



# **Senior Officer Professional Digest**

**Selected readings from the world's military journals**

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### **The CA's Introduction**

**Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.**



<b>Book Title</b>	<i>Field Artillery and Firepower</i>
<b>Author</b>	Major General J. B. A. Bailey
<b>Publication Details</b>	Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2004, 633pp.

### Synopsis

When this book was first written in 1989, by the then Major Jonathan Bailey of the Royal Artillery, it rapidly became known as the best single source on field artillery in the English language. Bailey's brilliant study did for field artillery what Richard Simpkin's work did for armour in the latter's classic 1979 study, *Tank Warfare*. Fifteen years on, Bailey, now a British major general, has produced a second edition that has been updated to explain the use of artillery firepower in the information age.

Non-artillerists should not be put off by the expert technical detail of General Bailey's sweeping study. This is the kind of book that, because of its subject matter, involves the author in a wide-ranging survey of modern warfare. As a result, used intelligently by the non-specialist, Bailey's work is capable of yielding a treasure trove of insights of great value to every military professional and to serious students of military operations. Of particular interest to uniformed practitioners will be General Bailey's observations on the future of war in parts one and four of the book.

In the first edition of *Field Artillery and Firepower*, Bailey observed that 'the significance of the deep battle will soon be comparable with that of the close battle of forty or seventy years ago; and artillery will be judged in future primarily by its performance in this engagement, not in close support'. The veracity of this observation has grown over the last decade and a half. Prior to 1914 armed conflict was essentially a two-dimensional, linear encounter. What mattered was the resolution of the close battle in pitched combat. World War I changed this situation in that close battle became siege-like and was characterised by bloody stalemate. In 1917–18, the advent of a military revolution based on accurate indirect artillery fire made progress possible by enabling the simultaneous engagement of targets throughout the two-dimensional area of the battlefield by way of the third dimension: the deep battle.

During the Cold War era, the deep battle was seen as the facilitator of the decisive close battle, but in the post-Cold War period, the deep battle increasingly came to be seen as the potentially decisive one. For Bailey this reality too is now changing as critical targets are now to be found

throughout the volume of all three dimensions of the battlespace. He notes:

Just as indirect fire dominated warfare of the twentieth century, which ended with the predominance of the deep battle over the close, so the early 21st century will see the development of new systems to engage targets directly 'above' in the third dimension, and with many sources of fire simultaneously throughout the battlespace.

As a result, perhaps the main difficulty facing Western armies today is the need to balance resources and weapons systems for both close and deep battle as well as retaining adequate combined-arms capability. The author predicts an increased role for artillery in the delivery of joint effects, re-emphasising his 1989 view that indirect-fire systems based on rapidly developing technologies are likely to become the most important on the battlefield. Moreover, surface-to-surface artillery will be a critical component of an ever more complex joint system of fires.

Bailey undertakes an excellent analysis of the significance of the emergence of the battlespace. He notes that, while in the Cold War, the battlefield was rigidly structured — with NATO adopting a linear defence for close, deep and rear battle — after the end of the Cold War, linear deployments became less relevant. Using the terms Close, Deep and Rear in ways that referred to specific, quantifiable space became unsatisfactory. In the 1990s, the idea of the battlefield was replaced by that of the battlespace, incorporating the third dimension of munitions, manned and unmanned aircraft and the electromagnetic spectrum.

The notion of volumetric depth came to be seen as the principal means of overwhelming an opponent by using multiple types of attack or 'multidimensional simultaneity'. Using indirect fire, a successfully executed deep battle shapes the close battle and helps obviate the need for a costly encounter between manoeuvre forces. For this reason, long-range precision attack systems have become popular in advanced armies. Attack helicopters, aircraft and rockets, and, in the future, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have the potential to shape the battlespace in a way that saves lives when the close encounter is joined.

Reflecting on contemporary military theory, Bailey observes that the operational aim is no longer to fight sequential battles against predictably advancing echelons of a Soviet-style enemy, but to be able to engage targets throughout the battlespace simultaneously. The objectives are to use multidimensional fires to maximise shock and disruption, and to

leverage accumulated pressures against the will of the enemy commander. Bailey believes that such systems as ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance), GPS (Global Positioning System) and UAVs alongside networked combined-arms teams of manned and robotic ground systems will change the way in which armies will deliver the effects of fire.

The advent of new precision air–ground RMA-style technologies will, Bailey believes, reshape battlespace geometry as radically as indirect fire in the early 20th century. The adoption of precise systems on land and in the air promises to transform the way in which land warfare is conceived. Bailey observes:

The new technologies of precision will . . . expand the land component's battlespace . . . into the third dimension, making the 'above' as vital as 'close', 'deep', and 'rear'. High-payoff moving targets will increasingly be located in three dimensions and require precise engagement by responsive fire systems.

The author notes that in the Second Gulf War of 2003, air interdiction, close air support, artillery fire and ground manoeuvre were all integrated while the role of individual soldiers became of increased value in calling for fire. The management of time has also emerged as a key issue in warfighting, becoming the fourth dimension of the battlespace.

Mastery of the battlespace by precision fire and manoeuvre must inevitably face the contraction of vital time. As Bailey puts it, 'seizing and holding the initiative is to time as seizing and holding vital ground is to maneuver. Pegging out the boundaries of this battlespace and turning the attrition of time on an opponent is an accomplishment of strategic command and operational art, but a daunting task'.

The premium on time places a requirement for the application of massed effects from all weapons systems and for decisive outcomes at all levels of war in order to weaken an opponent's will. Command skills are likely to lie not so much in massing fires, but in controlling ISTAR resources and bringing a mass of precise effects to bear against enemy targets in an efficient manner. Warfighting is likely to fuse manoeuvre with fire, with digitisation permitting seamless engagement of targets. The electromagnetic character of the battlespace will place a premium on bandwidth. The requirement of bandwidth for communication and information systems and for 'sensors to shooters' is likely to be as vital to operational success as a steady supply of fuel and ammunition.

Finally, the author emphasises that the application of military force in the future will also be joint service in character. Separate land, maritime and air components may continue as the providers of capabilities, but commanders will increasingly be joint commanders of specifically packaged forces with appropriate headquarters. As such they will need speedy access to a full spectrum of effects supplied by all systems, whether hand-held or from satellites.

Bailey believes that the trend towards joint warfare is likely to accelerate in the years ahead. This trend will create a situation in which a combination of precision weapons, information networks and robotics will continue to expand the battlespace, thus altering the relationships between the arms and services. ‘Joint activities’, predicts Bailey, ‘will become ever more integrated in the coming decades, to the extent that the term joint, which entails cooperation between separate entities, may come to seem an underestimation of the fundamental new relationships’.

**Article Title** ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: UK Defence White Paper 2003’

**Author** Ted Hooton

**Publication Details** *Military Technology*, vol. 28, no. 2, February 2004, pp. 76–8

### **Synopsis**

This article is critical of the new UK MoD Defence White Paper, calling it a triumph of style over substance. The author believes that the post– 11 September security environment has created a situation in which there have been a number of irrelevant and petty changes to bureaucratic regulations and radical changes to defence policy that have had a marginal impact on the war on terror.

Five years ago the United Kingdom produced the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), its post–Cold War defence policy. 11 September was the rationale to modify SDR policies in order to improve their effectiveness against terrorism. The ‘New Chapter’ of the SDR was launched in December 2003 in two documents:

The Defence White Paper, *Delivering Security in a Changing World*, and a National Audit Office Report, *Operation Telic — UK Military Operations in Iraq*.

The White Paper identifies security threats such as WMD in the hands of unstable regimes or terrorists. It also states that the United Kingdom will project forces further afield than was envisaged in the SDR, noting that it will not make a contribution to every international crisis and that it will not be involved in coalitions as a matter of course. Hooton believes that this means that the United Kingdom will no longer protect its interests unilaterally — that is there will be no more campaigns like that in the Falklands.

While coalitions have been an increasing feature of UK defence policy since the 1950s, Hooton points out that the White Paper and public statements by government officials play up aspects such as the close military relationship with the United States, while playing down cooperation in UN sponsored operations. Such a stance is heresy for the United Kingdom's European Union partners, especially as the close relationship with the United States seems to yield little real influence in political or military terms.

So far as procurement is concerned, Hooton sees more 'aping' of US trends, as the United Kingdom moves to equip its forces as lighter formations for more mobile operations. Much of these new procurements will be funded by retiring legacy systems and reducing existing programs such as the Type 45 destroyer program from twelve to eight ships or abandoning the purchase of a further eighty-eight TYPHOON aircraft. The objective is to provide the UK Forces with a net-centric capability based on precision munitions and enhanced strategic mobility. All of this is to be achieved within a defence budget that is effectively capped. However, as Hooton observes with reference to the state of the three services, this may be a bad time to starve them of funding.

The RAF, for example, currently has fewer front-line aircraft than are held in RAF Museums. Many of these airframes are twenty to thirty years old and pilot numbers are down. The rumoured cancellation of the TYPHOON purchase seems strange since these aircraft have greater air-to-ground capability than the JSF and better range and payload. The Navy's surface fleet is being reduced — a trend that is now three decades old. The future carrier program may be forced to reduce the size of the class from two 65 000 tonne ships to 45 000–50 000 tonne vessels. This

in turn will limit the number of aircraft on each carrier from fifty on the larger vessels to thirty–forty on the smaller ones. Similar trends can be seen in the submarine fleet and also with surface combatants. The Army will become a high-tech fighting force, but its ability to conduct peace support and stability operations may suffer unless the government intends to give a greater role to the Territorial Army.

Hooton concludes by pointing out the logistic and materiel problems faced in *Telic* and other recent operations, suggesting that important lessons have not been learnt after a decade of relatively high-tempo operations involving all three services. The British taxpayer, says Hooton, can have little confidence that, when their forces are next sent into action, they will have adequate support.

**Article Title** ‘The Law of War in the War on Terror’

**Author** Kenneth Roth, Executive Director,  
Human Rights Watch

**Publication Details** *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, issue 1,  
January–February 2004, pp. 2–7

### Synopsis

Kenneth Roth’s article provides a timely discussion of the rules of law that apply to the War on Terror. He begins by asking, *What are the boundaries of the Bush Administrations’s ‘war on terror?’*. This conflict has included both wars against states — Afghanistan and Iraq — and a broader ‘war’ against terrorist organisations, in particular al Qa’ida. Roth believes that Bush considers that the ‘War on Terror’ is as real as any war against a state, thus deducing that the use of ‘war rhetoric’ provides the necessary justification to detain or kill suspects without trial.

The author goes on to discuss the two sets of rules that apply through the cycle of conflict: ‘law enforcement rules’ and ‘rules of war’. Each is backed by a range of international and domestic laws, broadly applicable across the globe. This leads to Roth’s concern: there is little or no guidance to explain exactly when one set of rules apply. Roth looks to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the ‘custodian’ of the Geneva Conventions, to provide the necessary guidance. The ICRC offers three tests: the intensity of hostilities in a given situation, whether the

conflict is politically motivated, and the nature of the participants. The evidence provided by Roth indicates that, when assessing the War on Terror, it is not clear that ‘rules of war’ should apply.

Roth highlights five ‘hard cases’ to illustrate the difficulty of applying the ‘rules of war’ when ‘law enforcement rules’ might have sufficed: Jose Padilla, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a group of six Algerians and a group in Malawi. In the cases of Padilla and al-Marri, potentially cases of illegal detention, neither man posed an imminent threat that would justify the use of lethal force (even under ‘law enforcement rules’); both have been detained as ‘enemy combatants’. Al-Harethi was killed in a Predator strike in Yemen in November 2002. Roth highlights that al-Harethi, while implicated in the USS *Cole* incident of 2000, may no longer have been a ‘current combatant’, which is his right under the ‘rules of war’, and, as such, might not have been killed lawfully; the author suggests that this may be murder. The case of the two groups highlights the significant problem of the ‘rules of evidence’; in neither case was there sufficient evidence to try those held, but both groups were eventually turned over to the United States for interrogation and incarceration.

Roth also provides a synopsis of the US justification for their approach to the War on Terror. While a limited analysis, it provides a useful start point for understanding their legal approach. He offers a three-part test to apply in the current security situation. First, prove that an organised group is directing repeated acts of violence of such intensity that it can be fairly recognised as an armed conflict. Second, prove that the suspect is an active member of the opposing force or an active participant in violence. Third, that ‘law enforcement rules’ are unavailable. Roth concludes by advising that the United States should use caution before suspending due process, and that, in efforts at improving security, the United States risks the freedoms it espouses.

**Article Title** 'Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq'

**Author** Steven Metz

**Publication Details** *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 1, Winter 2003–4, pp. 25–36

### **Synopsis**

This paper explores the factors behind the current insurgency in Iraq and identifies some of the issues, problems and risks for the United States if it is to establish a stable Iraq. The paper argues that the initial success and persistence of the Iraqi insurgency is based on an underestimation of the difficulties in securing, stabilising and reconstructing Iraq. Compounding this underestimation are the conditions in Iraq, which allows insurgency to flourish. With its long open borders, lack of infrastructure, the appeal of radical Islam, and widespread apathy of those cowered by the former totalitarian regime and one harbouring a resentment to outsiders — especially non-Muslims — Iraq is a fertile breeding ground and focal point for various dissident elements. This complex environment makes any United States response fraught with danger.

While historical precedents provide some understanding of the United States problem, the current Iraqi insurgency is sufficiently different to suggest that it is very much a modern phenomenon. The current groups combating the United States coalition offer no real alternatives and they have little chance of matching the coalition forces but they do not need to. Because the governing forces are not indigenous, they have the option of leaving. This situation allows the insurgents to submerge themselves within the population while focussing their efforts on provoking a disproportionate response, and then manipulating the situation internally and externally to force a coalition withdrawal.

It is suggested that the keys to defeating the insurgency are first to admit the extent of the problem. Second, the United States has to acknowledge that it faces the dilemma of an insurgency aimed purely at removing its presence from the country; the only way for it to achieve its goals is to commit and remain in Iraq for several years, paying whatever the cost. To do so, however, will require a more integrated strategy, with the United States bureaucracy and its coalition partners addressing the full range of political, economic, social, cultural and military activities. Part of this strategy will be to break the linkages between the Iraqi insurgent and

affiliated or allied groups, especially organised crime. For this strategy to succeed, the United States would have to focus its efforts on two key battlespaces: intelligence and Iraqi perception. The problem of perception, however, is broader than just Iraq, and it has to be seen in the context of the regional and strategic issues of the Arab world but also the American people, who have to be convinced that success in Iraq is important to United States strategic interests.

Ultimately, the author concludes, there is no easy way out for the United States and its coalition partners, and they faces an intractable dilemma. In staying, the United States fuels the insurgency; by leaving prematurely, the United States will fail in its strategic objective. Only a comprehensive, coherent and long-term United States counterinsurgency strategy will provide the solution. Any other option will lead to failure and undermine the foundations of United States global strategy.

<b>Article Title</b>	‘Major Combat and Restoration Operations: A Discussion’
<b>Author</b>	Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, Commanding General JFK Special Warfare Centre and School
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Special Warfare</i> , vol. 16, no. 3, February 2004

### **Synopsis**

This article uses the case study of US Special Forces involvement in Panama in early the 1990s to highlight the importance of effective planning for the transition to peace. A serious flaw in the planning of the Panama operation was the lack of synchronisation between the invasion plan and the plan to restore a democratically elected government. This disconnection in the operational planning required the J5 staff at US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to do some serious ‘catch-up’ work, bringing in Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and SF planners in order to ensure that the objective of restoring democracy can be attained. In *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, John T. Fishel, concludes that the lack of a long-

term vision and strategy for the restoration of Panama created a situation in which the combat and restoration operations were less than successful.

Fishel highlights seven areas in which the planning for the Panama Operation failed:

- politico-military strategic objectives with clearly defined end-states;
- an interagency strategy expressed in terms of ends, ways and means (until this capability is developed, the military must lead the strategy-development process);
- unity of effort in the interagency environment;
- a campaign plan that links the strategic and operational levels, especially regarding civil-military operations (CMO) in all phases;
- effective CMO requires an interagency approach;
- the use of Reserves; and
- Adequate and timely funding of restoration operations.

In the light of the current problems with restoration or Phase IV operations in Iraq, these are still valid points. Four barriers to effective restoration planning in Iraq were, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- There was a lack of time to create the best blueprint for Phase IV.
- Dedicated Phase IV troops formations were designated too late and arrived in theatre too late.
- Phase IV planning was initiated too late.
- Revision of plans for combat operations limited the planner's focus and effort on Phase IV.

The author suggests that these problems are the result of continued adherence to Cold War planning scenarios (illustrated by a diagram), in which the focus of planning was survival. In the current international security environment, the United States and its allies are almost assured of victory in major combat operations. The sole superpower status of the United States means that planners can be much more discriminating in matters of targeting and also to look beyond the firing of the last bullet to determine desirable Phase IV end-states. The focus of planning (illustrated by another diagram) should now be on the restoration phase *first*, and then by reverse-sequence planning to the *major combat operations* that will support that end state.

In addition, as the sole superpower, the United States may now have the capacity to envelop the entire planet. By focusing on global and regional equilibriums as end states, it would be possible for the United States to identify preventative strategies (illustrated by a third diagram). The article concludes with the suggestion that it is time for planners to become more holistic and to look beyond major combat operations as they define success.

<b>Article Title</b>	‘Shift to a Global Perspective’
<b>Author</b>	General Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Naval War College Review</i> , vol. LVI, no. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 11–17

### **Synopsis**

General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argues that the US military must shift from a regional to a global view of the security environment in order to better understand and respond to current and emergent challenges. He argues that, in the past, America’s security needs were adequately served by having its uniformed leaders in Washington maintain a ‘global vision’ while the majority of US military organisations maintained a regional or functional focus. To provide effectively for defence in the 21st century, this dual focus must change and all levels of the US military organisation need to understand and appreciate the global perspective.

The author accepts that the past cannot be ignored, since it provides the foundation for understanding the focus and organisation of US armed forces today. To support this view, the article provides an excellent synopsis on how current command structures emerged and current command-and-control systems evolved. This evolution has two timeframes: the first from World War II and the second from the outset of the Cold War.

The combatant command structure has expanded both geographically and, over time, become empowered legally, giving rise to many regional commands. This process highlights the reality that having functions

dispersed can better fulfill some military missions and responsibilities. Regional combatant commands offer essential local expertise; they provide an enduring basis for US presence around the globe; they are the keys to successful theatre security cooperation; and they provide the basis for pursuing multinational interoperability and military coalitions.

However, General Myers argues that, given the dramatic shifts in global security, the impact of globalisation, and revolutionary advances in technology, regional strategies cannot address transnational issues such as terrorism. In the current security environment it is imperative that ‘seams’ or ‘discontinuities’ are avoided, where one command’s responsibilities end and another’s begin. The gaps, though often unavoidable, can become exploitable vulnerabilities. Another issue affecting defence structure debates concerns the supported–supporting relationships and the claim by many that functional combatant commands should always support regional commands. This issue is discussed at length.

To overcome these perceived shortcomings and to address the current security environment, a global approach is required. Defence professionals at all levels need to understand the security implications of these trends, and the author concludes that the challenge for US armed forces today is to balance regional responsibilities with the need to address missions that are global in nature.

**Article Title** ‘The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War’

**Author** Donald Chisholm

**Publication Details** *Parameters*, US Arm War College, vol. XXXIII, no. 4, Winter 2003–04, pp. 114–131

### **Synopsis**

This article explores the United States theory of ‘Rapid Dominance’, using this as emblematic of the wider range of reputedly ‘new’ ideas being examined by high-level United States defence policy-makers. ‘Rapid Dominance’ was proposed as a theory for the development of United States military power in the late 1990s, and it seeks a force characterised by ‘near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment’; ‘rapidity and timeliness of application’; ‘operational

brilliance in execution’; and ‘(near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment.’

The author argues that, while such theories are alluring to the United States, this thinking is flawed and risks lulling military decision-makers into taking an unduly optimistic approach to the conduct of war. To expose the problem he explores one of the several tenets on which this theory is based by examining the assumption that its best to attack enemy will directly. He suggests that social psychologists have long understood that human behaviour results from the complex interplay of motivation, capability and opportunity, but each is linked and cannot be addressed in isolation since all three must be present in order for behaviours to occur. Historically, warfare has focused on the degradation of an opponent’s capabilities or manipulating opportunities; Rapid Dominance strives to destroy the will.

Unfortunately the intentions and will of an enemy are harder to measure and they remain the least ‘knowable’ of the three pillars of behaviour. This is especially so in war when an enemy is rarely a single individual but is a group or groups operating at various levels, whether they are state- or non-state- based. Add to this the problem of cultural differences and it becomes all but impossible to measure with any accuracy or reliability the effect of targeting the will. The author then illustrates the difficulties inherent in this approach with a series of historical examples, which demonstrate the practical problems of applying a will-based military theory.

While not dismissing the importance of an opponent’s will, the author suggests that none of this is especially new and the importance of will can be traced to earlier theorists, notably Sun Tzu. In these theories, however, will was not meant to replace the focus on capabilities and opportunities but rather these were the means by which will was to be influenced.

Chisholm concludes that any theory based emphatically on attacking the will of an enemy is flawed. While previous theories have sought to shape an adversary’s will, this has been achieved by identifying their strengths and weaknesses, and exploiting these to attack their capabilities. He rebukes suggestions that this means returning to force-on-force attrition and of not exploiting the United States’ dominance in particular areas. Rather, he sees the necessity for continuing to exploit its advantages but by rendering ineffective an adversary’s capability to resist rather than optimistically seeking to manipulate motivations.

<b>Article Title</b>	‘Picking Up the Pieces: The UN’s Evolving Postconflict Roles’
<b>Author</b>	William J. Durch, Henry L. Stimson Centre
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> , vol. 26, issue 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 195–210

### Synopsis

Using the postconflict situation in Iraq as one example, the author, Co-Director of the Future of Peace Operations Project, argues the case for the presence of United Nations (UN) agencies in contributing to nation building after military intervention. The author claims that ‘the recent war against Saddam Hussein neither destroyed nor discredited the United Nations’. Instead, the example of Iraq has demonstrated that the UN has a political role to play.

The author acknowledges that, due to a decade of sanctions, the UN may not be popular among some Iraqis. The main enforcers of these sanctions — the United States and the United Kingdom — are not any more popular than the UN and they lack the years of experience in devising democratic education campaigns, giving electoral advice and conducting elections in war-torn countries. Further, because the United States tends to get involved militarily only when a heavy hand is needed, Americans tend to forget that the UN has a long record in securing postconflict governance outcomes.

UN operational, humanitarian, and political/development agencies faced a dilemma. As the Iraq war approached, should they prepare for war and risk further being tarred as ‘United States toadies’ by the UN’s majority, or await events and risk an avalanche of criticism should war trigger a major humanitarian emergency for which the system was unprepared? The UN decided to act instead of waiting. Operating under the authority of the UN’s humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, UN agencies were encouraged to liaise with coalition forces and to share information on humanitarian plans and intentions. UN personnel maintained a separate identity, both physically and organisationally, from coalition forces by not working from the same premises or inside the coalition’s Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC).

In a postconflict setting, the UN is much more than the Security Council. It is also a loosely structured, increasingly well-coordinated system of

agencies that protect refugees, distribute emergency food, immunise children, promote human rights, and organise peacekeepers as well as political advisers for states in distress or transition from war to peace.

The author concludes that detractors who dismiss the ‘people-oriented’ goals and consensus methods of UN agencies, and who believe that special forces and expeditionary air power can set the world right, are not looking at the whole problem. They see the war but ignore the postwar period, and, as a result, they miss a large part of the solution as well. This may well prove to be the case in Iraq.

**Article Title**                      ‘Feral Cities’

**Author**                                Richard J. Norton, Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making, Department of the Naval War College

**Publication Details**            *Naval War College Review*, vol. LVI, no. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 97–106

### **Synopsis**

This article attempts to introduce an alternative future security scenario centred on the breakdown of the rule of law and the potential impact of this on the domestic urban environment. Futuristic cities portrayed in apocalyptic movies are not the stuff of mere science fiction but could represent a future alternative reality. This article defines a ‘feral’ city, describes such a city’s attributes and suggests why the issue is worthy of international attention.

A ‘feral’ city is a metropolis of more than a million people that has lost the rule of law, yet remains a functioning actor in the international system. Social services are all but nonexistent, especially health and security assistance. Criminal elements, armed insurgents, clans, tribes or neighbourhood associations exert various degrees of control over portions of the city. Crime is a serious issue, and where intercity and international commercial transactions occur, they are characterised by corruption and violence. Disease is rife and there is pronounced environmental degradation due to pollution and expanding slum areas. ‘Feral’ cities will

be different from the troubled urban areas of today where police forces may opt not to enforce the rule of law in certain urban localities. In a feral city, police forces will not be able to do so.

The feral city will pose many threats that could be viewed as non-traditional and transnational. Firstly, feral cities would provide safe havens for armed resistance groups, including terrorist organisations. Secondly, the potential for pandemics, pollution, and illicit trade is high. Finally, there is also potential for small groups to access weapons of mass destruction. Given these potential challenges to authority, the author argues that even the military would be unable to impose legal order on a feral city.

How likely is it that ‘feral cities’ will emerge? Is a warning system possible? The author answers both questions in the affirmative and offers a model of twelve sets of measurements, grouped into four main categories, to predict if a city will go ‘feral’. ‘Healthy’ (Green) cities are characterised as having a stable government that can effect legislation and direct resources. They also have a robust economy and a well-regulated and professional police force. Residents also have access to a wide range of social services, including educational and cultural resources. The author cites New York as an example of a ‘green city’. In ‘Marginal’ (Yellow) cities such as Mexico City, government only enjoys ‘patchwork governance’.

There is only limited economic investment, minimal levels of social services such as public health services, and endemic corruption. Government control over Red (feral) cities ‘is even more limited and, in some cases, virtually nonexistent. Illegal commerce is rife, social services are intermittent or nonexistent and security is attained mainly through paid protection or private means. The author cited Johannesburg as an example of a city on such a ‘knife’s edge’.

‘Feral’ cities will present unique military challenges. Combat operations within such an urban context will not only be manpower-intensive but also expensive. Both combatant and non-combatant casualties are likely to be high and military operations would be more likely to leave behind a field of rubble than a reclaimed and functioning population centre. As such, feral cities will be a phenomenon that will pose security threats on a scale hitherto unencountered.

**Article Title** 'Sea Basing Isn't Just About the Sea'

**Author** John H. Klein and Rich Morales

**Publication Details** *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute,  
vol. 130, issue 1, January 2004,  
pp. 32–5

### **Synopsis**

The authors discuss the role of Sea Basing in the United States Navy's (USN) doctrine 'Sea Power 21'. Although interest in this concept has been the focus of the USN and Marine Corps debate, they suggest that Sea Basing has advantages for the United States Army as an effective means of projecting United States power across the globe, improving strategic and operational effectiveness and supporting United States diplomatic efforts.

Sea Basing offers the United States Army the flexibility to close rapidly on a ground objective, using an assembly area at sea, and to provide logistical support when access problems to land bases arise. The afloat base is an intermediate assembly area and can be used as a staging location prior to deploying ashore. Sea-based logistics allows the logistics effort to be tailored to immediate requirements while reducing the logistics 'foot-print' or 'tail' ashore. While acknowledging that Sea Basing will not completely replace existing bases or the need for forward ground operating bases, it can provide strategic and operational flexibility, offering commanders with a range of options. These options, they argue, will also reinforce the other elements of United States national power.

Sea Basing can be used to support and enhance diplomatic effectiveness proving presence without commitment. Sea-based forces provide a means of coercion and demonstrate commitment in a region even without actually landing forces. The authors conclude on a note of caution suggesting that Sea Basing cannot become the predominant method of deploying United States forces. The full range of strategic and operational advantages of Sea Basing can only be fully realised by maintaining a broad range of basing operations.