Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:
The Managing Editor
Australian Defence Force Journal
Building B-4-26
Russell Offices
Canberra ACT 2600
(06) 265 2682 or 265 2999
Fax (06) 265 1099

Advertising Enquiries:
(06) 265 1193

General Enquiries:
(06) 265 3234

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The underway replenishment ship HMAS Westralia.
Psychological Operations

Dear Editor,

Thank you for the Peacekeeping Edition. It was interesting and educational — I will retain my copy as a reference.

An article of particular interest was that penned by LTCOL G. Paterson on “Psychological operations”. The article highlighted the benefits of effective communications in gaining results that were both “morally and militarily” successful.

In the article LTCOL Paterson stated the Australian forces in Baidoa lacked a “psyops” capability. Given his specific descriptions of “psyops” activity it could be argued that the commander in Baidoa did have access to the resource — through a public relations officer.

The operations described were simple, effective communications plans — an area in which the Army Public Relations Officer deployed on Operation Solace had detailed specialist knowledge. Indeed, the officer was directly enlisted into the Army because of his extensive knowledge in the area.

That these skills were not called upon is, in itself, a communications problem. Part of the solution may lie in terminology — perhaps the less exciting “public affairs” covers the situation more accurately than the provocative “psyops” term (which has far broader connotations).

The value of deploying a Public Relations Officer on major operations for publicity and media liaison has been given time and again. The issue of “psyops” may, however, serve to remind commanders of the broader scope of the capability deployed with a full time professional Public Relations Officer.

Kirk Coningham
Captain, SO3 PR

Australians in Korea

Dear Editor,

I read with interest Lieutenant Colonel James’s article on Australian Peace Keepers in the January-February issue of the Journal.

However, his statement on page 7 regarding the United Nations Military Armistice Commission — Korea, that “… since the withdrawal of the last Australian forces from UNC-K in 1956, Australia’s UNCMAC responsibilities have been conducted by the Defence Attaché in the Australian embassy in Seoul” — whilst based on official sources — is not correct.

From the withdrawal of the R.A. Signals detachment at Inchon in 1957, the Australian Liaison Officer (ALO) in the Commonwealth Liaison Mission to UNCMAC was a Major (E). For example, from 1961 to July 1963, the incumbent was a RA SF Squadron Leader and from 31 July 1963 to 31 January 1965 the billet was filled by Lieutenant Commander R.A. Pioch RAN. He in turn was replaced by Major D. Findlay, Australian Staff Corps.

The ALO also had a Corporal (E) as his assistant, and it was in that capacity that I served as a Leading Seaman from 20 October 1963 until 26 March 1965. Curiously, the tri-service concept apparently didn’t extend to the NCOs as I relieved a corporal from the RAR and in turn was replaced by a Corporal of the RAASC.

Furthermore, for a number of years, the ALO was not accredited as Defence Attaché. ALO staff were posted unaccompanied and lived and worked in the United Nations Compound which was administered by the U.S. Army. (This compound with service representatives from twelve different nations, was originally situated at Dongdamun in Eastern Seoul, but moved to Pogandong near Eighth Army Headquarters in 1962.) They were purely part of the Military Armistice Commission organisation and had relatively minor contact with the Australian Embassy. It was not until 1967 that accreditation as Service Attaché was extended to the ALO with both billets being upgraded one rank.

J.J. Atkinson
Chief Petty Officer Writer

All letters should be addressed to:
The Managing Editor
Australian Defence Force Journal
Building B-4-26
Russell Offices
Canberra ACT 2600
Teeth To Tail Versus Capability

Dear Editor,

It is interesting to note the increasing use of the term "tooth-to-tail" within current defence literature, including your journal. The term itself and the concept it represents I believe is being misunderstood and greatly abused. The original concept behind the term "tooth-to-tail" was in relation to increasing DEFENCE CAPABILITY. All changes within defence should be aimed at increasing CAPABILITY. However the term "tooth-to-tail" is currently being used to support arguments for change which ultimately decrease capability.

A simple example will clarify the difference between Capability and the misuse of the term "Tooth-to-Tail". Most experts will agree that a mechanised infantry battalion will defeat a non-mechanised infantry battalion of the same size. To keep the mechanised battalion mobile a large tail (lower Tooth-to-Tail ratio) of support services is required such as workshops and fuel distribution just to identify two. INCREASED CAPABILITY from mechanisation despite a lower Tooth-to-Tail ratio provides the winning edge.

The Army is trying to raise another infantry battalion. The current Army rationale is not to fully fund extra units. For this extra infantry battalion to train, equipment and other resources are required. Without being fully funded there will not be sufficient funds to buy more equipment such as vehicles, radios and weapons or provide extra rations, training dollars and fuel for this new battalion. These resources will have to be reallocated from existing units. Units are already suffering from a lack of resources and removing more resources from units will significantly affect their training. It is highly unlikely that by reallocating resources to the new battalion that this battalion will be able to be fully resourced to provide effective training.

This extra infantry battalion results in more soldiers, but trained to a lesser level (due to lack of training resources). While this infantry battalion will increase the tooth-to-tail ratio there is no corresponding increase in CAPABILITY but rather a general lowering of CAPABILITY across the Land Army. An extra infantry battalion if fully funded (with training dollars and newly purchased equipment) would increase capability.

The Army's capability would be improved with the removal of one complete brigade off the current ORBAT (unfortunately politically unacceptable). The reallocation of this brigade's equipment and manning would allow the remaining brigades to be equipped and manned close to entitlement. These extra training resources made available to the other brigades would increase their readiness and capability.

The Navy is intending to buy six submarines but can only man four of these submarines. The initial purchase and ongoing maintenance costs on the two unmanned submarines is money that may be better spent on training personnel in the four manned submarines. This extra training in the four manned submarines would increase the capability. Buying six rather than four submarines increases the teeth but the total CAPABILITY is not necessarily increased.

The Navy has commenced the building of ANZAC class ships that maybe fitted for weapon systems, rather than fitted with complete weapon systems. The idea is to buy more ships with the defence dollar. The sailors will be training on incomplete ships (the defence of a ship is a totally integrated system) which results in a less CAPABLE sailor and hence system. In a time of crisis, weapon systems will be purchased (if available) and then the training of the ship as a complete system begins in earnest, perhaps too late. Again more teeth with more ships but an overall loss in CAPABILITY.

Having the correct mix of teeth to tail is a balancing act if the MAXIMUM CAPABILITY is to be attained with minimum resources. Having too many teeth compared to the sustaining tail results in a loss of capability as does too much tail and not enough teeth. The Australian Defence Force is still searching for the correct mix. Logic and sound reasoning should be the driving force on the correct mix not politics.

The MAXIMUM DEFENCE CAPABILITY will only be realised when all units/ships/bases are fully equipped and enough resources are made available within the Defence Force to fully train all personnel. This paranoia of having more teeth and less tail is lowering the capability of the Defence Force to fulfil its primary role in the defence of Australia.

S. Tarrett, CSM
Warrant Officer I
Unionisation in the Australian Armed Forces — The Emergence of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia

By Captain Toni Averay, ARA.

Introduction

The Defence Force is probably the only employer in Australia which denies its “employees” the right to representation in the determination of pay and conditions. Even though the Armed Forces Federation was formed in 1984 in an effort to secure this representation for service personnel, the Federation is still denied recognition and has no “right” to any role in the remuneration process. This is despite occasional statements of political support, such as that made by Gordon Bilney in March 1993, when as Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, he included the following statement in a letter to the Armed Forces Federation:

“... The Labor Government has for some time supported the right of members of the ADF to form voluntary associations to advance their interests as a professional body of employees. Virtually all people in employment have a union or association to represent their common interests and I see no reason why members of the ADF should be in any way different. I therefore support the right of your association to exist and to advance the welfare of the ADF membership...”

This article will examine the current and future roles of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia against the background of military unionisation in general, and the Australian context in particular. This article will argue that Australian service personnel need some form of collective representation in the determination of pay and conditions, and that there is scope for the Armed Forces Federation to have greater involvement in the Defence remuneration process.

Military Unionisation

The concept of military unionisation conflicts with the traditional approach to the management of armed forces. The strict discipline and command structures of military organisations have traditionally justified a paternalistic approach to personnel management matters, such as the determination of pay and conditions. Members of the armed forces have traditionally accepted their lack of input in this area and have happily relied on the government and the military hierarchy to look after their interests. In fact, the requirement to protect and further the interests of subordinates has traditionally been regarded as an important aspect of the command responsibility of officers.

A number of theories have been put forward to explain the emergence of military unionisation, which amounts to a rejection of traditional military paternalism. Moskos has described a process of transition from “institutional to “occupational” phases (Moskos, 1977). During the institutional phase, service personnel see military employment as a calling, and accept personal sacrifice for the greater good of the organisation. However, after the transition to the occupational phase, members of the military see their employment as just a job, and consequently they demand similar benefits and conditions to those enjoyed by civilians. The “convergence” theory suggests that military industrial relations undergoes an “evolutionary” process, gradually becoming more closely aligned with civilian industrial relations procedures. Janowitz argues that growing support for industrial organisation within the military can co-exist with traditional military ideals of duty and service (Janowitz, 1960 & 1977). However, the emergence of support for military unionisation might just be a reflection of economic changes which have made the protection of the financial interests of subordinates difficult for the command structure to achieve (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, p 60).

The European Experience

Military unionisation has traditionally been opposed on the basis that it presents a threat to military discipline and command by challenging military authority. It is also commonly argued that military unionism will adversely affect combat efficiency and unit cohesiveness. The lack of collectivism and representation in the military has probably been the area of greatest divergence from the civilian norm of most industrialised societies (Ballantyne, 1983, p 4).
Military unions exist in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway. There are in fact over 60 such organisations, generally catering for specific ranks, services or means of entry. For example, the Dutch VVD helps exclusively for conscripts, while the Swedish Officers' Association draws its members only from graduates of the tertiary level of Swedish military training. These organisations generally share a number of features: except for Sweden, they all reject the right to strike (and strike action has never been taken in Sweden); they are all politically neutral; and they usually confine their activities to personnel administration matters such as pay and conditions (Gowans, 1986, p. 23). These organisations do not regard themselves as "trade unions", but as professional associations. In fact, it is argued that none of the Western European military unions have structures, policies or objectives commensurate with those of traditional labour unions (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, p. 6). The associations are excluded from interference in military law and discipline, and from operational matters.

It has been said that European military unions are part of the traditions of the European labour movement, "rooted in political idealism and evangelical Marxism" (Krendel, in Sabrosky, 1977, p. 109). It has also been argued that the "rights" enjoyed by the unionised European military were not won by industrial action by military unions. Rather, it is contested that they simply flowed onto the military through the legislation of social democratic governments granting rights to all workers, including service personnel, such as the 40 hour week in Sweden (Taylor, 1978, p. 85). The right to organise service labour in Europe has been won by government initiated legislation guaranteeing individual rights, irrespective of the nature of an individual's employment (Ballantyne, 1983, p. 6). However, it is also recognised that the European unions have achieved some success in improving military pay levels and in "humanising" military employment. The European model shows a system of professional associations with little evidence of traditional style trade unionism. These organisations operate more on the basis of cooperation and consultation rather than confrontation (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, pp. 4 & 143). A brief examination of some of these organisations serves to illustrate these features.

There are 12 different associations within the Dutch military, representing different ranks, occupation skills or means of entry. The associations do not have the right to strike. However, the Defence Ministry is required to consult with representatives from the associations in the determination of conditions of service. Any decision made without this prior consultation has no judicial validity (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, p. 119). Two associations which provide stark contrast with each other are the KVMO and the VVD.

The Royal Netherlands Naval Officers Association (KVMO) was founded in 1883 and boasts a membership of 97 percent of all serving naval officers. The Association's objectives are to protect the interests of its members, while at the same time promoting the maintenance of a functional Navy geared to its task. The Association sees a community of interest between the welfare of naval personnel and the continued viability of the Navy, although it is emphasised that the Navy can only exist with the presence of well-motivated personnel in sufficient numbers and of sufficient quality. The KVMO is involved in the pay review process with other government employee organisations, negotiating with the Secretary of Internal Affairs and the Secretary of Defence on pay and allowances. The KVMO regards itself as a "fraternity" rather than as a union. The Dutch Government is supportive of the KVMO and other military associations. Legislation exists which requires the government to negotiate with the associations on any planned changes to military salaries and allowances. The Secretary of Defence is also legally required to take submissions from the various associations on such proposals. However, military members still have no right to strike if negotiations on these matters fail.

In contrast to the more conservative KVMO, the Dutch conscripts union — the VVD — earned a reputation as a militant organisation soon after its formation in 1966. The organisation won a number of radical concessions for its members, including the abolition of compulsory saluting, the introduction of "optional" hair cut regulations and the relaxation of uniform and dress standards. This lack of traditional military standards was blamed for a decline in discipline and efficiency among Dutch soldiers. For example, it was claimed that the Dutch were the least effective of all NATO forces (Grazebrook, 1983, p. 46). Opponents of military unionisation often use the VVD as an example of the adverse effects collectivism can have on the military: "Nowhere else have the radical implications of military unionism been so starkly outlined" (Cortright & Watts, 1991, p. 107). American soldiers serving in Europe regarded their Dutch counterparts as ill-disciplined and unkempt: "The unkempt appearance of the Dutch soldiery certainly does not recommend military unionism to parade-ground enthusiasts" (Sabrosky, 1977, p. 148). However, in its own defence, the VVD argued that its radical approach was in recognition of...
the fact that its members were only temporary members of the military organisation, and were therefore entitled to a relaxation of military standards. Such an approach is obviously not suitable for an organisation representing professional, permanent armed forces.

In the late 1980s, a more conservative conscripts union known as the AVNM was established. This organisation gradually developed a considerable following, taking members away from the VVDM (Cortright & Watts, 1991, p.123). Perhaps this development can be regarded as a return to traditional military conservatism.

The Danish armed forces have a system of consultative committees established on a hierarchal basis from unit to departmental level. The rights of these committees have been established by law, and government consultation on significant matters relating to pay and conditions is mandatory. Danish servicemen are regarded as professional government employees with rights and obligations similar to those of other permanent civil servants. Cooperation between service personnel representatives and the ministry is a major feature of the Danish system (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, p.136).

Swedish military unions claim members of up to 99 percent of regular personnel. The unions have been successful in improving pay and conditions for service personnel, but success has often been dependent on the activities of civilian unions with which the military associations are affiliated. For example, Swedish military unions are unique in that they are the only such organisations to have the right to strike, although this right has never been exercised. Swedish military personnel share this concession with their civil service counterparts as the result of a successful campaign by the civil service unions in 1965 (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, pp.128-129).

Swedish military associations are organised on a rank or means of entry basis. The largest is the Swedish Officers Association (SOF) which was founded in 1932. The SOF represents graduates of tertiary level officer training only, and boasts a high membership level among eligible personnel. The SOF belongs to the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO), which conducts negotiations with government on behalf of its members on general pay and conditions matters. However, for matters concerning only defence members, the SOF conducts its own negotiations. The role of the SOF in representing its members is recognised at all levels of the Swedish military organisation. Local branches of the SOF — known as "societies" — are located in most units and military bases. Local commanding officers are required to negotiate with the societies on matters affecting individual members, such as manning plans and proposed changes in working conditions. The Chairman of the SOF is a member of the advisory board of the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, which is currently involved in negotiations about major reorganisation of the armed forces planned for 1994. In addition, members of the SOF sit on all officer selection and promotion boards.

Germany's Bundeswehr-Verband (DBWV) was established in 1956 in accordance with the principle that a soldier is a "citizen in uniform" and in recognition of paragraph 9 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany which guarantees industrial representational rights for every citizen (Report of European Group Representation, 1979, p.110). The organisation claims 70 percent membership of eligible personnel. It rejects the idea of labour unionism and regards itself as a professional association akin to those formed by doctors and lawyers. The alignment of military pay levels with civil service salaries removed the requirement for separate negotiation on pay and conditions. The DBWV is routinely consulted by the Defence Ministry, along with the civil service organisations, in relation to pay and conditions matters. This arrangement allows the DBWV to concentrate its efforts on protecting the other interests of its members (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, p.112).

Military associations in the Norwegian armed forces cover only regular personnel and maintain close links with associations representing civil servants. Like their counterparts in Germany, members of the armed forces share the same pay scales as civil servants. The government must negotiate with the associations on matters of exclusive military interest, but is then free to introduce any regulation, whether agreement has been reached with the associations or not. However, the associations generally enjoy a co-operative relationship with the government and their affiliation with the larger confederations of civilian unions ensures their continued protection and recognition.

The European model of military unionism shows that group representation for members of armed forces does not have to present a threat to discipline or challenge the authority of military command. With one exception, in practice the European military unions operate as professional associations, rather than as traditional-style trade unions, and they generally confine their activities to issues affecting pay and conditions. The Armed Forces Federation of Australia has adopted the same philosophy and should not be viewed as a threat by the Australian Defence Force.
The concept of military unionisation has been rejected by both the United States and the United Kingdom. It is appropriate to examine the approach of each of these countries separately because their experiences are markedly different. The US considered the concept of collectivism for its military in the mid 1970s, but the prospect caused so much concern that Congress moved to legislate against the possibility. However, there has never been any serious attempt to unionise the British military.

The move to unionise the US military gathered momentum in the mid 1970s when the large government employee union, the Association of Federal Government Employees (AFGE), proposed organising the military. The union’s campaign gained support from many servicemen, and a number of reasons were suggested for this reversal of the traditional conservatism of US servicemen in this area. The US military was now an all-volunteer force with the recent abolition of conscription, and it was felt that soldiers now wanted a career with benefits similar to those available in civilian employment. They were no longer prepared to accept low pay and poor conditions out of a sense of duty or patriotism. It was also acknowledged that there had been a general erosion of benefits which created dissatisfaction among servicemen and fostered support for some form of collectivism. The military had apparently entered Moskos’ “occupational” phase.

Both the general public and the US Congress were strongly opposed to the concept of military unionisation for the American armed forces. Acknowledgement was made of the successful European experiences; however, it was generally felt that this was irrelevant to the United States. This argument was summarised in an article in a 1978 military journal which argued that the societal context of European unions was vastly different from that of the United States. The article described the nature of civil-military relations in America as different from those in Europe: Americans did not consider their armed forces as just another part of the labour force: “Americans continue to expect standards of conduct, discipline, dedication and self-sacrifice from their military which they are not prepared to have bargained away at the behest of any union.” (Taylor, 1978, p.87).

Opposition to the prospect of a unionised US military was strong. Some opponents argued that unionisation would mean an increase in manpower costs as pay and conditions were “improved” by union action — if unions do nothing else well, they do raise wages and benefits — and this would inevitably result in higher defence costs or a reduction in operational capabilities (Sabrosky, 1977, p.150). The attitude of the military hierarchy was expressed by General Maxwell Taylor: “Collective bargaining over such matters as pay, overtime and safe working conditions has no place (in the military) since pay is fixed by law, overtime has no meaning in a profession always on duty, and the work is of necessity often dangerous” (quoted by Coulter, 1978, p.23). A further fear was based on a traditional distrust of unions. There was concern that once a military union gained power, it could present a real threat to government control of the armed forces: “There is no sound reason to assume that military unions would exercise indefinitely a degree of politically neutral self-restraint and self-denial unparalleled in the history of the union movement... To rely on a military union not to act like a union, is fundamentally unwise” (Sabrosky, 1977, p.156).

Government action to prohibit unions in the US military quickly followed. The bill was drafted by Senator Strom Thurmond, who argued that “the fundamental need for obedience and the consequent need for discipline make it impossible for servicemen to do some of the things that civilians are entitled to do” (quoted by Coulter, 1978, p.24). The bill was passed with only three dissenting votes. The AFGE backed away from its proposal without any effort to challenge the government action. The issue had been quite definitely put to rest, and there has been no serious attempt to resurrect it since.

The British perception is that there can never be a place for unionism in the British armed forces. As argued by one former senior officer, the military are regarded as belonging to a service, not an occupation (Lunt, 1978). The Queen’s Regulations specifically ban military collectivism. This attitude places the British military firmly in the Moskos “institutional” phase, with no likelihood of progressing on to the “occupational” phase. The British accept the paternalistic role of the government and the military hierarchy in looking after the interests of service personnel. Service pay is largely determined by recommendation put to the government by the Review Body of Armed Forces Pay, which was established in 1971 to advise the Prime Minister on pay and allowances for the armed forces. The Review Body bases its approach on acceptance of the fact that members of the armed forces have no right of association and that the Review Body’s responsibility is to ensure fair levels of pay where there cannot be a process of collective bargaining (Review Body on Armed Forces Pay [UK], 22nd Report, 1993).
**The Australian Experience**

The Australian military has traditionally been conservative in regard to the concept of military unionism. This may in part be attributable to its origins in the similarly conservative British military, although unlike the British situation, collectivism in the Australian military has never been specifically prohibited under the Australian Constitution or the Defence Act. However, there were certain limitations in service law manuals, and the provisions of s.13 of the Defence Act highlight the fact that service personnel are not engaged under a normal employment contract. No action can be brought before a court by military personnel concerning their employment. This "unique" employment relationship was recognised by the High Court of Australia in 1985 in the case of Coutts v Commonwealth: Military service has always stood in a different position from service under a contract of employment with a private employer . . . (no service personnel have) at common law any right of action against the Crown for breach of contract or any right to sue for pay. However, the 1988 Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act includes members of the Defence Force in its definition of “employee” under s.5(1).

Australian service personnel have until recently accepted their lack of representation in conditions of service matters and were seemingly happy with the traditional paternalistic approach where such matters were left in the hands of government and senior officers. A proposal in 1974 by Whitlam Government Defence Minister, Lance Barnard, for the establishment of an organisation to represent service personnel in the determination of pay and conditions received little support within the military. An organisation known as the Australian Armed Forces Association was formed in 1974, but it attracted very few members and disappeared within a few years. However, by 1984, there was sufficient support for the concept of some form of collectivism within the ADF to enable the successful establishment of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia.

The Armed Forces Federation of Australia (ArFFA) was formed by a group of RAAF officers in October/November 1984. It does not regard itself as a "trade" union in the traditional sense, but rather as a professional association. This emphasises a different approach to objectives, strategies and politics. The Federation prefers to be seen as a watchdog and lobby organisation, with its main objective being to advise and inform the government, the opposition, the media and the services of concern in matters relating to pay, conditions of service, welfare and other personnel related issues. The reaction of the ADF to the formation of ArFFA was supportive and markedly different from the heavy-handed reaction of the US authorities to the attempt to introduce military collectivism there. The Chiefs of Staff issued guidelines on representative organisations for the Australian military, and the Federation’s Constitution was carefully drafted to comply with these guidelines. These guidelines require any military association to be voluntary, non-industrial and to have no political affiliations. The guidelines also specify that associations are not to interfere with government control of the services, the chain of command or disciplinary processes.

The Federation’s Constitution complies with these requirements, categorically rejects the right to strike and limits Federation activities to avoid interference in military command and discipline matters. The Federation concentrates on consultation and negotiation, and prohibits any action that may result in its members confronting their superiors (Parsons, 1992, p.15). The Federation also agrees to suspend its activities in any unit going on operations, and confines its area of interest largely to service pay and conditions matters. However, even after the formation of ArFFA, the military hierarchy in general still regarded conditions of service matters as being exclusively their domain. This was illustrated in a statement made by the Chief of the Naval Staff in 1985, in which he said that although he was happy for Navy members to join ArFFA, he was concerned about ArFFA trying to get involved in conditions of service matters because that was his job (Pratt, 1987, p.330).

The Federation’s conservative record to date has earned it the support of the Defence hierarchy. The current Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral Alan Beaumont, said last year: “The Federation’s aim of protecting and promoting the welfare of its members is consistent with my objective and those of the Chiefs of Staff on behalf of the whole of the ADF” (CDF letter to ArFFA dated 8 June 93, quoted in Army Newspaper No 839, 26 August 93). The establishment of ArFFA has been described as an “unequivocal rejection of paternalism”, reflecting increasing doubts about the ability of the military hierarchy to adequately protect and further the interests of their troops (Hogan, 1989, pp.13 & 17). In fact, it has been argued that among service personnel, “it is widely believed that the convention of the government’s faithful protection of the service-member’s interests had been set aside” (Gowans, 1986, p.25). There was a growing body of opinion, both within and outside the Defence Force, that service...
personnel should have an association to represent them because virtually every other group of people in Australia had such a right (Grazebrook, 1983, p.47). Service personnel had been traditionally conditioned to expect their military leaders to act in their best interests, but by 1983 it was apparent that these leaders lacked the influence required to effectively intervene on behalf of their subordinates (Jauncey, 1983, p.47). The climate, therefore, was right for the establishment of a military "union". The Moskos "occupational" phase had apparently been reached. It was generally perceived among ADF personnel that there had been a widespread erosion of conditions of service and that the government and service chiefs were unable or unwilling to improve conditions. It was this dissatisfaction which fostered support for ArFFA.

The political climate was also right for the formation of such an organisation. As part of its platform for the 1983 Federal Election, the Australian Labor Party had reiterated the position established by the Whitlam Government: "Serving personnel should have the right to form and be members of associations in respect to their pay and conditions" (quoted by Lawrence, 1986, p.31).

The Industrial Relations Commission plays no role in the determination of pay and conditions for members of the Defence Force. The Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal (DFRT) was established in 1984 to perform this task, and although reasonably independent, it is expected to follow Commission policy as much as possible. Under s.58k of the Defence Act, the DFRT is required to have regard to decisions and principles of the Commission which are considered relevant "in the opinion of the Tribunal". Under the Act, the Tribunal is supposed to conduct reviews of pay and all allowances every two years. This is designed to safeguard the interests of service personnel who are technically disenfranchised with respect to matters concerning their remuneration (Oates, 1992, p.33). Unfortunately, for various reasons, the Tribunal has been unable to meet this review timetable.

The DFRT is comprised of three part-time members who sit in a judicial capacity to hear submissions put to it by HQ ADF, acting on behalf of service personnel. The hearing operates like a court, with the Department of Industrial Relations acting on behalf of the Commonwealth as the employer. No other parties have the right to present submissions to the DFRT, although they may appear at the discretion of the Tribunal and put forward arguments in the capacity of interveners. The Tribunal is under no obligation to consider the evidence or submissions of interveners. The Armed Forces Federation, the RSL and the Australian Medical Association (AMA) are the most regular interveners.

The most obvious disadvantage of the current system is that service personnel are not independently represented in the remuneration process. In fact, it has been suggested that the absence of provision for direct employee representation before the DFRT was a major factor in the decision to form ArFFA (Pratt, 1987, p.330). While HQ ADF notionally represents the "employees", there is a tremendous conflict of interest in this role. HQ ADF works directly to the CDF, who is responsible for running the Defence Force within an allocated annual budget set by the Cabinet. It is his staff who are responsible for preparing submissions arguing for Defence pay rises, even though such pay rises may have to be funded out of the allocated Defence budget. This dual responsibility creates a conflict of interest recognised in the 1988 Cross Report which commented that the CDF is placed in "an invidious position if, say, proposed remuneration increases are likely to impact on re-equipment programs" (quoted by Oates, 1992, p.15).

The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) represents the Commonwealth as the employer in tribunal hearings. It has been suggested that this in fact means that the "employer" is therefore represented twice in the form of the CDF and DIR. The question which must be asked then is — where is the employee? (Gowans, 1986, p.28) A further major difficulty is presented by the limited understanding DIR has about the realities of service life. In a civilian industrial hearing in front of the Industrial Relations Commission, the employer organisations can at least be relied upon to understand the working conditions to which the union might be referring, even if they disagree with a particular argument. In DFRT hearings, DIR is generally unable to relate to the military situation, and tends to adopt a civilian point of view of any argument. This problem was identified in a 1990 Parliamentary Research Paper on conditions of service in the military: "DIR has little practical experience with Defence and unlike other employers, is not held responsible for productivity, efficiency, employee morale or manpower level" (quoted by Oates, 1992, p.25). This is a most unsatisfactory situation which only makes it more difficult for the tribunal to get the true picture from the point of view of service personnel. Captain Oates elaborated further on the problem: "DIR's lack of involvement in ADF management, its lack of direct knowledge of ADF matters and no independent information access make that Department poorly placed to perform the employer's role in any bargaining process" (1992, p.31).
The Armed Forces Federation is currently seeking federal registration with the Industrial Relations Commission in a bid to gain legal recognition for its role in representing the members of the Defence Force. It is felt that registration will secure the Federation's right of appearance at all DFRT hearings, and force the government and ministers to consult with the Federation on all matters affecting pay and conditions of service. The status of the Federation would also change from a lobby group to a legal representative group. However, the Federation would remain an independent organisation and would not seek affiliation with the ACTU or any other union body.

However, while registration will improve the status of the Federation and perhaps "legitimise" its role in the eyes of many Defence personnel, it will not give the Federation the exclusive right to represent Defence personnel before DFRT. The operation of the DFRT is laid down in the Defence Act, so it would be necessary for the Act to be amended before the Federation could replace the Defence Force Advocate in tribunal hearings. However, registration would at least give the Federation legal status and force the ADF to acknowledge the role it can play in representing service personnel.

Perhaps in the future, the Tribunal's functions could be absorbed by the Industrial Relations Commission. This was in fact a recommendation of the 1985 Hancock Report into Australian industrial relations, which acknowledged the unique nature of the Defence Force, but still concluded that the responsibility for determining salaries and allowances should reside with the Industrial Relations Commission (Report of the Committee of Review, 1985. p.116). However, this approach is probably unlikely in the foreseeable future because of the inherent differences between military and civilian employment, and the resulting requirement for different approaches to wage determination. As argued by Captain Oates, civilian procedures are generally incompatible with the military ethos and service under a code of discipline. The ADF is not prepared to accept their lack of representation in the DFRT hearings. However, registration would at least give the Federation legal status and force the ADF to acknowledge the role it can play in representing service personnel.

A separation of the salary vote from other Defence expenditure within the Defence budget must be regarded as a necessity. This is something which ArFFA could pursue as a major issue. Separation is necessary to avoid the conflict between competing interests for the same funds. There should never be a requirement for a "trade-off" between one area of Defence expenditure and another. After all, it has been pointed out that servicemen need satisfactory and fair pay levels as well as modern equipment and adequate training provisions (Lawrence, 1986, p.36). One cannot be offset against the other without adversely affecting morale and efficiency.

Conclusion

This article has argued that Australian service personnel require some form of collective representation in the determination of pay and conditions, and that therefore, the Armed Forces Federation should have greater involvement in the Defence remuneration process. The important role played by service conditions matters in terms of the overall morale and effectiveness of the Defence Force is now acknowledged. The growing demand among service personnel for increased representation in the remuneration process was highlighted initially by the formation of the Armed Forces Federation. Continued support for the Federation since then indicates that this lack of representation is still an issue of concern for service personnel.

Arguments that such representation would present a threat to military discipline and authority have been shown to be unfounded in the conservative behaviour of the ArFFA to date. The experiences of unionised armed forces in Europe have also shown that military unions concern themselves with issues of pay and conditions, not with discipline and operational matters (Group Representation in European Armed Forces, 1979, p.2).

Many Australian service personnel are no longer prepared to accept their lack of representation in the remuneration process. The Defence Force remains one of the only areas of employment where representation in the determination of pay and conditions is denied. It seems likely that this situation will eventually be corrected.

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Captain Toni Averay joined the Army in March 1985 as an RAAEC officer and was posted to Enoggera Education Wing in Queensland as a Lieutenant instructor. After transferring to RAEME in 1987 she was promoted to Captain and posted to 1 Training Group as a Training Development Officer. Captain Averay was adjutant of RAEME Training Centre 1990-91 and instructor and company second-in-command at Duntroon in 1992. In 1993 she was selected for full-time civil schooling where she completed a Graduate Diploma in Industry Relations at Canberra University. Captain Averay is currently posted as SO2 Pay and Allowances in the Directorate of Personal Support and Conditions — Army.
Politics and the Management of Change — A Case Study from the Australian Army Health Services

By Colonel W.P. Ramsey.

Introduction

During the past seven years the Australian Defence Force has undergone major structural reshaping. The Dibb Report (1986) and subsequent Defence White Paper (1987) have provided a new focus for defence planners. They created a renewed interest in field activities with a strategic emphasis on northern Australia. At the same time, the economic consequences of the national recession was manifested as financial restraint in all government departments including Defence.

The Australian Army identified one solution to these influences as the amalgamation of static and field units with similar functions. It was anticipated that the amalgamated units would more effectively utilise the available personnel while still performing the same functions; the Army Health Service (AHS) were not immune from these changes. In 1989, a field hospital (1st Field Hospital) and a static hospital (2nd Military Hospital) were amalgamated in Sydney. The new 1st Field Hospital retained a primary role of providing level three medical support to the field Army. At the same time the new hospital was also tasked to provide Australian Support Area (ASA) medical support to military personnel in the Sydney area, previously provided by 2nd Military Hospital.

The amalgamation process was a major change for both medical units and had the potential to dramatically alter the work practices of all personnel involved. It is well recognised that the process of change is associated with uncertainty and anxiety among participants (Brown, 1979, p.171). These characteristics were demonstrated at 1st Field Hospital during the amalgamation process. This article will explore the management of change at 1st Field Hospital and will begin with a contextual analysis of the circumstances surrounding the process of change (Pettigrew, 1987, p.655). It will then consider the traditional military approach to the management of change. Finally, an alternate approach that recognises the management of change as a political process will be described.

The Contest of Change

It is acknowledged that external factors play an important part in shaping the actions of individuals within an organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p.5). The ideology of both major political parties in Australia reflects national perceptions and expectations about the defence forces. While both parties acknowledge the need for a well equipped Defence Force, it is also acknowledged that the Defence Force receives significantly lower priorities during times of peace (O’Connor, 1985, p. 15).

Although the Australian Defence Force (ADF) receives little public attention during peace time, exceptions do occur when it is involved in major financial expenditure, especially the purchase of significant capital equipment items. Other instances are usually associated with controversial social issues such as the enlistment and retention of homosexuals in the ADF. Recently, the peace and environmental movements have also sought to influence the national defence agenda by arguing for a peace dividend following the end of the "cold war".

One other social issue has also had a major impact on the Australian Army. While the ADF has formally acknowledged the effect of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) principles on the employment of women, the ratio of males to females in the Australian Army is still only 10:1. (Defence Report, 1990-1991). At the same time, the employment of women in combat-related tasks has now received formal recognition. The impact of these initiatives is relevant to 1st Field Hospital. For many years, the only females in the unit were nurses associated with an operational requirement (Daniel, 1990).

In another external contest, it is important to consider the impact of changes to the Australian health care system on AHS. Army Health Services are unique in that they provide comprehensive health care to all personnel and are financed by costings determined by historical expenditure. The civilian health care system has recognised inefficiencies with historical based funding and has developed a number of methods, including privatisation, to restrict health expenditure. While contracting-out has been used by the Army for some services, until now the AHS have
not been involved. However, privatisation may have a significant impact on all AHS members including those employed in Army hospitals, such as 1st Field Hospital.

At the same time the consumers have modified their demands in line with changes identified in the civilian community. Improved education standards and a greater awareness of health issues is manifested as a growing critical assessment of the quality of health services. The demand for quality care and the fear of litigation are recognised as significant factors that affect health care professionals in the direct provision of health services (Palmer & Short, 1989). A major internal contextual factor of change was associated with the structural reshaping of both units due to amalgamation (Pettigrew, 1987, p.657). The new 1st Field Hospital maintained the organisational structure of a field unit with the addition of a static clinical services department. The organisational division of labour in field medical units is based on clinical services and administration support services. Bureaucratic management control is maintained by a formal hierarchy, rules and standard operating procedures. At the same time, in a field medical unit, the skills of medical administrators are well recognised because of the difficult circumstances of providing health support in a potentially hostile environment. Thus, within this framework, professional autonomy is resisted while other military skills are more highly recognised. The imperative of battlefield medical support is based on a philosophy to provide the greatest good to the greatest number and accepts that not all soldiers may survive or will receive full and comprehensive treatment.

The structural integrity of the static hospital underwent more dramatic changes. Static hospitals are managed by less bureaucratic techniques and place a greater emphasis on professional autonomy with less emphasis on hierarchy, rules and procedures. In the static hospital, health professionals with clinical skills are more highly regarded than personnel with advanced military skills, such as medical administrators. The philosophy of care in static military hospitals is recognised as the desire to provide high quality medical care for all.

While the Commanding Officer (CO) retained responsibility for all services within the hospital following amalgamation, a realignment of organisational authority occurred and was associated with a greater emphasis on the skills of senior medical administrators at the expense of clinical specialists. This realignment reflected a requirement to accentuate the unit’s primary task of providing field medical services. At the same time, the traditional clinical division of labour on professional lines was maintained with a senior medical officer responsible for clinical services and the senior nursing officer responsible for nursing services.

Culture reflects another important internal contextual factor (Pettigrew, 1987, p.657). The amalgamation of both hospitals was associated with a cultural shift to reflect the dual role that emphasised the need for military skills while continuing to provide high quality health care from the static facility. The culture of field medical units reflects a greater concept of selflessness with a commitment to service 24 hours a day and the acceptance of deployment at short notice for long periods of time. On the other hand, the culture of the static hospital resembled an equivalent civilian hospital. While work was highly regarded, the commitment to work did not reflect the same degree of selflessness as evidenced within the field unit.

There was also an acceptance in the field unit of a more rigid code of discipline with an acknowledgement of the need for more physical activities that often required aggressive physical and mental characteristics. The static hospital placed less emphasis on a strict code of discipline and attributes such as physical fitness were less well regarded.

The acceptance of females was also an important cultural difference between the two units. While the only females in the field unit were nursing officers, the static hospital included and accepted a large number of females in a broad range of employment categories. It has been recognised earlier that the amalgamation process occurred at a time when more women were expecting to be employed in field units. Notwithstanding the official policy on EEO, the inclusion of women in field units reflected a major cultural change to a male-dominated organisation. While many women supported the amalgamation process as a method of gaining employment in the field Army, others were more reserved and manifested a fear of uncertainty often associated with change (Brown, 1979, p.171).

The Management of Change

The culture of the new hospital was associated with a greater emphasis on the military ethos of service. At the same time, the desire for high quality medical care was emphasised as an imperative for soldiers in all circumstances and not restricted to static facilities. The new hospital also acknowledged the place of women in the field Army and included women in all categories of field activities.
The military approach to management, including management of change, is based on the assumption that the actions of individuals may be shaped according to needs. The existence of needs is said to be generic to human nature and encompass the desires of survival, social approval and self-actualisation (Aungles & Parker, 1989, p. 16). Thus, to ensure continued and effective performance of organisation roles, all members of the organisation should be provided with the means to satisfy individual needs.

The instrumental, rational account of management as a technical process that includes the systematic application of scientifically-based knowledge recognises the CO as the person responsible for managing change. Thus, to manage change effectively, the CO should provide a prescription for change. That prescription should include: the design of an appropriate organisational structure; coordination of activities; well-defined rules and procedures; and effective leadership to motivate an acceptance of change (Mintzberg, 1975, p.230).

Leadership and the ability to motivate individuals play a vital part in military management philosophy. General Sir John Hackett, in the well regarded military text *The Profession of Arms* (1983, p.215) argues that the leader provides the direction for success and identifies the characteristics and qualities of a good leader. Military leadership principles are based on the motivation theories of Maslow (1954) and Herzberg (1966). Motivation theories assume that individuals seek knowledge to understand change. Thus an important part of the management of change includes an explanation of the effects of change on an individual.

It may be argued that these processes occurred at 1st Field Hospital. A detailed organisational structure was prepared and an implementing instruction that described levels of hierarchy, control methods and a division of labour was issued. The process of change was also discussed in detail with individuals. It may further be argued that leadership and motivational skills were also invoked. However, the management of change at 1st Field Hospital may also be addressed by recognising the influence of interests of key personnel. The interests of individuals are a complex set of predispositions that include goals, values, desires, expectations and orientations. These interests cause an individual to act in a particular way. The interests of individuals may be classified as: task interests that are connected with the immediate work being performed; career interests which reflect future aspirations; and extramural interests which encompass private attitudes, values and beliefs that may shape reactions to position and career (Morgan, 1986, p.150). Thus, an understanding of the different types of interests of individuals and the influence of contextual issues described previously provides a method of recognising personal agendas as they relate to specific actions and activities.

The tensions that exist between different interests make work inherently political even before considering the actions of other individuals. It is well recognised that the formation of coalitions is an important and integral component of organisational behaviour. Coalitions form between individuals or groups with similar values, ideologies or a common interest in a specific issue or event (Morgan, 1986, p.154). It is acknowledged that in many organisations there is often a dominant coalition that controls important policy areas. It is also appreciated that in military units, these dominant coalitions form around the CO or other key personnel. In the health care system it is recognised that professional monopolists usually dominate corporate rationalisers and consumers (Alford, 1972, p.80). At 1st Field Hospital these groups are represented by medical and nursing staff, medical administrators, and patients. A recognition of these coalitions by the CO offers an important means to secure desired objectives.

Conflict occurs when the interests of individuals and groups differ and this is inherent to all organisations (Edwards, 1986, p.24). At 1st Field Hospital, conflict among key personnel was a manifestation of the emphasis placed on administrative skills and the imposition of a dominant military culture in preference to professional autonomy. It is also important to recognise the intensity of this conflict in terms of the effect of changed expectations of health care consumers on health professionals.

While all health professionals support the objective to provide a high standard of health care, it is also acknowledged that conflict is inherent between the medical and nursing professions (Willis, 1989). This conflict is related to medical dominance of the nursing profession and is influenced by gender differences between the two groups. Professional conflict was identified at 1st Field Hospital. Conflict due to gender was also apparent at 1st Field Hospital with the employment of females in a wide range of field occupations.

Conflict is resolved by the use of power (Morgan, 1986, p.157). Power has been defined by Dahl as "the ability to get another person to do something he or she would not do otherwise" (Morgan, 1986, p.158). There are a number of sources of power available to a CO that may be mobilised to resolve conflicts. In a military setting, the most obvious source of power is the legitimised power of formal authority vested in the CO and acknowledged by all military personnel.
Formal authority allows the CO to attempt to control conflict by decree. It was possible to promote EEO principles with the compulsory employment of women in the field component and in positions of authority. However, it should be noted that this action resulted in covert manifestations of conflict. The establishment of an organisational structure, rules and regulations that are justified on technical terms are also motivated by considerations relating to issues of control.

Control of resources is also a powerful tool available to a CO. At 1st Field Hospital, the control of staffing was a key issue and was used to influence the balance of power between department heads. It was possible to effectively place greater emphasis of field activities by allocating staff to the person in control of the field component. At the same time the maintenance of the traditional division of labour between medical and nursing staff did not resolve that inherent conflict.

The influence of medical administrators was also increased as a result of their ability to control information systems within the hospital. The senior medical administrator acted as a "gatekeeper" (Pettigrew, 1972, p.197) and was able to control and shape information flows in accordance with personal interests that also conformed with the CO’s desired outcome. The coalition between CO and the senior medical administrator played an important part in shaping actions within the hospital.

Symbolism and the management of meaning also plays an important part in the control of conflict (Pfeffer, 1981, p.181). Ceremonies are an integral component of any military organisation. At 1st Field Hospital, military parades were used to demonstrate control and shape information flows in accordance with personal interests that also conformed with the CO’s desired outcome. The coalition between CO and the senior medical administrator played an important part in shaping actions within the hospital.

The amalgamation of two Army units to create a new 1st Field Hospital was undertaken as part of the Australian Army solution to financial restraint and a renewed emphasis on the field Army. Other less apparent external factors influenced the amalgamation process; community attitudes to social issues such as the employment of women, the nature of the civilian health care system and consumer expectations, in particular. Internal factors also affected the process of change. Specifically, the establishment of a bureaucratic control structure that placed greater emphasis on medical administration at the expense of professional autonomy. Changes to the corporate culture were also initiated that placed greater emphasis on the military ethos and acknowledged the place of women in the field Army.

The amalgamation process was one of major change for both medical units, and dramatically altered the work practices of key personnel. The military approach to managing this change is derived from an instrumental account of management and emphasises the psychological perspective of leadership and motivational skills. However, this approach does not pay credence to the interests, meanings or beliefs of individuals within an organisation. A consideration of these factors recognises that conflict is inherent in all organisations and that power resources may be mobilised to manage conflict. This article identified the power resources available to the CO 1st Field Hospital and their use. In this case the mobilisation of power resources controlled most sources of conflict so that the amalgamation process was recognised as a success. At the time these actions were intuitive; they may have been enhanced to a greater understanding and awareness of the politics of managing change.

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Colonel Wayne Ramsay joined the Army as a medical undergraduate in 1976. He graduated from the University of Tasmania in 1977 with a Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery and Bachelor of Medical Science. His first posting was as RMO 1st Armoured Regiment and was followed by a range of command and staff appointments. From Dec 88 until Jan 92 he was CO 1st Field Hospital. He attended Command and Staff College, Queenscliff in 1986 and completed a Master of Health Administration at the University of New South Wales in 1992. He is currently posted as Commander, Land Command Medical Services.
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Appreciating the Military Problem — Part Two

By Major Darryl Stuart, RAA.

“Rules are for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools.”

Anon

Introduction

War is fought in an environment of imperfect knowledge and violent action. At its essence are initiative and decisive action. At their different levels the leader, commander, and strategist must all solve military problems to apply violence and win initiative. These problems are not susceptible to mere calculations or even to logic alone. They require intuition, prediction, and imagination. The problem-solving aid provided to invoke these skills is the appreciation process.

The appreciation process was conceived in 19th century Germany by Moltke and Elder (Chief of the German General Staff in 1853), who said:

‘Our science gives us no fundamental rules to be always applied, no formula to help us over all our difficulties. The essential thing in war is on every occasion to ‘appreciate the situation’ rightly and to make arrangements that are best suited for that situation.’

Thus, the essence of the appreciation is the rejection of rules or formula in favour of the demands of the situation. Since its beginnings as a systematic study for solving tactical problems, the appreciation process has evolved into an institution in professional armies around the world.

This is the second of two articles written on the appreciation process in the ADF. It proposes modifications to the process in order to address the ADF’s requirement for a problem-solving process in terms of the following criteria:

a. providing a guaranteed solution;
b. timeliness;
c. simplicity;
d. creativity; and
e. accountability.

It is beyond the scope of this article to modify the entire appreciation process. I will only concentrate on the selection of factors, analysis of information, and the development of courses open. These were the elements of the process specifically evaluated in my first article. A factor shall be defined as a category of information relating to the aim. The term information will be used to represent facts or reasonable assumptions bearing on the aim.

The topic will be addressed as a new doctrine for the appreciation process called the Queenscliff 92 Doctrine. It is written to supplement, rather than replace, the existing doctrine in JSP 102.

Having reviewed the appreciation process in terms of the requirements of the ADF, it is apparent that although it is theoretically sound, it is weakened by a number of practical deficiencies.

The appreciation process is not user-friendly. Logical deductive reasoning is a complex mental process requiring great discipline. Also the serial processing of information in the short term memory is inefficient. It fails to take advantage of the significant parallel processing powers of the long term memory.

The appreciation process is not a complete methodology. It relies heavily on factor and deduction guides used to guarantee a doctrinal solution at the expense of creativity. Specific gaps exist in the method of the process for selecting factors, and developing courses of action for both the enemy and own forces.

Moreover, the appreciation process is not capable of being amended to meet time constraints.

The process does not do enough to promote creative thinking, through the use of intuition or insight.

The first three deficiencies collectively give the concept of situating the appreciation credibility, since they are the areas where it excels. The final deficiency is a more general and subjective criticism, but one which should not require further justification.

A User-Friendly Process

Even though the existing appreciation process is not user-friendly, it is important to recognise its strengths. These are that it is logical, in the sense that conclusions can be explained and supported, and it is comprehensive in the analysis of information. These advantages should be retained as the test of any modified approach.

The deficiency in the existing process is a result of
the way information relevant to the aim is structured and analysed by being uniquely categorised under factor headings. Thus, the information that the enemy has air superiority by day is categorised under relative strengths, but not time and space. We rely on deductions to bridge the gap when information is relevant to more than one factor. Information is then analysed by factor, one piece at a time. This requires considerable mental discipline in the application of the “So what?” test, to information which may later be discovered to be irrelevant, redundant or wrong.

Thus, two areas for improvement can be identified:

a. information should be more easily available for analysis with all the factors; and

b. some process of reviewing information is required to identify the most important facts first, to reduce the deductive workload.

To improve the process, we must take a different approach to the way the problem is structured. Factors should not be considered as unique categories of information. It must be recognised that information is likely to be relevant to many, if not all, factors. In scientific terms, the factors are the dimensions of the problem space and information is considered as multi-dimensional.

The proposed technique for analysis is to first review all information in terms of the first factor and the aim. Using the knowledge base of the long term memory, relevant information is identified and deductions are drawn from the broad sweep of all the data available. If necessary, specific pieces of information can be identified for more detailed deductive analysis. This compares to the existing doctrine of making separate deductions from each piece of information. It is appropriate to call this process “Wargaming the factor” as we apply the technique of deduction laterally across all known information in terms of the factor. After consideration of the first factor is complete, the other factors are then wargamed in turn.

The objects of wargaming are to quickly identify the key deductions linking the factor to the aim, to highlight key information (or information gaps), requiring more detailed analysis, and to define the constraints and freedoms affecting possible courses of action.

It retains the benefits of a comprehensive analysis of all information. In fact, all the information is analysed with all the factors; this gives greater exposure to the information than the existing process. The lateral use of deduction also retains the logical integrity of the process, whilst making it more efficient by using the capacity of the long term memory to sort and relate vast quantities of information. Conclusions drawn from wargaming can be supported and proven from the professional knowledge stored in long term memory.

Thus, the benefits of wargaming are that information is automatically made available for analysis with all the factors, and that the parallel processing power of the long term memory is used to ease the burden of deductive reasoning.

### Factor Selection

By representing factors as component parts (or dimensions, of the problem, we have already developed a measure of guidance for their selection. Factors can be established on either the physical properties of the problem or on the theoretical principles of the problem. For military problems, the norm has been to use the physical dimensions of relative strengths, the environment, and time. These have been developed in great detail in existing tactical and operational appreciation doctrine and remain relevant in the proposed modification to the process. However, systems of non-tangible factors could also be used, eg. the principles of war, or the basic considerations for operations.

Further general guidance on selecting factors can be derived from the proposed new relationship between information and factors. If all the information is analysed in terms of every factor, then it follows that the set of factors must completely describe all the information. Thus, if there exists any information that cannot be adequately described in terms of the factors, then the list of factors is incomplete.

Once factors have been selected, they should each be considered in terms of their importance to the aim. Then the most decisive factor should be selected. This could be apparent from the nature of the aim, eg. in delay missions, time is the dominant factor; in capture missions, the ground; in destroy missions the relative strengths. Having identified the decisive factor in the problem, it is wargamed first.

### Generating Courses Open

Assume that an appreciation is being conducted in the new format and all the information has been wargamed in terms of each of the factors. Thus, we have identified the key deductions linking the factors and the aim and defined the constraints and freedoms
effecting possible courses of action. In effect we have decided all that it is possible to do and how it can be done. To link these conclusions into a course of action, it remains to decide what must be done to achieve the aim. This process will be described as “Task Analysis”.

Task analysis approaches the problem in terms of the aim. This compares with wargaming, which approaches the problem in terms of the situation and the information. Using professional knowledge, the aim is dissected into its implied component parts or tasks. These tasks can be derived either hierarchically or temporarily. A hierarchical set of tasks are enabling tasks, a temporal set of tasks is the timed sequence of tasks required to achieve the aim. The current Army tactical appreciation process already provides guidance for tasks analysis under the “assessment of tasks” heading.

Task analysis should be conducted for both friendly and enemy troops in a military appreciation. Then, by comparing the results of wargaming, what can be done, with the conclusions of the task analysis, what has to be done; workable courses of action can be generated. Because the conclusions of wargaming and task analysis are derived separately, the new process should assist in the identification of multiple courses of action.

Meeting Time Constraints

The process of wargaming is highly redundant to ensure a comprehensive analysis of the problem. Thus, it is responsive to time constraints. As the time for a full appreciation is reduced, the process can first be shortened by only wargaming the decisive factor. This still ensures that all the information is considered. Then, after courses are developed, they can be validated against the other factors. If even less time is available, then the process may go straight to the task analysis, with a subsequent validation of courses against all the factors as time allows.

Thus, in developing the concepts of wargaming and task analysis, we have also created a process which is responsive to time constraints. The risks involved in shortening the process have been minimised by ensuring that the decisive factor is analysed first, and that within each factor the most relevant information is identified first. It is accepted that shortened appreciations are more likely to produce doctrinal solutions.

Fostering Creativity

Creativity is encouraged by reducing the external constraints imposed on a problem solver and by establishing the conditions to encourage insight into the problem. Both of these requirements are addressed by the Queenscliff 92 Doctrine.

By allowing the freedom to choose and prioritise the factors relating to the aim, we have removed one of the constraints entrenched in the existing process. Similarly, the use of task analysis to replace the templates currently provided for outline plans will allow a greater freedom of expression in developing courses open.

By analysing all the information for every factor, the new doctrine encourages creativity by allowing the aim to be represented in several different ways, ie. in terms of each factor. Changing the perception of the problem allows the mind the maximum chance to re-order the information to gain insight into novel solutions. When time is constrained, the short versions described above will restrict the likelihood of creative solutions.

The Queenscliff 92 Doctrine relies on professional knowledge in the same way as the existing process. The conclusions of both wargaming and task analysis are only as valid as the professional knowledge of the commander. The symbiotic relationship between the method and knowledge has been retained and must be explicitly explained in any amendment to the appreciation process.

The Queenscliff 92 Doctrine has been consolidated to provide a direct comparison with the existing appreciation process in Figure 1.

Conclusion

The Queenscliff 92 Doctrine has been developed in this article to address the structural deficiencies identified in the appreciation process in terms of the ADF requirement for a problem-solving process. It proposes three reforms to the appreciation process which:

a. restructure the relationship between information and factors so that all information is available for analysis under every factor. The individual factors having been selected are also analysed to identify the decisive factor for analysis first;
b. replace the technique of sequential deduction
A Comparison of the Queenscliff 92 Doctrine with the Existing Appreciation Process

**QUEENSCLIFF 92 DOCTRINE**

**SELECTION OF FACTORS**
Factors are selected as categories of information. All the information relevant to the aim must be able to be expressed in terms of the factors. Existing guidance in tactical and operational appreciations is still valid.

**PRIORITISING FACTORS**
Factors are prioritised in terms of their importance to the aim. The decisive factor in terms of the aim is selected first. Then all other factors are prioritised.

**ANALYSING INFORMATION**
The decisive factor is wargamed against the aim referring to all the information available: to identify key deductions, and highlight information requiring further analysis, and to define any constraints or freedoms affecting possible courses of action.

All the information is then wargamed against each of the other factors in turn. During this stage the commander may wish to reconsider which is the decisive factor.

**IDENTIFYING COURSES OPEN**
After all the factors have been wargamed the aim is subjected to a task analysis. The object of task analysis is to identify what must be done to achieve the aim. By linking these conclusions with those from wargaming it will be possible to derive workable courses of action.

---

**THE EXISTING PROCESS**

**REVIEW OF THE SITUATION**

**SELECTION OF THE AIM**

**SELECTION OF FACTORS**
Factors are selected from a list developed for military use. More detailed guidance is provided for specific tactical and operational appreciations.

**PRIORITISING FACTORS**
Factors are arranged to ensure the logical consideration of the information. They can also be prioritised as either overriding or pervasive.

**ANALYSING INFORMATION**
The information is distributed between the factors. Starting with the first factor each piece of information is subjected to an exhaustive process of deduction in relation to the aim.

**IDENTIFYING COURSES OPEN**
Courses of action are considered as factors. Deductions are drawn from the analysis of information. These deductions are crafted into courses of action using professional knowledge.

**SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE**

**OUTLINE PLAN**
using information one piece at a time, by “War-gaming”. This allows us to apply the associative ability of our long term memory laterally to all the known information in terms of each factor, analysing the decisive factor first. The objects of wargaming are to:
(1) quickly identify the key deductions linking the factor to the aim;
(2) to identify key information (or information gaps) which require further analysis; and
(3) to define the constraints and freedoms affecting possible courses of action; it also

c. proposes a new technique to assist in the development of courses open, “Task Analysis” which aims to identify what must be done to achieve the aim, using either enabling tasks or a time series of tasks. Courses open are developed from the overlap between the deductions of wargaming the factors, and the results of the task analysis of the aim.

The Queenscliff 92 Doctrine retains the advantages of logical reasoning and the comprehensive analysis of information, inherent in the existing process. It provides greater guidance to assist the understanding of the general appreciation process, whilst retaining the benefits of the guidance already provided for specific operational and tactical appreciations. The inefficient process of analysing information one piece at a time has been replaced by the mind’s associative ability to draw deductions from a large array of information. It also offers shortened forms, trading creativity for doctrine when time is constrained.

NOTES
2. Detailed explanation for these criteria is outlined in Part 1 of this article, ADFJ, previous issue.
3. These definitions clarify current doctrine which is ambiguous in its use of the term "factor".
4. The title does not imply that the doctrine is endorsed by the Army Staff College at Fort Queenscliff, it merely nominates the location of its inception.
5. Detailed explanation for these deficiencies can be found in Part 1 of this article.
6. This term should not be confused with common usage at the infantry Centre where a technique of wargaming is used to evaluate and optimise courses open.
7. These examples are trivial and should not be used as a template. In operational terms, the decisive factor should include consideration of the centre of gravity of the problem.

Editor’s Note:

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How to Get the Most From Your Military Interpreter

By Capt D.J. Kilcullen, RA Inf.

"... interpreting has sometimes been called the art of transferring a speaker's statement from the speaker's mouth to the interpreter's ears, and from the interpreter's mouth to the audience's ears, without it passing through the minds of any."

R. Glemet,
Head of the GATT Interpreting Unit, 1957.

Introduction

Every year, many exercises and activities occur which involve foreign troops. For every single one of these activities there is a language problem — even if it is only knowing what US company commanders mean when they tell you "My FIST is in travelling overwatch". Consider, then, how enormous the language problem becomes when the participating troops are from Indonesia. Thailand. Brunei. Malaysia or any of the other non-English-speaking countries which regularly take part in training in Australia. The same problem arises when foreign officers visit this country. In these circumstances the Australian representative is likely to be allocated the services of one of the Military Linguists trained by the ADF School of Languages at Point Cook in Victoria. But this involves its own problems — many people are unfamiliar with interpreters, and feel constrained by their presence. Again, it is difficult to know exactly how to brief your interpreters, and what to expect from them.

The aim of this article is a simple one: to explain what interpreters are, what they can do for you, and how you can employ them in an effective manner — in short, how to get the most from your interpreter.

What is an Interpreter

Think of an interpreter as being one of the many specialist advisers available to the commander. Interpreters provide a liaison function, allowing effective communication between two officers who do not have an effective shared means of understanding.

Military Linguists are trained at the ADF School of Languages, Point Cook. They undergo a year of intensive training in their language, with a strong military and government orientation, but also with the ability to converse and write on a wide range of general topics, such as might unexpectedly be raised by, say, an Indonesian General at a cocktail party. They also study and practice techniques of interpreting and translating both into and out of English. Generally speaking, you can rely on your interpreter to understand what your foreign counterpart is saying, and to convert it into the appropriate English equivalent.

In addition to this training, most interpreters have lived in or at least regularly visited the relevant foreign country and have experience in interpreting and translating a wide range of spoken and written material. So, they have a good cultural understanding of the foreign nation’s way of life. Armed with this knowledge of the interpreter’s background, let us look at the services he or she can provide for you.

Services Provided by Military Linguists

Military Linguists offer three principal services:
• Interpreting. Spoken interpretation of meetings, orders groups, social functions, negotiations, and any other face-to-face communicative situations.
• Translation. Translation of instructions, orders, letters, plans or other written documents into English, or into the foreign language.
• Liaison. The interpreter’s cultural understanding allows him or her to perform various services such as briefing your personnel on religious restrictions for your visitors, ensuring food taboos are not infringed, and generally smoothing out the potential friction involved in the meeting of two cultures.

Another important wartime task of the interpreter is interrogation. However, since an interrogation interpreter requires extra qualifications such as the ability to conduct tactical questioning, and since such activities are not in regular demand at present, they fall outside the scope of this article and will not be examined further.

Having now gained some idea of the services interpreters can provide, let us look at each in turn and consider how to employ the interpreter most effectively.
Interpreting

This is not the place to delve too deeply into the black arts employed by interpreters to convert a foreign language sentence into idiomatic, military correct English — and vice versa — in the twinkling of an eye. Suffice to say that the interpreter relies on a good general knowledge of the foreign language, the learning of technical terminology in advance and the taking of a specialised form of notes which act as "memory joggers". In all these areas, except possibly the first, you can be of great assistance to your interpreter.

Remember that what is everyday language to you, may not be so to your interpreter. Generally an effort is made to allocate, say, an infantryman to an interpreting task involving infantry matters, a naval aviator to matters of maritime aviation and so on. But this cannot always be done, and your interpreter may not be fully familiar with your technical jargon. You therefore must brief your interpreter on any specialist terms involved, so that familiarity can be developed before any discussions take place. Give the interpreter as much time as possible for preparation.

While the interpreter passes your message, use the available pause to observe the foreign visitor's reaction — valuable understanding can be gained in this way, especially in negotiations. Remember also that many senior overseas officers speak English well and may understand more than you think.

Translation

Your interpreter can be used to translate many of the important documents involved in a visit or exercise — everything from a Mess Dinner menu to an Exercise Safety Instruction. As a general rule, for every 200-250 words of text the interpreter will require about one hour to produce a perfect, publishable solution. Of course, a rougher rendition can be done in a much shorter time, and an oral translation of the important points of a foreign language document can be given almost immediately. The golden rule is to specify exactly what your requirements are: the interpreter will then work to those requirements.

The linguist's aim will be to produce a translation that is accurate, on time and in a form acceptable to the user. You as the user must specify what form is acceptable. This means knowing whether you want to read the document yourself or are happy with an oral briefing; whether you need an in-depth knowledge of everything in the document; and whether you have time to read the whole document or would prefer a summary or precis of it. A sound practice is to ask for a quick oral briefing on the document and then armed with a rough knowledge of what it contains, specify those parts of it for which you require a detailed written translation.

Another crucial point is that you must always give a deadline. This should follow the guideline mentioned earlier — one hour for every 200-250 words. If you fail to set a realistic deadline, the interpreter may continue to work on accuracy, when what you really wanted was a less perfect English version delivered in a timely manner.

Liaison

Liaison, although one of the less tangible services provided by the interpreter, can be one of the most valuable. The many small cultural frictions which can quickly cause offence — religious matters, personal space, food taboos, and alcohol, for example, can be
smoothed out by giving your interpreter a liaison role with your guests.

Most visiting VIPs bring their own escort officers and ADCs, but some may be reluctant to state their real opinions or needs for fear of giving offence. The interpreter, by liaising with the relevant ADC or escort officer — preferably in advance — can make your visitors feel much more comfortable and more amenable to Australian ways. It may incidentally also provide you with a valuable source of extra information on their opinions and state of mind.

A Checklist for Employment of Linguists

Having examined the range of interpreting services available, and methods of employing the interpreter effectively, let us summarise these points in the form of a checklist for those likely to employ interpreters. The checklist provides a ready reference for those likely to be allocated an interpreter for visit or exercise liaison tasks. In short, the principle ways in which you can improve your interpreter’s performance — and hence your own — are to make the interpreter part of your team, to brief him or her effectively, and to speak clearly, concisely, and simply.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, the quote with which we began this article reflects the reality of much of the use of professional linguists in all fields, including business, international relations and defence. By applying the hints contained in this article and making use of the checklist provided, any commander who finds him or herself tasked to deal with non-English-speaking nationals should be in a position to well and truly get the most out of the Military Interpreter.

Checklist for Employment of Interpreters

Preparatory Briefing

- Explain the aim and objectives of the activity.
- Explain the desired impression to be made on the foreign participants.
- Provide a list of the more common technical terms likely to be used.
- Explain the subjects to be discussed and the various participants viewpoints.
- Give the interpreter any documents to be referred to or needing translation.
- Brief the interpreter on any liaison tasks required.

During Interpretation

- Give a measured, clear delivery. Say what you have to say clearly and simply.
- Use pauses to observe your counterparts’ reaction to your message.
- Make the interpreter part of the team.
- Ask the interpreter’s impression of proceedings and personalities.
- Task someone else to take minutes if necessary.

Translation

- Give a clear and realistic deadline for the translation.
- Get a quick oral briefing from the interpreter on the gist of the document.
- Decide how much of the article needs translating, and in what format.
- Allow one hour per 200-250 words of text to be translated.

Liaison

- Have the interpreter work with the escort officers to make arrangements.
- Task the interpreter to brief appropriate personnel on cultural differences.

NOTES

1. The term “translation” is usually used when the product is written, whereas the term “interpreting” usually relates to spoken language.
4. ADF School of Languages, Guidelines for Interpreters, 1992.
7. This figure is based on the Australian Defence Language Proficiency Rating Scale (ADLPRS), for Level 2 or Level 3 Translators. An experienced linguist working in a familiar field may be able to work much more quickly, but this is the base level. A Level 3 Translator may be required unless the material to be translated is in a formal or military register or is of limited length.
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Captain D.J. Kilcullen graduated from the Defence Force Academy in 1987 and after training at RMC returned to ADFA to complete a BA Hons in English and Politics in 1989. He has since served in a variety of Infantry regimental appointments, and is a 1993 graduate on the ADF School of Languages, Point Cook, in Indonesia. In 1994, he will be serving in a staff appointment at the Directorate of Infantry. He is currently undertaking a PhD in International Relations through the University College, UNSW.

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Australia’s Involvement in Vietnam and the Gulf Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Strategic Foreign Policy Formulation

By Private N.P. Oakey.

Introduction

This article serves to establish that there are important parallels that can be drawn between the decisions to commit Australian military forces to the war efforts in both Vietnam and the Gulf conflicts. A comparison of the foreign policy decision making processes in each case is made within a coherent framework of domestic and international perspectives. This analysis is used to draw up a number of important parallels and differences between the two decisions and permit some concluding speculation on the type of strategic foreign policy decisions best suited to Australia’s interests.

In attempting to establish any parallels between Australia’s Vietnam War contribution and the decision to send ships to the Middle East in 1991, one must essentially look at the process of foreign policy formulation. At the outset, the reader should be aware that this process is one of great complexity, being the end result of a whole host of inter-related factors. In order to provide a certain degree of logic to our analysis, it is imperative that these elements be placed into some sort of coherent framework. To further this end, the Vietnam and Gulf war decisions will be looked at in terms of both the prevailing international climates and elements of the domestic contexts; both are important in the shaping of foreign policy decisions of any government.

Australia and Vietnam — The International Context

Australia’s involvement in Vietnam is an exemplary case of the all pervading fear by Australians that they are living in an unstable region. The international context within which the Vietnam decision was made was one flavoured heavily with Cold War ideology; an era of superpower expansionism and a blind drive for global hegemony. This view of the world as one of capitalism versus communism encouraged the evolution in Australia of a strongly Eurocentric outlook, which meant that Australia’s perception of the region was one of great volatility and hostility. Basic to this perception was the concern about the southward ambitions of the People’s Republic of China and the possible fall of South East Asian “dominoes” as a great danger to Australian interests. The Australian assumption that Hanoi was an important “village” in China’s “countryside of the world” and so open to Chinese communist direction legitimised (in their eyes at least) intervention in South Vietnam. As such, intervention then was to be a purely Australian solution to a purely Australian problem. Yet it was not a problem which Australia sought to overcome by itself. In true Cold War spirit, under the auspice of the highly revered ANZUS agreement, Australian decision makers sought “reliance on a great and powerful friend to guarantee the Pacific as an area of security and tranquillity in a turbulent and hostile world”.

It was on the understanding of two basic premises that Australia actively sought United States involvement in Vietnam. The first was that the United States, through its involvement, would become committed to the South East Asian region, thereby creating a buffer zone across the approaches to Australia. Secondly, it was felt that if Australians actively assisted the American war effort in Vietnam and developed a “habitual closeness of relations with the United States” they would have an obligation to Australia should it be threatened from any outside source. The international context was thus one dominated by security concerns. What must now be assessed, is the extent to which these desired state of affairs were brought about by activity in the Australian domestic sphere.

Australia and Vietnam — The Domestic Context

It would be unsound to consider the reasons for Australia’s Vietnam effort in isolation from the domestic political context. There exist a number of “institutions” in the domestic arena which may play an important role in the shaping of foreign policy and serve as a useful comparative measure when looking at Australian involvement in the Gulf. It is thus to these “institutions” to which attention must be directed.

Firstly, it is imperative that we consider the role of the executive. It is the contention of this article that
one of the chief features of the decision was one of executive dominance. The key actors were a few strategically placed policy makers in the Department of External Affairs. Foreign policy was little debated; “even within the Cabinet it tended to be a matter for the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs.” Australian decision makers in the early months of 1965 took advantage of uncertainty within the US administration over the best course of action to take. They pushed assiduously for the most vigorous military intervention for the purpose of averting a communist victory in South Vietnam in the full knowledge that such a push might have an effect in the confused conditions which existed. Thus it is clear that the Australian decision making elite were not “dragged” into the war. On the contrary, they were very active in its design and implementation.

To discuss the role of parliament in the decision to send troops to Vietnam is in many ways an exercise in the obscure and the futile. The House was presented on the 29 April 1965 with a fait accompli and it is clear that subsequent parliamentary debate in no way contested or shaped in any important manner the decisions of executive government.

When looking at the role of the political parties foreign policy was for the (Liberal) government of the day a crucial issue to which domestic considerations were subservient. The Democratic Labor party was even more extreme in its anti-communist stance and vehemently opposed the Labor proposals of a political rather than a military solution in South Vietnam. In this domestic political climate, Menzies had effectively paved the way for Australian involvement in Vietnam. The government would simply be portrayed as the defender of national security and Labor’s reservations could be depicted as a lack of faith in the American alliance and an unwillingness to take a firm stand against communist aggression. Thus, “for those organising Australia’s Vietnam War effort, they could be sure that in this climate no real debate on the decision could take place.”

The media was a further element which effectively blocked rational debate on the Vietnam issue in the domestic context. There was little opportunity for the nation’s media to comment/report on the decision until it was announced. Hence, as with parliament, the ability of the media to influence that decision was, to say the very least, somewhat restricted.

The role of public opinion is often, given the nature of democratic government, seen to have a decisive role in the shaping of foreign policy decisions. However, given the limited media discussion of the Vietnam issue, informed opinion was largely confined to a minority of civil servants and academics. As the war progressed, however, public opinion polls showed popular support for the war effort at well over 60 per cent. “Vietnam in some senses appeared to be the most popular war in Australia’s history” with the anti-war movement emerging only when the war was at an end and no longer a political issue.

In sum, Australia’s drive to get the United States involved in South Vietnam and its efforts to ensure that it was itself part of that involvement, was politically motivated and a response to what it saw as the necessary defence of South East Asia under threat of advancing communist aggression. The rigidities of Cold War international relations meant that Australia failed to appreciate that they were confronting quite a different phenomena — that of anti-colonial nationalism. It is thus important that the reader be aware that the principles on which the decisions to send troops are in many respects ambiguous. Australia’s policy of “forward defence” towards Vietnam was one which the international climate (and the narrow-minded approach of Cold War diplomacy) encouraged and one which the domestic context had little opportunity to modify. It is this decision to send troops to Vietnam, to which Australia’s war effort in the Middle East in 1991 must now be compared.

Australia and the Gulf Conflict — The International Context

The international context in which Australia made the decision to send ships to the Gulf is in polar opposition to that which prevailed during the Vietnam War era. The end of the Cold War has meant that superpower upmanship is no longer the guiding principle around which global, political and strategic issues are arranged. It is clear that the division of power between nation states today is infinitely more complex than that exhibited in the Vietnam War period. The end of superpower confrontation has seen the erosion of bipolarity which provided the framework for ordering and disciplining the behaviour of world politics for over 40 years. A multilateral balance is emerging which means that peripheral, middle powers, such as Australia need no longer guide their actions along one side of an iron curtain. The thawing of the Cold War has bestowed on all states a more global outlook (although this has not meant that Australia has become any less committed to the American alliance). Many analysts see, with the loosening up of the political rigidities of decades past, the emergence of a “New World Order” which will, given the receding threat of global war, bring in an era of peace. It is not
surprising that given Australia’s incessant fear of it constantly being the object of an elusive aggression (such as in Vietnam) that it has readily attached itself to this romantic notion of everlasting global harmony.

One world body which has attracted a disproportionate degree of power with the decline of bloc rivalry is that of the United Nations. “Cold War divisions which crippled the Security Council for so long (and during Vietnam) have now disappeared . . . thus the United Nations collective security function is now working the way it was meant to”, A New World Order policed by the United Nations is said to be a distinct possibility and is held by those in Canberra to be one of the main premises underlying Australia’s commitment to the Gulf. “The reality and extent of (the) New World Order (and the new role of the UN),” said the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, “is being tested by the present Gulf crisis”. Thus, unlike Vietnam, the decision to send ships to the Gulf can (but not necessarily) be seen more as the Australian contribution to the global solution of a global problem of unprovoked aggression. Re-establishing international order, it is held, also engages Australia’s direct interests as well as a global sense of what is right and what is wrong:

“The security and prosperity of middle powers like Australia will, in the years ahead, depend directly on the strength of the United Nations principles. The strength of those principles in the years ahead depends directly on the support we give them today. If we or our neighbours were subject to aggression in the future, we would want, and we may need the support of the UN. It is in our interest to support the UN today.”

Indeed, Australia’s unprecedented commitment to recent UN operations in Cambodia and Somalia lends credence to such philosophy.

The second basic reason for Australia’s decision (although not as readily admitted) in terms of the international context also differs from that of Vietnam in that it is strongly flavoured with a degree of economic self-interest. The Gulf is the hub of the world oil market and, despite all the rhetoric, it is clear that this was oil which Australia needed and to which it was prepared to make a military commitment. Before turning to the domestic context, the reader should be aware that in terms of morality in international politics (if such a thing can be said to exist), military intervention in the Gulf was in many ways a more appropriate policy than it was in Vietnam. With Iraq’s unprovoked aggression against Kuwait, the moral principle behind such a decision is clearly unambiguous. The basis on which the decision was made in Vietnam is, as previously highlighted, an issue of great debate.

While the international environment in which the decision to send ships to the Gulf was very different from that which existed in the mid-1960s, some interesting parallels can be drawn with that era when one turns to the domestic context of foreign policy formulation.

As with Vietnam, the decision to send ships to the Gulf was once again one made largely by the executive. After high level consultation with Washington, it was only the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Minister who bore the decision for a military commitment. Thus, not even a full Cabinet debated the issue before a resolution was announced.

As was also the case in Vietnam, the prompt executive decision was presented to the parliament with a strong flavour of the fait accompli. The opportunity for qualitative debate which might have shaped the important decision thus did not arise. Hawke did, after the decision had been made, recall both the Senate and the House of Representatives for a report and debate on the war and Australia’s involvement, but such debate could do little to modify the decision and as such, was of limited purpose.

The role of the parties in the Gulf decision was similar to that of 1965 with only one major party formally opposing the Middle East commitment. In a rare display of bi-partisanship the Federal Opposition indicated their support of Australian participation in operations against Iraq. The Democrats opposed, but appeared to gain little electoral advantage in their call for the issue to be fully and publicly debated.” Indeed, one might say that given that the Opposition supported the government on the war, the debate could not be anything but limited. Thus again, as with Vietnam the government of the day was able to use the Opposition to its own advantage in stifling informed opinion.

The Gulf decision was not one widely debated in the media even though, unlike Vietnam, there was a fairly lengthy period for educated speculation. Oakes attributes this to the difficulties of getting political debate off the ground in a holiday period when “current affairs programmes go into recess” and “papers switch to summer reading mode”. Much media discussion was simply derived from or mirrored that of foreign press agencies. Thus, it is clear that as in the mid 1960s, the media did little to shape the decision.

Not unrelated to this is the role of public opinion. It is accepted that military actions require a degree of secrecy and as such are a prerogative of the executive.
However, it is the contention of this article that the decision to enter a war is not of the same league and should firstly be presented to the people (via parliament) for whom that decision is being contemplated. As with Vietnam this was not done: “Whilst President Bush was assiduous in preparing world, United States congressional and public opinion for a United Nations resolution which set the scene for war against Iraq after January 15th (the Australian executive) did no more than respond grudgingly to parliamentary questioning”. This meant that whilst a majority of the Australian population did support its government’s war effort, they may have done so blindly and without hindsight.

In sum, the domestic context in which the Gulf decision was made is one which identifies closely with that made on the decision to send troops to Vietnam.

## Conclusion

From the above discourse, the reader should now be aware of a number of fundamental differences and parallels in the circumstances which shaped the decision for military intervention in the Vietnam and Gulf conflicts. It is accepted that there are a whole host of as yet unmentioned differences including: the nature of the commitment (ships as opposed to combat troops), the differences in the type of military hardware used, the number of casualties — the list goes on. Such factors are not the concern of this article which has sought to focus more on a comparison of the processes which led to the respective decisions as determined by the international and domestic contexts in which each was made. It should be clear that the reasons for each decision were very different. Yet an important parallel can be made in that both cases the traditional “institutions” of the domestic context offered no substantive opposition to the decision of the executive in what it saw as vital in the light of the prevailing international climate.

In closing, the analysis presented in this article has pointed (albeit somewhat subtly) to the type of foreign policy decisions best suited to Australia’s interests. In the Vietnam War, Australia played an active, initiating, some might say even aggressive role in the decision to send troops and secure United States involvement. Yet its war aims were clearly not fulfilled: “it was clear that the Vietnam conflict had not locked the United States into South East Asia. On the contrary, it had proved to be the cause of its physical withdrawal from the region; the Americans’ experience in Vietnam has almost certainly made them less — not more — ready to come to the defence of nations like Australia”. In contrast, the Australian role in the Gulf was much more of a compliant partnership with a much broader United Nations-backed international force. In this instance it was to benefit to an infinitely greater extent than it did from the decision to send troops to Vietnam. Australia was seen to be unambiguously championing the cause of collective security, “global citizenship”, freedom from aggression and maintenance of a New World Order under the United Nations. This simple observation brings to light a rather interesting paradox: it appears that when Australia is a “prime mover” in war decisions it seems to ultimately suffer from their outcomes, as it did in Vietnam. Whereas when our nation adopts the position of an “obedient partner” as it did in the Gulf and continues to do so in Cambodia and Somalia, it is rewarded to no end. Thus in this case logic would lead one to conclude Australia’s interests are best furthered through a policy of obedience (not aggressiveness as in Vietnam) to “great and powerful friends”; although it is always dangerous to expect logic in international strategic relations, it would seem that Australia can only benefit from a system of collective security under a United Nations umbrella of New World Order.

### NOTES

4. Sexton, M., _op. cit_, p.94.
5. _ibid_, p.88.
SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE!

You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full Victory!

Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.

— Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Longest Day

On 6 June 1944 the greatest landing-force ever assembled began the Allied liberation of France — and of Europe. For those who survived ‘D-Day’, and the bloody battles that followed it, the bitter-sweet memories of those momentous hours will never be forgotten; for many others, it was the moment of supreme sacrifice.


The Prime Minister, Paul Keating, laying a wreath at the Air Force Memorial — Runnymede, England.
Peaceful Invasion at Normandy

On 6 June 1994, the beaches of Normandy were invaded once again. However, this time the invasion was a peaceful one unlike 50 years ago when Allied troops stormed the shores.

Half a century before, on 6 June 1944, after years of planning and preparation, Allied troops made their assault on the Normandy coastline. The Normandy landings were the prelude to the liberation of France and ultimately the end of the war in Europe.

Australia's participation was limited as most of her troops had been recalled to defend Australia against a probable invasion from Japan. However, Australian airmen played a vital role in the air war prior to and during the invasion.

At least 25 Australian soldiers were also involved in the landings and although no Royal Australian Navy vessels were in the invasion fleet several Royal Navy craft were commanded by Australians. About 500 Australian naval personnel were on British cruisers and destroyers off the coast of Normandy.

At the invitation of the British and French Governments, the Prime Minister, Mr Paul Keating attended commemorative functions in both England and France and took part in wreath laying ceremonies.

On 4 June 1994, the Prime Minister laid a wreath at the Air Force Memorial at Runnymede, England. Service personnel attending included Air Commodore Searle, who was representing the Chief of Air Staff, Commodore G.P. Kable, HADS — London, Colonel Don Tait, senior army adviser to the Australian High Commission, members of the High Commission Staff and members of No 1 Squadron who were in England to participate in the D-Day and Portsmouth flypasts.

Four Australian veterans who were sponsored by the Australian Government to attend the anniversary commemorations also attended the ceremony. The veterans, representing the three services and those held as prisoners of war accompanied the Prime Minister to the ceremonies in England and France.

A Drumhead Service, conducted by the Archbishop of Canterbury, was held on Sunday 5 June. The ceremony signified the forces committed to the "Great Adventure" that was to liberate Europe from the Occupation, to give thanks to those who took part in this momentous event and to remember those who did not return.

An Australian F-111 from the RAAF's No 1 Squadron was part of the flypast.

Following the service a flotilla left Portsmouth heading across the Channel to take part in the commemoration activities planned for the anniversary of D-Day on the Omaha, Utah, Gold, Juno and Sword beaches of Normandy.

On 8 June, Air Commodore Searle attended a church service and the inauguration of a wall built behind the Typhoon Pilot Memorial in Noyers-Bocage, France, on which the names of 150 Typhoon pilots are engraved.

The memorial commemorates the pilots of the Allied Typhoon ground attack aircraft who lost their lives in the Battle of Normandy. Air Commodore Searle laid a wreath in memory of the eight Australians whose names appear on the memorial wall.
By early 1944, 3,500,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen in Britain were preparing for D-Day. About 1,700,000 were British. They were joined by 1,500,000 United States troops. In addition there were Australians, Canadians, Greeks, New Zealanders, Rhodesians and South Africans. Those who had escaped from countries occupied by Germany also joined the Allies, including Belgians, Czechoslovaks, Dutch, French, Norwegians and Poles.

A huge Allied deception plan — Operation Bodyguard — was launched to mislead the Germans into diverting troops away from the planned invasion sites.

Bad weather caused a delay to the chosen invasion date of 5 June. The weather experts advised General Eisenhower, however, that although far from perfect, there would be some let up on 6 June. At 10.00pm on 5 June, Operation Neptune (the codename for the naval element of Overlord) began. The greatest amphibious operation in history was launched. One thousand two hundred and twelve Allied warships, 4,125 amphibious craft, 735 auxiliary craft and 864 merchant ships set sail, with 130,000 men embarked. It was the biggest fleet that was ever put to sea.

They took part in a five-pronged attack along a 50-mile stretch of the Normandy coastline from the Cherbourg Peninsula to the Caen Canal against beachheads designated (from west to east), Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword.

In the early hours of 6 June Allied paratroopers and gliderborne troops landed on the flanks of the invasion area to protect the assault forces during the early stages of the landings. Bombers dropped ‘window’ (thousands of strips of tinfoil), to confuse enemy radar and ‘Ruperts’ (dummy paratroopers), to take attacks on Rouen, Caen and Avranches.

Throughout the night, whilst the airborne troops fought to secure key areas, midget submarines were waiting with lights to guide the Allied tanks on to the beaches.

Then, at first light, Allied bombers dropped 5,000 tons of explosives on the main coastal batteries and the Royal Navy warships HMS Warspite and HMS Belfast led a ferocious barrage to cover the invasion forces.

At 6.30am on 6 June — H-Hour — the first seaborne troops (American) went ashore at Utah Beach and by mid-morning were able to push inland. A US Army report said that operations on Utah Beach were ‘smooth, perfectly co-ordinated and magnificent’.

At Omaha Beach United States’ forces encountered rough seas, underwater obstacles and a crack German infantry division unexpectedly exercising in the area. By the evening they had breached the defences but ‘Bloody Omaha’ was the beach which cost most Allied lives.

Gold Beach was the site of the first British assault; it was extensively mined and covered with obstacles but, with the use of ‘Hobart’s funnies’ (tanks adapted to deal with a variety of obstacles), losses were relatively light and troops pushed inland past Arromanches, making for Bayeux. By 8.00am villages behind the beaches were celebrating liberation and the commandos were moving on to the planned link-up with the Americans from the Utah and Omaha Beaches.

Juno Beach was assaulted by the Canadians. It was well protected by rocks and heavy gun emplacements. In the rough seas many landing craft were wrecked, while others fell victims to mines. Using ‘Hobart’s funnies’ the Canadians overcame many of the obstacles and by the evening were making for Caen.

At Sword Beach, the biggest worry for the British was the strong artillery battery at Le Havre. During the landings a smokescreen helped to hide the invaders and the seafront defences were breached. The first commandos at Sword Beach were then able to link up with airborne troops at Ranville. At Ouistreham the population was delighted to learn that their liberators included a battalion of the Free French.

Overall, operations on D-Day were a stunning success. More than 130,000 men had landed by sea and 23,000 had been brought in by air; 11,000 Allied troops had been killed, injured, or went missing but this number was much lower than SHAEF had dared to hope.

The Allies now had a foothold in Europe and, although it would be another eleven months before Nazi Germany was finally defeated, it was the beginning of the end of the war.
50th Anniversary Flypast at Portsmouth, England.

Typhoon Pilot's Memorial — Noyers-Bocage, France.
Australians in the Great Invasion

Thousands of airmen of the Royal Australia Air Force fought in the aerial bombardment campaign which, in its later stages, prepared Western Europe for Allied invasion. In Bomber Command alone 3486 members of the RAAF were killed.

The invasion, which came when Allied armies stormed ashore on the Normandy beaches on 6 June 1944, preceded by 25,000 airborne troops, was the climactic high point of the Second World War.

It was here at the fortified and obstructed beaches that hundreds of young Australian aircrafteers of the RAAF, flying heavy bombers, helped to destroy artillery batteries and obstacles to clear the way for the infantry, on who might otherwise be in great danger on the beaches.

It was here that Australian fighter pilots in a day fighter squadron (No 453) and night fighter squadron (No 456) and more than 200 individual fighter pilots serving in Royal Air Force squadrons were sent to keep Luftwaffe at bay as the infantry battled to seize the beaches.

Thus, although their numbers were not large, these young Australians who had learned to fly in the Empire Air Training Scheme were there to represent their country in one of the great battles in history.

A huge 80-kilometre wide invasion fleet of 6000 ships had ploughed through the English Channel carrying 130,000 men and 20,000 vehicles and had put them ashore. The task had only just begun. Another 2,000,000 servicemen waited to be shipped to France, to engage and defeat the Nazi forces defending “fortress Europa”.

On D-Day the sky was full of Allied aircraft which flew a total of 11,000 sorties. Some Australians flew transport aircraft carrying American paratroopers to their drop zones. Others took part in air operations aimed at misleading the enemy as to the point of attack. No less than 13,000 members of the RAAF, including the men on operational squadrons, were in England at the time of the invasion.

Bomber Command dropped more than 5000 tons of bombs in an attempt to silence shore batteries. Of the 1136 bombers committed, 168 were from RAAF squadrons or had RAAF pilots. In 5 Group, RAF, 43 Lancasters were captained by RAAF pilots; 14 from No 463 Squadron led by Wing Commander Rollo Kingsford-Smith; 14 from No 467 led by Squadron L.C. Deignan and 15 from the remaining five squadrons of No 5 Group, including No 61 led by Wing Commander A.W. Doubleday. No 460 Squadron flew two missions, dropping 150 tons of bombs, and No 466 (Halifaxes) bombed a battery at Maisy which threatened both Utah and Omaha beaches, where the American army was to land.

After the Normandy landing, Australian bombers took part in heavy and continuous air attacks on communications behind the beaches and were used also in direct support of British troops. The shock of heavy bomber attacks had a stupefying effect on German ground troops: following a close support strike, the British soldiers generally encountered only weak enemy resistance.

Heavy bomber support for the Normandy operations ended on 23 July when the strategic bombing campaign over Europe was resumed. Within 21/2 months, 86,000 tons of bombs rained on the industrial areas of Germany of which RAAF squadrons contributed 6 per cent.

On 8 July Australian Lancasters and Halifaxes attacked Caen in daylight. Squadron Leader W. Blessing of Braidwood, NSW, was shot down and killed when marking this target from his Mosquito light bomber. Blessing, who had been decorated with the DSO and DFC, was one of the most courageous and skilful pilots in Bomber Command.

The Spitfires of No 453 Squadron led by Squadron Leader D.H. Smith were on station over the American sector of the beachhead at 8.40am on D-Day. They saw no sign of the Luftwaffe. The German air force had lost the initiative on the first day and never regained it. By 25 June No 453 had moved to France and on 2 July at Liseux clashed with a mixed enemy force. The Australians claimed four enemy destroyed and five damaged.
On Friday, 1 September 1939, Adolf Hitler invaded Poland — and, in consequence, Britain and France declared war on Germany.

A year later, however, British troops fighting in Europe had been driven through France and faced what appeared to be certain defeat. Fortunately, in the greatest evacuation in military history, 330,000 British and French troops were snatched to safety from the beaches of Dunkirk, under the guns of the German Army, by a hurriedly-assembled fleet of 1,200 naval ships and civilian craft.

France surrendered to Germany in June 1940 and Nazi Germany, with its ally, Italy, controlled Europe from Norway in the north to the French/Spanish frontier in the south and the Polish/Russian border in the east.

Britain, weakened after Dunkirk and facing shortages of trained manpower, weapons, ammunition and food, faced Hitler alone in Europe. Hitler planned to invade Britain but, without air supremacy, he was forced to abandon his invasion plans after the Battle of Britain.

Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, realised that Nazi Germany could be finally defeated only on its own territory and he was determined to gain a foothold on Continental Europe again. Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia, followed by Japan's attack on the United States' fleet at Pearl Harbor, brought these two countries into the war on the side of the Allies.

By 1943 the tide had turned against Germany, which had suffered defeats by the Soviets at Stalingrad and by the British at El Alamein in North Africa.

For some time the Soviet Union had been pressing its allies to open a ‘Second Front’ in the west to ease the pressure on its armies in the east. After an unsuccessful raid on Dieppe in 1942, Allied amphibious operations had improved greatly. It was decided, therefore, to launch an invasion of ‘Fortress Europe’. The operation would be code-named Overlord.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, of the United States’ Army, was appointed Supreme Allied Commander in December 1943. His Deputy was Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, of the Royal Air Force, an expert on air/ground co-operation. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, of the Royal Air Force, became Commander Allied Air Forces; Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, of the Royal Navy, became Commander Allied Sea Forces and General Sir Bernard Montgomery, of the British Army, became Leader of Assault Troops. Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, of the United States’ Army and Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey, of the British Army, became Commanders of the main invasion forces (the US First and Anglo-Canadian Second Armies).

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) was set up at Bushey House, Bushey Park, near Hampton Court, in West London and Southwick House, at Southwick, near Portsmouth, became the advance headquarters for Operation Overlord and D-Day.

The ‘D’ in military terminology, stands for the day on which an operation is actually launched. The precise time is known as H-Hour. So, for the planners of Operation Overlord, D-Day would be the day, whichever date, on which the landings would begin and H-Hour would be the exact time of the first landing.

The target date, by which everything would be ready, was set for 1 June 1944 and D-Day was to be between 4 and 7 June, depending on the weather and other conditions.

Over the next few months Allied aircraft flying reconnaissance flights over northern France and members of the French Resistance working with men and women British agents, who were parachuted secretly into France, helped to build up an accurate picture of the German defences. Combat swimmers, landed by midget submarines, surveyed the planned landing beaches to check obstacles, gradients and load bearing capacities of the beaches.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Montgomery's old adversary in North Africa, was in charge of fortifications on the French coast. He had strengthened the coastline against Allied attack by placing batteries of heavy artillery, mines, explosive obstacles and infantry and Panzer (heavy armour) divisions at the likely landing areas. He believed that any invading army would have to be pinned down and destroyed on the beaches if he was to prevent an invasion.
AUSTRALIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND THE GULF CONFLICTS

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Nigel Oakey enlisted under the Defence Force Ready Reserve Scheme in 1992. He immediately undertook a full year of military service. He was posted to 1RTB Kapooka for three months basic training. His initial Employment Training was then conducted at the Royal Australian Ordnance Corps (RAAOC) Centre at Bandiana from where he was posted to 52 Combat Supplies Platoon, Enoggera (6 Brigade). Private Oakey completed his BA in Political Science and Industrial Relations in 1993. He has recently taken up a graduate position with the Shell Company of Australia.
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Telephone: (02) 368 1800
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Facsimile: (02) 368 0183
Psychological Operations in Somalia

By Captain D.J. Wilson  AA Psych.

Introduction

The ultimate objective of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is to convince enemy, friendly and neutral personnel to take favourable actions toward Australia and its allies. It can maximise the destructive power of our forces as well as reduce the need to destroy. PSYOPS can save the lives of Australian soldiers, noncombatants and enemy forces (FM 33-1, 1987).

In the Australian Army, PSYOPS has been defined as “planned psychological activities directed towards enemy, friendly and neutral audiences (target audiences) in order to create attitudes and behaviours favourable to the achievement of national, political and military objectives” (MLW 1-2-10, 1987). While the US Army defines PSYOPS as “planned activities of propaganda and psychological actions in peace and war directed toward foreign enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviours in a manner favourable to the achievement of national objectives — both political and military. It includes strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operations” (FM 33-1, 1987, p.1-2).

PSYOPS derives its chief effectiveness from being a part of a total operation. It is not a substitute for combat power. However, it may be employed when the use of combat forces is inappropriate such as during peacetime or against civilian population. When skillfully and closely integrated with military and political actions, “PSYOPS can act as a catalyst and can often mean the difference between mission success and failure” (Borchini, 1993).

United States Army PSYOPS units usually operate as support units and their primary role is to support other military units or government agencies in reaching national objectives. PSYOPS assets can also disseminate command information and products that explain the intent of military operations to target audiences (Jones, 1993). A commander, for example, may use PSYOPS to let his enemies know that it is honourable, as well as sensible, for individual soldiers or entire units to cease hostilities in the face of overwhelming combat force. PSYOPS is an asset that grows in usefulness through increased understanding. With training, its effectiveness becomes limited only by the ingenuity of the using commander and his/her PSYOPS personnel (4 POG(A), 1992).

The following article’s overall aim is to introduce US Army PSYOPS elements and highlight the US Army’s capabilities demonstrated in Somalia. Firstly, the US Army’s current PSYOPS structure, assets and general capabilities will be assessed. Secondly, an examination will be made of Operation Restore Hope and how PSYOPS was utilised by the 8th PSYOPS Battalion (Airborne) based in Mogadishu, Somalia. The final section will concentrate on the difficulties encountered by US Army PSYOPS in Somalia, possible improvements and future directions that may be valuable to the Australian Army in its consideration of PSYOPS deployments.

US Army PSYOPS

The general mission of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) based in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA is “to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice and plan, develop, and conduct Psychological Operations in support of the Unified Commanders, Coalition forces, or other government agencies, as directed by the National Command Authorities” [4 POG(A), 1992, p.2]. The 4 POG(A) PSYOPS support the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. PSYOPS consolidation operations are directed toward populations in friendly rear areas or in territories occupied by friendly military forces (FM 33-1, 1990).

The following illustrates some examples of favourable conditions for achieving PSYOPS objectives in strategic, operational, tactical, and consolidation operations (FM 33-1, 1990):

- High casualties and defeats suffered by the enemy.
- Precarious enemy military situations.
- Insufficient or inferior enemy supplies and equipment.
- Inexperienced or unqualified enemy officers.
- Unfavourable news about the enemy home front.
- Excessive time periods of combat for enemy troops.
- Ethnic or political dissident minorities (soldiers and civilians).
• Inexperienced or untrained troops.
• Sickness and lack of medical supplies.
• Lack of an effective enemy information program.
• Unit or significant individual defections.

The 4 POG(A) is the only active-duty (i.e. regular) PSYOPS Group in the US Army. It comprises a Group Headquarters, three regionally-orientated Battalions, a Tactical Support Battalion (TSB), and a PSYOPS Dissemination Battalion (PDB).

The 1st PSYOPS Battalion (Airborne) [1 POB(A)] covers Latin America and the Caribbean regions of the world. The 6 POB(A) has responsibility for European and African regions. The 8 POB(A) covers the Middle East, Asian and Pacific regions. The TSB supports conventional forces and Special Operations Forces (SOF) with audio-visual, loudspeaker, product development for operational and tactical PSYOPS [4 POG(A), 1992]. The PDB has audio-visual production, radio, television, and advanced printing capabilities.

The 4 POG(A) has a global responsibility for all US Forces. However, the Group’s potential operations are greatly enhanced by three US Army Reserve PSYOPS Groups which add up to a total of nineteen PSYOPS Battalions or 22 Companies. The 2nd PSYOPS Group, (Airborne) is based in Parma, Ohio and it has a regional orientation toward Europe and the Atlantic. The 5th PSYOPS Group (Airborne) based in Washington, DC, focuses on Europe, Central and South America. The 7th PSYOPS Group (Airborne), based in San Francisco, California concentrates on the Pacific (Morrisey, 1993).

PSYOPS soldiers are trained as linguists and area specialists capable of understanding the political, cultural, ethnic, and geographic subtleties of their intended target audiences. All US Army Corps are represented in US PSYOPS to allow a unique combination of trained personnel to operate anywhere overseas. All PSYOPS personnel are required to be Airborne qualified to allow them to support any tactical scenario US Special Operations Forces are required to conduct (FM 33-1, 1990, Parker, 1992).

**Operation Restore Hope**

As previously described, the 8 POB(A) is part of the 4 POG(A) and covers the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific regions of the world. The 8 POB(A) was assigned the task of providing PSYOPS support to the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) that landed on the beaches in Somalia, late December 1992. The US PSYOPS Battalion was based in the old US Embassy compound in Mogadishu, Somalia.

The following cultural summary will enable the reader to understand the complexities of the Somali people. Only by understanding some of these cultural aspects surrounding *Operation Restore Hope*, one can appreciate the potential difficulties a multifaceted UNITAF PSYOPS programme may pose on a PSYOPS battalion.

Practically all Somalis are Sunni Muslims. Often, clan leaders are religious leaders and take an active part in mediating civil disputes as well as administering religious affairs. Since independence in 1960, Somalia’s government has emphasised a separation of church and state. However, in recent years, Somalia has seen a steady growth of political organisations operating under a religious cloak. (Defence Language Institute, 1993).

Somalis are organised into an extensive clan structure that has existed since the Middle Ages. Clan structures emphasise loyalty to and from their members. Constant fighting over political and ethnic differences has marked Somali society throughout its history (Defence Language Institute, 1993). On a political level, the Somali national character is marked by an extreme dislike of central authority and government in general. Most Somalis have a pastoral nomadic background and little need or respect for a formal government. It is impossible to exaggerate the fragility of the ethnic-based alliances under which this society continues to operate (US Army Int., 1992).

The nature of social structure is such that every clan, lineage, and individual is in a potentially adversarial or alliance relationship with other members of Somali society. No clan, lineage, or individual can ever be considered politically neutral (Defence Language Institute, 1993).

Key considerations for the United States Army’s 8 POB(A) in *Operation Restore Hope* are that political neutrality is not part of the Somali world view (Borchini, 1993). Somalis have trouble accepting that the United Nations and private organisations working in Somalia do so under strict guidelines designed to ensure impartiality (Defence Language Institute, 1993). Broadly speaking, for Somalis, favouritism is perceived as an alliance constructed to exclude others, and armed factions might easily disrupt or stop aid if they believe that supplies have been channelled to their enemies (US Army Int., 1992).

The senior commanders in Somalia gave the 4 POG(A) the mission of providing an information dissemination capability for the Somali people. The information was given by a daily newspaper and radio program, both named “Rajo” (meaning “hope”
as well as leaflet drops and loudspeaker teams (Borchini, 1993).

The following gives details of how the 8 POB(A) conducted its Unified Task Force (UNITAF) PSYOPS mission during Operation Restore Hope. The information given was compiled while on deployment with the 8 POB(A) in 1993. Further information gathered on UNITAF PSYOPS was gained from several briefings conducted by the 8 POB(A) Commander to various command elements. These briefings detailed the structure of UNITAF PSYOPS and its capabilities during operations in Somalia (Borchini, 1993).

- UNITAF Somalia PSYOPS Mission: To support UNITAF tactical and operational objectives through the use of loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops, posters, newspapers and radio broadcasts (Borchini, 1993).
- UNITAF Somalia PSYOPS Task Organisation: (Borchini, 1993)

### Joint PSYOPS Task Force

| HQ | Product Development Centre (PDC) | Print Section | Radio Section | Loudspeaker Teams |

- UNITAF Somalia Broad PSYOPS Themes: (Borchini, 1993)
  - To explain UNITAF rules of engagement.
  - To highlight that UNITAF does not support or favour any faction.
  - To affirm the roles and capabilities of the 23 nations in UNITAF.
  - To highlight the seamless transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.
  - To encourage displaced persons to return to their homes, plant their fields and harvest new crops for future prosperity.
  - To highlight redevelopment and re-establishment of Somali infrastructure.
  - To highlight the agreements made by faction leaders.
  - To focus on the disarmament process and to keep everyone up to date with the progress shown in each region of the country.

### Leaflet Drops

Three days before US Marines landed in Somalia, leaflets were being dropped to inform the warring Somali factions that troops were prepared to use force to protect relief operations in the country (see Fig. 1). All leaflet drops were coordinated at the highest levels to ensure the projected PSYOPS message was unified and could be backed up by military action (Borchini, 1993).

The dissemination of these leaflets was accomplished through a variety of methods. The main dissemination technique in Somalia was the use of static line deployment of boxed and bagged leaflets from altitudes of 1000 to 500 feet. There are several mathematical calculations which determine the dispersion of different size leaflets according to the weight of the paper printed over the designated area. To ensure further dissemination accuracy, most missions made several passes over each target area, when hostilities in the region were favourable. Over 7 million leaflets were disseminated by JPOTF from 9 December 1992 to 10 April 1993 (Borchini, 1993).

### Tactical Loudspeaker Teams

The loudspeaker teams (LST) were from the 9th PSYOPS Battalion (Airborne) [4 POG(A)] and were primarily equipped for tactical operations. For Operation Restore Hope, they fell under the command of the JPOTF Commander and were tasked between 15,000 to 25,000 papers daily throughout their period of operations (Borchini, 1993). Unfortunately, most locally produced Somali newspapers were aligned with one or another clan vying for power in the war-torn nation. "Rajo" aimed to provide news from a non-clan, impartial perspective (Stevenson, 1993).

The radio program which reviewed the "Rajo" newspaper was broadcasted four times per day. Each produced session was prerecorded and thoroughly checked by the Somali interpreters prior to any broadcast going to air. This process ensured the translated Somali message did not hold any clan biases and at all times remained objective. Each pre-recorded broadcast lasted 45 minutes and was repeated twice on AM and twice on Short Wave radio (Borchini, 1993).

United Nations forces are here to assist in the international relief effort for the Somali people. We are prepared to use force to protect the relief operation and our soldiers. We will not allow interference with food distribution or with our soldiers' activities.

We are here to help you.
according to the overall PSYOPS objectives set down by UNITAF (Borchini, 1993). These teams landed with the first US Marines and played pre-recorded PSYOPS messages (English version shown), as they proceeded into Mogadishu.

"American Forces are landing to help the United Nations distribute relief supplies to the Somali people. Please stay in your homes. We mean no harm. We are here to help you." (Borchini, 1993)

In Baidoa, the 450-watt loudspeakers were utilised in supporting Australian forces in several missions under Operation Solace. Firstly, with the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams operating with 1 RAR. During this mission, a loudspeaker was mounted on the front of the leading Range Rover and a local Somali linguist asked people where they have seen explosives or arms in the surrounding areas as they drove in Baidoa. While this was occurring, the last vehicle would randomly distribute “mine awareness” leaflets by hand which showed exactly what the typical explosive ordnance looked like (see Fig. 2) (Borchini, 1993). A second mission, was where a loudspeaker was “manpacked” by a US Army soldier while local leaders and Australian Forces organised Somali volunteers to clean up the streets of Baidoa. This PSYOPS support provided assistance with crowd control, coordinating workers efforts and disseminating safe water messages to onlookers.

The safe water message (English version shown) was repeated at a later date in April 1993, throughout Baidoa while assisting Australian Counter Intelligence missions in the area (Borchini, 1993).

"Attention, people of Baidoa. To prevent disease, do not drink the water from the ravine or the surrounding surface water. Only drink water from the wells and clean all water containers before using the wells. To prevent disease, boil water for 5-10 minutes before using." (Borchini, 1993)

The above information was repeated in the Mogadishu and Baidoa dialect by a Somali interpreter. There was approximately a 10-15 second pause between the repetitions of the message while the vehicle travelled at a fast walking pace through the streets of Baidoa (Borchini, 1993).

The “safe water” message was further used in support of a sensitive task carried out by relief agencies...
in the main well area of Baidoa. There was approximately 11500 bodies buried on the edges of the main ravine from the mass starvation suffered during the civil war. The primary task was to prevent these bodies from contaminating the local water system, with the onset of the rainy season in April (Borchini, 1993).

Due to sensitive nature of exhuming Somali bodies, Australian forces wanted only to announce a portion (the Safe Water message) of a designed leaflet (see Fig. 3) to keep UNITAF military forces detached from the task. The designed leaflet was eventually distributed by SACO throughout Baidoa by hand and vehicle. The attempt by SACO to exhume the Somali bodies was achieved over many days without incident. This action was further followed up by an article in the “Rajo” newspaper and radio in April 1993 (Borchini, 1993).

The last PSYOPS mission was developed to counter PSYOPS by Somali warlords about UNITAF and relief agencies desecrating grave sites throughout Somalia. The use of newspaper, radio, loudspeaker and leaflets clearly illustrates to the reader, how many of the UNITAF PSYOPS missions were conducted by the JPOTF.

As shown, PSYOPS was simply applied to enhance the effectiveness of missions by using only loudspeaker/leaflet capabilities with 1 RAR in Baidoa. However, the overall PSYOPS approach by the JPOTF of further informing the Somali people of activity within Baidoa by newspaper and radio, also helped prevent further conflicts in operational areas (Borchini, 1993).

This section has examined how the 4 POG(A), particularly the 8 POB(A) acting in the capacity of the JPOTF conducted some “real world” missions in Somalia. It demonstrates exactly how the US Army PSYOPS structure, objectives, and assets are utilised in times of conflict. Although the PSYOPS shown by the 8 POB(A) in Operation Restore Hope were undoubtedly impressive, a more critical look at the proceedings in the next section of this is essential for future Australian PSYOPS. Taking into account time pressures, personnel and operational constraints imposed on the 8 POB(A), some unforeseen problems did arise.

The main area of concern that will be covered is the low priority that was given by the 8 POB(A) to pre-testing and post-testing of PSYOPS products on target audiences. Pre-testing is where a representative sample of a target audience is assessed under appropriate behavioural research methods. During pre-testing of a potential PSYOPS product (i.e. a leaflet, loudspeaker or radio messages), people from a sample group that represents the target audience are randomly chosen to give feedback on the PSYOPS product. Post-testing involves finding appropriate measures that indicate the impact of the PSYOPS product on an intended target audience (Shipman, 1985).

Evidence of pre-testing by the 8 POB(A) was only shown by UNITAF PSYOPS personnel on a random basis with educated Somali journalists, interpreters and workers within the old US Embassy compound in Mogadishu. Similarly, only some verbal feedback was gained on the impact of leaflets, handbills, posters and loudspeaker announcements (Borchini, 1993).

Although most UNITAF commanders were very positive towards PSYOPS support, they did express a concern that they could not see the actual impact of PSYOPS in their operations. There was limited objective measuring of whether these products had a negative, neutral, or the intended psychological impact on the Somali people. What behaviours were actually being changed in the target audiences, and were there any unintended consequences from the developed UNITAF PSYOPS products?

It is recognised that in time of war and low intensity conflicts, forces will not always have the opportunity or the resources to objectively measure the impact of PSYOPS on behaviour. However, without objective research conducted on PSYOPS, the 8 POB(A) had to continually try to sell the worth of PSYOPS to each UNITAF commander. This is because at the time they could not back up their actions with solid research results from previous operations in Somalia.

If the underlying goal of PSYOPS is to change friendly, neutral or enemy behaviour towards a commander’s intent (FM 33-1, 1990), it is perfectly logical that we must aim to measure those changes. This will enable us to see whether we are changing the target audiences behaviour in the desired direction. This means that we need correct research methodologies developed to ensure PSYOPS is appropriate and properly accountable (Shipman, 1985).

The profession of Psychology aims to understand the complexities of human behaviour. AAPsyCh Corps is well placed to contribute to Australian PSYOPS...
and developing efficient monitoring practices for the future. Due to the nature of psychology, the pre-testing of newly developed PSYOPS products, their themes, symbols and impact on target audiences can only be enhanced by closely identifying how PSYOPS works in an operational setting.

More importantly, possible improvement on the PSYOPS conducted in Somalia can be seen in more thorough data analysis and interpretation of missions. In an operational setting, this gives the commander timely feedback from his supporting PSYOPS element allowing him to incorporate the results in ongoing operational planning. For example, some basic research principles may have shed light on PSYOPS support in Operation Solace. The EOD teams conducting missions throughout Baidoa collected many explosives each day. A simple assessment of whether more explosives were collected when US loudspeaker support was given may have revealed that there was a relationship between PSYOPS support and more explosives being found in Baidoa. This simple analysis would give the commander timely feedback on whether PSYOPS support was truly enhancing EOD operations within his HRS.

AAPsych Corps units hold personnel with the necessary expertise to monitor such behavioural changes in people from PSYOPS intervention. Units like 1 Psych and 1 Psych Research in PSYOPS planning gives the Australian Army the opportunity to conduct more accountable, flexible and efficient PSYOPS than many other countries engaged in this type of operation.

Figure 3

Moving the bodies of these deceased Somalis while respecting Somali religious traditions is a necessity to help make the water safe.

Over the past several years, the civil war and factional fighting combined with banditry and looting caused many Somalis to die from starvation all over Somalia. In the SHIIKH ASHAROW ravine area, many of those who died were buried near the banks of the ravine. This has the potential to pose a very hazardous health risk to those who use the ravine’s water for drinking and washing. Under the strict guidelines set by Somali elders, the buried will be moved with proper religious respect and traditions to another location. The Somali people themselves will work on this task and hopefully be able to remove all of the bodies before the rainy season washes them into the water system. This operation will prevent disease from spreading and will be supported by relief agencies. Until the bodies have been removed from the banks near the ravine, and the water is safer to drink, do not drink water from the ravine or other surface water; only drink water from wells; clean all water containers before using wells. To prevent disease, boil water for 5 - 10 minutes before using.
Future Directions

In future conflicts, Australian forces may not be as fortunate as the US were in the Gulf War and Somalia. If the Australian Army wishes to improve its PSYOPS capability it must start training now for operational deployment. If Australian forces need to call upon effective PSYOPS support in future, the appropriate infrastructure must be put in place and the necessary planning conducted. Australia should be competitive in maintaining a PSYOPS initiative in the Asian/Pacific region.

The application of PSYOPS, as demonstrated by the US Army, is a fighting skill which can only be improved with practice and appropriate behavioural measurement. PSYOPS ought to be included in the early stages of ADF planning, rather than as an afterthought in counter-intelligence operations. Until PSYOPS is seen more as a logical, cost effective tool which can enhance many facets of a nation’s defence, the quality of PSYOPS in support of future conflicts involving Australian forces is in serious doubt.

The aim of PSYOPS is to change enemy behaviour in line with the commander’s intent. This task can only be achieved by being able to analyse current intelligence and having the necessary personnel to produce effective PSYOPS material. It must be noted that poorly prepared PSYOPS can be more harmful to a nation’s objectives, than no PSYOPS at all.

The US UNITAF PSYOPS battalion’s primary equipment requirements cost under $US150,000 to set up (excluding Tactical Loundspeaker capabilities) (Borchini, 1993). Although this does not include stationery supplies and equipment maintenance, this is well within the reach of most defence forces.

It should also be clear that Psychological Operations do not win wars alone and without the force to back the PSYOPS message, success will always remain questionable. This is the reason why all PSYOPS planning should begin, be coordinated and controlled at the highest levels of the ADF.

In an era when our Army is getting smaller, it is time to start thinking about fighting smarter. There is no smarter way to fight than through the aggressive application of PSYOPS. In peacetime, conflict or war, PSYOPS provides the commander with an edge that may save countless lives (FM 33-1, 1990). As emphasised throughout this paper, PSYOPS should be viewed like any other weapons system in a commander’s arsenal which is a non lethal force multiplier [4 POG(A), 1992]. If “Psychological Operations” is truly a force multiplier, can Australia afford not to enhance its defensive efforts with one of the most cost-effective weapon systems in modern warfare?

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Captain Daren Wilson completed his Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree at Charles Sturt University and the University of NSW in 1988. After working as a psychologist with the disabled, he joined the Australian Army Psychology Corps in 1990. He has served in psychology units in Kapooka, Adelaide and Sydney. In early 1993, he graduated from the Psychological Operations Officers Course held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA, and was deployed to Somalia in support of Operation Restore Hope with the US Army. He is currently serving as a Psych Officer with 1 Psychology Unit in Sydney.
Countering Terrorism in Australia Through Coordination

By Lindsay Hansch.

Introduction

Where did it all begin? Although some arrangements were in place in Australia during the 1970s, it was the bombing of the Hilton Hotel during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in February 1978 that gave the necessary impetus for some positive, coordinated action. The incident, although a relatively minor event by terrorism standards overseas, was the beginning of a new era in counter-terrorism preparedness in Australia. Perhaps the major outcome was the Protective Security Review by Mr Justice Hope. In his review, Hope identified many shortcomings in the national capability to deal with acts of terrorism. This prompted the government of the day to act and it did so in a positive way. Among the arrangements subsequently put in place was the establishment of the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) as the overall coordinator of the national arrangements. A highly trained counter terrorist force was also set up within the Australian Defence Force, and the Commonwealth Government machinery for dealing with the day-to-day aspects of counter-terrorism coordination was also put in place. One of the priority tasks facing SAC-PAV after its formation was the development of the National Anti Terrorist Plan (NATP). This plan has been in place since 1979 and, while it has been updated five times since, it has largely stood the test of time as the major guiding and planning document for the national arrangements.

Terrorism

What is terrorism? One of the problems with trying to develop definitions is getting agreement between all parties concerned. This is often exacerbated by the extraordinary number of definitions in use, some determined and shaped by foreign policy and others by academics seeking to make their contribution to a particular debate. A common purpose of all definitions is that they are generally designed to support a particular interest. Simply adopting someone else’s definition is therefore often not an appropriate solution. It is perhaps not surprising that it took some time to gain agreement between all governments in Australia to a definition of “terrorism.” Nevertheless a definition that is acceptable has been adopted and it now forms the basis of the arrangements outlined in the NATP. The definition of terrorism that satisfies Australia’s needs is:

“Acts or threats of violence of national concern, calculated to evoke extreme fear for the purpose of achieving a political objective in Australia or in a foreign country. This definition includes serious acts or threats of politically motivated violence directed:

• against visiting VIPs or resident foreign diplomats;
• against Australian VIPs;
• at influencing government policy or overthrowing governments or the system of government;
• at aircraft or civil aviation; or
• at engaging in or supporting hostile activities in a foreign country.”

This definition closely resembles the definition of politically motivated violence in the ASIO Act. This is not surprising since terrorism is a form of politically motivated violence. However, it does not necessarily follow that all politically motivated violence is terrorism. While the motive may be the same, the means may differ considerably.

Strategy

An essential element of capability is strategy. What is strategy? It often depends on where you function in the overall structure of an organisation. Generally it involves the definition of ends and means and this usually occurs at the highest level. However, if you are a police officer involved in normal police operations, the highest level is generally the executive of the police service. But since responding to terrorism will concern more than the police service, strategy will inevitably be determined at government level.
This is not to suggest that the operational role of the police is any less important, but it does have the effect that the police, from the perspective of the government, are seen to be at the operational level rather than the strategic. The high level strategies are implemented through various operational plans and orders designed to meet the specifics of an incident.

Australia's national strategy for countering terrorism is based essentially on three fundamental elements:

- integrated and coordinated preventive measures designed to minimise the scope for any incident to occur;
- a comprehensive capability to respond to any incident that might occur; and
- positive enhancement of the national security environment, which is to suggest that all elements in our society regard security as a cooperative endeavour which each element has a particular contribution to make.

The major focus is on preventive measures. Prevention includes such activities as support for cooperation against terrorism in international forums, arrangements within the international community for intelligence sharing, immigration entry controls, limitations on access to weapons and explosives and the coordination of protective security programs for high risk targets including both people and facilities.

Most of the preventive measures in place in Australia have been developed over many years and, initially at least, were established for purposes other than counter terrorism. For example, intelligence arrangements were established for national security, immigration entry controls to prevent the entry of all undesirables and limitations on access to weapons and explosives were put in place to reduce criminal activity. Preventive measures alone do not guarantee immunity from terrorism. Therefore, those measures must be backed by a comprehensive response capability to deal quickly and effectively with a terrorist act, should one occur. Having an effective response capability also serves as a deterrent, which contributes to the preventive measures and to the general enhancement of the national security environment.

Responding to and resolving acts of terrorism requires most of the operational capabilities found in the average police service. However, the difference in motive between the terrorist and the ordinary criminal, and that terrorists are likely to have been trained for the operation, means that a much higher level of operational capability may be required. It is for this reason that a greater proportion of the effort and cost expended in Australia since the Hilton bombing has been oriented at improving the basic capabilities of the police and, in some cases, developing capabilities that are beyond the police capacity.

Overlaying the operational capabilities of the police and other agencies are the government structures needed during an incident to provide political leadership, to respond to the terrorist's political demands and to provide support to the police in dealing with the terrorists. These arrangements, along with the police command and control structures, are referred to as the national crisis management response arrangements and are set out in the National Anti Terrorist Plan.

A critical element of our ability to deal effectively with a major terrorist act in Australia is the relationship between the government crisis managers and police operational commanders on the one hand and the media on the other. To illustrate the dimensions of the problem, consider the hypothetical example of an aircraft hijacking. A number of dedicated, well armed and well-trained terrorists are threatening the lives of hundreds of passengers and demanding the release of their colleagues from gaol in another country and safe passage out of Australia. What are the key considerations in this situation?

First, it is a police problem but one that goes beyond responding to normal criminal activity and for which political guidance and specialist assistance will be required, particularly from the Commonwealth Government. Secondly, there inevitably will be complex political issues affecting government interests and the interests of foreign states either because their nationals are involved or because they are the target of the demands. There are likely to be pressures for government to take a firm stand and other conflicting pressures that the government take all possible measures to end the incident without violence. Finally, there is the critical issue of the public information policy where there will be conflicting demands from the media and public to know what is going on and from operational commanders that rescue operations not be prejudiced. Inevitably, a world audience of tens or hundreds of millions will focus on the minute-to-minute detail of events and this will be one of the greatest challenges that the police and other crisis managers will have to face.
Exercise Brindabella was held in Canberra in May 1992. Three of the key overseers, Senior Sergeant Graham Waite of the NT Police who was an umpire; Superintendent Brian Brinkler of the AFP who was chief controller and the exercise coordinator Senior Sergeant Rowland Legg of the Victoria Police (then on secondment to the Protective Services Coordination Centre) get a briefing from Detective Sergeant Peter Drennan of the Special Operations Team (AFP).

Over the past two decades, Commonwealth and State governments have adopted a consistent policy towards terrorism. This has included a determination to oppose terrorism and to uphold the rule of law, support for international cooperation as the most effective means of combating terrorism, emphasis on peaceful and legal counter measures, readiness to take firm action to bring terrorists to justice, acceptance by the Commonwealth Government of a leading role in developing a coordinated national capability to counter terrorism and cooperation by the State and Territory governments in developing plans and providing resources in support of the national capability. These principles have provided guidance to the operational agencies, particularly the police, in developing appropriate capabilities.

National Counter Terrorism Organisation

The primary organisation for consultation and cooperation between Commonwealth and State government agencies concerned with maintaining a defence against terrorism, is the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SACPAV). SAC-PAV has two important functions:

- to propose to heads of Government steps to ensure nationwide readiness and co-operation between relevant Commonwealth and State Government agencies for the protection of Australia from terrorism; and
- to bring together bilateral and nationwide arrangements between the Commonwealth and the States to deal with protective security and counter terrorism planning including aviation security, the protection of holders of high office and the National Anti-Terrorist Plan.¹

In discharging their responsibilities, SAC-PAV members refer appropriate matters to their governments and otherwise represent their State or the national interest at the six-monthly meetings of the committee. SAC-PAV has not been without its difficulties, but generally these have been overcome by all members developing a better understanding of each agency's responsibilities and through a good spirit of
A "hostage" is executed and the Special Operations Team go in.

cooperation. SAC-PAV is widely regarded as one of the most successful Commonwealth/State cooperative forums.

Membership includes senior representatives of all police services, senior officials of the State Premiers' Departments and the Territories Chief Ministers' Departments and senior Commonwealth officers from the Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Attorney General, and the Australian Defence Force. Other Commonwealth departments and agencies serve the committee as advisers, including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Protective Service (APS) and Departments of Finance and Transport and Communications (Aviation Security). Recently, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the New Zealand Police and Prime Ministers Department were granted observer status.

Through SAC-PAV, the Commonwealth and the States have sought to enhance the national capability to deal with terrorism by developing and testing the arrangements necessary for a joint Commonwealth/State Government response to a terrorist act. They have achieved this by coordinating the development of agreed strategies and policy responses to terrorist threats and demands and by sponsoring the development of the appropriate operational capabilities. This has included the provision of specialist equipment and training and the conduct of periodic exercises to test the arrangements.

Day-to-day coordination, planning and monitoring of protective security arrangements is facilitated by the Protective Services Coordination Centre (PSCC), a branch of the Federal Justice Office of the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department. The PSCC provides executive and secretariat support for SAC-PAV and its various sub-committees and project groups. If a terrorist incident occurs, it will arrange the activation of the national crisis management response arrangements and maintain an information link with all SAC-PAV members.

Within the Commonwealth Government there is another committee that forms an integral part of the national arrangements, the Special Inter-Departmental...
Committee on Protection Against Violence (SIDC-PAV). The SIDC-PAV is the coordinating body within the Commonwealth and several of its members are also represented on the SAC-PAV. One of the SIDC-PAV's important functions is to monitor the threat from terrorism. At its regular monthly meeting, the SIDC-PAV considers reports from the intelligence and operational agencies and determines the level of alert to be maintained. Any changes are notified to all SAC-PAV members. The SIDC-PAV also meets from time to time in an abbreviated configuration, usually agencies with a direct interest, to consider what to do about serious threats or incidents. This configuration is known as the Special Incidents Task Force (SITF) which also forms an integral part of the Crisis Coordination Centre referred to later.

Consistent with the national strategy, Australia maintains a capability to respond quickly to terrorism should the front line preventive measures fail. The major elements required to provide an effective response capability are machinery to provide coordinated policy direction, an effective operational command structure, properly trained and equipped operational response units and comprehensive media liaison arrangements.

The framework for responding to a terrorist incident is set out in the National Anti-Terrorist Plan (NATP) which was developed jointly by the Commonwealth
and State Governments and police services. It outlines the agreed roles and responsibilities of Governments in managing a response to terrorism and outlines the basic organisation needed to coordinate and manage that response. The plan recognises that the appointed Police Commander has operational responsibility for resolving a terrorist incident but, of course, he must work within the government’s policy guidelines.

The crisis management organisation outlined in the National Anti-Terrorist Plan consists of four key elements (Figure 1):

- a Police Forward Command Post at the scene of the incident from where the tactical decisions affecting the management of the incident are made;
- a Police Operations Centre which is the command centre for the overall Police Commander and is normally located in the Police Headquarters;
- a State Crisis Centre from where the State Premier, or a minister appointed by him, and his senior advisers, including the Commissioner of Police, manage the state aspects of the crisis; and
- the Commonwealth Government’s Crisis Coordinating Centre responsible for the coordination of the Commonwealth’s involvement including the development of strategies and policy responses in consultation with the State in which the incident is occurring.

**Policy**

Australian governments have adopted a policy of granting no substantive concessions to terrorists. This is consistent with the approach adopted by most western countries. Within the context of granting no substantive concessions, the use of force is regarded as an absolute last resort. The preferred option is to convince the terrorists to surrender. These principles are relatively straightforward, but their implementation, particularly in the early stages of an incident, requires some skill.

**Specialist Capabilities**

A key early policy decision in the management of a terrorist incident will be the nature and level of Commonwealth assistance to the State in which the incident is occurring. The Commonwealth maintains a specialist counter terrorist force within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) which is trained and equipped to provide a higher level of capability to that which is generally achievable in police forces. The ADF Counter Terrorist Force, comprising the Tactical Assault Group (TAG) and the necessary command, communications and support elements, can be deployed to assist State authorities in the resolution of a high risk terrorist incident such as a hijacking or a major siege involving hostages. It provides a specialised military assault capability as the last resort option to save the lives of hostages. What is more important, however, is that it allows the government to maintain a firm line in its negotiation with terrorists.

Besides the Commonwealth resources, each police force possesses a range of specialist capabilities to respond to a terrorist incident. These include specially trained negotiation teams, bomb response teams, intelligence units and Police Assault Groups (PAG). The PAGs (the generic title for Tactical Response Group, State Protection Group, Special Operations Group, etc) are generally responsible for the initial containment of an incident. They also provide a limited assault capability should it be needed either in an emergency before the TAG is able to reach the scene or as the last resort option when the ADF is not involved.

These specialist police capabilities existed in one form or another in most police services before SAC-PAV was established. However, they have been further developed with SAC-PAV assistance in the form of equipment, training and exercises. Equipment provided by SAC-PAV generally consists of items that are beyond those needed for day-to-day police work. For example, DVP radios and operational support vehicles for the PAGs, the “Echidna” remote vehicle, bomb suits and vehicles for the bomb squads, specialist negotiator vehicles for the negotiation teams and secure communications for intelligence, command and control have all been provided by SAC-PAV. SAC-PAV policy is that police should use this equipment in their day-to-day work to ensure that they are familiar with it and that it is well maintained.

An important caveat applied to all SAC-PAV provided equipment is that it should be made available to any other jurisdiction if there is a terrorist incident occurring and additional resources are required.

**Operational Response**

The operational response to a terrorist incident will normally occur in four phases: initial response and stabilisation, negotiation, resolution and investigation.
The initial response will occur as the normal police response to any incident. This will invariably mean that the first on the scene will be general duties police. It is then up to these officers to assess the situation, report what they know and make some judgement about the resources needed to contain or control the incident. For major incidents involving ongoing terrorist activity, it is likely that the police assault group will be deployed to contain the incident and secure the scene. A Police Forward Commander will be appointed who will move quickly to the scene and take control. He will be initially concerned with the safety of the public which means keeping everyone not involved away from the scene, evacuating people within the immediate vicinity and containing the terrorists within a defined area. The principle means of doing this will be the positioning of cordons — an outer cordon to keep the public away from the scene and an inner cordon, generally the police assault group, keeping the terrorists within their stronghold.

At some time during or immediately following the initial stabilisation of the incident, the negotiation phase will begin. It is not necessary to wait until the situation has been stabilised to begin negotiating. Experience in overseas counter terrorist operations and criminal incidents in Australia indicate that the earlier contact can be made with the hostage takers, the better, as it has a calming effect and helps stabilise the situation. The negotiation phase will continue until either the incident is resolved through the efforts of the negotiators or a judgement is made that a negotiated settlement is unlikely and it should be ended by force. Alternatively, the terrorists themselves may decide that they do not wish to continue to prolong the incident and either surrender or create a situation whereby an assault has to be initiated.

The central activities occurring during the important negotiation phase will be the actual conduct of negotiations; provision of information to the public, generally through the media; intelligence gathering operations; and the refinement and rehearsal of hostage rescue plans.

Negotiations with terrorists will be conducted by a specially trained police negotiation team. This team will receive direction and guidance from the Police Forward Commander based on the agreed joint government negotiation strategy. This strategy will allow police commanders and negotiators to conduct negotiations, including the taking of decisions on minor tactical concessions. Tactical concessions may include such things as the provision of food or medical assistance. However, substantive concessions are not negotiable and police must operate on that basis.

Essentially, an incident can end either peacefully or by force. The primary objective will always be to save the lives of any hostages. The preferred strategy is to persuade the terrorists to surrender. Alternatively, if negotiations fail and, in particular, if violent action by the terrorists occurs, or is anticipated, action to subdue the terrorists by force may be the only available alternative.

There are two possible ways of ending an incident by force: an emergency action or a deliberate assault. An emergency action is mounted in a situation of immediate and pressing danger requiring the Police Forward Commander at the incident site to initiate action at once to save life. The type of situation that might justify an emergency action is the start of wholesale killing of hostages or a “break-out” by the terrorists from the stronghold. The primary consideration in this situation is speed of action. A decision to mount an emergency assault should be made by the Police Forward Commander on the basis that more lives are likely to be lost by not acting than in taking positive action. In making this decision, the Police Forward Commander will be assisted by any guidelines previously agreed by governments.

A decision for a deliberate assault is made when it becomes apparent that there is no reasonable prospect for a negotiated resolution and that force is the only available alternative. The primary consideration in a deliberate assault is surprise. It is mounted at a time and in a manner selected by the tactical commander as offering the greatest chance of success. The deliberate assault offers the greater opportunity to minimise the loss of innocent life but it also requires more time to implement. It therefore follows that if an incident must be ended by force, it should be by a deliberate assault rather than by an emergency action.

It is in preserving the ability to achieve surprise where the law enforcement agencies and the media are most likely to clash. During the siege at the Iranian Embassy in London a few years ago, some media organisations were successful in gaining agreement to telegen the actual assault on the condition that a delay was built into the telecast to ensure that the terrorists were not alerted. We now know that one media organisation, unknown to the police, had gained a vantage position behind the embassy, but were fortunately still setting up their cameras when the assault was launched. Consider the implications. It was known that the terrorist had access to television sets and the likelihood that they were monitoring events was high. What would their reaction have been on observing an assault being launched against them?

Even with the built-in delay in the telecast there was still a large element of danger. What if the assault had been delayed or called off at the last moment?
Having observed the attempt, the terrorists would have been prepared for any future similar attempt. In the worst case, some of the hostages may have been killed in retribution. The law enforcement agencies have an inherent responsibility to protect innocent life and their negative reaction to some requests from the media will often be driven by that motive.

The implication for crisis managers, however, is that the incident should be managed to avoid creating a situation where an emergency assault is necessary. The use of force to end an incident should be a deliberate policy decision and a last resort. This requires clear decisions in advance concerning the limits of negotiations and the acceptable threshold for the use of violence.

The final phase is the investigation where the police have to draw together all the available evidence to facilitate prosecutions and inquiries. This is normal police work, but in the case of terrorism, some additional considerations are present. For example, the terrorist may have come from thousands of kilometres away to commit the crime and may or may not have known the victims. Thus the collection of evidence about the motives of the terrorists will require the cooperation of overseas agencies and little will be available locally. There is also an additional dimension when non-police agencies (such as the ADF) are involved in activities which result in the deaths of terrorists. Arrangements for this are included in the NATP, but much of the detail will need to be worked out at the time.

### Public Information and Media Management

The problems of public information and media management are perhaps the most difficult to manage effectively because of the conflicting interests between law enforcement agencies and the media. These are problems that the SAC-PAV has been attempting to resolve for some years with only limited success. No one would deny that the law enforcement agencies are responsible ultimately to the public, but the nature and amount of detail that can be released must be balanced against the need to protect innocent life. Those in the greatest danger are undoubtedly the hostages, so great care is taken to ensure that no information that could irritate the hostage takers to the extent of causing them to cause injury to or kill a hostage is made public. The lack of substantial success has, in part, been due to the lack of a real appreciation
of the magnitude of the problem that will be faced if there is a significant terrorist incident in Australia. This is entirely understandable as the only real experience in Australia has been with criminal incidents.

Until recently, the major focus of SAC-PAV has been directed at the local media organisations, largely ignoring the need to educate members of its own agencies. Attention has, for example, been focused on editors and news directors in the hope that they might exercise some control over the release of critical information which, for operational reasons, we may not wish to see released. SAC-PAV has also attempted to develop guidelines for the media, albeit with little success. This may be entirely appropriate in the normal range of criminal activity where the main interest will be from the local media. But how effective will it be if there is a major terrorist incident? In reality, we do not know as we fortunately have not been put to the test, but there are many examples available to indicate how the media might respond.

Take, for example, the siege at Aramoana in New Zealand in 1990. A crazed gunman, in profile not unlike the gunmen involved in the Strathfield and Hoddle Street massacres, rampaged through a small village indiscriminately killing anyone he saw before being cornered by the police. Whilst this was not, by Australia's definition, a terrorist incident, its sheer ferocity elevated it to a similar level and attracted the world media. Within 24 hours of the news of that siege breaking, there were over 400 foreign and local media representatives at the scene. When the limited numbers of police present could not satisfy their demands for information and film footage, they went looking for it. Every available aircraft in the district was hired, locals were approached and made offers to hire their buildings as vantage points from which to observe and film, phone calls were made to residents still inside the village and attempts were made to speak to the gunman. The New Zealand police had no hope of controlling what was going on and there appeared to have been little consideration by the media as to the dangers they may have posed to the innocent people still within the village, not to mention the police officers who were trying to apprehend the gunman.

The siege at Cangai in Northern New South Wales early in 1993 also highlighted the impact of media activity on police operations. On this occasion three armed men seized two children and then went on a killing spree through southern Queensland and northern New South Wales. They were finally tracked down by police and besieged in an isolated farm house near Cangai. Some media organisations were able to contact the hostage takers by the only telephone available before the police were able to respond. They kept the line tied up for some time recording interviews with both the hostages and hostage takers that were put to air before the siege had ended. One interviewer actually asked the young hostages whether they knew that the men had killed. This action by the media not only prevented the police from making contact and beginning the negotiation process that might have resolved the situation more quickly, but it paid little regard to the potential impact that their direct discussions might have on both hostage takers and hostages. There were also attempts by the media to get close to the action and police had to contend with media helicopters and film crews not only exposing themselves to some danger but, what is more important, risking the lives of the innocent children who were the hostages in the drama.

As a hypothetical example of the magnitude of the media management problem, imagine that it is the year 2000 and the Olympic Games are in progress in Sydney. A group of armed men seizes a building in the Olympic Village at Homebush Bay housing athletes from a number of countries. The police respond and seal off the area, but the news quickly breaks. Not far away in the Media Village at Darling Harbour, there are 13,000 representatives of the world’s media, all with the responsibility to report what is occurring. How do the crisis managers and police deal with the incident and at the same time satisfy the media’s likely demands for information?

Appealing to the local news directors and editors would not in any of the cases described have contribute significantly to managing the problem. What is needed are clear policies and strategies to assist the crisis managers and operational commanders in doing their jobs without prejudicing the lives of innocent people and, at the same time, providing the media with information to satisfy their legitimate needs.

Crisis managers must be positive and forward thinking in their approach to media management policy. The aim of media management from their perspective should be to satisfy the public that the government is in control of the situation and is taking effective measures to end it. To assist, the National Anti-Terrorist Plan provides objectives and strategies for managing public information as well as detailing media liaison arrangements.
When the exercise is over, there is the debrief. Exercise Brindabella brought together officers from NSW, Victoria, NT, SA, Queensland and WA police services, the Australian Defence Force and ASIO. They provided the umpires, role players and controllers who guided the exercise to achieve the objectives.

federal system of government, with States being responsible for law and order, means that arrangements must be based on cooperation. The size of this country and the sparsity of communications also makes it difficult to maintain centralised response arrangements. Arrangements in other western countries vary considerably and are generally supported by more stringent legislation justified by a higher level of threat from terrorism.

In the United States, a single federal body, the FBI, has jurisdiction over any terrorist incident within the country. The US definition of terrorism is also much broader than our own. The FBI is provided with adequate resources to deploy its Hostage Rescue Team anywhere within the US at short notice and on arrival it simply takes over from the local police.

Counter terrorism in the United Kingdom is also handled by a single organisation and the relative size of the country allows deployment of its counter terrorist force in relatively short time. The actual UK arrangements are similar to those of Australia except without the State Crisis Centre. The major difference is that the crisis management team, including their duty minister, deploys to the scene and has authority to make decisions on behalf of the government. Their primary counter terrorist force is also provided by the military.

Canada faces similar structural and geographic problems to Australia, but has legislation that permits greater flexibility at the national level. However, Canada has used the Australian model as the basis of its arrangements. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for many years, maintained the primary counter terrorist force. However, that responsibility was recently handed over to the Defence Force.

Most European countries maintain a single response capability supported by legislation giving them jurisdiction over all areas within their national borders.

Conclusion

Special arrangements are necessary to deal with a terrorist incident because terrorism is qualitatively different from non-terrorist criminal activity. It is different in the complexity of the operational, political and media issues involved. Operational commanders require specialist support and need policy guidance.
While initial policy direction early in an incident probably will be based on standing policies, it is likely that these policies will have to be modified and adapted to the particular circumstances of a specific incident. It is absolutely essential that these policies address media management and public information.

Irresponsible media activity and reporting can have a major effect on the outcome of a terrorist incident. Terrorists rely on the media to spread their message. Therefore indiscriminate reporting will be playing into their hands and enhancing their cause. Whilst there may be some sympathy for their cause, the immediate concern will always be the innocent victims of terrorism. Their safety must always be foremost in the minds of the law enforcement agencies in their efforts to resolve the incident.

Ultimate operational responsibility always lies with the police, irrespective of government direction or military involvement. It is the police who are responsible for ensuring that the law is upheld and for the protection of the public. Good cooperation between governments, timely and effective guidance and support, and the assistance of the media in achieving those worthy goals will be essential.

NOTES
1. National Anti Terrorist Plan, Annex K.
5. SAC-PAV Strategic Guidance, September 1992, Annex D.

Lindsay Hansch is currently the Director, Counter Terrorism Coordination in the Protective Services Coordination Centre in Canberra. A former Army officer, he served with the Special Air Service Regiment for several years and was the officer responsible for counter terrorism policy, plans and coordination on the Joint Operations Staff, Headquarters, Australian Defence Force from 1986 to 1990. He is a graduate of the Army Command and Staff College and the Joint Services Staff College and has served in Vietnam (twice), the United States and Singapore in addition to most Australian states. He has occupied his current position since January 1991.

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An Australian Paukenschlag?

By Lieutenant Commander D.M. Stevens, RAN.

"If we could only have had more boats it would have led to a Paukenschlag like that off the coast of America."

— Korvettenkapitän Heinrich Timm in the War Diary of U 862 December 1944.

Introduction

The Paukenschlag or "Operation Drumbeat", alluded to above by the commander of U-boat 862, was the code name for the German U-boat offensive against the American Atlantic coast that began in January 1942. In the first two weeks of the campaign, a mere five U-boats sank 25 allied ships totalling 200,000 tons. In the four months it took for the Americans to introduce effective anti-submarine measures, 137 ships of almost one million tons would be lost. For the Allies it was a major disaster, for the U-boat commanders it would become regarded as "The Second Happy Time" of the Battle of the Atlantic.

In December 1944, however, U 862 was not in the Atlantic, and though planned to be part of a larger offensive, the U-boat was in reality quite alone. Korvettenkapitän Timm was actually making his observation while operating off the Australian east coast where he believed he had at last found another safe hunting ground for the U-boat arm. Elsewhere, Allied anti-submarine measures had largely driven the once feared "grey wolves" from the shipping routes, but Timm had just detected a large concentration of shipping at the eastern entrance to Bass Strait and no escorts were apparent.

Due to wartime secrecy and because it was so thoroughly overwhelmed, the German U-boat offensive against Australia in late 1944 has for 50 years remained virtually unknown and unexamined. This article aims to be an initial attempt to correct this deficiency. It will try to explain why Australia even figured in German planning at such a late stage in the war and why the last major U-boat offensive in the Far East ultimately proved to be such a futile endeavour.

U-boat Operations in the Far East

Though Germany began developing plans for U-boat operations in the Indian Ocean early in the Second World War, no practical action was taken until late 1942. While distant operations by the Hilfskreuzers, or surface raiders, were still reaping success, there was no urgent need to augment them and in any case the BdU (Commander-in-Chief Submarines), Admiral Karl Dönitz, was unwilling to transfer the scarce, long-range, Type IX U-boats away from the critical Atlantic battles. Japan too, was at first less than supportive of a free-ranging German presence, regarding the Indian Ocean as primarily Imperial waters. In the first agreement to delineate the Ocean in August 1942, the German zone of operations was limited to the waters south and west of 20°S and 85°E.

The first steps by U-boats into the Indian Ocean therefore remained tentative and were confined to the area around the Cape of Good Hope. As the war drew on into 1943, and both Axis partners found themselves on the defensive, the situation changed. Japanese submarines now made few operational patrols and were primarily engaged in transport duties in the Pacific. They could not readily be spared for remote operations in the Indian Ocean. Recognising their inability to continue to harass Allied shipping alone, the Japanese proposed greater German efforts in the northern part of the Indian Ocean, using U-boats based in Penang.

This change in Japanese attitude coincided with a difficult time for U-boats in the Atlantic and a desire by Dönitz to seek areas where Allied defences were weaker. Available intelligence suggested that the Indian Ocean might indeed offer new opportunities, so in June 1943 the first 11 U-boats of "Group Monsun" left their bases in Europe and headed east. The danger then existing in the Atlantic was evident when only five of these boats survived to reach the Indian Ocean. After operations in the Arabian Sea, where another boat was lost, the remaining U-boats eventually reached Penang in November 1943. With only 8 merchant ships sunk in return, the results were disappointing, but Group Monsun did at least confirm that, in comparison with the Atlantic, anti-submarine
measures in the Indian Ocean were weak and opportunities for attack more favourable. Dönitz therefore decided to continue sending long-range U-boats to the Far East. Ultimately, 44 operational and transport U-boats would be allocated to Indian Ocean operations. Besides Penang, facilities to support the boats were also established with Japanese assistance in Singapore, Djakarta and Surabaya.

German Interest in Australia

One of the first references to the possibility of U-boat operations off Australia appeared in May 1944 in a report written by Kapitanleutnant Lüdden of U 188. Lüdden was the first of the Monsun commanders to return home and he recommended that preliminary reconnaissance of the areas south and west of Australia should be undertaken. In this way, if it was intended to make a surprise attack with a larger group of boats, the force could operate with a sound knowledge of traffic and defence conditions.

A great weakness of German operations in the Far East was that operational control remained solely with BdU. The German commander at Penang, Chef im Südstraum, Fregattenkapitän Dommes, thus had little flexibility and no planning authority to arrange a mission to Australia. German strategic interest in the Indian Ocean was, in any case, still concentrated on the tanker and merchant ship routes in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden, so no immediate action was taken on Lüdden's recommendations.

However, the Japanese still found themselves hard pressed in the Pacific and continued to request even greater German cooperation. The Head of the Japanese Naval Mission in Berlin, Vice Admiral Abe, made several personal representations to Dönitz asking for more U-boats in the Indian Ocean and suggesting the expansion of their operations to include the Australian area. German strategic interest in the Indian Ocean was, in any case, still concentrated on the tanker and merchant ship routes in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden, so no immediate action was taken on Lüdden's recommendations.

Donitz understood that the Australian operation would primarily be for the benefit of the Japanese, but to show further German commitment, agreed to allocate an additional U-boat. At a conference on 26 September, Dönitz was able to inform Vice Admiral Abe that three submarines would now be scheduled to operate in the Australian area. The third U-boat was to be U 537, commanded by Kapitanleutnant Peter Schrewé. U 537 was another Type IXC, and had arrived in Djakarta from the Atlantic in early August.

The preparations required for a sortie of three submarines to Australia were not insignificant. Skilled manpower was scarce and, being far from home, spare parts were almost impossible to obtain. The Far East bases were also critically short of torpedoes and those that were available had often deteriorated in the tropical conditions. Many of these torpedoes ran slow, increasing the likelihood of a failed attack. In late September, the three Australian-bound U-boats were each ordered to be equipped with 14 torpedoes.
only half the full outfit of a Type IX, but a large proportion of available stocks.  A further difficulty for the Germans was that, despite BdU’s suggestion, the Japanese had not operated in Australian waters for over a year. They thus had little idea of the current traffic and defence situation, particularly off the West Australian coast where the Germans intended to concentrate. Without any means of obtaining accurate intelligence, the U-boat Commanders would be forced to rely on pre-war charts and their own hunting instincts.

A lack of current intelligence was not, however, a problem for the Allies. Unknown to both the Germans and the Japanese, their secret communications had been thoroughly compromised. The Australian CNS as Commander South West Pacific Sea Frontier, was receiving daily Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) reports from the US Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL) and was fully aware of German planning for the Australian operation. Just five days after the BdU had given approval for the mission, westbound Allied shipping was instructed to be routed well dispersed and pass not less than 250 miles south of Cape Leeuwin. Air patrols were also increased and additional anti-submarine vessels were transferred from Darwin to Fremantle. These ships were to form part of a “Hunter Killer” group under the direct operational orders of Naval Officer-in-Charge (NOIC) Fremantle. Of far more danger to the U-boats, however, were patrolling allied submarines.

U 168 was the first of the assigned U-boats to sail and left Djakarta at 0900 on 5 October 1944. The U-boat was initially programmed to conduct a one-day surface passage to Surabaya to complete battery trials. On successful completion of the trials, U 168 was to proceed south and operate off the southwest coast of Australia. Following normal procedures to safeguard a friendly submarine, local Japanese units were alerted by signal to the precise details of U 168’s departure and arrival times, intended course and speed. The signal was decrypted and the particulars repeated in the FRUMEL summary for 5 October. Though there was little time left to arrange an encounter, the Dutch submarine Zwaardvisch was on patrol nearby and was ordered to attempt an intercept.

Zwaardvisch belonged to the British 8th Submarine Flotilla based at Fremantle and was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander H Goosens. The submarine had left Fremantle for its second Far Eastern patrol on 26 September and six days later passed through the Lombok Strait. Shortly after dawn on 6 October, with Zwaardvisch off the north coast of Java at periscope depth, Goosens sighted U 168 on a steady easterly course at 14 knots. Zwaardvisch was well positioned for an attack and 11 minutes after the sighting, fired a fan of 6 torpedoes. On board U 168 the torpedoes were seen seconds before impact and much too late to take avoiding action. Two torpedoes hit. One pierced the U-boat’s pressure hull but failed to detonate, the second exploded in the forward torpedo room. Immediate shutting of the water-tight doors failed to slow the flooding and U 168 sank rapidly by the bows with the loss of 23 men.

Zwaardvisch surfaced shortly afterwards and five of the survivors, including Kapitanleutnant Pich, were recovered for interrogation. The remaining survivors were put on a native fishing vessel for return to Japanese territory. Pich was unable to explain why he had been caught unawares, but one crew member was later to blame the Japanese, stating that they never started anti-submarine air searches before 1100. The torpedoing of U 168 was reported by Surabaya late the same day and two Japanese submarine chasers were ordered to proceed to the scene. The Japanese found nothing and Zwaardvisch returned safely to Fremantle on 26 October having sunk or damaged another four enemy ships. Despite this failure and other similar losses, there appears to have been little extra effort put into improving anti-submarine defences by the Japanese. The Germans were so unimpressed by Japanese capabilities that even after the loss of U 168, Berlin raised the point that it might still be safer for U-boats to proceed independently rather than in the company of a Japanese escort.

The Australian operation remained the principal offensive mission planned for the Far East and obviously remained important, both for keeping the U-boats effectively employed and as a show of practical support for the Japanese. In early November, BdU therefore authorised another Type IXD2, Oberleutnant zur See Striegler’s U 196, as a replacement for U 168.

U 537 was the next U-boat to depart. U 537, sailed from Surabaya on 9 November for a series of diving tests.
If the tests were successful, she was then under orders to pass along the eastern coast of Bali and proceed outward bound for operations off Darwin and northwest Australia. Japanese units were again alerted to the presence of a friendly submarine. Five days before departure, the Surabaya Guard Force provided complete details of U 537’s program after leaving port. The message included the following lines:

“10th 0800 in 7-12°S 115-17°E where diving tests will be carried out for 10 miles on course 156 degrees.”

Unknown to her crew, U 537’s fate had thus been sealed even before the U-boat sailed. In Darwin on 6 November, the US submarines Flounder, Guavina and Bashaw received patrol orders that organised them into a coordinated search and attack group. Commander J Stevens, Commanding Officer of Flounder, was the senior officer. The following day, all three boats departed for their allocated areas. On the morning of 10 November, Commander Stevens ordered the submarine to submerge in a position north of Lombok Strait. The Flounder’s patrol report completes the story:

“0754 Officer of the deck sighted what appeared to be a small sailboat bearing 347° (T), distance about 9,000 yards.
0809 Target was identified as a German submarine making 12 knots.
0826 Fired four stern tubes. Track angle 90° starboard, range 1,000 yards, gyro angles very small. Torpedoes were set to run at 8 feet.
0827 Observed hit about 40 feet inside the bow. There was a tremendous explosion and the whole target was obscured by smoke and flame.”

The sinking took only 20 seconds and had occurred one mile from the advised position. There were no survivors from U 537’s crew of 58. Flounder went on to sink one other ship on this patrol, eventually securing in Fremantle on 13 December.

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**U 862**

After arrival in the Far East, U 862 had spent seven weeks undergoing refit in Singapore and 10 days in Djakarta, allowing the crew time for a short period of recuperation in the mountains. With all in readiness, Korvettenkapitän Timm finally began U 862’s second war cruise on 18 November, unaware of the loss of U 537. Expecting the other U-boats to be operating in the west, Timm instead planned to take his boat along the shipping routes to the south and east of Australia. Fortune was with U 862 and for a change insufficient departure details were available for allied submarines to arrange an intercept.

Reaching Cape Leeuwin on 28 November, Timm turned his boat east to try to intercept shipping in the Great Australian Bight. For a week, Timm conducted a fruitless search, eventually suspecting that traffic had been warned and directed away from the normal routes. U 862 then moved towards the Spencer Gulf hoping to have more success around the focal area of Adelaide.

On 9 December, the Greek steamship Illisos was sighted off Cape Jaffa, 130 miles southeast of Adelaide. Detecting the ship too late for a submerged torpedo attack, Timm instead surfaced and ordered his 10.5 cm deck gun into action. In the rough seas prevailing, accurate fire could not be maintained and as Illisos was also returning fire, Timm soon decided to break off the attack.

On being advised of the incident, NOIC Port Melbourne ordered two Australian corvettes in the vicinity, Burnie and Maryborough, to search for the U-boat. The corvettes found nothing on their own ASDIC, but were counter-detected by U 862’s hydrophones. Timm surfaced, but in poor visibility could not identify the warships and since the worsening seas prevented a torpedo attack, decided instead to run south at high speed.

No doubt remembering the mine-laying exploits of German surface raiders in 1940 and suspecting that U 862 might attempt the same, Burnie, Maryborough and HMAS Lismore were then ordered to sweep the shipping routes in Bass Strait. With the reduction in the Japanese threat, the local convoy system around Australia had ceased in February 1944, but other safety measures were now reintroduced. These measures included routing all shipping, except local traffic, south of Tasmania and ordering ships in southern Australian waters to zigzag and darken ship at night.

Timm had meanwhile moved to a position south of Tasmania where U 862 came across a tanker on a course for New Zealand. The target was moving quickly and the U-boat again surfaced to try to move into an attack position. With night and heavy rain making the approach more difficult, the attack was finally thwarted by the appearance of an aircraft that, apparently mistaking the U-boat for the tanker, attempted to exchange recognition signals. U 862 crash-dived and waited, but the expected counter-attack never came.

U 862 then turned north and while passing east of Bass Strait, heard on hydrophones what sounded like...
a large undefended group of ships moving at high speed. It was this detection that inspired Timm to pen his comments about an Australian Paukenschlag. Only one ship was actually sighted, but it was too far away for U 862 to reach a firing position. With no other U-boats in the area to assist the opportunity the attack was lost.

The U-boat continued moving up the coast and on Christmas Eve caught up with the American Liberty ship Robert J Walker off Moruya. The attack began at 0255 on Christmas Day and continued for more than three hours. The Liberty ships were well sub-divided and five torpedoes were eventually needed to ensure the ship was finished. At least two of the torpedoes ran slow, one so slow that it was destroyed by gunfire from the freighter before it could hit.

The first RAAF aircraft arrived in the area ten minutes after the last torpedo exploded, beginning a massive search that would last for over two weeks. Also included were several RAN and USN warships from Sydney and the Royal Navy’s 4th Destroyer Flotilla, that put to sea immediately from Melbourne. It was to be the largest and longest submarine hunt ever conducted off Australia. The searches were all negative and though some attacks were made on suspicious objects, U 862 managed to keep well clear. HMAS Quickmatch recovered the 68 survivors of Robert J Walker on 26 December, two men having been lost during the attack.

Deciding that, for the moment, he had caused enough commotion off New South Wales, Timm headed off undetected towards New Zealand. On the way, another freighter was sighted. A good attack position was reached, but again Timm was let down by a faulty torpedo. Attempting to conserve his stocks, only one was fired and this detonated prematurely 300 m from the U-boat. The freighter escaped undamaged.

Crossing the Tasman Sea, U 862 then sailed around North Cape and down the east coast of New Zealand. At times Timm brought the U-boat very close to the coast, close enough to Gisborne and Napier to see cars on the streets and to hear music from the cafes. The shipping though, was disappointing, several coastal vessels were seen but not the expected concentration of larger ships. Only one submerged attack on a small freighter was made. Despite the ship showing full peacetime lighting, Timm missed the shot. New Zealand was left undisturbed, with the population completely unaware of U 862’s visit.
With seven torpedoes now remaining, Timm had planned to return to the area off Sydney, but on 19 January 1945 he received orders from Fregattenkapitän Dommes to return immediately to Djakarta. The Japanese expected an Allied landing on the Malay peninsula and Dommes was concerned that Penang and Singapore would fall soon after.

For two weeks, the U-boat headed west into mountainous seas. Finally turning north, U 862 stumbled across another Liberty ship, the Peter Sylvester, on 6 February. The Liberty ships again proved their excellent construction when it took four hits from five torpedoes to sink. Thirty-two men were lost in the action and Peter Sylvester gained the dubious distinction of becoming the last Allied ship to be sunk by a submarine in the Indian Ocean.

U 862 broke radio silence for the first time since leaving Djakarta on 9 February, reporting her arrival time at a pre-arranged escort point in Sunda Strait. Though the signal was decrypted, it would appear the rendezvous position was unknown to the Allies and Timm was again fortunate enough to avoid an encounter with an Allied submarine. The U-boat finally returned to Djakarta on 15 February having sunk only two ships, totalling 14,000 tons on the three month voyage. In his post cruise report Timm explained: “Mistake in planning operation was that sea area was too large. Better chances are to be expected by concentrating on traffic north and south of Sydney. The sea area would repay a generously-planned operation with several boats.”

The last U-boat allocated to the Australian operation was U 196, which had arrived in Penang in mid-August after sinking one ship on the voyage from France. The U-boat departed Djakarta on 30 November and initially headed west to act as a refuelling stop for U-boats returning to Europe. On completion, Oberleutnant zur See Striegler’s orders directed U 196 to operate off southwest Australia for one month then proceed to Japan for a refit. Problems with the other U-boats caused the refuelling operation to be cancelled 11 days after U 196 sailed. A recall
order was sent, but despite repeated requests by Penang for a position report, U 196 failed to respond. By the end of December, she was presumed lost. No Allied submarine claimed U 196 as a victim and though it is possible the U-boat struck a submarine laid mine in Sunda Strait, her disappearance remains a mystery.

**Conclusion**

Although the *Monsun* U-boats together destroyed close to a million tons of shipping, sinking rates were not high enough to disrupt Allied strategy and came at a huge cost. Of the 44 U-boats Dönitz sent to the Indian Ocean, only five safely made the round trip back to Europe, six including U 862, were taken over by the Japanese on the defeat of Germany and four were destroyed while operating from Far Eastern bases. The remaining U-boats were all lost while deploying or returning to Europe.

The high loss rates and maintenance difficulties experienced by U-boats in the Far East ensured that even at their peak there were never more than four or five boats available for operations. By February 1945, when U 862 returned to Djakarta, there was only one operational U-boat left and Dönitz had already agreed with the Japanese that future German efforts would concentrate on Allied supply lines around the Philippines. Timm’s comments about Australian waters thus came too late to be acted upon. U 862 was to be the only U-boat ever to operate off Australia and the *Paukenschlag* envisioned by Timm was thankfully never to come about.

The phenomenal success of radio intelligence, and the lack of available enemy resources meant that Australian sea and air defences were never required to confront a determined underwater offensive. Nevertheless, it is sobering to imagine what might have happened. The unsuccessful search for U 862 after the attack on *Robert J Walker* was a major undertaking, involving at least 12 warships and 189 dedicated RAAF sorties. 22 Despite advanced warning, the free movements of U 862 showed that, when not betrayed by SIGINT, the U-boats were extremely difficult to pin down. With the Pacific war receding even further, Australia’s own defences were not worked up and
shipping had largely returned to peacetime practices. If the veteran U-boats of Group Monsun ever had been able to mount a determined challenge, the Australians would have been hard-pressed to match them.

On the other side, despite the lack of results achieved, the cruise of U 862, travelling alone, further from home than any other U-boat during the war, must stand out as an epic accomplishment. By 1944, the average life expectancy of a U-boat at sea was only eight weeks. Despite sickness, boredom, extremes of climate, frustration with faulty equipment and moments of terror, Timm kept his crew motivated and in high spirits, though all already knew that the war was lost. Timm's crew regarded him as one of the best U-boat Commanders of the war, but U 862's performance was also testimony to the qualities of leadership and loyalty instilled in the U-boat arm as a whole.

NOTES
1. Quoted by Jochen Brennecke in "Haie im Paradies (Sharks in Paradise)" Ernst Gerdes Verlag, Preetz/Holstein undated, p. 259.
2. The first "Happy Time" was from July to November 1940 when the U-boat "Aces" achieved their greatest successes.
3. Commander.
5. Lieutenant Commander.
6. Report by Commander of U 188 dated 6 May 1944.
7. Captain.
9. Vice Admiral Abe to Tokyo 27 September. AA (Victoria), MP 1587/1 167A.
10. NARG 457, op. cit., 6 May 1944.
11. CSWPSF message to C-in-C E. Fleet and NOIC Fremantle 191406Z/SEPT/44. A/S Precautions, AA (Victoria) MP 1185/8 2026-5-316.
12. FRUMEL Summaries, op. cit., 5 October 1944.
13. Interrogation of Survivors from the German U-Boat U 168. Submarines — German and Japanese Operations Indian Ocean. AA (Victoria), MP 1587/1 167A.
14. FRUMEL Summaries, op. cit., 8 October 1944.
15. Special Intelligence Bulletin No. 542, 30 October 1944 copy of text held by author.
16. Lieutenant.
19. Australia Station Daily Narrative, Naval Historical Section, Russell Offices, Canberra.
22. 106 by Beauforts, 24 by Catalinas and 59 by Kingfishers. Eastern Area Intelligence Section to RAAF HQ, AA (ACT) 1619/1002 Box 5 6/2/5, Folio 54A.

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David Stevens is the Director of Naval Historical Studies in the Maritime Studies Program. Prior to this appointment he had served for 20 years with the RAN, including time as the anti-submarine warfare officer onboard HMA Ships Yarra and Hobart and on exchange in HMS Hermione. Other postings included attachment to the Staff of the Commander of the RAN Task Group during the 1990-91 Gulf War and three years in HQADF Development Division. In 1992 he graduated from the ANU with a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies.
THE LAST CALL OF THE BUGLE —
THE LONG ROAD TO KAPYONG,
by Jack Gallaway, University of Queensland Press,
1994, 312pp, index, 30 photographs, 30 sketch
maps. RRP $18.95.

Reviewed by Bob Breen

This book is a eulogy to a generation of Australian men who responded to The Last Call of the Bugle and fought as members of 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) in Korea from September 1950 until late April 1951. They responded to a call by the Australian Government to enlist on contract for two years to fight North Korean Communist forces that had invaded South Korea. Most members of K Force, as the special enlistment was called, had fought in World War II and volunteered to take their chances in battle once again. It is arguable whether they joined to fight against the southern march of Communism, or to escape from the monotony or consequences of their circumstances.

The K Force veterans were joined by many lesser-paid young, inexperienced soldiers from the newly-raised Royal Australian Regiment. They flew together to join 3 RAR in Japan before deployment to Korea in September 1950. Subsequently, drafts of K Force reinforcements joined 3 RAR in Korea during operations. The raising of K Force as a pool of reinforcements for overseas service was the last time the Australian Government used a special enlistment to bolster the strength of the Army to deploy and support an expeditionary force.

Those who fought with 3 RAR in Korea during the period Gallaway covers and on subsequent operations there had a significant influence on the character of the newly-raised Australian Regular Army in general and the fledgling Royal Australian Regiment in particular. Several young officers who were to command infantry battalions in Vietnam in the 1960s and to rise to General rank in the 1970s were blooded in the Korean War under the watchful eyes and occasionally sharp tongues of members of K Force. The younger Regular Army soldiers of 3 RAR in Korea were to model their attitudes to leadership, personal courage and physical endurance on the K Force men who formed a bridge of experience between the Australian Army that fought in World War II and the Australian Regular Army of the 1950s. Much of the backbone, rugged individualism and larrikinism associated with the Royal Australian Regiment in the 1950s and 1960s was imparted by the men of K Force, many of whom joined to put their personal stamp on the Army after service in Korea.

This book is not the work of a disinterested academic historian. Jack Gallaway was 3 RAR’s Signals Sergeant during the period he writes about. He has written with the passion of a man who has felt for many years that no writer had fairly acknowledged the achievements of 3 RAR in the Korea War or fully understood the immense hardships, frustration and dangers that members of the Battalion faced as a lone Australian combat unit, fighting as part of the hastily-raised, under-strength 27th British Commonwealth Brigade amidst, and many times in the van or covering the retreat of, an enormous US-led United Nations army.

Gallaway’s book continues a consistent storyline in Australian military history about how Australian troops have been exploited for their fighting qualities by allied commanders who had their own personal and national agendas. He is critical of the senior British and American commanders who gave the Australians many of the difficult tactical tasks and then ordered them to stand aside so that their own troops could mop up and claim the glory.

This book is not only an accessible history of the exploits of 3 RAR but also a summary of the higher level planning and conduct of the Korean War by the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur. Gallaway is critical of MacArthur’s decisions and belittles MacArthur’s self-publicised achievements, such as the landing at Inchon which outflanked invading North Korean forces. He puts MacArthur in the dock and, using mainly secondary sources, argues that his prosecution of the Korean War was badly flawed. Gallaway contends that MacArthur’s inept interpretation of Chinese intentions before they crossed the Yalu River in late 1950 directly endangered the lives of members of 3 RAR and later threatened the survival of the entire Battalion.

Aside from General MacArthur, Gallaway has focused much of his narrative on three individuals: Lieutenant Colonel Charles “Charlie” Green, Commanding Officer of 3 RAR until his untimely death on 1 November 1950, six weeks after assuming command, Green’s eventual successor, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce “Fergie” Ferguson who commanded until July 1951 and the Officer Commanding Alpha
Company for most of the period. Major Bernard "Ben" O'Dowd. Gallaway’s interest in these three officers is personal as well as historical. His aim is to get as close as he can to the truth about each officer’s contribution to the successes and failures of 3 RAR in Korea. The performance of these three men is crucial to understanding the story of 3 RAR in Korea until late April 1951.

One of the strengths of this book is Gallaway’s meticulous research. Gallaway realised that he needed to back up his incomplete personal knowledge of aspects of 3 RAR’s operations with additional information. He also recognised that he had reasons not to like some of his fellow 3 RAR veterans and they had reasons not to like him. Accordingly, Gallaway has based his interpretation of events on the recollections of almost 80 3 RAR Korean War veterans as well as other primary and secondary sources. He knew that if his book was not based on a wide range of sources it would be dismissed as a personal diatribe.

Notwithstanding his deeply-felt personal reasons for telling 3 RAR’s story and his strong opinions about the performance of particular senior NCOs and officers, Gallaway has adhered to the substance of good scholarship while largely ignoring academic form. He has a blunt writing style, replete with what would be now regarded as “politically incorrect” Australian colloquialisms. He lays out the facts, develops his line of argument and leaves it to his readers to come to their own conclusions. Academic historians will have an interesting time deliberating over Gallaway’s thesis that 3 RAR was instrumental in deciding the outcome of the Korean War.

The vast majority of 3 RAR Korean War veterans will be grateful that one of their number has taken the time to write this book. The historic ledger needed to be balanced. There will be some veterans who will find fault with Gallaway’s interpretation of events, especially a small number of venal, obsequious officers and senior NCOs. These men knowingly or unknowingly contributed to the biased and incomplete history of 3 RAR’s first eight months in Korea. They have much to answer for. Until recently, the Australian Regular Army’s failure to retain operational information, to record interviews with its veterans and to commission the writing of its own history has facilitated the oral and written perpetration of many incorrect, florid accounts of 3 RAR’s operations in Korea. The Official History of Australian combat operations in the Korean War, published by the Australian War Memorial in 1985, and a monograph on the Battle of Kapyong, belatedly published by the Army in 1992, have filled many of the gaps and come closer to the truth. Gallaway’s book continues to correct the record.

In his 68th year Jack Gallaway has got off his chest what he wanted to say about 3 RAR in Korea. He writes in anger but mostly he writes with admiration for fellow Australians who fought as members of a gallant Australian infantry Battalion, engaged for eight months in some of the most dangerous and demanding operations ever fought by Australian infantrymen in war. Gallaway has done his Battalion, his Regiment and post-World War II Australian military history a great service.

This book is also a reminder that institutional histories of the Australian Regular Army need to be commissioned urgently as it approaches its 50th anniversary in 1996. At the book launch on 13 April 1994, Jack Gallaway stated that he felt a very personal sense of urgency to write his book because so many of his comrades were dying or succumbing to prolonged serious illness. The same urgency should be felt by the Army. The recent introduction of Army military history grants of up to $15,000 per grant will not facilitate the full time effort that will be required to write the Army’s institutional history of the 1950s and 1960s. The Army, like other significant publicly-funded institutions, should commission professional historians to write more of its institutional history and not rely on a free ride from authors like Jack Gallaway and other part-time enthusiasts.