



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.



Article Title 'A Potential Vulnerability of Precision-Strike Warfare?'

Author John E. Peters, Senior Researcher, RAND

Publication Details *Orbis*, vol. 48, issue 3, Summer 2004, pp. 479–87

Synopsis

In this article, Peters challenges the modern Western orthodoxy that precision-strike warfare is decisive. He begins by highlighting the significant decline in enemy casualty rates, with the second Gulf War being far less punishing for Iraq. Peters states that precision-strike warfare limits unintended death and destruction by being extremely accurate, with any destruction focused on military targets. Although various theorists predicted that precision methods would make war short and decisive, the evidence of the Second Gulf War does not support their views. Thus, Peters contends that the Coalition's attacks may not have been destructive enough to cause the Iraqis to submit to the occupation.

The author uses the wars against, and occupations of, Germany and Japan to support his hypothesis. He observes that, in both cases, the presence of the occupation discredited their wartime leadership. The levels of death, wounding and maiming were high, and the destruction of both property and infrastructure was devastating. Additionally, no charismatic leadership was free to flourish and continue the resistance after the war.

In contrast, in the Second Gulf War there was no strategic surrender, and the Iraqis were neither exhausted nor afraid at the start of the occupation. Peters also shows that the occupation ratio of 1:153 is within norms established in World War II. Additionally, the Iraqis have not been disarmed, nor do they show signs that they are fearful of punishment at the hands of occupation troops. Therefore, some Iraqis have concluded that cooperation may not be in their best interests.

Peters then draws some implications for the future. He suggests that the United States must plan to face an organised resistance in the aftermath of future wars. Military planning should encompass a greater emphasis on killing or capturing the leadership, and special efforts should be aimed at preventing charismatic leaders from inspiring resistance. Peters goes on to advocate an effective psychological campaign to undermine the previous regime and its ideology in order to win collaboration. Should resistance occur, the United States must have the means to defeat it.

Finally, a credible successor regime is required. Peters ends by warning that Washington must think carefully about the rationale and methods behind pre-emptive war.

Article Title	‘Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities’
Author	L. Brownlee & P. J. Schoomaker
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , vol. XXXIV, no. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 5–23

Synopsis

Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army, and General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, US Army, provide readers with a description of the type of war that the United States must now prepare to fight in the future and the attributes that will lead to American victory. The title neatly sums up their view. The authors believe that the United States is now a nation at war against a broad range of enemies. The new security environment demands forces designed to fight unilaterally a campaign by employing joint capabilities, not from forward bases, but from continental America.

The new range of 21st-century threats are different from those of the Cold War and require that the US Army rapidly adapt itself to novel conditions. There is a need for expeditionary forces and a joint mode of operations combined with new organisational, training and doctrinal methods. The authors outline ideas such as disaggregating forces into self-contained modular units, logistics structures and headquarters, and realigning doctrine in order that it matches the threats of the day. Other services should be viewed as supplementary agencies rather than competitors, while the army force mix also needs to change.

In particular, the active component must be capable of dealing with the demands of the first 30 days of any conflict. This situation is to be achieved by altering the mixture of active and Reserve capabilities, developing a new rotation manning model and moving to a ‘train–alert–

deploy–recover’ force preparation model. The Reserves will also need to be prepared for immediate action in homeland security operations.

All of the above measures require new approaches to individual and collective training, with multi-agency and joint assets now integrated into combat training centre rotations. The authors also see a need to incorporate rapidly operational lessons into the training system from observations gathered in the field.

The final attributes discussed are materiel and logistics, highlighting the need for the Future Combat System (FCS) and a shift to mobile, versatile distribution-based logistics, creating multiple modes of distribution direct to the end-user.

Article Title ‘Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding’

Author Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Donahoe

Publication Details *Military Review*, vol. LXXXIV, no. 3,
May/June 2004, pp. 24–6

Synopsis

The author examines the challenges of preparing military professionals for the difficult task of nation-building during military occupations and peace-making operations. He suggests that, while the US Army trains for operations across the spectrum of conflict, its focus, despite the experience since 11 September, is still on high-intensity conflict, largely ignoring the cultural, civic, ethical and city-planning tasks that soldiers face during stability operations. He sees this as a fundamental weakness in America’s new strategic environment.

The article utilises the character of Major Victor Joppolo, the protagonist of John Hersey’s 1945 Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, *A Bell for Adamouses*, to demonstrate those areas where US Army training must focus if it is to address the needs of an Army engaged in nation-building. Joppolo, the author notes, was an Italian–American officer during World War II who becomes the military governor of a Sicilian town following the fall of Mussolini. Unlike contemporary US commanders in Iraq, this soldier was equipped with a range of language and cultural skills, and the military had trained him as a civil-affairs specialist. The US Army of today faces a deeper challenge than the one that it had faced during World

War II—that of preparing combat soldiers to perform similar tasks but in the absence of a shared cultural heritage with those that they may be expected to govern.

The answer, according to Donahoe, lies in the military’s adopting a more broadly based education system that offers officers and non-commissioned-officers an understanding of the culture, language, history and geography of various areas in which they are likely to operate. Such training must begin with induction sessions and extend across the range of career and advanced courses including ones in staff colleges and war colleges. As well as making US soldiers culturally attuned and providing a basic understanding of language, career managers must offer more opportunities for service personnel to work and study in such areas.

Finally, officers require a broad understanding of law and legal structures; public administration; economics; and ethics (as it relates to the Law of Armed Conflict). Without a broad, educationally focused training regime that addresses the challenges of nation-building, the US Army will continue to struggle with securing peace in the wake of conflict.

Article Title ‘The Hollow Army’

Author: James Fallows

Publication Details *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 293, issue 2, March 2004, pp. 29–32

Synopsis

The author examines the 21st-century paradox of unchallenged American military power being stretched to breaking point. Fallows outlines the expansion of America’s military commitments over the past decade while observing that this same period has seen a reduction in defence spending and a decline in its uniformed strength. These trends have left America’s armed forces hollow and ‘the military’s people, its equipment, its supplies and spare parts, its logistics systems, and its other assets are under pressure they cannot sustain.’

Fallows believes that the American military is being asked to do too much with too little. With too few uniformed personnel, the armed forces, especially the US Army, has been forced into a number of short-term expedients, including a greater reliance on Reserves and National

Guardsmen being called up on full-time duty. Such a trend cannot be sustained indefinitely because the personnel pool remains a finite, indeed dwindling, resource. The worldwide commitments of the American military have left it with little in reserve to meet unforeseen or short notice challenges. Underpinning these problems is the thrust of US strategy that drives the military to match its responsibilities without funding a force capable of meeting wider commitments.

The author concludes by acknowledging that, although it is easy to see a solution to the military's problems, politically it will be difficult because the solution involves either cutting back on commitments, providing additional funding and volunteers, or turning to a military personnel solution that does not rely on voluntary enlistment.

Article Title 'The Cody Conference: Discussing the War on Terrorism and the Future of SF'

Author Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert,
Commander of the JFK Special Warfare
Center and School

Publication Details *Special Warfare*, May 2004, vol. 16, no. 4,
pp. 20–7

Synopsis

In January 2004, a cross-section of military, academic and policy thinkers gathered in Cody, Wyoming, to 'identify concepts that will be necessary for shaping the future of United States Army special forces', especially in the context of the Global War on Terror. This article captures many aspects of the discussion, and identifies areas for further study and possible options for personnel policy, force structure and intelligence capabilities.

Most importantly, the article explores SF responses to terrorism through a paradigm of national power called MIDLIFE (Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Financial, Economic). One outcome of this shift is the recognition that 'global perceptions and cooperation *do* matter.' Another is that SF operators, including the command hierarchy, must become much more knowledgeable about the regions in which they operate.

Other suggestions include creating a deployable SF HQ; questioning basic recruitment, training and educational assumptions; and equipping the soldier with the best intelligence and materiel. There is also a need to develop doctrine in order to encompass interagency and counterinsurgency operations and guerrilla warfare ‘to better address course-of-action development in an operational environment that comprises disparate adversaries.’

Article Title	‘Redrawing the Map of the Future’
Author	P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel
Publication Details	<i>World Policy Journal</i> , vol. XXI, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 15–21

Synopsis

In this article, the authors argue the need for a new ‘map’ or ‘frame of reference’ in which to view the current international political environment. They highlight a number of disturbing international trends that, if left unchecked, will likely ‘come back to haunt us in the coming decades’. In order to counter these threats, the world’s advanced states will have to develop new approaches.

New developments include:

- the changing demographics of cities and the rise of ‘feral’ cities in states and regions inextricably linked to the process of globalisation;
- new patterns of world order and disorder linked to significant changes in the globe’s physical, economic, cultural and political geography;
- new patterns of cooperation and discord, as exemplified by the drawing together of Central and Western Europe toward an enlarging European Union, and the distancing of North Africa from Africa and the Middle East towards a larger Euro-Mediterranean community;
- the emergence of a range of non-traditional security issues that have long plagued the developing world but that traditional state-centric strategists have consigned to non-state entities such as the United Nations; and
- The above include the emergence of anarchy, government collapse, ethnic rivalry, cultural grievances, religious–ideological extremism, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, competition for economic resources, drug trafficking, alliances between drug

traffickers and terrorists, the proliferation of inhumane weapons, cyberwar and the spread of infectious disease.

Such issues will increasingly affect the policy decisions and options open to developed states. Strategic analysts will need to develop a broader understanding of security concerns. The assumption that states and governments are the sole guarantors of security will be increasingly challenged. Security will depend on how states and societies cope with the broader human dilemma.

The authors argue that states affected by these issues are already entwined in the globalisation process. Since security will be closely linked to domestic governance shortcomings elsewhere, there will be a need to encourage internal public-sector reform and public-security improvements in states under threat. We also need to organise better the efforts of all the actors in the international community: governments, international organisations, international non-government organisations, national civil society organisations, and for-profit corporations. Security analysts must address worrisome trends, but this should be seen as a security investment rather than a security intervention.

Article Title	‘Plan of Attack’
Author	Bruce Hoffman
Publication Details	<i>The Atlantic Monthly</i> , vol. 294, no. 1, July/August 2004, pp. 42–3

Synopsis

Bruce Hoffman, acting director of the RAND Corporation’s Center for Middle East Public Policy and senior fellow at the US Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center, argues that the United States must adapt and relearn the lessons of the past if it is to defeat insurgents in its present and future conflicts.

Hoffman begins by highlighting the United States’ frustration in that it has killed and captured significant numbers of insurgents, and has collected sizeable quantities of weapons, but it does not know if this success equates to winning. The author observes that the United States has been slow to learn from its counterinsurgency experiences, and from work by various think tanks and military historians. On the other hand, the insurgents have learnt and have acted much more quickly.

Hoffman provides some useful insights into counterinsurgencies. First, counterinsurgency is primarily political rather than military in nature. Second, early diagnosis can stifle an armed insurrection. Third, the enemy must be understood in advance. Fourth, emphasising up-to-the-minute intelligence makes for workable action plans. Failure to understand these insights gives the insurgents time to entrench and solidify their efforts, and increases the amount of treasure and blood that will be lost in fighting them.

The rest of the article examines the military side, noting that the lack of ‘actionable intelligence’ is a significant failure in Iraq. Hoffman highlights the inability of the United States to define how many insurgents are present, who they are and their organisational structures. However, Hoffman points out that experiences with terrorists in Europe (specifically in Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) in the 1970s and the 1980s indicate that small numbers of terrorists can create long-term security concerns. Insurgents do not have to defeat their opponents; they just need to avoid losing.

Finally, Hoffman disagrees with General Abizaid’s assessment that Iraq demonstrates the features of a classic guerrilla campaign. Rather, he suggests that the insurgency is a manifestation of ‘netwar’. It is war fought by insurgents with no hierarchy, no territorial ambitions and no unifying ideology. In order for the United States to win, Hoffman suggests creating an indigenous intelligence system to help manage events, cooperating better with local police and improving the use of area specialists.

Article Title	‘America Unlimited: The Radical Sources of the Bush Doctrine’
Author	Karl E. Meyer
Publication Details	<i>World Policy Journal</i> , vol. 24, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 1–13

Synopsis

The author is a critic of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy and argues that a ‘radical new doctrine’ has swept through Washington. The effects of this doctrine can be clearly discerned in the war in Iraq and its aftermath. The essential characteristic of the doctrine is that, for the first time, the United States is claiming the self-validating right to wage wars

of choice. This approach is not only justified on the grounds of potential future threats to national security, but seeks to promote and implant a political and economic system that is deemed acceptable to the administration.

Meyer is critical of a president who, showing scant interest in foreign affairs before his inauguration, has now transformed himself into an ‘avenging warrior’, assuming a bold role as the leader of an ideological campaign to democratise Islamic countries. He is also critical of President Bush’s ‘close-knit group of advisers’, who hold the conviction that America possesses not only the means, but also the moral authority, to eliminate its adversaries and to do so alone if necessary.

The author claims that this new outlook is enshrined in the state paper, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS), promulgated on 19 September 2002. This paper is notable for its global aspirations and, more importantly, for its absence of any limits. The NSS claims that the United States must sustain beyond challenge its unparalleled supremacy in order to counter the terrorist threat, and to expand democracy and free markets. Most striking, however, is the affirmation of America’s right to wage preventative or pre-emptive war.

Meyer is disturbed not by the doctrine’s declared goals but by the absence of any harness on America’s interventions and by the shallow reasoning advanced by the Bush Administration to justify a unilateral resort to force. Meyer supported President Bush’s intervention in Afghanistan but argues that Iraq is a different case. Iraq was different because Washington failed to establish a credible *casus belli*. The Bush team showed perfunctory concern with rebuilding a shattered country and the United Nations was not only bypassed but scorned.

The author points out that the assertion of a presidential right to determine when a peril justifies armed intervention has an unhappy modern parallel: that of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1979. During this period, Soviet leaders advanced similar reasoning to sanction assaults on other nominally independent states, ‘repeatedly conjuring hostile plots that had to be foiled’. This approach resulted in the annexation of the Baltic states, suppression of the Hungarian revolution, the suppression of Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring and the invasion of Afghanistan.

- Article Title** 'The Terrorism to Come'
- Author** Walter Laqueur
- Publication Details** *Policy Review*, issue 126,
August/September 2004, pp. 49–64

Synopsis

In this article, Walter Laqueur, the co-chair of the International Research Council at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, examines the modern phenomenon of terrorism. He notes that, while the latest bout of international terrorism has created endless debate, the subject has long roots that are frequently ignored in contemporary discussions. Shallow understanding leads to alluring but largely erroneous claims that all terrorism has its roots in poverty, unemployment, backwardness and inequality, and that terrorism is, at root, essentially a social or economic problem. Laqueur suggests that, while poverty and youth unemployment may provide the social and psychological climate in which some forms of extremist religious belief may flourish, the threat of terrorism comes from a much broader range of nationalist, ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts for which there are no simple solutions.

The real roots of terrorism are complex, and each set of circumstances is sufficiently different to defy generalisations and simplistic analyses. Laqueur suggests that it is risky to make predictions on the future course of terrorism. While Islamist terrorism all but monopolises current attention, history suggests that all fanatical movements evolve, change, disappear or perhaps reappear in another form. In the immediate future, however, the West has to combat the forms of international terrorism that it faces today. These forms may grow, especially in a Europe, which may be the West's most vulnerable battlefield.

With its mix of relative freedom, growing Muslim communities and legal limits on policing and law enforcement, Western Europe has become the main base for terrorist support groups. These conditions provide terrorists with a freedom of action that few other regions offer. When democratic states face an opponent that does not abide by the laws and rules of civilised society, they face a true asymmetric threat, which places them at a severe, and perhaps fatal, disadvantage. For these states, the most effective solution is to launch an anti-terrorist campaign by applying overwhelming and massive force. However, for these states, this approach is invariably unpopular with the public. On the other hand, terrorists walk a tight line between striking blows that advance their cause but without

threatening those vital interests that may invoke the type of massive counterblow that could destroy them.

These conflicting priorities—the application of effective countermeasures versus the need to preserve the hard-won freedoms of Western democratic society—pose a dilemma for all Western democracies. Any response to a terrorist threat must be proportional. However, the problem that Western governments face today is that mega-terrorism, with its use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, increases the threat by placing ever-more destructive weapons in the fanatical hands of smaller and smaller groups. Whether terrorist groups will take this cataclysmic step is uncertain but the author concludes that ‘there can be no victory, only an uphill struggle, at times successful, at others not’.