



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

Issue No: 10 Date: March 2003

CONTENTS

One Year After 9/11: A Grand Strategy for the West?

International Law and the Use of Force: Attacking Iraq

Achieving Effect: UK Chief of Defence Staff Lecture

Prevention, not Preemption

The American Way of War

Officership: The Professional Practice

The Army Officer as Warfighter

Effects-Based Decisions and Actions

The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "A. Lee".

Editor's Note

Please note that the next issue of the SOPD will be published in April 2003.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title: ‘One Year After: A Grand Strategy for the West? An Exchange with Robert Kagan, Christoph Bertram and François Heisbourg’

Author: Robert Kagan, Christoph Bertram and François Heisbourg,

Publication Details: *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 135-56.

Synopsis:

This important article is an account of the IISS ‘Global Strategic Review’ of September 2002, in which three eminent analysts from the United States, Germany and France were asked to assess the prospects for forging a Western ‘grand strategy’ against terrorism and other threats in the new international environment. The exchange of views helps to explain the collapse of relations between the US and the ‘old Europe’ of Germany and France over the Iraq crisis.

‘Strategic Dissonance’: Western Grand Strategy - An American Perspective

The US perspective is presented by Robert Kagan who coined the popular phrase, ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’. Kagan argues that a new international era really began in 1989-91 following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The main feature of the new order is American global hegemony and the presence of a US grand strategy based on promoting a liberal international order and universal democratic values.

Using a historical perspective, Kagan argues that US influence has been expanding since the nineteenth century in a unique mixture of innocence, diffidence and strategic design that employs power, commerce and ideology. Just as the US became involved in Europe between 1917 and 1945, so it may now be en route to major involvement in the Middle East. For Kagan, when President Bush speaks of an ‘axis of evil’ he is describing an old and deeply rooted American sensibility that recalls the Truman Doctrine of 1947. In the 1940s, President Truman enunciated a global doctrine as a response to communist penetration of Greece and

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Turkey. In 2002 Bush has acted similarly following the terrorist assaults of September 11 2001.

Kagan believes the Bush Doctrine should be regarded as part of a 'Western grand strategy', although he believes there are three clear differences between the US approach and the current European tradition of statecraft.

- US grand strategy is clearly global; but it is not clear that Europe has a vision beyond its own geography.
- Europe is concerned with integration, stability and post-modern rules of cooperation and seeks to restrain US hegemony.
- European internationalism is supranational and seeks the equality of sovereign states under the law. US internationalism is a nationalist internationalism. The US seeks a liberal world order but with American power at its centre.

Finally, Kagan points out that the common grand strategy of the West during the Cold War may have been an aberration based on special circumstances. It is perfectly possible that the Western alliance may in the future have to grapple with fundamental differences between the US and Europe, Such differences may eventually lead to the end of a common Western grand strategy.

'Shaping a Congenial Environment': Western Grand Strategy - A German Perspective

Christoph Bertram, a former Director of the IISS, provides a German view of Western grand strategy. The author argues that the future of a Western grand strategy lies in the 'art of shaping' the international environment rather than in winning wars. Securing territory or people against conquest is no longer the main challenge facing the US and its allies. Global economic prosperity, secure access to energy, and containing regional conflicts are the real issues of the 21st century.

For Bertram, the Bush Doctrine is a 'strategy of strength' based on hard and soft power and may be unilateralist because of the passivity of Europe. There is no group of countries capable of forming a bloc against US power. Yet, Bertram believes the new US 'grand strategy' of

Senior Officer Professional Digest

unilateralism and maximum flexibility in international affairs will not work. Such an approach, in the long term, will be contrary to US interests. America can win wars, but it cannot create peace without the support of allies and partners. The only grand strategy that will work in the new global era is one of inclusiveness. Just as capital and economics are globalised, so too has strategy. As Bertram notes,

The globalisation of insecurity has devalued one of the central factors of traditional strategy: geography. During the Cold War, geography disappeared as a defining element of strategy, since the rivalry and the weapons were global. Geography came back when the Cold War ended. With 11 September 2001, it has again receded.

Catastrophic terrorism is a phenomenon of a borderless world, the work of macro-terrorists that have four things in their favour:

- Access to increasingly destructive arsenals of weaponry;
- They operate below the threshold of the state;
- They organise attacks from lawless or minimally governed places;
- They thrive on the globalisation of communication and money.

For Bertram, such a combination presents a deadly challenge to established order. He comments:

The consequences for security policy of these four factors are profound. It is no longer sufficient to protect borders against the armed incursions of hostile states. And since borders can never be closed entirely . . . territory, citizens and international order are best safeguarded by tackling the perpetrators at [their] source.

Under the new conditions of globalised security and insecurity, the premium is on influencing the domestic situation in a foreign entity – a state, a failing state, a party to a civil war, an ethnic tribe. Deterrence is least effective when addressing domestic political behaviour in a target country. Cooperation and aid policies are now essential in reducing regions of lawlessness from which terrorists can operate. Bertram comments:

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Globalised security thus requires common institutions and common rules for the state actors, as well as heightened attention to the prevention, containment or resolution of the more dangerous regional conflicts. Among its tools are diplomacy, development assistance and military power; indeed, any serious strategy of combating globalised insecurity necessarily links the three.

A new grand strategy of protection and inclusion has to be pursued by all Western countries. But where Europeans and Americans differ is in their 'responsive instincts'. The Europeans lack the confidence military power gives the US and the ambition to shape the international environment. There needs to be inclusion and interdependence.

'How The West Could Be Won': Western Grand Strategy: A French Perspective

François Heisbourg, a distinguished strategic analyst and Chairman of the IISS, provides a French perspective on Western grand strategy. He warns gloomily:

Transatlantic and transpacific unity of purpose can no longer be assumed: the Cold War legacy is simply no longer strong enough. For the first time since the 1940s, we have no shared visions of international governance. A firmly unilateralist US is in counterpoise to multilateral partners in Europe and Asia.

Yet, the author also suggests, a Western grand strategy in the age of al-Qaeda is not so radically different from that of the Cold War. There are, he contends, similarities in the challenges posed by a cross-border non-state terrorist group and a Soviet state bureaucracy. A successful counter-terrorist grand strategy requires – as it did during the Cold War – a broad-base of multilateralism and a clear value system. During the Cold War, hard power, alliance building and soft power all worked and there are lessons for the post-September 11 era:

- In the war against terrorism the West, as it did during the Cold War, must employ its values of freedom and democracy.
- The West must distinguish between short and long-term objectives – between stopping a WMD attack and eliminating the bearers of the terrorist method. Prevention and pre-emption must supplement

Senior Officer Professional Digest

deterrence and containment but there must be a realisation that the war on terror will be protracted.

- Non-state actors such as al-Qaeda are not ‘great beasts’ in the Hobbesian jungle where power goes to the swift and strong. They are more like mutating viruses within a human organism. Thus, *‘the fight against the threat of the use of WMD by terrorist groups resembles a complex array of immune responses mobilised against a viral attack. Brute military force, while necessary in Afghanistan, is not going to be the primary tool in determining the outcomes’*. In short, the art of ‘draining the swamp’ of its grievances will be important.
- The war against terrorism with a global reach cannot be won without stable coalitions of the able and willing. In this respect, multilateral organisations remain vital.

Heisbourg believes that there is no longer a common defence strategy shared by the West. Prevention and pre-emption have moved to the centre of US policy, while NATO remains wedded to traditional strategic concepts from the 1990s. Any new grand strategy will take a long time to formulate. The author notes:

The current challenge is not going to disappear soon. The emergence of non-state actors with mass-destruction ambitions and capabilities is the hideous face of the much broader transformation of the world system known as globalisation, upsetting the centuries-old Westphalian order. But just as it took several decades of warfare – the Thirty Years War of 1618-48 – to crystallise the Westphalian system of state sovereignty which superseded pre-existing religious and dynastic solidarities, it will probably take decades to tease out the rules governing the respective roles of state and non-state actors.

Heisbourg concludes by calling for a slow and careful policy towards Iraq in which America should avoid a ‘Napoleonic manner’. The West can ‘still be won’ but only if a new grand strategy emphasises the importance of the long-term over the short-term and the West’s similarities are allowed to triumph over its differences.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title: ‘International Law and the Use of Force: Attacking Iraq’

Author: Professor Michael N. Schmitt

Publication Details: *RUSI Journal*, February 2003, vol. 148, no. 1, pp. 12-15.

Synopsis:

Professor Schmitt is the Director of the Executive Program in International and Security Affairs at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany. This article was written before President Bush’s 18 March 2003 ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. In it he concludes that while there exists four factual circumstances that might merit the use of force against Iraq, the coalition risks being characterised as ‘overly legalistic and politically reckless’ if it goes to war without a Security Council mandate.

The author acknowledges that the Security Council has deemed Iraq’s non-compliance with resolutions and proliferation of weapons a ‘threat to the peace’ which would justify the use of force? but only with an express Security resolution setting out the terms of intervention. He points out that anticipatory self-defence is open to the coalition, but only if there is no viable option; measures are limited to deterring an attack and they are taken as a final resort. Iraq’s proven support for terrorism also constitutes a reason for war, but only if the evidence demonstrates Iraqi involvement in an imminent or ongoing terrorist campaign.

He points out that customary international law is based on the actual behaviour of states? so a war conducted without Security Council authority will most likely change our understanding of the circumstances in which war may be waged. He believes that this is a dangerous precedent to establish and insists that it is necessary to establish normative clarity before taking action.

This article is one of the more thoughtful articles on the actual justifications for war with Saddam Hussein’s regime. It highlights the weaknesses of a system of international law founded on Westphalian principles of the primacy of the nation-state.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title: 'Achieving Effect: Annual Chief of Defence Staff Lecture'

Author: Admiral Sir Michael Boyce

Publication Details: *RUSI Journal*, February 2003, vol. 148, no. 1, pp. 30-7.

Synopsis:

This article was originally given by Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the British Chief of the Defence Staff, as a lecture to the Royal United Services Institution. In it he discusses the role of contemporary forces in conducting effects-based operations as a part of a coherent 'whole-of-government' approach to national strategy.

The author argues that in the increasingly complex international environment military effects must be directed with precision if we are not to frustrate the non-military arms of national policy. He suggests that diplomatic, economic, political, social and humanitarian tools are the first resort of government and that when we have to fall back on the threat or use of force: 'we have to be clever, light on our feet and we have to gain asymmetric advantage'.

Admiral Boyce uses six lessons derived from recent operations and backs them up with examples. Those lessons are that:

- High level strategy needs to come with direction, so that troops on the ground are not only aware of their commander's intent, but are aware of the political effect required of them.
- Logistic reach and sustainability is vital. Despite all the fondest wishes to operate close to the national support base, the reality of operations in a globalised world is that forces will often have to operate far from home.
- Robust rules of engagement are required. Forces can always exercise discretion within their mandate, but the fact that they have that discretion gives them greater flexibility.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- Information operations, most notably the ability to control the rumour mill in-theatre, are essential if you are to effectively control the battlespace.
- Support helicopters have developed a significance beyond resupply in complex operations. They *'have been a vital factor in both manoeuvre and the manoeuvrist approach, enabling not just vertical envelopment, but also reinforcing the perception of reach, speed of reaction and reassurance to local populations undecided n whether to follow the local warlord or the writ of law'*.

Admiral Boyce points out that in the contemporary world the armed forces are increasingly being called upon to tackle the causes as well as the symptoms of conflict. The British military are being called upon to initiate action and shape events in circumstances where previously the might have done nothing. This challenge requires operations to be done 'properly'? with precise political objectives in mind. Successfully achieving stated objectives is the best vindication of an operation mounted in conditions of uncertainty.

To undertake these tasks he argues that 'our forces have to be fully trained, equipped, sustainable, adaptable, agile, responsive and deployable, able to operate anywhere in the spectrum of conflict, at home or abroad, with or without allies'. Admiral Boyce discusses transformation and its effects on capability development, force structure and multinational cooperation. He suggests that the British need to reprioritise in favour of critical capabilities to further the effects-based approach. This might mean a reduction in the number of platforms and greater investment in enablers and precision weapons.

He believes that the ability of modern forces to wage integrated joint operations constitutes our asymmetric advantage when confronted with less advanced opponents. This has particular significance for coalition operations, where it is not sufficient just to arrange effective liaison, but it is necessary to establish linked command and control measures as well as to use technology to share data and ease information flow.

This article is a valuable summary of some of the most contemporary ideas about the use of military force by middle powers. It emphasises discrimination and flexibility and the need for the modern military to serve identifiable and ethical political ends.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title: 'Prevention, not Preemption'

Author: Lawrence Freedman

Publication Details: *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 105-114.

Synopsis:

In this article Lawrence Freedman, the Professor of War Studies at Kings College in London, argues that the doctrine of preemption, spelt out in the September 2002 United States National Security Strategy is not adequate to manage the problems of the contemporary global security situation. His motto is that 'an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure'.

National security policy should look beyond simply responding to crises once they have arisen by conducting a preemptive strike. Freedman suggests that governments and policy makers must pay 'close attention to what is transpiring in the disadvantaged and disaffected parts of the international system and considering the full range of policy instruments.' He argues that in our complex global order it is increasingly unlikely that great powers will be able to eliminate problems with bold, timely and decisive strokes. Rather, states need to become accustomed to engaging difficult problems over an extended period of time.

Professor Freedman advocates utilising the whole range of 'soft power' available to a modern state, but does not back away from the use of force. Instead he argues that, where possible, states should engage threats using military or non-military tools before they have had time to develop. If this is done in sufficient time, states have the opportunity to take concurrent steps to ameliorate any harm that might arise from their actions.

The author accepts that the preventative approach might pose some threats to traditional concepts of international law, but concludes that the greatest challenge posed by adopting a preventative strategy is to the traditionally short-term perspective adopted by Western democratic forms of government.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title: 'The American Way of War'

Authors: James Fallows, Robert Coram, Donald Vandergriff

Publication Details: *The Atlantic Online*, 8-23 January 2003,
<http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/fallows/jf2003-01-08/>

Synopsis:

This is a three-part, three-way e-mail discussion on the website of *The Atlantic*. The discussants are James Fallows, *The Atlantic*'s national correspondent; Robert Coram, the author of *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot who Changed the Art of War*; and Major Donald Vandergriff, a widely published US Army officer who most recently wrote *Spirit, Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century*.

Both Coram and Vandergriff are highly critical of the US military. They both identify a ticket punching, no defects, bureaucratic culture as the main source of the problems of the American military profession. They believe that much military procurement is wasteful and is driven by careerism rather than actual need. They argue that the huge and heavy US military machine is poorly prepared to wage the sort of asymmetric conflict that is the reality of operations today. Major Vandergriff is attached to the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), which has become an article of faith with some contemporary strategic thinkers. 4GW emphasises irregular warfighting skills in close quarters combat against states and non-state opponents. It is an approach to conceptualising future warfare, but by no means the only one.

This article ranges broadly and lacks a single uniting theme. It should perhaps be read as food for thought, rather than a cohesive and coherent argument. Most importantly, it makes some points about capability and personnel development that are as applicable to the Australian Defence Force as they are to the US military.

Article Title: 'Officership: The Professional Practice'

Author: Colonel John J. Snider, US Army, Rtd.

Publication Details: *Military Review*, January-February 2003, vol. LXXXIII, no. 1, pp. 3-8.

Synopsis:

This article examines the meaning of officership in the US Army of the early 21st century. It argues that Army officers lack a 'dominant self-concept' and that this has contributed to the loss of satisfaction among majors, captains and lieutenants. Part of the problem is that, since the Gulf War of 1991, the US Army has not focused enough attention on junior officer professional development asking instead for those elements to 'do more with less'.

Over commitment and under resourcing has plagued the Army since the 1991 Gulf War. The result has been an erosion of morale and esteem and a credibility gap based on distrust between the upper and lower echelons of the officer corps. The author argues that the US Army's jurisdiction over conventional warfighting has also been affected by a strategically immobile force structure. Moreover, the US Army is based on both professional expertise and bureaucratic hierarchy. While bureaucratisation of the military cannot be avoided, it should not come to dominate the professional nature of officership. Unlike professions, bureaucracies focus on the routine application of non-expert knowledge:

When the bureaucratic dominates the professional . . . there is cause for immense tensions for individual professionals and for the institution as a whole. Militaries that do not resolve this tension in favour of their professional side can 'die' in the professional sense. As their bureaucratic nature dominates, they increasingly squeeze professional practices into bureaucratic moulds . . . and soon become little more than obedient military bureaucracies exhibiting little of the effectiveness of a vocational profession.

A self-concept based on expert knowledge and practice is essential if officers are to retain a sense of identity. There are four key areas or 'clusters' of military professional knowledge which require affirmation:

- *Military-technical knowledge* of warfighting in land combat;
- *Military ethics* to ensure that combat is conducted according to the legal and moral code of the profession of arms;

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- *Human development* (education, training, character development) in order to apply the profession's expertise;
- *Political-social knowledge* to resource the profession and represent its interests to Governments.

Each of these areas corresponds to four 'blended' identities:

- The officer as a warfighter;
- The officer as a leader of character;
- The officer as a member of his profession;
- The officer as a servant of the Nation.

These roles should provide meaning to the notion of officership and provide benchmarks for officers to 'walk the talk' in terms of duty, honour, loyalty, service, competence, teamwork and leadership.

'Understanding that they are simultaneously warfighters, leaders of character, members of a profession, and servants of the Nation can provide a powerful self-concept with which to confront challenges with inspiration and motivation'.

Article Title: 'The Army Officer as Warfighter'

Author: Major Paul Yingling, US Army and Major John Nagl, US Army

Publication Details: *Military Review*, January-February 2003, vol. LXXXIII, no. 1, pp. 9-14.

Synopsis:

The authors propose that the central feature of being an Army officer is a lifelong preparation for battle. Only a professional soldier can undertake warfighting; it his unique task. Warfighting has three dimensions:

- *Physical Dimension:* the officer must be capable of sharing the hardship and danger of combat alongside the men he commands. He must become 'the Old Man' up on the line in the mud and sleet.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Quoting Clausewitz, the authors state, '*the ardour of his [the officer's] spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in others; his inward fire must revive their hopes*'.

- *Intellectual Dimension*: a successful warfighting officer must have a comprehensive knowledge of the theory as well as the practice of war. He must seek a balance between what J. F. C. Fuller called 'military scholasticism' and becoming 'Prince Eugene's mule'. The former knows only theory; the latter, despite much operational experience, is blind to education and wise innovation and remains a mule.
- *Moral Dimension*: the officer as warfighter is a servant of society who subordinates his safety for the welfare of fellow citizens.

The challenge of 21st officership is to train for warfighting but be prepared for peace missions since the only purpose of war as Saint Augustine wrote, is to create a better peace. The article concludes with the words of John F. Kennedy in 1961 that officership should be '*a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation – a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself*'.

Article Title: 'Effects-Based Decisions and Actions'

Author: Major General James M. Dubik, US Army

Publication Details: *Military Review*, January-February 2003, vol. LXXXIII, no. 1, pp. 15-21.

Synopsis:

This article examines the theory of effects-based operations and the way in which commanders should employ effects-based decision and action. General Dubik argues that effects-based action and decision should focus on product not process. Effects are the 'end' of operations or battle. All else is the 'means' or to put it another way, '*effects are fixed; means are variable*'.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

In an effects-based decision and action system, the mission and the concept of operations become the means (the variable element) that the commander wishes to inflict upon an enemy. The end (the fixed element) is in the commander's intent. Effects look at action from an enemy perspective in a negative fashion (eg 'keep the enemy within a specific geographic area'). An effects-based intent from a commander provides subordinates with a decision tool to grasp what may be fleeting tactical opportunities.

Dubik believes, '*intent, then, is sacrosanct, for it describes the desired end state*'. Mission and concept of operations may vary because they describe means. An effects-based action system requires a common understanding of battlespace preparation including the use of priority information requirements (PIR) battlefield operating systems (BOS). These should be leveraged to assist in refining command intent and the end-state sought.