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Foreword

By Lieutenant General J. C. Grey AO
Chief of the General Staff

The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General J.C. Grey, AO escorted by Lieutenant Colonel S.H. Ayling inspecting the Guard at Pechentong Airport, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

When the United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945, one of its purposes was ‘to save succeeding generations from the ravages of war’. Peacekeeping has been perhaps the most highly visible way in which the international community, through the UN and sometimes through other multinational organisations, has tried to meet this objective. Since the Second World War, over thirty peacekeeping operations have been conducted by the UN and a number by other bodies. Of these, Australia has participated in over 20 UN and other multinational peacekeeping operations. Most of Australia’s peacekeepers have been soldiers, who during 47 years of peacekeeping, have operated in many parts of the world, on a variety of tasks and alongside soldiers from over 75 countries.

1993 was a particularly busy year for Australia’s peacekeepers. Last year, almost 2000 ADF personnel were deployed on peacekeeping duties in Somalia, Cambodia, Western Sahara, the Middle East and Pakistan-Afghanistan. While our numbers have reduced since then, the Australian Army is still actively involved in three UN operations and one multinational mission.

Peacekeeping has brought the Australian Army benefits as well as challenges but the features that have made the most enduring impact on the Australian and international communities have been the professionalism, technical skill and humanity of our soldier-peacekeepers.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce this special edition of the Australian Defence Force Journal. I particularly acknowledge the efforts of those authors, recently or currently deployed on peacekeeping operations, who have taken the time to share their experiences with their Service and civilian colleagues. The story of Australia’s involvement in peacekeeping is a creditable one and this edition gives the reader a first hand insight into just what makes up that involvement, throughout diverse parts of the world.

Chief of the General Staff
A Brief History of Australian Peacekeeping

By Lieutenant Colonel N.F. James.

Introduction

In the absence of any widely accepted definition of peacekeeping in international law or practice, Australia's peacekeeping record cannot be adequately recounted without establishing some definitional framework. This account is therefore based on a few simple premises. First, peacekeeping is almost invariably a multinational function. Second, the practice of peacekeeping has been a direct result of the rise of general and regional collective security systems, and is primarily motivated by the principle of common concern, (as distinguished from collective defence or common security systems which are primarily motivated by individual national concerns). Third, peacekeeping evolved as a collective method of controlling the outbreak, spread, continuation, escalation or resolution of conflict. Finally, peacekeeping involves stronger and more comprehensive measures than normal diplomacy, and may require fighting, but there are strict limitations on both the conduct and objectives of any force used.

Since 1947, the UN has conducted 26 multinational peacekeeping operations and another 30-odd operations have been conducted by other international bodies. It is important to note the terms multinational peacekeeping and UN peacekeeping are not synonymous. Most of the literature covering peacekeeping has tended to narrowly focus on UN operations to the exclusion of the others, with the result many observers misapply UN experience and doctrine (itself continuously evolving) to the whole concept.

There is also a simplistic but growing tendency to make too rigid a differentiation between multinational peacekeeping in the broader sense and what is currently termed “peace enforcement”. The record of collective conflict limitation since 1945 clearly indicates there is a spectrum of multinational peacekeeping involving three broad types of activity. However, with some peacekeeping cases, a clear distinction between the types has been blurred, and many cases have evolved from one type to another, or have

Australian medical support in northern Iraq
incorporated aspects of more than one type. The three broad types are best described as:

observation or verification — where armed, or frequently unarmed, neutral military observers are used to monitor or mediate ceasefires, armistices or peace agreements; or more rarely, monitor that the conduct of fighting complies with international humanitarian law.

containment — where impartial but not necessarily neutral, armed forces are used as a buffer between belligerents, or to supervise elections, changes of government or sovereignty, assist in the maintenance of law and order, or to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and

peace restoration — (sometimes termed police actions, collective security operations or peace enforcement measures), where a degree of impartial, but perhaps not neutral, limited force is used to restore peace and security.

As a foundation member of collective security organisations such as the UN and the Commonwealth, Australia has always supported multinational peacekeeping. However, Australia’s strategic circumstances in the 1950-1972 period, especially collective defence commitments in South East Asia, severely limited Australia’s ability to contribute to multinational peacekeeping during the 1960s and early 1970s. This was in marked contrast to most other western (and non-aligned) middle level powers, such as Canada and the Scandinavian states, who had relatively benign strategic circumstances and became major troop contributors to the UN during this period.

Even so, Australia has still participated in 19 UN and six other multinational peacekeeping operations since World War II. Australia has also been one of the few consistent contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget, both with assessed dues and with logistic support. Furthermore, Australia has made significant military and police commitments to UN humanitarian operations, including UNICEF’s evacuation of South Vietnamese orphans in 1975; the UN Mine Clearance Training Team in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1993; and assistance to Cambodian refugees in Thailand from 1989 to 1993, and Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northern Iraq in 1991.

**UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) 1947-1951**

Australia’s first experience with multinational peacekeeping was on our doorstep at the close of World War II. At the end of the war, the Dutch sought to reestablish their rule in the then Netherlands-East Indies. This was resisted by the newly self-proclaimed Indonesian Republic and war broke out. In August 1947, the UN established a Good Offices Commission (GOC) to delineate and supervise a ceasefire between the Dutch and the Indonesians, and eventually supervise the withdrawal of Dutch forces to the Netherlands. The ceasefire was tenuous at the best of times and seriously broke down in December 1948. Given the strong feelings on both sides, and the generally chaotic situation throughout the Indonesian archipelago, UNCT’s efforts in preventing large scale disaster were an excellent baptism of fire for UN peacekeeping.

Australia’s contribution began in early August 1947 when locally-based diplomatic staff were seconded to the GOC. They were joined by four military observers later that month. When the GOC was reorganised and renamed UNCI in January 1949, the Australian contingent increased to 15. It stayed at that strength until UNCI’s task ended in April 1951. One interesting side issue of Australian involvement with UNCI is the poor treatment of this mission by later UN historians. As the first UN peacekeeping operation involving military observers, the procedures used to establish and staff UNCI were different from those later developed for subsequent missions. Two major differences were that the military observers were drawn only from countries with diplomatic representation in Indonesia, and were loaned to the UN through the diplomatic missions and not directly posted to the UN. Misapplying current criteria to past situations, some UN peacekeeping references do not include UNCI in their list of UN missions. It is perhaps time Australia officially complained about what is a best unprofessional historiography, and at worst, political censorship.

**UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 1950-1985**

In 1947, the United Kingdom divided its Indian empire, including many princely states, in two along religious lines. Independence was then granted to the two halves as mainly Hindu India and predominantly Muslim Pakistan. One of the princely states involved was predominantly Muslim Kashmir in the mountainous far northwest of the subcontinent. Many Kashmiris did not want to join either India or Pakistan; however, many wanted to join Pakistan and only a few wanted to join India. Kashmir’s Hindu Rajah vacillated and an uprising occurred to overthrow him. In controversial circumstances he opted to join India to gain military assistance to quell the rebellion.
Among the ruins of war in Cambodia
Pakistan then intervened to assist the Kashmiris and the first Indo-Pakistan war began. A further two wars occurred in 1965 and 1971, each ending in a ceasefire with Kashmir still divided. UNMOGIP grew out of the military adviser staff to the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), and was separately established as an observer mission in late January 1949. UNMOGIP's role was to supervise the first ceasefire and it has remained on the job ever since, as Kashmir remains “territory in dispute” under international law.

Australian participation with UNMOGIP grew out of the activities of Sir Owen Dixon, a Justice of the Australian High Court, as UN mediator in 1950. This resulted in a UN request in September 1950 for an Australian general to command the mission because the UN considered an Australian was best suited to supervise a dispute involving two Commonwealth countries. In late October 1950, Major General R. H. Nimmo CBE, was appointed Chief Military Observer (CMO) UNMOGIP and he remained in command until his death on 4 January 1966. His 15 year plus command is a UN record and one unlikely to ever be broken.

“Putt” Nimmo was one of the earliest graduates from Duntroon where he was the second Sword of Honour winner. He had served at Gallipoli and in Palestine with the Light Horse brigades in World War I, commanded armoured, mechanised and motorised brigades in World War II, and was the first commander of 34 Infantry Brigade in Morotai and Japan with the British Commonwealth Occupational Force (BCOF) in 1945-46. Nimmo had also represented Australia in hockey, including against India in the early 1930s, and played for Victoria in hockey, rugby, cricket, tennis and polo. A noted sportsman like Nimmo was just the right man to supervise a ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and he even continued to play polo into his late fifties.

Australia added a contingent of six military observers in early 1952, with members generally serving on one to two year tours, although several served long extensions or did more than one tour. During Confrontation and the Vietnam War, when the Army's resources were stretched, many Army Reservists were used to man the contingent. In 1985, ironically the year of international peace, the contingent was withdrawn progressively with the last member returning in December. Australia withdrew from UNMOGIP because the then Government considered Australia was overcommitted to UN activities, a stance in marked contrast with earlier and subsequent policy.

Australia also provided UNMOGIP's air unit from March 1975 to January 1979 with a 39 Squadron RAAF detachment comprising 12 men and one DHC-4 Caribou serving on six month tours. The Karakorum mountains contain 33 peaks over 25,000 feet. The altitude ceiling of a loaded Caribou is approximately 21,000 feet in icy weather and Kashmir's climate features vicious extremes of weather and temperature. The detachment's accident free record in such circumstances was an impressive achievement.

**UN Command — Korea (UNC-K) 1950-1956**

UNC-K was the UN's first peace restoration operation. Australia was a strong supporter of the UN effort to restore peace and provided the fourth largest contingent (after the USA, UK and South Korea). At the height of the fighting, the Australian commitment consisted of an aircraft carrier and two destroyers, two infantry battalions with supporting arms and services, and a fighter squadron with supporting services.

By the time the Australian commitment ended in 1956, 339 Australians had been killed, over 1200 wounded and 29 had become prisoners of war.
Unfortunately the sacrifices of those UN members who fought in Korea have too often been ignored in UN circles. Later histories of UN peacekeeping have tended to gloss over UNC-K (and UNCOOK). The reasons for this are complex, but would seem too often to be the result of subjective political biases and, in some cases, the shame of countries that avoided participation.

**UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) 1953-Present**

UNCMAC was established in 1953 to represent the UN in its adherence to, and subsequently the monitoring of, the armistice between the UN and North Korea. UNCMAC's observation role is limited to the monitoring of the armistice, the investigation of serious incidents and participation in relevant negotiations. UNCMAC does not permanently deploy observers along the ceasefire line.

Australia's contribution is one senior service officer. Since the withdrawal of the last Australian forces from UNC-K in 1956, Australia's UNCMAC responsibilities have been conducted by the Defence Attaché at the Australian embassy in Seoul.

**UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) 1956-Present**

Israel and its Arab neighbours have fought several wars since the UN partitioned Palestine in 1948. In April 1948, a Truce Commission was established to supervise the various armistices and truces agreed to after the First Arab-Israeli War. In mid June 1948, military observers were added to the Commission and UNTSO was formed, becoming an independent observer mission in mid-August 1949. UNTSO has continued to supervise subsequent truces after the 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 Arab-Israeli Wars. UNTSO's area of operations covers Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

Australian involvement with UNTSO began with four military observers in 1956. This was increased to five in the early 1960s, ten in 1978 and the current 13 in 1982 after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. As with UNMOGIP, during Confrontation and the Vietnam War, many Army Reservists were used to man the contingent, with the last one not returning to Australia until mid 1977.

UNTSO currently includes four Observer Groups which also operate in support of other UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. Currently, this means Australian observers serving with the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) work closely, but not exclusively, with UNIFIL and those serving with Observer Group Golan (OGG) work closely with UNDOF. In the past, Australians serving with Observer Group Egypt (OGE) worked closely with UNEF I and UNEF II during the existence of those missions.

Traditionally most Australian Observers have served in OGL in southern Lebanon and with OGG on the Golan Heights. Between 1982 and 1986, Australians also served with Observer Group Beirut (OGB). In March 1984, the Australian Government reviewed participation in OGB and restricted it to a maximum of two observers. To considerable HQ UNTSO chagrin, Australian approval was withdrawn altogether in late 1986 with the last Australian leaving OGB in March 1987. The withdrawal ran counter to strong Army advice based on the considerable operation experience gained and stemmed from concern about the value of OGB compared with the considerable danger involved. UNTSO were most unhappy with this special restriction on the operational employment of Australian observers and it is hoped similar difficulties will be avoided in other missions.

On 12 January 1988, Captain Peter McCarthy RACT became the twenty-second UNTSO soldier to be killed in action, when his jeep was blown up by a landmine during a patrol in southern Lebanon. Other Australians serving with OGL have been kidnapped and mistreated by irregular militias.

During the establishment of new peacekeeping missions, UNTSO observers have often been redeployed to provide the initial personnel needed. When the new mission has been of short duration, seconded UNTSO personnel have often remained until its conclusion. Such redeployments have resulted in Australian observers serving with UNYOM in Yemen, UNIPOM in India-Pakistan, UNEF II in the Sinai, UNIIMOG in Iran, and UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) 1960-61**

In mid-1960, the newly independent Republic of the Congo began to disintegrate as a nation state and the former colonial power, Belgium, intervened to protect the large number of Belgians remaining there. ONUC was established to assist the Congolese government restore order and supervise the withdrawal of Belgian forces. ONUC's mandate was later expanded
to include the suppression of Kantangan secessionists and grew to some 20,000 strong.

Australia did not directly contribute to ONUC as such because the UN preference was for maximum participation by African states. At various times, however, the UN notified Australian UNTSO observers to prepare for temporary redeployment. In August 1960 an Army medical team comprising a tropical medicine physician, a surgeon and a medical orderly/theatre attendant were seconded to the International Red Cross, through the Australian Red Cross, and deployed to Bakwanga in the Congo to support ONUC's efforts at national rehabilitation. Team members returned to Australia in December 1960 and February 1961.

**UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) 1962**

In early 1962, Indonesia invaded the Dutch colony of West New Guinea. Following a ceasefire agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, UNTEA was established in October 1962 to supervise the transfer of West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian colonial administration.

From 18 November to Christmas Day 1962, an Australian detachment from 16 Army Light Aircraft Squadron, comprising four Army pilots, seven RAAF groundcrew and two Sioux helicopters, joined UNTEA to assist with the conduct of a cholera eradication program. The detachment was withdrawn near the end of the program after one of the helicopters crashed.

**UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) 1963**

In July 1963, the UN established UNYOM to monitor the disengagement of Saudi Arabian and Egyptian forces from the Yemeni civil war. From 25 June to 23 November 1963, two Australian UNTSO observers were detached to UNYOM in Yemen.

**UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1964-Present**

The UN established UNFICYP in 1964 to prevent communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and since Turkey's intervention in 1974, provide a buffer force between the Turkish Army and the Greek Cypriot National Guard. UNFICYP also includes a civil police component (UNCIVPOL) to assist in providing impartial law enforcement in disputed areas.

The Australian contribution commenced with 40 policemen in May 1964 shortly after UNFICYP's inception in March. It increased to 50 in 1967 before decreasing to 38 in 1971, 34 in 1974, and 16 in 1975. In 1977 it increased again to 20 and may increase again to 32 in the near future. State police forces contributed to the contingent until 1976 by seconding members to the Commonwealth Police. Since 1976, the contingent has been manned solely by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) (as the Commonwealth Police was renamed in 1979). In March 1988; another milestone in Australian peacekeeping was reached when the first Australian policewoman began her service with UNFICYP; the contingent currently includes five policewomen.

The Army provided predeployment training at Duntroon for the first contingents and several police who have served with UNFICYP have also been Army Reservists. In July 1974, when UNFICYP was being reinforced following Turkey's intervention, Australia offered an infantry company group with associated support elements, but the offer was declined by the UN.

Three Australians have died on duty with UNFICYP: Vehicle accidents killed Sergeant Lew Thomas on 26 July 1969 and Inspector Pat Hackett on 29 August 1971. Sergeant Ian Ward was killed when his Landrover was blown up by a landmine on 12 November 1974. Chief Inspector Jack Thurgar, who had himself been wounded by mines when serving with the Army in Vietnam in 1970, was awarded the Star of Courage for rescuing a badly wounded civilian from a minefield in October 1979.

**UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) 1965-1966**

In September 1965, the UN imposed a ceasefire to end the second Indo-Pakistan war and established UNIPOM to assist UNMOGIP in supervising the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces along the India-Pakistan border. This did not include Kashmir, which remained an UNMOGIP responsibility as the ceasefire line there was in 'territory in dispute' under international law.

Lieutenant General Nimmo, the Australian CMO of UNMOGIP, was appointed acting CMO UNIPOM until a separate CMO was available. When this occurred in October 1965, UN headquarters delegated
Nimmo oversight of both missions due to their symbiotic interrelationship. Due to the short duration of UNIPOM’s task, many observers were seconded from other UN missions. Two Australian military observers were redeployed to UNIPOM from UMN OGIP, and one was redeployed from UNTSO.

Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) 1976-1979

In October 1973, the UN established UNEF II to supervise the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula. Australia offered to contribute an infantry company group mounted in APC and supporting RAAF air transport, but the UN declined the offer. Two Australian UNTSO observers however were seconded to assist with UNEF II’s establishment, and others served in support while posted to UNTSO’s Observer Group Egypt.

Australia began contributing forces in July 1976 with a 46-man detachment from 5 Squadron RAAF operating four UH1H Iroquois helicopters on six-month tours. In July 1977, the detachment became a joint RAN-RAAF operation and the Army began providing a staff officer, on a 12-month tour, to HQ UNEF. From July to December 1979 he was joined by a warrant officer. The helicopter detachment was withdrawn when UNEF II was wound down in August 1979. The Army personnel returned to Australia in December 1979 and June 1980.

Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) 1979-1980

In December 1979, the CMF was established by the Commonwealth to supervise the Lancaster House Agreement between the government of Southern Rhodesia (itself in rebellion against the UK since 1965), and the African guerilla forces of the Patriotic Front. Under the agreement, UK authority was restored over its rebellious colony, a ceasefire implemented, a general election held, and independence achieved by the new Republic of Zimbabwe. The CMF was tasked with monitoring the agreement and resembled a UN Observer Mission, except that its duties were more extensive, it had municipal legal backing, and its personnel were armed.

The Australian Army contingent comprised 152 all ranks. They arrived in Rhodesia just before Christmas 1979 and returned to Australia in mid March 1980. Australia also provided Mr K.C.O. Shann, a former Head of the Public Service Board, as the Australian member of the attached 11-nation Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) tasked with verifying the conduct of the general elections held in February 1980. An eight-member Australian National Observer Group, comprising four parliamentarians and four government officials, also observed the elections, but were not part of the CMF or COG.

The Australians were largely spread throughout the force which comprised a headquarters and three groups. The first group comprised teams monitoring the Rhodesian security forces at all levels down to company bases. The second group comprised 23 teams of one officer and nine other ranks deployed deep in the African bush on the hazardous and sensitive task of manning the rendezvous points where the guerillas were initially concentrated. Once this was completed, they were redeployed in 16 teams of one officer and 16 other ranks to monitor the assembly points where the guerillas were subsequently cantoned. The third group comprised seven border crossing teams monitoring the return of civilian refugees from neighbouring countries. One interesting aspect of the operation was the stronger than normal tendency for teams to identify with the particular group they were monitoring and senior commanders had to take strong action to preserve the force’s impartiality.

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 1982-1986 1993-Present

Australian helicopters returned to the Sinai in 1982 when the MFO was established to supervise the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Under the Accords, Israel withdrew from the Egyptian territory it had occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The MFO was created because the Soviet Union was opposed to UN participation.

Australia and New Zealand contributed to the MFO at the outset by providing the force’s rotary aviation unit. The ADF provided a joint RAN/Army/RAAF detachment comprising eight UH1H Iroquois helicopters and 89 personnel on six month tours. New Zealand contributed another two UH1H and 30 personnel. A further five Army and two RAAF officers worked at HQ MFO.

The contingent was withdrawn in April 1986 as the Government sought to significantly reduce Australia’s peacekeeping commitments. On 8 January 1993, the ADF returned to the Sinai again. A 26-strong contingent of headquarters staff and military police, on 12 month tours, rejoined the MFO following a review of the Government’s position.
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG) 1988-1990

In early August 1988, the UN established UNIMOG to supervise the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq at the end of the eight year long First Gulf War. Australia's involvement began with the temporary secondment of an observer from UNTSO, followed by a 15 man contingent from Australia four days later on 16 August. All the Australians served on the Iranian side of the ceasefire line because Iraq vetoed an Australian presence in Iraqi-held territory. This was due to an Australian Defence Department scientist, Doctor Peter Dunn, being a member of the UN team that had proved Iraqi use of chemical weapons during three inspections in the 1984-87 period.

Most Australians served on six month tours although some earlier tours were as long as ten months. On 7 November 1990, the contingent was reduced to eight as the Second Gulf War loomed, and the remaining members were withdrawn on 10 December. UNIMOG service was particularly arduous due to a combination of a volatile ceasefire, climatic extremes, harsh terrain, primitive operational conditions, and the stress and social deprivation engendered by fundamentalist Islamic fervour.

UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 1989-1990

In April 1989, the UN established UNTAG in Namibia (and to a limited extent neighbouring countries) to supervise the return of refugees, a general election, the withdrawal of South African forces, and Namibia's transition to independence. Australia had promised the UN a commitment ever since UNTAG was first planned 10 years before in 1979.

The initial Australian contingent arrived in three groups between mid March and mid April, and was rotated in three groups in early September, late September and early October 1989. The first contingent of 304 personnel comprised a Chief Engineer Works Staff, 17 Construction Squadron, and 17 Construction Squadron Workshop. The second contingent consisted of 309 personnel due to the addition of a five man military police detachment, and included one RAAF officer and 14 New Zealand personnel. Following the success of Namibia's transition to independence, the contingent was withdrawn progressively from early February 1990, with the last members departing Namibia on 9 April.

From 26 October to 20 November 1989, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) also provided an
electoral organisation expert and 27 electoral supervisors, while the AFP contributed a fingerprint expert, to assist with the conduct of the general election in early November. Three other government officials were deployed to observe the election.

The Australians were vital to the success of the mission as the Australian engineer and British signals advance parties were the only troops on the ground when the ceasefire collapsed in early April 1989. They were hurriedly redeployed to bolster a renegotiated ceasefire by supervising the withdrawal of SWAPO guerillas from Namibia. The second contingent’s engineering and local security activities were also instrumental in the successful return of thousands of refugees and the success of the general election.

First Maritime Interception Force (MIF I) 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded neighbouring Kuwait and the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 demanding Iraq withdraw. On 6 August, the Security Council imposed mandatory commercial, financial and trade sanctions on Iraq under Resolution 661. This was followed on 26 August by Resolution 665 calling on UN members to contribute to naval forces to assist in implementing the trade sanctions. Australia had anticipated Resolution 665. A RAN task group comprising HMA Ships Adelaide, Darwin and Success sailed for the Gulf of Oman on 13 August and commenced maritime peacekeeping operations on the evening of 3 September. An international naval conference on 9 September coordinated the activities of the various navies participating and the force later became known as the MIF.

The Task Group was supported by an eight-man air defence detachment from 16 AD Regt aboard HMAS Success, an RAN Logistic Support Element (LSE) established at Muscat in Oman which eventually grew to 13 strong, and a liaison officer attached to the senior US commander afloat in the area. On 3 December 1990, HMA Ships Sydney and Brisbane replaced Adelaide and Darwin. On 29 November, Resolution 678 gave Iraq six weeks to withdraw and authorised UN members to use all necessary means if Iraq failed to comply. This meant the mounting of peace restoration operations to liberate Kuwait.

By the end of December, MIF I had conducted 6,945 interceptions of merchant vessels, including 487 boardings to check for illicit cargo, and 35 ships had been diverted to non-Iraqi ports. The Australian Task Group conducted a significant share of these operations with 1,627 interrogations, 11 interceptions, eight boardings and two diversions.

Multinational Forces in Iraq-Kuwait [MNF(I-K)] 1991

The Second Gulf War began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The most important phase, the UN sanctioned peace restoration operation to liberate Kuwait, commenced with air and maritime campaigns launched in the early morning of 17 January 1991. The major land offensive followed in the early morning of 24 February. Fighting ended with a ceasefire being declared 100 hours later on the morning of 28 February, although hostilities did not officially end until 12 April 1991.

During this period, the RAN Task Group operated in the Arabian Gulf, under US Navy operational control. The ships supported the air and maritime campaigns, including escort to US Marine amphibious forces. HMAS Success was replaced by HMAS Westralia on 26 January 1991.

On 18 September 1990, two surgical support teams comprising 19 RAN and one Army personnel were deployed aboard US Navy hospital ships in the area. They were replaced by four teams comprising 23 RAN, nine Army and eight RAAF personnel on 13 January 1991, and these teams returned to Australia on 15 March 1991. Between 27 January and 9 May, the 23-strong Clearance Diving Team 3 was deployed to support maritime, and especially amphibious, operations. The team was particularly valuable in clearing Kuwaiti harbours of Iraqi mines and ordnance.

A further 18 RAN, Army and RAAF personnel served on individual exchanges with other allied land, sea and air forces. From 8 January to 19 March 1991, a 10-strong Army/RAAF intelligence detachment was also attached to the US Headquarters Central Command, and deployed in various subordinate headquarters.

In April 1991, Resolution 687 imposed a peace agreement and disarmament provisions on Iraq, and established a UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNSCOM is tasked with locating and supervising the destruction of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapon capabilities. Since late 1991, Australia has contributed between two and six ADF personnel and scientific experts, to UNSCOM on three to six month tours. Currently, two ADF personnel remain deployed to the area on such tasks.

Following the ceasefire, Resolution 688 authorised humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. Between 16 May and 16 June 1991.
a further 72 Army and 3 RAAF medical, dental, engineering and logistic personnel were deployed to Turkey and Iraq assisting Kurdish refugees.

**Second Maritime Interception Force (MIF II) 1991-Present**

Following the liberation of Kuwait, UN sanctions have continued against Iraq because it continues to disobey some Security Council Resolutions. HMAS *Westralia* remained in the Arabian Gulf supporting these sanctions and was replaced by HMAS *Darwin* in mid June 1991. In October 1991, *Darwin* was replaced by HMAS *Sydney* and the area of Australian interception operations shifted to the Red Sea. Since then, HMA Ships *Darwin* and *Canberra* have continued our participation in MIF II and HMAS *Sydney* redeployed in June 1993 for a 4-6 month tour. Up until mid March 1993, Australian ships had conducted 621 interceptions, 679 boardings and 28 diversions since the end of the Second Gulf War.

**Mision de las Naciones Unidas para del Sahara Occidental (MINURSO) 1991-Present**

Since Spain’s unilateral withdrawal from the Western Sahara territory in 1975, the Saharawi people have fiercely resisted annexation by neighbouring Morocco. From 29 July to 12 August 1990, Australia deployed an officer to the Western Sahara, with the UN reconnaissance team planning a peacekeeping mission to monitor a ceasefire, and supervise a referendum on whether the Saharawi people want independence or incorporation into Morocco. Australia has provided the mission’s 45-strong force communications unit since MINURSO was established in early September 1991. The contingent is dispersed over four areas and operates in exceptionally harsh climatic and environmental conditions. The referendum has been postponed several times and is yet to occur. On 21 June 1993, Major Susan Felsche RAAMC became the first Australian female soldier to die in a multinational peacekeeping operation when she was killed in an aircraft crash.

**UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 1991-1993**

Since Vietnam intervened in Cambodia in 1979 to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia has been wracked by a four-sided civil war. In August 1989, the UN proposed an observer mission to monitor the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and supervise an internal peace process between the four factions. From 6-22 August 1989, two Australian officers were deployed to Thailand and Cambodia on the UN reconnaissance team planning the mission. Australia also offered to provide 12 military observers, a 40-strong signals unit and minor support elements to the mission. Due to the failure of peace talks between the four factions, the mission was not established.

In late March 1992, UNTAC was established under the 1991 Paris Agreements to supervise a ceasefire and general election in Cambodia. The successful conclusion of the agreements themselves was strongly influenced by Australian diplomacy over the 1989-1991 period. UNTAC’s military component currently comprises some 16,000 personnel from 32 countries. The Force Commander of this highly demanding and complex operation from the beginning has been Australia’s Lieutenant General J.M. Sanderson AO.

In October 1991, prior to UNTAC being formally established, Australia contributed a 65-strong communications unit to its precursor, the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). On UNTAC’s establishment, the ADF contingent increased to 502 personnel, comprising the 488-strong Force Communications Unit (FCU) and 14 staff on HQ UNTAC. The FCU was originally based on the 2nd Signal Regiment, but reinforced from many other units, including 20 personnel each from the RAN and the RAAF. The FCU, which is spread out across 60 locations throughout Cambodia, is currently some 459-strong with another 45 Australians serving on HQ UNTAC. The FCU also includes a further 40 New Zealand personnel.

From 11 May to 9 September 1992, a Movement Control Group (MCG) comprising seven RAN, 16 Army and seven RAAF personnel joined UNTAC. The MCG included a headquarters and nine three-person teams, and coordinated the reception and movement of forces during UNTAC’s main deployment phase. From 15 May to 19 July 1993, Australia contributed a further 115 troops and six S70A Blackhawk helicopters, with the deployment of a squadron from 5 Aviation Regiment and an infantry platoon protection party from the 2/4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment.

On 19 May 1992, the AFP began contributing a ten-strong detachment to UNTAC’s civil police component, and this increased to 11 with the first rotation in January 1993. Since July 1992, the detachment has been deployed in Banteay Chhmar.
and Thma Pouk in far north-west Cambodia, and their efforts in one of the most lawless areas of the country have won wide praise. AEC personnel worked in Cambodia from mid 1992 until the end of July 1993 preparing for the general election. A further 44 AEC staff deployed to Cambodia between 18 May and 15 June 1993 to assist with voter registration, electoral education and the conduct of the federal election during 23-27 May 1993.

UN Protection Force in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (UNPROFOR) 1992-Present

In mid January 1992 following the outbreak of serious fighting as the Yugoslav federation disintegrated, the UN established UNMLOY (the UN Mission of Liaison Officers in Yugoslavia). This became UNPROFOR in June 1992. Australia’s involvement began from the start when Colonel J.B. Wilson, then serving as Chief-of-Staff HQ UNTSO, was seconded to command UNMLOY on 11 January 1992. Colonel Wilson, later promoted to brigadier, served as Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNPROFOR’s Observer Group until December 1992. Since then he has been UNPROFOR’s military adviser to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) established in September 1992. Three other Australian officers were among the 50 UNTSO observers temporarily redeployed to UNPROFOR in Sarajevo when it was established and served there from 13 June to 5 August 1992.

First UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) 1992-1993

In late 1990 and throughout 1991, Somalia collapsed into clan warfare and then civil war. As 1992 progressed, the civil war in Somalia worsened and the country effectively ceased to function as an organised nation state. Mass starvation and anarchy followed to such a degree that the UN judged the principle of non-intervention in a member’s internal affairs ceased to apply. Beginning tentatively in September 1992, the UN stepped in to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance and reconstitute Somalia as a functioning political, social and economic entity.

On 20 and 27 October 1992, the first 11 members of a 30-strong ADF Movement Control Unit (MCU) arrived in Somalia to help UNOSOM I cope with the influx of assigned forces. The remaining 19 MCU personnel deployed on 7 January 1993.


By late 1992, the catastrophic situation in Somalia had outstripped the UN’s ability to quickly restore peace and stability, mainly because the UN was hamstrung in dealing with the need to apply limited force, and by its increasingly outmoded peacekeeping doctrine. On 3 December 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 794 authorised a coalition of UN members, led by the USA, to form UNITAF and intervene to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance and restore peace. Australian participation was requested on 8 December and approved on 15 December 1992. Australia contributed a 937-strong battalion group based on the First Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment and B Squadron Third/Fourth Cavalry Regiment. Other elements included the Command and Liaison Group from 107 Field Battery who provided the contingent’s civil military liaison teams, a field engineer troop from 17 Field Squadron, five communications detachments from the 103rd Signal Squadron, a communications detachment from the 126th Signal Squadron, a detachment from the 126th Electronic Warfare Squadron, a counter-intelligence detachment from the First Division Intelligence Company, and a company-sized Battalion Support Group (BSG) from the Third Brigade Administrative Support Battalion and the First Military Police Company. The contingent was supported by HMAS Tobruk operating off the Somali coast.

The initial advance party arrived in Somalia on 21 December 1992 and the main body arrived in Somalia in two groups on 15 January and 18 January 1993. From 19 January to 14 May 1993, the battalion group operated the 17,000 square km Baidoa Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS) in southwestern Somalia. The battalion group was very successful at fostering and protecting humanitarian relief efforts: and won widespread international praise for its efforts at restoring law and order, and re-establishing functioning legal, social and economic systems. On 2 April 1993, Lance Corporal Shannon McAliney RA Inf was accidentally shot dead on patrol during these operations.

Second UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) 1993 Present

On 5 May 1993, UNITAF handed over to a reinforced UNOSOM II. The Australian battalion group served for ten days under UNOSOM II before being
withdrawn progressively to Australia over the period 9-20 May.\(^{15}\) The MCU supporting UNOSOM I remained to support UNOSOM II. On 16 March 1993, three more ADF members joined HQ UNOSOM II and a further three joined in June 1993.\(^{13}\)

In May 1993, the AFP redeployed a senior officer from UNBRO in Thailand to Somalia as Senior Civil Police Adviser to the Commander UNOSOM II.\(^{40}\)

### Other UN Operations

Australia has also provided personnel and resources to the UN for diplomatic, judicial, military, scientific, humanitarian and law enforcement tasks related to, or in support of, peacekeeping activities.

**UN Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB).** From 1947-52 Australia provided a special diplomatic representative to UNSCOb assist its deliberation on the border dispute between Greece and its then communist neighbours, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.\(^{14}\) Australia did not provide military observers due to reservations about this being allowed by the UN Security Council Resolution establishing UNSCOb.

**UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).** In 1948, UNCIP was established to investigate and report on the situation in Kashmir and to mediate in the dispute between India and Pakistan. A major attempt at formal diplo-judicial mediation occurred from April to September 1950, when a justice of the Australian High Court, Sir Owen Dixon, was the UN mediator. No resolution resulted due to a refusal by India to accept unfavourable results.\(^{15}\)

**UN Headquarters Logistic Support Advisor.** During 1983, the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary General for the Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities (OFOESA), Doctor James Jonah, visited Australia to discuss UNTAG planning. He was so impressed with Australian methods and preparedness he requested an Australian officer be attached to his staff in new York.\(^{16}\) From September 1983 to March 1987, Australia provided a military communications and logistics adviser to UN headquarters to help the UN reorganise and reform its administrative support to peacekeeping operations.\(^{17}\) Many of the reforms proposed were blocked by bureaucratic and diplomatic inertia.\(^{18}\)

**UN Chemical Warfare Investigation Team.** During 1984, 1986 and 1987, Australia provided a scientific expert, Doctor Peter Dunn, to the UN Secretary General's four-man team investigating chemical weapon use during the first Gulf War.\(^{19}\)

Considerable personal risk, the team was instrumental in proving chemical weapon use by Iraq.\(^{20}\)

**UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO).** In mid-February 1989, Australia began to provide two AFP personnel to UNBRO on 12 month tours.\(^{21}\) The worked as part of a five-man security liaison team, operating with the Thai Army elements responsible for maintaining law and order in the UNBRO-sponsored refugee camps on the Thailand-Cambodia border. They also trained Cambodian camp guards in basic police functions. Australian participation ended in May 1993 when the refugees were repatriated to Cambodia.\(^{22}\)

**UN Mine Clearance Training Team (UNMCTT).** Beginning on 16 July 1989, Australia began providing nine Army field engineers on four month tours with the UNMCTT.\(^{23}\) In early March 1990, the contingent was reduced to six, but increased to seven in January 1991,\(^{24}\) and to nine again in December 1991.\(^{25}\) The UNMCTT, originally comprising contingents from nine countries but with only Australia remaining by 1992, conducts Operation Salam, a humanitarian activity mounted under the auspices of the Geneva-based UN Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA).

The original purpose was to train Pakistan-based Afghan refugees in mine and ordinance recognition, and basic clearance techniques. In January 1991, this broadened to include the planning and supervision of mine clearance activities in Afghanistan;\(^{26}\) however, the team was never part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan (UNGOMAP). Since 1991, three Australians have also been attached to UNOCA forward headquarters in Pakistan, and associated elements, on 12 month tours.\(^{27}\) By the time the last team was withdrawn on 12 July 1993, ten Australian teams had deployed since 1989.\(^{28}\) In July 1993, Australia announced it would also withdraw from HQ UNOCA in December 1993.\(^{29}\)

### Conclusion

At the strategic level, Australia's strong support for multinational peacekeeping has been an excellent means of contributing to world peace in a practical and achievable manner. At the tactical level, multinational peacekeeping has provided the ADF and AFP with considerable operational experience and, just as importantly, the professionalism displayed has been of significant practical humanitarian benefit for victims of the conflicts concerned.
In early 1993, Australia had nearly 2,000 ADF and AFP personnel deployed in seven UN and three other multinational peacekeeping operations. Following the withdrawal from UNITAF in Somalia this figure was halved and it will halve again as UNTAC winds down on schedule in late 1993.

Australia's record of 19 UN and six other multinational peacekeeping operations is one of which Australians can be justifiably proud. While Australia's geostrategic circumstances have meant the size of many of our commitments have often been nowhere near as large as some other UN members, Australia's record features a longevity, quality and degree of commitment matched by few other countries.

In particular, Australia can be especially proud of contributing to the harder and more dangerous operations in Korea, Lebanon, Kuwait, Sarajevo and Western Sahara and Cambodia. As the ADF prepares for a possible to UNOMOZ in Mozambique, the campaign medal, "in the service of peace", scored by the phrase embossed on every UN campaign medal, "in the service of peace".

NOTES

1. The USA's Sinai Support Mission (SSM) 1976-82 and the British naval blockade of Beira during the Rhodesian rebellion, both underwritten by UN Security Council sanctions, are the only two known exceptions. The self-styled Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka was Indian intervention and not a genuine peacekeeping function.

2. Collective security arrangements, such as the UN, OAS, and OAU are intended to deal with peace as an indivisible entity, whereby all members agree in advance to deter and prevent aggression among members through the collective action of the remainder.

3. Collective defence arrangements, such as NATO, FPDA, and ANZUS, are intended for self defence against outsiders not as a general system for keeping the peace. They can be used to conduct peacekeeping but only if it is underwritten by a collective security arrangement.

4. Common security arrangements, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), are multilateral to assist confidence building measures, arms control, disarmament, and security issues generally.

5. These figures are from the author's research over some years. No definitive published list exists.

6. Professor Alan James, one of the few internationally acknowledged academic experts on peacekeeping, considers there is a distinction between primary peacekeeping where peace is forcibly kept, and secondary peacekeeping where help is provided voluntarily with a view to peace being better secured. Professor Alan James, Peacekeeping and Keeping the Peace in Review of International Studies, Volume 15, Number 4, October 1989, p.373.

7. As the most recent example, UNPROFOR's UN mandate has already changed eight times.


10. ibid, pp.140-143.

11. ibid. p.142.

12. loc cit.

13. Much UN peacekeeping history (and doctrine) has been written by a self-selected group who appear to have consciously excluded peacekeeping operations where their country was not represented.

14. Previous UN special commissions, such as UNCOM in the Falklands, has only utilised diplomatic personnel and not involved a significant monitoring role in the field.

15. See for example, The Blue Helmets, op cit. which does not include UNCI, while Rikhye et al, op cit. (among many others) does.


17. Despite a marked lack of cooperation from India since 1971. A significant contradiction from a country with such strongly pros­essed support for the UN!

18. Discussions with Doctor W.J. Hudson, Editor of Historical Documents, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on 10 and 15 November 1989.

19. loc cit.

20. A separate biographical article on Nimmo is due for publication shortly.

21. The last Australian in UMMOGIP was Major J.A. Zaharias.

22. See for example adverse press comment in The Herald (Melbourne), Thursday 16 May 1985, p.3 and The Age (Melbourne), Thursday 16 May 1983, p.8. The withdrawal may also have been motivated by strong diplomatic pressure from India which wants UMMOGIP's mandate terminated but cannot request this without exposing to charges of hypocrisy. The Indians knew that UMMOGIP operational effectiveness would be severely curtailed without the Australians, as they were the only native English speakers and the only Commonwealth country represented in the Mission (see for example Rikhye et al p.270). This was exacerbated by high level Australian ignorance concerning peacekeeping in general, and UMMOGIP in particular, at the time. A good example was when the then Foreign Minister visited the contingent in 1984. Not only was this the first visit to the contingent by a senior Australian political or military figure, but he appeared very poorly briefed, asking the senior Australian "how many people have you got here?" and even asking one Australian observer "how long have you been with UNICEF?" Discussions with Major G.S. Nicholas on 15 October 1986.


25. loc cit.

26. Canada and Turkey committed more ground forces, but the overall Australian commitment was larger. See Doctor Robert O'Neill "Australia in the Korean War" Combat Operations, Volume II, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1985, Appendix G.

29. While The Blue Helmets, op cit. excludes all three Korean operations, other UN publications such as Basic Facts About The United Nations, UN, New York, 1989, pp. 47-49, include them. The exclusion of UNCOF from The Blue Helmets is especially outrageous as UNCOF even meets all current (post 1971) UN criteria for peacekeeping missions.
30. Australian Embassy Seoul Cablegram O.SE23316 of 1000 hours 5 Sep 90.
31. Advice from International Policy Branch, Department of Defence (Central Office), and International Organisations Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on 12 April 1990. Cablegram O.SE23316, loc cit.
33. Discussions with Major N.C. James (RL) on 26 July 93.
35. Lieutenant Colonel K.D. Howard RFD ED.
36. In the late 1970s, before the UN changed the rules for UN medals, Australian UNTSO observers seconded to UNIFIL and UNDOF were also entitled to the campaign ribbons for those missions. Four qualified for UNIFIL and another twelve for UNDOF. Discussions with Major A.F. Monaghan (Military Secretary’s Office) on 2 May 90.
37. Howard, op cit. Lieutenant Colonel Howard served with UNTSO from 28 May to 16 July 1977. He was Deputy Chief-of-Staff at HQ UNTSO for his last four years, including several long periods as acting Chief-of-Staff, and was acting CMO from August to December 1975.
38. Department of Defence (Central Office) Ministerial Briefing Minute SPFD 84/40315 dated 21 April 1986 (Army Office File 86-23844(1)); and a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister dated 16 December 1986 (Army Office File 86-23844(3)).
39. Major L.A. Lynch was the last Australian observer in OGB. Discussions with Colonel I.N. Turner (RL) then Director of Operations – Army, on 14 May 1990; and discussions with Majors L. Tranter, F.E.G. O’Brien and L.A. Lynch on 17 May 1990.
40. I.N. Turner, loc cit. HQADF Ministerial Briefing Minute CDF7/22/1986 dated 15 October 1986 (Army Office File A85-23844(4)).
45. Captain C.M. Burns served with UNIMOG from 12 August to 11 September 1988. Discussions with Captain C.M. Burns on 9 May 90.
48. N.C. James, loc cit.
49. The doctor, Captain F.N. Dwyer, and the theatre attendant Warrant Officer Class Two J.A. Acol were from ARA. The surgeon, Major B.W. Fox, was a Reservist on leave without pay. Dwyer returned early in December 1960 because of a death in the family. Discussions with Captain F.N. Dwyer (RL) on 26 Jul 93. CARO File 3/101834 Major B.W. Fox.
53. loc cit.
56. Eaton, loc cit.
59. DGOP-A Presentation to Command and Staff College 1982.
60. Platypus, op cit. p. 4.
61. loc cit.
63. ibid. p. 164, Copeman, loc cit.
64. The Blue Helmets, op cit. p. 431.
65. Copeman, loc cit.
66. DGOP-A Presentation to Command and Staff College 1982.
67. Howard, loc cit.
70. Discussions with Warrant Officer Class Two C.P. McLindon on 19 Mar 90.
71. Major McGee was posted to UNTSO for his last six month tour.
72. The contingent arrived in two groups on 23 and 25 December 79. 152 Rhodesia campaign medals were awarded but a few
man reconnaissance party also deployed 23-30 December 1979 (Army Office File MS67-3(R1)). Discussions with Brigadier F.K. Cole on 16 Nov 89 and Major B.J. Agnew on 14 May 90.


74. loc cit.


77. Discussions with Wing Commander R.S. Neilson on 28 Feb 90.

78. loc cit.


80. Flying operations ceased on 31 March 1986. The contingent was withdrawn because the left wing of the Australian Labour Party was opposed to the MFO because the mission was effectively undertaken by the USA.


82. Captain C.M. Burns served with UNIMOG from 12 August to 11 September 1988 at both Group Headquarters in Tehran, and at the Iranian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) demarcating what was to become the ceasefire line. Discussions with Captain C.M. Burns on 9 May 90.

83. Army Operations Room Diary — ASC UNIMOG.

84. Discussions with Doctor Peter Dunn on 25 October 89. Major S.D. Meekin on 9 November 89, Lieutenant Colonel J.M. Hawley on 27 February 90, and author's experience as SO2 (Ops) DGOP-A.

85. Author's experience as SO2(Ops) DGOP-A.

86. Army Operations Room Diary — ASC UNIMOG.

87. Army Operations Room Diary — ASC UNTAG.

88. loc cit.

89. loc cit.

90. loc cit.

91. Mr M.C. Maley, who was also later seconded to UNTAC in Cambodia.

92. Including Mr Colin Ball, a previous AEC Commissioner, on secondment to the AEC from the Tasmanian Electoral Office. Discussions with Mr B.D. Paterson, Personnel Section, AEC, on 6 Aug 93.

93. Author's experience as SO2(Ops) DGOP-A.

94. Two from DFAT and one from PM&C Paterson, loc cit.

95. Discussions with Colonel R.D. Warren and Lieutenant Colonel K.W. Pippard on 15 Sep 90, and author's experience as SO2(Ops) DGOP-A.


98. Discussions with Captain G.J. Reynolds on 9 August 93.


100. Commander A.W. Flint served as liaison officer to the Commander US Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNACENT) from 2 September 1990 to 14 February 1991, when he was relieved by Commander L. Pulakc who served until the position was discontinued in May 1991. See "RAN Liaison Officers in the Gulf" in Australia's Navy 1991-92, op cit. p. 34.


103. Figures for 3 September 1990 to 17 January, provided by Maritime Headquarters on 28 June 1993, and extracted from the Reports of Proceedings of the ships involved over this period.


110. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel C.L. Vagi CSC on 7 Dec 92.

111. AD/CC Diary - Operation Blazer.


113. Post Operation Report - Operation Habitat. op cit. p. 3 and Annex B.

114. Detail provided by Maritime Headquarters on 28 June 1993 and extracted from the Reports of Proceedings of the ships involved over this period.

115. loc cit.

116. loc cit.

117. loc cit.

118. loc cit. The figures cover the period 27 February 2992 to 12 March 1993.


121. Land Headquarters Operations Room Diary - ASC MINURSO.

122. Author's experience as SO2(Ops) DGOP-A during this period and discussions with Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Stuart in September 1989.

124. Author’s experience as SO2(Ops) DGOP-A during this period.

125. The framework for the agreement was Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal, AGPS, Canberra, 1990, (known as the “Red Book” after the colour of its cover). This was a working paper prepared by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, with technical advice from the Department of Defence, for a meeting of the Cambodian factions in Jakarta in late February 1990.

126. HQ UNTAC Deployment Chart dated 4 January 1993 issued to the author during a staff visit in mid January 1993.

127. Land Headquarters Operations Room Diary - ASC UNTAC.

128. Land Headquarters Operations Room Diary - ASC UNTAC.

129. In January 1993 FCU personnel were drawn from six RAN, 63 Army, four RAAF, and four NZ units. Brief to the author by CO ASC UNTAC, Lieutenant Colonel M.W. Studdert, during a staff visit on 16 January 1993.

130. Land Headquarters Operations Room Diary - ASC UNTAC.

131. Studdert, loc cit.

132. Land Headquarters Operations Room Diary - ASC UNTAC.

133. Studdert, loc cit. Land Headquarters Operations Room Diary - ASC UNTAC.


136. Eaton, loc cit.

137. The additional member was the result of Superintendent Bill Kirk being appointed Officer-in-Charge of the Special Investigations Task Force into allegations of human rights abuses. Eaton, loc cit.

138. During a staff visit to Cambodia in mid January, the author was advised on several occasions by a wide variety of UN personnel and diplomats, that the AFP contingent was the only really effective part of UNTAC’s large civil police component.

139. Four were directly seconded and three took leave without pay between 13-15 June. Patterson, loc cit.

140. 26 left Cambodia on 2 June 1993 and the remaining 18 were attached in August 1993. Mansfield, joined HQ L’NOCA on 3 September 1991 and was still attached in August 1993.


142. Wilson, op cit. His title was Head of Mission UNMLOY and he arrived in theatre 15 January 1993.

143. loc cit.

144. loc cit.

145. See footnote 46.


148. ADFCC Diary - ASC UNOSOM I.


150. loc cit.


152. loc cit.


158. The Baidoa HRS was handed over to French UNOSOM II troops on 14 May. Operation Solace — An Analysis of Infantry Battalion Security Operations, loc cit. Annex C.

159. ADFCC Diary - ASC UNOSOM II.


161. Rikhye et al, op cit. p. 144

162. Hudson, loc cit.

163. Army Office File A85-13741 and discussions with Colonel N.R. Bergin (RL) on 9 November 89.

164. Army Office File A85-13741.

165. Bergin, loc cit.


167. Dunn, loc cit.


170. Author’s experience as SO2(Ops) DGOP-A during this period.

171. Army Operations Room Diary - ASC UNTAC.

172. Discussions with Major S.L. Uebergang on 16 August 93. The tenth and last team was ten-strong due to the addition of a medical NCO.


174. One Australian has been attached to Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) since January 1991 and another one to the Mine Clearance Planning Authority (MCPA) since 24 September 1991. A further officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Mansfield, joined HQ UNOCA on 3 September 1991 and was still attached in August 1993. Uebergang, loc cit.

175. loc cit.

176. loc cit.

Communicators in Cambodia

By Lieutenant Colonel S.H. Ayling.

Introduction

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) participation in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia during the initial United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the subsequent United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Mission have been well reported in the media, and undoubtedly related and explained in depth to friends and colleagues by returning personnel. There was considerable involvement from the three Services, and most certainly from the Australian Army where most Corps were represented and a wide variety of personnel deployed from many different units.

The ADF commitment was diverse and ranged from 40 personnel during UNAMIC, to over 500 during UNTAC. While the primary task was the provision of the UNTAC Force Communications Unit (FCU) which developed from the original UNAMIC contingent, the commitment also included members of the Headquarters UNTAC military staff, and at various times a Movement Control Group, a Military Police Group, and more recently an Aviation Squadron equipped with Blackhawk helicopters. The FCU included Royal New Zealand Defence Force personnel and as such was a significant combined and joint unit which was definitely unique in both composition and tasking.

In addition to the Units and personnel which made up the contingent, the UNTAC Military Component Force Commander was LTGEN Sanderson. His steady hand and clear guidance was evident throughout the overall Mission as the peace process progressed through a succession of difficult times. The objective of providing democratic opportunities for the ordinary people of Cambodia to elect representatives of their own choice for the interim Government remain the focus.

Despite the background to the operation, and whatever the future for Cambodia, the Australian involvement in the Cambodian peacekeeping missions were remarkable in concept and in effect. Personnel who were deployed gained self confidence and satisfaction through their determination and achievements. Those who remained behind in their units can gain reassurance that the training and preparedness that they have received during their careers under the peace time constraints of the ADF is excellent as was demonstrated by the performance of their colleagues. Pride is the long term gain of the Cambodian commitment.

This article will necessarily focus on the FCU because of my appointment as Commanding Officer from 10 March until 14 December 1993. During this time, I was also the Australian Contingent Commander and the Chief Signals Officer on the HQ UNTAC staff.

Preparation

FCU’s unique nature had its origins in the requirement to design a communications unit to support the perceived command and control demands of the UNTAC military component consisting of 12 infantry battalions in a total force of some 16,000. The military communications system would support a single layer of command and control until the completion of the planned cantonment and demobilisation, of the four faction’s armies by which time a commercial communication system would be installed and fully operational. The commercial system incorporating the latest satellite and switchboard technology would then support the expected heavy telephone and facsimile communications demands of the seven UNTAC components during the voter registration and election phases.

To meet this requirement, the FCU incorporated 10 separate troop-sized communications nodes to match the military sectors, and organised into two communications squadrons together with an administration support squadron. The manpower requirement was determined to provide the necessary balance of communications trades and service support in each location. The equipment requirements were determined simultaneously, with the demanding production of a Single Entitlement Document to summarise the bill.

Planning was based on a concept of communications which was developed simultaneously by our-
selves on the basis of general command and control requirements identified by the UNTAC planning team which had been grouped by the UN in Bangkok. The concept comprised five separate phases of development for the communications system. Commencing with the UNAMIC system and concluding with the OTC-contracted system which we largely installed and then operated in its entirety. The UNTAC planning team estimated that 585 personnel were required to complete the FCU responsibilities, while we were allowed 495 ADF personnel and 40 RNZDF personnel to complete the task. The Kiwis were grouped into two communications troops to bolster the number of Signals operators and technicians which were available in addition to the very capable regimental signallers.

The allocation of communicators was further reduced with the inclusion of the Australian Contingent requirements for the variety of necessary support functions. These comprised the housekeeping functions of finance and pay; public relations; movements; military police and SIB; comprehensive medical support including the RMO, a six-bed ward in addition to pharmaceutical, hygiene and malarial research expertise; field engineer and limited construction capacity; chaplaincy and philanthropy catering and an Australian Forces Post Office. Possible requirements for legal and psychological support were allocated on an as required basis with deployment occurring from Australia when necessary.

Preparation of the FCU for actual deployment occurred in three separate locations using a training package developed at 2 Signal Regiment. It incorporated expert advice and assistance from Army and ADF training schools in addition to coordination from Headquarters Training Command. Training was conducted simultaneously at 2 Signal Regiment in Melbourne, 5/7 RAR in Holsworthy and by the RNZDF in New Zealand. Their training included trade training to reach a common standard of proficiency among all tradesmen, and specialist trade training designed to focus on the particular requirements perceived to be necessary for the Cambodian environment. All arms training was conducted covering first aid and preventative medical procedures, mine awareness skills, and weapons training on the Steyr. Familiarisation with the Cambodian customs and culture occurred, including the important political and historical background as to why we were to deploy. We worked hard to generate an early respect for the Cambodian people and their right to enjoy some of the individual freedoms which we, unfortunately tend to take for granted. This was an important focus for the families and loved ones of the contingent personnel and provided some reassurance in addition to the understandable concerns expressed usually in terms.
CPL Kneebone and his off-sider operated the FCU water purifying equipment at Stoeng Treng which provided fresh water to the FCU signal troop, in addition to the Uruguayan infantry battalion and other UNTAC elements. The Local Khmers were also daily customers for the best water in Cambodia. The water was drawn from the Mekong River.

of “why are you going, for how long, and will you be safe?”.

I was fortunate to have a complete weeks recon­naissance to Cambodia to visit the UNAMIC contin­gent in late January 1992 and was able to address the families and loved ones of the UNTAC contingent to reassure them that in my opinion we were well trained and would be safe. Despite the exaggerated fears of mines and the Khmer Rouge which existed; life was proceeding relatively comfortably for the average Cambodian. These fears outweighed the unknowns of a 12 month separation from home at this early stage, although the pressures were recognised by others who had served operational tours in Vietnam. In this regard I am forever grateful to MAJ­GEN Blake, the Land Commander, who directed that our two periods of rest and recreation outside Cambodia would be exclusive of travel time, and maximised to allow time with families and friends.

Deployment

The deployment of personnel and equipment occurred over a phased period from April to June 1992 until the FCU was at full strength. We were faced with rapidly expanding demands for communications in Cambodia from all seven components of UNTAC. There was little time for acclimatisation and rehearsals on arrival, as the troops were deployed up country after two weeks in Phnom Penh to support the military sector headquarters and the military observers on the crossing points on the Cambodian borders with Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. Our stores and equipment arrived initially on UN-chartered Russian aircraft and then by ship into the port of Sihanoukville. The planned arrival dates for these deployments were constantly a mystery to us until the particular aircraft or the ship actually arrived. At one stage the aircraft crew stopped flying because they had not been paid, nor had sufficient credit to be refuelled en route! Our OC Admin Squadron and logistics expert MAJ Mal McGough performed feats of wizardry in the reception and delivery of these stores and equipment to the FCU camp in Phnom Penh.

The FCU was eventually deployed in 55 different locations to provide the third phase of the communications support plan. The requirement for a military tactical communications system had expanded to six distinct layers: sector HQ, provincial capitals, district capitals, border crossing points, deployed electoral component teams and Liaison Officers deployed in
The Land Commander MAJGEN Blake inspects the FCU guard at Pteah Australii during his visit to the Contingent in October 1992. He is escorted by LTCOL Steve Ayling.
the neighbouring countries. Single man detachments were deployed to the very isolated and pressured border crossing points and with UNTAC Liaison Officers in Hanoi, Vientiane, Bangkok and U-Tapeo (a point of entry in southern Thailand). Three-man detachments were located in each provincial capital except those which were also military sector headquarters where a Troop HQ of generally 10 personnel were located. Isolated radio relay repeater detachments providing a five repeater link between Battambang and Phnom Penh together with a Squadron HQ in Battambang were in the west of the country; the remainder of the FCU was in Phnom Penh.

Our showpiece was the main Phnom Penh barracks known as Pteah Australii (or home of the Australians) which had been an officer cadet training school and an infantry training school. When we were given approval for its use (in a special declaration by Prince Sihanouk to the Secretary General of the UN as a measure of the complete support of the Cambodian Government for UNTAC) it was inhabited by squatters and offered a very dubious nightly gambling show. When the squatters were moved out by the Cambodian Army, they promptly removed all of the moveable door and window fittings as well as most of the trees in retribution, leaving six empty shells of permanent building. By the time of my departure it had 45 permanent and prefabricated buildings and had consumed over US$250,000 of UNTAC funds.

Communications Concept

The provision of the communications support for UNTAC was developed over five consecutive phases on the basis of a communications concept determined prior to deployment.

Phase 1: November 1991-February 1992, initial UNAMIC system comprising detachments in Phnom Penh and five other locations (Battambang, Siem Reap, Pailin, Phum Ku and Banteah Meanrith);

Phase 2: February-April 1992, expanded UNAMIC system adding Kompong Thom and a operational reverse detachment which was deployed almost continuously for cantonment reconnaissance tasks;

Phase 3: April-September 1992, UNTAC military system comprising ADF tactical communications facilities with some commercial equipment from Phnom Penh to over 50 communications nodes;

Phase 4: September-December 1992, transition from the military system to the OTC contract system, which increased demands on the FCU to include training and extensive installation support for the OTC system and

Phase 5: December 1992-November 1993, the OTC contract system, based on a core of demand assigned satellite services through the Indonesian Palapa satellite system down to provincial capital level, and reduced capacity HF radio and VSAT satellite services down to district capital level and other UNTAC locations.

The concept comprised five complementary means of communication to meet the command and control demands of each of the UNTAC components. The approach introduced easily understood civilian-oriented communications terminology to gain the confidence of the extreme variety of personnel in UNTAC. The concept also introduced levels of capacity for each means of communication to accommodate the variety of facilities provided, and the significant expansion planned under the UN contracted phase five communications. The means of communications and indicative levels were:

- Radio: single channel UHF, VHF and HF radio totalling over 60 different nets with provincial and country coverage;
- Message: provided through telex (telegraph) services to any of 24 communication centres, or by facsimile. The phase 5 system introduced an extensive facsimile service, whereas the Phase 3 system relied on telex as the high capacity means of communications;
- Telephone: services were expanded from an initial 24 extension system in HQ UNAMIC to a massive 5000 subscriber country-wide network which included cellular services in Phnom Penh and pay phones in each provincial capital;
- Courier: a country-wide air dispatch service was established during Phase 3 which delivered to 50 different locations of a three times weekly schedule (provincial capitals) or a once weekly schedule (border crossing points). Also, a Phnom Penh local service operated to 40 different UNTAC locations within the city. Limited local courier services were also operated within provincial capitals. The country-wide courier used a dedicated MI 17 helicopter;

Data: a basic service was established during Phase 3 to allow the physical transfer of computer disks using the courier system and was expanded for modem-based usage for individual staff and through communication centres for other users.

The communications established during phases 3, 4 and 5 were of immense magnitude and complexity. They were certainly well beyond anything which had ever been achieved by ADF personnel using in-service tactical communications equipment during Phase
3. It definitely broached new ground when the latest commercial equipment was introduced during Phase 4. The development and success of the communications support was a credit to the Operations Staff of the FCU who planned and conveyed the detail in numerous operations and fragmentary orders, and all ranks who controlled, operated, maintained and supported the system including the development of close liaison with the numerous military and civilian users. The readiness of all personnel to learn new skills and overcome all sorts of unpredictable constraints and limitations was commendable. In particular, the regimental signallers who assumed responsibility for the operation of HF telex (HF RATT) services at provincial capitals were a credit to their Corps.

### Organisation

Organisation of the FCU was altered to meet the expanding demands of the communications system and the activity levels of UNTAC. This gained momentum once the Electoral Component commenced detailed preparation for voter registration, and the Civil Administration and Police components established a permanent presence in provincial capitals and the numerous district capitals. This evolution was necessary but was not without some disturbance to the squadron and troop commanders who had to contend with change, and was of great impact on the Quarter Master and his staff who managed to keep up with the complexities of the accounting system on the very overworked AUTO Q system for some 30 different sub-accounts. Initially, a third communication squadron was created to support the demands in Phnom Penh itself and the installation requirements of the Phase 5 system. Additional signal troops were formed once communications were being extended to district capital level.

Needless to say, all levels of command were required to function without direct supervision and well above the usual level of responsibilities experienced back in Australia. The troops were based in UNTAC military sectors which comprised within a single Cambodian province, or up to four separate provinces in the eastern part of the country. The troops also commanded the border crossing points where a single FCU operator minded the Observer Party of up to five officers of different nationalities. Those operators who served on the border crossing points had to contend with isolation and were rotated back to the troop location on a monthly basis depending on the relative difficulty of the location.

Very tough going in some locations, and the men always appreciated the weekly delivery of mail and other treats. The RSM usually carried some fresh meat for barbecuing courtesy of the WO Caterer, and a few cans of beer. I particularly enjoyed visiting the three-man provincial capital detachments where the full range of communications were maintained for the civil administration provincial director and the collocated staffs of the other components. The detachments established excellent working arrangements through mutual respect and cooperation, and outwardly displayed their professional initiative and self confidence in their work. They became invaluable parts of the UNTAC team, and were often used for advice and assistance in all sorts of situations. Provincial Directors regularly sought me out during their visits to Phnom Penh to praise their FCU personnel and to complain if a rotation of personnel had been planned.

Another detachment worthy of mention provided the critical radio relay repeater on top of a high peak just south of the entrance to the Tongle Sap (central lake). They shared the peak with a Cambodian communicator and his family and converted the bare concrete shell of a building into a working and living accommodation for a six-month period. Cheerful and contented, these technicians enjoyed their isolation, and certainly the coolest temperatures in the whole country.

We adopted a team approach to the completion of the tasks in both progressing the communications system through five phases, and the successful functioning of the FCU with the myriad of inter-related functions and individual portfolios which made the contingent work. We all had a part to play and had to use our particular professional strengths to the full so as to not let others down or to be a burden on the Unit.

### Service Support

The initiative and dedication of the FCU communicators was complemented and matched by the support staff in Administration Squadron. The Squadron included the whole range of personnel and logistic support, and represented the powerhouse of the Unit. Their support ranged well beyond the expected unit first line functions. It included everything from complete direct unit purchasing to major construction contracts with local firms, huge financial transactions and innovative base type repair on equipment and sick personnel. The requirement existed because UNTAC
CPL Fraser and his detachment provided communications support to the UNTAC Provincial Director and staff at Mondol Kiri City in the rugged NE of the country. Pictured with some French and Malaysian UNMOs, CPL Fraser gained a reputation for his language skills.

CPL Johnstone with a Malaysian UNMO at Phum Kulen in the central north of the country. Johno subsequently deployed to the very remote border crossing point at Sok Sann on the Thailand border in the heart of Khmer Rouge territory.

CPL Quinn and his detachment provided communications support to an UNMO team at Pailin during the initial UNAMIC deployment. Pailin in the SW of Cambodia was controlled by the Khmer Rouge, who severely restricted the local movement of the detachment. SIG Jamie Ferguson on the right was the first FCU soldier to be under heavy artillery and mortar fire when he was later deployed to Phum Kulen.
logistic and personnel services were extremely slow to establish themselves and were hampered by the excessive delays in contract and purchase approvals by UNTAC Administration. Bold and aggressive action was required and provided, which kept the FCU functioning smoothly. This was particularly critical for the deployed detachments who could only depend on support from Phnom Penh.

Pteah Australii was home to about 250 personnel and temporary lodging for the up country personnel during their stays in Phnom Penh. The importance of the 2 Kay Club (for kangaroos and kiwis), and both the Officers’ and Sergeants’ Messes in establishing a regimental fabric of life of familiar comfort to all cannot be emphasised enough. These traditions which may seem out of date in Australian society were proven critical to the well being and morale of all ranks in a protracted deployment: 12 months was the average, with the balance of the UNAMIC originals completing almost 14 months away from home.

We all found that separation with separation from our families and friends was very difficult and something which had not been expected. The separation had unfortunately been a contributing factor towards the high percentage of breakdowns in relationships both during the deployment and on return. The quiet comfort of the chat in the Padre’s office and our Sunday Church service, in addition to the friendliness of the Hop In Centre all assisted in this regard. While not a regular church attender in Australia, I did enjoy the Sunday morning routine of church. The Padre was limited to half an hour which included three generally rousing hymns, and was enough to take your mind off things for a short while.

I also conducted a CO’s Hour after church each week in order to bring all ranks in Phnom Penh up to date on events in UNTAC and the political situation in Cambodia. I remained adamant that both good and not so good news should be delivered personally and that people had to be aware of what was happening with the peace process. After all, it was why we were in Cambodia. It was also a good opportunity to congratulate the 25 or so new fathers who had to celebrate the birth of children away from home, and announce promotions in rank. Sports results rated highly in our link with home and the time was used to learn of ladder changes after the weekend matches.

The critical lesson throughout the deployment was that we all must be good at personal communications. This is essential both within the Unit and even more so back to loved ones who had to shoulder the burdens at home without the thrill of professional satisfaction. My view remains that everyone must be made to feel special and not to be taken for granted, whether it is from the CO to the soldier deployed in terrible conditions on the Laos border or from the individual to his wife or girlfriend at home. The pressures of a protracted deployment are significant, but they can be overcome with a positive approach to business.

**Customs and Culture**

The ordinary Cambodian people are friendly towards Australians, hard working and genuinely concerned for the future livelihood of their families. We all developed a respect for them during the deployment and felt a sense of pride in the hard won successes that UNTAC was having in the country. Particularly with the emptying of the refugee camps on the Thai border and the conduct of free elections, the service with UNTAC brought a sense of achievement and fulfillment in doing something worthwhile.

Our first experience had been with the Cambodian community of Melbourne prior to deployment, and this followed with interaction on a mostly daily basis in all locations throughout the country. Most personnel developed passable colloquial Khmer language skills, although the Cambodians were generally faster at learning English than we were at Khmer. Our locally employed staff were instrumental in introducing FCU soldiers to the customs and culture.

All ranks were actively encouraged to visit the temples of Angkor Wat just outside Siem Riap and to marvel at the splendour and workmanship which was created some 900 years ago. Those who visited the lovely temple of Banteah Srei on one of CPL Williams’ tours will never forget the fine stone carvings of figures and images from the past. The personnel deployed in small detachments up country naturally had closer interaction with the local Cambodians and outwardly developed an affinity with the country and its customs and culture more quickly than those in Phnom Penh. It is a very beautiful place, and will hopefully find lasting peace and political stability in the period after UNTAC has finished. The ordinary people of Cambodia deserve it.

**The Lessons**

Taking a subjective view, I believe there are four main lessons which can be drawn from my deployment which relate to the performance of the individual and his or her capacity to achieve results in difficult and demanding circumstances.
Firstly, our doctrine and training methods for all ranks from the CO down to newly qualified soldiers are successful. Our preparedness compares more than favourably with those of other defence forces in terms of the capacity for the deployment and operation of a contingent with a unique role and with a purpose designed unit. We are good at our profession and should be confident of our ability, developed in peacetime, to successful during operations. We can operate with ease with our New Zealand colleagues.

Secondly, all ranks demonstrated a strength of character and self confidence in their ability to both assimilate new knowledge and to deal with unexpected and different situations. To me this is evidence that we as modern generation Australians and New Zealanders actually have the qualities which we hear about on ANZAC Day as being characteristic of the first ANZACs at Gallipoli. All that we have to do is create the environment for young Australians in which to perform and they will, with outstanding results.

Thirdly, we are well accepted as international citizens and particularly so in Asia. With encouragement and suitable introduction, personnel respected and assimilated the Cambodian customs and culture and genuinely associated easily with the locals and other nationalities. FCU personnel were well liked and individually could identify with South East Asia and its importance to Australia.

In conclusion, the commitment by the ADF to the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia has been worthwhile from many different viewpoints. From a personal side, it was a great adventure in which I had the pleasure and satisfaction to command a large number of extremely professional soldiers during an ambitious operation in a difficult country. The fact that they represented a complete cross section of the ADF and the RNZDF compounded the sense of achievement. I have admiration for their ability to adapt to the demanding environment we faced. I like to think that they became young men and women of the world who found added confidence in all of their qualities despite mostly being deployed for the first time outside Australia. All ranks were able to accept the challenge and were both fine ambassadors for Australia and the ADF. Pride remains the lasting result from our commitment to Cambodia.
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COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
Operation Solace

By Lieutenant Colonel D.J. Hurley, RAR.

"Gently in manner, resolutely in deed."

Introduction

Much to the chagrin of many soldiers in 1 RAR, in 1992 the year's training priority was Services Protected Evacuation. Particular emphasis was given to reducing levels of aggression and to developing the appropriate attitude towards Australian and host nation nationals. Operations under strict Rules of Engagement and Orders for Opening Fire were practiced in many imaginative scenarios. Had we known what was to occur in early 1993, perhaps our application would have been greater. The long hours in helmet and flak jacket paid dividends, however, in the streets of Baidoa and in its surrounding villages.

Operation Solace, the Australian Government's contribution to the US-led humanitarian relief operation in Somalia, tested the Battalion Group's strategic deployment capability and the initiative and training of the Australian soldier. It also provided an opportunity to observe the raising and preparation of a UN force and its headquarters. The former experiences reinforced my faith in our soldiers and our training; unfortunately the latter raised many concerns about serving under the UN flag in a combat role.

The 1 RAR Battalion Group committed to Somalia served under US operational control from the Group's arrival in January 1993 until 4 May 1993, the date on which UNOSOM II assumed command of operations in Somalia. During this period the UN provided political guidance while the US controlled military operations. Under US control, the Group’s links with the UN were limited to daily contact with the UNOSOM humanitarian assistance officer in Baidoa; infrequent contact with UN political advisers based in Mogadishu and occasional visits by UNOSOM II senior civil and military commanders. The UN had no direct input into the Group's activities although the views of the humanitarian assistance officer were frequently sought. In the short period under UN control, 4-15 May 1993, there were no changes to the policy or operational direction followed under US control.

Australia's Contribution

The 1 RAR Battalion Group committed to Somalia consisted of an infantry battalion augmented with armoured mobility and second-line logistic support. The Group was capable of meeting the operational tasks it was given but could have achieved more had integral helicopter support and additional B vehicles for convoy escort and tactical mobility been available.

The Battalion Group was allocated a Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS) of approximately 17000 km² in the Bai region of Somalia. The area was predominantly flat with a 90m escarpment bisecting the HRS from south west to north east. The vegetation was mostly camel thorn with a very few stands of timber. A significant proportion of the HRS had previously been cultivated. There were no major permanent ground water systems, most villages relying upon well for their water supply.

The major town in the HRS was Baidoa, located centrally in the HRS with Dinsoor in the south west and Buurhakaba in the southeast being the next major villages. Only one sealed road existed in the HRS connecting Baidoa with Mogadishu.

Mission and Tasks

The Battalion Group's mission was to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief aid in HRS Baidoa. There is no doubt that during Operation Solace a degree of what the Americans term mission creep occurred particularly when the Battalion Group became actively involved in nation rebuilding in its HRS.

My analysis of the Group's mission identified four key tasks:

- security of the Battalion Group's FOB (in this case the Baidoa airfield);
- protection of humanitarian relief convoys;
- security of Baidoa township; and
- patrolling in depth to dominate the outlying areas of the HRS.

The concept of operations developed to achieve these tasks was modelled on counterinsurgency oper-
ational techniques and low-level operations. The Battalion Group was to conduct security operations to dominate the HRS using static security positions, foot and mounted patrols and an on-call QRF. In concert with the military operations, intensive civil-military collaboration was conducted to assist the non-government organisations (NGO) and the local populace. As the stability and security levels in the HRS improved the civil-military operations gained greater importance as attempts were made to re-establish the law and order system of the country.

Initially a rifle company was allocated to each of the four major tasks with Support Company providing the QRF. Later in the deployment Support Company acted as a fifth rifle company. Each company would spend approximately nine days on each task and then a rotation of tasks occurred. The rotation of tasks was intended to prevent boredom during the less “exciting” tasks and to allow different approaches to each task develop. As security in the immediate vicinity of the airfield and Baidoa improved, fewer troops were allocated to airfield security and a larger number were committed to patrolling in depth. When the Battalion Group handed over to the French forces in mid May, two companies were deployed to the extremities of the HRS and only two platoons provided airfield security.

In addition to the major tasks conducted by the rifle companies a minimum of one platoon was committed to mobile counter-ambush patrols at night. This platoon conducted “reverse cycle” operations for prolonged periods using locally modified 6 x 6 vehicles modified with AN/TAS 6A Thermal Imagers and IR lights.

The Battalion also conducted a number of Battalion cordon and searches, some of which included night airmobile insertions with US Army Blackhawks. These major activities were intended to have a physiological effect on the Somali people in addition to the usual aim of upturning weapons, equipment and key hostile force personnel.

Achievements

The achievements of the Battalion Group in the military and humanitarian facets of the operation can be summarised as follows:

- over 400 convoys were escorted to 137 villages, distributing approximately 8000 tonnes of food, 8000 tonnes of seed and large quantities of clothing and agricultural tools;
- an embryonic law and order system which included 250 policemen, regional and district courts, and a prison was established;
- over 70 bandits/faction members were arrested, a number during contacts by day and night;
- a potentially large maize crop was planted throughout the HRS, the first in a number of years;
- commerce recommenced in all towns and villages; and
- over 900 weapons ranging from pistols to 106mm RCL were captured.

Civil-Military Operations

The Command, Liaison and Observation Group of 107 Fd Bty assumed responsibility for Civil-Military Operations Team (CMOT) tasks from when 1 RAR Bn Gp assumed command of HRS Baidoa. The Bty represented the Group at: Security Committee Meetings, Regional Relief Committee Meetings, NGO Meetings, and Elders Meetings. It also liaised with any interested party who wished to meet with UNITA’s and NGO for security of relief convoys by road and air. It provided a CMOT representative with 1 RAR patrols, particularly those of company strength outside Baidoa, gathered information about key personnel within the community, assisted with the gathering of information, particularly bandit and political activity.

The Bty provided advice and assistance for minor tasks to NGOs, maintained communications with NGO, coordinated the unloading of NGO relief and charter aircraft and coordinated the weapon policy for NGOs and their security staff within the HRS.

Movement of personal by air out of Baidoa was also looked after. Other tasks included the establishment and provision of the Liaison officer for the Auxiliary Security Forces, judicial and prison system; provided security of money and escort its delivery; coordinating the Extended Programme of Immunisation (EPI); providing assistance and guidance on the provisions of water in drought effected villages; providing escorts for work assistance for NGO; and providing liaison officers for VIP visitors.

It is evident from the above list of CMOT’s tasks that “mission creep” — in some cases “mission stretch” — had occurred. In some instances this was by default, in others deliberate decisions were made to widen the scope of operations. The decision to take on tasks outside the original mission reflected the pace at which developments were happening on the ground and UNITA’s and the UN’s inability to provide timely advice and policy direction.
Community leaders of the town of Baidoa take the first step towards providing their own system of law and order at a meeting to discuss the establishment of a Somalian Security Force. The meeting, chaired by Australian Army LTCOL David Hurley, named former senior police officer Colonel Aden Nor Sheik Mohammad, as commander of the new force.

### Command and Control

The Battalion Group deployed under national command of the HQ Australian Forces Somalia (HQ AFS). Upon arrival in Somalia, the Group was placed under the operational control of HQ 10th Mountain Division (Light), more commonly referred to as ARFOR (ARMY FORCE). ARFOR was under command of UNITAF (United Task Force). At that stage, no command links of any form existed with UNSOM, the then extent UN force in Mogadishu.

Upon the withdrawal of HQ 10 Mtn Div (LT) on 2 March, the Battalion Group returned to HQ AFS command. HQ AFS then became an operational headquarters under operational control of UNITAF. Under both command relationships the Battalion Group was given virtually unlimited scope to conduct operations as it saw necessary within its HRS. The US higher commanders insisted that each HRS had its own peculiarities and therefore theatre-wide directives on how to conduct operations would not be appropriate. Further, a theatre-wide common user command net was not established. This approach led to very little crosspollination of ideas or sharing of intelligence; both deficiencies being detrimental to achieving the UNITAF mission. For a Battalion Commanding Officer, however, it gave a freedom of action and level of responsibility rarely experienced in training and exercises.

A facet of command relationship that I had never experienced before existed in Somalia in the personal authority given to the HRS commander. In the absence of any form of civil government at any level and the failure of the UN to provide resident local UN political officers, HRS commanders became military governors. With largely undefined powers and little political guidance, commanders were required to negotiate with and provide guidance to local elders, community representatives and political faction leaders. This, not surprisingly, led to mounting tensions between HRS commanders and community leaders as local aspirations and expectations were held in check.
while centralised guidance was sought. In many instances, when UN guidance was not forthcoming, HRS commanders acted in accordance with what they assessed was best for the local population. The inability of the UN to recruit personnel for political officer positions and keep up with, let alone ahead of, developments in the field was frustrating and alarming.

Serving in a multinational force under both US and UN control highlighted a number of problem areas for the conduct of operations. Although each fault in itself was not significant enough to seriously hinder the execution of the mission, their synergistic effect greatly diluted the force’s capability. Apart from the difficulty created in trying to complete the mission, I consider that the failure to rectify these faults in the future would place Australian troops at greater risk than necessary. The UN’s attitude and response to correcting these faults should be key factors in determining whether or not Australian combat troops are again committed to a UN mission.

The faults which must be addressed are: the ad hoc method of raising UN forces and their headquarters, and the concept of national balance; the use of military intelligence; the conduct of combined operations.

### The Raising of UN Forces

The need for the US to intervene in Somalia in December 1992 highlighted the failure of the initial UNOSOM force from July to December 1992 and the inability of the UN to form an effective military force at short notice. The dysfunctional relationship between the UN Security Council and its military liaison staff, which inhibits effective military planning; the unnecessarily formal and time consuming system of requesting nations to contribute forces; the manner in which countries negotiate their force’s role in an operation and the commitment of national contingents inappropriately or inadequately equipped for the task, can only result in a military force inadequately prepared and belatedly positioned in support of a UN diplomatic initiative. These efforts are obviously much more pronounced in short warning time incidents.

In Somalia, the UN had lost nearly all credibility because of the failure of its UNOSOM force — a Pakistani battalion tasked to achieve the impossible — and its abandonment of the Somali people to inter-factional strife in 1992. This failure in military planning and the resultant loss of diplomatic initiative was compounded by the premature handover of US command in Somalia to UNOSOM II in April 1993. The UNOSOM II head-
quarters was undermanned and under-ranked. I believe that this was previously due to the time-consuming need to ensure national balance in the headquarters, that is, ensuring that each participating nation had appropriate representation on the headquarters. This process has many pitfalls, not the least being that many participating countries simply lack officers with the appropriate staff training and skills. Further, the headquarters had very little opportunity to develop processes, procedures and team work necessary to conduct complicated and sensitive operations prior to assuming command. This was well recognised by many Somali leaders who I am sure were awaiting the withdrawal of UNITAF before returning to their inter-factional rivalries. The idea of a standing UN force with an operational headquarters has been noted recently. I would support such a force and add the requirement for a standing military planning cell that can provide critical advice, particularly on the time and space necessary to mount a military operation, to the Security Cabinet. If military forces are to be committed more frequently by the UN in the future, they must be seen as an integral part of the proposed solution and not a necessary evil.

Use of Military Intelligence

In UN observer and peacekeeping missions there is an understandable reluctance to establish and use military intelligence assets because of their potential for causing distrust of the UN force. During the early stages of the UN-UNOSOM II handover process, the US had a significant concern that military intelligence would not have a role to play in UNOSOM II operations. The US had committed a very large, though unfortunately not overly customer-oriented, intelligence effort to Operation Restore Hope and was keen to ensure that its forces remaining under UN command were not denied a similar capability. Fortunately the UN agreed to the continued use of military intelligence.

It would appear that many member nations of the UN have a distrust of military intelligence and are reluctant to support its use. This view must be corrected because military intelligence is vital in complicated missions as it is in more conventional military operations. Without intelligence both human and technical, serious misjudgments will occur. The UN’s reluctance to use military intelligence and the sharing of intelligence are just a few of the major problems that must be resolved. Multinational forces such as those raised by the UN will not be successful without a centralised, technologically advanced, military intelligence component.

Conclusion

Operation Solace was a successful chapter in a book marred by a number of large, unresolved problems. The operation validated much of what the Australian Army is doing today and indicated corrective action where necessary. It revealed to me the great lengths that the UN must go to if it is to fill a viable “Global Policeman” role in the future. The UN is now at a critical stage in its history; if it cannot see through national interests when forming military forces and develop the capabilities for timely response, then it will become irrelevant in the shaping of new world order. The UN must examine closely the need for a standing UN response and the procedures it follows to raise follow-on forces and their headquarters. Australia cannot afford to commit her limited military assets to UN missions that are poorly organised, thereby increasing the risk to Australian troops. Our soldiers deserve better than that.
Author John Buckley, OBE, FIE (Aust.), served with the AIF and was attached to the British Army in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq in 1941, north-west Europe during 1944-45, and Luneberg, Germany, in 1945. Serving in these theatres, he was known as the "roving staff officer".

In his *Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer*, John Buckley casts his eye over the dreadful, almost unbearable conditions in the desert fighting of 1941 and other incidents.

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Human Intelligence and Somalia — A Cost Effective Winner for a Small Army

By Lieutenant Colonel G. Peterson.

"Over 90% of the information to support our operations was provided by our counter-intelligence people."

CO 1 RAR briefing LT GEN Bir (UNOSOM 2 COM) April 1993

Introduction

Somalia was not a war. It was a low-level conflict dominated by politico-humanitarian considerations subject to heavy media interest. Our mission was to provide a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian aid. We had a peacemaking charter which authorised the use of force only when essential to that mission. In short, it met many of the characteristics the Australian Army may face in likely contingencies within the ADMI.

Low-level conflicts are, however, intelligence wars. We need hard intelligence to understand our opponent and to impose our will over his. In underdeveloped countries such as Somalia and many of the countries within our ADMI, the infrastructure is poor and the C3I systems of the hostile forces are relatively simple. Sophisticated technical means are unlikely to provide the greatest returns; instead it is the person collecting at the "coal face" who provides the bulk of the information.

Specialist human intelligence collectors working in association with the battalion group were a cost effective winner. They were not expensive in manpower or support resources. Information was collected forward, analysed forward and immediately available to the commander on the spot. This approach was simple, responsive to the field commander's needs and directions, and relevant to his battle.

The Somalia Experience

In December 1992, a force of 930 Australians was committed for our first major land operation since Vietnam. Originally there was no specialist intelligence element with the force. This was remedied with a small number of human intelligence (humint) specialists. Most other nations brought some form of technical intelligence support, only the Australians included humint in their initial deployment. While most nations had only a limited return of their technical efforts, those with humint collectors went from strength to strength.

The US forces, having landed in December, only deployed humint teams in early January. The dramatic improvement in information flow and insight into the warring factions was such that the US senior leaders became very strong advocates of humint. In contrast, the Canadians have allowed their expertise in this area to run so low that they had no deployable capability, a situation we have only just avoided by retaining a handful of positions for an Army of 26,000.

In Somalia, we eventually had a group of eight who operated in Baidoa under command of the 1 RAR Battalion Group. They comprised three two-man detachments with a small HQ to direct the detailed collection of information, analyse the raw information and pass the product to the Commander. They were supported by local interpreters and worked in concert with the Battalion intelligence section. They operated in various ways: accompanying the patrols and other operations, working independently through contact with community groups and individuals, talking with our own forces who had information.

Why Was It Cost Effective and Successful?

Somalia, when we arrived, had very little infrastructure or system. Its main remaining resource was people. Overwhelmingly, the bulk of information was to be gained by speaking to the local players, be they UNITAF forces, UN officials, non-government organisations, the Somali factions, warlords and people. This required clear direction from commanders; specialist knowledge on how to identify the target groups and plan a systematic collection of information; trained personnel with interpreter support to systematically gather the information; and a systematic method of
Our first major land operation since Vietnam
sifting and reporting the synthesised information. Aside from the first step this was essentially done firstly by two persons and eventually a group of eight. The group required access to a small number of vehicles, a means of communication and protection when on-collection activities; the operational returns for the resources expended were disproportionately efficient.

It must be acknowledged that the conditions were suitable for humint collection. The population was talkative. The security situation, terrain and road systems were such that it enabled a determined force to move anywhere to seek out information. There was little local government to bind our collection efforts in a bundle of bureaucratic red tape. Aid organisations, other forces and community groups were keen to assist in improving the security situation and provided extensive coverage across the Area of Operation. Finally the hostile elements were bandits without the sympathy or support of the majority of the population.

**Is It a Universal Panacea?**

Humint has limitation. The value of humint relies heavily on asking the right questions and having good access to those with the real answers. Raw information is often inaccurate and the usefulness of it often relies on the skill of its appraisers to present truthfully its accuracy and reliability to the Commander. Humint does not carry the aura of “science” that technical gatherers such as imagery and sigint possess. As such it is often dismissed by Commanders as opinion rather than fact and seen as soft rather than hard information.

In Somalia the results of the commanders was proportionate to the way they exploited intelligence, especially humint.

**Implications For The Future**

Conditions in Somalia are not dissimilar to what we might experience in the ADMI or even northern Australia. While the use of specialist humint collectors has proven to be successful, awareness of their utility is not widespread in our Army.

To remedy this I recommend the following actions to be taken:

Reinforce success: Maintain the successful humint skills we have developed and build into our continuity planning the deployment of humint in environments where it is likely to succeed — then use the contingency plan when the time arrives.

Educate: Leaders must be shown that humint can give them the winning edge. It is a cost effective capability that they are expected to exploit.

Train: Direct commanders to exercise our deployable troops with humint specialists regularly to build up mutual trust and understanding.

**Conclusion**

Humint, properly directed and used, offers commanders good results for a miniscule outlay in manpower and resources. It is a cost effective winner for our small army, particularly in low-level conflict.
Psyops and Somalia — Spreading Good News

By Lieutenant Colonel G. Peterson.

Introduction

Psychological operations ("psyops") are often considered synonymous with manipulation to a negative end. This is wrong. It is simply marketing and is very effective in gaining results which are morally and militarily successful.

In Somalia, during Operation Restore Hope, US and Australian forces demonstrated that psyops could achieve positive results cheaply and minimise the loss of life on all sides. Somalia confirmed psyops as a cost-effective and acceptable tool in politico-military situations.

US Psyops Efforts in Somalia

In Somalia, as in most conflicts, lack of communication was often at the root of a problem. Psyops helped overcome this problem.

During Operation Restore Hope, the US military demonstrated a very good understanding of its potential and reinforced this with a range of capabilities including Somali-language radio station, newspaper, and vehicle and ground speaker teams working with Somali interpreters. All were effective in getting messages to the people.

Helicopter-mounted broadcast systems were also used, which I felt were the least effective. If the helicopter is too far away the message is not audible; too close and it sounds totally inhibiting. Even at the right distance the effect is transitory as the helicopter is only present for a few seconds and it is an expensive option given helicopter operating costs. Also the use of Cobra gunships in Somalia meant that helicopters were seen by locals as a potential source of destruction not information, so the right environment for the "pitch" was not created.

The US military had psyops well placed within its staff and planning cycle. On each operation, to secure a major population centre, psyops troops were present with the initial reconnaissance force. They reported on the likely local response to the arrival of UNITAF troops; identified key community figures and personalities that the UNITAF forces would deal with; and, passed specific messages relevant to that objective. They were very effective and impressive. In a dramatic departure from normal military philosophy, the US forces telegraphed their punches and let everyone know what was about to occur. This ensured there was no confusion and no opposition in the face of such overwhelming organisation.

Australia's Use of Psyops in Somalia

Lacking their own psyops capability, the Australian forces in Baidoa quickly modified their approach to include the use of US psyops to assist their humanitarian mission.

For example, in Baidoa in 1992, thousands of Somalis died of disease and malnutrition and were buried in very shallow graves in the dry wadi which bisected the town. However, in early 1993 it was realised that these estimated 11,500 bodies needed to be relocated before the monsoon rains exposed the diseased bodies which would pollute the water supply and probably cause a cholera or other epidemic. The aid organisations contacted local religious leaders and commenced to move bodies. However, as no religious leaders were present, the locals thought that Christian foreigners were attempting to defile Muslim graves. A riot ensued and unnecessary distrust was engendered. The Australian Battalion used US psyops assets to solve the problem. Local religious and civil leaders were contacted and through leaflets, newspapers, man-pack and vehicle-mounted broadcast and radio, locals were informed why the bodies were being relocated; when it would happen; and who would be involved. The exhumations went without a hitch and a potential epidemic was avoided.

This successful formula was used many times. Many children were being mutilated by playing with explosive ordnance left over from the Somali civil war. A campaign was organised explaining how the Australians would come to collect the ammunition; where to leave it; what not to touch, etc. The message
Lack of communication is often the root of the problem.
was produced in print media and radio. Many Somali children have limbs and lives today because of the campaign and the wisdom of the Commander to use psyops to spread his message.

**Implications for the Future**

Psyops proved to be an important military capability. It was cost-effective, achieved wide dissemination for a minuscule outlay, immediately responsive to the Commander and his planning staff, and it was peaceful. It was simple — an innocuous, non-threatening, non-lethal way of getting the message across. It gave the Commander more options. For UN or politico-military operations use of the written and spoken word is often preferable to force of arms.

The Somali experience highlights an often forgotten dilemma. We talk about two groups on the battlefield: enemy and friendly forces. But there is a third potentially huge group — non-combatants. We have a moral and military responsibility for them: on operations in Australia they would be our own kin. We have developed effective means to deal with the enemy and our own troops, but perhaps are yet to cater for non-combatants. Psyops offers part of the solution.

Psyps was one of the great winners in Somalia. It taught me that there is nothing sinister about psyops in itself — it is merely harnessing the power of the written and spoken word. It is the ends to which it is used which should be debated, but not the means itself. Psyops is simply marketing, which we experience every day of our lives in Australia.

Harnessing the power of the written and spoken word is cheap and easy. Official support, formal direction, $50,000 for equipment and less personnel than a Commander’s First 15 would give us an adequate tactical capability. Under the one Army concept it is particularly suited to contain a suitably qualified element. For contingencies in the ADMI and in northern Australia it is directly applicable.

**Conclusion**

It is timely that Australia’s military leaders have linked the power of the sword with that of the pen. For next to nothing we will gain one of the most important capabilities a commander can have — the ability to convey his wishes directly and extensively to communities in his Area of Operations. Our commanders should have this capability available to them. It is time we spread the good news.
The Light Blue Line in the Thin Blue Wedge: The RAAF and Peacekeeping

By Group Captain Gary Waters, RAAF.

"As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These Operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of the United Nations under Article 42." 2

Introduction

By this definition, we see that the Gulf War and Korean War were not United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations and accordingly will not be addressed in the article. 3 This is indicative of the difficulty experienced when discussing any military involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. The difficulty is reinforced when trying to settle on a definition; for example, "Peacekeeping as an institution evolved in the grey zone between Pacific Settlement and Military Enforcement". 4

Thus peacekeeping falls between the UN Charter's Chapter VI — Pacific Settlement and Chapter VII — Collective Enforcement; Dag Hammarskjold's phrase was "Chapter Six and a Half".5

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

Peacekeeping operations involving humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement are emerging as likely candidates for continuing military involvement in the future. However, such operations should not be viewed as an extension of "traditional" military operations. Consequently, special peacekeeping techniques and procedures should be included in routine training and peacekeeping may need to become a feature of regular exercises. ADF training for low-level operations may provide a sound model for other countries in this respect.

While mission-specific and some collective training could be taken only after the mission forms, much can be undertaken in advance. For example, the generic planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations, development of doctrine, honing of negotiation and conflict resolutions skills and some specific peacekeeping techniques could be undertaken in a general sense, well in advance of the formation of a mission. 6

Peace enforcement involves the use of armed forces to create a ceasefire between combatants. This usually means that at least one side does not want peace. On the other hand, peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing an existing ceasefire, which has been agreed to by the opposing sides. Peace enforcement is not a linear progression of peacekeeping as quite different forces are needed, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. A peace enforcement force may have to contend with hostility from all warring factions. For that reason, such forces would need a more specialised and probably offensive capability than would a peacekeeping force.

There is another aspect of peace enforcement that needs to be addressed. While the objective of warfighting is normally to stop the fighting (usually by destroying the enemy), the objective of peace enforcement is more complex. Not only does peace enforcement aim to stop the fighting, but it also aims to reach a political compromise and not destroy the warring factions. This has relevance to current air power technology in so far as the precise targeting now afforded and witnessed in the 1991 Gulf War can terminate conflict without destroying the warring factions. The links between the objective of peace enforcement and air power are far stronger than readily acknowledged.

Once conflict has ended, peacekeeping forces would expect to be invited in by both sides, with the explicit aim of ensuring adherence to an agreed ceasefire until peace negotiations could be successful. In any peacekeeping operation, military force can only ever be used to facilitate political processes; it cannot act as a substitute for such processes. 7 In other
words, "military force can act as a precondition for enduring peace (short-term objective); it cannot create such a peace (long-term objective)."

Moreover, peace enforcement may be relevant only in so far as it may be the option of last resort. "Winning" will not be clear-cut; political and military objectives will be vague and subject to constant and rapid change; forces will be mismatched for the task at hand; and public support will likely erode quickly.

One other term which needs to be addressed, and which has been applicable to Australia is "Military Observer Missions". The term covers the use of unarmed military observers to "monitor ceasefires, mediate and alleviate ceasefire tensions, provide 'good offices' as the basis for negotiations, and provide a means of impartial verification of armistice or ceasefire agreements".

From Australia's point of view, peacekeeping demonstrates national commitment to the UN's ideals, promotes Australia's standing internationally, demonstrates the military competence of the ADF and offers training and operational benefits to the ADF. In a regional sense, ADF participation in peacekeeping missions such as Cambodia "contributes directly to our own security by promoting stability in our more immediate strategic environment. It reinforces our position as a legitimate contributor to regional security and consolidates cooperative security relations in our neighbourhood."

In definitional terms, the ADF is currently drafting an instruction of peace support operations. For the purpose of this paper, two comments are relevant:

"Peace enforcement operations (like other war-like operations) are military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities." These would normally, but not necessarily always, be conducted under Chapter VII on the UN Charter.

Peacekeeping is an operation involving military personnel, without powers of enforcement, to help restore and maintain peace in an area of conflict with the consent of all parties. It has been defined as the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace".

The types of peacekeeping activities in which Australian forces could be involved include but are not limited to:

- activities short of peace enforcement where the application of force is normally limited to minimum force necessary for self defence;
- activities such as the enforcement of sanctions in a relatively benign environment which expose individuals or units to "hazards" above and beyond that of normal peacetime duty;
- military observer activities with the tasks of monitoring ceasefires, re-directing and alleviating ceasefire tensions, providing "good offices" for negotiations and the impartial verification of assistance or ceasefire agreements, and other like activities; or
- activities that would normally involve the provision of humanitarian relief.

Humanitarian relief in this context does not include normal peacetime operations such as cyclone or earthquake relief flights or assistance.

RAAF Peacekeeping Operations

The first UN peacekeeping operation was in Palestine in June 1948, and was known as the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). This was followed in 1949 by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Of the approximately 25 UN peacekeeping operations that have been undertaken, Australia has been directly involved in 16, with limited RAAF involvement in several. To this total must be added the recent ADF contributions to Somalia and Cambodia.

In UNMOGIP, which lasted from January 1949 to December 1985, the RAAF contributed to Australian participation. The RAAF detachment (of No 38 Squadron) comprised one Caribou and 12 crew on six-month tours, operating from March 1975 until January 1979, based out of Rawalpindi, Pakistan, and Srinigar, Kashmir, on rotation. The detachment's safety record was impressive considering the 21,000 feet altitude ceiling of a fully-laded Caribou in icy weather, operating in an area with approximately 33 peaks over 25,000 feet. The detachment flew mainly resupply and border patrol missions and had to contend operationally with dust and snow. RAAF C-130s provided logistics re-supply every six months.

One RAAF and one Australian Army officer also acted as Military Observers to the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) from 1949 to 1950. It was their report which established that North Korea initiated hostilities on 25 June 1950. Based on this report, the UN was then able to establish the moral and legal foundation for deploying military forces.
Since 1953, Australia has contributed one officer to the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) to monitor the armistice in Korea. From 1956, the Defence Attache at the Australian Embassy to South Korea has provided this contribution to UNCMAC; a RAAF officer is currently the Defence Attache.

In 1962, the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) was established with the task of supervising the transition of Netherlands West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian control. From 18 November to 25 December 1962 two Sioux helicopters, four Army pilots and seven RAAF groundcrew were attached to assist with a cholera eradication program. One of the helicopters crashed, thus necessitating withdrawal of the detachment just prior to the program’s end.

The UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was established in October 1973 to supervise the ceasefire in the Sinai following the Yom Kippur War. From 1976 until August 1979, the RAAF contributed a detachment of four Iroquois helicopters and 46 personnel on six-month tours and were joined by RAN personnel from July 1977. The detachment was based in Ismailia and operated in the buffer zone in the Sinai, moving troops and observers and conducting re-supply and border patrol missions. Change-over of personnel and logistics re-supply were effected by RAAF C-130s. At any one time, this deployment resulted in four helicopters in the Sinai, two in transit and one undergoing maintenance.

From 1983 to 1986, Australia contributed 109 personnel (approximately 99 RAAF) and eight Iroquois helicopters in the Sinai to supervise the Camp David Accords of September 1978 as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Based at El Gorah, the contingent (together with 29 RNZAF personnel and two helicopters) provided air transport for observers who conducted verification and reconnaissance missions in the four treaty zones. The combined ANZAC unit also provided logistics support to other UN elements, provided flight following and meteorological services to aviation elements, offered a Search and Rescue (SAR) capability and transported VIPS on inspection tours.

In both UNEF II and MFO deployments the RAAF helicopters were painted white and bore UN markings. An important issue with MFO was that it had to be created as a non-UN force due to the likelihood of the USSR vetoing a UN mandate.

Interestingly, the UN Charter expressly argues in Article 52 that nothing in it precludes a group of nations instituting a peacekeeping force to maintain international peace and security within a regional sense, provided all activities accord with UN principles. Indeed, it is preferable that nations try to settle local disputes referring the problem to the UNSC.22

From April 1989 to March 1990, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operated in Namibia to supervise the withdrawal of South African forces, the conduct of general elections, and Namibia’s transition to independence. One RAAF officer joined the second contingent of 309 Australian and New Zealand personnel in late September 1989.23

During the Gulf crises, five C-130s and one B-707 were placed on 24 hours notice to move, from 24 August 1990. On 6 September 1990, an RAAF Falcon 900 was used to evacuate 13 women and children from Amman, Jordan, after their release by Saddam Hussein. During Operation Desert Storm, two C-130s and one B-707 were positioned to evacuate Australian nationals if required. Other C-130s flew tasks to support the RAN commitment, including the carriage of RAN clearance divers. Slip crews were positioned in Seeb, Muscat, for these tasks.

RAAF personnel participated in Australia’s contribution to Operation Provide Comfort (relief to the Kurds in Iraq) in 1991 and in the UN Chemical Investigation Team, also in 1991. Participation in the Gulf has been in conjunction with the UN Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) established in August 1988.

The RAAF contributed to Australian representation in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Among the ADF personnel who arrived in Phnom Penh on 12 May 1992 were three RAAF officers and four senior non-commissioned officers, comprising an Air Movements team.24 Australia committed approximately 500 soldiers, sailors and airmen to Cambodia to provide the essential communications network for UNTAC, as well as the force commander and six headquarters staff. An additional contribution for six weeks in May/June 1993 added a further 100 personnel and six Blackhawk helicopters to the Australian contingent.25 RAAF C-130s were used on occasions to re-supply the Force Communications Unit (FCU). The RAAF component of the FCU was 18 personnel, with an additional seven Service Police deploying.

The RAAF provided eight personnel to the Movement Control Unit in Somalia. On 23 December 1992, an RAAF Falcon 900 carried the Australian National Liaison Team into Mogadishu. Four RAAF C-130s arrived on 10 January 1993, carrying the Advance Party. During the 17-week deployment, RAAF C-103s flew eight sorties each of approximately 50 hours. During the redeployment, completed on 18 May 1993, three C-130s based in Mambasa...
Airlift for peacekeeping forces.
flew shuttle services involving both personnel and cargo from Baidoa to Mogadishu and three B-707s flew shuttle services from Mogadishu to Townsville. RAFF and other Australian involvement was offered but not taken up in 1973 — additional forces for UNEF II; in July 1974 — reinforcement of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); and in August 1989 — to monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. In the latter case, the UN mission itself was not established due to the failure of peace talks, but one officer from the Australian Army and the RAFF each participated in a fact-finding mission from 6-22 August 1989.

Future Peacekeeping Operations

Based on Australia’s past experience, there are several important broad lessons that emerge for peacekeeping operations of the future. These will impact on RAFF and ADF involvement, and include:

- planning of operations must integrate political and military elements early in the process;
- the mandate should be clear, unambiguous and finite;
- all parties must have a commitment to peacekeeping, peace making and peace building;
- long-running peacekeeping operations should be terminated as a prolonged tends to be a substitute for positive resolution;
- status of Forces Agreements are essential, especially as they provide diplomatic and legal status to the UN peacekeepers;
- establishment of a liaison officer at the UN headquarters in New York during preparation and planning stages is desirable;
- Australia should ensure that all preparation, planning and training is carried out before deploying. This may mean committing resources ahead of formal decisions to deploy;
- Australia needs to be self-sufficient in terms of stockholding, communications and security. While the UN requires members to deploy with 30-days requirements, the Australian experience has been to deploy with 60-days requirements. (Many other nations now do likewise);
- financing and lead-time pose problems for the UNSC and peacekeeping nations need to plan initially on providing national assistance;
- burden-sharing of peacekeeping operations tends to be inequitable;
- reimbursement of costs tends to be on a case-by-case basis and the mechanism needs to be established each time;
- UN command tends to be confusing and an agreed command and control model does not yet exist; and
- the on-scene force commander needs to be appointed early so that he can be involved in developing the UN mandate. He needs to establish his position clearly with the host nation, preferably before forces deploy.

From a policy point of view, the recent Department of Defence policy paper argued that:

- a higher profile for peacekeeping affords benefits to wider strategic and international policy as well as defence;
- future peacekeeping levels will be higher than previously;
- Australia will periodically advise the UN of its forces available for peacekeeping;
- more formal peacekeeping training (principally through the ADF Peacekeeping Centre) will be undertaken by the ADF and include Australian military and civilian personnel and personnel of regional nations; and
- the Defence Attaché UN post will be retained permanently and increases in numbers of Australian staff to UN Headquarters New York will be sought.

With peacekeeping missions likely to increase and the possibility of decreased financial allocations from Governments to their Defence Departments, financial burden-sharing will be a growing thorn in the side of the UN, and Australia should expect to be called upon to contribute even more resources. This would impact severely on Australia as only 44 per cent of the approximate $50 million in additional outlays over the past three years is expected to be recouped. From a policy point of view, future UN peacekeeping operations by the ADF may be funded from an overall allocation to the Defence budget. Options are currently being examined by the Departments of Defence and Finance.

In responding to a UN questionnaire on the type of forces that Australia could provide for peacekeeping operations, the Department of Defence indicated on 31 August 1990 that the RAFF could provide:

a. a signals unit;
b. an air support unit;
c. specialist medical personnel.

During the Senate Committee hearings into peacekeeping operations, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade submitted: "we would argue that the benefits outlined are worth the expenditure". The Department of Defence argued similarly: "we should,
as in the past, continue to respond positively to UN requests".

With such continued support of UN peacekeeping by Australia, the RAAF should anticipate involvement which could exceed that listed. For example, the Department of Defence has recently defined the range of operations which it could support given the current benign strategic circumstances and budget supplementation.

This includes:

- an infantry battalion group;
- an APC squadron;
- a signals squadron;
- a field engineer squadron;
- a medical unit (medical and dental);
- a field supply company;
- a transport squadron;
- a field workshop;
- a light and medium helicopter flight;
- a fixed-wing SRT or MRT air transport flight;
- a military police platoon;
- a Force Commander and personal staff;
- military observers or individual specialist officers;
- a movement control unit.

RAAF personnel could be employed in many of these peacekeeping tasks and air power may have a direct involvement. While the RAAF commitment may not be large, it could involve a headquarters element in a movement control office, or even in an Integrated Air Defence System, if that were appropriate. Observations from one recent peacekeeping mission include the essential requirement for the commander to have aircraft at his disposal for airborne communications and liaison and some form of battlefield support for troop lift. Apart from communications and troop lift, such a capability would provide for photographic reconnaissance, CASEVAC, fire support (especially in terms of convoy escort) and day/night surveillance of major routes to suppress ambushes (in terms of ground forces).

With some lateral thinking, there are other operations which may be appropriate. For example, the potential exists for ADF fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to be used against land mines. With upwards of 200 million mines sown in the world’s trouble spots currently and the horrific injuries and deaths awaiting innocent civilians, including young children, considerable attention is being devoted to improved mine detection measures. In this respect, technology may allow aerial detection and the ability to render mines safe or destroy them from the air. While mine-laying techniques and the mines themselves conspire against detection, advances in technology do provide some hope for humanity, and possibly an increased utility of air power. Furthermore, the platforms are available, and may require only appropriate detection sensors — this could be achieved at marginal cost. For any peacekeeping operation though, the problem will be to balance increased demands with the requirement to conduct normal peacetime tasks in Australia.

Finally, should the military circumstances in a peacekeeping area of operations deteriorate rapidly, the responsiveness of air power to provide air defence over surface forces or to prosecute precision air-to-ground strikes could be called upon. Depending on the circumstances, the RAAF could be asked to provide a wide range of activities to peacekeeping. Some have been listed above, but in terms of traditional flying operations the RAAF may have to provide:

- enforcement of no-fly zones;
- visual identification of transgressors of ceasefire or other peace agreements;
- precision strikes against weapons stockpiles or command, control and communications nodes of warring factions;
- tactical airlift and reconnaissance for peacekeeping forces, possibly or other participants;
- airborne command post or liaison platform;
- airlift and surveillance for border enforcement operations, and in combating civil disorder;
- surveillance and reconnaissance in maritime observation operations (especially in enforcing economic embargoes);
- survey (aerial photography);
- Search and Rescue; and
- operational logistics support, especially in terms of deployable base support units, telecommunications units, airfield defence guards, military police and police dogs, and mobile air transport units. In the case of RAAF deployments, integrated logistics support (including maintenance, engineering and supply) would have to be deployed as well.

Conclusion

Australia’s involvement in peacekeeping operations has provided a significant contribution to world peace. It has also carried with it considerable practical humanitarian value to civilian populations. From the
RAAF’s perspective, participation has often been limited, but still reflective of the RAAF’s contribution to the ADF, even in areas removed from flying operations.

The good work by the UN to date is not sufficient and lessons from current missions in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia will contribute to future successes. While it may be argued that a blueprint for UN operations is not possible, there will be a wealth of experience and many important lessons to emerge from current current operations that will have relevance for the future. For example, there is a clear lesson from Cambodia, in which one group failed to abide by the terms of the Paris Accord, yet the elections were still held. The lesson is that subsequent stages of a peacekeeping process may have to be held in abeyance until the requirements of previous stages have been satisfied. Another, and perhaps the most fundamental, issue is that if there is no real prospect for a political solution, then there may be little that a traditional peacekeeping force can achieve.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Wing Commander Alan Curr of the RAAF’s Air Power Studies Centre and Sergeant Judith Leahy of RAAF Staff College for their invaluable research assistance.

NOTES

1. The light blue line indicates the RAAF. The thin blue wedge indicates a United Nations peacekeeping force between two combatants.
3. Although before the Korean War started Australia had a Major and a Squadron leader as the only UN observers in the field. See “Australian Forces in support of the United Nations: a long, impressive record”, Defence Update, No 1, Nov 90, p. 4.
8. ibid, p. 20.
9. ibid, p. 21.
12. ADF Warfare Centre draft entitled “Peace Support Operations”.
13. ibid, taken from the definition adopted by the International Peace Academy, New York.
14. These were discussed at the CGS Exercise 1993, Camungra, Queensland, 21-25 June 1993.
16. Lieutenant Colonel N.F. James, op.cit, p. 49.
18. Lieutenant Colonel N.F. James, op.cit, p. 50.
19. The author is indebted to Wing Commander Chris Spence, for his comments in a briefing paper entitled “The RAAF in Peacekeeping Operations”, provided on 15 July 1993.
20. The author is again indebted to Wing Commander Spence for expanding on aspects of this deployment.
23. Lieutenant Colonel N.F. James, op.cit, p. 52.
28. Information provided by Wing Commander Chris Spence.
29. Wing Commander Chris Spence, briefing paper entitled “The RAAF Role in Peacekeeping Operations”.
30. United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia, pp. 30-47. Many of these issues were re-inforced at an International Seminar held in Canberra on 21-24 March 1993, entitled “UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads”. In particular, the need for improved command and control, communications and intelligence were addressed. Similarly, Lieutenant General J.M. Sanderson in a paper entitled “Preparation for Deployment and Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations: A Cambodian Snapshot” identified five key elements, viz early involvement of the force commander, definition of a clear and finite mandate, establishment of a planning cell in UN Headquarters, rapid deployment, and clarification of financial procedures.
32. ibid, p. 9.
33. ibid, p. 10.
34. United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia, p. 144.
35. DFAT submission, Committee Hansard, p. 566 in United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia, p. 86.
38. In a paper entitled “The Australian Experience in Somalia”, delivered at the CGS Exercise 1993, Colonel Bill Mellor argued that the most obvious force structure deficiency was the lack of integral aviation assets.


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Group Captain Gary Waters joined the RAAF in January 1969. His more recent postings have included Bracknell UK, where he attended the RAAF Advanced Staff Course in 1985, and RAAF Staff College, Fairbairn Canberra from 1986 to 1988, where he served as an instructor and then Director of Air Operations Studies. In January 1989, he was appointed Director of Studies at RAAFSC for the review of the RAAF's Command and Staff Course. In June 1989, he was posted for six months to the newly formed Air Power Studies Centre, where he contributed to the writing of the AAP 1000, Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Manual.

From January 1990 he was the RAAF Visiting Fellow to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, where he produced two books: RAAF Air Power Doctrine: A Collection of Contemporary Essays and The Architect of Victory: Air Campaigns for Australia, both published by SDSC. In May 1991, he was posted back to the Air Power Studies Centre, where he undertook a study of the Gulf War and produced a book entitled Gulf Lesson One — The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons for Australia, published in June 1992.

He was employed in the Directorate of Logistics Development and Planning during 1992, where he produced several papers on logistics doctrine and strategic planning and a book entitled Line Honours: Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War, published in December 1992. In January 1993, he was posted as the Director of the Air Power Studies Centre.
United Nations Mine Clearance Training Team
Afghanistan/Pakistan, 1989-1993

By Lieutenant Colonel G.C. McDowall.

Introduction

The Mine Clearance Programme for Afghanistan comes under the auspices of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA). Neither the Security Council nor the United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping sponsors the programme. The activities of the United Nations Mine Clearance Training Team (UNMCTT) therefore do not officially come under the heading of peacekeeping. Regardless of this, I am sure that all who have served in the Team have felt immense satisfaction in working to help the Afghan people recover from a protracted and bloody war. It may not be peacekeeping by definition, but it is certainly a very real contribution to the achievements of the peaceful future to which the majority of Afghans aspire.

Background — The Afghan War

Afghanistan has rarely experienced real peace. The last significant period of political stability ended in 1973 when King Zaher Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Daoud. President Daoud initially gained support from the Soviet Union, but he soon became wary of their influence and of his growing dependence on them. He moved to purge Communists from the government and the army. The Communists retaliated and assassinated Daoud in the Saur Revolution of April 1978. The brutal and repressive Communist regime that followed alienated the people. Religious leaders declared a Jehad (Holy War). Throughout the country, men took up arms to become Mujahideen (holy warriors). Division within the Communist leadership and the threat of a mujahideen victory against the Communist regime led to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army on Christmas Eve 1979.

The Islamic countries of the region increased their support to the Jehad and Western governments also sent aid to stem the advance of Communism. For most of the war, the Communists controlled only Kabul, the major provincial cities, and the main routes. The rural areas and the rugged mountains were in mujahideen hands.

After the Soviet people became disillusioned with the prolonged war, the Geneva Accords were signed in April 1988. They called for a total Soviet withdrawal by 15 February 1989. The Soviet-installed regime of President Najibullah clung to power for a few years, but finally Kabul was handed over to the Mujahideen in April 1992, 14 years after the Saur Revolution. Those 14 years of war left Afghanistan devastated. Its provincial cities suffered severe damage. Its extensive irrigation systems had deteriorated and its agricultural land was not productive. Its roads were in terrible condition. A million Afghans, mostly civilians, and 150,000 Russian soldiers lost their lives. Amidst the devastation, millions of land mines lay waiting to maim or kill the the 5.5 million refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the 2 million internally displaced people wanting to return home.

Mine Warfare in the Afghan War

Both the Communists and the Mujahideen used mines, but by far the greatest numbers were laid by the Communists. They made extensive use of protective minefields to hinder Mujahideen attacks on their garrisons, posts, and vital assets.

Communist posts in rural areas were generally ringed by pattern-laid PMN blast-type anti-personnel mines and trip-wired POM-Z fragmentation mines. The minefields are unmarked and records available are very sketchy. Surveyors marking minefields generally have to rely on local information about mine incidents and on mine indications such as the presence of dead animals. Partly destroyed buildings and likely infiltration routes were often mined irregularly and sometimes very densely with PMN mines. Again the minefields are unmarked.

Occasionally PMN mines are replaced by MS-3
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan (UNOCA), as UNOCHA was initially known, was set up in May 1988. The Office was set up to facilitate the return of refugees and recognised that mines and unexploded ordnance in many areas of the country posed a major risk to the personal safety of the population. The foremost priority identified was an immediate mass public information programme to make the refugees and internally displaced people aware of the hazards and how to minimise risks. UNOCA also called on the international community to provide expert personnel in demining as well as the necessary equipment and resources, to set up several centres for the training of Afghans in minefield survey and in actual demining operations.

Personnel were needed to train the mine awareness instructors, the surveyors and the deminers. The problem was the post-hostility demining did not fall within the mandate of any international agency. Military contingents can normally only be raised under the authority of the Security Council, and the Soviet involvement would have made that a delicate issue at the time. To get around the problem, the head of UNOCA wrote personally to a number of ambassadors in Geneva requesting “teams of experts” to train the Afghans.

High priority areas include residential areas, roads, irrigation systems and areas of intensive agriculture. They are mostly concentrated around the major provincial cities of Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat.

Herat has suffered badly. To the west of the city, the Communists levelled a belt of houses over five kilometres long and a kilometre wide to create fields of fire and minefields for their defensive perimeter. Mines are frequently deeply buried and the whole area is heavily contaminated with metal fragments and in some places reinforced concrete rubble from destroyed buildings. It’s a nightmare to clear, but soon as the deminers have cleared a house, people are back in and rebuilding, even though they know that some mines may lie deeply buried. It’s astounding to see a half-rebuilt mud house with a TV antenna poking up from the roof in the middle of a half-cleared minefield!

Low priority minefields will be marked for later clearance by future Afghan governments, but many mines will lie unseen in remote areas, presenting a lethal hazard for many generations to come.
The official requests did not specify military personnel, but that was understood at the working level and was inevitable given the nature of the expertise required. The legal status of the personnel was that of "experts on mission" under the 1947 Vienna Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Personnel were not permitted to wear national uniforms or badges of rank, although a strict military hierarchy existed. Formal command and control arrangements between the Contingent commanders and UNOCA varied from country to country. For example the New Zealand Contingent was placed under the Operational Command of the then Controller, UNMCTT, a retired Turkish Army Brigadier General, whilst the British Contingent was assigned Under Operational Control of the Head of Mission, UNOCSA, a British civilian. The first teams (from the United States and France) arrived in Pakistan on 1 February 1989. At the height of the programme, nine countries — Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom — provided teams.

Training teams were based at Peshawar and Quetta, the two major centres for Afghan refugees. In each of these locations there was a small headquarters and a Chief of Staff who reported directly to the Controller in Islamabad. The Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers established and operated training centres near each location. They provided tented offices, classrooms, and accommodation for trainees, a field training area, and a demolitions range.

Instruction was through interpreters, with all instructors, regardless of nationality, having to communicate with the translator in English. This was obviously an inefficient way to do business and Afghan instructors were soon identified and trained so that now Afghans conduct all lessons, with expatriate personnel assisting in training development and management aspects. Although I still don't understand much Pushtu or Farsi, I sit in on a lesson from time to time and it is intriguing to watch the army instructional techniques, from the arousal at the start of the lesson through to the confirmation of the instruction, come through, even though the words are meaningless to me. The instructors are particularly diligent in following the correct question technique and the trainees are keen participants. The prospect of venturing into a live minefield provides an excellent incentive for students to pay attention.

Initially there were two types of courses, a three-day mine awareness "master trainer" course and a 15-day mine clearance course. The mine awareness master trainers went into the refugee camps and later into Afghanistan to educate the Afghans on the dangers of mines, how to recognise mines and mined areas, and how to mark and report them. The 12,500 mine clearance course graduates received a minimum of equipment, signed a solemn oath binding them to use their skills only for humanitarian purposes, and were then expected to return with the flood of refugees to their villages to clear them of mines. It soon became apparent that the concept of uncontrolled local mine clearance was not going to work. The anticipated return of refugees did not eventuate because of continuing inter-factional fighting, giving UNOCA a chance to rethink. Proper planning and control of the task were essential to success. Several Afghan non-governmental organisations were formed to undertake the tasks.

Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) was the first raised, and the UNMCTT trained a number of platoon-sized teams for ATC. Running these teams required leaders and operations staff, so the UNMCTT developed and conducted the required courses. To survey tasks for the demining teams, ATC established a Mine Clearance Planning Cell. As operations expanded, the cell spawned a separate organisation, the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MPCA). The South West Afghanistan Agency for Demining (SWAAD) formed to conduct operations in that area.

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Australian Army Participation

Australia was a little slow in joining the Programme, mainly due to our heavy commitment of sappers to Namibia. Our first contingent of nine personnel arrived on 16 July 1989, under the command of Major G.I. Costello. They conducted training at
Risalpur, 40 kilometres east of Peshawar and adjacent to the Pakistan Army Engineer Centre. Australian contingents initially rotated after four months, following pre-embarkation training and administration at the School of Military Engineering. Later contingents completed six-month tours of duty. Contingent sizes varied between six and 12. Team members came from all sapper units and included a number of Army Reserve members. An infantry assault pioneer sergeant joined each of the last three contingents and the final contingent, 10 ASC, included a sergeant medical assistant.

The original training plan called for foreign training teams to phase out as sufficient numbers of Afghans qualified as instructors. This process began slowly in late 1989, but increased rapidly in late 1990 with the deteriorating security situation that arose from the Gulf War. Many participating countries needed their personnel for their Gulf War commitments, or feared for the security of the personnel in Pakistan as anti-Western sentiment ran high. The largest contingent from the United States withdrew in December 1990 and soon only the Australian and New Zealand contingents remained.

The emergence of the Afghan mine clearance organisations resulted in requirements for dedicated technical advisors. Major G.A. Membrey was the first appointed to ATC in Peshawar in January 1991. He was also the first Australian Army member authorised to enter Afghanistan to monitor demining operations. The remainder of ASC members commenced cross-border monitoring and training missions from April 1991. The focus of ASC activities swung from training new personnel to monitoring, accident investigation, and refresher training. Personnel began spending more and more time in Afghanistan evaluating the survey and demining teams at work and conducting in-country refresher training.

Seeing the results of the training effort is particularly satisfying. Families move back into their homes and plant crops within hours of ground being cleared. Their gratitude and hospitality are boundless. I remember walking back from a minefield on my first visit to Afghanistan and passing a family who had just moved back into their home. The eldest son had previously tried to go back too soon and had a piece of cloth covering the stump where he had lost his right arm to a mine. They had very little and faced a cold winter, but they insisted on my joining them for a cup of chai (tea). They waved as I walked back to my vehicle across what used to be a minefield.

In September 1991 an Australian, Lieutenant Colonel I.W. Mansfield, took over from a New Zealander as Senior Technical Advisor to the Demining Headquarters in Islamabad and the last of the New Zealanders withdrew in December 1991. When the UN Programme Manager left the following month, Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield became Acting Programme Manager, and the Australian take of the Programme was just about complete. Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross for his dedicated efforts. He has continued his dedication to the programme by taking leave for a year to serve on as Programme Manager on a UN contract.

Following a review of the Australian commitment in April 1993, the Minister for Defence decided not to replace personnel as their tours of duty expired. Accordingly, 10 ASC departed in July 1993 and the remainder of us will finish up in December. We leave with some regret, but confident that the Afghan demining organisations are now sufficiently strong and experienced to continue their essential work. UNOCHA will employ some expatriate managers, technical advisers and training coordinators, including some former ASC UNMCTT members, so the Australian connection will continue for some time after the official Australian Army involvement concludes.

The Benefits of Australian Involvement

In total, 92 Australian Army personnel have served with the UNMCTT. They have gained a great deal of experience and confidence through working with personnel of many countries. A very high proportion of our field engineer senior NCOs have gained a wealth of practical mine warfare experience that will stand our Corps in good stead for many years to come. Those in more recent contingents who have been fortunate enough to work in Afghanistan itself have gained real operational experience. They have survived in a dangerous and unstable environment where they have had to plan and conduct missions taking into account personal security, mines, disease, and extremes of climate and terrain. We take pride in having completed our tasks with no casualties.

Lieutenant General Coates awarded the contingent a CGS Commendation when he visited the team in February 1992, but the real reward for all the lucky enough to have served here is the knowledge that they made a significant contribution to a very worthwhile humanitarian cause. Many Afghans have told me they will never forget the Australians — we were the ones who remained through the difficult times to keep the programme going. Australia has gained many good friends.
Postscript — 23 August 1993

Today. I met another young Afghan boy — right arm missing, blind in both eyes, about the same age as one of my sons. This time his injuries were far more recent.

Captain Harry Jarvie and myself were visiting a minefield survey task near Gardez in the Paktia Province of Afghanistan. During the morning, we heard a mine explosion approximately one kilometre away and a local guide went to investigate. The guide returned through an unsurveyed lane in the minefield to advise us that an Afghan boy had been blown up by a mine and was severely injured. We decided we had to do something to help.

The boy's injuries were horrific. His face and right side had been sandblasted to a pulp by the soil which had covered the mine, and his right forearm hung by a few sinews from his elbow. While Harry gave the boy a morphine auto-injector, I prepared a methoxyflurane inhaler to ease his pain until the morphine took effect. Harry did his best to bandage the arm and, with the help of the locals, loaded him on a stretcher for the one hour drive to the nearest doctor.

As we headed back to our worksites we passed a tent and noticed a smaller boy huddled sobbing inside. On closer inspection, we discovered he was bound hand and foot with a length of heavy white cord. There were a few turns around his neck for good measure. Muhammad Gul had been with his older brother in the minefield trying to lift mines. This was his father's way of teaching him a lesson. Deciding he had learnt enough for one day, we untied him and helped him clean his brother's blood off his hands. We tried to comfort him for a while and instructed another relative on how to treat him for shock. We headed on to the minefield shaking our heads at how tough life was in Afghanistan.

We later learned that the injured boy had mercifully died soon after he reached the doctor. At least we had made his last hour or so a little less painful.

REFERENCE

United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

By Lieutenant Colonel S.W. Nicholls.

Introduction

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to observe and maintain a truce or cease-fire in the Middle East, demanded by the Security Council, and to assist all parties in the supervision of the agreements concluded by them. UNTSO has also been tasked with preparing contingency plans and providing personnel for new UN peace-keeping missions anywhere in the world the require assistance.

UNTSO is an unarmed observer group of military officers who observe, patrol, report and provide UN Good Offices with the five countries which comprise the mission area (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon). All officers are expected to conduct their assigned functions in a fair, impartial and positive manner. The Australian Army provides a contingent of 13 officers to UNTSO which consists of a Contingent Commander (LTCOL) and 12 observers (MAJ & CAPT). The Contingent Commander (COMASC UNTSO) normally undergoes six month service as an observer before assuming an UNTSO command or staff appointment. The normal length of service for observers is 12 months serving in two outstations.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has undergone changes and the functions of UNTSO have evolved and adapted accordingly. UNTSO has moved its operational activities as cease-fire lines and the areas of confrontation have changed. Yet the two-fold mandate of UNTSO has remained the same: to observe and maintain the truce or cease-fire demanded by the Security Council and to assist the parties in the supervision of cease-fires, truces or other arrangements accepted by them.

Observer Functions

United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) monitor cease-fire arrangements and, through the chain of command and the Secretary-General, report to the Security Council on violations such as firings, overflights, forward military deployments and noteworthy incidents. UNMOs intercede with local commanders to restore cease-fires, defuse tense situations and prevent misunderstandings. By monitoring United Nations buffer zones or by periodic inspection of Areas of Limitation (AOL) of forces, their presence is a deterrent to military activity and a means of building confidence in the peacekeeping arrangements. They often receive complaints from the parties to the conflict and subsequently conduct inquiries. These functions together with the provision of humanitarian assistance, for example in the exchange of prisoners or repatriation of remains, combine to assure the parties of United Nations Good Offices in assisting them to resolve their disputes peacefully.

History

The formal involvement of the United Nations in Palestine started on 2 April 1947, when the United Kingdom requested the UN to consider the problem. Subsequently, the General Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which prepared what was later known as the United Nations Partition Plan. It soon became clear that the Partition Plan could not be implemented and when the United Kingdom's mandate over Palestine ended on 15 May 1948, widespread fighting broke out.

The Security Council had called for a ceasefire between the parties in the Palestine Conflict on 17 April 1948, and on the 23 April it had established the Truce Commission for Palestine. The commission consisted of representatives of Belgium, France and the United States of America. On 14 May 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte from Sweden was appointed as the United Nations Mediator on Palestine. The Mediator was instructed to establish a four-week truce in Palestine and to supervise its observance in cooperation with the Truce Commission. To this end the Mediator and the Truce Commission were provided with a number of military observers.

On 11 June 1948, the four-week truce went into effect and the first group of 93 observers supported by UN Secretariat personnel formed the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. The Organisation
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
An observation post on the Golan Heights.

was led by a Chief of Staff on behalf of the Mediator. UNTSO’s headquarters was initially established in Cairo, but was later moved to Haifa. Subsequently, UNTSO moved its headquarters to British Government House in Jerusalem.

After the truce lapsed and fighting erupted once again, the observers were withdrawn. On 15 July the Security Council called for a second truce of indefinite duration that went into effect on 18 July. UNTSO was re-established in a larger, more effective body to supervise the second truce. With the truce established, talks between the parties took place under the auspices of the Acting Mediator (Count Bernadotte had been assassinated in September 1948) which led to the conclusion of the 1949 General Armistice Agreements. These were adopted on 11 August 1979 by the Security Council.

In the period up to June 1967 the tasks of the Mediator and the Truce Commission were completed and the institutions dissolved. UNTSO was given a new two-fold mandate: to observe and report on the truce, established on 18 July 1948, and to maintain the organisations of the Mixed Armistice Commissions.

In each of the General Armistice Agreements, there was no provision for the establishment of a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC), consisting of equal numbers of representatives from the signatory parties and with a number of observers to investigate complaints by the parties. Four MACs were created between Egypt-Israel (EIMAC), Israel-Syria (ISMAC), Israel-Lebanon (ILMAC) and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordon-Israel (HKJ-I-MAC).

However great the effort of UNTSO, functioning of the MACs depended primarily on cooperation between the parties. Between 1949 and 1967 a lack of such cooperation gradually paralysed all except ILMAC.

In 1956, after the Suez War, Israel unilaterally denounced its Armistice Agreement with Egypt and ceased cooperation with EIMAC. Following the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel also denounced the Armistice Agreements with Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. However, the United Nations did not recognise this unilateral action. Except for EIMAC, which was formally closed following the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the MACs are still formally maintained by UNTSO as peacekeeping instruments which may be activated in the future.

After the Suez War of 1956, UNTSO assisted in establishing the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) by providing a core of trained military and civilian personnel for the new peace-keeping operation. This was the first time UNTSO’s expertise was used to set up a new UN mission. To the present day this has been repeated for most UN observer and peace-keeping forces.

In the Israel-Syria armistice sector, UNTSO’s observation operations were initially resumed along the agreed ceasefire line. With the conclusion of the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces and the
establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), Observer Group Golan (OGG) and Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD) were formed, over time, to assist the new Force. OGG has since been divided between Tiberius and Damascus.

In the Egypt-Israel sector, the Observer Group Sinai (OGS) was formed and attached to the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). OGS was divided into two groups, OGS-C in Cairo and OGS-J in Jerusalem. When the mandate of UNEF II expired in July 1979, UNTSO's presence in the Sinai was maintained with the establishment of Observer Group Egypt (OGE) based in Cairo and manning outposts throughout the Sinai Peninsula.

In Lebanon, the situation changed following the outbreak of civil war. In March 1978, after the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established and UNTSO's operation in southern Lebanon was re-established as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) to assist UNIFIL. The headquarters of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in Beirut was also tasked as the United Nations Liaison Office in Beirut (UNLOB).

After the second Israeli invasion into Lebanon in June 1982, and the incursion of Israeli forces into Beirut in August 1982, the Security Council at the request of the Lebanese Government ordered the deployment of United Nations Observers to Beirut. UNLOB/ILMAC was subsequently augmented to form Observer Group Beirut (OGB) until 1992 when it was re-designated UNLOB/ILMAC.

Changes within the mission area in recent times have meant that UNTSO's deployment and organisation have had to be modified. Political, military and economic circumstances routinely impact on the way in which UNTSO operates; however, with its permanent mandate UNTSO remains flexible and capable of providing valuable assistance to all parties as well as developing expertise for future tasks.

**Work in the Outstations**

**JERUSALEM**

The seven outstations are commanded from Government House in Jerusalem. HQ UNTSO remains in contact with all stations through its communications network to the following locations:

Amman — UNLOA.
Beirut — UNLOB/ILMAC
Cairo & Ismailia — OGE
Gaza — UNLOG
Damascus & Tiberius — OGG & ODD, and
Naqoura & Nahariya — OGL.

The Chief of Staff UNTSO has a military and civilian staff, at HQ UNTSO, responsible to him for the normal command and management functions. The key military functions include operations, plans and personnel with the civilian staff providing administrative support, communications, transport, supply, security and general services.

The Australian Contingent UNTSO (ASC UNTSO) has 13 officers who are replaced individually at the end of their tour of duty. In Jerusalem one Australian officer is assigned to HQ UNTSO as an operations officer who is also assigned as the Contingent Administration Officer.

The appointment demands qualities of diligence, maturity, judgement and a capacity for work. He is often required to deputise for the COMASC who is primarily occupied with Outstation responsibilities at some distance from Jerusalem. The Admin Officer routinely greets all new contingent members and assists them with their orientation. Major Bruce Reeves and Major Barry Heathwood and their wives have developed a programme of orientation and farewell hospitality which has made adjustment to the environment and settling must less stressful and very enjoyable. In addition to his contingent and UN duties the Admin Officer also maintains close links with the Australian Embassy and performs essential liaison with the Ambassador and his staff on COMASC's behalf. In recent months the level of violent activity in Jerusalem has outstripped Beirut and the Admin Officer maintains a close watch on all developments for contingent security.

**AMMAN**

UNLOA, with four observers in Jordan, provides essential liaison services for the Jordanian and Israeli authorities. They operate from Amman and have the additional tasks of assisting in the Yarmuk river meetings, inspections of Jordanian territory south of the Dead Sea, and provision of assistance to UN personnel travelling in or through Jordan. While Australia has an officer earmarked to join UNLOA in the near future, it is not common for ASC members to serve in Jordan due to the need for UNTSO to share the appointments among all 18 member countries.

**BEIRUT**

UNLOB/ILMAC has four observers who maintain liaison with the Lebanese authorities in Lebanon. Service in Beirut has often been hazardous, but in the
past two years the level of risk of operating in Beirut has significantly diminished. Under its new Government, Beirut is re-establishing itself as a safe and effective national capital. There are no Australians serving in Beirut at this time, however this is expected to change in the near future.

ISMAILIA

OGE recently shifted its HQ from Cairo to Ismailia to facilitate operations in the Sinai and to cut costs. OGE has 28 military observers who are required to maintain UNTSO’s presence in the Sinai by manning four outposts and conducting daily vehicle patrols. Australia currently has Captain John Hathaway serving with OGE as his first station which will provide valuable experience for employment in Lebanon or on the Golan Heights.

GAZA

UNLOG, with four military observers, provides essential liaison services with the local authorities within the city of Gaza. The observers also provide escorts for UN personnel travelling from Egypt or Israel through the Gaza Strip. While UNTSO observers maintain good relations with the local population, their working relationships with other UN agencies and the Israeli authorities can often lead to elevated risk levels. For this reason, only volunteers are accepted for service with UNLOG and single servicemen are preferred. Currently, there are no Australians serving in Gaza.

DAMASCUS & TIBERIUS

OGG is divided into two outstations and a headquarters detachment. In total there are 95 officers serving in OGG with the majority committed to observation, inspection and patrolling duties on the Golan Heights. OGG headquarters is co-located with that of duties on the Golan Heights OGG headquarters is co-located with that of UNDOF and the group is placed under Operational Control of the Force Commander UNDOF. OGG-Damascus (OGG-D) mans five observation posts along the Syrian side of the Area of Separation (AOS) and participates in regular inspections of Syrian armed units in the Area of Limitation (AOL). OGG-Tiberius (OGG-T) complements OGG-D on the Israeli side with six observation posts and participation in regular inspections of IDF units in the AOL.

Currently, Australia has five officers serving in Tiberius (LTCOL Tony Miles, MAJ Rik Modderman, MAJ John Cronin, Capt Don Roach and Capt R. Bradley) and two in Damascus (MAJ Peter Murphy and MAJ Don Roach). It is normal after after a tour of duty in Syria to serve in Lebanon or Israel although it is not usual to serve in both Damascus and Tiberius.

NAQOURA & NAHARIYA

OGL is under the Operations Control of the Force Commander UNIFIL and has a strength of 509 military observers. It is responsible for observation and reporting within the Israeli Controlled Area (ICA) of South Lebanon and for maintaining essential liaison between all parties. OGL’s forward HQ is co-located with HQ UNIFIL in Naqoura with a rear HQ and a Reporting and Evacuation Centre located in Nahariya, just over the border in Israel. OGL comprises five Area Teams each with a discrete Area of Operations. Each Team maintains a minimum of four personnel on duty in Lebanon 24 hours per day. In periods of heightened tension the teams are reinforced to cope with the additional demands. OGS is the most active and challenging unit to work with; observers work harder, longer and at a higher risk that any other UNTSO outstation.

Australia lost Captain Peter McCarthy to a landmine while he was serving with OGL in 1988. Volunteers for longer service than normal are always welcomed and the unit prefers officers with at least some experience in one other outstation. Currently, there are four officers serving with OGL (MAJ Andrew Monro, MAJ Russ Lowes, MAJ John Baldwin, and CAPT Scott Thomas). The Australian Army, has in the past, provided the Commanding Officer for OGL alternating with the United States until 1988 when LTCOL Richard Higgins (USA) was abducted. Now the appointment is shared between the member nations. The last Australian Commanding Officer of OGL (LTCOL Steve Nicolls) was the eleventh since 1978 when UNFIL’s mandate began.

Conclusion

Although it is unlikely that UNTSO will fulfil its mandate until such time as all the nations involved reach a full and lasting peace and the UN forces in place have been withdrawn, it still provides a very necessary instrument for peacekeeping in the Middle East.

While its mission continues to change and develop with the circumstances, it also provides an excellent training ground for United Nations officers. Additionally, Australian Army participation, through the provision of positive and capable professional officers, has always been highly regarded by all member nations of UNTSO. Australia’s participation, in its small way, is seen as a clear signal to the United Nations of a national commitment to world peace.
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Military Medicine and Peacekeeping

By Colonel P.G. Warfe.

Introduction

The Defence Force Health Services provide health support to the ADF in war and peace, including rapid evacuation, treatment of sick and injured and rehabilitation. This article defines and explains the scope of military medicine and describes its utility and contribution to peacekeeping, including the successful participation in the humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq in 1991 and Somalia earlier this year.

Military medicine involves the prevention or control of disease among members of the military forces and the maintenance of the health and fitness of its personnel. It is therefore analogous to civilian public health activities except where it must be modified in scope to meet specific military conditions. These conditions result from characteristics peculiar to a military population, such as environmental factors which accompany military activities, disease threats, limited health infrastructure, and other restrictions imposed on the practice of military medicine by the nature of the military mission. Military medicine encompasses a wide range of health professional disciplines including those of preventative medicine and occupational health as well as the more obvious one involving direct patient care.

Military medicine may also be examined within the context of the three levels of war. At the tactical level, where commanders are concerned with the planning and conduct of battle, medical support involves direct care of the sick and wounded. It includes tropical medicine, resuscitation, initial wound surgery and the operation of the casualty evacuation system under the command and control of Health Services Officers. Medical strategic planning includes health intelligence on disease threats, research on drugs and vaccines for disease prevention, and detailed information on the national health infrastructure and assets available for deployment. It is at the operational level of war, however, that the medical and operational staff interactions have the greatest impact on the force. Battle plans, casualty forecasts, and administrative capabilities are provided by the operations staff and the command elements. The medical staff then recommends medical unit requirements, medical logistic requirements, evacuation systems, interface with other services and the civilian infrastructure, and preventive medicine measures. These tasks and considerations are complex and if overlooked, or inadequately addressed by non-military physicians, then a medical disaster could be part of the operation.

ADF Health Services comprise primary (aid post), secondary (treatment and evacuation), and tertiary (hospital) treatment and preventive medicine units and assets. These are deployable by road, sea and air into diverse and inhospitable environments, involving military operations, peacekeeping missions and natural disasters assistance. Although force structure planning is not undertaken on the basis of peacekeeping requirements, Health Services field units are readily adaptable to a peacekeeping or humanitarian support role. Previous public health medicine projects involving Defence health assets include: medical planning and policy formulation for flood and cyclone relief, vector surveys, provision of safe water, restoration of public health services both on and off shore, and support of United Nations and coalition forces operations. One recent, and instructive, example of such activities was the ADF humanitarian deployment on Operation Habitat to assist the Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq in 1991.

Operation Habitat

The deployment of the Australian contingent to northern Iraq was triggered by the immediate consequences of the Gulf War which ended on 26 February 1991. At that time, opposition forces in Iraq were encouraged to overthrow President Saddam Hussein. As a result, the Kurdish armed resistance movement, Peshmerga, attempted to seize northern Iraq from the control of the central government. The revolt was easily crushed by Iraqi military forces, resulting in half a million Kurdish refugees fleeing over the Turkish border and a further million refugees moving east into Iran.

From April to July 1991, an international relief
operation was mounted from ten different countries including Australia, although the principal commitments were from the United States and the United Kingdom.

As part of this effort, on 6 May 1991, the Australian Government decided to provide military humanitarian aid to assist the coalition forces in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Land Headquarters mounted the operation, sending 75 specialised, tri-service personnel to provide aid to the refugees in northern Iraq as part of a multinational force.

An outline of the planning sequence and execution of the operation, which have already been described in detail elsewhere, is as follows. Military medical and disaster planning normally begins with a casualty forecast, both of severity and numbers of wounded. However, this was not available before departure from Australia. Planning was therefore based on defining the capability of the team: number treated each day, depending on the severity and range of conditions that could be handled, and the back-up support, such as in-patient, surgical and transport, that would be required.

Humanitarian operations revolved around the three functional sections of the contingent: preventive medicine, medical (including dental), and field engineers. Initially, the detailed need for health assistance within the area of operations was determined by deploying reconnaissance teams with representatives from the three functional areas. These teams were assisted by Kurdish interpreters. Tasking was also coordinated where possible with other humanitarian groups, including the British government's Overseas Development Agency, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and the various non-government organisations such as Medecins sans Frontieres.

Four medical teams were sent, each comprising a medical officer, nursing officer and three medical assistants, including a senior non-commissioned officer. Medical assistants possess the skills of both the enrolled nurse and paramedic. Teams were equipped and structured so that they could work either independently or grouped together as larger teams to provide a 24-hour service if required.

Five women were selected, including two medical officers, two nursing officers (both qualified midwives) and three medical assistants. This allowed the inclusion of at least one female per team. As anticipated, they performed extremely well and demonstrated the potential of women in combat-related positions in the Defence Force.

Each team deployed with a Land Rover and trailer, and worked from the trailer. The teams both travelled about 200 kilometres and saw around one hundred
patients per day. Seriously ill patients were evacuated by US Blackhawk helicopter to the British hospital at Sirsenk.

The spectrum of disease observed was what was expected in an area where the basic health infrastructure had been disrupted. By the time the contingent arrived the situation had stabilised considerably. By that time more general patterns of illness had replaced acute “disaster type” injuries and diseases. Accordingly, the medical teams undertook primary care while the engineer and preventive medicine teams supervised and prepared advice on public health services including provision of safe water, health inspection of facilities, and rubbish disposal.

Using simple, standard therapeutic protocols, the contingent treated more than 3,000 patients during its three weeks in Iraq. Over 80 percent of these were children with diarrhoea, dehydration, malnutrition, scabies or skin infections. The contingent also saw a number of patients who had chronic diseases that required regular medication, including hypertension, epilepsy and peptic ulcers.

Although of short duration, Operation Habitat represents an instructive example of the utility of Military Health Services for effective public health intervention in areas where civil instability has resulted in a breakdown of existing services.

**Operation Solace**

In late 1992, the Australian Government committed an infantry battalion group to the United Nations sponsored humanitarian operation in Somalia, as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The Australian operation was named Operation Solace. The clinical problems encountered in Somalia have been described elsewhere. Significantly, an examination of the military medical aspects of the deployment underline once again the utility of Military Health Services Support during both peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The operation will be considered from the strategic, operational and tactical levels of health planning in order to illustrate the processes involved in effective Health Service Support to a military peace keeping or humanitarian mission.

The early involvement of the Surgeon General Australian Defence Force (SGADF) in strategic planning allowed timely activation of the health intelligence process and the development of medical countermeasures specific to the operation. Health threat assessments were an essential component of the threat assessment presented for Government decision and in the determination of conditions of service.
Strategic level Health Intelligence (HI) on Somalia was available at an early date to support the planning process. This was largely a consequence of an earlier direction given by SGADF to the Quadripartite Medical Intelligence Committee (QMIC) for HI on Somalia to support the earlier United Nations Somalia (UNOSOM) efforts.

The HI process as detailed in current doctrine was successfully used during Operation Solace. Health information collection was undertaken by the battalion group and, along with regular medical situation reporting, permitted close monitoring of the contingent health situation.

The strategic health support concept included level 1 support integral to the contingent, levels 2 and 3 (surgical) support provided in Somalia by UNITAF, and level 4 (specialist medical and surgical) support provided by civilian facilities in North Africa and US military facilities in Europe. Dedicated forward aeromedical evacuation (AME) was to be provided in Somalia by UNITAF, and strategic AME provided by the US to Germany or other locations in its strategic chain. The Air Commander Australia was responsible for strategic evacuation to Australia and for casualty regulation into Australia. Clearly, the health support arrangements placed heavy reliance on other nations, particularly the US.

Health support planning at the operational level was facilitated by convening a meeting of the Joint Health Planning Group (JHPG) at Land Headquarters on 23 December 1992. This Group comprises the senior health officers of Maritime, Land and Air Headquarters, and a SGADF representative. The meeting briefed all concerned on health support arrangements as then proposed, confirmed responsibilities for strategic AME and casualty regulation, and confirmed the health support assets to be embarked on HMAS Jervis Bay and HMAS Tobruk.

Providing HI to the JHPG was difficult as certain essential information was unavailable from either the UN or UNITAF. In particular, details of the health infrastructure in countries adjacent to Somalia were not available. Timely HI on diseases and the remnants of civil health facilities in the Baidoa Area of Operations was provided and proven accurate.

A key outcome of planning at the operation level was the recommendation to include a medical representative in the Reconnaissance Group. This proved extremely valuable in that he was able to provide current information on the health situation in Somalia, accurate advice on plans for the lodgement of health support elements, and confirm force arrangements for the in-theatre evacuation and treatment.

At home, the Support Area commands — Naval
Corporal Stephen Vigar, Medic 1 RAR, examines a young Somali boy.

Support Command, Army Logistics Command, and RAAF Logistics/Training Command — had important roles to play during all phases of Operation Solace, particularly during the mounting phase and on redeployment to Australia. Responsibilities included medical and dental preparations of forces deploying, health training, reception of casualties and ongoing medical management and surveillance on return to Australia.

It is clear from Operation Solace that to ensure these responsibilities are coordinated effectively during operations, the Support Area headquarters health staff need to be kept better informed, more involved in appropriate aspects of health planning, and their efforts coordinated. Establishing a Support Area Health Planning Group along the lines of the JHPG will be a useful initiative in this respect.

The Health Services Support available to the battalion group consisted of the following levels of health care. Firstly, integral or level 1 medical support was provided by the battalion Regimental Aid Post (RAP). Level 2 medical support including a treatment section, dental support, preventive medicine, and road evacuation in Baidoa was provided from the battalion group. Level 3 medical support was initially furnished afloat from the USS Tripoli, then from 86th Evacuation Hospital (US Army) and a Swedish Field Hospital in Mogadishu. Level 4 medical capability was provided, to a limited extent, by 86th Evacuation Hospital, civilian facilities in Kenya and Djibouti, and US military facilities in Germany.

It is significant that most other nations who contributed security forces to Solace included level 3 (surgical) elements as part of their integral medical support. The inclusion of a limited level 3 capability as part of a battalion group or similar contingent should be considered in future operations of this nature. A small but balanced medical support element capable of providing levels 1, 2 and 3 care would appear to be most appropriate and the development of the Army Mobile Field Surgical Team, MFST, appears timely.

Forward AME was provided from the US 159 Medical Company, which was equipped with Blackhawk helicopters and located at Baledogle. Strategic AME was available by the USAF from the mission area to Germany and elsewhere in the US strategic evacuation system. In addition, Air Commander Australia was tasked with being prepared to provide strategic AME to Australia. While no dedicated strategic AME missions were mounted, a number of ADF casualties were evacuated on an opportunity basis. Six casualties were evacuated by RAAF strategic AME. One casualty was evacuated
Sergeant Joanne Cook, Treatment Section Medic, helps dress a Somali boy suffering from malnutrition.

Major Darrell Duncan, Senior Medical Officer Operation Solace, monitors a young Somali boy who is recovering from a general anaesthetic for skin grafting, plastic surgery.

Private Christina Maclean, monitors a male Somali patient suffering from burns, at the treatment section.
through Okinawa and returned to Australia on a civil flight. Another casualty was evacuated on a return QANTAS B747 charter flight. The total number of casualties evacuated was eight.

HMAS Jervis Bay included level 3 medical support. HMAS Tobruk included level 1 medical support, limited level 2 medical support and dental support. The deployment again demonstrated the ADF’s inability to provide level 3 medical support afloat. Logistic support afloat will be most viable in operations where infrastructure ashore is inadequate, and nations contributing forces to such operations will often be expected to be logistically self-sufficient. While the RAN does have the capability to provide other forms of afloat support, it has not had the capability to provide level 3 medical support afloat since the decommissioning of HMAS Stalwart in 1988.

The need for this capability is recognised and alternative means of providing it are being investigated in light of the decision not to proceed with the Training Helicopter Support Ship.

Preventive medicine strategies applied to Operation Solace included: predeployment medical and dental checks; vaccination and chemoprophylaxis measures to confer protection against endemic diseases; enforcement of wearing appropriate clothing and footwear; encouragement of early reporting of injury and illness; an aggressive vector control program; constant water quality monitoring; stress debriefing; and medical surveillance on return to Australia.

Operation Solace provided an opportunity to learn more about the most important disease of military significance — malaria. In fact, experience gained will form the basis for a revision of ADF malaria policy. This revision has drawn on the experience of US forces with issues of compliance, side effects of chemoprophylaxis, and variations of prophylaxis and eradication regimes. There is evidence that the cohesive nature of the Battalion Group facilitated the compliance with malaria prophylaxis.

The importance of compliance with eradication course recommendations has been highlighted by the occurrence of two cases of falciparum malaria in personnel on their return to Australia. In one case, the soldier concerned was seriously ill requiring admission to intensive care with pulmonary oedema (fluid on the lungs).

One member of the Australian contingent was killed through an accidental discharge of a weapon and died prior to arrival at the battalion group medical element. A number of other ADF and Somali battle casualties were treated within the battalion group. No ADF battle casualties required evacuation to level 3 facilities in Mogadishu. Two Somali battle casualties were evacuated to Mogadishu, and four others to the local civilian hospital in Baidoa.

During the period of the Battalion deployment, the incidence of non-battle casualties was significantly lower than military historical experience had suggested it would be, although generally consistent with recent exercise experience in northern Australia. This can be attributed to the aggressive preventive strategy outlined above, the fact that forces deploying from Townsville were already acclimatised, the environment in Somalia not as being harsh as expected, and to the graduated program of physical activity within the battalion group on arrival in Somalia. The reporting rate for sickness and injury within the contingent was 15 per cent of the force per week. Orthopaedic conditions, particularly minor wounds, and gastrointestinal tract infections were the most common reasons for seeking treatment.

Dental support was included with the Battalion group and on HMAS Tobruk. Morbidity from serious dental disease was low, and this reflects the effectiveness of screening prior to deployment, an active dental preventive campaign within the ADF and access to dental support in the mission area. In fact, the Dental party from HMAS Tobruk provided significant support to allied naval forces and deployed to Baidoa for two weeks.

While a number of females, deployed on Operation Solace, they did not contribute disproportionately to morbidity. This is completely consistent with US experience in the Gulf War. Malaria prophylaxis and vaccination regimes have been revised to allow for the possibility of pregnancy and/or conflict with contraception protocols.

As in other recent operations, provision was made for stress management during Operation Solace. A team was deployed to Somalia to provide in-country debriefing prior to redeployment to Australia. Comprehensive ADF policy on this subject is currently being developed and experience to date indicates that the ADF approach to stress prevention is effective and efficient in managing critical incident stress reactions and probably reduces the incidence of subsequent post traumatic stress disorder.

**Conclusion**

Military medicine is a complex field which encompasses a broad spectrum of medicine, including to a very large degree, public health medicine. Its application, particularly during Operation Habitat, is widely...
regarded as a great success and emphasises one of the less well known capabilities of the Australian Defence Force.

Health Service personnel have also been represented in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, chemical weapons surveillance and destruction operations in Iraq, sanction enforcement operations on ships in the Red Sea. In Western Sahara an Army Medical Officer, Major Sue Felsche, became the first servicewoman to die on operations outside Australia since the end of World War II.

Health Services personnel have contributed to all the major deployments of Australian forces since Federation. They have established a reputation for excellence, and contributed significantly to the success of the numerous operations with which they have been involved. Their willingness to provide humanitarian medical aid where possible, in addition to their primary role, is well documented.

At a time when new concepts of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking are evolving, and when the distinction between military and civilian roles is becoming blurred, the ADF Health Services clearly possess the expertise and professional dedication to make a significant and unique contribution.

NOTES


Colonel Warfe is a military physician who holds specialist qualifications in Tropical and Preventive Medicine and is a graduate of the Command and Staff College. He was responsible for much of the operational medical planning for recent operations as Commander Land Command Medical Services during 1990-92. He is currently the Director of Defence Force Environmental Medical Policy in the Office of the Surgeon General Australian Defence Force.
On 31 October 1917, not far from the Sinai Peninsula, General Harry Chauvel sharpened up his Mounted Divisions for an early morning attack on the Turkish strong point of Beersheba, successfully outflanking the well-prepared defenses of Gaza. Today, Australians still start work early just a few kilometres away.

Instead of attacking to kill and capture, they man perimeter gates and defences, computer terminals, radios, telephones, storerooms and engineer sites to play a small part in maintaining the historic peace between Egypt and Israel which has underpinned the entire Middle East peace process since 1979. Without that peace, all present initiatives between Israel and its other neighbours would most probably slither into the desert sands. Australia’s Defence Forces have changed markedly in the last 75 years, but the missions remain vitally important.

The MFO

The MFO is separate to, and has no relationship at all with the United Nations (UN) or any of its organs. This important fact is often overlooked by many in Australia and abroad who have come to see the UN as the only peacekeeping vehicle of modern times.

The Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, signed on 26 March 1979, provided for the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula linked to agreed security arrangements. Final withdrawal of Israeli forces and civilians from the Sinai took place on 25 April 1982.

The agreed security measures specified in the Treaty were of two kinds: military restrictions in the Sinai and similar restrictions on both sides of the border area of Israel and Egypt. The Treaty established Zones A, B and C in the Sinai and Zone D in Israel, with specified limitations on armed forces, armaments and equipment in each zone. The Treaty also called for stationing a UN peacekeeping force and observers in Zone C.

It became clear in early 1981 that the United Nations would not be able to provide the peacekeeping force and observers required by the Treaty. Therefore, the United States assisted in the negotiation of a Protocol, signed on 3 August 1981 by Egypt and Israel and witnessed by the US, which provided for establishment of the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) to serve in place of the UN force and observers. The Protocol also set forth the organisation and function of the MFO and the privileges and immunities of the MFO and its members.

The Protocol stipulates that the expenses of the MFO which are not covered by other sources will be borne equally by the three parties. In practice, the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the US have each contributed approximately one-third of the annual operating expenses of the MFO, with the governments of Japan and Germany making smaller contributions.

The Force was in place on 20 March 1982 and the MFO formally assumed its functions at 1 p.m. on 25 April 1982.

The mission of the MFO can be stated very simply: to observe, to report, and to verify. But it also provides a convenient barrier force which would need to be overrun or removed if hostilities were ever to recommence. Under the protocol, the MFO must employ its best efforts to prevent any violation of the security measures set forth in the Treaty of Peace.

Responsibilities for operation and administration of the MFO are divided among four elements: MFO Headquarters in Rome, Force Headquarters in the Sinai, and branch offices representing the Director General in Cairo and Tel Aviv.

In accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, Egypt and Israel appoint a civilian Director General and approve the Director General’s appointment of a Force Commander, who must be of a different nationality to the Director General and of general officer rank.

The Director General is responsible for the direction of the MFO. His staff, located in Rome, handles all diplomatic matters between the MFO, Egypt and Israel, as well as with the governments of the countries which provide troops to the Force. They also carry out...
important functions in the areas of procurement, contracting and personnel matters.

The Force Commander reports to the Director General and the governments of Egypt and Israel. He has command of all MFO forces and civilians assigned to the area of operations. The Force Commander establishes an operational concept and promulgates Force Standing Procedures based on the Treaty and Protocol. The Force is organised and administered as described in the Protocol.

Eleven nations participate in the operational military force in the Sinai, their contingents ranging in size from four to 529 men and women. The total military strength of the Force is about 2,000. The civilian component consists of approximately 180 expatriates and 500 locally hired civilians. The United States, Colombia, Fiji and Italy provide units that perform the actual operational mission of the MFO. Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Uruguay provide support units and staff personnel to the MFO. Though not technically a participating state, Norway provides personnel to the Force Commander's staff.

The Force Commander's Headquarters is at the "North Camp" located in El Gorah, North Sinai. In addition to the Headquarters, the 3rd Colombian Infantry Battalion, the US 1st Support Battalion and the 2nd Fijian Infantry Battalion operate from North Camp. The remainder of the Force — the US Infantry Battalion and the Italian Coastal Patrol Unit — operate from South Camp located at Sharm el Sheikh.

The Director General's representatives in Cairo and Tel Aviv represent the Director General in Egypt and Israel. They convey the Director Generals views and requests to the governments of Egypt and Israel. They also support the liaison and administrative requirements of the forces of the MFO and manage local contract purchases within their respective countries.

Australia decided to contribute to the MFO following a request from MFO HQ Rome in late 1992. This request followed the sudden departure of the British contingent in October of that year. We had previously participated with soldiers and airmen in the 1980s, but withdrew in 1986 at government direction.

A reconnaissance was conducted in October-November 1992 by the Contingent Commander-designate and a Lieutenant Colonel from HQADF and a contingent was formed and trained in December. The assembly and dispatch of our contingent was carried out in haste, but in good order. We arrived to fill important positions left vacant by the British departure to find the MFO in considerable pain and eagerly awaiting our arrival.

Apart from the Assistant Chief of Staff position we provide a Force security officer (MAJ) and three security sergeants (RAINF, one with counter terrorist experience) a Deputy Force Executive Secretary (WO1), Force Chief Clerk (WO2), Camp Commandant (MAJ), RQMS (WO2), Engineer (MAJ), a doctor, clerks and command post duty sergeants. As well as this we provide a liaison sergeant in Tel Aviv and Cairo respectively and an information systems officer (MAJ) at MFO HQ Rome.

**How the MFO achieves its Mission**

The MFO is a tailor-made Force for the set of circumstances which surround the peace between Egypt and Israel and though it provides a successful example of peacekeeping operations in the field, its efficacy as a blueprint for similar operations must be carefully considered.

Activities in Zones A, B, and D are almost wholly the domain of the Civilian Observer Unit (COU) while the military arm of the MFO is focused in Zone C abutting Egypt's border with Israel. These two operational branches of the MFO, one civilian and manned by Americans, the other military and multinational, coordinate closely to achieve the MFO's mission.

The COU, with 15 personnel, consists of retired US military officers and senior non-commissioned officers and active duty US foreign service officers, who resign from the US State Department or other US foreign affairs agencies when they accept a position with the COU.

The Chief of the COU is always a US Foreign Service Officer. Two-man COU teams, accompanied by a liaison officer from the respective country, cover the three zones in the Sinai and the one zone in Israel twice a month from the air (reconnaissance), and twice a month on the ground (verification). A reconnaissance mission and verification mission make up one cycle of inspection.

The missions ensure that military personnel and equipment in the zones do not exceed the agreed limits. Additionally, the COU checks that the various types of equipment are in the proper zones and that only equipment authorised by the Treaty is introduced into the area. The formal reports of these verifications are sent to Egypt, Israel and our Director's headquarters in Rome.

Violation reporting is one facet of the MFO operations. However, violations are very few, technical in nature and usually the result of mistakes (i.e., overflights, individuals and equipment in the wrong zone, misunderstanding of instructions, etc.).
Ground Forces:

Troops in Zone C are formed into three light infantry battalions along an approximate 400 km frontage extending from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Strait of Tiran in the south.

These battalions, which have recently been reduced in size, man a total of 30 permanent remote field sites to perform their mission as follows:

a. The 339-man Fijian Battalion occupies the Northern Sector.
b. The 356-man Colombian Battalion occupies the Central Sector.
c. The 529-man US Battalion occupies the Southern Sector from the Taba/Eilat Border area, along the Gulf of Aqaba, to Sharm El Sheikh.

Maritime Forces:

In addition to these land-based elements, the Italian Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU), consisting of three former mine sweepers monitors and reports all ship and air traffic activities in the Strait of Tiran. These Italian boats are tasked with the mission of ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran. Historically, it is a strategic choke point with those four countries with ports on the Gulf of Aqaba (Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia). The CPU conducts patrols in the Strait on a daily basis from their port facilities at Sharm El Sheikh. While one ship is at sea, a second remains on ready notice (two hours) and a third can muster its crew on 12 hours notice. The CPU ships monitor all ship traffic through the Strait, and coordinate closely with our shore-based observation posts in the South Sinai and on Tiran Island.

Air Forces:

The MFO maintains a helicopter force of 10 UH IH aircraft in two bases in North Camp El Gorah and South Camp Sharm El Sheikh. These aircraft were previously provided by Australia, New Zealand and Canada, but are now provided by the US and come under the command of the Commanding Officer of the 1st Support Battalion. In addition, the French Air Force provides a Fixed Wing Aviation Unit which provides one Twin Otter aircraft for command liaison, air observation and administrative tasks. The country, though ruggedly beautiful, can be desolate and the climate harsh. Most posts are isolated and are dependent upon sub-unit integrity and the leadership of junior officers and NCOs to accomplish their part of the peacekeeping mission. The constant rotation in and out of observation posts and checkpoints, coupled with infantry battalion rotation schedules of between six months to one year provides unique training challenges.

To fill the gaps in coverage between the permanent field sites, each battalion is tasked to conduct temporary operations in its area of responsibility. Each battalion deployed temporary observations posts (TOPs) at random locations in their sectors. These TOPs will last from 24 to 48 hours, and may be inserted by helicopter if required.

In addition, each battalion is tasked to conduct daily motorised patrols (MOTs) in their sector. These patrols will operate on planned patrol routes, and normally only last a single day. On average, there are 21 temporary OPs and up to 60 motorised patrols conducted in a normal week.

Daily activity consists of patrolling and observation tasks. Checkpoints log all military vehicle traffic and observation posts file incident reports on any significant activities within their area of responsibility. Sector control centres coordinate all reporting from sites in their sector, and in addition dispatch patrols to complete their assigned temporary OP and motorised patrol tasks. Battalion operation centres consolidate all reports from their remote field sites and submit a daily summary of significant events to the Force Headquarters.

Specific incidents that may hold Treaty-related implications are reported immediately by the battalion HQ to the Force Duty Centre where they are passed to...
The author as Assistant Chief of Staff receives a briefing from Italian and French liaison officers in North Camp Zone C.

A Force Operations representative. The Force Operations Officer consults with the Force Counsel for legal and treaty-related affairs, and the Force Commander. Should the circumstances require further clarification, a field grade officer specifically trained to conduct incident investigations will be dispatched from the Force Operations staff to conduct an investigation.

The investigator is required to report back to the Force Commander with a written record of his investigation and conclusions as soon as possible (always within 24 hours and generally much sooner). The Force Commander, in consultation with his cabinet (consisting of the Chief of Staff, Force Counsel, Chief Civilian Observer Unit and Force Operations Officer), reviews the investigator’s report and findings in detail before making a recommendation on the final disposition (violation or not) to the Director General.

The investigating officer attends the cabinet deliberation and the members are free to question the investigator at length. This system of detailed investigation and deliberations has served the MFO well over the past 11 years.

As a matter of interest over the past two years we have recorded on average a single treaty violation per month. All were minor in nature and were immediately rectified by the Treaty party concerned. By comparison, in UNIFIL in Lebanon up to 30 violations or incidents can occur in one day.

To ensure high standards are maintained by all MFO personnel, the Force Operations staff conduct a series of operational readiness checks and no-notice inspections on a monthly basis. These checks evaluate the soldiers’ ability to perform all mission essential tasks and as well ensure consistent standards of maintenance at all sites. When problems are identified they are either rectified or site assistance visits are organised so that the soldiers in the field are given the necessary guidance and training. As one may well appreciate, constant training is an ongoing requirement of the Force.

A most important function in this, and in all peacekeeping operations, is the liaison system which has become one of the most valuable assets of the MFO. It is an authorised network of official contact and coordination between the MFO, Egypt and Israel. It is structured in three tiers and is an extremely effective way to resolve issues and coordinate requirements. For example, the Director General in Rome, deals with political and multilateral issues and maintains at this level, communications with Egypt, Israel, the USA, and with participating nations. The Force Commander also has direct channels to Egyptian and Israeli generals who have responsibilities for liaison within their countries; the MFO relies on the Chief of
Operations and Liaison to maintain the day-to-day and routine staffing within the liaison system, especially at the two border crossing points at Eilat and Rafah.

There are two aspects of the liaison system that should be stressed and which are important for any peacekeeping force. The first is that every effort is made to promote the relations between the Treaty parties. The second is that the relations at the lower levels are of the utmost importance. This helps to resolve issues at the lower levels and it keeps the higher levels free to deal with more complex issues, should they arise. A workable liaison system is fundamental to the success of any peacekeeping mission, and should not be overlooked in the haste to get troops on the ground.

Most contributing nations to peacekeeping forces do not conduct specific peacekeeping training. A feature unique to the MFO is the eight-man New Zealand training and advisory team (under the plans and training section) which has as its mandate the responsibility to conduct and supervise all mission essential training in the Force. The conventional wisdom seems to be that “general purpose combat training” is the best means of maintaining readiness for all types of contingency operations, including peacekeeping.

Here at the MFO, we complement that foundation by training our soldiers in those mission-essential tasks specific to our role such as reading Arabic numerals, identifying Egyptian and Israeli aircraft, driving, patrolling and survival. The MFO also teaches soldiers how to adapt to the environmental and cultural differences in our area of operations. Also, in several lessons, special attention is given to the difference between a combat soldier and a peacekeeper. After successfully completing the MFO site commanders’ orientation course, our junior NCOs are qualified to assume responsibility for any of our 30 remote sites.

The MFO has assembled a comprehensive pre-deployment package which is used by the infantry battalions at home before deploying to Egypt. It contains unique MFO training lessons that the unit will use in its pre-deployment training.

Force recognition posters covering the gamut of military aircraft, ships and vehicle types — as well as other weapons of both Egyptian and Israeli forces — are available throughout the Force. The aforementioned on-site inspectors and readiness checks evaluate the validate MFO training and operational effectiveness.

Both Egypt and Israel have vested real power in the Director General so that he can take decisions quickly to satisfy their needs. The Director General tasks the Force Commander directly. In turn the Force Commander has clear operational control over all the elements of the Force in the Sinai. English is the working language.

The success of our mission depends a great deal on the provision of reliable communications. A comprehensive network of HF and VHF radios exists, linking the Force Headquarters through each battalion’s headquarters, to the sector control centres (equivalent to sub-unit, company level, headquarters), and then to observation posts, checkpoints and patrols, in the Sinai.

The Force is also linked to the Director General’s office in Rome and his representative offices in both Cairo and Tel Aviv. Radio, telephone, facsimile and teletype facilities are employed daily.

### Support

While the operational mission of the MFO is to verify the compliance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty, a significant part of the MFO mission is accomplished simply by maintaining a physical presence in the region.

The MFO’s support function is a challenging operation, particularly in this harsh physical environment, where we must develop and maintain our own support infrastructure.

The logistics system is tailored to the mission, supplies are drawn from North America, Europe, Egypt and Israel, both through the US Department of Defence Supply System, and our own civilian procurement offices in Cairo and Tel Aviv.

Unlike many UN organisations, where much of the support is delegated to the various contingents which are largely supported through national supply channels, the MFO has a centralised supply system which supports the entire Force. All MFO activity is consolidated at the Force Material Management Centre (FMMC) which is responsible for procurement, warehousing, accountability, issue and disposal of all classes of supply. The FMMC is composed of 47 soldiers and civilians who are responsible to provide such commodities as food, fuel, water, ammunition, office supplies construction materials and repair parts to the Force.

With only a few exceptions, the MFO actually owns the equipment used throughout the Force. This includes ADP and office equipment, office and billets furniture, assorted vehicles, electronics and commercial equipment, food service equipment, etc. The MFO does not own its fleet of ten UH-1 helicopters, nor its three naval vessels or its one fixed wing aircraft belonging to the US, Italy and France respectively.

The MFO currently executes a support services contract with Holmes and Narver Services Inc. (HNSI). While various MFO staff sections provide oversight and direction to HNSI supervisors, much of
the actual work is performed by HNSI's locally-hired employees. Their project manager is also an integral member of the MFO management.

The main problem with logistics is optimising efficiency in a multinational workplace. Procedures and organisation can be convoluted and bureaucratic and the US national logistics ethos, which dominates in the MFO experiences difficulty adjusting to the specific circumstances of the MFO which require a lean, lightly equipped and financially stringent concept of supply.

Peacekeeping forces are notoriously over-manned and over-ranked and the MFO is no exception. This impacts particularly in the support area.

**Financial Management**

The total MFO budget presently sits at around SUS56 million. Of this only SUS17.2 million is the budget to be spent to run the Force in FY 93/94, the remainder being held at MFO HQ Rome to pay overheads such as the HNSI contract, troop deployment costs, insurance, and the exhaustive cost of civilian salary packages and of maintaining a large headquarters in Rome. This budget has come down by more than half from the early days when cost was not a problem. The SUS17.2 million allocated to the Force is tightly managed and the costs per man compare most favourably with those of similar UN forces; however, the bulk of funds is spent in Rome. How it is spent and on what, is not widely known to the Force and is closely guarded information.

Within the Force certain officers have been given responsibility for a variety of budget lines which they must manage to keep the Force functioning effectively. Monthly meetings and regular staff contact ensure that wastage is minimised and the forecasts for expenditure are accurate. One of the principal tasks of the Australian Assistant Chief of Staff is to act with the Force Comptroller to steer this budget management process. Generally, the system works, notwithstanding a degree of unnecessary micro management from Rome perhaps unavoidable from a headquarters with only one formation to command.

**Life for the Soldier**

Peacekeeping operations are often described as monotonous, boring and arduous. This description is more than appropriate to the MOF. The jobs the Australians fill are not demanding and in some cases are well beneath their capabilities. Nevertheless, everyone is busy and many need to work long hours as the MFO struggles to administer itself. Our people are employed "in trade" doing jobs they might be expected to perform in Australia, but in the more challenging environment of a joint and combined multinational environment. The Australians are integrated with soldiers of other nationalities and are in many cases isolated from regular daily contact with other Australians.

Most of the Australians live in 15-man ATCO-hut type prefabricated accommodations with a small air conditioned room, a bed and a desk. The base is a defended position surrounded by barbed wire, patrolled by guards and over viewed from watch towers. In appearance, North Camp is not unlike a POW or refugee camp except that the dining and living conditions inside are far better. The North Camp is three hours from Tel Aviv when the border is open and five hours from Cairo, but is otherwise remote and isolated. The Bedouin are our neighbours and the MFO maintains a good relationship with them.

**Stress**

Almost everyone in the contingent exhibited signs of stress to varying degrees. A number of soldiers required counselling, two were repatriated to Australia as a result of stress and the remainder managed it in varying ways.

In the MFO the peace holds and there is little likelihood of death by gunfire or hostile action, so it quickly became apparent that this deployment would not be as sassy or adventurous as some of the ADF's concurrent operations in places like Somalia or Cambodia. This contributed visibly to stress, as soldiers, trained for war, found that they faced similar tasks and employment to their peace time jobs at home, but had to live a long way from home in isolated and difficult conditions without regular contact with their families. Soldiers would remark that they would rather be in Cambodia or Somalia "doing their job" than be stuck in Sinai.

A perception developed in the minds of some soldiers that ASC MFO was forgotten at home and this was exacerbated by the exhaustive media coverage and staff attention given to more adventurous expeditions in Somalia and Cambodia compared with the relative lack of coverage and interest in ASC MFO Sinai.

When soldiers deploy to a remote outpost at the other end of the globe, separated from friends and families to serve their country, their sense of self worth...
A typical MFO remote observation post usually manned by a squad of 6 to 10 men.

is challenged when they find that their efforts are described as routine and when the lack of excitement and adventure associated with their jobs fail to excite a reasonable amount of interest from home outside the circle of immediate friends and family. Staff officers responsible for action on peacekeeping must always remember that the great photograph or exciting near-death action in a situation report may not always be forthcoming. Nevertheless there is a human interest story in every soldier’s sacrifice when he deploys on such missions and it is the ADF’s challenge to listen to it and acknowledge it and report it where appropriate.

The monotony of life in the MFO combined with the 12-month length of tour was probably the greatest stress factor during service here. Prior to departure from Australia, and for a time after arrival, there was great excitement. Once the novelty of being in the Middle East wore off, as it inevitably did, then life at North Camp settled down to a daily and weekly routine which affected different people in different ways. Life here can be compared to living at RAAF Base Tindal for a year. All the basic needs of life are provided, but it’s a long way from home. The base has a book and video library and a local TV station which transmits American and other European programs. Very little Australian content is shown. Land Command amenities provide a quantity of Australian newspapers and magazines. However, soldiers were encouraged to write letters and to keep a diary to record their experiences. All the above helped to relieve boredom with varying degrees of success.

Quite a number of people relieved boredom by coming into work on weekends and evenings. Leave, particularly local weekend leave, became paramount. I encouraged, and in some cases insisted, that soldiers take it; however, there was a catch 22. The allowances are so paltry in ASC MFO that many soldiers could not afford to go on leave to places like Tel Aviv and Cairo where hotels cost over SUS100 per night and where prices for meal, entertainment and goods exceeded those in the centre of Sydney. The decision sometime into the tour by HQ ADF and the Land Commander to support the acquisition of a rented apartment in Tel Aviv for leave use greatly enhanced soldiers’ ability to take a break and such devices are important to relieve stress.

I anticipated a problem with alcohol and was relieved to find that this did not occur. One soldier clearly had a drinking problem stemming back to Australia and for this and other reasons it was ultimately necessary to repatriate this fellow. For the remainder, the bottle did not become their counsel. It is, however, a constant danger and one which needs to be guarded against.
By far the most effective answer to stress was to keep people fit. We started the year with a regular and intensive fitness program and later this evolved into individual training programs. However, once per month we got together for a 5km run and the contingent participated in a range of sporting fixtures such as rugby, floor hockey and slow pitch baseball. Without doubt physical fitness proved to be the most important factor in the mental well being of the soldiers.

In this contingent soldiers faced a number of personal challenges. One soldier's wife had a baby in the middle of the father's year in Sinai. He missed the pregnancy and the birth, arriving home on leave two days later. On the day of his return to Sinai he was called from Australia to be told his baby was in hospital intensive care and may not survive the night. Fortunately, the child recovered. Another soldier was repatriated partly due to a collapse in his marriage brought on by his posting to Sinai and at the time of writing a second soldier was being repatriated for the same reason. A number of soldiers experienced family troubles, leading to huge phone bills and considerable stress. Single soldiers lost fiancées and girlfriends due to their absence and married members' children at home got sick and broke bones. One soldier's father died, others had financial problems they really needed to be in Australia to fix. Family-related stress was a major consideration in this contingent and affected almost everybody whether married or single.

Two points that flow from the above are firstly that the value of a tried and tested welfare support infrastructure back home was proven again and again. The Land Headquarters Welfare Cell helped the unit several times and prevented problems from developing into disasters. These support mechanisms need to receive the fullest support from commanders and staff. Secondly, soldiers in the 1990s have different demands upon them and the sacrifices they are prepared to make and the circumstances in which they are prepared to make them are different. We really need to think about the families and what they stand to lose or gain when we send the father and husband, or the wife in the case of female soldiers, off to the desert for a year in non-war-like service. A year is a very long time in a young family's life, a fact older soldiers in more secure family and financial circumstances may wish to contemplate.

Stress is an insidious infection. It often appears when it is least expected, in those most unlikely to experience it and in response to the most surprising stimuli. Danger and active service can cause it, and so can isolation, boredom and an absence of self worth associated with lack of recognition. Australian society of the 1990s is different to any other time in our military history and it is at this time precisely that we are seeing the advent of peacekeeping as an ADF mission. Our study and discussion of the issue of stress needs to reflect these contemporary perspectives and should consider but not dwell on the past.

### Conditions of Service

As a considerable amount of time and effort was spent by ASC MFO, LHQ and other branches of Defence and Government looking at ways to improve the conditions of service of ASC MFO soldiers, this article would be incomplete without mentioning it. By far the poorest of Australia's peacekeepers, the ASC MFO soldier receives a Sinai allowance of $A25 per day. Some other nations working with us in the MFO have negotiated with the MFO daily allowances for their troops of between $US120 to $US150 tax free. Taxed and converted to US dollars, the currency used in the MFO, the Australian allowance amounts to about $US10-$11 per day. The average cost of a phone call for 10-15 minutes to Australia is $US50 (almost $A100). Throw in postage, toothpaste, razors, batteries, a role of film and Coca-Cola and it's easy to see that some ASC MFO soldiers experienced financial difficulty as a result of their posting.

Some soldiers could not afford to go on local leave to Israel or Cairo and it was not uncommon for some to spend 12 to 16 weeks on camp without a break. Others were able to spend their own money to travel and to take local leave when going on leave in Israel or Egypt. The soldier's Australian dollars, which he drew in US dollars, had to be converted and therefore devalued again into shekels or Egyptian pounds so that his purchasing power was further reduced. The additional burdens upon the families due to the absences of fathers and husbands such as child care, handyman costs, car maintenance, etc. were not compensated for. During 1993 alone, the depreciation of the Australian dollar reduced disposable income for the contingent by about 10 per cent. Subsequently, many of the soldiers who served in Sinai finished financially behind at the end of their posting.

The irony in this case is that Australia determined what soldiers would be paid, unlike UN operations where soldiers are often paid directly by the UN in accordance with separate scales and methods. The MFO was happy to reimburse Australia for whatever allowances it decided to pay, therefore there was to be no net cost to Australia. We chose to pay our soldiers an inadequate sum, thus preventing the soldier from
being able to say to his or her family that the absence meant there would be no hardship in it for them. As a result of inadequate financial compensation some wives left work as a result of their husband’s posting to look after children, while others were forced to take up work to pay the extra bills.

There appears to be agreement that the financial conditions of service packages for ASC MFO should be improved, but the process for achieving this seems bureaucratic and convoluted. There are also fundamental philosophical issues to be addressed about how we Australians are going to provide for soldiers on peacekeeping operations. There is no doubt that some UN peacekeeping deployments involving Australians have been generous. ASC MFO’s circumstances are at the opposite end of the spectrum and in the case of the MFO have put us in the category of the Third World nations. This disparity in standards from one mission to another has become incongruous.

Those responsible for determining a soldier’s financial conditions of service at all levels of defence and government need to remember that the soldier and his family are a team. The father or mother goes on peacekeeping operations because he or she joined the Defence Force and it is their duty, not necessarily because they want to be there.

The spectacular frequently tax-free salaries earned by civilians and some military from other participating countries in the MFO and UN do little to warm the conscience.

Challenges

One of the great experiences of peacekeeping is the exposure it brings to a diverse range of foreign soldiers and civilians. This experience can be one of the great pleasures and frustrations of peacekeeping service.

In the MFO, English is the language of the Force, however, the substantial number of Colombians, Uruguayans and Spanish-speaking Americans means that Spanish is the common usage second language. For many of the other participating nations such as the French, Dutch, Italians, Norwegians and Fijians, English is not the mother tongue thus inhibiting conversation on complex issues. Throw in the Arabic of Egypt and Hebrew of Israel and it quickly becomes apparent that Australians face a daunting challenge.

Those such as security sergeants who work regularly with civilian or military personnel without English are compelled to learn elementary level Spanish and Arabic while others can survive with only English. Indeed, in some cases it would be fair to say that our use of Australian jargon and local slang has meant we are far from the best English speakers in the MFO, which has required almost everyone to be careful with their speech. The whole experience underlined the relevance of language training to the ADF of the 1990s, not only Asian languages but other commonly used vernacular.

I had anticipated before our deployment that the degree of comfort soldiers enjoyed in the multinational work place would vary from person-to-person and this expectation proved correct. Some soldiers warmed only to English-speaking western nationalities while others developed friendships in the Hispanic and European contingents. As one might have anticipated, a very healthy and warm bond of friendship has developed between our own contingent and those of New Zealand and Fiji and an unofficial South Pacific forum developed.

Some soldiers arrived thinking that if it wasn’t Australian it wasn’t any good and saw that there were soldiers of ability and determination in other countries. Others arrived thinking that if it was Australian it wasn’t as good and also found they were wrong. Some soldiers always sat together with other Australians at meal times while others made a point of approaching soldiers from other nationalities whenever the chance arose. As a commander you can encourage soldiers in these areas, but you cannot force them. Every personality finds his own nook which is another reason why we must select our people very carefully for these operations. The more complex the multinational flavour of a force, the more particular we must be in our selection and our training.

Following on from the above, I had looked forward to observing the attitude of the contingent to Egypt and the Middle East. Sinai is a land of extremes in every respect. Populated by nomadic Bedouin and town-based El Arishies it offers a myriad of cultural and religious extremes. Dirty and primitive, it is a land of great rawness and spectacular beauty. Only five hours away by road is Cairo with its swarm of 20 million people; it is a crowded mass of humanity as chaotic and foreign as it is diverse and exciting. By contrast Israel is more western with its green fields, beaches, movie theatres, restaurants and bars. Some soldiers were immediately attracted to the place that more closely resembles home while others sought to immerse themselves in the mysteries of Egypt — in its bazaars, its food and its culture. A few soldiers were clearly and visibly uncomfortable in Egypt. They sought to avoid it in their off duty time and were openly critical of what they saw as its cultural short comings. Some of these were officers, warrant officers and
junior leaders with an influence over younger soldiers and I found it necessary to counsel them early on about setting the right example. As ASC MFO is a formed unit within a unified force, individuals are rarely exposed to foreign nationals in isolated areas for extended periods as has been the case in some of Australia’s other peacekeeping missions. Had this been required it would have been necessary to select carefully from within the contingent. A proven NCO, WO or officer in regimental life in Australia may have precisely the wrong psychology needed to establish rapport with people from the opposite side of the cultural universe in a remote part of a foreign land. Conversely, an average regimental soldier at home may blossom in this environment. At best, the wrong mind-set may cause a collapse of confidence and cooperation between the soldier and the indigenous soldiers or civilians whom he is trying to help and between whom he must keep the peace; at worst it could have far more serious consequences. This consideration is one which those selecting and training soldiers for peacekeeping would be most wise to contemplate.

Once the initial adventure of pre-embarkation training, deployment and settling in was over it became clear the challenge here would be keeping the troops on fire for the 12 months of their posting. Every soldier experienced a different year. To the extent that it is possible to generalise I would say that for most there were peaks and troughs throughout the year. Arriving in January, it began with a surge of excitement which by April had subsided as routine set in and familiarity with the area partly diluted the mystery of the Middle East. Morale was lifted again as soldiers received their mid-tour reunion travel leave. It remained buoyant on their return from leave, crashing into the depth of despair shortly afterwards as the reality of another five to six months to go dawned. The next up swing occurred as the end of the tour approached. No doubt a few months after returning to Australia and their new units, members of the contingent will be sitting at work reading this edition of the ADFJ depressed that they are not back in Egypt! The nature of the Australian soldier has not changed over the years and I’m sure that many commanders before me over many overseas deployments would comment on similarly trends.

A most important aspect of maintaining morale involved expectations. Fortunately, as Contingent Commander, I had the advantage of having conducted a reconnaissance of the Sinai so I was able to paint a very factual and realistic, if at times bleak picture of what to expect. I explained in blunt terms that the jobs and operational environment would be for many quite mundane and familiar, but that the Middle East location and multinational flavour would provide the greatest experiences. Thus, some anticipations were dispelled and no one was led to expect too much and therefore disappointment. There are two messages here: firstly, that Commanders must be involved in recons and secondly that we must be brutally frank with the troops and not create expectations which cannot be met. Peacekeeping is rarely exciting.

It was made clear to all that discipline in the unit would be stringently maintained and that offences would be dealt with promptly and severely. Interestingly, the news of punishment of two AWOL soldiers in Somalia was well received in ASC MFO by all ranks and this example strengthened our own morale and discipline. Generally, the quality of our people was such that formal disciplinary action in terms of the DFDA was not necessary. Nonetheless, problems were encountered born partly on the back of frustration, boredom and problems at home. These were dealt with administratively by the tried and tested combination of a CO and his RSM identifying the problem early and taking action to fix it together. If that relationship is right, as it was in this case, then disciplinary concerns are generally nipped in the bud before they develop into problems. During this tour it became necessary to repatriate two soldiers for failing to perform, a significant ratio for a small contingent of 26. On three occasions I needed to consider disciplinary action. In each of these instances, which occurred a long way from home in an isolated part of the Middle East, my RSM was an invaluable source of advice and assistance. To those who would question the relevance of the RSM in today’s modern army I would say that in peacekeeping operations where Australians deploy as formed contingents it was my experience that having him there was essential and helped stand us apart from other contingents in terms of both discipline and soldier career management.

ASC MFO was raised as a new unit on the Order of Battle as direct command unit LHQ. This was done in great haste following Australia’s decision to accede to the MFO’s request to provide a contingent. During the reconnaissance in late 1992, which I conducted in the company of a Lt Col from HQADF, I was able to firm up the exact number of people required and ascertain in basic terms their job descriptions. This was done is the haze of multinationalism without a firm grasp of
the MFO’s force organisation and modus operandi. As a result of this reconnaissance it was possible to articulate the needs of the mission to LHQ and others and preempt problems before they developed.

From the outset, I was provided with first class support from LHQ staff particularly in plans and operations and later in administration. They way LHQ is presently structured and operating provides a very stable platform to launch peacekeeping operations of this type. A unit establishment was raised and my new RQMS and I found ourselves standing in a warehouse at Randwick, Sydney, with a trestle table, chairs and stores arriving in a matter of weeks.

The only difficulty experienced was a tendency by some of the staff officers to question a commanding officer’s request for stores without good reason. Why did we need gloves, why this, why that? There was resistance where there should have been only support and valuable time and energy was lost. We also suffered from the instant expert, when some (but not all) who had served in the MFO years before insisted they knew better even though the MFO had changed since then and was under new management. These were minor problems, however, and over-all things went smoothly.

We focused on administration, area familiarisation, range practices, mine awareness training and fitness knowing that a further period of training would be conducted in-country. In retrospect, my advice to those who follow would be to concentrate on the soldier’s mental preparation while in Australia. Quite often training in the physical skills he needs to do his job will need to await deployment when he has access to the equipment and the operational environment in which he will work. It will always need to be complemented by country training and time and resources need to be allotted for this.

This first ASC MFO deployed as a contingent in two packets: an advance party on 7 January 1993 and a main body on 16 January 1993. Things went reasonably smoothly until we arrived in Egypt to find the MFO poorly prepared for our arrival. We were assisted enormously by the New Zealand contingent, which had been in the MFO since 1982, and without their help and guidance we would have had far more difficulty settling in.

Finally, a great strength in the way Australia provides for its peacekeeping missions is the financial arrangements. The combination of Australian government credit card and cash imprest enabled the contingent to pay its soldiers and but essential stores and supplies quickly and effectively and ultimately helped us to commence MFO operations weeks ahead of the planned date.

The MFO is a force of observers and soldiers commanded at the political level by our HQ in Rome comprised almost totally of diplomats, lawyers and accountants with only one formation under its command. Sprinkled about the Force are a large number of civilians filling key appointments whose loyalties are to Rome HQ and not the the Force Commander. As a result there is a lot of lobbying, informing and politicking which can at times make life difficult for the Force Commander and his military staff.

The Force must work closely to the political level, which for a brigade-sized force is a rare situation. There is a lot of micro management and a range of perceived inequities with which the soldier must live. The civilians are comparatively well off with generous financial packages which include tax-free salaries for Rome staff, generous accommodation and child’s schooling entitlements.

Rather than lapse into cynicism it is necessary to roll with the waves and just acknowledge the nature of things with peacekeeping. Officers and soldiers need to be mentally prepared for what they will find. The principles and ethics by which soldiers set their standards may not be found where they may be sought. Nevertheless there are times when a Contingent Commander must stand on an issue particularly where soldiers’ welfare is at stake. The civilian bureaucracy in the case of the MFO does not treat contingents or their commanders well, preferring to address issues through diplomatic channels often without even informal consultation at contingent level. In the MFO case it was my experience that pressure was applied to deny or interrupt open communication between the ASC and LHQ Australia. Contingent commanders and commanders in Australia need to anticipate these developments and work around them through effective national command arrangements, good communication and thorough staff work.

**Thoughts on Command**

I came to Operation Mazurka as Commanding Officer of ASC MFO from two years as Commanding Officer of the 1st Commando Regiment, so I was fortunate to have had the experience to fall back on. I recall how as a Lieutenant in my first battalion I had looked up to the CO in awe. Once you are there you find that your powers are not endless. There are questions from above and below that you cannot answer. There are problems you cannot solve and support you cannot rally. There are somethings you can achieve and some you will never achieve. As always when in
command you must feel your way and develop your priorities in accordance with your conscience and the operational circumstances in which you find yourself.

In comparing command of a combat unit to that of a peacekeeping contingent I would say that there are minor but not fundamental differences and that our training in Australia prepares us well. In this case, as is commonly found in peacekeeping, my contingent was split up and swallowed into a much larger force. Soldiers worked to an MFO supervisor on MFO matters and to me on Australian contingent issues. This cannot be resisted and Commanding Officers need to accept that they will lose control of their people to some extent.

In the ASC MFO we always met up for morning tea once a week to exchange news and information from time-to-time contingent physical training or social gatherings were organised. Despite this, rosters and shifts meant that the only time the whole contingent was together in one place at one time was at the beginning and the end of the tour of duty.

Morale issues and soldiers' living and working conditions warrant special attention from commanders on peacekeeping operations. The multinational nature of peacekeeping and the civilian peacekeeping bureaucracy can forget soldiers and their welfare and sometimes only personal representation by a Contingent Commander to the Force Commander can fix a problem. It pays to keep yourself well informed and to know what's going on in the Force.

A challenge, particularly on operations such as Mazurka is orienting the soldier towards peacekeeping and away from aggressive action. Sensitivity to this helps not only achievement of the mission, but assists interoperability with other contingents.

As always in command, it's a lonely road to walk. Everything is your problem as you represent the system to the soldier who cannot be expected to fully comprehend the complexities of the decision making process either within the peacekeeping force or at home. You receive little gratitude nor should it be expected.

The MFO provides an interesting hybrid. To the extent that its operations are routine but monotonous, the MFO provides a characteristic example of peacekeeping operations as they generally are. There is no gusto or guts here; just a necessary job being quietly and efficiently done by soldiers from 11 nations.

This deployment has shown that our general military training has provided an excellent foundation for peacekeeping but that we need to complement that basis with the right mission-specific training effort. In doing this we need to focus on the mental preparation of the soldier rather than his physical skills. The MFO experience has also shown that we need to rethink issues of morale, stress and conditions of service, to drag them into the 1990s where they belong and to adapt them to the particular circumstances of peacekeeping.

Just as importantly, we as a Defence Force and as a nation need to get smart in our dealings with international organisations like the MFO and the UN to ensure that we neither wed strategic disaster nor abandon our soldiers to the vagaries of the civilian peacekeeping bureaucracy where the dollar and not the soldier's welfare or safety will inevitably top the agenda. Finally, we should continue to build on our bilateral military relationships with allies, friends and neighbours established over many years during exercises, exchanges and interaction of varying forms as we find ourselves in the field with them again, peacekeeping.

The Future of the MFO and its Efficacy as a Model for Future Peacekeeping

As this article was written, the Middle East peace-process was taking some remarkable and exciting new directions. The MFO Director General attended the Washington ceremonies in September 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation which all hope will pave the way for a broader peace in the region.

I have mentioned that as an alternative to the UN, an MFO-type structure presents a viable and attractive alternative. Of course, it is easy for the MFO in Egypt to bask in its success; nobody is shooting at it, both sides want peace and there are few treaty violations. Nevertheless, it has its benefits. In overall terms the MFO is cost effective. Being small by comparison to the UN, it is also responsive to the participating states of Egypt, Israel and the United States, Israel, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon may find this smaller, leaner and responsive structure an attractive model compared to the more unwieldy option of a UNIFIL-style UN command. Such an MFO structure might have more appropriate rules of engagement, more effective liaison and greater regional and mission focus. No doubt as this article goes to print the MFO model is being touted exhaustively within the region, particularly for the Golan.

For the MFO in Egypt the future holds many uncertainties. A broader peace in the region will undoubtedly result in pressure to downsize the MFO perhaps to an observer group UNTSO-style presence. Certainly this direction would sit comfortably with Egypt though perhaps less so with Israel. On the other hand
the dynamics of the region, particularly in regard to resurgent Moslem fundamentalism in Egypt may remind Israel that a continued MFO presence in its existing size and shape provides a level of insurance in a sea of change.

**Conclusion**

In practical terms our participation in the MFO has been an outstanding success. Australia deployed a contingent at short notice to commence operations well ahead of anyone's expectations. Our people are doing a splendid job in an isolated and remote location and are gaining valuable experience. The work is not exciting or unduly dangerous or adventurous. MFO service is gruelling if at times monotonous; but we are making an important contribution to peace in the Middle East and exposing our soldiers to a diverse range of professional experiences.

At the military level the ADF has shown by its participation in the MFO that we can do it well. In this particular case we have also shown that we can participate in such undertakings outside the scope of the UN. The challenge ahead is to ensure that we maintain focus on the future and, without letting go of the past, that in every area from force structure to conditions of service we do not prepare for operations of the 60s, 70s and 80s but rather for what is ahead. So far our peacekeeping efforts have taken place under the auspices of the UN or they have been multilateral undertakings. As we look at the changing face of Australia's own immediate region of interest and find ourselves peacekeeping side-by-side with our South Pacific and Southeast Asian friends in places like Sinai, Cambodia and Somalia; Australian defence planners and observers might like to consider and debate with our neighbours, the merits of a regional collective peacekeeping strategy as an option for dealing with our security concerns beyond the year 2000.

**New Developments on Conditions of Service for United Nations or Multinational Service**

In 1993 the policy for setting conditions of service for overseas United Nations or multinational deployments was considered by Government. Following the consideration the authority to set the conditions of service for deployments was largely transferred from the Departments of Veterans' Affairs, Industrial Relations and the Treasury to the Department of Defence.

The Government also established a conditions of service framework which automatically authorises the flow on of preset benefits. A deployment is declared as either warlike, non warlike or peacetime service and flowing from the declaration the appropriate tax, compensation, leave and relief out the country benefits accrue. The declaration of service is made by the Minister for Defence, in consultation with the Prime Minister, with advice from the CDF. This process will ensure greater simplicity, consistency, and flexibility than has occurred in the past.

The Government also directed the Departments of Finance and Industrial Relations to develop a standing determination under the Defence Act to allow the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel to set the quantum of the Deployment Allowance within preset guidelines. These were previously determined by the Department of Industrial Relations.
Australians in Western Sahara

By Colonel I.C. Gordon, AM, Director of Signals — Army.

Introduction

Western Sahara is located in the north western corner of Africa, bordered by Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the Atlantic Ocean. It is a dry and hot country with very little infrastructure. The territory has been claimed by Morocco.

The United Nations Mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO — the acronym is from the French) is to run a Referendum to allow the people of the territory to vote for either integration with Morocco or for independence. Ownership of the territory has been disputed for many years, since the time that Spain was a colonial power and the “Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia El Hamra and the Rio de Oro” (POLISARIO) was formed to attempt to remove them. In 1976, Spain handed over the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. The POLISARIO continued their fight, this time against Morocco. Morocco fought to retain control of the territory with a number of strategies. Their final strategy was to enclose parts of the territory in a series of defensive sand and stone walls called the “Berm”. Now, the Moroccans are behind the sixth version of their Berm, which stretches some 2000 kms down the country. When a ceasefire was formally declared on 6 September 1991, approximately 5,000 soldiers of the Saharawi popular Front, the POLISARIO, faced some 140,000 Moroccan soldiers along the “Berm”.

Australia’s involvement in MINURSO began in 1990 when Lieutenant Colonel I.C. Gordon from 1 Signal Regiment took part in a two-week UN Technical Survey Mission to Western Sahara. A 220-man Signals Unit was proposed to support a referendum. This was later reduced to a 45-man contingent. The role was not well defined, but Australia was asked to provide radio operators and drivers; it amounted to establishing radio nets and a courier service. The Australian contingent was ready to be in Western Sahara four weeks before D-Day, planned for 6 September 1991. Unfortunately, several key issues held up the Mission. One of these was the criteria for voter eligibility — who should be in the electorate. Both sides could see that victory could be assured by having a favourable electorate and that issue has been the subject of endless negotiations, pressures and, on occasions, compromise. The present stalemate exists because this problem remains unresolved.

Before the cease-fire was due to start, Morocco agreed to let the UN into Western Sahara, but not to start the referendum process, only to monitor a cease-fire. It was to be a greatly reduced force — just 100 military observers instead of the 550 planned for the full deployment. This initial deployment included only eight Australians. In the last hours of 6 September 1991, ceasefire day, the seven Australians in the Australian advance party met Lieutenant Colonel Gordon in Laayoune, the main town in Western Sahara. Next day the observer deployments began and two Australians were sent to the first Sector HQ at Smara.

The UN had none of its own equipment; no vehicles or radios, no food or water, no accommodation. Everything was on loan from the Moroccans and POLISARIO. The Australians in Laayoune were given two very sad looking Moroccan Army HF radio sets. They took the radios into a bedroom, cleaned off a table, strung an antenna on the roof and declared the Force Headquarters Radio Room open. The Radio Sergeant, Sergeant Paul Goodrick, and one of his Line Corporals arrived in Smara, 220 km to the east, and, with a single radio frequency at their disposal, they opened communications. A few days later, another two Australian soldiers were sent south to Awsard, about 600 km away, to open another sector headquarters. From the Force Headquarters in Laayoune, the Australians developed a single channel command radio net, taking on the sector headquarters and the UN observer team sites as they opened up. The Force Commander made very strong representation to have an extra 100 observers and the remainder of the Australian Signals Unit deployed, and the Australian contingent main body arrived in Laayoune on the night of 19 September. Next day, the Australians pushed forward to each of the ten UN Team Sites, one at each team site with a full radio shift at each sector headquarters and at the Force Headquarters in Laayoune. Their job was to keep the Moroccan radios going and to train the observers in radio procedures.
Each of the team sites were manned by an average of 16 observers. They formed four, four-man patrols. The early days were difficult. The weather was hot — temperatures were estimated to over 55 degrees Celsius in places. Except for Laayoune, all the radios were mounted in vehicles and the operators spent their time in the vehicles, often with little shelter. The Moroccan Army radio equipment was most unreliable; half of it was unserviceable at any time, and there were very few radio frequencies. The radios were difficult to tune, especially for the UN observers and some of the observers spoke little English. The Australian soldiers made fuses out of foil from cigarette packets and repaired antennae from the signal wire they took with them. There were some fine individual efforts.

Accommodation in the desert was a combination of tents, Moroccan barracks, and some bombed-out POLISARIO buildings. In the desert, food was provided by the Moroccan Army and the POLISARIO, and the standard varied considerably from site to site. Some of the worse sites were those on the POLISARIO side, in the south. They were at the farthest end of the POLISARIO “food chain”. The POLISARIO would bring their stores south from Tindouf in Algeria, through a series of staging areas and by the time they got to Agwanit and Zoug in the south, there wasn’t too much to pick from. Each POLISARIO region had its camel herds and goats, and when a camel was slaughtered the team sites ate a lot of camel. Then it was back to bread, rice, tinned fish, chicken and goat and in one instance, cat. The food on the Moroccan side was more plentiful, but hygiene was a problem. Some of the Australians became very sick eating the food and had to live on the ration packs they’d taken.

Despite the difficulties, that first phase was very successful: bonds established between the young Australian soldiers and the UN officers at each team site were very strong and served the Contingent well for the rest of the Mission. When the radio nets and the observers had settled, the Australians were pulled back to the sector headquarters, despite pleas from the observers to leave them at team sites. However, some of the radio operators had been in the desert without a break for over a month, working up to 15 hours each day. The Australian Radio Troop settled down to maintain 24-hour radio watches at Laayoune, at two sector headquarters and to the UN Liaison Office in Tindouf. They passed formal messages by voice — up to 60 a day. They kept in radio contact with the aircraft, with all vehicles on the road, and arranged contact between staff. First by road — they drove twice a week to Smara, a seven hour round trip, and once a week to Aoussad, eight hours each way. They delivered mail, stores, vehicles, and observers.

The Mission continued to develop. The UN radios and vehicles were finally released by Morocco in November 1991 and Radio Troop set up additional radio nets. A third sector headquarters opened at Oum Drega and they manned that, as well as adding it to the courier service. The drive from Laayoune to Oum Drega was quite something; it was across the desert for about 300 km, navigating using the GPS equipment. UN aircraft...
eventually arrived and the vehicle dispatch became air dispatch. Later, fresh food began to be distributed and new air conditioned accommodation units began to be built at the team sites.

After some six months, it became obvious that the referendum would not be conducted in the near future, and plans were made for a rotation of the Australian contingent. Most of the military observer contingents were rotated after six months, and the Australians prepared to hand over to the 1st rotation after an eight month tour.

On 15 May 1992, the second Australian contingent arrived in Laayoune, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gary Allen, with his RSM Warrant Officer Blackie Reid OAM. They continued the work of the first contingent and gave additional clerical support to the sector headquarters. They gave significant support to the UN in planning the establishment of the VHF radio network across the territory and they provided drivers.

A third contingent, led by Lieutenant Colonel Keith Brewster and Warrant Officer R.B. Dabinett (RAInf) arrived in November 1992 and in May 1993, handed over to the fourth contingent led by Lieutenant Colonel Gary Barnes with his RSM Warrant Officer A.J. Bowen (RAAMC). Early in their tour, the fourth contingent suffered the tragic loss of their medical officer, Major Susan Felsche, who was killed when the Pilatus Porter aircraft on which she was travelling crashed while on a medical flight near Ausward. The fourth contingent has worked hard to improve the quality of the Mission radio nets, by returning Australians to the UN Team Sites to train and support the UN observers. A fifth contingent is now being prepared, to be led by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lambert and his RSM Warrant Officer M.C. Burke (RACT). This may be the last, depending upon the result on the continuing efforts by the UN to resolve the outstanding issues and finally conduct the referendum.

The Australian soldiers have performed very well. They have been well trained and well prepared for the job. They have all been fit, healthy and well equipped. In all Australian contingents, many of the radio operators have been Regimental Signallers from infantry, armoured and artillery units, and they have worked extremely well. All contingents have taken on extra tasks — escorting UN vehicle convoys, patrolling and instructing. The Kangaroo Club became the Mission Club, and the Australians became the distributors of beer. It has always been rewarding to hear from the UN observers how well the young Australians were performing. They have worked hard, they relate well with the observers, and maintain their sense of humour. The standard of communications has always been very high. The Australians have all been proud of themselves, particularly of their efforts in the difficult early days.

The early contingents were fostered by 1 Signal Regiment in Brisbane and they established a Family Support Office, staffed by the wives of contingent members. They had a 008 telephone number giving a weekly update on progress for the families to leave messages. The wives produced a monthly newsletter to wives and extended families and they organised regular social functions. They maintained phone contact with wives and first next of kin. This system was very successful; the extended families greatly appreciated being kept informed and all the families appreciated the chance to be able to become involved in their own support.

The first contingent established a radio phone patch from Western Sahara to Australia via the RAAF Telecommunications Unit in Sydney. The 16,000 km link was marginal, transmitting on just 125 watts from Western Sahara but for an hour or so, on three or four days each week, they could talk to their families at home. Of course they had the world listening, but it was worthwhile.

The contingents have learned a lot about providing communications for an important customer under difficult circumstances. They learned about the stress of working close with each other continuously, about coping with being a long way from home, and about the importance of having a clear chain of command, especially when there were a number of organisations involved in the activity. They have learned that things don’t always go according to their plans, and that in the end persistence and initiative will bring success. They have to concentrate hard on keeping health, safety and security as priority issues. Quite a number of observers ran over mines, fortunately most were anti-personal mines and they got away with holes blown in tyres. What was disturbing was that many of these mines were laid on what seemed to be well-used tracks.

Australia’s role in MINURSO has been very successful. It has given many officers and soldiers valuable operational experience. It helped refine the Army’s planning and deployment procedures in the early days before the Cambodian operation, and since then it has continued to enable the ADF to retain close ties with the UN. Importantly, MINURSO has done a great deal to consolidate the very strong reputation of the Australian Army. That reputation is sure to stay strong as long as Army’s leaders demand a great deal from their officers and soldiers, and even more from themselves.
Return to Greece

*Return to Greece* is an *Australian Defence Force Journal* production highlighting the 50th Anniversary of the Australian Defence Force's participation in the Allied struggle of the Greek Campaign of World War II.

In 1941, Greece fought for survival against the might of Germany. The Greeks, aided by Australian, New Zealand and British forces fought to ward off the invasion of their homeland. *Return to Greece* tells of these battles and of the Allied evacuation.

*Return to Greece* revisits the sites of the battlefields through a selection of 50 water colours and drawings. The book takes the reader on a journey with the veterans of the Greek Campaign through the country where they fought valiantly with their Greek comrades in defence of democracy. It illustrates the pride and professionalism of today's Australian Defence Force personnel as they pay tribute to the memory of those who fought with such bravery and self sacrifice in the cause of freedom in the dark days of 1941.

This book will rekindle memories for those who took part in the campaign of 1941 and also for those who participated in the return pilgrimage in 1991.

*Return to Greece* is illustrated by Defence artist, Jeff Isaacs with text by Michael Tracey.

*Return to Greece* is available from the *Australian Defence Force Journal* at a cost of $20.00.
The Mogadishu Express
HMAS Jervis Bay's Contribution to Operation Solace

By Lieutenant A.J. Morrice, RAN.

When relief convoys leave the southern town of Baidoa, 20 bags of food from each vehicle are given to the "technicals", i.e. the teenage escorts driving trucks mounted with machine guns. Other "technicals" at self-declared check-points are paid off along the way. When a convoy reaches a village, the local elders, the village committee and the local gunmen all take a cut. Of the 120 bags which leave Baidoa, only 20 reach needy people.

When HMAS Jervis Bay departed Mogadishu on 15 January 1993 the ship's company certainly had a much greater understanding of the desperate situation confronting Somalia, having observed local firefights and the ruins of the capital city, destroyed after two years of anarchy. Someone likened the dusty, barren, desert city to scenes from a Beirut movie set. The city's buildings and houses are pockmarked from small arms fire, there are no windows or roofs, no electricity or plumbing... all this in the major port and capital city. The soldiers of A Company 1 RAR who we had transported across the Indian Ocean were reflective the morning they left the relative security of the ship. They would be in Baidoa within 24 hours, 240 kilometres west of Mogadishu, the centre of a region which has endured the worst drought in Africa this century and has been one of the most affected by the bloody warlord and clan fighting since January 1991. They were keen to put into action all their years of training knowing they were part of the largest deployment of Australian soldiers since the Vietnam War.

It was this lethal combination of civil war, drought and famine which finally brought foreign forces to the rescue under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 794/92. This resolution included authorisation for the UN Secretary General and member states cooperating to use all necessary means to quickly establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The unique nature of the plight of the Somalians led to the unusual character of military, UN and aid agency cooperation. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is the UN controlled group who have been in Somalia for several years assisting the 40 or so aid agencies in collecting and distributing the financial and food aid that has been delivered to the country. The United Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States is the independent international force endorsed by the UN to protect the transport routes and the supply and distribution centres throughout the country.

Somalia's plight was known to few of the ship's company before the announcement was made that Jervis Bay would be deployed to Mogadishu, less than a week before the ship was to close down for Christmas leave. When the decision was announced on Tuesday 15 December and galley "buzzes" were rebutted by the facts, the feeling amongst most reflected the esprit de corps and excitement of being involved in an international operational deployment. Every department worked long and hard at establishing exactly what support would be required. The fact that nearly all establishments had closed down to skeleton staff for the Christmas break, and we only had two days alongside, sailing on a Saturday, made it all the more remarkable that nothing was forgotten (we didn't forget photocopier toner... it was an environmentally conscious idea to save paper!). During this time the embarked Sea Training Group continued to work-up the crew. Logistical planning by the ship and execution from those ashore was exemplary under the circumstances.

Alongside on Thursday 17 December, Sydney natives appreciated the opportunity to say goodbye to family and friends. The ship was a hive of activity and a wide range of people were onboard helping to repair defects, load stores and make plans for the embarkation of the Army force in Townsville. On the following Saturday morning several hundred people and a healthy media contingent turned out on the wharf to record the RAN training ship leaving on a deployment to carry troops and vehicles to assist what was a little known African state. Although it came as a surprise for the media to observe us in this role, most onboard were familiar with the task at hand having practised it during Exercise Kangaroo 92 less than a year before.

Enroute to Townsville, with the ship's Army detachment of 11 embarked to look after terminal operations, the ship undertook a successful work-up and mission specific operational evaluation. Although a very different and detailed change, the transition from our primary training role to our secondary logistic...
support role was executed with few hiccups. The often practised liaison with the Army was put to great effect.

After embarking 113 soldiers, mostly from A Company 1 RAR and filling the vehicle deck, 'tween deck holds and after deck with sundry vehicles, Army stores and equipment, we departed Townsville on Christmas Eve with a formal farewell from the Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence Force and the Maritime Commander. The army contingent settled smoothly into the rigours of life at sea and welcomed the relatively spacious accommodation in the mess-decks. A few soldiers were overheard however, asking where they could pitch their "hutchies". As the ship transited the Great Barrier Reef, Christmas was celebrated with carols by candlelight, ham and turkey for lunch, and presents handed out by the resident Santa Claus. Once the double beer issue had been disposed of, the day culminated with the finest of Australian traditions: the afternoon slumber. We had the good fortune of missing the full effects of Tropical Cyclone Nina which, at its nearest, was 160 miles west across Cape York. However, its presence was quite clear from the strong winds and driving rain experienced during the passage north.

The first short resupply stop, five hours in Darwin, was where we said farewell to Australia, aided by the Telecom Defence Unit which donated 300 $5 phone cards for everyone to make a Christmas call home. The British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia was the only other break from routine where the ship again resupplied and the Army enjoyed a final respite ashore. The soldiers had been engaged in a rigorous training schedule during their time onboard involving several hours physical training a day, intelligence and general briefs, classroom lectures to brush up on tactics, weapons training and self-defence exercises. Meanwhile, the ship's company conducted a myriad of damage control scenarios, prepared all cargo for offloading and practised routines which would be implemented alongside. The ship's defence team, two sections of eight from all departments, had been polishing their procedures since sailing from Sydney in preparation for maintaining the security of the wharf and the ship whilst alongside.

On 12 January 1993, as the shimmering sun rose astern of us, we made landfall on the desert landscape to the north of Mogadishu. Experiencing two-knot southerly tide sets and 25-knot winds from the northeast, we soon discovered that Somalians haven't been too interested in chart corrections over the last couple of years and sand dunes don't make good alternatives as fixing points. The one mile wide, six mile long area
looked like a World War II Atlantic convoy at rest with 23 merchant and naval ships at anchor from the United States, Canada, India, France, Turkey and Spain. USS Tripoli was prominent with her aircraft very active in sorties between ships and to the shore. She had the Commander of the Multinational Naval Task Force embarked, and contact was established with him as we joined the end of the line, furthest south of all the ships and some six miles from the port.

Communication was also soon established with the Commander Australian Forces Somalia (CAFS), and his RAN Liaison Officer (Lieutenant Tony Powell, RAN, who had been seconded from Jervis Bay) came onboard to answer our questions. Their information on the city and in particular the port facilities available was especially valuable. While final checks and preparations were being made to unload the cargo, some people on the upper decks were surprised to see an enormous explosion in the desert three miles away which turned out to be the US Marines destroying the ammunition caches they had collected that day.

Both anchors were weighed early on Thursday 14 January when Jervis Bay proceeded into Mogadishu Port. A Mediterranean moor to the roll on roll off berth (a concrete ramp), a manoeuvre made interesting by the strong north-easterly wind and southerly set across the harbour entrance, was completed by 0900. This entailed getting the anchors very close to the impressive 300-metre US Fast Sealift ship Algol which was one of four other ships in the port area at the time. The ship's defence team and 2 Platoon of A Company maintained the wharf and ship security, keeping a vigilant lookout on the dozen or so teenagers poking their heads around the corner of the port enclosure and the large group of spectators occupying the hill leading to the old prison. The unloading commenced immediately and with the help of the US Army and Marines (controlling the port area) and Australian UNOSOM and UNITAF personnel in the staging area, the evolution to clear the vehicle and 'tween deck holds took just six hours. At 1500 the anchors were weighed and we proceeded port side to the wharf to discharge the upper deck cargo which was completed by 2010. Concurrent with these operations, 25 accredited correspondents, CARE Australia representatives and Commander Australian Forces — Somalia, Colonel L.J.A.
Mellor, AM, OBE, visited the ship. The correspondents appreciated the support and protection given them by Colonel Mellor and the pooling of resources, hence working together. Ms Phoebe Fraser, daughter of former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (Director CARE Australia), reassured us that the 40 aid agencies in the country were no longer having to feed starving millions. In the previous month only infants and nursing mothers were being looked after. She said that death from one of the many epidemics was now the major threat and killer in Somalia.

During this day and night alongside we were able to learn a little of the plight of the people we were helping. The armed teenagers or “technicals” who prowl the streets of Mogadishu are the force behind the visual carnage. With their machineguns mounted on the backs of 4WDs they terrorise and workers transporting food across the country to refugee camps. Most have allegiance to one of the fighting warlords. These groups engage one another in sporadic shootouts. The timing of these firefight is predictable because in the mornings the technicals chew on the drug “khat”, mainly flown in from Kenya. This takes effect during the early afternoon and by the evening their hunger pains have gone, replaced by a feeling of invincibility and euphoria. The technicals are not always so haphazard though: the night before we berthed, the first UNITAF casualty was an American Marine on foot patrol killed in a roadside ambush which was notable for being well organised and occurred less than a mile from the port area.

Despite the huge show of force by UNITAF, with patrols through the streets and Cobra helicopters at immediate notice to intercept any disruption, the technicals and warlords have continued their campaign for control. The fact that the two warlords fighting for control of Mogadishu are actually from the same clan but different sub-clans adds to the irony and to our lack of real understanding. The bandits can be heard firing small arms around the port, tracer is visible at night, and occasional explosions or fires can be seen. When we departed the next day and left A Company 1 RAR on the wharf at 0530, knowing our role had been completed successfully and without incident, we wondered whether the rest of Australia’s forces would be so fortunate.

While en route home to Australia, Jervis Bay rendezvoused with HMAS Tobruk some two days later. Her command team was briefed on what we had learnt of Mogadishu, and nearly two and a half tons of stores were transferred before she continued to Somalia. We headed east, arriving in Diego Garcia on Thursday 21 January and stayed overnight. The club operations of the island had a most profitable night. For some of the ship’s company, it was their first release since departing Sydney.

We reverted to our more customary training role while in Diego Garcia when 67 midshipmen from the Australian Defence Force Academy joined to begin their Navy training. Everyone refocused on this more routine task very quickly and in many ways it was a relief to have them onboard to keep us all busy over the next week’s passage to Singapore. Arrival there began a real break from routine and the opportunity to deplete our accumulated pays. For the trainees it was a case of “work hard, play hard” and for most the chance to experience a South-East Asian port for the first time. Many had stories of their exploits which would be retold to their Army and Air Force compatriots back at ADFA. On the sporting field with the combination of the ship’s company and trainees we were largely unbeaten, particularly the rugby team which enjoyed big wins over two strong clubs who played both second and first grade players.

The return passage to Sydney began 7 February and we arrived home on Friday 19 February to a warm welcome from families and friends. This ended the first and most challenging of Jervis Bay’s Express Services to Somalia. It was a deployment of which we were proud, particularly of the versatility we displayed to successfully complete the mission. To follow this up and train a class of midshipmen with the same enthusiasm showed the true spirit of the crew and was the culmination of a deployment which will be fondly remembered. The flexibility and ability of the RAN to react at short notice to meet Government directives was again amply demonstrated.

HMAS Jervis Bay departed Sydney on 20 April 1993 to commence her second deployment to Somalia in support of Operation SOLACE. Her role in this extraction phase of the operation was to provide, with HMAS Tobruk, sea transport to Australia for deployed battalion group personnel and equipment.

Unlike the initial short notice deployment just prior to Christmas 1992, the ship’s company received good notice of the requirement to re-deploy. Consequently, preparations proceeded at a more orderly pace guaranteeing thoroughness. In addition, personnel took advantage of the two-month period between deployments to take leave and celebrate a somewhat belated Christmas with families and friends.

Jervis Bay sailed with 45 junior officer trainees and a 12-member ship’s army detachment embarked. The trainees were onboard for their sea familiarisation and common training cruise. They successfully completed this training and disembarked at Diego Garcia, which was the last port of call prior to Mogadishu.

On 16 May an advance party from HMAS Tobruk
and Commander Australian Forces Somalia provided a detailed brief of loading considerations, developments which had occurred in local security and navigation/berthing aspects. The briefing team arrived onboard by HMAS Tobruk's Seaking helicopter.

*Jervis Bay* arrived at Mogadishu at 0800 the following day and proceeded to anchor. The ship's entry into the port area was delayed until later that afternoon due to the congestion of the small port and other harbour movements. In particular, one UN-chartered vessel (*Strong America*) was undertaking a unique berthing operation and experiencing difficulty. Once *Strong America* had been secured in position, *Jervis Bay* proceeded into the port area, and in trying conditions, moored stern to the roll on roll off wharf.

The Ship's Defence Team had been trained to provide security while loading, and was employed only while the ship was in the port area. They were strategically positioned around the ship and on the wharf to protect the ship's personnel from possible sniper fire and prevent pilfering of valuable equipment.

Loading of army vehicles and equipment commenced on the evening of 17 May and was completed by midday two days later. The loading was protracted by strict quarantine procedures, which required that every item of Army equipment be thoroughly cleaned to ensure it was free from possible infestation. A total of 608 tonnes of equipment was eventually loaded onboard. In addition, some 50 Army personnel “signed up” for the “sea journey of their lives” — a ride home in a “grey funnelled taxi!”

On 18 May, Commander Australian Forces Somalia and his staff moved out of their office in the US Embassy and conducted operations from onboard. The ship was able to provide the staff with some creature comforts such as a comfortable bunk, freshly cooked meals, clean water and air conditioning. One could say it provided hotel services. The Headquarters staff left the ship early on the morning of 20 May and joined up with the remainder of the Australian Army personnel eager to return home. They departed Somalia by a Royal Australian Air Force aircraft that afternoon.

Prior to *Jervis Bay*'s arrival at Mogadishu, *Tobruk* had completed her loading of cargo and waited at anchor approximately two and a half miles from the port. *Tobruk* sailed from Mogadishu three hours ahead of *Jervis Bay* on the morning of 20 May, thus leaving *Jervis Bay* with the record of being the first Australian ship to arrive and the last to depart Mogadishu. “First in, last out.”

The ships remained in company for the majority of the homeward voyage to Australia. They separated for a brief period in Asia, with *Jervis Bay* visiting Penang and *Tobruk* visiting Singapore. The ships reunited south of Singapore for the final passage to Australia.

They arrived at Townsville on 16 June, for a welcome home celebration and to unload cargo. Finally, they returned to Sydney on 21 June, knowing they had just completed a successful operational tour of duty and made a significant contribution to Australia’s commitment to Operation Restore Hope.
Peacekeeping: A Minor Determinant of Australia’s Force Structure?

By Marion Rae, Australian National University.

Introduction

Current Government policy regarding Australian Defence Force (ADF) involvement in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations is that such operations should not be a force structure determinant. The ADF is developed to meet the primary task of the defence of Australia, and ADF contributions to UN operations are drawn from the force-in-being rather than being maintained and developed as a separate force. Recent Australian contributions to UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Somalia represented a startling increase in the use of ADF personnel for peacekeeping tasks.

The international trend is towards more numerous and larger UN peacekeeping operations. Australia must determine whether it can continue to respond at this increased level, with or without an alteration to the ADF force structure. Planning to meet the requirements of ADF commitments to UN peacekeeping operations is, and will continue to be, a relatively ad hoc process requiring case-by-case assessments.

This article will examine Government policies towards an ADF peacekeeping role, past Australian deployments to UN peacekeeping operations, the impact of such commitments upon the defence of Australia, recent changes within Australia’s regional strategic environment which point towards future strategic uncertainty, the changing characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations towards greater use of force, and the consistent contribution of the Austrian and Canadian Defence Forces to UN peacekeeping operations. In this way, an assessment will be made as to whether commitments to UN peacekeeping operations should, or should not, become a major determinant of Australia’s force structure.

In addition to establishing a national defence posture of self-reliance, the White Paper, The Defence of Australia 1987 (DOA87), implicitly states that Australia’s regional defence posture is of greater priority than involvement in UN peacekeeping tasks. As the largest military power in the Southwest Pacific, posing significant power projection with regard to Southeast Asia, consideration regarding regional defence involvement and influence affect Government decisions about the tasks and operations of the ADF. Australian Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP90) provided the basis for future force structure development, within the framework of defence self-reliance outlined in DOA87. The position is that there is a considerable versatility within the present and planned force structure to respond flexibly to a wide range of situations, including regional requests. However, international security does not figure highly in ASP90 and an adequate assessment of the impact of international strategic change upon the Asia-Pacific region as a force for instability and uncertainty has not yet been made. A strategic review is currently underway within the Department of Defence and it would be logical to expect this deficiency to be rectified.

Government Policies Towards an ADF Peacekeeping Role

The recent Department of Defence peacekeeping policy review reflects the increased level of Australian involvement, but remains with the consensus Defence position. The document states that there are operational, as well as wider strategic and international policy, benefits in assigning peacekeeping a higher profile as an ADF activity in future years; it also states that there is no case to establish peacekeeping as a force structure determinant. Several important recommendations were made, hence this document warrants closer attention.

Firstly, that traditional levels of involvement should be increased to reflect current international trends (a "floor" level of approximately 200 is recommended as an average annual commitment of ADF personnel); secondly, that the list provided to the UN of available capabilities be revised to reflect the restructuring contained within the Force Structure Review 1991; and thirdly, that attention be given to the establishment of formal peacekeeping training. Personnel would be properly brief and correctly trained, leading to a more effective and efficient use of Australian resources.
A major concern is cost. The cost of a commitment level of 200 personnel would be in the order of $A9 million per annum prior to reimbursement by the UN, and $A6.5 million after reimbursement. The cost will vary according to the nature of the contribution; $A25 million in additional costs was required by a six-month deployment to Iraq of a 75-person detachment with six helicopters. Briefly, the document states that costs are difficult to identify, peacekeeping is of little direct value to Australia's defence interests, and budget supplementation should be sought from Government to resource peacekeeping tasks.

This policy review adopts a "wrong-headed" approach to the issue of ADF contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. It is unwise to set a definite figure of ADF availability. Each contribution requires a case-by-case assessment. UN demands are difficult to foresee and the current trend is that of an exponential increase in new UN peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations. Australia, as a member of the international community, has a duty to respond. In addition, as a sovereign state with the concomitant concern of the protection of its physical integrity, Australia has an interest in a stable international environment.

Before continuing, it is important to identify the benefits of retaining the current force structure and force planning tools. The defence policy building process which has occurred over the past decade has created a strong consensus within the defence community. The recent internal Department of Defence peacekeeping policy review stated that 200 personnel is a level of commitment which could be accommodated, this level assumes no alteration in the ADF force structure and therefore poses no threat to the current defence consensus. The separate service arms have been restructured into a combined force, and sophisticated capabilities have been retained. Consensus and coordinated planning has resulted in the development of Australia's capabilities as a self-reliant regional power.

However, a need exists for a reappraisal of Australia's very expensive method of achieving consensus within the Australian defence community. The financial guidance which underpinned DOA87 was for +1 percent real growth in the budget year 1987-88, and a subsequent +3 percent until 1991-92. However, since 1987, real growth in Defence budget outlays has averaged 0 percent. In addition, the Defence Budget was cut by 0.5 percent in 1992 after an initial financial stimulus for the generation of employment. What this means is the flexibility has been determined due to fiscal restraint required in continued investment in long term ADF development — such as the development of the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon-Radar, Collins class submarines, the ANZAC frigate programme, as well as the northern deployment of Army personnel (which involves an additional operation cost of $200 million per annum).

Australia has a tradition of small, officer-intensive contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. In terms of significant military contributions, a precedent exists for multilateral regional deployments rather than UN commitments to regional security during the Cold War period. The Korean and Vietnam Wars, "put us in a position where we had no extra capacity to contribute to peacekeeping from the force-in-being," Australia significantly increased its commitment to UN peacekeeping operations in 1992-1993 and as of January 1993, 620 ADF personnel were committed to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The subsequent deployment of 900 troops to Somalia made a total contribution of 1700 ADF personnel as of March 1993. This figure swells to 2013 if involvement in non-UN multilateral peacekeeping is included, namely the deployment of the HMAS Canberra to the Red Sea. These levels have decreased.

Australia's regional security interests and involvement in international concerns coincided with the Cambodian operation. Of significance, and benefit to the ADF, was the appointment of Lieutenant-General John M. Sanderson as the Force Commander of UNTAC; national command — albeit under UN control — of Australian resources was thus retained. In addition, the ADF contribution to UNTAC led to the following gains: firstly, extensive operational knowledge of the deployment area; secondly, a greater understanding of the complexities of conflict resolution in the Indochina theatre; and thirdly, operational experience for a potential Chief of the ADF. The ADF has also played the key role in establishing communications facilities in Cambodia, which has assisted in the establishment of a long term civil telecommunications presence in Cambodia.

Australia has a broadly defined security interest in Cambodian stability; the short-term security threat for Australia is a flow of Cambodian refugees southwards, the medium-term threat is significantly increased regional instability. As stated above, a precedent exists for Australian military contributions to regional stability.
ADF involvement in UN peacekeeping tasks raises the concern of detrimental effects to ADF capabilities to meet national defence tasks. The decision to commit ADF personnel to UN peacekeeping operations will always be a political one, despite the fact that it entails a military response. Without an alteration to the ADF, this could result in a negative impact upon ADF capabilities to meet national and regional tasks. The official position that the ADF meets demands from the force-in-being without detriment to national defence tasks has been viewed with some scepticism. The December 1992 report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Stockholding and Sustainability in the Australian Defence Force*, stated that the nature of future UN commitments and their impact on the planning and resources of the ADF were matters needing separate urgent consideration by Defence. The Committee recommended that provision be made for separate stockholdings to meet a range of UN commitments, to be funded by an extension of the Defence budget. The findings of the report were rejected by Defence, which claimed that the impact of UN commitments was minimal.

If no change is made to ADF stockholding policy, it is logical to assume that a continued increase in ADF deployments to UN operations will lessen the ADF’s stockholding capability to meet national defence tasks, particularly if demands go beyond training exercises to responding to a low level or escalated low level threat to Australia’s physical integrity. Australian strategic planning utilises these two levels of conflict as the central analytical basis for national defence planning; low-level conflict is a situation in which “the adversary would normally seek to avoid engaging the ADF”. Escalated low-level conflict is a situation in which “the adversary would be prepared to engage the ADF”. They do not preclude an ADF response to a greater use of force by an adversary, rather, they are conceptual tools. ADF operations and the development of the ADF force structure are designed to reflect current and future strategic concerns, attempting to encompass all levels of conflict by maintaining an expansion base for the future mobilisation of national forces.

Professor Desmond Ball stated that Australia’s capacity to defend itself would be virtually halved by the deployment of 900 troops to Somalia. Australia’s combat force consists of two infantry battalions based in Townsville, one at full combat readiness, the other close to full readiness. Half of the Operational Deployment Force was deployed to Somalia for a 17-week tour of duty from January to March 1993; the second battalion was moved to a higher level of readiness. The purpose of maintaining the combat force is to attain rapid response to unforeseen crises, a strategy which Ball believes would be unsustainable without greater back-up. “It either says that the current defence planning logic of having those couple of ready battalions is wrong, because low-level contingencies are just not going to happen, or it says we do have something serious to worry about and we ought to get another couple of battalions fast”. A spokesperson for the acting Defence Minister at the time, Mr Gordon Bilney, responded “It’s the Government view at this stage that we only need one battalion ready for low-level conflict”.

The ADF has met increased UN demands without detrimental effects to national security. In terms of an ADF fulfilment of the specialised requirements of UN peacekeeping operations, such as the deployment of communicators to Cambodia, the ADF had reached its limit — beyond which national capabilities could have been affected, as of March 1993. However, the capacity to field more personnel remained. In addition, it is important to state that attached to all Australian commitments to UN peacekeeping operations is the proviso that, in the event of a threat to national security, the contingent will be withdrawn.

Of more concern is the current lack of balance between national, regional, and international security concerns within Australia’s strategic planning. Force structure concerns are two-fold: firstly, sustainability of ADF contributions to UN peacekeeping operations; and secondly, the question of whether a different balance of ADF forces is required in order to meet the needs of a land-based ADF response to a regional crisis or a prolonged stabilising maritime presence in Southeast Asia.

ADF involvement in UN peacekeeping tasks raises a concern regarding the ability of the ADF to pursue regional engagement and meet offshore contingencies. The regional strategic environment is an important consideration. The international strategic environment has radically changed.

However, the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, stated in September 1992 that no reason has been found to alter Australia’s policy of self-reliance.
"The regional focus of our defence policy means that events in Europe and elsewhere do not have a direct impact on our strategic planning. Dramatic as the collapse of the Soviet Union or events such as the Gulf War were, they did not change Australia's immediate security environment".

The "benign" nature of Australia's strategic regional environment must not be assumed. Political, social and economic change in South-east Asia and the South Pacific have produced a complex and uncertain strategic environment. The end of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region has removed long-held certainties and marked the beginning of unpredictable strategic change. The superpower "drawdown" has impacted upon regional strategic perceptions, causing former Asian allies of both the US and former Soviet Union to factor strategic uncertainty into their security planning. High technology capital acquisition programmes, which develop self-reliance and self-resilience (an Indonesian term), are now being pursued. Possible regional "flashpoints" include Cambodia, the conflicting claims in the South China Sea regarding the Spratly and Paracel Islands, instability sourced from the military junta in Mynmar, and, further afield, nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. In the longer-term, Japan, China and India could cause regional instability through competition for regional dominance. Although, not a product of a post-Cold War era, current tension between Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands is also of import to Australia.

Australia possesses limited resources. However, with no direct threat to Australia, ADF forces — configured for national defence tasks — should be capable of fulfilling Australian commitments to UN peacekeeping tasks, provided that an alteration is made at the margins of the ADF force structure. (Detailed in the next section of this paper.) Regional stabilising measures will also be of central importance to Australia's future regional defence posture. Due to the fact that peacekeeping tasks will be largely met by the Army and projecting a regional maritime presence will be a role of the Navy, the configuration of the force structure will require a subtle alteration. If both are considered to be priority tasks, a lessening of the role of the Air Force will logically follow, although the potential constabulary role of P3s and C130s will be of value. If this becomes the future reality of Australia's regional defence posture, a disjuncture between current acquisitions for the long term development of the ADF and meeting offshore tasks will become apparent. The capital investment programmes already noted will increasingly be maintained at the expense of meeting tasks, within the increasingly uncertain regional environment. In the context of regional uncertainty, and the continued purchase of sophisticated weaponry on the part of Southeast Asian countries, it could be that meeting regional maritime tasks will require a division of ADF resources, rather than contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

**The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping**

In June 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed a willingness to extend UN operations into the realm of peace-enforcement in his pronouncement "An Agenda For Peace", calling for the creation of a separate permanent UN armed force. While this may not be heeded by the international community, it cannot be ignored that the UN has proceeded with difficult and challenging operations. The lifting of a bipolar global overlay has removed the constraints which were inhibiting ethno-nationalist tensions and the role of the UN is achieving relative stability. Unshackled from great power vetoes, the UN has attempted to remedy such turmoil and increased its peacekeeping activities, expanding its operations into the realm of peace-enforcement. The crucial change made has been the removal of consent as a prerequisite for the initiation of a peacekeeping mission.

International expectations of the UN have grown; peacekeeping or peace-enforcement can be expected to continue. Political consensus exists regarding Australian involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. However, public concern could restrain involvement in peace-enforcement operations, operations which involve increased risks for personnel and possible Australian involvement in a protracted war. Neutrality is central to UN peacekeeping operations. In the context of a removal of consent as a prerequisite for UN intervention, military personnel will be faced with a higher degree of risk. Risk must be factored into political and military calculations regarding potential ADF involvement in UN peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. Peace-enforcement should only be contributed to if the situation poses more than an indirect threat to Australian interests. Such a situation would require serious and detailed consideration by Government prior to any deployment.

Peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement, is increasingly being used as a euphemism for war and may increasingly be the initial phase of escalatory UN intervention. The former Yugoslavia will become a test case for this type of UN intervention. If such a trend does become entrenched, the ADF should integrate peace-
keeping tasks into the doctrinal spectrum of armed conflict, rather than retaining a military doctrine that refers only to traditional forms of warfare. This doctrinal transformation of peacekeeping as a form of warfare rather than as a peacetime task, will then allow a more appropriate configuration of ADF policy and force structure designed to meet peacekeeping as a priority task. Dispensing with the euphemism may lead to an honest appraisal of the utility of contributing national forces to the prosecution of war and allow the development of mechanisms designed to address the task of peacekeeping. The training requirements of peace-enforcement are closer to those of regular combat training than the training requirements of peacekeeping. Greater understanding of the complexities of conflict resolution, and improved language skills will be required.  

### The Austrian and Canadian Models

Substantial ADF involvement in UN peace-enforcement could involve future infantry battalion deployments. In this instance, the alteration in force structure required would be that of a greater logistic and transport component. A balanced and self-contained battalion is the configuration preferred by the UN, as greater self-sufficiency enables greater security. Similarly, continuing to contribute in a meaningful way to peace-building (infrastructural development) will require a greater proportion of specialists such as engineers and communicators. This subtle redesign of the ADF force structure applies largely to the Army. The Defence Corporate Plan 1992-96 makes the following statement: "The challenge for Defence in the 1990s will be to achieve an appropriate balance between investment in new and improved capabilities, technology and infrastructure, and investment in personnel and the maintenance of existing capabilities and activity levels". In addition, the following operational environment is of importance: "The principle challenge facing the Army over the next five years will be to manage the reduction in size of the Regular force while maintaining a professional, modern fighting force relevant to Australia's strategic circumstances. The Army must be capable of performing a wide range of tasks, in particular the conduct of land operations as part of a joint force". The development of the ADF to fit this description is not inconsistent with the specialised needs of the UN. The challenge may be (in the context of resource constraint) to simultaneously meet regional and UN tasks.

The most radical force structure alteration to meet the requirements of ADF contributions to UN peacekeeping operations would entail the creation of a separate Australian peacekeeping force. The Austrian and Canadian examples of consistent involvement in UN peacekeeping operations are useful in demonstrating the pros and cons of this.

The Austrian Defence Force maintains a separate peacekeeping centre, containing warehouses, loading bays, classrooms, and barracks. The centre forms, trains, deploys, and monitors Austrian deployments to UN peacekeeping operations. This separate force functions efficiently and effectively, but important differences exist between the Austrian and Australian situations, which point towards the disutility of maintaining a separate Australian peacekeeping force. The Austrian Army is a conscript army, with personnel being recruited directly into peacekeeping missions on the basis of the two-year national service requirement. Peacekeeping deployments are the only operational component of the Austrian Army. Remuneration is maintained at an attractively high level, which reinforces public support for such involvement. The Austrian Army has fielded an annual total of one thousand personnel in the Golan Heights and Cyprus for the past 20 years. Key personnel are replaced and trained prior to a rotation of the contingent; in this way, continuity and efficiency are maintained within an operation. In operational terms the Austrian example differs from the ADF; the centre has minimal operational requirements due to the consistent nature of its deployments.

The central difference is the lack of an Austrian intelligence capability. A comprehensive relationship exists within the Australian intelligence community, information sharing processes are functional and effective. In addition, procedures which are designed for ADF wartime deployment are followed for the deployment of an ADF contingent to a peacekeeping task. (Although whether Australia can maintain a high level of commitment without the impact being more substantial is questionable.)

Maintaining the ability to deploy ADF personnel to peacekeeping operations from within the force-in-being is an effective use of resources. No duplication of procedures is required, the ability for joint service command can be maintained, and intelligence can be shared and disseminated. These factors contribute to current ADF procedures being cost-effective and resource-conscious. The Canadian experience within UN peacekeeping operations also serves to demonstrate the utility of maintaining peacekeeping capabilities within the force-in-being, although — as with the Austrian example — important differences do exist regarding the context of such involvement.
Canada has contributed to every UN peacekeeping operation and Canadian forces have incorporated peacekeeping into their professional ethos. The Canadian Defence Force does not train personnel specifically for peacekeeping tasks; rather, personnel are trained to be adaptable. The high standard of training is intended to allow personnel to readily adjust to challenges posed by subsequent deployments. In 1991, senior members of the Canadian Department of Defence conducted an assessment of Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. One conclusion was that personnel were often poorly prepared for the complexities and wider ramifications of their mission. Critics have also been voiced within a report by the Canadian Senate, which questioned the sustainability of the extensive Canadian commitment to UN peacekeeping in the context of the development of more complex operations: “A distinction needs to be drawn between humanitarian efforts which are little more than palliative and designed chiefly to make people in the West feel better, and more effective operations”. The strategic priorities of the Canadian Defence Force aided its extensive involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. The central focus of strategic priorities was the maintenance of the NATO alliance and a capability to deploy into the European theatre of operations. This has resulted in a defence force which is structured to meet the demands of forward deployment, operated in a joint command environment. The force structure framework of forward defence is in direct contrast to Australia’s defence posture of self-reliance. The Canadian model highlights the importance of training personnel to a high standard, and joint command experience, both of which are critical factors contributing to a continued ability to deploy national forces to UN peacekeeping operations.

A Minor Force Structure Determinant

Australia’s strategic environment dictates its comprehensive defence posture of self-reliance, rather than a focus on forward deployment. However, more attention to regional strategic uncertainty is required. This may detract from the existing consensus within the defence community, but the long term result will be the balancing of national defence capabilities and the capability to contribute to regional security and (less comprehensively) to international security. The central factor is that of resource constraint, which leads to a problem regarding the balancing of current tasks while maintaining and developing capabilities to meet future contingencies. The continued development of sophisticated maritime capabilities and a professional, modern army will enable the ADF to meet current tasks and maintain the ability to meet future contingencies. ADF commitments to UN peacekeeping operations have not resulted in a detrimental effect to national defence tasks. Indeed, there are recognisable benefits to be gained from such deployments. This paper has addressed the complexities surrounding the issue of ADF commitments to UN peacekeeping operations as a potential force structure determinant. The conclusion to be drawn from the discussion above is that such contributions should become a minor determinant of the ADF force structure.

NOTES
2. Ibid, p. 4.
3. Russ Swinnerton, *UN Peacekeeping — Personal Observations*, Seminar Programme, Division of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, 6 May 1993.
5. Ibid, p. 20.
7. Ian Munro, “Australia: UN operations will have the nation’s resources”, *Sunday Age* (Melbourne), Reuters by-line, 10 January 1993.
8. Preface to Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s.
12. An ADF peacekeeping training centre was established in January 1993. The centre will develop peacekeeping doctrine and conduct training; the first training programme is scheduled for July 1993. See: Major-General Murray Blake, op.cit. A statement has also been made at the JSSC regarding the development of greater language skills. See “Army sends officers to language school”, *Canberra Times*, 15 April 1993, p. 10.
16. ibid, p. 39.
17. Personal interview with Captain Russel Swinnerton, Visiting Defence Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 6 May 1993.
18. The two central intelligence agencies are the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA). DIO serves the Defence community, providing strategic assessments which may also be useful on the operational and tactical level. (DIO replaced the Joint Intelligence Organisation — JIO). Following current restructuring, the DIO will be the principal source of strategic analysis, which can be passed on to the operational level. Operational Headquarters will address operational and tactical intelligence collection and dissemination. ONA serves the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC), and ultimately the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister. DFAT also maintains its own diplomatic reporting services and analysts. Both the DIO and ONA call upon the services of the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). The key factor within the intelligence community is shared output.
19. Cited in David Todd, “Keeping the peace: Canada is the only country to have sent soldiers to every United Nations peacekeeping mission”, Canadian Geographic, November/December 1992, p. 56.

Book Reviews

PEACEKEEPING—CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE, Hugh Smith (Ed) 1993, Canberra Australian Defence Force Academy

Reviewed by Kevin P Clements, Head of Peace Research Centre, Australian National University

It was widely hoped that the end of the Cold War would result in a period of stable peace, lower defence expenditures and universal peace dividends. This optimism now seems somewhat premature. Since 1989 the United Nations has had to deal with an increasing number of violent internal and external conflicts in places as diverse as the Middle East, Somalia, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, and Cambodia. In fact there are now 36 such conflicts in different parts of the world. Each one of them has required sustained diplomatic attention and 14 of them have resulted in United Nations peacekeeping and/or enforcement operations.

This collection of papers was mainly presented originally at the Chief of General Staff’s annual exercise at Canungra. They were aimed at evaluating military aspects of peacekeeping and how such operations affect national defence planning. But they also consider peacekeeping training, preparedness for second generation peacekeeping operations and how the United Nations might make these operations more effective.

One of the central questions canvassed is how national armed forces can be trained and prepared for the traditional goal of national defence while at the same time prepared for the broader international goal of maintaining international peace and security. As the editor Hugh Smith notes, there is some incompatibility between these two objectives. In relation to national defence for example, soldiers are trained to fight wars with all the force necessary to repel an enemy whereas peacekeepers are expected to be soldiers without enemies, and maintain a neutral stance between combatants. Peacekeeping operations require a minimal use of force.

In the last four years the United Nations has also demanded a wider variety of contributions from its peacekeepers. Instead of just supervising ceasefires or providing buffers between opposing forces, peacekeepers now have to ensure the supply of humanitarian assistance, the safe conduct of elections, successful negotiations with a variety of combatants, and the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure. These skills are unlikely to be acquired in basic infantry training although that probably provides a good minimum upon which to build the flexibility needed to be a successful peacekeeper.

This collection traverses many of these issues from a variety of military and political perspectives.

Geoff Forrester of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for example, locates peacekeeping in the broader context of maintaining international peace and security and links his contribution to Gareth Evan’s book Cooperating for Peace which identifies peacekeeping as just one of a number of responses...
that the United Nations can make to threats to peace. The central argument of Evan’s book and this chapter is that the prevention of internal or international violence is infinitely preferable to the cures of peacemaking and/or peacekeeping. If these pre-emptive policies do not work, however, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations will inevitably come into play and will need to be conducted as professionally as possible.

This argument is continued by Cathy Downes in an interesting chapter on the ways in which second generation peacekeeping operations challenge small countries to determine what they can reasonably provide to these new and extended peacekeeping operations. Her conclusions suggest some confusion between peacekeeping and enforcement operations but it is a thoughtful statement about ways in which national force structures are being changed by the demands of the United Nations.

There are other interesting chapters on the role of the police and the media in Peace Keeping Operations. These are then followed by analyses of some recent UN operations in Somalia, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia. The ADF contributions to the Peace Keeping Operations in Cambodia and Somalia, for example, were generally successful. In each of these cases the command structure knew what it was doing, there were high levels of interoperability with contingents from other countries, especially in Somalia where the ABCA (America-Britain-Canada-Australia) arrangements worked well and a willingness to establish direct and useful working relationships with the local population. There were also clearly signposted exits. While there were occasional lapses (some are outlined in the Chapter by Peter Keiseker in which he reports some Australian cultural insensitivity in Somalia) by and large, however, the high level of disciplined training that Australian troops receive helped ensure that there were none of the “scandals” that afflicted some of the other contingents.

The chapters outlining the Fijian, Indonesian, Thai, Singaporean and US perspectives on peacekeeping are interesting for the ways in which they demonstrate several national commitments to peacekeeping operations and a common concern about what constitutes an adequate preparation for peacekeeping contingents. The chapter on the United States by Robert Ord III concludes that the best forces for peacekeeping are “highly trained and disciplined combat soldiers”. This seems a highly dangerous assertion since peacekeepers have to ensure that they do not act violently and reflexively to provocative acts. In fact it could be argued that the most successful peacekeeping operations (such as the Cambodian) were successful not because of the combat readiness of the soldiers but because of the diplomatic, conciliatory skills of the soldiers and high levels of obedience and discipline in the face of considerable adversity.

The question of what constitutes appropriate peacekeeping training is taxing many defence thinkers all around the world at the present time. The courses being developed at Williamtown seem to provide a good combination of conflict resolution, problem solving skills alongside the application of traditional military expertise and could have received a bit more prominence in this volume.

In terms of reforms within the United Nations itself there is a very thoughtful chapter by Bruce Osborn on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, the benefits of a more efficient command and control system and better political use of the information flowing into the newly formed operations centre/situation room.

This chapter is complemented neatly by Alain Forand on Civilian-Military relations at the United Nations. The civilians working in the Secretariat seem to interact intermittently with the military with the result that there is a very inadequate civilian understanding of the operational requirements of peacekeeping operations and from a military perspective there is often little understanding of the political complexities. There is a good case to be made for a permanent military advisor to be assigned to the President of the Security Council so that he/she could inform the President of the military consequences of different political decisions and vice versa.

General Soedibyo has an interesting chapter on the role of regional organisations in the maintenance of the peace and security and suggests the development of a coordinating body to try and link national peacekeeping initiatives at sub regional and regional levels.

The February 1994 Peacekeeping seminar at Williamtown will bring together regional participants and may in the future become such a centre. In the meantime, however, ensuring higher levels of regional interoperability in relation to Peace Keeping Operations would enhance more rapid deployment to areas of tension and conflict while being important confidence building mechanisms in their own right.

The final chapters by Paul Dibb and Hugh Smith highlight some of the new conflicts and challenges facing peacekeepers and the importance of anticipating new threats and conflicts and ensuring that forces have the necessary training and professionalisation to enable them to deal with them. Smith, for example, highlights the clear advantages of the peaceful settlement of disputes but also argues that when these don’t work there will always be a need for professional soldiers to meet unanticipated dangers and risks.
While this book is uneven in quality it succeeds in highlighting most of the dilemmas facing military peacekeepers in the 1990s. While a little more attention could have been paid to the non-military civilian dimensions of peacekeeping operations it stands as a worthwhile contribution to an ongoing debate about how to make the United Nations more effective in fulfilment of its charter obligations to maintain international peace and security. There is general agreement on the need for enhanced planning of peacekeeping operations, more precise mandates, better command and control systems and better use of national intelligence sources.

Although the volume stands alone Australians wishing to place this in a wider perspective might like to read it in conjunction with Gareth Evans 1993 Co-operating for Peace and the forthcoming volume on UN Peacekeeping at the Cross Roads currently being edited by the Peace Research Centre and scheduled for publication in early 1994.


Reviewed by Lex McAulay.

The title of this excellent book is somewhat misleading. What Laddie Lucas has provided here is a first class, probably unique, description of the life and times of a fighter squadron in one of the most intense and crucial campaigns of WW II. British retention of Malta was vital for victory in the Mediterranean, through its “Ultra” signals intercept role and as a base for the continued destruction of enemy shipping en route to Africa. In mid-1942, two battles were fought in which victory was essential for the defeat of the Axis powers: Midway and Malta. Only now, 50 years after the events, is due credit being given to the Malta campaigns and the men who defended the islands.

Laddie Lucas rose from Airman in June 1940 to Commanding Officer 249 Squadron in June 1942. Outnumbered, operating in adverse physical conditions, on a tiny island 1600 kilometres from friendly forces, the RAF squadrons on Malta fought without respite for 10 months in 1942. Laddie Lucas describes the merciless actions, and the almost daily losses, but the unique aspect of the book is his description, as a flight and squadron commander, of the squadron composition. 249 Squadron included Britons, Canadians, Rhodesians, New Zealanders and Australians. Laddie Lucas gives illuminating pen portraits of the young men from the nations of the Commonwealth who volunteered for aircrew, became fighter pilots, and went to the “fighter pilot’s paradise: Malta”. Of the many pilots who flew with Laddie Lucas, two examples are Paul Brennan DFC, DFM, RAAF, who scored 10 victories in 40 operational flights; the Canadian George Beurling claimed 28 victories with 249 Squadron. There has not been a book quite like Malta — The Thorn in Rommel’s Side.

This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the history of air war in general, and the study of fighter pilots in particular.


Reviewed by Lex McAulay.

This is another first class book from Laddie Lucas, this time in partnership with Johnnie Johnson, the leading Allied ace in Europe 1939-45. The reader is guided on an easy-to-read tour of air war from the earliest days of fighting in 1914, through to “Desert Storm”. The 208-page book is well illustrated with photos of the men and aircraft, and with simple but informative maps of the operational areas and operations themselves.

The reader is taken on a tour which includes the first calculated use of the aircraft as a fighting and bombing machine, the first development of tactics by Boelcke, the career of Richthofen and other WWI aces, the air war in Spain 1936-39, Fighter Command in 1939, the Battle of Britain, the Desert Campaigns in North Africa, the Bomber Offensive, the anti-submarine campaign in the Atlantic, the Normandy operations in 1944, air war in Russia, in the Pacific, in Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands and in the Gulf 1991. There are a few very minor errors in the photographs, but this seems unavoidable in publishing books of this nature.

There is only one chapter in the book with which this reviewer disagrees strongly: the crediting to the Canadian pilot Roy Brown of the victory over Baron von Richthofen, despite much available eyewitness and post-mortem examination evidence that the Baron was killed by ground fire from Australian troops while flying at very low level over their positions. If we did not persist in beating the Poms at cricket and footy, they might admit we got the Red Baron!

While perhaps of less value to the well-read student of military aviation, this volume is certainly recommended for the reader at an early stage of interest, one who requires a one-volume history, or one with a general interest in air war history.
Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

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