

# ***THE BOER WAR: ARMY, NATION AND EMPIRE***

## ***CONVENIENT CONFLICT? FROM FEDERAL DEFENCE TO FEDERATION***

**Luke Trainor**

Australian federation and the South African War constitute an important conjuncture. In the months preceding the war the Federal Enabling Bill had been passed in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania and was thought to be on the verge of being sent to Britain for parliamentary consideration. It was, however, as separate colonies that Australia sent troops. Still the contingents were despatched with a degree of efficiency and integrated into the British war effort fairly smoothly. This was partly because a federal defence scheme had been long advocated both in Britain and Australia. 'Federal defence' had various meanings. At one end of the spectrum it could mean pragmatic arrangements for military harmonisation between different colonial governments, although that had its own assumptions built in regarding, for example, possible threats and who should contribute to resistance against them. At the other end it involved a joint military or naval scheme between the colonies themselves and Britain and that might be a prelude to Australian or even imperial federation. A case of the latter, broader, meaning of federal defence is provided by the British Colonial Defence Committee which looked forward in January 1900 to federation which would 'remove many of the difficulties in the way of a scheme involving the co-operation of all the colonies of Australia (which had) furnished, without previous agreement, over 2500 men for South Africa and were preparing to considerably add to their contingent'.<sup>1</sup>

It is important therefore first to define and examine the notion of federal defence, which was not federation but could shape it and second to suggest the ways in which the war might have been convenient or inconvenient for federal defence.

The establishment of federal defence as a British goal goes back at least 20 years before federation. A recognition of the size of Australia and the poor communications pointed to the need for co-operation between the colonies at the time of the 1870s war scare, although at that time there were substantial obstacles, such as a lack of inter-colonial railways. The defence of ports and coaling stations, a prime requirement, would have to rely on small, permanent local batteries without the prospect of reinforcement. In Britain, the Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Carnarvon 1879-82, although offering that crucial advantage of bridging the usually insuperable War Office-Admiralty gap, had to recognise the impact of the Gladstone Government formed in 1880. Carnarvon wrote: 'They dislike any thing or person which may oblige them to spend money on military objects and they contend that such an enquiry as ours should be carried on by departments of government rather than by outsiders'.<sup>2</sup> The reports therefore emphasised the efficiency of defence co-operation and federation among the colonies, arguing that it would make Australia self-defending and a model for other colonies since Australia offered the prospect of financial contributions to Imperial naval expenditure as prosperity grew. Further, the reports sketched out the elements of federal defence, and flesh was put on it by the work of Sir Peter Scratchley, defence adviser to some colonial governments in the early 1880s while he participated in commissions and enquiries. In New South Wales he chaired a sub-committee of colonial commandants of the 1881 Commission under Sir James Martin, Chief Justice of New South Wales. Scratchley wanted to see each colony assign a number of permanent artillery to a federal force. That did not form part of the final report but in New South Wales and in other colonies' reports a proposal for an Inspecting Officer to help provide uniformity and resolve disputes in the forces in peace time did appear; for Scratchley such an officer would command in war.<sup>3</sup>

The federal defence scheme which was being urged for Australia had various components: the regulatory and legal framework; weapons of war; officers and men; area of service; and, the ultimate control of the forces. Proposals were modified over time, of course; nor could the military or naval personnel, even when briefed in Britain or Australia by core protagonists of the idea, be relied upon to argue the same case. A familiar example was the definition of the

likely threats to be met by Australia. Military men might envisage Russian or French invasion with troops carried by the invading naval force while a Royal Naval Commodore, like Wilson, might dismiss this as 'storming the moon'.<sup>4</sup> Still, there were large areas of agreement among the 'defence community' on possible federal or co-operative steps which should be taken.

There was concern to develop a shared framework in law and regulations. Scratchley urged this at the Defence Inquiry Commissions in New South Wales, Queensland and subsequently Victoria.<sup>5</sup> He recognised that the smaller colonies, such as South Australia and Queensland, could not easily entertain the idea of a permanent Artillery Force, although he did stress the importance of paid Volunteers. For Victoria and New South Wales, however, the 1880s saw a gradual shift towards what was termed a partially-paid militia alongside the Volunteers, with the prospect of greater discipline and less rapid turnover of the members of the forces. The permanent force came under regulations which were a simplified version of the British original.

The limitations of colonial legislation in the case of serving with British troops abroad became obvious in 1885 when Dalley, acting as New South Wales premier while Stuart was convalescent in New Zealand, offered troops for the Anglo-Sudan War. Stuart termed the offer 'more plucky than prudent', and added, 'Doubtful if Act contemplates service outside the Colony, if not discipline cannot be enforced'.<sup>6</sup> This was overcome after a style by men removing themselves from the New South Wales forces and volunteering for the British Army. Although serving alongside British troops, the Australians were not subject fully to British discipline—as demonstrated by the establishment of separate courts martial and an absence of corporal punishment.

As a result the War Office pressed then and after for such contingents to be placed under the British Army Act and the Queen's Regulations and to serve under a British Commander. This proposal was tabled, although not for discussion, at the Colonial Conference in London in 1887. It was scarcely the right time for the British Government to have the matter discussed. Anti-imperialism was a rallying call in eastern Australia and there was deep suspicion of British plots. Still, the War Office drew up a dormant Order in Council to extend the provisions of the Army Act to the colonies in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, since it was a legal necessity that troops be raised under a British officer.<sup>7</sup> That in turn meant British command, but it was thought in London that a surge of feeling in war would make this acceptable in Australia.

Uniformity of the armaments, a second aspect of the proposed federal defence scheme, was a consideration which quickly became important. There were proposals, which did not succeed, for a federal cordite factory and for standardisation of rifles, but the most significant was for the naval forces for Australia. Federal defence was never a purely military project. Those who were involved in the matter, beyond some members of the military forces, took both defence forces into account and generally regarded the navy as the first line and they focussed on port defence. More than that, the debates surrounding the eventual formation of the Australasian naval defence agreement, 1884-91, provided analogies and precedents for military measures which might be read, by some observers, as further stages in a process of imperial defence federation. Sir Henry Loch, who was to shift, as Governor, from Melbourne to Cape Town in 1889, attempted during the 1880s to discourage an Admiralty proposal which might have led to a strengthening of local navies, which he feared as a source of separation of the colonies from Britain, and to substitute instead a scheme by which each Australasian government would pay a subsidy towards a squadron on the station. Loch attempted to further the notion of financial support for the Royal Navy by convening a conference of premiers, governors and Tryon, the naval commander-in-chief. He explained to Stuart, recently the New South Wales Premier, that the conference would, he hoped, discuss:

the naval defence of Australasia and the commerce in these seas in the event of war. I should also like to see a common union with respect to the military defence of these colonies based upon some understanding which would give the colonial forces a direct interest in the Imperial Army that would be proportionately beneficial to us here and to the Mother Country.<sup>8</sup>

It must be recalled that this was almost simultaneously occurring with the formation of the Australasian Federal Council and that made the negotiation of such conferences more difficult since New South Wales had refused to join the Council. Loch's conference proposal failed but Tryon met the politicians and in 1887 the Naval Defence agreement was concluded between colonial and British representatives at the Colonial Conference in London. The Australian hostility to it and to the messages of imperialism which it carried are extremely plain in the historical record.<sup>9</sup> Still, Loch returned in 1888 to his federal defence suggestions; the naval agreement was only a prelude, he wrote, to 'a union of Imperial forces for the preservation of the freedom and the protection of the commercial and other interests of the empire ...'. The next step should be the amalgamation of the several Australian military forces. It would enlarge the area of promotion for officers and, in war at least, allow the movement of troops from one colony to another. A Commanding Officer would be needed and the forces could be used if Russia threatened North India and the Suez Canal was blocked.

In an associated confidential despatch to the Colonial Office of the same date Loch suggested that a further colonial conference should be held in Australia, a Second Act to the London Colonial Conference. Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, suggested that the agenda include the issue of Chinese Immigration to Australia, as a draw-card; but the answering Colonial Office despatch did not refer openly to the 'military question referred to in your despatch', although it was plain that the visit of an Inspecting Officer, possibly Wolseley, as a springboard to defence federation was part of the plan.<sup>10</sup>

This, third aspect of federal defence, the exchange of personnel between British and Australian forces, was important as giving reality to the grand schemes formulated chiefly, but not only, by the British. The idea was of a British Inspecting Officer who would in peace report on each of the Australasian forces and nudge them towards an assimilation of practice—frequently towards the British Army model—where that seemed desirable. In war, the same officer might well command the troops. This had been promoted by the Carnarvon Commission and foreshadowed by Jervois and Scratchley as colonial government advisers in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Analogous naval inspections were undertaken by the Royal Navy commander on the station. The proposal for an Inspecting Officer jointly serving the Australasian colonies was discussed at the 1887 Colonial Conference in London. Griffith, the Queensland Premier, supported the idea at the conference and, behind the scenes, Dr JM.Creed, a New South Wales parliamentarian anxious about defence preparedness, had written placing the idea before Lord Carnarvon and others in Britain.<sup>11</sup> A decision was not reached although a conference participant wrote: 'I gather that the feeling was in favour of some officer of standing and reputation coming out to organize a general system and then of periodical inspections'.<sup>12</sup> There followed the familiar prolonged negotiations. Victoria wanted Wolseley. In New South Wales Parkes fought a vigorous rearguard action, inviting his own inspecting officer, Major-General H Schaw, who came from New Zealand. Schaw's report did not keenly advocate the inspecting officer scheme or federal defence.<sup>13</sup> Parkes had to react to such British military propositions as this despite his reluctance to spend money on defence. Moreover, he was wary of federation, since the other colonies were seemingly attempting to trap him into the Federal Council. A fundamental point was Sydney's position as the naval base for the Royal Navy in Australian waters; it was an arrangement which provided security and commercial advantage for New South Wales, making Australian federal defence seem superfluous as well as costly and yet it required some show of concern lest the Admiral think of establishing a base elsewhere. Finally in 1889 the British Government agreed to pay for the visit of Major-General J Bevan Edwards from China, an offer difficult to refuse.

Eastern Australia was now linked by railway, a Federal Council with four colonies as members existed, however weakly, and Edwards felt able to recommend an Australian Fortress Corps with detachments of permanent forces from each colony to make about 1000 men in all. It could be enlarged in war and resist an enemy landing; it could defend King George's Sound and Thursday Island as two important coaling stations. Overall in reports on each colony and Australia generally, he advocated an integration of the colony's forces because each colony still had its own legislation, pay and commitments. He took the emphasis off fortifications and placed it firmly on federal defence. Sir Henry Norman, Queensland Governor and soldier, warned:

If the federating of troops is too much stressed I am sure difficulties will arise and those who are opposed to votes for troops will find their hands strengthened. I have no doubt that federation will come in time but it is a question surrounded with political difficulties and there is much that can be done to improve defence without raising controversial questions at present.<sup>14</sup>

Schaw, reporting to Parkes two years earlier, had addressed the problem of maintaining well instructed, up-to-date and vigorous officers in a small, largely volunteer, force. 'Two solutions appear to be possible', he said. One was a federation of forces but he said little of that. The second was the employment of British officers on contract and they could act as instructors as well for the Volunteer officers.<sup>15</sup> This was, in modified form, a return to the British Conservative policy, which the first Gladstone Government had modified around 1870, of keeping a British military presence in the colonies. British officers on contract to the colonies could bring problems, as Parkes knew. Colonel Roberts, Commander New South Wales Artillery, complained to Parkes about a British officer, Bingham, who was receiving orders about which Roberts knew nothing.<sup>16</sup> Parkes recognised the political dimensions of the issue. When the Colonial Office proposed to give military and naval chiefs precedence over governors, he wrote that it would

tend to shake Australian feeling which enters so largely into the bond of union ... (The) Admiral commanding Her Majesty's ships ... however widely respected, will always be looked upon as the servant of the Imperial Government with no interest in our affairs and no ties binding him even for a time to our fortunes.<sup>17</sup>

The fortunes and roles of British officers serving with Australian forces as military commandants, a practice introduced over the decade from the early 1880s, has been already well discussed by Stephen Clarke.<sup>18</sup>

The last Australasian colony to appoint a British commandant was New South Wales. Major-General ETH Hutton picked up in 1893 where Edwards had left off and gave greater prominence to federal defence, elaborating it, taking it into the area of political difficulties of which Sir Henry Norman, the Queensland Governor, had warned. Parkes, aware that Edwards' report might be used to push New South Wales into the Federal Council secured his own military advice from Major-General Strange who had arrived from Canada to promote the Maxim gun. He and Lady Parkes obligingly fired it. Strange supplied a memorandum asserting that there could be no federal army without a federal government and the Federal Council was inadequate for that purpose. He did not think Edwards' Federal Military College would work: 'The first necessity of military training is discipline. The most general characteristic of university life all over the world is insubordination'.<sup>19</sup> Nor did he think that an enlargement of the infantry was necessary. He commented that in Canada the artillery had been given rifles and had put down riots—a useful reminder that 'aid to the civil power', although concealed, was never far from military planning as became obvious in the strikes of the early 1890s. Strange was not supportive of the idea that the federal Australian force should be used to fight abroad. He thought that it would be unpopular in New South Wales, the British pay would be too low and the War Office would wish to use its own troops rather than those of the colonies who could best be used in developing their own territory.

There were two last issues regarding federal defence raised here by Strange and Edwards—who was to control federal defence and was it to provide troops for Britain abroad? They had been implicit, sometimes explicit, during the 1880s but were more sharply defined in the 1890s. First, as to control, Parkes in 1889 at Tenterfield famously adopted defence as a powerful argument for federation: federal forces would have to be controlled by a federal government. Alternative control structures, lines of responsibility, were pushed to the sides of federal debate. Still, they remained present. The Australasian Federal Council retained a frail existence during the 1890s but its use for defence purposes was limited. Take for example the attempt to garrison King George's Sound. Queensland could garrison Thursday Island because its defence legislation allowed movement of its troops outside the colonial borders; South Australia's, like that of the other colonies, did not. An Act of the Federal Council was needed to enable South Australian troops to serve in Western Australia. Such an Act had

then to be brought into effect by enabling Acts of the constituent colonies, but it applied only to that specific case, although Sargood, the Victorian Defence Minister, suggested to the Federal Council in 1893 a federal regiment of permanent artillery that could help garrison the coaling stations.<sup>20</sup>

Another possibility of federal control was lurking in the British proposal for an Inspecting Officer and the possible adoption of the British Army Act. In the event of war the Inspecting Officer might become the Commander and use the legal framework of the Army Act so that the British government would, advising Queen Victoria to whom all troops swore personal allegiance, be in control. In addition, in Britain the military believed that 'once the decision for war was made, the military were considered supreme and completely in charge ... The commanding officer was thus personally responsible for ensuring every aspect of the army's requirements for a particular region'.<sup>21</sup> It is interesting that Bevan Edwards hoped to secure the Tasmanian governorship in the expectation that he would be on the spot to take command if the need arose. Or to consider a further example of the persistence of the schemes for direct British wartime control: Mordike cites the amendment proposed by British authorities to the 1897 draft Australian Federation Bill, section 68, which 'would have given the British parliament a constitutional basis to command Australian forces'.<sup>22</sup>

In 1893 when Hutton arrived as New South Wales first British Commandant on contract, the Federal Council remained in existence, as did the possibility of British control of the forces in some surge of opinion in a war. Parkes' federal initiative which had helped produce the 1891 Convention had run into the sand. Hutton still gave great impetus to what he termed federal defence by securing a meeting in 1894 of Australian commandants under Major-General Tulloch of Victoria. It produced a detailed federal defence plan and developed the points which Edwards had suggested but proposed a Council of Australian Federal Defence which would be set up at short notice in war. It would appoint a Military Head who, together with the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the station, would be responsible for the protection of Australia. The commandants further developed that plan in 1896 enlarging the area, to which the proposed federal forces could be sent, to cover the South Pacific. That was not new in the sense that the colonies had contemplated action against European powers in, say, the New Hebrides in the 1880s and British war planning, such as it was, contemplated such action; Major-General Tulloch had undertaken a secret mission to report on Noumea in 1893.<sup>23</sup> The federal defence plan could not contemplate action for Australian troops beyond this area because it would provoke domestic opposition. There was a constraint on another side so far as the Colonial Office was concerned: at the instigation of Sir Henry Norman, the Queensland Governor, they refused permission to Hutton to publish the 1894 plan and the scheme enunciated for an Australian Defence Council was blocked as well, partly because British authorities rejected the possibility of war being conducted by a Council, but mainly because the Commander-in-Chief on the station, Bridge, refused to contemplate sharing the disposition of vessels with 'non-naval' personnel. Still, with Chamberlain's encouragement, the Colonial Defence Committee memorandum in July 1896 was circulated to the colonies embodying the federal defence features which have been sketched. British control of the forces was implicit although not mentioned, especially since the CDC spoke of the colonies contributing to an expedition abroad. That such an expedition would be in South Africa was contemplated in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid when support for the British government in the Australian major newspapers had been strong and South Australia offered troops.<sup>24</sup> It was all too sensitive in Britain for war with the Afrikaner republics to be openly contemplated, but the Australian federal defence role for mounted infantry fitted neatly the likely southern African situation.

Thus it was that long before even the Jameson Raid the ground had been laid for a system of federal defence assimilating under British commandants to some extent the regulations and practice of the Australian and New Zealand military forces, establishing a legal framework in the event of war, standardising weapons and the machinery of war on the basis of naval as well as military needs and addressing the knotty problems of command, political responsibility and the possible use of Australian and New Zealand troops outside their own borders to aid the empire. One should not be surprised that there was concealment and manipulation involved, especially on the side of the British armed forces and government apparatus. There was a culture of secrecy. Commandants attempted to use the Official Secrets Act for

concealment.<sup>25</sup> There was little attachment to democracy as that was understood in contemporary popular movements and there was long practice at playing off the various governments and people of Australia and New Zealand against one another. None of this is to say that there was any lack of people in Australia to collaborate with these strategies; real, existing imperialism was understood by contemporary Australians not as between the Mother Country and the colony but as involving all the components of the various societies involved: class, ethnic and geographical origin—especially that of the Aboriginal people—gender, age, religion and so on.

These tensions were not lessened in the last three years before the outbreak of the South African War. The nearness of federation heightened them. For example, under the encouragement of Lord Brassey, the Victorian Governor, a scheme was promoted for the exchange of troops between Britain and Australia to better secure standardisation. It failed for a number of reasons. There was War Office reluctance to contemplate exchange of colonial units of substantial size under Australian control, since they wished to ensure that Australian troops were under British command. There was the example of the New South Wales Lancers unit which was accepted for training with British Cavalry in 1899, but they were private volunteers.<sup>26</sup> Again, the perennial difficulty of the low British pay rates was an obstacle. Australians and New Zealanders at the war were resentful of the calls of 'five-bob-a-day colonials'.

In the later 1890s the British Government was face to face with the early prospect of the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia but it left them uneasy. It raised issues about the federal defence project that had long been advanced. Federation itself might consolidate or help fragment the Empire. The war, in prospect, might produce a surge of imperial support or trigger further evidence of republican and separatist feeling. In what sense if any would the war be a convenient conflict?

Reflecting on the war long afterwards, Tom Vincent of the New Zealand sixth contingent, raised the issue: 'I tell you one thing I could never find out. What was the war over? You tell me that. I don't know now what that Boer war was over'.<sup>27</sup> The tone of his comment suggests scepticism concerning the contemporary explanations; certainly the answers offered by historians are now very different. The war gave an impetus to nationalisms and the complex identity politics which fed them. Certain masculinities were defined; in the Afrikaner or Boer case focussed on the Commando; in the Australian case they emerged from the gender conflicts of the 1890s and perhaps the richly ironic male talk of the birth of the nation and the shedding of blood. Again, the conflict was cast as a white man's affair, partly because the British record regarding Africans in the Southern African colonies and Rhodesia did not bear examination, hence the emphasis placed on the *Uitlanders'* franchise issue. When New South Wales troops went to the Sudan in 1885, a British Tommy remarked: 'Blimey, these walers are white'. In this case, whiteness may have been a particular commendation for the 1899 federal defence exercise. How much better to have Anglo-Celtic Australians acting as 'white Gurkhas' than Indian troops.<sup>28</sup>

Contemporaries thought of colonial nationalisms being fused in the crucible of war, new nations within the Empire, as Kipling called them. Although this begs many of the questions of modern debate concerning nation-wide communities and identities it was consistent with a contemporary British notion of an Empire of federations, clusters of colonies exerting sway in their region both through shared defence and through British investment and trade being made more secure. In this way the Empire would include 'white federations' each exerting influence in its own geographical area, for example, New Zealand and Australia in the South Pacific. Andrew Porter's *The Origins of the South African War* concludes that 'the maintenance of British supremacy together with the ultimate intention of promoting federation (were) the local objects on British endeavours in South Africa'.<sup>29</sup> The Australian participation in the South African War could serve these same goals, but a good deal hinged on the nature of the federation. The process had been marked by ambiguity, in British eyes. The Federal Council, firmly under the Crown, had not succeeded; the Federal Convention of 1891 had met in the shadow of a clear rejection of imperial federation and affirmation of republicanism, along with bitter strikes. The new initiative at the 1893 Corowa Conference with its place for

popular involvement, sealed by legislation in each colony and concluded with referenda ran the risk of producing a constitution which might, if it were rejected or substantially amended by the British Parliament, cause a rupture; but if accepted, as passed in Australia, might have features which would not protect the continuity of British supremacy.<sup>30</sup> British ministers were reluctant therefore to say that they would pass the bill as produced in Australia. If it were possible to introduce elements which would make separation impossible it could be a useful safeguard. Federal defence offered that possibility because Australian armed forces would be integrated with the British forces and under, ultimately, British command. That would indeed be federation under the Crown.

The federal defence scheme over time had placed in key positions British officers responsible to the War Office for their fortunes. Part of their task was to formulate in peace structures for war. Federal planning was essential to that. Regulations, assimilable to those of the British forces could be issued by the commandants, political control was not part of their powers, but pre-federal structures had set up a dynamic. New South Wales was able to play in the 1890s, as they had at the time of the Sudan War, the role of collaborator. Reid's readiness to back Hutton's schemes on occasion was not some personal flaw in his nationalist fibre but arose from the case that could be made against federation, the security that had to be provided for the naval base—federal defence would spread the cost of that— and the desire to get the best possible deal for his colony. There was no prospect in peacetime of the defence forces being placed under British direct control. Even the existing constitutional responsibility of the governors did not extend to command in war. Parkes at the 1891 Convention had claimed without dissent that defence must be of a federal character and 'under one command by a federal officer answerable to the national government of Australasia'.<sup>31</sup>

But would not war produce a different situation? Contemporary observers frequently thought so and this was the last, best hope of the federal defence enthusiasts in the CDC and at the War Office and also the observers elsewhere. The idea of war as a catalyst for some form of federal defence can be found in *The Last Great Naval War*, a work written under a pseudonym by GS Clarke, the secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee, and in comments of Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, Alfred Deakin and George Reid. The readiness to participate, signalled long before, was heightened by the war talk. As in the Sudan War the War Office was somewhat reluctant to accept large numbers of colonial troops at first and the federal force sketched out in the Hutton plans was still eyed with some caution by the War Office. Indeed, the proximity of federation made that superfluous. The troops came under British command and the New South Wales Government made repeated requests for British officers instead of the less experienced local officers. With the early defeats, the number of Australians increased, the majority, in the New South Wales' case, being men who had served in the colonial forces before.<sup>32</sup> The standard training they had received helped them fit in well with the British forces with whom they served.

The ground for Australian war participation had been prepared for more than twenty years. It probably made easier the passage in Britain of the bill establishing the Commonwealth, although that did not prevent the amendment of the section dealing with Appeals to the Privy Council.

When the Commonwealth was inaugurated the New South Wales Government had taken considerable care to ensure a substantial military presence from Britain and the Empire. The Governor-General, Lord Hopetoun had been brought from Albany in a Royal Navy warship. There were good local reasons for this. Still the occasion had an imperial military flavour: military, although the Australian governments liked to think that the war was virtually over, and imperial, since, despite repeated New South Wales Government requests, British authorities would not countenance a military or naval presence from the United States or Germany.<sup>33</sup>

## Endnotes

1. John Mordike, *An Army for a Nation, A History of Australian Military Developments 1880-1914* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 63.
2. Carnarvon to Whitbread, 18 August 1881, private, Add Mss 60796, British Library, London.
3. Royal Commission on Defence, 1881, Defence Papers, 829 ff esp Question 353, 4/7054A, Archives Office of New South Wales (hereinafter AONSW); Scratchley was attempting to fulfil a similar position in a military promotion dispute: see letters exchanged between Parkes and Loftus, 5, 6 and 7 February, 1881, Parkes Papers, A891, Mitchell Library (hereinafter ML).
4. Luke Trainor, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, conflict and compromise in the late nineteenth century* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28 ff.
5. Queensland Volunteer Force, Military Committee of Inquiry, *Qld Votes and Proceedings*, 1882.
6. Stuart to Dalley, 13 February 1885, Col Sec 4/856, AONSW.
7. For the draft Order in Council, War Office to Colonial Office, 1 April 1892, CO 323/389; for the legal necessity of raising troops under a British officer, see Great Britain, *Parl Paps* 1904, XL, questions 8253-54.
8. Loch to Stuart, private, 27 December 1885, Stuart Papers, MSS 1279/16, ML.
9. See Queensland *Parliamentary Debates*, 53, 22-23 November 1887.
10. Loch to CO, 6 January 1888, CO 881/8; Loch to CO, confidential, 6 January 1888, CO 309/132, Public Record Office, Kew (hereinafter PRO).
11. Creed to Beresford, 31 May 1887, and Beresford to Creed, 12 July 1887, Carnarvon Papers, Add Mss BL.
12. War Office to CO, 16 November 1887; minute by Lord Onslow, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, CO 201/607, PRO.
13. Defences of New South Wales, confidential, 1887, Col Sec 1/2679, 1887 Minutes, AONSW.
14. Norman to Carrington, 8 October 1889, 1146, Carrington Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, by courtesy of Brigadier Palmer.
15. Schaw, 'The Defences of New South Wales', 15.
16. Roberts to Parkes, confidential, 21 February 1888, Parkes Papers A927, ML.
17. Parkes on Circular Despatch from Colonial Office, 26 February 1889, Col Sec Despatches, Main Series, 1889, Minutes 1/5961, M4981/B, AONSW.
18. See Stephen Clarke, "'Manufacturing "Spontaneity"? The Role of the Commandants in the Colonial Offers of Troops to the South African War', in this volume of essays (129-50), drawing on his unpub PhD thesis, 'Marching to their Own Drum: British Army Officers as Military Commandants in the Australian Colonies and New Zealand 1870-1901', University of New South Wales, 1999.
19. FB Strange, confidential, Memorandum as requested by Sir Henry Parkes, 29 October 1889, Parkes Papers, A907, ML.
20. Federal Garrison Act [56 Vic No 1] Victorian Government Gazette 1893, 131.
21. Keith SurrIDGE, *Managing the South African War 1899-1902: Politicians v Generals* (Woodbridge; Boydell Press for the Royal Historical Society, 1998), 6.
22. Mordike, *An Army for a Nation*, 51.
23. Report on New Caledonia, strictly confidential, enclosed in Hopetoun to Ripon, secret. 20 August 1893, CO 537/94, PRO.
24. AP Haydon, 'South Australia's First War', *Historical Studies* 42 (1964), 222-33.
25. Beauchamp to CO, 1 November 1900, CO 201/629, PRO.
26. Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, rev edn, 1999), 52.
27. Recording held in Radio New Zealand Sound Archives, 'Spectrum' Documentary—Jim Sullivan, *The First to the Fight*, 24 October 1999.
28. K Clark, New South Wales Sudan Contingent (Sydney: Military History Society of Australia, 1972); Bill Nasson, *The South African War 1899-1902* (London: Edward Arnold, 1999), 249, 280.
29. Andrew Porter, *The Origins of the South African War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 267.
30. Mark McKenna, *The Captive Republic. A History of Republicanism in Australia 1788-1996* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 9, presents evidence of the republicanism of the years before federation and the way in which it became muted in the late 1890s, but many observers, especially in Britain where information on Australia was not always up to date, retained fears of federation leading to separation. See Trainor, *British Imperialism and British Nationalism*, 155, 159. At the same time it is important to recognise that, although not the focus of this paper, defence as part of federation did not necessarily involve acquiescence in British or Australian plans for federal defence and could involve quite other goals, such as a federal republic. See Trainor, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism*, 186.
31. *Commonwealth*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1901, 563.
32. A sample of the New South Wales contingents (excluding Imperial Bushmen, Chaplains and Nurses) can be secured from the Nominal Roll reported in June 1900. These were the forces which saw the most active part of the conflict. Only 3 percent are listed as 'specially enrolled' the remaining 6 per cent

serving at the time of enlistment; it is probable that a high proportion of the specially enrolled had previous military training (Beauchamp to CO, 8 June 1900, enclosure, CO 201/627).

33. Beauchamp to CO, 17 November 1900, CO201/629, same to same, 15 November 1900 and preceding correspondence concerning United States presence at the inauguration of the Commonwealth. Australian governments proposed to British authorities that 25 October 1900 be set at Victory in South Africa Day, a proposal rejected by the British Government.