



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.



Publication Title	<i>Australia's Maritime Strategy</i>
Author	Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Publication	The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, June 2004, < http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/maritime/report.htm >

Synopsis

This important publication delves into the need for a comprehensive maritime strategy for Australia's defence forces. The report declares from the outset that:

Maritime strategies are significant in military planning because they provide the means to apply power flexibly over a range of contingencies and areas. Modern maritime strategy involves air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control. The role and influence of maritime strategies are therefore a significant feature of credible military strategies.

The inquiry declares the need for a National Security Strategy (NSS), which would articulate the interrelationships for the diverse elements of Australia's national power and their inputs for national security—a declaration of 'grand strategy' over and above 'military strategy'.

Of highest need is an ongoing Defence White Paper process, looking at 'the need for flexible joint forces capable of littoral manoeuvre'. Other key recommendations include:

- a declaration outlining the Army sustainment model;
- a thorough examination of Defence Reserves policy;
- a reassessment of air combat capabilities, including increasing Australia's air-to-air refuelling options;
- an examination of whether the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the best option for replacing the existing fast-jet fleets, given increasing development delays and cost overruns, compared to maintaining F/A-18 and F1-11 lifespans and evolving their capabilities; and
- the need for STOVL capability in any fast-jet replacement options.

The report concludes that the ability to project, protect and sustain amphibious forces in the region and globally requires redressing the imbalances created by the Defence of Australia focus, as evidenced in the operations in East Timor. To achieve this goal, government must address the chronic under-resourcing of Defence.

Article Title 'Distributed Operations: From the Sea'

Author Brigadier General Robert E. Schmidle,
Director, Expeditionary Force Development
Centre, Quantico

Publication Details *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 88, issue 7,
July 2004, pp. 37–41

Synopsis

Distributed Operations is a new concept being developed by the USMC in order to meet the evolving challenges of 21st-century warfare. The concept builds on the ideas put forward in the USMC document *Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea (OMFTS)* and is also intended as a response to recent changes in the international security environment. In addition, together with *OMFTS*, the new concept aims to position the USMC as the immediate response capability of choice for joint commanders, especially in military operations in littoral areas. The author makes clear his intent to use his article as a means of promoting professional debate about the concept of Distributed Operations in order to adapt it to operational requirements.

The concept of Distributed Operations responds to the type of amorphous adversaries faced by US Forces in conflicts such as those in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and the ongoing stability operations in Iraq. The focus is on the ability to field joint forces with capabilities that allow them to conduct decentralised and nonlinear operations in complex terrain, such as that encountered in most littoral regions of the world, including urban and mountainous terrain. The concept aims to be able to field physically dispersed and networked forces that range in size from a squad to a battalion within an extended battlespace. These forces will be used to dislocate and disorient opponents rapidly, rather than the United States relying on operations characterised by the traditional logistic intensive build-up of overwhelming numbers.

The key to successful implementation of Distributed Operations is a range of enhancements in capabilities, such as command and control, intelligence, precision fires, mobility, sustainment, and training and education. The body of the article contemplates how these capabilities might be employed to improve the speed, flexibility and agility of the USMC's air-ground taskforce units.

Article Title 'Defence and the Universities in the 21st Century'

Author Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely,
Commander Regional Forces, Land
Command, United Kingdom

Publication Details *RUSI Journal*, vol. 149, no. 3, June 2004,
pp. 34–9

Synopsis

The relationship between the British armed forces and institutions of higher education dates back over one hundred years. In this article the author acknowledges that history, and looks at how the challenges of the 21st century will alter and develop the relationship between the armed services and institutions of higher education. The author believes that, in the future, the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the universities will be guided by alterations in the strategic environment that require defence personnel to be able to think laterally and use their imaginations. Changes in the nature of military operations and the use of armed force will also require personnel of ranks to be better educated overall, not just technologically proficient.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) wants to ensure that the relationship between Defence and higher education continues to be fruitful. To this end, MoD has developed, and remains interested in, exploring ways for funding technological research programs and a range of educational schemes aimed at recruiting and retaining the type of personnel that the armed forces will need to operate in the 21st-century security environment. The article outlines some of these programs and suggests other areas for future expansion.

- Article Title** 'Don't Take Canberra for Granted: The Future of the US–Australian Alliance'
- Author** Michael Horowitz, Graduate Student at the Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University
- Publication Details** *Orbis*, vol. 48, no. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 465–78

Synopsis

Horowitz's article provides an American perspective on the alliance between Australia and the United States, and contains many interesting insights into how Australian foreign and defence policy are viewed from the other side of the Pacific. The author traces the development of these two strands of Australian national policy from the 1987 Dibb Review through to intervention in East Timor, 11 September and the Global War on Terror. Any Australians reading Horowitz might be surprised by the extent to which his analysis indicates China as a powerful force motivating Australia's relationship, not only with the United States, but also with its regional neighbours. Some factors highlighted in the article have been overtaken by events. For example, Horowitz speculates on the consequences of a failure by the United States Congress to pass the US–Australian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Bill. Of course, the FTA has now been passed in Congress and, even with Labor's hesitations, seems set to gain the approval of the Australian Parliament.

The author also makes several comments about what he calls 'Australian Defence Transformation'. Interestingly, he believes that the United States must provide both financial and technical assistance to the Australian Defence Force in order to ensure that Defence Transformation does not stall. Closely related to the area of Defence Transformation is Horowitz's discussion of the War on Terror. He believes that Australia has most to offer the alliance in this area through its knowledge of South-East Asia. He also points out how Australia has already made progress in the region through its assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines with their national counterterrorism efforts.

Ultimately, Horowitz believes that Australia will be able to achieve its security goals, both regional and global, through maintaining a close relationship with the United States. He concludes the article by making a number of recommendations about what needs to be done by both nations before they go to the polls later this year.

Article Title 'Clausewitz and Low-intensity Conflict'

Author Stuart Kinross

Publication Details *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 27.
no.1, March 2004, pp. 35–58

Synopsis

This article highlights the relevance of Clausewitzian thought in the conduct of low-intensity conflict (LIC). Despite significant changes in the traditional notions of war—particularly the rise of non-state actors since the end of the Cold War—Clausewitz's 1827 work *On War* remains important.

Kinross refutes Martin van Creveld's opinion that the Clausewitzian trinitarian war is no longer applicable by contesting van Creveld's understanding of the Clausewitzian triad. While van Creveld understands the three elements to be people, government and military, the fundamental truth—according to Edward Villacres and Christopher Bassford, as quoted by Kinross—has been misinterpreted. Clausewitz's trinity combined these three elements: primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and war's subordination, as an instrument of policy.

Edward Luttwak's critique of a Clausewitzian approach to LIC, however, was more concerned with the West dealing with its ability to reconcile taking casualties, being faced more often by aggressively inspired nationalistic and culturally defensive groups. History reveals that these similar concerns plagued Romans in the first century AD. Luttwak posits that Clausewitz was too bound by Napoleonic strictures, ignoring Clausewitz's admonition that the nature of conflict is never permanent.

According to Kinross, John Keegan is the weakest of Clausewitzian critics. Keegan's failing is his erroneous assumption that man is not an Aristotelian 'political animal' but a prisoner of primitive instinct. Keegan believes that peacekeeping is a matter of repulsion of war, as opposed to a means of ensuring political, military, economic and social stability. Kinross declares that Keegan's failing is not his understanding of history but a lack of ability to think conceptually.

It is generally understood that Clausewitz's main focus has been on the physical destruction of the enemy. In reality, however, Kinross locates in Clausewitz the recognition that the morale of the enemy's forces and its

people are seen of equal significance. Using al-Qa'ida as an example, while the West has overwhelmingly greater technological and economic capability, the miscalculation of the social aspects of al-Qa'ida's strength and conviction need to be considered within the wider strategic situation of diplomatic, economic and social factors.

Kinross' final section pertains to the relevance of LIC in American doctrine. Despite the US Marine Corps' publication of its *Small Wars Manual* in 1940 outlining the practice of LIC, it was not until the Kennedy administration that the United States applied a concerted interest in the counterinsurgency phenomenon. The Cold War also impacted on the deficiency of the West's understanding and application of low-intensity conflict. Some argue that it is Clausewitz' malign influence upon the future of warfare, as suggested by Luttwak, that is problematic. Kinross states that is rather more a question of inflexibility of the West to adapt to the post-Cold War strategic climate. In conclusion, despite the ways that Clausewitz has been interpreted and re-interpreted, his relevance remains as important as ever.

Article Title	'Operation <i>Iraqi Freedom</i> and the Challenges to Intelligence: Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs'
Author	William Nolte
Publication Details	<i>Studies in Intelligence: Journal of the American Intelligence Professional</i> , vol. 48, no. 1, < http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no1/article01.html >

Synopsis

This lengthy article provides an in-depth analysis of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), using Iraq as a case study. The author claims that in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF), the world witnessed a progress report on the RMA, that OIF occurred in the midst of the RMA.

Of most concern to the author, however, is the challenge that the RMA poses to other components of American national security, including intelligence, to undergo transformation. They must develop apace with the RMA or suffer the risk that intelligence and diplomacy will be unable

to contribute to, or compete with, defence organisations in the making of national security decisions. Accordingly, the author argues for an accompanying Revolution in Intelligence Affairs (RIA).

The author is positive about the performance of US forces in Iraq. He argues that, at every step, OIF demonstrated organisational and operational success enabled by technology. The author believes that, due to the RMA, at the point of attack the US military functioned as an emulated network, harnessing information in volumes and at speeds unprecedented in the history of warfare and encouraging behaviours that took advantage of that information. One lesson learnt from the RMA is the need to focus less on structure and more on behaviour. The ability to adapt makes a qualitative shift and becomes capacity for intended improvisation.

The author argues that the RMA will ride on technology and on the degree of technical development in transmission, storage and management of information. This is the same technology on which any prospective revolution in intelligence affairs will depend. He stresses the need for the RMA to take place within a balanced national security strategy, in which all elements of security—including military, diplomacy, intelligence and the additional components engaged in the homeland security edifice created after 11 September 2001—proceed apace.

Whether or not OIF achieved the touted ‘shock and awe’ is an open question, the author argues that it did produce confusion and a misinterpretation of American goals and capabilities. This may be true of the operational phase of the war in Iraq; however, the author largely ignores the counterinsurgency issues that have emerged since the end of combat operations. He asserts that the United States may have underestimated the degree to which Iraqis, either regime hardliners or simple criminals, would destroy their own infrastructure. Further, the United States may not have been prepared for the truly revolutionary event in which an invading (and conquering) army needs to be succeeded by an occupation force of equal or even larger size. While it may be difficult to plan for the unprecedented, the focus of this article is very much on the warfighting phase of operations in Iraq and the new modes of warfare that emerged from the conflict.

Article Title 'In the Crosshairs: USMC Snipers in Iraq'

Author Ross W. Simpson

Publication Details *Leatherneck*, vol. 87, no. 6, June 2004, pp. 24–27

Synopsis

The author—an embedded reporter with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment—provides a personalised account of the role and tasks of US Marine Scout – Sniper Platoon in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. The US Marine sniper teams operate in a sniper–observer pair and can be equipped with either the 7.62 mm M40A1 sniper rifle or the .50-calibre M82A1 anti-materiel rifle. In the opening operations of the war, during the advance to Baghdad, the snipers undertook a range of tasks including the provision of observation and security, as well as providing long-range direct-fire support against 'hard' targets. Engagements described in the article, mostly in desert terrain, occurred out to 800 m.

In later operations in and around Baghdad and Fallujah, the sniper teams were more often employed in establishing 'urban hides' to dominate areas, suppress Iraqi gunmen and engage high-priority targets such as operators of rocket-propelled grenades. Typical engagements described in these urban areas occurred at ranges under 300 m but could extend out to 900 m. The article concludes that the Marine scout–sniper teams continue to fulfil a vital role in the security operations since the end of formal hostilities and are a key asset in counterinsurgency operations.

Article Title 'Beyond Fallujah'

Author Patrick Graham

Publication Details *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 308, issue 1849, June 2004, pp. 37–48

Synopsis

Patrick Graham's article provides a journalist's eyewitness account of a year with the Iraqi Resistance. Graham's account is a personal commentary on the views, thoughts and hopes of a group of Iraqis from the Fallujah area that have decided to resist the Occupation.

Graham claims that the West is wrong about the anatomy of the Iraqi Resistance. He claims that Saddam is irrelevant and that there are few foreign fighters. With most participants in a tribal uprising controlled by religious leaders, clan loyalty helps to unite the various factions to defeat a common enemy. Graham indicates that the Resistance has gained local support, resulting in almost daily attacks on the occupation forces. On another level, Graham provides anecdotes that give an insight into the culture, hopes, aspirations and fears of these Sunni Iraqis and of Occupation Force actions that have prompted the resistance.

Article Title	‘Semper Sensitive: the Marine’s guide to Arab culture’
Author	USMC Division Schools
Publication Details	<i>Harper’s Magazine</i> , vol. 308, issue 1849, June 2004, pp. 25–6

Synopsis

This one-and-a-half page extract provides a ‘how to’ guide for soldiers to deal with Arab culture generally and Iraqi’s in particular. The topics discussed are greetings, physical contact, gestures, hospitality, respect, law, reality and a group of miscellaneous topics.

Examples of the advice contained in the article are as follows:

- every Iraqi should be treated as if he were a colonel;
- the Western halt signal means ‘hello’ rather than ‘stop’;
- the family is the bedrock of Arab society and thus they value family honour, with their individual actions reflecting on the family as a whole;
- no sunglasses should be worn when speaking to Iraqis;
- Iraqi decisions are made by the group, but can be expedited by asking the senior member what he would do;
- while showing family photos is a good way to open relations, do not show photos of the wife in shorts (doing so indicates a lack of respect for women);

- shame is an active force—one to be publicly avoided;
- safety is a foreign concept—everything happens because of Allah; and
- they never forget a wrong or good deed done.