

**A CENTURY OF SERVICE:
100 YEARS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY**

ARMIES IN HISTORY, HISTORY IN ARMIES

Roger Spiller

Official military history can be defined as that form of historical work done within and for a military institution. Naturally, such a general definition obscures any number of reservations, conditions and contingencies, but it is a good starting point for how one might see this sub-variant of historical practice today. As a concept, official military history seems new; it seems to belong to the age of institutions, of organisations, of bureaucracies—in other words, to the modern age. Yet, if one remembers the purposes of official military history—casting experience into useful form—the practice must be very old indeed. From the very beginning of historical practice in the west, history at large and military history in particular have been aimed at learning from one's mistakes, or better yet, the mistakes of others. Armies must always have wanted more information, more knowledge than they had. Armies that found themselves deficient in information could fight their way through ignorance, if they were lucky, but knowledge was a way of hedging one's bets. In the eighteenth century and gradually thereafter, armies increasingly decided that knowledge was preferable to luck, and that they should begin to invest some of their time and treasure in the disciplined, systematic collection and analysis of information. Other varieties of history might yet be dismissed as a luxury or worse, as merely a hobby for the antiquarian, but military history was believed to possess certain operationally useful properties. By the nineteenth century, military officers were being chosen to serve as historians as an integral part of the new, evolving general staff culture in the West.

So we can date the appearance of modern official military history with some precision. Professor Jay Luvaas considers Baron Henri Jomini the first official historian, working under Napoleon's patronage. We may suspect, however, that what Napoleon had in mind was his own good standing in the historical afterlife rather than good history *per se*.¹ Captain William Siborne's Waterloo researches during the 1830s, supported by the British Army, falls close to official history, or at least official commemoration. Siborne's mission was to reconstruct in miniature the battle at the height of crisis, not to write a book, although he could not be prevented from doing that as well. He based his reconstruction on the straightforwardly tendentious notion that the winners of a battle knew more about the event than the losers, and in keeping with this notion he wrote letters chiefly to British survivors of the battle—survivors who had outlived the battle itself by an extra fifteen years or so. Later in the century, Siborne's son, who had himself risen to the rank of major general, collected all his father's Waterloo letters and published what is still today one of the most compact, useful sources on the battle.²

Britain's official military histories date from just after the Crimean War. The first project was not very successful and was quite publicly condemned in—of all places—the pages of the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*. The two authors, both army officers who could not disentangle their regimental prejudices from their authorial responsibilities, disliked each other and would not agree about what were the 'major lessons' of the siege of Sebastopol. Alas, now we shall never know.

Official history, as it evolved within the general staff culture, seemed to suit the Prussians and then later the Germans very well indeed. Almost at the outset, their official histories were regarded as having set the gold standard for such enterprises. Other European armies imitated their highly detailed approach and comprehensive scope. Given a choice between comprehensiveness or profundity of thought, the Germans always chose the former and so did their imitators, so that a proper staff history, 'crammed full of facts *and dull*,³ might depict 'a picture of war on a gigantic scale, slowly unrolled before the reader, with all its complex purpose and involved action calmly traced by a master hand'.⁴

The United States' first entry into official military history was inspired by a suggestion during the Civil War from General Henry Halleck, President Lincoln's military advisor, a suggestion that led to the eventual publication of the 128 volumes of *The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*. The whole *Official Records* project spanned nearly forty years, and some sort of official military history work has been underway in the United States ever since.⁵

By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, leading armies had recognised the need for obtaining and analysing operational and tactical data that might be of practical use in future, and military history offered the best means by which these analyses could be conducted. Just at the turn of the century, however, we are seeing other fields beginning to make their first contributions toward the understanding of modern war. Ivan Bloch's six-volume *magnum opus*, arguing the futility of future war by means of innovative, if crude, econometric analyses, posed one of the first direct challenges to history as the best way of viewing war present or war past.⁶ History would persist as the intellectual mode for some time still, however. Great multi-volume official histories of this war were completed by both the Russians and the Japanese, and also by officers from several of the observing armies—the Germans, the French, and the British. The Americans reported their observations to headquarters, but one could not call these reports histories as such.⁷ All these works possessed a kind of Victorian stateliness, proceeding along similar lines from strategic appreciation to operational analysis to tactical exposition, written in the bloodless prose common to the professional's pose at the time.

These histories stand now as the very embodiment of that day's professional military knowledge. Legend around my own staff college has it that General William T. Sherman contributed a number of military works from his own library in order to get our library a good start. But when I arrived, the foundation stones of what is now a magnificent library were these very official histories—the German, French, British and Russian versions of the Russo-Japanese and other recent wars. Given the state of military history in general and official military history in particular, one could not have done better at the time than acquire these works. Strange to say, at the beginning of the twentieth century, military history of the academic sort in the United States had some growing to do. Not until after World War II could it be said that civilian academicians were gaining any ground on either the volume or the quality of military history produced under official auspices.

Official history projects represented a considerable investment in a nation's treasure, but they carried a certain emotional investment too, as when an Austrian officer was removed from the active list because he dared criticise his country's official history of the Austrian campaign of 1849. There was the celebrated case of the German general who challenged a crippled veteran to a duel because the veteran had taken issue in print with the general's official historical work. By the turn of the century, however, official military historical work had transcended these eccentricities by producing books of real and lasting intellectual and professional military value. This audience certainly needs no reminding of the work of C.E.W. Bean during and after the Great War and his important role in shaping Australia's national self-image. So far as can be told, however, no one ever challenged Bean to a duel.⁸

The impulse to commemorate the nation's sacrifice was perhaps the most elementary motive behind all these projects. The record of that sacrifice had to be collected and set down in some useful form. Perhaps behind these tasks lay the understanding that a kind of accounting had to be rendered, not only for posterity but for the society that gave life and sustenance to the army itself. Modern official historians may be forgiven if they lay claim to the ancient fathers of history itself as their intellectual forebears. Motives such as these would not have seemed strange to Thucydides.

So, even though military history, officially committed, has been in operation for rather a long time, in my country one would search university curricula in vain for any mention of it. As far as I know, apart from programs in what is called 'public history'—by which is usually meant foundation, park, museum or memorial work—there are no courses in how the historian might actually practice in an environment that is not strictly academic. The conceit is that if one is up to doing the academic work necessary to stack up letters behind one's name, one is naturally

qualified to practice in all possible environments—academic, institutional, commercial, or official. This is demonstrably not true. Perhaps, then, the academic might deign to pay attention to this matter, because while the craft of official history offers professional challenges unlikely to be encountered elsewhere, it is very poorly understood within the profession itself. I think the following case is very much to this point.

In the spring of 1959, the British military writer B.H. Liddell Hart published an essay in the journal, *Military Affairs*, entitled, 'Responsibility and Judgment in Historical Writing'. He began by describing the several ways a historian might find himself subordinated to a *raison d'être* other than the pursuit of historical truth—the 'scientific' pursuit of historical truth, as he put it.

Standing in the way of truth, he wrote, were 'so many people [who] are compelled to cover up truth, often against their inclination, by the requirements of their jobs'. These were historians who had submitted to what Liddell Hart saw as 'an inevitable condition of service for anyone who is a servant of Government or any other institution: a political party, a religious body, or a commercial firm'. In all such cases, the outcome was predictable: something less than truth, official truth masquerading as truth. Or, the reader was left to infer, official lying.

While Liddell Hart was suspicious of historians with associations of any kind, he reserved his most trenchant remarks for those who worked as official military historians.⁹ He thought it was time to say 'Official History' is a contradiction in terms—the word 'official' tends to qualify, and often cancels out the word 'history'. Furthermore, 'the worst examples of suppression and distortion', he wrote, 'have been in the field of military history—since this has usually been entrusted to, or undertaken by, men who were brought up in a profession where obedience and loyalty to authority are inculcated as the prime virtues'—that is to say, military officers themselves. He did not consider the possibility that an officer's loyalties might actually assist in the discovery of scientific truth.¹⁰

As it happened, Liddell Hart had one particular officer in mind as an example. This was Brigadier J.E. Edmonds, who had been placed in charge of producing the British Army's official military histories of the Great War, and in whom, Liddell Hart wrote, 'the effect is all too strikingly illustrated'. Liddell Hart did not tell his readers, however, that he and Brigadier Edmonds had a long and complex association that dated well back into the 1920s. In those days, before achieving public notice as a military critic with the *Daily Telegraph* and as a military historian in his own right, Liddell Hart saw Edmonds quite often. The relationship was important to Liddell Hart, who, having been medically decommissioned, was then making his start in journalism. It was also important because Edmonds was evidently something of a gossip. Today, journalists might characterise him as 'a source who wishes to remain anonymous'.

And, indeed, Edmonds did have a curious working philosophy. When he met with Liddell Hart, he would reveal information—information of the sort that, today, would be regarded as 'privileged', much as that shared by lawyer and client or doctor and patient—gleaned from his own official work on the history of the Great War. Edmonds clearly delighted in contributing to Liddell Hart's growing disillusionment with the war's generals, and in the 25,000 boxes of documents there was more than enough available to scandalise every meeting with Liddell Hart or anyone else for quite a long time. By the mid 1920s, more and more knowledgeable criticism of the conduct of the war was reaching the general public, very little of it redounding to the credit of the generals. But while Edmonds would tattle about his fellow officers to Liddell Hart and who knows how many others, he would not himself make the juicy bits public. Those who were really in the know, he said, would be able to 'read between the lines' of his *Official History* when it finally did come out.¹¹

No doubt Liddell Hart was flattered to be included among the cognoscenti. Fed horror stories by Edmonds, thoroughly attuned to the critical histories and memoirs that seemed to appear daily, Liddell Hart grew less forgiving of Allied war leaders. In the earlier days of his relationship with Edmonds, Liddell Hart had been rather more forgiving of the generals. That, most assuredly, would change.

By the mid 1920s, Liddell Hart had also formed an intellectual and personal alliance with the formidable J.F.C. Fuller, then Colonel, British Army, and very possibly the only human being Liddell Hart would ever regard as possessing an intellect and military knowledge superior to his own. Of course, Liddell Hart was very much the junior partner at the beginning of this relationship, just after the war. Reading through their earliest correspondence, while Liddell Hart was still on active service as a captain, detailed to write infantry tactical doctrine, one is impressed by his skilful dealings with the prickly Fuller. Liddell Hart's own intellect obviously impressed Fuller and before long the two were corresponding as near equals. I believe it does Liddell Hart no disservice to observe that this was as much because of Fuller's own personality as because of Liddell Hart's brilliance. Fuller was incessantly critical, but for him only ideas seemed to be worth arguing over. He certainly refused to stand on the dignity of his rank alone. When he took up an appointment in 1923 as an instructor at the Staff College at Camberley, he amazed his students (and no doubt scandalised the rest of the faculty) by announcing, 'Nothing clarifies true knowledge like a free exchange of ideas; consequently, because I happen to be a Colonel and you a captain or major, do not imagine for a moment that rank is a bar to free speech'.¹²

Toward the end of his tenure at Camberley, Fuller published *The Foundations of the Science of War*, an eccentric and not particularly successful book which aimed to reduce modern war to a universal principle that might guide the soldier's actions, regardless of where or when those actions might occur. As Fuller would admit later, the book was gratuitously complex, and the reviewers reacted accordingly. An anonymous review in *The Army Quarterly* offered the hope that the young 'might not take it too seriously'. Characteristically, Fuller would not contribute to his own defence. 'I am trying to work out a science of war and not a *vade mecum* for fools', he said. No doubt this mulish behavior only encouraged the critics, one of whom was none other than Brigadier Edmonds himself. In a crushing, ridiculing review for *The Army Quarterly*, Edmonds belittled Fuller's so-called 'universal principle'—a crackbrained, pseudo-mystical fantasy cribbed from his studies of the occult during his younger days in India. What is more amazing is that any part of Fuller's *Foundations* was regarded as worthy of any attention after such a public drubbing. But it did. Even with its defects, *Foundations* is worth anyone's time.¹³

By the late 1920s, Liddell Hart was outgrowing his tutorials with both Fuller and Edmonds. His correspondence, always assertively confident, grew increasingly contentious, as did his journalism and his writing in general. Tolerated by an amazingly forgiving military establishment, Fuller could afford to play the intellectual buccaneer, but Liddell Hart, living by his balance as a man of affairs, had no safety net to catch him if he imitated Fuller too closely. If Liddell Hart was coming to see Edmonds as the 'kept man', that put Liddell Hart somewhere between the two men. No doubt, Liddell Hart fancied himself as having created an environment of his own particular design, free from unwonted influences, one of near clinical purity. In reality, Liddell Hart alternated between these two models, Fuller the eccentric, Edmonds the insider, like a shuttlecock.

By the 1930s, Liddell Hart's relations with both men cooled. His correspondence with Edmonds grew quite adversarial. His judgment of British generalship had grown progressively more critical, so much so that he had alienated any number of his official contacts in the Army. At one point, Liddell Hart wrote bluntly to Edmonds, 'No one has given me clearer evidence of the deficiencies of our higher leaders as individuals than you have, yet you are inclined to pretend that, collectively, they were up to the problem they had to face'. In effect, the two men had switched opinions with one another, with Edmonds then defending, Liddell Hart attacking, Britain's wartime leadership. Of course, Liddell Hart would have said he was right on either side, and Edmonds was wrong. Edmonds was beyond the pale, now. Everything he touched was corrupted or corrupting, and in the process had become for him the very embodiment of the official military historian. Here is Liddell Hart, writing in 1933:

Not a few military historians have admitted that they feel compelled by position, interest or friendship, to put down less than they know to be true. Once a man surrenders to this tendency the truth begins to slip away like water down a wastepipe—until those who want to learn how to conduct war in the future are unknowingly bathing their minds in a shallow bath.¹⁴

Here, as in his *Military Affairs* essay so many years later, Liddell Hart is begging several questions. Being part of an official establishment is not a precondition for self-censorship. Independent or academic historians have shown themselves to be quite capable of withholding all manner of information, even distorting it at times. So can those who work within large institutions. For the better part of fifty years, official military historians produced huge multi-volume studies of the Second World War. Information that has come to light since these were published quite often revises or even overturns the official story. To what degree should these histories be relied upon now? The answer, I think, is quite straightforward: official history is just as vulnerable to corruption or manipulation as any other sort of history.

The historian's environment is no guarantee one way or another of what Liddell Hart would see as 'scientific truth'. Those of us who use history, whether scholar or general reader, should not at any time surrender our own critical faculties. We are the ones Liddell Hart left out of his equation. In the end, it is we who will decide whether the work in our hands has been corrupted. Liddell Hart seems to have imagined that we would give up the privilege of that decision to the historian. Why would he think so?

Liddell Hart insisted on being thought right at all times. A brief examination of his papers, dating from later in his life, reveals a near-obsessive compulsion to argue and re-argue points he had made in books years before. I think this is because Liddell Hart, like Fuller, was essentially an autodidact, unschooled in the exchange of ideas, and therefore much less interested in *explaining* than in *convincing*. There is a very strong polemical element in the work of both men. They consider themselves most successful when there are no more arguments for them to meet, and for Liddell Hart in particular, success had very practical, personal consequences.

Ironically, Liddell Hart's own relationship to 'scientific truth' has come under close examination in recent years. *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, by John Mearsheimer, appeared in 1988, to no small amount of controversy in the United Kingdom. Mearsheimer's thesis was that Liddell Hart conducted a very deliberate campaign to rehabilitate his reputation after the Second World War, and that he did this in no small part by distorting and manipulating the record of his prewar activities.

It is no secret at all that Liddell Hart's dalliance in defence politics before the war led to his being banished from official circles during the war. Very much in keeping with the public opinion in Great Britain at the time, Liddell Hart championed very conservative defence policies while serving as a shadow advisor to Chamberlain's Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha. Liddell Hart's so-called 'limited liability' approach called for reducing Britain's commitment to continental defence to an absolute minimum in order to avoid being dragged into another disastrous war. He was certainly not alone at the time, but after Chamberlain, after Munich, and after May, 1940, he must have felt so.

At some point Liddell Hart had begun to consider himself a man of affairs as much as a man of ideas. His ideas and his writings had brought him greater and greater public attention. Those who were impressed by the workings of his mind and his pen solicited his views on subjects beyond the range of his historical research. Such was Liddell Hart's view of the functions of history that he would have seen these developments as merely the natural outgrowth of his historical work. Both Liddell Hart and Fuller were not unlike other historians of the day who believed that cautionary lessons could be deduced from any historical subject, and that these lessons could be directly and rather literally applied to the present. Both men measured their success at least in part by the degree to which the lessons they promoted were adopted by modern military institutions. This is a self-deception perhaps as old as history itself, and one that makes modern historians shift in their seats. In Liddell Hart's case, the illusion led to his nearly complete eclipse as an influence on British military policy during the war.

For all his confidence and self-assured worldliness, I suspect Liddell Hart had a very incomplete view of what he was getting into when he began to involve himself in contemporary defence policy. He thought he had a storehouse full of lessons; if only

blockheaded officialdom would take heed, the mistakes and miscalculations of the past could be avoided. This was his message to his readers almost from the beginning: the assumption of superior knowledge and the wisdom that was created by its acquisition. I do not think he understood that a subtle change in his relationship to officialdom had occurred. He believed he was applying history. In fact he was applying himself—two very different things. If I seem altogether too completely convinced of this difference, I might add, by way of extenuation, that I have been convinced in quite a direct way.

In the late 1970s, I joined a group inside the US Army's staff college that in many ways would test Liddell Hart's dim view of official history. This group, which came to be called the Combat Studies Institute, had the idea that military historians might be used to investigate the historical and common sense of military doctrines as they were being written, or, perhaps, even before. Our task required us to make ourselves into close students of contemporary foreign and defence issues, including innovations in military technology, in the military thought of other nations, and any other matter of significance to the Army of the present. None of these ambitions could be said to have been very new. As I noted earlier, military history was until the twentieth century the dominating mode by which warfare was analysed, if indeed any analysis was performed at all. Against our background of contemporary knowledge, we argued, our historical knowledge might once more prove itself as a useful means of analysis. I recall there was a great deal of enthusiastic talk at the time about what was called 'historical mindedness', and references to 'the historical mind', just as one might refer to the 'legal mind' or the 'scientific mind'. The thought was that a certain frame of mind was imparted while preparing for a professional life in these other fields, so why not history? Indeed, the employment of military history in this way was very close to what Fuller and Liddell Hart thought they were doing in the interwar period. But there was no doubt, either, that several of us thought our historical souls were in danger. I was fairly certain I would never be admitted to the company of historians ever again.

But, between this small group as I found it in the late 1970s, and Fuller and Liddell Hart's circle between the wars, were several important differences. Fuller and Liddell Hart had an agenda. We had none. While Liddell Hart's mission was *to convince*, ours was to examine. The distinction is critical, and it comes down to how one knows whether one is successful. For Liddell Hart perhaps even more than Fuller, being able to draw a straight line between what he has argued and what has been officially adopted was a matter of paramount importance. By contrast, when we received a problem, we studied it as comprehensively and objectively as possible and forwarded our findings without regard to any official positions then held. To my knowledge, we never asked, nor were we ever told, whether 'the Army' had a position on the question under review. Our attitude was that if our elders and betters did not want to know what we thought, they had better not ask us. Nor did we keep score on ourselves. We understood very well that we were not the only people being asked about these matters. We believed that the worth of what was being done would be evident over the long term.¹⁵

The formation of this group worked a subtle change on official military history as it was practised then. I do not think we quite realised it at the time, but official military history was being 'operationalised', for lack of a better word. We were conducting analyses of contemporary developments with the techniques and standards we had been taught as historians. We were not really in the business of applying history. We were really applying the historians themselves. I think that, in fact, was what Liddell Hart was actually attempting to do when he became entangled in military policy.

I did not really understand this distinction, oddly, until I left the staff college for an operational job at the headquarters of one of our joint commands. No one wanted to be lectured on history there. Things were moving too fast to retire to a classroom. Everyone's judgment was tested daily. In the case of some of my colleagues, the basis of their judgment was long field experience; in others, long experience at the national staff level. The basis of my judgment was a very long memory that was not entirely my own. When the In-Box filled up, only good solutions counted. No one seemed to bother much with how one arrived at them. I discovered that staff work was interdisciplinary. No one mentality would ever be allowed to dominate it. Nor, indeed, should it. But any staff work that occurs without a keen understanding of the historical foundation of the question under the glass is doomed to be stunted, and less useful than it would be otherwise.

When I think of Liddell Hart in such a light, I believe he was asking too much of the history he wrote. When he expected his views to be adopted without cavil he betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding not only of how modern historical knowledge worked, but also of how modern bureaucratic government worked. He expected too direct a correlation between cause and effect, and he expected that the agency of change would always come in the dramatic form of a human being. But all too often, routines and processes determined courses of official action. If the modern official historian means to traffic in this environment, he should not assume that this sort of work in these sorts of places will come to him naturally, or automatically by virtue of his training. It does not.

I had occasion once to talk with an army officer who had served in Whitehall when Liddell Hart was at the zenith of his pseudo-official power. Every few days, he said, Basil would call up on the telephone, full of enthusiasm for this or that scheme, and go on at length. It was only necessary for the officer to reply occasionally, 'yes', or 'Hmm', 'I see', or 'most impressive'. Then, having extinguished his enthusiasm, Liddell Hart would ring off. He always had something interesting to say, recalled this officer, but it was always rather remote from what he saw on his desk. When I asked him if he could remember just one thing from those conversations, he said no, he couldn't.

Years ago, C.P. Snow, later Lord Snow, wrote what I think must be the best description, drawn from his own long experience, of how policy is advanced in modern government. 'One saw policy', Snow wrote, 'shaped under one's eyes by a series of small decisions. (In fact, it was rare for policy to be clearly thought out, though some romantics or worshippers of "great men" liked to think so. Usually it built itself from a thousand small arrangements, ideas, compromises, bits of give-and-take. There was not much which was decisively changed by a human will.)'¹⁶

In his *Military Affairs* article, Liddell Hart writes of the historian's responsibility toward his craft, and no historian would disagree. But I believe the military historian has an additional responsibility, one that does not much trouble the social historian or the medieval historian or the ancient historian. Military history distinguishes itself by the very intimate connection between thought and action. There is always the very real possibility that someone will actually be influenced by what one has written, and indeed that was what both Liddell Hart and Fuller wanted when both were at the height of their powers. But the exercise of influence is no proof of having achieved historical truth. Liddell Hart says nothing about his responsibility to those who listened to him or read his work and accepted its findings. A keen appreciation of that responsibility might well have encouraged a good deal more moderation on his part, just when he needed it the most.

Perhaps if Liddell Hart were with us today he would reconsider his position. He would see, I hope, that the practice of military history, whether in official or academic venues, has changed considerably in the last quarter-century, and that we have learned (or remembered) a great deal about how to win for history the esteem it deserves and we need. Those of us who have been involved in these changes hope they are for the better, but we do not know for sure. Perhaps after a thousand small arrangements, ideas, compromises, bits of give and take, we will know how wrong we are.

Endnotes

1. Jay Luvaas, 'The First British Official Historians', *Military Affairs* 26 (Summer, 1962); 49-58.
2. William Siborne, *History of the Waterloo Campaign* (London: Greenhill, 1990; orig. T & W Boone, 1848), and Herbert T. Siborne (ed.), *Waterloo Letters* (London: Cassell, 1891). See also John Keegan on Siborne and his contribution in *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 120.
3. Luvaas, 'The First British Official Historians', 51. The characterisation is Luvaas's, and no one could disagree.
4. Ibid.
5. No history or official historical work in the United States has ever been published, but a widely available bound typescript, written by Stetson Conn, is a very good general view. Stetson Conn, 'Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954' (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1980).
6. Only a summary volume has been translated to English from the original Russian: Ivan de Bloch, *The Future of War in its technical, economic and political relations*, translated by R. C. Long, and with a Conversation with the Author by W T Stead, and an Introduction by Edwin D. Mead (Boston: The World Peace Foundation, 1914). See also Michael Howard, 'Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 51-526, for a view of Bloch in context.
7. US War Department, Military Intelligence Division, *Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War*, 4 vols (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1906). See also John T. Greenwood, 'The US Army Military Observers with the Japanese During the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905', *Army History* (Winter, 1996).
8. Luvaas, 'The First British Official Historians', 58.
9. As we shall see, Liddell Hart had been making this complaint for some time.
10. B H Liddell Hart, 'Responsibility and Judgment in Historical Writing', *Military Affairs* 23: 1(Spring, 1959). 35-36.
11. See David French, 'Official But Not History'? Sir James Edmonds and the Official History of the Great War', *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies* 131 (March, 1986): 58-63. See also John Mearsheimer, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988): 56-74 contains a very valuable discussion on the evolution of Liddell Hart's judgments.
12. These remarks are based on my own reading of the Fuller-Liddell Hart correspondence at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London. Fuller's remarks before his staff college students are recorded in Brian Holden Reid's *J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987), 83.
13. Holden Reid, Fuller, 81-7.
14. Mearsheimer, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, 1 (facing).
15. I have written about this period elsewhere. See 'War History and the History Wars: Establishing the Combat Studies Institute', *The Public Historian* 10:4 (Fall, 1988), 65-81. However, Dr Brooks Kleber, at the time the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's command historian, was the author of the phrase, 'historical mindedness'.
16. C.P. Snow, 'The Light and the Dark', in *Strangers and Brothers* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1972), 244.