Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:
The Managing Editor
Australian Defence Force Journal
Building B-4-26
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600
(06) 265 2682 or 265 2999

Advertising Enquiries:
(06) 265 1193

© Commonwealth of Australia 1990
ISSN 1320-2545
Published by the Department of Defence
Canberra 1991
Contents

3. Letters to the Editor

5. Women in the Armed Services
   Captain M.S. Barry, RAEME

23. Motivation and the Army Student
    Major N.S. Bartels, AAAVN

27. Unit Recovery from Fatal Training Accidents
    Lieutenant Colonel K. Gifford and Mary P. Tyler

35. West Point Story
    David Whiteside

42. Just Defence
    Major G.J. Clayton, RNZAEC

45. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
    Dr Alan Stephens

53. Recapturing Our Youth
    Captain P.M. King, 2/14th Light Horse

57. The Evolution of Carrier Power
    Lieutenant Commander G.A. Dunk, RAN

65. Book Reviews
Over the last 5 years innovative technology, new plant and work practices have added considerably to Transfield Shipbuilding’s abilities in design, project management, construction, refit and repair.

Transfield’s proven modular shipbuilding technology enables it to excel in working to the highest quality, whilst operating to the tightest controls on deadline and budget.

An example is the recent launch of the FFG 06 Newcastle. This technology is now being applied in full to building the ANZAC Frigates.

With its breadth and depth of skills and its competitiveness in world markets, Transfield offers the reassurance of commitment, quality and excellence.
Air War in the Gulf

Dear Sir,

I refer to Major Finlayson's letter to the editor in the May/June edition of ADFJ, in which he takes issue with "a number of points" raised in my article "Conclusions for Doctrine from the Air War in the Gulf". I do not know which issues disturbed the major, save the one he discussed, which concentrated exclusively on attacks on national will and the links with Douhet. From the outset, let me make one point absolutely clear. At no time did Coalition air planners argue for or conduct air attacks aimed exclusively at the "national will" of Iraq.

Major Finlayson highlights a problem with Douhet's theory, which has been argued for many years. The important point here is that I did not mention Douhet in the article — indeed I find the relationship between Douhet and the contemporary strategic air attack theory tenuous at best. As I mentioned in a previous ADFJ article ("Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists", ADFJ Jan/Feb 91, pp.16-18), Douhet's theories were set within particular and quite specific circumstances — they were based on the need for Italy to use a small ground force to defend her northern frontier and an air force to conduct bomber offensives, which itself was predicated on a belief that the will of a nation could be destroyed if its population and production centres were attacked. Italy could not afford to become engaged in the trench warfare characteristic of World War I.

Major Finlayson quite correctly points out that Douhet's theories, which have been argued for many years. The important point here is that I did not mention Douhet in the article — indeed I find the relationship between Douhet and the contemporary strategic air attack theory tenuous at best. As I mentioned in a previous ADFJ article ("Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists", ADFJ Jan/Feb 91, pp.16-18), Douhet's theories were set within particular and quite specific circumstances — they were based on the need for Italy to use a small ground force to defend her northern frontier and an air force to conduct bomber offensives, which itself was predicated on a belief that the will of a nation could be destroyed if its population and production centres were attacked. Italy could not afford to become engaged in the trench warfare characteristic of World War I.

Major Finlayson quite correctly points out that Douhet's theories, which have been argued for many years. The important point here is that I did not mention Douhet in the article — indeed I find the relationship between Douhet and the contemporary strategic air attack theory tenuous at best. As I mentioned in a previous ADFJ article ("Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists", ADFJ Jan/Feb 91, pp.16-18), Douhet's theories were set within particular and quite specific circumstances — they were based on the need for Italy to use a small ground force to defend her northern frontier and an air force to conduct bomber offensives, which itself was predicated on a belief that the will of a nation could be destroyed if its population and production centres were attacked. Italy could not afford to become engaged in the trench warfare characteristic of World War I.

Major Finlayson quite correctly points out that Douhet's theories, which have been argued for many years. The important point here is that I did not mention Douhet in the article — indeed I find the relationship between Douhet and the contemporary strategic air attack theory tenuous at best. As I mentioned in a previous ADFJ article ("Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists", ADFJ Jan/Feb 91, pp.16-18), Douhet's theories were set within particular and quite specific circumstances — they were based on the need for Italy to use a small ground force to defend her northern frontier and an air force to conduct bomber offensives, which itself was predicated on a belief that the will of a nation could be destroyed if its population and production centres were attacked. Italy could not afford to become engaged in the trench warfare characteristic of World War I.

Major Finlayson quite correctly points out that Douhet's theories, which have been argued for many years. The important point here is that I did not mention Douhet in the article — indeed I find the relationship between Douhet and the contemporary strategic air attack theory tenuous at best. As I mentioned in a previous ADFJ article ("Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists", ADFJ Jan/Feb 91, pp.16-18), Douhet's theories were set within particular and quite specific circumstances — they were based on the need for Italy to use a small ground force to defend her northern frontier and an air force to conduct bomber offensives, which itself was predicated on a belief that the will of a nation could be destroyed if its population and production centres were attacked. Italy could not afford to become engaged in the trench warfare characteristic of World War I.
forces. Yet, we saw in the Gulf that fielded forces were attacked from the outset, with an increasing weight of effort being devoted to them, as the attacks on C3I, key production and infrastructure began to take effect. That was the difference between theory and practice and that is what analysis offers both the students of air power and the practitioners.

As Donald Rice (then Secretary of the Air Force) stated after the war: “the term ‘air campaign’ is fixed in the lexicon, and warfare has entered a new era. This new age also realised the concept of a strategic air campaign. Air power did exactly what air power visionaries said it could”. He went on to say: “strategic air power in previous wars suggested future potential... What is different now is the recognition by planners that technology caught up with theory”. I suggest that it is now time for students of air power similarly to catch up with technology and doctrine.

Contrary to Major Finlayson’s closing observation, there will not be a misemployment of a limited military asset because the senior RAAF practitioners of air power understand the whole equation (theory, history, technology, doctrine and practice). So too will the Joint Force Commander (JFC) understand just what is available to him (a JFC who quite probably will not be an RAAF officer), and he will be the one who issues the guidance and mission to the Air Component Commander.

The ADF is a highly professional force that keeps itself at the leading edge of technology and at the leading edge of conceptual development. While it is a healthy peacetime pursuit to examine critically the roles, capabilities, doctrine and training of the individual Services, it is neither healthy nor correct to imply that any of the Services, or indeed the ADF as a whole, will not be used to best effect in conflict by those charged with its conduct.

Group Captain G.W. Waters,
RAAF

Fort Canning Project

Dear Sir,

I am a research assistant writing from the Fort Canning Project in Singapore. The project aims to develop Fort Canning Hill into a historical park.

We need your help to reach out to Australian ex-servicemen. We urge your members to write to us if they have been to the Underground Command Centre at Fort Canning during the war period.

Fort Canning Hill in Singapore is rich with history. Sources dating from the 14th Century have mentioned activities taking place on the hill. In the mid-19th Century the British built a fort, part of which is still standing today.

Just before the outbreak of WW II in Singapore, the British established the Malayan Command on Fort Canning Hill and built the Underground Command Centre, also known as the Battle Box. It was the nerve centre for the British command of the Far East, and was considered the “impregnable fortress”. It was here the decision to surrender Singapore was made.

The most interesting period of the bunkers was before the British surrender. But we face the problem of gathering information for several reasons. First, the British destroyed most installations within the bunkers to prevent the Japanese from utilising them.

The whole complex was empty except for some small predictable items used during that period. Secondly, there is hardly any photographic evidence or written records about activities within the complex as it was a highly secretive place.

Also, the people we know who worked there could only provide parts of the history. The activities in each room were different and we have not found out how work was carried out in all the various rooms.

We have located some British veterans who have been inside the bunkers but we have found it impossible to ignore the role of Australian soldiers.

We are aware of Australian contribution at that time, especially as soldiers who were capable of the deadliest ambushes the Japanese had known.

We wish to find out if any Australians were attached to Fort Canning, or around the hill between 1939 and 1941.

Unfortunately, the only Australian we know who had been in the bunkers was Gordon Bennett when he participated in the meeting at the British surrender.

The Fort Canning Project is just beginning to establish formal contact with military and related organisations in Australia (with thanks to Captain Kavanagh).

Information can be directed to me at the Fort Canning Project, C/- Oral History Department, Hill Street Building, 140 Hill Street, Singapore.

Ms Tan Teng Teng
Singapore
Do We Really Want Equality of Employment for Our Women in the Armed Services?

By Captain M.S. Barry, RAEME.

"It is possible that the historic refusal to give women weapons... may be due not to a rejection of putting the power of death into the hands of those who give life, but rather because women who kill... are more implacable and less subject to chivalrous rules with which men seek to mute the savagery of warfare."

Margaret Mead (1972, from Andrews, 1978:33)

Introduction

Apart from the inevitable budget cuts made monotonous by their regularity, there are few issues to raise such heated debate in an infantry mess as the role of women in the armed forces, and more specifically, the possibility of their participation in combat. The Vietnam War brought vivid full colour images of dead and dying teenage soldiers into the living rooms of Australian and American families and these images played an important part in turning public opinion against the war. The fate of driver Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, captured by Iraqi soldiers during the Gulf War, was pondered in newspapers around the world, and her release received as much television footage as any other news story at the time. In the light of these events and the recent decision to allow Australian service-women to serve in combat related positions, the call by some for Australian women to serve in combat positions needs to be carefully examined. Is Australian society ready to accept teenage girls in body bags on the 6 o'clock news, and would society support in wartime, a policy that some are calling for in peacetime?

In 1990, Australia made the decision to allow female service personnel into combat related jobs. This bought immediate results, allowing female naval personnel to serve in the Persian Gulf and, if that war were to be refought today and Australia were to send ground troops, then we would see Australian women soldiers serving within range of Iraqi artillery in Brigade headquarters, logistic and administrative units. But this is not enough, according to some, who are calling for the extension of this policy to allow women to participate in combat duties. Is this a peacetime phenomenon or would there be similar support for such policies in time of war?

There is little doubt that the role of women in Society in general has changed a great deal over the past few decades and, "as increasing numbers of women have entered non-traditional jobs, the military has responded to the social pressures by opening more avenues of employment to women on a basis equal to men" (Cassidy, 1983:19). Changing demographics within Australian society and changing attitudes among new-generation women has resulted in an increase in the number of women considering the armed forces as a viable career option, which will see the proportion of women in the military increase. This is evidenced by increases in female recruitment, for example, in the third quarter of 1990, 21 per cent of all recruits were female, compared to an average 12 per cent within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a whole (Bergin & Smith, 1991:220).

The role, function and operation of the ADF is unique within Australian society, but during peacetime it is natural for the primary combat function to be seen by many as being secondary to the social function as an employer that the Defence Force carries out. Nevertheless the structure and preparation of the Defence Force is for war, and it is the combat effectiveness of the armed forces that is the primary issue to be considered whenever calls are made to alter the structure or method of preparation of the force. Gabriel (1980:45) says that "a military force that performs alternative social functions at the expense of its ability to wage war ceases to be an effective instrument of [national] policy". For this reason any discussion on the role women should have in the armed forces must centre on the combat ability and preparedness of the force. The employment of women in combat basically revolves around two issues: can women serve in combat? and should women serve in combat? There is much historical precedent for the ability of women to serve in combat but this precedent should be tempered by an examination of the situations in which women have actually served in combat, the roles in which they have served and the effectiveness of such service. In considering the second question it is necessary to look at the nature of the arguments for and against such service, the various ways in which a society approaches this issue, and once again, the differing situations that have led to acceptance and rejection of such service.

This article will examine these issues, and outline the major arguments put forward by those in favour of
women serving in combat, and the arguments of those against. The views of servicewomen were addressed in a major survey during the late 1980s and the results of this study are also included in this report. A number of countries around the world are re-examining the roles that their women will play in their armed forces and there is substantial historical precedent for an increased role for Australian women. In reading this article, however, it should be remembered that the primary role of the ADF, during peacetime, is to prepare for war. Not to meet the social or egalitarian needs of one section of society; not to act as a national emergency or civil defence force; and not to provide employment for the sake of providing employment. Whenever any of these "alternative social functions" are met to the detriment of its primary function, the potential cost can be tragic.

EEO Legislation and Its Implications to the ADF

Australia has at least seven Acts of Parliament that deal, in some way, with the issue of Sex Discrimination or Equal Employment Opportunity. The Department of Defence is primarily concerned with two of these: the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, and, to a lesser extent, the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1987. The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 came into force on 1 August 1984 with one of the main objectives being:

to eliminate, as far as is possible, discrimination against persons on the ground of sex, marital status or pregnancy in the areas of work, accommodation, education, the provision of goods, facilities and services, the disposal of land, the activities of clubs and the administration of Commonwealth laws and programs.

The Act defines discrimination on the ground of sex or marital status as having occurred if the "aggrieved person is treated less favourably by reason of that person's sex or marital status, or a characteristic appertaining to or generally imputed to persons of that sex or marital status". At this time regulations under the Act redefined "Combat" duties as "duties requiring a person to commit, or to participate directly in the commission of an act of violence against an adversary in time of war", and "Combat Related" duties as "duties requiring a person to work in support of, and in close proximity to, a person performing combat duties ..." (Sex Discrimination Legislation Precis: 38; Smith 1990:135; Cameron, 1988:88), and in line with these definitions the Defence Force was granted a number of exemptions regarding the employment of female personnel. This had the result that the Act was in fact a step back for women in the armed forces, and actually resulted in a number of jobs that had previously been available now being excluded to women. Servicewomen were exempted from performing combat and combat related duties, which effectively precluded them from serving aboard most Naval vessels, tactical military aircraft and within the field force component of the ground forces. This followed from a reservation regarding the exclusion of women from combat and combat-related duties made by Australia in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1983 (Precis: 37; discussion with CREWET staff).

Also included in the definition of these duties were positions which must be filled by those who have had experience in, or training for, warlike operations. But at the same time it was the intention of the Government to improve career opportunities for women and reduce manpower problems in the Defence Force by opening up more positions to women. So it was announced in August 1984 that a further 17,000 positions would be available to women on the basis of merit in competition with men (Precis: 38; Army Office Staff Instruction [AOSI] 33/84, 1984:1). This coincided with the adoption of joint male and female recruit and officer cadet training, standard promotion requirements and the introduction of weapons and tactical training for all female personnel.

On 30 May 1990 the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel announced that service in combat-related positions would be opened to women, thereby opening up many more jobs, and improving career opportunities for all ranks (AOSI 13/90, 1990:2). The exemption contained in the legislation would remain but would not be used, but implementation of the new policy would be reviewed annually, with the policy itself coming under review in June 1993, this has since been brought forward to November 1992. The philosophy behind the decision is to ensure that "all members of the ADF have an equal opportunity for employment and professional development except in areas specifically designated as combat duties" (AOSI 13/90:3), and it is expected that the representation of women in combat-related employment will grow to a level proportional to the percentage of women in the ADF. In practical terms this means that female personnel will still be excluded from service in the Navy on submarines; in the Army in Armoured, Artillery, Infantry and combat Engineer units; and in the Air Force from operating offensive combat aircraft and from duties as airfield defence guards (Smith, 1990:125-6). This will result in virtually all sea-going positions in the Navy becoming available; 55 per cent of Army positions, up
Positions available on a basis of merit.

from 17 per cent; and 94 per cent of Air Force positions, up from 65 per cent. The implementation of the new policy is ahead of schedule with 611, or 20.4 per cent of total regular Army female personnel, serving in combat related positions by September 1992, compared with the target of 450 by June 1992 and 600 by June 1993 (Moule, 1992:5). Out of a total of 146 different Employment Classifications (ECN) in the Army, all except for 19 are available to women, but of the 127 available, only 66 have women serving in them at present.

Although seen as a step forward and welcomed by many people, these changes were criticised in a number of quarters. Outspoken Victorian Returned Services League secretary, Bruce Ruxton, said on radio that the Chiefs of Staff must have “rocks between their ears” to make such a move while, at the other end of the scale, a female Air Force officer described the attitude of the Chief of the Defence Force in maintaining the exclusion from combat as “archaic” and “behind the times”, and the Opposition spokeswoman on Defence Personnel welcomed the changes (Smith, 1990:126). More recently the Prime Minister’s adviser on women’s affairs said that the ban on combat positions could no longer be justified, particularly in light of US experiences during the recent Gulf War (Summers, 1992:4). This view is popular with feminist writers and is important as it contains a fallacy that requires explanation, because it blurs the moral and physical distinction between acceptance that a soldier is exposed to danger as part of his or her job, and the different situation involving soldiers engaged on offensive operations.

The Practical Distinction Between Combat and Combat-Related Employment

Some writers have argued that, because of the nature of modern warfare whereby an enemy can strike at rear echelon units, support areas and lines of supply, the distinction between combat and combat-related employment has blurred and should be disregarded (Summers, 1992:4; Segal, 1980:268). The questions that this argument raises lie at the heart of this issue. At what point do duties “in support of... a person performing combat duties” become direct participation in the “commission of an act of violence against an adversary”? Smith (1990:135-6) outlines five different situations that can be used to explain the differences between Combat, Combat-Related and Non-Combat duties, and as a measure against which the desired level of female participation can be established:

a. the situation where any member of the armed
forces can be the object of legitimate enemy attack simply by wearing a military uniform:

b. service personnel who are involved in supporting an attack on an enemy without any direct threat to themselves, for example using radio to direct friendly aircraft against an enemy force, or flying tanker aircraft that re-fuel combat planes in the air;

c. the situation in which service personnel are engaged in support activities within a combat zone where they are liable to attack from an enemy guerrilla or mobile force;

d. the situation where an enemy is directly engaged over long distances and can retaliate, for example in a naval engagement or artillery duel; and

e. combat at ranges permitting the use of infantry and armoured weapons.

Prior to the Vietnam War the employment of women by the ADF in the first two situations was acceptable military and government policy. The third situation has occurred to a small degree during many conflicts in relation to medical personnel, and the deployment of female medical personnel in a combat zone has occasionally been used as an argument to justify the deployment of women in other roles within a combat zone. This argument is refuted by Cassidy (1983:22) who says that “. . . no analogy can be drawn legitimately between the presence of women medical personnel in theatres of war and the employment of other female personnel in such theatres” because “medical personnel are classed as non-combatants; as such they do not take up arms except in self defence or in defence of their patients” and he adds that such “protection is not personal, but is to their calling: they are required to aid all wounded and sick, friend and foe alike”. The stage three situation changed slightly in 1984 when women began to receive the same level of combat training as men during entry training and on general promotion courses, but policy regarding the employment of women restricted their involvement in third and fourth stage situations until the decision to open combat-related employment in 1990 effectively placed them in stage three and some stage four situations. The stage five situation, actual combat, is still completely restricted.

Although Australian Army women are currently excluded from serving in Artillery units, it could be argued that such service in, what is to Smith a primarily stage four situation, is sufficiently similar to service aboard a Naval combat ship as to warrant a change of policy. This is a matter for the individual services to determine and it may well be that at some stage women will be admitted to the combat-related roles, such as signaller or command post operator, within a gun battery, although the requirement of all Gunners to be able to “man” the guns when required could possibly justify their continued exclusion. The distinction between a stage four and a stage five situation is basically two fold. One difference relates to the proximity to offensive action and the exposure to danger; and the other to the actual deliberate participation in direct offensive action, which is fundamentally different to involvement in defensive action when required. In deciding whether this line should be crossed it is necessary to examine the suitability of women to be able to undertake the type of duties that are involved in direct offensive action and also the acceptability of this participation. First, however, it is useful to examine several situations in which women have actually participated in combat, as this can provide a useful insight into not only their ability to participate in combat, but also the social acceptability of such service.

Women in Combat: Separating Fact From Myth

Traditionally women have been expected to perform the vital functions of bearing and raising children, and are considered more fitted to caring and nurturing roles than to aggressive and violent ones. Although there are numerous examples throughout history in which women have served in combat, except in exceptional circumstances, it is only when national survival is at stake that they have been allowed by their society to take part in combat (Smith, 1990:126). Although feminist proponents of women in combat cite several legendary female warriors such as Boadicea and Joan of Arc, it is more appropriate to examine a number of contemporary situations in which women have served in combat and combat-related roles in order to establish whether there is a pattern to such service, and also the reaction of society to this service.

Often cited as the developed country with female soldiers, the nation attracting the greatest myths about female military service is Israel (Elshlaim, 1987:242). Contrary to common belief, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) does not use female soldiers in combat, has never used women in combat and, since its formation in 1949 has even adopted a policy whereby, “all jobs involving combat, jobs that have to be filled under bad conditions, and jobs where physical demands are too great for females are closed to them” (Bloom, 1982:155). This is not to say that Israeli women have not played an important part in their nation’s defence. Israeli women trained and fought as part of the illegal, underground army, the Hagannah, during the two decades prior to World War Two and in the Palmach (the Hagannah’s
assault companies) during that war. During the 1948 War of Liberation, when Israel fought against six Arab countries and internally against the Palestinians, women comprised approximately 20 per cent of the combat force and participated in both defensive and offensive actions. But with the creation of the IDF in 1949, the role of women was limited, so that today, although they can train and act as instructors in the combat branches, their service is deliberately restricted by the Defense Service Law of 1949 to non-combat positions (Cassidy, 1983:25; Smith, 1990:126; Hirshowitz, 1990:38-40; Saywell, 1985:60). They are eligible for conscription for a period of two years, rather than three as for male soldiers, which limits the scope and type of training that they can cost-effectively receive; they then serve in the reserve until they are 24, for males it is 30 years; and they are exempt from military service if they marry or have children (Bloom, 1982:152). Israel is actually lagging behind many other countries when it comes to female service on the basis of equality; they undergo separate basic training to male recruits, they are part of their own Women’s Corps, the CHEN; their service in non-combat positions is not automatic but depends on the changing needs of the IDF; and out of a possible 850 jobs available in the IDF, only 270 are available to women (Bloom, 1982:151-159; Almog, 1990a:30-35; Almog, 1990b:36-37; Hirshowitz, 1990:37-40). In short, Israel rejects the use of women in combat and, as a result, has taken positive steps to exclude its women from combat.

Another country that has made wide use of women in combat is Russia. As a last resort, in an effort to shame deserting men and in the face of severe manpower shortages, Russia formed a women’s infantry battalion in 1917, but this is seen as being a “symbolic device representing the inclusion of women in the national war effort” (Cassidy, 1983:23-24). In the early days, prior to and during the revolution, women were treated on relatively equal terms as the men, and participated in both the struggle against the Tsar, and in the new Bolshevik order; but the rise to power of Stalin in the 1930s saw a change of emphasis from liberation, to mobilisation and coercion (Griesse & Stites, 1982:61-62). At the beginning of World War II, the main role for women, as for most other countries, was to replace the men on the farms and in the factories; but by 1942 manpower losses were so severe, that civilian resistance to women in combat gave way to outright mobilisation (Griesse & Stites, 1982:69). This eventually resulted in approximately 800,000 women who trained and fought in the Red Army, of which about 500,000 served at the front. These figures do not include partisans and irregulars but represent roughly 8 per cent of the Soviet Union’s combatants (Griesse & Stites, 1982:73; Saywell, 1985: 131; Quinn, 1988:67). After the war the women largely returned to
traditional roles and the military forces of the former Soviet Union until recently were made up largely of male conscripts, with a relatively small number of professional male and female specialists and officers. Women receive equal pay and benefits and are treated somewhat more leniently in terms of discipline than the men, but despite the peace-time preference for an all-male army, the authorities are ready and prepared to bring into service as many women as they require, in whatever capacity, should the situation demand it.

Britain used female auxiliary soldiers as nurses, drivers and canteen staff in relatively small numbers during World War I. They served in rear echelon areas in France and in Britain in order to free up men for combat service at the front. During World War II the situation was somewhat different as Britain itself was directly threatened, and women served in combat related roles in anti-aircraft batteries, a small number flew transport and supply aircraft in the Air Transport Auxiliary, and they also served in more traditional roles as nurses, drivers, signalers, mechanics and logistics personnel. By the end of the war nearly 500,000 women had served as part of the British military forces, a number of which saw service in combat related roles (Goldman & Stites, 1982:24-32; Saywell, 1985:1-17; Taylor, 1988). Today the question of where women should serve still vexes the British military establishment. Early in 1990 Britain announced that females would serve on Royal Navy warships, and during the Gulf War a number saw active service with the Navy and in combat related roles with the Army in Kuwait and Iraq. They have also sent 50 female personnel to Bosnia as part of their United Nations commitment (McGrory, 1992a, 1992b), women are training as fighter pilots and bomber crews (Bakewell, 1992:40) and Britain even has a female paratrooper serving with their free-fall display team (McGrory, 1992b:48).

The experience of other Western nations is similar. The US has gradually expanded the role of women in their armed forces since the end of the Second World War. During that war women were generally employed in an auxiliary role in support units, with small numbers serving in operational areas as nurses and support personnel. This changed gradually in the post-war years as restrictions were slowly lifted, but the 1983 invasion of Grenada saw US servicewomen pulled out of units that were deploying and replaced with men, with disastrous results, as well-integrated teams suffered (Greenberg, Wilkinson, Turque & Bingham, 1990:85). US women moved closer to combat roles with the opening of 24,000 non-combat support positions to women in 1988 (Hyde, 1989:26), and, while American women cannot serve in front line air defence units, they are able to serve with second echelon units such as those equipped with the Patriot missile used during the Gulf War. During the war in Panama there was a well publicised incident in which female Military Police personnel were involved in a minor combat skirmish, and in the Gulf War they served in every capacity except for combat troops, although two US servicewomen became prisoners of war, and a number were killed in an Iraqi Scud missile attack (Greenberg et al., 1990:84). They do not fly combat helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, but are able to fly utility helicopters and aircraft that support the front line, even participating in search and rescue and medevac missions in enemy territory. Naval and US Airforce women have similar opportunities to their Army counterparts, but US Marine Corps women are restricted from any combat-related position, including flying (Hyde, 1989: 27-28; Gilbert, 1991:88-89).

Canada conducted a five-year trial in the early 1980s in which women were assigned related roles in support units in Europe, Canada and the Arctic (Beaglehole, 1982:44-47). Despite early opposition and many reservations, the trial was successful, and in 1989 the Canadian Human Rights Commission opened all positions, including combat roles, to women. This impacted quickly on the Canadian Forces with the result that women have now trained as fighter pilots, infantry soldiers and Naval command officers (Hyde, 1989:28).

The European countries provide a contrast to the direction taken by countries like the US, Australia and Britain. Denmark, Norway and Holland opened up positions in combat units in 1988 and women can train as paratroopers, commandos, general infantry soldiers, tank crewmen, Naval personnel and fighter pilots (Greenberg et al., 1990:84); although Danish women are restricted from flying fighter aircraft because of the physical demands of high-g performance aircraft. By contrast, German women are permitted in the medical corps only, with less than 2000 women out of a total force of 495,000. This comes as no surprise if Germany’s history is examined, as, even in the face of severe manpower shortages during the latter stages of World War II, Germany drafted “old men and young boys”, and suffered defeat, rather than let its women fight. Greek women are restricted to the Non-Commissioned ranks and are limited to clerical, secretarial and communications duties; while Italy bars women from serving in its armed forces in any capacity, despite their service as irregulars and partisans during the Second World War (Hyde, 1989:28-30, Goldman, 1982:4-7).

Clearly there is not widespread agreement on the role women should play in the military. It should be noted that countries that have actively sought more equality for women in general, have been more amen-
able to expanding their participation in military service. Where women have fought in combat it has been when their country is threatened and the lives of civilian women at risk. It is interesting to note that even those countries which allowed women to fight in combat out of a national need, no longer permit women in combat roles. Quinn (1988:67) says that this illustrates that "women combatants are a feature of war, not merely an indulgence of peace". And she adds that "what is remarkable is that we talk about women and the military profession and we are not even at war. Most societies have, until recently, been reluctant to permit women to serve in combat, or even in combat-related, roles but have done so out of either a national need during periods of war, or in response to social pressure during times of peace. Women have fought successfully as partisans and irregulars in France, Italy, Yugoslavia (both during World War II and today), Poland, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba and Mozambique and seem well able to cope with the special stress and trauma of this style of combat (Goldman, 1982:7-8; Quinn, 1988:67). The Bosnian conflict has seen schoolgirls, too young to fight, spending their evenings cleaning and loading weapons; and former computer operators, secretaries and housewives crawling behind enemy lines at night to kill Serbian soldiers and pinpoint targets. "Don't make me out to be a heroine. There are a lot of women caught up in this war", says 33-year-old mother of three, Karmen (McGrory, 1992b:48). There is definitely an historical precedent for the service of women in combat and many arguments in favour of women's service in this role legitimately draw heavily on both this precedent and also on the notion of citizenship obligations.

**Citizenship: Equal Rights, Equal Responsibilities?**

Of the major arguments used to justify calls for the participation of women in the combat branches of the armed services, the notion of full citizenship is perhaps the most persuasive. For many years women were not considered to be full citizens of society and their rights and obligations were restricted accordingly. Aristotle described a woman as "an inferior thing" who was a necessary condition, but not a part, of the polis (Okin, 1979:90). While, as late as 1968 courts in America were excluding women from jury duty because their "special family duties [took] priority over their basic duties as citizens" Okin (1979:263). These attitudes seem foreign in Australia today and few would deny that women are granted full citizenship in this country, but some authors believe that until women are provided with the opportunity to exercise all of the duties and obligations of citizenship, they have not achieved that status. It follows that "if women are to be treated as equal citizens . . . they should enjoy the rights and accept the duties of all citizens, including the fundamental obligation to bear arms in defence of the state" (Smith, 1990:129).

Segal (1980:269) says that "the rights of citizenship in our [American] society are viewed as connected to civic responsibilities, including military service", and, although she is writing of American society, there would be little doubt that the connection between citizenship and civic responsibility is equally valid in Australia. She argues that many minority groups use military, and more specifically combat, service to achieve more equal citizenship rights and Feld (1978:558) supports this by describing the "opportunity to serve in the combat branches" as "associated with the notion of civic and personal fulfilment". Jean-Jacques Rousseau, writing in the 18th Century, described citizenship as being "... constituted in the interstices of the self, inscribed in the flesh, felt in the bones" (Elshtain, 1987:60), and goes on to explain that the true city, or civis, is made by the citizens, and that the citizens must give their all, they must be prepared to fight in the defence of their city, thereby making the choice whether they are true citizens or "debased slaves". The first French Revolution also bought the call for universal conscription in which Citizen Carnot, of the Committee of Public Safety, explained that "... the republic is a great city in a state of siege: France must become one vast camp and Paris its arsenal", in proclaiming a law in 1789 conscripting every Frenchman, young men, married men, women, children and old men (Elshtain, 1987:63).

Modern feminist movements have also linked military service with citizenship. Many feminists agree that "the wider demands of equal citizenship should demand no special exemptions from civil duties for women, and no special privileges of civil rights reserved exclusively for men" (Porter, 1991: 187). The American National Organisation for Women (NOW), arguing that "compulsory, universal military service is central to the concept of citizenship in a democracy", declared that if women are to gain "first class citizenship", they must have the right to fight, and that laws that exclude women from registering for the draft or participating in combat duty perpetuate "archaic notions" of women's capabilities, and result in "devastating long-term psychological and political repercussions" (Elshtain, 1978:239). Whether many Australian women feel that they have suffered "devastating psychological repercussions" as a result of being denied...
combat service is doubtful, but the link between full and equal citizenship, and equal responsibility for maintaining and defending the society that provides that citizenship, is strong and demonstrates why some authors believe that the "case for accepting women for combat assignment cannot be argued on a [purely] pragmatic relationship; nor at least on strictly military grounds" (Feld, 1978:559).

There is a philosophical difference between rights and obligations. Porter (1991:188-9) argues that rights, on moral grounds, must be extendable to all: but it is the action of exercising those rights that confers responsibility on the possessor of the rights, and the decision whether or not to exercise one's rights is, by its very nature, optional. Obligations, on the other hand, are imperative and binding, and "not to fulfil one's obligations is to fail in one's duty as a moral being" (Porter, 1991:188). For this reason it can be argued that a "right to fight does not itself entail a duty to serve" (Ruddick, 1983:472), but the moral decision not to take up arms, or to renounce arms, depends upon the existence of the prior right to take up arms. Porter (1991:189) claims that the denial of any right, "presupposes equal status and a respect for an individual's choice in taking up or rejecting the right", and therefore, in excluding women from participating in combat, society is not extending all of the rights of citizenship to women, thereby denying them the opportunity to fulfil their moral obligations to society.

Men and women have long been stereotyped into gender-oriented roles and characteristics. The ideal woman possesses such character traits as warmth, compassion and sensitivity and is perceived as being the nurturer, while men are more aggressive and dominant. Segal, (1980:283) says that "one important component of the stereotype of the ideal man, and of a male-dominated society, is the protection of women". It was partly for this reason that the Mississippi Supreme Court, in 1966, excluded women from participating in jury service, "the legislature has the right to exclude women . . . to protect them from the filth, obscenity and noxious atmosphere that so often pervades a courtroom during a jury trial" (Okin, 1979:262). This view is extended by Questor (1977:88) who reminds us that "the world has long felt that women should be protected from combat, regardless of whether they should be good at combat". For this reason the call for the right to participate in combat is, according to Porter (1991:188), of symbolic significance for women, and Ruddick (1983:472) says that "dividing the protector from protected, defender from defended is a linchpin of masculinism [sic] as well as military ideology".

Another explanation offered to explain men's resistance to allowing women to participate in combat is offered by Segal (1980:278-9). She describes the phenomenon whereby the soldier is able to survive the psychological stress of combat by preserving a mental image of the "normal world" back home; where one of the most desirable elements of this image is the memory of the wives, mothers and girlfriends who are waiting for the soldier's return. "... 'our women', who are warm, nurturant, ultra-feminine, and objects of sexual fantasy. Women (at least 'our women') are not part of war. Indeed, one of the many reasons for fighting is to protect our women and the rest of what is in that image of the world back home" (Segal, 1980:278). By allowing women into combat, this psychological defence cannot be maintained, the mental image of the "real world" becomes blurred with the reality of his surroundings, and the soldier is unable to clarify, for himself, some of the reasons for which he is fighting.

Perhaps one of the more critical problems faced by the military, especially regarding the issue of women serving in combat is a psychological factor that relates to the traditional role discussed earlier of the male as the protector of the female. Regardless of the ability of a female soldier to fight in combat, there is some evidence that male soldiers may still attempt to live up to this expectation to the detriment of the effectiveness of the unit, and any issue that reduces the combat effectiveness of a unit is of concern (Gabriel, 1980:45-52; Segal, 1980:283). During the War of Independence, Israel found that the perception of a need to offer
additional protection to female soldiers caused male soldiers to be distracted from their own tasks, thereby causing them to jeopardise their own mission in order to protect the women (Dubuc, 1991:32). Irrespective of instructions and orders to the contrary, male soldiers continued to react differently to the death or wounding of a female soldier than they would to a male (Evans, 1990:124). While some women scoff at this notion, many veterans feel that a man’s instinct to protect a woman first, before himself, is too strong to be easily overcome (Greenberg et al, 1990:86).

Similarly, if male and female soldiers serving together form close relationships they are likely to be distracted by their concern for each other, rather than having a general concern for all of their fellow soldiers. But how much the effect of such a relationship differs from the “male bonding” and close friendships that emerge in any combat unit is of course arguable, and it may well turn out to be an unfounded fear. It is frequently assumed that “male-female bonding” is based on sexual attraction, and that males and females would form intimate relationships rather than bonding as peers (Greenberg et al, 1990:86), but there is plenty of evidence to show that men and women can work in close proximity without forming a sexual relationship, more commonly they form a close working friendship based on mutual respect and mateship or a type of “brother-sister” relationship (Brewer-Jones, 1990:23).

Problems With Integration:

Unit Cohesion

One of the three elements of combat power is morale, a key element of which is unit cohesion. Unit effectiveness and cohesion are the result of “socio-psychological bonding — anthropologically, male bonding — among soldiers within combat groups” (Gabriel, 1980:44), and there is a wide body of opinion that suggests that female integration in a combat force will have a detrimental effect on unit cohesion. In an interview on Four Corners on 3 August 1992, Air Vice Marshal Collins (Rtd), the former deputy head of the Royal Australian Air Force said that, “sexuality is one of those areas of human activity that creates most of the problems, . . . these sorts of problems in a fighting unit can be most disruptive. In combat units you don’t want to load up a commander or his fighters with these sorts of sexual problems on site, you have to isolate them from the serious business.”

Goldman (1982:11), suggests that when allowed to form female combat units, as in the Soviet example, women developed a special kind of group psychology of mutual support, different in content, but similar in function to “male bonding”. This differs to the experience of those in integrated units in the US who have
had to struggle against discrimination, prejudice and preferential treatment (Goldman, 1982:11; Roberts, 1978:72-75). The Australian experience is rather more positive, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the effect on unit cohesion has been minor, with individual performance being the benchmark for acceptability (Gradden: 1992:2; and discussions with personnel staff at logistic units in the Operational Deployment Force [ODF]). Whether this is because of the increased emphasis on individual and small team level leadership that is characteristic of the ADF, rather than the formation and unit level operations of the US Army, or because of differences in culture between US and Australian service personnel is unclear, but is an issue that deserves further study. Suffice to say that while problems do exist, integration has so far proved quite successful.

Problems With Integration: Sexual Discrimination

There are a number of ways in which sexual discrimination can manifest itself and cause tension and morale problems within integrated units: stereotyping, psychological invisibility, familiarisation and institutional sexism (Roberts, 1978:73), and sexual harassment. Stereotypes such as “women soldiers can’t physically do their jobs” and “women soldiers come into the army to find a husband, get their benefits and get out”, can be damaging to morale, hard to combat and degrading to all personnel, male and female. They can be overcome through education, clearly defined job specifications and through experience, as most stereotyping seems to occur with male soldiers who have had little experience serving with women. There is some support, however, for the view that differences in physical ability causes friction and morale problems amongst officer cadets as there is a perception amongst male cadets that their training is less effective because of the presence of women in the course (Smith, 1990:133). During this type of training individual performance and effort is closely monitored, and an individual who is unable to maintain the group’s standards is quickly ostracised because they are seen to be “dragging the group down”. Roberts (1978:74) describes “psychological invisibility” as the situation where the presence of women is either deliberately ignored, or they are treated in a condescending manner, in order to belittle their contribution. When this attitude is adopted by NCOs and officers, “Men, I want you to do this …”, “one of you Men change the tyre on that truck”; it can cause further problems because male soldiers perceive that it is acceptable to denigrate the performance and contribution of women. Another form of discrimination, familiarisation, or fraternisation, probably causes the most problems, and is perceived as a major problem in many armed forces (Dubuc, 1991:35). It occurs when male and female soldiers form close relationships and is most undermining to authority and morale when it involves soldiers of different ranks who work in the same environment. It usually manifests itself as favoured or preferential treatment and, apart from the morale problems it causes, will almost certainly damage the credibility of the personnel involved. Obviously this problem is not restricted to the military, but its impact and effect on morale can be greater due to the rigid rank hierarchy that exists. Another school of thought suggests, however, that the lack of privacy inherent in the communal nature of military life acts as a disincentive to the forming of intimate relationships, and these conditions do not provide the opportunities for relationships that sceptics fear (Brewer-Jones, 1990:23). Institutional sexism refers to problems caused by differences in standards and levels of training between male and female soldiers. This problem can be reduced through the development of gender neutral job specifications and the establishment of integrated training facilities, as has occurred during the past decade in the ADF (Nabors, 1982:55; Moule, 1992:5-7).

Sexual harassment takes many forms and represents the most unpleasant form of sexual discrimination. It occurs when female soldiers are not given the same respect and consideration that male soldiers of equal ability receive, and includes condescending behaviour, deliberate use of vulgar or obscene expressions, suggestive behaviour, sexual teasing, unwanted flirting, touching or sexual assault (Clausen, 1992:16). Although it occurs in most integrated workplaces, the risks and dangers are higher in the military because of the close living and working conditions, the greater level of control over personal matters exercised by those in authority, and the dependence of young soldiers on the military system for their daily living needs because they are living away from home in a communal environment.

None of the problems discussed here are peculiar to the armed forces, although the unique nature of military service and the demands of combat training accentuate the effect that they have on the work environment (Dubuc, 1991:36). Sound, equitable human resource management policies are as much the key to reducing or preventing problems like these in the armed forces as in any workplace, and it is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to ensure that
Table 1: Women in Combat, ADF Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Definitely YES</th>
<th>On Balance YES</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>On Balance NO</th>
<th>Definitely NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should women who are properly trained be allowed to serve in combat-related positions?</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should women who are properly trained be allowed to serve in combat positions?</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should women be given the opportunity to train in combat and combat-related skills?</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you be willing to serve in combat-related positions if you were properly trained?</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you be willing to serve in combat positions if you were properly trained?</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


these policies are developed and enforced. Research findings support the view that women perform better, and are better accepted by their male peers, in units where the commanders actively support their presence, as the quality of supportive leadership is a key factor contributing to the successful integration of women into a unit (Quinn, 1991:50). The armed forces are a microcosm of the larger society and does not attempt to operate in isolation from the society it both serves and is served by. As attitudes change in general society they also change within the military, albeit at a slower pace; and so, as more units become integrated, and as the “old soldiers” leave the system, to be replaced by new soldiers, the attitudes of society gradually become infused into the military system.

Physical and Physiological Factors That Affect Employment of Servicewomen

The most common arguments, particularly from combat soldiers, against women being employed in combat and combat-related duties relate to perceived physical and physiological weaknesses. Air Marshall David Evans (1990:124), a former Chief of the Air Staff, says that “if . . . physical strength were the only constraint, the task of increasing the employment of women in the armed services would be eased considerably”. However true this view might be for the Navy and Air Force, it is simplistic when applied to the Army, because the Army, by virtue of its modus operandi, demands higher levels of physical ability. The physical and physiological differences between men and women are real and distinct, but are they sufficient barrier as to warrant the attention they attract? It is necessary at this point to examine these differences to determine the validity of the arguments on which they are based.

The fact that the average female is not as strong as the average male is commonly used to reinforce arguments against female combat service, but Segal (1982:272) points out that the improvement in performance of female Olympic athletes has been faster than for males, and the top female athletes are actually performing better than the top male athletes of 50 years ago. This is all well and good, but soldiers are not Olympic athletes and are recruited from people with somewhat more average physical talents. A series of Canadian studies of male and female soldiers who had just completed recruit training, and were at a high level of physical conditioning, demonstrated that with regard to carrying, pushing and pulling, females had 68.6 per cent of the strength of the males; vertical lifting capacity was 66 per cent; isometric (hand-grip and up-right pull) was 63 per cent; lifting was 55-59 per cent; and total body strength ranged from 35 to 85 per
cent (Dubuc, 1991:33-4). Although this type of finding is not disputed, other writers such as Nabors (1982:52-3) argue that size and strength are relative and, although Western women are smaller on average than Western men, they tend to be larger than men from other cultures such as those found in SE Asia, and therefore their strength may not be a barrier. He says that “women should not be compared physically to their male counterparts but, rather, to the task which they have been asked to perform. If they can physically accomplish the desired task to required standards, male-female comparisons are irrelevant” (Nabors, 1982:53). Because modern technology has reduced the physical requirements of many tasks, those tasks that, although traditionally considered male but can be performed by women, should not be restricted purely on the basis of strength.

General physical fitness, which consists of a combination of strength, endurance, balance, speed, agility and motor power (Binkin & Bach, 1977:78), is an essential criteria for any combat soldier, and studies have shown that women, because they are limited by heart size, lung capacity, body size and strength, have to operate at a level closer to their maximum than men, and therefore will reach exhaustion sooner (Haakonson 1978 cited from Dubuc, 1991:34). They have to work harder to accomplish the same amount of output, which causes greater fatigue, and they take longer to recover to their full strength. While there are certainly many jobs on the modern battlefield within the capacity of most women, there are many fundamental tasks, such as carrying a casualty, carrying artillery ammunition, “digging in” and carrying a full patrol load across difficult country, that are beyond the capacity of many men, let alone the average woman.

Physiological factors such as menstruation and lost time due to pregnancy have been touted as further evidence of female unsuitability for combat duties, although the issues have been largely avoided by many writers. Although women have to be more careful than males with regards to personal hygiene (Dubuc, 1991:34), female non-combatants have coped in field situations for many years and the needs of female combatants do not really differ from non combatants in this area. There is little evidence that menstruation has more than a marginal effect on a female soldier’s performance (Segal, 1982:273), beyond the increased level of inconvenience and the lack of privacy. US Army statistics show that very little time is lost for healthy women, although many men attribute any female weakness to “that time of the month”, and it is not unknown for women to play on this ignorance (Nabors, 1982:55), but this is as much a socialisation problem as a physiological one.

Similarly, lost time due to pregnancy, although it can amount to a significant period for individual servicewomen, and is a disruption to career continuity, is no greater on average than lost time for men due to injury or disciplinary problems (Nabors, 1982:56-7). Policies have been developed to deal with the employment of pregnant servicewomen which state that servicewomen who become pregnant will be repatriated immediately if they become pregnant while on operations (Moule, 1992:4). With the availability of contraception, and through education, the incidence of unplanned pregnancy should be low (Thompson, 1978:50), although there is some anecdotal fear that female soldiers may deliberately become pregnant to avoid arduous duties or overseas deployment. Realistically, soldiers with this type of attitude, male or female, would be able to find other reasons to avoid such duties anyway, and so the threat of pregnancy is no more of concern than the threat of deliberate injury or absenteeism.

Physical and physiological factors do have an effect on the performance of women in the Armed Forces, but it is important to place this effect into perspective. Strength and endurance differences may exclude some women from some jobs, but these factors also exclude some men. They may exclude all women from some jobs but certainly shouldn’t exclude all women from all combat jobs. The easiest way to overcome this problem is to establish gender neutral employment criteria for each job, and to simply exclude all soldiers, male and female, who do not meet this criteria. This is done to some degree already, especially with units such as the Special Air Service Regiment and the Commando Regiment, and there is no reason why it cannot be extended to all units and to all positions.

What Do the Women Actually Want? The Impact on Recruitment, Selection and Placement

Female menstruation is, at worst, an annoying and inconvenient additional pressure on women in the field, it marginally increases the logistic support required, and will periodically make field life more uncomfortable for women. But there is minimal difference in its effect on female combatants and female non-combatants in the field, and so, if female non-combatants can cope, there is no reason why female combatants cannot cope. Pregnancy is an issue that can affect operational readiness in combat units that are on short
notice to deploy, but through the establishment of common-sense policies such as those outlined, and the availability of contraception, there is less chance of losing a female soldier due to pregnancy than there is of losing a male soldier due to a training injury.

A number of surveys have been conducted in an effort to discover the attitudes of servicewomen to their role within the armed forces. There have been many calls from individuals who wish to serve in combat and who believe that if women who wish to serve in combat units were allowed to volunteer for such duties then only those women capable of combat service would volunteer, but selection for specific duties and types of duties is not always voluntary, and differs across the services. The Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force use a muster system for recruitment and job allocation. Under this system individuals volunteer and are enrolled for specific employment categories and jobs, or mustering. The Australian Army, which has the most restrictions on female service and is more manpower intensive, however, has a general enlistment policy in which potential recruits undertake to enlist into the Army, not into a specific branch, type of employment or job. During their initial training they indicate a preference for a type of employment but are then allocated according to the needs of the service, while, hopefully, their personal preference can also be met.

This means that if Infantry, for example, require 50 per cent of a particular intake of recruits then, regardless of preference, 50 per cent will be allocated to Infantry. The implication of this for women, if the restriction on combat employment is removed, is that it will not only be volunteers that end up in combat positions because, depending upon the requirement, any soldier could go. Any action to make service in combat units voluntary for females but not for males would be as inequitable to males as the current policy which excludes all females from combat positions is to females. Because the Army is more manpower intensive than the other services, if the enlistment and allocation policy were to be changed to a muster system, where recruits are enlisted into specific jobs, then it is likely that some of the Army’s manpower needs would not be met.

The results of surveys carried out on the topic of women’s service in combat roles indicate that while the majority of women, as individuals, feel that women should have the opportunity to serve in combat and combat related employment, a significant number don’t actually want to serve there. In a study (Quinn, 1989) conducted during 1987, three years prior to the announcement opening up combat-related positions to women, 2000 randomly selected Australian service-women, representative of all rank levels, were asked a number of questions relating to their career and family expectations. Table one details the results of the section of the survey relating to combat and combat-related service.

Predictably the number of women “willing to serve” in combat or combat-related positions was lower than the number who responded that women should be allowed to serve in these positions, and that they should be given the opportunity to train in combat and combat related skills. The survey found that strongest support for combat and combat-related service came from the following groups:

a. junior officers and private soldiers, (this trend was only partially linked to age which indicates the influence of their particular women); those who had indicated that they endorsed the military ethos of “service before self”;

b. officers who saw such employment as influencing their career prospects; and

c. those service women who were single, or without children. (Quinn, 1989:45-48; Quinn 1991:48).

Follow up interviews were conducted with 70 of the respondents and it was found that when given the opportunity to distinguish between “all women” and “particular women”, those who had indicated that they were not supportive of women in combat roles indicated that they could find “no reason to prevent such a woman serving in a combat role” (Quinn, 1991:48-49). This indicates that if women were allowed to volunteer for such service, this would be viewed as a more acceptable situation than if they were simply assigned to such positions. Although the study examined intended behaviour rather than actual behaviour another study (Jans, 1989, cited in Quinn 1989:49) conducted at the same time using similar measures showed that stated career intentions successfully predicted actual behaviour in a service population (Quinn, 1989:49).

A subsequent survey, conducted in April/May 1991, the results of which are at table Two, found that 77.9 per cent of servicewomen would not choose to serve in a combat-related position but 71 per cent said that they would comply with a posting order into a such a position.

Studies conducted by the US Army in 1976 and the Canadian Forces in 1980-81 found that servicewomen in combat-related roles “did not adversely affect the performance and operational effectiveness of the units. [But] negative attitudes towards military participation and biased perceptions of their performance were
Table 2: Combat-Related Employment for Women Survey, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you want to serve in Combat-Related positions?</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you choose to serve in Combat-Related positions if it were voluntary?</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you comply with a posting order to a Combat-Related position?</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If you are already in a Combat-Related position, are you happy in that position?</td>
<td>Approx 50%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Approx 50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


identified as significant problems” (Quinn, 1991:49). The studies found that women did better in units where leadership was supportive of their presence and both countries emphasised the importance of supportive leadership.

A more recent US survey (Gilbert, 1991:88-91), the results of which are at Table Three, was conducted shortly after the end of the 1991 Gulf War. It found a large majority believed that women should be used for rear support roles only; that existing laws should be clarified because of the difficulty in segregating a battlefield into front line and rear areas; and a majority would not volunteer for front line duty but would go if required. There was universal condemnation of female reservists who refused to report for duty when their units were ordered to the Persian Gulf and there was a significant proportion that felt that the media had not given a balanced view of women serving in the Gulf because they, “played too much on the emotional issues ... [and] capitalised on the mother aspect ... with too little attention to dedication to duty, and to contribution to the mission” (Gilbert, 1991:90).

Conclusion

Ordinarily the views of service personnel are not generally sought when decisions of policy are made, but this issue is somewhat different. It strikes at the very core of social and human relations, and the argument for the inclusion of women into combat roles has drawn partly upon emotive argument concerning equal rights and the desire of some women to serve in combat. It is therefore justifiable to question and examine the views of those who would actually be called upon to serve in combat, in order to compare these views with those of writers who have little intention of volunteering for military service, let alone combat, but who fervently call for the right.

Western nations have traditionally placed a higher, or at least different, value on the lives of women and have gone to great lengths to protect them from situations considered inappropriate or dangerous. The role of women in the military has come under increasing scrutiny throughout this century, and the issue appears to be drawing to a head as there is peacetime consideration of women serving in combat roles. The English speaking Western countries have already opened up combat-related employment, to some degree, to women, and a number of European countries have gone as far as to permit women to train and serve as combat soldiers.

The issue is complex and involves consideration of the abilities of female soldiers to withstand the physical and psychological stresses of combat, and an examination of the social factors about the role of women in general, and in the military in particular. There is ample evidence to show that women can withstand the psychological stresses of combat as well as any male, and in fact there is some evidence to show that male soldiers would be more adversely affected if women were to serve in combat than the women would be. It is a fact that the average woman is not as strong as the average man, but this should not lead to generalisations about the ability of all women. Not all jobs require great strength and if detailed job requirements were to be established and individuals allowed to compete on the basis of personal merit, then a much more equitable situation would develop.

There are a number of strong and appealing arguments based on the rights of women to participate in all aspects of society, and the responsibility of women to share in the protection and defence of that society. While this is intuitively valid, it fails to acknowledge
that it is possible to contribute to the protection and defence of a society without actually serving in the front lines. Women, throughout history, have participated in the defence of their society and way of life by working in positions formerly held by men in order to allow men to go and fight. Women have supported a nation's war effort by acting in support roles behind the front line and, when it became really necessary, serving as combat soldiers in a defensive role. There are many groups within society who are do not serve as combat soldiers but who are still seen as contributing to the well-being of the society, and so, on its own merits, this argument does not justify a change in the status of women in the military.

Throughout history societies have usually only resorted to using women as combat soldiers as a last resort, and in the face of severe manpower shortages and the threat of invasion. Even in the most dire of circumstances other nations have refused to allow their women to fight, and have suffered defeat instead. There is strong social pressure against women serving in combat and, while some people are unwilling to support the deployment of any force into combat, many more would be unwilling to support the deployment of a force which included women in a combat role. There is always an element of resistance to the deployment of Australian troops overseas, but even those who ardently oppose such deployments admit that they would support a deployment in the defence of Australia. It can be concluded therefore that there is a tacit acceptance of women being employed in a defensive role, even if there is opposition to their service in an offensive one. Margaret Mead (1967, from Cassidy 1983:19) said,

"The historical and comparative material at least suggests that it may be highly undesirable to permit women, trained to inhibit aggressive behaviour, to take part in offensive warfare. Defensive warfare, on the other hand, does not have the same disadvantages, as it invokes the biological basis of defense of the nest and the young."

The issue is no longer one of simply assessing an acceptable level of exposure to risk, as most countries acknowledge that even in support areas, women are at risk and there will be female casualties (Smith, 1990:137). It is not really a question of whether or not women can meet the physical demands of combat, as they are currently excluded from those combat jobs with relatively light physical demands, it is really a question of whether society wants its women fighting and killing, when it has an alternative. Australia has never faced a manpower shortage that necessitated the sending of women into the front line, and it is unlikely that we ever will. If women are allowed to train as combat soldiers in peace time, will society accept their deployment overseas during war time? Combat units will suffer if, with the order to deploy, they suddenly have to lose crucial female personnel; or even worse if, when deployed, their freedom of action is restricted by political leaders in an effort to minimise female casualties.

I do not believe that Australian society wants women serving in combat, the ADF survey indicates that the majority of servicewomen do not want to serve as

| Table 3: Post Gulf War US Survey of Active Duty Women |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| **Question**                    | **YES** | **Unsure** | **NO** |
| Do you support the assignment of women for duty in Southwest Asia? | 85% | — | 15% |
| Should women serving in SW Asia be restricted to behind the lines support roles? | 84% | 3% | 13% |
| Is the media giving a representative view of women serving in SW Asia? | 65% | — | 24% Overemphasis 11% Biased View |
| If the law permitted it would you volunteer for combat duty in SW Asia? | 35% | — | 65% (But large proportion would go if trained and ordered to) |
| Should female reservists who are ordered for duty in SW Asia have the right to refuse? | — | — | 100% |

combat soldiers, and the social dangers are too great to risk taking the final step and removing the ban on combat duties. The employment of women in combat-related duties is to be reviewed shortly and should demonstrate that the removal of this restriction was well timed and will be successful. There will be some problems, but they will not be insurmountable. Australia should examine carefully what is happening in those European countries where women are now serving in combat units, and should allow society, and the military, to adjust to the present situation before considering any further changes. This issue will continue to be debated, and so it should, but there is no hurry, or need, to push women into combat while it is not absolutely necessary for the defence of Australia.

**NOTE**

1. Combat Related Employment for Women Valuation Team.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Australian Army, Army Office Staff Instruction 33/84: Employment of Servicewomen, Department of Defence, 15 November 1984.

Australian Army, Army Office Staff Instructions 13/90: Employment of Women in the Army, Department of Defence, 26 July 1990.


Cope-Williams, Captain D., The Employment of Females in the Divisional Signals Regiment, Department of Defence Service Paper, 2 October 1990.


Downes, C., Social, Economic and Political Influences upon the Australian Army of the 1990s, Working Paper No 169, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988.


Gradden, Captain, W.J., “Employment of Women in Field Workshops”, Correspondence from 106th Field Workshop, 2 October 1992.


DO WE REALLY WANT EQUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR OUR WOMEN IN THE ARMED SERVICES?

Sex Discrimination Legislation in Australia, Precis covering the provisions of Federal and State Sex Discrimination Acts, the background and objectives of the legislation and the differences in scope and coverage, provided by Senator Crowley’s office.
Summers, A., “Australian Women’s Status After Eight Years of the Sex Discrimination Act”, Address to Mark the 8th Anniversary of the Sex Discrimination Act, ABC Ultimo Centre, Sydney, 31 July 1992, transcript provided by the press secretary, Office of the Prime Minister.

Captain M.J. Barry enlisted in the ARA as a soldier in 1979. He graduated from Officer Cadet School, Portsea, in 1984. Although he was commissioned into the RAA, he was transferred in 1986 to RAEME as a Senior Instructor. In 1992, he received a Bachelor of Business in Human Resources Management and Industrial Relations from the South Australian Institute of Technology and took up an appointment at Army Office. In 1993, he became the Officer Commanding, Direct Support Company, Brisbane Logistic Group.
radio never reported the battle. However, in a macabre footnote, two weeks after the tragedy Tokyo announced that all Japanese soldiers were to be taught to swim.

A number of RAAF aircrew were decorated following the battle. The commanding officers of Nos 30 and 22 Squadrons, Wing Commanders B.R. Walker and K. McD. Hampshire, were both awarded the Distinguished Service Order for their leadership and fighting qualities during the New Guinea campaign. Distinguished Flying Crosses for the Bismarck Sea action were won by Squadron Leaders Learmonth and R. Little, Flight Lieutenant R. Uren, Flying Officers A. Spooner, J. Maguire and J.T. Sandford, and Pilot Officer C. Campbell. For his contribution to the success of the Allied Air Forces, Group Captain Garing was awarded an American Distinguished Service Cross in the field by General Whitehead.

The victory won by Australian and American airmen less than 500 miles north of Cape York fifty years ago was one of the most decisive in any theatre during World War II. For the loss of a handful of aircraft, the Allied Air Force sank 12 of 16 ships and killed almost 3000 enemy troops. The brilliantly conceived and executed operation smashed Japanese hopes of regaining the initiative in New Guinea.

To the extent that we as Australians draw on military history to help shape our national identity, we do so largely in terms of ill-considered Imperial adventures in distant lands. It would be more constructive and more relevant to our sense of nationhood if instead we contemplated the circumstances and human qualities — inspirational leadership, innovation, professional mastery, teamwork and courage — associated with the victory we shared with Americans in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943.

Dr Alan Stephens is a senior research fellow at the Air Power Studies Centre. He has previously contributed to the Australian Defence Force Journal.
Motivation and the Army Student – Things Are Not So Bad

By Major N.S. Bartels, AAAvn.

Introduction

This article is written in response to Captain M.J. Davies most thoughtful article “Motivation and the Army Student” (Defence Force Journal, 1992). Firstly, I wish to state that the article was very well presented and most timely in that it addressed an area of instructional concern that is going to become of great importance to the military in the years ahead. Unfortunately, the main premise of the article was based on some old research sources (notably, McGregor, 1966). The good news is, there have been some very significant inroads made into the applications of motivation research to the learning environment.

Captain Davies (1992) states that, “The bad news is, the Training Staff cannot be taught how to motivate a student”. The main premise of my article is that they can. Further, with the introduction of new technologies and the likelihood of new methods and means of presentation of courseware being investigated, the time is right to teach our instructors and courseware developers just how to do it.

The Problem

At present there is little regard for ensuring that soldiers are in a correct learning environment. Learning theories are obviously not the concern of the average military instructor (and nor should the Army attempt to turn them into educational psychologists). However, the Army has at its disposal a very important weapon. The Australian Army employs the Australian Army Training System (ATS) Model. It is characterised by what I have come to perceive as a flaw in most Instructional Design Models. The flaw is that it does not take motivation of learners into account at any time during the instructional design process.

The Army’s standard presentation format of training has actually worked quite well until now in classroom presentations. However, it is highly likely that some courses or at least portions of courses will be converted to Distance Education format requiring students to work at their own pace away from the classroom environment. Further, Computer Based Training (CBT) is being introduced into the Army’s repertoire. I unhappily state that there will be a significant number of hitherto unencountered problems to be overcome if the Distance Education programs and CBT are to function well within the Army.

Garrison (1989) points out that careful design of courseware is no more than half the exercise but it is an essential beginning. Cernicek and Hahn’s (1991) study cites motivation as the most significant variable in the success or failure of Distance Education packages (and the same applies to CBT). The two next most important were reading level and student autonomy. These results are not really very surprising in and of themselves. However, motivation and the other concerns mentioned must be addressed in the design of instruction if the chances of success are to be increased.

The advent of these new directions in training solutions does not mean that there will no longer be classroom instruction. Many Army courses will still be taught in the classroom setting. The instructors presenting these courses would also be serving their learners well if motivational design, in some fashion, were to be incorporated in their repertoire.

Motivational Design

There are two specific areas in which I believe that change is warranted. First, the classroom instructor, who primarily designs and delivers his own instruction needs to be made aware of motivational concerns. Secondly, the Training Development Officer’s (TDO) course should probably be the first venue where incorporation of some training in the area of motivational concerns be formally introduced. These changes would serve two purposes. Classroom instructors would be capable of delivering an improved product to learners. TDOs, in association with instructional designers will take notice of motivational concerns which are imperative in the production of courseware which is not dominated by a classroom instructor. I refer here to all types of CBT and correspondence courseware.
Motivation Options

There are few major models presently available which comprehensively address the requirements to design motivation to enhance instructional materials. The two most valuable are Kellers’ ARCS Model (meaning Attention, Relevance, Confidence and Satisfaction) and the Wlodkowski Time Continuum Model. Both these models approach the design of Motivational Strategies from a systematic viewpoint. Also, both models have similarities in terms of the motivational factors considered and the outcomes desired (Wlodkowski, 1985).

Consideration of motivation as a tool which instructional designers should employ is becoming more and more frequent. Many guidelines for employment for their respective models are provided in the literature (Keller 1987a, 1987b, 1983, Wlodkowski 1981, 1985,a, 1985,b). These articles and books provide sound theoretical bases for the models and additionally provide a plethora of tactics and ideas to get the budding motivational designer or classroom instructor heading in the right direction.

Ultimately, both models are presented in such a way as to make the adoption of the principles portrayed a relatively straightforward process. There is, however, a major difference in approaches. Keller tends to view Motivational Design from the standpoint of an instructional designer and the ARCS model is, therefore, a problem-solving model. Wlodkowski, on the other hand, writes of Motivational Design as the precinct of the instructor who will actually be delivering the instruction. As such, associated with the Time Continuum Model are a plethora of tactics, hints and strategies which the classroom instructor can use for improving the motivation to learn.

The Classroom Instructor

A concern of many classroom instructors is that they feel that they are not intuitively motivating personalities. Fortunately, motivation is an art which can be learned. The problem is that instructors in the Army generally receive no formal training (there are exceptions such as RISC and the Tactics Instructors’ Course). Nowhere in the loop is there the possibility of injecting motivational training into the instructors curriculum. Further, I am not convinced that doing so would be the best way to attack the problem.

The instructor in the classroom is very fortunate in that he can inject his own personality into the motivation process and spontaneously refine motivational tactics if they are found to be lacking. Obviously, the instructor must have a good knowledge of motivational tactics and strategies if this refinement is to take place in the classroom.

The dilemma still exists as to how best to impart this type of knowledge to the broad range of instructors in the Army at the present time. If formal training could not be provided, a workable solution would be to produce a Job Aid which would contain a layman’s explanation of the Time Continuum Model and a useful list of tactics, hints and strategies which could be employed during the various phases of a classroom lesson. Wlodkowski (1985b) (and to a lesser extent 1985a) presents what could best be described as a very good “How To” study on the use of this Time Continuum Model. It is this sort of study which would be most valuable in the preparation of the type of Job Aid envisaged.

Success of this type of motivational intervention can be assessed in two ways. Firstly, at the conclusion of all instructor-led courses, the students are required to answer a validation questionnaire. It would be quite simple to include some questions to assess whether the students found the instruction to be motivational or otherwise. A second method of assessment would be to send out questionnaires to the various instructional institutions to determine whether the instructors themselves found the Job Aid to be useful or not. Additionally, suggestions could be solicited from the instructors to include on subsequent Job Aids that may be produced.

Instructional Design

Instructor-led courseware is by no means the only form of instruction that can benefit from the input of motivation design. Keller and Keller (1991, p.313) strongly support this contention when they state:

"Yet, even in a multi-media environment instruction can become extremely boring or, at the other extreme, have so many 'motivating' enhancements that they distract from the instruction and become boring."

They go on further to indicate that the expense and time consumption involved in the production of multimedia presentations means that it really must be done correctly the first time. That means that there must be both appropriate types and amounts of interactive features in a multi-media presentation.
Media formats such as CBT and correspondence courseware are very "lock-step". Once they have been delivered, they are very difficult to change. Unlike the classroom instructor, the Instructional Designer does not have the very important weapons of spontaneity available to him to employ once CBT or correspondence materials have been delivered.

Thorough planning and inclusion of Motivational Design then, should logically be included in the design process at some stage. However, as Keller and Keller (1991) pointed out, "how much and what type" are two questions that must be addressed when designing motivational tactics for inclusion in instruction. These questions are addressed not by the Wlodkowski Model but by a problem-solving model. Notably, Keller's ARCS Model of Motivational Design.

As with the problem for the classroom instructor, the dilemma exists as to how to best impart the theory of the ARCS Model and its applicability to the instructional design process. This is the primary target audience as they will probably bare the responsibility for the production of correspondence courseware. Also, they will no doubt have a hand in the production of CBT courseware at the few venues where it has been introduced throughout the Army. Further, due to the small number of TDOs in the Army (generally at most two at any of the training schools) it would be possible to bring them together to conduct Motivational Design workshops at relatively little expense.

**Motivation Incorporation within the Army Training System**

A final consideration in the discussion of Motivational Design is to present a solution for the method of actually incorporating Motivational Design into the Army Training System. This is something that I believe should not be attempted intuitively. I do not feel that it is enough simply to inform TDOs about the ARCS Model. Rather, they must be presented with a framework in which they can systematically apply its principles. Logically, that framework is the Army...
Training System Model with which all TDOs are intimately familiar. Figure 1 depicts the Army Training System in its simplest form.

The ARCS Model can be effectively integrated with the Army Training System in the manner depicted in Figure 2.

Determining the success of ARCS-based interventions will depend primarily on feedback from students in both the CBT case and the correspondence course case. The unfortunate reality is that it is a great disadvantage not being in the classroom to gauge the success or failure of motivational interventions. It is therefore all the more important to very carefully consider motivational tactics and strategies prior to going to print with CBT or correspondence materials.

In much the same way as questionnaires regarding training are distributed to students at the conclusion of the training course, the same requirement will exist with CBT and correspondence courses. Additionally, it would be my intent to include a mid-course questionnaire to assess what students felt about the courseware as they were actually progressing through it. I consider this to be vital as all too often at the conclusion of a course, students tend to forget what was bad about a course and concentrate on freedom from study rather than seriously thinking about the course.

Conclusion

The methods the Army has employed have worked most effectively in the traditional presentation of training. This is primarily because the system has relied totally on the instructor-led medium. As the Army ventures into new fields such as CBT and correspondence courses, some emphasis must be placed on learner motivation issues if we are to guarantee successful and effective instruction.

The picture is not grim. It is not only possible, but relatively easy to teach both instructors and courseware developers how to motivate students.

Two measures have been suggested which will help to improve the quality of instruction in the Army. The first is the creation of Job Aids based on Wlodkowski’s Time Continuum Model for classroom instructors. The second is conducting of motivation workshops for TDOs and all those to be associated with the production of CBT and correspondence courseware. In combination, these two measures can only serve to enhance the quality and likelihood of success of new methods to be employed in the Army and also serve to improve the quality of instruction by classroom instructors.

REFERENCES


Major Nick Bartels graduated from the RMC with a BA (Honours) to Infantry in 1981. After serving in 5/7 RAR he transferred to Aviation in 1984 and has served in a variety of Regimental positions in both the First and Fifth Aviation Regiments. He completed a Masters of Science degree specialising in Instructional Design at Florida State University in 1992. He is presently posted to Headquarters Training Command.
Unit Recovery from Fatal Training Accidents:
Suggestions for Military Chaplains

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Gifford and
Mary P. Tyler.

"... from violence, battle, and murder; and from
dying suddenly and unprepared. Good Lord, deliver
us." Book of Common Prayer.

A fatal training accident transforms a make-believe
combat exercise into an encounter with sudden
death. Just as the injured soldier has little, if any, time
to prepare for death, the surviving members are equally
unprepared. Initially, there is no time to think. Soldiers
struggle to extract the injured from burning tanks. They
dig under overturned vehicles with shovels, helmets,
and hands. They perform first aid and comfort the
injured. When they cannot act, they wait, in frustration,
for the recovery vehicle, the medevac helicopter.
Young soldiers confront death for the first time; com­
bat veterans are reminded of painful memories. Finally
the chopper arrives and the dead and wounded are
evacuated. The soldiers are tired, stunned, overwhelm­
ed. Most are dirty; some are covered with their friends'
blood. Finally there is time to think. Why is it "always
the good ones that go?" "how can God let this happen?"

When we began our study of fatal training accidents
in US Army units in West Germany, we had no plan
to focus on the work of military chaplains. As psy­
chologists confronting a little-explored problem, our
goal was to describe very generally the psycho-social
impact of fatal training accidents, and the processes
through which a unit recovers. We studied four acci­
dents involving armoured tracked vehicles in situa­
tions that could occur in real combat. There were one
to three fatalities in each and a number of additional
injuries. We interviewed 117 soldiers affected by these
accidents, including friends, leaders, rescuers and
other unit members.

Though military chaplains were not our focus, we
soon realised that they had a unique role to play in the
unit’s recovery process. Unlike most care-giving pro­
fessionals, chaplains were at the site with the soldiers.
The battalion’s physician’s assistant (PA) and medical
corpsmen were absorbed in lifesaving duties, and
other medical or mental health professionals were
not readily available. Further, though uncertain of
what a chaplain should be doing, soldiers expected the
intervention of chaplains in times of death and crisis.
Soldiers were struggling with larger-than-life issues.

They were confronting their own mortality in a new
way and asking hard questions about God and God’s
activities on earth. They needed theological insight and
spiritual support.

Because of the vital role of the chaplain in recovery
from fatal training accidents, we would like to offer
some observations which might be helpful to the chap­
lain suddenly confronted with such a situation. We
assume that the chaplain would bring to the situation
such resources as personal faith and a basic knowledge
of pastoral counselling in response to grief and trauma­
tic stress. To supplement these resources, we would
like to provide some ideas for tailoring a pastoral re­
ponse to the special needs of soldiers who have ex peri­
enced a fatal training accident.

Our methods and results are discussed elsewhere
(Tyler & Gifford, 1989). Our suggestions for chap­
lains are based on our record of the thoughts, feelings,
and memories which soldiers shared with us in indi­
vidual interviews held within a few weeks after the
event. Our data base was limited to combat soldiers in
coheseive, effective, all-male units, but we believe that
similar results would be found in other types of units
as well. Because many interviewees were suffering
from acute grief and stress, we did not press for com­
plete, systematic data from each respondent. Thus,
there are many valid questions for which we have no
answers. We have no idea, for example, of the rank or
religious background of some of the chaplains who
appear in soldiers’ narratives. We do, however, know
from the soldiers themselves how they responded to
the chaplains’ attempts to help them, and would like to
share that perspective in this paper.

An Overview of Unit Recovery

One generalisation underlies all of our suggestions
about working with units after a fatal training accident:
A healing process began immediately after the acci­
dent. Each unit we studied exemplified Lieving’s
(1987) argument that:
"the many levels of bonding that occur within the unit
provide for individual physical and emotional needs
to be met and, at the same time, set the framework
within which the shared life of combat soldiers is
lived."
Each of the units was a close-knit community. Members knew each other very well, and used their knowledge to identify those most in need. Both the formal and informal structure of the unit mobilised as agents of healing, with leaders comforting subordinates and friends comforting friends. The process of taking care of one another was important not only for those who needed and received support. It also helped the unit as a whole to regain confidence in its ability to function as an organisation and take care of its own.

We believe that the chaplain can be most helpful by identifying and working with the unit’s own healing processes, affirming the care soldiers give one another, acting, when needed, as a catalyst for this healing, or as a specialist offering the kinds of help which a lay person cannot provide. In particular, the chaplain is needed to help soldiers cope with questions about God, life, and death. While prior knowledge of the unit and its dynamics can be very helpful, a chaplain who is not familiar with the unit can also serve these functions.

### Working with Surviving Unit Members

1. **Be active in offering a ministry of presence.** Go to the soldiers — in vehicles, billets, the motor pool, wherever they are. Start the conversation yourself, so they will know you really want to talk with them.

   We talked to a number of soldiers who had been visited by a chaplain at the accident site, in the hospital, or in their working or living environment. The first night after the tragedy was normally a time for sitting up and talking about it and visits then were especially appreciated. Some chaplains had gone to the soldiers wherever they were, whether that required going from room to room in the barracks or from tank to tank in the manoeuvre area. Soldiers never complained to us that a chaplain had been too “pushy” in visiting, reaching out to them, joining in their conversations. They seemed to welcome the chaplain’s presence, or at least to accept it as appropriate. As one sergeant remarked: “People are brought up that if you have problems, you can go to a chaplain.”

   Some chaplains, however, seem to have behaved as if they were afraid of intruding. They offered the opportunity for scheduled appointments, but did not initiate any conversation with soldiers. For example:

   > “The battalion chaplain came out when we were on the tanks and said, ‘If you need help, come through the chain of command and see me.’”

   Soldiers rarely felt comfortable making a formal appointment with a chaplain, particularly if they had never talked to him before. Those who had appointments were usually referred by their chain of command because of obvious distress.

   **2. Show respect for the social structure of the organisation.** Let soldiers explain the hierarchy of bereavement to you by telling you who is experiencing the most intense grief.

   We found that soldiers were very aware of both the formal and informal social structure of their organisations. They knew which relationships were close and sustaining, which were cordial but superficial. This understanding served as the foundation of what we have called the “hierarchy of bereavement” (Tyler & Gifford, 1989). Those who were seen as most bereaved, e.g., the closest friends, were at the top, other friends further down, and so forth. Care-giving normally flowed up the hierarchy, from less bereaved to more bereaved, but the most bereaved had a special license to forgive those who were struggling with guilt, for example, soldiers who had tried and failed to rescue the deceased. Understanding the hierarchy of bereavement is essential to working with a grieving unit and the best way to learn is to ask soldiers simple questions about who was closest to the deceased.

   We saw an example in a soldier’s story of an encounter with a chaplain, a stranger to the unit, who had happened upon the scene of an accident and offered to help. Hearing that a young man had just died, he walked up to a group of grieving soldiers and asked, “Did he have a best friend?” His approach helped him accomplish two purposes. First, he correctly identified the individual most seriously in need of his immediate care. Second, he conveyed an unspoken message to the soldiers: “You are a community, you know each other well, and you have the ability to help one another.”

   While the needs of the most bereaved are obvious, those at the opposite end of the hierarchy of bereavement may also need brief attention. A platoon leader described their situation to us:

   > “Some of the guys weren’t particularly touched, weren’t close. They felt guilty if they joked. It took time for them to feel OK if they laughed.”

   Soldiers who did not know the dead soldier well, who are less affected by the death, may need reassurance that there is nothing wrong with their not being terribly upset and that they can play a special role in supporting those who are more seriously bereaved.

   **3. Look for naturally occurring healing processes such as spontaneously occurring “grief groups” and support them as they occur.**

   In the units we studied, soldiers tended to come together in their natural working or friendship groups and to talk through grief and trauma associated with
the event. As one soldier described the process:

"Being around the company, helping everybody and sticking together brings you through. We talk, socialise, talk about happy things, fun things we did with the guys, the good memories."

In many cases, soldiers preferred to talk things through with close friends, though they also appreciated the chaplain's presence and concern. For example:

"The chaplain was there if you wanted to talk to him, but if was pretty much people in Alpha hanging on to each other."

We recommend that the chaplain support the work of these informal groups, respecting the soldiers' desire to take care of their own friends. Through commenting positively on the fact that members of a small group do a good job of taking care of each other, the chaplain can affirm and support the strength of the group. The chaplain can be available in case group members have questions or concerns that require outside help. This support can be given simply and quickly, providing the chaplain an opportunity to move on to individuals who lack solid group support and may be in greater need of immediate attention.

A chaplain with good group counselling skills can make brief, but very powerful, interventions in such groups. The secret is to serve as a catalyst for the group's healing forces and to avoid wresting leadership away from the group. One chaplain had gone through the barracks from group to group, talking for a few minutes with each one. He described his brief interaction with one informal "grief group". Since this chaplain knew his soldiers well before the accident, he realised that the group was composed of good friends from the deceased soldier's platoon and a medical corpsman who, though not part of their platoon, was frequently assigned to work with them.

He was the medic on the scene, started crying, and said, "Guys, I did all I could, forgive me. I wish I could have done more."

The guys handled it well. They said, "Tom, we did the best we could, too. We dug with our helmets, our hands." They said, "Thanks, Tom, for what you did."

I held him in my arms as he cried; we cried together. Some healing took place in that room.

Several important points emerge from this chaplain's story. He was able to use his prior relationships to analyse what was going on in the meeting. He knew where group members stood in the hierarchy of bereavement, and was aware of the special ability of the more bereaved to comfort and forgive less bereaved persons who are struggling with guilt.

Even more important, the chaplain knew when to sit quietly and let the soldiers comfort one another. It would have been easier to answer the medic himself, rather than wait and let the other soldiers respond to the young man's request for forgiveness. By letting them do the forgiving and comforting, while lending the authority of his presence to their healing work, he allowed a much more powerful intervention to take place.

When the timing was right for him to take active leadership, by holding the medic and crying with him, he modelled behaviours that are essential for grieving, yet threatening at first for soldiers who feel they must be "manly" under all circumstances. After supporting the group's act of forgiveness and showing it how to express grief and affection, he asked their advice about who needed help and moved on to work with other soldiers.

4. Show respect for the care-giving role of leaders. Ask them to identify soldiers who may need special attention.

We recommend asking battalion and company level leaders to identify several categories of soldiers who may need special attention. These leaders are most likely to have correct information, and they need reassurance that they know what is going on with their troops and are functioning effectively as leaders in the face of tragedy.

Groups to be checked on include those physically closest to the accident, for example survivors from the same vehicle, those involved in first aid or recovery efforts (Przybelski, 1989), those involved in working with dead bodies (Ursano, 1988), and those temporarily separated from the unit at the time of the accident (Gifford & Tyler, 1989). The needs of these soldiers are often not as clear to others as are the needs of the most bereaved individuals.

The company commander and first sergeant are usually good sources of information about who was involved in the accident, who from the company helped in recovery and first aid, and who is temporarily detailed away from the company. The battalion commander also needs to be questioned in order to locate soldiers from outside the company, for example, medical corpsmen or volunteers brought in to extract a body. Some of these soldiers may not have an informal group of peers who have shared the same trauma and can talk it through with them. The chaplain can be available to these soldiers, simply be dropping into their workplace or living quarters and asking, "How are you doing?" When possible, unit members who were away at the time of the accident should be brought back so they can grieve with their friends in the unit.

Leaders can identify those not recovering from acute stress in a timely manner. We found that, after a
week or two, most people were on the road to recovery, but a few were still “taking it hard,” despite having received support from their friends. Those responding in this way need to be seen individually for evaluation. Sometimes a pre-existing source of stress, for example a marital problem, has depleted the energy available for recovery from trauma. Informal counselling and peer support may not be enough for these soldiers, as the underlying problem may need to be clarified and worked with as well. Leaders, especially those at the platoon and squad level, are usually well attuned to changes in the subordinates’ behaviour and can do the best job of identifying soldiers who might need individual attention from the chaplain or referral to mental health resources.

5. Let soldiers in the unit know about your work with their injured or dead friends.

It was comforting to soldiers in the unit to know that their injured, dying or dead friends had received pastoral care, last rites, or whatever was appropriate. In one unit, the battalion chaplain and physician’s assistant visited the friends of a deceased soldier together. The PA explained the death in medical terms, while the chaplain told them about his time of prayer with the body. Between them they were able to answer any number of questions, ranging from how long the soldier might have suffered to what he might be experiencing in the afterlife. The soldiers found it easy to be open during this meeting because they already respected both the chaplain and PA and because the session was conducted informally in their own living area.

Working with Injured Soldiers

1. When soldiers are hospitalised, facilitate visits by unit members.

A soldier whose unit had been unusually conscientious about visiting him described it this way:

“That was really important for us to have people see us, tell us about the accident, tell us how everybody was while we were in the hospital. That was the most important thing, to talk with the people in the unit... People like the nurse, the psychiatrist, they can’t talk to you because they don’t understand. Having people that know what you are going through because of the accident is the best thing.”

While the nurse and the psychiatrist were probably more helpful to this soldier than he realised at the time, his message should be heard: fellow survivors can understand him in ways nobody else can and he needs their support. Visits from fellow unit members can keep the hospitalised soldier up-to-date on the organisation so that he feels a part of it, not isolated from it at his time of greatest need. Learning about unit rituals from friends can help him feel a part, even though he was not there in person. The chaplain can help by making this need clear to military leaders and by helping to facilitate unit visiting.

2. Help medical personnel understand that the soldier’s close friends serve as his family, and that he needs them when dying or seriously injured.

Some of saddest stories we were told concerned injured and dying soldiers separated from their friends.

“The last thing SGT J said to me, he asked for me to go with him, but they wouldn’t let me onto the chopper. I had asked the commander and all, but they wouldn’t let me go... I had told him before if they let me go, I’ll go with him, but they wouldn’t let me go... I think he asked me to go because I was an EMT and was explaining things to him. He couldn’t see, so I told him he had flash blindness, his vision would come back. He asked about his face, how bad his burns were...”

The problem was not that medical personnel were uncaring. They simply misperceived friends as extraneous, “unrelated” individuals who would get in the way, rather than as people so closely bonded to the patient that they could support him just as a family member would in civilian life.

Fellow unit members involved in first aid efforts were more likely to be aware of the injured soldier’s relationships and emotional needs. For example, an NCO described his work with a seriously injured soldier:

“SGT V, an E6 medic and myself and SGT K started loosening him up to prevent shock, started an IV, started checking him for injuries. To help him out of shock, I brought his best friend. I ordered somebody to get SGT L to bring him over right away; I thought, being coherent, he might understand the words of his best friend. I brought him over to hold his hand”.

Insights such as this sergeant’s tended to be overlooked as soon as the soldier was handed over to the care of the medical personnel from outside the unit. This soldier, like “SGT J”, died without the presence and support of his friends. A chaplain on the scene might be able to offer constructive influence.

Working with Leaders

Be aware that leaders are likely to be suffering, and to be receiving less support than their followers.

We found that leaders at all levels faced special
stress, such a sense of responsibility for the death, uncertainty about whether they would be blamed, charged, or relieved of duty, and an enormous burden of extra work in the aftermath. Most felt the need to keep up a brave front in order to motivate their subordinates. Since informal care-giving in military units tends to flow down the chain of supervision or horizontally from peer to peer, leaders often received less support than they might need. They often told us that taking care of their subordinates was comforting to them as well as to their soldiers, but administrative requirements often infringed on the time available for this healing activity.

Initially, leaders may be under so much pressure to act that they have no time or energy to deal with their own feelings. During this time, a chaplain with experience in dealing with bereavement can be a helpful consultant as they make decisions about planning the memorial, arranging for transport of the body, and other aspects of unit grieving. As time passes and pressure relents, the chaplain can be sensitive to the leader’s readiness to talk about personal responses to the event.

Planning the Memorial Ceremony

1. Make sure that memorial events reflect the hierarchy of bereavement.

Soldiers felt angry and cheated when memorial services or ceremonies failed to reflect the hierarchy of bereavement. When the most bereaved persons were not given a role in planning and carrying out the event, the reaction of the soldiers tended to be that the leaders were more concerned with impressing the higher-ups than with showing respect for the deceased. As one soldier related:

“We had no input. We knew Andy; he belonged to us. It hurt everybody . . . dishonoured the platoon. We said goodbye the way the colonel wanted it, not the way Andy wanted it”.

Mistakes can be avoided by involving leaders from the company — normally the first sergeant — in planning the ceremony and in coaxing the appropriate people to take part. The most bereaved soldiers are often afraid to read or speak, usually for fear of crying in public, but the chaplain or their sergeants can often help them past their fear. If not, they can serve in roles that don’t require talking, for example, as ushers or members of the honour guard.

Where the most bereaved persons spoke at the memorial, their words were experienced as comforting. It was not necessary for them to be creative or articulate; what mattered was that they were seen as the appropriate spokesmen. One soldier described a service in which the soldiers generally believed to be the closest to the deceased had spoken:

“Their speeches were powerful. The people that were closest to the three that died were the ones that really helped us out the most”.

2. Include at least one military ritual such as the “last roll call”.

There are a number of variations to this ritual, but the essence is that the names of all members are called in appropriate order, with the dead soldier not answering. A senior leader with combat experience expressed a point of view which was strongly supported by our interviews with soldiers:

“This is how soldiers deal with death, not civilians. It’s how we deal with burying young men . . . We did it in Viet Nam and we need to do it”.

When soldiers described memorial ceremonies, it was clear that such rituals had been particularly meaningful for them. They often spoke of them as the “worst” part of the ceremony, meaning the part where they had broken down and cried in public. However, these rituals did more than provide a setting for grieving soldiers to cry together. They also affirmed the reality of the loss, the unity of those left behind, and the shared values that gave meaning to the deaths.

Talking About Religious Issues

1. Be aware of the importance of timing.

In the initial aftermath of an accident, most soldiers were not yet ready to deal with religious issues in a cognitive, verbal way. Words, other than the simplest ones, had little meaning. These examples reflect soldiers’ encounters with chaplains shortly after the accidents:

“I can’t really explain what he said. He was trying to make us feel better, you know.
(Was the chaplain helpful?) Not really. I was just feeling, I don’t know what I was feeling. I felt empty . . . There was nothing he could say that would make me feel good”.

In the initial aftermath, we recommend that the chaplain offer non-verbal expressions of caring, for example, listening and holding. Verbal messages should be short and simple. Even if there is no prior chaplain-soldier relationship, the awareness that the chaplain was there and “trying to make us feel better” can provide a foundation of trust for later pastoral counselling once the soldier is ready to discuss specific concerns.
2. When the time is right to talk, be sensitive to spoken and unspoken concerns.

Though readiness to discuss specific issues is an individual matter, we found that the time when soldiers first had a night available for sleep and rest was also a time when religious issues, like other concerns, were first discussed at any length. These issues were still important when we interviewed two to four weeks after the accident. There are several themes the chaplain should expect to encounter, either directly or indirectly.

The most pressing and painful theme was how God could allow good, young people to die terrible deaths.

"I think, "God, why him?" He was one of the nicest guys you know, would do anything for you.
I'm just sick and tired of watching all my friends die. You have good people and your bad people and it's always the good ones that go. These were the best.
I think it is just a waste of good men, not fair at all . . . I don't see why it had to happen . . . God just took them away".

Though this is, we believe, the most pressing of soldiers' theological concerns, we fear that many soldiers may be reluctant to bring it up with a chaplain. Since the chaplain is perceived as God's representative, questioning or blaming God may seem almost like insulting somebody's best friend. Soldiers who feel betrayed and angry at God may feel ashamed to express these feelings, or may fear that the chaplain will reproach them for expressing them. Therefore, the chaplain needs to be active in letting soldiers know that such feelings and questions are natural ones in the aftermath of a tragedy. Other religious themes were also mentioned. Soldiers who did not normally consider themselves "religious" or "church-going" found themselves praying or thinking about God, sometimes immediately after learning of the accident. This experience led some to re-think the role of religion in their lives.

"I came across and I told the guys, told them to stop joking and pray for the guys, thank God it wasn't us. I'm not a church person, but I believe that if you pray, God can ease circumstances. That's helpful at any time. I was praying, not for myself, but for them, for J and P, hoping God would answer my prayer."

For many young men, it was time to confront their own mortality in a new way.

"It really makes you think. Civilians don't understand, when your Bradley is right next to his Bradley and you've never been so close to dying. A round went off in front of us; it could have been us. You think about a lot of things.
As I started falling asleep, I started praying, asking God to take care of Jim and let me sleep and also wake up."

Some struggled with guilt that rational explanations could not assuage.

"No matter how many people tell me it's not my fault. I still feel guilty . . . I almost wish it had been me that died."

Some speculated about the nature of life after death.

"I didn't die — there was a reason I was left back. I don't know if it is to ride tanks, but that's what they would have wanted."

3. Prepare yourself, in advance of a tragedy, to deal with some difficult questions.

Lieving (1987) points out that:

"The chaplain's theological training enables him or her to assist persons whose problems centre around ethical dilemmas, religious issues and such ultimate matters as dealing constructively with the fear of death.

Our observation of soldiers have led us to make a stronger claim than Lieving's: no one other than the chaplain is likely to be perceived as having the authority to help with these concerns. No matter how strong a faith or solid a theological education a lay person may have, there is still a sense that these matters should be taken to a member of the clergy.

Ellens (1984) argues that in preparation for combat, a chaplain needs:

"... a theological world view which affords meaning to human suffering, inhumaneness, and irrationality, in a way that neither jeopardises the integrity of God's grace nor blames the suffering humans by assigning a cause and effect relationship between their guilt and their pain.

We believe such a world view is also necessary for helping a soldier deal with fatal training accidents, and must be firm and clear in the chaplain's mind before the event. In his book, The Will of God, Weatherhead (1944/1972) points out that, "... it is so important that we should try to think clearly before disaster falls upon us." He argues convincingly that "comfort" which rests on unclear thinking about the will of God can cause great harm for individuals suffering in the aftermath of tragedy.

It can never be easy to help people cope with the apparent paradox between God's loving omnipotence and the presence of unjust suffering in the world. After a fatal training accident, the chaplain will find this challenge compounded by the difficulties of ministering to individuals of diverse religious backgrounds who are suffering from acute grief and stress. Therefore, prior preparation is essential.
Summary

Because chaplains are on the scene, and are accepted by soldiers as care-givers and interpreters of God's will, they have a responsibility and a unique opportunity to assist a unit in its recovery from a fatal training accident. The most important principle we can offer chaplains is that the unit, as a close-knit community, has its own healing processes, which the chaplain can affirm, strengthen and utilise in pastoral care. For example, we recommend that chaplains ask friends and leaders to identify those in need and that they support groups of soldiers grieving together. Because chaplains are sensitive to the social structure of the unit and also credible to outsiders, they have a unique opportunity to explain and affirm this structure to decision makers from outside the unit. By sharing their understanding, they can help ensure that the care of the injured and grieving for the dead is organised in a way that respects and draws on the strength of close relationships.

We advise chaplains to be ready to respond, when the time is right, to spoken and unspoken theological questions which arise in response to such a tragedy. The most pressing one is, "Why did God let this happen?" This would be a difficult issue under any circumstances and the chaplain must address it while ministering to a diverse community under severe stress. Prior preparation is essential if the chaplain is to help soldiers with their doubt and confusion.

REFERENCES


Editor's Note:
Return to Greece

*Return to Greece* is an *Australian Defence Force Journal* production highlighting the 50th Anniversary of the Australian Defence Force’s participation in the Allied struggle of the Greek Campaign of World War II.

In 1941, Greece fought for survival against the might of Germany. The Greeks, aided by Australian, New Zealand and British forces fought to ward off the invasion of their homeland. *Return to Greece* tells of these battles and of the Allied evacuation.

*Return to Greece* revisits the sites of the battlefields through a selection of 50 water colours and drawings. The book takes the reader on a journey with the veterans of the Greek Campaign through the country where they fought valiantly with their Greek comrades in defence of democracy. It illustrates the pride and professionalism of today’s Australian Defence Force personnel as they pay tribute to the memory of those who fought with such bravery and self sacrifice in the cause of freedom in the dark days of 1941.

This book will rekindle memories for those who took part in the campaign of 1941 and also for those who participated in the return pilgrimage in 1991.

*Return to Greece* is illustrated by Defence artist, Jeff Isaacs with text by Michael Tracey.

*Return to Greece* is available from the *Australian Defence Force Journal* at a cost of $20.00.
West Point Story

By David Whiteside.

Introduction

The history of the United States Military Academy at West Point can be traced back to the War of Independence when both sides realised the importance of the strategic position of the Hudson River.

Had the British secured control of the river, they could have divided the colonies into two, defeated both parts, and possibly won the war. History however, shows that it was the colonialists who took and held the high ground, dominating the narrow S bend in the river at West Point.

Such was the strategic importance of the site that General George Washington established his headquarters there in 1779 and, soon after, soldiers began building forts, batteries, redoubts, and river defences.

The British never did capture the fortress and today it is the oldest, continually occupied military establishment in the United States.

There were two important reasons for the founding of the Military Academy. First, during the War of Independence, the Army had to rely on foreign instructors to train its troops (whether there were any British instructors in their ranks is not recorded). Then secondly, the world political situation at that time, was unstable, and the Government recognised the need for a better trained military.

So in 1802, after much debate in Congress, President Jefferson approved plans to establish the United States Military Academy at West Point, just 50 miles north of New York City which opened on Independence Day of that year, with a strength of five officers, and 10 cadets.

In 1817, Colonel Sylvanus Thayer arrived at West Point and served as Superintendent until 1833.

Aware of the urgent need of engineers, Thayer made civil engineering the heart of the curriculum. He also insisted on small classes, regular study, and that every cadet must pass each course or make up his failure. Thayer also demanded the highest standard of character and knowledge in each cadet.
West Point has never forgotten this much respected soldier he is still affectionately known as the "Father of the Academy", and a statue to his memory stands proudly in the Academy grounds.

Throughout the Civil War, West Point graduates could be found in the high command of both sides. A sad fact that one time friends were later destined to become bitter enemies. Among those leaders were men such as Grant, Sherman, Meade, Lee and Jackson, to name just a few.

Of the 60 major campaigns of the war, 55 saw Academy graduates commanding both sides, while in the other five, a graduate commanded one side.

World War I also saw Academy graduates in positions of command. Of the 38 corps and division commanders in France at the end of the war, 34 were West Pointers, as too was John Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces.

When Douglas MacArthur was appointed Academy Superintendent at the end of the war, he set about improving the physical fitness of the cadets by introducing a more vigorous physical fitness programme. "Every cadet an athlete" became his hallmark.

Also at about this time, the Cadet Honour Committee was created to oversee the renowned West Point Honour Code, which simply states, "A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do". The Honour Code was introduced by the cadets themselves in the early years of the Academy to increase the quality of cadet life. While not an official regulation, the Honour Code is a valued tradition and anyone who breaks it is dealt with accordingly by his/her peers. Any cadet who tolerates such a violation is seen to be just as guilty as the violator.

During the Second World War, Academy graduates once again rose up to meet the challenges of leadership and command. Men like Eisenhower, MacArthur, Patten and Joseph Stilwell led many long and hard-fought campaigns.

Perhaps it was partly due to some of the lessons learnt during those war years, that after the hostilities had ended, sweeping changes occurred in the Academy’s curriculum.

Science-related subjects were improved, foreign languages were added, and as technology increased, so related courses were introduced.

It was in 1964 that President Lyndon Johnson signed a bill authorising an increase in the strength of the Corps of Cadets, from 2,529 to 4,417. To accommodate the additional personnel, a major expansion of the Academy’s facilities quickly followed.

Then in 1975, the necessary legislation was passed which, for the first time, allowed women to apply for entry into the service academies.

Later in 1982, West Point again made history by introducing academic majors into the curriculum. While the broad core curriculum is considered to be every cadet’s professional major, optional academic majors mean that cadets may also study an academic subject of their choice, but in much greater depth than had been allowed in the past.

To an outsider, the organisation at West Point might seem to be unreasonably complicated, but with over 4,000 cadets and 600 instructors on site, in addition to the supporting services of medical and dental practitioners, catering and maintenance staff, etc., the organisation has to be tight.

It is the Superintendent who is in overall command of both the Academy and the military post at West Point. Next comes the Chief of Staff, who is also the Deputy Post Commander.

The Commandant of Cadets supervises the student government body and oversees the military training of the Corps of Cadets. He also has command of the Department of Military Instruction.

The Dean of the Academic Board supervises the affairs of the 13 academic departments, which are:
- Department of Behavioural Sciences and Leadership
- Department of Chemistry
- Department of Electrical Engineering
- Department of Engineering
- Department of English
- Department of Foreign Languages
- Department of Geography and Computer Science
- Department of History
- Department of Law
- Department of Mathematics
- Department of Mechanics
- Department of Physics
- Department of Social Sciences

At regular intervals, the Superintendent will meet with the Dean of the Academic Board and the Commandant of Cadets, along with the Heads of the 13 Academic Departments and the Directors of Administration, Military Instruction, Physical Education and the Medical Activity Commander. Together, these senior officers make up the Academic Board, deals with those educational, administrative and academic matters encountered by any large college or university.

The Academy has its own Board of Visitors (formed in 1815) of 12 members, four civilians, four US Senators, and four members of the House of Representatives. Each member is appointed by the President of the United States.
The Board travels annually to West Point and reviews the Academy's curriculum, policies and equipment. Their findings and recommendations are then reported back to the President for his consideration.

Entry to the Academy

Each year, thousands of applications for cadetship reach West Point from young men and women all over America. But only about 1,350 will be accepted, so the competition for each place is fierce.

To be accepted to the Academy, a candidate must be:

i. between the ages of 17-22 years;
ii. a US citizen;
iii. single, not pregnant, nor have any legal obligation to support a child or children;
iv. have an above average high school or college academic record;
v. show high ratings on the entrance exam;
vi. pass a Qualifying Medical Examination and the Physical Aptitude Examination; and
vii. receive nomination.

Nomination

Each applicant to West Point is required by law to be nominated to the Academy in one of two ways.

First, those who already have strong military connections (sons and daughters of serving military personnel etc.) may apply to the Secretary of the Army for nomination.

About one quarter of cadetships awarded each year have been nominated in this way.

But other candidates do not have such connections, so their nominations must come from elsewhere. From the Vice-President of the United States or from a US Senator or from a member of the House of Representatives. Each of these officials are limited in the
number of nominations they can annually award, so it is in the candidate's own interest to apply early.

**Military Training**

Every summer, more than 1,000 new cadets arrive at the Academy to begin their four-year training programme. If the cadets think that they'll be “broken in” gently, they're mistaken!

The moment they set foot in the Academy, cadets begin a rigorous six-week intensive basic training course, which, with all its rigid military discipline and physical exercise etc., is similar to our own Basic Recruit Training.

At the end of those six weeks comes the “Acceptance Ceremony”, the first of many full-dress parades, when each new cadet (traditionally known as a “Plebe”), is assigned to one of the 36 companies which makes up the Corps of Cadets.

While the first year cadets are spending their first summer settling into the military environment, the second year cadets have just returned from the June vacation, and are about to begin an eight-week training programme in military field training at West Point's own Camp Buckner. Among the subjects taught here are: Infantry Operations, Artillery Firing, Army Aviation, Military Engineering, Communications; and Survival.

Also included in this programme is a one-week visit to Fort Knox, Kentucky, for basic familiarisation in Tank, Cavalry, Mechanised Infantry, Self-propelled Artillery, and Air Defence Operations.

Meanwhile, back at the Academy, the third year cadets are spending their summer months learning the art of Practical Leadership. While half of the class is away at one of the Army's eight training centres helping to train enlisted recruits, the remaining half have been seconded to nearby Camp Buckner as squad leaders to the second year cadets, and the “Plebes” going through their Basic Cadet Training at the Academy.

Following on from this, selected cadets may go on to specialised training in such activities as: Jungle Training in Panama; Arctic Operations Training in Alaska; and Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Training in Colorado.

Much more responsibility is added to the shoulders of the senior cadets in their fourth year. While half of the class will lead the training of the second year cadets, and the first year cadets in their Basic Cadet Training, the other half join regular Army units, at home and overseas, to complete their Leadership Training. It is these same 4th year cadets who are selected to positions of leadership, from Commander of the 4,400 strong Corps to leaders of the 40-strong platoons, and positions that involve the management of all cadet activities.

By now, readers will have realised that the summer months at the Academy are given over to the practical side of military training. For the rest of the year, the cadets are active in a wide range of relevant academic studies.
Academic Training

If four years seems like a long time to spend at West Point, one look at the complex curriculum will show why it isn’t.

The academic training comes in two parts: i) the Academy’s own core curriculum, and ii) the elective programme, where cadets, as well as studying the core curriculum, may choose to study in depth one of more than 40 subjects.

i. The Core Programme gives the cadets a background in the humanities and the social and physical sciences. The subjects (32 in all) include: Chemistry, Computer Science, Economics, Electrical Engineering, Engineering, Engineering Mechanics, English, Foreign Languages, History, International Relations, Law, Leadership, Mathematics, Military History, Philosophy, Physical Education, Physics, Political Science, Psychology, Terrain Analysis and Thermo-fluid Dynamics.

On successful completion of this core programme, the cadets are, not surprisingly, awarded a Bachelor of Science degree on graduation.

ii. The Elective Programme. Choosing the right elective subject is not always easy. To help, each cadet is carefully counselled and guided towards the most suitable subject. Many of the available subjects are as those in the core curriculum, but here the study is in far greater depth. The other subjects on offer include: American Studies, Behavioural Sciences, Geography, International Affairs, Literature, Military Studies, National Security and Public Affairs, Nuclear Engineering, and Operations Research.

Physical Education

After the first six weeks of basic training, cadets find that their standard of physical fitness is improving. It is the job of the Department of Physical Education to improve on that level of fitness.
With that in mind, the Department assigns a Physical Education Instructor to every company in the Corps of Cadets. In fact, the instructor is more of a counsellor, for part of his work is to encourage and assist those cadets who may be having difficulties in reaching the minimum standard in course work, or in the physical fitness tests.

Competitive games are played all year round. Games such as lacrosse, handball, (American) football, soccer, boxing, and swimming are among the more popular sports. If that’s not enough, there are facilities for a wide range of other sports too, including aerobics, badminton, golf, scuba-diving, and skiing.

In most cases, the cadets are free to pursue the sport of their choice, but it is compulsory for all senior cadets to participate in a “combative programme”.

While the ladies learn self-defence and close quarter combat, the men are taught wrestling and close quarter combat.

Many cadets, both past and present, have made their mark on the sporting and athletic world, not only for their achievements, but for their contributions to sport in general.

The dictum, “every cadet an athlete, every athlete challenged”, is still practised at West Point and it promises to be so for a long time to come.

Recreation

If the Academy’s working and training facilities are impressive, then so too are the recreational and social amenities. The cadets are free to use the sporting facilities during their off-duty hours of course, and they also enjoy the usual run of dances, formal banquets, movies, plays, and so on. But there’s much more besides.

For those who like to make music, there are several dance combos, a pipe and drum band, and the Academy’s own renowned military band.

The Academy publishes three journals at regular intervals and these give interested cadets the opportunity to improve their literary and photographic skills.

For those who like to hear themselves talk, there are a number of debating groups, including the Student Conference on US Affairs. This is the oldest conference group of its kind in the United States, and it often invites students from other universities, and senior government officials, to discuss major issues effecting American foreign policy.

The cadets can also invite family and friends to visit West Point and they, along with all visiting guests, may stay at the Academy’s own Hotel Thayer, which overlooks the Hudson River.

The spiritual side of life is also well catered for. Company Bible studies are held throughout the week and these compliment the weekly church services.

There are four chapels on campus. The Cadet Chapel serves the Protestant, Episcopal, and Eastern Orthodox denominations. The Roman Catholic Holy Trinity Chapel, the Jewish Chapel (services held each Friday), and the Old Cadet Chapel, which serves the Lutheran Denomination are the other three.

With these and the many other activities on offer, any cadet who can’t find at least one new interest must lead a fairly dull existence!

Graduation

At last Graduation Day arrives and, amid all the pomp and splendour, the graduates each receive a Bachelor of Science degree and a commission in the regular Army. With the rank of second lieutenant, they will serve for a period of at least five years and, where possible, in a specialised unit of their choice. Such specialities include: Air Defence, Artillery, Armour, Aviation, Chemical, Engineer, Field Artillery, Infantry, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signals, and Transportation.

No, as each new officer looks to the future, he or she will know that the Academy has given them a great start to a challenging future, and that is what West Point is all about!

The author has served for six years in Signals Command of the Royal Air Force. Today, he is a freelance writer, specialising in American social and historical subjects.
Highly motivated individuals already in positions of responsibility within the logistics, operations or technology areas who seek higher management positions.

By developing an improved understanding of the management of the particular functional area and providing the administrative and decision-making skills required for solving management problems.

Six course units to be completed on a part-time basis over one year.

On successful completion, you either:
- graduate with a Graduate Diploma, or
- apply to enter the PART-TIME MBA PROGRAM with CREDIT FOR ALL UNITS COMPLETED.

A degree from a recognised university and a minimum of 3-5 years work experience. A number of places are available for candidates without a degree who can demonstrate appropriate management experience.

Applications are now being accepted for the January 1994 programs. Closing date 22 October 1993.

Bookings are now being accepted for Information Evenings scheduled for September.

For further information and bookings, please contact:
Liz Giblett
Phone (02) 805 9027
Fax (02) 805 9022
Macquarie University
Graduate School of Management

These Diplomas qualify as eligible expenditure under the Training Guarantee Act
Just Defence? : The New Zealand Defence Force in its Society

By Major G. J. Clayton, RNZMC.

"Si vis pacem, para bellum. (If you want peace, prepare for war)."
Anonymous.

"It's Tommy this an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the brute!"
But it's 'Saviour of'is country' when the guns begin to shoot.
Kipling.

Introduction

In March 1992, Hugh Fletcher, chief executive of the nation's largest trading company, advocated draconian cuts to New Zealand's defence budget. Without an identifiable enemy, he suggested, half of the billion dollars spent annually on defence would be better used to promote small business. Unfortunately, for the security of the nation, Fletcher's contention is neither unique nor without support. His argument has the backing of a motley group of ill-informed politicians, producers, peace-activists, and parsons.

What the defence expenditure slashers conveniently ignore is the justifiable need of states to maintain military forces. Protection of territory and sovereignty is a fundamental task of any nation. Further, while defence forces are primarily military coercive bodies, they are equally important for their civil functions. They are useful for disaster relief, search and rescue, and maintenance of essential services. More importantly they provide unique training opportunities for a nation's youth.

Though no direct threat currently exists, New Zealand's defence forces are not anachronistic. Who in 1932 could have predicted the very real Japanese threat to New Zealand a decade later? It is this lack of prophetic insight which demands commitment to defence. Military forces are not a production line item that can be activated instantly. They are a national insurance policy that to be effective require continued payment of the premiums.

Discussion

Arguments in favour of maintaining defence forces are grouped into three broad categories: military, civil, and economic. This essay, using the three broad categories, will review the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to ascertain if its maintenance can be justified. It is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the development of the roles and functions of the NZDF. Nor is it intended to examine the level of appropriate expenditure for the NZDF. Rather it is an introductory survey highlighting the main arguments favouring the maintenance of a viable defence force for New Zealand.

Military Justifications for Defence Forces

Primarily, defence forces exist to maintain the territorial integrity of sovereign states. This is somewhat bewildering for New Zealanders when no threat can be specifically identified. It is this bewilderment which has brought into question the need for New Zealand to maintain defence forces. Threats real and potential are, unfortunately, unpredictable. Britain, for example, was unprepared for the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in 1982. Similarly, the world was stunned by Iraq's unprovoked invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Since the world is demonstrably not peaceful, it is essential that New Zealand maintain forces to protect its territorial integrity. Moreover, New Zealand has additional responsibility for maintaining defence forces. It has constitutional responsibility to protect the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.

Unfortunately, New Zealand, like most nations, does not have the economic power to be self-reliant in defence. To ensure its security it must maintain forces capable of being used in cooperative alliance with others. Even New Zealand's confused public do not need to be convinced of this. In 1986, they were polled on the issue and 82 per cent voted in favour of forming alliances. They do need to be made aware that alliances cost. When polled about the replacement frigate purchased, for example, 68 per cent were opposed. The purchase was proceeded with because the government realised that it was essential. Alliances
are partnerships that require participants to maintain credible inter-operable forces.15

**Civil Justifications for Defence Forces**

Defence forces are not solely coercive, they provide resources able to be used to offset the worst effects of disasters. New Zealand, situated on the Pacific rim of fire, is vulnerable to climatic and geological calamities. Service personnel are relied upon by the wider community for relief when tragedy does strike. In addition, they are ideally suited for search and rescue missions that require well trained and equipped personnel.16

As well equipped disciplined bodies controlled by government, defence forces can be used to maintain essential services in emergencies. When the Timaru hospital’s sterilising machines broke down in 1991 the Army supplied a team until the sterilisers were repaired.17 Defence forces can also be used in more controversial circumstances. In 1951, for example, they were used to man the waterfront.18 They have also been used to transport stranded ferry passengers across Cook Strait. More recently, the NZDF has been tasked with the running of prisons should the wardens ever strike.19 Not surprisingly, unionists have protested about what they consider is the misuse of the military.20

Strike-breaking is a minor function when compared to the benefits society receives from the training provided by the services. In New Zealand, service training fosters radical integration and by implication national cohesion.21 The military has become the acknowledged expert in providing all-round youth training. Politicians, like the Minister of Police (John Banks) and the Attorney-General (Paul East), echo society in advocating military training for at-risk juveniles.22

**Economic Justifications for Defence Forces**

Training is not the only benefit society receives from the military; expenditure on defence stimulates local economies. The controversial frigate purchase has already resulted in $200 million worth of contracts for New Zealand firms.23 Over the next 13 years this is likely to increase further. At a lower level the very presence of the military is important to local business. Canterbury, for example, lost $25 million when defence removed training and personnel functions from Wigram and Burnham. This loss was not just disposable income from military salary earners. It also lost income to local companies who supplied the bases.24

Technological advancement is also stimulated by the maintenance of defence forces. The maintenance of increasingly sophisticated weaponry systems requires attainment of high technical skills. Skills which are readily transferable into civilian electronic and engineering enterprises.25

**Conclusion**

Defence expenditure has become a convenient target for the critics of governmental policy. They are able to quickly identify the annual costs and the number of personnel employed. More importantly they can correctly quote the defence policy statements which admit the lack of a direct threat to New Zealand. What they then mistakenly do is try to combine these distinct elements together. Their conclusion inevitably is without a threat, all defence expenditure is wasteful. Worse, they go on to suggest it can better used elsewhere.

Such a clinical examination fails to view defence correctly. Defence is not purely concerned with meeting force with force. Prevention of threat development is equally important. It is also about working in collaboration with like-minded countries to preserve stability and security. Internally, it is ensuring a capability to assist in time of natural disaster of man-made emergency. Additionally it acts as a stimulus to a nation’s social, economic and technological development. On a return basis, defence is one of the best investments any society can make.

**NOTES**

3. Martin, R. J. 'Military has resources to help society.' New Zealand Herald, 22 April 1992.
12. Martin op cit.
12. ibid.

Major G.J. Clayton is a graduate of Waikato University, Hamilton Teachers College and the Royal New Zealand Air Force Command and Staff College. He has held appointments in Army Training Group (Waiouru), Army General Staff and Defence Headquarters. He currently holds the position of SO2 Concepts in Development Branch in Army General Staff, Wellington.

GREAT CAN'T TEAR 'EM
PROUD TO BE A SUPPLIER TO THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
Australia’s Forgotten Victory — The Battle of the Bismarck Sea

By Dr Alan Stephens, Air Power Studies Centre.

General Douglas MacArthur described it as “the decisive aerial engagement” of the war in the South West Pacific. The historian, Lex McAulay, believes it was one of World War II’s “great historical moments — a land battle fought at sea and won from the air”. With the exception of the Battle of Midway (June 1942), it involved more destruction more quickly than any other conflict between aircraft and ships during the war. It finally eliminated any likelihood that the Japanese might be able to regain the initiative in New Guinea, and subsequently invade Australia.

Yet few Australians have heard of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

Exactly why such a brilliant victory does not hold a pre-eminent place in Australians’ knowledge of their military history is puzzling and, perhaps, disturbing.

In the past twelve months, Australians have spent a great deal of time reflecting on the 50th anniversaries of those military campaigns which dominate our memories of the Second World War — Greece and Crete, Tobruk and the fall of Singapore. Like the disaster of Gallipoli from the First World War, those actions in distant lands all involved defeat (albeit often characterised as heroic). Again like Gallipoli, none of them had any immediate relevance to the defence of Australia.

Nations should not forget the young men and women who served them in war; nor should they fail to analyse disasters to try to avoid repeating them. Equally, however, it cannot be constructive to dwell excessively on failure at the expense of success.

Thus, one of the more valuable consequences of the current interest in World War II generated by the fiftieth anniversaries has been the attention focused on the Australian victories at Milne Bay and along the Kokoda Trail in mid-1942.

Unlike the ill-conceived and poorly managed early campaigns in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Malayan Peninsula (and, in World War I, Gallipoli), the fighting at Milne Bay and Kokoda was directly relevant to the defence of Australia. Also, unlike the earlier campaigns, the actions in New Guinea resulted in stirring victories rather than defeat. For those reasons alone they deserve far greater prominence than has been the case to date.

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea similarly warrants national acknowledgment.

Fought fifty years ago between 2-4 March 1943, just off the north east coast of New Guinea, the battle saw land-based aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) win a devastating victory over a Japanese fleet attempting to land urgently needed reinforcements in New Guinea. Of the 16 Japanese ships which left their major base at Rabaul for Lae, 12 were destroyed; of the estimated 6400 enemy troops on board, almost 3000 were killed by the Allied air attacks or drowned.

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the last occasion on which the Japanese tried to reinforce New Guinea with large vessels. As the American official historians concluded, the engagement was a “smashing setback” to the enemy’s plans to hold onto Australia’s nearest neighbour.

Following their defeats at Milne Bay and along the Kokoda Trail, the Japanese had attempted to regroup at Buna, on the coast halfway between Lae and Milne Bay. However, by the end of the year they had also been defeated there. Allied intelligence assessed that, in response to those reverses, the Japanese were likely to try to reinforce their garrisons at Lae and Salamaua by sea.

It would be the task of the Allied Air Forces (AAF) to prevent that landing.

The AAF comprised elements of the USAAF, the RAAF, the Royal New Zealand Air Force and the Netherlands East Indies Air Force. It was under the overall command of General MacArthur’s air commander for the South West Pacific Area, General George C. Kenney, an innovative and aggressive leader with an exceptional knowledge of the capabilities and potential of air power.

By February 1943, Allied intelligence was confident that the expected Japanese convoy would sail around the northern coast of New Britain to Lae or Salamaua, either later that month or early in March. General Kenney immediately began preparing for a major air assault on the convoy. He would rely on his reconnaissance aircraft to detect the fleet as early as possible. Long range heavy bombers from the USAAF would then start medium altitude attacks. Once the Japanese were within range of the AAF’s potent anti-shipping strike aircraft — the RAAF’s Beaufighters, Bostons and Beauforts, and the USAAF’s Mitchells and Bostons — an all-out combined attack would be mounted from medium, low and very low altitudes.
Fought fifty years ago between 2-4 March 1943, just off the north east coast of New Guinea, the battle saw land-based aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) win a devastating victory over a Japanese fleet attempting to land urgently needed reinforcements in New Guinea. Of the 16 Japanese ships which left their major base at Rabaul for Lae, 12 were destroyed; of the estimated 6400 enemy troops on board, almost 3000 were killed by the Allied air attacks or drowned.
The RAAF units assigned to the expected operation belonged to No 9 Operational Group, headed by Air Commodore J.E. Hewitt. Hewitt had, however, only recently assumed command, so the main Australian planning contribution came from his predecessor, Group Captain W.H. (Bill) Garing. An outgoing, intelligent and forceful officer who enjoyed General Kenney’s confidence, Garing made a vital contribution to the conduct and success of the battle.

Before World War II, Garing had spent seven years as a pilot with the RAAF’s seaplane squadron at Point Cook. When Germany invaded Poland, he was in England, taking delivery of the RAAF’s new Short Sunderland maritime patrol aircraft. For his gallantry in operations in Europe, he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. Posted back to the South West Pacific Theatre in 1941, Garing raised No 9 Operational Group in New Guinea in 1942 and directed the crucial and highly successful RAAF operations during the defence of Milne Bay and Port Moresby. At the time of the Bismarck Sea action, he was one of the few men in the AAF — Australian or American — who was an expert in maritime combat air operations.

It was Garing who convinced General Kenney of the need for a massive, combined attack against the Japanese convoy. That tactic would involve large numbers of different types of aircraft striking the convoy from different directions and at different altitudes, with exact timing. It was an operation which would demand precise coordination.

Group Captain Garing knew that relatively inexperienced aircrews would not find it easy to achieve the necessary degree of coordination. He therefore suggested to General Kenney’s forward commander, General Ennis C. Whitehead, that a full-scale dress rehearsal should be held.

Whitehead saw the merit of Garing’s proposal, and the American and Australian air staffs began to make arrangements for the rehearsal.

Allied planners decided that for the actual attack, the formations of aircraft would rendezvous over Cape Ward Hunt, on the coast ninety miles to the south east of the entrance to the Huon Gulf, where it was expected the Japanese convoy would be intercepted. The rendezvous point would also provide the aircrews with their last positive navigation fix before they reached the enemy. Overflying Cape Ward Hunt at the correct time would be vital if each element of the combined force were to make its time on target and achieve the coordinated attack and concentration of force sought by General Kenney.

For the dress-rehearsal, Group Captain Garing instructed the aircrews to rendezvous at Cape Rodney, ninety miles south east of Port Moresby, and carry out a simulated attack on a wrecked ship in Port Moresby harbour. He and General Whitehead then observed the arrival of the formations of aircraft over the wreck from a nearby hill, noting in particular their timing.

The dress-rehearsal proved to be invaluable as a potentially disastrous error was revealed — many aircraft were up to 20 minutes late over the target. Thorough debriefings were held and the problem resolved.

During the waiting period, intensive gunnery and bombing training was also conducted against wrecked ships.

Throughout January and February, Allied reconnaissance reported regular Japanese traffic between Rabaul and Lae, ranging from large surface warships to light transports and submarines. On occasions, fierce fighting took place between the vessels and RAAF and USAAF aircraft. But none of those resupply missions was large enough to strengthen the Japanese forces sufficiently for them to attempt to regain the initiative in New Guinea. The need for a major reinforcement remained.

The Japanese in fact intended reinforcing their New Guinea garrisons with about 6000 army troops and 400 marines, primarily from the 51st Infantry Division. Their soldiers were to embark at Rabaul between 23 and 27 February, with the convoy of eight destroyers and eight merchant ships scheduled to sail just before midnight on the 28th. The ships would arrive at Lae on 3 March and be back at Rabaul by 8 March. Air cover would be provided by about 40 naval and 60 army aircraft, flying out of bases in New Ireland, New Britain and New Guinea.

The convoy left on schedule and initially was favoured by poor weather, which hampered AAF reconnaissance aircraft. In the meantime, six RAAF A-20 Bostons from No 22 Squadron attacked the airfield at Lae in an attempt to put it out of action and deny the Japanese air support.

It was not until mid-morning on 2 March that USAF B-24 Liberators sighted the convoy. General Whitehead immediately launched eight B-17 Flying Fortresses, followed shortly afterwards by twenty more. The Fortresses attacked the convoy from 6500 feet using 1000 lb demolition bombs. Later in the day another attack was conducted by 11 B-17s. The Fortress crews claimed a large number of hits, reporting that vessels were “burning and exploding”, “smoking and burning amidships”, and “left sinking”. Up to three merchant ships may have been sunk.

By nightfall the enemy fleet had reached the Vitiaz Strait, which meant that on the morning of the 3rd it would be within range of the full force of AAF strike aircraft. For that attack to be successful, the precise
location of the convoy had to be known at daybreak. Consequently, throughout the night, it was tracked by an RAAF Catalina flying boat from No 11 Squadron, which occasionally dropped bombs to keep the Japanese in a state of anxiety.

Also during the night and before the planned main AAF attack, eight RAAF Beaufort torpedo bombers from No 100 Squadron took off from Milne Bay to try to use the darkness to their advantage. Flying through heavy frontal weather, only two of the aircraft found the convoy. Neither was successful with its attack.

On the morning of 3 March 1943, the Japanese convoy was rounding the Huon Peninsula. It was now within range of the entire AAF strike force, which had been waiting for this moment for weeks.

For much of the time since the convoy had sailed from Rabaul, adverse weather had helped the Japanese to avoid detection and attack. Now, however, as the morning came, clear conditions favoured the Australian and American aircrews. Over 90 aircraft took off from Port Moresby and set heading for their rendezvous point at Cape Ward Hunt. While the strike aircraft were en route, Bostons from the RAAF’s No 22 Squadron again successfully bombed the Japanese airfield at Lae.

By 0930 the AAF formations had assembled over Cape Ward Hunt, and by 1000 the battle had started.

The Australian and American aircraft attacked in three waves and from three levels, only seconds apart.

First, 13 USAAF B-17 Flying Fortresses bombed from medium altitude, at about 7000 feet. In addition to the obvious wish to sink ships, the medium level attacks were intended to disperse the convoy, as vessels broke station to avoid bombs.

Second, 13 RAAF Beaufighters from No 30 Squadron hit the enemy from below 500 feet, lining up on their targets as the bombs from the Flying Fortresses were exploding. With four cannons in its nose and six machine guns in its wings, the Beaufighter was the most heavily armed fighter aircraft in the world. The Australian crews’ job was twofold: to suppress anti-aircraft fire, and kill ships’ captains and officers on the bridges.

The Beaufighter pilots initially approached their targets at 500 feet in line astern formation. They then dived to mast-level height, set full power on their engines, changed into line abreast formation and approached their targets at 220 knots.

It seems possible that some of the Japanese captains mistook these manoeuvres for a torpedo attack, for they altered course to meet the Australians head on to present a smaller target. Instead, they made themselves better targets for strafing as, with a slight alteration of heading, the Beaufighters were now in a position to
Three Beaufighters from No. 30 Squadron strafing a Japanese ship. The water spout is from medium-level bombing by B-17s.

rake the ships from bow to stern. This they did, subjecting the enemy to a withering storm of cannon and machine gun fire. According to the official RAAF release at the time, “enemy crews were slain beside their guns, deck cargo burst into flames, superstructure toppled and burned”.

With the convoy now widely dispersed and in disarray, the third wave of attackers was able to concentrate on sinking ships. Thirteen USAAF B-25 Mitchells made a medium level bombing strike, while simultaneously, a mast-level attack was made by 12 specially modified USAAF B-25C1 Mitchells — known as “commerce destroyers” because of their heavy armament — which bombed and strafed the enemy. The B-25C1s were devastating, claiming 17 direct hits from the 37 bombs dropped. Close behind the B-25C1s, USAAF A-20 Bostons added more firepower.

Following the initial coordinated onslaught, Beaufighters, Mitchells and Bostons intermingled as they swept back and forth over the convoy, strafing and bombing the most suitable targets. Within minutes of the opening shots, the battle had turned into a rout.

The official Australian history records that at the end of the action, “ships were listing and sinking, their superstructure smashed and blazing, and great clouds of dense black smoke [rose] into a sky where aircraft circled and dived over the confusion they had wrought among what, less than an hour earlier, had been an impressively orderly convoy”.

Above the surface battle, 28 USAAF P-38 Lightning fighters provided air defence for the Allied strike force. In their combat with the Zeros which were attempting to protect the convoy, three of the Lightnings were shot down, but in turn the American pilots claimed 20 kills. Apart from those three P-38s, the only other AAF aircraft lost to enemy action during the battle was a single B-17, shot down by a Zero.

With their armament expended, the AAF aircraft returned to Port Moresby. However, there was to be no respite for the enemy. Throughout the afternoon the air attacks continued. Again, USAAF B-17s struck from medium level, this time in cooperation with USAAF Mitchells and RAAF Bostons flying at very low level. The Bostons were led by Squadron Leader C.C. Learmonth, after whom the RAAF’s major base in north west Australia is now named.

During this mission the Bostons were repeatedly attacked by enemy fighters. On one occasion, Flying Officer H.B. Craig was pounced on by four Zeros simultaneously, but Craig audaciously turned into his enemies with his guns firing, and they broke away.

The B-17s, Mitchells and Bostons claimed at least 20 direct hits on the by-now devastated convoy, and the RAAF was credited with a definite sinking.
That was the last of the coordinated attacks. The victory had been won.

There was, however, important work still to be done. On the night of 3 March, five American motor torpedo boats slipped out of their base at Tufi and finished off one crippled ship. The next day RAAF Beaufighters and USAAF Mitchells followed up the victory at sea by inflicting severe damage on Malahang airfield near Lae, destroying numerous aircraft and ground installations. At the same time, other AAF aircraft continued to patrol the Bismarck Sea, where they found and sank one solitary and badly damaged destroyer. As the official history notes, that was "the last that was seen of the great Japanese Lae convoy".

But there was still a "terrible yet essential finale" to come, one which has since created some controversy, and which confronts a central moral dilemma of war.

For several days after the battle, Allied aircraft patrolled the Huon Gulf, searching for and destroying barges and rafts crowded with survivors from the sunken ships. It was grim and bloody work which many of the crews found nauseating, but as one RAAF Beaufighter pilot said, every enemy they prevented from getting ashore was one less for their Army colleagues to face.

The morality of the AAF’s action is too complex a matter to be fully examined here. Briefly, however, an analogy might be drawn with the Royal Air Force’s largely indiscriminate bombing attacks against German cities in 1940-41, which were often criticised for their alleged immorality. Speaking on that issue years after the war, the distinguished historian Dr Noble Frankland suggested that the great immorality open to Britain at the time was to lose the war against Hitler’s Germany.

He argued that to have “abandoned the only means of direct attack which we had at our disposal [air bombardment] would have been a long step in that direction”.

The same logic applied in the South West Pacific in March 1943. After 15 months of Japanese brutality, the great immorality open to Allied commanders would have been to ignore the rights of their soldiers. It must also be remembered that as late as November 1942, the Australian War Cabinet had still feared Japanese invasion, with its frightful possibilities.

One further controversy clouded the immediate reaction to the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. On 7 March General MacArthur issued a communique stating that the AAF had destroyed 22 ships. Regrettably, at the time, arguments over this exaggerated claim and the exact composition of the Japanese convoy tended to divert attention from the stunning extent of the Allies’ victory.

In contrast to MacArthur’s overstatement, Japanese
radio never reported the battle. However, in a macabre footnote, two weeks after the tragedy Tokyo announced that all Japanese soldiers were to be taught to swim.

A number of RAAF aircrew were decorated following the battle. The commanding officers of Nos 30 and 22 Squadrons, Wing Commanders B.R. Walker and K. McD. Hampshire, were both awarded the Distinguished Service Order for their leadership and fighting qualities during the New Guinea campaign. Distinguished Flying Crosses for the Bismarck Sea action were won by Squadron Leaders Learmonth and R. Little, Flight Lieutenant R. Uren, Flying Officers A. Spooner, J. Maguire and J.T. Sandford, and Pilot Officer C. Campbell. For his contribution to the success of the Allied Air Forces, Group Captain Garing was awarded an American Distinguished Service Cross in the field by General Whitehead.

The victory won by Australian and American airmen less than 500 miles north of Cape York fifty years ago was one of the most decisive in any theatre during World War II. For the loss of a handful of aircraft, the Allied Air Force sank 12 of 16 ships and killed almost 3000 enemy troops. The brilliantly conceived and executed operation smashed Japanese hopes of regaining the initiative in New Guinea.

To the extent that we as Australians draw on military history to help shape our national identity, we do so largely in terms of ill-considered Imperial adventures in distant lands. It would be more constructive and more relevant to our sense of nationhood if instead we contemplated the circumstances and human qualities — inspirational leadership, innovation, professional mastery, teamwork and courage — associated with the victory we shared with Americans in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943.

Dr Alan Stephens is a senior research fellow at the Air Power Studies Centre. He has previously contributed to the Australian Defence Force Journal.
In October 1992, a group of World War II veterans made the pilgrimage back to the western desert to take part in the 50th Anniversary commemorations of the battles of El Alamein and Tobruk.

Desert Journey is an Australian Defence Force Journal publication highlighting the battles in the western desert and the veterans of the campaign who returned there 50 years later to commemorate the gallant struggle of that fateful time and to pay homage to their comrades who made the supreme sacrifice.

Illustrated by numerous drawings, this book will rekindle memories for those who took part in the campaign and also for those who participated in the Desert Journey of 1992.

Desert Journey will be available from the Australian Defence Force Journal at a cost of $25.00.
Recapturing Our Youth

By Captain P.M. King, 2/14th Light Horse.

"It is a modern irony that at the time of life when young people have to make the most important and permanent decisions of their lives, they are the most ill-equipped emotionally and mentally to make them."

On 3 November 1970, I began what was to become a significant turning point in my life. I marched into the 1st Recruit Training Battalion (1RTB) at Kapooka. Very few are not changed for the better by Kapooka and my time there and the changes it wrought in me are no different from the experiences of thousands of other young people. People who, if not for the remoulding effects of the training and the inculcating of ethical values, would most probably have ended up on society's scrap heap.

A Nation in Crisis

In the 1989-90 Federal Budget, a $100 million dollar strategy, "Towards Social Justice for Young Australians", was implemented. The Federal Government's "Supported Accommodation Assistance Programme" (SAAP) allocation in 1990-91 was $137 million dollars of which $44 million was specifically targeted at our youth. The Commonwealth also contributed $30 million towards the National Campaign against drug abuse with youth identified as a special needs group.

4,371 young people appeared on criminal charges before the children's court in Queensland alone in 1989-90 of which 87 per cent were boys. In the Brisbane Area there are a number of programmes aimed at the rehabilitation process. "The Youth Diversion Programme", was similar in scope to the proposal in this article but on a smaller scale. "Kickstart", run by Richard Danon from the Pine Rivers Office of the Juvenile Justice Division and programmes conducted at "The Outlook", an adventure training camp at Boonal near Amberley, QLD. In addition, various church groups and police sponsored programmes are also attempting to tackle the problem. While these programmes are important, they are of short duration and can only cater for a small number of youths. The organisation of these programmes is also on a regional basis and the problem is now clearly national, requiring national solutions, resources and coordination.

Each year, despite the buckets of money and good intentions devoted to the problem, there appears to be little tangible effect in the net improvement of our youth and, in fact, the situation is worsening, as most can see no hope of a future for themselves. This lack of hope causes a consequent loss of self esteem and a need to lash out to vent frustration. The anger of the young is beginning to tear apart the fabric of our society and the threat of anarchy is becoming very real.

The Cycle of Despair

There are many and varied reasons for the problems of our youth. Be they poverty, broken homes, sexual or physical abuse or the complex, rarely understood and often traumatic "puberty blues", a combination of low self esteem and lack of direction and purpose brought on by radical physical, hormonal and mental changes. The evidence of this upheaval manifests itself in many ways. From withdrawn sullenness across the whole gamut of emotions to anger and, more frequently, violence, suicide and disregard for the law.

Those caught up in either this socio-economic or emotional web are trapped in a "cycle of despair". They are often left with no hope or real chance to escape. Only a few, the highly motivated or exceptionally talented, break out.

The cost of this cycle on individuals and the community is sky-rocketing both in monetary and human terms. We as a society must provide the impetus for our young adults to take charge of their own destiny. This can be achieved by taking positive, long term steps on a national basis to reduce the impact of the "coming of age" trauma and provide constructive guidance and hope for a future to those who cannot break the cycle by themselves.

The mission of the Defence Forces is to protect and promote the security of Australia and its people in times of crisis. Now is clearly such a time. We have the people, the talent and the experience to assist the community by making a significant impact in the
restoration of values and worth amongst our youth.
We could achieve this by becoming a major contribu-
tor to the formation and management of a national
youth training and rehabilitation centre.

How Can the Defence Forces Help?

Consciously or not we have developed — based on a
need to turn out disciplined, fit, young soldiers — a
humane method of character building. By quickly
stripping away false impressions and bravado and
the results of an over-indulged or ill-discipline back-
ground, we then inculcate a set of values and sense of
responsibility that is unique in our society.

Many a soldier, both young and old, will grudgingly
acknowledge that he or she would probably have been
in some sort of trouble fairly quickly without the self
discipline and principles given to them through basic
military training. Our system challenges a young
person both physically and mentally. It teaches them the
depth of their own courage and intestinal fortitude —
“guts”. As each challenge is met and overcome, a new
sense of pride and self confidence is born.

This is what we have to offer our youth. We have
several generations of talented NCOs and Officers
who have taught and developed the courses at recruit
training establishments and they have built a wealth of
experience that could have considerable impact on our
youth problem. I’m not suggesting that we train the
nation’s youth in ceremonial parade drill and weapons
handling, however, many of the subjects covered at
Kapooka such as physical training, field craft, leadership
and character guidance are relevant. Other sub-
jects that should be considered are; citizenship and respon-
sibility, environmental awareness, survival skills,
first aid, team sports, and drug and alcohol awareness.
Allied with these subjects would be more arduous
challenges in the form of physically and mentally
demanding activities, such as rock climbing and rapp-
pelling, white water rafting, bush craft and hiking,
scuba diving and sky diving. As students progress,
senior school studies and trade skills are introduced
and extensive career guidance is conducted.

The cost and trainee numbers would have to form
part of a larger study, but as an example, the following
figures relating to the running costs and manning at
1 RTB are offered:
a. running costs, including wages, rations, contracts,
electricity, gas, water and new works programs is
$37.5 million per annum;
b. staff manning levels are currently 550 personnel
with the numbers divided equally between training
and support staff; and
c. the through-put of recruits has averaged 2845 per
annum since 1985.

Despite our available resources, I don’t believe we
can conduct the entire training program within the
Defence Force structure. There is a need to employ civi-
lian specialists for different aspects of the course. We
already have models for this type of interaction between
Defence personnel and civilians. Specifically ADFA,
RMC and the Army College of TAFE are excellent
working models of combined training establishments.

The youth training centre would operate on similar
lines to the above institutions with NCOs and Officers
conducting the initial induction and basic discipline
subjects and the civilian specialists guiding the edu-
cation and trade skill segments of the course. Civil and
military instructors could join forces in conducting
arduous challenge-training.

To complement this, guest speakers such as sporting,
media and entertainment personalities could be
involved in role model, motivation and drug alcohol
awareness sessions. The cooperation and assistance of
family members, if appropriate, may also be sought.

Retired ex-service personnel and civilians could be
encouraged to take long term appointments at the
school. Many ex-Defence Force Warrant Officers and
senior police have considerable skill and experience in
man-management and would provide stable ‘father
figure’ roles for the groups of trainees. Ex-trainees
from the school could be encouraged to seek employ-
ment in similar roles. In addition, there would be a
need to employ counsellors and teachers from Aborigi-
nal and ethnic groups to cater for the needs of trainees
from these areas.

A suitable site would have to be found for the centre
in a relatively isolated area to reduce the lure of the
cities and bright lights. However, a local community
of suitable size within reasonable travelling distance or
close proximity is necessary to support the infrastruc-
ture. An existing Defence or Government installation
not in use or recently decommissioned would be ideal
in moderating initial start up construction costs. A
single establishment to validate the programme would
initially be required. The need for future establish-
ments perhaps in each state, based on the success of the
original could then be evaluated. A suggested location
for the programme to commence is the Government
installation at Woomera, South Australia.

The initial length of the program for a juvveilne ap-
pointed to the training is recommended as six months.
Two months conducted on Kapooka lines, and the
remainder a type of “outward bound” program inter-
spersed with education and skills courses.
How it Would Work

The target group for rehabilitation would be those youth who have already committed crimes. Once convicted by a state court, the offender is awarded the six month program at the Youth Training Centre. Once arrival they join with other trainees to form their identity group and are subjected to the normal Kapooka style welcome. Orientation, physical and psychological assessment, medical and dental checks, haircuts and civilian uniform and necessary items are issued. Basic group drill is also taught to enable groups to be assembled and moved cohesively around the centre. Group identity is rapidly established as fieldcraft lessons and muscle toughening sessions to prepare for the arduous challenges are introduced. The programme follows a series of steps or goals the group must achieve to progress. As each step is successfully negotiated, privileges are granted and group status is raised. After a period of training when group identity is strong and individuals begin to achieve self esteem, more attractive activities are programmed. Peer group pressure would ensure the slackers performed and discipline maintained to prevent loss of privileges or cancellation of attractive activities.

Trainees would be encouraged to participate in the running and maintenance of the camp. Such areas as administration, meal preparation, farm animal husbandry, plant propagation and landscaping, and sporting event organisation would allow the students more control over their rehabilitation. Trainees would also be given the opportunity to meet and become involved in small group discussions with visiting personalities.

At about the eight week point, the emphasis would shift from imposed to self discipline. Trainees would be introduced to a wide range of skill subjects such as carpentry, brick laying, technical drawing, metal work and welding and computer studies. Opportunities to take subjects at high school certificate level could be offered and motivational visits to universities, businesses and factories would be conducted.

During all of this training, little contact with the outside world would be allowed. Access to television in particular would be strictly controlled. This is necessary to remove damaging influences from the old environment. The rehabilitation process would be delicate and any reminders of previous activities and haunts may bring about a reversion to old habits and the negating of the training process.

Overlayed with the training would be the ethical theme that, along with the rights given to one living in and enjoying the fruits of a free society such as ours, comes the necessity of certain responsibilities for one actions within the community. This need to accept responsibilities as a part of your rights could well form the motto and ethos of the centre, a “Rights with Responsibility” approach.

For this program to have long term success, the Government would have to be prepared to offer trainees opportunities for entry into TAFE institutions, apprenticeships and other vocational learning schemes. It would be hoped that eventually the distinction of successful graduation from the Youth Training Centre would become a matter of esteem and personal pride.

What’s in it for Us?

There are a number of major advantages for the Defence Forces becoming involved in such a scheme:

a. the first is the amount of good will and public relations we would gain. The Military appears to many civilians as a large, almost unnecessary, tax burden, useful during natural disasters, but generally anonymous and accorded little thought. A high profile, worthwhile task such as this would give us a “human face” and bring us much closer to our community;

b. the morale of our services also stands to gain. By being involved in an important community assistance scheme with such long term, national ramifications, self esteem and pride in one’s service can only be heightened. As with the graduating trainee, it would be hoped that direct involvement in the program would become a privilege and positions at the centre would be competitively sought;

c. we gain a small, highly motivated and competent group of NCOs and junior officers from the instructional postings at Kapooka. These high quality people have a marked advantage over others by their enhanced practical knowledge of military skills and leadership gained during their tenure at 1 RTB. Unfortunately, we can’t give this experience to all of our junior leaders. However, by becoming involved in the youth training programme we would create more 1 RTB style postings, allowing more people the chance to enhance their skills thus giving us a larger corps of professional junior leaders; and

d. As with the “Junior Leaders” scheme in the British Army, we would also stand to gain a valuable recruiting base from those graduate trainees.

The chance to be seen by the nation not as an increasing drain on the Federal purse, but as a worthwhile, contributing group of professionals dedicated to
the development of our youth is one that can only enhance the Defence Forces' role in Australian society.

Conclusion

Junior military leaders are constantly reminded, quite rightly, that our most valuable asset is our soldiers. Does this not hold true for a nation? Surely its most valuable resource is its children? If this is correct, then shouldn’t we at any price, attempt to develop that resource to its full potential?

We have the people, the experience and the talent. We have a proven track record of turning sow’s ears into silk purses. With community support and political will, we can play a major role in turning around the present youth crisis, securing the nation’s future and recapturing our youth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Year Book Australia 1991 Number 74 (Australian Bureau of Statistics).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Mr Richard Danson of the Juvenile Justice Division of Queensland.
Capt Mark Willis, Chaplain, 2/14 Light Horse (QMI).
Staff at 1 RTB, Kapooka.

Singapore Diary

AN ACCOUNT OF THE FALL OF SINGAPORE AND THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIONS.

In February 1992, a group of World War II veterans made the pilgrimage back to Singapore to take part in the 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Singapore.

Singapore Diary is an Australian Defence Force Journal production. It highlights the fall of Singapore during World War II and the veterans of that campaign who returned to Singapore to commemorate the gallant struggle of that fateful time and to pay homage to their fallen comrades.

Illustrated by numerous drawings, Singapore Diary tells of the Japanese invasion of the Malay Peninsula culminating in the assault on Singapore Island in February 1942.

Singapore Diary will be available at a cost of $20.00.
The Evolution of Carrier Air Power: Dardanelles to Coral Sea

By Lieutenant Commander G.A. Dunk, RAN.

"L'aviation, c'est le sport. Pour l'armée, c'est zéro."

Marshal Foch, 1910.

The serious use of the air as a medium for the projection of military power can be traced back to the Great War of 1914-1918, a short period when compared to the traditional use of land and sea power. In this brief time span, aircraft have demonstrated capabilities that have totally revolutionised the manner in which wars are fought and entry into any conflict without adequate air power is now rightly considered as a prescription for defeat.

It has been stated by Air Commodore Westmore that "almost every conceivable air strategy and tactic known today was employed between 1914-1918". Whilst this is true for land-based air power (of the six roles of air power cited by the RAAF Air Power Manual it can be shown that the Great War undertook them all in some embryonic form), it is less so for maritime air power, particularly carrier-based air power.

This article will examine the evolution of carrier air power from the Dardanelles campaign of 1915 to the Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942, and whether this power is covered by classical air power theory. The article will show that maritime air power does not exist as a separate entity, but enhances and enriches the application of traditional "sea power" to form "maritime power." Taking a commonly used definition of air power, and amending it to reflect the holistic nature of maritime power, maritime air power can be defined as:

"the ability to apply power in, on, or from, the maritime environment through the use of a platform in the third dimension above the surface of the earth. Maritime Air Power forms an integral part of the total Maritime Power."

Whilst this article will concentrate on the "at-sea" aspects of maritime air power it should be remembered that land-based aircraft engaged in maritime tasking also comprise part of overall maritime air power. The sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse in December 1941 by Japanese aircraft based in Indo-China is an example of the use of land-based maritime air power to achieve sea control.

At the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, aircraft had demonstrated a capability for reconnaissance and aerial bombing of enemy positions. In the maritime environment, a Curtiss biplane had been flown from, and recovered onto, wooden platforms erected between the decks of two cruisers in the United States, whilst in May 1912 a Short S.27 biplane had been launched from HMS Hibernia while the ship was steaming at 10 knots. The period prior to World War I also saw the initial development of the concept of using aircraft in the detection of submarines and initial experiments in the release of torpedoes from aircraft.

During the course of the War maritime aircraft evolved into two key types: the long range, land-based patrol aircraft for reconnaissance and anti-submarine work, and carrier-based planes. The latter followed the pattern of land-based aircraft by developing into a range of offensive and defensive types.

The first aircraft carrier was the HMS Ark Royal, a tramp steamer which had been purchased by the Royal Navy and re-designed as a seaplane carrier. The ship was commissioned on 9 December 1914 and was equipped with a total of ten sea planes, six operational plus another four in crates. Ark Royal arrived off the Dardanelles in February 1915 and engaged firstly in the fleet bombardment of Turkish forts and army positions, and later in the landings at Gallipoli. This participation took the form of reconnaissance of both the battlefields and the seaward approaches in conjunction with tethered observation balloons. Other tasks included bombing enemy positions ashore and spotting for ship bombardment.

It is noteworthy that little faith was placed in the capabilities of the aircraft to assist in naval bombardment. From the arrival of the Ark Royal into the Dardanelles area, no tests or practices with battleships were conducted until the first combined action with HMS Queen Elizabeth on 5 March 1915; gunnery crews were loath to accept large spotting corrections passed by the aircraft.

The Admiralty at this time was not particularly enamoured with the performances of aircraft at sea and, ironically in view of later events, repeatedly re-
fused requests from the Air Department for more ships to be converted to carriers, commenting:

“it is clearly undesirable that the Admiralty should order any new work which is not urgent for Naval requirements.”

In early 1916 the first land planes were being flown off the decks of converted merchant ships, although recovery was still by way of landing the plane on the surface of the sea and winching aboard, or for the aircraft to recover to shore on completion of the mission. On 2 August 1917 it was demonstrated that direct recovery onboard a ship underway was possible, albeit at great risk to both the plane and pilot, when a Sopwith Pup aircraft landed onboard HMS Furious at sea.

Support for maritime aviation by the Admiralty was still, lukewarm at best, although by late 1917 Admiral Beatty had begun to favour aircraft as the only way to break the stalemate between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea by conducting attacks on the German ships in their bases. This suggestion was not supported by Admiral Jellicoe who did not believe that torpedo planes had potential for attacking enemy shipping, although he did concede that large flying boats had “great value in connection with reconnaissance work with the Grand Fleet.” It was only when it became possible to fly reliable high-performance aeroplanes from ships to destroy the German Zeppelins that enthusiasm for carriers gained momentum.

In comparison to the British, the German Navy concentrated mainly on the use of Zeppelins to provide surveillance of allied shipping movements and rated each to be worth “five or six cruisers”. Work on aircraft development for naval use was much less advanced than in Britain, although one factor behind Beatty’s repeated requests for greater maritime air power was his belief that the Germans possessed six seaplane carriers to his three. The Zeppelin force was also used to conduct bombing raids over Britain and between January 1915 and August 1918 dropped nearly 6,000 bombs, killed over 550 people, hampered war production, and tied up considerable resources in the provision of home defence.

Another early idea of maritime air power, later abandoned, was to tow aircraft on barges behind warships to within range of the intended target. The planes would then take off from the barge and recover ashore after the mission.

At the end of World War I, only Great Britain had a modern through-deck carrier in service, although HMS Argus reached the fleet too late to play any part in the hostilities. No other country had yet begun to build such a ship.

World War I was, therefore, a period of rapid development for the aircraft as a military vehicle. Tactics and roles for both land and maritime applications progressed from concepts and ad-hoc trials to “standard” operations within a short period. By the end of the War in 1918 the arguments over the utility and nature of air power were, however, just beginning and political developments between the Wars would have serious ramifications for carrier air power.

Air Power Theory

On the doctrinal front, the experiences of World War I led to the development of air power theory by those who had been involved in its operational development and employment. This theory, although developed primarily from experiences with land-based aircraft invariably claimed that the traditional applications of land and sea power had been made obsolete by the capabilities of air power.

The three main theorists were Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell, although elements of their work was reflected in the writings of Wrigley, an Australian Flight Lieutenant, Brigadier Groves and others. All the advocates held the conviction that offensive air power was the best way to win future wars, applied through an independent air force. All three theories had substantial similarities although with significant differences in end application.

Giulio Douhet, an Italian Brigadier, advocated the destruction of an enemy’s will to continue fighting through attacks on population and production centres. Lord Hugh Trenchard, widely recognised as “the father of the RAF”, focussed on the use of strategic bombing to destroy centres of production, transportation and communication, whilst Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, US Army Air Service, believed in the use of air power to destroy enemy surface combat forces. Elements of these theories were accepted or rejected in differing degrees by different nations.

No separate theories for the application of maritime air power were developed. This can be understood in that the air power advocates saw no need for naval forces, and hence no need to base aircraft at sea. Later experiences would indicate that the application of carrier air power is more in line with Mahan than with the classical air power theorists.

The development of carrier air power between the Wars was affected as much by political events as by doctrine, and particularly by the series of naval arms limitation treaties held between 1922 and 1936. Political support for these treaties stemmed from a number
of different sources, including a philosophical support for arms control, to achieve a reduction in national shipbuilding rivalry, and to achieve economies in defence expenditure. The outcomes of this series of conferences were affected by the British desire to maintain a clear advantage in the maritime sphere, the United States, desire to at least achieve parity with Britain, the British and US desire to restrict Japanese power, and the Japanese desire to increase its maritime power. The process would have unforeseen effects on the development of the carrier.

### Washington Naval Treaty

The outcome of the first treaty, the Washington Naval Treaty, was to proclaim a holiday in the building of capital ships, and to establish a ratio of capital ships and aircraft carrier tonnage of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy respectively, with total capital ship tonnage limits of 525,000 tons for Britain and the US, and 315,000 tons for Japan. In addition, tonnage upper limits were set at 35,000 tons for capital ships, and 27,000 tons for aircraft carriers, although any nation could build two carriers of 33,000 tons provided the total allowable tonnage was not exceeded. Restrictions were also placed on the size and armament of cruisers.

The types of ships subject to restriction were extended at the London Naval Conference in 1930, the third of the series, to include destroyers and submarines, and included reductions in the allowable number of battleships. Limitations on the fortification of Pacific bases were not agreed to by Britain (Singapore) and the US (Pearl Harbour). The capital ship holiday was extended to 1936, making a total interlude of 15 years. The disarmament process finally failed in the period 1933-1936, initially through the collapse of the World Disarmament Conference, and later by Japanese demands for naval parity with Britain and the US. When this demand was denied, Japan withdrew from the system and the arms race, conducted in a clandestine manner to that point, “formally” recommenced.

### Between the Wars — Britain

In Britain, the development of air power, according to the theory, came closest to full expression, commencing with the creation of the world’s first independent air force, the Royal Air Force, in 1918, and the incorporation and dissolution of the Royal Naval Air Service. All military and naval aircraft therefore came under the control of the Air Ministry. From a strength of nearly 3000 land and sea-based aircraft in April 1918, the Fleet Air Arm diminished to just over 50 machines within two years. The “ownership” of the Fleet Air Arm by the RAF was continually argued against by the Admiralty and in 1923-24 a compromise was reached whereby responsibility for the Fleet Air Arm was shared between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. The design, supply, maintenance and numbers of naval aircraft therefore became a matter of negotiation between the services, while general administration, planning and development were shared and Fleet Air Arm personnel were partly naval and partly RAF. The compromise was intended to solve a demarcation dispute in which the Air Ministry claimed responsibility for all defence operations in the air, whilst the Admiralty did the same for those at sea. The “solution” did not, however, improve the lot of the Fleet Air Arm.

Dual control affected the number of naval officers willing to undertake aviation training due to concerns about career prospects under two masters and inhibited attempts by the Admiralty to expand the maritime air capability. While the Air Ministry could not veto Admiralty proposals they could make life difficult and force justification of those proposals to higher authorities. The main opposition to a naval air expansion programme lay in competition for scarce financial resources. An Admiralty proposal in 1926 for a modest plan to boost Fleet Air Arm strength to 241 aircraft by 1935 was described by the Air Ministry as being “out of proportion to the present financial stringency” and recommended 144 aircraft, further stating:

“The programme has evidently been drawn up with the idea of cramming aircraft into every possible space which can take them in every suitable ship in the British Navy”.

Even when funds became more plentiful, the Admiralty plans were constrained by the allocation of resources, both economic and industrial, to the RAF. The Air Ministry saw the Fleet Air Arm as being under its control, and the views expressed with regard to the Navy made the Admiralty more determined to regain complete control. In early 1930, the Secretary of State for Air stated in a letter to the Prime Minister:

“The Fleet Air Arm is an integral part of the Royal Air Force; the machines allocated to it are included in our total strength, and each machine so allocated means one less immediately available for Home Defence against attack by the shore-based aircraft of European Powers. The Navy, of course, needs some aircraft, and an adequate number can always...”
be made available in case of emergency; but the principal danger we have to guard against is air attack by shore-based aircraft". 27

The adequate number was not defined, and no attempt was made to understand the different role of maritime air power, nor of the different training required. As stated by Callender and Hinsley in The Naval Side of British History the "inefficiencies inherent in the system of dual control became ever more apparent" and yet "statesmen and the public, no less than the Air Ministry, in their failure to understand that aircraft had become an integral element in sea-power, rejected every attempt to restore naval control to sea-borne aircraft until 1938". 28

The failed experiment with unified control of all aircraft, a key tenet of the classical air power theories, was therefore a contributing factor in the tardy development of maritime air power by Britain, but it was not the only one. The contemporary attitudes of the Navy were also important, as were the outcomes of the Washington Treaty.

As stated previously, Britain ended World War I with a single, modern aircraft carrier (Argus) and followed with three more over the following ten years (Hermes, Eagle and Furious). These ships totalled over 70,000 tons of the allowable total of 135,000 tons, and the capital ship holiday meant that Britain could not replace any of these ships with more modern variants. The four carriers were diverse in age, speed and design, and between them operated only 84 aircraft, only slightly more than that operated by a single US carrier.

The implications of this diversity were that it was difficult to operate the carriers together in exercises, and in any case, the number of available aircraft was low. This lack of numbers meant that the Fleet Air Arm was unable to demonstrate the power inherent in massed aircraft attacks, and thus naval aviation did not attract the major support needed to develop from a supporting role to being a primary weapon of maritime power.

Although the concept of operating carriers in pairs to reduce vulnerability to attack was investigated as early as the mid 1930s, and proved useful, 29 the general role of the carrier was seen to be in single applications in support of the battleships. Such support was seen to include "spotting, scouting, attacks on enemy units at anchor, . . . and torpedo assaults on the enemy battle line to force it to face a decisive showdown with the Royal Navy's battleships". 30 Britain therefore favoured the power of the battleship in sea warfare, consistently under-rated the capabilities of aircraft, and over-rated their own anti-air defences. As stated by the First Sea Lord in 1936:

"The Navy hold the view that our anti-aircraft fire will be so severe in future, (that) we hope to make the problem of attacking ships one which is an improper one to carry out". 31

One year later it was argued that the presence of RAF fighters during a large scale German attack on the Fleet would be "possibly as great an embarrassment as assistance" as they would run the "serious risk of being shot down by our own gunfire". 32

Exacerbating the Royal Navy's lack of ability to fully appreciate the capabilities offered by carrier air power was the Admiralty's views on the naval aircraft themselves. The naval requirements called for two types of aircraft; the torpedo-spotter-reconnaissance and the fighter-dive-bomber or fighter-reconnaissance. This multiplicity of functions imposed design complexities and operating constraints, but was necessary due to the limited numbers of carriers available and their limited capacity. The Admiralty preferred programmes which had been previously proven and tested, and for this reason bi-planes continued to operate from British carriers long after they had been pensioned off elsewhere. 33 The strategic assumption up to the late 1930s was that the Fleet Air Arm would not be required to operate within range of enemy land-based aircraft. This was a far more cautious approach to carrier air power than that developed by the United States Navy.

Between the Wars — United States

Although Britain did not develop her own carrier air power to its fullest extent, it was instrumental in the early stages of this process in both the United States and Japan. At the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, at which time both Japan and the US possessed a single, small, experimental carrier, Britain suggested to these countries that they convert two uncompleted battlecruisers into carriers. This idea was endorsed by both and, for the US, resulted in the building and commissioning of two 33,000 ton, 75-plane carriers, Lexington and Saratoga.

Unlike the situation in Britain, naval aviation in the US managed to avoid being combined with the Army Air Service into an independent air force, despite the vigorous protests and campaigning of Mitchell. So bitter and acrimonious was the debate that, following Mitchell's court martial for outspoken remarks following the crash of a Navy dirigible in September 1925, 34 President Coolidge appointed a special board under Dwight Morrow to ascertain the correct place of aviation in both civil and military affairs. The Morrow
Board did not advocate the independent force sought by Mitchell and, on the naval side, recommended a five year, 1,000 aircraft programme. It also recommended that captains of aircraft carriers be qualified aviators and this led to a number of senior naval officers, King and Halsey among them, undertaking aviation training.

As in Britain, the introduction and development of aviation into the maritime environment was not without opposition, particularly from the battleship proponents. The arguments for and against the battleship had commenced at an early stage. In 1920 Mitchell had claimed that aircraft "could destroy, put out of commission, and sink any battleship in existence, or any that could be built". This claim was originally ridiculed by the Navy and Congress but eventually led to a series of carefully controlled demonstrations in which aircraft successfully sank a variety of ex-German vessels, including the battleship Ostfriesland. Both sides claimed support for their arguments from the results of the experiment; Mitchell and other advocates of land-based air power from the sinkings, and the Navy from the fact that the ships were stationary and undefended. However, the US Navy was interested in the results and it proved an important fillip for naval aviation.

As early as 1923 a US naval exercise in the Pacific, Fleet Problem I, had demonstrated the need for carriers in that area. In 1925, the formulation of air tactics by the Navy commenced and by 1927 it had been recommended that the Admiral in command of carrier operations be given "complete freedom of action in employing carrier aircraft". During Fleet Problem IX in 1929, the Saratoga achieved a successful surprise attack on the Panama canal, although the carriers were quickly sunk when they came within range of the defending battleships' guns. The battleship proponents took solace in this event, stating there was "no analysis of Fleet Problem IX fairly made which fails to point to battleships as the final arbiter of Naval destiny".

The US Navy decided to build more carriers, but was constrained by the terms of the Washington Treaty with its upper limit of 135,000 tons. In order to acquire a suitable number of hulls, carriers under 10,000 tons were considered and rejected. The Navy decided on a series of carriers of approximately 14,500 tons: Ranger, Enterprise, Yorktown, Wasp and Hornet. As argued by Reynolds, the US Navy thus preferred ever larger carriers, capable of employing large numbers of planes, and chose small only when bound by treaty or finances.

Carrier air power received a major boost when, in 1932, the carriers Lexington and Saratoga conducted a sneak air attack, at dawn on a Sunday, against Pearl Harbor. It was therefore shown that carriers could "operate independently with fast escorts, and could strike effectively against enemy shore bases and fleet units". The carrier task force concept therefore began to develop.

**Between the Wars — Japan**

As in the US, British involvement was instrumental in the establishment of Japanese carrier air power. At an early stage, the Japanese saw the benefit of acquiring knowledge of carrier aviation from the British and in 1921 a joint Royal Navy/RAF mission visited Japan to assist the navy in modernising both its aerial forces and training programmes. This assistance was strongly supported by the higher levels of the Japanese Navy in order to "leap from 1914 to 1919 in a single bound".

The British suggestion at the Washington Conference for the conversion of battleships to carriers saw the addition of the 60 plane Akagi in 1927, and the 72 plane Kaga in 1930 to Japan's first carrier, Hosho, itself the result of British advice.

As in the US, Japan did not unify its air forces and maritime aviation therefore developed in tune with the general requirements of the maritime environment. Unlike the US, Japan introduced a more complete policy on naval aviation, including the establishment of a series of governmental advisory bodies and research laboratories in 1923-24, and close liaison between the Navy and industry. By 1927 all junior officers were required to undergo a short period of aviation instruction, while any officer aspiring to Flag rank had to either qualify as an aviator, or command seaplane tender. Naval pilots in Japan were a highly skilled elite, with only 100 new trainees being accepted each year for the eight-year training programme. Only the best of these pilots were then selected for carrier duty. This reliance on a small, dedicated elite would prove advantageous in the early part of World War II, but costly once the attrition process commenced.

Acceptance of the potential offered by the carriers was not without opposition and, as in Britain and the US, many officers placed their faith in the power of the battleship. The carrier in Japanese strategy was intended to supplement, not supplant, the traditional plans centred on the conduct of defensive operations in local waters and eventually leading to the "decisive battle" as advocated by Mahan. The initial part of the strategy included operations against an invading fleet by land-based air assets and submarines based in the Japanese mandated territories of the Mariana, Caroline
and Marshall Islands. Carriers were to be another layer in the disposition of vessels designed to trap an enemy fleet prior to its final destruction by the battleship. At a later date the support for Army activities ashore was also added to the carriers’ roles.

A key point in the development of Japanese carrier airpower occurred late in 1940 when Commander Genda, a leading carrier tactician, “saw a newsreel showing four US carriers operating together” and realised that four or more carriers in one concentrated formation could provide mutual defence against air attack. His suggestions on this theme resulted in the creation of the first carrier task force, the First Air Fleet under Vice Admiral Nagumo. The Japanese operational concept was for the carriers to be screened by destroyers, with the battleships and cruisers continuing to operate separately.

As stated by Hone and Mandeles, Japanese “technical and doctrinal advances were not fortuitous; they were the result of an institutionalised analysis of ideas and technology within the navy and within major manufacturers.”

**Between the Wars — Germany**

For Germany, the terms of the Versailles Treaty restricted the Navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, and no submarines. In the years immediately before the repudiation of the Treaty in 1935, and openly afterwards, Germany embarked on a naval rearmament programme, Plan Z, under Grand Admiral Raeder to provide a “balanced fleet”. Included within this plan was an aircraft carrier, the *Graf Zeppelin*.

After the commencement of World War II, Hitler ordered Plan Z modified to give priority to U-boat construction, and allowed only those major ships nearing completion to go forward. The modified plan made no provision for further new battleships or carriers, and as *Graf Zeppelin* was not one of the ships to continue, the German carrier aviation programme was bypassed.

**World War Two**

When war commenced in Europe in 1939, a country that had forsaken the development of any kind of carrier air power in favour of a sub-surface capability faced a country that had failed to grasp the true potential of air power in the maritime environment. Added to this equation later was Italy, possessor of battleships, but no carriers. It is not surprising therefore that the European theatre did not advance the application of carrier airpower to any great extent, with the exception of the introduction of armoured flight decks, and Taranto.

On the night of 11 November 1940, British aircraft from *Illustrious* attacked the Italian fleet at Taranto, and sank two battleships, severely damaged a third, and damaged a cruiser and two destroyers. The Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Cunningham, later wrote:

“Taranto, and the night of November 11th-12th, 1940, should be remembered forever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon”.

It could be argued that Taranto, and the Yamamoto-planned, Nagumo-executed, repeat performance against the US Navy at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, vindicated the theories of Mitchell in that airpower was used against enemy surface formations to achieve a strategic result. Mitchell had however strongly advocated that this power could only be successfully applied through a unified, independent air force, and in both cases this was plainly not so. In fact, the Japanese action against Pearl Harbor, as many of the ensuing campaigns in the Pacific, could only have been made possible through the application of carrier air power.

At Taranto, as at Pearl Harbor, the aim was to achieve command of the sea in the classical sea power sense, and while the naval balance in the Mediterranean shifted significantly towards Britain after the raid, Japan’s failure to destroy the US carriers meant that their strategic objectives were not met, and the action gave only limited tactical advantage.

A sideline event in the development of carrier air power was the raid on Tokyo by 16 B-25s from the carrier *Hornet* on 18 April 1942. This raid could be considered as expressing classic Douhetian sentiment, although certainly not of the scale that Douhet had envisaged, nor large enough to cause significant physical damage. The raid was essentially a major public relations exercise and achieved little strategic or tactical result, although it has been argued that it forced Japan to reconsider its strategic plan and led it to the fateful encounter at Midway.

By early 1942, the Japanese had overrun the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and Malaya in about half the time anticipated, had suffered casualties of only a few thousand, and had lost no ship larger than a destroyer. The next step was seen as the seizure of Port Moresby in order to neutralise Allied airfields in northern and northeastern Australia, and...
eventually to cut sea communications between Australia and the US. Japanese forces commenced by the Port Moresby operation included a Landing Force, a Support Force, a light carrier Covering Force, and a heavy carrier Striking Force tasked with the engagement and destruction of the US carriers. To counter this threat were Yorktown and Lexington, and associated support forces of five heavy cruisers, 11 destroyers and an oiler. The Australian ships Australia and Hobart under Rear Admiral Crace were also involved.

Operations took place over the period 4-8 May 1942 during which time the opposing forces never came within sight of each other but aircraft from each side searched for, and then attacked, the other. Japanese casualties were the light carrier Shoho sunk, and serious damage to Shokaku. The US suffered the losses of the Lexington, the destroyer Sims, and the oiler Neosho, and serious damage to Yorktown. The Japanese believed that two carriers had been sunk, and thereafter planned for the Midway operation with this in mind. The Coral Sea battle was a strategic victory for the Allies, even though the damage toll went against them, as the Landing Force returned to Rabaul and the Japanese objectives were not met.

The Coral Sea Battle was the first time in naval history that fleets had engaged whilst out of sight of each other. In that respect, but in no other, it is unique. In all other aspects it is an engagement in which the seapower themes of sea control (Japan) and sea denial (the US) were predominant. The concepts of carrier air power were reinforced by the operation, and aircraft demonstrated the ability to inflict heavy damage on defended, manoeuvring enemy forces. It was also demonstrated that aircraft, and the associated air power, do not exist in isolation but rather as an extension to the overall maritime power of the fleet.

Advocated by Douhet, Trenchard and others and the ensuing levels of inter-service rivalry. The Washington Naval Treaty which was based upon, and subsequently doomed by, nationalistic desires for the maintenance, recognition, or restriction (depending upon the point of view of the participants) of maritime power was also important as it encouraged (US and Japan) or restricted (Britain) carrier developments. In Britain these factors were combined with economic constraints and lack of vision to result in the stagnation of the carrier air power concept. The full implications of this weapon system were seized upon by the United States and by Japan and developed into the carrier task force.

History has demonstrated that air power in the maritime environment is utilised to achieve the classic tasks of sea control or sea denial. Carrier air power has therefore been an adjunct, albeit an important one, to the overall power of the fleet. In this respect air power theory as expressed by Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell can be considered deficient as it concentrates on strategic bombing and sees no role for air power outside of air force control. The US and Japanese examples, when compared to the British development under air force and then joint control, have indicated that maritime air power achieves a more complete state of development and integration when undertaken as a part of the overall naval tactical and material evolutionary process.

The Pacific campaigns during World War II demonstrated clearly that maritime air power, both land and sea-based is a potent weapon system. It also showed that only carrier air power had the flexibility and "ubiquity" to stem the tide of the Japanese advance and ultimately to achieve success. The Japanese recognised from an early stage that an Allied victory could not have been achieved without it.

NOTES

2. The RAAF Air Power Manual Chapter 2 Outline, lists three distinct air campaigns: namely Control of the Air, Air Bombardment and Air Support for Combat Forces. It also lists six operations within those campaigns, namely: counter air operations for air control, independent strike, reconnaissance, airlift, combat air support and sustainment operations.
4. The first use of an airplane in war was by the Italians in the Italo-Turkish War. On 23 October 1911, an Italian pilot made a one hour reconnaissance flight over enemy positions between Tripoli and al-'Aziziyah. This was followed nine days later by
the first bombing raid. As cited in The New Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia, Volume 1, page 383.
5. ibid, page 383.
15. Flight Lieutenant Wrigley served in France during WW I as a pilot with No. 3 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps. He later rose to the rank of Air Vice Marshal. His writings, a series of essays on the use of air power during the War, and its potential in future conflicts has been published in Stephens, A. and O'Loughlin, B., The Decisive Factor, op-cit.
19. ibid, page 341.
20. ibid, page 345.
21. ibid, page 345.
22. Letter by Secretary of State for Air Lord Thomson to Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald of 13 January 1930. As cited in Till, op-cit, page 347.
26. ibid, page 68.
28. ibid, page 340.
29. In May 1937, the Admiralty selected the bi-plane version for its torpedo-spotter-reconnaissance aircraft, the Fairey Swordfish, with a maximum speed of 180 miles per hour, as the risks with the mono-plane version were considered too great. As cited in Postan, M.M, Hay, D and Scott, J.D., Design and Development of Weapons — Studies in Government and Industrial Organisation, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1964, page 134.
31. As cited in Reynolds, op-cit, page 15. Mitchell publicly accused the leaders of the Army and Navy with "virtual murder and treason for operating with a weak air policy that allowed such catastrophes."
34. As quoted in Groves, P.R.C., Behind the Smoke Screen, Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1934, page 204.
35. Reynolds, op-cit, page 17.
37. Reynolds, op-cit.
40. ibid, page 69.
44. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo was a specialist in torpedoed. He had had vast experience in all types of ships, except carriers.
47. ibid, page 223.
49. At Taranto, Cunningham had a single carrier and used a small number of Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers to achieve his result. At Pearl Harbor, Nagumo had six carriers, and employed two waves of attacks, the first comprising 183 aircraft, fighters, bombers and torpedo bombers, and the second 171. His outcome was five battleships sunk, three damaged, a mine layer and a target ship sunk, and three cruisers, a seaplane tender and a repair ship damaged. At least 177 planes were destroyed, and as many damaged. Personnel casualties were 5,000, with two thirds killed. The Japanese lost less than 50 aircraft. As cited in Coletta, op-cit.
52. ibid, page 361. The carrier in the Covering Force was Shokaku, those in the Striking Force Zuikaku and Shokaku.
53. Hornet and Enterprise were unavailable due to the Tokyo raid in April.
54. Gill, op-cit, page 52. The Japanese believed the carriers to be the Saratoga (Lexington's sister ship) and either the Enterprise or Yorktown.
BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by Michael Fogarty.

Volume IX covers the first six months of 1946, documenting particularly Australia's contribution to new international organisations, external economic relations, colonial administration, British Commonwealth cooperation, the relationship with the United States, the occupation of Japan and emergent nationalism in the Pacific.

As a specialist publication, the book offers much interest to academic historians and others working in the field who will appreciate the selection of and commentary on this archival material. Weighing in at 1.4 kilograms and totalling 608 pages, the book is vectored to a narrow sectoral base, but its utility is more lasting. Anyone who has noted recent appeals to nationalist sentiments will be encouraged by the evidence tabled here suggesting that our strategic interests were also being vigorously asserted almost 50 years ago.

The historians of the project section have achieved a highly professional standard in the preparation and publication of this book. As well they might, as the series has to meet the quality set by the official archives published by other foreign ministries. Those archival series include “Documents Diplomatique Francais”, “Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939” and “Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-45”. The Australian volumes are also correctly burdened with the usual scholarly apparatus which distinguishes such works.

The editor and his staff do not offer this collection as a history — it is a collection of documents. As Sir Paul Hasluck has previously commented in an instructive article, “...documents are not history but part of the materials of history in much the same way as a heap of blue metal is not a road but part of the materials for making a road.” (See Sir Paul Hasluck, “Archives, Anthologies and other Source Books”, Australian Outlook, AIIA, Volume 32, 1978).

Volume IX examines some of the acute political problems Australia had to contend with in the immediate post-war period. Clearly, the pre-war political order had been radically changed and there was much instability in Asia as nationalist aspirations manifested themselves, challenging attempts by colonial powers to re-assert their diminished authority and prestige in former possessions. Australia too had vital interests to preserve, defend and promote as she sought to influence events which impacted on our strategic basis.

If Australia’s policies were to succeed, then they required skilled representatives to implement them. This country was fortunate in having such people on the ground at the time. The efforts achieved by W. McMahon Ball in Tokyo and Alfred Brookes in Batavia demonstrated their political acumen and overall representative capacity. Australia then had an embryo foreign service and Asia was the cradle for many war-time entrants who later went on to increasingly senior appointments in the then Department of External Affairs — at home and abroad.

Australia’s envoys were confronted with some highly sensitive issues and their resolution presented not only political but legal dilemmas as well. For example, the problems presented in the judicial process involving the investigation of the murder of several RAAF officers at Buitenzorg in Java is a case in point — (see documents 240, 304 and 311). Recognising the right of pre-republican Javanese courts to try insurgents for crimes would entail recognising the sovereignty of those courts and the wider political implications which followed from such a decision, at a national level, in government to government relations. In a volatile political environment, characterised by suspicion and mistrust, Australia had to finely balance its interests between the two opposing groups.

Elsewhere in Tokyo, other situations were equally testing. (See documents 323 and 328). Australia was represented on the Allied Council for Japan and McMahon Ball liaised with General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan. Ball delivered Evatt’s views on the proposed Japanese constitution to MacArthur who reacted strongly considering them as destructive and an attack on MacArthur’s administration. Ball exercised consummate diplomacy to placate an irate MacArthur and Australia’s political adviser only succeeded in mollifying him through an unctuous appeal to MacArthur’s natural modesty.

The above examples are two of many and serve to demonstrate the complexity and nuances of some of the diplomatic exchanges covered in the work. The photographs and biographical notes locate many of the
officials and they add to a more informed understanding of events.

Observations on nationalism aside, the book reminds us that our foreign policy was not solely determined as a footnote to a cabinet agenda item in Whitehall or as an aside in the corridors of Foggy Bottom. The decisions were ours, as they had to be, if the government was to take any responsibility for Australia's welfare and progress. And again, as a major ally of both countries, Australia had to manoeuvre as best as she could.

The last words should be left to Gordon Craig who wrote in his article "On the pleasure of reading diplomatic correspondence", Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 26, September, 1991. "...[In the last analysis, the key to national security lies in the health and vigour of our own society. Only someone who is insensitive to the role of the individual in history could be bored by this kind of literature. All in all, these forbidding buckram-bound volumes deserve more readers than they get]."

THE BATTLE OF MARYANG SAN Fought by 3rd Battalion RAR Korea, 2-8 October, 1951. Published by HQ Training Command. The book may be obtained from the Australian War Memorial for $16.50.

Reviewed by John Buckley.

Several of the members of the battalion have written about their experiences in this important battle. It brings life and authenticity to the book.

Maryang San was a classic engagement, but strangely it has received little acclaim in Australian military history. The official historian, Robert O'Neil regarded it as "the greatest single feat of the Australian Army during the Korean War". It certainly did not get the recognition given to Kapyong or Long Tan (Vietnam).

It had to be a fine battalion because its officers and personnel were of high quality and experience. Frank Hassett, its CO, was a most gifted and experienced officer. In World War II he reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel at age 24. Later he was to become an outstanding staff officer and commander.

I knew Hassett as "gentleman Frank". He did not have to push himself forward for promotion nor did he put down any of his peers. A man of unusual stature, integrity, compassion and a born leader.

Of the officers in the battalion at Maryang San, Hassett became General Sir Francis Hassett, AC, KBE, CB, DSO, MVO; Lieutenant Jim Hughes became a major general with the AO, DSO, MC; Rofe and Shelton became Brigadiers; four became Lieutenant Colonels, and the Adjutant became Sir William Keys, AC, MC, ex-National President of the RSL. WOs Morrison and Rowlinson each had the DCM and bar.

During the period 2 DSOs, 10 MCs, 1 MBE, 2 DCMs and 10 MMs were awarded.

During the battle, Hassett's talents were noted and thereafter his promotion was rapid and richly deserved. He must rank as one of the best of the post World War II generals.

It was also at this battle that Jim Hughes' performance singled him out for a distinguished and dedicated service. Jim is now the President of the Naval & Military Club, Melbourne.

The battle of Maryang San was fought against a resolute enemy of at least two Chinese battalions who were entrenched in mountainous terrain. It is a miracle that the 3rd Battalion were able to overcome the fanatical defenders. Hassett was always well forward with his troops.

In my opinion, it was a classic performance by a courageous and dedicated battalion. I hope this book will prove that Maryang San rates equal to, or maybe higher than, Kapyong or Long Tan.

The study of Maryang San should be compulsory reading for all officers in the Army. It will also appeal to all non-military readers.

Lt Col Bob Breen and his helpers have produced an excellent monograph. Congratulations to them all.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel R.E. Bradford.

For a variety of reasons, since the end of World War II the British Army has been involved in a series of conflicts in many regions throughout the world. This prolonged period of active service had its origins in the gradual shedding of colonial status by the United Kingdom and the need to hand over power in a peaceful fashion to the rightful recipients. Apart from the full-scale nature of Korea and the Falklands War, the majority of the engagements could only at best be regarded as low intensity conflicts, where the British soldiers were deployed as an aid to the civil power in an attempt to counter armed insurgencies. As is often the case, once the political decisions are made and the military planning processes completed, such low intensity conflicts become the responsibility of the junior military leaders, the lieutenants, sergeants and corporals, to bring the conflict to a satisfactory conclusion. This book brings to life their story and their attempts to achieve this aim.
Conflicts covered by the author include operations in the jungles of Malaya and Borneo, the conflict against the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Middle East conflicts in Cyprus, Suez and Oman, and finishes with the still unsolved and on-going problems in Northern Ireland. The one aspect which pervades the book and which continually draws the reader close to the action, is the personal experiences of the various military participants. Charles Allen makes continual use of quotes from the soldiers which continually reinforces this theme of the personal involvement. At no stage does he attempt to colour these experiences with his own views or the views of the historian, but instead remains content to allow the soldiers’ stories to paint the picture. His words remain as simply the link, or the vehicle by which this personal side of war is conveyed.

The often portrayed “glory” aspects of warfare within this personal theme, are also avoided. Stories of courage and outstanding leadership typified by the defence of Mirbat, a township in Oman by eight SAS troopers against over 300 heavily armed rebels, can be found throughout the book, but in no way do they detract from the main theme. By ignoring the glorification of war, the author has been able to avoid compiling a formal type history while at the same time maintaining a flowing, easily read and most enjoyable text.

The author, Charles Allen is a well known British oral historian and broadcaster and has written a number of other historical works. In compiling this book he conducted a deal of written research, but more importantly was able to interview 70 as he calls them “eye-witnesses”, and was able to elicit from them their personal experiences in the conflicts covered in the book. As a consequence he has been able to produce a work which is easily read and which tells in a most engrossing fashion, the experiences of these “eye-witnesses”, and one that I can wholeheartedly recommend to all readers.

THE LEADING EDGE: AIR POWER IN AUSTRALIA’S UNIQUE ENVIRONMENT, by P.J. Criss and D.J. Schubert, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. $17.50 RRP Paperback. 193pp including glossary.

Reviewed by WGC DR Mark Lax.

It may come as a surprise to some, but the publication of this book represents a significant milestone in RAAF doctrinal thought. For the first time in over 50 years, two middle ranking serving officers have produced a publication which has both added to the debate about airpower and its applications and opened a hitherto unknown subject to the public, spurring much discussion. The book forms a backdrop to the AAP 1000 — The RAAF Air Power Manual, a text both officers had much to do with. The work was tasked by the CAS, Air Marshal Ray Funnell, to raise the general level of awareness of airpower, particularly in an Australian context and the authors had the opportunity to study the subject while attending the USAF Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama.

The book comprises eight chapters, a select bibliography and a glossary, but no index. Eight plates of various aircraft are included in the centre of the publication, but these really detract from the rest of the paper and are superfluous. Each chapter is preceded by a quote from Sun Tzu — The Art of War to whet the reader’s appetite and each chapter is individually footnoted. Chapters include: Introduction, Evolution of Air Power, Australia’s Unique Environment, Air Power and Doctrine in the Australian Context, Constraints on the Future, Future — ADF/Joint Forces, Future — RAAF Air Power and Conclusion.

The authors aim is to “examine Australia’s use of air power in order to determine its appropriate employment for a small air force which may have constraints peculiar to its circumstances”. As a starting point, the authors take the generally accepted Armitage and Mason definition of air power as “the ability to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension above the surface of the earth . . . the air is used not merely as a medium that is traversed by a bullet or other projectile but as a medium for manoeuvre, deployment, concealment and surprise”. The evolution of air power is examined in both historical and Australian-specific terms. The classical theorists are touched upon and the unique nature of air power; its flexibility of application and response, is highlighted to the reader in order to establish a base to develop the book’s central premise; that air power is the key to Australia’s defence. Central to this thesis is, according to the authors, an explanation of “how air power has been exploited to take advantage of its unique characteristics within the constraints of time, change and managing that change”.

The next section on Australia’s unique environment is included to review Australia’s geographic situation (for the benefit of USAF readers of the original paper) and some of recent politically motivated papers such as the Dibb Report and DOA87. This section dates the original work since, although published in 1991, one of the more recent defence reviews is discussed. The impact on the “No threat” scenario is also assessed.

After setting the scene for the first third of the book, the authors get into the meat of the subject in chapters
four and five: Air Power and Doctrine in the Australian Context and Constraints on the Future. The authors set about dispelling some myths about airpower and take pains to point out that because of a general misunderstanding the effective employment of airpower, Australia's force structure has become very skewed. Present doctrine and force capability also come under the microscope and are addressed as inappropriate for today and the future. Financial and manpower constraints dictate that Australia must develop an appropriate Air Force Structure that complements the Land and Sea Forces.

The authors conclude the monograph with short chapters on the future — joint operations and RAAF Air Power. Perhaps the "RAAF" portion could have been dropped since the three services pose at least some air power capability. The book gives the reader something to ponder whether you agree with the central premise regarding the all pervasive nature of air power or not.

The publication is in standard SDSC format, is well printed and at $17.50 is good value for money. Recommended for readers who want to know more about airpower and its employment, particularly in the Australian context. As Sun Tzu would say, "What the ancients call a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease" . . . and so it should be with air power in the Australian context.

NOTES
1. Both Criss and Schubert were Wing Commanders attending the US Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. This paper was derived from their award-winning research paper, written during the year they were overseas. Both have been promoted to Group Captain.
2. Schubert went on to the study team which developed the AAP 1000 — RAAF Air Power Manual.
4. The Leading Edge, p.22.
5. Ibid, p.23.

HAIG'S COMMAND: A REASSESSMENT,

Reviewed by Major W.J. Graco.

Back in the early 1980s, the reviewer conducted a study of a sample of competent commanders. One of the most controversial commanders studied was Field Marshal Douglas Haig, C-in-C of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) Western Front in Europe 1915-1918. Haig aroused strong passions in people and he had his supporters as well as his critics.

Denis Winter's Haig's Command falls in the latter category of being critical of Haig as a commander. Winter's publication follows closely those of De Groot and Travers who provide revealing portraits of the Field Marshal. Winter was able to uncover evidence previously not cited by other historians and biographers to correct a number of misconceptions about Haig. Most of the new evidence was obtained from Australian, US and Canadian archives.

Winter makes a number of startling claims in his biography. Two of these are that Haig falsified the record of his military career to cover up his mistakes and blunders in the war and that documents passed to the British Public Record Office were carefully vetted to remove embarrassing material which could reflect badly on the reputations of senior officers who served on the Western Front during the war. These revelations are not entirely new as General Sir James Edmonds, the official war historian of British military operations on the Western Front 1914-1918, admitted that while he wrote the histories to convey the lessons of the war, the histories were couched in such a way to protect the reputations of his fellow officers. Edmonds was a contemporary of Haig at Staff College.

In private comments to British military journalist and writer Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Edmonds stated that Haig was above averagely stupid, knew nothing of infantry or artillery (Haig was a cavalry soldier), and was technically illiterate. He was dominated by ambition and was too ready to promote favourites, but reluctant to dismiss senior commanders who had failed if their dismissal reflected badly on him because he had originally appointed them. He also used his authority to punish those who had crossed swords with him in the past. Edmonds stated to Liddell Hart that he could not write the truth about Haig.

Edmonds too came across attempts to doctor war diaries and to suppress evidence on what happened in particular events. The irony is that Winter accuses Edmonds of either destroying or suppressing incriminating material. The alleged cover-ups and destruction of documents reinforce the view of General Essame who said that generals who wish to avoid the exposure of their doubts after their deaths and who wish to cut a respectable figure in the eyes of posterity should not keep diaries.

Another revelation in Winter's biography is that Haig had a controlled personality. Hitherto now it was believed that Haig was inarticulate and had difficulties relating to all but intimates. Winter presents a different interpretation of these traits and conveys the view that Haig's combination of constraint and inarticulacy was possibly a defensive disguise he used to maintain distance from his subordinates in order to protect himself and to allow him to control others. He was distant,
brusque and at times abrasive in his treatment of colleagues and subordinates. He stayed close to his definitions always on the lookout for threats real or imagined. Haig also searched for rivals who threatened his position. Competitors were given cold steely treatment by Haig.

This aloofness and silence contrasted to his boyish, whimsical behaviour where he was given to moments of light-hearted fun and to his geniality where he took a fatherly interest in those he liked.

A third aspect to Haig’s personality was his tendency to bottle up his frustrations and hatreds and his nervous mannerisms such as his tugging of his moustache. He was also xenophobic, especially towards the French, and he intensely disliked politicians.

Winter attributes Haig’s rise to the top to his unrelenting pursuit of his own ambition, his painstaking attention to his work, his astute diplomacy and his manipulation of the system of patronage. Haig out-performed his rivals in the number and social standing of the patrons he enjoyed. These included Sir Evelyn Wood and Adjutant General in the 1890s, Field Marshall Kitchener and Lord Esher one of the architects of the Committee of Imperial Defence which secretly organised Britain’s part in the war with Germany the decade before it began. Later, when he served in the War Office from 1906 to 1909, he became known to Haldane, the Minister of War, the Asquith, the Prime Minister, who appointed him C-in-C during the war.

Winter also criticised the British Army and its failings. Winter indicated that the British Army was ill-trained and ill-equipped to fight the war in France and Flanders and that the quality of generalship at the top was substandard. Promotion to corps command and above and allocation of key staff appointments were reserved for Regular Army officers and it was a closed trade union shop. According to Winter the British Army suffered from over-bloated staffs and from too many men being misemployed in the administrative tail rather than the fighting teeth.

Travers made similar observations where he pointed out that Haig surrounded himself with sycophantic staff, some of whom were not fit for war, and how Haig’s GHQ suffered from what is called “group-think” by psychologist Irving Janis. This refers to a state where a group of decision makers are sheltered from unpleasant news, where there are strong pressures to conform to a particular view or policy, and where there is an absence of critical thinking and debate. Haig contributed to group-think in his GHQ. He picked acquiescent staff officers for his HQ. He also believed that the authority of the C-in-C is impaired by permitting subordinates to advance their ideas and that there must be unanimity at the HQ. This led to the isolation of GHQ from the rest of the BEF and to a lack of discussion of alternative strategy and tactics. Travers stated most senior officers were afraid of Haig and were not prepared to question him. Furthermore, officers further down the chain of command were afraid to tell Haig’s liaison officers the truth. This situation improved in 1918 with a cleaning out of the Augean stable after the disaster of the Flanders Campaign in 1917. Key staff officers on Haig’s GHQ were replaced by order of the War Cabinet.

Winter makes other serious and damning claims in his book and some of the more important ones include:

- the myth that the Somme Campaign 1916 was imposed on a reluctant Haig by the French to help reduce German pressure on French forces at Verdun. Winter claims that Haig had planned the campaign as a diversionary battle to draw German reserves away from Flanders where the main British thrust was planned for 1916. The Somme operation was to be a rapid, limited advance. Unfortunately, British artillery was inadequate for the task and British forces attacked German forces in well fortified positions and as a result sustained heavy casualties. The campaign dragged on for four months and denied Haig his opportunity to attack in Flanders in 1916;
- another myth was the claim by Haig that the Flanders Campaign of 1917 was undertaken for the dual reasons to keep German pressure off the French following their alleged collapse after the failed Nivelle offensive early in the same year and to eliminate German U-boat bases operating from the Flanders coastline. As shown above, Haig had intended to launch the offensive in 1916. Winter indicated that the British War Cabinet had recognised that a very powerful offensive on the Western Front was needed to head off an expected pre-emptive strike by the Germans in 1917. The Cabinet was therefore favourably disposed towards the Nivelle offensive which was aimed at eliminating the Noyon Salient between Arras in the north and the Aisne River in the south. Haig undermined the Nivelle offensive by withholding support that he had planned to use in Flanders. When the Flanders Campaign was launched in the middle of 1917 it was blunted by a combination of heavily fortified German defences laid in depth, rain and British artillery breaking up the ground and destroying drainage. Haig knew that the success of the battle hinged on making an early breakthrough. When mud and German concrete halted Haig’s forces, he continued the campaign based on faulty Allied intelligence that the Germans were planning a retreat and therefore it was wise to keep pressure on them; and
• a third myth is that British forces were caught unaware by the first German offensive aimed at splitting British and French Forces near Amiens in March 1918. Haig had correctly anticipated the offensive and later the second offensive in Flanders in April. Where Haig blundered was in underestimating the size and ferocity of the German attack. British and French forces had planned a trap for the Germans, but were themselves caught out by the overwhelming German response.

Overall, Winter’s biography tarnishes further Haig’s dwindling reputation as a commander. He is revealed as a flawed individual who was not suited to high command and who, as an Edwardian general, achieved high rank because of his burning ambition and because of the system of class and privilege in the British Army at the time. It is a provocative book full of controversial claims and it will be interesting to see how other historians respond to what Winter has said about Haig and the British Army of the First World War.

NOTES
5. Ibid, 59.


Reviewed by Colonel T.M. Boyce.

The creation of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the early 1970s was followed by changes in command structures and relationships which have led, according to Horner, to the most centralised defence structure in Australian history. With this in mind, Horner has taken the opportunity presented by the Australian commitment to the 1991 Gulf War to comment on the reshaping of the Department of Defence and the three Services which has occurred over the last 15 years.

However, the author has gone further than a pure examination of command structures. Horner’s experience as a military historian is evident in his treatment of the Australian preparations for and involvement in the United Nations’ actions against Iraq for he provides much detail of a historical nature on individuals and events. Despite this, he is careful to point out that the book is not an official history even though he interviewed the key participants and had access to Defence documents and information.

The second chapter (the first is an introduction) describes the development of the existing command structure including the formation of HQADF and the three environmental commands. It is a good summary of the part played by evolving defence policy, individuals, various reviews and acceptance of the concept of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war in developing the existing ADF and Departmental structure and relationships with the government.

The Morshead review of 1957 began the process of examining the defence organisation and the move away from the World War II structure to a single Department of Defence. The Vietnam War revealed the weaknesses in the modified organisation and changes in the structures were accelerated in the early 1970s. The 1973 Tange Review led to the establishment of a single department and the position of Chief of the Defence Force Staff. However, there was criticism that the new organisation gave too much authority to the senior civilian staff and that the CDFS’s staff was too small to support the CDFS and his responsibilities. In the mid 1980s the CDFS title was changed to CDF, HQADF was formed and the three environmental headquarters and commands were established.

By 1989, the three environmental commands had ceased to exist as single Service commands and had become, instead, responsible to the CDF for the planning and conduct of operations. Other refinements have followed including the decision to appoint a Commander Joint Forces Australia for higher level contingencies and the formation of Personnel and Development Divisions in HQADF. By the time the Gulf commitment was made the Australian Defence organisation had the most centralised structure for the formulation of policy, command and administration in its history (p.4).

Having set the scene, Horner uses the following chapters to describe the deployment and operations of the various Australian Defence elements involved in the Gulf conflict. Comment is made on the perform-
ance of the ADF on a modern battlefield and particularly the RAN units which were operating with foreign navies structured for contingencies of a different nature than those envisaged for the RAN. The speed to which the new ADF organisation is able to respond to the government’s demands and the workings of the strategic policy-making machinery are also examined. These chapters also contain much detail on incidents and individuals and should be of much interest to those involved in the deployments.

From those involved in the deployment, there are interesting observations on training which reinforce the need for realistic and demanding training in peacetime: . . .we do it in a peacetime environment and were quite woeful initially in a war scenario (p.46). Such coverage, together with detail on public relations activity, rules of engagement and the involvement of other departments and the government ensures that the book provides a range of recent Australian case studies which should be of use to staff colleges and other such institutions.

The final chapter serves as a conclusion and a commentary on the effectiveness of the changes in the defence structure over the last decade or so and the political considerations and involvement overlying the Australian involvement. In Horner’s view the Gulf War marked the coming of age of the ADF (p.210). What is missing is detailed comment on the changes brought about by the experiences of the Fiji and Vanuatu crises. Whilst the Gulf crisis was the first major test of the new command arrangements that had been instituted in the ADF over the previous several years (p.4), the Fiji crisis was, in fact, the first major operational test of the new HQADF and its command structures and operational procedures in place at that time. Despite Horner’s comment to the contrary (p.158), a crisis coordination centre did operate during the Fiji crisis. However, that contingency did prompt improved coordination between the centre and the ADF Command Centre and relationships, coordination and procedures between the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs were, as Horner points out, streamlined and formalised.

Horner has written extensively on command in the Second World War and the Vietnam War and is working on a larger study of Australian high command. This book continues with his works on command at the higher levels. The omission of the part played by the Fiji and Vanuatu crises in the development of the ADF is a minor criticism. The book is amply illustrated with maps and photographs and the five key United Nations resolutions are reproduced in an appendix. The Gulf Commitment will appeal to those interested in an historical account of Australia’s military involve-

ment in the Gulf War and will be of considerable use to those studying the development of the ADF, its ability to conduct operations and its role as an arm of the government.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A ROVING STAFF OFFICER, by Colonel John Buckley, OBE. Published by the Australian Defence Force Journal.

Reviewed by B.C. Ruxton, OBE, State President, Victorian Branch RSL.

It is always pleasing to read a good book, particularly if that book concerns Australian military history, and more importantly, written by a good friend of mine and the Victorian Branch of the RSL.

Colonel John Buckley has bound together a book of nine articles that had been previously published in the Australian Defence Force Journal, a very prestigious periodical published bi-monthly under the auspices of the Australian Defence Forces.

John Buckley’s service commenced pre-war with the Militia then the Regular Army until he joined the AIF in 1940 where he saw service in North Africa, Syria, Iraq, New Guinea, the United Kingdom, and the second front in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany.

He was known both to the British and Australian Armies as the Roving Staff Officer, and was virtually his own boss for most of the war, but his contribution to the Allied war effort was outstanding.

John married Margaret Sturdee, the daughter of another great Australian and former Chief of Staff of the Army, Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee, so the articles about “Father and Son on Gallipoli” (Sir Vernon Sturdee and his RMO father Colonel Alfred Sturdee) and because of his close friendship to Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring “Great Soldier — Great Christian”, were really written with a wonderful inside running of facts concerning these two great Australians that had not been told previously.

The article on John Curtin was written from John Buckley’s heart, and without political bias. It outlined in detail the exciting decisions taken by Curtin during the war, describing events in a “warts and all” manner.

No doubt the former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, General Peter Gration who launched this book, was delighted with the previously untold biography of one of Australia’s greatest bureaucrats, Sir Frederick Shedden, who was the permanent head of the Department of Defence from 1937 until 1956.

No person knew Sheddon better than John Buckley.
who served under Sheddon first as Assistant Secretary, in 1949 and then First Assistant Secretary from 1956 to 1974.

The lucid detail given by John Buckley to the doyen of all public servants, gives an insight not previously told, and records for all time the patriotic and loyal service given to Australia by Sir Frederick.

At long last the hidden history of the Syrian and Iraq campaigns in 1941 is told by John Buckley in an interesting and exciting form.

He is full of praise for the famous silent Seventh Australian Division in their titanic battle against the Vichy French, with just rifles and 25 pounder guns.

The French, using their famous Foreign Legion, with tanks and numerically superior forces, were over­come in true Australian fashion.

John was very critical of the British GOC, Field Marshal (then General) Lord Maitland-Wilson, and believes that he held his command because of his friendship with Churchill.

However, he did heap praise on the British Generals who were great soldiers, and he met plenty of them when he joined Habforce — the force sent to put down the rebellion in Iraq.

His lone trip across the desert, which was then the domain of the German-loving rebel Arab Fawzi Kawakji, was incredible and brave.

It was during his experience with Habforce that he met Major-General William Slim, who was later to become Governor General of Australia.

His stories continue, including a biography of the former Primate of Australia, Archbishop Sir Frank Woods, a great humanitarian who himself was a Dunkirk veteran.

Then John Buckley deals with “Australia’s Perilous Year”, January 1942 to January 1943. The ever so near conquering of Australia by the Japanese, all the crises of command amongst the hierarchy of the Australian Army, and the misunderstanding of the battle situation by General MacArthur and other leaders.

If the British deserted the Australians in Singapore, the military leaders certainly seem to have deserted those brave Australians who fought the Japanese to a stand-still in the Owen Stanley’s of New Guinea.

The perilous year is an apt, if not under-rated, title of this sad but victorious chapter in Australian history.

Finally, John Buckley really became the Roving Staff Officer again when he was detailed with a few other select Australian officers to join the British Army in the invasion of Europe in 1944.

His main job was to report on major weapons systems newly developed for the invasion, on research programs, and armoured assault vehicles — there were many other jobs as well.

He was assigned to the famous crack 79 British Armoured Division, whose GOC was the most famous tank expert in the world, Major General Sir Percy Hobart.

John Buckley tells the reader how Hobart, known as “Hobo”, was ostracised by his fellow officers during the years leading up to World War II.

The British High Command rebuffed his tactics for tanks in war, but the Germans certainly snapped up Hobart’s blue prints that made the Panzer Divisions feared by all.

General Hobart later resigned his commission, and was later reinstated by Churchill after he was found in the Home Guard as a Corporal.

Sir Percy Hobart’s funny tanks (e.g.) Swimming Tanks, Crocodile Flame Thrower Tanks, Crab Flail Mine Clearing Tanks, Bridgelaying Tanks and many others, were the main reason for the British breakthrough, and John Buckley very funny states in the book that the British and Canadian troops really had the hardest battles to win after D Day.

This book is a must for every RSL member to purchase for his library. It gives an insight to Australia’s war effort not previously written in such readable English.

General Sir John Monash wrote in 1918 that “the Staff Officer is the servant of the troops”.

He went on to say that “it was upon them, after all, that the principal burden of the campaign rested”.

Colonel John Buckley, OBE, more than measured up to the praise heaped upon Australian Staff Officers by General Monash.

It is certainly a privilege for me to know him as a friend.

This book, Recollections of a Roving Staff Officer, may be purchased for $30.00 plus $4.95 postage and handling and is available from:

Anzac House
4 Collins Street
Melbourne VIC 3000

RACV
123 Collins Street
Melbourne VIC 3000

RACV Country Club
Healesville VIC 3777

Defence Public Relations
St Kilda Road
Melbourne VIC 3004

Australian Defence Force Journal
B-4-26

Russell Offices
Canberra ACT 2061
Guaranteeing the safe communication of classified information is vitally important to Australia’s Defence Forces.

For this reason classified documents are often delivered by hand from communications centres on defence bases to supported units and headquarters. A method which is both costly and time consuming, as it requires the maintenance and management of full-time vehicle fleets and personnel.

To overcome these problems the Defence Signals Directorate and Telecom Australia joined forces to create a fast, simple, cost effective solution, capable of delivering classified messages by electronic means. The result is Speakeasy, a high grade, cryptographic device for fax, voice and data.

Just half the size of a video recorder, the compact and portable Speakeasy device simply links up to existing facsimile terminals. Using an Australian designed key management system, authorised personnel are able to transfer all levels of classified information between Speakeasy terminals.

At the push of a button Speakeasy switches from plain to secure mode and can be used for voice and computer data transfer, as well as faxing classified information. No specialised staff, training or support are required. Just the appropriate security clearance and access to the standard telephone networks.

All of which adds up to a convenient solution which is as fast and secure as it is cost efficient.

For more information about Speakeasy, simply call your Telecom Defence Account Executive on (06) 250 1201, or fax us on (06) 253 2333.