Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

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of Aye Aye. Minister Sir Oswyn Murray’s article “The Administration of a Fighting Service” which is an article of considerable importance to those engaged at the higher levels of Naval Administration. In this article Sir Oswyn Murray (1873-1936) asked very properly the question, “What is meant by the administration of a fighting service?” He went on to say that, “I, as the son of a great dictionary maker, always find it congenial to start with a definition. The illustration he used for his definition of Naval Administration was the Admiralty, London, of which he was at the time of his death in 1936 the permanent head. His definition was a three-point one which need not be repeated here because it has been examined by the author in Chapter 18 of Aye Aye, Minister.

The book is physically an attractive paperback. Its attention to detail makes it a good book for the general reader as well as for the specialist in Naval Administration and in Naval History.

The book includes a comprehensive bibliography as well as Lists of Ministers of State responsible for the direction and control of Australia’s naval forces, Lists of Permanent Heads and Chiefs of Staff of these naval forces. Most books I see nowadays have only token indexes. These have little value for users in a hurry. But they prevent reviewers from saying in a review, “this book has no index”. The author has provided readers with a useful and comprehensive analytical index. By analytical Index I mean one that does not have only main entries followed by “strings” of numbers only.

A useful adjunct to a book of this class too is a Chronology. The author’s chronology differs from most chronologies that one sees nowadays which are too short and too vague to be worth examining. It provides a useful and comprehensive chronology for readers. However, years of events only are given instead of complete dates.

It is a pleasure to review a book with no printing errors in the narrative. Nevertheless, the blur describes the author as a Commander instead of a Companion of the Imperial Service Order. Another comment concerns the author’s treatment of the Canadian and New Zealand Navies which both had a common origin namely the Royal Navy. Their similarities and differences could perhaps have been drawn out more effectively in one chapter instead of two.

The last Emperor, William II, said in one of his books something to the effect that “Most educated Englishmen he had met had a sound knowledge of the organisation and purpose of the British Navy”. So a study of Aye Aye, Minister should help educated Australians to become better acquainted with the Royal Australian Navy.

THE EAVESDROPPIERS, by Jack Bleakley. Published by the Australian Government Publishing Service. RRP $12.95. (Cat. No. 91 1743 8).

Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE, ED.

Having reviewed nearly 300 books over the past ten years, this is the first one I have read from the Australian Government Publishing Service; I hope it will not be the last.
The author, Bleakley, volunteered for the select group of wireless interpreters at the beginning of the war in the Pacific. He served with the RAAF Wireless Units whose outstanding performance has been kept a secret until the last few years. They certainly made a vital contribution to the Allied victory.

Bleakley traces the development and war experiences of his Unit with brilliant method and clarity. It is expertly supplemented with excellent maps and photographs. Its narrative is simple, direct and entirely interesting.
The author has had permission to use some top secret documents which readers will find most interesting and surprising.

As a war historian and book reviewer, I found much new information about the vital importance of “the Eavesdroppers” work in general war situation. This book tells of the value of the Australian contribution to the US Signal Intelligence Organisation until the end of the war. General Akin, the Chief Signals Officer on General MacArthur’s staff asked that the RAAF Signal Units be made available for the final Campaigns. He got them!

In the past few years much has been written about the brilliant work of the code crackers, but I think this book is second to none. It keeps to the central point of the story throughout and is not diminished by red herrings or political issues.

Bleakley is a gifted historian from his own experience and his excellent research, he tells his story with accuracy, truth and integrity — and what a story!
The Australian Government Publishing Service has produced a first class publication at minimal cost. At $12.95 the book must be the bargain of the year.

If I can mention one criticism, I consider this book should have been produced with a hard cover even though it might have been more expensive. However, the quality of the narrative and its outstanding contents deserves a better cover and I strongly recommend The Eavesdroppers to all readers. It shows that a good publisher and a good author can combine to produce a book which will appeal to all readers interested in the Australian war effort in breaking enemy codes.
Recapturing Our Faith

Dear Editor,

A useful policy is to employ the words of another if he or she has expressed more succinctly what you are attempting to express. As a believer in this policy, I offer the following in response to the recent article by Captain P.M. King (ADFJ No 101, July/August 1993) which proposes a role for the ADF in “recapturing our youth”.

“I am dismayed by the number of senior and important citizens, from politicians and powerful businessmen to dodderly old Diggers, who see National Service as the means to change the values of our youth and to improve their sense of responsibility, self-discipline and patriotism. I explain to them that I do not believe the Army should be the agent for changing societal values; parents, politicians and educators have that responsibility. Unless National Service continues to be ‘selective’ to meet proper force objectives, and each National Serviceman or woman serves for a minimum of two years, the Army will become a massive training-only organisation with no fighting capability and therefore no deterrent value.”


Allan A. Murray
Major, RAAOC

Traditions, Customs and Changes

Dear Editor,


The ADF has endured iconoclastic attacks of whopping magnitudes in recent years, and openly exposing traditions and customs in accessible literature is only going to increase these attacks.

Naval traditions and customs should be left alone until called for or required and then conducted as memory best serves. Most MIDS have had some sort of sea experience to align themselves prior to joining the Fleet, be it visits to ships alongside or sea time itself. I do not think they need to be warned or tipped off to what lies ahead from an article in the *Australian Defence Force Journal*. I urge any member of the ADF, serving or not, to grab their nearest naval counterpart for an explanation of the game “Carrier Deck Landings”. They will quickly discover that Carrier Deck Landings is only a game and not a tradition. I’m sure the “change” of the Navy will see this game overlooked in future mess dinners.

My concern is the article recounts history, not tradition or customs. To confuse either of the three would be disastrous. History is always accepted for what it’s worth, it is logged in the relevant BRs and remembered on its anniversary. Fine traditions and customs will be passed on for years to come with the presence they deserve, for to remember traditions and customs will make them history.

I was disappointed to read an article that besmirched traditions and customs and forced “herd instinct”. The finest traditions and customs should be upheld and kept alive, if anything, just to inspire.

A.J. Barr
LSSIG

Unacceptable Sexual Behaviour

Dear Editor,

Mainly due to the exigencies of the military function, societies have permitted their respective military institutions to have their own law and unique codes of behaviour.

An integral part of this argument is the concept of the “servicemen”. The military provide the service of defending the country in line with the wishes of the government of the day, who purport to represent the wishes of the nation. It is in this way, simply speaking, that the military serve the people.

What should happen then when the culture of the military institution comes into conflict with the wishes of the people, as presented by the government? My answer to this question is this, absolutely nothing.

To suggest that simply by virtue of the fact that we wear a uniform, we therefore occupy some kind of moral high ground is arrogant and dangerous thinking. No one gave the military a mandate to determine what constitutes moral or immoral behaviour. The military in Australia conforms to societies “liberal standards” in respect to homosexuality because it has been told to do so. Despite the fact we do have our
Dear Editor,

I have read the September/October issue of the Australian Defence Force Journal and was, to say the least, astounded to read the letter to the editor on Unacceptable Sexual Behaviour by LTCDR Prendergast. I question the editorial integrity of this journal to accept such correspondence for publication without at least an alternative point of view being given at least equal space. Accepting the principle of freedom of the press, it does raise the question of what is acceptable for publication in the ADF Journal, for example, would a letter supporting discrimination on racial grounds receive equal billing.

The letter has, however, at least had the effect of provoking me to stand up and be counted. That the views in this letter have even been expressed is a clear indication of the attitudes still prevalent in the ADF and perhaps an even clearer indication that the “educational material” mentioned by General Gration when announcing the policy is needed urgently.

The Lieutenant Commander opens by stating that he had attended a seminar on Unacceptable Sexual Behaviour and he did consider that it was necessary. Recent events onboard the HMAS Swan and HMAS Derwent should make that point obvious. S/he then goes on to assert that the military has previously not conformed to “societies liberal standards”. That to some extent is true, the Defence Forces have actually been innovators in a number of areas such as the equal employment opportunities for service women, the integration (albeit slowly) of ethnic minorities and the acceptance of the principles of occupational health etc have all been years ahead of our civilian counterparts in their introduction. There is no reason why the Defence Forces could not lead the way in the implementation of anti-discrimination legislation as well.

The main point LTCDR Prendergast seems to be missing is that the change to the policy in allowing homosexuals to serve is simply acknowledging that we are already here. Contrary to the ravings of the RSL, there has been no rush of Julian Clary clones to the Recruiting Centres demanding the right to join up or even F11 crews skipping down the road holding hands in uniform. This is not a case of bowing to political pressure but rather accepting that as a sizeable arm of Government we are not above the must comply with the laws of the land that we are required to defend.

LTCDR Prendergast then falls back on religious justification to support his/her argument stating that homosexuality is against God’s law and was formerly punishable by death. This is so with the relevant passage to be found in the book of Leviticus. I should also point out, however, that other crimes mentioned that also warrant death by stoning in the same paragraph include seeing your parents naked, not observing the Sabbath, taking the Lord’s name in vain and adultery.

S.J. Hackney
Flying Officer

Unacceptable Sexual Behaviour

Dear Editor,

I have read the September/October issue of the Australian Defence Force Journal and was, to say the
The reference to the acceptability of attending the Gay Mardi Gras is irrelevant to this argument, but as it has been raised I will address it. The Mardi Gras is great fun and the street parade, attended by literally hundreds of thousands of people. Either a lot of straight people are attending the Mardi Gras or our community is a lot bigger than anyone suspected.

The subject about the sleeping accommodation on Base/Shore is also largely irrelevant as the majority of ADF single member accommodation is now single rooms anyway. When at sea, the rules governing unacceptable sexual behaviour cover the situation. That is, that sexual behaviour of an unacceptable nature is not to be condemned. (The behaviour onboard the HMAS Swan, I will point out, was of a heterosexual nature).

There appears to be a misconception that the only reason gays join the military is for a good perve. I hazard that the majority of us joined to serve in the defence of this country. My sexuality is a non-issue in the work place as what I do in bed bears no relation to how I perform professionally. It is a subject that I do not consider appropriate for open discussion in the work place as it is irrelevant.

The rhetoric concerning a cancer spreading through the Defence Forces lowering morale and discipline and causing security problems are surprisingly the same arguments used when it was first suggested that blacks be allowed to serve in the regular defence forces. In both cases the original solution employed, and long since discarded, was the creation of separate services. WRAN, WRAAC and WRAAF and in the USA the formation of black regiments.

The remarks suggesting unprofessional behaviour by Recruiting Officers in “only recruiting their own kind” is a remark that should be treated with utter contempt. It is also against the very point gays have been attempting to put across that the job should go to the best person regardless of sex, religion, marital status or sexual preference. We should be assessed by superiors, peers and subordinates on our abilities in the work place as is everybody else and not on a perceived lifestyle after hours.

Another issue raised is the employment of Chaplains and how to use them now we are all apparently morally corrupt. Chaplains should be used exactly as they are in civilian life, for the people who feel they need to consult them. Being agnostic I do not feel the need to consult a Chaplain and would be more likely to consult a counsellor if I felt the need for personal guidance. It is a personal choice.

The moral duplicity of employing Chaplains is apparently based on an erroneous assumption — that Chaplains are employed to “uphold moral standards in accordance with Biblical principles”. On checking the Defence Instructions, the role of Chaplains is actually defined as being responsible for the spiritual and pastoral needs of all members and their dependents. The duties of Chaplains are clearly defined (for the RAAF) in DI(AF) ADMIN 3-6 paragraph 9 and certainly do not mention upholding moral standards in accordance with Biblical principles.

Lastly, I refer to General Gration’s announcement of the Government’s decision. “The Government has made its decision on this policy and the ADF is now to implement it without reservation”. A country’s Defence Force should be an integral part of the community reflecting adherence to that country’s laws and the wishes of its people. Examples of what can happen when a Defence Force makes itself separate from and independent of a community is evident in the numerous repressive military dictatorships around the world. Personnel, of any rank, who do not feel they can accept direction from their Government, frankly, do not belong in the profession of arms.

M. Livingstone
Sergeant, RAAF

Dear Editor,

I’m sure LCDR Prendergast’s letter in the Australian Defence Force Journal No 102, raised a few eyebrows both inside and outside the Services. It does, after all, contain three ingredients that invariably lead to a punch-up: sodomy, religion and politics. I’ve read the letter several times and find that I agree with the conclusion, but find the argument a bit hard to swallow.

Homosexual activity has always caused headaches for military commanders and has resulted in disciplinary problems — but there again, any kind of sexual activity does the same thing. I would tend to find a debate about sexual activity “per se” more appropriate than to select only one kind of activity and argue on its ills.

Perhaps the most uncomfortable aspect of LTCDR Prendergast’s letter was his idea that homosexuality was some kind of disease because it contravened Mosaic Law. He argued that sodomy was punishable by death under these laws and therefore should not be tolerated in the Services. I decided to look up the Mosaic Laws and tried to locate those that would result in a death penalty for sailors, soldiers and airmen:

- telling your parents to get stuffed — death;
- eating pork chow mein — death for second offence;
• reading your horoscope in the paper — death;
• sleeping with a married woman — death;
• sleeping with a camel — death to you and the camel;
• not killing witches — death.

If we followed Mosaic Law, I’m afraid most of us would have been stoned to death by now!!

My reason for making light of these laws is to show that they are not absolutes and they have changed. Mosaic Law allows you to nail a debtor to the door by his ear — State and Federal laws don’t quite let you do that.

I can understand an argument for or against sexual activity based on the effects it may have on discipline or morale, but I can’t accept that such activity should be banned because a possibly mythical religious leader said it was a naughty thing to do three thousand years ago.

Les Lamb
ex-CPO RAN

BACK COPIES

If any reader has copies of the AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL 1949 – 1955 that they no longer want, we would love to have them back in our care.

Issues most sought after are:
Nos 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 42, 43, 56, 57, 60, 61.

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What Problems Confront the Negotiation of Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific

By Major R.J. Easton, RNZAOC.

A survey of defence spending patterns among Asia-Pacific states, including development of defence industries, is revealing and worrisome. "The Asia-Pacific may soon become the most heavily armed region in the world," and as Michael Klare concluded: "unless fresh arms control efforts are undertaken soon, the Pacific Rim could be the site of periodic military convulsions in the 21st century, as Europe was in the 20th century." Indeed, a central theme of most of the literature emanating from the region is that there is now an urgent requirement to promote disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures (CBMs) to control potential arms races and conflict in the Asia-Pacific.

The purpose of this article is to determine what problems confront the negotiation of arms control, disarmament and CBMs in the Asia-Pacific. The terms disarmament, arms control and CBMs, will be defined and the current state of disarmament and arms control in the Asia-Pacific region will be described. Thereafter, the problems that confront the negotiation of arms control, disarmament and CBMs in the Asia-Pacific will be examined. Where relevant, specific examples of Asia-Pacific responses to disarmament and arms control proposals will elucidate the problems being examined. It concludes with a discussion on the prospects for disarmament, arms control, and CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s.

According to Trevor Findlay, disarmament, which dates back several hundred years, "refers to complete abolition, by international agreement, of weaponry and armed forces under the control of nation-states — other than the minimum required for maintaining internal law and order. Disarmament can... be seen as both a goal (the goal of disarmament) and a process (the process of reaching disarmament)." The concept of arms control is more fundamental than that of disarmament and was essentially a 1960s response, "to manage the nuclear competition rather than overturn it." Whilst arms control subscribes limits on existing systems and restricts the development and use of other prescribed systems, it does not "necessarily have (as) its ultimate goal the grand vision... disarmament". Arms control has three basic goals: first, to reduce the risk of war; second, to reduce its destructiveness should it occur; and third, to reduce the cost of military preparedness. Thus arms control, as Gerald Segal writes, "is concerned with everything from controlling the numbers of troops and weapons, to establishing demilitarised zones, arranging for confidence-building visits to many manoeuvres, or bringing in outside observers to monitor disengagements of troops." CBMs are a sub-set of arms control which, by "increasing transparency, openness and predictability in military matters... (and) increasing contacts at the individual level," increase confidence, security, and inter-state relations, and "may facilitate the verification of arms control agreements."

In contrast to Europe, where formal disarmament and arms control have a strong tradition, few formal arms control agreements exist in the Asia-Pacific. To date, the 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFWZ) treaty is the only multi-lateral arms control of disarmament agreement that has been negotiated specifically for the Asia-Pacific region. Two regional arms control proposals, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP) and the ASEAN based Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and its associated Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), remain unrealised. Bilateral arms control agreements have been undertaken but have been mostly CBMs as opposed to arms limitations, and tacit rather than formal agreements. Indeed, "instead of focusing on formal agreements with all the related problems of counting weapons and agreeing verification, Asian arms control is more concerned with conventional rather than nuclear weapons and with confidence-building measures and demilitarisation rather than the reduction of weapons".

Despite the lack of regional multi-lateral treaties or agreements, a web of global multi-lateral arms control agreements, generally negotiated under the ambit of the United Nations, overlays the Asia-Pacific region. There is also an array of US/Soviet bilateral agreements that have beneficial effects for the entire Asia-Pacific. But while Asian states such as India, Indonesia, Japan, and Australia amongst others, promote new global arms control agreements they have been reticent in pursuing such measures in the Asian region. Moreover, according to Trevor Findlay there
are arms control gaps within the Asian region relating to:
- nuclear weapons;
- chemical weapons;
- conventional weapons and conventional arms transfers;
- naval arms control; and
- CBMs, including regional security forums.\(^1\)

This state of affairs is both surprising and worrisome given the degree of militarisation in the region; the presence of a number of major powers; and the number of medium-sized powers, who favour and promote regional arms control and disarmament.\(^1\) So what factors are responsible for this situation? Why is the European pattern of cooperation not found in the Asia-Pacific? The answer to these questions lies in the array of problems that confront the negotiation of disarmament, arms control and CBMs in the Asia-Pacific.

In addressing these issues, it is first essential to understand just how heterogeneous in ethnic, religious, political, economic, cultural, military, and geographic terms the Asia-Pacific region is. As Desmond Ball noted: “The diversity of Asia is extraordinary. The countries range in size from more than nine million square kilometres (China) to some 600 square kilometres (Singapore); in populations from more than a billion (China) to some 275,000 (Brunei); in GDP from more than $US3,000 billion (Japan) to about half a billion dollars (Laos); in defence capabilities from nuclear powers (China) to a few thousand armed personnel (Brunei); in political systems from liberal democracies to Communist regimes and military dictatorships; and in culture and tradition from the Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian societies of East Asia to the Muslim countries of archipelagic Southeast Asia. They differ greatly in terms of their national interests, threat perceptions and even their definitions of national security and regional security. There are significant historical differences throughout the region. Some countries, such as China and Vietnam, have evolved “a distinctive military science” over hundreds of years. Other countries have exercised defence responsibility for only a few decades. The impact of colonialism and dependence, which affected most countries in the region and which has inevitably coloured their strategic cultures, is still in varying degrees of dissipation”.\(^1\)

In many ways, the lack of coherence in the Asia-Pacific region militates against disarmament and arms control, and clearly challenges the notion that the European experience may be applicable in the Asia-Pacific. European states are divided on ideological, political and socio-economic grounds, but they at least “share a common culture of European diplomacy and a lingua franca of arms control negotiations stretching back at least a century”.\(^2\)

The Asia-Pacific “lacks the centrifugal force of Europe”,\(^3\) hence, there has been little regional integration,\(^4\) nor formation of a multi-lateral alliance system similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WSO).\(^5\) There is, therefore, little tradition of multi-lateral security planning and conflict resolution.\(^6\)

Cultural predispositions and political attitudes within Asia-Pacific also have particular implications for negotiating disarmament, arms control and CBMs. Each has contributed significantly to the lack of formal indigenous arms control proposals in the Asia-Pacific, and shaped the pattern of tacit or informal arms control that currently characterises the region.

First, there is the tradition of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.\(^7\) Countries imbued with the tradition of non-interference, will avoid involving themselves in measures that limit the foreign policy options of a neighbour. Hence, such nations have been willing to take unilateral action and to enter global agreements that overlay the Asia-Pacific, but formal regional bilateral limitations have not been forthcoming.

Second, there is a cultural predisposition to informality among Asian countries. Informal arms control, neither demands formal structures, nor complex and costly verification.\(^8\) Such measures make sense in a region characterised by: “fundamental cultural traditions of decision making in which there is little habit of the rule of law, highly personalised notions of power and legitimacy, a stress on consensus (in appearance if not in reality), and a strong predilection for the resolution of differences in private rather than in public forum”.\(^9\) Asian responses to the UN General Assembly’s resolution to set up an arms sales register provide a good example of how such cultural predispositions impact on arms control proposals. Although the resolution was passed, Japan was the only Asian country who sponsored it, China refused to participate, while North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar (Burma), and Singapore all abstained from the vote. Gerald Segal noted: “In some respects the problem from the Asian point of view was with the very notion of transparency in a political culture which values face and the elaborate efforts to protect it. Many Asian states prefer not to confront unsavoury issues directly or in public, and prefer pragmatic solutions behind closed doors. European and Japanese officials turned initial reluctance into grudging acceptance of the arms register after heavy diplomatic pressure at the end of 1991”.\(^10\) Hence, the process of informal dialogue, of
getting to know each other, suits the Asian psyche. This cultural predilection means that formal arms control proposals will only be viable after "a lengthy period of informal and unstructured dialogue". In short, formal arms control proposals are simply unacceptable to many Asian countries.

Third, in contrast to the European and western conception of security in terms of military threats, many states in the Asia-Pacific view security in a multidimensional or comprehensive sense. In this sense economic, environmental and other non-military aspects of security are treated as being on the same plane of significance as military security. As Trevor Findlay noted: "In Asia there exists both a different view of national security and an over-riding concern with economic development and nation-building rather than with outside military threats. Consequently arms control is not seen as a solution to the most pressing national security challenges".

Fourth, the very characteristics of the nation state system in Asian countries impacts on arms control in the Asia-Pacific. In contrast to most western nations, where the influence of the military in domestic politics is limited, in many Asian nations the political system is dominated by the military and the military plays an important role in decisions. Therefore, arms control proposals, particularly those that seek to impose limitations on military capabilities, make the military establishment very apprehensive. According to Desmond Ball: "Military leaders need to be clearly persuaded that security initiatives are unequivocally in the national interest . . . the particular measures likely to be acceptable, at least in the short term, are those which build on existing military linkages".

Together, the cultural predispositions outlined above have resulted in a general lack of expertise, within the foreign policy establishments of Asian countries, in negotiating formal arms control measures. Without such expertise the Asian states are generally reluctant to enter into formal arms control negotiations.

There is also a deeply held belief among many Asian states that arms control measures are merely instruments of western domination in order to maintain the status quo in balance of power relationships. In the past, most arms control initiatives originated in the west. Such measures did not take into account the fact that Asian countries were developing politically and economically, and in many ways were still trying to catch up with the west. Hence, some Asian countries see western initiatives as a clever ploy to inhibit their growth and their ability to reach the same level of economic and political development as the west.

Finally, suspicion of outside proposals, together with cultural predispositions, are likely to manifest themselves in a lack of political will to accede to western arms control proposals; with no political will, arms control measures are not going to get very far. Such attitudes have in the past manifested themselves in outright opposition to some arms control proposals, such as the proposal to establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modelled on the CSCE. Despite the potential benefits to be gained, the CSCA proposals hit major opposition. Japan, ASEAN and the US, all opposed the CSA concept. Whilst much of the opposition centred around the lack of applicability of the European model in Asia, there were, however, more fundamental concerns. In ASEAN, for example, there was the "feeling that foreign ideas were being imposed on the region by foreigners for their own interests". As Singapore academic Bilveer Singh stated: "ASEAN sees itself as the most important CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measure) in the region, at least in Southeast Asia and does not wish to see it undermined". The CSCA has been ruled out, in the short term.

Regional disparities and differences in strategic and political culture are not the only problems that confront the negotiation of arms control measures in the Asia-Pacific. The myriad of unresolved intra and inter-state disputes, more complex and numerous than those in Europe, also pose a major problem.

There is a much wider variation in levels of political and economic development among Asia-Pacific states than in Europe. Many ethnic, racial and other domestic tensions are being encountered, in states such as Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Cambodia, as their economic and political systems develop. And, as Gerald Segal stated: "none of these issues looks like being easily resolved and therefore no swift end to conflict is likely. If the conflicts remain acute there will be little room for meaningful arms control".

At the inter-state level, in Europe, the CSCE arose as many fundamental divisive issues were resolved and threat perceptions coincided. In the Asia-Pacific, however, many territorial disputes remain unresolved and there is wide disparity in threat perceptions. Disputes currently exist in the Korean Peninsula, Sino-Indian Border, Indian-Pakistani border, Kurile Islands, and the South China Sea. There are also a number of unresolved border and territorial disputes between the ASEAN states. While the existence of such disputes does not rule out arms control and security cooperation in the region; "the complexity of the politics of each conflict is distinctive, making an Asia-wide approach unlikely". Moreover, the existence of these conflicts remains both a potent force behind the arms
build-up currently taking place in the Asia-Pacific, and a key catalyst for any arms races that may occur.48

A more intractable problem is the fundamental question of diplomatic recognition of some states. For example, China continues to oppose membership of Taiwan and the UN and in other forums such as APEC.49 While some rapprochement between states has taken place in the region, some differences between states remain unbridgeable “in the absence of broader political reconciliation between them”.51

A further problem confronting disarmament and arms control in the Asia-Pacific is the lack of a simple balance of power relationship. Until recently, Europe was characterised by a NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance of power relationship. In the Asia-Pacific, however, where Japan, India, China, North and South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and the US are all major military powers engaged in the region, and the economic and military strength of some middle powers is increasing rapidly, no simple balance of power relationship will exist for the foreseeable future. Indeed, “There are in fact several balances of power and needless to say this is a nightmare for arms control . . . a messy picture indeed, and one that essentially defies any region-wide arms control”.52

Asymmetries in force structures within the Asia-Pacific will also pose a significant obstacle to regional arms control measures. “Power asymmetries in the Asia-Pacific region, ... leave little room for reciprocity and a perception of shared benefits”.53 In Europe, the Western alliance used arms control as a means to redress an arms imbalance that favoured the Soviet Union. In the Asia-Pacific, however, the US and its allies have a conventional military superiority, particularly a maritime superiority that will militate against negotiating “far-reaching arms control measures”.54 As Trevor Findlay concluded: “Here then is a major reason for the lack of certain types of arms control in the Asian region (compared with Europe) — the absence of American support for any measure that might curtail US forces or military options. Hence, US opposition to naval arms control, enhanced naval CBMs and nuclear weapon-free zones. The US has not, however been shy about proposing or encouraging arms control for others, including CBMs on the Korean peninsula, Indian and Pakistani accession to the NPT and Chinese restraint in exporting ballistic missiles”.55 He also noted that, asymmetries in strategic situations, such as on the Chinese and Russian border, pose an obstacle to arms control negotiations.56

Another major problem confronting the negotiation of disarmament and arms control in the Asia-Pacific has been the lack of a negotiating forum like NATO. EEC, or CSCE, to launch and discuss indigenous arms control proposals. APEC has been proposed as an Asia-Pacific security forum but, for the foreseeable future, APEC’s agenda will be restricted to economic issues.57 On the other hand, the proposed ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), supported by second track diplomacy, may provide the much needed negotiating forum.

The ARF, agreed to at the 1993 Singapore ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (APMC),59 will meet for the first time in Bangkok in 1994. The 18-member group involves the ASEAN states, its seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, the EEC, South Korea, and the US) plus Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea in ASEAN-based talks on regional political and security issues. According to officials who spoke after the 1993 APMC, talks at the forum would “cover a full range of security issues, from arms transfers and notification of military exercises and procurements, to refugee and labour movement”.58 The ARF will be strongly supported by the increasing array of second track diplomacy going on in the region.59 For example, in 1993 regional nations agreed to form a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) to focus on regional security issues.60 This will allow academics, think-tank leaders, military and intelligence officials, and governmental officials, acting as private individuals, to meet in order to draw up proposals on dispute settlement and confidence building for governments to consider.

The APMC-based ARF promises no quick fix, the process is a very delicate one, because there is a fundamental difference between western and oriental conceptions of democracy, human rights, and government. Moreover, ASEAN not only controls who is a member, but also controls the agenda. If, however, the attitudes of participants thus far are indicative of the future, there is clearly room for optimism, and at least developments are moving in the right direction.

In determining both the problems and prospects for disarmament and arms control in the Asia-Pacific, it is essential and useful to make the distinction between nuclear, chemical, and conventional arms control efforts including ballistic missiles. North Korea’s recent actions have created much uncertainty over the future of the NPT, and there is a fear that supply-side economics will encourage China to sell chemical weapons technology.61 For many Asia-Pacific states, the vexed question of verification will remain a major stumbling block to passage of a universal Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and there are a number of other outstanding issues requiring resolution before there will be agreement to a universal CWC.62 On a more positive note, many Asia-Pacific countries have
tried, and seem willing to continue, to limit the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weaponry. This attitude, together with the weight of international pressure and the general levels of rapprochement occurring, can only assist in overcoming the obstacles faced.

While most states agree on the need to limit the proliferation of nuclear and chemical munitions, agreement to limitations or controls on state of the art conventional weapon systems, including ballistic missiles, is another matter. Currently in the Asia-Pacific, no controls govern the size of conventional armed forces, the acquisition by import or manufacture of conventional weapons, or the export of conventional weapons to other regions. Attempts have been made to control the export of missiles and missile components through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but its usefulness is open to question. Moreover, the UN Register of Conventional Arms only came into effect in April 1993, and there is serious doubt about whether states will comply with its basic requests for a modicum of transparency.

It is clear that significant obstacles must be overcome before controls on conventional weaponry will be realised. First, no interest exists for such arrangements while countries in the region are strengthening and modernising their forces. Second, regulation of the arms trade is unlikely to get the support from supplier nations such as North Korea, China, India, and Russia, whose economies are increasingly reliant on the arms trade. Thirdly, while neighbouring states continue to receive sophisticated arms supplies that are now more cheaply available, other countries are unlikely to agree to any form of arms control arrangements.

It is indeed one of the great contradictions that, despite the array of CBMs being put in place and dialogue being undertaken, Asia-Pacific states are going to continue defence modernisation because they are uncertain about their future. The real concern is that the defence planners will drive continued arms build-ups despite the dialogue taking place. "The prognosis is therefore not good for a region wide conventional forces reduction treaty such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Similarly, region-wide constraints on military budgets are also unlikely ... Probably the most that can be hoped for in the way of negotiated multilateral conventional arms control in Asia is an arrangement constraining the purchase of particularly threatening weapon systems, rather than an across-the-board cut in conventional arms. More readily attainable is a greater degree of transparency in military acquisitions, exports and imports, which may enhance mutual confidence and lead the way to more substantial arms control measures."

The prognosis for naval arms control involving Russia, the US and China, is mixed. The US Navy continues to resist naval arms control or even enhanced naval CBMs. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the US is now in a position to view selected Naval CBMs as useful for maintaining regional security, and there is evidence of a softening of US attitudes towards CBMs and Nuclear Free Zones. Certainly, there is much hope that there will be great gains in cooperation in maritime security issues, particularly in Southeast Asia, but "it remains to be seen whether the lesser powers currently developing their navies, ... will see naval arms control as in their interests".

In conclusion, a number of major problems confront the negotiation of disarmament and arms control measures in the Asia-Pacific. These include: diverse levels of political and economic development among states; a lack of regional integration; cultural predispositions and political attitudes that do not foster formal arms control agreements; lack of expertise in arms control processes within Asian countries, both intellectual and infrastructural; the myriad of unresolved and complex intra and inter-state disputes; the lack of a simple balance of power relationship; asymmetries in force structures, power relationships and strategic situations; the lack of a negotiating forum like NATO, EEC, or CSCE, from which to launch and discuss indigenous arms control proposals; difficulties in establishing verification regimes; and the forces that underpin the current build-up in conventional military forces going on in the region.

These problems are not immutable. As the number of disputes continue to break out in Europe, the importance of having arms control regimes in place prior to conflict has become increasingly evident to Asia-Pacific states. CBMs are now considered useful and vital tools of security policy throughout the Asia-Pacific. Among the ASEAN states, for example, who opposed the CSCE proposal and traditionally eschewed a security role, significant security cooperation has taken place, and it seems that much more is on their agenda. Indeed, as the region develops, states have become increasingly interested in how arms control can help stabilise their environment. As states grow economically and militarily stronger, they will gain the confidence and experience in international multilateral forums to negotiate arms control measures.

The proposed ARF and the array of second track organisations, particularly the CSCAP, will serve as valuable negotiating forums and venues through which a habit of multi-lateral security discussion can be built. This, together with the experience states gain with arms control arrangements at the global level,
such as those party to the proposed CWC and the UN Register of Conventional Arms, will hasten the growth of CBMs and may eventually provide the basis for indigenous regional and sub-regional arms control proposals. Moreover, in the post Cold War world, proposals are no longer seen in ideological terms. In the past, the US viewed many arms control proposals as benefiting the Soviet Union more than them, and therefore opposed such proposals. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US is less suspicious of the motives of others. Indeed, the whole pattern of rapprochement that has emerged in the post Cold War world, has created a climate more conducive to achieving arms control, albeit that considerable obstacles remain in the way.

While prospects for conventional arms limitations and controls, including ballistic missiles, are not good, and the future of naval arms controls is mixed, the future of CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region is promising, particularly in the fields of transparency of military activities and capabilities. As Geoffrey Wiseman stated: “They are better suited than formal arms control to the politico-strategic conditions and ‘defence culture’ of the Asia-Pacific . . . However, their purposes will not be the same as for Europe where defensive-CBMs have essentially been intended for crisis stability, especially reassurance concerning surprise attack . . . In the Asia-Pacific, such defensive measures will probably have more to do with arms racing, building mutual trust and improving the political climate than either crisis management or surprise attack”.

In short, whereas European countries have developed formal and complex regional military CBMs, the way forward in the Asia-Pacific area seems rather different. Moreover, the inherent diversity of the regional environment makes harmonisation of attitudes towards disarmament and arms control proposals, at best, a delicate and gradual process. Indeed, if all goes well, we are talking about something one foreign policy expert describes as “a movement in the tectonic plates that underlie the geopolitical game”. Such things take time — and patience.

How disarmament and arms control proposals and agreements actually develop in the future is open to speculation, but in terms of reaching the eventual goal of a secure and stable Asia-Pacific region, the limited progress that has been achieved can only be interpreted as encouraging. The pace of debate and dialogue certainly appears to be quickening, and where there is dialogue there must be hope. What is certain is that, unilateral, bilateral, subregional, regional, and global efforts all have a vital part to play in the Asia-Pacific arms control game.

As Europe has assumed a more multi-polar structure, and as problems of nationalism have re-emerged, it has lost some of the characteristics which facilitated arms control over recent years. Already the world is seeing how dialogue and cooperation are proving as important as formal arms control. It is therefore quite likely that, in the post Cold War world, Asian arms control has something to teach Europe.

NOTES

2. Douglas Johnston, “‘Rapprochement that has emerged in the post Cold War world, has created a climate more conducive to achieving arms control, albeit that considerable obstacles remain in the way.”

3. Vanuatu, and Tonga have not yet acceded to the treaty and are observers instead. 11 Asia-Pacific states are members of the UN Commission on Disarmament. See Trevor Findlay, op. cit.. pp.2-3: see also Geoffrey Wiseman, “Rapprochement that has emerged in the post Cold War world, has created a climate more conducive to achieving arms control, albeit that considerable obstacles remain in the way.”

4. As Geoffrey Wiseman stated: “They are better suited than formal arms control to the politico-strategic conditions and ‘defence culture’ of the Asia-Pacific . . . However, their purposes will not be the same as for Europe where defensive-CBMs have essentially been intended for crisis stability, especially reassurance concerning surprise attack . . . In the Asia-Pacific, such defensive measures will probably have more to do with arms racing, building mutual trust and improving the political climate than either crisis management or surprise attack”.


7. Ibid., p.2.


9. Findlay, op. cit., pp.2-3; see also Geoffrey Wiseman, “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, p.50, who notes that, “Generally speaking, a CBM will be a political commitment and less binding than arms control or disarmament agreements both of which will tend to have stronger international legal connotations . . . For the most part CBMs will tend to be less formal than arms control”. For a detailed explanation of CBMs and where they fit into the arms control process, see James Macintosh, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures: A Skeptical Look, Australian National University Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 85, Canberra, July 1990, passim.

10. See Segal, Arms Control in Asia, pp.7-10, for an analysis of arms control from 1945-1987.

11. Vanuatu, and Tonga have not yet acceded to the treaty and the US, France, and Great Britain amongst others have been unwilling to sign the protocols governing it, see Trevor Findlay, op. cit., pp.22-28.

12. Ibid., pp.30-37.

13. Segal, Arms Control in Asia, p.2.

14. For example, if Russia, Canada and the United States are included. 11 Asia-Pacific states are members of the Conference of Disarmament and five others are observers whilst all Asia-Pacific states who are members of the UN are entitled to participate in the UN Commission on Disarmament. See Trevor Findlay, op. cit., p.13.
15. ibid, pp.17-21.

16. ibid, p.6.

17. ibid, pp.38-45. Also see p.17 in which Findlay notes that "The most glaring gaps in coverage of existing multilateral arms control agreements in the Asian region are found in the list of parties to the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty). Missing are India . . . Pakistan . . . Burma and Vanuatu . . . North Korea . . . has acceded to the NPT and . . . signed and ratified the required safeguards with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association). In early 1993, however, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT and has refused IAEA inspections. See Andrew Mack, "Proliferation danger grows", Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, June-July 1993, p.26, for a more detailed account of North Korea's recent actions.


22. See Findlay, "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Asian Region", pp.6-7, who notes that, in Asia only the ASEAN and South Pacific states have so far engaged in a significant measure of regionalism — and then only at the sub-regional level.


24. See Ball, op. cit., p.5; and Cronin, op. cit., p.67.

25. See Ball, loc. cit., where he notes that, compared to Europe, the concept of non-interference is given more weight in the Asia-Pacific. See also p.10, where Ball notes that for the Asian states, adherence to the principle of non-intervention is seen as "an important basic condition for cooperation among states with different political systems and values, as well as an important instrument for nation building, thus contributing to national and regional resilience.

26. See Segal, Arms Control in Asia, p.7, for a discussion on the problems of verification among Asian states. Few Asian states have the technological capability to undertake sophisticated verification, indeed technical difficulties and the expense of verifying compliance currently pose a formidable obstacle to a universal Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). See also Findlay, "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Asian Region", p.40; and A.G.B. Vallance, "A Farewell To Arms Control", Air & Space, November, 1992, p.406, who notes that "any arms control agreement is only as good as the verification regime which is used to enforce it."

27. Ball, op. cit., p.11.


30. Ball, loc. cit., who notes that: "In Northeast Asia, where mechanisms for dialogue and consultation on regional security matters are perhaps most necessary but where the practice of dialogue is almost entirely absent, formal arrangements are simply unacceptable to China and North Korea (and even South Korea, although there are some refreshing indications that the intransigence in Seoul may be becoming less abso-

31. ibid, pp.16-18.


34. Gerald Segal in fact, stated that, "... there is a deeply held belief (within Asian states) that rules are made by the powerful to control the weak and by the old to control the young. For young states with optimistic dreams, arms control is often seen as merely a charade to slap them down and to maintain the status quo." See Segal, Arms Control in Asia, p.6.

35. First suggested by former Soviet President Gorbachev, the CSCE idea was "floated" by Australia and Canada. The CSCE is now a forum for 52 nations to discuss European security following collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War. It was argued that, like the CSCE, a CSCA would, through a comprehensive membership of Asia-Pacific nations, provide a forum to promote mutual understanding in the field of common security. See Joseph Camilleri, "New Approaches to Regional Security: The Asia-Pacific Context", contribution by Gary Smith and Sidholm Kettle ed., Threats Without Enemy: Rethinking Australia's Security, Pluto Press, NSW, 1992, p.179; Briquette Sauerwein, "A CSCE for Asia", International Defense Review, Vol. 24, June 1991, p.541; and "ASEAN mulls over forum to discuss its security", The Star (Malaysia), January 4, 1992, p.18.

36. Cronin, op. cit., p.63. At the time the US, still motivated by the suspicion of Soviet (now Russia) intentions in the region, view on a need for a new Asia-Pacific security forum was: "if it ain't broke, don't fix it ..." Also see "No need for Asia-Pacific security forum, says US", The Straits Times, 25 April 1991; and Michael Richardson, "Asia seeks new forum to resolve regional conflicts," The Straits Times, 24 June 1991.


39. Segal, Arms Control in Asia, p.6.

40. See Findlay, "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Asian Region", p.10, who cites agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union and resolution of disputes between Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea over conflicting territorial claims, as examples of bilateral agreements that have occurred in the past in spite of the existence of territorial disputes. The cooperation that has occurred among the ASEAN states also demonstrates that cooperation can occur in the face of unresolved disputes. Indeed, the 1992 ASEAN Declaration of the South China Sea, and Indonesian series of annual workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea held since 1990, are recent attempts at trying to prevent conflict in the South China Sea. But the Spratly Islands dispute also shows just how complex the issues are, how difficult resolution will be, and how fragile the current state of peace is.

41. Segal, Arms Control in Asia, p.4. By way of example, see Findlay, op. cit., p.9, who notes that India and Pakistan, "have begun a low-key process of building confidence . . .
whether this process can advance to more sophisticated arms limitation agreements in the absence of a settlement of their Kashmiri and other disputes, such as over their respective nuclear programmes, remains to be seen."


43. China, which had agreed to Taiwan and Hong Kong's membership of APEC, is not prepared to sit with them at a formal leaders summit. According to a Chinese spokesman, "Hong Kong and Taiwan are both regional economies. They're clearly not sovereign states. Therefore they're entitled to attend." See "Most Asia-Pacific countries for leaders meeting in Seattle", The Straits Times, 27 July 1993, p.19; Greg Sheridan, "China deals fresh blow to APEC summit", The Weekend Australian, July 17-18, 1993, p.4; and "Asean gets it right", The Business Times (Singapore), 27 July 1993, p.26.

44. Findlay, "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Asian Region", p.10.

45. Segal, Arms Control in Asia, p.4.

46. Johnstone, op. cit., p.106. Johnstone also noted that "this is in direct contrast to the European context, in which the CSCE plays its role in a highly institutionalised and interdependent system where even limited control over exercises and troop movements is important to the entire system, and the information gained is similarly useful to every participant as a possible signal of intentions.


49. ibid, p.39. In many ways perceptions of asymmetric relationships impact on India's attitudes towards arms control proposals. India's belief that the NPT "is discriminatory in its division of the world into nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots'," and its refusal to accede to proposals for nuclear-free Indian sub-continent when China is not governed by such, continues to prove a major stumbling block to negotiation of such proposals. In a post Cold War world, in which the Soviet Union no longer acts as its patron, it is however, possible that India may become more cooperative in arms control negotiations.

50. APEC now includes the ASEAN countries, Australia, Canada, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the US. It evolved as a forum for discussion on regional trade but there have been several proposals to increase its mandate to cover security issues. However, China, India, and ASEAN have all opposed explicitly changing APEC's charter to cover security and political issues. See Sheridan, "The Big League"; and Thomas Wilborn, Stabilizing Security Structures, And U.S. Policy For East Asia And The Pacific, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 1993, p.18.

51. In the 1980s, it became customary to follow the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) with a ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (APMC) which consisted of a six (the members of ASEAN) plus seven conference, (its seven dialogue partners which include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, the EEC, South Korea, and the US) and seven six plus one meetings. Throughout the 1980s, the dialogues held were concerned principally with practical questions such as trade, investment and development assistance. They were not, however, limited to such topics, and developed as a useful forum for discussions on international and regional issues, as well as any aspects of the relationships between ASEAN and each of the dialogue partners, albeit that discussion of security issues was taboo. In 1992, however, ASEAN openly endorsed discussion of security issues, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam and Laos now had observer status, while China and Russia were invited as guests to both the 1991 and 1992 AMMs. In 1991, India became a sectional dialogue partner within the APMC. Thus by the end of the 1992 AMM, ASEAN had an arrangement in place that could, and did, engage almost the complete arc of countries in the Asia Pacific in a security dialogue, albeit in an informal manner, and the APMC was firmly established as the most important forum for discussing regional security matters in the Asia-Pacific. In see V.K. Rajan, "ASEAN comes of age", New Zealand International Review, Vol. XVII, No. 5, September/October 1992, p.9, for a description of ASEAN's organisational structure; and Thomas Wilborn, op. cit., p.19-20.

52. See Martine Letts, "The Year of the CWCT", Pacific Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, August 1992, pp.6-9. According to Letts, "there are a number of states, many of them critical players in the Asia-Pacific region, which are far from convinced that a CWCT would be in their best military or economic interests, despite their unequivocal public support for the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty." (p.6) For example Aaron Karp states: "the fact remains that the MTIR is entirely voluntary, lacking a verification scheme; an enforcement procedure, or a secretariat. Because it fails to address the motives that compel regional actors to acquire long-range missiles, the regime will never be enough to stop their spread." See Aaron Karp, "Controlling ballistic missile proliferation", Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 6, Nov/Dec 1991, p.522. See also David Lague, op. cit., who notes that missile technology is one of the few remaining competitive Chinese military exports now that the cash-strapped Russian suppliers are seeking sales aggressively; Trevor Findlay, "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Asian Region", pp.42-43; Gerald Segal, "New Arms Races in Asia", p.271; and Kathleen Bailey, "Can Missile Proliferation Be Reversed?", Orbis, Winter, 1991, pp.10-12.


54. See Richard Lever and Graeme Cheeseman, "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Asian Region", pp.54-55; Gerald


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Appreciating the Military Problem — Part One

By Major Darryl Stuart, RAA.

“Rules are for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools.”

Anon

Introduction

War is a battle of moral forces, fought in an environment of imperfect knowledge and violent action. At its essence are the concepts of initiative and decisive action. At their different levels the leader, commander and strategist must all solve military problems to apply violence and win initiative. These problems are not susceptible to mere calculations or even to logic alone. They require the application of intuition, prediction, and imagination. The problem solving aid provided to invoke these skills is the appreciation process.

The appreciation process, as we now know it, was conceived in 19th century Germany by Moltke and Elder (Chief of the German General Staff in 1853), who said:

“Our science gives us no fundamental rules to be always applied, no formula to help us over all our difficulties. The essential thing in war is on every occasion to ‘appreciate the situation’ rightly and to make arrangements that are best suited for that situation.”

It is thus apparent that the essence of the appreciation is the rejection of rules or formula in favour of the demands of the situation. Since its beginnings as a systematic study for solving tactical problems, the appreciation process has evolved into an institution in professional armies around the world; embedded in our psyche as a revelation to be passed on to successive generations.

The purpose of this article is to critique both the appreciation process and the technique called situating the appreciation (referred to hereafter as the situation process). It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the entire appreciation process. I will concentrate on the selection and analysis of factors, and the identification of courses open. The first part of an appreciation — the review of the situation and selection of the aim — is currently the subject of debate on the implementation of directive control doctrine which is beyond the scope of this article. The final part of the appreciation — the selection of the best course — has already been the subject of considerable decision theory research.

Similarly, I will not address the possible role of artificial intelligence or decision support systems in the appreciation process. It is unlikely that either will have any impact before the turn of the century, and it is felt that such systems must conform to the theoretical basis of the appreciation process rather than vice versa.

The topic will be addressed in three steps establishing a common basis for understanding the nature of the processes, including an introduction to recent scientific theories of human problem solving techniques; defining the ADF requirement for a problem solving process and assessing both processes mentioned in existing doctrine against the ADF requirement.

The Nature of the Process

The nature of the appreciation process described in JSP 102 does not succeed in outlining the fundamental relationship between method and knowledge in solving complex problems. JSP 102 concentrates on the layout and written expression of an appreciation to the exclusion of explaining the elements of the process clearly. Any problem solving process must be able to be viewed in terms of:

a. a method which structures all the information relevant to the aim and advises on the technique for the analysis of that information to develop courses of action; and
b. the professional knowledge of the user, which is required to assess the relevance of information and analysis, and to ensure the workability of courses of action.

The inability of existing doctrine to explain this symbiotic relationship between method and knowledge makes the process difficult to understand and therefore difficult to teach. This is highlighted in training institutions by the frequent misuse of the appreciation process to teach and assess professional knowledge, in the form of doctrine. Instruction and assessment of the method of the appreciation is usually restricted to trivial summaries of deductions, or to staff duties exercises.
In any comparison of the appreciation and situation processes the affect of professional knowledge is a constant influence. In the form of learned doctrine or practical experience, it is essential for the development of workable plans, regardless of the method used. However, the methods of the two processes are significantly different.

The method of the appreciation process structures information into categories called factors. This information is then analysed by the comprehensive use of deduction. The familiar “What If?” question, or the like, is asked repetitively to extract all possible deductions from each piece of information, utilising the capacity of our short term or working memory. The link from deductions to courses open is not explicitly described in the method. It is implied that the lines of argument developed by deduction will end naturally in the elements of a course of action; aids such as factor and deduction guides guarantee that this occurs.

The method of the situation process is not completely outlined in current doctrine. It is assumed that information is structured under factor headings as is done for the appreciation process. However, the analysis of information is conducted using inductive reasoning. Information is progressively assimilated until, by inductive analogy, a course of action is triggered from our long term memory. If the course satisfies the aim, it is retained as a sieve for all subsequent information that may be considered.

Having introduced both deductive and inductive reasoning as the methods of analysis for the situation and situation processes respectively, it is informative to compare them in terms of recent studies of human problem-solving methods conducted by cognitive psychologists. Deductive reasoning is the process of matching two or more pieces of information together to create new information using logic. The strict application of rigorous logic would be a reliable problem-solving method, but recent research has discovered that formal logic is not a good model for human reasoning. The human mind is not well suited to the rigours of deductive logic. Real information is rarely black or white and, in an adversarial environment, incorrect or contradictory information is often used. In addition, because deductive reasoning relies on the serial processing of information in the short term, or working memory, it is highly inefficient. Sequential deductive reasoning is a complex human activity requiring great discipline to avoid high error rates. Thus, it is apparent that while deductive reasoning is a rigorous and reliable method for solving problems, it is not user-friendly.

Induction is defined as the development of general rules, ideas or concepts from sets of specific experiences or examples. It is a general characteristic of human cognition and forms the basis for most human learning. Thus induction establishes a powerful method for dealing with new information. When confronted with a problem, our first instinct is to order the information into a familiar pattern to fit known rules or formula. Thus, by a process of analogy, we situate the appreciation using either past experience or doctrine as the template.

This of itself is not necessarily bad, except the established pattern may bias our consideration of any additional information; this is called an anchoring heuristic. The other shortcoming of induction is that inductive conclusions are not provable. Only deductive reasoning provides the inferences and propositions that can prove a conclusion correct. Inductive arguments rely on analogy which can rarely be explained, and never proved conclusively.

A third technique for analysis exists, although it is not as well researched or understood. It is the techniques of intuition or insight. This is the ability to reorganise information in the working memory or the long term memory to identify new combinations to solve a problem. It is commonly referred to as creative or lateral thinking. In an appreciation, it would allow a sequence of deductions to be re-ordered to shed new light on the problem. It also enables information critical to the solution of a problem to be identified. Clearly, it is the quality we should be trying to evoke out of the appreciation. Insight can be encouraged by changing the representation of a problem or re-ordering the sequence that information is analysed. Currently, the rules that control the appreciation process fail to provide this encouragement.

**ADF Requirements**

Armed with an understanding of the nature of both the appreciation and situation processes, we must next develop a basis to compare their utility for the ADF. To date, the appreciation process has escaped the requirement for definition in terms of measurable performance indicators. Thus, there is no ADF requirement against which competing processes can be compared. In the absence of such guidance, I have selected five criteria as either essential or desirable, believed to reflect the needs of the ADF during the next decade.

a. Guaranteed Solution. Whilst only sound professional knowledge can ensure that a plan is work-
A Critique of the Appreciation Process

By drawing on a common understanding of the appreciation discussed in the nature of the process, it is now possible to critique the appreciation process against each of the ADF requirements.

The appreciation process guarantees a plan through the comprehensive nature of the method. It ensures that all information and all possible courses of action are considered. In the practical conduct of operational and tactical appreciations, factor and deduction guides are provided to ensure at least one course of action is deduced. In the Army, further tactical appreciation guidance has been provided in an “assessment of tasks” factor.

As described in doctrine, the existing appreciation process offers no practical assistance in meeting time constraints. The only advice offered suggests that time can be saved by using fewer group headings, or conducting a “note form” appreciation. This is inadequate. Given there are many solutions to any military problem, the method must be capable of deducing a quick workable plan while accepting that better solutions may exist if more time was spent in consideration. Time could be saved by making better use of the parallel processing power of the long term memory. The process may also be shortened with minimal risk if the decisive factor and information is identified early in the process. This requires insight into the problem.

The appreciation process is not simple. It is not well understood, nor is it easily applied to all levels of military problems. This has lead to a reliance on factor and deduction guides at the tactical and operational levels. These guides have evolved to compensate for gaps in the method of the process, in selecting and prioritising factors, and the development of courses open. From psychological research, it now appears that sequential deductive reasoning requires a high level of mental discipline and is not user-friendly. Deductive reasoning fails to efficiently employ the parallel capacity of our long term memory.

The general form of the appreciation fosters creativity by allowing freedom to set the structure of the problem by choosing and arranging factors. Practical applications at the operational and tactical level successively remove that freedom. Once information has been structured into factors, the current method does not allow any re-ordering during the analysis, which may encourage intuitive thought. There appears to be a deliberate trade-off between creativity and the criteria of a guaranteed solution.

The appreciation process is accountable. It provides an explicit audit trail of the decisions leading to any course of action. It also allows for the advantages and disadvantages of competing courses of action to be explained. Conclusions drawn from deductive reasoning are able to be proven.

A Critique of the Situation Process

The situation process cannot guarantee a workable solution. Situating the appreciation places the onus for forming a plan on professional knowledge. As concluded earlier, this occurs because the plan is derived from prior experience or knowledge. This system will fail under stress and when situations are encountered of which the staff have no prior experience. In these circumstances, the likelihood of inaction will increase.

The situation process is timely. The practical effect of severe time constraints is that staff situate the appreciation. Even if not done intentionally, it occurs when information is skimmed over ritualistically and the staff concentrate immediately on developing courses open. This method, with its weaknesses, is
the only available technique to produce quick solutions. It should be noted that in training, we often force individuals to meet severe time constraints while criticising the situation process without offering a viable alternative in the recommended process.

Situating the appreciation is a simple process. Given that commanders at all levels have sufficient experience and common training in doctrine, they should all be expected to solve problems inductively. Thinking inductively is a natural and powerful human reasoning process.

By psychological definition, the situation process cannot produce creative solutions. The use of prior experience to provide the basis of a plan prevents the re-ordering of data required for creative thought. This is not to deny the talent of some individuals to be instinctively creative, but such individuals are rare, and usually carry the title of either genius or fool. They are not a reasonable basis for developing a general methodology.

The situation process is not accountable. The inductive process of situating the appreciation relies on analogies which may not be easily explained, and are particularly difficult to understand from a written record only. As discussed earlier, the conclusions of inductive processes cannot be demonstrated to be true without actually implementing the plan.

**Conclusion**

A fundamental deficiency in Chapter 16 of JSP 102 is its failure to clearly explain the nature of a problem-solving process in terms of the symbiotic relationship between method and professional knowledge. The nature of both the appreciation and the situation process must also be understood in terms of deductive and inductive reasoning respectively. Deductive reasoning is rigorous and reliable, but not user-friendly. Inductive reasoning is limited by the professional knowledge of the user and is susceptible to the error of jumping to conclusions, but it is a simple and powerful human reasoning process.

The table below summarises a critique of both processes against five criteria reflecting the ADF requirement for a problem-solving process.

The process of situating the appreciation has some advantages. It is simple and timely to a greater extent than the appreciation process, but it fails to meet the requirements for a guaranteed solution, creativity, and accountability. The first requirements is especially telling, because commanders and staff must be equipped to deal with unexpected and new situations of which they have little or no experience. These conclusions demonstrate that situating the appreciation is not a valid methodology for solving military problems.

Having reviewed the appreciation process in terms of the requirements of the ADF, it is apparent that although theoretically sound it is weakened by a number of practical structural deficiencies:

a. the appreciation process is not user-friendly. Logical deductive reasoning is a complex mental process requiring great discipline. Also, the serial processing of information in short term memory is inefficient. It fails to take advantage of the significant parallel processing powers of the long term memory;
b. the appreciation process is not a complete methodology. It relies heavily on factor and deduction guides to guarantee a doctrinal solution at the expense of creativity. Specific gaps exist in the method of the process for selecting factors, and developing courses of action for both the enemy and own forces;
c. the appreciation process is not capable of being amended to meet time constraints; and
d. the process does not do enough to promote creative thinking through the use of intuition or insight.

The first three deficiencies collectively give the concept of situating the appreciation credibility, since they are the areas where it excels. The final deficiency is a more general and subjective criticism but one which should not require further justification.

Is it possible to retain the strengths of the existing process, whilst addressing the deficiencies identified above? This will be the aim of a subsequent essay which will propose modifications to the doctrine of JSP 102.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Appreciation Process</th>
<th>Situation Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guaranteed Solution</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

4. Current doctrine is ambiguous in discerning between a factor and information. For example, common usage refers to ground or time and space as factors, and these are clearly categories of information not facts in their own right. See Australian Joint Service Publication JSP (AS)0102 Service Writing, Ed.2 1984, para 1624. See also Manual of Land Warfare Part One Vol 5.1 “Staff Duties in the Field”, 1986, paras 511-513.
7. Sternberg, op. cit., p.195. When given a new task, if your first reaction is try and find out how it was done last year, then you seek an inductive solution.
8. ibid, p.223.
10. ibid, pp.234-235.
11. This relates to the concept of vital ground or centre of gravity, it could also be thought of as the defeat mechanism described in US doctrine. See US Army Publication Field Manual pp.101-5. *Staff Organization and Operations*.

*Editor’s Note:*

Part 2 of Appreciating the Military Problem will appear in the July/August issue of the Australian Defence Force Journal.

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Youth Crew Member, V993, Age 17, from Queensland

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Potts Point NSW 2011

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Toll Free: (008) 267 909
Facsimile: (02) 368 0183
Arms Proliferation Among the ASEAN Nations — Should Australia Be Concerned?

By Captain A.S. Drayton, RAAC.

Introduction

In recent years, the ASEAN nations have been steadily modernising their armed forces and increasing their offensive capabilities. Air and naval capabilities in particular have been re-equipped for roles beyond guarding against internal threats and coastal defence. Procurement of high technology/high profile weapon systems has focussed Australian attention upon such purchases. High economic growth rates have lent themselves to an increase in ASEAN capacity to buy these armaments. Why does it appear that the ASEAN states are embarking upon an arms buying spree? Are there legitimate reasons for such procurement activities? Should Australia be concerned about the developments occurring on its northern doorstep?

The aim of this article is to determine whether or not Australia should be concerned about recent trends in ASEAN arms procurements. Two methods of analysis will be used. Each of these methods helps shed light upon the findings of the other. The first method is to conduct a quantitative analysis and consider the amounts of money being spent on weapon systems, and the numbers and types of weapons being procured. The second is a qualitative analysis of the influences upon weapon purchases, which includes historical influences.

Quantitative Analysis

It should be noted that a quantitative analysis of military expenditures or arms transfers by countries is a difficult task because of the constraints of what information is available. Governments often provide incomplete, inaccurate or misleading figures about their spending patterns. Black market transactions also hinder the collection of accurate data. However, the three indicators chosen to conduct this quantitative analysis collectively overcome these problems, they are:

a. known arms procurements;

b. military expenditure; and

c. domestic burden.

Known Arms Procurements

Consideration of the major conventional weapon system procurement activities of the ASEAN members during the period 1987-91, at constant 1988 prices, gives an appreciation of who is buying what. The whole of ASEAN spent US$6,658 million during this period. As a comparison, Australia spent US$2,956 million. Thailand was the only country to spend more than Australia, it spent US$3,370 million. The lists of weapons shown in Tables A and B give an indication as to the type of weapon being procured by the member states of ASEAN. Many of the weapons being bought are close to state-of-the-art. Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore, for example, have all recently ordered or purchased F-16 fighter aircraft, and Malaysia has placed an order for MiG-29 fighter aircraft. Annex A also shows a list of significant equipment purchases either on order, or under way, or for which licences were bought and production was under way or completed in 1991. Table B shows some of the extra international arms transfers and deals struck subsequent to the publishing of the 1992 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook from which Table A was taken. These lists are by no means exhaustive. The details of major missile orders, for example, has not been included. Nor do these lists include orders/purchases completed prior to 1991. For example, Australia completed its procurement program for its 75 FA/18 fighter aircraft in 1990. This is obviously a significant purchase, yet it goes unmentioned. The types of weapon being bought by Australia’s neighbours are high technology/high profile weapon systems. It should be noted that many of these new weapon platforms have offensive capabilities. It is worth considering how much these new weapons are costing the ASEAN states by considering their overall military expenditures.

Military Expenditure

Consideration of the military expenditure of a country can give a guide as to the emphasis that a government places on the military capabilities of its defence forces. It can also give a guide as to its strategic concerns. Table C shows the military expenditure of each of the ASEAN states, as well as Australia, for the years 1982-91, in constant 1988 prices.

The figures at Table C show that Brunei is the only ASEAN state that has maintained steady expenditure.
Table A

Significant Equipment Purchases Made by ASEAN States
(on order or underway or for which a licence was bought and production was underway or completed in 1991)
Data from SIPRI 1992 Year Book

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Year of Order</th>
<th>Year of Delivery</th>
<th>Number Delivered</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4 Chinook</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Orion</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Seahawk</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8 also in 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Blackhawk</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1989/91</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>plus 14 earlier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Frigates</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8 for Aust/2 for NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Submarines</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65 PC-9 Trainer Acft</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1987/91</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105 Hamel 105 mm Guns</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1988/91</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 FFG Class 7 Frigates</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>3 Maritime Patrol Boats</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 Hawke 100 Jet Trainer Acft</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Blackhawk Helo</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1 Maritime Surv Patrol Boat</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 C-130H Tpt Acft</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 F-16A Fighter Acft</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80 B0105 Helo</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1988/91</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 PB-57 Patrol Craft</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1978/91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80 CN212 Tpt Acft</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1978/91</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69 Hawke Jet Trainer Acft</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>10 Hawke 100 Jet Trainer Acft</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Hawke 200 Fighter Acft</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Wasp Helo</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Rapier AD Wpns</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Bulldog Class OPV</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 FFG Class 7 Frigates</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table A (continued)**

Significant Equipment Purchases Made by ASEAN States
(on order or underway or for which a licence was bought and production was underway or completed in 1991)

Data from SIPRI 1992 Year Book

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Year of Order</th>
<th>Year of Delivery</th>
<th>Number Delivered</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6 PC-57M Patrol Boats</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 S-211 Trainer Acft</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1989/91</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Cormoran Class FAC</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150 FS-100 Simba Scout Car</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 530MG Helo</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 OV-10F Bronco Trainer COIN Acft</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20 A5-350 Helo</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 AMX-10RC Scout Car</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 GL-1 105mm Guns</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 F-50 Enforcer Patrol Boats</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Minehunter Vessel</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>450 T60 MB Tank</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1989/91</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>360 531 APCs</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Frigates</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Frigates</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 A310 Tpt Acft</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 DO-228-200 Tpt Acft</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Minesweepers</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 C212-200 Tpt Acft</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 PC-9 Trainer Acft</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 A-7E Fighter Acft</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Chinook Helo</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 FA-16A Fighter Acft</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 FA-16A Fighter Acft</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 212 Helo</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Orion Acft</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on military spending over the last decade. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have reduced their spending. Thailand and Singapore have increased their spending. The figures for Singapore show the greatest increase, an increase of upwards of fifty per cent in real terms. Australia, in the meantime, has maintained a relatively steady expenditure rate.

It is important to note that Australia’s military expenditure is almost as large as the sum of all the ASEAN countries. This will help keep the expenditure figures shown in Table C in perspective. However, defence expenditure by itself does not necessarily mean a great deal because these figures may represent a very small fraction of government spending. This is especially true if economic growth rates are high. The fraction of gross domestic product (GDP) dedicated to the military may prove more enlightening.

**Domestic Burden**

The amount spent on military expenditure by a country as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) provides an indication of the domestic burden of that country. If a government changes its strategic posture, this may necessitate a change in the level of domestic burden that it is prepared to carry. For example, new equipment may be required to meet the new challenges of a new strategic posture. A dramatic change to domestic burden of a country would give rise for concern amongst its neighbours. Table D, however, shows that generally military spending as a percentage of GDP for all of the ASEAN countries (as well as Australia) has remained relatively constant throughout the 1980s.

In summary, the ASEAN states are buying high technology weapon systems, but so is Australia. The data used in this analysis does not indicate that greater proportions of individual country’s budgets are being directed towards a military build-up. In fact, if a comparison is made between the 1970s and the 1980s, it is seen that more was spent on military expenditure by the ASEAN states during the 1970s. Perhaps the impression being created that the ASEAN nations are engaged in an arms race is caused in part by the type of weapons being bought; high profile weapons tend to make high profile news. Perhaps statistical data does not provide the full story — a qualitative analysis may prove helpful.

**Qualitative Analysis**

A qualitative analysis will help to explain the significance of the types of arms procurements the ASEAN members have been involved with. This analysis will be conducted in two parts; firstly by considering the historical developments that have led to the recent arms purchases by the ASEAN members, and secondly, by considering the main influences upon procurement activities.

An analysis of the history of arms procurement by the ASEAN members reveals that there have been general regional trends. To date, there have been four distinct activity periods as defined below:

a. **Heavy Reliance on Foreign Military Assistance.** From independence, all of the ASEAN states relied totally upon weapons being provided by outside powers through foreign military assistance programs. Large amounts of aid were provided by both East and West, primarily to try to cultivate allies in the region;

b. **Acquisition of Large Quantities of Second-hand Equipment.** The 1970s saw a decline in the amount of aid being provided to South East Asia. The ASEAN nations had to start buying armaments at market prices. Most items purchased during this period were therefore second-hand — those being removed from front-line service of the originator. The low cost of these weapons allowed rapid expansion of regional armed forces. Most of the weapon systems bought were of 1950s vintage;

c. **Advanced Weapon Systems.** Since the mid-1980s, the ASEAN states have purchased new, advanced weapons direct from manufacturers. These, close to state-of-the-art weapons, have proven to be a lot more expensive than previous acquisitions. Procurement quantities have therefore been forced down. In many cases these acquisitions have been made to replace obsolete 1950s vintage equipment. This process is still occurring today; and

d. **Self-Reliance.** The fourth phase of arms procurement is a move away from reliance on foreign purchases towards indigenous weapons manufacture. Several of the ASEAN states have embarked upon local manufacture. Limited advances have been made with the development of high technology indigenous weapons manufacture. However, most ASEAN states are self-sufficient in small arms and ammunition production. Some states have also developed capabilities in certain types of weapons such as patrol craft.

The preceding narrative is important because it provides an overview of the stages of arms acquisition experienced by the ASEAN states. In summary, the ASEAN states are still engaged in phase three of this development pattern, i.e., they are still buying high technology weapon platforms to replace obsolete
Table B
Recent Arms Orders Made by the ASEAN States
(Subsequent to publishing of the 1992 SIPRI Handbook)
Data from Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategy and Policy — September 1992, page 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Type of Weapon</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fleet tanker</td>
<td>Ordered February '92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>MiG-29 Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>Ordered June '92</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Helo (unspecified)</td>
<td>Ordered June '92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>Confirmed July '92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hawke simulator</td>
<td>Confirmed July '92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>F-16A Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>Before Congress September '92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Helo Carrier</td>
<td>Chosen April '92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>F-16 Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>Reported July '92</td>
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1950s vintage weapons. Phase four is still very much in its infancy. Along with the chronological changes there are a number of major factors that have influenced ASEAN weapon acquisition activities, these are described below.

Procurement decisions are affected by a host of considerations including bureaucratic politics, prestige and status, and supply-side factors. The main influences can be categorised as either internal or external influences. The main external influence is the international arms market, however there are a number of major internal influences:

a. budgetary politics;
b. national strategy; and
c. cultural.

Changes to the circumstances that surround the international arms market have played a major role in determining the arms procurement profiles of the ASEAN states. A worldwide decline in the demand for arms has coincided with an increase in competition for arms suppliers. This has meant that potential arms procurers, such as the ASEAN states, have found themselves in a buyers market. The ASEAN states have become obvious targets for arms sales given their high economic growth rates. The number of exhibitors gathering at arms exhibitions and conferences held in the region of late demonstrates the obvious interest. The influence of the international arms market upon the regional arms procurements should not be under-estimated. The supply side of the market place cannot be discounted capriciously.

Budgetary politics refers to the amount of money a government is prepared to spend on defence. Individual governments decide how much “domestic burden” is acceptable, and what their country can afford to spend on military procurement. Budgetary politics has played an important role in constraining the ASEAN states in the past. This was illustrated in the 1970s when the ASEAN states concentrated on purchases of second-hand equipment, a clear case of monetary constraint. Today, budgetary constraints have been somewhat loosened because of high economic growth rates.

National strategy plays a significant role in determining arms procurement decisions because it shapes the type of weapon required to counter the perceived threats to a nations security. Defining national strategies for the nations that comprise ASEAN is a complex issue. Currently, there are no clearly defined threats to the region on which to base arms procurement decisions upon. However, some of the strategic concerns that have influenced procurement decisions are:

a. Vietnamese military action;
b. withdrawal of US forces from the region, and the creation of a power vacuum;
c. both on and off-shore territorial disputes;
d. security of sea lanes and Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZs); and
e. domestic insurgencies.

Since the 1980s there has been a collective change in the strategic focus of the ASEAN nations. The ASEAN states have moved away from concern over internal threats such as communist, insurgencies and external threats such as Vietnamese aggression. They are now more concerned about the protection of vital sea lanes used for trade, and their off-shore assets, including their EEZs. This is evident in the type of
Table C

Military Expenditure, in Constant Prices, 1982-91
(Figures in $USM at 1988 Prices and Exchange Rates)

Data from SIPRI 1992 Handbook

<table>
<thead>
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weapon being purchased: maritime patrol boats, and fighter aircraft. Some of these new weapons have greater offensive capabilities; however, the intention is not to arouse regional concern, rather it is to enhance self reliance. This change in focus has played an important role in determining the type of weapons being used to replace obsolete inventories.

Other influences upon procurement activities are related to the cultural backgrounds of the ASEAN nations. For example, the South East Asian style of procurement is similar to that of most third world nations in that decisions to buy arms is often done through a system described most accurately as "closed politics". This term encapsulates a system whereby the power to make binding procurement agreements is often vested in a small group of decision makers, or even individuals. Once a decision is made there is little room for debate, negotiation or public criticism. As a generalisation, this system is indicative of the overall style of ASEAN politics.

Another important cultural influence upon arms procurements in the South East Asian region is the importance attached to the prestige gained from arms acquisitions. A country's standing within the region is related to its economic wealth but almost as importantly to its military strength. Great kudos is gained in being able to buy, maintain, and operate state-of-the-art weapon systems.

In summary, both internal and external influences combine to shape the procurement profiles of the ASEAN nations. The ASEAN nations are currently buying state-of-the-art weapon systems that have greater offensive capabilities than the weapons they replaced. However, these weapons are being bought in smaller numbers and there has not been a dramatic increase in military spending amongst the ASEAN nations. There has been a chronological development in the arms procurement activities of the ASEAN nations. Today, these states have reached a stage where they have the ability to buy more expensive weapons, and they face a situation that demands replacement of old equipment. To a much lesser extent, these states have ventured into indigenous weapon system development. The remaining question is whether or not Australia should be concerned about such developments in its region of greatest strategic importance.

Should Australia be Concerned?

Although the afore-mentioned indicates the tendency for the ASEAN states to be procuring state-of-the-art weapon systems that have offensive capabilities, this does not automatically mean doom and despair for Australia. All of the discussion above needs to be considered in context. For example, the South East Asian region is probably at its most stable in four decades. The region is far richer economically, and this has helped to enhance stability. The general standard of living has increased, and the threats from internal instability have dissipated.

Not only are individual states in the region enjoying relative stability internally, cooperation between the ASEAN states has improved. Dialogue opportunities that have been in place for a number of decades, seem to have helped to maintain the peace. The ASEAN forum for example, created in 1967, has improved co-operation in the region through political, economic and security measures. In terms of political
initiatives, the ASEAN members have become far more aware of each others cultural, racial and historical differences. This is a direct result of dialogue which reduces suspicions and distrust between these nations.

In terms of an economic focus, there have been many obstacles to the formation of a single representative economic block, for example, the diverse nature of the ASEAN economies, and the types of items covered by trade arrangements. However, more and more debate is beginning to revolve around the idea of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA). Finally, in regard to security co-operation, although the concept of ASEAN taking on the form of a military pact or alliance is still some ways down the track, there have been utterings recently of greater military cooperation. It should not be forgotten that one of the original purposes of ASEAN was to promote regional stability, even though this would probably never be conceded to by its founding members.

All of the above enhances Australia’s security outlook. This is not to say that the intermural differences that exist between the ASEAN nations will not continue to play an important role in the region. Australia should feel reasonably secure, however, that it will not bear the brunt of regional aggression. Australia should remain confident that although the ASEAN states are gaining offensive capabilities, they will be kept in check by the cooperative alliances set in place throughout ASEAN. Finally, Australia should understand that many of the ASEAN states consider Australia as a “secure south”, rather than a region for exploitation.

Finally, Australia can not afford to rest on its laurels and become complacent. Australia must vigorously pursue its policy of “comprehensive engagement”, a policy first proposed in the Whitlam era, and developed into a coherent policy in the government’s 1989 White Paper “Australia’s Regional Security 1989” (ARS89). Comprehensive engagement has become the term used to coin Australia’s thrust towards becoming a fully-fledged partner within the region. “Comprehensive” meaning that there should be many elements to Australia’s relationship with the region. “Engagement” implying that a mutual commitment will be formed between equal partners.

The ASEAN states have been, and are still continuing to buy, high technology/high profile weapon systems. These weapon systems are being bought in small numbers, and are replacing equipment that has become obsolete. The ASEAN states are not spending significantly more on military expenditure. Although individual states have changed their strategic focus from countering insurgency problems towards a more conventional setting, the aim of current arms acquisitions is more to protect EEZ’s and off-shore claims, rather than to provoke hostilities. The state-of-the-art weapon purchases do have an offensive capability, no doubt, however these acquisitions are not meant to upset the balance of strategic power.

Several factors have helped to create the illusion that the ASEAN states are entering an arms buying binge. Greater focus on the South East Asian region by arms suppliers has helped to create this image, as has the increased economic capacity of the ASEAN states. Of course, orders of high profile fighter aircraft are unlikely to go unnoticed.
Australia should not be overly concerned about the developments in ASEAN, but at the same time, it should not become complacent. Australia should continue to maintain a credible defence force, one that is capable of enhancing regional security, and it should continue to pursue the policy of comprehensive engagement. Only by aiming for these goals will Australia be able to contribute to regional security and stability as part of the region and not as an outsider.

NOTES

3. *ibid*, p.4.
4. The major source of statistical information used in this analysis was the SIPRI Yearbook 1992, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The SIPRI data base is well-respected for the impartiality of its collecting agency. Where ever possible, a second source, such as the World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers document, published by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), has been used to verify trends and figures.
9. The Defence Services Asia Exhibition (DSA '90), held in Kuala Lumpur attracted 230 exhibitors from 28 different countries.
11. Strategic concerns that have influenced procurement decisions that require further discussion are expanded upon below:
   a. Vietnamese military action. The perceived threat of Vietnamese military action has subsided greatly since the withdrawal of its army from Cambodia in 1989. However, there seems to have been a general correlation between the ASEAN states military spending patterns and the proximity of Vietnam. The closer the state to Vietnam, the greater the emphasis on defence.
   b. External power influence. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the subsequent withdrawal of the US forces from the South East Asian region has raised concerns over the possibility of the creation of a power vacuum. The ASEAN nations are anxious about the re-emergence of Japanese military strength and influence.
   c. On and off-shore territorial disputes. Most of the ASEAN nations are involved in one or more disputes over on or off-shore territorial disputes. These range from island claims, for example the Spratley group, to concerns over 200 mile Economic Exclusion Zones, to historic rivalries over territory such as claims to Sabah and the Malaysian continental shelf.
   d. Domestic insurgencies. Ethnic tensions, communist insurgencies, and religious rebellions continue to plague some of the ASEAN nations; however, these threats have largely subsided. The diversity in cultures, religions, and histories has made for an unpredictable security situation.

Captain Drayton graduated from the Royal Military college, Duntroon, in 1985. He completed the Officers Long Aeronautical Engineering Course with the British Army in 1988. He served as the Escort Officer to the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel in 1992. He is currently posted as the Officer Commanding Technical Squadron, 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI).
In October 1992, a group of World War II veterans made the pilgrimage back to the western desert to take part in the 50th Anniversary commemorations of the battles of El Alamein and Tobruk.

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Watching Paint Dry: Musical Meaning in a Military Ceremony

By Roland Bannister, Charles Sturt University.

Introduction

Military and non-military people alike are familiar with the sound and sight of Defence Force bands. After all, the bands — with their ceremonial music, their colourful dress, shining instruments and precision marching and drill — are central to the spectacle of military and civic pomp and circumstance. Military bands — and their civilian counterparts, the community brass and concert bands — are valued for their contribution to ceremonies in military and civilian settings in Australian cities and towns. Scarcely a day passes in which television news bulletins do not broadcast the sounds, and quite often the image, of a Service band in reports on news-worthy military or civic ceremonies in some part of the world. In fact, in Australia the largest employers of professional musicians, outside the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, are the Defence Force’s bands.

Yet, while the bands are the most public units in the military, their work is not well understood, even by military personnel. Certainly there is little written about the soldier-musicians of the Australian Defence Force bands. What is it like to be both a musician and a soldier? What meaning can military music and military ceremony have for young people who join the services intent on pursuing a career in music? How does the military, one of society’s most structured and ideologically driven institutions, affect the nature of music making? How do bands enhance meaning in military ceremonies? How does military music and ceremony contribute to the shaping of the ethos of our society? A knowledge of the relationship between soldier-musicians, the music they play, the military contexts in which they work, and the wider society, would seem to be critical to our understanding of the nature of military music, military ceremony and indeed music in society. Since 1989, I have been conducting a participant observation study (see Bannister 1991 and 1992) in which these questions are the focus.

In this article, I examine the experience of soldier-musicians of the Australian Army Band (Kapooka) in the context of their main duty, the weekly March Out Parade for graduates of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion’s Basic Training Course. I consider the meaning of ritual and the meaning of music, and offer some reflections on what meanings military ceremony can have for the wider society.

The 1st Recruit Battalion and the Kapooka Band

Meaning is a product of experience, and experience is shaped in part by the physical setting in which it occurs. This is especially so in ritual activities. For instance, people’s experience of the communion celebration, baptism ceremonies, and other rituals in Christian churches is shaped by the shape, colour, and acoustics of the space of church buildings. People in all societies carefully select the settings for coming-of-age, marriage, burial and other rites. Similarly, the setting of the Kapooka March Out Parade is important to the experience of those who participate in it as audience or as soldiers. I will describe this setting before going on to consider the ceremony itself.

Each year up to 3,500 young recruits begin their Army career by completing the 1st Recruit Training Battalion’s Basic Training Course at Blamey Barracks at Kapooka, near Wagga Wagga, NSW. On the last Friday of their course, the recruits take a final test called the “Challenge”. On the following Monday, successful recruits participate in a graduation ceremony called the “March Out Parade”. They graduate with the rank of private.

The main purpose of the Kapooka Band is to accompany the parades which mark the end of the Challenge, and the March Out Parade. The March Out Parade is a spectacular ritual of pomp and circumstance; a major event in the Army’s public relations calendar. The Kapooka Band’s expert display of figure marching and its provision of music for the marching and drill demonstration of the graduating recruits is central to the parade.

Blamey Barracks is an incongruous mix of eucalyptus forest and hills, soft lawns and military paraphernalia. Its buildings and roads are set among manicured lawns and ornamental and native trees. There are landscaped ponds, replete with ducks and water hens, a picnic ground for visitors, and an outdoors
The March Out Parade marks the graduation of young people from the status of recruit, to that of private. Yet its meaning goes far beyond this. For those who engage emotionally with it, it is a reinforcement of the military ethos and of Australian patriotic traditions and sentiments; the values of order, attainment, social cohesion, mateship, loyalty and pride. Conversely, for critics of the military, the March Out Parade may be seen as an attempt to engender militaristic, aggressive attitudes, to glorify war, and to preserve the patriarchal values of a male-dominated society; for these people, the ceremony may be a reinforcement of conservative values against the values of liberalism and change.

The main events in the March Out Parade are:

- **Markers Take Positions:** the Company Sergeant-Major takes his own position and places markers on theirs.
- **March On:** the band, and the platoons of recruits, march onto the parade ground and take up their positions.
- **March On of the Governor-General’s Banner:** a three-person banner party (an ensign and two banner escorts) carries the banner to its position.
- **Arrival of the Host Officer and the Reviewing Officer:** the Host Officer and the Reviewing Officer (usually the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion) arrive in separate staff cars, each escorted by a pair of Military Police on white military motorcycles.
- **Inspection of the Troops and the Band:** the official party inspects the Parade.
- **March Past in Slow and Quick Time:** a traditional custom in which the recruits demonstrate esprit de corps in a display of fine team work.
- **Advance in Review Order:** a demonstration of respect for the reviewing officer.
- **Presentation of Trophies:** trophies for skill-at-arms, physical training, best soldier, and most improved recruit are presented by civilian or military identities.
- **The Address:** the Reviewing Officer addresses the graduating recruits; he congratulates them on their achievement, reinforces the value of the work they will do as soldiers, and wishes them well.
- **Departures of Reviewing Officer and Host Officer:** these officers leave the ground in reverse order to that in which they arrived.
- **March Off of the Banner:** the banner party carries the Governor-General's banner from the parade ground.
- **The March Off:** the recruits, who now officially hold the rank of private, and the band leave the parade ground.

Within these larger sections of the ceremony are a number of symbolic military drills: the inspection of the recruits, the inspection of the band, present arms (with and without music), slope arms (with and without music), various changes of formation, slow marching to quick march music, eyes right, a counter march from the band, and verbal commands. There are visual symbols of army life: clean, well pressed uniforms, the slouch hats, insignia, weapons, the banner, the trophies. Then there are the participants themselves; the officers, the recruits, and the band, with their correct posture and regulation haircuts. All are symbolic of the military ethos.

A powerful element of military rhetoric is its appeal to tradition. When the Host Officer refers to the skill attainment, team work, self discipline, love of country, endurance of hardship, and Australia's participation in previous wars, he is following a tradition which I believe has not changed substantially since the Athenian general, Pericles, in his Funeral Oration to the Athenians in the winter of 430-431 BC, listed the characteristics of fine soldiers, democratic societies and the military ethos.

The band's visual presence is very strong with the elements of colour, movement and music all linked to each other and to the activities of the other participants. “People hear with their eyes” is a remark made
The Australian Army Band Kapooka on the parade ground (1993).

by more than one soldier-musician. I suggest that the most powerful moments in the ritual are those where the music has a strong presence; the march on of the recruits, the presentation of the Governor-General’s colour and the various drill and marching movements. *Rose Glory* (the regimental march of the 1st Recruit Battalion), and *Waltzing Matilda* evoke powerful associations in this context. Music is even more powerful in its role as a matrix to the other ritual elements; moving a ritual to music enhances the impression that the ritual is well performed. Olympic gymnastics and ice skating, ballroom dancing and the laying of wreaths on Anzac Day all seem to be more expertly done when performed to music. And, as theorists of ritual remind us, if rituals are to be effective, they must be well performed (see Kapferer, 1979b, p.146).

**The Experience of the Participants**

Army people know the power of symbols in their ceremonies. The March Out Parade is a symbolic rehearsal of the broad cultural understandings that participants bring with them from civilian life and the specific military interpretations which they have learnt during their time in the army. All participants have felt the powerful messages of Australian culture; they know something of ANZAC and our patriotic traditions. They live in a society in which paramilitary principles are ubiquitous; schools and work places have strong hierarchies of command, and emphasise team spirit and the importance of achievement. Values of the military ethos are congruent with those of sport. Pericles himself would be equally at home in both the modern and the ancient Olympic, where valour, loyalty, team spirit, self reliance, respect for the chain of command, physical prowess, efficiency, tenacity, and the will to win are familiar values.

Graduating recruits feel a real sense of occasion. It is they who are marching out, it is they who have completed the gruelling Basic Training Course. It is they who are being ceremonially transformed into soldiers with the status that this will bring. It is they who have succeeded, it is their day.

Their parents and friends and family share this experience. The civilian trophy presenters are ex-military people and may feel a certain pride and nos-
about how musicians engage with the meaning of the music in a very poignant way. At Gallipoli, very the importance of context to the meaning of military music they perform, a topic I will return to later.

Only the band participates in all of the March Out Parades, and in the several rehearsals which occur each week.

The Officer Commanding the Band Corps of the Australian Army (Lieutenant-Colonel Tony Sillcock), the drum major of the Kapooka Band (Staff Sergeant John Franklin), and a disaffected young soldier-musician whom we shall call Darryl have each told me about their experience in military ceremony.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sillcock was Commanding Officer and Musical Director of the Australia Army Band at the 75th ANZAC Ceremony at Gallipoli in 1990. He said:

“You require a certain amount of involvement, emotional involvement, to be able to play it the way it should be played, but I guess there is a professional detachment (so) that you don’t get emotionally involved to the extent that you become ineffective ... I can quote you a story of a younger soldier in my earlier days, on one of my first commands, he asked to be relieved of the duty of playing bugle calls at funerals and I spoke to him about it and he said he got too emotionally involved to perform ... I sort of explained to him that he is an actor in the play if you like, he makes the day memorable for the family, and the family will not have a very memorable day if the bugle call is a disaster. They won’t understand why a professional performer, if you like, got emotionally involved to the point that he stuffed their day up ... yes we ... are showmen and you must maintain that detachment — be it at a funeral, be it at a memorial service. I did the Gallipoli Dawn Service and ... Lone Pine, and I guess three quarters of the band had tears running down their face because the music was beautiful. You can be involved but you must maintain your presence.”

Lieutenant Sillock’s last two sentences highlight the importance of context to the meaning of military music in a very poignant way. At Gallipoli, very familiar — for some, “hackneyed” would not be too strong a word — hymns and marches become “beautiful”. His comments raise important aesthetic questions about how musicians engage with the meaning of the music they perform, a topic I will return to later.

Staff Sergeant Franklin, discussed his own role as Drum Major.

“His (the drum major’s) role’s a very important one because he has to know these sort of parades, not just this March Out Parade but any parades that we do ... we travel to Albury or Canberra ... to do ceremonial parades or Vice Regal parades and things like that, and the drum major’s got to know exactly what’s going on. A lot of times when (Regimental Sergeant Majors) are running parades, they’ve got their ways of doing things and some times they’re not necessarily correct and you’ve go to correct them or say, ‘Listen Sir, this is what we normally do’.”

John has a special leadership responsibility in the band’s parade work: he controls the band’s movement and music. Much of John’s concern with the March Out is of a technical kind: details of drill, marching, music making, getting it right. The bands in the Australian Army play an important role in the transmission of knowledge about military ceremony. Lieutenant-Colonel Sillock’s full title is in fact Director of Music. Australian Army Band Corps and Staff Officer Ceremonial. The Drum Major of the Kapooka Band is required to be expert in the enactment of ceremonial activity. John Franklin continues:

“Because we’re doing it all the time it’s just like water off a duck’s back to us. We see the funny side of it from the other point of view where the parade itself, the people on parade — the troops — who don’t do this thing all the time, are stuffing things up and the parade commanders are nowhere. They don’t know their words of command and give the band a bit of a laugh. But at the same time, once we’re doing the actual job itself that things start not happening the way they’re supposed to, the band having a bit of a crackle ... well you’ve really got to think — switch onto that sort of, you know — sort of settle down a bit. But yes, most of the time the band doesn’t have a problem out there ... I think the biggest thing is, if you’ve got a lot of self-confidence that sort of carries it through. If you can get out and sort of yell and scream and get things going — once you build up that confidence then you haven’t got a problem ... you know how the band is going to react to you. They know how you react and how you operate so there’s no problem. I give a word of command and they react straight away and they’re quite good.”

For John, the March Out Parade is a personal, professional, challenge.

Darryl is a former soldier-musician who has been granted an early discharge and is waiting to take up a civilian job. Darryl felt that he was not a good musician and he did not much like being a soldier. He thus saw little future for himself in the army. Darryl was
The Australian Army Band, Kapooka.

ready to spell out his dissatisfaction with the army’s ways, and yet he presented the band with a rather expensive memento when he left; the army fosters a high degree of loyalty among its members. I talked to Darryl about the March Out Parade.

“Oh, I just dream, think about the weekend or think about what’s coming up for the rest of the week. I try to forget about work while I’m on the parade ground and, like if it’s freezing cold you really can’t think of anything else except the cold and if it is hot you can’t think of anything but how much you are sweating, but on a nice day I drift off into my own little world.”

“Well, do you listen to the (Commandant’s) speech?” I asked.

“The commandant? Well sometimes you do and sometimes you don’t. He gives the same speech every week, so if he changes it at some stage you might have a bit of a laugh, but generally I think he talks for too long so you try to go to sleep.”

Psychic Distancing

Questions about the degree and nature of participants’ engagement with the meaning of ritual is a matter of considerable debate in the literatures of ritual and aesthetics. Kapferer (1979a) believes that if a ritual is to be effective then a connection must be made between the participants’ feelings and the ritual’s meaning. He takes issue with Durkheim on this critical question. “In contrast to Durkheim I make the assumption that when individuals or groups express anger, fear, love, sorrow, hate and happiness in the medium of ritual, they often actually feel what they express. (p.153). It is critical (that) a ritual connection, realised and understood by participants, between the conventionalised display of emotion in performance and the real, internal and privately-felt emotional and mental condition of the participants (is established).” (p.153).

Tambiah (1985), argues that because ritual is formalised and conventionalised it does in turn distance its participants from the meaning of their actions. Ritual behaviour is not meant to express the actual emotions and intentions of the participants (pp.131-133). Susanne Langer (quoted in Tambiah 1985) wrote of the importance of psychic distancing in ritual. Ritual involves not direct expression but the “articulation of feelings” and a disciplined rehearsal of “right attitudes” rather than of “free expression of emotion”.

“. . . the ultimate product of such an articulation is not a simple emotion but a complex permanent attitude. This attitude which is the worshippers’ response to the insight given by the sacred symbols, in an emotional patter which governs all individual lives. It cannot be recognised through any clearer medium than of formalised gestures”. (p.133-134)
For musicians in the Kapooka Band, meaning in military ceremony is heavily context-dependent. Meaning for soldier-musicians depends on the frequency with which they perform a particular ritual and the status they hold in the performance. The fact that they are full-time professional participants is an important factor in determining the nature of their experience in ritual performance; John Franklin estimates that in his seven years in the army he has performed in 200 March Out Parades and about 400 rehearsals. His experience of the parade is bound to be different from that of a graduating recruit. Soldier-musicians of all ranks express disdain for performing in the March Out Parade and, indeed, all military ceremonies which they see as routine. Most dislike marching and playing. They agree that the trials of the weather, working with the parade ground officers, the obvious "melody and drums"-style of military music, and the fact that the audience are there to witness the graduation of their family member, rather than to listen to the band, gives little satisfaction. The March Out Parade takes place as many as 48 times a year. Each March Out Parade has a number of rehearsals. The March Out follows virtually the same format each week; only the weather, and the number of graduating recruits varies. As the professional photographer who makes the video tape of each March Out said, "Watching a number of these is like watching paint dry". The musicians see the military ceremonial work as a trade-off for a career in music. Generally the Kapooka soldier-musicians spend about 50 per cent of their week on military music; the other 50 per cent is spent rehearsing and performing at civilian concerns of concert band music. Their attitude is generally one of: "Yes, we subscribe to the values of the military ethos, but do not enjoy or feel involved in the regular routine work of the military ceremonial". Special ceremonies are a very different case; the Anzac Day ceremony at Gallipoli was a moving experience for those soldier-musicians who took part. Similarly, those who take a special role in routine ceremonies feel a deeper involvement than do those who simply play as band members; the Drum Major and the musician who plays the bugle calls are cases in point.

So, how do symbols, in the context of ceremony, make meaning?

Theories of Symbolic Meaning

Langer (1978) distinguishes between discursive and presentational symbols. Discursive symbols are those which require to be set out one after the other in culturally-approved sequences if they are to make meaning; ordinary spoken language is by far the most common example. Presentational symbols may follow any order, they are untranslatable and their meaning depends on simultaneous, integral presentation (pp.81-98). The presentational symbols of movement, colour, identities and music all working together make very powerful, but nonetheless, ambiguous statements. Much of their power stems from this ambiguity. Kapferer (1977) stresses that in ritual, presentational symbols reinforce each other, making their meanings fixed and stronger. Their meanings override, or at least overlap, those of discursive symbols and unlike discursive symbols (speech) they are resistant to attack; because discursive symbols can be broken down into small segments they are more open to question (pp.112-113).

Myerhoff (1977) says that rituals appeal to "the entire human sensorium... in their sense of drama. Critical, analytic thought, the attitude which would pierce the illusion of reality, is anathema to ritual," she writes. "The enemy of ritual is one who is incapable of or unwilling to voluntarily suspend disbelief — the spoil sport". Ritual depends on the collusion of all participants in the production of the show. "No one can stand up and boo," she says. Rituals fail when the participants are bored, confused or self-conscious (pp.199-200). In the March Out Parade there are few moments when the sense of drama is relaxed, moments where the power of presentational symbols is suspended by the discursive symbolism of ordinary speech. Of these, the Commandant's Address is the most important. Here the ideology of the military is briefly, simply and unequivocally stated.

Military Ceremony in Civilian Society

Meanings ascribed to symbols are not inherent in the symbols themselves; they are ascribed to the symbols by people. Music has no meaning beyond that which is culturally ascribed; music therefore has no morality, it is the uses to which music is put that may be good or evil. Berger and Luckmann (1971) remind us of this when they stress that all symbol systems are human creations, "their existence has its base in the lives of concrete individuals, and has no empirical status apart from these lives". (p.146) Warren Bourne (1993), in lamenting the closure of the Australian Army Bands in Perth and Adelaide in June 1993, expressed concern about the ethics of some of the uses to which music may be put, and alerts us to the
potentially insidious use of military bands and their civilian counterparts, community bands.

“The symbolic function of the band is obvious: a sanctioned and legitimate social expression of authoritarian command, conforming obedience, directed by the underscoring of law, order, defence and aggression. Now so long as the brass band is only a symbol of these values, they are acceptable. Indeed, they are probably major contributors to the continued balance and integrity of our social fabric. But when they are harnessed to the direct support of these same values, as they inevitably are in a time of national emergency or war, then the potential abuse of the effective power of the symbol menace the very sanity of our society. Authoritarian regimes from ancient Sparta to Hitler’s Germany and beyond, have fully understood and exploited militaristic music ensembles to their own ends.”

In his novel *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, Milan Kundera (1985) has a perceptive section on the use of parades by the totalitarian communist regime he knew in Eastern Europe. He identifies the worst aspect of communism as its persistence in covering up unacceptable human activity by the insidious use of kitsch. The model of communist kitsch, he says, is the May Day ceremony.

“The women all wore red, white, and blue blouses, and the public, looking on from balconies and windows could make out five-pointed stars, hearts, and letters when the marchers went into formation. Small brass bands accompanied the individual groups, keeping everyone in step. As a group approached the viewing stand, even the most blasé faces would beam with dazzling smiles, as if trying to prove that they were properly joyful or, to be more precise, in proper agreement. Nor were they merely expressing political agreement with communism; no, there was an agreement with being as such. The May Day ceremony drew its inspiration from the deep well of the categorical agreement with being. The unwritten, unsung motto of the parade was not ‘Long live communism!’ but ‘Long live life!’” (p.249)

Kundera’s May Day Parade risks no discursive symbolism.

The power of military ceremony lies in the ambiguous meaning of its presentational symbols. Cohen (1985) argues that people in a community may share symbols but need not necessarily share their meaning. He says: “Symbols do not so much express meaning as give us the capacity to make meaning”. (p.15) So, symbols in military ceremonies mean different things to different people. Rousing band music and the colour, glitter and precise choreography of the marching military band may be nothing more than entertainment to the unreflective observer. Some participants in the ceremony — I’m thinking of the musicians here, in particular — are psychically distanced from the emotion of the ceremony when repetition has reduced the significance of the experience for them. On the other hand, the committed patriot, in the context of the commonly agreed cultural understanding about, say, ANZAC Day invests the symbols with powerful meanings. Participants and passers by at ceremonies like those of ANZAC Day, and I suspect, May Day in Kundera’s Cold War Prague, may respond with emotional responses ranging from deeply moving and patriotic sentiment to revulsion, depending on what meaning the person ascribes to the symbolism.

In short, meaning for participants and audiences in military music depends very much on the contexts in which it is made and heard; the physical setting, the social setting and the experiential setting which is the participants’ lives. Music’s power has long been recognised by those who plan military ceremonies and, for that matter, other ceremonies like masses, baptisms, and weddings. It is difficult to think of a significant ritual in our society in which music and music makers are not given a central role; music is present even at that ubiquitous suburban ritual, the dinner party.

The Army employs professional soldier-musicians to perform a symbolic role in its ritual activity to reinforce its ideology, to enhance its public image, and to reinforce and mould community values. In a society in which communications media are forever competing for the community’s eyes and ears, the potential of music and ceremony to evoke powerful experience and to be heard and seen in the context of this communications clamour, seems undiminished. As the military responds to the new sensitivities which characterise public discourse in the late twentieth century, I suspect that society and the military will become more conscious of music’s power in the context of military ceremony.

NOTES

1. Some of the research on which this article is based was carried out by the author under Charles Sturt University’s Special Studies Program in 1990.
2. An earlier version of this article was read to the Association of Music Education Lecturers at Bribie Island in September 1993.
REFERENCES


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**Effective Communications in the ADF**

Effective communications are essential for the successful conduct of the ADF operations. The Australian electronics industry has developed the capacity in design manufacture and support to meet the needs of the ADF. Cooperation between the Government’s Defence Science & Technology Organisation (DSTO) and industry has ensured that “leading edge” technologies, such as the Over The Horizon Radar (OTHR), can be developed and manufactured in Australia.

Australian electronics companies are building relationships and forming joint ventures overseas in defence electronics in support of a larger variety of defence projects including the ANZAC ship project and the COLLINS class submarine. Australian industry will continue to form close and successful relationships with overseas companies as part of major ADF projects.

Satellite services will soon provide backup tactical communications capability for static and mobile defence elements.

Other projects will improve the efficiency, security and survivability of Defence communications links.
The Critical Lynchpin: The Future of the Japan/United States Security Relationship and the Implications for Australia

By Lieutenant Colonel Jamie Callens, RA Inf.

“Our alliance with Japan remains a centrepiece of our security policy and an important anchor of stability. Japan’s importance is now global.”

“It is indispensable for the development and prosperity of Japan to retain close, friendly relations with the United States.”

“We believe that we can be a useful and congenial partner for Japan, politically as well as economically, and not only within the region but on the wider global stage, as you become more and more active a player across the whole expanding range of international diplomacy.”

Introduction

The arrival of the “Black Ships” at Yedo in July 1853 under the command of Commodore Perry marked the start of an enigmatic relationship between two powers, which as the world enters the final decade of the century, have emerged as the superpowers, one economic and the other military. As much as we are able to predict the immediate future, it appears that they will retain those respective positions into the twenty-first century.

The economic superpower Japan has slowly come to realise that its economic strength has resulted in increased global pressure for it to assume an international role commensurate with its standing. Japan has, however, continued to state that it will improve its military capabilities only for the purpose of self-defence. As a nation it continues to ponder its role in the future international order.

On the other hand, the United States as the military superpower increasingly calls into question its future role as guarantor of stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. As evidenced by recent outbreaks of urban violence, the state of the Federal deficit, and the more isolationist tendencies of the Clinton administration, the United States has indicated that it will become increasingly preoccupied with its internal problems. Defence officials, however, continue to warn, in Congressional testimony, of the dangers of isolationism and the continuing need for engagement and forward military presence. Washington refers to the Japanese-United States relationship as one of the “most important bilateral relationships in the world” and believes that it is in their strategic interest to preserve the relationship. Whilst the 30-year-old Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security forms the basis of the bilateral relationship, it is unlikely that the relationship will promise smooth sailing for both parties into the next century. The pace of change in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that there will be many pressures impacting on the relationship and these in turn promise to have critical implications for Australia.

In North East Asia the disintegration of the Soviet Union has not completely removed what Japan has historically perceived as its major threat. Russia will continue to possess significant military strength and despite its extensive internal problems, has indicated its willingness to pursue the modernisation of its forces in the Asia-Pacific. The way ahead for China is uncertain, although Beijing appears to be concentrating on economic development, and the continuing friction between the Koreas remains a potential flashpoint. The distrust that also exists between China, the Koreas, Russia and Japan is based on the experiences of this century. As Japan develops its stature and influence into the next century, it is more than likely that the residual distrust will remain.

The angst of the nations of South East Asia towards Japan, also based on the bitter experiences of World War II, are well documented. Despite assurances from the United States that, “Over the next decade, as a new global order takes shape, our forward presence will continue to be the region’s irreplaceable balancing wheel,” regional concerns about the future intentions of Japan remain. The failure, or indeed any major threat to the relationship will lead to instability throughout Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, it may be regarded as the major stumbling block regarding Japan’s further integration with South East Asia. This article will examine the Japan-United States security relationship and postulate future developments and their likely impact on Australia because the future of this bilateral relationship is the most crucial security issue for the Asia-Pacific region into the next century.
**The Current Situation**

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America was instituted on 23 June 1960 and the agreement called for consultation “whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.” Each party remains prepared to meet the common danger in the event of an armed attack on “the territories under the administration of Japan.” The Treaty does not, of course, make mention of Japan going to the aid of the United States if it were threatened, although it would act presumably in defence of United States facilities in Japan. The Treaty further recognised the responsibility of the United Nations for monitoring international peace and this aspect was the subject of vigorous debate during the Gulf War and the subsequent despatch of Japan’s minesweepers to the Gulf. This break from the tight guidelines of the Constitution with regard to the deployment of forces overseas can be seen as a fundamental change in policy. It is increasingly likely that the international community will further pressure Japan to participate more in promoting international security through measures such as supporting United Nations operations. Recent actions in Cambodia and Somalia are evidence of Japan’s new approach; however, the basic tenets of national defence policy in Japan still adhere to the principles of promoting international cooperation, developing the capabilities necessary for self-defence and dealing with external aggression utilising the Treaty arrangements as a basis.

Official policy in Japan further states that “it is impossible for any nation to guarantee its security by only its own will and power.” This displays a pragmatic approach by the Japanese to defence and foreign policy even though it is still very much feeling its way in the international order. It remains evident, however, that Japan remains seriously committed to the further development of the Japanese Self Defence Force through the current defence program. What Japan describes as concentrating on “building the minimum necessary defence capability in peacetime as an independent state” does not detract from the fact that it now has the world’s third largest defence budget. The current five year plan (1991-95) incorporates a budget of nearly 23 trillion yen reflecting a growth rate over the past decade of 5 per cent per annum. Indications at the time of writing however are that the Miyazawa Government may introduce severe cuts to the defence budget. The Japanese claim that the rationale for the continued development of the JSDF is the recurring fear of invasion from Siberia and this perception remains despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The single biggest issue between Japan and Russia remains the refusal by the latter to return the Northern Territories. Whilst there has been a recent thawing in relations, the world continues to wait for more definitive moves. The catalyst may well occur in the form of the pressing need by Russia for Japanese investment, particularly in Siberia, to shore up the faltering Russian economy. The Japanese Mid-Term Defence Program was completed in 1990 and continually emphasised aspects of self-defence. Despite this, the Air Self Defence Force is still examining proposals for in-flight refuelling, a capability possessed by few Western nations and one that would give Japan the potential to conduct offensive air operations against the Asian mainland. This aspect is but one area planned for investigation through to the end of the century.

The JSDF currently operates a 303 ship maritime service which includes 14 submarines, 390 combat aircraft, and ground forces totalling 13 divisions in five geographically-based armies. There are also recent indications that Japan intends upgrading its amphibious capability and both of these enhancements may be seen as incremental factors in the development of a power projection capability. Given that Japan’s security policy theoretically should reflect the desires of its people, it is important to note public attitudes to current policy. Recent figures indicate that more than 60 per cent of Japanese believe that the JSDF and the Japan-United States Treaty is the best arrangement and only 7 per cent believed that the Treaty should be abolished and the JSDF strengthened. The Japanese position is essentially that it is important to retain the Treaty whilst appreciating that it will be faced with paying the bills for the continued United States presence on Japanese soil.

Whilst it remains well within the Japanese capability, it is unlikely that Japan will resort to the acquisition of nuclear weapons unless there are major changes to its strategic relationships and it appears content to adhere to the three Non-Nuclear Principles. Such an approach is supported by the vast majority of the population. However, the Japanese intention to stockpile plutonium has resulted in expressions of concern from several quarters. There can be little doubt that if it desired, Japan could produce nuclear weapons within a year. Recent indications are also that it will need to make major decisions in the near future as to how much responsibility for its own security it is willing to bear and the best means of shouldering the burden.
There are no indications, however, other than from extremist factions, that Japan wishes to adopt militarism and has been generally willing to “support US strategic directions.” The Japanese concept of “comprehensive security” according to one analyst, is an “attempt at broader definition of security that included non-military components such as foreign aid and earthquake disaster relief in order to mitigate attention to the purely military aspects of foreign policy.”

In the area of Official Development Assistance, Japan now has taken over the lead from the United States as it holds the position of the largest donor of foreign aid. With the strength of the Japanese economy and the structural problems currently being faced by the United States, the position is unlikely to be challenged in the foreseeable future.

As is evidenced by recent events on the Japanese stockmarket however, there could well develop threats to Japanese economic supremacy. The fall in value of the yen also reflects changes in Japanese society as the population demands more in the way of material rewards for the continuing ethos of loyalty to the corporation. Despite this, the single most critical factor of Japanese economic security remains unchanged — its continued free access to world markets and reliance on maritime trade for its raw materials. In regard to its relationship with the United States, Japan leads in the fields of robotics, photonics, biotechnology, high energy density materials, simulation and modelling, composite materials, machine intelligence, semiconductor materials and micro-electronic circuits, leading to the claim by some observers that by 1996 the United States would become Japan’s Brazil. Whilst this comment might be taken with a pinch of salt, there can be little doubt that the United States sees Japan as a threat and may well be developing an inferiority complex given Japan’s ascendancy in many areas that were previously the sole province of the United States. Current United States policy towards Japan stresses that the Japanese connection is the United States’ most important relationship “bar none.” There has also been recognition of the current tension that exists between the countries in the area of trade, and its importance was highlighted during President Bush’s visit to Japan in January 1992.

The United States claims that “as a partner” it “works with Japan on the basis of respect and understanding.” It is important to note however, that the current Treaty is hardly one of partnership. The United States continues to push Japan to accept more responsibility for its own security and at the forefront is the increasing pressure for Japan to pay for the United States’ security guarantee in the form of “burden sharing”. Much of this pressure is generated by an American public who believe that Japan is getting a free ride. Whilst it is early days in the Clinton Administration, there are signs that the United States may adopt new strategic trade policies. Such an approach could mean a much harder line being taken towards the Japanese, who frequently express embarrassment at the size of their trade surplus with the United States. There can be little doubt that the Japanese are fearful of the prospect of such a change in policy. The nations of Asia-Pacific have also cause for concern.

By the mid-1990s, Japan will be paying approximately 75 per cent of the cost of stationing United States forces on Japanese soil. It remains important to also remember that from a United States perspective, it is far less expensive to base United States aircraft carriers in Japan in support of forward deployment and continuous engagement policies than to have them based in the United States. The United States appreciates that whilst the relationship remains the critical lynchpin of its Asian security strategy the relationship could be “further strained during the decade by persistent trade problems and charges of unfair competition”. The United States further appreciates that there exists the possibility of Japan acting independently of the relationship in the future and comprehends the effect that this may have on Asia-Pacific security and in particular on the South East Asian nations. The United States position was recently stated in a succinct manner by Paul Wolfowitz:

“Again, no one wants to see Japanese aircraft down in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean”,

As is the case with the Japanese nuclear weapon option, the Japanese do have the capability to develop their own carriers, but are lacking the intent or indeed the foreign or defence policy direction that would dictate the need.

Australia’s relationship with Japan is based on the concept of a “constructive partnership” which has as its components security, trade, the resolution of international problems and bilateral relations. Current Government policy in line with the US approach, perceives Australia and Japan as being the southern and northern anchors of the Western alliance in the western Pacific. It further believes that both countries have important roles to play in global security and Australia welcomes moves by Japan to play an increased international role. At the same time, however, Australia is cognisant of the reservations expressed by countries in Asia over the possibility of Japanese re-militarisation. The prosperity of Australia and Japan are closely related and there have been persistent views in Australian circles that Japan should emerge from her post-
war cocoon and take a leading role in the security of the region.27 More recent analysis suggests that the two countries are so economically interdependent that neither country could operate without the other.28 The Japanese economy is essentially dependent on guaranteed access to Australian raw materials, but there remains the threat that Japan could diversify regarding her raw material sources with the resultant catastrophic impact on Australia. The balance is in Japan's favour.

In the military arena, it should be noted that the creation of ANZUS, essentially at the insistence of Australia, was predicated on a concern that Japan had been presented with a "soft peace" option at the end of the Second World War. Current military contact with Japan is limited to multinational maritime exercises, high level visits and dialogue and little change to this arrangement is planned for the future, although Prime Minister Keating and Defence Minister Senator Ray in recent visits to Japan have raised expectations of a widening of the relationship. Although there was no change of government in the Australian Federal Election in March 1993, it is important to note the Opposition's plans for increased contact with Japan. The Coalition's defence policy "A Strong Australia" released in October 1992 called for the extension of Service to Service and official level bilateral contacts with Japan as well as China and South Korea.29 Also, under the Radford Collins agreement, the Australian Defence Force could be extensively involved in keeping sea lanes open in time of conflict. These sea lanes are vital to Japan for the free-flow of oil from the Middle East.

The future of the Japan-United States security relationship needs to be examined from the perspectives of the major actors, and the resulting analysis will highlight major implications for Australia.

If one follows the argument of Samuel Huntington that the emerging post-Cold War world can be described as "uni-multipolar", emphasising the supremacy of the United States but also lacking the clarity and stability that had existed for more than four decades, it can indeed be argued that the planet will be a "more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities".30 This naturally suggests that there will be few constants in international relations and the tenure of the Japan-United States relationship will increasingly be called into question. If, as Huntington suggests, it remains in the strategic interest of the United States to remain the world's premier economic and military power, then the United States is forced to actively counter the Japanese economic challenge. The United States is further committed to countering the emergence of another political-military hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific region. For the immediate future, Japan is the threat to United States primacy, it is the "menace".31 In 1989, 73 per cent of Americans saw the Japanese economic challenge as the greatest threat to American security. This potential clash has major implications for Australia as "the plodding minor power and eager regional ally".32 Japan will, for the immediate future, remain in step with United States strategic designs despite the rise of nationalism and increased calls for the removal of United States bases in Japan following events in the Philippines. The fact that Japan will remain in sympathy with United States intentions in the short term is further supported by the inclusion of major United States strategic statements such as the 1990 "Strategic Framework" as an integral part of the Japanese Defence White Paper. In essence, the Japanese are acutely aware that they are on to a good thing. With the benefit of the United States security guarantee for more than three decades the Japanese have been allowed to concentrate on the development of their economy without the drain of an enormous defence budget. The Japanese have thrived under the United States nuclear umbrella despite having spent the period since the Second World War in the frontline of the Cold War in a role as an "aircraft carrier" for the United States. The success is aptly described by Henry Kissinger who, whilst recognising the talent of the Japanese people and cohesion of its society, remarked that:

"...the Japanese decisions have been the most far-sighted and intelligent of any major nation of the postwar era even while the Japanese leaders have acted with the understated, anonymous style characteristic of their culture."33

Despite the landmark increase to the expenditure on defence in excess of 1 per cent GDP, the ongoing annual expenditure of approximately US$30 Billion on defence will allow Japan to continue her moderate increase in defence capability. But there are clouds on the horizon for Japan. Although attempts have been made through measures such as the Strategic Impediments Initiative to alleviate the trade tensions that exist with the United States, it is unlikely that there will be solutions to the US problems in the near future and the trade deficit in the order of US$41 Billion will remain. However, these aspects are partially balanced by the fact that 84 per cent of people polled in Japan
continue to admire the United States’ world leadership role.

From the Japanese perspective, an analysis of future developments could result in three possible options. In the first instance, the security relationship could remain much the same with the United States continuing to call the strategic shots whilst Japan, as part of the process of burden-sharing, pays the bills for United States forces stationed in Japan. The MSDF would continue to be responsible for the security of sea lines of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese coast. Combined exercising with US forces would continue as world technology transfer and Japanese participation in the SDI program. The major obstacles to this option are increasing calls for the removal of United States bases from Japanese soil, and the increasing disinterest of the American people in using resources to benefit the development of other nations to the detriment of the United States. This course would also assist in placating Japan’s regional neighbors who perceive the United States presence as the main ingredient of regional stability. International perceptions of Japan would be such that she would be seen as failing to assume the responsibilities associated with her economic superpower status.

The second option would see Japan breaking from the security relationship and establishing an independent foreign and defense policy. The visit to China by Emperor Akihito in October 1992 is an indication of Japan’s willingness to forget old rivalries and forge new ties. Other regional actors, however, may interpret this move as destabilizing the region, raising fears of Japanese expansionism, power blocs and perhaps initiating a regional arms race. Whilst this option is a possibility it remains unlikely that Japan will develop a nuclear weapons capability. Such a course of action would require a strategic vision and pronounced leadership both of which are factors lacking in Japanese politics. This option would also be hampered by domestic fears of a resurgence of militarism. The process, however, could be assisted by the Japanese perception of the United States as a nation in decline. While this process may be assisted by a belief in the redundancy of the security relationship due to the removal of the Soviet threat, Japan’s economic vulnerability may also be highlighted.

The third option suggests a partnership under the auspices of the current security relationship perhaps with the expansion of the bilateral relationship to a multilateral agreement. This approach would emphasize the “global partnership” articulated by President Bush. Such an option would downplay the Pax Nipponica or Pax Americana syndromes. In this instance Japan would be forced to appreciate the international responsibility commensurate with her economic power.

The United States position is tempered by the realization that “America’s fate is even more closely tied to East Asia and the Pacific”. The United States believes that the Japanese will need to concentrate more on opening its markets and accept the responsibilities associated with its developing power. If the security relationship were to remain essentially as it currently stands, the United States would be faced with claims that it was still doing too much for Japan, the “free-ride” concept. The United States does see the policy of forward deployment as being less relevant since Soviet expansionism has been halted and appears to appreciate that its continued presence in Japan is seen as an affront to sovereignty. On the other hand, the United States appreciates that there is no other regional country that is able to provide the stability that the security relationship offers. Whilst on the one hand the United States will continue to discourage Japanese acquisition of a power projection capability, it also expects Japan to do more for itself. The United States presence is a confidence-building measure in itself and is seen by regional countries as a means of keeping Japan under control, an approach that has recently been labelled as confirming United States distrust of Japan. The United States also appears content that Japan does not have the constitutional right to engage in collective security and that the Japanese have rejected approaches to engage in other security relationships outside that of the United States. The pace of change, however, is reflected in recent Diet decisions regarding United Nations sanctioned operations and the continuing argument in Japan that there is a need to change the Constitution to allow for a more extensive involvement in international affairs. The United States would actively discourage the Japanese from “going it alone” although it may be a stance that is accepted by the American public. The withdrawal of forces to the continental United States would be supported by a sizeable percentage of the American people. Action such as this would certainly result in a decline in the practice of “Japan bashing”, but would lead to considerable anxiety on the part of regional countries. In 1990, Paul Wolfowitz referred to the bases in the Philippines as being a cornerstone of Asia-Pacific security policy but two years later they are all but gone. Has there been any destabilisation in the region as a result? Perhaps the removal of the United States bases in Japan would also have minimal effect on stability as long as the United States continued its policy of forward presence by other means, including continual
The prospect of the “partnership” option is most appealing to the United States since it would result in continued United States presence, but with Japan accepting more financial and operational responsibility for its own security and that of the region. With the continued engagement of the United States, regional countries would be more at ease with the increased Japanese role. If the United States and Japan continue to work together in the words of James Baker “our potential will know few limits”.

From the perspective of Australia, Japan in the early 1990s is at a watershed and needs to accept the responsibilities of international political and economic leadership more commensurate with its status as the second largest economy in the world. Australia further believes that Japan should play an increased international role including involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations and even acquiring a place on the Security Council. There has been much discussion in the international forum on this issue with a proposed target date of 1995. Germany of course is another major contender. Australia has accepted and benefited from the Japan-United States security relationship but has also realised that international changes will pressure both parties in re-evaluating their respective roles in the relationship. Australia is firmly supportive of continued United States engagement in the region and actively promotes increased activity on the part of the United States.

The continued status quo is in Australia’s interests, but the other two suggested options would have major implications for Australia. If the Japanese were to go it alone, Australia would express the same concerns as many of its regional neighbours with regard to the possibility of Japanese expansionism. The current separate alliances that both Japan and Australia share with the United States provide a basis for “increasingly important dialogue and cooperation . . . on regional issues of shared concern”. The question to be asked by Australia is whether this important facet would remain if there was further deterioration or a break in the Japan-United States relationship. The fundamental point remains that Australia is very much the minor partner in the process and has to practise proactive diplomacy in order that its voice be heard in the deliberations of the two powers. Keeping in mind the interdependence of the Japanese-Australian relationship, moves to develop assertiveness by Japan, particularly in its search for alternate sources of raw materials, could have irreversible effects on Australia’s national interests and therefore its wellbeing. Australian protestations could well go unheeded by Japan.

With the third option, that of a partnership between Japan and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia would need to develop far-sighted policies that would be flexible enough to adjust to Japan’s growing prominence. This approach is further complicated by the fact that dealing with Japan has always been a difficult process for Australia. The security treaties which each country has with the United States have “instilled a common sense of strategic purpose” and Australia has much to gain from the development of an active bilateral security arrangement with Japan. This approach is further supported by recent moves from Washington to support APEC and Paul Keating’s proposals for APEC heads of government meetings. Such an approach displays a radical change from the previous United States position of opposition to the Australian suggestion of a Conference on Security and Cooperation for Asia in line with the Conference established in Europe. Australia may well be in a position to actively cultivate interest in regional security structures and this could be extended to include Japan. As we progress into the 1990s, APEC could well prove to be the catalyst. Overall, however, Australia is pragmatic enough to appreciate that she has limited influence with Japan and should concentrate on ensuring that any expansion in Japan’s defence capacity accords with broader western strategic policy.

It should not be forgotten that Australia is regarded by Japan as one of its few friends. There is, however, the potential for Australia to work with other regional actors to further influence Japanese actions. From a Japanese perspective however, she continues to look for support from countries like Australia and recognises that Australia’s primary diplomatic weapon is persuasion.

Conclusion

There is a certain truth in Scalapino’s claim that: “The economic and strategic interdependence of Japan and the United States is so great that although it gives rise to massive problems, the idea of a radical separation is unthinkable”. This is indeed a blessing for Australia. The thought of a powerful, nationalistic, militaristic Japan running rampant throughout the Asia-Pacific is a sobering proposition. A further unrealistic assessment is that of Friedman and Lebard who see Japan at war with the United States within 20 years with Australia siding with the United States. Whilst there is bound to be a continuing divergence of interests and periodic tension, the reality suggests
that Japan, whilst in a state of flux, remains cognisant of the fact that her future is tied to that of the United States. The Clinton administration is yet to set the course and Asia-Pacific waits with some trepidation. As a minor player in the process, but with significant economic, cultural and military ties with each of the superpowers, Australia's future is inextricably linked. The security relationship with the United States continues to be Japan's key to entry into Asia and in many respects, the United States is Japan's only true friend. The perspective remains entrenched in Asia that the United States acted as a constraint upon Japanese intentions and ambitions. This is primarily because, like Australia, Japan is a nation with an evolving sense of its place in the world and Japan lacks a cohesive foreign policy. Change, however, is endemic and is evidenced by Prime Minister Miyazawa's successful efforts to gain Diet approval to allow armed Japanese troops to serve overseas. The Peace Keeping Operations Bill became law with the support of at least 40 per cent of the Japanese people.

The security relationship will endure for the foreseeable future although the two nations will become more equal partners. With the United States facing continuing domestic crises, there will develop a willingness to allow Japan to assume more responsibility for her own security. Australia can take advantage of this development by encouraging increased Japanese involvement in regional security and by initiating the process of dialogue and multilateral cooperation. This approach is supported by a pragmatic realisation that the United States will continue to downgrade its presence, and as a consequence its influence, as we approach the end of the decade.

Australia has to find new solutions for emerging problems. There is no harm in Australia adopting a proactive stance and the Coalition has suggested an agenda for further development. Australia must continue to pursue her national interests, using a multidimensional approach and one of the most critical interests is a balanced working relationship with Japan that is of mutual benefit to both parties. Active diplomacy is the starting point and Australia should continue her efforts to be heard by both superpowers. Australia needs to continue to urge both parties to resolve their differences as a matter of priority but also continue to appreciate that Japan will eventually play a role in the Asia-Pacific region that is commensurate with her status as a superpower. That is the geopolitical reality.

NOTES

4. The Defence of Japan, op. cit., p.83.
9. ibid, p.254.
10. ibid, pp.86-87.
11. ibid, p.95
12. ibid, p.103.
14. ibid, p.158.
15. ibid, pp.310-316.
16. ibid, p.320.
17. Edson Spencer, "Japan as Competitor", Foreign Policy, No. 78, April 1990, p.160.
22. ibid, p.846.
25. Gareth Evans, op. cit., p.221.
26. ibid, p.222.
31. ibid, pp.8-9.
36. ibid, p.15.
37. ibid, p.18.
40. Rix, op. cit., p.194.
41. ibid, p.199.
42. ibid.
44. Rix, op. cit., p.203.
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*Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*

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**Australian Centre for Test and Evaluation**

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Papers presented at AIM-TEC94 included:

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Logistics Policy Branch, Australian Dept of Defence

"Defence Test and Evaluation Policy in Australia"

Col C A Wallace,

Director of Trials, Australian Dept of Defence

"Test and Evaluation Support for the procurement of defence material"

Other papers on T&E policy and implementation were presented by the Australian armed services and by defence representatives of Australia, USA, UK and Israel. Copies of these papers are available from ACTE.

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Return to Greece is an Australian Defence Force Journal production highlighting the 50th Anniversary of the Australian Defence Force's participation in the Allied struggle of the Greek Campaign of World War II.

In 1941, Greece fought for survival against the might of Germany. The Greeks, aided by Australian, New Zealand and British forces fought to ward off the invasion of their homeland. Return to Greece tells of these battles and of the Allied evacuation.

Return to Greece revisits the sites of the battlefields through a selection of 50 water colours and drawings. The book takes the reader on a journey with the veterans of the Greek Campaign through the country where they fought valiantly with their Greek comrades in defence of democracy. It illustrates the pride and professionalism of today's Australian Defence Force personnel as they pay tribute to the memory of those who fought with such bravery and self sacrifice in the cause of freedom in the dark days of 1941.

This book will rekindle memories for those who took part in the campaign of 1941 and also for those who participated in the return pilgrimage in 1991.

Return to Greece is illustrated by Defence artist, Jeff Isaacs with text by Michael Tracey.

Return to Greece is available from the Australian Defence Force Journal at a cost of $20.00.
Tanks in Low-Level Conflict — It Can be an Old Dog, They Aren’t New Tricks

By Lieutenant Colonel M.B. O’Brien, RAAC.

“Where tanks are — that is the front.”

Guderian

The Combined Arms Team

A t the conclusion of Australia’s commitment to Vietnam, most arms soldiers would have expected the bonds between the two combat arms to have been cemented forever. Certainly, few of the combat-experienced officers and men doubted the importance of the combined arms team. From their arrival in theatre in 1968 until their departure in 1971, tanks operated in intimate support of the infantry, supported by artillery and engineers, in some of the fiercest fighting of the war. However, many of the lessons learned over those four years have been discarded within a military generation. What remains are the implications of a generation of combat arms soldiers rarely, if ever, exposed to infantry/tank cooperation. Many in the Army are now ignorant of capabilities which are elsewhere accepted as essential, in any level of conflict. Our corporate memory is so faded that we risk culling capabilities which we know little or nothing about.

The Decline of Combined Arms Training

The decline in combined arms training was a result of a number of factors, chiefly among them: the geographical isolation of Army’s tanks at Puckapunyal; the decline of the tank capability (arguably as a result of inaccurate financial costing); a perceived reluctance within the Tank Regiment to embrace low-level conflict; and acceptance of the ignorant assertion that low-level conflict is synonymous with equally low levels of combat intensity and hence a lesser requirement for combat power. While a number of these factors have been addressed within Army during 1993, there remains a general lack of understanding of the contribution which the Tank Regiment is capable of making in low-level conflict.

1st Brigade’s Training Focus

Rather than concentrate on the individual capabilities which make up the 1st Brigade, training activities seek to exploit the synergistic effect of combinations of these capabilities. The 1st Brigade focus is low and escalated low-level conflict in the north of Australia; it stresses the unique capability derived from combinations of tanks and infantry working in combination with artillery, engineers and aviation; and supported by grouped administrative elements. Brigade training has reinforced the potency of combined arms teams at levels as low as the tank and mechanised infantry section group.

Success at Low-Level Conflict

Two-sided exercises and wargames have stressed that the key to success in low-level conflict lies in the ability to locate, positively identify and then capture or destroy a dispersed enemy. Simply reactive operations leave commanders floundering as the enemy dictates terms by constantly being inside the commander’s decision cycle.

At the outset, reconnaissance forces provided by aviation and ground reconnaissance units, or by the Tank Regiment or Mechanised Battalion, locate and identify the enemy. Tank weapons, more than any other, are then ideally suited to the graduated application of force to either kill or capture him. Groupings which provide infantry with the option of deploying by either Blackhawk or Armoured Personnel Carrier, allow a commander to use the high-speed, low-combat power option to contain an enemy, while the lower-speed, high-combat power tank and mechanised infantry team deploy to deal with him. The versatility of the tank and mechanised infantry group in these activities reinforces their claim of being ideal for every level of conflict. Other countries agree.

The Utility of Tanks in Low-Level Conflict

The United States Marine contingent in Somalia was equipped with M60A3 tanks and these were used extensively in major contacts. In fact, the Marines do not deploy for any operational activity without their armour.

Since the release of the White Paper, the plethora of hand held anti-armoured weapons which have so concerned our strategic planners when discussing the tanks vulnerability have recently proven to be more
The Leopard possesses a high mobility factor in Northern Australia. Even in the wet.

effective against helicopters; two of the Blackhaws shot down in Somalia being by RPG 2 and RPG 7 fire respectively. The United States’ response to an escalation of hostilities in Somalia has been to introduce M1A1 tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles into the conflict. This action reinforces the fact that a range of military problems will always require a range of versatile military solutions. No other weapon system is as versatile as the tank.

Capabilities of the Leopard

Recognising that our Leopard is not in the same technical league as the M1A1 Abrams, what is it that makes it such an ideal weapon system for low-level conflict?

Target Acquisition

Leopard’s optics include a range of variable magnification day sights and an image intensification night sight. These allow facial recognition to 1500 metres by day and at least 200 metres by night. Personnel bearing arms are obvious at about five kilometres by day and 500 metres by night. The tank sights allow pin point engagement to a range of over four kilometres by day. The gunner’s day sight is sufficiently sensitive to detect the glow of blacked out aircraft cockpit lights by night. This capability is enhanced by an eleven million candlepower searchlight which is ideal for the positive identification of enemy personnel and vehicles by night. A range of hand-held night observation devices augment the night capability.

Leopard Fire Control System

Leopard is the only armoured vehicle with fully stabilised sights and a computerised fire control system. These allow the tank to positively identify and then engage small, fast moving, ground and air targets at up to two kilometres range. Leopard gun control equipment allows the tank to fire indirect to a range of eight kilometres; although tanks fire indirect far less efficiently and responsively than does artillery. In any event, the tank is far better suited to driving quickly to the target and then engaging it.
Recent efforts to improve weapon system accuracy have borne dividends. Tanks achieve first round kills when sniping at half-sized figure 11 targets at ranges beyond 1500 metres. Standard issue Army binoculars will not allow you to detect a target at that range, let alone clinically kill it.

Ammunition Natures

The wide variety of ammunition types which can be fired from the 105mm main armament make it the ideal calibre for low-level conflict. Most important is the 105mm Splintex round which may be fused to detonate at any range from the tank muzzle out to 4400 metres. The Splintex round delivers 5,000 30mm steel flechettets (like 1.5 inch nails with fins) into the target area. This enables the comprehensive destruction of lightly protected enemy groups whether they are static or on the move.

APDS ammunition is used for sniping and against moving targets. High Explosive Squash Head is a good high explosive equivalent round; and white phosphorous smoke is a good target marking and general smoke screening round.

The coaxial machinegun, in conjunction with the laser rangefinder, enables the tank to apply fire to a range of 1600 metres. (Above 1000 metres nothing compares with Splintex.) With a rate of fire of 1300 rounds per minute, the MG3 is a first rate anti-aircraft machinegun.

Leopard Mobility

Leopard and M113 transported mobility are at least equivalent to that of wheeled AFVs on roads. Transporter-borne vehicles average 110 km per hour on roads without crew and vehicle fatigue. Loading takes five minutes; tanks are unloaded and combat ready in one minute. Crews can safely man and use vehicle optics and small arms weapons on the move. We are yet to trial firing the main armament during transit — it is unlikely to be popular with the driver!

A tank squadron is portable in one lift in the LSH; the LCH can carry up to four tanks and the LCM8 can carry one.

Protection Levels

The Leopard remains well protected against small arms fire and shell splinters and a range of land mines which would destroy other, lighter armoured or
wheeled vehicles. Most people who have dealt with mines understand that "the easy route is always mined" and it is therefore far better if you clear the route with a tank!

The Leopard is also the only land weapon system which is collectively protected against chemical and biological weapons. The tank is also easily decontaminated by unit personnel who are trained and equipped to do so.

**Sustainability**

The tank and infantry team are easily sustainable for long periods. Leopard achieves endurance of 550 km when travelling on its tracks. Decanting the Leopard’s fuel tanks would allow a no-refuel transporter trip from Katherine to Karratha!

Leopard carries 59 main armament rounds and 4400 rounds of machinegun ammunition. Tanks carry 150 litres of water; 120 stowed externally and 30 litres internally. Tank crews are indefinitely self-sufficient for hard rations.

**Reliability**

After 16 years service Leopard remains extremely reliable. On the last two Kangaroo Exercises, Leopards travelled over 28,000 km with only one major failure. The only commonly consumed repair parts are track pads which yield to the northern terrain after about 1000 km.

**Mobility**

Leopard and M113 low ground pressure and good amphibious capability provide relatively high mobility in the wet. Computer terrain modelling of areas of the north shows that combat laden, in the wet, Leopard can traverse 97 per cent of terrain and M113 99 per cent; compared to the 6X6 Perentie’s 88 per cent, LAV 25 79 per cent and the Unimog 75 per cent.

Leopard is currently being modified with handholds to carry infantry on the tank engine deck for short distances; such as to an FUP or between phases during an attack.

**Specialist Troops — The Leopard Variants**

Variants to the Leopard family include the tank dozer, mine clearer, bridgelayer and the recovery vehicle. These vehicles can restore a cratered MSR; rapidly bridge the abutments of a blown bridge for the passage of heavy civil vehicles; clear airfields and roads of scatterable mines and clear buried mines in verges or other high-use areas. The recovery vehicle is a first class general engineering vehicle capable of a wide range of repair and recovery tasks. This special equipment provides unique flexibility and contributes to the essential business-as-usual approach during low-level conflict.

**Close Reconnaissance Troop**

The Regiment’s Close Reconnaissance Troop conducts M113, motorcycle and dismounted reconnaissance. It specialises in mounted and dismounted observation posts; traffic control for up to formation moves; and provision of early warning at vital assets, traffic control points and ambush sites.

**Communications**

The communications fit of armoured vehicles make them ideal for dispersed operations. Vehicle radio fits are capable of sustained, long-range communications; cryptographic devices are a standard fit. Communications are demountable for specific operations.

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**Low-Level Conflict — Activities**

How may the capability be employed during low-level conflict? Combinations of tanks and infantry complement one another in a wide variety of tasks.

**Vital Asset Protection**

Tanks provide the defensive reach in protecting vital assets. The optics and fire control system allow early identification of enemy foot, vehicle or aircraft mounted groups and either engagement at long range or interception. Infantry provide close protection and dismounted patrols, or mounted patrols in conjunction with tanks. Tanks disprove the assertion that "if the enemy is in range — so are you." Enemy groups are inevitably detected well before they can achieve their aim. In addition, the presence of tanks signals political resolve and is a manpower light and easily sustainable reaction; whereas a larger number of dismounted infantry alone becomes more difficult to sustain, could therefore appear to be an over-reaction and is less balanced in achieving the task.

**Ready Reaction Force Tasks**

Tanks and infantry have the ideal balance of speed and combat power for ready reaction tasks. Operations are mounted quickly and flexibly, making the most of communications down to individual vehicle and therefore infantry section level. The combination of tanks and dismounted infantry provides forces for supported, close-quarter fighting and follow-up of a withdrawing enemy. Only aircraft outrun tanks across country and nothing outruns APDS!
Traffic Control

Combinations of tanks and infantry, supplemented by engineers, military and civil police are ideal for traffic control tasks. Concealed tanks provide early warning, positive identification and physical blocks while engineers provide search teams and explosive ordnance disposal. Military and civil police deal with detainees and provide a vital link to civil records for suspect vehicles and personnel. Infantry provide close protection and search teams when required. The organisation is mobile and entirely self contained. Experience shows that far from being daunted by the presence of tanks at these activities, personnel with nothing to hide are pleased to have us about.

Defensive or Blocking Forces

Combinations of tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, are ideal for blocking or confining concentrated enemy groups. The high tactical mobility and protection provided by the Leopard and M113-borne infantry makes it possible to contain or, supported by artillery or mortars, to destroy an enemy.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations

Leopard’s outstanding target acquisition and fire control system make it Army’s best land surveillance platform; a capability which will improve when it is upgraded with a thermal sight in two years. Tanks operating in conjunction with cavalry reconnaissance troops have the capacity to accurately engage fast moving enemy on rivers and estuaries, in the air or on roads and tracks. Two tank observation posts, or single tank posts supplemented by infantry, are suited to sustained surveillance operations.

Aggressive Mobile Patrolling

Leopard can conduct fast mobile patrols to dominate an area of operations. Groupings of tanks, infantry and unit reconnaissance can tie up large enemy groups by paralysing the enemy’s ability to move undetected. The tank’s mobility allows it to parallel run and simultaneously inspect tracks for signs of movement. These signs are obliterated by some less mobile wheeled vehicles and running confined to tracks encourages an enemy to mine.

Ambushing — At Short and Long Range

Tanks can ambush while fully satisfying Rules of Engagement and Orders for Opening Fire. No other organisation is so equipped to comply with the requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict.

Convoy Escort

Tanks slow convoy escort at up to 60 kph on their own tracks or fast convoy escort mounted on transporters. They provide a credible deterrent in the transported mode.

Cordon and Search

Tanks and infantry provide the ideal mix of arms for cordon and search. Tanks are best suited to the outer cordon where their optics, firepower and communications can cover the long distances around the perimeter of townships, stations and installations. Tanks can react quickly to apprehend or kill personnel attempting to breach the cordon.

Minimising Friendly Casualties

Regardless of the level of conflict, tanks reduce friendly casualties when used in intimate support of the infantry to fight-through enemy strong points or positions. We should not accept that actions in low-level conflict are any less intense than in other forms of conflict — to the man on the spot the danger is as real, the risks as great and the need for overwhelming combat power as important.

Psychological Impact of Tanks

Tanks send an important message to friendly troops, civilians and the enemy alike. Tanks have far greater presence than any other land force element and their psychological and morale impact should not be underrated. Having a tank regiment is like having a dinner suit — you may not need it all the time but when you do, nothing else will suffice.

Command of Armoured and Mechanised Forces

Both the Tank Regiment and the Mechanised Battalion Headquarters are capable of commanding manoeuvre. The circumstances will dictate the status of command of the deployed force; but it should not be concluded in every case that the Tank Regiment will be broken up and allocated to other units, rather than command a force itself. There is no tactical limit to the extent that tanks can be dispersed within and between areas of operations. There are however, some finite limits to the extent that a reduced post-Force Structure administrative and technical echelon can stretch to support dispersed operations.

In order to facilitate the employment of two tank sections per troop, tank troops will be re-configured to hold four tanks from the time the Regiment deploys to the north in 1995. This will reduce sabre squadrons to three such troops.

Operations which require more than one tank squadron, or one tank squadron and specialist elements of the Tank Regiment, may well be better commanded by the Regimental Headquarters since; while the Tank Regiment is capable of supporting the
equipment of many other units, no other unit is capable of supporting the equipment of the Regiment.

Tanks — Where Do They Stand?

Many within Army regard the tank as an expensive capability; chiefly because of the inflated, best-guess costings which have been produced in the past. Any capability costing 60 million dollars per annum (a popular best guess cost in the eighties) would be expected to attract criticism at a time of declining defence spending. But the capability costs less than one third of that amount — and less than other Regular combat arms units.

Unfortunately, criticism on the basis of cost is likely to have contributed to the attitude that cuts to the tank capability were warranted to allow funding to be directed elsewhere. The fact is that the tank capability is paid for — and it provides the high technology, low manpower, high combat power solution required for shrinking defence budgets. At the same time the Tank Regiment is becoming more efficient. The unit has been recognised for improved productivity; it provides genuine versatility, high combat power and value for money.

**Conclusion**

**Operations by Armoured Forces**

Elements of the Regiment should not be employed without other arms and neither should other arms groups be employed without tank support. Tanks are an essential and very affordable element of the total force. The Regiment, along with other 1st Brigade units, are focussed on training to win in Low-Level Conflict — alongside other elements of our Army.

**Solving the Dilemma — Supporting Combined Arms**

At the start of the article, I suggested four reasons for the decline of combined arms operations. They were: the geographical isolation of Army’s tanks at Puckapunyal; the decline of the tank capability (arguably as a result of inaccurate financial costing); a perceived reluctance within the Tank Regiment to embrace low-level conflict; and acceptance of the ignorant assertion that low-level conflict is synonymous with equally low levels of combat intensity and hence a lesser requirement for combat power.

Army’s officer graduates get a feel for what the tank can do on the RMC Exercise Beersheba. The isolation of the Regiment from the rest of the Army will be addressed during 1994 when tanks will work with the battalions of 3, 6 and 11 Brigades. Accurate, verifiable costing has dispelled the myth that the unit is expensive — it is the least expensive combat arms unit. All unit training is focussed on combined arms activities in a Low-Level Conflict setting. It remains for the Army to accept and then argue the need for the high combat power, low manpower solution provided by combined arms groupings based on, or including elements of, the Tank Regiment.

There are very few new tricks in low-level conflict. Little has changed except that, with the ill-defined nature of operations, everywhere can be “the front”.

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**Research and Development**

The use of technology optimises the effectiveness of the ADF, helping to offset the problems posed by a vast and sparsely populated continent and an often harsh environment.

The Defence Science & Technology Organisation (DSTO) is the second largest research and development organisation in Australia. It is regarded as a leader in many fields and has an impressive record of achievement. In-house expertise is augmented by a selective program of research contracts, agreements and cooperative research ventures.

With the increasing rate of technological innovation in military systems, the ADF priorities are reviewed regularly and activities adjusted to ensure they conform with strategic guidance and client priorities. The high quality of DSTO science is maintained through a policy of recruiting talented staff, providing good facilities and conditions of employment, and national and international collaborative programs.
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE ROVING STAFF OFFICER
by Colonel John Buckley, OBE,

For those of you who take the time to write book reviews for the Journal, one dilemma often faced (and remarked on by readers) is that it is only the opinion of one person, who having read the book, then provides a short 'buyers guide' on its strong and weak points. Often one is left with the feeling that more could have been said on the subject. In an effort to overcome this difficulty, five reviews have been prepared on John Buckley's book Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer. The book is published by the Australian Defence Force Journal and available for $30.

Reviewed by Major I.P. Mondon, RACT.

Readers of the Australian Defence Force Journal will be familiar with the writings of John Buckley, a regular contributor of articles and book reviews. As an admirer of his work it was with interest that I picked up his latest book — Recollections of a Roving Staff Officer published by the Australian Defence Force Journal, 1993.

The title of his work suggests that the volume is autobiographical, based on Colonel Buckley's personal experiences as a staff officer. This is not the case. The book consists of a collection of stand alone articles and biographies spanning the period from WWI through to WWII. Only the last third of the book is of Colonel Buckley's recollections, so in this respect the book is not aptly served by its title.

The title aside, the articles in the book are well written and provide a valuable insight into some very notable figures in Australia's military history such as Colonel Alfred Hobart Sturdee, General Sir Vernon Sturdee, and Lieutenant General Sir Edmond Harvey. However, the two central and most significant biographies are those on Sir Frederick Shedden and John Curtin.

For those with a limited knowledge of Australia's involvement in the First and Second World Wars, the biographies are a valuable adjunct to the classical historical references, and would be of most value to those who desire a more personal view rather than an in depth analysis. The biographies tend to concentrate on the individual rather than being a dissertation of their deeds, and consequently have a warmth to them that encourages the reader.

The two most important biographies are those on Sir Frederick Shedden and John Curtin, which is appropriate considering their contributions. Most people will already be familiar with John Curtin but not so familiar with Sir Frederick Shedden. I found this chapter to be the most enlightening. It is easy to work on a ship, in a battalion, or at a RAAF Base and either be at best, unaware of the contribution of the public service, or at worst scornful and resenting of their presence. This chapter should be read by all in uniform, as it clearly shows the essential role that the public service played, and continues to play, in the defence of Australia.

As the Permanent Head of the Department of Defence from 1937-1956, Sir Frederick Shedden provided the stability, experience, guidance and at times leadership that was necessary over a very turbulent period of Australia's history. An example of his contribution was his backing of Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee over the need for the Government to insist on the AIF returning to Australia, rather than to Burma, where Churchill wanted it deployed. As the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee insisted that the AIF be returned to defend Australia saying he would resign if the War Cabinet rejected his advice.

It is not until the last two chapters of the book that Colonel Buckley recounts his own experiences as a "Roving Staff Officer" recalling his experiences in Syria and Iraq in 1941, and with the 79th Armoured Division in Europe in 1944. These chapters — "Some Personal Recollections of the Syrian and Iraq Campaign 1941", and "Recollections of Cross Channel Duels" are the unabridged versions of the same articles that have appeared in the Australian Defence Force Journal. These are not strictly autobiographical but diverge to expand upon the experiences of Colonel Buckley and put what he observed into an historical context.
The book does have some detractions. Being a compilation of stand alone articles, there is often significant repetitions from one chapter to the next. As an example, the threat by Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee to resign appears in the chapter on Sturdee and Shedden virtually verbatim. This is a distraction but does not lessen the quality of the work. I also have some doubts about the value of this volume as an historical reference text. It is not footnoted despite extensive use of quotations and figures, and in the biographical chapters, it is Colonel Buckley’s opinion of the personalities and events and not a collection of accepted facts. Despite some minor reservations, my overall opinion of Colonel Buckley’s book is that it is well worth reading. It is easy to read, the style is fluent and it makes no pretensions to academic grandeur.

Reviewed by Major M.R. Power, AAAVN.

For the avid military historian, The Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer is probably not the book from which you will glean startling, previously unpublished facts. Colonel John Buckley, OBE, has produced a publication based on not only his personal recollections of life as a staff officer during the second world war, but also the lives of prominent officers during the Gallipoli campaign of the Great War. Because of this, the title is a slight misnomer. The recollections are not only his own, but also those of others including his father-in-law (Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee, KBE CB DSO) who features prominently in much of the book.

Buckley did not set out to produce a publication with chapters that flow chronologically to a logical conclusion. He wrote each chapter in isolation over the period 1982 to 1992 for the Australian Defence Force Journal. As a result, the reader will find that some points/facts/quotes are repeated several times. While this does not detract from the quality of the book, it does make it more difficult to read. The contents will mainly appeal to students of military life, especially during the Great War and World War II and they do give an easily understood personal aspect not normally available from other’s writings of history of the same era. As admitted by the author, his book is a series of unrelated stories. A further point to remember is that the articles were written to only bring out the positive sides of those characters. He rarely describes negative points.

Buckley starts the book with an abbreviated story of Colonel Alfred Sturdee and his son (later General Vernon Sturdee) who both served at Gallipoli from the original landing. Notebooks of both officers are currently held at the Australian Defence Force Academy. From the diaries of both officers, Buckley relates to the raising of the 2nd Field Ambulance which Alfred Sturdee led to Gallipoli only two months after the unit was raised.

In relating to the Second World War, Buckley spends much time raising the virtues of the then Prime Minister, John Curtin, and also Sir Frederick Shedden, KCMG OBE, who served as the permanent head of the Department of Defence from 1937 until his retirement in 1956. I consider his writings of these two men border on hero worship. He describes them in glowing terms. Of Curtin, he writes “his ability to inspire the nation especially when the inspiration was needed most, showed up his skills as a natural and great leader”. Admittedly, John Buckley did have close personal contact with those he describes, which does make his observations quite credible. However, I feel that this personal knowledge caused him to only look at and describe Curtin and Shedden as the saviours of Australia in a time of crisis.

Of Shedden, he wrote similar praises. However, to gain a different aspect of the contributions of both men, I recommend the reading of David Horner’s High Command. Horner describes Curtin as showing many inadequacies as the ultimate director of national strategy. Curtin did not appear to have a strategic view of his own and he relied on Shedden’s advice. Similarly Shedden would accept MacArthur’s advice unquestioningly, whereas he would challenge the advice of the Australian Chiefs of Staff. I do not raise these points to criticise Buckley’s writings, but to raise differing points of view from military historians.

Buckley’s main personal experiences as a staff officer are outlined in his recollections of Syria and Iraq when he was appointed as a liaison officer in the British Army Headquarters. Here he refers to command problems of a coalition force especially under the leadership of General “Jumbo” Wilson who complained about the Australian troops’ behaviour and who was reluctant to pass control to Australian Corps.

From 1943, Colonel Buckley was posted as a Lieutenant Colonel to the Chief Technical Officer (Weapons) position at Australian Army Staff, London. He describes engineering projects with which he was associated in his article “Recollections of Cross Channel Duels”. This is a very good article from an officer who was on the scene and would be of interest especially to those with an engineering/material background.

The foreword is provided by General Peter Gratton, AC, OBE, who recently retired as the Chief of the Australian Defence Force. Additional insights
into the stories and also the people involved are included as Appendices. Included amongst these are contributions from the Right Honourable Sir Paul Hasluck, KG, GCMG, GCVO, the Honourable K.E. Beazley, AO, the Right Honourable R.J.L. Hawke, AC, as well as General Gration.

Reviewed by Major G.P. Dibden, RAAOC.

*Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer* is a collection of stand alone articles focusing on World War II and unified by Colonel Buckley’s personal perspective of events and people. Colonel Buckley had a distinguished career in the Army being a Lieutenant Colonel at 29 and a Colonel at 33. He served attachments with the British Army in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq in 1941 and in North West Europe in 1944/45. In both theatres he was primarily attached to numerous formation headquarters (hence the Roving Staff Officer) and it is from these experiences that he writes the final third of the book. Following his military career, Buckley joined the higher Defence organisation as a civilian becoming a First Assistant Secretary.

The book contains several articles that are primarily biographical sketches of some notable figures in Australia’s military history. Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee’s sketch is particularly interesting. It spans two articles. The first focuses on Sturdee at Gallipoli where he served with his father, Colonel Alfred Hobart Sturdee. The second concentrates on Sturdee’s involvement in World War II. Sturdee was the CGS who threatened to resign if the AIF troops returning from the Middle East after the fall of Singapore were diverted to Burma as Churchill wanted. Both are written with considerable insight and perception drawing on notebooks from the period and Buckley’s close personal contact with Sturdee who was his father-in-law.

The articles on Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring and Archbishop Sir Frank Woods are well written and informative. Buckley had the privilege of being close to Herring who was a great wartime commander and he gives a soldier’s salute to the Archbishop whom he also knew well. He reminds us of the outstanding contributions of these fine Christian men.

The most fascinating biographical sketch is that of Sir Frederick Shedden. Buckley worked under Shedden for seven years and then spent extensive time with Shedden after his retirement. The article reflects this close personal friendship and understanding and should be read by all uniformed members of the Defence Force. It will put into perspective the influence and contribution that the Public Service has on defence policy.

Sir Frederick Shedden was the permanent head of the Department of Defence from 1937 until his retirement in 1956. Shedden was a great defence administrator and public servant who had an enormous influence on Australian defence during a critical time for Australia. He was known as the “civilian Commander-in-Chief” and in 1942 Prime Minister Curtin stated that with all the wartime problems facing him, he did not know how he could carry on without Shedden. As an example of his contribution, Shedden decided to get Blarney into an important post just prior to World War II so that Blarney could demonstrate his ability. Blarney would then be well placed to become the commander of an Australian Expeditionary Force in the event of war.

Perhaps the other most important biographical sketch is that of Prime Minister John Curtin. Although Buckley’s relationship to Curtin was considerably more distant than the others in the book, his perspectives on Curtin are very interesting. We read of Curtin the pacifist becoming the great wartime leader who stood up to Churchill, instigated the Australian-American alliance, fought against the “beat Hitler first strategy” and even battled members of his own party on the conscription issue.

The article on “Australia’s Perilous Year” is excellent and neatly dovetails with the biographical articles putting many of the crucial decisions taken by those Australian leaders into historical perspective. It recounts the time when a practically defenceless Australia, with most of its defence force deployed abroad to fight the Axis powers, faced the seemingly invincible Japanese who were virtually on Australia’s doorstep. The article thus centres on the New Guinea campaign including the vital aspect of the naval battles of Midway and the Coral Sea.

In the last two articles Buckley gives sparkling accounts, firstly of his own experiences in Syria and Iraq and, secondly of his time in North West Europe in 1944-45. Both contain the personal touch that bring the campaigns to life. They are well informed eye witness accounts, with some humourous anecdotes, of some of the central events and personalities of the times and make no claim to be formal histories. The article on Syria and Iraq concentrates on the campaign against the Vichy French in Lebanon and Syria. Almost in passing he gives us some glimpses of what must have been quite hair-raising experiences, including his lone travel in the desert occupied by marauding Arabs when he ended up behind enemy lines.

The article on North West Europe is woven around his attachment to 79th Armoured Division. It was the
specialist armoured formation which developed and employed the armoured “funnies” that played a momentous role in breaking into Fortress Europe and subsequently spearheading many assaults on strongly defended positions. The division commander was Major General Sir Percy Hobart and he, like the division, was remarkable.

The book does have a minor detraction. It is a compilation of stand alone articles concentrated around World War II. As a result there is some repetition of key aspects such as Sturdee’s threat to resign as CGS and Curtin’s plea for assistance from the US. Yet it is precisely because these articles focus around World War II that they lend themselves to being placed together in a book with their synergism developing a better picture of the people and the times.

Overall, I believe that Buckley’s book is first class and certainly worth a read, particularly if you have not read all his articles previously. It is very easy to read, has some quite amusing anecdotes, incisive, and most informative.

Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer is quite exceptional in this regard. Not only does Colonel John Buckley provide some enlightening insight into some of Australia’s great military commanders, he provides the reader with some vivid recollections of a wide cross-section of community leaders who in many ways, had a direct impact on what these commanders achieved. This book does much to reinforce in our minds that war is not the sole domain of the soldiers fighting it, but rather a burden that has to be borne by all members of the community. Furthermore, it reinforces the impact that non-military figures have on the outcome of military events both in peace and war.

This book does not need to be read from cover to cover for it is essentially a series of unrelated articles that were originally written to stand alone. However, the one thing that is common to each article, with the exception of the first, is the primary emphasis on the Second World War. This emphasis, linked with the author’s personal recollections of events and people, gives the reader a perspective that is rarely encountered in the study of military history.

It opens with what can only be described as a unique situation in military history, namely the experiences of a father and son in operations together. The impact of this is further strengthened by the fact that it occurred in Gallipoli. This is followed by two very perceptive and compassionate biographical sketches. The first is of Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee and the second is of Lieutenant General, the Honourable Sir Edmund Herring. Both of these articles provide uncommon insight into the personalities of two of this country’s great military commanders. Additionally, the author’s personal knowledge of the two men in question gives the reader a very different perspective from that available in such biographies as David Horner’s The Commanders.

Sir Frederick Shedden . . . became Australia’s foremost expert on defence policy and administration of the higher defence machinery. . . . As permanent head of the Department of Defence from 1937 until . . . 1956, he exercised a most powerful influence on defence policy and administration before, during and after World War II.” So commences the next article in Colonel Buckley’s book. Here again we have something unique in a book on military history. An article on someone that had a strong influence of the course of events yet was not a military commander. There is value in reading this article if only for the purpose of gaining another view on the reasons behind many of the events of the day. Again the author’s knowledge of Shedden as a friend and com­patriot adds a very personal touch to the article.

The next article, “A Soldier’s Tribute to John Curtin”, gives us a different perspective on Australia’s wartime Prime Minister. Colonel Buckley’s article stresses those enduring characteristics of John Curtin, his leadership, patriotism, dedication, personal strength and courage, that have such common appeal to the soldier. There is a lot of merit in this article in that it enlightens the reader on a number of the personal attributes of John Curtin that are rarely discussed.

“A Soldier’s Salute to Archbishop, Sir Frank Woods” is the final article about a person. This short, but very moving, account of one of Australia’s great church leaders adds a unique dimension to Colonel Buckley’s book.

In “Australia’s Perilous Year”, Colonel Buckley sets out to (in his own words) “inform our younger generations and the hundreds of thousands of migrants . . . of the crisis that this country faced . . . and of the seriousness of the struggle to preserve its sovereignty”. While this is not a rigorous analysis of the events of
January 1942 to January 1943, there is enough substance in the article to achieve the desired result.

The final two articles provide the reader with a very personal, eye-witness account of the events in Syria and Iraq in 1941 and later in the Normandy landings and the campaign in North West Europe. Neither of these could be construed as a formal military history, but they are both very incisive and informative. The fact that the author was there for the first and a staff officer involved, from London, with the other, combined with the benefit of hindsight, make them interesting reading for any military professional.

Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer is a very personal, informative and at times amusing collection of articles about some of the personalities and events that contributed to forging this nation as we know it today. Each article is interspersed with personal anecdotes that serve to reinforce the author’s very personal approach to military history. While I would not maintain that this book is “a must have” for the military historian, I believe it is valuable reading, especially for the unique perspective it brings to the subject.

Reviewed by Major K.E. Keegan, RASIGS

For many years, John Buckley has been a regular contributor to the Australian Defence Force Journal. His “recollections” bring together the many articles he has researched and written over the years. John Buckley writes as he has lived, relating his first hand experiences and observations in a straight forward and factual manner. To read his words and descriptions of Australia and Australians at war, is to know that he was there. It is presented thoughtfully and clearly, by a proud Australian Army officer who served during some of Australia’s darkest military hours, alongside many of Australia’s most notable military officers, public servants and politicians.

While his personal recollections contained within Chapters 8 and 9 give an accurate insight into the responsibilities of a staff officer, it is his insight into Sir Frederick Shedden and John Curtin that is his most powerful work. I believe he has been able to capture the very essence of these two men. Sir Frederick, the Secretary of the Department of Defence and Civil Member of the Defence Committee from 1937 to 1956, is described as totally dedicated to his work, a gifted, very intelligent man who combined broad vision with determination and self sacrifice. In particular, I noted that Shedden worked tirelessly to ensure that Australia was recognised and treated as an independent nation, not simply an extension of the Commonwealth. He was also instrumental in formulating both the ANZUS and SEATO treaties. Buckley states “Any hint of a challenge to recognition of Australian sovereignty was like a ‘red rag to a bull’ with Curtin and Shedden!”. Sir Frederick served with five Prime Ministers, but it was his term with John Curtin which surely proved him to be an outstanding Australian and further highlighted his contribution to Australia’s defence.

John Curtin is regarded by many as Australia’s greatest Prime Minister; I believe John Buckley brings yet another dimension to this man. His perspective from within the khaki uniform shows two clear sides to this great Australian wartime leader. As John Buckley highlighted, he was a pacifist at heart, yet proved to be a brilliant war strategist. It is at this point of the book that the sequencing of the chapters impacts on the reader, because “Australia’s Perilous Year” at Chapter 7 further amplifies the importance of both Shedden and Curtin to Australia. A comment contained in an operational report from 16 Brigade during World War II reads as follows: “The only time a soldier becomes so exhausted as to feel incapable of further action is when the officer in charge succumbs to fatigue”.

This comment can be applied to both Shedden and Curtin during “Australia’s Perilous Year”. Had either of these men succumbed to fatigue, lost their determination or strength during this year, then perhaps Australia could well have felt incapable of further action. This perilous year saw the Japanese war machine on the northern doorstep of Australia, the pressures within the domestic and international political arena were immense; pressures which were subsequently transferred onto the shoulders of the military commanders in the field. John Buckley captures the intensity of the time in an unemotional and forthright manner.

While the book is simply a series of recollections or tributes, there are occasions where information is repeated. This does not detract from the book, it merely enables the reader to approach each chapter as a stand alone article. John Buckley has written about his life as an Australian staff officer, the theatres of war in which he served, the people he served with, and most importantly he acknowledges the great work achieved by the many politicians, public servants and military officers of Australia’s war years.

This is not a glamourous, high profile book which is destined for the best seller list, it is a book which offers the reader a first hand glimpse into the hearts and minds of Australians at war. I commend this book to all Australians, but in particular to those who are in search of the “real” Australian character.

Reviewed by Warren Perry, President of the Military Historical Society of Australia.

Readers may consider it to be superfluous, after having read the sub-title of this book, for me to begin my task as a reviewer by saying it is a book on Naval Administration. But in doing this I do it with a purpose. I am merely employing that literary weapon of emphasis.

*Ayé Ayé, Minister* covers its subjects from 1939 to 1959 — a period which includes the War of 1939 — and during that time the Royal Australian Navy was administered direct by its own Department of State for the Navy. If for no other reason, *Ayé Ayé, Minister* is a contribution to Australia’s published literature on Public Administration, and more especially Naval Administration, because of the words of one of the great masters of Naval Administration and sometime Chief Clerk of the Admiralty, London, Sir John Henry Briggs. He said, in his *Naval Administrations, 1827-1892*, published posthumously, that: “The interior economy and management of any large public department must always be a matter of general interest.”

Throughout almost the latter half of the period covered by *Ayé Ayé, Minister*, the permanent head of Australia’s Department of the Navy was the late Thomas Joseph Hawkins (1898-1976). He was one of those permanent heads who always knew what he wanted and the methods by which his wants could be obtained when he wanted them. He did not see his role as the passive one of a spectator. When Robert S. McNamara became Secretary of the Defense Department, Washington, in January 1961, he was reported to have said: “I am here to originate and stimulate new ideas and programmes and not just to referee arguments”. Thomas Joseph Hawkins, as permanent head of Australia’s Department of the Navy was that kind of man too. So it could be said that he set the tone and created the atmosphere for prompt decisions and timely action for at least the latter part of the period covered by *Ayé Ayé, Minister* — the author of which was during this period one of his senior subordinates.

Mr Hyslop, a former Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Navy, served under that exacting master, T.J.H., even before he became permanent head of the Department in 1950. It is not necessary here to recite the author’s qualifications for the task he has undertaken and now completed. But it may be of interest to some newcomers to Naval Administration — a subject he was introduced to at Garden Island in 1936 by Mr Harry Allen, who was then the Civil Secretary there. Unlike today, Garden Island was in 1936 an island. In the course of his career Mr Hyslop had the good fortune to be selected to attend the Australian Administrative Staff College at Mount Eliza and later to be attached for a tour of duty at the Admiralty, London. During this attachment he did the course at the Joint Services Staff College at Latimer and thus gained the coveted “jssc”.

A handicap in undertaking the writing of books and articles of a research character on Australian Naval Administration is the dearth of published research in Australia by practitioners and former practitioners as is common in England where members and former members of the British Civil Service publish research studies on various aspects of Public Administration.

Sir Henry Bland, a former permanent head of Australia’s Department of Defence, drew attention to this deficiency in Australia in his lecture, “Some Aspects of Defence Administration in Australia”, which he delivered in Perth on 29 September 1970. He pointed out in this lecture that there are in Australia “Too few journalists specialising in defence matters” and what is “Needed badly are more commentators specialising in Defence.”

Although *Ayé Ayé, Minister* is a contribution towards remedying the situation pointed out by Sir Henry Bland, more needs to be done and done with greater frequency both quantitatively and qualitatively in the matter of research writing as well as in journalism. As far as Australian journalism is concerned, it has not yet produced “commentators on defence matters” of the intellectual calibre of say Sir James Richard Thursfield and Sir Archibald Hurd in the naval field or of Professor Spenser Wilkinson and Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A’Court Repington in the army field, just to mention four from a much larger British group. The need in Australia for journalists of this intellectual calibre, who specialise in Defence matters, has long been urgent.

The author’s previous book, *Australian Naval Administration, 1900-1939*, published in 1973, is the only other book devoted exclusively to its subject. Naval Administration is of course touched on in other works on Australian naval matters but only incidentally and superficially. Now *Ayé Ayé, Minister* fills in another gap in the history of Australian Naval Administration in the later period for 1939-1959. It also provides a useful introductory chapter entitled “As Things Were (1788-1939)”.

The author has mentioned in his Notes on page 229
of Aye Aye, Minister Sir Oswyn Murray’s article “The Administration of a Fighting Service” which is an article of considerable importance to those engaged at the higher levels of Naval Administration. In this article Sir Oswyn Murray (1873-1936) asked very properly the question, “What is meant by the administration of a fighting service?” He went on to say that, “I, as the son of a great dictionary maker, always find it congenial to start with a definition. The illustration he used for his definition of Naval Administration was the Admiralty, London, of which he was at the time of his death in 1936 the permanent head. His definition was a three-point one which need not be repeated here because it has been examined by the author in Chapter 18 of Aye Aye, Minister.”

The book is physically an attractive paperback. Its attention to detail makes it a good book for the general reader as well as for the specialist in Naval Administration and in Naval History.

The book includes a comprehensive bibliography as well as Lists of Ministers of State responsible for the direction and control of Australia’s naval forces, Lists of Permanent Heads and Chiefs of Staff of these naval forces. Most books I see nowadays have only token indexes. These have little value for users in a hurry. But they prevent reviewers from saying in a review, “this book has no index”. The author has provided readers with a useful and comprehensive analytical index. By analytical index I mean one that does not have only main entries followed by “strings” of numbers only.

A useful adjunct to a book of this class too is a Chronology. The author’s chronology differs from most chronologies that one sees nowadays which are too short and too vague to be worth examining. It provides a useful and comprehensive chronology for readers. However, years of events only are given instead of complete dates.

It is a pleasure to review a book with no printing errors in the narrative. Nevertheless, the blurb describes the author as a Commander instead of a Companion of the Imperial Service Order. Another comment concerns the author’s treatment of the Canadian and New Zealand Navies which both had a common origin namely the Royal Navy. Their similarities and differences could perhaps have been drawn out more effectively in one chapter instead of two.

The last Emperor, William H, said in one of his books something to the effect that “Most educated Englishmen had met had a sound knowledge of the organisation and purpose of the British Navy.” So a study of Aye Aye, Minister should help educated Australians to become better acquainted with the Royal Australian Navy.

THE EAVESDROPPERS, by Jack Bleakley. Published by the Australian Government Publishing Service, RRP $12.95. (Cat. No. 91 17438).

Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE, ED.

Having reviewed nearly 300 books over the past ten years, this is the first one I have read from the Australian Government Publishing Service; I hope it will not be the last.

The author, Bleakley, volunteered for the select group of wireless interpreters at the beginning of the war in the Pacific. He served with the RAAF Wireless Units whose outstanding performance has been kept a secret until the last few years. They certainly made a vital contribution to the Allied victory.

Bleakley traces the development and war experiences of his Unit with brilliant method and clarity. It is expertly supplemented with excellent maps and photographs. Its narrative is simple, direct and entirely interesting.

The author has had permission to use some top secret documents which readers will find most interesting and surprising.

As a war historian and book reviewer, I found much new information about the vital importance of “the Eavesdroppers” work in general war situation. This book tells of the value of the Australian contribution to the US Signal Intelligence Organisation until the end of the war. General Akin, the Chief Signals Officer on General MacArthur’s staff asked that the RAAF Signal Units be made available for the final Campaigns. He got them.

In the past few years much has been written about the brilliant work of the code crackers, but I think this book is second to none. It keeps to the central point of the story throughout and is not diminished by red herrings or political issues.

Bleakley is a gifted historian from his own experience and his excellent research, he tells his story with accuracy, truth and integrity — and what a story!

The Australian Government Publishing Service has produced a first class publication at minimal cost. At $12.95 the book must be the bargain of the year.

If I can mention one criticism, I consider this book should have been produced with a hard cover even though it is hardly more expensive. However, the quality of the narrative and its outstanding contents deserves a better cover and I strongly recommend The Eavesdroppers to all readers. It shows that a good publisher and a good author can combine to produce a book which will appeal to all readers interested in the Australian war effort in breaking enemy codes.
I hope Jack Bleakley continues to write and that the Australian Government Publishing Service continues to expand its coverage of Australian war history. The 50th Anniversary of so many of the important land, sea and air battles in 1942, hopefully, will bring forth many books similar to The Eavesdroppers. It would be appropriate for the Government Publishing Service to encourage and foster such important historical books.

AUSTRALIA'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS:
A SEARCH FOR SECURITY, by Alan Dupont
Ed. Published by Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. Cost: $12.00 RRP Paperback.

Reviewed by Wing Commander Mark Lax, RAAF.

Throughout Australia’s short yet dynamic history, Defence planners have been faced with the unresolved problem of “threat” and response. Australians have always perceived an external threat of one form or other. This internal insecurity has resulted in Foreign Affairs and Defence Strategies being reactionary rather than evolutionary. This short study traces the development of Australia’s threat perceptions and the impact such forecasts have had on the nation’s political, strategic and defence development.

Alan Dupont’s paper is the 82nd Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence produced by the SDSC at ANU. Mr Dupont is a Graduate of RMC Duntroon and served as an Officer in the Australian Army Intelligence Corps. His experience includes a tour in JIO, working as a freelance journalist and as a Counsellor in the Department of Foreign Affairs. This paper was researched when he was a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University, Canberra, in 1990.

Comprising five chapters and three appendices, the monograph aims to chart the evolution of Australia’s threat perceptions and at the same time, explore the ideological, cultural, political and strategic dynamics which have shaped these perceptions. In the event, the paper explores four distinct phases. Firstly, the colonial era forming the period up to the 1890s, when the preoccupation was with France, Russia and Germany. The second from 1895 to 1950, discusses the “Yellow Peril”, predominantly Japanese economic and military might. The third phase lasted until the 1970s according to Dupont when the final era of “no foreseeable threat” emerged. The fourth phase is discussed in terms of past, present and future direction. A seven page conclusion summarises Australia’s threat perceptions and argues Australia’s vulnerability may not lie with military invasion or ideological subversion but with social and economic changes sweeping the globe. Many may agree with Dupont yet out of interest, according to a Newspoll conducted by The Australian in May 1992, 38% of the respondents felt that Australia faced a military threat within the next 10 years and of those, 30% thought an Asian threat the most likely.

I enjoyed the paper. It is easy to read, logical and draws sensible conclusions and is worthy of consideration, particularly for those involved with Military Strategy and Analysis. The publication is in standard SDSC format, is well printed and bound and at $12.00 is good value for money. Recommended.


Reviewed by Lex McAulay.

This is another first class book from Laddie Lucas, this time in partnership with Johnnie Johnson, the leading Allied ace in Europe 1939-45. The reader is guided on an easy-to-read tour of air war from the earliest days of fighting in 1914, through to “Desert Storm”. The 208-page book is well illustrated with photos of the men and aircraft, and with simple but informative maps of the operational areas and operations themselves.

The reader is taken on a tour which includes the first calculated use of the aircraft as a fighting and bombing machine, the first development of tactics by Boelcke, the career of Richthofen and other WWI aces, the air war in Spain 1936-39, Fighter Command in 1939, the Battle of Britain, the Desert Campaigns in North Africa, the Bomber Offensive, the anti-submarine campaign in the Atlantic, the Normandy operations in 1944, air war in Russia, in the Pacific, in Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands and in the Gulf 1991. There are a few very minor errors in the photographs, but this seems unavoidable in publishing books of this nature.

There is only one chapter in the book with which this reviewer disagrees strongly: the crediting to the Canadian pilot Roy Brown of the victory over Baron von Richthofen, despite much available eyewitness and post-mortem examination evidence that the Baron was killed by ground fire from Australian troops while flying at very low level over their positions. If we did not persist in beating the Poms at cricket and footy, they might admit we got the Red Baron!

While perhaps of less value to the well-read student of military aviation, this volume is certainly recommended for the reader at an early stage of interest, one who requires a one-volume history, or one with a general interest in air war history.