

**SERVING VITAL INTERESTS:
AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC PLANNING IN PEACE AND WAR**

**US STRATEGY AND JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING:
THE NEED FOR 'HEDGING' AND 'SHAPING'**

Thomas-Durrell Young and Douglas C Lovelace Jr

The *National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS) expresses a two-dimensional strategy which is intended to provide for the common defence of the United States and promote its general welfare. It calls for the defence of US interests, at home and abroad, as well as the active promotion of US policies in the international arena through exploiting unique American assets to pursue unprecedented opportunities. Emphasising the two dimensions of the NSS, US President Bill Clinton observed: 'Never has American leadership been more essential—to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalise on its opportunities'.¹

The current NSS is well-suited to the post-Cold War era, given its generally favourable security outlook for Western interests and values. However, being dual-focused, that is, stressing traditional defence, as well as exploiting opportunities, has proven difficult to implement. This difficulty has been particularly manifest in the case of defence planning. The reason why the actual implementation of the NSS has not been easily effected is due in large measure to the nature of the current international security environment. The epoch of definable and quantifiable threats has disappeared, at least for the moment, thereby perplexing Western defence planners with the challenge: firstly, to plan for present and future missions, and secondly to present convincing rationales to sceptical politicians for the need to spend scarce resources on defence.² In short, the predictable threats associated with a half century of the Cold War have yielded to diverse and uncertain threats to US interests. At the same time, however, opportunities continue to arise in increasing number which, if exploited, could further US objectives significantly. This new environment of threats and opportunities has been recognised by the nation's political leadership, but has yet to evoke an adequate response from the US armed forces.

In short, joint strategic planning within the US military establishment remains focused on the defence of US interests and not on their active promotion. More specifically, the greatest difficulty encountered by US defence planners has been their inability to discard threat-based planning habits accrued over the past 50 years and adopt new planning methodologies that would facilitate the implementation of an NSS developed for the post-Cold War strategic environment. This failing has not gone unnoticed.

Consequently, serious lacunae in the current US joint strategic planning system have recently received high level attention in the US defence community and the US Congress. The Congress directed in its Fiscal Year 1997 Defence Authorization Act that a force structure review process be established to conduct 'an independent, non-partisan review of the force structure that is more comprehensive than prior assessments'.³ Concomitantly, the Secretary of Defense, acting upon the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions and responding to congressional concern, will initiate in 1997 the first Quadrennial Defense Review. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will participate in these processes. His Joint Strategy Review, which is guided by his Joint Vision 2010, will help to focus and rationalise the future modernisation programmes of the individual services. While congressional, executive and military leadership find themselves in agreement that reform of the US armed forces is needed, it is critical that these efforts produce a joint strategic planning process and product that implement both the protection and promotion dimension of the NSS.

The purpose of this essay is three fold. First, a brief analysis of the weaknesses in the current Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) will be presented. Inadequacies within current strategic planning processes which inhibit their utility in assisting the Chairman in providing integrated strategic advice to the National Command Authorities will be identified and assessed. It will be argued that these deficiencies are the result of an absence of a comprehensive National Military Strategic Plan. Second, a review of recent initiatives to address this planning deficiency will be presented, as well as assessments of their likelihood to effect positive change. Third, and finally, a reform of the JSPS, the adoption of a proposed Joint Strategic Engagement Plan, will be described as a means of moving US joint planning from its reactive character to one capable of capitalising upon opportunities to promote US interests in addition to defending them.

Joint Strategic Planning System

During the period beginning with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to the end of superpower confrontation in the early 1990s, a series of events combined to limit the effectiveness of the strategic planning conducted at the level of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Notwithstanding the effort of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to improve strategic planning by 1990, formal strategic planning at the Chairman's level fell short of that required by statute.

The three principal strategic direction and planning responsibilities assigned to the Chairman by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (codified in 10 USC) are to:

- '[assist] the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces';
- '[prepare] strategic plans, including plans which conform to the resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective' and to '[prepare] joint logistics and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and [recommend] the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistics and mobility plans'; and,
- '[conduct] net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of potential adversaries'.⁴

Nominally, strategic planning at the Chairman's level is conducted principally within the JSPS.

The JSPS is the formal process established to assist the Chairman in strategic planning. At the time of passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JSPS was defined by JCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (JCS MOP 84). This MOP, first published in 1952, survived until 1990 when it was replaced by CJCS MOP 7.⁵ The MOP 84 version of the JSPS was unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic and produced no fewer than ten major documents every two-year planning cycle.⁶ It was roundly criticised by Congress and others.⁷ Nevertheless, planning under the provisions of MOP 84 produced the *National Military Strategy Document* (NMSD) and the Base Case Global Family of Operation Plans, which collectively approached a strategic plan.⁸

Although the 1990 version of the JSPS (CJCS MOP 7) sought to streamline the JSPS in order to make it more responsive in a rapidly changing national security environment', it did not survive a single planning cycle.⁹ This streamlined JSPS envisaged one strategic planning process and three primary products:

- Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process;
- NMSD;
- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); and,
- Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA).

That new Memorandum of Policy described a system that began with the Joint Strategy Review. The objective of the review was to determine whether the NMS should be changed.¹⁰ The NMSD was to include the NMS, written and published by the Chairman, but approved by the President. Additionally, the NMSD was to contain the following recommendations:

- national military objectives;
- fiscally constrained force levels;
- military strategy and force options; and,
- a risk assessment of the recommended strategy, forces and military options.¹¹

The *NMSD* was also to feature functional annexes to supplement the base document. The annexes were to provide concise military taskings, priorities, requirements and additional guidance.¹² The *NMSD* was to serve as the Chairman's advice to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the development of the *Defense Planning Guidance*. The *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*, retained in CJCS MOP 7 as a key product of the JSPS, continued to serve as the principal vehicle by which the Combatant Commanders (CINCs) were given the task of developing global and regional operation plans.¹³

The final document prescribed by 1990 CJCS MOP 7 was the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). It provides the Chairman's assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) forces proposed by the Services.¹⁴ The *CPA* assists the Secretary of Defense in making decisions on the defence programme subsequent to receipt of the POMs from the military departments and other DOD components. It accomplished this in two ways. First, it contains the Chairman's assessment of the extent to which the various service POMs conformed to the priorities established in strategic plans and for the priorities established for the CINCs' requirements. Second, the *CPA* was to contain alternative programme recommendations to achieve greater programme conformance to established priorities.¹⁵ The 1990 version of the JSPS was aborted before completion of the JSR, which led to yet another revision of the strategic planning process.

In mid-1992, the Joint Staff began revising CJCS MOP 7 to make it reflect more accurately the manner in which joint strategic planning had been conducted during 1990 and 1991. The intent was to make it a less precise, more open-ended process that reflected the Chairman's more flexible approach in forging the NMS. Feeling somewhat disenfranchised from the process that produced the 1992 version of that document, the Services and many of the CINCs resisted the Joint Staff's efforts to dismantle the formal system.¹⁶ The compromise that emerged retained many of the original CJCS MOP 7 provisions, but also featured several important changes. The most significant change was elimination of the NMSD in favour of an unclassified, generalised *NMS*.¹⁷ This, combined with the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of OPLANs, effectively eliminated the elements that collectively served as a national military strategic plan. To date, nothing has filled this planning void.

The new *NMS* took a form radically different from that envisioned by the original CJCS MOP 7.¹⁸ Whereas the classified NMSD provided national military objectives, policy, strategy, force planning options and assessments, and risk evaluations, the *NMS*, in its new form, did not address national military objectives, but merely reiterated national interests and objectives from the 1991 *NSS*.¹⁹ While the national military strategy contained within the *National Military Strategy Document* published in 1989 consisted of some 50 pages of text specifying strategic objectives, assumptions and priorities; the 1992 *NMS* provided a ten-page discussion of what appeared to be national military doctrine, devoid of any specific strategic objectives and priorities.²⁰ It is interesting to note that although the *NMS*, in its new form, lacked the specificity of the strategy set forth in the NMSD, detailed operation planning guidance and tasks continued to be given to the CINCs via the *JSCP*. Hence, one might ask what is the basis for translating the *NMS* into the specific tasks and guidance contained in the *JSCP*?

The Joint Staff began implementation of CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), even before the revision was officially approved. A concerted effort was made to adhere to the established procedures and time-lines as closely as possible. The JSR was initiated in the autumn of 1992. By mid-summer 1993 a JSR report was provided to the Chairman and work subsequently began on a new *NMS*. However, a number of factors delayed publication of the new *NMS* until February 1995.²¹ Although featuring a new lexicon, the 1995 *NMS* is of the same form and not substantially different from its predecessor.²²

A National Joint Strategic Plan Defined

While not disparaging these potentially worthwhile internal Joint Staff initiatives, all of them potentially address only individual aspects, as opposed to the entirety, of the problem. Significantly, none of the above reforms addresses the fundamental requirement for creating strategic plans as stipulated in Goldwater-Nichols Act. The law is not clear on what constitutes a strategic plan; however, from the intent of the legislation and a review of congressional action leading up to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act one can determine what was envisaged. Strategic plans should enumerate specific strategic objectives, identify fiscal and other constraints, offer strategy for securing objectives, and play a key role in determining force capability requirements.²³

An amalgamation of the various specific references to strategic plans within 10 USC provides a more comprehensive definition. These plans:

- are to be prepared by the Chairman and should conform to the resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the periods during which the plans are to be effective;
- should be useful for assessing the capabilities of US and allied armed forces versus potential adversaries;
- are differentiated from, and are a level above, contingency plans prepared by the CINCs;²⁴
- should serve as a standard against which force capability strengths and deficiencies are measured;²⁵
- should contain strategic priorities that can be used to assess contributions of service programmes;²⁶ and,
- should integrate the theatre strategies and plans of the CINCs to ensure conformance to national military and security objectives.²⁷

From the above, one can distil a succinct definition of a strategic plan that is appropriate for the strategic planning requirements specified in 10 USC. It is a plan that specifies, in military terms, the national strategic objectives for the defence planning period under consideration (the Future Years Defence Program—FYDP period) and describes a strategy that rationalises the resources expected to be available during the FYDP with the strategic objectives described in the plan.²⁸ To support further the intent of 10 USC, a strategic plan must be based on a global perspective and should also provide:

- a definitive statement of strategic priorities;
- a means of providing unified, strategic direction for the combatant commands;
- a template for formulating and assessing changes in the assignment of service functions; and
- a basis for strategic concepts upon which joint doctrine should be based.

During the Cold War the United States possessed strategic plans that rationalised resources, established priorities, and which acted as a conduit through which US national strategy was implemented globally. Since the end of the Cold War and the US administration's adoption of a two-dimensional strategy, the current JSPS has proven to be inadequate. It should come as no surprise then that the US Congress would become dissatisfied with the inability of the Department of Defense to articulate in a convincing manner how it translates the administration's strategy into force structure. Perhaps sharing Congressional concern, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has initiated a process by which he intends to influence the future development of the US armed forces. And it is to the disparate and somewhat confusing efforts to reform the JSPS and reorganise the US armed forces that we must turn.

Reform Initiatives

Clearly, there is dissatisfaction both within the US Congress, as well as the Department of Defense, with contemporary strategic planning. Current measures to address this problem include the Joint Strategy Review, the Chairman's *Joint Vision 2010*, the Quadrennial Defence Review, and the Armed Forces Force Structure Review Act of 1996.²⁹ If their efforts are harmonised, they could produce military strategies which implement the policies set forth by the president in the *NSS*. Given the high level political attention directed at the Department of Defense, its planning processes and the structure of the US armed forces, it is likely that the initiatives will have some impact, either positive or negative. Whether they will produce processes and conditions that hedge against serious, but unlikely, threats to US vital interests, while at the same time shaping constructively the international security environment the better to facilitate the promotion US interests, remains to be seen.

Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR)

The concept of a quadrennial strategy review was endorsed by the Secretary of Defense as one of the many recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), which issued its final report in 1995. The CORM suggested that the Department of Defense should review strategy and force structure in a systematic and 'expansive' manner every four years following a presidential election.³⁰ The Chairman's initial influence on the QDR will be through his Joint Strategy Review report produced by the Joint Strategic Planning System. The current force will be used as a benchmark for comparative purposes.

Joint Strategy Review

A key product of the JSPS is the *Joint Strategy Review Annual Report (JSRAR)*. This document, the result of a comprehensive Joint Staff review of the international security environment, may fall short of recommending any changes to the *NMS*.³¹ Indeed, the Chairman may merely provide his views concerning the issues which should be considered during the QDR to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary will consider those views among others as input to the QDR.³²

Joint Vision 2010

The current Chairman recognises that technological advancements, domestic pressures, and changes in the international security environment make possible and necessitate a new vision for the US armed forces. In consequence, in summer 1996, General Shalikashvili published *Joint Vision 2010*.³³ In it, he describes what he feels are the necessary capabilities the armed forces will need over the next 15 years and outlines how information and other technologies may be applied to extant forces to fulfil the vision. By publishing *Joint Vision 2010*, the Chairman has already indicated the substance of the advice he will offer the Secretary of Defense for the QDR.³⁴ It is not anticipated that the JSRAR will contradict in any important way the thrust of *Joint Vision 2010*.

Armed Forces Force Structure Review Act of 1996

Culminating several years of congressional frustration over the inability of the Department of Defense to identify a force structure appropriate for the post-Cold War era, the US Congress passed, as part of the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorisation Act, legislation to establish a non-partisan National Defence Panel whose mission is to assess the QDR and provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on its improvement.³⁵ This review, along with an assessment of the QDR by the Chairman, will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his submission to the Congress, no later than 15 May 1997. The National Defense Panel will also conduct an independent Alternative Force Structure Assessment to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is required to report to Congress the findings of these panels no later than 15 December 1997.³⁶

Hedging and Shaping

Hedging

The significance of these four efforts occurring within a relatively short period of time suggests that the approach taken to date towards a post-Cold War *NMS* and accompanying force structures to execute the *NSS* will no longer suffice. Those infrequent occurrences in the nation's history where there is agreement for reform amongst the military, legislative and executive branches of government, makes fundamental change possible. Thus, the stage is set for a new *NMS* that includes strategic concepts for defending US interests, as well as emphasising the international security environment to promote US interests.

The nation will demand that its armed forces be capable of protecting vital US interests at home and abroad at acceptable levels of risk. But beyond that traditional expectation comes a post-Cold War consensus that the US military must be able to combine with the other instruments of national power to shape the international security environment to bring about ever decreasing threats to US interests. This is the guidance set forth in the *NSS*. Thus far, however, the US military has only partially responded to the *NSS*, by focusing on 'fighting and winning the nation's wars'.

Surprisingly, the US defence community and Congress have taken the initial steps towards achieving the objective of implementing a balanced *NSS*. The Chairman's *Joint Vision 2010* accomplishes a key task of providing a future *hedge* against threats to US vital national interests. In effect, the document takes select Cold War weapon systems and integrates new information technologies to make them even more lethal and effective against potential aggressors. Additionally, according to one press report, part of the objective of the *Joint Vision 2010* is the Chairman's desire to effect greater control over the modernisation programmes of the services to ensure that they support his envisaged structural plans.³⁷ If the Chairman is successful in this regard, he will have accomplished an important aspect of his strategic planning responsibilities by ensuring that the US armed forces are prepared to hedge against future threats.

Shaping

That which remains to be addressed relates to the *NSS* requirement to capitalise on opportunities as they present themselves in the international environment. The QDR and the National Defense Panel should recommend changes in the JSPS processes that will enable the US armed forces to be applied agilely where opportunities present themselves. In other words, the more specific question these reviews should address is what proportion of the defence budget should be devoted to capabilities which are not necessarily optimised for war-fighting, but rather would support the US armed forces in exploiting opportunities in furtherance of the *NSS*.

One way the QDR and National Defence Panel could accomplish this objective is through a recommendation to create a *joint strategic engagement plan* (*JSEP*) This document's objective would be to fill the void between the war-fighting oriented *Joint Vision 2010* and *JSCP* and the *NSS*. While the implementation of *Joint Vision 2010* can result in the creation of priorities and other resource guidance to the services for war-fighting, the *JSEP* could provide needed strategy and resource guidance for the most beneficial applications of the US armed forces in non-war-fighting roles. Moreover, the three documents, combined, would effect the joint strategic plans requirement established in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The *JSEP* would guide the overall planning for the peacetime application of US forces worldwide. The plan should be created with a view toward shaping the international security environment and defining how the US armed forces should be employed in the pursuit of US national security objectives. Importantly, the *JSEP* would specify the joint priorities to be used in force development, which would enable the US armed forces better to meet the objectives of the *NSS*. The plan would also specify force priorities for the *JSCP* for both the active

pursuit of *NSS* objectives and the planning for defending US interests, if necessary. This would better enable the *JSCP* to serve its true purpose, that is, a transition to war planning document which directs the creation of operation plans by the Combatant Commanders.

One example of how the *JSEP* would affect joint strategic planning is in the area of personnel. Following the end of the Cold War and the reduction in the force structure of the US armed forces, there has been a great need for officers and enlisted personnel with foreign language and regional expertise to capitalise upon opportunities. This has been most noticeable in staffing new embassies and military liaison team offices in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In the case of US military liaison teams, these are located in 14 ministries of defence in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the services, for a variety of reasons, have been unable consistently to provide well-qualified personnel with this expertise.³⁸ As a result, officers and enlisted personnel (active and reserve), some of whom possess no foreign language or regional expertise, have been used to staff these offices on short term bases. While not disparaging the constructive efforts of these individuals, untold opportunities and delays in achieving greater levels of success may have been missed by the war-fighting oriented personnel management policies of the services which have been out of balance with the dual requirements of the *NSS*. A *JSEP* would illuminate the requirement to provide officers and enlisted personnel with these types of expertise, to exploit opportunities to shape the future international environment. The *JSEP* would provide, therefore, the guidance needed by the services to meet this requirement.

In short, the *JSEP* would:

- allow for a better implementation of *NSS*;
- orchestrate the CINCs theatre strategies;
- recast the *JSCP* (short range) as a transition to war document; and
- provide a contextual springboard for the development of operation plans.

In sum, if the various review processes recommend the creation of a *JSEP*, the JSPS would become a more effective planning system that would be more capable of implementing the missions indicated by the *NSS*.

Conclusion

To quote the sagacious Sir Michael Howard, 'let us be clear: the West won the Cold War'.³⁹ Notwithstanding the writings of some,⁴⁰ the Western Alliance triumphed over the forces of Soviet communism. Yet, one must be careful in assigning to whom the spoils of victory fully belong. It is a bit superficial to argue that the United States and its allies 'defeated' in a political sense the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Rather, at a deeper level, it was Western norms of law and the West's adherence to the fundamental concept of the inherent dignity of man which triumphed over the Soviet concept of 'scientific man'. In its most basic form, Roman law and Greek philosophy, those fundamental manifestations of the Occident, were in the end victorious over communist despotism.

Yet, if the West is to remain cognisant of the lessons of history, then we cannot rest upon our victorious laurels. At the level of 'defence', we must be prepared to defend Western norms when challenged. As vividly demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, challenges and threats to Western norms continue to exist and they are unlikely to abate. Prudence dictates, therefore, that Western defence officials continue to make provisions in their planning to hedge against such threats as they emerge. In this respect, aspects of the current JSPS remain quite valid for designing strategy and suggesting forces required to hedge against these challenges to US interests in the years ahead.

Yet, at the 'philosophical' level, the JSPS in its current form does not sufficiently encourage the propagation of Western norms in the international security environment. Innovative strategic planning has proven difficult since the end of the Cold War for a variety of reasons. Not the least of these impediments has been the choices presented to senior military

leadership. The US armed forces, particularly the US Army, were rebuilt in the 1970s, *inter alia*, on the foundations of readiness and modernisation for large-scale warfare. No one should question the relevance, in principle, of adhering to that objective in future.

However, the question of the degree to which future joint strategic planning should be beholden solely to that principle is another matter. The new strategic environment requires that the United States direct fewer resources and attention to the force structure determinants associated with global and multi-regional conventional war. In consequence, greater resources, and certainly in a more organised and systematic fashion, should be directed to those capabilities and missions one normally does not automatically connote with 'war-fighting'.

These 'non-war-fighting' capabilities and missions could have a significant impact upon the US armed forces' future ability to shape the world by being better prepared to exploit opportunities in the international environment as they present themselves. For, without reforming the JSPS to include something akin to a *joint strategic engagement plan*, the Department of Defense will continue to be vulnerable to the charge that it is not fully implementing the NSS. Indeed, not only will it be exposed to such charges, but it will also abjure the opportunity of systematically 'shaping' the international environment, thereby lessening the likelihood of having to use the capabilities it has developed as a 'hedge' against untoward eventualities.

Endnotes

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

1. See, 'Preface by President William J Clinton', *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC, February 1996, i).
2. In the words of Andrew Krepinevich, 'Now, we don't know who the next competitor is, when they are going to show up, or how they are going to compete'. See *Chicago Tribune*, 22 September 1996.
3. S 1745 ES, 'Subtitle G—Review of Armed Forces Force Structures', Section 1091, Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1997, 450.
4. *Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces*, section 153(a) (1), (2), (3).
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy No 84, Joint Strategic Planning System* (17th Revision—24 January 1989) (Washington, DC), 1.
6. *Ibid*, 9.
7. The Senate Armed Services Committee identified the inability of the JSPS to provide useful strategic planning advice and to formulate military strategy as one of the causes of ineffective strategic planning within the DOD. Admiral Zumwalt, a former Chief of Naval Operations, commenting on a key JCS MOP 84 JSPS document remarked: 'I found this particular document to be almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Some of its prescriptions always were in the process of being falsified by events. Others were so tortured a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal'. See US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization and the Need for Change*, 495-6.
8. *Memorandum of Policy No 84, Joint Strategic Planning System*, 30, 35. The Base Case Family of Operation Plans was a grouping of OPLANs prepared individually by the CINCs in accordance with the strategy and guidance presented in the National Military Strategy Document and the specific tasks assigned in the JSCP. Collectively, they served as the 'Base Case' for Chairman- level force capability determinations and assessments as well as for identifying risks associated with implementing national security policy and achieving national security objectives. Each plan within the grouping related to others with respect to force apportionments, assumptions, timing and objectives.
9. *Memorandum of Policy No 7* (issued 30 January 1990), *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 1. Based on one author's notes and experience as a member of the Joint Staff and the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) Working Group from 1990 to 1993. Although detailed JSR Administrative Instructions were published, they were never implemented. The conduct of the JSR was deferred until after the annual CINCs' Conference. See also Harry Rothman, *Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff* (Carlisle barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992), 12-15. During the 1990 conference, the Chairman achieved consensus on a broad outline for a national military strategy for the post-Cold War period. Therefore, in consultation with the Service Chiefs and CINCs, the Chairman decided that the minutes of the conference, or more specifically the message that

summarised the conference and resulting taskings, would suffice as Chairman's Guidance and no JSR was required. This is the point at which the formal JSPS began to fall apart.

10. *Memorandum of Policy No 7* (issued 30 January 1990), *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 20-31.

11. *Ibid*, 24-5.

12. *Ibid*, 32-9.

13. *Ibid*, 40.

14. Each military department transmits its proposals for resource allocations, in accordance with its interpretation of the *Defense Planning Guidance*, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the form of a document called the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) It is the Secretary of Defense's responsibility, in consultation with the CJCS, CINCs and secretaries of the military departments, to rationalise and integrate the POMs into a coherent defence programme.

15. *Memorandum of Policy No 7* (issued 30 January 1990), *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 48-9.

16. Based on one of the author's experience as a member of the Joint Staff working group formed to revise the JSPS. The Joint Staff office of primary responsibility, J-5, initially attempted to remove almost all of the structure from the process and eliminate the regular publication of documents such as the Chairman's Guidance, NMS, and JSCP. The Services and several of the CINCs resisted this since they believed regular document publication would bring them into the process because of standard Joint Staff coordination requirements for joint documents.

17. *Memorandum of Policy No 7* (1st revision, 17 March 1993), *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 1.

18. Although an NMSD was not published under either CJCS MOP 7 or CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), NMSD FY 92/7 was published in 1989 (JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: *National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97*, 21 September 1989) in anticipation of revision of the JSPS.

19. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC, August 1991), 3-4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC, January 1992), 5.

20. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: *National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97*, 21 September, 1989, *passim*; and *National Military Strategy of the United States*, 1992,5.

21. While the Joint Staff was involved in the JSR the new Secretary of Defense initiated the now well-documented 'Bottom-Up Review (BUR)'. The BUR, intentionally conducted outside the JSPS, served to delay publication of the new *NMS*. Additionally, although his predecessor had given guidance for the development of a new *NMS*, General Shalikashvili wanted the Joint Staff to have the benefit of his guidance before proceeding. Another factor is the delay by the new administration in publishing a new *National Security Strategy*. It would have been poor form to publish the new *NMS* before the new *NSS*.

22. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC, February 1995), *passim*. We make this statement cognisant of a subtle difference between the *NMS* published by General Powell and the current *NMS* published by General Shalikashvili. In his letter transmitting the 1992 *NMS*, General Powell states: 'This strategy provides a rationale for ... a capability which will serve the nation well throughout the remainder of the 1990s'. The 1992 *NMS* was matched to the FY 94-99 FYDP. The comparable section of General Shalikashvili's letter transmitting the 1995 *NMS* says: 'This new national military strategy describes the objectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the near term'. This *NMS* is matched to the FY 96-01 FYDP. The JSPS still describes the *NMS* as a mid-range product. It is not completely clear why the current Chairman infers his *NMS* is a near-term document. However, this could be additional evidence of the need for stability in strategic planning that could be brought about by strategic plans.

23. Defense Organization and the Need for Change, 493-500.

24. *Title 10, US Code, Armed Forces*, sections 153 (a) (1), (2), (3)

25. *Ibid*, section 153 (a) (3) (C).

26. *Ibid*, section 153 (a) (4) (B), (C), & (E)

27. US Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC, 9 September 1993, III-I.

28. The Future Years Defence Program (FYDP) focuses on the period from 2-8 years into the future. For example, the FY 98-99 Department of Defense budget would normally be submitted, as part of the Presidents Budget, to Congress by February 1997. This DOD budget would represent the first two years of the FY 98-03 FYDP. The FY 98-03 would be built largely during 1996, based on Defense Planning Guidance nominally published in 1995. Thus, work on the FYDP during late 1995 and 1996 would focus on the FY 98-03 time period.

29. Recognising that *Joint Vision 2010* describes operational concepts for war in the 21st century, the document's strategic impact cannot be denied. It is the template for joint and service capabilities programming for the foreseeable future.

30. See *Directions for Defense*, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, May 24, 1995, 4-9/4-19.

31. CJCS MOP 7 describes the purpose of the JSRAR to recommend changes to the *National Military Strategy* resulting from the JSR.

32. See *Defense Daily* (Washington, DC), 10 October 1996.

33. John M Shalikashvili, 'Joint Vision 2010: America's Military—Preparing for Tomorrow', in *Joint Forces Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1996), 35-49.
34. See *Chicago Tribune*, 11 September 1996.
35. See *Defense Daily* (Washington, DC), 18 October 1996.
36. See 'Subtitle G—Review of Armed Forces Force Structures', 451-7.
37. See *Defense News* (Washington, DC), 19-25 August 1996, 4.
38. A number of visits to military liaison teams by one of the authors has confirmed this fact.
39. Sir Michael Howard, 'Lessons of the Cold War', *Survival* 36: 4 (Winter 1994-95), 161.
40. See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, 1993).