

**THE SECOND FIFTY YEARS:
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 1947-1997**

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN REGULAR ARMY,
1944-1952**

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Fifty years ago there was an important development in the history of our Defence Force, the formation of a regular army for Australia.¹ On 4 June 1947 the Minister for Defence, John Dedman, announced in Parliament that the Government was to create, for the first time, a field force within the Permanent Military Forces (or PMF), consisting of a brigade of over 4000 soldiers, within a total PMF strength of 19,000.² Enlistment in the postwar PMF began on 1 August 1947, and on 13 September 1947, the Minister for the Army, Cyril Chambers, approved the use of the term 'Regular Army'.³

Prior to this change in Government policy in 1947, there had never been in peacetime a permanent field force consisting of all the arms and services. Indeed, there were legislative provisions in the *Defence Act* which precluded the existence of such a force. This paper charts the development of the Regular Army from the wartime arrangements, via a force known as the Interim Army, into the Australian force that was dispatched to the Korean War in 1950. Its emphasis is on the development of an organisation, rather than on high policy; and it will not stray into the operational aspects of the Korean War, nor into the detail of the re-emergence of the Citizen Military Forces and National Service. But it will cover some administrative issues up until the extinguishment of the Interim Army in 1952.

Of course, organisations are about people, and there were some famous personalities—and some famous rivalries—in the immediate postwar Army. As well as the establishment of the Regular Army, 1947 also marked the formation of the Army Battle Honours Committee, to recommend unit awards for the Second World War. Eyebrows were raised when the names of the Committee's members were announced. In addition to some other wartime commanders, Generals Blamey, Rowell, and Gordon Bennett were appointed to the Committee, which led one correspondent to report about the meetings that 'tension was evident only in the atmosphere of extreme restraint on all sides'.⁴

The Official Historian of the Second World War, Gavin Long, made the following assessment of the Australian Army—an Army of 59 infantry battalions—in 1944:

The army which had now entered upon its final campaigns, and whose leadership and equipment were the subject of such keen debate at home, was at this time, in many respects, at the peak of its efficiency. More than two years earlier, it had established a tactical superiority over the Japanese, and since then it had gained in skill and confidence, and in particular, in the art of living healthily and cheerfully in tropical bush. Its experience included warfare in many kinds of terrain and climate, and in Africa, Europe and the South Seas. Its system of training and schools was comprehensive and their methods severe.⁵

The Official Historian of the Korean War, Robert O'Neill, wrote of our forces in Korea:

They fought hard, in appalling climatic conditions, against a determined enemy who showed that he could sometimes get the upper hand. Yet the Australians proved that man for man and unit for unit they could acquit themselves on the battlefield better than most and they earned unstinted praise from their allies. Their record of bravery, of consideration for their wounded mates when in danger, of dash in the offensive and dogged persistence in the defence—such as that displayed at Kapyong, on Maryang San and in countless small patrol actions on the Jamestown Line—and their quickwitted aggressive and subtle tactics set the new post-1939-45 War Army off to an excellent start.⁶

In describing how we developed a regular army in 1947 and after, and in explaining why it was in the form that developed, four themes emerge:

1. the legal background in which the senior soldiers and policy makers had to operate;
2. the policy commitments of the 1940s;
3. the new thinking that had to occur on conditions of service—if there was to be a volunteer regular army, then there had to be recruitment, and decent conditions of service; and
4. the very real links between the wartime Army, and the Army that fought in Korea.

There have been several strands in the military forces raised by Australia this century—permanent, Militia and AIF. The Australian Imperial Force has been the predominant wartime image— whether from Gallipoli, Tobruk or Borneo in 1945. Yet the two AIFs, all-volunteer forces, were composed of a mixture of permanent soldiers, of Militia soldiers, and of civilians with no military experience. Of course, in the Second World War, the Militia formations, consisting of both conscripts and volunteers also fought in their own right.

It was no accident that the AIF was raised for each of the World Wars. The policy and legislative framework established in the first decade of Federation predicated that this would be so. Laws should reflect government policy, but sometimes, laws develop an inertia all of their own.

In the Australian Army that was formed on 1 March 1901, there were permanent soldiers, Militia and volunteers. In relation to the permanent forces, the new *Defence Act* as amended laid out three themes that remained in force up until about 1950. The first was that the Army developed as a militia force, with permanent soldiers providing the administrative and instructional staff necessary to make it work. In wartime, a special force of volunteers was raised—the AIF—to augment the King's Regular Forces.⁷ Historians such as John Mordike and Craig Wilcox have discussed the policy and financial reasons that led us to adopt such a structure. Nationalism, fear for trade union freedom, or simply an affirmation of the historic traditions of the English (and colonial) militia may have been at work here.⁸

By the time of the postwar Army of the 1940s, this limitation on the permanent forces arising from section 31(2) of the *Defence Act* was interpreted as limiting the PMF to raising only the following corps in peacetime: the Staff Corps, the Australian Instructional Corps, Aviation, Survey, Service Corps, Medical, Veterinary, Ordnance, Artillery, and Engineers. One senior officer described this section of the Act as 'an embarrassment'.⁹

The second legal limitation was upon overseas service. From 1903 to 1964, section 49 of the Act stated that members of the Military Forces should not be required to serve beyond the limits of Australia and its territories unless they voluntarily agreed to do so.¹⁰ For example, the members of 3RAR in 1950 had volunteered to serve in Japan, not Korea, so they had to be re-attested for the Korean War.¹¹

The third legal limitation was upon the officering of the permanent forces, and this was reflected in section 148. The premise was that no one should be appointed a PMF officer who was not a graduate of the Military College. There were exceptions for time of war, for non-combatant corps and for QMs. Even if a particular corps could be raised under the Act in peacetime, it was very difficult to find enough RMC graduates as officers.¹²

A fourth limitation was the pegging of the establishment of the PMF. For example, from 1939 on, the size of the PMF was arbitrarily set at 4873, which were the numbers set out in the 1939/40 Financial Estimates. There were about 450 officers in the pre-war PMF.¹³

There had been suggestions that a regular army be formed before 1947. (The term 'regular army' is used here in the sense of a permanent force consisting of all arms and services.) In the late 1930s, it had been suggested by the Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, by the Inspector-General, Lieutenant-General Squires, and by Joseph Lyons. In the end, the only portion raised was the Darwin Mobile Force, which because of the *Defence Act* limitations had to be raised as an artillery unit.¹⁴ Nonetheless, the DMF provided regimental experience for young officers and NCOs. Prior to this time, the only regimental training available was service in British units in India for some RMC graduates.¹⁵

After 1939, many PMF officers and men were seconded to the AIF and served in the Middle East. With the return of the AIF and the crisis of 1942, virtually all members of the PMF were seconded to either the AIF or to the Militia, and there was an attempt to introduce uniform conditions of service within the obvious confines of the 'two army policy'.¹⁶ It was possible that PMF interests might be submerged in the massive wartime Army of 400,000, which had about 20,000 officers. Therefore a cell within the Directorate of Organisation ensured that nominal promotions were made for PMF members against the 1939/40 establishment for superannuation purposes.¹⁷

Three events in 1944 were important for the postwar Army: Government planning, Army planning, and the Vasey Report. In January 1944, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence had issued a standing instruction to the Defence Committee to keep in mind the question of the nature, strength and organisation of the postwar forces.¹⁸ In October 1944, a Post War Army Planning Committee was set up and the Vasey Report was commissioned. The Post War Army Planning Committee was chaired by Brigadier WJM Locke, and it established sub-committees to examine training, manning and conditions of service issues. After Lieutenant-General Wynter became ill, the Committee reported to the DCGS, Major-General Chapman.¹⁹

One of the main assumptions of the Vasey Report into RMC was that there would be a postwar regular army of 20,000 men, based on the General Staff estimate. The Report was commissioned by General Blamey, and the Committee members were Major-Generals Vasey and Robertson and Brigadier Coombes. The Report stressed the need for regimental service for regular officers in permanent units. The Committee stated that soldiering was one of the most human of all the professions, that regular army officers had to understand the men they led, and that regular officers should no longer be separated from soldiers by long periods on the Staff. The Committee recommended that RMC graduates serve in permanent units for at least four years before any staff appointment, and that officers of Lieutenant-Colonel rank and below periodically return to regimental duty.²⁰

Without reading too much into the Report, perhaps there was a realisation that regular officers would continue to be subsidiary to Militia officers until the regulars could demonstrate expertise in command. The precondition for regimental and command experience was, of course, the existence of permanent units in peacetime.

By June 1945 the Army was basing planning on a permanent division, within a permanent army of 26,775 men.²¹ In the same month, the Defence Committee was looking at postwar forces within the context of a Treasury forecast that only about £60m would be available annually for defence.²² The Services, however, were told to plan first, and were advised that financial limits would be discussed later. It was also understood that some kind of interim force would be necessary during the demobilisation period.²³

At the end of the war, the surviving regular soldiers had some experience of senior command. Lieutenant-Generals Berryman and Rowell had served as corps commanders. Major-General Milford had served as a divisional commander in New Guinea and Borneo, and Major-General Bridgeford had commanded 3rd Division in the Bougainville campaign. Major-General Robertson had commanded a division briefly in New Britain and at Wewak. The proportions were less at brigade and battalion level, and of the 59 infantry battalions, only two were commanded by regulars in 1945.²⁴ In addition, a number of RMC graduates saw service in infantry battalions and other units in the final campaigns of the war.

At the end of hostilities on 15 August 1945, the Army had a strength of about 383,000, with some 177,000 troops outside mainland Australia.²⁵ There were two divisions on Borneo, a division and a brigade in the Aitape-Wewak area, a division on New Britain, and a division and two brigades on Bougainville. In addition, there were large logistics and headquarters elements in the Islands and in New Guinea, including concentrations at Morotai and Lae. There were also about 20,000 prisoners of war,²⁶ mainly of the 8th Division.

The size and form of the postwar army was going to depend upon the type of defence and foreign policy commitments made by the Government in the transition from war to peace. The most pressing issue for the Government was demobilisation and postwar reconstruction, particularly since an election was due in 1946. Fortunately for those in favour of a postwar regular army, the Chifley Government had entered into a number of postwar commitments in August-September 1945.

In the first place, there was the occupation of Japan, which was going to require the basing of 10,000 Australian troops in Japan.²⁷ Secondly, there was the supervision of the surrender of several hundred thousand Japanese troops in the Australian territories and in the Dutch East Indies, and consequent actions to prosecute or repatriate the surrendered Japanese. In addition, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies had to be garrisoned until the Australians could hand over to Dutch or British troops (which occurred in February-March 1946).²⁸ Thirdly, the Army had responsibilities for guarding prisoners of war and internees in Australia, and supervising their repatriation.²⁹ Fourthly, the Army had to recover back to Australia large quantities of wartime equipment, and store it or hand it over to civil industry.³⁰ Fifthly, and most importantly for the Government, the Army itself had to demobilise.³¹

The Army therefore had to balance the demands of the Government for rapid demobilisation, together with meeting the foreign commitments entered into by that Government. All these tasks had to be accomplished over thousands of miles, and with very limited shipping.³²

Unlike the situation at the end of the First World War, in 1945 a formation of the wartime Army continued on full time duty, and for so long as 34th Brigade was in Japan, there was the possibility that it could become the basis for a postwar regular army. The Brigade Group had been established using the equipment and personnel available in Borneo, New Guinea and Morotai. Its structure followed the conventions of the time, with three infantry battalions, an armoured car squadron, a field battery, an engineer squadron, and the other arms and services.³³

The Force arrived in Japan in February 1946, and commenced duties in the Prefecture of Hiroshima. These duties included creating a presence amongst the Japanese and securing caches of weapons. The majority of the soldiers and officers had seen wartime service. For example, 65th Battalion was recruited from the 7th Division, and the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Marson, had served in the pre-war Militia, and had commanded the 2/25th Battalion from 1942 to 1945, concluding with the Balikpapan landings. There were thus real links between the wartime Army and the units of BCOF. Even in law, the members of BCOF were members of the AIF until they were later transferred to the Interim Army.³⁴ The links between the wartime Army and the battalions that eventually served in Korea remained strong.

At about the time that 34th Brigade was sailing to Japan in February 1946, the Government was implementing changes to the system of controlling and administering the Army. On 28 February 1946, the Military Board held its first (postwar) meeting. This reflected a major change from the wartime arrangements. The post of Commander-in-Chief was abolished, and the Military Board, as a corporate body, was to control and administer the Army. The first postwar members of the Board were: the Minister, Lieutenant-General Sturdee as CGS, Lieutenant-General Rowell as VCGS, Major-General Clowes as Adjutant-General, Major-General Bridgeford as QMG, Major-General Beavis as MGO, Mr Fitzgerald as the Financial Member, and Mr Kemsley as Business Member.³⁵

The Minister laid down policy, but would not attend the ordinary meetings of the Board, which were chaired by the CCS. The Secretary, Frank Sinclair, was permitted to attend, but was not permitted to vote nor to undertake Board duties. The Secretary was to be responsible to the Minister for financial administration³⁶ and was naturally an influential figure, but the statutory responsibility for controlling and administering the Army rested with the Military Board as a body. In addition, each member of the Board had individual responsibility for the normal duties of his appointment. Outside Army Headquarters, the system of commands begun by Lieutenant-General Squires in 1939 was reintroduced, with Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western Commands.³⁷

With the emergence of Sturdee and Rowell as the leaders of the postwar Army there remained a large number of general officers for whom it was difficult to find positions in the reduced establishment. Sturdee was keen to ensure that the reintroduced Military Board adopted a team approach with compatible personalities.³⁸ Before the reintroduction of the Board, the Government had agreed to an Interim Retirement Scheme for those Staff Corps officers deemed unable to undertake active employment. Amongst other objects, this allowed some senior officers to receive their pensions immediately.³⁹ Of the wartime group of principal staff officers, Lieutenant-General Northcott went to BCOF, Lieutenant-General Wynter had died, Major-General Chapman went to Washington, Major-General Lloyd retired, and Major-General Cannan returned to civilian life. Only Major-General Beavis remained to serve on the new Military Board.⁴⁰

While these changes to the legal and administrative framework of the Army occurred, work was continuing on the possible shape of the postwar Army. In March 1946, General Rowell circulated an internal policy paper which surveyed the threat and Australia's strategic interests, and suggested a force structure. The USSR was identified as the most likely future threat to security, particularly if it was able to influence or control China or Japan. Rowell cited the Squires Report of December 1938, and suggested that, given reduced readiness times and probable commitments, Australia needed a permanent force of all arms. Given his view of the strategic situation, and the decrease in time available for mobilisation, Rowell believed that the Army should maintain in peacetime a force of three divisions, one permanent division, and two further divisions 'in second echelon'. The permanent division was to be available for immediate deployment, and the other two divisions were to be deployable within three months.⁴¹

The final Army plan was submitted to Cabinet in December 1946. The plan envisaged national service and an Army of 33,461 regulars and 42,421 in the CMF. This would have required an Army budget of about £20m.⁴² The Government, however, was seeking to reduce defence expenditure to an absolute minimum.⁴³

The plans for the Services were finally considered at a Council of Defence meeting, chaired by the Prime Minister, on 12 March 1947. The Defence Committee estimated the cost of Service plans at £90m annually. Chifley stated that such a sum was 25 per cent of government income and was excessive. He limited the Defence vote to £50m, and told the Services to shape their organisations based on that figure. The British emphasis on defence science and research and development was noted, as was Australia's extensive commitments to the guided missiles project. The Defence budget was to provide for research and development first, and then provide the balance to the Forces. Concerning strengths, Chifley noted that there was a large body of trained men in Australia from the war, and that the emphasis should be on research and development, and upon small and highly efficient armed services. The Services, he insisted, should be able to get their numbers by voluntary enlistment.⁴⁴

The final allocation to the Army was £12.5m, and the Army was allowed to raise a force of 19,000 permanent soldiers, with 50,000 in the CMF. Cabinet approved this in June 1947. The scheme was known as the five-year plan since the Government proposed to spend an average of £12.5m on the Army over five years. The Field Force was to consist of one permanent brigade group (4470), which would be based on 34th Brigade in Japan, and two CMF divisions. About one third of the permanent strength was to be in the Field Force, when cadre staff for the CMF divisions were included. The remaining 13,000 or so permanent soldiers were base and administrative troops, and personnel on fixed defences and in training establishments.⁴⁵

The Army (PMF and CMF) was to provide forces for four roles: for UNO tasks, including regional commitments; for British Commonwealth defence; for an expansion base; and finally for the local defence of mainland Australia. The CMF (with the PMF) was still envisaged as the main striking force, but the PMF Field Force was to be deployable for short term UN and Commonwealth commitments.⁴⁶

The Chifley Government was not prepared to change the liability of soldiers for overseas service. Regular soldiers could not be sent abroad unless they voluntarily agreed to do so. The Army had sought to change this, particularly with the PMF, but it was opposed by the Minister for the Army, Cyril Chambers, and the Government.⁴⁷

Given that it was the dawn of the nuclear age, one might question why the postwar Army developed in the way that it did. The structures appeared conventional, and to be a continuation of Second World War formations, units and equipment. The reasons for this probably lay in the intersection of the issues of finance, foreign commitments, and the influence of the professional soldiers.

In the first place, the Chifley Government had higher priorities than defence. It was the era of postwar reconstruction, and the financial effort that had been devoted to six years of war had to be redirected. The Treasury forecast, in 1945, of £60m per year as the postwar allocation to defence was remarkably accurate' given the 1947 allocation of £50m. Secondly, in the process of allocating funds, the Government was prepared to give some weight to defence science and technology, before allocating the residue to the Services. The Minister stated that the Army would also study scientific developments, but the practicalities were that the Army would use equipment from the Second World War.⁴⁸

The commitments entered into by the Chifley Government in 1945, such as the occupation force in Japan, made it necessary to maintain a quasi-permanent field force after the end of the war. In addition, it was becoming clear by 1946 that international tension would continue, and the Government's professional military advisers were arguing that Australian prestige depended upon the maintenance of some forces in peacetime. In the light of the crisis of 1942, they were also arguing that developments in warfare made concepts such as local defence, strategic isolation and long mobilisation periods obsolete. There had to be forces in being that were capable of deployment.⁴⁹

Finally, and understandably, the influence of the professional soldiers can be seen in the structures adopted in 1947. There was no conference of senior officers, as in 1920, where the wartime commanders and Militia officers could put their imprint on the postwar forces. Indeed, the wartime commander, Sir Thomas Blamey, had been asked to resign in a peremptory fashion, and his suggestions for postwar control of the Army were rejected by the Government.⁵⁰ In the period from 1945 to 1948, the Militia was in 'suspended animation', and from the retirement of Major-General Cannan in 1945, until 1948, when Major-General Wootton was appointed, there were no CMF generals serving as principal staff officers or on the Military Board.⁵¹

The events of 1945-47 should also be understood in the context of the parsimonious treatment of regular soldiers between the wars, and the recognition by the regulars that there had to be a mechanism for regular officers to obtain regimental and command experience. The Vasey Report reflected these concerns, and if one accepted the requirement for regimental experience, then there had to be permanent battalions and regiments in which that experience could be obtained. In addition, there was sufficient anecdotal evidence that influential regular soldiers were determined that their experiences from 1919 to 1939 would not be repeated.⁵²

Once the decision had been taken to create the postwar Permanent Military Forces, the Army was able implement recruiting and conditions of service plans. One could not have a volunteer force of long service regulars if men refused to join. Recruiting for the AIF had been suspended in August 1945, and the Army had also stopped accepting intakes of conscripted militiamen. The political pressure for rapid demobilisation combined with the tasks given to the Army in the Islands and in Japan had caused great manpower problems.⁵³ Therefore, in February 1946, recruiting began for the 'interim forces', on two-year voluntary enlistments.⁵⁴

By this stage, the Army had personnel on a myriad of types of engagement. In addition to those in the new interim forces, there were members of the AIF and CMF, including members of the Permanent Military Forces seconded to the AIF or CMF. In the CMF there were both

conscripts and volunteers. Those soldiers who had volunteered to serve in BCOF were required either to be in the AIF, or transfer to it.⁵⁵ In addition, there were those known euphemistically as 'non-volunteers for further service', that is, wartime soldiers who were keen to be demobilised as soon as possible. Lacking a Government decision on the shape of the postwar Army, the solution to this problem had been to raise a force known as the Interim Army, and to transfer into it all those still serving on fulltime duty.

The Interim Army was created in May 1946, but with retrospective application to 1 October 1945.⁵⁶ Personnel were progressively enlisted or transferred into it, and by 1 February 1947 all 'non-volunteers for further service' had been discharged from the Army. The AIF was disbanded on 30 June 1947, and anyone still on full-time duty, and who had somehow been missed out, was transferred to the Interim Army with effect 1 July 1947. After the decision of June 1947 to raise a postwar PMF of 19,000 soldiers, the intention was to operate the postwar PMF and the Interim Army in tandem, and to persuade as many members of the Interim Army as possible to transfer to the postwar PMF.⁵⁷

By June 1947 the strength of the Army was reduced from its 1945 strength of 383,000 to 29,336. The 29,336 soldiers on full-time duty consisted of 19,488 wartime enlistees and 9848 who had enlisted after February 1946.⁵⁸ The labour market was buoyant and many of these could take discharge. The Permanent Military Forces had to establish itself as an attractive career in order to be able to recruit. The Army could foresee that its strength might fall below the authorised establishment of 19,000. This did in fact occur, and by June 1950 the number of soldiers on full-time duty was 14,651.⁵⁹ Even then, only about half of that 14,000 were enlisted on ARA conditions of service.⁶⁰

The Military Board had warned of these recruiting and conditions of service problems since 1946. The lack of certainty over conditions of service had adversely affected recruiting.⁶¹ Finally, a new pay code was introduced on 1 July 1947, and recruiting began for the postwar PMF on 1 August. The initial term of enlistment was for six years.

The pay code applied to both members of the new postwar PMF and to members continuing in the Interim Army. A recruit was to receive 10 shillings per day, and clothing was at the Army's expense. Rations and quarters were free for single members, and for married members on duty. Married men received marriage allowance, and a provision allowance when they were not consuming Army rations. The bad news was that, from 1 July 1947, all members of the armed services became liable for income tax. Prior to this date, soldiers serving in Japan, in the Islands and in certain other areas had been exempt from tax.⁶²

Based upon the pay code, a new superannuation scheme was introduced for the three Services. Prior to 1948, permanent members of the Army had been required to join the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme, that is the scheme designed for public servants. The Government had accepted, from the hard experience of the recent war, from the Squires Report of 1938, and from the recommendations of Generals Blamey and Sturdee, that there had to be lower retiring ages in the Army than applied in civil life. Consequently, the armed services had to have a separate and different superannuation scheme from that which applied to the public service. Also, in relation to superannuation, the Minister believed that the Services had to offer a financial incentive in order to attract good people.⁶³

As part of the changes, the retiring age for officers of the rank of Major and below, which had been set at 55, was cut to 47 years. Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels, who had previously retired at 60, were now to retire at 55 and 50 years respectively. Officers' pensions were to be based on retiring age for rank, and those of the other ranks were based on 20 years' service.⁶⁴

In order to assist recruiting, a name change was suggested for the Permanent Military Forces. In August 1947, the Military Board recommended that the *Defence Act* should be amended so that the Permanent Military Forces, would become known as the 'Regular Army'. The Minister agreed to this on 13 September 1947, although the amendment was not legislated until several years later. In November 1947, the Board directed that the term 'Australian Regular Army' should be used from then on, except for certain legal purposes.⁶⁵

The Adjutant-General suggested that the introduction of initial enlistments of six years made the term 'Permanent Military Forces' a misnomer. In addition, the Military Board believed that the average citizen had a better idea of what the term 'Regular Army' meant, compared to the term 'Permanent Military Forces'. Also the Board felt that the new title would bring the Australian Military Forces into line with the British and New Zealand armies, both of which used the term 'Regular Army' or 'Regular Force'.⁶⁶

When the *Defence Act* was amended in 1950, both terms were retained, with the 'Australian Regular Army' becoming a 'sub-set' of the 'Permanent Military Forces'. Another 'sub-set' of the PMF was the Regular Army Special Reserve (RASK) for those who were unable to meet the ARA conditions of service. The RASK had lower medical requirements and a three-year engagement period.⁶⁷

One might ask how the Government could have maintained permanent infantry and armoured units after 1945, given that the *Defence Act* was not amended until 1950. Legal coverage was provided under the 'time of war' provisions in the Act. The Government did not advise the Governor-General to revoke the 'time of war' proclamation until May 1952.⁶⁸ As the end of the decade approached, Army Headquarters became increasingly concerned that the Government had not yet legislated for the changes to the *Defence Act*. If the 'time of war' ended before the Act was amended, then the new units of the Regular Army would have been illegal.⁶⁹

A regular army required a far more extensive training system than the pre-war PMF. Many of the wartime corps schools were retained, albeit on different sites, and the functions of the Staff School (Australia) were eventually transferred to the Staff College, Queenscliff.⁷⁰ The shortage of officers and the legal requirement that most officers be RMC graduates was solved by the creation of 'RMC Wings' offering short courses in Australia and Japan.⁷¹ The eventual solution was the amendment of section 148, and, in 1952, the creation of the Officer Cadet School.

The commitments of the Army began to change during 1948 when the Government ordered the withdrawal all but one battalion (67th Battalion) from Japan. During this period it was decided that the regular infantry battalions of the Australian Army should have a unique designation, and, in November 1948, 65th, 66th and 67th Battalions became the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Australian Regiment. In March 1949, the Regiment was granted the prefix 'Royal'. One of the reasons for seeking this title was the belief that it would make it harder for a government to disband the permanent infantry force.⁷²

Upon its return to Australia, 34th Brigade was renamed 1st Brigade, and its units were dispersed throughout New South Wales and Victoria.⁷³ Units of the Brigade were understrength during this period.⁷⁴ The numbers on full-time duty fell, and the re-raising of the CMF in 1948 required about 1000 ARA cadre staff.⁷⁵ By October 1949, the Minister was forced to admit that there were only 1000 infantrymen in the entire Army.⁷⁶

During the Korean War, the size of the full-time Army doubled from 14,651 to 29,104. The Army supported a large number of commitments entered into by the Menzies Government, including maintaining two infantry battalions in a war, training 29,250 National Servicemen per year, and providing the cadre for the CMF.⁷⁷

In an atmosphere where Australia was preparing for a war, the issue of liability for overseas service arose again. The Menzies Government announced in September 1950 that all future enlistees into the ARA and CMF would be required to serve anywhere. Subsequently, all members were invited to sign an undertaking to that effect.⁷⁸

On 14 August 1952, the Interim Army was disbanded, and all its personnel (4168) were transferred to either the Australian Regular Army or to the Regular Army Special Reserve.⁷⁹ By 1952, the Regular Army had come of age both administratively and operationally. The fighting in Korea had demonstrated the fighting efficiency and bravery of the new Regular Army, and a new generation of junior leaders had proved their worth in battle.

But the links between the Army of the Korean War and the Army of the Second World War were strong. Both shared much of the same personnel, ethos, equipment and training. The stationing of 34th Brigade in Japan had caused the continued service of a large number of wartime soldiers, at least until 1947. Whatever the motives of those Second World War men who had sought to serve on in Japan after the War, they had a professional knowledge based on years of hard operational service. In 1950-51, over 1000 civilians, who had been soldiers in the Second World War, volunteered to serve in the battalions in Korea.⁸⁰ This enabled the Army to deploy 3RAR quickly from Japan to Korea, and to man the other battalions. In addition, many other Regular Army officers and men had served in the wartime AIF or Militia. Some, like Colonel Green, had served in all three forces: Militia, AIF and Regular Army.⁸¹

These, then, were the circumstances surrounding the development and birth of the Australian Regular Army in 1947. It was a time complicated by a Federation-era legal environment, a time of new policy commitments, and a time when the foundations for a Regular Army, including conditions of service, were laid.

The year 1947 did mark a change in our Army that is worth celebrating 50 years on. Whatever the planners of that time envisaged in terms of forces for defence of Australia or forces for other tasks, the formation of the Australian Regular Army was an acknowledgment by governments that land operations could no longer be solely conducted by a Militia, or by specially enlisted expeditionary forces. There would be roles for both regulars and citizen soldiers, but the mobilisation and deployment times of modern warfare made it essential to maintain a balanced regular force in peacetime, consisting of all the arms and services.

But *from* 1947, we also celebrate the generation of men who carried the great traditions of the wartime Army into the Regular Army that fought in Korea and after. That wartime Army had three strands—permanent, Militia and AIF—and we are indeed fortunate that all three became part of the Regular Army that developed after 1947.

Endnotes

1. See GC Sligo, 'A Birthday for the Australian Regular Army?', *Research and Analysis* [newsletter of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis], June 1996. The article was based on discussions with Dr David Horner,
2. *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, vol 192, 4 June 1947, pp 3340-41.
3. Australian Archives, Melbourne, MP742/1, item 240/1/2785, Military Board Minute (meeting 27 August 1947) approved by Minister, 13 September 1947. (All sequences cited as beginning MP are held by the Australian Archives, Melbourne); MP742/1, item 273/1/381 Adjutant-General 27377 of 28 July 1947; MP742/1, item 240/1/2798, Proposed Post War Army Organisation— Brief for the Minister dated 1 October 1947, 'A' Matters, p B-1.
4. John Hetherington, *Blamey: Controversial Soldier* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1973), p 389.
5. Gavin Long, *The Final Campaigns* (Australia in the War of 1939-45, Army Series, vol 7) (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963), p 73.
6. Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War 1950-53*, vol II, *Combat Operations* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985), p 289.
7. *Defence Act 1903-81*, s 117. Section 117 was repealed by Act No 153 of 1982.
8. John Mordike, *An Army for a Nation* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), esp pp 78-82, 126-7, and Craig Wilcox, Australia's Military Forces 1903-18 and Other British Militias', paper presented at the 'Australia and Britain in War in the 20th Century' conference at the Australian War Memorial, 20 September 1997. See also WM Hughes, 31 July 1901, *CPD*, vol 3, p 3295, and James McCay, 5 August 1903, *CPD*, vol 15, p 3087.
9. *Defence Act 1903-48*, s 31(2). The section was amended on 1 January 1950. MP742/1, item 4/2/360, Adjutant-General to Secretary, 18 May 1949, 'Appendix 1: Schedule of Proposed Amendments to the Defence Act ...', p 16.
10. *Defence Act 1903-56*, s 49. The provision was renumbered s 50C and amended by Act No 92 of 1964.
11. O'Neill, *Combat Operations*, pp 9-10.
12. For example, there was an attempt to raise a permanent corps of AEME in 1944, but since it could not be categorised as a non-combatant corps, s 148 required that it be officered with RMC graduates. The attempt failed, due to the combined effect of sections 31(2) and 148 (*Military Board Proceedings 1944*, vol 5, M296). See also MP742/1, item 5/1/490, 'Agendum 543/45: Enlistment for the Permanent Military Forces', p 3, attached to War Cabinet Minute dated 18 December 1945. Section 148 was amended by Act No 71 of 1949, and repealed by Act No 51 of 1965.
13. MP742/1, item 248/1/111, Gavin Long, *To Benghazi* (Australia in the War of 1939-45, Army Series, vol 1) (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), p 74.
14. Long, *To Benghazi*, pp 29, 29n, mentioned Curtin's idea of a standing army of 10,000 men. See also Curtin, 7 December 1938, *CPD*, vol 158, p 2810, who saw a larger permanent army as a force to which the training of the Militia could be related. Squires recommended a force of 7500 men. The Lyons Government authorised the raising of part of the permanent field force (two infantry battalions and a field artillery unit: 1571 men) in March 1939, but in August 1939 the Menzies Government reversed that decision.
15. One of the arguments used for sending PMF officers to BCOF units was the loss of regimental training in India: MP742/1, item 251/24/3, Military Board Agendum 89/1946 for meeting 21 October 1946.
16. MP742/1, item 248/1/44, Adjutant-General to MS, 6 September 1944, citing War Cabinet Agendum 7/1942 of 19 March 1942.
17. MP742/1, 240/1/2322, DAGC (PS) to AG, 1 May 1946.
18. Australian Archives, Canberra, A9787/2, Item 111, Council of Defence meeting, Canberra, 12 March 1947, p 1.
19. For example, from 20 December 1944, Circular—Post War Army Planning—Conditions of Service—PMF Other Ranks', and references to DCGS Memorandum of 16 December 1944, Procedure for Submitting Post War Army Plans or Sections Thereof, MP742/1, item 240/1/1469A.
20. MP742/1, item 48/2/227, 'Report on the Royal Military College of Australia', 30 November 1944 ('Vasey Report'), pp 11, 28. On Blamey's role, see 'Vasey Report' itself (title page) and Jeffrey Grey, *Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p 114.
21. MP742/1, item 323/1/1479, 'The Post War Army-Training Requirement', 7 June 1945, para 3.
22. Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War 1950-53*, vol I, *Strategy and Diplomacy* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), p 23, citing Defence Committee Minute 234/1945, 19 June 1945.
23. O'Neill, *Strategy and Diplomacy*, p 23, citing Defence Committee Minute 476/1945, 19 November 1945. On the interim force during demobilisation: MP742/1, item 284/1 /325, 'Outline Plan for Demobilisation of the Australian Defence Forces', 23 August 1945, pp 1,19.
24. Long, *The Final Campaigns*, pp 73-4. The two regulars were LTCOL TJ Daly (2/ 10th Bn) and LTCOL JLA Kelly (31st/51st Bn).

25. Ibid, p 581. The figures given elsewhere are often higher (eg MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation: Demobilisation 1939-45 War', dated 25 March 1954, stated that the Army was 398,594 strong as at 15 August 1945, with over 200,000 personnel overseas).
26. Ibid, p 581.
27. MP742/1, item 240/1/2274, Chifley to Francis Forde, Minister for the Army, 15 February 1946; Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army' (manuscript held by the Australian Archives, Melbourne), pp 17, 22-23.
28. Ibid. At the end of hostilities in 1945, it was estimated that there were 344,038 Japanese personnel in areas administered by Australian troops (Long, *The Final Campaigns*, p 555). Four Australian brigade groups were being used in 1945-46 in the Dutch East Indies. C M F troops could not be used outside Australian territory (eg as garrisons) after 2 March 1946, due to the provisions of the *Defence (CMF) Act 1943*.
29. The Army was still involved with this as late as 1947-48.
30. Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army', p 20.
31. The demobilisation period was from 1 October 1945 to 15 February 1947. In 16 months, 349,964 personnel were demobilised (MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, Post War Army Organisation and Activities: Demobilisation 1939-45 War', dated 25 March 1954, p 1).
32. Shipping was not only crucial for transporting Australian soldiers. The shortage of shipping spaces meant that large numbers of Japanese (and Formosans and Koreans) could not be repatriated. Consequently, the Army had to maintain a large number of troops in New Guinea as garrisons in 1946, and could not demobilise as quickly as the Government wished (MP742/1, item 240/1/2274, Adjutant-General to Forde, 4 March 1946). (Chifley approached MacArthur for increased shipping spaces.) There was constant pressure on senior Army officers during 1946 from the Minister, Forde, insisting that the Army demobilise at a faster rate. A Committee of Review of Interim Army Strengths was appointed under Sinclair in April to hasten the process (MP742/1, item 240/1/2449). Forde was being attacked by his colleagues, the Opposition and the press who perceived that the Army was being extravagant in its use of manpower. From the Army's point of view, it had to retain some skilled men against their wishes to meet Government tasks (MP742/1, item 240/1/2447, Forde to Sinclair, 6 August 1946, Adjutant-General to Secretary, 13 August 1946, and *Daily Telegraph*, 6 August 1946).
33. MP742/1, item 240/1/1957, Report by Adv HQ AMF- 25 October 1945. 34 Brigade opened its headquarters at Pandansari (Balikpapan) on 8 October 1945. The Brigade and its units later concentrated at Morotai.
34. MP742/1, item 240/1/1957, Adjutant-General signal 161030K October 1945 and S.8265 of 3 October 1945; David Chinn, 'Raising a Regular Infantry Force', in David Horner (ed), *Duty First: The Royal Australian Regiment in War and Peace* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990, p 6; GC Sligo (ed), Notes of Discussions between Major JB Godwin and Major-General DS Baldwin at Townsville, 27 October 1984'.
35. Sturdee relinquished his appointment as Acting Commander-in-Chief on 28 February 1946, and the new Military Board arrangements applied from 1 March 1946 (Military Board Proceedings 1946, vol 1, M1) .
36. MP742/1, Item 5/1/495, Inaugural General Meeting of the Military Board, 28 February 1946, p 8, and attached Press Statement by Mr Forde, Melbourne, 28 February 1946. The Minister attended and chaired several 'general' meetings of the Board where he laid down or discussed policy. In 1954, the Secretary became a full member of the Board.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. Sturdee's remarks at inaugural meeting of the Military Board, 28 February 1946, and letter by Mr JT Fitzgerald; John Buckley, *Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer* (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1993), p. 57.
39. MP742/1, 248/1/127, Press Release effected by the Prime Minister in Melbourne at 4 pm on 22nd February, 1946'. (The Scheme was based on War Cabinet Agendum No 428/1945.).
40. General Northcott shortly afterwards became Governor of NSW, and General Beavis later accepted a government appointment.
41. CRS A816, 52/301/245, SF Rowell, 'The Post-War Army—Policy Paper No 1', 6 March 1946, paras 36, 38, 48 et al.
42. O'Neill, *Strategy and Diplomacy*, p 23, citing Defence Committee Minute 460/46, 19 December 1946. By the time these proposals were considered by the Council of Defence in March 1947, the suggested period of national service was four months' continuous training.
43. MP742/1, item 240/1/2447, Acting Minister of Defence (Forde) to Minister for the Army (Forde), 19 July 1946, pp. 2-3, including quotations from the Treasurer.
44. Australian Archives, Canberra, A9787/2; Item 111: Council of Defence, 12 March 1947, pp 2-7.
45. CPD, vol 192, 4 June 1947, pp 3340-41; Australian Archives Canberra, A2703/XR2, vol 4, Cabinet Meeting, 3 June 1947. The ARA Field Force could not be raised in Australia until the bulk of BCOF returned (MP742/1, item 240/1/2850).
46. CPD, vol 192, pp 3340-41; MP742/1, item 240/1/2798, 'Proposed Post War Army Organisation—Brief for the Minister dated 1 October 1947', Training, p 3, para 9; and David Horner, *The Gunners: A History of Australian Artillery* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), pp 427-8, citing D MacLean, The

Development of the Australian Army 1945-50' (BA (Hons) thesis, University College, UNSW, 1987), pp 43-4.

47. A9787/2, item 111, Council of Defence, 12 March 1947, p 7; O'Neill, *Combat Operations*, pp 6-7. The Government believed that an obligation to serve in any overseas location would reduce the number of recruits for the PMF. It appears that the Army had proceeded on the assumption that enlistment in the PMF/ARA would be for service abroad, since in January 1948, the attestation form had to be changed (MP742/1, item 116/1/2322).

48. CPD, vol 192, p 3341, 4 June 1947.

49. Rowell, Policy Paper No 1, paras 15-22, 33-35. The effects of the decision to rely on voluntary enlistment meant (in the view of the Army) that the mobilisation times would be slow, and that the only Forces available in the first year of a war would be the permanent brigade, and the CMF formations after about nine months: CRS A816, 52/301/245, Army Post War Plan (March 1947), para 3; and Policy Paper No 1, para 36.

50. General Blamey's proposals had been considered by the War Cabinet on 9 November 1945, and were minuted on 13 November 1945. The next day, the Minister wrote to Blamey inviting him to resign at the end of November 1945. Sturdee was appointed Acting Commander-in-Chief from 1 December 1945, although Blamey's wartime service did not officially end until January 1946.

51. There was some hesitancy, based on principle rather than personality, about the appointment of a CMF Member to the Board. The first appointment was Major-General Wootten in 1948.

52. See, for example, C Coulthard-Clark, *Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia, 1911-1986* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp 150-1, Grey, *Australian Brass*, p 121, and David Horner, *General Vasey's War* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992). There was some opposition to the increased prominence given to the permanent forces: see O'Neill, *Strategy and Diplomacy*, pp 28-9.

53. MP742/1, item 5/1/490, 'War Cabinet Agendum 543/43: Enlistment for the Permanent Military Forces', and Minute dated 18 December 1945.

54. MP742/1, item 5/1/490, Adjutant-General 15221 of 15 February 1946, 'Resumption of Recruiting'.

55. MP742/1, item 240/1/1957, Adjutant-General signal of 161030K October 1945 and S.8265 of 3 October 1945.

56. MP742/1, item 240/1/2317, Military Board Minute of 3 May 1946, based on Agendum dated 2 May 1946. Increasing use was being made of the term 'interim' or 'interim force' by other departments on issues such as income tax exemptions for BCOF. The Military Board decided that the term needed a clear definition.

57. Army Office Secretariat, 'Commonwealth of Australia Gazette Notice Supplement No 9 1947 No 198 of 16 October 1947', and Executive Minute No 140 of 1 October 1947, reprinted in *Australian Army Orders and Gazette Notices 1947*, pp 503-4; CPD, vol 192, p 3341.

58. MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, Post War Army Organisation and Activities: Demobilisation 1939-45 War' (26 March 1954), p 3.

59. Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army', p 49.

60. Ibid, pp 46, 49; MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, Post War Army Organisation and Activities', p 3 (1 July 1948: 19,735 serving: 6167 ARA, 2577 RASR, 10,991 Interim Army; 25 June 1950: 14,651 serving: 1952 pre-war PMF, 6953 ARA, 4593 RASR, 1153 Interim Army).

61. The issue had gone to War Cabinet in 1945. The Government would not amend the *Defence Act* until the shape of the postwar forces had been determined (MP742/1, item 5/1/490, War Cabinet Agendum 543/45 Enlistment for the Permanent Military Forces', and Minute dated 18 December 1945). See also MP742/1, item 240/1/2447, Adjutant-General to Secretary, 13 August 1946, and MP742/1, item 240/1/2274, Clowes to Forde, 8 March 1946: lacking an establishment for the post-war PMF, one expedient suggested by the Army to assist in retaining skilled personnel was to recruit against vacancies on the 1939-40 PMF establishment. This foundered on legal difficulties until September 1946, when Cabinet authorised a larger (temporary) PMF establishment of 17,954 pending a final decision on the structure of the post-war army. Also MP742/1, item 251/1/2441, Military Board Minute, 6 December 1946, and Agendum 104/1946.

62. MP742/1, item 240/1/2798, MBI No 114/47 (13 June 1947), Introduction of New Pay Code. A system of non-reduction allowances and gratuities was introduced for those who had been on higher (eg AIF) rates of pay. The Treasury had attempted to impose tax on the AIF during in 1942, but Blamey fought this and obtained exemptions.

63. CPD, vol 197, pp 1424-7, Mr Dedman, House of Representatives, 5 May 1948. Officers with high wartime ranks but lowly substantive ranks were still paid out on the basis of their substantive rank under the new scheme: CPD, vol 197, pp 1620-1, 1627-8, Mr White, 3 June 1948.

64. MP742/1, 248/1/127, Press Release effected by the Prime Minister in Melbourne, 22 February 1946.

65. MP742/1, item 240/1/2785, Military Board Minute (meeting 27 August 1947); the amending act was Act No 71 of 1949, which took effect on 1 January 1950; MBI 191/1947, 7 November 1947.

66. MP742/1, item 240/1/2785, Military Board Agendum 141/1947 dated 26 August 1947, and Military Board Minute (meeting 27 August 1947).

67. *Defence Act 1903-50*, s 31, MP742/1, item 240/1/2798, 'Post War Army Organisation', dated 17 February 1949, 'A' Branch Matters, p 2.

68. *Defence Act 1903-48*, ss 31(2) and 31(3); Army Office Secretariat, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No 36 of 15 May 1952, reprinted in *Australian Army Orders, Supplements, Amendments and*

Military Board Instructions 1952, p 149; *CPD*, vol 205: House of Representatives: 12 October 1949, p 1257; Senate: 27 October 1949, p 2126.

69. MP742/1, item 4/2/360, Draft Minute XA.1622, Adjutant-General to Secretary, March 1949, para 5; MP742/1, item 4/2/360, Adjutant-General to Secretary 18 May 49, enclosing Appendix 1. The Peace Treaty with Japan was signed in 1981.

70. MP742/1, item 323/4/421, Northcott to Secretary, 29 November 1945, on retaining the Staff College (Staff School). As early as 20 January 1944, DMT was considering which training schools should be retained in the postwar army (MP742, item 323/1/1479).

71. MP742/1, item 248/1/172, Military Board Agendum 182/1947 dated 27 October 1947, for meeting 29 October 1947; Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army', p 39.

72. O'Neill, *Strategy and Diplomacy*, p 33.

73. Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army', p. 77.

74. Wayne Klintworth, 'Formation of The Royal Australian Regiment', in David Horner (ed), *Duty First*, pp 54-5.

75. *CPD*, vol 192, 4 June 1947, p 3340 (on cadre numbers).

76. O'Neill, *Strategy and Diplomacy*, pp 31-2, citing Chambers, 12 October 1949, *CPD*, vol 205, p 1300.

77. Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army', p 49; MF742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, pp 6-8. The Army had to train 29,250 national servicemen per year, beginning in August 1951. In 1951-52, there were three intakes per year, each of 9750. Each intake conducted 98 days of continuous training, followed by service in CMF units. This placed great pressure on the ARA for staffing the NS training battalions, and for accommodating the trainees (MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, pp 13- 16).

78. Given the international situation, Menzies announced on 22 September 1950 that Australia had to be prepared for a possible war in three years. The Cabinet decision that the PMF and CMF should, in future, be enlisted for service anywhere was made on 11 October 1950. In the case of the CMF, the undertaking was only to be enforced in the event of a major war (MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, pp 6,17). Subsequently, all serving PMF and CMF members were invited to sign the undertaking. Section 49 was not revised until 1964.

79. Army Office Secretariat, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette Notice Supplement No 6/1952 No 53 of 31 July 1952, reprinted in *Australian Army Orders, Supplements, Amendments and Military Board instructions 1952*, p 303. The author's 'best guess' interpretation of the various legal entities is as follows:

(a) 1939-30 September 1945. In terms of the *Defence Act*, the Military Forces (AMF) consisted of the PMF and the CMF. After 1939, the PMF consisted of the 'Pre-War PMF members, those (few) appointed to the PMF during the war, and a new legal entity, the AIF. In 1939, s 31(4) was added to the Act to prevent members of the AIF from being covered by the PMF superannuation arrangements. In practice, most 'Pre War PMF' members were seconded or transferred for service in either the AIF or CMF. The AIF were volunteers enlisted for service anywhere, whereas the CMF could only be sent to a restricted zone in the South West Pacific. The CMF contained conscripts (and volunteers).

(b) 1 October 1945-30 June 1947. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF, however, consisted of several legal entities, including: the PMF; the AIF; and, after 1 October 45, the Interim Army. The AIF was disbanded on 30 June 1947.

(c) 1 July 1947-31 December 1949. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The main legal entity under the PMF was the Interim Army, to which all those on full time duty were enlisted or seconded. Within the Interim Army, there were a number of administrative entities, including the ARA (1947-) and the RASR (1948-). Prior to being named the ARA, that force was known as the Post-War PMF'. The statistics often also separate out the Pre-War PMF".

(d) 1 January 1950-14 August 1952. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF consisted of the Active PMF (the ARA, and a 'time of war' force, the Interim Army), and the Reserve PMF (the Regular Army Reserve and the RASR). Members of the Regular Army Reserve were not on full time duty, but the members of the other three entities were on FTD.

(e) 15 August 1952-. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF consisted of the Active PMF (the ARA, and any force that might in future be raised in time of war), and the Reserve PMF (the Regular Army Reserve and the RASR). The Interim Army had been disbanded, and its members remaining on FTD had been transferred to the RASR.

80. MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, p 9. They were enlisted on a three-year engagement. The 1951 enlistments were on a two-year engagement.

81. LTCOL Green had commanded the 2/11th and 41st Battalions prior to commanding 3RAR: Klintworth, 'Formation of The Royal Australian Regiment', in Horner (ed), *Duty First*, pp 66-7.