches) and cynicism (denial of altruism as a motive for action) among personality traits.

For engineering orientation, the significant factors were engineering career involvement (psychological involvement and motivation towards engineering profession), technical quality (attention to detail and quality of work), engineering intrinsic (engineering inherent orientation based on desire to practise) and extrinsic (based on interpersonal influences such as financial attractiveness and status) indices, civilian orientation (curiosity to try a civilian job) and civilian prospects (chances of securing a comparable civilian job), job orientation (degree of involvement in performing engineering tasks), member of officer corps from the Navy and Air Force, and direct entry and tertiary qualified officers.

Out of the 18, the six most important predictors were identified as those which discriminated strongly between military and engineering orientations. Military values, military conservativeness and rank were the most important predictors for the military; and job orientation, engineering intrinsic indices and civilian orientation were the significant predictors for engineering orientation.

Three types of officers were identified in terms of career preferences - engineering, ambivalent and military. The data when divided according to these orien-
tations, revealed that about half of Navy and Air Force officers belonged to the ambivalent group, with about one-third being categorised by engineering orientation. In the case of the Army, slightly more than one-third of officers were in the ambivalent group and about half showed military orientation. Furthermore, difference in rank was significantly related to the various orientations as exhibited in the figure.

The percentage of officers with strong military commitment increased with rank. Some 10 per cent of officers under training had strong military commitment, while 32 per cent had strong engineering commitment. For the senior ranks (equivalent to Navy’s Captain and above), 52 per cent were strongly committed to the military and 10 per cent to engineering. Engineering officers thus changed their orientation during their career. It is estimated that somewhere in the middle to senior years of the Navy’s Lieutenant seniority level (and equivalent) the commitments to engineering and military are in balance. This is the most critical time in an engineering officer’s career and occurs after about ten years of service. At this point of time it is expected that the conflict between military and engineering careers may be at its peak. At this stage the decision to accept a diminution in engineering career and adapt to the military career is made. Those who do not wish to compromise their engineering preference in favour of a military career may leave the services at this stage.

The jobs engineers do in the military are very varied, as are the environments in which they work from one posting to the next. One would therefore expect levels of ambiguity and stress to vary considerably from job to job. Although many engineers begin their careers in a technical capacity, career management pushes them into the general arena of military speciality. Some of them make considerable adjustment to fill this dual role of military officer and engineer and
to cope with the conflicting pressures. Others may opt for one path, either engineering or military, depending upon the strength of their commitment.

The results of this study indicated a mismatch between self-selection and career involvement. In the military, career involvement is not self-regulated but is basically dependent on the management's selection of an individual's posting to a particular position. The results suggest that high resignation intention is related to high commitment to engineering and to low level of engineering oriented job involvement. These factors were significant in determining the resignation intention of officers in early to mid-career stages but not for officers in late career. The older group of officers were relatively more military oriented, and placed less importance on performing engineering tasks; this may be due to a self-selection process whereby those officers of the same group age who thought otherwise would have left already.

The results in general highlight the fact that a low level of socialisation and retention along with high levels of stress and conflict results from failure to manage people effectively. The military organisation finds difficulties in career management and the selection of jobs to suit individual career aspirations. Retention of trained personnel in the military from the organisational point of view is very important. In terms of economics, the human resource is the largest item in the defence budget. This money cannot be efficiently used unless the organisation retains its trained personnel, especially engineering and technical staff.

This study contributes to the current debate on salaried professionals who are located in large bureaucratic organisations and face a dilemma when the organisational ethos differs markedly from the professional ethics developed early in their career. Social changes within advanced industrialised societies are causing the military to converge towards the values and practices of other civilian organisations. As far as engineers are concerned the military in coming years has to adopt a flexible approach to personnel management, in line with civilian organisations.

Zakir Rahmani joined the RAN in 1972 and retired in 1989. During his Naval career he had postings to the Weapons Electronic Engineering School, HMAS Cerberus and the Naval College, HMAS Cresswell as well as a number of Navy Office postings. At present he is on the Navy Emergency List and enjoys interaction with the Navy through occasional postings.

3rd Australian Performance Management Symposium
Sponsored by the Australian Department of Defence
Experts in Performance Management from Australia and overseas will bring you up-to-date with the latest developments in this area of project management.

If you are involved in Defence Projects, can you afford to miss the latest developments in this vital area?

Lakeside Hotel, Canberra 17 - 19 May 1995
Enquiries & Registration Kit: Dr Alec Cameron Ph (02) 299 5699 Fax (02) 299 5334

Conducted by

Australian Graduate School
of Engineering Innovation

Earned Value Systems
Australia Pty Ltd
The Western Front was a continuous line of trenches stretching 450 miles from the Swiss border to the Belgian coast. In France and Belgium, it was the scene of the most prolonged and intensive fighting of the First World War.

The Australian Imperial Force fought the first battle of the Somme and experienced one of the bloodiest clashes of the War, sustaining 30,000 casualties. In so doing, they also weakened the German defences and hastened the end of the War.

Seventy five years later, a group of war veterans and widows returned to the Western Front to pay tribute to those who fought and died there.

* Australians on the Western Front * is an account of this pilgrimage and of the battles it commemorated.

*It is available from the Australian Defence Force Journal at $25 per copy.*
Manoeuvre Theory

A discussion paper produced by the Australian Army Doctrine Centre, November 1994

Manoeuvre theory has become a very popular phrase for those who discuss warfare at the operational and tactical level. It is seen very much as the "in" doctrine for the 1990s and has been openly embraced by the British and New Zealand armies and by the United States Marine Corps. While manoeuvre theory has received wide discussion in British and United States Army journals, this has not happened in Australia and consequently manoeuvre theory remains little understood by the Australian military.

This article aims to make Australian Army officers and NCOs more aware of the concept of manoeuvre theory. It does so by discussing the problem of defining manoeuvre theory, and outlines its basic principles. Finally, the article details some of the serious criticisms levelled at those who seek to have manoeuvre theory adopted as standard doctrine and discusses the linkages between manoeuvre theory and the principles of war.

The article is designed to promote further discussion on this complex concept, discussion that has largely been missing in Australian military circles. As such, it is definitely a starting point only and should not be seen as the last word on the issue.

Manoeuvre Theory - The Problem of Definition

One of the criticisms levelled against advocates of manoeuvre theory is that they have consistently failed to adequately define the term. According to Daniel P. Bolger (Hooker: 1993, p.21):

What do proponents define as manoeuvre warfare? Sometimes, it seems like the answer is "anything that works", as these people refuse to be pinned down on paper or on the battlefield. Still, like Supreme Court justices in search of pornography, they know it when they see it.

The tendency for manoeuvre theory to mean different things to different writers is evident in the following definitions. Note that one writer later changes his definition of manoeuvre theory.

Manoeuvre warfare has been defined as:

- military judo. It is a way of fighting smart, of out-thinking an opponent you may not be able to overpower with brute strength (Lind: 1985, p.2).
- Boyd Cycling the enemy, being consistently faster through however many OODA Loops it takes until the enemy loses his cohesion – until he can no longer fight as an effective, organised force (Lind: 1985, p.6).
- an overall concept or "style" of warfare. It has an opposite, the firepower – attrition style (Lind: 1980, p.55).
- an entire style of warfare, one characterised not only by moving in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage, but also – and even more – to moving faster than the enemy, to defeating him through superior tempo (Lind, in Hooker (ed): 1993, p.4).
- a methodology of war-fighting... an approach to which demands subtlety in the application of military art. Its lynch-pin is the seizure of the initiative and its retention thereafter (Richards: 1990, p.4).
- a thought process that seeks to pose our strengths against his weaknesses (Waddell, in Hooker (ed): 1993, p.119).
- Defeating the enemy's will. That is the essence of manoeuvre warfare, that you defeat the enemy's will to fight rather than his ability to fight (Grossman, in Hooker (ed): 1993, p.42).

With so many different definitions it is little wonder that manoeuvre theory has become a "contentious issue" that is "more misunderstood that understood" (Waddell, in Hooker (ed): 1993, p.119). Yet before it can be readily accepted as doctrine, if indeed this happens, a standard definition of the term, one that is readily understood and widely accepted, is essential.

For the purpose of this article manoeuvre theory is defined as:

an often deceptive planned or controlled action designed to defeat an opponent. It consists of adroit movement that places troops, materiel and firepower in a more advantageous location with respect to that opponent forcing him or her to react or risk defeat.
Manoeuvre Theory – Basic Principles

Manoeuvre theory is defined by its basic principles which are set out below as a list of affirmations and negations; that is what manoeuvre theorists argue for and against. Even a cursory glance at the list shows that manoeuvre theory is neither new nor revolutionary, but in fact conforms to most of the well-established principles of war.

Affirmations

Manoeuvre theory stresses the following:
1. The crucial importance of quick decision making. It is especially important to reach a decision and act on it before the enemy does. As one writer has stated “the need for rapid decisions and a quick response at all levels... distinguishes manoeuvre warfare from any other” (Richards: 1990, p.5). The goal is to out-think the enemy, get inside his decision cycle and exploit the “fog of war” to the full extent.
2. Speed in all things – decision making, movement, deployment, etc. Manoeuvre theorists argue for speed in everything known as tempo and quote General Black’s motto for his staff; “Don’t work hard – work fast!” (Lind, in Hooker 1993, p.8).
3. A decentralised approach to command where mission type orders replace detailed, elaborate and inflexible ones. Utilising the concept of Directive Control, the mission type orders promote initiative, resourcefulness and speed. Within this system, however, the commander’s intent remains sacrosanct and provides the framework for future action. Directive control is seen as “the glue” that holds the disparate actions of subordinate commanders and keeps them pulling in the same direction (Richards: 1990, p.5). Trust in subordinates is implicit and the risk of mistakes is accepted.
4. Attacking the enemy weaknesses. This is achieved through the use of reconnaissance to find surfaces and gaps. Once gaps or weaknesses are found, the reconnaissance “pulls” the rest of the force through it and exploits the weakness for all it is worth.
5. Maximising use of the element of surprise. This comes from a combination of tempo, placing strength against weakness, utilising deception, a high level of mobility and seizing initiatives.

The aim of manoeuvre theory is to defeat the enemy by seizing the initiative from the outset and never releasing it.

Negations

Manoeuvre theory stresses that the following should be avoided:
1. Attrition style warfare such as frontal assaults against heavily defended positions.
2. Relying solely on firepower to defeat the enemy.
3. The use of detailed, lengthy and specific planning and operation orders.
4. The over-direction of subordinates.
5. Inaction or passivity in a combat situation.
6. Relying solely on defensive operations to win a campaign.

Some Key Criticisms of Manoeuvre Theory

Manoeuvre theory was readily embraced, almost without question in the 1980s by many armies. Since that time, however, manoeuvre theory has been widely debated and several important criticisms have been made against the theory. Some of these criticisms are briefly outlined here.

A Selective Use of Military History

The proponents of manoeuvre theory have sought to strengthen their case by constant appeals to military history case studies. In reaching into the past for specific examples manoeuvre theorists have been especially selective. All historians by the nature of their discipline are selective, but most are careful not to dismiss or totally ignore repeated incidents or occurrences that do not support their argument.

For example, many theorists look to the German experience in World War II to support their arguments. A special hero of the theorists is Erwin Rommel. While Rommel’s successes are fully detailed, and even his World War I experiences have been fully described in the most recent work on manoeuvre theory (Grossman, 1993), his failures are all but ignored. Rommel’s “drive to the wire” which lost him the battle in November 1941 is ignored as is his obsession with Tobruk. The battle of Medenine is also conveniently forgotten. At Medenine on 6 March 1943, Rommel launched his last attack in North Africa. It was an unmitigated disaster and he lost 52 tanks without securing one objective. Eighth Army, informed by ULTRA of Rommel’s plans, lost no tanks. This is not the stuff manoeuvre theorists like to acknowledge about one of their heroes and so Medenine, Tobruk and the “drive to the wire” are all conveniently ignored.
Wehrmacht Penis Envy

Linked to the first criticism is the claim that manoeuvre theorists suffer from Wehrmacht (and sometimes Israeli) penis envy. As Bolger (1993, p.27) has stated:

*These people love the Panzers, the Stukas, and the Sturm und Drang with the enthusiasm of any 12-year-old boy who has yet to learn about Kursk, Omaha Beach, or Operation Cobra, let alone Bergen-Belsen.*

It is no accident that German words such as *Schwerpunkt* and *Auftragstaktik* are used to express important concepts. The German terms, according to Bolger (1993, p.28) make them more authoritative and warlike.

Surprisingly, the campaigns of General George S. Patton Jr. whom the German commanders rated the best allied fighting general of the war, have not been used extensively by the manoeuvre theorists. This is unusual as Patton espoused and put into practice many of the fundamental affirmations of manoeuvre theory. The manoeuvre theorists appear to be blinkered by their German and Israeli "penis envy".

The Attrition - Manoeuvre Dichotomy

Manoeuvre theorists tend to view war as consisting of two basic components – fire and movement. This leads on to two distinct styles of warfare – an attrition style based on firepower and a manoeuvre style of warfare which utilises firepower and mobility. As Andrew D. Walker has commented:

*The assumption that combat is composed of only two basic components and therefore is defined by two styles of warfare is a vast over-simplification of a complex concept (1991, p.48).*

Walker went on to identify six components of warfare – all important – and by varying the mix of them, this could lead to many possible styles of warfare. These six components are intelligence, firepower, manoeuvre, command and control, protection and logistics. Of the six components identified by Walker, firepower was regarded as the most crucial:

*Firepower is the decisive element of combat. If victory is gained by the destruction of the enemy’s means to resist then firepower is responsible for the destruction. All other components (the six operating systems) ultimately support firepower (1991, p.50).*

Certainly the manoeuvre theorists’ attrition–manoeuvre dichotomy is a simplistic distortion of military history and reflects a strong desire to avoid the body counts of the Vietnam War. The notion that you can be either Hannibal or Haig (Bolger: 1993, p.21) but not Patton, Plumer or Monash is clearly absurd.

Manoeuvre Theory – The Universal Panacea

Manoeuvre theorists constantly argue that manoeuvre theory is applicable at all levels, at all time and in every type of terrain. This assumption ignores the very nature of warfare: that each conflict is unique and places new demands upon the combatants. While the principles of war remain constant, nothing else does. The notion that all combat operations need to conform to manoeuvre theory is, according to Walker (1991, p.48), both short-sighted and dangerous.

There have been in the past, and will be again, times when there is no alternative but to attack an enemy at his strongest point. Successful examples include the German assault on Fort Eben Emael in 1940, the relief of Bastogne in 1944, Montgomery’s assault at El Alamein in 1942, the Israeli assault on Entebbe in 1976 and the Marine assault on Kuwait City in 1991. In each case either tactics, terrain or necessity dictated that an assault on a strong enemy position was required.

At times too, an intricate, high tempo manoeuvre may be extremely risky to undertake, may be unnecessary or may even be impossible as it was at El Alamein. Battlefield tactics should be flexible enough to cope with the variables of war and should not seek to follow a theory encased in stone when it may be impractical or impossible to do so.

Manoeuvre Theory – The Formula for Success

By being so selective with their use of military history, manoeuvre theorists have convinced themselves, and may convince others, that they have developed the formula for success. This is an exceedingly dangerous notion. War as an art (as opposed to a science) resists any attempt to invent a formula for success and contains too many variables to do so. War has innumerable, incalculable variables any one of which could spell success or failure on the day an army is tested on the battlefield.
Because war is a constantly changing art that generates its own uncertainty (the fog of war) military doctrine needs to be flexible and dynamic. The worst possible thing that could occur is for a single theory to become enshrined in army doctrine. This could easily happen if enough people become convinced that this theory alone holds the key to combat success.

**Manoeuvre Theory and the Principles of War**

The principles of war, first espoused by Major General J.F.C. Fuller, are basic guidelines for the waging of war. As guidelines, they are not absolute maxims but provide a sound framework for the planning and conduct of operations. The principles of war used by the ADF are:

- selection and maintenance of the aim;
- concentration of force;
- economy of effort;
- cooperation;
- security;
- offensive action;
- surprise;
- flexibility;
- administration; and
- maintenance of morale.


Of all the above principles selection and maintenance of the aim has precedence over the others. It equates to the commander's intent in directive control and should be seen as sacrosanct.

What should be readily apparent in the listed principles, is that manoeuvre theory in reality is simply the articulation of most of the principles of war. Manoeuvre theory stresses the selection and maintenance of the aim, economy of effort, offensive action, surprise, and flexibility. Manoeuvre theory may, however, be at variance with two of the stated principles.

By recommending the use of two elements of one's own force - a holding element and a manoeuvre element - this could at times encourage the dispersion of force rather than its concentration. A commander must seek in combat to concentrate his/her force against the enemy's weakest point, but there may be times during combat when this is impossible and a dispersion of force is inevitable. The guiding principle is concentration *where this is possible.*

Manoeuvre theory also stresses the need to take risks to secure the aim. This is sound as long as the principle of security is not neglected and as long as the risk being taken is absolutely necessary to maintain and secure the commander's intent. The taking of unnecessary risks in war is foolhardy in the extreme and may be heavily punished by the enemy.

While manoeuvre theory complements most of the principles of war it should not replace them. The principles of war were devised by experienced commanders on the basis of prior experience and a detailed analysis of military history to provide guidance to their successors. They are flexible, dynamic and respond to change. As such they are a valuable tool for commanders; too valuable to be replaced by any single theory of warfare.

**Conclusion**

Manoeuvre theory has built on the principles of war and the writings of early theorists such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, and later ones such as Liddell Hart and Fuller. There is nothing new about the theory except perhaps the vigour with which it is being pushed in overseas military circles. Manoeuvre theory is not a formula for victory nor does it contain the secrets to the art of war. It has served a useful purpose by focussing debate on the particular advantages of one style of warfare. It should not replace current doctrine although military commanders should certainly be aware of the advantages such a style of warfare has to offer.

For a commander to succeed in the complex business of warfare she/he needs a well-stocked armoury on which to draw. Manoeuvre theory should be just one weapon in that armoury; it is not the armoury itself.
A Code of Professional Ethics for Army Officers: Is One Needed?

By Major T.L. Stevens RAAC

"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster". (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1886)

"The prince must not mind incurring the scandal of those vices, without which it would be difficult to save the state, for if one considers well, it will be found that some things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one’s ruin, and some others which would appear vices result in one’s greater security and well-being." (Niccolo Machiavelli, 1532)

Today's Army is under ever increasing expectation to respond to its external environmental contexts — political-legal, technological and socio-cultural. Competing demands of stakeholders in the Nation's defence: citizens, governments, soldiers, businesses and others, coupled with a tendency towards decentralised control, exposes Army officers to ambiguity in the process of decision making as leaders and managers. Thus, the question of professional ethics arises.

Professional ethics seeks to determine what the role of professions and the conduct of professionals should be. As a discipline, it includes aspects of social, political and legal philosophy as well as individual ethics. The study of professional ethics will not automatically make one more ethical, but it should develop sensitivity to ethical problems and clearer thinking, provide some general guiding principles, and help one better understand the role and importance of professions in contemporary society. The aim of this article is to discuss the development of a professional code of ethics for Army officers.

What is a Profession?

No universally accepted definition of what a profession is exists. Further, it has been argued elsewhere that the military "profession" is declining from an institutional to an occupational model, due to an increase in incidental and peripheral duties that do not relate specifically to the task of leading troops in combat. What this argument fails to acknowledge is that the core skill of all General Service Officers remains combat leadership. It is the understanding of the art of war that provides a frame of reference for all officers, regardless of what part of the organisation to which they are drafted.

Several criteria are popular tests against which the bona fides of a profession is measured: a service orientation, formal education and collective autonomy. Military sociologist Samuel Huntington distinguished three criteria by which he measured military professionalism: expert skills and knowledge; social responsibility and corporateness.

Huntington argued that there is a distinct sphere of competence common to military officers and distinguishing them from civilians — which he described as the "management of violence". He saw the function of a military force as successful armed combat, and the duties of a military officer as including the organising, equipping and training of this force; the planning of its activities and the direction of its operations in and out of combat.

The Profession of Arms

The purely military educational component for Army officers training takes 18 months during which time they develop their "expert skills". This is augmented by up to a further six month’s of specialist in-service training and a further one year full time at the middle management level. Further, many Army officers undergo their initial military training as graduates from the Australian Defence Forces Academy (ADFA), in diverse disciplines including arts, engineering and science.

Huntington’s "social responsibility" is related to the service orientation. Professions are said to provide a valuable service to the community with which they are associated. Two aspects are relevant. The first is the value of the service provided by the Defence Force. Opinion polls provide a variety of cues as to the perceived value of the service provided
by the profession in general. The findings of recent surveys reveal a basic faith in the capability of the Defence Force. Even among those who do not think that Australia could defend itself effectively, their concerns pertain to the size of the Defence Force and the efficacy of Defence equipment rather than the capabilities of the personnel. The Army’s contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia and Somalia are also seen as a valuable service that we have been able to “export” recently. Secondly, the service orientation derives from the fiduciary relationship that exists between the Service Chiefs, defence bureaucrats and their political masters.

In the fiduciary model, a client has more authority and responsibility in decision making than in the paternalistic model. A client’s consent and judgement are required and s/he participates in the decision making process, but the client depends on the professional for much of the information upon which s/he gives or withholds consent. This is directly analogous to the relationship between officers of the Department of Defence and the Minister for Defence who rely on the professional judgements of the uniformed Service Chiefs to determine the force size and specialist composition required to carry out military operations.

The final criteria, that of collective autonomy, or Huntington’s concept of corporateness, is manifested in the self regulation of recruitment, training and education, promotion and dismissal of Army officers. This is further enhanced by the associations, customs and traditions of the Service. The salient point here is that professionals, who possess a unique expertise not shared by laypeople, alone are qualified to judge whether applicants to the profession have met the standards, and whether practitioners of the profession are performing up to the ideals. Through devices such as promotion advisory committees, selection boards and courts martial — the military exercises a degree of self-regulation rare in any other calling.

Our society will continue to place trust in the military profession only so long as it remains convinced that the career soldier is animated by strong ethical principle and a purely disinterested regard for the nation’s security. It is in this context that the need for an officer’s code of ethics is often broached.

The Code of Ethics

Codes of ethics are characteristic of professional groups — like the AMA and the CPA. However, several pre-existing Army standards could arguably be said to suffice for a code of ethics. These include the Defence Force Discipline Act (DFDA), the Oath of Enlistment, the Laws of War under the Geneva Convention and a strong set of cultural norms inculcated through intensive training on induction. This is further documented by the appointment and issue of a Commission from the Queen and assessed as part of the performance dimensions in the annual Evaluation and Development Report (EDRO). Given this profusion of ethical guidance, is there any need for a single code?

Part of the answer to this question relates to the preceding analysis of the occupational status of Army Officers. There is evidence that the military suffers a low status in Australian society. Studies of professions and elites in Australia simply do not mention the military; the best you can find is a reference to senior officials of the RSL. The establishment of an unequivocal code of ethics that embodies the military ethos would assist in the understanding of the profession by those outside it. Several criteria have been suggested for determining what the ethos of an organisation is. These include the efforts to encourage compliance with an ethical code, its educational programs, its official attitudes to whistleblowers, and its readiness to deal with unethical and illegal behaviour once it occurs. A code of ethics attempts to ensure ethical conduct by specifying priorities and eliciting behavioural conformity, not through explicit compulsion, but through the more subtle socialisation of organisational culture.

Codes and Culture

A written code provides a common set of standards. If it is accepted by an employee’s superiors, peers and subordinates as a model for behaviour, adherence to its provisions will gradually be internalised in the value system of many employees. The forces at work will be conscience and organisational loyalty rather than fear of punishment. This assumes a unitary approach, with a strong organisational culture. Opponents to this approach argue that the concept of a corporate culture is the antithesis of individual ethics, that such a culture demands a “surrender” of “individual integrity” to the organisation.
Research generally cautions that corporate codes and other cultural devices could discourage individuals from taking personal responsibility for ethical decisions in the workplace. Other research indicates that a key feature of successful organisations is a strong corporate culture where a set of shared values permeates the organisation.

**The Sub-cultural Approach – Ethical Anarchy?**

The alternative model offered for the development of good ethical practice is the sub-cultural approach. This approach recognises the existence of subcultures and questions the power and prerogative of management to control organisational culture. Instead of imposing corporation-derived ethical values, the task for managers becomes one of understanding and unleashing the moral commitment of subcultures towards goals which are consistent with, or ideally advance, those of the organisation. This would appear to some as ethical anarchy, but it is said to be consistent with achieving an ethical unity of purpose in a professional institutional setting.

But it is more than just a pooling of talents that is important. In a comprehensive study of the effects of threats and crises on individuals, groups and organisations, Straw et al. conclude that individual, group and organisational effects combine to increase concurrence seeking, at the expense of comprehensive information seeking and processing. Information seeking and processing is characteristic of the utilitarian approach to ethical decision making. One of the ways to inhibit concurrence seeking is to give outsiders, those who do not come from the dominant culture, authority and a clear mandate to question. Paradoxically, this is exactly what the dissemination of a code of ethics would provide for Army officers.

For the Army, an organisation with a strongly entrenched culture, the sub-cultural approach may have little to offer given that changing organisational culture is fraught with difficulty and only effective under particular circumstances. The challenge would be more about opening the process of determining and articulating core values within what is already a unitary framework. The debate stimulated by developing a code of ethics would be an indication of the intellectual maturity of the profession. It is a debate that is in its infancy if the dearth of published literature on the subject in Australian military journals is any indication.

**Practical Concerns**

While the issue of professional standing and organisational culture are central to the debate about the adoption of a code of ethics, there are several practical concerns that require examination in the debate. The first of these was alluded to earlier — the large body of extant ethical guidance. It is contended that this assemblage is actually too plentiful to achieve what a single ethical canon could. An individual specific code of ethics would complement rather than replace the present body of guidance. Ideally, it would serve as a public record of the profession’s commitment to duty, loyalty, integrity and teamwork. It is just this approach that opens a code to criticism for not covering all contingencies. A tempting argument in this age of definitive regulation from a burgeoning Defence bureaucracy. It is illustrative, if not cathartic, to examine this aspect of the debate from a US Army perspective, by quoting from a recent article in Army magazine. One does not need to look far to find analogies in a resource-strapped Army:

I dare say I have never read an Army regulation, no matter how seemingly value-neutral, that lacked ethical wrinkles. For example, when I was a young officer, the post Inspector General gaggled my company because the arms room failed to meet the requirements laid down in the Army reg. That cunning document, doubtless composed by a paranoid engineer cross-bred with a sadistic lawyer, was a prodigy of exacting specifications: the windows were to be secured by half-inch steel rods, no more than four inches apart and anchored to the building frame by 3/8 inch U-bolts; the doors, consisting of three-inch-thick oak slabs covered with quarter-inch steel plate, were to be secured to the jam by 3/16 inch bolted hinges, a heavy-duty hasp and staple, and a padlock that would resist the best efforts of Houdini; the walls, ceiling and floor were all specified in terms of similar impregnable features. The only problem was that the post G-4 and engineer were not about to provide my company the construction resources necessary to meet the specifications in the AR, and the IG was not about to withdraw the gig. In an act of reckless generosity, the IG did finally allow as to how he would construe a 24-hour-a-day armed sentry for the arms room as equivalent to the needed structural enhancements.

Even this was tough for a rifle company back in the early post-Korean War period, when many such
to a code applies to those professions where no compliance measures act as a valid indicator of adherence. Evidence presented to indicate that compliance measures will be subject to analysis, like many ethical questions, none of these analyses will be unequivocal in determining whether the need for a professional code of ethics for Army officers is needed. The unitary organisational cultural approach assumes that good ethics will flow from institutionalising ethical conduct through organisational guidelines. The sub-cultural model places emphasis on processes of ethical reasoning as the source of the sound test of ethics. Though the sub-cultural approach is said to be superior, it is not clear how this model would be implemented within a clearly unitary culture without following the path of cultural change, a difficult and in some circles discredited quest. What does seem clear however, is that the introspective process of ethical soul searching involved in developing a code, and the subsequent exposure to external scrutiny that would occur on its promulgation, would be good for the profession’s advancement. Concerns about duplication in the face of other ethical guidance are unfounded - the code which serves a deterrent role backed by military law. It is expected that unethical acts that are also illegal would be punishable under the DFDA. It is envisaged that a code of ethics would be viewed as a developmental creed, a positive and continuing inducement for the officer to internalise professional values. The question of values gives rise to the argument that due to each ethical decision being different, a code of ethics is of little utility.

Though it is undoubtedly true that each ethical problem is distinctive in character, a small set of core values, goals or ideals will serve together as necessary requirements for deliberation and action. The relevance and application of these core values are worked out in our lives via several forms of deliberation: archetypal cases, analogies, metaphors and precedent. The collection and comprehensive consideration of these kinds of cases allow us to organise our analysis of an issue by drawing distinctions and making generalisations. This characterises the formalist approach to ethical decision making. A code of ethics will not be comprehensive enough to cover all cases, but it will establish a framework for charting an ethical course.

Thus it can be seen that adopting a formal code of ethics for Army Officers will allow development of an eclectic approach to ethical issues. In the final analysis, like many ethical questions, none of these arguments will be unequivocal in determining whether the need for a professional code of ethics for Army officers is needed. The unitary organisational cultural approach assumes that good ethics will flow from institutionalising ethical conduct through organisational guidelines. The sub-cultural model places emphasis on processes of ethical reasoning as the source of the sound test of ethics. Though the sub-cultural approach is said to be superior, it is not clear how this model would be implemented within a clearly unitary culture without following the path of cultural change, a difficult and in some circles discredited quest. What does seem clear however, is that the introspective process of ethical soul searching involved in developing a code, and the subsequent exposure to external scrutiny that would occur on its promulgation, would be good for the profession’s advancement. Concerns about duplication in the face of other ethical guidance are unfounded - the code which serves a deterrent role backed by military law.
thoughtfully generated process for the developing of a code would engender "ownership" by the profession, and ensure a commitment to following the spirit as well as the letter of the code.

NOTES
17. ibid., p.131.
19. See Deal, T., and Kennedy, A., Corporate Cultures, Addison-Wesley, USA, 1982.; Drucker, P., "Don't Change Corporate Culture – Use it!", Wall Street Journal, 17 April 1991. The conditions where it is said to be applicable to attempt to change organisational culture are that if you have little choice, lots of resources and lots of time — a combination so rare that it is arguably a waste of time.
21. ibid., p.131.
22. ibid., p.131.
23. ibid., p.131.
25. ibid., p.131.
On 1 March 1901, the military and naval forces of the former Australian colonies were transferred to the Commonwealth. Although this date is celebrated as the Army's birthday, it wasn't until the Defence Act was proclaimed three years later that the Army had the legal machinery to operate.

The events of the period between the Commonwealth takeover of the Army in 1901 and the proclamation of the Defence Act in 1904 were to play an important part in shaping organisation and administration of the Australian Army and they reflected the concerns of the society from which it derived. There was a dichotomy of feeling in the community in respect of the Empire. On the one hand there were those who believed that rational strategic thinking required that there should be a single Imperial command to which the Australian Army should be subordinated. On the other hand there was a feeling of new nationalism and sensitivity over Australian sovereignty that demanded that the Australian Army be raised for national defence only and should not be deployed overseas for Imperial purposes. Control over the disposition of its troops should be the prerogative of the Australian Government. Nevertheless, this nationalism did not necessarily supplant the feeling of being part of a great Empire and that Australians should be free to contribute to its defence should they so desire. Therefore, provision had to be made to enable volunteer forces to be raised for Imperial purposes.

The Defence Act, the legislative response to these strands of public opinion, was to play an important part in determining the manner in which Australian forces were to be raised and committed to war service for many years. In the case of the First and Second World Wars and, to an extent, Korea, as well as providing an Australian component for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in postwar Japan, it was specially raised volunteer forces that were initially sent overseas. However, there were other more profound consequences of the legislation for Australian history and Australian society that would have surprised those who framed it. Under the provisions of Section 69 of the Constitution Act "on a date or dates to be proclaimed by the Governor General" the defence functions of the States were transferred to the Commonwealth. Consequently, on 1 March 1901, the military and naval forces of the former colonies were formally transferred to the Commonwealth.

National in name only, the Army continued to be administered by six sets of Colonial legislation. There was little uniformity in organisation and no rational force structure. For example, the Queensland, South Australian and Western Australian forces had no service corps elements; only New South Wales had ordnance and medical departments organised as military units (Mordike, 66-69). The contingents of horse raised in 1902 for the Boer War as the Australian Commonwealth Horse were raised on a state basis (Field 147-148). The permanent artilleries of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland were amalgamated into the Royal Australian Artillery in 1899 (thus forming the first federal institution), but the militia units were not included (Cubis, 71).

The Minister for Defence, Sir John Forrest, had presumed that the arrangements then in force could continue, but he was soon disabused of this when it was pointed out that these arrangements had no legal basis (Coulthard-Clark, 123). However, the legislative process was to be drawn out and acrimonious. This is not surprising considering the political environment in which the debate took place.

Concerned at the cost of Imperial defence, the United Kingdom was looking to contributions of men and money from the Dominions (Meane, 40). There was strong support for the British position in many sectors of local opinion. This was reflected in the set of proposals for Australia's defence forces by the Federal Military Committee, the body on which Forrest relied for advice in the initial drafting of the Defence Bill.

This Committee, composed of the state commanders, proposed:

- the establishment of a field force which would be available for Imperial military operations, offensive as well as defensive, beyond Australian shores;
- that the military commander be directly responsible to the Governor General rather than the Minister;
- that the office of Commander in Chief be held by an Imperial officer and the office of District Commandant be held by an Imperial or Commonwealth Permanent Service officer (Mordike, 72-75).
The Imperial views of the State commandants were generally reflections of those held by their Governments. (Field, 146).

In contrast to the Imperial school of thought there was a strong nationalist body of opinion in the community. It derived from a number of differing attitudes, but all were opposed to the establishment of a large permanent military force and to Australian troops being subordinated to Imperial control.

Large sections of the community were suspicious of the military. In the previous decade the colonial forces had been employed against organised labour on a number of occasions (Robson 315-316).

Others were disillusioned by certain events in the Boer War which had added jarring notes to the fanfare of support sounded for Britain in 1899. While there had been moments of glory, by 1901-1902 Australian soldiers were largely employed in disposing and interning Boer farming families. Ironically, the Boer way of life was one to which the Australian soldiers could relate more than that of their British allies. The execution of Morant and Handcock by the British Army without reference to the Australian authorities left a bitter taste (Field 173-174). Acts of indiscipline committed by Australian soldiers also helped bring the military into disrepute (Field, 177). The raising and dispatch to South Africa of the Australian Commonwealth Horse in 1902 demonstrated the ambivalence of public opinion concerning Imperial commitments. (Field, 149-151).

In Parliament, the Protectionist member H.B. Higgins represented a school of thought which believed that militarism was a European phenomenon best abjured by the new nation, while the Liberal member W.M. Hughes, called for a citizen force based on regular compulsory training. (Meaney, 43-48). The 1901 Manifesto of the Liberal Party stated that it would “not sanction the expenditure of public funds in the maintenance of large bodies of professional soldiers”.

The fiscal aspects were also important. While the cost of Imperial defence was regarded with alarm by the British Government, defence was a drain on the Australian treasury also, especially as the Commonwealth, for the first ten years of its existence, was obliged to remit to the States 75 per cent of customs and excise revenue, its main source of funds. (Meaney, 42). Some saw Federation as an opportunity to rationalise the colonial forces to reduce expenditure (Grey, 67). The supremacy of the British Navy was seen as the chief guarantee of Australia’s security.

Forrest himself, although by no means personally anti-Imperialist, and “keen to assist Australians to go to war as volunteers”, was determined as Minister for Defence that political control of the military would be held by the Commonwealth Government. It was undesirable to compel “Australian conscripts” to serve on Imperial operations. (Mordike, 78). He rejected the proposals of the Federal Military Committee (the proposal concerning the Governor General’s control of the forces was constitutionally invalid). When he refused to reconsider his rejection the commandants withdrew support from the Defence Bill. (Mordike, 75).

The Bill was first introduced into the House of Representatives by Forrest on 9 July 1901. It reflected the need to reconcile the view that Australian troops should only be used for national defence purposes with the fact that volunteer forces were involved in operations in China and South Africa.

The debate over the Bill ranged across the whole spectrum of opinion. While there was a considerable body in favour of contributing to Imperial defence, this was to be on a voluntary basis, with forces to be raised only after the outbreak of war. For although it did not go as far as the Federal Military Committee had wished, there was provision in the Bill for the mobilisation of forces in a “sudden emergency”. Labor members believed this term to be inexact while Higgins raised the possibility that “emergency” could be interpreted as “any emergency which the British Government think a national emergency”, putting an obligation on Australian troops to serve overseas.

The general tenor of the debate favoured the creation of a citizen force with a small permanent professional cadre for national defence only. (Mordike, 82-83). It became obvious that the Bill drafted was far too ambiguous and beyond simple amendment. Forrest’s sponsorship of the legislation was dogged by his poor health, lack of motivation and absence to attend his brother’s funeral in Western Australia. (Mordike, 68, 78). Consequently, it was withdrawn for redrafting.

If supporters of the Imperial case had received a setback on the first presentation of the Defence Bill and the rejection of the scheme of defence proposed by the Federal Military Committee, they were soon to have their cause revived. The Government had recruited a British Army officer to act as the Australian Army’s General Officer Commanding in Chief. The failure of the Federal Military Committee to provide an acceptable scheme effectively meant that this officer would be the chief adviser to the Government on Australia’s military defence.

The officer chosen was Major General Sir Edward Hutton, who had previously commanded the forces of the colony of New South Wales and those of the Canadian Government. However, given Forrest’s concerns that Australia should control its Army,
Hutton was a poor choice for the appointment. He was a firm believer in the Dominions providing a reserve of troops for Imperial purposes and arrived in Australia with the intention of organising Australia’s defences so that a reserve of 20,000 mounted men would be created. This intention he had discussed with the British authorities (Meaney, 60). Hutton also had a record of poor relations with the colonial administrations he had previously served (Grey, 69).

On 7 April 1902, he submitted his scheme of defence to the Australian Government. He proposed that the military forces be divided into two separate organisations – a garrison force of 16,000 and a field force of 14,000, expanding to 29,000 in wartime. The field force was to be “capable of undertaking active operations either in Australia or in any part of the world in which it may be desired by Australia to employ it” (Greenwood and Grimshaw, 219). Hutton displayed a certain deviousness, never actually explaining his agenda but leaving the Government to draw its own inferences. He maintained that the field force was intended to defend the White Australia policy or operate against foreign powers in the islands to the north (Coulthard-Clark, 125).

Additionally, the term “garrison force” was something of a misnomer as it had a capability for field operations built into its organisation including as it did mounted infantry and cavalry units. There was no provision for any force level higher than a brigade and the brigades had their subordinate units scattered around the country, making realistic training as a unified force practically impossible. (Mordike, 104). In effect, Hutton’s scheme created a highly impractical local defence force but one that would provide a valuable reinforcement for Imperial forces. This was actually admitted to the Australian Government by the Colonial Defence Committee, completely undermining Hutton.

The implications of Imperial control were not lost on the public at large and were the subject of adverse comment in sections of the press (Greenwood and Grimshaw, 221-222). When the Defence Bill was reintroduced into the Parliament it was apparent that Hutton’s deviousness had come to nought. The section authorising the government to send its forces “to any part of the world in which it may be desired... to employ it” had been excised and service beyond the limits of the Commonwealth was not required unless voluntary.

The Bill was passed in October 1903 and proclaimed on 1 March 1904. The Army at last had the legal machinery to operate. Following proclamation, military regulations and financial instructions were published and all officers placed on a single promotions list. Importantly, and against Hutton’s advice, the Bill vested control of the Army in a Military Board. Hutton, who apart from his attempts to create an Imperial Reserve against the wishes of the Government, had also displayed arrogance and a lack of tact and scruples in his dealings with it. This was to influence the Australian Government by making it very wary of having a single source of advice for the Minister (Mordike, 151). The Military Board was an administrative arrangement which, except for a period during World War II, was to last for 70 years.

The Australian Government’s resolve to retain control of the Army was a forerunner of future struggles against British endeavours to institute a single command to which the Empire’s forces would be subordinated. These were to involve not just the Army but the Navy for many years to come.

The decision to limit overseas operations to only specially raised volunteers was to have important consequences which could not be foreseen in 1904. Firstly, it was to lead to a “two army” situation with continuing tensions between the specially raised volunteer forces and the militia. A particularly sorry example of these tensions was the discouragement of militia officers enlisting in the 2nd AIF in 1939. More importantly, the arrangement was to have far-reaching effects on the course of Australian history and the development of Australian society. Hughes’ attempts to obtain public approval to change the Defence Act and introduce conscription for overseas service during the First World War caused deep divisions in the Government, the Labor Party and Australian society which have echoes today.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Joint Operation.
Command of Australian Joint Force Operations

By Group Captain Gary Waters, RAAF and Chris Mills, Air Power Studies Centre

Introduction

Recent conflict has shown that skilfully directed air power is a critical factor in winning a war, and is especially important when one operational requirement may be to minimise allied casualties. Key characteristics of air power such as mobility, flexibility, and ability to concentrate force in a short time are a good match to the Australian environment where long distances, small force size, and no discernible threat make defence of the nation a complex task.

Command arrangements for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) are currently being refined in light of joint force operations. This will likely see the position of Commander, Joint Forces Australia (CJFA) manned permanently. CJFA will interact with the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services who will support operational forces in peacetime and war, including preparing forces for operations.

Notwithstanding the progress that has been made, there is still much to be determined. This article presents a command arrangement that aims to maximise the combat power of the ADF and make the most efficient and effective use of the limited air power available.

The Proposed Command Structure

Figure 1 presents the command structure in diagrammatic form.

An Issue: Optimising a Command Structure for Three Operating Environments

The ADF operates in three environments: maritime, land and air. Weapon systems optimised for those environments are quite different, and each system brings with it its own imperatives in the way that system is directed. The issue then is to construct a command system that, while not necessarily being optimised for any one environment, will coordinate synergistically the combat power of the ADF across all three environments.

In Australia's maritime arena, capital ships provide a visible presence and offer good on-station endurance; however, they are costly and hence there are few in the ADF. Within each ship, especially the larger, many lives are at stake. Missions are long and slow relative to those in the air environment. A single ship can produce substantial firepower, but surface ships are vulnerable to modern anti-shipping weapons: a large, metal, warm object on a cool sea is easily detected and attacked. Submarines overcome this problem to some extent, but have other limitations in terms of mobility and firepower.

In the Australian land arena, individual Army combat elements are relatively low cost, but there are many such elements in the fighting force. The speed of movement of an army is slower than for ships while the combined firepower is very high. A large force on the ground is difficult to conceal and may be attacked, although dispersal makes it difficult to deal a crippling blow with conventional weapons. Land forces can stay in an area for extended periods of months or even years, provided the necessary logistic support is forthcoming.

Air environment weapons have different characteristics again, and few lives are at stake in any one aircraft. Speed of movement is orders of magnitude faster while endurance is measured in minutes or hours, rather than weeks or months. The firepower of an individual aircraft is comparable to a ship but cannot be sustained on a single mission. However, the speed of an aircraft allows more rapid response and repetition to produce an eventual effect. Aircraft are vulnerable to surface-to-air, as well as air-to-air weapons. In addition, the necessity of operating from large, fixed bases makes aircraft and their logistic support systems vulnerable to counter attack from both the air and the ground.

A command structure should seek to take advantage of the strengths of each of the component forces, while mitigating the effects of limitations. In the case of air power, this means building organisational structures that enhance the value of an aircraft's speed, flexibility and firepower. At the same time, we must reduce the vulnerability of the aircraft themselves (through effective self-protection systems) and the vulnerability of the support bases and infrastructure associated with their operations.
A COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOINT FORCE OPERATIONS

Functions of the Levels of Command

Modern organisation design is based on the principle that an abstract objective will be disaggregated into increasingly tangible tasks as the hierarchy of the organisation is traversed. The current trend is to have as few levels as possible in the hierarchy to promote clear and rapid communication, responsive action and to maximise the value added at each level.

There are four levels of command presented at Figure 1:
- national strategy;
- military strategy;
- operational command; and
- tactical command.

National Strategy. The decision to commit Australia to a conflict would be made by the Prime Minister and Security Committee of Cabinet, with military advice being provided by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF).

Military Strategy. CDF is responsible for military strategy. He would take direction from the Prime Minister through the Minister for Defence. Commander, Joint Forces Australia (CJFA) would probably by appointed by CDF, who would also assign forces to CJFA. CDF would set the strategy for the conflict, receiving operational advice from CJFA and support advice from the Chiefs of Staff through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).

Operational Command. CJFA would command operations. Under his command would be the ‘environmental commands’ of the ADF commanded by Maritime Commander Australia (MCAust), Land Commander Australia (LCAust) and Air Commander Australia (ACAust). He may also have designated one or more Joint Force Commanders (JFCs). Note, the environmental commanders are also referred to as Joint Commanders, a title not to be confused with JFC. Ideally, the environmental headquarters (Maritime Headquarters (MHQ), Land Headquarters (LHQ), Air Headquarters (AHQ)) would be collocated to form CJFA’s headquarters. CDF would seek from government the desired ‘end-state’ to be achieved and rules of engagement, and would pass these to CJFA. This would be CJFA’s starting point in developing his broad concept of operations and recommending appropriate force

Figure 1
levels. After approval from CDF, CJFA would produce his specific joint campaign plan.

**Tactical Command.** The JFCs would command fielded forces operating within defined areas of operation (AOs). Tactical units would be assigned to the JFC. Within the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) there could be either an integrated or component command structure, with size and function being the primary determinants — the larger the size of the Joint Force and the more spread of the missions between maritime, land and air environments, the more likely they would be managed using the component method. Forces not assigned to JFCs also have a tactical role. These forces would remain under the command of the environmental commanders as in the peacetime situation, and would likely operate from outside specific AOs.

### Operation of the Command Structure

CDF, having received instructions from the Prime Minister or the Minister for Defence, would provide CJFA with orders for the conduct of the war. These orders would be carefully written to ensure that operations are conducted within the ambit of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) so that in the inevitable post-conflict analysis, there is an objective basis on which to judge the wartime actions of commanders.

CJFA would interpret these orders and execute them through the command structure with orders issued through that structure. At the CJFA Headquarters (CJFAHQ), the combat power of the ADF will be maximised by collocating CJFA's staff and the staff of the three environmental headquarters: MHQ, LHQ, and AHQ.

One reason for this is based on the way air combat power is most effectively committed to combat. Aircraft such as the P-3, the F-111, the F/A-18 and C-130 all have the range to cover much of continental Australia on a single mission. For tactical reasons, CDF could appoint several JFCs to command fielded forces in different AOs. Long range combat aircraft will in all probability be based outside these AOs and may occasionally operate in more than one AO during a single mission.

The volume of tasking activity for ADF Units positioned outside the designated AO(s) is likely to be much higher for air Units than for land Units. Land forces by their nature are normally positioned within an AO and are given relatively general orders through a fielded commander.

Aircraft, by contrast, are usually given specific orders regarding the mission, including targets, times, weapons, ingress and egress routes etc. This specificity is especially important for strike aircraft that must operate safely in close contact with friendly forces where close coordination is required to allow the organic anti-air elements of the maritime and land forces to operate effectively, and at the same time allow friendly air power to enter the AO safely, deliver ordnance and leave within the endurance capability of the aircraft.

In some command models, CJFA is positioned at the military strategic level and the JFC(s) at the operational planning level. Such a structure begs the question of the function of CDF in the command chain. In the model presented in this article, CDF operates at the military strategic level, CJFA at the operational level, and JFC(s) and Force Element Group (FEG) commanders at the tactical level. Given the area of Australia and its territorial waters, such a model allows a good match between the geographic imperatives and the size of the ADF.

With CDF involved with military strategy and the JFC(s) and FEG commanders involved with tactics, the clear role for CJFA is at the operational level. Through collocation of the environmental headquarters, CJFA can closely coordinate the activities of all operational forces including those outside designated AOs (under the FEG commanders) and those in AOs under the command of one or more JFCs.

The diagram at Figure 1 shows how elements of the ADF are drawn together at the operational level under CJFA. The environmental commanders (working at the operational level with CJFA) maintain control of their relevant Force Element Groups which operate at the tactical level. In some circumstances CJFA may create a separate JFC with specific objectives and assigned forces, also to operate at the tactical level.

In some structures, (that used by the United States for example), a 'Joint Targeting Coordination Board' is created at the operational planning level. When the environmental commands are collocated as suggested here, CJFA can work directly with the environmental commanders to provide the necessary assessment of target priority and the subsequent coordination of the operations of forces within an AO and forces entering the AO for specific missions. Thus, the need for a JTCB tends to be superfluous in a collocated operational-level headquarters.

To coordinate the forces under the command of JFC(s) and the forces remaining under the command of the environmental commanders (eg ACAust), it is suggested that CJFA issue 'Operational Tasking...
Directives (OTDs)' to those forces under his command. These OTDs could be issued on a regular cycle, say 24 hours, or on an ad-hoc basis determined by the tempo and outcomes of the conflict. These OTDs should be of the style of mission control orders only.

With modern communications, tasking deliberations for (say) aircraft can be completed by the AHQ staff and orders issued by ACAust as an Air Tasking Directive (ATD) dispatched from the AFQ collocated with the CJFAHQ. Specific Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) could be determined at the Wing Headquarters. Where necessary, i.e. due to large numbers of aircraft, it may be prudent to issue the ATO from AHQ. Bear in mind that AHQ staff would be acting as component staff of the CJFAHQ, and ACAust would be the Air Component Commander.

Support for the War Effort

While consideration of support requirements is not the main thrust of this article, there, nevertheless, needs to be some consideration of support requirements, as the longer a campaign runs, the more important sustainability becomes.

The progressive implementation of the operational command chain: CDF-CJFA-(MCAust – LCAust – ACAust) has changed the function of the Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs now have the peacetime role to 'raise, train and equip' the standing forces of the ADF. In wartime, an additional role would be added: to sustain the rate of effort. Given the long distances and often difficult terrain in Australia, this latter task becomes especially important.

CDF can obtain logistic support (defined as all the functions: raise, train, equip and sustain), from the non-combat elements of the ADF through the Chiefs of Staff.

In peacetime, the Chiefs of Staff provide CDF with information on raising, training, and equipping each of the services. In wartime, CDF would expect the Chiefs of Staff to ensure that sustainability requirements of combat operations were met. Ideally, CJFA could attend an expanded COSC meeting to provide input on operational priorities. Once the realistic sustainability levels that could be maintained had been identified, CJFA would take account of this during his operational planning. Conversely, operational exigencies can define sustainability priorities. Using the COSC for this function provides the mechanism to coordinate all aspects of the CDF Preparedness Directive, including CJFA’s responsibility for the conduct of operations and the Chiefs of Staff’s responsibility for readiness and sustainability.

Communications

First class communications are essential to the conduct of combat operations of the ADF, regardless of the command structure. With a small standing force, maximum potential will only be realised provided all those in the chain of command are clear about the actual situation and what is required of them.

Communications must support three activity phases: evaluation, planning and execution. A commander first evaluates the situation, draws up a plan of action, then executes the plan.

Execution of the plan has consequences that must be evaluated, another plan made and executed. Thus, these phases are connected in a continuous cycle, with the outcome from one cycle becoming the input to the next. The cycle ends when the war is won or lost, or the political objective is achieved.

In any command structure, communications are a network of electronic and human channels. The most effective communications come from face-to-face human contact, and the advantage of this characteristic is taken by collocating the components in the most critical element of the structure: operational command where CJFA interacts directly with MCAust, LCAust and ACAust.

Electronic communications are used when the content is either well defined or when force elements are inevitably separated geographically. In the case of aircraft operations, individual missions can be described accurately in documents such as ATDs and ATOs. In the model proposed in this article, JFCs are at the tactical level and have fielded forces and fielded headquarters that through operational necessity will be mobile. Thus, the coordinating OTDs from CJFA would have to be transmitted to the JFCs using electronic means. ATDs or ATOs from ACAust would be transmitted by similar means to wing headquarters.

Conclusion

The command structure for ADF Joint Force Operations must be crafted to take account of several design criteria.
A small force requires close coordination to realise its potential. The position of CJFA as the operational commander allows the ADF combat elements to operate in a highly coordinated way, promoting effectiveness through the concentration of effort and efficiency by eliminating duplication of administrative and combat support tasks.

Two possibilities need to be considered. First, large-scale operations that would involve all three environmental headquarters; and second, more limited operations that may be restricted to a discrete Area of Operations (AO), and hence be conducted by a designated JFC.

For the former, the appointment of a CJFA, operating within a Headquarters in which the environmental commanders were collocated provides the optimum solution. That is, such a structure provides a focus at the operational level, whereby all tactical activities can be directed and coordinated as necessary. These tactical activities could occur across a wide geographic area; hence the characteristics of air power mentioned earlier would be optimised for responsive and flexible use as necessary.

However, in a discrete area, such as a single AO, such a structure could be unnecessarily cumbersome and inflexible. Hence, the model proposed in this article provides for certain flexibility of a JFC appointed to command tactical operations within a single AO.

This raises the issue of component versus unified command. The principle should be that for large forces, component command is preferred for organisational reasons; the task of operational command can be divided into manageable elements. Thus, at the operational level, CJFA is supported by a component structure, where he would expect to have responsibility for all operational elements of the ADF. For smaller forces such as a fielded tactical force, unified command may be a more appropriate structure. However, should a large joint force be formed for operational reasons, the JFC may choose to implement a component structure within his JFHQ.

Logistic support is an often overlooked aspect of command arrangements. With the roles of the Chiefs of Staff to 'raise, train and equip' their forces comes the opportunity to define a command structure that effectively manages sustainability in war. Operating through COSC, CDF can balance support and combat operations. CJFA would join COSC to provide an input on operational priorities. The Chiefs of Staff would, in addition to their peacetime roles, be responsible for providing the wherewithal to sustain combat operations.

Finally, the issue of communications is addressed. The power of face-to-face communications is recognised by the collocation of the three headquarters of MCAust, LCAust and ACAust to form CJFAHQ, which would allow the commanders to meet and conduct the war in the most effective way. When the content of communications is either mechanical or the location remote, electronic communications can be used.

Group Captain Gary Waters has been Director of the Air Power Studies Centre since January 1993. He has written extensively on air power and wider defence issues, and is a regular contributor to the Australian Defence Force Journal. Chris Mills is the General Manager of the Canberra Club. Formerly an RAAF fighter pilot, Chris worked at the Air Power Studies Centre in 1994 as a Wing Commander on the Reserve. This article is a product of his time at the APCS.
Australia in the War of 1939-45

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II and the theme for this commemorative year is ‘Australia Remembers’. This is the second in a series which deals with Australia’s involvement in the war.

Empire Air Training Scheme

The Empire Air Training Scheme, in which Australia provided aircrew and helped train them for the Royal Air Force, operated throughout the war. Some 27,000 Australians served with the RAF under this scheme. Ten thousand did their initial training in Australia before leaving for further training in Canada. A small number went to Rhodesia for training. Most though, completed their training in Australia before coming under RAF orders.

These Australians served in RAAF uniforms. Seventeen RAAF squadrons, numbered from 450 to 467, were formed although these were never solely manned by Australians. Australian airmen were also spread throughout the more than RAF 500 squadrons. At some stage, practically every RAF combat unit contained one or more Australians.

The citation for the posthumous Victoria Cross to RAAF Flight-Sergeant Rawdon Middleton, attached to No. 149 Squadron RAF, reads “His devotion to duty in the face of overwhelming odds is unsurpassed in the annals of the Royal Air Force”.

Other Australians to serve under RAF command were airmen of RAAF No. 10 Sunderland Squadron which was in Britain at the outbreak of war and remained to serve in Coastal Command. Regular RAAF No. 3 Fighter Squadron served in the Middle East and Italy. Other Australians, such as Wing Commander Hughie Edwards VC had been trained by the RAAF before joining the RAF prior to the outbreak of war.

In the European and Middle East theatres, some 6,532 Australian airmen lost their lives, the highest numbers being from Bomber Command. A further 1,360 were injured. Some 1,451 members of the RAAF were reported as missing, prisoners or interned but later returned safely after the conclusion of hostilities.

Loss of HMAS Canberra at Savo Island

HMAS Canberra supported the US Marine landings at Guadalcanal and Tulaga on 7 August 1942 and withstood intense air attacks in the next 36 hours. On the night of 8/9 August a Japanese cruiser force passed undetected through a picket line and attacked the Canberra and a number of US cruisers. Canberra was heavily damaged and lost 78 officers and men including her commanding officer, CAPT. F E Getting. As well as the Canberra, three US cruisers were lost in the same action.

Milne Bay

A Japanese force landed at Milne Bay on the night of 25/26 August 1942. Milne Bay was defended by the 7th Militia Brigade and the 18th AIF Brigade under the command of MAJ GEN C A Clowes. Both Militia and AIF battalions saw fierce fighting and drove the Japanese forces back along the northern coast where the main Japanese forces managed to re-embark on 6 September. Numbers 75 and 76 Squadrons of the RAAF, flying P40 Kittyhawks based at Milne Bay, whose airstrip was the main Japanese target, provided air support throughout the operation. The action at Milne Bay was the first allied success against Japanese land forces in World War II.

Leyte Gulf

On the morning of 20 October 1944 American troops landed on Leyte in the Philippines. The RAN provided eight of the 600 ships that converged on Leyte including the cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire. Australia was damaged on 21 October when a Kamikaze attack hit the ship killing its commanding officer, Captain E F V Dechaineux and 29 others. Shropshire was the sole non-American cruiser at the Battle of Surigao Strait on 25 October 1944. This battle saw the crippling of the main Japanese surface fleet. Royal Australian Air Force squadrons played an integral role in the Leyte operation preventing Japanese air reinforcements moving north into the battle area. The only Australian land unit involved in the Philippines was No. 3 Airfield Construction Squadron which landed at Mindoro on 15 December 1944. Australia was repaired and back in action in the Philippines in early 1945 but was hit four more times by Kamikaze aircraft killing 44 crew and wounding many others. Shropshire with HMA ships Hobart, Bataan and Warramunga were in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 to witness the Japanese surrender.
Australia Under Attack

Darwin 1942

On 19 February 1942, four of the six Japanese carriers that bombed Pearl Harbor launched another surprise attack. Japanese planes were launched against Darwin whose harbour was full of ships. Eight ships were sunk, two were beached and later refloated and many of the other 35 ships in the harbour were damaged by bomb or machine-gun fire. Darwin town and the RAAF aerodrome were also heavily damaged by the raid. Darwin would have been without any air defence except that ten Kittyhawks of the US 33rd Pursuit Squadron en route to Java had turned back to Darwin. Nine of the ten Kittyhawks were destroyed but one pilot stayed in the air during the raid and was able to shoot down two Japanese planes. A second raid of 54 bombers two hours later on the same day met no resistance in the air. Anti-aircraft guns that day destroyed four Japanese aircraft and probably destroyed another four. The raids on 19 February were the first two of 64 raids against the Darwin area and its nearby airfields which bore the brunt of Japanese attacks on mainland Australia. Darwin remained without air defence until the arrival, on 17 March, of the United States 49th Fighter Group flying Kittyhawks. The 49th Fighter Group achieved its first Darwin victory during the Japanese raid of 22 March 1942 in what was the first successful radar-controlled interception in Australia. In July the Japanese switched to night raids but resumed daylight attacks on 23 August. A large Japanese force was intercepted by 18 Kittyhawks which achieved their greatest success in bringing down 15 Japanese aircraft without loss. This was to be the last fight of the US 49th Fighter Group in the Darwin area which in five months destroyed 72 Japanese aircraft for the loss of 17 Kittyhawks. Australian Kittyhawks moved to Darwin to replace the US Kittyhawks. In August, No.77 Squadron RAAF arrived in the area and was followed by No.76 Squadron RAAF in October. The Japanese changed tactics after the heavy losses in August and abandoned large daylight raids for six months.

Townsville

In late July 1942, three nuisance raids were made against Townsville which was by then the most important air base in Australia. Three Kawanisi flying boats dropped bombs into the harbour on the night of 25/26 July and one flying boat returned on the nights of 27/28 and 28/29 July. Further bombs were dropped on both occasions but caused no damage. Several American Airacobras attempted interceptions on the latter two occasions and probably hit the flying boat on the second occasion without causing any serious damage. A final raid took place on the Australian east coast on the night of 30 July when a single bomb was dropped near a house at Cairns, injuring a child.

Darwin 1943-1944

In January 1943, No. 1 Fighter Wing, RAF moved to the Darwin area with three Spitfire squadrons, No. 54 RAF at Darwin, No. 452 RAAF at Strauss and No. 457 RAAF at Livingstone. The Spitfires had their first major clashes with the Japanese on 2 and 15 March 1943. On 2 May 1943, the Japanese again attacked with a force of 20 bombers and 20 Zeros. Spitfires intercepted the Japanese and shot down six aircraft and probably destroyed four more as well as damaging eight others. Five Spitfires were shot down and two pilots killed. However eight Spitfires were forced to land through engine failure or shortage of fuel, although six of these aircraft were later recov-

Broome

Broome suffered Australia's second worst air raid on 3 March when 70 people were killed and 24 aircraft including 16 flying boats were destroyed. Simultaneous to the raid on Broome, eight Japanese fighters hit Wyndham setting a petrol dump on fire, destroying an aircraft on the ground and sinking a steamer. Broome was again hit on 20 March, the same day that Derby suffered its only raid. Wyndham was hit again on 23 March. While moving to Darwin, the US 49th Fighter Group staged through Horn Island. When the Japanese hit that island on 14 March the Americans intercepted the Japanese force of 17 bombers and fighters and shot down four Zeros and one bomber for the loss of one Kittyhawk. Additional raids against Horn Island met no air resistance but ceased in August 1942 except for one bomber which jettisoned its bombs over the island on 28 June 1943.
erred. The Japanese returned to Darwin in strength on 20 June 1943. The Spitfires intercepted the formation of 21 bombers and 21 fighters, shooting down nine bombers and five fighters. Two Spitfire pilots were shot down and killed. This was the most successful encounter by the RAAF over Darwin, during which Group Captain Caldwell, an ace from the European theatre, shot down his fifth Japanese aircraft. The last raid in strength against Darwin was on 6 July although smaller raids continued until the early morning 12 November 1943 when with the help of searchlights two bombers were shot down by Spitfires. Japanese reconnaissance aircraft continued to fly over the Darwin area with the last Japanese aircraft destroyed in the area on 25 June 1944.

Two RAAF Hudson squadrons, Nos. 2 and 13 which flew operations against Japanese-held airfields, shipping and islands to the north of Darwin, were the first Australian units to receive the US Presidential Unit Citation.

**Australian Waters**

The first attack on Darwin signalled the start of nearly 17 months of air attacks against Northern Australia. However, the battle to control the sealanes around the Australian coastline continued throughout the war. Less than three months after war had been declared the war at sea came near Australian waters when a small British tanker was sunk in the Indian Ocean by the German pocket battleship, *Admiral Graf Spee*. Throughout the years 1939 to 1945, ships in Australian waters were on guard against attack from mines, surface raiders, submarines and aircraft. During 1940, four German armed merchant cruisers or surface raiders were operating in or near Australian waters. In June 1940, mines laid by the raider *Orion* sank a ship near Auckland. Two months later the *Orion* shelled and sank two further ships; one from Newcastle bound for New Caledonia and a second from Sydney that was nearing New Zealand waters. From the Tasman Sea, the *Orion* sailed to the Indian Ocean in September 1940 where it laid dummy mines near Albany WA before retreating its steps to meet with a German supply ship in mid-Pacific in October.

The first sinkings in Australian waters occurred in November from mines laid by the *Pinguin* and the *Storstad*, a captured Norwegian tanker. They laid minefields between Sydney and Newcastle, in Bass Strait, off Hobart and in the Spencer Gulf. Both ships returned to the Indian Ocean and on 20 and 21 November sank by gunfire two ships 800 miles west of Fremantle. The *Pinguin*, *Storstad* and *Orion* laid 234 mines in Australian waters which sank three ships and damaged a fourth in the last two months of 1940 killing nine seamen. Casualties from mines in Australian waters in 1941 were fortunately few with only one trawler being lost. The *Millimunal* sank with the loss of seven crew in March 1941 after hitting a mine that had been laid five months before by the *Pinguin*. On 14 July two ratings from a Rendering Mines Safe party were killed by a mine that had been laid in Spencer Gulf and had washed up onto a beach at Beachport, South Australia.

**HMAS Sydney**

The German raider *Kormoran* had entered the Indian Ocean in May 1941 and in the following six months sank eight merchant ships, although none were in Australian waters. At 4 pm on 19 November 1941, HMAS *Sydney*, returning to Fremantle from Java, sighted the *Kormoran* about 200 miles west of Carnarvon, Western Australia. For 90 minutes the *Kormoran* tried to pass itself off as a Dutch vessel but when all chance of deception evaporated, opened fire on HMAS *Sydney* with guns and torpedoes. The action lasted 30 minutes with both ships being crippled and set ablaze. Both sank and the entire complement of HMAS *Sydney* was lost.

**Japanese Submarine Attacks**

On 20 January 1942, six weeks after Pearl Harbor, a Japanese submarine *I-124*, specially equipped for mine laying was sunk 60 miles west of Darwin. Less than three months later, a large carrier force was turned back in the Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May). The submarines that accompanied the Japanese fleet in the Coral Sea were ordered to proceed to Truk to equip with midget submarines. On 20 May, an aircraft from Japanese submarine *I-29* carried out an unobserved reconnaissance of Sydney. Ten days later, an aircraft from *I-21* carried out another reconnaissance of Sydney. The following evening, Sunday 31 May, three midget submarines entered Sydney Harbour. The midget submarines were sunk but the depot ship HMAS *Kuttabul* and 19 naval ratings were lost. On 8 June, the *I-29* fired 10 high explosive shells at Sydney's eastern suburbs and *I-21* fired 6 high explosive shells at Newcastle. This was the last enemy action against the Australian mainland from ships.

During the period June to August 1942, seven Japanese submarines operated along the eastern coast of Australia sinking seven ships.

In January 1943, Japanese submarine *I-21* returned to the Australian east coast and sank or damaged five ships in four weeks. From April until June, five
Japanese submarines operated along the Australian eastern coast attacking 15 ships and sinking eight. Among those sunk was the hospital ship Centaur, torpedoed off Brisbane with the loss of 268 lives. On 16 June the Portnar sank with the loss of one crewman in what was the last Japanese sinking along the eastern Australian coast. During 1943, surface raiders and submarines operated in the Indian Ocean, but mainly along the African and Indian coasts. In June 1943, a German raider sank two ships about 1000 miles off the Western Australian coast, outbound from Fremantle and Exmouth. Surface raiders and submarines continued to operate in the Indian Ocean in 1944 to the south of India and into the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

**U-862**

The last sinkings on both the eastern and western coasts of Australia were made by the same German U-boat, U-862. It left Djakarta on 17 November 1944 to operate off the west coast of Australia, but then continued along the south coast through Bass Strait into the Tasman Sea. On 25 December, U-862 sank the Liberty ship Robert J Walker, 100 miles north of Gabo Island and on 6 February 1945, while returning to Djakarta, it sank the motor vessel Peter Silvester. This was the last submarine in Australian waters.

**Cowra**

On Friday, 4 August 1944, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, notice was given of a transfer of all Japanese below the rank of lance corporal from Cowra POW Camp B to Hay POW Camp on Monday, 7 August. At approximately 0150 hours on Saturday 5 August 1944, an unauthorised bugle call was heard in Camp B and immediately thereafter upwards of 900 Prisoners of War rushed with loud shouts from their huts and attacked the fences of their compound. Large parties of them broke through the fence separating their compound from an internal camp road. Before rushing from their huts, the Prisoners of War set fire to them. The Japanese had armed themselves with a large assortment of weapons, including knives, among them more than 1000 mess knives many of which had been specially prepared for use as weapons of offence by being ground down, pointed and sharpened or serrated. One group attacked and killed the two Australian crew of a Vickers gun outside the camp. During the ensuing nine days, 334 escaped Prisoners of War were retaken, of whom 25 were dead. Of these latter 11 were found hanging from trees, two had committed suicide by placing themselves before a railway train, and others bore signs of having been stabbed by the knives carried by the Japanese. In all, 231 Japanese were killed and 108 were wounded. One Australian officer was killed and three Australian other ranks were killed and four wounded. Privates Ben Hardy and Ralph Jones who were killed manning their Vickers machine gun were posthumously awarded the George Cross.
AUSTRALIA'S NAVY 1994-95
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994
178pp, index, 157 photographs and illustrations.
RRP $22.95.

Reviewed by Vic Jeffery, Defence Public Relations

This is the fifth edition of Australia's Navy and is some 50 per cent bigger than the highly successful 1993-94 edition.

Australia's Navy provides a good insight into the RAN's activities over the past year and like the four previous editions, provides a valuable historical record of many of the Navy's operations.

One of the features of this annual is the work of the RAN in our region, highlighting the maritime focus of our international policy in SE Asia and the SW Pacific. The work of the Navy's patrol boats in the region is highlighted and includes an article on HMAS Whyalla's SW Pacific deployment, a special feature on the Pacific Patrol Boat Program now well advanced with 18 boats delivered and the final two due for handover in 1995. A series of articles relating to regional exercise is also included.

The establishment of the new Naval Training Command has drawn a number of interesting feature articles including the challenges of teaching new technology and others detailing a brief history of life at Recruit School, the decommissioning of HMAS Nirimba, the purchase of the decommissioned USS Goldsbrough and the RAN's ropes courses.

As always, exercises and deployments are a large part of Navy life and articles covering RIMPAC 94 in Hawaii, the divers' annual joint Exercise Axolotl with Singapore and the Fleet Concentration Period in February this year give an insight into the activities.

There can be no doubt that the diversity of articles in Australia's Navy is one of its great strengths. The current edition is no exception. The RAN of the future, the new Anzac-class frigates, the Collins-class submarines, Minehunter Coastal Project and the commissioning of HMAS Newcastle are all included in individual articles.

One weakness in the regular segment, Australian Naval Operations which covers RAN activities over the previous 12 months are the events that are not included. Some I consider worthy of inclusion which were left out are:

* 14 June 93 – HMAS Geraldton took 49 survivors and family members to sea for a 50th anniversary Memorial and Wreath-laying Ceremony for the corvette HMAS Wallaroo lost off Fremantle.
* 17 November 93 – Homeporting of the trials and safety ship HMAS Protector at HMAS Stirling.
* 18 December 93 – The guided-missile frigate HMAS Darwin arrived at HMAS Stirling for homeporting.
* 9 January 94 – HMAS Darwin restarted the Whitbread Around The World Yacht Race off Fremantle.
* 2 May 94 – The RAN's new $30M Underwater Tracking Range off the WA coast was accepted into service at HMAS Stirling.
* 3 June 94 – A new $12M Magnetic Treatment Facility was commissioned at HMAS Stirling.

From the history aspect there are several interesting articles. The Royal Australian Navy in the Pacific War and the Navy in South Australia, with a third informative article looking at the history of HMAS Westralia I and II.

Personally I am not convinced that 'inhouse' articles such as 'Senate Committee Looks at Sexual Harassment in the Royal Australian Navy' should be included in the Navy Annual. This subject has been thoroughly examined and whether it warrants inclusion in a commercial publication is debatable.

This Annual has strong and proud links with the Sir David Martin Foundation, donating $1.00 from every copy sold to support this worthy charity providing crisis support and training to street kids.

Available from the Australian Government Bookshop and naval canteens, Australia's Navy 1994-95 is recommended reading.

HEROES HAVE WINGS by Peter Firkins, published in paperback by Hesperian Press, and distributed in W.A., N.T., and Queensland by the Publisher, N.S.W., by R & A Book Agencies, Victoria by K. Price Agencies, retailing at $25. 212 Pages, cover in colour maps and photographs in B & W.

Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant H.S. Brennan, RAAF, Retd.
A well written, chronological history of the role of the RAAF in all theatres during the 1939 – 1945 War.

The author does not provide any details of his personal career in the RAAF during the War, however, from the information sheet provided by the publishers he enlisted at age 17, completed a tour of operations with No. 460 RAAF Heavy Bomber Squadron attached to the RAF, and was commissioned. Peter Firkins has written several other books covering the Australians at war.

This book reveals the depth to which the author went to research his subject as considerable mention is made of fighter pilots as well as bomber crews and the author expresses his opinions on tactics when and where necessary, however the style of writing makes for easy reading and the book is well illustrated both with photographs and maps.

The final chapter of the book gives the author’s opinions on the set up of the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS), and the lack of cooperation between the British Government and the Australian Government at the time and his ideas in hindsight are very close to the truth. Being a member of both the A.I.F. and the RAAF during the War of 1939 – 1945 I can recall the fact that we always seemed to be at the beck and call of the British politicians.

Heroes Have Wings contains a list of RAAF Air ‘Aces’ with their ‘kills’ and subsequent decorations. It is interesting to note that only two out of some 71 pilots did not receive any decoration. A bibliography and comprehensive alphabetical index goes to making a good volume well worth buying and reading.

BURMA: THE TURNING POINT by Ian Lyall Grant. The Seven Battles on the Tiddim Road which Turned the Tide of the Burma War. Zampi Press, West Sussex, 1993.

Reviewed by Major G.T. Watman

‘An officer’s first duty is, and always has been, so to train the private soldiers under his command that they may, without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field.’

The Duke of Wellington

Major General Ian Lyall Grant writes a descriptive account of the seven key battles during the Imphal/Kohima campaign in 1944 that occurred along the Tiddim Road in Central Burma which turned the tide of the Burma War. Grant is well qualified to write, Burma: The Turning Point, having taken part in the Imphal/Kohima campaign himself as a Sapper Officer in the 17th Indian Light Division. This Division took the lead role in the Tiddim Road battles. The book is written to detail the battles on the Tiddim Road because no previous accurate recollection of the battles exists. Moreover, Grant ensures the reader grasps that the seven battles on the Tiddim Road were at the heart of the Japanese defeat in Burma. Whilst reading this book, the reader is overwhelmed by the detail given by Grant, the complexities of the battles and the extent and effect of the casualties on both sides. Many military lessons, such as that detailed by the Duke of Wellington prior to this introduction, are demonstrated (at times this appears unintentional by Grant) and the outstanding commitment and devotion of the British, Indian and Gurkha soldiers is inspiring.

The 17th Indian Light Division suffered a comprehensive defeat at the hands of the Japanese, in particular the Japanese 33rd Infantry Division, early in the war in Burma during 1942 and 1943. Grant explains the difficulties at this time of re-training an entire division in different field techniques and battle tactics to counter those of the Japanese. General Slim, the Commander of the Allied 14th Army in Burma, insisted on this change and it was to prove to be one of the vital decisions that altered the course of the war in Burma. The Japanese failed to realise that the British and Indian troops in 1944, then fully trained, were a very different type of opposition to anything they had previously met.

General Slim had a profound influence on the tactics adopted by his 14th Army in Burma. Not only did he insist on retraining his troops to counter the Japanese tactics, he saw the importance of air supply and the crucial influence it may have over his success. Slim saw that in Burma it was essential and with streamlined ground forces and a growing air force it could be made possible. The Japanese completely underestimated the advantages that air superiority, air movement and air supply would give to the British.

During the first phase of the Imphal/Kohima campaign, the 17th Indian Light Division relied entirely on air support for its daily resupply for 100 days whilst withdrawing along the Tiddim Road under contact with the Japanese. Never had an Army been so utterly dependent on air support. Grant emphasises that the Division would not have been successful in withdrawing intact without this air resupply. Moreover, it was this successful withdrawal that allowed the 17th Indian Light Division to be an effective and decisive fighting force during the subsequent battles on the Tiddim Road.

The failure of the major Japanese offensive in 1944 caused their downfall in Burma and it was the series of savage and decisive battles astride the road.
leading to Imphal from Tiddim which was at the heart of this defeat. Grant demonstrates how the British concentration of forces on the Imphal Plain in the south was a successful tactic in contributing to the defeat of the best Japanese Division, twice; the 33rd Infantry Division. The Japanese were doomed to failure even when first committed to the capture of Imphal. This was due to the over extension of their resupply effort and their underestimation of the British forces which caused them to be out-manoeuvred and out-fought. During the battles which were fought on the Imphal Plain, the Japanese Army Commander, General Mutaguchi, took personal command of this sector due to the importance that the outcome had on the Japanese advance to and capture of Imphal. After three weeks of intensive fighting, the Japanese were defeated and virtually annihilated and Mutaguchi admitted in his diary that the campaign was lost. The Japanese 33rd Infantry Division had suffered approximately 90 per cent casualties and was forced to withdraw along the Tiddim Road leaving the way free for the subsequent victories of General Slim’s Fourteenth Army in 1945.

_**Burma: The Turning Point**_ is written in great detail. Grant describes the strategic situation and, at times, the actions of individual soldiers during their own, equally important battles. Written appreciations by the Corps Commander in the Imphal area, General Scoones, are included as Appendices to the book on two crucial aspects of the campaign. The first appreciation is prior to the Japanese advance which determined that the concentration of forces on the Imphal Plain would ensure success. The second appreciation determines the best course in destroying the Japanese forces around Imphal. These appreciations are typical of the detail provided by Grant. In the text, the titles of all units involved are constantly given including the names of individual commanders and soldiers involved at crucial stages of battles. Grant has provided detailed colour maps of each major battle and 48 graphic, never before published, photographs. The only aspect of the book that is lacking is a more detailed map of Burma and of the Tiddim Road. This would assist the reader to orientate to the campaign strategy of the British and Japanese. Such a map would also assist the reader in absorbing the significant detail, given by Grant throughout the book, regarding places and terrain features.

The descriptions of the battles along the Tiddim Road give a new understanding of the importance of supporting arms, in particular, the Gunners, the Sappers and Armour. However, Grant’s description of the actions of the British, Indian and Gurkha Infantry leave no doubt that the main credit for victory unquestionably lay with them. More than in some other theatres, the war in Burma required a very high degree of skill and toughness from the Infantry. It was the skill and bravery of individual infantrymen both in holding isolated posts against desperate attacks and, even more courageously, working their way forward in the face of withering short range automatic fire, that was the deciding factor for success in many of the battles. Particular credit is also due to the junior officers, from the company commanders down. It was on their courage and leadership that the whole success of the Army depended. They were very valuable and far too many were killed in action. A descriptive example of Grant’s writing relating to individual action from page 135 of the book is as follows:

‘However, on the night of the 12/13 May a neighbouring piquet, called ‘Scrub Ridge’, was lost after the Japanese had shelled it and its Jemadar commander had been badly wounded. Oldham decided it must be retaken and mounted a company counter-attack at first light. Major Hammond and two Gurkha officers were wounded almost at once and the attack stopped. Lieutenant Macleod went forward to get the attack restarted but was killed while doing so. Captain Frankenburk, the Adjutant, went forward and renewed the assault but he too was killed. The very experienced Major Brodrick-Prittard then took over but was killed as he reached the wire and the attack petered out. In this one little action three British officers and six Gurkhas were killed and one British officer, two Gurkha officers and thirty one other ranks wounded.’

This description of a small part of a larger battle is inspiring and demonstrates the commitment and devotion of these soldiers to their fellow soldiers and to the achievement of their mission.

_**Burma: The Turning Point**_ contains a great deal of original material well researched by Grant from both British and Japanese sources which throws a new light on this particular phase of the war against Japan. The exploits of the ‘Forgotten Army’ have been well documented in this book that, for the first time, gives a full and objective account of the seven battles along the Tiddim Road which lay at the heart of success for the British in Burma. Major General Ian Lyall Grant’s own part in the Tiddim Road battles ensures the accuracy of the battle descriptions. He is able to demonstrate the importance of correct training which enabled 17 Division to out fight their old opponents, 33 Division, the best of the Japanese Burma Army. Moreover, the important lessons of war such as air support and the commitment of individual soldiers is amply demonstrated. This book is commended...
reading to those interested in the vital lessons that military history provides at such a great cost in human lives.

**VIETNAM – THE AUSTRALIAN DILEMMA**  
by TERRY BURSTALL

Reviewed by Major M.R. Power, AAANV

Terry Burstall was a former farmhand and builder’s labourer prior to enlisting in the Army at the age of 24. He served for three years which included a tour of Vietnam with the 6th Battalion of The Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR) in 1966/67. During this tour he was involved in the Battle of Long Tan. Burstall’s previous works include *The Soldiers’ Story*, published in 1986 and *A Soldier Returns* published in 1990. He has also produced articles in *Duty First*. There is very little in *Vietnam – The Australian Dilemma* to give the reader an indication of Burstall’s personal involvement and at what level. He advises in the preface that he served as a private and an NCO and I assume that this was in a rifle section. He completed his doctorate at Griffith University in 1991 and now works as a freelance writer and historian.

*Vietnam – The Australian Dilemma* comprises 330 pages with the last 100 pages dedicated to reproduced extracts of reports, maps, numerous notes to each chapter (in excess of 700 total) and the bibliography. One must look at Burstall’s reasons for producing another history on the Vietnam war when so much has already been published. Burstall claims that due to his previous service in Vietnam, he was able to identify “substantial inaccuracies and faulty analyses”. He further states that this gave him “the incentive to test the validity of some of the statements I thought incorrect, and to attempt to ascertain whether the misleading nature of these statements was intentional”.

There is no doubting the division created in Australia by its involvement in Vietnam and the decision to use conscription as a means to boost troops to the conflict. Burstall is not alone in his criticism of the political decisions taken at the time or in contradicting reports from the war. However in the process, Burstall has produced a publication that is difficult to read given the number of notes, and also is written in a very negative manner towards the Australian effort. He has portrayed the Australians at all levels of the political and military structure in a less than favourable light. He has obviously completed an extreme amount of research, given the number of other publications, unit records, official sources and interviews particularly with former Vietcong and Vietnamese civilians.

However, I consider that he will have difficulty in selling his views in light of the contradictions levelled at some of his previous works by commanders on the ground at the time and also by Ian McNeill, an historian with the Official History Unit at the Australian War Memorial. Regardless of the validity of the content, the reader who has a strong sense of pride in the ANZAC spirit will have difficulty in accepting his writings such as his attempt to disprove official records. In reading the book, I felt that he managed to display the Australians (of all ranks) as soldiers who took the easy option, distorted the truth and as being brutal aggressors although I doubt that this was his intention.

Burstall commences by looking at the causes and the course of the war in the early years (1962-65) including Australia’s provision of a Training Team to assist in instructing the South Vietnamese in guerilla warfare. He then examines the commitment of the initial battalion (1RAR) in 1965 and the move from being part of the United States brigade to becoming a self-contained task force in Phuoc Tuy province. He goes on the describe the “resettlement” of the locals and it is in this area that he portrays the Australians’ very poor treatment of the villagers. Burstall continues by questioning many of the claims of success made by the Australians. This criticism is not unique to this particular publication. Burstall has regularly questioned the official history writings, often basing his arguments on interviews with previous enemy officers. While he did not dwell in the Battle of Long Tan in this publication, this is one topic that he disagrees with the official history. His claims that Company of 6RAR was led into the enemy’s fully prepared trap are strongly disputed in *Duty First* by Brigadier (RL) Harry Honner and Ian McNeill who consider that it was an encounter battle created while the 5th Division NVA and the Local Force D445 Battalion were moving to attack and over-run the Australian Task Force at Nui Dat.

The later chapters examine the American perspective including events in the US such as a change in president and administration which created major changes in policy and attitudes. He looks at the changes that this created in Australian policy especially during the period 1969 to 1972 which he claims turned into a political exercise “as the Australian government tried to disentangle itself from the morass of Vietnam”.

Burstall claims access to important information was difficult to obtain with some of it only partially released and much more still classified. As a result he quoted extensively to validate lines of analysis which he considered at times varied with widely accepted
views. He also quoted from interviews with many of the political and military participants of the time. It is this use of verbal information, some of it gained more than 20 years after the event, for which he has been criticised in the past and which he continues to use as evidence in *Vietnam - The Australian Dilemma*. He quotes former enemies and Vietnamese civilians and uses their views/assertions as being fact while at the same time critically examining and refuting the official writings of many well known historians such as Ian McNeill and David Horner. He also claims the reporting of significant inaccuracies in the Battalion histories such as successes and the reporting of enemy KIA and WIA.

While I have been critical of this book, I consider that Burstall was well intended in providing another view on the Vietnam War. However, I consider that the way he has presented his views in such a negative manner without any positive contribution has made reading the book a difficult task. Nevertheless I feel that *Vietnam - The Australian Dilemma* does provide a different, if not a readily acceptable view of Australia's contribution and should be read. However it should not be read in isolation as this could lead the reader to hold the Australian contribution in a much less favourable light than that deserved by the soldiers who served there.

4000 BOWLS OF RICE - A PRISONER OF WAR COMES HOME


Reviewed by Major D.M. Cooper

**4000 Bowls of Rice** is the story of Staff Sergeant Cecil Dickson, a Prisoner of War in Java, Burma and Thailand during World War II. Dickson was a member of the 2/2 Australian Pioneer Battalion, a unit that was involved in the construction of the Burma-Thailand railway and whose members suffered greatly under the Japanese. The book is based on the letters that Dickson wrote home to his wife after his release in August 1945 while he waited for transportation back to Australia. The author has drawn on these letters and her research with other Pioneers to give the reader a graphic account of life as a prisoner of the Japanese. We also share the thoughts of the newly freed Dickson seeking to put the bitter memories of three and a half years of captivity behind him as he experiences the sights and sounds of post-war Bangkok.

Linda Goetz Holmes met Cecil Dickson at a dinner at his stepdaughters home on Shelter Island, New York. It was there that she heard him remark as he passed along a serving dish of rice 'Do you know, I once had over 3 800 consecutive bowls of rice, and do you know [laughter] I still enjoy rice!' Holmes' fascination at meeting an ex-POW who worked on the 'Railway of Death' led her to write the story of Dickson's coming home.

The first chapter of the book is a brief but moving account of the death in 1988 of Cecil Dickson. Chapter Two leads in with Dickson's first letter home on 30 August 1945. The book then retraces the time from the 2/2 Battalions journey to Java in 1942, through the years of captivity and the time spent waiting in Bangkok, to the home-coming of the POWs in the latter months of 1945. The final chapter of the book deals very briefly with the question of whether anything could have been done to ease the suffering of the POWs. There follows some criticism of the conduct of the International Red Cross during the war and of the Australian Government’s treatment of ex-POWs in subsequent years.

One of the endearing features of this story is the balanced manner in which Holmes deals with the matter of Japanese brutality. The cruel treatment meted out to the Australians by their captors was quite foreign to their Western mindset, rooted in the Judaic-Christian tradition of compassion and forgiveness. Holmes draws our attention to the harshness of the Japanese training methods and their culture of strict personal discipline. While in no way condoning Japanese brutality, we are given a reasoned explanation for the conduct of the Japanese soldiers in the POW camps. The final chapters deal briefly with attitudes in modern day Japan and it is with some concern that the lack of a national understanding of Japan’s full role in World War II is noted. At the risk of appearing trite, I cannot help but recommend this book to any present day Japanese reader who seeks a better understanding of Japan’s conduct towards prisoners during the war. The treatment of this issue is not offensive, the tone that of a concerned friend rather than an aggrieved victim.

Linda Goetz Holmes touches on some unexpected areas as well, such as the issue of back pay and meal allowance owed to POWs and for which they were never truly compensated by the government. Of particular interest is the use of never-before published photographs of life under Japanese internment. These photographs were taken secretly by the prisoners at the risk of a beating or death. Many have been kept in the personal collections of men who considered it too painful to allow them to be published until now. Few of the photos are of good quality, but they do flesh out this story with the gaunt faces and ravaged bodies of
just of man's capacity for inhumanity, but more importantly, of the bonds of friendship and courage that exists among men living together under unspeakable conditions who never give up their hope of freedom.


Reviewed by Major K.E. Keegan, RASigs

"Barbed Wire and Bamboo, a collection of Australian POW stories, delivers what is promised in the title. Hugh Clarke and Colin Burgess have drawn together a very interesting collection of stories, based on the first hand recollections of Australian POWs. In particular, Hugh Clarke vividly brings to life his own personal experience as a POW. Each story not only details the horrific conditions endured by the POWs but allows us a close look at the basic human survival instincts prevalent in each and every POW camp. As you read through the individual stories, you will be touched by the determination and comradeship that existed in those horror camps. While you will become sickened by the stories of ill treatment, torture, lack of food, water and medical supplies and general abuse of entrapped human beings, you will also be uplifted by the recollections of tolerance, loyalty, comradeship and humour that abound on every page.

It is evident that the more horrific the POW camp or treatment endured, the stronger the human endeavour to overcome and survive. In all of the POW camps, the priority activity apart from survival, was escape. You will read of men who burrowed underground in tunnels, with no light, little air and in inches of water, night after night. Many cut through barbed wire fences, clambered over walls or endured hours of physical pain while waiting for the right moment to escape. While some were lucky to escape successfully, the majority were recaptured and returned to prison.

All of the stories have a common thread, the experiences of Corporal George Thompson in Stalag VIIIIB, outlined in 'Revenge', warrants special mention. Here we see the enemy within, perhaps the real horror of these camps. During his incarceration, he witnessed a vicious band of nearly 150 Scottish thugs, who terrorised the other inmates with acts of brutality, sadism and rape. These racketeers were allowed to operate without interference from the German guards, thankfully a group of enraged Aussies, New Zealanders and Canadians put an end to this situation.

In 'Witnesses to Hell', we are taken for a short but shocking journey into the concentration camps at Buchenwald and Auschwitz. Here we are again confronted with human beings treated like animals, forced to defecate into a pail in front of other prisoners, stripped naked, completely shaved and then marched to the gas chamber. Flight Sergeant Ray Perry from Perth comments on his observations in Buchenwald, 'life was very cheap in the concentration camps'.

The brutality of war is further reinforced in 'Torpedoed', when you read of Australian POWs being moved to Japan in small cargo ships. Imagine the horror facing the POWs who survived the POW camps in Singapore and Thailand, to then be trapped below decks on a cargo ship that was torpedoed en route.

With each story comes a different view, a different time, a different place. What is common to all, is that this is a collection of POW stories about Australians, written by Australians. It is down to earth, honest and humorous. It reflects the qualities we Australians see in ourselves and in turn reflects the qualities that many of our POWs had to draw on to survive the horror of barbed wire and bamboo.

In summary, Hugh Clarke and Colin Burgess have been most successful in producing a text which provides an insight into the life endured by Australian POWs. This collection of short stories is both readable and enjoyable. I would recommend this book to any reader who seeks to broaden their knowledge of the Australian war years or to those who are in search of the Australian character.


Reviewed by Major W.P. Monfries

If the prospective reader collects bayonets, wears Soldier of Fortune tee-shirts, or thrives on magazine articles with titles like 'Me, Victor Charlie and D445', then he or she is unlikely to be spell-bound by John Murphy's book. If, however, the prospective reader
wishes to explore the larger issues surrounding Australia’s commitment to the ‘counter-revolutionary’ war in Vietnam, then this volume has a great deal to offer.

The book’s jacket notes eulogise somewhat, as jacket notes often do, describing the books as ‘a beautifully crafted history of Australia’s experience of the Vietnam War’. The reader is promised ‘an incisive look at Australian Cold War politics’ and ‘a brilliant portrait of the origins and political impact of the powerful Australian anti-war movement’. Fortunately the work itself is a little more subdued than this and Dr Murphy shows no signs of being carried away by his publicist’s enthusiasm.

The author’s aim is to synthesise his discussion of Australia’s involvement in Phuoc Tuy province around the issues of Cold War politics, Australian fear of Asia in general and China in particular, the concept of forward defence and strategic ties with and reliance on the United States, Australian political imperatives of electoral success, an increasingly powerful but ideologically diverse peace movement, and the Vietnamese people’s struggle for autonomy in a post-colonial but artificially divided country. As those ever-cheerful jacket notes say, this is indeed a broad and rich canvas.

To cope with these diverse strands, the author divides his discussion into a number of sections. ‘The Colonial Order’ deals with both Vietnam and Australia, providing the interesting information that Phuoc Tuy (formerly Baria) province was itself only penetrated by invading Vietnamese from the Red River Delta in the 17th century, and not finally wrested from the Khmer until the early 19th century. Here the author introduces his concept of the ‘sense of place’ which so tightly bound all provincial Vietnamese to their villages and which was to prove such fertile ground for the NLF in cultivating resistance to the imposed rule of the government of the Republic of Vietnam. It is interesting that the author refers to these Vietnamese raiders as ‘settlers’, whereas the French subsequently engaged in ‘violent colonial conquest’ of the Baria village society.

Australia is presumably placed in this ‘Colonial Order’ section to draw the post-colonial parallel of our own emergence from reliance on the British Empire and British control in ‘the East’. The notion of replacing this reliance with a dependence on new-found US allies, and shaping a foreign policy to foster the involvement of the US in the region, is presumably Murphy’s own comment on Australia’s substitution of one form of colonial order with another.

The second section, ‘Preparing for War’, is perhaps one of the more ‘academic’ parts of this serious work and I found that I had to laboriously re-read some passages (as I did towards the end of the previous section) in order to follow the thread of discussion. Again the author follows the multiple strands of South Vietnam’s struggle under the Diem regime, Australia’s foreign policy in the region, developments in the peace movement and the ALP’s struggle to define a coherent foreign policy of its own.

I was fascinated by the author’s revelation that in 1957 Australia’s strategic outlook noted that a possible conventional counter-offensive by Diem’s forces against the North was ‘in conflict with the SEATO concept which provides, amongst other things, for an atomic strike on the Hanoi area.’ It should be noted that these plans were somewhat modified by 1959, although whether the irony of the reasoning was not lost on the planners is a moot point:

The use of nuclear weapons would be ‘a most serious step... it would have a profound effect on the world opinion, particularly in Asia...’

The next section ‘Intervention’, is one of the most readable parts of the book and provides neat examples of the Australian Army’s attempts, in three villages, at counter-revolutionary warfare within a civil action context. The impact of the Tet Offensive is traced within both political and civilian circles, as is the trend amongst peace activists away from the treatment of conscription as an issue of individual conscience to a broader push for non-compliance and anti-Americanism. In a sparkling image of the dissent of the late 60s and early 70s, the author says:

‘Here was a movement which passionately opposed the war yet did not analyse it in detail. Australian involvement was the key event around which radicals mobilised from 1966, yet there was very little discussion of what was happening in Phuoc Tuy. Vietnam was the animating issue, yet there was no clear and widely accepted interpretation of what it meant.’

The final section, ‘The Withdrawal’, describes the enormous upsurge of dissent as various radical and not-so-radical groups formed the powerful Moratorium movement, even as the Government was winding down the nation’s involvement in South Vietnam. The author allies this with Government turmoil and loss of direction, including in foreign policy, as well as the dispersal of the forces of dissent once the major rallying point – Vietnam – was removed.

More a book for the interested student than the light-hearted ‘reader of war books for vicarious pleasure’, Dr Murphy’s volume is strongly recommended. In attempting to cover so many strands, he runs the inevitable risk of his treatment of the subject being seen as a mile wide and an inch deep, but only so much can be achieved in 278 pages of texts, plus notes.
There is plenty to interest those particularly who might be tracing the development of Australian foreign policy and our country’s relationships within the region as a part of their current studies.

**THE SAMSON OPTION** by Seymour M. Hersh, Random House, Inc, New York, 1991

Reviewed by Major I.P. Mondon, RACT

Most military members will have had more than a passing interest in the exploits of the Israeli military and their legendary feats in battle against what always appears to be overwhelming odds. No doubt some of this interest has been spurred by speculation over the status of Israel as a nuclear power, and the continuing potential for the Middle East to erupt in nuclear war. Therefore it was with interest that I picked up Hersh’s book *The Samson Option*, which deals with Israel’s nuclear program.

The book covers the history of the Israeli nuclear program from its formative years when Israel first became a state, up until the Gulf War with its Scud missile attacks on Israel and the potential consequences of Israeli intervention had those missiles been armed with chemical warheads. There are no surprises as to the motive fostering Israel’s development of a nuclear weapons program however what is surprising is the extent of assistance that the Israelis were given first by the French and later the United States. The French virtually helped construct Israel’s first nuclear facilities in the Negev Desert and continued to support the program up until the mid to late 60s. The Americans did little to actively assist Israel however it was their lack of action which provided the greatest assistance to Israel.

Though ostensibly written to provide a history as to the Israeli development of nuclear weapons, I found its insight into the duplicitous nature of American foreign policy to be most enlightening. This work catalogues a policy by a succession of American Presidents from Eisenhower through to Regan to deliberately ignore the blatant evidence of an Israeli nuclear weapons program including a test detonation in the Indian Ocean which was subject to a deliberate coverup by the US administration. This is in marked contrast with America’s current stance over North Korea’s potential weapons program and leaves one to question the morality of American foreign policy. There is an ironic touch in that the Israelis have always let it be known that their foremost foreign policy goal is the preservation of the state of Israel, and the security of the Israeli people. This is illustrated by Hersh who provides evidence of Israel passing on American secrets to the Soviet Union which is incongruous with their perceived relationship with the US.

I found the book to be easy reading though at times tedious due to excessive detail into which Hersh delves in describing the diplomatic and political manoeuvrings of the various protagonists. His extensive use of quotations slows down the otherwise fast pace of the text which detracts from the overall tone of the work, and at times drives the reader to skip ahead in search of the next interesting passage. However, the insights that Hersh provides into the Israeli nuclear program such as their involvement with the South Africans, their use of their nuclear weapons to blackmail the Americans during the 1973 Yom Kippur war, and their plans to target the former Soviet Union in the event of a Middle East conflagration, all contribute to make this book a worthwhile addition to any library. It is well researched and the extensive use of footnotes provides detail that would otherwise not be covered.

Why the title *The Samson Option*? In 73 A.D., at Masada, 900 Jewish defenders chose to commit suicide rather than die at the hands of the Romans. A Samson option was favoured by the Israeli nuclear advocates as a means of avoiding another Masada or Holocaust. According to biblical legend, Samson had been captured by the Philistines and had been put on display, for public entertainment, in the Dragon’s Temple in Gaza. He prayed to God to give him back his strength for one last time and cried out, “Let my soul die with the Philistines.” With that he pushed apart the temple pillars, bringing down the roof and killing himself and his enemies. The Samson option is for the Israelis another way of saying “Never Again”.