

**THE FOUNDATIONS OF VICTORY:
THE PACIFIC WAR
1943-1944**

**NO 'BLACK MAGIC':
DOCTRINE AND TRAINING FOR JUNGLE WARFARE
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In the official history of the New Guinea offensives, doctrine and training hardly rated mention. These issues did not sit well in a volume that, David Dexter wrote, was 'the story of the front line—if operations along a gloomy jungle track, or on a rain-drenched razor-back, or in the stifling kunai can be so described'.¹ Only recently has this neglect begun to be rectified. Tim Moreman has analysed the British Commonwealth's armies' experiences of jungle warfare in South-East Asia and the Pacific,² while John Coates has delivered an excellent case study of the 9th Division's campaign in New Guinea including discussion of doctrine and training.³ Others have focussed on the earlier Malayan and Papuan campaigns. Coates has concluded that even with these campaigns behind it, 'the army remained in the trial and error stage of training and doctrine'. Not until November 1944 was the first detailed manual for tropical jungle warfare printed.⁴ Yet progress was still made in the period in question. Doctrinal errors from the Papuan campaign were rectified and a sound system of training set in place.

Before 1942, there was little or no institutional knowledge of 'jungle warfare' or the territories of Papua and New Guinea. As Moreman has noted, the conduct of jungle warfare 'was largely alien territory to the officers and men of the pre-war ... Army'. Its special characteristics were not covered in *Field Service Regulations*, the 'tactical bible' of the British Empire's armies, with only a few hard-to-access manuals on bush/forest/ jungle warfare produced for colonial forces in Africa and Burma.⁵ The arc of islands stretching across Australia's north, regarded as an 'island barrier', also was little known. The official historian of the Papuan campaign, Dudley McCarthy, noted that 'few Australians had much knowledge of them, and the military leaders mostly shared the general ignorance'.⁶

In early 1942 officers returning from the Middle East and others in Australia sought information on jungle warfare, Japanese tactics and 'the islands' from any sources including escapers from overrun territories. Their impression was that 'with respect to the training necessary for jungle warfare and as required to counter those [tactics] of the enemy we have a lot to learn and the sooner we learn it the better'.⁷ Historians and veterans agree that the immediate response was inadequate. With no real knowledge of the islands, commanders and staff could give troops only simple ideas about jungle warfare. An infantryman recalled that the 'hairy goat capers of running up & down' timbered mountainsides in northern New South Wales and Queensland 'did nothing for us tactically but we were very, very fit physically'.⁸ On the Kokoda Track, Australians were shown to be 'novices at jungle warfare'.⁹ Many experienced 'feelings of claustrophobia' and they struggled to adapt tactically. Even the 16th Brigade, which spent five months on Ceylon training in jungle and rubber plantations, was, in retrospect, only 'slightly jungle minded'.¹⁰ McCarthy summed up this period thus:

The ignorance of New Guinea which prevailed in any circles until the year was well under way resulted in losses of life which could have been avoided, in wasted effort and tactical reverses ... [also] the lack of training and discipline in some militia units resulted in unnecessary deaths and inefficiency in battle. On the other hand there was an amazingly quick and thorough adaptation to the demands of tropical and bush warfare by individuals and units whose previous experience had been in no way related to this type of operation ...¹¹

The Army would prepare for its second island campaign with the knowledge gained, at great cost, in the first.

Perhaps the most important advance in doctrine and training after the Papuan campaign was simply to reaffirm the importance of doctrinal handbooks and training manuals. In addition to the 'bible', *Field Service Regulations*, or FSR, the arms and services had supplementary training manuals. For the infantry, the leading manual was *Infantry Training: Training and War* (1937), commonly referred to as *IT 1937* or *IT 37*. Also important was *Training Regulations* (1934), which laid down the training framework and suggested methods of instruction. These had stood the Army in good stead but in 1942, as officers struggled to conceptualise 'jungle warfare', with many thinking it was something altogether new, the handbooks and manuals were not so well utilised. Training was shaped by hastily produced memoranda and pamphlets based on reports from key escapers including Brigadier Ian Stewart, former commander of the 2nd Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, and Major-General H Gordon Bennett, commander of the 8th Division, Australia Imperial Force.¹²

No directives were issued to discount doctrinal handbooks and training manuals, but pamphlets and training memoranda on jungle warfare produced in 1942 referred to them only rarely. In October 1942 Brigadier Selwyn ('Bill') Porter, 30th Brigade, criticised the implication: 'Of late, every manual, text-book and report reeks of the implied doctrine: "the Jap does it this way, so we must".¹³ Battalions had begun converting to 'light infantry', with emphases on reduced motor transport and greater tactical mobility, in answer to (and replicating) Japanese tactics. Exercises resembled actions fought in Malaya, with 'defending' troops deployed in thick scrub flanking roads and 'attacking' troops encircling them.¹⁴ Porter wrote that the focus on this earlier campaign and enemy doctrine blurred British/Australian doctrine:

There can be NO doubt that every campaign has its own local colour, which is blindingly vivid to the participant who knows NO other campaign; and, even to the seasoned campaigner, tends to unbalance the bases which should exist in every tactician's mind and which have existed in our FSRs for so long.¹⁵

The end of the Papuan campaign provided an opportunity, through conferences and reports, to collate, evaluate and disseminate lessons. Several reports on operations stressed the need to refocus on the tried and tested doctrinal handbooks and training manuals. Lieutenant-Colonel AG Cameron, 3rd Battalion, wrote that 'although lessons may be learnt from notes such as [those issued after Singapore], our existing text books provide a sound basis for infantry training'.¹⁶ Captains LB Ferguson and ON Fairbrother, 2/2nd Battalion, reiterated that although there were 'special aspects of jungle warfare needing specialised training, the fundamentals laid down in IT 37 still apply'.¹⁷

There was also broad agreement among senior officers who stressed that the principles of war were not altered. Early in 1943, the Directorate of Military Training produced a draft pamphlet stating that jungle warfare was a specialised form of warfare requiring detailed tactical guidelines and methods. Major-General George Vasey, General Officer Commanding, 7th Division, responded by warning against the 'tendency of clouding "Jungle Warfare" with too much Hoodoo'. He argued that 'jungle warfare' was not fundamentally different from other forms of warfare.¹⁸ Major-General AJ Boase agreed:

an endeavour has apparently been made to embody the tactical principles and methods enunciated in 'FSR' and 'Infantry Training'. It is submitted that this is beyond the scope of a pamphlet of this nature. It would be better to concentrate on emphasising the differences in applying those principles and methods under jungle warfare conditions, rather than to endeavour inadequately to include normal aspects of tactical training which are dealt within existing manuals. Where necessary, reference to the relevant sections of other training manuals could be included.¹⁹

Moreman has suggested that prewar regulars, many of them graduates of Staff College at Camberley or Quetta, were more inclined to point out the principles of war as enunciated in *Field Service Regulations*.²⁰ They were so successful that a British observer of Australian training in 1943-44 noted: 'The Australians go so far as to say that *Field Service Regulations* is the "Bible" and contains "all the answers".²¹ This was reflected in pamphlets issued to formations training in 1943: 'Tactics in the Jungle are not "BLACK MAGIC". Certain special training is needed and certain special emphasis on particular principles of war is needed, but the fundamentals laid down in Inf Trg still apply.'²²

Having chosen to adapt established doctrine, the Army also then adapted force structure. The introduction of jungle divisions, with supporting arms and services pared back, was a direct consequence of experience in Papua. Midway through that campaign, Porter had predicted this because, he argued, the 'dictates of past local colour' invariably produced changes in structure, equipment and tactics:

After the Libyan campaign, we increased our mobility with wheels and tracks. After Syria, we experimented with pack transport and added fire power suitable to that terrain. After Malaya, we set about equipping for flat jungle country with roads. After the Owen Stanley incident, I expect we will enter the plains on foot, carrying a mountain battery or two.²³

He was correct in that infantry divisions were rejigged as jungle divisions with (even lighter) 'light infantry' and transport and artillery cut to the bone. The official historian, Gavin Long, discussed this with at least one American officer, Brigadier-General Jens A Doe. Doe believed that in formulating doctrine the Australians did not balance the lessons of Papua adequately. He believed they drew too heavily on the experience of mountain warfare on the Kokoda Track while discounting, to a degree, lessons from Buna where artillery was more decisive.²⁴ The Australians were compelled to become more adept 'jungle fighters' whereas Americans made greater use of artillery to pound enemy positions. As Stephen R Taaffe has noted, 'The American assaults did not exhibit much finesse at the tactical level, but it was hard to argue with their success'.²⁵ Long responded to Doe's comments by noting that there was a certain practicality to Australian force structure and doctrine—the army simply did not possess the logistic resources to maintain equipment and artillery comparable to the US Army's.

Rebuilding and retraining of formations in 1943 was a major undertaking. The 7th and 9th Divisions had lost heavily in Papua and Egypt, respectively, and militia brigades also had been decimated by combat and tropical diseases in Papua. John Laffin, who served in the 2/31st Battalion, explained the necessity for retraining, particularly in light of jungle warfare:

a veteran battalion needed retraining, as men who had recovered from illness and wounds rejoined it and reinforcements marched in. After a long period in action and under active service conditions soldiers become careless and forget their training, especially those parts of it which involve operations as an entire unit. In the Kokoda and Gona fighting no battalion was ever together as a complete unit. The various companies could rarely manoeuvre together and even the platoons of a company were separated from one another ... In addition, while the battalion had been on active service, new weapons had come into use, as had fresh doctrines about operations.²⁶

The 2/16th Battalion's historian suggested that, perhaps with the setbacks and heavy casualties of Papua in mind, this period of rebuilding and retraining was also seen as one in which troops could ensure more effective and less costly fighting next time: 'the veterans ... approached jungle training much in the mood of specialists anxious to become perfectionists'.²⁷

Virtually all reinforcements to combat units in 1943 had been introduced to jungle beforehand—some in action, having come from disbanded militia battalions, and others at the jungle warfare school established at Canungra in the Macpherson Ranges, Queensland, in November 1942. The school had three wings comprising a reinforcement training centre, an independent company (commando) training centre, and a tactical school for junior officers. Well regarded from the start, it improved as more jungle-experienced instructors arrived.²⁸ The reinforcement training centre at Canungra was, in essence, a finishing school for recruits destined for the fighting arms. Infantry training had been centralised with all recruits now passing through this establishment at the end of basic training; and no longer were they virtually guaranteed a posting to a unit raised in their home State. Centralised training was brought in for all arms and services. At Canungra, recruits were introduced to 'jungle' but, in accordance with *Infantry Training*, were not expected at this stage to perfect tactical drill. An instructor explained:

We try to give him an insecure sense of his security in jungle warfare against the Jap. We teach him the difficulties and the measures to overcome them and then train him to use his thinking processes and moral courage in the application of those measures. However, he must be impressed with the fact that only the highest order of mental and physical alertness and condition will insure his survival.²⁹

The emphasis was on getting recruits used to jungle and the noises of battle in it. One man who passed through the course in early 1943, Harry Pugsley, left a vivid account of the assault course completed in the last days:

Before us lay a fast running stream in which pre-set charges of explosives went off around us with a roar throwing up huge columns of water as we raced through them. Next was the most dangerous section—through a portion of rainforest in which hidden figures of Japanese soldiers cut from sheets of flat iron suddenly appeared briefly, for us to fire at, some of us with rifles, others with Owen sub-machine guns. We were in full battle dress, being yelled at by our instructors ... while all the time heavy machine-guns were firing on fixed lines over our heads [and] ... mortar bombs were dropped before us ...³⁰

Pugsley commented that 'we rookies reckoned we had earned a "returned from active service badge" after safely completing the "blood and guts" course'.³¹

Most were posted to a unit on the Atherton Tableland. They continued training with the men whom they would fight alongside, perfecting tactical drill. No longer were men fresh out of basic training sent to units in the field. In Papua, hundreds had arrived to reinforce depleted units—a system that had functioned for many years. It worked in some instances; for instance, the 39th Battalion took in 300 reinforcements after returning from the Kokoda Track, but it had almost two months to finish training these men and weed out 'dead wood' before going back into action.³² Lieutenant-General Iven Mackay, General Officer Commanding, New Guinea Force, explained that sending reinforcements to units in the forward area was not expected to cause a serious problem because one lesson of the First World War 'was that efficient battle experienced units could quickly absorb large reinforcements and still maintain their fighting efficiency'.³³ Brigadier George Wooten, a veteran of that war, kept his 18th Brigade going at Buna and Sanananda by absorbing about 600 reinforcements. However, although 'very welcome' and they 'pulled their weight', to some extent they just made up the numbers. They were psychologically, and probably tactically, ill-prepared.³⁴ Brigadier Ivan Dougherty, a young brigade commander, refused to take a batch who arrived just before his 21st Brigade emplaned for Gona because he 'knew what they would be like'.³⁵ Ferguson and Fairbrother declared such reinforcements liabilities: 'they have not the faintest idea of the elementary principles of Jungle Warfare. The worth of reinforcements would be increased 100% if they were trained with the Bn.'³⁶

The major challenge was to produce divisions capable of jungle warfare *and* trained 'in a common mould'.³⁷ The Papuan campaign had also showed up the shamefully inadequate training of militia units, several failing in battle or suffering unsustainable casualties. On the Sanananda Track the 36th, 49th and 55th/53rd Battalions suffered casualties relative to some of the worst on the Western Front a generation earlier. Porter reported that they went into action:

NOT fit for war. What success these units achieve or may achieve is due to a percentage of personnel who are brave in the extreme, and, is the result of unskilful aggression. Unfortunately, the latter personnel have been almost exterminated ... The remainder lack confidence in themselves and their weapons, and they lack discipline, due entirely to lack of training and, in some cases, cowardice.³⁸

Poor training had resulted in setbacks and more lives lost than was necessary. For practical and political reasons, this could not happen again. A concerted effort was made to produce 'one army', rather than the split AIF/Militia forces with markedly different standards of training. Many militia units were designated 'brackets AIF' units—for instance, the 58th/59th Battalion (AIF)—denoting that over half their men had volunteered for the AIF and were no longer militiamen. Theoretically, they received standardised training.

Another key development was selection of a new training area. In November 1942 Lieutenant-General SF Rowell, former commander of New Guinea Force, had reported: 'The only way to train for jungle operations is to train in actual jungle ... Unless troops live under conditions under which they have to fight, they will be dominated by their environment.'³⁹ General Blamey ordered a reconnaissance of the Atherton Tableland in northern Queensland. It was ideal, being relatively close to New Guinea, reducing transit time, with rugged country suitable for jungle and mountain training; and a relatively healthy climate (free of malarial mosquitoes).⁴⁰

Access to the Atherton Tableland and the lessons of the Papuan campaign made training markedly better and less narrowly focussed on 'jungle warfare' than the year before. In April 1943 Lieutenant-General LJ Morshead issued a II Corps training directive making it clear that while formations would train in jungle they would still be 'well fitted to undertake operations in any type of country'.⁴¹ Laffin described one area as 'near-jungle ... we advanced along open valleys, with protective platoons moving along the hills on either side'; this proved good preparation for the Markham Valley.⁴² Other parts of the Atherton Tableland were 'luxuriously clothed in rain forest'.⁴³ The only units to train extensively in tropical jungle in this period were those positioned in reserve in New Guinea, with several battalions training in and around Milne Bay.

For the men of the 9th Division, with battle experience only in North Africa, training for jungle warfare could be perplexing but they set about mastering it. Coates noted that the division was indeed fortunate in that months of training in well-chosen jungle-clad country 'represented a luxury that previous groups of Australians who had been rushed to New Guinea to stem the tide could not afford'.⁴⁴ They could also draw on the experiences of men who had fought in Papua. Brigadier DA Whitehead recalled that contact with assorted groups enabled him and others to grasp that it wasn't all just 'jungle': 'one group had fought in the mountains: the other along the plain. What they were telling us differed markedly. Eventually, we made up our own minds'.⁴⁵ They did so in part by turning to *Field Service Regulations* and its principles of war to devise training programs:

These principles are applicable to operations in any theatre of war ... Knowing these principles and appreciating that non-observance of any of them may lead to failure in battle and often to disaster, commanders of all ranks should be able to understand more clearly the requirements of battle and organise their training accordingly ... The battle must be fought in accordance with these fundamental principles. THE OBJECT OF TRAINING IS SUCCESS IN BATTLE.⁴⁶

Pamphlets stressed that with the close confines and limited visibility of jungle all ranks needed to achieve exceptionally high standards in tactical drill:

Complete confidence in one's self, one's weapons and one's leaders is very necessary to overcome the fear of the unseen. Necessity for a battle procedure, fully understood by all ranks, cannot be over emphasised. Pl and Coy control are essential, but the balance of responsibility devolves more heavily than ever upon the Sec Comd and on PTE BROWN himself.⁴⁷

This accorded closely with objectives in *Infantry Training*, which was to produce through individual and collective training a 'formidable fighting man', alert, confident in his use of weapons, able to stand fatigue, highly disciplined, determined, inquisitive, self-dependent, but always acting as one of a team.⁴⁸

Also progressively added to training programs was greater cooperation between the arms and services—including cooperation with armoured units and aircraft, especially important as close air support would partly make up for reduced artillery support. The 9th Division also commenced training in amphibious operations, with units sent to Trinity Beach near Cairns for introduction to landing craft, laying the foundations for amphibious doctrine and cooperation with American naval forces.⁴⁹ Infantry battalions preparing for the New Guinea offensives were thus probably more highly and technically trained than any had been before.

The Army would continue analysing and disseminating lessons from every subsequent campaign. However, most of the key aspects of jungle warfare had been realised by early 1943 and appropriate doctrine and training programs were introduced. Self-assurance was noted by a member of the British Military Mission 220 sent to assess operations in the South-West Pacific Area:

The Australians have seen more fighting against the Japanese than anybody else, and are morally absolutely on top. They are confident, man for man, they can beat the Japanese anywhere, and at any time. Their ideas on training are eminently sound, and they have all facilities for training large numbers.⁵⁰

Reports on operations in New Guinea in 1943-44 declared that the Army had got it right. Of the Markham-Ramu Valley campaign, the 18th Brigade stated: 'It is not considered that the operation brought to light any new lessons of importance, though many lessons of previous operations were again emphasised.'⁵¹ A 9th Division report on the Huon Peninsula declared: 'Owing to the lack of any real opposition there are few tactical lessons to be gained from these operations. What there were only went to confirm previous experience in jungle warfare.'⁵²

The conclusion was that doctrine and training for operations in 'the islands' had been righted. The perplexity evident before the Papuan campaign, and mistakes during it, did not recur. Although refinements could be made in most areas, from tank and air support to logistics, the Army effectively had mastered jungle warfare. Reports from even later campaigns put this down to 'the well tried principles of war and the accepted tactical teachings ... there is no "black magic" in jungle fighting'.⁵³

Endnotes

1. David Dexter, *The New Guinea Offensives* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961), xv.
2. Tim Moreman, 'The Jungle, the Japanese and the Australian Army: Learning the lessons of New Guinea', paper presented to the *Remembering the War in New Guinea* symposium, Australian National University, 19-21 October 2000, on the Australia-Japan Research Project/Australian War Memorial website; see also his forthcoming *The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth* (London: Frank Cass).
3. John Coates, *Bravery Above Blunder: The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1999).
4. *Ibid.*, 52-3.
5. Moreman, 'The Jungle, the Japanese and the Australian Army'.
6. Dudley McCarthy, *South-West Pacific Area—First Year Kokoda to Wau* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1950), 34.
7. Australian Corps, 'Notes of conference held 16 Feb at 2100 hrs', in Brigadier Kenneth Wills papers, A[ustralian]W[ar]M[emorial] 3DRL/6201 folder 4.
8. Angus Suthers, ex-2/12th Battalion, Old Toongabbie, letter to author, 19-23 June 1992.
9. Chester Wilmot, 'Observations on the New Guinea campaign, August 26th-September 26th 1942', National[A]rchives of[A]ustralia (Sydney) SP300/4 file 5.
10. John Moreman, 'A Triumph of Improvisation: Australian Army operational logistics and the campaign in Papua, July 1942 to January 1943' (PhD thesis, UNSW/ADFA, 2000), 266-7.
11. McCarthy, *South-West Pacific Area*, 59.
12. See John Moreman, "'Most Deadly Jungle Fighters'?: Australian infantry in Malaya and Papua, 1941-43' (BA (Hons) thesis, University of New England, 1992), 33-38; and Moreman, 'The Jungle, the Japanese and the Australian Army'. Bennett's *Army Training Memorandum (War) (Australia) No 10*, or *Notes on Japanese Tactics in Malaya and Elsewhere and Tactics to Counter-Attack and Destroy the Enemy*, was more widely distributed (one per ten officers) and of greater value than is perhaps popularly believed. Although some senior officers refuted his claims that the report was used ahead of the Papuan campaign, several reports mentioned its suitability. For example: 'enemy tactics in the Maroubra [Kokoda] campaign did not vary to any great extent to those accounts of which have already been published, notably in ARMY TRAINING MEMO (Aust) No 10 and TACTICAL METHODS 1942'. The latter was an American-produced pamphlet. HQ 9th Div, 'Owen Stanley - Buna Operations: Information gained on the enemy', 1 May 1943, in HQ 9th Div—G Branch War Diary, AWM52 1/5/20 April-May 1943 Appendices.
13. Brig, SHWC Porter, 30th Brigade, 'Notes on recently expressed concepts of tactics', 11 October 1942, AWM54 923/1/6. 14. Moreman, 'A Triumph of Improvisation', 92-4.
15. Porter, 'Notes on recently expressed concepts of tactics'.
16. Lt-Col AG Cameron, 3rd Battalion, 'Notes on New Guinea fighting', 19 December 1942, AWM54 577/7/29 Part 16.
17. Capts IB Ferguson and DN Fairbrother, 'Notes on the New Guinea campaign 4 Oct to 10 Dec 42', in Land Headquarters pamphlet 'Notes on the campaign in Papua', 8 February 1943, AWM54 937/3/7.
18. Vasey to Adv LHQ (DMT), 13 March 1943, AWM54 937/3/33.
19. Boase to Adv LHQ, 19 March 1943, AWM54 937/3/33.
20. Moreman, 'The Jungle, the Japanese and the Australian Army'.
21. Military Mission 220, or Lethbridge Mission, report quoted in Moreman, 'The Jungle, the Japanese and the Australian Army', p 11.
22. 'Jungle warfare extracts', nd [post Papuan campaign], AWM54 923/1/5.
23. Porter, Notes on recently expressed concepts of tactics'.
24. Gavin Long interview with Brig-Gen Doe, in Gavin Long notebooks, AWM67.
25. Stephen R Taafe, *MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 52.
26. John Laffin, *A Kind of Immortality* (Sydney: Kangaroo Press, 2000), 136.
27. Malcolm Uren, *A Thousand Men at War: The Story of the 2/16th Battalion*, AIF (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1959), 187.
28. An American officer who inspected Canungra in late 1943 reported that every officer instructor had battle experience and all would have been rated in the US Army as 'Excellent' or 'Superior'. Col Kenlon G Epling, US Army Ground Forces Observer Board, Southwest Pacific Area, 'Report on Australian Training Center (Jungle Warfare)', 12 December 1943, held by United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks Library, D767.U5-1942/45v.I, B-9.
29. Instructor quoted by Epling, *ibid.*
30. Harry Pugsley, *Confessions of a Dole Bludger!* (Brisbane: Boolarong Publications, 1984), 138.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Victor Austin, *To Kokoda and Beyond: The Story of the 39th Battalion 1941-1943* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988), 178.

33. Lt-Gen IG Mackay, General Officer Commanding, New Guinea Force, cover note to '18th Aust Inf Bde Report on Operations Cape Endaiadere-Buna-Sanananda, 14 Dec 42 to 22 Jan 43', 22 February 1943, AWM54 581/7/31.
34. WB Spencer, *In the Footsteps of Ghosts: With the 2/9th Battalion in the African Desert and the Jungles of the Pacific* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 135, 149.
35. Interview by the author with the late Maj-Gen, Sir Ivan Dougherty, Cronulla, 27 June 1992.
36. Ferguson and Fairbrother, 'Notes on the New Guinea campaign 4 Oct to 10 Dec 42'.
37. Dexter, *The New Guinea Offensives*, 228.
38. Porter to Maj-Gen GA Vasey, GOC, 7th Division, 'Fitness for War: 55/53 Aust Inf Bn and 36 Aust Inf Bn', 22 December 1942, in State Library of Victoria, Sir Edmund Herring papers, file 12/9.
39. Lt-Gen SF Rowell, 'Report on Operations New Guinea Force, 11 Aug to 28 Sep 42', November 1942, AWM54 519/6/60.
40. Dexter, *The New Guinea Offensives*, 228.
41. II Corps Training Directive No 1, 14 April 1943, quoted in Coates, *Bravery Above Blunder*, 48.
42. John Laffin, *Forever Forward: The Story of the 2/31st Infantry Battalion, 2nd AIF 1940-45* (Newport, NSW: 2/31st Battalion Association, 1994), 113.
43. Uren, *A Thousand Men at War*, 186.
44. Coates, *Bravery Above Blunder*, 49.
45. Brig DA Whitehead quoted in Coates, *Bravery Above Blunder*, 53. 46. 2/17th Battalion training memorandum quoted in *What We Have ... We Hold': A History of the 2/17 Australian Infantry Battalion 1940-1945* (Balgowlah, NSW: 2/17 Battalion History Committee, 1998 edn), 192.
47. 'Jungle warfare extracts'.
48. *Infantry Training: Training and War* (London: The War Office, 1937), 10.
49. For amphibious training and also the early difficulties of inter-Allied cooperation in relation to these operations, see Coates, *Bravery Above Blunder*, 54-60.
50. Maj-Gen JF Evetts, Military Mission 220, quoted in Moreman, 'The Jungle, the Japanese and the Australian Army'.
51. 'The New Guinea campaign: Report on operations of 18 Aust Inf Bde Ramu Valley-Shaggy Ridge, 1 Jan 1944-6 Feb 1944', AWM54 595/6/3.
52. 'Account of Operations 9 Aust Div for capture of Lae 4 Sept 43-16 Sept 43', AWM54 589/7/34.
53. 17th Brigade, 'Report on Operations in the Aitape-Wewak area November 1944-August 1945', 15 October 1945, AWM54 630/7/23 Part 1.